UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LOS ROVELL DAHDA, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 20-3097

(D.C. No. 2:12-CR-20083-DDC-1)

(D. Kan.)

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before LUCERO, MATHESON, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.

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Proceeding pro se, Los Rovell Dahda appeals the district court’s denial of 

release on bail pending his appeal of the sentence imposed on resentencing for 

convictions stemming from his participation in a marijuana distribution network.

1

 

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c), we affirm. 

Background

As pertinent here, Dahda’s convictions included one count of conspiring to 

manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Dahda is representing himself, we construe his pleadings liberally. 

See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

August 10, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court
2

of marijuana, and to maintain a drug-involved premises, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(vii), 846, and 856, and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (the conspiracy 

conviction), and one count of maintaining a drug-involved premises, in violation of 

§ 856 (the substantive drug-involved premises conviction). The district court 

initially sentenced him to 189, 60, and 40 months’ imprisonment and imposed a fine 

of almost $17 million. On direct appeal, Dahda challenged his convictions, the fine, 

and the 189-month sentence on the conspiracy conviction. We affirmed the 

convictions and the challenged sentence, but we reversed the fine and remanded for 

reconsideration of the amount because the amount of the fine exceeded the statutory 

maximum. United States v. Dahda, 853 F.3d 1101, 1118 (10th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 

138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018) (Dahda I). Dahda’s brother, Roosevelt Dahda, was a

codefendant and in a separate opinion, we affirmed Roosevelt Dahda’s convictions 

but remanded for a reassessment of the quantity of marijuana attributable to him and

for resentencing. See United States v. Dahda, 852 F.3d 1282, 1287, 1295, 1298 

(10th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 138 S. Ct. 1491 (2018).

On remand, Dahda argued that, in addition to recalculating his fine, the district 

court should recalculate the drug quantity attributable to him in light of this court’s 

ruling in his brother’s appeal. More specifically, relying on Alleyne v. United States, 
3

570 U.S. 99 (2013),

2 and United States v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2017),3

which was decided shortly after we issued Dahda I, he argued that because the jury 

did not make a specific finding on attributable drug quantity on the conspiracy 

charge, the court should resentence him on that conviction based on the five-year 

statutory maximum applicable to a drug offense involving less than 50 grams of 

marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). He also filed a motion for immediate 

release from custody under § 3145(c) pending resentencing. Like the motion to 

expand the scope of the remand, Dahda’s motion for immediate release relied on

Ellis—he maintained that he should be released because, under Ellis, the maximum 

prison sentence the court could impose for the conspiracy count at resentencing was 

five years and he had already served almost seven years. 

The district court denied the motion for release, concluding that even under the 

reasoning in Ellis, a five-year statutory maximum sentence was inapplicable to the 

conspiracy conviction because the jury found Dahda guilty of conspiracy to maintain 

a drug-involved premises, which, like the substantive drug-involved premises 

conviction, carries a statutory maximum penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment

2 In Alleyne, the court held that “any fact that increases the mandatory 

minimum [sentence] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” “and found 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” 570 U.S. at 103. 3 In Ellis, the defendant was convicted on drug conspiracy charges under 

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and 851, and the district court imposed a mandatoryminimum life sentence. 868 F.3d at 1160. Based on Alleyne, we held that the 

sentence violated Ellis’s Sixth Amendment rights because the conspiracy-cocaine 

amounts were an element of the offense for sentencing purposes and the jury had not 

made a finding of the amounts individually attributable to him. Ellis, 868 F.3d at 

1169-70.
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regardless of drug quantity, see id. § 856(b). We affirmed the denial of the motion 

for release on the alternative basis that the “patently deficient motion” failed to show 

that he met the conditions for release in 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). United States v. 

Dahda, No. 19-3099, Order and Judgment at 5 (10th Cir. July. 3, 2019) (Dahda II). 

In particular, we noted that Dahda’s motion “offered no evidence supporting [] a 

finding” that he was not likely to flee or pose a danger to the community if released, 

and that on appeal, he relied only on the evidence presented at his initial detention 

hearing despite the fact that the district court had found based on that evidence that 

he posed a serious flight risk and that no conditions would reasonably assure the 

safety of the community. Id.

On resentencing, the district court sentenced Dahda to 135 months’ 

imprisonment for the conspiracy and drug-involved premises convictions, and 

imposed lesser terms on the remaining counts, all to run concurrently. The court 

rejected Dahda’s argument that his sentence on the conspiracy count was capped at 

five years under § 841(b)(1)(D). His appeal of that sentence is pending.

After resentencing, Dahda filed a motion in the district court for release 

pending appeal. The court denied the motion for reasons discussed more fully below, 

and Dahda now seeks review of that order. 

Discussion

1. Legal Standards

We review the district court’s ultimate detention decision de novo because it 

presents mixed questions of law and fact, but we review the underlying findings of 
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fact for clear error. United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 2003). 

“A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the 

reviewing court, on review of the entire record, is left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Gilgert, 314 F.3d 

506, 515 (10th Cir. 2002) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because Dahda was convicted of a drug-related offense that carries a 

maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more, he needed to satisfy the 

requirements of both 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1) and § 3145(c) to obtain his release 

pending appeal. See id. § 3143(b)(2) (detention mandatory for person convicted of

offense in § 3142(f), which includes drug offenses with a maximum term of 

imprisonment of ten years or more); § 3145(c) (person otherwise subject to 

mandatory detention under § 3143(b)(2) may be ordered released for exceptional 

reasons). First, he was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 

he is “not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the 

community if released,” Id. § 3143(b)(1)(A). He was also required to demonstrate 

(1) that “the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of 

law or fact likely to result in . . . a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less 

than the total of the time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal 

process,” id. § 3143(b)(1)(B)(iv);

4 and (2) that “there are exceptional reasons why 

4 Dahda seeks immediate release pending his appeal. We note, however, that 

the only relief he can obtain under § 3143(b)(1)(B)(iv) is an order terminating his 

detention “at the expiration of the likely reduced sentence.” 
6

[his] detention would not be appropriate,” id. § 3145(c). But when a defendant fails 

to meet any one of the requirements of § 3143(b)(1), the inquiry ends and the court 

need not address whether § 3145(c) showing has been made. 

2. District Court Motion and Order

In support of his motion for release in the district court, Dahda presented 

evidence that he would not be a flight risk and, based primarily on his good behavior 

while in custody and his disagreement with the factual findings that underpinned the 

district court’s initial detention order, he maintained that he would not pose a danger 

to the community if released. He further maintained that his appeal presents a 

substantial question of law (the Alleyne/Ellis argument) that is likely to result in a 

shorter sentence than the amount of time he has already served. And he maintained 

that exceptional reasons justify his release pending appeal, including that he risks 

overserving his sentence; his appellate counsel was ineffective; he needs to be tested 

to determine whether he is a possible match to his sister, who needs a kidney 

transplant; and he suffers from an auto-immune disease that increases the risks of 

severe illness if he contracts the COVID-19 virus. 

The district court rejected Dahda’s arguments and denied his motion. With 

respect to the § 3143(b)(1) requirements, the court found that although Dahda

successfully demonstrated that he is not a flight risk, he failed to show by clear and 

convincing evidence that he would not pose a danger to the community. The court 

explained that, while a “positive factor,” the fact that he “has served several years in 

prison with no significant disciplinary incidents” did not “lessen the court’s concern 
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that if released, he poses a serious risk to the safety of the community.” Aplee. Bail 

Mem. Br., Attach. B at 6. The court found it significant that early in the charged 

conspiracy, Dahda was on supervised release in another case in which he pleaded 

guilty to providing false information to acquire a firearm and possession of an 

unregistered sawed-off shotgun. Reiterating its finding in the initial detention order, 

the court again held that Dahda “poses a serious risk of sophisticated, large-scale 

drug trafficking based in part on [his] long-term history of assaultive behavior, 

history relating to drug abuse, significant prior criminal record, committing the 

charged conduct while on supervised release in this court[,] and an unverified release 

plan.” Id. Although the district court could have denied Dahda’s motion based 

solely on its dangerousness determination, see § 3145(c), the court also considered 

and rejected his other arguments.

3. Arguments on Appeal

Dahda’s arguments on appeal focus primarily on the district court’s findings 

that his appeal does not raise a substantial question and that he did not show 

exceptional reasons why his detention is inappropriate. But we need not address 

those arguments because we agree with the district court’s determination that he did 

not meet his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that he would not pose 

a danger to the community if released. 

Dahda challenges the district court’s dangerousness determination on two 

grounds. First, he downplays the dangerousness of marijuana distribution, claiming 

that “marijuana offenses raise fewer concerns than other offenses that carry similar 
8

penalties.” Aplt. Bail Memo. Br. at 2. Second, he contends that the district court 

denied his motion for release based on what he characterizes as a “dated detention 

order” that he contends was based on findings that were “clearly incorrect based on 

the record of the case.” Id. at 1 (capitalization omitted). In other words, he disagrees 

with the fact findings that underpinned the district court’s initial detention order. 

For example, Dahda disputes that he presents a risk of “sophisticated, largescale drug trafficking,” id. at 2 (capitalization omitted), noting that “there is nothing 

special about using a cell phone” to facilitate drug distribution, id., and that the jury 

did not make a finding of drug quantity attributable to him. He also disputes the 

district court’s finding that he had a history of assaultive behavior, explaining that he 

committed an assault in self-defense when he was a young man and has not 

committed any violent offenses since then. He quibbles with the court’s finding that 

he had a history of drug abuse, claiming he only “smoked marijuana on two

occasions during his lifetime,” drank alcohol once every few months “but never to 

the point of intoxication,” and “never failed or refused a urinalysis while in custody 

or on supervision.” Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). Next, while he offers to “defer to 

the court on whether this prior criminal record is significant or not,” id., he points out 

that the revised presentence report rated his recidivism risk as low. And finally, he 

disagrees with the district court’s finding that he was involved in the conspiracy that 

led to his convictions in this case while on supervised release for firearms offenses in 

another case, ignoring the fact that, as the district court explained, although the 

prosecution’s evidence at trial focused on events that occurred after his supervision 
9

in the other case had ended, the jury found him guilty of a conspiracy that began 

eight months before he was released from prison and almost three years before his 

supervision ended. 

As was the case with his motion for release pending resentencing, see 

Dahda II, he presented no new evidence in the district court, much less clear and 

convincing evidence, that would support a finding that he was not likely to pose a 

danger to the community if released, and his arguments on appeal consist primarily 

of disputes about the district court’s factual findings in his initial detention order. 

But his attacks on those findings do not establish that they are clearly erroneous.

Accepting the district court’s findings of historical fact and based on our de novo 

review of the record, we agree with the district court’s determination that Dahda 

presents a danger to the community, despite his view that, unlike other drug-related 

crimes, marijuana offenses do not pose a threat to society. In any event, there is 

ample evidence of his potential dangerousness apart from his involvement with 

marijuana distribution, including his previous firearms convictions and other criminal 

history. 

We affirm the district court’s order denying Dahda’s motion for release 

pending appeal. 

Entered for the Court

Per Curiam