DLD-231 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-3855

___________

MATTHEW N. JONES,

Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civ. No. 1-15-cv-00731)

District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

April 28, 2016

Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and GARTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 18, 2016)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Matthew N. Jones appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We will affirm.

In 2015, Jones submitted eight complaints along with motions for leave to proceed 

in forma pauperis (“IFP”) to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. 

The District Court denied all eight motions. Jones then filed the complaint at issue here 

against the District Court itself seeking $1,000,000 dollars in compensation for the IFP 

denials. (Jones paid the filing and docketing fees for this action.) Jones cited 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 on the civil cover sheet and alleged that his annual income of approximately 

$13,000 would have qualified him for IFP status under the policies employed by the 

Delaware Chancery Court, but he did not assert any particular cause of action.

The District Court sua sponte dismissed Jones’s complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction after concluding that it is entitled to sovereign immunity and that any 

amendment of the complaint would be futile. Jones appeals. Our review is plenary. See

Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 1996).

We agree that the District Court, as part of the judicial branch of the United States 

Government, was entitled to sovereign immunity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475

(1994). The District Court did not give Jones notice and an opportunity to respond on 

that issue before dismissing his complaint, but any error in that regard was harmless. 

Jones has had an opportunity to address the issue of sovereign immunity on appeal and, 

having exercised our plenary review, we agree that sovereign immunity bars his 

complaint.
3

We further conclude that Jones’s complaint failed to invoke the District Court’s 

subject matter jurisdiction for the additional reason that the complaint is “wholly 

insubstantial and frivolous.” Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 455 (2015) (quotation 

marks omitted). Whether to grant leave to proceed IFP is within the District Court’s 

discretion. See Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985). If a prospective 

plaintiff is dissatisfied with the District Court’s denial of leave to file a complaint IFP, his 

or her remedy is to appeal from that final order. See Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 16 

(3d Cir. 1976). There is no arguable basis for an independent action against the District 

Court based simply on the District Court’s denial of leave to proceed IFP.1

Finally, we note that the same District Judge who denied Jones’s previous IFP 

motions presided over the civil action at issue here. Jones did not name the District 

Judge as a defendant, and he does not argue on appeal that the District Judge should have 

recused himself. Even if we were to raise that issue sua sponte, we would conclude that 

any error in that regard was harmless in light of the District Court’s clear entitlement to 

sovereign immunity, the patent frivolity of Jones’s complaint, and our plenary standard of 

review. See Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 171 (3d Cir. 

2004). 

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

 

1

Jones belatedly pursued the proper remedy by appealing from three of the District 

Court’s orders denying IFP status, but we dismissed those appeals as untimely. (C.A. 

Nos. 16-1064, 16-1065 & 16-1066.)