alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Gabriela GOMEZ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 09-71225.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 21, 2011.

Joubin Nasseri, Nasseri Law Group, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.

Oil, Julia Tyler, Esquire, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. LeFevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Gabriela Gomez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) denial of her second motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, *Perez v. Mukasey,*516 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir.2008), and we deny the petition for review.

*651The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Gomez’s second motion to reopen as untimely and numerically barred where the motion was filed over a year and a half after the BIA’s final administrative order, *see*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Gomez failed to establish changed circumstances in Mexico to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time and numerical bar for filing motions to reopen. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); *see also Malty v. Ashcroft,*381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004) (“The critical question is ... whether circumstances have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate claim for asylum now has a well-founded fear of future persecution.”).

The BIA also did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to reopen as to her cancellation of removal claim, because it correctly determined that Gomez had overstayed the period of voluntary departure, and was therefore statutorily ineligible for the requested relief. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(l); *Granados-Oseguera v. Mukasey,*546 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam).

We grant Gomez’s counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record. The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect that Gomez is proceeding pro se. The Clerk shall serve this order on Gomez at the address provided in the certificate of service: 21 S. Canada St. # B, Santa Barbara, CA 93103.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                      5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS
       
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         17,387
<SECURITIES>                                   0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               4,962,938
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          2,409,499
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   4,999,847
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               96,192
<CGS>                                          0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               67,191
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                29,001
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            14,212
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0
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</TABLE>
#### Bev ORR, Plaintiff-Appellant v. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-30970

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 14, 2011.

Bev Orr, New Orleans, LA, pro se.

Brock Darren Dupre, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Diane Hollenshead Copes, Esq., Stephen Andrew Higginson, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney’s Office, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before KING, BENAVIDES, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appellant Bev Orr appeals from the judgment of the district court dismissing her claim for want of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. In the court below Orr brought inconsistent claims. Orr sought a copy of an agreement allegedly entered into 20 years ago when she had worked as a pharmacist in the United States Army. Orr also claimed that such an agreement did not exist but that the district court should order the Army to enter into an agreement to negotiate a contract to provide her transportation costs for an alleged relocation -that occurred 20 years ago.

Orr cites no authority that would allow the district .court to entertain her suit against the United States for a contract that does not exist. Even assuming such a 20-year old contract exists that requires payment for her transportation costs, a claim against the United States is barred if not timely brought within six years of its accrual. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).

The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED. Orr’s motion to strike portions of the Appellee’s brief is DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 15.1  LOGO CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-156922 and No. 333-149717) of Sims Metal
Management Limited of our report dated 23 August 2012 relating to the financial statements and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in this Form 20-F. /s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers PricewaterhouseCoopers Sydney, Australia October 12, 2012   PricewaterhouseCoopers, ABN 52 780 433 757 Darling Park Tower 2, 201 Sussex
Street, GPO BOX 2650, SYDNEY NSW 1171 DX 77 Sydney, Australia T +61 2 8266 0000, F +61 2 8266 9999, www.pwc.com.au
Exhibit
31.1







CERTIFICATION
OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER





REQUIRED
BY RULE 13A - 14(A) OR RULE 15D - 14(A)





I, Adam
Radly, Chief Executive Officer, certify that:





1.
  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-Q of Inova Technology
Inc.





2.
  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;





3.
  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business
issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;





4.
  The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures
(as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small
business issuer and have:





(a)
 Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within
those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being
prepared;





(b)
 Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and





(c)
 Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small
business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth
fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or
is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting; and





5. The
small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based
on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to
the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of the small
business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):





(a) All
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and




(b)
 Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal
control over financial reporting.





Date:   December
      21, 2009
            /s/Adam
      RadlyChief
      Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Steven Roshan SKILLERN, also known as Heavy D, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-50912

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 8, 2011.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Steven Roshan Skillern, pro se.

Before DAVIS, SMITH and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Steven Roshan Skillern, federal prisoner # 49340-079, has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) in appealing the district court’s order granting his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court has certified that Skillern’s appeal is not taken in good faith. *See Baugh v. Taylor,*117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir.1997).

Skillern argues that his 365-month sentence resulted from the district court’s misinterpretation of his initial sentencing guidelines range and that his 365-month sentence raises a proportionality issue between the original sentence and the amended sentence. He contends that the district court misstated his original sentencing guidelines range, which was 360 months to life imprisonment, and erred in determining that his original sentence of 400 months was at the top of the sentencing guidelines range.

Section 3582(c)(2) permits the discretionary modification of a defendant’s sentence in certain cases where his guidelines range has been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. *United States v. Cooley,*590 F.3d 293, 298 (5th Cir.2009); *United States v. Doublin,*572 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir.), cert. *denied,*— U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 517, 175 L.Ed.2d 366 (2009). Skillern’s argument concerning the district court’s misstatement of his original sentencing guidelines range was rebutted by the district court’s recognition in its order that Skillern’s original sentencing guidelines range was 360 months to life imprisonment. The district court determined that Skillern had been “originally sentenced at the top end of the guidelines range” and did not state that his sentence was the top of the guidelines range.

The district court further stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors in concluding that Skillern was eligible for a reduction of his sentence. The district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the sentence to the guidelines sentence of 365 months.

Skillern has failed to show that he will raise on appeal a nonfrivolous issue with respect to whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that no further reduction of his sentence was warranted. *See Howard v. King,*707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.1983). Accordingly, his motion to proceed IFP is DENIED. *418Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. *See*5th Cir. R. 42.2.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
**EXHIBIT 99.1**
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF2002**
     In connection with the Annual Report ofConsolidated Water Co. Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form10-K/A for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), I, Jeffrey M. Parker, Chief ExecutiveOfficer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
     (1) The Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and
     (2) The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and result of operations of the Company.
Date: June 12, 2003 By: /s/ Jeffrey M. Parker      Name: Jeffrey M. Parker     Title: Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.1

    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the Annual  report on Form 10KSB of ATEL Cash  Distribution
Fund VI, LP, (the "Partnership") for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
and  pursuant  to 18  U.S.C.  ss.1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  ss.906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, I, Dean L. Cash,  Chief  Executive  Officer of ATEL
Financial  Services,  LLC,  general partner of the  Partnership,  hereby certify
that:

1. The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ; and

2. The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.

Date:     3/29/2005



 /s/ Dean Cash
----------------------------------
Dean L. Cash
President and Chief Executive
Officer of General Partner
#### Ronald Gray, Respondent, v Patricia Gray, Appellant.

[664 NYS2d 878]

Crew III, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the *585Supreme Court (Torraca, J.) granting plaintiff a divorce, entered October 2, 1995 in Ulster County, upon a decision of the court.

Plaintiff commenced this action for divorce in October 1993 alleging cruel and inhuman treatment *(see,*Domestic Relations Law § 170 [1]). The parties were married in October 1986 and apparently have no children. Following a nonjury trial, at which plaintiff, defendant and the certified social worker with whom plaintiff had treated appeared and testified, Supreme Court granted plaintiff a divorce upon the stated ground. This appeal by defendant ensued.

We affirm. As the party seeking a divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, plaintiff bore the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the credible evidence *(see generally, Reutenauer v Reutenauer,*229 AD2d 776, 777) that “defendant’s conduct so endangered his physical or mental well-being as to render it unsafe or improper for him to cohabit with her” *(Sim v Sim,*241 AD2d 660, 661). In this regard, Supreme Court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether the acts alleged constitute cruel and inhuman treatment *(see, Gaudette v Gaudette,*234 AD2d 619, 622, *appeal dismissed*89 NY2d 1023) and, as the trier of fact, its decision on this issue will not be overturned lightly on appeal *(see, Sim v Sim, supra,*at 661).

Based upon our review of the record as a whole, we cannot say that Supreme Court abused its discretion in determining that defendant’s conduct indeed rose to the level of cruel and inhuman treatment. Although Supreme Court’s decision does contain two factual errors, plaintiff’s testimony, which Supreme Court plainly credited, regarding the marked change in defendant’s religious beliefs and practices and her ensuing conduct toward plaintiff, his friends and his family, coupled with the testimony of the certified social worker as to the effect that continued cohabitation would be likely to have upon plaintiff, nonetheless is sufficient to sustain the court’s finding of cruel and inhuman treatment. Defendant’s remaining contentions, including her assertion that Supreme Court erred in permitting plaintiff to reopen his case, have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.

Mikoll, J. P., Mercure, White and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
EXHIBIT 11


                        COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
<TABLE>

                                                 THREE MONTHS ENDED             NINE MONTHS ENDED
                                                    September 30,                 September 30,
                                            --------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 2000            1999           2000            1999
                                            --------------------------------------------------------------
<S>                                         <C>             <C>             <C>             <C>
Net (loss) per share - basic and diluted:
     Numerator, net (loss) ..............   $ (1,244,229)   $ (1,657,359)   $ (2,698,181)   $ (3,533,678)
                                            ============================================================

     Denominator, weighted average shares
         Outstanding ....................   $ 16,352,615    $ 11,320,281    $ 16,352,615    $ 11,320,281
                                            ============================================================

Net (loss) per share - basic and diluted:
     Net (loss) per share ...............   $      (0.08)   $      (0.15)   $      (0.16)   $      (0.31)
                                            ============================================================
</TABLE>
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6565

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NEIL CALVIN JOHNSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge. 

(4:07-cr-00900-RBH-1; 4:10-cv-70246-RBH)

Submitted: July 28, 2011 Decided: August 2, 2011

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Neil Calvin Johnson, Appellant Pro Se. Rose Mary Sheppard 

Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Neil Calvin Johnson seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2011) motion. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is 

debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Johnson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
**Exhibit 13.1**
**906 CERTIFICATION**
The certification set forth below is being submitted inconnection with the annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2007 (the“Report”) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of theUnited States Code.
Rafael Mateo A., the Chief Executive Officer and ManuelIrarrázaval A., the Chief Financial Officer of Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A. (“Endesa Chile”),each certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:
 1. the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
 2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of Endesa Chile.
Date: June 6, 2008.
**/**s/ Rafael MateoA.
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATIONS

|I, Charles M. Sprock, certify that:
|-----------------------------------
|                                   
|1.                                 
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|2.                                 
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|3.                                 
|                                   
|4.                                 
|                                   
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|5.                                 
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|Date: |  | May 7, 2007 |  | /s/ Charles M. Sprock                
|----- |  | ----------- |  | -------------------------------------
|      |  |             |  | Charles M. Sprock                    
|      |  |             |  | President and Chief Executive Officer

---