UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4066

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MIGUEL PINEDA-SALAS, a/k/a Gerardo Iruegas,

a/k/a Miguel Angel-Salas, a/k/a Fidencio

Damian-Alcayo,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle

District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,

District Judge. (1:05-cr-00151-FWB-1)

Submitted: February 26, 2007 Decided: April 2, 2007

Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Leslie Carter Rawls, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Clifton Thomas Barrett,

Angela Hewlett Miller, Assistant United States Attorneys,

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Miguel Pineda-Salas appeals the district court’s order

sentencing him to 198 months’ imprisonment following his guilty

plea to a single count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine

hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A)

(2000). Pineda-Salas’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance

with Anders v. California, 396 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that she

finds no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning the

validity of Pineda-Salas’s guilty plea, the effectiveness of his

counsel, and the reasonableness of his sentence. The Government

did not file an answering brief. Although informed of his right to

file a supplemental brief, Pineda-Salas did not file a brief. We

have reviewed the record and, finding no reversible error, affirm

Pineda-Salas’s conviction and sentence.

Appellate counsel first questions whether the district

court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Pineda-Salas’s

guilty plea. Because Pineda-Salas did not move to withdraw his

guilty plea, we review any challenge to the adequacy of the Rule 11

hearing for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517,

525 (4th Cir. 2002). We find no plain error in the district

court’s acceptance of Pineda-Salas’s guilty plea. 

Pineda-Salas also argues that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

are not cognizible on direct appeal unless the record conclusively
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establishes ineffective assistance. United States v. Richardson,

195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). To allow for adequate

development of the record, a defendant generally must bring his

ineffective assistance claims in a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2000). United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997).

An exception exists where the record conclusively shows ineffective

assistance. Id. Here, the record on its face does not

conclusively demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.

Pineda-Salas also contests the reasonableness of his

sentence. A sentence imposed in a system of advisory sentencing

guidelines must be “within the statutorily prescribed range and

. . . reasonable.” United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47

(4th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). A sentence imposed

within a correctly calculated guideline range is presumptively

reasonable. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). 

We find Pineda-Salas’s sentence of 198 months’

imprisonment was reasonable because it “was selected pursuant to a

reasoned process in accordance with the law, in which the court did

not give excessive weight to any relevant factor, and which

effected a fair and just result in light of the relevant facts and

law.” Green, 436 F.3d at 457. Accordingly, because the sentence

was within the advisory guideline range and was determined
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according to a reasoned process, the challenge to its

reasonableness fails.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in

this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We

therefore affirm Pineda-Salas’s conviction and sentence. This

court requires that counsel inform Pineda-Salas, in writing, of the

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for

further review. If Pineda-Salas requests that a petition be filed,

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Pineda-Salas. We dispense with oral argument because

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED