alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3210 

To authorize appropriations for the rural housing and economic development 

program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 14, 2009 

Mr. HINOJOSA (for himself, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, and Ms. WATERS) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services 

A BILL 

To authorize appropriations for the rural housing and economic development program of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Rural Housing and 

5 Economic Development Improvement Act of 2009’’. 

6 SEC. 2. RURAL HOUSING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 

7 ASSISTANCE. 

8 (a) USE.—The Secretary of Housing and Urban De9 velopment may carry out a program, through the Office 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3210 IH

1 of Rural Housing and Economic Development, to provide 

2 assistance to Indian tribes, State housing finance agen3 cies, State community or economic development agencies, 

4 local nonprofit organizations, and community development 

5 corporations in rural areas to support innovative housing 

6 and economic development activities in rural areas. 

7 (b) REQUIREMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT

8 NUMBER FOR ASSISTANCE.—As a condition of initial or 

9 continuing assistance under any housing or economic de10 velopment activity that is provided assistance with 

11 amounts made available under this section, the Secretary 

12 of Housing and Urban Development shall require that 

13 each member of a family so assisted (or of a family apply14 ing for such assistance) who is 18 years of age or older 

15 or is the spouse of the head of household of such family, 

16 shall have a valid social security number. 

17 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

18 authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Housing 

19 and Urban Development for assistance under this sec20 tion— 

21 (1) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2010; and 

22 (2) $40,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2011, 

23 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015. 

Æ 


smartinez on DSKB9S0YB1PROD with BILLS
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

KENNETH EUGENE HOLLOWAY,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 16

- 1049 0

D.C. No. 4:07

- cr

- 00344

- CW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 18, 2017 **

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Kenneth Eugene Holloway appeals from the district court’s order denying

his second motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Holloway argues that the district court erred by failing to consider

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously conc ludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

DEC 20 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 16

- 10490

adequately his amended Guidelines range, all of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

sentencing factors, and by insufficiently explaining its decision. The record

reflects the district court acknowledged the reduced Guidelines range and

Holloway’s eligibility for a reduction . T he court noted its reasons for denying

Holloway’s first motion for a sentence reduction in 2012, and then discussed

several of the section 3553(a) factors and its reasons for again denying the

reduction in light of those factors. On this record, we conclu de that the court

considered the section 3553(a) factors and adequately explained the sentence. See

United States v. Carty , 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (describing

what constitutes an adequate explanation and stating that “[t]he district c ourt need

not tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that it has considered them”).

Holloway also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in

light of his post

- sentencing rehabilitation and other mitigating factors. The district

c ourt did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce Holloway’s sentence. See

United States v. Dunn , 728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013). Holloway’s 1 4 7

-

month sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the section 3553(a)

sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant

.

See id. at 115 9

- 60

.

AFFIRMED

.
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 199 (Tuesday, October 17, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 48306]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-22397]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

 SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION


 Svoboda Capital Fund IV SBIC, L.P.; License No. 05/05-0327; 
Notice Seeking Exemption Under Section 312 of the Small Business 
Investment Act, Conflicts of Interest

    Notice is hereby given that Svoboda Capital Fund IV SBIC, L.P., One 
North Franklin Street, Suite 1500, Chicago, IL 60606, a Federal 
Licensee under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, as amended 
(``the Act''), in connection with the financing of a small concern, has 
sought an exemption under Section 312 of the Act and Section 107.730, 
Financings which Constitute Conflicts of Interest of the Small Business 
Administration (``SBA'') Rules and Regulations (13 CFR 107.730). 
Svoboda Capital Fund IV SBIC, L.P. proposes to provide equity security 
financing to Estate Cheese Group, LLC (d/b/a Sonoma Creamery), 21750th 
Street East, Sonoma, CA 95476 (``Sonoma'').
    The financing is brought within the purview of Sec.  107.730(a) and 
(d) of the Regulations because Svoboda Capital Fund IV, L.P., an 
Associate of Svoboda Capital Fund IV SBIC, L.P., owns more than ten 
percent of Sonoma, and therefore this transaction is considered a 
financing of an Associate requiring prior SBA approval.
    Notice is hereby given that any interested person may submit 
written comments on the transaction, within fifteen days of the date of 
this publication, to the Associate Administrator for Investment, U.S. 
Small Business Administration, 409 Third Street SW., Washington, DC 
20416.

    Dated: September 6, 2017.
A. Joseph Shepard,
Associate Administrator, Office of Investment and Innovation.
[FR Doc. 2017-22397 Filed 10-16-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David M. Martin, Appellant.

[667 NYS2d 265]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.), rendered January 18, 1995, convicting him of assault in the first degree (four counts), attempted robbery in the first degree (three counts), and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a nonjury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that the testimony of the photographic identification should have been suppressed as unduly suggestive, since the background of his photograph was much lighter than the other photographs in the array. This contention is without merit since it cannot be said that this difference tainted the photographic array *(see, People v Guzman,*220 AD2d 614, 615; *People v Robert,*184 AD2d 597; *Matter of Christopher E.,*163 AD2d 385; *People v Cherry,*150 AD2d 475, 476; *People v Emmons,*123 AD2d 475). In any event, assuming arguendo that the photographic identification was unduly sug*309gestive, the in-court identification of the defendant by the witnesses had an independent source (see, *Matter of Christopher E., supra; People v Caccamise,*198 AD2d 537; *People v Clark,*155 AD2d 548, 549).

The defendant’s remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v White,*192 AD2d 736, 737; *People v Rios,*180 AD2d 696), and, in any event, is without merit. Thompson, J. P., Pizzuto, Joy and Florio, JJ., concur.
Document headings vary by document type but may contain
                    the following: the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document
the number of the CFR title and the number of each part
                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly
                      related to
the agency docket number / agency internal file number
the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in
                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
                      Actions See the
                    Document Drafting Handbook
                    for more details.
 Small Business Administration [Disaster Declaration #15340 and #15341; South Carolina Disaster Number SC-00050]
 AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.
 ACTION: Notice.
 SUMMARY: This is a notice of an Administrative declaration of a disaster for the State of South Carolina dated 10/05/2017. *Incident:*
                         Hurricane Irma. *Incident Period:*
                         09/06/2017 through 09/13/2017.
 DATES: Issued on 10/05/2017. *Physical Loan Application Deadline Date:*
                         12/04/2017. *Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date:*
                         07/05/2018.
 ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.
 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: A. Escobar, Office of Disaster Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW., Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205-6734.


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that as a result of the Administrator's disaster declaration, applications for disaster loans may be filed at the address listed above or other locally announced locations. The following areas have been determined to be adversely affected by the disaster: *Primary Counties:*
                     Beaufort, Jasper. *Contiguous Counties:* *South Carolina:*
                     Colleton, Hampton. *Georgia:*
                     Chatham, Effingham. The Interest Rates are: Percent*For Physical Damage:*Homeowners with Credit Available Elsewhere
3.500Homeowners without Credit Available Elsewhere
1.750Businesses with Credit Available Elsewhere
6.610Businesses without Credit Available Elsewhere
3.305Non-Profit Organizations with Credit Available Elsewhere
2.500Non-Profit Organizations without Credit Available Elsewhere
2.500*For Economic Injury:*Businesses & Small Agricultural Cooperatives without Credit Available Elsewhere
3.305Non-Profit Organizations without Credit Available Elsewhere
2.500
 The number assigned to this disaster for physical damage is 15340 8 and for economic injury is 15341 0. The States which received an EIDL Declaration # are South Carolina, Georgia. (Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008) Linda E. McMahon, Administrator.


[FR Doc. 2017-22396 Filed 10-16-17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-11515

(Summary Calendar)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAMON YANEZ,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

(USDC No. 3:92-CR-006-1-D)

June 30, 1997

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Ramon Yanez pled guilty to fo ur counts of distribution of controlled substances and was

sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and charged a $200 special

assessment. In this appeal, Yanez challenges only the length of incarceration. In particular, Yanez

argues that the district court erred in (1) calculating the amount of drugs involved, and (2) concluding2

that Yanez was not entitled to a reduction in his offense level under the safety-valve provision of §

2D1.1(b)(4) and § 5C1.2.

We have reviewed the record and find no error. The district court did not clearly err in

calculating the amount of drugs involved in the transaction. S ee United States v. Mergerson

, 4 F.3d

337, 345 (5th Cir. 1993); U.S. S.G. § 2D.1 cmt. n.12. And the district court did not clearly err in

determining that Yanez did not meet the safety-valve provisions of § 2D1.1(b)(4) because he failed

to timely and truthfully provide information to the Government concerning the offense (as required

by U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(5)). S ee Uni ted States v. Rodri guez , 60 F.3d 193, 195 n.1 (5th Cir.), c ert.

denied , 116 S. Ct. 542 (1995).

AFFIRMED.
#### Casiano Ner et al., Respondents, v Regulo Celis, Defendant, George Gerardi, Appellant, and Joy N. Legreid, Respondent.

[664 NYS2d 481]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant George Gerardi appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lockman, J.), dated October 2, 1996, as denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as they are asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs, the motion of the defendant George Gerardi is granted; and the complaint and all cross claims are dismissed insofar as they are asserted against that defendant.

The defendant George Gerardi was the operator of the second vehicle involved in a four-car, chain-reaction collision. The evidence in the record, including the deposition testimony of Gerardi as well as that of the operator of the first vehicle and of *279the plaintiffs themselves, demonstrated that Gerardi succeeded in coming to a full stop behind the first vehicle, and that the vehicle following Gerardi also came to a full stop before being struck by the plaintiffs’ vehicle and propelled into Gerardi. The plaintiffs failed to come forward with evidence in admissible form to substantiate their claim that Gerardi negligently stopped short and/or followed the vehicle in front of him too closely *(see, e.g., DiPaola v Scherpich,*239 AD2d 459; *Ayoub v Dufont,*229 AD2d 368; *Bando-Twomey v Richheimer,*229 AD2d 554; *Leal v Wolff,*224 AD2d 392). Gerardi’s mere statement during his deposition that he “had to make an abrupt stop” was insufficient for this purpose. In any event, under the circumstances of this case, any purported negligence on the part of Gerardi could not have been a proximate cause of the collision as a matter of law *(see, e.g., Lehmann v Sheaves,*231 AD2d 687; *Chamberlin v Suffolk County Labor Dept.,*221 AD2d 580; *Parise v Meltzer,*204 AD2d 295; *Smith v Cafiero,*203 AD2d 355; *Pasek v Playtime Kiddiewear,*179 AD2d 412). Accordingly, Gerardi demonstrated his entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against him. Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Santucci and Lerner, JJ., concur.
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and in connection with the filing by Intermost
Corporation, a Wyoming Corporation (the “Company”) with the Securities and
Exchange Commission of its Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the three months
ended March 31, 2008 (the “Report”), the undersigned, Rocky Wulianghai,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, does hereby certify, that
to the best of his knowledge:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
      and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





This certification is being provided
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 and is not to be deemed a part of this Report, nor is
it to be deemed to be “filed” for any purpose whatsoever.





Date:  May
10, 2008








By:       /s/ Rocky Wulianghai


Rocky
Wulianghai,


President
and Chief Executive Officer





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Plymouth Financial Company, Inc., Respondent, v Plymouth Park Tax Services LLC, Appellant.

[989 NYS2d 29]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (O. Peter Sherwood, J.), entered July 5, 2013, in plaintiffs favor, and bringing up for review an order, same court and Justice, entered on or about April 18, 2013, which, inter alia, granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, and denied defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the judgment vacated, plaintiffs motion for summary judgment denied, defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment granted, and the complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint. Appeal from aforesaid order unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment.

The parties disagree as to how much of a $1 million “hold-back payment” detailed in their asset purchase agreement (APA) defendant must pay to plaintiff. Defendant contends that it is entitled to reduce the amount of its payment by the amount of an indemnification found in the APA’s section 8.1 (a) (v), for costs associated with a specifically identified litigation matter known as the “MRS Litigation.” Plaintiff argues that defendant must pay the full $1 million and cannot deduct the indemnification, because its affiliate company acquired separate counsel in the MRS Litigation and, according to section 8.6 of the APA, this separate counsel was obtained at defendant’s expense.

The motion court correctly determined that section 8.6 was intended to apply only to future third-party claims, while the indemnification in section 8.1 (a) (v) was intended to apply specifically to the then-pending MRS Litigation. However, the court incorrectly applied the provisions of section 8.6 to the MRS Litigation indemnification regardless of this distinction. Section 8.1 (a) (v) evinces the parties’ clear intent to place the risk of “any and all losses” connected to the MRS Litigation, including legal fees, “whether arising before or after the Closing,” squarely on plaintiff. The provisions of section 8.6 cannot be read to limit the indemnification found in section 8.1 (a) (v), as this interpretation would vitiate the language of section 8.1 *599(a) (v), rendering it meaningless *(see U.S. Bank N.A. v Lightstone Holdings LLC,*103 AD3d 458, 459 [1st Dept 2013]).

Accordingly, defendant is correct in asserting that it is entitled to reduce the amount of its $1 million hold-back payment by the amount of the MRS Litigation indemnification. Therefore, plaintiffs claim for breach of contract must be dismissed.

Concur—Acosta, J.E, Renwick, Feinman and Clark, JJ.
#### Rodney S. GREEN, Petitioner—Appellant, v. J. Michael STOUFFER, Commissioner of Correction; The Attorney General for Maryland, Respondents—Appellees.

No. 10-7602.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 21, 2011.

Decided: April 7, 2011.

Rodney S. Green, Appellant Pro Se. Diane Carroll Bustos, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Rodney S. Green, a state prisoner, seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 *&*Supp.2010) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Green has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of ap*255pealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
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