IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs August 1, 2024

IN RE TUCKER R. ET AL.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County

No. 22-00735 Dennis “Will” Roach, II, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2023-01591-COA-R3-PT

___________________________________

The Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental 

rights of Meliah B. (“Mother”) to her children, Tucker R., Gracelynn R., and Roland R. 

(“the Children”). Mother has appealed, challenging only the Juvenile Court’s finding that 

termination of her parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Finding no 

reversible error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed; 

Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Matthew Lorah, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Meliah B.

Mindy Norton Seals, Morristown, Tennessee, Guardian ad litem.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Mara L. Cunningham, Assistant 

Attorney General for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

08/29/2024
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OPINION

Background

In September 2021, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”)

filed a petition to adjudicate the Children dependent and neglected by Mother and 

Gregory R. (“Father”)1in the Juvenile Court. DCS alleged the following:

1. On September 17, 2021, local law enforcement responded to the family

residence due to Scott [L.], Mother’s paramour, overdosing in the home. 

Law enforcement requested immediate assistance from DCS due to the 

situation at the home.

2. CM Ramsey responded to the request for assistance. Mr. [L.] was still 

in the residence upon her arrival. There were needles and heroin found in 

his room.

3. Mother admitted to methamphetamine, ecstasy, and Suboxone use on

September 16, 2021. Mother admitted that she has used marijuana one 

week prior. Law enforcement found a methamphetamine pipe, marijuana 

pipe, and baggies of methamphetamine in Mother’s room - this is the also 

the room in which the children were located. They also found more pipes

and marijuana seeds hidden in a desk and Mother admitted to selling.

4. Mother submitted to a urine drug screen and tested positive for

methamphetamine, amphetamine, benzodiazepine buprenorphine, ecstasy, 

and THC, for none of which did she have a prescription.

5. Mother reported that she used drugs while the children were asleep in 

the home. Mother admitted to knowing that Mr. [L.] was using heroin, but 

she had told him not to do it at her house.

6. Another adult female, Amanda [S.], was found in the home. She 

admitted to using methamphetamine at approximately 7:00 a.m. this 

morning by both intravenous injection and smoking.

7. CM Ramsey found the two-year-old in a crib with a baby gate strapped 

to the top, creating a cage. Mother reported that she did not want the child 

to be around in the house because she “does not know what is in her 

house.”

 

1 Father is not a party to this appeal and our focus is, therefore, limited to Mother.
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8. The home was cluttered. As noted earlier, there were several pipes and

baggies of methamphetamine found in the home. In addition, there was a 

knife and ashtray within reach of the children and the home was cluttered 

with clothes and dishes.

9. Based on these facts, the children are victims of severe abuse 

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-102(b)(27).

10. Father is currently incarcerated in the Jefferson County Jail.

11. CM Ramsey spoke with Tucker at his school. Tucker reported that 

[]he sometimes has to care for the children while Mother works at night or 

in the morning. Tucker told CM Ramsey that he gets in trouble at school 

because his Mother does not give him his medication; he admitted that 

sometimes he will find the medicine and take it himself. Tucker reported 

that he has never seen anyone using drugs in the home.

12. When CM Ramsey attempted to visit Adam[2]at school, he was not 

there. Mother reported that they are going to run with Adam. The 

grandfather and grandmother reported that grandfather and Adam were 

going to stay at the Rod Run in Sevierville this weekend. Grandfather 

attempted to say that they have partial custody, but they only have a Power 

of Attorney from Mother. Grandfather refuses to return the child to DCS.

DCS requested that the Juvenile Court place the Children in the temporary care and 

custody of DCS. At the time DCS filed its dependency and neglect petition, Tucker was 

six years old, Gracelynn was two years old, and Roland was one year old.

The Juvenile Court entered a protective custody order placing the Children in 

DCS’s temporary legal custody. The Juvenile Court found that DCS had made 

reasonable efforts to prevent the Children’s removal from the home and that it was 

reasonable to make no effort to maintain the Children in Mother’s home given the 

circumstances. Mother was granted supervised visitation. Mother waived the 

preliminary hearing and stipulated to probable cause of dependency and neglect. 

In October 2021, the Juvenile Court entered an order adjudicating the Children 

dependent and neglected by Mother. Mother stipulated to “clear and convincing 

evidence of dependency and neglect based on allegations in petition.” The Juvenile 

Court further found that Mother had committed severe child abuse against the Children, 

pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(27)(F), noting that at least two of the 

 

2 Adam B. is Mother’s oldest child from a prior relationship. Adam was not subject to the termination 

proceedings in the Juvenile Court and is only referenced herein for context.
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Children had tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. The order 

reflected that Mother had agreed to enter “Safe Baby Court.” In December 2022, the 

Juvenile Court appointed Mindy Seals as guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and appointed 

Mother an attorney. 

On December 5, 2022, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

to the Children. DCS alleged two grounds for termination: (1) persistence of conditions, 

pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), and (2) severe child abuse, pursuant to 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4) and § 37-1-102(b)(27). DCS further alleged that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest, pursuant to 

Tenn. Code Ann. 36-1-113(i).

Trial on the termination petition was in July 2023. The Juvenile Court heard 

testimony from Mother; the Children’s foster mother, Samantha A. (“Foster Mother”); 

and DCS case managers, Jessica Eslinger (“Eslinger”) and Jessica Boone (“Boone”). 

Eslinger testified that she was the DCS case manager for the Children from 

November 2021 until June 2023, with a brief absence between January and February 

2023. Eslinger affirmed that the Children had been in Mother’s care and custody when 

they were removed to DCS custody and that hair follicle tests revealed that Tucker and 

Gracelynn had been exposed to methamphetamine and amphetamines. Eslinger testified 

that the main issue preventing the Children from returning to Mother’s custody was 

Mother’s continued substance abuse. According to Eslinger, Mother completed two

alcohol and drug assessments and an inpatient drug rehabilitation program in May 2022

but failed to follow up with intensive out-patient therapy, referred to as “IOP” throughout 

the record. Eslinger testified that Mother relapsed and tested positive for illicit 

substances repeatedly. 

According to Eslinger, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and 

amphetamines in June 2022; failed a drug screen in July 2022; tested positive for 

methamphetamine in August 2022; tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamines, 

and other illicit substances in September 2022; and tested positive for methamphetamine 

and amphetamines in April 2023. Mother did not comply with hair follicle requests in 

February or June of 2023. Eslinger indicated that Mother had passed only one drug 

screen.

With respect to Mother’s support and visitation, Eslinger testified that Mother 

consistently paid child support and visited the Children approximately once per month. 

However, Mother’s visits often had to be canceled because she failed to confirm those 

visits in advance. Some visits were cancelled due to Mother’s failed drug screens. After 

one visit was cancelled due to Mother’s failure to confirm, Mother threatened to “bust” 

Eslinger in the face and “continued to text” Eslinger for three days, stating that Eslinger 

was a “crap person” and that she hoped Eslinger had a “horrible day.” Screenshots of 
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text conversations between Eslinger and Mother were entered into evidence, revealing the 

threatening and expletive-laden nature of Mother’s messages. Eslinger was removed 

from the case in June 2023 as a result of Mother’s behavior. 

Eslinger testified that the Children had been in the same foster home since their 

removal to DCS custody in September 2021 and that they had bonded with their foster 

parents, Foster Mother and Brandon A. (“Foster Father”) (collectively, “Foster Parents”). 

However, Eslinger also explained that Mother still had a relationship with the Children, 

that the Children still refer to Mother as mom, that the Children have cried when visits 

with Mother are over, and that they have asked to go home with Mother after a few of the 

visits. 

Still, Eslinger testified that changing caregivers would have a detrimental effect on 

the Children and that the Children would not be adversely affected if Mother’s parental 

rights were terminated. When asked for the basis of her conclusion, Eslinger reasoned 

that the Children do not ask about Mother outside of visits and that they refer to Foster 

Parents as mom and dad.

Foster Mother testified that the Children have lived continuously with Foster 

Father and her since September 2021. She stated that Foster Father and she love the 

Children very much and would like to adopt them. She further testified that Gracelynn 

and Roland refer to them as “mommy and daddy” and that Tucker calls them “mom and 

dad.” According to Foster Mother, the Children have developed bonds with her motherin-law, who lives close by and sees them two to three times per week. The Children have 

also developed bonds with Foster Mother’s mother, step-father, grandparents, and sister. 

The Children live in the foster home with Foster Parents’ four adopted children. Foster 

Mother testified that Gracelynn is best friends with their adopted daughter.

When Tucker first arrived in Foster Parents’ home, he exhibited behavioral issues 

and Foster Parents and his primary care physician determined which ADHD medication 

worked best for him through trial and error. Tucker also was evaluated at “Camelot”3

due to his behavioral issues and his need for “general trauma therapy.” Camelot 

recommended out-patient therapy to Tucker for “depression, anxiety, witnessing 

domestic violence.” When asked about Tucker’s emotional well-being, Foster Mother 

explained that “[r]ight now he just kind of has a lot of questions because he’s just unsure 

of . . . what’s happened” but that “for the most part his wellbeing is pretty good.” Foster 

Mother testified that Tucker continues to receive “trauma-focused therapy” at Camelot.

 

3 Although “Camelot” is not clearly defined, documentation in the record demonstrates that Camelot is 

the organization that conducted Tucker’s mental health assessment. Camelot evidently is a mental health 

provider.
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Regarding Gracelynn, Foster Mother testified that she had to receive Tennessee 

Early Intervention Services (“TEIS”) and occupational therapy because she had “a really 

hard time with transition and meeting people was really hard for her.” Foster Mother 

described Gracelynn as “very closed off” and testified that her demeanor was “afraid of 

anybody and everybody” when she first arrived in their home. However, as of the day of 

trial, Foster Mother described Gracelynn as “very happy, upbeat.” By the time of trial,

Gracelynn had completed TEIS and occupational therapy.

In terms of the Children’s relationship with Mother, Foster Mother acknowledged 

that the Children still retain a bond with Mother. Foster Mother testified that the 

Children have occasionally cried when Mother leaves visits and that they sometimes say 

that they miss Mother. According to Foster Mother, Tucker sometimes will ask about

Mother’s whereabouts and her work. However, when asked whether the Children ask for 

Mother outside of visits “like if they were to get injured or something,” Foster Mother 

responded, “No.” Foster Mother also testified that Tucker sometimes asks about his 

older brother, Adam, and she affirmed that if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, 

Tucker would still have a relationship with Adam. 

During her testimony, Mother affirmed that she has been “an addict” since she was 

a teenager and that her longest period of sobriety during the last two years was three 

months. When asked how many times she had “attended rehab,” Mother answered: “I 

went to in-patient and then I did Zoom IOP for a couple of weeks and I did IOP at New 

Hope and now I’m in IOP at Cornerstone.” She claimed that she had been unable to 

complete the first two intensive out-patient therapy programs due to her work schedule 

and that she started intensive out-patient therapy at Cornerstone a week prior to trial. 

Mother testified that she had completed an anger management class, domestic violence 

class, and parenting class. 

Mother testified that the last time she used methamphetamine was approximately 

two months prior to trial. She later stated that she had been sober close to three months 

prior to trial. When asked whether she believed she had “given it” her “all,” Mother 

acknowledged that she had not.

Despite being sober for not even three months, Mother believed the Children 

could safely return to her home that day. Mother attributed her inability to stay sober to 

her Children’s absence from her life, explaining: “I miss them. And it’s hard for me to 

stay clean when I’m a hurting. . . . They’re all I have.” As did Eslinger and Foster 

Mother, Mother testified that she still had a bond with the Children.

The Juvenile Court entered a final judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights 

to the Children on October 11, 2023. The Juvenile Court made the following findings of 

fact and conclusions of law:
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GROUND II.

PERSISTENT CONDITIONS

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(3)

In order to meet the requirements of this ground for termination, the 

Petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that there are 

persistent conditions as to Respondent, [Mother], pursuant to Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3) in pertinent part:

The child has been removed from the home or the physical or 

legal custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) 

months by a court order entered at any stage of proceedings in 

which a petition has been filed in the juvenile court alleging 

that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:

The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, 

preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or 

guardian, or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable 

probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further 

abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care 

of the parent or guardian;

There is little likelihood that these conditions will be 

remedied at an early date so that the child can be safely 

returned to the parent or guardian in the near future; and

The continuation of the parent or guardian and child 

relationship greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early 

integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home;

5. On September 17, 2021, and upon petition by DCS, this Court ordered 

that the minor children were to be removed from the house of the Mother. 

The conditions that led to the removal of the children were the drug use of 

Mother, and the death of Mother’s paramour due to an overdose. In the 

Severe Abuse Order dated October 27, 2021, Mother stipulated to the facts 

alleged in the petition of September the 17th. Among other things, Mom 

stipulated to using drugs and testing positive for a host of drugs, including 

methamphetamine. Mom also stipulated that a hair follicle test on two of 

her children had tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.

6. The testimony has shown that Mom has been struggling with addiction 

since her teenage years. Mother testified she has been enrolled in multiple 

intensive outpatient programs, but testimony also has shown she has 
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completed none. Mother testified she has been in rehab multiple times but 

has been clean no more than 3 months in a row over the past two (2) years. 

Mother has failed multiple drug screens throughout the custodial period. 

As late as April of this year (2023) Mother tested positive for 

Methamphetamine and Amphetamine. Mom is in the midst of what has 

thus far been an endless cycle of addiction, rehab, and relapse. On the other 

hand, Mother testified she has now been clean for 2 or 3 months, has a job 

with FedEx, and lives with her father.

7. It is the opinion of this Court that Mother’s battle with addiction is an 

ongoing and defining issue in her life. Her failure to maintain sobriety for a 

time period exceeding 3 months (over the last 2 years) is weighty evidence 

of a continuous inability to provide fundamental care to her children, 

stretching back at least to the time of removal in September 2021. This 

condition prevents the safe return of the children to the Mother’s care at 

this point, and would, in all reasonable probability, cause the children to be 

subjected to further abuse or neglect.

8. After a nearly 2-year custodial episode and multiple failed attempts at 

maintaining sobriety, there is little likelihood that these conditions will be 

remedied at an early date so that the children can be safely returned to the 

parent in the near future. To reason otherwise, would, in the opinion of this 

Court, necessarily subject the children to further lingering in a state of 

impermanency.

9. In this Court’s opinion, as it relates to the window of time Mother had to 

prove she was capable of consistent sobriety, the window has closed. The 

continuation of the parent and child relationship in this case greatly 

diminishes the children’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable, 

and permanent home.

10. For these reasons, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence the 

grounds set forth in T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(3) have been met, that there are 

persistent conditions with respect to Respondent [Mother] and there is little 

likelihood those conditions will soon be remedied and that it would pose a 

risk to permanency place the children back in her care or custody.

GROUND III.

SEVERE CHILD ABUSE

Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(27)

In order to meet the requirements of this ground for termination, the 

Petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent, 
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[Mother], committed severe child abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-

1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(27) in pertinent part:

The parent or guardian has been found to have committed 

severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior 

order of a court or is found by the court hearing the petition to

terminate parental rights or the petition for adoption to have 

committed severe child abuse against any child;

(D) Knowingly allowing a child to be present within a 

structure where the act of creating methamphetamine, as that 

substance is identified in § 39-17-408(d)(2), is occurring; (E) 

Knowingly or with gross negligence allowing a child under 

eight (8) years of age to ingest an illegal substance or a 

controlled substance that results in the child testing positive 

on a drug screen, except as legally prescribed to the child; or

(F) Knowingly allowing a child to be within a structure where 

any of the following controlled substances are present and

accessible to the child: . . . iii) Methamphetamine;

11. As alluded to earlier, Mother stipulated to severe abuse in the 

Adjudicatory Order of this Court dated September 27, 2021. Two of her 

minor children tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.

This ground has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

12. For these reasons, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence the

grounds set forth in T.C.A. § 36-1-113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(27) have 

been met, that Respondent [Mother] did commit severe abuse.

BEST INTEREST

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i)

* * *

13. The children in this case need stability and continuity of placement. 

They have had that stability and continuity for almost 2 years in the home 

of their current, preadoptive placement. The children are well-adapted, 

loved, safe, and thriving in their current placement. They are involved in 

extra-curricular activities, and have developed deep and enduring 

relationships with their foster parents, with other children in the home, and 

with relatives of their caregivers. To uproot the children at this point would

most likely cause a severe upheaval in the lives of the children.
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14. As evidenced by her series of failed attempts at sobriety, Mother has 

been unable to demonstrate continued stability in meeting the needs of her 

children. Mother does have a parental attachment to the kids, and the kids 

do enjoy seeing Mother, but this court cannot conclude that the relationship 

is either secure or healthy. The kids do not ask about Mother after visits, 

and call both Mother and their foster mom “Mom.” Mother has visited the 

kids somewhat regularly, excepting the months where her visits were 

cancelled due to failed drug screens, and the children do not appear to be 

fearful of being with Mother. However, Tucker [R.] is currently 

undergoing trauma-focused treatment due to what he witnessed in the home 

of the Mother.

15. Although Mother has attempted on multiple occasions to take 

advantage of services offered to her by DCS, she admittedly stated she 

hasn’t tried hard enough, and has failed to exhibit a sense of urgency. She 

has yet to complete an IOP, and has relapsed during the pendency of the 

custodial episode, failing multiple drug tests. By providing opportunities 

for IOP treatment, rehabilitation, and various assessments, DCS has made

reasonable efforts to assist the Mother.

16. In the Mother’s favor, she now lives with her supportive father, and has

made consistent support payments, both in cash and gifts, but in light of the 

reasons for the removal and the history of drug use, this Court cannot 

conclude Mother has the ability to maintain a home that meets the needs of 

her children - primarily the need for her continued sobriety.

17. The Court’s best interests analysis leans heavily on the proof that 

Mother’s last drug screen, an oral screen in April of this year, was positive 

for Amphetamine and Methamphetamine. Furthermore, DCS requested a 

hair follicle in February, April, and June of this year: none of which have 

been completed by Mother. A statement by Mother that she is 2-3 months 

sober, when viewed in light of her refusal to submit to a hair follicle test as 

requested by DCS, and coupled with her failed oral swab on April the 17th, 

leaves this Court incredulous as to Mother’s claim of sobriety. The Court is 

thus forced to look back to Mother’s last test in April as a weightier basis 

for judgment as to Mom’s sobriety.

18. Even if this Court were to assume as true Mother’s claim of sobriety 

over the past 3 months, when paired with her failed drug screens during the 

pendency of this case, her refusal to submit to a hair follicle test in 2023, 

and her admitted inability to maintain sobriety for longer than 3 months, the 

Court is left with little reasonable likelihood to believe Mother’s situation 

has changed in a lasting way, or will change in such a way as to provide the 
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children the safety, security, and stability they deserve in a reasonable time.

In essence, Mother is asking the Court to believe she can do something she 

has admittedly been unable to do for at least 2 years. Meanwhile, the 

children grow, thrive, and form healthy bonds with multiple members of 

the immediate and extended family of the pre-adoptive foster parents. In 

conclusion, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interests of 

the children that the parental rights of the Mother be terminated.

Mother timely appealed.

Discussion

Although not stated exactly as such, Mother raises only one issue on appeal: 

whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

was in the Children’s best interest. 

As our Supreme Court has instructed regarding the standard of review in parental 

rights termination cases: 

A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the 

oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected 

by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.4 Troxel v. 

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); Stanley 

v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); In re 

Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); In re Adoption of Female 

Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 

573, 578-79 (Tenn. 1993). But parental rights, although fundamental and 

constitutionally protected, are not absolute. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 

250. “‘[T]he [S]tate as parens patriae has a special duty to protect minors . 

. . .’ Tennessee law, thus, upholds the [S]tate’s authority as parens patriae

when interference with parenting is necessary to prevent serious harm to a 

child.” Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 

425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 

745, 747, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re Angela E., 303 

S.W.3d at 250. “When the State initiates a parental rights termination 

proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, 

but to end it.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759, 102 S.Ct. 1388. “Few 

 

4 U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 

without due process of law . . . .”). Similarly, article 1, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution states 

“[t]hat no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or

outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the 

judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”
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consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural 

family ties.” Id. at 787, 102 S.Ct. 1388; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 

102, 119, 117 S.Ct. 555, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996). The parental rights at 

stake are “far more precious than any property right.” Santosky, 455 U.S. 

at 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388. Termination of parental rights has the legal 

effect of reducing the parent to the role of a complete stranger and of 

“severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the parent or guardian 

of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)(1); see also Santosky, 455

U.S. at 759, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (recognizing that a decision terminating 

parental rights is “final and irrevocable”). In light of the interests and 

consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to 

“fundamentally fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky, 455 

U.S. at 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of 

Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 

(1981) (discussing the due process right of parents to fundamentally fair 

procedures).

Among the constitutionally mandated “fundamentally fair 

procedures” is a heightened standard of proof – clear and convincing 

evidence. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388. This standard 

minimizes the risk of unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference 

with fundamental parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 

596 (Tenn. 2010). “Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder 

to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and 

eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of these 

factual findings.” In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). 

The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are 

established as highly probable, rather than as simply more probable than 

not. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re 

M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Tennessee statutes governing parental termination proceedings 

incorporate this constitutionally mandated standard of proof. Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 36-1-113(c) provides:

Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based 

upon:

(1) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that 

the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights 

have been established; and

(2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the 

best interests of the child.
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This statute requires the State to establish by clear and convincing proof 

that at least one of the enumerated statutory grounds5for termination exists 

and that termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Angela E., 303 

S.W.3d at 250; In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006); In re 

Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). “The best interests analysis is 

separate from and subsequent to the determination that there is clear and 

convincing evidence of grounds for termination.” In re Angela E., 303 

S.W.3d at 254. Although several factors relevant to the best interests 

analysis are statutorily enumerated,6

the list is illustrative, not exclusive. 

The parties are free to offer proof of other relevant factors. In re Audrey S., 

182 S.W.3d at 878. The trial court must then determine whether the 

combined weight of the facts “amount[s] to clear and convincing evidence 

that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 

S.W.3d 533, 555 (Tenn. 2015). These requirements ensure that each parent 

receives the constitutionally required “individualized determination that a 

parent is either unfit or will cause substantial harm to his or her child before 

the fundamental right to the care and custody of the child can be taken 

away.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999).

Furthermore, other statutes impose certain requirements upon trial 

courts hearing termination petitions. A trial court must “ensure that the 

hearing on the petition takes place within six (6) months of the date that the 

petition is filed, unless the court determines an extension is in the best 

interests of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k). A trial court must 

“enter an order that makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law 

within thirty (30) days of the conclusion of the hearing.” Id. This portion 

of the statute requires a trial court to make “findings of fact and conclusions 

of law as to whether clear and convincing evidence establishes the 

existence of each of the grounds asserted for terminating [parental] rights.” 

In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 255. “Should the trial court conclude that 

clear and convincing evidence of ground(s) for termination does exist, then 

the trial court must also make a written finding whether clear and 

convincing evidence establishes that termination of [parental] rights is in 

the [child’s] best interests.” Id. If the trial court’s best interests analysis “is 

based on additional factual findings besides the ones made in conjunction 

with the grounds for termination, the trial court must also include these 

findings in the written order.” Id. Appellate courts “may not conduct de 

novo review of the termination decision in the absence of such findings.” 

 

5 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1)-(13).

6 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i).
- 14 -

Id. (citing Adoption Place, Inc. v. Doe, 273 S.W.3d 142, 151 & n. 15 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 2007)). 

B. Standards of Appellate Review

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in 

termination proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P. 

13(d). In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 

246. Under Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on 

the record and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless 

the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 

596; In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009); In re Adoption of 

A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). In light of the heightened 

burden of proof in termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court 

must make its own determination as to whether the facts, either as found by 

the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount 

to clear and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate 

parental rights. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97. The trial court’s 

ruling that the evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights 

is a conclusion of law, which appellate courts review de novo with no 

presumption of correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting In re 

Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810). Additionally, all other questions 

of law in parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de

novo with no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 

246.

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 521-24 (Tenn. 2016) (footnotes in original but 

renumbered). In conjunction with a best interest determination, clear and convincing 

evidence supporting any single ground will justify a termination order. E.g., In re 

Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). Although Mother does not challenge either

of the grounds found against her, the Tennessee Supreme Court has instructed “that in an 

appeal from an order terminating parental rights the Court of Appeals must review the 

trial court’s findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is in 

the child’s best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these findings on 

appeal.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 525-26 (footnote omitted). Therefore, we 

must review the grounds found against Mother even though she does not dispute them.

On December 5, 2022, at the time the termination petition was filed, the relevant 

statutory grounds for termination read as follows:

(g) Initiation of termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based 

upon any of the grounds listed in this subsection (g). The following 

grounds are cumulative and nonexclusive, so that listing conditions, acts or 
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omissions in one ground does not prevent them from coming within another 

ground:

* * *

(3)(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal 

custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a court 

order entered at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed 

in the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, 

and:

(i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, preventing the 

child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian, or other conditions 

exist that, in all reasonable probability, would cause the child to be 

subjected to further abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to 

the care of the parent or guardian;

(ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an 

early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or guardian 

in the near future; and

(iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship 

greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, 

stable, and permanent home;

(B) The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the 

termination of parental rights petition is set to be heard;

(4) The parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe child 

abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is found 

by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition 

for adoption to have committed severe child abuse against any child;

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g) (West July 1, 2022 to May 4, 2023). The definition of 

“severe child abuse” relevant to this case reads as follows:

(27) “Severe child abuse” means:

* * *

(D) Knowingly allowing a child to be present within a structure where the 

act of creating methamphetamine, as that substance is identified in § 39-17-

408(d)(2), is occurring;
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(E) Knowingly or with gross negligence allowing a child under eight (8) 

years of age to ingest an illegal substance or a controlled substance that 

results in the child testing positive on a drug screen, except as legally 

prescribed to the child; or

(F) Knowingly allowing a child to be within a structure where any of the 

following controlled substances are present and accessible to the child: . . . 

(iii) Methamphetamine[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(27) (West July 1, 2022 to May 4, 2023). 

The Juvenile Court found that DCS proved this ground by clear and convincing 

evidence based upon its October 27, 20217adjudicatory order finding that Mother had 

committed severe child abuse against the Children, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-

102(b)(27)(F). There is no indication in the record that Mother ever appealed the 

adjudicatory order or that it is nonfinal. Mother did not claim otherwise at trial, nor does 

she do so on appeal. 

Although the Juvenile Court’s adjudicatory order finds severe child abuse based 

solely upon subsection (F), the Juvenile Court also referenced subsections (D) and (E) in 

its final judgment. Despite its reference to subsections (D) and (E), it is unclear whether 

the Juvenile Court found that these subsections also served as a basis for this ground. 

Nevertheless, evidence that Mother committed severe child abuse as defined under 

subsection (F) is sufficient to establish this ground for termination, and we accordingly 

affirm the Juvenile Court’s finding of this ground, as established by clear and convincing 

evidence. 

The additional ground found by the Juvenile Court was persistence of conditions. 

As instructed by In re Carrington H., we have likewise reviewed the Juvenile Court’s 

findings as to this additional ground as found by the Juvenile Court. The evidence does 

not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings relevant to persistence of 

conditions. The ground of persistence of conditions was also proven by clear and 

convincing evidence, and we affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment as to this ground.

We next address whether the Juvenile Court erred in finding that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. When DCS filed its 

termination petition, the statutory best interest factors read as follows:

 

7 Although the Juvenile Court’s findings referenced an adjudicatory order dated September 27, 2021, the 

adjudicatory order is dated October 27, 2021. The Juvenile Court’s mistaken date amounts to harmless 

error.
- 17 -

(i)(1) In determining whether termination of parental or guardianship rights 

is in the best interest of the child, the court shall consider all relevant and 

child-centered factors applicable to the particular case before the court. 

Those factors may include, but are not limited to, the following:

(A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s 

critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s 

minority;

(B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to 

have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition;

(C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting 

the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;

(D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental 

attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the 

parent can create such attachment;

(E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact 

with the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive 

relationship with the child;

(F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;

(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household 

trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-traumatic 

symptoms;

(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with 

another person or persons in the absence of the parent;

(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons 

other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, 

and the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships 

and the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage;

(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of 

circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the 

child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether 

there is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol, 

controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render 

the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable 

manner;

(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, 

services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of 

circumstances, conduct, or conditions;

(L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent 

in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of 

the department;

(M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing 

paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the 
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circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe 

and not in the child’s best interest;

(N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the 

home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or 

psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult;

(O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child 

or any other child;

(P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and 

specific needs required for the child to thrive;

(Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to 

creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and specific 

needs and in which the child can thrive;

(R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and 

safe for the child;

(S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial 

support for the child; and

(T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be 

detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and 

effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

(2) When considering the factors set forth in subdivision (i)(1), the prompt 

and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to 

be in the child’s best interest.

(3) All factors considered by the court to be applicable to a particular case 

must be identified and supported by specific findings of fact in the court’s 

written order.

(4) Expert testimony is not required to prove or disprove any factor by any 

party.

(5) As used in this subsection (i), “parent” includes guardian.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) (West July 1, 2022 to May 4, 2023).

With regard to making a determination concerning a child’s best interest, the 

Tennessee Supreme Court has instructed:

When conducting the best interests analysis, courts must consider 

nine statutory factors[8]listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-

113(i). These statutory factors are illustrative, not exclusive, and any party 

to the termination proceeding is free to offer proof of any other factor 

relevant to the best interests analysis. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 

[507] at 523 [(Tenn. 2016)] (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 

 

8 Although there are now twenty best interest factors instead of nine, our Supreme Court’s instruction in 

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662 (Tenn. 2017) still applies.
- 19 -

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). Facts considered in the best interests analysis must 

be proven by “a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing 

evidence.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d [533] at 555 [(Tenn. 2015)]

(citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861). “After making the underlying 

factual findings, the trial court should then consider the combined weight of 

those facts to determine whether they amount to clear and convincing 

evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest[s].” Id. When 

considering these statutory factors, courts must remember that “[t]he child’s 

best interests [are] viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, 

perspective.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. Indeed, “[a] focus on the 

perspective of the child is the common theme” evident in all of the statutory 

factors. Id. “[W]hen the best interests of the child and those of the adults 

are in conflict, such conflict shall always be resolved to favor the rights and 

the best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).

Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote 

examination” of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. 

And the best interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of 

statutory factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v. 

Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts 

and circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant 

each statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182 

S.W.3d at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a 

factually intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives 

individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are 

terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon 

the circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the 

consideration of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the 

analysis.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171 

S.W.3d at 194).

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017).

On appeal, Mother primarily argues that the Juvenile Court should have assigned 

more weight to her relationship and bond with the Children. Although this Court has 

indicated that “in some cases the lack of a meaningful relationship between a parent and 

child is the most important factor” and that “it is not error for a trial court to place similar 

weight on the fact that such a relationship exists,” In re Addalyne S., 556 S.W.3d 774, 

795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018), the evidence of a meaningful relationship between the 

Children and Mother in this case was not so strong as to militate against the numerous 

other factors weighing in favor of termination of Mother’s parental rights. 
- 20 -

Although the evidence indicated that the Children have some degree of attachment 

to Mother, Mother visited the Children only once per month on average. Often visits had 

to be cancelled due to Mother’s failure to confirm with DCS that she could attend 

scheduled visits or her failure to pass a drug screen. Foster Mother testified that Tucker 

sometimes would ask where Mother was and what she did for work, but both Foster 

Mother and Eslinger indicated that the Children generally do not ask about Mother 

outside of visits. In addition, the Children referred to Foster Parents as mom and dad, 

and Foster Parents have filled the role of their parents when Mother was unable to do so 

for nearly two years. For these reasons, the Juvenile Court found that, although Mother 

and the Children have a parental attachment, it could not conclude that the relationship 

was healthy or secure. Furthermore, many of the other best interest factors weigh heavily 

against whatever degree of attachment remains between the Children and Mother.

Although the Juvenile Court did not identify each factor by letter which would 

have assisted this Court’s review, it clearly considered the relevant factors, and the 

evidence does not preponderate against the Juvenile Court’s findings related to the 

Children’s best interest. The Juvenile Court made findings related to the following 

relevant factors: (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), (H), (I), (J), (K), (L), (M), (Q), and (S). 

As the Juvenile Court found, the Children’s need for stability and continuity are being 

met by Foster Parents, who have provided the Children with a stable home for nearly two 

years. The Children have bonded with Foster Parents, their children, and extended 

family, and have adapted well to their foster home. In contrast, Mother failed to maintain 

sobriety for a significant period of time, despite her efforts, and cannot be expected to 

provide the Children with stability anytime soon. 

Although she completed an inpatient drug rehabilitation program, Mother did not 

follow up with intensive out-patient therapy as recommended in both alcohol and drug 

assessments and has been unable to maintain sobriety any longer than a period of three 

months during the two-year custodial period. Her most recent drug screen administered 

three months prior to trial revealed that Mother had used methamphetamine and 

amphetamines. We further note that the Juvenile Court understandably doubted Mother’s 

claim of three months’ sobriety, given that she had failed to comply with a requested drug 

screen one month prior to trial. The Juvenile Court was “incredulous as to Mother’s 

claim of sobriety.” Despite the recency and fragility of her sobriety, Mother believed that 

the Children could safely be returned to her custody on the day of trial, demonstrating her

loose grasp on the gravity of her addiction. 

Mother candidly acknowledged that she had not given it her all, and the Juvenile 

Court rightly found that she had not exhibited a sense of urgency in addressing her drug 

addiction and that Mother would be unable to provide the Children with the safety, 

security, and stability they deserve within a reasonable timeframe. While we 

acknowledge that “[r]ecovery from addiction will frequently entail ‘false starts and set 

backs, as well as successes and, regrettably, backsliding,’” In re Joshua S., No. E2010-
- 21 -

01331-COA-R3-PT, 2011 WL 2464720, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 16, 2011) (quoting 

In re M.J.M., Jr., No. M2004-02377-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 873302, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Apr. 14, 2005)), the focus of the best interest analysis is on the child’s perspective 

rather than the parent’s, and we are unable to say that Mother did all she could to address 

her drug addiction. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 

Despite taking some positive steps, Mother’s failure to complete intensive out-patient 

therapy demonstrates that she had not done all she could to tackle this major obstacle to 

regaining custody of the Children. Given that Mother has been able to achieve at most 

only three months of sobriety, if that, over the course of nearly two years, we are unable 

to say that the Juvenile Court incorrectly determined that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. The Juvenile Court’s best interest 

determination was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to the Children. This cause is remanded to the Juvenile Court 

for collection of the costs below. The costs on appeal are assessed against the Appellant, 

Meliah B., and her surety, if any. 

_________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE