NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________ 

No. 16-3325 

_____________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v. 

CHINA LEE SCOTT, 

Appellant 

______________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(District Court No. 1:16-CR-00079-001) 

District Judge: Hon. Sylvia H. Rambo 

______________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

February 6, 2017 

______________ 

Before: McKEE, COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 

(Opinion filed: June 15, 2017) 

_______________________ 

OPINION*

______________________

 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

 China Scott appeals the sentence that was imposed after she pled guilty to one 

count of healthcare fraud. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 

I 

Scott’s nursing license had previously been revoked based on a 2005 conviction 

for healthcare fraud. Close to ten years later, in September 2015, Scott pled guilty to one 

count of making false statements related to health care matters under 18 U.S.C. § 1035 

(a)(2) (MDPA 1:15-CR-00191).1

 One of the conditions of her release pending sentencing 

was that she not seek employment in the healthcare field. As a result, the United States 

Department of Health and Human Services listed her as an “excluded individual,” which 

precluded her from receiving federal payment for healthcare services provided. 

Despite the prohibition, Scott entered employment with a home healthcare 

services agency in November 2015. As part of her employment duties with that agency, 

Scott served as a home healthcare aide for at least one recipient of both Medicaid and 

Medicare (federally-funded healthcare benefit programs) in violation of that condition for 

release. 

Consequently, in March 2016, Scott was indicted by a grand jury, and again 

charged with health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (MDPA No. 1:16-CR00079). The Presentence Report for the March 2016 indictment calculated a total offense 

 

1

 This appeal concerns only MDPA No. 1:16-CR-00079. 
3 

level of six and a criminal history category of III.2

 Relevant to this appeal, the Probation 

Office did not reduce Scott’s offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Probation 

calculated Scott’s Guideline range as two to eight months’ imprisonment. The Probation 

Office also calculated the restitution Scott owed to be $2,103. 

In July 2016, the District Court conducted a combined change of plea and 

sentencing hearing in this case (MDPA 1:16-CR-00079), together with the sentencing 

hearing for her September 2015 case (MDPA No. 1:15-CR-00191). The judge explained 

at the hearing that the Sentencing Guidelines were the “starting point,” but that she could 

“vary or depart from [them] upward or downward depending on what [it] finds as a result 

of the pre-sentence report.”3

 She then imposed the sentences: twenty-one months’ 

imprisonment and payment of $112,434.80 in restitution for MDPA No. 1:15-CR-00191; 

and twelve months’ imprisonment and payment of $2,103 in restitution in the instant case 

(MDPA 1:16-CR-00079), with the prison time to be served consecutive to that imposed 

in MDPA No. 1:15-CR-00191.4

 

 

2

 The Presentence Report for MDPA No. 16-CR-00079 further stated that an upward 

departure from the Guidelines range “may be warranted to adequately reflect the 

seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history and the likelihood that she will reoffend.” 

PSR (MDPA No. 1:16-CR-00079) at 16. 

3

 App. 19–20. 

4

 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the revocation hearing under 18 

U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 

U.S.C. § 3742. 
4 

As to MDPA 1:16-CR-00079, the District Court stated that it “relied pretty much 

on the pre-sentence report that was filed . . . .”5

 The judge explained her decision not to 

credit Scott for acceptance of responsibility as follows: 

[Scott] committed the instant offense after she pled guilty to her related 

 healthcare matters and was awaiting sentencing in this case, which was just 

 imposed today, and she is still out there not learning her lesson. . . . Under 

 application note under the commentary 3, it also says, a Defendant who 

 enters a plea of guilty is not entitled to an adjustment under this section as a 

 matter of right. [Scott’s] initial appearance on this was March 18, and she 

 was under pretrial services supervision during that period of time, and has 

 continued to be involved in fraud. I don’t believe that she is deserving of 

 acceptance of responsibility under the circumstances of this case.6

Also relevant to this appeal, the District Court reached its sentencing decision in 

MDPA 1:16-CR-00079 by departing upward from the Sentencing Guidelines.7

 Scott did 

not object to the sentence, nor did she object to the restitution assessment.8

 

 Scott now appeals the sentence in MDPA No. 1:16-CR-00079.9

 She argues that 

the District Court provided no record basis for imposing an upward departure to the 

suggested Guidelines range. She further claims that the District Court abused its 

discretion by denying her credit for acceptance of responsibility and by inappropriately 

 

5

 App. 34. 

6

 App. 35–36. 

7

 Specifically, the District Court made an upward departure from the Sentencing 

Guideline of two to eight months by sentencing Scott to twelve months’ imprisonment. 

App. 36. The District Court issued a Statement of Reasons explaining its upward 

departure and final sentence. The Statement of Reasons was filed under seal. 

8

 Scott objected to the lack of credit for Acceptance of Responsibility, which the District 

Court ruled against. 

9

 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
5 

duplicating the restitution judgment from MDPA No. 1:15-CR-00191. We consider these 

challenges below. 

II. 

A. Acceptance of Responsibility and Restitution 

 1. Acceptance of Responsibility 

 A court’s determination of a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility is a factual 

matter that we review for clear error.10 “The sentencing judge is in a unique position to 

evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, [so] the determination of the 

sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.”11 In considering Scott’s claim, 

we also note that it is generally a defendant’s burden to show, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that she is entitled to any reduction.12 The sentencing judge is responsible for 

determining, in light of the totality of the circumstances, whether a defendant has met that 

standard.13 

 As we have already noted, the court clearly explained why it was not impressed 

with Scott’s claim that she was accepting responsibility and entitled to a sentencing 

reduction. Based on our review of the record and the circumstances of this case, the 

District Court did not err in concluding that Scott was not entitled to a reduction for 

acceptance of responsibility. The District Court concluded that Scott was “still . . . not 

 

10 United States v. DeLeon-Rodriguez, 70 F.3d 764, 767 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United 

States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1008 (3d Cir. 1992)). 

11 Application Note 5 to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. 

12 United States v. Harris, 751 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. 

Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2010)). 

13 Id. (quoting United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796, 806 (3d Cir. 1999)).
6 

learning her lesson” and had “continued to be involved in fraud.”14 The accuracy of that 

finding is obvious given Scott’s conduct. There was no error, and we will affirm the 

District Court’s denial of credit for acceptance of responsibility. 

2. Restitution Judgment15

 Scott next argues that the District Court imposed $114,537.80 restitution “for no 

reason” and characterizes the District Court’s judgment as a “clerical error” that this 

Court should correct. However, the record demonstrates that the District Court set the 

restitution in this case, MDPA No. 1:16-CR-00079, at $2,103.16 We find no error in its 

doing so. 

B. Upward Departure 

 Generally, a district court follows a three-step process in sentencing: 1) calculate a 

defendant’s Guidelines sentence; 2) formally rule on the parties’ respective motions and 

state on the record whether it is granting a departure as well as how that departure affects 

 

14 App. 35–36. The Sentencing Guidelines provide numerous, nonexclusive factors that a 

sentencing court may consider in determining the propriety of any reduction, and one of 

these is a defendant's voluntary withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations. See 

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, App. Note 1(B). 

15 This Court reviews the legality of a district court’s restitution order de novo, but 

reviews specific awards for abuse of discretion. United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 

235 (3d Cir. 2013). 

16 App. 36–37, 39–40. Earlier in the sentencing hearing, the District Court imposed 

restitution in MDPA No. 1:15-CR-00191 in the amount of $112,434.80. App. 30–31. 

The District Court then went on to impose a separate $2,103 restitution award for MDPA 

No. 1:16-CR-00079. App. 36–37, 39–40. At no point did the District Court state that the 

combined total of the two restitution award ($114,537.80) should apply in both cases, and 

at no point did Scott object to the $2,103 restitution award specifically for MDPA No. 

1:16-CR-00079. 

 The District Court’s Judgment ultimately entered further indicates that the 

restitution amount entered for this case was $2,103. App. 7. 
7 

the Guidelines calculation—an analysis that should account for this Circuit’s case law 

before United States v. Booker;

17 and 3) exercising its discretion pursuant to the relevant 

factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), irrespective of whether it varies from the sentence 

calculated under the Guidelines.18

 Although this process is intended to ensure an adequate record for an appeals court 

to verify that the district court considered the parties’ arguments,19 a sentencing court 

need not address arguments or sentencing factors at length. Rather, the sentencing court 

need only demonstrate that it gave “meaningful consideration” to a defendant’s 

arguments.20 “In considering a criminal defendant’s claim that a sentence is 

unreasonable, we inquire into whether the district court: (1) exercised its discretion by 

giving ‘meaningful consideration’ to the § 3553(a) factors; and (2) applied those factors 

reasonably by selecting a sentence grounded on reasons that are logical and consistent 

with the [§ 3553(a)] factors.”21 

 Scott argues that her sentence is procedurally unreasonable.22 She claims that the 

District Court failed to sufficiently articulate its reasoning in sentencing her to twelve 

 

17 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 

18 United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks, citations, and brackets omitted). 

19 See United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 328 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n order to provide 

for effective appellate review, the sentencing court must provide a record sufficient to 

allow a reviewing court to conclude that the sentencing court exercised its discretion.”). 

20 Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 256. 

21 Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

22 See id. at 328 n.29 (noting that “determining whether the district court actually 

exercised its discretion—has been described as ‘procedural review’”). 
8 

months’ incarceration. Because Scott did not object to the District Court’s upward 

departure, we review for plain error.23 

 We do find the District Court’s procedure for imposing a sentence on MDPA No. 

1:16-CR-00079 troubling. A district court can, of course, impose upward departures if, 

for example, “reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not 

adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s past criminal conduct or the 

likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.”24 But not only must a 

sentencing court comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) by providing a written explanation 

of why it departed from a Guidelines range, it also must “state in open court the reasons 

for its imposition of the particular sentence.”25 

 Here, in its Statement of Reasons—filed several days after the July 28, 2016 

sentencing —the District Court explained its rationale for the upward departure. It 

discussed, among other things, that Scott’s criminal history was “replete with activities 

involving fraud and/or theft” and that she “has shown no regard for the law and has not 

been deterred by previous contacts with law enforcement.” The District Court 

recognized that a twelve-month sentence “contemplates a one level upward departure,” 

 

23 Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 256. Under this standard, the Court considers whether: (1) 

there was an error; (2) the error was “plain”; (3) the error affects substantial rights—

generally, whether the error was prejudicial; and (4) the error “seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 259. 

24 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. This rule was designed to “provide flexibility in those cases where a 

point-by-point calculation of the defendant’s criminal history category is not alone 

sufficient to reflect his culpability and dangerousness.” United States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 

1206, 1214 (3d Cir. 1995). 

25 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); see Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 330 n.33. 
9 

and it further explained that the departure was “sufficient yet not greater than necessary 

to impress upon [Scott] the seriousness of her conduct, and will protect the public from 

further crimes.” 

 However, it does not appear that the court ever explained that rationale for the 

upward departure in open court, or in Scott’s presence. During the sentencing 

proceeding, the Court failed to mention any of the § 3553(a) factors, much less give them 

any “meaningful consideration”26 with regard to the sentencing for MDPA No. 1:16-CR00079. Subsection (c) of § 3553 provides that “[t]he court, at the time of sentencing, 

shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence . . . .”27 

However, during the sentencing, the District Court offered scant reasoning for its 

sentencing for MDPA No. 1:16-CR-00079 beyond its acknowledgment that it was relying 

on the Presentence Report.28 This was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 

 

26 Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 256 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets 

omitted). 

27 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (emphases added). 

