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*********************************************** 
CHARLES WILLIAM COLEMAN v. COMMISSIONER

OF CORRECTION

(AC 43122)

Elgo, Alexander and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes, appealed to this

court from the judgment of the habeas court, which dismissed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to statute (§ 52-470). Following

the filing of the petition, the habeas court, at the request of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, issued an order to the petitioner

to show cause, pursuant to § 52-470, why the petition should be permitted

to proceed in light of the fact that the judgment on his prior habeas

petition became final in 2014, but the petitioner had failed to file this

petition until almost four years later, beyond the presumptive deadlines

for doing so set forth in § 52-470 (d). After an evidentiary hearing, the

court found that the petitioner’s claim that he had difficulty obtaining

the transcripts from his prior proceedings in order to find new issues

to raise lacked credibility and that the petitioner’s argument that he had

not been informed by his prior attorneys of the retroactive application

of State v. Salamon (287 Conn. 509) in collateral proceedings was

unavailing. The court thus concluded that the petitioner failed to show

good cause for the delay in filing the petition and dismissed it pursuant

to § 52-470 (d) and (e). The court thereafter denied the petition for

certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court, claiming

that § 52-470 was unconstitutional, his inability to obtain the transcripts

from his prior proceedings and the ineffective assistance of his prior

counsel constituted good cause, and the court abused its discretion in

denying the petition for certification to appeal. Held that the habeas

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification

to appeal, as the petitioner did not distinctly raise his constitutional

challenge to § 52-470 in the petition for certification and, thus, this court

declined to review this claim; moreover, the petitioner could not prevail

on his claim that good cause existed for his delay in commencing his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as the petitioner’s inability to obtain

transcripts from prior proceedings did not prevent him from filing a

petition within the statutorily prescribed time period and this court was

bound by the habeas court’s determination that the petitioner’s claimed

difficulty in obtaining the transcripts was not credible; furthermore, the

petitioner’s ignorance of the possible retroactive application of Salamon

did not constitute good cause to proceed with his otherwise untimely

habeas petition, and the petitioner’s failure to raise his claim of the

ineffective assistance of prior counsel before the habeas court was fatal

to his claim that this allegedly ineffective assistance constituted good

cause, and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Argued October 14, 2020—officially released February 9, 2021

Procedural History

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where

the court, Newson, J., rendered judgment dismissing

the petition; thereafter, the court denied the petition

for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed

to this court. Appeal dismissed.

Deborah G. Stevenson, assigned counsel, for the

appellant (petitioner).

Jonathan M. Sousa, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state’s

attorney, and Adrienne Russo, assistant state’s attor-
ney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion

ALEXANDER, J. The petitioner, Charles William

Coleman, appeals from the denial of his petition for

certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas

court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court

(1) improperly determined that he had failed to establish good cause for the filing of his untimely habeas

petition and (2) abused its discretion in denying his

petition for certification to appeal. We disagree, and,

accordingly, dismiss the petitioner’s appeal.

As this court previously observed, ‘‘[t]he factual and

procedural history of the petitioner’s criminal case and

prior habeas cases is lengthy and well documented. See

Coleman v. Commissioner of Department of Corrections, United States District Court, Docket No. 2:91-

CV0005 (PCD) (D. Conn. December 30, 1991), aff’d, 969

F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1992); Coleman v. Commissioner of

Correction, 274 Conn. 422, 876 A.2d 533 (2005); State

v. Coleman, 251 Conn. 249, 741 A.2d 1 (1999), cert.

denied, 529 U.S. 1061, 120 S. Ct. 1570, 146 L. Ed. 2d 473

(2000); State v. Coleman, 242 Conn. 523, 700 A.2d 14

(1997); State v. Coleman, 241 Conn. 784, 699 A.2d 91

(1997); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 108

Conn. App. 836, 949 A.2d 536, cert. denied, 289 Conn.

913, 957 A.2d 876 (2008); Coleman v. Commissioner of

Correction, 99 Conn. App. 310, 913 A.2d 477, cert.

denied, 281 Conn. 924, 918 A.2d 275 (2007); State v.

Coleman, 38 Conn. App. 531, 662 A.2d 150, cert. denied,

235 Conn. 906, 665 A.2d 903 (1995); State v. Coleman,

17 Conn. App. 307, 552 A.2d 442 (1989).’’ Coleman v.

Commissioner of Correction, 149 Conn. App. 719, 721–

22, 87 A.3d 1208, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 905, 93 A.3d

156 (2014).

The petitioner was convicted of burglary in the first

degree, burglary in the second degree, sexual assault

in the first degree and unlawful restraint in the first

degree. Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction,

supra, 274 Conn. 423–24. ‘‘The convictions arose out of

an incident that occurred on July 7, 1986, in which an

assailant broke into a New Haven residence and sexually assaulted a woman.’’ Id., 424. This court vacated

the petitioner’s conviction of burglary in the second

degree and affirmed his other convictions. Id.

The self-represented petitioner commenced the present habeas action on May 7, 2018, alleging ineffective

assistance by his criminal trial counsel, Thomas E.

Farver. On October 31, 2018, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, requested that the habeas

court order the petitioner to show cause as to why this

petition should not be dismissed as untimely pursuant

to General Statutes § 52-470 (d) and (e). The respondent

claimed that the present habeas petition had been filed

more than two years after the conclusion of appellate
review of the prior petition challenging the same conviction and, therefore, was presumptively untimely.

On February 22, 2019, the court, Newson, J., held a

hearing on the respondent’s request. Only the petitioner,

who was now represented by counsel, testified at this

proceeding. On May 10, 2019, the court issued a memorandum of decision dismissing the habeas petition. In

its memorandum, the court noted: ‘‘The only contested

issue in the present case is whether the petitioner can

establish ‘good cause’ for the delay in filing the petition.

Since the decision on his last petition is deemed to have

become final on May 29, 2014, when the Supreme Court

issued the notice denying the petition for certification,

the petitioner had until May 29, 2016, to file a subsequent

petition challenging the same conviction. General Statutes § 52-470 (d) (1). Since it was not, the petition is

subject to dismissal, unless he can establish ‘good

cause’ for the delay in filing.’’ (Footnote omitted.)

The habeas court then turned to the issue of whether

the petitioner had established good cause for the delay.

The petitioner argued that his difficulty in obtaining the

transcripts from his prior proceedings to ‘‘find new

issues to raise’’ constituted good cause. The court

rejected this argument, concluding that it lacked credibility.1 The court also was not persuaded by the petitioner’s argument that his prior habeas and appellate attorneys had failed to inform him of the retroactive

application of State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509, 542,

949 A.2d 1092 (2008), in collateral proceedings pursuant

to Luurtsema v. Commissioner of Correction, 299

Conn. 740, 751, 12 A.3d 817 (2011).2 The court concluded

that the petitioner’s ignorance of the change to our

kidnapping jurisprudence did not constitute good cause

for the purpose of § 52-470. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and,

subsequently, denied the petition for certification to

appeal from the dismissal of the habeas petition. This

appeal followed.

On appeal, the petitioner claims, for the first time,

that § 52-470, both on its face and as applied, violates

both the federal and state constitutions by effectively

suspending the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus.

He also contends that his inability to obtain the transcripts of his prior proceedings, despite his due diligence, constituted good cause. Additionally, he argues

that good cause exists as a result of public defender

error and the ineffective assistance of prior counsel.

He contends that his prior counsel had failed to advise

him of the time limits to file his habeas petition, to

provide him with transcripts of the various proceedings

in a timely fashion and to advise him of the possibility

of raising a claim involving the retroactive application

of State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. 509. Finally, the

petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to
appeal. We are not persuaded.

We begin with the relevant legal principles. ‘‘Pursuant

to . . . § 52-470 (g), a petitioner may appeal from the

decision of the habeas court if the judge before whom

the case was tried . . . [certifies] that a question is

involved in the decision which ought to be reviewed

by the court having jurisdiction . . . . Section 52-470

(g) was enacted to discourage frivolous habeas corpus

appeals by conditioning the petitioner’s right to appeal

upon obtaining certification from the habeas court. See

Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 616, 646 A.2d 126

(1994). A petitioner who was denied certification to

appeal but nonetheless appeals must first demonstrate

that the denial of certification constituted an abuse

of the habeas court’s discretion.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Turner v. Commissioner of Correction, 201 Conn. App. 196, 206–207, 242 A.3d 512 (2020).

