(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD.

v. NEWTON

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 18–389. Argued April 16, 2019—Decided June 10, 2019

Respondent Brian Newton worked for petitioner Parker Drilling Management Services on drilling platforms off the California coast. Newton was paid for his time on duty but not for his time on standby, 

during which he could not leave the platform. Newton filed a class 

action in state court, alleging, as relevant here, that California’s minimum-wage and overtime laws required Parker to compensate him 

for his standby time. Parker removed the action to Federal District 

Court. The parties agreed that Parker’s platforms were subject to 

the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which provides that 

all law on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is federal law, administered by federal officials; denies States any interest in or jurisdiction 

over the OCS; and deems the adjacent State’s laws to be federal law

only “[t]o the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent 

with” other federal law, 43 U. S. C. §1333(a)(2)(A). The District 

Court concluded that the state laws relevant here should not be applied as federal law on the OCS because the Fair Labor Standards 

Act of 1938 (FLSA), a comprehensive federal wage-and-hour scheme, 

left no significant gap in federal law for state law to fill. It thus

granted Parker judgment on the pleadings. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. It held that state law is “applicable” under the 

OCSLA if it pertains to the subject matter at issue, a standard satisfied by California wage-and-hour laws. It also held that those state 

laws were not “inconsistent” with federal law because they were not 

incompatible with the federal scheme. 

Held: 

1. Where federal law addresses the relevant issue, state law is not 

adopted as surrogate federal law on the OCS. Pp. 3–14.
2 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD. v.

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Syllabus

 (a) After this Court held that the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the entire continental shelf, see, e.g., United 

States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699, 705, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act, which ceded certain offshore lands to the coastal 

States, and passed the OCSLA, which affirmed the Federal Government’s exclusive control over the OCS. Pp. 3–4.

 (b) Newton argues that state law is “applicable” on the OCS 

whenever it pertains to the subject matter at issue and that it is “inconsistent” only if it would be pre-empted under ordinary preemption principles. Parker counters that state law is not “applicable” 

absent a gap in federal law that needs to be filled and that state law 

can be “inconsistent” with federal law even if it is possible to satisfy 

both sets of laws. Parker’s approach is more persuasive. This Court

reads the statute’s words “ ‘in their context and with a view to their 

place in the overall statutory scheme.’ ” Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U. S. 93, 101. The Court’s pre-OCSLA decisions made 

clear that federal law controlled the OCS in every respect, and the 

OCSLA reaffirmed that role. Taken together, the OCSLA’s provisions convincingly show that state laws can be “applicable and not inconsistent” with federal law under §1333(a)(2)(A) only if federal law 

does not address the relevant issue. The OCSLA makes apparent 

“that federal law is ‘exclusive’ . . . and that state law is adopted only 

as surrogate federal law.” Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 

395 U. S. 352, 357. It borrows only certain state laws, which are then

declared to be federal law and administered by federal officials. It 

would thus make little sense to treat the OCS as a mere extension of 

the adjacent State, where state law applies unless it conflicts with 

federal law. That type of pre-emption analysis applies only where 

overlapping, dual state and federal jurisdiction makes it necessary to

decide which law takes precedence. But federal law is the only law 

on the OCS and there is no overlapping state and federal jurisdiction, 

so the reference to “not inconsistent” state laws presents only the 

question whether federal law has already addressed the relevant issue. If so, state law on the issue is inapplicable. Pp. 5–8.

 (c) This interpretation is supported by several other considerations. Pp. 8–14.

 (1) Newton’s interpretation—that the choice-of-law question on 

the OCS is the same as it would be in an adjacent State—would deprive much of the OCSLA of any import, violating the “ ‘cardinal 

principle’ of interpretation that courts ‘must give effect, if possible, to 

every clause and word of a statute.’ ” Loughrin v. United States, 573

U. S. 351, 358. Pp. 8–9.

 (2) This Court’s interpretation is consistent with the federalenclave model and the historical development of the statute. The 
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

Syllabus

OCSLA treats the OCS as “an upland federal enclave.” Rodrigue, 

supra, at 366. Generally, when an area in a State becomes a federal 

enclave, “only the [state] law in effect at the time of the transfer of 

jurisdiction continues in force” as surrogate federal law, James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 94, 100, provided that the state law 

does not conflict with “federal policy,” Paul v. United States, 371 U. S.

245, 269. Going forward, state law presumptively does not apply to 

the enclave. See Sadrakula, supra, at 100. As originally enacted, the 

OCSLA both treated the OCS as a federal enclave and adopted only 

the “applicable and not inconsistent” laws of the adjacent State in effect as of the Act’s effective date. This suggests that, like the general 

enclave rule, the OCSLA sought to make all OCS law federal yet also 

“provide a sufficiently detailed legal framework to govern life” on the 

OCS. Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 488 U. S. 19, 27. 

Providing a sufficient legal structure to accomplish that purpose 

eliminated the need to adopt new state laws. The OCSLA’s text and 

context thus suggest that state law is not adopted to govern the OCS 

where federal law is on point. The later amendment of the OCSLA to 

adopt state law on an ongoing basis confirms the connection between 

the OCSLA and the federal enclave model. Pp. 9–11.

 (3) This Court’s interpretation accords with precedent construing the OCSLA. In Rodrigue, supra, at 352–353; Chevron Oil Co. v. 

Huson, 404 U. S. 97; and Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453

U. S. 473, the Court viewed the OCSLA as adopting state law to fill 

in federal-law gaps. Pp. 11–14.

2. Under the proper standard, some of Newton’s present claims can 

be resolved, though others have not been analyzed by the Ninth Circuit. Some claims are premised on the adoption of California law requiring payment for all standby time. Because federal law already 

addresses this issue, California law does not provide the rule of decision on the OCS. To the extent Newton’s OCS-based claims rely on 

that law, they necessarily fail. Likewise, to the extent his OCS-based 

claims rely on the adoption of California’s minimum wage, the FLSA 

already provides for a minimum wage, so the state minimum wage is 

not adopted as federal law and does not apply on the OCS. Pp. 14–

15.

881 F. 3d 1078 and 888 F. 3d 1085, vacated and remanded.

 THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

Opinion of the Court

 NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in 

the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested 

to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, 

Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in 

order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to 

press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 18–389

_________________ 

PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD., 

PETITIONER v. BRIAN NEWTON

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[June 10, 2019] 

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 67 

Stat. 462, 43 U. S. C. §1331 et seq., extends federal law to 

the subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf and 

all attachments thereon (OCS). Under the OCSLA, all law 

on the OCS is federal law, administered by federal officials. The OCSLA denies States any interest in or jurisdiction over the OCS, and it deems the adjacent State’s 

laws to be federal law “[t]o the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with” other federal law. 

§1333(a)(2)(A). The question before us is how to determine which state laws meet this requirement and therefore should be adopted as federal law. Applying familiar 

tools of statutory interpretation, we hold that where federal law addresses the relevant issue, state law is not 

adopted as surrogate federal law on the OCS.

I 

Respondent Brian Newton worked for petitioner Parker 

Drilling Management Services on drilling platforms off the 

coast of California. Newton’s 14-day shifts involved 12 
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Opinion of the Court

hours per day on duty and 12 hours per day on standby, 

during which he could not leave the platform. He was 

paid well above the California and federal minimum wages

for his time on duty, but he was not paid for his standby 

time.

Newton filed a class action in California state court 

alleging violations of several California wage-and-hour 

laws and related state-law claims. Among other things, 

Newton claimed that California’s minimum-wage and 

overtime laws required Parker to compensate him for the 

time he spent on standby. Parker removed the action to 

Federal District Court. The parties agreed that Parker’s 

platforms were subject to the OCSLA. Their disagreement 

centered on whether the relevant California laws were 

“applicable and not inconsistent” with existing federal law 

and thus deemed to be the applicable federal law under 

the OCSLA. §1333(a)(2)(A).

The District Court applied Fifth Circuit precedent 

providing that under the OCSLA, “state law only applies 

to the extent it is necessary ‘to fill a significant void or gap’ 

in federal law.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 51 (quoting Continental Oil Co. v. London Steam-Ship Owners’ Mut. Ins. 

Assn., 417 F. 2d 1030, 1036 (1969)). It determined that 

the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 52 Stat. 

1060, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq., constitutes a comprehensive 

federal wage-and-hour scheme and thus left no significant 

gap for state law to fill. Because all of Newton’s claims 

relied on state law, the court granted Parker judgment on 

the pleadings.

