IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARE )

)

v. ) I.D. No. 9506017661

)

HECTOR BARROW )

)

Defendant. )

Submitted: June 20, 2014

Decided: August 25, 2014

Upon Defendant’s Third Motion for Post-conviction Relief. 

DENIED.

 

ORDER

Hector Barrow, pro se, Smyrna, DE. 

Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Department of Justice, 820 N. French St., 

Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State. 

WHARTON, J.
2

This 25th day of August, 2014, upon consideration of Defendant’s third

Motion for Post-conviction Relief, the State’s response and the record in this 

matter, it appears to the Court that:

1. Defendant Hector Barrow filed this Motion for Post-conviction Relief, 

his third, on January 28, 2014, alleging that his trial counsel was 

ineffective.

1

 Specifically, he alleges that trial counsel: (i) failed to 

subpoena an unnamed “key witness”; and (ii) failed to object to 

testimony regarding the Jamaican language, testimony which related 

to the identification of the person who shot the victim. Additionally, 

he contends that the Court should have appointed counsel for 

assistance with his first post-conviction relief effort.2

 

2. On June 25, 1995, Defendant, and two accomplices, Jermaine Barnett 

and Lawrence Johnson, shot and killed Thomas Smith, during the 

commission of a robbery of Smith’s gun shop.3

 On August 7, 1995, 

Defendant was indicted and charged with three counts of First Degree 

Murder (one count of intentional murder and two counts of felony 

murder), Robbery First Degree, Burglary Second Degree, Conspiracy 

First Degree, Conspiracy Second Degree and Possession of a Firearm 

during the Commission of a Felony.

4

 

3. Following a four-week trial, Defendant was convicted on all counts.5

 

The murder convictions resulted in the imposition of death sentences.

6

 

On direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the 

intentional murder conviction and sentence and the felony murder 

sentences, while affirming the felony murder convictions.

7

 The Court 

ordered a new trial on the intentional murder charge and a new 

penalty hearing for the felony murder sentences.

8

 

4. On remand, the State elected to proceed solely with the penalty 

hearing on the felony murder convictions. A new trial on the 

 1 Def.’s Mot. for Post-conviction Relief at 2.

2 Id. at 3.

3 Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230, 1234 (Del. 2000).

4 State v. Barrow, 1998 WL 733212, at *1 (Del. Super. Feb. 3, 1998).

5 State v. Barrow, 2005 WL 3436609, at *1 (Del. Super. Dec. 6, 2005).

6 Id.

7 Barrow, 749 A.2d 1230, 1234. 

8 Id.
3

intentional murder charge was waived.

9

 A second penalty hearing 

occurred in June of 2001. On January 4, 2002, the Court imposed a 

life sentence on the felony murder convictions.

10 Barrow did not 

appeal this sentence.

11 

5. On January 27, 2005, Defendant filed his first motion for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, among 

other things.12 That motion was dismissed on August 5, 2005.

13 On 

February 22, 2006, Defendant appealed the Court’s decision, raising 

only a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.14 On January 5, 

2007, the Supreme Court affirmed that decision.

15 

6. Defendant filed his second motion for post-conviction relief on 

August 29, 2007, raising grounds other than ineffective assistance of 

counsel.16 That motion was denied on October 31, 2008.17 Defendant 

filed an untimely appeal on December 9, 2008, and on January 13, 

2009, the Supreme Court dismissed that appeal.18 

7. Under the Delaware Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, a

motion for post-conviction relief can be barred for time limitations,

repetitive motions, procedural defaults, and former adjudications.19 A 

motion exceeds time limitations if it is filed more than one year after 

the conviction becomes final or if it asserts a newly recognized,

retroactively applied right more than one year after it was first 

recognized.20 A motion is considered repetitive and therefore barred if 

it asserts any ground for relief “not asserted in a prior post-conviction 

proceeding.”21 Repetitive motions are only considered if it is 

“warranted in the interest of justice.”22 Grounds for relief “not asserted 

in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction” are barred as 

 9 State v. Barrow, 2002 WL 88934, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 4, 2002).

10 State v. Barrow, 2005 WL 3436609, at *1.

11 Barrow v. State, 913 A.2d 569 (Del. 2006) (TABLE).

12 Dkt. 254.

13 Dkt. 268.

14 Dkt. 270.

15 Dkt. 273.

16 Dkt. 274.

17 Dkt. 284.

18 Dkt. 285.

19 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).

20Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).

21 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).

22 Id.
4

procedurally defaulted unless the movant can show “cause for relief”

and “prejudice from [the] violation.”23 Grounds for relief formerly 

adjudicated in the case, including “proceedings leading to the judgment

of conviction, in an appeal, in a post-conviction proceeding, or in a 

federal habeas corpus hearing” are barred.24 Former adjudications are 

only reconsidered if “warranted in the interest of justice.”25

8. Before addressing the merits of Defendant’s third Motion for Postconviction Relief, the court must first apply the procedural bars of 

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i).26 If a procedural bar exists, then 

the Court will not consider the merits of the post-conviction claim.27 

9. Defendant’s claims are procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 61(i)(1). 

Defendant’s conviction became final on January 4, 2003. This 

Motion was filed over ten years after Defendant’s conviction became 

final. Moreover, Defendant’s first motion was also time-barred, since 

it was filed over three years after his conviction became final, 

exceeding the then three year time limitation.28 Defendant has not 

offered any evidence of a retroactively applicable right that was newly 

recognized after his judgment of guilt became final in order to 

overcome the time bar. Defendant originally appeared to suggest that 

he had a retroactively recognized right to counsel based on Martinez 

v. Ryan.

29 In his Reply, he expressly rejects that suggestion, 

however.

30 In any event, Martinez “did not create a new right such as 

to qualify as a means of relief from the procedural bar of Rule 

61(i)(1). Further, since Martinez did not establish a new 

constitutional right, it cannot be applied retroactively.”31 If all of that

were not enough, this motion was filed more than a year after 

Martinez was decided, exceeding the one year time bar for newly 

recognized rights.

32 Instead, Defendant argues that the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying his request for appointment of counsel 

 23 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).

24 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).

25 Id.

26 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).

27 Id.

28 Barrow, 2005 WL 3436609, at *2. 

29 132 S.Ct. 1309 (1202).

30 Dkt. 291.

31 State v. Travis, 2013 WL 1196332, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 2013), aff’d sub nom., 

Anderson v. State, 69 A.3d 370 (Del. 2013) and aff’d, 69 A.3d 372 (Del. 2013). 32 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
5

in his first post-conviction relief motion, citing Holmes v. State.33 

However, since that first motion itself was untimely, the trial court’s 

denial of Defendant’s request for counsel was not an abuse of 

discretion.

10. Defendant’s claim that he should have been provided with counsel for 

his untimely initial post-conviction relief motion is subject to 

procedural default under Rule 61(i)(3) as well, since he did not raise 

that issue in his appeal from the denial of that motion.34 

Defendant has offered no cause for relief from the procedural default 

occasioned by his failure to raise the issue on appeal. Similarly, he 

has not shown prejudice from his own failure to raise that issue, nor 

could he, since the request for counsel was made in connection with 

an untimely post-conviction relief motion and was properly denied by 

the trial court. 

11. Defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel also is 

procedurally barred. To the extent his current claims are different than 

those previously asserted, they are barred by Rule 61(i)(2). To the 

extent they repeat those previously raised, they are barred as previously 

adjudicated under Rule 61(i)(4). 

 

12. The Court does not find that “the interest of justice”35 makes the above

Rule 61(i)(2) and (4) bars to relief inapplicable. The “interest of 

justice” exception applies when (1) “the previous ruling was clearly in 

error or there has been an important change in circumstances, in 

particular, the factual basis for issues previously posed,” or (2) there is 

an “equitable concern of preventing injustice.”36 The “interest of 

justice” exception is narrow and will only be applied in limited 

circumstances.37 No such circumstances exist here. The previous 

ruling was clearly not in error given the untimeliness of Defendant’s 

initial motion and there has been no important change in circumstances. 

Moreover, there is no “equitable concern of preventing injustice” since 

the evidence that Defendant was a participant in the felony murder of 

Thomas Smith was strong and the issue of who was the actual shooter 

was rendered moot when the trial court issued its decision after the 

 33 67 A.3d 1022 (Del. 2013); Dkt. 286.

34 Barrow v. State, 913 A.2d 569 (Del. 2006) (TABLE).

35 Super Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2) and (4).

36 Lindsey v. State, 2014 WL 2178453, at *3 (Del. May 27, 2014) (quoting Weedon v. State, 750 

A.2d 521, 527-28 (Del. 2000)) 

37 Id.
6

second penalty hearing. In that opinion, the trial court determined that it 

was unable to determine which of the three participants was the shooter

and imposed life sentences.

38 

13. Finally, the Court does not find that the bars to relief are inapplicable 

under Rule 61(i)(5). By its terms, that rule only provides relief from 

the bars found in Rules 61(i)(1)-(3). The bar to relief of Rule 61(i)(4) 

remains unaffected by Rule 61(i)(5). Defendant does not address Rule 

61’s bars to relief in his papers, and, hence, makes no argument that his 

underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim raises a “colorable 

claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional 

violation that undermined the legality, reliability, integrity or fairness 

of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.”39 Such an 

argument would lack merit in any case, since he has failed to show that 

he has a colorable claim.

 

14. To successfully articulate a colorable ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, a claimant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 

deficient, and that, but for such deficiency, there is a reasonable 

probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.40 “Mere allegations of ineffectiveness will not suffice. A 

defendant must make specific allegations of actual prejudice and 

substantiate them.”41 Defendant’s first claim is that trial counsel 

should have subpoenaed an unnamed “key witness” to “ascertain the 

exact nature of the deal struck between the witness and the prosecutor 

in exchange for testimony.”42 This allegation is far too lacking in 

specificity and in articulable prejudice to meet either prong of 

Strickland. Defendant’s second claim is that defense counsel failed to 

object to a witness’ testimony regarding Jamaican language and that 

such testimony was used to identify the shooter.43 Whether the claimed 

failure to object meets the performance deficiency prong of Strickland

is immaterial, since it clearly does not meet the prejudice prong. The 

identity of the shooter was relevant to the intentional murder charge 

and the penalty imposed. Since both of those issues were resolved in 

Defendant’s favor, he cannot complain of prejudice for his trial 

counsel’s failure to object to the testimony. 

 38 State v. Barrow, 2002 WL 88934, at *3 (Del. Super. Jan. 4, 2002). 

39 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5).

40 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

41 Wright v. State, 671 A,2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996).

42 Def’s Mot. for Post-conviction Relief at 3. 

43 Id. at 4.
7

 

Therefore, Defendant’s third Motion for Post-conviction Relief is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Ferris W. Wharton, J.

oc: Prothonotary

cc: Investigative Services 

Elizabeth McFarlan, Esquire

Anthony Figliola, Esquire

Hector S. Barrow, SBI # 33