This court repeatedly has explained that ‘‘[f]aced with

a habeas court’s denial of a petition for certification to

appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate review of the

dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunciated by our Supreme

Court in Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d

601 (1994), and adopted in Simms v. Warden, [supra,

230 Conn. 612]. First, he must demonstrate that the

denial of his petition constituted an abuse of discretion.

. . . Second, if the petitioner can show an abuse of

discretion, he must then prove that the decision of the

habeas court should be reversed on its merits. . . .

A petitioner may establish an abuse of discretion by

demonstrating that the issues are debatable among

jurists of reason . . . [the] court could resolve the

issues [in a different manner] . . . or . . . the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Humble v. Commissioner of Correction, 180 Conn. App. 697, 703, 184 A.3d 804, cert. denied,

330 Conn. 939, 195 A.3d 692 (2018).

‘‘In determining whether the habeas court abused

its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for

certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of

the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether

the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review

the petitioner’s substantive claims for the purpose of

ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more

of the three criteria . . . adopted by [our Supreme

Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas

court’s denial of the petition for certification.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Sanders v. Commissioner

of Correction, 169 Conn. App. 813, 821–22, 153 A.3d 8

(2016), cert. denied, 325 Conn. 904, 156 A.3d 536 (2017).

In the present case, the petitioner filed his petition

for certification to appeal the dismissal of his habeas

petition on May 15, 2019. He set forth the following as
the grounds for his request for certification to appeal

to this court: ‘‘Whether the habeas court erred in dismissing [the] [p]etitioner’s case for lack of good cause;

any other grounds revealed in [the] transcripts or

record.’’ The petition for certification to appeal did not

include a challenge to the constitutionality of § 52-470.

We review only the merits of claims specifically set

forth in the petition for certification to appeal. See Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn. App.

572, 578, 187 A.3d 543, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 909, 186

A.3d 13 (2018). ‘‘This court has declined to review issues

in a petitioner’s habeas appeal in situations where the

habeas court denied certification to appeal and the

issues on appeal had not been raised in the petition for

certification. . . . A habeas petitioner cannot establish

that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying

certification on issues that were not raised in the petition for certification to appeal.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 578–79; see also Pereira v. Commissioner of Correction, 176 Conn. App.

762, 775, 171 A.3d 105 (because it is impossible to review

exercise of discretion that did not occur, Appellate

Court confined to reviewing only those issues which

had been brought to attention of habeas court in petition

for certification to appeal), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 984,

175 A.3d 43 (2017); Ouellette v. Commissioner of Correction, 159 Conn. App. 854, 858 n.2, 123 A.3d 1256 (use

of broad language in petition for certification to appeal

does not serve as basis for this court to consider claims

not raised specifically in petition), cert. denied, 320

Conn. 907, 128 A.3d 952 (2015); Campbell v. Commissioner of Correction, 132 Conn. App. 263, 267, 31 A.3d

1182 (2011) (consideration of issues not distinctly

raised in petition for certification would amount to

ambuscade of habeas judge).

The petitioner did not distinctly raise his constitutional challenge to § 52-470 in his petition for certification to appeal. Pursuant to our well established jurisprudence, we therefore decline to review this claim.3 See

Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 181

Conn. App. 580 (no basis to conclude habeas court

abused discretion when petition for certification to

appeal raised issues relating to petitioner’s competency

to stand trial and appellate arguments raised ineffective

assistance of counsel claim); Sanders v. Commissioner

of Correction, supra, 169 Conn. App. 817–18 n.2 (noting

that habeas petitioner could not establish that habeas

court had abused its discretion with respect to due

process claim where petition for certification to appeal

addressed ineffective assistance of counsel claim and

‘‘such other claims of error found after a complete

review of record’’ (internal quotation marks omitted));

Melendez v. Commissioner of Correction, 141 Conn.

