1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re A.A.-R. and L.G.

No. 19-0120 (Kanawha County 18-JA-306 and 18-JA-307)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mother S.A.-D. by counsel Jason Lord, appeals the Circuit Court of Kanawha

County’s December 20, 2018, order terminating her parental rights to A.A.-R. and L.G.

1 The West 

Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by counsel Brandolyn N. 

Felton-Ernest, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem 

(“guardian”), Sharon Childers, filed a response on behalf of the children in support of the circuit 

court’s order and a supplemental appendix. On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred 

in denying her motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period.

2

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On May 24, 2018, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that petitioner 

physically and emotionally abused A.A.-R. The younger child, L.G., was also named in the petition 

as an infant respondent. Specifically, the DHHR alleged that during an interview with a Child 

Protective Services (“CPS”) worker, the child disclosed that petitioner called him “stupid, retard, 

dumb, moron, and tells him that he is never going to amount to anything.” The child also disclosed 

that petitioner scratched him and that he went to school with marks on his face. Further, the child 

stated that he was afraid of petitioner, but more afraid that CPS was going to take him away and 

 

1Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. 

Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

2Petitioner does not raise an assignment of error regarding the termination of her parental 

rights. 

FILED

June 12, 2019

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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put him in another “bad house.” The child requested that the CPS worker not tell petitioner

anything he told the school or the CPS worker. Finally, the child stated that he feared petitioner 

“might kill him or hit him” and that she hit him in the head with a boot about a month before the 

interview. When the CPS worker interviewed petitioner, she admitted to calling him names, but 

denied hitting him. She stated that she and the child do not get along because he is defiant, steals 

candy and money from her, and does not clean his room. She disclosed that A.A.-R. was previously 

removed from her home because she spanked him.3 She stated that the child started to act out for 

attention after L.G. was born. Petitioner told the CPS worker that she did not do anything wrong 

and that the problems were A.A.-R.’s fault.

The adjudicatory hearing was originally scheduled for July 19, 2018, but was continued in 

order for petitioner to complete a psychological evaluation. The circuit court conducted an in 

camera interview with A.A.-R. in August of 2018. On October 1, 2018, the circuit court held the 

adjudicatory hearing. The DHHR presented testimony regarding the allegations in the petition. 

The circuit court also considered A.A.-R.’s in camera testimony as well as petitioner’s 

psychological evaluation. The evaluating psychologist testified that petitioner failed to take any 

responsibility for her actions relating to the abuse and neglect and had no remorse for her actions. 

She further testified that petitioner suffered from mental health disorders and that, even with 

treatment, it was unlikely that petitioner could improve to become an appropriate parent. Petitioner 

testified on her own behalf and denied most of the allegations of abuse and neglect. However, she 

did admit to throwing a boot at A.A.-R. on one occasion and stated that she has a “little anger 

control issue.” In its order following adjudication, the circuit court found that petitioner had mental 

health and anger control issues that prevented her from being an appropriate parent; was violent 

and engaged in domestic violence with L.G.’s father; physically and emotionally abused one or 

more of her children; and accepted no responsibility for her actions. The circuit court adjudicated 

petitioner as an abusing parent and denied her motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period.

On December 7, 2018, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing. The circuit court 

granted the DHHR’s motion to consider all prior evidence and noted petitioner’s objection to the 

consideration of the child’s in camera interview. The DHHR presented the testimony of a CPS 

worker who testified that petitioner’s services were terminated due to her behavior with the service 

providers. Petitioner testified on her own behalf. In its dispositional order, the circuit court found 

that the petition in the instant matter was filed due to the same issues that occurred in petitioner’s 

2014 abuse and neglect case. The circuit court found that petitioner called A.A.-R. names and that 

the child disclosed ongoing physical and emotional abuse at the hands of petitioner. The 

dispositional order stated that domestic violence issues between petitioner and L.G.’s father were 

ongoing throughout the proceedings. Ultimately, the circuit court found that there was no 

reasonable likelihood that petitioner could substantially correct the conditions of abuse and neglect 

in the near future and that the termination of petitioner’s parental rights was necessary for the 

 

3

In 2014, an abuse and neglect petition was filed against petitioner alleging conditions of 

abuse and neglect similar to those in the instant matter. In the previous case, petitioner stipulated 

to inappropriately disciplining A.A.-R. and was adjudicated as an abusing parent. However, 

petitioner successfully completed her post-adjudicatory improvement period and the matter was 

dismissed.
3

children’s welfare. The circuit court terminated petitioner’s parental rights in its December 20, 

2018, order.

4

It is from this order that petitioner appeals.

The Court has previously established the following standard of review:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such 

child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing 

court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there 

is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, 

a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided 

the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the 

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In 

Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). Upon our review, this Court finds 

no error in the proceedings below. 

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying her motion for a postadjudicatory improvement period. In support, petitioner contends that she was denied an 

“opportunity to address parenting shortcomings.” However, she also asserts that she complied with 

services such as random drug screens, parenting and adult life skills classes, and a psychological 

evaluation. We do not find petitioner’s argument persuasive. West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B)

provides that the circuit court may grant a parent a post-adjudicatory improvement period when 

the parent “demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the [parent] is likely to fully 

participate in the improvement period.” We have noted that “West Virginia law allows the circuit 

court discretion in deciding whether to grant a parent an improvement period.” In re M.M., 236 

W. Va. 108, 115, 778 S.E.2d 338, 345 (2015). Moreover, we have held that 

[i]n order to remedy the abuse and/or neglect problem, the problem must first be 

acknowledged. Failure to acknowledge the existence of the problem, i.e., the truth 

of the basic allegation pertaining to the alleged abuse and neglect or the perpetrator 

of said abuse and neglect, results in making the problem untreatable and in making 

an improvement period an exercise in futility at the child’s expense.

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013) (quoting In re: Charity H., 215 

W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004)).

 

4The children’s respective fathers’ parental rights were also terminated. According to the 

DHHR and the guardian, the permanency plan for the children is adoption by their maternal 

grandmother.
4

Here, the record shows that petitioner repeatedly failed to acknowledge the issues of abuse 

and neglect and had no remorse for her actions. She justified calling A.A.-R. names, blamed A.A.-

R. and his behavior for causing problems, and stated that she had a “little anger control issue.” The 

circuit court found that A.A.-R. disclosed ongoing physical and emotional abuse by petitioner, 

which was the same type of abuse for which petitioner was adjudicated in her prior abuse and 

neglect case. Despite her participation in services during the instant proceedings, petitioner clearly 

did not benefit from them. Petitioner’s services were terminated due to her behavior with service 

providers and she continued to engage in domestic violence during the proceedings. Based on this 

evidence, it is clear that petitioner did not meet the burden to receive a post-adjudicatory 

improvement period and granting her the same would have been futile. We find no error in the 

circuit court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for a post-adjudicatory improvement period.

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

December 20, 2018, dispositional order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: June 12, 2019

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison