T he H onorabl e T homas W
. P hi l l i ps, U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct Ju dge f or t he E as t er n D i s t r i ct of T enn es s ee, * si t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0655n.06 F iled: Septem ber 5, 2007 Case No. 05- 2419 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT F RE DE RI CK

WRIG HT, P etitioner -Appellant,
v. JI M M Y ST EG AL L, Respondent-Appellee.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN

BEFORE: BATCHELDER and COLE, Circuit Jud ges; P HILL IP S , District Judge. * THOMAS W. PHILLIPS, Distr ict Judge. Fr eder ick W rig ht was convicted i n a Michig an state cour t of arme d robber

y and beinga third fe lony

offe nder. H e wa s sentenc ed to 30-60 y ear s imprisonment. Af

ter e x hausting his direct appe als in state cour t, Wright petitioned for a writ of habea s corpus pursua

nt to 28 U.S.C . § 2254, raising ten assig nments of er ror. The United States D is tr ic t C o u rt f

o r th e E a s te r

nD is tr ic t o f

M ic h ig and e n ie d

p e ti ti o n e r ’ s c la im s , b u t gr anted a
cer tificate of appea lability

on the issue of whe ther he is entitle d t o relief based upon his cla im of
ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e . B e c a us e pe tit ion e r’ s c la im of a c tua l inn oc e nc e is n ot c og niza ble , h e is not entitled to habeas c orpus re lief, and the judgme nt of the district court will be a ffirme d.2 I . Ba ckg round Pe tit ion e r w a s c on vic te d, a ft e r a jur y tr ia l, o f t he ro bb e ry of a Z e ph y

r g a s st a tio n in

F ru itp or t, Michig an on August 6, 1986. Petit ioner was also found g uilty of beinga third fe lony

offe nder a

nd sentenc ed to prison for 30-60 y ear s. After exhausting his direc t appea ls in state court, Wright f iled a peti ti o n f

o r a w r it o f h a

b e a s c o r p u s in th e f

e d e r a l c o u rt r a is in g te n a s s ig n me n ts o f e r ror. On September 30, 2005, the district court denie d all ten of petiti oner’ s claims on the merits, but g rante d
a ce rtificate of appe alability limit ed to petitioner’s f

ree standing actua l innocence claim. Specifica lly , petitioner conte nds that two other individuals, L arr y Boy les and Elson Ear l Gee, committed the Z ephy

r robber y . I n support of his claim, petitioner submitted an af fidavit from Ge e, an inmate at the Sag inaw Reg ional Correc tional fac ility , in which Gee claimed that he and B oy les committed the Z ephy

r r o bbery in Aug ust 1986. Petit ioner submitted a sec ond aff idavit from an ind ivi du a l na

me d F ra nk Gr ay s, a fe llo w inm a te of B oyle s, statin g tha t B oyle s to ld h im that he tol d the pol ice that petitioner commi tted the Zephy r robbery in reta liation for petitioner’s ide ntification of B oyle s a s th e pe rp e tr a tor of ano the r r ob be ry

a t Ra y ’s Min i Ma

rt
. Pe tit ion e r a lso subm itted a n a ff ida vit fr om L arr

y B oyle s in

wh ic h B oyle s c on fe sse d to committing the ar

med robbe ry

of the Z ephy

r station in Aug ust 1986. Boy les stated that he ide ntified petiti o n er as t h e per

petrator of the Z ephy

r robbe ry beca use he w anted to g et bac k at him for i n f o r m i n g t h e p o l i c e t h a tB o yl e s c o m m i t t e d t h e R ay’ s M i n i M art

r o b b e r y. Th e state c ourt

fo un d th a t so me of

the inf or ma tio n c on ta ine d in

Ge e ’s and

Gr ay ’s a ff

ida vit s was not “ne wly discovere d” and that the information in both affidavits was cumulative in the re spect that it sup po rt e d th e a lib i pe tit ion e r a sse rt e d at tr ia l. T he state c ourt fu rt he r q ue sti on e d th e a ff

iants ’3

reliability in light of their pr ior criminal histories. Ge e’s a ffidavit indicate s that Boy les and petitioner kneweac h other, a nd that Boy

les turned in petitioner i n reta liation for a simil ar a ction by petitioner ag ainst Boyles. Moreove r, the state c ourt held that it was not obliga ted t o ac ce p t the claims in the aff

idavits as true, noting that the new e vidence containe d s er i ous flaws. Ge e had
se ve ra l c on vic tio ns (l arc e ny , re ta il fr a ud , arm e d ro bb e ry

) that th e sta

te c ourt fo un d c ou ld b e us e d to impeach his testim ony . Gra y s also had a prior conviction (ar med robbery

) which made his testimony less convincing . The c ourt also noted that the statute of limit ations had run on any new pr osecution for Gee and Boy

les for the Z ephy

r robbery

. The state court concluded that the new e vidence offe red by petitioner would not ca

use the trier

of fa ct to rea ch a dif

fer ent ver dict at a se parate trial. I I . A na ly sis This action is g overne d by the Anti terror ism, and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act, Pub.L . 014- 1 3 2 , 1 1 0 St a t. 1 2 1 4 ( AEDPA). See P enry v . Johnson, 53 2 U .S. 78 2, 79 2 ( 20 01 ). Th e AE DPA “pre vents fede ral ha

beas ‘ retria ls,’” and e nsures that state court c onvictions are g iven ef fec t to the extent possi ble under

the law. Bell v. Cone, 53 5 U. S. 68 5, 69 3- 94 (2 00 2)

. An a pp lic a tio n f

or wr it of habea s corpus on behalf of a person who is incarc erated pursuant to a state conviction ca nnot be g rante d with respec t to any claim that was a djudicated on the me rits in state court unless the adjudication (1) resulted in a de cision that was contr ary to, or i nvolved an unrea sonable a pplication of, cle arly established Feder al l aw as deter mined by the S upreme Court of t he United St ates, or ( 2) resulted in a de cision that was based upon an unreasonable deter mination of the fac ts in li g ht of the evidenc e pre sented in the state c ourt proce eding . 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A f e de ra l ha be a s c ourt

may no t f ind a state a dju dic a tio n to be “ un re a so na bl e” “ sim ply4

beca use that cour

t concludes in its independe nt j u d gm en t t h at the re levant state c ourt dec ision applied cle arly

established fe dera l law er roneously or incorr e c tly .” W

illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 41 1 ( 20 00 ); ac c or

d B e ll, 535 U.S. at 699. Rather, the issue is whe ther the state court’s a pplication of cle arly established fe dera l law is “objec tively unrea sonable.” W

ill iam s, 529 U.S. at 409. The AED PA require s heig htened r espec t for state f actua l findings. Herbe rt v. Billy, 160 F.3d 11 31 , 1 13 4 ( 6 Cir . 1 99 8) . Ade te rm inatio n o f a fa c tua l is su e ma de by a state c ourt is pr e su me d to th be cor rec t, a nd the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the pre sumption by clea r and c onvincing
e vid e nc e . 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 54 (e )( 1) ; Lan c as te r v . A da ms , 32 4 F .3 d 4 26 , 4 29 (6 Cir . 2 00 3) ; Bailey v

. th Mi tc he ll, 2 7 1 F. 3 d 6 5 2 , 6 5 6 (6 C i r. 2 0 0 1 ). T h i s p re s u mp t i o n o f co rr ec t n es s i s ac co rd ed t o fi n d i n gs th of state a ppellate c ourts, as we ll as the trial court. See Sum mer v . Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1 98 1) ; Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n. 4 ( 6 Cir. 1989). Applying the fore g oing sta ndards th under A EDPA, the cour

t finds that petitioner is not entitled to relief. I n his moti on, petitioner does not se ek excusal of a pr ocedur al er ror so that he may

bring an ind e pe nd e nt c on sti tut ion a l c la im c ha lle ng ing his c on vic tio n o r s e nte nc e , b ut r a the r a rgue s th a t he is
e nti tle d to ha

be a s r e lie f b e c a

us e ne wl y dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e sh ow s th a t hi s con vi ction is fa c tua lly incorre ct. I n He rre ra v . Co lli ns , 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993), the Supre me Court explai ned that “cla ims of actual innoce nce ba sed on new ly discovere d evidenc e have never been hel d t o state a g round for

fede ra l habea s relief

absent a n independe nt constituti onal violation occur ring in the
un d e r ly in g s tate c r im in a l p r o c e e d in g . ” A c la im o f a c tu a l inn o c e n c e c an o n ly s e r v e to excuse a pr oc e dura l de fa

ult so that a pe tit ion e r m ay

br ingan in de pe nd e nt c on sti tut ion a l c la im c ha lle ng inghis conviction or sentence. Id. a t 40 4. “ Th e ru le is g ro un de d in the pr inc ipl e that f

e de ra l ha be a s c ourt s5

sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of t he Constituti on – not to corre ct er rors of fa ct.” Id. I n Ho us e v . B e ll, 126 S.Ct . 2064 (2006), the Supre me Court declined to answ er the question l ef t o p en in He rre ra –

w h e th e r a h a b e a s p e ti ti o n e r

ma y b r in g a f r e e s ta n d in g c la im

o f a c tua l innocenc e. House, 126 S.Ct
. at 2086-87 (noting that “in a capital case a trul y p er s u asive demonstration of ‘a ctual innocence’ made a fter tr ial would rende r the e x ecution of a defe ndant unconstitutional, and warr ant fe dera l habea s relief if there wer e no state avenue open to proc ess such
a c l ai m ” ( qu o t i n g He rre ra , 5 0 6 U
. S. a t 4 1 7 ) )

. Si n c e th e Su p r e me Co u rt h a s d e c li n e d to r e c o g n iz e a fr eesta nding innoc ence claim i n habea s corpus, outsi de the de ath-pe nalty context, thi s court finds that petitioner’s c laim is not ent i t l ed to relief unde r ava ilable Supreme Court pre cede nt. I n any event, a s the district court noted, ther e appe ars to be a state avenue open to pe titioner. I n denying petitioner’s sec ond motion for relief from judgment, t he C ircuit Court for the County of Muskeg on
e xpla ine d th a t it

“ wo uld be wi lli ng to re vis it thi s ma tte r if

. . . B oyle s’ s te sti mony , thro ug h e xce rp ts from a de position properly noticed, [were ] pre sented, or acc ompanied by tang ible phy sical evide nce suppo rt i n g t h e c l ai m s . ” T h u s , we ar e p re cl u d edfr o m co n s i d er i n g p et i t i o n er ’s fre estanding innocenc e
c la im

. I I I . Conclusion Be cause petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to relief on his application for a writ of habea s corpus, we aff

irm the district court’s de nial of re lief base d on newly discovere d evidenc e.6

ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, concurr ing. I c on c ur in the ma jor ity ’s jud g me nt and

wr ite separ ately to elaborate on the ac tual-innoce nce e x ception. In Herrera v . Colli ns , 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993), the Supre me Court stated: “Claims of ac tual innocenc e base d on newly discovere d evidenc e have ne ver be en held to state a g round for fede ral habeas r elief a bsent an indepe ndent constitutional violation occurr ing in the unde rly ing state cr iminal procee ding.” But the He rre ra Court did no t c los e the door completely , stating in dicta : “in a ca pital case a truly

persua sive demonstration of ‘ actua l innocenc e’ ma de af

ter trial would rende r t he ex ecution of a defe ndant unconstitutional, and war rant fede ral ha beas r elief if the re w ere no state ave nue open to pr ocess such a cla im.” Id . at 41 7. Thus , even w ithout the occurr ence of any independe nt constituti onal violat ion during the state c riminal proce eding , fede ral habea s relief might be war rante d for “truly persua sive demonstration of a ctual innocenc e,” pr ovided: (1) the ha beas pe tition s eeks r elief in a capital c ase , i n which ca se such a demonstration o f

a c tu a l i nn o c e n c e “would re nder the execution of a de fenda nt unconstituti onal”; and (2) ther e is “ no state a

venue ope n to proce ss such a c laim.” Id

. Th is He rre ra exception ha s never been applied and, moreove r, the Court e mp h as i z ed t hat “the thre shold showing for such an assumed rig ht would nece ssarily be extraordinar ily

