IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sara Ladd, Samantha Harris, :

and Pocono Mountain Vacation :

Properties, LLC, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 321 M.D. 2017

: Argued: June 7, 2021

Real Estate Commission of the :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

and Department of State (Bureau :

of Professional and Occupational :

Affairs) of the Commonwealth of :

Pennsylvania, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge

HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge (P.)

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE BROBSON FILED: December 22, 2021

I. INTRODUCTION

This original jurisdiction matter returns to us on remand from the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In Ladd v. Real Estate Commission, 230 A.3d 1096 

(Pa. 2020) (Ladd II), the Supreme Court, applying the heightened rational basis test 

first articulated in Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1954), held that 

the allegations set forth in Petitioners’ petition for review (Petition) presented a 

colorable claim that it is unconstitutional to apply the broker licensing requirements 

in the Real Estate Licensing and Registration Act (RELRA)1to Petitioner Sara Ladd 

1 Act of February 19, 1980, P.L. 15, as amended, 63 P.S. §§ 455.101-.902.
2

(Ladd) and her business as a “short-term vacation property manager.” Ladd II, 

230 A.3d at 1115 n.19, 1116. In so doing, the Supreme Court reversed this Court’s 

dismissal of the Petition on a demurrer and remanded the matter to this Court for 

further proceedings.

Following a period of discovery, the matter is again before the Court, this time 

on cross-applications for summary relief. In addition, Petitioners have filed a 

separate application, asking this Court to strike as hearsay a document that 

Respondents Pennsylvania State Real Estate Commission (Commission) and 

Pennsylvania Department of State, Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs 

(BPOA) (collectively, Respondents) filed in support of their application for 

summary relief. For the reasons set forth below, genuine issues of material fact 

prevent this Court from granting summary relief to either party. Accordingly, we 

will deny the cross-applications for summary relief and dismiss the application to 

strike as moot.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

As recently articulated by the Supreme Court in Ladd II, the legislative 

purpose of RELRA is to protect the public from fraudulent conduct by those that

engage in the business of trading real estate. Ladd II, 230 A.3d at 1110-11. Relevant 

here are RELRA’s provisions relating to brokers. The statute defines a “broker” as 

follows:

Any person who, for another and for a fee, commission or other 

valuable consideration:

(1) negotiates with or aids any person in locating or 

obtaining for purchase, lease or an acquisition of interest in any 

real estate;
3

(2) negotiates the listing, sale, purchase, exchange, 

lease, time share and similarly designated interests, financing or 

option for any real estate;

(3) manages any real estate;

(4) represents himself to be a real estate consultant, 

counsellor, agent or finder;

(5) undertakes to promote the sale, exchange, purchase 

or rental of real estate; Provided, however, [t]hat this provision 

shall not include any person whose main business is that of 

advertising, promotion or public relations;

(5.1) undertakes to perform a comparative market

analysis; or

(6) attempts to perform any of the above acts.

Section 201 of RELRA, 63 P.S. § 455.201. RELRA makes it unlawful for any 

person to act as a broker in the Commonwealth without first being licensed or 

registered under the law. Section 301 of RELRA, 63 P.S. § 455.301. There are, 

however, eleven categories of persons excluded from RELRA’s licensing

requirements. Section 304 of RELRA, 63 P.S. § 455.304.

Before applying for a broker’s license, a prospective applicant must take and 

pass a broker’s license exam. Section 511 of RELRA, 63 P.S. § 455.511. To be 

eligible to sit for the exam, the prospective applicant must meet the following 

qualifications: (1) be at least 21 years of age; (2) be a high school graduate or its 

equivalent; (3) have completed 240 hours of real estate instruction as prescribed by 

the Commission; and (4) have at least 3 years of experience as a licensed real estate 

salesperson or the equivalent thereof. Id. Upon satisfying these requirements and 

qualifications, the prospective applicant may apply to BPOA for a broker’s license. 

Section 512 of RELRA, 63 P.S. § 455.512. Each licensed broker must maintain a 

fixed office within the Commonwealth, which is designated on the broker’s license. 

Section 601(a) of RELRA, 63 P.S. § 455.601(a). If a broker desires to maintain 
4

more than one office, the broker must obtain a separate license for each location. 

Section 601(b) of RELRA, 63 P.S. § 455.601(b).

B. Petition and Ladd II

Petitioners include Ladd, Samantha Harris (Harris), who is one of Ladd’s 

clients, and Pocono Mountain Vacation Properties, LLC (PMVP), Ladd’s New 

Jersey-domiciled business. On July 17, 2017, Petitioners filed their Petition with 

this Court, seeking both declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. In their 

Petition, Petitioners allege that Ladd is in the business of managing short-term 

vacation rentals in the Pocono Mountains, which Petitioners define as “rentals for 

periods of fewer than thirty days.” (Pet. ¶ 2 n.1.) Nonetheless, Petitioners allege 

that since starting PMVP, most of Ladd’s services “have involved . . . rentals for 

periods of just a few days at a time . . . at rates of just a few hundred dollars at a 

time.” (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) Ladd runs her business almost exclusively from her home in 

New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 24.)

Petitioners allege that through her business, Ladd handles all of the marketing 

and logistics for property owners who wish to rent out their properties in the Pocono

Mountains. (Id. ¶ 25.) Her clients execute a property management contract, which 

sets forth the terms of Ladd’s arrangement with her clients, including the scope of 

the services that will be provided and the clients’ obligations in return. (Id. ¶ 26.) 

Petitioners did not attach a copy of the property management contract to their 

Petition. They allege, however, that Ladd’s “typical[]” services include, “but are not 

limited to:”

a. Serving as an independent contractor only for the property 

owner, with complete exclusion from the contractual relationship 

between the owner and each renter;
5

b. Marketing the owner’s property on the Internet—chiefly, on 

platforms like her own website, Airbnb, HomeAway, FlipKey, 

and VRBO;

c. Responding to all online inquiries and coordinating all bookings 

based on a pre-approved list of openings provided by the owner;

d. Handling all billing, which can include accepting rental 

payments and security deposits, subtracting administrative costs 

and her own commissions, refunding security deposits, and 

remitting payments to the owners; and

e. Facilitating cleanings of the property between renters.

(Id. ¶ 27.) Petitioners allege that, in return, the clients incur the following 

obligations:

a. Providing [Ladd] with a rental contract that will constitute the 

exclusive terms of the arrangement between the property owner 

and each renter;

b. Providing [Ladd] with a list of dates that she is allowed to book 

the property over the next twelve months[] and acknowledging 

that dates not specifically reserved by the property owner upfront 

or submitted in writing at a later date are open for booking;

c. Not double-booking the property and notifying [Ladd]

immediately if the property has been booked outside the scope 

of the arrangement;

d. Working with [Ladd] to establish rental rates with which the 

owner is comfortable;

e. Certifying that the property complies with all applicable laws, 

regulations, codes, and homeowners’ association rules;

f. Paying any state or local sales tax imposed on short-term rentals, 

as well as any federal, state, and local taxes on rental proceeds;

g. Maintaining short-term rental liability insurance for the property 

in a minimum amount of $1,000,000;

h. Providing [Ladd] with a list of all house rules, instructions, and 

an inventory list for cleaners; and

i. Providing household supplies and items in accordance with how 

the property was advertised.
6

(Id. ¶ 28.) Since discovering in 2015 that Pennsylvania’s “hotel tax” applied to her 

own property rentals, Ladd also advised her clients of their obligation to pay the tax 

on their rentals. (Id. ¶ 34.)

Petitioners allege, upon information and belief, that most residential brokers 

in Pennsylvania focus on selling homes and engaging in longer-term, more complex 

rental transactions. (Id. ¶¶ 35-38.) Ladd’s focus on short-term vacation property 

management with only a few clients at once allows Ladd to keep her clients’ 

properties more consistently booked. (Id. ¶ 39.) Her low overhead allows her to 

provide these services to her clients at a lower price. (Id. ¶ 40.)

Petitioners maintain that RELRA, as applied to Ladd’s business, violates her 

substantive due process rights under Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution,2 which includes, within the right to possess property and pursue 

happiness, the right to pursue a chosen occupation, because it does not bear a real 

and substantial relationship to the protection of public health, safety, and welfare. 

Ladd II, 230 A.3d at 1108 (citing Nixon v. Cmwlth., 839 A.2d 277, 288 (Pa. 2003)). 

In response to preliminary objections filed by Respondents, this Court, in Ladd v. 

Real Estate Commission, 187 A.3d 1070 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (Ladd I), reversed, 

230 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2020), sustained a preliminary objection in the nature of a 

demurrer, concluding that RELRA’s licensing scheme to protect buyers and sellers 

of real estate did not violate Ladd’s rights under Article I, Section 1 of the 

2 Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:

All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 

and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and 

liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of 

pursing their own happiness.
7

Pennsylvania Constitution. Ladd I, 187 A.3d at 1077-79. We dismissed the case, 

and Petitioners appealed. Id. at 1079.

In Ladd II, the Supreme Court reversed, holding, in a matter of first 

impression, that Ladd raised a colorable claim that RELRA’s licensing scheme for 

brokers, as applied to Ladd’s self-described services, is unconstitutional. Ladd II, 

230 A.3d at 1116. In so doing, the Supreme Court recognized that “the right to 

choose a particular occupation, although ‘undeniably important,’ is not 

fundamental” or “absolute[,] and its exercise remains subject to the General 

Assembly’s police powers, which it may exercise to preserve the public health, 

safety, and welfare.” Id. at 1108. The Supreme Court further recognized that “[a] 

claim, like Ladd’s, that a Pennsylvania statute violates substantive due process is 

subject to a ‘means-end review[,]’ where the court ‘weigh[s] the rights infringed 

upon by the law against the interest sought to be achieved by it, and also scrutinize[s] 

the relationship between the law (the means) and that interest (the end).’” Id. 

(alterations in original) (quoting Nixon, 839 A.2d at 286-87). Given that the right to 

pursue a chosen occupation is not fundamental, the Supreme Court noted that it 

would conduct this means-end review by applying the rational basis test. Id.

Applying Pennsylvania’s less deferential, “more restrictive,” rational basis 

test, as first articulated in Gambone,

3

the Supreme Court asked two questions:

3 As articulated in Gambone,

a law which purports to be an exercise of the police power must not be 

unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case, and 

the means which it employs must have a real and substantial relation to the objects 

sought to be attained. Under the guise of protecting the public interests the 

legislature may not arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual and 

unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. The question whether any 

particular statutory provision is so related to the public good and so reasonable in 

the means it prescribes as to justify the exercise of the police power, is one for the 
8

(1) whether RELRA’s real estate broker licensing requirements—

apprenticeship, instructional coursework and examinations, and brick 

and mortar location—are “‘unreasonable, unduly oppressive, or 

patently beyond the necessities of the case[;]’” and (2) whether those 

requirements bear a “‘real and substantial relation’” to the public 

interest they seek to advance when applied to Ladd under the 

circumstances alleged in her [petition for review].

Id. at 1109 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Nixon, 839 A.2d at 287

(quoting Gambone, 101 A.2d at 637)).

4

 While acknowledging the strong 

presumption that a statutory scheme is constitutional, the Supreme Court concluded 

that the allegations set forth in the Petition, when accepted as true, “present a 

colorable claim that RELRA’s [broker licensing] requirements, as applied to 

[Ladd’s]self-described services, are unreasonable, unduly oppressive[,] and patently 

beyond the necessities of the case” and that it is not clear whether those requirements 

“without a doubt . . . bear a real and substantial relation to the statutory goal of 

protecting the public” from “the fraudulent conduct of those ‘engaged in the business 

of trading real estate.’” Id. at 1109-10, 1111, 1116 (quoting Meyer v. Gwynedd Dev. 

Grp., Inc., 756 A.2d 67, 69 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2000)). The Supreme Court reasoned:

Ladd is . . . faced with 315 hours of coursework (75 hours for her 

salesperson license and 240 for her broker license) in various topical 

areas that pertain to the work of traditional real estate brokers, but not 

to the services contemplated by her unique business model. The only 

judgment, in the first instance, of the law-making branch of the government, but its 

final determination is for the courts.

Gambone, 101 A.2d at 637; see also Shoul v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 

173 A.3d 669, 677-78 (Pa. 2017) (recognizing Gambone as setting more restrictive rational basis 

test under Pennsylvania Constitution than applied in due process challenges under United States 

Constitution).

4 The Supreme Court expressly rejected our reading of Nixon and Gambone as applying 

only to regulatory regimes that imposed absolute bars or complete prohibitions on certain 

individuals engaging in a profession. Ladd II, 230 A.3d at 1110. In doing so, the Supreme Court 

held that the heightened Gambone rational basis test applied to any instance where the General 

Assembly exercises its police powers “to curtail a non-fundamental right.” Id.
9

topics listed that are arguably related to her services are the general 

two-credit “Commission-developed or approved law course” and 

maximum four-credit “Real Estate Law” and “Residential Property 

Management” courses which satisfy at most 150 hours of the 

315[-]hour requirement. In other words, RELRA requires Ladd to 

complete 165 hours of coursework geared toward educating individuals 

about large scale transactions including buying, selling, and leasing 

residential and commercial real estate. Further, because the broker 

coursework cannot be completed until the salesperson coursework and 

apprenticeship are satisfied, Ladd’s burden is substantially increased 

because she would have to forego her own PMVP profits for three years 

while she completes the licensure requirements. Applying this metric 

to the allegations of Ladd’s [petition for review], taken as true, we 

conclude she has asserted a colorable claim that RELRA’s instructional 

requirements, as applied to her, are an unreasonable and unduly 

oppressive means to achieve the statutory objective of protecting 

consumers from the fraudulent practices of those “engaged in the 

business of trading real estate.”

. . . RELRA imposes an apprenticeship and a 

brick[-]and[-]mortar office requirement in addition to an instructional 

coursework requirement, which obviously increases the economic 

burden. Considering both the quantity of non-relevant hours and the 

cost of completing those hours, . . . the three-year apprenticeship 

requirement would impose a substantial cost on Ladd; during that time 

she would ostensibly learn the traditional real estate trade, e.g., 

completing transactions involving thousands, if not hundreds of 

thousands of dollars to buy, sell, or lease properties. But, this practical 

knowledge would be neither relevant nor directly applicable to a 

short-term vacation property management business involving rentals 

that last only a few days and cost only a few hundred dollars. Adding 

to the equation the lost opportunity cost of shuttering PMVP during the 

apprenticeship, we conclude Ladd has stated a claim that the broker 

license requirements are unreasonable, unduly oppressive and patently 

beyond the necessities of the case.

Similarly, we conclude the brick[-]and[-]mortar office 

requirement, as applied to Ladd’s self-described business model, 

appears to be disproportionate to the government’s interest in 

safeguarding the public from fraudulent practices by those who “trad[e] 

in real estate.” According to Ladd, she performed her professional 

services solely online from her home in New Jersey . . . and a 

requirement that she obtain physical office space in Pennsylvania is 

tantamount to an excessive fee for entry into a profession. The 
10

allegations of Ladd’s [petition for review]—taken as true—indicate her 

business model is sustainable only because she can provide quality 

services with limited overhead . . . and requiring additional overhead, 

including rental or mortgage, taxes, insurance, and maintenance of a 

property does not further the statutory objectives of RELRA.

. . . .

We are further persuaded that it appears application of RELRA 

to Ladd is unconstitutional when we consider the fact that individuals 

who manage and facilitate rentals of lodging in apartment complexes 

and duplexes on behalf of their owners are completely exempt from the 

statute’s broker licensing requirements . . . and those who manage and 

facilitate rentals in hotels do not fall under the terms of RELRA at all. 

It is clear Ladd’s business model—as described in her [petition for 

review]—is more closely analogous to the services provided by these 

exempt individuals than to those of a broker, despite the fact that the 

statutory definition of “broker” technically catches Ladd in its net. 

Notably, Ladd routinely advised her clients they must comply with the 

Commonwealth’s “hotel tax,” . . . where “hotel” is defined as any form 

of lodging “available to the public for periods of time less than 30 

days.” Ladd’s “short-term vacation rental” clients were subject to the 

hotel tax because their contracts involved “transient” uses of property 

only. Under the circumstances, Ladd asserts a colorable argument that 

it is unreasonable, unduly oppressive and patently beyond the 

necessities of the case . . . to exempt professions so closely analogous 

to her own while mandating her compliance with RELRA’s onerous 

broker license requirements.

Id. at 1112-15 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (alteration 

in original). Given its conclusions and reasoning, the Supreme Court reversed our 

decision in Ladd I and remanded the matter to us for further proceedings pursuant to 

its opinion. Id. at 1116.

III. SUMMARY RELIEF STANDARD

“At any time after the filing of a petition for review in an appellate or original 

jurisdiction matter, the court may on application enter judgment if the right of the 

applicant thereto is clear.” Pa. R.A.P. 1532(b). Like motions for summary 

judgment, a motion for summary relief must be based on undisputed material facts 
11

of record. See Summit Sch., Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 108 A.3d 192, 195-96

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). A court “must determine, based on the undisputed facts, 

whether ‘either party has a clear right to the relief requested.’” Id. at 195 (quoting

Bell Atl.-Pa., Inc. v. Tpk. Comm’n, 703 A.2d 589, 590 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), aff’d, 

713 A.2d 96 (Pa. 1998)). “The moving party has the burden of proving the 

nonexistence of any genuine issue of fact.” Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal 

Co., 412 A.2d 466, 468-69 (Pa. 1979). “A material fact is one that directly affects 

the outcome of the case.” Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Delta Chems., Inc., 721 A.2d 411, 

416 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (en banc) (Delta Chems.); see also Hosp. & Healthsystem 

Ass’n of Pa. v. Cmwlth., 77 A.3d 587, 602 (Pa. 2013) (“A fact is considered material 

if its resolution could affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.”).

The Supreme Court has cautioned that when “the parties’ disparate takes on 

the record and the interpretations they draw from it suggest[] there are disputed 

issues of material fact . . . when viewed in the light most favorable to . . . the 

non-moving party, [the court] should . . . preclude[] summary [relief].” Bailets v.

Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 123 A.3d 300, 307 (Pa. 2015). “In summary [relief] proceedings,

. . . the court’s function [is not] to determine facts[] but only to determine if a 

material issue of fact exists.” French v. United Parcel Serv., 547 A.2d 411, 415 

(Pa. Super. 1988).

5

 Finally, “[t]he facts which directly affect the outcome of the case 

are gleaned from considering the substantive law underlying the cause of action.” 

Delta Chems., 721 A.2d at 416.

5 We are “not bound by the [Pennsylvania] Superior Court’s precedents, although where 

persuasive, we are free to adopt the Superior Court’s reasoning.” Wertz v. Chapman Twp., 

709 A.2d 428, 433 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), aff’d, 741 A.2d 1272 (Pa. 1999).
12

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Petitioners’ Application for Summary Relief

Petitioners argue that “the Supreme Court all but decided this case” in Ladd II

and, because RELRA has not changed since the Supreme Court issued its decision 

and it is undisputed that Ladd only wants to manage short-term rentals online, the 

only thing left for this Court to do “is follow the Supreme Court’s logic on the merits 

and declare RELRA unconstitutional as applied to [Ladd].” (Petitioners’ Br. 

at 23-26.) More specifically, Petitioners contend that RELRA, as applied to Ladd, 

does not bear a “real and substantial relation” to its intended purpose of “protect[ing]

the public from fraud by those engaged in the business of trading real estate” because 

RELRA’s apprenticeship, coursework/examination, and brick-and-mortar office 

requirements are unrelated to Ladd’s short-term rental business. (Petitioners’ Br. 

at 24, 26-31 (quoting Ladd II, 230 A.3d at 1109, 1110).) Petitioners further contend

that RELRA is unreasonable, unduly oppressive, and patently beyond the necessities 

of the case as applied to Ladd, because RELRA grants other brokers unchecked 

power over Ladd’s ability to obtain a broker license, imposes economic burdens on 

Ladd by forcing her to spend years to learn mostly irrelevant information when she 

could be earning a living and requiring her to have a brick-and-mortar office in 

Pennsylvania, and exempts individuals “who manage and facilitate rentals of 

lodging in apartment complexes and duplexes” and individuals “who manage and 

facilitate rentals in hotels” from its requirements. (Petitioners’ Br. at 32 (quoting 

Ladd II, 230 A.3d at 1114).) Petitioners maintain that the only material facts 

presented in this case are “RELRA’s ‘specific application to . . . short-term vacation 

property management services’ and the ‘economic burdens’ RELRA imposes on 

[Ladd]” and that those facts are not in dispute. (Petitioners’ Reply Br. at 4 (quoting 
13

Ladd II, 230 A.3d at 1109, 1111-15).) In support thereof, Petitioners suggest that 

any facts of record relative to how Ladd may have conducted her business in the 

past—e.g., participating in a few long-term rentals, advising a client on a property 

sale, and maintaining complete control over rental dates and rental rates—are

essentially irrelevant to this Court’s determination on summary relief because it is 

undisputed that Ladd only intends to manage short-term rentals in the future.

While we acknowledge that we are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Ladd II and that we must apply the legal framework set forth therein to analyze 

whether it is unconstitutional to apply RELRA’s broker licensing requirements to 

Ladd under the facts presented here, we do not agree with Petitioners that summary 

relief in their favor is appropriate at this time. Petitioners focus their argument 

entirely on the ways in which RELRA’s broker licensing requirements are unrelated 

to its purpose of protecting the public from fraud when applied to short-term vacation 

property management and how RELRA’s broker licensing requirements are 

unreasonable, unduly oppressive, or patently beyond the necessities of the case when 

applied to short-term vacation property management. In other words, Petitioners 

have essentially reiterated the potential problems with applying RELRA to 

short-term vacation property management that the Supreme Court identified in 

Ladd II. See Ladd II, 230 A.3d at 1112-15.

Petitioners fall short, however, by not demonstrating, through undisputed 

evidence of record, that Ladd’s business model actually constitutes that of a 

“short-term vacation property manager,” and the scope and limits of such a business. 

Petitioners baldly assert, without any citation to the record, that it is undisputed that 

Ladd “just wants to manage short-term rentals online.” (Petitioners’ Br. at 23.) At 

this stage of the proceedings, we are no longer required to “accept as true 
14

[Petitioners’] allegation that [Ladd] is a short-term property manager where 

‘short-term’ is defined as a period less than thirty days.” Ladd II, 230 A.3d at 1109. 

Rather, to be entitled to summary relief, Petitioners must demonstrate “the 

nonexistence of any genuine issue of [material] fact.” Thompson Coal Co., 412 A.2d 

at 468-69. Petitioners have utterly failed in this regard and, instead, would like this 

Court to simply take Ladd at her word, without any factual support, that she intends 

to only manage short-term vacation rentals, whatever that encompasses. For these 

reasons, we must deny Petitioners’ application for summary relief.

B. Respondents’ Application for Summary Relief

Respondents argue that the undisputed evidence of record demonstrates that 

RELRA’s broker licensing requirements, as applied to Ladd, are not unreasonable

or unduly oppressive and bear a real and substantial relation to protecting the public 

from fraud and, therefore, Respondents are entitled to summary relief. Respondents 

maintain that “[t]he Supreme Court’s opinion is premised upon Petitioners’ false 

representations that . . . Ladd engaged [in] simple internet ‘marketing’ for 

‘short[-]term vacation rentals’ lasting thirty days or less[] and that she is not involved 

in leasing,” when, in actuality, “Ladd, who has no training in law or real estate, . . . 

entered into complicated contractual relationships with her clients that gave her 

paramount control over their properties for an initial term of a year (with automatic 

renewal) and directly involved her in the leasing process.” (Respondents’ Br. 

at 20-21.) In support thereof, Respondents direct our attention to the following facts, 

which Respondents contend are undisputed: (1) Ladd maintained extensive control 

over her clients’ properties and the leasing process pursuant to complicated property

management contracts; (2) Ladd did not limit all of her clients’ rental agreements to 

thirty days or less; (3) Ladd handled significant amounts of money on her clients’ 
15

behalf and that money may not have been placed into an escrow account; and 

(4) Ladd had serious disputes with two of her five clients. Respondents further 

maintain that, given the breadth of Ladd’s vacation rental business, RELRA’s 

coursework, apprenticeship, and brick-and-mortar office requirements are not 

unreasonable, burdensome, or unduly oppressive.

The parties here have advanced very different presentations of Ladd’s 

vacation rental business. Petitioners maintain that Ladd “just wants to manage 

short-term rentals online” and that how Ladd may have managed her vacation rental

businessin the past has no bearing on her intention to manage only short-term, online

rentals in the future. Respondents, on the other hand, essentially suggest that the 

evidence of record establishes that Ladd’s business involved more than that of a 

“short-term vacation property manager.” Frankly, given the parties’ current 

positions, we are concerned that Ladd’s self-described services are markedly 

different than what Petitioners described in their Petition and presented to the 

Supreme Court for the purposes of surviving preliminary objections.

Before we can apply the legal framework set forth by the Supreme Court in 

Ladd II to determine whether RELRA’s broker licensing requirements, as applied to 

Ladd, violate Ladd’s substantive due process rights under Article I, Section 1 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution, we must have a clear view of the relevant facts, including 

the nature of Ladd’s vacation rental business. As a result, we must conclude that 

genuine issues of material fact exist and deny Respondents’ application for summary 

relief.

6

6 Given our disposition above, we also dismiss Petitioners’ application to strike as moot. 

In the event that the parties continue to disagree over the admissibility of the document, Petitioners 

can make an appropriate objection prior to or at trial.
16

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we deny Petitioners’ and Respondents’ cross-applications for 

summary relief and dismiss Petitioners’ application to strike inadmissible hearsay as 

moot.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sara Ladd, Samantha Harris, :

and Pocono Mountain Vacation :

Properties, LLC, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 321 M.D. 2017

:

Real Estate Commission of the :

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

and Department of State (Bureau :

of Professional and Occupational :

Affairs) of the Commonwealth of :

Pennsylvania, :

Respondents :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 22nd day of December, 2021, Petitioners’ and Respondents’ 

cross-applications for summary relief are DENIED, and Petitioners’ application to 

strike inadmissible hearsay is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge