IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 10–0912

Filed April 8, 2011

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

RICHARD R. SCHMIDT,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

The Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa filed a 

report recommending respondent’s license be suspended for six months. 

LICENSE SUSPENDED.

Charles L. Harrington and Elizabeth E. Quinlan, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

Mark McCormick of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, for 

respondent. 
2

WIGGINS, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Disciplinary Board filed a complaint 

alleging the respondent, Richard R. Schmidt, violated ethical rules by 

communicating with a represented party without the consent of opposing 

counsel or a court order and by engaging in domestic abuse. The 

grievance commission found Schmidt’s conduct violated provisions of the 

Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct and recommended Schmidt’s license 

be suspended for six months. Having considered the record, we agree 

Schmidt committed ethical violations. We disagree, however, with the 

commission’s sanction recommendation; therefore, we suspend his 

license to practice law in Iowa for thirty days.

I. Scope of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Axt, 791 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 

2010). The board has the burden of proving an attorney’s ethical 

misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Id. “This 

burden is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but more than the 

preponderance standard required in the usual civil case.” Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 

2004). We are not bound by the commission’s findings and 

recommendations, but we give them respectful consideration. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lustgraaf, 792 N.W.2d 295, 297

(Iowa 2010). We give particular weight to the commission’s assessments 

of witnesses’ credibility. Id. at 299. Upon proof of misconduct, we may 

impose a greater or lesser sanction than the sanction recommended by 

the commission. Axt, 791 N.W.2d at 101.
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II. Proceedings.

On April 13, 2009, the board filed its complaint against Schmidt. 

In count I, the complaint alleged Schmidt violated Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct 32:8.4(b), which prohibits misconduct reflecting 

adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law, and 32:8.4(d), which 

prohibits misconduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in 

connection with his commission and conviction of aggravated 

misdemeanor domestic abuse crimes against his wife. In count II, the 

complaint claimed Schmidt violated rule 32:8.4(d), as well as rule 

32:4.2(a), which prohibits communication with a represented party 

without the opposing party’s consent or a court order. The board claims 

the violation occurred when Schmidt, or his representative at his 

direction, was involved in assisting his client in personally obtaining the 

opposing party’s signature on a consent decree when such actions 

violated a no-contact order and opposing counsel did not consent to the 

actions nor did a court order permit them.1

In its report, the commission found Schmidt committed the alleged 

ethical violations. The commission also recommended a six-month 

suspension. 

III. Findings of Fact.

On our de novo review, we find the facts as follow.

A. General Background. Schmidt was born and raised in 

Des Moines, Iowa. He attended Iowa State University. In May 1994

Schmidt graduated from Drake Law School and began private practice in 

 1Also in connection with counts I and II, the board alleged, and the commission 

found, violations of rule 32:8.4(a), which prohibits misconduct in violation of the rules 

of professional conduct. We do not consider a violation of this rule as a separate ethical 

infraction, and so we give it no further consideration. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Iowa 2010).
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the areas of family law, personal injury, and workers’ compensation. 

Schmidt currently practices in Des Moines in a four-lawyer group of sole

practitioners.

B. Prohibited Communication with a Represented Party. In 

November 2005 Schmidt filed a petition for dissolution of marriage for a

wife. Attorney Mason J. Ouderkirk represented the husband. The 

district court entered several orders, including one continuing a nocontact order between the husband and wife. Schmidt sent Ouderkirk a 

consent decree that Schmidt’s client wanted her spouse to sign. 

Ouderkirk presented the consent decree to the husband. The husband 

rejected it. During the course of the representation, Schmidt filed several 

applications to show cause as to why the husband was not in violation of 

the no-contact order. 

On May 26, 2006, the husband called Ouderkirk to inform him 

that he and his wife had come to an agreement and Ouderkirk should be 

receiving a revised consent decree. The same day, the wife called 

Schmidt, requesting he prepare the same consent decree he had 

previously prepared and informing him that her husband would probably 

terminate Ouderkirk’s representation. Schmidt, either personally or 

through a representative in his law office acting upon his direction, 

changed the consent decree to indicate the husband was pro se,

removing references to Ouderkirk’s representation from the decree. The 

wife then picked up the consent decree and took it to her husband. Both 

parties signed the decree before a notary public. Schmidt then signed 

the decree.

After the decree was signed, Schmidt faxed it to Ouderkirk’s office. 

After reviewing the decree, Ouderkirk told Schmidt he found the 
5

situation unusual and noted Schmidt had stated the husband was pro se 

when he knew Ouderkirk was the attorney of record. 

Ouderkirk contacted his client, informing him the decree had all 

the provisions to which the husband had previously objected to, the 

decree was unfair to the husband, and Ouderkirk did not approve of the 

decree. Ouderkirk then informed the husband that the husband had to 

decide whether he wished to continue with the proceedings or agree to

the decree. The husband contacted Ouderkirk and stated he did not 

want to continue with the proceedings. 

On May 31 Ouderkirk filed an application to withdraw and 

Schmidt filed a dismissal of the application to show cause why the nocontact order had not been violated by the husband. In June 2006 the 

court granted Ouderkirk’s motion to withdraw and filed the consent 

decree.

C. Domestic Abuse. On June 6, 2006, the incident of domestic 

abuse by Schmidt of his wife occurred. Prior to June 6 Schmidt had 

never been violent toward his wife. Moreover, Schmidt had never acted 

with violence toward anyone else.

Schmidt’s marriage was tumultuous. In 1997 Schmidt began 

seeking therapeutic assistance for problems in his marriage. He started 

taking doctor-prescribed medications, including medications for 

depression, consisting of Prozac, Wellbutrin, and Effexor. On June 6 

Schmidt was taking Effexor. For about two and one-half years prior to 

June 6, Schmidt did not share a bedroom with his wife, but slept in the 

basement of the couple’s home. In Spring 2006 Schmidt’s wife informed 

him that she intended to leave him.

In August 2005 Schmidt attempted suicide, but failed. After this 

attempt, Schmidt sought psychiatric care. In August 2006 Schmidt 
6

began seeing Dr. Easton, a psychiatrist. Also after his suicide attempt, 

Schmidt began seeing P.J. McDonald, a licensed independent social 

worker and marriage and family therapist. Schmidt continues to see 

both practitioners.

On the evening of June 6, 2006, Schmidt and his wife began 

arguing about childcare issues. They were on the concrete patio near 

their hot tub. When his wife walked away from the argument, Schmidt 

grabbed her and threw her down, causing her to hit her head. Schmidt 

then began to choke her, and she temporarily lost consciousness. 

Schmidt then chased her around the house, choking her two more times 

into unconsciousness. At some point, Schmidt let her up and she fled 

the house, running to a neighbor’s house. Schmidt followed.

Schmidt attacked his wife again in the neighbor’s kitchen as she 

tried to call 911. Eventually, the couple began running through the 

neighbor’s garage. The neighbor, who was in his backyard, went to his 

garage after hearing screaming coming from the garage. The neighbor

asked Schmidt what happened, and Schmidt said his wife had fallen in 

the hot tub, hitting her head. The neighbor went to the kitchen, and 

found the 911 dispatcher still on the line. The dispatcher said help was 

on the way. Throughout the entire incident, the couple’s children

watched and chased them. They screamed and cried for Schmidt to stop.

A Polk County sheriff’s deputy arrived at the neighbor’s house. 

The deputy put Schmidt in the patrol car so he could assist Schmidt’s 

wife. When he returned to the car, he found Schmidt had broken the 

screen or “steel cage” between the front and back seats and had moved 

the deputy’s cell phone. Upon the deputy’s inquiry, Schmidt said he had 

to use the cell phone to make some calls.
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Schmidt’s wife was taken to the emergency room and was seen by 

a physician. The physician found she was in moderate distress, with 

abrasions to her neck, a three-centimeter-long head laceration, and 

abrasions on her nose and knees. Further examination revealed pain 

and stiffness of the neck, consistent with strangulation.

