[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State

v. Taylor, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1752.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1752

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. TAYLOR, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Taylor, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1752.]

Bindover jurisdiction—Sixth Amendment right to counsel—Court of appeals erred 

in holding that adult court lacked jurisdiction to convict appellee of felony 

murder—Court of appeals erred in concluding that appellee’s statements to 

police in absence of counsel should have been suppressed, because no 

criminal proceedings had been commenced when he was interrogated—

Court of appeals’ judgment reversing conviction reversed and cause 

remanded to court of appeals.

(No. 2022-1069—Submitted September 13, 2023—Decided May 9, 2024.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,

No. 19AP-396, 2022-Ohio-2877.

________________
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2

STEWART, J., writing for the court with respect to Parts I and II(B) and 

announcing the judgment of the court with respect to Parts II(A) and III.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Tenth District 

Court of Appeals, we consider whether the appellate court correctly determined that 

the General Division of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (“adult 

court”) lacked jurisdiction to convict appellee, Damon L. Taylor, of felony murder. 

We are also asked to decide whether the appellate court correctly determined that 

certain statements Taylor made to police should have been suppressed. We

conclude that both determinations were incorrect, and we therefore reverse the 

judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to that court.

{¶ 2} First, we conclude that the adult court had jurisdiction over the felonymurder charge against Taylor. The juvenile division of the common pleas court 

found probable cause to believe that Tayor committed the offense of complicity to 

commit murder, and the felony-murder charge is rooted in the acts supporting the 

complicity charge. See State v. Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 

N.E.3d 801, ¶ 13.

{¶ 3} Second, we hold that the court of appeals erred in concluding that

Taylor’s December 2016 statements to police should have been suppressed. The 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of a criminal 

prosecution against the accused, and at the time Taylor was interrogated, no 

criminal proceedings had been commenced. And even if the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel had attached, Taylor waived that right when he waived his Fifth 

Amendment right to counsel after being given Miranda warnings.1 Therefore, the

Sixth Amendment did not require the presence of counsel during Taylor’s 

December 2016 interrogation, and the adult court did not err in admitting his 

statements to police.

1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
January Term, 2024

3

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 4} Just after midnight on April 15, 2016, Enrique Straughter was shot 

and killed at a Reynoldsburg apartment complex. Responding officers discovered 

the gun rail of a Smith & Wesson M&P semiautomatic pistol, live rounds, shell 

casings, and a key fob that unlocked a nearby Chevrolet Malibu. Taylor’s mother 

had reported the car as stolen, and she told the police that she believed Taylor had 

taken it. She also informed the police that a firearm—a Smith & Wesson M&P40 

pistol belonging to Taylor’s mother’s boyfriend—was in the Malibu.

{¶ 5} Later that day, officers located Taylor, who was then just days away 

from his 18th birthday, and took him into custody to be questioned as a stolen-car 

suspect and a person of interest in the homicide. A detective read Taylor his 

Miranda rights, and Taylor invoked his right to counsel. Despite his invocation, 

the detective continued speaking with and questioning Taylor, and collected a DNA 

sample and conducted a gunshot residue test. Taylor was then released to his 

counsel.

{¶ 6} DNA testing connected Taylor to the gun rail found at the murder 

scene. On December 12, 2016, police arrested Taylor and interrogated him at the 

police station. The detective who interviewed him was aware that Taylor was 

already represented by an attorney regarding the investigation into Straughter’s 

killing. Without his attorney present, Taylor waived his Miranda rights, including 

the right to counsel, answered questions, gave conflicting stories, and eventually

claimed that he had witnessed another person, Damion Wade, shoot Straughter.

{¶ 7} That evening, the state filed a complaint in the Franklin County

juvenile court charging Taylor with Straughter’s murder under R.C. 2903.02(A). 

Pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(A), the state sought mandatory bindover of the charge to 

the general division of the common pleas court for prosecution of Taylor as an 

adult. The juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Taylor committed
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the offense of complicity to commit murder (with a firearm specification) and 

transferred the matter to the adult court.

{¶ 8} Taylor was then indicted on one count each of aggravated murder, 

murder, and felony murder predicated on felonious assault, with each count 

carrying a firearm specification. The adult court suppressed Taylor’s DNA sample 

and any statements that he made to police on April 15, 2016, after he had invoked 

his right to counsel, but the court allowed the admission of statements Taylor made 

to police on December 12, 2016.

{¶ 9} A jury acquitted Taylor of aggravated murder and murder but 

convicted him of felony murder and the accompanying firearm specification. The 

adult court imposed an aggregate sentence of 18 years to life in prison.

{¶ 10} The Tenth District vacated Taylor’s conviction and remanded the 

case to the juvenile court for further proceedings. 2022-Ohio-2877, 194 N.E.3d 

867, ¶ 34. Relying on this court’s recent decision in State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 

423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, the court of appeals explained that the adult 

court obtains jurisdiction over only those acts that were charged in the juvenile 

complaint and that the juvenile court has found probable cause to believe the 

juvenile committed. 2022-Ohio-2877 at ¶ 16-19. The appellate court concluded 

that here, the offense of complicity to commit murder, for which the juvenile court 

found probable cause, was not equivalent to the offense of felony murder and that

the adult court therefore lacked jurisdiction to convict Taylor of felony murder in 

the absence of a finding by the juvenile court of probable cause to believe that

Taylor committed that offense. Id. at ¶ 22.

{¶ 11} The court of appeals also reversed the adult court’s order denying 

Taylor’s motion to suppress his December 12, 2016 statements to police. Id. at 

¶ 32. The appellate court acknowledged that Taylor had validly waived his Fifth 

Amendment right to counsel. Id. at ¶ 26. However, the court of appeals applied a 

different analysis to whether Taylor had waived his Sixth Amendment right “ ‘to 
January Term, 2024

5

have counsel present at all “critical” stages of the criminal proceedings,’ ” including

“ ‘[i]nterrogation by the State.’ ” Id. at ¶ 27, quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 

U.S. 778, 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009), quoting United States v. 

Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), and Powell 

v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed.2d 158 (1932). It determined 

that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached by the time officers arrested 

and interrogated Taylor, because an adversarial judicial proceeding had begun 

“when the state approved [the detective’s] request to file a charge and arrest 

Taylor.” Id. at ¶ 29. The court noted that Taylor invoked his right to counsel on 

April 15, 2016, and further, that under the totality of the circumstances, he had not 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel when he executed the Miranda-waiver form on December 12, 2016. Id. at 

¶ 24, 30-31. The court emphasized the fact that the detective was aware that Taylor 

had been represented by counsel but nonetheless chose to interrogate him. Id. at 

¶ 30.

{¶ 12} We accepted the state’s appeal to review five propositions of law:

1. State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, does 

not prohibit complicity-based mandatory bindovers on category-one 

offenses.

2. R.C. 2151.23(H) authorizes an adult court to convict a 

defendant of any offense “rooted in” the offense that was the basis 

of the transfer, unless the conviction is for an offense that was 

charged in juvenile court and found to be unsupported by probable 

cause.

3. The jurisdiction referenced in R.C. 2151.23(H) implicates 

jurisdiction over the case, not subject-matter jurisdiction.
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4. The right to counsel in juvenile proceedings under either 

the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause attaches not upon 

the State’s approval of charges, but rather upon the actual filing of 

the complaint.

5. The right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment 

or the Due Process Clause may not be anticipatorily asserted prior 

to the filing of the juvenile complaint and may be waived without 

the advice of counsel.

See 168 Ohio St.3d 1479, 2022-Ohio-4617, 200 N.E.3d 261.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. The Adult Court Had Jurisdiction

{¶ 13} This court has considered bindover jurisdiction on two recent

occasions, and this case is governed by the same analysis set forth in the first 

decision, Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, and edified 

in Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801. Both decisions 

examined the prior version of R.C. 2151.23(H) and analyzed the scope of 

jurisdiction in cases that begin in juvenile court and are then transferred to adult 

court. In Smith, we held that “when a juvenile court determines that there is no 

probable cause for an act charged, the adult court has no jurisdiction over that 

charge.” Smith at ¶ 2. Burns considered a related question—“whether the state 

must prove in juvenile court that there is probable cause to believe that a juvenile 

committed every act charged before the juvenile may be indicted for those acts in 

adult court.” Burns at ¶ 1. We answered that “a case transferred from juvenile 

court may result in new indicted charges in the adult court when the new charges 

are rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint but were not 

specifically named in the individual acts transferred.” Id. at ¶ 13. In Burns, the 

state did not bring charges for attempted murder in the juvenile court, but the grand 
January Term, 2024

7

jury indicted on two counts for attempted murder. See id. Because those charges 

were rooted in the same acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint

(involving the same conduct, against the same victims, at the same time), the state 

could proceed with those counts in adult court. See id.

{¶ 14} Here, the juvenile court found that there was probable cause to 

believe that Taylor committed the offense of complicity to commit murder, with 

the attendant firearm specification, and it bound that charge over to the adult court. 

The grand jury then charged Taylor with aggravated murder, murder, and felony 

murder predicated on felonious assault, with each count including a firearm 

specification. At trial, Taylor was found guilty of felony murder only, along with 

the accompanying firearm specification.

{¶ 15} This case is similar to Burns in that the state did not present the 

felony-murder charge in juvenile court, so there was no finding of probable cause 

or a lack thereof regarding that offense. See Burns at ¶ 13. But this case also 

resembles Burns in another respect: the felony-murder charge was rooted in the 

same acts and events as the complicity-to-commit-murder charge—namely, the 

fatal shooting of Straughter. See id. Both charges rely on the same set of facts that

was present in the juvenile-court complaint; therefore, under former R.C. 

2151.23(H), 2016 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 410, and Smith and Burns, the adult court had 

jurisdiction over the felony-murder charge.

{¶ 16} There is one wrinkle in applying Smith and Burns to this case, 

however, as Taylor noted in his supplemental brief to the Tenth District and his 

briefing in this court. While the juvenile court found that probable cause existed to 

believe that Taylor was complicit in Straughter’s murder, that court did not find 

probable cause to believe that “he committed the murder by pulling the trigger.” 

The juvenile-court judge noted the lack of probable cause on the principal-offender

theory twice from the bench, and she reaffirmed the court’s finding in a judgment 

entry. Despite the juvenile court’s finding that there was no probable cause to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

believe that Taylor pulled the trigger, the state proceeded under both theories in 

adult court—that Taylor either shot Straughter himself or that he was complicit in 

Straughter’s killing by providing the gun to another shooter—and the jury was 

instructed that it could find Taylor guilty as a “principal offender or as a 

complicitor.” (Emphasis added.) In fact, Taylor’s defense counsel argued that the 

jury should not be instructed on complicity because, she asserted, there was a lack 

of evidence to support that theory. The jury-verdict form similarly did not require 

the jury to specify whether it found Taylor guilty under a principal or a complicity 

theory. However, Taylor’s counsel did not object to the verdict forms at trial.

{¶ 17} To be clear, the state could not and should not have charged Taylor 

as a principal, since the juvenile court found no probable cause to believe that 

Taylor was the person who shot Straughter. See Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-

Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, at ¶ 2. But it is unclear whether the jury even found 

Taylor guilty of felony murder under a principal-offender theory given the opaque 

verdict forms. Based on the unclear record and Taylor’s failure to clarify or correct 

the record below, we do not consider this issue and it would not affect our analysis.

{¶ 18} Finally, we decline Taylor’s invitation to overrule Burns. The 

decision to overrule precedent should not be made lightly, and Taylor has not put 

forth a compelling argument that Burns is incorrect or impractical. We further note 

that the General Assembly embraced this court’s correct interpretation of R.C. 

2151.23(H) when the legislature amended that provision and enacted R.C. 2152.022 

in order to ratify the rule we announced in Smith and subsequently edified in Burns. 

See 2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288; Ohio Legislative Service Commission, Final 

Analysis, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288, at 12, 102-104, available at

https://www.legislature.ohio.gov/download?key=20455&format=pdf (accessed 

Mar. 12, 2024) (noting that the changes to the bindover laws followed “the 

applicable case law under State v. Smith”). Additionally, the Tenth District did not 

have the opportunity to apply Burns in this case, as its decision was issued four 
January Term, 2024

9

months prior to our release of Burns. It would be imprudent to overrule precedent 

that the court of appeals did not even cite in its analysis.

{¶ 19} In taking the position that Smith and Burns should be overruled, the 

first concurring opinion completely disregards the doctrine of stare decisis, and it

does so unnecessarily. That opinion serves only to advocate for the contrary 

position asserted in those cases. See opinion concurring in part and concurring in 

judgment only, Kennedy, C.J., ¶ 48-54; Smith at ¶ 45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); 

Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801, at ¶ 66-69 (Kennedy, 

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And while the first concurring opinion

posits that Smith and Burns were wrongly decided, the position it advances has been 

rejected four times by this court. See Smith; Burns; State v. Williams, __ Ohio St.3d 

__, 2024-Ohio-1433, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 15-21. In fact, the only change in the relevant 

law since this court decided Smith and Burns has been the General Assembly’s 

enactment of legislation ratifying the rule set forth in Smith, and as the second 

concurring opinion notes, overruling those cases would create a “competing set of 

approaches” to this narrow issue for “pre- and post-April 2023 bindovers,” opinion 

concurring in part and concurring in judgment, Fischer, J., ¶ 64.

{¶ 20} Consequently, the court of appeals erred in holding that the adult 

court lacked jurisdiction to convict Taylor of felony murder.

B. Taylor Waived His Right to Counsel

1. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

{¶ 21} The court of appeals held that Taylor’s December 12, 2016 

statements to police should have been suppressed, based solely on its interpretation 

of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2022-Ohio-2877, 194 

N.E.3d 867, at ¶ 28-32.

{¶ 22} The Sixth Amendment provides, “In all criminal prosecutions, the 

accused shall enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 

defence.” Under the plain language of the Sixth Amendment, the right to counsel 
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belongs to an accused and does not attach until a criminal prosecution has 

commenced. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., Texas, 554 U.S. 191, 198, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 

171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008). The United States Supreme Court has “pegged 

commencement [of a criminal prosecution] to ‘ “the initiation of adversary judicial 

criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 

indictment, information, or arraignment.” ’ ” Id., quoting United States v. Gouveia, 

467 U.S. 180, 188, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984), quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 

406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972) (plurality opinion). 

“[O]nce the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the Sixth Amendment 

guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all ‘critical’ stages of 

the criminal proceedings. * * * Interrogation by the State is such a stage.” Montejo, 

556 U.S. at 786, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 173 L.Ed.2d 955, quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-

228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, and Powell, 287 U.S. at 57, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 

L.Ed. 158.

{¶ 23} Taylor was taken into custody and interrogated on December 12, 

2016. His criminal prosecution commenced after that interrogation—at the earliest,

with the filing of the juvenile complaint, which occurred several hours after the 

interrogation ended. Because a criminal prosecution had not been commenced 

before the December 12, 2016 interrogation that resulted in Taylor’s statements to 

police, the Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present at all critical stages of 

the proceedings had not yet attached.

{¶ 24} But even if the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached, 

Taylor waived it. “[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a 

defendant, so long as relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and 

intelligent. The defendant may waive the right whether or not he is already 

represented by counsel; the decision to waive need not itself be counseled.” 

(Citations omitted.) Montejo at 786. “And when a defendant is read his Miranda

rights (which include the right to have counsel present during interrogation) and 
January Term, 2024

11

agrees to waive those rights, that typically does the trick” to waive the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel. Id.

{¶ 25} The court of appeals concluded that Taylor had validly waived his 

Fifth Amendment right to counsel, 2022-Ohio-2877, 194 N.E.3d 867, at ¶ 26, a 

holding that Taylor has not challenged in this court and that is now the law of the 

case. His waiver of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel also relinquished any

Sixth Amendment right to counsel he may have had.

{¶ 26} Therefore, the court of appeals erred in concluding that the Sixth 

Amendment required the suppression of the statements Taylor made to police on 

December 12, 2016.

2. Due-Process Right to Counsel

{¶ 27} Lastly, the right to counsel in a juvenile-delinquency proceeding is 

guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 

1177, ¶ 79. That right to counsel is codified in R.C. 2151.352, in which “the 

legislature provided a statutory right to appointed counsel that goes beyond 

constitutional requirements,” C.S. at ¶ 83. Like the Sixth Amendment, R.C. 

2151.352 affords juveniles a right to counsel at “all stages” of the proceedings, and

this court has recognized that the statutory right to counsel in juvenile cases attaches 

“upon the filing of a complaint in juvenile court or upon initial appearance in the 

juvenile court,” In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538, 978 N.E.2d 164, 

syllabus.

{¶ 28} To the extent that the due-process right to counsel applies in this case 

to Taylor, who was an adult at the time of the December 12, 2016 interrogation, it 

did not attach until the state filed the complaint in the juvenile court. A video 

recording of that interview reveals that Taylor was brought into the interrogation 

room at 11:18 a.m. and that he was taken from the interrogation room at 2:24 p.m. 

The juvenile complaint, however, is time stamped 9:21 p.m. the same day. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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Consequently, the due-process right to counsel had not attached at the time Taylor 

made his December 12, 2016 statements to police.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 29} The General Division of the Franklin County Court of Common 

Pleas had jurisdiction over the felony-murder charge against Taylor pursuant to 

former R.C. 2151.23(H), as that charge was “rooted in the [same] act[] that [was] 

the subject of the juvenile complaint but [was] not specifically named in the 

individual act[] transferred,” Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 

N.E.3d 801, at ¶ 13. The felony-murder charge and the complicity-to-commitmurder charge both stemmed from Taylor’s alleged involvement in the fatal 

shooting of Straughter. The state did not bring extraneous or completely unrelated 

charges in its case in the adult court. Moreover, while the state could not and should 

not have pursued charges against Taylor as a principal offender, the record does not 

establish that the jury convicted Taylor under that theory, and Taylor has forfeited 

any argument on this issue by failing to object on these grounds.

{¶ 30} Further, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches upon the 

commencement of a criminal prosecution, and that occurred in this case after the 

police interrogated Taylor. Therefore, the state did not violate Taylor’s Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel when it interviewed him on December 12, 2016, in 

the absence of his attorney. And even if the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had 

attached, Taylor validly waived it when he relinquished his Fifth Amendment right 

to counsel after he received the Miranda warnings.

{¶ 31} For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Tenth District 

Court of Appeals and remand this matter to that court for it to consider Taylor’s

assignments of error that were not considered in the first instance.

Judgment reversed

and cause remanded.

DONNELLY and FORBES, JJ., concur.
January Term, 2024

13

KENNEDY, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in judgment only in part, with 

an opinion joined by DEWINE and DETERS, JJ.

FISCHER, J., concurs in part and concurs in the judgment, with an opinion.

LISA FORBES, J., of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 

BRUNNER, J.

_________________

KENNEDY, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment only in 

part.

{¶ 32} This case involves two distinct issues. The first is whether the Tenth 

District Court of Appeals correctly held that certain statements appellee, Damon L. 

Taylor, made to police should have been suppressed. I agree with the majority that 

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution did not require the 

suppression of those statements, and I therefore join Part II(B) of the lead opinion.

{¶ 33} The second issue is whether the appellate court correctly held that 

the General Division of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas lacked 

jurisdiction to convict Taylor of felony murder. I agree with the majority’s 

conclusion that the Tenth District got it wrong and that the general division of the 

common pleas court had jurisdiction over the felony-murder charge against Taylor. 

I write separately, however, to explain why Ohio law requires this result.

{¶ 34} Under a mandatory bindover, a juvenile who is alleged to have

committed a qualifying offense and who meets certain age requirements must be 

transferred from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for prosecution in the general 

division of the common pleas court (the “adult court”). And under the bindover 

statutes in effect prior to their amendment in 2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288, once a 

case was bound over, the adult court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and 

determine the case and convict the juvenile of the offense that was the basis of the 

transfer of the case or of another offense that was different from the offense charged
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in the complaint filed in juvenile court. Former R.C. 2151.23(H), 2014 

Am.Sub.S.B. No. 43.

{¶ 35} But this court in State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 

194 N.E.3d 297, and State v. Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 

N.E.3d 801, grafted new limits onto the straightforward language of the bindover 

statutes that were in effect at the time of Taylor’s transfer to the adult court. In 

Smith, the court held that the adult court lacks jurisdiction over charged offenses 

that the juvenile court found no probable cause to believe the juvenile had 

committed. Smith at ¶ 44. And in Burns, the court said that the adult court does 

have jurisdiction over charges that were not alleged in the juvenile complaint, but 

only if the new charges are “rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile 

complaint.” Burns at ¶ 13.

{¶ 36} Neither of these limitations on the adult court’s jurisdiction appear 

in the plain language of former R.C. 2151.23(H), 2014 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 43. That 

statute stated that when a case was transferred from the juvenile court for 

prosecution in the adult court, the adult court had “jurisdiction * * * to enter a 

judgment of conviction * * * against the child for the commission of the offense 

that was the basis of the transfer of the case for criminal prosecution, whether the 

conviction is for the same degree or a lesser degree of the offense charged, for the 

commission of a lesser-included offense, or for the commission of another offense 

that is different from the offense charged.” (Emphasis added.) An adult court was 

therefore not deprived of jurisdiction over a charge when the juvenile court had 

found no probable cause to believe that the child committed the charged act. Nor 

was an adult court’s jurisdiction limited to charges that either were transferred by 

the juvenile court or rooted in the acts alleged in the complaint. Because the 

holdings of Smith and Burns contradict the language enacted by the General 

Assembly, I would overrule those decisions today.
January Term, 2024

15

{¶ 37} In this case, the state charged Taylor with murder in the juvenile 

court, and the adult court had jurisdiction to convict him of felony murder even 

though that offense was not specifically charged in the juvenile complaint. 

Consequently, the court of appeals also erred in holding that the adult court lacked 

jurisdiction to convict Taylor for committing felony murder.

{¶ 38} Therefore, while I join Part II(B) of the lead opinion, I otherwise 

concur only in the court’s judgment reversing the judgment of the Tenth District 

and remanding this matter to that court for it to review the assignments of error that 

it did not consider in the first instance.

I. Jurisdiction of Juvenile and Adult Courts over Cases Involving Juveniles

{¶ 39} “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory 

power of a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case.” State v. Harper, 

160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 23. “ ‘A court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual 

parties involved in a particular case.’ ” Id., quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 

141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. “Rather, the focus is 

on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.” Id. “ ‘Once a 

tribunal has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of an action and the parties to 

it, “* * * the right to hear and determine is perfect; and the decision of every 

question thereafter arising is but the exercise of the jurisdiction thus conferred * * 

*.” ’ ” (Ellipses added in Pizza.) Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. Pizza v. Rayford, 62 Ohio St.3d 

382, 384, 582 N.E.2d 992 (1992), quoting Sheldon’s Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio St. 

494, 499 (1854).

{¶ 40} Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he 

courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction 

over all justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.” We have recognized 

that the General Assembly has “exclusive authority * * * to allocate certain subject 
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matters to the exclusive original jurisdiction of specified divisions of the courts of 

common pleas.” State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 

883, ¶ 2.

