alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
FDS FOR JP FOODSERVICE, INC. AS OF AND FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 28, 1997
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-29-1996             JUN-28-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-02-1995             JUN-30-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-29-1996             JUN-28-1997
<CASH>                                          12,224                  11,139
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  156,952                 142,284
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,547                   3,530
<INVENTORY>                                     84,138                 110,030
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               260,323                 271,869
<PP&E>                                         167,365                 227,938
<DEPRECIATION>                                  63,107                  86,214
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 448,279                 524,148
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          139,457                 118,445
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                           189                     225
<OTHER-SE>                                     127,960                 228,721
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   448,279                 524,148
<SALES>                                      1,449,303               1,691,913
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,449,303               1,691,913
<CGS>                                        1,198,797               1,396,223
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  205,291                 235,353
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                16,704                  21,922
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 2,048                   2,253
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              15,187                  16,522
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 28,511                  38,415
<INCOME-TAX>                                    11,598                  16,167
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             16,913                  22,248
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                    16,913                  22,248
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.90                    1.02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.90                    1.02
        


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2
                               ------------

                              CERTIFICATION
                     PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K/A (the
"Report") of AMCON Distributing Company (the "Company") for the fiscal year
ended September 24, 2004, I, Michael D. James, Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, to my knowledge, that:

    (1)the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

    (2)the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Date: August 19, 2005         /s/ Michael D. James
                              -------------------------
                              Title: Vice President and
                              Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to AMCON Distributing Company and will be retained by AMCON
Distributing Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED APRIL 6, 2023

NO. 03-21-00402-CR

Charles L. Sumrall, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES BAKER, TRIANA, AND THEOFANIS

MODIFIED AND, AS MODIFIED, AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE THEOFANIS

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court. Having reviewed 

the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no error in the court’s

judgment requiring reversal. However, there was error in the judgment that requires correction. 

Therefore, the Court modifies the trial court’s judgment to reflect that Sumrall’s pleas to the 

enhancement paragraphs were “TRUE” and that the statute for the offense was section 

481.115(b) of the Texas Health and Safety Code. The judgment, as modified, is affirmed. 

Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no adjudication of costs is made.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-7804
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus NEVILLE A. HUTCHINSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (1:01-cr-00206-JCC; 1:03-cv-00683-JCC) Submitted: March 29, 2007 Decided: April 4, 2007 Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Neville A. Hutchinson, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas More Hollenhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Neville A. Hutchinson seeks to appeal the district court’s denial of several incomprehensible pleadings construed by the court as post-judgment motions in Hutchinson’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) proceeding. By failing to challenge the district court’s characterization of his pleadings or the grounds for denying relief, Hutchinson has waived appellate review of the district court’s order. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (“The Court will limit its review to the issues raised in the informal brief.”). Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-01-1997
<CASH>                                           7,177
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,625
<ALLOWANCES>                                       479
<INVENTORY>                                      7,804
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                23,864
<PP&E>                                           2,069
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,079
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  38,079
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            7,830
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        46,180
<OTHER-SE>                                    (16,013)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    38,079
<SALES>                                         44,769
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                44,769
<CGS>                                           34,197
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,707
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   432
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 240
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  4,093
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,797
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,269
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .23
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .23
        

</TABLE>
#### Ronald D. Ingber, Respondent, v Anthony Mallilo et al., Appellants.

[860 NYS2d 180]

In an action to recover damages for defamation, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Tanenbaum, J.), dated September 19, 2007, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

*570Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff is former counsel and the defendants are current counsel to nonparty Rodrigo Lezcano in an unrelated litigation to recover damages for personal injuries. After a dispute arose over the plaintiffs fee, the defendants moved to compel him to turn over the case file. In support of that motion, the defendants submitted an affidavit from Lezcano wherein he averred that he had retained the defendants and that he had “been informed” that his prior counsel (the plaintiff) had been suspended from the practice of law. The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for defamation. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants are the source of Lezcano’s belief that he had been suspended from the practice of law, and that the statement was false and defamatory per se. Prior to answering, the defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The defendants argued that there is no proof that they were the source of Lezcano’s statement and that, in any event, the statement was absolutely privileged because it was made in the context of a legal proceeding. The Supreme Court denied the motion. We affirm.

Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, and according the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action to recover damages for defamation *(see Matovcik v Times Beacon Record Newspapers,*46 AD3d 636 [2007]; *Klepetko v Reisman,*41 AD3d 551 [2007]; *Gjonlekaj v Sot,*308 AD2d 471 [2003]). Further, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the statement was absolutely privileged. Statements made by parties, attorneys, and witnesses in the course of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged, notwithstanding the motive with which they are made, as long as they are material and pertinent to the issue to be resolved in the proceeding *(see Rufeh v Schwartz,*50 AD3d 1002 [2008]). Here, the alleged publication of the statement at issue was by the defendants to Lezcano, not by Lezcano to the court in the course of the litigation over the case file *(see Ostrowe v Lee,*256 NY 36 [1931]; *Rufeh v Schwartz,*50 AD3d 1002 [2008]; *Fedrizzi v Washingtonville Cent. School Dist.,*204 AD2d 267 [1994]). Thus, the alleged publication of the statement did not occur in the course of a judicial proceeding. Finally, whether or not the defendants were in fact the source of Lezcano’s statement is a factual issue not subject to summary resolution on the record presented. Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) to dismiss the complaint. Fisher, J.P, Ritter, Florio and Garni, JJ., concur.
#### Maureen Nardi et al., Appellants-Respondents, v David M. Hirsh et al., Respondents-Appellants, and David M. Hirsh, M.D., P. C., Respondent, et al., Defendants.

[666 NYS2d 607]

—Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Bertram Katz, J.), entered September 30, 1996, which, in a medical malpractice action, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment insofar as made on behalf of defendant David M. Hirsh, M.D., P. C., and denied such motion insofar as made on behalf of defendants David M. Hirsh, M.D. and University Orthopaedic Specialty Associates, (University Associates) unanimously modified, on the law, to reinstate the complaint as against defendant David M. Hirsh, M.D., P. C. (Hirsh, P. C.), and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

The IAS Court correctly held that plaintiffs’ failure to file proof of service of the summons and complaint within 120 days of the filing of the summons and complaint was of no jurisdictional consequence as to defendants Dr. Hirsh and University Associates, who, by way of a stipulation extending their time to answer or move, appeared within such 120-day period (CPLR 306-b [a]; *see, Capuana v Zolla,*10 Misc 2d 96; *Aloisi v Deaton,*34 Misc 2d 116, 117). We also agree with the IAS Court that issues of fact exist as to whether University Associates assumed the prior tort liabilities of its principal Dr. Hirsh and that disclosure is otherwise needed as to the nature of their re*206lationship. Concerning the claim against defendant Hirsh, P. C., which was dismissed because the amended summons and complaint naming it were never filed, we address plaintiffs’ argument that the relation back doctrine of CPLR 203 (b) applies to save such claim, even though raised for the first time on appeal *(see, Chateau D’If Corp. v City of New York,*219 AD2d 205, 209-210, *lv denied*88 NY2d 811), and agree that it does. It is clear that the claims against Dr. Hirsh and Hirsh, P. C. arise out of the same course of treatment, that as the principal of Hirsh, P. C., Dr. Hirsh was at all times united in interest with the former, “ ‘such that they stand or fall together and that judgment against one will similarly affect the other’ ” *(Connell v Hayden,*83 AD2d 30, 40, quoting *Prudential Ins. Co. v Stone,*270 NY 154, 159), and that Hirsh, P. C. knew, or should have known, that but for a mistake, the action would have been brought against it *{see, Buran v Coupal,*87 NY2d 173, 178). Furthermore, since the “ ‘linchpin’ ” of the relation back doctrine is notice to the defendant within the applicable limitations period *{supra,*at 180), and since, under CPLR 306-b (a), service of process can be made as much as 120 days after expiration of the limitations period, we hold that the relation back doctrine applies where, as here, the added party received notice of the claim against it within the limitations period plus 120 days. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Milonas, Wallach, Rubin and Mazzarelli, JJ.
Certification of CEO Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
As Adopted Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Partnership.
 /s/ Terry Considine

Terry Considine
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (equivalent of
the chief executive officer of AIMCO Properties, L.P.)
February 26, 2010
#### Joseph DeFrancis, Appellant, v North Shore Plainview Hospital, Respondent.

[860 NYS2d 587]

In an action pursuant to the New York State Human Rights Law *(see*Executive Law § 296), to recover damages for gender discrimination, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Parga, J.), entered March 29, 2007, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff, an at-will employee, claims that he was terminated from his employment as a security guard at the defendant, North Shore Plainview Hospital (hereinafter the Hospital), as a result of gender discrimination. To establish its entitlement to summary judgment in a gender discrimination case, a defendant “must demonstrate either plaintiffs failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their challenged actions, the absence of a material issue of fact as to whether their explanations were pretextual” *(Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind,*3 NY3d 295, 305 [2004]; *see Ferrante v American Lung Assn.,*90 NY2d 623, 631 [1997]; *Hemingway v Pelham Country Club,*14 AD3d 536, 536-537 [2005]; *Maguire v Quaker Ridge Golf Club,*306 AD2d 253 [2003]).

Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that it terminated the plaintiffs employment for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. In response, the plaintiff failed to raise an issue of material fact as to whether the termination of his employment occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination or as to whether the hospital’s motive was pretextual *(see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind,*3 NY3d at 306-308; *Castro v New York Univ.,*5 AD3d 135, 136 [2004]; *Liebowitz v Luitpold Pharms.,*288 AD2d 352 [2001]; *Dodd v Middletown Lodge [Elks Club] No. 1097,*277 AD2d 276 [2000]; *Gilroy v Continental Corp.,*237 AD2d 251 [1997]; *loele v Alden Press,*145 AD2d 29, 35 [1989]; *see also Hemingway v Pelham Country Club,*14 AD3d at 536-537; *Oross v Good Samaritan Hosp.,*300 AD2d 457, 458 [2002]). Accordingly, the Supreme *563Court properly granted the motion. Mastro, J.P, Skelos, Lifson and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
#### Robert LaVigna et al., Respondents, v Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., et al., Appellants, and Gerente De Construction, Inc., Defendant. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[665 NYS2d 410]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Norman Ryp, J.), *76entered April 5, 1996, which denied defendants-appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as barred by a Federal court stipulation of discontinuance, unanimously modified, on the law, to dismiss the complaint as against defendant WABC Television, Inc. (WABC), and otherwise affirmed, without costs. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant WABC Television, Inc. dismissing the complaint as against it.

Since plaintiff never obtained an order from the Federal court in the prior action removing his then attorney, as required by former Local General Rule 3 (c) of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (current Rules of US Dist Cts for S and E Dists of NY, rule 1.4; *see, Hallmark Capital Corp. v Red Rose Collection,*1997 WL 661146, 2, 1997 US Dist LEXIS 16328, *4 [SD NY, Oct. 21, 1997, Peck, J.]), counsel continued to represent plaintiff *(see, Fontaine v Ryan,*849 F Supp 242 [SD NY]), and therefore was able to bind him to the stipulation “so ordered” by the District Court. That order, which was never vacated or appealed, cannot be collaterally attacked in State court. Because a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice in Federal court is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata *(see, Chase Manhattan Bank v Celotex Corp.,*56 F3d 343, 345 [2d Cir]; *Staten Investors Group v Schaffer,*147 AD2d 631), and because plaintiffs current State law claims against WABC, for personal injuries caused by exposure to toxic fumes at the workplace owned and maintained by WABC, require the same evidence as did his claims in the discontinued Federal action, the current claims against WABC are barred by res judicata *(see, Computer Assocs. Inti. v Altai, Inc.,*126 F3d 365, 369-370 [2d Cir]). Plaintiff wife’s loss of consortium claim against WABC is merely derivative of her husband’s, and is therefore also precluded *(see, Liff v Schildkrout,*49 NY2d 622, 632-633). Accordingly, the complaint as against WABC is dismissed. However, because the stipulation of discontinuance was expressly limited to WABC and another person not a party to this action, plaintiffs’ instant claims as against defendants Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. and Lehrer McGovern Bovis, Inc. are not precluded. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Ellerin, Wallach, Williams and Andrias, JJ.
#### Galliher *vs.*Smith *et al.*

.'This court never interferes with the first grant of a new trial, where the evidence is conflicting; and the verdict in this case being decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence, a new trial was properly granted.

Judgment affirmed.

December 19, 1884.

Hall, Justice.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3013 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3013

To amend title 13, United States Code, to provide for the more accurate 
and complete enumeration of certain overseas Americans in the decennial 
                                census.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 24, 2009

   Mr. Bishop of Utah (for himself and Mr. Chaffetz) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and 
                           Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 13, United States Code, to provide for the more accurate 
and complete enumeration of certain overseas Americans in the decennial 
                                census.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. METHODS TO IMPROVE THE ENUMERATION OF CERTAIN OVERSEAS 
              AMERICANS.

    Section 141 of title 13, United States Code, is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsection (g) as subsection (h); and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the following:
    ``(g)(1) Effective beginning with the 2010 decennial census of 
population, in taking any tabulation of total population by States 
under subsection (a) for purposes of the apportionment of 
Representatives in Congress among the several States, the Secretary 
shall take appropriate measures to ensure, to the maximum extent 
practicable, that all Americans residing abroad on the decennial census 
date are fully and accurately counted, and are properly attributed to 
their respective States.
    ``(2) The measures under this subsection shall include at least the 
following:
            ``(A) One or more methods by which, at the request of a 
        non-governmental organization, administrative records of such 
        organization may, if such records satisfy such criteria as the 
        Secretary may establish, be used to enumerate members of such 
        organization who are residing overseas as of the decennial 
        census date.
            ``(B) One or more methods under which an international `Be 
        Counted' form may be completed at an embassy of the United 
        States by Americans residing overseas as of the decennial 
        census date.
    ``(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be considered--
            ``(A) to affect the methods used in the enumeration of any 
        civilian or military personnel of the United States; or
            ``(B) to permit or require that the data obtained under 
        this subsection be used for any purpose other than the 
        apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several 
        States.''.
                                 <all>
```