NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE 

## A RIZONA 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEALS D IVISION O NE

RAQUEL D.
, Appellant
,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY , PRISCILLA K.
, O . D.
, Appellee s

.
No. 1 CA

- JV 14

- 0029

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. JD21417 The Honorable Joa n M. Sinclair Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL
Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa By Suzanne W. Sanchez Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office
, Phoenix By Michael Valenzuela C ounsel for AppelleeRAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

2 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding J udge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

J O N E S
, Judge:

¶1 Mother, Raquel D., appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child
, O

. 1 For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. DCS Involvement

¶2 Raquel is the mother of O

. , who was born in April 2011. Prior to the birth of O

. , DCS 2 became involved with Mother due to her history of substance abuse that resulted in the birth of two substance exposed newborns. Although DCS offered Mother programs to address her substance abuse issues, Mother did not participate in the services.

¶3 In December 2011, Mother t ook eight month old O

. to a hospital where the infant was diagnosed with a fracture of her right tibi a

. Given DCS ’ prior involvement with Mother, DCS required her to undergo a drug test in January 2012, which returned a positive result. After Mother changed her story several times about how the infant injur ed her leg, and given the positive drug test result, DCS took custody of O

. , and later placed the infant in the care of a maternal aunt.

II. Reunification Services

¶4 To regain custody of O

. , Mother was required to demonstrate sobriety, provide a drug free and s table environment, demonstrate effective parenting skills, and attend visitation sessions. As part of the permane ncy plan toward reunification, DCS “ offere d, made

1 The juvenile court also terminated Father’s parental rights. However, Father did not appeal the termination order, an d is not part of this appeal.

2 Pursuant to S.B. 1001, Section 157, 51st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2014) (enacted), the Arizona Department of Child Safety is substituted for the Arizona Department of Economic Security in this matter. See ARCAP 27.RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

3 referrals for and/or [was] requesting” individual counseling, substance abuse treatment, psyc hological consultation, ps ychiatric evaluation, urinalysis drug te sting, and visitation services. In June 2012, December 2012, and June 2013
, the juvenile court found DCS had made reasonable effort s toward reunification of the fam ily through its permanency pl an

.

III. Substance Abuse Services

A. Psychological and Psychiatric Services

¶5 As part of the reunification services aimed at addressing Mother’s substance abuse issues, DCS referred Mother to TERROS Families F .I.R.S.T. outpati ent services. Mother part icipated actively in the TERROS services beginning with her intake in Ma rch 2012
, through September 2012
, when Mother transitioned from group to individual counseling sessions. After graduating from standard outpatient services ( SOP ) , Mother engaged in tr auma group counseling through E MPACT T empe , in October 2012
, where she received a psychiatric evaluation

. ¶6 In March 2013, Mother underwent a DCS referred psychological ev aluation
, which indicated Mother experienced anxiety
, and mani fested affective and physiological signs of depression

. The evaluating psychologist opined t here was a likelihood Mother had a bipolar disorder, but in order to administer the appropriate diagnostic tests, Mother was required to be substance free for at least si x months. The psychologist also recommended a master’s level counselor to assist Mother with her posttraumatic stress in the form of individual therapy and drug counseling
, and recognized TERROS drug counselors as professionally sufficient to provide subs tance abuse therapy

. Additionally, after reviewing the case records, the psychologist rated as poor Mother’s likelihood of demonstrating adequate parenting skills with in the foreseeable future

. ¶7 In May 2013, DCS referred Mother to the Arizona Center for Change (A.C.C.) for individual counseling

. Although t he case manager ’s attempts to contact Mother to initiate counseling services in August were unsuccessful
, Mother ultimately co m pleted her intake in November 2013

. DCS renewed suppo rt services in December 2013, so that Mother could continue counseling sessions and join a Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT) anger management group.RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

4 B. Drug Testing

¶8 DCS provided Mother drug testing , which requir ed her to undergo urinalysis a total of 209 t imes from January 2012
, to November 2013. Mother did not appear for drug testing on ninety

- five occasions (45%)
, which DCS considered positive results. In addition, Mother tested positive on two occasions for THC, three times for amphetamine use, and

on c e for alcoh ol; a n overall failure rate of 48%

. By July 2013, DCS move d to terminate Mother’s parental rights
, as O

. had been in an outside placement for fifteen months or longer
, DCS had made diligent effort s to provide appropriate reunification services, Mother was unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the child to be placed in DCS custody, there was a substantial likelihood Mother would not be capable of exercising proper and effective parenting and control in the near future, and

severance was in the best interest s of the child. See A riz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 8

- 533(B)(8)(c) (2014)

. 3 After DCS mov ed to terminate parental rights, Mother tested positive for THC on two additional occasions.

IV. Termination of Parental Rights

¶9 At the December 20, 2013 s everance trial
, Mother testified she had used marijuana on a daily basis since she was eighteen
, and her last use occurred i n October 2013. Mother also admitted using methamphetamine after DCS removed O

. , and again in June 2012. Given his review of the records, t he evaluating psychologist determined Mother continued to abuse cannabis, had not remed ied her substance abuse issues, and failed to see the seriousness of needing to resolv e her drug problem. The psychologist further asserted there was a substa ntial likelihood Mother’s substance abuse problem s would continue for a prolonged
, indeterminate period.

¶10 In January 2014, the juvenile court terminated Mother’ s parental rights, and f oun d DCS had prove n by clear and convincing evidence the allegations of the severance motion
, which included DCS ’ s assertion it made diligent effort s to provide appropriate reunification services. The juvenile court also found Mother had failed to res olve her substance abuse issues
, noting in particular that Mother’s positive test result s occurred as r ecently as two months prior to the severance trial

. The juvenile court further found that her positive test results
, coupled with her inconsistent testing at TASC
, indicated she had failed to rectify

3 A bsent material revisions, we cite the current version of the statutes and rules unless otherwise indicated.RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

5 the issues t hat existed when DCS took custody of O

. , twenty

- one months prior to the severance hearing. Finally , t he juvenile court determined
, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination w as in the best interest of the child as credible evidence demonstrated “the child would benefit from the severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship ; ” noting O

. could “have the stability she needs” and “[was] adoptable.” Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8

- 235(A) (2014), 12

- 120.21(A )(1) (2014), and 12

- 2101(A) (2014).

DISCUSSION

¶11 “T he juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.
, 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002). Therefore, we will uphold the juvenile court’s termination of parental rights “unless its factual findings are clearly erroneous, that is, unless there is no reas onable evidence to support them.” Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.
, 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 2, 982 P.2d 1290, 1291 (App. 1998). To carry its burden o n a petition to terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove at least one statutory ground for
t ermination under A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B) by clear and convincing evidence. Valerie M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.
, 219 Ariz. 331, 334, ¶ 9, 198 P.3d 1203, 1206 (2009). The petitioner must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the be st interest s of the child. Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.
, 217 Ariz. 585, 587, ¶ 7, 177 P.3d 327, 329 (App. 2008). We review interpretations of court rules de novo

. Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.
, 230 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 20, 282 P.3d 437, 44 1 (App. 2012).

¶12 On appeal, Mother asserts the juvenile court order terminating her parenta l rights was invalid because 1) DCS failed to make diligen t effort s toward reunification; and 2) the juvenile court did not find DCS had made diligent effort s to reun ify the family.

A. DCS Reunification Services

¶13 Once a child is placed in custody, A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(8) requires the agency responsible for the child’s care to make a “diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services. ” In providing services, the agency is “ not required to offer every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers.” In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS

- 501904
, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d 234, 239 (A pp 1994). The agency, however, must “undertake measuresRAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

6 with a reasonable prospect of success.” Mary Ellen C. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec.
, 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34, 971 P.2d 1046, 1053 (App. 1999).

¶14 Mother asserts DCS failed to make diligent effort s to provide reunification services bec ause it failed to offer the DBT anger management therapy recommended by her counselor to assist Mother in addressing her emotional issues connected with past trauma. Mother relies up on Mary Ellen C.
, for the proposition t hat DCS must offer “the very services that its consulting expert recommends” in order to meet the threshold requirement of making diligent effort s toward reunification. Id. at 192, ¶ 37, 971 P.2d at 1053. We read Mary Ellen C. differently.

