UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4912

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KEITH BELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:05-cr-00452-HEH-1)

Submitted: May 31, 2012 Decided: June 13, 2012

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. 

Pratt, Paul G. Gill, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, 

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Olivia L. Norman, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Keith Bell appeals the district court’s order revoking 

his supervised release and sentencing him to twenty-four months 

of imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief in accordance with 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there 

are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court failed to recognize and exercise its discretion 

to exempt Bell from the mandatory revocation and imprisonment 

directed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (2006). See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(d). In his pro se supplemental brief, Bell suggests that 

the district court erroneously determined that he had failed to 

successfully complete a drug treatment program. We affirm.

Generally, we review a district court’s judgment 

revoking supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment 

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 

279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). However, because Bell did not object 

to the district court’s revocation of his supervised release, we 

review for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 

731-32 (1993). To satisfy the plain error standard, an 

appellant must show: “(1) an error was made; (2) the error is 

plain; and (3) the error affects substantial rights.” United 

States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2009).

Even if Bell satisfies these requirements, correction of the 

error is appropriate only if we conclude that the error 
3

“seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

Under § 3583(g), a district court must revoke

supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment for a 

defendant who violates the terms of his supervised release by 

illegally possessing a controlled substance or testing positive 

for such substances more than three times in one year. However, 

“when considering any action against a defendant who fails a 

drug test,” § 3583(d) requires the court to consider “whether 

the availability of appropriate substance abuse treatment 

programs, or an individual’s current or past participation in 

such programs, warrants an exception” from the mandatory 

revocation and imprisonment directed by § 3583(g). See United 

States v. Hammonds, 370 F.3d 1032, 1038 (10th Cir. 2004).

Here, the record demonstrates that the district court 

acknowledged and exercised its discretion under § 3583(d). The 

court heard counsel’s submissions regarding possible noncustodial dispositions during Bell’s revocation hearing, but 

indicated that Bell’s chronic history of drug abuse all but 

ruled out such options as appropriate. See United States v. 

Kaniss, 150 F.3d 967, 968-69 (8th Cir. 1999). Further, the 

district court did not cite a statutory imperative for its 

disposition, focusing instead on Bell’s consistent inability to 
4

succeed in drug treatment programs and his lengthy criminal 

history as counseling for revocation and imprisonment. See

United States v. Crace, 207 F.3d 833, 835 (6th Cir. 2000). The 

record also belies Bell’s suggestion that he has in fact fully 

and successfully completed a drug treatment program. Therefore, 

we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the revocation of 

Bell’s supervised release and the imposition of his twenty-four 

month sentence.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore 

affirm the judgment below. This court requires that counsel 

inform Bell, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme 

Court of the United States for further review. If Bell requests 

that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a 

petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy thereof was served on Bell. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED