RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 21a0084p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHN LOUIS BOOKER, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 20-1047

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.

No. 1:19-cr-00177-1—Paul Lewis Maloney, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: April 14, 2021

Before: GIBBONS, COOK, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: John F. Clark, CLARK LAW FIRM PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. 

Alexis M. Sanford, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for 

Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. John Booker pleaded guilty to one count of distributing a 

controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced Booker 

as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, resulting in a prison term of 188 months. The 

district court also imposed a six-year term of supervised release with special conditions of 

supervision. On appeal, Booker challenges his career-offender status and his supervision 

conditions. We AFFIRM.

>
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 2

I.

In spring 2019, an undercover police officer was investigating a suspect named Julius 

Walker for narcotics offenses. The officer arranged on several occasions to purchase 

methamphetamine from Walker. John Booker accompanied Walker to one of these pre-arranged 

sales, and it was Booker who handed the officer Walker’s drugs. Booker used this opportunity to 

let the officer know that he could offer methamphetamine at a better price. Booker then gave the 

officer his cell phone number. Over the course of the next month, Booker sold 

methamphetamine to the officer on three separate occasions.

Things unraveled for Booker at his fourth planned sale to the officer. Booker noticed 

police cars at the initial planned meeting location. He ultimately ended up fleeing, first by car—

with a passenger and her two-year-old daughter in tow—and then on foot. Police eventually 

caught up with Booker. Once they apprehended him, officers dialed the phone number that 

Booker had used to arrange sales with the undercover officer. Booker’s cell phone rang. He was 

arrested.

A federal grand jury indicted Booker on four counts of distributing methamphetamine in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Booker pleaded guilty to the fourth charge, and the other 

three were dismissed. The district court sentenced Booker as a career offender based on his prior 

state convictions for unarmed robbery and for the “deliver[y]/manufacture” of a controlled 

substance. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). That classification increased his offense level by two, 

making his advisory Guidelines range 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. The district court 

sentenced Booker to a 188-month prison term and 6 years of supervised release. The court also 

imposed special supervised release conditions. Booker now appeals his sentence.

II.

Booker argues that he should not have been sentenced as a career offender and that the 

district court did not adequately explain its decision to apply the enhancement. Both claims fail.
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 3

A.

Because Booker challenged his career-offender status below, we review the application 

of this enhancement de novo. United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 384 (6th Cir. 2019) (en 

banc) (per curiam). To be a career offender, a defendant must have at least two prior felony 

convictions that qualify as “controlled-substance offenses” or “crimes of violence.” United 

States v. Garth, 965 F.3d 493, 495 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1). The defendant’s 

instant offense of conviction must also fall into one of those categories. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(2). 

At issue here is what constitutes a controlled-substance offense, which the Guidelines define as 

“an offense under federal or state law . . . that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, 

distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled 

substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 4B1.2(b). To determine whether an offense meets this definition, we use the “categorical 

approach,” which demands that “the least of the acts criminalized by the elements of th[e] 

statute” of conviction “fall[] within the Guidelines’ definition.” Havis, 927 F.3d at 384–85 

(emphasis omitted). 

Booker argues that his prior conviction under Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7401 for the 

delivery or manufacture of a controlled substance and his instant conviction under 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) for the distribution of a controlled substance are not valid career-offender predicates. 

For support, he relies on United States v. Havis, where we held that the Guidelines’ definition of 

“‘controlled substance offenses’ does not include attempt crimes.” 927 F.3d at 387. Michigan 

law defines “delivery” as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from [one] person to 

another of a controlled substance.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7105(1) (emphasis added). The 

federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) defines “distribute” as “to deliver” and, in turn, defines 

“deliver” substantially the same way Michigan does: to make an “actual, constructive, or 

attempted transfer of a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(8), (11) (emphasis added). 

Because both definitions include “attempted transfer,” Booker contends that the least conduct 

criminalized by each statute is “attempted delivery,” meaning that neither can be a predicate 

offense under Havis.
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 4

However, Booker admits that binding precedent forecloses his argument with respect to 

the Michigan statute. See United States v. Thomas, 969 F.3d 583, 585 (6th Cir. 2020) (per 

curiam). Still, he suggests that we have not yet decided whether the federal statute qualifies as a 

predicate offense. Yet our prior reasoning with regard to the Michigan statute maps squarely 

onto 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). And we recently rejected an identical argument about § 841(a)(1), 

albeit in an unpublished opinion. See United States v. Morton, ___ F. App’x ___, 2021 WL 

289311, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 2021).

In United States v. Thomas, we held that convictions for “delivery” under Mich. Comp. 

Laws § 333.7401 are controlled-substance offenses. 969 F.3d at 585. We explained that the 

word “distribution” in the Guidelines’ definition of “controlled substance offense” takes on the 

definition given in the CSA. Id.; see United States v. Jackson, 984 F.3d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 2021) 

(“[W]e routinely utilize the CSA (even after Havis) in defining the relevant conduct covered by 

the [career-offender] Guidelines.”). And, as we established above, the Michigan and CSA 

definitions are substantially identical. Compare Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7105(1), with 21 

U.S.C. § 802(8), (11). We held in Thomas that “the Michigan offense of delivery” is a 

controlled-substance offense. 969 F.3d at 585. Essential to our reasoning was the observation 

that the word “distribution” has the same definition in both the career-offender Guidelines and 

the CSA. See id. Thus, Thomas illustrates why Booker’s § 841(a)(1) conviction is a predicate 

controlled-substance offense.

At first blush, that reasoning might spark some confusion. If the Guidelines and relevant 

statutes define predicate offenses to include the attempted transfer of a controlled substance, then 

what of the rule from Havis that attempt crimes don’t count? Our caselaw eliminates that 

concern along with any confusion that might stem from Havis. See id.; Garth, 965 F.3d at 497. 

Havis addressed Tennessee’s definition of “delivery,” which is substantially identical to 

the Michigan and CSA definitions. See 927 F.3d at 384 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-

402(6)). In Havis, both parties agreed that, under this definition, the least conduct criminalized 

by the defendant’s statute of conviction was the inchoate offense of “attempted delivery.” Id. at 

385. Based strictly on the parties’ shared assumption, we had occasion to decide whether the 
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 5

definition of “controlled substance offense” in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) includes attempt crimes, and 

we held that it does not. Id. at 387. 

But we’ve since determined that the parties’ assumption in Havis was wrong. United 

States v. Elliott, 835 F. App’x 78, 81 (6th Cir. 2020); Thomas, 969 F.3d at 585. Federal law and 

Michigan law both codify attempted distribution or delivery separately from the completed 

offenses. See 21 U.S.C. § 846; Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7407a(1); People v. Burton, 

651 N.W.2d 143, 146 n.4 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). We must “construe statutes, where possible, so 

as to avoid rendering superfluous any parts thereof.” Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. 

Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991); see also Koenig v. City of S. Haven, 597 N.W.2d 99, 104 

(Mich. 1999) (“[A] court’s duty is to give meaning to all sections of a statute and to avoid, if at 

all possible, nullifying one by an overly broad interpretation of another.”). So, we have held 

that, under Michigan law, “an ‘attempted transfer’ constitutes a completed delivery rather than an 

attempt crime.” United States v. Hill, 982 F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) 

(quoting Thomas, 969 F.3d at 585); see also Garth, 965 F.3d at 497 (applying this reasoning to 

Tennessee’s delivery statute). The same applies to the analogous provisions of the CSA. See 

Garth, 965 F.3d at 497; United States v. Havis, 929 F.3d 317, 319–20 (6th Cir. 2019) (Sutton, J., 

concurring in the denial of en banc reconsideration). Moreover, if we had taken a contrary route 

and held that “distribution encompasses attempted distribution,” then “that would mean the 

guidelines’ definition of controlled-substance offenses does include attempted crimes—the very 

result we rejected in Havis.” Garth, 965 F.3d at 497. 

