* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GEORGE HAMILTON, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant - Appellee. No. 09-35277 D.C. No. 3:07-cv-06278-PK

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Malcolm F. Marsh, District Judge, Presiding Submitted February 2, 2010 ** Seattle, Washington Before: RYMER, GOULD and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. 

# FILED

FEB 17 2010 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 George Hamilton appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of Hamilton’s application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the So cial Security Act and for supplemental security income under Title XVI. In hi s application, Hamilton alleged disability due to back, leg and knee problems; carpal tunnel syndrome; and liver problems. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. Hamilton argues that the ALJ did not give sufficient reasons to reject treating physician Dr. Howison’s opinion that Hamilton “is disabled and in no way will be able to be gainfully employed in any endeavor in the near future.” See Reddick v. Chater , 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that a treating physician’s contradicted opinion may be re jected only for “specific and legitimate reasons”). Hamilton is mistaken. The ALJ re viewed Dr. Howison’s opinion, cited its findings concerning the straight-leg-ra ising test and Hamilton’s pain response, and accounted for Dr. Howison’s medically supported assessments of degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, and he patitis C by concluding that Hamilton was severely impaired by a combination of these and other impairments. Dr. Howison’s assertion that Hamilton was di sabled and could not work, on the other hand, was contradicted by Dr. Brewste r’s functional assessment—which the ALJ adopted—that Hamilton was capable of significant work activity. The ALJ1 Dr. Howison’s conclusory post-decision letter, asserting that Hamilton could not perform the full range of lightwork activities on a full-time basis, was consistent with the ALJ’s decision limiting Hamilton to less than the full range of light work and was immaterial, so no remand is required. See Burton v. Heckler , 724 F.2d 1415, 1417 (9th Cir. 1984). 3 considered all of the medical evidence and concluded that Hamilton was not disabled, implicitly rejecting Dr. Howi son’s conclusory disability assertion. The ALJ’s omitting to explicitly reject Dr. Howison’s disability assertion, if error, was harmless error. See Burch v. Barnhart , 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A decision of the ALJ will not be re versed for errors that are harmless.”). It is true that the ALJ nowhere explic itly recited that he was rejecting Dr. Howison’s conclusion for the reasons given. But it is also true that the ALJ’s findings contain numerous specific and legitimate reasons for rejecting a conclusion that Hamilton was disabled and could not work. 1 Hamilton next argues that the ALJ improperly rejected Hamilton’s subjective claims as not credible. We disagree. The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by substan tial evidence, for determining that Hamilton was not credible. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). As the ALJ concluded, Hamilton “has repeatedly exaggerated his symptoms.” Dr. Brewster noted that Hamilton “show[ed] what could be considered an ex aggerated pain response,” and Dr. Parvin determined that4 Hamilton’s “florid pain behavior,” in explicable variability on testing, and “functional overlay” compromised the examination. See Tonapetyan v. Halter , 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001) (concludi ng that the claimant’s tendency to exaggerate was a legitimate considerati on in determining credibility). Further, Hamilton’s daily activities—including inde pendence in personal care, washing dishes, vacuuming, preparing meals, doing laundry, shopping for food, and socializing with friends—were not cons istent with the level of debilitating impairment that Hamilton asserted. See Reddick , 157 F.3d at 722 (stating that a claimant’s activities bear on credibility “if the level of activity [is] inconsistent with [the c]laimant’s claimed limitations”).Also, the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Brewster’s controverted upperextremity-limitation opinion for specific and legitimate reasons. See Andrews v. Shalala , 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). The limitation was controverted by Dr. Parvin’s assessment that Hamilton’s wrists and hands were stable, without decreased tone, and had adequate range of motion. Dr. Brewster’s opinion was not based on objective medical evidence. Dr. Brewster’s tests showed that Hamilton had normal fine-motor movements in both hands and good hand strength, Dr. Jensen concluded that Hamilton’s variati on in grip strength during testing “cannot be attributable to an organic process, ” and Hamilton’s presentation of his hands2 These reasons for rejecting Dr. Brewster’s opinion apply equally to Dr. Jensen’s upper-extremity-limitation opinion. 5 dirty with soil at a medical evaluation with Dr. Howison suggested that Hamilton was less limited than he portrayed. 2 Finally, Hamilton argues that the ALJ e rred by concluding at step five that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Hamilton could perform. See Tackett v. Apfel , 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). We again disagree. Based on Hamilton’s residual functional capacity, age (approaching advanced age), and education (terminated after eleventh grade), the Medical-Vocational Guidelines establis h that Hamilton would be conclusively disabled only if he were both limited to sedentary work and had no transferable skills from prior employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, §§ 201.11 (transferable skills), 202.10 (light work). Because Hamilton could perform a limited range of light work and had transferable skills from his work as a3 Hamilton acknowledged that he worked as a bartender at least two months, part time, which was a sufficient amount of time to acquire the transferable skills. See Dictionary of Occupa tional Titles § 312.474-010

. 4 Even if the ALJ erred in applyi ng the Medical-Vocational Guidelines or in concluding that Hamilton acquired transferable skills, the ALJ was entitled to rely on the vocational expert’s asse ssment that Hamilton could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy, including representative unskilled, sedentary-to-light positions. See Tackett , 180 F.3d at 1100–01. 6 bartender, 3 the ALJ properly concluded that Hamilton was not disabled. 4 AFFIRMED.