United States Tax Court

T.C. Memo. 2024-62

ALAN HAMEL AND ESTATE OF SUZANNE HAMEL, DECEASED, 

ALAN HAMEL, SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR,

Petitioners

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

__________

Docket No. 20882-21. Filed June 3, 2024.

__________

Kenneth M. Barish and Steven Ray Mather, for petitioners.

Matthew R. Delgado and Heather L. Lampert, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WEILER, Judge: Before this Court are respondent’s Motion to 

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as to Penalties, filed on August 8, 2023,

and his Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on September 22, 2023. 

Respondent also filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for 

Summary Judgment on September 22, 2023. On September 22, 2023, 

Alan Hamel in his personal capacity, and as special administrator for 

the Estate of Suzanne Hamel (collectively petitioners), filed a Motion for 

Summary Judgment, a Declaration by Clifton Lamb in Support of 

Motion for Summary Judgment, and a Memorandum in Support of 

Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties also filed a First 

Stipulation of Facts. Each party has filed a Response to the other’s

respective Motion for Summary Judgment opposing the relief sought 

therein. 

For the reasons set forth below, we will grant respondent’s Motion 

to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as to Penalties and Motion for 

Served 06/03/24
2

[*2] Summary Judgment and deny petitioners’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment.

Background

The following facts are derived from the parties’ pleadings and 

motion papers, including the Stipulation of Facts, Declaration, and 

Exhibits attached thereto. These facts are stated solely for the purpose 

of deciding the above-referenced Motions and not as findings of fact in 

this case. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 

(1992), aff’d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994).

On December 20, 2005, respondent issued a Notice of Final 

Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) to AH Investment

Holdings, Inc. (AH Investment), the tax matters partner of Palm Canyon

X Investments, LLC1 (Palm Canyon), determining adjustments to the 

partnership items of Palm Canyon for its tax year 2001. On March 20, 

2006, AH Investment timely petitioned this Court, at Docket No. 5610-

06, challenging the FPAA determinations. We issued our opinion in the 

TEFRA partnership-level proceeding for Palm Canyon on December 15, 

2009, sustaining respondent’s adjustments as set forth in the FPAA. See 

Palm Canyon X Invs., LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-288, 2009 

WL 4824326, aff’d, No. 16-1334, 2018 WL 1326394 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 

2018). On April 10, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 

Columbia Circuit affirmed its judgment dated February 16, 2018. The 

decision in Palm Canyon became final on May 17, 2018, which was the 

date 90 days after February 16, 2018. We incorporate our findings of fact 

in Palm Canyon herein by this reference.

On July 28, 2004, before the issuance of the FPAA to AH 

Investment respondent notified Alan and Suzanne Hamel (Hamels) that 

their 2001 Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, had been 

selected for examination related to Palm Canyon. On January 20, 2006, 

the Hamels submitted Form 13750, Election to Participate in 

Announcement 2005-80 Settlement Initiative, on which they identified 

their reported losses from both Palm Canyon and Thighmaster World 

Corp. (Thighmaster), a subchapter S corporation wholly owned by Mr. 

Hamel. On August 13, 2007, as part of the Palm Canyon litigation, the 

parties submitted a stipulation of facts which included computations of 

1 Palm Canyon is limited liability company (LLC) treated as a partnership 

under the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-

248, §§ 401–407, 96 Stat. 324, 648–71, for federal income tax purposes.
3

[*3] the Hamels’ tax liability resulting from the Palm Canyon 

partnership item adjustments. On December 8, 2016, respondent issued 

a Notice of Computational Adjustment to the Hamels for their 1996 and 

2001 tax years, which computed additional taxes owed on the basis of

the adjustments determined in the Palm Canyon proceeding. 