28 By contrast, the District Court judge, in sentencing Scott for MDPA No. 1:15-CR00191, stated explicitly: “The sentence [of 21 months’ imprisonment] is within the 

guideline range, and the Court finds no reason to depart.” App. 33. The District Court 

judge further responded to the parties’ arguments before sentencing Scott for MDPA No. 

1:15-CR-00191 and found: 

 . . . [Scott] played a significant role in carrying out the scheme. [She] was 

 well aware that her nursing license was suspended due to a prior federal 

 healthcare fraud conviction. She completed documents containing false 

 information to conceal that she was operating under suspended license. 

 And for roughly 19 months, [she] used aliases and another person’s 

 medical license number to submit false claims for payment. She was 

 convicted in 2005 of similar conduct and suggest she was very much 

 aware of what she was doing and the illegal nature of her activity. 
10 

3553.29 Consequently, the delayed explanation of the District Court’s reasoning in the 

Statement of Reasons was error. 

 We nonetheless find that the District Court’s error did not satisfy the plain error 

standard.30 Although the District Court’s omission here was plain, it did not violate 

Scott’s substantial rights because the sentence was not substantively unreasonable.31 

Based on the record that was created at the sentencing, we are satisfied that the error did 

 

 With regard to assistance to the Government, I have to abide by the 

 Government’s take on what her assistance was and the reasons stated for 

 not granting her a downward departure under 5k1.1 motion. 

App. 29. 

29 See United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The extent of the 

explanation we require of the district court may turn on whether the court has varied from 

the Guidelines range, and, if it has, on the magnitude of the variance. If the court 

imposes a sentence outside of the Guidelines, it ‘must consider the extent of the deviation 

and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the 

variance.’” (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007))). 

30 See United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 103 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[S]entencing errors 

can also be harmless . . . .”). In contrast to our case here, consider, for example, United 

States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2005). In that case, this Court of Appeals for the 

Second Circuit found that the district court committed plain error by imposing a greaterthan-recommended sentence and providing both an insufficient verbal explanation and a 

“bare” written explanation to support the sentence. Id. at 245. 

31 See, e.g., United States v. Colian, 228 F. App’x 179, 181–83 (3d Cir. 2007) (not 

precedential) (finding that the sentencing procedure the district court followed resulted in 

harmless error, even though the court had “failed to mention its consideration of any of 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,” and instead had issued its reasoning by way of an 

explanatory order several days after the sentencing hearing); United States v. Parker, 462 

F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2006) (applying plain error review to the defendant’s argument 

that the district court failed to give a sufficient statement of reasons under § 3553(c)); 

United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 241–46 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying a plain error 

review to the district court’s failure to verify that the defendant had read and discussed 

the presentence report with his attorney—as required by Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure—and determining that the error, while plain, did not affect the 

defendant’s substantial rights). 
11 

not contribute to the District Court imposing a materially different sentence than it would 

have had the error never occurred. The District Court’s explanation in the Statement of 

Reasons, though improperly delayed and not offered in open court while the defendant 

was present, nevertheless satisfies the requirement that a court consider the relevant § 

3553(a) factors on the record.32 The Statement of Reasons “provide[d] [Scott] with a 

platform upon which to build an argument that her sentence [wa]s unreasonable.”33 

 The Statement of Reasons that the court did finally provide demonstrates that the 

District Court considered the nature of Scott’s crime; Scott’s individual characteristics 

and criminal history; the sentence’s potential deterrent effect; the applicable guideline 

range; and Scott’s recidivism with regard to fraud and/or theft. Based on these factors, 

the twelve-month sentence was not unreasonable. Accordingly, despite our displeasure 

with the fact that these reasons were not offered in open court, we cannot conclude that 

Scott has shown plain error. There is simply no way for us to find “that the District 

 

32 See United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 328 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n order to provide 

for effective appellate review, the sentencing court must provide a record sufficient to 

allow a reviewing court to conclude that the sentencing court exercised its discretion.”). 

