alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
32.2








CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT


TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Quick-Med
Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2009
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Nam H. Nguyen, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certify, pursuant Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:





(a)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and







(b)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.














Dated:  May
15,
2009                                                                                          /s/ Nam H.
Nguyen


Nam H. Nguyen


Chief Financial
Officer
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YUNCHUAN CHOU,

 Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 14-71578

Agency No. A087-700-346

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted April 26, 2016**

Before: McKEOWN, WARDLAW, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

Yunchuan Chou, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an 

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum and 

withholding of removal. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 2 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 14-71578

review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, and we review de 

novo legal questions. Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). 

We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review. 

We lack jurisdiction to consider Chou’s argument that the IJ discredited 

facts in his asylum application because he did not raise this claim to the BIA. See 

Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction 

to review claims not presented to the agency). 

Chou claims past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution 

based on his participation in a Christian house church. Substantial evidence 

supports the agency’s finding that Chou failed to establish that he suffered harm 

that rose to the level of persecution. See Gu v. Gonzalez, 454 F.3d 1014, 1020-21 

(9th Cir. 2006) (record did not compel the conclusion that petitioner’s three-day 

detention, interrogation, and beating with a rod rose to the level of persecution). 

We reject Chou’s contention that the agency did not consider the economic harm 

he suffered. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that 

Chou failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. See id. at 1022; 

see also Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he IJ 

and the BIA are entitled to rely on all relevant evidence in the record, including a 
3 14-71578

State Department report, in considering whether the petitioner has demonstrated 

that there is good reason to fear future persecution.”). We reject Chou’s

contention that the BIA failed to address his arguments on appeal. See Lata v. 

INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring error to prevail on a due 

process claim). Thus, we deny Chou’s petition as to his asylum claim.

Because Chou failed to establish eligibility for asylum, his withholding of 

removal claim necessarily fails. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1190 

(9th Cir. 2006).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                    JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                      MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                           0
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    0
<ALLOWANCES>                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                      0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 0
<PP&E>                                           0
<DEPRECIATION>                                   0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,495
<BONDS>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                        50
<OTHER-SE>                                  (1,545)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     0
<SALES>                                          0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 0
<CGS>                                            0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                5,351
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (5,351)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              0
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                                (5,351)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (0.00)<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                (0.00)
<FN>
<F1>*Less than .01 per share
</FN>




</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Amended Quarterly Report of Poseidis, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB/A for the period ending May 31, 2006 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Louis
Pardo, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company, certify pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

         1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company for the period presented in the Report.


Dated: November 21, 2007
                                     /S/ LOUIS PARDO
                                     -------------------------------------
                                     Louis Pardo
                                     Chief Executive Officer and President
The Honorable Joseph E. Stevens, Jr., United States District Judge for the

1

Western District of Missouri

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-2341

___________

Charlie Nathanael Lee, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

William J. Pierce; Jeff Carr; Janett * Western District of Missouri.

Riley; Dr. Mark Catron, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: June 17, 1998

 Filed: June 26, 1998

___________

Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD,

Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Charlie Nathanael Lee appeals from the district court&s grant of summary

1

judgment to defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, claiming constitutional

violations during his jail confinement. Having carefully reviewed the record and the

parties& briefs, we affirm the judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
-2-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 17, 2024

No. 04-23-00832-CV

ENVIRONMENTAL INDUSTRIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC. d/b/a EISG, Inc., Barry 

Esene, and Ruthie Esene,

Appellants

v.

HOLT TEXAS LTD,

Appellee

From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2021-CI-13443

Honorable Christine Vasquez-Hortick, Judge Presiding

ORDER

In accordance with the court’s opinion on this date, this appeal is DISMISSED FOR 

WANT OF JURISDICTION. We ORDER appellant to pay the costs of this appeal.

It is so ORDERED on January 17, 2024.

_____________________________

Beth Watkins, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 17th day of January, 2024.

_____________________________

Michael A. Cruz, Clerk of Court
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Ashanti Griffin, Appellant.

[986 NYS2d 358]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Hayes, J.), rendered November 18, 2009, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant claims that he was deprived of his right to be present at a *Sandoval*hearing *(see People v Dokes,*79 NY2d 656 [1992]; *see generally People v Sandoval,*34 NY2d 371 [1974]), but he forfeited that claim by pleading guilty *(see People v Henderson,*233 AD2d 253, 254 [1996]; *cf. People v Dunbar,*240 AD2d 275, 275 [1997]). Likewise, the defendant forfeited his claim that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at the *Sandoval*hearing, inasmuch as that claim “does not directly involve the plea and sentence negotiation” *(People v Bennett,*115 AD3d 973, 973 [2014]; *see People v Ross,*113 AD3d 877, 878 [2014]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

Skelos, J.E, Balkin, Hall and Maltese, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Raul GARCIA-PINON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-40601

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 19, 2011.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Timothy William Crooks, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Raul Garcia-Pinon has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396,18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and *United States v. Flores,*632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir.2011). Garcia-Pinon has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

September 5, 2018

No. 04

- 18

- 00583

- CR

Jose Hernandez PEREZ

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 289th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No . 2018CR4049 Honorable Daphne Previti Austin, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellant entered into a plea bargain with the State, and pled nolo contendere to the charged offense. The trial court imposed sentence in accordance with the agreement and signed a certificate stating this “is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The clerk’s record, which

includes the tri al court’s rule 25.2(a)(2) certification and a written plea bargain agreement, has been filed. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). This court must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record.” Id. The clerk’s record establishes the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The record also appears to support the trial cour t’s certification that appellant does not have a right to appeal. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that court of appeals should review clerk’s record to determine whether trial court’s certification is accurate).

Appell ant is hereby given notice that this appeal will be dismissed pursuant to rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure unless an amended certification showing that appellant has the right to appeal is made part of the appellate record by September 26, 2018 . See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d); Daniels v. State, 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, order), disp. on merits, No. 04

- 03

- 00176

- CR, 2003 WL 21508347 (July 2, 2003, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication). We ORDER al l appellate deadlines are suspended until further order

of the court._________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 5th day of September, 2018

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

, Clerk of Court
#### Lurdes Correia et al., Respondents, v Eduardo Suarez, Appellant.

[860 NYS2d 611]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendant appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Bellantoni, J.), entered October 13, 2006, as, upon a jury verdict, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against him awarding punitive damages in the principal sum of $70,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and the matter is remitted for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, unless within 30 days after service upon the plaintiffs of a copy of this decision and order, the plaintiffs shall serve and file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Westchester County, a written stipulation consenting to reduce the verdict as to punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress from the sum of $70,000 to the sum of $15,000; in the event that the plaintiffs so stipulate, then the judgment, as so reduced and amended, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s charge on the issue of punitive damages is unpreserved for appellate review *(see*CPLR 4110-b; *Harris v Armstrong,*64 NY2d 700 [1984]; *Ross v Mandeville,*45 AD3d 755 [2007]; *Maskantz v Hayes,*39 AD3d 211 [2007]; *Taggart v Shaw,*36 AD3d 683 [2007]; *Silverstein v Marine Midland Trust Co. of N.Y.,*35 AD3d 840 [2006]).

However, upon review of the record and consideration of the applicable factors, we agree with the defendant that the award of punitive damages in the amount of $70,000 for intentional infliction of emotional distress is excessive and impermissibly disproportionate to the award of $3,000 in compensatory damages on that same cause of action *(see State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v Campbell,*538 US 408 [2003]; *BMW of North America, Inc. v Gore,*517 US 559 [1996]; *Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Haslip,*499 US 1 [1991]; *Maskantz v Hayes,*39 AD3d 211 [2007]; *Sawtelle v Waddell & Reed, Inc.,*21 AD3d 820 [2005]). Accordingly, we remit the matter for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional *642distress, unless the plaintiffs agree to a reduction in the award from the sum of $70,000 to the sum of $15,000. Mastro, J.E, Skelos, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                   EXHIBIT 21

                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT


Parent
------

PVF Capital Corp.



                                        State or Other
                                        Jurisdiction of          Percentage
Subsidiaries (1)                        Incorporation            Ownership
----------------                        ---------------          ----------

Park View Federal Savings Bank               U.S.                   100%

PVF Service Corporation                      Ohio                   100%

PVF Mortgage Corp.                           Ohio                   100%

PVF Community Development Corp.              Ohio                   100%

Mid Pines Land Co.                           Ohio                   100%

PVF Holdings Inc.                            Ohio                   100%

------------
(1)  The assets, liabilities and operations of the subsidiaries are included in
     the consolidated financial statements contained in the Annual Report to
     Stockholders attached hereto as Exhibit 13.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 1**  **2 -**  **8012**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , P laintiff

- Appell ee ,
v. ERNEST FREDERICK HODGES, JR. , Defendant

- Appell ant .

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Roanoke
. Samuel G. Wilson , District Judge. ( 7:05

- cr - 00040

- SGW

- 1; 7:11

- cv - 80336

- SGW )

Submitted : April 1 8, 2013 Decided: April 22, 2013

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY , and DAVIS , Circuit Judges.

Dismiss ed by un published per curiam opinion
. Ernest Frederick Hodges, Jr. , Appellant Pro Se. Ronald Andrew Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Erne st Frederick Hodges, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court ’ s order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reconsideration of the district court ’ s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. A. § 2255 ( West Supp. 2012 ) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2006).
A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “ a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. ” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion st ates a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Hodges has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and di smiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### In the Matter of Liang-Houh Shieh, an Attorney, Respondent. Committee on Professional Standards, Petitioner.

[665 NYS2d 735]

Per Curiam.

Respondent was admitted to practice by this Court in 1983. He resides in Taiwan.

Respondent was admitted to the California Bar in 1987. By order of the Supreme Court of California filed April 2, 1997, he was disbarred in that State.

Petitioner, the Committee on Professional Standards, moves to reciprocally discipline respondent, who has filed papers and cross-motions in opposition.

The decision of the State Bar Court upon which the Califor*802nia Supreme Court based its disbarment order introduced its discussion of the matter as follows: the respondent, “through his litigation in California state courts, federal courts, and the State Bar Court, may be considered, as one of his opposing attorneys characterized him, as ‘the benchmark by which all vexatious litigants in the state of California will be judged.’ As a result of his actions, the State Bar has charged respondent with committing acts of moral turpitude, failing to report substantial sanctions imposed against him, failing to show proper respect for courts, pursuing unjust litigation, commencing or continuing legal actions from a corrupt motive of passion or interest, and engaging in actions which constitute an offensive personality. After reviewing this substantial record, the Court agrees with the State Bar that Respondent has engaged in serious misconduct, has greatly harmed individuals and the administration of justice, lacks any insight into his misconduct, expresses no remorse, and, based on the standards and case law, should be disbarred from the practice of law in California.”

Our review of the voluminous papers respondent has submitted in opposition to the motion indicates that he has not established any of the defenses to reciprocal discipline set forth in our rule (22 NYCRR 806.19 [c]). Nor do the papers disclose mitigating circumstances warranting imposition of any discipline other than disbarment.

Therefore, under the circumstances presented, we grant petitioner’s motion and order respondent’s disbarment, effective immediately.

Cardona, P. J., Mikoll, Yesawich Jr., Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that petitioner’s motion for the imposition of reciprocal discipline is granted and respondent’s cross motions are denied; and it is further ordered that respondent is disbarred and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law, effective immediately; and it is further ordered that respondent is commanded to desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form either as principal or as agent, clerk or employee of another; and he is forbidden to appear as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, Judge, Justice, board, commission or other public authority or to give to another any opinion as to the law or its application, or any advice in relation thereto; and it is further ordered that respondent shall comply with the provisions of section 806.9 (22 NYCRR 806.9) of the rules of this Court regulating the conduct of disbarred attorneys.