CLD-176 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 15-3816

___________ ANTHONY JOHNSON, on behalf of non party African Americans similarly situated

v. THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, as a person; GARY GLAZER, J.; JOHN M. YOUNGE, J.; THEODORE A. MCKEE, J. ; CYNTHIA M. RUFE, J.; WILLIAM J. DITTER, J.; WILLIAM H. YOHN, J.; TH E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Viz.

U.S.; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; U. S. DISTRICT COURT THIRD CIRCUIT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PA, located in Ph iladelphia; L. FELIPE RESTREPO, J.; AARON SHOTLAND, Assistan t City Solicitor Philadel phia; THE PHILADELPHIA

DAILY NEWSPAPER; THOMAS N. O'NEILL, J. (all defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities) Anthony Johnson, Appellant

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-05459) District Judge Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro

____________________________________ Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursua nt to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 March 10, 2016
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE , Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: March 18, 2016)2 _________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM Pro se appellant Anthony Johnson appeal s from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint as malicious. We will dismiss th e appeal as frivolous.
I. Johnson initiated this ac tion in October 2015 agains t several state and federal judges, and other governmental entities and indi viduals, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by prohibiting him from re presenting others in court, despite his obtaining their power of attorney. Johnson, who is not an attorney, appears to claim some constitutional right to represent others by virtue of possessing a power of attorney. On October 8, 2015, the District C ourt granted Johnson’s petition to proceed in forma pauperis and then dismissed his complaint as malicious, noting that it duplicates a case Johnson filed in the same District approx imately two months earlier, asserting the same claim against different judges.
II. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint as frivolous or ma licious for abuse of di scretion. See Denton

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.3 v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Be cause Johnson is pro ceeding IFP, we must dismiss the appeal if it is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The District Court properly dismissed Johnson’s claim as malicious because it duplicates a pending suit. Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5 th Cir.1993) (noting that a complaint is malicious when it “duplicates allegations of another pending federal lawsuit by the same plaintiff”). The District Court also accurately noted that Johnson’s claim is legally frivolous because it is prem ised on an “indisputably meritless legal theory.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 19 95). The Constitution guarantees no right to represent others, 1 and our rule barring non-lawyers from representing others remains. See Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 88 2-83 (3d Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we will dismiss the appe al as legally frivolous under § 1915(e).

1 In his Argument in Support of Appeal, Jo hnson argues that Penn sylvania’s prohibition of the unauthorized practice of law “is nothi ng more than legalizing the ‘Sedition Act.’” He does not identify any plausi ble constitutional basis for a ri ght to represent others or address the duplicative nature of his suit.