alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                           1,746
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,088
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,545
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                16,492
<PP&E>                                          29,652
<DEPRECIATION>                                  11,853
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  72,749
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           10,965
<BONDS>                                         17,886
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            79
<OTHER-SE>                                      45,195
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    72,749
<SALES>                                         80,932
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                80,932
<CGS>                                           62,625
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   62,625
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 8,443
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 2,219
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 961
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,684
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,774
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              3,910
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     3,910
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.48
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.47


</TABLE>
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.1

                     MANAGING GENERAL PARTNER CERTIFICATION
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Edward B. Lipkin, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of National Property Analysts
Master Limited Partnership;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: March 29, 2006

By: EBL&S, Inc., its managing general
    partner


By: /s/ Edward B. Lipkin
    ---------------------------------
Name: Edward B. Lipkin
Title: President
#### Douglas Robert COLLIER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Arnold SCHWARZENEGGER, Mr.; et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 07-16538.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 10, 2011.

Douglas Robert Collier, San Quentin, CA, pro se.

*752Amber N. Wipfler, Esquire, Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Douglas Robert Collier appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We dismiss.

Collier contends that the Board’s 2005 decision to deny him parole was not supported by “some evidence” and therefore violated his due process rights. After briefing was completed in this case, this court held that a certificate of appealability (“COA”) is required to challenge the denial of parole. *See Hayward v. Marshall,*608 F.3d 546, 554-55 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). Now the Supreme Court has held that the only federal right at issue in the parole context is procedural, and the only proper inquiry is what process the inmate received, not whether the state court decided the case correctly. *See Swarthout v. Cooke,*— U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 859, 862-63, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011). Because Collier raises no procedural challenges, a COA cannot issue, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. *See*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                          16,893
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                             232
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                 3,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     36,986
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        129,635
<ALLOWANCE>                                      2,219
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 198,241
<DEPOSITS>                                     176,279
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                              3,228
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        15,203
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,327
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 198,241
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 12,506
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                2,328
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   452
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                15,286
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               5,241
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               5,321
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            9,965
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    1,353
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                (19)
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                  3,406
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,107)
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                     (2,339)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    135
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,274)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.68)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.68)
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    6.38
<LOANS-NON>                                      1,736
<LOANS-PAST>                                        48
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 1,615
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                      895
<RECOVERIES>                                       146
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                2,219
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                          2,219


</TABLE>
#### Shannon RIVERA, Margaret O’Rama, her mother, Appellants v. HOPATCONG BOROUGH POLICE DEPARTMENT; Joseph Costello; Sussex County Prosecutor’s Office.

No. 10-1582.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 25, 2011.

Filed: March 31, 2011.

Robert A. Scirocco, Esq., Budd Lake, NJ, for Appellants.

Peter J. Lamont, Esq., James M. McCarthy, Esq., McCarthy & Jennerich, Rutherford, NJ, for Hopatcong Borough Police Department; Joseph Costello; Sussex County Prosecutor’s Office.

BEFORE: FUENTES, SMITH, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

Shannon Rivera and her mother Margaret O’Rama appeal to this Court from an order for summary judgment entered in the District Court on February 3, 2010, in favor of the appellees in accordance with *155that Court’s opinion of that day. This action arose out of appellees’ involvement in the prosecution of Rivera in the New Jersey state courts on charges relating to the dissemination of a nude photograph of a minor on the Internet. Rivera was acquitted of the charges in juvenile court. Appellants asserted both federal and state claims.

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 1367 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary jurisdiction on this appeal, see *Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States,*559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir.2009), and therefore can affirm only if appellees can show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [they are] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

After our review of this matter we are in full accord with the District Court’s disposition of this case and can add nothing substantial to its opinion. Consequently, we will affirm the order of February 3, 2010, for the reasons it set forth in its opinion. The parties will bear their own costs on this appeal.
#### Mario A. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Respondent.

No. 2011-3068.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

July 12, 2011.

Before GAJARSA, MAYER, and PROST, Circuit Judges.

ON MOTION

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) moves to dismiss Mario A. Mendoza’s petition for review as untimely.

On October 22, 2010, an administrative judge issued an initial decision, affirming OPM’s denial of Mendoza’s claims, and notifying Mendoza that, absent an appeal to the Board, the decision would become final on November 26, 2010. The Board further informed Mendoza that any petition for review must be received by this court within 60 calendar days of the date the initial decision became final. Mendoza did not appeal the initial decision to the Board. Mendoza’s petition for review was received by the court on January 27, 2011, 62 days after the Board’s decision became final on November 26.

A petition for review must be received by the court within 60 days of receipt of notice of the Board’s final order. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1). To be timely filed, the peti*978tion must be received by this court on or before the date that the petition is due. *Pinat v. Office of Personnel Management,*931 F.2d 1544, 1546 (Fed.Cir.1991) (petition is filed when received by this court; court dismissed petition received nine days late).

Because Mendoza’s petition was not timely received by this court, it must be dismissed based on controlling precedent of this court. *See Oja v. Dep’t of the Army,*405 F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed.Cir.2005) (“Seeing no specific authorization for the equitable tolling of section 7703(b)(1), we find that the congressionally approved statements of Rules 15(a)(1) and 26(b)(2) require the conclusion first reached in *Monzo*and herein followed. Compliance with the filing deadline for 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1) is a prerequisite to our exercise of jurisdiction over this case.”).

Accordingly,

It Is Ordered That-.

(1) OPM’s motion to dismiss is granted.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.
#### Anne Grezinsky et al., Appellants, v Mount Hebron Cemetery et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[857 NYS2d 907]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Martin Shulman, J.), entered May 3, 2007, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Under New York’s transactional approach to the doctrine of res judicata *(see O'Brien v City of Syracuse,*54 NY2d 353, 357 [1981]), the court properly held this action barred because the claims were litigated or could have been litigated in the prior Kings County action commenced in 1995 *(Marinelli Assoc. v Helmsley-Noyes Co.,*265 AD2d 1 [2000]). That action was dismissed for failure to prosecute, a motion to vacate was denied, and each court found that despite numerous opportunities, plaintiffs failed to set forth a meritorious cause of action *(see Grezinsky v Mount Hebron Cemetery,*305 AD2d 542 [2003]). We have considered plaintiffs’ remaining arguments and find them without merit. Concur—Lippman, P.J., Mazzarelli, Williams, Sweeny and Acosta, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Anthony McKnight, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 449]

—Appeal by the defendant from two judgments of the Supreme Court, Kings County (McKay, J.), both rendered December 19, 1995, convicting him of robbery in the second degree under Indictment No. 8197/95, and robbery in the third degree under Superior Court Information No. 15072/95, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences. The appeal under Indictment No. 8197/95 brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence.

Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.

The defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal forecloses review of his claim that the sentence imposed under Indictment No. 8197/95 was excessive *(see, People v Allen,*82 NY2d 761; *People v Burk,*181 AD2d 74; *see also, People v Seaberg,*74 NY2d 1).

Since the defendant was never informed at the plea allocution that the plea was conditioned upon his waiver of his statutory right to seek review of the suppression court’s ruling, the defendant did not waive his right to review the denial of that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence. In any event, the record in this case demonstrates *391that “the police conduct in this case was justified in its inception and reasonably limited in scope at each step in response to the circumstances presented” *(People v Nelson,*222 AD2d 614, 615; *People v Bianchi,*208 AD2d 551, *affd*85 NY2d 1022; *see also, People v Landy,*59 NY2d 369). Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the identification procedure employed was not improper under the circumstances presented *(see, People v Duuvon,*77 NY2d 541). O’Brien, J. P., Ritter, Thompson and Joy, JJ., concur.
Honorable Richard E. Rudeloff Opinion No. 

### wW-181.

County Attorney, Bee County Beeville, Texas Re: Authority of Commissioners’ Court to purchase law library from legal representative of deDear Sir: ceased District Judge.

Your opinion request of June 17, 

### 1957,presents the question of whether the Commissioners I Court of Bee County has the authority to purchase the law library of the late W. G. Gayle, formerly Judge of the 

### 36thJudicial District, from the legal representatfve of the late Judge Gayle.

Section 1, Article 1702h, Revised Civil Statutes, provides that Commissioners ( Courts of all counties have the authority, by first entering an order, to establish and maintain a County LawLibrary. Section 2 provides that the Court mayappropriate $10,000 or such part thereof as it may deem necessary, to properly establish such lfbrary.

The legal representative of a deceased District Judge, considered only as a legal representatfve, is a stranger as regards the Commissioners’ Court. He is not an “officer of any

“interested in the purchase of anything

~~~“,~~‘of such counti”‘within the meaning of Article 

### 373. . onVernon’s Penal Code. This statute fully covers the self-dealing situation which would exfst if the legal representative were a member of the Commissioners’ Court. Weassume that neither the legal representative nor any of the heirs or legatees of the deceased District Judge are county officers so as to come within the scope .of Article 

### 373$Vernon’s ?enal Code.

If the Commissioners’ Court has established, on its own initiative , a County LawLibrary in accordance with the provisions of Article 1702h,.,Vernonss Revised Civfl Statutes, the Commissioners’ Court maypurchase a law library from the legal representative of a deceased District Judge.Honorable Richard E. Rudeloff, page 2 

### W-181)

Under certain assumptions, the Commlssloners'Court has the authority to purchase a law library from the legal representative of a deceased District Judge. Very truly yours, WILLWILSON Attorney General of Texas

JRLtpf:wb Assfstant

APPROVED: OPINIONCOMMITTEE H. Grady Chandler, Chairman Larry Jones Joe Rollins Milton Richardson REVIEWED

FORTHEATTORNEY GENERAL BY: Geoo P. Blackburn
#### Sulter vs. Brooks *et al.*

1. Where five garnishees, under proceedings against the same defendant, each answered that he owed the defendant nothing, and each prayed to be allowed five dollars as expenses of making the answer, and a joint judgment was rendered in their favor against the plaintiff for twenty-five dollars, and he thereupon excepted, the ■ writ of error will not be dismissed on the ground that the case of' each garnishee was separate, and should have been brought up by ■ a separate writ of error.

2. If a garnishee truly answers that he owes the defendant nothing, and if he had incurred any expenses in making such answer, the ■ amount so incurred shall be taxed in the bill of costs under the approval of the court, and shall be paid by the party cast in the suit, as other costs are now paid. .A judgment is necessary to approve it; and where, in such a case, the expenses. of answering ■ were fully proved, and no contesting testimony was offered, a judgment for the amount so proved was proper. 53 *Ga.,*28; Code,. §3549.

Judgment affirmed.

January 6, 1885.

Jacksonj Chief Justice.
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-24-00192-CV

IN RE EDWARDO MEZA

______________

Original Proceeding

From the 443rd District Court

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court No. 44628CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed by Relator Edwardo Meza on June 24, 

2024 is denied.

STEVE SMITH

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Johnson, and

Justice Smith

(Chief Justice Gray dissents)

Petition denied

Opinion delivered and filed June 27, 2024

[OT06]
Exhibit 32.01
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 
 I, Gary Herman, certify that:
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report Form 10-Q of Digital Creative Development Corporation for the quarter ending December 31, 2009 (the “Report”), the undersigned officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of his knowledge:
 
 (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 June 3, 2011
/s/ Gary HermanGary Herman,

President
#### Miron Zohar et al., Appellants, v 3 West 16th Associates, LLC., et al., Respondents.

[858 NYS2d 656]

Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara R. Kapnick, J.), entered December 5, 2007, insofar as appealed from, upon a nonjury verdict in favor of defendants on the first and second causes of action of the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The trial court correctly concluded that plaintiffs were not *209entitled to recovery under their first (breach of contract) and second (specific performance) causes of action. The two preliminary agreements signed by the parties were not intended to bind the parties to a real estate transaction prior to the execution of a formal contract *(see BMH Realty v 399 E. 72nd St. Owners,*221 AD2d 165 [1995]). Rather, the inclusion of a term stating that in the event that the formal contract is not signed, defendant seller agrees to pay plaintiff Interbelmont Realty’s broker’s fee within the time frame for signing the formal contract, establishes that the parties intended to leave themselves the option of not going forward with the deal *(see Brause v Goldman,*10 AD2d 328, 332-333 [1960], *affd*9 NY2d 620 [1961]). Concur—Lippman, EJ., Mazzarelli, Williams, Sweeny and Acosta, JJ.