App. 836, 841, 62 A.3d 629 (habeas court could not

abuse its discretion in denying claims about matters

not raised in petition for certification to appeal), cert.
denied, 310 Conn. 921, 77 A.3d 143 (2013); see also

Whistnant v. Commissioner of Correction, 199 Conn.

App. 406, 418–19, 236 A.3d 276 (noting that review pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567

A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317

Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), was not available

for claim raised for first time on appeal and not raised in

or incorporated into petition for certification to appeal),

cert. denied, 335 Conn. 969, 240 A.3d 286 (2020).

We next turn to § 52-470 and good cause.4

In Langston

v. Commissioner of Correction, 185 Conn. App. 528,

532, 197 A.3d 1034 (2018), appeal dismissed, 335 Conn.

1, 225 A.3d 282 (2020), this court set forth a definition

of ‘‘good cause’’ in the context of § 52-470. ‘‘For the

purposes of . . . [§ 52-470 (e)], good cause includes,

but is not limited to, the discovery of new evidence

which materially affects the merits of the case and

which could not have been discovered by the exercise

of due diligence in time to meet the requirements of

subsection (c) or (d) of this section. . . . The parties

also agree that good cause has been defined as a substantial reason amounting in law to a legal excuse for

failing to perform an act required by law . . . [a]

[l]egally sufficient ground or reason.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

More recently, in Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 202 Conn. App. 21, 23, A.3d (2020), cert.

granted, 336 Conn. , A.3d (2021), we delineated ‘‘the ‘good cause’ standard that a petitioner must

satisfy to overcome the rebuttable presumption that a

successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed

outside of statutorily prescribed time limits is the result

of unreasonable delay that warrants dismissal of the

petition . . . and [clarified] the appellate standard of

review applicable to a habeas court’s determination

of whether a petitioner has satisfied the good cause

standard.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) After

a review of § 52-470; see id., 28–31; we then synthesized

‘‘a more fulsome definition of good cause as that term

is used in § 52-470 (d) and (e) . . . .’’ Id., 33. ‘‘We conclude that to rebut successfully the presumption of

unreasonable delay in § 52-470, a petitioner generally

will be required to demonstrate that something outside

of the control of the petitioner or habeas counsel caused

or contributed to the delay. Although it is impossible

to provide a comprehensive list of situations that could

satisfy this good cause standard, a habeas court properly may elect to consider a number of factors in

determining whether a petitioner has met his evidentiary burden of establishing good cause for filing an

untimely petition. Based on the authorities we have

discussed and the principles emanating from them, factors directly related to the good cause determination

include, but are not limited to: (1) whether external

forces outside the control of the petitioner had any

bearing on the delay; (2) whether and to what extent
the petitioner or his counsel bears any personal responsibility for any excuse proffered for the untimely filing;

(3) whether the reasons proffered by the petitioner in

support of a finding of good cause are credible and are

supported by evidence in the record; and (4) how long

after the expiration of the filing deadline did the petitioner file the petition. No single factor necessarily will

be dispositive, and the court should evaluate all relevant

factors in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances presented.’’ Id., 34–35.

Next, we considered the proper appellate standard

of review. We concluded that ‘‘a habeas court’s determination of whether a petitioner has satisfied the good

cause standard in a particular case requires a weighing

of the various facts and circumstances offered to justify

the delay, including an evaluation of the credibility of

any witness testimony. As such, the determination

invokes the discretion of the habeas court and is reversible only for an abuse of that discretion.’’ Id., 35–36.

We also noted, however, that ‘‘in applying the abuse of

discretion standard, [t]o the extent that factual findings

are challenged, this court cannot disturb the underlying

facts found by the habeas court unless they are clearly

erroneous . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 36 n.12. It is axiomatic that ‘‘[a] finding of fact is

clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the

record to support it . . . or when although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed. . . . A reviewing

court ordinarily will afford deference to those credibility determinations made by the habeas court on the

basis of [the] firsthand observation of [a witness’] conduct, demeanor and attitude.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Rose v. Commissioner of Correction, 202

Conn. App. 436, 442, A.3d (2021). Guided by

these principles, we consider the petitioner’s

remaining arguments.

The petitioner first argues that he demonstrated good

cause for the delay in commencing this habeas action

through his diligent efforts to obtain the transcripts

from his prior proceedings in order to present possible

‘‘new’’ issues that had not previously been raised. The

habeas court, in rejecting this contention, stated: ‘‘Considering all of the testimony and evidence, the claim is

simply not a credible one, especially given the extensive

litigation the petitioner has engaged [in] to challenge

these convictions. Further, while the lack of transcripts

may have made it difficult to ‘fine tune’ issues, it definitely did not prevent the petitioner from actually filing

a petition within the two year period. In fact, an active

petition would have given the petitioner the ability to

seek the appointment of assigned counsel, who could

have assisted with locating [the] transcripts, and to file

[a waiver] of costs and fees.’’
To the extent that the habeas court found the petitioner’s claimed difficulty in obtaining transcripts not credible, we defer to and are bound by that determination.

See Watts v. Commissioner of Correction, 194 Conn.

App. 558, 567, 221 A.3d 829 (2019), cert. denied, 334

Conn. 919, 222 A.3d 514 (2020); Noze v. Commissioner

of Correction, 177 Conn. App. 874, 885–86, 173 A.3d 525

(2017); see also Bagalloo v. Commissioner of Correction, 195 Conn. App. 528, 536, 225 A.3d 1226 (habeas

judge sole arbiter of credibility of witnesses and Appellate Court does not retry case or evaluate credibility of

witnesses), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 905, 226 A.3d 707

(2020). Additionally, as noted by the habeas court, nothing prevented the petitioner from first filing the petition

and then making efforts to obtain the transcripts, with

the assistance of appointed counsel. See Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 202 Conn. App. 34 (petitioner generally required to demonstrate that something

outside of his control caused or contributed to delay).

We agree with the habeas court and conclude that this

argument is without merit.

Second, the petitioner argues that prior counsel had

failed to advise him of the possibility of raising a claim

involving the retroactive application of State v. Salamon, supra, 287 Conn. 509. The petitioner claimed that

he only recently had become aware of Salamon and

that his failure to raise the claim earlier constituted

good cause. In rejecting this argument, the habeas court

stated: ‘‘It is important to note that [the] petitioner does

not claim that counsel misadvised him on the applicability of these cases, but that they simply failed to discuss

them. Even if we assume for purposes of argument that

Salamon and Luurtsema are applicable, since there is

nothing in the record before this court to indicate that

he was convicted of a kidnapping charge, this reason

is also insufficient to establish good cause for the delay.

Salamon was decided in 2008, three years before the

petitioner’s last habeas petition was even tried, and

eight years before this petition was filed. [E]veryone is

presumed to know the law, and that ignorance of the

law excuses no one . . . . Thus, the [petitioner] is

charged with knowledge of the law.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

In Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 202

Conn. App. 40–41, we concluded that ignorance of the

law did not constitute good cause to proceed with an

otherwise untimely habeas petition. Nothing in the petitioner’s appellate brief persuades us that a different

result is warranted in the present case.5 We conclude,

therefore, that this argument must fail.

Finally, the petitioner contends that good cause

exists as a result of public defender error and the ineffective assistance of prior counsel. Specifically, he

argues that his prior counsel had failed to advise him

as to the time limits to file his habeas petition and to
provide him with transcripts of the various proceedings

in a timely fashion. The fatal flaw with this contention

is that the petition failed to present these matters before

the habeas court. As noted in the appellate brief of

the respondent: ‘‘[T]he petitioner did not claim in his

petition, in his response to the request for order to

show cause, or during the good cause hearing that prior

counsel’s inability to find his transcripts in the years

following his prior habeas action and/or failure to advise

him about the timeliness provisions of § 52-470 (d) violated his sixth amendment right to [the] effective assistance of counsel.’’ Furthermore, the habeas court did

not address such matters in its memorandum of decision on the respondent’s request for order to show

cause. ‘‘We do not entertain claims not raised before

the habeas court but raised for the first time on appeal.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopez v. Commissioner of Correction, 142 Conn. App. 53, 57 n.2, 64

A.3d 334 (2013); see also Eubanks v. Commissioner of

Correction, 329 Conn. 584, 598, 188 A.3d 702 (2018)

(appellate review of claims not raised before habeas

court would amount to ambuscade of habeas judge);

Walker v. Commissioner of Correction, 176 Conn. App.

843, 846 n.2, 171 A.3d 525 (2017) (Appellate Court is not

compelled to consider issues neither alleged in habeas

petition nor considered at habeas proceeding); Sewell

v. Commissioner of Correction, 168 Conn. App. 735,

736–37 n.2, 147 A.3d 196 (2016) (Appellate Court did

not consider issues not alleged in habeas petition or

considered at trial during habeas proceeding), cert.

denied, 324 Conn. 907, 152 A.3d 1245 (2017).

The appeal is dismissed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘Considering all of the testimony and evidence, the claim is simply not a credible one, especially given the extensive

litigation the petitioner has engaged [in] to challenge these convictions.’’

2

‘‘Stated succinctly, [p]ursuant to the holdings of these decisions, a defendant who has been convicted of kidnapping may collaterally attack his

kidnapping conviction on the ground that the trial court’s jury instructions

failed to require that the jury find that the defendant’s confinement or

movement of the victim was not merely incidental to the defendant’s commission of some other crime or crimes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Nogueira v. Commissioner of Correction, 168 Conn. App. 803, 807, 149 A.3d

983, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 949, 169 A.3d 792 (2016); see also Pereira v.

Commissioner of Correction, 176 Conn. App. 762, 768–70, 171 A.3d 105,

cert. denied, 327 Conn. 984, 175 A.3d 43 (2017); White v. Commissioner of

Correction, 170 Conn. App. 415, 421 n.4, 423–24, 154 A.3d 1054 (2017).

3 We have recognized that an appeal following the denial of a petition for

certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying or

dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not the appellate equivalent of a direct appeal following a criminal conviction. See Tutson v. Commissioner of Correction, 144 Conn. App. 203, 216, 72 A.3d 1162, cert. denied,

310 Conn. 928, 78 A.3d 145 (2013). ‘‘Our limited task as a reviewing court

is to determine whether the habeas court abused its discretion in concluding

that the petitioner’s appeal is frivolous.’’ Id.

4 General Statutes § 52-470 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(d) In the case of

a petition filed subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the

same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of

the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition

is filed after the later of the following: (1) Two years after the date on which

the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to
the conclusion of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review; (2) October 1, 2014; or (3) two years after the date on which

the constitutional or statutory right asserted in the petition was initially

recognized and made retroactive pursuant to a decision of the Supreme

Court or Appellate Court of this state or the Supreme Court of the United

States or by the enactment of any public or special act. For the purposes

of this section, the withdrawal of a prior petition challenging the same

conviction shall not constitute a judgment. The time periods set forth in

this subsection shall not be tolled during the pendency of any other petition

challenging the same conviction. Nothing in this subsection shall create

or enlarge the right of the petitioner to file a subsequent petition under

applicable law.

‘‘(e) In a case in which the rebuttable presumption of delay under subsection (c) or (d) of this section applies, the court, upon the request of the

respondent, shall issue an order to show cause why the petition should be

permitted to proceed. The petitioner or, if applicable, the petitioner’s counsel, shall have a meaningful opportunity to investigate the basis for the delay

and respond to the order. If, after such opportunity, the court finds that the

petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for the delay, the court shall

dismiss the petition. For the purposes of this subsection, good cause

includes, but is not limited to, the discovery of new evidence which materially

affects the merits of the case and which could not have been discovered

by the exercise of due diligence in time to meet the requirements of subsection (c) or (d) of this section. . . .’’

See also Dull v. Commissioner of Correction, 175 Conn. App. 250, 252,

167 A.3d 466, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 930, 171 A.3d 453 (2017); see generally

Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 329 Conn. 711, 715–26, 189 A.3d 578

(2018); Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 548, 566–68, 153

A.3d 1233 (2017).

5

In his appellate brief, the petitioner’s argument regarding Salamon consists of the statements that the habeas court is presumed to know the law

and that it should have known that ‘‘a statute or court made law cannot

conflict with the plain language of the constitution, cannot eliminate or

suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and cannot be used to effectively deny

counsel or the right of a petitioner to redress his grievances.’’