alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* District Judg e of the Eastern District of Missouri,

sitting by designtation.

** Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________ No. 00-31316 Civil Docket #99-CV-549-D

_______________________ MARK D. COMPTON, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus
TORCH, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

_________________________________________________________________ November 12, 2001
Before JONES and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges and LIMBAUGH * , District Judge:

PER CURIAM: **

The court has carefully considered this appeal in light
of the oral argument, briefs and pertinent portions of the record. Having done so, we find no reversible error of fact or law. The plaintiff waived his objection to the jury charge, and the charge2

in any event was not erroneous. There was sufficient evidence in
the record to enable the jury to allocate fault between the parties
in the ratio that it chose. Finally, the district court did not abuse his discretion in allowing Torch’s witness to testify under
the relevant Federal Rules of Evidence.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2842 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2842

         To rescind all stimulus funds that remain unobligated.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 11, 2009

 Mr. Tiahrt (for himself, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Jones, Mr. Lamborn, and Mr. 
 Rohrabacher) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Appropriations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
         To rescind all stimulus funds that remain unobligated.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. RESCISSION OF UNOBLIGATED STIMULUS FUNDS.

    Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act, there are 
rescinded all unobligated balances of the discretionary appropriations 
made available by division A of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5).
                                 <all>
```
EXHIBIT 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF
                         THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K/A (the "Report")
of AMCON Distributing Company (the "Company") for the fiscal year ended
September 30, 2006, I, Andrew C. Plummer, Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to my
knowledge, that:

(1)   the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.

Date: January 29, 2007

                                  /s/ Andrew C. Plummer
                                  --------------------------
                                  Andrew C. Plummer,
                                  Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to AMCON Distributing Company and will be retained by AMCON
Distributing Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-1472

DAVID A. ROBERTS, Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus JOHN NICHOLAS, individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of Maine Department of Health and Human Services; PETER WALSH, individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner of Maine Department of Health and Human Services; KEVIN W. CONCANNON, individually and in his official capacity as Commissioner (former) of Maine Department of Health and Human Services; MARK O. VAN VALKENBURGH, individually and in his official capacity as agent for the Maine Department of Health and Human Services; INGRID B. LAPOINTE, individually and in her official capacity as agent for the MaineDepartment of Health and Human Services; ANNEMARIE JOHNSON, individually and in her official capacity as agent for the Maine Department of Health and Human Services; LORETTA DUMOND, individually and in her official capacity as agent for the Maine Department of Health and Human Services; MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge. (1:04-cv-02039-WDQ) Submitted: December 7, 2007 Decided: January 9, 2008- 2 - Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. David A. Roberts, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph B. Spillman, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Christopher Coles Taub, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Augusta, Maine, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 3 - PER CURIAM: David A. Roberts appeals the district court’s order granting Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Roberts v. Nicholas , No. 1:04-cv-02039-WDQ (D. Md. Jan. 26, 2007). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED
#### Terence Terell BRYAN, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; FNU Bird, Lieutenant; Captain Price; Officer Outlaw; Transportation Sergeant; Grey House, Officer; Officer Phillips; First Name Unknown, Lieutenant, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 08-6205.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 18, 2008.

Decided: May 1, 2008.

Terence Terell Bryan, Appellant Pro Se. Charles Franklin Turner, Jr., Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Terence Terell Bryan seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint. Appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” *Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr.,*434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting *United States v. Robinson,*361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (I960)).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on September 13, 2007, 2007 WL 2710738. The notice of appeal was filed on January 28, 2008. Because Bryan failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we grant the motion to dismiss the appeal. The motion for appointment of counsel is denied. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
STATE OF NEW MEXICO , 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3
v. NO. 31,166 4 TAMARA LOIS MAYFIELD , 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY 7 Teddy L. Hartley, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Tamara Lois Mayfield 12 Clovis, NM 13 Pro Se Appellant 14 MEMORANDUM OPINION 15 VANZI, Judge. 162 Summary affirmance was proposed for the reasons stated in the notice of 1 proposed summary disposition. No memorandum opposing summary affirmance has 2 been filed and the time for doing so has expired. 3 AFFIRMED . 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5

_______________________________ 6 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 7
WE CONCUR: 8

_________________________________ 9 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 10

_________________________________ 11 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 12
(December 24, 1997)

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Daniel Roy, Appellant.

[667 NYS2d 75]

—Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Schenectady County (Scarano, Jr., J.), rendered February 14, 1995, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of manslaughter in the second degree.

Defendant pleaded guilty to the crime of manslaughter in the second degree and, after he was denied adjudication as a youthful offender, was sentenced in accordance with a negotiated plea agreement to a prison term of 5 to 15 years. Contrary to defendant’s contention on appeal, we do not find that County Court improvidently exercised its discretion by denying him youthful offender status in view of the court’s consideration of the negative recommendation of the Probation Department and the serious nature of the crime to which defendant pleaded guilty (i.e., while under the influence of cocaine, defendant recklessly caused the death of an infant by throwing him up into the air) *(see, People v Bonilla,*237 AD2d 672; *People v Ortega,*114 AD2d 912, *lv denied*67 NY2d 887; *see also,*CPL 720.20 [1]). Moreover, inasmuch as defendant received the benefit of his plea bargain, we find that the sentence imposed was neither harsh nor excessive *(see, People v Shabazz,*242 AD2d 764).

Cardona, P. J., Mikoll, Mercure, Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
#### Stephanie Perez, Respondent, v City of New York et al., Appellants.

[986 NYS2d 850]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Landicino, J.), dated May 6, 2013, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

The plaintiff, a then-17-year-old member of her high school varsity softball team, was injured during a game when she slid into home plate and her left foot “got stuck” in mud. The plaintiff testified, both at a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h and when deposed, that it had rained heavily the day before the game and that she had seen the “mud area” prior to the accident.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury when she voluntarily participated in the game knowing the condition of the field. The Supreme Court denied the motion.

Pursuant to the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, a voluntary participant in a sporting event “consents to those commonly appreciated risks which are inherent in and arise out of the nature of the sport generally and flow from such participation” (M*organ v State of New York,*90 NY2d 471, 484 [1997]). “This includes those risks associated with the construction of the playing surface and any open and obvious condition on it” *(Welch v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y.,*272 AD2d 469, 469 [2000]).

The defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury by voluntarily participating in the game fully aware of the condition of the field *(see Wilck v Country Pointe at Dix Hills Homeowners Assn., Inc.,*111 AD3d 822 [2013]; *O’Connor v Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch. Dist.,*103 AD3d 862 [2013]; *Stadelmaier v Town of Tonawanda,*2 AD3d 1369 [2003]; *Swan v Town of Grand Is.,*234 AD2d 934 [1996]; *Totino v Nassau County Council of Boy Scouts of Am.,*213 AD2d 710 [1995]; *Giovinazzo v Mohawk Val. Community Coll.,*207 AD2d 980 [1994]; *Strauss v Town of Oyster Bay,*201 *687AD2d 553 [1994]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Mattas v Town of Hempstead,*106 AD3d 884 [2013]; *O’Connor v Hewlett-Woodmere Union Free Sch. Dist.,*103 AD3d 862 [2013]; *Godwin v Russi,*62 AD3d 945 [2009]).

The plaintiffs remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Skelos, J.E, Balkin, Hall and Maltese, JJ., concur.
### MANDATE



## Court of Appeals

**First District of Texas**

NO. 01

- 14

- 00462

- CR

EX PARTE PHO RI MA

Appeal from the 339th District Court of Harris County (Tr. Ct. No. 1271246

- A )

TO THE 339 TH DISTRICT COURT OF HARRIS COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before this Court, on the 25 th day of September

, 201 4 , the cause upon appeal to

revise or to reverse your judgment was determined. This Court made its order in these

words:

The cause heard today by the Court is an appeal from the judgment signed by the court below on June 4, 2014 . After inspecting the record of the court below, it is the opinion of this Court that there is no reversible error in the judgment. It is therefore CONSIDER ED, ADJUDGED, and

ORDERED that the judgment of the court below be affirmed

.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below for observance.

Judgment rendered September 25 , 201 4

.

Per curiam opinion delivered by panel consisting of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle

.WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court

in this behalf and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

January 30, 2015

Date CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE

CLERK OF THE COURT
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3136 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3136

 To extend the program to provide grants for specified energy property 
                        in lieu of tax credits.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              July 8, 2009

 Mr. Walz (for himself, Mr. Peterson, Mr. Oberstar, Mr. McIntyre, Mr. 
Perriello, Mr. Boswell, Ms. McCollum, and Mr. Rodriguez) introduced the 
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means, 
 and in addition to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, for a period 
    to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for 
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the 
                          committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To extend the program to provide grants for specified energy property 
                        in lieu of tax credits.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF PROGRAM TO PROVIDE GRANTS FOR SPECIFIED ENERGY 
              PROPERTY IN LIEU OF TAX CREDITS.

    (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1603 of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 is amended--
            (1) by striking ``2009 or 2010'' both places it appears and 
        by inserting ``2009, 2010, 2011, or 2012'', and
            (2) by striking ``after 2010'' in paragraph (2) and 
        inserting ``after 2012''.
    (b) Deadline for Submission of Grant Application.--Subsection (j) 
of section 1603 of such Act is amended by striking ``2011'' and 
inserting ``2013''.
                                 <all>
```
**DM** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 19 - 0413 CITY OF MISSOULA ,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. AARON DEAN STARR ,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 6 0 - day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is granted an extension of time to and including November 23 , 2020 , within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 15 2020

