alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**


**CHIEF
      EXECUTIVE OFFICER**




I,
      Gary
      Herman, certify that:





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Digital Creative Development Corporation
      (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending December 31,2007 (the
      "Report"), the undersigned officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.






Date:
                February 19, 2008/s/ Gary
                HermanGary
                HermanPresident
#### James Earl JONES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Loretta KELLY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 10-7465.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 31, 2011.

Decided: April 11, 2011.

James Earl Jones, Appellant Pro Se. Virginia Bidwell Theisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

James Earl Jones seeks to appeal the district court’s order treating his Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion as a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition, and dismissing it on that basis. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006); *Reid v. Angelone,*369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir.2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Jones has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.

Additionally, we construe Jones’ notice of appeal and informal brief as an application to file a second or successive § 2254 petition. *United States v. Winestock,*340 F.3d 200, 208 (4th Cir.2003). In order to obtain authorization to file a successive § 2254 petition, a prisoner must assert claims based on either: (1) a new rule of constitutional law, previously unavailable, made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral review; or (2) newly discovered evidence, not previously discoverable by due diligence, that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2006). Jones’ claims do not satisfy either of these criteria. Therefore, we deny authorization to file a successive § 2254 petition.

*235We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
Order entered November 10, 2022

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 22

- 00638

- CV

TITO E. MARRERO , Appellant

V.

BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION, ET AL. , Appellee s

On Appea l from the 193rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC

- 21

- 14549

O RDER

Before the Court is appellant’s November 8, 2022 “Motion Seeking Default
Summary Judgment Against Bank of America and Jenifer Hope Wright for Failure

to Answer Tito’s Petition Filed in the 193rd Violating Texas Civil Procedure.”
This Court reviews judgments and other appealable orders from the trial court. It
does not grant summary judgment. Accordingly, w e DENY the m otion. 1

/s/ BILL PEDERSEN, III JU STICE

1 By letter issued today, the Court questions its jurisdiction over this appeal. The letter directs the parties to file letter briefs addressing the jurisdictional issue.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the financial
statements and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                           DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                          448,328
<SECURITIES>                                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCES>                                          0
<INVENTORY>                                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                919,003
<PP&E>                                          159,040
<DEPRECIATION>                                   22,088
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                1,055,955
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         1,454,764
<BONDS>                                               0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                 0
<PREFERRED>                                           0
<COMMON>                                        225,700
<OTHER-SE>                                     (986,802)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  1,055,955
<SALES>                                               0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                      0
<CGS>                                                 0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                         0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                2,780
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (228,796)
<INCOME-TAX>                                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (228,796)
<DISCONTINUED>                                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                       0
<CHANGES>                                             0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (228,796)
<EPS-BASIC>                                        (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      (.01)






</TABLE>
#### Anthony Doria et al., Plaintiffs, v Cooke Properties, Inc., et al., Defendants, and Multiplex Electrical Services, Inc., Appellant. Cooke Properties, Inc., et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs, v Apex Electrical Company, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

[664 NYS2d 798]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Alfred Toker, J.H.O.), entered April 15, 1997, which dismissed the third-party complaint upon the ground that such impleader would not lie under recently *60amended provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, unanimously reversed, on the law, the motion denied and the third-party complaint reinstated, without costs.

This is an action for personal injuries brought by a worker at a construction site. The lawsuit presents the familiar configuration of a main action commenced against the owners of real property, who in turn bring a third-party action against the injured party’s employer for common-law indemnification and contribution. The employer subsequently moved to dismiss the third-party action under the recently amended section 11 of the Workers’ Compensation Law (L 1996, ch 635, § 2), which precludes third-party indemnity actions against an employer who has made Workers’ Compensation payments except where the worker has suffered “ ‘grave injury’ ” (concededly not the case here).

The sole issue on this appeal is whether the cited statutory proscription should be retroactively applied to litigation such as this, which was pending prior to the effective date of the amendment. The order appealed from, which applied the amendment retroactively so as to extinguish the third-party action, was apparently issued by the Referee prior to any decisive appellate guidance on the question. In carefully reasoned decisions, the Second and Third Departments have now held that the amendment contemplates prospective application only *(Morales v Gross,*230 AD2d 7; *Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist.,*231 AD2d 102)—a view with which we find ourselves in complete agreement. The third-party action is thus reinstated in accordance with what we consider to be prevailing law. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Milonas, Rosenberger, Ellerin and Wallach, JJ.
#### STATE OF CONNECTICUT *v.*DAVID ABRAHAMS

(AC 29928)

Flynn, C. J., and Lavine and Alvord, Js.

Argued September 21

officially released October 20, 2009

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of SE Global Equities
Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June 30, 2003, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Tim Leong, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section
  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
  material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
  Partnership.


|Date: August 14, 2003 | /s/ Tim Leong
    _______________________
    Tim Leong, Chief Financial Officer
|--------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JUN 27 1997

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

VICTOR MANUEL PRIETO-LOERA,

aka Manuel Torres-Loera, aka Victor

Lugo, aka Victor Lua,

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 96-4160

(D.C. 96-CR-150)

(District of Utah)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.

 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has unanimously

determined that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.
2

Defendant Victor Prieto-Loera appeals a 57-month sentence imposed after a

plea of guilty to one count of unlawful re-entry by a deported alien, in violation

of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Mr. Prieto-Loera’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in her opinion, there are no

meritorious grounds for appeal. This court ordered Mr. Prieto-Loera to respond

to counsel’s Anders brief on or before March 7, 1997, and to date, he has failed to

do so.

We have engaged in a thorough search of the record and are convinced that

Mr. Prieto-Loera’s counsel has done the same. We agree with counsel that there

are no meritorious grounds for appeal. According to counsel, Mr. Prieto-Loera

“feels that 57 months is too long of a sentence for the type of crime he

committed.” Aplt.’s Br. at 2. Apparently, Congress and the Sentencing

Commission feel otherwise; Mr. Prieto-Loera’s 57-month sentence is within the

guideline range for his offense level and criminal history category. Accordingly,

we GRANT counsel leave to withdraw, and DISMISS the appeal. See Penson v.

Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court,

Robert H. Henry

Circuit Judge
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2962 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2962

  To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to exclude certain 
   advanced diagnostic imaging services from the in-office ancillary 
   services exception to the prohibition on physician self-referral.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 19, 2009

  Ms. Speier introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
 Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committee on 
   Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to exclude certain 
   advanced diagnostic imaging services from the in-office ancillary 
   services exception to the prohibition on physician self-referral.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Integrity in Medicare Advanced 
Diagnostic Imaging Act of 2009''.

SEC. 2. EXCLUDING CERTAIN ADVANCED DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING SERVICES FROM THE 
              IN-OFFICE ANCILLARY SERVICES EXCEPTION TO THE PROHIBITION 
              ON PHYSICIAN SELF-REFERRAL.

    (a) In General.--Section 1877(b)(2) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1395nn(b)(2)) is amended--
            (1) in the matter before subparagraph (A), by striking 
        ``and supplies'' and inserting ``, supplies, and certain 
        advanced diagnostic imaging services''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following: ``For purposes of 
        subparagraph (A), the term `certain advanced diagnostic imaging 
        services' means diagnostic magnetic resonance imaging, computed 
        tomography, and positron emission tomography, and such other 
        diagnostic imaging services, including services described in 
        section 1848(b)(4)(B) (but excluding X-ray, ultrasound, and 
        fluoroscopy), as specified by the Secretary in consultation 
        with physician specialty organizations and other stakeholders, 
        but does not include imaging services performed for purposes of 
        radiation therapy treatment planning or in conjunction with an 
        interventional radiological procedure or nuclear medicine other 
        than positron emission tomography.''.

SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATES.

    The amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of this Act shall apply to 
services furnished on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
regardless of when the referral for such services is or was made.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>
                              POWER OF ATTORNEY 

   KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that the undersigned hereby constitutes 
and appoints each of Eric K. Kawamura, Joram C. Salig and Renee N. Tucei or 
any of them, each acting alone, his true and lawful attorney-in-fact and 
agent, with full power of substitution, for him and in his name, place and 
stead, in any and all capacities, in connection with the FIRST NATIONWIDE 
HOLDINGS INC. (the "Corporation") Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year 
ended December 31, 1997 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as 
amended, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, to sign 
the Form 10-K in the name and on behalf of the Corporation or on behalf of 
the undersigned as a director or officer of the Corporation, and any 
amendments to the Form 10-K and any instrument, contract, document or other 
writing, of or in connection with the Form 10-K or amendments thereto, and to 
file the same, with all exhibits thereto, and other documents in connection 
therewith, including this power of attorney, with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Office of Thrift Supervision or other appropriate regulatory 
authority and any applicable securities exchange or securities 
self-regulatory body, granting unto said attorneys-in-fact and agents, each 
acting alone, full power and authority to do and perform each and every act 
and thing requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as 
fully to all intents and purposes as he might or could do in person, hereby 
ratifying and confirming all that said attorneys-in-fact and agents, each 
acting alone, or his substitute or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to 
be done by virtue hereof. 

   IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has signed these presents this 25th day 
of March 1998. 

                                          /s/ Howard Gittis 
                                       --------------------------
                                              HOWARD GITTIS
Exhibit 32.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted
Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, Scott J. Davidson, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
the Quarterly Report of Quest Software, Inc. on Form 10-Q for the three months ended September 30, 2006, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained
in such Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Quest Software, Inc.



|                       |  |  |  |     |  |                       |  |                                               
|---------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | --------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------------
|                       |  |  | 
|Date: December 7, 2007 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ Scott J. Davidson
|                       |  |  |  |     |  | Name:                 |  | Scott J. Davidson,                            
|                       |  |  |  |     |  | Title:                |  | Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
EXHIBIT 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
                            (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

Pursuant  to  section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and
(b)  of  section  1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the
undersigned  officers  of  Payment Data Systems, Inc., a Nevada corporation (the
"Company"),  does  hereby  certify,  to  such  officer's  knowledge,  that:

The  Quarterly Report for the quarter ended June 30, 2005 (the "Form 10-QSB") of
the  Company  fully  complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the  Securities  Exchange Act of 1934, and the information contained in the Form
10-QSB  fairly  presents,  in all material respects, the financial condition and
results  of  operations  of  the  Company.


Date:  August  15,  2005

     By:  /s/  Michael  R.  Long
          ----------------------
     Michael  R.  Long
     Chief  Executive  Officer
     and  Chief  Financial  Officer
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-14-00498-CV

Steven B. Aubrey, Appellant

v.

Susan Kay Steeg, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-GN-13-003586, HONORABLE ORLINDA NARANJO, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Steven B. Aubrey appeals the district court’s order granting a plea to the jurisdiction

and dismissing his petition for writ of mandamus against Justice of the Peace Susan Kay Steeg.

Aubrey’s mandamus petition alleged that Steeg abused her discretion by issuing certain peace bond

orders against him. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 7.03 (magistrate may order person who threatens

to commit offense to give bond to keep the peace for one year from date of bond). Aubrey deposited

the bond amounts required by the peace bonds, but the State alleged that he violated the peace bond

orders and filed suit for forfeiture of the bonds. See id. art. 7.16 (district or county attorney may file

suit in name of State seeking forfeiture of peace bond). After filing this appeal, Aubrey resolved the

State’s enforcement of the peace bonds by entering into an agreed order, and Steeg argues that this

appeal has become moot based on the agreed order. We agree that the appeal is moot.

We may not decide a case that has becomemoot during the pendencyof the litigation.

Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012). A case becomes moot if, since
the time of filing, a justiciable controversy between the parties has ceased to exist, meaning that

the issues presented are no longer “live,” that or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in

the outcome. Id.; see Ex parte Carlton, No. 01-97-01387-CV, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 7654, at *2

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 10, 1998) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (peace

bond alleged to be restraint on appellant’s liberty expired on its own terms and rendered habeas

corpus appeal moot).

Here, the agreed order Aubrey signed “dismissed with prejudice” the enforcement

action on the peace bonds that were the core of Aubrey’s mandamus petition against Steeg. The

agreed order confirms the parties’ resolution of their disputes, specifies how the bond amounts will

be disbursed, and states that Aubrey “relinquishes any and all claims he has or may have” to the

retained amount. Aubrey has put forth no response to Steeg’s assertion that the agreed orderrenders 1

this appeal moot, nor do we find any support for an argument to the contrary. There is no longer a

justiciable controversy on these peace bond orders warranting resolution of this appeal, and as such

we dismiss this appeal as moot.

 

Jeff Rose, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Goodwin and Bourland 

Dismissed as Moot

Filed: June 17, 2015

We also note that the peace bonds issued in 2013 have expired on their own terms. See 1

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 7.03 (limiting duration of peace bond to one year).

2
Exhibit 32.2

 

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

 

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

 

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Altair Nanotechnologies Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2016 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Karen Werner, Interim Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

 

(1)     The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.