[Cite as In re B.G., 2021-Ohio-4250.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HANCOCK COUNTY 

 

IN RE: 

 CASE NO. 5-21-13 

 B.G., JR., 

ALLEGED DEPENDENT CHILD 

 O P I N I O N 

[R.H. - APPELLANT] 

 

IN RE: 

 CASE NO. 5-21-17 

 B.G., JR., 

ALLEGED DEPENDENT CHILD 

 O P I N I O N 

[B.G., SR. - APPELLANT] 

 

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court 

Juvenile Division 

Trial Court No. 20203003 

Judgments Affirmed 

Date of Decision: December 6, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Angela M. Elliot for Appellant, R.H. 

Linda Gabriele for Appellant, B.G., Sr. 

Justin Kahle for Appellee 

 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-2- 

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. 

{¶1} Mother-Appellant R.H. (“R.H.”) and Father-Appellant B.G. 

(“B.G.Sr.”) appeal the judgment of the Juvenile Division of the Hancock County 

Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the trial court erred (1) in deciding to grant 

permanent custody to the Child Protective Services Unit of Hancock County Job 

and Family Services (“CPSU”); and (2) in finding that the CPSU made reasonable 

efforts to accommodate the appellants’ intellectual disabilities by diligent case 

planning. For the reasons set forth below, the judgments of the trial court are 

affirmed. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} B.G. (“B.G.Jr.”) is the child of B.G.Sr. and R.H. Doc. 1. B.G.Jr. was 

born prematurely in December of 2019. Doc. 1. At that time, B.G.Sr. had a “violent 

outburst * * * toward medical staff and security * * * had to remove him from the 

unit where [B.G.Jr.] * * * is located.” Doc. 1. Further, R.H. and B.G.Sr. were 

“unable to care for B.G.Jr. or demonstrate that they [were] * * * able to understand 

how to care for [B.G.Jr.] * * * and follow through with his care.” Doc. 1. Tr. 43-

44. R.H. and B.G.Sr. were also, at that time, without a home. Doc. 1. Tr. 43. 

{¶3} The CPSU requested an ex parte order from the trial court, alleging that 

R.H. and B.G.Sr. were “developmentally delayed”; currently homeless; and unable 

to give proper care to B.G.Jr. Doc. 1. On January 13, 2020, the trial court granted 

the requested ex parte order. Doc. 1. On January 13, 2020, the CPSU filed a 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-3- 

complaint that alleged B.G.Jr. was a dependent child. Doc. 2. On January 14, 2020, 

the trial court issued an order that determined that B.G.Jr. “be placed in the 

Emergency Temporary Custody of [the] CPSU.” (Emphasis removed.) Doc. 8. 

{¶4} On February 27, 2020, the trial court found that B.G.Jr. was a dependent 

child. Doc. 23. On March 12, 2020, the trial court held a dispositional hearing and 

determined that the CPSU should retain temporary custody of B.G.Jr. Doc. 26. On 

December 21, 2020, the CPSU filed a motion for permanent custody. Doc. 32. On 

April 12, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on this motion. Tr. 1. On April 26, 

2021, the trial court granted the CPSU’s motion for permanent custody. Doc. 59. 

{¶5} R.H. filed her notice of appeal on April 27, 2021.1

 Doc. 63. On appeal, 

she raises the following two assignments of error: 

R.H.’s First Assignment of Error 

The trial court’s decision to grant permanent custody to the 

agency is against the manifest weight of the evidence as the 

appellee did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 

minor child should not be reunited with the mother. 

R.H.’s Second Assignment of Error 

The trial court committed prejudicial error in finding that the

Hancock County Children Services Board made reasonable 

efforts and diligent case planning to accommodate mother’s 

intellectual disabilities. 

1

 This case was erroneously processed as two separate appeals. For this reason, there are two judgment 

entries and two case numbers, even though these appeals are based on one child, one judgment entry, and 

one record. 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-4- 

On May 3, 2021, B.G.Sr. filed his notice of appeal. Doc. 71. On appeal, he raises 

the following two assignments of error: 

B.G.Sr.’s First Assignment of Error 

The trial court’s decision to grant permanent custody to the 

agency is against the manifest weight of the evidence as the 

appellee did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 

minor child should not be reunited with his father. 

B.G.Sr.’s Second Assignment of Error 

The trial court committed prejudicial error in finding that the

Hancock County Children Services Board made reasonable 

efforts and diligent case planning to accommodate father’s 

intellectual disabilities. 

Because R.H. and B.G.Sr.’s first assignments of error contain virtually the same 

arguments, we will address them in one analysis. For the same reason, we will 

address R.H. and B.G.Sr.’s second assignments of error together. 

R.H. and B.G.Sr.’s First Assignments of Error 

{¶6} R.H. and B.G.Sr. argue that the trial court’s decision to grant permanent 

custody to the CPSU was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Legal Standard 

{¶7} “The right to raise one’s child is a basic and essential right.” In re C.C., 

3d Dist. Marion No. 9-20-06, 2020-Ohio-5138, ¶ 14. However, this “right[] may be 

terminated under appropriate circumstances and when the trial court has met all due 

process requirements.” Id. “When considering a motion for permanent custody of 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-5- 

a child, the trial court must comply with the statutory requirements set forth in R.C. 

2151.414.” In re A.M., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-14-46, 2015-Ohio-2740, ¶ 13. 

{¶8} “R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) establishes a two-part test for courts to apply 

when determining whether to grant a motion for permanent custody: (1) the trial 

court must find that one of the circumstances in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) applies, 

and (2) the trial court must find that permanent custody is in the best interest of the 

child.” In re Y.W., 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-60, 2017-Ohio-4218, ¶ 10. R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1) reads, in its relevant part, as follows: 

(B)(1) * * * [T]he court may grant permanent custody of a child

to a movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant 

to division (A) of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, 

that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent

custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for 

permanent custody and that any of the following apply: 

(a) * * * [T]he child cannot be placed with either of the child’s 

parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the 

child’s parents. 

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). To determine if a child can or cannot be placed with either 

of the child’s parents within a reasonable time, the trial court must evaluate the case 

under the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E). In re A.F., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-

11-27, 2012-Ohio-1137, ¶ 54. 

If one or more of the factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E) is

found to be present by clear and convincing evidence, the trial

court shall find that the child cannot be placed with the parents 

within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with

the parents. 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-6- 

Id. R.C. 2151.414(E) includes the following factors that are relevant to this case: 

(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home 

and notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts 

by the agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that

initially caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent 

has failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy 

the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s 

home. In determining whether the parents have substantially 

remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental 

utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social 

and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made 

available to the parents for the purpose of changing parental 

conduct to allow them to resume and maintain parental duties. 

(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual 

disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the 

parent that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide 

an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time 

and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the 

hearing pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes 

of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code; 

* * * 

(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward 

the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate 

with the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an 

unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the 

child; 

R.C. 2151.414(E). “‘If the trial court determines that any provision enumerated in 

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies,’ it must proceed to the second prong of the test * * *.” 

In re K.M.S., 3d Dist. Marion Nos. 9-15-37, 9-15-38, and 9-15-39, 2017-Ohio-142, 

¶ 23, quoting In re A.F., supra, at ¶ 55. 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-7- 

{¶9} To determine whether a grant of permanent custody is in the child’s best 

interests, the trial court must consider the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), which 

includes the following factors that are relevant to this case: 

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the

child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-ofhome providers, and any other person who may significantly 

affect the child; 

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or 

through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the 

maturity of the child; 

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child 

has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children 

services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or 

more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the 

child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 

twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period 

and, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the

Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody

of an equivalent agency in another state; 

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and 

whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant 

of permanent custody to the agency; 

* * * 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). “R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to 

expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through 

(e). Consideration is all the statute requires.” In re A.M., --- Ohio St.3d ---, 2020-

Ohio-5102, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 31. 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-8- 

{¶10} “If the trial court makes the statutorily required determinations, a 

reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s decision unless it is not supported by 

clear and convincing evidence.” In re E.B., 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-21-09 and 5-

21-10, 2021-Ohio-3641, ¶ 17. 

Clear and convincing evidence is more than a preponderance of 

the evidence but not as much evidence as required to establish 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as in a criminal case; rather, it is 

evidence which provides the trier of fact with a firm belief or

conviction as to the facts sought to be established. 

In re A.T., 3d Dist. Crawford Nos. 3-19-13, 3-19-14, and 3-19-15, 2020-Ohio-2781, 

¶ 23, quoting In re H.M.K., 3d Dist. Wyandot Nos. 16-12-15 and 16-12-16, 2013-

Ohio-4317, ¶ 42. Further, 

When an appellate court reviews whether a trial court’s 

permanent custody decision is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, the court ‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines 

whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] 

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of

justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered.’ 

In re Dn.R., 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-20-06, 2020-Ohio-6794, ¶ 16, quoting Eastley 

v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20, quoting 

Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115, 750 N.E.2d 176 (9th Dist. 2001). 

Legal Analysis 

{¶11} The trial court found that three of the factors listed in R.C. 

2151.414(E) were applicable in this case. Doc. 59. First, the trial court found that 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-9- 

“the parent[s] ha[ve] failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the 

conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home.” Doc. 59, 

quoting R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). 

[R.H.] and [B.G.Sr.] * * * had four objectives on their case plan 

in addition to visitation. Those four objectives included 1) 

maintaining a safe and stable home; 2) completing parent 

education; 3) completing gain assessments and 4) cooperating 

[with] the Developmental [D]isabilities and SSA service 

providers. 

Doc. 59. The trial court found that the parents had found a home that was 

“physically safe.” Doc. 59. Tyler Layton (“Layton”), a caseworker for Hancock 

Job and Family Services, testified that, although R.H. and B.G.Sr. had lived in four 

different residences since the CPSU had been involved with B.G.Jr., the house 

where they were currently living was safe. Tr. 52, 56. 

{¶12} However, Layton testified that R.H. and B.G.Sr. lived with a person, 

Stormy Heath (“Heath”), who concerned the CPSU because of her prior 

involvement in an unrelated children’s services case. Tr. 52. Further, Karmen 

Lauth (“Lauth”), a supervisor at Hancock County Job and Family Services, 

explained that, in this prior case, there were issues with “domestic violence between 

Ms. Heath and her former boyfriend.” Tr. 121. However, Lauth also stated that 

Heath was no longer with this particular boyfriend. Tr. 122. 

{¶13} As to parenting education, Layton testified that R.H. and B.G.Sr. had 

not completed the “parent education and home coaching regarding infants and 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-10- 

toddlers neglect issues and discipline.” Tr. 57-58. He also stated that the parents 

had not completed the GAIN assessment to address any mental health or substance 

abuse issues that she might have. Tr. 58. Layton then testified that R.H. and B.G.Sr. 

had refused to cooperate with the Board of Developmental Disabilities or the Social 

Security Administration. Tr. 58-59. He stated that the parents “have both been 

outspoken in the fact that they do not need DD services, or SSA, for that matter. 

They * * * have completely disregarded that, those services.” Tr. 59. 

{¶14} Second, the trial court found that “[b]oth parents suffer from an 

intellectual disability.” Doc. 59. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(2). At the hearing, Morgan 

Lehman (“Lehman”), a caseworker at the Harmony House supervised visitation 

facility, testified that the parents struggled to change B.G.Jr.’s diapers during their 

visits and did not know how to hold a baby. Tr. 21, 36, 39. Further, Layton testified 

that R.H. did not know how to respond to B.G.Jr.’s cries; was inconsistent in 

visiting; and was not bonded with the baby. Tr. 63, 65. Similarly, he testified that 

B.G.Sr. had not bonded with the child; that B.G.Jr. would not stop crying with him; 

and that he inconsistent in visitation. Tr. 65-66. However, neither parent, according 

to Layton’s testimony, took advantage of the parenting education services that had 

been offered to them. Tr. 57-58. 

{¶15} The trial court also noted that Lehman’s testimony indicated that R.H. 

and B.G.Sr. were not able “to adequately parent during the infrequent visitations 

that the parents attended.” Doc. 59. While the extent of their inability to care for 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-11- 

B.G.Jr. was unclear because they “refus[ed] to cooperate with services,” the trial 

court found that the parents “remained steadfast in their position that they do not 

need any help” and that “[i]t does not appear that the parents * * * will accept help 

anytime soon.” Doc. 59. For these reasons, the trial court found that R.H. and 

B.G.Sr. were “unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child” because 

they each have an “intellectual disability.” Doc. 59. 

{¶16} Third, the trial court found that R.H. and B.G.Sr. have “demonstrated 

a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or 

communicate with the child when able to do so * * *.” Doc. 59, quoting R.C. 

2151.414(E)(4). Lehman testified that R.H. and B.G.Sr. did not consistently come 

to visitation with B.G.Jr. and had three suspensions of visitation because of her 

failure to attend visitation. Tr. 25. Layton also testified that R.H. and B.G.Sr. were 

not consistent in their visitation, coming to only 54% of the visits. Tr. 85. He stated 

that they had issues securing transportation but would not notify the CPSU of their 

need for transportation until “the day of” their visitation appointment. Tr. 69. The 

CPSU had informed them of various transportation services that could assist them. 

Tr. 68. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that B.G.Jr. could not “be 

placed with his parents within a reasonable time and should not be placed with 

them.” Doc. 59. 

{¶17} The trial court then considered whether the award of permanent 

custody to the CPSU was in the child’s best interests under the five factors listed in 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-12- 

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Doc. 59. First, regarding B.G.Jr.’s interactions with his 

parents, Lehman testified that B.G.Jr. cried throughout the supervised visits with his 

parents and had to be removed repeatedly to address this. Tr. 19, 38. Layton also 

testified that, when B.G.Jr. cries throughout their visitation, his parents do not 

understand how to respond to or help him. Tr. 63. 

{¶18} Further, Lehman testified that B.G.Sr. and R.H. struggle to change 

B.G.Jr.’s clothes and diapers. Tr. 37-38. On one occasion, B.G.Jr.’s head hit the 

floor three times while R.H. was trying to change his diaper. Tr. 37. Based on this 

testimony, the trial court concluded that 

[t]he parents have struggled to parent the child during the 

visitations. [B.G.Jr.] * * * often cries throughout his visits with 

his parents. Furthermore, the parents have been unable to keep

[B.G.Jr.] * * * safe during visitations and allowed his head to hit 

the floor. The child is bonded with his foster parents and they 

often remain at the visitation center and calm [B.G.Jr.] * * * when 

he cannot be calmed during the visit with his parents. 

Doc. 59, citing R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a). 

{¶19} Second, as to the wishes of the child, the trial court stated that B.G.Jr. 

could not express his preferences as a one year old but did note that his guardian ad 

litem had recommended that permanent custody be granted to the CPSU. Doc. 59, 

citing R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b). See Doc. 56. Third, as to the child’s custodial 

history, B.G.Jr. had been in the temporary custody of the CPSU since January of 

2020. Doc. 1, 8. The trial court found that “[t]he parents have not progressed past 

supervised visitations” and again noted that they “struggle to care for [B.G.Jr.’s] * 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-13- 

* * needs during the supervised visitations.” Doc. 59, citing R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1)(c). 

{¶20} Fourth, as to whether B.G.Jr. could obtain a secure placement without 

granting the CPSU permanent custody, Layton affirmed that B.G.Jr. needed “a 

legally-secure placement” and that this could not happen unless the CPSU received 

permanent custody. Tr. 70. Leah Cole (“Cole”), B.G.Jr.’s guardian ad litem, stated 

in her report that, “[e]xcept for a relatively short period (about two months), 

[B.G.Sr. and R.H.] * * * had lived under the supervision and care of others.” Doc. 

56. Cole testified that 

during their brief time of living on their own, they refused to work 

with their SSA providers and their waiver providers, which is 

part of what began this process and put their residence in 

jeopardy. 

Tr. 127. She also testified that B.G.Sr. and R.H. have “told [her] * * * that they 

don’t believe they need services from SSAs” and that they “have not complied with 

case plan services.” Tr. 133. Layton similarly testified that B.G.Sr. and R.H. have 

not progressed in their case plan. Tr. 49, 61, 66, 91. The trial court then concluded 

that R.H. and B.G.Sr. 

failed to make the necessary changes in their life and appear 

steadfast in their refusal to accept help. Their current level of 

parenting results in visits that cause the child to cry 

uncontrollably and put his safety at risk. 

Doc. 59, citing R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d). See also In re R.L., 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 

27214 and 27233, 2014-Ohio-3117, ¶ 34 (stating that “although case plan 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-14- 

compliance may be relevant to a trial court’s best interest determination, it is not 

dispositive of it”). 

{¶21} Further, Layton testified that the CPSU examined various kinship 

placement options. Tr. 72. The CPSU looked into whether the child could be placed 

with B.G.Sr.’s parents but found that B.G.Sr. has a “very volatile relationship” with 

them that was “broken, beyond repair.” Tr. 72. Two other family members “opted 

out as an option” because of their advanced aged. Tr. 73. The final kinship 

placement option had a prior history with children’s services and, for that reason, 

was not approved for a home study. Tr. 74. 

{¶22} Lauth testified that R.H. and B.G.Sr. wanted Heath to receive custody 

of B.G.Jr. Tr. 114. See Tr. 143. However, Heath had no prior relationship or 

connection with B.G.Jr. Tr. 114. Further, because of her history with children’s 

services, Heath was not considered for a home study. Tr. 116-117. Further, Layton 

testified that B.G.Jr. was bonded to his current foster parents. Tr. 76. The trial court 

found that the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), (c), and (d) indicated that a grant 

of permanent custody to the CPSU was in B.G.Jr.’s best interests. Doc. 59. 

{¶23} However, R.H. and B.G.Sr. argue that the trial court cannot grant 

permanent custody to the CPSU based on their “intellectual disabilities” alone. 

R.H.’s Brief, 6. B.G.Sr.’s Brief, 12. They direct our attention to In re D.A. wherein 

the Ohio Supreme Court held that, “[w]hen determining the best interest of a child 

under R.C. 2151.414(D) at a permanent-custody hearing, a trial court may not base 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-15- 

its decision solely on the limited cognitive abilities of the parents.” In re D.A., 113 

Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, at syllabus. 

{¶24} The case presently before this Court is distinguishable from In re D.A. 

At the outset, we note that, “[i]n In re D.A., * * * the parents complied with every 

aspect of their case plan except one, which the agency suspended * * *.” In re M.S., 

2d Dist. Clark No. 2008 CA 70, 2009-Ohio-3123, ¶ 43, citing In re D.A., ¶ 36. 

Turning to the case before us, the record indicates that R.H. and B.G.Sr. “did not 

comply with their case plan and progress enough in the case plan.” Tr. 49, 61, 66, 

91, 133. See Doc. 56, 59. In re Cunningham Children, 3d Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-

08-27, 13-08-28, 13-08-29, and 13-08-30, 2008-Ohio-5938, ¶ 13; In re Kinkel, 5th 

Dist. Stark No. 2006CA00358, 2007-Ohio-2322, ¶ 29. Thus, they failed to take the 

steps that were necessary to remedy the issues that led to B.G.Jr. being removed 

from their custody. 

{¶25} We also note that the record does not indicate that the trial court made 

its decision to grant permanent custody solely on the basis of R.H. and B.G.Sr.’s 

intellectual disabilities. See In re D.A. at ¶ 37. The trial court found that three 

factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) supported the conclusion that a grant of permanent 

custody to the CPSU was in the child’s best interests. Doc. 59. In re M.N., 4th Dist. 

Athens No. 08CA9, 2008-Ohio-4821, ¶ 23 (finding that, unlike in In re D.A., “the 

trial court appropriately considered all of the best interest factors”). In particular, 

the trial court emphasized the unwillingness of the parents to engage with the 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-16- 

services that would have given them the skills and assistance that they needed to 

provide B.G.Jr. with a stable home. Doc. 59, citing R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d). 

