Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1707-JT-1633 |December 13, 2017 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Shannon Mears 

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of: J.F., Minor 

Child, and 

J.F., Father

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 13, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1707-JT-1633

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Marilyn A.

Moores, Judge

The Honorable Larry Bradley, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D09-1611-JT-1166

Brown, Judge.
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[1] Jo.F. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights with 

respect to J.F. Father raises three issues which we consolidate and restate as 

whether the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] J.F. was born on March 18, 2014. On March 25, 2014, Father was charged 

with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a class B 

felony under cause number 49G21-1403-FB-15454 (“Cause No. 454”) for 

knowingly or intentionally possessing a handgun on or about February 20, 

2014.1In October 2015, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) 

removed J.F. from the care of his mother. In November 2015, DCS alleged 

that J.F. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Following a factfinding 

hearing in February 2016 at which Father failed to appear and Mother admitted 

J.F. was a CHINS, the court found in part that Father was incarcerated and 

unavailable to parent his child and adjudicated J.F. to be a CHINS. The court’s 

February 2016 dispositional order provided that the permanency plan for J.F. at 

the time was reunification with her parents and ordered Father to contact DCS 

within seventy-two hours of his release from incarceration. In June 2016,

Father entered a plea agreement in Cause No. 454, and the trial court entered a 

judgment of conviction and sentenced him to ten years with four years executed 

 

1

Father had been previously convicted of burglary as a class B felony in 2009. Family case manager Alicia 

Parker testified that to her knowledge Father was incarcerated in March 2014.
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at the Department of Correction (“DOC”).2 The court entered a permanency 

hearing order on November 4, 2016, which stated that J.F.’s mother had signed 

an adoption consent, that Father was incarcerated and at the prior hearing had 

indicated he wanted to sign a consent, that J.F. was doing well in the care of 

her maternal grandmother, and that the guardian ad litem was in agreement 

with the plan changing to adoption. 

[3] On November 22, 2016, DCS filed a petition for involuntary termination of the 

parent-child relationship of Father and J.F. An entry dated March 9, 2017, in 

the chronological case summary (“CCS”) in Cause No. 454 indicates the court 

entered an “Order to Release From Custody To Be Held For Other Agency” 

and indicates “Community Correction Staff.” Petitioner’s Exhibit 7 at 13. 

Another entry on March 9, 2017, stated in part “Continue on Community 

Corrections Work Release with Strict Compliance.” Id. Father did not contact 

DCS upon his release from incarceration. The CCS in Cause No. 454 includes 

an entry on March 31, 2017, stating that community corrections filed a 

violation against Father; entries on April 3, 2017, stating that an arrest warrant 

was issued and served; and an entry on April 17, 2017, stating “Amended 

Disposition on Violation/Noncompliance,” “Confinement to Commence 

 

2 The trial court’s June 2016 Order of Judgment of Conviction and Sentence under Cause No. 454 states that 

Father received a total sentence of ten years, a total executed sentence of six years, four years of which was 

ordered executed at the DOC and two years of which was ordered to be served as a community corrections 

placement, and a suspended sentence of four years. An abstract of judgment and the chronological case 

summary in that cause state that Father received a total sentence of ten years, an executed sentence of eight 

years, four years of which was ordered to be served in the DOC and four years of which would be served as a 

community corrections placement, and a suspended sentence of two years. 
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04/13/2017 Indiana Department of Correction,” “Term: 10 Yr,” “Jail Credit: 

1107,” and “Suspended: 2 Yr.” Id. at 15. 

[4] On June 21, 2017, the trial court held a termination hearing at which Father 

was not present and the court heard testimony from J.F.’s maternal 

grandmother, family case manager Alicia Parker (“FCM Parker”), and 

guardian ad litem Tanya Dixson-Jones (“GAL Dixson-Jones”). FCM Parker 

testified that J.F. was three years old, that the court entered a dispositional 

order in February 2016 after J.F. was adjudicated a CHINS, that no services 

were ordered for Father at the time because he was incarcerated, that to her 

knowledge Father was initially incarcerated in March 2014, and that there was 

a brief time in which he was released to work release. FCM Parker indicated 

that Father had made no efforts to participate in the case and that there was no 

documentation that he made contact with DCS. She testified that J.F. was 

born in March 2014, was removed from her mother’s care in October 2015, has 

never returned to the care of either of her parents, was currently placed with her 

maternal grandparents, and that, in addition to her grandparents, J.F. has a 

younger brother and an uncle who reside in that home. She testified that J.F. 

appears very bonded to her care givers and her younger brother. She also 

testified that J.F. does not know Father, that the pre-adoption home is that of 

the maternal grandparents, that J.F.’s mother had signed an adoption consent, 

and that DCS believed that adoption was a satisfactory permanency plan and 

was in the best interest o f J.F. She further testified that J.F. had idled in the 

DCS system and was three years old and that she believed J.F. deserved the 
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right to have permanency and to close a chapter in her life and be permitted to 

grow and thrive and have a life that is not interrupted by service providers. 

[5] J.F.’s maternal grandmother testified that J.F. had never been placed with 

anyone else and that she is basically the only home that J.F. has ever known. 

She testified that J.F. is doing well and that, with J.F.’s sickle cell, she takes her 

to the doctor every month to make sure her blood counts are proper. She 

testified that she had stayed up with J.F. when she became sick and her leg 

hurt, that she wrapped J.F.’s leg with a heating pad as the doctor instructed and 

gave J.F. her medication, and that one time she took her to the emergency 

room when she had a fever. She indicated she felt she had been able to provide 

J.F. with the appropriate care and treatment she needs. When asked how many 

times J.F. has seen Father during her life, she responded that Father had seen 

J.F. three times. She testified that when he was on work release he went to the 

school, that she told Father he needed a court order to go to the school, and 

that Father indicated it would not happen again. She stated that Father came to 

her house and she let him in the living room, that J.F. did not know Father and 

he was not there very long, and that she later received a call from a teacher that 

Father had gone back to the school. She also testified that she “was allowing 

him to call on the phone, just trying to be a decent person, and um I let her talk 

to him on the phone,” that she was there to observe it, and that J.F. “is just 

talking to a stranger.” Transcript Volume II at 22. J.F.’s grandmother 

indicated that she and her husband wished to adopt J.F. 
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[6] GAL Dixson-Jones testified that she believed J.F.’s placement with her 

maternal grandmother was appropriate and in J.F.’s best interest because J.F.’s 

needs were being met, she is bonded to that family, she has been there for an 

extensive amount of time, and that they love her, parent her, and raise her as if 

she was their own. GAL Dixson-Jones also testified that she agreed the plan 

should remain adoption for the same reasons. She also testified that to her 

knowledge there is not any bond between J.F. and Father and that she agreed it 

was in the best interest of J.F. for the parent-child relationship between J.F. and 

Father to be terminated. 

[7] The trial court entered an order terminating the parent-child relationship of 

Father and J.F. Specifically, the order states in part:

8. [Father] was incarcerated before [J.F.] was born and 

subsequently convicted of Unlawful Possession of a 

Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon. 

9. During the CHINS case, [Father] was placed on work 

release but was sent back to prison within a month due to 

violating probation. 

10. Pursuant to the Dispositional Decree, [Father] was to 

contact the IDCS within seventy-two hours of his release. 

He did not do so.

11. While on release, [Father] made three contacts with his 

daughter but was told he needed to contact the family case 

manager for a court order, much like the father of [J.F.’s] 

half-sibling. 

12. [Father] has brief phone contact with [J.F.].
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13. [J.F.] has resided with her maternal grandparents all her 

life. She remains there as a preadoptive placement.

14. [J.F.] has Sickle Cell Anemia for which she needs medical 

care, with attentive caregivers in a structured environment.

15. [J.F.] has been observed as being very bonded with her 

caregivers and half-sibling who resides in the same 

household.

16. [J.F.’s] maternal grandmother describes [J.F.’s] 

relationship with her father as being a stranger.

17. [Father] has a history of violence against women. 

18. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in [J.F.’s] removal and continued placement 

outside the home will not be remedied by her father who 

remains incarcerated. When not incarcerated he did not 

take steps to contact the IDCS and request visits or 

services.

19. There is a reasonable probability that the confirmation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to [J.F.’s] wellbeing in that it would pose as a barrier to obtaining 

permanency for her through an adoption into the only 

home she has known and is medically safe, and not be 

disrupted when she has no bond with her father. 

20. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best 

interests of [J.F.]. Termination would allow her to be

adopted into a stable and permanent home where her 

needs will be safely met.

21. There exists a satisfactory plan for the future care and 

treatment of [J.F.], that being adoption. 

22. Based on [J.F.’s] placement, with her half-sibling, where 

she has a bond and is having her needs met, and her need 

for permanency, the Guardian ad Litem believes it to be in 
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[J.F.’s] best interests that [Father’s] parental rights be 

terminated and she be adopted.

Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 12-13. 

Discussion

[8] The issue is whether the trial court erred in terminating Father’s rights. Father 

argues that the evidence does not show that the conditions resulting in J.F.’s 

placement outside the home would not be remedied, that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to J.F.’s well-being, or that 

termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interests of J.F. DCS 

maintains that Father does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings of fact 

and the unchallenged findings support the court’s order. 

[9] In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to allege and 

prove, among other things: 

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
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(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition 

described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parentchild relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[10] The State’s burden of proof for establishing the allegations in termination cases 

“is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-

1261 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2), reh’g denied. This is “a 

‘heightened burden of proof’ reflecting termination’s ‘serious social 

consequences.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re G.Y., 

904 N.E.2d at 1260-1261, 1260 n.1). “But weighing the evidence under that 

heightened standard is the trial court’s prerogative—in contrast to our wellsettled, highly deferential standard of review.” Id. We do not reweigh the 

evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the 

evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from the evidence. Id. We confine our review to two steps: whether the 

evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the 

findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. 

[11] This review is not a license to reweigh the evidence. Id. “[W]e do not 

independently determine whether that heightened standard is met, as we would 

under the ‘constitutional harmless error standard,’ which requires the reviewing 

court itself to ‘be sufficiently confident to declare the error harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ind. 
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1991) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967))). “Our 

review must ‘give “due regard” to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses firsthand,’ and ‘not set aside [its] findings or 

judgment unless clearly erroneous.’” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs., Dearborn Cty. Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind. Trial 

Rule 52(A))). “Because a case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been 

much more clear-cut in person, we must be careful not to substitute our 

judgment for the trial court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. 

at 640. 

1. Remedy of Conditions

[12] We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive 

and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-

2-4(b)(2)(B). Because we find it to be dispositive, we limit our review to 

whether DCS established that there was a reasonable probability that the 

conditions resulting in the removal or reasons for placement of J.F. outside the 

home will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).

[13] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in J.F.’s removal will not be 

remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642-643. First, 

we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine 

whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be 

remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s 

fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration 
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evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent’s recent improvements 

against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial 

probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that delicate 

balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history 

more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. Requiring 

trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them 

from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of future 

behavior. Id. 

[14] “The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s removal for 

purposes of determining whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but 

also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home.” In re 

N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). A court may consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal 

history, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing 

and employment, and the services offered by DCS and the parent’s response to 

those services, and, where there are only temporary improvements and the 

pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find 

that under the circumstances the problematic situation will not improve. Id. 

[15] To the extent Father does not challenge the court’s findings of fact, these 

unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver 

of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied. DCS is 

not required to offer a parent services aimed at reunification with the child 
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when the parent is incarcerated. See Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 

842 N.E.2d 367, 377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. A parent’s habitual 

patterns of conduct must be evaluated to determine the probability of future 

negative behaviors. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234. Individuals who pursue 

criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive 

and meaningful relationships with their children. Id. at 1235-1236. A parent’s 

incarceration is an insufficient basis for termination, and we have “not 

established a bright-line rule for when release [from incarceration] must occur 

to maintain parental rights.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 

643, 648 (Ind. 2015). Also, we have noted that the provision of services is not 

an element of the termination statute. In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2000); see In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting 

that “a failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly 

attack a termination order as contrary to law”). 

[16] The record reveals that Father was convicted of burglary as a felony in 2009, 

that he was arrested for possession of a handgun on or about February 20, 2014, 

and that J.F. was born on March 18, 2014. On or about March 9, 2017, Father 

was placed on work release with strict compliance through community 

corrections. Although the court’s February 2016 dispositional order required 

Father to contact DCS within seventy-two hours of his release from 

incarceration, FCM Parker testified that Father did not make any efforts to 

participate in the case and that there was no documentation that he made 

contact with DCS. Further, a violation was filed on March 31, 2017, and an 
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arrest warrant was issued and served on April 3, 2017. Father’s placement with 

community corrections was revoked for noncompliance, and he was ordered 

confined to the DOC to complete the executed portion of his sentence. Father 

does not point to evidence that, during the period when he was not 

incarcerated, he contacted DCS to request services or otherwise express an 

interest in seeing or reunifying with J.F. 

[17] Given Father’s incarceration, uncertain future, lack of a relationship with J.F., 

and criminal history, we cannot say that the conclusion reached by the trial 

court that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions leading to J.F.’s 

removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied is 

clearly erroneous. 

2. Best Interests

[18] In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required 

to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and to the totality of the evidence. 

McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2003). In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent 

to those of the children. Id. Children have a paramount need for permanency 

which the Indiana Supreme Court has called a central consideration in 

determining the child’s best interests, and the Court has stated that children 

cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or 

reunification, and courts need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed 

such that the child’s physical, mental, and social development is permanently 
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impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 

at 647-648. However, “focusing on permanency, standing alone, would 

impermissibly invert the best-interests inquiry . . . .” Id. at 648. 

Recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in 

addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be 

remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. 

[19] The trial court found J.F. had resided with her maternal grandparents for all her 

life and remained there as a pre-adoptive placement, that J.F. has sickle cell 

anemia for which she needs medical care with attentive caregivers in a 

structured environment, that J.F. has been observed as being very bonded with 

her caregivers and half-sibling who reside in the same household, and that J.F.’s 

maternal grandmother described J.F.’s relationship with Father as being a 

stranger. The evidence presented at the termination hearing supports the 

court’s findings. Moreover, both GAL Dixson-Jones and FCM Parker testified 

that it was in the best interest of J.F. that the parent-child relationship of J.F. 

and Father be terminated and that adoption was a satisfactory permanency plan 

and was in the best interest of J.F. Based on the testimony, as well as the 

totality of the evidence in the record and set forth in the court’s termination 

order, we conclude that the determination that termination is in the best 

interests of J.F. is supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
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Conclusion

[20] We conclude that the trial court’s judgment terminating the parental rights of 

Father is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error and 

affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.