FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT AUG 11 , 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ _ N o. 03- 1363 9

____ ____ ____ _ D.C. Dock etNo. 0 2- 00 25 7- CR-T-2 3- TGW UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee,

ve rs us ALVIN SMITH, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll an t.

____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ (A ug us t 11, 200 6) ON REM AN D F ROM THE SU PREME CO UR T OF THE U NITE D S TAT ES Be fo re T JO FL A T , RO N E Y and H IL L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e: T his c as e is b ef

or e us o n r em an d f

ro m the S upr em e Co urt w ithins tr uc tio nsSe c tio n 2 25 1( a ) p ro vid e s: 1 Any person who e mploy s, uses, persua des, induce s, entices, or coer ces a ny minor to eng ag e in . . . any

sexually expli cit conduct f

or the purpose of produc ing a ny visual depiction of such c onduct, shall be punished . . . if suc h person knows or has re ason to know that such visual de piction will be transported in interstate or fo re ig n c omm e rc e or

ma ile d, if

tha t vi su a l de pic tio n w a s p ro du c e d u sin gmate ri a ls that have be en mailed, shipped, or transporte d in interstate or f oreign commerc e by any means, includingby

computer, or

if such visual depic tion has actua lly been transporte d in interstate or f oreign commerc e or ma iled.

2 to r ec onsi de r our

pane l de ci sio n, 402 F . 3d 1 303 (1 1thCi r. 200 5) ( Sm ithI ), in lig ht of Gonzale z v. Raich, 545 U.S . 1, 125 S. Ct. 2195 , 162 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005 ). U nited St at es v. S m ith , 125 S . Ct . 293 8, 162 L . E d. 2d 8 63 ( 2005 ) (m em . ). Upon re co nsi de ratio n, w e have de te rm ine d th at , a s ar es ult of Ra ic h and o ur

r ec en t de ci sio n inU nit ed

S ta te s v. Ma xw el l, 446 F . 3d 1 210 (1 1thCi r. 200 6) ( Ma xw el l II) , w e can no longer say

that the failure to find 18 U. S. C. §§ 22 51(a), 22 52 A(a)(5 )(B) un co ns ti tu ti on al as app li edto th is cas e am ou nt edto pl ai n e rro r. Bec au se we fin d n o o th er re ve rs ib le erro r, we affi rm th e d efen da nt ’s con vi ct io ns . Part I lay s ou t the f

ac ts o f thi s c as e. P ar

t I I dis cu sse s th e ef

fe ct of Ra ic h and Ma xw el l I I on o ur

e ar lie r de ci sio n. P ar

t I II ana ly ze s c la im s r ai se d by the de fe ndant tha t w e did

not a ddr es s inthat de ci sio n. P ar t I V br ie fl y

c onc lud es . I. A lvi n S m ithw as c onvi ct ed of one c ount

of pr oduc ing c hil d po rn ogr ap hy in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 22 51( a) and o ne c ount of pos se ssi ng c hil d po rn ogr ap hy 1Se c tio n 2 25 2A (a )( 5) (B ) p ro vid e s: 2 Any pe rs on wh o . . . kn ow ing ly

po sse sse s a

ny bo ok , ma g a zine , p e ri od ic a l, f ilm , vid e ota pe , c omp ute r d isk , o r a

ny oth e r m ate ri a l th at c onta ins an im a g e of c hil d pornog raphy

that has bee n mailed, or shipped or transporte d in interstate or fore ign c ommerce by

any means, includingby

computer, or

that was produc ed using materials that have been ma iled, or shipped or tra nsported in interstate or fore ign c ommerce by

any means, includingby

computer . . . sha ll be punished . . .

. 3 in v iol at ionof

18 U . S. C. § 22 52A (a )( 5) (B ), and w as se nte nc ed to a tot al of

188 2 m onth s in prison and 60 m onth s of supervised release, a condition of w hich required him

to register w ith state agencies as a sex off ender. T he phy sical evidence used against Sm ith was discovered pursuant to a search w arrant executed at Sm ith’s m other’ s hom e in Tam pa, F lorida. At the tim e of the sear ch, S m ith was inc ar ce rate d and the targ et of the inv es tig at ionw as his br oth er , w ho l ive d a t the re sid en ce and w as sus pe ct ed of inv olv em en t i n dr

ug tra ff ic kin g. A s su ch , the fo cu s of the w ar rant w as dr

ugs an d dr

ug p ar ap he rn al ia . D ur ing the c our se of the se ar ch , anarc oti cs dog a le rt ed the pol ic e to a

loc kbox , w hic h w as sub se que ntl y ide nti fi ed a s S m ith ’ s. Upon ope nin g th e loc kbox , the pol ic e dis co ve re d num er ous phot ogr ap hs ( inv es tig at or s late r de te rm ine d th e ex ac t num be r to b e 1, 768) , m any se xua lly e xpl ic it, and a

num be r of w hic h a ppe ar ed to be of “ ve ry , ve ry

y oung gir ls ha vi ng sex . . . wit h am al e who [was lat er] id en ti fie d a s t he de fen da nt .” The photographs were refe rred to the departm ent’ s sex crim e unit where anAt trial, the Gove rnment introduce d the g irl’s Mexican birth cer tificate to e stablish her 3 ag e at the time of

the photog raphs. 4 of fic er co nf irmed th atm an y

of t he pi ctur es ap pe aredto be of you ng gi rls . In ve st ig at or s ev en tu al ly loc at eda gi rl wh o app eare d i n s ev eral of t he ph ot og rap hs . Fr om the da te s onthe pho tos it w as de te rm ine d th at

the gir l w as f

ourte eny ears old at the ti m e the pic tur es w er e take n. T he gir l c onf irm ed that the pho tos w er e of 3 her and, from

photo graphs of Sm ith, identified him as the photog rapher. At S m ith’s tr ial, the girl testified that, in Novem ber 1999, Sm ith approached he r an d he r boy fr ie nd and p er sua de d th em to al lowS m ithto take pic tur es of he r in her underwe ar in exchange for m onetary com pensation . Af

ter re trieving a cam era an d fi lm , Sm it h re se rv eda ho te l ro om in to whi ch on ly he an d t he gi rl e nt ered . Sm ithc onvi nc ed

he r to r em ove a ll of

he r cl oth es and p ro ce ed ed to take se xua lly sugg estive pictures. S m ith directed m any of the poses and ph y sically spread her ge nit al iahim se lf

f or apart ic ularl y

gr ap hic sho t. Whe n S m ithw as f ini she d takin g p i c tu r e s , h e l e f

tth e g i r l an dh e r

b o yf r i e n dw i th mo n e y a n dth e h o t e l r o o m. D ur ing the tr ia l, the G ove rn m en t i ntr oduc ed se ve ra l pi ct

ur es f ro m the loc kbox , inc lud ing the pho tog ra phs of the vic tim

( inc lud ing athum

bna il pr int

of one r oll of

the pho tog ra

phs) , se xua lly

e xpl ic it an d se xua lly

sug ge sti ve phot ogr ap hs o f oth er

f em al es – so m e of

w hom appe ar ed li ke ly to be of a ge – i nTh e Go ve rnme nt a lso int ro du c e d Sm ith ’s inm ate dis c ha rg e ide nti fi c atio n c ard

fo un d in 4 th e lo c k b o x. 5 what appear ed to be the sam e hotel room , and ph otog raphs of Sm ith alone. 4 Additionally , the G overnm ent offer ed testim ony of severa l of the office rs involv ed in the se ar chand s ubse que nt i nve sti ga tio n, a s w el l a s ar ec or din g of apho ne co nve rs at ionbe tw ee n S m ithand h is m oth er , L uc ill e, that t ook pla ce w hil e Sm ith w as inc ar ce rate d inJun e 2002 , r eg ar din g th e pic tur es in the loc kbox . Finally , the G overnm ent introdu ced evidence to satisfy the j urisdictio nal el em en ts o f the statut es . T he G ove rn m en t di d no t atte m pt t o de m onstrate that the im ag es e ith er

tr av el ed in int er state c om

m er ce the m se lve s or

w er e pr oduc ed

w ith the int en t tha t the y

w oul d tr av el in int er state c om m er ce . R athe r, by

pr ovi din g ev ide nc e that so m e of

the pho tog ra

phs w er e pr int ed

on K odak pa

pe r that the developer in Florida rece ived from Ne w Y ork and that som e of the pictures w ere pr oc es se d us ing e qui pm en t r ec ei ve d f ro m Ca lif or nia and m anuf

ac tur ed in Ja pan, the Governm ent’ s intentio n was to establish that the ph otog raphs wer e “produced usi ng m at er ia ls tha t have be enm ai le d, shi ppe d, or tr an spor te d inint er state or foreign com

m erce .” 18 U. S. C. § 225 1(a); see also id. § 2252A(a)( 5)(B) . A t the c los e of

the G ove rn m en t’ s c as e, the de fe nse m ove d f or j udgm en t of ac qui tta l un de r Fe de ra l R ule of Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 29. T he de fe nse arg ue d th at ,Congr ess may “re gulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sever al 5 States.” U.S. Const. art. I , § 8, cl. 3. 6 as to the pos se ssi on c ount , the re w as ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce to pr ove that S m ith knew the girl w as y oung er than eighteen y ears old; as to both counts, there w as ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce to es ta

bli sh the j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en ts. T he c ourt de nie d th e m oti on and s en t the c as e to the j ur y . T he j ur

y c onvi ct ed

S m ithon b othc ount s, s p e c i f i c a l l y f i n d i n g th a tth e p o rn o g r ap h i c p h o t o g r ap h s w e r e p r o du c e du s i n g f i l m, ph ot o p ap er, an d e qu ip m en t t ha t h adtra ve le d i n i nt ers ta te or f or ei gn co m

m erce . Sm ithappe al s hi s c onvi ct ion s r ai sin g se ve ra l arg um en ts f or the r ev er sa l of his c onvi ct ion s and the va catio n of his se nte nc es . W e be ginin part I I w ithhis claim that the statutes un der w hich he was c onvi cted we re unconstitu tional ap pl ic at io ns of C on gr es s’s Co m m erce Cla us e au th or it y

as app li edto hi s co nd uc t. II. Sm it h c on te nd s t ha t b ot h 1 8 U.S.C. § 22 52 A(a)(5 )(B) an d 1 8 U.S.C. § 2251 (a ) ar e unc onst itu tio na l e xe rc ise s of Co ngr es s’ s C om

m er ce Cl au se auth or ity as appl ie d to his c ondu ct . I n S m ithI , w e uphe ld S m ith ’ s c la im s and r ev er se d hi s 5 co nvi ct ion s. I t i s th es e hol din gs tha t the S upr em e Co urt r et ur ne d to us f

or re co nsi de ratio n inli ght

G onz al ez v. Ra ic h, 545 U . S. 1, 125 S . Ct . 219 5, 162 L . E d. 2d 1 (200 5).7

In our previous decisio n, w e noted that, because S m ith had no t challenged the c onst itu tio na lity

of the statut es a t tri al , suc h ac ont en tio n w oul d on ly be review ed for plain err or. “ Under the plain er ror standard, before an appellate court can c or re ct an e rr or not r ai se d a t tri al , the re m

ust be ( 1) e rr or , ( 2) that i s pl ai n, and (3) that af fects substantial right s. I f all three conditio ns are m et, an appellate court m ay the n e xe rc ise it s di sc re tio n to not ic e a fo rf ei te d e rr or , but

onl y if ( 4) the e rr or seriouslyaff

ects the fair

ness, integrity , or publ ic reputation of judicial pr oc eed in gs .” Uni te d S ta te s v . W il li am s, 4 45 F.3d13 02 , 13 08 (11 th Cir . 20 06 ). W e ag ai n r ev ie wS m ith ’ s c la im f or pla in e rr or . I n do ing so, w e ar e m ind fu l tha t, j ust a s inS m ithI , “ [t ] he e rr or m ust be ‘ pla in’ a t the ti m e of

appe llate co nsi de ratio n. ” 402 F. 3d at 13 15. T ha t i s, the e rr or m ust be pla in n ow , in lig ht o f re ce nt S upr em e Co urt and E le ve nthCi rc uit de ve lop m en ts. As w e stated in our prior opini on, the Suprem e Court has delineated three cate gor ie s of

a ct ivi ty that C ongr es s m ay

c onst itu tio na lly

r eg ulate pur suant t o it s C o mm e r c e C l au s e au th o r i ty: Fi rs t, Co ngr es s m ay

r eg ulate the use of

the c hanne ls o f int er state com m erce . Second, C ongress is em powere d to regulate and protect the ins tr um en ta lit ie s of

int er state c om

m er ce , or pe rs ons or

thi ngs in int er state c om

m er ce , e ve n th oughthe thr eat m ay c om e onl y

f ro m intrastate activities. F inally , C ongress’ c omm erce authority includes the pow er to re gul at e tho se a ct ivi tie s havin g asub stanti al r el at ionto interstate com

m erce , i. e. , those activities that subs tantially aff ect8

interstate com

m erce . Sm ithI , 402 F . 3d at 13 16 ( quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. L ope z, 514 U . S. 549 , 558 -5 9, 115 S. Ct . 162 4, 162 9- 30, 131 L . E d. 2d 6 26 ( 1995 )) ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks om itted). T he question we addressed in Sm ith I – and reconsider here – w as w he the r ei the r statut e, a s a ppl ie d to S m ith ’ s c as e, c oul d be sa id t o be r eg ulatin g co nd uc t t ha t “ su bs ta nt ia ll y affe ct [s ] in te rs ta te co m

m erce .” Id . As t o th i s i s s u e, o u r p ri o r o p i n i o n s t at edth at “ th e l aw atth e t i m e o f S m i th ’s tr ia l w as ‘ unc le ar ’ r athe r than ‘ se ttl ed and c le ar ly

c ontrary to’ him . ” S m ithI , 402 F. 3d at 13 15 n . 7 ( quot ing Joh nsonv. U nit ed S ta te s, 520 U . S. 461 , 468 , 117 S . Ct . 1544 , 154 9, 137 L . E d. 2d 7 18 ( 1997 )) . W e ult im at el y de te rm ine d, how ev er , that, at the tim e of appeal, it wa s settled that Sm ith’s c ondu ct could not be said to affe ct su bs ta nt ia ll y , at l eas t i n t he co ns ti tu ti on al sen se , in te rs ta te co m m erce . A cc or din gly , w e he ld tha t C ongr es s’ s r eg ulatio n of S m ith ’ s pr oduc tio n and poss es sio n of

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

w as be y ond the sc ope of it s C om m er ce Cl au se au th or it y . In arr iving at this conclusi on, w e re lied prim arily on this court’ s earlier decision in United State s v. Maxw ell, 386 F. 3d 10 42 (11th Cir. 2004 ) (Ma xwell I) , wher e w e concluded that “ purely intrastate possessio n of child porno graphy wa s not c onve rt ed

‘ int o an a ct ivi ty

sub j ec t t o C om

m er ce Cl au se r eg ulatio n’ sim plyMaxwell dealt only with 18 U.S.C. § 2251A(a)(5) (B ). Althoug h Maxwell Iinvalidated 6 the statute as a

pplied, we spe nt litt le time discussing Smith’s possession charg e as the argument in favor of

Congr essional authority

was ne arly

identical to that in Maxwell. S mith I , 402 F.3d at 1316-17 (“ Be cause there is no significa nt differ ence betwee n Smit h’s possession and Maxwell’s po sse ssi on , o ur

ana ly sis wi ll f

oc us on Smit h’ s intr a state , n on c omm e rc ia l pr od uc tio n o f c hil d pornog raphy .”). The bulk of our discussion dea lt with the applicability of Maxwell’s rea soning to the production cha

rg e. 9 because ‘ the disks on which the pornog raphy wa s ultim ately

copied traveled, when blank, to Fl or ida

f ro m som ep la ce out sid e of

F lor ida . ’ ” Sm ithI , 402 F . 3d at 13 09 (quot ing Ma xw el l I , 386 F . 3d at 10 68) . D isc er nin g no thi ng t o di sti ngui sh constitu tionallySm ith’s c ase fr om Maxwe ll’ s, w e found consti tutio nal error . See i d . a t1 3 1 6 -2 3 . Be l i ev i n g th i s co n cl u s i o nt o b e i n es cap ab l e b as edo n Ma x we l l I’s 6 hol din g and r ea soni ng, w e fo und thi s e rr or pla in. S ee id. a t 13 23- 25. O ur c onc lus ionthat the c onst itu tio na l e rr or w as pla in w as e xpl ic itl y

r el iant on M ax w el l I . F ram ing our ta sk unde r pla in e rr or

r ev ie win a co nte xt whe re the law wa s not settl ed at the tim e of trial, but is settledat the tim e of appeal, we noted that the relevant question we m ust answer is: “ If S m ith’s prosecution wer e ini tiate d to day , w oul d hi s c ondu ct be so o bvi ousl y

be y ond the pow er

of Co ngr es s to p ro sc ri be that the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d r ai se the iss ue sua spo nte e ve n a

bse nt a ti m el y ob jecti on ? ” Sm it h I, 4 02 F.3dat 1 32 3 (i nt ern al qu ot at io n m ark s o m it te d) . W e co nc lud ed

that, “ [i ] n li ght

of Ma xw el l, w e an sw er

thi s qu es tio n inthe af fi rm at ive . ” I d. W e la te r m ad e thi s r el ianc e ev enm or e cl ear: “ [T ] he e rr or is10

pla in o nly

if Ma xw el l i tse lf

m ad e it so. ” I d. T he S upr em e Co urt va cate d our de ci sio n inMa xw el l I , se e U nit ed S ta te s v. Ma xw el l, __U . S. __, 126 S . Ct . 321 , 163 L . E d. 2d 2 9 ( 2005 ) (m em . ), a lon g w ith our de ci sio n inthi s c as e, f

or r ec onsi de ratio n inli ght

of the Co urt’ s m ost

r ec en t Co m m er ce Cl au se opi nio n inRa ic h, 545 U . S. 1, 125 S . Ct . 219 5, 162 L . E d. 2d 1 (2 005) . R ai chuph el d a ga ins t c onst itu tio na l atta ck the appl ic at ionof

the Co ntr oll ed

S ubst an ce s A ct

( CS A ), 21 U . S. C. § 80 1 e t se q. , to the w hol ly intra state cu l t i v at i o n an du s e o f mar i ju an a f o r med i ci n al p u rp o s es . S ee i d . Th e C o u rt ’s opi nio n w as ba se d pr im ar ily on the pr em ise that C ongr es s m ay r eg ulate pur el y intrastate activity , whether econom ic or not, that could be rationally considered in ci de nt to Co ng res s’s co m pr eh en si ve reg ul at io n o f in te rs ta te eco no m ic act iv it y . See id. at 2205-15; id . at 2205 (“ Our c ase lawfirm ly establishes Cong ress’ power to r eg ulate pur el y

loc al a ct ivi tie s th at

are part of an e co nom ic ‘ cl as s of

a ct ivi tie s’ that have a substanti al eff ect on interstate com

m erce .” ); id. at 2206 (“ Congress can regulate purely

intrastate activity

that is not it self ‘ com

m ercia l,’ . . . if it concludes that f ai lur e to r eg ulate that c la ss o f ac tiv ity w oul d un de rc ut the r eg ulatio n of the interstate m arket in that com m odity .” ). In re visiti ng Maxwell I, we determ ined that R ai chc al le d in to que sti on m uc h of our e ar lie r an al y sis and u lti m at el y uph el d the constitu tionalit y

of 18 U. S. C. § 225 2A(a )(5)( B). See Maxwe ll II, 446 F.3d atWe e xpre ssl y de fe rr e d c on sid e ratio n o f whe the r t he c ur re nt C omm e rc e Cla

us e 7 fr ame wo rk

le ave s r oo m f

or a s a pp lie d c ha lle ng e s to fa c ia lly c on sti tut ion a l st atut e s. Se e Maxwe ll I I , 446 F.3d at 1215 n.5. Be cause Maxwell I Idealt with the possession of c hild pornog raphy and we discern 8 nothing to distinguish Smith’s possession from Max well’s, we have no tr ouble findingthe application of § 2252A (a) (5)( B) to Smi th’s conduct to be c onstitut ionally sound. We theref

ore only focus on the pr oduction char g e. 11 1 2 1 6 -1 9 ; i d . a t1 2 1 6 (“W e f i n dv ery l i t t l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h co n s t i tu t i o n al l y M ax we l l ’s claim from Raich’ s. I ndeed, m

uch of the Court’ s analy sis couldserve as an opi nio n inthi s c as e by

sim ply r ep la ci ng m ar ij uanaand the CS Aw ithc hil d por nogr ap hy and the [ Ch ild

P or nogr ap hy P re ve nti on A ct

of 199 6] . ” (f

ootnot e om itt ed )) ; i d. a t 12 19 ( “ [W ] e hol d th at 18 U . S. C. § 22 52Ais a va lid e xe rc ise of Co ngr es s’ s auth or ity

pur suant t o th e N ec es sary and P ro pe r Cl au se to ef

fe ct ua te Congress’ s power to re gulate com m erce am ong th e severa l states.”) . 7 In light of Raich and Maxwell I I, Sm ith’s c laim of plain error fails at step on e. W it ho ut Max well I, Sm it h c an no t es tabl is h t ha t an y erro r wou ldbe pl ai n. In de ed , a ft er

Ra ic h and M ax w el l I I, S m ithc annot e sta bli sh tha t the appl ic at ionof § 2 25 1( a) o r § 2 25 2A( a)(5 )(B) to hi s co nd uc t was erro r atall . We r at h erea s i l y co n cl u d e t h at th e ap p l i ca t i o n o f § 2 2 5 1 (a ) t o Smit h ’s intrastate production of child pornog raphy is within Congress’s c onsti tutio nal au th o r i ty. S e c t i o n 2 2 5 1 ( a ) “i s p arto f ac o mp r e h e n s i v e r e g u l a t o ry s c h e me 8 cr im ina liz ing the r ec ei pt, dis tr ibu tio n, sa le , pr oduc tio n, pos se ssi on, sol ic itatio nIn Smit h I , we de termined that a g g reg ation was not appr opriate be cause his conduct wa s 9 “ no ne c on omi c , p ur e ly

int ra state a c tiv ity .” 40 2 F .3 d at 13 22 . Ra ic h le ft so me c on fu sio n a s to whether Smit h’s conduc t could be conside red “ economic.” On the one ha d, the Supreme Court de fi ne d “ e c on omi c s” a s “ the pr od uc tio n, dis tr ibutio n, and

c on sumpt ion

of c omm od iti e s. ” 12 5 S. Ct. at 22 11 (q

uo tin gWeb ste r’ s T hir d N e w I nte rn atio na l D ic tio na

ry 72 0 ( 19 66 )) . O n th e oth e r, it g rouped tog ether

the intrastate ma

nufac ture a

nd possession of an a

rticle of c ommerce as conduc t Co n g r e s s c o u ld

r ati o n a ll y

r e gu late a s a

me an s o f r e gu lati n gc o mm e r c e in

th at p r o d u c t. I d . We need not dwe ll long on this question, as Raich made the ec onomic/non-ec onomic distinction ir re le va nt f or a g g re g atio n p ur

po se s. 12 an d a dve rt ise m en t of

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy . ” Ma xw el l I I, 446 F . 3d at 12 16- 17. A s su ch , w e ne ed

onl y de te rm ine “ w he the r Co ngr es s c oul d r at ion al ly c onc lud e that the c um

ulativ e ef fe ct of the c ondu ct

by [ Sm ith ] and h is i lk w oul d su bst an tia lly affe ct interstate com

m erce .” Id. at 1218. T his is b ecause, “ wher e Congress has atte m pte d to r eg ulate ( or

e lim inate ) anint er state m ar ke t, Ra ic h gr an ts C ongr es s subs tanti al le ew ay

to re gul at e pur el y

intra state a ct ivi ty

( w he the r ec onom ic or

not ) that it deem s to have the capability , in the aggregate , of frustrating the broader re gul at ionof

int er state e co nom ic a ct ivi ty . ” I d. a t 12 15. 9 Just as in Maxwell II, the re is nothin g ir

ratio na l a bout Co ngr es s’ s c onc lus ion , sup porte d by its f ind ing s, that po rn ogr ap hy be ge ts p or

nogr ap hy , r eg ar dle ss o f its or igi n. N or

is it ir ratio na l f or Co ngr es s to c onc lud e that i ts i nabil ity to r eg ulate the intra state inc ide nc e of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

w oul d unde rm ine it s br oa de r re gul at or y sc he m e de sig ne d to e lim inate the m ar ke t i n it s e nti re ty , or

that “ the e nf

or ce m en t di ff

ic ult ie s th at

a tte nd dis tin gui shi ng b etw ee n [ pur el y intra state and i nte rs ta te c hil d por nogr ap hy ] , ” w oul d f

ru str at e Co ngr es s’ s in te re st i n c om ple te ly el i m i n at i n g th e i n t er s t at e mark et . It i s we l l wi th i n Co n g re s s ’s au tho ri ty to re gul at e dir ec tly

the c om m er ci al a ct ivi tie s c onst itu tin g13

the int er state m ar

ke t f or c hil d po rn ogr ap hy , and “ [p ] ro hib iti ng the intra state pos se ssi on o r m anuf ac tur e of an art ic le of

c om m er ce is a rat io na l . . . m ean s o f reg ul at in g c omm erce in th atpro du ct .” Id. at 1218 (citations om itted) (quotin g Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209; id . at 2211 ). Beca use, f or Com m erce Clause purposes, there is nothing that distin guish es Sm ith’s intrastate production from his pos session , w e believe that Maxw ell II dic ta te s th e re sul t i n th is c as e. C ongr es s c oul d have r at ion al ly c onc lud ed

that the ina bil ity to re gul at e intra state pos se ssi on and p ro duc tio n of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy w oul d, in the a ggr eg at e, und er m ine Co ngr es s’ s r eg ulatio n of the int er state c hil d por nogr ap hy m ar ke t. W e the re fo re f

ind no c onst itu tio na l e rr or

in the appl ic at ion of eit he r §§ 22 51 (a) a nd22 52 A(a)(5 )(B) to Sm it h’s co nd uc t. III . Inour pr ior opi nio n w e ha d no oc ca sio n to r ea chS m ith ’ s othe r cl ai m s of er ro r. B ec au se w e nowr ev er se our pr ior de te rm inatio n and h old

that the re w as no pla in e rr or

in co nst itu tio na lly

appl y ing § 22 51 and § 225 2Ato Sm ith ’ s c ondu ct , w e m ust a ddr es s S m ith ’ s a ddi tio na l c la im s. Sm ith seeks on e of three form s of relief . He argues first that there wa s in su ffi ci en t ev id en ce fo r hi s co nv ic ti on s an d t he refo re h e sh ou ldbe acq ui tt ed . He alternatively

requests a newtrial based on several cla im s of evidentiary and j ury instructio n error. Finally , he asks that we set a side his sent ences and order a newWe note that, as fa r as Double J eopar dy

conce rns ar e implicated, we revie w the 10 sufficie ncy

of all the e vidence admitted at trial – admissible or inadmissible. See L ockhar t v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40-41, 109 S. Ct. 285, 291, 102 L . Ed. 2d 265 (1988) ( “It is quit e cle ar f rom our opinion in Burks that a revie wingcourt must consider a ll of the evidenc e admitted by the trial court in dec iding whe ther re trial is permissible under the D ouble J eopar dy Clause . . . .”) . B e c a us e we fi nd

no e vid e nti ary

e rr or s, we ne e d n ot c on c e rn ours e lve s w ithwh e the r a n a pp e llate court should disreg ard ina dmissibl e evide nce in de terminingsufficie ncy . Compare United States v. Khoury , 901 F.2d 948, 961 ( 11th Cir.1990) (“Although we a re r ever sing K luver’s c onviction beca use of ha rmful constitutional error , nonetheless we must sti ll rule on Kluver’ s sufficienc y argument beca

use if the pr operly

admitted evidenc e pre sented by the g overnme nt was insufficie nt to car ry the burde n of proof

, then Kluver ’s re trial would be prohibited by the double jeopa

rdy bar.” ) with L ockhar

t, 488 U.S. at 40-41, 109 S. Ct. at 291; Unit ed States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1319 n.13 (11th Cir. 2006) (e n banc) (notingthat, in passing on a sufficie ncy

of the e vidence c ha lle ng e , th e “ us ua l r

ule ” is t o c on sid e r a ll e vid e nc e a dmi tte d at tr ia l, e ve n unc on sti tut ion a lly admitted evidenc e). 14 se nte nc ing he ar ing a ft er

he is advis ed

of the m an da tor

y se nte nc ing r an ge s and co ndi tio ns o f supe rv ise d r el ea se . W e ad dr es s th e suf fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce a t the out se t, a s af

ind ing of ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce w oul d ob viate any ne ed to co nsi de r the al le ge d tr ia l e rr or s. S ee Burk s v. U nit ed S ta te s, 437 U . S. 1, 18, 98 S . Ct . 214 1, 2150 -5 1, 57 L . E d. 2d 1 ( 1978 ) (“ Si nc e w e hol d to day that the D oubl e Je opardy Clause precludes a sec ond trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence le ga lly ins uf fi ci en t, the onl y

. . . r em edy

a va ila ble f or that c ourt i s th e dir ec tio n of a j udgm ent of acquittal.”) ; United State s v. Bobo, 419 F. 3d 12 64, 1268 (11t h Cir. 10 2005 ) (noting thi s court’ s prudential rule “ that requires the court to review suf fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce c la im s r ai se d by de fe ndants , e ve n if

r es olu tio n on alternative grounds wouldotherwise dispose of the case” and collecting cases). A. Suffic iency

of the E vidence15 1. A rgum ents Made at T rial At the c lose of the Governm ent’ s case, Sm ith m oved pu rsuant to Federal Ru le of Cr im ina l P ro ce dur e 29 f or aj udgm en t of

a cquitta l, c la im ing ins uf fi ci en t evidence to prove the interstate nexus with regards to both 18 U. S. C. § 225 1(a) an d§ 2 2 5 2 A ( a ) ( 5 ) ( B ) an di n s u f f i c i e n te v i d e n c e t o p r o v e th a th e “ kn o w i n g l y” poss essed child po rnography in viol ation of § 225 2A(a )(5)( B). T he district court de nie d hi s m oti on. O f the se arg um en ts, S m ithonl y c la im s onappe al that the evidence wa s insu fficient to prove that he knew the victim wa s a child. W e re view a district court’ s denial of a m otion for j udgm ent of acquittal based on su fficiency of the evidence de novo. U nited States v. D ulcio, 441 F.3d 1269 , 1276 (11th Cir. 20 06 ). “ In de te rm in in g wh et he r th e g ov ern m en t p ro du cedsu ffi ci en t ev id en ce, we m ust review the e vidence in the ligh t m ost favorable to the gov ernm ent and draw al l r ea sona

ble f ac tua l i nf er en ce s inf

av or of the j ur y ’ s ve rd ic t. ” I d. W e ne ed onl y determ ine that a rea sonable fact-finder c ouldhave determ ined that the evidence pr ove d th e de fe ndant’ s gu ilt be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt. U nit ed

S ta te s v. P et er s, 403 F.3d 126 3, 1268 (11th Cir. 2005 ). Be ca use S m ithdid

not te sti fy a t tri al , any

e vid en ce r eg ar din g hi s kn ow le dge of the vic tim ’ s a ge m

ust ne ce ssari ly

be c ir cum stanti al . T he e vid en ce pr es en te d by the G ove rn m en t i nc lud ed the f oll ow ing : ( 1) the te sti m ony of O ff ic er May o – o ne16

of the of fi ce rs who e xe cu te d th e se ar chw ar rant and who h ad

no s pe ci fi c tr ai nin g re gard ing se x c ri m es or

c hil d e xpl oit at ion– who d es cr ibe d th e fe m al es in the ph ot og rap hs as “ ve ry , very y ou ng gi rls ;” (2) th e te st im on y of De te ct iv e Dic ki e, a se x c ri m es /se x a

buse inv es tig at or

w ithsix te eny ears of

r el at ed e xpe ri en ce , w ho te sti fi ed that so m e of

the pho tog ra

phs w er e of

f em al es und er

e igh te enand whose fo llo w -u p in ve sti ga tio n of

suc h ph oto gr ap hs l ed

he r to the vic tim ; and ( 3) the ac tua l ph oto gr ap hs o f the vic tim . G ive n th is e vid en ce , and the r ea sona ble inf er en ce s th at

c oul d be dr awn th er ef

ro m , ar ea sona

ble j ur or c oul d f ind be y ond a re as ona ble doubt tha t the vic tim

w as so o bvi ousl y

am ino r that the de fe ndant m ust have kno w n a s m

uc h. W e the re fo re a ff

irm the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of the de fe ndant’ s m oti on f

or j udgm en t of

a cquitta l. 2. P la in E rr or

– “ K now ing ly ” an d th e In te rs ta te N ex us O n a ppe al , S m itharg ue s th at

( 1) in or de r to b e co nvi ct ed und er e ith er 18 U . S. C. § 22 51( a) or

§ 22 52A , the pr ose cu tio n w as r equir ed to pr ove – e ith er

a s a m atte r of statut or y int er pr et at ionor

c onst itu tio na lly

– tha t he kne wthe int er state ne xus w as sa tis fi ed , and ( 2) the re w as ins uf fi ci en t e vid en ce to pr ove his know le dge of

the ne xus be y ond a re as ona ble doubt. A s th at

r equir em en t pe rt ai ns to this c as e, S m ithsub m its that the pr ose cu tio n ha d th e obl igatio n to pr ove that he kne wthat the pho tog ra

phs w er e “pr oduc ed

usi ng m at er ia ls tha t have be enm ai le d,17

shi ppe d, or

tr an spor te d inint er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce by any m eans, inc lud ing by c om put er . ” 18 U . S. C § 225 1( a) ; se e al so i d. § 22 52A (a )( 5) (B ). I n th is r eg ar d, he relies entire ly

on United States v. X- Citem ent Video, Inc. , 513 U. S. 64, 115 S. Ct . 464 , 130 L . E d. 2d 3 72 ( 1994 ). B ec au se S m ithdid not r ai se thi s is sue a t the di st ric t co ur t, we v ie w th is cla im forpl ai n e rro r. X-Ci te m en t v id eo de al t wi th th e kno wled ge req ui rem en t o f 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a )( 1) , ( 2) . W e be ginw ithtw o ob se rv at ion s a bout X -C ite m en t V ide o: F ir st, the Court did no t sugg est that the “ knowingl y ” term extended to the jurisdictional term s of the statute. I d. at 78, 115 S. Ct. at 472 (“ [W ] e conclude that the term

‘ knowingl y ’ in § 225 2 extends b oth to the sexually explicit nature of the m aterial and to the age of the perform ers. ”). Sec ond, we note that X-C item ent Video w as not ac onst itu tio na l ho ldi ng. T he Co urt i nte rp re te d th e statut e its el f, and i n co nc lud ing that “ know ing ly ” ap pli ed to the na tur e an d a ge pr ovi sio n, not ed that, in light of First A m endm ent precedent, “ a statute com pletely beref t of a scienter requirem ent as to the age of the perf orm ers w ouldraise ser ious con stitut ional doub ts. ” I d. B ut s ee id. a t 83 -8 5, 115 S . Ct . a t 47 4- 75 ( Sc al ia , J. , dis se nti ng) . T he conclusio n, howe ver, wa s one of statutory interpretation. T hus, X- Citem ent Video gu id es ou r an al y si s o nl y

to th e ex te nt itaid s o urin te rp ret at io n o f 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) and § 225 2A(a )(5)( B).In Bonne r v. Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir.1981) (en ba nc), w e adopte d as 11 binding pr ece dent the dec isions of the former Fifth Circuit hande d down prior to Oc tober 1, 1981. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) (B ) states that a nyone who “ knowing ly

violates subsection (a )(4) , 12 (f ), (k), or (q ) o f s e c tio n 9 22 ” sh a ll b e punis he d a c c or din gto t he statut e ’s state d te rm s. 18 U. S.C. § 922(g ) make s it unlawful for c erta in specified pe rsons “to ship or transpor t in interstate or 18 a. 18 U. S. C. § 225 2A(a )(5)( B) A s pr ev iou sly

not ed , 18 U . S. C. § 22 52A (a )( 5) (B ) pr ovi de s, in re le vant p ar t: Any person who . . . knowingl y possess es any

book , m agazine, periodical, f

ilm , videotape, com

puter disk, or any

other m aterial that co nta ins an im ag e of

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

that ha s be enm ai le d, or shi ppe d or

tr an spor te d inint er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce by any m eans, inc lud ing by

c om put er , or that w as pr oduc ed

usi ng m at er ia ls that have be enm ai le d, or shi ppe d or

tr an spor te d inint er state or fo re ignc om

m er ce by any m eans, inc lud ing by

c om put er . . . sha ll be pu ni sh ed. . . It w ouldnot be an im

plausib le interpretation of the statute to extend th e term

“ know ing ly ” to the j ur isd ic tio na l e le m en ts. I t i s no t, how ev er , an in ev ita ble interpretation, and w e ar e unaware of any court that has previousl y adopted it. Cf. U nit ed S ta te s v. T hr as he r, 569 F . 2d 8 94, 895 ( 5thCi r. 197 8) ( “ T he lawis w el l se ttl ed . . . that the gov er

nm en t i s no t r equir ed

to pr ove kno w le dge of

the int er state ne xus of the f ir ea rm ” in 1 8 U . S. C. § 92 2( h) (1 ). ); U nit ed S ta te s v. Mi lle r, 105 11 F. 3d 5 52, 555 ( 9thCi r. 199 7) ( “ W e ag re e w iththe de ci sio ns f ro m oth er c ir cu its that the § 92 4( a) kno w le dge r equir em en t a ppl ie s on ly

to the pos se ssi on e le m en t of § 92 2( g) (1 ), not

to the int er state ne xus or to fe lonstatus . ”) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. 12fore ign c ommerce , or possess in or af fec ting c ommerce , any

firea rm or ammunition; or to rece ive an y fi re armo r a m mun i t i o nwh i ch h as b ee ns h i p p edo r t ra n s p o rt edi ni n t er s t at e o r f o re i gn commerc e.” 19 D ar by , 37 F . 3d 1 059, 106 7 ( 4thCi r. 199 4) ( not ing that “ [n ] um er ous ca se s have he ld tha t c ri m ina l st at

ute s ba se d onthe gov er

nm en t’ s in te re st i n r eg ulatin g int er state c om

m er ce do n ot g en er al ly

r eq uir e that an of

fe nde r have kno w le dge of the int er state ne xus of

his a ct ion s, ” an d c oll ec tin g c as es ). N or have w e fo und anythi ng i n th e le gis la tiv e his tor y of the statut e that w oul d su gge st – pla inl y or oth er w ise – tha t C ongr es s on ly int en de d to r ea chpos se sso rs of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy who knew that the m aterials on or by which their pornography wa s produced had tr av el ed in int er state c om

m er ce . Mo re ove r, the pr es um pti on i n X -C ite m en t V ide o, w hic h gu ide d th e Co urt t o it s c onc lus ion , that “ a sc ie nte r re qui re m en t sh oul d a ppl y to each of t he st atut ory

ele m en ts th atcri m in al iz e o th erwi se in no cen t co nd uc t,” XCi te m en t Vi de o, 5 13 U.S. at 7 2, 1 15 S. Ct. at 46 9, d oe s n ot ap pl y in th is cas e. G i v e n th e b a c k g r o u n do f s t a t e c r i mi n a l r e g u l a t i o n o f c h i l dp o rn o g r ap h y, poss ession o f child pornog raphy that has not traveled in int erstate c omm erce cannot be said to b e “ inno cent conduct.” A ccordingly , w e cannot conclude that the failure to interpret the te rm “ knowingl y ” to extend to the int erstate nexus wa s plain error. Si m ilarl y , any

arg um en t tha t kn ow le dge of the int er state ne xus is20

co nst itu tio na lly

r equir ed c annot stand p la in e rr or

ana ly sis . A s pr ev iou sly

not ed , X -C ite m en t V ide o do es not e ve n st an d f

or the pr opos iti on tha t kn ow le dge of the ag e of the pe rf orm er s is c onst itu tio na lly r equir ed , le t a lon e know le dge of the int er state ne xus. T o th e ex te nt the F ir st A m en dm en t do es r equir e know le dge of age, m oreover, it is because m aterial that w ouldbe constitut ionallyprotected w hen the perform ers ar e adults is no t necessarily constitu tionallyprotected w hen inv olv ing c hil dr en . S ee A shc ro ft v. F re e Sp ee chCo al iti on, 535 U . S. 234 , 240 , 122 S. Ct . 138 9, 139 6, 152 L . E d. 2d 4 03 ( 2002 ) (“ A s age ne ra l r ule , por nogr ap hy can be banne d on ly

if obs ce ne , but

und er [ N ewY ork v. F er

be r, 458 U . S. 747 , 102 S. Ct . 334 8, 73 L . E d. 2d 1 113 (1 982) , ] por nogr ap hy sho w ing m ino rs c anbe pr osc ri be d w he the r or

not the im ag es are obs ce ne und er the de fi nit ionse t f

orth i n Mi ll er v . Cal ifo rn ia , 41 3 U.S. 1 5, 9 3 S . Ct. 2 60 7, 3 7 L. Ed. 2 d 4 19 (19 73 ).”). T hus, the arg um en t go es , kno w le dge of a ge is re qui re d f

or pr ose cu tio n so a s no t t o de te r co nst itu tio na lly

pr ote ct ed

spe ec h. T his ana ly sis doe s no t c ar ry ove r to the int er state ne xus. T he li ne of li m itatio n th e Co m

m er ce Cl au se im

pose s up on Congression al authority

(or that Congress im

poses up on itself) is not a line that distin guish es constitu tionallyprotected fr om unprotected condu ct. Beca use there is n o F ir st A m en dm en t r igh t t o po sse ss c hil d po rn ogr ap hy ( w hol ly intra state or oth er w ise ), astate ’ s a

bil ity to pr osc ri be c hil d po rn ogr ap hy is not de pe ndant u

pon21

Co ngr es s’ s a

bil ity or c hoi ce to do the sam e. T he re is no p ar al le l c onc er n, th er ef o re , o f o v er -d et erri n g co n s t i tu t i o n al l y p ro t ec t eds p ee ch . As s u ch , S m i th ’s ar gum en t tha t the pr ose cu tio n w as c onst itu tio na lly r equir ed to pr ove kno w le dge of the int er state ne xus cannot w ith stand p la in e rr or

ana ly sis , and w e the re fo re have no need to assess whether sufficient evidence w as offer ed so to prov e. b. 18 U. S. C. § 225 1(a) The argum ent with respect to 18 U. S. C. § 225 1(a) is m ore ea sily dispo sed of. The te xt of the statute sim ply does not p rovide a basis to conclu de that knowledge of the j urisdictio nal nexus is plainly required. Sec tion 2 251(a) rea ches anind ivi dua l’ s c ondu ct if suc h pe rs on know s or

ha s r ea son to k

nowthat su chvis ua l de pic tio n will be transpo rted in interstate or fore ign comm erce or m ailed, if that vis ua l de pic tio n w as pr oduc ed usi ng m at er ia ls tha t have be enm ai le d, shi ppe d, or

tr an spor te d inint er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce by any m eans, inc lud ing by

c om put er , or if suc h vi sua l de pic tio n ha s a ct ua lly be entr an spor

te d inint er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce or m ai le d. 18 U . S. C. § 22 51( a) . T he m ost na tur al r ea din g of

thi s pr ovi sio n is that j ur isd ic tio n extends to chi ld porno graphy (1) produced with the intent that it eventuallytravel in i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce ; ( 2) pr oduc ed

w ithm at er ia ls tha t have tr av el ed in int er state co m m er ce ; or ( 3) that ha s tr av el ed

in int er state c om

m er ce . O nly

the f ir st b as is f

or j urisdictio n requires any

proof of m ental state. W e cannot conclude, theref ore,In his brief, Smith argues that, in order for his 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) c onviction to be 13 constitutionally

upheld, the Gove rnment also had to pr ove knowledg e of the victim’s ag e, and that it failed to do so. At argument on the Rule 29 motion, defense counsel e x pressly conce ded that the statute on its fac e did not impose such a r equire ment, and made no constitutional objection: “[A]s to Count one . . . it i s a strict liability crime, it doesn’ t matter if the g overnme nt can pr ove that the photographe r knewthe ag e of the model . . . .” Rec ord, vol. 12, no. 107, at 52. Thus, we would or dinarily revie w def

endant’ s argument that proof of ag e is requir ed for

§ 2251(a) for plain e rror . In this case, howe ver, e ven if we wer e to agree with Smi th’s position, t he jury found, and w e have upheld, that Smith knew the victim was a minor for purposes of the § 2252A(a )(5) (B ) convic tion. Bec ause a ny err or would there fore nece ssarily be har mless, we nee d n o tad dre s s th i s cl ai m . Inarri v i n g atth i s co n cl u s i o n , we d o n o ti n t er p re tS m i tht o b e m ak i n g a fa c ia l c ha lle ng e to t

he statut e , c la imi ngov e rb re a dth de sp ite the c on sti tut ion a l a pp lic atio n in

his particula r ca se. In that context, harmless err or ana ly sis would be inappropriate. Smith a lso argue s, fo r t

he fi rs t ti me on

a pp e a l, t hat th e re wa s in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to prove that he was “ producing ” child pornography , beca use the e vidence only

demonstrated pe rs on a l us e , n ot d istri butio n a nd sa le . A s d isc us se d, se e inf ra pa rt I I I .E .2 , w e c ann ot f

ind that it was plain e rror

to interpret “ producing ” as not involvinga prof it moti ve. Smith’s insufficiency of the e vid e nc e c ha lle ng e the re fo re fa ils a s w e ll. 22 that the dis tr ic t c ourt c om m itt ed pla in e rr or

by not r equir ing kno w le dge of

the in te rs ta te ne xu s. Mo reo ve r, fo r th e rea so ns di sc us se d wi th reg ardto 18 U.S.C. § 2252 A (a )( 5) (B ), sup ra , w e cannot say that no t havin g su char equir em en t co nst itu te s pl ai n c onst itu tio na l e rr or . A s ar es ult , a ll of S m ith ’ s c la im s f

or acquittal fail, and we m ove on to his claim s of trial and sentencing error.

13 B. Im

proper Search and Seiz ure Sm ith argues that the pho tographs in question we re seize d pursuant to an uncons titutio nal search w ithou t a w arrant, and theref ore shouldnot have been adm itt ed a t tri al . T he dis tr ic t c ourt de te rm ine d th at the pla in v ie we xc ep tio n to the w ar rant r equir em en t auth or iz ed the se iz ur e. R ev ie wof

adis tr ic t c ourt’ s de nia l of“ Th e g ra vame n o f a

F ourt h A me ndme nt c la im i s th at th e c omp la ina nt’ s le g iti mate 14 expectation of privac y

has bee n violated by

an illeg al sea

rch or seizure.” Kimmelman v. Mo rr iso n, 47 7 U .S. 36 5, 37 4, 10 6 S. Ct. 25 74 , 2 58 2, 91 L . E d. 2d 30 5 ( 19 86 ). “ Th e Sup re me Court ha s e nunc iate d a

tw o- pa rt te st t o d e te rm ine wh e the r a n in div idu a l ha s a

le g iti mate expectation of privac y

in the object of a

sear ch: (1) the individual mustmanifest a subje ctive e xpe c tatio n o f p ri va c y

in t he ob je c t of the c ha lle ng e d s e arc h, and (2 ) s oc ie ty

mus t be wi lli ngto rec og nize that ex pectation as leg itimate.” United States v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1143, 1144 (11th Cir. 1994) (c iting California

v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S. C t. 1809, 1811, 90 L . Ed. 2d 210 (1986)) . The district cour t, in adopting the ma g istrate judg e’s r eport a nd rec ommendation, deter mined that the sea

rch w as lawf

ul both because the def

endant ha d not manifested a subjective e x pectation of privacy in the photogr aphs and be cause the plain view doc trine authorized the sea

rch a nd seizure. B eca

use we agree that the plain view doc trine applies, we express no opinion on the alternate g round for upholding the se arc h. 23 a m oti on t o su

ppr es s is am ixe d qu es tio n of lawand f

ac t. U nit ed

S ta te s v. Ho l l o wa y, 29 0 F. 3 d1 3 3 1 , 1 3 3 4 (1 1 th Ci r. 2 0 0 2 ). We re v i ew th e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s fa ct ua l f ind ing s f or c le ar e rr or and c onstru e tho se f

ac ts i n th e lig ht m ost

f av or ab le t o th e p re v ai l i n g p ar ty. Id . Th e ap p l i ca t i o n o f l aw i s re v i ew edd e n o v o . Id . We ag re e w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t, be ca use the se ar chof

the pr em ise s and l oc kbox wa s valid and th e seizure wa s legitim ately conducted pu rsuant to the plain view doc tr ine , S m ith ’ s F ourth A m en dm en t r igh ts w er e not vio la te d and the pho tog ra phs w er e law fu lly

a dm itt ed a t tri al . 14 The “plain view” doctrine perm its a warrantless seizure wher e (1) an officer is l aw fu lly

loc at ed in the pla ce f

ro m w hic h th e se iz ed

obj ec t c oul d be pla inl y vie w ed and m ust have alaw fu l r igh t of

a cc es s to the obj ec t i tse lf ; and ( 2) the incrim inating chara cter of the item is im m ediately apparent. H orton v. California,24

496 U.S . 128, 136-37, 110 S. Ct. 2301 , 2308, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990); United States v. Hr om ada, 49 F.3d 685, 690 n.11 (11th Cir. 1995 ). “ The plain view doctrine allows police officer s to seize any contraband in plain view if the officer s have a right of acc ess to the place wher e the contraband is located.” United State s v. Ro dge rs , 924 F . 2d 2 19, 221 ( 11th C ir . 199 1) . “ A n e xam ple of the appl ic ab ili ty of the ‘ pla in v ie w ’ doc tr ine is the sit ua tio n inw hic h th e pol ic e have aw ar rant t o s e ar c h ag i v e n ar e af

o r s p e c i f i e do b j e c t s , an di n th e c o u r s e o f th e s e ar c h c o me ac ro ss s om e oth er

art ic le of inc ri m inatin g c hara ct er . ” H orton , 496 U . S. a t 13 5, 110 S. Ct. at 2307 (quo ting Coo lidge v. Ne w H am pshire, 403 U. S. 443, 465, 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 2037, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (opini on of Stewart, J.) (internal quot at ionm ar

ks o m itt ed ). T he of

fi ce rs , how ev er , m

ust have pr oba

ble c au se to be lie ve that the obj ec t i n pl ai n vi ewis co ntr ab an d. Mi nne sot a v. D ic ke rs on, 508 U. S. 366, 375, 113 S. Ct. 2130 , 2137, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993) (“ If . . . the police la ck pr oba ble c au se to be lie ve that an ob j ec t i n pl ai n vi ewis co ntr ab an d w ith out conductin g som e further

searc h of the objec t – i.e. , if ‘ its incrim inating chara cter [i s no t] “ im

m ed ia te ly appare nt, ”’ – the pla in- vie wdoc tr ine c annot j ust if y it s se iz ur e. ” (s ec ond al te ratio n inor igi na l) ( ci ta tio n om itt ed ) (quot ing H orton , 496 U. S. at 136, 110 S.C t., at 2308 (quo ting Coo lidge, 403 U. S. at 466, 91 S. Ct. at 2038 (opinion of Stew art, J.) ))) .25

He re, the officer s wer e law fully at the Sm ith residence pursuant to an unchallenged s earc h war

rant authorizing the officers to searc h for and seize ev ide nc e of

il lic it dr ug a ct ivi ty . T he w ar

rant s pe ci fi ca lly

auth or iz ed

the of fi ce rs to se iz e “phot ogr ap hs tha t w oul d be pr obativ e to e sta bli sh r es ide nc y . ” T he of

fi ce rs , al er te d to the loc kbox by

anarc oti cs dog , w er e j ust if ie d inse ar ch ing it

f or ev ide nc e of

dr ugs – e ith er

be ca use aloc kbox c oul d r ea sona bly c ont ai n dr

ugs or related par aphernalia, United State s v. W uagneux, 683 F.2d 134 3, 1352 (11th Cir. 1 9 8 2 ) ( “[ A ] s e ar c h may b e a s e x t e n s i v e a s r e a s o n ab l y r e qu i r e dt o l o c a t e th e i t e ms de sc ri be d inthe w ar

rant. ”) , or be ca use the narc oti cs c an ine a le rt ed the of fi ce rs to the loc kbox , U nit ed

S ta te s v. Banks, 3 F . 3d 3 99, 402 ( 11th C ir . 199 3) ( “ O ur c ir cu it ha s r ec ogni ze d th at

pr oba ble c au se ari se s whe n adr ug- tr ai ne d c an ine a le rt s to dr ugs. ”) – or

pho tog ra phs, a s auth or iz ed

by the w ar rant. I t w as thr oughthe law fu l ex ec uti on o f the w ar

rant tha t the of

fi ce rs c am e ac ro ss the pho tog ra phs at iss ue he re . T he onl y

r em ai nin g qu es tio n, the n, is w he the r it w as im m ed ia te ly appare nt t o the officer s – whether they had probablycause to believe – that am ong what they f o u n di n th e l o c k

b o x , wa s e v i d e n c e o f

c h i l dp o rn o g r ap h y.

“ In dealing with probable cause . . . we deal w ith probabi lities. T hese are not te ch nic al ; the y

are the f ac tua l and p ra ct ic al c onsi de ratio ns o f ev er y day li fe on which re asonable and prud ent m en, not legal technicians, a ct. . . . ‘ The substance26

of a ll the de fi nit ion s’ of

pr oba ble c au se ‘ is a

r ea sona ble gr ound

f or be lie f of gu il t.’” Brin eg ar v . Uni te d S ta te s, 3 38 U.S. 16 0, 1 75 , 69 S. Ct. 1 30 2, 1 31 0, 9 3 L. E d. 187 9 ( 1949 ) (quot ing Carr oll v. U nit ed S ta te s, 267 U . S. 132 , 161 , 45 S . Ct . 280, 288 , 69 L . E d. 543 ( 1925 ) (quot ing Mc Carthy v. D earm it, 99 P a. 63, 69 (1 881) ( int er

na l qu otatio n m ar

ks o m itt ed )) ); se e al so Unit ed S ta te s v. $24 2, 484. 00, 389 F. 3d 1 149, 116 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 4) ( enbanc ). “ A lth oughw e m ust de ci de the le ga l i ssu e of

w he the r pr oba

ble c au se e xis ts o ur se lve s, w e do g ive w ei ght to the inf er en ce s th at

lawe nf or ce m en t a ge nts dr awf

ro m the f ac ts . . . . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. $242 ,484.00, 389 F. 3d at 116 2. O ffice r May o testified, and the district court fo und cr ed ibl e, that so m e of the gir ls i n th e phot ogr ap hs “ loo ke d e xtr em el y y oung , very very y oung .” H e though t it was “ very obvio us” that the girls were y oung er th an eig ht een . This tes ti m on y was c on fir m edby D et ect iv e Ju li e Dic ki e, a de te ct iv e wit h e xt en si ve ex pe rie nc e in ve st ig at in g s ex cri m es an d c hi ldab us e. D et ec tiv e D ic kie te sti fi ed that so m e of

the f em al es in the pho tos w er e cl earl y m ino rs w ithone li ke ly

a s y oung a s e le ve n. N ei the r O ff ic er May o no r D et ec tiv e D ic kie ne ed ed

to have be enc or

re ct in the ir a sse ssm en t i n or de r fo r pr oba ble c au se to have existed. N or m

ust Offic er May o have been a sex crim es expert – w e ar e onlyconcerned w ith what a “ reasonable and prudent” officer m ight h ave perce ived an d in fe rr ed . T ha t the dis tr ic t c ourt be lie ve d th at O ff ic er May o sawpho tog ra

phs,Smit h argues that without viewingthe photog raphs, the c ourt was inca pable of 15 de te rm ini ngthat it

wa s “ imm e diate ly

a pp are nt” that th e y

we re c hil d p or

no g ra phy . Sm ithpo int s to no authority , howeve r, nor ha ve we independe ntly

discovere d any , sug g estingthat the cour t c ann ot r e ly

on the te sti mony

of wi tne sse s, but mu st a c tua lly vie w a ny a lle g e d c ontr a

ba nd to de te rm ine if

pr ob a ble c a us e e xiste d. Ind e e d, ha d th e of fi c e rs fo llo we d Sm ith ’s pr e fe rr e d c ours e of a c tio n – se c ur inga

se pa rate wa rr ant a ft e r d isc ov e ri ngthe ph oto g ra ph s – it i s e xtre me ly unlikely that the mag istrate judg e would have observe d the photog raphs pr ior to issuing the war rant. We ar e satisfied, more over, that the mag istrate judg e re lied upon the testimony of a se x crimes a nd child abuse e x pert in dete rmining whether it could have be en obvious to Offic er Mayo that the photog raphs we re of youngg irls. Whi le it may have be en prude nt for the mag istrate judg e to view the photos indepe ndently , we c annot say that, as a matter of law , the court must view the e vidence to determine whether probable cause exis ted. 27 w hic h he pe rc ei ve d ob vio usl y to co nta in s ex ua lly

e xpl ic it im ag es of

ve ry y oung gi rls , is su ffi ci en t t o m ak e o ut a “ reas on ab le gro un d fo r be li ef o f gu il t.” 15 Sm ith m akes several other argum ents as to why it could no t have been

“ imm ed ia te ly app aren t” to th e o ffi cers th atth e p ho to s wer e ev id en ce o f a cri m e. Fi rs t , h e a l l eg es th at th er e w as n o ev i d en ce th at th e o ff i ce rs kn ewth at Smit h ’s co nduc t m et

the te ch nic al r equir em en ts o f the statut e (n am el y , that he

“pr oduc [e d] ” the pho tog ra phs as de fi ne d in18 U . S. C. § 22 56, that he ha d th e ne ce ssary m en s r ea , and the pho tog ra phs ei the r tr av el ed

in int er state c om

m er ce or w er e m ad e usi ng m at er ia ls tha t trave le d inint er state c om m er ce ). A s st at ed , pr oba ble c au se is not

ba se d onkno w le dge of

le ga l t ec hni ca lit ie s, but

r athe r on whe th er t he re i s a r eas on ab le gro un d t o b el ie ve th ata cri m e h as be en co m m it te d.

“ T he re is no r

ule of laww hic h r equir es an of fi ce r to k noww ithabsol ute c er

ta inty that a ll el em en ts o f a put at ive c ri m e have be enc om ple te d w he n he se iz es an art ic le28

w h i c h r e a s o n ab l y ap p e ar s t o b e i n c r i mi n a t i n g e v i d e n c e . ” U n i t e dS t a t e s v . S l o c u m, 708 F. 2d 5 87, 605 ( 11th C ir . 198 3) ( quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. W ood, 560 F . 2d 6 60, 664 (5 th C ir . 197 7) ) (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks o m itt ed ); U nit ed

S ta te s v. H erzb run, 723 F. 2d 7 73, 775 ( 11th C ir . 198 4) ( “ [P ] ro bable c au se m ust not be j udge d w ith clinical detachm ent, but with a c omm on sense view to the realities of norm al lif e. ”) . O ff ic er May o c oul d r ea sona

bly have be lie ve d th at

the se xua lly

e xpl ic it p h o t o g r ap h s o f

w h a th e o b s e rv e dt o b e v e ry yo u n g g i r l s w e r e e v i d e n c e o f ac r i me – e ith er state , se e Fl a. S ta t. A nn. § 84 7. 0137 ( W es t 20 06) ( cr im ina liz ing tr an sm iss ionof

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy

a s athi rd de gr ee f el ony ), or f ed er al – w ith out knowing whether the legal technicalities of those crim es had, in fa ct, been sa tis fi ed . Se co nd, S m ithc ont en ds tha t be ca use the of fi ce rs did not loo k a t e ac h ph oto , it could n ot have been “ im m ediately apparent” that the ones not viewed we re ev ide nc e of

ac ri m e. E ve n if

thi s w er e tr

ue , the arg um en t w oul d say nothin g a

bout w he the r it w as im

m ed ia te ly appare nt tha t the pho tog ra phs that the of

fi ce rs did actually view w ere properly

seized. Regar dless, this argum ent has been raised be fo re and h as be enr ej ec te d by thi s c ourt. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. Bl um , 753 F . 2d 999, 100 2 ( 11th C ir . 198 5) ( “ T he appe llant arg ue s th at the re is no w ay

the a ge nt could imm ediately

have rec ogni zed a box full of m iscellaneous papers as evidence29

without go ing th rough th e box and reading each item to determ ine its evidenti ary im portanc e. . . . O nc e the a ge nts saw[ som e of the e vid en ce , how ev er , ] the ev ide nti ar

y va lue of the se w oul d be appare nt. ”) ; U nit ed S ta te s v. S loc um , 708 F . 2d 587, 606 ( 11th C ir . 198 3) ( “ Inthe se c ir cum stanc es , to re qui re ase iz ing of fi ce r to ex am ine ind ivi dua lly

e ac h do cum en t w ith in a

f ile or bound v olum e ‘ w oul d subs tanti al ly

inc re as e the ti m e re qui re d to c ondu ct the se ar ch , the re by

a ggr av at ing the intru siv en es s of

the se ar ch . ’ S inc e the ind ivi dua l do cum en ts c ont ai ne d inthe file could be legitim ately seized under the plain view exce ption , [ the officer ] acted re as ona bly in or de ri ng the se iz ur e of the e nti re f

ile . ” (c itatio ns o m itt ed ) (quot ing United States v. W

uagneux, 683 F.2d 134 3, 1353 (11th Cir. 1982 ) (quoting United St at es v. Be usc h, 596 F . 2d 8 71, 876 ( 9thCi r. 197 9) ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks om itt ed )) )) . N or

is it pr obl em at ic that so m e of the pic tur es tur

ne d ou t t o be of ad ult w om en– the sc ope of

the “pla in v ie w ” doc tr ine e xte nds to the se iz ur e of ite m s th at , w hil e not

c ontra band the m se lve s, m ay

be use d a s e vid en ce a ga ins t a de fe ndant. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. L ad son, 774 F . 2d 4 36, 439 ( 11th C ir . 198 5) (s ta tin g th at , f

or the pla in v ie we xc ep tio n to appl y , “ it m ust have be enim

m ed ia te ly apparent that the item

wa s evidence, c ontraband or oth erw ise subject to seizure ” (e m pha sis a dde d) ). A cc or din gly , O ff ic e May o di d no t ne ed

to knowif

a ll the phot ogr ap hs w er e of

c hil d po rn ogr ap hy . F or

that m atte r, he did

not ne ed to know30

that any w er e of c hil d po rn ogr ap hy . R athe r he ha d to have ha d pr oba ble c au se to be lie ve that am ong the pho tog ra phs, som e w er e ill eg al . H av ing se enpho tos he reasonably

believed to be child po rnography , he had probable cause to presum e, w ith out goi ng thr oughe ac h in div idu al ly , that the re w er e oth er s am ong the gr oup of pho tog ra phs in the sam e loc kbox that w er e ei the r the m se lve s c hil d po rn ogr ap hy or evidence thereof. Fi na lly , S m ithr el ie s onthe f ac t tha t the te sti m ony

dif fe re d r eg ar din g th e num be r of pic tur es se iz ed

– r an gin g f

ro m 200 to 500 at

the sup pr es sio n he ar ing to 1 ,7 6 8 attri al –

an dn o ac co u n t i n g o f w h at wa s s ei ze d , t o ch al l en g e t h e o ff i ce r’s assertion that it was “ im

m ediately apparent” that the photog raphs wer e illicit. I n Sm ith ’ s vi ew , if

the num be r of pho tos w as not

“ im m ed ia te ly appare nt, ” the re is n o th i n g ab o u tth em th at co u l dre l i ab l y b e c o n s i d er edi m m ed i at el y ap p ar en t . We be lie ve , how ev er , that the dis cr ep an cy in te sti m ony

goe s so le ly

to the c re dib ili ty

of the w itn es se s – the ( ir )r el ia bil ity of w hom doe s no t ne ce ssari ly

e xte nd f ro m the num be r to the na tur e of

the pho tog ra

phs. E ve n if

w e co uld pr es um e that the num er ic al dis cr ep an cy

m ak es the of

fi ce rs ’ te sti m ony

w ithr es pe ct

to the num

be r of phot ographs in herently

unreliable, w e cannot presum e that the court com m itted cl ear er ro r in c re dit ing the of

fi ce rs ’ te sti m ony

in fi ndi ng tha t i t w as “ im m ed ia te ly ap pare nt” that so m e of

the pho tos – ho w ev er

m any the re w er e – w er e ch ild31

p o rn o g r ap h y. Be ca use the of fi ce rs c oul d law fu lly

se ar chthe pr em ise s, the loc kbox , and the phot ographs, and because the district court could reasonably find that it was

“ im m ediately apparent” to the office rs that the photo graphs wer e evidence of a crim e, their seizure wa s authorized by the plain view doctrine and they we re lawf ully adm itted into evidence.

C. I m pr ope r O ut- of

-C ourt I de nti fi catio n Sm ith next claim s that the victim ’ s out-of-court identification, which w as followed at trial by

an in-court identification bythe witness, shou ld have been supp re sse d, be ca

use the ide nti fi catio n pr oc ed ur e w as im

pe rm iss ibl y

sug ge sti ve an d c re at ed

asub stanti al li ke lih ood of m isi de nti fi catio n th er eb y de pr ivi ng S m ith of hi s ri gh t t o due pro ces s. Th e d is tri ctco ur t re fu se d t o s up pr es s t hi s ev id en ce. T he standard

of r ev ie wis the sam e as above : the f ac ts are r ev ie w ed

f or c le ar e rr or an d th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s a

ppl ic at ionof

the lawto tho se f

ac ts are r ev ie w ed

de nov o.

“ [C ] onvi ct ion s ba se d one y ew itn es s id entif ic at iona t tri al f

oll ow ing a pr etri al ide nti fi catio n by

pho tog ra ph w ill be se t a sid e on tha t gr ound onl y if the phot ogr ap hic ide nti fi catio n pr oc ed ur e w as so i m

pe rm iss ibl y

sug ge sti ve a s to giv e ri se to a ve ry

sub stanti al li ke lih ood of ir re para ble m isi de nti fi catio n. ” S im m ons v. United States, 390 U.S . 377, 384, 88 S. Ct. 967, 971, 19 L. Ed. 2d 124 7 (1968);32

see also Jones v. Ke m

p, 794 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1986) (“ A pre trial ide nti fi catio n and s ubse que nt i n- co urt i de nti fi catio n m ay a m ount to a due pr oc es s vio la tio n if

the pr etri al pr oc ed

ur e w as ‘ unne ce ssari ly

sug ge sti ve and c ondu ci ve to ir re para ble m ist ak enide nti fi catio n. ’ ” (quot ing S tov al l v. D enno, 388 U . S. 293 , 302, 87 S. C t. 1967, 1972, 18 L. Ed. 2d 119 9, 1206 (1967 ))) . Sm ith, however , doe s no t a lle ge that the in- co urt i de nti fi catio n w as ta int ed by w ha t he c onsi de rs to be the im pe rm iss ibl y

sug ge sti ve pr etri al ide nti fi catio n pr oc ed ur e. S ee Re co rd , vol . 9, no. 69 at 74 -7 5. R athe r, w e int er pr et S m ith ’ s arg um en t t o be that the ide nti fi catio n r es ult ing f

ro m the a lle ge dly

unc onst itu tio na l i de nti fi catio n pr oc ed ur e im pe rm iss ibl y

bol ste re d th e unc ha lle nge d in -c ourt i de nti fi catio n and therefore shoul d have been supp ressed. As a result, w e need not concern our se lve s w ithw he the r the a lle ge d e rr or w as so g re at

a s to le ad

ir re para bly to a m ist ak enin- co urt i de nti fi catio n. S ee N ei l v. Bi gge rs , 409 U . S. 188 , 198 , 93 S . Ct . 375, 382, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972) (“ While the phrase [‘ a very subst antial lik el iho od o f ir

re para ble m isi de nti fi catio n’ ] w as c oin ed a s astandard

f or de te rm ini ng whe the r anin- co urt i de nti fi catio n w oul d be a dm iss ibl e in the w ak e of a suggestiv e out-of-court identification, w ith the deletion of ‘ irrepar able’ it serves equa lly w el l a s astandard

f or the a dm iss ibi lit

y of te sti m ony

c onc er nin g th e out-of-court identification its elf. ”).33

O ut- of -c ourt i de nti fi catio ns are e xam ine d f or due pr oc es s vi olatio ns u sin g a two-part te st: “ The c ourt m ust first decide whether the [procedure] wa s im pe rm iss ibl y

sug ge sti ve , and i f it w as sug ge sti ve the c ourt m ust the n de te rm ine w he the r the ide nti fi catio n pr oc ed ur e cr eate d asub stanti al li ke lih ood of m is id en ti fic at io n.” Uni te d S ta te s v . Rus so , 79 6 F .2d14 43 , 14 52 (11 th Cir . 19 86 ). Sm ithc ont en ds tha t the ide nti fi catio n pr oc ed ur e w as im

pe rm iss ibl y

sug ge sti ve because, at the tim e of the pre- trial identification, the victim wa s in custo dy

for a pr obatio n vi olatio n, and w as sho w n se ve ra l nake d pi ct ur es of he rs el f, the de fe ndant, and o the r fe m al es . I n th is c ont ex t, a cc or din g to S m ith , the vic tim , not knowing whether she had com m itted a crim e, wa s likely to say whatever wa s ne ce ssary to av oid f urthe r tr oubl e fo r he rs el f. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di sa gr ee d w ith Sm ith ’ s arg um en t, and w e cannot say that the re w as c le ar

e rr or in any of the court’ s factual f

indin gs that would lead to th e conclusion that the procedure w as im perm issib ly

suggest ive. T he dis tr ic t c ourt f

ound that the of

fi ce rs w ho s how ed

the pic tur es to the vi ct im on ly ask edwhet he r sh e was ab le to id en ti fy an y on e in an y

of t he pi ctur es . T he of fi ce rs w er e hopi ng the vic tim c oul d id en tif

y oth er gir ls i n th e phot ogr ap hs, not j ust S m ith . A s su ch , the y

ne ve r as ke d th e vic tim

if the pho tog ra

phe r w as in any of the pic tur es . T he dis tr ic t c ourt f ound that, w hil e loo kin g a t the pic tur es , theSmit h also argues that the district cour t should have re quired the vic tim to t estify 16 be fo re a do pti ngthe ma g istrate jud g e ’s re po rt and re c omm e nd atio n. Th e re is n o r e qu ir e me nt, ho we ve r, tha

t c e rt a in t y pe s o r f or ms o f e vid e nc e mus t be he ard be fo re a mot ion to s up pr e ss evidenc e ca

n be re solved. We conclude , there fore , that the cour t could have de termined that the identification proc edure was not impermissibly sug g estive without hear ing dir ectly from the victim. Additionally , in consideringSmit h’s ar gument, we a re not c onfined to the e vidence prese nted at the suppre ssion hearing : “‘[I ]n ruling on the cor rec tness of the trial c ourt’s denia l of a motion to suppress,’ . . . we ‘may consider a

ny evidenc e pre sented at the trial of the c ase a nd [are] not li mited to the evidence introduced [at] the hearingon the motion.’” United States v. Villabona-G arnic a, 63 F .3d 1051, 1056 (11th Cir. 1995) (sec ond alteration added) ( quoting United States v. Soto, 591 F.2d 1091, 1098 n. 5 (5th Cir.) (quotingUnited States v. Griff in, 555 F.2d 1323, 1326 n. 3 ( 5th Cir. 1977)) (interna l quotation marks omitted)). In this reg ard, the victim’s testimony

at trial substantially

corr oborate d Detec tive Dickie’ s acc ount of the identification proc edure . 34 vi ct im he ldup on e an d “ sp on ta ne ou sl y ” id en ti fie d S m it h a s t he ph ot og rap he r. De tective Dic kie testified that the victim continu ed to lookthrough pictures after she ha d id en tif

ie d S m ithand c ont inu ed

to sin gle out

S m ithf ro m a m ong the pic tur es a s th e m anw ho h ad take n th e phot ogr ap hs. T hus, giv enthe tot al ity of ci rc um stanc es , w e cannot say that the f ac t tha t the vic tim

w as in cu sto dy

a t the tim e of the ide nti fi catio n ne ce ssari ly tr an sf orm ed an othe rw ise spo ntane ous id en ti fic at io n i nt o o ne ari si ng ou t o f an im pe rm is si bl y

su gg es ti ve pro cedur e. Be ca use w e fi nd tha t the pr oc ed ur e w as not

im pe rm iss ibl y

sug ge sti ve , w e ne ed

not de te rm ine w he the r the pr oc ed ur e cr eate d asub stanti al li ke lih ood of m isi de nti fi catio n. 16 D . E vid en tiary Ru lin gs Sm ithc la im s th at

c er ta in e vid en ce a t tri al w as e ith er ir re le vant, or

if35

relevant, “ subs tantially

outweighed by

the danger of unfair pre

j udice,” F ed. R . E vid . 403 , and the re fo re sho uld not have be ena dm itt ed . H e al so c ont en ds tha t the co urt sh oul d no t have a dm itt ed oth er -c ri m es e vid en ce und er F ed er al Ru le of Evi de nc e 4 04 (b ) an d o pi ni on ev id en ce u nd er Fe de ral Ru le of Ev id en ce 7 01 . While som e of this evidence wa s adm itted over Sm ith’s obj ection at trial, other ev ide nc e is b ei ng c ha lle nge d f or the f ir st t im e on a

ppe al and i s th er ef

or e subj ec t t o p l a i n e rr o r

r e v i e w . Ou r

an a l ys i s i s o r g an i z e da c c o r d i n g l y. 1. O bje ctions Raised at Tr ial Sm ith ob j ected to the following evidence as either irr elevant, see Fed. R. E vid . 401 , 402 , or

ove rl y pr ej udi ci al , se e Fe d. R. E vid . 403 : ( 1) pho tog ra phs of Sm ithnake d by

him se lf ; ( 2) pho tog ra

phs of S m ithw ithoth er

w om en( not

the vic tim) en ga ge d inse xua lly e xpl ic it co nduc t; an d ( 3) pho tog ra phs of w om en( not th e v i ct i m ) s tri k i n g s ex u al l y s u g g es t i v e p o s i t i o n s . We r ev i ew th e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s ev ide nti ar

y r uli ngs fo r cl ea

r ab use of dis cr et ion . Unit ed

S ta te s v. T ino co , 304 F . 3d 1088 , 1119 (11th Cir. 2002). “ An abuse of discretion arises when the district co urt’ s de ci sio n r es ts u

pon a cl earl y

e rr one ous fi ndi ng o f fa ct , an e rr an t c onc lus ion of law , or an im pr ope r ap pli catio n of

lawto fa ct . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. Bake r, 432 F. 3d 1 189, 120 2 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) . “ T he dis tr ic t c ourt po sse sse s br oa d di sc re tio n to ad m itev id en ce i f itha s an y ten de nc y to pro ve or d is pr ov e a fac t i n i ss ue .36

Conversely , w e ar e m indful th at the court’ s discretion to exclu de evidence under Ru le 40 3 i s n arro wly ci rcu m sc rib ed . ‘ Ru le 40 3 i s an ex tra or di na ry rem ed y [,] w hic h sh oul d be use d on ly spari ngl y sin ce it pe rm its the tr ia l c ourt t o e xc lud e co nc ed ed ly

pr obativ e ev ide nc e. ’ T he ba lanc e unde r the Ru le , the re fo re , sho uld be str uc k inf av or of a dm iss ibi lity . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. N orton , 867 F . 2d 1 354, 136 1 (1 1thCi r. 198 9) ( ci ta tio ns o m itt ed ) (quot ing U nit ed S ta te s v. Be tanc ourt, 734 F . 2d 750, 757 ( 11th C ir . 198 4) ). A cc or din gly , w e “ loo k a t the e vid en ce in a lig ht m ost favor ab le to its a dm iss ion , m ax im iz ing it s pr obativ e va lue and m ini m iz ing it s undu e prej udicial im

pact.” U nited States v. E lkins , 885 F. 2d 77 5, 784 (11th Cir. 1989 ). W e cannot hold th at the district erre d in conclud ing th at the challenged ev ide nc e w as r el ev an t. T he pic tur es of S m ithw er e the one s th e vic tim sin gle d ou t as photo graphs of the pho tographer. G iven that Sm ith’s def ense wa s that another pe rs on t ook the pic tur es , the se pho tog ra phs w er e ce rt ai nly

r el ev an t i n e sta

bli shi ng the pho tog ra

phe r’ s id en tity . T he pic tur es of S m ithe nga ge d inse xua l a ct s w ith other wom en in a room

identical to the one in which the victim wa s phot ographed w er e al so r el ev an t i n e sta bli shi ng S m ith ’ s r ole in pr oduc ing the pho tog ra phs of the victim – the fact that he had appear ed in pictures of a sexual nature in what appeared to be the sam e location could m ake it m ore probable that he fre quented18 U. S.C. § 2 25 1( a ) p ro hib its pr od uc tio n o f v isu a l de pic tio ns of “ se xua lly e xplic it 17 conduct” involving minors, and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a )(5) (B ) prohibits the knowingpossession of “ c hil d p or no g ra phy ,” wh ic h 1 8 U .S. C. § 22 56 (8 ) d e fi ne s, in p art , a s invo lvi ng“ se xua lly e xplic it conduct.” The c ourt instructed the jury , without objection, that sex ually expli cit conduct included “la scivious exhi bition,” which, the cour t expl ained, involved c onsideration of “ whether the settingof the de piction is such as to make it appe ar to be sexually inviting or sug g estive, for example in a location or in a pose associate d with sex ual ac tivity . . .[; ] and whether the depiction has bee n desig ned to elicit a se x ual re sponse in the viewe r.” Rec ord, vol. 12, no. 107 at 74. That the ph oto g ra

ph s o f t he vic timwe re fo un d w ithoth e r s e xua lly e xplic it p ho togra

ph s c ou ld m ake it more likely

that their purpose was to elicit a se x ual re sponse. 37 the locale for sim ilar purposes. A dditi onally , these pictures, as w ell as the pictures of other wom en in sim ilar poses in the sam e setting as thos e of the victim , w ere re le vant t o e sta

bli shi ng tha t the pic tur es of the vic tim

inc lud ed “ la sc ivi ous ex hi bi ti on [s ] of

ge ni ta ls or p ub ic areaof a ny pers on ,” 18 U.S.C. § 2 25 6( 2) (A) (defining “ sexually

explicit condu ct”), and that Sm ith “ knowingl y ,” as oppos ed 17 to in ad ve rte nt ly, po ss es se d t he pi ctur es of t he vi ct im as r equi redby 18 U.S.C. § 2252 A( a)(5) (B). Bec ause the district court could hav e found that these pictures had som e tendency

to m ake Sm ith’s def

ense less probable and the statut ory re qui re m en ts m or e pr oba ble , w e do n ot f

ind that c ourt a

buse d it s di sc re tio n in fi ndi ng the m

r el ev an t un de r Fe de ra l R ule of E vid en ce 401 . W e al so c annot

say that the dis tr ic t c ourt a

buse d it s di sc re tio n inf

ind ing that the pr obativ e va lue of the que sti one d e vid en ce w as not sub stanti al ly outw ei ghe d by

any pot en tia l f

or unf ai r pr ej udi ce , se e Fe d. R. E vid . 403 , pa rti cu la rly in l ig ht of t he pre su m pt io ns in fav orof a dm is si bi li ty stat edab ov e.38

Sm ithc ont en ds tha t the nake d pi ct ur es of him se lf , pic tur es of

oth er w om en , and pic tur es of

S m ithw ithoth er

w om enw er e lik el y

to inf lam e the j ur or s’ e m oti ons an d pr ev en te d ale ve l- he ad ed e va luatio n of

a ll the e vid en ce . T ha t i s ape rm iss ibl e co nc lus ionbut

not ane ce ssary

one . T he j ur

y m igh t a lso have be enable to ev al u at e t h e e v i d en ce fo r w h at i twa s – p h o t o g rap h s fr o m

wi th i n d ef

en d an t ’s loc kbox that t en de d to e sta bli sh i de nti ty , kno w le dge , and s ex ua l c ont en t. T ha t the na tur e of the c ri m e its el f, and the re fo re the na tur e of the e vid en ce te ndi ng t o pr ove it, is em oti ona lly

c harg ed doe s no t m ean th at

the pr ose cu tio n m

ust be de pr ive d of its m ost prob ative evidence. This is particularly true w hen the district court, as he re, o ffer s l im it in g i ns tru ct io ns as t o t he pro pe r pu rp os e o f ad m it te d e vi de nc e. T hus, w he n w e m ax im iz e the pr obativ e va lue dis cu sse d a bove and m ini m iz e any pr ej udi ci al im

pa ct , w e cannot

c onc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt c le ar ly abuse d it s discretion in adm itting the evidence. 2. P la in E rr or Sm ith alleges that the following evid ence should n ot have been adm itted de spi te his f

ai lur e to o bj ec t at tri al : ( 1) S m ith ’ s in m at e dis ch ar ge ide nti fi catio n card; (2) repeated refe rences to the fa ct that Sm ith was and is incarce rated; (3) an

“ unsanit iz ed ” (n on- re da ct ed ) re co rd ing and transc ri pt o f a phon e ca ll m ad e by Sm ith , w hil e inc ar ce rate d, to his m oth er ; ( 4) O ff ic er May o’ s te sti m ony

that theSmit h alleg es that the inmate discha rg e identification card, a s well as the r epeated 18 ref ere nces to his incar cer ation, including Smith’s unsanitiz ed phone c onversation from jail, were imp ro pe rl y

a dmi tte d a s “ oth e r c ri me s” e vid e nc e . “ Ev ide nc e of oth e r c ri me s, wr on g s, or

a c ts i s no t a dmi ssi ble to p ro ve the c ha ra c te r o f a

pe rs on in o rd e r t o s ho w a c tio n in c on fo rm ity there with.” Fe d. R. Evid. 404(b). We cannot sa y that this evidence was plainly admitted as propensity

evidenc e. The district court assure dly could have found the e vidence to be probative of identity

and/or mer ely

descr iptive. Smit h also claims that Off icer Mayo’s testimony

that the photog raphs he observe d in the lockbox were pornographic in nature a nd of “ve ry , very

youngg irls” was opinion evide nce offe red by

a non-e x pert. We ar e not satisfied that Of fice r Mayo’s opinion was plainly “scie ntific, technica l, or . . . specia liz ed,” F ed. R. Evid. 701, which would have require d him to be qualified a s an e xpe rt

purs ua nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of

Ev ide nc e 70 2, ra

the r t ha n th e op ini on

of a lay wi tne ss admissible pursuant to Fe dera l Rule of Evidence 701. Smit h, there fore , cannot e stablish error on this ground. Additionally , Smit h argues that the inca rce ration evide nce, O ffice r Mayo’s opinion testimony , as we ll as testimony reg ardingthe number of

photogr aphs and a

descr iption of the anatomica l components of a pa rticular photograph, e ven if other wise admissible, wer e substantially

more unfa irly

prejudicia l than probative in violation of F eder al Rule of Evidenc e 40 3. Al l of

thi s e vid e nc e c ou ld b e c on sid e re d p ro bativ e in e sta bli sh ingthe ide nti ty

of ind ivi du a ls in the photogr aphs, the owne rship and natur e of the photogr aphs and the context surrounding 39 pic tur es he f

ound w er e por nogr ap hic and o f y oung gir ls; ( 5) te sti m ony r eg ar din g the num be r of pho tog ra phs fo und in the loc kbox ; and ( 6) te sti m ony about a part ic ular phot ogr ap h de pic tin g tw o pe nis es . “ [W ] he n apart y r ai se s ac la im

of ev id en ti ary erro r fo r th e fi rs t t im e o n app eal , we rev ie w itforpl ai n e rro r on ly.” Baker, 432 F.3d at 1202. For ea se of re ading and clarity of discussio n, w e re peat that st an dard

he re : i f the re is er

ro r that i s pl ai n, and tha t a ff ec ts s ubst an tia l r igh ts, w e m ay e xe rc ise our

dis cr et ionto re co gni ze suc h an e rr or , so l ong as it se ri ousl y af fe ct s th e f ai rn es s , i n t eg ri ty, orp ub l i c r ep u t at i o n o f ju d i ci al p ro ce ed i n g s . We have no tro ubl e co nc lud ing that S m ithc annot sa tis fy thi s di ff ic ult bur de n and the re fo re li m it our se lve s to abr ie f dis cu ssi on o f Sm ith ’ s c la im s inthe m ar gin . 18other proba tive evidenc e. We ca

nnot say that any of the e vidence , even if

prejudicia l, was pla inl y un fa ir ly pr e jud ic ia l le t a lon e pla inl y

so un fa ir ly

pr e jud ic ia l a s to su

bs tanti a lly

outw e ig h it s probative va lue. “You may

consider this evide nce . . . only for the limited purpose of deter mining 19 whether the identity

of the de fenda

nt as the per

petrator of the c rime cha

rg ed has be en established.” Re cord, vol.12, no. 107, at 70 - 71. 40 E. Other Claim s Not Raised at T rial Sm ith raises several m ore issues not p reser ved at trial. T hese too are rev ie wedforpl ai n e rro r.

1. L ac k of A de quate L im iti ng I nstru ct ion Sm itharg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t pr ovi de an a de quate li m iti ng ins tr uc tio n w ithr eg ar ds t o th e ev ide nc e he c ha lle nge s inpart I II . C, sup ra . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d pr ovi de ali m iti ng i nstru ct ionw ithr es pe ct to the pho tog ra

phs of pe rs ons oth er

than th e vic tim . A s to the r em ai nde r of the e vid en ce , be ca

use 19 Fe de ra l R ule of E vid en ce 105 , w hic h pr ovi de s f or li m iti ng i nstru ct ion s in ap pr opr ia te c ir cum stanc es , onl y ope rate s “uponr eque st, ” se e Fe d. R. E vid . 105 ,

“ [t ] he f ai lur e to g ive ali m iti ng i nstru ct ionis er ro r onl y w he n su chan in str

uc tio n is req ue st ed .” Uni te d S ta te s v . Mir an da , 19 7 F .3d13 57 , 13 60 (11 th Cir . 19 99 ). Thus, w e find no plain error.

2. Jur y I nstru ct ionRe gard ing “ Pr oduc ing ” Sm itharg ue s th at

the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed

by not pr ovi din g aj ur

y ins tr uc tio nA def inition of “produce ” published conte mporane ously to the passag e of the 20 Protection of Children Ag ainst Sex ual Expl oitation Act of 1977, Pub. L . No. 95-225, § 2(a ), 92 Stat. 7 (1998), provides in re levant par t: “1. To bringforth; yield. 2. To cre ate by mental or phy sical ef

fort. 3. To manuf

actur e. 4. To c ause or

occur to exi st; give r ise to. 5. To bringforwa rd; exhibi t. 6. To sponsor and pre sent to the public . . . .” The Americ an He ritag e Dictionar y of the Eng lish L anguag e (N ew Colleg e ed. 1976) . 41 de fi nin g “pr oduc ing ” as use d in18 U . S. C. § 22 51( a) . “ Pr oduc ing ” is s ta tut or ily de fi ne d, som ewha t c ir cu larl y , a s “pr oduc ing , dir ec tin g, m anuf ac tur ing , iss uin g, publ ishin g, or a dvertising .” 18 U. S. C. § 225 6(3). “ It is we ll settled that a court ne ed not de fi ne te rm s th at

are not und uly te ch nic al or

a m big uous or

that are w ith in the c om m on unde rs tandi ng o f the j ur y . ” U nit ed

S ta te s v. P ep e, 747 F . 2d 6 32, 674 n.78 (11th Cir. 1984). W e do not believe that “ producin g” is so un dulytechnical or a m big uous a s pl ai nly

to re qui re aspe ci fi c ins tr uc tio n. S m ithc ont en ds, how ev er , that be ca

use “pr oduc ing ” ne ce ssari ly r equir es an in div idu al to be in the bu si ne ss of m ak in g c hi ldpo rn og rap hy, a defi ni ti on was p la in ly in o rd er. Now here in the statutory

definition o r the com

m on un derstanding of the w ord

“pr oduc ing ” do w e dis ce rnar equir em en t of am one tary

pr of it m oti ve . T hus, 20 ev enif “pr oduc ing , ” as use d inthe statut e, did r equir e the a cc use d to be in the por nogr ap hy bus ine ss –

apr opos iti on a

bout w hic h w e ar e qui te ske pti ca l – it is n ot obvi ousl y so. A cc or din gly , the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t pl ai nly e rr by not de fi nin gSmit h also claims that the district cour t committed plain error

by not instructing the 21 jury that “knowing ly ” applies to e ach of the statutory

elements of both 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and § 2252A(a )(5) (B ). We note at the outset that, with re spect to § 2252A(a)(5) (B ), the jury was proper ly instructed that the Gove rnment had to prove that the def endant kne w he wa s possessing c hil d p or no g ra phy . B e c a

us e , a s d isc us se d, su

pr a pa rt I I I .A .2 ,w e do no t f

ind tha t th e re wa s p la in err or committed in not requiringknowledg e of the interstate ne x us, we c annot say the district court c ommitt ed plain er

ror in not instructingthe jury as such. Similarly , as indicate d above, supra note 13, e ven if we wer e to find plain er ror in the district cour

t’s failure to instruct the jury that proof of

knowledg e of a g e is requir ed for § 2251(a) , it would be harmless e rror in light of the jury ’s finding , based on pr oper instruc tion and adequate evidenc e, that Smith knew the ag e of the victim for purposes of

§ 2252A(a )(5) (B ). Acc ordingto the statute eff ective at the time, the enhanc ement incr ease d the sentenc ing 22 rang e fr om ten-to-twenty

y ear s to fifteen- to-thirty

y ear s. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(d) (West, Westlaw throug h Apr. 2003 amendments). 42 “p r o du c i n g ” f

o r th e ju ry. 21 3 . L a c ko f

N o t i c e R e g ar d i n g M an d a t o ry S e n t e n c i n g M i n i ma Sm ith addit ionallyargues that, pr ior to sentencing , he wa s not gi ven form al not ic e of e ith er ( 1) the e nhanc ed

se nte nc ing r an ge ari sin g f ro m apr ior c onvi ct ion

“ re la tin g to the se xua l e xpl oit at ionof c hil dr en , ” 18 U . S. C. A . § 22 51( d) ( W es t, W estlaw through Apr. 2003 am endm ents); or (2) the r equirem ent that he register 22 as ase x of

fe nde r as ac ondi tio n of

his sup er vis ed r el ea se , and r eque sts re se nte nc ing . A t arr ai gnm en t onthe ini tia l i ndi ctm en t, the c ourt a dvi se d S m ith that the § 22 51( a) c harg e carr ie d ate n- y ea r m ini m um and tw en ty -y ear m ax im

um se nte nc e. A t arr ai gnm en t onthe sup er se din g and s ec ond supe rs ed ing ind ic tm en ts, Sm ithw ai ve d f

or m al r ea din gs o f the ind ic tm en ts. A t no poi nt p ri or to re ce ivi ng the pr es en te nc e re port w as he a dvi se d th at he m igh t f

ac e anythi ng m or e than ate n-43

to- tw en ty -y ear se nte nc e. T his , a cc or din g to S m ith , w as avio la tio n of his co nst itu tio na l r igh t t o du e pr oc es s. Sm ith cites no cases, and w e ar e aw are of none, that m andate a f orm al reading of the Feder al Sentencing Guidelines. T he statute und er which he was ch ar ge d, 18 U . S. C. § 22 51, spe ci fi ca lly de lin eate s th e se nte nc ing r an ge f or violatio ns of its prov ision s, both with and without prior offenses relating to sexual exploit ation of children. Moreover, 18 U. S. C. § 358 3(d) m andates registration as a co nd it io n o f su pe rv is edrel eas e fo r an y pe rs on de sc rib edin 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (c)( 4), a

category of persons that includ es indivi duals conv icted of offe nses cate gor iz ed

a s “ Se xua l E xpl oit at ionand O the r Abuse of Ch ildre n” ( inc lud ing both 18 U.S.C. § 2 25 1 & 22 52 A). 18 U.S.C. § 4 04 1( c)(4 ), 18 U.S.C. ch. 1 10 ; USSG § 5D1 .3(7 ). The s ta tu to ry

sch em e th eref

or e m an da te d S m it h’s s en te nc e, an d we cannot say that the c ourt pl ai nly

e rr ed by not pr ovi din g a ddi tio na l no tic e of the m ini m um se nte nc ing pr ovi sio ns. IV. Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , the j udgm en t of the dis tr ic t c ourt i s AFFIR MED.Ialso rec og nize that the discussion that follows does not neatly fit into circumstance s 1 wh e re it o nly

be c ome s p la in t

hat e vid e nc e is e xclu da

ble a ft e r t ri a l but pr ior

to a pp e a l. 44 T JO FL A T , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , spe ci al ly

c onc ur ri ng: I obvi ousl y

c onc ur in the c ourt’ s j udgm en t i n it s e nti re ty . I w ri te se parate ly to e xpl ai n w hy

I be lie ve appe llate c ourts s o r ar el y – and, in m

y vie w , sho uld

onl y rare ly – no tic e pla in e vid en tiary e rr or s. I arr ive a t this c onc lus ionba se d onthe int er ac tio n be tw ee n th e pla in e rr or standard and the inf

er en ce s th at

sho uld be dr awn f ro m de fe nse c ouns el ’ s f

ai lur e to o bj ec t at tri al . I not e, ini tia lly , the li m ite d sc ope of m y dis cu ssi on. I dis cu ss o nly the ad m is si on of e vi de nc e b y th e p ro se cu ti on , ov er n o o bjec ti on , in cri m in al cas es . T he re is no n ee d to a ddr es s e xc lus ionof e vid en ce of

fe re d by the de fe ndant ( as the atte m pte d in tr oduc tio n of

the e vid en ce w oul d su ff

ic ie ntl y r ai se the iss ue f

or f ull re vie won a

ppe al ) or e vid en tiary

r uli ngs in f

av or of the de fe ndant ( as the pr ose cu tio n c annot

appe al ). I a m

onl y c onc er ne d w ithc ri m ina l c as es a s I be lie ve that i t i s on ly

the de fe ndant’ s S ixth A m en dm en t r igh t t o c ouns el that pr ovi de s any basis for plain error r eview. A s such, every thing I say

here a pplies with even greater force in the civil context wher e there is no cons titutio nal right to an a t t o rn e y. 1 T o be gin , I r ec ite w ha t sh oul d no wbe af am ili ar standard : U nde r pla in e rr or45

re vie w , an a

ppe llate c ourt m ay

e xe rc ise it s di sc re tio n to not ic e ane rr or that i s pla in and tha t a ff

ec ts s ubst an tia l r igh ts, so l ong as the e rr or a ff ec ts the f ai rn es s, int eg ri ty , or

pub lic r ep utatio n of

j udi ci al pr oc ee din gs. I t sh oul d be im m ed ia te ly apparent that the standard itself sets an extraordinarily difficult burden for a defendant to overcom e – particularly in instances where the district court has s ub s t an t i a l d i s c r e t i o nt o a d mi te v i d e n c e ( f o r e x a mp l e , w h e r e th e d e f

e n d an tc l a i ms that the pr obativ e va lue of apie ce of

e vid en ce is subs tanti al ly outw ei ghe d by

it s pot en tia l f

or unf ai r pr ej udi ce , se e Fe d. R. E vid . 403 ). E vid en tiary r uli ngs, of which counsel and the trial j udge sho uld have been awar e, are often quite casean d f ac t- spe ci fi c an d it

is the re fo re unl ike ly

that a de fe ndant w oul d be able to poin t to a court decision or evidenti ary rule m aking th e adm issio n of the evidence obvi ousl y e rr one ous. D es pit e thi s di ff ic ulty , the re c er

ta inl y are c ir cum stanc es in w hic h an a

ppe llate c ourt c oul d say

that, giv ene xtant c as e lawa t the ti m e of appeal, a piece of e vidence adm itted at trial w as clear ly excludable (e. g., hearsay th atis no t o th erwi se ad m is si bl e u nd er Fe de ral Ru le s o f Evi de nc e 8 03 or 8 04 ). I do n ot b el ie ve , how ev er , that e ve n su chc ir cum stanc es are pr ope rl y r ec ogni za

ble as plain error. What is often overlook ed in the rote application of the plain err or standard is that, w ithou t objec tion, it is alm ost im poss ible to conclud e that the district courtT h e d ec i s i o nn o tt o o b j ec tt o ev i d en ce o ff

er edfo r a dm i s s i o ni s anas p ec to f t ri al s tra t egy 2 that c ouns e l ma

y make on be ha lf of the de fe nd ant. Se e He nr y v. State of

Mis sis sip pi, 37 9 U .S. 443, 451-52, 85 S. Ct. 564, 569, 13 L . Ed. 2d 408 (1965); 3 Way ne R. L a F ave e t al, Criminal Procedur e § 11.6 (2d e d. 2006) (“ Gene ral a g ree ment exis ts that the decisions as to guilty plea, jur y tr ia l, a pp e a l, d e fe nd ant’ s p re se nc e at tr ia l, a nd the de fe nd ant t e sti fy

ingare fo r t

he de fe nd ant, and that de c isi on s o n a

su bs tanti a lly

larg e r gro up of

matte rs , s uc h a s o bje c tin gto i na dmi ssi ble evidenc e, ar e for

counsel.” (footnote omitted)). A ccor dingly , the def endant is bound by

the strateg ic evidentiar

y decisions made by

counsel, so longas ef

fec tive assistance is provided. We have be en willing to r ecognize that the possibil ity for strateg ic non-objec tion 3 rende rs nea

rly impossibl e a f

inding of plain err or in the conte x t of a fa ilure to reque st a limit ing instruction. “L awyers f

reque ntly choose f or strate g ic re asons not to reque st lim iting instructions. In order to find plain err or in this context , there fore , a cour t must conclude that, as a matter of 46 co m m itt ed e rr or a t a ll. I t i s on e thi ng t o say that e vid en ce , if

obj ec te d to , sho uld have be ene xc lud ed ; i t i s qu ite anothe r to s ay that a dm iss ionof

e vid en ce ove r no obj ec tio n is e rr or

in som e ab str ac t se nse . T he e rr or in the f orm er c ir cum stanc e is the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f

ai lur e to s ust ai n th e de fe ndant’ s ob j ec tio n; i n th e la tte r, the er ro r is e vid en tly

the im pr ope r inf

ri nge m en t up on a

de fe ndant’ s un w ai vable r igh t to b e tr ie d on ly

by a dm iss ibl e ev ide nc e. T he pr obl em w iththe se co nd f

orm ulatio n is tha t de fe nse c ouns el c anw ai ve e vid en tiary r es tr ic tio ns, and o ft enha s le git im at e str at eg ic r ea sons f

or doi ng s o. D ef

en se c ouns el m ay

be lie ve , f

or e xam ple , that a pie ce of e vid en ce w ill tur

n ou t t o be e xc ulp at or

y r athe r than in cu lpator

y , or co unse l m ay

w an t t o ti e a w itn es s to c er ta in s ta te m en ts. R ev ie w ing a dm iss ionof 2 ev i d en ce fo r p l ai nerro r, h o we v er , c an s erv e t o tra n s fo rm de fe n s e c o u n s el ’s strategic decisions int o district court errors. T rial counsel’ s soun d strategy does not be co m e pla in e rr or

a t a ppe llate c ouns el ’ s ur gin g. 3law, counse l’s strateg ic choice resulted in a ma nifest miscarr iag e of justice.” Sherman v. B urke Contracting , Inc., 891 F .2d 1527, 1534 (11th Cir. 1990), superse ded in non-re levant par t by statute as stated in Andr ews v. L akeshor e Reha bilitation Hosp., 140 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir.1998); see a lso United States v. Miranda, 197 F .3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 1999) (“ The fa ilure to g ive a limit ing instruc tion is error only when suc h an instruction is reque sted.”); United States v. Peaden, 727 F .2d 1493, 1501 (11th Cir. 1984) (“ In deter mining whe ther the state ment require s reve rsal bec ause no limiting instruction wa s in fact g iven, we must first dec ide at whose door we la y th e f a il ur e to g iv e th e in s tr

u c ti o n . I f th e c o urt c o mm itte d

p la in e r r o r in f a il in gto r e c o g n iz e the nee d for the limiting instruction sua sponte, w e must reve rse. How ever , if Peade n was re qu ir e d to re qu e st the ins tr uc tio n, his fa ilure to d o s o c a us e d it s a bs e nc e . Si nc e fo r s tr ate g ic re a so ns c ouns e l ma

y have c ho se n n ot t o r e qu e st a n in str uc tio n, we wo uld

be re luc tant t o deter mine as a matter of law

that counsel’s strateg ic choice g ave r ise to a due pr ocess violation.” (citations omitted)); United States v. B arne s, 586 F.2d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1978) ( “Counsel may ref rain fr om reque sting a

n instruction in order not to emphasize potentially damag ing evidenc e and f

or other strateg ic re asons. We decline to se cond guess counse l’s decision.” (citations omitted)) (I

n Bonne r v. Prichar d, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 ( 11th Cir.1981) (en ba nc), w e a do pte d a s b ind ingpr e c e de nt t he de c isi on s o f t

he fo rm e r F if

th C ir c uit ha nd e d d own p ri or

to October 1, 1981.). I

rec og nize that plain error revie w is more pate ntly

incompatible with the evidentiar y rule in this context, as the rule only operates “upon re quest.” F ed. R. Evid. 105; see Sherman, 891 F .2d at 1534. I believe, how ever , the observations reg ardingstrateg ic nonob je c tio n c arr

y ov e r i nto oth e r e vid e nti ary c onte xts a s w e ll. 47 Ac onc lus ionthat the a dm iss ionof c er ta in e vid en ce c onst itu te s pl ai n e rr or is a determ ination that the evidence wa s so ob viou sly inadm issib le and prej udicial that, despite defense counsel’ s failure to obje ct, the district court, sua sponte, shou ld have excluded the evid ence. T hus, the existence of plain error review fo rc es the dis tr ic t c ourt, in ane ff ort t o avoi d th e re ve rs al of c onvi ct ionand a re tr ia l, to int er

ve ne and e xc lud e the e vid en ce on i ts o w n in iti at ive . I n de te rm ini ng w he the r to d o so , the dis tr ic t c ourt m ust e ith er ign or e the pos sib ili ty

that de fe nse co unse l i s c hoos ing not

to obj ec t f

or str at eg ic r ea sons ( an d th er ef or e int er ve ne in ev er y ins tanc e) or

m ust w ei gh tha t po ssi bil ity

a ga ins t the pot en tia l t im e an d c ost ofIsuppose a tria l court could a lso keep a runninglog of

all inadmissible evidence and at 4 the end of trial deter

mine which piec es, in isolation or in tandem, are likely substantially

to affe ct the de fe nd ant’ s r ig hts and str ike tho se pie c e s w ithe no ugh s ur g ic a l pr e c isi on to f or e c los e appellate reve rsal. I

believe, mor e re alistically , a trial c ourt would simply alway s intervene . I t w ou ld a lso no t be su ff

ic ie nt f or the dis tr ic t c ourt

to c a ll atte nti on

to t he e xclu da

bil ity 5 of the e vidence and for ce de fense counsel to wa ive exclusion. S uch a r equire ment may inappropriately

forc e def ense c ounsel to expose his defense strateg y to the Gover

nment. Nor would it be appropr iate to re quire the c ourt to hold a sidebar confe renc e, out of the pr esenc e of the prosec utor, to inform defe nse counse l that the court be lieves an of fer ed piec e of e vidence un du ly pr e jud ic e s th e de fe nd ant a

nd inq uir e of c ouns e l ho w the a dmi ssi on of the e vid e nc e fi ts i n t o a c o mp e t e n td e f

e n s e s tr at e g y. 48 a re tr ia l ( as sum ing one is ev enpos sib le und er the c ir cum stanc es ). T o th e ex te nt the dis tr ic t c ourt e ve n a tte m pts the latte r an al y sis , how ev er , it doe s so a t a

spe ci fi c m om en t duri ng the c our se of the tr ia l w ith out

the be ne fi t of

the e nti re r ec or d ( in part ic ular, w ha t othe r ev ide nc e the pr ose cu tio n is pr ep ar ed to of fe r, and wha t us e the pr ose cu tio n or

de fe nse int en ds t o m ak e of the e vid en ce ). B ec au se it is ex tr ao rd inari ly

dif fi cu lt, if not im poss ibl e, to de te ri m ine , m id- tr ia l, w he the r the ad m i s s i o n o f ace rt ai n p i ec e o f e x cl u d ab l e e v i d en ce p re ju d i ce s a d ef

en d an t ’s subs tantial rights, the poss ibilityof a r etrial cr eates an incentive for the district co urt a lw ay s to int er

ve ne . T his r es ult

e sse nti al ly

de pr ive s de fe nse c ouns el of the 4 ability to determ ine strategically a client’ s m ost effec tive defense – a consequence I w oul d pr ef

er to av oid . C f. E ste lle v. W ill iam s, 425 U . S. 501 , 512 , 96 S . Ct .

5 1691 , 1697, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1976) (“ Under our a dversary sy stem , once a de fe ndant h as the a ssi stanc e of c ouns el the va st arr ay

of tr ia l de ci sio ns, str at eg ic49

and tactical, which m

ust be m ade before and during trial re sts with the accused an d hi s a tto rn ey . A ny

oth er appr oa chw oul d r ewri te the dut ie s of tr ia l j udge s and counsel in o ur legal sy stem .” ). I shouldbe quick to add th at I hold no illu sions of infallibilitywith re spect to the legal profession. In som e case s, def ense counsel m ay

actually fail to notice that inadm issib le evidence is being adm itted. In others, however, counsel m ay m ak e a str at eg ic de ci sio n no t t o ob j ec t t o th e adm iss ionof

e vid en ce . T he r ole of anappe llate c ourt un de r pla in e rr or r ev ie w , the re fo re , is to s ort ou t the e rr or f ro m the strategy , to the extent strategy is consid ered at all. This is a role f or which ap pe llate c ourts are part ic ularl y il l- sui te d. I be lie ve our

ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of co unse l c as e lawis ins tr

uc tiv e in this r eg ar d. Ineff ective assistance claim s invariably invol ve a deter

m ination of w hether ana tto rn ey

w as a ct ing str at eg ic al ly

or inc om pe te ntl y . W e have appr opr ia te ly concluded th at such determ ination s ough t not to be m ade on direct appeal. See U nit ed S ta te s v. G ri ff

in, 699 F . 2d 1 102, 110 7 ( 11th C ir . 198 3) ( “ T he lawof thi s Circuit is that claim s of inadequate representation cannot be determ ined on d irect appeal wher e such claim s wer e not raised before the District Court and there has be enno o ppor

tun ity to de ve lop and i nc lud e in the r ec or d e vid en ce be ar ing on the m er its of the a lle ga tio ns. ”) ; i d. a t 11 07- 09. W ith out f ac tua l de ve lop m en t, it

is50

n ea rl y i m p o s s i b l e f o r a n ap p el l at e c o u rtt o d et erm i n e w h et h ero r n o tco u n s el ’s de ci si on s wer e st rat eg ic or t o a ss es s t he ov eral l q ua li ty of co un se l’s re pr es en ta ti on . Se e, e . g. , U nit ed

S ta te s v. P ri nc e, 456 F . 2d 1 070, 107 0- 71 ( 5thCi r. 197 2) (“ [D ef en dant] c annot

pr ope rl y r ai se the iss ue of

the a de qua cy

of c ouns el f or the fi rs t t im e on d ir ec t a

ppe al . T he r ec or d no wbe fo re us d oe s no t pr es en t su ff ic ie nt fa ct s f or apr ope r re sol uti on and d et er m inatio n of

that i ssu e. T he que sti on w as not ra ise d inthe dis tr ic t c ourt and n o f ac ts b eari ng u

pon the sub

j ec t w er e pr es en te d to the trial court. The governm ent has not hadan opportu nity to present evidence o p p o s i n g th e c l a i ms o f

[ d e f e n d an t ] t h a th i s a t t o rn e y wa s i n e f f e c t i v e . ” ) . S i mi l ar l y, in the c ont ex t of

pla in e rr or

r ev ie wof

“ im pr ope rl y ” adm itt ed

e vid en ce , it

is ex tre m el y d i ff

i cu l t , a l th o u g h n o ti m

p o s s i b l e, t o d et erm i n e w h et h erco u n s el ’s failure to obj ect to the adm issio n of excludable evidence wa s error or strategy . Cf. Flores v. Estelle, 513 F.2d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 1975 ) (G oldb erg, Circuit Judge, dissent ing) (“Nor is this even a ca se in which w e m ight reasonablyj udge that counsel sil ently

disregarded the point as a tactical gam bit in a com

plex trial: there w as onl y one que sti on at i ssu e an d th at iss ue w as be ing pr ove d by the S ta te en tir el y thr oughhe ar say . I n su chac ont ex t, and whe re the obj ec tiv e ev en ts re co rd ed in the tr an sc ri pt l en d sp ec ulatio n no sup port, I a m unw ill ing to attr ibu te im ag inary

w ai ve r str at eg ie s in to the c onsc iou sne ss o f co unse l whic h any r ea lis tic51

co nc ep ti on of t he cir cu m st an ces of t he he ari ng fai rly ass ur es were n ot th ere.” (f ootnot e om itt ed )) . G ive n th e fa ct ua l de pe nde nc y

of thi s de te rm inatio n, I do n ot b e l i e v e ap p e l l a t e c o u rt s s h o u l df i n dp l a i ne v i d e n t i ary e rr o r – s a v e f o r th e e x tr e me case where there could be no reasonable strategic reason for declining to ob j ect at the tim e the evidence is adm itted. T here is a f orum better suited for this purpos e – nam el y ac oll at er al a tta ck

pr oc ee din g onac la im

of ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of co unse l. Mor eo ve r, w er e w e to r ev ie wc la im s of e vid en tiary

e rr or w ith out f ac tor ing in the str at eg ic r ea sons not to obj ec t ( i. e. , by

sim ply appl y ing the pla in e rr or doc tr ine and a ssum ing that a ll ex cl ude d e vid en ce a dm itt ed w ithno o bj ec tio n is er ro r) , w e w oul d, in fa ct , be pr ovi din g de fe nse c ouns el w ithastr at eg ic r ea son not to object. D espite our stated concern about ensu ring that plain error reviewdoes not , in ef fe ct , se rv e as atr ia l strate gy , se e, e . g. , U nit ed S ta te s v. Br ow n, 548 F . 2d 1194 , 1207 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting th at the plain error standard is strict “ in order to . . . pr ev en t part ie s f

ro m gam bli ng f or f av or ab le ve rd ic ts and the n r es ortin g to ap pe al on e rr or s th at

m igh t have e as ily

be enc or re ct ed by obj ec tio n a t tri al ” (quotin g United States v. Jacquillon , 469 F. 2d 38 0, 386 (5th Cir. 1972)) (inter nal qu ot at io n m ark s o m it te d) ), pl ai n e rro r rev ie w in th is co nt ex t d oe s p reci se ly tha t. De fense counsel m ay

choose not to object to the adm issio n of certa in evidence –Indeed, by reve rsingthe conviction under plain err or re view as oppose d to a findingof 6 ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, we misallocate re sponsibili ty for the e rror

to the court a s opposed to counsel, whe re it appr opriately belong s. Any

diligenc e ince ntive inspired by fea r of be ingla be le d “ ine ff

e c tiv e ” is the re by

e lim inate d. F or

mor e on the int e rc onne c tio n b e tw e e n p la in err or and ine ffe ctive assistanc e, see infra. 52 pe rh ap s be lie vin g it

m ay tur n ou t t o be e xc ulp at or

y – w iththe und er standi ng tha t, if w ro ng, the de fe ndant w ill have an op portun ity to ch al le nge the a dm iss ionof the ev ide nc e on a

ppe al . Whe re w e fi nd e vid en ce of thi s strate gy

in the r ec or d, w e do not f ind pla in e rr or . U nit ed

S ta te s v. S ist o, 534 F . 2d 6 16, 624 n. 9 ( 5thCi r. 197 6) (“ If the r ec or d in dic at es that c ouns el f or the c om pla ini ng p ar

ty de lib er at el y av oid ed m ak ing the pr ope r obj ec tio n or r eque st, pla in e rr or

w ill a lm ost

ne ve r be fo und. T his c our

t w ill not tol er at e ‘ sandba ggi ng’ de fe nse c ouns el ly ing in w ai t t o spring p ost-trial err or.” ). A s previousl y m entioned, however, appellate courts are poor ly sit ua te d to dis ce rnli tig at ionstr at eg y , and unle ss d ef en se c ouns el f

ee ls the ne ed to dis cl ose his str at eg y

on the r ec or d, pla in e rr or r ev ie wpr ovi de s astr at eg ic he dge a ga ins t po te nti al ly r isky li tig at ionde ci sio ns, and e nc our ag es de fe nse co unse l no t t o ob

j ec t t o in adm iss ibl e ev ide nc e – a t l ea st at the m ar gin s. 6 Pr es en te d, the n, w iththe c hoi ce be tw ee n ( 1) pr es um ing le git im at e str at eg y an d f ind ing e rr or

in the e xtr em e ca se and ( 2) pr es um ing e rr or and r ar el y

f ind ing im pr ope r str at eg y , I c hoos e the f orm er . I arr ive a t this c onc lus ionby bor ro w ing furthe r fr om

our ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e ca se law . A s is of t st at ed , w e ge ne ra lly53

pr es um e that l awy er s pe rf orm c om pe te ntl y . S ee , e . g. , U nit ed S ta te s v. Cr oni c, 466 U . S . 6 4 8 , 6 5 8 , 1 0 4 S . C t . 2 0 3 9 , 2 0 4 6 , 8 0 L . E d . 2 d6 5 7 ( 1 9 8 4 ) ( “[ W] e p r e s u me that the law y er

is co m pe te nt t o pr ovi de the gui din g hand tha t the de fe ndant ne ed s. ”) ; B el l v. Co ne , 535 U . S. 685 , 718 , 122 S . Ct . 184 3, 186 3, 152 L . E d. 2d 914 (200 2) (Ste vens, J., dissenti ng) (“ [A ] presum ption that every

law y er . . . has perform ed ethically , diligently , and com petently is appropriate because such pe rfo rm an ce g en eral ly chara ct eri zes th e m em be rs of a n h on or ab le pro fes si on .”). W e have r ec en tly

not ed :

“ [C ] ouns el w ill not

be de em ed

unc onst itu tio na lly

de fi ci en t be ca

use of t ac t i ca l d ec i s i o n s .” Th er e i s a s tro n g p re s u m p t i o n th at co u n s el ’s pe rf orm an ce w as r ea sona

ble and a de quate , w ithgr eat de fe re nc e be ing shown to c hoi ce s di ct at ed by r ea sona ble str at eg y . “ T he pr es um pti on o f re as ona ble ne ss i s e ve n stro nge r w he n w e ar e re vie w ing the pe rf orm an ce of an experienced tria l counsel.” T o overcom e this presum ption , the petitioner “ m ust establis h that no com

petent couns el w ouldhave taken the action that hi s co un se l d idtak e.” Mi ch ae l v. Cr osby , 430 F . 3d 1 310, 132 0 ( 11th C ir . 200 5) ( ci ta tio ns and p ar ag ra ph break om itted) (quotin g McNe al v. W ainwright, 722 F. 2d 67 4, 676 (11th Cir. 1984 ) (c itations om itted); Callahan v. C am pbell, 427 F.3d 897, 933 (11th Cir. 2005 ); Chandler v. United State s, 218 F. 3d 13 05, 1315 (11t h Cir. 2000 ) (e n banc) (f ootnot e an d c itatio n om itt ed )) . I be lie ve thi s pr es um pti on i s j ust

a s r el ev an t i n the plain error context as in the ineffec tive assistance context. A s such, so long as“To prove ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, [defenda nt must] establish ‘both that 7 counsel’s pe rfor

mance was de ficient a

nd that the def

icient per formanc e pre

judiced the de fense .’” Rolli ngv. Crosby , 438 F.3d 1296, 1300 ( 11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ma hara j v. Sec’y for De p’t of Cor r. , 4 32 F .3 d 1 29 2, 13 18 (1 1th Cir .2 00 5) . In c on c lud ingthat th e fi rs t thre e pr on g s o f p la in err or ar e satisfied, w e dete rmine that counse l made an obvious e rror that aff ecte d defe ndant’s substantial rig hts. To the extent the doctrines of inef fec tive assistance and plain er ror a re not p e r f e c t l y c o t e r

m i n o u s , th e y c e rt a i n l y o v e r l a p s i g n i f i c an t l y. 54 w e ar e una

ble to take j udi ci al not ic e that no c om pe te nt atto rn ey

w oul d f ai l t o o b je ct t o th e a d m i s s i o n o f c er t ai n ev i d en ce , I wo u l dn o ts ay th at th e d i s tri ct co u rt ’s failure sua sponte to intervene and exclude the evidence is error. N ot o nly do I be lie ve that our ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e ca se lawis ins tr uc tiv e as to how we shoul d treat cla im s of plain evidenti ary err ors, but I also believe that there is a c onnection betwee n the two issues that is rarely , if ever, discussed. In or de r to s at isf

y the f ir st thr ee pr ongs of

the pla in e rr or

standard , w e w oul d have to find: error, that shou ld have been obvi ous to counsel, and that seriouslyprej udiced the de fe ndant’ s su

bst an tia l r igh ts. I n othe r w or ds, c ouns el w as inc om pe te nt f or not havi ng ob

j ected. In fa ct, counsel m ay have been incom

petent as m any

as 7 thr ee ti m es ( onc e at

the ti m e of

the e vid en ce w as a dm itt ed , onc e m or e w he n he fa ile d to m ove to str ike the e vid en ce , and y et a ga in d ur ing c los ing arg um en t shou ld the G ove rn m en t c om m en t onthe e vid en ce ) or pe rh ap s on ly

onc e but a s late as clo si ng arg um en t wh en th e p rev io us ly late nt pre jud ic e b ecame clear . Yet, if we then choos e not to exercise our discretion to not ice the er ror, or if w e could not sayInote that, eve n if it were possible for us to conc lude that there was plain e rror that 8 a ff e c te d d e fe nd ant’ s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts , it

wo uld sti ll b e ne arl y

imp os sib le to f

ind tha t th e pla in err or standar d was satisfied. It would be ver y difficult to conclude that the fa irness, integrity , or public reputation of the judicial proce eding s had bee n undermined where defe nse counse l, whom we pr esume to be c ompetent, dec lined not once, but per haps three times, to object to the a dmi ssi on

of the e vid e nc e . A g a in, to t he e xtent w e be lie ve thi s f a ilure to o bje c t sp e aks to counsel’s c ompetence , collater al re view provide s a more a ppropriate forum to re solve that issue. 55 that the error affe cted the fair ness, integrity , or publ ic reputation of judicial proceedings, plain error w ouldnot be found . T hus, we would not order a retr ial 8 on di rect ap pe al , bu t, wi th ou t t he be ne fit of b rie fin g o r fac tu al de ve lo pm en t, we w oul d e sse nti al ly

be pr ovi din g ave ry

f irm gr ound ing f

or asub se que nt i ne ff

ec tiv e as sis tanc e de te rm inatio n onc oll at er al a tta ck . W ha t m ak es thi s part ic ularl y tr oubl ing f

or m e is tha t i n an in ef

fe ct ive a ssi stanc e cl ai m , “ the de fe ndant m ust ove rc om e the pr es um

pti on tha t, und er

the c ir cum stanc es , the c ha lle nge d a ct ion ‘m ig ht be co ns id eredso un d t ria l s tra te gy.’ ” Mah araj v . Sec’y forDept . of C orr., 432 F.3d 129 2, 1318 (11th Cir. 2005 ) (quoting Strickland v. W ashingt on, 466 U. S. 668, 689 , 104 S . Ct . 205 2, 206 5, 80 L . E d. 2d 6 74 ( 1984 ) (quot ing Mi ch el v. Louisiana, 350 U. S. 91, 101, 76 S. Ct. 158, 164, 100 L. Ed. 83 (1955 )) ( internal quot ation m arks om itted)). Y et, because w e w ouldnot find pl ain error if w e w ere to b el ie ve that de fe nse c ouns el str at eg ic al ly c hose not

to obj ec t, af

ind ing of pla in er ro r that a ff

ec ts d ef en dant’ s su

bst an tia l r igh ts –

ade te rm inatio n li ke ly

m ad e w ith no c onsi de ratio n of

str at eg y and c er ta inl y m ad e w ithno s ta te d pr es um pti on i n56

favor of str at eg y – at l ea st i m

pli es that de fe nse c ouns el ’ s f ai lur e to o bj ec t w as not str at eg ic . C onse que ntl y , in suc h c ir cum stanc es , the re is a str ong ar gum en t t o be m ad e that w e unw itt ing ly shi ft ed the pr es um

pti on o n c oll at er al a tta ck f ro m strategy to incom petence. T he j ustification for this result is not apparent to m e. Fo r the f or eg oin g r ea sons , I w oul d no t e nga ge in pla in e rr or r ev ie wof

the adm iss ionof

e xc lud ab le e vid en ce unl es s I w er e ce rt ai n th at the re c oul d be no reasonable strategic r eason for not objecting at the tim e the evidence w as adm itt ed .