NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

VERONICA M., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.M., 

J.M., J.T., J.T., J.T., B.P., D.P., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0217

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD 21627

The Honorable Linda H. Miles, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Owsley Law Firm, PLLC, Avondale

By Carlie Owsley Walker

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By JoAnn Falgout

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
VERONICA M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

D O W N I E, Judge:

¶1 Veronica M. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to seven children (collectively, “the 

children”). For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

¶2 With the exception of J.N.T., the children came into DCS care

in March 2012 after D.P. was “born substance exposed and premature;” 

Mother used amphetamines during her pregnancy. Additionally, she 

lacked a stable home and was not meeting the children’s basic needs. 

J.N.T. came into DCS care in June 2013. 

¶3 In May 2012, the superior court found all children except 

J.N.T. dependent as to Mother. In November 2013, the court found J.N.T. 

dependent. At that time, the court noted Mother had failed to complete 

services DCS had offered, including substance abuse treatment, drug 

testing, a psychiatric evaluation, individual counseling, and parent aide

services. 

 

1 On appeal, “[w]e view the facts in the light most favorable to 

upholding the juvenile court’s order.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew 

L., 223 Ariz. 547, 549, ¶ 7, 225 P.3d 604, 606 (App. 2010). The statement of 

facts in Mother’s opening brief fails to cite to the record. See ARCAP 

13(a)(5) (statement of facts shall include “appropriate references to the 

record”). When a litigant fails to include citations to the record, the court 

may disregard that party’s unsupported factual narrative and draw the 

facts from the opposing party’s properly-documented brief and/or the 

record on appeal. See Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Redlon, 215 Ariz. 13, 15, 

¶ 2, 156 P.3d 430, 431 (App. 2007).

 
VERONICA M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

¶4 In March 2013, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights to J.M., J.M.T., J.S.T., B.P., and D.P. pursuant to Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 8-533(B)(3) (chronic drug abuse or 

mental illness), -533(B)(8)(a) (out-of-home placement for nine months or 

longer), and -533(B)(8)(b) (out-of-home for six months or longer). In

October 2013, DCS amended its petition to include A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) 

(out-of-home placement for fifteen months or longer). In February 2014, 

DCS amended its petition to include A.M. and J.N.T. 

¶5 After a contested severance trial, the superior court 

terminated Mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (as to all 

children); -533(B)(8)(a) (as to all children); -533(B)(8)(b) (as to J.N.T., D.P., 

and B.P.); and -533(B)(8)(c) (as to all children except J.N.T.). The court also 

found severance was in the children’s best interest. 

¶6 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

¶7 A court may terminate parental rights if it finds one of the 

statutory grounds for severance by clear and convincing evidence. A.R.S. 

§§ 8-533(B), -537(B). We review termination orders for an abuse of 

discretion. Xavier R. v. Joseph R., 230 Ariz. 96, 100, ¶ 11, 280 P.3d 640, 644 

(App. 2012). 

¶8 Mother contends insufficient evidence supports termination 

of her parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (history of chronic drug 

use or mental illness). Because we find sufficient evidence to support 

termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a) (out-of-home placement for nine 

months or longer), we need not address the additional grounds for 

severance the superior court found. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3, 53 P.3d 203, 205 (App. 2002) (“If clear and 

convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds on which 

the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not address claims 

pertaining to the other grounds.”). 

¶9 To terminate parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), a 

child must be in an out-of-home placement for nine months or longer 

pursuant to court order and the parent must have substantially neglected 

or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing the child to be in 

an out-of-home placement. Mother does not dispute that the children 

were in an out-of-home placement pursuant to court order for nine 

months or longer. 
VERONICA M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

¶10 DCS was required to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that it “made a diligent effort to provide appropriate 

reunification services.” See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(8), -537(B); Christina G. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 234-35, ¶¶ 12-15, 256 P.3d 628, 

631-32 (App. 2011). The record establishes that DCS offered Mother 

numerous services, including substance abuse treatment, drug testing, 

parent aide services, case aide services, psychological and psychiatric 

evaluations, individual counseling, bus passes, and cab service. DCS made

multiple referrals for some services because Mother failed to complete 

them. DCS advised Mother of the services she was required to complete. 

¶11 A parent will not be found to have substantially neglected to 

remedy the circumstances causing an out-of-home placement if she makes 

an appreciable, good faith effort to comply with services, even if she 

cannot completely overcome her difficulties. Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile 

Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 576, 869 P.2d 1224, 1229 (App. 1994). 

However, if a parent makes only “sporadic, aborted attempts to remedy” 

the circumstances, termination is appropriate. Id. Compliance requires 

more than de minimis effort. Id. at 576 n.1, 869 P.2d at 1229 n.1.

¶12 The DCS case manager testified Mother’s engagement in 

services, other than the psychological and psychiatric evaluations, was

“minimal” prior to April 29, 2014. The record supports this assertion. 