The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. It first held 

that state law is “‘applicable’” under the OCSLA whenever

it “pertain[s] to the subject matter at hand.” 881 F. 3d 

1078, 1090, amended and reh’g en banc denied, 888 F. 3d 

1085 (2018). The court found that California wage-andhour laws satisfied this standard and turned to “the determinative question in Newton’s case”: “whether Califor-
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

Opinion of the Court

nia wage and hour laws are ‘inconsistent with’ existing 

federal law.” 881 F. 3d, at 1093. According to the Ninth 

Circuit, state laws are “inconsistent” with federal law 

under the OCSLA only “if they are mutually incompatible, 

incongruous, [or] inharmonious.” Ibid. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Applying that standard, the court determined that no inconsistency exists between the FLSA and 

California wage-and-hour law because the FLSA saving 

clause “explicitly permits more protective state wage and 

hour laws.” Id., at 1097 (citing 29 U. S. C. §218(a)). Given 

the disagreement between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, 

we granted certiorari. 586 U. S. ___ (2019).

II

Before the OCSLA, coastal States and the Federal Government disputed who had the right to lease submerged 

lands on the continental shelf. Some coastal States even 

asserted jurisdiction all the way to the outer edge of the 

shelf. See Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue, 488 U. S. 

19, 26 (1988). The disputes eventually reached this Court, 

which held in a series of decisions that the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the entire continental shelf. See United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 

38–39 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699, 

705 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707, 717–718

(1950). 

After these decisions, Congress divided jurisdiction over 

the shelf. In 1953, Congress enacted the Submerged 

Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. §1301 et seq., which 

ceded to the coastal States offshore lands within a specified distance of their coasts. A few months later, Congress 

passed the OCSLA, which affirmed that the Federal Government exercised exclusive control over the OCS, defined 

as “all submerged lands” beyond the lands reserved to the 

States up to the edge of the United States’ jurisdiction and 

control. §1331(a). Specifically, the OCSLA declares that 
4 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD. v.

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Opinion of the Court

“the subsoil and seabed of the [OCS] appertain to the 

United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, 

and power of disposition.” §1332(1). The OCSLA then 

sets forth “detailed provisions for the exercise of exclusive 

jurisdiction in the area and for the leasing and development of the resources of the seabed.” United States v. 

Maine, 420 U. S. 515, 527 (1975); see §§1334–1354.

Of primary relevance here, the OCSLA defines the body 

of law that governs the OCS. First, in §1333(a)(1), the 

OCSLA extends “[t]he Constitution and laws and civil and 

political jurisdiction of the United States” to the OCS. 

Section 1333(a)(1) provides that federal law applies “to the 

same extent as if the [OCS] were an area of exclusive 

Federal jurisdiction located within a State.” Then, 

§1333(a)(2)(A) provides:

 “To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal 

laws and regulations of the Secretary now in effect or 

hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each 

adjacent State, now in effect or hereafter adopted, 

amended, or repealed are declared to be the law of the 

United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which 

would be within the area of the State if its boundaries 

were extended seaward to the outer margin of the 

outer Continental Shelf . . . .”

Section 1333(a)(2)(A) also states that “[a]ll of such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the 

appropriate officers and courts of the United States.” 

Finally, §1333(a)(3) emphasizes that “[t]he provisions of 

this section for adoption of State law as the law of the 

United States shall never be interpreted as a basis for 

claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any 

State for any purpose over” the OCS.
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 

Opinion of the Court

III

A 

The question in this case is how to interpret the 

OCSLA’s command that state laws be adopted as federal 

law on the OCS “[t]o the extent that they are applicable 

and not inconsistent” with other federal law. 

§1333(a)(2)(A). Echoing the Ninth Circuit, Newton argues 

that state law is “applicable” on the OCS whenever it 

pertains to the subject matter at issue. Newton further 

argues that state law is only “inconsistent” with federal 

law if it is incompatible with the federal scheme. In essence, Newton’s argument is that state law is “inconsistent” only if it would be pre-empted under our ordinary 

pre-emption principles.

Parker, on the other hand, argues that state law is not 

“applicable” on the OCS in the absence of a gap in federal

law that needs to be filled. Moreover, Parker argues that 

state law can be “inconsistent” with federal law even if it 

is possible for a party to satisfy both sets of laws. Specifically, Parker contends that, although the FLSA normally 

accommodates more protective state wage-and-hour laws, 

such laws are inconsistent with the FLSA when adopting 

state law as surrogate federal law because federal law 

would then contain two different standards.

B 

Although this is a close question of statutory interpretation, on the whole we find Parker’s approach more persuasive because “‘the words of a statute must be read in their 

context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.’” Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 

U. S. 93, 101 (2012). That rule is particularly relevant 

here, as the terms “applicable” and “not inconsistent” are 

susceptible of interpretations that would deprive one term 

or the other of meaning. If Newton is right that “applicable” merely means relevant to the subject matter, then the 
6 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD. v.

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Opinion of the Court

word adds nothing to the statute, for an irrelevant law 

would never be “applicable” in that sense. Cf. Ransom v. 

FIA Card Services, N. A., 562 U. S. 61, 70 (2011) (declining 

to interpret the word “applicable” in such a way that 

Congress “could have omitted the term . . . altogether”). 

And if Parker is right that “applicable” means “necessary 

to fill a gap in federal law,” it is hard to imagine circumstances in which “not inconsistent” would add anything to 

the statute, for a state law would rarely be inconsistent 

with a federal law that leaves a gap that needs to be filled. 

Moreover, when the OCSLA was enacted, the term “inconsistent” could mean either “incompatible,” as Newton 

contends, or merely “inharmonious,” as Parker argues. 

Webster’s New International Dictionary 1259 (2d ed. 

1953); see also Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary 1245 (1957) (“logically discrepant” or “disagreeing” 

and “discordant”); The New Century Dictionary 811 (1953) 

(“self-contradictory” or “at variance”); 5 Oxford English 

Dictionary 173 (1933) (“incongruous” or “not agreeing in 

substance, spirit, or form”). In short, the two terms standing alone do not resolve the question before us. Particularly given their indeterminacy in isolation, the terms 

should be read together and interpreted in light of the 

entire statute. See Star Athletica, L. L. C. v. Varsity 

Brands, Inc., 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 6) 

(“‘[I]nterpretation of a phrase of uncertain reach is not 

confined to a single sentence when the text of the whole 

statute gives instruction as to its meaning’”).

Our pre-OCSLA decisions made clear that the Federal 

Government controlled the OCS in every respect, and the 

OCSLA reaffirmed the central role of federal law on the 

OCS. See supra, at 3–4. As discussed, the OCSLA gives 

the Federal Government complete “jurisdiction, control, 

and power of disposition” over the OCS, while giving the 

States no “interest in or jurisdiction” over it. §§1332(1), 

1333(a)(3). The statute applies federal law to the OCS “to 
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 

Opinion of the Court

the same extent as if the [OCS] were an area of exclusive 

Federal jurisdiction located within a State.” §1333(a)(1). 

Accordingly, the only law on the OCS is federal law, and 

state laws are adopted as federal law only “[t]o the extent 

that they are applicable and not inconsistent with” federal 

law. §1333(a)(2)(A).

Taken together, these provisions convince us that state 

laws can be “applicable and not inconsistent” with federal 

law under §1333(a)(2)(A) only if federal law does not address the relevant issue. As we have said before, the 

OCSLA makes apparent “that federal law is ‘exclusive’ in 

its regulation of [the OCS], and that state law is adopted 

only as surrogate federal law.” Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty 

& Surety Co., 395 U. S. 352, 357 (1969). The OCSLA 

extends all federal law to the OCS, and instead of also 

extending state law writ large, it borrows only certain 

state laws. These laws, in turn, are declared to be federal 

law and are administered by federal officials. Given the 

primacy of federal law on the OCS and the limited role of 

state law, it would make little sense to treat the OCS as a 

mere extension of the adjacent State, where state law 

applies unless it conflicts with federal law. See PLIVA,

Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U. S. 604, 617–618 (2011). That type 

of pre-emption analysis is applicable only where the overlapping, dual jurisdiction of the Federal and State Governments makes it necessary to decide which law takes 

precedence. But the OCS is not, and never was, part of a 

State, so state law has never applied of its own force. 

Because federal law is the only law on the OCS, and there 

has never been overlapping state and federal jurisdiction 

there, the statute’s reference to “not inconsistent” state 

laws does not present the ordinary question in preemption cases—i.e., whether a conflict exists between 

federal and state law. Instead, the question is whether 

federal law has already addressed the relevant issue; if so, 

state law addressing the same issue would necessarily be 
8 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD. v.

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Opinion of the Court

inconsistent with existing federal law and cannot be 

adopted as surrogate federal law. Put another way, to the 

extent federal law applies to a particular issue, state law 

is inapplicable.

C 

Apart from §1333(a)(2)’s place in the overall statutory 

scheme, several other considerations support our interpretation, which accords with the standard long applied by 

the Fifth Circuit, see Continental Oil, 417 F. 2d, at 1036–

1037. First, if Newton were correct that the choice-of-law 

question on the OCS is the same as it would be in an 

adjacent State, much of the OCSLA would be unnecessary. 

Second, our interpretation is consistent with the federalenclave model—a model that the OCSLA expressly invokes—and the historical development of the statute. And 

third, the Court’s precedents have treated the OCSLA in 

accord with our interpretation.

1 

Under Newton’s interpretation, state law would apply 

unless pre-empted by federal law, meaning that the OCS 

would be treated essentially the same as the adjacent 

State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. But that interpretation 

would render much of the OCSLA unnecessary. For example, the statute would not have needed to adopt state 

law as federal law or say that federal law applies on the 

OCS as if it “were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction 

located within a State.” §§1333(a)(1)–(2). It could have 

simply defined which State’s law applied on the OCS and 

given federal officials and courts the authority to enforce 

the law. And the statute would not have needed to limit 

state laws on the OCS to those “applicable and not inconsistent” with federal law (as Newton understands those 

words), for irrelevant laws never apply and federal law is 

always “supreme,” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Newton’s 
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 9 

Opinion of the Court

interpretation deprives much of the statute of any import, 

violating the “‘cardinal principle’ of interpretation that 

courts ‘must give effect, if possible, to every clause and 

word of a statute.’” Loughrin v. United States, 573 U. S. 

351, 358 (2014).

2 

Further support for our interpretation comes from the 

statute’s treatment of the OCS as “an area of exclusive 

Federal jurisdiction located within a State”—i.e., as “an 

upland federal enclave.” §1333(a)(1); Rodrigue, supra, at 

366. It is a commonplace of statutory interpretation that 

“Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing law.” 

McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383, 398, n. 3 (2013). 

Generally, when an area in a State becomes a federal 

enclave, “only the [state] law in effect at the time of the 

transfer of jurisdiction continues in force” as surrogate 

federal law. James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U. S. 

94, 100 (1940). Existing state law typically does not continue in force, however, to the extent it conflicts with 

“federal policy.” Paul v. United States, 371 U. S. 245, 269 

(1963); see Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 

542, 547 (1885). And going forward, state law presumptively does not apply to the enclave. See Sadrakula, supra, at 100; see also Paul, supra, at 268; Pacific Coast 

Dairy, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture of Cal., 318 U. S. 

285, 294 (1943). This approach ensures “that no area 

however small will be without a developed legal system for 

private rights,” while simultaneously retaining the primacy

of federal law and requiring future statutory changes to be 

made by Congress. Sadrakula, supra, at 100; United 

States v. Tax Comm’n of Miss., 412 U. S. 363, 370, n. 12 

(1973).1

—————— 

1These general rules “may be qualified in accordance with agreements reached by the respective governments.” Sadrakula, 309 U. S., 

at 99; see also Paul, 371 U. S., at 268 (“[A] State may not legislate with 
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Opinion of the Court

The original version of the OCSLA both treated the OCS 

as a federal enclave and adopted only the “applicable and 

not inconsistent” laws of the adjacent State that were in 

effect as of the effective date of the Act. 43 U. S. C.

§1333(a)(2) (1970 ed.); see §1333(a)(1) (1970 ed.) (deeming 

the OCS “an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located 

within a State”). This textual connection between the 

OCSLA and the federal enclave model suggests that, like 

the generally applicable enclave rule, the OCSLA sought 

to make all OCS law federal yet also “provide a sufficiently 

detailed legal framework to govern life” on the OCS. Shell

Oil, 488 U. S., at 27. Once that framework was established, federal law (including previously adopted state 

law) provided a sufficient legal structure to accomplish 

that purpose, eliminating the need to adopt new state 

laws. The federal-state balance in a typical federal enclave is quite different than in a State, and that difference 

is all the more striking on the OCS, which was never 

under state control. The text and context of the OCSLA 

therefore suggest that state law is not adopted to govern 

the OCS where federal law is on point.

Although Congress later amended the OCSLA to adopt 

state law on an ongoing basis, this amendment only confirms the connection between the OCSLA and the federal 

enclave model. Beginning in 1825, when “federal statutory

law punished only a few crimes committed on federal 

enclaves,” Congress enacted several Assimilative Crimes 

Acts (ACAs) that “borrow[ed] state law to fill gaps in the 

federal criminal law” on enclaves. Lewis v. United States, 

523 U. S. 155, 160 (1998); see 18 U. S. C. §13(a) (criminalizing “any act or omission which, although not made punishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punishable if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the” 

—————— 

respect to a federal enclave unless it reserved the right to do so when it 

gave its consent to the purchase by the United States”).
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 11

Opinion of the Court

relevant State or territory). Mirroring the general enclave 

rule discussed above, the first ACA was limited to state 

laws in existence when the Act was passed. United States

v. Sharpnack, 355 U. S. 286, 291 (1958). Because of this 

limitation, the initial ACA “gradually lost much of its 

effectiveness in maintaining current conformity with state 

criminal laws,” and Congress eventually provided for the 

adoption of the state laws in effect at the time of the 

crime. Id., at 291–292. After this Court upheld this ongoing adoption of state criminal law against a nondelegation 

challenge, see id., at 294, Congress amended the OCSLA 

to borrow state laws “‘in effect or hereafter adopted, 

amended, or repealed.’” §19(f ), 88 Stat. 2146. At the same

time, Congress left unchanged the features of the OCSLA 

that we have emphasized above—i.e., that the only law on 

the OCS is federal, and that state law is adopted only 

when it is “applicable and not inconsistent” with existing 

federal law. Thus, we do not understand the statutory 

amendment to alter our conclusion. If anything, this 

history reinforces that the OCS should be treated as an 

exclusive federal enclave, not an extension of a State, and 

that the OCSLA, like the ACAs, does not adopt state law 

“where there is no gap to fill.” Lewis, supra, at 163.

3 

Finally, our interpretation accords with the Court’s 

precedents construing the OCSLA. We first interpreted 

the OCSLA’s choice-of-law provision in Rodrigue v. Aetna 

Casualty & Surety Co., where we considered whether suits 

brought by the families of men killed on OCS drilling rigs 

could proceed under only the federal Death on the High 

Seas Act or also under state law. 395 U. S., at 352–353. 

We emphasized that under the OCSLA, the body of law 

applicable to the OCS “was to be federal law of the United 

States, applying state law only as federal law and then 

only when not inconsistent with applicable federal law.” 
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Opinion of the Court

Id., at 355–356. We explained that “federal law, because 

of its limited function in a federal system, might be inadequate to cope with the full range of potential legal problems,” and that the OCSLA “supplemented gaps in the 

federal law with state law through the ‘adoption of State 

law as the law of the United States.’” Id., at 357 (quoting 

§1333(a)(3)). We reiterated that the statutory language 

makes it “evident” “that federal law is ‘exclusive’” on the 

OCS and that “state law could be used to fill federal 

voids.” Id., at 357–358. After concluding that the Death 

on the High Seas Act did not apply to accidents on the 

OCS and thus left a gap related to wrongful deaths, we 

held that state law provided the rule of decision. We 

explained that “the inapplicability of the [federal Act] 

removes any obstacle to the application of state law by 

incorporation as federal law through” the OCSLA. Id., 

at 366.

Two years later, in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U. S. 

97 (1971), the Court again viewed the OCSLA as adopting 

state law to fill in federal-law gaps. In Huson, the question was whether federal admiralty law or a state statute 

governed a tort action arising from an injury that occurred 

on the OCS. Id., at 98–99. Describing Rodrigue’s analysis, we explained that where “there exists a substantial 

‘gap’ in federal law,” “state law remedies are not ‘inconsistent’ with applicable federal law.” 404 U. S., at 101. 

We highlighted that “state law was needed” as surrogate 

federal law because federal law alone did not provide “‘a 

complete body of law,’” which is why “Congress specified 

that a comprehensive body of state law should be adopted 

by the federal courts in the absence of existing federal 

law.” Id., at 103–104. In other words, the OCSLA “made 

clear provision for filling in the ‘gaps’ in federal law.” Id., 

at 104. And because Congress had decided not to apply 

federal admiralty law on the OCS, leaving a gap on the 

relevant issue, we held that it was appropriate to “ab-
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 13

Opinion of the Court

sor[b]” the state law as federal law. Id., at 104, 109.

