NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES L. DONOHO, Naval Consolidated 

Brig Marine Corps Station Miramar 46141 

Miramar Way, Suite 1 San Diego, California 

92145, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

JUDDSON M. KIRK, Commander (O-5) 

Commanding Officer Naval Consolidated 

Brig Miramar United States Navy, 

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 23-55600 

D.C. No. 

3:20-cv-01362-RSH-BGS 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Robert Steven Huie, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 6, 2024**

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH and BADE, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,*** District 

Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUN 12 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

James Donoho appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas 

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We review the denial of Donoho’s habeas petition 

de novo. Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). Because 

the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here, except as 

necessary to provide context to our ruling. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

Following military court proceedings, a federal court may grant a writ of 

habeas corpus only to “guard against the military courts exceeding their jurisdiction, 

and to vindicate constitutional rights.” Broussard v. Patton, 466 F.2d 816, 818 (9th 

Cir. 1972) (citations omitted). Review of habeas proceedings “involving military 

convictions [is] limited to determining whether the court-martial had jurisdiction of 

the person accused and the offense charged and whether it acted within its lawful 

powers.” Id. (citing Sunday v. Madigan, 301 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1962)). “[O]nce it 

has been concluded by the civil courts that the military had jurisdiction and dealt 

fully and fairly with all such claims, it is not open to such courts to grant the writ 

simply to re-evaluate the evidence.” Id. (quoting Sunday, 301 F.2d at 873). “[I]t is 

not the duty of the civil courts simply to repeat that process—to re-examine and 

reweigh each item of evidence . . . . It is the limited function of the civil courts to 

determine whether the military have given fair consideration to each of these 

claims.” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 144 (1953). We may “affirm the district 
3 

court on any ground supported in the record.” Miranda v. City of Casa Grande, 15 

F.4th 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2021).

Donoho challenges the district court’s order on several grounds. We address 

each argument in turn:

1. Donoho argues, generally, that the district court misapplied the “full and fair 

consideration” standard to his petition because the court “failed to consider whether 

[the United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA)] decided those 

issues thoroughly and correctly.” Donoho asks for, essentially, de novo review of 

his claims. That is not required or appropriate under Burns. See 346 U.S. at 144.

2. Donoho argues that he did not receive full and fair consideration of his claims 

because the AFCCA denied his motion to file supplemental assignments of error on 

appeal. The argument fails. The AFCCA adequately considered Donoho’s request

to add claims on appeal, which was only two pages and failed to identify what other 

issues he wished to add. The AFCCA denied the motion after giving the government 

an opportunity to respond.

3. Donoho argues that the military courts did not “fully consider[] the issues 

relating to the misfiling of exhibits” because he was denied an evidentiary hearing. 

He contends that an “evidentiary hearing was necessary to resolve the factual 

disputes of who was responsible for the misfiled attachments (trial counsel or court 

reporter), how they were misfiled, when they were misfiled (before, during, or after 
4 

the court-martial), and why the attachments were misfiled.” But the military judge 

considered and rejected Donoho’s request for an evidentiary hearing, determining 

that “an evidentiary hearing is not required to examine the specifics of how the mix 

up occurred or who was responsible for it.” The AFCCA also fully and fairly 

considered the issue. Donaho raised the issue in his August 1, 2018, motion for 

reconsideration, which the AFCCA considered and denied.

4. Donoho argues that the AFCCA did not fully and fairly address whether the 

trial record was “complete” because it did not “conduct a qualitative analysis of how 

[the] missing attachment impacted the other images that were attached, which in 

turn, affected the legality of Mr. Donoho’s guilty plea.” We disagree. The misfiling 

of the three SV images was not a “substantial” record omission because, as the 

district court noted, the military judge made clear that he did not rely on the SV 

images to accept Donoho’s guilty plea and find him guilty of possession of child 

pornography.

5. Donoho argues that the military courts did not give full and fair consideration 

to his recusal motions. But the AFCCA fully considered Donoho’s first recusal 

motion and denied it in a written order that cited the governing statute. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455. The AFCCA also denied his second recusal motion, which was based on 

substantially the same arguments. Donoho attempts to rehash the merits of his 

motions on appeal, which is beyond the scope of our review. See Broussard, 466 
5 

F.2d at 818.

6. Finally, Donoho argues that the district court “misapplied” the waiver doctrine 

to several of his claims—i.e., claims of “structural error, breach of pretrial 

agreement, [and] the military judge improperly considering [at sentencing] images 

not agreed upon by the parties”—because the district court only looked to Donoho’s 

appeal to the AFCCA, not his appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Armed Forces (CAAF). But even assuming that these claims were not waived, they 

fail. As to the “structural error” and breach claims: the AFCCA found that, “at the 

time of trial, Attachments 2 and 3 were what they were purported to be.” That is, 

the AFCCA concluded that the military judge had the correct exhibits for 

consideration at the time of Donoho’s plea. Thus, while the AFCCA’s opinion did 

not explicitly address these claims (because Donoho did not raise them), the opinion 

nonetheless rejects them. And as to the consideration of images not agreed upon by 

the parties: Donoho’s argument is based on an interpretation of his plea agreement, 

which is not included in the excerpts of record nor on the district court’s docket.

1

 

Nor has Donoho briefed the language of the plea agreement for any court’s review. 

Given Donoho’s failure to develop the record or even cite the language of the plea 

agreement, a summary rejection of his claim—as CAAF entered—was sufficient 

consideration.

1 The government’s motion to supplement the record is denied as moot.
6 

AFFIRMED.