alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Renee Giovati et al., Respondents, v Halmar Corporation et al., Appellants.

[666 NYS2d 474]

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Miller, J.), dated February 4, 1997, which denied their motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants’ motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 to dismiss the complaint as time-barred is granted.

In a companion appeal, this Court held that a prior identical action between the parties should have been dismissed “with prejudice” *(Giovati v Kavanagh,*245 AD2d 420 [decided herewith]). Accordingly, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of the six-month extension of the Statute of Limitations provided by CPLR 205 (a), and the instant action must be dismissed. Mangano, P. J., Santucci, Joy and Lerner, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.1



Certification by the Chief Executive Officer pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Entheos Technologies, Inc. (the Company) on the Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Harmel Rayat, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(i)

the Report filed by the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii)

The information contained in that Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company on the dates and for the periods presented therein.



|                    |  |                            |  |                                                   
|------------------- |  | -------------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------
|                    |  | ENTHEOS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
|                    |  |                            |  |                                                   
|Date:  May 10, 2006 |  | By:                        |  | /s/ Harmel Rayat                                  
|                    |  |                            |  | Harmel Rayat
President and Chief Executive Officer



This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### In the Matter of Lucille Scola, Also Known as Lucille P. Scola, Deceased. James N. Scola, Administrator of the Estate of Stephen J. Scola, Deceased, Appellant; Kim Pepe, Respondent.

[988 NYS2d 631]

In a probate proceeding in which James N. Scola, as adminis*896trator of the estate of Stephen J. Scola, petitioned pursuant to SCPA 1809 to determine the validity and enforceability of a claim against the estate of Lucille Scola, also known as Lucille E Scola, James N. Scola appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Surrogate’s Court, Queens County (Kelly, S.), dated May 31, 2012, as granted that branch of the cross motion of Kim Pepe, the executor of the subject estate, which was for summary judgment dismissing the petition as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The deceased, Stephen J. Scola (hereinafter Stephen), and his wife, Lucille E Scola (hereinafter Lucille), purchased real property in 1976, which was to be their marital residence. In 1980, Stephen and Lucille entered into a separation agreement which provided, inter alia, that “The Wife shall have exclusive occupancy of the marital abode and may reside there until the child [James Scola] reaches the age of 16 years, or remarries or desires to purchase the home. In that event, the marital abode will be sold to the Wife or to another purchaser at a fair market value.” James Scola (hereinafter James) reached 16 years of age in 1988, but the premises were not sold at that time. Stephen died in 2009 and Lucille died in 2010. At the time of their deaths, the premises had not been sold.

In 2011, James, as administrator of the estate of his father, Stephen Scola, filed a petition to determine the validity of a claim against Lucille’s daughter Kim Pepe (hereinafter Kim), as executor of Lucille’s estate, for one half an ownership interest in the premises. Thereafter, James moved for summary judgment on the petition and Kim cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the petition as time-barred. The Surrogate’s Court denied the motion and granted that branch of the cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the petition as time-barred.

Although a separation agreement is enforceable as a contract, here, the cause of action to recover damages for breach of contract accrued in 1988, on the day of James’s 16th birthday, which was the date the separation agreement directed the sale of the premises and sharing of the proceeds of the sale *(cf. Matter of Violi,*65 NY2d 392 [1985]). Thus, Kim established, prima facie, that the cause of action accrued in 1988 and that the six-year statute of limitations had expired by the time of the filing of the petition in 2011 *(see Fade v Pugliani/Fade,*8 AD3d 612 [2004]). In opposition, James failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(cf. id.).*

Skelos, J.E, Dillon, Roman and Maltese, JJ., concur.
File Name: 09a0374n.06

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

No. 08-5458

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

RONALD R. GAW, Administrator of the Estate

of Clint C. Gaw, deceased; ALEXIS

FRANCISCO, by and through her mother,

guardian and next friend, Robin Francisco,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

MEGAN NEWTON,

Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE WESTERN

DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

/

Before: MARTIN, SUHRHEINRICH, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Clint Gaw was killed when the car he was

driving collided with a train operated by CSX as he crossed railroad tracks bisecting a gravel

driveway. In the pickup truck with him was his girlfriend, Megan Newton, and their six week old

son, Riley Gaw. Ms. Newton and RileyGaw were injured; RileyGaw will likely never fully recover.

Gaw’s survivors brought a diversity tort suit against CSX, charging that the railroad was negligent

under Kentucky law in failing to make the crossing safer or providing sufficient warnings. The

district court granted CSX’s motion for summary judgment, finding that it had not breached its
No. 08-5458

Gaw v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

Page 2

“limited” state law duties.

Having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the lower court opinion, we find that we have

nothing to add to the district court’s thorough disposition of this tragic and unfortunate case. Thus,

for the reasons stated by the lower court, Gaw v. CSX Transportation, Inc., No. 3:05CV-220-MO,

2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23131, 2008 WL 793655 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 24, 2008), we AFFIRM.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

 Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

786 

KA 13-00073 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, PERADOTTO, SCONIERS, AND DEJOSEPH, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 

KACIE MUNSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

ROBERT TUCKER, PALMYRA, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

RICHARD M. HEALY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LYONS (BRUCE A. ROSEKRANS OF COUNSEL), 

FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Wayne County Court (John B. Nesbitt, 

J.), rendered December 13, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon 

his plea of guilty, of assault in the first degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously 

affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon 

his plea of guilty, of assault in the first degree (Penal Law ' 120.10 

[1]). Defendant failed to move to withdraw his plea or to vacate the 

judgment of conviction and thus failed to preserve for our review his 

contention that his plea was not knowing and voluntary (see People v Jones,

118 AD3d 1354, 1354). Defendant also failed to preserve for our review 

his contention that County Court improperly delegated to the prosecutor 

the authority to conduct a portion of the plea allocution (see People 

v Swontek [appeal No. 1], 289 AD2d 989, 989). This case does not fall 

within the narrow exception to the preservation rule (see People v Lopez,

71 NY2d 662, 666).

Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe. 

Entered: August 8, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

CHARLES WILLIAMS,

Petitioner

v.

THE STATE OF PA. DEPT. OF 

CORRECTIONS, JOHN WETZEL, 

AMANDA WEST, MICHAEL OVERMYER, 

DEPUTY SUPT. OBERLANDER, 

DEPUTY SUPT. HORTON, LT. 

HAGGERTY, MAJOR ENNIS, SGT. 

BLOSS, C.O. I BERRY, C.O. III WENTZ, 

C.O. IV DELIMPEW, C.O. I FRIEDLINE, 

MS. SIEGEL, MR. PERRY, MS. BLAKE, 

SGT. KRAFCZNSKI, C.O. I BARB AND 

MR. BLICHA 

Respondents

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 317 WAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Commonwealth Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 28th day of December, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal and Request for Permission to File a Reply are denied.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6535

FRANK M. CONNELL, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

RONALD J. ANGELONE, Director of the Department

of Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District

Judge. (CA-01-806)

Submitted: July 21, 2004 Decided: August 18, 2004

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Frank M. Connell, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Frank M. Connell, Jr., seeks to appeal the district

court’s order denying as untimely his motion for relief from

judgment, filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). An appeal may

not be taken from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding

unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). The certificate of

appealability requirement applies to an order denying a motion

under Rule 60(b). See Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363 (4th Cir.

2004). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his

constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or

wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003);

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d

676, 683 (4th Cir 2001). We have independently reviewed the record

and conclude that Connell has not made the requisite showing.

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       3,527,472
<SECURITIES>                                21,487,774
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,990,534
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,226,524
<PP&E>                                         473,824
<DEPRECIATION>                                 226,464
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              28,534,089
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,657,174
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         9,581
<OTHER-SE>                                  26,863,249
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                28,534,089
<SALES>                                      2,115,799
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,115,799
<CGS>                                           75,885
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,042,277
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           (272,597)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,346,119
<INCOME-TAX>                                   498,064
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            848,055
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   848,055
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .08
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 32.2.1**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, David M. Young, ChiefFinancial Officer of TESSCO Technologies Incorporated, (the “Company”),certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

# 1.             The Annual Report on Form 10-Kof the Company for the period ended March 26, 2006, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), fullycomplies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and

# 2.             The information contained in theReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

| Date: June 19,  2006 |   | /s/ David M. Young |   |
|---------------------------|--------|--------------------|--------|
|                      |   | David M. Young     |   |

 

The foregoingcertification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated byreference into any filing of the Company, whether made before or after the datehereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.

----
#### Elizabeth HILL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-60311.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 31, 2011.

Jonathan Byron Fairbank, Law Office of Jonathan B. Fairbank, Jackson, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Philip W. Gaines, Esq., Currie, Johnson, Griffin, Gaines & Myers, P.A., Jackson, MS, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Elizabeth Hill sued in diversity for bad-faith denial of her workers’ compensation claim. The district court granted summary judgment for State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (“State Farm”) after considerable discovery. The court explained its ruling in a lengthy and comprehensive statement dictated into the record after a hearing.

The bare, undisputed facts are that Hill was the salaried office manager for a law firm and had the job responsibility of taking the firm’s backup computer disk home each workday for safekeeping. She also regularly did some work at home for the firm. Leaving work after a full day on the job, Hill was severely injured in an auto accident. A representative of the firm arrived on the scene and extracted the backup tape from the wreckage.

State Farm denied Hill’s workers’ compensation claim as outside the course and scope of employment but paid the claim after it was administratively upheld. In this bad-faith suit, the district court properly invoked the “going and coming” rule, also called the dual-purpose doctrine, which the district court explained basically as follows (relying on *Durr’s Dependents v. Schlumberger Oil Well Surveying Corp.,*227 Miss. 606, 86 So.2d 507, 509 (Miss.1956) (citing 1 Larson’s Workmen’s Com*339pensation Law § 18.12, at 241)): If the work assignment made the travel necessary, the worker is in the scope of employment, but if the trip would have occurred anyway, the travel is personal and not in the scope of employment. The district court concluded that “[t]he fact that Hill finished her normal workday and was heading home provides an arguable basis for the application of the dual purpose test.” So, there was no bad faith in denying the claim.

We have reviewed the briefs, pertinent portions of the record, and the applicable law and have heard the arguments of counsel. Because there is no error, the summary judgment is AFFIRMED, essentially for the reasons given by the district court.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Exhibit 10.3 

 

Description of Compensation of Non-Employee Directors 

 

The description below contains only certain information regarding the compensation of the non-employee directors of Sunterra Corporation. Additional information can befound in our proxy statements, reports, and other exhibits filed by us with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 

 

Effective with the first quarter of fiscal 2005, each non-employee director of Sunterra Corporation is entitled to an annual retention fee of $30,000 in addition to a feeof $1,250 per in person meeting of the board of directors, a fee of $1,250 for the annual meeting and a fee of $750 per telephonic meeting of the board of directors. An additional annual fee of $4,000 is paid to non-employee directors for eachcommittee membership, a fee of $500 per meeting of the committee and an additional $5,000 for serving as the chairman of any committee (except for the audit committee chairman who receives $10,000). The non-executive chairman is also entitled to anannual fee of $15,000. Each non-employee director is also entitled to an annual grant of stock-based compensation equivalent to $40,000 to be issued in advance on the first day of the fiscal year. 

 

A director who is also an employee of Sunterra Corporation does not receive additionalcompensation for service as a director. 

 

Sunterra Corporation pays for orreimburses its directors’ travel, lodging and other reasonable out-of-pocket expenses in connection with attendance at board, committee and stockholder meetings, and for other reasonable expenses related to board service such as continuingeducation.
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of Altair Nanotechnologies Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John Fallini, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.










/s/  John FalliniJohn Fallini, Chief Financial OfficerMay 6, 2011
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 14, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 03-21167

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JAVIER GONZALEZ GARCIA, also known as La Muerta

Defendant - Appellant

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-02-CR-572-9

--------------------

Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and WIENER, Circuit

Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Javier Gonzalez Garcia (Garcia) appeal the 168-month

sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to launder

money derived from drug trafficking. 

Garcia contends that the district court should have reduced

his offense level by three levels under U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1 because

he did not substantially complete the offense underlying the

conspiracy charge before being arrested. We review this claim
No. 03-21167

-2-

for plain error because Garcia did not raise it in the district

court. See United States v. Rodriguez, 15 F.3d 408, 415 (5th

Cir. 1994). The record shows that Garcia substantially completed

the underlying offense as set forth in the indictment; his

argument about his geographical distance from Mexico at the time

of his arrest is irrelevant. The district court committed no

clear or obvious error by not reducing the offense level. See

United States v. Waskom, 179 F.3d 303, 308 (5th Cir. 1999)

(§ 2X1.1(b)(2) requires no reduction for conspirator who made

“substantial progress” in criminal endeavor). 

Garcia also contends that there was no evidentiary support

for the drug-quantity calculation used to establish his base

offense level. The Presentence Report (PSR) relied on the

corroborated statements of co-conspirators that linked Garcia

directly to the transportation of 17.22 kilograms of cocaine. 

Because Garcia did not present any evidence to rebut the PSR’s

factual findings, the district court was entitled to rely on

those findings. See United States v. Ayala, 47 F.3d 688, 690

(5th Cir. 1995). Further, the PSR’s findings were not the sort

of “[b]ald, conclusionary statements” we disapproved of in United

States v. Elwood, 999 F.2d 814, 817-18 (5th Cir. 1993).

The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.