alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM GOLDEN BEAR
GOLF, INC.'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996, AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                      23,459,008
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                6,920,266
<ALLOWANCES>                                   503,778
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            32,841,636
<PP&E>                                      16,929,468
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,766,942
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              50,911,202
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        7,844,068
<BONDS>                                      4,855,448
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        54,890
<OTHER-SE>                                  38,156,796
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                50,911,202
<SALES>                                     13,654,879
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            22,652,852
<CGS>                                       11,298,458
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               19,053,835
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,955,405
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              93,569
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,222,071)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   213,368
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,435,439)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,435,439)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.68)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.68)
        

</TABLE>
# ***Exhibit 32***

# * *

# ***CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906***

***OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002***

 

Pursuant to 18U.S.C.  1350, we the undersigned ChiefExecutive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, respectively, of Canterbury ParkHolding Corporation (the “Company”), hereby certify that:

 

(1)                   TheAnnual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31,2005, (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

 

(2)                   Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
| Date: March 29, 2006 | /s/ Randall D. Sampson                 |   |
|----------------------|----------------------------------------|--------|
|                 | Randall D. Sampson,                    |   |
|                 | President, and Chief Executive Officer |   |
|                 | Canterbury Park Holding Corporation    |   |
|                      |                                        |        |  |

 
| Date: March 29, 2006 | /s/ David C. Hansen                         |   |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------|
|                 | David C. Hansen,                            |
|                 | Vice President, and Chief Financial Officer |
|                 | Canterbury Park Holding Corporation         |

 

----
* Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

* * Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For the Fifth Circuit

No. 99-30415

KENNETH J. NICOLOSI, SR., MARGARET NICOLOSI, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

VERSUS
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, erroneously sued as State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

98-CV-3160-D March 9, 2000 Before DAVIS, CYNTHIA HOLCOMB HALL * and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: ** Afte r reviewing the record and considering the briefs and arguments of counsel, the judgment of the district court is affirmed essentially for the reasons stated in its thorough Minute Entry of March 8, 1999.
AFFIRMED.
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**


**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 USC, SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906**


**OF
      THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Annual Report of Renhuang Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the
“Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended October 31, 2007, as filed with the
      Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the “Report”),
      I, Li Shaoming, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to
      18
      U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
      of
      2002, that:





(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)  Information
      contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
      condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:
                May 23, 2008
            /s/
                Li ShaomingBy:
                Li ShaomingIts:
                Chief Executive Officer




A
      signed
      original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
      to
      Renhuang Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and will be retained by Renhuang Pharmaceuticals,
      Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
      request.
Exhibit 32.1
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the  quarterly  report on Form 10-QSB of Appian,  Inc. (the
"Company") for the quarter ended September 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and  Exchange  Commission  on the  date  hereof  (the  "Report"),  I, F.  Briton
McConkie,  Principal Executive Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted  pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

/s/ F. Briton McConkie, Jr.
-----------------------------
F. Briton McConkie, Jr.
President, Director
(Principal Executive Officer)
November 19, 2004
#### Ralph Somma et al., Appellants, v Inge Wehrle, Respondent.

[666 NYS2d 17]

—In an action, *inter alia,*for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real property, the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kitson, J.), dated August 29, 1996, as, upon granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, awarded the defendant costs in the sum of $3,600 and imposed sanctions upon the plaintiffs in the sum of $1,500.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

At issue on this appeal is the propriety of an award of costs and sanctions which were imposed against the plaintiffs for bringing the instant action which was primarily for specific performance of a purported contract for the sale of real property and for filing a notice of pendency against the subject real property.

We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination that the writing, which the plaintiffs contended constituted a complete, enforceable agreement, was devoid of the “essential terms of any purchase/sale agreement” and that it therefore was not a valid contract subject to specific performance. The record further supports the court’s finding that the plaintiff Ralph Somma, an attorney at law who brought this lawsuit on behalf of himself and as counsel to the plaintiff Messena Somma, had acknowledged that these “essential terms” must be included in such a contract.

These facts, and other matter contained in the record support the ultimate conclusion that the commencement of this action was, among other things, without merit and that this constituted “frivolous conduct” within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.

Further, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ assertions to the contrary, they were not denied an opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of costs and sanctions (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [d]; *see, Matter of Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Prot. Dutch Church v 198 Broadway,*76 NY2d 411, 413).

*285The costs awarded to the defendant and the sanctions imposed against the plaintiffs were appropriate in all respects *(see, Matter of Williams v Williams,*215 AD2d 980, 981-982). Rosenblatt, J. P., Miller, Copertino and Goldstein, JJ., concur.
#### State Farm Insurance Companies, Respondent, v Joseph J. DeSarbo, Jr., Appellant.

[859 NYS2d 312]

Lahtinen, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ferradino, J.), entered June 8, 2007 in Saratoga County, which granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.

The underlying facts in this dispute about underinsurance coverage are set forth in our earlier decision where we reversed a stay of arbitration that had been granted to plaintiff upon the ground that plaintiff’s application for the stay had been untimely *(Matter of State Farm Ins. Cos. [DeSarbo],*36 AD3d *9371193 [2007]). While that appeal was pending, plaintiff commenced this declaratory judgment action contending that coverage was vitiated by defendant failing to cooperate and providing false information to plaintiff. Shortly after plaintiff moved for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action, our decision reversing the granting of a stay was handed down. Supreme Court, noting that our decision did not address the issues raised in plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action, granted plaintiffs motion. Defendant appeals.

Under CPLR article 75, *“a*court may involve itself in the arbitration process within the first 20 days ... or following the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding,” but “[t]here exists no authority for a court to become involved . . . between these periods” *(Matter of Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. [Miller],*95 AD2d 961, 961 [1983]; *see Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Olsen,*222 AD2d 579, 580 [1995]). “[W]here the parties have entered into an agreement to arbitrate their disputes, and the party desiring arbitration has served a proper notice of intention to arbitrate, the party seeking to avoid arbitration on the ground that the agreement is invalid or has not been complied with, must, under the statute’s clear language, seek a stay of arbitration within 20 days of service” *(Matter of Matarasso [Continental Cas. Co.],*56 NY2d 264, 267 [1982]). While a limited exception to the 20-day time frame applies when a party asserts there never was an agreement to arbitrate *(see id.),*challenges regarding, among other things, the scope of an agreement or compliance with the terms of an agreement are precluded if asserted outside the 20-day period *(see Matter of Steck [State Farm Ins. Co.],*89 NY2d 1082, 1084 [1996]; *Matter of Colonial Coop. Ins. Co. [Muehlbauer],*46 AD3d 1012,1013 [2007]; *Allstate Indem. Co. v Fernandez,*288 AD2d 42, 43 [2001]).

Here, a valid agreement to arbitrate underinsurance claims exists under the policy. The issue of defendant’s compliance with terms of that agreement had to be raised by seeking a stay within 20 days of service of the intent to arbitrate. We have previously held that plaintiff failed to properly seek a stay within 20 days. Plaintiff cannot now circumvent the arbitration requirements by asserting in a declaratory judgment action an issue it failed to assert in a timely fashion when faced with a demand for arbitration.

Peters, J.R, Rose, Kane and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and motion denied.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

September 21, 2011 

p0914 

Order 

 

September 21, 2011 

141708 & (164) 

 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 141708 

 COA: 247391 

Jackson CC: 02-002915-FC 

KATHERINE SUE DENDEL a/k/a 

KATHERINE SUE BURLEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 The motion to expedite the application is GRANTED. By order of February 4, 

2011, the application for leave to appeal the August 24, 2010 judgment of the Court of 

Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in People v Bryant, 483 Mich 132 

(2009), cert gtd ___ US ___; 130 S Ct 1685; 176 L Ed 2d 179 (2010). On order of the 

Court, the case having been decided on April 18, 2011, Michigan v Bryant, ___ US ___; 

131 S Ct 1143; 179 L Ed 2d 93 (2011), the application is again considered, and it is 

DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed 

by this Court. 

 MARILYN KELLY, J., would grant leave to appeal.
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Lindsey Wayne Trueblood

, * From the 42nd District

Court of Taylor County,

Trial Court No. 25706A

.

Vs. No. 11

- 14

- 00074

- CR * April 24, 2014

T he State of Texas, * Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J. , and Bailey, J. )

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that the appeal

should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction . Therefore, in accordance with this

court ’ s opinion, the appeal is dismissed.
September 8, 1970

Hon. J. H. Kultgen Chairman, Board of Regents Texas State Technical Institute Waco, Texas 76705

Dear Mr. Kultgen: Opinion No. M-681 Re: Construction of a rider to the approp$iation to the Texas State Technical Institute concerning income derived from the sale, lease or other use of theAmarillo Air Force Base facilities.
Your request for an opinion on the above subject matter asks the following question:

"Should the term 'all income' in the second full paragraph onpage 73 ofArticle IV ofH.B. 2, Acts of the 61st Legislature, Second Called Session, 1969, be interpreted as 'net income' after reasonable and necessary expenditures are made?" House Bill 2,Acts 61st Legislature, 2nd C.S. 1969,p. 957, Ch. 50, (GeneralAppropriation Act for thebiennium ending August 31, 1971), contains the following rider to the appropriation toTexas State Technical Institute onpage IV-74:

"~11 income derived from the sale, lease or other use of theAmarillo Air Force Base facilities shall be deposited to theGeneral Revenue Fund until the amount of such deposits shall total Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000). Appropriations to the Institute

-3255-- ,

Hon. J. H.Kultqen, page 2 (M-681)

arehereby made contingent upon adherence to such procedure. Provided however, that this shall not inanypreclude orprevent theuse ofTexas State Technical Institute facilities or equipment for in-kindmatching forparticipation inany Federal Vocational Programs permitting or recognizing in-kind matching by or onbehalf ofTexas State Technical Institute." The term "income"means gain derived from labor, from capital, or fromboth combined, including profit gained through sale or conversion of capital. See cases cited inWords and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Income -Gain or Profit, pages 218-231. With reference to the income realized from the sale, lease or other use of theAmarillo Air Force Base properties, we are of the opinion that the legislative requirement for the return of "all income" refers to all funds received over and above the direct, reasonable andnecessary costs attributable to theproduction of such income. SUMMARY

As used in the appropriation rider for the Texas State Technical Institute, the term "all income" refers to all funds received over and above thedirect, reasonable and necessary costs attributable to theproduction of such income. Y svery truly,

Attogey General of Texas Prepared by Malcolm L. Quick Assistant Attorney General

-3256-Hon. J. H.Kultqen, page 3 (M-681)

APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE Kerns Taylor, Chairman W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman Tom Bullington Bob Flowers Lehman Marks Pat Cain MEADE F. GRIFFIN Staff LegalAssistant ALFRED WALKER Executive Assistant NOLA WHITE First Assistant

-3257-
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000927388
<NAME> BGLS INC
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                           7,396
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   15,160
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     36,316
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               122,188
<PP&E>                                          93,481
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 227,396
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          304,516
<BONDS>                                        240,475
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                    (430,702)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   227,396
<SALES>                                        444,566
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               444,566
<CGS>                                          200,996
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  200,996
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                27,589
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              84,194
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (37,255)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (59,613)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             22,358
<DISCONTINUED>                                   3,208
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    25,566
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS

	SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	FORT WORTH

	NO. 2-05-183429-CV

IN RE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILYInN rReE GlLeEnNnN HaArRrRiIsSoOnN aAnNdD MaArRaA HaArRrRiIsSoOnN	RELATORS

AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES

	------------

	ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

	------------

	MEMORANDUM OPINION1

	------------

	The court has considered relator's’ petition for writ of mandamus and motion for emergency relief and is of the opinion that relief should be denied.  Accordingly, relator's’ petition for writ of mandamus and motion for emergency relief areis denied.

	Relator shall pay all costs of this original proceeding, for which let execution issue.

								PER CURIAM

PANEL A:	lLIVINGSTONGARDNER, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and WALKER, J.; CAYCE, C.J.; and HOLMAN, J.

HOLMAN, WALKER, J. , not partiCIcipatingNOwould request a response.

DELIVERED: December 12, 2005May 24, 2005
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed February 3, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ Nos. 3D20-1093 & 3D20-1130 Lower Tribunal No. 18-41945

________________ 

### Milagros Rodriguez and Rodolfo Rodriguez,

Appellants, vs. 

### Griselda Stanfield, et al.,

Appellees. Appeals under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.315(a) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Alan S. Fine, Judge. Milagros Rodriguez, and Rodolfo Rodriguez, in proper persons. Walter J. Harvey, School Board Attorney, and Jeff James, Assistant School Board Attorney; and Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Benjamin D. Simon, Assistant County Attorney, for appellees. Before LOGUE, SCALES, and MILLER, JJ. PER CURIAM.2

Affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Sylvester Loving, Appellant.

[670 NYS2d 121]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Paño Z. Patsalos, J.), rendered December 11, 1995, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, without a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

That branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress drugs and a weapon recovered from his vehicle was properly denied without a hearing because his supporting affidavit, and his counsel’s supporting affidavit, were conclusory and failed to assert sufficient facts to warrant such a hearing *(see, e.g., People v Mendoza,*82 NY2d 415, 430; *People v Nazario,*220 AD2d 695; CPL 710.60 [3]). None of the allegations in these affidavits refuted the People’s detailed account of various police officers’ investigation and surveillance of the defendant, which ultimately led to the stop of his automobile based upon probable cause that he was engaged in transporting illegal drugs from New York City to Newburgh *(see, e.g., People v Murray,*172 AD2d 437; *People v Mendoza, supra,*at 430, 431; *People v Knickerbocker,*230 AD2d 753; *People v Smith,*212 AD2d 552; *People v Chavous,*204 AD2d 475; *People v Hightower,*206 AD2d 253, *mod*85 NY2d 988). Santucci, J. P., Joy, Friedmann and Luciano, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard V. Bedford, Appellant.

[858 NYS2d 643]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (David D. Egan, J.), rendered February 14, 2004. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a nonjury verdict, of manslaughter in the first degree.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him following a nonjury trial of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]) in connection with the stabbing death of an acquaintance after a dispute arose between defendant and his friends and the victim and his friends. Contrary to defendant’s contentions, the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see generally People v Danielson,*9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]; *People v Bleakley,*69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]), and the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. Present—Scudder, P.J., Hurlbutt, Centra, Fahey and Peradotto, JJ.