NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JOHN LEO MEYERS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 17-0210

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County

No. S0300CR201600750

 S0300CR201601045

The Honorable Dan R. Slayton, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Jason Lewis

Counsel for Appellee

Coconino County Public Defender’s Office, Flagstaff

By Brad Bransky

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 2-27-2018
STATE v. MEYERS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W I N T H R O P, Presiding Judge:

¶1 John Leo Meyers (“Meyers”) appeals his conviction and sentence for

attempted second degree murder and aggravated assault. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This appeal arises from an incident that occurred in 2014 

between Meyers and his roommate, Earl. On June 20, 2014, Earl went for a 

run. When he returned from his run, and began to change his clothes, he 

felt a stab to his back. Earl turned, saw Meyers holding a knife, and yelled

at him, but Meyers did not respond.

¶3 Earl attempted to leave the house, but Meyers blocked the 

exit. Earl then drew his pocket knife and the two began to fight. At one 

point, Earl disarmed Meyers, however, Earl tripped as he tried to exit the 

house. In the meantime, Meyers recovered his knife and stabbed Earl in the

head and back. Eventually, Earl exited the house and ran to his neighbor 

for help. The neighbor called 911 and waited with Earl for the ambulance 

to arrive.

1

¶4 In his defense, Meyers testified that on the day of the stabbing, 

Earl accused him of stealing his money and marijuana. Then, when Earl 

came back from his run, he hit Meyers, and Meyers drew his knife in selfdefense. The two began to fight, each with his own knife, and eventually 

Meyers told Earl to leave. After Earl left, Meyers became scared because of 

what had happened and left. Meyers immediately went to his employer’s 

house, and his boss told him to contact the police. Meyers instead fled to 

California.

 

1 Earl was treated for six stab wounds: three stab wounds to his head, 

one stab wound near his kidney, one stab wound to his chest, and one stab 

wound to his shoulder.
STATE v. MEYERS

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¶5 In 2016, approximately two years after the stabbing, Meyers 

turned himself in to the police. Meyers was arrested and subsequently

interviewed by a detective. During the interview Meyers stated that he fled 

the state because he was afraid Earl “could be involved with Drug Dealers.” 

On November 23, 2016, Meyers was indicted on one count of attempted 

second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault.

¶6 Before trial, the State moved to preclude Meyers’ statement to 

the detective that Meyers fled to California because he was afraid of Earl’s 

possible drug connections, and to preclude Meyers from speculating “on 

the victim’s associations or supposed drug dealing.”

¶7 In response, Meyers argued that his statement to the detective

should be admitted to explain why he fled to California. The court granted 

the State’s motion “to preclude that [specific] statement.” After the court 

granted the motion, however, the parties continued to debate exactly what 

the court had precluded:

[The State]: And Your Honor, I don’t know if the court wants 

to address this now. But given the context of the statements 

that were made in the defense interview, in the interview of 

the defendant by Detective [ ], I do have some concerns about 

I just want to make sure the defendant is clear, Mr. Meyers is 

clear about what he is not allowed to be saying about the 

victim if he chooses to testify, particularly improper character 

evidence.

The Court: The only thing I’ve heard preclusion on is that 

[Earl], he [Meyers] believed him to be involved with or he 

could be a drug dealer.

...

[The State]: And there were some comments within our 

agreements, defendant made some comments in the 

interview about his feeling on the victim’s character. And we 

have agreed that it shouldn’t come in. And I just want the 

make sure that Mr. Meyers knows when he takes the stand, 

he shouldn’t be saying comments about what he thinks of the 

victim.

[Meyers’ counsel]: I’m not really sure that—I think that we 

made stipulations about his statement of the victim to [the 

detective]. I don’t think there is any anything that would 
STATE v. MEYERS

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prevent him on the stand from talking about his, the 

knowledge he had at the time of [Earl’s] behavior and so on 

and so forth.

[The State]: Well, I’m glad we’re bringing this up, then. . . . 

And I would just want Mr. Meyers admonished that he 

should not be making comments relating to that or related to 

prior violent behavior, assaultive behavior or . . . drug dealer 

associations or that type of statement.

The Court: Okay. All right. I understand your point. I 

understand Mr. [Meyers] modified it in that there has to be 

some room for I think the defendant to offer a characterization 

when they are offering or they are presenting a self-defense, 

if you will.

...

The Court: And so here’s what I would propose. Mr. Meyers, 

there are certain statements that you made that are not going 

to be allowed. I’ve already ruled on those. I never know what 

the testimony is going to be and how it’s going to be 

presented. I rely on the attorneys to craft their questions in 

such a way that they are designed not to elicit improper 

testimony that may result in a mistrial.

¶8 The trial court then confirmed its ruling on the State’s motion 

in its minute entry, which granted “the Motion to Preclude the Defendant’s 

statement regarding drug dealers.”

¶9 At trial, the State argued that Meyers’ flight was evidence of 

his guilt. Specifically, in its closing argument, the State argued that:

[Meyers] was well aware of what he did that night and well 

aware that it wasn’t justified. It wasn’t self-defense. He knew 

immediately that he was in big trouble. And that’s why he 

ran. He didn’t run because he was scared. . . . He was running 

to avoid the police, to avoid being caught because he knew he 

was in trouble. He knew he did something really stupid.

¶10 In his defense, Meyers testified that he fled and never called 

the police because Earl had previously threatened and assaulted him and 

he did not think the police would listen to him because Meyers had a 

previous assault charge. At the close of trial, the court instructed the jury 
STATE v. MEYERS

Decision of the Court

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that it could consider evidence of Meyers’ running, but also that the jury 

could consider his reasons for running, and that running, by itself, did not 

prove that Meyers was guilty of the alleged crime.

¶11 The State also requested that the trial court instruct the jury 

on voluntary intoxication, to which Meyers objected, arguing the 

instruction would confuse the jury. The court granted the State’s request 

after considering the evidence, which included a picture of Meyers’ trash 

filled with eleven beer cans; testimony that Meyers bought a thirty pack of 

beer on the day of the stabbing; and Earl’s testimony that Meyers had been 

drinking that day. The State additionally referenced Meyers’ potential 

intoxication in its opening and closing arguments, arguing Meyers attacked 

Earl in a “drunken rage.” After granting the State’s request for a voluntary 

intoxication jury instruction, the court allowed Meyers to modify the 

proposed instruction and adopted Meyers’ modified version for the final 

instruction.

2

¶12 After deliberation, the jury found Meyers guilty on all counts. 

The court then sentenced Meyers to concurrent sentences of twelve years’

imprisonment for count one, attempted second degree murder; seven years’ 

imprisonment for count two, aggravated assault; and ten years’ 

imprisonment for count three, aggravated assault.

3

¶13 Meyers filed a timely notice of appeal. We have appellate 

jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and 

 

2 The final voluntary intoxication instruction read: “[i]t is not a 

defense to any charged offense if the offense was committed due to 

temporary intoxication resulting from the voluntary consumption of 

alcohol.”

3 At the sentencing hearing the trial court granted Meyers 185 days 

pre-incarceration credit, however, in its sentencing minute entry it granted 

Meyers 217 days pre-incarceration credit. Neither party has raised this 

issue on appeal. Generally, a court’s oral statements at a hearing control 

over its written minute entry. State v. James, 239 Ariz. 367, 368, ¶ 7 (App. 

2016). In this case, however, it is unclear whether either of the court’s preincarceration credit calculations are correct. Without any cross-appeal from 

the State, we affirm the grant of 217 days of pre-incarceration credit. See 

State v. Dawson, 164 Ariz. 278, 282-83 (1990).
STATE v. MEYERS

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Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2016), 13-4031 (2010), 

and 13-4033(A) (2010).

