Filed 12/20/13 P. v. Wilson CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LUCIOUS WILSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

B241925

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. VA121164)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,

Roger Ito, Judge. Affirmed.

Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and 

Robert C. Schneider, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Lucious Wilson appeals from the judgment entered following his convictions by 

jury on count 1 – assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and count 

2 – exhibiting a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 417.8, subd. (a)), with admissions he 

suffered a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d)) and a prior serious felony 

conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)), and served two prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 

§ 667.5, subd. (b)).1The court sentenced appellant to prison for 13 years. We affirm the 

judgment.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Viewed in accordance with the usual rules on appeal (People v. Ochoa (1993) 

6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206), the evidence, the sufficiency of which is undisputed, established 

that on August 11, 2011, Evelia Castanon worked at a McDonald’s restaurant in 

Lakewood. She phoned Valerie Valdez, the manager, and told her appellant, Castanon’s 

boyfriend, was following Castanon. Castanon arrived at work and told Valdez that she 

was leaving appellant because he was abusive and she was obtaining a restraining order. 

Valdez testified Castanon told her that something bad was going to happen and that 

appellant had said “it’s going to be over today.”

Appellant entered the restaurant. Castanon went to the back of the restaurant. 

Appellant told customers they needed to leave because something bad was going to 

happen. Valdez called 911. She was standing near an opening near the registers. 

Appellant shoved her to go past her. Appellant said he wanted to talk to Castanon, she 

had made him homeless, he did not want to hurt anyone, and he was only going to hurt 

himself.

Edward Romero was working at a cash register in the restaurant. Romero grabbed 

appellant from behind and held him around the waist. Appellant pulled out a knife and 

Valdez told Romero to release appellant because he had a knife. Romero released 

appellant and backed up, and appellant said something to the customers. Appellant then 

 

1

Following a court trial, the trial court found appellant was legally sane at the time 

of the present offenses.
3

approached within about four feet of Romero while holding two knives in front of 

appellant at waist level. Appellant asked Romero if he felt tough or brave, then appellant 

pointed the knives at Romero. Romero said he did not want anyone to get hurt and he 

was trying to protect everyone. Appellant backed away and began talking to the 

customers. Romero jumped over the counter and stood with coworkers.

At various times, appellant pointed the knives at his heart, cut his neck and arms, 

stabbed himself in the stomach, and threw his blood throughout the restaurant. Appellant 

said he loved Castanon, she had left him, he wanted to kill himself, and he wanted to 

show his love for Castanon. Appellant went towards the back of the restaurant where 

Castanon and Valdez were. Appellant said something to Castanon and Valdez while 

pointing the knives in their direction and taunting them. 

The restaurant was located in a Walmart store. Jonas Pena, a Walmart loss 

prevention agent, distracted appellant and signaled to Valdez and Castanon to flee into 

the Walmart. The women did so. Castanon tried to return, but Pena told others to take 

her away. Appellant put the two knives to his throat, said he was going to kill himself, 

and told people to release Castanon and not to hurt her. Appellant also menacingly 

displayed the knives towards others.

Uniformed Los Angeles County sheriff’s deputies arrived and saw appellant 

yelling, and dangerously waving the knives in the restaurant. Deputies repeatedly yelled 

to appellant to drop the knives. Appellant, using profanity, told deputies they would have 

to shoot him. Appellant also said they would have to kill him. Appellant sat in a booth 

and held the knives like scissors to his throat. Deputies repeatedly told appellant to drop 

the knives but he failed to comply. A deputy shot appellant with bean bag ammunition, 

appellant dropped the knives, and deputies took him into custody. Appellant, using 

profanity, asked why he was not dead.

ISSUE

Appellant claims multiple punishment on counts 1 and 2 violated Penal Code 

section 654.
4

DISCUSSION

Penal Code Section 654 Did Not Bar Multiple Punishment on Counts 1 and 2.

During the June 7, 2012 sentencing hearing, the court indicated the offense of 

exhibiting a deadly weapon (count 2) arose “out of the same course of events and the 

continuous conduct” of the offense of assault with a deadly weapon (count 1). The court 

imposed a prison sentence of 13 years on count 1, with a concurrent term of two years on 

count 2.

Appellant claims multiple punishment on counts 1 and 2 violated Penal Code 

section 654. We reject the claim. Penal Code section 654, as interpreted by our Supreme 

Court, prohibits multiple punishment for offenses committed during an indivisible 

transaction. Whether a course of conduct is indivisible depends on the intent and 

objective of the actor. (People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 551 (Perez).) If all 

offenses are incident to one objective, the defendant may not be punished for more than 

one. However, if the defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were 

independent of and not merely incidental to each other, the defendant may be punished 

for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the 

violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of 

conduct. (Cf. People v. Bradley (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 765, 769, fn. 3.)

Whether Penal Code section 654 applies in a given case is a question of fact for 

the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination. 

Its findings will not be reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support 

them. (People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.) We view the evidence in 

the light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the sentence the 

existence of every fact the trial court reasonably could have deduced from the evidence. 

(People v. Tarris (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 612, 627.)
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In the present case, there was substantial evidence, and the trial court reasonably 

could have concluded, as follows. Appellant committed assault2 with a deadly weapon 

against Romero (count 1) when appellant approached within a few feet of Romero with 

knives pointing at Romero. Appellant had the requisite mental state for assault, i.e., he 

had the criminal intent and objective of committing an intentional act with actual 

knowledge of facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature would probably and 

directly result in the application of physical force against Romero. (Cf. People v. 

Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 782, 790.) 

Appellant’s motive for assaulting Romero was that Romero was preventing

appellant from getting past Valdez so appellant could approach Castanon and talk with 

her, hurt her, and/or hurt himself in Castanon’s presence. The assault on Romero ended 

once appellant backed away and Romero jumped over the counter and retreated to his 

coworkers. Appellant did not then have a criminal intent or objective towards deputies, 

because they had not yet arrived. 

The deputies arrived later and, by the time they did, appellant knew he had 

battered Valdez, and had assaulted Romero with a deadly weapon. That is, appellant 

knew deputies were there to detain and/or arrest appellant. Appellant dangerously waved 

the knives despite the deputies’ repeated commands that he drop them, and appellant told 

deputies they would have to kill him. Appellant later sat in a booth, held the knives to his 

throat, deputies told appellant to drop the knives, and he failed to comply. Appellant’s 

actions constituted the crime of exhibiting a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code 

section 417.8 (count 2).3 Appellant committed that offense with an independent criminal 

 

2

Penal Code section 240 provides, “An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with 

a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another.”

3

Penal Code section 417.8 provides, “Every person who draws or exhibits any 

firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or other deadly weapon, with the intent to resist or 

prevent the arrest or detention of himself or another by a peace officer shall be 

imprisoned . . . .”
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intent and objective, i.e., an “intent to resist or prevent the arrest or detention of 

[appellant] by a peace officer” (italics added) within the meaning of that section.

Appellant’s motive for committing the violation of Penal Code section 417.8 was 

he wanted deputies to kill him. Appellant did not then have a criminal intent and 

objective concerning Romero, but concerning the deputies. In sum, appellant had 

multiple independent criminal objectives when committing the offenses at issue in counts 

1 and 2. Penal Code section 654 did not bar multiple punishment on those counts. 

Appellant argues he had a “single intent and objective” when committing the 

offenses at issue in counts 1 and 2, i.e., “appellant intended (and expressed that intent), 

and attempted, to cause his death that day, at his own hands with the knives.” He also 

argues both offenses “ ‘were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or 

facilitating one objective’ – i.e., appellant’s death . . . .’ ”

However, the intent and objective posited by appellant are too broad and 

amorphous to determine whether Penal Code section 654 applies. (Cf. Perez, supra,

23 Cal.3d at p. 552.) The requisite intent and objective for purposes of Penal Code 

section 654 analysis are a criminal intent and objective. (People v. Ratcliff (1981) 

124 Cal.App.3d 808, 816-817.) Neither suicide nor attempted suicide is a crime. (In re 

Joseph G. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 429, 433.) Appellant’s argument fails.4

 

4

In light of our analysis, there is no need to reach the issue of whether Penal Code 

section 654 was inapplicable for the additional reasons the multiple victim exception 

applied (see People v. Williams (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1473) and/or because the

predicate offenses were divisible in time (see People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 

1236, 1253.) 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KITCHING, J.

We concur:

KLEIN, P. J.

ALDRICH, J.