alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3096 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3096

 To provide additional housing assistance for certain individuals and 
           households adversely affected by a major disaster.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 26, 2009

 Mr. Hinchey introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide additional housing assistance for certain individuals and 
           households adversely affected by a major disaster.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCREASED HOUSING ASSISTANCE.

    The amendments made by section 686 of the Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006 (120 Stat. 1448) shall apply to an 
individual or household adversely affected by a major disaster that 
occurred on or after January 1, 2006.
                                 <all>
```
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2942 

To appropriate to the Highway Trust Fund the unobligated balances of 

funds made available by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 

of 2009. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 18, 2009 

Mr. MARIO DIAZ-BALART of Florida (for himself, Mr. COBLE, Mr. WESTMORELAND, Mrs. MILLER of Michigan, Mr. SCHOCK, Mr. NUNES, Mr. 

JOHNSON of Illinois, Mr. CAO, Mr. LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART of Florida, 

and Mr. PLATTS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Appropriations 

A BILL 

To appropriate to the Highway Trust Fund the unobligated 

balances of funds made available by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Highway Trust Fund 

5 Reclamation Act’’. 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
2 

•HR 2942 IH

1 SEC. 2. APPROPRIATION OF UNOBLIGATED STIMULUS 

2 FUNDS TO HIGHWAY TRUST FUND. 

3 (a) RESCISSIONS.—Effective on July 15, 2009, any 

4 unobligated balances available on such date of funds made 

5 available by division A of the American Recovery and Re6 investment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–5), other than 

7 under the heading ‘‘FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRA8 TION—HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT’’ in title 

9 XII of such division (123 Stat. 106), are rescinded. 

10 (b) APPROPRIATION TO HIGHWAY TRUST FUND.— 

11 Effective on July 15, 2009, there is appropriated to the 

12 Highway Trust Fund established by section 9503 of the 

13 Internal Revenue Code of 1986, out of money in the 

14 Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the total amount re15 scinded by subsection (a). 

Æ 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
#### In the Matter of Gracie C., Respondent, v Nelson C., Appellant.

[987 NYS2d 333]

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (David Gilman, J.H.O.), entered on or about July 11, 2013, which, upon a fact-finding determination that respondent-appellant committed acts constituting menacing in the third degree, disorderly conduct, harassment in the second degree, aggravated harassment in the second degree and stalking in the fourth degree, and entered a two-year order of protection against him in favor of petitioner and her children, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The finding that respondent-appellant (respondent) committed the family offenses at issue is supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence (see Family Ct Act § 832), and there is no basis to disturb the court’s credibility determinations (see *Matter of Melind M. v Joseph P.,*95 AD3d 553, 555 [1st Dept 2012]). Respondent failed to preserve his contention that the court should not have admitted petitioner’s eldest son’s testimony that he listened in on telephone conversations between respondent and petitioner *(see Matter of F.B. v W.B.,*248 AD2d 119 [1st Dept 1998]), and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. In any event, any error was harmless in view of the overwhelming additional evidence supporting the court’s determination *(see Matter of Perry v Surplus,*112 AD3d 1077, 1080-1081 [3d Dept 2013]).

Respondent also failed to preserve his argument that the harassment charges as applied to him violated his constitutional right to freedom of speech, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. As an alternative holding, we find the argument unavailing given that the applicable statutes do not “prohibit speech or expression” *(People v Shack,*86 NY2d 529, 535 [1995]). Rather, they prohibit only illegitimate communication *(id.),*and respondent’s repeated and unwanted communications to petitioner were not for legitimate purposes.

Respondent failed to preserve his argument that the harassment statutes at issue are unconstitutionally vague or over-broad, and we decline to review it in the interest of justice.

The court properly exercised its discretion in issuing a two-year, rather than a one-year, order of protection *{see*Family Ct Act § 842).

Concur—Tom, J.E, Renwick, Andrias, Freedman and Clark, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                          43,358
<SECURITIES>                                     9,250
<RECEIVABLES>                                   15,499
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,140
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                67,616
<PP&E>                                           6,587
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,723
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  75,634
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           24,090
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        84,374
<OTHER-SE>                                    (32,830)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    75,634
<SALES>                                         35,360
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                46,597
<CGS>                                            2,138
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    5,030
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                38,752
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    21
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 256
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,175
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,339
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,836
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,246
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.03
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.03


</TABLE>
#### GAIL APRIL GREEN *v.*STEVEN J. DEFRANK

(AC 32948)

Lavine, Alvord and Borden, Js.

Argued October 24

officially released November 29, 2011

*332*Gail April Green,*pro se, the appellant (plaintiff).

*Steven J. DeFrank,*for the appellee (defendant).

*Opinion*

PER CURIAM.

The self-represented plaintiff, Gail April Green, commenced this action to dispute the attorney’s fees paid from the proceeds of her workers’ compensation award.1 On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Steven J. DeFrank, one of several attorneys who represented her. In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the court issued a memorandum of decision, which is a concise and thoughtful statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issue. See *Green*v. *DeFrank,*52 Conn. Sup. 160, 33 A.3d 899 (2010). We therefore adopt the decision of the trial court as our own. It would serve no useful purpose for this court to repeat the discussion contained therein. See *Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Ins. Co.*v. *Wysocki,*243 Conn. 239, 241, 702 A.2d 638 (1997).

The judgment is affirmed.

1

 General Statutes § 31-280 (b) (11) (C) provides that the chairman of the workers’ compensation commission shall issue annually guidelines for the maximum fees payable to a claimant for legal services. The chairman of the workers’ compensation commission has promulgated a 20 percent cap on attorney’s fees. See www.ctworkerscomplaw.com; see also *Arcano*v. *Board of Education,*81 Conn. App. 761, 769, 841 A.2d 742 (2004).
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 283 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 283

To modify the boundary of the Hopewell Culture National Historical Park 
             in the State of Ohio, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 7, 2009

  Mr. Space (for himself, Mr. Ryan of Ohio, Mr. Wilson of Ohio, Mrs. 
 Schmidt, Mr. Kucinich, and Ms. Sutton) introduced the following bill; 
        which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To modify the boundary of the Hopewell Culture National Historical Park 
             in the State of Ohio, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Hopewell Culture National Historical 
Park Boundary Adjustment Act''.

SEC. 2. BOUNDARY EXPANSION.

    Section 2 of the Act entitled ``An Act to rename and expand the 
boundaries of the Mound City Group National Monument in Ohio'', 
approved May 27, 1992 (106 Stat. 185), is amended--
            (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of subsection (a)(3);
            (2) by striking the period at the end of subsection (a)(4) 
        and inserting ``; and'';
            (3) by adding after subsection (a)(4) the following new 
        paragraph:
            ``(5) the map entitled `Hopewell Culture National 
        Historical Park, Ohio Proposed Boundary Adjustment' numbered 
        353/80,049 and dated June, 2006.''; and
            (4) by adding after subsection (d)(2) the following new 
        paragraph:
            ``(3) The Secretary may acquire lands added by subsection 
        (a)(5) only from willing sellers.''.
                                 <all>
```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-6363
FRED GOODINE, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, versus RICHARD S. LINDLER, Warden; T. TRAVIS MEDLOCK,Attorney General of the State of South Carolina, Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge. (CA-92-804-3-22BC) Submitted: October 31, 1996 Decided: April 9, 1997 Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Fred Goodine, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Respondents. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district co urt's orders granting his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104- 132, 110 Stat. 1214, directing Respondent to fashion a remedy and then approving the remedy. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinions and orders and find no reversible error. Respondents elected to treat Appellant as parole eligible on a twenty year basis, which is consistent with the representations made to Appellant at the time of his guilty plea. This is a satisfactory remedy that gives Appellant the benefit of his plea bargain. See O'Tuel v. Osborne , 706 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, we affirm both orders on the reasoning of the district court. Goodine v. Lindler , No. CA-92-804-3-22BC (D.S.C. Feb. 29 and Apr. 1, 1996). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>   1


EXHIBIT 11.1--STATEMENT RE: COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS

The following table presents the computation of basic and diluted earnings
per share:

                                                       Three Months Ended
                                                   --------------------------
                                                     March 29,     March 31,
                                                       1998          1997
                                                   -----------    -----------
Numerator:
        Net income                                  $   88,003    $    68,001
                                                   -----------    -----------

Denominator:
        Denominator for basic earnings per
        share--weighted-average shares               2,145,000      2,115,000


        Effect of dilutive securities:
           Employee stock options                       48,000
                                                   -----------    -----------

        Denominator for diluted earnings per share   2,193,000      2,115,000
                                                   ===========    ===========

Earnings per share:
        Basic                                      $      0.04    $      0.03
                                                   ===========    ===========
        Diluted                                    $      0.04    $      0.03
                                                   ===========    ===========
EXHIBIT-3.2

                            STATE OF DELAWARE
                        CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT
                     OF CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
                                   OF
                       AMCON DISTRIBUTING COMPANY

AMCON Distributing Company, a corporation organized and existing under
and by virtue of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.

DOES HEREBY CERTIFY:

FIRST:  That at a meeting of the Board of Directors of AMCON
Distributing Company resolutions were duly adopted setting forth a
proposed amendment of the Certificate of Incorporation of said
corporation, declaring said amendment to be advisable and calling a
meeting of the stockholders of said corporation for consideration
thereof.  The resolution setting forth the proposed amendment is as
follows:

     RESOLVED, that the Certificate of Incorporation of this
corporation be amended by changing the Section and the Article thereof
numbered "Article IV, Section 1" so that, as amended, it shall be and
read as follows:

     "ARTICLE IV.  Section 1.  The total number of shares of capital
stock which the Corporation shall have the authority to issue is
4,000,000, consisting of (a) 3,000,000 shares of Common Stock, par
value $.01 per share and (b) 1,000,000 shares of Preferred Stock, par
value $.01 per share."

SECOND:  That thereafter, pursuant to resolution of its Board of
Directors, an annual meeting of the stockholders of said corporation
was duly called and held upon notice in accordance with Section 222 of
the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware at which meeting
the necessary number of shares as required by statute were voted in
favor of said amendment.

THIRD:  That said amendment was duly adopted in accordance with the
provisions of Section 242 of the General Corporation Law of the State
of Delaware.

FOURTH:  That the authorized capital of said corporation shall not be
reduced under or by reason of said amendment.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said Board of Directors has caused this
certificate to be signed by Michael D. James, an Authorized Officer,
this 18th day of March, 2005.

By: /s/ Michael D. James
Title:  Michael D. James
Name:  Secretary, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 13.1

906 CERTIFICATION

The
certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2013 (the Report) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or
Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Joaquín Galindo V., the Chief Executive Officer and Fernando Gardeweg R., the Chief Financial Officer of Empresa Nacional de
Electricidad S.A. (Endesa Chile), each certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:



| | 1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Endesa Chile.
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: April 1, 2014



/s/ Joaquín Galindo V.Name: Joaquín Galindo V.Chief Executive Officer/s/ Fernando Gardeweg R.Name: Fernando Gardeweg R.Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 00-1993

MELVIN H. TEPHABOCK, Petitioner, versus LAUREL RUN MINING COMPANY; DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. (99-486-BLA) Submitted: February 23, 2001 Decided: March 13, 2001 Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Hook, Waynesburg, Pennsylvania, for Petitioner. William S. Mattingly, JACKSON & KELLY, P.L.L.C., Morgantown, West Virginia; Henry L. Solano, Solicitor of Labor, Donald S. Shire, Associate Solicitor, Christian P. Barber, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, Sarah M. Hurley, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Respondents. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Melvin H. Tephabock seeks review of the Benefits Review Board’s decision and order affirming the administrative law judge’s denial of black lung benefits pursuant to 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-945 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000). Our review of the record discloses that the Board’s decision is based upon substantial evidence and is without reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the Board. See Tephabock v. Laurel Run Mining Co. , No. 99-480-BLA (BRB June 16, 2000). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### In the Matter of: Roy L. OLSON, Debtor. Roy L. Olson, Appellant, v. Bay Area Foreclosure Investments, LLC, et al., Appellees.

No. 06-17394.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 22, 2008.*

Filed May 1, 2008.

Roy L. Olson, Fairfield, CA, pro se.

Orrin Leigh Grover, Esq., Law Offices of Orrin Grover, Woodburn, OR, for Appellees.

Lawrence J. Loheit, Sacramento, CA.

Before: GRABER, FISHER, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Roy Olson appeals pro se from the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirming the bankruptcy court’s order granting appellees retroactive relief from the automatic stay in order to validate a state court judgment entered after the bankruptcy filing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review the *642decision to retroactively lift the stay for an abuse of discretion, *National Envtl. Waste Corp. v. City of Riverside (In re National Envtl. Waste Corp.),*129 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir.1997), and we affirm.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting retroactive relief under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d), based on factual findings that appellees were not aware of the bankruptcy petition when they filed for judgment in state court and that Olson filed his bankruptcy petition in bad faith. *See id.*at 1055 (explaining that relief under § 362(d) is not an abuse of discretion where bankruptcy court properly weighs the equities, including the creditor’s knowledge of the bankruptcy and the debtor’s conduct in bringing the bankruptcy proceedings).

The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in determining that appellees were not aware of the bankruptcy petition when they filed for judgment, despite Olson’s testimony to the contrary, because the finding is supported by witness testimony and undisputed evidence that notice of the bankruptcy was mailed to appellees on the same day they filed for judgment. *See Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino),*245 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir.2001) (reviewing the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error and stating “[wjhere there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Contrary to his contention on appeal, Olson could not have used a witness’s indictment for bankruptcy fraud as impeachment evidence because Fed.R.Evid. 609(a) only permits evidence that a witness “has been convicted of a crime.”

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 4.3


 


Consent of Independent Registered
Public Accounting Firm


We consent to the
reference made to our firm under the caption “Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm” in Part B of the Prospectus
and to the use of our report dated December 19, 2014, in this Registration Statement (Form S-6 No. 333-199854) of Smart Trust,
Diversified Income & Growth Trust, Series 6.


 


/s/ Grant
Thornton LLP


Grant
Thornton LLP


Chicago, Illinois


December 19, 2014
#### Victor Hugo DEL RIO, Plaintiff-Appellant v. The State of TEXAS; Tracey Del Rio, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11-20044

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 24, 2011.

Victor Del Rio, Spring, TX, pro se.

*329Before DAVIS, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Victor Hugo Del Rio appeals the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of his verified emergency complaint and various motions. He files in this court motions for accelerated review, a stay pending appeal, and for injunctive relief. Del Rio’s appeal is frivolous and entirely without merit. *See Coghlan v. Starkey,*852 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir.1988); 5th Cir. R. 42.2. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED and all outstanding motions are DENIED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.