IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 18

- 1163 Filed May 15, 2019

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

vs. DEAN DAVID GEARY , Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Patrice Eichman , District Associate Judge.

Dean Geary appeals from judgment and sentence entered upon his plea of guilty to assault causing bodily injury or mental illness. SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.

Jonathon Mu ñ oz of Nidey, Erdahl, Fisher, Pilkington & Meier PLC , Cedar Rapids , for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga , Assis tant Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, C.J. , Bower, J., and Gamble, S.J. *

* Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).2

GAMBLE , Senior Judge

. Dean Geary appeals from judgment and sentence entered upon his written plea of guilty to assault causing bodily injury or mental illness , in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2(2) (2018)

. 1 Geary contends his written plea should be set aside for failure t o substantially comply with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(d)

— he argues the district court failed to him inform him of the consequences of his plea

. However, Geary’s written guilty plea complied with the required advisor y concerning the need to fi le a motion in arrest of judgment in order to challenge his plea

. See Iowa R s . Crim. P. 2.8(2)(d) , 2.24(3)(a)

. Geary filed no motion in arrest of judgment and , thus, waived his right to challenge the guilty plea. 2 See State v. Barnes , 652 N.W.2d 466, 467

– 68 (Iowa 2002). Geary also asserts the court abused its discretion in failing to properly consider statutory factors in sentencing him. We re view the district court’s sentencing decision imposing a sentence within the statutory limitations for an ab use of discretion

. State v. Thacker , 862 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 2015). “In exercising discretion, the district court must ‘weigh all pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant’s age, character, and propensities or chances for reform.’” Id. (citation omitted). The district court must provide the reasons for its sentencing decision on the record so that “a reviewing court will be able to assess whether there has been a n abuse of discretion.” Id. at 407. “[A] ‘terse and succinct’

1 Geary waived formal reporting of the proceedings. 2 Geary raises no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Any such complaints may be raised in postconviction

- relief proceedings.3

statement may be sufficient, ‘so long as the brevity of the court’s statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.’” Id. at 408 (citation omitte d). When a defendant waives the reporting of the sentencing hearing, we look to the sufficiency of the district court’s written sentencing order. See State v. Thompson , 856 N.W.2d 915, 921 (Iowa 2014). The use of computerized sentencing forms is not imp roper so long as we are able to discern whether the court properly exercised its discretion

. See id. (“In this age of word processing, judges can use forms, such as the one available in this case, to check the boxes indicating the reasons why a judge is i mposing a certain sentence. If the choices in the order need further explanation, the judge can do so by writing on the order or adding to the order using a word processing program.”)

. Here, t he district court’s written sentencing order includes the fo llowing list rather than a series of checked boxes: Reasons for sentence: Nature of offense Plea agreement Prior record Employment Age The sentencing order does not indicate the court considered the defendant’s character, propensities , or chances for reform. Cf. Thacker , 862 N.W.2d at 405. However, there is no requirement the court recite every factor considered. See, e.g. , State v. Mathews , No. 17

- 0519, 2018 WL 2084831, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 2, 2018) (“[T]he district court need n ot specifically state every possible sentencing factor.”). Perhaps as the State argues, consideration of these factors might be inferred. However, t he brevity of the court’s sentencing order

— in4

conjunction with the lack of record from the sentencing hear ing

— impedes appellate review of the court’s exercise of discretion. Further, concerning the court’s consideration of a “ plea agreement, ” Geary ’s written guilty plea notes : “This guilty plea is entered without any agreement with the [S] tate’s attorney in r egards to the charges against me or my sentence.” T he record is devoid of any details of a plea agreement. We are left to speculate as to whether there w as a plea agreement or what terms may have been considered by the court. See Thacker , 862 N.W.2d at 410 (vacating a sentence and remanding for resentencing where the record failed to include the details of a plea agreement and, thus, it was unclear if the court was merely giving effect to the parties’ plea agreement or independently exercising its discre tion) ; see also State v. Broughton , No. 17

- 0016, 2017 WL
6513969 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2017) (remanding where the c ourt was unable to determine whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing )

. Because we are unable to determine whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in sentencing Geary , we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. SENTENCE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.