Opinion filed November 19, 2020

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-18-00326-CR

__________

A.D. CROSS, JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1-997-17

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

A.D. Cross, Jr. was charged by information with the offense of theft of more 

than $750 but less than $2,500, a Class A misdemeanor. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 31.03(e)(3) (West 2019). The jury found Appellant guilty. The trial court assessed 

Appellant’s punishment at confinement for ninety days and a fine of $500 and

sentenced him accordingly. We affirm.

In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient 

to prove that he possessed the necessary intent to commit theft. 
2

Sergeant Michael Baird, the street crimes supervisor with the Abilene Police 

Department at the time of the offense, testified for the State. Sergeant Baird testified 

that there had been complaints of theft at an H.E.B. in Abilene. In response, Abilene

Police Department personnel conducted a “theft reduction initiative” or “bait 

operation” at that store on October 5, 2017.

Sergeant Baird and Agent Courtney Bailey, also with the Abilene Police 

Department, placed a purse owned by the Abilene Police Department in a shopping 

cart and placed the cart in the parking lot. They waited in an unmarked vehicle to 

see whether anyone would take the purse. The purse was a Michael Kors purse 

valued at approximately $200. The purse contained a wallet valued at approximately

$10, a watch valued at approximately $239, a cell phone with GPS tracking 

capabilities valued at approximately $800, some papers, and a one-dollar bill inside

the wallet. There was nothing in the purse that identified the owner. 

About two minutes after they placed the purse in the shopping cart, 

Sergeant Baird and Agent Bailey saw Appellant drive up to the shopping cart, get 

out of his vehicle, take the purse, return to his vehicle, and drive out of the parking 

lot. Sergeant Baird and Agent Bailey discreetly followed Appellant as he drove out 

of the parking lot, made several turns, and parked alongside a curb. Sergeant Baird 

testified that it appeared to him that Appellant “was just sitting there going through 

the purse.” After some time had passed, Appellant drove back to H.E.B. 

After Appellant had returned to H.E.B., he parked and went in the store; he 

did not take the purse into the store. When he came out of the store, Appellant got 

back in his vehicle and left. Sergeant Baird testified that Appellant drove forty miles 

per hour in a thirty-mile-per-hour zone. Officer Brad Hambright, another officer 

with the Abilene Police Department, testified that he was on patrol on the date of the 

offense and received a call to stop Appellant because Appellant was speeding.
3

When Officer Hambright stopped Appellant, Officer Hambright saw a purse 

in the passenger-side floorboard. Sergeant Baird and Agent Bailey went to the scene 

of the traffic stop. Sergeant Baird testified that Appellant did not mention the purse

but that, when asked about the purse, Appellant told them that he planned to return 

it. Appellant was arrested for theft, and his vehicle was searched. Although the 

officers found the purse in the passenger-side floorboard, the watch and the onedollar bill that were originally in the purse were found in the driver’s side door 

pocket. Sergeant Baird testified that he did not believe that Appellant’s behavior 

was consistent with someone who intended to return the purse to its owner.

At trial, Appellant testified that he had gone to H.E.B. that day to run some 

errands and that he had heard a beeping sound coming from within the purse. He 

grabbed the purse and put it in his car, but he “was not even thinking about it” 

because he had other things to do. Appellant explained that he left H.E.B. the first 

time because he had received a text message that he was to pick up someone. Later, 

he received another message that the person did not need to be picked up, and he 

went back to H.E.B. to finish his errands. Appellant further testified that he did not 

intend to steal the purse. He did not mention the purse to the officers initially

because he was not asked about the purse. 

Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended 

to deprive the Abilene Police Department of its property. We review a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. 

ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
4

When conducting a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted 

at trial, including pieces of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. 

Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 

S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In addition, we look at “events occurring 

before, during and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of 

the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited 

act.” Wirth v. State, 361 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting 

Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). We defer to the 

factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their 

testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for 

the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and 

to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. 

at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the record supports conflicting 

inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the 

verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 

S.W.3d at 778. 

A person commits theft if the person appropriates property “without the 

owner’s effective consent” and “with intent to deprive the owner of property.” 

PENAL § 31.03(a), (b)(1). A person acts with intent “when it is his conscious 

objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.” PENAL § 6.03(a)

(West 2011). The intent to deprive must exist at the time the property is taken. 

Hutspeth v. State, 187 S.W. 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 1916). In addition, no particular 

type of evidence is required to prove intent as “[d]irect and circumstantial evidence 

are equally probative.” Johnson v. State, 560 S.W.3d 224, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2018). Indeed, the jury “may infer intent from any facts which tend to prove its 

existence, including the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.” Edwards v. State, 
5

497 S.W.3d 147, 157 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (quoting 

Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).

Sergeant Baird testified that he observed Appellant exit his vehicle, take the 

purse from the shopping cart, get back into his vehicle, and drive away. Although

taking possession of the purse, when taken alone, might be considered consistent 

with innocent conduct, we do not find it unreasonable that a jury, under the 

circumstances of this case, would also consider Appellant’s actions as evidence of 

an intent to deprive. This, coupled with the other evidence of Appellant’s conduct 

after he took the purse, such as removing the watch and the money from the purse, 

when considered in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, constitutes 

sufficient evidence of an intent to deprive at the time of the taking. Thus, we

overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal. 

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 

JIM R. WRIGHT 

SENIOR CHIEF JUSTICE

November 19, 2020

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., 

Stretcher, J., and Wright, S.C.J.1

Willson, J., not participating. 

1

Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland, 

sitting by assignment.