alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 39429

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

WESTON KENNETH NELSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 598

Filed: August 21, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bingham County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge. 

Order denying I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed.

Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Sarah E. Tompkins, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge;

and GUTIERREZ, Judge

PER CURIAM

Weston Kenneth Nelson pled guilty to burglary, Idaho Code §§ 18-1401, 18-1403. The 

district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years with six years determinate. Nelson filed an 

Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. Nelson appeals from the denial 

of his Rule 35 motion.

A Rule 35 motion is a request for leniency which is addressed to the sound discretion of 

the sentencing court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); State v. 

Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting a Rule 35 motion, 

the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 

subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 

201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007). Our focus on review is upon the nature of the offense and the 
2

character of the offender. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 

1982). Where a sentence is not illegal, the appellant must show that it is unreasonably harsh in 

light of the primary objective of protecting society and the related goals of deterrence, 

rehabilitation and retribution. State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145, 814 P.2d 401, 405 

(1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992); 

State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 

Having reviewed the record, including any new information submitted with Nelson’s 

Rule 35 motion, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the motion. 

Accordingly, the district court’s order denying Nelson’s I.C.R. 35 motion is affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Lemar C. Thorpe, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 664]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland *473County (Nelson, J.), rendered December 19, 1995, convicting him of burglary in the first degree, assault in the third degree (two counts), menacing in the second degree, and criminal contempt in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by reversing the conviction of assault in the third degree under the ninth count of the indictment, vacating the sentence imposed thereon, and dismissing that count of the indictment; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

On March 10, 1995, the defendant, who had waited for the complainant in the hallway by her apartment, threw the complainant against the wall and punched her in the head. After the incident, the complainant went to the hospital complaining of a severe headache. Fourteen days later, the defendant went to the complainant’s apartment, kicked down the door and repeatedly beat and threatened the complainant until she finally escaped through the window. This subsequent assault required the complainant to be hospitalized for five days.

Contrary to the defendant’s contention, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see, People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt of burglary in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt *(see, People v Cowan,*184 AD2d 778). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

However, we agree with the defendant’s contention that the People failed to present any evidence as to physical impairment or pain or the extent of pain suffered to establish “physical injury” (Penal Law § 10.00 [9]; § 120.00) for the incident occurring on March 10, 1995 *(see, Matter of Philip A.,*49 NY2d 198, 200; *People v Briggs,*220 AD2d 762; *People v Carney,*179 AD2d 818; *People v Smith,*176 AD2d 904, 905). Accordingly, the conviction of assault in the third degree under the ninth count of the indictment is reversed.

The sentence is not excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Ritter and Florio, JJ., concur.
**Exhibit 13.1**

**906 CERTIFICATION**

The certification set forth below is being submitted in connection with the annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2009 (the “report”) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Joaquín Galindo V., the Chief Executive Officer and Eduardo Escaffi J., the Chief Financial Officer of Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A. (“Endesa Chile”), each certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:

1.     the report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and 

2.     the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Endesa Chile. 

 

Date: June 11, 2010.

 

                                                                                                       /s/ Joaquín Galindo V.
Brief Stricken and Order filed November 3 , 2016

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 15

- 00581

- CR NO. 14

- 15

- 00582

- CR NO. 14

- 15

- 00583

- CR

____________ LUIS EDUARDO LARA , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 405th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Cause No s . 14CR2148 , 14CR2149, and 14CR2150



### ORDER Appellant’s original brief was stricken because it discloses the name of a child victim of sexual assault under the age of 17. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. a rt. 57.02(h) ; Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(b)

. Appellant’s amended brief still discloses the names of child victims of sexual assault under the age of 17. See id. Accordingly, the amended brief is STRICKEN . Appellant is ordered to file a2

brief that complies with Tex. Code Crim. Proc. a rt. 57.02 and Tex. R. App. P. 9.10 by November 14 , 2016

. PER CURIAM
Exhibit 10.46  EXECUTION COPY  ADDITIONAL PARTY ADDENDUM  Reference is made
to the Revolver Intercreditor Agreement dated as of February 22, 2007 (the
Intercreditor Agreement) between
Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch (DBNY), as
First Lien Collateral Agent, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, as Second
Lien Collateral Agent and Deutsche Bank AG Cayman Islands Branch, as Third Lien
Collateral Agent (the Existing Third Lien
Collateral Agent). 
Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meanings
assigned to such terms in the Intercreditor Agreement.  DBNY is executing
this Additional Party Addendum in its capacity as collateral agent (the Collateral Agent) under the Junior
Lien Term Loan Agreement (amending and restating in its entirety the Bridge
Loan Agreement dated as of February 22, 2007, the Existing
Bridge Loan Agreement) dated as of March 15, 2007 (the Loan Agreement), among Building
Materials Corporation of America and certain of its Subsidiaries and the
lenders party thereto from time to time. 
The Loan Agreement amends and restates in its entirety the Existing
Bridge Loan Agreement and constitutes the Third Lien Obligations under the
Intercreditor Agreement, and the Collateral Agent is the replacement for the
Existing Third Lien Collateral Agent.  By
execution of this Additional Party Addendum, the Collateral Agent hereby
acknowledges and agrees to be bound by the terms of the Intercreditor Agreement
as the Third Lien Collateral Agent, as if originally so bound.  The Collateral Agent represents and warrants
that it has received a copy of each of the First Lien Documents, the Second
Lien Documents and the Third Lien Documents and satisfies each and all of the
criteria set forth therein for the assumption of its role as a Third Lien
Collateral Agent.  Accompanying this
Additional Party Addendum is the Officers Certificate contemplated by Section 7.4
of the Intercreditor Agreement.  This Additional
Party Addendum shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of
the State of New York.  Notices delivered
to the undersigned pursuant to this Additional Party Addendum shall be
delivered in accordance with the notice provisions set forth in the Credit
Agreement but to the address set forth below or such other address provided in
writing, to the Company and other parties to the Intercreditor Agreement.  [SIGNATURE PAGE
FOLLOWS]  1


DEUTSCHE BANK AG NEW
  YORK BRANCH60 Wall Street, MS 0208New York, NY 10005By:
  /s/ Marguerite
  SuttonName:   Marguerite
  suttonTitle:              DirectorBy:
  /s/ Evelyn ThierryName:
  Evelyn ThierryTitle: Vice
  President
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Roland Alford, Appellant.

[987 NYS2d 861]

Application by the appellant for a writ of error coram nobis to vacate, on the ground of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a decision and order of this Court dated November 4, 2009 *(People v Alford,*67 AD3d 696 [2009]), affirming a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered November 30, 2007.

Ordered that the application is denied.

The appellant has failed to establish that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel *(see Jones v Barnes,*463 US 745 [1983]; *People v Stultz,*2 NY3d 277 [2004]).

Mastro, J.E, Skelos, Chambers and Lott, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 21.1



SUBSIDIARIES OF ALABAMA NATIONAL



|Name of Subsidiary                             |  | State of Organization
|---------------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------
|National Bank of Commerce of Birmingham        |  | National Bank        
|NBC Securities, Inc.                           |  | Alabama              
|NBC Investments, Inc.                          |  | Nevada               
|NBC Joint Ventures, Inc.                       |  | Alabama              
|Bank of Dadeville                              |  | Alabama              
|TBD Investments, Inc.                          |  | Nevada               
|Ashland Insurance, Inc.                        |  | Alabama              
|Alabama Exchange Bank                          |  | Alabama              
|Tuskegee Loan Company, Inc.                    |  | Alabama              
|AEB Investments, Inc.                          |  | Nevada               
|First Gulf Bank                                |  | Alabama              
|First Citizens Bank                            |  | Alabama              
|Clay County Finance Company, Inc.              |  | Alabama              
|FCB Investments, Inc.                          |  | Nevada               
|First American Bank                            |  | Alabama              
|Corporate Billing, Inc.                        |  | Alabama              
|FAB Investments, Inc.                          |  | Nevada               
|ANB Insurance Services, Inc.                   |  | Alabama              
|Bill Eyerly Insurance, Inc.                    |  | Florida              
|Citizens & Peoples Bank, National Association  |  | National Bank        
|Public Bank                                    |  | Florida              
|Georgia State Bank                             |  | Georgia              
|Community Bank of Naples, National Association |  | National Bank        
|CBN Investments, Inc.                          |  | Nevada               
|Peoples State Bank of Groveland                |  | Florida              
|Alabama National Statutory Trust I             |  | Connecticut          
|Alabama National Statutory Trust II            |  | Connecticut
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BOYKIN LODGING COMPANY AS OF MARCH 31, 1999
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001015859
<NAME> BOYKIN LODGING COMPANY
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                             890
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    6,158
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0<F1>
<PP&E>                                         634,376
<DEPRECIATION>                                  39,762
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 609,072
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0<F1>
<BONDS>                                        288,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                     281,796
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   609,072
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                19,462
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   11,164
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                   278
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,138
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,882
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              2,882
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,882
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .17
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .17
<FN>
<F1>REGISTRANT UTILIZES AN UNCLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET THEREFORE TOTAL CURRENT
ASSETS AND TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES ARE NOT APPLICABLE.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JAMES MILLER,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 76 WAL 2020

