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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ISMAIL H.

ABDUS-SABUR

(AC 41515)

Keller, Prescott and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crimes of murder and criminal possession

of a firearm in connection with the shooting death of the victim, the

defendant appealed to this court. He claimed, inter alia, that that there

was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction because the

state did not establish that he had the specific intent to cause the death

of the victim. Held:

1. The defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to prove the

specific intent element necessary to support his murder conviction was

unavailing: the jury reasonably could have inferred from the evidence

and testimony that the defendant had the requisite intent to kill, as an

intent to kill could have been inferred from his use of a deadly weapon

when he repeatedly shot a firearm into a group of people who were

standing together within a close range, striking and killing the victim,

and the shooting followed an altercation earlier in the night between

the defendant and the victim’s two sons and, thus, the defendant had

a motive to seek retribution; moreover, there was evidence of the defendant’s conduct after the shooting from which the jury could have inferred

an intent to kill, as the defendant threatened the victim’s sons the day

after the shooting, and the defendant displayed a consciousness of guilt

by immediately fleeing the scene following the shooting, travelling out

of town the following day, and leaving the state later that week.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the court improperly

denied his request for a third-party culpability instruction, as the defendant did not establish a direct connection between the third party, C,

and the offense with which the defendant was charged; the only evidence

before the jury suggesting that C was the shooter was the testimony of

a witness that another person had told her that C was the shooter, which

was admitted as a prior inconsistent statement for the sole purpose of

impeaching the witness, and defense counsel conceded at oral argument

before this court that there was no evidence regarding C’s culpability

that was admitted for substantive proposes.

3. The defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

into evidence testimony regarding the defendant’s alleged gang affiliation, which he claimed constituted improper uncharged misconduct

evidence, was not reviewable; the defendant failed to address in his

principal or reply brief to this court how the allegedly improper admission of the uncharged misconduct evidence constituted harmful error,

and although he addressed the prejudicial effect of the uncharged misconduct evidence in his principal brief, prejudicial effect and harmful

error are not necessarily equivalent and must be briefed separately.

Argued February 11—officially released June 18, 2019

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of murder, manslaughter in the first degree

with a firearm, and criminal possession of a firearm,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Waterbury and tried to the jury before Cremins, J.;

thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s motion for

a judgment of acquittal as to the count of murder; verdict and judgment of guilty of murder and criminal

possession of a firearm, from which the defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Jodi Zils Gagne ́, for the appellant (defendant).
Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s attorney, and Cynthia S. Serafini and Don E. Therkildsen,

Jr., senior assistant state’s attorneys, for the appellee

(state).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. The defendant, Ismail H. Abdus-Sabur,

appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after

a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes

§ 53a-54a and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217 (a) (1). The defendant

claims on appeal that (1) there was insufficient evidence

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed

the specific intent to kill, as required for the crime of

murder, (2) the trial court improperly denied his request

for a third-party culpability instruction, and (3) that

the court improperly admitted evidence of his gang

affiliation. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The facts, as could have been reasonably found by

the jury, and procedural history, are as follows. On the

evening of January 17, 2014, the defendant was at an

apartment on the third floor of a Waterbury housing

complex known as ‘‘Brick City.’’ The defendant’s

friends, Arvaughn Clemente and Daniel Clinton, were

hosting a house party at the apartment. The defendant’s

brother, Isa Abdus-Sabur (Isa), and Ryan Curry, Sthalron Freeman, and Katrina Montgomery were also in

attendance. Clemente was dating Ja-Ki Calloway, who

was also in the apartment. Calloway’s father, Kareem

Morey, Sr. (victim), rented a second floor apartment in

the same complex, where he resided with his adult son,

Kareem Morey, Jr. (Kareem). On the evening of January

17, 2014, his other son, Kentrell Morey, was also at the

housing complex.

That night, Calloway’s brother, Kareem learned that

Clemente had assaulted Calloway, and became angry.

Kareem and Kentrell then presented themselves at the

third floor apartment and demanded that Calloway

leave the apartment, but she refused. Kareem wanted to

fight Clemente for having assaulted his sister. A verbal

altercation then ensued between the Morey brothers

and the men inside the apartment, which spilled onto

the landing outside the apartment. The altercation escalated into a fist fight between a number of the party

attendees and the Morey brothers.

