Iconcur in the m aj o ri t y ’s conclusion that the summary judgme nt was not void under 1 section 410.258 of the la

bor code

. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 312 -CV

Texas P ropert y and Casu alty Insu rance G uaranty Association f or P e tr os ur anc e Ca sua lt y C om pany , I m pai r e d Ins ur e r , A ppe lla nt

v. Randy B rooks , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-03- 0010 30 , HO NORAB LE DARLENE BY RNE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

C O N C U R

R I N G A N D D I S S E N T I N GO P I N I O N

I n this workers’ compensation case , the m ajority misapplies the standar d of re view and cr eate s a fa ct issue wher e none exis ts. The undisput ed facts s how that appe llee Randy Br ooks

wa s pai d $50 pe r day by his e mpl oy e r, Pa tte rs on Dr ill ingCom

pa ny , to tr ans po rt

his dr ill ingc re w t o and fr om work, there by

excepting his travel home from the “ coming and g oing” rule a nd rende ring his injury in an automobile ac ci d en t compensable under the statute. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 4 01 .0 11 (1 2) (A ) ( Wes t 20 06 ). B e c a us e the ma

jor ity c on c lud e s o the rw ise , I re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. 1 Pa tte rs on e mpl oy e d B ro ok s a s an oil ri g dr ill e r, and he wa s in jur e d in an a uto mob ile

acc ident while t ransporting himself a nd his crew

from the we ll sit e, located in a re mote are a nea r Gar den City , to their homes in Odessa, f ifty -two miles awa

y . Br ooks testified that he and his cre w2

g ener ally worke d seven day s a wee k from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. and that he would only g et a da y off whe n the well wa s finished and Patterson would move the oil r ig from one drilling site to another, sometimes as fre quently

as eve ry five or six day s. Br ooks testified that, once Patterson moved the oil r ig to a n e w dr il li n g s it e , h e w o u ld h a v e to dr iv e h im s e lf an d h is c r e w me mb e r s to the new location. A c c o r d in g to B r o o k s , h e w o u ld p ic k u p h is c r e w me mb e r s in O d e s s a e a c h e v e n in g and transport them to the drilling site for work and then transport them home a fterw ards. B rooks furthe r te sti fi e d th a t, o n th e da

y be fo re the a c c ide nt, Pa tte rs on c a ll ed him

and ins tr uc te d h im t o r e tur

n to

w o r k a f t e r t w o d a ys o f f b e c a u s e t h e r i g h a d

b e e nm o v e d

an d w o u l d b e r u n n i n g a g a i nt h e n e x td a y. The evidenc e showed that Patterson paid Br ooks an hourly wag e, plus a $50 pe r diem to co v er ex p en s es . The c rux of the dispute was whethe r the $50 pe r diem wa s for travel reimburse ment. The e vidence showed that, prior to hiring Br ooks, Patterson reimburse d its drillers fo r m ile a g e tr a ve le d to and fr om w or k. Pa tte rs on

sto pp e d it s p ra c tic e of

mil e a g e re imb ur se me nt i n fa vo r o f a $5 0 p e r day pay

men t to e a c h o f i ts e mpl oy e e s. Pa tte rs on ’s wi tne sse s te sti fi e d th a t th is $50 pay ment wa s fo r “e x penses.” Br ooks testified that he unde rstood the $50 pay ment to be “[ d ] ri v i n g p ay , dri v er

re i mb u rs em en t
. ” B ro o k s ex p l ai n ed t h a t h i s fo rm er em p l o y er

Ke y E n er gy paid him $35 as “drive r re imbursement” and that when he was hire d by Patterson, his hiring supervisor, Ron Simonds, tol d him, “Drillers make $17.00 an hour, [and ] y ou g et $50.00 a da y driving , [t o] bring y our cre w to the work site.” B rooks also stated that he would not have take n the job if Patterson had not ag ree d to pay for the e x pense of

driving his crew

. According to Mark Cullifer, Patterson’ s Vice Pre sident of Oper ations, “I t was the driller’ s [responsibil ity ] t o make sure h e h as a ful l cre w.” Cullifer te stified that if a driller3

continually

showed up at the drilling site without a full cr ew “ [h] e’d pr obably be re place d.” Cullifer also testified that it wa s g ener al industry prac tice in the reg ion where Br ooks worked f or the driller to transport his cre w to and fr om the oil rig. The evidenc e also showe d that Patterson paid the $50 pe r d ie m on ly

to d ri lle rs ; it did no t g ive thi s p e r d ie m to the dr ill e r’ s c re w m e mbe rs . A c c or din g to Patterson, it was pay

ing the $50 per d i em t o d ri l l ers “ beca use it’s competitive out there ” and “ we

wer e losing driller s to our competition.” Cullifer testified that Patterson did not wa nt to raise wa g es beca use “w hen we raise w ag es, it costs us a lot of money in othe r way s.” The evidenc e also showed that Patte rs on

ma de no de du c tio n f

or so c ia l se c ur ity

or wi thh old ing ta xes fr om t he $5 0 p e r d ie m pa id to B ro ok s and

the oth e r d

ri lle rs . Pr e se nte d w iththe se fa c ts, the dis tr ic t c ourt re nd e re d jud g me nt fo r B ro ok s a ft e r b oth partie s fi l ed cr oss-motions for summary judgme nt. The majority corr ectly states that we r eview the district court’s g rant of summar y judgme nt de novo, se e Va le nc e Op e ra tin g Co . v . D or se tt , 16 4 S. W.3 d 65 6, 66 1 (T e x. 20 05 ), and that w he n b oth

pa rt ie s f ile mot ion s f

or su mma ry jud g me nt,

we r eview the summary jud gm ent evidence pr esente d by both sides, determine a ll questions prese nted and r end er t h e judg ment the trial cour t should have re ndere d, see SAS I nst., Inc.

v . B re ite nfe ld , 1 67 S.W. 3d 84 0, 84 1 (T e x. 20 05 ). B ut, in l ig ht o f t he un dis pu te d f

a c ts, the ma

jor ity misapplies this st andar d of re view.

The que stion before us is whether Brooks’ s injury in an automobile ac cident on the

w ay h o m e f r o m w o r k o c c u r r e d w i t h i nt h e c o u r s e an d

s c o p e o f h i s e mp l o y

m e n tw i t h P a t t e r s o n . If so, then it is a compensable injury , and he is e ntitled to rec eive wor kers’ compensation benefits. See De a t h erage v . International Ins. Co. , 615 S.W .2d 181, 182 (Tex. 1981) (wor kers’ compensation4

benef its recove rable only

wher e death or injury

in questi o n o ccur s within course a nd scope of employ ee’ s employ

ment). I f, howe ver, the injury did not oc cu r wi t h in the course and scope of Brooks’s employ

ment, then he is not entitled to rece ive bene fits. See id. The labor code de fines

“ c ours e and

sc op e of e mpl oy me nt” to i nc lud e “ an a c tiv ity of any kin d o r c ha

ra c te r t hat ha s to do wi th and orig inates in the work, business, trade , or profession of t he employ er and that is perfor med by an employ ee w hile eng ag ed in or a bout the further ance of the aff airs or business of the e mploy er.” Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 401.011( 12) (West 2006). The term includes ac t i vities conducted on the pre mises of the employ er or at other loc ations. Id . W o rk t hat is directe d or authorized by the employ er is within the cour se of employ ment reg ardle ss of whethe r the wor k benef its the employ er’ s business. Bu rk

e tt v . W e lbo rn , 42 S.W .3d 282, 287-88 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.). An injury “ar ises out of” e mploy

ment if the injury wo u l d n ot have oc curr ed if the c onditions and obligations of employ

ment had not place d the claimant in harm’s wa y . Te x . W or k e rs’ Com p. In s. Fund v. Simon , 980 S.W .2d 730, 735-36 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).

As a g ener al rule, a

n employ ee is not within the course and scope of his employ ment wh e n h e is i nju

re d g oin g to a

nd c omi ngfr om w or

k. Te x. L a

b. Cod e Ann. § 4 01 .0 11 (1 2) (A ); see , e.g. , Ev an s v . I

lli no is E mp loy e rs I

ns . , 790 S.W .2d 302, 304 (T ex . 1 990); Texas Ge n. Indem . Co. v. Bottom , 365 S.W .2d 350, 353 (Tex. 1963). The r ationale f or t his rule is t hat such injuries do not arise out of

a per s o n ’s employ

ment, but are suffe red a s a conse quence of the risk to which all trave ling pe rsons are exposed. Evans , 790 S.W

. 2d at 304. The supr eme c ourt has long held, howeve r, that the g ener al rule is not applicable and that an e mploy ee is a cting within the course a nd scope of his employ

ment when he is g oing to or returningfrom wor k in case s where the employ er5

furnishes the transportation a s a part of the contra ct of employ ment. See Texas Employe rs Ins. Ass’n v. Inge , 208 S.W. 2d

86 7, 86 8- 69 (T e x. 19 48 ); se e als o Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 401.011( 12)(A) (i). Th e ke y iss ue in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r c omp e ns a tio n is a va ilable for an in jur y inc ur re d w hil e trave ling to or f

rom work unde r this exception is whether the e mploy er’ s furnis hing or paying f or the tr ans po rt a tio n w a s an in te g ra l pa rt of the e mpl oy

me nt c on tr a c t or mer e ly an a c c omm od a tio n to the employ ee. I n the former case , the injury is w ithin the course of employ ment and is compensa

ble; in t h e l at t er , it is not

. See R ose v. O diorne , 795 S.W .2d 210, 214-15 (Te x . App.—Austin 1990, writ denied) (oil rig employ ee e ntitled to compensat i o n if employ er’ s transportation plan ( 1) wa s essential for

transporting employ ees to remote job site, (2) be nefitted e mploy er, a nd (3) wa s neede d to operate rig ). The fa cts of Texas Employe rs I nsurance Assoc iation v. Inge are rema rkably simil ar to the case bef

ore us. See I

nge , 208 S.W .2d at 868. I ng e wa s employ ed as a n oil field “roug hneck” and re ceive d an hourly

wag e, plus a trave l remittance of seve n cents pe r mile to cover the expenses of oper atin g h i s au t o m o b ile. Id. Under this arra ng ement, Ing e we nt to work and used his own vehicle to tr ansport himself and his fellow worke rs to and fr om the well site. Id. I ng e re ceive d no wag es for the time c onsumed trave ling to and f rom work, a

nd his employ er ma de no deduc tions from the mileag e re imbursement for soc ial secur ity or withholding ta x es. Id. After completinghis reg ular work shift at the w ell site, I ng e starte d d ri v i n g t o his home in his own automobile, accompa nied by two other membe rs of his drilling c rew . Id. Whil e driving home, I ng e’s c ar c ollided with another vehicle, a nd I ng e died a s a re sult of the injuries he suff ere d. Id.6 On the se fa c ts, the su

pr e me c ourt

he ld a s a ma tte r o f l aw t

hat Ing e wa s a c tin g wi thi n the cour se and sc ope of his employ ment beca

use his employ er f

urnished the tra

nsportation as par

t of Ing e’s c ontrac t of employ ment. Id. at 869. The c ourt explained that the location of the dr illing sit e in a n uninha bit e d a re a ma de it e sse nti a l th a t Ing e ’s e mpl oy e r f ur nis h tr ans po rt a tio n in ord e r t o induce his employ ees to work on the j ob. Id. The ha llmark of the a rra ng ement betwe en Ing e and his employ er w as that the members of the drilling cre w wer e being transporte d to the well site fre e of cost to them. Id. Th e c ourt c on c lud e d th a t th is tra

ns po rt a tio n w a s a

n im port ant par

t of the ir contra ct of e mploy

m en t an d t hat the employ er’ s aff airs and busine ss were being further ed by the transportation of cre w member s to and from the w ell site in I ng e’s a utomobile. Id. The undisput ed fa cts are no differ ent her e. The evidenc e showe d that the drilling sit e wa s lo c a te d in

a re mot e are a

ne ar G arden Ci ty th at ma de it e sse nti a l f or Patte rs on

to f ur nis h transportation to it s employ ees in orde r to induce the m t o wo rk o n t his job. The substance of B ro ok s’ s e mpl oy

me nt a rr a ng e me nt re qu ir e d him to tra ns po rt his c re w to an d f

ro m th e dr ill ingsit e or fa ce the possibili ty

of beingrepla ced himself. T he $50 per diem paid by Patterson to Br ooks was t o c o v e r h i s e x p e n s e s . B r o o k s t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s p r e v i o u s e mp l o ye r p a i d $ 3 5 p e r d ay i n“ dr i v e r s ’ p a y”