See also, e.g., United States v. Perry, 460 F. App’x 149, 157 (3d Cir. 2012) (not 

precedential) (finding that the defendant’s argument that the district court “fail[ed] to 

adequately explain its reasons for granting an upward departure . . . lack[s] merit because 

the District Court complied with the § 3553(c)(2) requirement by issuing a written 

Statement of Reasons with its Judgment, explaining the basis for th[e] departure.” The 

Court concluded: “Although the Statement of Reasons was filed under seal, the sentence 

has received meaningful appellate review.”); United States v. Tinajero-Rivera, 278 F. 

App’x 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2008) (not precedential) (“The Court clearly stated its reasons 

for imposing the sentence that it imposed, and its opinion was adequate for us to engage 

in meaningful review of the reasonableness of defendant’s sentence.”). 

33 Cf. Lewis, 424 F.3d at 249 (remanding the case based on the district court’s lacking 

statement of reasons under § 3553(c)(2)). 
12 

Court would have imposed a lesser sentence had defense counsel been given the required 

notice.”34 Indeed, on appeal, Scott levies not a single challenge to any of the specific 

reasons contained in the Statement of Reasons that justify the upward departure. 

 We nonetheless note our strong discouragement with the procedure adopted here. 

We have previously explained: “[T]he mandate of § 3553(c) and the presumption in our 

case law [is] that all issues pertaining to the pronouncement of sentence will be addressed 

at the sentencing hearing while the defendant is present.”35 Indeed, “sentencing judges 

normally state and resolve sentencing issues from the bench while the sentencing 

proceeding is underway.”36 This “offers the defendant, the government, the victim, and 

the public a window into the decision-making process and an explanation of the purposes 

the sentence is intended to serve.”37 Moreover, “it promotes respect for the adjudicative 

process, by demonstrating the serious reflection and deliberation that underlies each 

criminal sentence, and allows for effective appellate oversight.”38

 

34 United States v. Reynoso, 254 F.3d 467, 470 (3d Cir. 2001); see United States v. 

Berger, 689 F.3d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2012) (“A defendant establishes that an error affected 

her substantial rights by showing ‘that the District Court would have imposed a lesser 

sentence had defense counsel been given the required notice’” (quoting Reynoso, 254 

F.3d at 470)); United States v. Nappi, 243 F.3d 758, 770 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that the 

defendant “bears the burden of demonstrating that he was prejudiced by the District 

Court’s error”). 

35 Id. at 182; see also United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2000). 

(“[D]istrict court errors like this one are regrettable and easily avoidable, and we exhort 

district courts to engage in the ‘simple practice’ of addressing defendants directly . . . .”). 

36 United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006). 

37 United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 572 (3d Cir. 2007). 

38 Id. 
13 

 Thus, despite our conclusion that the District Court’s error did not violate Scott’s 

substantial rights, we take this opportunity to reiterate “the principle that a 

contemporaneous explanation of the rationale should accompany the pronouncement of 

sentence.”39 Indeed, absent her undeniable pattern of criminal conduct, Scott may well 

have been able to satisfy her high burden under plain error review here. 

III 

 Because we find the District Court’s error harmless, we will affirm the judgment. 

 

39 Colian, 228 F. App’x at 183. In Ausburn, this Court also found it “useful to draw 

attention to the continued vitality of § 3553(c),” 502 F.3d at 330 n.33, by approvingly 

noting Justice Scalia’s observation in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 382 (2007). In 

Rita, Justice Scalia observed, as dicta, that the “explanations” § 3553(c) requires “help 

the [Sentencing] Commission revise the advisory Guidelines to reflect actual sentencing 

practices consistent with the statutory goals.” 551 U.S. 338, 382 (2007) (Scalia, J., 

concurring in part and in judgment). Justice Scalia further observed that the 

“reasonableness review g[i]ve[s] appellate courts the necessary means to reverse a district 

court that . . . does not comply with § 3553(c)’s requirement for a statement of reasons.” 

Id. at 383.