alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In re: Reverend Franklin C. REAVES, PhD, Petitioner.

No. 11-1055.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 31, 2011.

Decided: April 4, 2011.

Franklin C. Reaves, Petitioner Pro Se.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Franklin C. Reaves petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking an order requiring the district court to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We conclude that Reaves is not entitled to mandamus relief.

Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. *Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court,*426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); *United States v. Moussaoui,*333 F.3d 509, 516-17 (4th Cir.2003). Further, mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. *In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,*860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir.1988).

Reaves asserts various violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by the district court, all stemming from his belief that pretrial matters were improperly assigned to the magistrate judge. Mandamus, however, may not be used as a substitute for appeal. *In re Lockheed Martin Corp.,*503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.2007). As the review of any alleged errors by the district court may be had through the normal appellate process, the relief sought by Reaves is not available by way of mandamus.

Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately *294presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

N o. 04

- 20

- 00 3 9 3

- CV

SEGUNDO NAVARRO DRILLING, LTD.

, Lewis Petro Properties, Inc.,

and BP America Production Company,

Appellant s

v.

JUAN SALINAS RANCH MINERALS, LTD.

, Appellee

From the 111 th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CV7000614D2

Honorable Monica Z. Notzon , Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebecca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 31, 2021

DISMISSED

The parties have f iled a joint motion to dismiss this appeal due to settlement . We g rant the

motion and dismiss the appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(a)(1). C osts of the appeal are taxed

against the party who incurred them.

PER CURIAM
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2604 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2604

   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the 
additional standard deduction for real property taxes for nonitemizers.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 21, 2009

Mr. Hodes (for himself and Mrs. Lummis) introduced the following bill; 
         which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the 
additional standard deduction for real property taxes for nonitemizers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ADDITIONAL STANDARD DEDUCTION FOR REAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR 
              NONITEMIZERS MADE PERMANENT.

    (a) In General.--Subparagraph (C) of section 63(c)(1) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking ``in the case of 
any taxable year beginning in 2008 or 2009,''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008.
                                 <all>
```
111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3137 

AN ACT 

To amend title 39, United States Code, to provide clarification relating to the authority of the United States Postal 

Service to accept donations as an additional source of 

funding for commemorative plaques. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
2 

•HR 3137 EH

1 SECTION 1. DONATIONS FOR COMMEMORATIVE PLAQUES. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 401(7) of title 39, United 

3 States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘business;’’ and in4 serting ‘‘business, including monetary donations made (in 

5 such manner as the Postal Service may prescribe) for the 

6 funding of plaques in connection with the commemorative 

7 designation of postal facilities;’’. 

8 (b) DESIGNATIONS.—The donor of a monetary dona9 tion described in the amendment made by subsection (a) 

10 may specify the postal facility with respect to which such 

11 donation is to be used. 

12 (c) REQUIREMENT.—The United States Postal Serv13 ice shall provide for a suitable plaque, in the case of any 

14 postal facility which has been designated by law to com15 memorate a particular individual, no later than 120 days 

16 after the date as of which— 

17 (1) a law has been enacted providing for the 

18 designation of the postal facility involved; and 

19 (2) sufficient amounts have been received, in 

20 the manner described in subsection (b), to provide 

21 for such plaque. 

22 Any donations received by the Postal Service under sub23 section (b) in excess of the total amount needed in order 

24 to provide for a suitable plaque may, with the consent of 

25 the donors involved, be used for the funding of a plaque 
3 

•HR 3137 EH

1 in the case of any other postal facility as to which a law 

2 (as described in paragraph (1)) has been enacted. 

3 (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec4 tion shall be considered— 

5 (1) to affect the authority of the United States 

6 Postal Service with respect to any requirements con7 cerning the design, placement, and limitation on 

8 costs relating to commemorative plaques (as de9 scribed in the preceding provisions of this section), 

10 so long as such requirements are applied in a uni11 form manner; or 

12 (2) to limit, supersede, or render inapplicable 

13 any other authority or duty which (but for this Act) 

14 the United States Postal Service would otherwise 

15 have had with respect to the commemorative des16 ignation of a facility or the funding, commissioning, 

17 or installation of a plaque in connection with such 

18 a designation. 

Passed the House of Representatives September 15, 

2009. 

Attest: 

Clerk. 
111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3137 

AN ACT 

To amend title 39, United States Code, to provide 

rative plaques. as an additional source of funding for commemoUnited States Postal Service to accept donations clarification relating to the authority of the
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39713

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PHILLIP T. MADRID,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

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)

)

)

)

)

)

2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 638

Filed: September 17, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bannock County. Hon. David C. Nye, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of four years, with a minimum 

period of confinement of two years, for failure to register as a sex offender, 

affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;

and GUTIERREZ, Judge

PER CURIAM

Phillip T. Madrid pled guilty to failure to register as a sex offender. Idaho Code § 18-

8309(1). The district court sentenced Madrid to a unified term of four years, with a minimum 

period of confinement of two years, suspended the sentence, and placed Madrid on supervised 

probation for four years. Madrid appeals asserting that the district court abused its discretion by 

imposing an excessive sentence.

The district court accepted an Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea agreement, which called for 

the sentence which Madrid received. Thus, Madrid requested the sentence which he received. 

The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her own 
2

conduct induces the commission of the error. Thomson v. Olsen, 147 Idaho 99, 106, 205 P.3d 

1235, 1242 (2009). One may not complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in. Id. 

In short, invited errors are not reversible. Id. This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as 

well as rulings made during trial. State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. 

App. 1990). Having requested the sentence he received through a Rule 11 plea agreement, 

Madrid cannot now challenge his sentence as an abuse of the court’s discretion.

Therefore, Madrid’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### 112 West 34th Street Associates L.L.C., Respondent, v 112-1400 Trade Properties LLC, Appellant.

[988 NYS2d 159]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Jeffrey K. Oing, J), entered July 19, 2013, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted so much of plaintiffs motion for summary judgment as sought a declaration on the first cause of action in the amended and supplemental complaint, and declared that plaintiff effectively renewed the lease between the parties through noon on June 10, 2077, unanimously affirmed, with costs. Appeal from order, same court and Justice, entered June 4, 2013, and from the corresponding so-ordered transcript, entered June 20, 2013, unanimously dismissed, without costs, as subsumed in the appeal from the judgment.

In 1963, plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest, as lessee, and defendant’s predecessor-in-interest, as lessor, entered into a lease of certain property with an initial term of 30 years and, at the lessee’s option, eight renewal terms of 10 or 11 years each, through June 10, 2077. The lease provided that at any time, lessee could renew for one or more of the renewal terms so long as lessee provided written notice to lessor at least two years before expiration of the then-current term.

Section 20.03 of the lease further provided that, “[i]n the event that any default shall have occurred of which Lessor shall have given notice to Lessee, which shall not have been cured and which shall not then be in the process of being cured with due diligence and in good faith by Lessee . . . within the time or times permitted by this Lease, the attempted exercise by Lessee ... of any option to renew this Lease shall not become effective, nor shall any such renewal term be created, if any such default shall exist on the purported commencement date of any such renewal term.”

The second clause of section 20.03 states that a renewal term will not be created if there exists at the commencement of the renewal term “any such default,” which refers back to the previously specified default in the first clause (i.e., any default that has occurred and of which lessor has given notice, which is still outstanding and not in the process of being cured at the time lessee exercises its renewal option) *(see Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v City of New*York, 46 AD3d 378, 380 [1st Dept 2007]; *Merchants Bank of N.Y. v Kluger,*221 AD2d 289, 290 [1st Dept 1995], *lv denied*88 NY2d 807 [1996]).

*544Plaintiff was not in default when it exercised its renewal option for all remaining renewal terms. Therefore, its renewal is valid, regardless of whether a subsequent default is present at the commencement of any renewal term. Contrary to defendant’s assertion that this interpretation of section 20.03 permits each renewal term to commence even if plaintiff is in default, article 19 of the lease provides for remedies if plaintiff is in default, including termination of the lease upon 15 days’ notice.

We have considered defendant’s remaining contentions and find them unavailing.

Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P, Friedman, Saxe and Feinman, JJ.
**CERTIFICATION          OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL**

**OFFICER          PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS          ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION          906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|   | 1. | The                    Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March                    31,                    2007, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32 (the“Periodic                    Report”), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section                    15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;                    and |
|--------|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The                    information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents,                    in all                    material respects, the financial condition of the Company at                    the end of                    the period covered by the Periodic Report and results of operations                    of the                    Company for the period covered by the Periodic                    Report. |
|--------|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| /s/                    Peter A. Michel     | /s/                    David G. Vana       |
|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|
|                                       |                                       |
| Peter                    A. Michel         | David                    G. Vana           |
| Chief                    Executive Officer | Chief                    Financial Officer |

----
----

Exhibit 32.2  
 CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
REQUIRED BY RULE 13A - 14(B) OR RULE 15D - 14(B) AND 18 U.S.C. 1350In connection with the Quarterly Report of Inova Technology Inc. on Form 10-Q for the period ended October 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange  Commission  on  the date hereof (the "Report" ), I, Bob Bates, CFO of the  Company,  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, that:                                                                                   (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                    (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.                                                                             By: /s/ Bob Bates                        Bob Bates  CFO    December  20, 2010
EXHIBIT 31.2

**CERTIFICATIONS**

I, Thomas A. Schuler, Chief Financial Officer andCompany Secretary of Sun New Media, Inc., certify that:

1.      I have reviewed thisquarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Sun New Media, Inc.;

2.      Based on my knowledge, thisreport does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit tostate a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;

3.      Based on my knowledge, thefinancial statements, and other financial information included in this report,fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;

4.      The registrant’s othercertifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15 (e)and 15d-15 (e)) for the registrant and we have:

(a)       designed such disclosurecontrols and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures tobe designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relatingto the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to usby others within those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport was being prepared;

(b)       evaluated the effectivenessof the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in thisreport our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls andprocedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and

(c)       disclosed in this reportany change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and

5.      The registrant’s othercertifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluationof internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors andthe audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performingthe equivalent function):

(a)       all significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

(b)       any fraud, whether or notmaterial, that involves management or other employees who have a significantrole in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
| /s/ Thomas A. Schuler                       |   |
|---------------------------------------------|--------|
| Thomas A.  Schuler, Chief Financial Officer |   |
| Date: December  15, 2006                    |   |

 

----
V 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3111 

For the relief of Walter Enrique Lara. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 26, 2009 

Ms. CORRINE BROWN of Florida introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

For the relief of Walter Enrique Lara. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR WALTER 

4 ENRIQUE LARA. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsections (a) 

6 and (b) of section 201 of the Immigration and Nationality 

7 Act, Walter Enrique Lara shall be eligible for issuance of 

8 an immigrant visa or for adjustment of status to that of 

9 an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence upon 

10 filing an application for issuance of an immigrant visa 

11 under section 204 of such Act or for adjustment of status 

12 to lawful permanent resident. 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
2 

•HR 3111 IH

1 (b) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.—If Walter Enrique 

2 Lara enters the United States before the filing deadline 

3 specified in subsection (c), he shall be considered to have 

4 entered and remained lawfully and shall, if otherwise eligi5 ble, be eligible for adjustment of status under section 245 

6 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date of 

7 the enactment of this Act. 

8 (c) DEADLINE FOR APPLICATION AND PAYMENT OF

9 FEES.—Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply only if the ap10 plication for issuance of an immigrant visa or the applica11 tion for adjustment of status is filed with appropriate fees 

12 within 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

13 (d) REDUCTION OF IMMIGRANT VISA NUMBER.— 

14 Upon the granting of an immigrant visa or permanent res15 idence to Walter Enrique Lara, the Secretary of State 

16 shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by 1, during the 

17 current or next following fiscal year, the total number of 

18 immigrant visas that are made available to natives of the 

19 country of the aliens’ birth under section 203(a) of the 

20 Immigration and Nationality Act or, if applicable, the 

21 total number of immigrant visas that are made available 

22 to natives of the country of the alien’s birth under section 

23 202(e) of such Act. 

24 (e) DENIAL OF PREFERENTIAL IMMIGRATION

25 TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN RELATIVES.—The natural 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
3 

•HR 3111 IH

1 parents, brothers, and sisters of Walter Enrique Lara 

2 shall not, by virtue of such relationship, be accorded any 

3 right, privilege, or status under the Immigration and Na4 tionality Act. 

Æ 


jbell on PROD1PC69 with BILLS
ex-10.1

  
 PROMISSORY NOTE
 

 

  October 28, 2014
 

 FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Oaxaca Resources Corp., a Nevada Corporation, promises to pay Jose Othoniel Gonzalez Montes, on or before December 31, 2018, the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) in the currency of the United States, plus simple interest on the principal amount of this Promissory Note accrued at a rate of 6% per annum.
 

 Time shall be the essence of this Promissory Note.
 

 This Promissory Note shall be governed by and constituted in accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada.
 

 

 OAXACA RESOURCES CORP.
 

 

 Per /s/ Jose Othoniel Gonzalez Montes
      Jose Othoniel Gonzalez Montes, Pres., CEO, CFO
#### Manhattan Venture Company, Appellant-Respondent, v Dover Corporation, Respondent-Appellant.

[665 NYS2d 878]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Beatrice Shainswit, J.), entered on or about June 6, 1996, which, *inter alia,*dismissed the first cause of action sounding in breach of contract seeking recovery of finder’s fees, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of reinstating that cause of action except insofar as it seeks punitive damages, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Issues of material fact remain as to whether plaintiff’s disclosure to defendant of information about an acquisition candidate invoked an obligation by defendant to pay a finder’s fee to plaintiff under the agreement between these parties. The record is unclear as to whether the acquisition candidate had a confidential relationship with another intermediary and/or whether defendant, when it informed plaintiff that it already *101had been informed of the potential acquisition, invoked one of the exceptions under the parties’ agreement, and related notice requirements, whereby no finder’s fee would be paid to plaintiff.

The IAS Court’s disposition of the remaining issues was proper. As plaintiff effectively concedes on appeal, no basis has been set forth for recovery of punitive damages under the first cause of action. Concur—Ellerin, J. P., Williams, Tom and Mazzarelli, JJ.