alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 4.1

 

STATEMENT REGARDING RESTRICTIONS ON

 

TRANSFERABILITY OF SHARES OF COMMON STOCK

 

(To Appear on Stock Certificate or to Be Sent upon Request

 

and without Charge to Stockholders Issued Shares without Certificates)

 

The Securities of Monogram Residential Trust, Inc. are subject to restrictions on Beneficial and Constructive Ownership and Transfer for the purpose of the Company’s maintenance of its status as a real estate investment trust under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Subject to certain further restrictions and except as expressly provided in this Charter, (i) no Person may Beneficially or Constructively Own Common Shares of the Company in excess of 9.8% (in value or number of Shares) of the outstanding Common Shares of the Company unless such Person is an Excepted Holder (in which case the Excepted Holder Limit shall be applicable); (ii) no Person may Beneficially or Constructively Own Preferred Shares of the Company in excess of 9.8% (in value or number of Shares) of the outstanding Preferred Shares of the Company unless such Person is an Excepted Holder (in which case the Excepted Holder Limit shall be applicable); (iii) no Person may Beneficially or Constructively Own Shares that would result in the Company being “closely held” under Section 856(h) of the Code or otherwise cause the Company to fail to qualify as a REIT; and (iv) no Person may Transfer Shares if such Transfer would result in the Shares of the Company being owned by fewer than one hundred (100) Persons. Any Person who Beneficially or Constructively Owns or attempts to Beneficially or Constructively Own Shares that cause or will cause a Person to Beneficially or Constructively Own Shares in excess or in violation of the above limitations must immediately notify the Company. If any of the restrictions on transfer or ownership are or would be violated, the Shares will be deemed to have automatically transferred to a Trustee of a Trust for the benefit of one or more Charitable Beneficiaries upon such transfer. In addition, the Company may redeem Shares upon the terms and conditions specified by the Board in its sole discretion if the Board determines that ownership or a Transfer or other event may violate the restrictions described above. Furthermore, upon the occurrence of certain events, attempted transfers in violation of the restrictions described above may be void ab initio.

 

All capitalized terms in this notice have the meanings defined in the Charter of the Company, as the same may be amended from time to time, a copy of which, including the restrictions on Transfer and ownership, will be furnished to each holder of Shares of the Company on request and without charge.

 

Note: Instead of the foregoing legend, the certificate may state that state that the Company will furnish information about the restrictions on transfer to the Stockholder on request and without charge.

 

1
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. Dollars
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1   
<CASH>                                         56,089
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  227,800
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               2,587,008
<PP&E>                                         54,578
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 6,234,769
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          3,635,050
<BONDS>                                        1,334,670
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     1,265,049
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   6,234,769
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               105,211
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               74,268
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                30,943
<INCOME-TAX>                                   15,561
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            15,382
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   15,382
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0
        


</TABLE>
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED DE CEMBER 31 , 2013

NO. 03
- 11
- 005 98
- CR

Cortez Williams, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM THE 147 TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY BEFOR E CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES ROSE AND GOODWIN MODIFIED AND, AS MODIFIED, AFFIRMED
-- OPINION BY JUSTICE GOODWIN

This is an appeal from the judgment s of conviction entered on September 1 5 , 2011. Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no reversible error
in the trial court’s judgment s of conviction

. However, the trial court’s judgments of conviction
in this case are modified to reflect that the sex offender registration requirements of Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure apply to Williams and to reflect that the age of the victim at the time of the offense was 13 years

. In addition, the judgment of conviction for indecency with a child by exposure is modified to reflect that the “Statu t e for Offense” is 21.11(a)(2)(B) of the Penal Code. As so modified , the trial court’s judgments of conviction are affirmed. It is further ordered that it appearing that the appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, that no adjudication as to costs is made

.
#### Adrian Marion SMITH, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. BRIDGESTONE NORTH AMERICA TIRE OPERATIONS LLC; Ford Motor Company; Richardson Patric Westbrook & Brickman LLC Law *301Firm; Terry E. Richardson, Jr., Attorney; Donnie Howard; Edward J. Westbrook, Attorney; Michael J. Brickman, Attorney; Charles W. Patric, Jr., Attorney, Defendants—Appellees.

No. 10-2208.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 31, 2011.

Decided: April 4, 2011.

