1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EMERY P.,

Plaintiff, 

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Civil Action No.

21-cv-3147-MAU

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Emery P. (“Plaintiff”)1filed this case challenging the final decision of the Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, Dr. Kilolo Kijakazi (“Defendant” or “the Commissioner”),2

denying his claim for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“SSDIB”) and Supplemental 

Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

1383(c)(3). Plaintiff moves this Court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision, or in the 

alternative, remand to the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) for further proceedings. The 

Commissioner argues that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision should be affirmed.

1

 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in accordance with the recommendation of 

the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the 

United States. See Memorandum from Hon. Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chair, Comm. on Ct. Admin. 

& Case Mgmt. to Chief Judges of the U.S. Cts. of Appeals, Chief Judges of the U.S. Cts., Clerks 

of the U.S. Cts. of Appeals, and Clerks of the U.S. Dist. Cts. (May 1, 2018), available at 

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-ap-c-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf (last visited 

September 12, 2023). 

2 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), the current Defendant has been 

substituted for her predecessor. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 
2

Having reviewed the Administrative Record,

3

the Parties’ briefs, and the relevant law, this 

Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 15), DENY Defendant’s Motion (ECF No. 17),

and remand this case to the SSA for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum 

Opinion. 

BACKGROUND

A. The Social Security Act 

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act (“the Act”), the Commissioner must 

find that that a claimant has a “disability.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a)(1). The Act 

defines a “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of 

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected 

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

To assess a claimant’s alleged disability, the Commissioner uses a five-step sequential 

evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The ALJ must determine 

whether: (1) the claimant is currently “engaged in substantial gainful activity”; (2) the claimant 

has a “medically severe impairment or impairments”; (3) the claimant’s impairments are medically 

equivalent to one of the impairments listed in the appendix of the relevant disability regulation; 

(4) the claimant, because of the impairments, is incapable of meeting the physical and mental 

demands of his past work; and (5) the claimant, in light of his age, education, work experience, 

and Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”), is capable of performing other work in the national 

economy. See id.; see also Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

3 Citations to the Administrative Record, ECF No. 9, are referred to as “AR.” The Court 

will cite to the consecutive page numbers provided in the lower right-hand corner of each page of 

the AR.
3

The RFC is “what an individual can still do despite his or her limitations.” S.S.R. 96–8p, 

1996 WL 374184, at *2. Determining a claimant’s RFC requires an assessment “of the extent to 

which an individual’s medically determinable impairment(s), including any related symptoms . . . 

may cause physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may affect his or her capacity to do 

work-related physical or mental activities.” Id. The RFC reflects an individual’s “maximum

remaining ability to do sustained work activities.” Id. (emphasis added). 

At step four, the claimant must compare the RFC assessment with the physical and mental 

demands of his past relevant work and demonstrate that his impairments prevent him from 

performing that work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At step five, the burden 

shifts to the Commissioner to identify specific jobs available in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform in light of his age, education, work experience, and RFC. See id.; see also 

Callahan v. Astrue, 786 F. Supp. 2d 87, 89 (D.D.C. 2011). In making this determination, the ALJ 

may call upon a vocational expert (“VE”) to testify at the administrative hearing. Callahan, 786 

F. Supp. 2d. at 90. 

B. Plaintiff’s Disability Claim and Procedural History 

On July 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed for SSDIB and SSI benefits. AR at 15. Plaintiff was born 

on September 26, 1967, and at the time of his application, was fifty-one years old. Id. at 61. 

Plaintiff’s claims were based on physical impairments, including ankle and back pain, and 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. Id. at 90-91. 

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s initial claims on September 25, 2019, and again upon 

reconsideration on December 10, 2019. Id. at 15, 110. On December 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a

written request for an administrative hearing, which the ALJ held on October 20, 2020. Id. at 15, 

133. 
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C. The Administrative Hearing

At the hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert. Id. at 32. 