After the fight ended, the Morey brothers, upset by the

altercation, left and walked to a nearby neighborhood

to recruit additional people to renew the fight. They

also called the victim, who had not been present at the

initial altercation, and he informed them that he would

return home. When the Morey brothers left, the partygoers returned to the third floor apartment. At this

point, Montgomery overheard the defendant mention a

gun to the other men at the party.

At about 10:30 p.m., the Morey brothers returned to

Brick City with four additional men. Around this time,

the victim also returned and parked his car on the street

outside of the housing complex. The Morey brothers
then entered the interior courtyard of Brick City

through a passage from the street and climbed the stairs

to the landing outside of Clemente and Clinton’s third

floor apartment. The victim remained standing at

ground level in the courtyard near the foot of the stairs.

The Morey brothers began kicking Clemente and Clinton’s apartment door. Eventually, the door to the apartment opened, but all the lights were off inside the

apartment. Shortly thereafter, Kareem heard the ‘‘click,

click’’ sound of a gun. The Morey brothers then fled by

descending the stairs toward the courtyard.

As the Morey brothers retreated down the stairs, the

occupants of Clemente and Clinton’s apartment

emerged onto the third floor landing overlooking the

courtyard. Within the crowd on the third floor porch

were the defendant, Isa, Clemente, Clinton, Curry, and

Freeman. The defendant then began firing a black handgun from the railing of the landing toward the people

in the courtyard below.

By the time the defendant started shooting, the Morey

brothers had arrived at the bottom of the stairs, where

the victim was standing. When the victim heard the first

gunshot, he pushed Kareem out of the way. The victim

was then struck in the chest with a .45 caliber bullet.

He told his sons that he had been hit and ran out of

the courtyard through the passage toward his parked

vehicle. The victim was driven to St. Mary’s Hospital

in Waterbury, where he later died as a result of the

gunshot wound to his chest.

Following the shooting, the defendant and Isa ran to

the defendant’s car and left Brick City. The next day,

the defendant and Isa pulled up in a sports utility vehicle

alongside Kentrell’s girlfriend, Zyaira Cummings, while

she was walking on a street near Brick City. The defendant then said to Cummings, ‘‘they’re next,’’ which she

interpreted to be a threat against the Morey brothers,

whom she then warned about the interaction. On January 18, 2014, the day after the shooting, the defendant

fled to Southington. On January 21, 2014, the defendant

traveled to New York City. That same day, the police

obtained a warrant for his arrest. The defendant eventually turned himself in on January 27, 2014.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of

murder and criminal possession of a firearm. The court

sentenced the defendant to forty-five years of incarceration for his conviction of murder and two years of

concurrent incarceration for his conviction of criminal

possession of a firearm, for a total effective sentence of

forty-five years of incarceration. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the specific intent to cause the death of the

victim.1 We disagree.
The following additional procedural history is relevant to this claim. At the close of the state’s evidence,

the defendant made a motion for a judgment of acquittal, contending that the evidence was insufficient to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to

cause the death of the victim. Specifically, defense

counsel argued that the evidence that the defendant

possessed and fired a firearm was insufficient to establish the requisite intent to cause the death of the victim.

The court denied the defendant’s motion.

‘‘The standard of review we apply to a claim of insufficient evidence is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction

we apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.

Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom

the [finder of fact] reasonably could have concluded

that the cumulative force of the evidence established

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

‘‘We note that the jury must find every element proven

beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the

basic and inferred facts underlying those conclusions

need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .

If it is reasonable and logical for the jury to conclude

that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is

permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider

it in combination with other proven facts in determining

whether the cumulative effect of all the evidence proves

the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime

charged beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perkins, 271

Conn. 218, 246, 856 A.2d 917 (2004).

‘‘Because [t]he only kind of an inference recognized

by the law is a reasonable one [however] . . . any such

inference cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or

conjecture. . . . It is axiomatic, therefore, that [a]ny

[inference] drawn must be rational and founded upon

the evidence. . . . [T]he line between permissible

inference and impermissible speculation is not always

easy to discern. When we infer, we derive a conclusion

from proven facts because such considerations as experience, or history, or science have demonstrated that

there is a likely correlation between those facts and the

conclusion. If that correlation is sufficiently compelling,

the inference is reasonable. But if the correlation

between the facts and the conclusion is slight, or if a

different conclusion is more closely correlated with the

facts than the chosen conclusion, the inference is less

reasonable. At some point, the link between the facts

and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it

speculation. When that point is reached is, frankly, a

matter of judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 93, 836 A.2d 224
(2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S. Ct. 1614, 158

L. Ed. 2d 254 (2004).

‘‘Moreover, it does not diminish the probative force

of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of

evidence that is circumstantial rather than direct. . . .

It is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts which establishes guilt in a case involving

substantial circumstantial evidence. . . . In evaluating

evidence, the [finder] of fact is not required to accept

as dispositive those inferences that are consistent with

the defendant’s innocence. . . . The [finder of fact]

may draw whatever inferences from the evidence or

facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . .

‘‘[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable

doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt

. . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require

acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by

the defendant that, had it been found credible by the

[finder of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal.

. . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether

there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports

the [finder of fact’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Perkins,

supra, 271 Conn. 246–47.

‘‘[I]t is well settled that the specific intent to kill is

an essential element of the crime of murder. To act

intentionally, the defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of the victim. . . .

Because direct evidence of the accused’s state of mind

is rarely available . . . intent is often inferred from

conduct . . . and from the cumulative effect of the

circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences

drawn therefrom. . . . Intent to cause death may be

inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner in

which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the

events leading to and immediately following the death.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bennett,

307 Conn. 758, 780, 59 A.3d 221 (2013).

Finally, ‘‘transporting a deadly weapon to the location

where that weapon ultimately is used supports an inference of an intent to kill.’’ State v. Otto, 305 Conn. 51,

71, 43 A.3d 629 (2012). Moreover, ‘‘an intent to kill can

be inferred merely from the use of a deadly weapon

on another person.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v.

McClam, 44 Conn. App. 198, 210, 689 A.2d 475, cert.

denied, 240 Conn. 912, 690 A.2d 400 (1997). ‘‘One who

uses a deadly weapon upon a vital part of another will

be deemed to have intended the probable result of that

act, and from such a circumstance a proper inference

may be drawn in some cases that there was an intent

to kill. . . . A pistol . . . or gun is a deadly weapon

per se.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 72, 621

A.2d 728 (1993).

In the present case, the jury was presented with evidence that the defendant repeatedly shot a firearm into

a group of people who were standing together within

a close range, striking and killing the victim. Therefore,

an intent to kill can be inferred based solely on the

defendant’s use of a deadly weapon on another person.

Moreover, even if Kareem was the intended target, the

fact that the defendant struck the victim does not undermine the existence of the necessary specific intent to

cause the death of another person. See State v. Gary,

273 Conn. 393, 411–12, 869 A.2d 1236 (2005) (defendant

who, under chaotic circumstances, shot bystander

rather than intended target possessed intent to kill).

‘‘The doctrine of transferred intent operates to render

a defendant culpable of the murder of a third person

when the defendant causes the death of that third person with the intent to cause the death of someone else.

. . . The principle, which is reflected in the express

language of § 53a–54a (a),2

represents a policy determination by the legislature that a defendant who engages

in such conduct is no less culpable than if he had killed

his intended victim.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote

added.) State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 719, 998

A.2d 1 (2010).

Furthermore, the events leading to and immediately

following the victim’s death support a finding that the

defendant possessed the intent to kill. The shooting

followed an altercation earlier in the night between

the partygoers, including the defendant and the Morey

brothers. Accordingly, the defendant had a motive to

seek retribution. See State v. Gary, supra, 273 Conn.

407 (evidence that defendant had been involved in altercation with intended victim on night of murder, and

intended victim had punched defendant, supported

inference that defendant had motive to kill).

Additionally, there was evidence that the defendant

fled the scene directly after the shooting, travelled out

of town the next day, and travelled out of state later

that week. These facts are indicia of an intent to kill.

See State v. Melendez, 74 Conn. App. 215, 223 n.5, 811

A.2d 261 (2002) (‘‘[T]he defendant’s fleeing the scene

[of the murder] and subsequent flight to Puerto Rico

are evidence of his consciousness of guilt. ‘We have in

the past considered consciousness of guilt evidence as

part of the evidence from which a jury may draw an

inference of an intent to kill.’ ’’), cert. denied, 262 Conn.

951, 817 A.2d 111 (2003). Finally, there was evidence

that the defendant threatened the Morey brothers the

day after the murder by stating ‘‘they’re next’’ to Cummings. This evidence further supports the conclusion

that the defendant had the specific intent to kill.

In sum, from the cumulative weight of this evidence,

the jury reasonably could have concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the specific intent required for murder. Accordingly, we reject

the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly

denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal.

II

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

denied his request for a third-party culpability instruction. We disagree.

The following facts are relevant to this claim. Nunez,

who lived in Brick City and was present at the shooting,

identified the defendant as the shooter on several occasions during her testimony. Nunez also stated that she

did not see anyone other than the defendant with a gun.

Nunez was impeached, however, by a prior inconsistent

statement that she admitted she had made to her friend,

Queyla Martinez, that she did not see the shooter. She

also testified that Kareem told her that Clinton was

the shooter.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the

trial, the court instructed the jury that the testimony

of Nunez, Kareem, and Martinez given on December 7,

2016, that related to whether Clinton was the shooter

was not substantive evidence in the case but, instead,

could be considered only for impeachment purposes.3

Following closing arguments, but before the court

charged the jury, defense counsel, contending that Clinton was the actual shooter on the night of the incident,

requested a jury charge on third-party culpability. Specifically, defense counsel relied on testimony from

Nunez that Kareem had told her that Clinton was the

shooter.4

The court denied the request for a third-party culpability instruction. After the court charged the jury,

defense counsel took an exception to the charge and

renewed his request for a third-party culpability charge.

The state argued that it would be inappropriate to give

such a charge because the only evidence before the

jury suggesting that Clinton was the shooter was admitted for impeachment purposes only. The court again

declined to instruct the jury on third-party culpability,

stating that there must be more than a mere suspicion

that Clinton was the shooter, and that there was no

substantive evidence that Clinton was the shooter in

this case.

On appeal, defense counsel conceded during oral

argument that there was no evidence regarding Clinton’s culpability that was admitted for substantive purposes.5 Moreover, the defendant does not challenge on

appeal the court’s decision limiting the testimony to

impeachment purposes only.

‘‘In determining whether the trial court improperly

refused a request to charge, [w]e . . . review the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to
supporting the . . . proposed charge. . . . A request

to charge which is relevant to the issues of [a] case and

which is an accurate statement of the law must be given.

. . . If, however, the evidence would not reasonably

support a finding of the particular issue, the trial court

has a duty not to submit it to the jury. . . . Thus, a

trial court should instruct the jury in accordance with

a party’s request to charge [only] if the proposed instructions are reasonably supported by the evidence. . . .

‘‘It is well established that a defendant has a right to

introduce evidence that indicates that someone other

than the defendant committed the crime with which

the defendant has been charged. . . . The defendant

must, however, present evidence that directly connects

a third party to the crime. . . . It is not enough to show

that another had the motive to commit the crime . . .

nor is it enough to raise a bare suspicion that some

other person may have committed the crime of which

the defendant is accused. . . .

‘‘The admissibility of evidence of third party culpability is governed by the rules relating to relevancy. . . .

Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is material to the

determination of the proceeding more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence. . . .

Accordingly, in explaining the requirement that the

proffered evidence establish a direct connection to a

third party, rather than raise merely a bare suspicion

regarding a third party, we have stated: Such evidence

is relevant, exculpatory evidence, rather than merely

tenuous evidence of third party culpability [introduced

by a defendant] in an attempt to divert from himself

the evidence of guilt. . . . In other words, evidence

that establishes a direct connection between a third

party and the charged offense is relevant to the central

question before the jury, namely, whether a reasonable

doubt exists as to whether the defendant committed the

offense. Evidence that would raise only a bare suspicion

that a third party, rather than the defendant, committed

the charged offense would not be relevant to the jury’s

determination. A trial court’s decision, therefore, that

third party culpability evidence proffered by the defendant is admissible, necessarily entails a determination

that the proffered evidence is relevant to the jury’s

determination of whether a reasonable doubt exists as

to the defendant’s guilt. . . .

‘‘[I]f the evidence pointing to a third party’s culpability, taken together and considered in the light most

favorable to the defendant, establishes a direct connection between the third party and the charged offense,

rather than merely raising a bare suspicion that another

could have committed the crime, a trial court has a duty

to submit an appropriate charge to the jury.’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 607–10, 935
A.2d 975 (2007).

In the present case, there simply was no evidence

that tended to establish a direct connection between

Clinton and the charged offense. The defendant cites

only to testimony by Nunez that she had told Martinez

that she did not know the identity of the shooter, and

that she had heard from Kareem that Clinton was the

shooter. Importantly, this testimony was not admitted

for its truth, but rather only to assess the credibility of

the witnesses’ testimony. Defense counsel conceded

at oral argument before this court that there was no

substantive evidence that Clinton was the shooter. See

footnote 5 of this opinion. Accordingly, we conclude

that the court properly determined that the defendant

was not entitled to a jury instruction on third-party culpability.

III

Finally, the defendant claims that the court abused

its discretion by permitting Nunez and Kareem to testify

regarding the defendant’s gang affiliation. In particular,

the defendant argues that this evidence was improperly

permitted because it constituted uncharged misconduct

and did not fall within one of the exceptions provided

by § 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence.6 Moreover, the defendant argues that the evidence was unduly

prejudicial and that its prejudicial effect outweighed its

probative value. We decline to reach this claim because

the defendant failed to brief whether the admission of

this testimony constituted harmful error. Accordingly,

we deem the claim abandoned.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of this claim. Prior to

trial, the state filed a notice of uncharged misconduct

evidence, indicating that it intended to present evidence

of the defendant’s gang affiliation. The defendant

objected to admission of such evidence, and the court

deferred ruling on the evidentiary issue. Thereafter,

prior to the start of trial, the court directed that, until

it had ruled on an offer of proof outside the jury’s

presence, witnesses were not to mention the defendant’s gang affiliation. The court stated that it would

consider each offer of each witness’ testimony individually, and would not make a blanket ruling on the issue.

At trial, during Nunez’ direct examination, the state

asked for the jury to be excused and, outside the jury’s

presence, notified the court that it anticipated asking

Nunez about the defendant’s gang affiliation. The state

then examined Nunez outside the presence of the jury,

where she stated that she had not reported the shooting

to the police on the night it occurred because she was

afraid ‘‘that somebody would do something to [her].’’

When asked who she meant by ‘‘somebody,’’ she replied,

‘‘the Bloods.’’ After hearing this proffer, the court ruled

that it would allow the examination, but that it would
provide a limiting instruction. The jury returned and

the prosecutor elicited the proffered testimony from

the witness that implied that the defendant was a member of the Bloods.7

Kareem also testified that the defendant was in a

gang. There was a proffer of this testimony outside the

presence of the jury before it was admitted. At the

request of defense counsel, when the prosecutor questioned the witness he specifically used a transcript of

the approved questions from the proffer.

We now turn to the relevant law. ‘‘Evidence of a

defendant’s uncharged misconduct is inadmissible to

prove that the defendant committed the charged crime

or to show the predisposition of the defendant to commit the charged crime. . . . Exceptions to this rule

have been recognized, however, to render misconduct

evidence admissible if, for example, the evidence is

offered to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, a system of criminal activity or the elements of a crime. . . .

To determine whether evidence of prior misconduct

falls within an exception to the general rule prohibiting

its admission, we have adopted a two-pronged analysis.

. . . First, the evidence must be relevant and material

to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by

the exceptions. Second, the probative value of such

evidence must outweigh the prejudicial effect of the

other crime evidence. . . . [Because] the admission of

uncharged misconduct evidence is a decision within

the discretion of the trial court, we will draw every

reasonable presumption in favor of the trial court’s

ruling. . . . We will reverse a trial court’s decision only

[if] it has abused its discretion or an injustice has

occurred. . . .

‘‘It is well settled that, absent structural error, the

mere fact that a trial court rendered an improper ruling

does not entitle the party challenging that ruling to

obtain a new trial. An improper ruling must also be

harmful to justify such relief. . . . It is a fundamental

rule of appellate review of evidentiary rulings that if

[the] error is not of constitutional dimensions, an appellant has the burden of establishing that there has been

an erroneous ruling [that] was probably harmful to him.

. . . We do not reach the merits of [a] claim [if] the

defendant has not briefed how he was harmed by the

allegedly improper evidentiary ruling.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Toro,

172 Conn. App. 810, 815–17, 162 A.3d 63, cert. denied,

327 Conn. 905, 170 A.3d 2 (2017)

‘‘[W]hether [an improper ruling] is harmless in a particular case depends upon a number of factors, such

as the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative,

the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or

contradicting the testimony of the witness on material

points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise per-
mitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. . . . Most importantly, we must examine

the impact of the . . . evidence on the trier of fact and

the result of the trial. . . . [T]he proper standard for

determining whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling

is harmless should be whether the jury’s verdict was

substantially swayed by the error. . . . Accordingly, a

nonconstitutional error is harmless when an appellate

court has a fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 817.

Although the defendant in his brief discusses the

prejudicial effect of the evidence that he was a member

of a gang, he does so in the context of arguing that the

evidence was inadmissible because its prejudicial effect

outweighed its probative value. What the defendant has

failed to do, however, is to analyze whether the allegedly

erroneous admission of this evidence deprived him of

a fair trial, in other words, that the admission of the

evidence constituted harmful error.

As the court noted in State v. Toro, supra, 172 Conn.

App. 819, the concept of the prejudicial effect of evidence and whether its admission constitutes harmful

error ‘‘may overlap with one another to some extent,

[but they] are not necessarily equivalent and must be

briefed separately. . . . Indeed, it is not inconsistent

for a reviewing court to conclude that, although evidence was unduly prejudicial, and thus improperly

admitted at trial, its improper admission nevertheless

was harmless.’’ (Citation omitted.)

In the present case, beyond summarily concluding

that the court’s decision to allow witness testimony

regarding the defendant’s gang affiliation prejudiced

him, and stating in his reply brief that ‘‘[t]his error is

not harmless because it painted the defendant in a very

negative and violent light,’’ the defendant has failed

to address the issue of whether the alleged error was

harmful in light of the evidence as a whole and the

court’s limiting instruction. The defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the court’s allegedly

improper ruling likely affected the outcome of the trial.

‘‘[W]e are not required to review issues that have

been improperly presented to this court through an

inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere

abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.

. . . [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties

must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their

briefs. . . . The parties may not merely cite a legal

principle without analyzing the relationship between

the facts of the case and the law cited.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Buhl,

321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868 (2016). Because the

defendant has failed adequately to brief the question
of whether the allegedly erroneous admission of his

membership in a gang was harmful, we deem his claim

abandoned. See id.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 For jurisprudential reasons, we address the sufficiency of the evidence

claim first, although this differs from the order the claims were presented

by the defendant in his principal appellate brief.

2 General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘A person is

guilty of murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person,

he causes the death of such person or of a third person . . . .’’

3 The court provided the following limiting instruction: ‘‘The testimony

that you heard today from Ms. Nunez, from [Kareem], and most recently

just now from Ms. Martinez, again, that testimony related to alleged prior

consistent and inconsistent statements made by other individuals. Therefore,

the only thing you could use those statements for is for credibility. You

cannot use them for substantive purposes to the truth of their content.

‘‘This is the situation under our rules that statements that were or were

not made—allegedly were or were not made go to the credibility of that

witness, not to the substance of what the person may or may not have said.

So it’s limited to credibility. It’s not for the truth of the matter asserted in

the counts.’’

4 Witnesses at the trial frequently referred to Daniel Clinton by the nicknames of ‘‘Country’’ and ‘‘DaDa.’’

5 The panel at oral argument before this court asked defense counsel

whether there was ‘‘any evidence in this record that you say supports a thirdparty culpability instruction where the evidence was admitted for something

other than impeachment purposes?’’ Defense counsel replied, ‘‘There was

none, Your Honor.’’

6 Section 4-5 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant

part: ‘‘Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible

. . . to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, common plan or scheme,

absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal activity,

or an element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony.’’

7 The court provided the following limiting instruction: ‘‘There are certain

circumstances under which evidence is admitted for a limited purpose only.

The testimony that you just heard about any relationship to a gang is admitted

solely for purposes of establishing why this witness did not give a statement

earlier than the time that she did, that’s the only thing that it’s admitted for,

nothing else, it’s limited to that purpose, you can use it for nothing else.’’