Filed 2/27/23 Marriage of Pourmoradi CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of ANDREA

and JOHN POURMORADI.

__ ___________________________ ANDREA POURMORADI,

Appellant,

v.

JOHN POURMORADI,

Respondent. B308938 , B312579

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BD527978)

APPEAL S from a judgment and a postjudgment order of

the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark A. Juhas, Judge.

Appeal from judgment dismissed (B308938); p ostjudgment order

affirmed (B312579).

Gary J. Cohen

, Gary J. Cohen ; Benedon & Serlin, Gerald

M. Serlin and Kelly Riordan Horwitz for Appe llant.

Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Kirstin M. Ault,

Claudia Ribet ; Jaffe Family Law Group, Daniel J. Jaffe and

Sandra P. Mendell for Respondent.2 Andrea Pourmoradi appeals from a judgment and an order

entered in heavily litigated marital dissoluti on proceedings with

John Pourmoradi. 1 Andrea contends the family court improperly

sanctioned her by awarding John $700,000 in attorney fees and

costs under Family Code section 271. 2 That statute empowers

the court to impose attorney fees and costs as sanctions against

litigants whose conduct undermines the policy of promoting

settlement of litigation and cooperation of the litigants, and

increases litigation costs. ( § 271, subd. (a ).) Finding no abuse of

discretion, we affirm the sanctions order

. Because Andrea’s

appellate briefs do not present an argument as to why she

believes the family court erred in rendering its judgment, we

deem the appeal from the judgment abandoned and di smiss it on

that basis.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Overview

John and Andrea were married on January 15, 1989

, and

ha ve two children, now adults. The parties separated, and

Andrea petitioned for dissolution of their marriage in July 2010.

Judgment was entered dissolving the marriage in April 2017

with the family court reserving jurisdiction over all other issues,

mainly involving the division of property. Those issues were

litigated in January and February 2020.

1 A lthough Andrea Pourmoradi’s name was restored to
Andrea Schreiber by the April 14, 2017 status

- only judgment,
consistent with the family court proceedings, we use her prior
surname. As is customary, however, we generally refer to both
parties by their first names.

2 U ndesignated statutory references are to the Family

Code.3 The family court issued its final judgment on

September 10, 2020, confirming the rulings made in its

statement of decision, rejecting each of Andrea’s claims

, a nd

dividing the community property equally in kind. The court

reserved jurisdiction to consider later requests for support and

attorney fees, costs, and monetary sanctions.

On October 8, 2020, John sought an award of $2,114,229 in

attorney fees and costs under section 271. Andrea filed

opposition. Following a hearing, the family court awarded John

$700,000 in sanctions against Andrea.

Andrea appealed from the September 10, 2020 judgment

entered in the dissolution proceeding. She later appealed from

th e postjudgment order awarding section 271 sanctions to John.

We ordered the appeals consolidated.

II. Summary of Pertinent Property Issues

Andrea’s sole challenge on appeal is to the postjudgment

order imposing section 271 sanctions. Andrea is not conte sting

the factual findings in the family court’s statement of decision

concerning property issues, which included the results of related

federal court and superior court actions. We therefore

summarize only those findings of the 57

- page statement of

decis ion that pertain to John’s section 271 sanctions request,

Andrea’s opposition, or the court’s sanctions award, and/or

otherwise provide context for the issues on appeal.

A. FSGM

Apart from their family residence, the parties’ primary

asset was their 50 p ercent interest in Four Seasons General

Merchandise, Inc. (FSGM). The business was also their primary

source of income. FSGM imported mainly Chinese merchandise

to be sold to independent discount stores. FSGM’s 50 percent co

-4

owner was Behruz Gabbai (Gab bai). He was involved in every

aspect of FSGM, except purchasing and product safety, which

John oversaw. Andrea was not involved with the operation of

FSGM.

Due to global economic downturns, FSGM’s annual sales

declined from over $100 million to $24.4 m illion from 2006

through 2018. In 2013, Gabbai blocked the sale of FSGM to Point

Capital Partners. This was one of several actions Gabbai took to

destabilize FSGM until it ceased operations on June 15, 2018.

B. 2801 East Vernon LLC

The parties’ ownersh ip interest in FSGM included a 50

percent interest in two commercial buildings in Vernon. One of

them, 2801 East Vernon Avenue, housed FSGM’s headquarters,

showroom

, and warehouse.

In December 2009, at Gabbai’s urging and after meeting

with an attorney at Andrea’s direction, John, Andrea, and Gabbai

signed a grant deed transferring the 2801 Vernon property into

2801 East Vernon LLC. On the same day, John and Andrea

signed multiple loan documents identifying 2801 East Vernon

LLC as the borrower.

Disagreements with Gabbai led the parties in 2017 to

jointly retain attorneys to represent them in legal proceedings to

separate their interest from Gabbai’s interest in the two

commercial buildings in Vernon: a partition action and an

involuntary disso lution of 2801 East Vernon LLC. In response,

Gabbai sought to acquire the parties’ 50 percent ownership

interest of 2801 East Vernon LLC under Corporations Code

section 17707.3, subdivision (c), and appraisers were appointed.

John and Andrea unsuccessful ly requested an alternate valuation5

date. In 2019, the superior court accepted an appraisal that was

$1,425,000 below the stipulated market value.

The family court rejected Andrea’s claims, as unsupported

by the evidence, that she was unaware of the prop erty transfer to

the 2801 East Vernon LLC and that John should be charged with

the $1,425,000 difference in valuation and with rent and other

costs that Gabbai had failed to pay.

When the bill for the legal fees of the parties’ jointly

retained attorneys became due, Andrea refused to countersign

the wire transfer instructions for payment. As a result, the

parties lost a discount they would have received with timely

payment. Instead, the parties were obligated to pay interest on

the outstanding balance, w hich accrued until a court order

released funds from their joint accounts. In addition, Andrea

hired her own counsel, who, the family court found, interfered

with the litigation and allowed Gabbai to take advantage of the

parties’ conflicting positions.

C. DEA Investigation and Corporate Guilty Plea

In 2015, FSGM was federally charged with aiding and

abetting the operation of an unlicensed money transfer business

after the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) froze FSGM’s bank

accounts and conducted an investig ation. Pursuant to a plea

agreement, FSGM was placed on three years ’ probation and

forfeited $1,665,661.99. 3

John was in no way implicated in the offenses and was not

a party to the plea agreement. Andrea was never a target of the

DEA investigation.

3 T rial in this matter was delayed for years until the DEA
investigation and federal charges were resolved.6 I n 2016, Andrea retained counsel, who informed federal

prosecutors that John was “a fugitive from justice,” “had

purchased a home ” in Beverly Hills (a claim Andrea later

withdrew), and had hidden away “an additional $50

- 100 million.”

Andrea also provided p rosecutors with documents and accused

John of “ ‘ pure money laundering. ’ ”

Andrea’s counsel received thousands of pages of documents

from John’s counsel relating to the investigation. After entry of a

stipulated protective order, Andrea, nonetheless, tol d family

members and business people about the DEA investigation.

Andrea also filed a petition in federal district court seeking

25 percent of the funds that FSGM paid under the plea

agreement. Her petition was later dismissed on the federal

prosecut ors ’ motion.

The family court rejected Andrea’s claims that John should

be held responsible and compensate her for any amount of legal

fees and loss of funds incurred and paid by FSGM concerning the

DEA action and corporate guilty plea.

D

. Julie Oun Loans

J ulie Oun (Oun) was a buying agent for FSGM. She helped

John obtain merchandise from China. In 2006, Oun loaned

FSGM $8,680,477 toward the purchase of a Garfield Avenue

property in Paramount for a new FSGM headquarters. In 2009,

Oun loaned Andrea and Joh n $2,585,000 to pay off the existing

mortgage on their residence and replace it with a lower interest

loan.

The family court found there was no evidence the loans

were made with community funds funneled through John as

Andrea claimed. Instead, the evidence showed they were “real”

loans extended by and repaid to a third party; none of the repaid7

funds w as given to John. Accordingly, there was no community

interest in the fully repaid loans and, contrary to Andrea’s

assertion, no basis to charge John with repayments.

The family court rejected Andrea’s argument that under an

expanded view of In re Marriage of Pre ntis

- Margulis & Margulis

(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252 ( Margulis ), the burden of proof

should shift to John to disprove that Oun’s money was his. 4 The

court determined that even if it accepted Andrea’s novel

interpretation of Margulis

, the evidence did not support its

application to this case.

E. Morris Matloubian’s Alleged “Blackmail”

John and Andrea maintained bank accounts in Israel and

Switzerland that they failed to disclose in their tax filings and on

which they had not paid fed eral taxes.

Morris Matloubian (Matloubian) was FSGM’s

controller/CFO from 1992 through 2007, when he voluntarily

terminated his employment. Before leaving, Matloubian

purportedly threatened to disclose the existence of the foreign

bank accounts unless he were paid $1 million . Matloubian was

paid $900,000 and denied it was blackmail.

The family court agreed with Andrea’s contention that

Matloubian’s demand for payment had been “blackmail” but

found the evidence established the amount John paid was

$450,0 00, not the entire $900,000 as Andrea claimed. The court

4 I n Margulis, supra, 198 Cal.App. 4th at p age 1265, the
husband had exclusive control and management of the
community assets, and , as managing spouse, had the best
knowledge of where the assets and accounts were located. The
court shifted the burden of proof on the missing community
assets to the managing spouse. ( Id. at p. 1268.)8

rejected Andrea’s assertion that she was entitled to either an

offset or a reimbursement for John’s use of community funds to

pay the blackmail. The court found the payment benefited the

community equally by resolving threatened litigation and

protecting the community from “serious adverse consequences.” 5

The family court also found both parties were aware of,

participated in, and financially benefited from the foreign

accounts and their nondisclo sure to the U nited States

government. Nor did John breach any fiduciary duty to Andrea

regarding the payment. The court further found

, “[i]rrespective

of whether it was ‘blackmail,’ the payment to Matloubian does

not satisfy any statutory exception to th e general rule against

reimbursement of debts paid during marriage with community

funds.”

F. Demise of FSGM

O n January 24, 2018, Gabbai told John it was time to

dissolve FSGM. John so informed Andrea’s counsel.

Two days later, Andrea made demands under Corporations

Code section 800 that FSGM’s board of directors recover all

monies paid in connection with the DEA matter and all

repayments made by FSGM to Oun. Andrea threatened to file a

shareholder derivative suit against FSGM and a petition to have

the superior court take jurisdiction over the winding up of FSGM

if her demands were not met.

In February 2018, Andrea attended and was allowed to

vote at a FSGM’s shareholders and board of directors meeting.

5 J ohn and Andrea participated in the Internal Revenue
Service’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, which they

completed in 2013. They a lso paid over $2.3 million in back
taxes, penalties, and interest.9

The shareholders outvoted Andrea and agreed to b egin FSGM’s

voluntary dissolution. A certificate of Election to Wind Up and

Dissolve was filed with the California Secretary of State. Andrea

later failed in three attempts to have the superior court assume

jurisdiction over the dissolution and winding u p of FSGM.

In April 2018, Gabbai offered to acquire the parties’

interest in FSGM for $6.75 million and forwarded a proposed

stock purchase agreement for the acquisition. John urged

Andrea to accept the offer, explaining it would likely net the

parties m ore money than the proceeds from an auction. Andrea

did not consent to the terms of the proposed sale to Gabbai. She

made a counteroffer that he rejected. No further negotiations

occurred between them.

An auction of FSGM’s assets took place in May 2018

. Andrea refused to allow John to use community funds to bid on

FSGM’s assets to obtain a higher price for the community.

Between Gabbai and John, the winning bidder was Gabbai. He

acquired FSGM’s inventory for 63 percent of its cost, FSGM’s

intellectua l property for $900,000, and FSGM’s furniture,

fixtures, and equipment for $350,000.

One month later, FSGM ceased operations.

G. Alternate Valuation Date f or FSGM

The family court denied Andrea’s request that FSGM be

valued as of the parties’ 2010 separ ation date rather than as near

as practicable to the January 2020 trial under section 2552.

Andrea argued the precipitous decline in FSGM’s value over that

decade was due to John’s misconduct and mismanagement. The

court determined, however, that “Andrea failed to establish any

criminal, tortious, grossly negligent or even negligent conduct by

John resulting in a decline in value of FSGM.” The court found10

FSGM’s loss of value was caused by changes in the wholesale

discount business and international mark et forces

, not by John’s

actions.

III. Section 271 Sanctions

A. John’s Request for Sanctions

On October 8, 2020, John requested that $2,114,229 in

section 271 sanctions be imposed against Andrea for her failure

to cooperate in settlement negotiations bef ore and during trial

and her overlitigation of issues relating to property.

In support of his sanctions request, John described 13

settlement offers and two requests for counteroffers that he

communicated to Andrea in June 2014, following the collapse of

Point Capital Partners’ proposed purchase of FSGM, through

trial in July 2020. Of these, Andrea failed to respond to eight

offers and rejected four offers without making a counteroffer.

John also pointed to Andrea’s extensive collateral litigation

in sta te and federal court involving FSGM, which the family

court found harmed the community by forcing FSGM to spend

resources responding to the meritless suits rather than

distributing funds to the parties.

John enumerated other pretrial activities by Andrea that

were detrimental to the community, specifically, Andrea’s

(1) hiring of independent counsel to make false claims of John’s

involvement in criminal activity to federal prosecutors ; (2) refusal

to allow John to use community funds to bid on FSGM’s asset s at

auction to receive a higher price, and to consider Gabbai’s offer to

purchase FSGM assets for $6.75 million rather than have them

auctioned; (3) refusal to countersign the wire transfer

instructions to timely pay discounted attorney fees; and11

(4) insistence on retaining her own counsel for the 2801 East

Vernon LLC litigation, which ultimately benefited Gabbai.

John also argued Andrea made numerous claims that she

abandoned shortly before or during trial, after he had incurred

legal fees to defend against them: (1) Andrea abandoned in the

second month of trial her allegation that John had received

perquisite income from FSGM beginning January 10, 2 012 ;
(2) Andrea abandoned two and one

- half months before trial her

allegation that John breached his fiduciary duty by selling one of

the Vernon commercial building s at below market price even

though the sale was by a court

- appointed referee to the highest

bidder as the parties had agreed ; (3) Andrea claimed John

purchased a home on N orth Crescent Drive in Beverly Hills,

which he failed to disclose to Andrea. After receiving evidence

from John and title companies that her claim was not true,

Andrea failed to confirm to John that she was withdrawing it and

did not raise the claim at trial ; (4) Andrea alleged John had

forged her signature on various financial documents. In

discovery, however, Andrea admitted almost all of her signatures

were genuine. Otherw ise, as the family court found, Andrea was

aware of most of the transactions and had signed other related

documents. Andrea never asked for reimbursement for any

documents she did not sign, and the court found Andrea did not

suffer any economic harm from the signatures.

John further maintained he was compel l ed to prepare and

file requests for orders (RFO ’ s) for which he incurred litigation

costs after Andrea refused to agree to his reasonable requests.

For example: (1) Following their partition action, Andrea failed

to respond to John’s request that each of them be allowed to use

their respective share of the sale proceeds to acquire new12

property to avoid $2.6 million in taxes. Only after John filed an

RFO did Andrea stipulate to his request. (2) Andre a informed

John that one of her primary attorneys would be joining a law

firm started by an attorney who had previously represented

John. When John refused to waive the resulting conflict of

interest, Andrea insisted the attorney would continue to

represe nt her. Only after John filed an RFO seeking the

attorney’s disqualification did Andrea agree to no longer retain

the attorney.

B. Andrea’s Opposition to the Request

In her opposition to the request for sanctions, Andrea did

not deny John’s allegations. Instead, Andrea argued she should

not be sanctioned for (1) rejecting John’s unreasonable and one

sided settlement offers, and all of them ignored her primary

“colorable claims” ; (2) refusing to trust John, who “had cultivated

a life of perfi dy to mask decades of financial schemes.” According

to Andrea, “ H aving chosen to enter into years of illegal,

convoluted financial transactions with unsavory characters, John

flouted his duties of full, complete, and ongoing disclosures

, forcing Andrea to investigate his multifarious schemes.” Nor,

Andrea argued, should she be sanctioned for advancing “colorable

claims” concerning Oun’s loans, Matloubian’s blackmail payment,

the expanded application of Margulis

, supra , 198 Cal.App.4th

1252, and an alterna te valuation date of FSGM, or advancing

positions hinging on credibility findings of Oun’s and

Matloubian’s testimony. Lastly, Andrea maintained the

requested $2,114,229 amount would impose an unreasonable

financial burden on her

, contrary to section 271.13 C. Family Court’s Ruling on the Sanctions

Request

At a February 4, 2021 hearing, the parties stipulated to

proceed on a written record consisting of the declarations and

exhibits submitted by each party. Following argument by

counsel, the matter was submitted.

On March 10, 2021, the family court partially granted

John’s section 271 request for sanctions and ordered Andrea to

pay $700,000 rather than $2,114,229. The court calculated the

$700,000 award as one

- third of John’s attorney fees a nd costs

attributable to Andrea’s “unreasonable and unsupported

positions.” The court found “ this amount will not impose an

unreasonable financial hardship” on Andrea. The court stayed

payment until resolution of this appeal.

DISCUSSION

Andrea contends t he family court erred in imposing

$700,000 in attorney fees and costs as sanctions under section

271.

I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Section 271 provides: “ Notwithstanding any other

provision of this code, the court may base an award of attorney ’ s

fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or

attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote

settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of

litigation by encouraging cooperation between the par ties and

attorneys. An award of attorney ’s fees and costs pursuant to this

section is in the nature of a sanction

. ” ( § 271, subd. (a) .)

We review an award of section 271 sanctions for an abuse

of discretion. ( In re Marriage of Pearson (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th

218, 233; In re E.M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 828, 850.) The14

imposition of section 271 sanctions “will be upheld on appeal

unless the reviewing court, ‘considering all of the evidence viewed

most favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable

inferences in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the

order.’ ” ( In re E.M.

, at p. 850; In re M arriage of Greenberg (2011)

194 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1100 [the applicable standard of review is

highly deferential].)

II

. Family Court’s Ruling Imposing Section 271

Sanctions

In its four

- page minute order, the family court addressed

John’s claims that Andrea had failed to cooperate in settlement

negotiations and overlitigated issues related to property.

A. Failure t o Cooperate in Settlement

Negotiations

The family court acknowledged that Andrea “should not be

sanction ed simply because she did not settle the case.” The court

advised, however, that Andrea had an obligation to enter into

settlement negotiations and could not simply ignore John’s

repeated of

fers of settlement. ( Boblitt v. Boblitt (2010) 190

Cal.App.4th 603, 612 [“ ‘ The duty imposed by

. . . section 271

requires a party to a dissolution action to be cooperative and

work toward settlement of the litigation on pain of being required

to share th e party’s adversary’s litigation costs ’ ”]; see also

Nichols on v. Fazeli (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th1091

, 1102 [same];

Shenefield v. Shenefield (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 619, 627 [same].)

Andrea does not dispute that John made 13 settlement

offers and two requests for counteroffers. And o f these, Andrea

failed to respond to eight offers and rejected four offers without

making a counteroffer. The family court found b y not responding

“at all,” Andrea “failed to allow [ John] an opportunity to address15

her concerns and perhaps have a meaningful and fruitful

settlement discussion.” The court found “[t]here is no doubt that

some of [Andrea’s] actions frustrated the policy of the law for

settlement.” Andrea’s lack of cooper ation in settlement

negotiations both before and during trial supports the court’s

exercise of discretion.

B

. Over l itigation of Property I ssues

The family court made findings concerning Andrea’s

emotionally charged and meritless litigation of property issues.

The court found Andrea “allowed her distrust of [ John] to drive

her litigation strategy” and “cost both parties significant attorney

fees.” The court found Andrea adhered to positions supp orted by

her beliefs and feelings, rather than by the facts and evidence,

which “ultimately undermined her credibility.” The court

excerpted portions of Andrea’s written opposition to section 271

sanctions to show her use of “quite aggressive language to

overstate what the actual facts in the case are.” As examples, the

court quoted: “ ‘John sewed the tangled web of intrigue and

dissembling that swept up Andrea and sapped away years of her

lif e as she struggled to peel off stand (sic) after strand to reach

the source’ ” ; “ ‘John controlled those spheres by working

surreptitiously with a cast of characters to ping

- pong millions of

dollars throughout the globe in a yarn of impenetrable,

contradictory and untraceable transactions.’ ” The court found

these hyperbolic allegations in Andrea’s written opposition

typified those made at trial and led to protracted litigation. “It is

precisely [Andrea’s] distrust, when viewed through the filter of

overstatement and argument, that got the partie s where they are

in this matter. It is one thing to build a case on ‘I believe’ or ‘I16

think the facts will support’

, and altogether another thing to

build a case on evidence.”

The family court did not abuse its discretion in sanction ing

Andrea for pursuing clearly baseless and costly litigation.

F amily law l itigants who flout the policy of section 271 through

conduct that increases litigation costs are subject to imposition of

attorney fe es and costs as sanctions . ( In re Marriage of

Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1524; accord, In re

Marriage of Greenberg , supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1 100 ; see In

re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830

[ § 271 sanctions are appropriate where spouse’s motion s “were

reckless, baseless and frivolous” and “an abuse of the legal

system”]; In re Marriage of Quay (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 961, 970

[ § 271 sanctions are appropriate where a spouse’s “[t]aking an

unreasonable position” at trial “is something more than simply

taking a hard stand and aggressively litigating it ” ]; In re

M arriage of Burgard (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 74, 82 [husband’s

sanctionable con duct required wife to “respond to an unnecessary

motion, to write a brief, to research the law on motions for

reconsideration, [and] to appear at yet another hearing”]; Burkle

v. Burkle (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 387, 403, fn. 7 [ § 271 sanctions

are appropriat e where wife’s filing of “a separate civil action

which was bound to be dismissed and her conduct in doing so

necessarily caused litigation costs to increase and therefore

patently ” frustrated the policy of the statute]; In re Marriage of

Norton (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 53, 58 [ § 271 sanctions are
appropriate for frivolous or bad faith claims] .)

To be sure, family law proceedings, by their very nature,

lend themselves to distrust and lack of communication. ( In re

Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.Ap p.4th 1295, 1298.) Here,17

however, the family court found Andrea’s distrust of John “seeped

through this entire matter and cost both parties significant

attorney fees.”

III. Andrea’s Contentions on Appeal from the Order

A. No Finding John Acted in Good Faith

On appeal

, Andrea first contends because section 271

requires both parties to have engaged in conduct that promotes

settlement and reduces litigation costs, John was not entitled to

sanctions unless the family court found his settlement offers were

made in good faith. (See § 271, subd. (a).)

Andrea is correct t he statement of decision did not include

an express finding whether John made his settlement offers in

good faith

. Consistent with th e doctrine of implied findings,

however, we infer the family court found John’s offers were made

in good faith as supported by substantial evidence. 6 The record

does not indicate Andrea either objected or otherwise apprised

the court that the statement o f decision failed to address the

issue of John’s good faith

. Thus, invoking the doctrine of implied

findings, we presume the court made all factual findings in

support of its order, including a finding that John made good

faith settlement offers. And substantial evidence supports the

6 “T he doctrine of implied findings provides that a ‘party

must state any objection to the statement in order to avoid an implied finding on appeal in favor of the prevailing party.

. . . [I]f

a party does not bring such deficiencies to the trial court’s

atten tion, that party waives the right to claim on appeal that the

statement was deficient

. . . and hence the appellate court will
imply findings to support the judgment.’ ” ( Estate of O’Conn o r (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 159, 164 ; see also Fladeboe v. American

Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.)18

implied finding. In his writ ten request for section 271 sanctions

, John a sserted he “made good

- faith efforts to settle, which Andrea

rejected.” John submitted supporting declarations from himself

and his counsel, which detailed the parties’ history of settlement

negotiations.

B. Andrea Cooperated by Making Stipulations

Andrea also contends she substantially cooperated in

settlement by making stipulations. However, as John stated in

his request for sanctions, the record shows a number of Andrea’s

stipulations were in response to his having sought or successfully

obtained an RFO, or her stipulations ultimately caused John to

seek an RFO, all which led to unn ecessary delay and litigation

expenses. ( In re Marriage of Tharp, supra , 188 Cal.App.4th at p.

1317 [ § 271 sanctions are appropriate “ whenever a party ’ s
dilatory and uncooperative conduct ” frustrates the statute’s

policy]; In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205,

1227 [“ s anctions under section 271 are justified when a party has

unreasonably increased the cost of litigation”].)

C. Andrea Should Not Be Sanctioned for

Litigating Leg al Positions that Are

Nonfrivolous or Turn o n Witness Credibility

Andrea contends, as she did before the family court, that

she “ was entitled to pursue reasonable extensions of the law and

positions that could have been decided in her favor had the

[ family ] court made different credibility determinations

. ” In

addition, Andrea points to the recent decision of Featherstone v.

Martine z (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 775 ( Featherstone ), in which our

colleagues in Division Five reversed section 271 sanctions

imposed by a family court, in part because a mother in a child19

custody dispute took litigation positions with which the court

disagreed. 7 ( Id. at pp. 777, 785.)

We agree with Andr ea’s assertion that she should not be

sanctioned for litigating legal positions that are nonfrivolous or

turn on witness credibility. 8 But that is not what happened here.

In its statement of decision, the family court expressly agreed

with Andrea’s cont ention in her opposition that she should not be

sanctioned for seeking to expand the law of Margulis

, supra
, 198

Cal.App.4th 1252. The court then explained that, based on its

factual findings, John would have prevailed even if he had been

charged with carrying the burden of proof as urged by Andrea.

The family court also agreed with Andrea’s assertion that

many of her trial position s hinged on a credibility finding

— one of

which, the court noted, was Andrea’s position that Matloubian’s

payment constituted “blackmail.” This was an issue “that

depended on credibility, and presumably could have gone either

way.” The court also found, h owever, that “many” of Andrea’s

positions “were simply not supported regardless of witness

credibility

. ”

In Featherstone , t he family court’s grounds for imposing

$10,000 sanctions included: (1) The mother’s early declarations

in the case; (2) the mother’s Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1

7 W e denied Andrea’s request to file supplemental briefing

on this decision.

8 W e find it troubling that in asking us to infer, rather than
claiming outright, the family court sanctioned her for pursuing

reasonable extensions of the law and positions turning on credibility, Andrea parses the statement of decision to misleadingly sugge st ambiguities and contradictions where none
exist s

.20

motion to disqualify the judge for bias; (3) the mother’s proposed

judgment; and (4) the mother’s request that the father’s video

calls with their child “ take place on Zoom only.” ( Featherstone

,

supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 784.)

In concluding the family court’s imposition of section 271

sanctions was an abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal

explained : “ Threaded throughout the court ’s recitation were

(1) the court ’ s characterizations of Mother ’ s requests as ‘ entitled, ’

‘ controlling, ’ and ‘ overreaching, ’ and (2) its own umbrage at being

accused of bias and being the subject of a disqualification motion.

Individually or collectively, this is not litigation behavior that a

judge, staying within the bounds of reason, could conclude

merited sanctions at all

— much less a $20,000 sanctions award (if

we count the improper amount assessed against counsel too). ”

( Featherstone, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p p. 784

– 785 .)

The Court of Appeal also faulted the famil y court for using

its characterization of the mother’s “controlling ‘mindset’ ” and

her requests in her declarations for Zoom video calls to justify

sanctions. This was improper because the court “ was principally

sanctioning Mother not for taking actions that frustrated

settlement efforts but for taking litigation positions with which

the court disagreed. ” ( Featherstone, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p.

785.) The C ourt of Appeal also concluded the errors in the

mother’s proposed judgment were not sign ificant to warrant

sanctions and the family court itself had previously encouraged

the parties to video

- record each other. ( Id. at p. 785 & fn. 7.)

We discern no similarities between the instant case and

Featherstone . The record before us contains no hint of judicial

bias, and nothing in the statement of decision suggests the family

court imposed section 271 sanctions because it disagreed with21

Andrea’s litigation positions. Rather, as discussed, Andrea was

sanctione d for conduct that discouraged settlement, needlessly

lengthened court proceedings, and increased litigation costs

. D. Family Court Erred by Imposing Sanctions

Without Evidence of John’s Income, Assets, and

Liabilities

Andrea contends the family court abused its discretion by

imposing sanctions without having John submit an updated

income and expense declaration or similar financial information,

thereby contravening section 271’s directive that “ the court shall

take into consideration all evidence concerning the parties ’

incomes, assets, and liabilities. ” 9 ( § 271, subd. (a).) This is an

issue of first impression.

Andrea’s contention rests on two grounds: (1) Section 271

requires such evidence; and (2) if a court obtains current financial

information from both parties, it can “scale” a sanctions award to

their comparative wealth so as not to discourage an economically

weaker party, like Andrea, from vigorously pursuing future

litigation, citing In re Marriage of Norton

, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d

at p. 60.)

9 T his issue arose during the section 271 sanctions hearing
when Andrea’s counsel argued John had to file a current income
and expense declaration before the family court could award him

sanctions. John ’s counsel opposed the reque st, arguing it was
contrary to the existing state of the law, but offered to provide the

court with John’s current financial condition. The court
answered that was unnecessary and took the matter of sanctions

under submission.22 Our interpretation of the language of section 271 “is an

issue of law, which we review de novo.” ( United Riggers &

Erectors v. Coast Iron & Steel Co. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1082, 1089.)

“ The fundamental task of statutory construction is to

ascertain legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the

law. ” ( People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 611.) In doing

so, a court should look to the plain meaning of the statutory

language. ( Ibid. ) Where the intent is clear from the language

itself, the court will not look beyond the plain meaning.

( Stephens v. County of Tulare (2006) 38 Cal.4th 793, 802.) In

other words, when the words are unambiguous, a court presumes

the legislators meant what they said.

Further, a court may not, “ ‘ under the guise of statutory

construction, “ rewrite the law or give the words an effect different

from the plain and direct import of the terms used. ” ’ ”

( California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State of California

(2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 849, 858.) Nor may a court add to or alter

the statute’s words “ ‘ “to accomplish a purp ose that does not

appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” ’ ”

( In re Marriage of Siller (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 36, 43 .) This

would violate “ ‘ the cardinal rule of statutory construction that

courts must not add provisions to st atutes. [Citations.] This rule

has been codified in California as [Code of Civil Procedure]

section 1858, which provides that a court must not “ insert what

has been omitted ” from a statute. ’ ” ( People v. Guzman (2005) 35

Cal.4th 577, 587.) Further, a court shall “ give effect to all words

and provisions of a statute and leave no part superfluous or

inoperative. ” ( Leavitt v. County of Madera ( 2004) 123

Cal.App.4th 1502, 1519.)23 Turning to the relevant language of the statute, section

271, subdivision (a) states: “ In making an award pursuant to this

section, the court shall take into consideration all evidence

concerning the parties ’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The court

shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes

an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the

sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this

section, the party r equesting an award of attorne y’ s fees and

costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the

award. ” ( Italics added.)

In interpreting section 271, we apply the rules of statutory

construction and “give effect to all words and provisions” with out

“insert[ing] what has been omitted. ” The plain meaning of

section 271, subdivision (a) is clear; it is unambiguous. It directs

the family court to consider “all evidence concerning the parties’

incomes, assets, and liabilities.” But the statute also expressly

omits the usual requirement that a party requesting an award of

attorney fees and costs must establish a financial need for the

award or financial disparity between the parties. (Compare

§§ 2030, 2032, 3557, 7605.) Certainly, the family court has

discretion to ask or order the requesting party to provide

financial information, in the belief such information would be

helpful or relevant. The requesting party may also seek to

provide financial information, as John did, or simply file an

income and expense declaration to avoid the risk of an adverse

ruling.

Thus, contrary to Andrea’s contention, we do not interpret

section 271 as requiring the requesting party to provide a current

income and expense declaration or similar financia l information.

The requesting party may be asked by the family court or may24

choose to submit the evidence for the court’s consideration. But

there is no statutory obligation for the requesting party to do so

before the court can consider ordering sanctio ns.

While section 271 is not need

- based, we do agree with

Andrea that in certain instances, b y comparing the parties ’

relative wealth, a family court avoids discouraging the less

af fluent party from vigorously litigating claims and defenses for

fear of incurring excessive sanctions. ( In re Marriage of Norton,

supra
, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 59 .) This is not one of those

instances. The record fails to show Andrea is significantly less

affluent than John. Indeed, Andrea does not argue the court was

unfamiliar with her financial condition or that payment of a
$700,000 sanction will cause her unreasonable financial

hardship.

The family court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning

Andrea in the amount of $700,000.

IV. Appeal from the Judgment I s Deemed Abandoned

“ ‘An appealed

- from judgment or order is presumed correct.

[Citation.] Hence, the appellant must make a challenge. In so
doing, he must raise claims of reversible error or other defect

[citation]

, and “prese nt argument and authority on each point

made [citations]

. If he does not, he may, in the court’s discretion,

be deemed to have abandoned his appeal

. [Citation.] In that

event, it may order dismissal.’ ” ( Conservatorship of Ben C.

(2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 544, fn. 8; see also Berger v. Godden (1985)

163 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1119 [“failure of an appellant in a civil

action to articulate any pertinent or intelligible legal argument in

an opening brief may, in the discretion of the court, b e deemed an

abandonment of the appeal justifying dismissal”]; Bauer v.
Merigan (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 769, 771 [contemplated appeal25

may be deemed abandoned if not pursued].) Because Andre a ’s

appellate briefs lack any argument that the family court erred in

rendering its judgment, we exercise our discretion to dismiss her

appeal from the judgment as abandoned.

DISPOSITION

The order entered pursuant to Family Code section 271 is

affirmed. The appeal from the judgment is dismissed.

Respondent John Pourmoradi is awarded his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

ASHMANN

- GERST, J.

CHAVEZ, J.