NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v. 

ANDRIENE NATALIE WALTERS, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0253 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-147352-004 

The Honorable John R. Ditsworth, Judge Retired

The Honorable Roland J. Steinle, Judge Retired

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz 

Counsel for Appellee 

Barbara Hull Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Barbara L. Hull

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 7-10-2018
STATE v. WALTERS

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Andriene Walters appeals her five felony convictions and 

sentences. She argues the State violated her Fourth Amendment rights. We 

affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 This case is about a drug deal. A confidential informant for 

the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office learned about the potential deal in 

September 2012. The informant posed as a bulk marijuana seller. A broker 

contacted him about an interested buyer who wanted to purchase 800 

pounds of marijuana. They met to discuss price; the informant gave the

broker a marijuana sample. The informant was wearing an audio 

monitoring device that allowed Detective Claudio Fausto to hear the 

informant’s conversations. 

¶3 The informant and broker met again the next day in South 

Phoenix. The buyer wanted to see “the whole block of weed,” which the 

informant had placed in the back seat of his car. A “Jamaican guy” soon

arrived, peered into the car, saw the block of marijuana and said, “let’s 

make this happen.” The men then drove to a fast-food restaurant in West 

Phoenix, where they met a second broker and followed him to a nearby 

house in separate cars. 

¶4 Detective Fausto continued to monitor the transaction. A 

surveillance team was deployed around the house, including at least three 

officers who “had eyes on the front of the house” and more officers on the 

perimeter. 

¶5 The informant entered through the garage and met a larger 

group in the kitchen, where they discussed the transaction. Through the 

monitoring device, Detective Fausto heard “at least two males, or two 

Jamaican males, the brokers, and . . . a female.” Fausto heard the female 

well “because she got very close to the informant.” She asked the informant 

if he was a cop; the informant said no. She said if he wasn’t a cop, then they 
STATE v. WALTERS

Decision of the Court

3 

would be in business. The informant asked to see the money. The woman 

boasted “that she was ready to purchase 6,000 pounds if she wanted to. She 

had the money for that, and then she told him that she was the queen of the 

Jamaicans.” The informant saw the money, which was hidden inside the 

lining of multiple suitcases. 

¶6 The informant agreed to retrieve the drugs, ostensibly stashed 

not far from the house. He returned to his car and drove off, followed by 

the second broker in another car. Police descended and stopped both cars, 

but not before the second broker called to warn the buyers at the house. At 

least three suspects fled the house “running [in] different directions,” 

including two men and one woman. Police secured the residence and 

detained the suspects who remained in the house. 

¶7 Meanwhile, the informant was “arrested,” pulled aside and 

asked to describe the suspects. He described the woman who referred to 

herself as “the queen of the Jamaicans” as “wearing like a blue denim or 

Levi[’]s type of a bottom and top.” She had long curly hair and “a thick 

Jamaican accent.” Detective Fausto broadcast the description to the 

surveillance team via radio. 

¶8 Sergeant Gentry was on the surveillance team. As the deal 

unfolded, he was parked a street north of the house. He initially pursued 

the second broker’s car, but returned toward the house to search for the 

fleeing suspects. He was driving slowly through the neighborhood when 

two men standing in a driveway said, “Your bitch is running . . . that way,” 

signaling toward 91st Avenue. Sergeant Gentry continued in that direction 

and found a woman “matching the clothing description.” It was Walters. 

She had not made it far, only a block north of the house. Nor had much 

time elapsed. She was found within 10 minutes after Sergeant Gentry heard 

the suspects had fled on foot. 

¶9 Sergeant Gentry parked his patrol car, approached the 

woman and asked for identification. She pulled two ID cards from her 

purse. Neither belonged to her. She provided her name in “a very thick 

Jamaican accent.” It did not match either ID card. Asked where she was 

headed, Walters said she was hemorrhaging and thus walking to the 

hospital. Sergeant Gentry saw nothing physically wrong with her. Gentry 

snapped a photograph of her with his cell phone, which was electronically 

sent to Detective Fausto and the informant. The informant confirmed it was 

“the lady that claimed she was the queen of the Jamaican [sic].” Sergeant 

Gentry arrested Walters. 
STATE v. WALTERS

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¶10 Walters was charged with conspiracy to commit possession 

of marijuana for sale, a Class 2 felony (“Count 1”); possession of marijuana 

for sale, a Class 4 felony (“Count 2”); possession of drug paraphernalia, a 

Class 6 felony (“Count 3”); money laundering in the second degree, a Class 

3 felony (“Count 4”); conspiracy to commit money laundering in the second 

degree, a Class 3 felony (“Count 5”); misconduct involving weapons, a 

Class 4 felony (“Count 6”); and misconduct involving weapons, a Class 4 

felony (“Count 7”). 

¶11 Walters filed a pretrial “motion to dismiss for lack of 

reasonable suspicion,” arguing that Sergeant Gentry violated her Fourth 

Amendment rights when he approached and photographed her on a public 

street. She asked the court to dismiss the charges or suppress all evidence

“obtained after [she] was wrongfully seized.” The superior court heard 

argument and held an evidentiary hearing before denying the motion. 

¶12 After a hung jury, a second jury found Walters guilty of 

Counts 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7. Walters admitted her historical prior felony 

convictions and was sentenced to concurrent, mitigated terms, the longest 

of which is 11 years. Walters appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 9, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶13 Walters argues that Sergeant Gentry violated her Fourth 

Amendment rights because he lacked reasonable suspicion to approach her 

on the street, lacked probable cause to take and share her photograph and 

lacked probable cause to arrest her based solely on the photograph. We 

disagree.

¶14 To begin, Walters seeks an improper and unavailable remedy. 

The standard remedy for an unlawful search and seizure in a criminal trial 

is to exclude the tainted evidence acquired by the illegal search. See United 

States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 366 (1981) (“The remedy in the criminal 

proceeding is limited to denying the prosecution the fruits of its 

transgression.”). But Walters asks us to reverse her convictions and dismiss 

all charges under the Fourth Amendment. No such remedy is available. Id. 

(“[W]e have not suggested that searches and seizures contrary to the Fourth 

Amendment warrant dismissal of the indictment.”).

¶15 We review determinations of reasonable suspicion and 

probable cause de novo, but defer to the superior court’s findings of fact. 

State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, 76, ¶ 5 (App. 2008) (reasonable suspicion); State 

v. Blackmore, 186 Ariz. 630, 632 (1996) (probable cause). 
STATE v. WALTERS

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¶16 Walters never argued in her opening brief that the court 

erroneously admitted any evidence resulting from the stop, but in a single

sentence in her reply brief, without citation, she posits that “all information 

obtained [after Sergeant Gentry told her to stop] is fruit of the poisonous 

tree and must be suppressed.” We disagree. The record indicates no Fourth 

Amendment violation. Sergeant Gentry had ample reasonable suspicion to 

stop Walters. He had amassed a bevy of “articulable facts that criminal 

activity may be afoot” under the totality of circumstances. State v. Evans, 

237 Ariz. 231, 234, ¶ 7 (2015) (quotation omitted); see Fornof, 218 Ariz. at 76, 

¶ 6 (factors to consider in reasonable suspicion analysis include a suspect’s 

conduct and appearance, the location, and surrounding circumstances, 

including the time of day). Gentry spotted Walters only one block from a 

house where a woman and two men had just fled a busted drug deal. She 

matched the description of the female suspect. She was black, her hair was 

long, and she wore a blue denim top and bottom. Gentry found her within 

10 minutes of the reported escape. Two neighbors saw a suspect fleeing

and pointed Sergeant Gentry in that direction, where he found Walters. 

¶17 Nor did Sergeant Gentry violate Walters’ Fourth Amendment

rights by taking her photograph on a public street. Police may capture or 

record in public spaces what they normally may view with the naked eye. 

United States v. Gonzalez, 328 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2003). 

¶18 Last, Sergeant Gentry had probable cause to arrest Walters 

even before he took and shared her photograph. See, e.g., State v. Romero, 

178 Ariz. 45, 51 (App. 1993) (reasonable suspicion ripened into probable 

cause when, among other things, suspects matched description given by 

victims and police stopped them within short time of incident in an adjacent 

neighborhood). A warrantless arrest is proper “when the facts and 

circumstances known at the time of the arrest are sufficient to lead a 

reasonable person to believe a felony was committed by the person to be 

arrested.” State v. Hein, 138 Ariz. 360, 364 (1983). 

¶19 The facts and circumstances establishing reasonable 

suspicion here likewise demonstrate probable cause to arrest. But Sergeant 

Gentry had even more. He heard Walters speak in the suspect’s “very thick 

Jamaican accent.” Her conduct was suspicious, too. She handed Sergeant 

Gentry two forms of false identification and provided a false name. She

also claimed to be hemorrhaging, but showed no physical manifestations. 

That was enough for a reasonable person to connect the dots. See, e.g., State 

v. Dixon, 153 Ariz. 151, 153 (1987) (police officer had probable cause to arrest 

a man who largely matched the suspect’s description, was found near the 

crime scene and was trying to leave the area). The Fourth Amendment did 
STATE v. WALTERS

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6 

not require Sergeant Gentry to seek photographic confirmation or greater 

certainty before he arrested Walters.1

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm the convictions and sentences of Walters.

 

1 Walters obliquely argues the State staged an unduly suggestive 

pretrial lineup in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights when her 

photograph was shown to the confidential informant. This argument fails 

because pretrial identification issues implicate the Due Process Clause, not 

the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Rojo-Valenzuela, 237 Ariz. 448, 450, ¶ 6 

(2015).