{¶ 41} The General Assembly exercised that authority when it vested in the 

juvenile courts “exclusive original jurisdiction,” R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), over cases in 

which minors are alleged to be delinquent for committing acts that would be a

criminal offense if committed by an adult, see In re M.P., 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 

2010-Ohio-599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 11. However, the legislature created “ ‘a narrow 

exception to the general rule that juvenile courts have exclusive subject matter 

jurisdiction over any case involving a child.’ ” Aalim at ¶ 2, quoting State v. Wilson, 

73 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995). If a child is 14 years old or older at 

the time of the delinquent act and is alleged to have committed what would be an 

offense if committed by an adult, the case may, and sometimes must, be transferred 

to adult court for prosecution. See R.C. 2151.23(H), 2152.10, and 2152.12.

{¶ 42} Effective April 6, 2023, the General Assembly has amended the 

statutes providing for discretionary and mandatory bindovers to adult court. See

2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288. Those amendments do not impact the bindover in this 

case, which predated the amendments enacted by S.B. 288.

{¶ 43} Relevant here, the applicable version of R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i) 

provided as follows:

After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a 

delinquent child for committing an act that would be aggravated 

murder, murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted murder 

if committed by an adult, the juvenile court at a hearing shall transfer 

the case if * * * [t]he child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at 

the time of the act charged and there is probable cause to believe 

that the child committed the act charged.
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(Emphasis added.) 2012 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 33.

{¶ 44} Former R.C. 2151.23(H), 2014 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 43, stated that 

except as provided in R.C. 2152.121, after a case was transferred to adult court for 

criminal prosecution, the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear 

or determine the case. Instead, “[t]he court to which the case is transferred for 

criminal prosecution * * * has jurisdiction subsequent to the transfer to hear and 

determine the case in the same manner as if the case originally had been 

commenced in that court.” 2014 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 43. Former R.C. 2151.23(H)

specified that the adult court had subject-matter jurisdiction to accept a plea or a 

verdict and to enter a judgment of conviction “for the commission of the offense 

that was the basis of the transfer of the case for criminal prosecution, whether the 

conviction is for the same degree or a lesser degree of the offense charged, for the 

commission of a lesser-included offense, or for the commission of another offense 

that is different from the offense charged.”

{¶ 45} So, once a juvenile’s case was transferred to adult court, the adult 

court was the proper forum for the case and it therefore had subject-matter 

jurisdiction over that case, including offenses that were not initially charged in the 

juvenile-court complaint. Any error in the adult court’s adjudication of the case 

after the transfer involved an error in the exercise of jurisdiction over that particular 

case, not a defect in the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

II. Smith and Burns

{¶ 46} We addressed the bindover statutes recently in Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 

423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, and Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio4606, 208 N.E.3d 801. In Smith, this court stated that “a juvenile court may transfer 

a case or a matter to adult court, but the adult court’s jurisdiction is limited to the 

acts charged for which probable cause was found.” Id. at ¶ 29. The court held that 

“[i]n the absence of a juvenile court’s finding probable cause * * *, no adult court 
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has jurisdiction over acts that were charged in but not bound over by the juvenile 

court.” Id. at ¶ 44.

{¶ 47} But in Burns, this court backtracked and clarified that “an adult court 

is not necessarily limited to considering only the specific acts bound over from the 

juvenile court.” Id. at ¶ 12. Rather, “a case transferred from a juvenile court may 

result in new indicted charges in the adult court when the new charges are rooted 

in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint but were not specifically 

named in the individual acts transferred.” Id. at ¶ 13. The court in Burns concluded 

that the absence of a probable-cause finding in the juvenile court did not preclude 

the adult court from exercising jurisdiction over charges based on conduct alleged 

in the juvenile-court complaint, id.; however, it held that the adult court cannot 

exercise jurisdiction over charges if the same charges were also included in the 

juvenile complaint but found by the juvenile court not to be supported by probable 

cause, id. at ¶ 9-10.

{¶ 48} The problem is that this court departed from the plain language of 

the then-applicable bindover statutes when it held in Smith and reiterated in Burns

that a juvenile court’s finding of no probable cause is a jurisdictional bar to 

prosecution in adult court. See Smith at ¶ 44; Burns at ¶ 8. And the Burns court 

added words to former R.C. 2151.23(H) when it held that new indicted charges in 

adult court are permitted “when the new charges are rooted in the acts that were the 

subject of the juvenile complaint.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 13.

{¶ 49} Smith’s holding that the adult court lacks jurisdiction over charges 

for which the juvenile court found no probable cause misstated the law. Former 

R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a), 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 158, made clear that what was 

transferred from the juvenile court to the adult court was “the case”—not just the 

charges for which the juvenile court found probable cause. Similarly, former R.C. 

