Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-14-00619-CR

Rudy MARTINEZ,

Appellant

v.

The State 

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Gillespie County, Texas

Trial Court No. 4957

Honorable Stephen B. Ables, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Jason Pulliam, Justice

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Karen Angelini, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 14, 2015

AFFIRMED

BACKGROUND

Appellant Rudy Martinez was charged by indictment with the felony offense of family 

violence-assault by choking or strangulation. In February 2011, Martinez entered a plea agreement 

with the State in which he pled nolo contendre to this charge. As part of the plea agreement, 

Martinez stipulated that he had been previously convicted and imprisoned for prior felonies. This 

stipulation effectively enhanced the range of punishment to a minimum of twenty-five years’ 
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imprisonment. Under the plea agreement, Martinez was placed on ten years’ deferred adjudication 

with certain required conditions. 

On December 31, 2012, the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt alleging Martinez 

violated multiple conditions of his deferred adjudication. The State subsequently amended its 

motion to adjudicate five times to assert additional violations. The trial court held an evidentiary 

hearing on the State’s motion on July 17, 2014. Martinez pled not true to each alleged violation 

in the State’s motion. After presentation of evidence, the trial court found all the violations alleged 

in the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt to be true, adjudicated Martinez guilty and sentenced him 

to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Martinez perfected this appeal. We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a proceeding to revoke deferred adjudication, the State has the burden of proving by a 

preponderance of evidence that the defendant violated the terms of his deferred adjudication. Cobb 

v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Torres v. State, 103 S.W.3d 623, 625 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) To meet this burden of proof, the greater weight of the evidence 

must create a reasonable belief that the defendant violated a condition of the deferred adjudication

as alleged. Battle v. State, 571 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Torres, 103 

S.W.3d at 625. In reviewing the trial court’s revocation of an appellant’s deferred adjudication, 

an appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Torres, 103 S.W.3d at 625. The appellate court reviews the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the trial court’s order. Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. Crim.

App. [Panel Op.] 1979); Torres, 103 S.W.3d at 625. The trial court is the sole judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses. Jones v. State, 589 S.W.2d at 421; Torres, 103 S.W.3d at 625. If the 

State fails to meet its burden of proof, the trial court abuses its discretion in revoking the deferred 
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adjudication. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Reasor v. State, 

281 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. ref’d). Proof of a single violation of a 

condition of deferred adjudication is sufficient to support a trial court’s order of revocation. Moore 

v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Reasor, 281 S.W.3d at 134.

ANALYSIS

Issue Four: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding Martinez violated 

condition (d) of his deferred adjudication.

In his fourth issue on appeal, Martinez contends the trial court abused its discretion by 

finding Martinez violated conditions (d) and (e) by failing to report to his probation officer as 

ordered from December 2013 through May 2014. Martinez argues the evidence presented at the 

evidentiary hearing was insufficient to prove he violated the conditions requiring him to report to 

his probation officer. Specifically, Martinez argues the State failed to present any evidence that 

he was ordered to report to his probation officer for those months.

The terms of Martinez’s deferred adjudication included the following two conditions 

related to the requirement that Martinez report to his probation officer:

(d) Report to the Probation Officer at the Probation Office immediately, and 

thereafter monthly beginning no later than thirty (30) days from the date hereof; 

(e) Report to the Probation Officer (in addition to the reporting required by (d) 

above), when, where, and in the manner as may hereafter be ordered by the Court 

through the Probation Officer.

The record indicates Martinez acknowledged and received a copy of these conditions when he was 

placed on deferred adjudication. 

In its motion to adjudicate, the State alleged Martinez violated condition (d) of his deferred 

adjudication by failing to “[r]eport as directed by the Probation Officer. The Probationer failed to 

report as ordered for the months of December, 2013, January, February, March, April, and May 
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2014.”1 At the evidentiary hearing, the State presented the testimony of Probation Officer Kenny 

Bode. Officer Bode became Martinez’s probation officer in March of 2012. Officer Bode testified 

that Martinez did not report in December 2013 and had not reported at all during 2014. Martinez 

did not present any evidence refuting Officer Bode’s testimony.

In arguing the State failed to prove he was ordered to report for the months alleged in the 

motion to adjudicate, Martinez relies on Rodriguez v. State, 2 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). In Rodriguez, the terms of the defendant’s community supervision 

required the defendant to report to his probation officer on the 6th of each month or on a date 

agreed upon by the defendant and the probation officer. Id. at 746. In its motion to revoke the 

defendant’s community supervision, the State alleged the defendant did not report as directed for 

three specific dates, none of which were the 6th of any month. Id. at 749. At the hearing on the 

motion to revoke, the State did not present any evidence which established the defendant and the 

probation officer agreed that the defendant was to report on those specific dates. Id. Because the 

State failed to prove such an agreement, the court of appeals concluded the State had not met its 

burden of proving the defendant was required to appear on the dates alleged in the motion to 

revoke. Id.

The facts in this case are distinguishable from those in Rodriguez. Thus, the holding in 

Rodriguez is inapplicable. Here, the terms of Martinez’s deferred adjudication did not require 

Martinez to report on a specific day of the month, nor did the State allege Martinez violated the 

conditions of deferred adjudication by failing to report on a specific date. Based upon the language 

used in condition (d), the State was not required to prove a specific date which Martinez failed to 

 1 In its motion to adjudicate guilt, the State alleged conditions (d) and (e) together. The trial court, in its order, adopted 

the language of the State’s motion and found violations of both conditions (d) and (e) occurred. This court’s analysis 

will focus on the allegations and evidence presented related to Martinez’s failure to report to his probation officer 

monthly as required by condition (d).
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report to his probation officer, but was required to prove Martinez did not report “monthly.” The 

State presented evidence Martinez violated condition (d) by failing to report to his probation 

officer between December 2013 and May 2014. 

As discussed, Probation Officer Bode testified Martinez had not reported to him for seven 

consecutive months, beginning in December 2013 and ending in June 2014. Because this 

testimony was the only evidence presented on this point, through Officer Bode’s testimony the 

State satisfied its burden to establish through the great weight of the evidence a reasonable belief 

Martinez violated condition (d) by failing to report to the Probation Office monthly. See Cobb,

851 S.W.2d at 874; Torres, 103 S.W.3d at 625. 

Because the State satisfied its burden of proof to show Martinez violated condition (d) of 

his deferred adjudication, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking his deferred 

adjudication. Accordingly, Martinez’s fourth issue on appeal is overruled.

Issue Twelve: Whether the trial court erred by admitting Martinez’s medical records into 

evidence.

In Martinez’s twelfth issue on appeal, he contends the trial court erred by admitting 

Martinez’s medical records in violation of his right to privacy afforded him under the Health 

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502. 

Martinez argues the State obtained his medical records in violation of the provisions of HIPAA 

and, for that reason, the records should have been excluded as evidence obtained in violation of 

the laws of the United States. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23 (West 2005).

To prove its allegation that Martinez used illegal drugs in violation of condition (o) of his 

deferred adjudication, the State admitted into evidence a copy of Martinez’s medical records 

authenticated by a business records affidavit. Assuming, arguendo, the trial court abused its 

discretion by admitting Martinez’s medical records and this abuse would result in reversal of the 
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trial court’s revocation based upon condition (o), this error is inconsequential based upon the trial 

court’s appropriate and valid revocation based upon condition (d). As discussed, the State proved 

by a preponderance of the evidence that Martinez violated condition (d) of his deferred 

adjudication. Because proof of a single violation of conditions is sufficient to support a trial court’s 

revocation of a defendant’s deferred adjudication, the proof Martinez violated condition (d), 

standing alone, supports the revocation of Martinez’s deferred adjudication. See Moore v. State, 

605 S.W.2d at 926; Reasor, 281 S.W.3d at 134. The State’s use of Martinez’s medical records did 

not pertain to Martinez’s violation of condition (d). Therefore, Martinez’s twelfth issue is 

overruled.

Further, because proof of a single violation is sufficient to uphold the trial court’s judgment 

revoking deferred adjudication, this court need not address Martinez’s remaining issues—

numbered 1 to 3 and 5 to 11—which relate to the other violations of conditions of Martinez’s 

deferred adjudication. 

CONCLUSION

Because the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Martinez violated 

condition (d) of his deferred adjudication, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by adjudicating 

him guilty and revoking his deferred adjudication. See Torres, 103 S.W.3d at 625. For the 

foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment revoking Martinez’s deferred 

adjudication.

Jason Pulliam, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH