In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1217

ROBIN MEADE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MORAINE VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 7950 — Samuel Der-Yeghiayan, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 8, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 30, 2014

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. In August 2013, Robin Meade wrote a 

letter to the League for Innovation in the Community College about her employer, Moraine Valley Community College. The letter was not complimentary. Meade, an adjunct 

faculty member at Moraine Valley, leveled multiple charges 

at the college regarding its poor treatment of adjuncts. These 

practices, she charged, harmed Moraine Valley’s students. 
2 No. 14-1217

She signed the letter in her capacity as president of the Moraine Valley Adjunct Faculty Organization, a union representing the college’s adjunct faculty. Two days later, Moraine 

Valley fired Meade. Its explanation for doing so was unusually frank: it sent her a written notice explicitly citing

Meade’s letter as the reason for its action. A few weeks later,

the college warned Meade that it would regard her further 

presence on campus as criminal trespass.

Believing that Moraine Valley retaliated against her for 

exercising her right to freedom of speech and violated her 

due process rights, Meade sued the college in federal district 

court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Moraine Valley persuaded the 

district court to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court 

first concluded that Meade’s letter did not address matters of 

public interest and thus could not serve as the basis of a First 

Amendment retaliation claim. It rejected Meade’s due process claim for lack of a cognizable property interest in her 

employment at the college. Both of these conclusions are incorrect, and so we must return this case to the district court 

for further proceedings.

I

Because this appeal comes to us from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we construe Meade’s complaint in the 

light most favorable to her and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Park v. Ind. Univ. Sch. of Dentistry, 692 F.3d 

828, 830 (7th Cir. 2012). In August 2013, Meade received a 

one-page document that set out the schedule of the courses 

she was assigned to teach that autumn at Moraine Valley, a 

community college in Palos Hills, Illinois. At the top of the 

document were the words “EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT”; 

it then listed three classes along with their start and end 
No. 14-1217 3

dates (August 19 through December 20), as well as Meade’s 

salary for the semester. At the bottom of the page, the words 

“employment agreement” appeared again, followed by two 

paragraphs of text. The text first noted that the agreement

incorporated “[d]uly established and published Board policy,” which was to be binding on the signing parties (Meade 

and Moraine Valley’s dean). It then stated that the document

was “not a full-time employment contract” and added 

“Should the need for indicated service not materialize, this 

agreement automatically becomes null and void.” Finally, it

said that the agreement could not “be considered a commitment on the part of the College for a future assignment.”

Shortly after receiving this document, Meade composed 

her letter to the League for Innovation in the Community 

College (LICC). Under the letterhead of the Moraine Valley 

Adjunct Faculty Organization (MVAFO), which she headed, 

Meade began by referring to a request the college had made 

to Meade and other union leaders to write letters supporting 

Moraine Valley’s reapplication for the LICC board. Meade 

explained in some detail why she did not wish to do so. She 

accused the college of treating adjunct faculty as “a disposable resource” and “a separate, lower class of people.” As evidence, Meade cited the fact that the administration allocated 

more resources to full-time faculty and staff, often leaving 

adjuncts “to fend for themselves.” She also noted that adjuncts were teaching 60% of Moraine Valley’s classes, meaning that student success rates depended more on adjunct instructors than their full-time equivalents. She criticized the 

college’s decision to prohibit adjuncts from working on an 

hourly basis. As a result, Meade wrote, adjuncts could not 

spend extra time tutoring students. This contributed, she 

implied, to the problem of high failure rates in developmen-
4 No. 14-1217

tal classes at the college. Elsewhere in the letter, Meade 

wrote that the college was underpaying adjuncts, denying 

them access to health care, and denying them certain classes 

without explanation. All of this, Meade told LICC, “has created a chilling effect which affects adjunct performance and 

erodes the confidence the idyllic atmosphere and beautiful 

buildings and grounds strive to project.”

Meade sent her letter to LICC on August 20, 2013. On 

August 22, she received a notice of job termination from Andrew Duren, Moraine Valley’s executive vice president. Duren told Meade that LICC had sent a copy of her letter to the 

college, and the college did not like what it saw. The letter 

was “replete with misrepresentations and falsehoods,” Duren wrote, along with “irresponsible rhetoric” that was “disruptive and not consistent with the best interests of the College.” Duren added that the letter was not responsible advocacy on behalf of Meade’s union, but rather “a personal attempt to falsely discredit” the college and undermine its relationship with LICC. Because this behavior did not coincide 

with the college’s best interests, Duren wrote, Meade’s job 

there was terminated effective immediately. A little over two 

weeks later—the record is silent about what happened in the 

interim—Meade received an email from the chief of Moraine 

Valley’s police force announcing that any future visits she 

made to the college campus would be considered criminal 

trespass.

Meade responded to these events by suing Moraine Valley. Her complaint set out three theories, two of which concern us here. (The district court dismissed without prejudice 

a third claim under Illinois law; Meade has not appealed 

from that ruling.) First, Meade alleged that her firing and 
No. 14-1217 5

banishment from campus were in retaliation for her exercise 

of her First Amendment right to free speech (applicable to 

the state through the Fourteenth Amendment). Second, she 

contended that her employment contract for Fall 2013 created a property interest, which Moraine Valley revoked without due process. As we noted earlier, the district court granted Moraine Valley’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, and Meade now appeals.

II

We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to state a 

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. 

Batson v. Live Nation Entm’t, 746 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Meade begins her appeal with her retaliation claim, and 

so do we. Meade’s ability to press this claim depends on 

whether the speech that prompted her termination was constitutionally protected. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 

(2006). The first part of that inquiry, and the one the district 

court found dispositive, asks whether Meade’s speech related to a matter of public concern. Id. A teacher such as Meade 

cannot be fired for exercising her right of free speech on such 

matters. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 

Will Cnty., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). If, however, Meade’s 

overall point in writing the letter was to express a purely 

personal grievance, then the First Amendment will not help 

her. Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979, 986 (7th Cir. 

2013); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). The 

Supreme Court has defined “public concern” to mean “legitimate news interest,” or “a subject of general interest and of 

value and concern to the public at the time of publication.” 

City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam). In deciding whether Meade’s letter fits this description, 
6 No. 14-1217

we consider its content, its form, and the context in which it 

was written. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. Of these three considerations, content is the most important. Chaklos v. Stevens, 

560 F.3d 705, 714 (7th Cir. 2009). We also must take care not 

to place undue weight on Meade’s apparent motive in writing her letter, in particular whether it was personal or not. 

Rather, we look at “the overall objective or point” of the letter 

to determine whether it discussed matters of public concern. 

Kristofek, 712 F.3d at 985. (One side note: although Garcetti

held that a public employee’s statements made pursuant to 

her official duties cannot provide the basis for a retaliation 

claim, see 547 U.S. at 421, Moraine Valley concedes that 

Meade had no employer-imposed duty to write her letter.)

Applying these standards, we have no trouble concluding that Meade’s letter discussed several matters of public 

concern. In fact, the letter contained almost no content personal to Meade. Although she informed LICC that she had 

turned down Moraine Valley’s request to support its reapplication as an LICC board member, she said nothing about her 

own experiences or gripes. Rather, she emphasized that she 

was writing as the head of a union whose members were

concerned about the way the college treated them as a 

group. The letter’s multiple references to the difficulties facing all Moraine Valley’s adjuncts remove it from the realm of 

the purely personal. And Meade is not alone in expressing

concern about the treatment of adjuncts. Colleges and universities across the country are targets of increasing coverage 

and criticism regarding their use of adjunct faculty. See, e.g., 

Sydni Dunn, Colleges Are Slashing Adjuncts’ Hours to Skirt 

New Rules on Health-Insurance Eligibility, CHRON. OF HIGHER 

EDUC. (Apr. 22, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article/CollegesCurb-Adjuncts-Hours/138653; Rachel L. Swarns, Crowded 
No. 14-1217 7

Out of Ivory Tower, Adjuncts See a Life Less Lofty, N.Y. Times, 

Jan. 20, 2014, at A11; Lewis Wallace, Adjunct Professors Demand Inclusion in Health Care Reforms, WBEZ NEWS (Mar. 11, 

2013), http://www.wbez.org/news/adjunct-professorsdemand-inclusion-health-care-reforms-106034. (All websites 

cited in this opinion were last visited Oct. 29, 2014.)

Meade’s attempt to link the treatment of adjunct faculty 

to student performance underscores the public dimension of 

her comments. She twice remarked on the effect of ill treatment of adjuncts on student performance and provided evidence for this accusation by reporting the percentage of classes that adjuncts teach at Moraine Valley. She then observed 

that adjuncts’ inability to teach and work on an hourly basis 

had compromised their ability to tutor students (at least for 

compensation, we assume). It is difficult to see how any part 

of this discussion could be considered purely personal to 

Meade, or of zero interest to the public. The people who attend Moraine Valley, along with their families and others

who live in the area, no doubt want to know if this practice 

poses a threat to student performance.

The district court did not understand the letter this way, 

apparently because Meade herself taught as an adjunct and 

thus would be affected by any changes in policy. But such an 

approach disregards Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72, in which 

the Supreme Court noted that public employees as a class 

may often be the best informed on matters of public concern 

related to their jobs. More generally, the district court failed 

to consider the broader nature of Meade’s comments. It criticized Meade’s discussion of student interests as cursory—a 

flaw that undermined the public quality of the comments, it 

thought. Yet we have never held that speech that is partly 
8 No. 14-1217

about a matter of public interest but also touches on private 

concerns is without constitutional protection. Indeed, we 

held the opposite in Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 

F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2013). There, a high school guidance 

counselor’s book of relationship advice contained provocative, racy sections that would not in isolation be considered 

of interest to the public. But we concluded that the book as a 

whole covered topics of public concern insofar as it explored 

the dynamics of adult relationships; an array of recent articles showed that the public was indeed interested in the topic. Meade’s letter presents an even stronger case for protection. Even if the district court were correct that Meade’s references to student success were cursory, the remainder of 

her letter still discussed the treatment of adjuncts, which easily qualifies as a topic of public interest. As we said in Craig, 

a topic of public concern need not “relate to an issue of exceptional significance” or “address a topic of great societal 

importance.” Id. at 1116.

Moraine Valley’s arguments to the contrary focus in part

on Meade’s motive in writing the letter, but that is beside the 

point. As we already have explained, a person’s motive is not 

dispositive in the analysis of whether a communication discusses issues of public concern. In a case such as this one, 

where the content of the letter touches on multiple topics in 

which the public would be interested, the writer’s motive 

(whatever it may be—recall that this case is before us on a 

motion to dismiss and the record contains little beyond the 

letter itself) is useful only to the extent that it may shed light 

on ambiguous statements. Moraine Valley also argues that 

Meade’s letter warrants no protection because it was sent 

privately. But the college cites no authority for such an unqualified proposition. Worse, it fails to acknowledge that 
No. 14-1217 9

Meade was transmitting her criticisms to an organization 

(the LICC) that includes 800 member institutions and 160 

corporate partners. See About the League, LEAGUE FOR 

INNOVATION IN THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE, http://www.

league.org/league/about/about_main.htm. That is hardly 

confidential. And quite obviously, the letter got around; despite its ostensibly private nature, Moraine Valley had a copy 

and fired Meade within two days of her sending it.

The content of Meade’s letter places it squarely among 

matters that are of public concern. The district court thus 

erred in concluding that her speech was not constitutionally 

protected. Because it resolved the case at that point, the court 

did not address the other two issues her case raises: whether 

the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the retaliatory action, and whether the defendant can show that it 

would have taken the same action without the existence of 

the protected speech. See Chaklos, 560 F.3d at 711. We think it 

best for the district court to have the first look at those issues 

on remand. 

III

Our conclusion is similar with regard to Meade’s procedural due process claim. In her complaint, Meade alleged

that Moraine Valley should not have fired her without 

providing her with notice and an opportunity to contest the 

decision. Meade has to satisfy three requirements in order to 

show that Moraine Valley violated her right to due process. 

The first, and the only one that concerns us here, is demonstration of a cognizable property interest. (The other two requirements are that the defendant deprived her of that interest and that it did so in a way that violated due process 

standards. Price v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 755 F.3d 605, 
10 No. 14-1217

607 (7th Cir. 2014).) To demonstrate a cognizable property 

interest in her job at Moraine Valley, Meade must be able to 

show that she had some legitimate expectation of continued 

employment at the college. That expectation can arise 

through contractual language limiting the college’s discretion to fire her. See Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 

604 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 

408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (a plaintiff can show an expectation 

of entitlement to employment through “mutually explicit 

understandings” between employee and employer). State 

law (here, that of Illinois) defines the extent of Meade’s 

property interest in her continued employment. Redd v. Nolan, 663 F.3d 287, 296 (7th Cir. 2011).

Meade’s one-page employment agreement is a spare 

document. It has two components: first, a listing of classes, 

with dates, course numbers, and Meade’s pay for the semester; and second, four sentences of legalistic language that set 

forth a series of caveats. At no point does the agreement state 

that Meade’s employment could be terminated only for 

cause, nor does it say that her employment was at-will and 

terminable at any time. The latter would have been unnecessary, in light of Illinois’s well-settled rule that “the terms of 

employment must provide that termination will only be for 

cause or otherwise evince mutually explicit understandings 

of continued employment” in order for there to be a property interest in employment. Cromwell v. City of Momence, 713 

F.3d 361, 364 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Meade’s agreement, however, contained language that 

“otherwise evinces” such a mutual understanding. The 

course numbers and corresponding dates define what work 

Meade was to do for Moraine Valley, during what specific 

period, and for what pay.
No. 14-1217 11

We long ago observed that “[a] term of employment set 

by contract has been recognized as a property interest which 

the state cannot extinguish without conforming to the dictates of procedural due process.” Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior Coll. 

Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir. 1972). In Illinois, 

there is an exception to the presumption that employment is 

at-will for work that is of a specified, fixed duration. See, e.g.,

Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores, 568 N.E.2d 827, 835 (Ill. 1990) (“It 

is still the general rule, that an employment relationship 

without a fixed duration is terminable at will by either party.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. George J. 

Ball, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 1355, 1358 (Ill. App. 1993) (“In general, 

an employment contract is terminable at will by either party 

unless the contract itself specifies a different durational 

term.”) (citing Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 

N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ill. 1987)). The course schedule on Meade’s 

employment agreement provided specific starting and ending dates for her teaching responsibilities and told her what 

she would be paid for doing so. This was sufficient to provide Meade with an expectation of employment at Moraine 

Valley during the specified time, and thus a cognizable 

property interest in working at the college during that period. (Notably, the employment agreement cautioned that she 

had no guarantee of future employment; thus, she could not 

have complained under the Due Process Clause if the college 

had simply announced that it was not going to renew her 

contract for the spring semester.) 

In concluding otherwise, the district court did not adequately take into account Illinois’s rule that employment 

with a fixed duration provides an exception to the at-will 

presumption. It sought instead to distinguish the facts of 

Hostrop from Meade’s while ignoring our recognition there 
12 No. 14-1217

that “[a] person is deprived of property if the government 

extinguishes his legitimate claim of entitlement to his job,” 

471 F.3d at 494, and that “[a] term of employment set by contract has been recognized as a property interest which the 

state cannot extinguish without conforming to the dictates of 

procedural due process.” Id. The district court also pointed 

to our acknowledgment in Cromwell of the at-will presumption for employment in Illinois. But we were not dealing in 

Cromwell with employment of fixed length. The employee in 

that case relied not on a contract as the source of his expectation of continued employment but on municipal disciplinary 

regulations. See Cromwell, 713 F.3d at 362–63. We also reiterated in Cromwell that terms of employment can create a 

property interest if they “evince mutually explicit understandings of continued employment.” Id. at 364. In this case, 

that mutual understanding is present in Meade’s specified 

duration of employment.

There was also a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 

between Meade’s union and Moraine Valley. Although it did 

not feature in the district court’s decision, the parties devote 

some attention on appeal to the question whether the CBA

extinguished any property interest she may have had in her 

employment. The CBA was an exhibit to the college’s motion 

to dismiss. We may consult it because Meade did not object 

to its consideration. It provides that MVAFO members are 

at-will employees and that Moraine Valley can terminate 

them at its discretion. Moraine Valley argues that Meade was 

subject to the CBA, which deemed her an at-will employee 

and thus left her without a property interest in her employment at the college. But Meade had a more specific agreement with the college, and her personal employment agreement says nothing about the CBA. It does incorporate 
No. 14-1217 13

“[d]uly established and published Board policy,” but there is 

nothing to suggest that this general language included the 

CBA. We cannot assume, adversely to Meade, that it did. 

The relation between the CBA and Meade’s own employment agreement is not clear from the pleadings, and so we 

cannot conclude at this stage that the CBA blocks Meade’s 

claim.

The same is true of other language in Meade’s employment agreement. Although Meade agreed that she was not a 

full-time employee and that she was not entitled to fringe 

benefits, doing so did not automatically make her an at-will 

employee. Nor did the agreement’s provision permitting the 

college to declare the agreement null and void should the 

need for Meade’s services “not materialize” have that effect.

This passage might mean, for example, that Moraine Valley 

was permitted to cancel the agreement only if an adequate 

number of students failed to register for Meade’s classes. It 

does not provide a basis to dismiss Meade’s complaint for 

failure to state a claim. The same is true of the agreement’s 

language providing that it was not a commitment for a future assignment; Meade is arguing only that she had a property interest in her assignment to work for the Fall 2013 semester.

On a final note, Meade argues in her opening brief that 

Moraine Valley stigmatized her by accusing her of dishonesty in the letter terminating her employment. This stigma, she 

argues, impinged upon her liberty interests and was defamatory per se. The college points out that Meade did not mention stigmatization in her complaint, and on that basis it argues that it could not have been on notice that she intended 

to raise it. See Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 538 F.3d 797, 
14 No. 14-1217

801–02 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff “may not amend the complaint on appeal to state a new claim” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Yet Meade did assert that she suffered 

harm to her reputation. This theory, however, runs squarely 

into the Supreme Court’s decision in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 

693 (1976), which holds that a generalized interest in reputation is neither “liberty” nor “property” for purposes of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 712. Meade contends that we 

should follow Second Circuit law to the effect that damaging 

information in a public employee’s personnel file will almost 

certainly be released to future employers. See Valmonte v. 

Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1000 (2d Cir. 1994). That rule is contrary to 

our circuit’s requirement that a plaintiff show publication of 

the stigmatizing information. See, e.g., Palka v. Shelton, 

623 F.3d 447, 454-55 (7th Cir. 2010). Thus, even taking into 

account the fact that complaints need not plead legal theories, see McDonald v. Household Int’l, Inc., 425 F.3d 424, 427–28 

(7th Cir. 2005), Meade has failed to allege a deprivation of a 

protected liberty interest. 

IV

Although Meade may not pursue a due process claim 

based on the deprivation of a liberty interest, she has pleaded enough to go forward on the theory that the college deprived her of a protected property interest. She has also stated a claim for retaliation in violation of her First Amendment rights. We therefore REVERSE the district court’s decision granting Moraine Valley’s motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.