IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2019-IA-00170-SCT
CHARLES BRADLEY

CARSON

v.
KIMBERLY (CARSON) LINLEY AND JAY HOWARD HURDLE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/02/2019 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARK SHELDON DUNCAN TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: LYDIA QUARLES THOMAS L. TULLOS W Y ATT HAZARD KATELYN ADELE RILEY COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: SCOTT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: THOMAS L. TULLOS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: LYDIA QUARLES J. W YATT HAZARD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 03/12/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC. COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT : ¶1. Kim

berly Carson Linley

and Charles Bradley Carson are f orm er spouses who share

a child together. Following their divorce, the Chancery C ourt of Oktibbeha County entered

a m oney judgm ent a gainst Carson. Carson appealed the judgm e nt to t he Mississippi Suprem e C ourt and f

i led an appeal bond. W hile t he appeal was pending, Linley ’s attorney , Jay Howard Hurdle, executed the m oney judgm ent and had writs of g arnishm ents issued bythe Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County

. Once issued, Linley served the writs in Scott County ,

Mississippi, on Carson’s em ploy er and bank. Carson sued Linley and Hurdle in the Circuit
Court of Scott C o u n t y , alleging that they conspired to seize his f u nds. L inley a nd Hurdle
f iled m o tions t o t ransf

er venue to Oktibbeha County

. T he Scott County Circuit Court granted
the m otions and transf

e rred venue to the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County

. Carson f iled

an interlocutory appeal, arguing the S cott County Circuit Court had abused its discretion by
transf erring venue. B ecause the Scott County Circuit Court abused i ts discretion by
transf erring venue, we reverse i ts ruling and rem and the m atter to the Scott County Circuit
Court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. To understand the f acts and the procedural h i s t o r y o f t h e i n t e rlocutory appeal, the
Court m ust ref erence the f

acts and the procedural history of Carson’s appeal f rom chancery

court

. I n chancery c ourt, Hurdle had represented Linley i n her d ivorce f rom Carson. Following their divorce, L inley petitio n e d t he Chancery Court of Oktibbeha County f or

m odif ication of custody and child support against Carson. ¶3. On Septem

ber 19, 2017, the chancery court awarded Linley a m oney judgm ent against
Carson f o r $7,946.02. On Septem ber 29, 2017, Carson f

iled a m otion f

or a new trial and/or
reconsideration. O n N ovem ber 17, 2017, f

ollowing the denial of his m o tion f or a new trial,
Carson appealed t he m oney judgm ent and f i led a notice of

appeal with the chancery court.
The sam e day , Carson also f iled a s upersedeas a

ppeal bond. S haron Livingston, t he chancery

2clerk of O ktibbeha County , stam ped the supersedeas appeal bond as f iled , but she did not electronically

f ile the bond on Mississippi Electronic Courts. ¶4. On March 16, 2018, af ter the chancery court’s judgm ent against Carson but bef ore the
clerk f i l e d a n d uploaded the supersedeas a ppeal bond on Mississippi Electronic Courts, Linley and Hurdle, p ursuant to the m oney judgm ent, served t he Scott County Board of Supervisors, the em

ploy er of Carson, with a w rit of garnishm ent o f his wages. On April 4,
2 0 1 8 , Linley and Hurdle also served a writ of garnishm ent of the accounts of C arson on BancorpSouth in Scott County , Mississippi. ¶5. Carson’s em

ploy e r inf orm ed h im of the service of the w rit, and, on A pri l 1 6 , 2 018,
Carson f iled a conspiracy com

plaint in t h e S c o t t C o u nty Circuit Court and applied f or a

tem porary restraining order and a perm anent injunction against Linley and H urdle. 1 Linley
and H urdle f

i led a m otion to t ransf

er venue. Carson contested the m oti o n , a n d the Scott County Circuit C ourt scheduled oral argum ents. Bef ore the Circuit Court of Scott County
heard oral argum ents in t he m otion to t ransf er venue, Carson’s appeal f rom chancery court

cam e bef ore the Suprem e Court of Mississippi due to issues with his sup e r s e d e a s appeal
bond. Acknowledging the issues with the supersedeas appeal bond, t he Suprem e Court of Mississippi stay ed Carson’s appeal f rom chan c ery court a n d ordered t hat the Oktibbeha County Chancery Court deter m ine whether Carson properly f iled the s upersedeas appeal bond. Order, C

arson v. Linley , No. 2017-TS-01603 (Miss. Aug. 20, 2018).

