UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4864

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ADRIAN GAMBRELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (6:03-cr-01092-HMH-6)

Submitted: March 28, 2013 Decided: May 23, 2013

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Leesa Washington, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIUM:

Adrian Gambrell appeals the district court’s 

revocation of his term of supervised release and his resulting 

sentence of sixty months of imprisonment. On appeal, counsel 

for Gambrell has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious 

issues but asking whether the district court’s sentence was 

procedurally erroneous. Gambrell has not exercised his right to 

file a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.

We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of 

supervised release if it is within the statutory range and not 

plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 

439–40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first determine whether the sentence 

is unreasonable. Id. at 438. A sentence is procedurally 

reasonable if the district court considered the Sentencing 

Guidelines range and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors 

applicable to supervised release revocation. Id. at 438–40. A 

sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court 

stated a proper basis for concluding the defendant should 

receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Id.

at 440. We take a more deferential appellate posture concerning 

issues of fact and the exercise of discretion for revocation 

sentences than for review of sentences imposed after a criminal 
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conviction. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th 

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We conclude that Gambrell’s revocation sentence is not 

unreasonable, much less plainly so. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439–40.

The district court correctly calculated the applicable 

Guidelines range, considered relevant § 3553(a) factors, 

explained its reasons for sentencing Gambrell in excess of his 

30-37 months advisory Guidelines sentencing range, and imposed a 

sentence within the statutory maximum. We have reviewed the 

entire record pursuant to our obligation under Anders, and we 

discern no meritorious issue for appeal.

Accordingly, we affirm the revocation of Gambrell’s 

supervised release and his sentence. This court requires 

counsel to inform Gambrell, in writing, of his right to petition 

the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If

Gambrell requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

such petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court 

for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion 

must state that a copy thereof was served on Gambrell. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED