alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 00-6685

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ROBERT AUGUSTINE D’ANJOU,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Chief

District Judge. (CR-91-86-MU)

Submitted: April 27, 2001 Decided: May 8, 2001

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Augustine D’Anjou, Appellant Pro Se. Brian Lee Whisler,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
* Appeals from the denial of a motion pursuant to § 3582(c)(2)

are considered criminal appeals for purposes of Fed. R. App. P.

4(b).

2

PER CURIAM:

Robert Augustine D’Anjou seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying his motion for reconsideration of the court’s prior

order denying his motion filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)

(1994). We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because

D’Anjou’s notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties in a criminal case* are accorded ten days after entry

of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal,

see Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1), unless the district court extends the

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4). This appeal period is

“mandatory and jurisdictional.” United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d

191, 197 (4th Cir. 1991).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on March

1, 2000. D’Anjou’s notice of appeal was filed on May 1, 2000. Because D’Anjou failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain

an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 198 (Monday, October 16, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 48145]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-22331]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration #15324 and #15325; Florida Disaster Number FL-
00131]


Presidential Declaration Amendment of a Major Disaster for Public 
Assistance Only for the State of Florida

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Amendment 1.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Florida 
(FEMA-4337-DR), dated 09/21/2017.
    Incident: Hurricane Irma.
    Incident Period: 09/04/2017 and continuing.

DATES: Issued on 10/05/2017.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: 11/20/2017.
    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: 06/21/2018.

ADDRESSES: Submit completed loan applications to: U.S. Small Business 
Administration, Processing and Disbursement Center, 14925 Kingsport 
Road, Fort Worth, TX 76155.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:  A. Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd Street SW., 
Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205-6734.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of the President's major disaster 
declaration for Private Non-Profit organizations in the State of 
FLORIDA, dated 09/21/2017, is hereby amended to include the following 
areas as adversely affected by the disaster.

Primary Counties: Alachua, Bradford, Brevard, Desoto, Dixie, Gilchrist, 
Hardee, Highlands, Indian River, Jefferson, Lafayette, Lake, Leon, 
Levy, Marion, Martin, Okeechobee, Orange, Osceola, Saint Lucie, 
Seminole, Sumter, Taylor, Union, Volusia, Wakulla.

    All other information in the original declaration remains 
unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008)

Rafaela Monchek,
Acting Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance.
[FR Doc. 2017-22331 Filed 10-13-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8025-01-P
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 6765** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,
v. ERIC PASCAL JACKSON , Defendant

- Appellant
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Greenville
. Malcolm J. Howard , Senior District Judge. ( 4:10

- cr - 00078

- H

- 1; 4:14

- cv - 00215

- H )

Submitted : March 30 , 2017 Decided: April 3, 2017

Before TRAXLER and WYNN , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON , Senior Circuit Judge
.
Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Eric Pascal Jackson, Appellant Pro Se. William Glenn Perry, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Seth Morgan Wood, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Eric Pascal Jackson seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice o r judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (B) (2012)
. A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district cour t denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the d enial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Jackson has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Jackson’s motion for appointment of counsel, deny a certificate of appealability , and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately3 presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
Exhibit 4.1







THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON


NEW YORK’S FIRST BANK-FOUNDED 1784 BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON


 


 


2 HANSON PLACE, 12TH FLOOR, BROOKLYN,
N.Y. 11217


 


 


 


December 18, 2014


 


Hennion & Walsh, Inc.


2001 Route 46, Waterview Plaza


Parsippany, New Jersey 07054


 


Smart Trust, Tax Advantaged Growth &
Income Trust, Series 6


Dear Sirs:


The Bank of New York
Mellon is acting as trustee for Smart Trust, Tax Advantaged Growth & Income Trust, Series 6 set forth above (the “Trust”).
We enclosed a list of the Securities to be deposited in the Trust on the date hereof. The prices indicated therein reflect our
evaluation of such Securities as of close of business on December 17, 2014, in accordance with the valuation method set forth in
the Trust Indenture and Agreement. We consent to the reference to The Bank of New York Mellon as the party performing the evaluations
of the Trust Securities in the Registration Statement (No. 333-199663) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect
to the registration of the sale of the Trust Units and to the filing of this consent as an exhibit thereto.


 


 


Very truly yours,


 


/s/ GERARDO CIPRIANO_______________ 


Gerardo Cipriano


Vice President
Exhibit 32.2

**CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT**

As adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the first quarter endedSeptember 30, 2008 of Integrated BioPharma, Inc. (the “Company”) as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Dina L. Masi, the Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer        of Integrated BioPharma, Inc.certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that to her knowledge:         

|  | (1)      | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and |
|--|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|  | (2)      | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.         

A signed original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.                  

Dated:     November 14, 2008                    By:/s/ Dina L. Masi

                                                               Dina L. Masi

                                                                      Chief Financial Officer & Senior Vice President
#### Jose PEREZ-GONZALEZ, a.k.a. Jose C. Gonzalez, a.k.a. Jose Gonzalez-Perez, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-73728.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 18, 2011.

Rosanne Perry, Trial, John Hogan, Senior Litigation Counsel, Kathleen Kelly Volkert, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, IDB-District Counsel, Office of the Chief Counsel/Den-Boi Department of Homeland Security, Denver, CO, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: FARRIS O’SCANNLAIN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Perez-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo due process claims, *Fernandez v. Gonzales,*439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir.2006), and we dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary determination that the evidence Perez-Gonzalez submitted with his motion to reopen was insufficient to warrant reopening. *See id.*at 601 (if “the BIA determines that a motion to reopen proceedings in which there has already been an unreviewable discretionary determination concerning a statutory prerequisite to relief does not make out a prima facie case for that relief,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)© bars this court from revisiting the merits).

*610To the extent Perez-Gonzalez contends that the BIA failed to consider some or all of the evidence he submitted with the motion to reopen, he has not overcome the presumption that the BIA did review the record. *See id.*at 603.

In light of our disposition, we do not reach Perez-Gonzalez’s remaining contentions.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
March 12, 2015

No. 04-14-00806-CV

AMADO ABASCAL III,

Appellant

v.

RODOLFO FLORES GALVAN AND G&M LOGISTICS CORP.,

Appellees

From the 365th Judicial District Court, Maverick County, Texas

Trial Court No. 12-11-27955-MCVAJA

Honorable David A. Berchelmann, Jr., Judge Presiding

ORDER OF REFERRAL

The Court, after reviewing the responses of the parties, has determined that the dispute

pending in this Court is appropriate for referral to an Alternative Dispute Resolution procedure.

TEX. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. 154.021 (a) (Vernon 2005). It is therefore, ORDERED

that this cause be referred to Mediated Settlement Conference which will be conducted by

Judge Raul Vasquez, an impartial person, as Mediator. See id. 154.051.052.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that all appellate deadlines are hereby suspended until April

27,2015.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that mediation shall commence at such place as the Mediator

may designate and proceed in accordance with the schedule set by the Mediator until completed,

but in any event the mediation shall be completed no later than forty-five (45) days from the date

of this Order. The Mediator shall file with the Clerk of Court within three (3) days of the

completion of the mediation written report concerning the disposition of this appeal.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Mediator shall be compensated and that parties in

this cause shall be equally responsible for its share of this obligation. Mediation fees shall

ultimately be taxed as court costs. See id. 154.054.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that all parties to this cause are directed to attend the

Mediated Settlement Conference with their counsel of record. The corporate party representative

in attendance and the individual parly representatives shall have full authority to settle up to and

including the judgment amount. To facilitate this procedure the Mediator shall encourage and

assist, but will not compel or coerce the parties in reaching settlement of the dispule. Unless the

parties otherwise agree, all matters, including the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their

counsel during mediation, shall remain eonfidentiai and shall never be disclosed to anyone,

including this Court. See id. 154.053.

Provided the parties are able to settle all matters related to this appeal, the parties are

directed to file joint motion requesting an appropriate disposition of this appeal within thirty

(30) days of the date of mediation.

It is so ORDERED on March 12, 2015.

Marialyn Barnard. Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 12"1 day of March. 2015.
#### In the Matter of Ann K. Lovett, Respondent, v Manhasset Public Schools, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 654]

—In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Education of the Manhasset Union Free School District, s/h/a Manhasset Public Schools, dated September 21, 1995, which adopted the findings and recommendations of a Hearing Officer and denied the petitioner retroactive membership in the New York State Teacher’s Retirement System, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.), entered November 12, 1996, which, *inter alia,*granted the petition and annulled the determination.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, a notice of claim pursuant to Education Law § 3813 was not a condition precedent to the commencement of this proceeding *(see, Matter of Piaggone v Board of Educ.,*92 AD2d 106). Nevertheless, the petition must be denied on the merits.

