Filed 2/27/23 Marriage of Pourmoradi CA2/2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of ANDREA 

and JOHN POURMORADI.

_____________________________

ANDREA POURMORADI,

 Appellant,

v.

JOHN POURMORADI,

 Respondent.

 B308938, B312579

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BD527978)

APPEALS from a judgment and a postjudgment order of 

the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark A. Juhas, Judge. 

Appeal from judgment dismissed (B308938); postjudgment order 

affirmed (B312579).

Gary J. Cohen, Gary J. Cohen; Benedon & Serlin, Gerald 

M. Serlin and Kelly Riordan Horwitz for Appellant.

Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Kirstin M. Ault, 

Claudia Ribet; Jaffe Family Law Group, Daniel J. Jaffe and 

Sandra P. Mendell for Respondent.
2

Andrea Pourmoradi appeals from a judgment and an order 

entered in heavily litigated marital dissolution proceedings with 

John Pourmoradi.1 Andrea contends the family court improperly 

sanctioned her by awarding John $700,000 in attorney fees and 

costs under Family Code section 271.2 That statute empowers 

the court to impose attorney fees and costs as sanctions against

litigants whose conduct undermines the policy of promoting

settlement of litigation and cooperation of the litigants, and

increases litigation costs. (§ 271, subd. (a).) Finding no abuse of 

discretion, we affirm the sanctions order. Because Andrea’s 

appellate briefs do not present an argument as to why she 

believes the family court erred in rendering its judgment, we 

deem the appeal from the judgment abandoned and dismiss it on 

that basis.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Overview

John and Andrea were married on January 15, 1989, and 

have two children, now adults. The parties separated, and 

Andrea petitioned for dissolution of their marriage in July 2010. 

Judgment was entered dissolving the marriage in April 2017 

with the family court reserving jurisdiction over all other issues, 

mainly involving the division of property. Those issues were 

litigated in January and February 2020.

1 Although Andrea Pourmoradi’s name was restored to 

Andrea Schreiber by the April 14, 2017 status-only judgment, 

consistent with the family court proceedings, we use her prior 

surname. As is customary, however, we generally refer to both 

parties by their first names.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family 

Code.
3

The family court issued its final judgment on 

September 10, 2020, confirming the rulings made in its 

statement of decision, rejecting each of Andrea’s claims, and 

dividing the community property equally in kind. The court 

reserved jurisdiction to consider later requests for support and 

attorney fees, costs, and monetary sanctions.

On October 8, 2020, John sought an award of $2,114,229 in 

attorney fees and costs under section 271. Andrea filed 

opposition. Following a hearing, the family court awarded John 

$700,000 in sanctions against Andrea.

Andrea appealed from the September 10, 2020 judgment 

entered in the dissolution proceeding. She later appealed from 

the postjudgment order awarding section 271 sanctions to John. 

We ordered the appeals consolidated.

II. Summary of Pertinent Property Issues

Andrea’s sole challenge on appeal is to the postjudgment 

order imposing section 271 sanctions. Andrea is not contesting 

the factual findings in the family court’s statement of decision 

concerning property issues, which included the results of related 

federal court and superior court actions. We therefore 

summarize only those findings of the 57-page statement of 

decision that pertain to John’s section 271 sanctions request, 

Andrea’s opposition, or the court’s sanctions award, and/or 

otherwise provide context for the issues on appeal.

A. FSGM

Apart from their family residence, the parties’ primary 

asset was their 50 percent interest in Four Seasons General 

Merchandise, Inc. (FSGM). The business was also their primary 

source of income. FSGM imported mainly Chinese merchandise 

to be sold to independent discount stores. FSGM’s 50 percent co-
4

owner was Behruz Gabbai (Gabbai). He was involved in every 

aspect of FSGM, except purchasing and product safety, which 

John oversaw. Andrea was not involved with the operation of 

FSGM.

Due to global economic downturns, FSGM’s annual sales 

declined from over $100 million to $24.4 million from 2006 

through 2018. In 2013, Gabbai blocked the sale of FSGM to Point 

Capital Partners. This was one of several actions Gabbai took to 

destabilize FSGM until it ceased operations on June 15, 2018.

B. 2801 East Vernon LLC

The parties’ ownership interest in FSGM included a 50 

percent interest in two commercial buildings in Vernon. One of 

them, 2801 East Vernon Avenue, housed FSGM’s headquarters, 

showroom, and warehouse.

In December 2009, at Gabbai’s urging and after meeting 

with an attorney at Andrea’s direction, John, Andrea, and Gabbai 

signed a grant deed transferring the 2801 Vernon property into 

2801 East Vernon LLC. On the same day, John and Andrea 

signed multiple loan documents identifying 2801 East Vernon 

LLC as the borrower.

Disagreements with Gabbai led the parties in 2017 to 

jointly retain attorneys to represent them in legal proceedings to 

separate their interest from Gabbai’s interest in the two 

commercial buildings in Vernon: a partition action and an 

involuntary dissolution of 2801 East Vernon LLC. In response, 

Gabbai sought to acquire the parties’ 50 percent ownership 

interest of 2801 East Vernon LLC under Corporations Code 

section 17707.3, subdivision (c), and appraisers were appointed. 

John and Andrea unsuccessfully requested an alternate valuation 
5

date. In 2019, the superior court accepted an appraisal that was 

$1,425,000 below the stipulated market value.

The family court rejected Andrea’s claims, as unsupported 

by the evidence, that she was unaware of the property transfer to 

the 2801 East Vernon LLC and that John should be charged with 

the $1,425,000 difference in valuation and with rent and other 

costs that Gabbai had failed to pay.

When the bill for the legal fees of the parties’ jointly 

retained attorneys became due, Andrea refused to countersign 

the wire transfer instructions for payment. As a result, the 

parties lost a discount they would have received with timely 

payment. Instead, the parties were obligated to pay interest on 

the outstanding balance, which accrued until a court order 

released funds from their joint accounts. In addition, Andrea 

hired her own counsel, who, the family court found, interfered 

with the litigation and allowed Gabbai to take advantage of the 

parties’ conflicting positions.

C. DEA Investigation and Corporate Guilty Plea

In 2015, FSGM was federally charged with aiding and 

abetting the operation of an unlicensed money transfer business 

after the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) froze FSGM’s bank 

accounts and conducted an investigation. Pursuant to a plea 

agreement, FSGM was placed on three years’ probation and 

forfeited $1,665,661.99.3

John was in no way implicated in the offenses and was not 

a party to the plea agreement. Andrea was never a target of the 

DEA investigation.

3 Trial in this matter was delayed for years until the DEA 

investigation and federal charges were resolved.
6

In 2016, Andrea retained counsel, who informed federal 

prosecutors that John was “a fugitive from justice,” “had 

purchased a home” in Beverly Hills (a claim Andrea later 

withdrew), and had hidden away “an additional $50-100 million.” 

Andrea also provided prosecutors with documents and accused 

John of “ ‘pure money laundering.’ ”

Andrea’s counsel received thousands of pages of documents 

from John’s counsel relating to the investigation. After entry of a 

stipulated protective order, Andrea, nonetheless, told family 

members and business people about the DEA investigation.

Andrea also filed a petition in federal district court seeking 

25 percent of the funds that FSGM paid under the plea 

agreement. Her petition was later dismissed on the federal 

prosecutors’ motion.

The family court rejected Andrea’s claims that John should 

be held responsible and compensate her for any amount of legal 

fees and loss of funds incurred and paid by FSGM concerning the 

DEA action and corporate guilty plea.

D. Julie Oun Loans

Julie Oun (Oun) was a buying agent for FSGM. She helped 

John obtain merchandise from China. In 2006, Oun loaned 

FSGM $8,680,477 toward the purchase of a Garfield Avenue 

property in Paramount for a new FSGM headquarters. In 2009, 

Oun loaned Andrea and John $2,585,000 to pay off the existing 

mortgage on their residence and replace it with a lower interest 

loan.

The family court found there was no evidence the loans 

were made with community funds funneled through John as 

Andrea claimed. Instead, the evidence showed they were “real” 

loans extended by and repaid to a third party; none of the repaid 
7

funds was given to John. Accordingly, there was no community 

interest in the fully repaid loans and, contrary to Andrea’s 

assertion, no basis to charge John with repayments.

The family court rejected Andrea’s argument that under an 

expanded view of In re Marriage of Prentis-Margulis & Margulis 

(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252 (Margulis), the burden of proof 

should shift to John to disprove that Oun’s money was his.4 The 

court determined that even if it accepted Andrea’s novel 

interpretation of Margulis, the evidence did not support its 

application to this case.

E. Morris Matloubian’s Alleged “Blackmail”

John and Andrea maintained bank accounts in Israel and 

Switzerland that they failed to disclose in their tax filings and on 

which they had not paid federal taxes.

Morris Matloubian (Matloubian) was FSGM’s 

controller/CFO from 1992 through 2007, when he voluntarily 

terminated his employment. Before leaving, Matloubian 

purportedly threatened to disclose the existence of the foreign 

bank accounts unless he were paid $1 million. Matloubian was 

paid $900,000 and denied it was blackmail.

The family court agreed with Andrea’s contention that 

Matloubian’s demand for payment had been “blackmail” but 

found the evidence established the amount John paid was 

$450,000, not the entire $900,000 as Andrea claimed. The court 

4 In Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at page 1265, the 

husband had exclusive control and management of the 

community assets, and, as managing spouse, had the best 

knowledge of where the assets and accounts were located. The 

court shifted the burden of proof on the missing community 

assets to the managing spouse. (Id. at p. 1268.)
8

rejected Andrea’s assertion that she was entitled to either an 

offset or a reimbursement for John’s use of community funds to 

pay the blackmail. The court found the payment benefited the 

community equally by resolving threatened litigation and 

protecting the community from “serious adverse consequences.”5

The family court also found both parties were aware of, 

participated in, and financially benefited from the foreign 

accounts and their nondisclosure to the United States

government. Nor did John breach any fiduciary duty to Andrea 

regarding the payment. The court further found, “[i]rrespective 

of whether it was ‘blackmail,’ the payment to Matloubian does 

not satisfy any statutory exception to the general rule against 

reimbursement of debts paid during marriage with community 

funds.”

F. Demise of FSGM

On January 24, 2018, Gabbai told John it was time to 

dissolve FSGM. John so informed Andrea’s counsel.

Two days later, Andrea made demands under Corporations 

Code section 800 that FSGM’s board of directors recover all 

monies paid in connection with the DEA matter and all 

repayments made by FSGM to Oun. Andrea threatened to file a 

shareholder derivative suit against FSGM and a petition to have 

the superior court take jurisdiction over the winding up of FSGM 

if her demands were not met.

In February 2018, Andrea attended and was allowed to 

vote at a FSGM’s shareholders and board of directors meeting. 

5 John and Andrea participated in the Internal Revenue 

Service’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, which they 

completed in 2013. They also paid over $2.3 million in back 

taxes, penalties, and interest.
9

The shareholders outvoted Andrea and agreed to begin FSGM’s 

voluntary dissolution. A certificate of Election to Wind Up and 

Dissolve was filed with the California Secretary of State. Andrea 

later failed in three attempts to have the superior court assume 

jurisdiction over the dissolution and winding up of FSGM.

In April 2018, Gabbai offered to acquire the parties’ 

interest in FSGM for $6.75 million and forwarded a proposed 

stock purchase agreement for the acquisition. John urged 

Andrea to accept the offer, explaining it would likely net the 

parties more money than the proceeds from an auction. Andrea 

did not consent to the terms of the proposed sale to Gabbai. She 

made a counteroffer that he rejected. No further negotiations 

occurred between them.

An auction of FSGM’s assets took place in May 2018. 

Andrea refused to allow John to use community funds to bid on 

FSGM’s assets to obtain a higher price for the community. 

Between Gabbai and John, the winning bidder was Gabbai. He 

acquired FSGM’s inventory for 63 percent of its cost, FSGM’s 

intellectual property for $900,000, and FSGM’s furniture, 

fixtures, and equipment for $350,000.

One month later, FSGM ceased operations.

G. Alternate Valuation Date for FSGM

The family court denied Andrea’s request that FSGM be 

valued as of the parties’ 2010 separation date rather than as near 

as practicable to the January 2020 trial under section 2552. 

Andrea argued the precipitous decline in FSGM’s value over that 

decade was due to John’s misconduct and mismanagement. The 

court determined, however, that “Andrea failed to establish any 

criminal, tortious, grossly negligent or even negligent conduct by 

John resulting in a decline in value of FSGM.” The court found 
10

FSGM’s loss of value was caused by changes in the wholesale

discount business and international market forces, not by John’s 

actions.

III. Section 271 Sanctions

A. John’s Request for Sanctions

On October 8, 2020, John requested that $2,114,229 in 

section 271 sanctions be imposed against Andrea for her failure 

to cooperate in settlement negotiations before and during trial 

and her overlitigation of issues relating to property.

In support of his sanctions request, John described 13 

settlement offers and two requests for counteroffers that he 

communicated to Andrea in June 2014, following the collapse of 

Point Capital Partners’ proposed purchase of FSGM, through 

trial in July 2020. Of these, Andrea failed to respond to eight 

offers and rejected four offers without making a counteroffer.

John also pointed to Andrea’s extensive collateral litigation 

in state and federal court involving FSGM, which the family 

court found harmed the community by forcing FSGM to spend 

resources responding to the meritless suits rather than 

distributing funds to the parties.

John enumerated other pretrial activities by Andrea that 

were detrimental to the community, specifically, Andrea’s 

(1) hiring of independent counsel to make false claims of John’s 

involvement in criminal activity to federal prosecutors; (2) refusal 

to allow John to use community funds to bid on FSGM’s assets at 

auction to receive a higher price, and to consider Gabbai’s offer to 

purchase FSGM assets for $6.75 million rather than have them 

auctioned; (3) refusal to countersign the wire transfer 

instructions to timely pay discounted attorney fees; and 
11

(4) insistence on retaining her own counsel for the 2801 East 

Vernon LLC litigation, which ultimately benefited Gabbai.

John also argued Andrea made numerous claims that she 

abandoned shortly before or during trial, after he had incurred 

legal fees to defend against them: (1) Andrea abandoned in the 

second month of trial her allegation that John had received 

perquisite income from FSGM beginning January 10, 2012;

(2) Andrea abandoned two and one-half months before trial her 

allegation that John breached his fiduciary duty by selling one of 

the Vernon commercial buildings at below market price even 

though the sale was by a court-appointed referee to the highest

bidder as the parties had agreed; (3) Andrea claimed John 

purchased a home on North Crescent Drive in Beverly Hills, 

which he failed to disclose to Andrea. After receiving evidence 

from John and title companies that her claim was not true, 

Andrea failed to confirm to John that she was withdrawing it and 

did not raise the claim at trial; (4) Andrea alleged John had 

forged her signature on various financial documents. In 

discovery, however, Andrea admitted almost all of her signatures 

were genuine. Otherwise, as the family court found, Andrea was 

aware of most of the transactions and had signed other related 

documents. Andrea never asked for reimbursement for any 

documents she did not sign, and the court found Andrea did not 

suffer any economic harm from the signatures.

John further maintained he was compelled to prepare and 

file requests for orders (RFO’s) for which he incurred litigation 

costs after Andrea refused to agree to his reasonable requests. 

For example: (1) Following their partition action, Andrea failed 

to respond to John’s request that each of them be allowed to use 

their respective share of the sale proceeds to acquire new 
12

property to avoid $2.6 million in taxes. Only after John filed an 

RFO did Andrea stipulate to his request. (2) Andrea informed 

John that one of her primary attorneys would be joining a law 

firm started by an attorney who had previously represented 

John. When John refused to waive the resulting conflict of 

interest, Andrea insisted the attorney would continue to 

represent her. Only after John filed an RFO seeking the 

attorney’s disqualification did Andrea agree to no longer retain 

the attorney.

B. Andrea’s Opposition to the Request

In her opposition to the request for sanctions, Andrea did 

not deny John’s allegations. Instead, Andrea argued she should 

not be sanctioned for (1) rejecting John’s unreasonable and onesided settlement offers, and all of them ignored her primary 

“colorable claims”; (2) refusing to trust John, who “had cultivated 

a life of perfidy to mask decades of financial schemes.” According 

to Andrea, “Having chosen to enter into years of illegal, 

convoluted financial transactions with unsavory characters, John 

flouted his duties of full, complete, and ongoing disclosures,

forcing Andrea to investigate his multifarious schemes.” Nor, 

Andrea argued, should she be sanctioned for advancing “colorable 

claims” concerning Oun’s loans, Matloubian’s blackmail payment, 

the expanded application of Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 

1252, and an alternate valuation date of FSGM, or advancing 

positions hinging on credibility findings of Oun’s and 

Matloubian’s testimony. Lastly, Andrea maintained the 

requested $2,114,229 amount would impose an unreasonable 

financial burden on her, contrary to section 271.
13

C. Family Court’s Ruling on the Sanctions

Request

At a February 4, 2021 hearing, the parties stipulated to 

proceed on a written record consisting of the declarations and 

exhibits submitted by each party. Following argument by 

counsel, the matter was submitted.

On March 10, 2021, the family court partially granted 

John’s section 271 request for sanctions and ordered Andrea to 

pay $700,000 rather than $2,114,229. The court calculated the 

$700,000 award as one-third of John’s attorney fees and costs 

attributable to Andrea’s “unreasonable and unsupported 

positions.” The court found “this amount will not impose an 

unreasonable financial hardship” on Andrea. The court stayed 

payment until resolution of this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Andrea contends the family court erred in imposing 

$700,000 in attorney fees and costs as sanctions under section 

271.

I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Section 271 provides: “Notwithstanding any other

provision of this code, the court may base an award of attorney’s

fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or

attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote

settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of

litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and

attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to this

section is in the nature of a sanction.” (§ 271, subd. (a).)

We review an award of section 271 sanctions for an abuse

of discretion. (In re Marriage of Pearson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th

218, 233; In re E.M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 828, 850.) The
14

imposition of section 271 sanctions “will be upheld on appeal

unless the reviewing court, ‘considering all of the evidence viewed

most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable

inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the

order.’ ” (In re E.M., at p. 850; In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011)

194 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1100 [the applicable standard of review is

highly deferential].)

II. Family Court’s Ruling Imposing Section 271

Sanctions

In its four-page minute order, the family court addressed

John’s claims that Andrea had failed to cooperate in settlement

negotiations and overlitigated issues related to property.

A. Failure to Cooperate in Settlement

Negotiations

The family court acknowledged that Andrea “should not be 

sanctioned simply because she did not settle the case.” The court 

advised, however, that Andrea had an obligation to enter into 

settlement negotiations and could not simply ignore John’s 

repeated offers of settlement. (Boblitt v. Boblitt (2010) 190

Cal.App.4th 603, 612 [“ ‘The duty imposed by . . . section 271

requires a party to a dissolution action to be cooperative and

work toward settlement of the litigation on pain of being required

to share the party’s adversary’s litigation costs’ ”]; see also

Nicholson v. Fazeli (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th1091, 1102 [same]; 

Shenefield v. Shenefield (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 619, 627 [same].) 

Andrea does not dispute that John made 13 settlement 

offers and two requests for counteroffers. And of these, Andrea 

failed to respond to eight offers and rejected four offers without 

making a counteroffer. The family court found by not responding 

“at all,” Andrea “failed to allow [John] an opportunity to address 
15

her concerns and perhaps have a meaningful and fruitful 

settlement discussion.” The court found “[t]here is no doubt that 

some of [Andrea’s] actions frustrated the policy of the law for 

settlement.” Andrea’s lack of cooperation in settlement 

negotiations both before and during trial supports the court’s 

exercise of discretion.

B. Overlitigation of Property Issues

The family court made findings concerning Andrea’s

emotionally charged and meritless litigation of property issues. 

The court found Andrea “allowed her distrust of [John] to drive 

her litigation strategy” and “cost both parties significant attorney 

fees.” The court found Andrea adhered to positions supported by 

her beliefs and feelings, rather than by the facts and evidence, 

which “ultimately undermined her credibility.” The court 

excerpted portions of Andrea’s written opposition to section 271 

sanctions to show her use of “quite aggressive language to 

overstate what the actual facts in the case are.” As examples, the 

court quoted: “ ‘John sewed the tangled web of intrigue and 

dissembling that swept up Andrea and sapped away years of her 

life as she struggled to peel off stand (sic) after strand to reach 

the source’ ”; “ ‘John controlled those spheres by working 

surreptitiously with a cast of characters to ping-pong millions of 

dollars throughout the globe in a yarn of impenetrable, 

contradictory and untraceable transactions.’ ” The court found 

these hyperbolic allegations in Andrea’s written opposition 

typified those made at trial and led to protracted litigation. “It is 

precisely [Andrea’s] distrust, when viewed through the filter of 

overstatement and argument, that got the parties where they are 

in this matter. It is one thing to build a case on ‘I believe’ or ‘I 
16

think the facts will support’, and altogether another thing to 

build a case on evidence.”

The family court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning

Andrea for pursuing clearly baseless and costly litigation. 

