Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

CORAL RIDGE MINISTRIES MEDIA, INC., DBA D. 

JAMES KENNEDY MINISTRIES v. SOUTHERN 

POVERTY LAW CENTER 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 21–802. Decided June 27, 2022 

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting from the denial of certiorari. 

Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc., is a Christian nonprofit dedicated to spreading the “Gospel of Jesus Christ” 

and “a biblically informed view of the world, using all available media.” 406 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1268 (MD Ala. 2019) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). In 2017, Coral Ridge

applied to receive donations through AmazonSmile, a program that allows Amazon customers to contribute to approved nonprofits. To its dismay, Coral Ridge learned it 

was ineligible for the program. The Southern Poverty Law 

Center (SPLC) had designated Coral Ridge an “Anti-LGBT 

hate group” because of its biblical views concerning human

sexuality and marriage. Id., at 1270 (internal quotation

marks omitted). AmazonSmile excluded Coral Ridge based

on SPLC’s “hate group” designation. 

Objecting to that designation, Coral Ridge sued SPLC for 

defamation under Alabama law. Coral Ridge maintained

that although it “opposes homosexual conduct” based on its

religious beliefs, it is in no sense a “hate group.” Amended 

Complaint in Coral Ridge Ministries Media, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 2:17–cv–566 (MD Ala., Oct. 18, 2017),

ECF Doc. 40, p. 13. To the contrary, it “has nothing but love 

for people who engage in homosexual conduct” and “has 

never attacked or maligned anyone on the basis of engaging 

in homosexual conduct.” Ibid. Coral Ridge alleged that 
 

 

2 CORAL RIDGE MINISTRIES MEDIA, INC. v. SOUTHERN 

POVERTY LAW CENTER 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SPLC was aware that it was not a “hate group,” but falsely 

labeled it one anyway to “destroy the Ministry” by “dissuad[ing] people and organizations from donating to [it].” 

Id., at 19. 

SPLC responded that its “hate group” designation was

protected by the First Amendment. The District Court 

agreed and dismissed Coral Ridge’s complaint for failure to

state a claim. Because Coral Ridge conceded that it was a 

“‘public figure,’” the court observed that Coral Ridge had to 

prove three elements to rebut SPLC’s First Amendment defense: the “‘hate group’” designation had to be (1) provably 

false, (2) actually false, and (3) made with “‘actual malice.’” 

406 F. Supp. 3d, at 1270. The court concluded that SPLC’s 

“hate group” designation was not provably false because 

“‘hate group’ has a highly debatable and ambiguous meaning.” Id., at 1277. Additionally, the court held that Coral

Ridge had not plausibly alleged that SPLC acted with “actual malice,” as defined by this Court’s decision in New York 

Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 280 (1964). See 406 

F. Supp. 3d, at 1278–1280. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed but rested its decision exclusively on the “actual malice” standard. See 6 F. 4th 

1247, 1251–1253 (CA11 2021). While a defamed person

must typically prove only “a false written publication that 

subjected him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule,” McKee v. 

Crosby, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring in

denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks

omitted), a “public figure” laboring under the “actual malice” standard must prove that a defamatory statement was

made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,” New York Times, 376 

U. S., at 280. Applying that “actual malice” standard, the

Court of Appeals agreed that Coral Ridge’s complaint had 

not sufficiently alleged that SPLC doubted or had good reason to doubt the truth of its “hate group” designation. See 

6 F. 4th, at 1252–1253. 
 

 

Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) 3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Coral Ridge now asks us to reconsider the “actual malice”

standard. As I have said previously, “we should.” Berisha 

v. Lawson, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (opinion dissenting 

from denial of certiorari) (slip op., at 2). “New York Times 

and the Court’s decisions extending it were policy-driven

decisions masquerading as constitutional law.” McKee, 586 

U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 2). Those 

decisions have “no relation to the text, history, or structure 

of the Constitution.” Tah v. Global Witness Publishing, 

Inc., 991 F. 3d 231, 251 (CADC 2021) (Silberman, J., dissenting in part). This Court has never demonstrated otherwise. In fact, we have never even inquired whether “the 

First or Fourteenth Amendment, as originally understood, 

encompasses an actual-malice standard.” McKee, 586 U. S., 

at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 10).

I would grant certiorari in this case to revisit the “actual

malice” standard. This case is one of many showing how 

New York Times and its progeny have allowed media organizations and interest groups “to cast false aspersions on 

public figures with near impunity.” Tah, 991 F. 3d, at 254 

(opinion of Silberman, J.). SPLC’s “hate group” designation 

lumped Coral Ridge’s Christian ministry with groups like

the Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazis. It placed Coral Ridge on

an interactive, online “Hate Map” and caused Coral Ridge

concrete financial injury by excluding it from the AmazonSmile donation program. Nonetheless, unable to satisfy 

the “almost impossible” actual-malice standard this Court 

has imposed, Coral Ridge could not hold SPLC to account 

for what it maintains is a blatant falsehood. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 771 

(1985) (White, J., concurring in judgment).

Because the Court should not “insulate those who perpetrate lies from traditional remedies like libel suits” unless 

“the First Amendment requires” us to do so, Berisha, 594 

U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 3), I respectfully dissent from the denial of certiorari.