### THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
,TMr. Bob E. Bradley ,,

Executive Director Texas State Board of Public Accountancy Opinion No. JR-873

Re: Applicability tory fee increases of statuto certi1033 La Posada, Suite 340 fiedpublic accountants Austin, Texas 78752 (RQ-1243)

DearMr. Bradley:

you request our opinion concerning the interpretation of section 31 of the Public Accountancy Act of 1979, article 41a-1, V.T.C.S. Section 31 was added to the act during the second called session of the 70th Legislature. Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 5,art. 9, §6, at 68-69. The pertinent part of.the newprovision imposes a temporary increase inthe fees required by the act:

(a) Each of the following fees imposed by or under another section of thisAct that first becomes due on orafter the effective date of Article 9, H.B. 61, Acts of the 70th Legislature, 2nd Called Session, 1987, but. before August 31, 1989, is increased by $110:

(1) annual license feeunder Section 9(a) of thisAct forCertified Public Accountants:
(2) renewal fee under Section 9(a) of thisAct forCertified Public Accountants: and
(3) fee for issuance of acertificate of Certified Public Accountants under Section 13 of thisAct.

V.T.C.S. art. 41a-1, **531(a).** Section 9(a) imposes an annual license feeof notmore than $60 and an annual license renewal feeofnot more than $60. An additional penalty of $20 ischarged for reinstatement of licenses cancelled because of failure to pay the renewal fee; a license may be reinstated upon payment of this penalty

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only during the licensing year for which the fee was unpaid. These feesmust bepaid by the following persons prior to the issuance of a license:

(1) holders of the certificate of 'Certified"Public Accountant' issued under this or prior Acts: and
(2) such persons as are registered with the board under the provisions of this or prior Acts.

V.T.C.S. art. 41a-1, 59(a). Section 13of the act imposes
a fee ofnotmore than $100 forthe issuance ofa certificate of "Certified Public Accountant8*by reciprocity.

The Texas State Board of Public Accountancy has adopted three interpretations of section 31. The first interpretation and theboard's reasoning follows:

It isthe int'erpretationof the Texas State Board ofpublic Accountancy (theBoard) that the $110 fee increases identified in [subdivisions] (l), (2) 8 and (3) [of section 31(a)] are restricted to certified vublic gccountants only rather than all license feesprescribed inSection 9(a) of the Act. The Board came to this conclusion by the following deductions:

Section 9(a) of the Act specifies that licenses shall be issued to '(1) the holders of the certificate of "Certified Public Accountant" issued under this or prior Acts; and (2) suchpersons as 'are registered with the Board under the provisions of this orprior Acts.'

**Had** the Legislature intended to impose the temporary $110 feeon&A&. licenses, itwould have done sowithout the inclusion of the language 'for certified public accountants.* The Board feels that the addition of this language clearly restricts the temporary $110 fee increase to those identified ' Section 9(a)(l) of theAct. (Emphasis ii original.)

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P Inanother context, this office advised the board that a

professional corporation cannot be issued acertificate of **CertifiedPublic Accountant.nl Acting upon this advice, the board has concluded that the temporary fee increase imposed **by** section 31 does not corporations apply to professional

or partnerships registered under section 9(a)(2) of the act.

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain legislative intent. Winton v, Frank, 545 S.W.2d 442 (Tex.1976). Whenever possible, legislative intent is' determined fromthe language of the statute. Crimmins v. &ygy, 691 S.W.Zd 582 (Tex. 1985). If the intent of the legislature is apparent from thewords of the statute, there isno need to consult extrinsic sources for evidence of such intent. Winton v. Frank suvra. Therefore, unless a statute isambiguous, we ar; compelled to follow the clear language of the statute. RevublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal. Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1985).

Ifthemeaning **of** a statute isdoubtful or ambiguous, the contemporaneous construction of the statute by the agency charged with itsadministration isgiven weight. See Calvert v. Kadane, 427 S.W.Zd 605 (Tex.1968). An administrative agency's construction of a statute is not controlling, however. Bullock v.Ramada Texas, Inc., 609 S.W.Zd 537 (Tex.1980). It isvalid only insofar as it is consistent with statutory language andwill not be allowed the effect of expanding or contracting the language of the statute. See Firestone Tire andRubber co.v. Bullock, 573 S.W.Zd 498, 500 (Tex.1978).

We conclude that theboard's first interpretation of section 31reflects theplain language of that provision. By the terms of section 31,the temporary fee increase is tobe collected for licenses issued for certified public accountants under section 9(a) or section 13. Under section 9(a), licenses are issued to "holders of the certificate of 'Certified **Public** Accountant"' and to "such

1. youhave not asked us to reconsider this advice. We believe, however, that the language of article 41a-1 clearly supports the conclusion. See V.T.C.S. art. 41a-1, §§8, 12. Therefore, it isunnecessary to reexamine in this opinion the cogent analysis of the issue provided therein.

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persons [including partnerships and corporations] as are registered with the board.n Because only natural persons may hold a certificate of "Certified Public Accountant," the reference to certified public accountants in section 31necessarily excludes corporations andpartnerships from its coverage. Therefore, webelieve theboard's interpretation of section 31 with respect to corporations and partnerships registered with the board under section 9(a)(2) isreasonable.

The board has also interpreted section 31 to' require payment of the temporary fee increase only twice during the .periodinwhich the fee increase is ineffect.

The Board has also concluded that the temporary license fee increase applies to the annual licenses (January 1, through December 31) foraCPA anddoes not apply in those situations where an initial licensee paw a prorated portion of the annual license feeand is licensed for less than 365days. It isthe Board's understanding that the legislative 'intentofHB 531 [sic]
was forthe Board to collect the temporary increase for the 1988 and 1989 license years (twoyears only), and the imposition of the $110 temporary increase in the remaining months of 1987 would cause an initial licensee topay the feethree times.

The board has put in place a licensing program that runs fromJanuary 1to December 31 of each year. Fees for licenses issued during a license year are prorated and expire on December 31of the license year.
Section 31of the act states that the temporary fee increase applies to annual license fees and renewal fees that "first become due on orafter the effective date of Article 9, Ii.B.No. 61,Acts of the 70th Legislature, 2nd Called Session, 1987, but before August 31, 1989." Article 9ofHouse BillNo. 61became effective September 1, 1987. m Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 5, art. 9, 914(a), at 74;Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 8, at 88-89 (supplying two-thirds vote ofboth houses of the legislature required to satisfy article III, section 39of the Texas Constitution). Subsection (c)of section 31 requires payment of the entire $110 amount even if the license feeor renewal fee covers aperiod that extends beyond theAugust 31, 1989, expiration date.

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L

P We believe that the language of section 31 is unequivocal and requires the $110 fee increase tobe added to all designated license orrenewal fees that first become duebetween September 1, 1987andAugust 31, 1989. Thiswould include initial license fees collected by the board for that portion of the 1987 license year following September 1, 1987. There are two reasons for our conclusion. First, initial licenses, like all licenses issued by the board, are issued pursuant to section 9. Section 31 states clearly that each annual license fee issued under section 9(a) that firstbecomes due between the relevant dates must be increased by $110. Itmakes no exception for initial licensees. The board may not read into the statute exceptions that arenot embodied therein Stubbs v. Lowrev's Heirs, 253 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.Civ.App. - Eastland 1952,writ ref'd n.r.e.). Second, ifthe legislature had intended the fee increase tobe charged only twice during theperiod inwhich it is ineffect, itcould plainly have stated so. The legislature could also have expressed such intentby simplymaking the act effective
onJanuary 1; 1988. Itdid neither. Furthermore, we are obliged togive effect to acts of the legislature. We must therefore presume that the legislature had adefinite purpose in mind when itprovided forthe September 1, 1987, effective date. To read section 1as the board has isto effectively nullify section 31 for fourmonths and make it effective on January 1, 1988, a result the legislature took great pains to avoid. Accordingly, we disagree with theboard's interpretation of section 31 with respect to initial licensees.

your third question is whether the board may reduce the $110 temporary fee increase for VetiredV1 licensees. Section 9(c) of article 41a-1 authorizes the board to "adopt a systembywhich individual licensees over age 65 may qualify for a reduced license fee." Pursuant to that provision, theboard has adopted arule that sets a reduced fee for licensees over age 65. 22T.A.C. 3515.8. you askwhether section 9(c) allows the board to reduce the temporary $110 license fee set out in section 31 of article 41a-1 aswell as the annual feeprovided for in section 9(a). Section 31 provides that the "annual license fee under Section 9(a)" **iS** increased by $110. Thus, section 31temporarily increases the license fee under section 9(a): itdoes not impose **a**different fee or **tax.** Section 9(c) gives theboard authority to reduce the "license fee" for licensees over age 65. We think that

**“ license**  fee" in section 9(c)must be read to include the entire license fee:i.e., the annual fee aswell as the

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temporary $110 increase. Therefore, we think that section 9(c) gives theboard authority to reduce the total fee for qualified licensees over age 65.

SUMMARY
Professional corporations and partnerships licensed pursuant to section 9(a)(2) of article 41a-1, V.T.C.S., are not required to pay the $110 temporary fee increase imposed by section 31 of the act; Initial licensees are required to pay the fee increase. The Texas State Board of Public Accountancy may reduce the license fee for qualified licensees over the age of 65.

Very truly yo r ,

J AJdk A JIM MATTOX Attorney General of Texas

MARY KELLER First Assistant Attorney General

LouMCCREARY Executive Assistant Attorney General

JUDGE ZOLLJE STEAKLBY Special Assistant Attorney General

RICK GILPIN Chairman, Opinion Committee
Prepared by Steve Aragon Assistant Attorney General -,

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