[Cite as Pla v. Cleveland State Univ., 2016-Ohio-3150.]

{¶1} This case came to be heard on a Complaint brought by Plaintiff, Maria Pla, 

for age discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112 and promissory estoppel. The case 

proceeded to trial on the issues of liability and damages on March 14-16, 2016. 

{¶2} At the conclusion of Plaintiff’s case, Defendant moved for dismissal of all of 

Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2). Upon reviewing the Parties’ arguments, 

the Court granted Defendant’s motion, in part, dismissing Plaintiff’s claim of promissory 

estoppel. Promissory estoppel is a quasi-contractual or equitable doctrine designed to 

prevent harm resulting from the reasonable and detrimental reliance of an employee 

upon the false representations of his employer. Karnes v. Doctors Hospital, 51 Ohio St. 

3d 139, 142 (1990). To prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a plaintiff must establish 

the following four elements: 1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; 

2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; 3) that reliance must be 

reasonable and foreseeable; and 4) the party claiming estoppel must be injured by the 

reliance. Russ v. TRW, Inc., 59 Ohio St.3d 42, 570 N.E.2d 1076 (1991); Masek v. 

Reliance Elec. Co., 60 Ohio St.3d 134, 573 N.E.2d 594 (1991); Steele v. Mara Enters., 

10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-102, 2009-Ohio-5716, ¶ 1. Upon careful consideration of 

Plaintiff’s testimony and that of Dr. Angelin Chang, the Court found that Plaintiff did not 

establish any of the four elements of promissory estoppel. Dr. Chang testified that she 

never promised Plaintiff that she would get her job back. Rather, she merely informed 

MARIA PLA 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2014-00918 

Judge Dale A. Crawford 

DECISION 
Case No. 2014-00918 -2- DECISION 

her that she was communicating with Defendant in order to facilitate a renewal of 

Plaintiff’s contract. It was unreasonable for Plaintiff to rely on the alleged promise, as 

there is no evidence that Dr. Chang had the authority to promise a contract renewal. 

Finally, Plaintiff did not provide any evidence that she relied on the alleged promise to 

her detriment. 

{¶3} Defendant’s post-trial brief was filed on March 30, 2016 and Plaintiff’s posttrial brief was filed on March 31, 2016. The following constitutes the Court’s Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law. 

FINDINGS OF FACT

{¶4} Plaintiff worked as a part-time piano instructor in Defendant’s Music 

Department for over 19 years; 

{¶5} Plaintiff taught a class called Keyboard Skills, which is a required class for 

all undergraduate music majors; 

{¶6} Plaintiff was the only instructor of the Keyboard Skills class; 

{¶7} The Gateway Exam is an internal student evaluation for music education 

students used to assess the skills students should acquire during their first two 

years of study to determine if they are ready for upper-level courses; 

{¶8} During the time when both Dr. Birch Browning, Music Department Chair, 

and Plaintiff taught at the University, all of the students taking the Gateway Exam 

were students of Plaintiff: either they took her Keyboard Skills class, or Plaintiff 

exempted them from the class after evaluating their abilities; 

{¶9} On June 30, 2014, Dr. Browning called Plaintiff to inform her that he 

decided not to renew Plaintiff’s contract for the fall 2014 semester; 

{¶10} Plaintiff’s contract was previously renewed 23 years in a row; 

{¶11} According to Defendant’s policies, the decision to hire or fire part time 

faculty was exclusively within Dr. Browning’s discretion and control; 
Case No. 2014-00918 -3- DECISION 

{¶12} At the time of her termination, Plaintiff was 73 years old and she was the 

oldest member of the Music Department by approximately 20 years; 

{¶13} Dr. Browning renewed Plaintiff’s contract a total of four times between his 

promotion to Chair in 2012 and Plaintiff’s termination in 2014; 

{¶14} Plaintiff’s replacement, Dr. Shuai Wang, was 34 years old at the time she 

was hired and had no experience teaching full-time at the university level; 

{¶15} Dr. Wang’s salary is $125 more per credit hour than Plaintiff’s. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

{¶16} Plaintiff claims discrimination on the basis of age in violation of R.C. 

