SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

240 

CA 11-02046 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CARNI, AND SCONIERS, JJ.

 

 

THOMAS BANNISTER AND LAURA BANNISTER, 

PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LPCIMINELLI, INC., CITY OF BUFFALO, BUFFALO 

PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY 

OF BUFFALO, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

HODGSON RUSS LLP, BUFFALO (RYAN J. LUCINSKI OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS. 

MAXWELL MURPHY, LLC, BUFFALO (ALAN D. VOOS OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Diane Y.

Devlin, J.), entered January 6, 2011 in a personal injury action. The

order denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously modified on the law by granting those parts of defendants’

motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and commonlaw negligence causes of action insofar as they are based on

defendants’ alleged supervision and control of plaintiff’s work and

the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action, and dismissing those causes

of action to that extent, and as modified the order is affirmed

without costs. 

Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this Labor Law and common-law

negligence action seeking damages for injuries sustained by Thomas

Bannister (plaintiff) when he slipped on ice and fell while working in

an open courtyard at a school renovation project. We agree with

defendants that Supreme Court erred in denying those parts of their

motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and

common-law negligence causes of action insofar as they are based on

defendants’ alleged supervision and control over plaintiff’s work, and

we therefore modify the order accordingly. Defendants established as

a matter of law that they did not have the authority to supervise or

control the methods and manner of plaintiff’s work (see Ortega v

Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61-63; Wade v Atlantic Cooling Tower Servs., Inc.,

56 AD3d 547, 549-550), and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue

of fact sufficient to defeat those parts of the motion (see generally

Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). We further conclude,

however, that the court properly denied defendants’ motion with
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CA 11-02046 

respect to those causes of action insofar as they are based on the

defective condition of the property where the project was located. 

Plaintiffs “need not establish that defendants had supervisory control

over the work being performed in the event that the accident was

caused by a defective condition on the premises and defendants had

actual [or] constructive notice of such defect” (McCormick v 257 W.

Genesee, LLC, 78 AD3d 1581, 1582; see also Ozimek v Holiday Val.,

Inc., 83 AD3d 1414, 1416). Where, as here, the plaintiff slipped and

fell on ice, the defendants “were required to establish ‘that the ice

formed so close in time to the accident that [they] could not

reasonably have been expected to notice and remedy the condition’ ”

(Sullivan v RGS Energy Group, Inc., 78 AD3d 1503, 1503). Although

defendants submitted plaintiff’s deposition testimony that he did not

inform defendants of the icy condition, we conclude that such evidence

alone is insufficient to establish that they did not have actual or

constructive notice of the icy condition. 

We agree with defendants that the court erred in denying that

part of their motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law

§ 241 (6) cause of action, and we therefore further modify the order

accordingly. To recover pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), plaintiffs

“must allege a violation of an applicable regulation ‘mandating

compliance with concrete specifications,’ as opposed to ‘those that

establish general safety standards’ ” (Motyka v Ogden Martin Sys. of

Onondaga Ltd. Partnership, 272 AD2d 980, 981, quoting Ross v CurtisPalmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 505). Although the complaint, as

amplified by the bill of particulars, alleges multiple violations of

the Industrial Code, plaintiffs conceded at oral argument on

defendants’ motion that the section 241 (6) cause of action was

premised solely upon a violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d). Thus, the

court erred in denying those parts of defendants’ motion seeking

summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action

insofar as it was based on the alleged violation of the remaining

regulations.

Pursuant to 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d), “[e]mployers shall not . . .

permit any employee to use a floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold,

platform or other elevated working surface which is in a slippery

condition. Ice, snow, water, grease and any other foreign substance

which may cause slippery footing shall be removed, sanded or covered

to provide safe footing.” We conclude, however, that the regulation

is inapplicable here based on the circumstances of plaintiff’s fall. 

Although that regulation “proscribes slipping hazards” (Farrell v Blue

Circle Cement, Inc., 13 AD3d 1178, 1179, lv denied 4 NY3d 708), it

does not apply where “the accident occurred in an open area and not on

a defined walkway, passageway or path” (Bale v Pyron Corp., 256 AD2d

1128, 1128). In support of their motion, defendants established that

the open courtyard in which plaintiff slipped does not constitute a

walkway, passageway or path sufficient to support a cause of action

based on an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) (see Hertel v

Hueber-Breuer Constr. Co., Inc., 48 AD3d 1259, 1260; Ramski v Zappia 
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CA 11-02046 

Enters., 229 AD2d 990). 

Entered: March 23, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court