No. 2--08--0544 Filed: 12-10-08

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE AP PE LLATE COU RT OF ILLIN OIS SECOND DI STRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ In re BABY GI

RL F., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Boone County. ) ) No. 08--AD--4 (Mark B . and Mar

y K arl B., Petitioner

s- ) Appellees and Cross-Appellants, v. Kry stal F., ) Honorab le Respondent-Appellant and Cross-Appellee ) J. To dd Ke nn ed y, (Ralph L., Jr., Respondent)). ) Judge , Pres idin g.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE BOWMAN de livered

the opinio n of the c ourt: This case inv olves a

n inte rstate custody dispute betwe en the Illinois birth mother of Baby Girl F., Kry

stal F. ( responde nt-appe llant and

cross-a ppellee ), and the

South Caro lin a ad optive parents, Mark B. and Mary Karl B. (petitioners-appelleesand cross-appellants). The critical issue is whether a decision

by t he South Ca

rolina Supreme Court awa rding c ustody to the ado ptive par ents is entitle d to full fa

ith and cr edit in I llinois. We determine that the decision is entitled to full fa ith and credit, and we thus affirm. I. BACKGROUND InApril 2006, 20-yea

r-old Krystal, who w as seven months pregnant, contacted an I llino i s adoption agency

ca lled A Baby

to Lov e. The a

doptive pa

rents re tained a n attorne y in South Carolina, Ray Godwin, to help them adopt a ba by. Attorney

Godwin worked

with A Baby to Love, whichmatched

Kry stal with th e adoptiv e paren ts. Th e a do pt iv e p ar en ts re ta in ed an Ill in oi s a tt or ne y,No. 2--08--0544

-2-

Denise Patton, to handle the adoption paperwor k in Illino is and to a

ppear with Kry

stal in cou

rt. Attorney Patton testified that , even tho ugh the adoptive parents paid for her ser vices, sh e acted

in the interest of Kry stal, not the adoptive parents. Prio r to th e baby's birth, attorney Patton met with Kry stal to discuss the various d ocuments that she would

need to si gn. Atto rney

Patton we

nt over a pproximate ly 1 1 forms wi th Krystal, explaining each one. The documents allowed Ba by Girl to cross state lines. With respect to the baby' s father, Kry stal told A Baby to Love and attorney

Patton that she had been raped. Krystal testified that attorney Patton advised he r that if the child was the result of
a rape, there was no need to notify the father. According to Krystal, she told attorney Patton that the father 's name was Ralph, but she did not provide Ralph's last name or address because she did not want him to know about the baby or the adopt ion. Cont rary to Krysta l's testimony, attorney Patton testified that Krystal

would not t ell he r the f

ather's first name. According to attorney Patton, Krystal knew the father 's first nam e throug h friend s of frie

nds, but she

did not know

his last na

me or his address . Kry stal ref

used to sha

re the f ather' s first na

me beca use she w as rape d, and she wanted to get on with her life and make an adoption plan. Krystal gave birth to Baby

Girl in Rockford, Illinois, on June 16, 200 6. At the hospit al, Krystal met the adoptive parents and then left the hospital without Baby Girl. The adoptive

parents
were present at the hospital to provide care for Ba by Girl. Attorney

Patton did not contact Krystal at the hospital, but she contacted her prior to their scheduled cour t hearing on June 19, 2006.No. 2--08--0544

1 Two document s that app ear in Kr yst al's ap pendix, att

orney Patton's petitio n for guardianshi

p and the transcripts of the June 1 9, 2006, pr oceedin gs, do no t appear

in the re cord on a

ppeal. Therefore, we cannot consider them. See Walczak v. Onyx Acceptanc e Corp. , 365 Ill. App. 3d 664, 672 (2006) (generally

, materials not taken from the record may not be placed before the reviewing court by way of an ap pendix). As a result, we derive the following facts fr om the South Carolina Supreme Court's published decision, issued on January 28, 2008, which is a part of the record. -3- OnJune 19, Krystal and attorney Patton appeared

in an I llinois cir

cuit cour t. 1 At the he aring, Krystal stated that she intended to place Baby Girl up for ad

option and

that the p rospect

ive pare nts resided in South Carolina. Krystal signed a "Consent

t o Guardianship," and, after questioning Kry stal, the Illinois court waived the appointment of a g ua rdian ad litem and appointed attorney Patton guardian

of Baby Girl (June Illinois Guardianship Order) for the pur pose of facilitating her transfer to South Carolina. That day, Kry stal signed

four more docum ents, inclu ding a relinquishment

of parental rights, a consent to jurisdiction under South Carolina law, an affidavit of identification, and a consent to adoption. In the conse nt to jurisdiction documen t, Krystal acknowledged

that the a doptive pa

rents wou ld be filin g a South Carolina petition to

adopt Ba by Girl. The do cumen t stat ed the follo wing: "Having been informed about the law in both South Carolina and I llinois, I

hereby submit to the jurisd

iction of t

he state of South Ca

rolina. I agree that all ma

tters relating

to th e adoption of my child, including, but not limited to the right to revoke m y Re linquishme

nt, to notice of further

proceedings in the adoption and term ination of my p arenta

l rights, shall be determined in accordance with the law s of the state of South Carolina."No. 2--08--0544

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Inthe aff idavit of identification, Krysta

l checked a box indicating that she did not know the ide nt ity of the father. However, she also inconsistently stated, " 'I

was raped and I

only knew the birth father through friends of friends. I do not know his full name and will not say his first name.'

" In the consent to adoption, she refuse d to name the father, stating that he had not supported her and had not paid any

pre-birth expenses. OnJune 20, 2006, the adoptive parents returned to South Carolina with Baby Girl and filed an action for adoption in the family court. OnJuly 14, 2006, the father, Ralph L ., Jr., filed a petition in Illinois, requesting that the court void ab initio the June Illinois Guard ianship Or

der. Ralp h's peti tion alleg ed that Kr

yst al knew h is identity and wher eabouts a t all times. It al so alleg ed that Kr yst al had sa id the baby wa s borndead. Ralph argued that the Illinois court was witho

ut jurisdiction to ente

r the June I

llinois Guardia

nship Order because he never rece ived not ice. Ralph's petition failed to name the adoptive parents as parties. Upon learning Ralph's identity , the adoptive parents filed an amended adoption petition in the South Carolina family court on July 21, 2006. The adoptive p arents requested an emergenc y hearin g, which too k place on July 31, 2006. Although Ralph had noti ce of th is eme rgency heari ng, his South Carolina counsel arrived too late to participate. O n August 2, 2006, the court issued a temporary

order ( Augu st Sou th Carolina Order) that (1) grante d temporary le gal custody of Baby Gir l to the adoptive parents; (2) vested jurisdiction in the South Carolina family cou rt; and (3 ) directed Ralph to take a paternity test. The court additionally rule d that South Carolina was Baby Girl's home state.No. 2--08--0544

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OnAugust 4, 2006, Kry stal filed a petition in Illinois to vacate her consent to adoption and have Baby

Girl retu rnedto her. I

n an aff idavit, Kr yst al stated that she a

nd Ralph be gan da

ting in January 2005 an d w ere livin

g toge ther in Se ptember 2005. I n Octobe r 2005, Kr

yst al filed a ssault charges against Ralph, and he was arrested. K rystal then found out

she was pregnant and

contacted
anadoption agency , which put her in contact with the adoptive parents. Attorney Patton contacted Krystal to assist with th e adop tion and told her that the adoptive parents would pay for attorney Patt on's services. According to Kry stal's affidavit, attorney

Patton advised her that

Ralph would not need to be notified if she did not list him on the adoption papers. Krystal alleg ed that attorney Patton had a conflict of interes t re presenting her. The adoptive pare nts were not named as parties or provided notice of the pleadings. Apparently , however, they receiv ed "indi

rect not ice," a nd Ill inois counsel entered a special appear ance on their behalf. OnSeptembe

r 8, 2006, the I llinois cou rt vaca te d a b initio the June Illinois Gua rdianshi p Order (September Illinois Order). The court determined that

Kry stal inten

tionally failed to disclose Ralph 's identity and that

the failure to provide him notice deprived the court of jurisdiction to grant the guardianship. As a result, the court order ed that Baby

Girl be returned to Kry stal in Illinois.
Ralph then filed a motion in South Carolina to vaca te the August South Carolina Order awarding the adopt ive pare nts temporary c

ustody of Baby

Girl. The cou rt hel d a hear ing on Ralph 's mot i on on Octobe

r 20, 2006 , and made

a ruling on Dece mber 15, 2 006. Acc ording t o the cour

t, Illinois first exercised jurisdiction over Baby Girl when it issued t he June Il linois Gua rdianshi p Order, and Illinois exercised continuing jurisdiction when it vaca ted tha t ord er in its September Illinois Order. After conducting a telephone conference with the presidin g I llinois judg e, the Sou

thNo. 2--08--0544

-6-

Carolina court de termined that I llinois wa s the home state of Baby Gir l. The court granted Ralph 's motion to vacate based on its lack of subject matter jurisdiction (December South Carolina Order).

Inthe mean time, Kry stal filed a custody ac tion in South Carolina on December 7, 2006, requesting the court to enforce the September Illinois Order that awarded Kry stal custody of Ba by Girl. Krystal did not name Ralph as a party in this action. The adoptive pa rents answered and

filed
a counterclaim and a cross-claim, and they named Ralph as a party
. Following a hearing, the cour t issued a ruling on February

13, 2007 (February

South Carolina Order) . The co urt gra nted K rystal's request to enforce the Septe

mber I llinois Order and dismissed the adoptive parents' counter claim and
cross-c laim. In addition, the court or dered t he ado ptiv e paren ts to deliv er Baby Girl to Krysta l's counsel no later than February 23, 2007. The adoptive parents app ealed both orders and petitioned the South Carolina Court of Appeals for a wr it of su persedeas for leave to enforce the Aug ust South Carolina Order granting them temporary c

ustody of Baby

Girl. The appeal and the petition were denied , and the adoptive parents surrendered Baby

Girl on February

23, 2007. At that time, Baby Gir l was over eight months old. The adoptive parents appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Prior to the November 15, 2007, oral argument before the South Ca

rolina Supreme Cour

t, Ralph 's counsel requested to be relieved based on his failure to pay he

r. Ralph submi

tted an a ffidavit inwhich he stated that he understood that, if he did not hire replace m ent counsel, t he court

could presume that it was his intenti on to waiv e his rig hts. Ralph did not retain replacement counsel and did not appear pro seat the oral argument.No. 2--08--0544

-7-

On January 28, 2008, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued a decision (January South Carolina Supreme C ourt Dec ision) re versing the Feb ruary

South Caro lina Orde

r. It r e asoned that the June Il linois Gua

rdianshi p Order was not a

"custo dy d etermination" within the meaning of a federal act, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA) (28 U.S.C. §1738A (2000)), and thus it was not first in time. The court noted that there we re no "p leading s" for th e guar dianship procee ding; there was no written o rder in the record; and Baby

Girl never lived with attorney Patton, meaning that she never had phy sical custody of the c h ild and was not named guardian for the purpose of becoming a parent. Rather, the purpose of the guardianship pro ceeding was a limited one; namely, making

attorney Patton a tempora ry g uardian in order to facilitate the transfer of Baby Girl from Illinois to South Carolina for the subsequent adoption. The South Caro lina Supre me Court st

ated tha t, becau se the June Illinois Guardianship Order
was not a custody deter

mination, Illinois did not have jurisdiction over the custody of Ba by Girl prior to South Carolina's exercise of jurisdiction in August, an d t herefore the August South Carolina Order granting te mp or ar y legal custo dy to the adoptive pare nts was first in time. Without initial jurisdiction, it logica

lly f ollowed, Illinois did not hav e continu ing juri sdiction to

issue its September Illinoi s Order vac ating th e June I llinois Gua rdianshi p Order . In a

ddition, th e Septemb er I llinois procee dings were flawed i n that the adoptive parents were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard. The South Caro lina Supre me Court f

urther f ound that neither So

uth Caroli

na nor I llinois qualified as the home state of Baby Girl. Nevertheless, Baby Girl ha d a signi f

icant co nnection

to South Carolina in that

she had been living there since she wa s four days old, and South Carolina was the only state in which there was evidence concerning her care and personal rela tionships.No. 2--08--0544

-8-

The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that the February South Caro lina Or der incorre ctly

afford ed full fa ith and cr

edit to the

Illinois Septem

ber Ord er. The So uth Carolina Supreme Court thus r

einstate d the Aug

ust South Carolina Order a warding custody of Baby Girl to the adoptive parents, and Krystal was given 15 day s to return Baby Girl. OnFebruary

15, 2008, the adoptive parents moved in South Car

olina for a rule to show cau se
as to why Kry

stal should not be held in contempt fo r failin g to return Baby Girl by Febr

uary 12, 2008. On March 5, 2008, the court found Kry stal in willful contempt of the January South Carolina Supreme Court Decision (March South Carolina Contempt Order). OnMarch 7, 2008, the adoptive parents moved in I llinois to register the Ja nuary South Carolina Su preme Co urt Decision and the March South Carolina Contempt Order. The court registered the judgments in Illinois but stay ed execution of the March South Carolina Contempt Order until March 11, 2008. OnMarch 11, 2008, Kry stal and her counsel appeared at the hearing . The court ordered that the March South Carolina Contempt Order was stay ed until further

court orde r. The matter was continued to April 18, 2008. OnMarch 3 1, 200 8, Krysta l fil ed vari ous m otio ns con testi ng the r egistr ation of the forei gn judgmen ts under the provisions of the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforc eme nt Act (UCCJEA) (750 IL CS 36/101 et seq. (West 2004)). Krystal also filed a motion to vacate the orders and a motion to appoint a guardian ad litem
. At the April 18, 2008, hearing, Kry stal orally moved for a

substitution of judge. The court denied this motion, and it also denied Kry stal's motion to appoint a guardian ad litem . The court noted that t he maj ority of K rystal's motions concerned whether the South Carolina Supreme CourtNo. 2--08--0544

-9-

had jurisdiction to make a custody de termination. The matter was continued to May 16, 2008, for
a hea ring. Bec ause Ralph had not received notice of the Marc h 11, 2008, hearing, the adoptive parents were ordered to notify

Ral ph of the May 16, 2008, he aring. In re sponse to the adoptive parents ' concerns that Kry stal was delaying the case and attempting to relitigate issues other t han jurisdiction, th e c ou rt ad vi se d K rys ta l t ha t t es ti mo ny at the ne xt hearing would be l imited to jurisdict ional issue s. Ralph received notice of the May 16, 2008, hearing on April 23, 2008. At th e heari ng, Ralph appeared pro se , and he filed a motion requesting more time to hire an at to rn ey. The court denied this request, noting that Ralph had not presented any valid reason for a continuance. Kry stal filed several motions, including a motion to dismiss and/or transfer due to improper venue; a motion for discovery seeking to depose several individuals; and a motion for DNA testing and

finger print ing, based on a

letter th at the ad

optive pa rents allegedly

sent to Krystal near

ly one y ear after Baby

Girl
was born. (T he ad optive pa rents de nied send ing the u nsigned letter, w hich off ered money

to Krystal.) Kr

ystal arg ued that the South Carolina Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction and that there
was fraud in the procurement of the judgment in that Kry stal's consent

was invalid. The adoptive parents responded with a motion to strike Kry stal's motions. After the court heard te stimony

from the a

doptive pa

rents, Krystal' s mother, and Krysta l, the
casewas c ont inu ed t o Ju ne 9, 2008. On June 9, 2008, Ralph again appeared pro se , alth ough Krystal's attorneys filed

a motion for appointment of counsel for an indigent party . The court denied this motion for

two re asons . Firs t, th e atto rneys did not h ave st andin g to bri ng a mot ion o n Ralp h's behalf without entering an

appearance for him. Second, the hea ring did not

involve a termination of parental rights; instead, it was a hearing to contest the reg istration of a foreign judgment, whichNo. 2--08--0544

-10-

meant he wa s not entitled to counsel. The court heard more testimony , including that of attorney Pa tt on , a nd re nd er ed it s d ec is io n t he ne xt da y. The court fo

und as fol lows. First, in

regist ering t he fore ign judg

ment, the adoptive parents substantia lly complied

with the no tice req

uiremen t in section 3 05(b) of

the UCCJEA ( 750 I LCS 36/305(b) (West 2004)). Although notice was not sent out by the clerk

when the adoptive parents orally moved to register the foreign judg ment, the court ordered that notice be sent to Kry stal so that she would hav e the opportunity to object. Four day s later, Krysta l did contest the registration and, ul ti ma te ly, she rec eived an evidenti ary

hearing . In a

ddition, a t the Apri l 18, 2008, hearing, the court ordered that Ralph receive notice of the hear ing to contest the r

egistr ation of the forei gn judg

ment. Becau se of the nature of the hearing, Ralph was not entitled to fre e counsel, so there was no du e process violation. The court al so noted th e way s in which the adoptive parents had failed to comply with the statute. Under se ction 305( a)(2), orders s ought to b e regi stered n eed to be certif ied. While the March South Carolina Cont empt Order had bee n certif ied, the Ja

nuary South Caro lina Supre

me CourtOrder had

not. Also, contrary to that sec tion, there was no proof that the orders had not been modified. Finally , the names and addresses of the adoptive pare nts and Krystal wer

e required by section305(a)( 3). While

these were not jurisdictional or constitutional requirements, they ne eded to be satisfied to register the foreig n judgment. The court reiterated that

the hearing

did not invo lve termi

nation of parenta l rights, it was to contest the registration of a foreig n judgment. The co urt noted that, under section 305(d), jurisdiction is a basis for challenging reg istration, and Krystal had a rgued that South Carolina lacked jurisdiction because it was not Baby Girl's home state . On this po int, the c ourt ag reed wit h the SouthNo. 2--08--0544

-11-

Carolina Supreme Courtthat neither Illinois nor South Carolina was Baby Girl's home state. The next inquiry under the statute was which state had the most significant connection. The c ourt noted that, when the August South Carolina Order was issued, Ba by Girl was living in a

nd had adequa te contact s with South Carolina, allowing that court to assume jurisdiction. The court agreed with the South Carolina Supreme Court that, after South Carolina made the initial custody determination, it had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, and the Illinois court did not have jurisdiction to modify that order. Wit h respect to notice, the trial court found that Ralph had notice of the South C arolin a procee dings, and specifically of the hearing at

which the August South Carolina Order was entered. The court was unclear whether Kry stal had notice of that hearing but, even if she did not, it d

id not matter, because

she had a

lready consente d to th e adopt ion. Also, there was no evidence that Krystal' s consent

was fra udulently obtained . On the c ontrary , Kry stal had c onfirmed

with A Baby to Lov e a nd at to rn ey P at to n t ha t s he wi sh ed to pl ac e B ab y G irl up f or adoption. The court determined

that the January

South Caro lina Supre

me Court D ecision w as entitle d to full faith and credit and would

be enforced as soon as the adoptive pare nts complied with the statutory requirements highlighted above. The parties next appeared in court on June 12, 2008. The court confirmed the registration of the Januar

y Sou th Carolina Supreme

Court Dec ision and t

he Marc h So uth Caro lina Contempt Order, finding that they w ere entitled to full faith and credit in I llinois. The adoptive parents did not seek to enforce the portion of the contempt order requiring Kry stal to serve jail time. They re quested enforcement

of only the

January South Caro lina Supre

me Court Dec ision, whic

h ordere d Kry stal to return Baby

Girl to the adoptive parents.No. 2--08--0544

-12-

Krystal moved to reconsider and presented an alter native argum e nt. As the court noted, Krystal's argument all along had been tha tthe June Illinois Gua

rdianshi p Order was void ab initio , meanin g that ther

e was no l egal a

uthority to transf er Bab y G irl to South C arolina and that S out h Carolina did not hav e jurisd

iction an d th us could not have made the initial child custody determination. Now, Kry stal arg ued that t he June I llinois Gua

rdianshi p Order was the in

itial child custody determination, or

first in tim e, which

meant tha

t Illin ois had contin

uing a nd exclusive jurisdiction. The cour

t stated th at Kry

stal could not have i

t both ways: arg uing on the one hand that the June Illinois Guardianship Order was void ab initio and

invalid for the purpose of transferring Baby Girl to Sout

h Carolina, and arguing

on the other hand that it was valid for the purpose of being the first chi ld cu st od y d etermination. In any event, the court agreed with the South Carolina Supreme Court that attorney Patton's g uardianship was not a traditional custody order because she "was notasking for her own custody ," the guardianship being a n administrative or

procedural matter to help transfer Baby

Girl over state line s. Moreover, if the June Illinois Guardianship Order was void ab initio , then the

order di d not exist, a

nd it could

not be fir st in time . For both of tho se
reasons , the court

mai ntained its position that the August South Carolina Order was first in time. Also that day, Kry

stal filed an emergency

motion to stay enforc ement of the order pending appeal, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 305(b) (210 Ill. 2d

R. 305(b)). The court noted that there
was a co nfl ict bet wee n R ul e 30 5(b ) an d se cti on 3 14 o f th e UC CJ EA ( 750 IL CS 36/314 (West 2004)), which pr

ohibits sta

yin g an or der pend ing app eal unle ss t

h e court enters a temporary emergency

order. Reasoning that the rule trumped the statute, the court stay ed enforcement of the June 12, 2008, order, which ordered Kry stal to return Baby

Girl to the adoptive parents.No. 2--08--0544

2 The UCCJEA's exclusion of adoptions

create s an obvious gap in the jurisdictional legislation -13- OnJune 17, 2008, Krystal filed a notice of appeal. On

June 19, 200 8, the ado

ptive par ents
cross -appealed

and filed an emergency

motion to vacate the stay. This cour t, with one justice diss entin g, denied the adoptive parents ' motion t o vacate the stay . We turn no

w to the issues raised on appea l. II. AN ALYS IS Krystal's three contentions of err or are that: (1) Illinois made the initial child custody determination

and retained exclusive and continuing jurisdiction; (2) the trial cou rt re gistered the child custody determination of a South Carolina court that lacked jurisdiction; and (3) Ralph did not receive proper notice of the registration proce edings. The problem with all of these a rg uments, however, is that they are

premised on the UCCJEA, which does not apply to adoptio n procee dings. Our legisla ture ado pted the U CC J EA on January 1, 2004, there by replac ing the Uniform Child C u stody Jurisdiction Act (750 ILCS 35/1 et seq. (West 2002)) (UCCJA). One major difference between the UCCJA and the UCCJEA is

in their a pplicabi lity

to adoptio n procee dings. Alth ough t he term " adoption" did not app ear in th e UCCJA's d efinition s of child

custo d y determinations, Illinois courts construed the UCCJA to apply to adoption proceedings. See Noga
v. Noga , 111 Ill. App. 3d 328, 332 (1982) (an adoption proce eding is considered to be a custody proceeding

within the scope of the UCCJA). However, unlike the UCCJA, sec tion 103 of the UCCJEA expressly

states that

the "Act does notgovern an adoption proceeding ." (Emphasis added.) 750 IL CS 3 6/103 (West 2004); see also People ex r el. A.J.C. , 88 P.3d 599, 609 (Colo. 2004) (the most important

and ulti mately

dis positive provision of the UCCJEA for our purposes is that the UCCJEA does not govern an adoption proceeding ). 2 While the is sue in this c ase is whether IllinoisNo. 2--08--0544

governing interstate adoptions. To fill this vo id, the draf ters of th e UCCJEA inte

nded that state legislatures also adopt the Uniform Adoption Act. People ex r el. A.J.C. , 88 P.3d at 609. -14- shou ld give full faith and credit to a South Carolina Supreme Court decision, that decision i s th e direct result of the adoption action that the adoptive parents filed in th e South Car

olina fa mily court. Therefore, the UCCJEA does not apply. Unfortunately , it appears that neither the parties nor the trial court were awar e of t his exc lusion i n the UCCJEA, as much time and en ergy were de voted to argume nts based on that statute. In any event, the South Ca rolina Supreme Court correc tly base d its decision on a federal statute, t he PKPA. Congress enacted the PKPA in 1980 to remedy the weaknesses of the UCCJA, and it is a uniform federal statute gover ning child custody jurisdiction disputes. In re

Marriag e of Mich alik , 172 Wis. 2d 640, 648-49, 494 N.W.2d 391 , 39 4 (1 993 ). In addition to ki dnapp ing and child abduction, the PKPA applies generally to interstate custody disputes ( Inre Marriage of

Wiseman , 316 I ll. App. 3d 631, 638 (2000)) and specifically to adoptions. See Peopleex rel. A.J.C
. , 88 P.3dat 611 (be cause th e PKPA doe s not spec ifically exclude a

doptions, it is assumed t

hat it applies to adoption proceedings); see also In re the Custody

of K.R. , 897 P.2d896, 899-900 (Colo
. App. 1995) (the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have concluded

that the PKPA applies to adoption proceedings). As noted by t he South Ca

rolina Supreme Court, the primary purpose o f the PKPA i s to promote coopera tion betwe en state

courts regarding custody determinations; to f

acilitat e the enf orceme nt of cust ody and visita ti on decrees of sister state s; to disco urage continuing interstate controversies over child custody , in the interest of a

more stab le home environment and of s ecure family relationships for the child; and to avoid jurisdictional competiti o n and conf

li ct betwe en state

courts in matters o f child c

ustody that have

in the pas tNo. 2--08--0544

3 When the Aug

ust South Carolina Order was entered, in 2006, South Carolina was gove rned by the UCCJA. Ev entually , on June 8, 2 007, South Ca roli na enac ted the UCCJEA. For the proceedings relevant to this appeal, howe ver, the UCCJA was in effect. -15- resulted in shifting children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being. 28 U.S.C. §1738A (1982). While Krystal arg

ues that the federal PKPA is irrelevant, and that we shoul d not give the South Carolina Supreme Court Decision deference be cause it relied on that federa l statute, this view is plain ly wrong. It is c lear tha t Illin ois, South Ca

rolina, a nd other s tates ap

ply the PKPA (a s well
as the ir vers ions of the UCCJA) to interstate custody disputes. See In re Marriag e of Kne itz , 341 Ill. App. 3d 299, 305 (2003) (under the PKPA and the UCCJA, Illinois rendered the initial custody decisionand conti

nued to ha

ve exclusi

ve jurisd iction); Arnal v. Fraser , 371 S.C. 512, 51 8, 641 S.E.2d419, 422 (2007) (both the PKPA and t he UCCJA govern whe n multiple s tates cla

im jurisdiction over a child custody dispute); see also Clay

v. Burc kle , 369 S.C. 651, 655, 633 S.E.2d 173, 176 (App. 2006) (the PKPA and the UCCJA g overn th e subjectmatter ju risdictio n of state courts to rule in interstate custody disputes). More over, although Kry stal contends that the I llinois trial court did

not rely on the PKPA

in reaching its d

ecision, we may

affirm on any

basis in the record. See Burton v. Airborne Express, Inc. , 367 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1033 (2006) (the trial court may be affirme d on any

basis in the

record , without r

egard to whethe

r the tr ial cour t relied upon that ground or whether the trial court' s rationale was correct). The effec t of the Janu

ary South Caro lina Supre

me Court D ecision w as to rein state the August South Carolina Order awarding custody of Baby Girl to the adoptive parents
. 3 If th e Augus t South Carolina Order was consistent with the provisions of the PKPA, Illinois must enforce it. PeopleexNo. 2--08--0544

-16-

rel. A.J.C. , 88 P.3d at 6 11 (the PKPA imposes a duty on a state to enf orce a child custody determination entered by

a court of a sister state if the determination is consistent with the federal statu te's provisions). Once a state exercises jurisdiction consistently with the PKPA, no other sta te may concurrently

exercise jurisdiction over the custody dispute, even if it woul d have bee n empowered

to take jur

isdiction i n the firs t instance , and all s tates must accord full fait h and cre dit to the first state's ensuing custody decree. Inre Marr

iage of Michalik , 172 Wis. 2d at 649-50, 494 N.W.2dat 394-95 . The South Carolina Supreme C ourt foun

d th at, under

both the PKPA and the UCCJA, South Caro lina had j urisdicti on when it issued th e August Sout h C aro li na O rde r. In reviewing the fac tual histor y of this case , we ag

ree. As we discu ss, the issu

e turns on

wheth e r Illinois or South Carolina issued the first custody determination. Three days afte

r Baby Girl was born, attorne

y Pa tton and K

ry stal appe ared in c ourt in Illinois. Attorney Patton was appointed

guardian of Baby

Girl, and Krystal signe d a consent to guardianship,
a relinquishment of parental rights, a consent to jurisdic

tion under

South Caro lina law, an affi davit of identification, and a consent to adoption. According to the cour t, there was no ev idence that Krystal' s consent was fraudulently obtaine d. The next da y, t he adopti ve pare nts retur ned to South Carolina with Baby

Girl and filed an action for adoption there. Approximat

ely one month later, the adoptive parents filed an amended a doption petition aft e r learningof Ralph's identity. Ralph wa s provided notice of an emergency

hearing on the matter, but his counsel a

rrived to o late to p articipa te. On Aug

ust 2, 2006 , the cour

t iss ue d an order granting temporary

legal c ustody of Baby Girl to the adopt

ive pare nts, vestin

g jurisd iction in So

uth Carolina, and dire cting Ra

lph to take

a pater nity test.No. 2--08--0544

4 It is unclear whether the South Carolina Supr eme Cour t considered attorney

Patton's petition -17- Inthe meantime , Ralph ha d filed a petition in

Illinois, requ

esting t hat the c ourt void ab initio the June Il linois Gua

rdianshi p Order , and Kry

stal had f iled a petition in Illinois to va cate he r consen t. On September 8, 2006, the Illinois court vaca ted ab initio the June Illinois Guardianship Order. As the Sout

h Carolina

Supreme C ourt rec ognized, it is nece ssary to determine which s tate issued the first custody deter

mination. After loo king at the June Illinois Guardianship Order, the August South Carolina Order, and the September I llinois Order, the court determ i ned that t he Augu st South Carolina Order was first in time. In r eaching this conclusio n, it rejected the notion that the June Illino is Gua rdian ship Order, entere d at wh at was undi sput edly the f irst court procee ding, constituted a "custody

determination" within the meaning of the PKPA. At oral argume

nts, we ins tructed

the part ies to arg ue wheth er the June

Illinois Guardia

nship Order constituted a

"custod y de terminat ion" unde r the PKPA. In a

naly zing this is sue, we b egin

by setting fo rth the relevant terms under the federa l statute. The PKPA defines a "custody determination" as a "judgment, decree , or other order of a court providing

for the custody of

a child, and includes permane nt a nd te mporary

orders, and initia

l orders and modif

ications. " 28 U.S.C
. §1738A(b)(3) (1982). I t then define s "physica l custody" as " actual possession and control of a child." 28 U.S.C. §1738A( b)(7) (1982). F inally , a "per son actin g as a p arent" under the

PKPA means a "person, other than a parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custo dy by a court or claims a right to custody." 28 U.S.C. §1738A(b)(6) (1982). According

to the South Ca

rolina Supreme Cour

t, the June Illinois Guardianship Order was nota "c ustody deter

mination" because there were no ple adings filed in connection with the procee ding; 4 attorney Patton never had physical custody

of Baby Girl; she was not named guardianNo. 2--08--0544

for guardianship. -18- for the purpose of

acting as a parent; she never claimed a rig ht to Baby Girl' s custody; and Ba by Girl
never lived with her. Rather , a tt or ne y Patton was named a temporary guardian for the limited purpose of facilitating both the interstate transport of Baby Girl from Illinois to South Carolina and the subseque

nt South Car

olina ado ption. I n contra st to the limited purpose of the gua rdianshi p in this case, th e court r

easoned that the PK

PA clear ly e nvisions phy sical cu stody determinations.

To sup port her

position that the June Illinois Guardianship Order constituted a custody determination, Krystal points to the "Letters of Office" in the record stating

that attorney Patton was "authorized to have under the direction of the court the custody of the minor and to do all ac t s required of her by law." H owever , we ag

ree with the South Ca

rolina Supreme Cour

t and the I llinois trial court tha

t the gua rdianshi p in this ca se is distinct from a gua rdia nship that a ward s cus tody . We note that a

"guardian may

be appointed either for all purposes or for specific purposes." (Emphasi s added.) Black's L aw Dictionary 712 (7th ed. 1999). Here, the guardia nship ha d the specific and limited purpose o f facili

tating the transf

er of the child; it wa s notfor the pur pose of awarding physical custody. The I

llinois trial court

specifically f

ound that attorney Patton took on this role as
an"administrative matter

to help transfer," as oppose d to seeki ng custo dy o f Baby

Girl. The Illinois trial court stated that attorney Patton "was not seeking custody , was not seeki ng any parenta l rights,
was not seeki

ng cont rol over upbring ing, lea

ve to do an

y me dical t

reatme nt, leave to enroll the child," or "any

of the things that would normally be " done when seeking custody of a child. While it is true that the "Letters of Office" gave attorney Patton "custody" of Baby Girl, the guard ianship order must be viewed contextua

lly given the purpose of the proceeding . As stated, theNo. 2--08--0544

-19-

purpose of the proceeding was to file the ne ces sary pape rwork in Illinois to allow the adoptive parents to transfer Baby

Girl and to file adoption proceedings in South Carolina. In serving as the child 's guard

ian, atto rney

Patton wa s not a

"person acting

as a parent" or a person seeking "physica l
cu st od y" as defin ed by

the PKPA. T

hus, the limited guardianship in this case did not constitute a "custody de

termination" under the PKPA. It seems nonsensical that the very proceeding intended to elicit Kr

yst al's consent to the adopt

ion and g ive South

Carolina jurisdiction be interpreted as the initial " custody det ermination" entitling Illinois to continuing jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1738A(d) (1982) (p ro vi di ng co nt in ui ng ju ri sd ic ti on to th e s ta te th at ha s m ad e a ch il d c us to dy d ete rmination consistent with the provisions of the PKPA). Krystal cites no authority for the proposition that a guardian who was appointed merely to facilita te the transfer of a child, and who never r etained physica

l custody of the ch ild, amoun

ts to a custody determination as contemplated by the PKPA. I

n fact, t his case is easily disting

uished from other cases in which the guardianship confer red physical custody

of the child to the named guardian. See Murphy

v. Danfo rth , 323 Ark. 482, 488, 915 S.W.2d 6 97, 700-0 1 (1996) ( where the case involved a petition for gua rdianshi p, rathe r than the more usua

l chance ry court de termin ation of

child
cu st od y, the PKPA was applicable because the temporary appointment

was to be made per manent, thus having the effect of perma nently determining

custody and interfe

ring with other State's custody orders); see also Ray v. Ray , 494 So. 2d 634, 637 (Ala. Civ. App.1986) (guardianship appointment of paterna l aunt who

had phy sical cu stody

of the ch ild for two yea

rs was a custody de

termination within the meaning of the PKPA). Therefore, the first

custody determination unde

r the PKPA i s the Aug

ust So uth C arolina Order giving tempora ry legal c ustody to the ado

ptive par ents. Aft er South Carolina made the initialNo. 2--08--0544

-20-

custody determination, it

follows that Illinois did not have jurisdiction to issue the Septe mber I llinois Order that voided the June Illinois Guardianship Order. A s tate s hall n ot mo dify anot her st ate's custody determination mad

e consist ently with the PK

PA. 28 U.S.C
. §1738A(a) (1982). Thus, the South Carolina Supreme Court correctly determined that

the September Illinois Order violated the PKPA. Moreover, even if we were to hold otherwise, our re sult woul d not change. I f the June Illinois Guardia

nship Ord er was a custody determination, an

d thus firs tin time, South Carolina was still entitled to modify the Illinois order under the PKPA . T he PK PA al lo ws a c ou rt to mo di fy a custody determination of another state if that court has jurisdiction and the other cour t no longer has jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1738A(f) (1982); see also In re Marria ge o f Kneitz , 341 Ill. App. 3d at 305 (under the PKPA, a State court may modify the custody

decision of another state court only if the second

state co urt has ju risdictio n and the f

irst State court no l onger

has jurisd

iction). I n this case, both of those requirements we re s atisfied. First, while Kry stal argues that South Carolina lacked jurisdiction to enter th e Augus t South Caro lina Orde r, we re ject that argume nt, as we discuss below. Secon d, Illi nois no lo nger had juris dicti on bas ed on K rystal's consen t to South Carolina jurisdiction. It is u

ndisputed that, at the June Illinois guardianship proceeding , Krystal signe d a consent to jurisdict

ion under South Caro lina law i

n which sh e ackno wledge d that the adopti v e parents would be filing a South Carolina petition to adopt Baby Gi rl. Thus, e ven if we

were to accept Kry stal' s argumen t that the June Illinois Guardianship Order was the first custody determination, the

effec t of that pr

oceedin g was no t to give I

llinois the exclusive right to proceed. Rather, it was to give South Carolina jurisdiction to proceed with the adoption.No. 2--08--0544

-21-

As stated, Krystal' s next argument is that South Carolina lacked jurisdiction to enter the August South Carolina Order, because Baby Girl did not have a signifi cant con necti on with that state. Because Baby

Girl was born in Illinois, but within fou

r day s of birth was trans

ported to South Carolina, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that Baby Girl had no home state. The I llinois trial court ag

reed. Whe

n a child h as no home

state, the PKPA and the UCCJA in South Carolina allow jurisdiction if it is in the best interest of the child. See 28 U.S.C. §1738A(c)(2)(B) (1982) (a court has jurisd

iction if i t is in the be st intere st of the c hild that a

court o f such sta

te assu me jurisdiction because the child and his pare nts have a signific ant conne ction with such stat e other than
mere physical prese

nce a nd if substantial evidence is available concerning the child's present or future care, protection, train ing, and p ersonal relationships); S.C. Code Ann. §20--7--788(a)(2 ) (Wes t 1976) (same). Again, we agree with the South Carolina Supreme Court that Ba by Girl ha d a significant connection

with South Carolina. When the August South Carolina Order was issued, Baby Girl had been living wi th the adoptive parents since she was four day s old, and the adoptive parents had filed
anadoption a

ction in the

South Caro lina fami ly c ourt. I t was in B aby

Girl's b est inte rest to have South Carolina assume ju

risdicti on b ecause South Carolina was the only state in which there was evidence concerning her

care and pe rsona l rela tion ship s. Und er bot h the P KPA an d Sou th Car olin a's UCCJA, theref

ore, South Carolina had juris diction wh en it entered the August South Carolina Order. Krystal's final arguments regar ding improper notice of the registration of the foreig n custody order fail for two reasons. First, they are premised

on the UCCJEA, which we have already stated is inapplicable to this case. Second, they seek redress on

behalf o f Ralph, w

ho is not a

party to this appeal. See S outh P ark Commissioners v. Livingston , 344 Ill. 368, 372 (1931) (a party in a reviewing court

will not be permitted to take advantage of an e rror that does not injuriously aff ectNo. 2--08--0544

-22-

himself or his interests). Although it is not necessary to con sider

Krystal' s arguments regarding notice, we do note

that the tr ial cour t found tha

t Ralph had

notice of the South Ca

rolina pr oceedin gs, specifically the

hearing at which the August South Carolina Orde r was entered. As a final matter, the adoptive parents cross-a ppealed regar ding the trial cou rt's de cision to stay enforcem ent of its order pending appeal. Accord ing to the ad opti ve pare nts, the tr ial co urt's decisionto stay the order pur sua nt to Sup reme Court Rule 305(b) violated section 314 of the UCCJEA (750 IL CS 36/314 ( West 2 004)). We do not consider this issue, because the UCCJEA does not apply in this case and be cause the issue is rende red moot b y th e resolu

tion of this

appeal. See Chicorp, Inc. v. Bower , 336 I ll. App. 3d 132, 137 ( 2002) (a

n issue is moot if there remains no live controversy be

tween the parties or the resolution of the issuewill have no practical effect on the existing controversy). II I. CONCL USION For the reasons stated, the January South Carolina Supreme Court Decision and the March South Carolina Contempt Order are entitled to full faith and credit in Illinois. Therefore, we affirm the judgmen

t of the B oone Count

y c ircuit court and remand the cause with directions to lift the stay and set a date for the expeditious turnover of Baby Girl to the adoptive parents. Affirmed and remanded. HUTCHINSON and BU

RKE, JJ., concur.