REVISED MARCH 7, 2007

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 05-11391

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

OMAR MEJIA-HUERTA, also known as Omar 

Huerta-Mejia, also known as Omar Mejia, 

also known as Omar Huerta, also known as 

Ivan Mexia-Huerta, also known as Omar Mexia,

Defendant-Appellant

_________________________________________________________________

Consolidated with

06-10004

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ANASTACIO PANTOJA-ARELLANO, also known as 

Andy Pantoja, also known as Armando 

Puentes-Herrera, also known as Pedro 

Garcia-Rodriguez,

Defendant-Appellant

_________________________________________________________________

Consolidated with

06-10082

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE ANDRES DEHUMA-SUAREZ,

Defendant-Appellant

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 28, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk
2

_________________________________________________________________

Consolidated with

06-10099

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ANTONIO CRUZ-MARTINEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

_________________________________________________________________

Consolidated with

06-10142

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

LUIS ESTRADA,

Defendant-Appellant

_________________________________________________________________

Consolidated with

06-10211

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

TABRODRICK DESHAUN CRADDOCK,

Defendant-Appellant

----------------------

Appeals from the 

United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

----------------------
1 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

3

Before JONES, Chief Judge, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

This consolidated appeal involves six defendants, each of

whom challenges his sentence. All of the sentences were imposed

by the same district judge. Defendant-Appellants Omar MejiaHuerta, Anastacio Pantoja-Arellano, Jose Andres Dehuma-Suarez,

and Antonio Cruz-Martinez were convicted of illegal re-entry

after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. DefendantAppellant Luis Estrada was convicted of transporting aliens, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324. Defendant-Appellant Tabrodrick

Deshaun Craddock was convicted of being a felon in possession of

a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Of the six,

only one —— Estrada —— was sentenced before United States v.

Booker,

1 but, post-Booker, his case was remanded for resentencing. All the sentences were imposed between early

December 2005 and early February 2006.

Although nothing in the government’s pre-sentencing

submissions or the probation officers’ Pre-Sentence Investigation

Reports (“PSR”) recommended or mentioned any grounds for

sentencing departures or variances, the district court in each

case —— without providing pre-sentencing notice of its intent to
2 501 U.S. 129 (1991).

3 Rule 32(h) states:

Before the court may depart from the applicable

sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure

either in the presentence report or in a party’s

prehearing submission, the court must give the parties

reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a

departure. The notice must specify any ground on which

the court is contemplating a departure.

Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32(h).

4 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

4

do so —— imposed a non-Guidelines sentence greater than the

Guidelines range indicated. Finding Burns v. United States2 and

the plain language of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h)

inapplicable to post-Booker sentences at variance with the

Guidelines,3 we conclude that, post-Booker, a sentencing court

need not provide pre-sentencing notice of its sua sponte

intention to impose a non-Guidelines sentence and affirm the

district court in all respects.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Omar Mejia-Huerta

Mejia-Huerta was indicted for a single count of illegal reentry after deportation.4 He pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement. Prior to sentencing, the probation officer prepared a

PSR, which calculated Mejia-Huerta’s advisory Guidelines range at

9 to 15 months imprisonment. 
5 Mejia-Huerta had two prior convictions for driving while

intoxicated, two prior convictions for improper entry by an illegal

alien, a single conviction for interfering with public duties of

Emergency Medical Services officials, and arrests for making a

false claim of U.S. citizenship, possession and use of an inhalant,

driving while intoxicated, evading arrest, and tampering with a

government document.

6 Id.

5

The district court sentenced Mejia-Huerta to a nonGuidelines sentence of 36 months imprisonment followed by three

years supervised released. Before imposing the sentence and

after considering the sentencing objectives of 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a), the district court stated that Mejia-Huerta’s extensive

criminal history, disrespect for the laws of the United States,

and threat to public safety warranted an “upward variance.”5

Prior to sentencing, neither the district court nor the PSR, or

any pre-sentencing submission by the government, indicated the

possibility of or reasoning behind the imposition of a nonGuidelines sentence. Mejia-Huerta did not object to the

sentence, but timely filed a notice of appeal.

B. Anastacio Pantoja-Arellano

Pantoja-Arellano was indicted for a single count of illegal

re-entry after deportation.6 He pleaded guilty pursuant to a

plea agreement. Prior to sentencing, the probation officer

prepared a PSR, which calculated Pantoja-Arellano’s advisory

Guidelines range at 33 to 41 months imprisonment. 
7 Pantoja-Arellano had three prior convictions for driving

while intoxicated, two prior convictions for illegal re-entry, two

prior convictions for aiding and abetting transportation of illegal

aliens, two prior convictions for assaults causing bodily injury to

family members, a single prior drug offense conviction, and

additional convictions that were not specifically identified by the

district court at sentencing. 

6

The district court sentenced Pantoja-Arellano to a nonGuidelines sentence of 96 months imprisonment followed by three

years supervised released. Before imposing the sentence and

after considering the sentencing objectives of § 3553(a), the

district court stated that Pantoja-Arellano’s extensive criminal

history, disrespect for the laws of the United States, and threat

to public safety warranted an “upward variance.”7 Prior to

sentencing, neither the district court nor the PSR, or any presentencing submission by the government, indicated the

possibility of or reasoning behind the imposition of a nonGuidelines sentence.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, PantojaArellano’s counsel objected to the upward variance and asked the

district court if it preferred to consider the objection by oral

argument at present or subsequently in writing. The district

court advised Pantoja-Arellano to file a subsequent written

objection.

In the post-sentencing written objection, Pantoja-Arellano’s

counsel complained that the district court erred in failing to
8 Id.

9 Dehuma-Suarez had four prior convictions for driving while

intoxicated and a single conviction for assault on a peace officer,

and was arrested and charged with sexual assault of a 14-year-old

7

give him notice of its intent to make a variance; that the

variance did not comply with § 4A1.3 of United States Sentencing

Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”); and that the sentence was unreasonable.

The district court denied the motion and stated that, even if it

were to grant the motion and resentence Pantoja-Arellano, it

would impose the same sentence. Pantoja-Arellano timely filed a

notice of appeal.

C. Jose Andres Dehuma-Suarez

Dehuma-Suarez was indicted for a single count of illegal reentry after deportation, to which he pleaded guilty pursuant to a

plea agreement.8 Prior to sentencing, the probation officer

prepared a PSR, which calculated Dehuma-Suarez’s advisory

Guidelines range at 21 to 27 months imprisonment. 

The district court sentenced Dehuma-Suarez to a nonGuidelines sentence of 120 months imprisonment followed by three

years supervised released. Before imposing the sentence and

after considering the sentencing objectives of § 3553(a), the

district court stated that Dehuma-Suarez’s extensive criminal

history, disrespect for the laws of the United States, and threat

to public safety warranted an “upward variance.”9 Prior to
female child. In addition, Dehuma-Suarez had been deported twice

and subsequently re-entered the United States both times.

10 Id.

8

sentencing, neither the district court nor the PSR, or any presentencing submission by the government, indicated the

possibility of or reasoning behind the imposition of a nonGuidelines sentence.

Despite not voicing an objection at the sentencing hearing,

Dehuma-Suarez filed a post-sentencing objection to the upward

variance later that day, making the same claims as PantojaArellano. In response, the district court denied the motion and

stated the same observation that it had made in PantojaArellano’s case: it would impose the same sentence, even if

Dehuma-Suarez’s motion was meritorious. Dehuma-Suarez timely

filed a notice of appeal.

D. Antonio Cruz-Martinez

Cruz-Martinez was indicted for a single count of illegal reentry after deportation, and pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement.10 Prior to sentencing, the probation officer prepared

a PSR, which calculated Cruz-Martinez’s advisory Guidelines range

at 21 to 27 months imprisonment. 

The district court sentenced Cruz-Martinez to a nonGuidelines sentence of 60 months imprisonment followed by three
11 Cruz-Martinez had two prior convictions for driving while

intoxicated, a single prior conviction for assault causing bodily

injury, which was committed on his wife and children, and three

prior illegal re-entries into the United States. During one

incident of driving while intoxicated, Cruz-Martinez had an

unrestrained 7-month-old child in the vehicle with him.

9

years supervised released. Before imposing the sentence, the

district court stated as it had in the other cases consolidated

with this one, that, after considering the sentencing objectives

of § 3553(a), Cruz-Martinez’s extensive criminal history,

disrespect for the laws of the United States, and threat to

public safety warranted an “upward variance.”11 Prior to

sentencing, neither the district court nor the PSR, or any presentencing submission by the government, indicated the

possibility of or reasoning behind the imposition of a nonGuidelines sentence.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Cruz-Martinez’s

counsel objected to the upward variance and asked the district

court if it preferred to consider the objection by oral argument

at present or subsequently in writing. The district court

advised Cruz-Martinez to file a subsequent written objection.

In the post-sentencing written objection, Cruz-Martinez’s

counsel objected to the upward variance for the same reasons

espoused by Pantoja-Arellano and Dehuma-Suarez. Making the same

observations as it had in those cases, the district court denied
12 Id. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii).

13 United States v. Estrada, 153 F.App’x 265, 266-67 (5th Cir.

2005).

10

the motion and stated that it would impose the same sentence,

even if Cruz-Martinez’s motion was meritorious. Cruz-Martinez

timely filed a notice of appeal.

E. Luis Estrada

Estrada was indicted for a single count of transporting

illegal aliens.12 He pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement

and was sentenced pre-Booker. On appeal, we vacated his sentence

for Booker error and remanded.13

Prior to resentencing, the probation officer prepared a PSR,

which calculated Estrada’s advisory Guidelines range at 33 to 41

months imprisonment. The district court lowered Estrada’s

Guidelines range after sustaining an objection to a two-point

enhancement. As a result, Estrada’s Guidelines range was 27 to

33 months imprisonment. The district court nevertheless

resentenced Estrada to a non-Guidelines sentence of 41 months

imprisonment followed by three years supervised release. Before

imposing the sentence and after considering the sentencing

objectives of § 3553(a), the district court stated that Estrada’s

disrespect for the laws of the United States and threat to public
14 Estrada was transporting 17 illegal aliens in his vehicle

and his co-defendant was transporting 10 additional illegal aliens

in his vehicle. The district court concluded that these facts

alone justified the upward variance. 

15 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

11

safety warranted an “upward variance.”14 Prior to sentencing,

neither the district court nor the PSR, or any pre-sentencing

submission by the government, indicated the possibility of or

reasoning behind the imposition of a non-Guidelines sentence.

Estrada did not object to the sentence, but did timely file a

notice of appeal.

F. Tabrodrick Deshaun Craddock

Craddock was indicted for a single count of being a felon in

possession of a firearm.15 He pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement. Prior to sentencing, the probation officer prepared a

PSR, which calculated Craddock’s advisory Guidelines range at 21

to 27 months imprisonment. 

The district court sentenced Craddock to a non-Guidelines

sentence of 60 months imprisonment followed by three years

supervised released. Before imposing the sentence and after

considering the sentencing objectives of § 3553(a), the district

court stated that Craddock’s history of violent criminal

behavior, his threat to public safety, the need to provide

adequate punishment, and the need to promote respect for the law
16 Craddock had prior convictions for assault in which he

assaulted his mother and two younger siblings (ages twelve and

thirteen, respectively), evading arrest, and unauthorized use of a

motor vehicle, in which he led law enforcement officers on a chase

throughout Lubbock, Texas and was only apprehended after crashing

the vehicle into a utility pole. Furthermore, during the occasion

of one of Craddock’s arrests, law enforcement officers entered the

residence where Craddock was located and observed Craddock

brandishing a pistol. Craddock charged the officers, engaging in

a fight with one of them. Craddock continued to fight with this

officer until subdued by a taser. In addition, an analysis of

spent rounds from the pistol in Craddock’s possession indicated

that it had been used one week earlier in a home-invasion robbery.

12

warranted an “upward variance.”16 Prior to sentencing, neither

the district court nor the PSR, or any pre-sentencing submission

by the government indicated the possibility of or reasoning

behind the imposition of a non-Guidelines sentence. Craddock did

not object to the sentence, but did timely file a notice of

appeal.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

On appeal, all six defendants assert two identical

arguments: (1) The district court erred when it failed to provide

pre-sentencing notice of its sua sponte intention to impose a

non-Guidelines sentence, thereby violating Burns and Rule 32(h);

and (2) the district court erred when it failed to follow the

sentencing methodology set forth in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. In

addition, Mejia-Huerta, Pantoja-Arellano, Dehuma-Suarez, and

Cruz-Martinez contend that the district court erroneously treated

each of their prior aggravated felony convictions as sentence-
13

enhancing factors, rather than as substantive elements pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b).

The government agrees with the defendants that the district

court was required by the rationale of Burns and Rule 32(h) to

provide pre-sentencing notice of its sua sponte intention to

impose a non-Guidelines sentence. The government contends that

this notice will insure a more focused and adversarial

proceeding, and will avoid any due process implications. 

Notwithstanding its position, the government asserts that

the district court’s failure to provide pre-sentencing notice of

its sua sponte intention to impose a non-Guidelines sentence does

not constitute reversible error. As to Pantoja-Arellano, DehumaSuarez, and Cruz-Martinez, the government asserts that our review

is for harmless error and, because the district court explicitly

acknowledged that, even if it had provided pre-sentencing notice

of its sua sponte intention to impose a non-Guidelines sentence,

it would have imposed the same sentence, any error was harmless.

As to Mejia-Huerta, Estrada, and Craddock, the government

contends that review is for plain error and, because there is no

binding, pre-existing law on this issue, any error was not plain.

A. Standard of Review

Having timely objected, Pantoja-Arellano’s, Dehuma-
17 It is questionable whether Dehuma-Suarez timely raised an

objection to his sentence, thus implicating the standard of review

we apply to his claim. Dehuma-Suarez failed to raise a

contemporaneous objection during his sentencing hearing, but filed

a written objection later that same day. His actions may not have

been sufficient to constitute a timely objection, but because his

claim fails under both harmless error and plain error review, we

need not reach this issue. Instead, we will review Dehuma-Suarez’s

claim under the more lenient harmless error standard. 

18 United States v. Walters, 418 F.3d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 2005).

19 Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 52(a).

20 United States v. Akpan, 407 F.3d 360, 377 (5th Cir. 2005).

21 United States v. Pineiro, 410 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2005).

22 United States v. Vargas-Garcia, 434 F.3d 345, 347 (5th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1894 (2006). Estrada contends that

14

Suarez’s,17 and Cruz-Martinez’s claims are reviewed for harmless

error.18 Under harmless error review, “[a]ny error, defect,

irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights

must be disregarded.”19 An error affects substantial rights if

it affects the outcome of the trial proceedings; conversely, an

error is harmless if it does not affect the outcome of the

district court proceedings.20 A sentencing error will be

considered harmless if the government can establish beyond a

reasonable doubt that the district court would have imposed the

same sentence absent the error.21

In contrast, we review the claims of Mejia-Huerta, Estrada,

and Craddock for plain error, as they failed timely to object to

the district court.22 Under plain error review, we may exercise
his claim should be reviewed for harmless error as he properly

objected to the imposition of his sentence. We disagree. At the

conclusion of Estrada’s sentencing, Estrada’s counsel stated,

“[W]ith the Court’s permission, I’ll file a written objection on

the notice requirement.” Nothing more was said concerning the

district court’s alleged error. In response, the district court

approved Estrada’s proposed procedure. Estrada, however, failed to

file his proposed written objection. Estrada’s counsel’s single

statement was simply insufficient to preserve Estrada’s objection.

It did not adequately provide the district court with the substance

of the objection or an opportunity to cure the perceived error.

Thus, Estrada’s claim is reviewed for plain error. 

23 United States v. Lewis, 412 F.3d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 2005).

24 501 U.S. at 138-39.

15

our discretion to correct a defendant’s sentence if there is: (1)

an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights;

and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.23

B. Merits

i. Rule 32(h) and Burns

Rule 32(h) was a legislative response to the Supreme Court’s

decision in Burns. There, the Supreme Court held that an earlier

version of Rule 32 required a sentencing court to give parties

reasonable notice of its intention to depart upwardly sua sponte

from the appropriate Guidelines range, if the grounds for such a

departure were not identified in either the PSR or a presentencing submission by the government.24 The Court concluded

that, to give effect to a defendant’s right “to comment upon the
25 Id. This right was codified in Rule 32(a)(1) at the time

of Burns, but is now codified in Rule 32(i)(1). 

26 Id. at 136-37. The Court also expressed concern with

whether a lack of notice under Rule 32 would violate the Due

Process Clause. Id. at 138. 

27 543 U.S. at 259.

16

probation officer’s determination and on other matters relating

to the appropriate sentence,” advance notice was a prerequisite

to a departure.

25 Otherwise, reasoned the Court, a litigant

would unfairly have (1) to engage in an incoherent comment and

defense at sentencing; (2) in a pre-sentencing filing, to waste

large amounts of time guessing when or on what grounds a court

might depart sua sponte; or (3) to suggest reluctantly a

departure possibility to the sentencing court in a pre-sentencing

filing, only for the purpose of rebutting the possible departure

grounds.26 Rule 32(h) has essentially codified the holding of

Burns.

Before United States v. Booker, sentencing courts were

compelled to impose sentences that fell within the sentencing

ranges assigned by the Guidelines, unless a specified exception

existed.27 When a sentencing court found such an exception and

exercised its limited discretion to sentence outside the

applicable Guidelines range, the court was said to be engaging in
28 United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006).

29 United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 n.7 (5th Cir.

2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005).

30 Smith, 440 F.3d at 707.

31 United States v. Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742, 746 (5th

Cir. 2005).

32 Smith, 440 F.3d at 707. Section 3553(a)’s factors include:

the defendant’s offense conduct, personal history, and

characteristics; the need for the sentence to reflect the

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to

provide just punishment, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal

conduct, to protect the public, and to rehabilitate the defendant;

the kinds of sentences available; the advisory Guidelines range and

17

a “departure” from the Guidelines.28 Thus, pre-Booker, a

sentencing court would either impose a sentence within the

properly calculated Guidelines range or impose a Guidelines

sentence that included an upward or downward departure.

Since Booker, sentencing courts have had a third sentencing

option —— a non-Guidelines sentence.29 Under the post-Booker

advisory Guidelines regime, a sentencing court may impose a

sentence either higher or lower than —— at variance with —— the

appropriate Guidelines range.30 Before doing so, however, the

sentencing court must calculate the correct Guidelines range,

consider it as advisory, and use it as a frame of reference.31

If the sentencing court chooses to impose a non-Guidelines

sentence, its reasons for doing so must be consistent with the

factors enumerated in § 3553(a).32 Thus, post-Booker, a
policy statements; the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

disparities; and the need to provide restitution. 

33 United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 195-98 (3d

Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 424 (2006).

34 United States v. Walker, 447 F.3d 999, 1005-07 (7th Cir.

2006), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 314 (2006).

35 United States v. Egenberger, 424 F.3d 803, 805-06 (8th Cir.

2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 1106 (2006).

36 United States v. Irizarry, 458 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir.

2006).

37 United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 236-38 (2d Cir. 2006).

38 United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 371 (4th Cir.

2006).

39 United States v. Evans-Martinez, 448 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

40 United States v. Dozier, 444 F.3d 1215, 1217-18 (10th Cir.

2006).

18

sentencing court may impose a non-Guidelines sentence, i.e., a

“variance”, but not a “departure,” if it calculates the proper

sentencing range and references the broad array of factors set

forth in § 3553(a).

Since Booker, an incongruent pattern of caselaw has

developed among those federal circuits that have considered

whether Burns or Rule 32(h) continue to apply to non-Guidelines

sentences. The Third,33 Seventh,34 Eighth,35 and Elevnth36 Circuits

have answered in the negative; the Second,37 Fourth,38 Ninth,39 and

Tenth40 Circuits have answered in the affirmative. In an
41 United States v. Dean, No. 05-51015, 2006 WL 3005546, at *2

(5th Cir. Oct. 23, 2006); cf. United States v. Mateo, 179 F.App’x

64, 65 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Pettus, 166 F. App’x 532,

534 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Simmerer, 156 F.App’x 124, 128

(11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 1599 (2006). 

19

unpublished and thus non-binding opinion, we have previously

determined that a sentencing court’s failure to provide notice of

its intention to impose a non-Guidelines sentence post-Booker

does not constitute plain error, but we have expressly declined

to rule on whether such failure constitutes error.41 We now

enter the fray, agreeing with the circuits that have concluded

that neither Burns nor Rule 32(h) apply to non-Guidelines

sentences and thereby disrupt the equipoise of the circuit split

on this issue.

We first note that the plain language of Rule 32(h) limits

its application to departures. It contains no language even

hinting that it might apply elsewhere. We conclude that we are

bound to hold that Rule 32(h) applies to departures only and not

to variances from the Guidelines. 

In addition, as Booker has rendered the Guidelines purely

advisory, the concerns that precipitated the Court’s decision in

Burns are no longer viable. Sentencing post-Booker is a heavily

discretionary exercise. Sentencing courts need only consider the

Guidelines as informative and must consult the full host of

factors set forth in § 3553(a) before rendering a reasonable non-
42 See Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d at 196.

20

Guidelines sentence. These factors are known (or knowable) by

the parties prior to sentencing, thus putting the litigants on

notice that a sentencing court has discretion to consider any of

these factors. This knowledge eliminates the element of unfair

surprise, the concern that defense counsel will waste time with a

pre-sentencing filing, the possibility that defense counsel will

unwittingly provide the sentencing court with a grounds for

departure, and the worry of possibly undermining the adversarial

process, that permeate Burns, thus negating its application to

non-Guidelines sentences.

Here, each defendant had knowledge of the facts of his case

on which the district court would rely in applying the § 3553(a)

factors. The district court correctly calculated the sentencing

ranges and, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, exercised

its discretion to impose non-Guidelines sentences. This is not

an instance when the sentencing court unexpectedly departed from

a binding Guidelines range. Rather, the district court

predictably did what any district court is empowered to do postBooker. If we were to conclude that the advance notice

requirement of Rule 32(h) applies to non-Guidelines sentences, we

would re-elevate the Guidelines to a position it no longer

enjoys.42 Thus, we conclude that sentencing courts are not
43 On appeal, the Defendant-Appellants did not assert that

their respective sentences were unreasonable in and of themselves,

but instead only challenged the reasonableness of the sentences

based on the district court’s failure to consult and comply with §

4A1.3.

21

required to give pre-sentencing notice of their sua sponte

intention to impose a non-Guidelines sentence, regardless of the

pre-Booker pronouncements of Burns and Rule 32(h).

ii. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3

Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1), a sentencing court may

impose an upward departure “[i]f reliable information indicates

that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially

under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal

history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other

crimes.” In the event that the sentencing court decides to

depart, it is to follow the method for calculating the extent of

the departure set forth in §§ 4A1.3(a)(4)(A) and (B).

Here, the defendants argue that their sentences were

unreasonable because the district court failed to comply with or

consult the methodology established in § 4A1.3.43 As each

sentence was a variance and not a departure, we disagree.

We note initially that the district court’s decisions to

impose non-Guidelines sentences were not based exclusively on

unrepresentative criminal histories. Rather, they were based on

a number of § 3553(a) factors, including extensive criminal
44 Smith, 440 F.3d at 708.

45 United States v. Castro-Juarez, 425 F.3d 430 (7th Cir.

2005).

22

history, the need to promote respect for law, deterrence of

future criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public. We

reiterate for emphasis that § 4A1.3 applies only to departures ——

based on unrepresentative criminal history —— not to variances.

Thus, from the outset, the defendants’ argument fails. 

Furthermore, the defendants completely skirt our test for

determining the reasonableness of a non-Guidelines sentence. We

have established that a non-Guidelines sentence is unreasonable

when it (1) does not account for a factor that should have

received significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an

irrelevant or improper factor, or (3) represents a clear error of

judgment in balancing the sentencing factors.44 Here, the

defendants do not argue that the district court short-changed a

particular factor, over-emphasized another, or erred in balancing

multiple factors. Instead, the defendants disregard our caselaw

and rely on a single, inapposite Seventh Circuit case to argue

that the sentencer’s failure to conduct the calculus of § 4A1.3

renders a non-Guidelines sentence per se unreasonable.45

In simplest terms, the district court in the six cases

consolidated here on appeal (1) calculated the proper Guidelines
46 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998); see United States v. AlvaradoHernandez, 465 F.3d 188, 190 n.2 (5th Cir. 2006).

23

ranges, (2) considered multiple § 3553(a) factors, (3) explained

its reasons for imposing non-Guidelines sentences, and (4)

imposed non-Guidelines sentences that we conclude are not

unreasonable. We hold that the district court committed no error

in calculating and imposing the defendants’ sentences.

Therefore, defendants’ no-pre-sentencing-notice claim fails under

either of the applicable standards of review.

iii. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)

Finally, four of the six defendants contend that the

district court inappropriately treated their prior aggravated

felony convictions as sentence enhancements, rather than as an

element of their offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). As this

argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States,

46

it fails.

III. CONCLUSION

In the post-Booker world of advisory Guidelines, all parties

are on notice that, after considering the sentencing factors of §

3553(a), a sentencing court has the discretion to impose a nonGuidelines sentence. Stated differently, parties are

conclusively presumed to have pre-sentencing knowledge of these

factors. Thus, no party is unfairly prejudiced by the imposition
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of a non-Guidelines sentence based on a sentencing court’s sua

sponte consideration and application of § 3553(a). Accordingly,

the unfair surprise and other concerns sought to be remedied by

Burns and Rule 32(h) is no longer a legitimate concern and no

longer necessitates that a sentencing court provide presentencing notice of its intention to impose a non-Guidelines

sentence sua sponte.

Based on the applicable law and our extensive review of the

parties’ briefs and the records of the cases consolidated in this

appeal, we hold that (1) the district court was not required to

provide pre-sentencing notice of its sua sponte intention to

impose a non-Guidelines sentence; (2) the district court’s

failure to follow the methodology of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 did not

constitute error; and (3) the defendants’ § 1326(b) claims are

non-meritorious. We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the

district court in each of these six consolidated cases.

AFFIRMED