Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2266 | May 29, 2019 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Frances Barrow

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

State of Indiana, as Assignee of 

the Support Rights of 

William McRoberts, 

Appellant-Petitioner/Assignor, 

v. 

Ruthanna (Thompson) 

McRoberts, 

Appellee-Respondent

May 29, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-DR-2266 

Appeal from the Montgomery 

Superior Court

The Honorable Heather Barajas, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

54D01-0402-DR-55 

May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-2266 | May 29, 2019 Page 2 of 6

[1] The State of Indiana, as assignee of the support rights of William McRoberts,

appeals the grant of Ruthanna (Thompson) McRoberts’ petition for her child 

support obligation to be retroactively abated between January 4, 2018, and 

April 27, 2018. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Ruthanna (Thompson) McRoberts (“Mother”) and William McRoberts 

(“Father”) were married, and their marriage produced two children. In July 

2006, the trial court dissolved their marriage and ordered Mother to pay child 

support. In the years after dissolution, Mother accumulated a significant 

arrearage. The trial court repeatedly found Mother in contempt for failure to 

pay support and modified Mother’s support obligation numerous times.

[3] On March 1, 2017, a contracted public defender, Justin Froedge, entered his 

appearance for Mother in the divorce action. Thereafter, the Montgomery 

County public defender system changed from using private attorneys under 

contract to hiring full-time public defenders. As a result, on January 2, 2018, 

Froedge moved to withdraw his appearance in the divorce action, and the trial 

court granted his motion on January 3, 2018. Mother was not notified of 

Froedge’s withdrawal of appearance, nor was she appointed a new public 

defender for the divorce case. 

[4] Meanwhile, on November 28, 2017, the State charged Mother with nonsupport 

of a dependent child as a Level 6 felony in case number 54D01-1711-F6-
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003121. On January 4, 2018, Mother was arrested on that charge and confined 

in the Montgomery County Jail. Shortly thereafter, the court appointed Jacob 

Moore, a public defender, to represent Mother in the felony case. Mother 

began working through a work release program on April 15, 2018, and she 

received her first paycheck on April 27, 2018. On May 18, 2018, Mother pled 

guilty to nonsupport of a dependent child, and the court sentenced her to 545 

days to be served in work release. 

[5] In late May 2018 public defender Johnathon Holley was appointed to represent 

Mother in the divorce action. On July 26, 2018, Mother moved for the trial 

court to retroactively eliminate her support obligation from January 4, 2018, to 

April 27, 2018, the time period Mother was incarcerated but not receiving 

paychecks from the work release program. The State objected to Mother’s

petition and filed a response in opposition with supporting memorandum. 

[6] The court conducted a hearing on Mother’s petition on August 22, 2018. At 

the hearing, the State noted Mother had not contacted the child support office 

to request an abatement of her support obligation between the date she was 

arrested and the date of her petition. The trial court granted Mother’s petition. 

The court acknowledged the law did not favor Mother, but the court chose to 

follow equity and “not hold [Mother] accountable for her lack of counsel when 

she didn’t even know she wasn’t represented.” (Tr. at 37.)

Discussion and Decision
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[7] Mother, the Appellee-Respondent, has failed to file an appellate brief. 

Consequently, we will not develop an argument for her. State v. Miracle, 75 

N.E.3d 1106, 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). In such situations, we apply a less 

stringent standard of review and will reverse upon a showing of prima facie

error. Id. However, Mother’s failure to file a brief does not relieve us of our 

obligation to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record when determining

if reversal is necessary. Id. 

[8] We review a trial court’s decision to modify a parent’s child support obligation 

for an abuse of discretion. Hooker v. Hooker, 15 N.E.3d 1103, 1105 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against 

the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, including 

any reasonable inferences therefrom.” Id. 

[9] Indiana case law has long prohibited the retroactive reduction or elimination of 

child support obligations once those obligations have accrued. Whited v. 

Whited, 859 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Ind. 2007). Further, retroactive modifications of 

child support obligations have been statutorily prohibited since at least 1987. 

Id.; see also Ind. Code § 31-16-16-6. This is a “bright-line rule” subject to two 

narrow exceptions. Whited, 859 N.E.2d at 661-62. Those exceptions are when: 

(1) the parties have agreed to and carried out an alternative 

method of payment which substantially complies with the spirit 

of the decree, or 

(2) the obligated parent takes the child into his or her home, 

assumes custody, provides necessities, and exercises parental 
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control for such a period of time that a permanent change of 

custody is exercised.

Id. at 662. Neither of the two exceptions identified in the Whited case are 

applicable here. The parents did not make some sort of alternative payment 

arrangement while Mother was incarcerated, nor did Mother take custody of 

the children. She simply did not pay support because she was in jail. 

[10] Our Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that incarceration may significantly 

diminish the income and assets available to a parent to pay child support. 

Lambert v. Lambert, 861 N.E.2d 1176, 1177 (Ind. 2007). Nevertheless, 

“incarceration does not relieve parents of their child support obligations.” Id. 

For example, in Becker v. Becker, an incarcerated former husband moved to have 

his child support obligation abated during the period of his incarceration, and 

the trial court retroactively reduced the husband’s child support obligation. 902 

N.E.2d 818, 819 (Ind. 2009). On review, our Indiana Supreme Court reversed

the trial court and held a “trial court only has the discretion to make a 

modification of child support due to incarceration effective as of a date no 

earlier than the date of the petition to modify.” Id. at 821. We are bound by 

Indiana Supreme Court precedent until it is changed either by that court or by 

legislative enactment. Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005). Consequently, the trial court did not have discretion to retroactively 

abate Mother’s child support obligation, even if a changeover in the 

Montgomery County public defender system was to blame for Mother’s failure 
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to timely petition for modification of the support order. See Strowmatt v. 

Rodriguez, 897 N.E.2d 500, 503 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“As there was no 

abatement order or modification of Strowmatt’s child support obligation, it 

continued during his incarceration and accrued until his son’s emancipation on 

December 10, 2005.”). 

Conclusion

[11] We conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it retroactively abated 

Mother’s child support obligation from January 4, 2018, to April 27, 2018

because Indiana recognizes a bright line rule against retroactively modifying an 

arrearage once it has accrued and the exceptions to this bright line rule are not 

applicable here. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for the trial court to 

recalculate Mother’s arrearage. 

[12] Reversed and remanded.

Baker, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.