alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SELIM UMIT KUCUK, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

CENTRAL WASHINGTON 

UNIVERSITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-36020 

D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01262-BAT 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**

Submitted September 18, 2019***

Before: FARRIS, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges. 

Selim Umit Kucuk appeals pro se from the district court’s summary 

judgment in his Title VII employment action. We have jurisdiction under 28 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c).

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

SEP 26 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-36020 

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 

599, 602 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Kucuk’s disparate 

impact discrimination claim because Kucuk failed to raise a genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether defendant’s facially-neutral accreditation requirement 

for tenure-track positions caused a significant discriminatory impact on the basis of 

national origin. See Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(setting forth elements of prima facie case of disparate impact).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kucuk’s request to 

conduct additional discovery in order to oppose summary judgment because Kucuk 

failed to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). 

See Family Home & Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 

822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008) (setting forth standard of review and requirements). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by deeming the expert 

declarations submitted by Kucuk inadmissible. See Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 

285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and stating that 

“unauthenticated documents cannot be considered in a motion for summary 

judgment.”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised in the 

opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See 
3 18-36020 

Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Elias, 

921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the 

district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

Appellee’s opposed motion to strike (Docket Entry No. 9) is denied.

AFFIRMED.
2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-12-2012

Fitzroy Gerald Green v. Atty Gen USA

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 11-3732

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Fitzroy Gerald Green v. Atty Gen USA" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 360.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/360
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

August 14, 2012

No. 11-3732

FITZROY GERALD GREEN,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent

(Agency No. BIA-1: A099-232-461 )

Present: RENDELL, SMITH and BARRY, Circuit Judges

1. Motion filed by the Respondent to publish opinion dated 7/13/12.

2. Response in Opposition to Motion to Publish filed by Petitioner.

Respectfully,

Clerk/trg

_________________________________ORDER________________________________

The foregoing motion is GRANTED. 

By the Court,

/s/Maryanne Trump Barry

Circuit Judge

Dated: September 12, 2012

trg/cc: Elissa C. Steglich, Esq.

Amelia Wilson, Esq.

Jason Wisecup, Esq.
Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,
J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk September 21, 2011

p0914 

# Order

September 21, 2011

141708 & (164)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 141708 COA: 247391 Jackson CC: 02-002915-FC KATHERINE SUE DENDEL a/k/a KATHERINE SUE BURLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

The motion to expedite the application is GRANTED. By or der of February 4, 2011, the application for leave to appeal the August 24, 2010 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyan ce pending the decision in People v Bryant , 483 Mich 132 (2009), cert gtd ___ US ___; 130 S Ct 1685; 176 L Ed 2d 17 9 (2010). On order of the Court, the case having been decided on April 18, 2011, Michigan v Bryant , ___ US ___; 131 S Ct 1143; 179 L Ed 2d 93 (2011), the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not pe rsuaded that the question pr esented should be reviewed by this Court.

M ARILYN K ELLY

, J., would grant leave to appeal.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Alan PINEDA, a.k.a. Juan Antonio Burgos-Skerrett, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-10218.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted March 8, 2011.*

Filed March 15, 2011.

Jeffrey David Nedrow, Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Jose, CA, for Plaintiff-Ap-pellee.

Lupe Martinez, Esquire, San Jose, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Alan Pineda appeals from his guilty-plea conviction and 108-month sentence for conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). Pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), Pineda’s counsel has filed a brief stating there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel of record. We have provided the appellant with the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief have been filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80-81, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief on direct appeal. We dismiss in light of the valid appeal waiver. *See United States v. Nguyen,*235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.2000).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices 

# Order

March 27, 2013

146383

- 4 & (55)(58)

____________________________________

In re APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL

TRANSMISSION COMPANY FOR

EXPEDITED SITING CERTIFICATE

____________________________________

ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESSES

ADVOCATING TARIFF EQUITY,

Appellant/Cross

- Appellee,

v SC: 146383

COA: 303009

Public Service Commission:

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE 00

- 016200

COMMISSION,

Appellee,

and

INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION

COMPANY, d/b/a ITC TRANSMISSION,

Petitioner

- Appellee/

Cross

- Appellant,

and

CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY,

MICHIGAN PUBLIC POWER AGENCY,

and MICHIGAN MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC

ASSOCIATION,

Appellees.

____________________________________/

MICHIGAN PUBLIC POWER AGENCY

and MICHIGAN MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC

ASSOCIATION,

Appellees,

SC: 146384

v COA: 303040

Public Service Commission:

00

- 016200I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

______________________ ___________________ Clerk March 27, 2013

h0320 2

MICHIGAN PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION,

Appellee,

and

INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION

COMPANY, d/b/a ITC TRANSMISSION,

Petitioner

- Appellee/

Cross

- Appellant,

and

CONSUMERS ENERGY COMPANY

Appellee,

and

ASSOCIATION OF BUSINESSES

ADVOCATING TARIFF EQUITY,

Appellant/Cross

- Appellee.

____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the joint motion for immediate consideration is

GRANTED. The application for le ave to appeal the November 6, 2012 judgment of the

Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as cross

- appellant are considered

and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE, in

part, the judgment of the Co urt of Appeals. The Michigan Public Service Commission

correctly determined that issuance of an expedited siting certificate under 2008 PA 295

carries with it authorization to construct the transmission line that is the subject of the

certificate. The Co urt of Appeals clearly erred in determining that Const 1963, art 4, § 25

would be violated if 2008 PA 295 authorizes such construction because 2008 PA 295 was

enacted without re

- enacting and publishing 1995 PA 30, which generally governs

construction of el ectric transmission lines. 2008 PA 295, and particularly Part 4 of the

act, provides a comprehensive legislative scheme for issuing expedited siting certificates,

and clearly intends construction of approved transmission lines. Because 2008 PA 295 is

an act complete in itself, Const 1963, art 4, § 25 is not violated. See Alan v Wayne

County, 388 Mich 210

, 276

- 277 (1972), and People v Mahaney, 13 Mich 481, 496

- 497

(1865). In all other respects, the applications are DENIED, because we are not persuaded

th at the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2980 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2980

To amend title 38, United States Code, to reduce the period of time for 
which a veteran must be totally disabled before the veteran's survivors 
  are eligible for the benefits provided by the Secretary of Veterans 
  Affairs for survivors of certain veterans rated totally disabled at 
                             time of death.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 19, 2009

  Mr. Filner introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 38, United States Code, to reduce the period of time for 
which a veteran must be totally disabled before the veteran's survivors 
  are eligible for the benefits provided by the Secretary of Veterans 
  Affairs for survivors of certain veterans rated totally disabled at 
                             time of death.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDUCTION OF PERIOD OF TIME FOR WHICH VETERANS MUST BE 
              TOTALLY DISABLED FOR PURPOSES OF BENEFITS PROVIDED BY 
              SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS FOR SURVIVORS OF CERTAIN 
              VETERANS RATED TOTALLY DISABLED AT TIME OF DEATH.

    (a) Expansion.--Section 1318(b) of title 38, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``if--'' and all that follows through the period at 
the end and inserting the following: ``if the disability was 
continuously rated totally disabling for a period of not less than one 
year immediately preceding death.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to deaths occurring on or after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

PENELOPE VERONIKIS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 290 MAL 2019

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 22nd day of October, 2019

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED

.
EXHIBIT
32
 
 
 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of The Majestic Star Casino,
LLC, The Majestic Star Casino Capital Corp., and Majestic Star Casino Capital
Corp. II (collectively, the “Registrant”) for the quarter ended March 31, 2009
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), we, Don H. Barden, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Registrant, and Jon S. Bennett, Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
and Treasurer of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:
 
 (1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the
Registrant.
 
 Dated:
May 15, 2009
 
 /s/ Don H.
Barden
 Don H.
Barden
 President
and Chief Executive Officer
 The
Majestic Star Casino, LLC
 The
Majestic Star Casino Capital Corp.
 Majestic
Star Casino Capital Corp. II
 
 /s/ Jon S.
Bennett
 Jon S.
Bennett
 Senior
Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
 The
Majestic Star Casino, LLC
 The
Majestic Star Casino Capital Corp.
 Majestic
Star Casino Capital Corp. II
Exhibit 32.1

# CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC REPORT

|As adopted to
    Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
|---------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                               

I, E. Gerald Kay, the Chief Executive Officer of
Integrated BioPharma, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:

| | 1. |  | the Quarterly Report on Form
    10-QSBof the Company for the quarterly period ended September 30,
    2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
    15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and
| | -- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |    |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
| | 2. |  | the information contained in the
    Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition
    and results of operations of the Company.                                                                                                       
| |    |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    



|                        | INTEGRATED BIOPHARMA, INC.          | 
|----------------------- | ----------------------------------- | 
|                        |                                     | 
|Date: November 15, 2004 | By: /s/ E. Gerald Kay               | 
|                        | Name:  E. Gerald Kay                | 
|                        | Title:  Chief Executive
    Officer |
### NUMBER 13

- 13

- 00 211

- CV


## COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

- EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________ LAWRENCE EUGENE FERNANDEZ , Appellant ,

v.
CESAR GARCIA , Appellee

.

____________________________________________________________

On a ppeal from the 404 t h District Court of Cameron County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________



## MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam
Appellant, Lawrence Eugene Fernandez , perfected an appeal from a judgment
rendered against h im in favor of appellee, Cesar Garcia . On June 19, 2013 , the Clerk of
this Court notified appellant that the clerk 's record in the above cause was originally due

on June 10 , 20 13 , and that the district clerk, Jesus Cantu , had notified this Court that
appellant failed to make arrangements for payment of the clerk's record. The Clerk of2

this Court notified appellant of this defect so that steps could be taken to correct the
defect, if it could be done. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 37.3, 42.3(b),(c). Appellant was advised
that, if the defect was not corrected within ten days from the date of receipt of this notice,
the appeal w ould be dismissed for want of prosecution.

The notice was sent to appellant ’s address by certified mail return receipt
requested ; however, the certified mail was returned as unclaimed and unable to forward.
Subsequently, the Clerk of the Court sent the notice to appellant by regular mail.
Appellant has failed to respond to this Court ’ s notice s . Accordingly, the appeal is

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.3(b), (c).

PER CURIAM

D elivered and filed the 5 th day of September, 2013.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THE SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE UNAUDITED
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF MARCH 31, 2000 AND THE UNAUDITED STATEMENT OF
OPERATIONS FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2000 IN THE REPORT ON FORM
10-Q/A FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2000 OF BRISTOL RETAIL SOLUTIONS,
INC. AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.

</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         393,383
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,390,897
<ALLOWANCES>                                   309,421
<INVENTORY>                                  3,828,026
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,779,199
<PP&E>                                       1,062,469
<DEPRECIATION>                                 514,542
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              13,823,625
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        8,461,448
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  1,100,000
<COMMON>                                         6,968
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,112,418
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                13,823,625
<SALES>                                      6,144,011
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,144,011
<CGS>                                        5,053,648
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                7,233,231
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (8,133)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             138,905
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,219,992)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (1,219,992)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.23)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.23)


</TABLE>
#### E. Anthony Wilson et al., Appellants, v Herbert L. Hochberg et al., Respondents.

[665 NYS2d 653]

—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Sheila Abdus-Salaam, J.), entered on or about November 11, 1996, granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint and denying plaintiffs’ cross motion to consolidate with another related action and bringing up for review, pursuant to CPLR 5517 (b), an order, same court and Justice, entered on or about December 20, 1996, which, *inter alia,*denied plaintiffs’ request for leave to replead and otherwise adhered to its original decision, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Although on a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a complaint, the facts pleaded are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference, nevertheless, allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions, as well as factual claims either inherently incredible or flatly contradicted by documentary evidence, are not entitled to such consideration *(Kliebert v McKoan,*228 AD2d 232, *lv denied*89 NY2d 802). Here, plaintiffs’ causes of *117action for breach of contract by defendants for their alleged failure to sell plaintiffs’ restricted stock pursuant to Securities and Exchange Commission rule 144 (17 CFR 230.144) are flatly contradicted by the documentary evidence in the record, and therefore, were properly dismissed. Defendants followed plaintiffs’ express written directive that the stock be sold at a specified price below market. Any noncompliance by defendants with SEC rule 144 was immaterial to the agreement, which reflected plaintiffs’ motive for the sale—to raise money for personal expenses.

Plaintiffs have not alleged a cause of action for fraud in the inducement and may not convert their so-called contract action into one for fraud by the mere additional allegation that the contracting party did not intend to meet his contractual obligation *(Hudson v Greenwich I Assocs.,*226 AD2d 119, *lv dismissed*89 NY2d 860). Nor did plaintiffs justifiably rely on any misrepresentation by defendants when they decided to contract with them. Further, there was no breach of fiduciary duty by any of the defendants.

Since the record indicates plaintiffs have no viable cause of action against defendants, leave to replead was properly denied (CPLR 3211 [e]; *Hornstein v Wolf,*67 NY2d 721). Concur— Murphy, P. J., Sullivan, Milonas, Mazzarelli and Andrias, JJ.