alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

AMIR FATIR, aka STERLING HOBBS,

Defendant Below, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Appellee. §

§ No. 41, 2023 § § Court Below–Superior Court § of the State of Delaware § § Cr. ID No. 75060892DI (N) § § §

Submitted: April 6, 2023 Decided: May 23, 2023

Before SEITZ , Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR , Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to

affirm, and the record on appeal, we conclude that the judgment below should be

affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons cited by the Superior Court in its January

20, 2023 order denying the appellant’s motion for correction or reduction of

sentence.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                  JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                    MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                          3,258,672
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   60,427
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                4,548,366
<PP&E>                          511,874
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  5,853,196
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           382,794
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        10,968
<OTHER-SE>                      4,945,592
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    5,853,196
<SALES>                         1,129,004
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                1,129,004
<CGS>                           868,832
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   868,832
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                1,188,470
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (912,752)
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (893,721)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (893,721)
<EPS-BASIC>                   (.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                   (.09)



</TABLE>
vggl_ex101.htm


Exhibit 10.1


 


DEMAND PROMISSORY NOTE


 




 



	$2,000,000.00 	December [__], 2014
	 	New York, New York







 


FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, Viggle Inc. (the “Borrower”), with an address at 902 Broadway, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10010, hereby promises to pay to the order of Robert F.X. Sillerman (the “Lender”), with an address at c/o SFX Entertainment, Inc., 430 Park Avenue, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10022, the principal sum of Two Million Dollars ($2,000,000.00), together with interest thereon from the date hereof at an annual rate equal to 12.00% per annum.  Principal and interest due under this Note shall be due and payable upon demand.


 


Interest hereunder shall be computed on the basis of a 360-day year consisting of twelve 30-day months and shall accrue so long as any sum remains outstanding under this Note.  Anything in this Note to the contrary notwithstanding, the obligation of the Borrower to make payments of interest shall be subject to the limitation that payments of interest shall not be required to be made by the Borrower to the extent that the receipt thereof would not be permissible under the law or laws applicable to the Lender limiting rates of interest which may be charged or collected by the Lender.  Any such payments of interest which are not made as a result of the limitation referred to in the preceding sentence shall be made by the Borrower to the Lender on the earliest interest payment date or dates on which the receipt thereof would be permissible under the laws applicable to the Lender limiting rates of interest which may be charged or collected by the Lender.


 


Payments of principal and interest made more than (10) days after they are due, shall bear interest at the lesser of (i) 5% per annum or (ii) the highest rate permitted by applicable law.  Payment of the principal and interest due under this Note shall be made at such place as the Lender shall designate to the Borrower and in such coin or currency of the United States of America as at the time of payment is legal tender for the payment of all public and private debts.


 


The principal amount of this Note may be prepaid at any time and from time to time, in whole or in part, without premium or penalty.


 


The Borrower hereby waives presentment, demand for payment, notice of dishonor, and any and all other notices or demands in connection with the delivery, acceptance, performance, default or enforcement of this Note.  The Borrower shall pay all fees, expenses and disbursements of the Lender’s counsel in connection with the enforcement of this Note and the collection of all sums due hereunder.


 


This Note shall be binding upon the Borrower, its successors and assigns and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, successors and assigns of the Lender.


 


This Note and the rights and obligations of the Borrower hereunder shall be governed by and construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of New York.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Borrower has executed this Note as of the day and year first written above.


 




	 	VIGGLE INC.	 
	 	 	 	 
	
 

	
By: 

	 	 
	 	Name:	 	 
	 	Title:
<PAGE>
                                                                Exhibit 99

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Intermost Corporation (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending December 31, 2002, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Andy
Lin, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 3(a) or
15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.




                             /S/ Andy Lin
                             ---------------------------------
                             Andy Lin
                             Chief Executive Officer and
                             Chief Financial Officer

February 13, 2003


                                       35

<PAGE>
Exhibit
31.2







CERTIFICATION
OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER





REQUIRED
BY RULE 13A - 14(A) OR RULE 15D - 14(A)









I,
   Bob Bates, Chief Financial Officer, certify that:





1.
  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Edgetech
Services Inc.





2.
  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3.
  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;





4.
  The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small
business issuer and have:





(a)
 Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;





(b)
 Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and





(c)
 Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or
is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and





5.The
small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control    over
financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit
committee of the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):




(a)All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and





(b)
 Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.








Date:
      June 15, 2009
                By:
                /s/  Bob
      BatesBob
      BatesChief
      Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Emory J. Winston, Appellant.

[858 NYS2d 645]

Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Sheila A. DiTullio, J.), rendered July 19, 2006. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, false personation and improper license plates.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed. Present—Martoche, J.P, Smith, Centra, Lunn and Pine, JJ.
In October 2020, the Honorable Jarnes A. Manley, Judge of the District Court for

the Twentieth Judicial District of the State of Montana, requested the assistance of retired

District Judge Karen Townsend to assurne jurisdiction of Lake County Cause No.

DV 20-109, Briney, et al. v. Presbyterian Church, et al. Judge Townsend was no longer

able to preside over this matter, and the Honorable Amy Eddy agreed to assume

jurisdiction. A substitution of judge has been filed, and the Honorable Elizabeth A. Best

has agreed to assume jurisdiction.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The Honorable Elizabeth A. Best is hereby authorized to assist the Twentieth

Judicial District of the State of Montana and shall assume judicial authority of Lake County

Cause No. DV 20-109, Briney, et al. v. Presbyterian Church, et al.

2. Judge Best is hereby authorized to proceed with any and all necessary hearings,

opinions, and orders, including final resolution of said rnatter.

3. A copy of this Order shall be filed with the Clerk of Court of Lake County, with

the request that this Order be sent to all counsel of record in County Cause No. DV 20-109,

Briney, et al. v. Presbyterian Church, et al.

A copy of this Order shall be provided to the Honorable James A. Manley, the

Honorable Elizabeth A. Best, the Honorable Arny Eddy, and Beth McLaughlin, Suprerne

Court Administrator.

This Order is entered by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VII, Section 6(3) of

the 1972 Montana Constitution, and statutes enacted in conformity therewith and in

implementation thereof.
2
#### Fred SWANIGAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Anthony P. KANE, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 07-56140.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 10, 2011.

Fred Swanigan, Soledad, CA, pro se.

Jennifer L. Dolan, Esquire, James Conrad Schroeder, Esquire, AGCA — Office of *749the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before: FARRIS, LEAYY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Fred Swanigan appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We dismiss.

Swanigan contends that the Board’s 2005 decision to deny him parole was not supported by “some evidence” and therefore violated his due process rights. After briefing was completed in this case, this court held that a certificate of appealability (“COA”) is required to challenge the denial of parole. *See Hayward v. Marshall,*603 F.3d 546, 554-55 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). Now the Supreme Court has held that the only federal right at issue in the parole context is procedural, and the only proper inquiry is what process the inmate received, not whether the state court decided the case correctly. *See Swarthout v. Cooke,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 859, 862-63, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011). Because Swanigan raises no procedural challenges, a COA cannot issue, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Notice is hereby given that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as Receiver for Blue Ridge Savings Bank, Inc., Asheville, North Carolina (“the Receiver”) intends to terminate its receivership for said institution. The FDIC was appointed Receiver of Blue Ridge Savings Bank, Inc. on October 14, 2011. The liquidation of the receivership assets has been completed. To the extent permitted by available funds and in accordance with law, the receiver will be making a final dividend payment to proven creditors.

                    Based upon the foregoing, the receiver has determined that the continued existence of the receivership will serve no useful purpose. Consequently, notice is given that the receivership shall be terminated, to be effective no sooner than thirty days after the date of this                           ( print page 48081)                        notice. If any person wishes to comment concerning the termination of the receivership, such comment must be made in writing and sent within thirty days of the date of this notice to: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Resolutions and Receiverships, Attention: Receivership Oversight Department 34.6, 1601 Bryan Street, Dallas, TX 75201.                

No comments concerning the termination of this receivership will be considered which are not sent within this time frame.

Dated: October 11, 2017.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Robert E. Feldman,

Executive Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2017-22290 Filed 10-13-17; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 6714-01-P
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

JESUS GUADALUPE FRANCO,

 

 Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 State.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-18-00040-CR

Appeal from the

409th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas 

(TC# 20170D00288)

O R D E R

The Court GRANTS Natalie Martinez’s request for an extension of time within which to 

file the Reporter’s Record until November 6, 2018. NO FURTHER REQUESTS FOR 

EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THE REPORTER’S RECORD WILL BE CONSIDERED 

BY THIS COURT.

It is further ORDERED that Natalie Martinez, Official Court Reporter for the 409th

District Court for El Paso County, Texas, prepare the Reporter’s Record and forward the same to 

this Court on or before November 6, 2018.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of October, 2018.

PER CURIAM

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez and Palafox, JJ.
#### In the Matter of 542 A Realty, LLC, Appellant.

[989 NYS2d 72]

In a proceeding pursuant to REAEL article 14 to foreclose a mortgage by power of sale, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Butler, J.), entered November 19, 2012, which denied its unopposed motion, in ef*994feet, to vacate the dismissal of the proceeding pursuant to Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR 202.27) and to restore the proceeding to the trial calendar.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the petitioner’s motion, in effect, to vacate the dismissal of the proceeding and to restore the proceeding to the trial calendar is granted.

This mortgage foreclosure proceeding was dismissed pursuant to Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR 202.27) after none of the parties appeared at a calendar call in the Trial Scheduling Part of the Supreme Court, Queens County. The petitioner demonstrated that it did not have notice of the trial calendar call of the proceeding through the uncontroverted affirmation of its attorney, which stated that counsel did not receive any notice for a court appearance *(see Pavlou v Associates Food Stores, Inc.,*96 AD3d 919, 919-920 [2012]; *Bonik v Tarrabocchia,*78 AD3d 630, 632 [2010]; *M.S. Hi-Tech, Inc. v Thompson,*23 AD3d 442, 443 [2005]). Without notice of the court appearance, the petitioner’s default was a nullity *(see Rosas v Stieg,*108 AD3d 693, 694 [2013]; *Pavlou v Associates Food Stores, Inc.,*96 AD3d at 919-920; *Tragni v Tragni,*21 AD3d 1084, 1085 [2005]). Consequently, vacatur of the default was required as a matter of law and due process, and no showing of a potentially meritorious action was required *(see Pavlou v Associates Food Stores, Inc.,*96 AD3d at 920; *Bonik v Tarrabocchia,*78 AD3d at 632; *Pelaez v Westchester Med. Ctr.,*15 AD3d 375, 376 [2005]). Under these circumstances, the petitioner’s motion, in effect, to vacate the dismissal of the proceeding and to restore the proceeding to the trial calendar should have been granted.

Mastro, J.P, Hall, Lott, Austin and Duffy, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Hector B., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[665 NYS2d 663]

—Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Alma Cordova, J.), entered on or about April 30, 1996, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon a fact-finding determination that he had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and placed him on probation for a period of 2 years, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Appellant’s suppression motion was properly denied. Under the circumstances, the arresting officer’s testimony implicitly provided sufficient detail as to the content of the radio transmission, so as to allow the hearing court to make an independent determination that the arrest of appellant was supported by probable cause *(cf., People v Brown,*238 AD2d 204), unlike *137the situation presented where the People completely fail to establish the content of the description *(see, People v Rivera,*187 AD2d 258). Concur—Milonas, J. P., Eosenberger, Ellerin, Nardelli and Colabella, JJ.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3018 

To amend the Controlled Substances Act to address the use of intrathecal 

pumps. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 24, 2009 

Mr. GOHMERT (for himself, Mr. SCOTT of Virginia, and Mr. SMITH of Texas) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, 

for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case 

for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 

committee concerned 

A BILL 

To amend the Controlled Substances Act to address the 

use of intrathecal pumps. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. INTRATHECAL PUMPS. 

4 Section 102(10) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 

5 U.S.C. 802(10)) is amended— 

6 (1) by striking ‘‘The term ‘dispense’ means to 

7 deliver’’ and inserting the following: ‘‘(A) The term 

8 ‘dispense’ means— 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
2 

•HR 3018 IH

1 ‘‘(i) to deliver’’; 

2 (2) by striking ‘‘such delivery.’’ and inserting 

3 the following: ‘‘such delivery; or 

4 ‘‘(ii) to deliver a controlled substance by a phar5 macy to a practitioner, pursuant to the prescription 

6 of the practitioner, where such controlled substance 

7 is to be administered through the use of an 

8 intrathecal pump by the practitioner acting in the 

9 usual course of professional practice.’’; 

10 (3) by striking ‘‘The term ‘dispenser’ means’’ 

11 and inserting the following: 

12 ‘‘(B) The term ‘dispenser’ means’’; and 

13 (4) by striking ‘‘to an ultimate user or research 

14 subject’’. 

Æ 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
#### In the Matter of Eugene Prosetti, Respondent, v Norwood Jackson, as Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Correction, Appellant.

[665 NYS2d 940]

—In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Correction which denied the petitioner’s request to rescind his resignation from his position as a Correction Officer, the appeal is from an amended order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Cowhey, J.), entered September 27, 1996, which, upon a jury verdict, directed reinstatement of the petitioner to the position of Correction Officer and awarded him back pay with interest.

Ordered that the amended order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court correctly gave a missing-witness charge. Copertino, J. P., Sullivan, Pizzuto and Lemer, JJ., concur.