Plaintiff testified that he previously worked security at a bowling alley and a bar. Id. at 41. In 

addition to providing security, Plaintiff’s responsibilities included setting up chairs, carrying boxes 

of liquor to the bar, and cleaning off tables. Id. at 41-42. As to his living arrangements, Plaintiff 

testified that he lived with his sister on her pull-out couch. Plaintiff stated that he needs his sister 

to help him get around the house and do chores such as getting groceries. Id. at 54. 

Plaintiff elaborated on his physical limitations, stating that he requires a crutch to stand and

keep his balance. Id. at 52. Plaintiff testified that he cannot sit or stand for “too long,” even while 

using a crutch, before his leg gets numb or before pain shoots from his back to his left leg. Id. at 

52, 55. Plaintiff noted that his daily routine is largely sedentary. Id. at 54-56. He testified that,

because of his pain, he hardly gets out of the house. Id. at 55. According to Plaintiff, he generally 

remains indoors, attempts to do his prescribed back exercises to the extent he is able, and on rare 

occasions, goes to the park. Id. He further explained that even small tasks such as bending over 

to tie his shoes sometimes presents a challenge. Id. at 56. When asked how long he could stand 

at home without the crutch, Plaintiff testified that he could stand for about fifteen to twenty

minutes. Id. at 52, 58, 59. 

Plaintiff then described his treatment. Id. at 52. He stated that he goes to pain management

for his back. Id. at 53. Plaintiff testified that over the course of his treatment, he received three 

cortisone injections for his pain. Id. Plaintiff explained that the relief the cortisone shots provided 

was temporary, as the third injection wore off after a couple of days. Id. In terms of his treatment 

for his left ankle, Plaintiff testified that he sees a podiatrist who prescribed a custom brace which 

Plaintiff wears daily. Id. at 52. 
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The ALJ then elicited testimony from the vocational expert, Irene Montgomery. Id. at 44. 

The ALJ asked Montgomery a list of hypothetical questions about an individual with the same age, 

education, and past relevant work experience as Plaintiff. Id. at 44-47. The ALJ asked 

Montgomery if the hypothetical individual with the RFC the ALJ formulated could perform 

Plaintiff’s past job as a security guard. Id. at 44. Montgomery testified that the individual could 

not perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work. Id. at 45. Montgomery stated, however, that if the 

individual could lift up to ten pounds one-handed, this hypothetical individual could perform three 

light, unskilled jobs: a cashier, collator, or inspector. Id. at 45-56. Finally, Montgomery testified

that the individual could not be regularly off task more than ten percent of the time and could not 

miss more than one day of work per month. Id. at 45, 48.

D. The ALJ’s Decision 

On April 7, 2021, the ALJ issued his decision, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id.

at 24. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since January 26, 2019, the alleged onset date of his disability. Id. at 17. At step two, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: (1) degenerative disc disease of the 

lumbar spine; (2) L5-S1 vacuum disc; (3) left knee tibial plateau fracture; (4) right knee 

degenerative joint disease; (5) left ankle sprain; (6) diabetes mellitus; and (7) obesity. Id. at 18. 

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairment or combination of impairments did 

not meet or medically equal one of the Listings. Id. The ALJ specifically considered Listings 

1.15, 1.18, and 11. Id. at 19. Under the Revised Listing 1.15 (Musculoskeletal Disorders) and 

Listing 1.18 (Abnormality of a Major Joint), the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not 

reach the level of severity required under the Listings, noting that although Plaintiff ambulated 

with an assistive device, Plaintiff maintained 5/5 muscle strength in all other muscle groups besides 
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his left knee. Id. at 18-19. Under Listing 11.00 (Neurological Impairments),

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the ALJ determined 

that Plaintiff did not have peripheral neuropathy with disorganization of motor function in two 

extremities. Id. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s obesity did not qualify as a severe impairment 

because it is no longer a listed impairment in the regulations, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. Id. at 19. The ALJ considered, however, Plaintiff’s obesity in relation to and in 

combination with Plaintiff’s other impairments. Id. 

