### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ugus t 19 , 200 3 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. MIC HAE L C HRIS TOP HER AB RA MS

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 76148 Richard R. Baum gartner , Judge

No. E2003-00810-CC A-R3- CD F ebruary 13, 2004
The pe titioner appea ls the Knox County Criminal Court’s s u m m ar y dismiss al of his appe al and petition for writ of c ertiora ri, arguing that he was entitled to a criminal court review of the g ener al sessions court’s rulingon his moti on t o s u p p ress evidence . Be cause we c onclude we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss t he appe al.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dism issed

A L AN E. G L EN N , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, in w hich J O S EP H M. T I PTON and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

He rb e rt S. M on c ie r, Kn oxvil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the a pp e lla nt, Mic ha e l Ch ri sto ph e r A br a ms.

Pa ul G. Sum me rs , Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; B ra de n H . B ou c e k, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney Gene ral; and C. L eon Fr anks, Assistant D istri ct At t o rn ey Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

F ACTS AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY

On J anuar

y 5, 2002, a Knox County sheriff ’s deputy initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle that resulted in the arr est of the pa sseng er, the petitioner, Michae l Christopher Abrams, on drug -re lated char g es. On July

17, 2002, the petitioner filed a motion to s uppress in t he Ge nera l Sessions C ourt of Knox Count y

in which he a

rgued that the she riff’ s deputy lacke d the authori t y t o conduct the traff ic s t o p beca

use his oath of off

ice wa s not properly

administered a

nd not filed with the ap p ro p ri at e o ff

i ce

. T h e f

i v e j u d ge s o f t h e ge n er al s es s i o n s co u rt , s i t t i n g en banc , dismiss ed the motion to s uppress in a written opinion entere d on Dec ember 2, 2002, finding that the deputy was a defac to of

fi c e r at th e tim e of

the sto p, his a c tio ns we re va lid , a nd the mot ion

to s up pr e ss constituted a collate ral attack on the of fice r’s a uthority to act, which w as not permitted by law.-2-

On Dec ember

13, 2002, the petitioner filed a notice of a

ppeal to the Knox County Criminal Court pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec ti o n 40-4-110, a s well as a ple adingentitled “Appe al and Petiti on Certiorar i and Supersede as F rom the Orde r of the K nox County

Gene ral Se ssi on s Court .” Af

te r he ari ng the matte r, the c ri min a l c ourt , on F e br ua ry 19 , 2 00 3, de nie d th e wr it and d i smissed the appea l on the basis that the g ener al sessions court’s de nial of the pe titioner’s motion to s uppress e vidence was ne ither a pr oper g round for revie w under

a petiti on for wr it of
cer tiorari and supe rsede as nor a f inal judgme nt subject to direct c riminal court re view. The trial
c ourt ’s or de r s tate s in

pe rt ine nt p art :
Def endant c oncede s at oral argument that this is not a dire ct appea l from the Ge n era l Sessions C ourt as it is not a final orde r of that Co urt

. Defendant d oe s c la im, ho we ve r, that it is s ub je c t to revie w pursuant to ce rtiorar i and superc edes [s i c]

. He a sserts that be c a us e the Ge ne ra l Se ssi on s Co ur t dismi sse d his moti on to s up pr e ss on the gr ounds that he could not collate rally attack the law enfor ceme nt office r’s a

uthority to act due to de fec ts in the manner [t he] oath was administere d and filed, that an interlocutory revie w by this court is warr anted.

I n State v. J ohnson, 569 S.W .2d 808 (Ten n . 1978), our Sup re me Court

he ld that ce rt ior ari and

su pe rc e de s [si c ] wo uld

lie to inquire i nto various inferior court actions i ncluding , but not restricted to t he fo llo wi ngsit

uatio ns :
A. W here the ru lin g of the c ourt be low re pr e se nts a f u n d am e n t a l i l l e g a l i t y. B. Wh er e t he rulingconstitutes a fa ilure to proce ed
acc ording to the essential re quirements of la w. C. Where the r

uling is tantamount to the denia l to either pa rt y of a da y in c ourt

. D. Where the action of the trial judg e wa s without lega l
a u t h o r i t y. E. Whe re the a c tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt

c on sti tut e d a

[pla in and palpa ble abuse ] of discretion. F. Where e ither par

ty has lost a rig ht or

interest that may
never be re captur ed.

Af te r c on sid e ri ngargume nts of c ouns e l, a

nd re vie wi ngthi s matter, this court is of the opinion that def endant’ s position [does] not
asser t a ny of the criter ia set forth in State v. J ohnson. T h e G en er al S e s s i o n s C o u rt ru l i n g d o e s n o tr e p r e s e n ta f u n d a m e n t a l i l l e g a l i t y; does not constitute a fa ilure to proce ed ac cordingto these esse ntial require ments of law; does not de ny either pa rty a day in court; i s not-3- without lega l authority ; did not constit ute an a buse of discr etion; and does not deprive a par

ty a righ t that cannot be re- asser ted or
rec apture d. Be cause this court does not believe that defe ndant’s appea l meets the g rounds for revie w under a petition for c ertiora

ri and superc edes [ sic], and is not a final judgme nt with the Gener al Sessions Court subj ect to re view by this Court, the appea l is hereby DI SM ISSED , an d the ca se is rema nded to the Ge nera l Sessions Court fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s. Subsequently , the trial cour t denied the pe titioner’s motion for relief from its order , and the petitio n er fi l ed a timely

notice of a

ppeal to this court under Rule 3 of the Te nnessee Rules of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure . H ow e ve r, be c a us e Rul e 3 d oe s n ot p ro vid e fo r a n a pp e al of a

n a dv e rs e cer tiorari ruling , this court reque sted at ora l argument that the pa rt i es fi l e suppl emental br iefs addre ssing our

jurisdiction to entertain this appea l.

AN AL YSI S

There are essentially

two issues prese nted by

th i s ap p eal: (1) whether the trial cour

t erre d in summarily

dismiss ing the petitioner’s appeal a nd petition for writ of c ertiora ri, and (2) whether this court has jurisdiction to enter tain this appea l. As to the first issue, the petitioner c ontends he wa s e nti tle d to a

c ri min a l c ourt

re vie w o f t

he g e ne ra l se ssi ons c ourt ’s de nia l of his mot ion

to s up pr e ss evidenc e pursua

nt to common law/constitutional certiora ri, statutory

cer tiorari, or Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-4-110, which provides that ce rtain proc eeding s of the g ener al sessions court may be super cede d and re moved by cer tiorari to the cir cuit court of the c ounty “upon g ood cause .” The pe titioner argues t he criminal court errone ously failed to addre ss his claims for r eview pur suant to T e nn e sse e Cod e Anno tat ed se c tio n 4 0- 4- 11 0 o r s tatut or y c e rt ior ari , a

nd e rr on e ou sly

de nie d h is petition pursuant to common law certiorar i by mistakenly applying the State v. J ohnson, 569 S.W .2d 808 (Tenn. 1978) , criter ia as the e x clusive proc edura l prere quisite s fo r g rantingcommon law
cer tiorari.

As for the latter issue, the pe titioner first contends this c ourt may enter tain the appe al under Rule 3(a) of t he Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e, which pr ovides that an a ppellate c ourt has jur isd ic tio n to re vie w f

ina l j ud gment s in c ivi l a c tio ns . H e c on c e de s th a t hi s mo tio n to su pp re ss evid e n c e ar o s e in

th e c o n te xt o f

a c r im in a l c a s e

. N o n e th e le s s , h e a s s e rts th a t t h e c r im in a l c ourt applied Rule 12.06 of the T ennesse e Rules of C ivil Procedur e to dismiss his petition on t he g rounds that it failed to state a c laim for wh i ch re lief could be g rante d, as there is no rule of c riminal proce dure w hich provides f or the summary

dismiss al of a writ of ce rtiorar i. He ar g ues, there fore , that this court should ap p l y T ennessee Rule of Appe llate Proce dure 3( a) to re view the c riminal court’s a ction as a f

inal j u d gm en t on the petition. I n the alter native, he a

rgues this court has the authority to consider the appea l pur suant to a writ of c ertiora ri, as an e x traordina

ry appea l pursuant to Tennesse e Rule of Appe llate Proce dure 10, or under Te nnessee Rule of Appe llate Proce dure 2 which provide s that an appe llate cour t may suspend any

of the rule s of appe llate proc edure “for g ood
cause .”-4-

Th e State re sp on ds to t

he pe tit ion e r’ s c on te nti on that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in dis mis sin g his appea l and denying his pe tition for writ of cer tiorari by arguing, inte r a lia : (1) the pe titioner failed to assert a ny g rounds in support of statutory cer tiorari; (2) Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 40-4- 11 0 d oe s n ot p e rm it i nte rl oc uto ry a pp e a ls t o th e c ri min a l c ourt ; and (3 ) t he c ri min a l c ourt

c or re c tly de nie d th e pe tit ion e r’ s w ri t of c omm on law c e rt ior ari be caus e he is n ot w ith out ot he r r e me die s, including the ability

to file a motion to suppress the evide n ce p re t ri al u nder Te nnessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b) a nd, should the motion be denied, to either e nter a conditional plea of gu i l t y wh i l e r es erv i n g t h e q u es t i o nfo r ap p ea l o r t o ra i s e t h e i s s u e o nd i re ct ap p ea l f o l l o wi n g a c on vic tio n at tr ia l. A s f

or the se c on d issu e , the State argue s th is c ourt la c ks jur isd ic tio n und e r R ule 3 of the Rules of Appe llate Proce d u re beca use this appea l is of a cr iminal matter for which a judgme nt of conviction has not been entere d. Acc ording ly , by the S tate’s argument, this court lac ks jurisdiction under Rule 10 of the Rules of Appe llate Proce dure be cause the cr iminal court’s orde r dismiss ing the appea l and petition is not an interlocutory order wher e re view is nec essar y to preve nt the petit ioner from fore ver losing an interest. Finally , the S tate arg ues t hat this court should decline to a c c e pt j ur isd ic tio n und e r e ith e r R ule 2 of the Rul e s of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure or purs ua nt t o a wr it of common law c ertiora

ri bec ause the petitioner has other available reme dies at his disposal.

Jurisdi ction to Entert ain App eal

We first a d d

r e s s th e p e ti tioner’s c ontention that this court’s jurisdiction to consider his appea l arises unde r Ru l e 3 o f t he Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e. The petitioner conc edes subsecti o n ( b ) , w h ic h g r an ts a c r im in a l d e f e n d an t an a

p p e a l a s o f r igh t f

r o m a ju d g ment of conviction, from a

n order denying or

revokingprobat i o n , and fr om a final judg ment in a cr iminal contempt, h ab eas corpus, extradition, or post-conviction proce eding , does not g ive this court jurisdiction over the c riminal court’s dismissa l o f h i s petition for writ of c ertiora ri. Instead, the petitioner conte nds that beca use the trial court applied Rule 12.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedur e to summarily

dismiss his petition on t he g rounds that it failed to state a claim for which re lief may be g rante d, fundame ntal fairne ss dictates that this court re view the tri al co u rt ’s dismissal under subsection (a ) of Rule 3, whic h provides in pe rtinent part that “[i] n civil actions eve ry final judg ment
e nte re d b y

a tr ial court

fr om whic h a

n a pp e a l li e s to the Sup re me Court or Court of Ap pe a ls i s appea lable as of

rig ht.” The pe titioner bases his c laim that the trial court applied Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 12.06 to dismi ss his pe tition on the fac t that “ [n] o Rule of Criminal Proc edure applies to a pe tition for cer tiorari from Gene ral Sessions Court to criminal cour t” and “ [n] o Rule of Criminal Procedure permits a trial c ourt to dismiss a petiti on prior to a hearing .” Howe ver, a s the State points out, there is no rule of c ivil procedure that cover s the filing of a petition for wr it of cer

tiorari either . Moreove r, althoug h a full evide ntiary hear ing ma

y not have be en held, the tr ial court’s or der r ecites it hear d the matter “ on Fe bruar

y 11, 2002,” and a llowed the par ties to prese nt oral ar g ument befor e conc luding it h a d n o ju

ri sd ic tio n to c on sid e r t

he iss ue a s a

dir e c t a pp e a l a s th e re wa s n o fi nal , a pp e a la ble judgme nt in the ge nera l se ssions c ourt, and there wer e no g rounds to suppor t granting the petition for wr it of cer

tiorari. “D ecision s ei t her to g rant or to de ny a petition for wr it of cer tiorari ar e ordinarily based on the alleg ations in the petition, although the r eviewing court may , in its di scre tion,-5-

conduct a hear ing be fore g rantingthe writ.” Timothy V. Bowling v. Tenne ssee Bd. of Paroles, No. M2001-00138-COA- R3-CV , 2 0 0 2 WL 772695, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2002). Since the pe tit ion e r’ s c la im f

or the ri g ht to a revi ew of

the g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ourt ’s ru lin g pr e se nte d le g a l, rathe r than fac tual, issues, a full evidentiar y hear ing was not ne cessa ry in this case. The ref

ore, w e c on c lud e we have no jur isd ic tio n to e nte rt a in thi s a pp e a l un de r e ith e r su

bs e c tio n (a ) or (b ) of

Rul e 3 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e. The pe titioner next contends this court has jurisdiction pur suant to Rule 10 of the Rules of Appellate Proc edure . Rule 10 provides that an a ppellat e cour

t may , in its di scre tion, gr ant an extraordinary

appea l of interlocutory

order s of a lowe r cour

t “(1) if the lower

court ha s so far depar ted from the a cce pted and usua l course of judicial proce eding s as to requir e immediate r eview,
or (2 ) if ne c e ssa

ry fo r c omp le te de te rm inatio n o f t he a c tio n o n a

pp e a l a s o the rw ise pr ov ide d in the se rules.” T enn. R. App. P. 10(a) (2003). W e agr ee with the State that a Rule 10 discr etionary appea l is not appropriate under the circ umstances of this case

. “Ty pically , the Rule 10 re quirements for a dis c re tio na

ry a pp e a l are no t me t w hen a tr ia l c ourt ov e rr ule s a de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss evidenc e.” State v. N orris, 47 S.W .3d 457, 463 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Our supre me cour t has
c on c lud e d th a t an e xtra or din ary a pp e a l, whe the r p ur su ant t o a c omm on law wri t of

c e rt ior ari or

to Rule 10 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e, is appropr iate:

a. Where the ruli n g o f the cour t below re prese nts a fundame ntal i l l e g a l i t y.
b. Where the ruling constitutes a failure to proce ed ac cordingto the essential re quirements of the law.

c. Where the ruling is tantamount t o t h e d en i al of either party of a da y in c ourt

. d

. W h e r e t h e a c t i o no f

t h e t r i a l j u d g e w a s w i t h o u tl e g a l a u t h o r i t y.

e . Wh e re the a c tio n o f t

he tr ia l ju dg e c on sti tut e d a pla in a nd pa lpa ble abuse of discretion.

f. Where e ith er p arty

has lost a rig ht or interest that may never be
rec apture d.

State v. Wil loughby , 594 S.W .2d 388, 392 (Tenn. 1980) (citing J ohnson, 569 S.W .2d at 815); see also State v. Adrian Lumpkin, No. W 2002-00648-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31730894, at *2 (Te nn. Cr im

. Ap p

. N o v

. 2 7 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( a p p ly in g Wi ll o u g hb y

f a c to r s to c o n c lu d e th a t d e f e n d an t m et require ments for a

Rule 10 ext raor dinary appeal beca use trial cour

t imposed ill eg al condition of confine ment in its gra

nt of judicial d i v er s i o n ). I n this case, the tr ial court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s a

ppeal a nd petition for writ of c ertiora ri meets none of

the cr iteria listed above

.-6-

Finally , the petitioner urg es this c ourt to a cce pt jur isdiction either under Rule 2 of the Rules of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure , w hic h p ro vid e s th a t, w itha fe w e xce ption s, the R

ule s o f A

pp e llate Procedur e may

be suspende d “[f]or good c ause, inc luding the interest of e x pediting de cision upon any matter,” or pursua

nt to a writ of ce rtiorar i. Howeve r, we ag ain ag ree with the State that neither of these e x traordina

ry m et h o ds for obtainingjurisdiction is appropriate in this case beca use the pe tit ion e r h a s o the r a

ve nu e s b y wh ic h to c ha lle ng e the le g a lity of the tr a ff ic sto p whi ch led

to h is
arr est on drugchar g es.

Tenne ssee Rule of A

ppellate Proc edure 2 al l o ws an appellate court to assume jurisdiction in a n a pp ro pr iate c a se by

su sp e nd i n g the jur isd ic tio na l r e qu ir e me nts of Rul e 3. Se e B ay

be rr y As so c s. v. J o n es , 7 8 3 S

. W

. 2 d 553, 559 (Tenn. 1990) (finding , under Rule 2, “ no bar to the suspe nsion of Rule 3(a) ”). The c ourt must, however , find a g ood rea son for the suspe nsion of the rules, whic h we fail to find her e. I d. Nor do we find this sit uation appropr iat e for the ext raor dinary reme dy of
cer tiorari. A wr it of cer

tiorari is “a

proce dural ve hicle which . . . f uncti ons proper ly

when a court
us e s it to re vie w a pr oc e e din g to d e te rm ine wh e the r t he re we re any

ir re g ula ri tie s. ” State v. Wins e tt, 882 S.W .2d 806, 809 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary , 228 (6 ed. 1990))

. th Constit utional or common law ce rtiorar i is codified at Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 27-8-101:

Const i tu ti o n al basi s. – The wr it of cer tiorari may

be g rante d whene ver authorized by law, and also in a ll c ases whe re an i n fer ior tribunal, board, or office r exercising judicial functions has e x cee ded the jurisdiction confe rre d, or is acting illega lly , when, in the judgme nt of the c ourt, there is no other plain, spee dy , or ade quate r emedy

. Thus , th e c omm on

law w ri t of

c e rt ior ari is an e xtra or din ary re me dy wh ic h is not av a ila ble a s o f r ig ht. Bla ckmon v. Tenne ssee B d. of Paroles, 29 S.W .3d 875, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). “ Whether the common law wr i t o f ce rt iorari will issue is a matter of discretion. I t is not i ssued as a matter of rig ht.” B oy ce v. Williams, 215 Tenn. 704, 713-14, 389 S.W .2d 272, 277 (1965) ( citation omitted). Th e Court

of Ap pe a ls h a s e xpla ine d th e dis c re tio na ry natur e of thi s w ri t:

The c ommon-law writ of c ertiora ri is co n s idere d an
e xtra or din ary

re me dy that is no t ava ila

ble a s of right. I t sh ou ld o nly be g rante d when, in the wor ds of Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8- 101 (2000), “ther e is no other plain, spe edy , or ade quate r emedy .” While the statutory require ment that the person seeking the writ have no othe r plain, speedy , or adequate remedy does not impose strict “finality ” or “exhaustion of reme dies” re quiremen ts on petitions for writs of common-law c ertiora

ri, i t reflects a rev iewing court’s prudential
o b li ga ti o n to s ta

yit s h a n d a n d to d e c li n e to dis r u

p t o n -going procee dings when timely and adequate relief for the perce ived wrong is available either in the on-going proce eding or elsewhere

. Bow ling, 2002 WL772695, at *2 (c itations and footnote omitted) (empha sis added).-7-

On appe al, the def

endant ha s prese nted the additional ar gument that the ac tion of the g ener al sessions court violated va rious of his constitutional r i gh t s , as s ertingthat it was, in eff ect, a “proc edura l dismi ssal” of his motion to suppress because the court “mistakenly viewed [his] motion to s up pr e ss a s an atta c k o n th e of fi c e r’ s a uth or it y , rat her th an an atta c k o n th e state ’s a bil ity to in tr oduce ev id ence .

. . th at w as u nl awfu ll y ob tai nedby

th e cri mi n a l actof t he s tat e’s agent .” By do ingso , a c c or din g to t he de fe nd ant’s argume nt, the g e ne ra l se ssi on s c ourt vio late d h is
c on sti tut ion a l ri g hts un de r the F ourt h, F if th, and F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nts , a s w e ll a s und e r A rt ic le I , Sections 7, 9, and 17 of the T ennesse e Constituti on. We ag ree with the d ef

en dant’s asse rtion that a pre liminary hear ing is a

critica l part of a criminal prose cution, as our supre me cour t has ex p l ai n ed most rece ntly in State v. Gr a ve s, ___S.W .3d___, 2003 WL 21212667, at *4 (Te nn. 2003):

I n McKe ldin v. St ate, 516 S.W.2d 82, 85-86 (Tenn. 1974) , . . . , we rec og nized that the T ennesse e pre liminary hear ing is a

"c ritical stag e" of the c riminal prosec ution a nd that its importanc e to the def ense a s a di s co v er y

tool could not be ignor ed. I d. I n addition, the preliminary

hear ing is g ener ally

the first opportunit y

the def ense ha s to confront a

nd cross-e x amine witnesses unde r oath. See id.
This court, i n State v. Whaley , 51 S.W .3d 568, 570 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), noted another function of a

preliminary

hear ing, “ to determine wh et h er p ro b able c ause e x ists to believe that the
acc used committed the off ense ch ar ged, and to f

ix the amount of ba il for bailable of fense s.” Howeve r, the fa cts that a pre liminary hear ing is a criti cal stag e in a c riminal prosec ution and the g ener al sessions court dismissed the def endan t ’s m otion to suppress without the presentation of witnesses does not, as we wil l explain, lead us to conclude that his constitut ional rig hts were violated
or eve n that the proc eedingwas unfa ir.

The de fendan t m akes a

number of c laims as to the dismiss al of his suppression motion,
sayingthat it was “erro neo us ,” be c a us e the c ourt

“ mis take nly

vie we d [th e de fe nd ant’ s] mo tio n to suppress as a

n attack on the officer’ s authority , rathe r than a n attack on the state’s a

bility to introduce evidenc e ag ainst [t he def

endant] . . . obtained by

the cr iminal act of the state’s a g ent.” He argues that “[i] t is leg ally sound to provide for an appe al from a

n err oneous ruling during a pre liminary hear ing.”
We respec tfully

disag ree with the defe ndant’s c h a r a c terization of the g ener al sessions court’s ruling as deny

ing him the rig ht to a motion to s uppress be cause the judg es conc luded that the motion constituted “a ‘ collater al attac k’ on the off icer ’s authority

that can only

be pursue d by

the District Attorney .” B y

our view, the g ener al sessions court conclude d, rig htly or wrong ly , that the def

endant did not have standingto pur sue the c laim which was the basis for his motion to suppress. Thus, the
c ourt c ompl ied wi th R

ule 5. 1 a nd ru le d o n th e de fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss, a lth ou g h d oin g so on a proc edura l basis. Reg ardles s o f h o w the def endant c hara cter izes the ruling of the g ener al sessions court and a

rgues that it was wrong and unfair, t he fact remains that the cour t neither ig nored nor dismissed without ex planation the motion to suppress. Ba sed upon the re cord, w e conc lude that-8-

the de fe nd ant w a s a ff

or de d h is ri g hts un de r T e nn e sse e Rul e of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 5. 1, and that, i n de nyinghis mot ion

to sup pr e ss, the g e ne ra l ses sio ns c ourt did no t viol a te his c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts

.
I n c on c lus ion , a lth ou g h th e pet it io ner ar g ue s to the c on tr ary , w e c on c lud e that th e re is a timely and adequa

te relief to the perc eived wrong in this case

. The State corr ectly n o t es t h at t he g ener al sessions court’s r uling on the suppr ession issue is not dispos itive, as the petitioner r etains the rig ht to file a pretria l motion to suppr ess the evidenc e in the trial court under Te nnessee Rule of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 12 (b ). Sho uld the tr ia l c ourt

de ny his mot ion a t th a t st a g e in t he pr oc e e din g s, he may then plead guilty

while re serving the s uppression i ssue as a certified question of law pur suant to Tennesse e Rule of Criminal Proce dure 37( b)(2) , or proc eed to tria l and ra ise the issue on direc t appea l pursuant to Tenne ssee Rul e of Appellate Procedure 3(b) should he be f ound g uilty . We find without merit the petitioner’s ar g ument that a re view of the suppression i ssue at the ge nera l sessions l e v e l w o u l d

b e m o r e e f

f i c i e n tt h ant o w a i t f

o r t h e r e s u l t s o f

t h e o n g o i n g c r i m i n a l m a t t e r , w h i c h m ay, in f a c t, o bv iate the ne e d f

or any a pp e llate re vie w o f t

he iss ue . We, the re fo re , de c lin e to gra nt a wr it of ce rtiorar i.

CO NC LU SION

B a se d o n th e fo re g oin g , w e c on c lud e we ar e wi tho ut j ur isd ic tio n to e nte rt a in t his a pp e a l. Acc ording ly , we dismiss the appea l.

___________________________________ AL AN E. GL ENN, JUDGE