IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-10639

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RICHIE LOUIS KRASE, also known as “Krazy Kraze”, also known as Sean 

Haas, also known as Richard Louis Kraze, also known as Richie Louis Kraze,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:17-CR-198-7

Before DENNIS, CLEMENT, AND OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Richie Louis Krase appeals his 250-month term of imprisonment 

imposed following his guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with 

intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, a controlled 

substance. Krase has failed to adequately brief his arguments that (1) the 

district court clearly erred in not relying on the statements of coconspirators 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 18, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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who testified at a trial, (2) his sentence should not be upheld based on the 

statements of coconspirators that were not supported by evidence, and (3) he 

was held accountable for drug transactions that occurred while he was 

incarcerated. Therefore, he has abandoned those claims on appeal. See FED. 

R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A); United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 286 n.7 (5th Cir. 

2002).

Krase argues that the district court overestimated the drug quantity 

attributed to him at sentencing because the amounts were based on statements 

of a coconspirator who did not testify at trial and who was not subject to crossexamination. Krase preserved this error by objecting at sentencing; therefore, 

this court reviews the sentencing court’s factual findings for clear error and its 

interpretation or application of the Guidelines de novo. See United States v. 

Gomez-Alvarez, 781 F.3d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 2015). “A factual finding is not 

clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” 

United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court heard the testimony 

of the case agent relative to the information provided by Shanda Hawkins, a 

coconspirator, concerning Krase’s role in the conspiracy and the testimony of 

Krase indicating that he had a very limited role in the drug-trafficking 

conspiracy. After considering the competing evidence, the district court 

concluded that the preponderance of the reliable evidence showed that Krase 

was involved with 1.62 kilograms of methamphetamine, a finding that is 

entitled to deference. See United States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 267 (5th Cir. 2006). The district 

court’s determination of the drug quantity attributable to Krase was “plausible 

in light of the record read as a whole,” and, therefore, was not clearly 

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erroneous. See Betancourt, 422 F.3d at 246 (internal quotation and citation 

omitted).

Next, Krase asserts that the district court clearly erred in making a twolevel enhancement of his base offense level for use of a dangerous firearm

during the drug activity based on a single ambiguous statement by Hawkins 

that Krase was “known to carry a gun.” Krase preserved this error by filing an 

objection to the enhancement. See Gomez-Alvarez, 781 F.3d at 791. Section 

2D1.1(b)(1) provides for a two-level enhancement if the defendant possessed a 

dangerous weapon in connection with the offense. In addition to Hawkins’s 

statement to law enforcement that Krase was observed in possession of a 

weapon, the probation officer advised that a second coconspirator had reported 

that Krase was seen in possession of a firearm on three occasions during the 

conspiracy. Krase did not present any rebuttal evidence showing that this

information was “materially untrue, inaccurate or unreliable.” See Harris, 702 

F.3d at 230 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, the district 

court’s determination that Krase possessed a dangerous weapon during drugtrafficking activity was “plausible in light of the record read as a whole,” and, 

therefore, was not clearly erroneous. See Betancourt, 422 F.3d at 246 (internal 

quotation and citation omitted); United States v. Vital, 68 F.3d 114, 119 (5th 

Cir. 1995).

Additionally, Krase contends that the district court clearly erred in 

overruling his objection to the two-level adjustment to his offense level based 

on the possession and distribution of methamphetamine imported from 

Mexico. The two-level U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5) enhancement applies if “the 

offense involved the importation of amphetamine or methamphetamine” and 

the defendant does not receive a mitigating role adjustment. Krase was not 

found to have a mitigating role in the offense. Possession with intent to 

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distribute imported methamphetamine “without more” subjects the defendant 

to the § 2D1.1(b)(5) enhancement, even if he is not personally involved in the 

importation or does not know that the methamphetamine was imported. See 

United States v. Foulks, 747 F.3d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 2014). Based on reliable 

evidence in the record, it was plausible for the district court to determine that 

Krase was in possession of imported methamphetamine with the intent to 

distribute it. See Foulks, 747 F.3d at 915; Betancourt, 422 F.3d at 246. Thus, 

the district court did not clearly err in making the enhancement under 

§ 2D1.1(b)(5). See id.

Krase complains that there were inappropriate references in the 

presentence report (PSR) to his affiliation with a white supremacy gang 

because he had ended his association with that gang. He further complains 

that did not receive adequate “credit” for participating in the state prison’s 

Gang Renunciation and Disassociation program because he was unable to 

complete the program since a federal writ was issued for his presence in this 

case. Krase has not demonstrated that there was any incorrect information in 

the PSR relative to his past gang affiliation or that improper consideration was 

given to that affiliation by the district court at his sentencing. The district 

court’s ruling was not clearly erroneous. See Betancourt, 422 F.3d at 246. 

Last, Krase argues that the district court erred in overruling his 

objection to the district court’s reliance on a drug offense charge that was 

dismissed to enhance his criminal history score. The offense was listed in the 

“other criminal conduct” section of the PSR, where it was stated that the case 

was dismissed due to prosecutorial discretion. The PSR clearly stated that this 

offense had no effect on the determination of Krase’s sentencing guidelines 

range, and the district court agreed with the findings in the PSR. Krase has 

not demonstrated that the information in the report was incorrect and, 

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therefore, the district court did not clearly err in overruling the objection. See 

Betancourt, 422 F.3d at 246. 

Except for his briefing of the drug quantity issue, appointed counsel 

failed to comply with the briefing requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 28(a). Counsel should be mindful of his responsibility to file an 

adequate brief, and counsel is CAUTIONED that the filing of similar 

inadequate briefs in the future may result in the imposition of sanctions. See

United States v. Alaniz, 569 F. App’x 219, 221 (5th Cir. 2014).

AFFIRMED.

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