alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<RESTATED>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          FEB-28-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             MAR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1999
<CASH>                                         526,089
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               13,475,328
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                 20,620,369
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            35,184,096
<PP&E>                                       5,911,888
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              73,814,783
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       24,711,663
<BONDS>                                     22,007,924
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                         22
<COMMON>                                         7,859
<OTHER-SE>                                  27,087,315
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                73,814,783
<SALES>                                     29,446,871
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            29,446,871
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               22,507,161
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,367,090
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,422,178
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,192,528
<INCOME-TAX>                                    19,080
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,173,448
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                    (719,903)
<NET-INCOME>                                   453,545
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .04


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-10343 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus BETTY JEAN GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:99-CR-251-1

--------------------- September 5, 2000 Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM: * Court-appointed counsel for Betty Jean Green has filed a motion
to withdraw and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S.
738 (1967). Green was sent a copy of counsel’s motion and brief,
but she has not filed a response . Our review of the brief filed by
counsel and of the record disclo ses no nonfrivolous point for appeal. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED,
counsel is excused from further responsibilities, and the APPEAL IS
DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR . R. 42.2.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-01-1996
<CASH>                                         198,708
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,485
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               565,169
<PP&E>                                      22,001,980
<DEPRECIATION>                                 753,053
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              21,870,824
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       14,884,682
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         6,848
<OTHER-SE>                                   3,889,706
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                21,870,824
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,566,114
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,940,454
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,338,597
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (712,938)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (712,938)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (712,938)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
SCWC-19-0000428

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

STATE OF HAWAI‘I,

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

WILSON KENZO KOIKE,

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-19-0000428; CASE NO. 1CPC-18-0000250)

ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, and Wilson, JJ., 

and Circuit Judge Eddins, assigned by reason of vacancy)

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant’s Application for Writ 

of Certiorari filed on November 2, 2020, is hereby rejected.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, December 17, 2020.

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

/s/ Michael D. Wilson

/s/ Todd W. Eddins

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-19-0000428

17-DEC-2020

04:21 PM

Dkt. 7 ODAC
Exhibit 32.2 Certification Pursuant to Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code  I, Michael J. Marx, the Chief Financial Officer of Nano Mask, Inc. (Nano Mask), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:  (i) the accompanying Form 10-Q of Nano Mask for the quarter ended March 31, 2010 (the Form 10-Q) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (ii) the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Nano Mask.   /s/ Michael J. Marx Michael J. Marx Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)  January 5, 2012
IIB 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 325 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 3, 2009 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural 

Resources 

AN ACT 

To amend the Reclamation Wastewater and Groundwater 

Study and Facilities Act to authorize the Secretary of 

the Interior to participate in the Avra/Black Wash Reclamation and Riparian Restoration Project. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
2 

HR 325 RFS 

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Avra/Black Wash Rec3 lamation and Riparian Restoration Project’’. 

4 SEC. 2. PROJECT AUTHORIZATION. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Reclamation Wastewater and 

6 Groundwater Study and Facilities Act (Public Law 102– 

7 575, title XVI; 43 U.S.C. 390h et seq.) is amended by 

8 adding at the end the following: 

9 ‘‘SEC. 16ll. AVRA/BLACK WASH RECLAMATION AND RI10 PARIAN RESTORATION PROJECT, PIMA 

11 COUNTY, ARIZONA. 

12 ‘‘(a) AUTHORIZATION.—The Secretary, in coopera13 tion with Pima County, Arizona, may participate in the 

14 planning, design, and construction of water recycling fa15 cilities and to enhance and restore riparian habitat in the 

16 Black Wash Sonoran Desert ecosystem in Avra Valley 

17 west of the metropolitan Pima County area. 

18 ‘‘(b) COST SHARING.—The Federal share of the cost 

19 of the project described in subsection (a) shall not exceed 

20 25 percent of the cost of the project. 

21 ‘‘(c) LIMITATION.—Federal funds provided under 

22 this section shall not be used for operation or maintenance 

23 of the project described in subsection (a). 

24 ‘‘(d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

25 is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section 

26 $14,000,000. 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
3 

HR 325 RFS 

1 ‘‘(e) USE OF FUNDS.—Federal funds provided under 

2 this section shall only be used for the design, planning 

3 and construction of water-related infrastructure.’’. 

4 (b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 

5 for Public Law 102–575 is amended by inserting after the 

6 last item relating to title XVI the following: 

‘‘Sec. 16ll. Avra/Black Wash Reclamation and Riparian Restoration Project, 

Pima County, Arizona.’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives June 2, 2009. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
[No. 41956-4-II.

Division Two.

November 6, 2012.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Maksim Vasil Yevich Shkarin, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 09-1-03947-1, Rosanne Buckner, J., entered March 11, 2011. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per

Johanson, A.C.J.,

concurred in by Quinn-Brintnall and Penoyar, JJ.
### IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10

- 19

- 00147

- CR

GUILLERMO SANTILLAN , Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

From the 13th District Court Navarro County, Texas Trial Court No. D38068

- CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Guillermo Santillan Jr., entered an open plea of guilty to the offense of
manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance in an amount greater than or equal to
200 grams but less than 400 grams. See T EX

. H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE A NN

. § 481.112(e)
(West 2017). The trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea, found him guilty, and
assessed punishment at twelve years’ imprisonment. Sentence was imposed on March

22, 2019. No motion for new trial was filed. Because no motion for new trial was filed,S antillan v. State Page 2

appellant was required to f ile his notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment within
thirty days after the day sentence was imposed in open court. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P.
26.2(a)(1). Thirty days from March 22, 2019 was April 21, 2019, which was a Sunday.

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.1, the timetable for filing appellant’s
notice of appeal ex tended to the “end of the next d ay that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or
legal holiday.” Id. at R. 4.1. As such, appellant’s notice of appeal was due on the next
day that wa s not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday

— Monday, April 22, 2019. See id.
Appellant’s notice of appeal was not filed until the following day

— April 23, 2019.
An appellant must timely perfect an appeal to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. “If
an appeal i s not timely perfected, a court of appeals does not obtain jurisdiction to
address the merits of the appeal. Under those circumstances[,] it can take no action other
than to dismiss the appeal.” Slaton v. State , 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)
(citing Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).
Because appellant did not timely file his notice of appeal in this matter, we hereby
dismiss this appeal. 1 See Slaton , 981 S.W.2d at 210; see also Olivo , 918 S.W.2d at 523.

1 We note that appellate courts may extend the time to file the notice of appeal if, within fifteen days after the deadline for filing the notice of appeal, the party: (a) files in the trial court the notice of appeal; and (b) files in the appellate court a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal. T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.3. Appellant has not filed a motion for extension of time to file his notice of appeal in this case. Theref ore, we cannot apply Rule 26.3 to extend the filing deadline for appellant’s notice of appeal. See id. ; see also Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“When a notice of appeal, but no motion for extension of time, is filed within the fifteen

- day period, the court of appeal lacks jurisdiction to dispose of the purported appeal in any manner other than by dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction.”).S antillan v. State Page 3 JOHN E. N EILL Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Neill Appeal dismissed Opinion delivered and filed July 10, 2019 Do n ot p ublish [CR25]
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-24-00403-CV

Venky Venkatraman, Appellant

v.

Board of Law Examiners, Appellee

FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

NO. D-1-GN-24-000808, THE HONORABLE LAURIE EISERLOH, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Venky Venkatraman attempts to appeal from an order signed by the trial court on 

May 21, 2024, that denied his request for an emergency hearing on his “Motion Asking to Set 

Aside Defendant’s Order.” Appellee the Texas Board of Law Examiners has filed a motion to 

dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction, asserting that the order at issue is not a final order 

or otherwise appealable interlocutory order. We agree with the Board and grant the motion 

to dismiss.

No final order or judgment appears in the record. In civil cases, Texas courts of 

appeals generally have jurisdiction over appeals only from final judgments. See Lehmann v. 

Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 

§ 51.012. We also have jurisdiction to consider appeals of interlocutory orders, but only if a 

statute explicitly provides appellate jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352–53 
2

(Tex. 1998); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014. No statute provides this Court 

with appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory order denying a request for an emergency 

hearing on a motion seeking to set aside an order issued by appellee.

We therefore lack jurisdiction over this appeal and accordingly dismiss the appeal 

for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

__________________________________________

Thomas J. Baker, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Smith, and Theofanis

Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction

Filed: July 12, 2024
#### Steven Erick RILEY, Petitioner—Appellant v. L.E. SCRIBNER, Warden, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 06-56806.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 22, 2008.*

Filed May 2, 2008.

Steven Erick Riley, Calipatria, CA, pro se.

Gerorge H. Williamson, Dag, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General (LA), Los Angeles, CA, for RespondentAppellee.

*660Before: GRABER, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Steven E. Riley, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition claiming denial of due process and other constitutional rights because he did not receive a parole hearing until three years after the statutorily required time. We affirm the district court’s holding that the case is moot. Riley has received a hearing and thus already has received the only remedy to which he would be entitled. *See Burnett v. Lam-pert,*432 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir.2005) (discussing mootness); *Benny v. U.S. Parole Comm’n,*295 F.3d 977, 989-90 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that remedy for federal prisoner entitled to parole termination hearing was mandamus petition ordering hearing).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 19

- 00118

- CR

A LLEN D EWAYNE T HOMAS

, Appellant

V

.

T HE S TATE OF T EXAS §

§

§

§

§ On Appeal from the 415th District Court

of Parker Co unty (CR17

- 0403)

December 19, 2019

Opinion by Justice Kerr

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that there

was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of the trial

cour t is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By _ /s/ Elizabeth Kerr

__________________ Justice Elizabeth Kerr
#### Patricia A. Hollowell, Appellant, v James Decaro, Respondent.

[987 NYS2d 173]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Martin, J.), dated May 9, 2013, which granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CFLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred and denied the plaintiffs cross motion pursuant to CFLR 306-b and 2004 to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On December 17, 2007, a vehicle operated by James Decaro collided with a vehicle operated by the plaintiff. Decaro died on April 4, 2009, of causes unrelated to the accident. On June 8, 2012, the plaintiff filed a summons and complaint naming “The Estate of James Decaro” as the defendant, seeking to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from the subject ac*750cident. However, a personal representative for Decaro’s estate was not appointed until September 25, 2012.

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. Because a plaintiff is unable to commence an action during the period of time between the death of a potential defendant and the appointment of a representative of the estate, the purported action commenced on June 8, 2012, was a nullity *(see Arbelaez v Chun Kuei Wu,*18 AD3d 583, 584 [2005]; *Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y. v*Luna, 302 AD2d 558 [2003]; *Laurenti v Teatom,*210 AD2d 300, 301 [1994]). Further, the three-year statute of limitations, as tolled for 18 months by CPLR 210 (b) due to Decaro’s death, expired on June 17, 2012 *(see*CPLR 214 [5]).

The Supreme Court also properly denied the plaintiffs cross motion pursuant to CPLR 306-b to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint. While this provision allows for the extension of time to serve the summons and complaint after an action has been properly commenced, it does not allow a court to extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action *(see*CPLR 201).

Rivera, J.P, Lott, Miller and Duffy, JJ, concur.
Exhibit
        32.1
 
 **CERTIFICATION
        PURSUANT TO**
 **18
        U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**
 **AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**
 **OF
        THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**
 
 In
        connection with the Quarterly Report of Inova Technology, Inc. (the “Company”)
        on Form 10-Q for the period ending July 31, 2008, (the “Report”), as filed with
        the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Adam Radly,
        Chief
        Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec.1350,
        as
        adopted pursuant to Sec.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best
        of my
        knowledge, that
 
 (1)
        The
        Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
        the
        Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)
        The
        information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
        the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 
 
 By:
        /s/
        Adam Radly
 
 Adam
        Radly
 Chief
        Executive Officer
 *September
        15, 2008*
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Bedford, Appellant.

[665 NYS2d 596]

Mercure, J.

Ap*823peal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (McGrath, J.), rendered October 24, 1995, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree.

A Grand Jury indicted defendant for sexual abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child based upon a factual allegation that defendant touched the vagina of a nine-year-old girl in March 1993. Convicted after trial of sexual abuse in the first degree, defendant now appeals.

We affirm. We are entirely unimpressed by defendant’s primary contention, that County Court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial following the People’s impermissible reference to an alleged prior bad act. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked defendant whether he had ever gotten into trouble at his place of employment for dishonesty. Defendant gave a negative response and his counsel’s objection elicited an immediate curative instruction from County Court that the jury was to disregard the question and that the testimony should be stricken from the record. Considering the fairly innocuous nature of the People’s inquiry, defendant’s denial, County Court’s prompt curative instruction and the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the victim’s testimony and defendant’s confession, we view the claim of reversible error as devoid of merit (see, *People v*Herring, 227 AD2d 658, 660-661, Zu *denied*88 NY2d 986; *People v Nusbaum,*222 AD2d 723, 726, *lv denied*87 NY2d 1023). For similar reasons, we conclude that the People’s failure to provide particulars concerning defendant’s acts of “french kissing” constituted, at most, harmless error.

Cardona, P. J., Casey, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.