alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
No. 99-10764 -1-

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-10764 Summary Calendar

RAY HONSBERGER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant-Appellee.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:98-CV-617-Y

-------------------- February 25, 2000 Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Ray Honsberger appeals the magistrate judge’s judgment affirming the decision of the Commissioner to deny Honsberger’s disability claim. Our review is limited to determining whether the record as a whole shows that the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards. See Anthony v. Sullivan , 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992). The ALJ’s determination that Honsberger’s medical conditions failed to meet the criteria set forth in the Impairment RatingsNo. 99-10764 -2- is supported by substantial evidence. As for Honsberger’s ability to perform work despite his complaints of severe headaches and neck pain, the ALJ has great discretion in determining whether pain is disabling. See Wren v. Sullivan , 925 F.2d 123, 128 (5th Cir. 1991). The ALJ acted within his discretion in rejecting these claims. See Griego v. Sullivan , 940 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1991). We also find no error in the ALJ’s determination that numerous jobs exist meeting Honsberger’s limitations. See Morris
v. Bowen , 864 F.2d 333, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1988). Thus, the ALJ properly concluded that Honsberger is not disabled. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the magistrate judge.
AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of
Mad Catz Interactive, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:

(i)
the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended December 31, 2006 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                        |  |                                         
|----------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------
|Date: February 13, 2007 |  | /s/ STEWART HALPERN                     
|                        |  | Stewart Halpern, Chief Financial Officer

The foregoing certifications are being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350,
and are not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and are not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the date hereof, regardless of any
general incorporation language in such filing.
#### Westchester Fire Insurance Company, Appellant, v Dina L. Canceleno et al., Respondents.

[664 NYS2d 829]

—In an action for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff is not obligated to defend or indemnify the defendant Dina Lee Canceleno in connection with certain underlying actions arising out of an automobile accident, the plaintiff appeals, as limited *287by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Lama, J.), dated December 30, 1996, as denied its motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for the entry of a judgment declaring that the plaintiff is not obligated to defend or indemnify the defendant Dina Lee Canceleno in connection with the underlying actions arising out of an automobile accident occurring on August 6, 1993.

This action arises from an automobile accident which occurred on August 6, 1993. The defendant Dina Lee Canceleno, who was driving one of the automobiles involved in the accident, made a claim against insurance policies issued by the plaintiff insurance carrier Westchester Fire Insurance Company (hereinafter Westchester Fire) to her parents on the ground that she was an authorized driver of a “non owned” automobile under the policies. Westchester Fire denied coverage and commenced the instant action seeking a judgment declaring that it was not obligated to defend or indemnify Canceleno because she owned the vehicle that she was operating at the time of the accident and, thus, it was not a covered vehicle under her parents’ insurance policies. The Supreme Court, *inter alia,*denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, finding that an issue of fact existed as to the ownership of the vehicle in question. We now reverse.

The documentary evidence submitted by Westchester Fire conclusively shows that the subject vehicle was owned by Canceleno. Indeed, the certificate of title indicated that ownership of the subject vehicle was transferred to Canceleno on March 29, 1993, and the “Vehicle Registration/Title Application” listed Canceleno as the owner. As the defendants have failed to offer any evidence of a subsequent transfer, Canceleno must be deemed to be the owner of the vehicle in question *(see, Cwiakala v Lalone,*97 AD2d 632). Accordingly, Westchester Fire is under no duty to defend or indemnify Canceleno in connection with the accident, and its motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Thompson, J. P., Pizzuto, Joy and Florio, JJ., concur.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 15**  **- 6567** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.

LENNELL DYCHES , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Anderson

. G. Ross Anderson, Jr. , Senior District Judge. ( 8:06

- cr
- 00136

- JFA

- 1 )

Submitted : June 25, 2015 Decided: June 30, 2015

Before GREGORY, FLOYD , and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirm ed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Lennell Dyches , Appellant Pro Se. Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant U nited S tates Attorney , Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Lennell Dyches appeals the district cou rt’s order denying his

self

- styled “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Territorial
Jurisdiction[.]” We have reviewed the record and find no
reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated
by the district court. United States v. D yches , No. 8: 06

- cr
00136

- JFA

- 1 (D.S.C. Apr. 9, 2015). We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 19

- 13985 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 3:05

- cr - 00104

- HLA

- MCR

- 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

versus JACET A ANYA STREETER, a.k.a. Star, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

________________________ (April 7 , 2020 ) Before WILSON, WILLIAM PRYOR , and JILL PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Gerald Scott Bettman, appointed counsel for Jaceta Anya Streeter in this direct criminal appeal, has filed a motion to withdraw from further representatio n

Case: 19-13985 Date Filed: 04/07/2020 Page: 1 of 22 of Streeter , supported by a brief prepared under Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED , and Streeter ’s revocation of supervised release
and sentence are AFFIRMED

.

Case: 19-13985 Date Filed: 04/07/2020 Page: 2 of 2
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OFTHE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection
with the Quarterly Report of Intelligroup, Inc, (the Company) on Form 10-Q for
the quarterly period ended September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Alok Bajpai, Chief
Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and to the
best of my knowledge and belief, that:

|(1) |  | The Report fully complies with
      the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act);
      and
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|   
|(2) |  | The information contained in the
      Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
      and results of operations of the Company.                        
|   

|DATE: November 9,
      2007 | By: | /s/ Alok Bajpai              
|---------------------------- | --- | -----------------------------
|                            
|                             |     | Alok Bajpai                  
|                             |     | Chief Financial
      Officer

---
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v William Foster, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 79]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress evidence of a showup identification on the ground that it was the fruit of an unlawful entry into his apartment. We disagree. Police may enter private premises without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that an occupant has committed a crime or that contraband will be found there, and if exigent circumstances justify the entry *(see, People v Clements,*37 NY2d 675, *cert denied sub nom. Metzger v New York,*425 US 911; *People v Anzalone,*170 AD2d 397, *lv denied*77 NY2d 991). The People established that defendant sold cocaine to an undercover officer and immediately went to his apartment with the buy money. The police could have reasonably concluded that defendant, in fear of police pursuit, would dispose of the marked buy money and any additional cocaine in his apartment and flee if they did not enter immediately. Thus, exigent circumstances justified their nonforcible entry into defendant’s apartment approximately one minute after the transaction *(see, People v Gates,*199 AD2d 629, 630, *lv denied*83 NY2d 805; *People v Bradley,*167 AD2d 249, *lv denied*77 NY2d 836; *People v Jones,*131 Misc 2d 873, 876-877).

We conclude that the verdict is not contrary to the weight of the evidence *(see, People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495). (Appeal from Judgment of Erie County Court, D’Amico, J.—Criminal Sale Controlled Substance, 3rd Degree.) Present—Denman, P. J., Lawton, Wisner, Balio and Boehm, JJ.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                     EXHIBIT 11
 
                              POLYMER GROUP, INC.
 
                       COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
                                (IN THOUSANDS)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                            FISCAL YEAR
                                                      -------------------------
                                                       1997    1996      1995
                                                      ------- -------  --------
<S>                                                   <C>     <C>      <C>
BASIC:
  Net income (loss) applicable to common stock (A)... $15,428 $(2,130) $(28,446)
  Weighted average shares outstanding................  32,000  27,688    20,500
  Net income (loss) per common share--basic.......... $   .48 $  (.08) $  (1.39)
DILUTED:
  Net income (loss) applicable to common stock (A)... $15,428 $(2,130) $(28,446)
  Weighted average shares outstanding................  32,000  27,688    20,500
  Net income (loss) per common share--diluted........ $   .48 $  (.08) $  (1.39)
</TABLE>
--------
(A) Includes cumulative dividends on redeemable preferred stock of
    approximately $3.0 million and $4.8 million in 1996 and 1995,
    respectively.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 10.7

                       AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

          THIS AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (the "Amendment"), dated as of
October 15, 1999, between bamboo.com, Inc., a Delaware corporation (formerly
known as Jutvision Corporation) (the "Company"), and Mark Searle, ("Employee"),
amends the Amended and Restated Employment Agreement, dated as of January 25,
1999, between bamboo.com and Employee (the "Agreement").

          IN CONSIDERATION of the mutual promises and covenants contained
herein, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of
which is hereby acknowledged, the parties agree as follows:

          1.  Base Salary.  Effective October 1, 1999, the Base Salary set forth
              -----------
in Section 3 of the Agreement is increased to an annual rate of $230,000.

          2.  Miscellaneous.  Except as expressly amended hereby, the Agreement
              -------------
is, and shall remain, in full force and effect and each and every term and
condition thereof is hereby confirmed, continued and ratified. All terms defined
in the Agreement, except as otherwise defined herein, shall have the same
meanings where used herein. This Amendment may not be altered, amended or
modified in any way except by a writing signed by both parties. This Amendment
may be executed by exchange of signature pages by facsimile and/or in any number
of counterparts, each of which shall be an original as against the party whose
signature appears thereon and all of which together shall constitute one and the
same instrument.


          IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the
day and year first above written.


BAMBOO.COM, INC.                             MARK SEARLE


By: /s/ Leonard B. McCurdy                   /s/ Mark Searle
   ---------------------------               ---------------------------
Name: Leonard B. McCurdy
     -------------------------
Title: Chairman and CEO
      ------------------------
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Susquehanna Media
Co. (the "Company") for the period ending June 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Peter
P. Brubaker, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

/s/ Peter P. Brubaker
---------------------
Peter P. Brubaker
President and Chief Executive Officer
August 12, 2003


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Susquehanna Media Co. and will be retained by Susquehanna Media Co.
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
The Hono rable Joseph E. Stevens, Jr., United States District Judge for th e 1 Western District of Missouri



## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-2341

___________ Charlie Nathanael Lee, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the William J. Pierce; Jeff Carr; Janett * Western District of Missouri. Riley; Dr. Mark Catron, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: June 17, 1998 Filed: June 26, 1998

___________ Before BOWMAN, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Cha rlieNathanael Lee appeals from the district court & s grant of summary 1 jud gment to defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, claiming constitutional vi olations during his jail confinement. Having carefully reviewed the record and th e parties & briefs, we affirm the judgment of the district court. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.-2-

A true copy. Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Barnaby Infante, Respondent.

[667 NYS2d 374]

—Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rutledge, J.), dated June 4, 1996, which granted those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and statements made by him to law enforcement authorities.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and the facts, those branches of the defendant’s omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and statements made by him to law enforcement authorities are denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings.

A resolution of the issue of the legality of the police officers’ interaction with the defendant depended, in this case, on whether the defendant was seen by the police in a stolen Toyota Camry, as the People’s witness, Officer Porter, testified, or was never in that car, as the defense witness, a friend of the defendant, testified.

In its decision, the Supreme Court found the defense witness’s “statement of the facts more accurate than Officer Porter’s”.

Although “factual findings by a hearing court are not to be lightly disregarded, plainly unjustified or clearly erroneous findings are not to be accepted” by an appellate court *(People v Tempton,*192 AD2d 369, 370; *see also, People v Pilotti,*127 AD2d 23, 29). In its decision, the Supreme Court credited a detective’s hearing testimony that the defendant gave a voluntary statement to the police, after being given *Miranda*warnings, wherein he admitted that he was in the stolen car. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court’s decision to credit the testimony of the defendant’s friend is illogical, and cannot be accepted.

Since the weight of the probative evidence adduced at the suppression hearing indicated that the defendant was seen by the police in the stolen car, the subsequent police conduct was, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, lawful in all respects. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred in suppressing the fruits of that conduct, i.e., a knapsack and two statements. Finally, the record indicates,* and the Supreme Court acknowledged, that the police officer performed a lawful computer check on the Toyota Camry and determined that it was stolen before he ever approached the defendant. Accordingly, the Supreme Court erred when it suppressed the stolen car.

The order appealed from is therefore reversed and the *304defendant’s motion to suppress is denied. Altman, J. P., Friedmann, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Susan C. Carr, Respondent, v Jonbil, Inc., et al., Respondents, and John Carr, Jr., Intervenor*370Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 193]

—In a turnover proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5225 (b) and 5227, the intervenor John Carr, Jr., appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cohalan, J.), entered January 16, 1997, and an order of the same court, entered March 18, 1997, which, *inter alia,*granted Susan Carr’s petition and directed Jonbil, Inc., as the administrator of the Jonbil, Inc., Merged Profit Sharing Plan, and South Trust Bank of Alabama, N.A., as the trustee thereof, to pay Susan Carr $37,368.73, plus investment earnings on such amount accruing on or after February 5, 1997, less fees and expenses, from his account with the Jonbil, Inc., Merged Profit Sharing Plan.

Ordered that the judgment and the order are reversed, with one bill of costs, on the law and the facts, and the proceeding is dismissed.

Contrary to the trial court’s determination, no qualified domestic relations order was entered in the present proceeding *(see,*Internal Revenue Code [26 USC] § 414 [p]; 29 USC § 1056 [d] [3]). Therefore, pursuant to CPLR 5205 (c), the funds in the appellant’s account with the Jonbil, Inc., Merged Profit Sharing Plan (hereinafter the plan) are exempt from satisfying the petitioner’s judgment *(see, Dallin v Dallin,*225 AD2d 728). Moreover, a pension plan may not be assigned or alienated unless a qualified domestic relations order is issued *(see,*29 USC § 1056 [d] [1], [3]; *Winter v Boskin,*181 AD2d 1000).

Furthermore, the evidence presented failed to establish that Susan Carr and the appellant are joint beneficiaries of the appellant’s account. Rather, the evidence established that the appellant is a participant in the plan and Susan Carr’s consent was needed merely to approve early lump sum payment in order to protect her rights as a potential surviving spouse. Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Santucci and Lerner, JJ., concur.