The determination of the Board of Education of the Manhasset Union Free School District, s/h/a Manhasset Public Schools, which denied the petitioner’s application for retroactive membership in the New York State Teacher’s Retirement System *(see,*Retirement and Social Security Law § 803) was not arbitrary and capricious or without a rational basis. The petitioner’s prior membership in the retirement system and her response in her most recent employment application that she is no longer a member of the system, were sufficient to establish that she participated in “a procedure that a reasonable person would recognize as an explanation or request requiring a formal decision by him or her to join a public retirement system” (Retirement and Social Security Law § 803 [b] [3] [iii]; *see, Matter of Clark v Board of Educ.,*90 NY2d 662). Consequently, the petitioner was ineligible for retroactive membership. Mangano, P. J., Santucci, Joy and Lerner, JJ., concur.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13

- 60107

ROBERT ANTHONY HUBBARD , Plaintiff

− Appellant ,

v ersus BOLIVAR COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY; CAPTAIN GATLON, Chief of Security; SERGEANT REYNOLDS, Shift Supervisor , Defendant s− Appellee s

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi No. 2:12

- CV

- 96

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *

Robert Hubbard, Mississippi prisoner # 109084 , moves for leave to

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances se t forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED February 7, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 13-60107 Document: 00512526519 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2014No. 13

- 60107

proceed in forma pauperis ( “ IFP ” ) on appeal from the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The district court concluded that Hubbard’s claims were based only on allega

tions of negligence. Hubbard’s request for IFP status was denied, and the court certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. By moving to pro ceed IFP on appeal, Hubbard challenges th at certification. See Baugh v. Taylor , 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997). Hubbard provides only conclus ional contentions, wi thout citations to the record or reference to any relevant legal authorities, that the district court
erred and that he alleged more than negligence . His appeal fails to set forth any issue of arguable legal merit and is therefore frivolous. See Howard v

. King , 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983). The motion to proceed IFP is denied,
and the appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. The district court’s dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim and the dismissal of this appe al count as two strikes under § 1915(g). See Ade

pegba v. Hammons , 103 F. 3d 383, 387

- 88 (5th Cir. 1996). Hubbard has one

pre vious strike. See Hubbard v. Carroll

- Montgomery Reg ’ l Corr

. Facility , No. 4:10

- CV

- 157 ( N.D. Miss. Sept. 7, 2011 ). Hubbard has now accumulated three strikes; therefore, he is barred from proceeding IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See § 1915(g).

2 Case: 13-60107 Document: 00512526519 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2014
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


        In connection with the Quarterly Report of Horseshoe Gaming Holding
Corp. ("the Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2002 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Jack B. Binion, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
        15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
        respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
        Company.


                                    By: /s/ Jack B. Binion
                                        -----------------------------------
                                    Jack B. Binion, Chief Executive Officer
                                    November 13, 2002
#### CHICAGO INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jan B. HAMILTON, Ph.D., d/b/a Nutritional Biomedicine, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-1381.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

May 4, 2011.

Michelle D. Mitchell, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Jan Barton Hamilton, Ph.D., Aspen, CO, pro se.

Before MURPHY, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

NEIL M. GORSUCH, Circuit Judge.

Chicago Insurance Co. (“CIC”) filed this diversity case seeking a declaratory judgment that Jan Hamilton wasn’t covered for losses she incurred as a result of disciplinary proceedings brought by the Colorado State Board of Medical Examiners. When Ms. Hamilton failed to file a timely answer to CIC’s complaint and missed multiple discovery deadlines, a magistrate judge recommended default judgment in favor of CIC. He advised Ms. Hamilton of her right to object to the recommendation, the deadline for doing so, and that failing to object would prejudice review in the district and appellate courts. Nonetheless, Ms. Hamilton did not file any objection. She now appeals the resulting default judgment.

Unless a party files a timely objection in the district court, she can’t ordinarily challenge the magistrate’s factual or legal conclusions on appeal. *See Duffield v. Jackson,*545 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir.2008). But we have recognized two exceptions: 1) when a *pro se*litigant has not been informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences of failing to object; or 2) when the interests of justice require review. *Id.*Ms. Hamilton can’t invoke the first exception: there’s no dispute that the magistrate judge informed her both of the time period for objecting and the consequences of failing to do so. Neither can she prevail on the second. The “interest of justice” standard is, this court has held, akin to plain error review, and Ms. Hamilton simply doesn’t explain how default judgment in this case — entered after she repeatedly failed to comply with the magistrate’s orders — “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” *See Morales-Fer*
      *741
      *nandez v. INS,*418 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (10th Cir.2005).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Because Ms. Hamilton failed to present any nonfrivolous arguments in support of the issues on appeal, her motion to proceed *informa pauperis*is denied, as are all other motions pending in this case.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R.App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.