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 15th day of June, 2020, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2604 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make permanent the 

additional standard deduction for real property taxes for nonitemizers. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 21, 2009 

Mr. HODES (for himself and Mrs. LUMMIS) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to make 

permanent the additional standard deduction for real 

property taxes for nonitemizers. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ADDITIONAL STANDARD DEDUCTION FOR REAL 

4 PROPERTY TAXES FOR NONITEMIZERS MADE 

5 PERMANENT. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (C) of section 

7 63(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended 

8 by striking ‘‘in the case of any taxable year beginning in 

9 2008 or 2009,’’. 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
2 

•HR 2604 IH

1 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

2 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after 

3 December 31, 2008. 

Æ 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
Exhibit
      ___




**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO**


**THE
      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**


**CHIEF
      EXECUTIVE OFFICER**




I,
      Gary
      Herman, certify that:





In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Digital Creative Development Corporation
      (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2007 (the
      "Report"), the undersigned officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18
      U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
      Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:
                October 9, 2007/s/ Gary
              HermanGary
              HermanPresident
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Giovanni Ramos, Appellant.

[857 NYS2d 923]

Appeal by the defendant from a resentence of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (DiBella, J.), dated August 2, 2005, pursuant to the Drug Law Reform Act of 2004 (L 2004, ch 738, § 23), imposed after a hearing, the resentence being a determinate prison term of 14 years and a period of post-release supervision of 5 years, upon his conviction of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree (Perone, J.), upon his plea of guilty.

Ordered that the resentence is affirmed.

Considering the nature of the defendant’s crime and his level of participation in that crime, the resentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80, 84-88 [1982]). Santucci, J.P, Covello, Belen and Chambers, JJ., concur.
#### Nicola C. Padula et al., Appellants, v City of New York, Respondent.

[859 NYS2d 379]

In an action to recover damages for injury to property, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Aliotta, J), dated August 8, 2007, which granted the defendant’s motion to consolidate the action with four other actions and denied the plaintiffs’ cross motion for a joint trial of the actions instead of consolidation.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant’s motion to consolidate the action with four other actions against the municipal defendant in the interest of judicial economy, and denying the plaintiffs cross motion for a joint trial of the actions instead of consolidation. The actions share common questions of law or fact *(see GAM Prop. Corp. v Sorrento Lactalis, Inc.,*41 AD3d 645, 646 [2007]; *Moor v Moor,*39 AD3d 507 [2007]; *Hood v City of New York,*8 AD3d 232 [2004]; *J & A Vending v J.A.M. Vending,*268 AD2d 505, 506 [2000]; *Mattia v Food Emporium,*259 AD2d 527 [1999]; *Rahman v Miller,*257 AD2d 654 [1999]; *Fransen v Maniscalco,*256 AD2d 305, 306 [1998]; *cf. Skelly v Sachem Cent. School Dist.,*309 AD2d 917 [2003]). Mastro, J.P, Skelos, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 31.01


SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION




I, Gary Herman, Chief Executive Officer of Digital Creative Development Corporation., certify that:




1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010 of Digital Creative Development Corporation.




2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which suchstatements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;




3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;




4. The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13-a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:




(a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;




(b)  Not applicable (X-13)




(c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and




(d)  Disclosed in the report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and




5. The registrant's other certifying officer and Ihave disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):




(a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and




(b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employe have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.






Date: June 3, 2011
/s/ Gary HermanGary HermanPresident