Family law litigants who flout the policy of section 271 through 

conduct that increases litigation costs are subject to imposition of 

attorney fees and costs as sanctions. (In re Marriage of 

Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1524; accord, In re 

Marriage of Greenberg, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100; see In 

re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 

[§ 271 sanctions are appropriate where spouse’s motions “were 

reckless, baseless and frivolous” and “an abuse of the legal 

system”]; In re Marriage of Quay (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 961, 970 

[§ 271 sanctions are appropriate where a spouse’s “[t]aking an 

unreasonable position” at trial “is something more than simply

taking a hard stand and aggressively litigating it”]; In re 

Marriage of Burgard (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 74, 82 [husband’s 

sanctionable conduct required wife to “respond to an unnecessary 

motion, to write a brief, to research the law on motions for 

reconsideration, [and] to appear at yet another hearing”]; Burkle 

v. Burkle (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 387, 403, fn. 7 [§ 271 sanctions 

are appropriate where wife’s filing of “a separate civil action 

which was bound to be dismissed and her conduct in doing so 

necessarily caused litigation costs to increase and therefore 

patently” frustrated the policy of the statute]; In re Marriage of

Norton (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 53, 58 [§ 271 sanctions are

appropriate for frivolous or bad faith claims].)

To be sure, family law proceedings, by their very nature, 

lend themselves to distrust and lack of communication. (In re 

Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1298.) Here, 
17

however, the family court found Andrea’s distrust of John “seeped 

through this entire matter and cost both parties significant 

attorney fees.”

III. Andrea’s Contentions on Appeal from the Order

A. No Finding John Acted in Good Faith

On appeal, Andrea first contends because section 271 

requires both parties to have engaged in conduct that promotes

settlement and reduces litigation costs, John was not entitled to 

sanctions unless the family court found his settlement offers were 

made in good faith. (See § 271, subd. (a).)

Andrea is correct the statement of decision did not include 

an express finding whether John made his settlement offers in 

good faith. Consistent with the doctrine of implied findings, 

however, we infer the family court found John’s offers were made 

in good faith as supported by substantial evidence.6 The record

does not indicate Andrea either objected or otherwise apprised

the court that the statement of decision failed to address the 

issue of John’s good faith. Thus, invoking the doctrine of implied 

findings, we presume the court made all factual findings in 

support of its order, including a finding that John made good 

faith settlement offers. And substantial evidence supports the 

6 “The doctrine of implied findings provides that a ‘party

must state any objection to the statement in order to avoid an

implied finding on appeal in favor of the prevailing party. . . . [I]f

a party does not bring such deficiencies to the trial court’s

attention, that party waives the right to claim on appeal that the

statement was deficient . . . and hence the appellate court will

imply findings to support the judgment.’ ” (Estate of O’Connor

(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 159, 164; see also Fladeboe v. American

Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.)
18

implied finding. In his written request for section 271 sanctions, 

John asserted he “made good-faith efforts to settle, which Andrea 

rejected.” John submitted supporting declarations from himself 

and his counsel, which detailed the parties’ history of settlement 

negotiations.

B. Andrea Cooperated by Making Stipulations

Andrea also contends she substantially cooperated in

settlement by making stipulations. However, as John stated in

his request for sanctions, the record shows a number of Andrea’s

stipulations were in response to his having sought or successfully

obtained an RFO, or her stipulations ultimately caused John to

seek an RFO, all which led to unnecessary delay and litigation

expenses. (In re Marriage of Tharp, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 

1317 [§ 271 sanctions are appropriate “whenever a party’s

dilatory and uncooperative conduct” frustrates the statute’s

policy]; In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205,

1227 [“sanctions under section 271 are justified when a party has 

unreasonably increased the cost of litigation”].)

C. Andrea Should Not Be Sanctioned for 

Litigating Legal Positions that Are

Nonfrivolous or Turn on Witness Credibility

Andrea contends, as she did before the family court, that

she “was entitled to pursue reasonable extensions of the law and

positions that could have been decided in her favor had the

[family] court made different credibility determinations.” In

addition, Andrea points to the recent decision of Featherstone v. 

Martinez (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 775 (Featherstone), in which our 

colleagues in Division Five reversed section 271 sanctions 

imposed by a family court, in part because a mother in a child 
19

custody dispute took litigation positions with which the court 

disagreed.7 (Id. at pp. 777, 785.)

We agree with Andrea’s assertion that she should not be

sanctioned for litigating legal positions that are nonfrivolous or

turn on witness credibility.8 But that is not what happened here. 

In its statement of decision, the family court expressly agreed

with Andrea’s contention in her opposition that she should not be

sanctioned for seeking to expand the law of Margulis, supra, 198 

Cal.App.4th 1252. The court then explained that, based on its

factual findings, John would have prevailed even if he had been

charged with carrying the burden of proof as urged by Andrea.

The family court also agreed with Andrea’s assertion that 

many of her trial positions hinged on a credibility finding—one of 

which, the court noted, was Andrea’s position that Matloubian’s 

payment constituted “blackmail.” This was an issue “that 

depended on credibility, and presumably could have gone either 

way.” The court also found, however, that “many” of Andrea’s 

positions “were simply not supported regardless of witness 

credibility.”

In Featherstone, the family court’s grounds for imposing 

$10,000 sanctions included: (1) The mother’s early declarations 

in the case; (2) the mother’s Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1 

7 We denied Andrea’s request to file supplemental briefing 

on this decision.

8 We find it troubling that in asking us to infer, rather than 

claiming outright, the family court sanctioned her for pursuing 

reasonable extensions of the law and positions turning on

credibility, Andrea parses the statement of decision to

misleadingly suggest ambiguities and contradictions where none

exists.
20

motion to disqualify the judge for bias; (3) the mother’s proposed 

judgment; and (4) the mother’s request that the father’s video 

calls with their child “take place on Zoom only.” (Featherstone, 

supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 784.)

In concluding the family court’s imposition of section 271 

sanctions was an abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal 

explained: “Threaded throughout the court’s recitation were 

(1) the court’s characterizations of Mother’s requests as ‘entitled,’

‘controlling,’ and ‘overreaching,’ and (2) its own umbrage at being 

accused of bias and being the subject of a disqualification motion. 

Individually or collectively, this is not litigation behavior that a 

judge, staying within the bounds of reason, could conclude 

merited sanctions at all—much less a $20,000 sanctions award (if 

we count the improper amount assessed against counsel too).” 

(Featherstone, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 784–785.)

The Court of Appeal also faulted the family court for using 

its characterization of the mother’s “controlling ‘mindset’ ” and 

her requests in her declarations for Zoom video calls to justify 

sanctions. This was improper because the court “was principally 

sanctioning Mother not for taking actions that frustrated 

settlement efforts but for taking litigation positions with which 

the court disagreed.” (Featherstone, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 

785.) The Court of Appeal also concluded the errors in the 

mother’s proposed judgment were not significant to warrant 

sanctions and the family court itself had previously encouraged 

the parties to video-record each other. (Id. at p. 785 & fn. 7.)

We discern no similarities between the instant case and 

Featherstone. The record before us contains no hint of judicial 

bias, and nothing in the statement of decision suggests the family 

court imposed section 271 sanctions because it disagreed with 
21

Andrea’s litigation positions. Rather, as discussed, Andrea was 

sanctioned for conduct that discouraged settlement, needlessly 

lengthened court proceedings, and increased litigation costs.

D. Family Court Erred by Imposing Sanctions 

Without Evidence of John’s Income, Assets, and 

Liabilities

Andrea contends the family court abused its discretion by

imposing sanctions without having John submit an updated 

income and expense declaration or similar financial information, 

thereby contravening section 271’s directive that “the court shall 

take into consideration all evidence concerning the parties’

incomes, assets, and liabilities.”

9 (§ 271, subd. (a).) This is an 

issue of first impression.

Andrea’s contention rests on two grounds: (1) Section 271 

requires such evidence; and (2) if a court obtains current financial 

information from both parties, it can “scale” a sanctions award to 

their comparative wealth so as not to discourage an economically 

weaker party, like Andrea, from vigorously pursuing future 

litigation, citing In re Marriage of Norton, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d

at p. 60.)

9 This issue arose during the section 271 sanctions hearing 

when Andrea’s counsel argued John had to file a current income 

and expense declaration before the family court could award him 

sanctions. John’s counsel opposed the request, arguing it was 

contrary to the existing state of the law, but offered to provide the 

court with John’s current financial condition. The court 

answered that was unnecessary and took the matter of sanctions 

under submission.
22

Our interpretation of the language of section 271 “is an 

issue of law, which we review de novo.” (United Riggers &

Erectors v. Coast Iron & Steel Co. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1082, 1089.)

“The fundamental task of statutory construction is to

ascertain legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the

law.” (People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 611.) In doing

so, a court should look to the plain meaning of the statutory

language. (Ibid.) Where the intent is clear from the language

itself, the court will not look beyond the plain meaning. 

(Stephens v. County of Tulare (2006) 38 Cal.4th 793, 802.) In

other words, when the words are unambiguous, a court presumes

the legislators meant what they said.

Further, a court may not, “ ‘under the guise of statutory 

construction, “rewrite the law or give the words an effect different 

from the plain and direct import of the terms used.” ’ ” 

(California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State of California

(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 849, 858.) Nor may a court add to or alter 

the statute’s words “ ‘ “to accomplish a purpose that does not 

appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” ’ ” 

(In re Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36, 43.) This 

would violate “ ‘the cardinal rule of statutory construction that 

courts must not add provisions to statutes. [Citations.] This rule 

has been codified in California as [Code of Civil Procedure] 

section 1858, which provides that a court must not “insert what 

has been omitted” from a statute.’ ” (People v. Guzman (2005) 35 

Cal.4th 577, 587.) Further, a court shall “give effect to all words 

and provisions of a statute and leave no part superfluous or 

inoperative.” (Leavitt v. County of Madera (2004) 123 

Cal.App.4th 1502, 1519.)
23

Turning to the relevant language of the statute, section 

271, subdivision (a) states: “In making an award pursuant to this 

section, the court shall take into consideration all evidence 

concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court 

shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes 

an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the 

sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this 

section, the party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and 

costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the 

award.” (Italics added.)

In interpreting section 271, we apply the rules of statutory 

construction and “give effect to all words and provisions” without 

“insert[ing] what has been omitted.” The plain meaning of 

section 271, subdivision (a) is clear; it is unambiguous. It directs 

the family court to consider “all evidence concerning the parties’ 

incomes, assets, and liabilities.” But the statute also expressly 

omits the usual requirement that a party requesting an award of 

attorney fees and costs must establish a financial need for the 

award or financial disparity between the parties. (Compare 

§§ 2030, 2032, 3557, 7605.) Certainly, the family court has 

discretion to ask or order the requesting party to provide 

financial information, in the belief such information would be 

helpful or relevant. The requesting party may also seek to 

provide financial information, as John did, or simply file an 

income and expense declaration to avoid the risk of an adverse 

ruling.

Thus, contrary to Andrea’s contention, we do not interpret 

section 271 as requiring the requesting party to provide a current 

income and expense declaration or similar financial information. 

The requesting party may be asked by the family court or may 
24

choose to submit the evidence for the court’s consideration. But 

there is no statutory obligation for the requesting party to do so 

before the court can consider ordering sanctions.

While section 271 is not need-based, we do agree with 

Andrea that in certain instances, by comparing the parties’

relative wealth, a family court avoids discouraging the less

affluent party from vigorously litigating claims and defenses for

fear of incurring excessive sanctions. (In re Marriage of Norton,

supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 59.) This is not one of those

instances. The record fails to show Andrea is significantly less

affluent than John. Indeed, Andrea does not argue the court was

unfamiliar with her financial condition or that payment of a

$700,000 sanction will cause her unreasonable financial

hardship.

The family court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning

Andrea in the amount of $700,000.

IV. Appeal from the Judgment Is Deemed Abandoned

“ ‘An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct.

[Citation.] Hence, the appellant must make a challenge. In so

doing, he must raise claims of reversible error or other defect

[citation], and “present argument and authority on each point

made [citations]. If he does not, he may, in the court’s discretion,

be deemed to have abandoned his appeal. [Citation.] In that

event, it may order dismissal.’ ” (Conservatorship of Ben C.

(2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 544, fn. 8; see also Berger v. Godden (1985)

163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119 [“failure of an appellant in a civil

action to articulate any pertinent or intelligible legal argument in

an opening brief may, in the discretion of the court, be deemed an

abandonment of the appeal justifying dismissal”]; Bauer v.

Merigan (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 769, 771 [contemplated appeal
25

may be deemed abandoned if not pursued].) Because Andrea’s

appellate briefs lack any argument that the family court erred in

rendering its judgment, we exercise our discretion to dismiss her

appeal from the judgment as abandoned.

DISPOSITION

The order entered pursuant to Family Code section 271 is

affirmed. The appeal from the judgment is dismissed. 

Respondent John Pourmoradi is awarded his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.