Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1503-CR-85 | November 18, 2015 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kristin A. Mulholland

Appellate Public Defender

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John Paul Garcia,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 18, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A03-1503-CR-85

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Diane Ross 

Boswell, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45G03-1303-FC-41

Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issues

[1] The trial court accepted John Paul Garcia’s plea of guilty to forgery, a Class C 

felony, and ordered him to serve the maximum agreed sentence under the plea 

agreement: sixty-six months in the Indiana Department of Correction

(“DOC”). In addition, the trial court entered a judgment in the amount of 

$360,000.00 in favor of the victim of the crime. Garcia now appeals, raising 

two issues for our review: 1) whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of his offense and his character; and 2) whether the trial court abused 

its discretion in entering a restitution order. Concluding Garcia’s sixty-six 

month sentence is not inappropriate but the restitution order is not supported by 

sufficient evidence, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On several occasions in early 2009, Garcia sold to Bruce Petrovich silver dollar 

coins purporting to be issued by the United States Department of the Treasury. 

After purchasing the coins, Petrovich had them tested for authenticity and 

discovered they were counterfeit. Petrovich said Garcia “conned [him] out of 

all [his] life savings” by selling him the coins, which amounted to $360,000.00. 

Transcript at 31.

[3] The State charged Garcia with forgery and theft, both Class C felonies, and 

counterfeiting, a Class D felony. The State and Garcia reached a plea 

agreement pursuant to which Garcia would plead guilty to forgery, the State 
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would dismiss the remaining counts, and the parties agreed “they are free to 

fully argue their respective positions as to the sentence to be imposed by the 

Court; [h]owever, there shall be a cap of [s]ixty six (66) months (or 5.5 years).” 

Appendix at 46. The trial court accepted Garcia’s guilty plea, and following a 

sentencing hearing at which both Garcia and Petrovich gave statements, 

sentenced him to sixty-six months in DOC. The trial court also entered a 

judgment in the amount of $360,000.00 against Garcia in favor of Petrovich. 

Discussion and Decision

I. Inappropriate Sentence

[4] Garcia first contends his sentence of sixty-six months is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of his offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)

provides: “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” The defendant bears the burden of persuading this court that his or 

her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind.

2006). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate turns on “the culpability 

of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and 

myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 

N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The principal role of appellate review of 

sentences is to attempt to “leaven the outliers . . . .” Id. at 1225.
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[5] As to the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point the 

legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. 

Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Garcia was convicted of Class C felony forgery, 

which carries a possible sentence of two to eight years, with an advisory 

sentence of four years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(a). Forgery is defined as making, 

uttering, or possessing a written instrument, with intent to defraud, in such a 

manner that it purports to have been made by authority of one who did not give 

authority. Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(b)(4) (2006). Although Garcia seemingly did 

not make the coins himself, there were several transactions through which a 

great number of coins and a large amount of money changed hands. This is a 

severe example of forgery that caused serious financial damage to the victim, 

who lost his “life savings that was for retirement” on the transactions. Tr. at 31.

[6] As to Garcia’s character, we note in his favor that he entered a plea of guilty, 

expressed his willingness to repay his victim, and gave the victim several pieces 

of jewelry for that purpose prior to sentencing. However, he also has an 

extensive criminal history which dates back to 1986 and includes multiple 

misdemeanor and felony convictions. He has convictions for burglary, theft, 

and possession of stolen goods or property. He has federal convictions for 

forged or counterfeit obligations and for dealing in counterfeit obligations. And 

as part of the plea agreement in this case, he simultaneously entered a plea of 

guilty to forgery against another victim to whom he had sold counterfeit coins

in 2012. The significance of a criminal history varies based on the gravity, 

nature, proximity, and number of prior offenses as related to the current 
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offense. Bryant v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (Ind. 2006). In this case, the 

nature and number of Garcia’s other criminal offenses weighs heavily against 

him. 

[7] Garcia has not carried his burden of persuading this court that his sentence is 

inappropriate. Both the nature of the offense and Garcia’s character support 

the sixty-six month sentence imposed by the trial court.

II. Restitution Order

[8] Garcia also contends the trial court abused its discretion in entering a restitution 

order in the amount of $360,000.00. Specifically, he challenges the evidence 

supporting the amount of the order. 

[9] A trial court has the authority to order a defendant convicted of a crime to 

make restitution to the victim of the crime. Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3(a). An order 

of restitution is within the trial court’s discretion and will be reversed only for 

an abuse of that discretion. Kays v. State, 963 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ind. 2012). 

Under this abuse of discretion standard, we will affirm the trial court’s order if 

there is any evidence supporting the decision. Smith v. State, 990 N.E.2d 517, 

520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[10] The trial court “shall base its restitution order upon a consideration of . . . 

property damages of the victim incurred as a result of the crime, based on the 

actual cost of repair (or replacement if repair is inappropriate)[.]” Ind. Code § 

35-50-5-3(a)(1). A restitution order must reflect the actual loss suffered by the 

victim, which is a factual matter that can only be determined by the 
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presentation of evidence. Smith, 990 N.E.2d at 520. “Evidence supporting a 

restitution order is sufficient if it affords a reasonable basis for estimating loss 

and does not subject the trier of fact to mere speculation or conjecture.” 

Guzman v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1125, 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quotation 

omitted). The victim’s in-court testimony may be sufficient to support a 

restitution order. Blixt v. State, 872 N.E.2d 149, 153-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)

(noting testimony of minor victim’s mother at sentencing hearing that family’s 

out-of-pocket expenses for psychiatric treatment precipitated by defendant’s 

crime totaled $5,935.40 was sufficient to support restitution order in that 

amount).

[11] Restitution was not specifically addressed by the plea agreement entered into by 

the parties in this case. The amount Petrovich paid for the coins was not part of 

the factual basis to which the parties stipulated, and the pre-sentence 

investigation report did not include a victim impact statement addressing 

Petrovich’s loss due to Garcia’s crime or his desire for restitution. Petrovich did 

appear at Garcia’s sentencing hearing to give a victim impact statement, but he 

was not placed under oath. His statement, in total, is as follows:

[State]: . . . Please let the Judge know your feelings today.

[Petrovich]: Okay. Well, Mr. Garcia was supposedly a friend 

that I’ve known for several years and he conned me out of all my 

life savings that was for retirement. I started to work when I was 

14 and I worked two jobs my entire life so I could have a nice 

retirement, and he took it all away from me, so --

[Court]: How much was that?

[Petrovich]: $360,000.

[Court]: And how did he do that?
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[Petrovich]: By selling me some coins, and of course, they were 

counterfeit . . . . And what I’m really looking for is restitution.

[Court]: . . . You understand that he’s probably not in a position 

to pay you back; right?

[Petrovich]: Right. You could give him work release and he 

could make some money until it’s paid back.

Tr. at 31-32.1 Garcia also spoke at his sentencing hearing, stating he had 

offered to pay Petrovich back: “I gave him a couple diamond rings through my 

business that were worth some money, not what he wanted back, but I was 

willing to pay him back, no question about that.” Id. at 39. The State requested 

the trial court enter a judgment in Petrovich’s favor for restitution in the 

amount of $360,000 so “that can always hang over his head and hopefully one 

day Mr. Petrovich will be reimbursed.” Id. at 38. Garcia objected to the 

request for restitution because there were “no documents to support the actual 

valuation of what they’re asking for and what was – what they’re out, outside of 

what they’ve said.” Id. at 46.

[12] The trial court clearly had authority to enter a restitution order when sentencing 

Garcia, especially given Garcia’s stated willingness to repay Petrovich. 

However, the only evidence supporting the amount of the order is Petrovich’s 

 

1 A trial court can order restitution as a condition of probation or as a part of defendant’s sentence wholly 

apart from probation. Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. When the trial 

court enters an order of restitution as a condition of probation, the court is required to inquire into the 

defendant’s ability to pay and to fix the manner of payment. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(a)(6). However, 

“when restitution is ordered as part of an executed sentence, an inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay is 

not required” because it is merely a money judgment and the defendant cannot be imprisoned for nonpayment. Pearson v. State, 883 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ind. 2008). Here, the trial court ordered restitution as part of 

Garcia’s executed sentence and no inquiry into his ability to pay the judgment was required.
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unsworn testimony unsupported by any documentation. See Iltzsch v. State, 972 

N.E.2d 409, 414 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding the unsworn and unsupported 

hearsay statements of the victim in the pre-sentence investigation report were 

insufficient to support the restitution order and noting the State could prove the 

claimed restitution amount in a number of ways, including sworn testimony 

from the victim at the trial or sentencing, an affidavit from the victim, or 

documentation of claimed damages), vacated on other grounds, 981 N.E.2d 55, 56

(Ind. 2013) (agreeing as to the sufficiency of the evidence that “the better 

practice for the State would have been to present more substantial evidence 

about the nature and extent of the property damage as outlined by the Court of 

Appeals”). Further, Garcia indicated that he had already made some amount 

of restitution to Petrovich, which may or may not have been accounted for in 

Petrovich’s figure. Given the late hour at which the subject of restitution arose, 

it is not surprising that Garcia did not offer more specific evidence of his 

“payment,” but there is no indication the trial court took that into account in 

any way when entering the restitution order.

[13] On this evidence or lack thereof, the trial court abused its discretion in entering 

a restitution order in the amount of $360,000.00 in favor of Petrovich. In 

Iltzsch, our supreme court held that remand for a new restitution hearing is 

appropriate in these circumstances. 981 N.E.2d at 56-57. Accordingly, this 

case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to conduct a new restitution 

hearing at which both the State and Garcia may present any additional 

evidence bearing on the restitution order. 
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Conclusion

[14] Garcia has failed in his burden to persuade us that his sixty-six month sentence 

is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. We 

therefore affirm his sentence. However, the restitution order is not supported 

by sufficient evidence of actual loss to the victim of $360,000.00, and we 

therefore reverse that order and remand for a new restitution hearing.

[15] Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

Vaidik, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.