[Cite as State v. Crenshaw, 2019-Ohio-3840.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

LAKE COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 CASE NO. 2018-L-121

 - vs - : 

ISIAH CRENSHAW, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas. 

Case No. 2015 CR 000711. 

Judgment: Reversed and vacated; remanded. 

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Teri R. Daniel, Assistant Prosecutor, 

Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH 

44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

Edward M. Heindel, 2200 Terminal Tower, 50 Public Square, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For 

Defendant-Appellant). 

TIMOTHY P. CANNON, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Isiah Crenshaw, appeals from the August 17, 2018 judgment 

entry of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, which terminated appellant’s 

community control sanctions and sentenced him to serve 72 months in prison for violating 

community control. The judgment is reversed, and appellant’s conviction for violating 

community control is vacated. This matter is remanded for further proceedings. 
 2

{¶2} On January 29, 2016, appellant was indicted by the Lake County Grand 

Jury on eight drug-related offenses. Appellant entered into an agreement with appellee, 

the state of Ohio, to plead guilty to one count of tampering with evidence (F3) and one 

count of possession of heroin (F4). 

{¶3} On March 23, 2016, appellant appeared before the trial court, with counsel, 

for a change of plea hearing. After the trial court advised appellant that it could proceed 

immediately to sentencing, appellant appeared reluctant to enter the plea. Appellant 

expressed to the court that he was remorseful and wanted to receive drug treatment. The 

state, however, requested a prison sentence of two years. 

{¶4} The trial court refused to accept appellant’s guilty plea and engaged in a 

lengthy colloquy with appellant. The court proposed that it would consider community 

control sanctions if appellant pleaded guilty to all counts of the indictment, except for 

those subject to merger, which would carry a maximum suspended prison term of ten 

consecutive years. Should the court choose not to impose community control sanctions 

following the outcome of a pre-sentence investigation, the court stated it would dismiss 

all counts except the two for which appellant had originally agreed to plead guilty and 

would sentence appellant to two years in prison. The trial court gave appellant a week to 

consider the proposal and discuss it with defense counsel. 

{¶5} On March 30, 2016, appellant again appeared before the trial court, with 

counsel, for a change of plea hearing. Appellant pled guilty to the five counts not subject 

to merger: Count 1, tampering with evidence (F3), in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1); 

Count 3, trafficking in heroin (F3), in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) with forfeiture 

specifications for heroin, a scale, and $1,502.00 in cash; Count 5, aggravated trafficking 
 3

in drugs (F4), in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) with a forfeiture specification for fentanyl; 

Count 7, aggravated trafficking in drugs (F4), in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) with a 

forfeiture specification for hydrocodone; and Count 8, possession of dangerous drugs 

(F5), in violation of former R.C. 4729.51(C)(3) (eff. Feb. 1, 2016) with a forfeiture 

specification for trazadone. 

{¶6} The sentencing hearing was held on April 26, 2016, following a presentence investigation. The judgment of sentence was entered on May 10, 2016. 

{¶7} The trial court considered the factors in R.C. 2929.12 and found that the 

presumption in favor of prison on Count 3, pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(D), had been 

overcome. The trial court suspended a consecutive 120-month prison sentence: 36 

months on Count 1, 36 months on Count 3, 18 months on Count 5, 18 months on Count 

7, and 12 months on Count 8. 

{¶8} Appellant was sentenced to a three-year term of community control. The 

specific sanctions and conditions imposed included, inter alia, that appellant successfully 

complete the Lake County Jail Treatment Program while serving 60 days in jail, followed 

by successful completion of the North East Ohio Community Alternative Program, 

followed by an additional 60 days in jail for participation in the Transitional Day Reporting 

Program. 

{¶9} In February 2018, appellant was arrested in Cuyahoga County on drugrelated offenses and admitted to possessing drugs during his arrest. This was a violation 

of appellant’s community control conditions in the case sub judice. The state moved to 

terminate appellant’s community control. Appellant waived his rights to a probable cause 
 4

hearing and to a final hearing. Appellant pled guilty to the charge of violating his 

community control. 

{¶10} At the sentencing hearing, both defense counsel and the prosecuting 

attorney represented to the trial court that, should the court determine appellant was not 

amenable to continue on community control, appellant and the state had agreed to a sixyear term of incarceration. A written agreement to this effect is not in the record before 

us. 

{¶11} The trial court accepted the joint recommendation of a six-year prison 

sentence. The trial court sentenced appellant to a prison term of 30 months on Count 1; 

30 months on Count 3; 12 months on Count 5; 12 months on Count 7; and 12 months on 

Count 8. Counts 1 and 3 were run consecutive to each other; Counts 5, 7, and 8 were 

run concurrent to each other but consecutive to Counts 1 and 3. The judgment of 

sentence was entered August 17, 2018. 

{¶12} Appellant raises the following two assignments of error for this court’s 

review: 

[1.] The six year prison term that was imposed was contrary to law 

because it did not comport with the purposes and principles of 

sentencing and the sentencing factors. 

[2.] The trial court erred by imposing a community control “sentencing 

package” at Crenshaw’s initial sentencing. The imposition of the sixyear sentence for violating the “sentencing package” should be 

vacated, along with the original sentence. 

{¶13} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court’s imposition 

of a six-year prison sentence was contrary to law because it did not adequately consider 

the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing 
 5

factors in R.C. 2929.12. We need not consider this argument, however, as appellant’s 

second assignment of error is dispositive. 

{¶14} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by 

imposing a community control “sentencing package” at his initial sentencing, rather than 

individually on each charge, which thereby invalidates the imposition of a prison sentence 

for his community control violation. Appellant requests this court vacate the trial court’s 

original sentence, as well as his conviction and sentence for violating his community 

control. 

{¶15} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), felony sentences may be increased, 

reduced, modified, or vacated and remanded if the appellate court “clearly and 

convincingly finds either of the following: 

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings 

under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or 

(C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the 

Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant; 

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 

{¶16} Appellee concedes appellant’s original sentence is contrary to law, based 

on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding that the Ohio felony sentencing statutes do not 

allow for “sentencing packages.” State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 

¶10 (“This court has never adopted the sentencing-package doctrine, and we decline to 

do so now.”). 

{¶17} “Instead of considering multiple offenses as a whole and imposing one, 

overarching sentence to encompass the entirety of the offenses as in the federal 

sentencing regime, a judge sentencing a defendant pursuant to Ohio law must consider 
 6

each offense individually and impose a separate sentence for each offense.” Id. at ¶9, 

citing R.C. 2929.11 through R.C. 2929.19.

{¶18} “Generally, pursuant to the felony-sentencing statutes, a court must impose 

either a prison term or a community-control sanction as a sentence for a particular felony 

offense * * *.” State v. Paige, 153 Ohio St.3d 214, 2018-Ohio-813, ¶6, citing State v. 

Anderson, 143 Ohio St.3d 173, 2015-Ohio-2089, ¶31. This court, and others, have held 

that not only must prison terms be imposed individually for each offense, pursuant to 

Saxon, terms of community control must also be imposed individually for each offense. 

Therefore, when a trial court imposes community control sanctions on multiple charges 

in a “sentencing package,” rather than individually, the sentence is contrary to law. See,

e.g., State v. Edwards, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2017-G-0122, 2018-Ohio-2462, ¶18; State 

v. Armstrong, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2015-T-0131, 2017-Ohio-8801, ¶27; State v. White, 

4th Dist. Hocking No. 18CA2, 2018-Ohio-4104, ¶2; State v. Lynch, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 104200, 2016-Ohio-7721, ¶5; State v. Williams, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-10-02, 2011-

Ohio-995, ¶21. 

{¶19} “‘No court has the authority to impose a sentence that is contrary to law.’” 

State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, ¶22, quoting State v. Fischer, 

128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, ¶23. “Any attempt by a court to disregard statutory 

requirements when imposing a sentence renders the attempted sentence a nullity or 

void.” State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 75 (1984). Void sentences may be reviewed 

and vacated at any time—on direct appeal or, as here, by collateral attack. Williams,

2016-Ohio-7658, at ¶22-23, citing Fischer, supra, at ¶30; State v. Blair, 8th Dist. 
 7

Cuyahoga No. 102548, 2015-Ohio-5416, ¶11, citing Fischer and Beasley, supra; State v. 

Price, 4th Dist. Athens Nos. 17CA30 and 17CA31, 2018-Ohio-2896, ¶20. 

{¶20} Here, appellant was convicted of five offenses. The trial court, however, 

imposed a blanket three-year term of community control on all five offenses. Therefore, 

the May 10, 2016 judgment of sentence is void, and the trial court could not have found 

appellant in violation of it. Accordingly, the August 17, 2018 judgment of sentence is also 

void. See, e.g., Price, Lynch, and Williams, supra. 

{¶21} Appellant’s second assignment of error has merit. As a result, appellant’s 

first assignment of error is moot. 

{¶22} The judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and 

appellant’s conviction for violating his community control sanctions is hereby vacated. 

This matter is remanded for a de novo sentencing hearing as it relates to the underlying 

offenses to which appellant pled guilty, to wit: Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, and 8. 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., 

MATT LYNCH, J., 

concur.