At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant 

work and had the RFC to perform light work with the following limitations:

[Plaintiff] can sit, stand, or work for about six hours, but can never climb ladders, 

ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, 

kneel, crouch, and crawl. He must be permitted to alternate between standing and 

sitting as needed and change positions every thirty minutes, such that sitting, 

standing, or walking would total four hours in an eight-hour workday. Lastly, 

Plaintiff would also require the use of a cane or crutch for walking, but not for 

standing, and he would have the ability to use his free hand to carry objects 

weighing 10 pounds or less. 

Id. 

At step five, the ALJ found that, after considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and RFC, there were jobs that Plaintiff could perform in the national economy, such 

as collator, mail clerk, and inspector. Id. at 23. In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered 

the objective medical evidence of record, prior administrative medical findings, Plaintiff’s daily 

activities, the hearing testimony, and medical opinions from the following: Drs. Jaqueline 

McMorris, Lisa Venkataraman, Richard McClendon, James Tozzi, and Certified Physician 

Assistant Aisha Haram. Id. at 21-22. 

4 Because there is no longer a specific listing for Diabetes Mellitus, Listing 9.00B5(a)(ii) 

directs the ALJ to evaluate diabetic peripheral and sensory neuropathy under Listing 11.00. AR

at 19. 
7

Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision on April 24, 2021. Id. at 189-190. The Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s appeal on September 29, 2021. Id. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A federal district court has jurisdiction over a challenge to the final decision of the 

Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision 

if it is based on substantial evidence in the record and the correct application of the relevant legal 

standards. Id.; Butler, 353 F.3d at 999; Smith v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 

Substantial evidence is “‘more than mere scintilla’” and means only “‘such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. 

Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938)). Ultimately, substantial evidence is a “low bar,” La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 20 

F.4th 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2021), and “requires considerable deference to the decision rendered by the 

ALJ.” Crosson v. Shalala, 907 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1995). Even so, although there is no 

requirement that the ALJ refer to every piece of evidence in his decision, the ALJ is “prohibited 

from ignoring an entire line of evidence that supports a disability finding.” Goodman v. Colvin, 

233 F. Supp. 3d 88, 109 (D.D.C. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

On review, this Court may not reweigh the evidence. Butler, 353 F.3d at 999. Instead, it 

is the Court’s role to “carefully scrutinize the entire record to ensure that the Commissioner, 

through the ALJ, has both analyzed all of the evidence available and has sufficiently explained 

his/her reasoning and the weights given to the facts.” Pinkney v. Astrue, 675 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 

(D.D.C. 2009). Moreover, the Court’s job is to “consider the grounds actually proffered by the 

ALJ” rather than to make those determinations for itself. See Ward v. Berryhill, 246 F. Supp. 3d 

202, 210 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Settles v. Colvin, 121 F. Supp. 3d 163, 167-70 (D.D.C. 2015)). 

In performing this role, the Court must “. . . be mindful of the harmless-error rule. Consequently, 
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even if [the Court] perceive[s] error,” it must “affirm the Commission’s decision unless the error 

is prejudicial.” Saunders v. Kijakazi, 6 F.4th 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (internal citation omitted). 

“‘[P]laintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Commissioner’s decision [is] not based on 

substantial evidence or that incorrect legal standards were applied.’” Settles, 121 F. Supp. 3d at

169 (quoting Muldrow v. Astrue, No. 11-1385, 2012 WL 2877697, at *6 (D.D.C. July 11, 2012)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff makes two arguments in support of his motion to reverse the ALJ’s decision, both 

assigning error to the ALJ’s RFC assessment. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in 

evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms. ECF No. 16 at 10-17. Second, Plaintiff argues that 

the ALJ failed to properly weigh Plaintiff’s primary care physician’s opinion. Id. at 16-20. The 

Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision and that the ALJ 

properly considered both Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician. ECF No. 18 at 10-18.

I. The ALJ Erred in Evaluating Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints. 

Plaintiff argues that, in evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ ignored 

relevant contradictory evidence, understated Plaintiff’s limitations in everyday activities, and 

mischaracterized the efficacy of Plaintiff’s treatment. ECF No. 16 at 12, 14-16. The 

Commissioner responds that the ALJ accurately considered the entire record and relied on

substantial evidence to support his evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. ECF No. 18 at 

11-13. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. 

ALJs are required to follow a two-step process when evaluating the intensity and 

persistence of a claimant’s symptoms to determine the extent to which such symptoms limit the 

claimant’s ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). First, the ALJ must determine whether a

claimant’s symptoms could be reasonably expected to arise from his alleged impairments. Troy v. 
9

Colvin, 266 F. Supp. 3d 288, 295 (D.D.C. 2017). Second, the ALJ “evaluate[s] the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms to determine the extent to which the 

symptoms limit the individual’s ability to do basic work activities.” Id. The second step requires 

the ALJ to evaluate “all available evidence.” See Butler, 353 F.3d at 1004 (defining “all the

available evidence” as claimant’s statements, medical history, laboratory findings, objective 

medical evidence of pain, opinions of treating physicians, and other evidence that would speak to 

severity of pain). An ALJ “must ‘note[] the contradictory evidence in the record and ‘explain [] 

the weight he has given to obviously probative exhibits.’” Williams v. Saul, No. 17-2576, 2020 

WL 2464519, at *4 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Williams v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 1494, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 

1993)).

A reviewing court must give deference to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and 

intervene only where an ALJ “fails to articulate a rational explanation for his or her finding[s].” 

Grant v. Astrue, 857 F. Supp. 2d 146, 156 (D.D.C. 2012); Lane-Rauth v Barnhart, 437 F. Supp. 

2d 63, 67 (“The ALJ must build an ‘accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [his] 

conclusion’ so that, as a reviewing court, we may assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate 

findings and afford a claimant meaningful judicial review.”) (quoting Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 

589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002)). “While an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s statements about pain ‘solely 

because they are not substantiated by objective medical evidence,’ the ALJ may consider ‘whether 

there are any inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there are any conflicts 

between [the claimant’s] statements and the rest of the evidence.’” McCormick v. Saul, No. 18-

cv-1704, 2021 WL 2634732, at *9 (D.D.C. June 25, 2021) (quoting Butler, 353 F.3d at 1004-05)).

A. The ALJ failed to consider the entire record in support of his RFC.

In evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ determined that although 

Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged 
10

symptoms [. . .] the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects 

of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 

record.” AR at 20. The ALJ explained his findings as follows:

Physical examinations of the claimant show that he had a full range of motion in 

his bilateral knees (3F/11), and that his spin was non-tender (3F/11). Strength in 

the claimant’s left knee was reduced at 4/5, while the claimant maintained 5/5 

muscle strength in all other muscle groups (9F/2). However, other physical 

examinations did reveal swelling of the left ankle and bilateral knees, and antalgic 

gait, and reduced muscle strength in the lower left extremity (3F/11, 2F/25, 9F/2). 

Straight leg raise testing was also positive on the left (9F/11). Imaging of the 

claimant’s left ankle revealed mild soft tissue swelling (8F/3). Similarly, an MRI 

of the claimant’s lumber spine revealed degenerative changes (8F/7-8).

The claimant’s severe impairments also include diabetes mellitus. (11F/5, 

Hearing). The claimant’s prescription regimen included Metformin. (3F/16). 

Physical examinations of the claimant generally showed that his diabetes was well 

controlled, with blood sugars between 130- 150. (9F/9, 9F/21). The claimant’s 

A1c was also generally within an acceptable range. (11F/62). However, other 

physical examinations did reveal that the claimant’s A1c was above goal. (5F/15, 

7F/31).

Id. at 20-21.

The ALJ’s reasoning reads as a recitation of the medical evidence devoid of analysis. 

Furthermore, as Plaintiff noted, the ALJ fails to grapple with contradictory record evidence. ECF 

No. 16 at 13-19. For example, the ALJ cites to a report that the Plaintiff had full range of motion 

in his knees and other muscle groups; however, in the next sentence, the ALJ notes that there was 

swelling and reduced muscle strength in those same groups. AR at 20-21. The ALJ then notes

that Plaintiff’s spine was non-tender, only to immediately reference degenerative changes in his 

spine. Id. The ALJ does not grapple with these apparent contradictions or provide any insight 

into how this factored into Plaintiff’s RFC. The ALJ also appears to rely mainly upon medical 

findings relating to Plaintiff’s knee in fashioning his RFC:

Physical examinations of the claimant show that he had a full range of motion in 

his bilateral knees (3F/11), and that his spine was non-tender (3F/11). Strength in 

the claimant’s left knee were reduced at 4/5, while the claimant maintained 5/5 
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muscle strength in all other muscle groups. (9F/2). However, other physical 

examinations did reveal swelling of the left ankle and bilateral knees, and antalgic 

gait, and reduced muscle strength in the lower left extremity. (3F/11, 2F/25, 9F/2). 

Straight leg raise testing was also positive on the left. (9F/11). An imaging study 

of the claimant’s right knee showed moderate degenerative joint disease. (3F/9).

Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff’s knee, however, is only one component of Plaintiff’s physical complaints. See 

ECF No. 16 at 15 (arguing that Plaintiff’s back, leg, and ankle constitute the bulk of Plaintiff’s 

claim). The ALJ’s reliance on improvements to Plaintiff’s knee reflects an incomplete assessment

of the record. See id. (noting medical findings the ALJ did not address in his decision). In fact, 

the record reflects that Plaintiff’s symptoms appear to be more significant and limiting than the 

ALJ has assessed. See e.g., AR at 577-78 (medical evaluation noting “significant exacerbation of 

pain with extension and left lean” and classifying Plaintiff’s pain as “Throbbing, Aching, 

Shooting”). Outside of noting “mild swelling” in Plaintiff’s ankle or that Plaintiff’s spine was 

“non-tender,” id. at 20, the ALJ fails to weigh or consider other material evidence relating to 

Plaintiff’s ankle and back pain. See id. at 322-33 (stating Plaintiff’s plantarflexion was reduced to 

3/5, inversion and eversion ere to 3+/5, and dorsiflexion to 4/5); see also id. at 598-99 (“There is 

increased pain to palpation along left lateral ankle ligaments . . . There is decreased dorsiflexion 

to the left ankle compared to the right.”). 

Due to the ALJ’s failure to analyze or address contradictory probative evidence, the Court 

can neither determine whether the ALJ considered the entirety of the record nor discern the weight 

he gave to particular evidence. Grant v. Kijakazi, 619 F. Supp. 3d 128, 139 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting

Turner v. Astrue, 710 F. Supp. 2d 95, 105 (D.D.C. 2010)) (“[A]n ALJ cannot merely disregard 

evidence which does not support [her] conclusion.”); see also Lane-Rauth, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 67

(“While the ALJ need not articulate his reasons for rejecting every piece of evidence, he must at 

least minimally discuss a claimant’s evidence that contradicts the Commissioner’s position.”)
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(citations omitted). In this case, he erroneously simply listed medical evidence, without more. 

Lane-Rauth, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (“Because the ALJ simply listed all of the evidence without 

clearly explaining which particular pieces of evidence led him to his conclusion, there is no logical 

bridge, and no thorough discussion and analysis.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). 

In attempting to justify the ALJ’s decision, the Commissioner cites to record evidence that

the ALJ failed to include in his decision. ECF No. 18 at 12. For example, the Commissioner cites

to an examination with Dr. Berkenblit indicating that Plaintiff had nearly full range of motion in 

both his knee and ankle. Id. (citing AR at 396-98). The ALJ, however, did not include reference 

to this examination in his decision. Id. Although this examination and findings may well have 

been material to the ALJ’s determination, the Court can only consider the grounds the agency 

proffered. See Clark v. Astrue, 826 F. Supp. 2d 13, 20 (D.D.C. 2011). For all these reasons, 

remand on this issue is warranted. See Brown v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 703, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The 

judiciary can scarcely perform its assigned review function, limited though it is, without some 

indication not only of what evidence was credited, but also whether other evidence was rejected 

rather than simply ignored.”).

B. The ALJ misstated Plaintiff’s participation in everyday activities and the

relief his treatment provided.

In discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints so as to fashion an RFC, the ALJ relied 

upon Plaintiff’s ability to “perform largely independent activities, including the ability to prepare 

simple meals, at-home exercise, and spending time at the park.” Id. at 21. Additionally, the ALJ 

noted that Plaintiff’s cortisone injections were “greatly” effective at treating his back pain. Id. at 

21. 
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These characterizations are at odds with the record, as the ALJ left out significant

contextual details. For example, Plaintiff testified that he would have to sit down when preparing 

a simple meal. Id. at 58. Further, Plaintiff’s “exercising at home” entailed physical therapy 

exercises his doctor recommended. Id. at 54. Moreover, Plaintiff only rarely went to the park 

when it was a “good day” after he got a “good night’s sleep.” Id. As Plaintiff testified, he could 

only stand for fifteen minutes, and “sometimes, it’s a task just for [him] to bend over to try and tie

[his] shoe.” Id. at 56. The ALJ’s failure to explain the extent to which Plaintiff is capable of 

performing certain activities reflects a misstatement of the record and warrants remand. See 

Jackson v. Barnhart, 271 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2002) (remanding where the ALJ

“ignored the limited fashion the plaintiff engages in some of the activities she described.”)

(emphasis in original); Stubbs v. Saul, No. 18-cv-1457, 2020 WL 1893173, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 

2020) (reversing an ALJ’s decision where the ALJ mischaracterized Plaintiff’s everyday 

activities). 

The ALJ’s discussion of the efficacy of Plaintiff’s medical treatment is also inconsistent 

with the record. Although the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s cortisone shots “greatly” mitigate his 

symptoms, the ALJ failed to note that the efficacy of the cortisone shots diminished over time. 

AR at 53. Both Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical record reflect that the cortisone shots 

provided only temporary relief. See id. at 579, 582, 584, 585, 605. From February to July of 2020, 

Plaintiff received three cortisone injections. Id. Although his first injection provided relief for up 

to two weeks, his third injection provided relief for only a few days. See id. at 582, 585 (“He is 

still having back pain for which he is receiving injections for. They relieve his pain for a few days

but not thereafter.”). The ALJ failed to acknowledge the injections’ waning effectiveness and

further failed to explain why he did not consider this information in his analysis. Id. at 21. 
14

In support of the ALJ’s decision, the Commissioner again cites to evidence that the ALJ 

did not cite. Id. at 21; ECF No. 18 at 13 (citing to a telephonic follow-up billing appointment and 

noting that Plaintiff indicated that he had no complaints). Specifically, the Commissioner argues, 

“in September 2020, [Plaintiff] was evidently returning to work as he filled out some forms for his 

job. Thus, the ALJ correctly observed that Plaintiff’s back injections reduced his back pain.” ECF 

No. 18 at 13. The Commissioner’s argument misses the mark. Plaintiff did not make these 

statementsto a health care provider, but rather to an administrator who called to discuss his medical

bills. Id. at 613-14. This does not constitute a medical opinion. Moreover, reliance on this 

evidence would constitute a post hoc rationalization that the Court cannot consider. Settles, 121

F. Supp. 3d at 170 (“Moreover, with regard to an ALJ’s reasoning ‘the Court may only consider 

the grounds proffered by the agency in its decision for post hoc rationalizations do not suffice.’”)

(quoting Espinosa v. Colvin, 953 F. Supp. 2d 25, 33 (D.D.C. 2013)). As noted above, the record 

suggests that Plaintiff’s limitations are more significant than the ALJ reflected in his decision. 

Because the ALJ failed to consider or, at a minimum, failed to explain why he did not credit this 

evidence, this Court remands the ALJ’s RFC determination for further proceedings. See Jackson,

271 F. Supp. 2d at 37 (remanding an ALJ’s RFC determination due to the ALJ’s failure to conduct 

a proper evaluation of all relevant evidence in the record). 

II. The ALJ Failed to Properly Evaluate Dr. McClendon’s Opinion. 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the opinion of Plaintiff’s 

primary care treating physician, Dr. McClendon. ECF No. 16 at 19. The Commissioner argues

that the ALJ properly considered Dr. McClendon’s opinion, as the ALJ evaluated the opinion’s 

persuasiveness based on its consistency and supportability with the record. ECF No. 18 at 17. The

Court agrees with Plaintiff.
15

For claims filed after March 27, 2017, ALJs are not required to defer or give specific 

evidentiary weight to medical opinions from claimants’ treating providers. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520c(a). Before the SSA issued revised regulations in 2017, courts in this Circuit followed 

the “treating physician rule,” which interpreted prior regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), and 

required ALJs to give “controlling weight” to physicians’ opinions so long as they were consistent 

with the record. Butler, 353 F.3d at 1003. Under the revised regulations, however, an ALJ shall 

not give specific evidentiary weight to any medical opinion, “including those from [the claimant’s] 

medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c. Instead, the ALJ must articulate how 

persuasive all medical opinions are, according to five factors: (1) supportability, (2) consistency, 

(3) the medical source’s relationship with the claimant, (4) specialization, and (5) “other factors 

that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(a), 404.1520c(c)(2) (“The

more consistent a medical opinion is with other sources of the claim, the more persuasive it will

be.”). The most important factors for an ALJ to consider are supportability and consistency. Id.

§ 404.1520c(b)(2); Minor v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-3577 (ZMF), 2022 WL 17726903, at *8 (D.D.C.

Dec. 16, 2022) (“Supportability refers to the extent to which a medical source’s opinion is 

supported by relevant objective medical evidence and the source’s supporting 

explanation. Consistency refers to the extent to which the opinion is consistent with the evidence 

from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.”) (citations omitted).

An ALJ is required to “provid[e] a sufficient basis for this Court to understand his 

reasoning when viewing the decision as a whole.” Colter v. Kijakazi, No. 20-0632 (CKK), 2022 

WL 715218, at *11 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2022) (citation omitted). In evaluating medical opinions, 

“the ALJ must explain how he considered and resolved any material inconsistencies,” not just state 

that that an opinion was unpersuasive. See Cobb v. Astrue, 770 F. Supp. 2d 165, 171 (D.D.C. 
16

2011) (holding the ALJ’s RFC insufficient where the assessment of medical opinions contained 

only broad generalizations rather than analysis and citation to specific facts) (citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. McClendon, included the following limitations: 

[Plaintiff] had a moderate limitation in restriction of activities of daily living, a 

moderate limitation in difficulties in maintaining social functioning, a moderate 

limitation in difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace, and a 

moderate limitation in repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended 

duration. [Plaintiff] would be limited to lifting/carrying less than 10 pounds, and 

could sit, stand, and walk for less than two hours in a workday. 

AR at 22. 

