United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 4, 2022*

Decided April 5, 2022 

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

Nos. 21-2311 & 21-2338 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

WAYNER D. BLACK, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin. 

No. 09-cr-108-bbc

Barbara B. Crabb, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Wayner Black, a federal prisoner, separately appeals two post-judgment 

decisions in his criminal case: a turnover order for $4,043.02 in funds from his inmate 

trust account to satisfy a restitution award, (No. 21-2311), and the denial of his motion

for compassionate release (No. 21-2338). The appeals are unrelated, and were not 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
Nos. 21-2311 & 21-2338 Page 2 

initially consolidated, but the line between them blurred during briefing, and so we 

have consolidated them for disposition. In each appeal, we affirm. 

In 2009, Black and three accomplices held tellers at a Wisconsin bank at 

gunpoint, stealing $15,208.97. Black pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery under

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), and was sentenced as a career offender to 262 months’ 

imprisonment. In his plea agreement, Black accepted joint-and-several liability for

restitution with his co-defendants for “the full amount of restitution ... due and payable 

immediately,” under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3664. At the

sentencing hearing, Black was again told, “your restitution obligation is joint and 

several” with his co-defendants, and the court entered a restitution order for $15,208.97, 

“due in full immediately.” Black surrendered $2,400, but because he lacked means to 

pay in full, the court ordered his participation in the Inmate Financial Responsibility 

Program, an installment plan administered by the Bureau of Prisons, under which 

payments were automatically deducted from his earnings in prison. See United States v. 

Alverez, 21 F.4th 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2021) (court must set payment schedule for indigent 

defendant); United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2020) (court may 

delegate administration of payment schedule to IFRP).

In May 2021, Black signed an agreement with the Bureau of Prisons increasing 

his payments under the IFRP to half of his monthly prison earnings, to be withdrawn 

from his inmate trust account. That document also noted that the restitution was 

“payable immediate[ly].” The next month, the government learned that Black had over 

$4,000 in his inmate trust account, when he and his co-defendants still owed $9,860.94 in 

restitution. The government moved to seize Black’s funds as “substantial resources”

that must be applied toward restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n). The district court 

entered a turnover order, rejecting Black’s argument that his May 2021 IFRP agreement

set a maximum monthly payment and restricted the source of restitution funds to his 

earnings. Black raised the same arguments in a motion to reconsider the turnover order, 

which the court denied, and Black appealed.

At the same time, Black was seeking early release from prison for compassionate 

reasons under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court denied Black’s first motion for 

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and he refiled in June 2021. As grounds for 

relief, he cited chronic health conditions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the alleged 

unlawfulness of his career-offender enhancement. The district court ruled that Black did 

not qualify for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because vaccines were available at his 

facility, and he remained a danger to the community. Black appealed.
Nos. 21-2311 & 21-2338 Page 3 

Appeal No. 21-2311 

We first consider Black’s appeal of the turnover order, No. 21-2311, applying 

de novo review. See United States v. Sayyed, 862 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 2017). He argues 

that the order called for payment beyond the maximum set by his installment plan and 

seized exempt funds that were for his personal expenses. 

The first argument—that his restitution repayment is capped at half of his

monthly prison earnings—lacks merit. His IFRP agreement did not purport to amend

the criminal judgment, which includes the restitution order, nor could it: the Bureau of 

Prisons may administer restitution, not modify the judgment. See 18. U.S.C. § 3664(o); 

Hernandez, 952 F.3d at 861. Further, Black’s agreement reiterates that full restitution is 

due immediately and that half of his earnings “will be withdrawn from [his] account” 

towards the debt until he revokes authorization (an act that carries other consequences). 

Thus, on its face, the payment plan is not a cap on collections and does not exclude his 

trust account. (If Black means to contest the prison’s interpretation of his plan, 

moreover, the proper venue is the inmate grievance process. Hernandez, 952 F.3d at 861.) 

Black’s second argument, that the $4,043.02 in his account was from non-income 

deposits and not a valid source of restitution funds, also fails. Black explains that his 

trust account contained funds that friends and family contributed for his living 

expenses and contends that this money is therefore not an “inheritance, settlement, or 

other judgment” that must go toward restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n). But the list

in § 3664(n) is non-exhaustive, and we have held that the provision permits seizure of 

funds from any source—no matter how acquired or for what purpose—to satisfy 

restitution. See e.g., United States v. Wykoff, 839 F.3d 581, 582 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding 

turnover of prison account, percentage of earnings, and pension fund). The court 

therefore properly granted the order in the interest of collecting restitution “as quickly 

as possible.” See United States v. Sawyer, 521 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Finally, Black argues that the seizure of the full balance in his account, to be applied 

toward the then $9,860.94 in outstanding debt, impermissibly left him destitute. 

See United States v. Dawson, 250 F.3d 1048, 1050 (7th Cir. 2001). But the statute directs full 

restitution “as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic 

circumstances of the defendant.” § 3664(f)(1)(A); see United States v. Brazier, 933 F.3d 796, 

804 (7th Cir. 2019). And we have specifically held that there is no exception to restitution 
Nos. 21-2311 & 21-2338 Page 4 

for personal expenses. See United States v. Gomez, 24 F.3d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing 

United States v. House, 808 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.1986)).

Appeal No. 21-2338 

We now turn to Black’s second appeal, No. 21-2338, in which he contends that 

the district court erroneously denied his amended motion for compassionate release in 

June 2021. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). First, he argues that he qualified for relief based on 

hypertension, obesity, high cholesterol, mental health, a slipped spinal disc, and the 

COVID-19 pandemic. Black appended multiple exhibits to his motion, but he provided 

no verification of any health conditions, nor information about whether he had access to 

a COVID-19 vaccine and was able to receive it. The availability of vaccination within the 

Bureau of Prisons means that the health risk of the pandemic is not an “extraordinary 

and compelling” reason for release. United States v. Broadfield, 5 F.4th 801, 803 (7th Cir. 

2021). As the court noted, Black did not represent that he lacked access to or would not 

benefit from the vaccine, nor did he substantiate his assertion that his health was poor,

or argue that he lacked medical treatment in prison. Because the court gave at least “one 

reason adequate to support the judgment,” there was no error in concluding that he did 

not establish cause for his release. United States v. Ugbah, 4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021).

Second, Black argues that the district court wrongly constrained its discretion by 

asking whether he posed a danger to the community under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2) and

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), rather than weighing the sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

See United States v. Kurzynowski, 17 F.4th 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2021). But the court properly 

denied his motion based on the absence of extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief 

(primarily the vaccine). Its decision thus rested on § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and implicitly 

recognized it was not constrained by § 1B1.13(2) or 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Moreover, 

protecting the public is a relevant consideration under § 3553(a)(2)(C), so any error in its 

alternative explanation was harmless. See Kurzynowski, 17 F.4th at 760. 

Finally, Black argues that the district court erred by “refusing to revisit” his careeroffender status, but a motion for compassionate release does not entitle him either to 

collaterally attack his original sentence, or to a full resentencing. See United States v. Hible, 

13 F.4th 647, 650 (7th Cir. 2021). Regardless, we rejected the same career-offender 

argument in his prior appeal. See United States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 897–99 (7th Cir. 2011). 

AFFIRMED