4112.02. R.C. 4112 states, in part: 

{¶17} “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: 

“(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military 

status, origin, disability, age or ancestry of any person, to discharge 

without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against 

that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment.” 

{¶18} To establish an employment discrimination claim, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate an adverse employment action was causally linked to discriminatory intent. 

A plaintiff may introduce direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence to show that the 

motivation for the adverse employment action plaintiff suffered was intentional 

discrimination. Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457 (6th Cir.1990); Johnson v. 

Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 864-65 (6th Cir.2003). The ultimate inquiry is “whether the 

defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” USPS Bd. of Governors v. 

Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983). 

{¶19} A prima facie claim for employment discrimination may be established with 

either direct evidence or indirect evidence. Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 75 Ohio St. 3d 
Case No. 2014-00918 -4- DECISION 

578, 1996 Ohio 265, 664 N.E.2d 1272, 1276-77 (1996). Direct evidence “refers to a 

method of proof, not a type of evidence. It means that a plaintiff may establish a prima 

facie case of age discrimination directly by presenting evidence, of any nature, to show 

that the employer more likely than not was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Mauzy,

664 N.E.2d at 1279. Direct evidence of discrimination may be present, such as where 

an employer says, “I fired you because you are disabled.” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 

F.3d 799, 805 (6th Cir. 1998). The Court is aware that this type of evidence rarely 

occurs. 

{¶20} Plaintiff believes there exists direct evidence of age discrimination in the 

form of a comment made by Dr. Browning. Specifically, upon becoming chair of the 

music department, in or around July 2012, he asked her if she had plans to retire. 

{¶21} An employer’s discriminatory comments may constitute direct evidence that 

an employee who was the subject of an adverse employment action was a victim of 

discrimination. Courts consider four factors to determine whether an employer’s 

comments demonstrate an age bias: 

(1) whether the statements were made by a decision-maker or by an 

agent within the scope of his employment; (2) whether the statements 

were related to the decision-making process; (3) whether the statements 

were more than merely vague, ambiguous or isolated remarks; and 

(4) whether they were made proximate in time to the act of termination. 

{¶22} Skelton v. Sara Lee Corp., 249 F. App’x 450, 455 (6th Cir.2007) (citing 

Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 285 F.3d 456, 477-78 (6th Cir.2002). “[N]one of these 

factors is individually dispositive of age discrimination, but rather, they must be 

evaluated as a whole, taking all of the circumstances into account.” Peters, 285 F.3d at 

478, citing Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1330 (6th Cir.1994). 

{¶23} The question about retirement was made by Dr. Browning in the scope of 

his employment. However, there is no evidence that it was related to his decision not to 
Case No. 2014-00918 -5- DECISION 

renew Plaintiff’s contract. This singular isolated comment was also made approximately 

two years before he decided not to renew her contract. Plaintiff testified that 

Dr. Browning did not make any other age-related remarks to her. Dr. Browning testified 

that he questioned Plaintiff regarding retirement solely for planning purposes, i.e. to 

ensure he had adequate time to hire a replacement should she decide to retire. The 

Court finds it is appropriate and reasonable for a newly promoted chair of a department 

to ask faculty members about retirement plans for logistical reasons. Further, the 

Supreme Court of the United States has held that retirement is analytically distinct from 

age. Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993); Kentucky Retirement Sys. v. 

EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, 142 (2008). Therefore, no inference of age bias will be drawn 

from Dr. Browning’s question. 

{¶24} Plaintiff also attempts to demonstrate discriminatory intent on the basis of 

statistical evidence. “Appropriate statistical data showing an employer’s pattern of 

conduct toward a protected class as a group can, if unrebutted, create an inference that 

a defendant discriminated against individual members of the class.” Barnes, 896 F.2d 

at 1466, citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). “When a 

plaintiff demonstrates a significant statistical disparity in the discharge rate, he or she 

has provided strong evidence that chance alone is not the cause of the discharge 

pattern.” Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1466-69. “[F]or statistics to be valid and helpful in a 

discrimination case, both the methodology and the explanatory power of the statistical 

analysis must be sufficient to permit an inference of discrimination.” Amini v. Oberlin 

College, 440 F.3d 350, 359 (6th Cir.2006). 

{¶25} The Court finds that Plaintiff’s statistical data is insufficient to establish 

discriminatory intent. Plaintiff relies on a document produced by Defendant which 

purportedly shows the employees supervised by Dr. Browning, including their date of 

hire and date of termination. (Ex. #78.) Plaintiff contends that Dr. Browning’s hiring 

practices are evidence of his age bias. Without an explanation of how the varying hires 
Case No. 2014-00918 -6- DECISION 

and fires relate to each other, i.e. whom was replaced by whom, this document does 

little to demonstrate Dr. Browning’s alleged age bias. The evidence submitted simply 

does not confirm Plaintiff’s belief that Dr. Browning regularly hired younger employees 

and fired older employees. When questioned about specific instances of age-related 

terminations, Plaintiff asserts that two part-time instructors, including herself, were 

terminated. Dr. Browning testified that he makes approximately 100 employment 

decisions (hiring/renewal of contract, firing/non-renewal) per year. Therefore, it can 

hardly be said that two non-renewals out of approximately 200 employment decisions 

over a time period of approximately two years is statistically significant evidence of age 

discrimination. In addition, Dr. Browning testified that during the above-mentioned time 

period he hired eight people over the age of 40, four of which were in their 60’s. 

{¶26} In the absence of direct evidence, Plaintiff may establish a prima facie case 

using the disparate treatment method. Disparate treatment discrimination has been 

described as “the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply 

treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, 

or national origin.” Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 (1977) fn. 15. In 

a disparate treatment case, liability depends upon whether the protected trait actually 

motivated the employer’s decision. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 

(1993). For example, the “employer may have relied upon a formal, facially 

discriminatory policy that required adverse treatment” of protected employees, or the 

“employer may have been motivated by the protected trait on an ad hoc, informal basis.” 

Id. at 610. “Whatever the employer’s decision making process, a disparate treatment 

claim cannot succeed unless the employee’s protected trait actually played a role in that 

process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.” Id. at 610. 

{¶27} To determine whether the employer’s actions were motivated by 

discriminatory intent, and thereby establish a prima facie case, courts may employ the 

framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas. 
Case No. 2014-00918 -7- DECISION 

Under the McDonnell Douglas standard, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 

age discrimination by establishing that he: 1) was a member of a protected class; 2) 

suffered an adverse employment action; 3) was qualified for the position held; and 4) 

that comparable, non-protected persons were treated more favorably. McDonnell 

Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. The Supreme Court of Ohio approved and slightly 

modified the McDonnell Douglas test to fit a claim of age-based wrongful discharge. 

See Barker v. Scovill, Inc., 6 Ohio St.3d 146, 451 N.E.2d 807 (1983). Under the Barker

standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he or she was a member of the statutorily 

protected class, (2) that he or she was discharged, (3) that he or she was qualified for 

the position, and (4) that he or she was replaced by, or that the discharge permitted the 

retention of, a person not belonging to the protected class. Id.; see also Ackerman v. 

Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir.1982). 

{¶28} Plaintiff has established her prima facie case under the Barker/McDonnell 

Douglas standards: 1) she was 73 years old at the time of her termination, 2) there is no 

dispute that her contract for the fall of 2014 was not renewed, 3) contrary to Defendant’s 

assertion, Plaintiff was qualified for the position, having performed it for over 20 years, 

and 4) she was replaced by someone not belonging to the protected class.1 

{¶29} Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under the disparate 

treatment method, using the McDonnell Douglas standards, a presumption of age 

discrimination is created. Then, similarly to the direct evidence method, the burden of 

production then shifts to the defendant-employer to overcome the presumption of 

discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp.; see also Allen v. Totes/Isotoner Corp., 123 Ohio St.3d 216, 

2009-Ohio-4231, ¶ 4. 

 1Considering her age, the average age of the workforce, and the average age of the Cleveland 

State University Department of Music, hiring someone substantially younger was almost certain to occur. 
Case No. 2014-00918 -8- DECISION 

{¶30} Dr. Browning provided a number of reasons for the termination of Plaintiff. 

When he called Plaintiff to inform her of his decision he told her that her contract would 

not be renewed because her students failed the Gateway Exam. In response to 

Interrogatories by Plaintiff, used to impeach Dr. Browning, he gave the reason of 

unsatisfactory performance as evidenced by: 1) music education students having not 

done well on the Gateway Exam, which they must pass for acceptance into the 

licensure program in the College of Education, 2) students having to take additional 

lessons with [Plaintiff]; 3) junior level music education students not being taught basic 

information that they needed to pass the class; they said they were not told the 

information, 4) Plaintiff’s syllabi pulled for failing to align with prescribed proficiencies for 

the course, she was teaching skills she did not need, and 5) Plaintiff did not change 

teaching materials, even after being asked. 

{¶31} However, during trial, Dr. Browning testified several times that the reason 

for her termination was: for years he had witnessed students taking the Gateway exam 

and, in his opinion, the students performed at an inadequate level. Since Plaintiff was 

the only instructor responsible for those skills, and students either took her course, or 

she tested them out of the course, he believed the low performance was due to 

Plaintiff’s instruction. When questioned about the apparent discrepancy with the reason 

he gave Plaintiff on the phone (students failed the exam), he explained that students 

were passing the Gateway, but below standards which he deemed acceptable. Further, 

Dr. Ziolek testified that Dr. Browning told him the reason he decided not to renew 

Plaintiff’s contract was because she failed to stay current. The Court finds Defendant 

articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. 

{¶32} If a defendant provides a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 

terminating an employee the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of 

material fact exists as to whether the defendant’s reason was merely pretext to hide 

intentional discrimination. To meet this burden, the employee must submit evidence 
Case No. 2014-00918 -9- DECISION 

that an employer’s proffered reason (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate 

the employer's challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged 

conduct. Knepper v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1155, 2011-Ohio-6054, 

¶ 12. See Hall v. Banc One Mgmt. Corp., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-905, 2006-Ohio913, ¶ 31-34 (defining pretext). See also Dautartas v. Abbott Labs., 2012-Ohio-1709 

(10th Dist.). Under any of the three options, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence 

from which the trier of fact could reasonably reject an employer’s explanation and infer 

that the employer intentionally discriminated against him or her. Id. Beyond that, as 

explained later in this decision, Plaintiff must prove that the real reason for the adverse 

employment action was a discriminatory purpose. 

{¶33} Plaintiff proffered evidence regarding Defendant’s reasons for her 

termination. The original reason offered by Dr. Browning, when he called her to 

terminate her contract on June 30, 2014, was that her students had failed the Gateway 

Exam. Both Plaintiff and her significant other, Forest Collins, testified that Dr. Browning 

told Plaintiff the reason he was not renewing her contract was because her students 

had failed the Gateway Exam.2 Dr. Browning testified that he could not recall whether 

he mentioned students failing the Gateway Exam during that phone call. However, he 

did recall telling her the reason he decided not to renew her contract was because for 

13 years he had watched students during the Gateway Exam and in his professional 

opinion students consistently performed at an inadequate level. He testified that this 

was the sole reason for deciding not to renew Plaintiff’s contract. Plaintiff presented 

evidence that the reason stated on the phone had no basis in fact. According to records 

provided by Defendant, all of the students eventually passed the Gateway Exam (some 

requiring retakes on certain sections). Plus, Drs. Chang, Ziolek, and Browning all 

 2Plaintiff and Mr. Collins testified that Dr. Browning used different terminology to describe not 

passing the Gateway Exam; Plaintiff used the word “failed” and Mr. Collins used the word “flunked.” 

However, they both agree that the only reason given for the termination was that students had not passed 

the Gateway Exam. 
Case No. 2014-00918 -10- DECISION 

testified that performance by an instructor’s students on the Gateway exam is not in 

itself a justifiable reason for non-renewing the instructor’s contract. Likewise, regarding 

Plaintiff’s syllabus and teaching materials, Plaintiff admits that she was asked to make 

changes to her syllabus. However, Plaintiff made the requested changes to her 

syllabus and her replacement used an exact copy of the syllabus, and continues to do 

so. Therefore, even though this reason had a basis in fact, it does not seem to be the 

actual motivation for Plaintiff’s termination, nor is it sufficient to warrant the termination. 