2152.12(I), 2016 Sub.H.B. No. 158, provided that a “transfer abates the jurisdiction 

of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent acts alleged in the complaint, 
January Term, 2024

19

and, upon the transfer, all further proceedings pertaining to the act charged shall be 

discontinued in the juvenile court, and the case then shall be within the jurisdiction 

of the court to which it is transferred as described in division (H) of section 2151.23 

of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis added.) Former R.C. 2151.23(H), 2014 

Am.Sub.S.B. No. 43, stated that “[t]he court to which the case is transferred for 

criminal prosecution pursuant to [R.C. 2152.12] has jurisdiction subsequent to the 

transfer to hear and determine the case in the same manner as if the case originally 

had been commenced in that court.” (Emphasis added.) It is the case that was the 

focus of the bindover statutes.

{¶ 50} “Case” means a “criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy.” 

Black’s Law Dictionary 266 (11th Ed.2019). “The word ‘action’ has typically been 

understood to refer to the entire legal proceeding, regardless of how many claims 

or charges are included in the proceeding. This understanding is consistent with 

common parlance. When we say that someone pursued a legal action, we are 

talking about the entire proceeding, not some discrete part of the proceeding.” 

(Citations omitted.) State v. Craig, 159 Ohio St.3d 398, 2020-Ohio-455, 151 

N.E.3d 574, ¶ 13. Similarly, in common parlance, a criminal “case” means all the 

charges that arose from a series of related events. Therefore, the “case” in former 

R.C. 2151.23, 2014 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 43, included all the acts that were charged in 

the juvenile complaint, and it even included acts for which the juvenile court made 

a finding of no probable cause.

{¶ 51} Contrary to this court’s contention in Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 

2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, at ¶ 44, former R.C. 2152.12(I), 2016 Sub.H.B. 

No. 158, did not say that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court abates only as to the 

acts charged for which probable cause was found. Instead, that version of the 

statute provided that the jurisdiction of the juvenile court abates regarding all the 

delinquent acts alleged in the complaint. And former R.C. 2151.23(H), 2014 

Am.Sub.S.B. No. 43, clarified that after a bindover, a juvenile could be charged 
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with and convicted of any offense—even one that was different from the offense 

charged in the complaint filed in juvenile court. The adult court’s jurisdiction 

“includ[ed], but [was] not limited to, jurisdiction to * * * enter a judgment of 

conviction * * *, whether the conviction is for the same degree or a lesser degree 

of the offense charged, for the commission of a lesser-included offense, or for the 

commission of another offense that is different from the offense charged.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id.

{¶ 52} Smith’s holding—which was reaffirmed in Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 

57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801, at ¶ 10—that an adult court cannot exercise 

jurisdiction over bound-over charges for which the juvenile court made a finding 

of no probable cause is simply wrong, and because it is wrong, it should be 

overruled.

{¶ 53} The language in Burns at ¶ 13 stating that “a case transferred from a 

juvenile court may result in new indicted charges in the adult court when the new 

charges are rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile complaint but 

were not specifically named in the individual acts transferred” rewrote the law. 

Although the Burns court purported to rely on former R.C. 2151.23(H), that 

provision does not contain any language limiting new indicted charges to those that 

were “rooted in” the acts alleged in the juvenile complaint.

{¶ 54} Rather, former R.C. 2151.23(H) provided that when a case was 

transferred to adult court for prosecution, the adult court had subject-matter 

jurisdiction to hear and determine the case and to convict the juvenile “of the 

offense that was the basis of the transfer of the case” or “of another offense that is 

different from the offense charged.” 2014 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 43. By the plain words 

of the statute, then, the adult court could enter a conviction for an offense that was 

different from the offense that was the basis of the transfer to adult court, including 

an offense that was not rooted in the acts that were the subject of the juvenile 
January Term, 2024

21

complaint. Burns’s “rooted in” standard is inconsistent with the language of 

former—and current—R.C. 2151.23(H) and should be overruled as well.

III. Applying the Correct Law to the Facts of this Case

{¶ 55} Applying former R.C. 2151.23(H) here demonstrates that the court 

of appeals erred in determining that the adult court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction to convict Taylor of felony murder. The state filed a juvenile complaint 

alleging that Taylor was a delinquent child for murdering Enrique Straughter, and 

the juvenile court found probable cause to believe that Taylor had been complicit 

in Straughter’s murder. When the juvenile court transferred the case to adult court 

and the grand jury indicted Taylor for aggravated murder, murder, and felony 

murder, the adult court had jurisdiction to convict Taylor of each of those offenses. 

That the juvenile complaint did not allege that Taylor was a delinquent child for 

committing felony murder is of no import, because former R.C. 2151.23(H)

permitted the adult court to convict him of offenses that were different from those 

specifically charged in the complaint.

{¶ 56} Consequently, the court of appeals erred in holding that the adult 

court lacked jurisdiction to convict Taylor of committing felony murder.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 57} Under the bindover statutes in effect prior to the amendments in 

2022 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288, when a juvenile’s case was transferred from juvenile 

court for prosecution in adult court, the adult court had subject-matter jurisdiction 

to convict the juvenile of the offense that was the basis of the transfer of the case 

or of another offense that was different from the offense charged in the juvenile 

complaint. So, although the juvenile complaint in this case had charged Taylor 

with murder and the juvenile court had found probable cause to believe only that 

he had been complicit in a murder, the trial court had jurisdiction to convict Taylor 

of felony murder.
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{¶ 58} Further, as explained in Part II(B) of the lead opinion, the state did 

not violate Taylor’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it interviewed him on 

December 12, 2016, in the absence of his attorney.

{¶ 59} For these reasons, while I join Part II(B) of the lead opinion, I 

otherwise concur only in the court’s judgment reversing the judgment of the Tenth 

District Court of Appeals and remanding this matter to that court for it to review 

those assignments of error that it did not consider in the first instance.

DEWINE and DETERS, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.

_________________

FISCHER, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment.

{¶ 60} I concur in this court’s judgment reversing the judgment of the Tenth 

District Court of Appeals. I write separately to briefly outline my position 

regarding State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, and 

State v. Burns, 170 Ohio St.3d 57, 2022-Ohio-4606, 208 N.E.3d 801.

{¶ 61} First, I concur fully and unequivocally in the portions of the lead 

opinion analyzing and disposing of appellee Damon L. Taylor’s Sixth Amendment 

and due-process arguments regarding the right to counsel. Therefore, I join Part 

II(B) of the lead opinion.

{¶ 62} Second, I agree with some of the points the lead opinion makes in 

relation to the adult court’s jurisdiction over the felony-murder charge that Tayor 

was convicted of. As the lead opinion acknowledges, the statutes providing for 

discretionary and mandatory bindovers to adult court were recently amended by the 

General Assembly, effective in April 2023. See lead opinion, ¶ 18, citing 2022 

Am.Sub.S.B. No. 288. The bindover in this case predated those amendments, so 

those amendments do not and cannot affect Taylor’s bindover. I agree that the 

existence of those amendments underscores the notion that it is not prudent for us 

to revisit our decisions in Smith and Burns.
January Term, 2024

23

{¶ 63} I unequivocally joined the separate opinions in Smith and Burns. See 

Smith at ¶ 92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Burns at ¶ 77 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 

part and dissenting in part). At those times—Smith was decided in February 2022, 

and Burns was decided in December 2022—I agreed with the analysis set forth in 

those separate opinions. And I still believe that those separate opinions best applied 

the text of the relevant statutory provisions in the context of those cases.

{¶ 64} However, the General Assembly has spoken definitively about how 

bindover cases from April 2023 forward are to be handled. Any further statements 

of law we make regarding pre-April 2023 bindover proceedings will apply to a 

shrinking number of cases. Overruling Smith and Burns at this late date could have 

multiple consequences—some foreseeable and perhaps some unforeseeable—and 

will effectively set up an unnecessary competing set of approaches to pre- and postApril 2023 bindovers. While I fully agreed with the approach set forth in the 

separate opinions in Smith and Burns, the relationship between the majority 

opinion’s approach in Smith and the post-Smith amendments to the relevant 

bindover statutes raise doubts in my mind as to whether it is necessary for us to 

overrule those decisions at this time.

{¶ 65} Additionally, the parties in this case have not advocated for Smith or 

Burns to be overruled. See State v. Gwynne, 173 Ohio St.3d 525, 2023-Ohio-3851, 

___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 34 (“We should not be addressing issues that were not presented 

in the proposition of law”), citing State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 48 (Fischer, J., concurring in judgment only). And I 

otherwise remain unconvinced that in light of the statutory amendments, the high 

standard for overruling previous decisions of this court has been met with regard to 

Smith and Burns. Thus, after careful consideration, I conclude that the most prudent 

approach is to let Smith and Burns stand.
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{¶ 66} For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the judgment reversing 

the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanding the matter to 

that court for review of Taylor’s remaining assignments of error.

__________________

G. Gary Tyack, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Carpenter Lipps, L.L.P., and Kort Gatterdam; and Timothy Young, Ohio 

Public Defender, and Lauren Hammersmith and Timothy B. Hackett, Assistant

Public Defenders, for appellee.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy 

Solicitor General, and Samuel C. Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General, urging 

reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel 

T. Van and Gregory Ochocki, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, urging reversal for 

amicus curiae Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office.

_________________