NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAMUEL W. WANI, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

GEORGE FOX UNIVERSITY; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

PROVIDENCE MEDICAL GROUP, 

Defendant.

No. 19-35355 

D.C. No. 3:17-cv-01011-YY 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Youlee Yim You, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted March 31, 2021

***

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, AND N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). 

*** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 1 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 19-35355 

Samuel W. Wani appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his 

action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of an injury sustained while 

attending George Fox University (“GFU”) as a student athlete and an incident of 

cyberbullying. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. 

Hamby v. Hammon, 821 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment); 

Yakima Valley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wash. Dep’t of Health, 654 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 

2011) (judgment on the pleadings). We affirm. 

The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for FixGonzalez on Wani’s cyberbullying claim because Oregon’s cyberbullying statue 

does not create any statutory cause of action. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 339.364.

The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for FixGonzalez and the individual GFU defendants (“GFU Defendants”)1 on Wani’s

racial harassment and racial discrimination claims because these defendants are

individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (statute applies only to “program or activity 

receiving federal assistance”). 

The district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for GFU on

Wani’s racial harassment claim because Wani failed to allege facts sufficient to 

show a hostile environment. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 

1 The individual GFU defendants are: Gregg Boughton; Chris Casey; John Bates; 

Ian Sanders; Gabe Haberly; Craig Taylor; Dave Johnstone; Mark Pothoff; and 

Sarah Taylor.
 3 19-35355 

F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998) (setting forth the definition of a hostile 

environment and delineating the test for a Title VI violation). 

The district court properly dismissed Wani’s negligence claims against GFU

and the GFU defendants arising from these defendants’ alleged failure to address 

his injury because Wani failed to allege facts sufficient to show these defendants 

breached a duty of care while he was a student at GFU. See Brennen v. City of 

Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 722 (Or. 1979) (setting forth elements of negligence and 

breach of duty of care claims).

The district court properly dismissed Wani’s intentional infliction of 

emotional distress (“IIED”) claims against GFU and the GFU defendants because 

Wani failed to allege facts sufficient to show these defendants intended to inflict 

severe emotional distress. See Dawson v. Entek Intern., 630 F.3d 928, 941 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (setting forth the three-part test for IIED under Oregon law). The 

district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings for Fix-Gonzalez on

Wani’s IIED claim because Wani failed to allege that Fix-Gonzalez’s actions

“were sufficiently grievous to constitute a transgression of the bounds of socially 

tolerable conduct.” Id. 

The district court properly dismissed Wani’s claim for negligent infliction of 

emotional distress (“NIED”) against GFU and the GFU defendants because Wani

failed to allege facts sufficient to show whether his relationship with these
 4 19-35355 

defendants gave rise to a distinct, legally protected interest. See Stevens v. First 

Interstate Bank of Cal., 999 P.2d 551, 554 (Or. App. 2000) (to recover for NIED 

under Oregon law, a plaintiff must demonstrate a relationship with defendants that 

gives rise to “some distinct legally protected interest beyond liability grounded in 

the general obligation to take reasonable care not to cause a risk of foreseeable 

harm’’ (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court properly 

granted defendant Fix-Gonzalez’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on Wani’s 

NIED claim because Wani failed to allege his relationship with Fix-Gonzalez 

created a distinct, legally protected interest. See id. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wani’s Title VI 

racial discrimination claims because Wani failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether GFU was deliberately indifferent to known peer 

harassment or disparate treatment in medical care. See Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1033 

(“When a district is deliberately indifferent to its students’ right to a learning 

environment free of racial hostility and discrimination, it is liable for damages 

under Title VI.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Flores v. 

Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Deliberate 

indifference is found if the school administrator responds to known peer 

harassment in a manner that is . . . clearly unreasonable.” (internal citation 

omitted)).
 5 19-35355 

The district court properly dismissed Wani’s Health Insurance Portability 

and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) claims against defendants Taylor and 

Boughton because HIPAA does not allow a private civil action for money 

damages. See Garmon v. County of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 

2016) (HIPAA itself provides no private right of action).

The district court properly dismissed Wani’s breach of contract claim 

against GFU because Wani failed to allege facts sufficient to show the existence of 

a contract. See Slover v. Or. State Bd. of Clinical Soc. Workers, 927 P.2d 1098, 

1101-02 (Or. App. 1996) (setting forth the elements of breach of contract under 

Oregon law). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wani’s negligence 

claim against defendant Croy because Wani failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact that defendant Croy had a duty of care to Wani and that Croy 

breached that duty. See Brennen, 591 P.2d at 722 (outlining the elements required 

to show negligence under state law).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wani’s negligence 

claim against defendants Boughton and Casey because Wani failed to provide 

expert testimony regarding the standard of care and causation. See Baughman v. 

Pina, 113 P.3d 459, 460 (Or. App. 2005) (expert testimony is required to establish 

causation); see also Getchell v. Mansfield, 489 P.2d 953, 179 (Or. 1971) (expert 
 6 19-35355 

testimony is required to determine what reasonable practice is in the community).

The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant GFU

on the remaining vicarious liability and negligent hiring claims because the 

underlying claims against defendants Boughton and Casey failed. See Schmidt v. 

Slader, 327 P.3d 1182, 1185-86 (Or. App. 2014) (outlining the elements of 

vicarious liability); see also Brennen, 591 P.2d at 722 (outlining the elements 

required to show negligence under state law).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Wani’s second 

amended complaint without leave to amend because amendment would have been 

futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, 656 F.3d 1034, 1040-41 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court may 

deny leave to amend if amendment would be futile).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wani’s motion to 

compel discovery because Wani failed to establish that denial would result in 

actual and substantial prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that a district court’s 

“decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing 

that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the 

complaining litigant” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wani’s motion for 
 7 19-35355 

reconsideration because Wani failed to establish any basis for relief. See Sch. Dist. 

No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(standard of review and discussing grounds for reconsideration).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wani’s motion for 

recusal because Wani presented no basis for recusal. See Glick v. Edwards, 803 

F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 2015) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for 

recusal); see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (explaining that 

“judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality 

motion”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised in the 

opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Wani’s motion for an evidentiary hearing (Docket Entry No. 31) and any 

related requests set forth in his supplemental pleadings regarding the motion 

(Docket Entry No. 35) are denied. 

AFFIRMED.