As a result of this incident, Schmidt pleaded guilty to two 

aggravated misdemeanors involving domestic abuse crimes. In March 

2007 Schmidt was sentenced to incarceration for one year with all but 

thirty days suspended. The no-contact order prohibiting Schmidt from 

contact with his wife and children was ordered to remain in full force 

through March 2012, unless modified by a court order.

In November the couple’s marriage was dissolved. In connection 

with the dissolution proceeding, the no-contact order was modified to 

permit Schmidt two supervised visitations with his children. The 

children were too traumatized to visit with Schmidt, and therefore,

Schmidt has not seen his children since June 6, 2006.

In addition to the physical injury she sustained, Schmidt’s wife lost 

thirty pounds, was off work for months, undertook intensive counseling, 

experiences flashbacks, and fears Schmidt. The children were also 

harmed. The children exhibit symptoms of anxiety, especially when 

separated from their mother. They have trouble in crowds, unfamiliar 

surroundings, and staying the night at friends’ houses. At least one 

child has trouble sleeping, has stomach problems, and is on an 

antidepressant. They have been in counseling.

Even before the disposition of his criminal case, Schmidt began 

intensive rehabilitative efforts, attending a ten-day program pertaining to 

therapeutic approaches to change destructive behaviors at a retreat in 

Arizona; a domestic abuse and intervention program at the West Central 
8

Mental Health Center; parent enrichment classes sponsored by the Child 

Abuse Prevention Council; and a five-week program in anger 

management that the children’s therapist recommended. Schmidt 

continues counseling with McDonald and Dr. Easton. He has adopted a 

rigorous exercise regime and has improved his depressive state to the 

point where he is no longer on medications.

Schmidt takes responsibility for his actions and is remorseful. 

McDonald expressed surprise, noting that the incident was “out of 

character” for Schmidt and an “aberration.” Even the district court judge 

who sentenced Schmidt for his aggravated misdemeanors stated that the 

acts “are most accurately described as an aberration in [Schmidt’s] life 

and do not seem likely to be repeated by” him. We agree with this 

assessment. We also agree with the commission’s finding that Schmidt’s 

conduct has not affected his behavior toward his clients, fellow lawyers,

and judges.

IV. Ethical Violations.

A. Violation of Rule 32:4.2(a). Rule 32:4.2(a) provides:

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate 

about the subject of the representation with a person the 

lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 

matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer 

or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:4.2(a). In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board v. Gailey, 790 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 2010), we recently 

had occasion to interpret this rule. In Gailey, we noted that the language 

of rule 32:4.2(a) is substantially similar to our prior disciplinary rule, 

DR 7–104(A)(1). Gailey, 790 N.W.2d at 806. DR 7–104(A)(1) stated:

(A) During the course of representing a client a lawyer 

shall not:
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(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on 

the subject of the representation with a party known to be 

represented by a lawyer in that matter except with the prior 

consent of the lawyer representing such other party or as 

authorized by law.

We then observed that we 

have interpreted our prior rule to prohibit an attorney from 

communicating with an adverse party represented by 

counsel concerning litigation or a transactional matter 

unless the attorney for the adverse party gives the opposing 

attorney permission to talk to the adverse party.

Id. We held that we should interpret rule 32:4.2(a) in the same manner 

we interpreted DR 7–104(A)(1). Id.

The record shows Schmidt, or one of his representatives at 

Schmidt’s direction, prepared the consent decree by removing opposing 

counsel’s name and indicating the husband was proceeding pro se. 

Schmidt, or one of his representatives at his direction, then gave the 

consent decree to the wife so that she could personally take it to her 

husband to sign. The record also indicates that opposing counsel 

objected, showing Schmidt did not have opposing counsel’s consent to 

act as Schmidt did. These facts establish that Schmidt engaged in a 

prohibited communication and violated rule 32:4.2(a). Moreover, 

Schmidt cannot circumvent rule 32:4.2(a) by having his client do what 

he cannot do, especially when a no-contact order exists prohibiting the 

parties from contacting each other. Schmidt aided and abetted his 

client’s violation of that order. See id. at 807 (recognizing, “a lawyer 

should not aid or abet a party to ignore a no-contact order”).

