alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 22

- 00726

- CV

In re Calvin Walling McGowan, Individually and as trustee of the Elizabeth M. Blount 2012 Trust, Trustee of the Jane M. Brigman 2012 Trust, Trustee of the Anne M. Schooler

2012 Trus t, and as Executor of the Estate of Calvin B. McGowan, deceased: McGowan Ranch, LLC; Calvin Ogden McGowan, Individually and as Trustee of the Calvin Ogden

McGowan 2020 Trust; Cora Caleene M. Kothmann, Individually and as Trustee of the Cora McGowan Kothman n 2020 Trust;

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM TOM GREEN COUNTY

O R D E R

PER CURIAM

Relator Calvin Walling McGowan has filed a petition for writ of mandamus and

emergency motion for temporary stay of further proceedings in the trial court

. See Tex. R. Ap p

.

P. 52.1, 52.10(a). We grant the motion and temporarily stay all proceedings pending further

order of this Court. See id . 52.10(b). The Court orders the real party in interest to file a response

to the petition for writ of mandamus on or before Novemb e r 2 8 , 2022

.

It is ordered on November 1 5 , 2022

.

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Smith
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Noel Marte, Appellant.

[860 NYS2d 191]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.), rendered April 19, 2006, convicting him of assault in the first degree and robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the hearing court erred in refusing to suppress the identification made by the complainant on the ground that it was unreliable as a result of an unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedure is without merit. “A pretrial identification procedure may be considered impermissibly suggestive and, therefore, violative of due process, only when it is the result of improper conduct by law enforcement officials” *(People v Darnell,*146 AD2d 583, 583 [1989]).

As the hearing evidence established that there was no police involvement in the presentation of the defendant’s photograph to the complainant, and as no claim was made that the lineup procedure was suggestive, the hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to suppress identification testimony *(see People v Stevens,*44 AD3d 882 [2007]; *People v Butler,*286 AD2d 443 [2001]; *People v Darnell,*146 AD2d at 583-584). Under the circumstances, the reliability of the complainant’s identification of the defendant presented a question for the jury.

The defendant’s contention that the sentencing court imposed consecutive sentences in violation of Penal Law § 70.25 (2) is without merit. The evidence established that the defendant shot the victim after the robbery already had been completed. *738Therefore, although the convictions arose out of a single transaction, the robbery and assault were separate and distinct acts and the imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate the statute *(see People v Laureano,*87 NY2d 640 [1996]; *People v Bryant,*39 AD3d 768 [2007]; *People v Murray,*299 AD2d 225 [2002]).

The defendant’s contention that the sentencing court violated the principles of *Apprendi v New Jersey*(530 US 466 [2000]) by making a factual finding that the assault and the robbery were separate and distinct acts, a determination the defendant asserts should have been made by the jury, is unpreserved for appellate review *(see People v Cruz,*46 AD3d 567 [2007]; *People v Pritchett,*29 AD3d 828 [2006]) and, in any event, is without merit. The sentencing court did not engage in judicial fact-finding, but instead made *“a*legal determination based on facts already found by the jury” *(People v Pritchett,*29 AD3d at 829). Mastro, J.E, Skelos, Lifson and Leventhal, JJ, concur.
#### Judith A. Listopad, Appellant, v Sherwood Equities, Inc., et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

[858 NYS2d 600]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louis B. York, J.), entered May 14, 2007, which, in this personal injury action, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

As there is no evidence linking defendants to the plastic sheeting that allegedly caused plaintiffs fall, a jury would be left to base its verdict on speculation, rather than logical inferences *(Schneider v Kings Highway Hosp. Ctr.,*67 NY2d 743, 744 [1986]).

The court properly declined to consider plaintiffs supplemental bill of particulars alleging for the first time that her fall was caused by poor lighting *(see Boland v Koppelman,*251 AD2d 176 [1998]). Concur—Tom, J.P, Mazzarelli, Gonzalez, Sweeny and DeGrasse, JJ.
**EXHIBIT 31.01**

 

I, Scott J. Hammack, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K for CyberGuard Corporation; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statementsmade, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s mostrecent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control overfinancial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

 

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financialreporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting. 

 

Date:  August 28, 2003
Exhibit 21



|                               |  |                                       
|------------------------------ |  | --------------------------------------
|                               |  | Subsidiaries                          
|                               | 
|NAME OF SUBSIDIARY             |  | STATE OF INCORPORATION OR ORGANIZATION
|                               | 
|Intervest National Bank        |  | National Banking Association          
|                               | 
|Intervest Mortgage Corporation |  | New York                              
|                               | 
|Intervest Statutory Trust II   |  | Connecticut Business Trust            
|                               | 
|Intervest Statutory Trust III  |  | Connecticut Business Trust            
|                               | 
|Intervest Statutory Trust IV   |  | Delaware Business Trust               
|                               | 
|Intervest Statutory Trust V    |  | Delaware Business Trust
<PAGE>

Exhibit 13.1

                  CERTIFICATION BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                           PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. 1350
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, (i) the Form 20-F filed
by Central Minera Corp. (the "Issuer") for the year ended June 30, 2005, fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange act of 1934, and (ii) the information contained in that report fairly
present, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Issuer on the dates and for the periods presented therein.

                                         CENTRAL MINERA CORP.

                                         /s/ Michael Cytrynbaum
                                         -------------------------------------
December 15, 2006                        Michael Cytrynbaum
                                         President and Chief Executive Officer

Central Minera Form 20F December 2006

                                      -31-
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                        JUL-1-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                         SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                                   2881625
<SECURITIES>                                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                              86684
<ALLOWANCES>                                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                         2968309
<PP&E>                                                    900613
<DEPRECIATION>                                           (261986)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                           8867740
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                      82090
<BONDS>                                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                          0
<PREFERRED>                                                    0
<COMMON>                                                18212463
<OTHER-SE>                                              (9426813)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                             8867740
<SALES>                                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                               0
<CGS>                                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                          421444
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                          (382451)
<INCOME-TAX>                                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      (382451)
<DISCONTINUED>                                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                0
<CHANGES>                                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                             (382451)
<EPS-BASIC>                                               (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                             0 <F1>





<FN>
<F1> Fully diluted EPS not computed on loss.
</FN>


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER  PURSUANT TO SECITON 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned, being the Chief Financial Officer of AmeriVest Properties Inc., a Maryland real estate investment trust (the "Issuer"), hereby certifies
that the Annual Report on Form 10-K (the "Annual Report") of the Issuer for the year ended December 31, 2004, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §78 m(a)) and that the information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Issuer

| |  | By: |  | /s/KATHRYN L. HALEKathryn L. Hale
Chief Financial Officer
| |  | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------

March 16,
2005



QuickLinks
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs September 9, 2003

EDDIE HOWARD PITTMAN v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. C02-131 Roger A. Page, Judge

No. W2002-02892-CCA-R3-PC - Filed March 18, 2004

JOE G. RILEY, J., dissenting.

Although I agree with manyofthe conclusions setforth in the majority opinion, I respectfully

disagree with its primary conclusion that the petitioner did not establish ineffective assistance of

counsel. In my view, he established deficiency and prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

I conclude counsel was deficient to the prejudice of the petitioner in the following respects:

(1) Failing to call Evelyn Donita Shaw to testify about the numerous calls she

received from Ms. Luster. Although the content of the conversations may

have been hearsay, the fact that numerous calls were made would not be

hearsay.

(2) Failing to call Eugenia Pharmer to testify that the victim stated after the

preliminary hearing that he could not at that point “back out” of the

prosecution because they would get him for “false something.” Ms.

Pharmer could also corroborate that the petitioner and Ms. Luster were

seeing each other.

(3) Failing to call Officer Smith to testify that he searched the defendant fifteen

minutes before the alleged assault and the petitioner did not have a weapon.

The jury might also infer from such testimony that it would be unlikely for

the defendant to have entered the nearby residence and committed an armed

assault after he was searched by a policeman fifteen minutes earlier.

(4) Failure to discover and introduce evidence relating to the victim’s

numerous convictions for crimes involving dishonesty.
-2-

The state has advanced no evidence or argument indicating these failures related to tactical decisions.

See generally, Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996).

This is indeed a close case. More significantly, it was a close case at trial. Trial counsel

stated it was one of the closest cases in his career with the jury deliberating several hours over a

period of two days. Although any one of the above listed deficiencies might not be enough to

establish prejudice, I believe the combination of the deficiencies, along with the other bizarre facts

and circumstances, establish prejudice.

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

______________________________________

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1700

In Re: WILLIAM C. BOND, 

Petitioner. 

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 

(No. 1:14-cr-00186)

Submitted: October 30, 2015 Decided: November 5, 2015

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. 

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

William C. Bond, Petitioner Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2

PER CURIAM: 

William C. Bond petitions for a writ of mandamus, seeking 

an order from this court directing the district court to make 

its docket “whole” and properly captioned or titled, to produce 

an order terminating an attorney from criminal proceedings, and 

to unseal attorney termination matters. Bond also requests that 

this court “provide a framework for future district courts to 

determine how they should go about such matters, including a 

step-by-step procedure which would include separating [attorney] 

‘disqualification’ matters from ‘inquiry’ matters.” He further 

requests that this court remand matters to the district court 

for “further consideration” and adopt certain protocols

governing “conflict of interest” and attorney “disqualification” 

hearings. We conclude that Bond is not entitled to mandamus 

relief. 

Mandamus is a drastic remedy to be used only in 

extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 

394, 402 (1976); United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 516 

17 (4th Cir. 2003). Mandamus relief is available only when 

there are no other means by which the relief sought could be 

granted, In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987), and may 

not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re Lockheed Martin 

Corp., 503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007). The party seeking 

mandamus relief bears the heavy burden of showing that his 
3

entitlement to relief is clear and indisputable. Allied Chem. 

Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). 

We conclude after review of the mandamus petition that Bond 

has not established a clear and indisputable entitlement to the 

relief he seeks. Accordingly, although we grant leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for a writ of 

mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

PETITION DENIED
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2926 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of Veterans 

Affairs to provide, without expiration, hospital care, medical services, 

and nursing home care for certain Vietnam-era veterans exposed to 

herbicide and veterans of the Persian Gulf War. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 17, 2009 

Mr. NYE (for himself and Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Veterans’ Affairs 

A BILL 

To amend title 38, United States Code, to direct the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to provide, without expiration, 

hospital care, medical services, and nursing home care 

for certain Vietnam-era veterans exposed to herbicide 

and veterans of the Persian Gulf War. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
2 

•HR 2926 IH

1 SECTION 1. PROVISION OF HOSPITAL CARE, MEDICAL 

2 SERVICES, AND NURSING HOME CARE FOR 

3 CERTAIN VIETNAM-ERA VETERANS EXPOSED 

4 TO HERBICIDE AND VETERANS OF THE PER5 SIAN GULF WAR. 

6 Section 1710(e) of title 38, United States Code, is 

7 amended— 

8 (1) in paragraph (3)— 

9 (A) by striking ‘‘subsection (a)(2)(F)—’’ 

10 and all that follows through ‘‘(C) in the case’’ 

11 and inserting ‘‘subsection (a)(2)(F) in the case 

12 of’’; and 

13 (B) by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) of 

14 the former subparagraph (C) as subparagraphs 

15 (A) and (B) of such paragraph (3) and by mov16 ing such new subparagraphs two ems to the 

17 left; and 

18 (2) in paragraph (1)(C), by striking ‘‘para19 graphs (2) and (3)’’ and inserting ‘‘paragraph (2)’’. 

Æ 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with BILLS
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

RAYMONT WALKER,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 9 WAL 2023

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 21st day of June, 2023

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Susquehanna Media
Co. (the Company) for the period ending September 30, 2004 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Peter
P. Brubaker, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company. /s/ Peter P. BrubakerPeter P. BrubakerPresident and Chief Executive OfficerNovember 11, 2004
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-2231
WAYNE E. PATTERSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus IRMA JOYCE RUBY, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge. (CA-96-209-2) Submitted: November 21, 1996 Decided: December 3, 1996 Before HALL, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Wayne E. Patterson, Appellant Pro Se. Irma Joyce Ruby, Appellee Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant appeals the district court's order denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the magistrate judge'srecommendation and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED