alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Michael McGrath, as Director of Inpatient Care for Park Ridge Hospital, Inc., Respondent. *1082Rosemarie Noto, Appellant.

[667 NYS2d 550]

—Appeal unanimously dismissed without costs. Memorandum: After a *Rivers*hearing *(Rivers v Katz,*67 NY2d 485, *rearg denied*68 NY2d 808), Supreme Court granted the application of petitioner, Michael McGrath, M.D., Director of Inpatient Care for Park Ridge Hospital, Inc., for permission to administer antipsychotic drugs to respondent without her consent. Because respondent is no longer a patient at Park Ridge Hospital, the appeal is moot. Respondent is no longer aggrieved by the order because she is no longer subject to the forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs at that facility *(see, Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne,*50 NY2d 707, 713; *Matter of Garcia v Soley,*63 AD2d 981).

Respondent failed to show that this controversy falls within any recognized exception to the mootness doctrine. A case falls within an exception to the mootness doctrine where “three common factors [are present]: (1) a likelihood of repetition, either between the parties or among other members of the public; (2) a phenomenon typically evading review; and (3) a showing of significant or important questions not previously passed on, i.e., substantial and novel issues” *(Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, supra,*at 714-715; *see, Matter of Schultz v State of New York,*200 AD2d 936, 937, *appeal dismissed*83 NY2d 905). Here, the issue whether the order authorizing involuntary medication is over-broad has no application outside this particular proceeding. It would be wholly speculative to assume that the exact facts at issue will be repeated in another case and will result in a similar order. Further, the issue is not one that typically evades review; a patient would be entitled to a *Rivers*hearing in any other proceeding where Park Ridge Hospital or any other facility seeks to medicate a patient without his or her consent. Finally, the issue does not present a substantial and novel issue; rather, it presents a typical *Rivers*issue. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Ciaccio, J.—Mental Hygiene Law.) Present—Denman, P. J., Lawton, Wisner, Balio and Boehm, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2740 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2740

 To amend the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to permit a 
prevailing party in an action or proceeding brought to enforce the Act 
     to be awarded expert witness fees and certain other expenses.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 4, 2009

Mr. Van Hollen (for himself and Mr. Sessions) introduced the following 
    bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act to permit a 
prevailing party in an action or proceeding brought to enforce the Act 
     to be awarded expert witness fees and certain other expenses.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``IDEA Fairness Restoration Act''.

SEC. 2. INCLUSION OF EXPERT WITNESS FEES AND OTHER EXPENSES AS 
              ATTORNEYS' FEES.

    (a) In General.--Section 615(i)(3) of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)) is amended by adding 
at the end the following new subparagraph:
                    ``(H) Inclusion of expert witness fees and other 
                expenses as attorneys' fees.--For the purposes of this 
                paragraph, the term `attorneys' fees' shall include the 
                fees of expert witnesses, including the reasonable 
                costs of any test or evaluation necessary for the 
                preparation of the parent or guardian's case in the 
                action or proceeding.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to any action or proceeding brought under section 615 of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. 1415) that has 
not been finally adjudicated as of the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
[Letterhead of Simon Master & Sidlow, P.A.]



BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND STOCKHOLDERS
CECIL BANCORP, INC.
ELKTON, MARYLAND




                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

         We consent to the  incorporation  by  reference  in this Annual  Report
(Form  10-KSB) of Cecil  Bancorp,  Inc.  and  Subsidiaries  of our report  dated
February 23, 2000,  included in the 2000 Annual Report to  Stockholders of Cecil
Bancorp, Inc.

         We also  consent to the  incorporation  by  reference  in  Registration
Statements (Form 10-KSB Number 0-24926) of Cecil Bancorp,  Inc. and Subsidiaries
of our  report  dated  February  23,  2000,  with  respect  to the  consolidated
financial statements incorporated herein by reference.

                                                 /s/ Simon Master & Sidlow, P.A.

                                                 Simon Master & Sidlow, P.A.


Wilmington, Delaware
March 22, 2001
Motion Granted and Abatement Order F iled September 2 , 2021

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 20

- 00083

- CR

____________ KENIA LASHAN WILKINS , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 339th District Court

Ha rr is County, Texas Tr i a l Court Cause No. 1536960

ABATEMENT ORDER
Appellant is represented by appointed counsel

. Appellant ’ s brief was initially due March 25, 2021 , but she was granted multiple extensions enabling her
to file a timely brief on or before Ju ly 1 3, 2021. Appel lant did not provide a brief on that date and this court issued a notice of late brief accordingly.
On August 2 , 2021, appellant file d the motion to abate appeal currently
before this court. That motio n seeks relief based on the fact th at a ruling2

address in g a motion to suppress , centering on a statement made by the appella nt, was not included in the clerk ’ s record or in findings of fact and conclusions of law
si gned by the trial court on February 22, 2021. According to the motion, th is

req uires the creat ion of a s u pplemental clerk ’ s record including the findings of fact and conclusions of law signed by the trial court on February 22, 2021 , as well a s supplemental or amended findings of fact and conclu sions of law reflecting the
trial co urt ’ s ruling on the motion to suppress

.
Al though we conclude the discrepancies in the court record warrant abating this appeal, it is concerning that roughly five months passed between when the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of l aw a nd when appellant ’ s counsel noticed the re were issues requiring an abatement. It appears appellant ’ s counsel had ample o pportunity to detect the issues underlying the abatement request well before the pres ent time and possibl y eliminate the need for t h e abat ement altogethe r

. Appellant ’ s motion does not provide any information explaining how counsel only identified those discrepancies several months after the findings of fact and con clusions of law were provided

. Even so, as appellant ’ s motion i ndi cat es this is the final action needed before being able to fully litigate this appeal, this court finds the motion meritorious and hereby grants the motion.
The appeal is abated, treated as a close d case, and removed from this court’s active docket pending su pp lementation of the clerk’s record for this appeal. The
Harris County Clerk is instructed to provide a supplemental clerk’s record, containing the findings of fact and conclu sions of law signe d by the trial court on February 22, 2021 and supplemental or am ended findings of fact signed by the trial court addressing obj ections and rul ings made regarding the motion to suppress the
defendant ’ s statement , within 21 days of the date of this order. A ppellant shall file3

h er brief no later than 21 days after the su pplemental clerk ’ s record has been provided . No further extens ion s will be gr anted to appell ant to file a brief absent exception al circumstances.

PER CURIAM

Panel Consists of Justices Wise
, Bourliot , and Zimmerer

.
EXHIBIT
32.1
 
 CERTIFICATION
OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
 TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In
connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Quick-Med
Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") for the fiscal quarter ended September 30,
2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Report"), I, J. Ladd Greeno, Chief Executive Officer and principal
executive officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant Section 1350, Chapter
63 of Title 18, United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:
 
 (a)
              The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and
 
  (b)
              The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.
 
 
 
 
 
 Dated:  November
14,
2008                                                                                                                                  
  /s/  J. Ladd
Greeno      _________________________
 J. Ladd Greeno
 Chief Executive Officer (and Principal Executive Officer)
#### Charles Everette HINTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael W. HENDERSON; Peter S. Gilchrist; Teresa Broadway; Andrew Rudgers, Probation Officer, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-6096.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 31, 2011.

Decided: April 6, 2011.

Charles Everett Hinton, Appellant Pro Se. Sean Francis Perrin, Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina; Grady L. Balentine, Jr., Special Deputy Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina; Oliver Gray Wheeler, Office of the Attorney General of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-lees.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Charles Everette Hinton seeks to appeal the magistrate judge’s order denying his motion to amend his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint to add an additional defendant. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); *Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,*337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The order Hinton seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we deny Hinton’s request for counsel and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-7793

GEORGE ADAMS, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus RICKY HARRISON, Warden; KERSHAW CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION; FREDERICK THOMPSON; STAN BURTT; DERWIN NEASMAN; BETTY BOWERS, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofSouth Carolina, at Orangeburg. Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior District Judge. (CA-98-810-5-6JI) Submitted: May 25, 1999 Decided: June 7, 1999 Before MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. George Adams, Appellant Pro Se. Benjamin A. Hagood, Jr., DAVIS, CRAVER, HAGOOD & KERR, P.A., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: George Adams, a South Carolina inmate, appeals the districtcourt's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find that this appeal is frivolous. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Adams v. Harrison , No. CA-98-810-5-6JI (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
**EXHIBIT
32.** **4**
 
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE
 SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002
 
 I,
Patrick J. Goodman, Vice President and Treasurer of MidAmerican Funding, LLC
(the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to the
best of my knowledge:
 
 (1)
    the
      Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the annual period ended
      December 31, 2004 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements
      of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
      U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and(2)
    the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.Dated:
      February 28, 2005/s/
      Patrick J. GoodmanPatrick
      J. GoodmanVice
      President and Treasurer(chief
      financial officer)
EXHIBIT
32.1





OFFICER’S
CERTIFICATION


PURSUANT
TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18
U.S.C. 1350)





In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of TELETOUCH COMMUNICATIONS, INC.
(the “Company”) for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2010 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”),  the undersigned, Robert M. McMurrey, Chief Executive
Officer, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to the best
of his knowledge:





1.
            The
      Report is in full compliance with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
  and





2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the
      Company.





/s/ Robert M. McMurreyRobert
      M. McMurreyChief
      Executive OfficerAugust
      30, 2010
**Court of Appeals**

**Sixth Appellate District of Texas**

JUDGMENT

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the motion of the appellant to dismiss the appeal should be granted.  Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

We note that the appellant, Donald Eugene Goodwin, Jr., has adequately indicated his inability to pay costs of appeal.  Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED DECEMBER 5, 2013

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk

# image1.png
Exhibit
32.2








CERTIFICATION
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and in connection with the filing by Intermost
Corporation, a Wyoming Corporation (the “Company”) with the Securities and
Exchange Commission of its Quarterly Report on Form 10-QA for the three months
ended September 30, 2007 (the “Report”), the undersigned, Thomas Lee, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, does hereby certify, that to the best of his
knowledge:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
      and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





This
certification is being provided pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 and is not to be
deemed a part of this Report, nor is it to be deemed to be “filed” for any
purpose whatsoever.





Date:  December
1, 2008








By:
            /s/ Thomas LeeThomas
      Lee,
              Chief
      Financial Officer





A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Arthur Lee HAIRSTON, Sr., Defendant—Appellant.

No. 09-6350.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 17, 2011.

Decided: April 7, 2011.

*311Arthur Lee Hairston, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Paul Thomas Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Arthur Lee Hairston, Sr., appeals from the district court’s order granting in part his 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (2006) motion for reduction of sentence. On appeal, Hair-ston asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to give him a full resentencing hearing and that the district court failed to provide sufficient reasoning for the chosen sentence. We affirm.

Hairston’s claim that he was entitled to a full resentencing pursuant to *United States v. Booker,*543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), is foreclosed by our decision in *United States v. Dunphy,*551 F.3d 247, 251 (4th Cir.) (holding that “proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant”), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 2401, 173 L.Ed.2d 1296 (2009), and the Supreme Court’s decision in *Dillon v. United States,*— U.S. —, —, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2693, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010) (finding that holding in *Booker*does not apply to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings). Accordingly, this claim is without merit.

Hairston next asserts that the district court did not fully consider his circumstances prior to choosing a sentence. Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court “may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” In *United States v. Legree,*205 F.3d 724, 728-29 (4th Cir.2000), we held that there exists a presumption, absent a contrary indication in the record, that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors in denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion. Here, the record provides no support for Hairston’s assertions that the district court failed to properly consider his motion; accordingly, we presume that the court’s consideration of the appropriate factors was sufficient. *See also United States v. Evans,*587 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir.2009) (holding that court is not required to state findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying § 3582 motion), *cert. denied,*— U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 3462, 177 L.Ed.2d 1064 (2010).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Hair-ston’s motions to appoint counsel, to clarify, and to order the Warden to provide writing materials. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
OF ROSETTA STONE INC.
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K for the calendar year ended December 31, 2010 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Tom P. H. Adams, Chief Executive Officer of Rosetta Stone Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certify, to my knowledge, that:



Date: March 14, 2011

/s/ TOM P. H. ADAMS Tom P. H. Adams


---



QuickLinks
[No. 62669-8-I.

Division One.

November 13, 2012.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Ricky Lee Horne, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-1-07899-8, Jeffrey M. Ramsdell, J., entered January 8, 2009. *Reversed*and *remanded*by unpublished opinion per

Grosse, J.,

concurred in by Cox and Lau, JJ.
#### Surender KUMAR-GARG, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 06-73131.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 22, 2008.*

Filed May 2, 2008.

Martin Avila Robles, Esq., Law Office of Martin Resendez Guajardo, P.C., San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Richard M. Evans, Esq., David E. Dauenheimer, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: GRABER, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Surender Kumar-Garg, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying his motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion, *Ordonez v. INS,*345 F.3d 777, 782 (9th Cir.2003), and we deny the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Kumar-Garg was not prima facie eligible for special rule cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(ii) because he was unable to establish the requisite 3-year period of continuous physical presence in the United States. *See Ordonez,*345 F.3d at 785 (“[A] motion to reopen will not be granted unless the respondent establishes a prima facie case of eligibility for the underlying relief sought.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### Progressive Image Group, Inc., Respondent, v David Cardillo, Appellant, et al., Defendant.

[665 NYS2d 874]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Eileen Bransten, J.), entered on or about July 15, 1996, which denied defendant-appellant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against him, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant’s documentary evidence is insufficient to establish, as a matter of law, that plaintiff was not the owner of the equipment allegedly converted by defendant. With respect to the cause of the action for conversion of money, neither side submitted any proof whatsoever. Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Wallach, Williams, Andrias and Colabella, JJ.