[Cite as State v. Terrell, 2012-Ohio-3361.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 97458

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

HARRY TERRELL

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-521919 

BEFORE: Boyle, J., Blackmon, A.J., and Keough, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 26, 2011
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Aaron T. Baker 

Aaron T. Baker Co., L.P.A. 

38109 Euclid Avenue 

Willoughby, Ohio 44094

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Jeffrey S. Schnatter 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

9th Floor Justice Center 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
MARY J. BOYLE, J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Harry Terrell, was indicted on one count of drug 

trafficking and one count of possessing criminal tools. The counts also included two 

forfeiture specifications, namely, for a large sum of money and a vehicle. He pleaded no 

contest to the indictment. The trial court sentenced him to a total of 12 months in prison 

and ordered that he forfeit the money and the vehicle. 

{¶2} In his sole assignment of error, Terrell argues that the trial court violated 

Crim.R. 44(A) and (C) when it failed to engage in any meaningful colloquy with him 

regarding his waiver of counsel. The state concedes this error, asserting 

[t]he record shows that the trial court granted Mr. Terrell’s written motion 

to proceed pro se with no meaningful inquiry into Mr. Terrell’s 

understanding of the rights that he was waiving, and therefore it could not 

have made a determination as to whether Mr. Terrell was making a 

knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of those rights. 

 

{¶3} In criminal prosecutions, the right to counsel is guaranteed by both the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, 

Section 10. The defendant may dispense with this right, however, and represent himself 

if he “‘knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel.’” State v. 

Martin, 103 Ohio St.3d 385, 2004-Ohio-5471, 816 N.E.2d 227, ¶ 26, quoting Crim.R. 44. 
{¶4} To effect a valid waiver of the right to counsel, it is necessary that the trial 

court “make sufficient inquiry to determine whether defendant fully understands and 

intelligently relinquishes that right.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Before 

concluding there has been a waiver, the court must be satisfied that the defendant made an 

intelligent and voluntary waiver with the knowledge that he will have to represent himself 

and that there are dangers in self-representation. State v. Ebersole, 107 Ohio App.3d 

288, 293, 668 N.E.2d 934 (3d Dist.1995). 

{¶5} The trial court judge originally assigned to Terrell’s case recused herself 

after Terrell filed an affidavit to disqualify her. A second judge was assigned to the 

case. 

{¶6} At a pretrial hearing, the second judge stated to Terrell, “I haven’t reviewed 

the docket in full. Has any judge determined on the record whether you’re capable of 

representing yourself?” Terrell responded that the first judge had. The judge then 

proceeded to permit Terrell to proceed pro se with standby counsel. Although the 

docket indicates that the first judge granted Terrell’s motion to proceed pro se, there is 

nothing in the record to show that the first judge made the proper inquiry to determine 

whether Terrell was making a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to 

counsel. 

{¶7} Thus, after reviewing the record, we agree with Terrell and the state that the 

second judge (who took over Terrell’s case when the first judge recused herself) did not 
properly conduct a colloquy to determine whether Terrell was making a knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. 

{¶8} Accordingly, Terrell’s sole assignment of error is sustained. 

{¶9} Judgment reversed and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J., and 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR