1 Filed 6/26/13 P. v. Texas CA1/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. SHAWN PATRICK TEXAS, Defendant and Appellant. A137503
(Lake County Super. Ct. No. CR930314)

Shawn Patrick Texas appeals from a judgm ent upon his plea of no contest to malicious destruction of property (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)). He contends that the trial court erroneously imposed a $ 90 booking fee without finding that he had the ability to pay the fee. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On August 22, 2012, a co mplaint was filed charging de fendant with stalking while subject to a restraining order (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (b)) and malicious destruction of property. The charges stemmed from defendant’s arrest fo r violating a restraining order and breaking the rear door window of a patr ol car. On November 26, 2012, the court placed defendant on pr obation for a period of three years on conditions including that he serve 120 days in the county jail, pay a res titution fine of $720, pay a court operations assessment of $40, a crimin al conviction assessment of $30, and a criminal justice2 administrative fee of $90. 1 Defendant waived a reading of the amount and statutory authority for the fines which were ordered imposed, and expressly agreed to imposition
of each of the conditio ns of probation.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that th e trial court erred in imposin g the $90 criminal justice administrative fee (booking fee) without find ing that he had the ability to pay the fine. 2 The People argue that defend ant waived the clai m because he failed to object to imposition of the fine in the trial court. The issue was recently addre ssed by our Supreme Court in People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589 ( McCullough ). The Court held that “because a court’s imposition of a booking fee is confined to factual dete rminations, a defendant who fails to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the proceeding when the fee is imposed may not raise the challenge on appeal.” ( Id. at p. 597.) The court reasoned th at its review of statutes in which the Legislature has required a court to de termine if a defendant is able to pay a fee indicated “that the Legislature considers the fi nancial burden of the booking fee to be de minimis and has interposed no procedural sa feguards or guidelines for its imposition. In this context, the rationale for forfe iture is particularly strong.” ( Id. at p. 599.) Thus, the
court concluded: “Given that imposition of a fee is of much less moment than imposition of sentence, and that the goals advanced by judicial forfeiture appl y equally here, we see no reason to conclude that the rule permitting challenges made to th e sufficiency of the

1 The court also imposed sentence on tw o probation violati on matters, case nos. CR929150 (45 days) and CR9301 78 (90 days), the sentences to be served concurrently to each other, and awarded a to tal of 45 days credit against those terms.

2 Government Code section 29550, subdivis ion (c), provides in relevant part: “Any county whose officer or agent arrest s a person is entitled to recover from the arrested person a criminal justice administra tion [booking] fee for administrative costs it incurs in conjunction with th e arrest if the person is conv icted of any criminal offense related to the arrest, whether or not it is th e offense for which the person was originally booked . . . .” Subdivision (d)(2) provides that “[t]he c ourt shall, as a condition of probation, order the convicted person, based on his or her ability to pay , to reimburse the county for the criminal justice administrative fee . . . .”3 evidence to support a judgment for the first time on appeal ‘should apply to a finding of’ ability to pay a bookin g fee . . . .” ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, we conclude that defendant forfeited his claim that he lacked the ability to pay the booking fee. ( McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 599.)
III. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

_ ____________ ____________ Rivera, J.

We concur:

_____________ ____________ Ruvolo, P.J.

_____________ ____________ Humes, J.