Based on these limitations, Dr. McClendon found that “[Plaintiff’s] impairments prevent 

him from working.” Id. The ALJ, in evaluating Dr. McClendon’s opinion, determined that this 

was only partially supported by the record and ultimately unpersuasive. Id. The ALJ reasoned as 

follows:

Dr. McClendon’s opinion is somewhat supported by the provider’s treating 

relationship with the claimant as his primary care physician. This opinion is 

unpersuasive due to its inconsistency with the longitudinal record. For instance, 

finding that the claimant would have certain standing and walking restrictions is 

consistent with evidence showing that the claimant ambulated with a boot or 

assistive device. (7F/10, 9F/8). However, finding that the claimant would have 

moderate limitations in the areas identified above is inconsistent with evidence 

throughout the record showing that the claimant was alert and oriented (3F/11,

9F/10, 11F/4), cooperative with examiners (3F/11), and that he had a normal mood 

and affect (11F/4). Furthermore, the claimant was able to maintain a conversational 

exchange with his representative and the undersigned during his telephonic hearing; 

an indication that he is capable of maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. 

(Hearing).

Id. 

Although the ALJ accounts for certain physical limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC, such as

Plaintiff’s need to ambulate with an assistive device, he failed to explain why Dr. McClendon’s 

opinion regarding Plaintiff’s further physical limitations was unsupported by the record. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)-(c) (requiring ALJs to articulate only how they considered factors 
17

supporting supportability and consistency of opinion evidence). In fact, there is hardly any 

discussion of the consistency and supportability of Dr. McClendon’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s 

physical limitations. AR at 23. 

The ALJ provides only one example as to why the opinion is unsupported by the 

longitudinal record. 

However, finding that the claimant would have moderate limitations in the areas 

identified above is inconsistent with evidence throughout the record showing that 

the claimant was alert and oriented (3F/11, 9F/10, 11F/4), cooperative with 

examiners (3F/11), and that he had a normal mood and affect (11F/4). Furthermore, 

the claimant was able to maintain a conversational exchange with his representative 

and the undersigned during his telephonic hearing; an indication that he is capable 

of maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. (Hearing)

Id. 

This “explanation,” however, inexplicably relies upon Dr. McClendon’s opinion of 

Plaintiff’s mood and mental limitations to discount Dr. McClendon’s broader findings. Id.

Plaintiff’s mental limitations are not at issue in this case, nor is the ALJ’s discussion of them in 

any way sufficient to discredit Dr. McClendon’s findings as to Plaintiff’s physical limitations. 

Significantly, Dr. McClendon determined that Plaintiff could walk and stand for less than two 

hours in a workday. Id. at 569. The ALJ’s RFC, however, allows for Plaintiff to stand and/or 

walk for six hours in an eight-hour workday. Id. at 19. This does not square with the ALJ’s 

apparent acceptance of Dr. McClendon’s findings relating to standing and walking restrictions. 

See id. at 22 (“For instance, finding that the claimant would have certain standing and walking 

restrictions is consistent with evidence showing that the claimant ambulated with a boot or 

assistive device.”). Without more, the Court cannot untangle how or why the ALJ discounted Dr. 

McClendon’s relevant findings, or more specifically, why the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could 

sit/stand for longer periods of time. See Pinkney, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (“[T]he ALJ has a duty to 
18

explain why they either ignored or rejected contradictory evidence.”). Indeed, the ALJ’s reliance 

upon Dr. McClendon’s purported erroneous evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental limitations to refute

Dr. McClendon’s broader findings provides, at best, an illogical bridge. See Brown, 794 F.2d at 

708 (An implicit rejection, “without even a breath of explanation” would “violate[ ] the elementary 

requirement that ALJ’s not only state their findings but explicate the reasons for their decision”); 

see also Henderson v. Saul, No. 17-2846, 2019 WL 5549907, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2019) (“A 

reviewing court should not be left guessing as to how the ALJ evaluated probative material . . . .”). 

Therefore, remand is warranted on this issue. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reversal, ECF No. 15, is GRANTED and 

Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance, ECF No. 17, is DENIED. This case is 

REMANDED to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this 

Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED.

Date: September 14, 2023

 ______________________________________ 

 MOXILA A. UPADHYAYA

 United States Magistrate Judge