and that he wo uld

no t hav e take n th e job wi th P a tte rs on wi tho ut r e c e ivi ngsim ila

r r e imb ur se me nt. This testimony was undisput ed, and Patterson admit ted t hat i t was required to pay the $50 per diem to r emain competitive with othe r industry employ ers. Wit hout the $50 per die m, Cull ifer te stified that Patte rs on

wo uld los e dr ill e rs to t

he c omp e tit ion

. Re g ard le ss of the na me us e d b y

Pa tte rs on to

re fe r t o th e $5 0 pe r die m, Pa tte rs on ’s ow n wi tne ss, Ron a ld Simo nd s, a ve rr e d that he “ may have ” tol d Br ooks that it wa s “drive rs’ pay .” L ike the employ er in Inge , Patterson did not deduct taxes from7

the $50 per

diem it paid to Br ooks. The undisput ed evidence further showed that, like Ing e, B rooks was not in the business of c arr y ing pa sseng ers f

or hire a nd that transportin g himself and his cre w members to and f

rom the dril ling sit e wa s merely part of his job as a

driller wor

king f or Patterson. Be cause the undisputed evidenc e showe d that Patterson paid the $50 pe r diem to transport B rooks and his cre w member s to the drilling site, I would aff irm the trial court’s judgme nt that B rooks was actingwithin the course a nd scope of

his employ

ment when he was injured. I n a dd iti on , I

ob se rv e that ano the r e xce pti on to t he “ c omingand

g oin g ” ru le is likewise applica

ble to the undisputed fac ts in thi s case . Subsection 401.011(12)( A) of the labor c ode also excepts from the g ener al rule tra nsportation to and from the p l ac e of employ ment wher e the employ er dire cts the employ ee in his employ ment to proce ed from one plac e to another place

. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 401.011( 12)(A) (iii).

I n Janak v . Texas Employe rs Insurance Assoc iation , th e s upreme court c onsidered wh e the r a

n e mpl oy e r’ s d ir e c tio n “ to p ro c e e d f ro m on e pla c e to an oth e r” mus t be e xpre ss. 381 S.W .2d 176, 181 (Tex. 1964). Rely ing on Jec ker v . W estern All i a n ce In s u rance Company , 369 S.W .2d 776 (Tex. 1963) , the supreme c ourt held that the e mploy er’ s direction ca n be implied, but the implied direction must be within the employ ment and the tra

vel must be in further ance of the business of the employ er. See J anak , 381 S.W .2d at 181. The undi s p u t ed evidence in this ca se satisfies the e x ception as inter prete d by the supreme c ourt in Janak . B ro ok s tes tif ie d th a t, o n th e da

y be fo re the a c c ide nt, Pa tte rs on c a lle d h im and told him to r eturn to w ork the next day beca use the rig had been moved and would be running ag ain. This test i m o n y was undisputed. The evidenc e wa s likewise undisputed that the drilling8

sites were located in r emote ar eas; t h at Patterson moved the oil rig from one dr illing site to the

ne xt, so me tim e s a s f

re qu e ntl y a s e ve ry fi ve or six da y s; a nd tha t Patte rs on

re qu ir e d B ro ok s to tr ans po rt his c re w m e mbe rs to a

nd fr om t he dr ill ingsit e or

fa c e the ri sk

of be ing“ re pla c e d. ” As in Janak, benef

its flowed to Patterson from the arr ang ement or pla n of pay ing a $50 per die m to Brooks and makingit Brooks’s duty to ge t the cre w to the job site. See id. a t 18 1- 82 ; se e als o Li be rty Mu t. Ins. Co. v. Chestnut , 53 9 S.W. 2d 92 4, 92 8 (T e x. Ap p. —E l Pa so 19 76 , wr it re f’ d n. r. e .) . F ro m th is evidenc e, the tria l court could have prope rly found that Patterson “dire cted [Brooks] .

. . to proce ed from one pla ce to a

nother plac e” w ithin the meaning of section 401.011(A)( 12)(iii) and that Br ooks

was there fore acting within the course and scope of his employ ment. See J

anak , 381 S.W .2d at 181. Be cause the majority misapplies the s tandar d of review and c reates a fa ct issue wher e

no ne e xists , I

re sp e c tf ull y dis se nt.

__________________________________________

J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Filed: August 8, 2008