FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RONALD WILSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 07-56765

KAYO OIL COMPANY, doing D.C. No.

business as 76 Circle K #5250;  CV-06-01035-BEN

TED KOBAYASHI, successor trustee

of the Walsh Trust Agreement U/

D/T dated 5/7/86,

Defendants-Appellees. 

RONALD WILSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 08-55444 v.

D.C. No. KAYO OIL COMPANY, doing  3:06-cv-01035- business as 76 Circle K #5250;

BEN-AJB TED KOBAYASHI, successor trustee

of the Walsh Trust Agreement U/ OPINION

D/T dated 5/7/86,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Roger T. Benitez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 16, 2009*

Pasadena, California

*The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without

oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

4863
Filed April 24, 2009

Before: Barry G. Silverman and Consuelo M. Callahan,

Circuit Judges, and Richard Mills,** District Judge.

Per Curiam Opinion

**The Honorable Richard Mills, United States District Judge for the

Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation. 

4864 WILSON v. KAYO OIL CO.
COUNSEL

Lynn Hubbard III and Scottlynn J. Hubbard IV, Chico, California, and Fred Isaacs, Lake Oswego, Oregon, for the

plaintiff-appellant. 

Stephen Thomas Erb, San Diego, California, for the

defendants-appellees. 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Plaintiff Ronald Wilson appeals the district court’s: (1) dismissal of his suit against Defendant Kayo Oil Company for

lack of standing; and (2) entry of monetary sanctions against

Wilson and his counsel. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we reverse for the following reasons. 

[1] “Standing is a question of law that we review de novo.”

Salmon Spawning & Recovery Alliance v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d

1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2008). “Allegations that a plaintiff has

visited a public accommodation on a prior occasion and is

currently deterred from visiting that accommodation by accessibility barriers establish that a plaintiff’s injury is actual or

imminent.” Doran v. 7-Eleven, 524 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir.

2008). Here, Wilson makes these minimal allegations, and

therefore survives a facial attack on standing. See id. at 1041

(“Notwithstanding the [500-mile] distance between Doran’s

home and the 7-Eleven, there is an actual and imminent threat

that, during his planned future visits to Anaheim, Doran will

WILSON v. KAYO OIL CO. 4865
suffer harm as a result of the alleged barriers.”).1

 Because the

district court “relie[d] solely on undisputed facts or on facts

as they are represented by” Wilson, we express no opinion on

whether Wilson’s allegations would survive a factual attack.

We “review the district court’s entry of sanctions for abuse

of discretion.” Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d

1109, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008). “A district court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions when it bases its decision on an

erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp.,

500 F.3d 1047, 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

[2] Here, the district court concluded that Wilson and his

counsel committed nine sanctionable acts. With respect to

seven of these acts,2 Wilson was not given “sufficient, [particularized,] advance notice of exactly which conduct was

alleged to be sanctionable.” See In re DeVille, 361 F.3d 539,

549 (9th Cir. 2004). However, the district court’s order to

show cause did indeed notify Wilson and his counsel that they

needed to demonstrate that they did not file this ADA case in

bad faith or for oppressive reasons. Both of these allegedly

sanctionable acts rely on the same lynchpin: that Wilson filed

his suit knowing that he did not have standing. As discussed

above, the district court’s standing decision is contrary to our

decision in Doran, 524 F.3d at 1041. Accordingly, we reverse

the district court’s sanctions order. 

Finally, we decline Wilson’s request to reassign his case to

1

In fairness to the district judge, we note that Doran had not yet been

decided when the motion for summary judgment was before him. 

2These seven acts are: (1) exaggerating the extent of Wilson’s disability;

(2) Wilson’s alleged misrepresentations; (3) Wilson’s attorneys’ alleged

misrepresentations; (4) violating an attorney’s duty of candor; (5) violating the local rules; (6) intentionally omitting dates in the Complaint; and

(7) raising a legal theory not advanced previously. 

4866 WILSON v. KAYO OIL CO.
a different judge on remand. See Mendez v. County of San

Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008). 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

WILSON v. KAYO OIL CO. 4867