IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2015-CP-01097-COAIN THE MATTER OF ONE HUNDRED THIRTYSEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS ($137,325.00) IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY AND ONE (1) 2006 FORD 500 BEARING VIN #1FAFP24146G171666: DARRYL JEROME BOBO, II APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, EX REL. PELAHATCHIE POLICE DEPARTMENT APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/18/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W ILLIAM E. CHAPMAN III COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DARRYL JEROME BOBO II (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: CHRISTOPHER TODD MCALPIN THOMAS RICHARD MAYFIELD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: ORDERED THE FORFEITURE OF THE APPELLANT’S 2006 FORD 500 AND $137,325 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 11/22/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, JJ. CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Pursuant to t he Mississippi Unif orm Controlled S ubstances L aw, the Rankin County Circuit Court af

f irm ed the f

orf e itur e o f D a r r y l Bobo’s 2006 Ford 5 00 and his $137,325 in United States currency . See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-153 (Rev. 2013). On appeal f rom the circuit court’s judgm ent, Bobo asserts the f o llowing issues: ( 1) whether his attorneyprovided i nef f ective a ssistance of counsel; (2) whether the State unreasonably extended the traf f i c stop and unlawf

ully seized his property ; (3) whether substantial evidence supported the f orf eiture of his property ; and (4) whether the f orf eiture am ounts to an excessive f ine. ¶2. Finding no error, we af f irm the circuit court’s judgm ent. FACTS ¶3. O n N o v e mb e r 8 , 2 0 1 2 , L i e u t e n ant Nick McLendon with the Richla n d P o l i c e D e p a r t me nt 1 s topped a 2006 Ford 500 f or s peeding on Interstate 20. 2 The vehicle had a South Carolina l icense plate and was registered t o Bobo. B obo was not present at the t im e of the traf f ic stop. Instead, Parrish Norf leet was driving the vehicle. ¶4. Lieut e n a n t M c L e n d on t estif ied that Norf

leet said he was a rapper and that he was traveling f

rom Georgia to Calif

orn i a to visit f

a m ily

. Lieutenant McLendon stated that he observed n um erous air f

resheners inside the vehicle, a sm all overnight bag on the backseat, and a single key in the ignition. According to Lieutenant McLendon’s t estim ony , the single key in the ignition and t he m ultiple a ir f

resheners w e r e c o n s i s tent with vehicles he had previously encountered t hat were used to sm uggle contraband. W hile r u n n i n g a check on Norf leet’s driver’s license and awaiting crim inal-history reports f or both Norf

leet and Bobo,

1 A lth o u g h th e R ich lan d P o lice D ep artm en t sto p p ed B o b o ’s v eh icle an d sei z e d h i s p r o p erty , th e P elah atch i e P o l ice D ep artm en t i n stitu ted th e a c tu al f o rf eitu re p r o cee d i n g ag ain st th e seized p ro p e rty

. T h e reco rd ref lects th at th e p o lice d ep artm en ts o f R ich lan d an d P elah atch ie h av e an in terlo cal co o p e ratio n a g reem en t t h at allo w s “each [ c] i ty [ to ] sh are eq u ally in th e d iv isio n o f th e p ro ceed s o f all f o rf e itu r e actio n s resu ltin g f

ro m s eizu res o n th e U n ited S tates In terstate H ig h w ay S y stem ly in g an d b ein g situ ated w i th in each m u n icip ality

. . . .”

2 T h e reco rd ref

lects th at th e v eh icle w as d riv in g s e v e n t y - t h r ee m iles p er h o u r in a sev en ty -m ile-p er-h o u r sp eed zo n e . 2Lieutenant McLendon asked Norf leet’s p erm i ssion to search the vehicle. However, Norf leet ref used to consent to a search. ¶5. Although Norf

l eet’s driver’s license appeared to be in o rder, Lieutenant McLendon testif i ed that the results of the crim inal-history reports indicated that Bobo possessed prior narcotics convictions and t hat Norf leet possessed m isdem eanor n arcotics violations. Af ter asking N orf

l eet to exit the v e hicle, Lieutenant McLendon d eploy ed his c ertif ied K9, Rocky , f or a f ree air snif

f . Lieutenant McLendon testif ied that Rocky jum

p ed inside the vehicle’s
open p assenger window a nd drew Lieutenant M cLendon’s attention to the seam of the backseat and the trunk. F ollowing Rocky ’s alert, Lieutenant McLendon called f or backup and i nf orm ed Norf

l eet that he would be conducting a probable-cause search of the vehicle. ¶6. Lieutenan t M c L e n d o n t e s t i f ied t hat he f

ound no weapons on Norf

l eet. However, upon searching the vehicle, Lieutenant McLendon noticed a discrepancy in t he depth o f the trunk around the spare t ire. Inside a concealed com partm ent, Lieutenant McLendon f ound f ive bundles of United States currency wrapped in heat-sealed bags, plastic w r a p , a nd dry er sheets. Lieutenant M c Lendon also f ound a bag inside the t runk that c ontained tools to access the hidd e n c o mpartm ent. Af ter f inding the c o m

partm ent and currency , L ieutenant McLendon asked N orf

leet to f ollow h im to Richland’s n a r c o t ics of f ice. L ieutenant McLendon also inf

orm ed Hom eland Security Investigations about the discovery

. ¶7. O n c e a t t h e narcotics of f ice, Lieutenant McLendon p hotograp h e d t h e v e h i c l e ’ s
contents and rem oved the f i ve bundles of currency hidden insi de t he trunk c o m partm ent. Lieutenant McLendon testif ied that the bundles totaled $137,325 and that Norf leet denied

3any knowledge of the trunk c om partm ent and the m oney . Lieutenant McLendon a lso stated that he f ound receipts inside the vehicle that docum ented m ulti p l e t r i ps f

rom Georgia to Calif o rnia and showed the vehicle had traveled 98,000 m iles in less than a y ear. ¶8. On Novem

ber 14, 2012, the State f

iled a petiti o n a g a inst Bobo and Norf leet in the County C ourt of Rankin County f or the f orf eiture of the 2006 Ford 500 and the $137,325 in
currency . The State’s p etition c la i me d t h a t t he 2 006 Ford 500 w as subject to f orf eiture as

a vehicle “used or intended f or use . . . t o t ran s p ort, or in any m anner to f acilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession[ ,] or concealm ent of p roperty

. . . .” See Miss. Code
Ann. § 41-29-153(a)(4). T he State f urther asserted that the $ 137,325 was s u bject to f orf eiture as m o ney “used or i ntended f o r use in violation of the M ississippi Unif orm Controlled Substances Law.” See Miss. C o d e A n n. § 41-29-153(a)(4), (a)(7). Although Bobo f iled an answer to the State’s petition on Decem ber 1 2, 2012, Norf

leet f ailed to answer

or o therwise def

end a gainst the State’s p etition. As a result, on January 7 , 2013, the county court entered a def

ault judgm ent against Norf leet. ¶9. On Sept e mb e r 2 2 , 2014, the county court held a hearing o n the State’s f orf eiture petition against B obo. F ollowing Lieutenant McLendon’s testim ony , the S tate of f ered Staf f Sergeant B rad Vincent of the Mississippi Highway Patrol a s a n e xpert i n t he f i eld of drug traf f i cking and crim inal interdiction. F ol l o w i n g voir dire, the county c ourt accepted Staf f Sergeant Vincent as an expert in the m ethods, techniques, instrum entalities, procedures, and
pra c t ices utilized by drug traf f ickers and couriers in transporting, concealing, and storing drugs and drug proceeds.

4¶10. Staf

f Sergeant Vincent testif ied to the s i g n i f

i c a n c e o f t h e I

- 2 0 c orridor where Lieutenant McLendon stopped Norf leet. According to Staf f Sergeant V incent, drugs ty pically travel eastbound through Mississippi while currency usually t rave l s westbound through the state. Staf

f Sergeant Vincent f

urt h e r e x p lained that the route Norf leet was driving, f rom Georgia to Calif

ornia, was consistent with the f low o f drugs and currency through the state. W hen questioned about the signif icance of the various item s Lieutenant McLendon observed and photographed in Bobo’s vehicle, Staf f S ergeant V incent testif

ied: [ T]he s ignif

icance of a single key in the ignition i s t hat o f tentim es these vehicles that are used f

or transporting narcotics and m oney are u sed solely f or that purpose, s pecif

ically the vehicles that c ontain these hidden com partm ents. It’s not alway s the sam e pe r s o n d riving. S om etim es[ , ] with c ertain organizations[ ,] the vehicles m a y change hands s everal tim es over a period of m onths, depending on how long the vehicle stay s in c irculation. S o t he v ehicle doesn’t really b elong to a ny body

