I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3107 

To prohibit the expenditure of United States taxpayer dollars on nuclear 

assistance to state sponsors of terrorism, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 26, 2009 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. MCCAUL, and 

Mr. POE of Texas) introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To prohibit the expenditure of United States taxpayer dollars 

on nuclear assistance to state sponsors of terrorism, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Stop Nuclear Assist5 ance to State Sponsors of Terrorism Act of 2009’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) The International Atomic Energy Agency 

9 (IAEA) was established in 1957 with the objectives 


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1 of seeking to ‘‘accelerate and enlarge the contribu2 tion of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity 

3 throughout the world’’ and to ‘‘ensure . . . that as4 sistance provided by it or at its request or under its 

5 supervision or control is not used in such a way as 

6 to further any military purpose.’’. 

7 (2) The United States, via assessed contribu8 tions, is the largest financial contributor to the reg9 ular budget of the IAEA. 

10 (3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now 

11 called the Technical Cooperation Program, financed 

12 primarily through voluntary contributions by mem13 ber states to the Technical Cooperation Fund, to 

14 provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) for 

15 peaceful purposes to countries worldwide. 

16 (4) The United States is the largest financial 

17 contributor to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation 

18 Fund. 

19 (5) A March 2009 report by the Government 

20 Accountability Office (GAO) found that ‘‘neither 

21 [the Department of State] nor IAEA seeks to sys22 tematically limit TC assistance to countries the 

23 United States has designated as state sponsors of 

24 terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even 


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1 though under U.S. law these countries are subject to 

2 sanctions.’’. 

3 (6) The GAO report also found that ‘‘Together, 

4 [Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria] received more than 

5 $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 

6 2007.’’. These four countries received over 

7 $4,400,000 in TC assistance in 2008. 

8 (7) The GAO report also found that ‘‘prolifera9 tion concerns about the [Technical Cooperation Pro10 gram] have persisted because of the assistance it has 

11 provided to certain countries and because nuclear 

12 equipment, technology, and expertise can be dual13 use—capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but 

14 also useful in contributing to nuclear weapons devel15 opment.’’. 

16 (8) The GAO report also found that ‘‘[The 

17 State Department] reported in 2007 that three TC 

18 projects in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian 

19 nuclear power plant at Bushehr.’’. 

20 (9) The GAO report also found that ‘‘The pro21 liferation concerns associated with the [Technical 

22 Cooperation Program] are difficult for the United 

23 States to fully identify, assess, and resolve . . . [be24 cause] there is no formal mechanism for obtaining 

25 TC project information during the proposal developVerDate Nov 24 2008 00:08 Jul 02, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3107.IH H3107

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1 ment phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State 

2 documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC 

3 proposals were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in 

4 U.S. policies and IAEA procedures [including moni5 toring proliferation risks] related to TC program fel6 lowships.’’. 

7 (10) The GAO report noted that ‘‘IAEA offi8 cials told us that the [Technical Cooperation Pro9 gram] does not attempt to exclude countries on the 

10 basis of their status as U.S.-designated state spon11 sors of terrorism or other political considerations’’ 

12 and that, according to the Deputy Director General 

13 for the Technical Cooperation Program, ‘‘there are 

14 no good countries and there are no bad countries’’ 

15 with respect to provision of technical cooperation by 

16 the IAEA. 

17 (11) The GAO report also found that ‘‘given 

18 the limited information available on TC projects and 

19 the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and 

20 expertise, we do not believe [the State Department] 

21 can assert with complete confidence that TC assist22 ance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruc23 tion] programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of 

24 terrorism’’. 


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1 (12) The GAO report also found that ‘‘we do 

2 not share [the State Department’s confidence in 

3 IAEA’s internal safeguards to prevent TC projects 

4 from contributing to weapons development . . . ]’’. 

5 (13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

6 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibited any of the funds au7 thorized to be appropriated for ‘‘International Orga8 nizations and Programs’’ from being made available 

9 for the United States proportionate share for pro10 grams for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Lib11 eration Organization, inter alia. 

12 (14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financ13 ing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 

14 1998 (Public Law 105–118) prohibited any of the 

15 funds made available by such Act for the IAEA from 

16 being made available for programs and projects of 

17 the IAEA in Cuba. 

18 (15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc19 turing Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277) required 

20 the United States to withhold a proportionate share 

21 of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba regard22 ing the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro 

23 Pi Nuclear Research Center. 

24 (16) The GAO report asked Congress ‘‘to con25 sider directing [the State Department] to withhold a 


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1 share of future annual contributions to the [Tech2 nical Cooperation Fund] that is proportionate to the 

3 amount of funding provided from the fund for U.S.- 

4 designated state sponsors of terrorism and other 

5 countries of concern, noting that such a withholding 

6 is a matter of fundamental principle and intended to 

7 foster a more consistent U.S. policy toward such na8 tions.’’. 

9 (17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that 

10 the Government of Iran continues its work on heavy 

11 water-related projects and its enrichment of ura12 nium, in violation of United Nations Security Coun13 cil Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 

14 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008). 

15 (18) United Nations Security Council Resolu16 tion 1737 (2006) decided ‘‘that technical cooperation 

17 provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices 

18 shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or 

19 other humanitarian purposes [inter alia] . . . but 

20 that no such technical cooperation shall be provided 

21 that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive nuclear 

22 activities . . .’’. 