1 O rig in ally , L iv in g sto n w as a d ef en d an t alo n g w ith L i n ley an d H u rd l e, b u t C arso n d ism issed h e r. 3¶6. On Decem ber 6 , 2 018, while review of the supersedeas appeal bond was pending, the
Scott County Circuit C ourt heard o ral argum ents about venue in Carson’s conspiracy claim

. Carson argued that venue was proper in the Circuit C our t o f S c o t t County because

“ s u b stantial acts, as well as substantial events that c aused the injury , occurred in Scott County , Mississippi.” Carson’s com plaint alleged,
Def endants Kim

berly (Carson ) Linley , J ay Howard Hurdle, and Sharon Livingston did conspire one with the other t o wrongf ully , and without authority of l aw, i ssue the af oresaid garnishm ents while such judgm e nt w as on appeal t o the Suprem e Court of Mississippi, with supersedeas, resulting i n the wrongf ul taking of

the property

of Plaintif f , without authority

of law;
Def endants Kim

berly (Carson) Linley , Jay Howard Hur d l e , and Sharon Livingston did, by their extrem e a nd outrageous conduct, i n t e n tionally or recklessly c ause severe em otional distress to Plaintif f Charles Bradley C arson;
The actions of Def

endants K im

berly (Carson) Linley , Jay Howard Hurdle, and Sharon Livingston in c ausing the property of Plaintif f Charles Bradley Carson to b e taken f

r o m him without authority of law and in violation of the appeal bond with supersedeas were willf ul, wanton, intentional and oppressive, and done with m alice af

orethought and/or g ross r ecklessness evincing r uthless disregard f

or the rights of

Plaintif f Charles Bradley

Carson and others. ¶7. Carson argued t hat u n der Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i), the s u bstantial

e v e n t that caused t he injury to occur in Scott County was the s ervice o f the writs o f garnishm e nt on his e m

p loy er a nd bank. Linley and Hurdle asserted that they could not have conspired against Carson because they had no notice of the bond’s existence. Linley and
Hurdle also argue d t h a t i f there were t o be a claim , it is the a lleged acts or om i ssions that
should determ ine ve n u e
. T h e y argued that they took no action in Scott County and that

proper v enue l ay i n Oktibbeha County

. The Scott County C i r c u i t Court agreed and
transf erred venue to the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County

.

4¶8. Af

ter the ruling, Carson petitioned the Court f or an i nterlocutory appeal. On March 18, 2019, we granted Carson’s Petition f or Interlocutory Appeal by Perm ission and f or Stay

o f Proceedings. On S eptem ber 17, 2019, pursuant to the Court’s Order pe r t a i n i n g t o
Carson’ s supersedeas appeal b ond issue, the Oktibbeha County Chancery Court ruled that
Carson properly f

iled h is s upersedeas appeal bond on Novem ber 17, 2017. 2 The sole issue
bef ore the Court is whether t he trial court erred by transf erring v enue f

rom the Circuit Court
of Scott County

to the Circuit Court of

Oktibbeha County

. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9. “Th[ e] Court reviews a trial court’s determ inations regarding venue f or an abuse of
discretion.” Ram sey v. Auburn Univ
. , 191 So. 3d 102, 107 ( ¶ 1 7) (Miss. 2 016) (citing

Janssen Pharm aceutica, Inc. v. Arm on d , 8 6 6 So. 2d 1092, 1 095 (¶ 9) (Miss. 2004)). “A
trial judge’s ruling on such m o tion ‘will not be disturbed o n appeal u nless it c learly appears
that there h a s b e e n a n abuse of discretion or that the d iscretion has not b een justly and properly e x e r cised under the circum stances of the case.’” Herm an Grant Co., Inc. v. Washington , 2 1 4 S o
. 3d 266, 270 (¶ 12) ( Miss. 2017) (quoting Park on Lakeland Drive, Inc. v. Spence , 941 So. 2d 203, 206 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2006)).

DISCUSSION ¶10. Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 states, in relevant part,

2 D u rin g th e m o t io n -to -tran sf er v en u e h earin g , L in ley an d H u rd le arg u ed th at C arso n f ailed to p ro p erly f

i le th e su p ersed eas a

p p eal b o n d , m ean i n g th ey h ad n o n o t ice o f th e ap p eal b o n d ’s e x isten ce w h en th ey serv ed th e w rits o f g arn ish m en t. O u r C o u rt i s n o t ad d ressin g th e m erits o f

th e co n sp i racy claim

. 5Civil actions of w hich the c i r c u i t c o urt has original jurisdiction shall be

com m enced in t he c ounty w here the d ef endant r esides, or, i f a corporation, in the c ounty of i ts principal place o f business, or in the c o unty where a substantial alleged a ct o r om ission occurred or where a substantial event t hat caused the injury

occurred. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) (Rev. 2019). ¶11. “Of right, the plaintif f selects am ong the perm issible venues, and his choice m ust be
sustained unless in the end there is no credible evidence supporting the f actual basis f

or the
claim o f v enue.” Hedgepeth v. Johnson , 9 75 So. 2 d 235, 238 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2008) (internal

q u o t a t i o n m arks om i tted) (quoting Flight L ine, Inc. v . Tanksley , 608 So. 2d 1149, 115 5 (Miss. 1992)). “ Theref

ore, a bsent weighty reasons, a plaintif f ’s choice of f

orum should not
be disturbed.” Washington , 214 So. 3d at 271 (¶ 1 4) (citing Purdue Pharm a, L.P. v. Estate of Heffner , 904 So. 2d 100, 102 ( ¶ 5) (Miss. 2004)). In Hedgepeth v . Johnson , the Court explained Clearly , Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) lay s out f o ur v enue options jurisdiction shall be com m enced in one of these f our f rom which p lain t i f

f s c an choose when f iling a lawsuit. The f

irst two are based o n the s tatus of t he def endant; that is, if the def endant is a resident def

endant, t he suit m ay be f

iled in his county

of residence; or, if the def

endant is a c o r

p o r a t i o n , the suit m ay be f iled in the county of its principal place of business. T he latter two venue options f ocus on the alleged a cts or om issions of the def endants; that is, t he suit m ay b e f i l ed where a substantial alleged act o r om ission occurred; or, f inally , s uit m ay be f iled where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. According to the clear language of the statute, “[ c]ivil actions of which t he circuit c ourt h as original jurisdiction shall be com m enced in” one of these f our places.

Hedgepeth v. Johnson , 975 So. 2d at 238–39 (¶ 10) (alteration in original). ¶12. B e cause Scott C ounty is neither the “ c ounty w here [ eith e r o f ] t h e d e f e n d a n t [ s ] reside[ ]” nor “ the county [ where either o f t he def endants have their] principal place of

6business,” the Court need only consider whether Scott Coun t y i s t h e “county where a

substantial alleged act or om ission occurred o r where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) (Rev. 2019). ¶13. T h e C i r c u i t C o u r t o f S c o t t C o u nty m ade the f ollowing f

indings of f

act whe n
transf erring the case to the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County :
1. Carson’s com

p laint alleged a c onspiracy am ong three def endants that all lived in Oktibbeha County ;
2. T h e alleged conspiracy could have o nly occu r r e d i n O k t i b b e h a C o u n t y , Mississippi;
3. N o a l l e g e d a c t o r o mi ssion of the d ef endants occurred in Scot t C o u n t y , Mississippi; and,
4. No substantial event that caused the a lleged injury occurred in Scott County , Mississippi. (Em phasis added.) ¶14. The trial judge explained, in relevant part, [ T]he way I s ee it is what the plaintif f has alleged is b asically a big conspiracy by the people i n Oktibbeha C o u n t y to wrongfully seize his money, a nd everything that they did or didn’t do in furtherance of wrongfully seizing his money h a ppened i n Oktibbeha County , w hether they were right or wrong, and I’m n ot -- I don’t know and I’m not say in g o n e w ay or another. But that’s where all of the alle

g e d acts or omissions o ccurred was there , in Oktibbeha County

. The q uestion now is whether or not t he f act th a t h i s mo n e y -- he had an account i n a b a nk in Scott County is a s ubstantial enough act to m ake venue proper in Scott County , and m y opinion is t hat it is -- it is not. That Oktibbeha County is the proper venue f or the case. (Em phasis added.)

7¶15. On appeal, Carson a rgues that it is the service of w rits of garnishm ent that l ay venue
in Scott County

. Carson cites Tanksley , 608 So. 2d at 1156, to support his contention. That

case said, “[ a] cause of action accrues when it com es into existence as an enf orceable claim , that is, when the right to s ue b ecom es vested. This m ay well m ean the mo me n t i n j u r y is
in f l i c t e d , t h at point in space and tim e when the last legally signif icant f a ct is f ound.” Id. (citation om itted). Carson argues that the last legally signif i cant f act h ere is the g arnishm ent
of his pay check and bank account. He explains that “without those occurrences, there would be no actionable cause based upon abuse of process.” ¶16. In Tanksley , the Court explained that a suit a ccrued when the “last legally signif icant
f act is f ound.” Tanksley , 6 08 So. 2d at 1156. But the Court in Wilkerson v. Goss addressed
whether a trial court erred by deny ing a m otion to transf er venue because the “cause of action
occurred/accrued in Sm ith County , Mississippi.” Wil k e r son v. G oss , 113 So. 3d 544,
547–48 ( ¶ 7) (Miss. 2 013) ( in ternal q uotation m a r

ks om itted). The Wilkerson Court explained, “The Mississippi Legislature am ended Section 11–11–3 in 2004, ‘ to set venue
where substantial acts or events causing the injury occurred , not where the cause of action
accrued , a s w a s p e rm issible under the f orm e r statute.’” Id. at 547 (¶ 6) (quoting Med.
Assurance C

o. of Miss. v. M

yers , 956 So. 2 d 213, 217 (¶ 15) (Miss. 2007)). T he Wilkerson
Court explained that “venue is proper in Sm it h C o u n t y o n ly if that county is ‘where a
substantial alleged act or omission o ccurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury o c c u r r e d .’” Wilkerson , 113 S o. 3d at 547 (¶ 6) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 11–11–3(1)(a)(i) (Rev. 2004). The W ilk e r s o n Court did n ot address whether venue was

8proper u nder the def inition o f a c c r u e , but it d id address venue using the word occur
. Carson’s assertion that “without garnishm ent [ as the last legally s u f f icient f act] there would
be no actionable c ause” would be co r r e c t if the C ourt applied the def inition of a ccrue to
determ ine venue. It does not. ¶17. L i k e t h e W

i lkerson Court, we will not address whether venue is pr o p e r i n S c o t t County b ecause the cause of act i o n a c c rued t here. However, Carson a lso alleged that the

cause of action occurred

in Scott County

. Theref

o re, the Court will look to determ ine if a

s u b s t a n t i a l a lleged act or om ission or a substantial injury -causing e vent occurred in Scott County

. ¶18. “In venue d isputes courts begin with the well-pleaded a l legations of the com plaint.” Tanksley , 608 So. 2d at 1155. “These, of course, m ay be supplem ented—and contested—by
af f idavits or other evidence in cognizable f orm .” I d. (citing Long v. P

atterson , 198 Miss. 554, 22 So. 2d 490, 492-93 ( 1945)). “If the plaint if f wishes to def

eat a m otion t o transf

er

venue, it f

ollows that he or she should b e p r e p ared to present s om e credible evidence supporting his or her choice of f orum .” Wilkerson , 113 So. 3d at 548 (¶ 8) n.9. ¶19. The basis f

or Carso n ’ s c o m

plaint is a c o nspiracy

. A c ivil “[ c]onspiracy requires a
f inding o f [ :] (1) two or m ore persons or corporations; (2) an object t o be accom plished; (3)

a m eeting of the m inds o n the object or course of action; (4) one or m ore unlawful overt acts ; and (5) dam ages as the proxim a te result.” Braddock Law Firm , PLLC v. Becnel , 139 So.
3d 722, 726 (¶ 18) ( Miss. C t

