alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material

assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th

Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JUN 2 2000

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

vs.

CARLOS ALBERTO ESTUPINAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 99-6378

(D.C. No. 99-CR-15)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.**

Defendant-Appellant Carlos Estupinan appeals from his conviction of

conspiracy to distribute cocaine powder, 21 U.S.C. § 846. He was sentenced to

78 months imprisonment and five years supervised release. On appeal, he

contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a downward

departure on the misapprehension that it lacked the authority to depart under 18
- 2 -

U.S.C. § 3553(b).

Mr. Estupinan sought a downward departure under § 3553(b) and USSG

§ 5K2.0 on the grounds that the sentence in this case will have unusually harsh

effects on him and his family because of his status a deportable alien. In

response, the trial court determined that the ground urged for departure “just does

not qualify under this Court’s understanding of the controlling authorities so as to

remove it from the heartland of cases or sufficiently distinguish his case as would

be required to grant the defendant’s request . . . .” Sent. Tr. (Sept. 7, 1999) at 61. 

We have reviewed the sentencing transcript, including the authority cited therein,

and conclude that, on balance, the trial court was aware of its authority to depart

and chose not to exercise it. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to review

the district court’s decision not to depart and DISMISS the appeal. See United

States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 887-888 (10th Cir. 1998).

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr.

Circuit Judge
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996             DEC-31-1996
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<CASH>                                     134,100,000              22,469,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                              315,173,000             232,846,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                20,331,000              17,328,000
<INVENTORY>                                174,991,000             142,870,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0                       0
<PP&E>                                      30,062,000              14,612,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             711,028,000             445,884,000
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<BONDS>                                    445,864,000             236,122,000
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<COMMON>                                       356,000                 330,000
<OTHER-SE>                                 195,072,000             126,095,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               711,028,000             445,884,000
<SALES>                                    210,261,000             182,300,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                           249,285,000             219,847,000
<CGS>                                       54,317,000              48,218,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              149,074,000             137,258,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            49,741,000              50,104,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             6,013,000               8,311,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          18,037,000              17,245,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             26,420,000               6,929,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                10,387,000             (4,105,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         16,033,000              11,034,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                15,267,000              11,034,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.42                    0.40
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.42                    0.40
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                   EXHIBIT 32.01


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of CyberGuard Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-K/A for the year ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Patrick
J. Clawson, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
         material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
         the Company.



/s/ Patrick J. Clawson
-----------------------
Patrick J. Clawson
Chief Executive Officer
October 26, 2005


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to CyberGuard Corporation and will be retained by Corporation and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 99.2

                LIVESTAR ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


     In connection with the Quarterly Report of Livestar
Entertainment Group, Inc.  (the Company) on Form 10-Q
for the period ending June 30, 2003, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Edwin Kwong, Principal Financial Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of1934; and
(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Edwin Kwong
---------------------------------------
Edwin Kwong
Principal Financial Officer
August 19, 2003

     A signed original of this written statement required by
Section 906 has been provided to Livestar Entertainment
Group, Inc. and will be retained by Livestar Entertainment
Group, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Boslow Family Limited Partnership et al., Appellants, v Kaplan & Kaplan, PLLC, et al., Respondents.

[860 NYS2d 526]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy Friedman, J.), entered November 1, 2007, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred and denied plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing defendants’ second affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Since plaintiffs’ claim, while cast in contract, is essentially that defendants failed to perform services in a professional, nonnegligent manner, it is governed by the three-year statute of limitations *(Matter of R.M. Kliment & Frances Halsband, Architects [McKinsey & Co., Inc.],*3 NY3d 538 [2004]). Plaintiffs have not identified any particular provision of a written retainer agreement whereby defendants contracted to provide a particular result above and beyond what they might be expected to accomplish using due care *(id.*at 542-543; *see also Sarasota, Inc. v Kurzman & Eisenberg, LLP,*28 AD3d 237 [2006]). Concur— Lippman, P.J., Tom, Andrias and Saxe, JJ. [See 2007 NY Slip Op 33554(U).]
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-50643

Summary Calendar

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Adrian Christopher Aguilar, 

Defendant—Appellant.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:19-CR-181-1

______________________________

Before Elrod, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Adrian 

Christopher Aguilar has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in 

accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States 

v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Aguilar has filed a response. The 

record is not sufficiently developed to allow us to make a fair evaluation of 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 15, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-50643 Document: 50-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/15/2024
No. 23-50643

2

Aguilar’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial 

misconduct; we therefore decline to consider the claims without prejudice to 

collateral review. See United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Corbett, 742 F.2d 173, 176–78 (5th Cir. 1984). We DENY

Aguilar’s request to seal his pro se response. See S.E.C. v. Van Waeyenberghe, 

990 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1993).

We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the 

record reflected therein, as well as Aguilar’s response. We concur with 

counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for 

appellate review. Accordingly, the motion for leave to withdraw is 

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and 

the appeal is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2.

