alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Javier GUILLEN-REYES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 07-10965.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 25, 2008.

Juan Carlos Rodriguez, U.S. District Court, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Charles M. Bleil, Federal Public Defender’s Office Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before GARWOOD, WIENER and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Javier Guillen-Reyes (Guillen) appeals the 77-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction on one count of illegal reentry. Guillen argues that the district court erred by enhancing his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(ii) (2006) based on the determination that his prior Texas conviction of burglary of a habitation was a crime of violence as defined by the Sentencing Guidelines.

*391As Guillen concedes, because he did not object to the district court’s application of the enhancement, review is for plain error only. *See United States v. Gracia-Cantu,*302 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir.2002). Plain error exists when the district court committed a clear and obvious error that affected the substantial rights of the defendant. *See United States v. Marek,*238 F.3d 310, 315 (5th Cir.2001). This court will exercise its sound discretion to correct the error if it finds that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” *Id.*

The record includes a judicial confession, admitted at the sentencing hearing below without objection, in which Guillen admitted to facts that establish that he committed the offense of burglary of a habitation in a manner that is equivalent to the enumerated offense of “burglary of a dwelling.” *See*Tex. Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1); *United States v. Garciar-Mendez,*420 F.3d 454, 456-57 (5th Cir.2005). A written judicial confession may be relied on “in an effort to determine the nature of the Texas offense to which [the defendant] previously pleaded guilty.” *United States v. Garcia-Arellano,*522 F.3d 477 (5th Cir.2008). In view of the judicial confession, the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in enhancing Guillen’s offense level based on his Texas conviction of burglary of a habitation. *See id.*

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

March 31, 2003

Via EDGAR
Securities and Exchange Commission
Judiciary Plaza
450 Fifth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20549

Re:      Consolidated Water Co. Ltd.

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In connection with the Annual Report of Consolidated Water Co. Ltd. (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Jeffrey M. Parker, Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.

This certification is being furnished to the SEC solely pursuant to ss.906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not being filed as part of the Report or
as a separate disclosure document.

                                            Very truly yours,



                                            /s/ JEFFREY M. PARKER
                                            -----------------------------
                                            Jeffrey M. Parker
                                            Chief Executive Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kisha Jones, Appellant.

[987 NYS2d 857]

Appeal by the defendant, as limited by her motion, from a sentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Murphy, J.), imposed March 29, 2011, *1027upon her plea of guilty, on the ground that the sentence was excessive.

Ordered that the sentence is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, her waiver of the right to appeal was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent *(see People v Ramos,*7 NY3d 737, 738 [2006]; *People v Milton,*111 AD3d 765, 766 [2013]; *People v McCray,*103 AD3d 666, 667 [2013]). Since the defendant’s valid waiver of her right to appeal encompasses the waiver of the right to invoke the Appellate Division’s interest of justice jurisdiction to modify sentences, review of the defendant’s contention that the sentence imposed was excessive is precluded *(see People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 255 [2006]).

Eng, EJ., Mastro, Dickerson, Lott and Miller, JJ., concur.
**EXHIBIT 23 (a)**

 

**INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ CONSENT**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-11150 on Form S-3, and No. 33-90860, and 333-75255 on Form S-8 of our report dated April14, 2004, relating to the consolidated financial statements and financial statement schedules of Featherlite, Inc. (the “Company’) as of and for the years ended December 31, 2003 and 2002 appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of theCompany for the year ended December 31, 2003. 

 

/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP 

 

Minneapolis, Minnesota 

April 14, 2004
<PAGE>

32.1              Certification of the Chief Executive Officer and Chief
                  Financial Officer of VOXEL pursuant to Section 906 of
                  the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of VOXEL (the "Company") for
the year ended December 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned Michael Anthony,
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of VOXEL, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Dated: June 17, 2008

                                      /s/Michael Anthony
                                      ----------------------
                                      Michael Anthony
                                      Chief Executive Officer

                                      /s/ Michael Anthony
                                      ----------------------
                                      Michael Anthony
                                      Chief Financial Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2938 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.2938

                      One Hundred Eleventh Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE FIRST SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
             the sixth day of January, two thousand and nine

                                 An Act

 
      To extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a 
                         hydroelectric project.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. EXTENSION.
    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding the time period specified in 
section 13 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 806) that would 
otherwise apply to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission project 
numbered 12187, the Commission may, at the request of the licensee for 
the project, and after reasonable notice, in accordance with the good 
faith, due diligence, and public interest requirements of that section 
and the Commission's procedures under that section, extend the time 
period during which the licensee is required to commence the 
construction of the project for up to 3 consecutive 2-year periods from 
the date of the expiration of the extension originally issued by the 
Commission.
    (b) Reinstatement of Expired License.--If the period required for 
commencement of construction of the project described in subsection (a) 
has expired prior to the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
Commission may reinstate the license effective as of the date of its 
expiration and the first extension authorized under subsection (a) 
shall take effect on the date of such expiration.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.
```
Exhibit 31.02


SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION




I, Vincent De Lorenzo, Chief Financial Officer of Digital Creative Development Corporation., certify that:




1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010 of Digital Creative Development Corporation.




2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;




3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;




4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13-a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:




(a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;




(b)  Not applicable (X-13)




(c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and




(d)  Disclosed in the report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and




5. The registrant's other certifying officer and Ihave disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):




(a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and




(b)  Any fraud, whether or not materia l, that involves management or other employe have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.






Date: June 3, 2011
/s/ Vincent De LorenzoVincent De LorenzoChief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Geraldo Perez, Appellant.

[665 NYS2d 865]

—Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Dominic Massaro, J.), rendered March 28, 1995, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of robbery in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 5 to 15 years, unanimously affirmed.

Defendant’s plea allocution demonstrates a voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to appeal from all rulings made by the trial court in connection with his case, including the sentence, which defendant now challenges solely on the ground of excessiveness *(see, People v Allen,*82 NY2d 761). Taken in context, the court’s remarks concerning defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal cannot be viewed as a limitation on the scope of defendant’s waiver, but rather as an indication that the waiver was intended to be all encompassing *(supra).*

In any event, we perceive no abuse of sentencing discretion. Concur—Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Tom, Mazzarelli and Colabella, JJ.
#### Eddie G. PHILLIPS v. J. S. GATHRIGHT et al.

Civ. A. No. 79-0028.

United States District Court, W. D. Virginia, Harrisonburg Division.

April 13, 1979.

*1212Eddie G. Phillips, petitioner, pro se.

Guy W. Horsley, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

DALTON, District Judge.

Plaintiff Eddie G. Phillips brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants who are officials at the Staunton Correctional Center, where Phillips is imprisoned. He complains that defendants violated his constitutional civil rights by punishing him for keeping in his cell a 2V2 foot-long stick. His theory is that because other prisoners in his unit have possession of more serious weapons, such as knives and scissors, and they are not punished, the discipline imposed on him (5 days solitary confinement) is irrational and discriminatory-

 Defendants made a motion to dismiss Phillips’ complaint, and this court, in an earlier opinion, noted that plaintiff’s allegations did, indeed, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court explained that it may not serve as a reviewing board over the accuracy of a disciplinary committee’s findings of fact. *Flythe v. Davis,*407 F.Supp. 137 (E.D.Va. 1976). It acknowledged, however, that plaintiff may state a claim if he can show that his punishment was arbitrary. As an example was cited the case of *Howard v. Smyth,*365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966). Plaintiff Howard had requested of prison officials that he and other Black Muslim inmates be allowed to conduct their own religious services. The prison superintendent called Howard before him and demanded the names of the other Black Muslim inmates. Howard refused this demand and he was ordered confined in maximum security, where he remained over 4 years. The Court held “that where a prisoner, acting not surreptitiously but frankly and candidly through proper channels, requests arrangements for religious services but refuses to divulge the names of the other interested prisoners, and as a result is summarily confined in the maximum security ward for a period of years, the only reasonable conclusion is that he is being arbitrarily punished.” 365 F.2d, at 431. Punishment is not arbitrary simply because others escape punishment for the same, equal or even worse behavior. Black’s Law Dictionary (1st Ed., 1891), defines arbitrary as “not supported by fair, solid, and substantial cause, and without reason given.” *Howard*requires that if prison disciplinary measures are to be voided as arbitrary, they must be based on illicit reasons or no reason at all.

Plaintiff has been given the opportunity to amend his complaint to state a proper claim, but his response adds nothing to what was originally alleged. Therefore, this complaint is ORDERED dismissed, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Rule 12(b)(6), F.R.C.P.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

February 3, 2014

No. 04-14-00046-CV

ESTATE OF MARIA F. HERNANDEZ DECEASED,

From the Probate Court No 2, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013-PC-1030

Honorable Tom Rickhoff, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

 We order appellees to file a response to appellants’ Motion for Review of Excessive 

Supersedeas Bond. We order that the written response be filed in this court on or before 

February 13, 2014.

 We order the clerk of this court to serve copies of this order on all pro se parties, all 

counsel, and the probate court.

_________________________________

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 3rd day of February, 2014.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### Terence Terell BRYAN, a/k/a T. Terell Bryan, a/k/a Terence Bryan, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SCDC; Warden Cartledge; Responsible Officers, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 10-7488.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 31, 2011.

Decided: April 6, 2011.

Terence Terell Bryan, Appellant Pro Se. Erin Mary Farrell, Daniel Roy Settana, Jr., McKay, Cauthen, Settana & Stubley, PA, Columbia, South Carolina; Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Ap-pellees.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Terence Terell Bryan seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and granting the South Carolina Department of Corrections’ motion for summary judgment on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. RApp. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). “[ T] he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on March 16, 2009. The notice of appeal was filed on October 20, 2010.* Because Bryan failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. Accordingly, we deny Bryan’s motions for a certificate of appealability and to appoint counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R.App. P. 4(c); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988).
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Wilson Adams, Appellant.

[986 NYS2d 845]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garnett, J.), rendered July 18, 2011, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree, and failure to signal, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s *Batson*challenge *(see Batson v Kentucky,*476 US 79 [1986]) to the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory challenge to exclude a certain black male prospective juror. The Supreme Court’s determination that the facially neutral explanation provided by the prosecutor for excluding this prospective juror was not pretextual, which is entitled to great deference on appeal, is supported by the record *(see People v Hecker,*15 NY3d 625, 656, 663-665 [2010]; *People v Smith,*98 AD3d 533, 534 [2012]; *People v Waters,*81 AD3d 673, 673-674 [2011]).

Mastro, J.E, Roman, Hinds-Radix and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ramon HUESO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-30017.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.

Filed March 14, 2011.

Andrea Steward, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Colleen Ann Libbey, Libbey Law Offices, LLC, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: McKEOWN,'FISHER and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

The evidence at trial was sufficient to support a reasonable jury’s conclusion that Hueso agreed to participate in the conspiracy. Hueso not only repeatedly fronted drugs knowing that he would be paid only if they were resold, but also participated in and structured the final transaction. *See United States v. Mincoff,*574 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir.2009). Venue was proper because an overt act of the conspiracy— drug sales — occurred in Alaska. *United States v. Corona,*34 F.3d 876, 879 (9th Cir.1994).

The district court did not clearly err by finding Hueso was a “leader” within the scope of U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(c) for purposes of applying a two-level enhancement. Evidence reasonably showed he exercised decisionmaking authority and directed his co-conspirator’s participation in and the terms of the final transaction. *See United States v. Maldonado,*215 F.3d 1046, 1050-51 (9th Cir.2000); *United States v. Varela,*993 F.2d 686, 691 (9th Cir.1993).

The government’s information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 was sufficient to give Hueso clear notice of the crime the government intended to use as the basis for its request for an enhanced sentence, despite the information’s errors and omissions. *See United States v. Severino,*316 F.3d 939, 943 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
LIVESTAR ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Livestar Entertainment Group, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2004, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
Edwin Kwong, Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of1934; and

(2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations
of the Company.

/s/ Edwin KwongEdwin KwongPrincipal Financial
Officer

May 24, 2004

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Livestar Entertainment Group, Inc. and will be retained by Livestar Entertainment Group,
Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request