alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-7384

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHARLIE THOMPSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at 

Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00286-TDS-1; 1:15-cr00180-TDS-1; 1:16-cv-00879-TDS-JLW)

Submitted: March 8, 2018 Decided: March 14, 2018

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charlie Thompson, Appellant Pro Se. Kyle David Pousson, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Charlie Thompson seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) 

motion. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 

(2012), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1949). 

Because the district court failed to address Thompson’s claim based on Dean v. United 

States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017), the order Thompson seeks to appeal is neither a final order 

nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. See Porter v. Zook, 803 F.3d 694, 696-

97 (4th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand 

the case to the district court for consideration of Thompson’s Dean claim. We express no 

opinion on the merits of any of Thompson’s claims. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED AND REMANDED
#### Lester E. PATRICK, Plaintif—Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 05-16984.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 22, 2008.*

Filed May 2, 2008.

Lester E. Patrick, Stockton, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Joseph E. Maloney, Esq., Bobbie Montoya, USSAC-Offiee of the U.S. Attorney, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.

*668Before: GRABER, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Lester E. Patrick appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of the Department of Veterans Affairs, in his action alleging race discrimination in a promotion decision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for a new trial, *Sanghvi v. City of Claremont,*328 F.3d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 2003), and we affirm.

Patrick contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the verdict was based on perjured testimony and there were numerous inconsistencies in the testimony offered by defendant. Patrick failed to raise many of these issues before the district court, and therefore waived them on appeal. *See A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc. v. County of Monterey,*90 F.3d 333, 338 (9th Cir.1996). To the extent Patrick did not waive, his contentions fail because credibility is an issue for the jury and is not generally subject to appellate review. *See Murray v. Laborers Union Local No. 321,*55 F.3d 1445, 1452 (9th Cir.1995) (“The credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are issues for the jury and are not subject to appellate review.”).

Patrick contends that the evidence in his favor outweighed the verdict, but he failed to address the evidence in support of defendant’s arguments. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. *See Desrosiers v. Flight Intern. of Florida Inc.,*156 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.1998) (“[W]e reverse for a clear abuse of discretion only where there is an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury’s verdict.”).

Patrick contends that the jury was not properly charged, but he failed to object to the instructions before the jury retired. *See Grosvenor Props. Ltd. v. Southmark Corp.,*896 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.1990) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 states that no party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless that party specifically objects to that instruction before the jury retires.”).

Patrick’s remaining contentions, including those regarding alleged juror confusion, the brevity of the deliberations, and entitlement to a 12-member jury, are not persuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND> This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from
Polymer Group, Inc.'s Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 2, 1999 and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         JAN-02-1999
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-04-1998
<PERIOD-END>                              JAN-02-1999
<CASH>                                         58,308
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 111,561
<ALLOWANCES>                                    7,603
<INVENTORY>                                    98,820
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              310,731
<PP&E>                                        820,918
<DEPRECIATION>                                135,909
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              1,282,967
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          98,275
<BONDS>                                       600,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                          320
<OTHER-SE>                                    219,805
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                1,282,967
<SALES>                                       802,948
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              802,948
<CGS>                                         599,894
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 599,894
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             67,444
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                38,100
<INCOME-TAX>                                   14,157
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            23,943
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                               (2,728)
<CHANGES>                                     (1,511)
<NET-INCOME>                                   19,704
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    0.62
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    0.62
        


</TABLE>
Filed 7 / 14 / 14 P. v.Guerrero CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b ). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.111.5.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respon dent,

v.

MICHAEL JASON GUERRERO,

Defendant and Appellant. 2d Crim. No. B252757

(Super. Ct. No. 2012034560)

(Ventura County)

Michael Jason Guerrero appeals from the judgment entered after a jury

convicted him of sale/transpo rtation/offer to sell a controlled substance. (Health & Saf.

Code, § 11352, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced appellant to three years state prison

plus eight months for violating probation in an unrelated case (Case No. 2009047390).

Appellant was ordered to pay a $200 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)), a $200

parole revocation fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.45) a $200 crime lab fee (Health & Saf. Code, §

11372.5, subd. (a)) and a $600 drug program fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7, subd. (a)).

We appointed counsel to represent appellant in this appeal. After counsel’s

examination of the record, she filed an opening brief in which no issues were raised.

On May 1, 2014, we advised appellant that he had 30 days within which to

person ally submit any contentions or issues he wished us to consider. No response has been

received.2 We have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied that appellant's attorney

has fully complied with her responsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. ( People v.

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 126.)

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

PERREN, J.3 Patricia M. Murphy, Judge

Superior Court County of V entura

______________________________

Patricia A. Malone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

No appearance for Respondent.
Exhibit 31.1

I, Steve Careaga, CEO of the Company, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Reality Wireless
Networks, Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:

      a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

      b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this
quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

      c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation
as of the Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):

      a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial data and have identified for the
registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

      b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and

6. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have indicated in this
quarterly report whether there were significant changes in internal controls or
in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to
the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with
regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.



Dated:  May 13, 2005          /s/ Steve Careaga
                              -----------------------
                              Its:  Chief Executive Officer, Principal Financial
                              Officer/Acting Chief Financial Officer, Director
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

JUAN M. VILLANUEVA, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 353 MAL 2015 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 17th day of December, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is DENIED.
Exhibit 32.2


CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the period ended December 31, 2009 of Dutch Gold Resources, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the “Company”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Steven Keaveney, Chief Financial Officer of the Company certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





2. The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.





Date: August 25, 2011





/s/Steven KeaveneySteven Keaveney, Chief Financial officer, Director(principal accounting officer)
Exhibit 32.1



SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the quarterly report of Emergency Filtration Products, Inc. (the ACompany@) on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the AReport@), I, Douglas K. Beplate, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:



(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





/s/ Douglas K. Beplate

Douglas K. Beplate, Principal Executive Officer



Date: May 10, 2006





A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 99.1

|Exhibit
Number |  |  |  | 
|-------------- |  |  |  | 
|99.1           |  |  |  | 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Spectrum Bancorporation, Inc ("Spectrum") on Form 10-Q for the three month period ended
September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Deryl F. Hamann, Chief Executive Officer of Spectrum, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



/s/DERYL F. HAMANNDeryl F. Hamann,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer


---

QuickLinks
Exhibit 10.9
 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
FOR
ROBERT J. KING, JR.
 
 WHEREAS
 WHEREAS
 NOW, THEREFORE
 1. POSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES
  2. TERM AND ANNUAL REVIEW
 Term.




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##### 



Annual Review
 3. PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES
  4. COMPENSATION AND REIMBURSEMENT
 Base Salary
 Bonus and Incentive Compensation
  2




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##### 



Benefit Plans
 Vacation and Leave
 Expense Reimbursements
 Restricted Stock Grant
 5. WORKING FACILITIES
   3




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##### 



6. TERMINATION AND TERMINATION PAY
 Death
 Retirement
 Disability
   Termination for Cause
      4




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Voluntary Termination by Executive
 Termination Without Cause or With Good Reason
   5




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6




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##### 



Termination and Board Membership
 Section 409A
 Section 280G
 7. NOTICE
 Notice of Termination
 Date of Termination
  7




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##### 



Good Faith Resolution
 8. POST-TERMINATION OBLIGATIONS
 Non-Solicitation
 Confidentiality
  8




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Information/Cooperation
 Reliance .
 9. SOURCE OF PAYMENTS/RELEASE
     9




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10. REQUIRED REGULATORY PROVISIONS
        10




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11. NO ATTACHMENT
  12. ENTIRE AGREEMENT; MODIFICATION AND WAIVER
    13. SEVERABILITY
  14. HEADINGS FOR REFERENCE ONLY
  15. GOVERNING LAW
   11




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##### 



16. ARBITRATION
  17. PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES
  18. INDEMNIFICATION
 Indemnification
 Insurance
 19. SUCCESSORS AND ASSIGNS
   12




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##### 



SIGNATURES
 
 PARK VIEW FEDERAL SAVINGS BANKBy:Date
    
    
    
    
    
    Chairman of the BoardPVF CAPITAL CORP.By:Date
    
    
    
    
    
    Chairman of the BoardDate
    
    
    
    
    
    Robert J. King, Jr.
  13
#### Nancy J. Cavanagh, as Executrix of Richard D. Cavanagh, Deceased, Respondent, v 133-22nd Street Jackson Heights, Inc., Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 702]

—In an action for a judgment declaring that the defendant’s consent is not required prior to the assignment of the decedent’s proprietary lease and the transfer of his shares in the defendant cooperative corporation, the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dye, J.), dated February 21, 1997, which, *inter alia,*declared that the defendant’s consent was not required.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for entry of a judgment declaring that the plaintiff may not assign the decedent’s proprietary lease or transfer his shares in the defendant cooperative corporation without obtaining the defendant’s written consent.

The plaintiffs decedent was a shareholder/lessee in a building owned by the defendant cooperative corporation. His proprietary lease provides that the lease may not be assigned without the written consent of the cooperative corporation. In accordance with paragraph 18 of the proprietary lease, the plaintiff, the executrix of the decedent’s estate, is bound by its terms, which include the restriction on assignment.

*482The Supreme Court’s reliance on the case of *Francis v Ferguson*(246 NY 516) to hold otherwise was misplaced. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that the executors of the estate of a deceased tenant were not bound by a covenant in a commercial lease prohibiting assignment without consent despite the existence of a general clause binding the parties and their legal representatives to the terms of the lease. We do not find the rule in *Ferguson*to be applicable in this case.

*Francis v Ferguson (supra)*involved a commercial, not a proprietary lease. In that case, the landlord had the right to arbitrarily refuse consent for any reason or no reason at all *(see, Mann Theatres Corp. v Mid-Island Shopping Plaza Co.,*94 AD2d 466, 470, *affd*62 NY2d 930). She could therefore prevent the estate from disposing of the lease as an asset while burdening the estate with the payment of rent for the balance of the lease term. The Court of Appeals would not permit such interference with the orderly and prompt administration of the estate in the absence of specific language dictating that result *(see, Francis v Ferguson, supra,*at 519).

The reasoning underlying the Ferguson decision is inapplicable here. The plaintiff is not precluded from disposing of an estate asset. While the defendant’s board of directors has broad decision-making authority, it cannot act arbitrarily, as it owes a fiduciary duty to its shareholders/lessees and must act in good faith *(see, Matter of Levandusky v One Fifth Ave. Apt. Corp.,*75 NY2d 530, 537-538). Consequently, there is no reason to create a special rule which would, in effect, exempt an executor from the restrictions which apply to other holders of proprietary leases. Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Thompson and Altman, JJ., concur. *[See,*171 Misc 2d 217.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

NICHOLAS MULLINS,

Petitioner

v.

SANDS BETHLEHEM GAMING, LLC 

D/B/A SANDS CASINO RESORT 

BETHLEHEM,

Respondent

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 441 MAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 11th day of December, 2018, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
Exhibit 32.2

TELETOUCH COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

OFFICERS CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. 1350)

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of TELETOUCH COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (the Company) for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Douglas E. Sloan, Interim Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to the best of his knowledge:

1. The Report is in full compliance with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operation of the Company.



|                               
|-------------------------------
|                               
|/s/ Douglas E. Sloan           
|Douglas E. Sloan               
|Interim Chief Financial Officer
|September 13, 2006
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 200 (Wednesday, October 18, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 48513]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-22548]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION


Notice to All Interested Parties of the Termination of the 
Receivership of 10445--Putnam State Bank, Palatka, Florida

    Notice is hereby given that the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) as Receiver for Putnam State Bank, Palatka, Florida 
(``the Receiver'') intends to terminate its receivership for said 
institution. The FDIC was appointed Receiver of Putnam State Bank on 
June 15, 2012. The liquidation of the receivership assets has been 
completed. To the extent permitted by available funds and in accordance 
with law, the receiver will be making a final dividend payment to 
proven creditors.
    Based upon the foregoing, the receiver has determined that the 
continued existence of the receivership will serve no useful purpose. 
Consequently, notice is given that the receivership shall be 
terminated, to be effective no sooner than thirty days after the date 
of this notice. If any person wishes to comment concerning the 
termination of the receivership, such comment must be made in writing 
and sent within thirty days of the date of this notice to: Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Division of Resolutions and 
Receiverships, Attention: Receivership Oversight Department 34.6, 1601 
Bryan Street, Dallas, TX 75201.
    No comments concerning the termination of this receivership will be 
considered which are not sent within this time frame.

    Dated: October 13, 2017.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-22548 Filed 10-17-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6714-01-P