In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-2662 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JOSEPH A. WILLIAMS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division. 

No. 3:16-CR-100-JD-MGG-1 — Jon E. DeGuilio, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED JULY 9, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 23, 2019 

____________________ 

Before KANNE, HAMILTON, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Joseph Williams pleaded guilty 

to possessing a gun as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 

He appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district court 

erred by sentencing him under the Armed Career Criminal 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on three prior Indiana convictions: burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. He challenges 

the use of the cocaine conviction on two grounds. First, he 
2 No. 18-2662 

says the record does not show just which statute he was convicted of violating. Second, he argues that Indiana’s statute on 

dealing cocaine, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (2006), is broader than 

the ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” We disagree 

on both points and affirm the sentence under the ACCA. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine and then 

found a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal 

firearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which applies 

if the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses on three different occasions. The 

government offered evidence of Williams’ three prior convictions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the cocaine conviction, the government established that the State of 

Indiana filed an information in 2007 charging Williams with 

a Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine.” The information cited 

Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1 and two subsections. It also alleged 

that Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine 

within one thousand feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty 

under a plea agreement to “the lesser included offense of 

Dealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The state court accepted 

Williams’ plea of guilty to “the lesser included offense of 

Dealing Cocaine.” 

The district court concluded that Williams was an armed 

career criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The parties agree that Williams had two prior convictions for violent 

felonies. The ACCA enhancement depends on the cocaine 

conviction. The court determined that Williams’ “Dealing Cocaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug offense.” The court relied on the presentence report. It said, 
No. 18-2662 3

without any dispute from Williams, that the conviction for delivering cocaine qualified as a serious drug offense under the 

ACCA. With three qualifying convictions, Williams was an 

armed career criminal subject to a statutory minimum of fifteen years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The court calculated a Sentencing Guideline range of 210 to 262 months in 

prison based on offense level 32 and criminal history category 

VI. The judge found that this range likely overstated the seriousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188 

months in prison. 

II. Analysis 

On appeal, Williams argues that the district court improperly enhanced his guideline range because his dealing-cocaine 

offense is not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the 

ACCA. The statute defines a “serious drug offense” to include 

crimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing 

with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Because Williams did not 

raise this issue in the district court, we review the enhancement for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States 

v. Lynn, 851 F.3d 786, 793 (7th Cir. 2017). 

Williams first contends that his conviction for dealing cocaine is not a predicate offense because the district court did 

not know which statute the Indiana court used to convict him. 

He concedes that he pleaded guilty to delivering cocaine, but 

he points out that the state court judgment refers only to the 

“lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine” and does not cite 

a more specific statutory provision. Therefore, Williams reasons, the district court plainly erred in deciding that his statute of conviction meets the definition of a “serious drug 
4 No. 18-2662 

offense” under the ACCA. We disagree for two independent 

reasons, one legal and one factual. 

First, as a matter of law, even assuming the state court documents were ambiguous, the ambiguity would not establish 

plain error. Williams did not object at sentencing to the court’s 

reliance on this conviction as a predicate offense. Naturally, 

then, the parties did not put energy into building a thorough 

record on the issue. The court was entitled to accept the undisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as 

a finding of fact. See United States v. Aviles-Solarzano, 623 F.3d 

470, 475 (7th Cir. 2010). Even if the documents may not resolve 

the issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error review. It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually

occurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. United 

States v. Ramirez, 606 F.3d 396, 398–99 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting 

government’s confession of error on plain-error review; in absence of objection in district court, record did not show definitively whether defendant’s prior convictions qualified as 

crimes of violence under Sentencing Guidelines). On appeal, 

Williams points to no evidence suggesting that he was convicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). See United 

States v. Meherg, 714 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 2013) (affirming 

ACCA sentence where defendant failed to come forward with 

evidence that PSR description of prior conviction was wrong); 

United States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (same 

under career-offender guideline). 

Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually removes uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction. 