The purpose underlying rule 32:4.2(a) is the same as that of DR 7–

104(A)(1). The rule protects the represented party from the imbalance of 

legal skill and acumen between the lawyer and that party. Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Herrera, 626 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Iowa 
10

2001). The rule “promotes the integrity of the attorney-client 

relationship and serves to prevent a variety of overreaching.” Id. at 113–

14.

B. Violations of Rule 32:8.4(b). Rule 32:8.4(b) provides, “It is 

professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act that 

reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as 

a lawyer in other respects.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(b). We 

recently interpreted rule 32:8.4(b) in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney 

Disciplinary Board v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761 (Iowa 2010). In 

Templeton we stated, “The mere commission of a criminal act does not 

necessarily reflect adversely on the fitness of an attorney to practice law.” 

Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 767 (citing 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The 

Law of Lawyering § 65.4, at 65-8 to 65-9 (3d ed. 2009 Supp.) [hereinafter 

The Law of Lawyering]). “One’s fitness to practice law . . . is determined 

by more than one’s competency in legal matters. It includes one’s 

[moral] character and one’s suitability to act as an officer of the court.” 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Mulford, 625 N.W.2d 

672, 683 (Iowa 2001).

In assessing whether rule 32:8.4(b) has been violated, we look to 

“[t]he nature and circumstances of the act . . . to determine if the 

commission of the criminal act reflects adversely on the attorney’s fitness 

to practice law.” Tempelton, 784 N.W.2d at 767. There cannot be too 

much attention focused on the moral quality of the conduct; instead, the 

court must focus on the link between the conduct and the actor’s ability 

to function as a lawyer. The Law of Lawyering § 65.4, at 65-8. Whether 

an attorney is fit to practice law encompasses whether the attorney “can 

be trusted to represent clients vigorously and without overreaching,” and 

maintain a professional relationship. Id. at 65-9. Whether an attorney is 
11

fit to practice law also depends on whether his conduct manifests 

“character defects calling into question the wisdom of trusting the lawyer 

with important controversies and confidential information.” Id. at 65-9

to 65-10. Pertinent considerations in determining a rule 32:8.4(b) 

violation include:

“the lawyer’s mental state; the extent to which the act 

demonstrates disrespect for the law or law enforcement; the 

presence or absence of a victim; the extent of actual or 

potential injury to a victim; and the presence or absence of a 

pattern of criminal conduct.”

Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 767 (quoting In re Conduct of White, 815 P.2d 

1257, 1265 (Or. 1991)).

An act that signals the characteristic of intemperance is considered 

to be an act that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law. 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Steffes, 588 N.W.2d 

121, 124 (Iowa 1999) (“When an attorney’s conduct cannot fairly be 

characterized as temperate and dignified and crosses the line into 

professional impropriety, such conduct reflects adversely on the 

attorney’s fitness to practice law.”). We have found violations of rule 

32:8.4(b) for acts of violence. See, e.g., Axt, 791 N.W.2d at 101–02; see 

also Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Wilson, 270 N.W.2d 613, 615 

(Iowa 1978) (disciplining respondent for intemperate conduct of assault 

on another attorney under former Canon 1 of our prior Iowa Code of 

Professional Responsibility for Lawyers).

We note that not all acts of violence will lead to discipline. The 

Law of Lawyering § 65.4, at 65-8 to 65-9. For example, a lawyer who 

becomes involved in an isolated incident of assault and battery while 

drunk, “might well be considered unlikely to commit such a violent 

outburst in his professional life,” and thereby not be subject to 
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discipline. Id. at 65-9. “On the other hand, a lawyer who, nursing a 

grudge of some kind, deliberately assaulted another would manifest 

character defects calling into question the wisdom of trusting the lawyer 

with important controversies and confidential information,” and thereby 

be subject to discipline. Id. at 65-9 to 65-10; see also In re Johnson, 471 

P.2d 269, 271 (Ariz. 1970) (“Isolated, trivial incidents of [assault] not 

involving a fixed pattern of misbehavior find ample redress in the 

criminal and civil laws. . . . [Such incidents arise] out of the infirmities of 

human nature. They are not the appropriate subject matter of a solemn 

reprimand by this Court.”); White, 815 P.2d at 1265 (“For example, a 

misdemeanor assault arising from a private dispute would not, in and of 

itself, violate [a disciplinary] rule.”).

