alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 1999
ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K OF BUILDING MATERIALS CORPORATION OF AMERICA AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         927314
<NAME>                        BUILDING MATERIALS CORPORATION OF AMERICA
<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000

<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                              55,952
<SECURITIES>                                        30,389
<RECEIVABLES>                                       22,938
<ALLOWANCES>                                         4,019
<INVENTORY>                                        108,615
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   345,747
<PP&E>                                             410,703
<DEPRECIATION>                                     101,826
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                     895,112
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              235,835
<BONDS>                                            600,745
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                                 1
<OTHER-SE>                                          21,688
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                       895,112
<SALES>                                          1,140,039
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 1,140,039
<CGS>                                              812,697
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      812,697
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  48,317
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                     40,221
<INCOME-TAX>                                        14,882
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 25,339
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    (1,296)
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                        24,043
<EPS-BASIC>                                              0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0


</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Certification

To Whom It May Concern,

     In connection with the Annual Report of Ingen Technologies Inc. ("Ingen")
on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended May 31st, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on or very near the date hereof ("the
Report"), I, Scott R. Sand, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of Ingen,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
          the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of Ingen.

/s/ Scott R. Sand
Scott R. Sand
Chief Executive Officer and
Chairman

November 30, 2005
EXHIBIT 32.1

Certification Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of Polymer Group, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended January 1,
2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, James L. Schaeffer, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



|Date: March 29, 2005 | /s/JAMES L. SCHAEFFERJames L. Schaeffer Chief Executive Officer
|-------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------

A
signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.

---



QuickLinks
Order entered July 7, 2021

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-20-00982-CV

JOHNNY AGUINAGA, ET AL., Appellants

V.

JAT PROJECTS HOLDINGS TEXAS, LLC, ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 193rd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-10069

ORDER

Before the Court is appellees’ July 2, 2021 motion to dismiss the appeal for 

mootness and unopposed request to stay briefing. The motion to dismiss is based 

on the issues asserted in appellants’ amended brief filed on May 7, 2021. We 

GRANT the motion to the extent that we STAY the deadline for appellees’ brief

pending disposition of the motion to dismiss. Appellants shall file, by July 19, 

2021, a response to the motion to dismiss.

/s/ ROBERT D. BURNS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE
<PAGE>

                               VIALOG CORPORATION

            CALCULATION OF SHARES USED IN DETERMINING LOSS PER SHARE
                                  (Unaudited)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                               Three Months Ended March 31,
                                               ------------------------------
                                                    1999            2000
                                               --------------  --------------
<S>                                            <C>             <C>
Common stock, beginning of period.............      3,693,672       9,133,569
Weighted average common shares issued during
 period, net..................................      2,339,102           2,143
Common stock options and warrants using the
 treasury stock method........................            --              --
                                               --------------  --------------
                                                    6,032,774       9,135,712
                                               ==============  ==============
Net loss (in thousands)....................... $       (1,717) $       (1,191)
                                               ==============  ==============
Basic and diluted net loss per share.......... $        (0.28) $        (0.13)
                                               ==============  ==============
</TABLE>

                                       18
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF EARNINGS AND BALANCE SHEETS OF
INDUSTRI-MATEMATIK INTERNATIONAL CORP. AND SUBSIDIARIES ANNEXED HERETO AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001016243
<NAME> INDUSTRI-MATEMATIK INTERNATIONAL CORP.
       
<S>                             <C>         
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS       
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               APR-30-1998 
<PERIOD-START>                   MAY-1-1997 
<PERIOD-END>                    JUL-31-1997 
<CASH>                           16,661,000 
<SECURITIES>                              0 
<RECEIVABLES>                    14,696,000 
<ALLOWANCES>                        202,000 
<INVENTORY>                               0 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                 43,702,000 
<PP&E>                            7,617,000 
<DEPRECIATION>                    3,885,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                   50,481,000 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>            11,876,000 
<BONDS>                                   0 
<COMMON>                            279,000  
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0  
<PREFERRED>                               0  
<OTHER-SE>                       35,719,000  
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>     50,481,000  
<SALES>                          15,575,000  
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                 15,706,000  
<CGS>                             7,583,000  
<TOTAL-COSTS>                     7,668,000  
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                  7,626,000  
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0  
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                  (15,000) 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                     572,000  
<INCOME-TAX>                        (58,000) 
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                 630,000  
<DISCONTINUED>                            0  
<EXTRAORDINARY>                           0  
<CHANGES>                                 0  
<NET-INCOME>                        630,000  
<EPS-PRIMARY>                           .02  
<EPS-DILUTED>                           .02  

        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Altair Nanotechnologies Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Terry M. Copeland, President and CEO of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and









(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.










/s/  Terry M. CopelandTerry M. Copeland, President and CEO
August 7, 2009
*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 18, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-31096

Summary Calendar

ALDORA SANFORD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

STATE OF LOUISIANA, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES; TERRI RICKS,

Individually and in her Official Capacity as the Undersecretary.

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

(3:05-CV-225)

Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM*:

Aldora Sanford brought claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §

1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination

Act, and state law claims against his former employer, the

Louisiana Department of Social Services, and Terri Ricks. The

defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for

failure to state a claim. Having received no response from Sanford,

the district court eventually granted the motion, but invited
Sanford to respond. Sanford filed a motion for a new trial under

Rule 60(b) or alternatively for reconsideration under Rule 59(e).

The court denied the motion. Because we agree with the district

court that the complaint fails to state a claim, we affirm. 

This court reviews de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6). Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid

Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Further, “[d]ismissal is proper if the complaint lacks an

allegation regarding a required element necessary to obtain

relief.” Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 2006)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

A plaintiff must assert more than general legal conclusions to

avoid dismissal. Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 106 F.3d

1245, 1250 (5th Cir. 1997). “[T]he complaint must contain either

direct allegations on every material point necessary to sustain a

recovery . . . or contain allegations from which an inference

fairly may be drawn that evidence on these material points will be

introduced at trial.” Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973,

975 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).

After reviewing the briefs and relevant portions of the

record, we agree with the district court that Sanford’s complaint

is deficient. It alleges legal conclusions without alleging the

facts necessary to support them. See Jefferson, 106 F.3d at 1250.

Further, it fails to allege facts on each required element of the

various causes of action. See Rios, 444 F.3d at 421. Consequently,
we affirm.

AFFIRMED.
#### Louise K. McQuade et al., Appellants, v City of Poughkeepsie, Respondent.

[666 NYS2d 505]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Beisner, J.), entered November 7, 1996, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

“After examination of the facts presented, including the width, depth, elevation, irregularity and appearance of the defect along with the ‘time, place and circumstance’ of the injury *(Caldwell v Village of Is. Park,*304 NY 268, 274)” *(Trincere v County of Suffolk,*90 NY2d 976, 978), we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the existence of a dangerous condition *(see, e.g., Guerrieri v Summa,*193 AD2d 647). Since the defendant made out a prima facie case for summary judgment, the court properly granted the motion.

In view of the foregoing, we need not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. Bracken, J. P., Sullivan, Santucci and Luciano, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 12.2**

**302 CERTIFICATION**

I,Fernando Gardeweg R., certify that: 

1.    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Empresa Nacional deElectricidad S.A. (“Endesa Chile”); 

2.    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairlypresent in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4.    The company’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosurecontrols and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the company and have: 

(a)      designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared; 

(b)      designed such internal control over financialreporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for externalpurposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; 

(c)      evaluatedthe effectiveness of the company’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based onsuch evaluation; and 

(d)      disclosed in this report any change in the company’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

5.    The company’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to the company’s auditors and the audit committee of the company’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

(a)      all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the company’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b)      any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the company’s internal control over financial reporting. 

Date: April 1, 2014
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Moses LEYVA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-40375

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 4, 2011.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Reynaldo Alejandro Pena, Esq., Law Offices of Reynaldo A. Pena, P.L.L.C., Corpus Christi, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JOLLY, GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Moses Leyva pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess more than 500 grams of *444methamphetamine with intent to distribute; the district court sentenced him to serve 262 months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release. This direct appeal raises several challenges to Leyva’s sentence. When analyzing such challenges, *Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), instructs us to determine whether the sentence imposed is procedurally sound, including whether the calculation of the advisory guidelines range is correct. We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. *United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez,*517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008).

Under Leyva’s view, the district court clearly erred by concluding that he was a leader or organizer of the offense and by imposing a corresponding two-level adjustment. The record includes evidence indicating that, at a minimum, Leyva had supervisory authority over at least one other individual involved in the conspiracy. The imposition of the disputed adjustment is plausible in light of the entire record and thus is not clearly erroneous. *See Cisneros-Gutierrez,*517 F.3d at 764; *United States v. Rose,*449 F.3d 627, 633 (5th Cir.2006).

Leyva challenges the district court’s imposition of a firearms adjustment. Similar to his argument concerning the leadership adjustment, this argument fails because it is refuted by the record, which shows that another member of the conspiracy, with whom Leyva lived, knowingly possessed weapons in connection with drug-related activity. *United States v. Zapata-Lara,*615 F.3d 388, 390 (5th Cir.2010); *United States v. Aguilera-Zapata,*901 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir.1990). Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that Leyva’s coconspirators used firearms during the conspiracy and that these actions were reasonably foreseeable to Leyva. *See Zapata-Lara,*615 F.3d at 390.

Next, Leyva claims that the district court erred by concluding that he should be held responsible for more than 15 kilograms of methamphetamine. This argument is unavailing because various portions of the record, when considered together, show that the district court’s determination that the offense involved at least 15 kilograms of methamphetamine is plausible and thus not clearly erroneous. *See Cisneros-Gutierrez,*517 F.3d at 764.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under *444the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
#### Susan M. Weichert, Appellant-Respondent, v Donald J. O’Neill et al., Respondents-Appellants.

[667 NYS2d 527]

—Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs in accordance with the following Memorandum: In this trespass action, Supreme Court properly denied that part of plaintiffs cross motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability against defendant Michael D. O’Neill. His alleged admissions in a letter dated August 21, 1995 are inconclusive on the issue of liability.

*1122The court erred, however, in failing to grant that part of plaintiffs cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (d) to dismiss defendants’ first, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth and 10th affirmative defenses. The first affirmative defense alleges that defendants were lawfully on the premises pursuant to a 1987 lease agreement. In 1992, however, that lease was terminated as a matter of law upon the issuance of a warrant of eviction *(see,*RPAPL 749 [3]). The third and fourth affirmative defenses are redundant and repeat the second affirmative defense, and the seventh affirmative defense is identical to the fifth affirmative defense. The eighth affirmative defense has no merit because the summons complies with CPLR 305. The ninth affirmative defense alleges that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations. The action, which is based on alleged conduct since April 1995, is timely because the Statute of Limitations for trespass is three years *(see,*CPLR 214 [4]). The 10th affirmative defense alleges that the complaint should be dismissed because plaintiffs spouse, who is a co-owner of the property, is not a party *(see,*CPLR 3211 [a] [10]). Where property is owned by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, either spouse may bring an action for trespass without joining the other *(Mastrofrancisco v Mohawk Gas Co.,*201 App Div 586; *see also, Matter of Goodrich v Village of Otego,*216 NY 112; 24 NY Jur 2d, Cotenancy and Partition, § 111, at 373).

We reject plaintiffs contention that the second affirmative defense, alleging that the action is barred by release, res judicata or collateral estoppel, should be dismissed. In May 1995 plaintiff sued defendants Michael O’Neill and Donald J. O’Neill for trespass arising from their allegedly unauthorized farming of plaintiffs land in January 1994. In settlement of that action, Michael O’Neill paid plaintiff $10,973.22 for the use of the land in 1994, and there is an issue of fact whether an additional $9,166.30 payment pursuant to the settlement was for the use of the land in 1995.

We therefore modify the order by granting in part plaintiff’s cross motion and dismissing defendants’ first, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth and 10th affirmative defenses. (Appeals from Order of Supreme Court, Cayuga County, Corning, J.— Summary Judgment.) Present—Lawton, J. P., Wisner, Callahan and Boehm, JJ.