No

No. 97-096

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1998 MT 221

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RONALD A. CLARK,

Defendant and Appellant.

 APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Gallatin,

The Honorable Thomas A. Olson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Daniel P. Buckley (argued); Berg, Lilly, Andriolo and 

Tollefson, P.C.; Bozeman, Montana; and 

Brock Albin (argued); Kommers & Roth; Bozeman, Montana

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For Respondent:

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; Carol Schmidt (argued),

Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana

Marty Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney; Jane Mersen, Deputy

County Attorney; Bozeman, Montana

For Amici Curiae:

William F. Hooks; Montana Appellate Defender Office; Helena, Montana

(for State Bar of Montana Criminal Defense Section)

James J. Shea; Bricker, Zakovics, Querin, Thompson & Ritchey, P.C.;

Missoula, Montana (for Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)

Heard: April 27, 1998

Submitted: April 30, 1998

Decided: September 3, 1998

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the opinion of the Court.

¶1 Ronald Clark appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the Eighteenth 

Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, on his convictions for criminal possession of 

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dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia, driving under the influence of alcohol, 

failure to remain at the scene of an accident, and failure of duty upon striking an 

unattended vehicle. For the reasons stated below, we reverse in part, affirm in part, 

and remand to the District Court. 

¶2 Clark presents the following issues on appeal:

¶3 1. Is that portion of Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., which governs the introduction of 

written reports from the Montana state crime laboratory unconstitutional?

¶4 2. Did the District Court err in denying Clark's request for a psychological 

evaluation pursuant to § 46-14-202, MCA?

¶5 3. Did the District Court err in denying Clark's motion for a mistrial made on the 

grounds that the court erred in permitting a witness for the State to testify as to other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts by the defendant?

¶6 4. Did the District Court err in denying Clark's motions to set aside the verdict 

and to dismiss Count 1 of the amended information made on the grounds that the 

court had failed to arraign Clark on the charges contained within the amended 

information filed by the State?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶7 On March 26, 1996, Bozeman police arrested Clark in connection with two 

automobile accidents which had occurred on the city's streets that morning. On April 

3, 1996, the State filed an information charging Clark with two felony counts of 

criminal possession of dangerous drugs, in violation of § 45-9-102, MCA. The State 

also charged Clark with misdemeanor counts of criminal possession of drug 

paraphernalia, in violation of § 45-10-103, MCA, second offense DUI, in violation of 

§ 61-8-401, MCA, failure to remain at the scene of an accident, in violation of § 61-7-

104, MCA, failure of duty upon striking unattended vehicle, in violation of § 61-7-

106, MCA, and failure to carry proof of insurance, in violation of § 61-6-302, MCA. 

Clark appeared with counsel at his April 17, 1996, arraignment and pled not guilty to 

all charges.

¶8 On October 21, 1996, the State filed a motion for leave to file an amended 

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information "to consolidate the charges in counts 1 and 2 and to change the name of 

the dangerous drug from Methamphetamine to Amphetamine." The court heard 

oral argument on the State's motion and advised the State to file an amended 

affidavit of probable cause. The State filed its amended affidavit on October 22, 1996, 

and the court issued an order the following day granting the State permission to file 

an amended information. The State accordingly filed an amended information on 

October 23, 1996, consolidating Counts 1 and 2 of the original information, and 

charging Clark with criminal possession of amphetamine. 

¶9 On October 21, 1996, the same day it filed a motion for leave to amend its 

information, the State also filed a notice of its intent to offer written crime lab 

reports in evidence pursuant to Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid. Clark filed a written 

response, objecting to "the admission of the reports without the proper foundation 

being laid by the author of the report." Clark argued that the admission of the report 

in the absence of its author would violate his "right to conduct a cross-examination." 

On November 21, 1996, the court held a hearing on Clark's various pretrial motions, 

and ordered from the bench that the State could introduce the crime lab reports 

without making the author available. The court explained that, pursuant to Rule 803

(8), M.R.Evid., if Clark wished to question the author of the crime lab reports, he 

would have to subpoena her as a witness. 

¶10 Clark was tried before a jury on November 26 and 27, 1996. The jury returned 

its verdict on November 27, 1996, convicting Clark of criminal possession of 

dangerous drugs, criminal possession of drug paraphernalia, DUI, failure to remain 

at the scene of an accident, and failure of duty upon striking unattended vehicle. 

¶11 On December 30, 1996, Clark filed a post-trial motion to set aside the verdict on 

Count 1 of the amended information, and dismiss that charge with prejudice. The 

court denied Clark's motion on January 6, 1997, and sentenced him the following 

day. The court sentenced the defendant to five years in prison, with all but thirtythree days suspended, on his conviction for Count 1, criminal possession of 

dangerous drugs. Clark received a concurrent sentence of six months in jail, with all 

but thirty days suspended, on his conviction for Count 2, criminal possession of drug 

paraphernalia. As to Counts 3, 4, and 5, the court ordered that Clark be committed 

to the county jail for a period of thirty days for each offense, with those sentences to 

be served concurrently with his sentence under Count 1. Clark filed his notice of 

appeal on January 7, 1997. 

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ISSUE 1

¶12 Is that portion of Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., which governs the introduction of 

written reports from the Montana state crime laboratory unconstitutional?

¶13 Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., provides as follows:

To the extent not otherwise provided in this paragraph, records, reports, 

statements, or data compilations in any form of a public office or agency 

setting forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities, or 

matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and as to which there was a 

duty to report, or factual findings resulting from an investigation made 

pursuant to authority granted by law. The following are not within this 

exception to the hearsay rule: (i) investigative reports by police and other law 

enforcement personnel; (ii) investigative reports prepared by or for a 

government, a public office, or an agency when offered by it in a case in 

which it is a party; (iii) factual findings offered by the government in criminal 

cases; (iv) factual findings resulting from special investigation of a particular 

complaint, case, or incident; and (v) any matter as to which the sources of 

information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. However, 

written reports from the Montana state crime laboratory are within this 

exception to the hearsay rule when the state has notified the court and 

opposing parties in writing of its intention to offer such report or reports in 

evidence at trial in sufficient time for the party not offering the report or 

reports (1) to obtain the depositions before trial of the person or persons 

responsible for compiling such reports, or (2) to subpoena the attendance of 

said persons at trial.

¶14 As noted above, it was on October 21, 1996, that the State first filed notice of its 

intent to offer written crime lab reports into evidence pursuant to Rule 803(8), M.R.

Evid. The State indicated it intended to offer "the report of forensic scientist 

Annalivia Harris, relating to the substances taken from the defendant on March 26, 

1996, in evidence during the trial of this action." Clark filed a written response on 

November 13, 1996, in which he objected "to the admission of the reports without the 

proper foundation being laid by the author of the report." Clark additionally 

objected to the admission of the report in the absence of its author on the grounds 

that such a procedure violated his right to conduct a cross-examination. In reply, the 

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State urged the District Court to apply Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., and admit the crime 

lab report without requiring Harris to testify. The State argued "[t]here will be no 

prejudice to the defense if Ms. Harris does not testify," because all she would "say is 

contained in her report." 

¶15 On November 14, 1996, the District Court held a hearing regarding the State's 

proposed use of the crime lab report prepared by Harris. The State argued the 

report was admissible pursuant to Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., and asked that "the Court 

require the defendant to subpoena Ms. Harris if [he] want[s] her here." Having 

heard argument by the parties, the court deferred its ruling on the admissibility of 

the crime lab report. On November 21, 1996, during a hearing on various pretrial 

motions, the court ruled from the bench that "the State can introduce the report." 

With respect to Harris's presence at trial, the court instructed defense counsel with 

the following in accordance with Rule 803(8): "If you want that person here, Mr. 

Buckley, you subpoena her."

¶16 On appeal, Clark argues that that portion of Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., which 

governs the introduction of Montana state crime lab reports is unconstitutional, and 

asserts the District Court thus erred in permitting the State to introduce the crime 

lab report without calling its author as a witness. More specifically, Clark first 

argues that portion of the rule which required him to subpoena Harris as a witness in 

the event he wished to cross-examine her, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof 

from the State to the defendant in violation of both the Montana and United States 

Constitutions. Clark next argues that, because the rule authorized the State to 

introduce Harris's crime lab report without calling her as a witness, it violated his 

right to confront and cross-examine his accusers as guaranteed by the Montana and 

United States Constitutions.

