NO. 04-15-00287-CV

IN THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS 

____________________________________ 

Cecil Adams and Maxine Adams 

Appellants, 

vs.

Harris County, Rebecca Ross, Kathleen Keese, Christopher Prine Clerk of the 

Court and Chris Daniel District Clerk 

Appellees 

On Appeal from 269th Judicial Court 

Houston, Texas 

Cause No. 2014-35653 

Transferred by Order of the Supreme Court from the First Court of Appeals 

Houston, Texas 

Cause No. 01-15-00384-CV 

Adams’ Motion to Amend and Correct Judgment 

Pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE 51.015 

__________________________________________________________________ 

Cecil Adams 

Maxine Adams 

5510 S. Rice #1206 

Houston, Texas 77081 

p.713.840.0330 

Email: cecillovesmax@sbcglobal.net

ACCEPTED

04-15-00287-CV

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

12/24/2015 6:39:50 PM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 12/24/2015 6:39:50 PM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 12/28/2015 11:03:00 AM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
- 1 -

NOW HERE COMES Maxine Adams and Cecil Adams (collectively the “Adams”) 

to file this Motion to Amend and Correct Judgment pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. 

& REM CODE (“CODE”) 51.015 and would show as follows:

A judgment was enter in an interlocutory appeal filed pursuant to TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE 51.014(a)(8) on December 9, 2015 in the above captioned 

case (“the Judgment”). The Judgment orders “Harris County and Christopher A. 

Prine, Clerk of the Court for the First Court of Appeals, recover their costs of this 

appeal from appellants Cecil Adams and Maxine Adams” see Appendix 1.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE outlines costs for interlocutory appeals 

under Sec. 51.015. In the case of an appeal brought pursuant to Section 51.014(6), 

if the order appealed from is affirmed, the court of appeals shall order the appellant 

to pay all costs and reasonable attorney fees of the appeal; otherwise, each party 

shall be liable for and taxed its own costs of the appeal. The Adams did not file an 

interlocutory appeal under Section 51.014(6), thus all parties are statutorily 

responsible and should be taxed their own costs of the appeal.

Request for Relief

The Adams respectfully request this Honorable Court to amend and/or correct 

The Judgment to (1) comply with the statutory court cost outlined under TEX. CIV. 

PRAC. & REM. CODE 51.015, and (2) state that “each party shall be liable for and 

taxed its own costs of the appeal.”
- 2 -

Dated: December 23, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

/s/: Maxine Adams

Maxine Adams

5510 S. Rice #1206

Houston, Texas 77081

713.840.0330

cecillovesmax@sbcglobal.net

Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

In accordance with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.2(c)(1), I certify that 

a copy of this Motion to Amend and Correct pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 

REM CODE 51.015 was served on the following parties by e-service through a 

government approved electronic filing system via email on December 23, 2015.

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

This paragraph is certification pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 10.1(a)(5) that the filing 

party conferred, or made a reasonable attempt to confer, with all other parties about 

the merits of the motion. 

Vince Ryan, Esq. (opposed)

Harris County Attorney 

vince.ryan@cao.hctx.net

Clinton Gambil Senior (opposed)

Assistant County Attorney 

clinton.gambill@cao.hctx.net

Brian A. Quintero (opposed)

Esq. Senior Assistant County Attorney 

brian.quintero@cao.hctx.net

1019 Congress, 15th Floor 

Houston, Texas 77002 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/: Cecil Adams 

Cecil Adams

5510 S. Rice #1206

Houston, Texas 77081

713.840.0330

cecillovesmax@sbcglobal.net

Pro Se

Respectfully submitted,

/s/: Maxine Adams 

Maxine Adams

5510 S. Rice #1206

Houston, Texas 77081

713.840.0330

cecillovesmax@sbcglobal.net

Pro Se
- 3 -

p. 713.274.5173 f. 713.437.8633 

ATTORNEYS FOR CHRIS DANIEL AHARRIS COUNTY 

Timothy J. Henderson (opposed)

6300 West Loop South, Suite 280 

Bellaire, Texas 77401

timhenderson@msn.com

p. 713.667.7878 f. 713.668.5697

COUNSEL FOR REBECCA ROSS 

Jayson Booth, Esq. (did not state opposition)

3730 Kirby Drive, Suite 777 

Houston, Texas 77098 

jbooth@boothricheylaw.com

713.333.0377 713.526.1175 (fax) 

COUNSEL FOR KATHLEEN KEESE

Christian Cobe Vasquez (opposed)

Assistant Attorney General 

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Austin, 

Texas 78711 

christin.cobe@texasattorneygeneral.gov

p. (512) 463-2080 f. (512) 495-9139 (fax) 

COUNSEL FOR CHRISTOPHER PRINE

/s/: Maxine Adams

Maxine Adams

Pro Se

/s/: Cecil Adams

Cecil Adams

Pro Se
4

APPENDIX 1

OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-15-00287-CV

Cecil ADAMS and Maxine Adams,

Appellants

v.

HARRIS COUNTY and Christopher A. Prine, Clerk of the First Court of Appeals

Appellees

From the 269th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014-35653

Honorable Dan Hinde, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 9, 2015

AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN PART

Maxine and Cecil Adams filed this interlocutory appeal, complaining of the trial court’s 

orders denying their motion to dismiss Harris County’s interpleader action and granting 

Christopher A. Prine’s plea to the jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court’s order dismissing the 

Adamses’ claims against Christopher A. Prine in his official capacity as Clerk of the First Court 

of Appeals. We dismiss the rest of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
04-15-00287-CV

- 2 -

BACKGROUND

This litigation arose as a result of a landlord-tenant dispute between the Adamses and 

Rebecca Ross. A lawsuit between them in the 269th Judicial District Court of Harris County, 

Texas, resulted in a judgment in favor of the Adamses. The Adamses recovered part of the 

judgment through a writ of garnishment, and Ross deposited the balance due on the judgment into 

the registry of the court. The Adamses appealed the judgment to the First Court of Appeals, and 

in August 2013, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. Adams v. Ross, 

No. 01-11-00552-CV, 2013 WL 4003757 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 2, 2013, pet. 

denied) (per curiam, mem. op.). The judgment assessed all of the costs of the appeal against 

Maxine Adams and ordered the Clerk of the Court to issue a statement of costs with the mandate. 

The court of appeals’ mandate issued April 4, 2014. The same day, Christopher A. Prine, Clerk 

of the First Court of Appeals, prepared and issued a bill of costs in Appeal No. 01-11-00552-CV. 

The bill of costs indicated that a number of items, including fees for preparing parts of the appellate 

record, remained unpaid or that the status of payment was unknown.

In June 2014, Harris County filed a petition in interpleader in the district court, alleging 

that the Harris County District Clerk is custodian of the funds Rebecca Ross previously deposited 

into the registry of the court. The petition alleged competing claims to the funds had been made 

by the Adamses, Ross, the Harris County District Clerk, the court reporter, and Prine, as Clerk of 

the First Court of Appeals. Prine disclaimed any interest in the interpleaded funds, and Harris 

County nonsuited him from the interpleader action. The Adamses subsequently filed a motion to 

dismiss the interpleader action, which the trial court denied by an order signed March 13, 2015.

The Adamses also filed counter and cross claims against several parties, including an action 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Prine. The Adamses’ live pleading alleges that in the bill of costs, 

Prine “systematically over billed for each appellate record filed in the Court of Appeals, and 
04-15-00287-CV

- 3 -

charged fees for appellate records that the Harris County [sic] documented as no amount due” and 

that Prine and the Harris County District Clerk “falsified court records individually or collectively 

to deprive Adams of property without due process.” The Adamses assert that “Christopher Pine 

[sic] acting in his individual capacity as the Clerk of the 1st Court of Appeals in performing 

ministerial billing responsibilities” proximately caused them to be deprived of property without 

due process of law, in violation of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Adamses 

sought damages “from Christopher Prine individually for falsified billing entries resulting in costs 

not associated with [the] appeal and punitive damages.” 

Prine filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on the pleadings, asserting he has sovereign and 

quasi-judicial immunity from the Adamses’ suit and from liability for the damages claimed. The 

trial court granted Prine’s plea and signed an order dismissing the Adamses’ claims against Prine 

with prejudice. This appeal followed. 

DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS INTERPLEADER ACTION

The Adamses moved to dismiss Harris County’s interpleader suit on the ground that the 

County had failed to allege or present evidence on one or more of the elements of an interpleader 

action. The trial court denied the motion. This court does not have jurisdiction to consider 

immediate appeals of interlocutory orders unless a statute explicitly provides such jurisdiction.

Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007).1

 The Adamses’ notice of

appeal asserts that an interlocutory appeal of this order is authorized by Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 29.6. Rule 29.6 provides that while an appeal from an interlocutory order is pending, 

the appellate court may review:

(1) a further appealable interlocutory order concerning the same subject matter; and

 1 We must inquire into our jurisdiction to consider an appeal even if the parties have not challenged appellate 

jurisdiction. See M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam).
04-15-00287-CV

- 4 -

(2) any interlocutory order that interferes with or impairs the effectiveness of the relief 

sought or that may be granted on appeal.

TEX. R. APP. P. 29.6. An order denying a motion to dismiss an interpleader petition is not 

immediately appealable. See Law Office of Henry Gates Steen Jr., P.C. v. Eagle Pass Indep. Sch. 

Dist., 293 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no. pet.) (holding order allowing 

interpleader action to go forward is an unappealable interlocutory order). Because the order is not 

appealable, Rule 29.6(1) does not apply. In order for Rule 29.6(2) to apply, the Adamses must 

establish that the trial court’s order interferes with or impairs the effectiveness of any relief that

may be granted in this appeal. The Adamses’ brief does not contain any argument or authority 

directed to this order — either on the merits of the order or in support of our exercising jurisdiction 

over the order. We conclude we lack jurisdiction to review the order. Therefore we dismiss for 

lack of jurisdiction the Adamses’ appeal of the trial court’s order denying their motion to dismiss 

Harris County’s interpleader action.

PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

Prine’s plea to the jurisdiction asserted grounds for dismissing both official capacity and 

individual capacity claims against him. The trial court’s order sustained the plea in its entirety and 

dismissed all of the Adamses’ claims against Prine with prejudice.2 This court generally has 

jurisdiction to hear appeals only from final judgments. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 

266, 272 (Tex. 1992). The trial court’s order dismissing the Adamses’ claims with prejudice is 

not final because other claims and parties remain pending in the trial court. We have jurisdiction 

to review the trial court’s interlocutory orders only if expressly authorized by statute. Koseoglu, 

233 S.W.3d at 840.

 2 The parties dispute whether the Adamses’ pleading asserted both individual and official capacity claims against 

Prine. For purposes of this appeal, we construe the Adamses’ pleading broadly and assume that official capacity 

claims as well as individual capacity claims were pleaded.
04-15-00287-CV

- 5 -

The Adamses contend that section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies 

Code authorizes us to exercise jurisdiction over the trial court’s interlocutory dismissal order. That 

section provides:

A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court . . . that . . . 

grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit as that term is 

defined in Section 101.001.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (West 2015).3 “We strictly construe Section 

51.014(a) as ‘a narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable.’” 

Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 841 (quoting Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 355 

(Tex. 2001)). 

Official Capacity Claims

Under Texas law, a suit against a government employee in his official capacity is usually

a suit against his government employer. Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367, 382-83 (Tex. 

2011). A state official sued in his official capacity may invoke the sovereign immunity from suit 

held by the governmental unit itself because the suit is not one against the official personally; the 

real party in interest is the governmental unit. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 844 (citing Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). A state official sued in his official capacity therefore may 

challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction on the grounds of sovereign immunity by filing a plea to the 

jurisdiction, and the trial court’s ruling on the plea is within the scope of section 51.014(a)(8). Id.

at 843.

 3 The definition of “governmental unit” in section 101.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code includes:

this state and all the several agencies of government that collectively constitute the government of 

this state, including other agencies bearing different designations, and all departments, bureaus, 

boards, commissions, offices, agencies, councils, and courts;

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 101.001(3)(A) (West Supp. 2015) (emphasis added).
04-15-00287-CV

- 6 -

Prine is an officer or employee of the First Court of Appeals, which is an agency of the 

State of Texas and a “governmental unit” within the meaning of section 101.001(3)(A) of the 

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001(3)(A).

A suit against Prine in his official capacity as the Clerk of the First Court of Appeals is effectively 

against the governmental unit, and Prine may assert the governmental unit’s immunities from suit 

in a plea to the jurisdiction. See Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d at 843. The court’s order granting the plea 

filed by Prine in his official capacity is appealable under section 51.014(a)(8). See id.

Prine’s plea to the jurisdiction argued that a section 1983 suit against Prine in his official 

capacity is barred by sovereign immunity and by the Eleventh Amendment. We agree. The 

Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars a suit against the State in state court 

unless the State waives its immunity or Congress abrogates it. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 

(1999); Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Herrera, 322 S.W.3d 192, 195 (Tex. 2010). In enacting 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, Congress did not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. 

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337–45 (1979); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 27 (1991) (holding 

suits against state officials in their official capacity are suits against the State, and section 1983 

does not authorize suits against them). We therefore hold the trial court did not err in sustaining 

the plea to the jurisdiction filed by Prine in his official capacity and affirm the order dismissing 

the Adamses’ claims against Prine in his official capacity.

Individual Capacity Claims

The Adamses also challenge the trial court’s order dismissing their section 1983 claims 

against Prine in his individual capacity for actions he took under the authority of his office. Prine’s 

plea to the jurisdiction asserted the defense of quasi-judicial immunity to the individual-capacity 

section 1983 claims. 
04-15-00287-CV

- 7 -

A section 1983 claim against a governmental official or employee in his individual capacity 

for actions taken under the authority of his office seeks to impose personal monetary liability on 

the officer or employee. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25. It is not a claim against a governmental unit, 

and a person sued only in his individual capacity may not assert the governmental unit’s sovereign 

immunity. City of Leon Valley v. Wm. Rancher Estates Joint Venture, No. 04-14-00542-CV, 2015 

WL 2405475, at *2 (Tex. App. May 20, 2015, no pet.); see Harrison v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal 

Justice–Institutional Div., 915 S.W.2d 882, 887-89 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.)

(sovereign immunity does not bar a section 1983 suit against individual state officials in their 

individual capacities, even if they were acting in their official capacities when they took the actions 

complained of). A governmental official or employee sued in his individual capacity may assert 

quasi-judicial immunity as an affirmative defense; however, it is a personal defense, not one 

asserted by a governmental unit or by a state employee sued in his official capacity. See Turner v. 

Houma Mun. Fire & Police Civ. Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 2000).

The plea to the jurisdiction filed by Prine in his individual capacity was based on his claim 

of quasi-judicial immunity, a personal defense that is not based on the governmental unit’s 

immunity. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling on the plea was not one that “grant[ed] or denie[d] a 

plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit,” and the Adamses’ interlocutory appeal is not 

authorized by section 51.014(a)(8). See Sanders v. City of Grapevine, 218 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (holding trial court’s order granting plea to jurisdiction and 

dismissing with prejudice claims against city officials in their individual capacities was not an 

appealable interlocutory order under section 51.014(a)(8)). We therefore dismiss this part of the 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
04-15-00287-CV

- 8 -

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s order dismissing with prejudice Maxine and Cecil Adamses’ claims 

against Christopher A. Prine in his official capacity as the Clerk of the First Court of Appeals is 

affirmed. The Adamses’ appeal of the trial court’s orders (1) denying their motion to dismiss 

Harris County’s interpleader petition and (2) granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by 

Christopher Prine in his individual capacity and dismissing the individual capacity claims against 

him are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-15-00287-CV

Cecil ADAMS and Maxine Adams,

Appellants

v.

HARRIS COUNTY and Christopher A. Prine, Clerk of the First Court of Appeals

Appellees

From the 269th Judicial District Court, Harris County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014-35653

Honorable Dan Hinde, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ANGELINI, JUSTICE MARTINEZ, AND JUSTICE CHAPA

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order dismissing with 

prejudice Maxine and Cecil Adamses’ claims against Christopher A. Prine in his official capacity 

as the Clerk of the First Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The appeals of the trial court’s orders 

denying Maxine and Cecil Adamses’ motion to dismiss Harris County’s interpleader petition and 

granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by Christopher Prine in his individual capacity are 

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

We ORDER that Harris County and Christopher A. Prine, Clerk of the First Court of 

Appeals, recover their costs of this appeal from appellants Cecil Adams and Maxine Adams.

SIGNED December 9, 2015.

_____________________________

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice