IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL

IN RE INTEREST OF EYLLAN J.

NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

IN RE INTEREST OF EYLLAN J., A CHILD UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE.

STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,

V.

NATHANIEL V., APPELLANT.

Filed October 21, 2014. No. A-14-300.

Appeal from the County Court for Scotts Bluff County: JAMES M. WORDEN, Judge. 

Affirmed.

Leonard G. Tabor for appellant.

No appearance for appellee.

IRWIN, MOORE, and PIRTLE, Judges.

IRWIN, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Nathaniel V. appeals from an order of the Scotts Bluff County Court, sitting as a juvenile 

court, which terminated his parental rights to his son, Eyllan J., in a case in which the Nebraska 

Indian Child Welfare Act (NICWA) is applicable. Upon our de novo review, we find that a 

statutory ground to terminate exists, that the additional requirements under NICWA were met, 

and that termination is in Eyllan’s best interests. Accordingly, we affirm the county court’s order 

terminating Nathaniel’s parental rights.

II. BACKGROUND

Nathaniel is the biological father of Eyllan, born in January 2013. Eyllan’s biological 

mother, Elizabeth J., relinquished her parental rights during the pendency of the lower court 

- 1 -
proceedings. As a result, she is not a party to this appeal and her involvement in the county court 

case, and in Eyllan’s life, will be discussed only to the extent necessary to provide context.

On January 24, 2013, shortly after Eyllan’s birth, the State filed a petition alleging that he 

came within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2008) in that he lacked 

proper parental care by reason of the faults or habits of both Nathaniel and Elizabeth. 

Specifically, the petition alleged, in part, that both Nathaniel and Elizabeth have a history of 

using methamphetamine; that Nathaniel was currently incarcerated for a conviction of possession 

of methamphetamine and was, as a result, unable to care for Eyllan; and that Elizabeth admitted 

that she ingested methamphetamine at least five times while she was pregnant with Eyllan, 

including 5 days before his birth. The petition also alleged that Eyllan “is of Native American 

heritage and subject to the provisions of [NICWA].”

At the same time that the petition was filed, Eyllan was removed from his parents’ care 

and placed in a foster home. In fact, it appears that Eyllan was actually removed from the 

hospital before Elizabeth had a chance to take him home after his birth. Because Eyllan has 

remained in an out-of-home placement since his removal in January 2013, he has never resided 

with either of his parents.

In April 2013, Eyllan was adjudicated and determined to be a juvenile within the 

meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) based on Elizabeth’s admissions to the allegations in the State’s 

petition. It is not clear from our record whether Eyllan was ever adjudicated to be within the 

meaning of § 43-247(3)(a) as to Nathaniel. However, our record does reveal that regardless of 

whether there was an actual adjudication order, Nathaniel was provided with a rehabilitation plan 

by the Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) to assist him in regaining 

reunification with Eyllan. The rehabilitation plan required Nathaniel to do the following: work 

with a family support worker on improving his parenting skills and obtaining appropriate 

housing; submit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations that resulted 

from such an evaluation; participate in monthly team meetings; attend regular, supervised 

visitation with Eyllan; participate in regular drug testing; and be a law-abiding citizen.

On December 19, 2013, 1 month prior to Eyllan’s first birthday, the State filed a motion 

to terminate Nathaniel’s parental rights. In the motion, the State alleged that termination of 

Nathaniel’s parental rights was warranted pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(1) (Cum. Supp. 

2012), because he had abandoned Eyllan for at least the preceding 6 months; § 43-292(2), 

because he had substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected and refused to give Eyllan 

necessary parental care and protection; § 43-292(4), because he is unfit by reason of debauchery, 

habitual use of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, or repeated lewd and lascivious behavior, 

which is found by the court to be seriously detrimental to the health, morals, or well-being of 

Eyllan; and § 43-292(6), because reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family failed to 

correct the conditions that led to the determination that Eyllan was within the meaning of 

§ 43-247(3)(a). The State’s motion also alleged that termination of Nathaniel’s parental rights 

was in Eyllan’s best interests; that active efforts had been made to provide remedial services and 

rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these 

efforts proved unsuccessful; and that continued custody by Nathaniel was likely to result in 

serious emotional or physical damage to Eyllan.

- 2 -
On March 10, 2014, a hearing was held on the State’s motion to terminate Nathaniel’s 

parental rights. While we have carefully reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing in its 

entirety, we do not set forth the specifics of the testimony and exhibits here. Rather, we will set 

forth specific facts as presented at the hearing as necessary in our analysis below. We do note 

that the evidence presented at the hearing revealed that Nathaniel was incarcerated on various 

drug charges for a majority of the time the county court proceedings were pending.

After the termination hearing, the county court entered an order finding that the State 

proved by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination of Nathaniel’s parental 

rights existed pursuant to § 43-292(2), (4), and (6) and that termination was in Eyllan’s best 

interests. The court also specifically found that the State had presented the testimony of “a 

qualified expert witness for the purpose of [N]ICWA cases” and that based on that testimony, 

there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that returning Eyllan to Nathaniel’s care would 

result in serious emotional or physical damage. Finally, the court found that active efforts had 

been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the 

breakup of the Indian family prior to the termination of parental rights, but that those efforts had 

failed. Based on these findings, the court entered an order terminating Nathaniel’s parental rights 

to Eyllan.

Nathaniel appeals from the county court’s order here.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Nathaniel assigns as error and argues four issues, which we rephrase and 

consolidate into three issues for our review. First, he alleges that the county court erred in finding 

that termination of his parental rights was warranted pursuant to § 43-292(2). Second, he alleges 

that the court erred in determining that the State’s expert witness was a “qualified expert 

witness,” who could provide an opinion about whether continued custody of Eyllan by Nathaniel 

would result in serious emotional and physical damage to him, pursuant to NICWA. Third, 

Nathaniel alleges that the court erred in finding that termination of his parental rights was in 

Eyllan’s best interests.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

An order terminating parental rights pursuant to NICWA is reviewed de novo on the 

record, and an appellate court is required to reach a conclusion independent of the juvenile 

court’s findings. See, In re Interest of Phyllisa B., 265 Neb. 53, 654 N.W.2d 738 (2002); In re 

Interest of Sabrienia B., 9 Neb. App. 888, 621 N.W.2d 836 (2001). However, when the evidence 

is in conflict, an appellate court may give weight to the fact that the juvenile court observed the 

witnesses and accepted one version of facts over another. In re Interest of Clifford M. et al., 261 

Neb. 862, 626 N.W.2d 549 (2001).

V. ANALYSIS

On appeal, each of Nathaniel’s assigned errors generally challenges the county court’s 

decision to terminate his parental rights to Eyllan. Before we address Nathaniel’s specific 

assertions, however, we must outline the relevant law pertinent to the termination of parental 

rights in a case in which NICWA is applicable.

- 3 -
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held the State must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that one of the statutory grounds enumerated in § 43-292 exists and that termination is 

in the child’s best interests. See In re Interest of Jagger L., 270 Neb. 828, 708 N.W.2d 802 

(2006). Clear and convincing evidence is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of 

fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of the fact to be proven. Id.

NICWA, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-1501 to 43-1516 (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2013), 

however, adds two additional elements the State must prove before terminating parental rights in 

cases involving Indian children. In re Interest of Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 744 N.W.2d 55 

(2008). First, § 43-1505(4) provides an “active efforts” element:

Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights 

to, an Indian child under state law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been 

made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the 

breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.

We note that, on appeal, Nathaniel does not challenge the county court’s finding that active 

efforts were made to prevent the breakup of his family. As such, we will not specifically address 

this issue any further in this opinion.

The second additional element required by NICWA can be found in § 43-1505(6). That 

section provides a “serious emotional or physical damage” element:

No termination of parental rights may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a 

determination, supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of 

qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian 

custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.

See, also, In re Interest of Phoebe S., 11 Neb. App. 919, 664 N.W.2d 470 (2003) (under 

NICWA, determination to terminate parental rights must be supported by evidence beyond 

reasonable doubt).

We now turn to Nathaniel’s specific assertions of error.

1. STATUTORY FACTORS

In the county court’s order, it found that termination of Nathaniel’s parental rights was 

warranted pursuant to § 43-292(2), (4), and (6). In his brief to this court, Nathaniel assigns as 

error only the court’s finding that termination was warranted pursuant to § 43-292(2). However, 

in the argument section of his brief, Nathaniel appears to address the county court’s findings as 

to each of the three statutory factors warranting termination of his parental rights. As we have 

often stated, though, an alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued 

in the brief of the party asserting the error to be considered by an appellate court. See Jeremiah J. 

v. Dakota D., 287 Neb. 617, 843 N.W.2d 820 (2014). Accordingly, we do not address 

Nathaniel’s assertions with regard to § 43-292(4) or (6). Instead, we focus our analysis on 

whether the evidence presented at the termination hearing sufficiently demonstrated that 

Nathaniel has substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected Eyllan and refused to give 

him necessary parental care and protection, pursuant to § 43-292(2).

The evidence presented at the termination hearing revealed that for a majority of the time 

this case was pending in the county court, Nathaniel failed to provide Eyllan with any parental 

- 4 -
care or protection because he was incarcerated and unable to have any contact with Eyllan. In 

fact, Nathaniel has been out of jail for only 2 months of Eyllan’s life.

Nathaniel has a history of drug use which has resulted in him spending the majority of the 

last 3 years incarcerated. This history began before Eyllan’s birth, in 2011, when Nathaniel was 

found guilty of possession of methamphetamine and carrying a concealed weapon. He was 

sentenced to a total of 1 year in jail for his convictions. According to Nathaniel’s estimations, 

after he was released from jail, he was sober approximately 5 months before he began using 

methamphetamine again and was subsequently arrested.

Nathaniel’s next conviction for possession of methamphetamine occurred in the fall of 

2012. This conviction resulted in another sentence of 1 year in jail. As a result of this conviction 

and sentence, Nathaniel remained incarcerated at the time of Eyllan’s birth in January 2013. 

Nathaniel was released from jail in April 2013, when Eyllan was approximately 3 months old. At 

this time, Nathaniel began to cooperate with the Department and began to have visits with 

Eyllan. However, by the beginning of May, Nathaniel began missing visitations with Eyllan and 

admitted to the Department workers that he was using methamphetamine again.

In June 2012, less than 2 months after he had been released from jail, Nathaniel was 

arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine. Nathaniel pled no contest to the 

charge and was sentenced to a term of 1 to 2 years in prison. Nathaniel remained incarcerated on 

this charge until March 2014. He testified at the termination hearing that he had been released 

from prison approximately 1 week before and that he was currently on parole.

Nathaniel’s history of drug use and the resulting periods of incarceration as a result of 

this drug use are troubling, and appear to represent a pattern of behavior indicative of Nathaniel’s 

inability to remain sober when he is not in jail. However, what is perhaps the most troubling is 

Nathaniel’s most recent arrest and conviction. This arrest occurred after Eyllan’s birth and after 

Eyllan had been removed from his mother’s care and placed in the custody of the Department. 

As such, this arrest is particularly telling regarding Nathaniel’s ability to place Eyllan’s needs 

before his own needs and before his addiction. Ultimately, this arrest reveals that Nathaniel 

chose to engage in inappropriate and illegal behavior even after he knew of the severe 

consequences such behavior would have on his relationship with Eyllan.

As a result of Nathaniel’s repeated incarcerations, he has been unable to provide Eyllan 

with such basic necessities as housing and food. He has not been able to tend to Eyllan’s basic 

needs or provide any emotional support. In fact, Nathaniel has seen Eyllan only a handful of 

times in between his periods of incarceration. The Nebraska Supreme Court has recognized that 

in termination of parental rights cases, it is proper to consider a parent’s inability to perform his 

or her parental obligations because of imprisonment. In re Interest of Kalie W., 258 Neb. 46, 601 

N.W.2d 753 (1999). A parent’s incarceration may be considered along with other factors in 

determining whether parental rights can be terminated based on neglect. Id.

Given the evidence presented, it is clear that Nathaniel has failed to provide Eyllan with 

any parental care or protection throughout the entire duration of these proceedings. He has 

neglected Eyllan’s physical, emotional, and financial needs, and has not put himself in a position 

to have seen Eyllan since May 2013. Accordingly, upon our de novo review of the record, we 

conclude that the county court did not err in concluding that termination of Nathaniel’s parental 

rights to Eyllan was warranted pursuant to § 43-292(2).

- 5 -
2. QUALIFIED EXPERT WITNESS UNDER NICWA

As we explained in more detail above, in order to terminate parental rights in a case in 

which NICWA is applicable, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the continued 

custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or 

physical damage to the child. See § 43-1505(6). Proof of this element requires the testimony of a 

“qualified expert witness.” Id.

In the county court’s order, it found that the State had presented the testimony of “a 

qualified expert witness for the purpose of [N]ICWA cases,” Megan Patterson, and that based on 

Patterson’s testimony, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that returning Eyllan to 

Nathaniel’s care would result in serious emotional or physical damage. On appeal, Nathaniel 

challenges the court’s finding. Specifically, he argues that Patterson was not a “qualified expert 

witness” pursuant to the NICWA guidelines and that there was not sufficient evidence to support 

a finding of serious emotional or physical damage. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the 

findings of the county court.

Pursuant to NICWA, qualified expert testimony is required on the issue of whether 

serious emotional or physical damage to the Indian child is likely to occur if termination of 

parental rights is not ordered. See § 43-1505(6). The Nebraska Supreme Court has previously 

addressed the qualifications of experts to give testimony under § 43-1505. In In re Interest of 

C.W. et al., 239 Neb. 817, 824, 479 N.W.2d 105, 111 (1992), overruled on other grounds, In re 

Interest of Zylena R., 284 Neb. 834, 825 N.W.2d 173 (2012), the court noted the following 

guidelines set forth by the Bureau of Indian Affairs under which expert witnesses will most 

likely meet the requirements of NICWA:

“(i) A member of the Indian child’s tribe who is recognized by the tribal 

community as knowledgeable in tribal customs as they pertain to family organization and 

childrearing practices.

“(ii) A lay expert witness having substantial experience in the delivery of child 

and family services to Indians, and extensive knowledge of prevailing social and cultural 

standards in childrearing practices with the Indian child’s tribe.

“(iii) A professional person having substantial education and experience in the 

area of his or her specialty.”

In this case, the State called Patterson to testify that returning Eyllan to Nathaniel’s care 

was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to him. Patterson is currently 

employed as a school psychologist. Her educational background includes an education specialist 

degree and a bachelor’s degree in social work. Previous to her current employment position, she 

has worked as a social worker who specialized in and worked exclusively with Native American 

families. As a part of this employment, she provided expert testimony in NICWA cases, 

developed activities for children living outside of their tribe to maintain “cultural 

connectiveness,” and worked with tribes to facilitate enrollment of Indian children. In addition, 

Patterson has experience providing parental supervision, parenting education, and in-home 

counseling for Native American families. Patterson testified that she continues to have 

knowledge of “the prevailing social and cultural standard for rearing children within the Native 

- 6 -
American community.” She also indicated that she has experience with the Sioux Tribe, which is 

the tribe in which Eyllan is eligible for enrollment.

Given her extensive background and continued involvement with Native American 

families, and the Sioux Tribe in particular, we find that the record establishes that Patterson was 

sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert witness under the requirements of NICWA. The 

evidence supports a determination that Patterson has extensive knowledge of social and cultural 

standards in childrearing practices within Native American communities, including the Sioux 

Tribe, and also that she has experience in child and family services with Native American 

families. Accordingly, the county court did not err by finding that Patterson was qualified to 

render expert testimony pursuant to NICWA. Nathaniel’s assertion to the contrary is without 

merit.

We next turn to Nathaniel’s assertion that even if Patterson was a qualified expert witness 

under NICWA, that her testimony did not sufficiently establish that if Nathaniel were to regain 

custody of Eyllan, it would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to Eyllan. 

Nathaniel’s arguments on this subject focus on Patterson’s failure to interview or observe either 

Eyllan or Nathaniel.

Upon our review, we conclude that Nathaniel’s assertion is without merit. Patterson’s 

testimony established that she had sufficient foundation to render an opinion about Eyllan’s 

well-being. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence in the record to demonstrate beyond a 

reasonable doubt that if Nathaniel were to regain custody of Eyllan, it would likely result in 

serious emotional or physical damage to Eyllan.

At the termination hearing, Patterson testified that it was her opinion that Nathaniel’s 

having continued custody of Eyllan “would result in serious physical damage or trauma because 

of [Nathaniel’s] extensive history with drugs and the resulting . . . incarcerations.” She went on 

to explain that Nathaniel has been unable to maintain his sobriety when he has not been 

incarcerated and, as a result, has been unable to make himself available to be a parent to Eyllan. 

In particular, Patterson pointed to Nathaniel’s most recent incarceration as evidence of his 

inability to stay away from drugs for the benefit of Eyllan.

Patterson also testified that she had based her opinions on her review of Eyllan’s “case 

file.” This file included court records and journal entries, case plans and reports from the 

Department, reports from various service providers who had met with Nathaniel and/or Eyllan 

during the pendency of the case, and information from the Nebraska Department of Correctional 

Services regarding Nathaniel’s history of incarcerations.

During cross-examination, Patterson admitted that her review of this case and of Eyllan’s 

circumstances had not included a meeting with either Nathaniel or Eyllan, nor had it included 

any personal observations of Nathaniel and Eyllan interacting with each other. While we 

recognize that the absence of such personal interactions with the family could be viewed as a 

limitation to Patterson’s ultimate opinions about Eyllan’s future needs, we also must recognize 

the realities of this case. Nathaniel was incarcerated throughout the pendency of the lower court 

proceedings. As a result, he was not readily available to be interviewed by Patterson, nor was he 

having any contact with Eyllan that Patterson could observe. In addition, at the time of the 

termination hearing, Eyllan was only 1 year old. Due to his young age, it is not clear that any 

- 7 -
direct observation or conversation with him would have added much, if anything, to Patterson’s 

knowledge about the family’s circumstances.

Moreover, other evidence presented at the termination hearing supported Patterson’s 

opinion about the potential for serious emotional or physical damage. This evidence 

demonstrated that Nathaniel has a history of drug use that has resulted in him being incarcerated 

for the better part of the last 3 years. Nathaniel has shown himself to be incapable of staying 

sober while out in the community, even after Eyllan’s birth and placement in a foster home. As a 

result of Nathaniel’s drug use and incarcerations, he has been unable to be a parent to Eyllan. He 

has never provided Eyllan with any substantial physical, emotional, or financial support and he 

has not even seen Eyllan since May 2013. Eyllan does not know Nathaniel and does not have any 

sort of bond to him.

Based on the totality of the evidence presented at the termination hearing, it is clear 

beyond a reasonable doubt that custody of Eyllan by Nathaniel is likely to result in serious 

emotional or physical harm to Eyllan. Nathaniel has exhibited a serious addiction to drugs and 

has, at this point, been unable to demonstrate that he has gotten his addiction under control or 

that he is capable of being a parent to Eyllan. Such evidence is sufficient to support the county 

court’s finding concerning the potential for serious emotional or physical harm.

3. BEST INTERESTS

In its order, the county court also found that termination of Nathaniel’s parental rights 

was in Eyllan’s best interests. Nathaniel challenges this finding. Specifically, Nathaniel argues 

that he has made progress toward achieving reunification with Eyllan and that he should be given 

another opportunity to prove that he can be an appropriate parent. In addition, he argues that the 

court should not have admitted into evidence the testimony of the Department caseworker for the 

family, David Fox, that termination was in Eyllan’s best interests. Upon our de novo review of 

the record, we find sufficient evidence to conclude that termination of Nathaniel’s parental rights 

was in Eyllan’s best interests. We affirm.

At the termination hearing, Nathaniel testified that he had been released from prison 1 

week ago and that he was currently on parole for the next 2 months. He also testified that while 

he was incarcerated, he attended and completed an intensive outpatient treatment program for 

substance abuse, obtained his high school diploma through the GED program, and attended a 

parenting class. He also testified that he was willing to attend counseling and that he wanted to 

attend college. Nathaniel told the court that he was ready to be a more appropriate parent for 

Eyllan:

I have changed and . . . I have learned from where I just came from, from all my classes 

and all that. I think that I can be a better parent, considering the fact that the first chance I 

had, I didn’t have any kind of treatment or I didn’t have any GED. I didn’t have anything 

like that. So this time around I think I’ll be suitable.

We first note that we applaud Nathaniel’s efforts to enroll in and complete a drug 

treatment program and a parenting class. However, when we consider Nathaniel’s efforts during 

his latest incarceration alongside his history of recurring drug use and alongside his efforts 

throughout the duration of the lower court proceedings, we conclude that Nathaniel has simply 

not made significant progress toward reunification with Eyllan.

- 8 -
Nathaniel’s efforts to complete the drug treatment program while incarcerated are only 

the first steps in becoming a sober and stable parent. The discharge summary from his treatment 

facility indicated that Nathaniel’s prognosis is “fair but guarded due to multiple relapses and 

returning to the same area.” In addition, the discharge summary indicated that Nathaniel needed 

to continue his treatment after his release from prison and from parole. We also note that during 

his testimony, Nathaniel admitted that he had to attend substance abuse treatment in order to be 

placed on parole. Accordingly, his motivation for attending the treatment and his desire to 

actually live a sober lifestyle is not entirely clear.

In short, it is clear that Nathaniel still has a lot of work to do in order to remain drug free. 

Remaining drug free outside of prison is arguably very different than remaining drug free while 

incarcerated. Due to Nathaniel’s history of drug use outside of the prison walls, he would have to 

demonstrate his ability to sustain his sobriety for a period of time prior to achieving any kind of 

reunification with Eyllan.

Moreover, Nathaniel indicated that after his release from prison, he must reside in 

transitional housing. After that, he planned on residing in his mother’s apartment. This housing 

may present some challenges to Nathaniel, as he will be returning to the same environment 

where he has readily obtained and used drugs. Nathaniel does not have employment, and 

although he expressed an interest in obtaining either a job or a college education, he has not 

taken any significant steps toward either goal.

Nathaniel admitted that he does not have a bond with Eyllan. In fact, he testified that 

Eyllan does not even know him. Nathaniel has not been any part of Eyllan’s life for almost a 

year, and prior to that, Nathaniel saw Eyllan only a handful of times when Eyllan was 3 months 

old.

The Department caseworker for the family, Fox, testified that it was his opinion that 

termination of Nathaniel’s parental rights would be in Eyllan’s best interests because of the 

length of time that Eyllan has been in foster care and because of Nathaniel’s absence from 

Eyllan’s life. Although Nathaniel asserts that the county court should not have admitted this 

opinion at the hearing, we conclude that there was sufficient foundation to support Fox’s 

opinion. Fox had been the family’s caseworker for almost 1 year, and he had a great deal of 

knowledge about the family’s circumstances and about Eyllan’s needs. Accordingly, in our de 

novo review of the evidence, we consider Fox’s testimony and his opinion about best interests. 

We agree with his statements.

The evidence presented at the termination hearing revealed that despite Nathaniel’s desire 

to be reunited with Eyllan, he is simply not ready or able to be an effective parent. When a parent 

is unable or unwilling to rehabilitate himself or herself within a reasonable period of time, the 

child’s best interests require termination of parental rights. In re Interest of Walter W., 274 Neb. 

859, 744 N.W.2d 55 (2008). Children cannot, and should not, be suspended in foster care or be 

made to await uncertain parental maturity. Id.

By the time of the termination hearing in March 2014, Eyllan had been in an out-of-home 

placement for 14 months, which was his entire life. Eyllan deserves a permanent and stable home 

environment, which Nathaniel is unable to provide. We conclude that termination of Nathaniel’s 

parental rights is in Eyllan’s best interests. We affirm the order of the county court.

- 9 -
VI. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the county court did not err in finding that Nathaniel’s parental rights to 

Eyllan should be terminated pursuant to § 43-292(2). Regarding the requirements of NICWA, 

the county court did not err in finding that Nathaniel’s continued custody of Eyllan would likely 

result in serious emotional or physical damage, pursuant to § 43-1505(6). Finally, the county 

court did not err in finding that termination of Nathaniel’s parental rights was in Eyllan’s best 

interests. Therefore, the county court’s order terminating Nathaniel’s parental rights to Eyllan is 

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

- 10 -