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*********************************************** 
BRENDA MCLEOD v. A BETTER WAY

WHOLESALE AUTOS, INC.

(AC 38608)

DiPentima, C. J., and Prescott and Beach, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia,

breach of the implied warranty of merchantability in connection with

her purchase of an automobile from the defendant. The case was tried

to the court, and, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, the defendant moved

for a judgment of dismissal on all counts of the complaint, which the

trial court granted as to certain counts, including count one alleging

breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Thereafter, the defendant presented its evidence, and the trial court subsequently rendered

judgment for the plaintiff on counts one through four of the complaint,

from which the defendant appealed to this court. Subsequently, the

trial court granted the plaintiff’s motions for attorney’s fees, and the

defendant filed an amended appeal. On appeal, the defendant claimed,

inter alia, that the trial court improperly rendered judgment for the

plaintiff on count one because the court previously had dismissed that

count. The defendant also claimed that, in light of the trial court’s

dismissal of count one, the court improperly determined that the defendant had violated the Magnuson-Moss Act (15 U.S.C. § 2310 [d]), as

alleged in count two of the complaint, which violation was based on

the defendant’s alleged failure to comply with its obligations under the

implied warranty of merchantability. Held:

1. The trial court improperly rendered judgment for the plaintiff on count

one of the complaint; that court clearly and unequivocally rendered a

judgment of dismissal as to count one, and, once it did so, the count

was effectively removed from the case, and the court had no authority

to address the merits of that dismissed count in its final decision or to

award damages on the basis of the dismissed cause of action; moreover,

even though a trial court has the authority to correct clerical errors in

a prior judgment or to clarify or interpret an ambiguous judgment, the

trial court never indicated to the parties that it had determined that its

prior dismissal of count one was in error, and its subsequent ruling on

the merits could not be construed as an implicit reversal, sua sponte,

of its prior determination that the plaintiff had failed to present a prima

facie case on that count, as that could have unfairly prejudiced the

defendant, which did not have an opportunity to present evidence in

defense of that count, it having believed that it was dismissed.

2. The trial court improperly rendered judgment for the plaintiff on count

two of the complaint alleging a violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act:

because the plaintiff’s general theory of recovery with respect to count

two hinged on her state law claim in count one, which alleged a violation

of the implied warranty of merchantability, the court’s dismissal of count

one for failure to make out a prima facie case precluded any finding

that such a breach formed the basis of a violation of the MagnusonMoss Act; moreover, the court could not have found that the plaintiff

proved a violation of that act on the basis of its finding of a breach of

an express warranty, as alleged in count three of the complaint, because

the plaintiff never pleaded such a violation.

3. The trial court improperly awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees as a

component of damages under count two of the complaint for the defendant’s purported violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act, which contains

an express statutory exception to the general rule that a successful

party may not recover attorney’s fees and ordinary expenses of litigation

in the absence of a contractual or statutory exception; in light of this

court’s determination that the trial court improperly rendered judgment

for the plaintiff on count two, the plaintiff could not reasonably rely on

the express statutory grant of authority for attorney’s fees under the

Magnuson-Moss Act as a legal basis for upholding the trial court’s award

of attorney’s fees under that count.

4. The trial court’s finding that the defendant had committed fraud was
legally and logically correct and supported by the evidence; the court’s

finding that the defendant made a false statement by failing to disclose

an accurate odometer reading was supported by the evidence and was

not clearly erroneous, and the court properly found, on the basis of the

evidence presented and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, that

the mileage of the vehicle purchased by the plaintiff was not accurately

recorded by the defendant’s representatives, the recording failures were

a deliberate attempt to record lower mileage, that deceit and misrepresentation were to the detriment of the plaintiff because they impacted

her ability to take full advantage of the warranty period, the defendant’s

actions were intended to induce the plaintiff’s reliance on its representations, and the plaintiff purchased the vehicle believing the sale included

warranty coverage for 3000 miles, when in fact, due to the defendant’s

actions, the vehicle warranty would expire after fewer miles, lowering

the value of the vehicle and reducing the defendant’s potential liability

for repairs.

5. The trial court improperly awarded the plaintiff punitive damages of

$15,000 under count four, which alleged fraud; the court failed to explain

the factual basis for its award and had no evidence before it regarding

the plaintiff’s total litigation expenses, as the plaintiff had submitted an

affidavit from her attorney claiming attorney’s fees of nearly $7000 but

did not provide any evidence from which the court reasonably could

have inferred an additional $8000 in nontaxable costs, and, although

some award of punitive damages was permissible in conjunction with

the fraud count, a new hearing was necessary to determine the actual

amount of the plaintiff’s litigation expenses, which, in addition to reasonable attorney’s fees, would include other nontaxable costs.

Argued April 10—officially released October 24, 2017

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of

the implied warranty of merchantability, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury and tried to the court, Brazzel-Massaro, J.; thereafter, the court granted in part the

defendant’s motion for a judgment of dismissal and

rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which the

defendant appealed to this court; subsequently, the

court, Brazzel-Massaro, J., granted the plaintiff’s

motions for attorney’s fees, and the defendant filed an

amended appeal. Vacated in part; reversed in part;

judgment directed; further proceedings.

Kenneth A. Votre, for the appellant (defendant).

Louis E. Faiella, with whom, on the brief, was Scott

Jackson, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. In this action for damages arising out

of the purchase of a used automobile, the defendant,

A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc., appeals, following

a trial to the court, from the judgment rendered in favor

of the plaintiff, Brenda McLeod, on counts one through

four of her six count complaint.1 Counts one through

four alleged, respectively, that the defendant breached

the implied warranty of merchantability, violated the

Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission

Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss Act), 15 U.S.C.

§ 2301 et seq., breached an express statutory warranty,

and committed common-law fraud. In total, the court

awarded the plaintiff $5435 in actual damages, $15,000

in punitive damages, and $7045.35 in attorney’s fees.

The defendant claims on appeal that the court improperly (1) determined that the defendant had breached

the implied warranty of merchantability as alleged in

count one because that count previously had been dismissed along with counts five and six at the close of

the plaintiff’s case-in-chief pursuant to Practice Book

§ 15-8; (2) determined that the defendant had violated

15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d) of the Magnuson-Moss Act, despite

the plaintiff’s having pleaded that the alleged violation

arose from the defendant’s breach of the implied warranty of merchantability as alleged in count one, which

the court had dismissed because the plaintiff had failed

to establish a prima facie case; (3) awarded the plaintiff

attorney’s fees; (4) determined that the defendant committed common-law fraud without clear and convincing

evidence of either a false statement or intent to defraud;

and (5) awarded the plaintiff punitive damages on the

fraud count.2 We agree with the defendant as to all but

the fourth claim and, accordingly, reverse in part the

judgment of the court and remand the case with direction to render judgment in accordance with this opinion

and for a new hearing in damages. We otherwise affirm

the court’s judgment.

The following facts, as found by the court, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claims on appeal. The plaintiff lived in Waterbury

and commuted to work in Monroe. In September, 2012,

she determined that she needed a more reliable automobile, and she visited the defendant’s used car dealership

and met with one of its sales representatives. During

that first visit, she expressed an interest in buying a

Jeep that she saw on the sales lot and provided a $500

deposit to hold the vehicle. She returned to the dealership on October 1, 2012, and looked at other vehicles.

On that date, she test-drove a 2008 Saab. She expressed

her interest in purchasing the Saab and changed her

deposit to that vehicle. A retail purchase order was

completed and signed by the plaintiff on October 1,

2012. The purchase order indicated that the mileage on

the Saab’s odometer was 65,738.
The vehicle was serviced by the defendant on October

5, 2012. At that time, a repair order was completed that

listed the vehicle’s mileage as 65,743.

The plaintiff returned to the defendant’s business on

October 10, 2012—this time with her fiance ́. They testdrove the Saab for a second time. After the plaintiff

indicated that she wanted to purchase the Saab, the

defendant prepared the necessary paperwork, which

included an invoice, loan documents, registration, an

odometer statement, and a new retail purchase order

listing the total cash price for the vehicle as $16,267.67.

The October 10, 2012 odometer statement indicated that

the Saab had 65,738 miles. That mileage was identical

to the odometer reading listed on the October 1, 2012

retail purchase order, despite the additional test drive

that occurred on October 10, 2012. The mileage was

also less than the mileage recorded on the October 5,

2012 repair order.

The plaintiff finalized the purchase and took possession of the Saab on October 17, 2012. When she returned

that day, she noted that the car had been returned to

the sales lot rather than placed in a secure location. Her

understanding was that the vehicle would be separated

from other inventory so that it would not be test-driven

by other potential customers. She noticed that the Saab

had additional miles on the odometer since she first

expressed her interest in purchasing it.3 The defendant

did not prepare a new odometer reading on October

17, 2012, when the plaintiff completed the purchase

documents and accepted delivery of the Saab. Included

among the various purchase documents was a limited

express warranty, mandated by statute, covering specified parts for sixty days or 3000 miles, whichever

occurred first.4 See General Statutes § 42-221 (b). The

warranty, which was dated October 17, 2012, did not

contain a specific odometer reading. In fact, none of the

purchase documents indicated the odometer reading

as of October 17, 2012, the day of delivery. Although

the plaintiff noted a chemical smell coming from the

vehicle that day, she was told that this would burn off.

On Friday, December 7, 2012, during her commute

to work, the plaintiff began experiencing problems with

the vehicle’s operation. The next day, she called the

defendant to alert it to the problems and, later that same

day, brought the vehicle to the defendant’s business. A

representative of the defendant drove the vehicle to

determine if there was a problem, but the plaintiff was

told that the service department was not open on that

Saturday and that she needed to return with the vehicle

at a later date. No paperwork was completed by the

defendant on that date to memorialize the nature of the

plaintiff’s complaint, the condition of the vehicle, or

the vehicle’s mileage as of that date.

The plaintiff returned with the vehicle on the follow-
ing Monday, December 10, 2012. At that time, a repair

order was completed. Although the typed portion of

the repair order form indicated that the ‘‘current mileage’’ was 65,743, in the next box designating ‘‘mileage

out,’’ there is a handwritten indication that the mileage

was 68,931. The form also listed incorrectly the ‘‘delivery date’’ as October 3, 2012. Handwritten notes on the

form indicated ‘‘needs engine’’ and estimated repairs

totaling $5000.

At some point, the defendant informed the plaintiff

that the vehicle would need a new engine and that the

repairs would not be covered by her warranty because

the car was 188 miles over the mileage warranty limit

of 3000 miles. The defendant attempted to convince the

plaintiff to enter into a new contract with it to replace

the vehicle. The plaintiff retained counsel, who, on April

9, 2013, sent a letter to the defendant revoking acceptance of the vehicle and demanding that the defendant

return all moneys paid in connection with the purchase

of the Saab. The plaintiff filed the present action on

January 31, 2014, challenging, inter alia, the defendant’s

denial of her warranty claim.

The complaint contained six counts. Count one

alleged a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and asserted that the vehicle was not in merchantable condition when sold to the plaintiff and was

not fit for the ordinary purpose for which a car is used.

See General Statutes § 42a-2-314 (1) (‘‘[u]nless excluded

or modified as provided by section 42a-2-316, a warranty

that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a

contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with

respect to goods of that kind’’).

Count two alleged a violation of the Magnuson-Moss

Act. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the vehicle

was a consumer product as defined by the act and that

the defendant, as a warrantor under the act, had ‘‘failed

to comply with its obligations under the implied warranty of merchantability’’ and, thus, was liable to her

for ‘‘her damages, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs

pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d).’’5

(Emphasis added.)

Count three alleged a violation of the express warranty, in accordance with § 42-221, that she was provided at the time of the sale.6

In particular, she claimed

that the vehicle had been sold with the statutorily

required warranty that it would be mechanically operational and sound for at least sixty days or 3000 miles,

and that she possessed and controlled the vehicle for

less than sixty days and operated the vehicle for less

than 3000 miles at the time she reported her operational

problems to the defendant.

Count four alleged that the defendant committed

fraud by registering the sale of the vehicle to her with

the Department of Motor Vehicles using an odometer

reading that was significantly lower than the actual
odometer reading on the vehicle as of the date of delivery. The defendant allegedly then used that fraudulently

disclosed odometer reading to deny her claim for

repairs under the warranty.

