### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 20, 200 5 ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v . S TE V EN BR A D LE Y HE F LI N
Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty

No. 2000-C- 1768 Steve D ozier , Judge

No. M2004- 02680-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Septem ber 28, 2005

Th e de fe nd a nt, Ste ve n B ra dle y He fl in, wa s orig ina lly ind ic te d fo r a g g ra vate d a ssa ult wi th a de a dly wea pon, a Class C felony . The de fendant entere d an open ple a of g uiltyto re ck l ess ag g ravated assault with a dea dly

wea pon, a Class D felony , pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 39- 13 -1 02 (a )( 2) (B ), a s a

Ra ng e I , s ta nd ardof

fe nd e r. The defe nd ant wa s se nte nc e d to fo ur y e ars , to serve nine months with the rema inder on probation. The defe ndant now appe al s t h e s entence, contending that certain enhanc ement factors were applied i n err or and that one mitigating fac tor was imp ro pe rl y

re je c te d. Af

te r r e vie w, we re ma ndthe c aus e to m od if y the se nte nc e to th ree y e ars , to serve nine months and the re mainder on pr obation. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt R em anded for Modif ication of S entence
J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., d el i v er ed the opinion of the c ourt, in which A L AN E. G L EN N and R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined. Ross E. Alderman, District Public Def ender ; J eff

rey A. DeVa sher ( on appea l) and Richar d Tenne nt (at trial) , Assistant Publ ic Def ender s, for the a

ppellant, Steven B radle y

Hef lin.
Paul G. Sum me rs , Attorne y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; B e njamin A. B a ll, As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Vi ctor S. (Torry ) Johns on, I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and James F. Todd and Tammy Meade , Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
.

OP IN ION During the plea c olloquy , the S tate sum marized the factual basis for the ple a in the following manner : Assistant A ttorney Gene ral: Had this matter g one to trial, the Sta t e’ s witnesses would testify

that on April the 6th o f 1999, Officer Steven Duncan was dis patc he d to t he area of M ill wo odDrive a ndMu rf re e sb or o Ro a d h e re inT h e di s pos i t i on w as a pl ea t o r ec k l es s a ggravat ed as s au l t w i t h a de adl y w ea pon , u n der T en n es s ee Code 1 A n n o ta te d se c tio n 3 9 -1 3 -1 0 2 (a )( 2 )( B ), a s a R a n g e I, sta n d a rd o ff e n d e r. -2- Nashville, Da vidson County

. He arrived at that are a, was waiting for ba ckup. Whil e he w as wa iting for backup, the defe ndant walke d u p t o h is marked police cr uiser and kic ked it. The suspec t y elled, come on, mother [ex pletive de le te d]. A t th a t ti me , h e y e lle d at th e of fi c e r, he pu lle d u p h is s hirt, exposi ng a lar g e knife

. Of fi ce r Duncan exit ed the police vehicle. T he defe ndant t hen pull ed the knife from his belt area . Offic er D uncan or dere d the def endant to drop that knife. Of fice r Dunc an then be g an re treating to the rea r of his vehic le. The de fendant then advanc ed towar d Offic er D uncan stating, mother

[ex pletive d eleted], kill me, I want to die. Of

fice r Dunc an retre ated a g ain to the passeng er side of his cruiser. T he def

endant a dvance d ag ain. At that time, O ffice r Dunca n fired one shot from - - f ired one shot at the de fe nd a nt, hittin g him in the low e r right abd ome n. Al l th e e ve nts oc c ur re d h ere in David so n Co un ty . B a se d o n th os e fa c ts, the State rec ommends the previously announce d dispositi on. 1 Testimony

at the sente ncing hearing w as hea rd fr o m t h e victim, the def endant, the defe ndant’s father, a nd Mary Ann Hea , a licensed clinical socia l worker . The trial c ourt also had a va ila ble fo r i ts c on sid e ratio n th e pr e se nte nc e re po rt a ndarg ume nts of

c ou ns e l.
Steven Duncan, the offic er- victim, described how the def endant, a rmed with a larg e knife , advanc ed on him and re peate dly pleade d for Dunca n to shoot and kill him. Although the defe ndant never lunge d at Off

