Filed 1/24/22 In re E.L. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

IN RE E.L., A Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

_____________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 

OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

E.L.,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Juv. No. B310363

(Super. Ct. No. PJ53299)

(Los Angeles County)

E.L. appeals the juvenile court’s order requiring her to pay

$5,275.89 in victim restitution pursuant to Welfare and 
2

Institutions Code1 section 730.6. Appellant challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the order. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 21, 2019, appellant was charged in a section 602 

petition with battery (Pen. Code, § 242). The detention report 

alleged that on May 17, 2019, appellant and two other 

individuals battered the victim, Gustavo A., after he discovered 

them inside his vehicle. Appellant was placed on informal 

supervision pursuant to section 654 and a restitution hearing 

was set for September 17, 2019. 

Gustavo A. testified at the restitution hearing. As a result 

of the battery Gustavo suffered bruises, scrapes, open wounds, 

and a back injury. Gustavo had to go to the emergency room at 

West Hills Hospital (West Hills) for treatment and submitted an 

invoice from West Hills reflecting $4,557.04 in medical costs. 

Gustavo’s vehicle, eyeglasses, cellphone, and insulin pump were

also damaged during the assault. He submitted documentary 

evidence of $948.50 in damage to his vehicle and estimates of 

$8,688.90 to replace his insulin pump, $633.34 to replace his 

glasses, and $999.99 to replace his cellphone. At the conclusion 

of the hearing, the juvenile court rejected appellant’s claim that 

the evidence was insufficient to support the claimed losses and 

ordered appellant and her two accomplices to jointly and 

severally pay $15,827.69 in victim restitution.2 

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code.

2 Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the court’s 

restitution order, but subsequently abandoned her appeal 

because the order was not appealable. (In re M.T. (2019) 43 

Cal.App.5th 947, 953-954.)
3

Appellant’s informal supervision order was subsequently 

continued pursuant to section 654.2 and the matter was 

ultimately set for a termination hearing on February 3, 2021. At 

the hearing, appellant reiterated her assertion that the evidence 

was insufficient to support the amount of restitution ordered and 

alternatively asked the court to order that appellant and her 

accomplices each be ordered to pay one-third of the restitution 

amount, i.e., $5,275.89, rather than imposing joint and several 

liability. The court rejected appellant’s claim of insufficient 

evidence but reduced her restitution order to $5,275.89 as 

requested, entered that order as a civil judgment, dismissed the 

section 602 petition and ordered the records thereof sealed, and 

terminated jurisdiction. 

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support 

the restitution order. We disagree. 

“Section 730.6 governs restitution in cases where a minor is 

adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant to section 602. 

[Citation.] Section 730.6 parallels Penal Code section 1202.4, 

which governs adult restitution. [Citation.]” (In re M.W. (2008) 

169 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) “Generally speaking, restitution awards 

are vested in the trial court’s discretion and will be disturbed on 

appeal only where an abuse of discretion appears.” (In re K.F.

(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661.) “‘“When there is a factual and 

rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial

court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing 

court.”’ [Citation.]” (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 

1128, 1132.) 

When a minor contends the evidence is insufficient to 

support a restitution order, we review the order for substantial 

evidence. (In re K.F., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 661-662.) In 
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conducting this review, “‘“the power of the appellate court begins 

and ends with a determination as to whether there is any 

substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,”to support 

the trial court’s findings.’” (People v. Sy (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th

44, 63.) The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is a 

preponderance of the evidence, and if “‘the circumstances 

reasonably justify the [court’s] findings,’ the judgment may not be 

overturned when the circumstances might also reasonably 

support a contrary finding.” (Ibid.) 

In ordering restitution, the court may consider a property 

owner’s statement about the value of stolen or damaged property 

as prima facie evidence of his or her economic losses. (In re S.S. 

(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 547.) Once the victim makes the 

requisite prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant 

to disprove the amount of claimed losses. (People v. Fulton (2003) 

109 Cal.App.4th 876, 886.) This procedure “complies with the 

statutory mandate that the amount of restitution is to be based 

on the ‘loss claimed by the victim’ and the designated right of the 

defendant to a hearing ‘to dispute the determination of the 

amount of restitution.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

Appellant does not dispute that the evidence is sufficient to 

support the amounts ordered to compensate the victim for the 

damage to his vehicle and the costs to replace his eyeglasses and 

insulin pump. She claims, however, that the victim presented 

insufficient evidence of $4,557.04 in medical and related 

expenses. She notes that the invoice the victim submitted from

West Hills states that “this is not a bill and does not show the 

amount you owe. The amount you owe will be sent to you 

separately on your hospital bill once payments from your 

insurance company or other adjustments are applied to the total 

shown here.” The invoice also shows a total of $4,631.53, 
5

followed by $4,557.04 in “[a]djustments/discounts,” which results 

in a total amount of $74.49.

3

 It is well-settled, however, that

appellant is not entitled to credit for any payments to be made 

through medical insurance or other third-party sources. (In re 

Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381,1387-1388 [recognizing 

that “trial courts are not to consider whether the victim has been, 

or will be, reimbursed from third parties in ordering victim 

restitution”].)

Appellant fares no better in claiming the evidence is 

insufficient to support a finding that the estimated replacement 

cost of the victim’s cellphone (an iPhone 6S) was $999.99. In 

addition to testifying, the victim submitted documentation 

reflecting that a new iPhone 6S would cost $999.99. Appellant

argues that “[a]lthough Gustavo testified that the lost cell phone 

was this same, precise make and model, there was no evidence 

presented that the cell phone was new at the time that it was 

broken.” But appellant offered no evidence below to rebut the 

victim’s prima facie showing of his claimed losses for the phone. 

Accordingly, her claim of insufficient evidence fails. (See In re 

S.S., supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 547, quoting People v. Foster

(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 946 [recognizing that “an item’s 

original cost can generally be treated as evidence of replacement 

cost for purposes of restitution” and that “a property owner’s 

statements of value . . . ‘should be accepted as prima facie 

evidence of value’”].)

3 Appellant also notes that the court imposed $4,557.04 in 

restitution for the victim’s medical expenses—which represents 

the “[a]djustments/discounts”—rather than the full $4,631.53. 

The People do not urge us to modify the restitution order to 

include the additional $74.49, so we decline to do so. 
6

In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

restitution order, appellant also contends the juvenile court erred 

in denying her request for a continuance of the restitution 

rehearing so that she could “conduct further investigation for

further substantive evidence.” As the People note, appellant

merely sought a continuance to question the officer who 

interviewed the victim regarding the injuries he claimed to have 

suffered as a result of the battery. In any event, appellant failed 

to establish good cause for a continuance such that the court’s 

denial thereof was an abuse of discretion, nor does she 

demonstrate that the denial of a continuance constitutes 

reversible error. (See In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 

594, 605 [juvenile court’s denial of a continuance reviewed for 

abuse of discretion; In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 

1187 [recognizing that an erroneous denial of a request for a 

continuance compels reversal only if a “different result” is 

reasonably probable].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment (restitution order) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J. YEGAN, J.
Morton Rochman, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Supervising 

Deputy Attorney General, and John Yang, Deputy Attorney 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.