The Honorable Rudolph T. Randa, District Judge of the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 12-1511

CARRIS JAMES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

HYATT REGENCY CHICAGO,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:09-cv-07873—Milton I. Shadur, Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 22, 2012—DECIDED FEBRUARY 13, 2013

Before BAUER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and RANDA,

District Judge.



BAUER, Circuit Judge. James has been an employee

of Hyatt Regency Chicago (“Hyatt”) since 1985. In

April 2007, James took a leave of absence due to an eye
2 No. 12-1511

injury that occurred outside of work. James filed suit in

2009 claiming that Hyatt violated his rights under the

Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601

et seq., as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. During discovery, the

district court denied James’ motions to compel and

awarded Hyatt a portion of attorney’s fees it expended

responding to Plaintiff’s motions pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(B), and subsequently

granted Hyatt’s motion for summary judgment on all

of James’ claims. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

James has been continuously employed as a banquet

steward at Hyatt, a hotel in downtown Chicago, since

1985. When James applied to Hyatt, he noted on his

application that he had a vision problem that is correctable with eyeglasses and magnifying glasses. Hyatt

was aware that James was nearsighted and accommodated him by increasing the print size of his work

assignments and schedules.

As a banquet steward, James is responsible for maintaining the cleanliness of Hyatt’s banquet and other

food-service areas, as well as transporting food items

and equipment. Specifically, according to the testimony of his supervisors as well as Hyatt’s written job

description, James’ position required him to lift pots

and pans and transport garbage cans around Hyatt’s

banquet and food-service area.
No. 12-1511 3

In March 2007, James was involved in an altercation

outside of work and was punched in the eye. James

developed a retinal detachment in his left eye in the

weeks following the altercation. In April 2007, James

underwent corrective surgery and had to miss work in

order to recuperate.

Hyatt’s Human Resources Department learned that

James’ absence was attributable to a medical issue,

and provided him with information regarding FMLA

leave. As required under the FMLA, Hyatt’s policies

provide for twelve weeks of job-protected leave

for eligible employees. On April 24, 2007, James

provided Hyatt’s Human Resources Coordinator with a

note from his doctor, Dr. Scott, stating that James

could return to “light duty” on May 10, 2007. The note

did not list any specific restrictions, nor did it say how

long James must remain on light duty. The next day

James requested FMLA leave; the request was

granted and Hyatt applied FMLA retroactively to cover

James’ absence prior to his submission of the certification form.

On May 9, 2007, James provided Hyatt with an authorization for the release of his health information “for the

purposes of authorizing a medical leave.” James provided

Hyatt, and its short-term disability provider, with a

substantial amount of disability benefit paperwork

that represented that he was unable to work in any capacity. James subsequently received disability benefits

based upon those representations.

On May 11, 2007, James submitted an FMLA certification

form to Hyatt which stated that James required con-
4 No. 12-1511

tinued FMLA leave because he was unable to work in

any capacity. Dr. Scott noted on the form that James’

condition was probably longstanding and most likely

occurred before his initial visit with the doctor. The

form further stated that this condition could possibly

incapacitate James permanently.

James’ twelve week FMLA leave ended July 13, 2007.

The collective bargaining agreement between his union

and Hyatt, however, entitled James to remain on jobprotected leave for up to one year from his original absence. On August 2, 2007, James submitted to Hyatt a

release from Dr. Scott that stated that James was allowed

to return to work on August 5, 2007, with the restriction of being “visually impaired.” James testified that

Hyatt’s Human Resources Coordinator told him that

he could not return to work with restrictions. James

did not return to work on August 5, and then continued

to submit paperwork from Dr. Scott representing that

James was incapable of working in any capacity. Forms

provided by Dr. Scott stated he was “not sure” when

James could return to work (May 11, 2007 and June 14,

2007 forms), that James would be unable to work until

August 20, 2007 (June 1, 2007 form), and that James

would be disabled until August 5, 2007 (August 2, 2007

form). Based upon James’ request, and Dr. Scott’s representations of James’ condition, Hyatt completed all

necessary disability paperwork.

On September 25, 2007, James faxed Hyatt a note

from Dr. Matchinski, a different doctor, indicating that

James could return to work with the restrictions of “no
No. 12-1511 5

heavy lifting or excessive bending.” Dr. Matchinski’s

note made no reference to any “visual impairment.”

Hyatt then attempted to contact James in September,

and again in December, to seek additional information

as to the specifics behind his restrictions and the conflicting paperwork he was submitting. However,

months went by and James offered Hyatt no further

clarification of his condition. On January 15, 2008, James

Parsons, Hyatt’s Workers’ Compensation and Safety

Manager, sent a letter directly to Dr. Scott requesting

clarification of James’ medical condition. Parsons enclosed with the letter a return-to-work certification

form as well as a job analysis for James’ position. On

January 28, 2008, Dr. Scott responded stating that James

could return to work but could not complete any task

that required vision better than 20/200. After receiving

Dr. Scott’s letter, Hyatt scheduled a meeting with James

to discuss his return. During that meeting James requested, and was granted, two weeks of paid vacation.

On February 17, 2008, James returned to work in the

same position, shift, and seniority level as before his

leave of absence. James testified that he felt he was

treated fairly during the FMLA application process and

that no one at Hyatt has said anything negative to

him regarding his leave, eye surgery, or visual impairment. Nonetheless, James filed suit in 2009, alleging

claims of retaliation and interference with his rights

under the FMLA and discrimination and retaliation

under the ADA. Ultimately, the district court found

that James failed to present a genuine issue of material

fact as to any of his claims, and granted summary judgment to Hyatt.
6 No. 12-1511

II. DISCUSSION

James’ claim in this case is unique in that he does not

deny he asked for and was granted FMLA benefits by

Hyatt; rather he contends that he was left on FMLA

leave too long. In support of this claim, James argues

that Hyatt failed to promptly return him to work

after his submission of various “releases” from his physicians. The district court granted summary judgment

in favor of Hyatt and dismissed James’ FMLA and ADA

claims. The district court also denied James’ motion to

compel further discovery, and subsequently imposed

Rule 37 sanctions. James now appeals the district court’s

decision to grant summary judgment, as well as the

district court’s denial of his motions to compel discovery and the assessment of sanctions. We review each

of James’ arguments in turn.

A. FMLA Interference Claim

James first contends that the district court improperly

granted summary judgment on his FMLA interference

claim. We review a district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo. Darst v. Interstate Brands Corp., 512

F.3d 903, 907 (7th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view

the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s

favor. Darst, 512 F.3d at 907.
No. 12-1511 7

The FMLA makes it unlawful for any employer to

interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the

attempt to exercise rights under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C.

§ 2615(a)(1). An employee on FMLA leave has the right

to be restored to the same or an equivalent position

that the employee had before he took leave. 29 U.S.C.

§ 2612. However, if an employee cannot perform an

essential function of their original position because of

a physical or mental condition, the employee has no

right to restoration to a different position under FMLA.

29 U.S.C. § 825.216(c).

In order to succeed in an FMLA interference claim,

James “must show that: (1) he was eligible for the

FMLA protections; (2) his employer was covered by

FMLA; (3) he was entitled to take leave under FMLA;

(4) he provided sufficient notice of [his] intent to take

leave; and (5) [his] employer denied [him] FMLA benefits

to which he was entitled.” Goelzer v. Sheboygan Cnty., Wis.,

604 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir. 2010). Hyatt does not

dispute that James was eligible and entitled to take

FMLA leave, and that James supplied notice of his

intent to take FMLA leave. So our focus turns to the

fifth element, whether a reasonable jury could find

that Hyatt denied James any FMLA benefit.

As we have noted, this is a unique claim in that

James concedes he was granted the full twelve weeks of

FMLA leave; rather James contends he was wrongfully

prohibited from returning to work prior to the expiration of his FMLA leave on July 13, 2007. Specifically,

James argues that Hyatt interfered with his FMLA en-
8 No. 12-1511

In total, James submitted five doctor’s notes to Hyatt, which 1

he characterizes as “physician releases.” Only three of those

doctor’s notes fall within the relevant time frame of James’

FMLA leave: the April 24 note, the May 11 note, and the July 10

note. We agree with the district court and reject James’ May 11

note and July 10 note as physician “releases.” On both of those

doctor’s notes the question is asked, “If medical leave is

required for the employee’s absence from work because of the

employee’s own condition (including absences due to

pregnancy or a chronic condition), is employee unable to

work of any kind?” [sic]. On both the May 11 and the July 10

release form, James’ physician checked the box marked “yes”

indicating that James was unable to return to work in any

capacity. Therefore, the only relevant physician’s release

that falls within the requisite time frame of James’ FMLA

leave is the April 24 note. 

titlement when it did not promptly reinstate him to

his position when he presented the April 24 doctor’s

note that released him to “light duty” starting on May 11,

2007. In support of his argument, James relies upon 1

Brumbalough v. Camelot, 427 F.3d 996 (6th Cir. 2005). In

Brumbalough, the plaintiff submitted a doctor’s note that

stated, in its entirety, “[Linda Brumbalough] may return

to work on 8/13/01[.] She should only work a 40-45 hour

work week and limit her out of town travel to 1 day per

week.” Id. at 1004. Her employer rejected this certification as insufficient and requested that Brumbalough

submit additional documentation before she was allowed to return to work. Id. The Sixth Circuit court

held “that once an employee submits a statement from

her health care provider which indicates that she may
No. 12-1511 9

return to work, the employer’s duty to reinstate her has

been triggered under the FMLA.” Id. We agree with

the holding in this case, and further the FMLA

requires an employer to restore an employee to

the position held at the time FMLA leave began or

“an equivalent position with equivalent employment

benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). However, an employer

has no duty under the FMLA to return an employee to

his or her position, if that employee cannot perform an

essential function of the job. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b).

The crux of James’ argument on appeal is that Hyatt

violated the FMLA on April 24, 2007 when it did not

promptly reinstate him to his position after he submitted a doctor’s note releasing him to “light duty”

beginning on May 10, 2007. We disagree. First, the

April 24 note James submitted did not release him to

return to work in any capacity until May 10, 2007. We

do not see how Hyatt violated James’ FMLA benefits

by not returning him to work on April 24, when his

own physician release stated he could not return until

May 10, 2007. Second, the April 24 note only permitted

James to return to work on “light duty” beginning

May 10, 2007; the note did not specify when James’

“light duty” restriction would be lifted. The FMLA only

requires that an employer permit an employee to take

up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for illness and

return to his prior post or an equivalent position. Id.

Employers are under no obligation to restore an

employee to his or her position if the employee is

unable to perform the essential functions of the job. As
10 No. 12-1511

noted by the district court, we have held that, “[t]here is

no such thing as ‘FMLA light duty’ ” Hendricks v. Compass

Group, USA, Inc., 496 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2007). See

29 C.F.R. §§ 825.220(d) and 825.702(d) (providing that

an employee may take “light duty” under workers’ compensation or may continue with unpaid FMLA leave).

Third, James then represented to Hyatt, through disability paperwork and additional doctor certifications,

that he was completely unable to work in any capacity

and required disability benefits. We agree with the

district court that even when the evidence in this case

is viewed in the light most favorable to James, Hyatt is

entitled to summary judgment because James has failed

to show that Hyatt interfered with his FMLA benefits.

B. FMLA Retaliation Claim

James next argues that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment on his FMLA retaliation

claim. Under the FMLA, employers are prohibited

from retaliating against an employee who exercises or

attempts to exercise FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2).

In other words, the employer cannot use an employee’s

use of FMLA leave as a negative factor in promotion,

termination, and other employment decisions. Breneisen

v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 978 (7th Cir. 2008). “We

evaluate a claim of FMLA retaliation the same way

that we would evaluate a claim of retaliation under

other employment statutes.” Buie v. Quad/Graphics Inc., 366

F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff making a claim

for retaliation under the FMLA can proceed under the
No. 12-1511 11

James concedes that he is unable to establish a prima facie 2

case of FMLA retaliation under the indirect method. James

blames this fact on the district court’s denial of his motion to

compel discovery. We find this to be a misstatement of the

record and will address the denial of James’ motion to

compel, and resulting sanctions, in turn. Next, James argues

that we lessened the McDonnell Douglas burden in Coleman v.

Donahue, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) and he therefore

does not have to establish a prima facie case under the

indirect method. This is a misstatement of the holding in

Coleman and we do not interpret the concurring opinion in

that case as lessening a plaintiff’s burden to establish a

prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.

direct or indirect methods of proof. Id. James proceeds

under both the direct and indirect methods but his retaliation claim, which is really just a reformulation of

his FMLA interference claim, fails because James

produced no evidence of a materially adverse action.2

Under both the direct and indirect methods, the

plaintiff must present evidence that a materially adverse

action was taken by their employer. See Daugherty v.

Wabash Center Inc., 577 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2009);

Simpson v. Office of Chief Judge of Circuit Ct. of Will Cnty.,

559 F.3d 706, 718 (7th Cir. 2009). James contends that

Hyatt’s “refusal” to reinstate him after the submission

of his April 24 doctor’s note was a materially adverse

employment action. For an employer’s action to be

defined as “materially adverse” it must be “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job

responsibilities.” Nagle v. Vill. of Calumet Park, 554
12 No. 12-1511

F.3d 1106, 1120 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Crady v. Liberty

Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)).

For example, a “materially adverse change might be

indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion

evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly

diminished material responsibilities, or other indices

that might be unique to a particular situation.” Crady,

993 F.2d at 136 (citations omitted). Here, Hyatt’s “refusal” to reinstate James after the submission of his

April 24 doctor’s note is not a materially adverse employment action. As we discussed above, Hyatt did not

violate the FMLA by not returning James to work on

April 24, when he submitted a doctor’s note releasing

him to return to work on “light duty” on May 10.

Further, James submitted the April 24 “light duty” note

one day prior to submitting, and Hyatt granting,

James’ FMLA leave request. Therefore, confusingly,

James argues that Hyatt granted his request for

FMLA leave, and then nearly simultaneously retaliated

against him for taking it.

Actually the record in this case indicates that Hyatt

attempted on multiple occasions to return James to work.

Hyatt’s Human Resources Department reached out to

James in September 2007 and again in December 2007,

seeking clarification of the conflicting documents he was

submitting. James never responded to these requests.

Finally, in January 2008, Hyatt reached out directly

to James’ physician, Dr. Scott, to request clarification.

Thirteen days later, Dr. Scott responded by stating

that James could return to work but could not complete

any task that required vision better than 20/200. After
No. 12-1511 13

Hyatt received Dr. Scott’s letter, they scheduled a

meeting with James to discuss his return, and during

that meeting James requested, and was granted,

two weeks of paid vacation. James returned to work on

February 17, 2008 to the same position, shift, and

seniority level as before his leave of absence. Therefore,

James has failed to provide evidence sufficient to prove

his claim under either the direct or indirect method.

C. ADA Failure to Accommodate Claim

James also claims that Hyatt failed to accommodate

him as required under the ADA. To establish a prima

facie case for failure to accommodate, “a plaintiff must

show that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a

disability; (2) the employer was aware of his disability;

and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate

the disability.” Kotwica v. Rose Packing Co., 637 F.3d 744,

747-48 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must present the court with

evidence that, if believed by a trier of fact, would

establish all three elements of his claim. Id. Additionally,

“the standard rule is that a plaintiff must normally

request an accommodation before liability under the

ADA attaches,” Jovanovic v. Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d

894, 899 (7th Cir. 2000). Even assuming that James’ vision

impairment amounts to a disability under the ADA,

James fails to put forth sufficient evidence to indicate

that Hyatt failed to accommodate him.

James argues that by rejecting his requests to return

to work via his doctor’s “releases,” Hyatt violated the

ADA by failing to accommodate James’ vision problems,
14 No. 12-1511

with the same accommodations they have provided

him for the past twenty years of employment. It is wellestablished under the ADA, that an employee begins the accommodation “process” by informing his

employer of his disability; at that point, an employer’s

“liability is triggered for failure to provide accommodations.” Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130,

1134 (7th Cir. 1996). But based on the evidence before

us, Hyatt did not receive notification as to the true

state of James’ medical condition until Hyatt proactively reached out to James’ physician in January 2008

for clarification. Prior to that point, James was simultaneously submitting conditional doctor releases, along

with paperwork indicating he was completely incapable

of working—all while failing to respond to Hyatt’s

requests for clarification as to the true nature of his condition. James argues that the conflicting medical documentation he submitted creates a materially disputed

fact as to whether or not James could return to work.

We find that circular reasoning does not establish a prima

facie case showing Hyatt failed to accommodate him.

In this case, James’ conditional releases from his

doctors restricted him from performing essential functions of his position. For example, in the September 25

note, James’ doctor represented that he could return to

work under the restriction of “no heavy lifting or

excessive bending over”—two essential functions of his

position. Reassigning such tasks to another employee is

not considered a reasonable accommodation when reassignment of the task would equate, essentially, to reassignment of the job itself. Miller v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp.,

643 F.3d 190, 199 (7th Cir. 2011).
No. 12-1511 15

 The core of James’ accommodation argument is that

if he did not have a visual impairment, Hyatt would

not have prohibited him from returning to work for

ten months. The undisputed facts in this case do not

support that conclusion. Rather, as we have previously

discussed, the record indicates that James’ submissions of medical documentation representing that he

was incapable of working kept him from returning to

work. Further, we believe a trier of fact could not find

that Hyatt suddenly decided not to extend James the

same accommodations for his visual impairment that

he was afforded during the prior twenty years of his

employment at Hyatt.

D. ADA Disparate Treatment Claim

On appeal, James presents an ADA disparate treatment

claim for the first time. James failed to articulate this

theory or support it with any facts in the district court,

and thus has waived the argument. See Local 15, Int’l Bhd.

of Elec. Workers v. Exelon Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 783 (7th

Cir. 2007) (“ ‘A party waives any argument that it

does not raise before the district court or, if raised in the

district court, it fails to develop on appeal.’ ”(quoting

Williams v. REP Corp., 302 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2002))).

E. Denial of James’ Motion to Compel and Rule 37

Sanctions

During the arduous discovery process in this case,

the parties had the benefit of eighteen months of

discovery where James was provided with several thou-
16 No. 12-1511

sand documents in response to his written discovery

requests, and deposed every one of Hyatt’s witnesses.

Then on June 22, 2010, James brought several motions to

compel further discovery responses and requests for

production. These motions were denied on June 24,

2010. The next day, James filed additional motions to

compel virtually the same discovery requests. The district

court again denied these motions and awarded Hyatt

attorney’s fees incurred in responding. Originally,

Hyatt sought payment of $5,112.50, the amount billed

for the associate and co-counsel to respond to and

attend the hearing on James’ motions to compel. The

district court considered the time spent and the fees

incurred by Hyatt and determined only the primary

associates fees were reasonable under the circumstances and reduced the fees awarded to $3,975.00. The

district court ordered James to pay Hyatt $3,975.00.

Several months passed and James failed to comply with this order. Ultimately, the district court intervened and ordered James’ attorney to reimburse

Hyatt directly, noting that it “could well have just

brought [Section] 1927 into play, place[d] the obligation

directly on [him], in which case [he] would have a

problem in recovering from [his] client.” James now

appeals both the denial of his motions to compel discovery, as well as the resulting sanctions.

First, we note that district courts have broad discretion

in discovery matters, and therefore this court reviews

the denial of motions to compel discovery for an abuse

of discretion. See Kalis v. Colgate–Palmolive Co., 231 F.3d

1049, 1056 (7th Cir. 2000). We shall not reverse the
No. 12-1511 17

district court’s ruling absent a clear showing that the

denial of discovery resulted in actual and substantial

prejudice to James. See Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co.,

267 F.3d 628, 646 (7th Cir. 2001).

Despite James’ arguments to the contrary, we find

no evidence in the record to support his contention that

the district court abused its discretion in denying his

motions to compel. One of the many discovery requests at issue sought to compel Hyatt to provide

James with all documents relating to all Hyatt employees (including their names, addresses, and telephone numbers) who requested FMLA leave, ADA

leave, or any other type of medical leave from

August 2002 to the present date. At the time James

made this request that amounted to over 2,400 leaves

of absence, according to Hyatt. Further, James was not

prejudiced by the denial of this overly broad request,

especially in light of the fact that the parties had

engaged in extensive discovery. We agree with the

district court that James is not entitled an additional

fishing expedition, in hopes of finding a new way to

reshape the facts, because he failed to obtain the

answers he had hoped for during the previous eighteen

months of discovery.

We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district

court’s denial of James’ motion to compel discovery.

We next address the issue of the assessed sanctions in

this case. “[W]e review all discovery sanctions for abuse

of discretion and will uphold a district court’s decision

so long as it could be considered reasonable.” Collins v.
18 No. 12-1511

Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 2009). Under

Rule 37(a)(5)(B), if a motion to compel is denied, a court

“must after giving an opportunity to be heard, require

the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to

pay the party or deponent who opposed the motion its

reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion,

including attorney’s fees.” James argues that he was

denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard because

he did not know the district court would issue sanctions against him on July 27, 2010, and therefore had

not prepared a response. Again, we disagree. The

record indicates that the district court thoughtfully attempted to lead James’ attorney towards a more reasonable and appropriate approach to the discovery

process, and he declined to follow on multiple occasions. The district court found that rather than using

discovery as a tool to uncover facts and evidence

to support his case, James was using unreasonable discovery requests as a weapon against Hyatt. The

district court in this matter fully discharged its obligation to craft reasonable sanctions. We find no

abuse of discretion and reject James’ appeal of the

district court’s sanctions.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the

decision of the district court.

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