A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 1 of 21 NO. 03
- 16 -00353- CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTICT OF TEXAS

at AUSTIN

S TEVE V EIGEL , Appellant/Defendant

v . T EXAS B OLL W EEVIL E RADICATION F OUNDATION , I NC . Appellee/Plaintiff

Appealed from the County Court at Law No. 1

of Travis County, Texas

APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

A PPELLANT S TEVE V EIGEL , PRO SE 105 Quince Street Hereford, Texas 79045 (806) 231-1008 SVeig@aol.com ACCEPTED 03-16-00353-CV 13916912 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/21/2016 9:56:14 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERKA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 2 of 21 T ABLE OF C ONTENTS Page C OVER P AGE
................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 1 R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S S TATEMENT OF F ACTS
................................ ................. 5 R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S S UMMARY OF THE A RGUMENT
................................ .... 7 R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S A GRUMENT I SSUE 1

................................ ..................... 9 R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S A RGUMENT I SSUE 2

................................ ................... 14 R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S A RGUMENT I SSUE 3

................................ ................... 17 R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S C ONCLUSION
................................ ............................. 18 C ONCLUSION AND P RAYER FOR R ELIEF
................................ ......................... 20 C ERTIFICATE OF C OMPLIANCE
................................ ................................ ....... 21 C ERTIFICATE OF S ERVICE
................................ ................................ ............... 21A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 3 of 21 I NDEX OF A UTHORITIES
Statutes T EX
. A DMIN
. C ODE TIT
. 4, § 3.502

................................ ................................ . 13 T EX
. A DMIN
. C ODE TIT
. 4, § 3.70

................................ ................................ ... 13 T EX
. A DMIN
. C ODE TIT . 4, § 3.75

................................ .............................. 6, 14 T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE § 74.101

................................ ................................ ............ 5 T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE § 74.109

................................ ................................ .......... 11 T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE § 74.115

................................ ................................ ...... 6, 14 T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE § 74.127

................................ ................................ ............ 8 T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE § 74.129

................................ ................................ .......... 11 T EX
. C IV
. P RAC
. & R EM
. C ODE § 16.061

................................ ..................... 4, 7 T EX
. T AX
. C ODE § 171.2515

................................ ................................ ............ 6 T EX
. T AX
. C ODE § 171.252

................................ ................................ ........ 6, 15 T EX
. T AX
. C ODE § 171.255

................................ ................................ .............. 6 Other Authorities 50 Tex. Jur. 3d Limitation of Actions § 20

................................ .................. 11 Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation Self Evaluation Report to the Texas Sunset Commission

................................ ................................ ... 8 Constitutional Provisi ons T EX
. C ONST
. A RT
. III, § 52

................................ ................................ ............. 4 T EX
. C ONST
. A RT
. XVI, § 59

................................ ................................ .......... 4 T EX
. C ONST
. A RT
. XVI, § 68

................................ ................................ .... 4, 12A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 4 of 21

T O THE H ONORABLE J USTICES OF THE T HIRD C OURT OF A PPEALS : COME NOW, the A PPELLANT named herein in the above styled and numbered appeal, and present the Court t he following A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF to A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF filed on October 31, 2016.

S UMMARY OF THE A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF 1. In contradiction to the clear intent of the Texas Legislature and the Texas Constitution, A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF essentially request this C ourt to ignore the expressed requirements of Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code § 16.061 and declare A PPELLEE to be a qualifying “political subdivision” exempt from any statute of limit ations by judicial fiat.
2. A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF does not deny that A PPELLEE ’ S formation was only authorized and continued pursuant to Article XVI, Section 68 of the Texas Constitut ion instead of pursuant to Section 52, Article III , or Section 59 , Article XVI , Texas Constitution required of qualifying “political subdivisions” under Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code § 16.061

. 3. A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF does not cite any legal authority that the Texas Legislature or the T exas Constitution expressly holds or provides that
A PPELLEE is a “political subdivision” as there is none

. Instead, both the governing Texas Agriculture Code [“ T EX
. A GRI
. C ODE ”] C hapter 74 and Texas Administrative Code Title 4 [“4 TAC”] , Chapter 3 have clearA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 5 of 21

provisions that the Legislature provided that the A PPELLEE is a single
sta tewide quasi

- government entity and a government unit in certain respects , but is not and does not function as separate local political subdivision s in each eradication zone exempt from statutes of limitations. Unlike political subdivisions, the A PPELLEE i s expressly “ acting under the supervision and control of the commissioner ” of agriculture and the Texas Department of Agriculture and is not governed by a separate locally elected and/or appointed board for each eradication zone.
4. Quite simply, A PPELLEE ’ S c laims to collect debts are barred by the four year limitations statute as the A PPELLEE is not exempt for such statutes of limitations.

R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S S TATEMENT OF F ACTS 5. A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF ’ S Statement of Facts [Appellee’s Brief p. 1

- 2] does
not assert t hat A PPELLEE is a political subdivision or deny that it is instead a quasi statewide government entity/unit acting under the supervision and control of the Texas Department of Agriculture and the Texas Commission of Agriculture pursuant to T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE § 74.101(a)(1 ) . [ A PPELLANT ’ S B RIEF p. 18

- 22.]A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 6 of 21

6. A PPELLEE states that “ Veigel Farms, Inc. (“Veigel Farms”) is a Texas corporation that farmed cotton for commercial production from 19 99 to 2002... and, therefore, was subject to assessments... The Foundation levied assessments against Veigel Farms ... as a result of its cotton farming operation... ”. [ A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF p. 1]. However, it is undisputed that
A PPELLEE only seeks to collect assess ments including penalties and interest for the 1999 and 2001 cotton crops which were undisputedly grown during the time from August 27, 1996 until September 26, 2002 wherein Veigel Farms, Inc. had lost its corporate privileges to legally transact any busin ess in Texas pursuant to Tex. Tax Code § 171.25 1 5

. As such, pursuant to Tex. Tax Code § 171.255 (b) Veigel Farms, Inc. is to be treat ed as a general partnership consisting of Bob and Steve Veigel individually instead of a corporation authorized to do business in Texas including growing cotton in 1999 and 2001. [ A PPELLANT ’ S B RIEF p. 8, 10, and 14]
7. A PPELLEE states “[b] y letters dated Ma rch 8, 2000 and May 20, 2003 the Foundation demanded payment from Veigel Farms ... and advised that the Foundation will [sic] take legal action... ”. [ A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF p. 1

. ]
However , such letters did not comply with T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE § 74.115 and
T EX
. A DMIN
. C ODE TIT . 4, § 3.7 5 which requires of right to an administrative hearing concerning assessment of a penalty

.A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 7 of 21

8. A PPELLEE states “

Appellant made his strategic legal decision to direct Veigel Farms no t to defend these lawsuits. ” [ A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF p. 2

. ] However, pursuant to Tex. Tax Code § 171.252 , Veigel Farms Inc . was legally prohibited from defending itself from such lawsuits. [ A PPELLANT ’ S B RIEF p. 10 and 14.]

R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S S UMMARY OF THE A RGUMENT
9. A PPELLEE does not cite any facts or legal authority that A PPELLEE is a political subdivision much less a qual ifying political subdivision exempt from some statutes of limitations under Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code §
16.061

. A PPELLEE (and its board) are state agencies only for purposes o f indemnification and exemption from taxation and A PPELLEE is a government unit for purposes of immunity. [Appellant’s Brief p. 21

- 22.] A PPELLEE clearly is not and does not function as a political subdivision in any respect and does not qualify to be exe mpt from any statue of limitations otherwise applicable in this Case

. 10. Given that it is undisputed that A PPELLEE seeks to recover the 1999 assessment which was due almost 11 years prior to filing this suit and the 2001 assessment which was due almost 6 year s prior to filing this suit,
A PPELLEE ’ S claims are barred by limitations [ A PPELLANT ’ S B RIEF p. 15

- 16,
18

– 2 4 .]A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 8 of 21

11. Unlike political subdivisions with limited geographical jurisdiction,
A PPELLEE is a non

- profit corporation which serves as the single quasi state wide government entity/unit that has statewide jurisdiction in Texas (and portions of New Mexico ) which unlike most political subdivisions is subject to the Texas Sunset Act and has a statutory limited existence

. See T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE § 74.1 27

. In A PPELLEE ’ S August 2007 Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation S el f E valuation R eport to the Texas Sunset Commission , A PPELLEE makes repeated references to its statewide agency jurisdiction including A PPELLEE ’ S answer to question A in Section VII Guide to Agency Programs on report page 21 stating that its location/division was “statewide”

. 12. Unlike political subd ivisions A PPELLEE is constitutionally prohibited from assessing any taxes. [ A PPELLANT ’ S B RIEF p. 23

- 24.] Unlike political subdivisions with local control, A PPELLEE is under the expressed control and supervision of the Texas Department of Agriculture and the Texas Agriculture Commissioner who appoints at least 5 of the 21 members of
A PPELLEE ’ S board o f directors with only 1 member being elected locally from each eradication zone. [ A PPELLANT ’ S B RIEF p. 23.]A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 9 of 21 R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S A GRUMENT I SSUE 1
13. A PPELLEE sta tes “[o] mission from section 16.061 does not mean the Foundation does not qualify as a political subdivision. ” [ A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF p. 7.] A PPELLEE argues that “[u] nder Texas law, “including” or “includes” are words of enlargement and not limitation or excl usive enumeration... . ”
However , in holding that a plain and literal reading of section 16.061 demonstrates that it does not apply to a municipal utility district as a state agency, the Texas Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939

- 940 (Tex.1993) stated: The goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature . ... “Where language in a statute is unambiguous, this court must seek the in tent of the legislature as found in the plain and common meaning of the words and terms used .” ... When the legislature has failed to define a word or term, courts will apply its ordinary meaning

. ... When applying the ordinary meaning, courts “may not by impl ication enlarge the meaning of any word in the statute beyond its ordinary meaning, and implications from any statutory passage or word are forbidden when the legislative intent may be gathered from a reasonable interpretation of the statute as it is writt en. ” ... The language of section 16.061 is clear and unambiguous . The statute applies to “[a] right of action of this state, a county, an incorporated city or town, or a school district....” ... The legislature has not defined “state” as it is used in section 16.061 . Consequently, we apply its ordinary meaning.... The ordinary meaning of “state,” as it used by the Texas courts, envisions an entity [ *940] having statewide jurisdiction rather than an entity having local or limitedA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 10 of 21

jurisdiction. In Guaranty Petroleum Corp. v. Armstrong, 609 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.1980) , we held that a navigation district created pursuant to article XVI, section 59 of the Texas Constitution was a political subdivision of the state, and “not a ‘department, board or agency of the state’....” Id. at 530. In reaching that conclusion, we recognized that [a] political subdivision differs from a department board or agency of the State. A political subdivision has jurisdiction over a portion of the State; a department, board or ag ency of the State exercises its jurisdiction throughout the State. Members of the governing body of a political subdivision are elected in local elections or are appointed by locally elected officials; those who govern departments, boards or agencies of th e State are elected in statewide elections or are appointed by State officials

. Political subdivisions have the power to assess and collect taxes; departments, boards and agencies do not have that power
. Our examination of a number of statutes shows that t he legislature has consistently recognized these distinctions between departments, boards or agencies on the one hand and political subdivisions on the other

. Id. at 531 (footnote omitted) This interpretation of “state” comports with the legislature’s ordinary us e of the word. State government is defined generally in terms of the executive, legislative, and/or judicial branches, excluding entities with limited jurisdiction

. To read “political subdivision” into “state” would by implication enlarge “state,” and section 16.061 , beyond their plain and ordinary meaning. Such implication is forbidden when, as here, the legislative intent may be determined from a reasonable interpretation of the statute as written. Applying the ordinary meaning of “state” to section 16.061 , we conclude that it was the intent of the legislature to include within “state” only those entities having statewide jurisdiction. Therefore, we hold that section 16.061 does [ *941] not apply to municipal utility districts such as C ornerstones. [emphasis added]A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 11 of 21

14. With knowledge of and s ubsequent to Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist. and Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex.1997) , section 16.061 was amended in 1 997 to expressly include “or a political subdivision of the state, including” “a municipal utility district” and “, or an entity created under Section 52, Article III, or Section 59 , Article XVI, Texas Constitution ” and the T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE C HAPTER 74 was amended. However, the legislature did not and has not made any effort to include A PPELLEE in section 16.061 as a political subdivision or otherwise expand A PPELLEE ’ S expressly limited status as a “state agency” or “government unit” under T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE § 74.109 or T EX
. A G RIC
. C ODE § 74.129

. 15. As stated in 50 Tex. Jur. 3d Limitation of Actions § 20 , the plain section 16.061 does not apply to all political subdivisions just because of the word “including”. In addition to rights of actions brought by the State, a right of action of a political subdivision of the State, including a county, an inc orporated city or town, a navigation district, a municipal utility district, a port authority, an entity acting under a statutorily specified chapter of the Transportation Code, a school district, or an entity created under statutorily specified constituti onal provisions, is generally not barred by the statutory provisions governing limitations of actions. By the foregoing statute, the Legislature has exempted counties and certain, statutorily specified political subdivisions and entities

—

unlike ordinary li tigants

— from the limitationsA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 12 of 21

defense in appropriate cases. [emphasis added] 16. T he intent of the legislature as found in the plain and common meaning of the words and terms used . A pplyin g the ordinary meaning,
courts may not by implication enlarge the meanin g of any word in the statute beyond its ordinary meaning, and implications from any statutory passage or word are forbidden when the legislative intent may be gathered from a reasonable interpretation of the statute as it is written. The language of section 16.061 is clear and unambiguous that it does not apply to the
A PPELLEE even if the A PPELLEE was nevertheless a political subdivision
created under Section 52, Article III, or Section 59 , Article XVI, Texas Constitution, which it is not. A PPELLEE was created under T EX
. C ONST
. A RT
. XVI, § 68 . [ A PPELLANT ’ S B RIEF p. 20.]
17. The A PPELLEE is expressly only a quasi government entity and governmental unit for specially defin ed purposes whose jurisdiction is statewide and not limited by a geographical region of each eradication zone. There is one statewide foundation and one board that governs the entire state under the expressed control and supervision of the Texas Departmen t of Agriculture and the Texas Agricultural Commission. There is not a foundation and locally elected or appointed governing board for eachA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 13 of 21

eradication zone required for each foundation to be considered or function as a political subdivision.
18. A PPELLEE tri es to equate itself to the El Paso County Juvenile Board held to be a political subdivision because the juvenile board’s ability to impose fees not taxes under the Texas Family Code claiming that the
A PPELLEE has the authority to similarly impose assessmen ts as fees. [ A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF p. 12.] However, unlike a juvenile board or other political subdivision , A PPELLEE has no statutory authority to “impose” taxes, assessments or penalties

. A PPELLEE can only make recommendations of
assessment rates to the Tex as Agriculture Commission through the Texas Department of Agriculture

. T EX
. A DMIN
. C ODE TIT
. 4, § 3.502 expressly provides :
( a) Each year, the foundation shall recommend assessment rate s , the date a notice of assessment will be sent, and assessment due dates for each active eradication zone to the department for consideration by the commissioner

. (b) The Commissioner will review these proposals and determine the assessment rates and due dates for each zone

. [emphasis added] 19. T EX
. A DMIN
. C ODE TIT
. 4, § 3.70 provides: The Code, § 74.113, provides the foundation with the authority to collect assessments for each eradication zone as part of the foundation’s duties. The Code, § 74.121, provides that each person within an active eradication zone growing cotton shall furnish to the foundation, upon request, informationA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 14 of 21

concerning the size and location of all commercial and noncom mercial cotton. The Code, § 74.118, provides the department with the authority to require participation in an established eradication program. The Code, § 74.115, provides the department with the authority to place a lien on cotton produced and harvested t hat year from acreage that is subject to an assessment that is due and unpaid. The Code, § 74.115, also provides the department with the authority to assess administrative penalties for failure to pay an assessment when due, and the Code, § 74.118, provide s the department with the authority to assess administrative penalties for failure to comply with department rules regarding participation in cost sharing and acreage reporting. The Code, § 74.116, provides the department with the authority to establish cr iteria for exemption from penalties assessed under the Code, § 74.115. [emphasis added]

R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S A RGUMENT I SSUE 2
20. A PPELLEE , without citing any legal authority, asserts that
A PPELLANT ’ s laches defense fails solely because of actions by A PPELLANT with knowledge of impending legal and not actions by the A PPELLEE
. [ A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF p. 16

- 17.] However, A PPELLEE does not deny that it does not have the records or other evidence to explain how or why it or the Texas Department of Agriculture did not enf orce its statutory lien or otherwise actually received timely payment of the assessments from Veigel Farms Inc.’s sale of cotton with checks jointly paid to the Texas Department of Agriculture. [ A PPELLANT ’ S B RIEF p. 11, and 17.] A PPELLEE does not deny tha t relevant evidence and documents in the possession and control of theA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 15 of 21

A PPELLEE , Texas Department of Agriculture, the Plains Cotton Cooperative Association, Ag Services of America, Inc., and Ag Acceptance Corporation have also been lost or destroyed during the approximate 15 year delay in
A PPELLEE prosecuting this Case. [ A PPELLANT ’ S B RIEF p. 11

- 12, 14, 16

- 17.]
21. A PPELLEE has apparently also lost any record or evidence to show that it complied with T EX
. A GRIC
. C ODE § 74.115 and T EX
. A DMIN
. C ODE TIT . 4, §
3.7 5 which requires of right to an administrative hearing concerning assessment of a penalty.
22. A PPELLEE states Appellant “ ... made his “strategic legal decision” to direct Veigel Farms not to defend the lawsuits...

. ” [ A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF p. 16.] However, pursuant to Tex. Tax Code § 171.252 , Veigel Farms Inc. was legally prohibited from defending itself from such lawsuits. Furthermore, there is no evidence showing or otherwise indicating that A PPELLANT had any knowledge of any impending legal action against him personally prior to the filing of this suit on August 3, 2010 or that A PPELLANT was aware that Veigel Farms Inc.’s corporate privileges had been forfeited until he filed documents to reinstate with the Secretary of State in September 2002

. 23. A PPELLEE has offer no reasonable justification for its almost 15 year delay i n prosecuting this Case or any evidence that A PPELLANT did notA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 16 of 21

change his position to his detriment and is not prejudiced by A PPELLEE ’ S unreasonable delay.
24. A PPELLEE contends that A PPELLANT submitted no authority supporting his contention of constructive no tice that Veigel Farms Inc. had lost its corporate privileges and that A PPELLEE did not have actual knowledge of such until May 19, 2010. However, t here is no evidence that A PPELLEE did not have actual knowledge of Veigel Farms Inc.’s corporate forfeiture long before 2010.
25. A PPELLANT cited that Veigel Farms Inc.’s corporate status was a matter of public record that A PPELLEE had access which serves as a legal basis for such contention. [ A PPELLANT ’ S B RIEF p. 10, 12, 16, and 26.] As
A PPELLEE surely knows, “co nstructive notice” or “constructive knowledge” are common legal terms for notice or knowledge implied or imputed by the law with regard to facts shown to the world properly recorded as matters of public record.
26. Although A PPELLANT has not found a case hol ding that A PPELLEE had a legal duty to check Veigel Farms Inc.’s corporate status prior to making the assessments at issue as there involving in rem actions where there is a legal duty to check public deed and probate records, it is not uncommon business a nd legal practice in the context of extending credit or contractingA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 17 of 21

with entities. For example, creditors commonly conduct lien and corporate searches of the Secretary of State’s public records before extending credit ensuring that the corporate debtor is in good standing and allowed to conduct business in Texas. Given that the A PPELLEE relies on cotton acres planted as reported to the Farm Service Agency, it is not an unreasonable
burden for the A PPELLEE to similarly search the Secretary of State’s onlin e records to confirm a cotton grower’s good standing as a proper party prior to be given notice of assessments by the A PPELLEE
. Had A PPELLEE taken such reasonable legal pr ecautions, it could not and should not have accessed Veigel Farms Inc. as a “cott on grower”.

R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S A RGUMENT I SSUE 3
27. A PPELLEE contends that A PPELLANT failed to present and brief relevant material facts or argument or authority of his waiver defense. [ A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF p. 23.] However, there is un

- contradicted evidence in
t he record that A PPELLEE or the Texas Department of Agriculture were instructed by A PPELLANT to receive jointly payable checks for the 1999 and 2001 cotton sales in a sufficient amount to timely satisfy the respective assessments due at the time and that su ch checks must have been endorsed by the A PPELLEE or the Texas Department of Agriculture as the checks wereA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 18 of 21

apparently cashed. Yet, apparently the A PPELLEE or the Texas Department of Agriculture did nothing to protect their statutory security interest in the proceeds or show the assessments timely satisfied . [CR 198

- 199, 204

- 206]
28. There is nothing in the record to contradict the likely reasonable possibility that the Texas Department of Agriculture or A PPELLEE actually received and endorsed the assessment payment from such joint checks but somehow failed to have the A PPELLEE give the appropriate credit to satisfy the assessments. Such documents and records of this transaction have apparently been lost or destroyed by the A PPELLEE , the Texas Department of Agriculture, Veigel Farms Inc., A PPELLANT , or other third parties over the 15 year delay of Appellee’s prosecution of this Case. Whether it is viewed waiver, negligence, release, failure to mitigate, or something else there is a least a dispute of materia l facts in the record concerning the endorsement of the jointly payable checks and the actual receipt /application of such funds sufficient to preclude summary judgment.

R EPLY TO A PPELLEE ’ S C ONCLUSION 29. A PPELLEE makes a partial quote apparently from 50 Te x. Jur. 3d Limitations of Actions § 20. [ A PPELLEE ’ S B RIEF p. 23] The next sentence therein indicates there are exceptions which are applicable in this CaseA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 19 of 21

stating “ Therefore, the State is not bound by any statute of limitations unless that statute expre ssly provides that it applies to the State ... ” . In this Case,
A PPELLEE admits that its is not a state agency exempt from some limitations but rather tries to argue that it should be exempt from some limitations statutes pursuant to section 16.061 me rely because it claims that it is a political subdivision and that all political subdivisions are exempt under section 16.061

. 30. There is simply no statute, regulation, or court case that supports
A PPELLEE ’ S contention that it is a political subdivisi on in form or function in any context including exemption from some limitation statutes pursuant to section 16.061

. A PPELLEE ’ S jurisdiction is clearly statewide and not limited to a local geographical area and is under the control and supervision of the Texas Department of Agriculture and its Commissioner instead of a locally elected or appointed board in each eradication zone. A PPELLEE does not even set or impose its own assessment rates and penalties for non

- payment. If the Legislature ever int ended A PPELLEE to be a political subdivision or any other type of quasi government entity or governmental unit exempt from some limitations pursuant to section 16.061 , it could have clearly done so, but it has not.A PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 20 of 21 C ONCLUSION AND P RAYER F OR R ELIEF
F or these reasons stated herein above, A PPELLANT prays that the Court that determine that the Trial Court erred in reinstating the Case to the Docket and subsequently denying A PPELLANT ’ S M F SJ and granting A PPELLEE ’ S M F SJ and reverse and rendered that A PPELL EE should take nothing and immediate file releases of record of its judgment in this Case and any other relief in law or equity that A PPELLANT may be entitled

.

Respectfully submitted,

A PPELLANT :

/ S / S TEVE V

EIGEL

_______________ S TEVE V EIGEL , PRO SE 105 Quince Street Hereford, Texas 79045 (806) 231

- 1008 SVeig@aol.comA PPELLANT ’ S R EPLY B RIEF page 21 of 21 C ERTIFICATE OF C OMPLIANCE I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft Word 2003 using 14 point New Times Roman font and contains 3, 678 words, as determined by Microsoft Word 2003 word

- count function, excluding the sections of the document listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).

/ S / S TEVE V EIGEL

____________ Steve Veigel, pro se

C E RTIFICATE OF S ERVICE I hereby certify that when a true and correct file marked copy of this

e - filed document is available to me, it will be e - mailed that day to A PPELLEE ’ S counsel as follows:

Mr. Matt Dow at MDow@JW.com Mr. Andrew J. McKeon at AMcKeon@JW.c om Jackson Walker L.L.P 100 Congress Avenue, Suite 1100 Austin, Texas 78701

/ S / S TEVE V EIGEL

_____________ Steve Veigel