alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marcus Wayne COVINGTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-4408.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 24, 2011.

Decided: March 31, 2011.

J. Donald Cowan, Jr., Heather Howell Wright, Ellis & Winters, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. John W. Stone, Jr., Acting United States Attorney, Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, James E. Minogue, Third Year Law Student, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Marcus Wayne Covington was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2006), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. *275§ 924(c) (2006), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006). On appeal, Covington argues that the district court abused its discretion by not permitting him to display to the jury the scars and disfigurement he sustained to his right arm as a result of gunshot injuries that preceded the charges against him. We affirm.

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. *United States v. Blake,*571 F.3d 331, 350 (4th Cir.2009). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision to exclude evidence is arbitrary and irrational. *United States v. Weaver,*282 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir.2002).

Relevant evidence is evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. However, relevant evidence may be excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Fed.R.Evid. 403; *Buckley v. Mukasey,*538 F.3d 306, 318 (4th Cir.2008). Unfair prejudice occurs when “there is a genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will be excited to irrational behavior, and this risk is disproportionate to the probative value of the offered evidence.” *United States v. Williams,*445 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). We review a district court’s decision to exclude evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 403 and 401 “under a broadly deferential standard, and will not overturn a district court’s ruling in the absence of the most extraordinary circumstances in which the court’s discretion has been plainly abused.” *United States v. Hassouneh,*199 F.3d 175, 183 (4th Cir.2000).

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court’s evidentiary ruling challenged on appeal did not constitute an abuse of the court’s considerable discretion. Accordingly, we affirm Covington’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOCIEL PEDROZA PEDROZAMACIAS,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 10-71324

Agency No. A098-801-333

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 8, 2011** 

Before: O’SCANNLAIN, TASHIMA, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

Jociel Pedroza Pedroza-Macias, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 

FILED

NOV 08 2011

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 10-71324

We review de novo questions of law, Salviejo-Fernandez v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), and we deny the petition for review.

Pedroza-Macias’ 2008 conviction for violating California Health & Safety

Code § 11359 is an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) that

renders him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and ineligible for

cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). See id. at 1066 (“A state

drug offense is an ‘aggravated felony’ for immigration purposes . . . if it would be

punishable as a felony under federal drug laws.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jonathan Watson, Appellant.

[988 NYS2d 85]

Appeals having been taken to this Court by the above-named appellant from judgments of the Supreme Court, New York County (A. Kirke Bartley, Jr., J., at plea; Rena K. Uviller, J., at sentencing), rendered on or about October 17, 2012, said appeal having been argued by counsel for the respective parties, due deliberation having been had thereon, and finding the sentence not excessive, it is unanimously ordered that the judgments so appealed from be and the same are hereby affirmed.

Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P, Acosta, Freedman, Richter and Clark, JJ.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 31.3

                      CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, David A. Simon, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of National Property Analysts
Master Limited Partnership ("NPAMLP");

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date: March 29, 2006

By: EBL&S Property Management Inc., Agent for NPAMLP


By: /s/ David A. Simon
    ---------------------------------
Name: David A. Simon
Title Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jeffrey J. Terborg, Appellant.

[860 NYS2d 340]

Appeal from an amended judgment of the Monroe County Court (Richard A. Keenan, J.), rendered April 23, 2007. The amended judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree.

It is hereby ordered that the amended judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an amended judgment convicting him following a jury trial of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree (Penal Law § 165.45 [5]) and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree (§ 165.05 [1]). On a prior appeal, we modified the original judgment by reversing that part convicting defendant of criminal mischief in the fourth degree (§ 145.00 [1]) and dismissing that count, and we remitted the matter to County Court for a *Wade*hearing to determine whether any police suggestiveness tainted a police officer’s showup identification of defendant *(People v Terborg,*35 AD3d 1169, 1170 [2006], *lv denied*8 NY3d 927 [2007]). On remittal, the court determined following a *Wade*hearing that the showup identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive and that “there was . . . virtually no chance” of misidentification, and defendant now appeals from the amended judgment rendered following that hearing. We affirm.

Showup identification procedures are permissible “if the suspects are captured at or near the crime scene and can be viewed by the witness immediately” *(People v Riley,*70 NY2d 523, 529 [1987]; *see People v Amin,*294 AD2d 863 [2002], *lv denied*98 NY2d 672 [2002]). Defendant was apprehended only 20 minutes after he initially fled from the police, and the showup identification procedure, which was conducted approximately one-half mile from the location where the officer initially observed defendant, was “the culmination of an unbroken chain of exigent events” *(People v Davis,*232 AD2d 154, 154 [1996], *lv*
      *1278
      *denied*89 NY2d 941, 1091 [1997]; *see People v Jackson,*281 AD2d 906, 907 [2001], *lv denied*96 NY2d 920 [2001]; *People v Boyd,*272 AD2d 898, 899 [2000], *lv denied*95 NY2d 850 [2000]). Although we agree with defendant that the court erred in admitting in evidence at the post-trial *Wade*hearing the transcript of the pretrial suppression hearing *(see*CPL 670.10 [1]; *People v Ayala,*75 NY2d 422, 429-430 [1990], *rearg denied*76 NY2d 773 [1990]), we nevertheless conclude that reversal is not required inasmuch as the court stated that its conclusion following the *Wade*hearing was “inescapable even based solely on the *Wade*hearing testimony.” Present—Hurlbutt, J.P, Martoche, Smith, Green and Pine, JJ.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2941 Engrossed Amendment Senate (EAS)]

                  In the Senate of the United States,

                                                     December 10, 2010.
    Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 
2941) entitled ``An Act to reauthorize and enhance Johanna's Law to 
increase public awareness and knowledge with respect to gynecologic 
cancers.'', do pass with the following

                               AMENDMENT:

            Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

SECTION 1. REAUTHORIZATION AND ENHANCEMENT OF JOHANNA'S LAW.

    (a) In General.--Section 317P(d) of the Public Health Service Act 
(42 U.S.C. 247b-17(d)(4)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (4), by inserting after ``2009'' the 
        following: ``and $18,000,000 for the period of fiscal years 
        2012 through 2014''; and
            (2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (6).
    (b) Consultation With Nonprofit Gynecologic Cancer Organizations.--
Section 317P(d) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 247b-17(d)), as amended by 
subsection (a), is further amended by inserting after paragraph (3) the 
following:
            ``(4) Consultation with nonprofit gynecologic cancer 
        organizations.--In carrying out the national campaign under 
        this subsection, the Secretary shall consult with nonprofit 
        gynecologic cancer organizations, with a mission both to 
        conquer ovarian or other gynecologic cancer and to provide 
        outreach to State and local governments and communities, for 
        the purpose of determining the best practices for providing 
        gynecologic cancer information and outreach services to varied 
        populations.''.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
111th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H.R. 2941

_______________________________________________________________________

                               AMENDMENT
```
#### Lourdes Peregrina GARCIA, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 06-74338.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 18, 2011.

Filed March 1, 2011.

Tim Ramnitz, Trial, Thankful Townsend Vanderstar, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before: ALARCÓN, RYMER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM *

Lourdes Peregrina Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review from a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing her appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, voluntary departure, relief under the Convention Against Torture, adjustment of status, and cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and deny the petition.

Peregrina Garcia presents only two issues for our review. One, she contends that the IJ erred in admitting a letter into evidence from her ex-spouse in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1367. Section 1367 prohibits “an adverse determination of admissibility or deportability ... using information furnished solely by — (A) a spouse or parent who has battered the alien or subjected the alien to extreme cruelty[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(1). Two, she argues that “[t]he conduct of the Immigration Judge was so prejudicial during the hearings that it amounted to a denial of due process to Petitioner.”

The admission into evidence of Peregrina Garcia’s ex-spouse’s letter does not merit reversal. The IJ explained that he *596had not relied on the letter in reaching his decision because the letter was “not worthy of evidentiary weight since its maker was not present to be questioned.” Therefore, there was no prejudice, and the IJ’s decision does not violate § 1367.

The IJ denied each of Peregrina Garcia’s claims to avoid removal because she was not a credible witness. Peregrina Garcia contends that she was denied her right to due process because the IJ “[took] over the role of proseeutor[.]” Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(l), an IJ has the authority to “interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.” The record does not reflect that the IJ was biased against Peregrina Garcia or that his cross-examination violated her right to due process by preventing her from presenting evidence to support her claims.

The petition for review is DENIED.

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2804 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2804

   To amend title XXI of the Social Security Act to require 12-month 
    continuous coverage under the State Children's Health Insurance 
                                Program.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 10, 2009

   Mr. Gene Green of Texas introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To amend title XXI of the Social Security Act to require 12-month 
    continuous coverage under the State Children's Health Insurance 
                                Program.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Ensuring Continuous Coverage under 
SCHIP Act of 2009''.

SEC. 2. REQUIREMENT OF 12-MONTH CONTINUOUS COVERAGE UNDER SCHIP.

    (a) In General.--Section 2102(b) of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 1397bb(b)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph:
            ``(6) Requirement for 12-month continuous eligibility.--In 
        the case of a State child health plan that provides child 
        health assistance under this title through a means other than 
        described in section 2101(a)(2), the plan shall provide for 
        implementation under this title of the 12-month continuous 
        eligibility option described in section 1902(e)(12) for 
        targeted low-income children whose family income is below 200 
        percent of the poverty line.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to determinations (and redeterminations) of eligibility made on 
or after October 1, 2009.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>   1


                                  EXHIBIT 23.1


                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT



The Board of Directors
Caredata.com, Inc.

We consent to incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No.
333-81301, No. 333-28541 and No. 333-63313) on Form S-8 of Caredata.com, Inc. of
our reports dated February 4, 2000, relating to the consolidated balance sheets
of Caredata.com, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1999 and 1998, and the
related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders' equity (deficit),
and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31,
1999, and the related consolidated financial statement schedule, which reports
appear in the 1999 annual report on Form 10-K of Caredata.com, Inc.

                                  /s/ KPMG LLP


Atlanta, Georgia
March 27, 2000


                                      S 17
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">Compas Medical, P.C., as Assignee of Erilma Desruisseaux, Appellant, April 6, 2016<br><br>against<br><br>United Services Automobile Association, Respondent.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Appeal from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), entered January 10, 2014. The order denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and, in effect, granted defendant's cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.</p><p>ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with $25 costs.</p><p>In this action by a provider to recover assigned first-party no-fault benefits, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and defendant cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the insured vehicle was not involved in the accident in question. Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court entered January 10, 2014 which denied plaintiff's motion and, in effect, granted defendant's cross motion. </p><p>In support of its cross motion and in opposition to plaintiff's motion, defendant proffered an affidavit by its insured, who averred that she had not struck anyone with her vehicle. The insured's passenger also submitted an affidavit, in which she stated that the subject vehicle did not come into contact with a pedestrian. The affidavits were sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that "the alleged injur[ies] do[] not arise out of an insured incident" (<i>Central Gen. Hosp. v Chubb Group of Ins. Cos.</i>, 90 NY2d 195, 199 [1997]; <a href="../2009/2009_52601.htm" target="_blank"><i>see Andromeda Med. Care, P.C. v NY Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.</i>, 26 Misc 3d 126</a>[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52601[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th &amp; 13th Jud Dists 2009]; <a href="../2009/2009_52379.htm" target="_blank"><i>Midwood Med. Equip. &amp; Supply, Inc. v USAA Cas. Ins. Co.</i>, 25 Misc 3d 139</a>[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52379[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th &amp; 13th Jud Dists 2009]). Plaintiff opposed defendant's cross motion only with an affirmation by its counsel, who did not assert that he possessed personal knowledge of the facts. Consequently, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to defendant's cross motion (<i>see Zuckerman v City of New York</i>, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). </p><p>Accordingly, the order is affirmed.</p><p>Weston, J.P., Solomon and Elliot, JJ., concur.</p><br>Decision Date: April 06, 2016<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Matthew B. Smith, state and attest that:



|1. | I am the President of Main Place Funding, LLC (the Registrant).
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Registrant for the year ended December 31, 2006 (the Report) containing financial statements fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant for the periods presented.



|                    
|--------------------
|/s/ Matthew B. Smith
|Matthew B. Smith    
|President           
|March 30, 2007
Exhibit 32.1



Liquid Audio, Inc.

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

(18 U.S.C. Section 1350)



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Liquid Audio, Inc. (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Form 10-Q), I, James A. Mitarotonda, Co-Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. |  | The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
| | -- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. |  | The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Dated: August 14, 2003



/s/ James A. MitarotondaJames A. MitarotondaCo-Chief Executive Officer