Count five alleged that she had ‘‘justifiably and effectively’’ revoked her acceptance of the Saab on April 9,

2013, and that the defendant had refused to return all

amounts paid by the plaintiff. See General Statutes

§ 42a-2-608.7

Finally, count six alleged that the defendant’s actions

violated the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act

(CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. According

to the plaintiff, the defendant had engaged in unfair

and deceptive acts or practices by, inter alia, committing fraud with respect to the odometer readings and

then using that fraud to deny the plaintiff warranty

coverage; failing to abide by any implied warranties;

and failing to recognize the plaintiff’s revocation of

acceptance. In addition to damages, the plaintiff sought

attorney’s fees, costs, and punitive damages pursuant

to CUTPA.

The matter was tried to the court, Brazzel-Massaro,

J., on September 16, 2015. At the close of the plaintiff’s

case, the defendant moved for a judgment of dismissal

as to all counts of the complaint on the ground that

the plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case.

See Practice Book § 15-8.8

With respect to count one, the defendant argued that

in order to prove a breach of the implied warranty of

merchantability, the plaintiff needed to have produced

some evidence that the vehicle was not in a merchantable condition at the time the vehicle was sold to her.

According to the defendant, the only evidence before

the court demonstrated that the vehicle was in proper

working condition when it was sold and that it was

utilized thereafter by the plaintiff, without difficulties,

for a considerable period of time.

As to count two alleging a violation of the MagnusonMoss Act, the defendant argued that the act was

designed primarily to ensure that warranties were properly disclosed and explained to consumers, and that

the plaintiff had presented no evidence demonstrating

any disparity or disagreement as to the terms of the

express warranty at issue in the present case, which

was disclosed in writing to the plaintiff.

The defendant initially argued that there was no evidence presented that the defendant had breached the

express warranty as alleged in count three because the

only credible evidence presented demonstrated that the

vehicle had been driven more than 3000 miles at the

time it was presented for warranty repairs. The defendant later conceded, however, that the evidence the

plaintiff had presented thus far may have been sufficient

to raise a factual dispute regarding that issue.
According to the defendant, the plaintiff also had

failed to produce any evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, demonstrating that the defendant misrepresented a material fact or had the necessary intent

to support the allegation of fraud in count four.

Regarding the fifth count alleging a revocation of

acceptance, the defendant argued that this claim failed

as a matter of law because the evidence presented demonstrated that the purported revocation was not made

within a reasonable period of time. Specifically, the

revocation was made via an April, 2013 letter, which

was six months after the vehicle was delivered to the

plaintiff and four months after the warranty dispute

arose.

Finally, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had

failed to establish a prima facie case of a CUTPA violation as alleged in count six. The defendant again noted

that the plaintiff had failed to present any evidence

rising to the level of fraud, which it claimed was the

only stated basis in the complaint for the CUTPA count.

In response, the plaintiff argued that the court should

deny the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to all six

counts. The plaintiff first argued that she had presented

evidence that the vehicle needed a new engine to be

operable and that this was sufficient to move forward

on the claim of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, which requires that goods be fit for the

ordinary purpose for which they are sold. With respect

to the Magnuson-Moss count, the plaintiff argued that

it goes ‘‘hand in hand with the express warranty as

provided by state statute’’ and, thus, was directly linked

to the breach of the express warranty as alleged in count

three of the complaint. The plaintiff further argued that

she had established a prima facie case of breach of the

express warranty because, according to her testimony,

she had provided the defendant with notice of her warranty claim prior to its expiration, even if the vehicle

had been driven in excess of 3000 miles by the time

the vehicle was brought into the dealer to effectuate

the necessary repairs.9 With respect to the fraud count,

the plaintiff argued that she had established a prima

facie case on the basis of both the discrepancies in the

mileage recorded on the purchase paperwork and the

fact that the defendant tried to get her to spend more

money on a replacement vehicle without first informing

her that the repairs to the Saab fell outside the warranty

period. The plaintiff disagreed with the defendant that

her attempt to revoke the sale was not made within a

reasonable time after discovering the ground for revocation. Finally, the plaintiff essentially argued that her

CUTPA claim was not solely based upon fraud but upon

a multitude of unfair and deceptive practices by the

defendant and that the CUTPA count remained viable

on the basis of the evidence presented.
After hearing argument from the parties and considering a memorandum of law submitted by the defendant,

the court issued the following oral decision: ‘‘As to

count one, the court is going to dismiss count one. I

don’t think that the plaintiff has presented sufficient

evidence to indicate that there’s been any implied warranty of merchantability that has been in any way

proven by you. I do agree with defense counsel that I

think you needed more than just to say that the car

broke down. It was obviously working at the time. [The]

plaintiff testified that she took it for two test drives,

and it seemed to be fine, and everything was good

about it, had been through whatever mechanical work

it needed to have done in order to put it on the lots,

so there’s nothing to indicate that, in fact, that there

was at the time that she took it off the lot a problem

with the car.

‘‘The other counts do create some concern. And some

question I think is still left in the mind of the court as

to count[s] two, three, and four, how—so, I will not

grant the motion to dismiss as to each of those counts.

I think a lot of that has to do with the time period and

also what the miles were on the car. The court has

heard evidence which could be interpreted in many

ways as to what the mileage of the car was from the

time that she first picked it up on October 17 [2012]

until the first time at the dealer, which was December

the 10th—I’m sorry—December the 8th, when it was

actually driven by somebody, as the plaintiff has testified—I haven’t heard anything that would be contrary

to that—on December the 8th to the dealer. So, counts

two, three, and four, the court will not grant the motion

to dismiss.

‘‘I will grant the motion to dismiss as to the CUTPA

claim. I don’t think that there’s sufficient evidence to

rise to the level of a CUTPA claim—or, I’m sorry, that’s

count six as to the CUTPA claim—simply because the

car broke down at some point and there’s a question

about the warranty. I think that the level of evidence

that’s necessary in a CUTPA claim has not been satisfied

in this particular action.

‘‘As to count five regarding revocation of acceptance,

I noted that exhibit 3, which was provided to the court,

was actually a letter that was provided to her counsel

some months later to the dealer. There doesn’t seem

to be any evidence other than that there was a revocation of acceptance. In fact, they were in negotiations

going back and forth. I don’t think there was a revocation of acceptance. And I would grant the motion to

dismiss as to count five also.

‘‘So, what we have remaining is counts two, three,

and four of the complaint.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The defendant then proceeded to put on its evidence.

At the close of all evidence, the court instructed the
parties that it would accept simultaneous posttrial

briefs of ten pages or less on or before September 30,

2015. Each party submitted a memorandum of law on

that date. No motion for reconsideration ever was filed

regarding those counts of the complaint that were dismissed during the trial, nor did the court ever open,

vacate, or modify its judgment dismissing counts one,

five and six.

On October 30, 2015, the court issued a memorandum

of decision. After setting forth its factual findings, the

court first indicated that it had already ‘‘directed a verdict’’ as to counts five and six, and that the remaining

causes of action to be considered were those in counts

one through four. Although technically the court had

dismissed certain counts rather than having ‘‘directed

a verdict’’ for a particular party, the court’s failure to

recognize that it had already disposed of count one is

far more significant to our analysis, as we discuss in

parts I and II of this opinion.

The court next turned to a discussion of what it aptly

identified as the primary factual dispute in this case,

namely, whether the 3000 mile provision of the express

warranty had lapsed by the time the plaintiff sought

coverage under the warranty. The court determined,

on the basis of the paperwork that had been admitted

into evidence and the testimony of witnesses, that the

defendant had failed to document accurately the vehicle’s odometer readings throughout its dealings with

the plaintiff. The court noted that accurate odometer

readings were essential to evaluating warranty claims

and found that the lack of accurate documentation in

the present case was detrimental to the plaintiff’s ability

to establish her rights under the warranty. The court

thus resolved any factual dispute regarding mileage in

favor of the plaintiff. In particular, the court found that

the defendant’s errors regarding the odometer readings,

when coupled with the fact that the plaintiff was permitted to engage in additional and significant travel after

the defendant had received notice of a claimed defect

but prior to its evaluation of the vehicle, provided a

sufficient basis on which the court could ‘‘determine

that the plaintiff was within the warranty period and,

thus, there [was] a breach of warranty’’ by the defendant. The court stated: ‘‘Although the actions of the

defendant can be characterized as careless and sloppy,

they are also dishonest in that when the car left the

lot on October 17, 2012, the plaintiff was relying on a

warranty that was not appropriately calculated, and

the mileage was not accurately noted by the defendant

when she first brought the car to the defendant dealer

on December 8 or December 10, 2012.’’

The court then continued its analysis by turning to

a discussion of each of the purportedly unresolved

counts, stating: ‘‘Having determined that the plaintiff

was within the warranty period, the court examines the
claims.’’ With respect to count one alleging a breach of

the implied warranty of merchantability, which it had

already dismissed, the court found that the defendant

had sold the vehicle with an assurance of merchantability, and that it would not be expected that a vehicle

with a cash value of more than $16,000 would need a

new engine costing between $4000 and $5000. The court

found that the vehicle was not in merchantable condition because it was not fit for the ordinary purpose for

which it was intended, which the court identified as

‘‘normal and reliable driving to work and elsewhere.’’

The court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to

recover her actual damages, which the court calculated

to be ‘‘so much of the price as has been paid through

her trade-in allowance of $4500 and the additional costs

of $800 as the gap contract and title and government

license and registration fees of $135 for a total of

$5435 . . . .’’

Turning to count two, the court indicated that the

Magnuson-Moss Act permits a consumer to sue a warrantor for a breach of a written or implied warranty,

but creates no additional basis for liability, limiting

recovery to those damages existing under state law plus

reasonable attorney’s fees. In other words, the court

noted, claims under the Magnuson-Moss Act ‘‘stand or

fall with [the] express and implied warranty claims

under state law.’’ The court concluded that ‘‘based upon

the finding by the court that there is liability for breach

of warranty, the plaintiff is entitled to the $5435 actual

damages as awarded for the breach of warranty and

reasonable attorney’s fees . . . .’’

The court next awarded the plaintiff her actual damages of $5435 for violation of the express warranty as

alleged in count three. The court found that the plaintiff

had proven her cause of action because, as it already

determined, at the time the plaintiff submitted her

request for repairs, the vehicle had been driven less

than 3000 miles and, thus, remained under warranty.

Finally, as to the fraud allegations in count four, the

court also ruled in favor of the plaintiff. After setting

forth the elements of a cause of action sounding in

fraud and properly noting that fraud must be proven

by ‘‘ ‘clear and satisfactory’ ’’ evidence, the court stated:

‘‘In this action, the defendant was the party responsible

for recording accurately the odometer readings. The

testimony of [the defendant’s representative] is that

when repairs are done, the miles are first noted by the

service department in the [repair order]. This testimony

is not accurate, given the documents which the court

has earlier described as cookie cutter because it

appears that the numbers are not an accurate reflection

of the odometer, but are more a copying from

paperwork. The defendant provided the plaintiff with

the warranty not on October 10 but on October 17, 2012

when she came back to the dealer. Their failure to do
an actual reading with the warranty is not only sloppy

but can be viewed in no other way than as a deliberate

act to record lower miles knowing that the car has been

driven to emissions, for a number of test drives and

repair work. The statement of the mileage is not correct

based upon the testimony and the dealer’s records. It

must be known to the dealer when there has been no

change in the mileage although the car has been on the

lot presumably with test drives, servicing, and emissions testing that the readings should reflect these normal activities. The plaintiff relied upon the defendant

in establishing the base number for her warranty, and

there is no testimony that anyone ever looked specifically at the odometer to record the mileage (other than

possibly sometime after the plaintiff returned the second time for repairs), even for the mandated odometer reporting.

‘‘Therefore, the plaintiff has proven that the defendant’s actions were fraudulent in failing to properly

record the odometer readings, refuse warranty coverage, and attempt to have her enter into other purchase

contracts with the defendant to replace the car. These

acts demonstrate fraudulent misconduct in the form

of deceit and misrepresentation by the defendant and

impacted the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to

the actual damages of $5435 and punitive damages in

the amount of $15,000.’’ In summarizing its decision,

the court indicated that it was awarding the plaintiff

‘‘actual damages of $5435, punitive damages in the

amount of $15,000 and reasonable attorney fees in

accordance with count two to be awarded upon the

submission to the court of an affidavit filed by [the]

plaintiff’s counsel and the costs as submitted by the

plaintiff in the attachment to the memorandum dated

September 30, 2015.’’10

On November 6, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for

counsel fees, attached to which was an affidavit of

attorney’s fees in the amount of $6655.35. The plaintiff

also submitted a bill of costs totaling $668.58. On

November 18, 2015, the defendant filed an objection

challenging the reasonableness of the requested fees

and costs. That same day, the defendant timely filed

the present appeal from the court’s October 30, 2015

judgment.11

The court heard argument regarding attorney’s fees

on November 30, 2015, granted the plaintiff’s motion,

and overruled the defendant’s objection. The court further awarded the plaintiff additional attorney’s fees for

the time spent filing and arguing the postjudgment

motion. The plaintiff submitted a supplemental affidavit

of attorney’s fees later that day in the amount of $390,

which the court granted on December 14, 2015, bringing

the total award of attorney’s fees to $7045.35. The defendant amended this appeal on January 4, 2016, disputing

the award of attorney’s fees.
Before turning to the claims raised by the defendant,

it is important to take note of what has not been challenged by the defendant in the present appeal. In summarizing its arguments, the defendant suggests in its

brief that if this court were to rule in the defendant’s

favor as to all claims, we should reverse the court’s

judgment ‘‘in its entirety.’’ The defendant, however,

failed to advance or adequately brief any claims on

appeal regarding the court’s decision holding the defendant liable under count three of the complaint for

breach of the express statutory warranty and awarding

compensatory damages on that count in the amount of

$5435. Although the defendant states in its reply brief

that such a claim was ‘‘discussed at length’’ in its main

brief, there is no mention of this claim in the statement

of issues, and the only discussion resembling a challenge to the court’s finding of a breach of the express

warranty comes within the defendant’s discussion of

the Magnuson-Moss count and contains no legal citations or references to the record. Indeed, the plaintiff

did not brief issues related to the express warranty

count, presumably because she did not construe the

defendant’s brief on appeal as challenging the court’s

determination on that count. Accordingly, even if the

defendant were to prevail on all the claims raised and

briefed, the practical effect would not be a judgment

for the defendant ‘‘in its entirety,’’ but merely a potential

reduction in the overall damages award to $5435. Having noted the limits of this appeal, we turn to our discussion of the claims raised.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly

rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on count

one of the complaint alleging a breach of the implied

warranty of merchantability because the court previously had dismissed that count pursuant to Practice

Book § 15-8. We agree.

Whether the court properly rendered judgment on a

previously disposed count presents a question of law

over which we exercise plenary review. There is no

dispute that, after the plaintiff presented her evidence

at trial and rested, the defendant made an oral motion to

dismiss all counts of the complaint pursuant to Practice

Book § 15-8. ‘‘For the court to grant [a] motion [for

judgment of dismissal pursuant to Practice Book § 15-

8], it must be of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed

to make out a prima facie case. In testing the sufficiency

of the evidence, the court compares the evidence with

the allegations of the complaint. . . . In order to establish a prima facie case, the proponent must submit

evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish

the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove. . . .

[T]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken

as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to

[the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be
drawn in [the plaintiff’s] favor.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gambardella v. Apple

Health Care, Inc., 86 Conn. App. 842, 846, 863 A.2d

735 (2005).

Applying that standard in the present case, the court

clearly and unequivocally rendered a judgment of dismissal as to count one of the plaintiff’s complaint.12 The

court stated on the record: ‘‘As to count one, the court

is going to dismiss count one.’’ It also dismissed counts

five and six, indicating at the close of its oral decision

that ‘‘what we have remaining is counts two, three, and

four of the complaint.’’ The trial proceeded, therefore,

only as to those counts. In dismissing count one, the

court indicated: ‘‘I don’t think that the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to indicate that there’s been

any implied warranty of merchantability that has been

in any way proven by you.’’ Once the court had dismissed count one, it effectively was removed from the

case, and the court had no authority to address the

merits of that dismissed count in its final decision or

to award damages on the basis of that dismissed cause

of action.

It is true that a court has the authority, even sua

sponte, to correct clerical errors in a prior judgment

or to clarify or interpret an ambiguous judgment. Sanzo

v. Sanzo, 137 Conn. App. 216, 222 n.5, 48 A.3d 689

(2012). The court may also open a judgment, although

generally the court will not do so absent a motion by

a party. See Carabetta v. Carabetta, 133 Conn. App.

732, 735–36, 38 A.3d 163 (2012). If the court in the

present case determined that its prior dismissal of count

one was somehow in error and, thus, should be opened

and set aside, it never indicated this to the parties on

the record prior to rendering judgment. On the basis

of the record before us, we decline to construe the

court’s subsequent ruling on the merits as an implicit

reversal sua sponte of its prior determination that the

plaintiff had failed to present a prima facie case. Doing

so here would unfairly prejudice the defendant, which

never had an opportunity to present its own evidence

in defense of count one, believing it was dismissed.

The only argument made by the plaintiff in response

to this claim is that any mistake by the court in ruling

on count one is harmless because the court awarded

the same measure of damages with respect to count

three of the complaint alleging breach of the express

warranty. That does not justify or excuse the error, and

speaks only to the damages awarded, not the finding

of liability. Simply put, any judgment rendered on the

merits of a previously dismissed count, in the absence

of any proper restorative action, amounts to reversible

error. The judgment for the plaintiff on count one,

accordingly, is vacated.

II
Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly

determined that the defendant had violated the Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d), because the plaintiff

had pleaded in count two of the complaint that the

Magnuson-Moss violation was the result of the defendant’s failure to comply with its obligations under the

implied warranty of merchantability. It argues that any

judgment for the plaintiff on count two, therefore, was

logically incongruous with the court’s dismissal of

count one, which alleged a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. We agree.

‘‘Magnuson-Moss, enacted by Congress in 1975, is not

limited in its application to the sale of automobiles but

applies to consumer products in general. It does not

require that warranty be given, but if there is a written

warranty, Magnuson-Moss imposes certain requirements as to its contents, disclosures, and the effect

of extending a written warranty.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)

Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 294, 312–13,

503 N.E.2d 760 (1986). A Magnuson-Moss Act violation

may be premised upon either the breach of an express

or implied warranty or both. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d)

(1) (2012); see also Sandoval v. PharmaCare US, Inc.,

145 F. Supp. 3d 986, 998 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (explaining

Magnuson-Moss ‘‘allows consumers to enforce written

and implied warranties in federal court, borrowing state

law causes of action’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). If a Magnuson-Moss claim is premised solely upon

a state law warranty claim, the Magnuson-Moss claim

will ‘‘stand or fall’’ with the state law claims. Clemens

v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 and n.3

(9th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we must first look to the

pleadings to decide the scope of the plaintiff’s Magnuson-Moss claim in the present case and whether the

defendant was entitled to judgment on that count

because of the dismissal of the associated state law

claim.

‘‘The interpretation of pleadings is always a question

of law for the court . . . . [W]e long have eschewed the

notion that pleadings should be read in a hypertechnical

manner. Rather, [t]he modern trend, which is followed

in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and

realistically, rather than narrowly and technically. . . .

[T]he complaint must be read in its entirety in such a

way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to

the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do

substantial justice between the parties. . . . Our reading of pleadings in a manner that advances substantial

justice means that a pleading must be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means, but carries with

it the related proposition that it must not be contorted

in such a way so as to strain the bounds of rational

comprehension. . . . Although essential allegations

may not be supplied by conjecture or remote implication . . . the complaint must be read in its entirety in
such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded,

and do substantial justice between the parties. . . . As

long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the

facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not

surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not

conclude that the complaint is insufficient to allow

recovery.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation,

306 Conn. 523, 536–37, 51 A.3d 367 (2012).

Turning to the complaint in the present case, we

note that count one alleged a violation of the implied

warranty of merchantability as expressed in this state’s

Uniform Commercial Code, General Statutes § 42a-2-

314. Count two, alleging a violation under the Magnuson-Moss Act, immediately followed and incorporated

the allegations of count one. After alleging facts necessary to invoke the protection of the federal statute, the

plaintiff alleged: ‘‘[The] defendant failed to comply with

its obligations under the implied warranty of merchantability, and it is liable to the plaintiff for her damages,

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 15

U.S.C. § 2310 (d).’’ Thus, the reasonable and rational

construction of that count is that the plaintiff’s general

theory of recovery with respect to the Magnuson-Moss

count hinged upon the state law claim in count one,

which alleged a violation of the implied warranty of

merchantability. Although, on appeal, the plaintiff

attempts to shift the focus away from the breach of

implied warranty count and to tie the Magnuson-Moss

allegations to its claim of a breach of the express warranty, there is simply no support for that in the

pleadings.

The breach of express warranty claim is found in

count three of the complaint. That count, however, does

not incorporate any of the allegations set forth in count

one or two, and makes no mention of a violation of the

Magnuson-Moss Act. There are simply no allegations

set forth in count three that would have alerted the

court or the defendant that the plaintiff was alleging a

Magnuson-Moss violation on the basis of the breach of

express warranty count, which, up to that point in the

complaint, had not yet been pleaded. Having elected to

hinge its allegations of a Magnuson-Moss violation to

the breach of implied warranty claim asserted in count

one, the success or failure of the counts are inextricably tied.

In its memorandum of decision, the court summarily

found for the plaintiff on the Magnuson-Moss count on

the basis of its finding ‘‘that there is liability for breach

of warranty . . . .’’ Although this finding immediately

followed its ruling regarding the breach of the implied

warranty of merchantability, the court did not clearly

identify whether it was referring to that finding or to

its later holding that the defendant breached the express
written warranty as alleged in count three. It is, however, unnecessary to resolve this ambiguity because the

ruling would be improper under either scenario.

As we have explained, to the extent that the Magnuson-Moss Act violation found by the court was tied to

the alleged breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the court’s dismissal of the implied warranty

count for failure to make out a prima facie case should

have precluded any finding that such a breach formed

the basis for a Magnuson-Moss Act violation. On the

other hand, if the court intended to hold that the plaintiff

proved a Magnuson-Moss violation on the basis of its

finding of a breach of the express warranty, that determination would be improper because the plaintiff never

pleaded such a violation. See Brochu v. Brochu, 13

Conn. App. 681, 684, 538 A.2d 1093 (1988) (‘‘[i]t is fundamental in our law that the right of a plaintiff to recover

is limited to the allegations of his complaint’’ [internal

quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, we agree with

the defendant that the court improperly ruled in favor

of the plaintiff on count two, and that portion of the

judgment is reversed.

III

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees in addition to compensatory damages. The defendant argues that the

plaintiff was not entitled to recover her attorney’s fees

as a matter of law and that the amount of attorney’s

fees was unreasonable. We agree that the plaintiff was

not entitled to recover attorney’s fees.

‘‘Ordinarily, we review the trial court’s decision to

award attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion. . . . This

standard applies to the amount of fees awarded . . .

and also to the trial court’s determination of the factual

predicate justifying the award. . . . [If], however, a

damages award is challenged on the basis of a question

of law, our review is plenary.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chicago Title Ins. Co. v.

Accurate Title Searches, Inc., 173 Conn. App. 463, 496,

164 A.3d 682 (2017).

‘‘The general rule of law known as the American

rule is that attorney’s fees and ordinary expenses and

burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful

party absent a contractual or statutory exception. . . .

This rule is generally followed throughout the country.

. . . Connecticut adheres to the American rule. . . .

There are few exceptions. For example, a specific contractual term may provide for the recovery of attorney’s

fees and costs . . . or a statute may confer such

rights.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) ACMAT Corp. v. Greater New York Mutual

Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 576, 582, 923 A.2d 697 (2007).

In the present case, the court’s award of attorney’s

fees was a component of the damages for the purported
Magnuson-Moss Act violation as alleged in count two.

That act contains an express statutory exception to

the American rule. See Chrysler Corp. v. Maiocco, 209

Conn. 579, 588, 552 A.2d 1207 (1989) (‘‘Magnuson-Moss

[Act] gives authority to the court to grant attorney’s

fees in a civil suit’’).13

Because we have determined in part II of this opinion,

however, that the court improperly rendered judgment

in favor of the plaintiff on count two, the plaintiff cannot

reasonably rely upon that statutory grant of authority

as a legal basis for upholding the court’s award of attorney’s fees with respect to count two. Further, attorney’s

fees also may be awarded at the discretion of the court

for a CUTPA violation, the court dismissed that count

of the complaint. The plaintiff has not cited in her brief

to this court any alternative statutory or common-law

basis for an award of attorney’s fees with respect to

count two. Accordingly, the court’s award of attorney’s

fees must be set aside. Because we determine that the

court improperly awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff

as a matter of law, at this juncture, we need not reach

the defendant’s additional argument that the amount of

attorney’s fees awarded by the court was unreasonable.

IV

The defendant next claims that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the defendant committed fraud

because the plaintiff failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made a false representation or had the requisite intent to defraud the plaintiff.

We are not persuaded.

‘‘Under the common law . . . it is well settled that

the essential elements of fraud are: (1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) it was untrue

and known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it

was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and

(4) the other party did so act upon that false representation to his injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Leonard v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 264

Conn. 286, 296, 823 A.2d 1184 (2003). ‘‘It is well established that common law fraud must be proven by a

higher standard than a fair preponderance of the evidence. This middle tier standard has been described as

‘clear and satisfactory evidence’ and as ‘clear, precise

and unequivocal evidence.’ ’’ (Footnote omitted.) Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 219 Conn. 314, 327–28, 593 A.2d

478 (1991); see also Wieselman v. Hoeniger, 103 Conn.

App. 591, 595 n.7, 930 A.2d 768 (2007) (describing burden of proof in common-law fraud cases as requiring

‘‘clear and convincing evidence’’), cert. denied, 284

Conn. 930, 934 A.2d 245 (2007).

‘‘Fraud and misrepresentation cannot be easily

defined because they can be accomplished in so many

different ways. They present, however, issues of fact.

. . . The trier of facts is the judge of the credibility of
the testimony and of the weight to be accorded it. . . .

When the trial court finds that a plaintiff has proven

all of the essential elements of fraud, its decision will

not be reversed or modified unless it is clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the

record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence

is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . . [A]s a reviewing court

[w]e must defer to the trier of fact’s assessment of the

credibility of the witnesses that is made on the basis

of its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor

and attitude. . . . The weight to be given to the evidence and to the credibility of witnesses is solely within

the determination of the trier of fact. . . . In reviewing

factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to

determine whether the [court] could have reached a

conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead,

we make every reasonable presumption . . . in favor

of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Roll-A-Cover, LLC,

131 Conn. App. 443, 449–51, 27 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 303

Conn. 915, 33 A.3d 739 (2011).

In reviewing whether a plaintiff has proven her case

by clear and convincing evidence, we are cognizant that

the trier of fact ‘‘may draw reasonable, logical inferences from the facts proven as long as [it does] not

resort to speculation and conjecture. . . . Insofar as

circumstantial evidence can be and is routinely used

to meet the higher standard of proof in a criminal prosecution, so can it be used in a case . . . [in which]

the applicable standard is that of clear and convincing

proof.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added.)In re Juvenile Appeal (85-2), 3 Conn. App. 184, 193, 485 A.2d

1362 (1985). With these principles in mind, we turn to

the defendant’s arguments.

The defendant first argues that the court improperly

found that the defendant made a false statement by

failing to disclose an accurate odometer reading

because the court had no evidence before it from which

to determine the vehicle’s true mileage either at the

time of sale or when the vehicle was delivered. Accordingly, the defendant argues, there was no evidence to

refute the mileage as stated on the sales agreement or

the odometer statement. We disagree and conclude that

the court’s finding is supported by evidence in the

record and, thus, is not clearly erroneous.

Although the defendant is correct that, in her testimony at trial, the plaintiff could not recall the precise

odometer readings she had observed, she did testify

that the odometer reading at the time of delivery on

October 17, 2012, was higher than what she observed

when test-driving the vehicle. The court was entitled
to credit that testimony. The court also had evidence

that the same mileage number was recorded on documents despite the reasonable inference that the mileage

should have increased as a result of subsequent test

drives by the plaintiff and by the defendant’s service

department.

The defendant also argues that there was no evidence

from which the court could have found that the defendant intended to induce the plaintiff to rely upon the

inaccurately recorded mileage in order to influence her

decision to purchase the Saab. We disagree.

The court found, on the basis of the evidence presented and its assessments of the credibility of the

witnesses, including its negative view of the testimony

provided by the defendant’s service department representative, that the vehicle’s mileage was not accurately

recorded by the defendant’s representatives on

paperwork. Rather, the court found that the mileage

was simply carried over in ‘‘cookie cutter’’ fashion from

one document to another. The court also found that

the defendant’s recording failures were not merely

sloppy but a deliberate attempt to record lower mileage,

and that this deceit and misrepresentation were done

to the detriment of the plaintiff because they impacted

her ability to take full advantage of the warranty period.

In considering whether there was clear and convincing

evidence of fraud, the court, as the trier of fact, was

permitted to draw reasonable inferences, including that

the defendant’s actions were intended to induce the

plaintiff’s reliance upon its representations and that

she purchased the vehicle believing the sale included

warranty coverage for 3000 miles, when in fact, due to

the defendant’s actions, the vehicle warranty would

expire after fewer miles, lowering the value of the vehicle and reducing the defendant’s potential liability for

repairs.14

We conclude, on the basis of our review of the record,

including the court’s memorandum of decision, that the

court’s determination that the defendant engaged in

fraud was legally and logically correct and supported

by the evidence adduced at trial. The defendant’s claim

to the contrary, therefore, fails.

V

Finally, the defendant claims that the court improperly awarded the plaintiff punitive damages of $15,000.

We agree.

‘‘Punitive damages may be awarded upon a showing

of fraud.’’ Plikus v. Plikus, 26 Conn. App. 174, 180,

599 A.2d 392 (1991). Common-law punitive damages,

however, are limited under well established Connecticut law ‘‘to litigation expenses, such as attorney’s fees,

less taxable costs.’’ Hylton v. Gunter, 313 Conn. 472,

484, 97 A.3d 970 (2014).

In the present case, the court awarded $15,000 in
punitive damages under the fraud count without

explaining the factual basis for that order. The court

had no evidence before it regarding the total litigation

expenses of the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff had submitted an affidavit from the plaintiff’s attorney claiming

attorney’s fees of nearly $7000, the plaintiff did not

provide any evidence from which the court reasonably

could have inferred an additional $8000 in nontaxable

costs. In other words, there is simply no evidentiary or

legal basis supporting the court’s award of $15,000 in

punitive damages. Accordingly, although we conclude

that some award of punitive damages was permissible

in conjunction with the fraud count, a new hearing in

damages is necessary to determine the actual amount

of the plaintiff’s litigation expenses, which, in addition

to reasonable attorney’s fees, will include other nontaxable costs.

The judgment is vacated as to count one and reversed

as to count two, including the award of attorney’s fees,

and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of the defendant as to those counts; the

award of punitive damages in connection with count

four is vacated and the case is remanded with direction

to conduct a new hearing in damages consistent with

this opinion; the judgment is affirmed in all other

respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The court previously dismissed counts five and six, which alleged a

revocation of acceptance and a violation of the state’s unfair trade practices

act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The plaintiff has not appealed or

cross appealed from the court’s judgment of dismissal.

2 For clarity and ease of analysis, we address the defendant’s claims in

an order different from how they were presented in the defendant’s brief.

3 The plaintiff never provided any testimony quantifying how many additional miles she believed the vehicle had been driven.

4 Although the court states at several points in its memorandum of decision

that the express warranty had a durational term of three months, that finding

is not supported by the record, including the exhibit cited by the court.

That discrepancy, however, had no bearing on the court’s analysis or on

our review on appeal.

5 Section 2310 (d) of title 15 of the 2012 edition of the United States Code

provides in relevant part: ‘‘(1) . . . a consumer who is damaged by the

failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any

obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty,

or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief—

‘‘(A) in any court of competent jurisdiction in any State . . . .

‘‘(2) If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought under paragraph

(1) of this subsection, he may be allowed by the court to recover as part

of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses

(including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended) determined by

the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action, unless the

court in its discretion shall determine that such an award of attorneys’ fees

would be inappropriate. . . .’’

6 General Statutes § 42-221 (b) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Each contract

entered into by a dealer for the sale of a used motor vehicle which has a

cash purchase price of five thousand dollars or more shall include an express

warranty, covering the full cost of both parts and labor, that the vehicle is

mechanically operational and sound and will remain so for at least sixty

days or three thousand miles of operation, whichever period ends first, in

the absence of damage resulting from an automobile accident or from misuse

of the vehicle by the consumer. . . .’’
7 General Statutes § 42a-2-608 (2) sets forth the conditions that must be

met before a revocation of acceptance following the discovery of a defect

will be valid, including that a revocation is not effective until ‘‘the buyer

notifies the seller of it’’ and that such a revocation must be made ‘‘within

a reasonable time’’ after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the

defect at issue.

8 Practice Book § 15-8 provides: ‘‘If, on the trial of any issue of fact in a

civil matter tried to the court, the plaintiff has produced evidence and rested,

a defendant may move for judgment of dismissal, and the judicial authority

may grant such motion if the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie

case. The defendant may offer evidence in the event the motion is not

granted, without having reserved the right to do so and to the same extent

as if the motion had not been made.’’

‘‘A prima facie case . . . is one sufficient to raise an issue to go to the

trier of fact. . . . In order to establish a prima facie case, the proponent

must submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact

or facts which it is adduced to prove.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Chen v. Hopkins School, Inc., 148 Conn. App. 543, 548, 86 A.3d 482 (2014).

9 The plaintiff’s theory, in part, is that the defendant was on notice of her

warranty claim when she first brought the vehicle into the dealership on

Saturday, December 8, 2012, but was told the repair shop was closed, a fact

disputed by the defendant. According to the plaintiff, the car was under the

mileage limit on Saturday, but she added more than 200 miles commuting

back and forth to work before the car could be seen by the defendant the

following Monday.

10 The record before us does not contain a bill of costs attached to the

plaintiff’s posttrial memorandum.

11 We note that, in Paranteau v. DeVita, 208 Conn. 515, 544 A.2d 634

(1988), our Supreme Court adopted a ‘‘bright-line rule’’; id., 522; that ‘‘a

judgment on the merits is final for purposes of appeal even though the

recoverability or amount of attorney’s fees for the litigation remains to be

determined.’’ Id., 523.

12 ‘‘A motion for judgment of dismissal has replaced the former motion

for nonsuit for failure to make out a prima facie case.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 391, 734 A.2d 535

(1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187, 120 S. Ct. 1239, 146 L. Ed. 2d 99 (2000).

The remedy afforded in response to a successful motion brought pursuant

to Practice Book § 15-8 is accordingly more akin to a directed judgment on

the merits in favor of the proponent of the motion. Although it appears to

be somewhat of a misnomer to call the resulting judgment a judgment of

dismissal, we use that terminology nevertheless because it comports with

the language used in our rules of practice.

13 Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d) (2) provides in relevant part that a

prevailing plaintiff ‘‘may be allowed by the court to recover as part of the

judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court

to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with

the commencement and prosecution of such action, unless the court in its

discretion shall determine that such an award of attorneys’ fees would

be inappropriate.’’

14 To the extent that the defendant’s arguments can be construed as challenging whether the court had sufficient evidence from which to find that

the plaintiff purchased the vehicle in reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations, we deem any such claim abandoned for lack of adequate briefing.

‘‘We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges

to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed. . . . The parties may

not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between

the facts of the case and the law cited. . . . [A]ssignments of error which

are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will

be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Clelford v. Bristol, 150 Conn. App. 229, 233, 90

A.3d 998 (2014).