¶15 In Mary Ellen C.
, this Court addressed t he preliminary question of whether DCS was obliged to make reasonable effort s to preserve the family relationship before seeking termi nation of parental rights on mental illness grounds
, pursuant to A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(3). 4 Id. at 1 91, ¶ ¶ 28

- 29, 971 P.2d at 1052. Finding DCS did not “prove by clear and convincing evidence that it had made a reasonable effort to provide Mary with rehabilitation services or that such an effort would be futile, ” i d. at 193, ¶ 42, 971 P.2d at 1054, this Court reasoned:

[ DCS ] offered Mary no significant reunification services for almost a year after removing [ the child ] from her care. It waited more than a year after removing the child before referring a mother with a serious mental illness for a psycholo gical evaluation and did not ste er her to ComCare for treatment un til three months more had passed . As for
ste e ring Mary to Comcare [sic]
, which was the sum total of [ DCS ’s ] response to Dr. Bencomo’s recommendation of intensive psychiatric services, [ DCS ] gave Mary a phone number, encouraged her to self

- refer, and never followed up sufficiently to secure ComCare records of her progress

. . . . Mary received six sessions of counseling at ComCare. This level of intervention obviously fell short o f Dr. Bencom o’s recommendation.

4 A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(3) states, in pertinent part: “Evidence sufficient to justify the termination of the parent

- child relationship shall include .

. . [t]hat the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness [or] mental deficiency . . . and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.”RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

7 Id. at 192, ¶¶ 35

- 36, 971 P.2d at 1053.

¶16 The case at bar, however, differs from Mary Ellen C. In the immediate case, when DCS assumed custody of O., it began provid ing a wide range of services aimed at assist ing Mother in attaining and maintain ing sobriety

. Some of th o se services included group and individual counseling at TERROS
, as well as trauma group counseling at EMPACT Tempe where Mother received a psychiatric evaluation and medication for anxiety and depression. Further addressing Mother’s mental health needs, DCS provided two psychological consultations, a psychological evaluation
, and additional individual counseling sessions at A

. C

. C

. , where the counselor recommended DBT anger mana gement group therapy.

¶17 We dis agree with Mother’s assertion DCS failed to provide reasonable reunification services because Mother did not receive the DBT anger management therapy that is the subject of her appeal

. The record indicates DCS renewed Mother’s referral for services for th e express purpose that she join a DBT anger management therapy group. More ove r, DCS approved the DBT recommendation expeditiously : Mother began counseling sessions at A

. C

. C

. in late November 201 3
, and , either at that time or shortly thereafter, the counselor recommended the DBT therapy

. Prior to the December 20, 2013 termination hearing, DCS renewed the services to allow Mother to continue individual counseling and to joi n a DBT anger management group. Even with DCS’ response, Mother testified she needed several additional sessions of individual counseling to prepare for DBT therapy. Though
, arguably
, the juvenile court’s severance of Mother’s parental rights on January 9, 2014, may have precluded Mother’s involvement in DBT therapy, we cannot agre e with Mother’s contention that DCS did not make diligent effort s to reunify the family by failing to offer “the very services that its consulting expert recommends.” Mary Ellen C.
, 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 37, 971 P.2d at 1053.

B. The Juvenile Court’s Findings

¶18 Mot her also asserts the termination order is invalid because the juvenile court failed to specifically find DCS made diligent effort s to reunify the family. Mother asserts the juvenile court failed to meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(8)(c) and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 66(F)(2)(a) because rather than specifically find ing DCS made diligent effort s to provide reunification services, the juvenile court merely made legal findings pertaining to Mother’s inability to resolve iss ues present at the time DCS assumed custody of O

.RAQUEL D. v. DCS, et al. Decision of the Court

8 ¶19 T he record , however, indicates the juvenile court ma d e the appropriate findings. On three occasions p rior to the termination hearing; in June 2012, December 2012
, and June 2013, the juvenile court found D CS had made reasonable effort s toward reunification of the family

. Furthermore, although the juvenile court did not specifically engage in reasonable effort s analysis in granting the termination motion, it did find DCS m et its burden of proof regarding the allega tions in its severance motion ; those allegations includ ed DCS ’ assert ion it had made diligent effort s , as required by A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(8), in providing services

. ¶20 Most importantly, however, when sufficient evidence exists to support a termination order, we presume the juvenile court made the necessary findings even though the juvenile court did not explicitly engage in reasonable effort s analysis under A.R.S. § 8

- 533(B)(8). Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.
, 207 Ariz. 43, 49

- 50, ¶¶ 16

- 17, 83 P.3d 43, 49

- 50 (App. 2004) (citations omitted). Here, the record clearly indicates DCS provided services necessary toward Mother regaining custody of her child. In addition to the drug testing and psychological and psychiatric services aimed at addressi ng Mother’s substance abuse issues, parenting classes, supervised visitation, and transportation services were made available. W ith that, w e are satisfied sufficient evidence w as presente d to support a “diligent effort ” finding.

CONCLUSION

¶21 For the foregoi ng reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights

.