Filed 1/25/23 Semanick v. State Automobile Mutual Ins. Cos. CA2/2

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

BRITTNEY SEMANICK,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

STATE AUTOMOBILE 

MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANIES,

Defendant and 

Respondent.

 B316340

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20STCV20627)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Lia R. Martin, Judge. Affirmed.

Parris Law Firm, R. Rex Parris, Alexander Wheeler, 

Jason P. Fowler, Jonathan W. Douglass and Mark G. Shihady for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Julian J. Pardini and 

W. Eric Blumhardt for Defendant and Respondent.
2

Brittney Semanick (appellant) appeals from a judgment of 

dismissal with prejudice entered after the trial court granted 

respondent State Automobile Mututal Insurance Companies’

(respondent) motion to quash appellant’s summons and 

complaint on the ground that the trial court lacked personal 

jurisdiction over respondent. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On March 13, 2018, respondent issued a “Personal Auto 

Policy” (policy) to Patty and Daniel Semanick, who were residents 

of Indiana. The policy was in effect from March 13, 2018, to 

September 13, 2018, and provided uninsured and underinsured 

motorist coverage.

The policy provided coverage to the Semanicks as well as 

any “family member,” which the policy defined as “a person 

related to [the Semanicks] by blood, marriage or adoption who is 

a resident of [the Semanick’s] household.” The policy was issued 

through an Indiana agent with the understanding that all of the 

vehicles insured under the policy were registered and principally 

garaged in Indiana. The policy applied to accidents and losses 

occurring “[w]ithin the policy territory.” The policy territory 

included the United States of America, its territories, or 

possessions; Puerto Rico; and Canada.

Appellant is the daughter of the policyholders, Patty and 

Daniel Semanick. Although appellant is not a named insured, 

she is listed on the policy as a covered driver.

On July 4, 2018, appellant was injured in an accident in 

West Hollywood, California. Appellant was a pedestrian crossing 

Santa Monica Boulevard when she was hit by a drunk driver. 

Appellant sustained severe injuries and incurred substantial 

damages.
3

Appellant made a claim against the responsible driver, and 

he tendered his $15,000 policy limit. However, the policy limit 

was insufficient to cover appellant’s damages, and she submitted 

a claim to respondent under the underinsured motorist provisions 

of her parents’ policy.

Respondent retained a California law firm to investigate 

appellant’s claim that she was entitled to benefits under her 

parents’ policy as a “resident” of her parents’ household. The 

attorneys conducted discovery and performed an examination of 

appellant under oath in their Los Angeles office on September 28, 

2018. Appellant testified that her legal address, found on her 

driver’s license, was her parents’ home in Highland, Indiana. 

However, she stated that her current residence was in Los 

Angeles, California, where she had moved approximately three 

years earlier. Appellant testified that she traveled back and 

forth between the two addresses. Following the completion of its 

investigation, respondent denied appellant’s claim on the ground 

that, at the time of the accident, appellant was not a resident of 

her parents’ household and therefore did not fall within the scope 

of the policy’s definitions of “family member” or “insured.”

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant filed a lawsuit against respondent in the superior 

court for Los Angeles County on June 1, 2020. Appellant’s 

complaint asserted two causes of action: (1) breach of contract for 

failure to pay benefits under the policy and (2) breach of the 

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The complaint 

also included a claim for declaratory relief, seeking a finding that 

appellant was a resident relative under the policy. Appellant 
4

personally served respondent with the summons and complaint 

at its offices at 518 East Broad Street in Columbus, Ohio.1

On October 21, 2020, respondent moved to quash service of 

the summons and complaint. Respondent argued that it was a 

nonresident with no connection to California. Respondent 

asserted that it does not maintain offices in California, conducts 

no business, marketing, or advertising in California, and does not 

sell insurance policies in California. Further, it derives no 

revenue in California, holds no investments, commercial loans, 

real property, or bank accounts in California. Respondent had 

not sought or received approval from California’s Department of 

Insurance to issue or deliver its insurance products in California. 

Respondent argued that it did not have sufficient minimum 

contacts with California to support the exercise of personal 

jurisdiction over respondent in California. Specifically, it did not 

have sufficiently continuous or substantial contacts with 

California to support general jurisdiction, and it did not 

purposefully avail itself of California’s forum benefits to support 

specific jurisdiction. Appellant opposed the motion, arguing that 

respondent’s policy coverage territory covered accidents occurring 

anywhere in the United States, including California. Appellant 

also argued that respondent’s postaccident investigation, 

utilizing the services of a California law firm, subjected 

respondent to jurisdiction in California.

On August 31, 2021, the trial court heard respondent’s 

motion to quash. Following oral argument, the trial court 

1 Respondent is a corporation organized under the laws of 

Ohio with its principal place of business in Columbus, Ohio. Its 

claims department is located at its corporate headquarters in 

Columbus, and it does not maintain any offices in California.
5

granted the motion. The trial court found that appellant failed to 

establish that respondent engaged in any significant activities in 

California. The court noted, “There was no lawsuit filed in 

California over the accident in which plaintiff was injured. 

Defendant was not involved in plaintiff’s settlement with the 

driver. The only connection to California is that defendant 

responded to plaintiff’s claim, using a California law firm because 

plaintiff was in California at the time she made the claim. That 

is not sufficient to support personal jurisdiction.”

Judgment was entered on October 4, 2021. Appellant filed 

her notice of appeal on October 29, 2021.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

The parties agree that the sole issue presented by this 

appeal is whether the trial court may exercise personal 

jurisdiction over respondent in in connection with the coverage 

dispute between the parties.

On appeal from a judgment quashing service of a summons 

and complaint based on lack of personal jurisdiction, we review 

the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. (Snowney v. Harrah’s 

Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062.) “When no 

conflict in the evidence exists . . . , the question of jurisdiction is 

purely one of law and the reviewing court engages in an 

independent review of the record.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. 

Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449.) Where relevant 

facts are disputed, the substantial evidence standard applies. 

(Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 272

(Pavlovich).)
6

II. Applicable law regarding jurisdiction

Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10 permits a court in 

California to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant “on 

any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of 

the United States.” Accordingly, California courts may rely on 

federal court opinions to determine whether an exercise of 

personal jurisdiction will violate due process. (See, e.g.,

Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 147 (Cornelison) 

[relying on U.S. Supreme Court decisions when analyzing 

personal jurisdiction].)

The exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally 

permissible if the defendant purposefully established “‘minimum 

contacts’” with the forum state to make jurisdiction reasonable. 

(Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 474,

quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 

310, 316.) “Jurisdiction is proper . . . where the contacts 

proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that 

create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.” (Burger 

King, at p. 475.) “‘The unilateral activity of those who claim some 

relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the 

requirement of contact with the forum State.’” (Id. at p. 474.) 

“Under the minimum contacts test, ‘an essential criterion in all 

cases is whether the “quality and nature” of the defendant’s 

activity is such that it is “reasonable” and “fair” to require him to 

conduct his defense in that State.’” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th

at p. 268.)

“‘Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.’” 

(Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 268-269.) General 

jurisdiction applies where the defendant’s activities in the forum 

state are “‘extensive or wide-ranging’” or “‘substantial . . . 

continuous and systematic’” in a manner that warrants 
7

jurisdiction. (Cornelison, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 147.) Appellant 

makes no argument that respondent’s contacts with California 

are so extensive or continuous that general jurisdiction is proper.

If a defendant’s activities in the forum are not so pervasive 

as to justify general jurisdiction over him, a state may still have 

specific jurisdiction over a defendant depending upon “the quality 

and nature of his activity in the forum in relation to the 

particular cause of action.” (Cornelison, supra, 16 Cal.3d at

p. 148.) Such jurisdiction is also referred to as specific or “caselinked jurisdiction.” (Rivelli v. Hemm (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 380, 

392 (Rivelli).) When determining whether specific jurisdiction 

exists, a court must consider the “‘“relationship among the 

defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”’” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 

Cal.4th at p. 269.) A court may exercise specific jurisdiction if 

three requirements are met: “(1) ‘the defendant has purposefully 

availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the 

“controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant’s 

contacts with the forum”’ [citation]; and (3) ‘“the assertion of 

personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and 

substantial justice’”’ [citations].” (Ibid.) “The case-linked 

jurisdictional analysis is intensely fact-specific.” (Rivelli, at

p. 392.)

III. Specific jurisdiction as to respondent

In determining whether California may constitutionally 

assert specific jurisdiction over respondent in this matter, we 

analyze the three applicable elements set forth above. We 

conclude that the exercise of jurisdiction over respondent in this 

matter does not comport with the constitutional principles 

expressed in the relevant case law.
8

A. Purposeful availment

To assert specific jurisdiction over respondent, we first 

analyze whether respondent has purposefully availed itself of the 

forum’s benefits. “‘The purposeful availment inquiry . . . focuses 

on the defendant’s intentionality.’” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th

at p. 269.) This prong is only satisfied when “the defendant 

purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the 

forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit he 

receives, to be subject to the court’s jurisdiction.” (Ibid.)

The facts of this case do not show that respondent 

intentionally availed itself of the benefits of the state by 

conducting activities in this state. Respondent maintains no 

offices in California, does not advertise its insurance policies in 

California, and does not issue insurance policies in California. 

The policy at issue was issued to appellant’s parents in Indiana, 

where appellant claims to be a resident. In short, there is no 

evidence that respondent has ever intentionally conducted 

business in California. As the trial court pointed out, the only 

apparent connection between respondent and the State of 

California is that appellant was in California at the time she 

made the claim.2

2 Generally, a foreign insurance company does not subject 

itself to specific jurisdiction in California by virtue of its insured 

simply moving to this state. (Elkman v. National States Ins. Co. 

(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1321 [“It was the unilateral 

decisions of Elkman and other insureds to relocate to California 

which caused [the foreign insurance company] to accept 

payments from this state and to process and pay claims for 

services rendered in this state. These circumstances do not 

support a finding [the insurance company] purposefully availed 
9

Appellant argues that a nonresident insurance company 

may be subjected to specific jurisdiction in California when (1) 

the insurance company provides policy coverage that extends to 

the forum state and (2) an insured event results in litigation 

there. In making this assertion, appellant relies on several cases, 

including Southeastern Express Systems v. Southern Guaranty 

Ins. Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1 (Southeastern). Southeastern 

involved an insurance company that provided commercial 

liability coverage to an interstate business. The policy covered 

injuries arising from offenses committed in California. (Id. at

p. 4.) The respondent insurance company was a corporation 

organized under the laws of Georgia and maintained its principal 

place of business in Georgia. The insured appellant was a 

business organized under the laws of Georgia selling and 

servicing computers throughout many states, including 

California. When the appellant was sued in the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of California, it tendered 

its defense to the insurance company, which refused to pay for 

the appellant’s cost of defense. (Id. at pp. 4-5.) The appellant 

then brought the underlying action for breach of contract and bad 

faith insurance in state court in California. The insurance 

company moved to quash service, and the motion was granted.

The Southeastern court reversed, noting that “the exercise 

of personal jurisdiction is not dictated by the place of contracting 

or performance, but is guided by a realistic approach which 

considers the contractual relationship in its totality, including 

the terms of the contract and the contemplated future 

consequences of the obligations assumed.” (Southeastern, supra,

itself of forum benefits so as to make it subject to specific 

jurisdiction in California.”].)
10

34 Cal.App.4th at p. 6.) The Southeastern court evaluated the 

contract at issue, pointing out that it obligated the respondent 

insurer to “defend and indemnify advertising injuries for offenses 

committed by appellants in the ‘coverage territory,’” which was 

defined as the United States, Puerto Rico and Canada. (Ibid.) 

The Southeastern court held that it was “neither unreasonable 

nor unfair to require an insurer who has assumed the 

responsibility of defending its insured in California to defend 

itself when it refuses its insured’s defense in a suit brought in 

California.” (Id. at pp. 6-7.) The Southeastern court refused to 

“categorically deny an insured a local forum to dispute its 

insurer’s refusal to defend an action pending in the state.” (Id. at

p. 8.)

Southeastern is distinguishable in several important ways. 

First, the contract between the parties specifically contemplated 

that the insured would be engaging in interstate commercial 

activity, and the contract provided commercial liability insurance 

for this interstate activity. As the Southeastern court noted, it 

was foreseeable that “the insurers would be called into a foreign 

forum, given the nationwide distribution of the insured’s products 

which the insurers were charged with knowing about.” 

