Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 26 , 2022.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 20

- 00271

- CR

BLAS TIERRABLANCA , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee
On Appeal from the 155th District Court

Austin County, Texas Trial Court Cause N o. 91R

- 458

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Blas Tierrablanca appeals his co nviction for murder. He was convicted by a jury , which then assessed his punishment at life in prison. In a single issue, appellant contends that the t rial court abu sed its discretion in permitting the State to p resent a live , E nglish translation of a recorded tele p hone conversation that occurred in Spanish

. We affirm.2 Background Appellant was cha rged with the 1991 murder of complainant Brenda Smith in Sealy, Texas

. After complainan t ’ s death, appellant fled to Mexico where he remained for over twenty

- six years before being extradited back to Texas. Upo n his return to Texas , appellant confessed to causing complainant ’ s death

. At the guilt

- innocen ce phase of trial , t estifying witnesses included the Sealy police officers and forensic and DNA analysts who inves tigated complainant ’ s death, the assistant medical examiner who performed the auto psy of complainant, the Texas R anger who interviewed appellant upon his retu rn t o Texas , two of appellant ’ s friends from the time of the alleged crime, the girlfriend of one of those fr iends, and the manager of the motel where the crime allegedly occurred

. A certified Spanish language interpreter was sworn in by the trial court to tra nslate the proceedings for appellant. During trial, a written translation of portions of the
ranger ’ s interview with appellant w as read for the jury in a question

- and

- answer format. A redacted recording of the i nterview itself was also admitted into

ev iden ce. Later, the State was permitted over defe n s e objection s to play a portion of a recorded Spanish language phone c onversatio n between appellant and a friend while the interpreter translated the conversation for the jury. It is this presentation that a p pel lant complains about on appeal.
The parties generally agree regarding much of what the evidence in the record established ; a ppellant even acknowledges in his briefing that “ the e vidence

wa s clear , Tierrablanca murdered Brenda Smith. ” I n 1991, appellan t me t comp lainant in a bar in Sealy . Appellant agreed to pay complainant for sex , borrow ed a friend ’ s Camaro , and drove himself and complain ant to a nearby mo tel. According to appellant, once they we re in the motel room, complainant demanded

more mon ey tha n or iginally agreed. He said that he felt threatened that she wanted3

to take the $2000 he was keeping in his wallet

. Ultimately, appellant stabbed and
cut complainant and slashed her neck with a knife

. Complainant bled to death in the motel room. Appellant t he n fled in the Camar o and eventually made his way to Mexico, where he wo uld rem a in for over twenty

- six years. Because appellant ’ s sole complain t concerns the publication of the recorded telephone conversation to the jury , we will discuss the circumstan ces surr ounding that con versation and publica tion in some detail. After the murder , Sealy Police Detective Joe Villareal learned about a potential witness, Di ana Hernandez, who was a friend of appellant and his girlfriend. Hernandez permitted Villare al to list en

o n and record several conversations that she had with appellant over the phone

. The State provided the record ing s to defense counsel prior to trial. Hernandez and Villareal both testified during trial that the recording of one of the phone calls off ered into evidence was a tru e and accur ate copy of the conv ersation between Hernandez and appellant and was made on a devi ce capable of making an accurate recording

. Before its admission into evidence, t he subject of the recorded phone

c onversation was ra ised outside the jury ’ s presence
. Defense counsel noted that the recording apparently h ad been transcribed at some point but the transcription was never filed and no notice of its use was provided. The State explained that it would not be offering a transc ript into evidence. When the State then offered the recording into evidence as State ’ s exhibit 55 during Hernandez ’ s testimony , appellant objected that she was no t a proper witness to authenticate the recording because she did not own the device on which t he r ecording was made. T he State reminded the court that Villareal also had earlier testified as to the auth e nticity of the recordin g, and the trial court admitted exhibit 55 into evidence. A portion of the recording was then playe d for the jury while the int erpreter ,4

who had been sworn to provide a t ranslation of the proceedings for appellant , provided a live , in

- court translation of th e conversation. 1 Before the recording was played, defense counsel objected t hat the State was improperly using extrinsic evid ence to refresh the recollection of Hernandez, who was then on the witness stand. That objection was overruled. When the recording first began playing, the interpreter stated , “ I agree with the

— ” and “ I concur , ” before the judg e admonished him to pro v ide live translation and not simply indicate whether he agreed with a written transcription. Defense counsel then renewed the extrinsic

- evi dence

- to

- refresh

- recollection objection. The State explained that the recording was being offered as evidence in its own right and was not being used to refresh He rn andez ’ s recollection of the conversation. The trial court again overruled the objection but per mitted counsel a running objection on that ground

. As the recording began to play again, t he interpreter asked t h e ju dge ,

“ Read? ” and the judge responded, “ yes. ” The interpreter then said , “ And that ’ s why I don ’ t want them to find out. Because if they find out, the y could deport me or something. And I don ’ t want that. ” Defense counsel objected that it appeared the i n terp reter w as reading from a document and referring to notes that were not his. The judge observed that the interpreter had been instructed to translate the tape , and defense counsel thanked the judge

. As the recording began playing again , t he interpreter said , “ [I] t ’ s not my problem. It makes no sense to be locked up over there for so many years, but

. . . I

1 We note that although the jury presumably would have been able to tell w hether the words being translated were appellant ’ s or Hernandez ’ s because they could he ar the voices on the recording , the recor d be fore us does not explicitly reflect whose w ords were being translated at any given time

. Although some indication of the speaker can be gle a n ed from context, it is no t necessary to resolution of the issues in this appeal.5

know they can ’ t prove anything. Even if they d o arrest me

. . . . ” The trial judge then asked the State whether there would be any questions asked of t he w itness, and the State responded that they were publishing the recording of the p hone call just as they had done with the recording of appell ant ’ s interview with the ranger

. Defense counsel objected t o the narrative nature of the presentation and that t he

w itness was not being asked any questions. The judge overruled the objections. When the recording began playing again, the interpreter stated , “ I want to go back a little bit . One more ti me. I just can ’ t say. It wasn ’ t me. Proof? What proof is there? J u st b ecause they say it was me. They can ’ t do that. ” The State then stopped the recording and asked Hernandez to clarify whose voice the jury was hearing on the recording, and sh e responded that it was appellant ’ s voice. The S tate asked what they were talk i ng a bout in terms of what appellant m ight be going to jail for, and Hernandez responded, “ T he murde r. ” The S tate asked whether they had discussed whether appellant had told anyo ne else “ what he had done , ” and Hernandez ind i cated appellant had spoken to hi s gir lfriend at the time and the recording included that part of the conve rsation

. When the recording began to play again , the interpreter s aid, “ She is scared of that, to go over there. Yeah. I know. She is very scared , ” The recording stopped and started a gain , and the interpreter said , “ Yeah. And you, and you don ’ t know why she got sick? Well, because of what you did, [appellant] . Yeah. I know. ” After one more stop and start, the interpre ter said, “ She asked me, and I said yes, that you told me that yo u d i d it . And she said that she already

— . ” Defense counsel then objected on the ground of hearsay

- within

- hearsay, and the trial court sustained the objection. A discussion then ensued outside of the jury ’ s presence regarding whether the statements constituted hear say. At the conclusion of the discussion, the State opted to continu e by simply asking Hernandez questions rather than playing6

more of the recording. Hernandez then testified that app ellant acknow ledged that he had also told his girlfrien d that he had kill ed the complainant. The State then passed the witness. At the conclusion of the guilt