Adrian Marion Smith, Appellant Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Adrian Marion Smith appeals from the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his civil action without prejudice and for lack of jurisdiction. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Smith v. Bridgestone North America Tire Operations, LLC,*No. 1:10-cv-01757-MBS, 2010 WL 4027972 (D.S.C. Oct. 14, 2010). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2853 

To require the purchase of domestically made flags of the United States 

of America for use by the Federal Government. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 12, 2009 

Mr. BRALEY of Iowa introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To require the purchase of domestically made flags of the 

United States of America for use by the Federal Government. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘All-American Flag 

5 Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT FOR PURCHASE OF DOMESTICALLY 

7 MADE UNITED STATES FLAGS FOR USE BY 

8 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 

9 Only such flags of the United States of America, re10 gardless of size, that are 100 percent manufactured in the 


tjames on PRODPC75 with BILLS
2 

•HR 2853 IH

1 United States, from articles, materials, or supplies 100 

2 percent of which are grown, produced, or manufactured 

3 in the United States, may be acquired for use by the Fed4 eral Government. 

5 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

6 Section 2 shall apply to purchases of flags made on 

7 or after 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 

8 Act. 

Æ 


tjames on PRODPC75 with BILLS
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Altair  Nanotechnologies  Inc. (the
"Company")  on Form 10-Q for the  quarterly  period ended June 30, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
I, Edward Dickinson,  Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ Edward H. Dickinson
----------------------------
    Edward H. Dickinson
    Chief Financial Officer
    August 13, 2003

This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed  filed by the  Company  for  purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**445 CAF 14-00178**  PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., CENTRA, PERADOTTO, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ.

IN THE MATTER OF DAVIANNA L. ------------------------------------------- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER MONROE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT;

DAVID R., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JANE YOON OF COUNSEL), PRO BONO APPEALS PROGRAM, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

MERIDETH H. SMITH, COUNTY ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (CAROL L. EISENMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

BRYAN S. OATHOUT, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD, ROCHESTER.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Monroe County (Joseph G. Nesser, J.), entered January 10, 2014 in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order, among other things, adjudged that respondent had permanently neglected the subject child and transferred guardianship and custody of the subject child to petitioner.

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: In this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, respondent father appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated his parental rights with respect to the subject child on the ground of permanent neglect and transferred guardianship and custody of the child to petitioner. We reject the father’s contention that petitioner failed to establish that it made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that petitioner presented the requisite clear and convincing evidence that the assigned caseworker made repeated and diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship between the child and the father, who was incarcerated, including through written correspondence and telephonic communication ( see Matter of Jaylysia S.-W. , 28 AD3d 1228, 1228-1229; see generally Matter of Alex C., Jr. [Alex C., Sr.] , 114 AD3d 1149, 1149-1150, lv denied 23 NY3d 901). Contrary to the father’s further contention, petitioner established that, despite those efforts, the father failed substantially and continuously or repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan appropriately for the child’s future ( see Alex C., Jr. , 114 AD3d at 1150; Matter of Whytnei B. [Jeffrey B.] , 77 AD3d 1340, 1341).**-2- 445 CAF 14-00178** 
“The [father’s] failure . . . to provide any ‘realistic and feasible’ alternative to having the child[ ] remain in foster care until [his] release from prison . . . supports a finding of permanent neglect” ( Matter of Gena S. [Karen M.] , 101 AD3d 1593, 1594, lv dismissed 21 NY3d 975).

Entered: May 1, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
EXHIBIT 32



Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of

the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



Elton Alderman, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Prolong International Corporation (the Company), and Nicolaas M. Rosier, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, each certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



|(1) | the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of the Company for the period ended June 30, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 780(d); and
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                          |  |  |  |                                                                                              
|------------------------- |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                          |  | 
|Dated: September 20, 2004 |  |  |  | /S/    ELTON
ALDERMAN                                                                        
|                          |  |  |  | Elton Alderman, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer (Principal Executive
Officer)
|                          |  | 
|Dated: September 20, 2004 |  |  |  | /S/    NICOLAAS M.
ROSIER                                                                    
|                          |  |  |  | Nicolaas M. Rosier, Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer)
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

PASCUAL FRANCISCO-PASCUAL,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 11-50037

D.C. No. 3:09-cr-04151-W-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Thomas J. Whelan, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 8, 2012** 

Pasadena, California

Before: D.W. NELSON, O’SCANNLAIN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Pascual Francisco-Pascual (Francisco) appeals his jury conviction for illegal

reentry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

FILED

FEB 14 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Generally, “a defendant is entitled to his proposed instruction even if his

evidence is weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.” United

States v. Espinoza-Baza, 647 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted). But while this standard is “somewhat generous,” the “trial record

must still contain evidence upon which the jury could rationally find for the

defendant.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a defendant must present

something more than a mere “scintilla of evidence” of national status “to warrant a

defense instruction on that theory.” See id.; United States v. Sotelo, 109 F.3d 1446,

1448 (9th Cir. 1997). 

“All citizens of the United States are also nationals. However, some

nationals are not citizens.” Perdomo-Padilla v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 964, 967 (9th

Cir. 2003). We have held that “a person can become a ‘national of the United

States’ . . . only through birth or naturalization.” Id. at 972. Today, “the only

remaining noncitizen nationals are residents of American Samoa and Swains

Island.” Id. at 967 (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 467 n.2 (1998)

(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by following the Ninth

Circuit Model Jury Instructions and rejecting Francisco’s requested jury

instruction, because Francisco did not present even a mere “scintilla of evidence”
3

of his status as a national of the United States. Francisco was born in Mexico. 

Thus, Francisco could not have become a national of the United States through

birth, because he was not born as a citizen national in the United States or as a

noncitizen national in American Samoa or Swains Island. Also, Francisco did not

offer any evidence that he was a national of the United States through

naturalization. Francisco’s requested instruction, as the district court determined,

therefore lacked a factual foundation in the evidence. Put otherwise, “no jury

could have found [Francisco] to be a national.” See Sotelo, 109 F.3d at 1448. 

AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT 31.1**Certification of the Principal Executive OfficerPursuant to 15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)(Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)I, Morris H. Wheeler, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Cohesant Technologies Inc. (the“Company”), certify that:(1) I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of the Company;(2) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary tomake the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered bythis report;(3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofthe Company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.(4) The Company’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company andwe have:(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to bedesigned under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the Company’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in thisreport our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of theperiod covered by this report based on such evaluation;and
 

 
(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the Company’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurredduring the Company’s most recent fiscal quarter (theCompany’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonablylikely to materially affect, the Company’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and(5) The Company’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the Company’s auditors and the audit committee of Company’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknessesin the design or operation of internal controls overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely toadversely affect the Company’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involvesmanagement or other employees who have a significant rolein the Company’s internal controls over financialreporting.   /s/ Morris H. Wheeler     Morris H. Wheeler  Cohesant Technologies Inc.  President and Chief Executive Officer     February 23, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

CHARLES WILLIAMS,

Petitioner

v.

THE STATE OF PA. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, JOHN WETZEL, AMANDA WEST, MICHAEL OVERMYER, DEPUTY SUPT. OBERLANDER, DEPUTY SUPT. HORTON, LT. HAGGERTY, MAJOR ENNIS, SGT. BLOSS, C.O. I BERRY, C.O. III WENTZ, C.O. IV DELIMPEW, C.O. I FRIEDLINE, MS. SIEGEL, MR. PERRY, MS. BLAKE, SGT. KRAFCZNSKI, C.O. I BARB AND

MR. BLICHA

Respondents :

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: No. 317 WAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 28th day of December, 2016

, the Petition for Allowance of

Appeal and Request for Permission to File a Reply are denied.
#### In the Matter of Ronald J. Gumbaz, Petitioner, v City of New York Department of Finance Parking Violations Operations, Respondent.

[987 NYS2d 144]

Determination of respondent, dated August 29, 2012, which found that petitioner violated New York City Traffic Rules (34 RCNY) § 4-08 (c) (3), unanimously annulled, on the law, without costs, the petition in this proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, New York County [Michael D. Stallman, J.], entered on or about May 1, 2013), granted, and respondent directed to remit to petitioner the $115 fine and $185 towing fee.

At a hearing held on the summons issued by respondent alleging that petitioner violated the traffic rules (34 RCNY 4-08 [c] [3]) by parking in a bus stop, petitioner submitted a series of high-quality photographs of the street where he was parked and provided sworn testimony explaining the photographs’ context and relationship to one another, which established that he was *511lawfully parked at a distance of approximately half a block from the bus stop, thereby rebutting the prima facie case established by the summons *(see*Vehicle and Traffic Law § 238 [1]; 19 RCNY 39-08 [f] [4]). Respondent failed to call any witness or to produce “additional evidence” to refute petitioner’s showing *(see Matter of Gruen v Parking Violations Bur. of City of N.Y.,*58 AD2d 48, 50 [1st Dept 1977]; *Matter of Rosen v New York City,*2014 NY Slip Op 30137[U], *5 [Sup Ct, NY County 2014]).

Concur—Acosta, J.E, DeGrasse, Richter, Manzanet-Daniels and Feinman, JJ.