SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2201-16T1

DINA M. KAUL, 

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RICHARD A. KAUL,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Argued May 9, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Koblitz, Manahan and Suter.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Somerset County, Docket No. 

FM-18-0254-08.

Richard Arjun Kaul, appellant pro se.1

Jessica Ragno Sprague argued the cause for 

respondent (Weinberger Divorce & Family Law 

Group, LLC, attorneys; Jessica Ragno Sprague, 

on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

Defendant Richard A. Kaul appeals from a December 19, 2016 

order denying his request to modify his support, assessing $1719 

 

1 Although defendant requested oral argument, he did not appear 

to argue.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

June 13, 2018
2 A-2201-16T1

in counsel fees against him, and denying his request for an order 

directing the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners to reinstate 

his medical license.

Defendant presents the following arguments on appeal: 

POINT I: THE COURT ERRED BY EITHER WILLFULLY 

OR NEGLIGENTLY FAILING TO FIND THE FACTS, AND 

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO REPORT THE 

ALLEGATIONS OF FORGED TRANSCRIPTS TO FEDERAL 

AUTHORITIES.

POINT II: THE COURT HAS INCORRECTLY 

INTERPRETED THE LAW OF GENERAL JURISDICTION, 

AND HAS WITHOUT LEGAL FOUNDATION, TRUNCATED 

ITS EQUITABLE AUTHORITY.

POINT III: THE COURT HAS INCORRECTLY PREMISED 

ON ITS FLAWED PRECEDING CONCLUSIONS [SIC], ITS 

GRANT OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-MOTION TO DENY 

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION.

POINT IV: THE COURT HAS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

BY NOT DENYING WITH PREJUDICE THE PLAINTIFF'S 

REQUEST THAT THE DEFENDANT'S FUTURE MOTIONS 

ARE SCREENED.

POINT V: THE COURT ERRED BY NOT PERFORMING 

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PARTIES, BEFORE 

ENTERING ORDERS OF LEGAL COST.

POINT VI: THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

FAILING TO CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT'S REPLY 

PAPERS, AND ERRED BY IGNORING APPELLATE 

AUTHORITY.

POINT VII: THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO ORDER 

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PLAINTIFF AND 

FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAS 

COHABITED SINCE 2014.

POINT VIII: PARAGRAPH SPECIFIC CRITIQUE OF 

COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS OF 

FACT.
3 A-2201-16T1

 After reviewing the record in light of the contentions 

advanced on appeal, we affirm substantially for the reasons 

incorporated by Judge Hany A. Mawla into his December 2016 order. 

We add the following.

The parties entered into a Property Settlement Agreement

(PSA) in August 2005, but were not divorced until October 2009. 

Plaintiff Dina Kaul was awarded counsel fees by an October 7, 2009

order. Plaintiff appealed the enforcement of the PSA, and 

defendant cross-appealed the award of counsel fees. We affirmed

both orders. Kaul v. Kaul, No. A-0177-09 (App. Div. Aug. 15, 

2011) (slip op. at 14).

On April 2, 2012, defendant's medical license was suspended, 

and on February 12, 2014, his license was revoked. Plaintiff 

successfully filed for support enforcement three times. Defendant

appeals from the denial of his second motion to modify unallocated

support of $10,000 per month, although the parties agreed in the 

PSA that there would be no modification regardless of future

"increases or decreases in their income." 

The parties were married in 2003. Two children were born of 

the marriage. Defendant was a doctor with a hugely successful

minimally invasive surgery practice. He claims that his success 

caused professional jealousy that led other specialists in his 

field to bribe then-Governor of New Jersey, Chris Christie, who 
4 A-2201-16T1

arranged for defendant's medical license to be revoked.2 He also 

claims that the record of his medical license revocation contains 

many forged transcripts and seeks intervention from the Family 

Court.

Defendant alleges that after his medical license was revoked, 

his income decreased by 90% and many parties filed lawsuits against 

him. His business declared bankruptcy and he sought to reduce his 

support payments from $10,000 a month to $500 a month. At the 

time he filed his first motion seeking a reduction, he was $280,000 

in arrears. He claimed at that time that his income had been

reduced from many millions to $500,000 per year. He presently 

claims that, as of July 2014, he has no income. He asked the 

Family Court to reinstate his medical license, arguing that the 

Superior Court has jurisdiction to do so and that he needs his 

license to support his family. He filed a case information 

statement (CIS) alleging that he was fully supported by others and 

has no assets, income or expenses. He did not attach a tax return, 

financial records or his prior CIS. See R. 5:5-4(a).

Judge Mawla found that "[d]efendant has provided no financial 

documentation necessary to demonstrate a substantial and permanent 

change in circumstances" and denied the motion "without 

 

2 He adds that insurance companies have a policy of coercing 

medical boards or politicians into revoking a person's medical 

license so the companies do not have to pay the doctors. 
5 A-2201-16T1

prejudice." The judge noted the deficiencies in defendant's CIS 

and stated that letters from his relatives and friends did not 

constitute objective proof that he unsuccessfully sought 

employment, or was fully supported by others. 

Plaintiff points out that the PSA contained an anti-Lepis3

clause precluding modification regardless of defendant's loss of 

income. See Kaul, No. A-0177-09 (slip op. at 4); Morris v. Morris, 

263 N.J. Super. 237, 241 (App. Div. 1993). The PSA, however, does 

not entirely prevent modification.

Paragraph 14 of the PSA calls for a termination of support 

in the event of "the [w]ife's cohabitation with another person in 

accordance with existing case law." Of course, cohabitation would 

not affect the child support component of this agreed-upon 

unallocated support. 

Defendant filed a reply certification in support of his 

modification motion one day before oral argument. The judge did 

not consider this certification, in which defendant alleged that 

plaintiff had been cohabiting for several years with "a male, 

whose income, it is believed, is derived from the operation of a 

privately held business." The obligor has the burden of proof to 

make a prima facie showing that cohabitation exists. Ozolins v. 

Ozolins, 308 N.J. Super. 243, 248 (App. Div. 1998). Additionally, 

 

3 Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139 (1980). 
6 A-2201-16T1

new issues are not the proper subject matter of a reply 

certification, which should only respond to opposing affidavits 

or certifications. R. 1:6-3(a).

Judge Mawla granted plaintiff's "request [to] compel 

[d]efendant to pay for her legal fees and costs associated with 

this [m]otion," totaling $1719. He stated: "Defendant has acted 

in bad faith by filing the same [m]otion he filed in May 2016. 

Defendant is self-represented and [p]laintiff has incurred $1719 

in legal fees in connection with this [m]otion." He continued:

"Pursuant to the May 1, 2014 Order, [p]laintiff was awarded 

$5972.65 in attorney's fees, which he has not paid. Defendant was 

not successful in any of his requests and [p]laintiff was

successful as to all of her requests." 

Awards of counsel fees are within the sound discretion of the 

trial court. Kingsdorf v. Kingsdorf, 351 N.J. Super. 144, 147 

(App. Div. 2002). Judge Mawla considered the Rule 5:3-5(c) 

factors, finding that the current incomes are unknown, defendant 

has not previously paid court-ordered attorney's fees, he was 

unsuccessful in his requests, and this motion was repetitious of 

a previously filed motion. 

Judge Mawla soundly exercised his discretion in denying the 

application filed by defendant, who is highly educated, for lack 

of supporting documentation. Self-represented litigants are 
7 A-2201-16T1

expected to follow the Court Rules. See, e.g., Clifton v. 

Cresthaven Cemetery Ass'n, 17 N.J. Super. 362, 364 (App. Div. 

1952) (observing that compliance with a particular court rule 

should not be dispensed with when a non-lawyer appears pro se); 

see also Trocki Plastic Surgery Cent. v. Bartkowski, 344 N.J. 

Super. 399, 405 (App. Div. 2001) (pro se litigants are regarded 

as lawyers for the purposes of Rule 1:4-8). "[P]ro se litigants

are not entitled to greater rights than litigants who are 

represented by counsel." Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 

N.J. Super. 90, 99 (App. Div. 2014).

We add that our decision does not preclude defendant from 

filing a future motion, accompanied by appropriate documentation, 

seeking modification. In that event, the court, in the exercise 

of its equitable authority and subject to opposition by plaintiff, 

may allow that any relief afforded be retroactive to the original 

filing of the motion under review, October 21, 2016.

Affirmed.