ALD-256-E NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 15-2379

___________ IN RE: CHRISTI AN DIOR WOMACK, Petitioner

___________________ _________________ On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United States District Court for th e Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Related to E.D. Pa. Cr im. No. 2:13-cr-00206-001)

___________________ _________________ Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. June 30, 2015 Before: RENDELL , Circuit Judge (Opinion filed: July 1, 2015)

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM Christian Dior Womack, a.k.a. Gucci Pr ada, citing the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, pr esents a petition for a writ of mandamus. He describes claims relating to his criminal prosecution si milar to those he raised in a previous mandamus petition, which we denied. See In re Womack, No. 15-2 064, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9393 (3d Cir. June 5, 20 15) (per curiam). Essentially, he asserts that his criminal

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not2 prosecution, in which he pleade d guilty to charges of sex tr afficking of a minor and sex trafficking by force, was a “complex fraud.” He alleges that the judge, prosecutors, and his former counsel violated several federal stat utes by participating in his criminal case. Womack further alleges that his right, under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(1 ), “to be reasonably protected from the accused” is being violated by his deten tion in a maximum security prison. He asks us, in the “interest of” § 3771(a)(1), to “remove [him] from any further harm.” In his petition, he also appears to se ek “the right to be heard” under the CVRA and the right to initiate a criminal prosecution of (at least) the judge and prosecutors. In appropriate circumstances, mandamus relief pursuant to the CVRA is available under a standard that is different from, a nd less demanding than, that used in traditional mandamus proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771( d)(3); Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court, 435 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2 006); United States v. Rigas, 409 F.3d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 2005). However, relief under the CVRA is not available to Womack here. First, while we have not yet considered exactly what is mean t by the term “crime victim” under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2), see United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d 453, 462 & passim (D.N.J. 2009) (noting the same and providing a thorough overview of the caselaw discussing th e term), it is difficult to see how the term could apply to Womack under the circumst ances presented. However, even assuming that he could be considered a crime vic tim for whom mandamus and other relief is

constitute binding precedent.3 available under § 3771, he has in no way shown that he is being deprived of the rights accorded crime victims. Womack’s right to “reasonable protection from the accused” under § 3771(a) is in no way compromised in this case by his impris onment. The “right to be heard” that Womack seeks is a right to “be reasonably hear d at any public procee ding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proc eeding.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). However, there are no such pr oceedings involving those whom Womack accuses of committing crimes. Womack additi onally wants those pers ons he accuses of crimes to be prosecuted. Even if we believe d prosecution to be appropriate (which we do not), we cannot order their prosecution as some form of relief to him because nothing in the CVRA “shall be construed to impair th e prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer un der [her] direction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). We note additionally that Womack appear s to have applied for relief in the first instance in the wrong court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). Ther e is no evidence that Womack filed a motion seeking relief under the CVRA in the appropriate district court before he filed his petition for a writ of mandamus. For these reasons, we deny Womack ’s petition for a writ of mandamus.