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TRIKONA ADVISERS LIMITED v. HAIDA

INVESTMENTS LIMITED ET AL.

(SC 19439)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, Espinosa and Vertefeuille, Js.

Argued April 21—officially released September 1, 2015

John G. Balestriere, pro hac vice, with whom were
Jillian L. McNeil, pro hac vice, Stefan Savic, and, on

the brief, James T. Shearin, for the appellants

(defendants).

Michael C. Gilleran, pro hac vice, with whom, on

the brief, was Christopher L. Ayers, for the appellees

(named plaintiff et al.).

Robert D. Laurie, with whom, on the brief, was

Shrina B. Faldu, for the appellee (plaintiff Vera Financial Corporation).
Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. This action arises out of a dispute

over the control and ownership of 500 shares of stock

(shares) in the named plaintiff, Trikona Advisers Limited (Trikona), an investment advisory corporation specializing in Indian real estate, which is incorporated in

the Cayman Islands. The plaintiffs Asia Pacific Ventures

Limited (Asia Pacific) and Vera Financial Corporation

(Vera Financial) brought an interpleader action, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-484, to determine ownership of the shares.1 The named defendant, Haida

Investments Limited (Haida), appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendering an interlocutory judgment of interpleader.2 On appeal, Asia Pacific claims

that Haida lacks standing to appeal because Haida was

not aggrieved by the trial court’s interlocutory judgment

of interpleader.3 Haida contends that there are no competing claims to the shares warranting the trial court’s

interlocutory judgment of interpleader.4 We conclude

that Haida has established aggrievement and that the

trial court properly rendered an interlocutory judgment

of interpleader because Asia Pacific and Vera Financial

alleged facts sufficient to establish that Haida has a

claim to the shares and that there are facially competing

claims to the shares. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural

history, which provide the necessary background for

the resolution of this appeal. The present interpleader

action stems from a dispute between two families over

the ownership and control of Trikona.5In 2006, Aashish

Kalra6 and Rakshitt Chugh formed Trikona. Asia Pacific

allegedly owns 50 percent of Trikona stock, representing Kalra’s interest. Haida and ARC Capital, LLC (ARC

Capital), collectively own the remaining 50 percent of

Trikona stock, representing Chugh’s interest. Kalra and

Chugh initially were comanaging directors of Trikona,

sharing equal operational control over the corporation,

and they both served on Trikona’s board of directors

since its inception.7 On February 24, 2012, Trikona filed

a complaint alleging, inter alia, that Chugh, acting in

his capacity as the agent of Haida, had breached his

fiduciary duties owed to Trikona (underlying complaint). In the underlying complaint, Trikona sought the

imposition of a constructive trust on the stock held by

Haida and ARC Capital.8

Between 2010 and 2012, Vera Financial made a series

of unsecured loans to Asia Pacific. In April, 2013, Vera

Financial and Asia Pacific entered into an agreement,

which consolidated the unsecured loans into one

secured loan and granted Vera Financial a security interest, not to exceed $500,000, in all of the assets of Asia

Pacific, including Asia Pacific’s shares in Trikona. The

agreement also included a special power of attorney,

by which Asia Pacific granted Vera Financial the right
to acquire, sell, transfer, assign, and dispose of all or

any part of the shares. Asia Pacific subsequently

defaulted on its obligation under the agreement. Vera

Financial alleges that, in July, 2013, Asia Pacific ‘‘executed a stock power transferring and/or assigning all

of its ownership rights in the shares to Vera Financial.’’

In February, 2012, Haida and ARC Capital, as shareholders of Trikona, filed a petition to wind-up and dissolve Trikona in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands

and named Asia Pacific as the principal respondent

in the action. Haida and ARC Capital also sought the

immediate appointment of provisional liquidators, otherwise known in the United States as trustees. The

Grand Court of the Cayman Islands granted this request

in January, 2013, and awarded Haida and ARC Capital

approximately $760,000 in attorney’s fees against Asia

Pacific. Haida and ARC Capital moved to attach the

shares and the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands

subsequently granted an ex parte provisional charging

order against the shares in the amount of the judgment

that had been previously awarded. In its appellate brief

before this court, Haida represents that, once the charging order was made absolute, Haida and ARC Capital

issued a summons for the sale of the shares by public auction.

On October 4, 2013, Asia Pacific filed a motion in the

Superior Court seeking permission to tender the shares

to that court or, in the alternative, the appointment of

a temporary receiver to hold the shares. By a complaint

dated October 23, 2013 (interpleader complaint), Asia

Pacific and Vera Financial commenced the present

interpleader action, seeking, among other relief, a final

judicial determination as to the proper owner of the

shares.9 Haida and ARC Capital did not file an answer

to the interpleader complaint denying the factual allegations contained therein.10

Following oral argument on the motion, the trial court

rendered an interlocutory judgment of interpleader,

ordering that the shares be deposited with the clerk of

the court on the same day that the order was entered.

In its brief, Haida represents that, following the trial

court’s judgment of interpleader, Haida and ARC Capital asked for an adjournment of the proceeding before

the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands, which was

granted, and that, therefore, the public auction never

took place. Haida subsequently moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader. Following oral argument, the trial court denied

that motion. Haida subsequently appealed from the

judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and

we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to

General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

Pursuant to Practice Book §§ 60-2 (1) and 61-10 (b),

this court ordered the trial court to articulate the factual

basis for its judgment of interpleader. Specifically, this
court ordered clarification as to ‘‘whether [the trial

court] found [that there were claims by] two or more

[persons] to the [shares].’’ The trial court issued an

articulation in which it stated thatit had ‘‘concluded that

all of the parties who participated in the interpleader

hearing had, and apparently still have, claims to the

[shares] which were and are strong enough to justify

the standards of an interlocutory judgment of interpleader.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The trial court further

clarified that it cannot ‘‘make the necessary determinations as to any of the . . . parties, who are at this point

in the case at least potentially entitled to some interest

in the [shares], until the case is tried on the merits.’’

Before we address the claims on appeal, we begin

by setting forth the general legal principles governing

interpleader actions pursuant to § 52-484. ‘‘Although

interpleader originally derived from common law and

equity, in [1893], the legislature adopted ‘a broad statutory bill in the nature of interpleader that did not incorporate the traditional equitable restriction[s] [on

interpleader]. Except for the addition of a provision for

costs and fees and for a few trivial language modifications, this statute remains as Connecticut’s interpleader

rule.’ ’’ Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, 297

Conn. 489, 495–96, 1 A.3d 1026 (2010), quoting 2 E.

Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (3d Ed. 2002)

§ 225 (b). Section 52-484 provides in relevant part:

‘‘Whenever any person has, or is alleged to have, any

money or other property in his possession which is

claimed by two or more persons, either he, or any of

the persons claiming the same, may bring a complaint

in equity, in the nature of a bill of interpleader, to any

court which by law has equitable jurisdiction of the

parties and amount in controversy, making all persons

parties who claim to be entitled to or interested in such

money or other property. Such court shall hear and

determine all questions which may arise in the case

. . . .’’

‘‘ ‘[I]nterpleader is a broad joinder device to facilitate

consolidation of related claims so as to avoid multiple

litigation as well as protection against multiple liability

. . . .’ ’’ Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra,

297 Conn. 496, quoting 2 E. Stephenson, supra, § 225

(a). ‘‘The classic interpleader action existing in equity,

prior to the enactment of the statute, was brought by

a disinterested stakeholder to establish the undivided

ownership of money or property claimed by two or

more entities or individuals. . . . After the passage of

the forerunner to § 52-484 in 1893, the rule that an

interpleader action be maintained only by a stakeholder

with no interest in the disposition of the fund was

relaxed.’’ (Citations omitted.) Millman v. Paige, 55

Conn. App. 238, 242, 738 A.2d 737 (1999). ‘‘Section 52-

484 does not preclude an action . . . in which all claimants, including an interested possessor, as defendants,

seek all or a portion of the amount being held by one
of the defendants. The equitable purpose of the statute

is to give all those interested or entitled to all or a

portion of a fund held by another an opportunity to

resolve all questions in a single action.’’ Id., 243; see

also Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra,

497 n.9 (noting that ‘‘stakeholders may commence interpleader actions even if they have an interest in the

disputed fund’’).

‘‘Actions pursuant § 52-484 involve two distinct parts

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent

Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra, 297 Conn. 497;

see also Gold v. Rowland, 296 Conn. 186, 216 n.24,

994 A.2d 106 (2010). In the first part, the court must

determine whether the interpleader plaintiff has alleged

facts sufficient to establish that ‘‘there are adverse

claims to the fund or property’’ at issue. Practice Book

§ 23-43. If the court considers interpleader to be proper

under the circumstances, then the court may render

an interlocutory judgment of interpleader. See Yankee

Millwork Sash & Door Co. v. Bienkowski, 43 Conn.

App. 471, 473, 683 A.2d 743 (1996) (‘‘[t]he interlocutory

judgment of interpleader determines the propriety of

the interpleader procedure’’). Only once an interlocutory judgment of interpleader has been rendered may

the court hold a trial on the merits, compelling the

parties to litigate their respective claims to the disputed

property. Practice Book § 23-44.11

I

As a preliminary matter, we first address the issue

of whether Haida has standing to bring the present

appeal. Asia Pacific contends that Haida lacks standing

to appeal the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of

interpleader. Specifically, Asia Pacific asserts that,

because Haida disclaims all rights to the shares, Haida

was not aggrieved by the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader and, therefore, Haida does not

have sufficient interest in the matter to pursue this

appeal. Haida contends that it has standing to bring

this appeal because it was named as a defendant to the

interpleader action. We agree with Haida.

‘‘A threshold inquiry of this court upon every appeal

presented to it is the question of appellate jurisdiction.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) King v. Sultar, 253

Conn. 429, 434, 754 A.2d 782 (2000). ‘‘The right to appeal

is purely statutory, and only an aggrieved party may

appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perry v.

Perry, 312 Conn. 600, 610, 95 A.3d 500 (2014); see also

Practice Book § 61-1. General Statutes § 52-263, which

governs the subject matter jurisdiction of this court,

provides in relevant partthat‘‘if either party is aggrieved

by the decision of the court or judge upon any question

or questions of law arising in the trial . . . he may

appeal to the court having jurisdiction from the final

judgment of the court or of such judge . . . .’’12 ‘‘A

determination regarding . . . subject matter jurisdic-
tion is a question of law . . . [and, therefore] our

review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Niro v. Niro, 314 Conn. 62, 67, 100 A.3d 801 (2014).

‘‘It is axiomatic that aggrievement is a basic requirement of standing, just as standing is a fundamental

requirement of jurisdiction. . . . There are two general

types of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory;

either type will establish standing, and each has its own

unique features.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Perry v. Perry, supra, 312 Conn. 620. ‘‘Classical

aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party

must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest

in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed

to a general interest that all members of the community

share. . . . Second, the party must also show that the

[alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected

that specific personal or legal interest.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘Statutory aggrievement exists

by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particularfacts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory

aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to

those who claim injury to an interest protected by that

legislation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Soracco v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 92, 971

A.2d 1 (2009). ‘‘Aggrievement is established if there is

a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that

some legally protected interest . . . has been

adversely affected.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456,

461, 839 A.2d 589 (2004).

In the present case, Haida does not claim statutory

aggrievement; therefore, we consider whether Haida

has been classically aggrieved by the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader. Asia Pacific claims

that, by contending on appeal that it does not presently

have any claim to the shares, Haida has failed to satisfy

the test for classical aggrievement because it has no

specific personal and legal interest that has been

adversely affected.

For purposes of resolving the issue of whether Haida

has been aggrieved by the trial court’s interlocutory

judgment of interpleader, it is not necessary that this

court determine the exact nature of Haida’s interest in

the subject matter. Haida need only have a ‘‘personal

and legal interest in the subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Perry v. Perry, supra, 312

Conn. 620. Asia Pacific and Vera Financial allege that

Haida and ARC Capital are seeking to use the final

charging order from the Grand Court of the Cayman

Islands to gain full control and ownership over the

shares, thereby obtaining full control and ownership

of Trikona and gaining the authority to withdraw the

underlying complaint. Although, in its appellate brief,

Haida disclaims ‘‘any possessory interest’’ in the shares

and asserts that ‘‘no lien exists,’’ Haida does not dispute
that the shares are subject to a charging order in the

amount of a judgment previously awarded to Haida and

ARC Capital in a proceeding held before the Grand

Court of the Cayman Islands or that the shares may

be sold at a public auction in the Cayman Islands in

satisfaction of the judgment rendered by that court

against Asia Pacific.13 These undisputed facts demonstrate that Haida has an interest in the disposition of

the shares at the second stage of the interpleader action

because of its interest in having the shares sold at a

public auction to satisfy its judgment against Asia

Pacific. We conclude, therefore, that as a secured creditor of Asia Pacific by means of the charging order

granted by the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands,

Haida has a sufficient personal and legal interest in the

subject matter of this action to be aggrieved. See Perry

v. Perry, supra, 620.

Moreover, it is sufficient that Asia Pacific and Vera

Financial’s allegations establish that there is a ‘‘possibility’’ that some legally recognizable interest of Haida’s

‘‘ ‘has been adversely affected’ ’’ by the interlocutory

judgment of interpleader. Smith v. Snyder, supra, 267

Conn. 461. Because the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader has effectively deprived any party

of the use of the shares and the ability to exercise any

rights over the shares until there is a judicial determination as to each party’s rights to the shares, the present

case satisfies the standard for classical aggrievement.

We conclude, therefore, that Haida has standing to

bring this appeal because the allegations in Asia Pacific

and Vera Financial’s interpleader complaint, if true,

demonstrate that there is a possibility that Haida’s

alleged security interest in the shares will be

adversely affected.

II

Having concluded that we have appellate jurisdiction,

we next consider the merits of Haida’s claim on appeal.

On appeal, Haida claims that the only entity with an

interest in the shares legally recognized under the law

of the Cayman Islands is Asia Pacific and that, as a

result, the statutory requirement that the property at

issue in an interpleader action be ‘‘claimed by two or

more persons’’ has not been satisfied. General Statutes

§ 52-484. Asia Pacific and Vera Financial respond that

there are competing claims to the shares. Specifically,

Asia Pacific claims that Asia Pacific, Haida, and ARC

Capital have uncontested claims to the shares and that

Vera Financial has a ‘‘contested claim’’ to the shares.

Vera Financial asserts that it has a claim to the shares

because Asia Pacific validly transferred ownership of

the shares to Vera Financial as the winding-up proceeding held in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands was

not formally recognized under chapter 15 of the United

States Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 1501 et seq.

Vera Financial further claims that Haida and ARC Capi-
tal have an ex parte lien over the shares. We conclude

that Asia Pacific and Vera Financial have alleged facts

sufficient to establish the existence of competing claims

to the shares.

Neither this court nor the Appellate Court has established the standard of review for a claim challenging

the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader

pursuant to § 52-484.14 Therefore, in determining the

appropriate standard of review, we turn to a procedurally similar action—a motion to intervene as a matter

of right. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public

Health, 279 Conn. 447, 456–57, 904 A.2d 137 (2006).

‘‘For purposes of judging the satisfaction of [the] conditions [for intervention] we look to the pleadings, that is,

to the motion for leave to intervene and to the proposed

complaint or defense in intervention, and . . . we

accept the allegations in those pleadings as true. The

question on a petition to intervene is whether a wellpleaded defense or claim is asserted. Its merits are not

to be determined. . . . Thus, neither testimony nor

other evidence is required to justify intervention, and

[a] proposed intervenor must allege sufficient facts,

through the submitted motion and pleadings, if any,

in order to make a showing of his or her right to

intervene. The inquiry is whether the claims contained

in the motion, if true, establish that the proposed intervenor has a direct and immediate interest that will be

affected by the judgment.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 457. Similarly, the question presented at the first stage of an

interpleader action is whether there are ‘‘conflicting

claims to property in the hands of a stakeholder’’ so as to

make interpleader appropriate. Commercial Discount

Co. v. Plainfield, 120 Conn. 274, 278–79, 180 A. 311

(1935), citing Grand Lodge v. Burns, 84 Conn. 356, 363,

80 A. 157 (1911). ‘‘A complaint in an interpleader action

should allege only such facts as show that there are

adverse claims to the fund or property and need not,

in fact, should not, allege the basis upon which any

claimant relies to justify his claim; the latter allegations are to be made in the statement of claim following

the interlocutory judgment of interpleader.’’ (Emphasis

added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Yankee Millwork Sash & Door Co. v. Bienkowski, supra, 43 Conn.

App. 473, citing Practice Book (1978–97) § 538 (now

§ 23-43).

This court has held that ‘‘the less restrictive de novo

standard of review is more consistent with the nature

of the relevant inquiry taken to evaluate [whether a

movant seeking to intervene as a matter of right has

demonstrated a sufficient interest in the subject matter

of the litigation], which is confined to a review of the

relevant pleadings, with all allegations therein taken as

true’’ than the abuse of discretion standard of review.

Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra, 279

Conn. 455. In light of the similarities to granting a
motion to intervene as a matter of right, we conclude

that the appropriate standard ofreview for an interlocutory judgment of interpleader is de novo.15

Section 52-484 is ‘‘remedial . . . and to be favorably

construed. It requires the court to which any complaint

founded upon it may be brought, to ‘hear and dispose

of all questions which may arise in such case,’ and by

the provision for making not only all who claim to be

‘entitled to,’ but all who claim to be ‘interested in,’ the

property in question, parties defendant, shows that its

purpose is to secure a determination of every right,

title or interest that can by possibility be set up.’’16

(Emphasis added.) Union Trust Co. v. Stamford Trust

Co., 72 Conn. 86, 93, 43 A. 555 (1899); see also United

States v. Federative Republic of Brazil, 748 F.3d 86, 95

(2d Cir. 2014)(‘‘[a]n interpleader suit, by its very nature,

identifies various possible claimants to the funds at

issue, but leaves it to the court to decide which, if any,

have a valid claim’’ [emphasis in original]); 44B Am.

Jur. 2d 609, Interpleader § 3 (2007) (‘‘Interpleader statutes are to be liberally construed. Every reasonable

doubt should be resolved in favor of a putative stakeholder’s right to interplead.’’ [Footnote omitted.]). ‘‘It

is the express purpose of interpleader actions to avoid

duplicative litigation by resolving all possible questions

of liability between all possible parties in one proceeding. As such, interpleader actions are especially

designed to advance the interests of wise judicial administration and should be furthered whenever possible.’’

Zellen v. Second New Haven Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359,

1365 (D. Conn. 1978); see also John Hancock Mutual

Life Ins. Co. v. Advance Realty Co., 9 Conn. Supp.

367, 368 (1941) (‘‘[t]he instances will be extremely rare

where an interlocutory judgment will be denied when

the plaintiff alleges the possession of funds to which

two or more claim to be entitled’’).

In the present case, although Vera Financial alleges

thatitis the ‘‘legal and/or equitable owner’’ ofthe shares,

Asia Pacific asserts that it continues to own the shares.17

Furthermore, Asia Pacific and Vera Financial allege that

the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands awarded Haida

and ARC Capital a judgment against Asia Pacific at the

winding-up proceeding and subsequently granted an ex

parte provisional charging order against the shares in

the amount of the judgment. Asia Pacific alleges that

the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands disregarded the

fact that Asia Pacific had existing creditors, including

a secured creditor, namely, Vera Financial, when it

made the charging order absolute. Haida and ARC Capital did not deny Asia Pacific and Vera Financial’s allegations regarding the alleged charging order at oral

argument before the trial court. Having reviewed the

facts set forth in the interpleader complaint, we conclude that Asia Pacific and Vera Financial’s allegations

are legally sufficient to support the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader.
Haida dedicates most of its appellate briefs to contesting the merits of each party’s purported claim to

the Trikona shares, and its briefs are devoid of any

claim that Asia Pacific and Vera Financial have failed

to satisfy the pleading standard set forth in Practice

Book § 23-43.18 The crux of Haida’s claim on appeal is

that, pursuant to Cayman Islands law, Asia Pacific is

the only possible legal owner of the shares and that,

therefore, there are no competing claims to the shares

that would warrant the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader, as required under § 52-484. First,

Haida alleges that Cayman Islands law precludes any

transfer of shares in a company after the commencement of a winding-up proceeding. Thus, Haida claims

that Vera Financial can have no claim to the shares

under Cayman Islands law because the alleged stock

power between Asia Pacific and Vera Financial

occurred after the winding-up proceeding held in the

Grand Court of the Cayman Islands had commenced.

Second, Haida similarly claims that Cayman Islands law

precludes Haida’s acquisition of the shares without an

order from the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands.

Haida argues that, as a result of the charging order

against the shares issued by the Grand Court of the

Cayman Islands, Haida and ARC Capital issued a summons for the sale of the shares at a public auction.

Haida claims that because any individual or entity,

including Asia Pacific and Vera Financial, would have

an opportunity to bid on the shares at the public auction

and no such auction has yet taken place, Haida does

not have a ‘‘possessory interest’’ in the Trikona shares.

To the extent that Haida asserts that this court should

consider the merits of the claims alleged in the interpleader complaint to determine their viability under

Cayman Islands law, we decline to entertain such an

assertion.19 It was not the role of the trial court, nor is

it the function of this court on appeal, to consider the

merits of the purportedly competing claims at this preliminary stage of the present interpleader action. See

Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra, 297

Conn. 497. Applying the interpleader standard set forth

previously in this opinion, and considering the liberal

construction of § 52-484, we accept the allegations in

the interpleader complaint as true and conclude that

Asia Pacific and Vera Financial have alleged facts sufficient to establish that Asia Pacific, Vera Financial,

Haida, and ARC Capital all have facially competing

claims to the shares. See 44B Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 3,

p. 609 (‘‘[i]nterpleader statutes are to be liberally construed’’). As the Appellate Court has previously

explained, Asia Pacific and Vera Financial have no duty

to ‘‘allege the basis upon which any claimant relies to

justify his claim’’ before the trial court’s interlocutory

judgment of interpleader, as the parties will have an

opportunity to present such allegations at the second

procedural stage of this action in which the merits of
their claims are adjudicated. Yankee Millwork Sash &

Door Co. v. Bienkowski, supra, 43 Conn. App. 473.

We further rely upon the trial court’s articulation in

which it stated that interpleader was proper under the

circumstances because all parties to the interpleader

action are ‘‘at least potentially entitled to some interest

in the stock . . . .’’20 Moreover, insofar as Haida claims

that the charging order granted by the Grand Court of

the Cayman Islands against the shares does not qualify

as a sufficient interest in the Trikona shares for purposes of maintaining an interpleader action, we disagree. As this court explained in Union Trust Co., § 52-

484 is broad enough to encompass any ‘‘interest that

can by possibility be set up.’’ (Emphasis added.) Union

Trust Co. v. Stamford Trust Co., supra, 72 Conn. 93.

In consideration of the fact that these parties have

been involved in multiple proceedings in several jurisdictions; see footnote 5 of this opinion; and that the

underlying dispute between the parties is likely to continue until the ownership of the shares and, thus, the

ultimate control of Trikona, are determined, it is in the

interest of wise judicial administration to resolve all

questions concerning the shares in a single proceeding

with all interested parties present. See Zellen v. Second

New Haven Bank, supra, 454 F. Supp. 1365 (noting

that ‘‘interpleader actions are especially designed to

advance the interests of wise judicial administration’’).

We conclude that Asia Pacific and Vera Financial

have sufficiently stated a cause of action for interpleader, satisfying the pleading requirements as set

forth in Practice Book § 23-43. Accordingly, we affirm

the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of interpleader.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 We note that, although Trikona filed the original complaint in the underlying action, it was not named as a party in the interpleader complaint by

Asia Pacific and Vera Financial. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to all

of the plaintiffs by name.

2 The other defendants in the present case are Rakshitt Chugh and ARC

Capital, LLC. Although Chugh was named as a defendant in the original

complaint filed by Trikona, he was not named a party in the interpleader

complaint filed by Asia Pacific and Vera Financial. ARC Capital, LLC, was

named as a defendant in the interpleader action, but is not a party to the

present appeal. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to all of the defendants

by name.

3 We note that Trikona has filed a joint appellate brief with Asia Pacific

and that Rakshitt Chugh has filed a joint appellate brief with Haida. Because

neither Trikona nor Chugh were named as parties to the interpleader action

filed by Asia Pacific and Vera Financial, we ascribe the various assertions

contained within these joint briefs to Asia Pacific and Haida, respectively.

4

Insofar as Haida claims that the trial court’s interlocutory judgment of

interpleader interferes with a proceeding involving the shares in the Cayman

Islands in violation of principles of international comity, the argument is

premised on conclusory statements. Although Haida cites to one case for

the general principle of international comity, Haida does not undertake any

analysis or application of the law to the facts in this case. Furthermore, to

the extent that Asia Pacific claims that the failure of ARC Capital, LLC, to

appeal from the trial court’s judgment of interpleader deprives this court

of the authority to reverse the trial court’s judgment, the argument is made
in a mere three sentences of its appellate brief and is unaccompanied by

any supporting analysis or citation to relevant legal authority. We consider

these claims inadequately briefed and, therefore, decline to address them.

See Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 444

n.40, 35 A.3d 188 (2012) (‘‘Claims are inadequately briefed when they are

merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare assertion. . . . Claims are

also inadequately briefed when they . . . consist of ‘conclusory assertions

. . . with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from

the record . . . .’ ’’ [Citations omitted.]).

5 These parties have filed several actions in multiple domestic and international courts. For example, other than the present action, the parties have

filed actions in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the New York Supreme Court, the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands,

India, and Mauritius. Although the number of proceedings and the variety

of venues may provide context as to the ongoing nature and extent of the

dispute between the parties, only the proceeding before the Grand Court

of the Cayman Islands is relevant to the present appeal. We discuss that

proceeding in more detail subsequently in this opinion.

6 Although Kalra is not a party to either the underlying action or the

interpleader action in an individual capacity, we note that he signed the

verified complaint in the underlying action on behalf of Trikona and filed

an affidavit in support of the subsequent interpleader complaint.

7

In January, 2012, the board of directors of Trikona expelled Chugh.

8 Trikona also named Haida, in its corporate capacity and in its capacity

as the alleged alter ego of Chugh, as a defendant.

9

In the interpleader complaint, Asia Pacific and Vera Financial combine

requests for permissive intervention and a judgment of interpleader. Count

one of the complaint requests interpleader relief. We note that Asia Pacific

and Vera Financial filed a revised complaint dated November 27, 2013,

containing identical allegations, but in which they solely request interpleader

relief. Neither Haida nor Chugh challenge the procedural nature in which this

interpleader action was instituted. Therefore, we do not address that issue.

10 We note that Haida filed a memorandum of law in opposition to Asia

Pacific’s motion to intervene, but it made no objection to the interpleader

relief sought. Furthermore, we note that even if we were to take the ‘‘[s]tatement of [f]acts’’ set forth in Haida’s memorandum of law in opposition to

Asia Pacific’s motion to intervene as a pleading, there are no facts in the

memorandum that contradict the allegations of the interpleader complaint

in a manner that would affect the outcome of the present appeal.

11 Practice Book § 23-44 provides: ‘‘No trial on the merits of an interpleader

action shall be had until (1) an interlocutory judgment of interpleader shall

have been entered; and (2) all defendants shall have filed statements of

claim, been defaulted or filed waivers. Issues shall be closed on the claims

as in other cases.’’

12 In the present case, it is undisputed that the trial court’s interlocutory

judgment of interpleader constitutes an appealable final judgment. See Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty, LLC, supra, 297 Conn. 497.

13 We note that, although at the trial court’s hearing on the motion for

reconsideration, Haida asserted that there are not ‘‘sharply divergent claims

about the [shares],’’ it never denied the existence of the charging order over

the shares. Instead, counsel for Haida stated: ‘‘I mean we’re not saying that

the stock belongs to ARC [Capital] and Haida or . . . Chugh or any of these

other entities on our side. . . . What we’re saying is that under the . . .

proceedings [before the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands], that [the]

shares could soon be put up for public auction, and that this court should

not interfere with that.’’

14 Although all parties have asserted in their respective appellate briefs

that the applicable standard of review for this interpleader action is abuse

of discretion, no party has cited to relevant legal authority for this proposition. Haida cites to First National Bank of Chicago v. Maynard, 75 Conn.

App. 355, 815 A.2d 1244 (foreclosure action), cert. denied, 263 Conn. 914,

821 A.2d 768 (2003), and Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 198 (2d Cir.

2007) (discussing applicability of abuse of discretion standard to court’s

granting of injunctive relief). Both Asia Pacific and Vera Financial incorrectly

rely on Driscoll v. Norwich Savings Society, 139 Conn. 346, 93 A.2d 925

(1952), for the proposition that an appellate court reviews a trial court’s

interlocutory judgment of interpleader for an abuse of discretion. Although

Driscoll involved an interpleader action, this court did not apply the abuse

of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s interlocutory judgment of

interpleaderin that case, butrather, this court applied the abuse of discretion
standard to the trial court’s award of counsel fees to the parties’ respective

personal representatives. Id., 351–52.

15 We further note that Florida’s First District Court of Appeal has held

that the de novo standard of review applies to a ‘‘trial court’s decision to

grant interpleader . . . .’’ Zimmerman v. Cade Enterprises, Inc., 34 So. 3d

199, 201 (Fla. App. 2010).

16 As noted previously in this opinion, ‘‘[e]xcept for the addition of a

provision for costs and fees and for a few trivial language modifications

. . . [the interpleader statute of 1893] remains as Connecticut’s interpleader

rule.’’(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent Metro, LLC v. YAH Realty,

LLC, supra, 297 Conn. 495–96.

17 We note that Vera Financial asserts in its appellate brief that it acquired

rightful, exclusive ownership of the shares, and that Asia Pacific claims in

its appellate brief that Vera Financial has a ‘‘contested claim’’ to the shares.

18 We note that no party to this action cites to Practice Book § 23-43 in

its appellate briefs. Although Haida cites to Practice Book § 23-44 in its

brief, it fails to cite to Practice Book § 23-43 in either its initial or reply brief.

19 Similarly, we decline to address Vera Financial’s claim concerning the

application of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code and any claims relating

to the amount of due process afforded in the Cayman Islands proceedings,

as these claims speak to the merits of the purported claims and relate to

Haida’s inadequately briefed international comity claim. See footnote 4 of

this opinion.

20 We further note that, at the hearing dated December 12, 2015, the

following statement was made by the trial court: ‘‘I have made nothing

resembling a decision as to who’s right and who’s wrong because . . . we

haven’t gotten to those issues in the case.’’