Citations and pinpoint citations are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
I n the M atter of the Guardianship of : D.F.R. , and D.C.R., Alleged i ncapacitated

Persons

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No. 82316

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with No. 82317

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- I ) DIVISION ONE UNPUBLISHED OPINION

H AZELRIGG , J.

— Sarah Riley 1 appeals from order s appointing Rebecca Riley guardian of Sarah’s two minor children, D.F.R. and D.C.R

. She alleges: (1) guardianship was the improper statutory vehicle for the action because there are insufficient procedural safeguards to protect her fundamental right to parent, (2) substantial evidence does not support the determination that guardianship w as in the children’s best interests, (3) the court erred in granting the guardianship petition of one child when that child was not present at the guardianship hearing, (4) the appointment of the G uardian A d L item (GAL) was improper because he was not free from influence, and (5) her due process rights were violated when she was not properly served prior to the appointment of the GAL in the guardianship proceeding. Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, but prior to oral argument, the
trial court granted the emancipation petitions of D.F.R. and D.C.R. in separate

1 Because the parties share a last name, we refer to them by their first names. No disrespect is intended.No.82316

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proceedings, which functionally terminated the guardianship s which were based solely on age. Because this court can no longer provide effective relief, we decline to reach the merits of any of S arah’s claims and dismiss the appeal as moot

.
FACTS In September 2020, Rebecca Riley filed petition s for guardianship of her minor niece and nephew pursuant to former chapter 11.88 RCW (2020). A hearing was held on December 23, 2020, after which the superior court appointed Rebecca guardian of the children’s persons and estates. Sarah Riley, the children’s mother, timely appealed. At oral argument before this court on January 20, 2022 , the parties informed the panel that both minor children had peti tioned for emancipation

on November 23, 2021 and that the trial court granted the petitions on January 3 , 2022. The parties failed to submit documentation of this change to the panel prior to oral argument on appeal

. This court sua sponte granted permiss ion under RAP
7.2 to seek an order terminating the guardianship and further directed the parties
to supplement the record on appeal with the relevant pleadings from the emancipation proceedings

.
ANALYSIS
I. Mootness Once the emancipation petition was granted, the guardianship s were effectively terminated as a matter of law , though the trial court delayed entering
order s terminating the guardianship s because this appeal was pending.No.82316

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- A ny minor 16 years of age or older may petition “for a declaration of emancipation.” RCW 13.64.010. If the petition is granted , the minor has “the power and capacity of an adult.” RCW 13.64.060. Here, t he sole basis for the guardianships was the age of Sarah’s children. The orders on emancipation provide them with all t he rights of a legal adult, despite their age. Although the parties concede the case is moot, Sarah ask s this court to reach the merits of her first assignment of error under the continuing and substantial public interest exception to mootness. As a general rule, we decline to issue decisions if a case is moot. In re Marriage of Horner , 151 Wn.2d 884, 891 , 93 P.3d 124 (2004) . “ ‘ A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief. ’ ” Id

. (quoting Orwick v. City of Seattle , 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984)). However, if a case presents “matters of continuing and substantial public interest,” we may exercise our
discretion and decide an otherwise moot issue. Sorenson v. City of Bellingham , 80 Wn.2d 547, 558 , 496 P.2d 512 (1972 ) . In determining whether there is a continuing and substantial public interest, we consider “ ‘ (1) whether the issue is of a public or private nature, ’ ” (2) whether it “ ‘ is desirable to provide future guidance to public officers, ’ ” and “ ‘ (3) whether the i ssue is likely to recur. ’ ” 2
Horner , 151 Wn.2d at 892 (quoting Westerman , 125 Wn.2d at 286).
T he guardianship s at issue here , which were solely based on the fact that the children were minors, have effectively been terminated and the children are legally emancipated. Additionally, guardianship over the children had been

2 We also consider the level of advocacy and the likelihood the issue will escape review. Homer , 151 Wn.2d at 892

. Neithe r are pertinent here.No.82316

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established under former chapter 11.88 RCW , which has been repealed. L AWS

OF 2020 , ch. 312, § 904

. It was replaced by the Uniform Guardianshi p, Conservatorship, and Alternatives Act. See Ch. 11.130 RCW

. The new statutory framework contains additional safeguards to protect the fundamental right to parent, such as requiring additional findings 3 , providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent 4 , and explicitly noting the guardian has parental powers and duties 5

. Accordingly , the issues presented in this appeal are unlikely to recur, and there is no need for this court to provide guidance on a statute that
has been superseded

. T he appeal is dismissed as moot

.

WE CONCUR:

3 RCW 11.130.185 4 RCW 11.130.200 5 RCW 11.130. 235