alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Michael McDevitt, Respondent, v Maryann Salamone, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 459]

—In a child custody proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Friedenberg, J.H.O.), entered February 22, 1995, which, after a hearing, granted the application of the petitioner father to transfer custody of the parties’ child from her to the father.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The court weighed the appropriate factors and, thereupon, properly transferred custody of the child to the petitioner father. The record clearly supports the court’s conclusion that a transfer of custody to the father was in the child’s best interests *(see, Eschbach v Eschbach,*56 NY2d 167).

The appellant’s remaining contention is without merit *(see, People v Lewis,*69 NY2d 321, 325). Mangano, P. J., Santucci, Joy and Lerner, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 197 (Friday, October 13, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 47623]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-21959]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[Docket Number USCG-2017-0808]
RIN 1625-AA00


Safety Zone; Patapsco River, Northwest and Inner Harbors; 
Baltimore, MD

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Temporary final rule; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is correcting a temporary final rule that 
appeared in the Federal Register on October 3, 2017. The document 
issued a temporary safety zone for certain waters of the Patapsco 
River, Northwest Harbor and Inner Harbor in association with the 
movement of the historic sloop-of-war USS CONSTELLATION on October 26, 
2017 (rain date of October 27, 2017).

DATES: This correction is effective from 8 a.m. on October 26, 2017, 
through 1 p.m. on October 27, 2017.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If you have questions on this rule, 
call or email Mr. Ronald L. Houck, at Sector Maryland-National Capital 
Region, Waterways Management Division, U.S. Coast Guard; telephone 410-
576-2674, email <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c496abaaa5a8a0ea88ea8cabb1a7af84b1b7a7a3eaa9ada8"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="14467b7a7578703a583a5c7b61777f54616777733a797d78">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In FR Doc. 2017-21180 appearing on page 
45981 of Wednesday, October 3, 2017, the following corrections are 
made:


Sec.  165.T05-0808   [Corrected]

0
1. On page 45984, in the 1st column, in Sec.  165.T05-0808, correct 
paragraph (e) to read as follows:
    ``(e) Enforcement period. This section will be enforced from 8 a.m. 
through 1 p.m. on October 26, 2017, and, if necessary due to inclement 
weather, from 8 a.m. through 1 p.m. on October 27, 2017.''

    Dated: October 4, 2017.
Lonnie P. Harrison, Jr.
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port Maryland-National 
Capital Region.
[FR Doc. 2017-21959 Filed 10-12-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 9110-04-P


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</html>
#### Ronald FOSTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NOYCE, Correctional Officer; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-16314.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed March 10, 2011.

*721Ronald Foster, Susanville, CA, pro se.

Megan R. O’Carroll, Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM ***

California state prisoner Ronald Foster appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendants deprived him of an adequate number of daily meals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Foster’s Eighth Amendment claim because Foster failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the food he received was inadequate to maintain his health. *See LeMaire v. Maass,*12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir.1993) (“The Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health.... ”).

The district court properly dismissed Foster’s due process claim because it was correctly construed as an Eighth Amendment claim. *See Graham v. Connor,*490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (where a particular Amendment “provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection” against a particular sort of government behavior, “that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims”).

Foster’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

***

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provid*722ed by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
# FILED

June 22, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE SUPREME COUR T OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE

NOT FOR PUBLICA

TION Filed: June 22, 1998 MICHAEL SCOTT EVANS, ) ) Petitioner/Appellant, ) ) Vs. ) Davidson Juvenile ) ) No. 01S01-9701-JV-00019 KAREN MARIE BISSON STEELMAN, ) ) Respondent/Appellee. ) and IN THE MATTER OF SEAN MICHAEL ) CRAWFORD, A CHILD UNDER 18 ) YEARS OF AGE, THOMAS MI CHAEL ) CIHLAR, ) ) Petitioner/Appellant, ) ) Davidson Circuit Vs. ) ) No. 01S01-9703-CV-00046 MARY ANN CRAWFORD and ) RONALD SHANE CRAWFORD, ) ) Respondents/Appellees. )

O R D E R The appellants in these consolidated appea ls have filed petitions for a rehearing pursuant to Tenn. R . App. P. 39. We have considered all of the arguments raised in the peti tions, and we have found them to be without merit. It is, therefore, ORDERED tha t the petitions are denied.

PER CURIAM
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA

#### H. Daniel Hall v. Charles H. Bird et ux.

April 26, 1984

Case No. (Chancery) 14952

By JUDGE ALBERT H. GRENADIER

The Court has reviewed the pleadings and the relevant authorities and is of the opinion that the complainant is entitled to the relief he seeks in this proceeding.

Section 8.01-428 of the Code of Virginia outlines the circumstances under which a default judgment may be set aside. One of these circumstances is where the judgment is void. A judgment by default which is not founded upon a sufficient process duly served is wholly void. Where constructive service of process is allowed in lieu of personal service, the terms of the statute by which it is authorized and prescribed must be strictly followed or the service will be invalid, and the judgment rendered thereon by default void. 11A Michie’s Jurisprudence, *Judgments and*Decrees, Sec. 189.

The complainant states that he did not live in Virginia at the time the motion for judgment was served in Law No. 8625. He further states that he used to have an office at the place where service was posted, but that it never was his residence. The Court finds from the evidence, therefore, that the complainant was not properly served with process in the law action. As he was not properly served the *188Court never acquired personal jurisdiction over him and the default judgment entered was invalid.

Accordingly, the Court has entered the final decree tendered by the complainant vacating the default judgment.
EX-10.13



 Exhibit 10.13 

AMENDMENT NO. 3 
 TO THE

 KINDRED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN 

This is Amendment no. 3 to the Third Amendment and Restatement of the Kindred Deferred Compensation Plan, as last amended and restated as of
January 1, 2009 (the “Plan”), which amendment shall be effective as of the 1st day of August, 2014. 

Recitals 
  

	A.	Kindred Healthcare, Inc. (the “Company”) maintains the Plan and has reserved the right in Section 12.2 of the Plan to amend the Plan from time to time in its discretion. 


 

	B.	The Company wishes to amend the Plan to clarify that short term disability benefit payments under the Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. Employee Medical and Welfare Benefits Plan shall not be considered as Base Annual
Salary for purposes of the Plan. 

 Amendment 

1. Section 1.5 of the Plan is hereby amended to clarify that payments for short term disability shall be considered an excluded
“welfare benefit” and not as a Base Annual Salary, regardless of the method of payment, by adding the following new sentence at the end thereof: 

Notwithstanding anything in this Section 1.5 or the Plan to the contrary, Base Annual Salary shall not include amounts paid to a
Participant as short term disability benefit payments under the Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. Employee Medical and Welfare Benefits Plan, regardless of whether such payments are made pursuant to an insurance policy or as self-funded payments by
the Company or an Employer either directly through payroll or as payment by a third party. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this
Amendment No. 3 to be executed this 1st day of August, 2014. 
  

			
	KINDRED HEALTHCARE, INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Stephen R. Cunanan

	Printed Name: Stephen R. Cunanan
	Title: Chief People Officer
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2956 

To remove the additional tariff on ethanol. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 18, 2009 

Mr. SHADEGG (for himself, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. MCCAUL, Mr. BARTLETT, 

Mr. GALLEGLY, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. FRANKS of Arizona, Mrs. MYRICK, and 

Mr. HERGER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To remove the additional tariff on ethanol. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REMOVAL OF ADDITIONAL TARIFF ON ETH4 ANOL. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subchapter I of chapter 99 of the 

6 Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is 

7 amended— 

8 (1) by striking heading 9901.00.50; and 

9 (2) by striking U.S. notes 2 and 3. 

10 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

11 this section apply to goods entered, or withdrawn from 


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2 

•HR 2956 IH

1 warehouse for consumption, on or after the 15th day after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


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<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 13.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the annual report on Form 20-F of Metallica Resources Inc.
for the year ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof, I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

1. The annual report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

2. The information contained in the annual report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
registrant.

Date: March 30, 2005

/s/ Richard J. Hall
-----------------------
Richard J. Hall
President and Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to the registrant and will be
retained by the registrant and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY

#### Commonwealth of Virginia v. Karl Eric Jacobsen

May 9, 1995

Case No. (Law) 16150

By Judge Thomas D. Horne

Defendant raises the bar of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution in die instant habitual offender proceeding. He suggests that the Commonwealth, by the pursuit of this action, seeks to impose upon the Defendant multiple punishments for the same traffic-related offenses of which he has been convicted in the past Should the Court determine that the Defendant was so convicted of at least three such predicate offenses, then it must declare him a habitual offender and suspend his privilege to operate a motor vehicle over the highways of the Commonwealth for a period of ten years.

Counsel for the Defendant has asserted by way of his motion to dismiss the instant show cause proceeding that the declaration and driver’s license suspension constitutes punishment. He has noted that in determining whether the suspension of the Defendants operator’s license is punishment, the Court must look beyond mere labels of “civil” and “criminal” to determine whether the Fifth Amendment prohibition against multiple punishments is implicated. See, *United States*v. *Halper,*490 U.S. 435 (1989). Should the Court find that the purpose of the instant proceeding is pend, it must find for the Defendant However, in the event the Court should determine the purpose to be remedial, the motion of the Defendant must fail.

Virginia courts have historically construed statutes relating to the suspension of the right to drive a motor vehicle to be remedial in nature. *Prichard*v. *Battle,*178 Va. 455 (1941); *Huffman*v. *Commonwealth,*210 Va. 530 (1970). The intent of such statutes has been found to be the *316protection of the public and not the punishment of the offender. *Virginia ex rel. Shifflett*v. *Cook,*333 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. Va. 1971).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the purpose of the habitual offender statute is to protect the driving public and not to punish the offender for his past misconduct. The Motion to Dismiss is denied.
V 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2763 

For the relief of Llesh Miraj, Enkeleda Miraj, Michaela Miraj, Vanessa 

Miraj, and Sabrina Miraj. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 8, 2009 

Mr. CROWLEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

For the relief of Llesh Miraj, Enkeleda Miraj, Michaela 

Miraj, Vanessa Miraj, and Sabrina Miraj. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR LLESH 

4 MIRAJ, ENKELEDA MIRAJ, MICHAELA MIRAJ, 

5 VANESSA MIRAJ, AND SABRINA MIRAJ. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsections (a) 

7 and (b) of section 201 of the Immigration and Nationality 

8 Act, Llesh Miraj, Enkeleda Miraj, Michaela Miraj, 

9 Vanessa Miraj, and Sabrina Miraj shall each be eligible 

10 for issuance of an immigrant visa or for adjustment of 


tjames on PRODPC75 with BILLS
2 

•HR 2763 IH

1 status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 

2 residence upon filing an application for issuance of an im3 migrant visa under section 204 of such Act or for adjust4 ment of status to lawful permanent resident. 

5 (b) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.—If Llesh Miraj, 

6 Enkeleda Miraj, Michaela Miraj, Vanessa Miraj, or 

7 Sabrina Miraj enters the United States before the filing 

8 deadline specified in subsection (c), he or she shall be con9 sidered to have entered and remained lawfully and shall, 

10 if otherwise eligible, be eligible for adjustment of status 

11 under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

12 as of the date of the enactment of this Act. 

13 (c) DEADLINE FOR APPLICATION AND PAYMENT OF

14 FEES.—Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply only if the ap15 plication for issuance of an immigrant visa or the applica16 tion for adjustment of status is filed with appropriate fees 

17 within 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

18 (d) REDUCTION OF IMMIGRANT VISA NUMBER.— 

19 Upon the granting of an immigrant visa or permanent res20 idence to Llesh Miraj, Enkeleda Miraj, Michaela Miraj, 

21 Vanessa Miraj, and Sabrina Miraj, the Secretary of State 

22 shall instruct the proper officer to reduce by 5, during the 

23 current or next following fiscal year, the total number of 

24 immigrant visas that are made available to natives of the 

25 country of the aliens’ birth under section 203(a) of the 


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3 

•HR 2763 IH

1 Immigration and Nationality Act or, if applicable, the 

2 total number of immigrant visas that are made available 

3 to natives of the country of the aliens’ birth under section 

4 202(e) of such Act. 

5 (e) DENIAL OF PREFERENTIAL IMMIGRATION

6 TREATMENT FOR CERTAIN RELATIVES.—The natural 

7 parents, brothers, and sisters of Llesh Miraj, Enkeleda 

8 Miraj, Michaela Miraj, Vanessa Miraj, and Sabrina Miraj 

9 shall not, by virtue of such relationship, be accorded any 

10 right, privilege, or status under the Immigration and Na11 tionality Act. 

Æ 


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EXHIBIT 23



                      CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


To Board of Directors
Strouds, Inc.:

We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Form S-8 (No. 33-87608 and No. 33-87610) of our report dated April 14, 1999,
relating to the balance sheets of Strouds, Inc. as of February 27, 1999 and
February 28, 1998 and the related statements of operations, stockholders'
equity, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended
February 27, 1999, which report appears in the February 27, 1999 Annual Report
on Form 10-K of Strouds, Inc.



/s/KPMG LLP
--------------------------
Los Angeles, California
May 20, 1998
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ismael MARTINEZ-HERNANDEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-10305.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 15, 2011.

Owen Peter Martikan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Christopher Johns, Esquire, Johns & Al-lyn, APC A Professional Corporation, San Rafael, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Ismael Martinez-Hernandez appeals from the 77-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for being a deported alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Citing *United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez,*161 F.3d 556 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc), Martinez-Hernandez contends that the district court erred when it failed to grant a two-level downward departure based on a pre-indictment delay. He also contends that his low-end Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable. The record reflects that the district court considered the *Sanchez-Rodriguez*arguments, properly understood the scope of its direction in imposing the sentence, and did not otherwise procedurally err. *See United States v. Carty,*520 F.3d 984, 991-93 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc).

Martinez-Hernandez also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. The record reflects that, under the totality of the circumstances, the sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. *See Gall v. United States,*552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); *see also Carty,*520 F.3d at 993.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
----

EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of SE Global Equities Corp. (the"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the six month period ended June 30, 2004, as filedwith the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),I, Tim Leong, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, that:

- The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)  of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
- The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the  Partnership.

 

| Date: August 13, 2004 | /s/ Tim Leong

_______________________Tim Leong, Chief Financial Officer
 
  |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
#### YATI BONG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 08-70417.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed March 8, 2011.

Albert C. Lum, Esquire, Law Office of Albert C. Lum, Las Vegas, NV, for Petitioner.

OIL, Kate D. Balaban, Esquire, Carl H. McIntyre, Jr., Esquire, Assistant Director, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, CAC-District Counsel, Esquire, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. LeFevre, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Yati Bong, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence, *Wakkary v. Holder,*558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir.2009). We deny in part and grant in part the petition for review, and we remand.

The record does not compel the conclusion that Bong established changed or extraordinary circumstances excusing the untimely filing of her asylum application. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4), (5); *Ramadan v. Gonzales,*479 F.3d 646, 656-58 (9th Cir.2007) (per curiam); *Tampubolon v. Holder,*610 F.3d 1056, 1059 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, Bong’s asylum claim fails.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Bong’s claim for CAT relief because she failed to show it is more likely than not she will be tortured if returned to Indonesia. *See Wakkary,*558 F.3d at 1067-68.

Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Bong’s experiences in Indonesia, including harassment, discrimination, and a robbery, did not constitute past persecution. *See id.*at 1059-60. In addition, the record does not compel the conclusion that there is a pattern or practice of persecution against Chinese in Indonesia. *See id.*at 1061-62. However, in denying Bong’s withholding of removal claim, the agency did not apply the disfavored group analysis. Because the agency did not have the benefit of our intervening decision in *Wakkary,*we remand for the agency to assess Bong’s withholding of removal claim under the disfavored group analysis in the first instance. *See id.*at 1067; *see also INS v.*
      *671
      *Ventura,*537 U.S. 12, 16-18, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; GRANTED in part; REMANDED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.