It i s t he p o l i cy o f t his co urt t o refer t o victi m s i n c hil d sexu al ab use ca ses b y t he i r i nit i als. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y 18, 200 4
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . RICHARD DEWAYNE J ORDAN

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Rhea County No. 15533 J. Curtis Sm ith, Jud ge

No. E2003-02351-CC A-R3- CD June 16, 2004

A Rhea County

jury convicted the defe ndant, Richard D eway ne Jordan, of two counts of a g g ravated sexual battery

and one c ount of incest, for which he rec eived an eff ective twelve-y ear sentenc e. On appea l, the defe ndant ar g ues: (1) thetrial court improperly allowed the state to amend the indictment to c ha rg e a dif fe re nt d a te of c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e s; an d (2) the ind ic tme nt f a ile d to inf

orm hi m of the c harg es with suff

i ci en t p ar ticularity . We remand f or cor rec tion of a cle rica l error in the jud g me nt b ut o the rw ise a ff ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Ci r c uit Co ur t A ffirm e d; Rem anded f

or Cor rec tion of

Cleric al Error

J OE G. R I L EY , J ., delivere d the op i n i o n of the c ourt, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., joined.

L arry G. Roddy , Sale Cree k, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Richard D eway ne Jordan.

Paul G. Sum me rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Kathy D. As lin g e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Jame s Mi c ha e l T aylor , D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge nera l; a nd Will D un n, As sis tant D ist ri c t A tto rn e y

Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

Be cause sufficie ncy of t he evidence is not an issue on appe al, we w ill li mit our recitation of the fa ctual bac kg round. The victim, A.J ., was born on October 7, 1983. At the time she wa s abused, 1 A.J . lived i n Gr ay s v i lle, Tenne ssee, with her pare nts. The def

endant, he r uncle , lived in another home on the same property with his wife.-2-

The victim was ninete en y ear s old at the time of trial. She testified that on Oc tober 3, 1989, the date he r brother was born, the defe ndant enter ed her bedroom a nd digitally

penetr ated he r vag ina. She stated that on anothe r o cc as i o n, when the de fenda nt was on work r elea se fr om the jail, the de fe nd a nt d ig ita lly

pe ne tr a te d h e r v a g ina

wh ile sh e wa s sl e e pin g in the liv ing ro om with h e r s ist e rs
. She testified that when she was ten y ear s old, the defe ndant fondled he r bre asts afte r put ting he r on his c lothe s d ry e r. Th e de fe nd a nt c a te g oric a lly de nie d c omm itt ing the se a c ts.
The de fenda

nt w as convicted of ag g rava ted sexual battery

under Count Thre e of theindictment for the bedroom incident, incest under Count F ive for the living room incident , an d ag g ravated
se xua l batte ry

un de r C ou nt S ix fo r the dry e r i nc ide nt.
I. WA IV ER

The de fenda nt contends the trial c ourt err ed in allowing the state to ame nd Count Five and Count S ix of the indictment, which ch an ged the dates of commission of these two offe nses. The transcript of this hearing is not in t he re cord. It is the dutyof t he appellant to provide a rec ord which convey s a fa ir, ac cu ra te and c omplete ac count of what transpired w ith reg ard to the issues whic h fo rm the ba sis of

the app e a l. T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 2 4( b) ; see State v. Tay l o r, 9 9 2 S

. W

. 2d 941, 944 (Tenn. 1999)

. Neve rtheless, the rec ord does clea rly indicate the state’s a mendments to Count Five and Count Six wer e int ended to r efle ct the ra ng e of time the de fenda nt participate d in the work rele ase pr og ram fr om the jail; namely , “fr om J uly 1, 1992, to Aug ust 2, 1994.” Be cause the re cord is a de qu a te fo r o ur

re vie w, we wi ll a dd re ss the iss ue on the me ri ts.
II. P ROP RIETY OF AM ENDED INDICTMENT

The de fenda nt alleg es the trial c ourt err ed in allowing the st at e t o amend Count Five and Co u n t S ix o v e r

h is o b je c ti o n
. Co u n t F iv e o f

th e in d ic tm e n t o r ig in a ll y a ll e g e d th a t th e d e f

e n d ant committed the offe nse of ince st betwee n October 1, 1994, and Mar ch 3 1 , 1995. Count S ix of the indictment orig inally

alleg ed that the defe ndant committed the offe nse of ag g ravated sexual battery betwee n April 1, 1 9 9 5 , and Oc tober 31, 1995. As a mended, the indictment a lleg es both offe nses wer e committed betwe en Jul y 1, 1992, and Aug ust 2, 1994.

An amendment to a

n indictment is authorized by Rule 7(b) of the Te nnesseeRules of Criminal Pr oc e du re , w hic h s ta te s: An indictment, prese ntment or information m ay b e am en ded in all ca ses with the consent of the defe ndant. I f no additional or diff ere nt offense is thereby

char g ed and no substantial rig hts of the def endant a re there by prejudice d, the court may permit an
a me nd me nt w ith ou t th e de fe nd a nt’ s c on se nt b e fo re je op ard y a tta c he s.
The date in an indictment may be ame nded pursua nt to this rule. See State v. Marlow, 665 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p
. 1 9 83). An a mendment of the date in an indictment does not alleg e a differ ent or a dditional crime. State v. Ke nnedy , 10 S.W .3d 280, 284 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999)

.-3-

After the re turn of th e o ri g inal indictment and prior to the origina l trial setting, it was determined the def

endant wa s actua lly

incar cer ated at the time the orig inal indictment alleg ed he ha d committed these two off

enses. The victim, however , had alway s claimed these offe nses occ urre d while the defe ndant was on work rele ase. Upon ascertaining the time of the def endant’ s work re lease , the state so ug ht the a me nd me nt. Th e de fe nd a nt arg ue s he wa s pr e jud ic e d by th e am end ment, beca use his incar cer ation during the time stated in the original indictment provided him with an a libi which wa s eff

ectively voided by

the amende d indictment. By amending the indictment to r efle ct the dates that the defe ndant was on wor k rele ase, the state mere ly

broug ht these two counts into conformity wi t h t he victim’s re collection of w hen the of fe ns e s o c c ur

re d. I t is no t un us ua l in c hil d sexua l a bu se c a se s f

or the vic tim

to r e la te the of

fe ns e to an eve nt, rather

than a spe cific date. S ee S t at e v
. Shelton, 851 S.W .2d 134, 137 (Tenn. 1993)

. The state soug ht the amendment in January 2002. The trial court g rante d the re quest and c ontinued the tr ia l dat e to av oid a ny pr e jud ic e to the de fe nd a nt. Th e c a se wa s trie d in Oc tob e r 2 00 2. At tr ia l, the vic tim wa s th or ou g hly

c ro ss- e xami ne d a

bo ut the c ha ng e in the date s in the a me nd e d in dic tme nt. We conclude the amende d indictment did not c harg e a differ ent offe nse, and the defe ndant was not pr e jud ic e d. Th is i ssu e la c ks me ri t.

III . SU F F IC IEN CY OF THE I ND IC TM EN TS

The defenda nt further

claims the def

ense w as hampe red by

the two-y ear

date r ang e for

the commission of Count Five and C ount Six ; namely , from J uly 1, 1992, to Aug ust 2, 1994. An indictment alleg ing a rang e of dates is n o t i m p ro p er, and the ordinary rec ourse is for

the def endant to file a
mo ti o n f o r a b il l o f p ar ti c u la

r s. See T enn. R . Crim. P. 7(c); State v. By rd, 820 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn. 1991)

.

Although a

court should make e very eff ort to see that the pr osecution supplies critica l information in the bi ll of particulars, we have observed that in cases involving child sexual abuse, the prose cution may be unable to supply specific dates on whic h
a lle g e d o ff

e ns e s o c c ur

re d. I n su c h c a se s, ho we ve r, wh e re the vic tim is t oo y ou ng to rec all specific dates, “ the child may be able to def

i n e t h e t i me of the of

fense by ref ere nce to suc h memorable o cc as ions in a child’s life as birthday s, seasona l cele brations and holiday s, the beg inning or end of the school y ear , or visitations by
re la tiv e s.
. . .” I f the state is tru ly un able to pr ov ide e ve n an app ro xima te tim e or date of the off ense by means of a descriptive r efe renc e, “a conviction may nonetheless be aff irmed if in the cour se of trial it doe s not appea r that the de fenda nt’s defe nse has been hampere d by

a lac k of spec ificity .” State v. Speck, 944 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tenn. 1997) (c itations omi tted). Although the defe ndant contends he filed a mot ion for a bill of particulars, no such motion
app e ars in the re c or d. I t is the du ty of the app e lla nt t o p ro vid e a n a de qu a te re c or d f or app ell ate revie w. See Tay lor, 992 S.W .2d at 944. Howeve r, t he record doe s reve al the def endant wa s awa

re-4-

many months before trial that these two offe nses alleg edly occur red when he wa s on work re lease

. T h e v i ct i m t es t i fi ed o n e o ff en s e o cc u rr ed i n t h e l i v i n g ro o mwh er e s h e a n d h ers i s t er s we re s l ee p i n g, and the other

offe nse was committed when the defe ndant pl ace d the victim on his clothes dry er a fter she had be en sent by her mother to dry clothes. Ba sed upon the record be fore us, we c onclude the defe nse wa s not “ hamper ed” by the lack of

further specific ity

. See Speck, 944 S.W.2d at 600. The defe ndant categ orica lly

denied a ll of the cha

rg es, and there is no indication in the rec ord bef ore us t h at hi s defe nse would have been dif fer ent had the of

fense s been a lleg ed with more te mporal sp e c if ic ity . A c c or din g ly , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.
IV . C LER IC AL ER RO R Although not r aised by the parties, we note a cle rica l error in the judgme nt on Count 3 of the indictment for the of

fense of ag g ravat ed s ex u al battery . The judg ment lists t he statute a s “39-13- 504,” which is the c urre nt statute for a g g ravated sexual battery . The off ense w as committed prior to November

1, 1989, and is controlled by the statute in eff

ect at t h e t i m e o f co m m ission of the offe nse. Upon rema nd, the trial court shall enter an amende d judgme nt on Count 3 listi ng the statutory ref ere nce a s “39-2- 606 (Supp. 1988).”

Ba sed upon our revie w, we rema nd for entry of an a mended judg ment but otherwise a ffirm the jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

____________________________________ J OE G. RILEY, JUDGE