IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-51042

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CAMERAN ARNOLD FLANAGAN,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:11-CR-29-1

Before KING, CLEMENT, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Cameran Arnold Flanagan pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(C). Flanagan was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment and three

years of supervised release on each count to run concurrently. Flanagan

contends that the district court clearly erred in imposing an enhancement for

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 8, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 11-51042

obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and in determining the drug

quantity under § 2D1.1.

Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level

enhancement if the defendant willfully attempted to obstruct or impede the

administration of justice by, inter alia, attempting to commit perjury in a

codefendant’s case. § 3C1.1 & cmt. n.1 & n.4(B). Perjury for purposes of § 3C1.1

is defined as “giv[ing] false testimony concerning a material matter with the

willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion,

mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). 

“[A] finding of an obstruction of, or impediment to, justice that encompasses all

of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury” is sufficient. Id. at 95.

Flanagan challenges two aspects of the enhancement for obstruction of

justice: whether the district court made the predicate factual findings of

attempted perjury and whether the evidence supported the enhancement. 

Flanagan’s challenge to the adequacy of the district court’s findings is reviewed

for plain error because this challenge is raised for the first time on appeal. Cf.

United States v. Johnson, 352 F.3d 146, 150 n.2 (5th Cir. 2003). His challenge

to the application of the enhancement based on his conduct was presented to the

district court and is, therefore, reviewed for clear error. See United States v.

Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 752 (5th Cir. 1999). 

The district court adopted the presentence report (PSR), making the

factual findings in the PSR the findings of the district court. See United States

v. Cabral-Castillo, 35 F.3d 182, 186 (5th Cir. 1994). The PSR concluded that

Flanagan obstructed justice by conspiring to lie about his codefendant’s conduct. 

Implicit in this finding, was the finding that Flanagan planned to exculpate his

codefendant by falsely testifying that she was unaware of Flanagan’s unlawful

conduct. See id. at 187. Although there was no explicit finding that Flanagan’s

intended testimony was material, Flanagan’s testimony that his codefendant

had no knowledge of his unlawful conduct was material as it tended to exculpate

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her. See id. Accordingly, the district court’s findings respecting Flanagan’s

attempted perjurywere sufficient, and Flanagan has failed to demonstrate error,

much less plain error, in this respect.

Flanagan stated that he and his codefendant needed to coordinate and

that he would give the testimony that he said he would. His codefendant stated

that Flanagan should testify that she was unaware of his unlawful conduct. 

These statements could plausibly be read as an attempt by Flanagan to falsely

exculpate his codefendant. See United States v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 275, 283-84

(5th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the district court’s finding that Flanagan obstructed

justice by attempting to commit perjury in his codefendant’s case was plausible

in light of the record as a whole and not clearly erroneous. See Powers, 168 F.3d

at 752.

In determining a defendant’s base offense level under § 2D1.1, a district

court may consider the defendant’s relevant conduct. §§ 1B1.3(a), 2D1.1 cmt. 12. 

The district court attributed an additional 1,347 grams of cocaine based on the

cocaine sales documented in pages two, three, five, and six of a drug ledger. The

district court committed an arithmetic error at sentencing in calculating this

quantity of cocaine. However, as explained below, the arithmetic error was

harmless.

The district court’s finding that the ledger documented cocaine sales was

supported by the testimony of a case agent. The agent’s testimony was

corroborated by Flanagan’s admission that he possessed the cocaine found in the

apartment and by the evidence of drug distribution paraphernalia, digital scales

with cocaine residue, found in the same room as the ledger. Therefore, the

agent’s testimony bore sufficient indicia of reliability to support the district

court’s determination of the drug quantity. See United States v. Nava, 624 F.3d

226, 231-32 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2945 (2011). Although the

ledger did not indicate whether the recorded transactions fell within the time

period of the charged offense, “drug transactions occurring before the precise

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time frame of the conspiracy for which a defendant is convicted may be

considered for sentencing purposes if those transactions otherwise satisfy the

criteria for relevant conduct prescribed by the guidelines.” United States v.

McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 375 (5th Cir. 1993). 

Flanagan specifically challenges the district court’s use of pages three,

five, and six of the ledger but neglects to specifically challenge page two of the

ledger. For the reasons set forth previously, Flanagan has failed to show that

the district court clearly erred by attributing cocaine based on the cocaine sales

documented in page two of the ledger. The quantity of cocaine on page two, 392

grams, when added to the amount in the PSR, 371.73 grams, totals 763.73

grams. This total quantity of cocaine, 763.73 grams, yields a base offense level

of 26 for more than 500 grams but less than two kilograms of cocaine. See

§ 2D1.1(c)(7). The district court calculated the same base offense level. 

Therefore, any error by the district court in attributing additional cocaine to

Flanagan based on pages three, five, and six of the ledger was harmless. See

United States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 462 (5th Cir. 2002). 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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