alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT SANTOS FR

ANC ISC O JUANTA, Pe titione r, v. LORETTA E. LYNC H, Attorne y Ge ne ra l, R

e sponde n t . No. 12-71122 Age n c y No. A095-753-541 M EM O R ANDUM *

On Pe tition for Re vie w of a n Orde r of the B oa rd of Im m igration Appe a ls Subm itte d August 25, 2015 ** B e fore : M c KEOW

N , C LIFTON, a

nd HUR W ITZ, C irc u it Judge s. Santos Fra

nc isc o Jua

n ta , a native and c itiz e n of Gua te m a la , pe titions pro se for re vie w of the B o a

rd of Im m igration Appe a ls’ (“ B IA” ) orde r de c lining to re m and a nd dismissing his a

ppe a l from

an im m igration judge ’ s orde r de ny ing his re que s t for a

c o ntinua nc e . Our jurisdic tion is governe d by 8 U.S.C . § 1252. W e 

# FIL ED SEP 03 2015 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public a t ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without ora l a

rgum e nt. Se e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2).re vie w for a

buse of disc re t ion both the de nia l of a

m otion for a

c ontinua nc e , Sandov al-Luna v . Muk

a se y , 526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th C ir. 2008), a nd the de nia l of a m otion to re m a

nd, M ov s isian v . Ashc roft , 395 F.3d 1095, 1097-98 (9th C ir. 2005). W e de ny

in pa rt a nd dismiss in pa

rt the pe tition for re vie w. The a ge n c y

did not a b u se its disc re tion in de ny ing Jua nta ’ s m otion for a c ontinua nc e to file an

a pplic a tion for a

U visa , whe re Jua

nta ha d be e n gra

nte d five c ontinua nc e s for the purpose of filing a n a pplic a tion for a

U visa , but ha d fa ile d to do so. Se e Sandov a l-Luna , 526 F.3d a t 1247 (no a b use of disc re tion by

de ny ing a m otion for a

c o ntinua nc e whe re the re lie f sought wa s not im m e diate l y ava ila

ble to pe titione r). To the e xte nt Jua

nta c ha lle nge s the B IA’ s de c ision not to rem and in light of e vide nc e Jua

nta subm itte d on a

ppe a l re lating to his U visa e ligibility , the B IA did not a buse its disc re tion in de c lining to re m and, whe re Jua nta did not subm

it e vide nc e tha

t he ha d a c tua lly file d a

n a pplic a tion for a U visa

an d, the re fore , ha d not e sta blishe d tha

t he wa rrante d re m a

nd for a furthe r c ontinua

nc e . Se e id . To the e xte nt Jua

nta c ha lle nge s his de te ntion a n d the a ge nc y ’ s de nia l of bond or pa

role , those c o nte n t ions a

re not prope rly

be fore us. S

e e 8 U.S.C . § 1226(e ); 8 C .F.R . § 1003.19(d); Le onardo v . C raw ford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th

1 2 - 7 1 1 2 2 2C ir. 2011) (noting entitle m e nt to bond he aring for c e rta in a lie ns he ld in c u stody

and se tting forth proc e dure for c ha lle nging bond de te rm inations). PE T IT IO N FO R RE V IE WDE NIE D in par t; DISM ISSE D in par t.

1 2 - 7 1 1 2 2 3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          23,665
<SECURITIES>                                     1,324
<RECEIVABLES>                                   43,638
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        761
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                69,975
<PP&E>                                          37,026
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,090
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 114,297
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           22,645
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          3
<COMMON>                                            17
<OTHER-SE>                                      89,910
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   114,297
<SALES>                                         34,392
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                34,392
<CGS>                                           27,047
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   32,142
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (318)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  63
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,505
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,052
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,453
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,453
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.09
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.09
        

</TABLE>
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 279 

To amend the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site Act of 1991 

to designate the historic site as the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historical Park, to expand the boundaries of the park, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 7, 2009 

Mr. ORTIZ (for himself and Mr. GONZALEZ) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To amend the Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site 

Act of 1991 to designate the historic site as the Palo 

Alto Battlefield National Historical Park, to expand the 

boundaries of the park, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Palo Alto Battlefield 

5 National Historical Park Boundary Expansion and Redes6 ignation Act of 2009’’. 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with BILLS
2 

•HR 279 IH

1 SEC. 2. DESIGNATION OF PALO ALTO BATTLEFIELD NA2 TIONAL HISTORICAL PARK. 

3 (a) DESIGNATION.—The Palo Alto Battlefield Na4 tional Historic Site is hereby designated the ‘‘Palo Alto 

5 Battlefield National Historical Park’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper or other record of the United 

8 States to Palo Alto Battlefield National Historic Site is 

9 deemed to be a reference to the Palo Alto Battlefield Na10 tional Historical Park. 

11 (c) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—The Palo Alto 

12 Battlefield National Historic Site Act of 1991 (Public Law 

13 102–304; 106 Stat. 256; 16 U.S.C. 461) is amended— 

14 (1) by striking ‘‘National Historic Site’’ each 

15 place it appears and inserting ‘‘National Historical 

16 Park’’; 

17 (2) in the heading for section 3, by striking 

18 ‘‘NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE’’ and inserting ‘‘NA19 TIONAL HISTORICAL PARK’’; and 

20 (3) by striking ‘‘historic site’’ each place it ap21 pears and inserting ‘‘historical park’’. 

22 SEC. 3. BOUNDARY EXPANSION. 

23 Section 3(b) of the Palo Alto Battlefield National 

24 Historic Site Act of 1991 (Public Law 102–304; 106 Stat. 

25 256; 16 U.S.C. 461) is amended— 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with BILLS
3 

•HR 279 IH

1 (1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as para2 graph (3); 

3 (2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the fol4 lowing new paragraph: 

5 ‘‘(2) The historical park also shall consist of approxi6 mately 34 acres as generally depicted on the map entitled 

7 ‘Palo Alto Battlefield NHS Proposed Boundary Expan8 sion’, numbered 469/80,012, and dated May 21, 2008. 

9 The map shall be on file and available for public inspection 

10 in the appropriate offices of the National Park Service.’’; 

11 and 

12 (3) in paragraph (3), as so redesignated, by 

13 striking ‘‘map referred to in paragraph (1)’’ and in14 serting ‘‘maps referred to in paragraphs (1) and 

15 (2)’’. 

Æ 


rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with BILLS
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2833 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2833

  To require a minimum loss ratio for 90 percent for health insurance 
            coverage offered through an insurance exchange.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 11, 2009

Mr. Ellison (for himself, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Tierney, and Mr. Johnson 
 of Georgia) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To require a minimum loss ratio for 90 percent for health insurance 
            coverage offered through an insurance exchange.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT OF MINIMUM LOSS RATIO OF 90 PERCENT FOR A HEALTH 
              INSURANCE PLAN TO BE OFFERED THROUGH AN INSURANCE 
              EXCHANGE.

    (a) In General.--No health insurance coverage may be offered 
through a health insurance exchange (as defined in subsection (b)) 
unless the coverage is demonstrated to have a medical loss ratio (as 
defined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services) of at least 90 
percent.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) The term ``health insurance exchange'' means a 
        mechanism established or recognized under Federal law, whether 
        operated at a national, regional, or State level, that provides 
        a coordinated, centralized mechanism for offering for purchase 
        to individuals (and others) of health insurance coverage from 
        more than one health insurance issuer.
            (2) The terms ``health insurance coverage'' and ``health 
        insurance issuer'' have the meanings given such terms in 
        section 2791 of the Public Health Service Act.
    (c) Effective Date.--This section shall apply to health insurance 
coverage offered on or after January 1, 2010.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 99.1


                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Intelligroup,  Inc.
(the "Company") for the period ended March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  the  undersigned,
Nagarjun  Valluripalli,  Chairman of the Board,  President  and Chief  Executive
Officer of the Company,  hereby certifies,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,
that:

          (1)  the Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2)  the information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
               material  respects,   the  financial  condition  and  results  of
               operations of the Company.

DATE: May 15, 2003              By: /s/ Nagarjun Valluripalli
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                                Nagarjun Valluripalli
                                Chairman of the Board, President
                                and Chief Executive Officer

     In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Intelligroup,  Inc.
(the "Company") for the period ended March 31, 2003 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  the  undersigned,
Nicholas  Visco,  Senior Vice  President-Finance  and  Administration  and Chief
Financial  Officer  of the  Company,  hereby  certifies,  pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, that:

          (1)  the Report fully complies with the  requirements of Section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2)  the information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in all
               material  respects,   the  financial  condition  and  results  of
               operations of the Company.

