[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 14

- 11156 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:13

- cv - 20042

- JAL EDDY JEAN PHILIPPEAUX, Plaintiff

- Appellant,

versus APARTMENT INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT COMPANY, AIMCO, DANIEL MELENDEZ, General Manager of the Flamingo South Beach Property, TIA BUCHANAN, Resident Relations Manager, MCZ/CENTRUM FLAMINGO II, LLC, Flamingo, BRYAN KEBDLE, et al., Defend ants

- Appellees, FLAMINGO SOUTH BEACH, Defendant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern Di strict of Florida

________________________ (January 15, 2015) Case: 14-11156 Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 1 of 102 Before MARCUS , WILLIAM PRYOR, and JORDAN , Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Eddy Jean Philippeaux , proceeding pro se , appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his second amended complaint, which a lleg ed violations of the
F air H ousing A ct , 42 U.S.C. § 3601 , and the F lorida F air H ousing A ct , Fla. Stat. § 760.20. The district court dismissed Mr. Philippeaux ’s complaint on mootness grounds because , subsequent to filing suit, Mr. Philippeaux vacated the ap artment at issue pursuant to a settlement agreement between the parties in a state court eviction action

. 1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I
Mr. Philippeaux is a disabled veteran. At the time of this dispute, h e l eased

a ground

- floor apartment at Flamingo South Beach Apartments , which are owned by MCZ/Centrum Flamingo II LLC

. MCZ lease d the ground level of its seven

level parking garage to a third party , which in turn use d the space for a valet parking service. Residents of Flamingo Apartments could park on the ground level of the garage if they pay the hourly valet rate. Alternatively, residents could pay a monthly flat rate for the privilege of parking on levels two through seven (if a

1 Mr. Philippeaux argues in part that dismissal was improper because his claims are not barred by the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine, res judicata , or collateral estoppel. T he district court , however, did not dismiss the case pursuant to any of these doctrines. As a result, we do not address them.

Case: 14-11156 Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 2 of 103 space is available) , or they could pay a higher monthly flat rate for an assigned space on levels two through seven.
Mr. Philippeaux allege d that MCZ violated the FHA and FFHA by denying his request for a n assigned, handicapped parking space on the ground level of the parking garage

. Because he was not given a ground

- level parking space, he had to park on one of the upper levels of the garage. He claim ed that parking on an upper level caused him to walk a long distance to reach his apartment, which resulted in
p hysical and mental harm (including failure to recover and heel from hernia
surgery )

. Mr. Philippeaux argue d that an assigned, handicapped parking space on the ground level of the garage was a reasonable accommodation under the FHA and FFHA.
In his second amended complaint, M r. Philippeaux requested (1) that MCZ be enjoined from refusing to make a reasonable accommodation and from retaliating against him by evicting him because of his request; (2) a declaration that MCZ’s conduct violated the FHA and FFHA ; and (3) actual and p unitive damages, pursuant to the FHA , for discrimination and retaliation

. A fter fili ng his second amended complaint , Mr. Philippeaux submitted a motion for preliminary injunction, to which he attached a stipulation and order for dismissal in a state court eviction action , which he and a representative of MCZ had signed . Pursuant to th at stipulation, Mr. Philippeaux agreed to vacate his

Case: 14-11156 Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 3 of 104 apartment on March 10, 2014, and MCZ agreed to waive any unpaid rent owed by Mr. Philippeaux. The stipulation also dismissed MCZ’s eviction action against Mr. Philippeaux. On March 10, 2014, Mr. Philippeaux filed a “notice of plaintiff’s status,” in which he indicated that he would be homeless as of March 11, 2014. Based on these filing s , t he district court dismissed Mr. Philippeaux’s second amended complaint , finding that , because Mr. Philippeaux had vacated the apartment his , claims were moot. Mr. Philippeaux now appeals.
II
We review the question of mootness de novo

. Christian Coal. of Ala

. v. Cole , 355 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004)

. Article III of the United States Constitution requires a live case or controversy at the time a federal court decides the case, and “‘ a federal court has no authority to give opinions upon moot questions [.] ’” Zinni v. ER Solutions, Inc. , 692 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal

. v. United States , 506 U.S. 9, 12, (1992) ). “ A case is moot when events subsequent to the commencement of a lawsuit create a situation in which the court can no longer give the plaintiff meaningful relief. ” Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth. , 162 F.3d 627, 629 (11th Cir. 1998)

. “[I] t is well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte

Case: 14-11156 Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 4 of 105 whenever it may be lacking. ” Univ. of S. Ala . v . Am. Tobacco Co. , 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999)

. Mr. Philippeaux ’s claims for injuncti ve and declaratory relief were premised
upon the allegation that MCZ was in violation of the FHA and the FFHA by failing
to fulfill his request for an assigned, handicapped parking space on the ground level of the parking garage

. But during the pendency of the action, Mr

. Philippeaux v acated his apartment and no longer lives at the Flamingo A partments

. Consequently, the district court correctly ruled that Mr. Philippeaux ’s claim s for equitable and declaratory relief were moot. See Jews for Jesus , 162 F.3d at 629

. 2
III Liberally construed , Mr. Philippeaux ’s second amended complaint also alleged a claim for damages allegedly result ing from MCZ’s refusal to provide an assigned, handicapped parking space on the ground level of the garage

. That Mr. Philippeaux vacat ed the apartment does not moot any claim for d amages he may have suffered in the past as a result of MCZ’s alleged violations of the FHA and FFHA. Thus , the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Philippeaux ’s claim for damages as moot. See McKinnon v. Talladega Cnty., Ala. , 745 F.2d 1360, 1362 (11th Cir. 1984) (“ A claim for damages does not expire upon the termi nation of the wrongful conduct. Unlike declaratory and injunctive relief, which are prospective

2 To the extent Mr. Philippeaux sought equitable relief with regard to his retaliation claim, that cl aim was also moot given that Mr. Philippeaux no longer lives at Flamingo Apartments

.

Case: 14-11156 Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 5 of 106 remedies, awards for monetary damages compensate the claimant for alleged past
wrongs. ”) (citation omitted)

. Nonetheless, we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Philippeaux ’s damages claim on the alternative ground that the complaint fail s to state a claim for relief under the FHA and FFHA

. “ We may affirm the district court's judgme nt on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not that ground was relied upon or even

c onsidered by the [district] court [.]” Powers v. United States , 996 F.2d 1121, 1123

- 24 (11th Cir. 1993)

. Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6), where, accepting the allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a complaint fails to state a claim for relief

. See Baker Cnty. Med. Servs. v. U.S. Att’y
Gen. , 763 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir. 2014). When reviewing wh ether a complaint states a claim for relief, p ro se pleadings are liberally construed. Alba v. Montford , 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, “ plaintiffs must do more than merely state legal conclusions; they are required to allege some spe cific factual bases for those conclusions [.]” Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm

. , 372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004)

. “The FHA and the Florida Fair Housing Act are substantively identical, and therefore the same legal analysis applies to each.” Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n, Inc. , 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014). Under the FHA and the

Case: 14-11156 Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 6 of 107 FFHA, it is unlawful to discriminate against a renter with disabilities by refusing “to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practi ces, or services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)( B); Fla. Stat. § 760.23(9)(b). To establish a f ailure

- to

- accommodate claim, a plaintiff “ must prove t hat (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the FHA, (2) he requested a reasonable accommodation, (3) the requested accommodation was necessary to afford him an [equal] opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling, and (4) the defendants refused to make the accommodation. ” Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n, Inc. , 765 F.3d 1277 , 1285 (11th Cir. 2014).
W e have held that “[t] he FHA's reasonable accommodation provision requires only those accommodations that may be necessary . . . to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. ” Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island , 544 F.3d 1201, 1226 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original)

. Equal opportunity means that a disabled person must be afforded the same opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling as a non

- disabled person. Id. Preferential treatment is not required

. I d

. MCZ d oes not dispute that Mr. Philippeaux is handicapped within the meaning of the FHA and FFHA, nor does it dispute that he occupied a dwelling as defined by the se acts

. Rather, the issue on appeal is whether Mr. Philippeaux ’s

Case: 14-11156 Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 7 of 108 request for an assigned, handicapped parking space on the ground level of the garage is a reasonable accommodation

. We conclude that it was not. First, the ground level of the parking garage was leased to a third

- party vendor, and residents of Flamingo Apartments were not permitted to park on the ground level unless they were willing to pay the hourly valet rate

— s omething Mr. Philippeaux was unwilling to do

. Because a ll residents park on levels two through

seven , providing Mr. Philippeaux a ground

- level parking space at no cost or at a reduced rate would place him in a better positi on than all other residents , d isabled and non - disabled alike. Second, requiring MCZ t o either break its lease agreement with the third

party valet vendor , or pay the hourly valet parking fees charged by the vendor so that Mr. Philippeaux could park on the ground level , would place a n undue financial burden upon MCZ

. And, as we have said, a n accommodation is not reasonable if it imposes an undue financial burden on the landlord. See Schwarz, 544 F.3d at 1220 (analogizing Rehabilitation Act cases to a claim brought under the FHA). In short, Mr. Philippeaux failed to alleg e the denial of a reasonable

ac commodation. See Loren v. Sasser , 309 F.3d 1296, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002) (“ Under the [FHA] , plaintiff [ ] have the burden of proving that a proposed

Case: 14-11156 Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 8 of 109 accommodation is reasonable

. ”). As a result , he failed to state a claim under t he FHA or FFHA.
III To state a claim for retaliatory housing discrimination, a plaintiff must assert that a defendant coerced, intimidated, threatened, or interfered with his exercise of rights granted under the FHA or FFHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617; Fla. Stat. § 760.37; Dixon v. Hallmark Cos. , 627 F.3d 849, 858 (11th Cir. 2010). “ To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant subjected him to an a dverse action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. ” Walker v. City of Lakewood , 272 F.3d 1114, 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the legal framework used in Title VII cases to an FHA retaliation case). “ A plai ntiff engages in statutorily protected activity when he or she protests

. . . conduct which is actually lawful, so long as he or she demonstrates a good faith, reasonable belief that the [conduct engaged in] was . . . unlawful [.]” Harper v. Blockbuster En tm't Corp. , 139 F.3d 1385, 1388 (11th Cir. 1998) (Title VII case) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff ’s belief that the conduct was unlawful must be objectively reasonable. Id.
Mr. Philippeaux ’s second amended complaint fail ed to establis h a prima facie case of retaliation . Simply stated, Mr. Philippeaux has not alleged that he

Case: 14-11156 Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 9 of 1010 engaged in statutorily protected activity. Rather, he claimed that he was denied a reasonable accommodation. H is belief that MCZ violated the law by not providing him with an assigned, handicapped parking space on the ground level of the
garage , however, was not objectively reasonable. Mr. Philippeaux admit ted t hat the entire ground level of the parking garage was leased to a third party an d that all the residents at Flamingo Apartments had to par k on levels two through seven. He also admit ted that there were handicapped parking spaces on levels two through

seven . Moreover, while he claimed that he was evicted because he requested the

acco mmodation, the record establishes that the state court eviction action was triggered by Mr. Philippeaux’s failure to pay rent.
Because Mr. Philippeaux fails to allege that he engaged in statutorily protected activity, he failed to state a claim for retali ation. IV
W e affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mr. Philippeaux ’s equitable claims as moot . W e affirm the dismissal of Mr. Philippeaux ’s damages claim s for d iscrimination and retaliation because he failed to state claim s for relief

. AFFIRMED. Case: 14-11156 Date Filed: 01/15/2015 Page: 10 of 10