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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

310 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. GNANAPRAKASAM

Cite as 310 Neb. 519

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Samraj 

Gnanaprakasam, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed December 3, 2021. No. S-21-246.

1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court’s 

determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial 

grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless 

clearly erroneous.

2. Courts: Appeal and Error. The district court and higher appellate 

courts generally review appeals from the county court for error appearing on the record.

3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors 

appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms 

to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, 

capricious, nor unreasonable.

4. Speedy Trial. To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court 

must exclude the day the complaint was filed, count forward 6 months, 

back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) to determine the last day the defendant can 

be tried.

5. Speedy Trial: Indictments and Informations: Complaints. Although 

the speedy trial statutes expressly refer to indictments and informations, 

they also apply to prosecutions commenced by the filing of a complaint 

in county court.

6. Speedy Trial: Misdemeanors: Warrants: Arrests. For misdemeanor 

offenses where an “intimate partner” is an element of the offense, the 

6-month period in which an accused is to be brought to trial commences 

the date the defendant is arrested on a complaint filed as part of a warrant for arrest.

7. Speedy Trial: Proof. The burden of proof is upon the State to show by 

the greater weight of the evidence that one or more of the excluded time 

periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) are applicable when the defendant is not tried within 6 months.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

02/04/2022 08:07 AM CST
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

310 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. GNANAPRAKASAM

Cite as 310 Neb. 519

8. Speedy Trial: Good Cause. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 

2016) does not specifically describe a “continuance” by the court’s own 

motion or judicial delay, but § 29-1207(4)(f) presents a catchall that 

designates as excluded in computing the time for trial other periods of 

delay not specifically enumerated in this section, but only if the court 

finds that they are for good cause.

9. ____: ____. Judicial delay, absent a showing by the State of good cause, 

does not toll the speedy trial statute.

10. ____: ____. When a trial court relies on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) 

(Reissue 2016) to exclude time from the speedy trial calculation, it must 

make specific findings as to the good cause which resulted in the delay.

11. ____: ____. Evidence of good cause is properly presented at the hearing 

on the motion for absolute discharge and need not be articulated at the 

time of the court’s sua sponte order delaying trial.

12. ____: ____. Depending upon the evidence presented, a trial court can 

reasonably conclude that a bench trial poses a serious risk of exposing 

its participants to COVID-19 and therefore may be good cause under 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(f) (Reissue 2016).

Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County, Gregory 

M. Schatz, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court 

for Douglas County, Craig Q. McDermott, Judge. Judgment 

of District Court affirmed.

Thomas M. Petersen and Jennifer Miralles, of Petersen Law 

Office, for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust 

for appellee.

Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and 

Freudenberg, JJ., and Daugherty, District Judge.

Cassel, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Samraj Gnanaprakasam appeals the judgment of the district court, affirming a county court’s order denying his 

motion for absolute discharge under the speedy trial statutes. 1

1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1205 to 29-1209 (Reissue 2016).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

310 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. GNANAPRAKASAM

Cite as 310 Neb. 519

Gnanaprakasam asserts that COVID-19 was not good cause to 

delay his trial and that therefore, he was entitled to discharge. 

He attempts to distinguish our recent pandemic jurisprudence, 2

because he was to be tried to the bench rather than by jury. 

Finding no merit, we affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

On December 2, 2019, Gnanaprakasam was arrested and 

the State filed a complaint against him in the county court, 

charging him with one count of third degree domestic assault, 

a Class I misdemeanor. The State later amended the complaint to charge him with assault and battery under the Omaha 

Municipal Code. Following a 1-week delay resulting from 

withdrawal of his counsel, the case was rescheduled for a 

bench trial on April 17, 2020.

However, on April 7, 2020, the court continued 

Gnanaprakasam’s trial to June 16 for good cause under 

§ 29-1207(4)(f). The court cited this court’s and the Douglas 

County Health Department’s administrative orders regarding 

the COVID-19 pandemic.

On June 16, 2020, Gnanaprakasam filed a motion for absolute discharge, asserting that the State failed to bring him to 

trial within 6 months. At a hearing on his motion, the State 

called no witnesses and offered no exhibits, but requested the 

court to take judicial notice of its continuation order, which 

the court did. Gnanaprakasam introduced an audio recording of the hearing regarding the withdrawal of his counsel, 

the cited administrative orders, and the Nebraska Pandemic 

Bench Book.

The county court overruled Gnanaprakasam’s motion for 

discharge, citing this court’s and the Douglas County Board 

of Health’s administrative orders regarding the COVID-19 

pandemic. The court found that 197 days had elapsed between 

2 See, State v. Brown, ante p. 224, 964 N.W.2d 682 (2021); State v. Chase, 

ante p. 160, 964 N.W.2d 254 (2021).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

310 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. GNANAPRAKASAM

Cite as 310 Neb. 519

the filing of the complaint against Gnanaprakasam and his 

motion for discharge, but that the 70 days after the court’s 

postponement of trial were excludable under § 29-1207(4)(f). 

The court explained that the COVID-19 pandemic qualified as 

good cause for the delay.

Gnanaprakasam filed a timely appeal to the district court, 

which affirmed the county court’s order. The district court concluded that the 70-day period was excludable for good cause, 

because the COVID-19 pandemic “provided good cause for 

suspension of all activity in the trial court, including the continuance of [Gnanaprakasam’s] trial until June 16, 2020.”

Gnanaprakasam filed a timely appeal and subsequently petitioned to bypass the Nebraska Court of Appeals. We granted 

the petition. 3

After the parties submitted their original briefs, this court 

released two decisions 4 addressing COVID-19 as good cause 

under § 29-1207(4)(f). We invited the parties to submit supplemental briefing regarding the applicability of those opinions to 

the instant appeal. They did so, and we have considered their 

submissions.

III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Gnanaprakasam assigns that the district court erred in 

affirming the ruling of the county court, which refused to 

sustain his motion for discharge, based upon the speedy trial 

provisions of § 29-1207.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether 

charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly 

erroneous. 5

3 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020).

4 See, Brown, supra note 2; Chase, supra note 2.

5 Brown, supra note 2.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

310 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. GNANAPRAKASAM

Cite as 310 Neb. 519

[2,3] The district court and higher appellate courts generally 

review appeals from the county court for error appearing on 

the record. 6 When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing 

on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms 

to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither 

arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 7

V. ANALYSIS

1. Speedy Trial Principles

An appeal regarding the overruling of a motion for discharge presents a relatively simple mathematical computation 

of whether the 6-month speedy trial clock, as extended by statutorily excludable periods, has expired before the commencement of trial and does not require any showing of prejudice. 8

[4-7] To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court 

must exclude the day the complaint was filed, count forward 

6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded 

under § 29-1207(4) to determine the last day the defendant 

can be tried. 9 Although the speedy trial statutes expressly refer 

to indictments and informations, we have held that they also 

apply to prosecutions commenced by the filing of a complaint 

in county court. 10 For misdemeanor offenses, such as the 

original charge here, where an “intimate partner” is an element of the offense, the 6-month period in which an accused 

is to be brought to trial commences the date the defendant is 

arrested on a complaint filed as part of a warrant for arrest. 11

The burden of proof is upon the State to show by the greater 

weight of the evidence that one or more of the excluded time 

6 Schaefer Shapiro v. Ball, 305 Neb. 669, 941 N.W.2d 755 (2020).

7 Id.

8 See Chase, supra note 2.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

310 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. GNANAPRAKASAM

Cite as 310 Neb. 519

periods under § 29-1207(4) are applicable when the defendant 

is not tried within 6 months. 12

[8-10] Section 29-1207(4) does not specifically describe a 

“continuance” by the court’s own motion or judicial delay, but 

§ 29-1207(4)(f) presents a catchall that designates as excluded 

in computing the time for trial “[o]ther periods of delay not 

specifically enumerated in this section, but only if the court 

finds that they are for good cause.” 13 We have explained that 

judicial delay, absent a showing by the State of good cause, 

does not toll the speedy trial statute. 14 And when a trial court 

relies on § 29-1207(4)(f) to exclude time from the speedy trial 

calculation, it must make specific findings as to the good cause 

which resulted in the delay. 15

2. Motion for Discharge

In Gnanaprakasam’s original brief, he supported his assignment with two arguments. First, Gnanaprakasam asserted that 

the district court erred when it continued his trial sua sponte 

without a hearing, evidence, or argument to find good cause. 

Next, Gnanaprakasam argued that the county court erred in its 

order overruling his motion for discharge, because it was not 

supported by good cause. Each will be addressed in turn.

(a) Continuance

Gnanaprakasam first asserts that the State needed to establish good cause in order for the court to continue his trial. 

Gnanaprakasam argues that the State needed to present evidence at a hearing before the court could continue the case 

sua sponte.

[11] This argument has no merit. We have recently explained 

that evidence of good cause is properly presented at the 

12 See id.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

310 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. GNANAPRAKASAM

Cite as 310 Neb. 519

hearing on the motion for absolute discharge and need not be 

articulated at the time of the court’s sua sponte order delaying trial. 16

(b) Order on Motion for Discharge

Gnanaprakasam alternatively asserted that the court’s order 

was not supported by the evidence adduced at the hearing. 

In fact, he claimed that the evidence “only encourage[d] the 

continued operation of courts during the pandemic and highlight the concern for a[n] [a]ppellant’s right to a speedy trial 

in criminal cases.” 17 Gnanaprakasam cites language from this 

court’s administrative order that stated “no court shall close” 

during the pandemic, that the Nebraska Pandemic Bench Book 

(compiled before the COVID-19 pandemic) recommends only 

that civil cases be continued, and that the Douglas County 

Health Department’s administrative order exempted the courts 

from its prohibition on public gatherings.

This court recently explained that the circumstances entailed 

by the COVID-19 pandemic were such that a court could find 

good cause to delay a criminal trial. 18 In those cases, this court 

found that the trial courts’ determinations that the COVID-19 

pandemic was good cause for the courts to continue criminal 

trials sua sponte were not erroneous. 19 The same is true here.

In Gnanaprakasam’s supplemental brief, he asserts that State 

v. Chase 20 and State v. Brown 21 are distinguishable from the 

instant appeal because both cases entailed jury trials while 

he would have received a bench trial. He argues that because 

fewer people would be in the courtroom for a bench trial, 

COVID-19 did not justify the continuance.

16 Brown, supra note 2.

17 Brief for appellant at 6.

18 See, Brown, supra note 2; Chase, supra note 2.

19 See id.

20 Chase, supra note 2.

21 Brown, supra note 2.
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets

310 Nebraska Reports

STATE v. GNANAPRAKASAM

Cite as 310 Neb. 519

[12] We find no merit to Gnanaprakasam’s argument. 

Depending upon the evidence presented, a trial court can 

reasonably conclude that a bench trial poses a serious risk of 

exposing its participants to COVID-19 and therefore may be 

good cause under § 29-1207(4)(f). 22 Jurors are not the only participants potentially placed at risk. This court’s administrative 

order mandated that trial courts “devise and implement emergency preparedness plans to carry out mission essential functions.” The county court implemented a plan that it reasonably 

believed was necessary to protect itself, court staff, and other 

participants (including Gnanaprakasam himself) from exposure 

to COVID-19.

VI. CONCLUSION

The district court did not err in affirming the county court’s 

order that found good cause for the continuances related to the 

COVID-19 pandemic. We affirm the district court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

Heavican, C.J., not participating.

22 See, Brown, supra note 2; Chase, supra note 2.