IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-40480

Summary Calendar

MAYLA V. CAMPOS, Individually and next friend of David Christopher 

Campos, an incapacitated person; DAVID CHRISTOPHER CAMPOS,

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

WEBB COUNTY, TEXAS,

Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:12-CV-7

Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

David Campos (“Campos”) alleges that he was sexually assaulted in the 

Webb County jail as a result of Defendant-Appellee’s actions and policies. 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, Campos and his mother Mayla Campos, challenge the 

district court’s application of the “episodic event” standard and grant of 

summary judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 27, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Campos was arrested on April 20, 2011, for possessing more than five 

pounds of marijuana in a drug-free zone. After his arrest Campos went 

through three different screenings from various prison officials. The initial 

screenings did not indicate that Campos suffered from mental illness. 

Campos also denied being treated for mental illness on his intake form. On 

April 21, 2011, however, a nurse noted that Campos complained of depression 

and mentioned attempting suicide eight years earlier. Campos was then 

scheduled to meet with the prison’s mental health specialist. 

Four days later Campos was evaluated by a mental health specialist, 

Jose Macias (“Macias”). During this evaluation Campos denied being 

depressed or suicidal or ever having received treatment for mental health 

issues. Macias noted that Campos appeared “alert, stable, coherent, and 

oriented.” Macias did not conduct further investigation into Campos’s mental 

health history and concluded that he did not require further evaluation. On 

April 25, 2011, Campos entered the general prison population. Campos was 

placed in a medium-maximum cell despite being classified as a low-medium 

risk detainee. 

Jose Velasquez, the alleged assailant, was admitted to the Webb County 

Jail on April 27, 2011. There was no indication that Velazquez had any history 

of sexual assault or was a sexual threat. Velazquez was housed with Campos. 

Id. Velazquez was discharged on July 5, 2011. 

Campos’s mother, Mayla Campos (“Ms. Campos”), visited Campos on 

July 26, 2011. During this visit Ms. Campos became concerned, based on 

comments and cues, that Campos had been assaulted. That day, Ms. Campos 

alerted a jailer about her concerns. The next day, she reported her concern to 

Lieutenant Gutierrez and Captain Trevino. Though the content of this 

conversation is in dispute, Ms. Campos contends that she told the officers that 

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her son may have been sexually assaulted or threatened and that he suffered 

from borderline mental retardation and bipolar disorder. 

The officers then spoke with Campos. They allege that he denied both 

being assaulted and mentally handicapped. Campos wrote and signed a 

statement stating: “I David Campos was not sexually assaulted I was just 

pushed by Inmate Velasquez I do not want to press charges. I do not want to 

be moved from cell 3G.” Campos alleges that he was coerced into writing this 

statement. 

Campos was then evaluated again by Macias. It does not appear that 

Macias spoke with Campos about the alleged sexual assault as Macias’ notes 

do not mention it. Macias did note that Campos was “cooperative, with clear 

speech,” did not appear distressed, and was not a mental health risk. Campos 

was not evaluated for physical signs of abuse. 

Campos was released on bond on August 1, 2011. Ms. Campos filed a 

complaint that her son had been sexually assaulted in prison on two weeks 

later. On January 28, 2012, Campos and Ms. Campos (as next friend of 

Campos, an incapacitated person) filed a suit against the Webb County 

Sheriff’s Department and Webb County (“Webb”). The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

complaint alleged that Campos was sexually assaulted while in Webb County’s 

custody in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. As to the 

Fourteenth Amendment, Campos alleged that Webb both failed to protect him 

and failed to provide him adequate medical care before and after the alleged 

sexual assault. Campos later voluntarily dismissed the Sheriff’s Department

from the case and proceeded solely against Webb. 

Webb filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which the district 

court treated as a motion for summary judgment because of the evidence 

attached to the motion. The court dismissed Campos’s Eighth Amendment 

claim on the grounds that pre-trial detainees may not bring actions under the 

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Eighth Amendment. The court then analyzed the Fourteenth Amendment

claim as an episodic act or omission. Under this standard, the court held that 

the evidence could not support a finding that the jailers had the “requisite 

knowledge” for the failure to protect claim to proceed. The court also dismissed 

the claim for failing to provide medical care on the basis that Campos did not

show any “serious harm that resulted from failing to order a physical 

examination or more adequate mental evaluation.” 

Campos raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the court erred 

in analyzing his claims under an episodic act, as opposed to a conditions of 

confinement, standard. Second, he argues that even under the episodic act 

standard, the court erred in finding that the evidence presented did not 

demonstrate Webb’s deliberate indifference.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, with 

all evidence construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See 

Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp. La., 234 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 2000) 

(citations omitted). “Summary judgment is proper when the evidence reflects 

no genuine issues of material fact and the non-movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “A genuine issue of 

material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the non-moving party.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 

II. Did the District Court Err in Applying the Episodic Event Standard?

This court evaluates pretrial detainees’ constitutional complaints of 

Fourteenth Amendment violations under one of two rubrics, “jail conditions” 

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or “episodic acts or omissions.” Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633, 

644–45 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Jail conditions challenges are evaluated 

under Bell v. Wolfish to determine “[i]f a particular condition or restriction of 

pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental 

objective.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). Episodic acts or omissions, 

however, require the plaintiff to prove that the official “acted or failed to act 

with subjective deliberate indifference to the detainee’s needs.” Hare, 74, F.3d 

636, 647–48. 

In Hare this court held that conditions challenges are against “general 

conditions, practices, rules or restrictions of pretrial confinement,” whereas 

episodic challenges are against “a jail official’s episodic act or omission.” Id. at 

643. Expressed another way, a claim against a jail condition exists when “a 

jailer’s act or omission . . . implement[s] a rule or restriction or otherwise 

demonstrate[s] the existence of an identifiable intended condition or practice.” 

Id. at 645. Absent an established rule, a claim against a jail condition exists 

where there is “extended or pervasive” misconduct. Id. 

This court made this distinction, in part, because when a jail implements 

a condition or policy, this “manifests an avowed intent to subject a pretrial 

detainee to that rule or restriction.” Id. at 644. But, “[w]ith episodic acts or 

omissions, intentionality is no longer a given,” and this accordingly requires a

higher showing of subjective deliberate indifference, demonstrating that the 

“official had the requisite mental state to establish his liability as a 

perpetrator.” Id. at 645. 

A few additional cases provide guideposts for determining if a complaint 

is properly construed as challenging jail conditions. Shepherd v. Dallas 

County, 591 F.3d 445, 449 (5th Cir. 2009), was “the rare case in which a 

plaintiff demonstrated deficiencies in the conditions of confinement that 

amounted to punishment.” In Shepherd plaintiff “presented extensive 

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evidence on the jail’s treatment of inmates with chronic illness,” which

included testimony from the jail’s medical staff that they were chronically 

under-staffed and regularly failed to deliver prescriptions to over fifty-percent 

of the inmates. Id. at 450. Plaintiff’s claim was also supported by reports 

finding that the jail’s medical processes were totally inadequate. Id. 450–51. 

As the Shepherd court noted “[m]ore often, however, a plaintiff’s claim, 

properly characterized, faults specific jail officials for their acts or omissions 

because the plaintiff cannot establish the existence of an officially sanctioned 

unlawful condition.” Id. at 452. In Brown v. Bolin, 500 F. App’x 309, 313 (5th 

Cir. 2012), for example, this court held that a claim against a physician for 

failing to respond appropriately to a seriously ill inmate was an episodic event, 

even where the plaintiff argued that the physician’s training was inadequate 

and that there was a culture of intimidation among the physicians that 

stymied reporting serious medical emergencies. Brown specifically contrasted 

its facts with Shepherd, noting that Brown did not offer jail-wide statistics or 

independent studies about the conditions in the jail. Id. Other cases draw a 

similar line, rejecting a challenge-to-conditions claim where the evidence does 

not show a systematic policy or failure. See, e.g., Brown v. Harris County, 409 

F. App’x 728, 731 (5th Cir. 2010) (classifying a “brutal” sexual assault as an 

episodic claim where the court found no evidence that sexual assaults were 

common in the jail and despite evidence of jail overcrowding introduced by the 

plaintiff); Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 1999) 

(holding that an allegation that officers failed to screen and secure treatment 

for an asthmatic detainee “fits the definition of the episodic omission”); Scott v. 

Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (rejecting a rape-victim 

plaintiff’s argument that her claim was a condition of confinement because 

understaffing allowed the assault to occur, and holding that the claim was 

episodic because the alleged harm was the assault itself). 

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Comparing these cases to the record, it is clear that Campos’s claim is 

for an episodic act or omission. Looking at the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Campos, he paints a picture of a mentally handicapped man whose 

verbal and nonverbal behavior should make his handicap obvious to observers. 

As a result of this obvious disability, Campos argues, Webb erred in not 

treating him as mentally handicapped and isolating him from certain inmates. 

Campos attempts to turn these acts into a jail conditions case by arguing that 

Webb had a policy of not segregating mentally handicapped inmates. He points 

to portions of the record where witnesses testified that Campos was dealt with 

according to policy, in order to demonstrate that Webb did not separate 

mentally handicapped inmates from the general population. 

Still, taking the evidence in Campos’ favor, it shows only that Webb 

made an error in failing to identify Campos’ illness and segregate him from the 

general population. Webb clearly screens its inmates for mental illnesses for 

the purpose of ensuring that inmates don’t harm themselves or others. The 

fact that Webb may have been negligent or careless in failing to identify 

Campos does not make this a jail conditions case. There is no evidence of a 

systematic failure or a policy at the jail to either not screen inmates for mental 

health problems or to house mentally handicapped inmates in the general 

population. 

Thus, we hold that the complaint alleges an episodic act. The complaint 

and record lack the required evidence of a policy or systematic failure required 

to show an unconstitutional condition of confinement. The district court did 

not err in considering this case under the episodic acts rubric. 

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III. Did the District Court Fail to Weigh the Evidence in the Light Most 

Favorable to Campos When It Held Campos Failed to Provide Sufficient 

Evidence of Subjective Deliberate Indifference? 

“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet.” Domino

v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). 

Negligence or even gross negligence is not enough. Hare, 74. F.3d at 650. 

Deliberate indifference exists where a plaintiff shows that officials “refused to 

treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or 

engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard 

for any serious medical needs.” Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th 

Cir. 1985). For example, an official who “replaced [a] female jailer, entered 

[plaintiff’s] cell, and sexually assaulted her repeatedly during the course of his 

eight-hour shift,” was deliberately indifferent. Scott, 114 F.3d at 52–53; see 

also Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 918–21 (10th Cir. 2008) (reversing a grant 

of summary judgment because plaintiff showed there was an issue of material 

fact regarding defendant’s deliberate indifference when she alleged that 

defendant knew of the dangerous condition, knew that sexual assaults 

occurred as a result of the condition, and failed to sufficiently address the 

condition). 

Contrastingly, the decision whether to provide additional treatment “is 

a classic example of a matter for medical judgment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Similarly, “failure to alleviate a significant risk that [the 

official] should have perceived, but did not” is not deliberate indifference. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1970).

The evidence presented does not demonstrate deliberate indifference in 

failing to protect. For example, though—reviewing the evidence in Campos’

favor—Macias should have known that Campos was mentally handicapped, 

there is no evidence that Macias suspected that his diagnosis was incorrect or 

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that he knew Campos would be harmed if he was not classified as mentally 

handicapped. Though Macias could have searched for Campos’ health records 

or conducted further tests, it was not indifferent to rely on his medical 

judgment and Campos’ own assertion that he was not mentally retarded. 

Similarly, though David Martinez, the classification officer, may have erred in 

housing Campos in a medium-high cell instead of a low-medium cell, there is 

no evidence that this mistake was made intentionally or with a wanton 

disregard for Campos’ well-being. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Martinez 

intended to place Campos in a low-medium cell for Campos’ benefit but made 

a mistake. Further, Campos has not provided evidence that the training or 

supervision provided by the jail was somehow defective. 

The evidence offered to show a failure to provide medical care also does 

not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. A detainee’s right to medical 

care is “violated if an officer acts with deliberate indifference to a substantial 

risk of serious medical harm and resulting injuries.” Mace v. City of Palestine, 

333 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2003). “[T]he correct legal standard is not whether 

the jail officers knew or should have known, but whether they had gained 

actual knowledge of the substantial risk . . . and responded with deliberate 

indifference.” Hare, 74 F.3d at 650 (internal quotations omitted). Here, as with 

the failure to protect analysis, we do not find that Campos has presented

sufficient evidence to conclude that Webb was deliberately indifferent to his 

medical needs before or after the alleged assault. 

Campos alleges that Webb knew he had been sexually assaulted once his 

mother reported it and yet did not provide him with appropriate medical care. 

In support of this he claims that the jail forced him to write a false statement 

that he had not been assaulted. Despite being screened by Macias for mental 

health issues after writing this statement, Campos argues that he was not 

given a physical evaluation and not identified as a victim of sexual assault.

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These actions, while clearly less than model, do not amount to deliberate 

indifference. First, Campos received a mental health review from Macias after 

the alleged assault. While Macias’ notes do not mention the sexual assault, 

which is concerning, the fact that Campos was provided an opportunity to meet 

with Macias cuts against the idea that the prison was deliberately indifferent 

to his medical needs. Second, though the allegation of rape alone suggests the 

need for physical evaluation, there is no indication that the jailers believed 

that Campos was suffering from any sort of physical injuries that required 

attention. Indeed, Ms. Campos’ report alleged that there was either an assault 

or a threat, thus, the jailers may have concluded that there were no physical 

injuries. Lastly, as the district court noted, there is no evidence that not 

receiving care during the four days between Ms. Campos’ report and Campos’

release on bond worsened his condition. This does not mean that there could 

not have been deliberate indifference, but it does support the argument that 

the jailers were not deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need during 

those four days. 

The evidence Campos presents to show that after the sexual assault 

Webb failed to provide him proper medical care is not without substance. 

Webb’s apparent failure to inform Macias about the alleged sexual assault 

before Campos’ mental health evaluation, in particular, is troubling. It does 

not, however, rise to the level of deliberate indifference. By comparison, 

Webb’s actions are neither of a piece with those in Scott, 114 F.3d at 53, nor 

clouded by a clear knowledge of an institutional danger as in Tafoya. 516 F.3d 

at 921. Webb’s actions do not demonstrate that Campos was “intentionally 

treated . . . incorrectly” or with “wanton disregard for any serious medical 

needs.” Johnson, 759 F.2d at 1238. Consequently, we hold that the district 

court did not err in granting summary judgment on the grounds that Campos 

failed to demonstrate Webb’s deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment. 

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