DATE: May 15, 2003              By: /s/ Nicholas Visco
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                                Nicholas Visco
                                Senior Vice President-Finance and Administration
                                and Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with this amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report of Asia Premium Television Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries (the Company) on Form 10-KSB/A for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Bulin Miao, Finance Manager of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





Date:  February 14, 2006







/s/ Bulin Miao

Bulin Miao

Finance Manager
#### Joseph C. Gala, Appellant, v Renata G. De R. Magarinos et al., Respondents.

[665 NYS2d 95]

—In an action, *inter alia,*to impose a constructive trust and for an accounting, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.), entered August 27, 1996, which, upon a verdict in favor of the defendants and against him after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

After the death of his parents, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants Renata G. De R. Magarinos and Jose R. Magarinos, his sister and brother-in-law, contending that they had exerted undue influence over his parents, both of whom, he claimed, were rendered incompetent by Alzheimer’s disease, and depleted their estates. After a nonjury trial, the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint.

The record supports the court’s conclusion that both parents were of sound mind and appropriate capacity at the time they executed certain challenged documents. Even had the court credited the plaintiffs claim that both of his parents suffered from Alzheimer’s disease, one suffering from Alzheimer’s disease is not presumed to be wholly incompetent. Rather, it must be demonstrated that, because of the affliction, the individual was incompetent at the time of the challenged transaction *(see, Matter of Waldron,*240 AD2d 507; *Feiden v Feiden,*151 AD2d 889, 891). Here, the attorneys who supervised the execution of the various documents, and the subscribing witnesses thereto, testified without contradiction that the parents appeared to be capable of comprehending and understanding the nature of the transactions at issue *(see, Ortelere v Teachers’ Retirement Bd.,*25 NY2d 196, 202; *Smith v Comas,*173 AD2d 535).

Moreover, the plaintiff did not establish that a confidential relationship existed between him and the defendants. Accordingly, he failed to demonstrate a right either to the imposition of a constructive trust *(see, e.g., Scivoletti v Marsala,*97 AD2d 401, 402, *affd*61 NY2d 806; *Martin v Martin,*169 AD2d 821, 822) or an accounting *(see, e.g., Adam v Cutner & Rathkopf,*238 AD2d 234; *Top-All Varieties v Raj Dev. Co.,*173 AD2d 604).

The plaintiff’s remaining contentions are without merit. Altman, J. P., Friedmann, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS AUSTIN **,gOVEA SELLERS**  **AT~~~~~I GLNcRAL** 

Honorable W. 

### P. iierme, Jr. county auditor 

### *11er county \lempstead, Texas
mar sir:

“ii the Cozlnsloners* court deterzA:.es teat

suck books 6re needed by various officers, caL the county legally pay for such books, or stosld this expcaas be bor;;e gersocally by the o;Sficer re;ulrILG s&%3?”!ionorable ‘ij. P, !leCme, 

### Jr., pace2 The Co0mlrslonera* court 18 a oourt 

## 0r lidha jurlrdiotlon and ha8 only euoh pouerr ar are oonferred upon it by the Constitution and statuter of 

### thie state 

### by express terns or by implloation. Von Rosenberg T. Lovett, 173 s. w. 

### 508; AUler v. Brown, 

### eoncounty,1169.w. (.ZC)216 8. w. 452; Howard v. tlender

### 479;GIlveaton,ii.& s.A.Ry.Co. V.uvalae County,

### 1678.w. (2tl) 1084111Ter.Jur:564. InourOpinion

No. O-5347, a oopy of whloh ir hei%to attaobed, thlr depertnent held that the oomm.leelonera*~ oourt did not have the authorlty to expend oouuty lurid8 for the purchase 

### of Vurnot'a Annual rocket Parts to 

### be furnlehed to the dietrlct olerk. ife wish to 0911 your attention to Artlole 4335, V.A.C.S., whereby the Seoretary Of State Is authorizad to furalah one oopy of .eaoh of all ce,ereral end epeolal lane passed by the Le~lalafure to the judce of the aereral oourta throu@out the atate, and 

### the olerka of eela oourta, and eaoh oounty 

### attorney; and 

### the Seoretarg of State la also authorieea to furnish one oopy eaoP of all &mere1 laws to the county treaeurer;oouihy surveyor, 

### sherlff,~ oounty,tax

asseesor 

### ad collector,

tispeotor

of 

### hide8and anlmla, justice of the peaoe, oonstable ar;d oouoty oomlaaloner. Art, 

### 1650,V. A; ci i;.,~aa mended, prooidee that the county auditor stall be authorized to provide hlmelf with all neoessary leaccra, books, reoords, blafika etetion- $ry, bCuipment, telephone and postace at the oounty*s exger.se, but all FurchaEea thereof ehall be mde ir the aeznur i:rovided for by law, Uxider the faallier rule of conetructlon known 88
“8jusdem ~enerlaW, books motioned in Xrticle 1650, aupra, could tot reeeofiably be coratrued to inolude *Comic.issfofier8’ Court Guide %ookd,* “Attorney Canerala’ Opinion Volme6,” and”Sup~lener,t to Texae ;tatutes." ,,e know of ko provision In the Constitution or etstutes of thla State which confers upor. the Co.m.i88iOfiere’ Court the power to expend county funds for the purodese Of. .

xonorsblr 

### vf. ‘i. Beram, 

### SF*, Q4&4 3



### th4booka suer your

. -------__-

raforte(l 

### tolnyourroquoat. x4, th0r4ron, anqusrtlonr In thr ne&atito. Yourr rerf truly,
NO. 07-04-0092-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

MAY 27, 2004

______________________________

MATTHEW ANDRAE, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE COUNTY COURT OF HALE COUNTY;

NO. 2003C-942; HONORABLE BILL HOLLARS, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before JOHNSON, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On May 17, 2004, the parties filed an Agreement to Remand with this Court,

indicating that this case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 

It is therefore ordered, that the judgment of the trial court be reversed and the cause

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 

Phil Johnson

Chief Justice

Do not publish.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
The schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Form
10-KSB for the fiscal year ending August 31, 1996 and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          AUG-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               AUG-31-1996
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   72,448
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  2,435,477
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<DEPRECIATION>                               1,333,291
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              20,845,613
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,813,900
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,606,289
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                20,845,613
<SALES>                                      7,037,927
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,037,927
<CGS>                                        6,422,838
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                7,446,289
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                66,604
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           1,001,329
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
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</TABLE>
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH

#### ESMA Chemicals, Inc. v. Norfolk Dental Laboratories, Inc.

October 21, 1982

Case No. (Law) 13,131

By JUDGE GEORGE W. VAKOS

After a review of the evidence and the authorities cited by Mr. Roussos on behalf of the plaintiff, I am of the opinion that:

1. Evidence of one telephone solicitation in this state for the sale of merchandise by a foreign corporation without any evidence regarding the nature of the plaintiff’s business, or the extent of its total sales to sales in Virginia, is not sufficient for the court to find that the plaintiff was "transacting business" in Virginia as contemplated by § 13.1-119 of the Code of Virginia, which requires a foreign corporation transacting business in Virginia to obtain a certificate of authority prior to maintaining a suit in this state.

2. Section 11-2.2 of the Code of Virginia adopted in 1970 does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution. This section merely provides that the sender of unsolicited goods is deemed to have made a gift of those goods to the recipient and does not involve confiscation of property as alleged by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff’s argument that the Statute is overbroad and makes no exception for goods sent by error or misunderstanding, or for shipment between those customarily transacting business also is without merit. The Statute applies *30to offers for sale of goods, wares, or merchandise not actually ordered or requested by the recipient.

If there was evidence to support an allegation of error or misunderstanding, a reasonable interpretation of the Statute would be that this was not an offer. Also, if the evidence supports an allegation that this sales method was customary between the plaintiff and defendant his retaining the merchandise would amount to an acceptance of the offer.

The only evidence before the court was that of the defendant, who testified that when solicited by telephone he refused the offer and subsequently after receipt of the merchandise notified the plaintiff to pick it up. He further testified that thereafter it remained in his place of business uncrated for two months prior to his use of the goods, and that when U.P.S. arrived to pick it up approximately three months after receipt he had disposed of the shipping cartons.

It is therefore my opinion that the defendant was not obligated to return the unsolicited merchandise upon receipt and in accordance with § 11-2.2 of the Code of Virginia could dispose of it or use it without any obligation to pay for it.