alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Baljinder KAUR; Gurbir Singh, Petitioners, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 06-73356.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*674Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed March 9, 2011.

Pardeep S. Grewal, Esq., Law Offices of Pardeep S. Grewal, Castro Valley, CA, for Petitioners.

Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, San Francisco, CA, Adam T. Severt, Esq., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Baljinder Kaur and Gurbir Singh, natives and citizens of India, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying their application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, *Singh-Kaur v. INS,*183 F.3d 1147, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1999), and we deny the petition.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Kaur’s testimony that the police killed her father in 1991 was inconsistent with the affidavit from her town’s sarpanch which stated that terrorists killed her father in 1999. *See Pal v. INS,*204 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir.2000) (inconsistencies between testimony and documentary evidence support an adverse credibility finding). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s finding that Kaur omitted from her asylum application declaration that police beat her four times during her first arrest, and that police arrested her a second time because she filed a complaint about the police to a human rights organization. *See Li v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 959, 962-64 (9th Cir.2004). The agency reasonably rejected Kaur’s explanations for the inconsistencies and omissions. *See Rivera v. Mukasey,*508 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir.2007). Accordingly, in the absence of credible testimony, Kaur’s withholding of removal claim fails. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003).

Because Kaur’s CAT claim is based on the same evidence the agency found not credible, and she points to no other evidence showing it is more likely than not she would be tortured if she returns to India, Kaur’s CAT claim also fails. *See id.*at 1156-57.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Samuel SEVILLA-RODRIGUEZ, also known as Samuel Ortiz-Savillon, also known as Samuel S. Rodriguez, also known as Oscar Homusor, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50521

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 30, 2011.

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

M. Carolyn Fuentes, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Henry Joseph Bemporad, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before REAVLEY, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Samuel Sevilla-Rodriguez appeals the 41-month sentence imposed in connection with his guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry. He argues that his sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to meet the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Specifically, SevillaRodriguez contends that the illegal reentry guideline produces excessive sentences because it is not empirically based and overstates a defendant’s criminal history and that the guidelines range did not adequately reflect his motive for reentering the country (reuniting with his son), his solid work history, or that this was his first illegal reentry offense.

Sevilla-Rodriguez’s sentence is at the low end of the properly calculated guideline range and is presumptively reasonable. *See United States v. Alonzo,*435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir.2006); *see also United States v. Duarte,*569 F.3d 528, 529-31 (5th Cir.) (rejecting the argument that a guidelines illegal reentry sentence was unreasonable because the guideline is not empirically based and emphasizes a defendant’s criminal history), cert. *denied,*— U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 378, 175 L.Ed.2d 231 (2009). As Sevilla-Rodriguez concedes, his argument that the presumption should not apply is foreclosed. *United States v. Mondragon-Santiago,*564 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir.), cert. *denied,*— U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 192, 175 L.Ed.2d 120 (2009). Sevilla-Rodriguez has not rebutted the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence is reasonable. *See United States v. Campos-Maldonado,*531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir.2008); *United States v.*
      *383
      *Gomez-Herrera,*528 F.3d 554, 565-66 (5th Cir.2008). The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Sevilla-Rodriguez to 41 months of imprisonment. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 1 3

- 179 V

(Not to be published)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*

WILLIAM T. SMITH, JR., as F iduciary of the *

E state of MICHAEL E. SMITH, *

* Filed: May 30, 2014

Petitioner, *

* Decision by Stipulation; Attorney’s

v. * Fees & Costs

*

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND *

HUMAN SERVICES *

*

Respondent. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Diana Stadelnikas Sedar

, Sarasota, FL

, for Petitioner

Darryl R. Wishard , Washington, DC, for Respondent

ATTORNEY S ’ FEES AND COSTS DECISION 1

On March 8, 2013 , Petitioner filed a petition seeking compensation under the National

Vaccine Injury Compensation Program . On April 15, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss.

On April 21, 2014, a decision dismissing the claim was filed

, and judgment for dismissal

pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a) was entered on May 22, 2014.

On May 30, 2014 , counsel for both parties filed a joint stipulation in regards to attorney s ’

fees and costs. The parties have stipulated that Petitioner’s counsel should receive a lump sum

1 Because this decision contains a reasoned explanation for my action in this case, it will be

post ed on the United States Court of Federal Claims’ website, in accordance with the E

Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107

- 347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913 (codified as

amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2006)). As provided by Vaccine Rule 18(b), moreover, each

party has 14 days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party:

(1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential;

or (2) that includes medical files or simila r files, the disclosure of which would constitute a

clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the decision will be

available to the public. Id.of $ 6,300.00 , in the form of a check payable to Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel. T his amount

represent s a sum to which respondent does not object.

I approve the requested amount for attorney s ’ fees and costs as reasonable. Accordingly,

an award should be made in the form of a check payable jointly to Petitioner and Petitioner’s

counsel, Diana Stadelnikas Sedar, Esq . In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to

RCFC Appendix B, the clerk of the court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with

the terms of the parties’ stipulation. 2



### IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Special Master

2 Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint

notice renouncing the ir right to seek review.
#### Costas Gagasoulis, Appellant, v Siavash Daneshfar, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

[859 NYS2d 869]

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County *566(Spinner, J.), entered December 5, 2006, which, after a nonjury trial, inter alia, is in favor of the defendant Siavash Daneshfar and against him dismissing the first, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and tenth causes of action of the complaint insofar as asserted against that defendant.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

“Where, as here, a case is tried without-a jury, this Court’s power to review the evidence is as broad as that of the trial court, ‘taking into account in a close case the fact that the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses’ ” *(Terry v State of New York,*39 AD3d 846 [2007], quoting *Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford,*60 NY2d 492, 494 [1983]). On this record, there is no basis to disturb the trial court’s determination dismissing the stated causes of action.

The plaintiffs remaining contention regarding a specific evidentiary ruling is unpreserved for appellate review *(see Bazza v Banscher,*143 AD2d 715, 716 [1988]). Mastro, J.P, Spolzino, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                   Exhibit 10.53


                                     BELIZE

                       THE REGISTERED LAND ORDINANCE, 1977
                              CERTIFICATE OF LEASE
                           Chapter 157, Laws of Belize

REGISTERED SECTION                          BLOCK                      PARCEL
SAN PEDRO                                     7                        1870/1
------------------                          -----                      ------
Area: 1.186 Acres

LESSOR            Government of Belize
RENT              $1.00 p.a.
TERM              18 years          27/4/93

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT BELIZE WATER LTD.

of                     #37 Regent Street, Belize City, Belize District

Is now registered as the proprietor of the leasehold interest above referred to,
subject to the agreements and other matters contained in the registered lease,
to the entries in the register relating to the lease and to such of the
overriding interests set forth in section 31 of the Registered Land Ord. 1977 as
may for the time being subsist and affect the land comprised in the lease.

At the date thereof the following entries appear in the register relating to the
lease:

PART A- PROPERTY SECTION (EASEMENTS, ETC.)

PART B- PROPRIETORSHIP SECTION (INHIBITIONS, CAUTIONS AND RESTRICTIONS)
Not to transfer the land, lease or charge without written consent of Lessor.
Hereinafter subject to the lease conditions attached.

PART C- INCUMBRANCES SECTION (LEASES, CHARGES,ETC.)

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND THE SEAL OF THE LAND REGISTRY
THIS 18th DAY OF July, 2001

                                                   /s/ M. Petzold
                                         ---------------------------------------
                                                 REGISTRAR OF LANDS
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Bradley J. Broadbent, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 534]

—Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed and matter remitted to Genesee County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: On September 23, 1996, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery in the second degree and was sentenced on November 4, 1996 to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 1 to 3 years. On September 27, 1996, defendant was charged with burglary in the second degree. On November 12, 1996, defendant waived indictment on the burglary charge and pleaded guilty under a superior court information to attempted burglary in the second degree. The transcript of the sentencing proceeding indicates that County Court believed that, pursuant to Penal Law § 70.25 (2-b), the sentence for attempted burglary had to run consecutive to the sentence previously imposed for attempted robbery. Consequently, the court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 2V2 to 5 years, to run consecutive to the previously imposed sentence.

Pursuant to Penal Law § 70.25 (2-b), a court has limited discretion to direct concurrent sentences “[w]hen a person is convicted of a violent felony offense committed after arraignment and while released on recognizance or bail, but committed prior to the imposition of sentence on a pending felony charge”. Because the court erroneously believed that it lacked that discretion, we vacate the sentence and remit the matter to *1115Genesee County Court for resentencing. (Appeal from Judgment of Genesee County Court, Griffith, J.—Attempted Burglary, 2nd Degree.) Present—Lawton, J. P., Hayes, Wisner, Callahan and Boehm, JJ.
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 96-60254

Summary Calendar

TROY ALEXANDER HOLMAN,

Petitioner,

VERSUS

UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION,

Respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas

(18 USA 4106A)

December 24, 1996

Before JONES, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

On Octo ber 4, 1994, Troy Alexander Holman (Holman) was

sentenced in Mexico to an 11 yea r term of imprisonment upon his

conviction of transporting 3,199.5 grams of heroin in Mexico City,

Mexico on May 20, 1994. Holman appealed his sentence and

successfully had it reduced to ten years. On October 10, 1995,

Holman was transferred to the United States to serve his sentence

pursuant to the terms of the United States-Mexico treaty on the2

execution of penal sentences.

Following a hearing on February 26, 1996, the Parole

Commission ordered Holman to continue to serve the full term of his

Mexican sentence, ten years less good time, and to serve a 12-month

period of supervised release following his release from prison.

The Parole Commission determined that Holman’s guideline range for

a comparable of fense under United States law was 151-188 months

based on offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of I.

In making its d ecision to have Holman serve the full term of his

sentence, the Parole Commission relied upon the fact that Holman’s

120-month Mexican sentenc e was already substantially below the

applica ble United States Sentencing Guideline range of 151-188

months. Holman requested a downward departure based on his alleged

mistreatment in Mexico and his co ntention that the Mexican court

wrongly convicted him of transporting heroin. The Parole

Commission rejected Holman’s request for a downward departure.

We have carefully reviewed the bri efs, the reply brief, the

record excerpts and relevant portions of the record itself. We

review the Parole Commission’s determination de novo

. M olano-Garza

v. United States Parole Commission

, 965 F.2d 20, 23 (5th Cir.

1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1065 (1993). We will uphold the

sentence unless it (1) was imposed in violatio n of law; (2) was

imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing

guidelines; (3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and is3

unreasonable or (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is

no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable. 18

U.S.C. § 3742(e); a nd see 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f). A review of this

record satisfies us that there is no basis, either in law or fact,

for changing the determination of the Parole Commission.

Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED

.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of Polymer Group, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 29,
2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Veronica M. Hagen, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|Date: March 11, 2008 |  | /s/VERONICA M. HAGENVeronica M. Hagen Chief Executive Officer
|-------------------- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

---



QuickLinks
Exhibit 32.2

STATEMENT
FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE 
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

The
undersigned, David C. Nolan, is the Executive Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer of Rome Bancorp, Inc. (the Company). This statement is
being furnished in connection with the filing by the Company of the Companys
Annual Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2006 (the
Report).

By
execution of this statement, I certify that:

| |    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | A) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of
  Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
  (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and                                                               
| |    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
| | B) | the information contained in the Report fairly
  presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
  operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods covered by the
  Report.

This
statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the Report so that this
statement will accompany the Report at such time as the Report is filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.  It is not intended that this statement be
deemed to be filed for purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended.

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to
the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request

|                       |                                                        | 
|---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ | 
|Date: November 9, 2006 | /s/ David C. Nolan                                     | 
|                       |                                                        | 
|                       | David C. Nolan                                         | 
|                       | Executive Vice President and Chief
  Financial Officer | 

---
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Michael P. Andrews, Respondent. A.C. Roman & Associates, Appellant; Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[987 NYS2d 524]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 4, 2013, which ruled that claimant was entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits.

We affirm. It is well settled that whether a claimant has *1217engaged in disqualifying misconduct is a factual question for the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board to resolve and its decision will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence *(see Matter of Jaiyesimi [ISS Action Inc.—Commissioner of Labor],*114 AD3d 983, 983 [2014]). Here, the Board concluded that claimant was discharged for reporting to work one hour after his scheduled start time on February 15, 2012. With respect to that assignment, claimant testified that he and his supervisor discussed changing the start time from 7:30 a.m. until 8:30 a.m. a week earlier. While the employer claimed that there was no discussion or agreement to change that specific start time, the Board chose to credit claimant’s testimony. It is the Board’s exclusive province to decide issues of credibility, and we find its decision that there was no credible evidence of misconduct and that claimant is entitled to receive benefits is supported by substantial evidence *(see Matter of Morris [Lenox Hill Neighborhood House Inc.—Commissioner of Labor],*110 AD3d 1333, 1334 [2013]).

Peters, EJ., Lahtinen, Stein, Rose and Devine, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the decision is affirmed, with costs.
[No. 30110-9-III.

Division Three.

November 8, 2012.]

#### The State of Washington, *Respondent,*v. Lucas J. Merrill, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 09-1-04190-4, Maryann C. Moreno, J., entered July 1,2011. *Remanded*by unpublished opinion per

Sweeney, J.,

concurred in by Siddoway, A.C.J., and Brown, J.
United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 28, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-40031

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MOHAMMED GOUJIL,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Consolidated with:

 

No. 03-40032

Summary Calendar

 

UNITES STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MOHAMMED GOUJIL, also known as Ramiro Munoz,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-02-CR-215-1

USDC No. C-01-CR-41-1

--------------------

Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
No. 03-40031

c/w No. 03-40032

- 2 -

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

PER CURIAM:*

Mohammed Goujil appeals the revocation of his supervised

release term imposed in connection with his conviction for passport

fraud. Goujil was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 24 months

for the violation. Goujil also appeals his conviction following a

jury trial for assault of a federal employee, for which he received

a sentence of a term of imprisonment of 36 months, to run

consecutive to his sentence imposed for the violation of the terms

of his supervised release. Goujil argues that the district court

judge plainly erred in both cases in failing to sua sponte recuse

herself based on judicial bias and prejudice. A review of the

record of all proceedings did not raise any type of inference that

would have led a reasonably objective person to doubt the

impartiality of the district court judge. See Levitt v. Univ. of

Texas at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 1988); 28 U.S.C. §

455. There was no indication that any of the district court’s

rulings were the result of a deep seated favoritism or antagonism.

The district court did not plainly err in not recusing itself from

presiding over the proceedings. See Liteky v. United States, 510

U.S. 540, 550-55.

The judgments in both cases are AFFIRMED.