Mother has a history of illegal drug use. DCS referred her to TERROS 

Families First, which provides substance abuse treatment. DCS made four 

referrals to TERROS, yet Mother did not participate until April 29, 2014 —

more than two years after most of the children were removed from her 

care. Although the TERROS counselor testified that, as of the time of trial, 

Mother was on track to complete the program in July 2014, she also stated 

Mother would require an additional six months of aftercare. 

¶13 DCS also required Mother to drug test. Mother understood 

that, as of March 2012, she was required to call in daily and to test as 

directed. DCS informed Mother that missed tests would be considered 

positive. Mother, however, did not begin to consistently comply with 

testing requirements until April 2014 — less than two months before the 

severance trial. She missed over 100 tests. When Mother did test, the 

results were negative for drug use; however, the case manager testified

that sporadic testing may indicate a drug user who is testing only “when 

they can clean out their system.” 

¶14 Mother completed a psychological evaluation after two 

missed appointments. The evaluating psychologist offered a poor
VERONICA M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

parenting prognosis, but suggested giving Mother 60-90 additional days 

to engage in services. The DCS case manager testified that a year had 

passed since that evaluation, and during that time, Mother had not 

substantially participated in services. 

¶15 Mother also completed a psychiatric evaluation with 

Dr. Rosengard, who found “symptoms consistent with depression, 

substance abuse, and . . . traits of a personality disorder,” offering a poor 

prognosis for Mother’s ability to parent the children. Even with the 

knowledge Mother had begun engaging in services as of April 2014, 

Dr. Rosengard testified his prognosis was “[l]ess than poor . . . because 

more time has gone by and there’s only been a relatively brief period of 

time of proven sobriety and there has not been . . . engagement in 

therapy.”

¶16 DCS also made referrals to three different counseling 

agencies. However, Mother only participated in counseling at the outset

of the first referral, and the agency later closed out that referral for 

non-compliance. Mother knew she was required to complete individual 

counseling, yet never did so. Dr. Rosengard testified that, given the 

length of time that had elapsed, “it solidifies a very bad prognosis if 

[Mother’s] not able/willing to go to therapy.”

¶17 DCS also made three parent aide referrals. The first two 

were closed out unsuccessfully. Mother canceled roughly half of her 

sessions with the parent aide. Although she used an aide for J.N.T., 

Mother canceled numerous visits and was required to make a confirming 

call before visits because of her inconsistent attendance. The parent aide 

testified Mother did not make J.N.T. a priority and often would not 

confirm her visits on time. When the parent aide referral for J.N.T. closed 

in April 2014, Mother’s behavior objectives had not been met. 

¶18 Mother also did not establish stable housing or employment. 

DCS had six or seven different addresses for her since January 2013.

Mother did not consistently update DCS on address changes. DCS 

discussed housing with Mother several times and offered resource

information, but Mother did not follow through. Mother admitted at trial 

that she had been “unstable” and would not provide a number when 

asked how many places she had lived in the past year. In terms of 

employment, Mother consistently told DCS she had worked for a 

temporary service for years. However, she provided no verification, and 

at the time of trial, Mother testified she was unemployed. 
VERONICA M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

¶19 Dr. Rosengard testified that individuals with personality 

disorders tend to engage in unhealthy relationships, causing instability. 

Mother confirmed that, before DCS became involved, she and S.P. — the 

father of some of her children — engaged in domestic violence that the 

children witnessed, and S.P. used methamphetamine in the home. The

case manager testified Mother and A.T. — the father of some of the other 

children — provided the same address as of January 2014, despite A.T.’s

recent positive test for methamphetamine. 

¶20 Mother testified her depression affected her ability to engage 

in services. She did not, however, participate in services that could have 

addressed that condition. Mother had two years to remedy her 

circumstances as to most of the children, and DCS offered appropriate 

services to assist her in doing so. DCS is not required to “ensure that a 

parent participates in each service it offers” or to leave “the window of 

opportunity for remediation open indefinitely.” Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile 

Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353, 884 P.2d 234, 239 (App. 1994); 

JS-501568, 177 Ariz. at 577, 869 P.2d at 1230 (engagement and recovery 

three years after child’s out-of-home placement, though commendable, 

was “too little, too late”). The record supports the superior court’s 

determination that Mother substantially neglected or willfully refused to 

remedy the circumstances causing the children’s out-of-home placements. 

CONCLUSION2

¶21 We affirm the superior court’s order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to all seven children. 

 

2 Mother has not challenged the court’s best interest finding, so we 

do not address it. See MT Builders, L.L.C. v. Fisher Roofing, Inc., 219 Ariz. 

297, 304 n.7, ¶ 19, 197 P.3d 758, 765 n.7 (App. 2008) (arguments not 

developed on appeal are deemed waived).