09/15/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0413
#### In the Matter of Alex Shoga, Petitioner, v Brian Fischer, as Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision, Respondent.

[987 NYS2d 713]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

During a mental health interview, petitioner made comments *1233to a female social worker regarding her personal appearance and marital status. He continued to do so even after she directed him to stop, which prompted her to end the interview. The following day, petitioner allegedly again attempted to engage the social worker in a personal conversation. As a result, he was charged in a misbehavior report with refusing a direct order, harassment and stalking. Following a tier III disciplinary hearing, he was found guilty of the former two charges, but not of the latter. The determination was affirmed on administrative appeal and this CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

We confirm. The misbehavior report and related documentation, together with the testimony of the social worker and a correction officer to whom she reported the incident, provide substantial evidence supporting the determination of guilt *(see Matter of Rodriguez v Fischer,*115 AD3d 1104, 1105 [2014]; *Matter of Oliver v Fischer,*107 AD3d 1268, 1268-1269 [2013]). We find no merit to petitioner’s contention that he was improperly denied certain witnesses, as there is nothing to indicate that the individuals in question personally witnessed the exchanges that provided the basis for the determination of guilt *(see Matter of Tafari v Fischer,*94 AD3d 1324, 1325 [2012], *lv denied*19 NY3d 807 [2012]; *Matter of Ramsey v Fischer,*93 AD3d 1000, 1002 [2012], *lv denied*19 NY3d 955 [2012]). Notably, the testimony of one of the medical professionals requested was relevant only to the stalking charge that was ultimately dismissed. Furthermore, upon thoroughly reviewing the record, we find nothing to suggest that the Hearing Officer was biased or that the determination flowed from any alleged bias *(see Matter of Quezada v Fischer,*113 AD3d 1004, 1004 [2014]; *Matter of Guillory v Fischer,*111 AD3d 1005, 1005-1006 [2013]). We have considered petitioner’s remaining arguments and find that they are either unpreserved for our review or lacking in merit.

Peters, PJ., McCarthy, Egan Jr., Devine and Clark, JJ., concur.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Polymer Group, Inc. (the "Company") for the fiscal year
ended January 2, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Dennis E. Norman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



Date: March 22, 2010

/s/ DENNIS E. NORMAN Dennis E. Norman Chief Financial Officer


A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---



QuickLinks
<PAGE>
EXHIBIT 99.01


                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of CyberGuard Corporation (the "Company")
on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Scott
Hammack, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


/s/ Scott Hammack

Scott Hammack
Chief Executive Officer
September 27, 2002
Exhibit 10.1 Amendment No.2 to the Scholastic Corp 2011 Stock Incentive Plan






Amendment Number 2
to the
Scholastic Corporation
2011 Stock Incentive Plan


Section 4.1 of the Scholastic Corporation 2011 Stock Incentive Plan (the “Plan”) is amended by substituting: “4,575,000” for “2,100,000” where it appears therein; and 
Subject to the foregoing, the Plan remains in full force and effect in accordance with the terms thereof.
The foregoing amendment was duly approved by resolution of the Human Resources and Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of Scholastic Corporation at its meeting held on July 22, 2014.