1998 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

5-22-1998

Lauria v. Natl RR Passenger

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 97-1306,97-1361,97-1362,97-1363

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Recommended Citation

"Lauria v. Natl RR Passenger" (1998). 1998 Decisions. Paper 117.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/117
Filed May 22, 1998 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

Nos. 97-1306, 97-1361, 97-1362, 97-1363 

FRANK LAURIA, 

 Appellant in Appeal No. 

 97-1306 

v. 

NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION, 

 Appellant in Appeal Nos. 

 97-1361/62/63 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

(D.C. Civil No. 95-1561) 

Argued: March 17, 1998 

Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL, and SEITZ, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion Filed: May 22, 1998) 

 Marvin I. Barish 

 Stacey E. Barish (ARGUED) 

 Marvin I. Barish Law Offices, P.C. 

 The Curtis Center, Suite 801 

 Sixth & Walnut Streets 

 Philadelphia, PA 19106 

 Attorneys for Appellant, Cross- 

 Appellee 
 David E. Faust 

 Andrew J. Connolly (ARGUED) 

 Sheila A. Haren 

 Post & Schell, P.C. 

 1800 JFK Blvd., 19th Floor 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 Attorneys for Appellee, 

 Cross-Appellant 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 

Appellant Frank Lauria and two railyard co-workers were 

traversing the railroad tracks near Philadelphia's 30th 

Street Station late one evening when Lauria slipped and 

injured himself. He sued his employer, Appellee National 

Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), under the 

Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. S 51, et seq., 

("FELA"), claiming a workplace injury caused by Amtrak's 

failure to provide a reasonably safe work environment. At 

trial, the district court refused to permit the admission of 

expert and lay opinion testimony, and at the close of 

Lauria's case it entered a judgment as a matter of law in 

favor of Amtrak. We have jurisdiction over the district 

court's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we will 

reverse and remand for a new trial. 

I. 

On November 8, 1993, Lauria slipped while crossing the 

tracks at Amtrak's Penn Coach Yard in Philadelphia with 

two co-workers, Campbell Smith, an engineer, and Carl 

Boselli, a conductor. Lauria testified that because they were 

crossing a "dark" railyard with "poor" lighting conditions, 

he was trying to step on the ballast, the coarse gravel that 

is used to form the bed of the railroad, rather than on the 

rail ties themselves, because it provides stable footing and 

support between the tracks. However, Lauria lost his 

balance and fell on Track 26 while trying to step over the 

ties. He stated under oath that he raised his left foot, lifted 

 2 
it over the rail, and set it firmly on the ballast. He then 

lifted his right foot, but he slipped when trying to place that 

foot down on the ballast, and he fell to the ground, 

developing sharp pains in his right leg and lower back 

before losing consciousness. Lauria admitted that he never 

saw what caused the fall, but he testified that he had 

stepped on "something slippery," rather than on the ballast 

that is usually found between the two rail ties on the 

tracks. 

Boselli testified that he was standing an "arm's length" 

from Lauria when the accident occurred. Boselli saw Lauria 

fall, heard him "smack" onto the ground, and felt "baffled" 

because Lauria "fell violently." Immediately after the 

accident, Boselli looked down and saw a "fresh" skid mark 

on the surface of a piece of wood that was lying inside the 

gauge of the track where the ballast providing stable footing 

would normally be found. The wood was in the exact area 

where Lauria had slipped, and the skid mark was at the 

precise spot where the fall had occurred. Boselli also 

noticed that the lighting conditions were "poor," because 

the overhead lights did not sufficiently illuminate the area 

where Lauria fell, and because the trains "were blocking the 

passage of what lights did exist." 

Lauria attempted to offer Robert T. Slavin, a track

foreman and maintenance engineer, to support his case as 

an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. 

Slavin was prepared to testify that Amtrak's negligence in 

failing to remove a piece of wood from the tracks had 

contributed to and caused Lauria's injuries. However, the 

district court found that Slavin was not sufficiently 

qualified as an expert on track maintenance operations, 

and it refused to allow him to render an opinion. The court 

also rejected Lauria's effort to introduce Slavin as a lay 

witness pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701. As a 

result, Lauria sought to recall Boselli as a lay opinion 

witness to testify about the condition of the tracks on the 

morning after the accident. Once again, though, the district 

court denied Lauria's request under Rule 701 and 

precluded the witness from testifying. Amtrak then moved 

for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 50(a), arguing that without the testimony of 

 3 
Slavin and Boselli, Lauria had presented no evidence that 

Amtrak's negligence had contributed to his injuries. The 

district court agreed, and on March 27, 1997, it dismissed 

Lauria's claims and entered judgment in favor of Amtrak at 

the close of Lauria's case. 

Lauria contends on appeal that the district court abused 

its discretion in excluding the testimony of Slavin and 

Boselli and erred in entering a judgment in Amtrak's favor.1 

We need not reach the issue of the correctness of the 

district court's ruling on the motion for judgment as a 

matter of law, because we conclude that Lauria's failure to 

produce evidence of negligence resulted from the improper 

exclusion of testimony from Slavin and Boselli that was 

clearly admissible.2 Therefore, we will reverse and remand 

for a new trial at which Slavin and Boselli may testify on 

Lauria's behalf. 

II. 

The district court incorrectly prohibited Slavin from 

testifying as an expert witness. Federal Rule of Evidence 

702 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 

understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 

witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 

_________________________________________________________________ 

1. We review the district court's decisions to exclude expert testimony 

under Rule 702, and to exclude lay opinion testimony under Rule 701, 

for abuse of discretion. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 

829, 856 n.33 (3d Cir. 1990) (expert testimony); Government of the V.I. 

v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 1993) (lay opinion testimony). 

2. Although we need not decide the propriety of the court's judgment as 

a matter of law based on the evidence before it, we note that it is a 

close 

question given the minimal proof required to withstand a directed verdict 

in FELA cases combined with Lauria's evidence as to poor lighting in the 

railyard. See Pehowic v. Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co., 430 F.2d 697, 

699-700 (3d Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) (holding 

that a "trial court is justified in withdrawing[FELA] issues from the 

jury's consideration only in those extremely rare instances where there 

is a zero probability either of employer negligence or that any such 

negligence contributed to the injury of an employee"). 

 4 
form of an opinion or otherwise." The Rule therefore has 

three fundamental requirements: (1) the proffered witness 

must qualify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education; (2) the expert must testif y to 

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge; and 

(3) the expert's testimony must assist the trier o f fact. 

United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 849 (3d Cir. 1995). 

Here, the district court appears to have excluded Slavin's 

testimony based on the first two elements of the test, 

evincing skepticism as to both the extent of Slavin's 

qualifications and as to whether he possessed specialized 

knowledge.3 

Lauria offered Slavin as an expert in track maintenance 

based on his experience and education in "Maintenance of 

Way" and related train procedures. Slavin's expert report 

contained his opinion that, from an examination of photos 

and the site, the piece of wood in question was a"base tie" 

over which a walkway platform once existed; that it should 

have been discovered by Amtrak during a regular 

inspection and removed; and that it "contributed to and 

caused" Lauria's injuries.4 

_________________________________________________________________ 

3. The district court's colloquy with Slavin, set forth below, could be 

interpreted as questioning either the first element of the Rule -- whether 

Slavin qualified as an expert by virtue of his special knowledge -- or 

both of the Rule's first two prongs -- his experience and the nature and 

extent of his knowledge regarding track maintenance. We will construe 

it based on the latter, believing that to be the approach most consistent 

with the nature of the court's inquiry. 

4. At oral argument Amtrak argued that the district court properly 

excluded Slavin's testimony, because Slavin could not testify as to 

causation since he was not an expert in accident reconstruction. 

However, this argument misconstrues the district court's ruling, which 

never reached this issue, but focused instead on the extent of his 

"specialized knowledge" as it relates to qualifying him to be an expert 

witness. No mention was made of the last sentence of Slavin's report 

regarding his stated view that Amtrak's failure"to provide a reasonably 

safe place in which to perform his duties contributed to and caused 

Lauria's injury." We thus focus only on Slavin's qualifications and 

specialized knowledge in the area of industry standards for track 

maintenance. It will be for the district court to examine whether Slavin 

is qualified to speak to the issue of causation if Amtrak makes this 

objection at a new trial. 

 5 
Lauria proffered evidence as to the extent of Slavin's 

experience in railroad track operations. Slavin had worked 

for Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") from 1976 to 

1993, where he was hired as a trackman and then 

promoted to machine operator, assistant supervisor, and, in 

1981, to supervisor of railroad tracks. As a supervisor, 

Slavin assumed ultimate responsibility for conditions on a 

200-300 mile stretch of track located in Indiana. Among 

other things, he oversaw maintenance of the track 

structure, installation of the rail ties, and rehabilitation of 

all switches, and he was responsible for records, 

chargeouts, and safe maintenance of the area. Slavin also 

successfully completed training programs for track 

foremen, maintenance and way engineers, equipment 

operators, and supervisors during his seventeen-year 

tenure at Conrail. In addition, he had been self-employed 

as a railroad track safety consultant since 1993. 

In pretrial proceedings, the district court had denied 

Amtrak's motion in limine to exclude Slavin's testimony. 

See Lauria v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., No. Civ. A. 

95-1561, 1997 WL 138906, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. March 24, 

1997). However, after listening to the voir dire, and asking 

its own questions, the district court rejected Lauria's 

_________________________________________________________________ 

We note, however, that counsel for Lauria stated at oral argument that 

Slavin's work in accident reconstruction over the last five years did 

provide a basis for his expert status on causation, and that a number of 

federal courts have permitted experts qualified because of their 

specialized knowledge to testify as to the cause of railroad accidents. 

See, 

e.g., Lowery v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. , 891 F.2d 1187, 1194 & n.3 

(5th Cir. 1990) (witness with ten years experience as train master, 

operating rules examiner, manager of railroad car repair, and inspector 

of railroad equipment was qualified as an expert on whether hand brake 

operations could cause personal injuries); Fritts v. Toledo Terminal R.R. 

Co., 293 F.2d 361, 364 (6th Cir. 1961) (engineer with forty years of 

railroad experience could testify that worn frogs, or railroad track 

devices, caused a train to lurch, because "[q]ualified persons as 

experienced railroad employees may testify and express opinions on 

matters of this type"); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Simmons, 

153 F.2d 206, 208-09 (10th Cir. 1946) (locomotive engineers with 

experience operating trains qualified as experts to testify as to whether 

the presence of caliche rock caused a train derailment). 

 6 
request to introduce Slavin at trial as a qualified expert on 

track maintenance.5 The court's examination of Slavin 

proceeded in relevant part as follows: 

The Court: Now the first question, do you consider yourself 

 qualified by reason of your scientific 

 education? Do you feel yourself qualified to

 testify as an expert based on your technical

 knowledge by reason of education or 

 experience and if so would you be specific as to 

 what you think that is? Technical knowledge.

Slavin: I believe so with the hands-on experience that I've 

 had over the years working with track and track 

 equipment and maintenance and production, yes, 

 I -- 

The Court: You consider that to be your specialized

 knowledge? 

Slavin: Yes. 

The Court: And what separates you from other persons 

 who have worked for twenty years on the 

 railroad? Would all of those . . . ladies or

 gentlemen who have had the same experience 

 -- work experience as you, in your mind, sir, 

 do you consider them to be persons who have 

 the type of technical or specialized knowledge 

 who can come into a court of law and give 

 answers to hypothetical questions like a doctor 

 does? 

Slavin: I believe so. 

The Court: And why is that? What is so unusual about 

 working the rails as you have over the years

 which gives persons who had that experience 

 specialized knowledge of the type that would

 enable them to offer an opinion, to 

 hypothecate? 

_________________________________________________________________ 

5. Under Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), the trial judge decides the preliminary 

questions of whether the proposed expert is qualified and whether the 

testimony is admissible. 

 7 
Slavin: I don't have an answer for that. 

The Court: And that's my dilemma. . . . I'm not qualifying 

 him as an expert. . . . I don't see any basis to 

 qualify him as an expert. 

We must exercise restraint in examining the district 

court's decision on appeal, because a "trial court's 

determination whether to admit or exclude expert testimony 

will be upheld unless manifestly erroneous." Waldorf v. 

Shuta, ___ F.3d ___, Nos. 97 5195, 97-5222, 1998 WL

173103, at *27 (3d Cir. Apr. 15, 1998) (quotation omitted). 

Nevertheless, we find that in light of Slavin's qualifications 

and the liberal standard for determining whether a witness 

qualifies as an expert for purposes of Rule 702, the district 

court did err in precluding Slavin from testifying. 6 

We have consistently maintained that Rule 702 is to be 

interpreted liberally. See, e.g., Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 849; In 

re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 855 (3d Cir. 

1990) ("Paoli I"). "[A] broad range of knowledge, skills, and 

training qualify an expert as such," and we have thus 

"eschewed imposing overly rigorous requirements of 

expertise and have been satisfied with more generalized 

qualifications." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 

741 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Paoli II"). 

In fact, "it is an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony 

simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed 

expert to be the best qualified or because the proposed 

expert does not have the specialization that the court 

considers most appropriate." Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. 

Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Paoli I, 916 

F.2d at 855 (writing that any "insistence on a certain kind 

of degree or background is inconsistent with our 

jurisprudence"). We have held that witnesses such as 

Slavin can qualify as experts under Rule 702 on the basis 

of practical experience alone, and a formal degree, title, or 

educational speciality is not required. American Tech. 

_________________________________________________________________ 

6. Because we hold that Slavin should have been permitted to testify as 

an expert witness, we do not reach Lauria's contention that Slavin 

should have been permitted to testify alternatively as a lay witness 

pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 701. 

 8 
Resources v. United States, 893 F.2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 

1990). For example, in Hammond v. Int'l Harvester Co., we 

held that a witness who sold agricultural equipment and 

taught automobile repair and maintenance at a high 

school, but who lacked any formal training or education, 

could testify as an expert in a products liability action 

involving tractors, based on his "knowledge and experience" 

alone. 691 F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir. 1982). Similarly, we held 

recently that a witness could qualify as a vocational expert, 

despite a lack of formal training, because he had experience 

in vocational rehabilitation and familiarity with the relevant 

literature in his field. Waldorf, #6D6D 6D# F.3d ___, 1998 WL 

173103, at *27; see also United States v. Riccobene, 709 

F.2d 214, 230-31 (3d Cir. 1983) (concluding that an FBI 

agent qualified as an expert to define certain terms on 

undercover audiotapes because of his twelve years of 

practical experience in organized crime investigations), 

overruled on other grounds by Griffin v. United States, 502 

U.S. 46 (1991); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 

Weinstein's Federal Evidence S 702.06[4], at 702-39 (2d ed. 

1997) ("A person may qualify as an expert on the basis of 

skill or practical experience rather than education or 

training."). We conclude that Slavin's twenty years of 

experience with track equipment, maintenance, and safety 

procedures qualified him as an expert who could testify as 

to Amtrak's responsibility to inspect and maintain the track 

in a safe condition. 

Additionally, the knowledge forming the basis of Slavin's 

opinion was clearly "specialized." In evaluating this second 

element of Rule 702, we measure the reliability or 

trustworthiness of the expert's testimony. Velasquez, 64 

F.3d at 849. However, the "specialized" knowledge upon 

which Slavin's testimony is founded is not the same as 

"scientific" and "technical" knowledge, as these terms are 

used in the disjunctive in Rule 702. To be "specialized," 

knowledge can be based on sufficient practical or work 

experience in the field about which the witness is testifying, 

and it need not be based on testing or experiments beyond 

common understanding. Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory 

committee's note; Habecker v. Copperloy Corp. , 893 F.2d 

49, 51-52 (3d Cir. 1990). Therefore, we need only ask 

whether Lauria has shown that Slavin's testimony would be 

 9 
reliable or trustworthy in light of Slavin's practical 

background and training.7 We conclude that given Slavin's 

twenty years of experience in track maintenance, 

operations, and safety, and given the nature of his opinion 

and the liberal standard by which we interpret reliability 

under Rule 702, Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 849-50, Lauria has 

clearly met his burden to demonstrate that Slavin's

testimony would be sufficiently reliable so as to be 

admissible. 

We also find that the third element under Rule 702,

namely, that Slavin's testimony would assist the trier of 

fact, is clearly met. As the Supreme Court has written, this 

"condition goes primarily to relevance." Daubert v. Merrell 

Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). The proffered 

expert's testimony must "fit" under the facts of the case so 

that "it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute." Id. 

(quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d 

Cir. 1985)). Once again, however, the standard for this 

factor "is not that high," Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 745, and we 

find that it has been met in the case at bar. The primary 

issue here is whether Amtrak was negligent in failing to 

remove a base tie from Lauria's workplace. Slavin was the 

only witness originally presented to testify that the tie was 

a dangerous obstruction that should have been discovered 

and removed, and was the only such witness who would 

have asserted that Amtrak's negligence made the workplace 

unsafe. There is, therefore, a clear "fit" connecting the issue 

_________________________________________________________________ 

7. This case does not require us to test the reliability of Slavin's 

opinion 

with the factors outlined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 

579 (1993). Whether Daubert even applies outside the scientific context 

remains in dispute. See, e.g., id. at 590 n.8 (noting that the opinion was 

"limited to the scientific context because that[was] the nature of the 

expertise" offered in the case); Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 

991 (5th Cir. 1997) (Daubert is applicable to cases involving specialized 

knowledge); United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(Daubert's standards "simply do not apply" to experts with specialized 

knowledge). We do not, however, need to resolve that controversy here. 

Because Slavin's opinion is based on his observations and familiarity 

with "Maintenance of Way Procedures" and is gleaned from years of 

practical experience, the discipline in this case is so different from a 

scientific inquiry that we see no need to engage in a detailed analysis 

regarding the scientific reliability of the proffered opinion. 

 10 
in the case with the expert's opinion, which will aid the jury 

in determining whether the defendant's conduct met the 

standard of care. Consequently, we conclude that Slavin 

should have been permitted to testify. 

Finally, we note that because Slavin was the only witness 

originally offered to prove Amtrak's negligence with respect 

to the base tie, his exclusion from the trial did not 

constitute harmless error. The exclusion of expert evidence 

will be upheld as harmless error only where it is"highly 

probable" that the error did not affect the judgment in the 

district court. Holbrook, 80 F.3d at 787. After reviewing 

Slavin's proffered testimony, as well as the basis for the 

district court's ruling, we cannot say that it is"highly 

probable" that the error in this case did not contribute to 

the entry of a judgment in Amtrak's favor. 

III. 

We also conclude that the district court abused its

discretion in rejecting Lauria's request to recall Boselli as a 

witness to render a lay opinion under Rule 701. Once the 

district court rebuffed Lauria's attempt to introduce Slavin 

as an expert witness, Lauria sought to have Boselli testify 

about the condition of the tracks as he perceived them on 

the morning after the accident. The record indicates that 

Boselli would have opined that Lauria slipped on an extra 

piece of wood that was located between the tracks in an 

area where train employees would ordinarily expect to find 

ballast. However, after discussing the matter with the 

parties, the district court concluded that Boselli could "add 

nothing more as a lay witness," and it denied Lauria's 

request to recall him to the stand because, in its view, 

Boselli had "no information to give to the jury which would 

in any way, shape, or form aid them in their determination 

regarding the location of the fall and what caused the fall." 

We disagree. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 states: 

 If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' 

 testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is 

 limited to those opinions or inferences which are 

 (a) rationally based on the perception of the witn ess 

 11 
 and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the wi tness' 

 testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 

The district court did not view Boselli's proffered testimony 

as helpful to the determination of Amtrak's negligence, and 

it thus prohibited Boselli from testifying based on the 

language in Rule 701(b). Yet we believe that the standard 

for admissibility under that provision is liberal enough to 

allow Lauria to recall Boselli in support of his case-in-chief. 

We have noted concerning the admissibility of lay opinion 

testimony that the "modern trend favors the admission of 

opinion testimony, provided that it is well founded on 

personal knowledge and susceptible to specific crossexamination." Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 620 F.2d 

399, 403 (3d Cir. 1980). Therefore, an opinion is"helpful" 

to the trier of fact within the meaning of Rule 701(b) if it 

aids or clarifies an issue that the jury would not otherwise 

be as competent to understand. See United States v. Skeet, 

665 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Opinions of non-experts 

may be admitted where the facts could not otherwise be 

adequately presented or described to the jury in such a way 

as to enable the jury to form an opinion or reach an 

intelligent conclusion.") As long as the "circumstances can 

be presented with greater clarity by stating an opinion, then 

that opinion is helpful to the trier of fact." Government of 

the V.I. v. Knight, 989 F.2d 619, 629 (3d Cir. 1993). 

Boselli's opinion that Lauria slipped on an extra piece of 

wood on the tracks easily satisfies these permissive 

standards. His testimony would have shown the existence 

of an unforseen obstruction in the exact location where 

Lauria fell, which, in turn, could have assisted the jury in 

determining whether the wood posed an unreasonable 

danger to railroad employees crossing the tracks. 

Regardless of what other evidence had been presented at 

trial, Boselli's statements would have informed the jury as 

to issues of track maintenance and safety encountered in 

the ordinary course, and would have identified a potential 

hazard that was central to Lauria's theory of negligence. 

Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that Boselli lacked 

the experience or specialized knowledge needed to render 

an opinion on this issue. In this regard, the instant case 

differs materially from Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor 

 12 
Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1201 (3d Cir. 1995), where we held 

that lay opinions on technical matters such as causation 

"must derive from a sufficiently qualified source as to be 

reliable and hence helpful to the jury." 

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by 

prohibiting Lauria from recalling Boselli to the stand, 

because Boselli's lay opinion testimony certainly would 

have been "helpful" to the "determination of a fact in issue" 

within the meaning of Rule 701. Also, given the substance 

of Boselli's proffered testimony in the context of Lauria's 

case, we cannot conclude that the court's error in excluding 

Boselli's testimony was harmless. See Holbrook , 80 F.3d at 

787. 

IV. 

Amtrak has filed a cross-appeal challenging several of the 

district court's rulings, but we reject these contentions 

because we agree substantially with the reasoning of the 

district court. We will thus affirm the February 19, 1997, 

denial of Amtrak's renewed motion for summary judgment, 

the March 24, 1997, denial of Amtrak's motion in limine to 

exclude the testimony of John Mariani, D.O., I. David 

Weisband, D.O., and Robert T. Slavin, and the March 24, 

1997, grant of Lauria's motion in limine to exclude Slavin's 

personnel and medical records. 

V. 

The district court abused its discretion by excluding the 

testimony of Robert T. Slavin as an expert witness, and by 

prohibiting Lauria from recalling Carl Boselli to the stand 

as a lay opinion witness. Accordingly, the district court's 

Order dated March 27, 1997, will be reversed, and the 

cause will be remanded for a new trial consistent with this 

opinion. 

A True Copy: 

Teste: 

 Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 

 for the Third Circuit 

 13