In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U. S. 473 

(1981), we once again emphasized that “[a]ll law applicable to the [OCS] is federal law” and that the “OCSLA

borrows the ‘applicable and not inconsistent’ laws of the 

adjacent States” “to fill the substantial ‘gaps’ in the coverage of federal law.” Id., at 480. We noted that under the 

OCSLA, the Federal Government “retain[ed] exclusive . . . 

control of the administration of the [OCS],” and that state 

law is incorporated “to fill gaps in federal law.” Id., at

479–480, n. 7.

These precedents confirm our understanding of the 

OCSLA. Although none decided the precise question 

before us, much of our prior discussion of the OCSLA 

would make little sense if the statute essentially treated 

the OCS as an extension of the adjacent State. In Rodrigue, for example, there was no question that the state 

law at issue pertained to the subject matter or that the 

relevant federal law expressly preserved state laws regulating the same subject. See 395 U. S., at 355; 46 U. S. C. 

§767 (1964 ed.). Under Newton’s interpretation, that 

should have ended the case. Yet the Court instead analyzed at length whether the federal law extended to the 

OCS. See 395 U. S., at 359–366. It would be odd for our 

decisions to focus so closely on the gap-filling role of state 

law under the OCSLA if, as Newton argues, the existence 

of a federal-law gap is irrelevant. Our consistent understanding of the OCSLA remains: All law on the OCS is 

federal, and state law serves a supporting role, to be 

adopted only where there is a gap in federal law’s 

coverage. 

In sum, the standard we adopt today is supported by the 

statute’s text, structure, and history, as well as our precedents. Under that standard, if a federal law addresses the 

issue at hand, then state law is not adopted as federal law 
14 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD. v.

NEWTON

Opinion of the Court

on the OCS.2

IV

Applying this standard, some of Newton’s present 

claims are readily resolvable. For instance, some of his 

claims are premised on the adoption of California law 

requiring payment for all time that Newton spent on 

standby. See Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc., 60 

Cal. 4th 833, 842, 340 P. 3d 355, 361 (2015); Cal. Lab. 

Code Ann. §510(a) (West 2011). But federal law already 

addresses this issue. See 29 CFR §785.23 (2018) (“An 

employee who resides on his employer’s premises on a 

permanent basis or for extended periods of time is not 

considered as working all the time he is on the premises”); 

see also 29 U. S. C. §207(a). Therefore, this California law 

does not provide the rule of decision on the OCS, and to 

the extent Newton’s OCS-based claims rely on that law, 

they necessarily fail.

Likewise, to the extent Newton’s OCS-based claims rely 

on the adoption of the California minimum wage (currently

$12), Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §1182.12(b) (West Supp. 2019), 

the FLSA already provides for a minimum wage, 29 

U. S. C. §206(a)(1), so the California minimum wage does 

not apply. Newton points out that the FLSA sets a minimum wage of “not less than . . . $7.25 an hour,” ibid. (emphasis added), and does not “excuse noncompliance with 

any Federal or State law . . . establishing a [higher] minimum wage,” §218. But whatever the import of these 

provisions in an ordinary pre-emption case, they do not 

help Newton here, for the question under the OCSLA is 

—————— 

2Of course, it is conceivable that state law might be “inconsistent” 

with federal law for purposes of §1333(a)(2) even absent an on-point 

federal law. For example, federal law might contain a deliberate gap, 

making state law inconsistent with the federal scheme. Or, state law 

might be inconsistent with a federal law addressing a different issue. 

We do not foreclose these or other possible inconsistencies.
Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 15

Opinion of the Court

whether federal law addresses the minimum wage on the 

OCS. It does. Therefore, the California minimum wage is 

not adopted as federal law and does not apply on the OCS.

Newton’s other claims were not analyzed by the Court of 

Appeals, and the parties have provided little briefing on 

those claims. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that 

Newton should be given leave to amend his complaint. 

Because we cannot finally resolve whether Parker was 

entitled to judgment on the pleadings, we vacate the 

judgment of the Court of Appeals, and the case is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.