This case arises from two notices of deficiency dated March 12, 

2021, in which respondent determined deficiencies for the Hamels’ tax 

years 1996 and 2001 (years at issue) of $399,742 and $1,565,086, 

respectively, and accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a) and 

(h)2 of $159,897 and $626,034, respectively. These deficiencies are 

attributable to items affected by changes to the partnership items of 

Palm Canyon. The Hamels resided in California when they timely filed 

their Petition. Suzanne Hamel passed away on October 15, 2023, after 

the Petition was filed. 

Discussion

I. Legal Background

The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and may exercise 

jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by Congress. Judge v. 

Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1175, 1180–81 (1987); Naftel v. Commissioner, 

85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985). We are without authority to enlarge upon that 

statutory grant. See Phillips Petroleum Co. & Affiliated Subs. v.

Commissioner, 92 T.C. 885, 888 (1989). We nevertheless have 

jurisdiction to decide whether we have jurisdiction. McCrory v. 

Commissioner, 156 T.C. 90, 93 (2021).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and 

avoid unnecessary and time-consuming trials. FPL Grp., Inc. & Subs. v. 

Commissioner, 116 T.C. 73, 74 (2001); Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 

90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). We may grant summary judgment when there 

is no genuine dispute of material fact and a decision may be rendered as 

a matter of law. Rule 121(a)(2); Elec. Arts, Inc. v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 

226, 238 (2002). However, it is not a substitute for trial; it should not be 

2 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue 

Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (I.R.C. or Code), in effect at all relevant times, regulation 

references are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all 

relevant times, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and 

Procedure. All monetary amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.
4

[*4] used to resolve genuine disputes over material factual issues. Elec. 

Arts. Inc., 118 T.C. at 238. When determining whether to grant 

summary judgment, we must view factual materials and inferences 

drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See 

FPL Grp., Inc. & Subs., 116 T.C. at 75; Bond v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 

32, 36 (1993). The nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere 

allegations or denials of his pleadings but must set forth specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial. Rule 121(d); 

Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520.

III. Summary of the Parties’ Arguments

A. Respondent’s Argument

In his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction as to Penalties 

respondent concedes that this Court has jurisdiction in this partnerlevel proceeding to redetermine certain issues with respect to 

adjustments made to the Hamels’ taxable income for the years at issue.

However, respondent contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the 

portion of this case relating to section 6662 penalties, since those 

penalties were determined in a prior TEFRA partnership-level 

proceeding, and the deficiency procedures of the Code do not apply.

In his Motion for Summary Judgment respondent argues that he 

is entitled to summary adjudication since the notices of deficiency issued 

to the Hamels concern items related to partnership items of Palm 

Canyon and the deficiency was challenged in the prior TEFRA 

proceedings before this Court and the D.C. Circuit. According to 

respondent, if this Court does not grant his Motion to Dismiss for Lack 

of Jurisdiction as to Penalties, the Court should treat his Motion for 

Summary Judgment as a motion for partial summary judgment on the 

period of limitations and income tax issues. Finally, respondent avers 

that on the basis of the prior partnership-level proceedings, the 

pleadings in this case, and the stipulations between the parties, there is 

no dispute as to any material fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.

B. Petitioners’ Argument

Petitioners argue that the Court should grant summary 

adjudication in their favor on the grounds that the notices of deficiency 

were issued after the expiration of the applicable periods of limitations, 

and therefore respondent’s adjustments are time barred.
5

[*5] Relying on sections 6501 and 6229 petitioners contend that the 

periods of limitations to assess deficiencies for the years at issue expired

on May 17, 2019, which was one year and 90 days from the date on which 

the D.C. Circuit’s judgment was entered in Palm Canyon. Petitioners

dispute respondent’s reliance on section 6229(e) and contend that the

Hamels were not “unidentified partners” on or after March 12, 2020, 

which was the date one year prior to the issuance of the notices of 

deficiency in this case.

IV. Analysis

A. Our Jurisdiction to Consider Section 6662 Penalties in this 

Case 

First, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to 

consider petitioners’ challenge to the penalties (in whole or in part) in 

this proceeding. The answer to this question turns largely on whether 

respondent’s adjustments arise from partnership-level or partner-level 

items. It is undisputed that the underlying deficiencies and penalties 

were based on the “affected items” determined in a partnership-level 

proceeding before this Court. See Palm Canyon X Invs., LLC v. 

Commissioner, 2009 WL 4824326.

In our prior opinion, id. at *38–39, we sustained all of 

respondent’s adjustments made in the FPAA, including the applicability 

of penalties under section 6662. Accordingly, we find that the 

adjustments in the notices of deficiency arise from partnership items of 

Palm Canyon for tax year 2001.3

It is undisputed that respondent sent notices of deficiency to the 

Hamels regarding deficiencies and penalties arising out of these 

partnership items previously determined by this Court. Generally, there 

are two different types of affected items described in section 6230(a). The 

first type requires only a computational adjustment at the partner level, 

which must be made at the conclusion of the partnership-level 

proceeding. See I.R.C. § 6230(a)(1); Woody v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 193, 

3 As discussed in our Palm Canyon opinion, the operating agreement of Palm 

Canyon was amended on October 19, 2001, creating a partnership. During the 

partnership year at issue Palm Canyon acquired Canadian dollars for $1,000 which 

were then distributed to the Hamels through AH Investment, reflecting a tax basis of 

$5 million. Ultimately, Thighmaster claimed a $5 million loss derived from AH 

Investment on its 2001 Form 1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, 

and a $1,900,000 flowthrough ordinary loss was claimed on the Hamels’ 2001 Form 

1040. 
6

[*6] 201–02 (1990). For this type of affected item the Commissioner is 

not required to send a notice of deficiency to the individual partner 

because the deficiency determination is merely computational. Woody, 

95 T.C. at 202.

The second type of affected item is one that is dependent upon 

factual determinations (other than a computational adjustment)4

relating to an adjustment made at the partner level. I.R.C. § 6230(a)(2); 

Woody, 95 T.C. at 202. In circumstances involving this latter type of 

affected item the Commissioner is obligated to issue a notice of 

deficiency to the partner for the affected item after the partnership 

proceeding. Woody, 95 T.C. at 202.

Petitioners dispute respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 

Jurisdiction as to Penalties and contend that we do have jurisdiction to 

consider these penalties. Petitioners argue that Congress amended 

sections 6221 and 6230(a) in 1997 making penalty determinations for 

both partnership and computational affected items part of partnershiplevel proceedings. Moreover, penalty determinations on substantive 

affected items are subject to partner-level deficiency proceedings.

Petitioners point us to the change in section 6221 made by 

Congress after enactment of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 

105-34, § 1238(a), 111 Stat. 788, 1026. Before the 1997 amendment 

section 6221 provided in part:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, the tax 

treatment of any partnership item shall be determined at 

the partnership level.

After the 1997 amendment section 6221 provided in part:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, the tax 

treatment of any partnership item (and the applicability of 

any penalty, addition to tax, or additional amount which 

4 The term “computational adjustment” means the change in the tax liability 

of a partner which properly reflects the treatment of a partnership item. See I.R.C. 

§ 6231(a)(6). A computational adjustment can include a change in a partner’s tax 

liability with respect to affected items that do not require partner-level 

determinations. Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(6)-1(a)(2). Computational adjustments for 

this type of affected item are not subject to the deficiency procedures of the Code and 

are directly assessed. Id.
7 

relates to an adjustment to a partnership item) shall be 

determined at the partnership level. 

(Emphasis added.)

Under a plain reading of the newly enacted wording, the effect of 

the amendment was to remove partnership-item penalties from 

deficiency procedures effective for partnership tax years ending after 

August 5, 1997. See Domulewicz v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 11, 21–22 

(2007), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Desmet v. 

Commissioner, 581 F.3d 297 (6th Cir. 2009); see also H.R. Rep. No 105-

220 (1997) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1997-4 C.B. (Vol. 2) 1457. We find 

the foregoing text and change to undermine petitioners’ argument and 

confirm our prior holdings. See Domulewicz, 129 T.C. at 22.5 Therefore, 

the change in the law is of no benefit to petitioners here. After 

consideration of the changes made to section 6221 under the Taxpayer 

Relief Act of 1997, we remain convinced that we do not have jurisdiction 

to consider the Hamels’ section 6662 penalties. 

Petitioners contend that Temporary Treasury Regulation

§ 301.6231(a)(6)-1T(a)(2) is unlawful and contrary to a plain reading of 

sections 6221 and 6230. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(6)-1T. 

Under paragraph (a)(2), changes in a partner’s tax liability with respect 

to affected items that require partner-level determinations are 

computational adjustments subject to deficiency procedures. Further, 

penalties may be directly assessed following a partnership proceeding, 

regardless of whether partner-level determinations are required. See

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6231(a)(6)-1T. 

We disagree with petitioners. Section 6230(k) dictates that “[t]he 

Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry 

out the purposes of this subchapter.” Sections 6221 and 6230 are

ambiguous as to whether deficiency procedures apply to the assessment 

of penalties determined at the partnership level, regardless of whether 

partner-level determinations are required, and section 6230 directs the 

Secretary to fill in such gaps via regulation. Considering the foregoing, 

5 Furthermore, even if we were to accept petitioners’ contention that the legal 

issue for years before 1997 remains unresolved, respondent notes that tax year 1996 

arises solely as a net operating loss carryback claimed by petitioners from tax year 

2001. We agree with respondent’s contention here and find the adjustments in this 

case to be affected items relating to tax year 2001.

[*7]
8

[*8] we conclude that the regulation is neither contrary to the statute

nor otherwise unlawful.

Further, we disagree with petitioners’ reading of section 

6230(a)(2) and find Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6231(a)(6)-

1T(a)(2) to be controlling here. Manroe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 

2020-16, at *9; Gunther v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2019-6, at *8–15, 

aff’d, 789 F. App’x 836 (11th Cir. 2020); see Highpoint Tower Tech. Inc. 

v. Commissioner, 931 F.3d 1050, 1057–58 (11th Cir. 2019); see also I.R.C.

§ 6230(a)(1). Consistent with our prior decisions we find that we do not 

have jurisdiction to consider section 6662 penalties in this proceeding. 

Accordingly, we will grant respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for 

Lack of Jurisdiction as to Penalties. 

B. The Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment 

The parties have filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. 

The sole issue with respect to the underlying tax deficiencies relates to 

whether the periods of limitations for assessment have expired. As 

explained above, the parties do not dispute that the tax deficiencies are 

subject to deficiency procedures, since they are affected items dependent 

upon factual determinations (other than a computational adjustment)

relating to an adjustment made at the partner level. See I.R.C. 

§ 6230(a)(2). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to determine whether the 

notices of deficiency were timely issued.

Petitioners contend that the time for assessment has long run; 

while respondent contends the period of limitations remains open under 

section 6229(e). To determine who is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law under Rule 121, we must address the following legal issues.

1. Has the Time for Assessment Against Petitioners

Run? 

We must now look at whether the periods of limitations for 

assessing tax attributable to Palm Canyon’s partnership items have

expired with respect to petitioners. We have previously stated that 

section 6229 extends the period of limitations for section 6501 with 

respect to tax attributable to partnership items or affected items, and 

therefore we will not reexamine this issue. See Estate of Quick v. 

Commissioner, 110 T.C. 172, 181–82 (1998) (“Section 6501(a) provides 

generally that [the Commissioner] has 3 years from the date the return 

was filed in which to assess the tax. Section 6501(o) provides a 
9 

[*9] cross-reference to section 6229, which extends such period in the 

case of adjustments pertaining to partnership items or affected items.”), 

supplemented by 110 T.C. 440 (1998); Harris v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 

121, 131 (1992) (“The section 6229 limitations period acts to extend the 

limitations period otherwise available under section 6501 when such 

period has otherwise expired.”), supplementing T.C. Memo. 1990-80, 

aff’d, 16 F.3d 75 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants & 

Specialties, L.P. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 533, 543 (2000) (“See section 

6229(a) which extends the period of limitations for assessments of tax 

‘attributable to any partnership item (or affected item).’” (quoting 

Maxwell v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 783, 791 n.6 (1986))). 

The issuance of an FPAA triggers a suspension of the partnership 

item period of limitations. This suspension results by operation of 

section 6229(d)(2), which suspends the partnership item period of 

limitations from the date of the FPAA to the date the Court’s decision 

becomes final in a proceeding contesting the adjustments. 

Respondent acknowledges that the Court’s decision in Palm 

Canyon became final on May 17, 2018, the date which was 90 days after 

the February 16, 2018, judgment by the D.C. Circuit. Respondent

further acknowledges that the FPAA issued to Palm Canyon suspends 

the running of the periods of limitations for assessment against 

petitioners for partnership items or affected items for one year from the 

date this Court’s decision becomes final under section 6229(d). 

However, in this case, the notices of deficiency were not issued 

until March 12, 2021, over three years after the Palm Canyon decision 

became final. Citing section 6229(d), petitioners contend that the notices 

of deficiency are invalid since the periods of limitations in which to

assess a tax deficiency expired on May 17, 2019—one year after the 

Court’s decision in Palm Canyon became final on May 17, 2018. In 

response to petitioners’ contention respondent argues that the periods 

of limitations for assessment against petitioners remain open under 

section 6229(e), since they are unidentified partners6 who failed to 

furnish certain identifying information to the Internal Revenue Service 

(IRS). 

6 For purposes of these Motions we have assumed that the Hamels were not 

identified on the partnership return as indirect partners and, therefore, are 

unidentified partners under the Code. 
10

2. Were Petitioners Unidentified Partners of Palm 

Canyon at the Time the Notices of Deficiency Were 

Issued? 

There are circumstances in which a partner’s status as an

unidentified partner will result in an extension of the period of 

limitations for assessment after a TEFRA proceeding. First, the period

remains open if the partner has not been identified by submitting the 

required information to the IRS and remains open until one year after

certain information is furnished to the Secretary. See Gaughf Props., 

L.P. v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. 219, 232–34 (2012), aff’d, 738 F.3d 415 

(D.C. Cir. 2013). Second, the period remains open if the unidentified 

partner files inconsistently with the partnership’s return and does not 

file a Form 8082, Notice of Inconsistent Treatment or Administrative 

Adjustment Request (AAR). Id. at 237. In both situations the period of 

limitations for assessment of the unidentified partner is extended until 

one year after either the partner or the inconsistent filing is identified 

to the IRS. I.R.C. § 6229(e). 

Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6229(e)-1T indicates that

a partner remains unidentified for purposes of section 6229(e) until 

identifying information is furnished as provided in Temporary Treasury

Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T.7 

Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T provides in 

pertinent part: 

(a) In general. In addition to the names, addresses, 

and profits interests as shown on the partnership return, 

the Service will use additional information as provided in 

this section for purposes of administering subchapter C of 

chapter 63 of the Code.

(b) Procedure for furnishing additional 

information—(1) In general. Any person may furnish 

additional information at any time by filing a written 

statement with the Service. . . . 

(2) Where statement must be filed. A 

statement furnished under this section shall 

7 Although not raised by the parties the Court notes the effective date for 

Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1 is for tax periods commencing after October 4, 

2001. See id. para. (g). The years at issue here commenced before this date. In any 

event the text at issue in the final regulations appears identical to Temporary Treasury

Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T.

[*10]
11

generally be filed with the service center with which 

the partnership return is filed. However, if the 

person filing the statement knows that the notice 

described in section 6223(a)(1) (beginning of an 

administrative proceeding) has already been mailed 

to the tax matters partner, the statement shall be 

filed with the Internal Revenue Service office that 

mailed such notice.

(3) Contents of statement. The statement 

shall— 

(i) Identify the partnership, each 

partner for whom information is supplied, 

and the person supplying the information by 

name, address, and taxpayer identification 

number;

(ii) Explain that the statement is 

furnished to correct or supplement earlier 

information with respect to the partners in 

the partnership;

(iii) Specify the taxable year to which 

the information relates;

(iv) Set out the corrected or additional 

information, and

(v) Be signed by the person supplying 

the information.

(c) No incorporation by reference to previously 

furnished documents. Incorporation by reference of 

information contained in another document previously 

furnished to the Internal Revenue Service will not be given 

effect for purposes of sections 6223(c) or 6229(e). For 

example, reference to a return filed by a pass-thru partner 

which contains identifying information with respect to the 

indirect partners of that pass-thru partner is not sufficient 

to identify the indirect partners unless a copy of the 

document referred to is attached to the statement. . . . 

(d) Information supplied by a person other than the 

tax matters partner. The Service may require appropriate 

verification in the case of information furnished by a 

person other than the tax matters partner. The 30–day 

period referred to in paragraph (b)(1) of this section shall 

not begin until that verification is supplied

. . . .

[*11]
12

(f) Service may use other information. In addition to 

the information on the partnership return and that 

supplied on statements filed under this section, the Service 

may use other information in its possession (for example, a 

change in address reflected on a partner’s return) in 

administering subchapter C of chapter 63 of the Code. 

However, the Service is not obligated to search its records 

for information not expressly furnished under this section.

According to petitioners, the information required by section 

6229(e) was long held by the IRS, and this fact is confirmed by 

respondent’s inviting petitioners to participate in a settlement 

initiative. Petitioners point to a Notice of Beginning of Administrative 

Proceeding issued by the IRS to petitioner Alan Hamel dated July 22, 

2004, which included his name, address, and taxpayer identification 

number. However, we find these arguments do not address compliance 

with the foregoing requirements of Temporary Treasury Regulation

§ 301.6223(c)-1T.

Respondent argues that the information referred to in section 

6229(e) was not furnished to the IRS since none of the documents 

received from petitioners satisfy the requirements of Temporary 

Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T. We agree. 

Petitioners, in opposition to respondent’s Cross-Motion for 

Summary Judgment, essentially concede their failure to comply with the 

requirements of the regulation. In the alternative they contend that the 

regulation goes beyond—or is contrary to—the requirements of section 

6229(e) and is therefore invalid. These same arguments, however, have 

already been considered and rejected by this Court. See Gaughf Props., 

L.P., 139 T.C. at 246–49. 

On the basis of our precedent requiring strict compliance we are 

compelled to conclude that petitioners remained unidentified partners 

for purposes of section 6229(e) on or after March 12, 2020, since they 

have failed to comply with the foregoing specified regulatory 

requirements. See Gaughf Props., L.P., 139 T.C. at 240–49 (addressing

the requirements of providing information to satisfy section 6229(e) and 

concluding that Temporary Treasury Regulation § 301.6223(c)-1T(b) 

applied, all information listed in paragraph (b)(3) was required, and the 

regulation was valid); see also Walthall v. United States, 131 F.3d 1289, 

1296 (9th Cir. 1997); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6223(c)-1T(f) (stating that 

IRS may use other information in its possession but is not required to). 

[*12]
13

[*13] We hold that the periods of limitations for assessments of tax 

attributable to any partnership item (or affected item) under section 

6229(d) against petitioners as to Palm Canyon remain open. We further 

hold that the notices of deficiency, which were issued to the Hamels on 

March 12, 2021, are valid. Accordingly, we will deny petitioners’ Motion 

for Summary Judgment, and grant respondent’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment.

We have considered all of the arguments that the parties have 

made, and to the extent they are not addressed herein, we find the 

arguments to be moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing,

An appropriate order and decision will be entered.