2020 IL App (4th) 180796-U 

NO. 4-18-0796 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JOSHUA FARNER, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

 Livingston County 

No. 17CF189 

 Honorable 

 Jennifer H. Bauknecht, 

 Judge Presiding. 

PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Cavanagh and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to 

 withdraw guilty plea. 

¶ 2 In June 2017, the State charged defendant, Joshua Farner, with one count of 

aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2016)), alleging that in May 2016, 

defendant threw an unknown liquid substance on Timothy Bowden, an Illinois Department of 

Corrections (DOC) employee. At the time of the offense, defendant was located at Pontiac 

Correctional Center in the mental health ward. He had previously been diagnosed with numerous 

mental health problems.

¶ 3 Throughout the proceedings, defendant had occasional outbursts in court, and on at 

least one occasion, his appointed counsel, an assistant public defender, made representations to the 

trial court that he had difficulty communicating with defendant. In August 2018, counsel filed a 

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

December 10, 2020

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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motion requesting that the court appoint a psychiatrist to determine whether a bona fide doubt 

existed as to defendant’s fitness to stand trial and to render an opinion as to his sanity at the time 

of the offense. The court never addressed the motion, and counsel never took further action in 

relation to it. 

¶ 4 In August 2018, defendant pleaded guilty but mentally ill in exchange for a 

sentence of six years in prison, to run consecutively to the sentence he was already serving. 

¶ 5 In September 2018, defendant pro se filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In 

October 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing at which the court asked defendant whether he 

wanted the previous assistant public defender to assist him with his motion or whether he would 

prefer to proceed pro se. Defendant ultimately agreed to have the public defender represent him. 

¶ 6 In December 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion at 

which the court noted it had received from counsel a certificate of compliance with Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). The court denied the motion to withdraw. 

¶ 7 Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying 

his motion to withdraw guilty plea, (2) the trial court erred by denying defendant’s request for new 

counsel to represent him on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and (3) counsel failed to comply 

with Rule 604(d). We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 8 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 9 A. Pretrial Proceedings 

¶ 10 In June 2017, the State charged defendant with one count of aggravated battery in 

violation of section 12-3.05(d)(4)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 2012. 720 ILCS 

5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2016). The charge alleged that in May 2016, defendant threw an unknown 

liquid substance on Timothy Bowden, a DOC employee. At the time of the offense, defendant was 
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located at Pontiac Correctional Center in the mental health ward.

¶ 11 In August 2017, the trial court appointed the public defender to represent defendant. 

In September 2017, counsel filed a motion seeking defendant’s psychiatric records. In October 

2017, counsel informed the court that he had received defendant’s records. In December 2017, 

counsel requested that the case be set for trial.

¶ 12 In February 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing at which the court asked 

counsel if defendant was ready for trial. Defendant interjected, “Why are you asking him? Why 

are you asking him if he is ready for trial. I am the one you should be asking. What’s wrong with 

you, Lady?” The court replied, “All right. I am not—really not in the mood. It has been a very long 

day.” Defendant responded, “I don’t give a fuck what kind of mood you are in.” The court had 

defendant removed, and as defendant left, he called the court a “stupid bitch.” Counsel informed 

the court that he had been having difficulty communicating with defendant that day and “much of 

it has been what the Court just experienced.” In April 2018, defendant told the court, “Ma’am, I 

wanted to apologize to you for my last court date on the video screen. I wasn’t taking my 

medication.”

¶ 13 In a June 2018 pretrial hearing, counsel told defendant that defendant would receive 

a letter soon discussing some of the issues in the case. Counsel also noted that he scheduled a 

phone conference with defendant the following week. Counsel stated that he had spoken with 

defendant’s expert witnesses.

¶ 14 Later that month, counsel informed the trial court that he was not ready for trial 

because defendant had “raised an issue with me in respect to mental health which we are 

addressing[.]” In August 2018, counsel filed a motion requesting that the court appoint Dr. Terry 

Killian, a psychiatrist, to determine whether a bona fide doubt existed as to defendant’s fitness to 
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stand trial and to render an opinion regarding defendant’s sanity at the time of the alleged offense. 

Neither counsel nor the court took any further action on that motion.

¶ 15 B. Defendant’s Guilty Plea 

¶ 16 Later in August 2018, counsel informed the trial court that the parties were working 

out a plea deal. Counsel explained, “The proposal is a plea of guilty but mentally ill so that we can 

get him into a hospital *** rather than a correctional center.” Counsel said that he had reviewed 

defendant’s mental health records “from when the case was first filed,” ending in mid-to-late 2017. 

Counsel explained that defendant deteriorated at Pontiac Correctional Center. Counsel spoke with 

the people who treated defendant while at Pontiac and had requested, but not yet received, 

defendant’s most recent medical records. Counsel further stated, “We do not have a separate report 

from Dr. Killian.” 

¶ 17 Counsel continued that the records he had indicated that defendant had been 

hospitalized and civilly committed since he was 13 years old. Defendant had been involuntarily 

medicated, and those medications were currently in flux because the most effective medication 

caused blood platelet problems. Counsel said that defendant may have been diagnosed with 

schizophrenia when he was younger but counsel could not confirm that in the reports he had. 

¶ 18 Counsel noted that defendant was diagnosed while in prison with bipolar disorder, 

post-traumatic stress disorder, impulse control disorder, antisocial personality disorder, and 

borderline personality disorders. Defendant had attempted to commit suicide at least twice while 

in prison and attempted suicide three or four times before he was in prison. However, counsel said, 

“Some of that though I don’t know how accurate the number is simply because most of that seems 

to be self-reporting by [defendant].” Counsel explained that based upon his experience with 

defendant, “[T]he breadth with which he describes his issues from time to time will expand or 
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contract.” 

¶ 19 The State provided to the court a report created by Dr. Kelly Renzi, a clinical 

psychologist and director of mental health services at Pontiac Correctional Center. The State 

summarized the report, stating, “[Renzi] did indicate, while not as specific as [defense counsel], 

indicated that mental illness did contribute to behaviors; and then there’s stuff regarding the 

enforced medication.” The State continued, “So I think that’s sufficient. The State wouldn’t contest 

the finding of guilty but mentally ill and would agree that it’s appropriate.” 

¶ 20 The trial court then took a recess so that defendant and defense counsel could speak 

about the plea agreement. When they went back on the record, defendant asked for another moment 

to ask counsel a question, which the court allowed. The court then told defendant, “So, as I 

understand the agreement, you are prepared today to plead guilty but mentally ill to the Class 2 

felony offense of aggravated battery. In exchange for that plea, the State has agreed to a term of 

six years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.” The court stated defendant would serve two 

years of mandatory supervised release. The court further explained, “The sentence will run 

consecutive to the sentences you are currently serving.” The court also listed the fines and fees 

defendant would need to pay. 

¶ 21 The trial court asked if defendant had any questions about the sentence or 

agreement, and defendant responded, “No,” and “No, ma’am,” to each. The court asked if that was 

defendant’s understanding of the agreement. Defendant replied, “Yes, ma’am.” The court 

explained the rights defendant was giving up by pleading guilty, and defendant said he had no 

questions about those rights. The court listed some collateral consequences of a conviction, 

including that “there may be registration requirements that restrict where you can live, work, or be 

present,” to which defendant asked, “What do you mean register or something?” The court then 
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gave defendant an opportunity to speak with his counsel about that question. The court asked if 

defendant had any other questions, and he replied, “No, ma’am.” 

¶ 22 The trial court asked whether anyone forced defendant to plead guilty, defendant 

replied, “No, ma’am.” The court asked whether anyone promised him anything other than the 

agreement, defendant replied, “No, ma’am.” The court asked whether he had enough time to talk 

with his attorney, defendant replied, “Yes, ma’am.” The court asked whether he still wanted to 

plead guilty, defendant replied, “Yes, ma’am. Could I ask him another question, please?” The court 

allowed defendant time to ask counsel his question. Defendant then pled guilty. 

¶ 23 Immediately following the guilty plea, counsel told the trial court that defendant 

had asked him whether he could be transferred to Joliet Correctional Center, “pending his 

placement in a hospital,” to which the court replied, “Okay. And thank you. And that, of course, 

is up to the Department of Corrections.” The court then sentenced defendant pursuant to the 

agreement described above.

¶ 24 C. Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

¶ 25 In September 2018, defendant pro se filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In 

the motion, defendant claimed (1) his plea counsel was ineffective, (2) defendant was unfit at the 

time of his guilty plea, and (3) defendant did not understand the terms of the plea agreement when 

he pled guilty. Defendant contended that his counsel “never consulted with the expert witnesses 

employed by IDOC that were willing to testify on behalf of defendant, Dr. K Renzi, Dr. D. Marano, 

Dr. Sangster, and Dr. Washington.” Defendant further claimed his counsel never visited him to 

discuss the charges or review the evidence. Defendant stated that he had been diagnosed as 

“Seriously Mentally Ill” and required residential treatment. At the time of the crime, he was in a 

manic state, and shortly thereafter, he attempted suicide. Defendant believed the combination of 
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his mental health problems and medications had made him unfit to assist in his defense or to enter 

a guilty plea. Finally, defendant asserted that he did not understand the terms of his plea because 

he believed he would be placed in a hospital and that no further time would be added to his prison 

sentence.

¶ 26 In October 2018, the trial court conducted a hearing at which the court asked 

defendant whether he wanted the public defender to assist him with his motion or whether he 

would prefer to proceed pro se. Defendant ultimately agreed to have the counsel that represented 

him during his plea also assist him with the motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After speaking 

with defendant, counsel said, “[Defendant] expressed the portions of the process and the day that 

he did not understand and what the ramification of that is.” The court then continued the hearing 

to give counsel more time to confer with defendant. 

¶ 27 In December 2018, the trial court conducted the continued hearing on defendant’s 

motion. During the hearing, counsel provided to the court a certificate which stated that he 

performed the duties enumerated in Rule 604(d). 

¶ 28 Counsel informed the trial court that he had spoken with defendant in November 

and also that morning. Defendant testified in support of his motion, stating that he did not 

understand when he pled guilty that he would have to spend more time in prison. He also testified 

that when he pled guilty, he thought he would be re-evaluated by the Department of Corrections 

regarding proper placement and treatment but was not re-evaluated. 

¶ 29 The trial court noted that defendant’s “motion alleges ineffective assistance of 

counsel in regards to consultations with Dr. Renzi. Is that something that [defendant] wishes to 

still go forward with, or I can kind of do a Krankel hearing in connection with that if that is an 

issue.” Defendant replied, “[Counsel] said he had my mental health files himself.” Defendant 
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continued, “And that he reviewed them himself and he said he didn’t need to speak with him 

because he was able to review those, so—” The court asked, “So are you withdrawing your claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel and just proceeding on the other issues?” Defendant replied, 

“Yes, ma’am. Now that that was clarified. Yes, ma’am.” 

¶ 30 Counsel said to the court that although he explained defendant’s sentence to 

defendant, as he does with all his clients, defendant had consistently indicated that he did not know 

there would be time added to his sentence. Counsel also noted that he had told defendant that DOC

was required to conduct a new evaluation upon his return to their custody, and that this evaluation

could result in defendant’s being transferred to a different correctional center or a state hospital. 

Defendant said, “IDOC has done nothing, ma’am.” The court replied, “Well, I am sorry. I don’t

mean with regards to what IDOC has done. I mean with regards to what [counsel] may have 

advised you or what understood [sic] at the time of the plea was entered.”

¶ 31 Following the State’s argument, the trial court said that it remembered asking 

defendant if he understood the agreement. The court said that it believed it had “very clearly 

spelled out for him” the length of the sentence and that it would lengthen the time he would have 

to spend in prison. The court believed it had “very clearly admonished” defendant and noted the 

evidence suggesting otherwise was only “defendant’s own testimony, which I think is fairly 

self-serving at this point[.]” The court denied the motion.

¶ 32 This appeal followed.

¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 34 Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying 

his motion to withdraw guilty plea, (2) the trial court erred by denying defendant’s request for new 

counsel to represent him on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and (3) counsel failed to comply 
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with Rule 604(d). We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 35 A. The Trial Court Properly Denied Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw His Plea

¶ 36 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea because (1) he was unfit at the time of plea and (2) he did not understand the terms 

of the plea agreement. We disagree.

¶ 37 1. The Law

¶ 38 “To enter a voluntary plea of guilty, a defendant must understand the nature of the 

proceedings against him and be competent to assist in his own defense. [Citation.] The standard is 

the same whether a defendant is standing trial or pleading guilty.” People v. Shanklin, 351 Ill. App. 

3d 303, 306, 814 N.E.2d 139, 142-43 (2004). “A defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial or 

to plead, and be sentenced. A defendant is unfit if, because of his mental or physical condition, he 

is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his 

defense.” 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2018). “When a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness is 

raised, the court shall order a determination of the issue before proceeding further.” Id. § 104-11. 

¶ 39 “[A]lthough any party may raise the issue of a defendant’s fitness to stand trial at 

an appropriate time, whenever a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness arises, the trial court 

must sua sponte order a determination of the defendant’s fitness before proceeding further.” 

People v. Nichols, 2012 IL App (4th) 110519, ¶ 31, 979 N.E.2d 1002. “Whether a bona fide doubt 

of the defendant’s fitness exists is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.” Id. If no fitness 

hearing was held, a reviewing court will reverse a conviction “only where the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to act on a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness.” Id. 

¶ 40 “Fitness concerns the defendant’s functioning only in the context of trial and 

sentencing, such that [a] person can be fit for trial although his mind may be otherwise unsound.” 
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(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 32. “ ‘A bona fide doubt exists when the facts raise a real, 

substantial, and legitimate doubt regarding a defendant’s mental capacity to meaningfully 

participate in his defense.’ ” People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 45, 145 N.E.3d 544 

(quoting People v. Westfall, 2018 IL App (4th) 150997, ¶ 54, 115 N.E.3d 1148). “ ‘Relevant 

factors that the trial court may consider in assessing whether a bona fide doubt exists include 

(1) the defendant’s behavior and demeanor, (2) prior medical opinions regarding the defendant’s 

competence, and (3) defense counsel’s representations about the defendant’s competence.’ ” Id. 

(quoting Westfall, 2018 IL App (4th) 150997, ¶ 54). “A defendant’s use of psychotropic 

medications may indicate unfitness but cannot alone override the presumption of fitness.” Nichols, 

2012 IL App (4th) 110519, ¶ 32.

¶ 41 “Generally, a trial court's decision to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” People v. Williams, 2016 IL 118375, ¶ 14, 47 N.E.3d 976. 

¶ 42 2. This Case

¶ 43 The motion to withdraw guilty plea stated that the motion should have been granted 

because (1) defendant was unfit at the time of his plea and (2) defendant was led to believe he 

would receive treatment for his mental illness and no further prison time as a result of his guilty 

plea.

¶ 44 The trial court never made a finding of a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness 

in the proceedings leading up to defendant’s guilty plea. In his motion for a psychiatric evaluation, 

defense counsel did not claim that he believed defendant was unfit. In fact, the motion was to 

appoint a doctor to determine if a bona fide doubt existed, further highlighting the fact that no one, 

including counsel, had yet come to that conclusion. Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court stated 

that neither the filing of a motion seeking the appointment of a psychiatrist, nor the trial court’s 
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granting of such a motion, amounts to a bona fide doubt concerning defendant’s fitness. People v. 

Brown, 2020 IL 125203, ¶ 43. Additionally, following counsel’s filing of that motion, no further 

action was taken, which amounts to abandonment of that motion. See People v. Haywood, 2016 

IL App (1st) 133201, ¶ 25, 50 N.E.3d 1237. Here, counsel merely filed a motion on the issue and 

then abandoned that motion, making the question as to whether a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s 

fitness existed in this case less of a close call than in Brown. 

¶ 45 Although defendant, on appeal, explains that defendant had outbursts in court, we 

note that these outbursts were emotional outbursts of rage or frustration and not the sort of 

outbursts that would obviously lead an observer to believe defendant did not understand the 

proceedings. Importantly, following one of those outbursts, defendant apologized to the court at 

the next hearing and explained, “I wasn’t taking my medication.” A reasonable inference from this 

statement is that since the outburst, he began taking his medication again and had thereafter 

regained control of his emotions.

¶ 46 Defendant also lists numerous possible ways that defendant could have been 

impacted by his mental illnesses or by his medication, as well as the red flags of defendant’s suicide 

attempts and other problems related to his mental health. However, the trial court had the 

opportunity to observe defendant in the courtroom and saw that after defendant’s initial outburst, 

he began to function more appropriately. Moreover, the court was presented with all of this 

information and had the opportunity to consider it at the guilty plea hearing. Defendant responded 

to the court’s questions appropriately and asked questions that helped demonstrate that he 

understood what the court was saying and what the proceedings entailed. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not sua sponte ordering a fitness hearing 
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prior to accepting defendant’s plea.

¶ 47 Similarly, defendant’s argument that his plea was not knowing or voluntary, and 

therefore his motion to withdraw guilty plea should have been granted, is meritless. For the reasons 

already mentioned, we conclude that there was no reason for the trial court to suspect that 

defendant was unable to understand the proceedings. Further, the court’s admonitions to 

defendant—particularly in relation to the length of his sentence—were crystal clear. The court 

further asked appropriate follow up questions of defendant to ensure defendant understood the 

proceedings, and defendant’s answers indicated he understood them. The court noted that his claim 

that he did not understand the agreement following his plea was self-serving, and the court was 

entitled to utilize its discretion to conclude that his motion to withdraw guilty plea should not be 

granted. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea. 

¶ 48 B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Not Appointing New Counsel for Defendant 

¶ 49 Defendant next argues that (1) counsel had a conflict of interest with defendant and 

(2) the trial court failed to assess whether a potential conflict of interest existed.

¶ 50 Defendant argues that a conflict of interest existed when counsel (1) “convinced 

[defendant] that the challenge to [counsel’s] effectiveness should be withdrawn,” (2) “framed the 

issues so as to avoid review of [counsel’s] failure to obtain a fitness evaluation or properly explain 

the plea terms,” and (3) “directly contradicted [defendant’s] claims (effectively testifying against 

[defendant]) at the motion hearing.” 

¶ 51 We conclude the record does not support the claim that counsel convinced 

defendant to withdraw his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Counsel did not ask defendant 

if he wanted to withdraw that claim; instead, the trial court inquired by saying, “The only issue or 
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question I have at this point [defense counsel,] is part of the motion alleges ineffective assistance 

of counsel in regards to consultations with Dr. Renzi. Is that something that [defendant] wishes to 

still go forward with, or I can kind of do a Krankel hearing in connection with that if that is an 

issue.” See People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984). Defendant replied, 

“[Counsel] said he had my mental health files himself.” Defendant continued, “And that he 

reviewed them himself and he said he didn’t need to speak with him because he was able to review 

those, so—.” The court interjected, “So are you withdrawing your claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel and just proceeding on the other issues?” Defendant replied, “Yes, ma’am. Now that 

that was clarified. Yes, ma’am.” Obviously, counsel took no part in this discussion between the 

trial court and defendant; accordingly, no conflict of interest could have existed in relation to this 

decision. 

¶ 52 Because no ineffective assistance of counsel claim remained, counsel was perfectly 

capable of assisting defendant with his remaining claims without a conflict of interest. Defendant’s 

claims on appeal regarding how counsel “framed the issues” and “contradicted [defendant’s] 

claims” are better understood as issues related to the effectiveness of counsel. Although defendant 

now casts aspersions as to the motivation behind counsel’s arguing defendant’s claims in the 

manner that he did, this court concludes that the content of counsel’s argument was a matter of 

strategy. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 

¶ 53 Further, the trial court did not err by not conducting a Krankel or similar inquiry 

regarding defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim or any potential conflict of interest. 

The court told defendant that it was prepared to conduct such an inquiry, but defendant chose of 

his own free will to withdraw the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court cannot and 
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should not force defendant to proceed with a claim he has chosen to abandon. 

¶ 54 C. Trial Counsel Did Not Fail to Comply With Rule 604(d) 

¶ 55 Defendant next argues counsel failed to comply with Rule 604(d) because the 

record refutes counsel’s certificate. We disagree.

¶ 56 1. The Law

¶ 57 We review counsel’s compliance with Rule 604(d) de novo. People v. Grice, 371 

Ill. App. 3d 813, 815, 867 N.E.2d 1143, 1145 (2007). Rule 604(d) sets forth the procedures to be 

followed when a defendant who entered a guilty plea subsequently moves to reconsider his 

sentence or to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. The rule provides, in relevant part: 

“The motion shall be in writing and shall state the grounds therefor. When 

the motion is based on facts that do not appear of record it shall be supported by 

affidavit ***. *** The trial court shall then determine whether the defendant is 

represented by counsel, and if the defendant is indigent and desires counsel, the 

trial court shall appoint counsel. 

*** The defendant’s attorney shall file with the trial court a certificate 

stating that the attorney has consulted with the defendant either by phone, mail, 

electronic means or in person to ascertain defendant’s contentions of error in the 

sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty, has examined the trial court file and 

both the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in 

the sentencing hearing, and has made any amendments to the motion necessary for 

adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings. 

*** Upon appeal any issue not raised by the defendant in the motion to 

reconsider the sentence or withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment shall 
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be deemed waived.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). 

¶ 58 “It is well established that the attorney’s certificate must strictly comply with the 

requirements of Rule 604(d).” People v. Calleros, 2018 IL App (2d) 151256, ¶ 3, 127 N.E.3d 75. 

If the certificate does not comply with Rule 604(d), the reviewing court must “remand to the circuit 

court for the filing of a new motion to withdraw guilty plea *** and a new hearing on the motion.” 

People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27, 33, 630 N.E.2d 790, 792 (1994). However, “even when the 

certificate is valid on its face, a remand will be necessary if the record refutes the certificate.” 

People v. Winston, 2020 IL App (2d) 180289, ¶ 14, 155 N.E.3d 1125. 

¶ 59 2. This Case

¶ 60 As an initial matter, we note that because counsel did file a certificate in compliance 

with Rule 604(d), the question is whether the record refutes what is contained in that certificate. 

Id. Defendant argues that counsel’s certification that he had made “any amendments to the motion 

necessary for the adequate presentation of any defects in those proceedings” is undermined by the 

record because counsel failed to (1) attach affidavits to support defendant’s claims, (2) contact 

defendant’s proposed expert witnesses, or (3) request an evaluation of defendant’s fitness to stand 

trial.

¶ 61 Counsel was not obligated to contact defendant’s expert witnesses or to obtain 

affidavits from them because defendant withdrew his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel 

regarding counsel’s alleged failure to speak with the experts. Because the claim was withdrawn, 

further evidence to support that claim would be unnecessary. 

¶ 62 Counsel also was not obligated to request a fitness hearing for the same reason we 

previously described—no bona fide doubt existed as to defendant’s fitness at the time of his plea.

Instead, the question is whether the record refutes counsel’s certification that he “made any 
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amendments to the motion necessary for adequate presentation of any defects in those 

proceedings.” Despite the numerous suggestions defendant expresses on appeal regarding how 

counsel could have improved his representation of defendant on his motion, we conclude that 

nothing in the record refutes counsel’s Rule 604(d) certification. Rule 604(d) requires adequate 

presentation, and the motion along with defendant’s testimony at the hearing fulfilled that 

requirement.

¶ 63 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 64 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 65 Affirmed.