alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### TEXA S COU RT O F AP PEAL S, THIR D DISTRIC T, AT AU STIN NO. 03-00-00746-CR
Christine Lee Mea d, Appellant

v. The State of Texas , Appellee FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAYS COUNTY, 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. CR-94-0060, HO NORABLE CHARL ES R. RAMSAY, JUDG E PRESIDING Christ ineLee Mea

d app eals f

rom a n orde r revoki ng c omm uni ty s uperv i sion. She was pla ced on su perv i sion f oll owi ng a conv i cti on f or f elo ny d r iv i

ng w hi l e i ntoxi cated. SeeTex. Penal Code An n. §§ 49.04(a), .09(b) (West Supp. 200 1). Th e c ourt i m pos ed sente nc e of i m prison men t f or fi ve y ears and a $750 f

in e. Appellant’s co ur t - ap po int ed at t o r ne y filed a b r ief c o nc lud ing t ha t t he ap pe al is fri volous and wi

thout m eri t. Th e b rief meets th e r eq ui re men ts o f Anders

v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967 ), by pre sent ing a pr ofe ssio nal evalua t ion o f the re co rd demo nst ra t ing why t her e ar e no ar gu ab le grounds t o be advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio , 48 8 U. S. 75 ( 198 8); High v. State , 573 S.W.2d 807 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 78) ; Curr ie v. State , 516 S.W.2d

684 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 74) ; Jackson v. State , 485 S. W.2d 553 (T ex. Cr im . App . 19 72) ; Gainous v. State , 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) . A copy

of counsel ’s b

rief was del iv ered t o a ppe llant, and a ppe llant wa s ad vised o f her r ight to exam in e the appel

la te recor d and to file

a pro se brie f. No pro se bri ef h as been fi le d.2 We have r eviewe d t he record and counsel ’s b rief and agree that the appeal

is fri volous an d w it ho ut mer it . We find no t hing in t he r ec o r d t ha t migh t ar gu ab ly su pp o r t t he ap pe al.

The order revoking c omm uni ty superv is ion i s af fi rmed.

__________________________________________ Davi d Puryear, Justice Bef ore Justices K

idd, B. A . Smi

th and Pury

ear Af fi rmed File d: August 9, 2001 Do No t Publis

h
##### 



Exhibit 32.2 SECTION 906
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, the undersigned officer of National
Processing, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge,
that the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March
31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Dated: May 7, 2004
    
    /s/ David E. Fountain
Name: David E. Fountain
Title: Senior Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
#### Winfred Howard LAVIRGNE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. James A. YATES, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-17365.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 14, 2011.*

Filed March 16, 2011.

Cheryl Rae Anderson, Esquire, Central California Appellate Program, Sacramento, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Winfred Howard Lavirgne, Coalinga, CA, pro se.

*775Before: WALLACE, NOONAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner-Appellant Winfred Howard Lavirgne, a California state prisoner, appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253.

Lavirgne’s argument that he “had an absolute right to amend [his] habeas petition once” falls outside the scope of the certifícate of appealability. *Hiivala v. Wood,*195 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam).

We choose not to expand the scope of the certificate of appealability because Lavirgne has not demonstrated a “ ‘substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’ ” *Id.*at 1104, *quoting*28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Prior to a summary dismissal by the district court, a habeas petitioner must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard. *Herbst v. Cook,*260 F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir.2001). Lav-irgne was given notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the sua sponte dismissal of his habeas petition. In response, Lavirgne failed to present any colorable argument why the statute of limitations on his habeas petition should be tolled or how the statute of limitations was improperly calculated by the California Superior Court. Neither does he identify on appeal anything other than hypothetical speculation to support the proposition that his petition was not untimely. Lavirgne’s argument that he must also be given an opportunity to amend his habeas petition has no support in the caselaw.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-1697

YOSEPH NIGATU BEZABEH, Petitioner, versus ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A97-629-491) Submitted: February 24, 2006 Decided: March 15, 2006 Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Alan M. Parra, LAW OFFICE OF ALAN M. PARRA, Bethesda, Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, M. Jocelyn Lopez-Wright, Assistant Director, Diane Kelleher, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Yoseph Nigatu Bezabeh, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) denying his motion to reopen immigration proceedings. A denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of discretion. INS v. Doherty , 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992). A denial of a motion to reopen must be reviewed with extreme deference, since immigration statutes do not contemplate reopening and the applicable regulations disfavor motions to reopen. M.A. v. INS , 899 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc). The Board ruled that Bezabeh did not warrant the exercise of favorable discretion because he did not produce evidence sufficient to overcome the immigration judge’s adverse credibility finding. We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that Bezabeh fails to show that the evidence compels a contrary result. Accordingly, we find that no abuse of discretion occurred, and therefore deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Michael Turnbull, Appellant.

[860 NYS2d 189]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Putnam County (Rooney, J.), rendered April 1, 2003, convicting him of rape in the first degree, sodomy (now criminal sexual act) in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to concurrent determinate terms of imprisonment of 24 years on the conviction of rape in the first degree, 20 years on the conviction of sodomy (now criminal sexual act) in the first degree, 7 years on the conviction of burglary in the second degree, and 1 year on the conviction of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of rape in the first degree from 24 years to 20 years; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that a severance was warranted is unpreserved for appellate review *(see People v Islam,*22 AD3d 599 [2005]; *People v Santiago,*204 AD2d 497 [1994]). In any event, the defendant’s contention is without merit, as the core of each defense was not in irreconcilable conflict with the other *(see People v Sabatino,*41 AD3d 871 [2007]; *People v Watkins,*10 AD3d 665, 665-666 [2004]; *People v Martins,*306 AD2d 423 [2003]; *cf. People v Mahboubian,*74 NY2d 174, 184 [1989]). As the “proof against the defendants [was] supplied by the same evidence, only the most cogent reasons [would] warrant a severance” *(People v Bornholdt,*33 NY2d 75, 87 [1973], *cert denied sub nom. Victory v New York,*416 US 905 [1974]; *see People v Martins,*306 AD2d at 423). Where there is no irreconcilable conflict in the defenses and the defenses are fundamentally similar, a severance is not warranted *(see People v Peisahkman,*29 AD3d 352 [2006]). In this case, there was no irreconcilable conflict and the defenses were not only fundamentally similar, but largely identical.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a *748reasonable doubt. Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility is primarily a matter to be determined by the jury, which saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination should be accorded great deference on appeal *(see People v*Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644-645 [2006]; *People v Mateo,*2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], *cert denied*542 US 946 [2004]). Upon the exercise of our factual review power *(see*CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence *(see People v Romero,*7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The sentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated herein. Mastro, J.P, Skelos, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Frank DaCosta, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 494]

—Appeal by the de*526fendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Brill, J.), rendered July 5, 1995, convicting him of burglary in the first degree, assault in the second degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and endangering the welfare of a child (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court conducted a proper inquiry as to defense counsel’s claimed conflict of interest (see, *People v Gomberg,*38 NY2d 307, 314; *People v Hunt,*227 AD2d 568).

The defendant’s remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit. Bracken, J. P., Thompson, Goldstein and Lerner, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Cara J. David, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[860 NYS2d 298]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed February 22, 2007, which, upon reconsideration, adhered to its prior decision ruling that claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because her employment was terminated due to misconduct.

Substantial evidence supports the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruling that claimant, a news writer, was discharged from her employment due to disqualifying misconduct—namely, violating the employer’s policy prohibiting an employee from recording conversations in the workplace without the prior approval of the human resources department or the consent of all parties. Claimant admitted *1083that she brought a tape recorder to a meeting with three members of the employer’s management team with the intent to record the ensuing conversation. Although claimant professed to be unaware of the policy governing the recording of conversations in the workplace, she nonetheless acknowledged receiving a copy of the employer’s handbook setting forth its policy in this regard. Similarly, while claimant turned off the recorder when asked to do so, she also admitted that she previously recorded a conversation with her supervisor. Absent any indication that claimant obtained the required approval or consent in advance, her violation of the employer’s established policy could be found to constitute disqualifying misconduct (see *Matter of Goldman [Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr.—Commissioner of Labor],*42 AD3d 847 [2007]; *Matter of Ackermann [New York City Dept. of Citywide Admin. Servs.—Commissioner of Labor],*31 AD3d 1040 [2006]; *Matter of Gallagher [Commissioner of Labor],*13 AD3d 702 [2004]).

As a final matter, claimant admitted that she was discharged but nonetheless indicated, when filing for unemployment insurance benefits, that she lost her employment due to a lack of work. Under such circumstances, we find no basis upon which to disturb the Board’s finding that claimant made a willful false statement to obtain unemployment insurance benefits *(see Matter of Attara [Permis Constr. Corp.—Commissioner of Labor],*257 AD2d 936, 937 [1999]).

Cardona, P.J., Spain, Rose, Kane and Kavanagh, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
Opinion issued April 28, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00046-CV

———————————

ANNIE EAST, Appellant

V.

SOUTHWEST CIMM’S INC. D/B/A BURGER KING #1002 

A/K/A CIMM’S INCORPORATED, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 997701

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Annie East, has filed two unopposed motions to dismiss this

appeal, informing the Court that “all matters in controversy” between the parties
2

have been “settled” and “resolved.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1). The parties 

have agreed that each will bear its own costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(d). 

We grant the motions and dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P.

42.1(a)(1). We withdraw our August 28, 2014 majority and dissenting opinions 

and judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(c). We dismiss all other pending motions 

as moot. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Brown, and Lloyd.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-1697

YOSEPH NIGATU BEZABEH,

Petitioner,

versus

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A97-629-491)

Submitted: February 24, 2006 Decided: March 15, 2006

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Alan M. Parra, LAW OFFICE OF ALAN M. PARRA, Bethesda, Maryland, for

Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, M.

Jocelyn Lopez-Wright, Assistant Director, Diane Kelleher, Office of

Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Yoseph Nigatu Bezabeh, a native and citizen of Ethiopia,

petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (Board) denying his motion to reopen immigration

proceedings. 

A denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992). A denial

of a motion to reopen must be reviewed with extreme deference,

since immigration statutes do not contemplate reopening and the

applicable regulations disfavor motions to reopen. M.A. v. INS,

899 F.2d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).

The Board ruled that Bezabeh did not warrant the exercise

of favorable discretion because he did not produce evidence

sufficient to overcome the immigration judge’s adverse credibility

finding. We have reviewed the evidence of record and conclude that

Bezabeh fails to show that the evidence compels a contrary result.

Accordingly, we find that no abuse of discretion occurred, and

therefore deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
CIRCUIT COURT OF STAFFORD COUNTY

#### Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Lawrence J. Dupre, Sr., and Doris Dupre, Administrators of the Estate of Lawrence J. Dupre, Jr., et al.

December 20, 1985

By JUDGE JOHN A. JAMISON

Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment in the above styled matter, and a hearing was held on November 22, 1985.

I have carefully studied the transcript of your opening statements and arguments as well as the memoranda and my bench notes. The moving party in this case has asked the court "to determine the rights, privileges, duties and obligations" of GEICO under a contract of insurance issued to James B. Durnil, the owner of the vehicle in question, insured by GEICO.

On August 22, 1984, Mr. Durnil left his car for repairs at Automotive Classics located at that time in Arlington, Virginia. The owners of that firm, David O’Connell and Ross Montgomery, moved their repair shop and Mr. Durnil’s car to Stafford County and as of October 15, 1984, Mr. Durnil’s car had not been repaired. On the evening of that same date, at approximately 8:00 P.M., O’Connell and Montgomery allowed Lawrence J. Dupre to drive the Durnil vehicle, "to try out the car." At 8:10 P.M., some ten minutes later, Dupre, the driver of Durnil’s car, and O’Connell and Montgomery, passengers in Durnil’s car, were involved in a head-on collision with Ronald E. Holland.

The main issue to be decided here is whether Mr. Dupre had the express or implied permission of Mr. Durnil to *277operate his automobile. According to Code Section 38.1-381  :

> No policy. . . shall be issued. . . to the owner of such vehicle. . . unless it contains a provision insuring the named insured and any other person responsible for the use of or using the motor vehicle. . . with the consent, expressed or implied, of the named insured.

Mr. Hayes, counsel for Ronald Holland, cites in his trial brief the case of *Virginia Farm Bureau*v. *Apco,*228 Va. 72 (1985), in which the Supreme Court has said:

> One with whom the named insured has left a vehicle for general use may permit its use by another, who will be deemed to have the permission of the named insured.

The question then becomes one of construction of the term "general use." The scope of the permission is a question of fact and must be decided after a review of all of the circumstances.

It is clear that Mr. Durnil took his car to Automotive Classics for repairs by an employee of that firm. Mr. Dupre was merely a friend with some experience in the repair of cars, not an employee or agent of Automotive Classics. Durnil’s permission extended only to Automotive Classics.

In view of the above finding, that Mr. Dupre lacked either express or implied authority within the meaning of the Statute, it follows that Mr. Durnil’s carrier, GEICO, is not primarily responsible for coverage in these circumstances, and the court will so hold.
---

**Exhibit 7**

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. §1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Minefinders Corporation Ltd. (the Company) on Form 40-F for the period ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Mark H. Bailey, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)

The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)

The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                      |  |     |  |                                                                               
|--------------------- |  | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                      |  |     |  |                                                                               
|Date:  March 10, 2009 |  | By: |  | /s/ Mark H. Bailey
      
      Mark H. Bailey
        Chief Executive Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Minefinders Corporation Ltd. and will be retained by Minefinders Corporation Ltd. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



---
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
                     906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the Annual  report on Form 10KSB of ATEL Cash  Distribution
Fund VI, LP, (the "Partnership") for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),
and  pursuant  to 18  U.S.C.  ss.1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  ss.906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, I, Paritosh K. Choksi,  Chief Financial  Officer of
ATEL Financial Services, LLC, general partner of the Partnership, hereby certify
that:

1. The Report fully complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ; and

2. The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Partnership.

Date:     3/29/2005



/s/ Paritosh K. Choksi
----------------------------------
Paritosh K. Choksi
Executive Vice President of General
Partner, Principal financial officer of registrant
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, Kenneth A. Shewer, Co-Chief Executive Officer of Preferred Investment Solutions Corp., the Managing
Owner of Diversified Futures Trust I (Registrant), hereby certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | Registrants Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Annual Report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Registrant.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                             
|-----------------------------
|/s/ Kenneth A. Shewer        
|Kenneth A. Shewer            
|Co-Chief Executive Officer   
|(Principal Executive Officer)
|March 30, 2007