- innocence phase , the jury found appellant guilty of murder. During the punishment phase, appellant te stified regarding the events leading to complainant ’ s death and h is s ubsequent life in Mexico. The jury assessed appellant ’ s punishment at life in prison. Applicable Law
In his sole issue , appellant contends that the trial court erred in its admission into evidence and publication to the jury of the phone call recordin g
. Ap pellant further argues that this error ultimately influenced the jury ’ s assessment of punishment , and he requests a new trial on punishment. We review a trial court ’ s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. De La P a z v. State , 279 S.W.3d 336, 343

– 44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). If the trial court ’ s ruling falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we will affirm that decision. Moses v. State , 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Relevant evidence is admissi b le e xcept as otherwise provided by the United States and Texas c onstitution s , by statute, by the Texas Rules of Evidence , or by other rules enacted pursuant to statutory authority. Tex. R. Evid. 40 2.
To suc cessfully complain of error on appeal, an appell a nt m ust have preserved any error in the trial court by making a timely and sufficiently specific motion, re quest , or objection and then pursued it to an adverse ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 ; Musgrove v. State , 425 S.W.3d 601, 607

– 08 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 t h Di st.] 2 014 , pet. ref ’ d )

. An appell ant must then file a brief that includes clear and concise argument in support of the comp laint , with appropriate citation s to relevant authority and the record. See Tex. R

. App. P. 38. l(i) ; Checo v. State , 402 S.W.3d7

440, 451 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013 , pet. ref ’ d )

. The complaint of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial. Bekendam v. State , 441 S.W.3d 295, 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)

. A recording in a foreign language is not inadmissibl e sim ply because it is in a foreign language. Leal v. State , 782 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)

. Courts have typically analy zed the admissibility of a foreign lang uage rec ording under e ither Rule of E vidence 1009, which governs translation of forei g n la nguage documents, or Code of Criminal Procedure article 38 .03 , which governs the use of interpreters in criminal proce edings , or both

. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.30 ; Tex. R. Evid. 1009 ; see , e.g. , Leal , 782 S.W.2d at 849

– 50 (an alyzing admission of

r ecor ding under article 38.03 before enactment of Rule 1009); Castrejon v. State , 428 S.W.3d 179, 183

– 84 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2014 , no pet. ) (analyzing admission under both article 38.30 and Rule 1009) ; Peralta v. State , 338 S.W.3d 598, 606 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2010 , no pet. ) (same). Under Rule 1009 , a t ranslation can either be done in writing under subsection (a) or through the testimony of a qualified translator under subsecti on (e). Tex. R. Evid. 10 09 (a), (e). Article 38.30 requires, among other t hing s, tha t the interpreter be sworn to interpret. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.30 (a).
Discussion
M ost of appellant ’ s brie fing on appeal consists of a recitation of the events that transpire d in the trial court. This format makes it somewhat difficult to unde rstand what appellant is arguing on appeal. N onetheless , we will endeavor to ad dress all of appellant ’ s trial and appellate complaints

. Appellant first notes that he ob j ected at trial that the State failed to timely provide a transcription of the reco r ding and written translation under Rule 1009(a). However, a s appellant acknowledge s in his brief, the State presented live8

translation under Rule 1009(e) , not a written translation under Rule 1009(a). Appellant next a sserts that the interpreter failed to p rovi de a contemporaneous translation of the recording when it was publ ished to the jury. He points out that when the recording first began playing, the interpreter s t ated , “ I agree with the

— ” and “ I concur , ” and immediately thereafter, the interpreter
app e ared to be rea ding something rather than simply translat ing what was being played on the recording . While the interpreter did initially appear to misunderstand his role in tran s lating the recording and appellant made objections , the judge quickly correct e d the interpreter and admonished him to provide live translation and not simply indicate whether he agreed with a written transcription . T he translation continued thereafter in proper fashion. Indeed, defense counsel thanked the judge for his efforts and m a de n o further objections or requests in th is regard

. Appellant also suggests that the translation was inaccurate but cites no support for this conclusory assertion beyond the translator ’ s “I agree with the

— ” and “I

concur ” statements mentioned above , whic h app eared to be referencing a written translation that the interpreter was h olding. A ppellant su ggests that th e translator ’ s remarks c ommented on the weight of the evidence, but they appear to have been no more than an indication of agreement with a writt e n tr anslation and not somehow a
comment on anything said on the recording . Again, once corrected by the judge very early in the process , the translator began prov iding contemporaneous interpretation , and defense counsel did not complain further regarding t h e m anner of interpretation. We discern no error in the interpreter ’ s early struggles or the
court ’ s corrective measu res. See Castrejon , 428 S.W.3d at 1 84 ( explaining that a translation should be “ accurate ” but need not be “ perfect ” ) ; Peralta , 338 S.W.3d a t 60 4 (same). Next, appellant suggests the trial court should have instructed members of9

the jury that may speak Spanish not to engage in their own attempts to interpret the recording. Appellant, however, neither made such a request in the trial court nor

c ite s any authority in support of such ins truction on appeal

. S ee Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 , 38.1(i); Musgrove , 425 S.W.3d at 607

– 08 ; Checo , 402 S.W.3d at 451

. Appellant hig hlights the following passage from the translation as improper ly admitted and h armful: “ A nd that’s why I don’t want them to find out

. Because if they find out, they could deport me or something. And I don’t want that.” Appellant asserts this statement was highly speculative regarding appellant ’ s mental impressions and was offered without con t e xt or foundation. Appellant, however, did not object to this passage on any of these gro unds in the trial court. See Bekendam , 441 S.W.3d at 300 (explaining that a complaint of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial ). Appellant note s th at he objecte d to hearsay

- within

- hearsay at the end of the int e rpreter ’ s testimony. See generally Sanchez v. State , 354 S.W.3d 476, 485

– 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ( “ When hearsay contains hearsay, the Rules of Evidence require that each part of the combi n ed statements be within an exception to the hearsay rule. ” ). Although appellant asserts error on appeal in relation to this objection, the trial court sustained the objection, defense counsel did not request a n instruction to d isregard or a mistrial, and t he interpreter did not testify any further. Accordingly, nothing is preserved for our review. See Musgrove , 425 S.W.3d at 607

– 08

. Appellant also notes that he objected that the recording sh ould have been used only to refresh the recollection of the witnes s , H ernandez. Appellant, however, neither cite s any authority support ing the proposition that a foreign language recording or the translation of a fore ign language recording can only be used in that manner nor makes a cogent argument in support of such con t ent ion

.10

See Tex. R

. App. P. 38. l(i) ; Checo , 402 S.W.3d at 451

. Appellant further notes that he objected to the narrative nature of the translation and the fact that the State was not asking questions whil e the recording was being played and interpret ed. B ut again, appellant neither cite s any authority requiring questioning while a recording is being translated nor makes a ny argument in support of such requiremen t. See generally Leal , 782 S.W.2d at 849

– 50 ; Castrejon , 428 S.W.3d at 183

– 84 ; Peralta , 338 S.W. 3 d a t 606

. Appellant also suggests that the State ’ s grounds for offering the reco rding in response to his refresh

- the

- recollection objection misstated the law, likely confused the j ury, and commented on the weight of the evidence. The State cited the “ best evi dence rule ” in urging the admission of the recording and translation

. However, regardless of whether the State ’ s best

- evidence argument supported adm ission , it was made outside of the jury ’ s presence and thus could not have confused the jury or been a c omm ent on the weight of the evidence

. M oreover, appellant does not cite any au thority suppor ting the proposition that a trial court errs in admitting evidence simply because the proponent ’ s basis for offering the evidence was incorrect

. See Checo , 402 S.W

. 3d at 451

. Finding no merit in any of appellant ’ s arguments, we overrule his sole issue and affirm the trial court ’ s judgment.

/s/ Frances Bourliot Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, an d Po issant. Do Not Publish

— T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2 ( b )

.