THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 

OF TEXAS 

,TMr. Bob E. Bradley ,, 

Executive Director 

Texas State Board of 

Public Accountancy 

Opinion No. JR-873 

Re: Applicability 

tory fee increases 

of statuto certi1033 La Posada, Suite 340 fied public accountants 

Austin, Texas 78752 (RQ-1243) 

Dear Mr. Bradley: 

you request our opinion concerning the interpretation 

of section 31 of the Public Accountancy Act of 1979, 

article 41a-1, V.T.C.S. Section 31 was added to the act 

during the second called session of the 70th Legislature. 

Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 5, art. 9, §6, at 

68-69. The pertinent part of.the new provision imposes a 

temporary increase in the fees required by the act: 

(a) Each of the following fees imposed by or 

under another section of this Act that first 

becomes due on or after the effective date of 

Article 9, H.B. 61, Acts of the 70th 

Legislature, 2nd Called Session, 1987, but. 

before August 31, 1989, is increased by $110: 

(1) annual license fee under Section 9(a) 

of this Act for Certified Public Accountants: 

(2) renewal fee under Section 9(a) of 

this Act for Certified Public Accountants: 

and 

(3) fee for issuance of a certificate of 

Certified Public Accountants under Section 13 

of this Act. 

V.T.C.S. art. 41a-1, 531(a). Section 9(a) imposes an 

annual license fee of not more than $60 and an annual 

license renewal fee of not more than $60. An additional 

penalty of $20 is charged for reinstatement of licenses 

cancelled because of failure to pay the renewal fee; a 

license may be reinstated upon payment of this penalty 

p. 4255 
Mr. Bob E. Bradley - Page 2 CM-8731 

only during the licensing year for which the fee was 

unpaid. These fees must be paid by the following persons 

prior to the issuance of a license: 

(1) holders of the certificate of 'Certified"Public Accountant' issued under this or 

prior Acts: and 

(2) such persons as are registered with 

the board under the provisions of this or 

prior Acts. 

V.T.C.S. art. 41a-1, 59(a). Section 13 of the act imposes 

a fee of not more than $100 for the issuance of a certificate of "Certified Public Accountant8* by reciprocity. 

The Texas State Board of Public Accountancy has 

adopted three interpretations of section 31. The first 

interpretation and the board's reasoning follows: 

It is the int'erpretation of the Texas State 

Board of public Accountancy (the Board) that 

the $110 fee increases identified in [subdivisions] (l), (2) 8 and (3) [of section 

31(a)] are restricted to certified vublic 

gccountants only rather than all license 

fees prescribed in Section 9(a) of the Act. 

The Board came to this conclusion by the 

following deductions: 

Section 9(a) of the Act specifies that 

licenses shall be issued to '(1) the 

holders of the certificate of "Certified 

Public Accountant" issued under this or 

prior Acts; and (2) such persons as 'are 

registered with the Board under the 

provisions of this or prior Acts.' 

Had the Legislature intended to impose 

the temporary $110 fee on &A&. licenses, 

it would have done so without the inclusion of the language 'for certified 

public accountants.* The Board feels 

that the addition of this language 

clearly restricts the temporary $110 

fee increase to those identified ' 

Section 9(a)(l) of the Act. (Emphasis ii 

original.) 

p. 4256 
Mr. Bob E. Bradley - Page 3 (JR-8733 

P 

In another context, this office advised the board that a 

professional corporation cannot be issued a certificate of 

**Certified Public Accountant.nl Acting upon this advice, 

the board has concluded that the temporary fee increase 

imposed by section 31 does not 

corporations 

apply to professional 

or partnerships registered under section 

9(a)(2) of the act. 

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to 

ascertain legislative intent. Winton v, Frank, 545 S.W.2d 

442 (Tex. 1976). Whenever possible, legislative intent is' 

determined from the language of the statute. Crimmins v. 

&ygy, 691 S.W.Zd 582 (Tex. 1985). If the intent of the 

legislature is apparent from the words of the statute, 

there is no need to consult extrinsic sources for evidence 

of such intent. Winton v. Frank suvra. Therefore, 

unless a statute is ambiguous, we ar; compelled to follow 

the clear language of the statute. RevublicBank Dallas, 

N.A. v. Interkal. Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1985). 

If the meaning of a statute is doubtful or ambiguous, 

the contemporaneous construction of the statute by the 

agency charged with its administration is given weight. 

See Calvert v. Kadane, 427 S.W.Zd 605 (Tex. 1968). An 

administrative agency's construction of a statute is not 

controlling, however. Bullock v. Ramada Texas, Inc., 609 

S.W.Zd 537 (Tex. 1980). It is valid only insofar as it is 

consistent with statutory language and will not be allowed 

the effect of expanding or contracting the language of the 

statute. See Firestone Tire and Rubber co. v. Bullock, 

573 S.W.Zd 498, 500 (Tex. 1978). 

We conclude that the board's first interpretation of 

section 31 reflects the plain language of that provision. 

By the terms of section 31, the temporary fee increase is 

to be collected for licenses issued for certified public 

accountants under section 9(a) or section 13. Under 

section 9(a), licenses are issued to "holders of the 

certificate of 'Certified Public Accountant"' and to "such 

1. you have not asked us to reconsider this advice. 

