FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

DAVID W. STONE IV S. GREGORY ZUBEK

Stone Law Office & Legal Research Whitham Hebenstreit & Zubek LLP

Anderson, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

A.G., )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 49A04-1201-PO-94

)

P.G., )

)

Appellee-Petitioner. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Barbara Cook Crawford, Judge

Cause No. 49G21-0909-PO-41818

September 21, 2012

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge
2

A.G. (Father) appeals the extension of P.G.’s (Mother) protective order against him. 

He presents three issues1for our consideration, one of which we find dispositive: whether 

there was sufficient evidence to support the extension of Mother’s protective order against 

Father. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 10, 2009, Mother filed for, and was granted, an ex parte order of 

protection against Father. On March 8, 2010, the order was amended to allow Father certain 

visitation and communication with the parties’ two children. On May 12, 2011, a Missouri 

court dissolved the parties’ marriage.

On June 5, when Mother picked up the children from their scheduled visitation with 

Father, their son reported Father indicated he desired to hurt Mother and her friend. The 

parties’ daughter also told Mother that Father wished to harm Mother.

On June 6, Mother filed a petition for contempt against Father, alleging he violated the 

protective order by communicating threats against Mother. The trial court did not find Father

in contempt, but it extended the protective order until October 21, 2020.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

When considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a decision to issue or 

modify a protective order, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of 

 

1 Two of the issues Father presents involve the admissibility of certain pieces of evidence. As this was a bench 

trial, we need not consider those issues. See Berry v. State, 725 N.E.2d 939, 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“In 

bench trials, we presume that the court disregarded inadmissible evidence and rendered its decision solely on 

the basis of relevant and probative evidence.”). Father offers nothing to overcome this presumption. 
3

witnesses. Andrews v. Ivie, 956 N.E.2d 720, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). “We look only to the 

evidence of probative value and reasonable inferences that support the trial court’s 

judgment.” Id. As we stated in Andrews:

The Indiana Civil Protection Order Act (“CPOA”) is to be construed to 

promote (1) the protection and safety of all victims of domestic or family 

violence in a fair, prompt, and effective manner and (2) the prevention of 

future domestic and family violence. Ind.Code § 34-26-5-1 (2002); Moore v. 

Moore, 904 N.E.2d 353, 357-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Pursuant to the CPOA, 

a person who is or has been a victim of domestic or family violence may file a 

petition for a protective order against (1) a family or household member who 

commits an act of domestic or family violence or (2) a person who has 

committed stalking under Indiana Code section 35-45-10-5 (2002) or a sex 

offense under Indiana Code chapter 35-42-4 against the petitioner. Ind.Code § 

34-26-5-2(a) (2002); Tisdial v. Young, 925 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. Ct. App.

2010). The trial court may issue or modify a protective order only upon a 

finding “that domestic or family violence has occurred.” Ind.Code § 34-26-5-

9(a), (f) (2009); Tisdial, 925 N.E.2d at 785. For purposes of the CPOA, 

domestic and family violence also includes stalking as defined in Indiana Code 

section 35-45-10-1 (1993) or a sex offense under Indiana Code chapter 35-42-

4, “whether or not the stalking or sex offense is committed by a family or 

household member.” Ind.Code § 34-6-2-34.5 (2007); Tisdial, 925 N.E.2d at 

785.

To obtain a protective order under the CPOA, the petitioner must 

establish by a preponderance of the evidence at least one of the allegations in 

the petition. A.S. [v. T.H., 920 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)]. A trial 

court generally has discretion to grant protective relief according to the terms 

of the CPOA. Moore, 904 N.E.2d at 358. However, a finding by the trial 

court that domestic or family violence has occurred sufficient to justify the 

issuance of an order for protection means that the respondent represents a 

credible threat to the safety of the petitioner. Id. Therefore, upon a showing of 

domestic or family violence by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial court 

shall grant relief necessary to bring about a cessation of the violence or the 

threat of violence. Id.

Id. at 722-23.

In her motion for contempt, Mother alleged Father, in violation of a protective order 
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issued at the time of the parties’ dissolution of marriage, “made a death threat against me to 

my daughter and a death threat against my friend to my son on 6-5-11.” (App. at 29.) During 

the contempt hearing, Mother testified to statements made by both of her children concerning 

Father’s desire to hurt Mother and her family and friends. The trial court found:

[W]hile I um, am inclined to believe that maybe these conversations did occur 

with her children, and her children had some kind of information that they 

received that upset them and -- and caused them to make these statements, I 

cannot find there was clear and convincing evidence that contempt was found.

However, I do find that this protective order should be extended, and 

the Court at this time, is going to extend the order for protection, and it will be 

extended to October 21st of 2020.

(Tr. at 93.) To the extent Father’s arguments are premised on conflicting evidence, they are 

invitationsfor us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Andrews, 956 N.E.2d at 722. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed. 

KIRSCH, J., and NAJAM, J., concur.