alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
DISMISS and Opinion Filed April 3, 2019 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-01514-CV JOHN W. SMITH, Appellant V. COTTAGES AT HICKORY CROSSING, LLC, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-18-05504-E



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burns, J ustice Whitehill, and Justice Molb erg Opinion by Chief Justice Burns The docketing statement and clerk’s record in this case are pas t due. By postcard dated December 18, 2018, we informed appellant the docketing statemen t in this case was due. We cautioned appellant that failure t o file the docketing statemen t within ten days might result in the dismissal of this appeal without f urther notice. The notice was returned to the court. The clerk’s office called appellant and left a voice mail directing appella nt to update his address so that the Court could notice appellant about the case. Appellant did not respond. By letter dated February 19, 2019, we notified appellant at his last known address that the Dallas County Clerk had informed the Court that the clerk’s recor d had not been filed because ap pellant had not paid or made arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record. We directed appell ant to provide verification of payment or arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record or to pro vide written documentation–2– appellant had been found entitled to proceed without payment of costs within ten days. 1 We cautioned appellant that failure t o do so would result in the d ismissal of this appeal without further notice. To date, appellant has not filed the docketing stateme nt, provided the Court with the required documentation, updated his address, nor otherwise corr esponded with the Court regarding the status of this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this a ppeal for want of prosecution. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.3(b), (c).

181514F.P05

1 Appellant filed a statement of inability to pay costs. Our re cords do not indicate whether the statement was challenged by t he County clerk or Court Reporter. /Robert D. Burns, III/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE–3– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JOHN W. SMITH, Appellant
No. 05-18-01514-CV V. COTTAGES AT HICKORY CROSSING, LLC, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC-18-05504-E. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burns. Justices Whitehill and Molberg participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the appe al is DISMISSED

. Judgment entered April 3, 2019
CERTIFICATIONS OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERS
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Exhibit 32

                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly Report of INVVISION CAPITAL, INC., a Nevada
corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2004,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), John E.
Rea, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, does hereby certify, pursuant
to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss. 1350), that to his
knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and


(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ John E. Rea
--------------------------------
John E. Rea
Principal Executive Officer
August 16, 2004

<PAGE>

                           CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly Report of INVVISION CAPITAL, INC., a Nevada
corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2004,
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), Bruce A.
Hall, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, does hereby certify, pursuant
to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. ss. 1350), that to his
knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ Bruce A. Hall
---------------------------------
Bruce A. Hall
Principal Financial Officer
August 16, 2004

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to INVVISION CAPITAL, INC. and will be retained by INVVISION CAPITAL,
INC. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Earl Nesmith, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 866]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted *(see, People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38). (Appeal from Judgment of Monroe County Court, Bristol, J.—Attempted Murder, 2nd Degree.) Present—Green, J. P., Lawton, Hayes, Callahan and Balio, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL  INFOMRATION EXTRACTED FROM THE FILER'S
FINANCIAL  STATEMENTS  AND IS  QUALIFIED  IN ITS  ENTIRETY BY  REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                  0001088464
<NAME>                 Planetgood Technologies, Inc.
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                          5,436
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                       0
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                5,490
<PP&E>                                         22,289
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (3,588)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                117,979
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         701,973
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                   16,038,000
<OTHER-SE>                                    567,956
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  117,979
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                    0
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                       0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              302,361
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              7,597
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (309,958)
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (309,958)
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (309,958)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.03)



</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-7083

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BROOKS JAMES TERRELL, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge. (CR-99-610-HMH; CA-05-1379-HMH) Submitted: September 29, 2005 Decided: October 11, 2005 Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Brooks James Terrell, Appellant Pro Se. David Calhoun Stephens, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Brooks James Terrell seeks to appeal the district court order dismissing his motion for relief from indictment as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000); Reid v. Angelone , 369 F.3d 363, 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. SeeMiller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Terrell has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. Additionally, we construe Terrell’s notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v. Winestock , 340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, a prisoner must assert claims- 3 - based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review, or (2) newly discovered evidence, not previously discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2), 2255 (2000). Terrell’s claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
**EXHIBIT 31.01**

 

I, Scott J. Hammack, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K for CyberGuard Corporation; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting. 

 

Date:  October 23, 2003
[Nos. 66716-5-I; 66717-3-I; 66718-1-I; 66719-0-I.

Division One.

November 13, 2012.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Aaron Andre Johnson, Jr., *Appellant.*

Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 09-1-06842-5, Susan J. Craighead, J., entered January 10, 2011. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per

Lau, J.,

concurred in by Grosse and Cox, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3325 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3325

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 29, 2009

     Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To amend title XI of the Social Security Act to reauthorize for 1 year 
the Work Incentives Planning and Assistance program and the Protection 
       and Advocacy for Beneficiaries of Social Security program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``WIPA and PABSS Reauthorization Act 
of 2009''.

SEC. 2. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE WORK INCENTIVES PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE 
              PROGRAM.

    Section 1149(d) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320b-20(d)) 
is amended by striking ``2009'' and inserting ``2010''.

SEC. 3. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR 
              BENEFICIARIES OF SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM.

    Section 1150(h) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320b-21(h)) 
is amended by striking ``2009'' and inserting ``2010''.

            Passed the House of Representatives July 28, 2009.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### In the Matter of Geraldine Dorosky, Appellant, v Vaughn L. Herald, Respondent.

[861 NYS2d 124]

In a child support proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the mother appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Family Court, Orange County (Bivona, J.), entered October 12, 2006, as, in effect, sustained the father’s objections to an order of the same court (Patsalos, S.M.), entered July 13, 2006, which, after a hearing, granted her petitions to enforce the father’s child support obligation as set forth in a judgment of divorce dated May 17, 1999, and for an upward modification of that child support obligation, and vacated the order entered July 13, 2006.

*830Ordered that the order entered October 12, 2006 is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and the facts, without costs or disbursements, the father’s objections are denied, and the order entered July 13, 2006 is reinstated.

The parties were divorced by judgment dated May 17, 1999. Pursuant to the judgment of divorce, which incorporated but did not merge an earlier stipulation, “[t]he parties . . . voluntarily agreed to child support for the minor issue of the marriage payable . . . through [the father’s] Social Security Disability to each child in the amount of $172.00 per month, per child.” In 2006 the mother filed petitions to enforce the father’s child support obligation as set forth in the judgment of divorce and for an upward modification of that child support obligation. After a hearing, the Support Magistrate, by order entered July 13, 2006, granted the mother’s petitions. Thereafter, the father filed objections to the Support Magistrate’s findings and, upon review, the Family Court, by order entered October 12, 2006, in effect, sustained the father’s objections and vacated the Support Magistrate’s order. The mother appeals.

Although parties are permitted to “opt out” of the requirements of the Child Support Standards Act (hereinafter the CSSA) *(see*Family Ct Act § 413 [1] [h]), that decision must be made “knowingly” *(Matter of Schaller v Schaller,*279 AD2d 525, 526, 527 [2001]). Compliance with the CSSA guidelines requires “that the parties have been fully informed of the provisions of the statute, and of how the guidelines would operate in their individual circumstances” *(Matter of Bill v Bill,*214 AD2d 84, 90-91 [1995]). Here, there is no indication that the mother knew, inter alia, that “[a] dependent child’s Social Security benefits are . . . not intended to displace the obligation” of the father to support his children *(Matter of Graby v Graby,*87 NY2d 605, 611 [1996]) or that Social Security benefits would be payable only until the dependent children reached the age of 18. Accordingly, under the facts of this case, the Support Magistrate properly granted the mother’s petitions, and the Support Magistrate’s order entered July 13, 2006 must be reinstated. Rivera, J.P, Fisher, Lifson and Dillon, JJ., concur.
IB 

House Calendar No. 117 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3305 

[Report No. 111–286] 

To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located 

at 224 South Boulder Avenue in Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the ‘‘H. Dale 

Cook Federal Building and United States Courthouse’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 23, 2009 

Mr. SULLIVAN (for himself, Mr. LUCAS, Mr. BOREN, Mr. COLE, and Ms. 

FALLIN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

OCTOBER 6, 2009 

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3305 RH

A BILL 

To designate the Federal building and United States courthouse located at 224 South Boulder Avenue in Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, as the ‘‘H. Dale Cook Federal Building and 

United States Courthouse’’. 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 3305 RH

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION. 

4 The Federal building and United States courthouse 

5 located at 224 South Boulder Avenue in Tulsa, Oklahoma, 

6 shall be known and designated as the ‘‘H. Dale Cook Fed7 eral Building and United States Courthouse’’. 

8 SEC. 2. REFERENCES. 

9 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 

10 paper, or other record of the United States to the Federal 

11 building and United States courthouse referred to in sec12 tion 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘H. Dale 

13 Cook Federal Building and United States Courthouse’’. 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
House Calendar No. 117 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3305 

[Report No. 111–286] 

A BILL 

To designate the Federal building and United 

house’’. Cook Federal Building and United States CourtAvenue in Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the ‘‘H. Dale States courthouse located at 224 South Boulder 

OCTOBER 6, 2009 

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 

printed 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
EX-99.j

INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT

To the Shareholders and Board of Directors of AMCON Distributing Company:

In our opinion, the accompanying consolidated statements of income and
shareholders' equity and comprehensive income and of cash flows present
fairly, in all material respects, the consolidated results of operations and
cash flows of AMCON Distributing Company and its subsidiaries for the year
ended September 29, 2000, in conformity with accounting principles generally
accepted in the United States of America.  These financial statements are
the responsibility of the Company's management; our responsibility is to
express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audit.  We
conducted our audit of these statements in accordance with auditing
standards generally accepted in the United States of America, which require
that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about
whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement.  An
audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts
and disclosures in the financial statements, assessing the accounting
principles used and significant estimates made by management, and evaluating
the overall financial statement presentation.  We believe that our audit
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.


PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP
Omaha, Nebraska
November 22, 2000, except for paragraph 1
 of Note 1 and paragraph 10 of Note 2,
 for which the date is March 23, 2001
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OFWASHINGTON, 

## ) No. 77060-8-I

Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. 

## )

) EARL IRA BOWMAN, 

## ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

## ) Appellant. 

## ) FILED: April 15, 2019

PER CURIAM. Earl Ira Bowman appealsthetrial court’s orderdenying his “requestto recall NCO” entered as part ofthejudgment and sentence imposed upon his conviction of assault in the third degree. His court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw on the ground thatthere is no basisfora good faith argument on review. Pursuantto State v. Theobald, 78 Wn.2d 184, 470 P.2d 188 (1970), and Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), the motion to withdraw must: (1) be accompanied bya brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. (2) A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and (3) time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; (4) the court—not counsel—then proceeds, afterafull examination of all the proceedings, to decide whetherthe case is whollyfrivolous. Theobald, 78 Wn.2d at 185 (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). This procedure has been followed. Bowman’s counsel on appeal filed a briefwith the motion to withdraw. Bowman was served with a copyofthe briefNo. 77060-8-1/2

and informed of his righttofile a statement ofadditional grounds for review. Bowman has notfiled a statement ofadditional grounds. The material facts are accuratelysetforth in counsel’s brief in support of the motion to withdraw. The court has reviewed the briefs filed in this court and has independently reviewed the entire record. The court specifically considered the following potential issues raised by counsel: 1. Did the trial court err in refusing to modifythejudgment and sentence by striking the no-contactorder? 2. Was Bowman denied due process and equal protection as a result ofthe court’s ruling? The potential issues are whollyfrivolous. Counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted and the appeal is dismissed.

FOR THE COURT:

A1~