United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 21-1631

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ADILSON TEIXEIRA,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Kayatta, Selya, and Gelpí,

Circuit Judges.

Gregory M. Lipper and LeGrand Law PLLC on brief for appellant.

Rachael S. Rollins, United States Attorney, and Randall E. 

Kromm, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee. 

March 10, 2023
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. This appeal poses a vexing

question as to the extent to which a judge may factor his personal 

knowledge of a subject into the decisional calculus. Concluding, 

as we do, that the court below did not stray into forbidden terrain 

in this regard and that the record is otherwise free from

reversible error, we affirm the judgment below. 

I

We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the 

case. In November of 2016, defendant-appellant Adilson Teixeira 

pleaded guilty to drug-trafficking and firearms charges. See 21 

U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On February 2, 

2017, the district court sentenced Teixeira to a forty-one-month 

term of incarceration to be followed by a three-year term of 

supervised release.

Teixeira served his prison sentence and was released in 

April of 2019. His supervised release term proved to be 

tumultuous: the first two years included a series of violations, 

revocation hearings, and consequent modifications of the term. 

The district court found that Teixeira had violated the conditions 

of his supervised release by, among other things, associating with 

persons involved in criminal activity, using a controlled 

substance, and committing a crime (operating a motor vehicle with 

a suspended license). The upshot was that Teixeira began serving 

a new term of supervised release on March 19, 2021.
- 3 -

Past proved to be prologue, and on July 1, 2021, a 

preliminary revocation hearing was held before a magistrate judge 

to address a new complement of alleged violations. The government 

asserted that Teixeira had failed a drug test, had failed to 

participate in a substance abuse counselling program, had

possessed a firearm, and had committed a crime by possessing a 

firearm as a convicted felon. Following this hearing, the 

magistrate judge ordered Teixeira detained.

The district court held a final revocation hearing on 

August 10, 2021. Teixeira did not dispute the two drug-related 

violations, conceding that he had failed a drug test and had failed 

to take part in a drug counselling program. But he disputed the 

charges that he had possessed a firearm.1

At the hearing, the government called a probation 

officer, Julianne Robinson, as a witness. Robinson testified that 

she had received two recordings of Snapchat videos2 from the 

Taunton, Massachusetts police department, one depicting Teixeira 

in a music studio holding what appeared to be a firearm and the 

other depicting Teixeira driving a vehicle with what appeared to 

1 The firearms offenses were classified as Grade A violations

of supervised release, which are the most serious. See USSG 

§7B1.1(a)(1).

 

2 Snapchat is a social media app through which users can send 

or post images or videos that disappear either after a recipient 

views them or after a certain period of time has elapsed.
- 4 -

be a firearm in his lap. In the second video, a man — later 

identified as James Martin — was sitting in the front passenger 

seat. Martin was a friend of Teixeira's who had a side business 

involving the production of music videos.

The government then called special agent Patrick Briody, 

a ten-year veteran of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives. When asked about the music studio video, 

Briody explained that he "saw what appeared to be possibly a Glock 

pistol with an extended magazine in it, having the characteristics 

of what I recognize to be a firearm." He said that the gun in the 

video appeared to be a Glock 26 and expounded on the particular

characteristics of Glock 26 pistols. With respect to the vehicle 

video, he testified that "[s]imilarly, . . . the item [seen on

Teixeira's lap] had characteristics consistent with what would be 

a firearm." Briody went on to explain that, after reviewing the 

videos, he interviewed Martin, who told him that the weapon 

Teixeira was holding in the vehicle video was one of Martin's three 

prop guns. Martin later provided Briody with two of his prop guns 

but could not produce the third. Briody testified that the two 

prop guns that Martin showed him were not the guns depicted in the 

videos. 

On cross examination, Briody was presented with two 

photographs. Although it is not entirely clear from the record, 

these photographs seem to have been photographs of Martin's third 
- 5 -

prop gun, with one of the photographs depicting the weapon with an 

extended magazine. Briody examined the first photograph and stated 

that he "would say that could be a firearm" but "it could be a 

replica." It was, however, "definitely different" than the weapon

depicted in the music studio video and "would appear to be 

different" than the weapon depicted in the vehicle video. He also 

testified that the gun shown in the second photograph was 

inconsistent with the characteristics of the guns depicted in the 

videos. 

To buttress its case, the government presented an 

affidavit from Briody that had been executed in support of an 

application for a warrant to search Teixeira's cellphone. Briody 

testified that the search related to a separate investigation into 

firearms trafficking between Ohio and Massachusetts. The 

affidavit relied on electronic communications (text messages) 

between Teixeira and an alleged co-conspirator, which appeared to 

discuss the trafficking of firearms. The affidavit also included 

the summary of an interview that Briody had conducted with a man 

in Ohio labelled K.M., who the affidavit stated had admitted to 

purchasing firearms in Ohio for resale by the co-conspirator in 

Massachusetts. And in addition, the affidavit described the 
- 6 -

movement of funds by means of Cash App3 between Teixeira and the 

co-conspirator and between Teixeira and K.M. 

Teixeira's counsel objected to the admission of the 

affidavit on the ground that it included "communications from text 

messages from another phone from another gentleman who apparently

is a cooperator or a coconspirator" and "interviews with a 

gentleman in Ohio who's not before the Court." In counsel's view, 

the affidavit "contain[ed] hearsay evidence," and counsel 

complained that he could not "cross-examine an affidavit. Under 

Rule 32.1, I'm entitled to inquire into adverse witnesses." The 

court responded that "[t]he confrontation clause doesn't apply in 

a probation violation hearing," overruled the objection, and 

admitted the affidavit. Although Teixeira's counsel crossexamined Briody, he did not elicit any testimony from him 

concerning the Ohio investigation.

In his defense, Teixeira called Martin, who testified 

that he had produced the Snapchat videos. He asserted that the 

guns depicted in the videos were props. 

The district court concluded that the government had 

shown by a preponderance of the evidence that at least one of the 

weapons depicted in the videos was a real firearm and that,

3 Cash App is a mobile app for peer-to-peer money transfers. 
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therefore, Teixeira had violated the conditions of his supervised 

release:

I am convinced, and here I am relying 

principally on the agent's opinion, especially 

with respect to the Glock 26. Perhaps I 

shouldn't know this, but I am a firearm[s]

owner, and I actually know these guns pretty 

well; and that is a Glock 26 in my judgment, 

at least by a preponderance of the evidence, 

as I understand my own opinion being 

corroborated and relying on the agent's 

testimony. I do credit it, and, therefore, I 

do find that there is a violation of 

conditions, and I'm going to revoke supervised 

release.

Having made this determination, the court sentenced

Teixeira to a two-year term of imprisonment. This timely appeal 

followed. 

II

A district court may revoke a term of supervised release 

if the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the releasee violated a release condition. See United States v. 

Colón-Maldonado, 953 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2020); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in

revocation proceedings, but the evidence presented must be 

reliable. See United States v. Portalla, 985 F.2d 621, 622 (1st 

Cir. 1993). 

Teixeira's claims of error all relate to the district 

court's determination that the government proved, by a
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preponderance of the evidence, that he possessed a firearm (in 

violation of conditions of his supervised release). Teixeira

challenges the judge's reference to his (the judge's) knowledge of 

firearms, the admission of the affidavit, and whether the violation 

was shown by a preponderance of the evidence. We consider these 

interrelated claims sequentially, mindful that the district 

court's determination rested upon a finding that the videos showed 

Teixeira handling one or more real firearms. 

III

Teixeira's most loudly bruited claim is that the 

district court's reference to its own familiarity with firearms 

during its ruling at the conclusion of the revocation hearing was 

in error. We divide our discussion of this claim into two parts.

A

Our starting point is the standard of review. Preserved 

claims of error arising out of a judge's handling of revocation 

proceedings are typically reviewed for abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Mulero-Díaz, 812 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2016). 

Here, however, the government insists that Teixeira's failure to 

object to the district court's statements below relegates this 

claim of error to plain error review.4 Teixeira responds that he 

4 Review for plain error is a "heavy burden." United States

v. Correia, 55 F.4th 12, 41 (1st Cir. 2022). Under that standard, 

the appellant must prove "(1) that an error occurred (2) which was 

clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's 
- 9 -

had no meaningful opportunity to object to the district court's 

statements, which were made at the conclusion of the revocation 

hearing as part of the court's oral decision. 

When a party fails to make a contemporaneous objection 

below, a counterpart claim of error is ordinarily subject to plain 

error review on appeal. See United States v. Franklin, 51 F.4th 

391, 400 (1st Cir. 2022). But that rule is not absolute. If a 

party did not have a fair opportunity to object to a particular 

ruling below, a counterpart claim of error is not relegated to 

plain error review. See, e.g., United States v. Mojica-Rivera,

435 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 2006); Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b). For an

opportunity to object to be sufficient, it "must have arisen prior 

to the trial court's entry of judgment." United States v. 

Rodriguez, 919 F.3d 629, 634 (1st Cir. 2019). The "mere 

possibility that an aggrieved party might be able to file a motion 

for reconsideration is not the functional equivalent of the 

opportunity to object." Id.

In this instance, the district court did not refer to 

its own knowledge of firearms until the conclusion of the hearing 

when it was rendering a bench decision. Teixeira had no reason to 

anticipate that such a statement would be forthcoming. And once 

substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United 

States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001).
- 10 -

its bench decision was announced, the court immediately shifted 

gears and went on to a different phase of the proceeding (the 

sentence to be imposed). The hearing ended soon thereafter.

Taking a practical view of the circumstances, we 

conclude that Teixeira did not have a fair opportunity to object, 

on the spot, to the judge's allusion to his personal knowledge of 

firearms. When making his ruling that a violation had occurred, 

the judge did not invite comments from the lawyers but, rather, 

proceeded immediately to the separate question of the sentence to 

be imposed. Interrupting a judge in mid-stride is risky business 

for a lawyer, and Teixeira's counsel was caught between a rock and 

a hard place. We hold, therefore, that Teixeira's claim of error 

is not relegated to plain error review. Our review, instead, is 

for abuse of discretion.

B

We turn next to the merits. We start by acknowledging 

that a judge presiding over a revocation hearing must act in two 

roles when deciding whether a violation has occurred: the judge 

must be both an "unbiased neutral arbiter[]" and a factfinder. 

United States v. Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2014). 

In neither of these capacities is it permissible for a judge to 

undertake his own extrajudicial investigation of the facts. A 

judge may not, for example, unilaterally reach out to witnesses,

make an ex parte trip to view the scene of the dispute, or undertake 
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his own fact-gathering outside of court. See Lillie v. United 

States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1189-90 (10th Cir. 1992); see also State v. 

Malone, 963 N.W.2d 453, 464-65 (Minn. 2021); State v. Baker, 667 

P.2d 416, 418 (Mont. 1983). So, too — apart from facts susceptible 

to judicial notice, see Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) — it is impermissible 

for a judge to consider evidence that has not been introduced. 

See United States v. Berber-Tinoco, 510 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 

2007); Fox v. City of W. Palm Beach, 383 F.2d 189, 194-95 (5th 

Cir. 1967); cf. Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 51-52 (2014) 

(discussing types of knowledge that jury may not consider when 

finding facts). If a judge oversteps these bounds, the judge, in 

effect, impermissibly assumes the role either of a witness, see

United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 158 (1st Cir. 1989), or of 

an advocate.

The rule, though, is more easily stated than applied. 

After all, it is always permissible for a judge, acting in his 

capacity as a factfinder, to use his knowledge and experience to

assess the credibility of witnesses and to evaluate the evidence. 

See Hersch v. United States, 719 F.2d 873, 878 (6th Cir. 1983). 

But applying one's knowledge in assessing whether a fact is 

adequately proven is not the same as introducing a new fact into 

evidence. Just as jurors may permissibly rely on their knowledge 

and experience to evaluate evidence, see United States v. Ortiz,

966 F.2d 707, 712 (1st Cir. 1992), so may a judge.
- 12 -

Here, Teixeira labors to portray the district judge as 

having strayed into forbidden terrain. He characterizes the 

judge's statements as "relying on personal evidence" from 

"personal observations about his own, private gun collection" and 

"comparing his own firearms to the objects depicted in the 

video[s]." Those actions, Teixeira complains, "flouted settled 

limits on judges' ability to rely on their own evidence or 

investigation." 

We reject Teixeira's plaint. A judge, sitting as a 

factfinder, is allowed — indeed, obliged — to bring to bear his 

own knowledge and experience in evaluating the evidence admitted 

in the case. See Hersch, 719 F.2d at 878. There is nothing in 

the record to suggest that the judge in this case exceeded the 

bounds of that authority. Fairly read, the record belies 

Teixeira's assertion that the judge relied upon "a specific 

comparison based on evidence not shared with the parties." Nor is 

there anything to suggest that the judge either conducted an 

independent investigation into facts pertinent to the case or 

introduced any new evidence into the decisional calculus. The 

judge — in his own words — "rel[ied] principally on the agent's 

opinion" in reaching the conclusion that at least one of the guns 

was real. We find nothing amiss in the fact that the judge's 

personal knowledge and experience informed his assessment of the 
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evidence and — as the judge stated — "corroborated" his decision 

to credit Briody's testimony.

Teixeira rejoins that our opinion in Chart House, Inc.

v. Bornstein, 636 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1980), demands a contrary 

result. We disagree.

In that case, the district court denied a preliminary 

injunction sought by the holder of a registered service mark

seeking to enjoin another business's use of a similar name. See

id. at 10. The court had been presented with detailed evidence 

tending to show intent to sow confusion, but concluded summarily 

that there was "little likelihood of confusion between the two 

establishments." Id. We reversed, explaining that the district 

court had failed to make any adequate or accurate findings as to 

the evidence. See id. at 10-11.

At the same time, we "note[d] our concern" regarding the 

judge's commentary during the hearing, in which he extemporized: 

"I don't know how many times I drove by [the defendant's business], 

and I was never tempted to stop — . . . . It struck me as one of 

those selfcontained apartment units . . . ." Id. at 10, 11 n.4

(alterations in original). We expressed our disapproval, stating

that for a trial court "to interject its personal evidentiary 

observations is against basic principles" and that, in any event, 

its personal conclusions contradicted the record evidence. Id. at 

10-11, 11 n.4. 
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Teixeira argues that the district court's conduct in 

this case rests on an even more porous foundation: the district 

court's observations in Chart House, the argument goes, were at 

least based on its perusal of public roads, rather than a private 

collection of firearms. See id. at 10. Teixeira's argument, 

however, glosses over a critical distinction between Chart House

and the case at hand. In Chart House, the court had gained specific 

extrajudicial knowledge of the evidence by independent 

investigation (driving by the defendant's business) and used that 

information to assess the likelihood of confusion. See id. Here, 

by contrast, it is clear from the district judge's statements that 

he undertook no independent investigation but, rather, simply 

applied his previously acquired knowledge of a particular subject 

to the case before him. Put another way, the judge did no more 

than use his own background knowledge and experience to assess the 

evidence introduced in the case. That was the judge's job, and we

discern no abuse of the district judge's discretion in his 

statements regarding his knowledge of firearms. 

IV

Teixeira next assails the admission of Briody's 

affidavit, which incorporated text messages between Teixeira and 

an alleged co-conspirator and a summary of Briody's interview with 

K.M. Teixeira submits that the admission of the affidavit abridged 

his rights of confrontation and due process. See U.S. Const. 
- 15 -

amends. V, VI. Relatedly, Teixeira asserts that the district court

abused its discretion in admitting the affidavit without 

conducting the balancing required by Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C). Had this balancing been conducted, he 

submits, the affidavit would have been excluded. 

A

We start with Teixeira's constitutional claims. His 

principal plaint — that his right to confrontation was abridged —

implicates the Sixth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. 

Because the district court treated Teixeira's argument as 

referring to the Sixth Amendment, we treat this claim as preserved. 

Cf. United States v. Rivera-Berríos, 968 F.3d 130, 134 (1st Cir. 

2020) (explaining that to preserve a claim of error, "[i]t is 

enough if the objection is 'sufficiently specific to call the 

district court's attention to the asserted error'" (quoting United 

States v. Soto-Soto, 855 F.3d 445, 448 n.1 (1st Cir. 2017))). Our 

review, therefore, is de novo. See United States v. Rondeau, 430 

F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir. 2005).

Even so, we need not linger long over Teixeira's claim. 

The short answer to it is that a releasee does not have a Sixth 

Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses during revocation 

proceedings. See Franklin, 51 F.4th at 396. Instead, a more 

limited confrontation right applies during revocation proceedings 

through the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Fed. R. Crim. 
- 16 -

P. 32.1(b)(2)(C); see also Rodriguez, 919 F.3d at 635. Teixeira 

invites us to reconsider this legal framework in light of the 

Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 

(2004). We decline this invitation. Given the special nature of 

revocation proceedings, see, e.g., Rondeau, 430 F.3d at 47, there 

is no reason to think that a long line of precedents developed 

over time should be discarded now. No other court has extended 

Crawford to revocation proceedings, see, e.g., Rondeau, 430 F.3d 

at 47-48, and we see no principled basis for us to blaze a new 

trail. 

Teixeira also hints at a Fifth Amendment claim for denial 

of due process. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). 

This claim, though mentioned, is undeveloped and unaccompanied by 

pertinent authority. It is the "settled appellate rule that issues 

adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort 

at developed argumentation, are deemed waived." United States v. 

Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). So it is here. 

B

This leaves Teixeira's claim under Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(C). In revocation proceedings, 

releasees have a limited right of confrontation, see Rodriguez, 

919 F.3d at 635, under which a releasee does not have a right to 

question a witness against him if "the court determines that the 

interest of justice does not require the witness to appear," Fed. 
- 17 -

R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C); see United States v. Fontanez, 845 F.3d 

439, 443 (1st Cir. 2017). To determine whether the interests of 

justice require a particular witness to appear, the court must 

"balance 'the releasee's right to confront witnesses with the 

government's good cause for denying confrontation.'" United 

States v. Marino, 833 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Rondeau, 

430 F.3d at 48). In this process, the court should "weigh both 

the apparent reliability of the hearsay evidence and the 

government's proffered reason for not producing the declarant." 

Rodriguez, 919 F.3d at 635 (quoting Fontanez, 845 F.3d at 443).

Teixeira contends that the admission of the affidavit 

transgressed the strictures of Rule 32.1. Because this contention 

was made below, our review ordinarily would be for abuse of 

discretion. See Rondeau, 430 F.3d at 48. Under that multi-faceted

standard, "we examine the district court's legal conclusions de 

novo, its findings of fact for clear error, and its judgment calls 

with considerable deference." Franklin, 51 F.4th at 396. 

But here, there is a rub. The record makes manifest 

that the district court did not explicitly undertake the balancing 

that Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) contemplates with regard to the statements 

within Briody's affidavit. Teixeira maintains that the court's 

failure explicitly to perform this balancing is reversible error 

in itself. The government responds that the district court was 

not required to subject the text messages to balancing because 
- 18 -

they are not hearsay and that the court's failure to undertake an 

explicit balancing with respect to K.M.'s statements was in any 

event harmless error. We address these two types of evidence 

separately.

1

We first address the text messages between Teixeira and 

the alleged co-conspirator. The government argues convincingly

that these text messages fall within either or both of two hearsay 

exclusions: statements of a party opponent and/or statements not 

offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d)(2)(A), (c)(2). 

This court has not yet determined whether a third-party 

statement that falls under a hearsay exclusion must be subjected 

to Rule 32.1 balancing. But common sense instructs — and the few 

cases to have considered the issue confirm — that a practice 

crafted to evaluate the admissibility of hearsay evidence should 

not be applied to evidence that is not hearsay. See, e.g., United 

States v. Falls, 960 F.3d 442, 445 (7th Cir. 2020); cf. United 

States v. Walter, 434 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that 

Confrontation Clause is not implicated in circumstances involving 

non-hearsay evidence). We therefore hold that a third-party 

statement that falls within a hearsay exclusion need not be 
- 19 -

subjected to Rule 32.1 balancing prior to its admission in a 

revocation hearing.5

In the case at hand, the text messages from Teixeira are 

not subject to balancing because they are statements of a party 

opponent. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A); see also Walter, 434 

F.3d at 34. The text messages of the alleged co-conspirator are 

also exempt from balancing under Rule 32.1: those messages were 

not offered for their truth but, rather, to provide context for 

Teixeira's messages. As such, they are not hearsay evidence. See

United States v. Pena, 24 F.4th 46, 61 (1st Cir. 2022); see also

Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2).

That ends this aspect of the matter. We conclude that

the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to 

conduct an explicit Rule 32.1 balancing with respect to the text 

messages. 

5 We note that there is disagreement among the circuits as to 

whether a finding that a proffered statement falls within a hearsay 

exception — as opposed to an exclusion — renders Rule 32.1 

balancing unnecessary. Compare Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 599 

F.3d 984, 988-90 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that Rule 32.1 balancing 

is required if statement falls within established hearsay 

exception), with United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332, 343-44 

(2d Cir. 2004) (holding that Rule 32.1 balancing is "inapplicable" 

if statement falls within established hearsay exception), 

abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 

220 (2005). We have not yet spoken to the issue, and we have no 

occasion to do so today. 
- 20 -

2

We turn next to K.M.'s statements (included within the 

affidavit), which the parties seem to agree were subject to Rule 

32.1 balancing. To begin, we hold that the district court's 

failure to make an explicit finding as to the balancing required 

by Rule 32.1 is not per se reversible error. See United States v. 

Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332, 343 (2d Cir. 2004), abrogated on other 

grounds by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also

Franklin, 51 F.4th at 401. When — as in this case — the district 

court fails to make an explicit finding with respect to Rule 32.1 

balancing and admits the third-party statements anyway, we first 

ask whether the record may fairly be read to show that the court 

implicitly performed such a balancing. See Franklin, 51 F.4th at 

401. If the answer to that first question is in the affirmative, 

we then review the decision to admit the statements under the

customary abuse-of-discretion standard. See Marino, 833 F.3d at 

7. But if the answer is in the negative, we must find error and 

proceed to conduct a harmless-error analysis. See United States

v. Cintrón-Ortiz, 34 F.4th 121, 125 (1st Cir. 2022). 

In this instance, it is not immediately apparent whether 

the court below undertook an implicit Rule 32.1 balancing with 

respect to K.M.'s statements. Here, however, we can leave that 

question unresolved and assume, favorably to Teixeira, that the 

court did not implicitly perform such a balancing. Even so — as 
- 21 -

we shall explain — its error was harmless. We thus turn directly 

to that inquiry — an inquiry that requires us to "weigh both the 

apparent reliability of the hearsay evidence and the government's 

proffered reason for not producing the declarant." Rodriguez, 919 

F.3d at 635 (quoting Fontanez, 845 F.3d at 443).

To start, K.M.'s statements are characterized by 

compelling indicia of reliability. Importantly, the statements 

were given in the context of an interview with a federal agent and 

implicated K.M. in illegal arms trafficking. The fact that the 

statements were against K.M.'s interest is strongly suggestive of 

their reliability. See United States v. Mosley, 759 F.3d 664, 668 

(7th Cir. 2014). What is more, K.M.'s account is consistent with 

the text messages about plans for obtaining firearms in Ohio for 

resale in Massachusetts and the Cash App charges. Consistency of 

the challenged statements with other evidence supports a finding 

of reliability. See Fontanez, 845 F.3d at 443; see also Rondeau, 

430 F.3d at 48-49.

Teixeira struggles to throw shade on the reliability of 

K.M.'s statements. He claims, in a conclusory fashion, that search 

warrant affidavits are "prone to error" and, thus, inherently 

unreliable. This generalization, though, is of dubious force. 

Shaming search warrant affidavits on a categorical basis is no 

more persuasive than arguing, say, that all police officers are 

liars or that all criminal defendants are inherently incredible 
- 22 -

witnesses. Each search warrant affidavit is distinctive and —

like any other affidavit — must be judged on its own merits.

Next, Teixeira points out that the Ohio investigation 

never resulted in charges against him. We agree, generally, that 

reliance on allegations of uncharged conduct cannot take the 

government very far. Here, however, the government did not rely 

on the mere fact of the investigation to imply that Teixeira was 

guilty of arms trafficking. Rather, the government relied on the 

communications described in the affidavit to show that Teixeira

was communicating with others about buying firearms, making it 

more likely that the items depicted in the videos and photographs 

were real guns. Seen in this light, those communications were 

relevant, as circumstantial evidence, to the gravamen of the 

revocation proceedings even though the investigation did not 

result in substantive-offense charges against Teixeira. Whether 

or not Teixeira's activities were unlawful was beside the point. 

Of course, we also must examine the other component of 

the balancing test: the government's reason or reasons for not 

producing the declarant. See Rodriguez, 919 F.3d at 635. Teixeira 

notes that the government never expressly articulated any reason 

for not producing K.M. But this is thin gruel: the reasons are

apparent.

First and foremost, the unchallenged evidence shows that 

K.M. resides in Ohio. The logistical problems in hauling an Ohio 
- 23 -

resident to Massachusetts for a revocation hearing require no 

elaboration. As we have said, "'the difficulty and expense of 

procuring witnesses from perhaps thousands of miles away' is a 

paradigmatic example of the type of situation that might call for 

the admission of hearsay evidence at a revocation proceeding." 

Marino, 833 F.3d at 5 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 

782 n.5 (1973)); see also Fontanez, 845 F.3d at 444. Here, 

moreover, there is a second equally obvious reason: the government 

may well be reluctant to call as a witness in a revocation 

proceeding a gun dealer who has been cooperating with it in an 

arms-trafficking investigation.

The bottom line is that the evidence in the affidavit

was reliable and there were good reasons why the government did 

not call K.M. to testify in person. Given these conclusions, we 

hold — with a high degree of confidence — that the failure 

explicitly to conduct the required Rule 32.1 balancing was, at 

worst, harmless error. See United States v. Sasso, 698 F.3d 25, 

29 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining that — for trial errors that are 

not of constitutional magnitude — the harmless-error standard 

"allows a conviction to stand, error notwithstanding, as long as 

it can be said 'with fair assurance, after pondering all that 

happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, 

that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error'" 

(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946))). 
- 24 -

C

We add a coda. Although we have upheld the revocation 

order in this case despite the district court's failure to make 

the explicit balancing determination that Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) 

contemplates, we do not gainsay the importance of such explicit 

determinations. We urge the district courts — when presiding over 

revocation proceedings — to take care to make explicit balancing 

determinations.

V

Teixeira's final claim proceeds along two strands: that 

the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous and 

that the government has not carried its burden of demonstrating

the firearms violation by a preponderance of the evidence. These 

strands are inextricably intertwined, and we treat them as a single 

claim of error. 

We review a district court's decision to revoke 

supervised release for abuse of discretion and the "underlying 

finding of a violation of supervised release for clear error." 

United States v. Wright, 812 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2016). A

determination that a district court committed clear error requires 

that, "on the whole of the record, we form a strong, unyielding 

belief that a mistake has been made." Franklin, 51 F.4th at 399 

(quoting United States v. Padilla-Galarza, 990 F.3d 60, 73 (1st 

Cir. 2021)). In this review, we are constrained to interpret the 
- 25 -

evidence in the light most hospitable to the disputed finding and

to recognize that "credibility is largely a matter for the factfinder." United States v. Oquendo-Rivera, 586 F.3d 63, 67 (1st 

Cir. 2009).

We discern no clear error in the district court's factual 

findings. The court made pellucid that it was "relying principally 

on the agent's opinion." In that testimony, Briody affirmed that 

both weapons shown in the videos had characteristics that he 

recognized as consistent with those of real firearms. Moreover, 

he furnished detailed descriptions comparing the depicted firearms

with real firearms. The decision to credit Briody's testimony was 

quintessentially a decision for the factfinder, see id., and the 

court did not clearly err in crediting Briody's testimony.

Teixeira suggests that the district court "misstated" 

Briody's testimony with respect to whether the guns were real. 

But any equivocation on Briody's part was (as has been said of 

beauty) more in the eye of the beholder: although Briody admitted

that discerning whether a firearm is real or fake from a photograph

or video is "difficult," he stated that he saw, in the music studio 

video, an item that had "the characteristics of what I recognize 

to be a firearm." So, too, Briody vouchsafed that, in the vehicle 

video, "the item had characteristics consistent with what would be 

a firearm." 
- 26 -

We add, moreover, that Briody's testimony included not 

just his assessment of the video evidence but also his description 

of his interviews with Martin and his attempts to obtain Martin's 

prop guns. Briody testified that Martin was unable to produce any 

prop guns that resembled the guns featured in the videos. Briody's 

testimony in this regard was unequivocal: none of the three prop

guns that Martin provided — two examined on the spot by Briody and 

one depicted in a photograph introduced at the hearing — were the 

same as the guns shown in the videos. 

To conclude that a supervised release violation has 

occurred, "the district court need not point to direct evidence 

but, rather, may rely on reasonable inferences drawn from the 

evidence." Rodriguez, 919 F.3d at 637. "The inferences so drawn 

'need not be compelled but, rather, need only be plausible.'" Id.

(quoting United States v. Nuñez, 852 F.3d 141, 146 (1st Cir. 

2017)). Nor is it clear error to discredit an alternative 

explanation which is lacking in evidentiary support or otherwise 

unpersuasive. See United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51, 55 (1st 

Cir. 1993).

The upshot is that the government supplied evidence from 

which reasonable inferences could be drawn that one or more of the 

weapons depicted in the videos was real. We cannot say that the 

court clearly erred either in crediting that evidence or in 
- 27 -

crediting an expert who testified that he believed the firearms in 

the videos were real guns based on a detailed comparison. 

Teixeira resists this conclusion. He argues that the 

court erred in "overlooking other factors reinforcing the lack of 

basis to determine whether the purported firearm was a real 

firearm." Chief among these factors, Teixeira says, is the 

government's failure to produce or inspect the firearms depicted

in the videos. 

This argument will not wash. The court did not clearly

err in relying on video evidence and expert testimony to reach its 

conclusion despite the absence of the actual guns. See Franklin, 

51 F.4th at 398 (holding that government's failure to introduce 

specific type of substantiating evidence "does not diminish the 

force of the corroboration that is present"); see also United 

States v. Viloria-Sepulveda, 921 F.3d 5, 9-10 (1st Cir. 2019) 

(finding no error in district court's reliance on photographs of 

firearms to support upwardly variant sentence). And to cinch the 

matter, we have no reason to believe that the government's failure 

to produce the particular firearms shown in the videos was

overlooked by the district court. The fact that the court did not 

address that factor specifically in its ruling does not mean that 

the court ignored it; it instead may mean that the court considered

it and concluded that it was unpersuasive. A district court need 

not articulate its conclusions as to every jot and tittle of 
- 28 -

evidence in making a determination as to a supervised release 

violation, and the fact that the court did not do so here cannot 

compel a finding of clear error. 

VI

We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above, 

the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.