### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Se pte m be r 24, 200 4 S es sio n TER RI M ITCHE LL v. SA RA TOGA INV ESTM ENT CO MP AN Y and

WILLIAM LEIGHT ON REE D An Appeal f

romthe Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. 107896-2 Walte r L. Evans, Ju dge

No. W2004-00587-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 30, 2004

This case is a

bout e nforc ement of a settlement ag ree ment. I n 1994, the parties entere d into a joint
a g re e me nt f

or the de ve lop me nt of re sid e nti a l pr op e rty . In 1 99 6, theplaint if f f ile d a la ws uit a g a ins t the def endants, a lleg ing brea ch of contra ct. The parties attempted to reach a settlement ag ree ment to resolve the dispute. This re sulted in a written ag ree ment signe d only b y t h e d ef en dant. The defe ndant made some payments pursuant to the written a g ree ment, but f urther disputes a

rose. The defe ndant m oved to enfor ce the settlement ag ree ment. The plaintiff a lleg ed that she ne ver a g ree d to the final settlement ag ree ment. The trial c ourt held that t h e written settlement ag ree ment was bindi n g o n t h e parties. The plaintiff then appe aled this ruling , ag ain alleg ing that no settlement ag ree ment ever

exis ted, and, in the alternative, that the def endant br eac hed the se ttlement ag ree ment by no t te nd e ri ng there qu ir e d p a y me nts . We va c a te theor de r of the tria l cou rt , fin din g that eve n if a valid settlement ag ree ment exis ted, the def endant br eac hed the a g ree ment by failing to tender the
re qu ir e d p a y me nts

. Rule 3 Appeal; Jud gm ent of the Chancery Court is Vacate d and Rem anded
H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., and D A V ID R. F ARMER , J ., joined.
John S. Co lle y , II I , Co lumbia , f or theplaint if

f/ app e llant T e rri Mi tc he ll G. Coble Caperton, Memphis, for the def endant/appe llee Willi am L eig hton Reed
J ohn McQuiston, I I , Memphis, for def endant/appe llee Saratoga

I nvestment CompanyR u le 1 0 o f t h e R u le s o f t h e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls o f T e n n e sse e p ro v id e s a s fo llo w s: 1
T h i s Cou r t , w i t h t h e c on c u r r e n c e of a l l j u dg e s pa r t i c i pa t i n g i n t h e c a s e , ma y a f f i r m, r eve r s e or mo di f

y t he act i ons of

t he t r i al cour t by memo r andum opi ni on wh en a f ormal
o p i ni o n wo ul d have no prece d ent i al val ue. W hen a case i s d eci d ed by me m o randum opi n i on i t s h al l be des i g n at ed "M EM O RAN D U M O PINION , " s h al l n ot be pu bl i s h ed, and s hal l not be ci t ed or r el i ed on for a ny r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed cas e.

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### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION 1

I n Marc h 1994, Plaint i ff/Appe llant Terri Mitchell (“Mitchell”) and De fendant/Appellee Saratog a Investment Company (“Sar atog a”) and De fendant/Appellee William L . Reed (“ Reed”) entered i n t o a joi nt venture a g ree ment for the de velopment of re sidential property . As part of the joint ventur e, Saratog a and Reed executed a pr omissory note for $35,000 to a

third party , which wa s later a ssigne d to Mitchell.
I n J uly 1996, Mitchell filed a la wsuit ag ainst Saratog a and Re ed, alleg ing br eac h of contra ct a n d m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
. O v e r t h e n e x tt h r e e ye ar s , t h e p art i e s a t t e m p t e d t o s e t t l e t h e l a w s u i t

. F i n a l l y, on November 2 , 1999, Reed sent Mitche ll a written settlement ag ree ment, signe d by Reed. The rele vant terms of the settlement ag ree m en t we re that (1) all dama g es re lated to the orig inal promissory

note totaled $55,000; (2) Reed would pay Mitchell $10,000 upon Mitchell’s execution of the settlement a g ree ment; (3) Ree d would pay Mitchell $5,000 on or before November 12, 1999; (4 ) R e e d w ou ld pa y Mit c he ll $5, 00 0 on o r b e fo reDe c e mbe r 1 0, 19 99 ; ( 5) Re e d w ou ld p a y Mit c he ll $5 ,0 00 on or

be fo reJanu ary

7, 20 00 ; a nd (6 ) the re maini ng ba la nc e of $3 0, 00 0 w ou ld e ith e r b e pa id or the pa rties would neg otiate a pay ment plan.
As se t f orth in the writt e n se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, Re e d s e nt a $1 0, 00 0 p a y me nt t o M itc he ll along w i th the written ag ree ment. Despite this, Mitchell did not ex ecute the written settlement ag ree ment. On Novembe r 2, 1999, Reed paid an additional $5,000 to Mitche ll. Wit h this additional payment, Reed’s attorney enclose d a letter to Mitchell’s attorney , noting that Mitchell still had not
re t u rn ed a s i gn ed co p y

o f t h e s et t l em en tagr ee m en t

. De s p i t e R ee d ’s co n ce rn ab o u t n o tre ce i v i n g a sig ne d c op y

of these ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, he c on tin ue d to a tte mpt to m ake pay me nts

. I n a let ter date d F e br

ua ry 28 , 2 00 1, Mit c he ll’ s atto rn e y re turne d th e $5 ,0 00 pay me nt t o Reed’s attorney , advising Reed that Mitchell did not acc ept the settlement a g ree ment and that if Ree d did not imm ediately

pay the full amountowed, Mitche ll would procee d to trial. I n response , on November

2, 2001, Reed filed a

Motion to Enforce Settlement Ag ree ment. Mitchell filed an objection to Reed’s motion. I n support, Mitchell filed her own af fidavit stating that, although she had agr eed to the t erms of the s ettlement agr eeme nt, her a g ree ment was c ontinge nt on Reed making sever al “good faith” pay ments. Since R eed had made only two payments, Mitchell refuse d to acc ept the settlement ag ree ment.T he ap p el l ee reco rd d o es not i ncl ud e t hi s o rder, only a l et t er f rom t he t ri al judge’ s cl erk i nfo rming t he 2 p arti es’ co un sel o f

t he t rial co urt’ s d ec i si o n. H o w ev er, t he ex i st en ce o f t he o rd er a p p ea rs und i sp uted b y t he p arti es. A t t h is ju n c tur e , t h e a p p e a l wa s d ism isse d b e c a u se the re w a s n o fi n a l o rd e r re g a rd ing S a ra to g a . M itch e ll 3 t hen f i l ed a nonsui t agai nst Sarat o ga. A l t ho ugh not co m p l et el y cl ear, i t ap p ears f rom t he reco rd t hat Sarat o ga became i ns ol ven t

. Af

t er t he nons ui t ag ai ns t Sar at oga wa s en t er ed, t he r ecor d f r om t he f

i r s t appeal was cons ol i dat ed into this a p p e a l b y a n o rd e r d a te d A p ril 2 9 , 2 0 0 4

. -3- I n J anuary

2002, the trial court appar ently g rante d Reed’s motion to enfor ce the settlement ag ree ment. Mitchell immediately filed a Motion to Reconsider , Clarify and/or Confirm the Court’s 2 Ruling of January

7, 2002 (“Motion t o Reconsider ”), asserting ag ain that no settlement ag ree ment e xiste d, that th e se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt w a s to o v a g ue to b e e nf or c e d, that th e a g re e me nt d id n ot s tate when pay ments wereto be made, and that it did not resolve the pending litigation betwe en the parties. In addit ion, in the event that the tria l court dec lined to chang e its prior ruling , Mitchell’s motion to reconsider a sked for clarification of the a lleg ed settlement a g ree ment.
I n an orde r date d Fe bruary 8, 2002, the trial court rea ffirme d its prior order and cla rified the terms of the settlement ag ree ment to be enfor ced: (1) Reed owed Mitchell $40 , 0 0 0 (t h e o ri g inal $55,000 less the $15,000 alre ady paid); (2) $5,000 would be paid on Ma rch 1 and April 1 of 2002 with the $30,000 balanc e paid by May 1, 2002; ( 3) Mitchell was not e ntitled to anyadditional interest, attor n ey ’s fees or other unpaid char g es; and (4) that if the payments werenot made
a c c or din g to this or de r, Mit c he ll c ou ld b ri ng thematte r b a c k to thetria l c ou rt fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s. O n M ar c h 5 , 2 0 0 2 , M i t c h e l l ap p e a l e d t h i s ru l i n g t o t h e C o u rto f A p p e a l s
. O n t h e s a m e d a y, Mitchell’s attorney

notified Reed’ s attorney

by letter that the issue was on appea l. With this l etter, Mitchell returne d Reed’s $5,000 chec k and advised Reed to make further payments to the trial court cler k.
Whil e Mitchell’s a

ppeal wa s pending in this C ourt, Mitchell filed a moti on with the trial
c ou rt fo r re lie f u nd e r R ule60 of theTe nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re , a s w e ll a s a mot ionwi th t h i s C o u rtto remand f

or the trial c ourt to consider the Rule 60 motion. This Court gr anted Mit c he ll’ s mo tio n to re ma nd . T he tria l c ou rt c on sid e re d Mit c he ll’ s Rul e 60 mot ion bu t de c lin e d to
c ha ng e its prior

de c isi on . Co ns e qu e ntl y , M itc he ll c on tin ue d th e a pp e a l in thi s Co urt. 3 On appe al, Mitchell asserts that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the trial court’s f inding that a se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt e xiste d. Mit c he ll f urthe r as se rt s tha t, ev e n if a s e ttl e me nt a g re e me nt d id exis t, Reed bre ache d the ag ree ment by failing to make the pay ments as orde red.
Since this case was t ried by the t rial court sitti ng without a jury , we r eview the case de novo upon the re cord w ith a presumption of cor rec tness of the finding s of fa ct by the trial court. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Questions of law a re r eviewe d de novo , w ithno pr e su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss. Cam pbell v. Florida St eel Corp. , 919 S.W .2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996)

. Mit c he ll f

ir st a sse rt s th a t th e e vid e nc e be fo rethetria l c ou rt wa s in su ff

ic ie nt to fi ndthat a settlement ag ree ment exis ted. Mitchell arg ues t hat t he only evidenc e bef

ore the trial court wa s the unsigne d, written ag ree ment and the a ffidavits of Mit chell and her attorney , both indicating that theT h e r el ev an t por t i on of Rul e 8. 01 s t at es t h at “ [ r ] el i ef i n t h e al t er n at i v e or of s ev er al di f

fer en t t y pes ma y be 4 dema n ded. ” T en n
. R. Ci v
. P. 8. 01

T end er i s d ef

i ned as “an unco nd i t i o nal off er of pa y m ent co nsi st i ng i n t he act ual pro d uct i o n.
. . of a sum 5 n ot l es s t h an t h e amou n t du e on a s pec i f i c debt or obl i g at i on
. ” 74 Am. J u r
. 2d Tend er § 1 (20 0 4 ).

-4- settle me n t a g r e e me n t w a s n e v e r f in a li ze d

. M it c h e ll f

u rth e r a s s e rts th a t, in th e a lt e r n a ti v e , if the
se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt d id exis t, the n Ree d bre a c he d the a g re e me nt by faili ng to te nd e r p a y me nts to the court clerk a s advised by Mitchell’s counsel.
It is undisput ed from the rec ord that Reed did not tender the payments in acc ordanc e with the schedule set forth in the Februa ry 8, 2002 order of t he trial court. The first $5,000 payment, due on Marc h 1, 2002, was re turned to Re ed with the letter advising Reed to te nder the payments to the trial court c lerk. Ree d did not do s o an d m ad e n o attempt to tender any of the other

payments. Reed
arg ue s tha t he wa s e xcu se d f ro m ma kin g thepay me nts be c aus e Mit c he ll r e fu se d to a c c e pt the fi rs t pay me nt, a ndthi s ma de Re e d’ s pe rf orma nc e imp os sib le . Re e d f urthe r a rg ue s th a t, b e c aus e Mit c he ll has consistently

maintained that no settlement a g re em ent exist ed, she is judicially estopped fr om arg uin g that Re e d b re a c he d th e se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt.
As a thre shold issue, we addr ess the is s u e o f j u dicial estoppel. The doctrine of judicial estoppel pre vents a litigant from taking contra ry positions i n judicial proce eding s. “Where onestates under oath in former litig ation, either in a pleading , a deposition or on oral testimony , a g iven fa ct as true, one will not be permitted to de ny that fac t in subsequent litigation.” Sib le y v . M c Cor d , 2004 WL 2168392 at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2004).
The doc tri n e of judicial estoppel is simply not applicable in this ca se. Mitchell is not
asserting inconsistent fa cts, she is making classic a lternative a rg uments, clea

rly permitted under

the applicable rules. See Rule 8.01 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure. Mitchell is permitted 4 to a rg ue that no settlement ag ree ment ex i s t ed or , even if a settlement a g ree ment exis ted, Reed br e a c he d it . Re e d’ s a

rg ume nt o n th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.
Reed a lso asserts that Mitchell’s re fusal to ac cept pay ment rende red his performanc e impossibl e and thus e x cused his performance. How ever , Mitchell’s counsel spe cifica lly advised Re e d to te nd e r the pay me nts to the tria l c ou rt c le rk sin c e thetria l c ou rt ’s de c is io n w a s o n a pp e a l. At no point did Mi tchell indicate that Reed wa s excused from tende ring payment; quite the opposite. Mo re ov e r, Mit c he ll’ s a c tio n did not make it impo ssi ble fo r Re e d to ten de r pa y me nt; thepay me nts wer e mer ely

direc ted to the trial court c lerk. Clearly , Reed wa s still responsible for tendering the

5 payments as or d er ed b y

the trial court. Reed’s failure to do so was a brea ch of the settlement ag ree ment. See Ge neral Const . Cont ractors As s 'n, Inc. v. G

reater St. Thom as Baptis t Ch urch , 107 S.W. 3d 51 3, 51 9 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 20 02 ). B e c aus e Re e d c le arl y br e a c he d th e se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, it is no t ne c e ssa

ry fo r us to de te rm ine wh e the r a se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt a c tua lly e xiste d. Pur su a nt t o the trial court’s Fe bruary

8, 2002 order , Mitchell may proce ed to enf

orce her c laim ag ainst Reed.
Acc ording ly , we va cate the orde r of the t rial court finding that a settlement a g ree ment exis ted betwee n the parties and re mand for f urther proce eding s not inconsistent with this opinion. Cost s of-5-

thi s a pp e a l arec ha

rg e d to the app e lle e , William L e ig hto n Ree d, fo r wh ic h e xec uti on ma y iss ue , if
n e c e s s ar y.

____________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE