### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Ma y 25, 200 6 S es sio n TERRY R. CLAYTON, ET AL 

### . v. CA MILLE M. HER NA ND EZ

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 02C-3233 Barbara Haynes, Judge

No. M2005- 01714-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on S eptem ber 28, 2006

Trial cour t gr anted dismissal for failure of se rvice of process although defendant failed t o raise the defe nse timely

by motion or in her answe r. We reve rse. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN , and F R ANK G. C L EME NT , J R ., J J ., joined.
Terry R. Clay ton, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellants Ter

ry R. Clay ton and Shery l Clay ton. Sh ar o n E

. E n g lan d , F r a n k li n , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll e e , Cami ll e M

. H e r n a n d e z. OP IN ION
I n 2001, Mr. Clayton was involved in an automobile acc ident involving Ms. Hernandez. As a re sult, Mr. and Mrs. Clay ton sue d Ms. H ernandez se eking to r ecove r damag es. Attempts to serve thecom pl ain t on Ms. He rn a nd e z we reun su c c e ssf ul. Th e Clayton s th e n h ir e d a private pr oc e ss s e r v e r w h o s e r e tu r n o f

s e r v ic e p r o v id e d “ s e r v e d to f e ma leth a t s tate d s h e w a s n o t [ M s . H e r n a n d e z], but she lived there

. Would not g ive name, how ever , seeme d to know about summons.” There afte r, in M a y of 20 04 , co un se l for Ms. He rn a nd e z fi le d a Not ic e of Ap pe aranc e that pr ov ide d a s f oll ow s: Co me s n o w . . . a n d h e r e b y ma k e s s p e c ia l ap p e ar a n c e o n b e h a lf o f [M s . H e r n a n d e z], without waiving any

rig ht s or def

enses pur suant to Rule 12 . . . including, but not lim ite d to , la c k o f p e rs on a l ju ri sd ic tio n andfailu reof se rv ic e of

pr oc e ss. The re cord doe s not show that any action wa s taken by

counsel pursuant to this “special a ppear ance .”
I n J une of 2004, Ms. H ernandez f iled an answe r wher ein she raised sever al a ff i rm at i ve de fe ns e s in c lud ing failu re to state a c la im u nd e r R ule12 .0 2( 6) of theTe nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi lW e n ot e t h e mot i on t o di s mi s s l at er f i l ed by M s . H er n an dez e r r oneo usl y a l l eges t h at f ai l u r e of s er v i ce of 1 proces s was r ai s ed as a def ens e i n her ans wer : “ D ef endan t f i l ed ans wer by t he un ders i gn ed at t orn ey . . . . T he ans wer as s er t ed as pot en t i al de fen s es l ac k of a n d f ai l u r e of s er v i ce of pr oce s s . ” T h e an s we r a ppea r i n g i n t h e r ec or d doe s n ot i ncl ude t hat af

f i r mat i ve defens e. T hi s sam e erro ne o us al l ega t i on was made by coun s el for M s . H er nan dez i n h er R e sp o n se to P la intiff ’s M o tio n to C o m p e l.

O n ap p eal , co unsel fo r M s. H ernand ez st at es i n her b ri ef that her mo t i o n t o dis m i ss was based on i nsuf f i ci ent 2 pr oce s s a n d e x pi r at i on of t h e l i mi t at i on s pe r i od. T h at t oo i s e r r on eou s . T he mot i on r el i ed s ol el y on i n s u f f i ci en cy of p ro ce ss o r i nsuff

i cien cy o f

service o f

p ro ce ss. -2- Pr oc e du rea nd the statut e of lim itatio ns . No wh e re in Ms. He rn a nd e z’s a ns we r did sh e raise a de fe ns e under Rule 12.02(2) or (5) alleg ing lack of jurisdiction ove r Ms. H ernandez or insu ff i ci en cy of proce ss. After

filing he r answe r, counse l for Ms. Hernandez p ar t icipated in a status confer ence , 1 i s s u ed s ev er al s u b p o en as fo r M r. C l ay t o n ’s m ed i ca l re co rd s , ap p ro v ed a s ch ed u l i n g o rd ers et t i n g a trial date, took Mr

. Clay ton’s deposition and otherwise participated fully i n t h i s l itigation. There afte r, i n April of 2005, Ms. Hernandez fil ed a motion to dismiss based on failure of service of pr oc e ss. Th e tria l c ou rt

g rante d M s. He rn a nd e z’s mot ion , a ndplaint if fs app e a l. 2
Th e Clayton s a

rg ue that di smi ssa l w a s n ot a pp ro priate s i n c eM s . H e rn an d e z s u b m i tt e d h e rs e lf to the court’s jurisdiction by filing an answe r that did not raise insuff icient servic e and pa

rticipating in discovery . Ms. Hernandez’s counsel c laims that th e“ specia l appea ranc e” r eserved the insuff

icient proce ss defe nse. Rule 12.02 provides that all def enses sha ll be asserted in the re sponsive pleading except that eig ht enumerated def

enses, including insufficienc y of service of proce ss, may be made by

motion. Rule 12.08 provides “Aparty waives a ll defense s . . . whi ch t h e p ar t y d o es not prese nt either by motion . . . or, if the party has m ade no motion, in the party ’s answe r.” Furthermor e, insuffic iency of proc ess may

not be ra ised by

amendment to the answer. Rule 12.08. As a g ener al rule, de fec ts in process, service of proce ss, and return of service may be waived. T he Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedur e expressly state that whe re the issue is not raised prope rly , the defendant waives t he objection. The failure of a def endant to challeng e insuffic iency of proce ss in a ccor dancewith Rule 8.03 will constit ute a waiver of the matter

raised in a

motion. It is also g ener ally held that a de fendant may also, by his c onduct, be estoppe d to object that prope r service wa s not made. Such conduct may

include participating in discove ry , in addition to failing to raise the issue o f i n s u f f i c i e n c y o f s e r v i c e c l e ar l y o r

w i t h t h e n e c e s s ar y s p e c i f i c i t y. Faulks v. Crowder , 99 S.W .3d 116, 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ( internal c itations omi tted).C o u n se l f o r M s. H e rn a n d e z a p p e a rs to c o n te n d th a t b y s p e c ifi c a lly re se rv ing th e s e rv ic e o f p ro c e ss issu e in 3 he r “spe cial ap p ea ran ce ,” she h as s o m eh o w o b viated t he ne ed t o co m p l y w i t h R ule 1 2 ’ s req uirem en t t ha t t his de fen se be r ai s ed i n t h e i n i t i al r es ponsi v e pl ea di n g or mot i on f i l ed bef or e t h e r es pon s i v e pl ea di n g . Su ch a c on t en t i on i s n ot s u ppor t abl e. Fi r s t , a n ot i ce of a ppea r an ce i s not a re s pon s i v e pl ea di n g . Se con d, s i mpl y s t at i n g t h e appe ar an ce doe s n ot “wa i ve ” a ny d efen ses d o es no t co nsti t ute an asserti o n o f such d efen ses. -3- The filing of the “ specia l appea ranc e” itself did n ot serve to waive the insuffic iency of pr oc e ss d e fe ns e si nce it wa s e xpre ssl y re se rv e d. It pu t th e c ou rt a ndplaint if

f o n n oti c e that Ms

. 3 Hernandez was repr esente d by counsel and that there may be questions about service. At that point M s . He rn an d ez was fr ee to f ile a motion to dism iss based on service of proce ss or raise it in her answe r unpre

judiced by the not ice of specia l appea ranc e. Howe ver, w hen Ms. Hernandez did not pursue the de fense by

motion or raise it in her answer , then pursuant to Rule 12.08, the insufficienc y of proc ess def

ense w as wa ived. Counsel for Ms. Hernandez points to the fact that she raised the proce ss issue in her Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. This Re sponse, howeve r, wa s filed af ter the answer, and Rule 12.08 prohibits amendment to add this defe nse whether im plicitly or otherw ise. The de fendant also relies on Dye v. Murphy , No. W2003-01521-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 350660 (Tenn. Ct. App. Fe b. 25, 2004), which w e do not find helpful to her position.
I n Dye , th e pa

rty fi le d a “ sp e c ia l app e aranc e ” re se rv ing a ll d e fens es. Th e re a ft e r, thepa rty filed a motion for summary judgme nt raising a statute of limitations defense. The re is no mention of an answer be ing f

iled. The c ourt in Dye stated: Under Rule 12, althoug h a spec ial appea ranc e is no long er r equire d, a party who files a motion or re s p o nsive pleading but does not raise the defe nses of pe rsonal jurisdi ct i on, improper ve nue, insuffic iency of proc ess, and insuff

iciency of service of pr oc e ss i s d e e me d to ha ve waive d th os e de fe ns e s. Id ., 2004 WL

350660, at *3, citing Robert B anks, J r. an d J une F . Entman, T ENNES S EE C IV IL P ROCE D U RE , § 5

- 6 ( a )

. T h e d e f e n s e in Dye wa s properly raised by motion. As in t his case, the “spec ial appea

ranc e” did not waive any

defe nse. The issue in Dye a ndhe reis w he the r the de fe ns e has bee n appropriately

raised in e ither a pre- answe r m otion or t he answ er. In Dye , it w a s p ro pe rl y raised by motion. I n our ca se, it was not ra ised in the answe r or p re -a n s we r m otion and was there fore waived.
For the fore g oing rea sons, the trial court is r ever sed and the matter is r emande d. Costs are a s s e s s e d a g a i n s tt h e ap p e l l e e , C a m i l l e M

. H e r n a n d e z , f o r w h i c h p r o c e s s m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE