alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                               0
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<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,765
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           100
<OTHER-SE>                                      (2,865)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                         0
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,985
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
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</TABLE>
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13

- 51152 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
KEITH RUSSELL JUDD , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal s from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 7:98

- CR

- 93

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Keith Russell Judd, federal prisoner # 11593

- 051, was convicted of two counts of mailing threatening communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876. In 1999, he was sentenced to 210 months in prison on each count, with the terms to be served concurrently. He was also sentenced to concurrent three

year terms of supervised release. Judd began his supervised release on June 24, 2013. On October 11, 2013, the Probation Office sought a warran t for Judd

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED November 4, 2014 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 13-51152 Document: 00512825107 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/04/2014No. 13

- 51152

because he violated the terms of his supervision. The district court subsequently revoked Judd’s supervision finding that he had violated the terms of his release , notably, contacting the victim of his underlying threat s conviction s . The distr ict court imposed a sentence of 12 months in prison to be followed by 24 months of supervised release. On appeal, Judd makes no direct challenge to the district court’s revocation of his supervised release or the sentence imposed on revocation. He argues that the district court was without jurisdiction to conduct the proceedings because the district court was without jurisdiction to convict him. We will not consider this argument because a defendant may not challenge the validity of his underlyi ng sentence of supervised release o n appeal from the revocation of supervised release. United States v. Willis , 563 F.3d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hinson , 429 F.3d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 2005)

. Judd also argues that he was denied his right to represent himself in the revocation proceedings. This argument is mistaken because the record shows
that Judd assented, in open court, to proceeding with representation by
counsel. Th e issue is without merit , therefore, because it lacks basis in fact. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983)

. Judd has shown no reversible error in the district court’s revocation of his supervised release or the sentence imposed on revocation . T he judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. His outstanding motions , including his
amended motion for release pending appeal, are DENIED.

2 Case: 13-51152 Document: 00512825107 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/04/2014
[No. 41809-6-II.

Division Two.

October 24, 2012.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. M.R.H., *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clark County, No. 10-8-00813-1, Barbara D. Johnson, J, entered February 14, 2011. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per

Van Deren, J,

concurred in by Johanson, A.C. J., and QuinnBrintnall, J.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-10074 Summary Calendar

GERALD R. BROOKMAN and DARLENE L. BROOKMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JESSE BROWN, Secretary, an Officer of the United States of America,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (4;95-CV-428-A)

June 9, 1997

Before JOHNSON, EMILIO M. GARZA, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

The defendant’s, the Secretary of Veteran’s Affairs (t h e

Secretary), petition for rehearing is granted and this court’s

prior opinion is withdrawn. The following opinion is substituted

in its place.

On appeal, Gerald and Darlene Brookman complain that the

district court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of the

Secretary. The Brookmans contend that a material fact issue exists2

about the Secretary’s status as a bona fide purchaser.

We review the district court’s order granting summary judgment

in favor of the Secretary de novo. S ee, e.g., Degan v. Ford Motor

Co.
, 869 F.2d 889, 892 (5th Cir. 1989). In determining whether the

district court properly grant ed summary judgment, this court

applies the same standards used by the district court. Thus, we

review the evidence a light most favorable to the non-movant and

then determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. See id.

After carefully reviewing the record in the present case, we

hold that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the

Secretary’s status as a bona fide purchaser. Therefore, the

Secretary is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the

district court’s order is

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
      a)
    
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;b)
    
    Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such
internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles;c)
    
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the Registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; andd)
    
    Disclosed in this report any change in the Registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the Registrants most recent fiscal quarter
that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially effect, the
Registrants internal control over financial reporting; and
  a)
    
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the Registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; andb)
    
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the Registrants internal control over financial
reporting.
  By:
    /s/ James C. MastandreaJames C. MastandreaChairman of the Board, Chief Executive

Officer and President
(Chief Executive Officer)
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**








CERTIFICATION
      OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT


TO
      SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
      connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Quick-Med
      Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2007
      as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
      "Report"), I, David S. Lerner, President and principal executive officer of
      the
      Company, hereby certify, pursuant Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United
      States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
      2002, that to my knowledge:





(a)
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and






(b)
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
                Company.








Dated:
      May 15, 2007     /s/
      David S. Lerner______________________ ____


David
      S. Lerner


President
      (and Principal Executive
      Officer)
#### Yacov Yardeny, Appellant, v Steven S. Jordan, Respondent.

[988 NYS2d 658]

In an action to recover damages for breach of contract and fraud, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Agate, J.), entered November 21, 2011, which granted the defendant’s motion, in effect, to vacate his default in appearing or answering the complaint and to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was, in effect, to vacate his default in appearing or answering the complaint, as he established that he had a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action *(see Targee St. Internal Medicine Group, P.C. v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co.,*92 AD3d 768, 769 [2012]).

Furthermore, that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the complaint was properly granted based on the doctrine of res judicata, which “is applicable to an order or judgment entered upon default that has not been vacated, as well as to issues that were or could have been raised in the prior proceeding” *(Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Williams,*29 AD3d 688, 690 [2006]). Here, a default judgment was entered against Yacov Yardeny, the plaintiff in this action, in a prior action commenced by Jordan. Since Yardeny’s claims in this action could have been raised as defenses in Jordan’s action against him and, if accepted, would have impaired Jordan’s rights established in that prior action *(see Santiago v Lalani,*256 AD2d 397 [1998]), they are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Yardeny’s remaining contention is without merit.

Mastro, J.E, Leventhal, Lott and Miller, JJ., concur.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3053 

To amend the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 

Act of 1996 to repeal the denial to drug felons of eligibility for benefits 

under the program of temporary assistance for needy families. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 25, 2009 

Mr. CARSON of Indiana (for himself, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. ELLISON, Mr. HASTINGS of Florida, and Ms. NORTON) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways 

and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 

Reconciliation Act of 1996 to repeal the denial to drug 

felons of eligibility for benefits under the program of 

temporary assistance for needy families. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
2 

•HR 3053 IH

1 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF DENIAL TO DRUG FELONS OF ELI2 GIBILITY FOR BENEFITS UNDER THE PRO3 GRAM OF TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR 

4 NEEDY FAMILIES. 

5 Section 115 of the Personal Responsibility and Work 

6 Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (21 U.S.C. 862a) 

7 is amended— 

8 (1) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘for—’’ and 

9 all that follows through ‘‘(2)’’ and inserting ‘‘for’’; 

10 (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (1) 

11 and all that follows through ‘‘—’’ in paragraph (2); 

12 and 

13 (3) in subsection (e), by striking ‘‘it—’’ and all 

14 that follows through ‘‘(2)’’ and inserting ‘‘it’’. 

Æ 


rfrederick on PROD1PC67 with BILLS
[Nos. 67801-9-I; 67802-7-I; 67803-5-I.

Division One.

November 5, 2012.]

#### *In the Matter of the Dependency of*A.W. et al. Shawlee Geiger, *Appellant,*v. The Department of Social and Health Services, *Respondent.*

Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 11-7-01687-9, Palmer Robinson, J., entered September 23, 2011. *Affirmed*by unpublished opinion per

Leach, C.J.,

concurred in by Appelwick and Lau, JJ.
#### Daniel D. Jackson et al., Respondents, v Nassau County et al., Appellants.

[666 NYS2d 11]

—In an action, *inter alia,*for a judgment declaring that employment contracts exist between the named plaintiffs and the other members of a purported class and the defendant Nassau County Police Department, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Adams, J.), dated September 30, 1996, which denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of an appropriate judgment declaring that no employment contracts exist between the plaintiffs and the defendant Nassau County Police Department.

The law is well settled that when an individual passes a civil service examination and his name appears on a list of eligible candidates, that individual “does *not*acquire any ‘legally protectable interest’ in an appointment to the position for which the examination was given” *(Matter of Andriola v Ortiz,*82 NY2d 320, 324, *cert denied*511 US 1031, quoting *Matter of Cassidy v Municipal Civ. Serv. Commn.,*37 NY2d 526, 529). Indeed, such eligible candidates “do ‘not possess any mandated right to appointment *or any other legally protectable interest.*[They] can assert at most the right to consideration for and a “hope” of appointment’ ” *(Matter of Deas v Levitt,*73 NY2d 525, 532, *cert denied*493 US 933, quoting *Matter of Cassidy v Municipal Civ. Serv. Commn., supra,*at 529). In the instant matter, notwithstanding the extension of conditional employment offers, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they are more than mere eligible candidates, or that they possess any viable contractual rights to compel the defendant Nassau County to hire them, or that the defendant Nassau County Police Department breached any final, enforceable employment contracts with them *(see, e.g., Matter of Scheurer v New York City Employees’ Retirement Sys.,*223 AD2d 379; *Meyers v City of New York,*208 AD2d 258; *Matter of Joseph v City of New York,*201 AD2d 397; *Matter of D’Amico v Leonard,*64 AD2d 626). Therefore, an appropriate judgment declaring the rights of the parties should be entered and the complaint otherwise dismissed *(see, Lanza v Wagner,*11 NY2d 317, 334, *cert denied*371 US 901; CPLR 3211 [a] [7]). Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Santucci and Lerner, JJ., concur.
#### Craig SMALLWOOD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-16730.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 21, 2011.

Craig Smallwood, Ewa Beach, HI, pro se.

Thomas A. Helper, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Honolulu, HI, Joan M. Pepin, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Michael H.Q.L. Lau, Paul H. Sato, Sandra L. Wilhide, Morihara Lau & Fong LLP, Don Sadao Kitaoka, Esquire, Deputy Corporation Counsel, Office of Corporation Counsel, Honolulu, HI, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: FARRIS, O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Craig Smallwood appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging various environmental claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 *685U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Aloha-Care v. Haw. Dep’t of Human Servs.,*572 F.3d 740, 744 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009), and we affirm.

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Smallwood’s National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) challenges to the federal agency actions that occurred in 1993 and 2002. *See Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States,*946 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir.1991) (six-year statute of limitations).

The district court properly dismissed Smallwood’s NEPA claim concerning the 2005 permit amendment and the Clean Water Act claim because Smallwood failed to allege facts showing that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ decisions were arbitrary or capricious. *See*5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (standard for reviewing agency decisions).

The district court properly dismissed Smallwood’s Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) claim because Smallwood did not comply with the statutory notice requirement. *See*16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A); *Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block,*840 F.2d 714, 721 (9th Cir.1988) (the ESA notice requirement is jurisdictional).

Smallwood’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
<PAGE>

                               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS         
 

Board of Directors
First Nationwide Holdings Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statement
(No. 33-82654) on Form S-3 of First Nationwide Holdings Inc. of our report
dated March 7, 1997, relating to the consolidated statements of financial
condition of First Nationwide Holdings Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31,
1996 and 1995, and the related consolidated statements of operations, 
stockholders' equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year
period ended December 31, 1996, which report appears in the December 31, 1996,
annual report on Form 10-K of First Nationwide Holdings Inc. Our report refers
to a change in accounting for mortgage servicing rights in 1995.


                                     /s/  KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
                                          ---------------------
                                          KPMG Peat Marwick LLP


Dallas, Texas
March 27, 1997
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13**  **- 4564** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. RICHARD LEE JONES , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina , at Greensboro
. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr. , Senior District Judge. ( 1:12

- cr - 00326

- NCT

- 1 )

Submitted : December 17, 2013 Decided: December 19, 2013

Before KING, GREGORY, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Affirm ed by un published per curiam opinion
. Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, Senior Litigator, Winston

- Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant
. Terry Michael Meinecke , Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina , for Appellee.
Unpublishe d opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Richard Lee Jones appeals h is eighty

- s even - month sentence following h is guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine , in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (20 12). In accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Jones’ counsel has filed a brief certifying that there are no meritorious ground s for appeal but questioning whether Jones’ sentence is substantively reasonable. Jones has not file d a supplemental brief despite receiving notice of his right to do so
. We affirm. We review Jones’ sentence for reasonableness, using an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We first review for significant pr ocedural errors, including improperly calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (20 12 ) factors, sentencing under clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
sentence. Id. at 51; see United States v. Ev ans , 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). Only if we conclude a sentence is procedurally reasonable may we consider its substantive reasonableness. United
States v. Carter , 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). Here, the district court correctly calculated Jo nes’ Guidelines range and fu lly explained it s reasoning supporting Jones’ sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that the sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. See United States v.3 Montes

- Pineda , 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) ( affording within

- Guidelines range sentence presum ption of reasonable ness on appeal). In accordance with Anders , we have reviewed the entire record and have found no meritorious ground s for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
req uires that counsel inform Jones , in writing, of h is right to petition the Supreme Court of the Un ited States for further review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave t o withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Jones. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED