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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JULY 9, 2002
 

JEANNE and KRISTIN OMELENCHUK,


Co-Personal Representatives of


the Estate of George Omelenchuk,
 

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
 

v	 No. 117252
 

THE CITY OF WARREN, and the


WARREN FIRE DEPARTMENT,
 

Defendants-Appellants.
 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
 

CAVANAGH, J.
 

Plaintiffs allege that their decedent died as the result
 

of gross negligence by employees of defendant, the city of
 

Warren. The circuit court granted summary disposition on the
 

basis of governmental immunity. MCR 2.116(C)(7). The Court
 

of Appeals reversed, but this Court reinstates the judgment of
 

the circuit court because the controlling statutes plainly
 

provide immunity to defendant, the city of Warren.
 
I
 

Two years ago, when this case was before us in connection
 

with a separate issue, we stated the facts. Omelenchuk v City
 

of Warren, 461 Mich 567, 568-570; 609 NW2d 177 (2000). 


On February 13, 1994, a man named George


Omelenchuk suffered a heart attack at work.[1] The
 

person who found him lying on the floor called the


Warren Fire Department, which sent two trucks.


Emergency personnel at the scene included two


firefighters, three paramedics, and an emergency


medical technician.
 

Resuscitation efforts included insertion of an
 

endotracheal tube. The defendants say that all


three paramedics checked to make sure the tube was


properly placed. However, when Mr. Omelenchuk


arrived at the hospital, the tube was found to be


in his esophagus, rather than his trachea.
 

Mr. Omelenchuk was transported to a hospital


that was located across the street from his place


of business. In the emergency room, further
 

efforts were made to save his life. However, these


were unsuccessful, and he was declared dead.
 

The day after Mr. Omelenchuk died, plaintiffs


Jeanne Omelenchuk and Kristin Omelenchuk were named
 

co-personal representatives of the estate.[2]
 

* * *
 

1In the earlier appeal, as now, we were examining an


untried case. As we did two years ago, we take the facts as


presented in plaintiffs’ complaint, though we have also


examined other pleadings in the record for the purpose of


providing a factual narrative.
 

2

As we noted in our first opinion, “[t]he plaintiffs’


complaint identifies Jeanne Omelenchuk as the decedent’s


widow. However, the defendants dispute that assertion on the


basis of a 1992 judgment of divorce. Kristin Omelenchuk is
 

the daughter of George and Jeanne Omelenchuk.” [461 Mich


569.]
 

2
 
[T]he plaintiffs filed suit against the city
 

of Warren and the Warren Fire Department on
 

July 19, 1996. 


In March 1997, the defendants moved for
 

summary disposition. MCR 2.116(C)(7). The motion
 

listed several grounds, including governmental


immunity and the statute of limitations. 


At the motion hearing, defense counsel argued


that the defendants were immune because there was
 

no showing that the emergency personnel had been


grossly negligent and because the city could not be


held vicariously liable.[3] In presenting these


arguments, counsel cited MCL 333.20965 and
 

691.1407. Without explaining the precise statutory


basis of its ruling, the circuit court granted


summary disposition “[o]n the basis of governmental


immunity.”
 

The plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals
 

affirmed,[4] but not on the basis of immunity.


Instead, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’


complaint had not been timely filed.
 

We vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, finding
 

that plaintiffs had timely filed their complaint. We also
 

remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of
 

the immunity issue, which had formed the basis of the circuit
 

court’s decision to grant summary disposition. 461 Mich 571­

577. On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
 

the circuit court because “defendants failed to produce any
 

3It is agreed that the fire department is not a separate


entity from which plaintiffs can recover. Any recovery would
 

be from the city of Warren.
 

4Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 6, 1999


(Docket No. 204098).
 

3
 
 

documentary evidence to establish that the conduct of the
 

responding paramedics did not constitute gross negligence.”
 

Slip op at 1.5
 

We granted defendants’ application for leave to appeal.
 

II
 

We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.
 

Cardinal Mooney High Sch v Mich High Sch Athletic Ass’n, 437
 

Mich 75, 80; 467 NW2d 21 (1991).
 

III
 

A
 

The issue presented in this case is one of statutory
 

interpretation. Therefore, we must apply familiar statutory
 

interpretation principles that were recently restated in
 

Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d
 

686 (2001):
 

The paramount rule of statutory interpretation
 

is that we are to effect the intent of the
 

Legislature. Tryc v Mich Veterans’ Facility, 451


Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). To do so, we


begin with the statute’s language. If the
 

statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we


assume that the Legislature intended its plain


meaning, and we enforce the statute as written.


People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702


(2001). In reviewing the statute’s language, every


word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a


construction that would render any part of the


statute surplusage or nugatory. Altman v Meridian
 

Twp, 439 Mich 623, 635; 487 NW2d 155 (1992).
 

5Unpublished memorandum opinion, issued June 23, 2000


(Docket No. 204098).
 

4
 
In this case, a plain reading of the emergency medical
 

services act (EMSA), MCL 333.20965, requires a conclusion that
 

defendant, the city of Warren, is entitled to a grant of
 

summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity.
 

The first subsection of the EMSA, MCL 333.20965(1)(f),
 

provides that an “authoritative governmental unit,” in this
 

case defendant, the city of Warren, is immune from suit on the
 

basis of the acts of its emergency medical services workers in
 

treating a patient “[u]nless the act or omission is the result
 

of gross negligence or wilful misconduct . . . .”6 Stated
 

affirmatively, this means that the city can be sued under this
 

provision if the plaintiff can prove the city’s emergency
 

medical workers were grossly negligent in treating a patient.
 

Yet, this ability to sue is subsequently narrowed by MCL
 

333.20965(4). This section of the statute states:
 

Subsections (1) and (3) do not limit immunity


from liability otherwise provided by law for any of


the persons listed in subsections (1) and (3).
 

Because MCL 691.1407(1), which is part of the act commonly
 

described as the governmental tort liability act (GTLA),
 

provides that a governmental entity, including of course
 

defendant, the city of Warren, is “immune from tort liability
 

if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or
 

6That is the language of 1990 PA 179 (in effect at the


time of these events). The same phrase is found in 1997 PA


78, 1999 PA 199, and 2000 PA 375.
 

5
 
discharge of a governmental function,”7 MCL 333.20965(4) means
 

that the city of Warren is immune in the discharge of a
 

governmental function.8
 

B
 

Notwithstanding the clarity that this analysis of the
 

statute yields about its meaning, plaintiffs effectively ask
 

us to depart from applying the plain language of the statute
 

on the ground that the Legislature’s inclusion of any
 

governmental entity by use of the phrase an “authoritative
 

governmental unit” in MCL 333.20965(1) is rendered pointless
 

if MCL 333.20965(4) means that such a governmental entity will
 

always be immune from suit under the GTLA anyway. Thus, they
 

argue, to avoid making the statute a futile exercise, or
 

7 That is the current language of the statute, as enacted


in 1999 PA 241 and 2000 PA 318. Throughout this opinion, we


will discuss the case in terms of the current statutory


language. The version enacted in 1986 PA 175 was in effect at
 

the time of these events; it and 1996 PA 143 include a


stylistic difference that does not affect the present issue.
 

8 While the plain language of the statute is dispositive,
 

we note that the history underlying the adoption of MCL


333.20965(4) supports the conclusion that it was adopted by


the Legislature to make clear that MCL 333.20965 does not take


away any immunity enjoyed by a governmental entity under the


GTLA. In construing a predecessor version of the EMSA that


did not include language like that of MCL 333.20965(4), this


Court in Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132; 468 NW2d 479


(1991), affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in that


case that the prior version of the EMSA created an exception


to governmental immunity in cases of gross negligence or


wilful misconduct in the provision of emergency medical


services.
 

6
 
nullity, we should ignore MCL 333.20965(4) so as to leave MCL
 

333.20965(1) with meaning. In other words, plaintiffs would
 

have us hold that an authoritative governmental unit, such as
 

defendant, the city of Warren, can be sued under the EMSA in
 

cases of gross negligence by its emergency medical services
 

workers, notwithstanding the immunity shield set forward in
 

the same statute.
 

We disagree that such an approach to the statute is
 

proper. While plaintiffs are correct to the extent that we
 

should strive to prevent any part of a statute from being a
 

nullity, a thorough review of the statute at issue leads to
 

the conclusion that the reading occasioned by the plain
 

meaning analysis does not produce a nullity and, thus, this
 

principle is not implicated in this case. No portion of the
 

EMSA need be ignored to give the entire legislative enactment
 

a coherent meaning. 


As we noted in Malcolm at 141, n 9, the Legislature added
 

language to the EMSA substantially the same as the present MCL
 

333.20965(4) in providing that the EMSA did not limit
 

liability otherwise provided by law, shortly after the Court
 

of Appeals issued its opinion in Malcolm. Clearly, the
 

purpose of adding this language was to make clear that the
 

EMSA did not remove the immunity of a governmental entity
 

under the GTLA. 


7
 
When read carefully, it is apparent that immunity under
 

the GTLA for municipalities or other governmental entities is
 

only given if they are engaged “in the exercise or discharge
 

of a governmental function.” MCL 691.1407(1). Implicit then,
 

and later made explicit in MCL 691.1413, is that the GTLA does
 

not give immunity if the governmental function is proprietary.
 

Thus, to particularize this principle, if a governmental
 

agency provides emergency medical services as part of its
 

governmental functions, it has immunity, but, if it does so as
 

part of a proprietary function, it does not. Thus, when one
 

understands that this act outlines with precision when suit
 

can be brought against governments providing emergency medical
 

services, it is clear that there is no nullity effected in the
 

Legislature’s handling of this issue. This approach brings
 

harmony to both MCL 333.20965(1) and (4), as well as the GTLA,
 

MCL 691.1407(1), and makes clear that they are not in
 

conflict.
 

In the present case, it is beyond reasonable dispute, and
 

thus we take judicial notice, that the relevant activity of
 

the city’s fire department was part of its discharge of its
 

governmental functions, and not part of any proprietary
 

function. Accordingly, the city is immune from suit.
 

IV
 

The plain language of MCL 333.20965(4) compels the
 

8
 
conclusion that defendant is entitled to the governmental
 

immunity granted in MCL 691.1407(1). Accordingly, we reverse
 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the
 

judgment of the circuit court, MCR 7.302(F)(1).
 

CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN,
 

JJ., concurred with CAVANAGH, J.
 

9