* The case is unanimously ordered submitted withoutoral argument

pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The Court g enerally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and ju dgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### MAR 26 2002 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

DAVID ANDREW WOODRUFF, Petitioner - Appellant, v. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent - Appellee. No. 01-8013 (D.C. No. 00-CV-120-B) (D. Wyoming)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before EBEL , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

Pro se petitioner David Andrew Woodruff, a Wyoming state prisoner, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) to challenge the district court’s dismissal of his pet ition for a writ of habeas corpus as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). We deny a COA and dismiss. On March 12, 1997, Woodruff was convicted in Wyomin g state court of-2-

first degree sexual assault and attempted first deg ree sexual assault. He does not appear to have appealed those convictions. On June 15, 2000, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the premise th at he “is presently denied his right to access the court,” and that he “has this r ight pursuant to Wyoming Constitution Art. 158 and the 14th and 5th amendmen t due process clauses of the US Constitution.” (R. Doc. 1 at 1.) The district court dismissed the petition, reasoning that it was untimely because it was filed more than a year after his convictions became final. Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death P enalty Act of 1996, prisoners challenging the validity of their convict ions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 generally have one year from the date on which thei r convictions become final to petition for federal habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S. C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). A conviction becomes final “by the conclusion of dire ct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Id. Nevertheless, prisoners may file a habeas petition one year from “the date on which the factu al predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” § 2244(d)(1)(D). In dismissing the petition as time-barred, the dist rict court applied the period of limitation set forth in § 2244(d)(1)(A), without giving consideration to the alternate period set forth in § 2244(d)(1)(D). It seems to us that the latter is a1 We note that the relief sought by Woodruff is notavailable in a § 1983

suit. See McIntosh , 115 F.3d at 812 (“A habeas corpus proceeding attacks the fact or duration of a prisoner’s confinement and se eks the remedy of immediate release or a shortened period of confinement. In c ontrast, a civil rights action . . . attacks the conditions of the prisoner’s confinemen t and requests monetary compensation for such conditions.” (quotation omitt ed)). Petitioner specifically (continued...) -3- better fit. Woodruff seeks relief, not the on the basis of errors in his prosecution, but on the ground that his indigent status prevents him from meaningful access to the courts (e.g., he claims to be unable to pay fil ing fees and is prevented from making photocopies and using a typewriter). In add ition, he takes issue with the actions of several courts—from the Wyoming districtcourt to the United States Supreme Court—in a civil case where “Woodruff claim ed he wishe[d] to challenge his conviction on grounds he was refused counsel at trial and to challenge the conditions of confinement.” (R. Doc. 1 at 2.) In one of his objections, Woodruff clarifies that his “habeas corpus petition isn’t challenging trial or sentencing errors of the court who convict ed him.” (R. Doc. 7 at 2.) Nevertheless, we decline to issue a COA because the substantive claims for which Woodruff seeks habeas relief—i.e., early rele ase—are not cognizable under the federal habeas corpus statutes. Under our prec edent, “condition of confinement” suits by state inmates are civil right s suits properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm’n , 115 F.3d 809, 811–12 (10th Cir. 1997). 11 (...continued)

claims that “remedies such as monetary or injunctiv e [relief] will not remedy” his injury. (R. Doc. 1 at 2.) -4- Petitioner’s application for a COA is therefore DENIED , and this matter is
DISMISSED . The mandate shall issue forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge