IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-134

No. 124A21

Filed 5 November 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: I.P.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 15 

February 2021 by Judge J.H. Corpening, II in District Court, New Hanover County. 

This matter was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 30 September

2021 but determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 

30(f) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Garron T. Michael for petitioner-appellee.

No brief filed for Guardian ad Litem. 

Richard Croutharmel, for respondent-appellant.

MORGAN, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent-father appeals from the trial court’s order terminating his

parental rights to “Ivey,”

1 a minor child born on 27 November 2018. After careful 

review, we hold that there was no error in the trial court’s determination that grounds 

existed to support the termination of respondent-father’s parental rights to Ivey and 

there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that it would be in 

 

1 We use a pseudonym to protect the identity of the juvenile and for ease of reading. 
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Ivey’s best interests to terminate respondent-father’s parental rights. Accordingly, 

we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights to 

Ivey.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 2 Prior to Ivey’s birth, all of her older siblings had been taken into nonsecure 

custody by the New Hanover County Department of Social Services (DSS), with Ivey’s 

mother eventually relinquishing her parental rights to each of these children. Ivey 

tested positive for cocaine at her birth on 27 November 2018 and was taken into 

custody by DSS. Ivey’s mother identified three men as possible fathers of Ivey; one of 

them was respondent-father. On 11 December 2018, DSS filed a juvenile petition 

alleging that Ivey was a neglected juvenile. Following a hearing conducted on 31 

January 2019 and by order filed on 25 February 2019, the trial court adjudicated Ivey 

to be neglected. On disposition, the trial court ordered Ivey’s mother to comply with 

a case plan to effect reunification with Ivey and ordered the putative fathers 

identified by Ivey’s mother to submit to DNA testing in order to confirm the identity 

of Ivey’s biological father.

¶ 3 On 30 May 2019, the trial court adjudicated respondent-father as Ivey’s 

biological father. At a hearing held on 3 October 2019 and in an order entered on 13 

November 2019, the trial court directed respondent-father to comply with a case plan 

to effect placement of Ivey with him. The trial court changed Ivey’s primary 
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permanent plan to adoption after an 8 July 2020 hearing and the entry of a 22 July 

2020 order. Ivey’s mother relinquished her parental rights to Ivey on 10 July 2020. 

On 1 September 2020, DSS filed a petition to terminate respondent-father’s parental 

rights to Ivey. Following a hearing conducted on 26 and 29 October 2020 and by an

order filed on 15 February 2021, the trial court terminated respondent-father’s 

parental rights to Ivey. In its termination of parental rights order, the trial court 

found that three grounds existed to permit the termination of respondent-father’s 

parental rights: neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), willful failure to make 

reasonable progress to correct the matters which caused Ivey to be in an out-of-home 

placement for at least 12 months under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), and abandonment 

under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Respondent-father appeals. 

¶ 4 On 17 June 2021, appellate counsel for respondent-father filed a brief, stating 

that “[a]fter a conscientious and thorough review of the record and the relevant law 

and consultation with other experienced appellate attorneys, [appellate counsel for 

respondent-father was] unable to identify any issues with sufficient merit on which 

to base an argument for relief on appeal.” Pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 3.1(e), appellate 

counsel for respondent-father identified two general issues for this Court’s review 

that might potentially support relief on appeal. Appellate counsel for respondentfather also sent to respondent-father copies of counsel’s brief, the record on appeal, 

and the transcript, along with a letter explaining respondent-father’s right to file his 
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own pro se brief and instructions on how to do so. Respondent-father did not submit

his own brief or any other filing to the Court. 

¶ 5 The brief filed in this Court by appellate counsel on behalf of respondent-father 

only analyzes the ground for termination of parental rights found under N.C.G.S. § 

7B-1111(a)(2)—failure to make reasonable progress—as a sufficient basis for the 

termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. The trial court made the following 

findings concerning respondent-father’s failure to make reasonable progress: 

129. That the Court finds that Respondent-Father lacks 

credibility. 

130. That the Court finds that Respondent-Father clearly 

fabricated his pay stubs and lease. The lease is suspect at 

best. The Court struggles to believe that this is a lease for 

that address. 

131. That the Court finds that Respondent-Father’s 

testimony about the quality of his visits with [Ivey] are not 

credible. 

. . . .

134. That this Court questions anything said by 

Respondent-Father and any documents provided by 

Respondent-Father. 

135. That Respondent-Father is unfit to parent and is 

acting contrary and contradictory to his parental rights. 

136. That this Court has no confidence that things will 

change any more than they have in the past twenty-three 

months that the child has been in care. 

137. That Respondent-Father is not in a position to parent 
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[Ivey] almost two years after she came into care and at 

least eighteen (18) months since he learned that he was her 

biological father. 

. . . .

146. That Respondent-Father has made periodic progress 

on his case plan but cannot remain consistent nor has 

addressed his significant mental health issues. 

Respondent-Father is partially compliant, at best, after 

two years and instead of focusing on completing the 

objectives of his case plan spent more time creating a 

façade of progress. 

147. That the concerns that originally brought [Ivey] into 

care remain unaddressed by Respondent-Father. He lacks 

understanding of the detrimental effects of his decisionmaking and its lasting effects on [Ivey]. Respondent-Father 

has not complied and has failed to actively engage in most 

services designed to address the issues of neglect that 

brought [Ivey] into care and support reunification efforts. 

Respondent-Father continues to have ongoing and 

longstanding issues that impact the care and supervision 

of the child. He disengaged from his child for the first year 

of her life and then after three visits, disengaged with her 

again until the plan changed to adoption and the [TPR]

Petition was filed. 

148. That Respondent-Father has not made reasonable 

progress in correcting those conditions which led to the 

removal of the minor child based on his conduct. . . . 

Respondent-Father’s lack of credibility does not show 

progress in being able to parent this child safely as 

Respondent-Father continues to put his needs ahead of 

hers. 

. . . .

151. That Respondent-Father is not in a position to parent 

today. Respondent-Father would need significant therapy 
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and verified stable income and housing before he would be 

in a position to reunite with [Ivey]. Respondent-Father has 

had the luxury of additional time to complete his case plan 

with the six-month hiatus of this case due COVID-19 and 

still has not accomplished the necessary objectives to 

reunite with [Ivey]. [The social worker and the guardian ad 

litem] do not see Respondent-Father being in a position to 

safely parent or complete his recommended treatment in 

the near future and this Court agrees.

Respondent-father’s appellate counsel represents that he cannot refute these findings

of fact as they apply to the ground of respondent-father’s willful failure to make 

reasonable progress to reunify with Ivey after she had been in an out-of-home 

placement for at least twelve months, specifically in light of evidence in the record 

that: (1) there was a question as to respondent-father’s veracity during the 

termination hearing; (2) there was some doubt as to whether respondent-father had 

stable employment, adequate and stable housing, and adequate and stable income; 

(3) there was a question as to whether respondent-father had another newborn child 

and romantic relationships with multiple women; (4) respondent-father failed to visit 

Ivey from June through November 2019 and January through July 2020, with 

questionable reasons for not visiting; (5) respondent-father’s failure to consistently 

visit Ivey undoubtedly led to his inability to form a stronger bond with her; and (6) 

respondent-father never developed the parenting skills necessary to assuage Ivey’s 

anxiety in his presence despite multiple parenting classes. It is well settled that “a 

finding of only one ground is necessary to support a termination of parental rights.” 
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In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194 (2019).

¶ 6 After a careful review of the record on appeal in this matter, we agree with the 

candid assessment of respondent-father’s appellate counsel and with the 

determinations of the trial court in this case. As this Court has noted, “[a] 

respondent’s prolonged inability to improve [his] situation, despite some efforts in 

that direction, will support a finding of willfulness regardless of [his] good intentions, 

and will support a finding of lack of progress sufficient to warrant termination of 

parental rights.” In re J.S., 374 N.C. 811, 815 (2020) (extraneity omitted). Here, 

respondent-father has not achieved reasonable progress under his case plan and has 

not demonstrated an intention and commitment to do so. Based upon the evidence 

adduced in the trial court and upon the entirety of the record, we affirm the trial 

court’s determination that grounds existed under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) to support 

termination of respondent-father’s parental rights.

¶ 7 Further, during the disposition phase of the termination of parental rights

hearing, the trial court made findings of fact which addressed evidence concerning 

the specifically enumerated factors contained in the disposition statute, N.C.G.S. § 

7B-1110(a): Ivey’s age, her likelihood of adoption, her permanent plan, her bond with 

respondent-father, her relationship with her current caregivers, and other relevant 

considerations. The evidence showed that Ivey was adoptable and that her foster 

parents were interested in adopting her, that Ivey was bonded with her foster 
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parents, that Ivey did not have a bond with respondent-father, that Ivey lived in the 

foster home with a half-sister, and that the foster parents encouraged the paternal 

grandmother to bring Ivey’s half-brother to the foster home so that Ivey could visit 

with him. This evidence amply supported the trial court’s determination that 

termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in Ivey’s best interests.

¶ 8 For the aforementioned reasons, the trial court’s order terminating the 

parental rights of respondent-father is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.