### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 010 -CV

K e vin Je r om e Ro lli ns- El , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas Depart m ent of Fam ily and P rote ctive Service s , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF B ELL COUNTY , 146TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 215, 278- B , HO NORAB LE RICKMO RRIS , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Kevin Jerome Rollins-El appeals fr om the decr ee terminating his parenta l rig hts. He

c o n te n d s th a t th e r e f

e r r in g tr ia l c o u rt e r

r e d b y d e n y in g h im a ju

r y tr ia l d e n o v o , b y d e n y ing the pater nal g randmother ’s plea in inter vention, and by deciding that it ha d lost plenary power to act on post-judgme nt motions , including a motion for new tria l. We affirm the de cre e. Rolli ns-El raise s only

proce dural c omplaints reg ardingthe district court’s decre e. Consequently , we will discuss the underlying fac ts br iefly and focus our revie w on the proc edura l po sture of

the c a se . Ro lli ns -E l w a s c on vic te d of fe lony the ft and pla c e d on pr ob a tio n in 19 92

. Hi s probation was revoke d in 1993 when he tested positive f or coc aine use . I n 1998, he wa s convicted of possession of a f

irea rm by a fe lon and was se ntence d to prison followed by probation. That ter

m of proba t i o n was re voked whe n he plea ded true to a cha rg e of posse ssion of coca ine. I n 2002, he assaulted the mother

of his first child. I n May 2004, he wa s arr ested in Kentucky for assaulting the2

mother of the children who are the subject of this matter , flee ing and evading arr est, p o s s essi ng marijuana , and public intox ication. Acc ording to the State’s attorne y , these c harges rema ined outstanding at the time of the hea ring befor e the trial court. I n 2005, he was char g ed with driving wh ile int oxic a te d a

nd c on vic te d o f p os se ssi on

of c oc a ine , wh ic h le d to his inc arc e ratio n at th e tim e of thi s p ro c e edi ng. Th e re wa s te sti mony tha t th e c hil dr e n’ s mo the r u se d d ru g s and oc c a sio na lly

wo uld be c ome tr a

ns ie nt and los e c on ta c t wi th fa mil y me mbe rs . In h is f

ind ing s o f f

a c t, t he a sso c ia te jud g e fo un d th a t Ro lli ns -E l kn e w f ro m hi s p re vio us c on vic tio n th a t dr ugpo sses sio n c ou ld l e a d to inc arc e ratio n a

nd that hi s 2 00 5 in c arc e ra

tio n le ft the c hil dr e n pri mari ly in t he c are of “ an uns ta ble

and dr uga bu sin g mot

he r. ” Th e tr ia l c ourt fo un d that Rol lin s- El e ng a g e d in c on du c t or kn ow ing ly place d the childre n with persons who e ng ag ed in conduc t that endang ere d the children’s phy sical or

em o t i o n al we l l -b ei n g.

Th e fo llo wi ngpr oc e dura l e ve nts are re le va nt t o th is a

pp e a l:

Oc tob e r 2 4, 20 06 As so c ia te jud g e ho lds he ari ng on pe tit ion to t e rm inate pa re nta l ri g hts and ora lly announce s that Rolli ns-El’s rig hts are te rminated October 26, 2006 Roll i n s -E l fi l es h i s n o t i ce o f ap p ea l an d reque sts hear ing befor e

district court November

2, 2006 District court sets c ase f or hea ringon November

28, 2006 N o v e mb e r 1 6 , 2 0 0 6 Ro ll in s - E l r e qu e s ts ju r y , a s s e rts in d ig e n c e , and re quests waiver of jury fee ; Rolli ns-El’s attorne y

moves to withdraw November

17, 2006 Rolli ns-El alleg edly first rec eives notice of setting No v em b er

2 8 , 2 0 0 6 R o l l i n s -E l re qu es t s co n t i n u an ce , m o v es t o s t ri k e n o n j u ry s et t i n g; Court denies these motions Rolli ns-El files af

fidavit/unsworn dec laration of indige nce; Court beg ins hearinglasting throug h Dec ember 1, 2006Despite the g ranting of the motion, the trial c o u n sel who wa s permitted to withdraw 1 ne ve rt he le ss c ur re ntl y re pr e se nts Rol lin s- El in t his a pp e a l.

3 Dec ember

1, 2006 Wanda Rollins fil es motion to int erve ne;

Court or a lly or de rs te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts ; Court gr ants motion for counsel to withdra w 1 De c e mbe r 1 1, 20 06 Court sig ns or de r t e rm inatin g pa re nta l r ig hts Ja n u ar y 8 , 2 0 0 7 Rol li n s - E l f il e s n o ti c e o f a

p p e a l an d a g ree d motion for additional time to file statement of points on appeal , al l eg ing la ck of notice of judgme nt J anuar y 9, 2007 Rolli ns-El files motion for newtrial and statement of points on appea l

Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

de c lin e d to se t a he ari ng on the Janu ary mot ion s, wr iti ng on the m “ c a se on a pp e a l, court ha s lost it s plenary

power .” Appellants in termination ca ses ar e re quired to file statements of points they intend to appea l no later than f

ifteen da y s after the judg ment is signed. T ex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405(b) (West Supp. 2007). Appellate c ourts “may not c onsider any issue that was not spe cifica lly prese nted to t he tr ia l c ourt

in a tim e ly fi le d s ta te me nt o f t

he po int s on whi c h the pa rt y int e nd s to app e a l or

in a stateme nt combined with a motion for new tria l.” Id. § 263.405(i). The judgme nt was sig ned on Dec ember

11, 2006, and Rollins-El filed his state ment of points on appeal on January 9, 2007, more than fiftee n day s after

the judg ment was sig ned. Althoug h there is no provision ex pressly permitting an extension of time to file the statement o f p o i n t s , Rolli ns-El filed an “ Ag ree d Motion for Ad dit ion a l T ime to F ile State me nt o f P oin ts a nd Rul e 11 Ag re e me nt” a sse rt ing t hat he file d h is statement late be cause no notice of the judgme nt was sent to him. Roll ins-El did not, however,Rol lin s- El a lso fi le d two oth e r n oti c e s o f a pp e a l: ( 1) Oc tob e r 2 6, 20 06 , f ro m th e a sso c ia te 2 judge ’s orde r, and ( 2) Nove m b er 1 6, 2006, afte r the trial c ourt adopted the associate judge ’s proposed or der. Eve n if these doc uments were construed a s a statement of points on appeal prematurely

filed, they

prese nt nothing for

our re view bec ause the y do not co n t ai n t h e p oints he raises in this appea l. The point s Rolli ns-El raises in this appea l bear on actions or inac tions of the trial court oc curr ing a fter both notice s were filed. 4 obtain a finding from the trial court reg arding the date he rec eived notice. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 306a. Str ic tly int e rp re tin g the te rm s o f t he fa mil y c od e , w e c ann ot c on si der th e g ro un ds pr e se nte d in the J anuar

y 9 statement of points on appea l beca use t hat document was not t imely filed. Te x. F a m. 2 Cod e Ann. § 2 63 .4 05 (i ); Po ol v . Te x as De p’ t of Fa mi ly & Pr ote c tiv e Se rv

s. , 227 S.W .3d 212, 215 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2007, no pet.).

B e c a us e the int e re sts a t st a ke are so imp or tant a nd be c a us e the re c or d c on ta ins so me indication that Rolli ns-El did not rece ive timel y n o t i ce of judg ment, we will consider the issues raised in the s tate me n t o f p o in ts o na

p p e a l i nth e in te r e s t o f

ju s ti c e . We c o n c lu d e th a t t h e is sues raised in the statement of points on appea l do not suppor t a ltering the judgmen t

. R o llins-El complains of the trial court’s denials of his r equest for jury trial, his mother’s plea

in intervention,

and his mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l. We review a t ri al court’s refusa l to gr ant a jury trial under a

n abuse- of-discr etion standard. Merc edes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne , 925 S.W .2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996). We examine the e nti re re c or d a

nd wi ll f ind that an a bu se of dis c re tion ex is ts if

the tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on is arbitra ry , unrea sonable, a

nd without refe renc e to gu i d i n g principles. Id. Un de r t he ru le s o f c ivi l proce dure, a

court may

set contested c ases f

or trial on its own m otion or based on a par ty ’s written reque st, provided that t he cour t give s at least 45 day s’ notice of a first setting for tria l, unless the5

parties a g ree otherwise. T ex. R

. C i v. P. 245. The court will not hold a jury trial unless a wr itten reque st for a jury trial is filed wit h the clerk of t he court “a r easona ble time befor e the date set for tr ia l of the c a us e on the no n- jur y do c ke t, but no t les s than thir ty da y s in adv anc e .” Te x. R. C iv. P. 216(a) . The jury

fee must be deposited with the di strict cler k within the time for making a wr itten reque st for a jury trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 216(b). I nstead of paying the fee , the par ty may within the time for making such deposit file with the cler k, his a ffidavit to the eff

ect that he is unable to make such deposit and c annot, by the pledg e of pr operty

or otherw ise, obtain the money nece ssary

for that purpose. Te x . R. Civ. P . 217. An inmate in the Te x as De partm en t o f C o rre ctions may instead file an unswor

n decla ration to the same e ffe ct. Tex. Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 132.001(a) (West 2005). Rol lin s- El c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y de nying his reques t f

or a jur y tr ia l. He c ontends that he wa s not require d to file a jury reque st thirty day s in advanc e of the trial setting beca use the fa

mily code’ s acc eler ated timetable re n d er ed that impossibl e. See B ell Helicopter Te x tron v . A bb ott , 863 S.W .2d 139, 140-41 (Te x . App.—Texarkana 1993, writ denied) . I n Be ll , the tr ia l c ourt

g a ve no tic e of

no nju ry tr ia l t wenty -s ix day s in

a dv anc e of

tr ia l ( re c e ive d b y

B e ll twenty -four day s befor e trial). Id. at 140. Althoug h Be ll had reque sted a jury ear ly on in the case , Be ll did not pay

the jury fee until after the or igina l trial date. Id. Th e Tex ark ana c ourt he ld t hat, beca use the trial c ourt did not give notice of the first t ri al s ett ing f orty -five da

y s in advanc e of the trial, the re maining pr ocedur al timetable was inapplicable, and Bell’s jury demand wa s deeme d timely

. Id. at 1 4 1 (c i t i n g Simpson v. Stem , 822 S.W .2d 323, 324-25 (Te x . App.—Waco 1992, orig . proce eding )). The Si mpson op ini on fu rt he r e xpla ins that th e jur

y de mand , d e e me d ti me lyAll persons ar e pre sumed to know the law a nd are char g ed with knowledg e of pr ovisions 3 of statutes. See G reater Houston Transp. Co. v. Philli ps , 801 S.W .2d 523, 525 n.3 (Tex. 1990). T h e c o u rt s et a t ri al d at e t h i rt y -t h re e d ay s af t er t h e n o t i ce o f ap p ea l wa s fi l ed

. Al t h o u gh 4 a r ef erri n g t ri al co u rt s h o u l d h ea r a pa rt y ’s ap p ea l wi t h i n t h i rt y d ay s o f th e as s o ci at e j u d ge’ s ru l i n g, the fa ilure to do so will not deprive the court of jur isdiction over the ca se. Ha rre ll v . H arre ll , 986 S.W .2d 629, 631 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.). 6 beca use of the tr ial co u rt ’s noncompliance with Rule 245, is presumed to have be en made a

rea sonable time ahe ad of tria l. Simpson , 822 S.W .2d at 324. Under Simpson , the presumption of timeliness is rebuttable. Id.

Th is c a se is d ist inc t f

ro m Be ll and Simpson b e c a

u s e o f t h e s t a tu t o r

y c o n str a int s pla c e d o n te rm inatio n c a se s. Ge ne ra lly , tr ia l in te rm inatio n c a se s in

wh ic h th e De pa

rtme nt i s the conse rvator must beg in within a y ear of fili ng . See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.401 (West Supp. 2007). T h e fa m i ly code r equire s that the ref err ing tr ial court he ar a

n appea l from an associate judge ’s ruling in a termination ca se within thirty day s af t er t h e appeal to the trial court is filed. Id. § 2 01 .0 15 (f

) ( Wes t Su

pp . 2 00 7) ; see also id. § 101.032(a) (West 2002). This statutory

re qu i re m en ts u

p er s ed es t h e r

u l e- b as edre qu i re m en t o f fo rt y -f i v e da y s ’ ad v an ce n o t i ce o f t ri al s et t i n g. See J oh ns ton e v . S

tat e , 22 S.W.3 d 408 , 409 (T e x. 20 00 ) ( statut e s g e ne ra lly pr e va il i n c on fl ic t w ith

r u l e s )

. O t h e r

w i s e , t h e r e f

e r r i n g c o u rt w o u l d b e r e qu i r e d t o g i v e n o t i c e o f t r i a l a tl e a s tf

i f t e e nd a ys befor e the a ssociate judg e announc ed a r uling a nd, qu i t e li kely , befor e any party g ave notice of appea l of that ruling . I n contra st to the district courts in Be ll and Simpson , the district court’s f ailure in this case to g ive at lea st forty -five da y s’ notice of

trial was a

cre ature of statute, not er ror. Unlike the par

ties in Be ll

and Simpson , Rolli ns-El knew when he filed the notice of 3 appea l from the assoc iate judg e’s r ul i n g that the district court wa s require d to hear the appe al wi th in t hir ty da y s. Even if he was not re quired to make his jury demand until he re ceive d a trial 47

setting—w hich was se nt only twenty -six day s befor e trial—he was require d to make the jury demand

a re asonable time before trial. Simpson , 8 22 S.W. 2d a t 32 4; se e als o Tex. R. C iv. P. 216(a). We f ind no a bu se of dis c re tio n in

the tr ia l c ourt ’s de nia l of the jur y de mand in t his

case beca use the c o u rt could re asonably have de nied the dema

nd as not having been ma de or completed within a r easona ble time befor e trial. “ I t is withi n the discre tion of the trial cour t to deny

a jury trial in the absenc e of a timely reque st or pay ment of a jury

fee .” Martin v. Black, 909 S.W .2d 192, 197 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1995, writ denied) . Rolli ns-El did not file a jury demand when a ppealingto the district court, eve n though he knew wh en fi l i ng the notice of appea l that it would have to be he ard w ithin thi rty day s and that the ca s e wo u l d have to be resolved by F e br ua ry 13 , 2 00 7. He de mand e d a jur y on No ve mbe r 16 , 20 06 —tw e nty -o ne da y s a ft e r f ili nghis notice of a

ppeal—but did not acc ompany his jury demand with the jury fee or oath of ina

bility to pay the fe e. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 216(b) (fee due at time of j ury demand) , 217 (oath in lieu of f ee due at same time). The Request for Jury Trial filed by

counsel a sserts that Rolli ns-El is repre sented by appointed counse l “bec ause of his indigenc e”—a lthough the O rder Appointing Attorne y

states that the app o i ntment is made bec ause Rollins-El “is incar cer ated” without mentioning his financia l sta t u s . Rolli ns-El filed an unsw orn dec laration of indige nce on N ovember 28, 2006—the date of tr ia l, t we lve da y s a ft e r f ili nghis jur

y de mand and thi rt y -t hr e e da y s a fter app eal ingthe a sso c ia te jud g e ’s ru lin g . A lth ou g h th e tr ia l c ourt did no t sta te a ba sis fo r its de nia l of the re qu e st f or jur y tr ia l,

we c on c lud e tha

t the tr ia l court wo uld no t hav e a bu se d its disc re tio n by

de nyingthe re qu e st b e c a

us e it was neither m ade nor

completed ( i.e., ac companied by the re quisite fee or

decla ration of indig ence )

a re asonable amount of time befor e the tria l date g iven the statutory timetables. See W

i l l i ams8

v. W illiams , 19 S.W. 3d 54 4, 54 6 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 20 00 , pe t. de nied) . W e ov e rr ule Rolli ns-El’s first issue.

Rol lin s- El ne xt co mpl a ins that th e c ourt e rr e d b y de ny in g W and a

Rol lin s’ s p le a

in intervention. Wanda R ollins, the paternal gra ndmother of the children, filed her plea in interve ntion on Dec ember

1, 2 0 0 6 —the last day

of the he aring . After

the plea w as denie d, she did not file a

no tic e of a pp e a l. A n a

pp e a lin g pa

rt y may no t c omp lain

of e rr or s th a t do no t in

jur iou sly a ff e c t it

. Torringt on Co. v. Stutzman , 4 6 S. W.3 d 8 29 , 8 43 (T e x. 20 00 ); see also In re H.M .J.H. , 209 S.W .3d 320, 321 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pe t.). Whil e a g randmother may intervene in a suit affe cting a par ent-c hild relationship, se e Mc Cor d v . W att s , 777 S.W .2d 809, 812 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no pet.), we find no basis for he r son to c omplain on appea l of the trial court’s ref usal to allow the int e rv e nti on

wh e n s he do e s n ot h e rs e lf fi le a no tic e of a pp e al. Ro llins- El may

no t su c c e ssf

ull y complain of the de nial of Wanda’s pe tition i n intervention. We overr ule his second issue. I n h is thi rd iss ue , Rol lin s- El c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d by statin g that it

los t plenar y power to consider his post-judg ment motions, i ncluding his moti on for ne w t rial. We revie w a trial c ourt’s denial of a motion for new trial for a n abuse of discretion. In re R.R. , 209 S.W .3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2006).

Rolli ns-El’s motion for new trial was not timely

. I n termination case s, th e m o t i on for ne w trial is due within fiftee n day s after the judg men t o r o rd er . Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405(b)( 1). Ther e is no provision for ex tending that deadline in the statute. See id. Ex cept a s specifie d in the rules of pr ocedur e, the trial court cannot enlar g e the time f or filing a motion for new tr ia l u n d e r th e r

u le s e v e n w it

h th e p arti e s ’ a g r e e me n t. See Te x. R. C iv. P. 5 ; Mo rit z v . P re iss ,Even if the Be ll County courthouse was c losed on Dec ember 26, 2006, Rolli ns-El’s motion 5 for new t rial filed on J anuar y 9, 2007, was untimely

beca use it was filed more than 15 day s after the judgme nt was sig ned on De cembe r 11, 2007. I n his moti on for ne w trial, Rollins-El essentiall y re q uests rec onsideration of tria l court 6 de c isi on s. He co mp la ins tha t th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y de nyinghis re qu e st f

or jur y tr ia l and his mother’s plea in intervention and not naming her pe rmane nt manag ing c onservator, by concluding that the Department made rea sonable e ffor ts to return his children to him or to his mother, by finding the e vid e nc e fa c tua lly

su ff ic ie nt t hat he ha d k

no wi ng ly pla c e d o r a llo we d the c hil dr e n to r e ma in i n 9 12 1 S. W.3 d 7 15 , 7 20 (T e x. 20 03 ); se e als o Tex. R. C iv. P. 306a (descr ibing pr ocess f or proving late notice of

judgme nt). The tria l court sig ned i t s j u dg ment terminating Rolli ns-El’s par ental rig hts on Dece mber 11, 2006. B y statute, the motion for n ew trial was due fiftee n day s later on Dec ember

26, 2006. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405(b)( 1). Rolli ns-El filed his motion for new tria l on J anuar

y 9, 2007. Ev e n if the pr ov isi on s of Te xas R ule of Civ il Pr oc e dure 30 6a

a pp ly 5 t o t er m i n at i o nca s es , t h er e i s n o i n d i ca t i o nt h at t h e c o u rt wa s as k edt o m ak e o r m ad e a n y fi n d i n gs

e xten din g the tim e fo r fi lin g the mot ion fo r ne w tri a l. Thus , th e mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l w a s n ot t ime ly filed and did not extend the t rial court’s plenar y power . Acc ording ly , the trial cour t’s plenar y power expired thirty

day s after

it signed the judgme nt. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 329b(d), (e)

. The rec o rd does not demonstrate re versible e rror with reg ard to the tria l court’s notation on the post-judgme nt motions that it had lost plenary p o we r. T h e motions were f iled on J anuar y 9, 2007 and the tria l court lost plenary power on J anuary 1 0 , 2007. The notations on the motions are undate d, but if they wer e made any t i m e af

t er J anuar

y 10, 2007, there is no error

. Fur th er , as just discussed, the motion for new tria l was untimely filed. The c ourt could not have g rante d the untimely

motion. Although the court could have g rante d a new tria l on its own mot ion on J anuar y 9-10, 2007 on the same g rounds raised by Rolli ns-El’s motion, the rec ord bef ore us doe s not demonstrate that its failure to do so was an a buse of discr etion. 6cond i t ions or with people that enda ng ere d the childre n’s well-be ing, a nd by concludingthat the evidenc e supported a

conclusion that termination is in the best interests of the children. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial c ourt’s fa ilure to g rant a new tria l on its own mot ion. One diff ere nt g round raised in the m otion for new t rial i s Rolli ns-El’s assertion that the final hear ing da

te was imprope rly

ac celerate d “in violation of Texas Family Code §§ 262.2015 (authorizing a cce leration if certa in ag g ravating f actor s are prese nt) and 263.401 (r equiring dismiss al unless trial beg ins within a y ear afte r t he Department be comes tempora ry manag ing c onservator).” Although the re w ere statements at trial that the case was place d on the “fast trac k,” this acc eler ation is not appar ent from the rec ord as it was hea rd by the district court less than nine ty day s befor e the deadline f or dismissing the ca se. F urther, it i s n o t clear how a ny acc eler ation was or w ould have been imprope r or how any acc eler ation harme d Rolli ns-El. We do not find an er ror in not g ranting a ne w tri a l on

the se g ro un ds

. 10 We s imi larl y

fi nd no re ve rs ibl e e rr or

in t he c ourt ’s no ta tio n o n th e state me nt o f p oin ts on appea l or the reque st f or finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law that it had lost plenar y power . Even if these documents we re c onsidered timely filed, the re cord doe s not compel a c onclusion that the trial cour

t’s ref usal to consider the m harmed Rollins-El. We have c onsidered the iss ue s r a ise d in

the state me nt o f p oin ts o n a pp e al and

have re vie we d th e re c or d th a t w ou ld have unde rlain any

finding s or conc lusions. The rec ord does not r evea l harmful er ror on a ny of the iss ue s Ro lli ns -E l r a ise s.

Affir med.

G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Waldrop a nd Henson Affir med Filed: May

9, 2008