Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 29, 2019.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00443-CR

JOE DANIEL HULL, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 177th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 1505624 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

A jury found appellant guilty of indecency with a child and assessed 

punishment at forty-five years’ imprisonment. In a single issue, appellant contends 

that the trial court erred by designating the incorrect outcry witness. We affirm 

because the error, if any, was harmless. 

The “outcry” statute excludes from hearsay a child’s statements describing 

the alleged sexual offense that the child made to the first adult other than the 

defendant. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.072, § 2; Sanchez v. State, 354 
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S.W.3d 476, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). There can be only one outcry witness 

per event of sexual abuse. See Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2011). 

In this case, the trial court allowed a forensic interviewer from the 

Children’s Assessment Center to testify as the outcry witness. Appellant contends 

that the child’s mother was the first adult to whom the child described the offense, 

and thus, the trial court erred by admitting the child’s statements to the interviewer 

as the outcry witness. Assuming without deciding that the trial court erred, we hold 

that appellant was not harmed. 

Generally, the erroneous admission of hearsay under the outcry–witness 

statute is non-constitutional error. See Rosales v. State, 548 S.W.3d 796, 808 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d); Chapman v. State, 150 S.W.3d 809, 

814 & n.8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). Non-constitutional 

error regarding the admission of evidence requires reversal, i.e., is harmful, only if 

the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 

363, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Tex. R. Evid. 

103(a). Error affects substantial rights if the error had a substantial and injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373. 

If we have a fair assurance from examining the record as a whole that the error did 

not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect, we will not overturn the 

conviction. Id. Generally, error is harmless if very similar evidence is admitted 

without objection. See Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 302 n.29 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010); see also Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) 

(“It is well established that the improper admission of evidence does not constitute 

reversible error if the same facts are shown by other evidence which is not 

challenged.” (quotation omitted)). 
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In Chapman, for example, this court held that the admission of hearsay 

statements through the incorrect outcry witness was harmless because the witness’s 

testimony was cumulative of other evidence—namely, the complainant’s 

testimony, testimony from a doctor, and the doctor’s report. See 150 S.W.3d at 

814–15; see also, e.g., Rosales, 548 S.W.3d at 808–09 (harmless error from 

admission of testimony of two outcry witnesses because the same or similar 

evidence was admitted through testimony of a doctor and the complainant); Nino v. 

State, 223 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] no pet. 2007) 

(harmless error from improper designation of forensic interviewer as outcry 

witness because the child and mother provided substantially the same account of 

the offense); West v. State, 121 S.W.3d 95, 105 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. 

ref’d) (harmless error to admit hearsay from mother who was not designated as 

outcry witness because the child gave detailed testimony about the assault); Poole 

v. State, 974 S.W.2d 892, 899 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref’d) (harmless error 

to admit hearsay from mother who was not properly designated as outcry witness 

because the children gave substantially the same testimony). 

Here, the interviewer relayed the complainant’s statements: 

 The complainant said that appellant sexually abused her three 

times.

 One event was in a living room. The complainant had been 

watching “SpongeBob” on television when appellant came over to 

her, undid her pants, and touched her vagina. The complainant had 

been standing up at the time. She screamed, and appellant went 

back to washing dishes and pretended like nothing had happened. 

 One event was in the parents’ room. The complainant had been 

watching “Animal Planet,” and appellant touched her genitals 

under her clothes. 

 The touching hurt. Appellant’s hand was “hard” because he 

worked on cars. 
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The complainant testified similarly: 

 The touching happened three times. 

 One event was in the living room. The complainant had been 

watching “SpongeBob” on television while her mother was taking 

a shower. Appellant told the complainant to pull down her pants 

and underwear. He touched her private part for a few minutes. 

When the shower turned off, appellant told her to pull up her pants, 

and he went and acted like he was washing dishes. When the 

mother asked the complainant what happened, the complainant 

told her “nothing.” The living room incident was the most recent. 

 The complainant thought another event occurred in a bedroom, but 

she was not sure. The complainant was watching an “animal show” 

when appellant started touching the complainant’s private part. 

The bedroom incident happened before the living room incident. 

 The complainant could not remember details about the third 

incident because she was younger. She just remembered appellant 

touching her. 

 Appellant’s hands felt rough. 

A doctor at the Children’s Assessment Center performed an examination on 

the complainant and testified about some statements the complainant made: 

 Appellant touched the complainant’s vaginal area and buttocks 

three times. 

 The complainant described appellant reaching into the 

complainant’s pants while the complainant’s clothes were on. The 

complainant also described appellant removing the complainant’s 

pants and underwear and putting them on the floor. The physician 

did not know if the complainant was describing the same event or 

different events. 

 The touching hurt the complainant because “his hands are real 

hard.” 

The analysis in Chapman is controlling under the facts of this case. The 

complainant’s hearsay statements admitted through the interviewer’s testimony 
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were similar to the complainant’s testimony and, to a lesser degree, the doctor’s 

testimony. See, e.g., Chapman, 150 S.W.3d at 814–15

Appellant contends that the interviewer’s testimony nonetheless influenced 

the jury’s assessment of the complainant’s credibility because the interviewer (1) 

testified that she had interviewed over 800 children in her career; (2) testified that 

memory lapses were very common; and (3) emphasized her training in her 

assessment of the complainant’s truthfulness. However, the trial court’s alleged 

error of designating the interviewer as an outcry witness merely authorized the 

admission of the complainant’s statements as substantive evidence of guilt. See 

Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 806, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The interviewer’s 

testimony regarding her experience, memory lapses in children, and an assessment 

of the complainant’s truthfulness were not statements of the complainant. Thus, the 

trial court’s alleged error of designating the interviewer as an outcry witness did 

not cause the admission of testimony other than the statements of the complainant. 

Cf. Shaw v. State, 329 S.W.3d 650–52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. 

ref’d) (holding that a police officer who was not designated as an outcry witness 

could testify that the child’s actions of disclosing abuse to multiple adults was 

“appropriate”). 

Having reviewed the record, we have a fair assurance that the alleged 

error—admission of the complainant’s hearsay statements to the interviewer—did 

not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect, because very similar evidence was 

admitted elsewhere. See, e.g., Chapman,150 S.W.3d at 814–15. 

Appellant’s sole issue is overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

 

 /s/ Ken Wise 

 Justice 
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Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Hassan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).