We turn now to an application of the Templeton considerations. 

Schmidt’s acts of violence were more than trivial. As to Schmidt’s mental 

state, he and his wife were having marital problems for a number of 

years. Over that time, he chose to remain hostile to his wife, rather than 

end his relationship. At the time of the assaults, he made the conscious 

decision to act on this hostility and assault his wife multiple times, 

rather than walk away from the situation. Schmidt’s depression does not 

excuse the choices he made, especially as there was no evidence 

submitted that this mental condition clouded Schmidt’s judgment in any 

manner. No legal justification, excuse, or defense exists for Schmidt’s 

commission of these acts.

Several actions by Schmidt indicate disrespect of the law or law 

enforcement. Schmidt prevented his wife from calling 911 and tried to 

prevent his neighbor from doing the same by lying to him about what 

had occurred; he broke the steel cage in the police car and then used the 

police officer’s cell phone without permission. The finding of a violation 
13

of rule 32:8.4(b) is also supported by the presence of victims, Schmidt’s

wife and his children. His wife was physically and mentally injured, and 

the children were traumatized. The only consideration weighing in favor 

of finding Schmidt’s conduct was not a violation of the rule is the lack of 

a pattern of criminal conduct. In light of this analysis, we find Schmidt 

violated rule 32:8.4(b) with his acts of domestic abuse.

C. Violations of Rule 32:8.4(d). Schmidt violated rule 32:8.4(d) 

when he communicated with a represented party without opposing 

counsel’s consent, but not when he engaged in private acts of domestic 

violence. Rule 32:8.4(d) provides, “It is professional misconduct for a 

lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration 

of justice.” We have defined conduct prejudicial to the administration of 

justice to be acts that hamper “ ‘the efficient and proper operation of the 

courts or of ancillary systems upon which the courts rely’ ” by violating 

the well-understood norms and conventions of the practice of law. 

Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 768 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 373 (Iowa 2005)); accord

Steffes, 588 N.W.2d at 123.

1. Prohibited communication with a represented party. With regard 

to Schmidt’s communication with a represented party without opposing 

counsel’s consent, the record establishes that Schmidt hampered 

opposing counsel’s representation of the husband so thoroughly that 

opposing counsel was forced to withdraw from representation because he 

believed the consent decree hurt the husband’s interests. This conduct 

violates rule 32:8.4(d), as it constitutes the type of overreaching that our 

ethical rules are meant to prevent in protecting the integrity of the 

attorney-client relationship. Herrera, 626 N.W.2d at 113–14 (discussing 

DR 7–104(A)(1), now found in rule 32:4.2(a)).
14

Further, we stated in Gailey that, 

[i]n order for our system of justice to work, attorneys should 

counsel their clients to abide by court orders. It is outside 

the well-understood norms and conventions of the practice 

of law for a lawyer to aid and abet the violation of a nocontact order . . . .

Gailey, 790 N.W.2d at 807. When Schmidt prepared the consent decree 

for the wife to take to her husband, such actions violated the no-contact 

order in the case, thereby resulting in a violation of rule 32:8.4(d).

2. Domestic abuse. We have held that, when the basis of a 

domestic abuse conviction results from personal conduct that is 

unrelated to the practice of law, no violation of rule 32:8.4(d) occurs. 

Axt, 791 N.W.2d at 102. We have such a case before us; especially given 

our finding that the domestic abuse did not affect Schmidt’s

relationships with his clients, fellow lawyers, and judges. Thus, the 

board has failed to prove this alleged ethical violation.

V. Sanction.

“ ‘There is no standard sanction for a particular type of 

misconduct, and though prior cases can be instructive, we ultimately 

determine an appropriate sanction based on the particular 

circumstances of each case.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.

Ackerman, 786 N.W.2d 491, 497 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Earley, 774 N.W.2d 301, 308 (Iowa 2009)). In 

tailoring the sanction to the particular circumstances of each case,

“we consider the nature of the violations, the attorney’s 

fitness to continue in the practice of law, the protection of

society from those unfit to practice law, the need to uphold 

public confidence in the justice system, deterrence, 

maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any 

aggravating or mitigating circumstances.”
15

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 N.W.2d 53, 61 

(Iowa 2009) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ireland,

748 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Iowa 2008)).

In the past, attorneys have been admonished for violations of 

ethical rules prohibiting communications with represented parties. 

Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Zimmermann, 522 N.W.2d 619, 621 

(Iowa 1994). Unlike a public reprimand, an admonition does not amount 

to discipline. Id. We have also disciplined attorneys for violating ethical 

rules prohibiting communications with represented parties. Sanctions 

have ranged from public reprimands, suspensions of law licenses, and

revocation of law licenses. See, e.g., Gailey, 790 N.W.2d at 808 

(imposing sixty-day suspension of license of respondent with two 

incidents of prior discipline for aiding and abetting client’s violation of a 

no-contact order and offering witness an inducement to testify that is 

prohibited by law); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Box, 715 

N.W.2d 758, 765 (Iowa 2006) (imposing a public reprimand on 

respondent with no prior disciplinary record when prohibited 

communication resulted in substantial harm; rejecting request to 

privately admonish respondent); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Sullins, 556 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Iowa 1996) (imposing a public 

reprimand on respondent for direct contact with child witness in child 

abuse proceedings when respondent knew lawyer would soon be 

appointed for child and refusal to respond to ethical committee’s 

inquiries on an unrelated matter); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Shepler, 519 N.W.2d 92, 93 (Iowa 1994) (revoking respondent’s license 

for intentionally taking advantage of elderly woman with diminished 

capacity by obtaining her signature on three subordination agreements 

after being told woman would not subordinate her interest in property, 
16

as well as by failing to contact woman’s lawyer concerning any business 

dealings after being told to do so); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Hoffman, 402 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Iowa 1987) (imposing a public reprimand 

on respondent whose nine intemperate letters involved some persons 

known to be represented by counsel).

Attorneys also have been admonished for first offense domestic 

violence. Axt, 791 N.W.2d at 100 (indicating that respondent was 

admonished for committing his first offense of domestic abuse assault 

against his wife and for resisting arrest while intoxicated). Again, this 

does not amount to discipline. Zimmermann, 522 N.W.2d at 621. In 

light of our determination that domestic abuse violence is a 

“reprehensible crime,” we now find that admonishment for such acts to 

be inappropriate. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Polson, 569 N.W.2d 612, 613 (Iowa 1997). Under circumstances where 

admonitions have been found sufficient for committing domestic abuse 

assault, we now hold that the more appropriate disposition is to at least 

impose the discipline of a public reprimand.

In one nondomestic assault case involving other serious 

misconduct, we imposed a two-month suspension. Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Thompson, 595 N.W.2d 132, 135–36 

(Iowa 1999) (imposing two-month suspension on respondent’s license for 

conviction of assault and criminal trespass). As to our prior domestic 

abuse cases, we have imposed the discipline of suspension ranging from 

three months to two years, depending on the nature and extent of other 

misconduct proved by the board in the same case. See, e.g., Axt, 791 

N.W.2d at 102–03 (imposing two-year suspension of respondent’s license

with prior record of discipline for second offense domestic abuse assault 

and multiple violations of a court’s no-contact order); Iowa Supreme Ct. 
17

Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ruth, 636 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Iowa 2001) 

(imposing six-month suspension of respondent’s license for domestic 

abuse and OWI-third offense convictions); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l 

Ethics & Conduct v. Apland, 599 N.W.2d 453, 454–56 (Iowa 1999) 

(imposing two-year suspension on respondent’s license for “embarking 

on a course of harassment, threats, misrepresentations, and outright 

lies” toward his ex-wife and representing himself to be an attorney when 

his license was under suspension); Polson, 569 N.W.2d at 613–14

(imposing two-year suspension on respondent’s license for conviction of 

domestic abuse causing injury and thirty-one violations of a protective 

order); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lapointe, 415 N.W.2d 617, 

