### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 14 , 200 2 S es sio n STATE OF TENNESS EE v . HARLEY B. UPCHURCH
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Over ton County

No. 4934 Lilli e Ann Sells, Ju dge

No. M2001- 03170-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Septem ber 9, 2002

Def endant pled guilty

to burg lary , theft under $500, and vanda lism under $500 and wa s sentence d by the trial cour

t to an eff ective se ntence of four y ear s with the require ment that he ser ve one year
" da y for day " i n th e c ounty ja il f oll ow e d b y

tw e lve y e ars of

su pe rv ise d p ro batio n. On

a pp e a l, de fe nd ant c on te nd s ( 1) the le ng th o f h is s e nte nc e is e xce ssi ve ; ( 2) he sh ou ld h ave be e n g ra nte d f ull probation; and (3) the trial cour t erre d in requiringhim to serve his time of conf inement " day

for day ." We r emand f

or deletion of t he "day for day " r equire ment beca use it deprives the defe ndant of the opportuni ty to ear

n statutory sentenc ing cre dits; howeve r, we aff irm the j udg ments of the trial court in all other r espec ts. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed as Modif ied; Rem anded
J OE G. R I L EY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.
Da vid N. B ra dy , D istri c t Pu

bli c De fe nd e r; and J ohn B . N isb e t, I I I , A ssi sta nt D ist ri c t Pu bli c Def ender , for the a

ppellant, Har ley

B. U pchurc h.
Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; El iza

be th T . Ryan, As sis tant Attor ne y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam Edward G ibson, District Attorney Gene ral; a n d Ow en G. B urnett, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION Def endant pled guilty

to burg lary , theft under

$500, and vanda lism under $500 with the se nte nc e to b e de te rm ine d b y the tr ia l c ourt

. F or

burg lary , th e tr ia l c ourt

se nte nc e d th e de fe nd ant t o four year s to serve one y ear in c onfinement followed by twelve year s supervised pr obation. For the misdemeanor of

fense s of t heft under $500 and vanda lism under $500, the trial cour t sentence d the-2-

defe ndant to eleve n months and twenty -nine da y s for e ach of

fense to run co n cu rr ently with eac h other a nd also conc urre ntly

with the burg lary

sentenc e. Te sti mony

at the sen tenci nghe ari ngind ic a te d th a t on De c e mbe r 7 , 2 00 0, the de fe nd ant, while " drunk," broke through a door a nd burg larized a store in Monr oe, Tenne ssee. He was a rre sted by office rs inside the store; va rious items had bee n scatter ed about in the store

. The ninete en-year -old defe ndant had a tenth g rade education but had secur ed his GED. He ha d a sp ars e wo rk

his tor y , h a d mi sd e me ano r c onvic tio ns a s an a du lt, a nd ha d nume ro us juv e nil e adjudications. Testimony

at the sente ncinghear ing f urther r evea led the victim told the defe ndant to stay awa y from the store afte r this burg lary

. Ne v er theless, the victim had to instruct the def endant on three separ ate oc casions to leave the prope rty

. The trial c ourt applied e nhance ment fact o rs (1 ), prior history of cr iminal convictions or criminal beha

vior, and (8) , previous history of unwillingne ss to comply with conditions of a sentenc e involving re lease

. SeeTenn. Code Ann . § 40-35-114( 1), (8) . The trial c ourt applied mitigating fac tor (1), c onduct d i d n o t cause or threaten serious bodily injury , and g ave this mitigating f actor littl e we ight. SeeTe nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -1 13 (1 ). Th e trial cou rt fo un d n o o the r a

pp lic a ble mitigatingfac tors. The trial court further found the defendant wa s untruthful in his testi mony and exhibi ted a " lai

sse z fa ire " attitude concer

ning hi s s en t en cing. The tria l court fur ther noted the defe ndant' s ext ensive c riminal history and that no p ri o r p u n i shments had bee n eff ective to de ter defe ndant' s criminal ac tiviti es. Althoug h the trial cour t denied total probation, the trial court orde red that the def

endant e ffe ctively

serve one y ear

in confine ment followed by twelve year s of probation.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW
In defe ndant' s first two issues, he contends the trial court err ed by imposing the maximum leng th of sentenc es and f

urther e rre d by

denying total pr obation. We respec tfully disag ree
. Th is c ourt ’s re vie w of the se nte nc e imp os e d by the tr ia l c ourt is de novo with a pre sumption of cor rec tness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . This presumption is conditioned upon an a ff ir mativ e sh ow ingin t

he re c or d th at th e tr ia l ju dg e c on side re d th e se nte nc ingpr inc ipl e s and a ll rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s. State v. Pettus, 986 S .W.2d 540, 543 (Tenn. 1 9 9 9 ). I f the trial court fai ls to c o mp ly

w it hth e s tatuto r

y d ir e c ti v e s , th e r e is n o p r e s u mp ti o no f c o r r e c tn e s s an d

o ur re vie w i s de novo . State v. Poole, 945 S.W .2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1997)

. The burde n is upon the appea ling party to show that the sentenc e is improper. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d) Sentencing Commi ssion Comments. I f no mitigatingor enha nceme nt fac tors for se ntencingare prese nt, Tennessee C o d e Annotate d section 40-35- 210(c) provides that the pr e sumpt ive se nte nc e fo r t he fe lony of fe ns e sh a ll b e the min imum se nte nc e with in t he a pp lic a bleT he pres ent enc e r eport r ef l ect s t he def

endan t "p l ed gu i l t y t o v i ol at i on of t he i mp l i ed cons ent l aw, " was pl ace d 1

o n pro b at i o n f

o r el even m o nt hs and tw e n ty-nine d a ys, and had hi s l i cense revoked

. T hi s was not co nt est ed at t he se n te n c ing he a rin g . O rd ina rily, a v io la tio n o f t h e i m p lied c o n se n t l a w is no t a c rim ina l o ff e n se , an d the sa n c tio n is re v o c a tio n o f th e d riv e r' s lice n se
. See T en n. C o d e A nn
. § 5 5

- 1 0

- 4 0 6 (a)(3 ). O nly und er li m i t ed circum st an ce s d o es a m isd e m e a n o r c o n v ic tio n re su lt. See i d

. R egard l ess of whether t hi s vi o l at i o n s ho ul d be co nsi d ered unde r enhancem ent fac to r (1 ) a s a c rim ina l co n v ic tio n o r c rim ina l b e h a v io r, it w o u ld no t affe c t o u r se n te n c ing d e te rm ina tio n s. -3- rang e. State v. L avende r, 967 S.W .2d 803, 806 (Tenn. 1998); State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 9 9 1 ). Ho we v er, if suc h fac tors do exis t, a trial cour t should enhance the minimum sentenc e within the ra ng e for enhanc ement fac tors and then reduc e the se ntence within the rang e for the mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210(e ); State v. Arne tt, 49 S.W .3d 250, 257 (Tenn. 2001) . No par ticular we ight f

or ea ch fa ctor is pre scribed by the statute, as the we ight g ive n to e a c h f

a c tor is le ft to the dis c re tio n of the tr ia l c ourt a s lo nga s th e tr ia l c ourt

c omp lie s w ith the purp os e s and

pr inc ipl e s o f t

he se nte nc inga c t and

its fi nd ing s are su

pp or te d by the re c or d. State v. Moss, 727 S.W .2d 229, 238 (Tenn. 1986) ; State v. Kelley , 34 S.W .3d 471, 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. 20 00 ); seeTenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-210 Sentenc ing Commission Com ments. A. Length of

Sentences The ra ng e of punishment for

burg lary , a Class D felony , for a standard offe nder is from two to four y ear s. SeeTe nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -1 12 (a )( 4) . T he tr ia l c ourt se t pu nis hme nt at f

our ye ars , the maxim um. The rang e of punishment for the two Class A misdemeanor offe nses is any

time not g reater than e leven months and twe nty -nine da y s. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-111( e)( 1). The trial court set punishment for

eac h misdemeanor of

fense at the maximum

. Def endant c ontes t s the trial cour t's a pplication of enha

nceme nt fac tor (1), pr ior history of criminal convic tions or criminal behavior. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1) . The de fenda nt had p r i o r j u v e n i l e a d

j u d i c at i o n s f

o r tr u an c y, un r

u l y b e h av i o r , d o m e s t i c a s s a u l t , d e l i n qu e n c y, misdemeanor the ft and e scape from conf inement on a mis d emeanor adjudication. The trial cour t err oneously relied upon the defe ndant' s prior juvenile a djudications in applying this fa ctor. SeeState v. Adams, 45 S.W.3d 46, 58 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (holding juvenile adjudications can now be used for e n h an c e me n t p ur p o s e s o n ly

un d e r f a c to r ( 2 0 ) an d n o t f a c to r ( 1 ) )

. T h e d e f

e n d an t' s p r ior juvenile adjudications would not have qualified a s felonies as an adult; there fore , they could not be considere d under either factor (1) or fac tor (20). The recor d also shows the def endant wa s convicted of under ag e posses s i o n o f al co hol when he w as over 18 y ear s of ag e but under 21 y ear s of ag e. Howeve r, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 57-3-412(a)(3)( C) (Supp. 2001) expressly provides that "[n]o viol ation of [this provision]

. . . may at any time be used ag ainst the violator in any criminal proce eding ." A ccor dingly , undera g e possession of alcohol could not be considered under fa ctor (1)

. Neve rtheless, the de fenda nt did have misdemea

nor convic ti o n s as an adult for c ontributing to the delinquency of a minor and violation of the implied consent law. Fur thermore , defe ndant admitted 1 to using mar ijuana two months prior t o sentenc ing and illeg ally using hydrocodone six months prior to se ntencing

. This c riminal behavior , though not r esulting in c onvictions, may also be c onsidered under enhanc ement fac tor (1). SeeS t at e v . C ar i c o , 9 6 8 S

. W

. 2 d 2 8 0 , 2 8 8 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 8 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, enhanc ement fa ctor (1) applies.W e n ot e t he pres ent enc e r eport r ef l ect s def endan t was on probat i on f or vi ol at i on of

t he i mp l i ed cons ent l aw 2

w h e n he un la w fully p o sse sse d a lc o h o l, fo r w h ic h he w a s su b se q u e n tly c o n v ic te d

. See su p ra not e 1 as t o po t ent i al i nval i d i t y of t he p rob at i o nary pe nal t y f o r vi o l at i o n of t he i m p l i ed co nsent l aw. H o wever, as we have st at ed , unde rage po s s es s i on of

al cohol by one ove r 18 b ut un der 21 y ear s of ag e i s not t o be us ed ag ai ns t t he vi ol at or i n a ny cr i mi nal p ro c e e d ing

. See T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 5 7 -3 -4 1 2 (a )( 3 )( C ) (S u p p . 2 0 0 1 ). -4- Th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr on e ou sly

a pp lie d e nh anc e me nt fa c tor (8 ), pr ior his tor y of unwi lli ng ne ss t o comply with condit i o n s o f re lease into the community , based upon its findingthat the cur rent offe nses wer e commi t t ed wh i l e the defenda nt was on probation and, further , based upon the de fe nd ant' s p ri or

juv e nil e a dju dic atio n o f e sc a pe fr om a juv e nil e de te nti on

c e nte r. F a c tor

(8 ) o nly applies to a previous history of unwillingne ss and does not a pply wher e the pr esent off enses we re committed while the def

endant wa s on probation. SeeState v. Hayes, 899 S.W .2d 175, 186 (Tenn. Cr im . App . 1 99 5) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . F ur the rm or e , w e c on c lud e the e sc a pe fr om j uv e nil e detention does not tr igg er the application of enhanc ement fa ctor (8) beca use juvenile de tention does not involve rele ase into t he community . Neve rtheless, we conclude that fac tor (8) is applica ble for rea sons not relied upon by th e t ri al cour

t. The de fenda

nt was plac ed upon juvenile pr obation on 2 No ve mbe r 5 , 1 99 7, pla c e d on h ou se arr e st, and wa s su bs e qu e ntl y

a dju dic a te d f

or do me sti c a ssa

ult committed while he was on house arrest. Violation of a c ondition of probation as a juve nile qualifies a s a p r e v i o u s h i s t o r

y o f un w i l l i n g n e s s t o c o mp l y w i t h c o n d i t i o n s o f r e l e a s e i n t o th e c o m mun i ty. State v. J ac k s o n , 6 0 S.W .3d 738, 743 (Tenn. 2001) (holding enhanc ement fa ctor (20) does not preve nt juvenile probation violations from beingconsidere d under en h an ceme nt fac tor (8))

. Acc ording ly , enhanc ement fa ctor (8) applies.
Th e tr ia l court a

pp lie d mitig atin g fa c tor (1 ), c on du c t did not c a us e no r t hr e a te n s e ri ou s b od ily injury , but ga

ve it littl e we ight. SeeTe nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -1 13 (1 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in g iving this mi tigating f

actor littl e we ight. See State v. Ti mot hy Al an H op pe r, No . 0 2C0 1- 97 09 -C C00371, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. L EXI S 293, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar . 29, 1999, at J ackson) , perm. to app. denie d

(Tenn. 1999) . L ikewise, we fi n d t h e t rial cour t properly reje cted mitigating fac tor (6), de fenda

nt la cked substantial judg ment beca use of his youth. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113(6) . A defendant' s y outh does not automatically require application of this fa ctor but, rather, w e mu s t c o n s i d e r " y o u th i n c o n t e xt " o f th e c i r c u m s t an c e s t e n d i n g t o d e m o n s tr a t e th e abil ity to ap p re ci at e t h e n ature o f t h e c o n d u ct

. S t at e v
. Ad am s , 8 6 4 S

. W

. 2 d 3 1 , 3 3 (T en n
. 1 9 9 3 ). De fe n d an t 's extensive involvement with the criminal and juvenile justice sy stems neg ates this mitigatingfac tor.
Finally , defe ndant contends the trial court err ed in w eig hing the enhanc ement and mitigating fac tors. Howeve r, the weig ht to be g iven enha nceme nt and mitigatingfac tors is left to the discretion of the trial c ourt. Kelley , 34 S.W .3d at 479.
Ba sed upon our de novo revie w, and in light of the application of enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors, we c onclude the f our-year sentenc e for

burg lary and the se ntence s of eleven m o n t h s andT h e per i od of pr obat i on ma y be f

or a pe r i od u p t o "t h e s t at u t or y ma x i mu m t i me f or t h e cl as s of

t h e con v i ct i on 3 of f ens e. " T enn
. Co de A nn
. § 4 0- 35

- 30 3(c)

. T he t ot al ran ge of p un i s hment f

or bur gl ar y , a Cl as s D f el ony , i s f

r om t wo to twe lve ye a rs
. See T enn
. Co de Ann. § 40

- 35

- 11 1(b) ( 4). T hu s , t he t wel ve y ear s of probat i on was wi t hi n t he al l owed
r ang e. Al t houg h w e q ue st i o n t he w i sd om of s uch a l eng t hy per i od of probat i on, we do not bel i eve t hat we hav e a n a p p ro p ria te b a sis to d istur b this se n te n c ing d e te rm ina tio n b y th e tr ia l c o u rt. See St at e v . Fl et ch er , 805 S. W

. 2d 785, 789 (T e n n . C ri m
. A p p
. 19 9 1 ) ( no t i ng t he ap p el l at e co urt m ay no t dis t urb t he sent ence i m p o sed b y t he t ri al co urt sim p ly b e c a u se " w e w o u ld ha v e p re fer re d a d iff e re n t re su lt" ). -5- twenty -nine da

y s for the misdemea

nors are appropriate. Fur ther, we will not dis turb the leng th of pr ob a tio n s e t by

the tr ia l c ourt

. 3
B. Denial of

Total P robation Def endant c ontends the trial cour t erre d in denying total pr obation. An especially mitigated or sta nd ard of fe nd e r c onvic te d o f a Cla ss C, D or E fe lony is pr e sume d to be a fa vo ra ble c and idate for a ltern at i v e s en t encing in the a bsence of evide nce to the c ontrary . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35- 102(6). A tr ial court must presume that a def endant se ntence d to eig ht y ear s or less and f or whom incar cer ation is not a priority is s u b j ect to alter

native sente ncing . State v. By rd, 861 S.W.2d 377, 379-80 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1993). I t is further pr esum ed that a se ntence other than inc arc eration would result i n succe ssful reha bilitation unless rebutted by sufficie nt evidenc e in the record. Id. at 380. Howeve r, althoug h a def endant may

be presumed to be a fa

vorable candidate for a lternative sentenc ing, the defe ndant has the bur den of e stablishing s u i t ability for total probation. St ate v. Bog g s, 932 S

. W

. 2 d 467, 477 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-303(b) . Even tho ug h pro batio n must be a uto matic a lly

c on sid e re d, “ the de fe nd ant i s n ot a uto matic a lly

e nti tle d to pr ob a tio n a s a

matte r o f l aw. ” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -3 03 (b ) S e nte nc ingCommis s i o n Co mme nts ; State v. Har

tley , 818 S.W .2d 370, 373 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . A def endant se ekingfull probation be ars the burd e n o n a

pp e a l of sh ow ing the se nte nc e imp os e d is imp ro pe r, and that f ull pr ob a tio n w ill be in the best interest of the defe ndant and the public. State v. B aker , 966 S.W .2d 429, 434 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997).
In deter mining if inca

rce ration is appropr iate, a trial court may consider the need to pr otect so c ie ty by re str a ininga

de fe nd ant h avin g a

lon g his tor

y of c ri min a l c on du c t, t

he ne e d to avo id de pr e c iatin gthe se ri ou sn e ss o f t he of fe nse, whe the r c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula rl y a pp ro pr iate to eff ectively deter others likely

to commit si milar offe nses, and whether less restric tive measure s have often or r ece ntly

been unsuc cessf

ully applied to the def

endant. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(1).
The trial c ourt did not err in de nying total probation. We f irst note that defe ndant did rec eive alternative s en t en ci ng in the form of split confine ment. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-104(c )(5)

. We further

note that the def

endant, even at his y oung ag e, has a massed a c onsiderable history of criminal conduc t, albeit mostly in the form of j uvenile adjudications. Measur es less re strictive than confine ment have be en unsucc essfully applied. The trial court a ls o p ro p er l y considere d the defe ndant' s untruthfulness, which relates to his potential for rehabilitation. SeeState v. Nunley , 22 S.W .3d 282, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) . Def endant ha s not me t his burden of establishing that full probation should have be en g rante d. This issue is without merit.-6- "DAY F OR DAY" CONF INEMENT Finally , defe ndant contends the trial court erre d in order ing his one-year confine ment in the county jail to be serve d "da

y for da y ." We must ag ree with his contention.
The orde r to confine the defe ndant in the burg lary case for one y ear

"da y for da y " de prives the def endant of the opportunit y

to ear n proper sentenc ing c redits as provide d by statute. See generally State v. J ames Ke vin Und erwo o d , No

. E 2 0 0 0 -0 1 9 4 5 -C C A- R 3 -C D, 2 0 0 1 T en n . Crim. App. L EX I S 58 5, at *8 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. Au g . 2 , 2 00 1, at K no xvill e ); se e als o State v. Clark, 67 S.W.3d 73, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). An order of confine ment for one y ear in the county jail is gove rned by Tenne ssee Code A

nn o ta te d s e c ti o n 4 1

- 2 1

- 2 3 6 ( d ) r e la

ting to sente nce r eduction cr edits established by the Depa rtment of Corre ction for f elony offe nders serving sentenc es of one or more y ear s in the county jail. Accor dingly , we modify the time of

confine ment to the extent of deleting the " day for day " la ng uag e set for

th in the judg ment for the felony offe nse; thus, defe ndant will be entitled to ear n appropr iate sente nce c redits. The judgme nts f or the two misdemeanor offe nses do not have the "da y fo r d ay " languag e; th us , th e de fe nd ant w ill be e nti tle d to e arn g oo d c on du c t c re dit

tow ard the se sentenc es. See T en n
. C ode Ann. § 41- 2-111(b) . In summary , defe ndant will be entitled to ear n pr op e r s e nte nc e re du c tio n c re dit s w hic h w ill a pp ly tow ard his on e y e ar of c on fi ne me nt in the c ounty jail.

CO NC LU SION We remand to the tria l court for entry of an a mended judg ment in the burglar y case deleting the " day for da y " la ng uag e. We af

firm the judg ments of the trial c ourt in all other re spects.

___________________________________ J OE G. RI L EY, JUDGE