The information charged Williams with delivering cocaine, 

and it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1. Under Indiana’s criminal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections, 
No. 18-2662 5

both of which were also cited in the information. Subsection 

(a)(1)(C) defined the base crime—delivery of cocaine—as a 

class B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class 

A felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a 

school, which the information also alleged. Williams’ plea of 

guilty to a “lesser included ... Class B Felony” means that this 

additional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime 

of conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). 

That brings us to Williams’ second argument, that even if 

he was convicted under § 35-48-4-1, a conviction under it cannot be an ACCA predicate. Asserting that the statute is “indivisible” for purposes of applying the categorical approach under the ACCA, he argues its subsections collectively cover 

more than “serious drug offenses.” He explains that another 

portion of the section criminalizes a person who “finances” an 

illegal drug trade. See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(D) (2006). 

By contrast, he continues, the ACCA definition does not cover 

financing; it covers state crimes “involving manufacturing, 

distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance,” without mention of financing. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This argument fails for 

two independent reasons. 

First, circuit precedent forecloses one premise of his argument—that the Indiana statute is indivisible. We held in 

United States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019), that 

this Indiana statute is divisible—that is, it contains multiple 

crimes under one heading or section. See Descamps v. United 

States, 570 U.S. 254, 261–62 (2013) (explaining divisibility). 

Williams admits that he was convicted of “delivering” cocaine, not “financing” it. And the ACCA unquestionably covers delivering cocaine. See Meherg, 714 F.3d at 459–60. By 
6 No. 18-2662 

that reasoning, the ACCA enhancement was proper under 

§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C). 

Williams counters that Smith was decided wrongly. He 

asks us to seek guidance on the divisibility of § 35-48-4-1 from 

the Indiana Supreme Court, which has not addressed that issue under this statute. See United States v. Franklin, 895 F.3d 

954 (7th Cir. 2018) (certifying state-law issue of divisibility of 

state burglary statute to state supreme court). But certification 

is appropriate only when the law is indefinite or unclear. See

Village of Bedford Park v. Expedia, Inc., 876 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir. 

2017). For the reasons we explained in Smith, the divisibility 

of this Indiana statute is sufficiently clear, and much clearer 

than the state-law issue that led us to certify in Franklin. Moreover, even if divisibility were unclear, as Williams contends, 

he would still lose on plain-error review because only a 

“plain” error could justify reversal. See Lynn, 851 F.3d at 793. 

In any event, as explained in Smith, most of Indiana’s caselaw 

supports treating § 35-48-4-1 as divisible. 921 F.3d at 714–15 

(collecting Indiana cases). And Williams’ “disagreement with 

a prior holding is an inadequate basis to overturn precedent.”

United States v. Lamon, 893 F.3d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 2018). 

The second reason Williams’ challenge fails is that even if 

§ 35-48-4-1 were not divisible, the entire statute does not encompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of “serious 

drug offense.” We reached this conclusion in a non-precedential order earlier this year, United States v. Anderson, 766 

F. App’x 377, 381–82 (7th Cir. 2019). We now adopt the reasoning and holding of that decision on the issue in this precedential opinion. 

As we explained in Anderson, under the ACCA, we apply 

the “categorical” method that focuses only on the elements of 
No. 18-2662 7

the crime of conviction, not the actual facts of the defendant’s 

conviction. 766 Fed. App’x at 380, citing Mathis v. United 

States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). Under that method, if the 

elements of the crime of conviction reach more broadly than 

the definition of a “serious drug offense” in the ACCA, so that 

it is possible to violate the underlying statute without committing a “serious drug offense” within the meaning of the 

ACCA, then a conviction under the statute cannot serve as a 

predicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. See 

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248, citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 

575, 600–01 (1990). 

The principal point of dispute is the Indiana statute’s application to financing of cocaine manufacture or delivery. The 

Indiana statute under which Williams was convicted provided in 2007: 

(a) A person who: 

(1) knowingly or intentionally: 

(A) manufactures; 

(B) finances the manufacture of; 

(C) delivers; or 

(D) finances the delivery of; 

cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methamphetamine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule 

I or II; or 

(2) possesses, with intent to: 

(A) manufacture; 

(B) finance the manufacture of; 

(C) deliver; or 

(D) finance the delivery of; 

cocaine or a narcotic drug, or methamphetamine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule 
8 No. 18-2662 

I or II; 

commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug, 

or methamphetamine, a Class B felony, except 

as provided in subsection (b). 

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a) (2006). 

Williams argues that by including financing the manufacturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more 

broadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We 

disagree. 

Recall that the ACCA’s text covers crimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The word “involving” is broad enough to 

reach the Indiana crimes of financing the manufacture or delivery of cocaine. 

As we explained in our order in Anderson, federal courts 

interpret the word “involving” as having “expansive connotations.” 766 Fed. App’x at 382, quoting United States v. King, 

325 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2003). In King, the Second Circuit 

ruled that the word “must be construed as extending the focus of § 924(e) beyond” the listed offenses to “encompass[ ] ... 

offenses that are related to or connected with such conduct.” 

325 F.3d at 113. Adopting this reasoning, other courts have 

affirmed sentencing enhancements under the ACCA based on 

convictions for attempt and conspiracy to manufacture, distribute or possess with the intent to distribute drugs. See 

United States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012) (attempt); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 

2007) (attempt); United States v. McKenney, 450 F.3d 39, 43–45 
No. 18-2662 9

(1st Cir. 2006) (conspiracy); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d 

703, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2005) (attempt); King, 325 F.3d at 114–15 

(attempt). The Third Circuit adopted a similarly expansive 

definition of “involving” in United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180 

(3d Cir. 2011), finding that a Delaware conviction for wearing 

body armor while committing a felony “involve[d]” a serious 

drug offense where the underlying felony was manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute 

drugs. Id. at 184–85, 188. 

Williams argues that Indiana courts have interpreted the 

“financing” language to apply to a defendant’s purchase of 

drugs for his own personal use. The Indiana Court of Appeals 

persuasively rejected that broad reading in Hyche v. State, 934 

N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), explaining that the term 

“is commonly construed as applying to one who acts as a 

creditor or an investor and not one who merely acts as a purchaser.” In Hyche, the defendant had been convicted of felony 

murder in a drug deal in which he was trying to buy ecstasy 

for his personal use. The state court reversed his conviction 

because he had not been “financing” the purchase with his 

own money for his own use. The defendant had acted “merely 

as a purchaser and not as a creditor or an investor,” and “he 

could no more be deemed to be financing the delivery of ecstasy than a grocery shopper could be deemed to be financing 

the supermarket’s inventory.” Id. at 1180. 

To counter Hyche, Williams cites two Indiana appellate 

cases that he contends ruled differently. In Kibler v. State, 904 

N.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 2009) (non-precedential), the court vacated a conviction for dealing in heroin on double jeopardy 

grounds but based its conclusion on the unexplained and unjustified theory that the defendant had “financed” his own 
10 No. 18-2662 

purchase of heroin for his own use. In Vausha v. State, No. 

13A01-0607-CR-280, 2007 WL 2595427 (Ind. App. 2007) (nonprecedential), the defendant and her husband had teamed up 

to sell methamphetamine to a neighbor who was cooperating 

with the police, and the defendant had participated in negotiating the price of the sale. 

These cases do not convince us that the Indiana statute actually reaches activity that would not be a serious drug offense under the federal ACCA. Both are non-precedential, 

and both predate Hyche, which is precedential and well-reasoned. Also, Vausha was not even a personal-use case. The defendant there financed drug dealing in part by buying “600 

cold pills” to make more than three grams of methamphetamine that she then tried to sell. 2007 WL 2595427, at *5. 

Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the 

scope of the Indiana crimes of “financing” the manufacture 

and delivery of cocaine. That scope falls within the federal 

definition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.