alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3103 

To revise certain requirements relating to the Department of Veterans Affairs 

pilot program of enhanced contract care authority for health care needs 

of veterans in highly rural areas. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 26, 2009 

Mr. MORAN of Kansas introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To revise certain requirements relating to the Department 

of Veterans Affairs pilot program of enhanced contract 

care authority for health care needs of veterans in highly 

rural areas. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
2 

•HR 3103 IH

1 SECTION 1. REVISION OF CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS FOR 

2 THE PILOT PROGRAM OF ENHANCED CON3 TRACT CARE AUTHORITY FOR HEALTH CARE 

4 NEEDS OF VETERANS IN HIGHLY RURAL 

5 AREAS. 

6 Subsection (b) of section 403 of the Veterans’ Mental 

7 Health and Other Care Improvements Act of 2008 (Public 

8 Law 110-387; 38 U.S.C. 1703 note) is amended to read 

9 as follows: 

10 ‘‘(b) COVERED VETERANS.—For purposes of the 

11 pilot program under this section, a covered veteran is any 

12 veteran who— 

13 ‘‘(1) is— 

14 ‘‘(A) enrolled in the system of patient en15 rollment established under section 1705(a) of 

16 title 38, United States Code, as of the date of 

17 the commencement of the pilot program under 

18 subsection (a)(2); or 

19 ‘‘(B) eligible for health care under section 

20 1710(e)(3)(C) of title 38, United States Code; 

21 and 

22 ‘‘(2) resides in a location that is— 

23 ‘‘(A) more than 60 minutes’ driving dis24 tance, as determined by the Secretary, from the 

25 nearest Department health care facility proVerDate Nov 24 2008 05:16 Jul 01, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3103.IH H3103

smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
3 

•HR 3103 IH

1 viding primary care services, in the case of a 

2 veteran seeking such services; 

3 ‘‘(B) more than 120 minutes’ driving dis4 tance, as determined by the Secretary, from the 

5 nearest Department health care facility pro6 viding acute hospital care, in the case of a vet7 eran seeking such care; and 

8 ‘‘(C) more than 240 minutes’ driving dis9 tance, as determined by the Secretary, from the 

10 nearest Department health care facility pro11 viding tertiary care, in the case of a veteran 

12 seeking such care.’’. 

Æ 


smartinez on PROD1PC64 with BILLS
#### Hubert J. HORNE, Claimant-Appellant, v. Eric K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 2010-7046.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 25, 2011.

*963Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

ON MOTION

RADER, Chief Judge.

ORDER

The Secretary of Veterans Affairs moves to vacate the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and to remand for further proceedings.

The appellant filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Veterans Claims more than 120 days after the Board of Veterans’ Appeals mailed its decision in his case. That court dismissed the appeal as untimely, concluding that the 120-day appeal period established by 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) for seeking review of Board of Veterans’ Appeals decisions is jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The appellant sought this court’s review.

This court stayed the briefing schedule in this appeal pending the United States Supreme Court’s review of our decision in *Henderson v. Shinseki,*589 F.3d 1201 (Fed.Cir.2009) (en banc) (affirming Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims determination that period to appeal to that court is not subject to equitable tolling). In *Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011), the Supreme Court reversed this court’s decision and concluded that the 120-day deadline for filing an appeal with the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims does not have jurisdictional consequences. Because the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims erred in concluding that the appeal deadline established by § 7266(a) is jurisdictional, we vacate the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Accordingly,

It Is Ordered That:

(1) The motion is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

(2) All sides shall bear their own costs.
Exhibit
      32.1





CERTIFICATION
      OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER


REQUIRED
      BY RULE 13A - 14(B) OR RULE 15D - 14(B) AND 18 U.S.C. 1350





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Inova Technology Inc.





On
      Form
      10-QSB for the period ended January 31, 2008, as filed with the Securities
      and
      Exchange  Commission  on  the date hereof (the *“Report”* ),
      I,
      Adam Radly, Chief Executive  Officer of  the  Company,
 certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, that:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





By:
                /s/ Adam RadlyAdam
                RadlyChief
                Executive Officer*March
                21, 2008*
Slip Op. 20– 5 UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

__________________________________________ : CHINA STEEL CORP., : : Plaintiff, : : Before: Richard K. Eaton, Judge v. : : Court No. 17-00152 UNITED STATES, : : Defendant, : : and : : ARCELORMITTAL USA LLC, NUCOR CORP., : and SSAB ENTERPRISES LLC, : : Defendant-Intervenors. : __________________________________________: JUDGMENT Before the court is the United States Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) remand redetermination (“ Remand Results”), ECF No. 110, issued pursuant to the court’s order in China Steel Corp. v. United States , 43 CIT __, Slip Op. 19-106 (Aug. 13, 2019) (“ China Steel ”). No party contests the Remand Results. See Letter from China Steel Corp., Response to Court’s Request for Comments on Remand Results, EC F No. 112 (“China Steel Corporation does not intend to comment on the final rema nd determination.”).
In China Steel , the court directed Commerce to recalculate its difference-in-merchandise (DIFMER) adjustment to normal value without usin g data that had been affected by Commerce’s use of adverse inferences: Commerce shall compute the DIFMER adjustment to normal value using information from China Steel’s final COP2 cost database, without the application of an adverse inference, and may use facts available in filling in missing orCourt No. 17-00152 Page 2 replacing unverifiable ne cessary information. China Steel , 43 CIT at __, Slip. Op. 19-106 at 42. Under protest, Commerce calculated a rate of 6.23 percent for Plaintiff, in compliance with the court’s order: Pursuant to the Court’s order, we calcul ated a weighted-average margin for China Steel without the use of AFA in the DIFMER test. Based on this approach, we calculated a dumping margin of 6.73 percent for China Steel. Remand Results 10. Upon consideration of the Re mand Results, the parties’ sub missions, and the papers and proceedings had herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the Remand Results are sustained.

Richard K. Eaton Richard K. Eaton, Judge Dated: January 9, 2020 New York, New York
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony Anderson, Appellant.

[988 NYS2d 85]

An appeal having been taken to this Court by the above-named appellant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, New York County (Edward J. McLaughin, J.), rendered on or about January 18, 2012, said appeal having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, due deliberation having been had thereon, and finding the sentence not excessive, it is unanimously ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same is hereby affirmed.

Concur — Tom, J.E, Moskowitz, Manzanet-Daniels, Feinman and Gische, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



I, Vincent C. Smith, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Quest Software, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the three months ended September 30, 2005, fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Quest Software,
Inc.



|                       |  |  |  |     |  |                         |  |                        
|---------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | ----------------------- |  | -----------------------
|                       |  |  | 
|Date: November 9, 2005 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/    VINCENT C. SMITH
|                       |  |  |  |     |  | Name:                   |  | Vincent C. Smith       
|                       |  |  |  |     |  | Title:                  |  | Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit
32.1








CERTIFICATION
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002





Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and in connection with the filing by Intermost
Corporation, a Wyoming Corporation (the “Company”) with the Securities and
Exchange Commission of its Quarterly Report on Form 10-QA for the three months
ended March 31, 2008 (the “Report”), the undersigned, Rocky Wulianghai,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, does hereby certify, that
to the best of his knowledge:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
      and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





This
certification is being provided pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350 and is not to be
deemed a part of this Report, nor is it to be deemed to be “filed” for any
purpose whatsoever.





Date:  December
1, 2008








By:
            /s/ Rocky
      WulianghaiRocky
      Wulianghai, President and
              Chief
      Executive Officer





A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
**THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS**

**Post Office Box 12248**

**Austin, Texas 78711**

**(512) 463-1312**

April 2, 2004

Mr. Randall L. Brim

Singleton Cooksey & Hanson LLP

6363 Woodway, Ste. 610

Houston, TX 77057

Mr. Jerry A. Pusch

Pusch Lowery & Gilcrease

2701 Louisiana

Houston, TX 77006

RE:Case Number:  02-1008

Court of Appeals Number:  06-01-00097-CV

Trial Court Number:  96-52431

Style:STORAGE & PROCESSORS, INC. AND LEONEL GUERRERO

v.

RAMON REYES

Dear Counsel:

Today, the Supreme Court of Texas delivered the enclosed opinions and judgment in the above referenced cause.  Justice Jefferson not sitting.

Encl.

Sincerely,

Andrew Weber, Clerk

by Claudia Jenks, Chief Deputy Clerk

**Case No. 02-1008Page 2**
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                             807
<SECURITIES>                                     6,112
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 7,037
<PP&E>                                           1,381
<DEPRECIATION>                                     867
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   7,625
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              212
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         7,406
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     7,625
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 6,690
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  10
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (6,440)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (6,440)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (6,440)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.02)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
         This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
audited financial statements of Quality Stores, Inc. at and for the period ended
January 29, 2000 and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial
statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Jan-29-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 Jan-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   Jan-29-2000
<CASH>                                         11,029
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  9,017
<ALLOWANCES>                                   1,275
<INVENTORY>                                    365,383
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               394,389
<PP&E>                                         147,680
<DEPRECIATION>                                 24,213
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 822,463
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          202,485
<BONDS>                                        389,657
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     224,627
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   822,463
<SALES>                                        1,092,021
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               1,092,021
<CGS>                                          774,455
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  774,455
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               273,532
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               586
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             34,637
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                9,397
<INCOME-TAX>                                   6,234
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            3,163
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   3,163
<EPS-BASIC>                                    0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0



</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dzemil Balic, Appellant.

[860 NYS2d 17]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Brenda Soloff, J.), entered on or about September 14, 2005, which adjudicated defendant a level two sex offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C), unanimously affirmed, without costs.

As the People concede, certain points were incorrectly assessed and defendant’s presumptive risk level should thus be *202level one. Nevertheless, the record supports the court’s alternate conclusion that an upward departure to level two is warranted. Clear and convincing evidence established aggravating factors that were not otherwise adequately taken into account by the risk assessment guidelines *(see e.g. People v Brown,*45 AD3d 1123 [2007]). Defendant’s background includes a violent sexual attack on a child, and a pattern of misconduct displaying a likelihood of recidivism. Concur—Lippman, P.J., Mazzarelli, Williams, Sweeny and Acosta, JJ.
H. R. 2938 

One Hundred Eleventh Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE FIRST SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, 

the sixth day of January, two thousand and nine 

An Act 

To extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric project. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. EXTENSION. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the time period specified 

in section 13 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 806) that would 

otherwise apply to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

project numbered 12187, the Commission may, at the request of 

the licensee for the project, and after reasonable notice, in accordance with the good faith, due diligence, and public interest requirements of that section and the Commission’s procedures under that 

section, extend the time period during which the licensee is required 

to commence the construction of the project for up to 3 consecutive 

2-year periods from the date of the expiration of the extension 

originally issued by the Commission. 

(b) REINSTATEMENT OF EXPIRED LICENSE.—If the period 

required for commencement of construction of the project described 

in subsection (a) has expired prior to the date of the enactment 

of this Act, the Commission may reinstate the license effective 

as of the date of its expiration and the first extension authorized 

under subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of such expiration. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.53


July 8, 2004


Luis Wood


Dear Luis,

RE:      EMPLOYEE SHARE INCENTIVE PLAN AND EMPLOYEE SHARE OPTION PLAN

In accordance with the Employee Share Incentive Plan ("the Preference Share
Plan"), you are hereby advised that the Grant Date is July 6, 2004 for benefits
you have accrued during the year ended 31 December 2003.

Accordingly you are granted 54 Preference Shares in the Company. You have the
option to purchase an equal number of Preference Shares at a price of US$13.45
or CI$11.21 each, which has been calculated in accordance to the terms of the
Preference Share Plan. If you intend to exercise this option, then payment must
be received in full no later than the close of business on AUGUST 5, 2004.

As a member of the Employee Share Option Plan ("the Option Plan"), you will also
be granted, as of July 6, 2004, the option to purchase 270 Ordinary Shares in
the Company. These options are exercisable in accordance to the terms of the
Option Plan. You furthermore have the opportunity to obtain an equal amount of
options to purchase Ordinary Shares of the Company, in accordance to the terms
of the Option Plan, if you exercise your right to purchase the above additional
Preference Shares before AUGUST 5, 2004.

Your continued dedication and hard work have contributed to another successful
year for Consolidated Water, and I look forward to a very bright future.

Yours sincerely,
CONSOLIDATED WATER CO. LTD.


/s/ Frederick W. McTaggart

Frederick W. McTaggart
President and CEO
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





The undersigned, Robert Hemmerling, Chief Executive Officer and Devinder Randhawa, Chief Financial Officer, of Eye Catching Marketing Corporation, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.

the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Eye Catching Marketing Corporation for the period ended June 30, 2005 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2.

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Eye Catching Marketing Corporation.









Dated August 8, 2005

/s/Robert Hemmerling



Robert Hemmerling,

Chief Executive Officer





Dated August 8, 2005

/s/Devinder Randhawa



Devinder Randhawa,

Chief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Burnett, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 658]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.), rendered April 28, 1995, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (three counts), criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (three counts), and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree (three counts), after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that his conviction was based on legally insufficient evidence because the People’s forensic chemist did not distinguish between the natural L-cocaine and its synthetic isomer D-cocaine. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, a controlled substance under Schedule II of Public Health Law § 3306 includes cocaine and all of its isomers (Public Health Law § 3306 [b] [4]). Hence, upon the forensic chemist’s conclusion that cocaine was present in the substance tested, there was no need for additional testing to ascertain whether the substance was L-cocaine or D-cocaine.

Furthermore, the chemist’s opinion testimony that the vials contained cocaine was properly admitted into evidence given the basis of that opinion, to wit, four chemical analyses, three of which did not employ a known standard. It is well settled that an expert who tests a substance for the presence of cocaine may not rely solely upon a test involving a comparison of the substance at issue to a known standard when the accuracy of the known standard is not established *(see, People v De La Rosa,*162 AD2d 698; *People v Flores,*138 AD2d 512). However, when the expert’s opinion testimony that the substance contained cocaine is not based solely upon comparative tests using known standards but also on a series of other tests not involving known standards, a comparison test may then be relied upon by the expert *(see, People v De La Rosa, supra; People v Flores, supra).*Therefore, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Ritter and Florio, JJ., concur.