No. 3--05--0736 

Filed August 22, 2006. 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

THIRD DISTRICT A.D., 2006 

DANIEL J. SEDLOCK, JR., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

 ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit, 

 Petitioner-Appellant, ) La Salle County, Illinois 

) 

v. ) No. 04--MR--197 

) 

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ) 

 

POLICE PENSION FUND OF THE ) 

CITY OF OTTAWA, ) 

) Honorable William Balestri, 

Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the opinion of the court: 

This is an appeal of the trial court's dismissal of 

petitioner Daniel Sedlock's complaint for declaratory judgment. 

Sedlock asked the circuit court of La Salle County to declare 

that the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the City 

of Ottawa (PPF) does not have the authority to make a final 

salary determination for Sedlock in any sum other than 

$84,338.31. 

BACKGROUND 

Sedlock retired as chief of police of the City of Ottawa on 

September 8, 2003. Sedlock's salary, as chief of police, was 
2 

$64,000 until the city council of the City of Ottawa amended his 

employment agreement on August 5, 2003, to increase his annual 

salary to $84,338.31. The increase in his salary took effect on 

September 1, 2003, one week before his retirement. The PPF set a 

public hearing to be held on October 26, 2004, to consider what 

the final salary determination should be for calculating the 

future retirement pension of Sedlock. 

Under section 3--111 of the Illinois Pension Code (the 

Code), a police officer shall receive a pension of one-half of 

the salary attached to the rank held on the last day of service. 

 40 ILCS 5/3--111(a) (West 2004). Pursuant to the Code, "salary" 

means the annual salary, including longevity attached to the 

police officer's rank, as established by the municipality's 

appropriation ordinance, including any compensation for overtime 

which is included in the salary established, but excluding any 

"overtime pay," "holiday pay," "bonus pay," "merit pay," or any 

other cash benefit not included in the salary so established. 40 

ILCS 5/3--125.1 (West 2004). 

On October 5, 2004, Sedlock filed a complaint for 

declaratory judgment, requesting that the court enter an order 

finding that the PPF has no authority under the Code to make a 

final annual salary determination in any sum other than the 

amount of $84,338.31. The PPF filed a motion to dismiss, 

claiming that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over 
3 

the subject matter of the complaint because there was no actual 

controversy between the parties since the PPF had not yet made a 

determination as to what the salary was and no final appealable 

decision by the PPF had been made. Sedlock filed a motion to 

strike the PPF's motion to dismiss. 

A hearing was held on both motions and, on May 31, 2005, the 

court denied Sedlock's motion to strike and granted the PPF's 

motion to dismiss. First, the court found that it is the PPF's 

fiduciary duty to determine a police officer's salary when 

calculating his pension. Then, the court found that dismissal 

was appropriate because Sedlock was required to exhaust his 

administrative remedies, if dissatisfied with any decision of the 

PPF, before seeking judicial relief in court. 

There are two issues before this court. First, whether the 

PPF has the authority to determine what a police officer's 

"salary" is under the Code for the purpose of calculating the 

officer's pension benefit amount. The second issue is whether, 

after having answered the preceding question in the affirmative, 

the trial court properly dismissed the declaratory judgment 

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

ANALYSIS 

We affirm the circuit court. First, we address whether the 

court has jurisdiction to decide whether the PPF has the 

authority to determine Sedlock's salary. Generally, a person 
4 

with a claim from an administrative agency must exhaust his 

administrative remedies before seeking relief from the judicial 

system pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Review Law. 735 

ILCS 5/3--101 et seq. (West 2004). However, the court has 

recognized several exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of 

administrative remedies, including when the agency's jurisdiction 

is attacked because a party claims that it is not authorized by 

statute to do something it is attempting to do, as Sedlock claims 

here. Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 

304, 309, 547 N.E.2d 437, 439 (1989); Wright v. Pucinski, 352 

Ill. App. 3d 769, 773, 816 N.E.2d 808, 814 (2004). Where an 

administrative assertion of authority to hear or determine 

certain matters is challenged on its face as not authorized by 

the enabling legislation, such a facial attack does not implicate 

the exhaustion doctrine and exhaustion is not required. Wright 

v. Pucinski, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 816 N.E.2d at 814. The 

rationalization for this exception is that when an agency's 

statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction is at issue, no 

questions of fact are involved. The agency's particular 

expertise is not implicated in the necessary statutory 

interpretation. Wright v. Pucinski, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 774, 816 

N.E.2d at 814. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to 

decide whether the PPF had the authority to determine Sedlock's 

salary for the purpose of calculating his pension under the Code. 
5 

Next, we consider whether the PPF has authority to determine 

Sedlock's "salary." We agree with the trial court's statutory 

interpretation that the PPF has the authority to determine what 

Sedlock's salary is under the Code for the purpose of calculating 

his future pension. Section 3--132 of the Code provides that, 

pursuant to section 3--131, police pension fund boards have the 

exclusive control and management of the pension fund. 40 ILCS 

5/3--132 (West 2004). The fundamental purpose of a police 

pension fund board is to determine eligibility to participate in 

the fund. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund v. Human 

Rights Comm'n, 141 Ill. App. 3d 447, 455, 490 N.E.2d 232, 238 

(1986). Additionally, the trustees of the fund are statutorily 

designated as fiduciaries. Section 1--101.2 of the Code provides 

that any person who exercises any discretionary authority or 

control over the money amount of a pension fund is a "fiduciary." 

 40 ILCS 5/1--101.2 (West 2004). As a fiduciary, each board 

member is required to "discharge his or her duties with respect 

to the *** pension fund solely in the interest of the 

participants and beneficiaries and *** for the exclusive purpose 

of *** providing benefits to participants and their 

beneficiaries." 40 ILCS 5/1--109 (West 2004). 

We hold that the board's statutory duties include determing 

what Sedlock's annual salary should be for the purpose of 

calculating his retirement benefits. Granting Sedlock's request 
6 

could result in circuit courts being charged with making salary 

determinations for thousands of public employees seeking 

disability or retirement pensions each year. This is not what 

the legislature intended. The board is in the best position to 

determine whether Sedlock's most recent salary included overtime, 

holiday, bonus, or merit pay. 

Next, we consider whether the court properly dismissed the 

complaint for declaratory judgment. Once the court properly 

determined the scope of the PPF's authority, there was no actual 

controversy between the parties since there had been no 

determination by the PPF as to what the salary of Sedlock was or 

what his retirement pension will be. Under section 3--128 of the 

Code, all final administrative decisions of the pension board are 

judicially reviewable under the provisions of the Administrative 

Review Law. 40 ILCS 5/3--128 (West 2004). An administrative 

decision is "any decision, order or determination of any 

administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which 

affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of [a party] and 

which terminates the proceedings before the administrative 

agency." 735 ILCS 5/3--101 (West 2004). Until there is a final 

appealable decision by the PPF, any action brought before the 

court is premature and the court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction. Judicial review can only be undertaken where there 

is a final agency determination. Taylor v. State Universities 
7 

Retirement System, 159 Ill. App. 3d 372, 374, 512 N.E.2d 399, 401 

(1987). 

Without a final decision from the PPF, there is simply 

nothing for the circuit court to review. The circuit court, 

therefore, correctly determined that it had no subject matter 

jurisdiction on the issue of what Sedlock's salary should be. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court 

of La Salle County is affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

LYTTON and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur.