United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-40606

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Pasquale Theodore Salas, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:22-CR-12-1

______________________________

Before King, Stewart, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Pasquale Theodore Salas (“Salas”) pleaded guilty to one count of 

sexual exploitation of a minor child in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) & (e),

and one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) & (b)(2). The district court imposed a 384-month sentence 

of imprisonment and 15 years of supervised release. Salas now appeals. For 

the following reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 7, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2019, Salas was convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor and 

cyberstalking, following a guilty plea for engaging in a virtual sexual 

relationship with a minor in Massachusetts. He was sentenced to 220 months 

in prison. During the Massachusetts investigation, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation discovered that Salas had engaged in sexual acts in Texas with 

his minor adoptive sister, recorded those acts on video, and took sexually 

explicit photographs of her as she slept. A grand jury returned a two-count 

indictment charging Salas with: (1) sexual exploitation of a minor child in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) & (e) and (2) possession of child 

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) & (b)(2). He pleaded

guilty to both counts of the indictment.

Salas received three criminal history points for his conviction of sexual 

exploitation of a minor and cyberstalking arising from his felonious conduct 

with the Massachusetts minor. With a total offense level of 40 and a criminal 

history category of II, Salas’s Guidelines range was determined to be 324 to 

405 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Salas to 360 

months on Count One and a consecutive 24 months on Count Two, for a 

total term of 384 months in prison concurrent to the Massachusetts sentence. 

The court imposed 15 years of supervised release on Count One and a 

concurrent 5-year term of supervised release on Count Two. The court 

waived the imposition of a fine and the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act 

assessment, but imposed a $100 special assessment per count. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews “the substantive reasonableness of the sentence 

imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “[Our] review is highly deferential as the sentencing 

judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under [18 

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U.S.C.] § 3553(a) with respect to a particular defendant.” United States v. 

CamposMaldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 50–

51). “The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that 

a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the 

district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

“[I]f the defendant does not preserve a claim of . . . substantive 

unreasonableness in the district court, plain error review applies.” United 

States v. Sepulveda, 64 F.4th 700, 709 (5th Cir. 2023). “First, there must be 

an error that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned.” MolinaMartinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 194 (2016). “Second, the error must

be plain—that is to say, clear or obvious.” Id. “Third, the error must have 

affected the defendant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means 

he or she must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted). “Once these three conditions have been met, 

the court of appeals should exercise its discretion to correct the forfeited 

error if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Salas argues that the district court’s consideration of his

socio-economic status as a police officer rendered his within-guidelines 

sentence substantively unreasonable. Salas also argues that this purported 

error affected his substantial rights because “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for the error, the district court would have imposed a lower 

sentence.” In support of this argument, he asserts that: (1) he “did not 

commit any new offenses after having been arrested and prosecuted in 

Massachusetts”; (2) the “conduct underlying the convictions occurred 

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during the same timeframe, and the fact that [he] happened to be prosecuted 

and sentenced in Massachusetts first and then in Texas increased his 

Guidelines range by about three years”; and (3) “the only case-specific 

reason the district court articulated for the 384-month sentence imposed was 

the improper factor of [his] status as a law enforcement officer.” We are 

unpersuaded.

The record establishes that the district court sentenced Salas to 384 

months in prison, which falls within the Guidelines imprisonment range of 

324 to 405 months for his convictions. Salas did not object to the advisory 

Guidelines range calculated in the initial Presentence Investigation Report. 

Furthermore, although Salas requested a downward variance to a sentence of 

247 months’ incarceration concurrent with the sentence he was serving from 

the Massachusetts case, the district court was under no obligation to accept 

his request. See United States v. Duke, 788 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2015)

(citing United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005)). 

“If the sentencing judge exercises [his] discretion to impose a 

sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range, in our reasonableness 

review we will infer that the judge has considered all the factors for a fair 

sentence set forth in the Guidelines.” Mares, 402 F.3d at 519. While Mares

indicates that it will be “rare” for a reviewing court to find a sentence within 

the Guidelines to be “unreasonable,” the district court is still required to 

state its reasons for its imposition of a particular sentence in open court if the 

sentence range exceeds 24 months. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1).

Here, the district court stated that Salas’s occupation as a law 

enforcement officer was considered in determining the appropriate sentence. 

Because the record does not illuminate any of the other implied 

considerations, and because § 3553(c)(1) mandated that the district court 

explicitly state its reasoning in open court, it would not be unreasonable to 

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infer that Salas’s occupation was a strong consideration for the issuance of 

the 384-month sentence. Even if we were to concede this point, however, 

Salas still fails to demonstrate that his substantial rights were violated in 

accordance with the third prong of the plain error analysis. 

To show that his substantial rights were affected, Salas must 

demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the error of improperly 

relying on his socio-economic status as a law enforcement officer, the 

outcome of the sentencing proceeding would have been different. See MolinaMartinez, 578 U.S. at 194. In support of his position, Salas cites to United 

States v. Chandler where we emphasized that “a defendant’s socio-economic 

status is never relevant to sentencing.” 732 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2013 

(quoting United States v. Burch, 873 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1989)). In that 

case, we concluded that a district court had done so when it relied entirely on 

a defendant’s employment as a police officer but emphasized that “[i]f a 

defendant police officer abuses his position by using it to facilitate the 

offense, his position is an appropriate sentencing factor.” Id. at 439.

Conversely, however, the Supreme Court has previously held that “highly 

relevant—if not essential—to the selection of an appropriate sentence is the 

possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life 

and characteristics.” Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 488 (2011)

(cleaned up). Unlike in Chandler, where the facts of the case did not establish

that the defendant used his status as a law enforcement officer to facilitate 

criminal conduct, the record before this court is replete with evidence of 

Salas using his position as a law enforcement officer in furtherance of his 

criminal activity. The district court emphasized Salas’s use of his status to 

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victimize multiple minors.1 Therefore, we conclude that the district court did 

not plainly err by imposing the within-guidelines sentence of 384-months of 

imprisonment and 15 years of supervised release.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court. 

_____________________

1 As the Government points out on appeal, “Salas does not address the fact that he 

used his law enforcement officer position to victimize the two minors in Massachusetts. He 

doesn’t claim his abuse of the Massachusetts minors was irrelevant to the instant 

sentencing proceeding. He also does not explicitly assert that the district court erred in 

considering that conduct.” 

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