alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
T he Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States District Judge for th e 1 Western District of Arkansas. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT



### ___________ No. 96-3808

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Arkansas. Dennis Cordes, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: June 6, 1997 Filed: June 18, 1997

___________ Before BOWMAN, MAGILL, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Dennis Cord es appeals the 372-month sentence imposed by the District Court 1 af ter he pleaded guilty to attempting to manufacture methamphetamine an d methcathinone, in violation of 2 1 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (1994). Cordes argues fort he first time that imposition of an obstruction-of-justice enhancement for havin g escaped from custody w hile awaiting sentencing violates the Double Jeopardy Clause-2-

because the District Co urt imposed the enhancement after his conviction in a separate proceeding for escape. We affirm.
We "will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal absent a showing o f plain error resulting in a miscarriage of justice." United States v. Merritt , 982 F.2d 305, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 508 U.S. 979 (1 993). We conclude that the District Court did not commit plain error because Cordes’s se ntence in the drug case wa s within the combined statutory limits for the two drug offenses, and thu s impo sition of the obstruction enhancement in the drug case after Cordes’s conviction in the escape case did not violate double jeopardy. See Witte v. United States , 11 5 S. Ct. 2199, 2206- 08 (1995) (holding that use of evidence of related criminal conduct to enhance defendant’s sentence does not constitute punishmen t for that conduct within meaning of Double Jeopardy Clause and that "where the legislature has authorized a particular punishment ran ge for a given crime, the resulting sentence within that range constitutes punishment only for the offense of conviction for purposes of the doubl e jeopardy inquiry"); United States v. Bellrichard , 62 F.3d 1046 , 1051-52 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that Witte

compelled this court to reject defendant’s argument that imposition of se ntence based on conduct for which defendant had received obstructio n enhancement in previous proceeding violated double jeopardy), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 1425 (1996); see a lso United States v. Jernigan , 60 F.3d 562, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1995). Although we ordinarily do not consider a pro se brief when a party is represented by counsel, see United States v. Whitelaw , 86 F.3d 788, 789 (8th Cir. 1996), we have revi ewed Cordes’s pro se submissions and conclude that his arguments are withou t merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.-3-

A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
Exhibit 32.1

SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Emergency Filtration Products, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10 QSB for the quarter ending June 30, 2003, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Douglas K. Beplate, Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge and belief:

 (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


/s/ Douglas K. Beplate
Douglas K. Beplate, Principal Executive Officer

Date: August 14, 2003


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
#### Richard Albanese et al., Appellants, v Village of Freeport et al., Respondents.

[860 NYS2d 579]

In an action to recover damages based on assault and battery and a deprivation of civil rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (O’Connell, J.), dated October 10, 2007, as denied that branch of their motion which was for an in camera review of the personnel records of the defendant Michael Flood pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 50-a.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiffs served a notice for discovery and inspection dated April 27, 2007, seeking the production of “[a]ll records of Michael Flood’s employment by the Village of Freeport, including his personal, disciplinary and any other file consisting [of] documents concerning his employment.” In their response dated May 16, 2007, the defendants objected to this demand, citing . Civil Rights Law § 50-a. The plaintiffs thereafter moved for an order “pursuant to 50-a of the Civil Rights Law requiring the Defendants’ [sic] to produce Defendant MICHAEL FLOOD’S personnel file for an in camera review as provided for in said statute,” which motion was denied in its entirety by the Supreme Court.

For the first time on appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the federal rule of disclosure should govern, and that under this rule, they are entitled, at the very least, to have the Supreme Court conduct an in camera inspection of these documents, if not outright disclosure of the documents in question without *551the filter of an in camera review. This argument was never raised before the Supreme Court as a ground for the disclosure sought. Since this contention has been raised for the first time on appeal, it is not properly before this Court *(see Lawler v City of Yonkers,*45 AD3d 813, 813-814 [2007]; *Pile v Grant,*41 AD3d 810, 811 [2007]). Spolzino, J.P, Garni, Dickerson and Eng, JJ., concur.
#### Oleg Zhavoronkin et al., Respondents, v Oleg Koutmine, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

[860 NYS2d 561]

In an action, *598inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant Oleg Koutmine appeals, as limited by his brief, from (1) so much of an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Friedman, J.H.O.), dated August 28, 2006, as, after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against him on the fifth cause of action in the principal sum of $80,000, and determined that he was liable on the fourth cause of action for any sums awarded against the defendants Jon Ginsburg and Nasha Construction Corp. on the first cause of action, (2) so much of a judgment of the same court dated April 2, 2007, as is in favor of the plaintiffs and against him in the principal sum of $60,000 on the fourth cause of action.

Ordered that the appeal from so much of the interlocutory judgment as determined that the defendant Oleg Koutmine was liable on the fourth cause of action for any sums awarded against the defendants Jon Ginsburg and Nasha Construction Corp. on the first cause of action is dismissed, as that portion of the interlocutory judgment was superseded by the judgment dated April 2, 2007; and it is further,

Ordered that the interlocutory judgment is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,

Ordered the final judgment dated April 2, 2007 is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents.

The Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff Oleg Zhavoronkin loaned $80,000 to the defendant Polarus Agency, Inc. (hereinafter Polarus), to purchase a certain parcel of real property, at the direction of the defendant Oleg Koutmine (hereinafter the defendant). Further, the Supreme Court properly determined that the loan was not usurious *(see*General Obligations Law § 5-501 [1], [2]; Banking Law § 14-a [1]). There is a strong presumption against a finding of usury, and, at trial, the defendant was required to establish usury by clear and convincing evidence *(see Mahler v Bernsley,*265 AD2d 531 [1999]). Here, the defendant did not meet this burden *(id.)*There is ample evidence in the record to support the Supreme Court’s determination that the defendant was liable for the $80,000 loan that Zhavoronkin made to Polarus.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court also properly determined that the defendant was liable on the fourth cause of action for any sums awarded against the defendants Jon Ginsburg and Nasha Construction Corp. on the first cause of action.

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Fisher, J.P, Ritter, Florio and Garni, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Balance
Sheet at September 30, 1999 and the Statement of Income for the Year Ended
September 30, 1999 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                           1,728
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   19,623
<ALLOWANCES>                                       677
<INVENTORY>                                     23,980
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                45,771
<PP&E>                                          14,095
<DEPRECIATION>                                   6,592
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  68,589
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           27,034
<BONDS>                                         27,195
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            25
<OTHER-SE>                                      13,233
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    68,589
<SALES>                                        385,501
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               385,501
<CGS>                                          343,021
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  343,021
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,755
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,181
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,346
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,836
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,836
<EPS-BASIC>                                     1.55
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.48


</TABLE>
FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 13, 2011 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

S. MOLI NGATUVAI, Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 11-4025 v. D. Utah TODD BRECKENRIDGE, Provo City Officer; ROBERT TROMBLY, Prosecutor; JUDGE FNU ROMNEY, Defendants - Appellees. (D.C. No. 2:09-CV-00803-DS)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, MURPHY , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

After examining the parties’ briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. SeeFed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. S. Moli Ngatuvai appeals from the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. The district court

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.concluded even a liberal reading of Ngatuvai’s complaint, which challenged the appropriateness of a traffic citation Ngatuvai received in 2009, revealed no facts demonstrating a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court further concluded that dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because Ngatuvai had been afforded ample opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his civil rights complaint. This court reviews a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Teigen v. Renfrow , 511 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 2007). Upon de novo review, exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the district court’s order of dismissal. In so doing, this court sees no need to repeat the cogent analysis set out in the district court’s order dated January 12, 2011. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED

. ENTERED FOR THE COURT Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge

-2-
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 196 (Thursday, October 12, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 47396-47397]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-21929]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 52

[EPA-R07-OAR-2017-0143; FRL-9969-14--Region 7]


Air Plan Approval; Iowa; Amendment to the Administrative Consent 
Order, Grain Processing Corporation, Muscatine, Iowa; Withdrawal of 
Direct Final Rule

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Withdrawal of direct final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Due to an adverse comment, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) is withdrawing the direct final rule for ``Air Plan Approval; 
Iowa; Amendment to the Administrative Consent Order, Grain Processing 
Corporation, Muscatine, Iowa,'' published in the Federal Register on 
August 25, 2017.

DATES: The direct final rule published at 82 FR 40491, August 25, 2017, 
is withdrawn effective October 12, 2017.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Heather Hamilton, Environmental 
Protection Agency, Air Planning and Development Branch, 11201 Renner 
Boulevard, Lenexa, Kansas 66219 at 913-551-7039, or by email at 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#b7ffd6dadedbc3d8d999dfd2d6c3dfd2c5f7d2c7d699d0d8c1"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="6028010d090c140f0e4e08050114080512200510014e070f16">[email protected]</span></a>.

[[Page 47397]]


SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Due to an adverse comment, EPA is 
withdrawing the direct final rule to approve a SIP revision submitted 
by the State of Iowa pertaining to an amendment to the Administrative 
Consent Order, Grain Processing Corporation, Muscatine, Iowa. In the 
direct final rule published in the Federal Register on August 25, 2017, 
(82 FR 40491), we stated that if we received adverse comment by 
September 25, 2017, the rule would be withdrawn and not take effect. 
EPA received an adverse comment. We will address those comments in a 
proposed rulemaking.

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 52

    Environmental protection, Air pollution control, Intergovernmental 
relations, Incorporation by reference, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements.

    Dated: September 27, 2017.
Cathy Stepp,
Acting Regional Administrator, Region 7.

PART 52--APPROVAL AND PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTATION PLANS

0
Accordingly, the amendment to 40 CFR 52.820 published in the Federal 
Register on August 25, 2017 (82 FR 40491) on page 40493 is withdrawn 
effective October 12, 2017.

[FR Doc. 2017-21929 Filed 10-11-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6560-50-P


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Ex10-4



		

			 

		




		
			Exhibit 10.4
		

		
			 
		

		
			Accession Agreement
		

		
			 
		

		
			THIS ACCESSION AGREEMENT, dated as of December 1, 2014, is entered into by SNH SE TENANT TRS, INC., a Maryland corporation (the “Company”).
		

		
			RECITALS:
		

			
	
			
				 (a)
			The Company has entered into two separate Management Agreements with FVE Managers, Inc., a Maryland corporation (“Manager”), dated as of the date hereof, one with respect to that certain senior living facility known as Coventry Village and located at 7707 N. Brookline Drive, 7710 S. Brookline Drive and 7839, 7841, 7843, 7915, 7917-22 and 7924 Courtyard Drive, Madison, Wisconsin (“Coventry Village”), and the other with respect to that certain assisted living and memory care facility known as Jackson Crossings and located at N168 W22022 West Main Street, Jackson, Wisconsin (“Jackson Crossings”).




			
	
			
				 (b)
			Manager and the Company are parties to that certain Pooling Agreement No. 3, dated as of November 1, 2013, by and between the Manager and the Company (the “Pooling Agreement”).  Capitalized terms used in this Accession Agreement without definition shall have the meanings given to such terms in the Pooling Agreement.




			
	
			
				 (c)
			The Company desires to become a party to the Pooling Agreement with respect to Coventry Village and Jackson Crossings.




		
			NOW, THEREFORE:
		

		
			The Company hereby accedes and becomes a party to the Pooling Agreement with respect to Coventry Village and Jackson Crossings,  each as an Additional Facility, agrees to be bound by the provisions of the Pooling Agreement with respect to Coventry Village and Jackson Crossings, and acknowledges that provisions of the Management Agreement will be superseded as provided therein, on and after the date first above written.
		

		
			 
		

		
			[Signature Page Follows]
		

		

		

		 


		

			 

		




 


		

			 

		




		
		

		
			IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Accession Agreement has been duly executed and delivered by the Company with the intention of creating an instrument under seal.
		

		
			 
		

		
			 
		

		
			COMPANY:
		

		
			 
		

		
			SNH SE TENANT TRS, INC.,
		

		
			a  Maryland corporation
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: /s/ Richard A. Doyle
		

		
			Richard A. Doyle
		

		
			President
		

		
			 
		

		
			ACCEPTED:
		

		
			FVE MANAGERS, INC.,
		

		
			a Maryland corporation
		

		
			 
		

		
			By: /s/ Bruce J. Mackey Jr. 
		

		
			Bruce J. Mackey Jr.
		

		
			President
		

		
			[Signature Page: Accession Agreement]
		

		
			 
		

		
			{B1790650; 2}
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 31.2

                                  Certification

I, Ernst Luebke, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Mymetics Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.


Dated:  March 31, 2008                   /s/ Ernst Luebke
                                        ----------------------------------------
                                        Ernst Luebke
                                        Chief Financial Officer