alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-10-00767-CV

A. M., Appellant

v.

Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY, 207TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 2010-0384, HONORABLE CHARLES R. RAMSAY, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This accelerated appeal is from a section 263.405 order concerning the termination

of appellant’s parental rights with her child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405 (West 2008). 

After conducting a section 263.405 hearing, the trial court found appellant’s appeal frivolous and

appointed an attorney on appeal of the section 263.405 order only. See id. § 263.405(e).

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and appoint

attorney and a motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief. Appellant’s counsel seeks to

withdraw based upon factual representations that she made to the trial court at the final termination

hearing. Appellant’s counsel represents that the Texas Department of Family and Protective

Services does not oppose her motion to withdraw.

We construe her motion as a motion to abate the appeal for the trial court to consider

appellant’s motion to withdraw and to appoint a new appellate attorney. See id. Accordingly, we
abate this appeal for fifteen days and remand the cause to the district court of Hays County to

consider counsel’s motion to withdraw and appoint a new appellate attorney. All appellate deadlines

will be tolled during the period of abatement. Any orders resulting therefrom shall be filed with the

clerk of this Court no later than February 10, 2011.

__________________________________________

Melissa Goodwin, Justice

Before Chief Justice Jones, Justices Henson and Goodwin

Abated

Filed: January 25, 2011

2
Exhibit 10.7 Agreement with Kae Yong Park


EXHIBIT 10.7




Northsight Capital

7740 E. Evans Road

Scottsdale, AZ 85260





		
	Kae Yong Park

	September 23, 2014




PO Box 14110

Scottsdale, AZ 85267




Dear Ms. Park:




This will confirm the agreement between you and Northsight Capital, Inc. (the “Company”) that you will transfer to the persons listed on Exhibit A hereto, for the consideration set forth herein and no other consideration, that number of shares of Company Common Stock listed opposite each such person’s name on such Exhibit A (an aggregate of 3,775,000 shares of Company Common Stock) (the “Shares).




In consideration of your transfer of the Shares in accordance with the foregoing, the Company shall, concurrently with the execution of this agreement, pay to you the sum of $75,500 in cash.




If the foregoing correctly states our agreement, please countersign this letter where indicated below and return a copy to me as soon as possible.




Very truly yours,




Northsight Capital, Inc.

By: /s/ John Bluher

John Bluher, CEO




AGREED TO AND ACCEPTED:




/s/ Kae Yong Park

Kae Yong Park

Date: September 23, 2014











EXHIBIT A




			
	Name of Shareholder

	 
	Number of Shares


	JSL Kids Partners

	 
	100,000


	John Sandor Lemak

	 
	200,000


	Sandor Capital Partners

	 
	500,000


	Frenkel Fam.Trust

	 
	125,000


	Leon S. Frenkel

	 
	200,000


	James Barragan, JR. 

	 
	200,000


	Triage Capital Management

	 
	100,000


	Alla Pasternak

	 
	100,000


	Christopher Walk

	 
	800,000


	Yury Minkovsky

	 
	100,000


	Elliot Barnett

	 
	200,000


	Leon Frankel

	 
	400,000


	Tom Frey

	 
	50,000


	Wintermark, LLC

	 
	700,000


	Total:

	 
	3,775,000
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 10 ,

201 2

.

In The



## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 1 2

- 00 295

- CR

____________ IN RE TOMMY LYNN HAYES , Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING WRIT OF MANDAMUS 228th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court No. 1157419

- A



### M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On March 30 , 20 12 , r elator, Tommy Lynn Hayes , filed a petitio n for writ of
mandamus in this c ourt. See Tex. Gov’t Code §22.221 ; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52.1. In his petition, realtor asks that we direct Chris Daniel, the Harris County District Clerk
, to transmit a copy of his post

- conviction application for writ of habeas corpus to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.07.

This c ourt’s mandamus jurisdiction is governed by section 22.221 of the Texas Government Code. Section 22.221 expressly limits the mandamus jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to: (1) writs against a district court judge or county court judge in the2

court of appeals’ district, and (2) all writs necessary to enforce the court of appeals' jurisdiction. Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221.

This c ourt does not have mandamus jurisdiction over a district clerk unless it is necessary to e nforce our jurisdiction. See In re Washington , 7 S.W.3d 181, 182 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding)

. We have no jurisdiction over post

- conviction applications for habeas corpus relief from final felony convictions

. See Ater v. Eighth Court of Appeals , 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that intermediate appellate court improperly granted mandamus relief because court of criminal appeals is “the only court with jurisdiction in final post

- conviction felony proceedings”)

. Because relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is directed toward the Harris County District Clerk and is not necessary to enforce this court’ s jurisdiction, we
lack jurisdiction to grant the requested relief

. See Tex. Gov’ t Code § 22.221(b)(1).

Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Jamison and McCally

. Do Not Publish

– Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
**EXHIBIT  31.1**

**CERTIFICATIONS**

I, Ren Huiliang, ChiefExecutive Officer of NextMart, Inc., certify that

1.      Ihave reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of NextMart, Inc.;

2.      Basedon my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.      Basedon my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.      Theregistrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15 (e) and 15d-15 (e)) for the registrant and we have:

(a)       designedsuch disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report was being prepared;

(b)      evaluatedthe effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

(c)       disclosedin this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5.      Theregistrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

(a)       allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and

(b)      anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.
| /s/ Ren Huiliang                       |   |
|----------------------------------------|--------|
| Ren Huiliang,  Chief Executive Officer |   |
| Date: August 20,  2007                 |   |

 

----
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Euclides PENA-CASTILLO, also known as Willy Rosado, also known as Eu-clides Pena, also known as Victor Ma-tos, also known as German Carlos Lopez-Rivas, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-4058-cr.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 4, 2011.

*86Randa D. Maher, Law Offices of Randa D. Maher, Great Neck, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Euclides Pena-Castillo.

Amie N. Ely, Assistant United States Attorney (Katherine Polk Failla, Assistant United States Attorney, Of Counsel on the brief), for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee United States of America.

PRESENT: JOSEPH M. McLaughlin, guido calabresi, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal. Pena-Castillo argues that the United States Sentencing Guidelines’s pri- or conviction sentencing enhancement for illegal reentry cases, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), is unreasonable on its face. As such, he claims that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to sentence him, in part, on the basis of this enhancement.

We note, first, that Pena-Castillo does not appear to have fully raised this point in the district court, an omission that would limit our review to plain error. *See United States v. Bonilla,*618 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir.2010). Pena-Castillo’s claim fails under any standard of review, however, because we have already decided that a district court’s application of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) (A) (ii) is not by itself grounds for reversal. *See United States v. Perez-Frias,*636 F.3d 39, 43-44 (2d Cir.2011); *see also Bonilla,*618 F.3d at 105, 111.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>   1



                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.4



                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS


The Board of Directors
Brooke Group Ltd.

We consent to the incorporation by reference of our report dated February 11,
1997 in the registration statements on Form S-3 (No. 33-38869 and No. 33-63119)
of Brooke Group Ltd., relating to the consolidated balance sheets of Thinking
Machines Corporation and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1996, and the related
consolidated statements of operations, stockholders' investment and cash flows
for the years then ended, which report appears in the December 31, 1996 annual
report on Form 10-K of New Valley Corporation.


Arthur Anderson LLP


Boston, Massachusetts
March 27, 1997
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FEBRUARY 13, 2019

NO. 03-18-00385-CV

Joe Y. Rogers, III, Appellant

v.

Sandra Rogers Miller, Appellee

APPEAL FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 4 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE ROSE, JUSTICES KELLY AND SMITH

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION -- OPINION BY JUSTICE KELLY

This is an appeal from the judgment signed by the trial court on June 4, 2018. Having reviewed 

the record, the Court holds that appellant has not prosecuted his appeal and did not comply with 

a notice from the Clerk of this Court. Therefore, the Court dismisses the appeal for want of 

prosecution. Appellant shall pay all costs relating to this appeal, both in this Court and the court 

below.
Exhibit 31.2 

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, M. Brinkley Morse, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Quest Software, Inc.; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a materialfact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly presentin all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as definedin Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, includingits consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s othercertifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent functions): 

 

a) All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: May 10, 2004
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Chris Innes, state and attest that:



|1. | I am the President of Main Place Funding, LLC (the Registrant).
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Registrant for the year ended December 31, 2005 (the Report) containing financial statements fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant for the periods presented.

/s/ Chris Innes

---

Chris Innes

President

March 31, 2006
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Monique BRADDY, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-7462.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 31, 2011.

Decided: April 5, 2011.

Thomas Monique Braddy, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Howard Jacob Zlotnick, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Thomas Monique Braddy, Jr., appeals the district court’s order construing his “Motion for Rescission of Plea Contract” as an unauthorized successive 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.2010) motion and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certifícate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Braddy has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Exhibit 32.2.1






CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




I, David M. Young, Chief Financial Officer of TESSCO Technologies Incorporated, (the “Company”), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:




1.The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the annual period ended March 27, 2011, (the “Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and




2.The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Date: May 24, 2011                                                                                                /s/ David M. Young


David M. Young






The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.
<PAGE>
                                  EXHIBIT 32.1


        STATEMENT REQUIRED BY U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of PCB Bancorp, Inc.,
(the "Company") for the quarter ended September 30, 2003, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Phillip
R. Carriger, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and I, David LeVeau, Senior
Accounting Officer, certify that


          -    the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          -    information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Company.






/s/    Phillip R. Carriger
     ---------------------------------------
     Phillip R. Carriger, Chairman
     and Chief Executive Officer
     11/13/03


/s/  David LeVeau
     ---------------------------------------
     David LeVeau, Senior Accounting Officer
      11/13/03
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HECTOR RAFAEL GUTIERREZ, AKA

Hector Rafael Gutierrez Montoya,

Petitioner,

 v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 15-71485

Agency No. A200-370-217

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 14, 2016** 

Before: WALLACE, LEAVY, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 

Hector Rafael Gutierrez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying a continuance and entering an order of

removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of

FILED

DEC 20 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
discretion the denial of a continuance and review de novo constitutional claims. 

Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008). We deny the

petition for review.

The agency did not abuse its discretion or violate due process by denying

Gutierrez’ motion for a continuance to seek post-conviction relief for failure to

establish good cause. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (an IJ may grant a motion for a

continuance for good cause). Gutierrez’ conviction was final for immigration

purposes, the possibility of post-conviction relief was speculative at the time of his

last hearing, and he failed to submit any evidence with his appeal or after that his

conviction had been vacated. See Sandoval-Luna, 526 F.3d at 1247 (the denial of a

continuance was within the agency’s discretion where relief was not immediately

available to petitioner); Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“[T]he IJ [is] not required to grant a continuance based on . . . speculations.”);

Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (to prevail on a due process

challenge, an alien must show error and prejudice). Gutierrez’ contention that the

IJ denied the continuance based solely on case completion goals is belied by the

record.

The record does not support Gutierrez’ contention that the agency failed to

address his arguments or failed to provide sufficient reasoning and analysis. See

2 15-71485
Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (the agency must

“consider the issues raised, and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable

a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted”

(citation and quotation marks omitted)). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 15-71485