(Southeastern, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 11.) Under those 

circumstances, “‘insurers cannot be said to have failed to avail 

themselves, in a conscious and deliberate manner, of the benefits

of doing business in those fora in which the insured manufacturer 

distributes its products.’” (Ibid.) In contrast to the commercial 

liability policy at issue in Southeastern, in which the insurance 

company knowingly insured interstate business activity, the 

respondent here did not knowingly insure interstate business 

activity. Instead, it provided coverage to Indiana residents for 

cars principally garaged in Indiana.
11

Second, the coverage lawsuit in Southeastern arose out of a 

lawsuit pending in California against the insureds. 

(Southeastern, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 6-8.) The 

Southeastern court’s primary focus was that the insurance 

company had denied “a duty to defend alleged losses arising 

here.” (Id. at p. 4.) The insureds had been sued in California, 

and the Southeastern court felt it would be unfair to 

“categorically deny an insured a local forum to dispute its 

insurer’s refusal to defend an action pending in the state.” (Id. at

p. 8.) Here, in contrast, there is no action pending in this state 

involving appellant, thus respondent has no obligation to defend 

appellant in this state. Consequently, this element of fairness to 

the insured is not present.

The Southeastern court relied on McClanahan v. TransAmerica Ins. Co. (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 171 (McClanahan), which 

appellant also cites in support of her position in this appeal. In 

McClanahan, residents of Washington recovered a judgment in 

California state court against the insurance company’s insureds, 

who were residents of Colombia, arising out of an automobile 

collision in California. The foreign defendant insurance company 

failed to pay the judgment, resulting in the action against the 

insurance company by the third party creditors of the insureds. 

(Id. at pp. 171-172.) The McClanahan court noted that “it is 

apparent that no hard and fast rule can be adopted which would 

apply to all cases[;] it is obvious that the final determination 

must be predicated upon the peculiar facts of each individual 

case.” (Id. at p. 172.) After analyzing the specific facts of the 

case, the McClanahan court determined that jurisdiction was 

proper. The McClanahan court noted that it is “the combination 

of local activities conducted by the foreign corporation, the 

manner, nature and extent thereof, which is determinative” of 
12

the jurisdictional question. (Id. at p. 172.) In that case, the 

insurance company had engaged an adjustment service agency 

located in California to investigate the claims, settled one claim,

defended another through trial, and made several offers of 

settlement. (Id. at p. 173.) In addition to preparing and 

defending the case brought by the plaintiffs, there was evidence 

that the insurance company “ha[d] adjusted and defended 

numerous cases in California.” (Id. at p. 174.)

Respondent’s activities in California do not rise to the same 

level of purposeful availment as existed in McClanahan. As 

there was no lawsuit arising out of appellant’s accident in 

California, respondent was not required to defend a lawsuit or 

negotiate a settlement here. Nor was there any evidence that 

respondent has done so in the past. Appellant points out that 

respondent hired a local law firm in California to investigate her 

claim that she was a resident of Indiana and invoked California 

law to deny coverage. However, the investigation of appellant’s 

postaccident claim cannot be considered purposeful availment. 

(See Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co. 

(9th Cir. 1990) 907 F.2d 911, 913 (Portage) [“The district court 

properly placed little weight on post-accident communications. 

Only contacts occurring prior to the event causing the litigation 

may be considered. [Citation.] Significant consideration of postaccident investigation and settlement contacts would deter good 

faith attempts by insurers to settle.”].) Appellant agrees that 

“post-accident conduct may not, on its own, establish minimum 

contacts.” Further, the question of governing law is not relevant 

to the jurisdictional analysis. (Halyard Health, Inc. v. KimberlyClark Corp. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1071 [holding that the 

question of governing law “has no place in our jurisdictional 

analysis”].)
13

Appellant emphasizes language in both Southeastern and 

McClanahan suggesting that “insurers of rambling 

automobiles . . . should reasonably anticipate being called into 

foreign forums.” (Southeastern, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 9; see 

McClanahan, supra, 149 Cal.App.2d at p. 171 [“[i]t could be said 

that from the very nature of defendant’s business, the insuring of 

automobile owners, that . . . the holder thereof might at some 

time be a user of the highways of this state . . .”].) However, 

appellant provides no case holding that providing an automobile 

insurance policy that covers incidents within the state alone is 

sufficient, without more, to show the required purposeful 

availment of state benefits. Case law suggests that the issuance 

of a policy covering incidents in California alone is not sufficient 

to constitute “purposeful availment” of the benefits of this forum. 

(See, e.g., Benefit Assn. Internat., Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 46 

Cal.App.4th 827, 833-834 (Benefit) [finding that insurance 

company’s agreement to pay medical expenses incurred in 

California insufficient to constitute purposeful availment when 

the plaintiff “fail[ed] to present any evidence that [the insurance 

company] has been involved with California or ‘purposely availed’

itself of California’s economic market”].)

Further, reasonable anticipation of being called into court 

is different from purposeful availment. As noted in Benefit, 

“insuring . . . foreign citizens, knowing they might travel in 

California, [does] not constitute purposefully availing itself of the 

benefits of the economic market in California.” (Benefit, supra,

46 Cal.App.4th at p. 834; see Tri-West Ins. Services, Inc. v. 

Seguros Monterrey Aetna, S.A. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 672, 677-

678 [insurance company providing transit insurance covering 

goods being transported to and from Mexico not subject to 

jurisdiction in this state where “the sole act through which such 
14

jurisdiction could arise was the issuance of an insurance policy 

which covered goods while in transit in California”].) The United 

States Supreme Court has cautioned that “‘“foreseeability” alone 

has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction 

under the Due Process Clause.’” (OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal 

Ins. Co. of Canada (10th Cir. 1998) 149 F.3d 1086, 1094 (OMI 

Holdings), quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 

(1980) 444 U.S. 286, 295 (World-Wide).) Thus, contrary to the 

statement in Southeastern, an insurer’s “reasonabl[e] 

anticipa[tion]” of being called into court in California is 

insufficient to create jurisdiction. (Southeastern, supra, 34 

Cal.App.4th at p. 9.)3

The issue of purposeful availment is focused on the 

defendant’s “‘intentionality’” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at

p. 269), and is “intensely fact-specific” (Rivelli, supra, 67 

Cal.App.5th at p. 392). We find that under the circumstances of 

this specific case, the minimum contacts to assert personal 

jurisdiction over respondent are lacking.

Portage, supra, 907 F.2d 911 and Rossman v. State Farm 

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (4th Cir. 1987) 832 F.2d 282, federal cases 

cited by appellant, are distinguishable on the grounds that the 

insurance companies availed themselves of the courts in the 

relevant jurisdictions in order to defend or settle litigation there.4

3 We note that the dissent relies exclusively on Southeastern

and fails to discuss the constitutional principles set forth in 

World-Wide, OMI Holdings, and Benefit.

4 We decline to discuss McGow v. McCurry (11th Cir. 2005) 

412 F.3d 1207, as the decision has been abrogated after the 11th 

Circuit determined that the long-arm statute on which the 

decision was based “was not coextensive with constitutional due 
15

As the parties point out, certain cases have distinguished 

between a nonresident liability insurer being sued for failure to 

defend an insured in a foreign state and a nonresident insurer 

being sued in the foreign state to provide first party benefits. 

(See, e.g., OMI Holdings, supra, 149 F.3d at p. 1095 [“While it is 

reasonably foreseeable that an insured would be involved in 

litigation with a third-party in another forum, it is not 

necessarily foreseeable that a dispute between the insured and 

the insurer over an insurance contract prepared, negotiated, and 

executed pursuant to Canadian law in Canada with a Canadian 

company would be litigated in a foreign forum where neither 

party has any contacts.”].) The Southeastern court rejected this 

distinction, finding it irrelevant. Instead, the Southeastern court 

explained, “the important question is whether the nonresident 

defendant has ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the benefits of an 

economic market in the forum state.” (Southeastern, supra, 34 

Cal.App.4th at p. 10.)

We agree with the Southeastern court that the question is 

not the type of lawsuit involved, but whether the facts before us 

show purposeful availment of the state’s benefits. Under the 

circumstances of this case, where the respondent had no contacts 

with California other than investigating appellant’s claim for 

underinsured motorist coverage, we find respondent’s minimum 

contacts to be insufficient.

process.” (W. World Ins. Co. v. Narconon of Ga., Inc. (N.D. Ga. 

2014) 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206003, *8 [2014 WL 11860698]; see 

Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Internat., Inc. 

(11th Cir. 2010) 593 F.3d 1249, 1263.) 
16

B. Whether the claim arises out of respondent’s 

contacts with California

In addition to the requirement of evidence that respondent 

purposely availed itself of the economic benefits of California, 

appellant must also prove that the claim she has asserted against 

respondent arises out of or relates to respondent’s contacts with 

California. (Halyard Health, Inc. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., supra,

43 Cal.App.5th at p. 1070.)

As set forth above, appellant has failed to show that 

respondent has any contacts with California other than a 

postaccident investigation of appellant’s claim for underinsured 

motorist coverage. Her claim against respondent involves a 

contract between respondent and appellant’s parents—a contract 

issued in Indiana to Indiana residents. The question of whether 

appellant is an insured under that policy does not involve any 

contact that respondent has had with California. Although 

appellant sustained her injuries in California, the resolution of 

her claims in that accident did not involve respondent’s alleged 

obligation to defend her nor did it require respondent to avail 

itself of the court system here. Thus, appellant has failed to show 

that the claim she has asserted arises out of any contact 

respondent has had with California, and appellant has failed to 

meet this second prong of the specific jurisdiction test.

C. Fair play and substantial justice

The final element of the test for specific jurisdiction is 

whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport 

with “‘“fair play and substantial justice.”’” (Vons Companies, Inc. 

v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 447.) However, this 

element is not relevant unless the plaintiff has established that 

the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the state. 

(Ibid. [“‘[O]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully 
17

established minimum contacts within the forum State, these 

contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine 

whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport 

with “fair play and substantial justice.”’”].) In determining 

whether personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, courts may evaluate “the burden on the 

defendant of appearing in the forum, the forum state’s interest in 

adjudicating the claim, the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and 

effective relief within the forum, judicial economy, and ‘the 

“shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental 

substantive social policies.”’” (Id. at p. 448.)

Semanick has failed to establish that respondent has 

purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in 

California or that her claims are related to activities of 

respondent in this state. Therefore, we need not discuss the 

fairness element of personal jurisdiction. However, we note that 

California has little interest in adjudicating a dispute between 

appellant, who claims to be an Indiana resident, and respondent 

on a contract formed in Indiana and subject to Indiana law.

Appellant emphasizes that the evidence and witnesses 

relating to the accident are present in California. However, the 

issue in this case does not concern liability or damages resulting 

from the accident. Instead, the issue is whether appellant is a 

resident of Indiana for the purposes of her coverage claim under 

her parents’ contract with respondent. Appellant emphasizes the 

location of the accident in arguing that the California forum 

provides her convenient and effective relief, and promotes judicial 

economy. Again, because the details of the accident itself are not 

at issue in this lawsuit, appellant fails to convince us that 

California is the most efficient forum for this dispute. As it 

involves an Indiana contract formed in the state of Indiana, and 
18

the primary issue is whether appellant is an Indiana resident, 

considerations of convenience and judicial economy weigh in 

favor of disallowing specific jurisdiction. Finally, as both parties 

point out, in the event that appellant is determined to be an 

Indiana resident and respondent must provide coverage, any 

dispute over the amount of recovery must be arbitrated “in the 

county in which the ‘insured’ lives.” Thus, if appellant is indeed a 

resident of Indiana and entitled to coverage, any further disputes 

must be arbitrated in Indiana.

Considering all the elements set forth above, we conclude 

that the exercise of jurisdiction over respondent under the 

specific circumstances of this case is inconsistent with the 

constitutional limits on judicial power.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Each side is to bear their own 

costs of appeal.

_____________________

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

I concur:

_________________________

HOFFSTADT, J.
Brittney Semanick v. State Automobile Mutual Insurance 

Companies

B316340

Benke, J.,* Dissenting

There are multiple ways to interpret the constellation of 

cases addressing the existence of specific jurisdiction. I part 

company with my colleagues as to the picture created in this case 

by that constellation, and conclude the nationwide territory of 

coverage here, which encompasses third party liability coverage 

and coverage for damages caused to the insureds by 

underinsured motorists, constitutes “purposeful availment” of the 

privilege of conducting activity within California. Thus, I would 

find specific jurisdiction exists.

Southeastern Express Systems v. Southern Guaranty Ins. 

Co. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1 (Southestern) is central to my 

analysis. There, residents of Georgia brought an action in 

California against their Georgia insurance company for refusing 

to defend a federal case brought against them in California. The 

insurance policy issued by the Georgia insurance company 

provided nationwide, third party liability coverage. When the 

trial court in California granted the insurance company’s request 

to quash service of process for lack of jurisdiction, plaintiff 

Georgia residents (the insureds) appealed, and the Southeastern

court reversed, concluding that given the nature of the territory 

of coverage, a wrongful refusal to defend the action is subject to 

specific jurisdiction in California.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth 

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
2

Southeastern can be read broadly as suggesting a 

nationwide territory of coverage clause may subject the insurance 

company to a state’s specific jurisdiction where it purposely 

avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the forum 

state (i.e., California). The court discussed at length how an 

economic market analysis operates, namely, that in writing and 

selling its insurance policy as one providing nationwide coverage, 

and collecting insurance premiums calculated upon that broad 

coverage, the insurance company benefited from the economic 

market of all states in which the insured faced liability, including 

California. This benefit in turn establishes purposeful availment.

With its economic analysis as background, Southeastern

concluded that where there is third party liability coverage in the 

territory of coverage, the insurance company expects and agrees 

it will be called into the forum state if there is a third party 

lawsuit and thus should reasonably anticipate being called into 

forum courts if it denies coverage and is sued in the forum state. 

(Southeastern, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at pp. 6-7.) I see no reason 

why this logic does not apply in this case.

There are several arguments available that Southeastern is 

not applicable to our case. One argument is that Southeastern is 

factually confined to third party liability coverage in cases 

involving commercial entities. I would first point out that the 

opinion appears to expressly erase the analytical distinction 

between third and first party coverage. The panel noted it was 

“not persuaded that a constitutionally significant distinction 

exists between first party and third party actions against a 

nonresident insurer providing nationwide coverage.” 

(Southeastern, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 10.) Moreover, 

although one might argue it is only coverage of commercial 

entities to which Southeastern addresses itself, nothing in the 
3

opinion appears to so confine its holding and rationale. The fact a 

commercial entity was involved constitutes a difference in facts 

but not one limiting the application of Southeastern. Rather, I 

believe the case exemplifies the observation that each case must 

be examined individually to discern the parties’ intent. In 

Southeastern, the insurance company issued a nationwide policy 

designed to address the concerns of a commercial enterprise.

Thus, although our respondent agreed to cover damages for 

bodily injury or property damage any insured becomes legally 

responsible to pay, including a duty to settle or defend, 

respondent’s policy is also drawn to address an important concern 

of insureds traveling through multiple jurisdictions, namely that 

an underinsured motorist may subject them to injury and 

damages. By addressing this concern, and expressly carving out 

this specific obligation, respondent surely anticipated it might 

choose to avail itself of the jurisdiction of any forum where such 

damage or injury caused by underinsured motorists, occurred. In 

declining such underinsured coverage, respondent should not be 

surprised it is being sued in the state where such damage and 

injury occurred.

I believe the economic reach of the territory of coverage 

clause, coupled with the third party liability coverage 

(anticipated defense of insureds in California), and coverage of 

damages to the insured for injury by an underinsured motor 

vehicle, bring this case within the ambit of those cases that would 

find specific jurisdiction in California.

Further, I do not observe any compelling reason why 

California, once determined to have specific jurisdiction, is an 

inconvenient forum. The accident occurred in California, 

witnesses are in this state, as is other evidence. Moreover, 

respondent has demonstrated it is quite capable of mounting a 
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defense with the assistance of law firms in this state, and indeed 

it may anticipate being called into, or employing, California 

courts if third party coverage liability arises.

Finally, I do not suggest coverage is ultimately owed. The 

issue of whether Brittney is covered by her parents’ policy is not 

before us.

___________________________

BENKE, J.*

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth 

Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.