alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony Bennett, Appellant.

[988 NYS2d 477]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bruce Allen, J.), rendered April 19, 2011, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony drug offender, to an aggregate term of two years, unanimously affirmed.

*642The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). There is no basis for disturbing the court’s determinations concerning identification and credibility.

Concur — Mazzarelli, J.E, Acosta, Freedman, Richter and Clark, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2



Certification of Chief Financial Officer
                     Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
                     As Adopted Pursuant to
                     Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Mattson Technology, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K
for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Andy
Moring, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §.
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)	The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and

(2)	The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and
will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



|Date: March 5, 2010 | /s/ ANDY MORING
                   Andy MoringExecutive Vice President — Finance and Chief
                   Financial Officer
|------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---
# In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District

FEBRUARY 10, 2015

THE FOLLOWING CASES WERE AFFIRMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE

84.16(b) OR RULE 30.25(b).

1. ED100977 CORY J. BROOKS, APP V STATE OF MISSOURI, RES

2. ED101046 C. HERMANN APP V MO ST PUBLIC DEF SYSTEM ETAL

RES

3. ED101153 RONA LD C. HAMILTON, APP V STATE OF MISSOURI, RES

4. ED101397 ANTONIO POWELL, APP V. STATE OF MISSOURI, RES
#### Christopher H. Zafra, Appellant, v Simon Pilkes, Respondent.

[666 NYS2d 633]

—Order of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court, First Department, entered on or about April 10, 1996, which affirmed an order of the Civil Court, New York County (Howard Malatzky, J.), entered on or about December 25, 1994, dismissing this nonpayment petition after trial, with leave to restore for purposes of determining the amount of any rent overcharge, unanimously reversed, on the law, without *219costs, to the extent of precluding consideration of the rental history prior to the four-year period provided by statute, and the matter remanded to the Civil Court for proceedings consistent with the decision herein.

Appellate Term upheld the determination of the Civil Court that neither the four-year Statute of Limitations for rent overcharge complaints (Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 [Administrative Code of City of NY] § 26-516 [a] [2]; Rent Stabilization Code [9 NYCRR] § 2526.1 [a] [2]) nor the record-keeping provisions relieving a landlord from having to produce records dating back more than four years prior to the most recent registration date (Rent Stabilization Law § 26-516 [g]) prohibits inquiry into the legality of rent increases prior to the four-year period through testimony or other additional proof, for the purpose of determining the extent to which any overcharges prior to the four-year period bear upon the recovery for the four-year period.

However, on June 19, 1997, the Legislature adopted the Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1997, two provisions of which amended Rent Stabilization Law § 26-516 (a) (2) to specifically “preclude examination of the rental history of the housing accommodation prior to the four-year period preceding the filing of the complaint”. These particular provisions, moreover, were among those that were to take effect immediately and apply to “any action or proceeding pending in any court”. (L 1997, ch 116, §46 [1].)

By virtue of the Act, and the unambiguous, unqualified language regarding its effective date, the Appellate Term order is reversed to the extent that, upon further Civil Court proceedings, the rental history prior to the four-year statutory period may not be considered, pursuant to the amended statute, and the matter is remanded to the Civil Court for proceedings consistent with the decision herein.

Motion denied insofar as it seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and granted insofar as reargument/renewal is sought, and upon reargument/renewal, this Court’s unpublished decision and order entered on July 24, 1997 (Appeal No. 60466-60467) is recalled and vacated and a new decision and order decided simultaneously herewith is substituted therefor; motion by *amici curiae*for permission to appear in support of petitioner-appellant’s motion is granted and the affirmation and exhibits are deemed filed. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Milonas and Mazzarelli, JJ.
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 193 (Friday, October 6, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 46818]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-21650]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4337-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2017-0001]


Florida; Amendment No. 7 to Notice of a Major Disaster 
Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Florida (FEMA-4337-DR), dated September 10, 2017, and 
related determinations.

DATES: This amendment was issued September 16, 2017.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dean Webster, Office of Response and 
Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW., 
Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2833.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Florida is hereby amended to include the following 
areas among those areas determined to have been adversely affected by 
the event declared a major disaster by the President in his declaration 
of September 10, 2017.

    Dixie and Lafayette Counties for Individual Assistance (already 
designated for debris removal and emergency protective measures 
[Categories A and B], including direct federal assistance, under the 
Public Assistance program).

The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) 
are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community 
Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 
97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment 
Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, 
Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In 
Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially 
Declared Disaster Assistance--Disaster Housing Operations for 
Individuals and Households; 97.050 Presidentially Declared Disaster 
Assistance to Individuals and Households--Other Needs; 97.036, 
Disaster Grants--Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared 
Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.

Brock Long,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. 2017-21650 Filed 10-5-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

**LQ CORPORATION, INC.**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**

**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of LQ Corporation, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004, as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James A. Mitarotonda, Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that: 

 

1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended; and 

 

2. Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. 

 

Dated: May 14, 2004
#### Hatcher *vs.*Bowen.

Where a party making a motion for new trial was allowed by order until a day named, and at a place designated, make out a brief of the evidence and perfect his motion for new trial, and it was required that the same should be heard at the time and place named, if nothing was done until that time, and no cause was shown why the motion had not been completed, and thé movant or his counsel failed to appear at the place named, but sent word that the latter was engaged in the trial of a capital case pending in an adjoining county and asked for a postponement, there was no error in dismissing the motion for new trial.' 59 *Ga.,*626.

(a.) Absence of counsel in attendance on other courts is not a favored ground for a postponement. 72 *Ga.,*901; 74 *Id.,*220.

*(b.)*Where exception is taken to the admission of evidence, the ground of objection thereto should be stated. 56 *Ga.,*444.

*841(c.) An offer to pay a debt with a mule, not made pending any negotiations to compromise, was admissible as a direct acknowledgment of the claim. Code, §3789 and citations; 59 *Get.,*343 (5), 349, 350; 64. *Id.,*172.

Judgment affirmed.,

February 24, 1885.

Hall, Justice.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-7554
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MARK ANTHONY WILLIAMS, a/k/a Michael Nemhardt, a/k/a Alex Cruz, a/k/a Smiley, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (5:97-cr-00142-F-3) Submitted: December 14, 2006 Decided: December 21, 2006 Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Mark Anthony Williams, Appellant Pro Se. John Samuel Bowler, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Mark Anthony Williams seeks to appeal the district court’s orders denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See United States v. Williams , No. 5:97-cr-00142-F-3 (E.D.N.C. July 21, 2006; Aug. 21, 2006). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### Sharanjeet Kaur DHANOYA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 09-71528.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed March 9, 2011.

Martin Avila Robles, Esquire, Immigration Practice Group A Professional Corporation, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

*673Dana Michelle Camilleri, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *673*See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Sharanjeet Kaur Dhanoya, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen, *Iturribarria v. INS,*321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Dhanoya’s motion to reopen as untimely where the motion was filed over five years after the BIA’s final decision, *see 8*C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Dhanoya failed to establish changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, *see 8*C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); *see also Toufighi v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir.2008) (requiring movant to produce material evidence with motion to reopen that conditions in country of nationality had changed). Because the BIA considered the evidence regarding torture submitted with the motion to reopen, we reject Dhanoya’s Convention Against Torture contention. *See Singh v. INS,*295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir.2002) (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law”).

Dhanoya’s contentions that the BIA failed to properly consider the evidence and applied an improper legal standard in denying her motion to reopen are belied by the record.

We reject Dhanoya’s contention that the BIA erred by failing to inform her of the deadlines for the filing of a motion to reopen, because as the BIA concluded, neither the statute nor the regulations impose such an obligation on the BIA. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.

Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review Dhanoya’s renewed challenge to the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, because this petition for review is not timely as to that order. *See Singh v. INS,*315 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir.2003); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           4,308
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     39,414
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                          12,375
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                            12,829
<LOANS>                                         99,691
<ALLOWANCE>                                        725
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 162,077
<DEPOSITS>                                     118,709
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             30,328
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         2,314
<OTHER-SE>                                      10,726
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 162,077
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                  7,723
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,892
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                10,615
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               4,589
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,051
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            4,975  
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      230
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  4,066
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,626
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,205
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    7.87
<LOANS-NON>                                        289
<LOANS-PAST>                                       467
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                   512
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      118
<RECOVERIES>                                       101
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  725
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               725
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
### The Honorable Beverly R. Stites, United States Magistrat e 1 

### Judge fo r the Western District of Arkansas, to whom the case wa s referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ___________ No. 95-3316

___________ Terry Peasha, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * Western District of Arkansas. of Social Security * Administration, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: May 24, 1996 Filed: June 6, 1996

___________ Before FAGG, BOWMAN, HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
TerryPeasha appeals from the final order entered in the Distric t Court affirming the decision to deny her application for supplementa l

1 security income (SSI). We affirm.
Peasha was born in 1954, and worked as a hair bow assembler and a newspaper inserter, among other things. In May 1991 and again in Jul y 1992, Peasha applied for SSI benefits alleging disability due to acut e bro nchial asthma, emphysema, migraine headaches, vomiting, and sever e swellin g. Peasha's applications were denied initially and o n reconsideration. At a June 1993

### -2-

hearing before an Adm inistrative Law Judge (ALJ) on the 1992 application, Peasha, her husband, and a vocational expert testified.
The ALJ f ound Peasha was not disabled. The ALJ discounted Peasha's subjec tive complaints to the extent that she alleged total disability , noting her complaints were not supported by the objective medical evidence and were inconsistent with her daily activities, her refusal to qui t smoking, and her cont inued part-time work. The ALJ concluded that, while Peasha was unable to perform her past relevant work, she had the residual functi onal capacity to perform sedentary work subject to a protecte d enviro nment free of respiratory irritants. The Appeals Council denie d review. The District Court affirmed the denial of SSI benefits. Peasha appeals. Having reviewed the record, which, contrary to Peasha's argumen t, was fullyand fairly developed, we conclude that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ's decision to deny Peasha benefits. Se e Shannonv. Chater , 54 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, th e judgment is affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
#### In the Matter of Jose C., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Appellant.

[859 NYS2d 179]

Order of disposition, Family Court, Bronx County (Juan M. Merchan, J.), entered on or about June 11, 2007, which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent, upon a fact-finding determination that he had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree, petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree and possession of burglar’s tools, and placed him with the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of vacating the findings as to unauthorized use of a vehicle, larceny and possession of stolen property and dismissing those counts of the petition, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

The evidence established that appellant and a companion were standing behind a car with an open trunk in the early morning hours, and closed the trunk as a police officer drove up. The officer observed that the door lock and window had been broken, and that an ashtray full of change apparently had been removed from the car and deposited in a different car. The evidence also established that appellant and his companion possessed screwdrivers.

As the presentment agency concedes, since the vandalized car *254was not stolen, but was still at the location where the owner’s brother had parked it, the evidence does not support the findings as to petit larceny and criminal possession of stolen property, which both related to the car. The evidence also was insufficient to establish unauthorized use of a vehicle in violation of Penal Law § 165.05 (1). That crime requires “an exercise of dominion and control over the car, either mechanically or physically, to the exclusion of the owner’s proprietary interest, even transitorily” *(People v Gray,*154 AD2d 547, 547 [1989]). There was no evidence that appellant or his companion ever attempted to start the car, or had the means to do so. Neither appellant’s presence near a vandalized car, nor the inference that he or his companion must have entered the car at some point to steal the ashtray and coins, established the requisite exercise of dominion and control *(id.; see also Matter of Javier F.,*3 AD3d 493 [2004]; *Matter of Archangel O.,*157 AD2d 729 [1990]; *Matter of Ruben P.,*151 AD2d 485 [1989]). However, the court’s findings as to the remaining charges were based on legally sufficient evidence and were not against the weight of the evidence, as the evidence supported the inference that appellant committed criminal mischief by damaging the car and possessed a screwdriver that he used as a burglar’s tool. Furthermore, the petition, as supplemented by the supporting deposition, was legally sufficient with respect to the criminal mischief and burglar’s tools charges.

Appellant’s remaining contentions are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we also reject them on the merits. Concur—Saxe, J.P, Nardelli, Catterson and McGuire, JJ.
EXHIBIT 23.1




                         CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-87715, 333-39129, 333-59859, 33-85272,
33-94972, 333-41954, 333-54010, 333-63156 and 333-100094) and the Registration
Statements on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-86072 and 333-111527) of Mattson Technology,
Inc. of our reports dated January 23, 2004, except as to Note 18, which is as of
February 17, 2004 relating to the financial statements and financial statement
schedule, which appear in this Form 10-K.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP


San Jose, California
March 12, 2004