{¶34} The Court finds that Dr. Browning’s subjective beliefs were different than 

the standards of Cleveland State University and it is hard for the Court to believe 

Dr. Browning’s stated reasons were the actual reason for his decision to terminate 

Plaintiff. Considering all of the students did in fact end up passing the Gateway exam 

and there was apparently no issue with Plaintiff’s syllabus considering her replacement 

copied it and continues to use it, the Court does not believe Dr. Browning’s stated 

reasons for termination are reasonable or appropriate. However, the Court is not 

tasked with determining what is appropriate or reasonable. The Court is tasked with 

determining whether his decision was the unlawful result of discriminatory intent. 

{¶35} As a general rule, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 

employer and will not second-guess the business judgment of employers regarding 

personnel decisions. Kirsch v. Bowling Green State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 95API11-1476 

(1996). Additionally, in a discrimination case, the Court must examine the employer’s 

motivation, not a Plaintiff’s perceptions. Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 502 (6th 

Cir.1987). Accordingly, just because it may appear unfair or unreasonable does not 

mean that the stated reasons are pretext for discrimination. “Plaintiffs lose if the 

company honestly believed in the nondiscriminatory reasons it offered, even if the 

reasons are foolish or trivial or even baseless.” Hartley v. Wis. Bell, 124 F.3d 887, 890 

(7th Cir.1997). 
Case No. 2014-00918 -11- DECISION 

{¶36} Plaintiff has established that the reasons offered for her termination are 

likely false. However, she must also prove the real reason was discriminatory intent. “A 

reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that 

the reason was false, and the discrimination was the real reason.” Crase v. Shasta 

Beverage, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-519, 2012-Ohio-326, ¶ 21. Federal courts, in 

considering claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, hold that 

in order to prevail on a disparate treatment claim a plaintiff must prove that age was the 

“but-for” cause for the challenged adverse employment action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 

Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177, 129 S. Ct. 2343, 174 L. Ed. 2d 119 (2009). Similarly, Ohio 

courts have held that the “ultimate inquiry” in considering an employment based age 

discrimination case is “whether the plaintiff was a victim of intentional discrimination and 

was subject to an adverse employment decision because of his or her age, i.e., whether 

age was the ‘but for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” (Emphasis sic.) 

Morrissette v. DFS Servs., LLC, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-611, 2013-Ohio-4336 

citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). 

“The Cornerstone of the analysis [whether there was discriminatory intent] is whether 

the employment action is the result of discrimination – not merely whether the action is 

unfair or the justification questionable.” Price v. Matco Tools, Inc., 2007-Ohio-5116, 

¶ 31 (9th Dist.). 

{¶37} “The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” 

Vossman v. AirNet Sys., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-971, 2013-Ohio-4675. Under 

R.C. 4112, a plaintiff alleging age discrimination must show they were terminated 

because of their age. This is referred to as but-for causation. See Smith v. Ohio Dep’t 

of Pub. Safety, 2013-Ohio-4210, 997 N.E.2d 597 (10th Dist.) (“Age discrimination 

cases, like retaliation cases, require proof of but-for causation.”). What Plaintiff must 

prove by a preponderance of the evidence is that she was singled out because of her 
Case No. 2014-00918 -12- DECISION 

age. Scott v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 160 F.3d 1121, 1126 (6th Cir.1998). 

Regardless of which method is used to establish discriminatory intent, Plaintiff must 

show that she was “discharged on account of age.” Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., 75 Ohio 

St.3d 578, 588, 1996-Ohio-265, 664 N.E.2d 1272, citing Kohmescher v. Kroger Co., 61 

Ohio St.3d 501, 575 N.E.2d 439 (1991). 

{¶38} Plaintiff sets out circumstantial evidence which she believes, coupled with 

the established prima facie case, are sufficient to show that Defendant’s reasons were 

pretext and that the real reason was intentional discrimination. First, Defendant 

asserted numerous different conflicting reasons for Plaintiff’s termination. Second, the 

alleged disparity of qualifications and pay rate between Plaintiff and her replacement. 

