DLD
- 231 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 15

- 3855

___________ MATTHEW N. JONES,

Appellant

v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

________________________________ ____ On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware (D.C. Civ. No

. 1

- 1 5

- cv - 00731 ) District J udge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews

____________________________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 19 15(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 April 28, 2016 Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and GARTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : May 18, 2016 )

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

Matthew N. Jones appeals from the Distr ict Court’s order dismissing his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We will affirm. In 2015, Jones submitted eight complaints along with motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) to the United States District Court for the Di strict of Delaware. The District C ourt denied all eight motions. Jones then filed the complaint at issue here against the District Court itself seeking $1,000,000 dollars in compensation for the IFP denials. (Jones paid the filing and docketing fees for this action.) Jones cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the civil cover sheet and alleged that his annual income of approximately $13,000 would have qualified him for IFP status under the policies employed by the Delaware Chancery Court, but he did not assert any particular cause of action. The District Court sua sponte dismissed Jones’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after concluding that it is entitled to sovereign immunity and that any amendment of the complaint would be futile. Jones appeal s. Our review is plenary. See Stehney v. Perry , 101 F.3d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 1996). We agree that the District Court, as part of the judicial branch of the United States Government, was entitled to sovereign immunity. See F DIC v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). The District Court did not give Jones notice and an opportunity to respond on that issue before dis missing his complaint , but any error in that regard was harmless. Jones has had an opportunity to address the issue of sovereign immunity on appea l and, having exercised our plenary review, we agree that sovereign immunity bars his complaint.3

We further conclude that Jones’s complaint failed to invoke the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction for the additional reason that the complaint is “ wholly insubstantial and frivolous

. ” Shapiro v. McManus , 136 S. Ct. 450, 455 (2015) (quotation marks omitted)

. Whether to grant leave to proceed IFP is within the District Court’s discretion. See Jones v. Zimmerman , 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985). If a prospective plaintiff is dissatisfied with the District Court’s denial of leave to file a complaint IFP, his or her remedy is to appeal from that final order. See Sinwell v. Shapp , 536 F.2d 15, 16 (3d Cir. 1976). There is no arguable basis for an indepe ndent action against the District Court based simply on the District Court’s denial of leave to proceed IFP. 1 Finally, we note that the same District Judge who denied Jones’s previous IFP motions presided over the civil action at issue here. Jones did no t name the District Judge as a defendant, and he does not argue on appeal that the District Judge should have recused himself. Even if we were to raise that issue sua sponte, we would conclude that any error in that regard was harmless in light of the Dis trict Court’s clear entitlement to sovereign immunity, the patent frivolity of Jones’s complaint, and our plenary standard of review

. See Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. , 360 F.3d 155, 171 (3d Cir. 2004). For these reasons, we will affirm th e judgment of the District Court.

1 Jones belatedly pursued the proper rem e dy by appealing from three of the District Court’s orders d enying IFP status, but we dismissed those appeals as untimely. (C.A. Nos. 16

- 1064, 16

- 1065 & 16

- 1066.)