¶17 We have repeatedly recognized that "a legislative enactment 'is presumed to be 

constitutional and will be upheld on review except when proven to be 

unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Zempel v. Uninsured Employers' Fund

(1997), 282 Mont. 424, 428, 938 P.2d 658, 661 (quoting City of Billings v. Laedeke

(1991), 247 Mont. 151, 154, 805 P.2d 1348, 1349). 

A. Confrontation Clause

¶18 We turn first to Clark's assertion that the provisions of Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., 

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which govern the introduction of state crime lab reports, violate the Confrontation 

Clause of the Montana Constitution. Clark specifically asserts that "[w]hen the 

District Court admitted the crime lab report without requiring the presence of the 

technician who wrote the report, it violated [his] right to confront and cross-examine 

his accuser." Clark argues admission of the report without the presence of its author 

denied him the opportunity to cross-examine the technician, to observe the witness at 

trial, to cast doubt on the accuracy of the report, and to question the chain of 

custody. 

¶19 The State, in contrast, argues Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., "does not violate a 

defendant's right to confront and cross-examine his accusers as protected by the 

Montana Constitution." In support of its argument, the State points to a number of 

decisions in which various federal courts have held that the admission of certain 

written laboratory reports, without the presence of the author at trial, does not 

violate the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. For example, the 

State relies in part upon the case of United States v. Roulette (8th Cir. 1996), 75 F.3d 

418, 422, cert. denied, Roulette v. United States (1996), 117 S. Ct. 147, 136 L. Ed. 2d 93, 

in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, pursuant to the business 

records exception to the hearsay rule, the government could introduce laboratory 

reports identifying the substance involved in a drug case without producing 

testimony by the person who conducted the tests or proof of her unavailability. The 

State urges this Court to follow the foregoing line of federal court cases, and hold 

that that portion of Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., which governs the introduction of 

Montana state crime lab reports complies with the requirements of Montana's 

Confrontation Clause.

¶20 It is well-established, however, that we may interpret a provision of the Montana 

Constitution to afford greater protection than that afforded by its federal 

counterpart. Pfost v. State (1985), 219 Mont. 206, 215, 713 P.2d 495, 500-01, overruled 

on other grounds by Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc. (1989), 238 Mont. 21, 26, 776 P.2d 

488, 491. For example, in State v. Stever (1987), 225 Mont. 336, 344, 732 P.2d 853, 

858, we recognized that we were not bound by a United States Supreme Court 

decision interpreting the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in the context of 

hearsay evidence "as we may interpret our state constitution to guarantee greater 

rights than those guaranteed by the federal constitution." 

¶21 Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution, the counterpart to the 

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Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution, provides as follows:

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 

defend in person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the 

accusation; to meet the witnesses against him face to face; to have process to 

compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf, and a speedy public trial by 

an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to 

have been committed, subject to the right of the state to have a change of 

venue for any of the causes for which the defendant may obtain the same.

¶22 Unlike its federal counterpart, the text of Montana's Confrontation Clause 

specifically guarantees the accused's right "to meet the witnesses against him face to 

face." As we noted in State v. Young (1991), 249 Mont. 257, 260, 815 P.2d 590, 592, 

"[t]he 1972 Montana Constitution and subsequent cases analyzing the Confrontation 

Clause have made it abundantly clear that full cross-examination is a critical aspect 

of the right of confrontation." Moreover, we have recognized that the rights 

contained in the Declaration of Rights, which include the rights guaranteed to an 

accused person in a criminal prosecution, are fundamental rights. Wadsworth v. State

(1996), 275 Mont. 287, 299, 911 P.2d 1165, 1171-72.

¶23 Cross-examination is the hallmark of our system of justice because it produces 

truth. Such things as the demeanor of a witness, his or her body language, and a 

witness's hesitancy in giving testimony, often communicate as much to the fact-finder 

as the spoken words. All of this is lost in a written deposition. 

¶24 In this case, the chemical analysis of the drugs was a critical component of the 

State's case. The experience, background, and training of the technician, and the 

method and manner of tests conducted, are all matters which the defendant is 

entitled to explore through cross-examination in the presence of the fact-finder. The 

framers of the Montana Constitution appreciated these safeguards and saw fit to 

distinguish our Confrontation Clause from the United States Constitution by 

insuring a criminal defendant the right "to meet the witnesses against him face to 

face." Mont. Const. art. II, § 24.

¶25 In light of the fact that Montana's Constitution specifically guarantees a criminal 

defendant the right to a face-to-face confrontation with his or her accusers, and in 

light of the critical importance of an accused's fundamental right of confrontation, 

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including the right of cross-examination, we conclude that portion of Rule 803(8), M.

R.Evid., which governs the introduction of Montana state crime lab reports violates 

Article II, Section 24, of the Montana Constitution. 

B. Due Process 

¶26 Clark next argues that the segment of Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., which required 

him to subpoena Harris as a witness in the event he wished to cross-examine her, 

impermissibly shifted the burden of proof, including the burden of production and 

persuasion, to him in violation of both the Montana and United States Constitutions. 

More specifically, Clark argues that portion of the rule which required him to 

subpoena the author of the crime lab report in the event he wished to confront and 

cross-examine her, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof away from the State by 

"allowing the State to prove an integral part of [its] case against the defendant 

without more than a crime lab report." Clark thus argues the requirement that he 

subpoena the technician in the event he wished to cross-examine her violated the due 

process guarantees of Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution, and the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 

¶27 The State, in contrast, argues the fact that Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., permitted 

Clark to subpoena Harris in the event he wished to cross-examine her in no way 

shifted the burden of proof. The State argues that Rule 803(8) does not allow the 

State or the jury to presume any of the elements of the crime charged, but "is simply 

another hearsay exception the courts have allowed because it is the type of evidence 

that bears an adequate indicia of reliability and trustworthiness." The State asserts 

that it always bore the burden of proving "beyond a reasonable doubt all the 

elements of the crime," and asserts the "admission of evidence under a hearsay 

exception does not alter that fact."

¶28 Moreover, the State effectively argues that portion of Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., 

which afforded Clark the opportunity to subpoena the author of the crime lab report 

actually guaranteed Clark's constitutionally protected right of confrontation. For 

example, the State asserts that where, as it alleges is the case here, the utility of 

producing a witness is remote, "the opportunity for effective cross-examination is 

satisfied where the defendant himself had the opportunity to call the declarant as a 

witness." See, e.g., Reardon v. Manson (2d Cir. 1986), 806 F.2d 39, 42, cert. denied, 

Reardon v. Lopes (1987), 481 U.S. 1020, 107 S. Ct. 1903, 95 L. Ed. 2d 509 (recognizing 

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that "in those borderline cases where the likely utility of producing the witness is 

remote, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an opportunity for effective crossexamination is satisfied where the defendant himself had the opportunity to call the 

declarant as a witness.") The State argues that, "if Clark investigated and had 

evidence that the personnel at the Montana State Crime Laboratory were careless in 

their procedures, then Clark could have, as part of his defense, subpoenaed the 

technician and anyone else from the crime laboratory that he felt necessary to 

support his argument." Because Clark could have chosen to call Harris as a witness, 

the State argues the opportunity for effective cross-examination was satisfied. 

¶29 The due process guarantee of the Montana Constitution, embodied in Article II, 

Section 17, makes it the State's duty in a criminal prosecution to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged. State v. Korell (1984), 213 

Mont. 316, 330, 690 P.2d 992, 1000 (citing In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 

S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375). Pursuant to Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., 

however, the State in this case was not required to present the technician who 

prepared the state crime lab report as a witness in its case-in-chief, and was not 

required to subject her to cross-examination or confrontation. Instead, it was Clark 

who bore the burden of subpoenaing the State's witness in order to present a full 

defense and enjoy his constitutionally protected rights under the Confrontation 

Clause. Contrary to the State's argument, the fact that Clark could have subpoenaed 

the State's witness if he had so chosen does not remedy the Rule's constitutional 

deficits. Rather, the Rule effectively required Clark to subpoena and produce the 

State's expert in order to rightfully take advantage of the protection afforded him 

under the Confrontation Clause. In reality, the defendant is compelled to produce 

evidence during his case-in-chief, which in many instances will be incriminating, 

should he choose to test the State's case. Such a result is impermissible in light of the 

due process guarantees of Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution. 

¶30 Based on the foregoing, we hold that that portion of Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., 

which governs the introduction of Montana state crime lab reports, not only violates 

the Confrontation Clause of the Montana Constitution, but also violates the due 

process guarantees embodied in Article II, Section 17. Having so held, we need not 

address Clark's argument that the rule similarly violates the Confrontation Clause 

and due process guarantees of the United States Constitution.

ISSUE 2

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¶31 Did the District Court err in denying Clark's request for a psychological 

evaluation pursuant to § 46-14-202, MCA?

¶32 Just prior to the start of trial on November 26, 1996, Clark asked for a 

continuance on the grounds that his mother's recent hospitalization rendered him 

unable to provide effective assistance for his defense. The court denied Clark's 

motion from the bench, and the trial commenced as scheduled.

¶33 During the second day of trial, defense counsel asked that the court grant Clark 

the opportunity to undergo a psychological evaluation to determine whether he was 

capable of proceeding with the trial and providing assistance in his defense. Again 

referring to Clark's ailing mother, defense counsel explained that his client was 

"under an extreme amount of stress and pressure," and noted that "[t]he past day 

and a half have taken a toll on my client." Clark's attorney asked that the court 

grant his client "an opportunity to contact his psychologist so that the psychologist 

can render an opinion as to whether Mr. Clark can proceed in this trial and . . . 

provide assistance in his defense." The court denied Clark's motion without 

discussion, and the trial continued. On appeal, Clark argues the District Court erred 

in denying his request for a psychological evaluation to determine his fitness to 

proceed with his trial. 

¶34 Having already determined that Clark is entitled to a new trial on the grounds 

that that portion of Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., which governs the introduction of 

Montana state crime lab reports is unconstitutional, we need not address Clark's 

argument that the court erred in denying his request for a psychological evaluation. 

ISSUE 3

¶35 Did the District Court err in denying Clark's motion for a mistrial made on the 

grounds that the court erred in permitting a witness for the State to testify as to other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts by the defendant?

¶36 We review a district court's ruling on a motion for a mistrial to determine 

whether the court abused its discretion. State v. Partin (Mont. 1997), 951 P.2d 1002, 

1005, 54 St. Rep. 1474, 1476.

¶37 Clark argues the District Court improperly permitted Officer Tim Little, a 

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witness for the State, to testify as to prior crimes, wrongs, or acts, under Rule 404(b), 

M.R.Evid., despite the State's failure to abide by the notice requirements of State v. 

Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 274, 602 P.2d 957, 963-64. Clark contends the District 

Court erred in denying his subsequent motion for a mistrial which he made based 

upon the admission of what he characterizes as evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 

acts.

¶38 Clark asserts it was during the following exchange that the State improperly 

elicited testimony from Officer Little regarding other crimes, wrongs, or acts: 

County Attorney: Okay. When I asked you earlier about the defendant's -- 

your observation or your opinion as to his state of intoxication; what did you 

base that on? 

Officer Little: I had known him before and --

Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I'm going to object. This is getting into 

Rule 404. 

The Court: Okay. Yeah. Do you want to rephrase the question?

County Attorney: No, but I'd like to respond to the objection, possibly outside 

the presence --

 The Court: No. No. The objection is sustained.

County Attorney: Then I'll rephrase it, if I may. Have you seen the defendant 

not intoxicated?

Officer Little: Yes, I have. 

County Attorney: And what is your opinion of his state that day?

Officer Little: He was intoxicated.

¶39 Clark later moved for a mistrial, arguing Officer Little's testimony suggested to 

the jury that he had seen Clark intoxicated on prior occasions, and was an improper 

reference to "Mr. Clark's previous run-ins with the police while he was intoxicated." 

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Clark contends that Officer Little's testimony constituted improper evidence of prior 

crimes, wrongs, or acts by the defendant, and argues the court thus erred in denying 

his subsequent motion for a mistrial.

¶40 In response, the State argues it was merely "eliciting a lay opinion from Officer 

Little as to whether Clark was intoxicated on" the day of his arrest. The State asserts 

it "was establishing a foundation which would allow Officer Little to give his opinion 

as to his perception of Clark" on the day of his arrest, and argues that "[n]othing in 

the cited testimony is evidence of any other crimes, wrongs or acts."

¶41 We agree. We conclude that the disputed portion of Officer Little's testimony 

does not constitute evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to Rule 404(b), 

M.R.Evid. Officer Little simply explained that he had previously seen Clark when 

Clark was not intoxicated. Officer Little made no mention of the circumstances 

surrounding his prior contact with Clark, and simply made no mention of any other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts as contemplated by Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid. Based on the 

foregoing, we hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clark's 

motion for a mistrial.

ISSUE 4

¶42 Did the District Court err in denying Clark's motions to set aside the verdict and 

to dismiss Count 1 of the amended information made on the grounds that the court 

had failed to arraign Clark on the charges contained within the amended 

information filed by the State?

¶43 On April 3, 1996, the State filed the original information in this case, charging 

Clark with, among other offenses, two counts of possession of dangerous drugs, 

methamphetamine, in violation of § 45-9-102, MCA. On October 21, 1996, the State 

filed a motion to amend the information to consolidate the two counts of possession of 

dangerous drugs and to change the drug identified in the information from 

methamphetamine to amphetamine. The State presented its motion to the District 

Court on October 22, 1996, and Clark objected on the grounds that "there is 

insufficient probable cause to allow the amendment to go forth at this time." The 

court advised the State to file an amended affidavit of probable cause, which it did 

the following day. The court reviewed the amended affidavit, and on October 23, 

1996, issued an order granting the State leave to file its amended information. The 

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State filed its amended information that day, thereby charging Clark with criminal 

possession of amphetamine. Clark was never arraigned on the amended information. 

He was tried on November 26 and 27, 1996, and found guilty of Count 1 of the 

amended information, criminal possession of amphetamine. 

¶44 On December 30, 1996, Clark filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict on 

Count 1 of the amended information, and to dismiss Count 1 of the amended 

information on the grounds that the court had erred in failing to arraign him on the 

amended information. The court denied Clark's motion in an order dated January 6, 

1997. The court determined that, because "the Amended Information was merely a 

change in form," it was not required to conduct another arraignment. Moreover, the 

court concluded, "[e]ven if it was a change in substance, the defendant waived this 

objection by standing trial on the amended information without objection."

¶45 On appeal, Clark argues that the State substantively amended the original 

information when it decided to charge him with criminal possession of amphetamine, 

rather than methamphetamine. More specifically, Clark asserts the fact that "[t]he 

State was required to prove possession of methamphetamine under the original 

Information but was required to prove possession of amphetamine under the 

Amended Information," demonstrates that an element of the crime charged is 

different, and that the amendment was a substantive one. Clark also argues "the 

State was required to prove a different matter under the two Informations," because 

it "was required to prove that the substance was methamphetamine under the 

original Information but was required to prove the substance was amphetamine 

under the Amended Information." Because the amendment to the information was 

one of substance, Clark alleges, the court was required to arraign him on the 

amended information, and its failure to do so warranted reversal of his conviction for 

criminal possession of amphetamine.

¶46 The State, in contrast, asserts the amendment to the original information in this 

case was one of form only and did not alter the elements of the crimes charged. 

Because the amendment to the original information "was one of form and not of 

substance," the State argues, the District Court "did not err by not arraigning Clark 

on the amended information," and did not err in denying his motion to set aside the 

verdict and dismiss Count 1 of the amended information. 

¶47 A district court's grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a 

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question of law which we review de novo. State v. Brander (1996), 280 Mont. 148, 151, 

930 P.2d 31, 33.

¶48 Pursuant to § 46-11-205, MCA, if the district court grants the State leave to 

amend the information "in matters of substance," then "the defendant must be 

arraigned on the amended information without unreasonable delay and must be 

given a reasonable period of time to prepare for trial on the amended information." 

Section 46-11-205(1) and (2), MCA. Section 46-11-205(3), MCA, provides that: 

The court may permit an information to be amended as to form at any time 

before a verdict or finding is issued if no additional or different offense is 

charged and if the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. 

¶49 We have held "that an amendment is one of form and not substance when the 

same crimes are charged, the elements of the crimes remain the same, the required 

proof remains the same, and the defendant is informed of the charges against him." 

State v. Sor-Lokken (1991), 247 Mont. 343, 349, 805 P.2d 1367, 1371.

¶50 In the present case, the State originally charged Clark with two counts of 

criminal possession of dangerous drugs, felonies, in violation of § 45-9-102(1), MCA. 

Count 1 charged that Clark, on or about March 26, 1996, possessed 

methamphetamine, a dangerous drug as defined in § 50-32-101, MCA. Count 2 

charged Clark with possessing methamphetamine on or about March 27, 1996, in 

violation of § 45-9-102(1), MCA. In its amended information, the State merely 

consolidated Counts 1 and 2, and charged Clark with the possession of amphetamine 

rather than methamphetamine. 

¶51 Section 45-9-102(1), MCA, the statute pursuant to which Clark was charged in 

both the original and amended information, provides that "[a] person commits the 

offense of criminal possession of dangerous drugs if he possesses any dangerous drug, 

as defined in 50-32-101." Section 50-32-101(6), MCA, defines a "dangerous drugs" as 

"a drug, substance, or immediate precursor in Schedules I through V set forth in 

part 2." Section 50-32-224(3)(a) and (c), MCA, lists both methamphetamine and 

amphetamine as Schedule II drugs.

¶52 We conclude that the amendment in the present case was one of form only. 

Although the State altered the information to charge Clark with criminal possession 

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of amphetamine rather than methamphetamine, the criminal offense and the 

elements which the State was required to prove remained the same. To convict Clark 

of criminal possession of a dangerous drug, the State bore the burden of proving only 

that Clark possessed a dangerous drug, as defined by § 50-32-101, MCA. Both 

amphetamine and methamphetamine qualify as dangerous drugs pursuant to § 50-32-

101, MCA. The amendment in the present case was one of form and not substance 

because the crime charged remained the same, the elements of the crime remained 

the same, as did the required proof. Based on the foregoing, we hold the District 

Court did not err in denying Clark's motion to dismiss and set aside the jury verdict 

on Count 1 of the amended information. 

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON 

Justice W. William Leaphart, specially concurring.

¶53 I concur with the Court's resolution of issues 2, 3 and 4. As to issue 1, I agree with the 

Court's conclusion that Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., violates the Confrontation Clause of the 

Montana Constitution and that Clark's conviction should be reversed. Accordingly, I 

would not reach the question of whether Rule 803(8) violates the Due Process Clause.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

¶54 I concur with issues one, two and three of the majority opinion.

¶55 I dissent from issue four of the majority opinion which holds that the District Court 

did not err when it refused to set aside the verdict and dismiss count 1 of the amended 

information on the grounds that the court failed to arraign Clark on the charges contained 

within the amended information.

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¶56 The crux of the issue is whether the amendment to the original information was only 

one of form or whether it was one of substance. If the change was one of substance, then 

the District Court was required to arraign the defendant on the amended information. 

Section 46-11-205(2), MCA. I would hold that the amendment was one of substance. 

¶57 As the majority points out, the test for determining whether the amendment is one of 

form or substance was set forth in Sor-Lokken (1991), 247 Mont. at 349, 805 P.2d at 

1371. Pursuant to that test, an amendment is one of form only if:

(1) The same crimes are charged;

(2) The elements of the crimes remain the same;

(3) The required proof remains the same; and

(4) The defendant is informed of the charges against him. 

¶58 In this case the required proof changed when the information was amended. The 

prosecution was required to prove that Clark possessed a "dangerous drug" as defined by § 

50-32-101(6), MCA. That statute in turn defines a "dangerous drug" as any "drug, 

substance, or immediate precursor in Schedules I through V set forth in part 2." To prove 

that Clark possessed a dangerous drug, the prosecution was thus required to produce 

evidence specifically identifying the substance he allegedly possessed. The evidence 

necessary to prove he possessed methamphetamine differs from that necessary to prove 

that he possessed amphetamine, regardless of the fact that both substances constitute 

"dangerous drugs." 

¶59 In fact, had the prosecution not amended the information, and had it produced 

evidence that Clark possessed amphetamine rather than methamphetamine as identified in 

the original information, the prosecution would have failed in its burden of proof. For that 

very reason, the prosecution sought to amend the information to accurately identify the 

substance as amphetamine. For that same reason, once the information was amended, the 

District Court specifically instructed the jury that to convict the defendant of criminal 

possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that the "defendant possessed 

amphetamine."

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¶60 So yes, while the majority is correct in its view that in either case the prosecution must 

prove that Clark possessed a "dangerous drug," it is also true that the prosecution bears the 

burden of specifically identifying the substance he possessed in order to prove that the 

substance constitutes a "dangerous drug" within the meaning of the statute. Because the 

required proof changes, depending on substance possessed, it is my view that the 

amendment to the information was one of substance. 

¶61 For this reason, I would reverse the District Court and hold that it was required to 

arraign Clark on the charges contained within the amended information. 

¶62 I concur in part and dissent in part.

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler concurs in the forgoing concurring and dissenting opinion.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

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