Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R . 47 .5, the court has determined that this order should not b e * publishe d an d is not prece dent except under the limite d circumstances set forthin5 T H C IR . R. 47.5 .4. 

### INTHE UNI TED S TATESCOU RT OFAPPEALS

FORTHE FIFTH CIRCU IT

N o. 08- 70049 L IN D AA N IT AC A R T Y , P e tit io n e r- A p p e lla n t, v. N A TH A N I E L Q U A R TE R M A N , D i r ec t or , Texas D epar t m entof C r i m i nal J u s tic e , C o r r e c tio n a l In s tit u tio n s D iv is io n , R e s p o n d e n t - A p p e lle e .

A pp ealf

rom t h e U n i t ed S t ates D i st ri ctC ou rt f o rt he So ut he r n Di s t r i c to f Te xa s , H o us t o n Di vi s i o n N o. 06- 614 B ef ore K IN G , D E N N IS, an d O W E N , C i rcui tJu dg es. P E R C U R I A M: * A Tex as j ur y c o nvi c t e d a nd s e nt e nc e d t o de at h pe t i t i o ne r–a ppe l l antLi nda A n i t a C art y f

or t h e i n t en t i on alm u rder of Joan a R odri qu ez d u ri n g t h e cou rse of a kidna pi n g of

R odri gu ez an d h er new born son. Stat e app el l ate c ou rt s af f i rm ed t h e convi ct i on an d sen t en ce and den i ed p ost - convic t i on rel i ef. C art y t h en b r o ug htt hi s fe d e r a lh a b e a s p e t i t i o n un d e rt he Ant i t e r r o r i s m a ndEf fec t i ve D eath P en al t y A ct( “A E D P A” ) , 28 U . S . C . § 2254 . T h e di st ri ctcourtden i ed United States Court of App eals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D Aug ust28, 2009 Cha rl es R. F ulb ru g e II I Clerk2

sub st an t ive rel i ef, di sm i ssed C a rt y’ s c ase, an d d en i ed a cert i f i cat e of a p p e a l a b i l i t y ( “ CO A” ) fo rmo s to f h e rc l a i ms . I tg r a n t e d a C OAf o rt wo s u b s ta n tiv e cla im s . C a r ty ’ s a p p e a l o f th o s e tw o cla im s is n o w b e fo r e u s , a s is Car t y’ s r e q u e s t f

o r a n a d d i t i o n a l COA f o r m a n y o f t h e o t h e r c l a i m s s he unsucc es sf

ul l y r ai se d i n t he di st r i c tc our t . W e d en y C ar t y’ s r eques tf oran a d d i t i o n a lC OA , g r a n th e rr e q u e s tf o ro r a la r g u me n tr e g a r d i n gt he t wo subs t ant ive c l ai m s, and r ese rv e opi ni on o n t hos e c l ai m s unti laf t eror al a rg u m en t. I . F ACT S AND PROC EDURE T h e d i stri ct cou rt’ s ex h a u stive op i n i on m ore tha n ad eq u a tel y d ocu m en ts th e fa c tu a l b a c k g r o u n d a n d p r o c e d u r a l d e v e lo p m e n t o f th is ca s e . SeeCarty v . Q uar t e r m an ( Car ty Fe de r alHab e as ), N o. 06 -61 4 , s l i p o p . a t 5

– 3 5 (S . D . T ex . S ep t. 30, 200 8) . H ere, w e rec i t e t h e fact s and procedu re i n cursor y f orm t o provi de a f r a m e wo r k f

o ro u rd e n i a lo f

a n a d d i t i o n a lCOA. C a r t y , a f

o r e i g n n a t i o n a lc i t i z e n o f S t . K i t t s a n d t h u s t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m, w as i n di ct ed by a T exas gran d j u ry f or t h e ki dn ap i n g an d i n t en t i on alm u rder of R o d r ig u e z . A lth o u g h C a r tyo r ig in a llyh ir e d h e ro w n a tt o r n e y , w h e n h e rfa m ily c o ul d no tpa y hi s fe e s , t he Te xa s t r i al c o ur t ap po i nt e d Je r r y G ue r i no t andW e ndy A kins t o represent h er (co l l ect ivel y, “ t ri alcoun sel” ) . Tri alcoun selhi red in v e s t ig a t o rJ o h n C a s t il lo a n d p s y c h o lo g is tD r . J e r o m e B r o w n to a id C a r t y ’s d e fe n s e . T h e tri a lpr oce e d ed i n tw o p h a ses : gu i l t/i n n oce n ce a n d pu n i sh m en t. D u r in gth e g u ilt-in n o c e n c e ph a se, th e p ros e c u tio n ca lle d , in tera lia , Jo se C or ona, w it h w h o m C a r t yh a d p r e v io u s lyr e s id e d a n d w h o m a y h a v e b e e n C a r t y ’s c o m m o n- l aw hus ba nd; Char l i e M at hi s, a n a ge nto f t he D r ug Enfo r c e m e nt A g e n c ya n d fo rw h o m C a r tyh a d p r e v io u s lyw o r k e d a s a n in fo r m a n t; a n d J o s ie A n derson, M a rv in C aston, C h ri s R obi n son, an d Z ebed i ah C om bs, al lof w h om h a d s o m e ro le in t h e k i d n a p in g , a lth o u g h th e p a r tie s cu r r e n tlyco n te s t t h e ir st atuses as acc om pl i ces. T h e j u ry ret u rned a verdi ctof gu i l t y on t h e charge of3

capi t alm u rder. D u ri n g t h e su bsequ en tp u n i shm en tph ase, D r. B row n t est i f i ed on beh al f

of C art y, as di d m em bers of her fam i l y. Th e j u ry an sw ered al lt h ree o f Te xa s ’ s “ s pe c i ali s s ue s ” i n fav o ro f s e nt e nc i ng Car t y t o de at h. Th e T exa s Cour to f Cr i m i nalAppe al s a f f i r m e d Car t y’ s c o nvi c t i o n a nd s e n te n c e . S ee Ca rty v. S ta te , N o. 7 429 5, 2 004 W L 309 322 9 (T ex. C ri m . A pp . A pr. 07, 200 4) . C art y t h en app l i ed f or st ate post - convic t i on rel i ef. C art y rai sed a few of her presentl y assert ed cl ai m s i n her i n i t i al a p p li ca t i on f or post - convic t i on rel i ef bu tm ostot h ers in h er Fu rt h er A dd i t i on alR espon se (h er t h i rd am en ded r e s po ns e t o t he g o ve r nm e nt ’ s ans w e r) . The p ar t i e s di s put e w he t he rt he y— al o ng w i t h t he st at e habeas cour t

— agr ee d to per m i tC ar t y t o r ai se new c l ai m s i n t hat r es ponse . The st at e habe as c our tr evi ew ed t he c l ai m s she r ai se d i n heri ni t i al ap pl i cat i on an d r e co m m en ded t h at t h e C ou rtof C ri m i n alA pp eal s den y t h ose c la im s , se e ExPa rte Ca rty , N o . 8 7 7 5 9 2 -A , o r d e r(T e x . D is t. C t . D e c . 2 , 2 0 0 4 ), a r e c o m m e n d a tio n th a t t h e C o u rt of C ri m i n a lA p p e a ls a d o p te d , see ExPa rte Ca rty , N o. W R

- 61, 055
- 01, sl i p op. 2 (T ex. C t . C ri m . A pp . M ar. 2, 200 5) . N ei t h er c ou rt ad dressed t h e cl ai m s s h e rai sed f or t h e f i rstt i m e in h e r A dd i t i on alF u rt h er R espon se. H a v in gfo u n d n o s u c c e s s in s ta te co u r t, C a r tyth e n file d a n a p p lic a tio n in federaldi st ri ctcourtf or a w ri t of h abea s c orpu s un der § 2254 . C art y presented a p p r o x im a tel y tw en ty i ssu es to th e d i stri ct cou rt, w h i ch con cl u d ed tha t C a rty fa il e d to r a is e a tr ia b le is s u e o f h e r e n t it le m e n tto r e li e f, g r a n t e d th e s t a t e ’s m o tio n fo rs u m m a r yju d g m e n t, a n d d is m is s e d th e ca s e . S ee C arty Fe de r al Hab e as , N o. 06-614, sl i p op. at 142 . C art y t h en m oved f or a C O A . T h e di st ri ct c o ur tg r ant e d Car t y a CO A on w he t he rshe fai l e d t o ex haus tt he c l ai m s t hats he r ai se d f or t he f i r stt i m e i n herFu r t herA ddi t i onalR es ponse and on w het hert r i al c ounse lr ender ed i nef fec t ive as si st ance by fai l i ng t o no t i f y Coro na of

hi s spo usal pr ivi l e ge a nd b y fai l i ng t o produ ce m o r e m i t i ga t i o n e vi de nc e dur i ng t he p u n is h m e n t p h a s e o f tr ia l. It d e n ie d a C O Afo ra ll o th e rcla im s . SeeCarty v . Q uar t e r m an ( Ca r ty C OA ), N o . 0 6 -6 1 4 , slip op . a t 2

– 3 (S .D . T e x . D e c. 1 6 , 2 0 0 8 ).4

Car t y no w a ppe al s t he cl ai m s f o rw hi c h t he di s t r i c tc o ur tg r ant e d he ra CO A and m oves us t o gran ta C O Aon h er add i t i on alcl ai m s. A tthis ti m e, w e rul e onl y on h er m oti on f

or a n ad d i ti on a lC O Aan d de n y it .

I I . S TA NDARDS OF REVI EW C ar t y’ s m ot i on i s gov er ned by A E D PA . U nderA E D PA , a s tat e habe as pe t i t i o ne rm aya ppe ala di s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s d i s m i s s alo f hi s pe t i t i o n o nl y i f t he d i s t r i c tc o u r to rt h e c o u r to f a p p e a l s f

i r s ti s s u e s a C O A. 28 U. S . C. § 2 2 5 3 (c )(1 )(B ); se e Miller -E l v. Co ck re ll , 537 U . S. 322, 336 ( 2003) ( des c r ibi ng a C O Aa s a “ju r is d ic tio n a l p r e r e q u is ite ” w ith o u t w h ic h “fe d e r a l co u r ts o f a p p e a ls l a ck ju ri sd i cti on to ru l e on the m erits of ap p ea l s f rom h a b ea s p eti ti on ers”). In de t e r m i ni ng w he t he rt o g r anta pe t i t i o ne r ’ s r e que s tf o ra CO A, w e l i m i to ur
“ e xa m i nat i o n t o a t hr e s ho l d i nqui r y i nt o t he und e r l yi ng m e r i to f [t he p eti ti on er’ s] cl a i m s. ” Mi l le r - El , 537 U . S. at327 ( c i t i ng S lack v. McD an i el , 529 U . S . 473 , 481 ( 200 0) ) . “ T h i s t h reshol d i n qu i ry does n otrequi re f u l lconsi derati on of th e fa ctu a l or l eg a l b a ses a d d u ced i n su p p ort of th e cl a i m s. In fa ct, the statu te forbids i t. ” Id . at336. W e w i l lgran ta request f or a C O A“ on l y i f

th e app l i can tha s m ad e a s u b s t a n t i a ls h o wi n go f t h e d e n i a lo f

a c o n s t i t u t i o n a lr i g h t . ” 2 8 U. S . C. § 225 3( c) ( 2) . Ty pi cal l y, w h ere t h e d i st ri ctcou rtden i es a hab eas peti t i on at l east i n pa r to n pr o c e dur alg r o unds w i t h ou t reac hi ng t he a ppl i c ant ’ s und e r l yi ng c ons t i t ut i onalc l ai m , o rby r eac hi ng t he under l yi ng c ons t i t ut i onalc l ai m by den yi n g i ti n t h e al t erna t ive, “ a C O Ashou l d i ssue w h en t h e [ ap pl i can t ] show s, at l east, t h at j u ri st s of reason w ou l d f i n d i t deb atabl e w h et h er t h e peti t i on st ates a vali d cl ai m of

t h e den i alof

a c o n stituti on alri gh tan d that j u ri st s of reason w oul d f i nd i tdeba t abl e w het hert he di st r i c tc our tw as c or r ec ti n i t s pro c edur al ru l i n g.” S lack , 529 U . S. at484. In th i s ca se, t he di st r i c tc our tc onc l uded t hat t h e cl ai m s t hatC ar t y r ai se d f ort he f

i r stt i m e i n herFu r t herA ddi t i onal R espon se wer e no te xhausted i n st ate c ou rt , a procedu ralrul i n g precl u di n g rel i ef o n th o s e c la im s ; h o w e v e r , it g r a n te d a C O A fo r th a t ru lin g . S e eCa r ty C OA , N o.Cartyal so seeks a COA for the dis t ric tcourt’s hol ding th at the procedural default 1 that re sulte d from her failure to exh aust was not subje ct tocertainexceptio ns. Our disposition on Carty’s appealof themerits of the exhau stionissu e will necessarilyresolve the correctnes s of th e di strictc ourt’sun derlyin gp roce dural defaulthol ding. We co n si der a s a separate matter wheth er to grant Carty’s reque st for a C OA o n the applicab ility of exception s top roce dural default .

Where a district court hel d that a differe nt procedural bar applied to p revent 2 consi derationof the merits of o ne of Carty’s clai ms, we applyth e appropri ate standard toboth th e proc edural an d sub st antive hol din g s. See Slack , 52 9 U .S. at48 4. 5 06-614, sl i p op . at 2 ( “ [ G ] iven t h e com pl exi t y of t h e rec ord an d the i n t ri caci es of T exas h abea s l aw , t h e [ di st ri ctcourt ] f i n ds t h at t h e exh au st i on i ssue ‘ deserves en cou ra ge m en t t o p roce ed fu rth er.’ T h e [dist ri ct co u rt] , th ere fore, w i l lgra n t a C O A on t he q ue s t i o n o f w he t he r[ Car t y] s uf f i c i e nt l y e xha us t e d s t at e c o u rt r em edi es . ” ) . Thu s, in o rd er t o g r anta CO Af orone of

C ar t y’ s addi t i onal 1 s ubs t ant ive c l ai m s , w e m u s tc o nc l ude o nl y t hatCar t y has de m o ns t r at e d t he t h r e s h o l d s h o w i n g f

o r t h a t s u b s t a n t iv e c l a i m. Se e Mi l l e r - El , 537 U . S. at327. 2

“A l t h ou gh t h e i ssuan ce of a C O A ‘ m u st n otbe pr o f o r m a o ra m a tt e ro f c o u r s e ,’ t he pet i t i oners at i sf i es t he bur den under § 2 253(c ) by ‘ dem ons t ra t[ i n g] t hat r eas onabl e j uri st s wou l df i nd t he di st r i c tc our t ’ s as se ss m entof t he c ons t i t ut i onal cl a i m s d eb a tab l e or w ron g.’” Pi ppi n v. D r e t ke , 434 F. 3d 782, 787 ( 5t h C i r . 2005) (a l t er at i on i n or i gi nal) ( quot i ng Mi l le r - El , 5 3 7 U . S. a t 3 3 7

– 3 8 ) . “ [A] c l ai m c an be debat abl e e ven t hough eve r y j uri st of r eas on m i ght agr ee , af t er t he C O Ahas b e e n g r a n te d a n d th e ca s e h a s re c e iv e d fu ll co n s id e r a tio n , th a t p e t itio n e rw ill not pre vai l . ” Mi l le r - El , 5 3 7 U. S . a t3 3 8 . “ [A] n yd o u b ta s t o wh e t h e ra C OA s h o u ld is s u e in a d e a th -p e n a lty c a s e m u s t b e re s o lv e d in fa v o ro f th e p e tit io n e r .” P ipp in , 434 F. 3d at787. In determ i n i n g w h et h er t h e distr ict court’ s den i alof C art y’ s pet i t i on f

or a CO A on he ra ddi t i o nalc l ai m s w as de bat ab l e , w e m us tke e p i n m i nd t he d eferen ti a lstan d a rd of rev i ew tha t A E D P Areq u i res a distri ct cou rt t o a p p l y to th e s ta te co u r ts ’ru lin g s . SeeB r ow n v. D r e t ke , 419 F. 3d 365, 371 ( 5t h C i r . 2005)C arty pres ente d th e ma j ority of th es e cl aim s in h er Furth er Additio n al Res po n se , so 3 ther e we re no st at ec o u rtho ldi ngs to which thedis tri ct co urtcouldapply theAEDPAman date d st an dardof defere nce . See § 2 2 5 4 (d); Pip pi n , 43 4 F .3d at 7 87. Wewillnote the few clai msfor which thestat e court provideda holding. 6 (“W i th resp ect to th e review of factu a l fi n d i n gs , A E D P A sign i fi ca n tl y r e s tr ic ts t h e s c o p e o f

fe d e r a lh a b e a s r e v i e w. ” ) . Un d e rAEDP A, a federal court i s n ot t o gran t a w ri t of ha beas corpu s “ w i t h res pect t o an y cl ai m t h at w as adjudic ated on the m eri t s i n Sta te court proceedi n gs” un l ess i tdeter m i n es t h at t he st ate c ou rt ’ s adj u di cat i on “ r es ul t ed i n a dec i si on t hatw as c ont r ar y t o, ori nvolved an unr e a s o na b l e a p p l i c a t i o n o f, c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s he d Fe d e r a l l a w , as d e te r m in e d b yth e S u p r e m e C o u r t o f th e U n ite d S ta te s .” P ipp in , 4 3 4 F .3 d a t 7 8 7 ( q u o t in g2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 5 4 (d )( 1 )) . M o r e o v e r , “ ‘a det er m i nat i on o f

a fac t uali ss ue m ade b y a St at e c our ts hal l be pre sum ed t o b e c o r r e c t ’unl e s s t he pe t i t i o ne rr e but s t he pr e s um pt i o n ‘bycl eara nd c o nvi nc i ng ev i d en ce.’” I

d. at 788 ( qu ot i n g 28 U . S . C . § 2254 ( e) ( 1) ) . “ T h is p resu m pti on of corre ctn ess attach es n ot on l y to ex p l i ci t f i n d in g s of fa ct, bu t also to

‘ u n art i cul ated f

i n di n gs w h i ch are necessary t o t h e st a te c o u rt ’ s c on cl u si on s of m i xed l aw a n d fa ct. ’ ” Id . ( quot i ng Pond ext e rv. D r e t ke , 34 6 F . 3 d 14 2 , 14 8 ( 5 th C ir. 2 0 0 3 )). I I I . DI S CU S S I ON C a r tyre q u e s ts a C O Afo rn u m e r o u s s u b s ta n tiv e c la im s a n d fo rh e rcla im t h at exc epti on s t o procedu raldefau l tapp l y t o t h e cl ai m s s h e rai sed f or t h e f i rst t i m e i n her F u rt h er A dd i t i on alR espon se. A . S u b s t a n t i v e c l a i ms C art y rai ses six types of substantive cha l l en ges t o her convic t i on or sentence. 3 1. I nef f ec t i ve as s i s t ance o f co un s el Car t y c o nt e nds t hather t r i alc o uns e l ’ s a s s i s t anc e w as i ne f fe c t ive . “ The b e n c h m a r k fo rju d g in ga n yc la im o f i n e ffe c t iv e n e s s m u s tb e w h e t h e rc o u n s e l’s c o nduc ts o und e r m i ne d t he pr o pe rf unc t i o ni ng o f

t h e a d v e r s a r i a lp r o c e s s t hatt he“It b ears repeating that,” where the state hab eas court h ad the opportunityto rul e o n 4 the petitioner’s ineffe ctive a ssistanc e of coun sel clai m, “thetest for fe deralh abe as purposes is notwhether [the petitioner] made [the re quired] showing .” Schae tzle v. C ock re ll , 34 3 F .3d 440 , 44 4 (5 th Cir. 2 003). “In stead, the test isw he the rt he state court’s decision—that [th e p etitioner] di d notmake the St ricklan d

- s ho win g—wa sc o ntr aryto , oranunr e a s o n ab le app licationof, th e st an dard s, providedbyth e clearlyest ab li sh edfeder al law (St ricklan d), for succ ee din go n[th e petitioner’s] IA Cclaim . ” Id. 7 tri a l ca n n ot b e rel i ed on a s h a vin g pro d u ced a ju s t r e s u l t. ” St r i c klandv. W ash i ngt on , 466 U . S . 668 , 686 ( 198 4) . U n der t h e St r i c kland stan d a rd , the S i xth A m en dm en tri gh tt o ef fect ive assi st an ce of

cou n sel“ i s den i ed w h en a defen se at t o r ne y’ s pe r f

o r m anc e fal l s be l o w an obj e c t ive s t and ar d o f r e as o nab l e ne s s a nd t her eby prej udi c es t he def en se.” Y

a rborough v. G entr

y , 5 4 0 U .S . 1 , 5 (20 0 3 ).

“ F ai l u re t o m ak e t h e requi red show i n g of ei t h er def

i cie n tperf

orm an ce or su ff i ci en t prej u d i ce d efea ts t h e ine ff ectiven ess cl a i m . ” St r i c kland , 466 U . S . at 7 0 0 . “T h e p r o p e rm e a s u r e o f a t t o r n e yp e r fo r m a n c e re m a in s s im p ly r e as o nab l e ne s s und e rpr e va i l i ng professi o nalno r m s , ” b y r e fe r e nc e t o “ al lt he ci rcu m stan ces.” I

d. at688. “Judi c i als c r ut i ny of c ounse l ’ s per f

or m ance m ustbe h ig h lyd e fe r e n tia l” a n d m u s t a v o id s e c o n d -g u e s s in g . I d. at 689 . Prej u di ce requ i res a “r eason able proba bi l i t y t h at, bu tf or c ou n sel ’ s un professi on alerr ors, th e res u l t of th e pro cee d i n gs w ou l d h a ve be en dif feren t. ” I

d. a t6 94 . I n l i ght

4 of t h ese s t an da rds, w e now consi der C art y’ s c l ai m s of i n ef fect ive as sist an ce of c o u n s e l. F i rst , C art y al l eges t h at t ri alcoun selrendered i n ef fect ive assi st an ce t hro ugh def

i c i en t p r e- t r i alpr epar at i on by ( 1) fai l i ng t o i nt er vi ew M at hi s; ( 2) fai l i ng t o c onducti nqu i ri es of C ar t y’ s fam i l y and herl i fe i n St. K i t t s; and ( 3) fai l i ng t o i nt er vi ew and pr epar e t o c r os s- exam i n e state w i t nes se s. Cart y has fai l ed t o i dent i f

y any t es t i m ony o ri nf or m at i on t hatt r i alc ounse ls houl d have e l i c i t e d f

rom M at hi s t hatw o ul d ha ve b e e n a dm i s s ibl e , r e l e va nt , a nd n o nc u m u la tiv e . S ee Un i t ed S t ate s v. G ree n , 88 2 F . 2 d 99 9 , 10 0 3 ( 5 th C i r. 19 8 9 ) (“A defenda n tw h o al l eges a fai l u re t o i n vest i gate on the part of h is co u n selm u st a lle g e w ith s p e c i f

i c i t y w h a t t h e in v e s tig a tio n w o u ld h a v e re v e a le d a n d h o w itThe district court granted a C OA o n wheth er trialcounselshould have cond ucted 5 mor es e archin gin quiri e sof C arty’ sf

a m ilyan dof

h e rlif einS t . Kitt stounc ove rm itig atio n evidence for u se in the punishment ph ase of trial . 8 w ou l d h ave al t ered t h e ou t com e of t h e t ri al . ” ) . Sh e ha s s i m i l arl y fai l ed to show t h at t est i m on y abou ther characterf rom her fam i l y an d di st an tacqu ai n t an ces i n St. K i t t s w as adm i ssibl e an d w ou l d h ave alt ered t h e gu i l t/i n n ocence ph ase of t ri al . C art y h as add i t i on al l y fai l ed to show tha tR obi n son an d C om bs, w h o w ere

5 al so c h arged w i t h cr i m es, w ou l d h ave ag reed t o be intervi ew ed by tr i alcoun sel or t h at t h ey h ad an y kn ow l edg e t h at w as n o t o th e rw i se di scl osed t o t h e j u ry du ri n g t ri al . Th u s, t h e di st ri ctcou rt ’ s h ol di n g— t h at t ri alcoun sel ’ s perf orm an ce di d notfal lbe l ow an obj ec t ive st andard of reas onabl enes s— i s notdeba t abl e b y j ur i s t s o f

r e as o n. Sec ond, C ar t y c l ai m s t hat t r i al c ounse l pro vi ded i nef fec t ive as si st ance by fai l i ng t o c al lD r . B r ow n t o t es t i f y dur i ng t he gui l t/i nnoce nce phase and by fai l i n g t o pr e p a re h i m f or c ross - exam i n ati on du ri n g t h e pu n i shm en tph ase. C art y h as fai l ed to show t h at D r. B row n coul d h ave test i f i ed to h i s prof

fered opi ni ons — t hatC ar t y’ s psy c hol ogi c al pro f i l e di d notf

i tt he c r i m e, t hatbandage s c i s s ors coul d no tc uthum an f l e s h, a nd t hatCar t y c o ul d no tha ve pa s s e d t he bab y of f as her ow n— du ri n g t h e gu i l t/i n n ocence ph ase. D r. B row n ’ s opi n i on abou tC art y’ s psychol ogi calp rof i l e w as not hel pfult o t h e j u ry becau se t h e j u ry w as ult i m atel y cha rged w i t h deci di n g w h et h er C a rty k idn ap ed an d k i l l ed R odr i guez w i t h t he r equi si t e i nt ent . D r . B r ow n’ s anal ys i s of herps yc hol ogi c al prof i l e based on l aterobservati on s i n a control l ed s et t i n g w ou l d n otha ve been h e lp fu l t o t h e ju r yin d e te r m in in gw h e th e rs h e c o m m itt e d t h e s e c r im e s a n d , in an y case, t h at C art y’ s l a te r p sy ch ol ogi calprof i l e sugg est ed that she w ou l d n ot h ave com m i t t ed these cr i m es p a les i n com pa ri son to t h e substanti alevi den ce t hats he di d s o . The o nl y c as e r e l i e d up o n b y Car t y pe r m i t s t e s t i m o ny r e ga r di ng t h e d efe nda nt ’ s ps yc ho l o gi c alpr o f i l e i n t he pun i s hm e ntpha s e , no tt he g u ilt/i n n o c e n s e p h a s e . S ee G riffith v. S ta te , 9 8 3 S . W. 2 d 2 8 2 , 2 8 8 (T e x . C r i m.9

App. 1 99 8) . N e xt , D r . Br o w n’ s o pi ni o n t hatb and ag e s c i s s o r s cou l d n o tc ut h u m a n f

l esh w a s n ot releva n t t o th e p rose cu ti on ’ s u s e of th a t evide n ce— to pr o vi de ev i de nc e of

C ar t y’ s w i l l i ngn e s s t o do any t hi ng t o ki dna p t he b ab y— and w as n ot n ec es sa r y be c ause t r i alc ounse lpr es ent ed t hatar gum entt o t he j ury, w hi c h di d notnee d ex per tt es t i m ony t o r eac h t h a t co n cl u si on. Fi nal l y, t hat C art y could n o t h a v e p a ssed t h e bab y of f as her ow n du e t o i t s et h n i ci t y i s not rel evan tt o w h et h er she w an t ed t o do s o, i gn ores C orona ’ s et h n i ci t y, an d i gn ores Car t y’ s s t at e m e nt s t hatRod r i gue z wa s p r e g n a ntw i t h Cor o na’ s c hi l d. Reg ar di ng c r os s- exam i nat i on, an i ss ue t hatC ar t y r ai se d i n st at e habe as c ou r t , s he has fai l ed to rebu tt h e factt h at D r. B row n w as fam i l i ar w i t h her case, c har ac t e r i s t i c s , a nd c r i m e s , e ve n i f he di d notkno w he rt he o r y o f t he c as e , a nd has fai l e d t o s ho w a ny pr ej udi c e a r i s i ng f r o m t he a l l e ge d d e f

i c i e ntpr e pa r at i o n. C ar t y has fai l ed t o r ebutw i t h cl ear a nd co nvi nci ng evi denc e t he s t at e habe as c o ur t ’ s f

i ndi ng t hatt he pr o s e c ut o rpr o pe r l y que s t i o ne d Dr . Brow n a bo ut h yp ot h et i calcharacter i st i cs an d h as fai l ed t o sh ow tha tthe st ate h abea s c ou rt u n reasona bl y ap pl i ed fe d e ra l l aw t o concl u de that t ri alcoun selw as not in e ffe c t iv e d u r in gD r . B r o w n ’s c r o s s -e x a m in a t io n . O v e r a ll , t h e d is t r ic tc o u r t ’s hol di ng— t hatt r i alc ounse l ’ s per f or m ance di d notfal lbe l ow an obj ective s ta n d a r d o f r e a s o n a b le n e s s a n d d id n o t p r eju d ic e t h e d e fe n s e — is n o t d e b a ta b le byj ur i s t s o f

r e as o n. Th i r d, C ar t y c ont ends t hatt r i alc ounse lrender ed i nef fec t ive as si st ance by fai l i ng t o pr e s e nt ad di t i o nal e vi de nc e t hat w o ul d hav e r e but t e d t he s pe c i ali s s ue of f u t u re da n gerousn ess. C art y’ s cursory argum en ton thi s i ssue fai l s t o add ress a n yo f th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s co m p r e h e n s iv e d is c u s s io n o f tr ia l co u n s e l’ s ta c tic s in c o u n te r in gfu tu r e d a n g e r o u s n e s s . Cf. Willia m s v . Ca in , 125 F. 3d 269, 278–79 (5 th C ir . 1 9 9 7 ) (h o ld in gth a t t h e tr ia l a tt o r n e y ’ s ta c tic o f n o t p r e s e n tin gce r ta in evi den ce w as not prej u di ci alt o t h e defen da n tbecau se i tavoi ded ha rm f u lcr osse x a m in a t io n ). T h e d is t r ic tc o u r t ’s th o r o u g h h o ld in g— t h a ttr ia l c o u n s e l’s10

perf orm an ce di d n otfal lbel ow an obj ect ive st an da rd of reasonab l en ess— i s not de ba t ab l e b y j ur i s t s o f r e as o n. Fourt h, C ar t y ass er t s t hattr i alcounse lrender ed i nef fec t ive as si st ance by fai l i ng t o c o nt r ad i c tt he pr o s e c ut i o n’ s e vi de nc e o f t he c aus e o f

Rod r i que z ’ s de at h, p a rti cu l a rl y a s i t rel a tes to C a rty’ s i n ten t. T h e sta te h a b ea s cou rt d en i ed C a rty r e lie f o n th is cla im b e c a u s e , in tera lia , tr ia l co u n s e l p u r s u e d a re a s o n a b le ta c tic o f a t t a c k i n gt h e p r o s e c u t i o n ’ s e x p e r ta n d e l i c i t e d b e n e f i c i a lt e s t i m o n yd u r i ng cross-e x a m i n ati on . Th e federaldi st ri ctcourthel d that t h e st ate hab eas court di d n otun reasona bl y a p p ly fed erall aw i n den yi n g C art y’ s c l ai m . C art y n ow c o n te n d s th a t h a d tr ia l co u n s e l p u r s u e d a d iffe r e n t t a c tic , h e rd e fe n s e w o u ld h a v e b e e n stron ge r. T h i s ar gu m en t i s i n su ff i ci en t t o sh ow tha t reas on a b le ju r is ts co u ld d e b a te th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s co n c lu s io n . S ee S ch a etz le , 343 F. 3d at 4 4 4 . C ar t y m ai nt ai ns t hatt r i alc ounse lpr ovi ded i nef fec t ive as si st ance by p e r m itt in gt h e d is m is s a l o f o v e r8 0 % o f p o te n tia l ju r o r s , b yin a p p r o p r ia te ly qu est i on i n g potenti alj u ro rs , an d by fai l i n g t o obj ectt o prosecutoran d court st atem en t s du ri n gju ry v o i r di re. C art y fai l s t o show t h at t h e excl u si on of p oten ti a lj u ror s , tri a lcou n sel’ s statem en ts, or tri a lcou n sel’ s d ecisi on s n ot to o b je c t g a v e r is e to c o n s tit u tio n a l v io la tio n s . See , e . g. , Penry v. Joh n son , 5 32 U . S. 782 , 801 –02 ( 200 1) ( “ T h e com m en t s of t h e courtan d co u n seldu ri n g voi r di re w e r e s u r e lya d is ta n t a n d c o n v o lu te d m e m o r y b y th e tim e th e ju r o r s b e g a n th e ir d e lib e r a tio n s o n [th e d e fe n d a n t’s ] s e n te n c e .”); Zafi ro v. Un i t ed S t ate s , 5 06 U . S. 53 4, 5 40 –4 1 ( 19 93 ) ( “ [ E] ve n i f t he r e w e r e s o m e r i s k o f pr ej udi c e , he r e i ti s o f t he typ e th a t can be cu red w i th pr op er ins tru cti on s, an d ‘j u ri es a re p resu m ed to fo llo w th e irin s tr u c tio n s .’”); G ree n v. Joh n son , 160 F . 3d 102 9, 103 7 ( 5th C i r. 1 9 9 8 ) ( “ B e c a u s e fa i l u r e to m a k e a fr iv o lo u s o b je c t io n d o e s n o tc a u s e c o u n s e l’s p erform a n ce to fallbe l ow an ob j ective leve lof rea s o n a b len ess , [th e d efen d a n t] h a s n o te s t a b li s h e d d e fi c ie n tp e r fo r m a n c e .” ). T h u s , t h e d is t r ic tc o u r t ’s11

hol di ng— t hatt r i a lcounse l ’ s per f or m ance di d notfal lbe l ow an obj ec t ive s t and ar d o f

r e as o nab l e ne s s — i s no tde ba t ab l e b y j ur i s t s o f r e as o n. S i xth, C art y cl ai m s, as s h e d id i n st ate hab eas court , t h at t ri alcoun sel r e nde r e d i ne f

fe c t ive as s i s t anc e by fai l i ng t o ad vi s e he r o f he r r i ght s unde rt he V i enna C onvent i on o n C ons ul arR el at i ons ( “V C C R ” ) , A pr. 24, 1963, 21 U . S. T. 77, 596 U . N . T. S. 261. The d i stri ct c our thel d t hatw het herC ar t y has an i n di vi du al l y en f

orceabl e ri gh tun der t h e V C C R i s not cle a rly est abli shed f or pu rposes of

A E D P A ; t h at C art y di d n otcl ai m prej u di ce di st i n ctf rom her u n successf

u lcl ai m of

cu m u l ative prej u di ce r esul t i n g f rom i n ef

fect ive assi st an ce of coun sel ; an d that, in a n y case, C art y w as n otprej u di ced becau se even w h en st at e o f f i c i al s not i f

i ed herof

V C C R

- bas ed r i ght s, s he fai l ed t o as se r t herf or ei gn nat i o nal i t y. Car t y i s a c i t i z e n o f St . K i t t s a nd t he U ni t e d Ki ngd o m . As s uc h, A rt i cl e 36 of

t h e V C C R obl i gated the U n i t ed S t ates t o noti f y t h e con sul ar of

f i cers of St . K i t t s and t he U nit ed K i ngdom of C ar t y’ s det ent i on i f

s he r eques t ed t hat th e yd o s o a n d a ls o to in fo r m h e rw ith o u t d e la y o f h e rn o tific a tio n rig h ts . S ee S an chez- L lam as v. O regon , 548 U . S . 331 , 33 8

– 3 9 (2 006 ) . W h i l e t h e U n i t ed S t ates h as un dertaken t h at t reat y obl i gati on , t h e Su prem e C ou rtha s not a n s w e r e d w h e th e r the V C C R cr e a te s rig h ts e n fo r c e a b le b yin d iv id u a ls . See , e . g. , Me de l l ín v . Te x as , - - - U . S. - - - - , 1 28 S. Ct . 13 46 , 13 57 n. 4 ( 20 08 ) . Fi l l i ng t hatv o i d, w e ha ve previ ou sl y h el d that “ ‘A rt i cl e 36 of t h e V i en n a C on ven t i on does not crea te a n i n d ivid u a l l y e n forcea b l e righ t. ’” See , e . g. , Le alG ar c i a v . Q uar t e r m an ,

- - - F. 3d -

- - - , 2009 W L 1800141, at *2 n . 1 9 ( 5t h C i r . 2009) ( quot i ng Me del l ín v. D r e t ke , 371 F. 3d 270, 280 ( 5t h C i r . 2004 )) . C a rt y nonet hel es s r ec i t es t hat

“ num e r o us o t he rc o ur t s have he l d t he o ppo s i t e , t hatt he Vi e nna Conv e nt i o n d oes c r e a te a n in d iv id u a llye n fo r c e a b le rig h t,” s e ei d. (c itin g , e .g ., O sagie d e v. Un i t ed S t ate s , 5 43 F. 3d3 99 , 4 09 –1 0 ( 7th Ci r . 2 00 8) , t hus e vi de nc i ng de ba t e a m o ng ju r is ts o f r e a s o n . W h ile t h e r e m a yb e a v ib r a n t d e b a te in th e co u r ts o f a p p e a ls aboutw het hert he V C C R c onvey s an i ndi vi dualr i ght , t hats pl i tdoes n otm ean th a t t h e s ta te co u r t ju d g m e n t w a s “c o n tr a r yto , o rin v o lv e d a n u n r e a s o n a b leThis conclusion is without prej udic e t o Ca rty’ s claim th at trial coun sel’s all eged 6 ina dequ ate develop ment of mitigatio n evidence constitute d prej udicial deficient performance, an iss ue for which the dis tri ct court grant ed a COA and thatrem ainsbefor e us on app eal. To the extentC arty’s VC CR clai m is relevant to the develop ment of facts supp ortin g mitigatio n, weres erve j u dgme nt for our co n si derationof h erp en din gapp eal. 12 a p p lic a tio n o f, c le a r l y e s t a b l i s h e dF

e d e r a lla w , a s d e t e r mi n e dby t h eS u p r e me Cou rtof t h e Un i t ed S t ate s . ” S ee § 22 54 ( d) ( 1) ( e m pha s i s ad de d) . Ther e c an be no d e b a te a m o n gju r is ts o f r e a s o n th a t th e p u r p o r te d in d iv id u a l rig h t is n o t a t t h is ti m e cl ea rl y estab l i sh ed b y S u p rem e C ou rt p rece d en t. Y et, C a rty con ti n u es to as se r therV C C R c l ai m by r ef er enc e t o v ar i ous f

or m s of purpo r t ed i nef

fec t ive as s i s t anc e r e nde r e d b y t r i alc o uns e l , s uc h a s t r i alc o uns e l ’ s fai l ur e t o m ak e i nqui r i es abo utherl i fe on S t . K i t t s. E ven ass um i ng w i t houtdeci di ng t hatt r i al coun selerr ed by fai l i n g t o a dv i se C art y of t h e avail abil i t y of

consular assi st an ce, w h i ch m ay h ave resul t ed in s u ch an i n qu i ry, w e concl u de sh e ha s fai l ed sh ow t h at j u ri st s of

reason coul d deb ate that sh e h as suf fered an y act i on able prej u di ce r e s ul t i ng f

r o m t r i alco uns e l ’ s def i c i e ntr e pr e s e nt at i o n. Thi s i s pa r t i c ul ar l y t r ue 6 w h e r e s h e fa ile d to a s s e r t h e rs ta tu s a s a fo r e ig n n a tio n a l a fte rs ta te o ffic ia ls n o tifie dh e rth a t fo r e ig n n a t i o n a ls w o u ld b e p e r m itt e d to co n ta c t t h e irco n s u ls unde r t he VC CR . The di s t r i c t c o ur t ’ s ho l di ng t hat t he s t at e ha be as c o ur t ’ s r ul i ng w a s n o tc o n t r a r yto c le a r lye s t a b li s h e d fe d e r a l la w a n d th e d is t r ic tc o u r t ’s concl u si on t h at t ri alcoun sel ’ s perf orm an ce di d n otprej u di ce t h e defense are not de ba t ab l e b y j ur i s t s o f r e as o n. S even t h , C art y assert s, as she d i d i n stat e h abea s c ou rt , t h at t ri alcoun sel s h o u l d h a v e o b j e c t e d w h e n t h e p r o s e c u t o rme n t i o n e d n u me r o u s b a b yi t e ms du ri n g h i s open i n g st atem en t , i t em s t h at t h e t ri alcourtl aterex cl u ded f rom evi den ce, an d als o asser t s t h at t ri alcoun selshou l d h ave s ou gh ti n st ructi on s on ando bj e c t e d t o e vi de nc e a nd a r gum e ntr e l at i ng t o Ande r s o n’ s , Cas t o n’ s , a nd C om bs ’ s st at use s as acc om pl i c e w i t nes se s. The baby i t em s w er e no tex c l uded at t ri alun t i laf

t er opening argu m en t s, an d n u m erous ot h er baby i t em s w ere ad m i s s ibl e e vi de nc e ; t hus , t r i alc o uns e ldi d not actunr e as o nab l y, a nd t he13

pu rport ed errorw as only c u m u l ative of exi st i n g evi den ce. In ad di t i on , becau se que s t i o ns e xi s t e d a s t o t he a l l e ge d a c c o m pl i c e s ’s t at us e s a nd t he i s s ue w as t hus s u b m itt e d to th e ju r yw ith p r o p e rin s tr u c tio n s , tr ia l c o u n s e l w a s n o t d e fic ie n t in h a n d lin gth e a c c o m p lic e w itn e s s e s . S ee B la k e v . S ta te , 971 S. W . 2d 451, 455 (Tex. C ri m . A pp . 199 8) ( “ If t h e evi den ce i s c on f

l i ct i n g, i ti s proper t o l eave t h e qu est i on of w h et h er an i n cul pa t ory w i t n ess i s an accom pl i ce w i t n ess as a m att er of fact t o t h e j u ry u n der i n st ructi on s defi n i n g t h e t erm accom pl i ce. ” ) . Th u s, t h e di st ri ct c our t ’ s hol di ng— t hatt r i al c ounse l ’ s per f or m ance di d notfal lbe l ow an obj ec t ive s ta n d a r d o f r e a s o n a b le n e s s — is n o t d e b a ta b le b yju r is ts o f r e a s o n , e s p e c ia lly w h en vi ew ed throug h A E D P A ’ s m u l t i pl e pri sm s. E i gh th , C a rty a rg u es th a t t ri a lcou n sel sh ou l d h a ve resign ed du e to exc es sive w or kl oad a nd due t o Cart y’ s uncoo pera ti ve i nt er ac t i on w i t h t r i al co u n se l. Th e di st ri ctcourthel d that C art y h as fai l ed to rai se an i ssue of c o ns t i t ut i o nalm ag ni t ude , a nd t hathol di ng i s no tde ba t ab l e b y j ur i s t s o f r e as o n. Car t y’ s ni nt h a nd f

i nali ne f

fe c t ive a s s i s t anc e o f

c o uns e lc l ai m i s t hatt he cum u l ative error s of t ri alcoun se l deprived her of a fai r t ri al . C art y preserved th is c la im in s ta te h a b e a s c o u r t. M o s t o f th e a lle g e d e r r o r s th a t C a r tyre c ite s d id n o t c o n s tit u te d e fic ie n t p e r fo r m a n c e a n d th u s co u ld n o t b e t h e b a s is o f a cla im o f c u m u la tiv e p r eju d ic e . S ee Mi l ler v. Joh n son , 200 F . 3d 274 , 286 n. 6 ( 5th C i r. 20 00 ) . M o r e o ve r , w i t ho utpr ej udi c e t o t he m e r i t s o f Car t y’ s pe ndi ng ap pe al , t he o s t e ns ibl e error s t hatdi d o c c urdi d no t“ ‘ s o i nfe c t [] t he e nt i r e t r i alt hatt he resu l ti n g co n victi on viol a tes d u e p roce ss. ’” D erden v. McNeel , 978 F. 2d 1453, 14 54 ( 5t h Ci r . 1 99 2) ( e n b anc ) . Thus , j ur i s t s of reason c o ul d no tde ba t e t he di s t r i c tc o ur t ’ s ho l di ng de nyi ng Car t y r e l i e f ba s e d o n i ne f fe c t ive a s s i s t anc e due to th e a lle g e d cu m u la tiv e e r r o r s o f tr ia l co u n s e l. O veral l , w e de ny a CO A f o rCar t y’ s i n ef

fect ive assi st an ce of

coun selcl ai m s. 2 . V io latio n o f V C C R -d e riv e d rig h ts C a rty a rg u es th a t t h e sta te erre d byfa i l i n g to inform h er of h e r ri gh ts u n der t h e V C C R . A s noted above, w e ha ve previ ou sl y h e ld th a t “‘A rt i cl e 36 of14

th e V i en n a C on ve n ti on d oe s n ot c rea te a n in d ivid u a l l y en forcea b l e righ t. ’” S ee L ea l G a rc ia , 2009 W L 1800141, at *2 n. 19 ( quot i ng Med ellín , 3 7 1 F .3d a t 2 8 0 ). Th us, as C ar t y att hi s t i m e l ac ks an i ndi vi dualr i ght , s he has fai l ed t o s how t hat ju r is ts o f r e a s o n co u ld d e b a te th e v a lid ityo f h e rcla im . Se e , e . g. , Carde nas v . D r e t ke , 405 F . 3d 244 , 253 ( 5th C i r. 200 5) (“ [ T h e peti t i on er’ s] cl ai m fai l s because t h i s c ou rtha s det erm i n ed in the past t h at t h e V i en n a C on ven t i on does not con fer in d ivid u a l l y en forcea b l e ri gh ts. ”) . In a n y ca se, ev en pr esu m i n g a de b a te a b o u t w h e th e rth e V C C R g iv e s r is e t o a n in d iv id u a llye n fo r c e a b le rig h t, s e eLe al G a rc ia , 2 0 0 9 W L 1 8 0 0 1 4 1 , a t* 2 n .1 9 , w e d o n o tf in d t h a tt h e m e r it s o f C a r t y ’s c l ai m c o ul d b e de ba t e d b y j ur i s t s o f r e as o n b e c aus e t he s t at e ha be as co ur tf o und t hat , as a m a t t e ro f

fa c t , Ca r t ywa s t wi c e n o t i f i e d o f t h e a v a i l a b i l i t yo f

VCC Rderi ved ri gh t s, an d sh e den i ed that she w as a f orei gn na t i on alon both occasi on s. C art y h as not r ebu t t ed th a t c o n cl u si on w i t h cl ear an d conv i n ci n g evi den ce. B e c a u s e C a r tyh a s fa ile d to s h o w th a t ju r is ts o f r e a s o n w o u ld fin d it d e b a ta b le w he t he rhe rpe t i t i o n s t at e s a va l i d c l ai m o f t he de ni alo f

a c o ns t i t ut i o nalr i ght b a s e d o n th e U n ite d S ta te s ’ s o b lig a tio n s u n d e rth e V C C R , w e d e n ya C O A . 3. T ri al cou rterr ors C a r ty a s s e rts thre e err ors b y th e tri a lcou rt. C a rty fi rst arg u es th a t, dur i ng j ur y vo i rdi r e , t he t r i alc o ur ti m pr o pe r l y i ns t r uc t e d t he j ur y r e ga r di ng c a p ita l m u r d e r b y o m itt in gre fe r e n c e to s p e c ific in te n t. S eeT EX . P ENAL C ODE § 1 9. 03(a) . A ssum i n g t h at i n st ructi on w as i n corr ect , “ t h e qu est i on i s . . . w h et h er t he a i l i ng i ns t r uc t i o n b y i t s e l f s o i nfe c t e d t he e n t i re t r i alt hatt he r e s ul t i ng c o n v ic tio n v io la te s d u e p r o c e s s .” C u pp v. Naugh t en , 4 1 4 U .S . 1 4 1 , 1 4 7 (19 7 3 ). In t h i s c ase t h e ai l i n g i n st ructi on di d n otinf ectt h e ensu i n g t ri al . Th e t ri alcourt p r o p e r lyin s tr u c te d th e ju r yre g a r d in gth e re q u ir e m e n t o f in te n t im m e d ia te ly b efore su b m i tti n gt h e ca se to th e j u ry , the cou rt also i n stru cted the j u ryto r e s o l ve a ny do ubti n fav o ro f Car t y w he n de c i di ng be t w e e n f e l o ny- m u rdera nd capi t alm u rder, an d the pa rt i es argued at l en gth abou t w h et h er t h e prosecuti on h a d p r o v e n in te n t. S ee Penry , 532 U . S. at801–02 ; Zafi ro , 506 U . S. at540.15

Ju ri sts o f r e a so n coul d n otdeba t e t h at C art y h as fai l ed to show a du e process vi o l at i o n. C art y n ext arg u e s th at t h e t ri alcourterr on eou sl y i n st ructed t h e j u ry a b o u t cr im in a l a c ts o f v io le n c e , a g a in d u r in g ju r y v o ird ir e . S eeT EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . a r t . 3 7 .0 7 1 § 2 (b )( 1 ). C a r t yh a s fa il e d to s h o w th a tth e tr ia l c o u r t ’s i n st ructi on w a s con t rary t o st ate l aw ( even w i t h ou tref erence t o t h e of

t - st ated p r in c ip le th a t s ta te -la w e r r o r s ty p ic a llyd o n o t g i v e ris e to a rig h t t o re lie f in fe de r alha be as pr o c e e di ngs ) a nd h as no t s ho w n t hat t he pur po r t e d e r r o rm ad e th e fu n d a m e n ta l fa ir n e s s o f tr ia l d e b a ta b le . S ee L i t t le v. Joh n son , 162 F. 3d 855, 8 6 2 (5 th C ir . 1 9 9 8 ) (h o ld in gt h a t s ta te la w v io la tio n s m u s t p la y“a cr u c ia l, crit i ca l , an d h i gh l y sign i fi ca n t rol e i n the tri a l” t o w a rra n t ha b ea s reli ef) . Ju ri sts o f r e as o n c o ul d no tde ba t e t hatCar t y has fai l e d t o s ho w a due pr o c e s s v i o l at i o n. C a rty fi n a l l y a rg u es th a t T ex a s l a w u n con sti tu ti on a l l y p erm i ts t h e j u ryto ans w e r“ no ” t o t he s pe c i alm i t i ga t i o n q ue s t i o n wi t ho utc o nc l udi ng be yo nd a r e as o nab l e do ubtt hatt he s t at e ha d s ho w n t hatthe fac t s do no tw ar r ant o t he r w i s e . Car t y e xha us t e d t hi s cl ai m i n st at e co ur t , and i ti s f o r e c l o s e d b y o ur p r e c e d e n t. Se eO r t izv . Q uar t e r m an , 5 04 F. 3d4 92 , 5 04 –5 05 ( 5t h Ci r . 2 00 7) ( “ The Texa s d e a t h p e na l t ys c he m e d o e s n o tv i o l a t e [ Su p r e m e Co ur tp r e c e d e nt] by fai l i n g t o requi re t h e State t o prove beyon d a reason able do u b t t h e absen ce of m i t i gat i ng c i r c um st ance s. ” (c i t i ng Sc he ane t t ev . Q uar t e r m an , 482 F. 3d 815, 828–29 ( 5t h C i r . 2007) ) . A gai n, j uri st s of r eas on c oul d notdeba t e t hatC ar t y has fai l e d t o s ho w a due pr o c e s s v i o l at i o n. B e c a u s e C a r tyh a s fa ile d to s h o w th a t ju r is ts o f r e a s o n w o u ld fin d it de ba t ab l e w he t he r he r pe t i t i o n s t at e s a va l i d c l ai m o f c o ur t e r r o r r e s ul t i ng i n a c o n s tit u tio n a llyd e fic ie n t t r ia l, w e d e n ya C O A . 4 . In s u ffic ie n t e v id e n c e o f in te n t to k ill C art y argu es, as she di d to t h e st ate hab eas court , t h at t h e evi den ce provi n g h er i n t en tt o ki l lw as l egall y i n suff i ci en t . T exas l aw prem i ses a m u rder convic t i on on w h et h er t h e act or “ i n t en t i on al l y or k n ow i n gl y cau ses t h e death of16

a n i n d iv id u a l . ” T EX . P ENAL C ODE § 1 9 .0 2 (a )(1 ); s e eMor e no v. D r e t ke , 450 F. 3d 15 8, 1 72 ( 5t h Ci r . 2 00 6) . Car t y c o nt e nds he r s t at e m e nt s — f o r e xa m pl e , t hats he w an t ed to cut t h e bab y f rom R odri gu ez’ s body— w ere i n suff i ci en tt o show in t e n t i o n a lc o n d u c tb e c a u s e t h e b a b yw a s a l r e a d yb o r n a tt h e t i m e o f R o d r i g u e z ’s m ur de r , t he s c i s s o r s Car t y i nt e nde d t o us e w e r e n ot cap ab l e o f t he a bho r r e nt t ask, an d sh e accom pl i shed R odri gu ez’ s m u rder by t h e al t erna t ive m et h od of suff ocat i on . C art y’ s stat em en t s d i d n ot h i n g m ore than ev i den ce her w i l l i n gn ess and des i r e t o ki l lR odr i guez t o a c c om pl i sh t he ki dnapi ng of R odr i gu ez ’ s baby, an d the st ate of

fered suff

i ci en tevi den ce t h at, w h en vi ew ed i n t h e l i gh tm ost fa v o r a b le to th e it, se e J a ck so n v . V

irg in ia , 443 U . S. 307 ( 1979) , prove d t hat , as t he s t at e habe as f

ound, “ pl ac i ng a p erso n fac e do w n i n t he t r unk , t api ng t hat per so n’ s hands, fee t, a nd m out h, and t hen pl ac i ng a pl as t i c bag ove rt hat p erso n ’ s h ea d . . . sh ow [s] a n in ten t to k i l lo r c a u se seriou s b od i l y inj u ry . ” C a rty has fai l ed t o sho w t hat j uri st s of r eas on c oul d debat e w het hert he s t at e habe as c o u r t r e a s o n a b lya p p lie d fe d e r a l la w ; w e d e n ya C O A . 5. P rosecutori al m i scond u ct C ar t y as se r t s t w o c l ai m s of pr os ec ut or i alm i sc onduct . “ P rosec ut or i al m i s c o nduc ti s no ta g r o und f o rr e l i e f

unl e s s i tc as t s s e ri ou s d oubtupo n t he corre ctn ess of th e j u ry ’ s ve rd i ct. ” S tyron v. Joh n son , 262 F . 3d 438 , 449 ( 5th C i r. 20 01 ) . Car t y f

i r s ta s s e ve r at e s t hatt he pr o s e c ut o rs ho ul d ha ve no t i f i e d Co r o na of hi s r i gh tnot t o t est i f y aga i n stC art y becau se s h e w as h is com m on - l aw w i fe. Car t y has fai l e d t o s ho w pr o s e c ut o r i alm i s c o nduc ti n pu t t i n g Cor o na o n t he s ta n d t o t e s tify . S ee B en itez v . S ta te , 5 S .W .3 d 9 1 5 , 9 1 8

– 1 9 (T e x . A p p .— A m a r illo 1 9 9 9 , pe t. refu sed ) (“ [C ]al l i n g th e sp ou se is no t i pso f act o er r or . [T] he St at e has no dut y t o pr o ve t hats he t e s t i f i e d v o l unt ar i l y. ” ) . N o rha s Car t y s ho w n t he m a r ita l p r iv ile g e is a co n s tit u tio n a llyd e r iv e d ru le . S ee Portv. Heard , 764 F. 2d 42 3, 4 30 ( 5t h Ci r . 1 98 5) ( “ [ T] he m ar i t alpr ivi l e ge ha s n eve rb e e n pl ac e d o n a c ons t i t ut i onalf

oo t i ng . ”) . W hi l e i ti s debat abl e i n fac tw het herC or ona w asArticl e 3 8.14provi des: “A conviction c an not be had uponth e te stimonyof an 7 acco mpliceunle ss corroborated b y other evidence t endingto connect the defen dantwithth e offen se co mmitted; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merelyshows the commission of th e of fe n se .” 17 C art y’ s c om m on - l aw hu sban d, reason able j u ri st s cou l d n otd ebate t h e absen ces o f a c o ns t i t ut i o nalv i o l at i o n b y t he pr o s e c ut o r s i n put t i ng Cor o na o n t he s t and . C ar t y nextm ai nt ai ns t hatt he pr os ec ut or s i nco r r ec t l y a r gued t hat A n derson, C aston, an d C om bs w ere n ot accom pl i ces becau se t h ey w ere n ot p r e s e n t d u r in gth e k id n a p in ga n d m u r d e r . S ee S ing leta ry v. S ta te , 509 S. W . 2d 572 , 575 (T ex. C ri m . A pp . 197 4) . Sh e al so argu es that the p rosec u t ors m i sst ated t h e l a w b ya s s e r t i n gt h a tc o r r o b o r a t i o n r e q u i r e d o n l ye v i d e n c e t h a tt h e c r i me o c c u r r e d . S ee T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . a rt . 3 8. 14. For al l eged m i scondu ct 7 based on the prosecutor ’ s argu m en tto the j u ry, a n app l i can ti s enti t l ed to rel i ef w h ere “t h e p rose cu tors’com m en ts ‘ so infected the tri a lw i th u n fai rn e s s a s to m a k e t h e res u l ti n g co n victi on a d en i a lof d u e p roce ss. ’” D ar de n v. W ai nw r ight , 477 U . S. 168, 181 ( 1986) ( quot i ng D on n el l y v. D eCh ri st of

oro , 416 U . S. 637, 643 (1 9 7 4 )) . T h e d is t r ic tc o u r t h e ld th a tC a r t yd id n o to b je c tto th e p r o s e c u t o r ’s c o m m e n t s a ttr ia l, s u b je c t in gt h e s e e r r o r s to p r o c e d u r a l d e fa u ltu n d e rT e x a s ’s c o n te m p o r a r yo b je c tio n ru le . See , e . g. , B arri ente s v. Joh n son , 221 F. 3d 741, 779 ( 5th C i r. 200 0) . C art y h as of fered no ch al l en ge t o t h at c on cl u si on , an d i ti s not de ba t ab l e b y j ur i s t s o f r e as o n. The di s t r i c tc o ur ta l t e r nat ive l y he l d t hatt he i n stru cti on bythe tri a lcou r t p rov i d ed the j u ryw i th ad eq u a te gu i d a n ce to o v e r c o m e a n ym is s ta te m e n t b yth e p r o s e c u to ra n d th a t a n ym is s t a te m e n t d id n o t c a s t s e r io u s d o u b t u p o n th e ju r y ’ s v e r d ic t. See , e . g. , W ardv. W

h i t ley , 21 F. 3d 13 55 , 1 36 6 ( 5t h Ci r . 1 99 4) ( “ The ar gum e nt s o f co uns e lper f

o r c e do no tha ve t he sa m e force a s a n in stru cti on from th e cou rt. ”) . Ju ri sts of rea son cou l d n ot d eb a te t h at no du e process vi ol ati on res u l t ed f rom t h ese pu rport ed error s. B e c a u s e C a r tyh a s fa ile d to s h o w th a t j u r is ts o f r e a s o n w o u ld fin d it deb atabl e w h et h er her peti t i on stat es a vali d cl ai m of prosecutori alm i scondu ct th a t c a s ts d o u b t u p o n th e co r r e c tn e s s o f th e ju r y ’ s v e r d ic t, w e d e n ya C O A .18

6. Cu m ul at i ve e r r or C ar t y al l ege s c um ul at ive er r or by t he t r i al c our t , pro se c ut or , and t r i al c o uns e l . “ The c um ul at ive e r r o rdo c t r i ne pr o vi de s r e l i e f o nl y w he n t he c o ns t i t ut i o nale r r o r s c o m m i t t e d i n t he s t at e t r i alc o ur tso ‘ fatal l y i nfe c t e d t he tri a l ’tha t t h eyviol a ted the tri a l ’ s ‘ fun d a m en tal fa i rn ess . ’” S pen ce v. Joh n son , 80 F. 3d 989, 1000 ( 5t h C i r . 1996) (c i t i ng D erden , 9 78 F. 2da t 14 57 ) . To pr o vi de rel i ef, cum u l ative error s m u stha ve “ m ore l i kely t h an not c au sed a susp ect ve rd i ct. ” I

d. at 100 1 ( qu ot ati on m arks om i t t ed). I n this case, w i t h ou tprej u di ce to the m erits of C a rty’ s p en d i n g a p p ea l , an d j u ri sts of rea son cou l d n ot d eb a te t h at t h e su m m ati on of otherw i se non - prej u di ci alerr ors di d n otcause a susp ect v e r d i c to re f

fe c tt h e f

u n d a m e n t a lfa i r n e s s o f t h e r e s u l t . W e d e n ya COA. B . P r o c e d u r a l D e fa u lt C art y al so s eeks a C O Aon the di st ri ctcourt ’ s procedural defau l thol di n gs. Th e di st r i c tc our tc onc l uded t hatC ar t y fai l ed to ex haustnum er ous c l ai m s by i m p rop erly ra i singthe m i n h er A d d i ti on a lF u rth er R esp on se; th a t T ex a s cou rts wo u l d c o n s i d e rh e ru n e x h a u s t e d c l a i ms a n a b u s e o f wr i ti f s h e f i l e d t h e m n o w, r es ul t i n g i n pr oc edur aldefaul tbar r i ng fede r alhabeas r evi ew ; and t hat e x c e p tio n s to p r o c e d u r a l d e fa u lt d id n o t a p p ly . S ee Ca rty , N o. 06- 614, s l i p op. at 53–55 (c i t i ng Nobl es v. Joh n son , 127 F. 3d 409, 420 ( 5t h C i r . 1997) ( “Apr oc edur al de faul ta l s o o c c ur s w he n a pr i s o ne rfai l s t o e xha us ta va i l ab l e s t at e r e m e di e s a nd t h e courtt o w h i ch t h e peti t i on er w ou l d be requ i red t o present h i s cl ai m s i n order to m e e t t h e e x h a u s tio n re q u ir e m e n t w o u ld n o w fin d th e cla im s p r o c e d u r a lly b a rred . ” ( q u ota ti on m a rk s an d ci tati on om i tted))) . T h e d i stri ct cou rt gra n ted “a C O Aon th e qu est i on of w h et h er [ C art y] suf f i ci en t l y exh au st ed st ate c ou rt r em edi es , ” buti tdi d nots pec i f i c al l y m ent i on i ts corr es pondi ng pr oc edur al d e fa u lt r u lin g s . W e i n i t i a llyn o te th a t t h e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s u n d e r ly in gp r o c e d u r a l d e fa u lt r u li n gw a s e n t i r e lyd e p e n d e n to n it s fa il u r e -t o -e x h a u s tr u li n g ; t h u s , C a r t y ’s s uc c e s s o n he ra ppe alo f t he e xha us t i o n i s s ue w o ul d b y de f i ni t i o n r e m o ve t heEx parte Hood and its progenycon side r edt heatypically complexdevelop ment of 8 Supre me C ourtpre cedent in Smith v. Texas , 5 5 0U .S . 2 9 7(2 0 0 7); Brewer v. Quarterman , 55 0 U. S. 2 8 6(2 0 0 7); Abdu l-Kabir v. Quarterman , 55 0U .S . 2 3 3(2 0 0 7); Pen ry v. Joh nson , 53 2 U .S. 782(20 01); and Penryv. Lyna ugh , 4 9 2U .S . 3 0 2( 1 9 8 9). 19 p r o c e d u r a l d e fa u lt b a r to fe d e r a l r e v ie w . B o th p a r tie s a d d r e s s e d th a t is s u e in th eir m a i n briefs, an d w e d o n ot ru l e on it h e r e . P r ese n tl y, C a rty a sk s u s to g r a n t a C O Ao n th e a d d itio n a l, a lte r n a tiv e b a s is th a t ju r is ts o f r e a s o n co u ld d e b a te th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s co n c lu s io n th a t e x c e p tio n s to p r o c e d u r a l d e fa u lt d id no ta ppl y. Al t ho ugh the i nt e r pl ayo f t he s e v ar i o us pr o c e dur alr ul i ngs a nd e x c e p tio n s r a is e s s o m e in te r e s tin gle g a l q u e s tio n s , see O ’ S u l l i van v. B oerc kel , 526 U . S. 8 3 8 , 8 5 1

– 8 5 7 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ( St e v e ns , J . , d i s s e nt i ng) , we n e e d n o th e r e d el ve i n t o t h ose nu an ces, as a C O Ai s not w arran t ed i n an y case. C a rty initi a l l y claim s th a t i t i s d eb a tab l e w h eth er T ex a s s ta te cou rts w o u ld a p p lya n e q u ita b le e x c e p tio n to p r o c e d u r a l d e fa u lt. Se e Ex par t e Hood , N os. W R -41 , 16 8 -10 , A P -75 , 3 7 0 , 20 0 8 W L 41 5 1 6 6 6 , at *2 (T ex . C ri m . A p p . S ep t. 9, 2 00 8) . I n Ex pa rt e Hood , t h e C ou rtof C ri m i n alA pp eal s opt ed to reconsi der a pri or di sm i ssalof

a subseq u en tapp l i cat i on f or a w ri tof

ha beas corpu s based on “de ve l op m en ts i n the l a w reg a rd i n g n u l l i fi ca ti on i n stru cti on s. ” I d. ; seealso 8 Ex Part e Hathorn ,- -- S .W .3d ----, 2 0 0 9 W L 9 2 9 0 9 5 (T e x . C rim . A p p . 2 0 0 9 ) ( sa m e ); Ex p ar t eBr i s e no , N o. A P- 76132, 2009 W L 949075 (Tex. C r i m . A pp. A pr. 8, 2009) ( or der i ng br i ef

i ng on s am e) . I n t hi s c as e, C ar t y al l ege s nei t herl egalnorfac t ual p o s t - ap pl i c at i o n de ve l o pm e nt s s i m i l art o t ho s e t hate xi s t e d i n Ex pa rt e Hood and i t s pro geny; t hus, s he has fai l ed t o s how t hatt he di st r i c tc our t ’ s pro c edur al defaul trul i n g i s debatable by j u ri st s of reason based on these cases . C ar t y nextargu es t hatt he go ver nm entw aived t he i ss ue o f pr oc edur al d e fa u lt. S ee Fi sher v. T exas, 169 F . 3d 295 , 301 ( 5th C i r. 199 9) ( “Ast ate w ai ves a p ro ce d u ra l ba r d e fen se b yfailin gt o r a ise th e d e fen se in th e d istr ict co u rt.”). W h i l e exh a u st i on an d p rocedural defaul tare t w o di st i n ctconcepts, i n cases w h ere p rocedural defaul tis b ased on t h e fai l u re t o exh au st , w ai ver of exh au st i on w a iv e s b o th . S ee B ledsu e v. Joh n son , 1 88 F. 3d250 , 254 ( 5t h Ci r . 1 99 9) ( “ [ T] heAs such, we nee d not address Carty’s argu ment that the state can waive apro cedur al 9 default that is exclu sively depen dent on the exhau stionrequirementbya mean s other than coun sel’ s expres s s tate me nt. C f. Jackson v. Jo hnson , 194 F.3 d 64 1, 6 52 & n .35 (5thC ir. 1 999) (“Althou gha‘ St atesh allnotb e de em edto h ave waivedth e exh au stio nrequirem ent . . . u nle ss the State , through couns el , e xp resslywaives the re quirement,’ 2 8 U .S.C. § 2 254 (b)(3), the exh au stio nrequirem ent isrel ate d b ut di stinctf ro m th at of

p roce dural default .”). 20 s t at e ha s w aive d a ny i nde pe nde nte xha us t i o n a r gum e nt , a s w e l la s t he e x ha us t i o n a r g um e nti nc l ud e d wi t hi n t he d o c t r i ne of pr o c e d ur a lde fa ul t . ” ) . To t h e ext en tt h at t h e governm en t ’ s w ai ver of procedu ral defaul t i s depen den ton its p u r p o r te d w a iv e ro f e x h a u s tio n , b o th p a r tie s h a v e b r ie fe dth a t is s u e in th e ir m a in b r ie fs , a n d w e w ill co n s id e rth e is s u e in o u r r e v ie w o f C a r ty ’ s a p p e a l. O t he r w i s e , i t is u n di s put e d t hat , a f t e rpr o m pt i ng byt he di s t r i c tc o ur t , t he gov er nm entas se r t ed pr oc edur aldefaul tand C ar t y r ec eived not i c e a nd had an o p p o r tu n ityto re s p o n d . Se e Mago u i rk v. Ph i l l i ps , 144 F . 3d 348 , 359 ( 5th C i r. 1 9 9 8 ). T h u s, j u ri sts of rea son cou l d n ot d eb a te th a t t h e sta te d i d n ot w a ive i ts

9 procedu raldefau l tdefen se. C art y ad di t i on al l y cl ai m s t h at she h ad show n cause an d actual prej u di ce t o e xc use herpr oc edur aldefaul tbe c ause t he st at e habeas cour tan d s t at e habe as cou n sel ag ree d to an ex ten d ed p eriod for fi l i n g h er claim s, a p eriod tha t t h e sta te h a b e a s co u r t t h e n d id n o t h o n o r . S ee generall y Colem an v. T

h ompson , 5 01 U . S. 72 2, 7 50 ( 19 91 ) (r e c o gni z i ng t he c aus e a nd a c t ualpr ej udi c e e xc e pt i o n) . The di st ri ctcourthel d that t h i s cl ai m , a tit s ba se, w as on e f or i n ef fect ive assi st an ce o f h a b e a s c o u n s e l. B e c a u s e C a r tys h o w e d n o re a s o n w h ya p p o in te d co u n s e l d id n otf i l e t h e cl ai m s i n her i n i t i alapp l i cat i on f or post - convic t i on rel i ef, t h e court c o n c lu d e d t h a t c a u s e d id n o t a p p ly . Se eRi e s v . Q uar t e r m an , 522 F. 3d 517, 526 n . 5 (5 th C ir . 200 8) ( “ [ I] n ef fect ive assi st an ce of st ate hab eas coun selcann ot provi de cau se t o excuse a procedu ral defaul t . ” ) . C art y h as provi ded no ba si s on w h ic h a ju r is t o f r e a s o n co u ld d e b a te th e d is tr ic t c o u r t’s co n c lu s io n . C a r tyfin a llycla im s th a t a fu n d a m e n ta l m is c a r r ia g e o f ju s tic e w ill re s u lt i f he rc l ai m s a r e pr o c e dur al l y de faul t e d b e c aus e o f he r“ ac t uali nno c e nc e o f t he21

dea t h pen al t y. ” C art y assert s t h at a f u n da m e nt alm i s c ar r i ag e of j u st i ce oc curred i n t he puni shm entphase of t r i al , butonl y i n suf f i c i entdept h re gar di ng t r i al c o u n s e l’ s a s s is ta n c e in p r e s e n tin gm itig a tin ge v id e n c e . See L oo k ingbi l lv. Co ck re ll , 29 3 F . 3 d 2 5 6 , 2 6 3 (5th C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) (“W h ere a h a b ea s p eti ti on er fail s to bri ef an argu m en tadeq u atel y, w e consi der i tw ai ve d .”) . M i t i gati on evi den ce c a n n o t b e th e b a s is o f a cla im o f a fu n d a m e n ta l m is c a r r ia g e o f ju s tic e . S ee S aw yer v. W

h i t ley , 505 U .S . 333 , 347 ( 199 2) ( “ [ T ] h e ‘ act u ali n n ocence’ requ i rem en tm u stf

ocus on those el em en t s t h at r en der a defenda n tel i gibl e f or t h e death p en al t y, an d n oton ad di t i on alm i t i gati n g evi den ce that w as preven t ed f r om be i ng i nt r oduc ed as a r es ul tof a c l ai m ed c ons t i t ut i onaler r or . ” ) . Cart y has aga i n provi ded no ba si s on w h i ch a ju ri stof reason coul d d ebate t h e di st ri ct c o u r t’s co n c lu s io n . B ec ause j uri st s of

r eas on c oul d notdeba t e t he di st r i c tc our t ’ s pro c edur al ru l i n gs , w e d en y C a rty’ s req u est for a C O Aon the ap p l i ca b i l i ty of exce p ti on s to p roce d u ra lde fau l t. I V . C ONC L US I ON F o rt h e a b o v e -d e s c r ib e d r e a s o n s , C a r ty ’ s m o tio n fo ra n a d d itio n a l C O Ais D E N IE D . H er r equ estf or or alargu m en ton th e c lai m s f or w h i ch the di st ri ct c o u r t is s u e d a C O Ais G R A N T E D , a n d w e re s e r v e o p in io n o n th o s e cla im s u n til a ft er or a larg u m en t.