{¶26} Further, the trial court found that R.H. and B.G.Sr. had failed to 

progress beyond supervised visits; struggled to care for B.G.Jr. during their 

visitation; and “put [B.G.Jr.’s] * * * safety at risk.” Doc. 59. In her Guardian ad 

Litem report, Cole’s list of concerns included that R.H. and B.G.Sr. were “explosive 

and volatile”; had “impaired decision-making”; and have “difficulty maintaining 

hygiene.” Doc. 56. Cole’s report also stated the following: 

When given an opportunity to be independent, [B.G.Sr.] * * * and 

[R.H.] * * * lived in a substandard environment that include filth, 

rotting food, urine and feces, and bugs. They did not ask for or 

accept assistance when circumstances were at their worst. They

refused service providers from the Lucas County Board of 

D[evelopmental] D[isabilities]. They were in the process of being 

evicted when a family member intervened. 

Doc. 56. See Tr. 127. See Doc. 22. Thus, in this case, “objective evidence existed 

to show that the statute was satisfied.” In re N.M., 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 26693 

and 26719, 2016-Ohio-318, ¶ 30, quoting In re D.A., supra, at ¶ 37. 

{¶27} Having examined the evidence in the record, we conclude that R.H. 

and B.G.Sr. have not demonstrated that the trial court’s decision to grant the CPSU 

permanent custody of B.G.Jr. was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

There is competent, credible evidence in the record that supports the findings of the 

trial court. Thus, R.H.’s first assignment of error is overruled, and B.G.Sr.’s first 

assignment of error is overruled. 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-17- 

R.H. and B.G.Sr.’s Second Assignments of Error 

{¶28} R.H. and B.G.Sr. argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the 

CPSU engaged in reasonable case planning and diligent efforts to reunite the family. 

Legal Standard 

{¶29} In the process of determining whether a child should be removed from 

his or her home, the trial court 

[s]hall determine whether the public children services agency * * 

* that filed the complaint in the case, removed the child from 

home, has custody of the child, or will be given custody of the child 

has made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child

from the child’s home, to eliminate the continued removal of the 

child from the child’s home, or to make it possible for the child to 

return safely home. The agency shall have the burden of proving 

that it has made those reasonable efforts. 

R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). In interpreting this provision, the Ohio Supreme Court held: 

R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) does not apply in a hearing on a motion for

permanent custody filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413. However, 

except for some narrowly defined statutory exceptions, the state 

must still make reasonable efforts to reunify the family during the 

child-custody proceedings prior to the termination of parental 

rights. If the agency has not established that reasonable efforts 

have been made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent 

custody, then it must demonstrate such efforts at that time. 

In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 43. 

Case plans are the tool that child protective service agencies use 

to facilitate the reunification of families who, for whatever reason, 

be it abuse, neglect or otherwise, have been temporarily 

separated. Case plans establish individual goals, concerns and the 

steps that the parent and agency will take in order to achieve 

reunification. 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-18- 

In re Evans, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-01-75, 2001 WL 1333979, *3 (Oct. 30, 2001). 

‘Agencies have an affirmative duty to diligently pursue efforts to 

achieve the goals in the case plan.’ [In re T.S., 3d Dist. Mercer 

Nos. 10-14-13, 10-14-14, and 10-14-15, 2015-Ohio-1184, ¶ 27], 

citing In re Evans at *3. ‘Nevertheless, the issue is not whether 

there was anything more that [the agency] could have done, but 

whether the [agency’s] case planning and efforts were reasonable 

and diligent under the circumstances of this case.’ [In re T.S.], 

quoting In re Leveck, [3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-02-52, 5-02-53., 

and 5-02-54,] 2003-Ohio-1269, ¶ 10]. “‘Reasonable efforts’ does 

not mean all available efforts. Otherwise, there would always be 

an argument that one more additional service, no matter how 

remote, may have made reunification possible.” In re H.M.K., [3d 

Dist. Wyandot Nos. 16-12-15 and 16-12-16,] 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 95, 

quoting In re M.A.P., 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2012-08-164 and 

CA2012-08-165, 2013-Ohio-655, ¶ 47. ‘We also note that the 

statute provides that in determining whether reasonable efforts

were made, the child’s health and safety is paramount.’ In re T.S. 

at ¶ 27, citing R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). 

In re A.M., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-14-46, 2015-Ohio-2740, ¶ 25. 

{¶30} “We review under an abuse-of-discretion standard a trial court’s 

finding that an agency made reasonable efforts toward reunification.” In re A.M. at 

¶ 24. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment. Southern v. Scheu, 

3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-17-16, 2018-Ohio-1440, ¶ 10. Rather, to constitute an abuse 

of discretion, the trial court’s decision must be unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

capricious. Schroeder v. Niese, 2016-Ohio-8397, 78 N.E.3d 339, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). 

Legal Analysis 

{¶31} R.H. and B.G.Sr. argue that the CPSU did not accommodate their 

“apparent cognitive restrictions” by fully explaining the objectives in the case plan. 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-19- 

R.H.’s Brief, 8. However, at the hearing, Layton testified that he discussed the 

details of the case plan with the parents, saying “oftentimes, we would speak about 

like kind of priority, although I knew they needed to get all of it done, we would 

speak about what is the most important, * * * how to tackle the situation.” Tr. 101. 

He affirmed that he “didn’t just hand them the case plan” but went over the case 

plan with them multiple times. Tr. 101-102. 

{¶32} Further, Layton stated that he knew R.H. understood the case plan 

because, after the CPSU filed its motion for permanent custody, she called him on 

more than one occasion and 

actually went through all of her objectives on the phone * * *,

angrily, explaining that she has done * * * objective one through 

whatever it may be. 

She was wrong in that, but she explained to me each objective, 

and that she’s safe and stable housed now, she is going to be taking 

parenting classes, they’re taking some counseling, and they’re 

doing their medicine, and they don’t need DD services. 

Tr. 103. Layton testified that he explained to both R.H. and B.G.Sr. what was 

expected of them. Tr. 103. Cole also testified that R.H. and B.G.Sr. “have relayed 

to me very well what their case plan requires” and affirmed that they “understand 

what is being expected of them * * *.” Tr. 135. She concluded by saying that her 

“concern was that the services that they needed most, they were refusing * * *” and 

that they demonstrated “a lack of interest * * *.” Tr. 139, 127. 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-20- 

{¶33} Layton testified that the content of the case plan was fairly standard. 

Tr. 89, 97. After he was questioned about why two parents with developmental 

disabilities received a fairly standard case plan, he stated the following: 

The case plan was cultivated for the family based on what they 

were struggling with. I understand the cookie-cutter argument,

but the reality of the situation is they were struggling with 

parenting techniques, skills, they were struggling with having safe 

and stable housing, and ultimately, they were struggling with med 

management and working with DD services. None of those things 

have been done completely. 

Tr. 97. See Tr. 89-90. Layton testified that the CPSU made referrals for all of the 

services that R.H. and B.G.Sr. needed. Tr. 67. 

{¶34} However, Cole testified that she had experience working with people 

who had developmental disabilities, having been employed “in the MRDD field for 

seven, eight years * * *.” Tr. 125-126, 135. She then testified that she was involved 

in the formation of the case plan after the CPSU sought her input and had signed the 

case plan in February of 2020. Tr. 136, 138. Further, the record indicates that many 

of the case plan objectives that R.H. and B.G.Sr. refused to complete were generally 

those that were geared towards helping them to manage their developmental 

disabilities. Doc. 17. Tr. 58, 70, 139. 

{¶35} Having reviewed the materials in the record, we conclude that R.H. 

and B.G.Sr. have not demonstrated that the trial court erred in finding that the CPSU 

engaged in reasonable case planning and diligent efforts to reunite the family. The 

evidence in the record does not contain any indication that the trial court abused its 
Case Nos. 5-21-13 and 5-21-17 

-21- 

discretion in reaching this conclusion. Doc. 56. As such, R.H.’s second assignment 

of error is overruled, and B.G.Sr.’s second assignment of error is also overruled. 

Conclusion 

{¶36} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants in the particulars 

assigned and argued, the judgments of the Juvenile Division of the Hancock County 

Court of Common Pleas are affirmed. 

Judgments Affirmed 

ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/hls