COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-11-00419-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF D.C.J.,

A CHILD

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FROM THE 16TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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In terminating Appellant J.R.J.’s parental rights to his son D.C.J., the trial 

court found by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant

knowingly placed or allowed D.C.J. to remain in conditions or surroundings 

which endangered his physical or emotional well-being;

engaged in conduct or knowingly placed D.C.J. with persons who engaged 

in conduct which endangered his physical or emotional well-being;

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

constructively abandoned D.C.J., who has been in the temporary 

managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective 

Services (TDFPS) for not less than six months, and TDFPS made 

reasonable efforts to return D.C.J. to Appellant, Appellant did not regularly 

visit or maintain significant contact with D.C.J., and Appellant 

demonstrated an inability to provide D.C.J. with a safe environment; and

failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically 

established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of D.C.J., 

who has been in the temporary managing conservatorship of TDFPS for 

not less than nine months as a result of his removal from Appellant for 

abuse or neglect.2

The trial court also found that termination of the parent-child relationship 

between Appellant and D.C.J. is in D.C.J.’s best interest.3

We decline to revisit our prior order rejecting TDFPS’s assertion that we 

lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, given the timely-filed notice of appeal 

and Appellant’s February 14, 2012 telephonic statement to his appellate counsel 

confirming that he desires this appeal.4

In two points, Appellant complains that the evidence is not legally sufficient 

to support the trial court’s endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E).

5

 

 

2See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D)–(E), (N)–(O) (West Supp. 

2011).

3See id. § 161.001(2).

4See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 26.1(b); In re Smith, 263 S.W.3d 93, 95 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding); Lab Corp. of Am. v. Mid-Town 

Surgical Ctr., Inc., 16 S.W.3d 527, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.); see 

also In re J.R.J., 357 S.W.3d 153, 155–57 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, orig.

proceeding) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by ordering Appellant’s 

appellate counsel not to file a notice of appeal).

5See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D)–(E).
3

Along with a best interest finding, a finding of only one ground alleged under 

section 161.001(1) is sufficient to support a judgment of termination.6 Because 

Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s findings under subsections (N) and 

(O) or the finding that termination is in D.C.J.’s best interest, we overrule his two 

points and affirm the trial court’s judgment.7

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and MCCOY, JJ.

DELIVERED: July 5, 2012

 

6

In re E.M.N., 221 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).

7See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N)–(O), (2); In re A.V., 113 

S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re K.W., 335 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2011, no pet.).