UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 96-4587

WILLIAM SHANNON BALDRIDGE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.

Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge.

(CR-96-9)

Submitted: August 19, 1997

Decided: September 4, 1997

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Brian A. Glasser, BOWLES, RICE, MCDAVID, GRAFF & LOVE,

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Rebecca A. Betts, United

States Attorney, Miller A. Bushong, III, Assistant United States

Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

A jury found William Shannon Baldridge guilty of conspiracy to

distribute and to possess with intent to distribute anabolic steroids in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994), and the district court sentenced him to imprisonment for six months and supervised release for

three years. Baldridge appeals his conviction and sentence. Baldridge's attorney filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising three issues but asserting

that, in his view, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. We

grant Baldridge's motion to file a supplemental pro se brief, and we

have considered his brief, in which he raises numerous meritless

claims. Because we find the evidence sufficient to support his conviction, when construed in the light most favorable to the Government,

we affirm his conviction and sentence. See United States v. Burgos,

94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that "an

`appellate court . . . must sustain [a] verdict if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, to

uphold it'" (quoting Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978))),

cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1087 (1997).

First, Baldridge claims that his conviction was invalid either

because he conspired with a government agent or because the evidence was insufficient to support it. To the extent that Baldridge challenges the jury's factual finding that he conspired with a nongovernment agent, we find his claim meritless. The record discloses

that Baldridge supplied Raymond Fields with steroids in July 1995,

and September 1995, prior to the time Fields was arrested and became

a government agent. See United States v. Heater , 63 F.3d 311, 323

(4th Cir. 1995). Thus, after reviewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Government, we find that a reasonable jury could

determine that Baldridge conspired with a non-government agent. See

Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862-63.

Baldridge's alternative contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict is also unavailing. The record is

replete with evidence that Baldridge conspired to distribute anabolic

steroids. See id. at 857 (holding that "[t]o prove conspiracy to possess

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[] with intent to distribute, the Government must establish that: (1) an

agreement to possess [] with intent to distribute existed between two

or more persons; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3)

the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became a part of the conspiracy"). The record reveals that in July 1995, and again in September

1995, Baldridge agreed to supply Fields with steroids to sell to a third

party. Thus, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the Government, we find that a rational jury could have found Baldridge guilty of conspiracy. See id. at 862-63.

Next, Baldridge alleges a variance between the indictment and the

evidence produced at trial. We conclude, however, that there was no

variance between the indictment, which charged conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute anabolic steroids, and the

evidence at trial which fully supported such allegations. See United

States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 883 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 1128 (1995). Furthermore, we find that Baldridge failed to make

the required showing that any alleged variance infringed his substantial rights and thereby resulted in actual prejudice. See id. (holding

that "[a] variance constitutes a legitimate grounds for reversal only if

the appellant shows that the variance infringed his"substantial rights"

and thereby resulted in actual prejudice").

Baldridge filed a supplemental pro se brief realleging some of the

same claims that his counsel included in the formal brief and raising

additional meritless claims. To the extent that Baldridge raises ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we find that ineffective assistance does not plainly appear on the face of the record, and therefore

we decline to address the claims. See United States v. DeFusco, 949

F.2d 114, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that ineffective assistance

of counsel claims are generally not cognizable on direct and are more

properly brought in motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2255 (West

1994 & Supp. 1997)). Additionally, Baldridge alleges that a witness

committed perjury and was not credible. However, we do not review

witness credibility. See United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60

(4th Cir. 1989). Finally, we conclude that Baldridge's claims that the

trial judge erred in not dismissing the case and in not sua sponte

directing a verdict in his favor are unavailing. We find that the district

court did not err because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the

conviction. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).

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In accordance with the requirements of Anders , we have examined

the entire record and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Baldridge's conviction and sentence. We deny counsel's motion to withdraw at this time. This court requires that counsel

inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court

of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be

frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was

served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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