J-S50042-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LERON FRANK HARRIS

Appellant No. 1451 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 26, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004713-2014

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., STABILE, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JULY 08, 2016

Appellant, Leron Frank Harris, appeals from the June 26, 2015 

aggregate judgment of sentence of two to five years’ imprisonment, imposed 

after Appellant was found guilty of one count each of possession with intent 

to deliver (PWID), intentional possession of a controlled substance, and 

possession of drug paraphernalia.1 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant factual history of this case as 

follows.

At the hearing held on Appellant’s Suppression 

Motion, the Commonwealth presented the testimony 

of Dauphin County Probation Officer Sean Hamor 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), 780-113(a)(16), and 780-113(a)(32), 

respectively.
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(“PO Hamor”) and Harrisburg City Police Officer 

Nicholas Ishman (“Ofc. Ishman”). At or about 7:53 

p.m. on the evening of August 16, 2014, the Officers 

were partnered on routine patrol as part of the 

Dauphin County Street Crimes Unit (“SCU”). The 

SCU is a team of law enforcement officers consisting 

of police, county probation officers and state parole 

officers who patrol high crime areas and address any 

violent crimes or drug transactions that they 

encounter.

While on patrol, Ofc. Ishman and PO Hamor 

were driving in an unmarked police van on Woodbine 

Street in Harrisburg when they spotted Appellant 

standing with another mate, later identified as David 

Bucci, in Wharton Alley. When they turned the 

corner onto Wharton Alley, Ofc. Ishman, who was 

familiar with Appellant, saw money in his left hand 

and observed him put something down the front of 

his pants. Although he was not Appellant’s 

supervising Probation Officer, PO Hamor was familiar 

with Appellant as he had seen him report to PO 

Anglemeyer. Ofc. Ishman reported to PO Hamor 

what he had seen so, the two decided to make 

contact with Appellant.

Ofc. Ishman and PO Hamor turned onto 

Wharton Alley without emergency lights or sirens 

activated. Upon exiting the police vehicle, Appellant 

walked up to Ofc. Ishman greeted him and shook his 

hand. [Ofc.] Ishman testified that he did not 

indicate to Appellant that he wanted to speak to him 

or that Appellant was not free to leave the scene. 

Ofc. Ishman then walked over to Mr. Bucci who was 

standing by his truck that was parked in the alley.

PO Hamor then exited the car to make a 

routine probation contact with Appellant. Appellant’s 

demeanor was nervous and shaky. PO Hamor gave 

him a pen and paper to write down his name and 

probation officer’s name and he continued to shake 

while performing the task. PO Hamor never told 

Appellant that he was not free to leave; rather, he 

asked for consent to search his person which consent 
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was granted. Approximately $200 in cash and a 

cellphone were found during the search. While 

searching him, PO Hamor shook Appellant’s shorts 

which caused a rubber band to fall out which was 

spotted by Ofc. Ishman who was now standing about 

5 feet away. Once he was alerted to the rubber 

band, PO Hamor asked Appellant if he had any 

contraband on him to which he replied no. PO 

Hamor followed up with a request for consent to 

search down his pants; Appellant agreed and 

unbuckled his belt. PO Hamor pulled the waistband 

away from Appellant’s stomach and immediately saw 

a bag of suspected crack cocaine on top of his 

private parts. Appellant reacted by repeatedly 

saying “I’m done, I’m done.” The substance found in 

Appellant’s pants field tested positive as crack 

cocaine.

On August 16, 2014, around 6:00 p.m., David 

Bucci ... called Appellant, a person he knew as 

“Ralph”, to make arrangements to buy $20 worth of 

crack cocaine. Mr. Bucci had been in contact with 

Appellant numerous times prior to August 16, 2014, 

to purchase illegal drugs. He indicated that the 

usual practice was for him to call Appellant to see if 

he had cocaine available and, if so, meet on Wharton 

Street. On the date of the incident, the pair was to 

meet at approximately 7:00 p.m. on Wharton Street 

off Woodbine Street. Appellant instructed Bucci to 

call him when he arrived at the meeting spot so he 

could come out of his apartment building and 

consummate the drug transaction.

Bucci drove to the meeting location with his 

fiancée who waited in his truck. After notifying 

Appellant by phone that he had arrived, Appellant 

met with Bucci on the sidewalk outside of the 

apartment building on Wharton Alley. While making 

the exchange, Bucci and Appellant saw a police 

vehicle turn down the alley which caused them to go 

separate ways – Appellant towards his apartment 

building and Bucci to his truck.
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After exiting the police vehicle, Ofc. Ishman 

approached Bucci and asked why he was there. 

Bucci lied at first about the reason for being at the 

location; however, he eventually admitted that he 

was there to buy drugs. Upon request, Bucci 

granted Ofc. Ishman permission to search his person 

but, according to Bucci, since he admitted to the 

reason for meeting with Appellant, the search never 

occurred. At trial, Bucci identified Appellant as the 

person named “Ralph” from whom he would 

purchase crack cocaine.

Ofc. Ishman’s and PO Hamor’s testimony was 

essentially the same as the testimony provided 

during the suppression hearing with further 

amplification of some details relating to the 

encounter with Appellant and Bucci. When Ofc. 

Ishman first spotted Bucci and Appellant, they were 

standing at the rear of the apartment building on 

Wharton Alley. He stated that the two men 

immediately stopped speaking and Appellant shoved 

something down his pants. After shaking Appellant’s 

hand, he told Ofc. Ishman that the men were talking 

about a job. Ofc. lshman then proceeded to speak 

with Bucci. Initially Bucci told Ishman that the pair 

had been talking about tattoos for his fiancée but, 

eventually he admitted that he was there for a 

cocaine purchase. After Bucci consented to a search 

of his person, Ofc. Ishman found no contraband.

PO Hamor was informed by Ofc. Ishman that 

he had seen Appellant shove something down his 

pants. PO Hamor made contact with Appellant after 

lshman began speaking with Mr. Bucci. At trial, PO 

Hamor reiterated the details of his encounter with 

Appellant up to the point of the consensual search of 

his pants where the bag of suspected crack cocaine 

was found.

Ofc. Ishman took custody of the bag and field 

tested the substance. The substance recovered from 

Appellant field tested positive as cocaine. Ishman 

searched Appellant incident to the arrest after finding 

the baggie and recovered a cellphone and $205 in 
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the form of two $100 bills and a $5 bill. Ofc. Ishman 

got permission to use Mr. Bucci’s cellphone to call 

the contact number listed as Ralph. Upon placing 

the call from Bucci’s phone, Appellant’s cellphone 

rang.

Ofc. Ishman submitted the recovered 

substance to the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) 

Forensic Lab for testing. The parties stipulated to 

the admission of the PSP lab report into evidence. 

The report indicated that the substance recovered 

from Appellant was crack cocaine that weighed 5.76 

grams.

The Commonwealth also presented the expert 

testimony of Chief John Goshert (“Chief Goshert”) of 

the Dauphin County Criminal Investigation Division 

(“CID”). After testifying to his training, experience 

and background, Chief Goshert was qualified as an 

expert in street level drug trafficking without 

objection.

Chief Goshert testified that he had reviewed 

the police report and the evidence related to this 

case. Chief Goshert was given a hypothetical upon 

which to determine whether he was able to form an 

opinion regarding whether the cocaine recovered in 

this matter was for personal use or for distribution. 

After considering the hypothetical factual scenario 

and reviewing the PSP lab report, Chief Goshert 

opined that the drugs recovered in this case were 

possessed with the intent to sell or deliver to another 

person.

Chief Goshert testified to the many factors 

which led him to his opinion which included his 

experience with significant drug trafficking at that 

location; the fact that the secreted area of the 

location eased the facilitation of a drug transaction; 

and, the actions of the two men were synonymous 

with persons engaging in a drug transaction. Chief 

Goshert found the significant amount of cocaine 

recovered along with the fact that a device by which 

a person may smoke the crack cocaine was not 
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found and packaging in which it was found are 

inconsistent with personal use. An additional factor 

considered was the presence of a significant amount 

of cash given Appellant’s lack of employment.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/16, at 3-8.

Appellant filed a motion to suppress on December 23, 2014, for which 

the trial court conducted a hearing on January 26, 2015. After post-hearing 

briefing, the trial court entered an order on February 27, 2015, denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress.

Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on June 3, 2015, at the conclusion 

of which, the jury found Appellant guilty of intentional possession and drug 

paraphernalia counts, but deadlocked on PWID. Appellant proceeded to a 

second jury trial on June 11, 2015, limited to the one count of PWID, at the 

conclusion of which, the jury found Appellant guilty of that offense. On June 

26, 2015, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of two to five years’ 

imprisonment.2 That same day, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence 

motion, which the trial court denied on August 10, 2015. On August 24, 

2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.3

On appeal, Appellant raises the following four issues for our review.

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two to five years’ 

imprisonment for PWID, a concurrent six months’ probation for possession of 

drug paraphernalia, and no further penalty on intentional possession.

3 Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.
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I. Whether the trial court erred in denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence where 

the police and probation officer lacked 

reasonable suspicion to conduct an 

investigative detention[,] in violation of Article 

I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

and the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution?

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence where 

the police and probation officer lacked 

reasonable suspicion to conduct a probation 

search, in violation of Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution?

III. Whether the trial court erred in denying 

Appellant’s post-sentence motion where the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

so as to shock one’s sense of justice where the 

Commonwealth never showed that [] Appellant 

engaged in acts which constitute the offense of 

which he was convicted?

IV. Whether the Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s 

convictions where the Commonwealth did not 

prove that Appellant possessed the drugs with 

the intent to deliver them?

Appellant’s Brief at 8-9 (some capitalization omitted).

We elect to address Appellant’s issues in reverse order for ease of 

appellate review and analysis. See generally Commonwealth v. Stokes, 

38 A.3d 846, 853 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating, “a successful sufficiency of the 

evidence claim warrants discharge on the pertinent crime, [therefore,] we 

address those claims first[]”). In his fourth issue, Appellant avers that the 

Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient evidence of PWID, specifically that 
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he possessed the drugs in question with the intent to deliver. Appellant’s 

Brief at 36-38. The Commonwealth counters that through Bucci and Chief 

Goshert, their testimony was sufficient to establish the “intent to deliver” 

element of the offense. Commonwealth’s Brief at 31-32.

We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review. “In reviewing 

the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether the evidence presented 

at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, support the 

jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Patterson, 

91 A.3d 55, 66 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Patterson v. 

Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 1400 (2015). “The Commonwealth can meet its 

burden by wholly circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the 

defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be 

drawn from the combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 

A.3d 108, 113 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate 

court, we must review “the entire record ... and all evidence actually 

received[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of 

the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” 

Id. (citation omitted). “Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, 
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our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” 

Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013) (citation 

omitted), cert. denied, Diamond v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 145 (2014).

In this case, the offense at issue is PWID, the statute governing said 

offense provides in relevant part, as follows.

§ 780-113. Prohibited acts; penalties

(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within 

the Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:

...

(30) Except as authorized by this act, the 

manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to 

manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a 

person not registered under this act, or a practitioner 

not registered or licensed by the appropriate State 

board, or knowingly creating, delivering or 

possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit 

controlled substance.

...

35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). Regarding the intent to deliver element, this 

Court has explained that the jury may infer said intent from the following 

circumstances.

“To establish the offense of possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver, the 

Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant possessed a controlled 

substance with the intent to deliver it.” 

[Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 831 A.2d 607, 611 

(Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 847 A.2d 1280 

(Pa. 2004)] (citing Commonwealth v. Conaway,

791 A.2d 359 (Pa. Super. 2002); Commonwealth 

v. Aguado, 760 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. 2000)).
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The trier of fact may infer that the defendant 

intended to deliver a controlled substance from 

an examination of the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the case. Factors to consider in 

determining whether the drugs were possessed 

with the intent to deliver include the particular 

method of packaging, the form of the drug, 

and the behavior of the defendant.

Kirkland, supra at 611. “Thus, possession with 

intent to deliver can be inferred from the quantity of 

the drugs possessed and other surrounding 

circumstances, such as lack of paraphernalia for 

consumption.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 617 

A.2d 812, 814 (Pa. Super. 1992), appeal denied, 629 

A.2d 1379 (Pa. 1993).

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 121 (Pa. Super. 2005) (parallel 

citations omitted).

In this case, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Bucci, 

who testified that he “basically [] bought [his] drugs from [Appellant].” 

N.T., 6/11/15, at 25. Bucci described Appellant’s manner of conducting 

business in the following terms.

Q. When you would purchase these drugs, did you 

have any routine for getting them?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you please describe that to the members 

of the jury?

A. Basically I would call, I would ask if [Appellant] 

was good. He would [say] yes or no. If the 

answer was yes, I would -- we would proceed 

to make a time on how long it was going to 

take me to get there. I would get there, at 

which point I would call him again, and then he 
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would come out and the transaction would be 

made.

Q. Now, you just stated that you would call 

[Appellant] and ask him if he was good. Can 

you please describe to the members of the jury 

what that means?

A. Basically did he have drugs on him. Cocaine.

Q. Would you always meet in the same location?

A. Yes.

Id. at 25-26. Bucci further testified that on the night of August 16, 2014, 

he intended to purchase $20.00 worth of crack cocaine, and was in the 

middle of making that transaction with Appellant when the police interrupted 

them. Id. at 26, 28.

The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Chief Goshert, 

who testified as an expert in the field of “street-level drug trafficking.” Id.

at 63. Chief Goshert testified that in his expert opinion, the 5.76 grams of 

crack cocaine recovered from Appellant’s person was possessed with the 

intent to deliver and not for personal use. Id. at 66. Chief Goshert stated 

that several factors led him to this conclusion. This included that the area 

where Appellant and Bucci were found was “an area that is known for drug 

trafficking.” Id. at 67. Also, Chief Goshert stated that the street value of 

the 5.76 grams of crack cocaine was “about 450 to 570 dollars [sic] worth” 

and it was “not an amount that would be consistent with someone who is 

using crack cocaine.” Id. at 67-68. Chief Goshert also noted that Appellant 
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and Bucci’s behavior of being “in the alley like that huddled up would be 

consistent with a drug transaction, with transactional behavior.” Id. at 69. 

Chief Goshert also noted that Appellant was not found with any drug 

paraphernalia on his person, and that the packaging in which the crack 

cocaine was found in was consistent with the sale of the substance, as 

opposed to being for personal use. Id. at 72.

In light of the above evidence, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to 

relief. The Commonwealth’s evidence showed that Appellant possessed 5.76 

grams of crack cocaine, worth at least $450.00, and regularly sold the same 

to Bucci. As Chief Goshert explained, the location and behavior of Bucci and 

Appellant, combined with the value of the crack cocaine found, were all 

consistent with an intent to deliver. Furthermore, it is undisputed that at the 

time the police encountered Appellant, he did not possess any drug 

paraphernalia on his person, which would have indicated that the drugs were 

for personal consumption. Although, Appellant highlights factors that were 

not present, these do not detract from the fact that Chief Goshert and 

Bucci’s testimony presented facts from which a jury could conclude that 

Appellant possessed the crack cocaine with an intent to deliver. See, e.g., 

Kirkland, supra; Torres, supra. Based on these considerations, we 

conclude the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence of intent to 

sustain the PWID conviction. See Diamond, supra; Jones, supra.
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In his third issue, Appellant avers that the jury’s verdict was against 

the weight of the evidence.4 We begin by noting our well-settled standard of 

review. “A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v. 

Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). An 

argument that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

concedes that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions. 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1067 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 

Lyons v. Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 1792 (2014). Our Supreme Court has 

admonished that “[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have 

arrived at a different conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 

1055 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). Instead, “the trial judge is to determine 

that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater 

weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is 

to deny justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] 

new trial should be awarded when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice ....” Id. 

As an appellate court, it “is not [our role] to consider the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” 

____________________________________________

4 We reject the trial court and the Commonwealth’s position that Appellant 

has waived this issue for want of specificity.
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Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 91 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted), 

cert. denied, Morales v. Pennsylvania, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015). An 

argument that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence 

remains “[o]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting ... a new trial ....” 

Id. (citation omitted). “Thus, only where the facts and inferences disclose a 

palpable abuse of discretion will the denial of a motion for a new trial based 

on the weight of the evidence be upset on appeal.” Id. (citation omitted; 

emphasis in original).

In this case, Appellant avers the jury’s verdict was against the weight 

of the evidence because, in his view, Bucci and Chief Goshert’s testimony 

was unreliable. Appellant argues that Bucci’s testimony was unreliable 

because of his crimen falsi, pending charges, and his admission that he lied 

to the police. Appellant’s Brief at 40. Appellant also assails Bucci’s 

testimony for its purported inconsistency with the evidence. Appellant 

maintains that although Bucci stated that he purchased the $20.00 worth of 

crack cocaine from Appellant, Bucci was not found with any drugs on him, 

nor was Appellant found with any “denominations [of currency] ... that would 

account for twenty ($20) dollars.” Id. at 41. Appellant also avers that Chief 

Goshert’s conclusions were unreliable because he testified that he did not 

know whether Appellant had drug paraphernalia in his home 50 feet from 

where he met Bucci. Id. Appellant also notes that Chief Goshert agreed 
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that buying crack cocaine in a bulkier quantity was “safer and that the drugs 

would not go bad so one could keep them for a long period of time.” Id.

The trial court concluded that Appellant was not entitled to relief based 

on two propositions. First, it concluded the record contained “an abundance 

of evidence [that] was presented to prove an intent to deliver the crack 

cocaine.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/16, at 18. Second, the trial court’s 

“[r]eview of the transcript does not reveal such [an] amount of 

inconsistencies or a lack of credibility that it would shock the [trial c]ourt’s 

sense of justice to learn that the jury resolved any credibility issues in favor 

of the Commonwealth.” Id.

It is axiomatic that the jury is the ultimate finder of fact at trial. 

[T]he veracity of a particular witness is a 

question which must be answered in reliance on the 

ordinary experiences of life, common knowledge of 

the natural tendencies of human nature, and 

observations of the character and demeanor of the 

witness. As the phenomenon of lying is within the 

ordinary capacity of jurors to assess, the question of 

a witness’s credibility is reserved exclusively for the 

jury.

Commonwealth v. Alicia, 92 A.3d 753, 761 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). 

Likewise, “[t]he trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Feese, 79 A.3d 1101, 1122 (Pa. 

Super. 2013), appeal denied, 94 A.3d 1007 (Pa. 2014).
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In this case, as the trial court pointed out, the jury was free to find 

Bucci and Chief Goshert’s trial testimony credible, and resolve any 

inconsistencies in said testimony in the Commonwealth’s favor. See 

generally Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 286 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(concluding the weight of the evidence claim could not prevail as “the jury 

resolved the inconsistencies among the testimonies as it saw fit and reached 

a verdict[]”), appeal denied, 102 A.3d 984 (Pa. 2014). The jury weighed 

their testimony and ultimately concluded that Bucci and Chief Goshert were

credible. As an appellate court, we will not reweigh the evidence and 

substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. 

Serrano, 61 A.3d 279, 289 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Based on 

these considerations, we conclude the trial court did not commit a palpable 

abuse of discretion in deciding the jury’s verdict was not against the weight 

of the evidence. See Morales, supra.

We address Appellant’s remaining two issues together, in which 

Appellant argues the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. 

We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review.

In addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a suppression motion, we are limited to 

determining whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. 

Since the Commonwealth prevailed in the 

suppression court, we may consider only the 

evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the 

evidence for the defense as it remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the 
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record as a whole. Where the record supports the 

factual findings of the trial court, we are bound by 

those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 89 A.3d 679, 683 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 102 A.3d 985 (Pa. 2014).5 In his first 

issue, Appellant argues the police lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an 

investigative detention of Appellant. Appellant’s Brief at 19. The 

Commonwealth counters that the interaction was a mere encounter, but 

even if it was an investigative detention, the police had reasonable 

suspicion. Commonwealth’s Brief at 14, 20.

The Fourth Amendment of the Federal 

Constitution provides, “[t]he right of the 

people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....” 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. Likewise, Article I, 

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

____________________________________________

5 Our Supreme Court has clarified our scope of review when considering a 

challenge to a trial court’s suppression ruling as it relates to “the extent of 

the record that the appellate court consults when conducting that review.” 

In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1080 (Pa. 2013). The Court held that such review 

is limited to the suppression hearing record, and “it is inappropriate to 

consider trial evidence as a matter of course, because it is simply not part of 

the suppression record, absent a finding that such evidence was unavailable 

during the suppression hearing.” Id. at 1085. Because prior cases held that 

a reviewing court could consider the trial record in addition to the 

suppression record, our Supreme Court determined that the more limited 

scope announced in In re L.J. would apply prospectively to cases where the 

suppression hearing occurred after October 30, 2013. Id. at 1088-1089. 

Instantly, the subject suppression hearing was held on January 26, 2015. 

Accordingly, our scope of review is confined to the suppression hearing 

record.
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states, “[t]he people shall be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers and possessions from 

unreasonable searches and seizures ....” Pa. 

Const. Art. I, § 8. 

Commonwealth v. Carter, 105 A.3d 765, 768 (Pa. 

Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 

295 (Pa. 2015).

Commonwealth v. Williams, 125 A.3d 425, 432 (Pa. Super. 2015). Our 

cases have recognized three levels of police-citizen interactions.

The first is a mere encounter, which requires no level 

of suspicion at all. Commonwealth v. Daniel, 999 

A.2d 590, 596 (Pa. Super. 2010). The second level 

is an investigative detention, which must be 

supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 596-597. 

Finally, the third level is an arrest or custodial 

detention, which must be supported by probable 

cause. Id. at 597.

Commonwealth v. Walls, 53 A.3d 889, 892-893 (Pa. Super. 2012). “In 

evaluating the level of interaction, courts conduct an objective examination 

of the totality of the surrounding circumstances.” Commonwealth v. 

Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

The totality-of-the-circumstances test is ultimately 

centered on whether the suspect has in some way 

been restrained by physical force or show of coercive 

authority. Under this test, no single factor controls 

the ultimate conclusion as to whether a seizure 

occurred—to guide the inquiry, the United States 

Supreme Court and this Court have employed an

objective test entailing a determination of whether a 

reasonable person would have felt free to leave or 

otherwise terminate the encounter. What constitutes 

a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude 

that he is not free to leave will vary, not only with 

the particular police conduct at issue, but also with 

the setting in which the conduct occurs.
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Id. at 302-303.

In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of 

Officer Ishman, who testified that he was patrolling in an unmarked car with 

P.O. Hamor. N.T., 1/26/15, at 16-17. Officer Ishman testified that at about 

7:53 p.m., he and P.O. Hamor were driving by Wharton Alley, when he saw 

Appellant. Id. at 17, 18. Officer Ishman observed that Appellant had 

money in his left hand, and he was speaking to Bucci. Id. at 18. Officer 

Ishman also observed Appellant “put something down the front of his pants.” 

Id. at 19. Officer Ishman knew Appellant and identified him to P.O. Hamor. 

The two officers got out of the car, which had neither its lights or sirens 

activated. Id. at 19. As Officer Ishman got out of the car, Appellant walked 

over to him. Id. Officer Ishman shook his hand, asked him how he was 

doing that evening. Id. Appellant responded he was fine and had been 

speaking to Bucci “about doing some work.” Id. Officer Ishman then turned 

and went to speak to Bucci. Id. at 19-20.

P.O. Hamor testified at the suppression hearing that after Officer 

Ishman and Appellant shook hands and exchanged greetings, he also 

introduced himself to Appellant and asked him what he was doing. Id. at 8. 

Appellant responded to P.O. Hamor that he was talking to Bucci about a job. 

Id. P.O. Hamor described Appellant as acting nervously, with his hands 

shaking. Id. at 9. P.O. Hamor gave Appellant his pen and notepad to write 

down his name and his supervising probation officer. Id. P.O. Hamor 
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explained that even though he already knew this information, he made the 

request to illustrate Appellant’s nervousness. Id. P.O. Hamor asked 

Appellant if he could search his person, to which Appellant said yes. Id. at 

10. P.O. Hamor recovered over $200.00 in currency and a mobile phone. 

Id. When P.O. Hamor was “shaking out his pants” as part of the search, “a 

rubber band fell out on the ground.” Id. Officer Ishman pointed out that it 

came out of Appellant’s pants. Id. P.O. Hamor asked Appellant if he “had 

anything on him[]” to which Appellant said no. Id. P.O. Hamor asked 

Appellant for his consent to search his pants. Id. Appellant unbuckled his 

belt, and P.O. Hamor pulled Appellant’s pants away from his stomach. P.O. 

Hamor observed the crack cocaine on top of Appellant’s genitals. Id.

Looking at the circumstances, we conclude that at the relevant times, 

Appellant was subjected to a mere encounter, and not an investigative 

detention. Both the United States Supreme Court and our Supreme Court 

have held that a request for identification by police does not itself amount to 

a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Hiibel v. Sixth 

Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004); Commonwealth v. 

Au, 42 A.3d 1002, 1007 (Pa. 2012). In addition, our Supreme Court has 

instructed that an investigative detention arises when “an encounter 

involving a request for identification could rise to a detention when coupled 

with circumstances of restraint of liberty, physical force, show of authority, 

or some level of coercion beyond the officer’s mere employment, conveying 
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a demand for compliance or that there will be tangible consequences from a 

refusal.” Lyles, supra at 304. Here, the officers were pulled up in an 

unmarked vehicle without lights or sirens and were approached initially by 

Appellant himself. The officers then exchanged greetings and shook hands 

with Appellant and inquired into his name and activities. In our view, there 

was no identifiable “restraint of liberty, physical force, show of authority, or 

... coercion” that escalated this mere encounter into anything more than just 

that. Id. Therefore, we conclude that Appellant was not subjected to a 

seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.6 See Walls, supra.

In his second issue, Appellant claims the police lacked reasonable 

suspicion to conduct a “probation search.” Id. at 28. However, the trial 

court concluded that Appellant consented to the search at issue, as such, no 

reasonable suspicion was required. Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/16, at 13. 

Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s consent conclusion except to 

say that “[t]he fact that Appellant allegedly consented to th[e] search is 

irrelevant as the consent would have occurred after the illegal detention.” 

____________________________________________

6 Although the Commonwealth argued in the trial court that Appellant was 

subjected to a mere encounter, it appears the trial court’s overriding 

conclusion was that the officers possessed reasonable suspicion. Trial Court 

Opinion, 1/12/16, at 12. It is unclear whether the trial court was 

affirmatively rejecting the Commonwealth’s position that this was a mere 

encounter, or was assuming that even if it was a seizure, it was 

constitutional. Nevertheless, as an appellate court, we “may affirm [the 

lower court] for any reason, including such reasons not considered by the 

lower court.” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 373, 381 n.6 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citation omitted).
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Appellant’s Brief at 36. As we have explained above, Appellant’s Fourth 

Amendment rights were not violated. Appellant does not raise any other 

argument challenging the trial court’s consent conclusion; as a result, we 

conclude this issue lacks merit. Therefore, as Appellant’s two suppression 

issues fail, the trial court correctly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. 

See Scarborough, supra.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude all of Appellant’s issues are 

devoid of merit. Accordingly, the trial court’s June 26, 2015 judgment of 

sentence is affirmed.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/8/2016