IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

MAX REED, II, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

RENEE BAKER, WARDEN, ELY STATE 

PRISON, 

Respondent. 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

No. 67842 

FILED 

APR 1 4 2016 

TRACIE K, LINDRMAN 

CLERK OFSUPREME COURT 

. . 

BY c..esc 

DEPUTY CLER 

This is a pro se appeal from a district court order denying 

appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Second 

Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Janet J. Berry, Judge. 

Appellant Max Reed, II, represented himself at trial and was 

convicted of murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Reed was sentenced 

to two consecutive terms of 20 to 50 years in prison. This court affirmed 

his judgment and sentence on appeal. Reed v. State, Docket No. 62177 

(Order of Affirmance, July 30, 2014). On September 16, 2014, Reed filed a 

pro se petition for postconviction relief, which the district court denied.' 

This appeal followed. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A . 

'The district court denied the following claims on the grounds that 

they could have been, or were, raised on direct appeal and were therefore 

waived: (1) the State failed to prove intent, (2) the State failed to turn over 

evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and failed to 

collect/preserve evidence, (3) the trial judge was biased and issued 

erroneous legal rulings, (4) insufficient evidence was presented at the 

preliminary hearing, (5) Reed was denied his right to self-representation, 

(6) insufficient evidence supports the conviction, (7) the racial makeup of 

the jury was unconstitutional, and (8) Reed was denied his right to 

compulsory process. See NRS 34.810(1) (b); see also Franklin v. State, 110 

Nev. 750, 752, 877 P.2d 1058, 1059 (1994) (holding that "claims that are 

appropriate for a direct appeal must be pursued on direct appeal, or they 

will be considered waived in subsequent proceedings"), overruled on other 

continued on next page . . . 

16- 1/7442 

, 
In his petition, Reed contended that the attorneys who 

represented him before he assumed his own representation were 

ineffective. 2To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must 

demonstrate that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 

100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting Strickland). We 

give deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by 

substantial evidence but review the court's application of the law to those 

facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 

(2005). An evidentiary hearing is warranted where a petitioner raises a 

claim supported by specific facts that are not belied by the record and that, 

if true, would entitle him to relief. Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 255, 

71 P.3d 503, 508 (2003). An evidentiary hearing is not warranted, 

. . . continued 

grounds by Thomas v. State, 115 Nev. 148, 979 P.2d 222 (1999). We agree 

and conclude that the district court did not err by denying these claims 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

2Reed also contended that standby counsel and appellate counsel 

were ineffective. We reject Reed's standby counsel claims because he had 

no right to the effective-assistance of standby counsel. See, e.g., McKague 

v. Whitley, 112 Nev. 159, 164, 912 P.2d 255, 258 (1996) (explaining that a 

defendant only has a right to the effective assistance of counsel where 

counsel is constitutionally or statutorily required); United States v. 

Cochrane, 985 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a petitioner 

cannot challenge the performance of standby counsel because he has no 

right to standby counsel). We decline to consider Reed's appellate counsel 

claims because we conclude that they were not adequately raised. See 

Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

2 

10) 1947A e 
however, where an appellant presents bare or naked claims. See Hargrove 

v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984). 

First, Reed contended that counsel Richard Davies 3was 

ineffective because he did not obtain discovery, investigate, or challenge 

the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. The district court 

determined that Reed failed to demonstrate that Davies was ineffective. 

We agree because Reed failed to demonstrate that the State would have 

been unable to muster slight or marginal evidence had counsel performed 

differently or that challenging the evidence presented would have been 

successful. See Sheriff v. Hodes, 96 Nev. 184, 186, 606 P.2d 178, 180 

(1980). Second, Reed contended that counsel Scott Edwards 4was 

ineffective because he failed to investigate and perform other tasks. Reed 

failed to demonstrate that Edwards was ineffective because Reed assumed 

his own representation almost two years before trial and does not explain 

why he could not have performed these tasks, or how he was prejudiced. 

We conclude that the district court did not err by denying this claim 

without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Next, Reed contended that he was prevented from filing a 

meaningful postconviction petition due to the restrictions placed upon him 

as an inmate. The district court denied this claim because he failed to 

allege sufficient facts suggesting an actual injury. We agree. See Lewis v. 

Casey, 518 U.S. 343,351 (1996) (explaining that an inmate contesting his 

access to the courts must demonstrate specific examples of injury). Reed 

3Davies represented Reed at the preliminary hearing. 

4Edwards represented Reed after the preliminary hearing until Reed 

assumed his own representation. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

3 

(0) I 947A .er. 
failed to identify any specific deficiencies in his petition which resulted 

from the alleged restrictions. We note that the petition was filed well 

before the relevant deadline and is replete with citations to authority and 

facts in the record. We conclude that the district court did not err by 

denying this claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing. 

Finally, Reed's claim that cumulative error warrants relief 

lacks merit because there were no errors to cumulate. 

Having concluded that no relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 5 

J. 

cc: Hon. Janet J. Berry, District Judge 

Max Reed, II 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

5We have reviewed all documents that appellant has submitted to 

the clerk of this court in this matter, and we conclude that no relief based 

upon those submissions is warranted. To the extent that appellant has 

raised any claims or facts in those documents that were not precisely 

presented in the proceedings below, we have declined to consider them in 

the first instance. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 4 

(0) 1947A e