No. 19 April 7, 2016 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

Hanna VAANDERING,

Trent Lutz, Heather Conroy,

and Jill Gibson,

Petitioners,

v.

Ellen F. ROSENBLUM,

Attorney General, State of Oregon,

Respondent.

(SC S063820)

En Banc

On petitions to review ballot title filed January 15, 2016; 

considered and under advisement February 23, 2016.

Margaret S. Olney, Bennett, Hartman, Morris & Kaplan, 

LLP, Portland, filed the petition and reply for petitioners 

Vaandering, Lutz, and Conroy.

Jill Gibson, Gibson Law Firm, Portland, filed the petition 

and reply for petitioner Gibson.

Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, 

filed the answering memorandum for respondent. With her 

on the answering memorandum were Ellen F. Rosenblum, 

Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor 

General.

KISTLER, J.

Ballot title referred to Attorney General for modification.

Case Summary: Petitioners seek review of the Attorney General’s ballot title 

for Initiative Petition 69 (2016), which would change collective bargaining laws 

for public employees by establishing two separate frameworks for determining 

the terms of employment, based on union membership. Petitioners assert that 

the Attorney General’s caption, “yes” and “no” result statements, and summary 

do not substantially comply with the legal requirements for ballot titles. Held: 

The Attorney General’s caption fails to convey some of the measure’s major 

effects because the caption focuses too narrowly on two of those effects, nonunion 

employee compensation and public employee unions’ duties of representation. A 

similar problem affects the “yes” result statement, which focuses on compensation for nonunion employees but fails to convey that the measure would establish 
2 Vaandering v. Rosenblum

separate frameworks for determining terms of employment for union and nonunion employees. The “no” result statement fails to adequately describe existing 

law and public employee unions’ ability to recover their representation costs from 

nonunion employees. Finally, the summary fails to convey, among other things, 

that employment terms for nonunion employees would be determined based on an 

individualized assessment of each nonunion employee’s qualifications and that 

different terms of employment for union and nonunion employees would not give 

rise to an unfair labor practice.

Ballot title referred to Attorney General for modification.
Cite as 359 Or 1 (2016) 3

KISTLER, J.

Two sets of petitioners seek review of the certified 

ballot title for Initiative Petition 69 (2016) (IP 69). See ORS 

250.085(2) (specifying requirements for seeking review of 

certified ballot titles). We review the ballot title to determine 

whether it substantially complies with ORS 250.035(2). See 

id. (stating standard of review). For the reasons explained 

below, we refer the ballot title to the Attorney General for 

modification.

IP 69, if enacted, would alter the rights and obligations that public employers, their employees, and the 

unions representing those employees owe each other under 

the Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA), 

ORS 243.650 to ORS 243.782. Before explaining how IP 69 

would affect those rights and obligations, we first describe 

the current law briefly. Under PECBA, public employees have the right to form, join, and participate in labor 

organizations for purposes of representation and collective 

bargaining with their public employer. See ORS 243.662. 

If a union is either recognized or certified as the exclusive 

representative of the employees within a bargaining unit, 

see ORS 243.682 (providing procedures for recognizing or 

certifying public employee unions), the employees in the 

bargaining unit may but need not join the union. PECBA, 

however, imposes a duty on unions to represent all employees within a bargaining unit without regard to whether the 

employees are union members. That duty includes negotiating terms of employment on behalf of all the employees within the bargaining unit. In the same vein, PECBA 

makes it an unfair labor practice for a public employer to 

provide different employment terms to union and nonunion 

employees to encourage or discourage union membership. 

ORS 243.672(1)(c).

To offset the costs of representing employees who 

choose not to join a union and who thus do not pay union 

dues, PECBA authorizes unions and public employers to 

enter into a “fair-share agreement” as part of a collective 

bargaining agreement. See ORS 243.650(10) (defining fairshare agreements). A “fair-share agreement” permits the 

deduction of a “payment-in-lieu-of-dues” from the salaries 
4 Vaandering v. Rosenblum

of nonunion employees within a bargaining unit “to defray 

the cost for services by the [union] in negotiations and contract administration.” See ORS 243.650(18) (defining payments in lieu of dues). See also Davenport v. Washington 

Educ. Ass’n, 551 US 177, 181, 127 S Ct 2372, 168 L Ed 2d 

71 (2007) (describing the “fair-share” goal of “prevent[ing] 

nonmembers from free-riding on the union’s efforts, sharing 

the employment benefits obtained by the union’s collective 

bargaining without sharing the costs incurred”).1

IP 69, if enacted, would effect two sets of changes 

to that framework. First, it would divide public employees 

within a bargaining unit into two groups (union and nonunion employees), and it would provide different means 

for determining the employment terms (wages, benefits, 

and other employment terms) for each group. Employment 

terms for union employees would be based on the collective 

bargaining agreement. IP 69 § 3(3). Employment terms 

for nonunion employees could not be based on a collective 

bargaining agreement but would be based instead on an 

assessment of each employee’s “individual education, experience, training, skills, and performance.” Id. §§ 3(2), 9(4), 

(5). Having provided for separate means for determining the 

employment terms for union and nonunion employees, IP 69 

also provides that “[a] comparison of employment terms for 

union employees to the employment terms for [nonunion] 

employees, and any effects of such terms, may not form the 

basis of an unfair labor practice.” Id. § 9(1)(c).

The second group of changes that IP 69 would 

effect concern a union’s obligation to represent union and 

nonunion employees within a bargaining unit equally and 

nonunion employees’ corresponding obligation to make 

“payments in lieu of dues.” IP 69 would provide that a 

1 The First Amendment places limits on the extent to which public bodies 

can require public employees to participate in a union. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of 

Educ., 431 US 209, 97 S Ct 1782, 52 L Ed 2d 261 (1977). Abood held that the First 

Amendment does not prohibit public bodies from entering into collective bargaining agreements that require nonunion employees to pay their “fair share” of representation costs but that it does prohibit them from entering into collective bargaining agreements that require nonunion employees to pay for a union’s political 

activities. See Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 578 US ___, ___ S Ct 

___, ___ L Ed 3d ___ (2016) (per curiam) (affirming by an equally divided court a 

Ninth Circuit decision that followed Abood).
Cite as 359 Or 1 (2016) 5

union is “not required to collectively bargain for or to provide any type of service to public employees who choose 

not to join a labor organization and who do not pay for 

such services.” IP 69 § 10(1). By using the phrase “not 

required,” the measure leaves open the possibility that 

a union may engage in collective bargaining that would 

benefit employees in the collective bargaining unit who do 

not join the union.2

Section (4) of the measure similarly would provide:

“(1) Compulsory payments to labor organizations by 

public employees who choose to not join a labor organization shall be prohibited.

“(2) Public employees who choose to not join or pay a 

labor organization may not benefit from labor organization 

bargaining, representation, or services without sharing 

representation costs.”

Id. § 4. By its terms, subsection (4)(1) would prohibit nonunion employees from paying what PECBA currently 

describes as “payment in lieu of dues.” At first blush, subsection (4)(2) appears to be a corollary of that proposition. 

It prohibits nonunion employees from benefitting from a 

union’s efforts on behalf of its members. However, the last 

prepositional phrase in subsection (4)(2)—“without sharing 

representation costs”—suggests that, if nonunion members 

do benefit from “labor organization bargaining, representation, or services,” they would owe their share of the costs 

of procuring those benefits. How those two subsections and 

section 10 of IP 69 work together is, at best, ambiguous.

The Attorney General certified the following ballot 

title for IP 69:

“Public employer cannot compensate non-union 

employee based on union contract; limits union 

representation of non-members

2 Sometimes, it might be difficult for a union to negotiate benefits for its 

members without also benefitting nonunion employees, even if the union sought 

to limit its representation, as IP 69 would permit. Suppose, for example, a collective bargaining agreement required an employer to install an air filtration system to make the workplace healthier. That system presumably would benefit both 

union and nonunion employees, even if the union was “not required” to bargain 

on the latter group’s behalf.
6 Vaandering v. Rosenblum

“Result of ‘Yes’ Vote: ‘Yes’ vote prohibits public employer 

compensating non-union employee based on union contract; 

public employee unions need not represent non-members; 

limits charging representation fees to non-members.

“Result of ‘No’ Vote: ‘No’ vote retains current law: 

unions represent all public employees in organized bargaining unit; member, non-member compensation based on 

union contract; mandatory non-member fees permissible.

“Summary: Currently, public employees in a bargaining unit may be represented by a union. Union membership cannot be required as condition of public employment. 

Union represents (in negotiations, contract enforcement) all 

public employees in bargaining unit. Collective bargaining 

agreements can require non-members to share the costs of 

the legally-required union representation. Compensation 

differences/conduct to encourage/discourage union membership prohibited. Measure prevents public employer 

from establishing non-union employee compensation and 

employment terms by union contract, allows compensation differences. Measure removes requirement that public 

employee unions represent non-members; prohibits requiring non-members to pay costs of representation unless they 

benefit from representation; union members must renew 

membership annually. Measure applies to new, renewed, or 

extended contracts entered into after the effective date of 

measure. Other provisions.”

Petitioner Gibson challenges the ballot title’s caption, 

the “yes” result statement, and the summary. Petitioners 

Vaandering, Lutz, and Conroy (collectively Vaandering) 

challenge the ballot title’s caption, the “yes” and “no” result 

statements, and the summary.

We begin with the caption. ORS 250.035(2)(a) provides that a ballot title must contain “[a] caption of not more 

than 15 words that reasonably identifies the subject matter 

of the state measure.” A caption will reasonably identify the 

subject matter of a measure if it describes the “actual major 

effect” of the measure or, if there is more than one major 

effect, all the major effects that can be described within the 

word limit. See Lavey v. Kroger, 350 Or 559, 563, 258 P3d 

1194 (2011). To identify an “actual major effect,” we consider 

the “changes that the proposed measure would enact in the 
Cite as 359 Or 1 (2016) 7

context of existing law.” Rasmussen v. Kroger, 350 Or 281, 

285, 253 P3d 1031 (2011).

We have recognized that attempting to distill a complicated, multifaceted measure into 15 words is often difficult, and sometimes impossible. That difficulty may require 

a caption that uses more general terms in order to reasonably capture the universe of the measure’s major effects. 

McCann/Harmon v. Rosenblum, 354 Or 701, 707, 320 P3d 

548 (2014) (explaining that, “[a]t times, it may be necessary to describe [the measure’s] effects generally”). Put differently, specificity can lead to its own problems, such as a 

caption that selects and identifies only some out of multiple 

major effects, which in turn may “understate the scope of 

the proposed measure’s subject matter.” Greenberg v. Myers, 

340 Or 65, 69, 127 P3d 1192 (2006).

Both sets of petitioners raise essentially the same 

challenge to the caption, although their specific arguments 

differ. At bottom, both sets of petitioners argue that the caption is too narrow and focuses on only some of the measure’s 

major effects, to the exclusion of other major effects. Gibson 

views IP 69 as having four major effects.3

 In her view, the 

caption is “slanted” because it describes what she views as 

the negative aspects of the measure without mentioning 

what she sees as its positive aspects. Vaandering views IP 69 

as having five major effects.4

 She argues that the caption is 

defective because it focuses on only two of those effects.

We agree that the caption fails to substantially 

comply with the requirement that it reasonably identify the 

3 Gibson identifies those effects as: (1) prohibiting payments in lieu of dues for 

nonunion members; (2) relieving the union of the duty to represent all members 

in a bargaining unit; (3) requiring employers to compensate nonunion employee 

based on “employee’s individual education, experience, training, skills, and performance”; and (4) prohibiting employers from compensating nonunion employees 

based on a collective bargaining agreement.

4 Vaandering identifies those effects as: (1) requiring public employers to provide different wages, benefits, and other terms of employment for union and nonunion employees; (2) requiring employers to base employment terms for each nonunion employee on individualized criteria rather than the collective bargaining 

agreement; (3) weakening PECBA’s anti-discrimination provisions and thereby 

allowing employers to encourage or discourage union membership; (4) prohibiting fair share agreements; and (5) prohibiting nonunion employees from “benefitting” from union representation without sharing representation costs.
8 Vaandering v. Rosenblum

measure’s subject matter. The Attorney General’s caption 

focuses on two aspects of the measure that, in some ways, 

mirror each other: nonunion employees may not be compensated based on a collective bargaining agreement and 

unions have no obligation to represent nonunion employees. 

However, a caption that mentions only those two aspects of 

the measure fails to convey all the measure’s major effects.

IP 69 is not limited to a prohibition against nonunion employees being compensated based on the collective bargaining agreement and the corollary proposition 

that unions would have no obligation to represent nonunion 

employees. Rather, IP 69 would establish employment terms 

(wages, benefits, and other terms of employment) differently for union and nonunion employees. The employment 

terms for union employees would be based on the collective bargaining agreement while the employment terms for 

nonunion employees would be based on an individualized 

assessment of each “employee’s individual education, experience, training, skills, and performance.” IP 69 § 9(5). Under 

IP 69, treating employees differently in terms of wages, 

benefits, and conditions of employment because of their 

union status would not give rise to an unfair labor practice. 

Finally, unions would not be required to represent nonunion 

employees, and the measure would prohibit requiring nonunion employees to make payments in lieu of dues.5

In our view, those changes are major effects of the 

measure. We recognize that a caption cannot identify all 

those effects completely in 15 words. Sometimes, the 15-word 

limit will require trade-offs between breadth and detail. See 

McCann/Harmon, 354 Or at 707. We think that the caption could have complied with the statutory requirement by 

emphasizing the main effect of the measure (establishing 

employment terms differently for union and nonunion public employees), while identifying briefly the types of changes 

that the measure would effect. For example, the caption 

5 As discussed above, in providing that nonunion employees may not receive 

benefits from a “labor organization’s bargaining, representation, or services without sharing representation costs,” IP 69 leaves open the possibility that some 

benefits may extend to nonunion employees from a union’s representation of its 

members, which perhaps could trigger an obligation under IP 69 for nonunion 

employees to bear their share of the representation costs of those benefits.
Cite as 359 Or 1 (2016) 9

could have said, “Establishes employment terms differently 

for union, nonunion public employees; modifies bargaining, 

representation, cost-sharing, anti-discrimination laws.”6

 We 

leave it to the Attorney General to decide whether another 

caption better describes the major effects of IP 69. We agree, 

however, that the caption, as presently drafted, conveys only 

a few of those effects and must be modified.

We now turn to the “yes” and “no” result statements. Both Gibson and Vaandering challenge the “yes” 

result statement. A ballot title must include “[a] simple 

and understandable” statement of no more than 25 words 

that describes the result if the measure is approved. ORS 

250.035(2)(b). A “yes” result statement “should describe the 

most significant and immediate effects of the ballot initiative for the general public.” McCann/Harmon, 354 Or at 707 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Attorney General certified the following “yes” 

result statement:

“Result of ‘Yes’ Vote: ‘Yes’ vote prohibits public employer 

compensating non-union employee based on union contract; 

public employee unions need not represent non-members; 

limits charging representation fees to non-members.”

Both Gibson and Vaandering argue that the “yes” result 

statement is underinclusive for the same reasons that the 

caption is underinclusive. Vaandering argues that the “yes” 

result statement focuses too narrowly on one aspect of the 

measure—compensation for nonunion employees—when the 

larger effect of the measure, which the “yes” result statement 

does not mention, is that the measure authorizes different 

employment terms for union and nonunion public employees. 

As a corollary to her argument, Vaandering notes that the 

measure would eliminate the current prohibition on public 

employers’ “[d]iscriminat[ing] in regard to * ** any terms or 

condition of employment for the purpose of encouraging or 

6 The possible caption set out above is taken largely from one that Vaandering 

suggested. While Vaandering had suggested a caption that would say “[r]equires 

different employment terms,” the measure technically would not require different employment terms. It would require different methods for determining 

employment terms for union and nonunion employees. The suggestion in text 

reflects that distinction.
10 Vaandering v. Rosenblum

discouraging membership in an employee organization.” See 

ORS 243.672(1)(c).7

Both of Vaandering’s points have merit. An important result of IP 69 would be to divide employees within a 

bargaining unit into two groups—union and nonunion

employees—and establish the terms of employment differently for each group. A related result would be that providing different terms of employment to union and nonunion 

employees will no longer give rise to an unlawful employment practice. The “yes” result statement fails to convey 

those important results and must be modified.

Gibson faults the “yes” result statement for not mentioning that the terms of employment for nonunion employees would be based on an assessment of each employee’s 

“individual education, experience, training, skills, and performance.” IP 69 § 9(5). We agree with Gibson that the “yes” 

vote statement does not reflect how the terms of employment 

for nonunion employees would be established, but we are not 

persuaded that it must explain that point specifically. The 

Attorney General reasonably could reserve a more specific 

explanation for the summary.

Only Vaandering challenges the “no” result statement. That statement must be “[a] simple and understandable” statement of no more than 25 words that describes 

the results if the measure is rejected; in other words, the 

“no” result statement should describe the status quo. ORS 

250.035(2)(c). The certified “no” result statement provides:

“Result of ‘No’ Vote: ‘No’ vote retains current law: unions 

represent all public employees in organized bargaining 

unit; member, non-member compensation based on union 

contract; mandatory non-member fees permissible.”

7 Vaandering also argues that the clause in the “yes” result statement—

that “public employee unions need not represent non-members”—is inaccurate 

because many of the conditions over which public unions bargain will affect nonmembers equally with members. Given the practicalities of collective bargaining 

and employee compensation plans, Vaandering may be correct. However, IP 69 

provides that ORS 243.672(2)(a) does “not require a labor organization to represent, provide services to, or bargain on behalf of [nonunion] employees.” IP 69 

§ 9(2)(a). We cannot say that the Attorney General’s statement does not accurately reflect that provision.
Cite as 359 Or 1 (2016) 11

Vaandering argues that the “no” result statement is deficient in three respects. She argues that: (1) it focuses on 

compensation, to the exclusion of other terms of employment; 

(2) it fails to explain that the fees that unions can recover 

from nonmembers are limited to representation costs that 

the union is legally obligated to provide; and (3) it fails to 

explain that it is currently unlawful to provide different 

employment terms based on union membership.

We agree with each of Vaandering’s points. The 

measure is not limited to compensation but affects all 

terms of employment. Additionally, the phrase “mandatory 

non-member fees permissible” fails to state that only certain 

types of fees may be collected from nonunion employees. See 

ORS 243.650(18) (defining “payment-in-lieu-of-dues” as “an 

assessment to defray the cost for services by the exclusive 

representative in negotiations and contract administration 

of [nonunion employees]”). Finally, an important aspect of 

the current law is that it prohibits public employers from 

“[d]iscriminat[ing] in regard to * ** any terms or conditions of employment for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership in an employee organization.” ORS 

243.672(1)(c). Because IP 69 authorizes different treatment 

of union and nonunion employees in setting the terms of 

employment, it is important, in describing the current law, 

to identify the aspect of the law that would remain in effect 

if the measure is rejected.

Finally, we turn to the summary. ORS 250.035(2)(d)

requires that the ballot title contain “[a] concise and impartial statement of not more than 125 words summarizing 

the state measure and its major effect.” Gibson argues that 

the summary fails to mention that, under IP 69, the terms 

of employment for nonunion employees must be based on 

each employee’s “individual education, experience, training, skills, and performance.” IP 69 §9(5). We agree that 

the summary should mention that IP 69 would require public employers to undertake an individualized assessment 

of each nonunion employee’s qualifications in setting that 

employee’s terms of employment.

Vaandering also challenges the summary, arguing that it fails to comply with ORS 250.035(2)(d) in five 
12 Vaandering v. Rosenblum

respects. First, Vaandering argues that the summary’s first 

sentence is inaccurate when it states that “[c]urrently, public employees in a bargaining unit may be represented by a 

union.” Vaandering contends that a public employee cannot 

be “in a bargaining unit” unless the union has been recognized or certified as the employees’ exclusive representative. Once a union has been recognized or certified as the 

employees’ exclusive representative, all the employees in the 

bargaining unit will be represented by the union. See ORS 

243.682. Presumably, the Attorney General intended to convey the idea that not every employee within a recognized 

bargaining unit must become a union member. However, we 

agree with Vaandering that it is inaccurate to imply that, 

under PECBA, a union need not represent all the employees 

within a recognized or certified bargaining unit. See Conroy 

v. Rosenblum, 358 Or 807, 816-17, ___ P3d ___ (2016) (recognizing that union must represent all employees in a bargaining unit).

Second, Vaandering urges that the summary’s 

description of current anti-discrimination provisions is too 

narrow. The summary states: “Compensation differences/

conduct to encourage/discourage union membership prohibited.” Vaandering argues that current law prohibits 

treating union and nonunion employees differently based 

on their union membership, without regard to whether the 

different treatment is intended to encourage or discourage 

union membership. In support of her argument, Vaandering 

cites ORS 243.672(1)(a) and (c), and a Court of Appeals decision interpreting ORS 243.672(1)(a) and (e). See Wy’East 

Education Assoc. v. Oregon Trail School, 244 Or App 194, 

207-10, 260 P3d 626 (2011).8

Vaandering’s argument assumes that providing different terms of employment to union and nonunion members 

would be an unfair labor practice under ORS 243.672(1)(a), 

and that the Court of Appeals’ analysis in Wy’East is correct. 

8 ORS 243.672(1)(a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a public employer 

to “[i]nterfere with, restrain or coerce employees in or because of the exercise of 

rights guaranteed in ORS 243.662.” ORS 243.672(1)(c) makes it an unfair labor 

practice for a public employer to “[d]iscriminate in regard to * ** any terms or 

condition of employment for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging [union] 

membership.”
Cite as 359 Or 1 (2016) 13

We express no opinion on whether Vaandering’s argument 

under ORS 243.672(1)(a) is correct. However, for us to 

resolve the issue that she raises, we would have to decide 

the relationship between the specific unfair labor practice 

set out in ORS 243.672(1)(c) and the more general unfair 

labor practice set out in ORS 243.672(1)(a). We also would 

have to decide whether the Court of Appeals’ decision interpreting ORS 643.672(1)(a) is correct. With the issue in that 

posture, we cannot say that the Attorney General did not 

substantially comply with her obligation to summarize the 

measure and its major effect by focusing only on the more 

specific unfair labor practice described in ORS 243.672(1)(c).

Cf. McCann v. Rosenblum, 355 Or 256, 262, 323 P3d 955 

(2014) (explaining that “a ballot title challenge ordinarily 

is not the appropriate forum for deciding legal issues that 

require interpretation of a proposed measure”).

Third, Vaandering argues that, as with the caption 

and “yes” result statement, the summary’s focus on “compensation” is too narrow and potentially misleading. We 

agree that the effects of the measure are not limited to compensation but extend to other terms of employment.

Fourth, Vaandering contends that the summary 

inaccurately describes a union’s duty of representation 

under IP 69 and its ability to collect fair-share fees. The 

summary provides: “Measure removes requirement that 

public employee unions represent non-members; prohibits requiring non-members to pay costs of representation 

unless they benefit from representation.” As we understand 

Vaandering’s argument, she contends that the measure 

is ambiguous and that the summary goes too far, at this 

stage of the process, in attempting to resolve that ambiguity. She notes that the measure expressly prohibits public 

sector unions from collecting any money from nonmembers, 

and it prohibits nonmembers from “benefit[ting]” from labor 

representation “without sharing representation costs.” See 

IP 69 § 4. In her view, it is unclear how unions can recover 

representation costs from nonmembers if they may not collect those costs. Alternatively and perhaps additionally, 

she contends that it is unclear what IP 69 means in using 

the term “benefit.” She argues that, given that ambiguity, 
14 Vaandering v. Rosenblum

the summary should not imply that unions can “requir[e] 

non-members to pay costs of representation [if] they benefit 

from representation.”

We explained in Wolf v. Myers, 343 Or 494, 501, 173 

P3d 812 (2007), that “the preparation of a ballot title necessarily requires some level of interpretation of the measure.” 

However, we were also careful to explain that,

“[w]hen confronted with the narrower problem of the 

meaning of a specific provision in a proposed measure that 

is subject to two or more plausible interpretations, we ordinarily have declined to choose (or to permit the Attorney 

General to choose) one of those interpretations for purposes 

of the ballot title.”

Id. at 501. In this case, the relationship between subsections 

(4)(1) and (4)(2) is, at best, ambiguous. However, we think 

the Attorney General’s summary substantially complies 

with the requirement that it capture that ambiguity.

As noted, the summary states that the measure 

“prohibits requiring non-members to pay costs of representation unless they benefit from representation.” By stating 

the dependent “unless” clause as an exception to the prohibition on requiring nonmembers to pay representation costs, 

the summary does not express an opinion on how a union 

could collect fees from nonunion members if they benefit 

from representation. At the same time, the summary captures the suggestion in the measure that the prohibition on 

recovering fees from nonunion employees may not apply if a 

union’s representation benefits those employees. That aspect 

of the summary substantially complies with the Attorney 

General’s obligation to describe the measure accurately.9

Finally, we agree with Vaandering that the summary should mention a significant effect of the measure, 

which is that differences in terms of employment for union 

9 The Attorney General could have chosen to highlight the tension between 

those two aspects of IP 69 by juxtaposing them. She could have said, for example: 

“Prohibits requiring compulsory payments by nonmembers; nonmembers may 

not benefit from representation without sharing costs.” We cannot say, however, 

that that part of the summary, as currently written, fails to substantially comply 

with the Attorney General’s statutory obligation to summarize the measure.
Cite as 359 Or 1 (2016) 15

and nonunion employees will not give rise to a unlawful 

labor practice.

For the reasons stated above, the caption, the “yes” 

and “no” vote result statements, and the summary should be 

modified.

Ballot title referred to Attorney General for 

modification.