Case: 23-50643 Document: 50-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/15/2024
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                          5

<S>                                                  <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                      12-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                  dec-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                       dec-31-1997
<CASH>                                                        739,701
<SECURITIES>                                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                              10,694,629
<ALLOWANCES>                                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                                    0
<PP&E>                                                              0
<DEPRECIATION>                                                      0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                            170,290,581
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                               0
<BONDS>                                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                               0
<PREFERRED>                                                         0
<COMMON>                                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                                 78,274,435
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                              170,290,581
<SALES>                                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                           36,485,165
<CGS>                                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                       0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                           30,424,531
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                              364,852
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                          7,993,746
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                            (2,297,964)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                        (2,297,964)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                     0
<CHANGES>                                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                               (2,297,964)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                                       0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                                       0



</TABLE>
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC
REPORT


As
adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the third quarter ended
March 31, 2010 of Integrated BioPharma, Inc. (the “Company”) as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), E. Gerald
Kay, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Integrated BioPharma,
Inc.certifies,
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, that to his knowledge:





(1)
            the
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
      and





(2)
            the
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





This
certification accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.





A signed
original of this written statement has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.








Date:  May 19,
      2010
            
            By:
            /s/ E Gerald
      KayE. Gerald
      KayPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer
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#### Miguel Angel MARTINEZ, Alba Rosa Cadavid De M., a.k.a. Alba Rosa Cadavid-De Martinez, Petitioners, v. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.

No. 10-10704.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 12, 2011.

Miguel Angel Mendizabal Freire, Orlando, FL, for Miguel Angel Martinez.

Joseph D. Hardy, David Bernal, Yedidya Cohen, Krystal Samuels, U.S. Department of Justice-Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Michelle Ressler, District Counsel’s Office USICE, Miami, FL, for U.S. Attorney General.

*876Before MARTIN, FAY and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Colombian natives and citizens Miguel Martinez and his wife, Alba Rosa Cadavid De M, proceeding *pro se,*appeal the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA’s) denial of their motion to reconsider a previous BIA order, which in turn affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) decision finding them ineligible for asylum and denying their application for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1231 and denying relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c), 1208.18. “We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion.” *Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,*504 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir.2007). Our review is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the manner in which it was exercised has been arbitrary or capricious. *See Abdi v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,*430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining the abuse of discretion standard in the context of a motion to reopen).

“A motion to reconsider shall state the reasons for the motion by specifying the errors of fact or law in the prior [BIA] decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1). A motion to reconsider that merely reiterates arguments previously presented to the BIA does not substitute specifying errors of facts or law as required for a successful motion to reconsider. *Calle,*504 F.3d at 1329 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)).

Martinez’s motion to reconsider failed to identify any errors of fact or law in the BIA’s prior decision upholding the IJ’s denial of his application. Instead, Martinez merely reargued he was eligible for withholding of removal and extraordinary circumstances excused the untimely filing of his asylum application. Martinez reiterated that the FARC persecuted him because of an imputed political opinion, and that he faced persecution if he returned to Colombia. Martinez previously advanced those arguments before the BIA. Therefore, the BIA’s decision to deny Martinez’s motion was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Accordingly, we deny Martinez’s petition for review.

PETITION DENIED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Shakeem Richardson, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 445]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Plug, J.), rendered December 21, 1995, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts) and criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial after a hearing (Golia, J.), of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contentions concerning the suppression of the in-court and out-of-court identifications are, in part, unpreserved for appellate review *(see, People v Kern,*149 AD2d 187, *affd*75 NY2d 638, *cert denied*498 US 824). In any event, the hearing court properly concluded that the police officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant *(see, People v Kelland,*171 AD2d 885; *People v Miller,*149 AD2d 538; *People v Diaz,*103 AD2d 82), and, therefore, the identification testimony was properly admitted.

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80).

The defendant’s remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit. O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Thompson and Joy, JJ., concur.
GCEAR2 - Exhibit 10.4 Schedule of Omitted Documents


EXHIBIT 10.4




Schedule of Omitted Documents
of Griffin Capital Essential Asset REIT II, Inc.


The following notes have not been filed as an exhibit pursuant to Instruction 2 of Item 601 of Regulation S-K; these documents are substantially identical in all material respects, except as noted below, to Exhibit 10.2 to this Form 8­K:


		
	1.
	Note payable to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. in the amount of $42,500,000.00, dated December 12, 2014.


		
	2.
	Note payable to Capital One, N.A. in the amount of $35,000,000.00, dated December 12, 2014.


		
	3.
	Note payable to Fifth Third Bank in the amount of $35,000,000.00, dated December 12, 2014.


		
	4.
	Note payable to SunTrust Bank in the amount of $35,000,000.00, dated December 12, 2014.


		
	5.
	Note payable to Wells Fargo Bank, National Association in the amount of $35,000,000.00, dated December 12, 2014.


		
	6.
	Note payable to Bank of America, N.A. in the amount of $25,000,000.00, dated December 12, 2014.
#### Laura REYES-ORTIZ, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-71652.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed March 10, 2011.

Patrick Joseph Sandoval, Esquire, Gallagher Sandoval, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.

OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, CAC-District Counsel, Esquire, Office of The District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of The District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Laura Reyes-Ortiz, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her motion to reopen deportation proceedings conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. *Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft,*383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), *amended by*404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005). We deny the petition for review.

The *agency*did not abuse its discretion in denying Reyes-Ortiz’s motion to reopen based on lack of notice where the record *727establishes that she was personally served with an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) and Notice of Hearing, written in both English and Spanish. There was no statutory requirement that the OSC be orally translated. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2), (3) (1995); *see also Matter of Hernandez,*21 I. & N. Dec. 224, 226-27 (BIA 1996).

Reyes-Ortiz’s remaining contentions are unavailing.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.