NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

NATHANIAL WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0675

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2013-461405-001

The Honorable Jo Lynn Gentry, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Chris DeRose

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Paul J. Prato

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Nathanial Williams appeals his conviction of possession or 

use of marijuana, a Class 6 felony, and resulting probation grant, arguing 

the superior court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 A detective and his partner on patrol one night in South 

Phoenix stopped a vehicle with a broken taillight and expired registration.1 

The car had three occupants; Williams sat in the front passenger seat.

¶3 As the detective approached the passenger side of the car (his 

partner took the driver's side), he smelled marijuana emanating from where 

Williams sat. Intending to search Williams for weapons, the detective asked 

him to step out of the car with his hands on his head. According to the 

detective, at some point before the search began, Williams "twist[ed] away" 

from the detective. When the detective asked Williams why he was pulling 

away, Williams replied that he had marijuana in his pocket. The detective 

then searched Williams' pocket and found two small plastic bags of 

marijuana. Williams was arrested and, after receiving Miranda warnings, 

admitted the marijuana was his.2

¶4 A grand jury indicted Williams on a charge of possession or 

use of marijuana, a Class 6 felony. Williams moved to suppress the 

marijuana evidence and his incriminating statements, and the superior 

court denied his motion without explanation. After a three-day trial, a jury 

 

1 On review, we consider only the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing and view it in the light most favorable to upholding 

the ruling. State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, 288, ¶ 2 (App. 2004).

2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

3

found Williams guilty as charged. The court suspended imposition of 

sentence and placed Williams on supervised probation for two years.

¶5 Williams timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised 

Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and -4033(A)(1) (2015).3

DISCUSSION

¶6 "We review the superior court's ruling on [a] motion to 

suppress for abuse of discretion if it involves a discretionary issue, but 

review constitutional issues and purely legal issues de novo." State v. 

Booker, 212 Ariz. 502, 504, ¶ 10 (App. 2006). We will affirm if the ruling is

legally correct for any reason supported by the record. See State v. Aguilar, 

228 Ariz. 401, 403, ¶ 12 (App. 2011).

¶7 The Fourth Amendment protects the right of people to be free 

from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A

warrantless search is presumed unreasonable unless a specific, welldelineated exception applies. State v. Blakley, 226 Ariz. 25, 27, ¶ 6 (App. 

2010). One such exception is an investigatory stop and frisk. See Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). Another exception to the warrant 

requirement is a "search incident to a lawful arrest." See, e.g., Arizona v. 

Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235

(1973). Under this exception, a contemporaneous search incident to an

arrest is constitutionally permissible when there is probable cause for the 

arrest. See State v. Bonillas, 197 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 7 (App. 1999). An officer may 

search a suspect before a formal arrest, so long as there is probable cause 

for the arrest at the time of the search. See id.; Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 

98, 111 (1980).

¶8 On appeal, Williams argues only that the search did not come 

within the Fourth Amendment exception for an investigatory stop and 

frisk. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326-27 (2009); State v. Serna, 235 

Ariz. 270, 275, ¶ 21 (2014). But the superior court reasonably could conclude

from the evidence presented at the suppression hearing that the detective 

did not begin to search Williams until after he pulled away from the

detective and told him he had marijuana in his pocket.

¶9 The detective, who was the only witness at the suppression 

hearing, could not recall precisely when the search began, but testified that 

 

3 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

a statute's current version.
STATE v. WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

4

Williams "started pulling away once he stepped out of the car." The 

detective said, "I'm not sure if I got to the pat down [before Williams twisted 

away]. . . . I mean, like once [he] got out of the car and I'm going to pat him 

down, but prior to me being able to pat him down, he twists away." He 

further testified, "I didn't get to the pat down, he's twisting away 

immediately when he gets out of the car." Once Williams told the detective 

of the marijuana in his pocket, the detective had probable cause to arrest 

him. See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (officer performing

traffic stop had probable cause to arrest all three occupants of vehicle after

cocaine was found in backseat of car behind armrest). Because the officer 

had probable cause to arrest Williams, the contemporaneous search 

incident to the arrest was constitutionally permissible. See Robinson, 414 

U.S. at 235; Bonillas, 197 Ariz. at 98, ¶ 7.

4 Accordingly, the superior court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams' motion to suppress

evidence.

CONCLUSION

¶10 Because the superior court could conclude that the detective

had probable cause to arrest Williams before the search, it did not err in 

denying the motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

 

4 For this reason, Williams' reliance on People v. Medina, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

546 (2003), is misplaced. That case did not analyze the "search incident to 

lawful arrest" exception to the warrant requirement, and, by contrast to 

Medina, the detective in this case had probable cause to arrest Williams at 

the time he conducted the search. See id. at 549 (officer's only reason for 

searching the suspect during a traffic stop was the time and location of the 

stop).