Third, a comment by Dr. Ziolek in an email that “things are in the hands of younger folks 

now” and the fact that Dr. Ziolek testified that Dr. Browning informed him the reason for 

Plaintiff’s termination was her failure to “stay current.”3 In regards to Dr. Ziolek’s 

comment in the email about the department being in the hands of younger folks, one 

can infer that he simply meant that the new chair runs things differently, or that he is 

commenting on the fact that Dr. Browning is younger than Dr. Ziolek. The Court finds 

no such inference based on this statement that the Department of Music now 

discriminates against older employees. Plaintiff also asserts that Dr. Browning’s 

conduct toward her and others is direct evidence of his discriminatory intent. 

Specifically, many years ago he scheduled an exam in conflict with one of hers, he did 

 3The Court is aware of the well-established principle that phrases such as “staying current” are 

often buzz words for age discrimination. However, as circumstantial evidence, Dr. Browning’s comment 

alone is not sufficient for a finding of discriminatory intent. It can, however, be considered as evidence of 

pretext. The Court cannot reasonably infer that Dr. Browning’s comment was indicative of his age bias. 

During trial Dr. Browning was never asked to confirm this statement nor was he asked what he meant by 

“staying current.” As such, the Court is left to surmise the meaning. In considering this statement and all 

of the remaining circumstantial evidence, the Court can just as reasonably infer that a failure to “stay 

current” is consistent with the other stated reasons for termination, i.e. that Plaintiff failed to upgrade her 

syllabus or course materials. Even though those reasons are likely not the real reason for termination, 

Plaintiff’s inability to “stay current” may be related to her teaching methods and is not inherently related to 

her age. 
Case No. 2014-00918 -13- DECISION 

not respond to her emails, he avoided her, and he was friendly with younger students 

while some older students complained about his behavior. The Court finds no evidence 

of discriminatory intent based on Dr. Browning’s alleged conduct. An inference can be 

drawn that Dr. Browning did not like Plaintiff. However, there is absolutely no evidence 

that his dislike was related to her age. “Mere dislike that is unrelated to the plaintiff’s 

[age] will not support a claim of discrimination.” Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 

2013-Ohio-4210, 997 N.E.2d 597 (10th Dist.), citing Skvarla v. Potter, 109 Fed. Appx. 

790, 801 (7th Cir.2004). Plaintiff also alleges that Dr. Wang, her replacement, was far 

less qualified for the position. However, she did not establish the fact that Dr. Wang 

was less qualified. While Dr. Wang had no teaching experience, she did have a 

doctorate and a substantial amount of experience performing with orchestras and other 

music groups. She was also recommended by a former member of the Cleveland State 

University Music Department. One could draw an inference that the disparity in pay rate 

was related to Dr. Wang’s advanced degrees and had nothing to do with age. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶39} Considering the circumstantial evidence and all of the facts and 

circumstances described by Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her 

burden of proving that Defendant terminated her because of her age. A trier of fact may 

draw more than one inference from the evidence. In this case, several inferences may 

be drawn. Plaintiff’s burden is that she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that the chosen inference was that her termination was based upon her age. She has 

not done so – mere suspicion is not sufficient. This a close case. The Court finds that 

the evidence is equally balanced. Thus, Plaintiff did not meet her burden of 

demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that she was terminated by 

Dr. Browning because of her age. 
Case No. 2014-00918 -14- DECISION 

{¶40} Judgment shall be rendered in favor of Defendant. 

 DALE A. CRAWFORD 

 Judge 
[Cite as Pla v. Cleveland State Univ., 2016-Ohio-3150.]

{¶41} This case was tried to the Court on the issues of liability and damages. 

The Court has considered the evidence and, for the reasons set forth in the decision 

filed concurrently herewith, judgment is rendered in favor of Defendant. Court costs are 

assessed against Plaintiff. The clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment 

and its date of entry upon the journal. 

 DALE A. CRAWFORD 

 Judge 

cc: 

Caryn Markowitz Groedel 

Tiffany Fischbach 

31340 Solon Road, Suite 27 

Cleveland, Ohio 44139 

Lee Ann Rabe 

Randall W. Knutti 

Assistant Attorneys General 

150 East Gay Street, 18th Floor 

Columbus, Ohio 43215-3130 

Filed April 12, 2016 

Sent to S.C. Reporter 5/25/16

MARIA PLA 

 Plaintiff 

 v. 

CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY 

 Defendant 

Case No. 2014-00918 

Judge Dale A. Crawford 

JUDGMENT ENTRY