. It’s u sed f

or traf f icking, so nobody has any . . . personal key s and stuf f on these key

chains. Air f r esheners a re used o bvious l y t o ma s k odors

. . . . It’s another indicator again in and of i tself

. It doesn’t m ean a whole lot, but when y ou look at the totality

of the circum stances[ ,] it’s another indicator.
We ’ r e looking a t a sm all backpack in t his picture, and again, it go e s back to training and experience. And I’ve known Of f icer McLendon f

o r a long tim e[ ,] and he’s got a lot of e xperience in dealing with t h e innocent m otoring public and how they g enerally travel, and coast t o c oast is a very long trip. Som e of t he questions raised earlier about [ Norf leet] having f

am ily and s t u f f i n a nother s tate a nd m ay be his c lothes could be there. Yes, that’s a possibility , but t hat would be [ an] expensive way t o li v e , t o m a intain t wo dif f erent wardrobes at two dif f erent houses as o pposed to t raveling w ith y o ur clothes. That w ould be inconsistent with t he norm a l innocent m otoring public. The trash in the vehicle. T he vehicle, a g ain, is on t he road. W e already know that the vehicle has h ad a lot of m iles put o n i t in a short period of tim e, so when traveling[ ,] there[ are] f requent s t ops f

o r g a s . A l ot of people buy energy drinks; t hey e at a lot of f ast f ood. Esp e c i a l l y w hen the vehicle is loaded[ ,] and it’s containing m oney or it’s containing drugs, the d rivers rarely

5like to separate them selves f rom the vehicle. That’s why they d on’t l ike t o get m otels on these trips. That’s w hy t h e y l i k e t o d rink their energy drinks and sleep in ro a d s i d e p a r ks so they can m aintain control of the vehicle when it’s loaded. ¶11. Staf

f Sergeant Vincent a lso testif ied that, in h is experi e n c e , h i d d e n com partm ents inside vehicles alm o st alway s contain drugs or m o ney . He f u rther s t ated t hat the p ackaging

m ethod used f

or the m o ney f

ound in Bobo’s vehicl e was consistent with the way drugtraf f i cking organizations wrap their m oney f or t ransport. In addition, Staf f Sergeant Vincent testif i ed t hat t he a m ount of m ileage accum ulated on Bobo’s v ehicle in under a y e ar was not

uncom m on f

or a vehicle used by a drug-traf f icking organization to constantly transport drugs

a n d m oney . M oreover, based on the size a nd sophistication of the hidden com p artm ent i n Bobo’s vehicle, Staf

f Sergeant Vincent t e s t i f ied that he possessed no doubt that the

com partm ent w as used t o transport drugs. I n his expert o pinion, Staf f Serge a nt Vincent concluded that B obo was involved with drug traf f icking a n d that the m oney hidden in Bobo’s vehicle constituted the proceed s o f d rug traf f icking or was intended to be used in the
f urtherance of

drug traf f i cking. ¶12. On October 2 , 2014, t he county court e ntered an order f inding b y a preponderance of the evidence t hat Bobo’s seized property was f orf eitable under M i s s i s s i ppi’s Unif orm Controlled Substances Law. As a result, the county court granted the S tate’s petition f or the
f or f e i t u r e o f Bobo’s seized property to the P elahatchie Police D epartm ent. B obo then
appe a l e d t o the circuit court, w hich e ntered a n o rder on J une 18, 2015, af f irm ing the
f orf eiture. Aggrieved, Bobo appeals to this Court.
DISCUSSION

6I. W hether Bobo’s attorney provided i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l . ¶13. In his f

irst a ssignm ent of error, Bobo argues t hat his attorney , Bernard Jones, provided inef f ective assistance of counsel. Based o n various a l leged errors c o m m itted by J ones, Bobo asks this Court to reverse the order of f orf eiture. ¶14. In addressing t his assignm ent of error, we acknowledge that the record r ef lects that Bobo f aced no pending crim inal charges in the proceedings belo w a n d t hat the State’s petition f or t he f orf eiture in rem o f Bobo’s property constituted a civil a c tion. See State ex rel. Miss. Bureau of

Narcotics v. Lincoln Cty. , 6 05 S o. 2d 802, 8 04 (Miss. 1992) ( discussing the c ivil nature of a f

o r f eiture i n rem ). W e a l s o a c knowledge that Mississippi’s civil
f orf eiture statutes p rovide no right to appointed counsel. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-101 to -191 (Rev. 2013 & Supp. 2016). In a d d i t i o n , our precedent ref lects n o right to appointed counsel or to ef

f ective a s s i s t a nce of counsel i n civil proceedings. See G oodin v. Dep’t of
Human Servs. , 772 So. 2d 1051, 1055 (¶12) (Miss. 2 000); DeMyers v
. DeMyers , 742 So. 2d 1157, 1162 (¶20) (Miss. 1999); Parker v. B liven , 59 So. 3d 619, 621 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). ¶15. T h e r e c o r d here ref lects that, of his o wn volition, Bobo hired Jones as his pri v a t e attorney to represent him i n the f orf eiture proceeding. The record f ails to ref lect any claim s of indigency m ade by Bobo or any requests f or counsel that he asserted to the circuit court. The record also f

a ils to support Bobo’s claim on appeal that h i s p r i v ate counsel possessed

a conf lict of interest. In addition, upon review o f this assignm ent of e r ror, w e f ind nothing in the r ecord to show that Bobo’s com plained-of errors f

ell outside t he r ealm of his attorney ’s

7t r i a l strategy

. See Jackson v. S t ate , 52 So. 3d 1203, 1210 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 201 0 ) (acknowledging that decisions within the am bit o f trial strateg y f

a i l t o give rise to an inef f ective-assistance-of

-counsel claim ). B e cause t he f orf eiture in rem of Bobo’s property constituted a civil proceeding, and because the right t o ef f ective assistance of counsel f ails to apply in civil proceedings, we f ind no m erit to this assignm ent of error. II. Whether the State unreasonably ex tended the t raffic stop and unlaw f ully seized Bobo’s property . ¶16. Bobo concedes on appeal that Lieutenant McLendon was justif ied w hen he initially stopped Norf

leet f or speeding. However , Bobo asserts that the S tate then proceeded to unreasonably extend the traf f ic s top and to u n lawf

ully s eize his property

. According to
B o b o ’ s argum ent, t he State “detained

. . . Norf leet f or well over f

ive hours, an unl a w f

u l duration, to search

. . . Norf leet[ ’ s] and [ Bobo’s] property without a ny cognizable r easonable suspicion or probable cause.” ¶17. “The Fourth Am endm ent t o the United States Constitution and Article 3 Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution provide that an i ndividual has the right to be f ree f rom unreasonable searches a nd seizures.” Shelton v
. State , 4 5 So. 3d 1 203, 1208 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (citing D ies v. State , 926 So. 2d 910, 917-18 (¶21) (Miss. 2006)). “The action of an of f icer stopping a vehicle is reasonable when there is ‘probable cause to believe that

a traf f ic violation has occurred.’” Lee v. State , 100 So. 3d 982, 984-85 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting W

hren v. United States , 517 U .S. 806, 810 (1996)). “To stop and tem porarily detain is not an arrest, and t he cases hold that[ ,] given reasonable circum stances[ , ] an of f icer

m ay stop and detain a person to r esol v e an am biguous situation w ithout having suf f icient

8knowledge to justif y a n arrest.” Gonzales v. S tate , 9 63 So. 2d 1138, 1141 (¶13) (Miss. 2007) (citation om itted). “[ I]t is im perative that the f

acts be judged against an objective standard:
Wo uld the f

acts available to the of

f icer at t he m om ent of the seizure or the search wa r r a n t

a m an of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? ” I d. at 1141- 42 (¶13) (citations and internal quotation m arks om itted). ¶18. As previo u s l y s t a t e d , B o b o c oncedes that p robable cause existed f or Lieutenant McLendon to initially

stop and detain Norf

leet since Norf

l eet was speeding. According to Lieutenant McLend o n ’ s t estim ony , during the t raf f i c stop he observed num erous air
f resheners inside the vehicle, a s m all overnight bag on the backseat, and a single key in the vehicle’s ignition. L ieutenant McLendon stated that the s i n g l e k ey in the ignition and the

m ultiple air f

resheners were consistent with indicators he had encountered in other vehicles used to s m

uggle contraband. Lieutenant McLendon f urther testif

ied th a t t he r esults of the crim inal-history reports he r equested indicated that Bobo p o s s e s s ed prior narcotics convictions and that Norf l eet possessed m isdem e anor narcotics violations. ¶19. O u r c a s elaw provides that, if , during a p roper i nvestigative s top, a poli c e o f f i c e r “develops reasonable, a rticulable suspicion of s om e c r im inal activity in addition to

. . . that initi a l l y s u s p ected, the perm issible scope o f the stop expands to include the of f icer’s investigation of the n ewly suspected crim inal activity .” Tate v. State , 946 So. 2d 376, 382 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (citing United States v. Lee , 898 F.2d 1034, 1040 (5th Cir. 1990)). Af

ter observing the item s in Bobo’s v ehicle and reviewing the crim i n a l-history reports on Bobo and Norf leet, Lieutenant McLendon asked Norf leet t o e xit the vehicle and

9deploy e d

his certif i ed K9 f or a f ree air snif

f

. ¶20. I n S

h e l t o n , t h is Court recognized that, “[ e]ven without re a s o n a b l e , a r t i c u l a b l e suspicion, the perf

orm ance of a dog s n i f

f of the outside o f a vehicle by a trained canine during a routine, valid traf f ic stop is not a v i o l a t i o n of one’s Fourth Am endm ent rights against unreasonable searches a nd seizures.” Shelton , 45 So. 3d at 1209 ( ¶15) (quoting Jaramillo v. State , 950 So. 2d 1104, 1107 ( ¶7) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2007)). W e h eld i n Shelton that “the drug-dete c t i n g d o g ’ s p o s i t i v e a l e rts created probable cause f or the [ law-enf

orcem ent of f icer] to search the trunk of the [ def endants’] rental car.” Id. Here, Lieutenant McLendon testif i ed that his certif

ied K9 jum

ped inside the open passenger w indow of Bobo’s vehicle and alerted Lieutenant McLendon to t he seam of the backseat and the trunk. Following the alert, Lieutenant McLendon c alled f or backup a n d i n f

orm ed N orf

leet that he would be conducting a probable-cause search of the vehicle. ¶21. B a s e d o n o u r r e v i ew of the f acts in the record and a

p plicable caselaw, we f

ind no

m erit to Bobo’s claim s that L ieutenant McLendon unlawf ully extended the traf

f ic stop and illegally seized B obo’s property

. As previously discussed, Lieutenant M c L e ndon m ade a valid traf f ic stop, and then he a cted within h is a uthority when he deploy e d h is trained K9 f or

a f ree a ir snif

f outside the vehicle. See id. As i n Shelton , we f i nd that Lieutenant McLendon possessed probable cause to search the trunk of Bobo’s vehicle af ter his K9 a l erted to the

area. See id. W e theref

o re f ind that this assignm ent of error lacks m erit.
III. Whether substantial evidence supported t he forfeiture o f B o b o ’s property . ¶22. B o b o also contends that s ubstantial evidence f a i led to support the co u n t y c o u r t ’ s

1 0j u d g me n t f o r the f orf eiture of his property

. In reviewing this assignm ent of e rror, w e acknowledge the f

ollowing: Forf eiture statutes a re penal in nature a n d m ust b e strictly construed. In a civil f

orf e iture case, the question i s whether, g iven a l l of the evidence taken together, a rational trier of f act could h ave f

ound that the f

unds were the product o f or the instrum entalities of violations o f the State’s Unif orm Controlled Substances Laws. The t r i e r o f f a c t m ay act on circum s t antial evidence and inf

e rences as well as direct evidence.
Evans v. City of Aberde e n , 925 So. 2 d 8 50, 853 ( ¶11) (Miss. C t. App. 2005) (internal

c i t a t i o ns om itted). Our precedent f urther establishes that “[ t]he appropriate standard o f review in f

orf eiture cases is the f

am i liar substantial eviden c e /clearly e rroneous test. [ The appellate court] will not disturb a circuit court’s f indings unless it has applied an erroneous legal standard to decide the q uestion of f

act.” Six Thousand Dollars ( $6,000) v. State ex rel. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics , 179 So. 3d 1, 4 (¶4) (Miss. 2015) (citation om itted). ¶23. To support its argum ent that Bobo’s s eized property was used or intended f or use in violation of the Mississippi Unif orm Controlled Substances Law, the State called L ieutenant McLendon a nd Staf

f Sergeant V incent to tes t i f y . Both law-enf

orcem ent of

f icials testif

ied that the item s observed and photographed in Bobo’s v ehicle at t he t i me of the traf f ic stop

were consistent with item s f ound in vehicles used to sm uggle c o ntraband. Staf

f S e r g e a nt Vincent, testif

y ing as an e xpert i n the f

i eld of drug traf

f icking and crim inal interdiction, even presented evidence about the drug-courier prof ile and explained the relationship each item inside Bobo’s vehicle possessed to the drug-courier prof ile. ¶24. In a ddition, Staf

f S ergeant Vincent testif

ied about the signif

i cance of the I-20 corridor

to the f low of m oney and drugs through Mississippi. He stated that, in his experience, hidden

1 1com

partm ents like the one f

ound inside Bobo’s vehicle were alm ost a lway s used to transport drugs or m oney . Moreover, taking into account t he size and sop h i s t ication of t he hidden

com partm ent in Bobo’s vehicle, the packaging m e thod used f or the m oney f

ound inside the

com partm ent, and the am ount of mi l e a g e accum u lated on B obo’s v ehicle in under a y ear, Staf f Sergeant Vincent concluded t hat B obo’s vehicle w a s involved with drug traf f icking and that the m oney h idden i nside the vehicle w as proceeds f rom or i ntended f

or the f urtherance of drug traf f icking. ¶25. Upon r eview, we f ind the record contained substantial evidence to support the county court’s judgm ent f

o r t he f orf eiture of Bobo’s property

. See Six Thousand Dollars , 179 So. 3d at 4 (¶4). Taking all the evidence and t estim ony t ogether, “a rational trier of f act could h a v e f ound that [ B obo’s vehicle a nd the $137,325 in currency ] were the product o f o r t h e instrum entalities of violations of the State’s U nif orm Controlled Substances Laws.” Evans , 925 So. 2d at 8 53 (¶11) (citation om itted). W e theref ore f ind that this argum ent lacks m erit.
IV. Whether the forfeiture am ounts to an ex cessive fine. ¶26. In his f

inal assignm ent o f error, Bobo contends that the f orf e iture of h i s p r o p e r t y

am ounts to an excessive and grossly disproportionate f ine because “no controlled s u bstances were involved in [ t he traf f ic] stop.” ¶27. Under Mississippi stat u t o r y l a w , v e h i c l e s a

r e subject t o f

o rf eiture w hen they “ are used,

or i ntended f

or u se, t o transport, or in any m anner to f acilitate the transportation, s ale, receipt, possession[ ,] or conceal me n t of [ controlled s u bstances.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29- 153(a)(4). In addition, m oney “used, or intended f o r use, i n v iolation of [ the Mississippi

1 2Unif

orm Controlled S ubstances Law]” is also s u bject to f orf eiture. Miss. Code Ann. § 41- 29-153( a)(5). In discussing t he f orf eiture o f s e ized property , t his Court has previously stated: Article 3, Section 28 of the Mississippi Constitution prohibits the governm ent f rom im posing excessive f

i nes. Because f

orf eiture actions are penal in nature, the

. . . [ s]uprem e [ c]ourt has applied Article 3, Section 28 to them and adopted a f our-elem ent proportionality test t h a t a pplies in the context of f o rf eiture proceedings. Those f

our elem ents are: (1) The nexus between the of f e n s e and the property and the extent of the property ’s role in the of f ense; (2) The role and culpability of the owner; (3) T he possibility of separating t he o f f ending property f

rom the rem ainder; and (4) W hether, af

t er a review of a l l relevant f acts, the f o rf eiture divests the owner of property which has a value tha t is grossly disproportionate t o the crim e or g rossly disproportionate to the culpability

of the owner. The suprem e court [ has f

urther held]: The analy sis under t he proportionality test that we em ploy h ere is two-part. First, under the instrum entality (or nexus) test, the f orf eited property m

ust h ave a suf

f iciently close relationship to the illegal a ctivity

. Second, u n d e r the proportionality test, f orf eiture of t he property m

ust not im

pose upon the owner a penalty grossly

disproportionate to his of f e n se. One ( 1) 2 0 11 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 v. Pan o l a C t y. Narcotics Task Force , 169 So. 3d 967, 970 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (internal citations and quotation m arks om itted). 3

3 O n e ( 1 ) C h a r ter A rm s, B u lld

o g 4 4 S p ecia l v
. S ta te ex rel. M

o o re , 7 2 1 S o . 2 d 6 2 0 , 6 2 4 ( ¶1 6 ) (M iss. 1 9 9 8 ) (“T h e test em p lo y ed m u st b e o n e th at p e rm its f

o rf eitu re o f p ro p erty f ro m th o se p erso n s w h o u t ilize said p ro p erty in f u rth eran c e o f th eir o w n crim in al activ ity

. Y e t, th e test m

u st also b e f

lex ib le so as n o t to p e rm it f o rf eitu r e w h ere in n o cen t p erso n s w ill su f f er o r w h ere th e v a lu e o f th e p ro p erty is g r o ssly

d i sp ro p o rtio n a te to th e crim e.”). 1 3A. The Instrum entality Test

¶28. As stated, under the f irst prong of our analy sis, we determ ine whether Bobo’s seized property p o s s e s s es a suf

f iciently close relationship to drug traf f icking to justif

y f orf eiture.
See id. ; see also One (

1 ) 1979 Ford 15V v. State ex rel. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics , 721 So. 2d 631, 636 (¶19) (Miss. 1998) (“For f orf eiture to b e p erm issible, t here m ust be suf f icient

nexus b e tween t he of

f ense and the property and the e x tent of the property ’s r ole in the of f ense.”). ¶29. In 1979 Ford 15 V , the suprem e court f

o und that a suf

f icient n exus existed between the of f ense (conspiracy to d istrib u t e ) a n d t he seized property (a van) to satisf y the instrum entality

test. 1 979 Ford 15V

, 721 So. 2d at 636 (¶19). In reaching this c onclusion, the suprem e court stated: The c rim e at issue h ere is n ot an i s o l a t e d c a s e of m ere possession of a s m all quantity o f illegal drugs. [ The o f f ender] pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute a large am ount of cocaine. In f urtherance of t his co n s p i r a c y , [ the of f ender] used the v a n to f

acilitate the eventual drug deal, which gives the van a role in the conspiracy

. In addition, the van provided a cover f o r [ t he of f e nder], as a dif f erent vehicle was em

ploy ed to consum m ate the sale. The nexus between the property , the van, and the of f ense, conspiracy to distribute, was suf f iciently established[ ,] a nd the lower court was not c learly erroneous in its f inding t hat the van should be f

orf eited. Id. ¶30. In One (

1) Charter Arms, Bulldog 44 Special v
. S tate ex rel. Moore , 721 So. 2d 620,
625 (¶26) (Miss. 1998), the suprem e court also f ound that an ap p l i c a t i o n o f the instrum entality t est f

avored f orf e iture where a drug of

f e n der’s vehicle was used to transport
t h e o f f e n d er “into a known drug area to purchase cocaine, [ it] af f orded h im quick egr e s s

1 4f

rom the area, and [ it] allowed him a m easure of p rivacy in which to consum e h is ill-gotten drugs.” Id. at (¶25). The suprem e court f urther n oted that la w e n f o r cem e nt “f

ound som e drug paraphernalia concealed inside [ the of f ender’s] car, and not just on his person.” Id. ¶31. In the present case, t h e S t a t e presented evidence to the county c ourt t o show that Bobo’s seized property constituted instrum entalities used in the f u r t h e r a nce of a drugtraf f i cking operation. First, the record ref lects that Lieutenant McLendon discovered a signif icant am oun t o f U n i t ed States currency hidden in the t runk of Bobo’s vehicle. Lieutenant McLendon testif ied that he discovered f

ive bundl e s o f c u

r r e n c y t o t a l i n g $ 1 3 7 , 325. Although Bobo now claim s on appea l t h a t the m oney cam e f rom legitim ate business interests, the State presented evidence at trial to prove otherwise and to ref ute Bobo’ s assertion. Lieutenant McLendon testif ied that t he bundles were wrapped in heat-sealed bags, plastic wrap, and dry er sheets. As Sta f f S e r g eant Vincent later explained during his testim o ny , this packaging m ethod is consistent with the techniques used b y drug-traf f icking organizations. ¶32. The S tate also presented e vidence to support its argum ent that Bobo’s vehicle play ed

a role i n the f

urtherance of d

rug traf f icking. Staf

f Sergeant Vincent’s testim o ny revealed that

com partm ents such as t he o ne c oncealed in the t runk of Bobo’s vehicle of ten possess a nexus
to c rim i nal a c t i v i t y . A ccording to Staf f Sergeant Vincent, in his experience, such

com partm ents are alm ost alway s u sed to transport drugs or m oney . Staf f S ergeant Vincent also t estif ied that the size and sophistication of the hidden c om partm e nt i nside Bobo’s vehicle were consistent with that of the com partm ents u sed by drug traf f ickers to conceal and

1 5transport contraband.

¶33. In addition, t he record ref le c t s t h a t t h e route Norf

leet traveled through Mississippi possessed a con n e c t i o n t o drug traf f i cking. As Staf

f Sergeant Vincent explained, the I-20 corridor is signif

icant t o the f

low of m oney a nd drugs through the st a t e . Furtherm ore, the receipts disc o v e r e d by Lieutenant McLendon indicated that, within the s pan of a y ear, the vehicle h ad m a de num e rous trips between C alif ornia and Georgia and h ad am a s sed 98,000

m ile s . B a sed on the s ize and sophistication o f the hidden c om partm e nt, t he item s photographed inside Bobo’s vehicle, the packaging of the currency , and the am o unt of m iles

am assed on the vehicle in under a y ear, S taf f S ergeant Vincent testif

ied that Bobo’s vehicle and t he currency f

it the prof ile of property used or intended f or use in the f

urtherance of drug traf f i cking. ¶34. Upon review, we f ind t he record contain s s u f f i c i e n t evidence to show that Bobo’s seiz e d p r o p e r

t y fa c i l i t a t e d a violation of the Mississippi Unif o rm Controlled Substances Law. Thus, like the s u

prem e court’s h oldings i n both 1979 Ford 1 5V and Charter A rms , we f ind the instrum entality test f

avors the f

orf eiture of Bobo’s property

. W e theref o re proceed to a discussion of

whether the evidence satisf ies the second prong of

our analy sis.
B. The Proportionality Test ¶35. Under t his p rong of our analy sis, we determ i n e w h e t h e r t h e f o r f eiture of Bobo’s seized property i m

poses a penalty that is grossly d isproportionate to the c rim e or to Bobo’s culpability

. See 2011 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 , 169 So. 3d at 970 (¶6). ¶36. Af ter reviewing both the r ecord and relevant caselaw, we f ind the f o rf eiture o f Bobo’s

1 6property f

ailed t o r e s ult in a f

ine that was grossly disproportionate to Bobo’s c ulpability

. Considering the l arg e s u m o f money discovered in the hidden com p artm ent o f Bobo’s vehicle, as well as t he testim ony o f the State’s witnesses l inking t h e c i r cum stances of this

c a s e t o t h e f

urtherance of a drug-traf f icking operation, we f

ind that substantial evidence supported the f

orf eiture of Bobo’s property

. ¶37. T H E J U D G M E N T O F T H E R A N K I N COUNTY C I R C U I T C O U R T I S AFFIRMED. A LL COSTS O F THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT. LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.J J . , BARNES, ISHEE, FAIR, JAMES, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.

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