icer Dunca n, he ig nored the office r’s de mands to surrende r the we apon and ke pt advanc ing until Offic er Dunca n felt compelled to shoot him. The victim said that this ex perie nce bo thered him

e motion a lly

the n a ndthat it

bo the re d h im t o r e liv e the e xpe ri e nc e thr ou g h h is t es t i m o n y att h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g. The de fendant, who was seve nteen at the time of the off ense, testified that he wa s suffering from depr ession and sui cidal thoughts at t hat t ime. He related an unusual childhood that included his parents’ divor ce w hen he w as t en. He de scribed his mother a s confined to a whee lchair and as a very devout per son, even “ somewhat fanatical.” The mother vie wed the de fendant’s homosex ual fathe r a s th e “ ro ot o f al l evi l.” Th e de fe nd a nt’ s mo the r h a d s e nt the de fe nd a nt t o li ve wi th a c ou sin in Bilox i, Missi ssippi. W hen the de fendant returne d, he lived with his father and the father’s pa rtner, whom the def

endant de scribed a s alcoholic a nd prone to e x posing his g enitals in the home.
The de fendant underwe nt two weeks of unconsciousness a nd the nea r loss of his right leg due to the s h o o ti n g
. H e r e c e iv e d p s y c h o lo g ic a l c o u n s e li n g a t V a n d e r b il t an d to o k

a n ti d e p r e s sant me dic a tio ns fo r fi ve to six mon ths

. Sin c e the of fe ns e , the de fe nd a nt ha s be e n able to h old e mpl oyme nt a nd wa s e lig ibl e to e nte r Pizza Hu t ma na g e me nt tr a ini ng be fo re dis c ov ery of h is outstanding c harg es wa s made.-3-

Steven Ly nn Hef

lin, the defe ndant’s father, is blind and suffe rs from de g ener ative spine dis e a se . H e liv e s a lon e in N a sh vil le in a on e-be droo m apa rt me nt. Hi s so le inc ome is a dis abil ity chec k. He testified that the defe ndant could re side with him on his release. Mary An n H e a , a

li c e n s e d c li n ic a l s o c ia l w o rk e r inth e Pu b li c D e f

e n d e r ’ s o f

f ic e , te s ti fied conce rning her me eting s with the defendant and a review of his psy cholog ical re cords. She state d that the def

endant’ s rec ords ref

lected that he wa s suffering f rom major depr ession at the time of the offe nse. Ms. Hea

did not observe a ny

sy mptoms of depression by the defe ndant at the prese nt but rec ommended further individual counseling for r efe rra l to psy chiatric counseling if nee ded.
After the sentenc ing hearing, the trial court f ound the following four statutory enhanc ement fac tors to be applica

ble: (1) The de fendant has a pre vious historyof criminal conviction s or criminal behavior in addition to thos e nec essary to establish t h e appropriate r ang e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(2)

. (2 ) Th e pe rs on a l in

jurie s in fl ic te d u pon the v ic tim [we re ] part ic ula

rl y g re a t. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(7)

. (3 ) Th e de fe nd a nt h a d n o h e sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt ing a

c ri me wh e n th e ri sk

to human life wa s high. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 114(11). (4) The victim of the a g g ravated assault wa s a law e nforc ement off i ce r. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 102(d)( 1).
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

app lie d th e fo llo wi ng statut ory mit ig a tin g fa c tor s: (1 ) Th e de fe nd a nt w a s su ff e ri ng fr om a

me nta l . . . c on dit io n tha t si g nif ic a ntl y reduc ed the de fendant’s culpability for the offe nse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113(8)

. (2) The de fendant, although g uiltyof the c rime, committed the offe nse under su c h u nu su a l c ir c ums ta nc e s th a t it is un lik e ly that a su staine d in te nt t o v iol a te the law motivated his conduc t. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113(11)

. The de fendant, in challeng ing his sente nce, a lleg es that the trial c ourt err ed in applying the fi rs t th re e e nu me rate d e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor s a nde rr e d inpla c ing “ g re a t w e ig ht” on the fo urth enhanc ement fac tor. The defe ndant also ar g ues that, in eff ect, no we ight wa s g iven the enume rate d applicable mitigating fac tors and that an a dditional factor, that due to the def endant’ s y outh he lacke d substantial judg me n t, T e n n e s s e eCo d eA n n o ta te d s e c ti o n4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 3 ( 6 ) , was inappr opriately reje cted.
Th e State c on c e de s th a t e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor (1 1) , th e de fe nda nt’ s a c tio ns c aus e d h ig h risk to huma n life, was applied in e rror
. Howeve r, the State points out that only minimal we ight wa s g iven this factor by the trial court. The State maintains that, eve n afte r excluding e nhance ment fac tor (11), the se ntence imposed is just ified by the re cord.
This c ourt’s re view of the sentenc e imposed by the trial court is de novo with a presumption of cor rec tness. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401(d) . This presumption is conditioned upon an-4-

a ff ir ma tive sh ow ing in the re c or d th a t th e tr ia l ju dg e c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing princ ipl e s a nda ll rele vant fa cts and c ircumst an ce s
. State v. Pettus, 986 S .W.2d 540, 543 (Tenn. 1999). I f the trial court fails to complywith the statutory direct i v es , t here is no presumption of corr ectne ss and our revie w is de novo. State v. Poole, 945 S.W .2d 93, 96 (Tenn. 1997)

. The burde n is upon the appea ling party to show that the sentenc e is improper. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d), Sent en ci ng Commi ssion Com ments. I n conducting our re view, we are require d, pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnota te d s e c ti o n4 0

- 3 5

- 2 1 0 , to consider the f ollowing f

actor s i n s en t en ci n g: (1) [t] he evide nce, if

any , rec eived at the tri al an d the sentenc ing he aring ; (2) [t] he prese ntence report; (3) [t] he princ iples of sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing alternatives; (4) [t] he nature and char acte ristics of t he criminal conduct involved; (5) [e] vidence and information offer ed by the parties on the enha nceme nt and mitigating fac tors in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114; and (6) [ a]ny statement the de fendant wishes t o m ak e i n t h e d ef

en d an t ’s o wn b eh al f a b o u ts en t en ci n g.
I f no mitigating or

enhanc ement fa ctors fo r sentencing are prese nt, Tennesse e Code Annotated section 40-35-210( c) provides that the pre sumptive sentence for most offe nses shall be the minimum s entenc e within the applica ble ra ng e. State v. L avende r, 967 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Te nn. 1998); State v. Fletc her, 805 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). How ever , if such fa ctors do exis t, a trial court should enhance the minimum s entenc e within t h e ra n ge for e nhance ment fac tors and then r educe the sentenc e within the ra ng e for the mitigating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( e); State v. Arnett, 49 S.W .3d 250, 257 (T enn. 2001). No particular weig ht for ea ch fac tor is prescribed by

the statute, as the w eig ht give n to eac h fac tor is left to the discre tion of the trial court as long as the t rial court complies with the purposes and princ iples of the sente ncing act a ndits fi nd ing s a

re su pp orte d b y

the re c or d. State v. Ma dd e n, 99 S .W .3 d 12 7, 13 8 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 02 ); se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 40 -3 5- 21 0, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts . N e ve rthe le ss, should the re be no mitigating fac tors but e nhance ment fac tors are prese nt, a trial court may set the sentenc e above the minimum wit hin the rang e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( d); State v. I mfeld, 70 S.W .3d 698, 704 (Tenn. 2002)

. I f our r eview r efle cts that the trial court followed the statutory se n te n c ing pr ocedur e, imposed a lawf ul sentence afte r g iving due consideration and proper weig ht to the fac tors and princ iples set out u n d er s en t en ci ng law, and the trial court’ s findings of fac t are adequately

supported by

the re c or d, the n w e ma y

no t mo dif

y the se nte nc e e ve n if

we wo uldha ve pr e fe rr e d a dif ferent r e su lt. State v. Hooper , 29 S.W .3d 1, 5 (Tenn. 2000)

. The de fendant arg ues that the e nhance ment fac tor for a previous hist o ry of criminal convictions or criminal behavior, Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-114( 2), should not have been a ccor ded eve n the minimal weig ht g iven i t by the t rial court. The defenda nt bases his objection on the fact that the m isdemeanor offe nse was self-r eporte d during the pre paration of the pre- sentenc e report. The d ef

en d an t cites to State v. Geor g e J. J ohnson, No. M2002-1054-CCA-R3-CD, 2002-5-

Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 1060 (Tenn. C ri m
. Ap p
. at Nashville, De c. 10, 2002), w here in it was stated: Although a

rele vant fa ctor, we rema in mindful of the fact that the pre -sentenc e re port wa s nev e r

i n t e n d e d t o s e r v e t h e p u rp o s e o f g a t h e r i n g i n c r i m i n a t i n g e v i d e n c e to punish the offe nder. The offe nder is enc ourag ed to be truthful and participate in the prepa ration of the pr e-sen t en ce report in order that information provided may be utiliz ed by

the sentenc ing court i n arriving at an individualiz ed sente nce. T o use the of fe nd e r’ s state me nts wi thi n the re po rt a g a ins t the of fe nd e r is c ou nte rp ro du c tiv e in that it d is c o u r a g e s tr

u th f u ln e s s a n d is in c o n s is te n t w ith th e p u rp o s e s o f th e prese nte nc e re po rt

. I d. at *6.
Howeve r, Ge org e J. J ohnson was an a ppeal f rom denial of judicia l diversi on and the se lfre po rt e d o ff

e ns e wa s th e so le ba sis fo r d e nia l of div e rs io n by th e tr ia l c ou rt . In o ur vie w, it i s distinguishable f

rom the case at hand a s we did in State v. Consuela P. Carter, N o. M2002-01100- CCA-R3-CD, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXI S 269, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Mar. 27, 2003), appe al denied, State v. Ca rter, 2003 Tenn. L EXI S 991 (Tenn., Oct. 13, 2003). W e conc lude that the self- reported offe nse wa s rele vant but w as due only minimal weight a s ascribed by the trial c ou rt

. Ne xt, t he def

e nd a nt o bje c ts t o th e app lic a tio n o f the e nh a nc e me nt f a c tor , th a t th e vic tim suffe red “ particula

rly g reat” injuries, under

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-114(7). T he injury which the victim-police office r testified c o n ce rn i n g was that it bothere d him that he was forc ed to shoot the defe ndant. I n finding this fac tor applicable , the t rial j udg e noted that the of fice r was “ about to cry ” during his te stimony

. No other e vidence , expert or lay , was off ere d to show that the psy cholog ica l i n

j u ry was pa

rticularly g reat. State v. Arnett, 49 S.W.3d 250 (Tenn. 2001), addre ssed the amount of pr oof re quired t o fi nd that psy cholog ical or e motional injuries were particula rly g reat under this enhanc ement fa ctor. “ Specific obje ctive examples . . . of the disabling eff ects of the vi ctim’s mental i njury obviate the need f or expert proof. O n the other hand, wher e the State do e s not of

fe r spe c if ic e vid e nc e of

the vic tim ’s pa

rt ic ula rl y se ri ou s in jurie s, the tr ia l c ou rt

wi ll not be justified in apply ing the enhanc ement fa ctor.” I d. at 261.
Two case s of non-expert proof, which set forth examples of spec ific and obje ctive evide nce of mental injury

justify ing a

pplication of this enhanc ement fa ctor, we re discusse d in Arne tt. I d. at 26 0. I n Stat e v. Smith, 89 1 S.W.2 d 922 , 930 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 4) , the ra pe vic tim wa s u na ble to l ive in he r ho me fo r thr e e mon ths a ft e r the a tta c k, ha d s ou g ht c ou ns e lin g , a ndaro se e ve ry thi rt y min ute s to c he c k th e se c urity of the loc ks on the do or s and wi nd ow s w hil e stay ing ov e rn ig ht w ith a friend.
I n State v. Wil liams, 920 S.W .2d 247, 259-60 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1995), the victim suffer ed periods of de pression and low e steem, was often unable to work, mi ssed five wee ks of colleg e, and a va ile d h e rs e lf

of c ou ns e lin g se ssi on s.-6-

These ty pes of spe cific and objective e x amples we re c onspicuous l y l acking in the pr esent case . Unquestionably , the experienc e of be ing f orce d to shoot an u n s t ab l e and threate ning individual, who by all outward manifestations soug ht to commit s uicide by policeman, “ bothere d” the vi ctim policeman. Howeve r, t he S tate has not met the te st of providing specific and objec tive examples of disabling or

disruptive effec ts that would make this enhanc ement fa ctor a ppropriate

. We n ote that in c on c lud ing thi s enh a nc e me nt fa c tor wa s in a pp ro pria te ly

app lie d, it w a s g ive n o nly minimal weight by

the trial court but was consider ed in determining the leng th of the sentenc e. The de fendant also asserts that bodily injury was an element of the offense. Howeve r, the defe ndant pled to r eckle ss a g g ravated assault under Tenne ssee Code Annotated sectio n 39-13- 102(a) (2)( B) , requiring the defe ndant to use or display a deadly wea pon, as opposed to Te nnessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102( a)( 2)(A) , which relies on bodily injury as an elem en t o f t he crime. A pplication of the e nhance ment fac tor would be a ppropriate for the r eason state d.
T h e S t at e d o es n o t ch al l en ge t h e d ef en d an t ’s co n t en t i o n t h aten h an ce m en tfa ct o r ( 1 1 ), h i gh risk to human life, wa s improper. We ag ree . This enhancement factor, a s to the victim, is an essential element of t he offense and thus prec luded for enhanc ement byTenne ssee Code A nnotated section 40-35- 114. There w as n o evidenc e of any other pe rson enda ng ere d by the def endant’ s a c tio ns
.The de fendant contends that the trial c ourt s h o u ld h av ea p p li e d ana d ditional mit igating f

actor that, beca use of his y outh, t h e d ef

en d ant l acke d substantial judgment in committing the of fense

. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 13 (6 ). Th e re c or d e sta bli sh e d th a t th e de fe nd a nt w a s se ve nte e n y e ars old at the time of the offense and that the case was transfe rre d from the juvenile court. The S tate ar g ues that the def

endant was less than a y ear from bec oming e ighte en and w as “not a novice to the c riminal jus tic e sy ste m.” Th e e vid e nc e , how e ve r, do e s not sup po rt the State ’s c on te nti on
. Th e de fe nd a nt d id not have a n extensive recor d of off enses a nd was the pr oduct of a deeply conflicte d family , which e xac e rb a te d h is imm atu ri ty . We c on c lud e that th e e vid e nc e su pp orts the app lic abil ity of thi s mitigating fac tor.
Conclusion
As a re sult of our

revie w, there are two rema ining e nhance ment fac tors: a pre vious history of criminal convictions or criminal beha vior, Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-114( 2); and the victim of the ag g ravated assault was a poli ce office r, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102( d)(1)

. The trial c ourt assig ned minimal we i gh t t o t h e first and g reat weig ht to the second e nhance ment fac tor. Ther e ar e thre e mitigating fac tors: (1) the de fendant was suffering from a me ntal condition that significantly reduc ed the def endant’ s culpability , Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-113(8) ; ( 2) the def endant, a lthough g uiltyof the crime, committed the offe nse under such unusual circ umstances that it is unlikely that a sustained intent to violate the law motivated his conduc t, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 3 5 -1 1 3 (1 1 ); and (3) that beca use of his y outh, the defe ndant lacke d substantial judgment in co m m i tting the of fense , Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 113(6).-7-

Ac c or din g ly , w e mod if

y the se nte nc e to thr e e y e ars , w ithnin e mon ths to b e se rv e d in incar cer ation and the r emainder on probation. All conditions of m ental assessment contained in the orig ina l ju dg me nt s ha ll r e ma in i n e ff e c t. T he c aus e is r e ma nd e d f or mod if ic a tio n o f j ud g me nt.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE