* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The Honorable William H. Albritton III, Senior United States District Judge for the Middle District of Alabama, sitting by designation

. NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARAN JIT-SINGH, Petitioner,

v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. No. 07-74360 Agency No. A074-583-601

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted October 12, 2011 San Francisco, California Before: THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and ALBRITTON, Senior District Judge. ** Petitioner appeals the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) adverse credibility determination as well as the IJ’s denial of his application fo r asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 

# FILED

OCT 21 2011 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS1 Because Jit-Singh applied for asylum, wit hholding of removal, and relief under the CAT prior to May 11, 2005, pre-REAL ID Act standards govern his credibility determination. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (asylum); 1231(b)(3)(C) (withhol ding of removal); 122a(c)(4)(C) (other relief from removal); see also Shreshtha v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). 2 under the Convention Against Torture (“CA T”). Because the parties are familiar with the history of the case, we need not recount it here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition for review. We deny the petition for review of the BIA’s decision to deny asylum and withholding of removal. Substantial ev idence supports finding that Petitioner was not credible. Kin v. Holder , 595 F.3d 1050, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2010). For example, the IJ found that Petitioner testified in a vague manner about the posters he prepared and posted for the AISSF. The IJ also found that Petitioner testified vaguely and inconsistently when disc ussing recruitment efforts, fundraising responsibilities, and other political tasks unde rtaken on behalf of the student group. These discrepancies go to the heart of Petitioner’s claim of persecution. SinghKaur v. INS , 183 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Singh v. Ashcroft , 367 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding adverse credibility determination supported, in part, by inability to explain political party responsibilities). We affirm as long as one of the reasons supporting the adverse credibility determination goes to the heart of the persecution claim. 1 Li v. Ashcroft , 378 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2004). The IJ supported the adverse credibility determination3 with “specific, cogent reason[s]” that ar e substantial and have a legitimate nexus to the finding. Gui v. INS , 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2002); Salaam v. INS , 229 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Although one may dispute some of the IJ’s credibility findings, taken as a whole, the discrepancies in Petitioner’s testimony and declarations constitute substa ntial evidence in support of the adverse credibility determination. Kin , 595 F.3d at 1054. We cannot say that any reasonable adjudicator would be compe lled to conclude to the contrary. Singh , 367 F.3d at 1143. In addition, Petitioner has not shown that he has a well-founded fear of persecution. Because Petitioner was not f ound credible, he was not entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). Substantial evidence in th e record supports the IJ’s findings that Petitioner is not a high profile militantor person with known former militant contacts, and, therefore, is not at risk of future persecution. See Zhao v. Mukasey ,540 F.3d 1027, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2008) (IJ’s factual findings regarding wellfounded fear of future persecution must be supported by substantial evidence). The IJ performed the required individualized analysis of how changes in country conditions would affect Petitioner. See Lopez v. Ashcroft , 366 F.3d 799, 805 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that BIA must provide individualized analysis of how changed4 conditions will affect petitioner’s situation). We deny the petition for review of th e BIA’s decision to deny CAT relief. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and BIA’s finding that the Petitioner failed to establish that it is more likely than not he would be tortured upon return to India. See Singh v. Gonzales , 439 F.3d 1100, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2006) (evidence did not compel conclusion it was more likely th an not petitioner would be tortured). Accordingly, we deny the Petition for Review. PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.