United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 25, 2011*

Decided October 26, 2011

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

   

No. 11‐2299

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

EDWARD W. FEDOSKY,

Defendant‐Appellant.                 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 10‐CR‐160‐BBC‐01

Barbara B. Crabb,

Judge.

O R D E R

Edward Fedosky testified at a bankruptcy proceeding that a copy of a tax return he

gave to the trustee was a true copy of one he had sent to the Internal Revenue Service, when

in fact he hadn’t sent it yet. He pleaded guilty to knowingly and fraudulently making a false

oath in a bankruptcy case. See 18 U.S.C. § 152(2). The district court sentenced him to six

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

*

After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 11‐2299 Page 2

months’ imprisonment, the bottom of his guidelines range. He appealed, but his appointed

lawyer believes that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Fedosky did not accept our invitation to address

counsel’s submission. See 7TH CIR. R. 51(b). We confine our review to the potential issue that

counsel identified in her facially adequate brief. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968,

973–74 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel explains that she discussed with Fedosky whether he wants to challenge his

guilty plea and that he gave “no affirmative indication” he wants to do so. Counsel thus

properly omits discussion about the adequacy of the plea colloquy or the voluntariness of

the guilty plea. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel considers whether Fedosky might argue that his six‐month sentence is

unreasonable, but aptly rejects any such argument as frivolous. Fedosky’s sentence is at the

bottom of his guidelines range and thus presumptively reasonable, see Rita v. United States,

551 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2007); United States v. Moreno‐Padilla, 602 F.3d 802, 810 (7th Cir. 2010),

and counsel identifies no reason to disturb that presumption. When imposing this within‐

guidelines sentence, the district court properly applied the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The

court discussed Fedosky’s personal characteristics, noting his financial irresponsibility and

“questionable honesty,” see 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(1); United States v. Omole, 523 F.3d 691, 698

(7th Cir. 2008), and the need to protect the community from someone who runs up debts

that cannot be paid off, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(c). These considerations, according to the

court, outweighed Fedosky’s argument that probation would be more appropriate given the

absence of any loss resulting from the crime and his role as the sole provider for his family.

The court discussed the relevant sentencing factors and addressed Fedosky’s mitigating

arguments, and was required to do nothing more. See United States v. Kilgore, 591 F.3d 890,

893 (7th Cir. 2010).

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.