We believe, however, that the language of article 41a-1 

clearly supports the conclusion. See V.T.C.S. art. 41a-1, 

§§8, 12. Therefore, it is unnecessary to reexamine in 

this opinion the cogent analysis of the issue provided 

therein. 

p. 4257 
Mr. Bob E. Bradley - Page 4 04-873) 

persons [including partnerships and corporations] as are 

registered with the board.n Because only natural persons 

may hold a certificate of "Certified Public Accountant," 

the reference to certified public accountants in section 

31 necessarily excludes corporations and partnerships from 

its coverage. Therefore, we believe the board's interpretation of section 31 with respect to corporations and 

partnerships registered with the board under section 

9(a)(2) is reasonable. 

The board has also interpreted section 31 to' require 

payment of the temporary fee increase only twice during 

the .period in which the fee increase is in effect. 

The Board has also concluded that the 

temporary license fee increase applies to 

the annual licenses (January 1, through 

December 31) for a CPA and does not apply in 

those situations where an initial licensee 

paw a prorated portion of the annual 

license fee and is licensed for less than 

365 days. It is the Board's understanding 

that the legislative 'intent of HB 531 [sic] 

was for the Board to collect the temporary 

increase for the 1988 and 1989 license years 

(two years only), and the imposition of the 

$110 temporary increase in the remaining 

months of 1987 would cause an initial 

licensee to pay the fee three times. 

The board has put in place a licensing program that runs 

from January 1 to December 31 of each year. Fees for 

licenses issued during a license year are prorated and 

expire on December 31 of the license year. 

Section 31 of the act states that the temporary fee 

increase applies to annual license fees and renewal fees 

that "first become due on or after the effective date of 

Article 9, Ii. B. No. 61, Acts of the 70th Legislature, 2nd 

Called Session, 1987, but before August 31, 1989." 

Article 9 of House Bill No. 61 became effective September 

1, 1987. m Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 5, art. 

9, 914(a), at 74; Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 8, 

at 88-89 (supplying two-thirds vote of both houses of the 

legislature required to satisfy article III, section 39 of 

the Texas Constitution). Subsection (c) of section 31 

requires payment of the entire $110 amount even if the 

license fee or renewal fee covers a period that extends 

beyond the August 31, 1989, expiration date. 

p. 4258 
Mr. Bob E. Bradley - Page 5 UM-873) 

L 

P 

We believe that the language of section 31 is unequivocal and requires the $110 fee increase to be added 

to all designated license or renewal fees that first 

become due between September 1, 1987 and August 31, 1989. 

This would include initial license fees collected by the 

board for that portion of the 1987 license year following 

September 1, 1987. There are two reasons for our 

conclusion. First, initial licenses, like all licenses 

issued by the board, are issued pursuant to section 9. 

Section 31 states clearly that each annual license fee 

issued under section 9(a) that first becomes due between 

the relevant dates must be increased by $110. It makes no 

exception for initial licensees. The board may not read 

into the statute exceptions that are not embodied therein 

Stubbs v. Lowrev's Heirs, 253 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. - 

Eastland 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Second, if the legislature had intended the fee increase to be charged only 

twice during the period in which it is in effect, it could 

plainly have stated so. The legislature could also have 

expressed such intent by simply making the act effective 

on January 1; 1988. It did neither. Furthermore, we are 

obliged to give effect to acts of the legislature. We 

must therefore presume that the legislature had a definite 

purpose in mind when it provided for the September 1, 

1987, effective date. To read section 1 as the board has 

is to effectively nullify section 31 for four months and 

make it effective on January 1, 1988, a result the 

legislature took great pains to avoid. Accordingly, we 

disagree with the board's interpretation of section 31 

with respect to initial licensees. 

your third question is whether the board may reduce 

the $110 temporary fee increase for VetiredV1 licensees. 

Section 9(c) of article 41a-1 authorizes the board to 

"adopt a system by which individual licensees over age 65 

may qualify for a reduced license fee." Pursuant to 

that provision, the board has adopted a rule that sets a 

reduced fee for licensees over age 65. 22 T.A.C. 3515.8. 

you ask whether section 9(c) allows the board to reduce 

the temporary $110 license fee set out in section 31 of 

article 41a-1 as well as the annual fee provided for in 

section 9(a). Section 31 provides that the "annual 

license fee under Section 9(a)" iS increased by $110. 

Thus, section 31 temporarily increases the license fee 

under section 9(a): it does not impose a different fee or 

tax. Section 9(c) gives the board authority to reduce the 

"license fee" for licensees over age 65. We think that 

“license fee" in section 9(c) must be read to include the 

entire license fee: i.e., the annual fee as well as the 

p. 4259 
Mr. Bob E. Bradley - Page 6 (JR-873) 

temporary $110 increase. Therefore, we think that section 

9(c) gives the board authority to reduce the total fee for 

qualified licensees over age 65. 

SUMMARY 

Professional corporations and partnerships licensed pursuant to section 9(a)(2) 

of article 41a-1, V.T.C.S., are not required 

to pay the $110 temporary fee increase 

imposed by section 31 of the act; Initial 

licensees are required to pay the fee 

increase. The Texas State Board of Public 

Accountancy may reduce the license fee for 

qualified licensees over the age of 65. 

Very truly yo r , 

J AJdk A 

JIM MATTOX 

Attorney General of Texas 

MARY KELLER 

First Assistant Attorney General 

Lou MCCREARY 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

JUDGE ZOLLJE STEAKLBY 

Special Assistant Attorney General 

RICK GILPIN 

Chairman, Opinion Committee 

Prepared by Steve Aragon 

Assistant Attorney General 

-, 

p. 4260