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*********************************************** 
GAIL PIZZOFERRATO v. COMMUNITY

RENEWAL TEAM, INC.

(AC 43956)

Prescott, Moll and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained as a result of the defendant’s negligence. The court

referred the case to arbitration pursuant to statute (§ 52-549u). Following

a hearing, the arbitrator issued a decision in favor of the defendant.

Electronic notice of the decision was provided to the parties’ counsel

on that same day. Neither party filed a demand for a trial de novo within

twenty days of when electronic notice was sent. Because a demand for

a trial de novo was not filed within twenty days, the trial court rendered

judgment in accordance with the arbitrator’s decision. Thereafter, the

court denied the plaintiff’s motion to open and vacate the judgment,

and the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the court improperly denied her motion because the language of the applicable statute

(§ 52-549z) and rule of practice (§ 23-66) require that notice of an arbitrator’s decision be sent both electronically and by mail before it can

become a judgment of the court, and notice was not sent by mail in the

present case. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the plaintiff’s motion to open and vacate the judgment: § 52-

549z does not provide that notice of an arbitrator’s decision must be

sent both electronically and by mail in order for the statutory twenty

day period to commence, § 52-549z was amended after the judicial

branch gave notice of its practice of sending only electronic notice of

an arbitrator’s decision unless counsel obtain an exclusion from the

electronic services requirement, and Practice Book § 23-66 does not

preclude electronic service of an arbitrator’s decision; moreover, it was

undisputed that both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s counsel received

electronic notice of the decision, neither counsel obtained an exclusion

from the electronic services requirement, the plaintiff’s counsel never

argued that he was unaware of the court’s practice of sending only

electronic notice of the decision, and the case did not involve selfrepresented parties; accordingly, notice did not need to be provided

by mail.

Argued January 6—officially released March 29, 2022

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the defendant’s alleged negligence,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Hartford and referred to Jeffrey

V. Phelan, arbitrator, who issued a decision for the

defendant; thereafter, the court, Sheridan, J., rendered

judgment in favor of the defendant in accordance with

the arbitrator’s decision; subsequently, the court, Sheridan, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion to open and vacate

the judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Steven J. Errante, with whom, on the brief, was Garrett A. Denniston, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Meredith Ashley Hill, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PELLEGRINO, J. The plaintiff, Gail Pizzoferrato,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying

her motion to open and vacate the judgment of the

court rendered in favor of the defendant, Community

Renewal Team, Inc., in accordance with a decision of an

arbitrator that resulted from court-annexed arbitration.

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly

denied her motion because the language of both General

Statutes § 52-549z1 and Practice Book § 23-662

require

that a decision of an arbitrator be sent to the parties

both electronically and by mail before it can become a

judgment of the court. Because notice of the arbitrator’s

decision was never sent to the parties or their counsel

by mail in the present case, the plaintiff argues that the

judgment of the court, rendered on the basis of the

arbitrator’s decision, should be vacated. We disagree

and affirm the judgment of the court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff’s appeal. On

November 29, 2016, the plaintiff allegedly fell and suffered several injuries while walking on a sidewalk

owned and controlled by the defendant. The plaintiff

instituted a negligence action against the defendant,

which the court referred to arbitration pursuant to General Statutes § 52-549u. Following a hearing before the

arbitrator, on October 29, 2019, the arbitrator issued a

decision in favor of the defendant. Electronic notice of

the arbitrator’s decision was provided to the parties’

counsel that same day. The electronic notice stated that

the arbitrator’s decision had been filed and informed

the parties that it could be viewed in the case’s electronic file. It also stated that ‘‘[s]elf-represented parties

and attorneys who have an exemption from [the electronic services requirement] will continue to receive a

copy of the decision, findings, or report by mail.’’ Neither party filed a demand for a trial de novo within

twenty days of when the electronic notice was sent.

On December 19, 2019, because a demand for a trial

de novo was not filed within twenty days, the trial court

rendered judgment in accordance with the decision of

the arbitrator.

On January 13, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion to

open and vacate the judgment of the court, claiming

that she had failed to make a claim for a trial de novo,

pursuant to § 52-549z and Practice Book § 23-66,

because she had never received a copy of the arbitrator’s decision by mail and, thus, ‘‘was not aware of

the arbitrator’s [decision] . . . .’’ The court denied the

plaintiff’s motion to open and vacate because ‘‘[t]he

record clearly demonstrated that electronic notice of

the filing of the arbitrator’s decision was provided to

the parties on October 29, 2019.’’ This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff first claims that § 52-549z
provides that a demand for a trial de novo must be filed

no later than twenty days after notice of the decision

of an arbitrator has been sent to the parties electronically or deposited in the United States mail, whichever

is later, meaning that notice must be sent both electronically and by mail before the twenty day period for filing

a demand for a trial de novo begins. The plaintiff further

argues that her interpretation of § 52-549z is ‘‘bolstered

by the inclusion [in the statute] of the phrase in accordance with the rules of [the] court’’ (emphasis in original); see General Statutes § 52-549z (d); which she contends refers to Practice Book § 23-66, under which she

argues notice must be sent by mail. We do not agree

that notice of the arbitrator’s decision must be sent

both electronically and by mail in order for the twenty

day period to commence.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard

of review. ‘‘[B]ecause this case presents an issue of

statutory construction . . . [w]ell settled principles of

statutory interpretation govern our review. . . .

Because statutory interpretation is a question of law,

our review is de novo. . . . When construing a statute,

[o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give

effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In

seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes

§ 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute

itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after

examining such text and considering such relationship,

the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and

does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not

be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is

whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible

to more than one reasonable interpretation.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Planning & Zoning Commission v. Freedom of Information Commission, 316

Conn. 1, 9, 110 A.3d 419 (2015).

We turn now to the relevant language of § 52-549z:

‘‘(a) A decision of the arbitrator shall become a judgment of the court if no appeal from the arbitrator’s

decision by way of a demand for a trial de novo is filed

. . . (d) . . . with the court clerk not later than twenty

days after the date on which (1) notice of the arbitrator’s

decision is sent electronically to the parties or their

counsel, or (2) the arbitrator’s decision is deposited in

the United States mail, whichever is later, and shall

include a certification that a copy thereof has been

served on each party or counsel of record, to be accomplished in accordance with the rules of the court. . . .’’

(Emphasis added.) According to the plaintiff, § 52-549z

requires that notice of an arbitrator’s decision be sent

both electronically and by mail. We disagree because

there is no language in § 52-549z that dictates that notice

must be sent both electronically and by mail. Section

52-549z merely recognizes that notice may be sent by

two possible methods and then dictates how the twenty
day period is to be calculated with respect to each

method. The phrase ‘‘whichever is later,’’ on which the

plaintiff’s argument hinges, is applicable only in circumstances in which notice is sent both electronically and

by mail—something that did not occur in the present

case. In the present case, electronic notice was sent to

the plaintiff’s counsel on October 29, 2019. Because

notice was sent electronically and not by mail, the

twenty day period for filing a demand for a trial de

novo began on October 29, 2019.

This interpretation of § 52-549z is further supported

by the fact that § 52-549z was amended in July, 2019; see

Public Acts 2019, No. 19-64; after the Judicial Branch,

in 2018, gave notice of the new Superior Court practice

of sending only electronic notice of an arbitrator’s decision to counsel of record unless counsel has obtained

an exclusion from the electronic services requirement.

See Connecticut Judicial Branch, Superior Court

Notices, June 6, 2018, available at https://jud.ct.gov/

superiorcourt (last visited March 18, 2022). Thus, as a

practical matter, there may be cases involving a selfrepresented party or an attorney who has obtained an

obtained an exclusion from the electronic services

requirement in which notice of the arbitrator’s decision

is sent both electronically and by mail.

Practice Book § 23-66, on which the plaintiff relies,

has not been updated since 2003. Although § 23-66 discusses instances in which notice of the arbitrator’s decision has been mailed, it does not preclude electronic

service of the arbitrator’s decision or govern the calculation of the twenty day period when notice has been

given electronically or in cases involving both methods

of giving notice. In the present case, it is undisputed

that (1) both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s counsel

received notice electronically, (2) neither counsel had

obtained an exclusion from the electronic services

requirement, and (3) the case did not involve any selfrepresented parties. Thus, notice of the arbitrator’s

decision did not need to be provided by mail under the

circumstances of this case.3

Having determined that notice was properly provided

to the parties, we now turn to the plaintiff’s claim that

the court abused its discretion by denying her motion

to open and vacate the judgment rendered in accordance with the decision of the arbitrator. We first set

forth our applicable standard of review. It is well established that ‘‘[t]he denial of a motion to open is an appealable final judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Worth v. Korta, 132 Conn. App. 154, 158, 31 A.3d

804 (2011), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 905, 38 A.3d 1201

(2012). This court does not ‘‘undertake a plenary review

of the merits of a decision of the trial court to grant or

to deny a motion to open a judgment. . . . In an appeal

from a denial of a motion to open a judgment, our

review is limited to the issue of whether the trial court
has acted unreasonably and in clear abuse of its discretion. . . . In determining whether the trial court

abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. . . . The

manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not

be disturbed so long as the court could reasonably

conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Veneziano v. Veneziano, 205 Conn. App. 718, 732, 259

A.3d 28 (2021).

In the present case, it is undisputed that the plaintiff’s

counsel received electronic notice of the arbitrator’s

decision on October 29, 2019. Furthermore, the plaintiff’s counsel never argued that he was unaware of the

Superior Court’s practice, effective June 1, 2018, of

sending only electronic notice of an arbitrator’s decision to counsel of record. Notwithstanding these undisputed facts, the plaintiff failed to file a demand for a

trial de novo within the twenty day period set forth by

§ 52-549z. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiff’s

motion to open and vacate the judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 General Statutes § 52-549z provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A decision of

the arbitrator shall become a judgment of the court if no appeal from the

arbitrator’s decision by way of a demand for a trial de novo is filed . . . .

(d) An appeal by way of a demand for a trial de novo shall be filed with

the court clerk not later than twenty days after the date on which (1) notice

of the arbitrator’s decision is sent electronically to the parties or their

counsel, or (2) the arbitrator’s decision is deposited in the United States

mail, whichever is later, and shall include a certification that a copy thereof

has been served on each party or counsel of record, to be accomplished in

accordance with the rules of the court. . . .’’

2 Practice Book § 23-66 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A decision of the

arbitrator shall become a judgment of the court if no claim for a trial de

novo is filed . . . .

(c) A claim for a trial de novo must be filed with the court clerk within

twenty days after the deposit of the arbitrator’s decision in the United States

mail, as evidenced by the postmark. . . .’’

3 We encourage the Rules Committee of the Superior Court to consider

amending the language of Practice Book § 23-66 to correspond to both the

amendments made to § 52-594z in 2019 and the current practice of giving

notice under the now existing electronic services program.