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_____________________________________ Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 48909

C hief Justice Justices Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Clifford W. Taylor Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman 

# Opinion

FILED JUNE 12, 2002

NANCY KOONTZ, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 116366 AMERITECH SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellant, and UNEMPLOYMENT AGENCY of the MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND INDUSTRY SERVICES, formerly MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AGENCY, Appellee. BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except MARKMAN, J.). CORRIGAN, C.J. This case requires that we interpret a statute directing coordination of unemployment benefits with pension benefits. Pl aintiff received a lump-sum pension payment under an employer-funded retirement plan. When plaintiff sought unemployment compensation, the Unemployment Agency 1

1 The Unemployment Agency was formerly known as the Michigan Employment Security Commission.coordinated her weekly benefits with her prorat ed weekly

am ount of pension payments (i.e., the amount of pens io n benefits plaintiff woul d ha ve received weekly had she not opted for a lump-sum payment). The ensuing reduction rendered plaintiff ineligible to receive any unemployment benefits. The Employment Security Board of Reviewand the circuit court upheld the reduction. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that coordination was not required. We hold that the governing statute, MCL 421.27(f)(1), mandates coordination of plaintiff’s unemployment benefits withher pension benefits. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Board of Review and the judgment of the circuit court. I. Underlying Facts and Procedural History Plaintiff began working for Ameritech in its Traverse Cityoffice in 1965. Thirty years later, Ameritech closed its Traverse City office and offered to continue plaintiff’s employment in another office. She declined, electing instead to retire. Ameritech’s retirement incentive program entitled pla intif f to a $1,052.95 monthly pension allowance, which Ameritechfully funded. In lieu of monthly payments, however, plaintiff elected to receive her pension in a lump-sum in the amount of $185,711.55. Plaintiff also chose to transfer the lump-sumdirectly into her individual retirement account ( IRA ). Plaintiff then applied for unemployment compensation. Ameritech argued in response to plaintiff’s application that MCL 421.27(f) of the Michigan Employment Security Act, MCL

2421.1 et seq ., allowed coordination of plaintiff’s unemployment benefits with the amount of pension pa yment s plaintiff would have received if she had elected the monthly payment option. The Unemployment Agency agreed and directed coordination under MCL 421.27(f). This coordination resulted in a reduction in plaintiff’s unemployment benefits in the amount of $243 weekly, rendering her ineligible to receive any unemployment benefits. 2 Plaintiff timely protested this determination, but the Unemployment Agency upheld its decision on redetermination. Plaintiff thereafter appealed the redetermination. A referee reversed the decision of the Unemploymen t Ag ency on the ground that neither MCL 421. 27(f)(1) nor (5) required coordination since plaintiff had transferred the pension funds directlyinto her IRA and thus had not “received” the funds

w ithi n the meaning of the act. The referee relied on the Unemployment Agency’s Revised Benefit Interpretation No. 20.641, which indicates that an employee who rolls a pension amount over into an IRA does not incur immediate income tax liabilitybecause the Intern al Revenue Service does not consider the payment “received” for income tax purposes. Ameritechappealed the referee’s decision to the Michigan Employment Security Board of Revi ew, w hich reinstated the Unemployment Agency’s determination in a split decision. The Board of Review ruled that the taxability of plaintiff’s

2 Because plaintiff’s pro-rata retirement benefits would have been equal to or greater than her wee kly unemployment benefits, sh e was not eligible to receive unemployment benefits chargeable to Ameritech. See MCL 421.27(f)(1)(a). 3pension benefit did not affect the operation of MCL 421.27(f) and that the lump-sumdistribution was a “retirement benefit” under the plain language of the act. Accordingly, the board concluded that coordination was required under MCL 421.27(f)(1)(a). One member of the Board of Review dissented, finding that plaintiff did not receive a retirement benefit because the lump-sum distribution had been rolled over into an IRA. The dissenting member relied on Revised Benefit Interpretation No. 20.641 and the United States Department of Labor’s (USDOL) Unemployment Insurance Pr ogra m Letter No. 22-97. The USDOL Letter No. 22-97 stated that pension amounts rolled over into an IRA within sixty days of receipt are not gross income for purposes of federal income taxation and thus are not “received” f or p urposes of 26 USC 3304(a)(15)(A) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 USC 3301 et seq . 3 The dissenting member concluded that MCL 421.27(f) did not require coordination of plaintiff’s weekly benefit amount. The circuit court affirmed the Board of Review’s decision. The Court of Appeals then granted leave to appeal 4 and reversed the ci rcuit court order. 239 Mich App 34; 607 NW2d 395 (1999). It held that another subsection, MCL 421.27(f)(5), governed and did not require coordination of benefits. Alternatively, the court stated in dictum that even

3The Unemployment Agency issued Revised Benefit Interpretation No. 20.641 on November 29, 1995, in an apparent attempt to comply with USDOL Letter No. 22-87.

4Unpublished order, entered July 7, 1998 (Docket No. 208176). 4if MCL 421.27(f)(1) applied, coordination was not required because 1) plaintiff had not received a “retirement benefit” within the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(4), and 2) the phrase “receive or will receive” in MCL 421.27(f)(1) does not include the direct rollover of a pension fund to an IRA. II. Standard of Review This case requires us to ascertain the meaning and proper application of MCL 421.27. Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that we review de novo. Oade v Jackson Nat’l Lif e Ins Co , 465 Mich 244, 250; 632 NW2d 126 (2001); Donajkowski v Alpena PowerCo , 460 Mich 243, 248; 596 NW2d 574 (1999). III. Relevant Statutes MCL 421.27(f)(1) has existed in essentially the same form since 1954 PA 197. It states: [N]otwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of this act, the weekly benefit rate of each indi vidual who is receiving or will receiv e a “retirement benefit,” as defined in [MCL 421.27(f)(4)], shall be adjusted as provided in subparagraphs (a) . . . . However, an individual's extended benefit account and an individual's weekly extended ben efit rate under [MCL 421.64] shall be established without reduction under this subsection unless [MCL 421.27(f)(5)] is in effect . . . . (a) If an d to the extent that unemployment benefits payable under this act would be chargeable to an employer who has contributed to the financing of a retirement plan under which the claimant is receiving or will receive a retirement benefit yi eldi ng a pro rata weekly amount equal to or larger than the claimant's w eekl y benefit rate as otherwise established under this act, the claimant shall not receive unemployment benefits that would be chargeable to the employer under this act. MCL 421.27(f)(1) thus requires an offse t in unemployment compensation for retirement benefits if the employer charged

5with unemployment benefits funded the retirement plan. This type of reduction is known as “narrow coordination.” Before 1980, federal lawdid not address coordination of unemployment and retirement benefits. In March 1980, Congress amended 26 USC 3304(a )(15) of the FUTA to require the coordination of unemployment benefits with employer-funded retirement benefits, regardless of whether the empl oyer who had funded the retirement benefits was the same employer whose account would be charged for the unemployment benefits. This type of co ordination is known as “broad coordination.” Section 3304, particularly subsection (a)(15), of the FUTA requires the states to conform to federal policy regarding coordination of unemployment benefits to insure eligibility for federal funds or tax credits. See Gormley v General Motors Corp , 125 Mich App 781, 785-786; 336 NW2d 873 (1983). In response to the federal amendment, the Michigan Legislature promptlyadopted broad coordination to the extent required by federal law. MCL 421.27(f)(5) states: Notwithstanding a ny other provision of this subsection, for anyweek that begins after March31, 1980, and with respect to w hich an individual is receiving a government a l or other pension and claiming unemployment compensation, the weekly benefit amount payable to the individual for th os e weeks shall be reduced, but not below zero, by t he entire prorated weekly amount of anygovernmental or other pension, retirement or retired pay, annui ty, or any other similar payment th at is based on any previous wo rk of the individual. This reduction shall be made only if it is required as a condition for full tax credit against the tax imposed by t he federal unemployment tax act, chapter 23 of subtitle C of the internal revenue code of 1986, 26 USC 3301 to 3311. The federal mandate for broad coordination was shortlived. In September 1980, Congress amended 26 USC 3304(a)(15) 6to its present form, which requires only narrowcoordination, i.e., that coordination specified in MCL 421.27(f)(1). Despite the federa l am endment, the Michigan Legislature has

never amended MCL 421.27(f)(5). MCL 421.27 thus retains both broad and narrow coordination provisions. We now address the interplay of those provisions. IV. Principles of Statutory Interpretation When interpreting statutory language, our obligation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System , 465 Mich 5 3, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). When the Legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent in a statute, the statute speaks for itself, an d judicial construction is not permit ted. Huggett v Dep’t of Natural Resou rce s , 464 Mich 711, 717; 629 NW2d 915 (2001); Donajkowski, supra at 248. Because the proper role of the judiciaryis to interpret and not write the law, courts simply lack authority to venture beyond the unambiguous text of a statute. Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. Wicken s, sup ra at 60. Further, we give undefined statutory terms their plain and ordinary meanings. Donajkowski, supra at 248-249; Oakland Co Road Comm’rs v Michigan Property & Casualty Guar anty Ass’n , 456 Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). In those situations, we may consult di ctio nary definitions. Id.

7V. Analysis A. Interpretation of MCL 421.27(f) The Court of Appeals determined that MCL 421.27(f)(5) controlled over MCL 421.27(f)(1): We conclude that subdivisio n 27(f)(5) is controlling with regard to the coordination of plaintiff’s retirement benefits. Its purpose was to conformwith the federal government’s goal of mai nt aining certain uniformity among the state programs regarding the coordination requirements for unemploymen t compensation, which purpose would be defeated were Michigan to default t o its own interpretations for coordination under its previous statutoryprovisions and, in this case, circumv ent the clear result under subdivision 27(f)(5) that coordination of plaintiff’s benefit s is not required. Moreover, the express statu t ory language manda te s a conclusion that subdivision 27(f)(5) controls over subdi vi sion 27(f)(1). Subdivision f(5) was enacted after f ( 1) and provides: “Notwithstanding any other provisio n of this subsection . . . .” [Emphasis in orig inal.] To applysubdivision 27(f)(1) indep e ndently of subdivision 27(f)(5) and deny plaintiff unemployment benefits i s inconsistent with the result under federal law. Such an interpretation also creates an inconsistencywithin the statute, contrary to t he rules of statutory construction. In construing statutes, s ee ming inconsistencies in the various provisions sh ould be reconciled if possible. [Citation omitted.] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that MCL 421.27(f)(5) exempted plaintiff’s benefits from coordination. The Court of Appeals failed to give effect to every word and phrase of MCL 421.27(f). While the court acknowledged the phrase, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection” in MCL 421.27(f)(5), it failed to give effect to similar language in MCL 421.27(f)(1), stating, “notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of this act.” In addition, in finding that MCL 421.27(f)(5) controls over MCL

8421.27(f)(1), the Court rendered nugatory MCL 421.27(f)(1), contrary to established rules of interpretation. We believe that t he language of MCL 421.27(f) is clear and unambiguous and must therefore be enforced as written. Huggett, supra at 717; Donajkowski, supra at 248. MCL 421.27(f)(1) provides, in pertinent part: [N]otwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of this act, the weekly benefit rate of each indi vidual who is receiving or will receiv e a “retirement benefit,” as defined in [MCL 421.27(f)(4)], shall be adjusted as provided in subparagraph (a) . . . . (a) If and to the extent that unemp loyme nt benefits payable under this act would be chargeable to an employer who has contributed to the financing of a retirement plan under which the claimant is receiving or will receive a retirement benefit yielding a pro rata weekly amount equal to or larger than the claimant's weeklyben efit rate as otherwise established under this act, the claimant shall not receive unemployment benefits that would be charg eable to the employer under this act. [Emphasis added.] This text requires coordination where the claimant’s unemployment benefits are chargeable to the e mployer who contributed to the financing of the claimant’ s ret irement benefits. Thus, “narrow coordination” is required “notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of this act . . . .” MCL 421.27(f)(5), on the ot her h and, requires “broad coordination” where necessary to conform to federal law: Notwithstanding any other provision of t hi s subsection, for any week that begins after March 31, 1980, and with respect to wh ich an individual is receiving a governmental or other pension and claiming unemployment compensation, the weekly benefit amount payable to the individual for th os e weeks shall be reduced, but not below zero, by t he entire prorated weekly amount of any governmental or other pension, retirement or retired pay, annui ty, 9or any other similar payment tha t is ba sed on any previous work of the in div idual. This reduction shall be made only if it is required as a condition forfull tax credit against the tax imposed by t he federal unemployment tax act, chapter23 of subtitle Cof the internal revenue code of 1986, 26 USC 3301 to 3311. [Emphasis added.] This pr ov ision broadens the coordination required in MCL 421.27(f)(1) by compelling a reduction not only with regard to pension funds that the chargeable employer contribu tes, but also with regard to pension funds “based on any previ ous work,” regardless of whether the chargeable employer contributed the funds. MCL 421.27(f)(5) requires such“broad coordination” only when necessary to conform to federal law. Thus, c ontr ary to the Court of Appeals analysis, MCL 421.27(f)(1) and (5) are not in cons istent, but can be harmonized. While MCL 421.27(f)(1) always requires coordination of pension benefits that the chargeable employer contributed, MCL 421.27(f)(5) may also require coordination of pension benefits on the basis of the claimant’s previous work if such broad coordination is necessaryto conform to federal law. Our application of the plain language of these provisions does not render MCL 421.27(f)(5) nugatory. If Congress again chooses to require broad coordination, the additional reduction prescribed in subsection 27(f)(5) will be triggered. That federal lawdoes not presently require the reduction does not render MCL 421.27(f)(5) nugatory and does not compel the Michigan Legislature to amend the statute. B. The Meaning of “Liquidation”

10Because MCL 421.27(f)(5) does not apply here, 5 th e question remains whether MCL 421.27(f)(1) required coordination of pl aint iff’s benefits. The Court of Appeals stated in dictum that even if MCL 421.27( f)(1) governed, it did not require an offset because plaintiff did not receive a “retirement benefit” within the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a). That subdivision provides: (4)(a) As used in this subdivision, “retirement benefit” mean a benefit, annuity, or pension of any type . . . that is: ( i ) Provided as an incident of employment under an established retirement plan, pol ic y, or agreement, including federal socia l security if subdivision (5) is in effect. ( ii ) Payable to an individual because the individual has qualified on the basis of attained age, length of service, or disabi lity, whether or not the individual reti red or was retired from employment. Amounts paid to individuals in the course of liquidation of a private pension or retirement f u nd because of termination of the business or of a plant or department of the business of the employer involved shall not be considered to be retirement benefits. [Emphasis added.] The Court of Appeals determined that plaintiff’s pension was not a retirement benefit within the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a) because the fund was liquidated upon plaintiff’s termination when Ameritech closed its Traverse City office. This factual conclusion was erroneous. Although the Ameritech Traverse City office was closed,

5 Ev en if MCL 421.27(f)(5) applied, it would not cha ng e the result. Plaintiff did not receive extended benefits, but, rather, Ameritech contributed to all the pension benefits paid to plaintiff. P laintiff did not receive benefits from any employer other than Ameritech, the chargeable employer. Thus, even if federal law mandated broad coordi nati on under MCL 421.27(f)(5), the facts of this case implicated only the narrow coordination already required by MCL 421.27(f)(1). 11the record does not re flect that the pension fund was liquidated. RandomHouse Webster’s College Dictionary (2000) defines “liquidate” as “to settle or pay (a debt),” “to reduce (accounts) to order,” “to dissolve (a business or estate) by apportioning the assets to offset the liabiliti es,” “ to convert (inventory, securities, or other assets) into cash,” “to get rid of, esp. by killing,” “to break up or do away with,” and “to liquidate debts or accounts.” The more pertinent of these definitions contemplate the elimination of

an entire entity or the abolition of all assets or accounts within an entity. As such, liquidation would involve the Ameritechpension fund distributing all its assets. The distribution of a single employee’s vested interest is not a liquidation of the pension fund. In addition, plaintiff could have elected to accept her pension benefits as a mont hly annuity, which clearly refutes the Court of Appeals conclusion that the fund had been liquidated. Our dissenting colleague maintains that we misconstrue the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a) by failing to consider the entire sentence in which“liquidation” appears. She attempts to generate an ambigu ity in the phrase “liquidation of a priv ate pension or retirement fund” by asserting that the phrase could refer either to an individual’s personal account

or fu nd o rto the collective pension fund. We reject the dissent’s view. The meaning of the phrase in MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a)(ii) hinges on the word “liquidation.” As discussed, the plain meaning of that term requires distribution of all assets held

12in the pension fund for all employees. The dissent contends that the term “liquidate” has many definitions, some of which maybe interpreted to apply to a sole pension account, suchas that belonging to p lai ntiff. A word is not rendered ambiguous, however, merely because a dictionary defines it in

a variety of ways. Upjohn Co v New Hampshire Ins Co , 438 Mich 197, 208-209, n 8; 476 NW2d 392 (1991). Rather, the doctrine of noscitur a sociis requires that the term “liquidation” be viewed in light of the words surrounding it. Herald Co v Bay City , 463 Mich 111, 130, n 10; 614 NW2d 873 (2000). “Contextual understanding of statutes is generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur a sociis : ‘[i]t is known from its associates,’ see Black’s LawDic tionary (6th ed), p 1060. This doctrine stands for the principle that a word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting.” Brown v Genesee Co Bd of Comm’rs (After Remand) , 464 Mich 430, 437; 628 NW2d 471 (2001), quoting Tyler v Livonia Schs , 459 Mich 382, 390­ 391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999). In the context of the statute, the term “liquidation” pertains to multiple accounts rather than to an individual account. The statute exempts fromthe category of “retirement benefits” those amounts “paid to individual s in the course of liquidation of a private pension or retirement fund.” Therefore, the text contemplates that liquidation pertains to multiple accounts and not merely the single account of an individual pensioner. In addition, the liquidation must occur because of “termination of the business or of a plant or department of the business.” Such a termination would involve

13all employees within the business, plant, or department, and not merely a single employee. Therefore, in accordance with the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the phrase “liquidation of

a private pension or retirement fund” is not am biguous; the language clearly refers to t he distribution of all assets within the fund. Moreover, the dissent does not explain how the fund was liquidated where, as discussed above, plaintiff could have chosen to collect her pension benefits as a monthly annuity. Further, the dissent asserts that MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a) is

a remedial statute that we should construe liberally in favor of plaintiff. We do not apply preferential rules of statutory interpretation, however, without first discovering an ambiguityand attempting to discern the legislative intent underlying the ambiguous words. Crowe v Detroit , 465 Mich 1, 13; 631 NW2d 293 (2001). Only if that inquiry is fruitless,

or produces no clear demonstration of intent, do we resort to

a preferential or “dice-loading” rule. 6 Because no ambiguity exists, the remedial rule of preference does not apply. Id
. The dissent also asserts that our interpretation of the statute produces “unconscionable results.” It is not the role of the judiciary, how eve r, to second-guess the wisdom of a legislative policy choice. Our constitutional obligation is to interpret, not to rewrite, the law. The Legislat ur e apparentlydetermined that the sa me result should obtain regardless of whether an employee opts for a monthly annuity

6See als o Sc alia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law(Princeton, NJ, 1997) pp 27-29. 14or for a lump-sum payment. Here, if plaintiff had elected a monthly annuity in lieu of the lump-sum payment, no question would exist that she would have been ineligible t o r eceive unemployment benefits. Moreover, plaintiff chose to accept her pension benefits instead of relocating to another Ameritech office. Ameritech had offered plaintiff the opportunity to continue her emplo yme nt in another location, but she declined to do so. The payout followed plaintiff’s decision to retire rather than

re locate
. While the dissent contends that plaintiff had no choice but to accept her pension benefits, the record does not support this assertion. Accordingly, the condition set forth in MCL 421.2 7(f) (4)(ii), providing an exception to the term “retirement benefit,” does not apply in this case. Thus, whether Ameritech’s payment t o pla intiff was a “retirement benefit” depends on whether it was “a benefit, annuity, or pension of any type” payable to her “because [she] has qualified on the basis of attained age [or] length of service . . . .” In defining a “re tirement benefit,” the Legislature has used words of common and ordinary meaning, and

we apply them accordingly. Donajkowski, supra at 248-249; Oakland Co Rd Comm’rs, supra at 604. It i s und isputed that plaintiff received a pension benefit on the basis of her age and years of service. Thus, she received a “retirem en t benefit” as contemplated in MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a). C. The Meaning of “Receive or Will Receive” The Court of Appeals also stated, in dictum, that even if pla i ntiff’s distribution were a retirement benefit, it was

15exempt from coordinati on be cause “the Legislature did not intend the terms ‘receive or will receive’ under § 27(f)(1) to include the direct rollover of a pension fund to an IRA . . . .” The Court stated: This co nstruction of the statute is the most reasonable and comports with the benefit interpretations of boththe UA and the USDOL. M ESC Revised Benefit Interpretation No. 20.641 (November 29, 1995); U SDOL Unemployment Ins ura nce Program Letter No. 22-87, Change 1 (June 19, 1995). In reaching our conclusion, we are mindful that the role of the judiciary is not to engage in judicial legislation, but rather to determine the way chosen bythe Legislature. [Citation omitted.] We decline to interpret the statute to incorporate any change that overrides requirements clearly adopted by the Legislature. [239 Mich App 47.] While this issue is one of first impression in th e context of unemployment compensation, it has been addressed in the somewhat analogous context of worker’s compensation. White v McLouth Steel Products , decided sub nom Corbett v Plymouth Twp , 453 Mich 522; 556 NW2d 478 (1996). 7 In White, this Court construed MCL 41 8.354( 1)(d), of the Worker’s Disabil ity Co mpensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq ., which directs that worker’s compensation benefits be coordinated with “[ t]he after-tax amount of the pension or retirement payments received or being received . . . .” The employee in White rolled his lump-sum pension distribution into an IRA . The question was whether the nontaxable nature of the rollover transfer precluded coordination of the retirement payments withthe worker’s compensation benefits. This Court ruled in

7 See, generally, Drouillard v Stroh Brewery Co , 449 Mich 293, 304-305; 536 NW2d 530 (1995) (holding that the employer could coordinate a lump-sum pension distribution withworker’s compensation benefits where the employee had been “forced” to accept the pension distribution). 16favor of the empl oye e. It rejected as “literalism” the employer’s contention that the employee “received” the transferred amount. This Court also stated that its interpretation was consistent with the language o f M CL 418.354(1)(d), limiting coordination to the after-tax amount of the pension: Byreason of the tax-free aspect of a rollover into an IRA , there is no taxable event and, hence, no tax or “ afte r-tax amount” that is “received or being received.” [ Id . at 547.] Three justices dissented in White . They opined: The [majority] opinion dismisses the statute’s language by labeling as “literalism” defendant McLouthSteel Products’ argument that under the statute White has received his pension payment. Ante at 544. [ T]h e better phrase would be plain meaning

. Subsection 354(1)(d) provides that weekly worker’s compensation benefits may be reduced by the “after-tax amount of the pension or retirement payments received ” by the emp loyee and does not condition the coordination of pension benefits on whether the employee actually begins to u se t hese funds or invests them in a plan in which he will only later receive payments. . . . The majority attempts to justify its interpretation . . . by noting the statute’s use of the “ after-tax amount,” but fails to note that [MCL 418.354(13)] defines “after-tax amount” as the amount remaining after subtracting the estimated tax the employee would pay on the benefit, not the actual tax t he employee incurred . . . . [ Id . at 562-563 (emphasis in original). [8] MCL 421.27(f)(1) is the unemployment compensation counterpart of MCL 418.354(1)(d), but it lacks the “after-tax amount” language on which the White majority relied in part. The question here is whether plaintiff “received” the

8More precisely, MCL 418.354(13) defines “after-tax amount” as the gross amount remaining aft er s ubtracting the amount “ which would have been paid , if any, under . . . state income tax and federal income tax . . . .” [Emphasis added.] 17transferred amounts. Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2000) defines “receive” as “to take into one’s possession,” “to have (something) bestowed, conferred, etc.,” “to hold, bear, or contain,” and “to take, get, accept, or meet wi th som ething.” In light of these definitions, we conclude that plaintiff received her retirement benefits within the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(1), notwithstan ding the fact that Ameri tech transferred the funds directly into her IRA. We disagree with our dissenting colleague that plaintiff did not take the pension funds into her possession within the meaning of the dictionary definition of “receive.” The funds

were transferred at plaintiff’s direction. She is abl e to withdraw the funds at any time and use them as she sees fit. Ameri techclearly conferred the funds upon plaintiff, and plaintiff accepted those funds by directing them into an account of her choice. Acco rdingly, it is inescapable that plaintiff received the funds. Because the dissenting opinion in White is better reasoned, following that approach, we conclude that plaintiff “received” the distribution at issue within the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(1). 9

9 We overrule White to the extent that it is inconsistent with our present holding. The White majority also relied in part on the statutory language “after-tax amount” in MCL 418.354(1)(d) in support of its decision. We do not decide whether that aspect of White was decided correctly because it is irrelevant to our determination in this case. Our concurring colleague asserts that overruling White in part is unnecessary because, unlike the statute in White , the statute before us does not con tain the “after-tax amount” language. He fails to acknowledge, however, that in addition to the “after-tax amount” language, the White majorityrelied in part on an erroneous definition of “receive,” conditioned on the taxable nature of the funds in question. The concurring opinion, therefore, overlooks part of the reasoning 18Like, the Court of Appeals, the dissent would erroneously elevate a construction from an extratextual source above the unambiguous language of the statute itself. As we have stated repeatedly, courts may not look beyond the clear text of a statu te t o discover an unexpressed legislative intent. Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward , 460 Mi ch 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). Although this Court generally accords due deference to an administrative agency charged wit h ex ecuting a particular statute, we grant no deference here because the plain meaning of the statute controls. “An agency interpretation cannot overcome the plain meaning of a statute.” Consumers Power Co v Public Service Comm , 460 Mich 148, 157, n 8; 596 NW2d 126 (1999). The plain and ordinary meaning of “receive” provides no basis to differentiate between funds that are taxable and those that are not. Therefore, MCL 421.27(f)(1) requires coordination whether or not the funds are subject to taxation when plaintiff received them by directing their deposit into her IRA account. VI. Conclusion We conclude that MCL 421.27(f)(1) required coordination of plaintiff’s unemployment benefits with her pension benefits. Plaintiff received a “retiremen t be nefit” within the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(1). That subsection required coordination, whether or not the funds were subject to taxation at the time of their re cei pt. Accordingly, we

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the Board of Review and the judgment of the upon which the majority in White based its decision. 19circuit court. WEAVER , T AYLOR , andY OUNG , JJ., concurred withC ORRIGAN , C.J.

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NANCY KOONTZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 116366 AMERITECH SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellant, and UNEMPLOYMENT AGENCY of the MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND INDUSTRY SERVICES, formerly MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AGENCY, Appellee. CAVANAGH, J. ( concurring ). I concur with the result in this case that MCL 421.27(f)(1) required coordination of plaintiff’s unemployment benefits with her pension bene fits. However, I write separately bec ause in reaching this result, it is not necessaryfor the majority to adopt the dissent’s approach from White v McLouth Steel Products , decided sub nom Corbett

vPlymouth Twp , 453 Mich 522; 556 NW2d 478 (1996), and to overrule White to the extent that it is inconsistent with today’s holding. In White , this Court constr ued MC L 418.354(1)(d) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act(WDCA), which provided that worker’s compensation benefits be coordinated with “[t]he after-tax amount of the pension or retirement payments received or being rece ive d . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The White Court stated: The construction that we adopt is consistent with the language of the statute, which provides for an offset “of the after-tax amou nt of the pension or retirement payments received or being received by the employee . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Byreason of the tax-free aspect of a rollover into an IRA , there is no taxable event and, hence, no tax or “a ft er-tax amount” that is “received or being received.” [ White, supra at 547.] The instant case involves an unemployment benefits statute that is similar to the worker’s compensation statute in White , but does not contain the “after-tax” language. Althoughthe remaining language in these statutes is similar, it is not identical. The two statutes are clearly different; theycontain materially different language and arguablyserve different purposes. Because of the diff erences between these statutes, the majoritydoes not need to address Whi te . The White Court clearly stated that its holding was based on the “after-tax” language in the WDCA statute it was construing.

2___________________________________ v S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N SUPREME COURT

NANCY KOONTZ, Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 116366 AMERITECH SERVICES, INC., Defendant-Appellant, and UNEMPLOYMENT AGENCY of the MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AND INDUSTRY SERVICES, formerly MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AGENCY, Appellee. KELLY, J. ( dissenting ). I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that plaintiff's unemployment compensation benefits should be eliminatedbecause she has received retirement benefits as defined by the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA). MCL 421.1 et s eq . T he majority reads the relevant statutory language as unambiguous, despite strong indications to the contrary. It fails to consider the entirety of the sentence inwh ich the word "liquidation" appears and disregards interpretive letters that define "receive." In so doing, themajority misconstrues the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a). The Court of Appeals advanced the correct interpretation. I would affirm its holding that plaintiff did not receive a "retirement benefit" within the meaning of the a ct and that her unemployment compensation benefits should not be eliminated as a consequence. I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Whenconstruing a statute, our primary goal is to ascertainand give effect to the intent of the Legislature in writing it. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). While judicial interpretation usually is not permitted where statutory language is clear, a literal constructionmust yield when it produces absurd and unjust results. See Salas v Clements, 399 Mich 103, 109; 247 NW2d 889 (1976). Judicial interpretation is also appropriate when reasonable minds can differ regarding the meaning of the language. Adrian Sch Dist v Michigan Pub Sch Emp Retirement System , 458 Mich 326, 332; 582 NW2d 767 (1998). If judicial interpretationis necessary, legislative intent is determined by giving the statutory language a construction that is both reasonable and that best accomplishes the purpose of the statute. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc , 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998). A. THE TERM "LIQUIDATION" The MESA allows unemployment benefits payable under it to be reduced or elimin ated where a claimant is receiving a "retirement benefit." MCL 421.27(f)(1). It defines that term as "a benefit, annuity, or pension of any type . . . payable 2[when] . . . the individual was retired from employment." MCL 421 .27(f)(4)(a)(ii). But the act expressly excludes as a retirement benefit any amounts paid to individuals "in the

course of liquidation of a private pensionor retirement fund because of termination of the business or of a plant or department of the business of the employer involved . . . ."

1 Id . Inthis case, plaintiff lost her job with defendant because defendant closed the facility where she worked. The questionis whether her retirement funds fall within the statutory definition of "retirement benefit" or within the exception. The expression "liquidation of a privat e pension or retirement fund" in § 27(f)(4)(a)(ii) could mean a distributionof all pension monies that an employer holds for

1 MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a) provides: As used in this subdivision, "retirement benefit" means a benefit, annuity, or pension of any type or that part thereof that is described in subparagraph (b) that is: (i) Provided as an incident of employment under an established retirement plan, policy, or agreement, including federal social security if subdivision (5) is in effect. (ii) Payable to an individual because the ind ividual has qualified on the basis of attain e d age, length of service, or disability, whether or not the individual retired or was retired fr om employment. Amounts paid to individuals in the course of liquidation of a priva te pension or retirement fund because of termination of the business or of a p lant or department of the business of the employer involved sh al l not be considered to be retirement benefits. 3all its employees. Defendant here maintains that it did not liq uidate its entire pension fund monies when it closedth e facility where plaintiff worked andthat the fundcontinues to exist. Under this interpretation and in this fact ual situation, plaintiff's pension distribution would constitute retirement benefits and she could not be paid unemployment benefits. On the other hand, the clause "liquidation of a private pension or retirement fund" could mean a distribution of all pensionmonies that an employer holds for one or more but not all of its employees. 2 As noted by the majority, the word "liquidate" has many definitions, including "to settle or pay (a debt)" and "to convert (inventory, securities, or other assets) into cash." 3 Applying that definition here, defendant "liquidated" plaintiff's retirement fund when it distributed the entire contents andclosed the account, settling its debt to plaintiff and converting her pension into cash. Hence, the distributionwould not constitute retirement benefits and plaintiff could draw unemployment benefits. The majority offers no p ersuasive reasoning to support its con clusion that the "more pertinent" definition of

" liquidate" is that contemplating the elimination of all corporate pension assets. The mere fact that it prefers this

2 It is not clear from the record wheth er defendant distributedretirement funds to all employees in the facility that it closed. It is known that five other employees were affected in the same way as plaintiff.

3 See Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001). 4to a definition more favorable to plaintiff has no bearing on what the Legislature intended "liquidate" to mean. The varied definitions of the word leave room for reasonable mi nds to differ. It is inescapable that the statutory language is ambiguous. The majority's interpretation, that "liquidation" means

a distribu tion o f all pension monies held for all its employees, produces unconscionable results. For example, in this case, Ameritech would never "liquidate" all its pension fund monies by shutting down one or some of its facilities. Hence, no employee in plaintiff's situation could ever collect unemployment benefits. As an extreme example, if def endant dischargedall its employees, it could distribute all but one dollar of the funds in the pension fund. Then, the fund would not have beenliquidated under the majority's reading because all the assets would not have beendistributed. In so doing, defendant coul d r educe or eliminate all its employees'

un employment benefits. The Legislature could not ha v e intended the result in either example. The practical implications of the majority's reading of § 27(f)(4)(a)(ii) are enormously detrimental to employees like plaintiff. During plaintiff's hearing before the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review, defendant's human

resources mana ger testified that there is a single common trust fund for pension monies to which both defendant and MichiganBell contrib ute. Absent closure of the entire corporationand all its pension funds, w henev er defendant shuts down one facility , it will always escape paying 5unemployment benefits to the employees who worked there. The majority distorts the facts of this case by portraying plaintif f's acceptance of her pension funds as a choice. Defendant o ffe red plaintiff two other jobs in its corporation. However, both were located approximately two hours from her residence. When plai ntif f declined them because the commute would be unreasonable, defendant distributedher retirement funds. She did not have the option to leave them in defendant's trust fund. She was obliged to have them rolled into an IRA or paid to her in a monthly annuity. 4 It is in light of these facts that defe ndant believes the funds were not liquidated within the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a)(ii). My construction of § 27(f)(4)(a)(ii) is in keeping with the fact that the MESA is a remedial statute. As such, by principle, it should be liberally construed to afford benefits to a displ ace d employee. Empire Iron Mining Partnership v Orhanen, 455 Mich 410, 415-416; 565 NW2d 844 (1997). My constructionalso furthers the pu rpose of the act, which is "to lighten the burden of econ omi c insecurity on those who become unemployed through no fault of their own." Id. at 417. B. THE PHRASE "IS RECEIVING OR WILL RECEIVE" I also disagree with the majority's re ject ion of the Court of App eals finding that, within the meaning of MCL

4 Defendant did not at any point during the tri al a nd appellate proceeding contest this. Accordingly, there is no reasonfor this Court to question the accuracy of plaintiff's assertionthat she was requi red to see her retirement funds distributed. The record supports the claim. 6421.27(f)(1), the funds were not "received." Once again, the majority brushes aside reasonable interpretations other than its own and characterizes a word as unambiguous. The facts of this case show that plaintiff did not take the pe nsio n funds into her possession within the dictionary definition of "receive." Instead, defendant transferred the funds directly into an individual retirement account in her

name. The Court of Appeals decision inte rpre ted "receive" by relying in part on interpretive letters issued by the United States Department of Labor (USDOL) 5 and the Michigan Employment Security Commission. 6 Both conclude that, when an employer transfers an employee's retir ement funds into an individual retirement account, the employee does not receive them for purposes of the relevant unemployment compensation laws. The majority ignores these letters, choosing instead to construct a definition of "receive" o n the basis of a dissen tin g opinion 7 and dictionary definitions. However, it is a long-established principle of law that "'[t]he

5 USDOL Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 22-87, Change 1 (June 19, 1995).

6 Michigan Employment Security Commission Revised Benefit Interpretation No. 20.641 (November 29, 1995).

7 The majority adopts the reasoning from the dissenting opinionin White v McLouth S tee l Products , decided sub nom Corbett v Plymouth Twp , 453 Mich 522; 556 NW2d 478 (1996). In so doing, it reverses that part of White that is inconsistent withits holding. There is no reason to reach White . That case is easily distinguishable on the basis of the statutory provisions involved. 7constructiongiven to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful considerationand ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons.'" Oakland Schs Bd of Ed v Superintendent of Pub Inst, 401 Mich 37, 41; 257 NW2d 73 (1977), quoting United States v Moore , 95 US (5 Otto) 760; 24 L Ed 588 (1877). The majority offers no cogent reason to deviate from the administrative agencies' interpretations, which provide a reasonable construction of the statutory language consistent witht he purpos e and the policy of the MESA. This Court shouldaccord that interpretation due deference andhold that plai ntif f did not receive a retirement benefit within the meaning of § 27(f) of the MESA. II. PUBLIC POLICY The controversy here regarding the correct interpretation of the statutory defini tion of "retirement benefit" is best resolved by considering the public policy expressly declared in the MESA. It provides: Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the health, mor als, and welfare of the people of this state. Involuntary unemployment is a subject of gene ral interest and concernwhich requires action by the legislature to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which so often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his family, to the detriment of the welfare of the people of this state. Social security requires protection against this hazard of our economic life. Employers should be encouraged to provide stable employment. The systematic accumulation of funds during periods of employment to provide benefits for periods of unemployment by the setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own, thus maintaining purchasing power and limiting the serious social consequences of relief assi stan ce, is for the public good, and 8the general welfare of the people of this state. [MCL 421.2.] The majority disregards this part of the act despite the fact that the Legislature's declaration of public po licy containedthere is of pa ramo unt importance. Plaintiff lost her position with defendant as a result of defendant's decisionto close the facility where she worked. She had vestedpension benefits that defendant distributed and treated as hers prematurely. Haddefendant offered plaintiff reasonable employment, plaintiff could have left her pension benefi ts u ndisturbed. Instead, it terminated plaintiff's employment and prevented her from drawing unemployment b enefit s. It required her to choose between paying her current living expenses or preseving her retirement monies, contrary to the explicit public policy of the state. Defendant's scheme only exacerbated plaintiff's economic insecurity. III. CONCLUSION Ambiguity exists in the statutory language of § 27(f)(4)(a) of the MESA that defines a "retirement benefit" as not including an amount paid in the course of liquidation of a private pension or retirement fund. The Court should ascertainthe Legislature's intent in using that expression by referring to the stated purpose of the MESA and the underlying public policy. With these in mind, the only reason abl e construction is one that defines a pension distribution made under the circumstances of this case as not constituti ng a "retirement benefit."

9The meaning of "receive" is also subject to differing

reas onable interpretations. In construing it, this Court shoulddefer to the meaning that the state and federal agencies responsible for administering unemployment compensationhave given to it. The majority ignores this principle, preferring a definition constructed from a dissenting opinion and dictionary definitions, which it contends is in keeping with the plain meaning of the statute. This approach is contrary to the reasonable interpretation advancedby the administrative agencies and to the purpose of andthe policy underlying the MESA. The term should be construedas not inclusive of retirement funds transferred directly into an individual retirement account. I would affirm the Court of Appeals ho ldin g that plaintiff was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits under the MESA. M

ARKMAN , J., took no part in the decision of this case.

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