ANALYSIS

¶14 On appeal, Meyers argues the trial court erred by precluding 

him from fully testifying about why he fled to California. Meyers 

additionally argues the court erred by providing a voluntary intoxication 

instruction to the jury. We address each issue in turn.

I. Preclusion of Evidence

¶15 Meyers argues his potential testimony explaining that he fled 

to California because he was afraid of Earl’s possible drug connections was 

necessary to support his self-defense claim and to rebut the State’s 

argument that he fled because he was guilty. Meyers, however, fails to 

distinguish the trial court’s ruling precluding the admission of his prior 

statement to the detective from his ability to fully testify at trial about the 

reason he fled to California.

4 Although Meyers conflates these issues, they 

are distinguishable, and the record does not support Meyers’ contention 

that the court precluded him from testifying at trial that he fled to California

because he was afraid of Earl’s possible drug connections.

¶16 We review a trial court’s ruling to preclude certain evidence 

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Davis, 205 Ariz. 174, 178, ¶ 23 (App. 2002). 

A court abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on insubstantial evidence 

or an error of law. State v. Cowles, 207 Ariz. 8, 9, ¶ 3 (App. 2004) (citation 

omitted).

5 In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion we 

acknowledge that the United States Constitution guarantees defendants “a 

meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” State v. Foshay, 239 

Ariz. 271, 279, ¶ 36 (App. 2016) (quoting State v. Machado, 224 Ariz. 343, 351,

¶ 12 (App. 2010), aff’d, 226 Ariz. 281 (2011) (internal quotation omitted)). A 

defendant is deprived of the opportunity to present a complete defense if 

 

4 The State also mischaracterizes the trial court’s ruling as broadly 

precluding Meyers “from speculating that Earl had drug connections.”

5 Even if a trial court abused its discretion in precluding certain 

evidence, its ruling will not be overturned if the error was harmless. State 

v. Fish, 222 Ariz. 109, 114, ¶ 8 (App. 2009) (finding an error is harmless if

“the actual verdict rendered ‘was surely unattributable to the error’” 

(quoting State v. Anthony, 218 Ariz. 439, 446, ¶ 39 (2008))).
STATE v. MEYERS

Decision of the Court

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he is unable to introduce evidence pertinent to an issue in his case. Id. 

(quoting State v. Fleming, 117 Ariz. 122, 125 (1977)).6

¶17 The record does not support Meyers’ contention that the trial 

court abused its discretion in precluding his prior statement to the detective 

that Earl was possibly involved with drug dealers as hearsay. Nor does the 

record support Meyers’ argument that preclusion of this statement 

prevented him from having a meaningful opportunity to present his 

defense to the underlying charges.

¶18 A defendant has a fundamental right to testify in his own 

defense. See U.S. v. Pino-Noriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999). This 

right, however, does not trump applicable rules of evidence. Id. Thus, a 

court will generally preclude a defendant’s prior exculpatory, self-serving

statement as hearsay unless the statement qualifies under a hearsay 

exception. State v. Barger, 167 Ariz. 563, 566-67 (App. 1990). See also State v. 

Wooten, 193 Ariz. 357, 366, ¶ 47 (App. 1998) (finding a defendant’s hearsay 

statement is admissible if it fits within a recognized exception to the hearsay 

rule). Meyers testified at length about his version of the events, and his 

belief that, at all times, he was acting in self-defense. Meyers’ statement to 

the detective two years’ later that he fled to California because he feared 

Earl’s possible drug-dealing connections does not go to the issue of selfdefense, but rather is an exculpatory statement because it attempts to

retroactively justify the reason he left after the stabbing and the inference of 

guilt that arises from fleeing. Although Meyers argued the statement 

should be admitted to show his state of mind, the trial court ultimately

granted the State’s motion to preclude Meyers’ statement. We find no 

abuse of discretion in precluding this self-serving pretrial statement, which 

if allowed by the court would have improperly bolstered Meyers’ trial 

testimony. After precluding Meyers from testifying that he told the 

detective that he fled to California because of Earl’s drug-dealing 

connections, the court informed Meyers and his counsel that he had the 

right to testify at trial as to why he left the state, to the extent permitted by 

the rules of evidence.

¶19 As noted, Meyers exercised his fundamental right to testify in 

his defense at trial, and consequently, his testimony was subject to 

reasonable limitations—such as the trial court precluding the admission of 

 

6 The State argues Meyers failed to raise this issue before the trial 

court, and thus, this issue is subject to fundamental error review. Meyers, 

however, objected to the court’s preclusion ruling, which preserved this 

issue for a harmless error review on appeal.
STATE v. MEYERS

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prior out-of-court self-serving statements, which are inadmissible under the

Arizona Rules of Evidence. See Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. Contrary to 

Meyers’ argument on appeal, the court only precluded Meyers from 

improperly bolstering his testimony with the admission of his prior 

statement to the detective that he fled to California because of Earl’s drug 

connections, and did not categorically preclude Meyers from testifying that 

he fled to California because he feared Earl’s potential drug connections. 

Instead, the court reserved its ruling regarding the admission of Meyers’ 

testimony on this issue subject to how the information was raised and 

presented at trial. Thus, Meyers could have testified that he fled to 

California because he feared Earl’s drug connections if this testimony was 

otherwise admissible under the Arizona Rules of Evidence.

¶20 We cannot say, on this record, that the trial court abused its 

discretion in precluding Meyers’ statement to the detective. Nor can we 

say, based on the court’s ruling, that Meyers was prohibited from testifying 

that he fled to California because he was afraid of Earl’s drug connections. 

Meyers chose to testify instead that he fled because of Earl’s prior threats 

and assaultive behavior, and not because of concerns about Earl’s potential

drug connections. This decision was entirely within his control.

7

II. Voluntary Intoxication Jury Instruction

¶21 On appeal, Meyers argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by issuing a voluntary intoxication jury instruction because the 

instruction was confusing and irrelevant to Meyers’ justification of selfdefense.

¶22 We review the trial court’s decision to grant a jury instruction 

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Johnson, 205 Ariz. 413, 417, ¶ 10 (App. 

2003). A court may provide a jury instruction “on any theory reasonably 

supported by the evidence.” Id. (citing State v. Tschilar, 200 Ariz. 427, 436, 

¶ 36 (App. 2001)). We look to jury instructions as a whole to determine 

whether they have misled the jury, and we will not reverse a case if only an 

isolated portion of the jury instructions was misleading. State v. Guerra, 161 

Ariz. 289, 294 (1989).

¶23 At trial evidence was admitted that Meyers had bought a 

thirty pack of beer and had been drinking on the night of the stabbing. 

 

7 There is no offer of proof in the record to show that Meyers’ potential 

testimony as to possible drug connections would have been anything other 

than pure speculation.
STATE v. MEYERS

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Additionally, there was photo evidence showing Meyers’ trash filled with 

beer cans. From this, a jury could reasonably conclude that Meyers was 

intoxicated on the night of the stabbing. Even if other evidence tended to 

prove that Meyers was not intoxicated, there was sufficient evidence on 

which the court could give the voluntary intoxication jury instruction. 

Moreover, the court allowed Meyers to modify the proposed jury 

instruction to reflect his desired language while still accurately stating the 

law. Meyers, however, argues that even the modified instruction was 

improper because he did not raise an intoxication defense. In response, the 

State argues the voluntary intoxication jury instruction was necessary to 

help the State carry its burden of proving that Meyers committed a 

voluntary act—regardless of whether he was intoxicated—by stabbing Earl. 

We agree and find that the court did not abuse its discretion in instructing 

the jury on voluntary intoxication because the instruction was relevant to 

the State’s theory and consistent with the admitted evidence.

CONCLUSION

¶24 Meyers’ conviction and sentence are affirmed.