It would be remarkable if Booker were right that § 841(a)(1) did not describe a 

“controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). In directing the Sentencing 

Commission to enact the career-offender Guidelines, Congress specifically instructed that 

“offense[s] described in . . . 21 U.S.C. [§] 841” be covered. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)(1)(B), (2)(B); 

Jackson, 984 F.3d at 511–12. Booker would have us hold that the Sentencing Commission failed 

to comply with this statutory command and, consequently, that the primary federal statute 

criminalizing offenses related to controlled substances does not count as a “controlled substance 

offense” under the Guidelines. But, for the same reasons that “delivery” of a controlled 

substance under Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7401 is a predicate offense, so is “distribution” of a 
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 6

controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). See Thomas, 969 F.3d at 585; Garth, 965 F.3d at 

497. The district court properly sentenced Booker as a career offender. 

B.

Booker next argues that the district court committed procedural error by failing to address 

his argument that 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is not a career-offender predicate. Booker admits that he 

did not object to the adequacy of the district court’s explanation below, so we review only for 

plain error. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Booker must 

“show (1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected [his] substantial rights and (4) that 

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The district court specifically rejected Booker’s argument at sentencing. The court 

explained that it would “not make any sense whatsoever” to find that the career-offender 

Guidelines “do[] not include 401 convictions under the federal code.” This statement was a 

reference to § 401 of the CSA, which is codified in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See Pub. L. No. 

91-513, § 401, 84 Stat. 1236, 1260–62 (1970). 

Booker also complains that the district court did not expressly respond to his (somewhat 

puzzling) argument that our decision in Costo v. United States, 904 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1990), 

requires a different result. Costo involved a double-jeopardy issue. Id. at 348. We held that 

attempted distribution of a controlled substance does not require any element that completed 

distribution does not. Id. That holding has no bearing on whether the least culpable conduct 

criminalized by the federal statute outlawing completed distribution qualifies as a controlledsubstance offense. Below, the district court explained that Judge Sutton’s opinion concurring in 

the denial of en banc reconsideration in Havis and “[c]ongressional intent as outlined in 28 U.S. 

Code 994(h)” both indicate that it was proper to apply the career-offender enhancement. 

Because this reasoning was logically responsive to Booker’s Costo argument, the district court 

did not need to address Costo explicitly. See United States v. Chiolo, 643 F.3d 177, 184–85 (6th 

Cir. 2011). We find no error.
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 7

III.

Booker next challenges the special conditions of his supervised release. The district court 

crafted special conditions mandating that Booker do the following during his six-year term of 

supervision: (1) provide his probation officer “any requested financial information” and allow 

his probation officer to release that information to the United States Attorney’s Office; 

(2) comply with a nightly curfew; (3) refrain from the use or possession of controlled substances, 

including marijuana; (4) refrain from the use or possession of alcohol and “not frequent any 

establishments whose primary purpose is the sale and serving of alcohol”; (5) participate in a 

program of testing and treatment for substance abuse and “pay at least a portion of the cost, 

according to his ability to pay, as determined by his probation officer”; (6) submit to reasonable 

probationary searches; (7) comply with certain employment or community service benchmarks; 

and (8) not own any “cell phone or other electronic device” without the permission of his 

probation officer and subject to other restrictions.

A.

Booker argues that the district court “inadequately explained its reasoning for imposing 

these special conditions” and “fail[ed] to analyze the conditions using the factors in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a).” Booker did not object to his supervised release conditions below, so we review for 

plain error. United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 572 (6th Cir. 2012). 

For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “the district court [must] state its rationale 

for mandating special conditions of supervised release in open court at the time of sentencing.” 

United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The district court, in so doing, is required to consider factors “specified in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(c),” a requirement the court can satisfy by considering certain § 3553(a) factors. See 

Zobel, 696 F.3d at 572 (citing United States v. Presto, 498 F.3d 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2007)). But 

we do not demand a repetitive discussion of those factors “where the special conditions of 

supervised release logically flow from the reasons” the district court gave “for imposing a 

sentence of incarceration.” United States v. Banks, 722 F. App’x 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing 

Zobel, 696 F.3d at 572); see United States v. Babcock, 753 F.3d 587, 593 (6th Cir. 2014) 
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 8

(“In outlining its reasons for imposing the sentence of incarceration . . . the district court was also 

outlining the reasons supporting the [term] of supervised release, even though the court did not 

do so explicitly.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In 

addition, an inadequate explanation is harmless error “if the reasons for imposing the special 

conditions are ‘clear from the record.’” Henry, 819 F.3d at 874 (quoting United States v. 

Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 599 (6th Cir. 2015)). 

The district court provided a thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. It explained that 

“at a very young age, 24 years old, Mr. Booker has managed to roll up a criminal history placing 

him in the highest criminal history category”—and this was true even “without the application of 

the career offender guideline.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Additionally, the court observed 

that Booker “has been impervious to rehabilitation”; a “relatively short period of time” had 

elapsed between Booker’s last state conviction and his renewed criminal conduct. See id. The 

court “view[ed] Mr. Booker as a serious risk to re-offend,” who “need[ed] to be specifically 

deterred.” See id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). The court was also greatly concerned with the need to 

protect the public, explaining that methamphetamine “is a major problem” in its jurisdiction. See 

id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). After “consider[ing] all of the 3553 factors,” the court ultimately imposed a 

sentence that it believed would “reflect the seriousness of the offense[,] . . . promote respect for 

[federal] controlled substance laws[,] . . . and provide just punishment.” See id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).

The district court had no need to tie its discussion of the sentencing factors explicitly to 

Booker’s supervised release conditions. See Henry, 819 F.3d at 874; Babcock, 753 F.3d at 593; 

Zobel, 696 F.3d at 572. The district court’s concerns about Booker’s risk of recidivism and the 

need to promote public safety formed the basis for both the prison term and the supervised 

release conditions it imposed, as the nature of the selected conditions makes clear. See United 

States v. Arnold, 549 F. App’x 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2013); Zobel, 696 F.3d at 572; Presto, 498 F.3d 

at 419. The district court manifestly designed these conditions to steer Booker away from his 

prior criminal activities and to facilitate effective monitoring by his probation officer. Because 
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 9

the district court provided an adequate explanation for these special conditions, this component 

of Booker’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable.1

Booker suggests that the district court had an additional duty to explain its imposition of 

a probationary search condition because the Guidelines only expressly recommend this measure 

in relation to sex offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C). Likewise, he complains that the 

Guidelines recommend financial disclosures in cases that, unlike Booker’s, involve the payment 

of restitution, forfeiture, or fines. See id. § 5D1.3(d)(3). Yet, Booker admits that the Guidelines 

recognize these conditions “may otherwise be appropriate in particular cases.” Id. § 5D1.3(d). 

The same rationale that supports Booker’s other release conditions supports these two as well. 

Financial disclosure will allow his probation officer to determine his ability to pay for drug 

treatment, as the district court directed. It will also complicate any of Booker’s future efforts to 

profit from trafficking illegal drugs. Similarly, the search provision will deter Booker from 

returning to the old habits that have placed him in the Guidelines’ highest criminal history 

category. It would have “serve[d] no useful purpose” for the district court to “repeat its 

§ 3553(a) analysis with respect to the supervised-release” conditions here. See United States v. 

O’Georgia, 569 F.3d 281, 289 (6th Cir. 2009); accord United States v. Clark, 726 F.3d 496, 501 

(3d Cir. 2013). 

Even if we agreed with Booker that the district court’s explanation was inadequate, any 

error would be harmless because the record demonstrates why the district court found each 

condition necessary. See Henry, 819 F.3d at 874. As the district court said, Booker’s proclivity 

for returning to criminal conduct shows that he “ha[d] not taken to heart the lessons that he 

learned from [his] prior convictions.” The district court also noted the need to protect the public 

from the deleterious effects of drug distribution, observing that methamphetamine has been “a 

major problem” in the district. We find that all of Booker’s special supervision conditions are 

tailored toward dissuading him from returning to his old unlawful practices and protecting the 

public from similar criminal acts. For example, the restriction on cell phone usage harkens back 

to Booker’s regular use of a cell phone to arrange drug sales. The record indicates that any error 

1Booker does not ask us to consider “[w]hether these conditions were in fact warranted,” which “is a 

question of substantive reasonableness.” See Zobel, 696 F.3d at 572.
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 10

in the district court’s explanation of Booker’s special supervision conditions was harmless,2see 

Collins, 799 F.3d at 599; United States v. Berridge, 74 F.3d 113, 119 (6th Cir. 1996), and 

certainly was not plain error, see United States v. Ziska, 602 F. App’x 284, 293–94 (6th Cir. 

2015).

None of the cases that Booker cites changes this result. In United States v. Inman, we 

remanded for the district court to reconsider supervised release conditions that lacked any 

apparent relation to the criminal conduct at issue. 666 F.3d 1001, 1004–06 (6th Cir. 2012) (per 

curiam) (explaining that the district court imposed a lifetime ban on the consumption of alcohol 

even though “[n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that Inman ha[d] any problem with alcohol or 

drug[s]” and imposed a financial disclosure requirement where “Inman’s crime was not financial 

in nature,” nor a crime that benefited him financially, such as drug trafficking); see also Zobel, 

696 F.3d at 572 (distinguishing Inman). Similarly, we found remand necessary in United States 

v. Maxwell because “nothing before the district court was said to have linked [the] activities 

[prohibited by the release conditions] to the defendant’s offenses.” 483 F. App’x 233, 239 (6th 

Cir. 2012). In United States v. Thompson, the government conceded that “the district court’s 

total failure to articulate any basis for the lengthy term of supervised release or the onerous 

special conditions” was plain error. 509 F. App’x 449, 453 (6th Cir. 2012). And finally, in 

United States v. Dotson, we found an “absence of any statement that set[] forth the district 

court’s actual rationale” for imposing certain broad restrictions. 715 F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Maxwell, 483 F. App’x at 240). Dotson did not acknowledge our earlier 

decisions, which establish that a district court may “engage[] in a single consideration of the 

sentencing factors . . . embrac[ing] both the incarceration sentence and the supervised release 

term.” Presto, 498 F.3d at 419; see Zobel, 696 F.3d at 572. Nor did Dotson grapple with 

controlling precedent applying plain-error or harmless-error review in the relevant context. See, 

e.g., United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 836–37 (6th Cir. 2001); Berridge, 74 F.3d at 119. 

2Booker intimates that our early harmless error jurisprudence is inconsistent with the procedural 

reasonableness requirements set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

50 (2007), but he fails to explain how. We can find no inconsistency, and we note that we have continued to 

review supervised release conditions for harmless error after Gall. See, e.g., United States v. Blue, 767 F. App’x 

608, 612–13 (6th Cir. 2019); Collins, 799 F.3d at 599.
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 11

Booker’s arguments therefore are not persuasive, and he has failed to establish that the district 

court erred, let alone plainly. 

B.

Finally, Booker argues that the special supervised release conditions listed in the district 

court’s written judgment of conviction include greater restrictions on his phone usage than those 

announced at sentencing. “[W]hen an oral sentence conflicts with the written sentence, the oral 

sentence controls.” United States v. Denny, 653 F.3d 415, 421 (6th Cir. 2011) (alteration in 

original) (quoting United States v. Penson, 526 F.3d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 2008)). The oral sentence 

takes precedence because “a defendant is present only when being sentenced from the bench. 

Because criminal punishment affects the most fundamental human rights sentencing should be 

conducted with the judge and defendant facing one another and not in secret.” Id. (quoting 

Penson, 526 F.3d at 334).

Even though Booker raised no objection to the written judgment below, this claim is not 

subject to plain-error review; Booker could not have raised it during his sentencing hearing 

before the written judgment had been issued. See United States v. Carpenter, 702 F.3d 882, 884 

(6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Logins, 503 F. App’x 345, 348–49 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 51(b) (providing that a party shall not be prejudiced by “the absence of an objection” 

when the “party does not have an opportunity to object”). We review an alleged discrepancy 

between oral and written sentences de novo. Carpenter, 702 F.3d at 884; Logins, 503 F. App’x 

at 348–49. 

Here, we find no discrepancy. At Booker’s sentencing hearing, the district court 

described the disputed condition as follows:

[Booker] is not to possess a cell phone or other electronic device without the prior 

permission of his probation officer. If he is given permission to have a cell phone 

or other electronic device, the device must be in his name or a name approved in 

advance by his probation officer, and he shall provide the bill for the device with 

each monthly report.

The district court’s written judgment divided this condition into two provisions that are 

somewhat more detailed:
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 12

You must not possess or be the primary user of any cellular phone without prior 

permission from the probation officer. If given permission to use/possess a cell 

phone, you must provide the number to the probation officer and the phone must 

be maintained in your name or another name approved in advance by the 

probation officer.

You must provide the probation officer with your monthly cellular and home 

telephone bills with each monthly report form and must report any cellular 

telephone you have used or own on each report form.

The oral and written conditions “[b]oth convey the same message.” United States v. Lewis, 565 

F. App’x 490, 498 (6th Cir. 2012). Booker was only to have phone access with his probation 

officer’s permission and, if given permission, would be subject to certain forms of monitoring. 

Nevertheless, Booker claims to spot four differences: “(1) in addition to not possessing a cell 

phone (without prior approval), he must also not be the ‘primary user’ of a phone; (2) he must 

provide the number to the probation officer; (3) he must provide home telephone bills; and (4) he 

‘must report any cellular telephone [he has] used or own[s] on each report form.’” (Alterations 

in original.) None of these purported distinctions is meaningful. Booker would need to 

“possess” a cell phone to be its primary user. His phone number would presumably appear on 

the bills he is required to submit to his probation officer. The district court’s oral pronouncement 

covered any “cell phone or other electronic device,” including a home phone. (Emphasis 

added.) The oral condition contemplated that Booker would need to make disclosures in his 

“monthly report,” and the requirement that the report list any cell phone Booker owns or has 

used merely formalizes the enforcement of this condition. This court and others have found no 

discrepancy in written supervision conditions that use different language to impose substantially 

identical requirements. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 830 F. App’x 420, 423–24 (5th Cir. 

2020) (“[W]hen the pronouncement explicitly refers to the condition, despite wording it 

differently[,] . . . no conflict results.”); United States v. Buchanan, 820 F. App’x 401, 405 (6th 

Cir. 2020); United States v. Gaynor, 530 F. App’x 536, 542 (6th Cir. 2013); Lewis, 565 F. App’x 

at 498. 

Booker identifies two unpublished decisions where we found a written supervised release 

condition to conflict with the conditions announced at sentencing. See United States v. Dean, 

657 F. App’x 503, 507–08 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Hall, 669 F. App’x 297, 298 (6th Cir. 
No. 20-1047 United States v. Booker Page 13

2016) (per curiam). Neither case does him any good. In both, the government conceded that 

plain error occurred, and we offered no further analysis. See Dean, 657 F. App’x at 508; Hall, 

669 F. App’x at 298. Each case involved a written judgment that required the defendant to pay 

treatment costs that the district court entirely failed to mention at sentencing. See Dean, 657 F. 

App’x at 508; Hall, 669 F. App’x at 298; see also Hall’s Br. at 20, (No. 15-6202), 2016 WL 

1084879, at *20 (explaining the discrepancy in Hall). But see Thomas, 830 F. App’x at 422–23 

(upholding a requirement, stated for the first time in a written judgment, that the defendant bear 

some costs of court-ordered treatment); United States v. Vega, 332 F.3d 849, 852 (5th Cir. 2003) 

(per curiam) (same). By contrast, we find that the district court below did not impose any new 

conditions in its written judgment.

* * *

We AFFIRM.