23 (19) According to multiple news reports, the 

24 IAEA Director General reported to the IAEA Board 

25 of Governors in June of 2009 that the Government 


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1 of Iran now has approximately 7,000 centrifuges for 

2 enriching uranium, is running almost 5,000 of them, 

3 and has increased its stockpile of low-enriched ura4 nium to over 1,300 kilograms, considered sufficient 

5 for further enrichment into enough high-enriched 

6 uranium for an atomic bomb. 

7 (20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

8 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

9 in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘there re10 main a number of outstanding issues which give rise 

11 to concerns . . . [regarding] the existence of pos12 sible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear pro13 gramme’’. 

14 (21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

15 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

16 in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘Iran has 

17 not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a 

18 prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide credible as19 surance about the absence of undeclared nuclear ma20 terial and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the 

21 IAEA’s] request that Iran provide, as a trans22 parency measure, access to additional locations re23 lated, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, 

24 research and development on uranium enrichment, 


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1 and uranium mining and milling, as also required by 

2 the Security Council.’’. 

3 (22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

4 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

5 in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘as a result 

6 of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in con7 nection with . . . issues which give rise to concerns 

8 about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 

9 programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive 

10 progress on these issues.’’. 

11 (23) Iran has refused to comply with resolu12 tions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 

13 September 12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 

14 2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 

15 11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, 

16 and July 31, 2006, regarding ‘‘Iran’s many failures 

17 and breaches of its obligations to comply with its 

18 NPT Safeguards Agreement’’ and continues to block 

19 IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, in violation 

20 of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. 

21 (24) According to multiple news reports, Iran 

22 recently denied access to its enrichment site at 

23 Natanz to IAEA inspectors, and has also denied a 

24 request by the IAEA to place one or more additional 


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1 surveillance cameras at the enrichment site at 

2 Natanz. 

3 (25) In April of 2008, United States Govern4 ment officials publicly revealed that Syria was build5 ing at the Dair Alzour site, with North Korea’s as6 sistance, a secret nuclear reactor that was based on 

7 a North Korean model capable of producing pluto8 nium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away 

9 from becoming operational before an Israeli air 

10 strike reportedly destroyed the reactor in September 

11 2007. 

12 (26) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hay13 den, the former Director of the Central Intelligence 

14 Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair 

15 Alzour could have produced enough plutonium for 1 

16 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming operational. 

17 (27) The IAEA Director General reported to 

18 the IAEA Board of Governors, on November 19, 

19 2008, that the Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore 

20 features that resembled those of an undeclared nu21 clear reactor, adding that ‘‘Syria has not yet pro22 vided the requested documentation in support of its 

23 declarations concerning the nature or function of the 

24 destroyed building, nor agreed to a visit to the three 


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1 other locations which the IAEA has requested to 

2 visit.’’. 

3 (28) The IAEA Director General publicly stated 

4 to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, 

5 that ‘‘the limited information and access provided by 

6 Syria to date have not enabled the Agency to deter7 mine the nature of the destroyed facility’’ at Dair 

8 Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found 

9 in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 

10 Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and 

11 that the particles found at both sites ‘‘are of a type 

12 not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear 

13 material.’’. 

14 SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FUNDS. 

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—No funds from any United States 

16 assessed or voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be 

17 used to support any assistance provided by the IAEA 

18 through its Technical Cooperation program to any coun19 try, including North Korea that— 

20 (1) is a state sponsor of terrorism; 

21 (2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its 

22 obligations regarding— 

23 (A) its safeguards agreement with the 

24 IAEA; 

25 (B) the Additional Protocol; 


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1 (C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 

2 (D) any relevant United Nations Security 

3 Council Resolution; or 

4 (E) the Charter of the United Nations; or 

5 (3) is under investigation for a breach of or 

6 noncompliance with the obligations specified in para7 graph (2). 

8 (b) WITHHOLDING OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBU9 TIONS.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the en10 actment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall withhold 

11 from the United States voluntary contribution to the 

12 IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA 

13 in the period from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through 

14 its Technical Cooperation Program to countries described 

15 in subsection (a). 

16 (c) WITHHOLDING OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

17 If, not later than 30 days of the date of the enactment 

18 of this Act, the amount specified in subsection (b) has not 

19 been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all assist20 ance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program 

21 to the countries described in subsection (a), an amount 

22 equal to that specified in subsection (b) shall be withheld 

23 from the United States assessed contribution to the IAEA. 


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1 SEC. 4. WAIVER. 

2 The provisions in subsections (b) and (c) of section 

3 3 may be waived if— 

4 (1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance pro5 vided through its Technical Cooperation Program to 

6 the countries described in section 3(a); or 

7 (2) the President certifies that the countries de8 scribed in section 3(a) no longer pose a threat to the 

9 national security, interests, and allies of the United 

10 States. 

11 SEC. 5. UNITED STATES ACTIONS AT IAEA. 

12 The President shall direct the United States Perma13 nent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, 

14 and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block 

15 the allocation of funds for any assistance provided by the 

16 IAEA through its Technical Cooperation Program to any 

17 country described in section 3(a). 

18 SEC. 6. REPORT. 

19 Not later than six months after the date of the enact20 ment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the ap21 propriate congressional committees a report on the imple22 mentation of this Act. 

23 SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS. 

24 In this Act: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com3 mittees’’ means— 

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 

5 the Committee on Appropriations of the House 

6 of Representatives; and 

7 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 

8 and the Committee on Appropriations of the 

9 Senate. 

10 (2) STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.—The term 

11 ‘‘state sponsor of terrorism’’ means a country the 

12 government of which has been determined by the 

13 Secretary of State, for purposes of section 6(j) of 

14 the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 

15 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 

16 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or other provi17 sion of law, is a government that has repeatedly pro18 vided support for acts of international terrorism. 

Æ 


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