SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

808 

CA 14-01199 

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, VALENTINO, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

SUSAN TERASAKA, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID TERASAKA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP, SYRACUSE (JANET D. CALLAHAN OF COUNSEL), FOR

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

ALDERMAN AND ALDERMAN, SYRACUSE (EDWARD B. ALDERMAN OF COUNSEL), FOR

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Onondaga County (Kevin

G. Young, J.), entered September 16, 2013 in a divorce action. The

order, among other things, distributed the marital assets. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order that, inter alia,

equitably distributed the parties’ marital property in a divorce

action. We reject defendant’s contention that Supreme Court erred in

determining that the disputed trust account, funded with plaintiff’s

premarital property and property acquired by gift or inheritance, was

plaintiff’s separate property. It is well settled that separate

property that is “ ‘commingled with marital property or is

subsequently titled in the joint names of the spouses is presumed to

be marital property’ ” (Gately v Gately, 113 AD3d 1093, 1094, lv

dismissed 23 NY3d 1048), and that “[t]he party seeking a finding of

separate property has the burden of rebutting that presumption” (id.). 

Here, the uncontroverted evidence at trial “trace[d] the source of the

[commingled] funds . . . with sufficient particularity to rebut the

presumption that they were marital property” (id. at 1903 [internal

quotation marks omitted]). Defendant stipulated to the introduction

in evidence of the forensic accounting report prepared by plaintiff’s

accountant “subject to whatever legal arguments either party may

advance” regarding certain aspects of the report. Furthermore,

plaintiff’s accountant was the only expert witness who testified

regarding the report and the ability to distinguish plaintiff’s

separate property from the parties’ marital property even after they

were commingled. Plaintiff also rebutted the presumption that the

commingled separate property is now marital property by establishing

that her transfer of her separate funds into a marital checking

account for 95 days was merely a convenient means of transferring her
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CA 14-01199 

separate funds into her trust account (see Noble v Noble, 78 AD3d

1386, 1389). Furthermore, the marital checking account in which the

funds at issue were commingled was held only in plaintiff’s name (see

Chamberlain v Chamberlain, 24 AD3d 589, 593).

Finally, contrary to defendant’s contention, the court properly

ordered him to pay the fees of the Attorney for the Child (AFC)

inasmuch as the record establishes that there was a significant

“economic disparity between the parties[’ incomes]” (Veronica S. v

Philip R.S., 70 AD3d 1459, 1461; see Stefaniak v NFN Zulkharnain, 119

AD3d 1418, 1419). Although defendant asserts that plaintiff engaged

in obstructionist conduct with respect to the AFC, the record does not

establish that plaintiff’s motion to remove the AFC was frivolous.

Entered: July 2, 2015 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court