2023 IL App (4th) 221043-U 

NOS. 4-22-1043, 4-22-1044 cons. 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re S.S. and L.F., Minors 

(The People of the State of Illinois,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v. 

Jessica S., 

Respondent-Appellant). 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Fulton County 

Nos. 22JA1 

22JA2 

Honorable 

William A. Rasmussen, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices Harris and Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court’s neglect finding was not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 2 Respondent, Jessica S., is the mother of L.F., age 11, and the legal guardian of S.S., 

age 7. The minors were adjudicated neglected and subsequently made wards of the court. 

Respondent appeals the adjudicatory order only, claiming (1) the State failed to sufficiently prove 

the allegations of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence as to both minors and (2) the trial 

court erred by applying a per se rule of anticipatory neglect as to L.F. We affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 On January 16, 2022, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)

received a report that S.S. was receiving questionable treatment by respondent, her legal guardian

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

April 26, 2023

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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and stepgrandmother. It was reported that on January 14, 2022, S.S. was left in a recreational 

vehicle (RV) for over four hours, where she was monitored by a video camera system. Respondent, 

her husband Richard S., and L.F. were inside a residence at a holiday gathering. Respondent 

reportedly repeatedly ordered S.S. to stay on the bed in the RV. S.S. was allowed to enter the 

residence to eat. However, according to the reporter, S.S. appeared to be “ ‘emaciated.’ ” The next 

day, S.S. was again kept in the RV for two to three hours at the same location. S.S. was eventually 

allowed to enter the residence but was ordered to remain at a table in a room separate from where 

the family’s holiday gift exchange was occurring. According to the reporter, respondent had told 

her a psychiatrist agreed that S.S. should be locked up, “grounded,” and away from other people. 

The reporter also said respondent kept a gate on S.S.’s bedroom door.

¶ 5 On January 28, 2022, after investigating the report, the State filed a petition for 

adjudication of neglect in the interest of S.S. (Fulton County case No. 22-JA-1). On February 1, 

2022, the State filed an amended petition as to S.S., adding an allegation of abuse, and an original 

petition in the interest of L.F. (Fulton County case No. 22-JA-2). These cases were combined in 

the trial court and have been consolidated in this appeal.

¶ 6 The allegations in the petitions of the two cases generally mirrored each other. That 

is, the State alleged S.S. was a neglected and abused minor, while L.F. was neglected and abused 

because she resided in the same home as S.S. Specifically, the State alleged (1) S.S. was a 

neglected minor because she was not receiving the care necessary for her well-being from 

respondent as her guardian in that she was not receiving adequate food (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) 

(West 2020)) (count I); (2) S.S. was a neglected minor because respondent left the minor without 

supervision for an unreasonable period of time without regard for S.S.’s mental or physical health, 

safety, or welfare (id. § 2-3(1)(d)) (count III); and (3) S.S. was an abused minor because 
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respondent had committed or allowed to be committed an act or acts of torture upon her (id. § 2-

3(2)(iv)) (count IV). The State alleged L.F. was neglected and abused on the same grounds because 

she resided in the same home as S.S. and the person responsible for S.S.’s neglect and abuse was 

L.F.’s mother, respondent. Respondent was not named in count II of either petition.

¶ 7 On May 12, 2022, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing. The following 

is a summary of the testimony relevant to the issues raised in this appeal.

¶ 8 Marci Well, S.S.’s pediatrician, testified she last treated S.S. in September 2019. 

At the time, S.S. had a bruise on her cheek and on her head. This appointment had been “suggested 

to the family by DCFS” after she had fallen at school. S.S. weighed 37 pounds—a “smaller than 

average” weight but not worrisome.

¶ 9 Amy Stufflebeam, the caseworker, testified she was assigned the case the day after 

DCFS received the hotline call. As a result of the call, on January 17, 2022, Stufflebeam and a 

deputy sheriff made contact with respondent at her home. Respondent told them S.S. was 

“grounded because she had shit and pissed on her floor.” Once Stufflebeam spoke with S.S. alone, 

she learned S.S. had not eaten breakfast or lunch that day. This conversation took place at 

approximately 3:30 p.m. S.S. told Stufflebeam she was hungry and Stufflebeam escorted S.S. to 

the kitchen. S.S. asked respondent if she could have lunch and respondent said, “ ‘Of course.’ ” 

Stufflebeam stepped outside to call her supervisor. She said after she had returned inside, she 

noticed S.S. had eaten “every single bite of those [two] corn dogs and [she] picked up that glass 

of milk and drank it without stopping before putting it down.”

¶ 10 Stufflebeam spoke with L.F., who denied any abuse and advised that S.S. was 

“troublesome” for respondent, was “bad,” and was punished or grounded “ ‘most of the time.’ ” 

L.F. said S.S. “poops her pants and gets in trouble.” Stufflebeam asked L.F. to say one good thing 
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about S.S. and L.F. said, “ ‘I can’t think of anything good about [S.S.]’ ” When asked if there was 

any fighting among the adults in the home, L.F. said yes, respondent and Richard fight with 

“ ‘[w]ords and sometimes their hands.’ ” L.F. told Stufflebeam S.S. was in trouble at the time of 

the holiday gathering, so she had to stay in the RV and stay on the bed.

¶ 11 Stufflebeam testified that, during her conversation with respondent about S.S.,

respondent indicated she knew who the reporter was and described her as one who “can’t keep 

their nose out of their business.” Stufflebeam inquired whether S.S. had a medical condition that 

caused incontinence. Respondent denied the existence of any medical issue and said the reason 

S.S. soils her pants and defecates in her room “ ‘is because she’s an asshole’ ” and “lazy.”

Respondent told Stufflebeam she had previously taken S.S. to a therapist, who told respondent S.S. 

was “defiant” and “that everything that [respondent] was doing for discipline was appropriate and 

that she should continue doing what she was doing.”

¶ 12 Stufflebeam testified respondent then agreed to allow her to speak with S.S. alone. 

They went to S.S.’s bedroom and, at this point, everything Stufflebeam had already asked S.S. 

about had changed. S.S. now said she eats every day, the gate on her bedroom was never closed, 

she was never locked in her room, everything was fine, and she was not scared to be there. She 

said she had to stay in the RV because she was in trouble but did not know why.

¶ 13 Stufflebeam described seven-year-old S.S. as “extremely skinny[ and] very frail.” 

She said her eyes and cheeks were “sunken [in].”

¶ 14 Stufflebeam spoke with respondent about the gate on S.S.’s bedroom. Respondent 

explained it was for S.S.’s safety. Respondent said S.S. gets up in the middle of the night and 

“get[s] into things *** and get[s] pills.” She also said S.S. had “gotten outside before.” Stufflebeam 

questioned respondent about using a regular bedroom door with an alarm instead of using a gate,
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but respondent indicated doors were expensive. Stufflebeam described the gate as being 

approximately chin-high for S.S. and it was locked from the outside.

¶ 15 Respondent agreed to intact services with counseling, but those intact services were 

never started because, according to Stufflebeam, “there was more that happened within the 

investigation.” Stufflebeam explained that on January 28, 2022, when she accompanied the intact 

worker to respondent’s home for introductions, respondent answered the door but blocked the view 

into the home. Respondent indicated S.S. had “ ‘bruises all over her’ ” from fighting with 

respondent for over an hour in the bathtub. However, they were not able to see S.S. because she 

was currently at respondent’s mother’s house. Stufflebeam searched for the identity of 

respondent’s mother and then drove to Hazel W.’s house. There, Hazel reported she had not seen 

S.S. in over two years. Stufflebeam contacted her supervisor and was told to take S.S. into 

protective custody when she was found.

