alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2900 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2900

To repeal the wage rate requirements commonly known as the Davis-Bacon 
                                  Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 16, 2009

 Mr. King of Iowa (for himself and Mr. Mack) introduced the following 
    bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To repeal the wage rate requirements commonly known as the Davis-Bacon 
                                  Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Davis-Bacon Repeal Act''.

SEC. 2. REPEAL OF DAVIS-BACON WAGE REQUIREMENTS.

    Subchapter IV of chapter 31 of title 40, United States Code, is 
repealed.

SEC. 3. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS REPEAL.

    Section 276c of title 40, United States Code, is repealed.

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE AND LIMITATION.

    The amendments made by sections 2 and 3 shall take effect 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act but shall not affect any 
contract in existence on such date of enactment or made pursuant to 
invitation for bids outstanding on such date of enactment.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



EXHIBIT 31.2
 Certification of Chief Financial Officer
Pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Mad Catz Interactive, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period
covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in
this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this
report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and
15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls
and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us
by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is
being prepared;b)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures
and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure
controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; andc)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially
affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control
over financial reporting; and
 5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the
audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent
functions):
 a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;
andb)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
 Date: November 14, 2007
    /s/ Stewart A. HalpernStewart A. Halpern, Chief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v David L. Monroe, Appellant.

[860 NYS2d 564]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Bivona, J.), rendered August 28, 2007, convicting him of assault in the third degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]; *People v Hunt,*13 AD3d 160, 160-161 [2004]; *People v Petteys,*223 AD2d 992, 993 [1996]). Resolution of issues of credibility is primarily a matter to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination should be accorded great deference on appeal *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633, 644-645 [2006]; *People v Mateo,*2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], *cert denied*542 US 946 [2004]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]; *People v Romero,*7 NY3d at 636; *People v Hunt,*13 AD3d at 160-161).

To the extent that the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves matter dehors the record, namely, defense counsel’s failure to offer a certain letter for admission into evidence, it may not be reviewed on direct appeal *(see People v Gillespie,*36 AD3d 626, 627 [2007]; *People v Jackson,*19 AD3d 614, 615 [2005]). Otherwise, defense counsel provided meaningful representation *(see People v Satterfield,*66 NY2d 796, 798-799 [1985]; *People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 146-147 [1981]). Defense counsel prepared and pursued trial strategies and defense theories, presented a clear and cogent summation, and adequately cross-examined the People’s witnesses to develop his *624defense theories. Hindsight does not elevate counsel’s unsuccessful trial strategies to ineffective assistance of counsel *(see People v Benevento,*91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; *People v Satterfield,*66 NY2d at 798-799; *People v Baldi,*54 NY2d at 146-147). Mastro, J.P, Skelos, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         374,319
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  755,975
<ALLOWANCES>                                   222,907
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,313,105
<PP&E>                                         377,850
<DEPRECIATION>                                 313,719
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,699,165
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,285,153
<BONDS>                                      1,110,990
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        200
<COMMON>                                           361
<OTHER-SE>                                   (697,539)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,699,165
<SALES>                                      1,421,431
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,421,431
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  873,444
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,437,829
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              35,677
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (916,936)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (916,936)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (916,936)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.28)


</TABLE>
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 5, 2019

No. 04-19-00792-CV

Richard Leon ROSE,

Appellant

v.

Peter G. ADAMS,

Appellee

From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CI04064

Honorable Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

On November 7, 2019, Appellant Richard L. Rose filed a notice of appeal. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 25.1(a). The same day, a deputy clerk of this court notified Appellant in writing that our 

records do not show that the $205.00 filing fee has been paid. Further, our records do not 

conclusively establish that Appellant is excused by statute or rule from paying the filing fee. See

id. R. 5 (requiring fees in civil cases); id. R. 20.1 (waiving appellate court costs under certain 

circumstances). 

Our November 7, 2019 letter warned Appellant that if the filing fee was not paid by 

November 18, 2019, the appeal could be stricken by this court. To date, this court has not 

received payment or a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. See id.; see also

TEX. R. CIV. P. 145.

Our letter also advised Appellant that the docketing statement must be filed with this 

court by November 18, 2019. See id. R. 32.1; 4TH TEX. APP. (SAN ANTONIO) LOC. R. 5.2, 

http://www.txcourts.gov/4thcoa/practice-before-the-court/local-rules.aspx. To date, no 

docketing statement has been filed. 

We ORDER Appellant to file a docketing statement within TEN DAYS of the date of 

this order. 
We ORDER Appellant to show cause in writing within TEN DAYS of the date of this 

order that either (1) the $205.00 filing fee has been paid, or (2) Appellant is entitled to appeal 

without paying the filing fee. 

If Appellant fails to respond as ordered, this appeal will be dismissed without further 

notice. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5, 42.3(c); In re W.J.C., No. 04-05-00532-CV, 2005 WL 3477883 

(Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 21, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

_________________________________

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 5th day of December, 2019.

___________________________________

MICHAEL A. CRUZ,

Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  814,892
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,600,012
<PP&E>                                         571,702
<DEPRECIATION>                                 267,536
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              13,558,579
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,850,359
<BONDS>                                         36,463
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        40,627
<OTHER-SE>                                   5,631,130
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                13,558,579
<SALES>                                      1,695,853
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,695,853
<CGS>                                        1,935,121
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,705,085
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             513,242
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (3,457,595)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (3,457,595)
<DISCONTINUED>                              (3,726,254)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (7,183,849)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (3.26)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (3.26)


</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee v. Michael Scott MCAULEY, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 10-50470

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 31, 2011.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Albert A. Flores, Law Office of Albert A. Flores, San Antonio, TX, for Defendan1>-Appellant.

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Michael Scott McAuley pleaded guilty conditionally to transporting child pornography and was sentenced, *inter alia,*to 188 months’ imprisonment. He reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered on his external computer hard drive during a warrant-less search at a border checkpoint.

Arguably, because this search occurred at a border checkpoint, McAuley’s consent *401was not required to conduct the warrant-less search. *See United States v. Arnold,*538 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir.2008) (“[R]easonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search a laptop or other personal electronic storage devices at the border”.). In the light of the following, however, we need not decide whether the search was constitutionally permissible as a routine search under the border-search doctrine. *See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,*473 U.S. 531, 538, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985).

The district court’s finding that McAuley consented to the search is reviewed for clear error. *E.g., United States v. Pickett,*598 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir.2010) (reviewing legal conclusions *de novo;*factual findings for clear error). McAuley, among others, testified at the hearing on his suppression motion. The factual findings underlying the district court’s conclusion that McAuley voluntarily consented to the search were not clearly erroneous. *See United States v. Mata,*517 F.3d 279, 291 (5th Cir.2008) (noting defendant did not withdraw verbal consent despite his refusal to sign consent form); *United States v. Garza,*118 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir.1997) (“We will not second guess the district court’s factual findings as to the credibility of witnesses.”); *United States v. Alfaro,*935 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir.1991) (finding defendant’s conduct not unequivocal act or statement of withdrawal). Because McAuley waived his Fourth Amendment rights, the search was constitutionally permissible. *See Mata,*517 F.3d at 290.

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 32.2

**Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to****18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to****Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

*          *I, M. Brinkley Morse,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Quest Software, Inc. on Form 10-Q/A for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2002, fully complieswith the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Quest Software, Inc.

|   | By:    | /s/ M. BRINKLEY MORSE                          |
|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                |
|   | Name:  | **M. Brinkley Morse**                          |
|   | Title: | **Vice President, Finance and Operations and** |
|   |   | **Chief Financial Officer**                    |
Exhibit 12

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                       CENTRAL TRACTOR FARM & COUNTRY, INC.
                       SCHEDULE REGARDING COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

                                                  (in thousands)
                               
                                                     Fiscal 1997                                                           
                                        ----------------------------------
                             Pro Forma  7 months ended     5 months ended         Fiscal      Fiscal
                               1997     November 1, 1997    March 26, 1997         1996        1995
                              ------    ----------------   ---------------        ------       -----
                                 
<S>                          <C>               <C>               <C>              <C>          <C>   
Income before income taxes   $ 6,778           3,422             (1,881)          14,994       13,905
                             =======         =======            =======          =======      =======
                                                                                             
                                                                                             
                                                                                             
Fixed charges:                                                                               
  Interest expense           $22,050          11,463              3,188            1,663        1,302
  Portion of rent expense                                                                    
    representing interest      3,418           1,860                814            1,859        1,567
                             -------         -------            -------          -------      -------
  Total fixed charges        $25,468          13,323              4,002            3,522        2,869
                             =======         =======            =======          =======      =======                            
                                                                                             
Earnings before income                                                                       
  taxes and fixed charges    $32,246          16,745              2,121           18,516       16,774
                             =======         =======            =======          =======      =======              
                                                                                              
Ratio (deficiency) of                                                                        
 earnings to fixed charges     1.3X            1.3X             $(1,881)           5.3X         5.8X
                             =======         =======            =======          =======      =======
                                                                                             
</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Virgilio Ferrer, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 508]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Jones, J.), rendered November 16, 1995, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that prosecutorial misconduct denied him his right to a fair trial is without merit. Contrary *570to the defendant’s contentions, the comments made by the prosecutor during summation were appropriate. It is the right of counsel during summation to comment upon every pertinent matter of fact bearing upon the questions the jury have to decide (see, *People v Ashwal,*39 NY2d 105, 109). The prosecutor’s comments referred to matters in evidence, or which were fairly inferable from the evidence (see, *People v Ashwal, supra,*at 109-110). The prosecutor’s remarks constituted a permissible response to the defendant’s characterization of a buy and bust operation and the performance of the police officers involved, and did not constitute improper bolstering.

The prosecutor did not attempt to shift or limit the People’s burden of proof. In any event, as the court correctly conveyed the burden of proof requirements to the jury, the jury is presumed to have followed the instructions as given *(see, People v McCray,*167 AD2d 304, 305). Rosenblatt, J. P., Ritter, Altman and Florio, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.48


July 8, 2004


Chet Ritch


Dear Chet,

RE:      EMPLOYEE SHARE INCENTIVE PLAN AND EMPLOYEE SHARE OPTION PLAN

In accordance with the Employee Share Incentive Plan ("the Preference Share
Plan"), you are hereby advised that the Grant Date is July 6, 2004 for benefits
you have accrued during the year ended 31 December 2003.

Accordingly you are granted 72 Preference Shares in the Company. You have the
option to purchase an equal number of Preference Shares at a price of US$13.45
or CI$11.21 each, which has been calculated in accordance to the terms of the
Preference Share Plan. If you intend to exercise this option, then payment must
be received in full no later than the close of business on AUGUST 5, 2004.

As a member of the Employee Share Option Plan ("the Option Plan"), you will also
be granted, as of July 6, 2004, the option to purchase 360 Ordinary Shares in
the Company. These options are exercisable in accordance to the terms of the
Option Plan. You furthermore have the opportunity to obtain an equal amount of
options to purchase Ordinary Shares of the Company, in accordance to the terms
of the Option Plan, if you exercise your right to purchase the above additional
Preference Shares before AUGUST 5, 2004.

Your continued dedication and hard work have contributed to another successful
year for Consolidated Water, and I look forward to a very bright future.

Yours sincerely,
CONSOLIDATED WATER CO. LTD.


/s/ Frederick W. McTaggart

Frederick W. McTaggart
President and CEO