620 (Iowa 1987) (imposing fourteen-month suspension on respondent’s 

license for convictions of assault on his girlfriend and tampering with a 

witness); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Patterson, 369 N.W.2d 798, 

799, 801 (Iowa 1985) (imposing three-month suspension on 

respondent’s license for conviction of domestic assault lasting two hours 

where photographs “taken the following day show a badly disfigured and 

battered woman, a dramatic testimonial to respondent’s eighteen-month 

instruction in the martial arts”). The common thread in these assault 

cases in which we imposed a suspension is that the attorney also 

committed other serious misconduct.

The mitigating circumstances present include the following. First, 

Schmidt has no prior record of discipline. Lustgraaf, 792 N.W.2d at 301–

02 (considering prior ethical practices in fashioning sanction). Second, 

Schmidt suffered from clinical depression and he has received in-depth 

treatment for his depression and domestic abuse. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Fields, 790 N.W.2d 791, 799–800 (Iowa 2010) 

(considering depression a mitigating circumstance and noting 
18

respondent’s “efforts to get healthy must be considered in fashioning an 

appropriate sanction”). Third, Schmidt takes responsibility for his 

actions and is remorseful. Id. at 799 (noting respondent “acknowledged 

his misconduct and has not attempted to shift blame for his actions”). 

Fourth, the incident of domestic abuse was out of character for Schmidt 

and an aberration. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 

781 N.W.2d 263, 271 (Iowa 2010) (noting imposition of public reprimand 

was appropriate when ethical violation was an isolated incident involving 

client trust account violations). Fifth, Schmidt’s domestic-abuse conduct 

did not affect his behavior toward his clients, fellow lawyers, or judges. 

Axt, 791 N.W.2d at 102 (holding no violation of rule 32:8.4(d) occurred 

because the domestic abuse did not occur within the context of 

respondent’s practice). Finally, the mere act of communicating with a 

represented party without opposing counsel’s consent is normally not an 

offense requiring suspension of an attorney’s license. Box, 715 N.W.2d 

at 765 (imposing a public reprimand on respondent with no prior 

disciplinary record for communicating with a represented party without 

opposing counsel’s consent); Sullins, 556 N.W.2d at 457; Hoffman, 402 

N.W.2d at 451. While none of these mitigating circumstances excuse 

Schmidt’s conduct, they nevertheless constitute factors that we take into 

account in imposing less severe discipline. Fields, 790 N.W.2d at 799–

800 (recognizing mitigating circumstances do not excuse conduct, but 

are considered in fashioning discipline).

Acts of domestic abuse committed by attorneys are serious and will 

not be tolerated by this court. Schmidt’s acts were not trivial. He had no 

legal justification or defense for his actions. His actions are especially 

egregious, not only because his conduct caused substantial harm to his 

spouse and his children, but also because he attempted to prohibit his 
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spouse from contacting the authorities and, when apprehended, he 

displayed a disregard towards the police by breaking the screen between 

the front and back seats of the police vehicle. Generally, these 

circumstances would require us to suspend Schmidt’s license for a 

period of up to six months. However, the mitigating circumstances 

compel us to suspend Schmidt’s license to practice law for a shorter 

period. We consider the most important mitigating factors being his lack 

of prior discipline, his taking responsibility for his actions, his 

remorsefulness, and the fact that this act was a one-time aberration and 

not a part of a pattern of abuse. We also note that he has taken 

significant steps to prevent this from happening again.

VI. Disposition.

Accordingly, we suspend Schmidt from the practice of law for thirty 

days. This suspension applies to all facets of the practice of law. See

Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(3). Schmidt must comply with Iowa Court Rule 35.22 

dealing with notification of clients and counsel. Costs of this action are 

taxed to Schmidt pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.26. Absent an 

objection by the board and under the condition that Schmidt has paid all 

costs assessed under rule 35.26, we shall reinstate Schmidt’s license to 

practice law on the day after the thirty-day suspension period expires. 

See Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(2).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.

All justices concur except Mansfield, J., who takes no part.