alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.2

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In
connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of Indiantown
Cogeneration, L.P. for the year ended December 31, 2002, I, Thomas E. Legro,
Vice President, Controller and Principal Accounting Officer of Indiantown
Cogeneration, L.P., hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted
pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my
knowledge and belief, that:

1. such Annual  Report on  Form 10-K  for the year ended  December 31, 2002,
       fully  complies  with the  requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
       Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2. the  information  contained in such Annual  Report on  Form 10-K  for the
       tear ended December 31, 2002, fairly presents,  in all material respects,
       the   financial   condition  and  results  of  operations  of  Indiantown
       Cogeneration, L.P.

`March 31, 2003                                   s/ THOMAS E. LEGRO
                                                 ------------------
                                                 Thomas E. Legro
                                                 Vice President, Controller and
                                                   Principal Accounting Officer
                                                 Indiantown Cogeneration, L.P.`
<PAGE>
   
                                                                    Exhibit 11.1

               WILSONS THE LEATHER EXPERTS INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
                           NET LOSS PER COMMON SHARE
                    (IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE AMOUNTS)

                                                QUARTER             QUARTER
                                                 ENDED               ENDED
                                             AUGUST 1, 1998      AUGUST 2, 1997
                                             --------------      --------------


Net Loss                                           $(11,878)           $(12,581)
                                             ==============      ==============

Weighted average common shares outstanding           10,240               8,928

Effect of options granted (1)                            --                  --
Effect of warrant (1)                                    --                  --
                                             --------------      --------------

Weighted average common shares outstanding--
assuming dilution                                    10,240               8,928
                                             ==============      ==============

Basic net loss per common share                    $  (1.16)           $  (1.41)
                                             ==============      ==============

Diluted net loss per common share (1)              $  (1.16)           $  (1.41)
                                             ==============      ==============




                                               SIX MONTHS          SIX MONTHS
                                                 ENDED               ENDED
                                             AUGUST 1, 1998      AUGUST 2, 1997
                                             --------------      --------------

Net Loss                                           $(16,415)           $(19,844)
                                             ==============      ==============

Weighted average common shares outstanding            9,886               8,289

Effect of options granted (1)                            --                  --
Effect of warrant (1)                                    --                  --
                                             --------------      --------------


Weighted average common shares outstanding--
assuming dilution                                     9,886               8,289
                                             ==============      ==============

Basic net loss per common share                    $  (1.66)           $  (2.39)
                                             ==============      ==============

Diluted net loss per common share (1)              $  (1.66)           $  (2.39)
                                             ==============      ==============


Note 1:  Under Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 128 "Earnings per 
         Share," common stock equivalents are excluded when computing diluted
         net income or loss per common share if the effect is anti-dilutive.
Exhibit
32.1








CERTIFICATION
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and in connection with the filing by Intermost
Corporation, a Wyoming Corporation (the “Company”) with the Securities and
Exchange Commission of its Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three months
ended September 30, 2008 (the “Report”), the undersigned, Rocky Wulianghai,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, does hereby certify, that
to the best of his knowledge:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
      and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





This
certification is being provided pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 and is not to be
deemed a part of this Report, nor is it to be deemed to be “filed” for any
purpose whatsoever.





Date:  November
13, 2008








By:
            /s/
      Rocky WulianghaiRocky
      Wulianghai,President
      and Chief Executive Officer





A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-2487 

CHARLES ALSTON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

VIRGINIA JUDICIARY SYSTEM,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District

Judge. (CA-03-410-A)

Submitted: February 19, 2004 Decided: February 24, 2004

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles Alston, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Charles Alston appeals the district court’s order denying

relief on his civil complaint. We have reviewed the record and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons

stated by the district court. See Alston v. Virginia Judiciary

Sys., No. CA-03-410-A (E.D. Va. filed Oct. 16, 2003 & entered

Oct. 20, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Juan Ramos, Appellant.

[667 NYS2d 269]

—Appeal by the defen*315dant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Silverman, J.), rendered May 10,1996, convicting him of attempted burglary in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. This appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, to hear and report on the question of whether the defendant was present during the trial court’s questioning of two prospective jurors, and the appeal is held in abeyance in the interim. The Supreme Court, Kings County, shall file its report with all convenient speed.

The defendant contends that he was denied his right to be present during an on-the-record sidebar questioning of two jurors. It is undisputed that the defendant did not effectively waive that right, and the record reflects that the sidebar conversations concerned the “juror[s’] bias, hostility or predisposition to believe or discredit the testimony of potential witnesses” *(People v Antommarchi,*80 NY2d 247, 250). One of the jurors was seated on the jury while the other was peremptorily challenged by defense counsel.

As *Antommarchi*considerations were fully implicated in both conferences, the defendant should have been present. Since his presence or absence during the conferences cannot be ascertained from the record, a reconstruction hearing is necessary *(see, People v Davis,*216 AD2d 314, 315). Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Santucci and Lemer, JJ., concur.
#### Heinz Von Ancken et al., Appellants, v City of New York et al., Respondents. (And a Third-Party Action.)

[666 NYS2d 16]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Price, J.), dated July 10, 1996, which granted the motion of the defendants City of New York and New York City Fire Department to dismiss the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff Heinz Von Ancken, a police officer, was injured by an explosion while assisting at the scene of several manhole fires. The Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint on the ground that a claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e could not be predicated on an alleged violation of the New York City Fire Department’s All Units Circular No. 180 (Revised), since that directive neither imposes clear legal duties nor constitutes part of a well-developed body of law and regulation with positive commands that mandate the performance or nonperformance of specific acts *(see, Desmond v City of New York,*88 NY2d 455, 464; *Luongo v City of New York,*240 AD2d 712; *Lawrence v City of New York,*240 AD2d 711; *Stea v City of New York,*240 AD2d 725). Copertino, J. P., Sullivan, Pizzuto and Lerner, JJ., concur.
#### Joseph Brightley, Respondent, v Brian Fedele et al., Appellants.

[666 NYS2d 473]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Belen, J.), dated March 13, 1996, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

There are issues of fact requiring the denial of summary judgment. O’Brien, J. P., Joy, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Willie Dyla, Appellant.

[861 NYS2d 98]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate a decision and order of this Court dated December 30, 1988 *(see People v Dyla,*142 AD2d 423 [1988]), affirming a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered May 16, 1984, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. By decision and order of this Court dated April 10, 2007, the appellant was granted leave to serve and file a brief on the issue of an alleged deprivation of his rights pursuant to *Batson v Kentucky*(476 US 79 [1986]).

Ordered that the application is denied.

The defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree (three counts) and burglary in the first degree in 1984. The instant application is based on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failure to argue that there was a *Batson*
      *733violation in the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes to challenge black potential jurors *(see Batson v Kentucky,*476 US 79 [1986]; *People v Childress,*81 NY2d 263 [1993]).

In applying for a writ of error coram nobis, the key issue is whether the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of the particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of appellate counsel’s representation of appellant, reveal that appellate counsel provided “meaningful representation” to the defendant *(see People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]; *People v Larkins,*10 AD3d 694 [2004], quoting *People v Baldi,*54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]). The record in this case was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under *Batson (see People v Childress,*81 NY2d 263, 267-268 [1993]). Accordingly, appellate counsel’s decision to forgo briefing that issue and instead to brief others cannot be said to have deprived the defendant of meaningful representation. Upon review of the record and the issues raised on direct appeal, we are satisfied that appellate counsel provided the defendant with meaningful representation in this case *(see People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]; *People v Larkins,*10 AD3d 694 [2004]). Accordingly, we deny the application. Rivera, J.P, Ritter, Miller and Dillon, JJ., concur.
##### 



Exhibit 32.2

Written Statement of Chief Financial
Officer

Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


The undersigned, the Chief Financial Officer of
LCC International, Inc. (the Company), hereby
certifies that, to his knowledge on the date hereof:



| |     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (a) | the Form 10-Q of the Company for the
    quarterly period ended June 30, 2003, filed on the date
    hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
    Report) fully complies with the requirements of
    Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
    1934; and
|
| | (b) | information contained in the Report fairly
    presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
    results of operations of the Company.                                                                                                                                     

A signed original of this written statement
required by Section 906 has been provided to LCC
International, Inc. and will be retained by LCC International,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or
its staff upon request.



| |                                       
| | --------------------------------------
| | /s/ GRAHAM B. PERKINS                 
| |                                       
| | Graham B. Perkins                     
| | Senior Vice President, Chief Financial
| | Officer and Treasurer                 
| | August 12, 2003                       

29
Exhibit 31.2CERTIFICATIONSI, Reggie Cook, certify that:1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Aduddell Industries, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) forthe registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b) Reserved;  c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation;  d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal controls over financial reporting.Date: April 2, 2007   /s/ Reggie Cook   Signature  Title: Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 31.1
**CERTIFICATION**
I, Peter P. Brubaker, certify that:
 1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for thequarter ended June 30, 2004 of Susquehanna Media Co.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material factnecessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respectto the period covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and otherfinancial information included in this report, fairly present in allmaterial respects the financial condition, results of operations andcash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presentedin this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I areresponsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures,or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to bedesigned under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;  b. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in thisreport our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  c. Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter(the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and
 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I havedisclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal controlover financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):
 a. All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarizeand report financial information; and  b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant role inthe registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: August 13, 2004    /s/ Peter P. Brubaker  Peter P. Brubaker President and CEO
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Kevin JACKSON, aka Treppants, Ryan King, Vivian Montaque, Anthony Phillips, aka Curtis, Desmond Shaw, Karl Wilson, aka Barry, Tamard Cleary, aka Tommy, Sheldon Fuller, aka Andre Blake, aka David Campbell, Mark Brown, aka Blackbud, aka Blacks, aka Kirk Watson, Conrad Cooper, aka Dervin, Robert Deleon, aka Bobby Socks, aka Robert Miller, Enrico Thomas, aka Meng Feng, aka Rico, Stephen Mattis, Maxine Davis, Kevon Holt, Lewis Carrides, aka Dibble, Tedane Muir, aka Sampson, Grandville Newell, aka Sherlock, aka Donald Thomas, Matthew Martin, aka Blacks, Defendants, Bobby Weston, aka Badness, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-736-cr.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 5, 2011.

Flora Edwards, New York, NY, for Appellant.

Steve C. Lee (Andrew L. Fish, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.

PRESENT: WALKER, GUIDO CALABRESI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Bobby Weston appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Castel, *J.),*which denied his third motion for a new trial. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

We review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Stewart,*433 F.3d 273, 295 (2d Cir.2006). This court disfavors motions for a new trial, *United States v. Gambino,*59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir.1995), and has directed district courts to grant new trials only in exceptional circumstances, *United States v. Sanchez,*969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir.1992). “The ultimate test is whether letting a guilty verdict stand would be a manifest injustice. There must be a real concern that an innocent person may have been convicted.” *United States v. Canova,*412 F.3d 331, 349 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

*89We have reviewed the district court’s order and conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Weston’s third motion for a new trial. The district court provided numerous reasons for denying Weston’s motion, all of which were well within the court’s discretion. We have considered all of Weston’s other arguments on appeal and find them without merit. Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Weston’s third motion for a new trial is AFFIRMED.