high.” Id .;
se e als o H

ou se v . B e ll , 547 U.S. --, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2087 (2006) (“I n He rre ra , howeve r, the Court de sc ri be d th e thr e sh old

fo r a ny hy po the tic a l fr e e sta

nd inginn oc e nc e c la im a s ‘ e xtra or din a ri ly hig h. ’” ); Cress v. Palmer , 484 F.3d 844, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2007). The ref ore, to invoke this exception and obtain habeas relief on his free standing innocenc e cla im, W rig ht must m eet both pre -conditions and then ove rcome the “e x traordina rily high” threshold. Wright fa ils the first prec ondition. This is not a capital case , and henc e, the c oncer n about7

th e u nconstitutionalit y

of executing a def

endant who ha s shown persua sive evidenc e of a ctual innocenc e is not impli cate d. Se e He rre ra , 5 06 U. S. at 41 7; Cre ss , 484 F.3d at 855 (“We first point
ou t th e ob vio us -- that th is i s n ot, in f a c t, a c a pit a l c a se .” ). Th e re fo re , Wr ig ht c ann ot a va il h ims e lf of thi s a c tua l- inn oc e nc e e xce pti on , a nd his ha be a s p e tit ion

is w ith ou t me ri t.8

ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, concurr ing. I c on c ur in the ma jor ity ’s jud g me nt and

wr ite separ ately to elaborate on the ac tual-innoce nce e x ception. In Herrera v . Colli ns , 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993), the Supre me Court stated: “Claims of ac tual innocenc e base d on newly discovere d evidenc e have ne ver be en held to state a g round for fede ral habeas r elief a bsent an indepe ndent constitutional violation occurr ing in the unde rly ing state cr iminal procee ding.” But the He rre ra Court did no t c los e the door completely , stating in dicta : “in a ca pital case a truly

persua sive demonstration of ‘ actua l innocenc e’ ma de af

ter trial would rende r t he ex ecution of a defe ndant unconstitutional, and war rant fede ral ha beas r elief if the re w ere no state ave nue open to pr ocess such a cla im.” Id . at 41 7. Thus , even w ithout the occurr ence of any independe nt constituti onal violat ion during the state c riminal proce eding , fede ral habea s relief might be war rante d for “truly persua sive demonstration of a ctual innocenc e,” pr ovided: (1) the ha beas pe tition s eeks r elief in a capital c ase , i n which ca se such a demonstration o f

a c tu a l i nn o c e n c e “would re nder the execution of a de fenda nt unconstituti onal”; and (2) ther e is “ no state a

venue ope n to proce ss such a c laim.” Id

. Th is He rre ra exception ha s never been applied and, moreove r, the Court e mp h as i z ed t hat “the thre shold showing for such an assumed rig ht would nece ssarily be extraordinar ily

high.” Id .;
se e als o H

ou se v . B e ll , 547 U.S. --, 126 S.Ct. 2064, 2087 (2006) (“I n He rre ra , howeve r, the Court de sc ri be d th e thr e sh old

fo r a ny hy po the tic a l fr e e sta

nd inginn oc e nc e c la im a s ‘ e xtra or din a ri ly hig h. ’” ); Cress v. Palmer , 484 F.3d 844, 854-55 (6th Cir. 2007). The ref ore, to invoke this exception and obtain habeas relief on his free standing innocenc e cla im, W rig ht must m eet both pre -conditions and then ove rcome the “e x traordina rily high” threshold. Wright fa ils the first prec ondition. This is not a capital case , and henc e, the c oncer n about9

th e u nconstitutionalit y

of executing a def

endant who ha s shown persua sive evidenc e of a ctual innocenc e is not impli cate d. Se e He rre ra , 5 06 U. S. at 41 7; Cre ss , 484 F.3d at 855 (“We first point
ou t th e ob vio us -- that th is i s n ot, in f a c t, a c a pit a l c a se .” ). Th e re fo re , Wr ig ht c ann ot a va il h ims e lf of thi s a c tua l- inn oc e nc e e xce pti on , a nd his ha be a s p e tit ion

is w ith ou t me ri t.