[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-14123

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-02681-TWT

EKATERINA SEVOSTIYANOVA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

COBB COUNTY OF GEORGIA, 

OFFICER A. C. AYERS, 

JOHN DOE I,

RICHARD CUNNINGHAM, 

JOHN DOE, III, et al.,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(June 13, 2014)

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2

Before HULL, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

We previously remanded Ekaterina Sevostiyanova’s pro se 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

malicious prosecution claim against Cobb County Police Officer Christopher 

Ayers for the district court to address the claim and make factual findings. On 

remand, Ayers moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. 

Sevostiyanova again appeals and, after review, we affirm.

 I.

The underlying facts of the case are set out in our previous opinion, 

Sevostiyanova v. Cobb County of Georgia., 484 F. App’x 355 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(unpublished) (Sevostiyanova I). In summary, as relevant to this appeal, 

Sevostiyanova was arrested and charged with driving without proof of insurance 

and for a hit-and-run accident. Although the insurance-related charge was dropped 

because Sevostiyanova had insurance at the time of the accident, she was convicted 

by a jury of the hit and run. Thereafter, Sevostiyanova filed a § 1983 complaint 

against multiple defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to all 

defendants on all other claims, but did not specifically discuss or make factual 

findings as to the malicious prosecution claim against Ayers. On appeal, we

remanded for the district court to address the malicious prosecution claim. Ayers 

then renewed his motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted,

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finding that Sevostiyanova failed to show damages because her underlying arrest 

was valid and supported by probable cause for the hit-and-run charge. 

 II.

On appeal, Sevostiyanova argues that Officer Ayers improperly filed a 

renewed motion for summary judgment, contrary to our mandate in Sevostiyanova 

I, and that he should have been held in contempt for doing so. She also challenges 

the entry of summary judgment itself.

A. Contempt

We review the denial of a motion for civil contempt under the abuse of 

discretion standard. McGregor v. Chierico, 206 F.3d 1378, 1383 (11th Cir. 2000). 

The primary question in regards to the charge of civil contempt is whether the 

alleged contemnors have complied with the court’s order. FTC v. Leshin, 618 F.3d 

1221, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010).

1

Civil contempt issues generally do not arise when multiple decisions are 

rendered by courts in a particular case, and a litigant seeks to have a court 

disregard a prior ruling therein. Instead, the law-of-the-case doctrine and the 

mandate rule apply. See Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F.2d 1437, 1440 

(11th Cir. 1984). Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, we, along with the district

 1 Although Sevostiyanova discusses both civil and criminal contempt, we need only address her 

civil contempt argument because her contention is that Officer Ayers and the district court failed 

to comply with our previous order. See Leshin, 618 F.3d at 1233.

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court, are generally bound by findings of fact and conclusions of law made by this 

court in a prior appeal of the same case. Id. The mandate rule, a specific 

application of the doctrine, provides that a district court is not free to deviate from 

the appellate court’s mandate. Id. at 1440 n.2. 

We conclude that the district court properly denied Sevostiyanova’s motion 

to hold Ayers in contempt. Our opinion in Sevostiyanova I concluded only that 

Sevostiyanova had sufficiently alleged and preserved her malicious prosecution 

claim and that the district court had failed to rule on it. Nothing in Sevostiyanova I

addressed the merits of the malicious prosecution claim. Neither the mandate rule 

nor the law-of-the-case doctrine limited Ayers’s ability to renew his motion for 

summary judgment. Accordingly, there was no basis for holding Ayers in 

contempt.

II. 

We review the district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, 

drawing all inferences and reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the non-moving party. Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011). 

The moving party may prove that there are no genuine issues of material fact by 

demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient to support the essential elements of 

the claims. Id. Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than those 

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drafted by lawyers, and thus, are entitled to liberal construction. Alba v. Montford, 

517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). 

“To establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must prove 

two things: (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution; and 

(2) a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 

seizures.” Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Under Georgia law, the elements of malicious prosecution include: 

“(1) prosecution for a criminal offense; (2) instigated without probable cause; (3) 

with malice; (4) under a valid warrant, accusation or summons; (5) which has 

terminated favorably to the plaintiff; and (6) has caused damage to the plaintiff.” 

Barnette v. Coastal Hematology & Oncology, P.C., 670 S.E.2d 217, 220 (Ga. Ct. 

App. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).2

 “[I]t is well established that an 

arrest without probable cause is an unreasonable seizure that violates the Fourth 

Amendment.” Grider, 618 F.3d at 1256. Thus, “the existence of probable cause 

defeats a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim.” Id.; see also Holmes v. Achor Ctr., 

531 S.E.2d 773, 775 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that the existence of probable 

cause is an absolute defense to a malicious prosecution claim). 

 2

 This Circuit “has identified malicious prosecution as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and 

a viable constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983.” Grider, 618 F.3d at 1256 (internal citation 

omitted). “[A]lthough both state law and federal law help inform the elements of the common 

law tort of malicious prosecution, a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under § 

1983 remains a federal constitutional claim, and its elements and whether they are met ultimately 

are controlled by federal law.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

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We conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in 

this case. As we have explained, “when a crime under which the arrest is made 

and a crime for which probable cause exists are in some fashion related, then there 

is no question but that there is a valid arrest.” United States v. Atkinson, 450 F.2d 

835, 838 (5th Cir. 1971) (quoting Mills v. Wainwright, 415 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 

1969). 

Sevostiyanova was arrested for the hit and run and the insurance charge at 

the same time on the same warrant. In our previous opinion, we held that probable 

cause existed for the hit-and-run charge, Sevostiyanova, 484 F. App’x at 359, n.3, 

and under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the district court was bound by our

previous determination, Wheeler, 746 F.2d at 1440. Thus, even if Ayers lacked 

probable cause to arrest and charge Sevostiyanova for no proof of insurance, the 

valid arrest and conviction on the hit-and-run charge precluded Sevostiyanova

from establishing damage or harm arising from her arrest for the insurance-related 

charge.

3

 

Because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to damages, Ayers 

was entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim.

AFFIRMED.

 3

 Because Sevostiyanova’s hit-and-run conviction has been affirmed, Sevostiyanova v. State, 

722 S.E.2d 333 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012), she cannot attack the validity of that conviction in federal 

court. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).

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