* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 8/13/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

JO ANN MITCHELL, for Sanchez Mitchell, a minor,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-5238 (D.C. No. 94-C-162-M) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ***** Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Circuit Judge, Un ited States Court of

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designat ion. -2- Before PORFILIO, BRIGHT, *** and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Plaintiff Jo Ann Mitchell, on behalf of her son San chez Mitchell, appeals from an order of the district court affirming the f inal decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying her application f or child’s supplemental security income benefits. Sanchez was born on May 17, 1987, and was six-years-old at the time of the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ). Plaintiff contends that Sanchez has been disabled f rom birth due to attention deficit disorder and related hyperactivity. In an opinion that now stands as the final decision of the Secretary, the ALJ determined that Sanchez’s attention deficit disorder was mild and well-controlled with Ritalin and did not constitute a severe impairment. He therefore found that Sanchez was not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d). Alternatively, the ALJ fou nd that Sanchez did not have an impairment meeting the Listing of Impairments, i d. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1,-3-

nor did he have an impairment of comparable severity to an impairment that would cause an adult to be disabled. See id. § 416.924(e) and (f). In the district court, the parties consented to pro ceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). We have juri sdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and 28 U.S.C. § 12 91. We review the Secretary's decision to determine whether it is supported by su bstantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Washingt on v. Shalala , 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is ade quate relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusio n. Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ’s decision th at Sanchez does not have a severe impairment is not supported by substantial e vidence. We have fully considered plaintiff’s argument and reviewed the re cord, and we reject this argument for substantially the same reasons as thos e stated in the magistrate judge’s September 7, 1995 order. Because we conclu de that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision that Sanchez does not h ave a severe impairment, we need not address plaintiff’s contentions that the A LJ’s alternative bases for denying benefits were also flawed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b)(“If your impairment(s) is not severe, we will determine thatyou are not disabled and not review your claim further.”).-4-

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to prop erly inform plaintiff concerning her right to representation and that herwaiver of counsel was therefore ineffective. Again, we find this argumen t unpersuasive for substantially the same reasons as those stated in the magistrate judge’s order. AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Myron H. Bright Senior Circuit Judge