alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-19-00218-CR

JOHNNY RAY CONLEY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 8th District Court

Delta County, Texas

Trial Court No. 7662

Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Johnny Ray Conley appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child.1 

Conley was tried on four indictments in one trial; each indictment alleged a distinct commission 

of aggravated sexual assault on the same child, on a different date. 

Conley claims his convictions subjected him to double jeopardy. We address that claim 

in our opinion in cause number 06-19-00217-CR, issued on even date herewith. For the reasons 

explained in our opinion in that cause, we overrule Conley’s point of error in this case.

The trial court’s judgment and sentence are affirmed.

Josh R. Morriss, III 

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: April 1, 2020

Date Decided: April 2, 2020

Do Not Publish

1

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021. We also affirm Conley’s other convictions in cause numbers 06-19-00217-

CR, 06-19-00219-CR, and 06-19-00220-CR. Conley was sentenced to seventy-five years’ incarceration in each case. 

The trial court ordered the sentences for cause numbers 06-19-00217-CR, 06-19-00218-CR, and 06-19-00219-CR to 

run concurrently and the sentence for 06-19-00220-CR to run consecutively.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jorge L. Parra, Appellant.

[858 NYS2d 641]

Appeal from a judgment of the Oneida County Court (Michael L. Dwyer, J.), rendered January 19, 2007. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of attempted promoting prison contraband in the first degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 205.25 [2]). Contrary to the contention of defendant, his waiver of the right to appeal was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered *(see People v Lopez,*6 NY3d 248, 256 [2006]; *People v Tantao,*41 AD3d 1274 [2007], *lv denied*9 NY3d 882 [2007]), and there is no authority to support his further contention that County Court was required to address defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal at sentencing. Defendant’s challenge to the factual sufficiency of the plea allocution is encompassed by his valid waiver of the right to appeal *(see People v Spivey,*9 AD3d 886 [2004], *lv denied*3 NY3d 712 [2004]) and, in any event, defendant failed to preserve his challenge for our review *(see People v Lopez,*71 NY2d 662, 665 [1988]; *People v Owes,*34 AD3d 1320, 1321 [2006]). Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Centra, Fahey and Peradotto, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Alex Sokolov, Appellant.

[667.NYS2d 263]

—Appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Thomas, J.), both rendered June 14, 1995, convicting him (1) under Indictment No. 2907/93 of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, burglary in the first degree, and burglary in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, and (2) under Indictment No. 2780/93 of attempted robbery in the first degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

*318Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the trial court’s *Sandoval*ruling was proper. The fact that a defendant may specialize in one type of criminal activity should not shield him from impeachment by use of his prior convictions *(see, People v Walker,*83 NY2d 455, 459; *People v Mattiace,*77 NY2d 269, 274-275; *People v Pavao,*59 NY2d 282; *People v McClam,*225 AD2d 799).

The defendant’s contention that the evidence adduced at trial was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of the crimes of robbery in the first and second degrees and burglary in the first and second degrees is unpreserved for appellate review *(see,*GPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the fact that the defendant wore a mask, the complainant briefly observed the entire right side of his face, and for 15 minutes, heard his voice, and observed his build, the way he walked, and his height, under good lighting conditions. Given the facts of this case, a rational trier of fact could have found that the People proved the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Rodriguez,*192 AD2d 731). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]). Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Santucci and Lerner, JJ., concur.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-7036

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus JOHN ALBERT WILKERSON, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge. (CR-00-9; CA-02-161-1) Submitted: July 28, 2004 Decided: August 13, 2004 Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. John Albert Wilkerson, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Richard Ascik, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).1 For the purpose of this appeal, we assume the date appearing in the letter is the earliest date it could have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266 (1988). - 2 - PER CURIAM: John Albert Wilkerson, Jr., moves for a certificate of appealability. We deny the motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Wilkerson has not filed a timely notice of appeal. When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed no more than sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court’s order denying Wilkerson’s § 2255 motion was entered August 19, 2002. Wilkerson’s next filing was a letter dated April 7, 2004. 1 Construing the letter as a notice of appeal, it is clearly untimely. In a May 7, 2004, order responding to the April 7 letter, the district court instructed Wilkerson to file in this court a motion for a certificate of appealability and implicitly denied Wilkerson’s request in his April 7 letter to give him permission to appeal. Wilkerson adhered to the court’s2 Construing the petition for a certificate of appealability as a notice of appeal from the May 7 order is also without merit. The district court’s implicit denial of permission to file a notice of appeal is without error. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), (6). - 3 - instruction and filed the petition in this court on May 31, 2004. Construing this filing as a notice of appeal from the August 19, 2002, order, it is also untimely. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and deny as moot the petition for a certificate of appealability. 2

DISMISSED
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 19

- 1055

_____________________________
R ACHEL W AGNER , Appellant,

v.

S TATE O F F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County

. John Jay Gontarek , Judge

. July 18, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. W OLF , R OBERTS , and J AY , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Rachel Wagner, pro se
, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
ex10-3.htm


 




EXHIBIT 10.3





THIRD AMENDMENT TO KAMAN CORPORATION


 


POST-2004 DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN


 


THIS AMENDMENT is made by Kaman Corporation for the purpose of amending the Kaman Corporation Post-2004 Deferred Compensation Plan effective January 1, 2015.


 


WITNESSETH


 


WHEREAS, by written plan instrument effective January 1, 2005, Kaman Corporation (the “Corporation”) adopted the Kaman Corporation Post-2004 Deferred Compensation Plan (the “Plan”); and


 


WHEREAS, the Corporation reserved the right, in Section 9.2 thereof, to amend the Plan; and


 


WHEREAS, the Corporation previously amended the Plan by a First Amendment thereto, dated February 20, 2012 and a Second Amendment thereto, dated December 12, 2013, and


 


WHEREAS, the Corporation now wishes to further amend the Plan in the particulars set forth below.


 


NOW THEREFORE, the Corporation hereby amends the Plan as follows, effective as of January 1, 2015, as follows:


 


1. Section 1.3 is amended by deleting the phrase “and receives a matching contribution in the form of Additional Compensation”.




 


2. A new Section 6.3 is added as follows:


 


                  “6.3           Discontinuance of Additional Deferred Compensation.  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Section 6, Additional Deferred Compensation shall not be credited under the Plan with respect to services provided by Participants on or after January 1, 2015.”


 


3. Section 11.1 is hereby amended by substituting the phrase “additional deferred compensation” with “Additional Deferred Compensation.”


 


4. Section 11.18 is amended by replacing subsection (a) in  its entirety with the following:


 


“(a)           increased by deferral contributions made on a Participant’s behalf under a cash or deferred arrangement pursuant to either Section 125 or 401(k) of the Code or pursuant to any other plan of deferred compensation sponsored by an Employer (but in no event shall include expense reimbursements or cash-out payments of accrued vacation pay), and”


 


EXCEPT AS AMENDED HEREIN, the terms of the Plan as amended are confirmed and remain unchanged.


 




 





 











 






 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Kaman Corporation has caused this Third Amendment to be executed on its behalf by its duly authorized officer this 18th day of November 2014.


 



	  	
ATTEST

	  	  	
KAMAN CORPORATION

	  
	  	  	  	
By:

	  	  
	  	
/s/  Shawn Lisle

	  	  	
/s/  Robert D. Starr

	  
	  	
Shawn Lisle

	  	  	
Robert D. Starr

	  
	  	
Senior Vice President and

	  	  	
Senior Vice President and

	  
	  	
General Counsel

	  	  	
Chief Financial Officer
**Exhibit 32.1**

**Certification by the Chief Executive Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of Entheos Technologies, Inc. (the “Company”) on the Form 10-Q/A for the period ending March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Derek Cooper, President, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 

 

(i)        the Report filed by the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(ii)       The information contained in that Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company on the dates and for the periods presented therein. 

 

|                 |   | **ENTHEOS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.** |
|----------------------|--------|--------------------------------|
| ** **           |   |                           |   |   |
| Date: August 7, 2009 |   | By:                            |   | /s/ Derek Cooper |
|                 |   |                           |   | Derek CooperPresident, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Director |

 

This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

 

 

 

----
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

THOMAS VANCE GREGG,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D22-3918

February 16, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; Michael F. Andrews, 

Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Megan Olson, Assistant 

Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Michael W. Mervine, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Krystle Celine Cacci, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SLEET, C.J., and LaROSE and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF EDUCATIONAL MEDICAL, INC. FOR THE 9 MONTHS ENDED
DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<RESTATED>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                       9,303,194
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                8,838,422
<ALLOWANCES>                                 1,021,824
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            19,849,731
<PP&E>                                      14,911,805
<DEPRECIATION>                               6,547,348
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              40,017,796
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,114,256
<BONDS>                                      2,551,079
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        73,691
<OTHER-SE>                                  30,329,496
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                40,017,796
<SALES>                                     41,468,515
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            41,468,515
<CGS>                                       36,473,977
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               36,473,977
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               938,233
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               803,414
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            (256,082)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              3,508,973
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,403,715
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          2,105,258
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 2,105,258
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.29<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.28
<FN>
<F1>TAG (EPS - PRIMARY) DENOTES BASIC EPS.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### Keith Lee WILLIAMS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Edward S. ALAMEIDA, Jr., Director, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-55604.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Filed Dec. 28, 2007.

Keith Lee Williams, Los Angeles, CA, pro se.

*974Elizabeth A. Keech, Julie A. Bachman, Esq., Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before: KIM McLANE WARDLAW, CARLOS T. BEA, and N. RANDY SMITH, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Keith Lee Williams appeals the district court’s order granting Edward Alameida’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Williams sued Alameida, the Director of the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging he was held in CDC custody past the date of his sentence for failure to submit a DNA sample in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

On November 5, 2007, Alameida moved to dismiss this appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. In support of this motion, Williams’s parole agent declared that Williams was released from prison and placed on parole on June 2, 2005, but failed to report to his parole agent. An arrest warrant has been issued for Williams, who remains a parolee at large.

Under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, we have discretion to dismiss the appeal of a party who becomes a fugitive while his appeal is pending. *Conforte v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,*692 F.2d 587, 590 (9th Cir.1982).

We grant Alameida’s Motion to Dismiss. Because it appears from the face of the complaint that Williams’s unlawful detention claim is potentially meritorious, and the district court failed to address that claim, we conditionally dismiss Williams’s appeal pursuant to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. *See id.*(“Joseph Con-forte’s appeal is dismissed. If within 56 days he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the District Court of Nevada, he may move to reinstate his appeal.”).

If within 60 days Williams submits himself to the State of California authorities, he may move to reinstate this appeal and have the action remanded so that the district court may consider the unlawful detention claim in the first instance.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-12-00670-CR

WILLIE MICHAEL MWACHANDE

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the

372nd District Court of Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 1262338D

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

January 30, 2014
##### 



Exhibit 4.13 CERTIFICATE OF CORRECTION
TO
CERTIFICATE OF DESIGNATION
OF
SERIES C PREFERRED STOCK
OF
SPANISH BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF DELAWARE ON DECEMBER 22, 2004 The undersigned, an officer of Spanish Broadcasting System, Inc. (the Corporation),
a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the General Corporation Law of the
State of Delaware (the DGCL), in order to correct Annex A of the Certificate of
Designation of Series C Preferred Stock of the Corporation pursuant to Section 151 of the DGCL,
hereby certifies as follows: FIRST: The name of the Corporation is Spanish Broadcasting System, Inc. SECOND: That a Certificate of Designation of Series C Preferred Stock of the Corporation was
filed by the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware on December 22, 2004 and that said
Certificate requires correction as permitted by Section 103 of the General Corporation Law of the
State of Delaware. THIRD: The inaccuracy or defect of said Certificate to be corrected is as follows: this Certificate is being filed to correct certain typographical errors. FOURTH: The following definitions in Paragraph 2 of the Certificate of Designation of Series C
Preferred Stock of the Corporation are corrected to read as follows: Issue
Date means December 23, 2004.
 Merger Agreement means the merger agreement dated as of October 5, 2004,
by and among, Infinity Media Corporation, Infinity Broadcasting Corporation
of San Francisco, the Company and SBS Bay Area, LLC.
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Spanish Broadcasting System, Inc. has caused this Certificate to be signed
by Joseph A. García, its Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary, this 6th
day of January, 2005. SPANISH
    
    BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.By:
    
    /s/ Joseph A. GarcíaName: Joseph A. García
Title:   Executive Vice President, Chief Financial
            Officer and Secretary
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2938 

To extend the deadline for commencement of construction of a hydroelectric 

project. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 18, 2009 

Mr. COSTELLO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Energy and Commerce 

A BILL 

To extend the deadline for commencement of construction 

of a hydroelectric project. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. EXTENSION. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the time period 

5 specified in section 13 of the Federal Power Act (16 

6 U.S.C. 806) that would otherwise apply to the Federal En7 ergy Regulatory Commission project numbered 12187, the 

8 Commission may, at the request of the licensee for the 

9 project, and after reasonable notice, in accordance with 

10 the good faith, due diligence, and public interest requireVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:05 Jun 19, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2938.IH H2938

tjames on PRODPC75 with BILLS
2 

•HR 2938 IH

1 ments of that section and the Commission’s procedures 

2 under that section, extend the time period during which 

3 the licensee is required to commence the construction of 

4 the project for up to 3 consecutive 2-year periods from 

5 the date of the expiration of the extension originally issued 

6 by the Commission. 

7 (b) REINSTATEMENT OF EXPIRED LICENSE.—If the 

8 period required for commencement of construction of the 

9 project described in subsection (a) has expired prior to the 

10 date of the enactment of this Act, the Commission may 

11 reinstate the license effective as of the date of its expira12 tion and the first extension authorized under subsection 

13 (a) shall take effect on the date of such expiration. 

Æ 


tjames on PRODPC75 with BILLS