. A p p
. 2 013) (em phasis added) ( second a lteration in original)

9(internal quotation m arks om itted) (quoting Gallegos v . Mid-S. Mortg. & Inv., Inc. , 956 So. 2d 1055, 1060 (¶ 22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)). ¶20. Carson’s com

p laint alleged that venue is p roper in Scott C ounty because “substantial

a c t s c o mp l a ined o f herein as well as substantial events that caused t he injury occurred in
Scott C ounty , Mississippi.” The com plaint also contains allegati o n s t h a t the appellees conspired against him to unlawf ully issue and serve writs of garnishm e nt even though they

were aware of the existence of a s upersedeas appeal bond. A review of t he r ecor d reveals that, in f a ct, Linley and Hurdle served two writs of garnishm ent in S cott County , M ississippi,
f or the purpose of ta k i n g Carson’s f unds. Im portantly , Linley and Hurdle’s service of the writs, their purpose, and the garnishing of Carson’s f unds are undisputed f

acts. Contesting
Carson’s venue choice, L inley and Hurdle argued that no alleged act or om ission occurred
in S cott County

. Hurdle explained “that the c onspiracy alleged in the subject C o m plaint, as
well as the requests f

or the W rits of Garnishm ent, are the s ubstantial alle g e d a c t s o r

om issions . . . that led to the claim ed injury .” ¶21. W e agree with the trial court that Carson alleged a conspiracy b y t he a p p e l l e es to wrongf ully seize his m oney
. H owever, the trial court erred when i t c oncluded that “every thing that t he[ ] [ appelle es] did or d idn’t d o i n f u rtherance o f wrongf

ully seizing [ Carson’s] m oney happened in Oktibbeha County

. ” Carson’s well-pleaded com plaint, the

u n c ontested f

acts, and evidence presented reveal that h e alleged that a substantia l a c t
occurred in Scott County , M i s sissippi; specif ically , service o f the w rits of garnishm ent. Linley and Hurdle agree that they served t he writs in Scott County with the intent to garnish

1 0Carson’s f

unds. However, they argue no injury occurred in Scott County , explaining, “there really wasn ’ t a n y m oney taken o ut of Scott County

. It was a paper transaction, but no

m oney .” In other w ords, Linley and Hurdle argue that service of the writs is not a s u bstantial injury -causing event. ¶22. Assum ing service of the writs is not a substantial i njury -causing event, a n act “can
nevertheless establish venue if it is both substantial and alleged by the plaintif f

. ” Myers , 956
So. 2d at 218 (¶ 21). The service of the writs of

garnishm ent in Scott County , M ississippi,
is a substantial a lleged overt act or om i ssion i n f urtherance of the alleged unlawf ul conspiracy to seize C a r s o n ’ s f unds. Moreover, the overt act of serving the writs in Scott County e f f ectuated the alleged unlawf ul purpose o f seizing Carson’s f u nds. W hile it is true
that the Court c an construe the issuance of the writs a s a substantial alleged act, t he issuance
of the writs is n o t the only substantial alleged act t hat occurred. Even if an act or om ission
did not cause the injury , “it can n evertheless esta b l i s h v e n u e if it is both substantial and alleged by the plaintif

f .” Id. Theref

ore, the Court f

inds that Linley and H u rdle’s s ervice of
the writs in Scott County was a substantial a nd a l leged act done in f urtherance of the alleged conspiracy

to wrongf

ully seize Carson’s f

unds. ¶23. “It is the plaintif

f ’s prerogative to decide where, am ong perm issible venues, to sue the
def endant.” Washington , 21 4 S o. 3d at 271 (¶ 14) (internal q uotation m arks om itted) (quoting Forrest Cty. Gen. Hosp. v. Conway , 70 0 So. 2d 324, 326 (¶ 12) ( Miss. 1997)).
Carson had his choice of perm issible venues, an d h e c h ose Scott County , Mississippi.

Because Carson produced credible evidence supporting h is choice o f f orum , we reverse the

1 1Scott C ounty Circuit Court and rem and the case f or f urther proceedings i n the S cott County
Circuit Court.
CONCLUSION ¶24. Because the ser v i c e o f t h e w r i t s o f g a r n i s h me n t is a substantial alleged act in
f urtherance of an alleged conspiracy , S c o t t County , M ississippi, is a p erm issible venue. Accordingly , the Court reverses t he Scott County Circuit Court’s order granting the m otion

to transf er venue and rem ands the m atter to the Scott County C i rcuit C ourt f or proceedings
on the m erits. ¶25. REVERSED AND REMANDED. RANDOLPH, C .J., KITCHENS A ND KING, P.JJ., MAX WELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND IS H EE, JJ., C ONCUR. GRIFFIS, J ., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. GRIFFIS, JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶26. The m ajority f

inds that “the service of the writs of garnishm ent is a substantial alleged

act in f u rtherance of an alleged conspiracy ” and then concludes that v enue is “perm issible” in Scott County . Maj. O p. ¶ 24. I respectf ully disagree. I agree with the circuit judge that Oktibbeha County

is the only

proper venue given the f acts of this case. ¶27. Actually , this claim should sim ply be a c o n tem

pt m otion in t he pending Oktibbeha County Chancery Court dom estic-relations case between these sam e parties. One litigant in
that case (the plaintif

f ) sued the other litigant and her atto r n e y (the def endants). 3 The

3 T h e p l a in tif

f also su ed th e C h an cery C lerk o f O k tib b eh a C o u n ty b u t ch o se to
v o lu n tarily d ism iss th e clerk o n th e m o rn in g o f th e h earin g f o r th e m o tio n to tran s f

er v en u e.

1 2plaintif

f ’s claim is that the def

endants im

properly sought to execute o n t h e j udgm ent in

v iolation of the stay by issuing and serving w rits o f garnishm e nt. The Oktibbeha C o u n t y
chancellor could have q

u ickly dealt with any dam age that r esulted in a cont e mp t mo t i on. ¶28. Instead, w e have a separate law s u i t that is f iled i n Scott County , a dif f erent county
with no relationship to the parties or the essential acts of t his case. None of the parties reside
in S cott County

. The only act that occurred in Scott County was that the def endant attorney
served two writs o f garnishm e nt on banks in S cott County

. The m a j ority f inds th e service
of t he writs of garnishm ent is a “substantial alleged act” that perm i ts venue in Scott County

. The com plaint alleges one claim

—conspiracy . The plaintif f alleges,
13. D e f

e n d a n t s
. . . d i d conspire one with the other to wron g f u l l y , a n d without authority of law, issue the a f o resaid garnishm ents while such judgm ent was on appeal to t he Suprem e C ourt of M i s s i s s ippi, with supersedeas, resulting in the wrongf ul taking o f t h e property of Plaintif f , without authority of

law.
14. Def

endants

. . . did, by their extr e m e and outrageous c onduct, intentionally or recklessly cause severe em otional d istress to P l aintif f

. . . . 15. The a c t ions of Def endants

. . . in causing the property of Plaintif f

. . . to be taken f

rom him witho u t authority of law and in violation of the
a ppeal bond with supersedeas were willf ul, wanton, intentional and oppressive, and d one with m a lice af orethought and/or gross reckl e s sness e vincing reckless disregard f or the rights of Plaintif

f

. . . and others. ¶29. For venue to be proper in S cott County , Mississippi Co d e S e c t i o n 11-11-3(1)(a)(1) ( R ev. 2 019) requires that a “substantial alleged act

. . . occur” in that county

. Th e s t a t u t e clearly and unam

biguously anticipates that every a ct w ill not be “substantial.” H ere, venue

1 3is only proper in Scott County if the def en d a n t s ’ s e rvice of writs of garnishm ent is
determ ined to be a “substantial alleged act.” ¶30. T h i s c a s e i s d ecided based on what “substantial” m e ans under the venue statut e
. Merriam -W ebster def

i n e s “substantial” as “consisting of or relating to substance”;
“im portant, essential”; or “signif icantly great.” Substantial , Merriam -W e bster D ictionary , https://www.m erriam -webster.com /dictionary

/substantial (last accessed Mar. 10, 2020). In Medical Assurance Co. of Mississippi v. Myers , this Court ruled,

Finally , Dr. My ers argues that because h e operated a c linic i n Holm es County , a substantial injury -causing event occurred or a ccrued in H o l mes County

. H owever, u nder the am ended statute, venue i s no longer set by where
a c a u s e o f a ction accrued. Even though Dr. My e r s claim s he was dam age d when he experienced being uninsured in Holm es County (and in Hum p hrey s, W a shing t o n, and S unf

lower counties), this could be the r esult of s u bstantial acts, om i ssions, or injury -causing events which o ccurred in Madison County alone. Following Dr. M y ers’s logic, a plain t i f f injured in an autom obile accident in M adison County could establ i s h v e n ue in every c ounty in which the plaintif

f t raveled sim

ply by showing that, in each county , his or her injuries worsened.
The venue s t a t u t e d o e s not allow t he “piling” of acts or events to establish venue. It specifically requires a s ubstantial alleged act, omission, or injury-causing event t o have happened in a particular jurisdiction in order

for
venue to be p roper there

. In Am erican Hom e Products Corp. v . Sum l in , 9 42 So. 2d 766 (Miss. 2006), the plaintif f f iled s u it against a p harm aceutical
com pany f o r injuries s u stained f

rom taking Redux. The plaintif f obtained the prescription, f

ille d i t , a n d ingested the pills in W ay ne County

. Id. at 771. However, s he f

iled s uit in Sm ith County because the e c h o c a r d iogram revealing her injuries w as p e rf

o rm ed there. Id. W hether the test w as p roperly perf orm ed
was a m ajor point of c ontention between the parties. I d

. a t 769. Nevertheless, this Court held that venue was onl y p r o p e r in W ay ne County , say ing “the perf orm ance and interpretation of an echocardiogram , alone, i s not suf f icient
so as to constitute a ‘substa n t i a l c o m ponent’ of this claim

. Likewise, any em otional d i stress or p sy chological pain resulting f rom the f indings o f an echocardiogram d oes not constitute a substantial com p onent o f the claim .” Id. at 771 (internal citations om itted). Thus, the perf o r m ance of an

1 4echocardiogram or the place where the plaintiff experienced her i njuries was

not “substantial” enough t o establish venue i n a particular county

. The sam e is t rue of the r eceipt of c orrespondence, the location of a singl e c l i n i c in a m ulti-clinic operation, or the place where D r
. M y ers “experienced” being uninsured.
Med. Assurance Co. of Miss. v. Myers , 956 So. 2d 213, 219-20 (Miss. 2 0 0 7 ) (em phasis added). ¶31. In Sharkey v. B arber , 1 88 S o. 3d 1245, 1247 (Miss. Ct. App. 2016), Judge Ishee (now
Justice Ishee of

the Mississippi Suprem e Court) wrote f or the Court of

Appeals that
the claim of civil conspiracy does not stand alone, but is d e p e n dent on conspiring to com m it a particular wrong — in this case, the i ntentional tort of assault. See Aiken v. Rim kus Consulting Grp., Inc. , 333 F. App’x 806, 8 12 (5th C ir. 2009) (per c uriam ) (citing Wells v. She l t e r G en. Ins. , 217 F. Supp. 2d 744, 755 (S.D. Miss.2002)). ¶32. F o r a c i v i l c o n s p iracy claim to lie a g ainst the def endants, we m

u st loo k t o t h e “particular w rong” or the “unlawf ul act.” Here the “particular wrong” o r the “unlawf ul act”
was the issuance o f

the writs of garnishm e nt by the chancery clerk in violation of

the stay

. This occurred in Oktibbeha County

. In m y opinion, this was t he “substantial alleged act” that gives rise to the claim s asserted by the plaintif

f s. ¶33. I agree that the f

act that the def

endants allegedly caused the writs of garnishm ent to
be served o n two banks, which occurred in Scott C ount y , w a s i n f urtherance of the conspiracy

. B u t I a m o f t h e o p inion that the service of the writs was not a signif icant or substantial act upon which the courts should base venue. ¶34. In m y o p i n i o n , t h e c ircuit judge was correct and should be af f irm ed. The judge
considered the allegations of the com plaint and deter m ined that the service of the writs of

1 5garnishm e nt in Scott County was not a “substantial alleged act” under the venue statute. I

agree.

1 6