¶ 16 Stufflebeam testified she went back to respondent’s house, accompanied by two 

police officers, and made contact with Richard S., respondent’s husband. Richard claimed 

respondent and the minors were not home and would be gone for hours. Stufflebeam and the 

officers waited for respondent’s return. They eventually approached the residence again, showing 

Richard a warrant for S.S.’s custody. While searching the home, one of the officers found 

respondent, S.S., and L.F. hiding in the attic.

¶ 17 Stufflebeam testified she took S.S. into protective custody and was going to take 

her to the hospital. They stopped at McDonald’s on the way. S.S. ate four chicken nuggets, french 

fries, apple slices, two containers of apple juice, and all of Stufflebeam’s french fries. S.S. said she 

was still hungry, so Stufflebeam bought her a blueberry muffin, which she “devoured.” At the 

hospital, the doctors diagnosed her with dehydration. She weighed 37.9 pounds. She had a black 
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eye, a football-sized bruise on her back, a “pretty substantial gash out of her chin,” a “gash out of 

the inside of her left ankle,” bruises on her legs, and several bruises on her buttocks.

¶ 18 On January 30, 2022, Stufflebeam took protective custody of L.F. “[b]ecause of the 

abuse and neglect that [S.S.] had sustained while in the home, and since she was another child in 

the home, she need[ed] to be removed as well.”

¶ 19 Respondent told Stufflebeam she was the guardian of S.S. because S.S. had 

contracted salmonella poisoning and was hospitalized when she was six months old. According to 

Stufflebeam’s conversation with Stephanie, S.S.’s biological mother, respondent “forced” her to

sign over guardianship to respondent at a time when Stephanie was unable to care for S.S. 

Stephanie last saw S.S. when she was approximately one year old. Stufflebeam testified Stephanie 

was interested in obtaining custody of S.S.

¶ 20 On cross-examination, Stufflebeam testified S.S. had a cardboard sign in her 

bedroom over her desk that said “ ‘I pee my pants.’ ” According to Stufflebeam, S.S. was unable 

to open the gate to her room. If she had to use the restroom, she had to yell for respondent to let 

her out.

¶ 21 At the conclusion of Stufflebeam’s testimony, the State asked the trial court to take 

judicial notice of an order of probation from a McDonough County court case where respondent 

was convicted of cruelty to animals. Upon respondent’s objection on relevance grounds, the State 

argued the evidence tended to demonstrate respondent’s propensity to “not take care of things that 

are under her control.” The court agreed to take judicial notice.

¶ 22 Fulton County Sheriff’s Deputy Tim Harper testified about the events that occurred 

on January 28, 2022, when he accompanied Stufflebeam to respondent’s residence. He searched 

the residence for respondent and S.S. In an upstairs bedroom closet, he “separated the clothes on 
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the hangers to see if there was any type of doors or whatnot.” He said he saw a door with a large 

blue tote sitting in front of the door. He pushed the tote away from the door, opened it, and found 

S.S., L.F., and respondent in the crawl space.

¶ 23 Dr. Channing Petrak, a pediatrician and the medical director of the Pediatric 

Resource Center, testified he was board certified in child abuse pediatrics. He testified he evaluated 

S.S. on January 31, 2022, at Children’s Hospital of Illinois. Dr. Petrak testified S.S. explained the 

layout of her bedroom. She said she had a gate in her bedroom doorway that she was unable to 

unlock, and she had a bucket in her room to use for the bathroom. On some occasions, if she yelled 

“really loud,” she would be allowed to go into the bathroom, but she would have “to go right back 

to her room.”

¶ 24 Dr. Petrak questioned S.S. about her visual injuries. S.S. said the bruise on her back 

was from slipping in the tub and the cut on her chin was from the gate. She indicated the bruises 

on her buttocks were from being spanked by respondent. Dr. Petrak noted S.S.’s weight was low 

and below the growth curve. She had gained 0.9 pounds in two years, when she would have been 

expected to gain four to eight pounds per year. It appeared from her medical records that S.S. had 

not been seen by her primary care physician in two years.

¶ 25 According to Dr. Petrak, S.S. showed physical signs of malnutrition. For example, 

she had very dry and scaly skin, thickened and cracked skin on her feet and palms, and overall 

“decreased fat stores.” She also showed signs of physical abuse. In Dr. Petrak’s opinion, “[s]ome 

of her bruises were not what you would find from typical childhood play.”

¶ 26 Stephanie, S.S.’s biological mother, testified that throughout her childhood, she 

moved between her father’s home and her mother’s home. Her father, Richard, was married to 
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respondent. Respondent often disciplined Stephanie with corporal punishment, timeouts, and loss 

of privileges.

¶ 27 Stephanie gave guardianship of S.S. to respondent upon respondent’s request when 

S.S. was an infant because Stephanie was unemployed and homeless, though she was living with 

respondent and Richard. In 2015, respondent and Richard “kicked [her] out of the house” because 

they felt Stephanie was not making sufficient efforts to better herself. Stephanie said she was not 

“welcome back at the house.” And therefore, she has had little to no contact with S.S.

¶ 28 Respondent called her 18-year-old daughter, Skylar S., as a witness. She began her 

testimony with an explanation of the holiday party and the RV. Skylar said, on that day, S.S. was 

grounded for “pooping and peeing on the floor and everything at the house.” Skylar was not sure 

why S.S. did such things and recalled that when they asked S.S. for an explanation, she said she 

was mad at them. On the day of the party, respondent told S.S. to stay in the RV because she was 

not allowed to play with the other children at the holiday gathering. According to Skylar, 

respondent allowed S.S. to come into the house during the meal, but she had to open her gifts at 

the table away from the other children. Skylar’s cousin, Harley, expressed her opinion that it was 

unfair that S.S. was not allowed to play with the other children. Harley and respondent argued 

about the situation until respondent and her family left the party.

¶ 29 Skylar described S.S.’s bedroom as having a toddler bed, toys, shelves, a television, 

and a dollhouse. She said there was no door on S.S.’s bedroom but there was a “child’s gate that 

went up at night so she wasn’t getting into anything.” Skylar said S.S. “could open it on her own 

if she needed to.” Skylar said S.S. ate three meals a day plus snacks.

¶ 30 Skylar said S.S. would often act out by refusing to do her homework, throwing or 

slamming things, or going to the bathroom throughout the house. With regard to the bathtub 
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incident, Skylar said S.S. was in her bedroom “doing her own thing” when Skylar smelled 

something suspect. She went to the bedroom, where she found S.S. had taken off all her clothes

and “peed and pooped all over her room.” Respondent said she was going to take a photograph “to 

show DCFS what she’s doing.” Skylar said when S.S. heard that, she “started throwing a fit and 

throwing herself around.” They got S.S. upstairs into the bathtub, but she refused to wash herself. 

The following exchange occurred

¶ 31 “Q. Okay. Okay. And then once you got her in the bathtub, what happened?

A. She was wanting to throw a fit because she didn’t want to wash herself, 

and at our house, if you’re being that age and you’re purposefully pooping and 

peeing yourself, you have to wash yourself, and [S.S.] is more than capable of 

washing herself, and she went to go throw herself down, and mom went to go catch 

her which caused mom to fall, and I quickly caught mom from behind. My dad was 

on the phone with my mom, and he says, ‘Jess, stopping [sic] hurting herself, let 

her throw her fit.’ So we took a step back, we closed the curtain, mom sat on the 

toilet, I sat on the floor, and every now and then we’d open up the curtain, look in, 

try talking to her to calm her down, wouldn’t work, so we’d close the curtain again. 

Eventually, she did calm down and washed herself up, we got her out, we— 

 Q. When she was having this sort of episode, I suppose, what was [S.S.] 

doing? 

 A. She was screaming, hitting, kicking, throwing herself around, saying [‘]I 

hate you,[’] and everything she could think of really.

Q. Okay. And then what happened after that?
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 A. After we got her out of the shower, we dried her off and everything, we 

went back downstairs, sat down, after cleaning up her room and everything, but we 

went back downstairs, sat down, later on we had some supper, and went to bed, and 

the next day, my mom took [S.S.] to my grandma’s just so we could have a cool 

down.” 

The record indicates the “grandma” Skylar was referring to was not respondent’s biological 

mother, Hazel W., but her adopted mother, Jonnie S.

¶ 32 After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court found the 

State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence the minors were neglected. The court found 

respondent was not providing adequate food and care to S.S. The court relied on (1) the medical 

testimony, which indicated S.S. was well below average in terms of her weight, (2) Stufflebeam’s 

testimony regarding S.S.’s conversations with her regarding her lack of food, and (3) the fact 

respondent was hiding with the minors to avoid DCFS.

¶ 33 The trial court also found L.F. neglected. The court stated: “If there’s neglect in the 

house for one, there’s neglect in the house for the other.”

¶ 34 On July 7, 2022, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing. The State 

presented as its only evidence the integrated assessment, family service plan, and the June 29, 

2022, dispositional hearing report for each minor.

¶ 35 Richard S. testified that L.F. and respondent had a good relationship. In his view, 

respondent took good care of L.F. and provided for all her needs.

¶ 36 The trial court found respondent unfit as to both minors and made the minors wards 

of the court.
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¶ 37 Respondent filed a motion to reconsider the adjudicatory order, which the trial court 

denied. 

¶ 38 This appeal followed.

¶ 39 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 40 Initially, we note, in respondent’s amended notice of appeal and in the concluding 

paragraph of her opening brief, she mentions appealing the findings from the dispositional hearing. 

However, she makes no argument as to the trial court’s determination of her fitness, and therefore, 

we find that argument forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (stating points not 

argued in an appellant’s opening brief are forfeited). 

¶ 41 In her brief, she claims the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that both minors were neglected as determined by the trial court. In its adjudicatory order, the court 

found both minors were neglected in that they were in an environment injurious to their welfare 

pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) 

(West 2020)). We note respondent made no objection to the court’s injurious-environment finding 

because that ground was not alleged against respondent in the petition. See In re April C., 326 Ill. 

App. 3d 225, 242 (2001) (“Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, 

he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is [forfeited].”). As to S.S., 

the court based its finding on the “lack of care or concern; failure of [respondent] to provide food.” 

As to L.F., the court based its finding on the “[f]ailure to show care or concern; failure to provide 

food to minor in home.”

¶ 42 In a petition for adjudication of wardship under the Act, the “paramount 

consideration is the best interest of the child” In re J.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 847, 856 (2008). The 

State must prove its allegation of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 
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2d 338, 343 (2000). Preponderance of the evidence means proof that makes the condition more 

probable than not. Id. Upon review, the trial court’s finding “[shall] not be disturbed unless it is 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d 661, 667 (2001).

¶ 43 Generally, Illinois courts have interpreted “injurious environment” to mean a 

breach of a parent’s duty to ensure a safe and nurturing shelter for her minor children. N.B., 191 

Ill. 2d at 346. The State may use the evidence of neglect of one child as evidence of neglect of 

another child who lives in the same household and for whom the same parent is also responsible. 

In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062-63 (1991) (“Where an injurious environment has been 

found to exist, the trial court need not wait until the child becomes a victim or is emotionally 

damaged permanently in order to remove the child from the household.”); In re R.R., 409 Ill. App. 

3d 1041, 1045 (2011) (“Proof of neglect of one minor is admissible evidence on the issue of neglect 

of any other minor for whom the parent is responsible.”). In fact, section 2-18(3) of the Act states: 

“In any hearing under this Act, proof of the abuse, neglect or dependency of one minor shall be 

admissible evidence on the issue of the abuse, neglect or dependency of any other minor for whom 

the respondent is responsible.” 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 2020).

¶ 44 A. Allegation of Inadequate Food for S.S. 

¶ 45 Respondent claims the State failed to prove S.S. did not receive adequate food. She 

claims the testimony of Stufflebeam, L.F., and Skylar supports her claim. Stufflebeam testified 

that during her second conversation with S.S., the child said she eats three meals a day. L.F. and 

Skylar corroborated S.S.’s claim, each testifying that S.S. received and had access to adequate 

food. Respondent argues the doctors’ testimony that S.S. was small for her age did not prove it 

was more probable than not her weight and size were from a lack of food.
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¶ 46 Respondent’s argument ignores the magnitude of the evidence demonstrating S.S. 

was underfed and malnourished. The evidence of her weight alone suggests inadequate food. Dr. 

Petrak testified S.S. had gained less than a pound in two years, when a typical child would be 

expected to gain four to eight pounds a year. That is, S.S. should have gained 8 to 16 pounds 

between her reported doctor’s visits. Stufflebeam described S.S. as “extremely skinny” and “very

frail.” She said her eyes and cheeks were “sunken [in].” According to Dr. Petrak, S.S. showed 

physical signs of malnutrition, such as very dry and scaly skin, thickened and cracked skin on her 

feet and palms, and overall “decreased fat stores.” The evidence also demonstrated that S.S. told 

Stufflebeam at 3:30 p.m. she was hungry, as she had not eaten breakfast or lunch that day. 

Stufflebeam also described witnessing S.S.’s unusual consumption of food and drink—as if she 

was ravenous.

¶ 47 Based on this evidence and contrary to respondent’s position, we conclude the trial 

court’s finding that S.S. was neglected based on respondent’s failure to provide adequate food was 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find the State established the allegations of 

neglect are more probably true than not. That is, it is more probably true than not, based on this 

evidence, that S.S. was in an environment injurious to her welfare because respondent failed to 

provide her with adequate food.

¶ 48 Having found sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order adjudicating S.S. 

neglected based upon an injurious environment due to respondent’s failure to provide adequate 

food, it is not necessary to address any further grounds or bases therefor. See In re Faith B., 216 

Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2005) (the court found the minors neglected on one basis and determined there was 

no need to review the additional bases).

¶ 49 B. Anticipatory Neglect of L.F.
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¶ 50 Respondent also claims the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that L.F. was a neglected minor. In particular, respondent claims the trial court erred in finding 

L.F. neglected based on anticipatory neglect. Respondent argues, because the State presented no 

evidence relating specifically to the neglect of L.F., the court’s finding L.F. was a neglected minor 

was in error. We disagree.

¶ 51 As our supreme court has found, under a theory of anticipatory neglect, the State 

seeks to protect not only minors who are direct victims of neglect or abuse, but also those who 

have a probability to be subject to neglect or abuse because they reside with an individual who has 

been found to have neglected or abused another child. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 468 (2004). 

Respondent relies on Arthur H. for the following proposition: “[T]he mere admissibility of 

evidence does not constitute conclusive proof of the neglect of another minor. Each case 

concerning the adjudication of minors, including those cases pursued under a theory of anticipatory 

neglect based upon the neglect of a child’s sibling, must be reviewed according to its own facts.” 

Id. at 468-69. 

¶ 52 We reject respondent’s reliance on Arthur H. as factually distinguishable. In that 

case, the evidence clearly established the minor in question did not live in the same home, or even 

the same state, as the abused and neglected minors. See id. at 472-73. Because the minor was not 

exposed to the same environment as the other abused and neglected minors, our supreme court 

concluded the subject minor was not exposed to the same risk of harm and therefore not neglected. 

Id. at 478. Unlike the minor in Arthur H., L.F. lived in the same home as S.S. and was under the 

care and control of respondent, just like S.S., and was therefore exposed to the same risk of harm.

¶ 53 For these reasons, we conclude the trial court’s finding of anticipatory neglect was 

not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 55 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 56 Affirmed.