In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: August 21, 2023

S23A0715. ANNUNZIATA v. THE STATE. 

 LAGRUA, Justice.

Appellant Robert Annunziata was tried and convicted of malice 

murder and other crimes in connection with a shooting that took 

place outside of a nightclub that resulted in the death of John Price 

and injuries to Washington Young and Andrew Darling.1 On appeal, 

 1 The crimes occurred on May 25, 2019. On November 19, 2019, a Fulton 

County grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder (Count 1), two counts 

of felony murder (Counts 2 and 3), three counts of aggravated assault with a 

deadly weapon (Counts 4, 5, and 6), possession of a firearm during the 

commission of a felony (Count 7), and possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon (Count 8). Appellant was tried from September 28 to 30, 2021, and the 

jury found him guilty on all counts. Appellant was sentenced to serve life in 

prison without the possibility of parole plus 50 years. The felony murder counts 

were vacated by operation of law, and the aggravated assault count associated 

with Price merged into the malice murder count for sentencing purposes. 

Following his conviction, Appellant filed a motion for new trial on October 29, 

2021 and amended his motion on February 28, 2022. A hearing was held on 

May 3, 2022. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, but vacated Count 

8 after the State conceded that it failed to show evidence of a prior felony 

conviction. Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, and the 

case was initially docketed to this Court’s August 2022 term but was remanded 

to the trial court to complete the record in February 2023. After the record was 
2

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct

the jury on voluntary manslaughter. We disagree and affirm. 

The evidence presented at Appellant’s trial showed that, in the 

early morning hours of May 25, 2019, Appellant arrived at a 

nightclub with two companions. They attempted to enter, but were 

not admitted, causing Appellant to become upset. Sloan Duckie, the 

event organizer, explained to Appellant that Appellant had paid for 

only one entry, and that he would have to pay two additional cover 

charges if he wanted his entire group to get into the nightclub. 

Appellant responded that he wanted a refund for the initial cover 

charge he had paid, so Duckie proceeded to process the refund

through a mobile payment application. Appellant became upset 

because he wanted his refund immediately in cash, despite having 

paid the cover charge electronically. Duckie then explained that it 

would take a few days for the refund to go through, and he could not

give Appellant cash because he had already initiated the electronic 

 

completed, this case was re-docketed to this Court’s April 2023 term and 

submitted for a decision on the briefs.
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refund. Appellant became increasingly agitated. 

Young and Price were working security at the nightclub that 

evening. Young was working just inside the front doors, and Price 

was working outside in front of the nightclub. Young observed the 

interaction between Appellant and Duckie at the entrance to the 

nightclub. As the conversation intensified and “got loud[er],” Price 

approached Appellant and Duckie and told Appellant, “[I]t’s time to 

go.” After Appellant refused to comply with multiple requests to 

leave, Price picked up Appellant, carried him outside, and dropped 

him on the ground. Young testified that Appellant landed on his feet, 

but he “kind of fell backwards.” Surveillance footage from the 

nightclub supported the witnesses’ testimony at trial. Although 

there is no audio, Price and Appellant can be seen engaging in a 

heated exchange on the surveillance footage. Young testified that 

Price came outside and told Appellant: “[I]t’s time to go. Just go 

home.” Price then went inside the nightclub, and Young came 

outside and told Appellant to leave. 

Appellant did not leave as instructed. After Price walked back 
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into the nightclub, Appellant began “egging [Price] on” and 

attempted to reenter the nightclub, telling Price to “come outside.” 

Surveillance footage from the nightclub’s entrance showed

Appellant beckoning to someone inside the nightclub while standing 

outside the entrance; Price coming out of the nightclub and shoving 

Appellant; and Appellant falling into a sign outside the front of the 

entrance to the nightclub. The footage further showed that after 

Appellant regained his footing, he approached his friend and stood 

next to him while Price continued to appear agitated, motioning 

with his hands and speaking to Appellant and his friend. Young 

testified that he heard Appellant say repeatedly to his friend, “Give 

me the ting.” Young testified that he understood “ting” to be West 

Indian slang for “firearm.” Young heard Appellant’s friend tell him, 

“Just wait, not now,” and the two of them walked away from the 

nightclub around the corner of the building. Price re-entered the 

nightclub. 

Young testified that he knew Appellant was “going to come 

back” because “he [was] upset,” so Young took out his pistol and put 
5

it behind his back under his jacket.2 Appellant then came running 

back around the building with a gun in his hand. As Appellant

started running up the stairs toward the entrance to the nightclub 

with a gun drawn, Young told him: “There’s no need for that[.] It’s 

over. Everybody go home and have a good time. Tomorrow is another 

day.” Appellant responded saying, “All right, it’s cool . . . no 

problem,” and initially started to walk away. Young testified that 

Appellant was “really upset,” and while Appellant acted like he was 

leaving, he tried to push past Young and enter the nightclub with 

the gun. Young told everyone standing outside the nightclub to get 

inside, pulled his weapon, and held it behind his back while pushing 

Appellant away from the nightclub. Appellant reached around 

Young and began shooting toward Price and the front entrance of 

the nightclub. Young grabbed Appellant’s gun-wielding arm, and 

Appellant stumbled down the stairs, shooting at Young. A bullet 

grazed the side of Young’s right leg. Appellant and his friend ran, 

 2 Young was licensed to carry a firearm and was routinely armed in his 

role as a security guard. At all times during the course of the evening, Price 

was unarmed. 
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and Young chased them into the nightclub parking lot. Appellant

shot at Young again, and Young returned fire. Appellant and his 

friend got into their vehicle and left the premises. Young heard 

someone say that Price had been shot, so he returned to the 

nightclub to check on Price. Surveillance footage confirmed Young’s 

testimony.

Around 2:00 a.m., Atlanta Police Department officers 

responded to a 911 call of “shots fired” at the nightclub. When they 

arrived, officers found a gunshot victim—later identified as 

Darling—next to the building and rendered aid to him. The officers 

also discovered a deceased victim—later identified as Price—lying 

on the patio outside the nightclub. Price had been shot in the left 

side of his face, and the medical examiner testified that, based on 

the bullet trajectory, his injuries were consistent with crouching on

the ground when he was shot. 

During their investigation, officers obtained a copy of the 

receipt for the refund processed to Appellant. Using the name on the 

receipt, officers were able to access Appellant’s driver’s license and 
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photograph, and they used this photograph in lineups shown to

multiple witnesses at the scene. Three witnesses, including Duckie 

and Young, identified Appellant as the shooter. After Appellant was 

positively identified and officers reviewed the surveillance footage 

from the nightclub, an arrest warrant was issued for Appellant on 

May 26, 2019. Appellant was arrested by the Connecticut State 

Patrol on July 7, 2019, in Stonington, Connecticut, after being pulled 

over for speeding. Appellant was then extradited to Georgia. 

In his sole enumeration of error, Appellant contends that the 

trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary 

manslaughter.3 At trial, Appellant submitted a written request to 

instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. Appellant did not 

testify at trial, and following the close of the evidence, the trial court 

informed the parties that it would not give a voluntary 

manslaughter instruction because the evidence did not support it. 

 3 A person commits voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death 

of another “under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he 

acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting 

from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable 

person[.]” OCGA § 16-5-2 (a).
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Appellant did not object after the jury was charged. 

Because Appellant did not object to the trial court’s refusal to 

instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, we review Appellant’s 

claim of instructional error for plain error and reverse only if (1) the 

instruction was erroneous, (2) the error was obvious, (3) the 

instruction likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and (4)

the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings. See Davis v. State, 312 Ga. 870, 

874 (2) (866 SE2d 390) (2021). See also OCGA § 17-8-58 (b). And we 

need not analyze all of the elements of the plain-error test when, as 

in this case, Appellant has failed to establish one of them. See Early 

v. State, 313 Ga. 667, 672 (2) (b) (872 SE2d 705) (2022) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). Turning to our analysis of whether the trial 

court committed plain error in refusing to give the voluntary 

manslaughter charge, we conclude that there was no error, because, 

as discussed below, the evidence presented did not meet the 

threshold of “slight evidence” necessary to require a jury charge on 

voluntary manslaughter. See Thompson v. State, 312 Ga. 254, 257-
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258 (2) (862 SE2d 317) (2021).

Although a trial court is required to charge the jury on 

voluntary manslaughter if there is “any evidence, however slight” to 

support such a charge, Thompson, 312 Ga. at 257 (1), it is still “a 

question of law for the courts to determine whether the defendant 

presented any evidence of sufficient provocation to excite the 

passions of a reasonable person.” Barton-Smith v. State, 309 Ga. 

799, 801 (2) (848 SE2d 384) (2020). “This is an objective standard, 

and we must evaluate the alleged provocation with respect to its 

effect on a reasonable person, putting aside any peculiar response 

Appellant may have had.” Orr v. State, 312 Ga. 317, 321 (862 SE2d 

513) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). Further, evidence of 

a “violent exchange” or the exchange of angry statements do not 

amount to the serious provocation within the meaning of OCGA

§ 16-5-2 (a). Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 466, 470 (877 SE2d 568) (2022) 

(noting that despite a “violent exchange” between the appellant and 

victim and that the two “had some kind of words,” the interaction 

did not qualify as serious provocation to warrant a voluntary 
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manslaughter charge). Even a physical confrontation between two 

individuals does not necessarily provide the slight evidence 

necessary to require a voluntary manslaughter charge. See Johnson 

v. State, 313 Ga. 698, 700 (873 SE2d 123) (2022) (voluntary 

manslaughter instruction was not warranted when the gunshot 

victim knocked on the front door of the defendant’s mother’s home, 

confronted the defendant for disrespecting his mother, and when 

defendant pulled a gun on the victim, the victim shoved the gun 

away, causing the defendant to fall, become upset, and then shoot 

the victim).

Appellant argues that there was evidence from which the jury 

could have concluded that the shooting was the result of a “sudden, 

violent, and irresistible passion resulting from provocation” because 

Price “physically picked [Appellant] up, took him outside, and 

dropped him, causing [Appellant] to fall backwards,” and then, at 

another point, Price shoved Appellant. However, no evidence was 

presented to show that anything occurred on the night of the 

shootings that rose to the level of the serious provocation necessary 
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to support a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Being tossed out 

of a nightclub after a disagreement about the cover charge would not 

provoke in a reasonable person a “sudden, violent, and irresistible 

passion” to shoot and kill the security guard. OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). See 

Mobley v. State, 314 Ga. 38, 43 (875 SE2d 655) (2022) (holding that, 

because the defendant knew he was not permitted on the victim’s 

premises and had ignored the victim’s demand to leave, the victim’s 

conduct in refusing to let the defendant into her home, arguing with 

the defendant, and shooting the defendant “would not be sufficient 

to excite [a sudden, violent, and irresistible] passion in a reasonable 

person” (emphasis in original)).

Appellant also argues that the “charge conference should not 

have focused on whether or not sufficient time had elapsed for the 

jury to find a ‘cooling off’ had occurred” because “the security video 

showed that only 25 seconds elapsed between when [Appellant] . . . 

began to leave the [nightclub] entrance [] and when he returned with 

a gun,” and the jury could have found that “25 seconds” was not a 

“sufficient interval after the provocation” for Appellant to cool off.
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However, the charge-conference transcript does not reflect that the 

trial court considered the interval between the provocation and the 

shooting in determining there was not slight evidence of serious 

provocation. But, in its order denying the motion for new trial, the 

court clarified that there were two independent and alternative 

grounds for refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter

and that the interval factored into its reasoning as to only one of 

those grounds. Specifically, the court concluded that there was no 

evidence of serious provocation that would “excite [a] sudden, 

violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person,” and the 

court separately concluded that “there was an interval sufficient for 

the voice of reason and humanity to be heard.” See Henderson v. 

State, 234 Ga. 827, 831 (2) (218 SE2d) (1975) (noting that, although 

the jury must determine whether there was an interval between the 

provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and 

humanity to be heard, “it is a question of law for the courts to 

determine whether there was slight evidence that the defendant 

acted as the result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion 
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resulting from serious provocation.”). The court did not consider the 

interval between the provocation and the shooting in determining 

that there was not even slight evidence of serious provocation, and, 

as we concluded above, the court correctly declined to instruct the 

jury on voluntary manslaughter on that basis. Accordingly, we need 

not address the court’s alternative ruling that the charge was 

unwarranted due to a cooling-off period.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.