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SJC-13271

COMMONWEALTH vs. MIGUEL REMI DONES.

Hampden. December 7, 2022. – June 23, 2023.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 

& Georges, JJ.

Youthful Offender Act. Firearms. Practice, Criminal, Sentence.

Department of Youth Services. Juvenile Court, Probation.

Statute, Construction.

Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 

Department on February 8, 2021.

Following transfer to the Hampden County Division of the 

Juvenile Court Department, a motion to revise the sentence was 

heard by David B. Paradis, J.

The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 

transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

Cynthia Cullen Payne, Assistant District Attorney, for the 

Commonwealth.

Debbie F. Freitas for the defendant.

Sara LoPresti, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 

youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel 

Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

GEORGES, J. At issue in this case is the question whether 

a Juvenile Court judge may commit a youthful offender to the 
2

custody of the Department of Youth Services (DYS) until his 

twenty-first birthday, and then suspend that commitment with 

conditions of probation. We conclude that a judge in the 

Juvenile Court has such discretion to suspend a commitment in 

that manner, and that the judge in this case did not abuse his 

discretion in doing so. We therefore affirm the denial of the 

Commonwealth's motion to revise the juvenile's sentence.1

1. Background. During a motor vehicle stop, a State 

police trooper saw a firearm in plain view in the vehicle driven 

by the juvenile, who was then seventeen years old. The trooper 

removed the juvenile from the vehicle and arrested him. The 

juvenile subsequently was indicted as a youthful offender, see 

G. L. c. 119, § 54, on a charge of carrying a firearm without a 

license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). Because the juvenile's family 

was unable to post bail, the juvenile was held at a DYS facility

for eight months prior to entering into a plea agreement.

In tendering his plea, the juvenile recommended a 

continuation without a finding, with supervised probation and a 

condition that he possess no weapons, until his nineteenth 

birthday. The Commonwealth recommended that the juvenile be 

found guilty as a youthful offender and sentenced to eighteen 

1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth 

advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services, 

Attorney Naoka Carey, and Citizens for Juvenile Justice.
3

months in a house of correction. After a plea colloquy, the

Juvenile Court judge adjudicated the juvenile to be a youthful 

offender and ordered him committed to DYS until he reached the 

age of twenty-one, pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 58 (c). The 

judge then suspended the commitment pursuant to G. L. c. 279, 

§ 2, with conditions of probation, see G. L. c. 276, § 87, until

the day before the juvenile's twenty-first birthday.

As required by G. L. c. 119, § 58, fourth par.,2 prior to

imposing sentence, the judge conducted a sentencing

recommendation hearing and made a number of findings. The 

record shows that the judge considered all of the statutory 

factors set out in that paragraph to the extent that they were 

2 General Laws c. 119, § 58, fourth par., provides in 

relevant part:

"In making [a] determination [of a youthful offender,] the 

court shall conduct a sentencing recommendation hearing to 

determine the sentence by which the present and long-term 

public safety would be best protected. At such hearing, 

the court shall consider, but not be limited to, the 

following factors: the nature, circumstances and 

seriousness of the offense; victim impact statement; a 

report by a probation officer concerning the history of the 

youthful offender; the youthful offender's court and 

delinquency records; the success or lack of success of any 

past treatment or delinquency dispositions regarding the 

youthful offender; the nature of services available through 

the juvenile justice system; the youthful offender's age 

and maturity; and the likelihood of avoiding future 

criminal conduct. In addition, the court may consider any 

other factors it deems relevant to disposition."
4

applicable to the juvenile's offense. The Commonwealth does not 

dispute any of the judge's findings.

The judge found that the juvenile lived with his mother, 

father, and four brothers. He was welcome in the family home 

and got along with all of his family members. He had a two year

old child and took an active role in raising that child. With 

respect to the juvenile's age and maturity level, the judge 

noted that, at eighteen years old, the juvenile enjoyed playing 

basketball, "hang[ing] out" with friends, and playing video 

games. The judge found that even though the juvenile was

"immature" for his age, he was young enough that "probation 

and/or DYS" would "have time to work with him and assist in his 

maturing process."

With respect to the eight months that the juvenile spent in 

a DYS facility awaiting disposition, the judge found that the 

juvenile had done very well. The juvenile was able to maintain 

the highest behavioral level and earned recognition as the 

"group member of the week" multiple times. The juvenile met 

with his clinician daily and actively participated in daily 

psycho-educational groups, including substance use disorder

prevention, interpersonal effectiveness, and "DBT Mindfulness." 

He did not instigate any problems, and if he was targeted by 

peers, he was able to express his concerns to staff and to ask 
5

for help. The judge also considered the Juvenile Court's 

policies on dispositional and sentencing best practices.

Based on his considerations of the sentencing policies and 

all of his findings, the judge determined that, pursuant to 

G. L. c. 119, § 58, the present and long-term safety of the 

public would best be served by committing the juvenile to DYS 

until he reached the age of twenty-one, with the commitment 

suspended and conditions of probation imposed. In addition to 

the standard conditions of probation, the judge added a number 

of special conditions: that the juvenile must either obtain 

employment or work toward a general equivalency diploma; that he 

not possess drugs or alcohol and must submit to random screens; 

and that he not possess firearms or other dangerous weapons.

The Commonwealth then timely moved for a revision of the 

juvenile's sentence. Specifically, the Commonwealth challenged

the judge's decision to suspend the juvenile's commitment to DYS 

and to place him on probation. The judge denied the motion, and 

the Commonwealth appealed to the Appeals Court. We transferred 

the matter to this court on our own motion.

2. Discussion. This case requires us to consider the 

interplay of four statutes: G. L. c. 119, § 58, which, inter 

alia, sets forth dispositional options for youthful offenders; 

G. L. c. 279, § 2, which generally authorizes a Juvenile Court 

judge to suspend a juvenile's commitment to DYS; G. L. c. 276, 
6

§ 87, which generally permits a judge of certain Trial Court 

departments, including the Juvenile Court, to place a defendant 

on probation; and G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), which prescribes

punishments for unlawful possession of a firearm. Whether these 

statutes provide a Juvenile Court judge with the discretion to 

suspend a youthful offender's commitment to DYS, with probation

being imposed in lieu of the committed sentence, is a legal 

issue that we consider de novo. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Beverly, 485 Mass. 1, 11 (2020).

"As with all matters of statutory construction, our goal in 

construing [a] . . . statute is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intent of the Legislature." Commonwealth v. Rossetti, 489 Mass. 

589, 593 (2022), quoting Commonwealth v. Newberry, 483 Mass. 

186, 192 (2019). "[T]he language of the statute[s] . . . is 

'the principal source of insight' into the intent of the 

Legislature." Id. "Therefore, we start with the language of 

the statute[s themselves] and presume, as we must, that the 

Legislature intended what the words of the statute[s] say"

(quotations omitted). Rossetti, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 

Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 679 (2012). If the legislation is

found to be ambiguous, we give the juvenile the benefit of the 

ambiguity. Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 642 

(2000), citing Charles C. v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 58, 70 

(1993).
7

We begin with G. L. c. 119, § 58, a statute that is to "be 

liberally construed so that the care, custody and discipline of 

the children brought before the court shall approximate as 

nearly as possible that which they should receive from their 

parents, and that, as far as practicable, they shall be treated, 

not as criminals, but as children in need of aid, encouragement 

and guidance." G. L. c. 119, § 53. When a child is adjudicated 

to be a youthful offender, G. L. c. 119, § 58, requires the 

sentencing judge to impose one of three dispositional options:

"(a) a sentence provided by law [for the criminal offense 

charged in the indictment]; or

"(b) a combination sentence which shall be a commitment to 

the department of youth services until [the child] reaches 

the age of twenty-one, and an adult sentence to a house of 

correction or to the [S]tate prison as is provided by law 

for the offense. The adult sentence shall be suspended 

pending successful completion of a term of probation, which 

shall include, but not be limited to, the successful 

completion of the aforementioned commitment to the 

department of youth services. . . . ; or

"(c) a commitment to the department of youth services until 

[the child] reaches the age of twenty-one."

Otherwise put, paragraph (a) authorizes the judge to impose the

most severe option, namely, "the punishment the child would 

receive were [the child] an adult"; paragraph (b) authorizes an 

intermediate "combination sentence"; and paragraph (c), "the 

least severe option," authorizes a commitment to DYS until the 

child reaches the age of twenty-one. Connor C., 432 Mass. at

638.
8

Here, the judge determined that, given all of the 

circumstances, the least severe option, commitment to DYS, was 

appropriate. The Commonwealth does not contest the judge's 

decision to commit the juvenile to DYS pursuant to G. L. c. 119, 

§ 58 (c), instead of imposing a more severe adult or combination 

sentence under G. L. c. 119, § 58 (a) or (b). Rather, the 

Commonwealth takes issue with the judge's decision to suspend 

the commitment to DYS and to place the juvenile on probation.

As the Commonwealth points out, nothing in G. L. c. 119, 

§ 58, expressly authorizes such a disposition. At the same 

time, however, nothing in the language of that section prohibits 

a judge from suspending a commitment to DYS that has been 

imposed upon a youthful offender pursuant to G. L. c. 119, 

§ 58 (c). By contrast, G. L. c. 119, § 58, seventh par.,3

expressly prohibits the suspension of a commitment to DYS 

3 General Laws c. 119, § 58, seventh par., provides:

"Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, a 

person adjudicated a delinquent child by reason of a 

violation of [G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), (c), or (d), or G. L. 

c. 269, § 10E], shall be committed to the custody of the 

commissioner of youth services who shall place such child 

in the custody of a facility supported by the 

[C]ommonwealth for the care, custody and training of such 

delinquent children for a period of at least [180] days or 

until such child attains his eighteenth birthday or his 

nineteenth birthday in the case of a child whose case is 

disposed of after he has attained his eighteenth birthday, 

whichever first occurs, provided, however, that said period 

of time shall not be reduced or suspended" (emphasis 

added).
9

imposed on a juvenile who has been adjudicated a delinquent 

child by reason of a violation of, inter alia, G. L. c. 269, 

§ 10 (a), the provision under which the juvenile here was 

convicted as a youthful offender. We held in Connor C., 432 

Mass. at 645, that the seventh paragraph of G. L. c. 119, § 58, 

by its plain language, applies only to delinquent children and 

not to youthful offenders. Accordingly, this provision does not 

deprive a judge of the authority to suspend a youthful 

offender's commitment to DYS. Moreover, the fact that the 

Legislature expressly prohibited the suspension of a delinquent 

child's commitment to DYS shows that it knew how to preclude 

suspension of a commitment to DYS if it chose to do so. In the 

nearly twenty-three years since this court's decision in

Connor C., the Legislature has not seen fit to do so with 

respect to youthful offenders. Cf. DiMasi v. Secretary of the 

Commonwealth, 491 Mass. 186, 197 (2023), quoting Casseus v. 

Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 796 (2018) (if Legislature had 

intended different meaning from how statute was written, then

"the wording of the statute could have easily reflected [the 

Legislature’s intent]").

The Commonwealth argues that because G. L. c. 119, 

§ 58 (b), authorizes a Juvenile Court judge to suspend the adult 

portion of a combination sentence, the Legislature could have 

also authorized the suspension of a commitment to DYS in G. L. 
10

c. 119, § 58 (c), but chose not to do so. We do not agree. 

General Laws c. 119, § 58 (b), does not bestow on a judge

discretionary authority to decide whether to suspend the adult 

portion of such a sentence; the provision rather requires that 

"[t]he adult sentence shall be suspended pending successful 

completion of a term of probation, which shall include, but not 

be limited to, the successful completion of the aforementioned 

commitment to" DYS until the juvenile reaches the age of twentyone (emphasis added). That a judge is required to suspend the 

adult portion of a combination sentence under G. L. c. 119, 

§ 58 (b), says nothing about a judge's discretion to suspend a 

commitment to DYS under G. L. c. 119, § 58 (c).

At first glance, it might appear incongruous to conclude 

that where a juvenile violates G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), the 

commitment to DYS may not be suspended if the juvenile is 

adjudicated a delinquent child, but may be suspended if the 

juvenile is found to be a youthful offender. The Legislature, 

however, rationally could require a delinquent child to serve 

out a commitment to DYS until the child reaches the age of 

eighteen (or, in some cases, nineteen) while permitting judges 

to decide to suspend the longer commitment of a youthful 

offender until the age twenty-one.

"[I]t is evident from the Legislature's over-all approach 

to the sentencing of youthful offenders that it intended to give 
11

the sentencing judge wide latitude in fashioning a sentence that 

best serves the needs of the community and the youthful 

offender." Commonwealth v. Lucret, 58 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 629 

(2003). Moreover, the Legislature presumably has been aware, at 

least since our decision in Connor C., 432 Mass. at 638, 645-

646, that G. L. c. 119, § 58, seventh par., applies only to 

delinquent children, and not to youthful offenders, and it has 

not chosen to amend that provision. "We do not read into the 

statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put 

there, nor add words that the Legislature had an option to, but 

chose not to include." Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass. 799, 

807-808 (2019), quoting Commissioner of Correction v. Superior 

Court Dep't of the Trial Court for the County of Worcester, 446 

Mass. 123, 126, (2006).

In addition, we note that certain other statutes expressly

provide a Juvenile Court judge the authority to suspend a 

commitment to DYS and then to impose probation. In particular, 

G. L. c. 279, § 2, provides:

"In all cases the execution of orders of commitment to any 

training school or reformatory, however named, the 

department of youth services, or the department of public 

welfare may be suspended, and such suspension continued or 

revoked, in the same manner and with the same effect as the 

execution of sentences in criminal cases."

This provision, by its plain terms, authorizes a Juvenile Court 

judge to suspend an order committing a juvenile to DYS "[i]n all 
12

cases." Contrary to the Commonwealth's argument, we do not read 

the final phrase of G. L. c. 279, § 2 -- "in the same manner and 

with the same effect as the execution of sentences in criminal 

cases" -- as limiting a judge's authority to suspend a 

commitment to DYS only in instances where an ordinary criminal 

sentence could be suspended.

The statutory language provides that a commitment to DYS

may be suspended "in the same manner and with the same effect"

as a criminal sentence, not that it may be suspended in the same 

circumstances as a criminal sentence (emphasis added). G. L. 

c. 279, § 2. In other words, the provision simply analogizes 

the suspension of a DYS commitment to the suspension of a 

criminal sentence, without limiting the judge's authority to 

suspend the DYS commitment by any restrictions on suspension 

that are enumerated in the criminal statute.4 In construing the 

provision in this manner, we are mindful that juvenile justice 

laws "shall be liberally construed," and that "[p]roceedings 

against children under said sections shall not be deemed 

4 General Laws c. 279, § 2, authorizes a Juvenile Court 

judge to suspend a DYS commitment in all cases, except, of 

course, where a suspension of a DYS commitment is specifically 

prohibited. As discussed supra, such a prohibition does not 

exist for the cases of juveniles adjudicated as youthful 

offenders for violations of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).
13

criminal proceedings." G. L. c. 119, § 53.5 Restricting 

juvenile sentencing, even for youthful offenders, to adult 

sentencing provisions, would be contrary to the plain statutory 

language, as well as the Legislature's intent in adopting this 

provision. See Connor C., 432 Mass. at 641-642 (noting that 

language of G. L. c. 119, § 53, "does not label a 'youthful 

offender' proceeding as 'criminal'"). See also Commonwealth v. 

Anderson, 461 Mass. 616, 630, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 946 (2012) 

("an adjudication of a juvenile as a youthful offender . . . 

does not transform [the juvenile's] illegal act from an act of 

delinquency into a crime"). If the Legislature had intended to 

limit a judge's authority in the manner the Commonwealth 

5 "Independent of the rule of lenity, we have said that 

interpreting an ambiguous statute against a juvenile would 

conflict with the statutory command of G. L. c. 119, § 53." 

Commonwealth v. Samuel S., 476 Mass. 497, 506 (2017), citing 

Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 810-813 (2013). 

General Laws c. 119, § 53, "requires a liberal construction of 

the juvenile justice laws in order to ensure that juveniles who 

commit offenses are 'treated[] not as criminals, but as children 

in need of aid, encouragement, and guidance.'" Samuel S.,

supra, quoting G. L. c. 119, § 53.

To be sure, G. L. c. 119, § 53, mandates that liberal 

construction shall apply to G. L. c. 119, §§ 52-63, and G. L. 

c. 279, § 2, is not included within those sections. However, 

this case requires us to consider G. L. c. 279, § 2, a provision 

concerning the suspension of sentences to DYS, in light of our 

interpretation of G. L. c. 119, § 58, and other juvenile justice 

statutes. Therefore, the command of G. L. c. 119, § 53, is 

instructive here. See Samuel S., 476 Mass. at 506.
14

suggests, then it would have done so in plain and unambiguous 

language.

In determining whether the juvenile's sentence was 

permissible, we also must consider the effect of certain 

language in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). General Laws c. 269, 

§ 10 (a), first par., which prohibits unlawful possession of a 

firearm, provides that a person who violates it shall be 

punished by a minimum term in State prison or in a house of 

correction, and that "[t]he sentence imposed on such person 

shall not be reduced to less than [eighteen] months, nor 

suspended." This language plainly precludes a judge from 

suspending an adult offender's committed sentence to less than a 

period of eighteen months. Two paragraphs later, the provision 

states:

"The provisions of [G. L. c. 276, § 87,6] shall not 

apply . . . to any child between ages fourteen and 

[eighteen] so charged, if the court is of the opinion that 

the interests of the public require that [the child] should 

be tried as an adult for such offense instead of being 

dealt with as a child."

G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (6), third par.

6 General Laws c. 276, § 87, permits a Juvenile Court judge 

to place

"on probation in the care of [the court's] probation 

officer any person before it charged with an offense or a 

crime for such time and upon such conditions as it deems 

proper, with the defendant's consent, before trial and 

before a plea of guilty, or in any case after a finding or 

verdict of guilty."
15

Reading the paragraphs of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a) (6), in 

harmony with one another, see Hovagimian v. Concert Blue Hill, 

LLC, 488 Mass. 237, 241 (2021), we conclude that the statutory 

language in no way prohibits a Juvenile Court judge from 

suspending a youthful offender's commitment to DYS. While there 

is such a prohibition for juveniles adjudicated delinquent for 

violations of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), here, the Juvenile Court 

judge sentenced the defendant as a youthful offender under the 

"least severe" option under G. L. c. 119, § 58 -- commitment to 

DYS. Connor C., 432 Mass. at 638. We again note that the 

declared policy of G. L. c. 119, § 53, is that the "operative 

provisions of the [juvenile sentencing] statutes shall be 

liberally construed to require rehabilitative 'aid, 

encouragement and guidance' rather than criminal dispositions 

for children who offend." Id. at 641 ("the provisions of the 

1996 amendments [to the juvenile sentencing provisions of G. L. 

c. 119, §§ 52-63,] did not eviscerate the longstanding principle 

that the treatment of children who offend our laws are not 

criminal proceedings").

Accordingly, a judge's determination that a juvenile should 

be sentenced as a youthful offender under G. L. c. 119, § 58, 

does not amount to an adjudication of the juvenile in a criminal 

proceeding that would implicate adult sentencing requirements. 

See Connor C., 432 Mass. at 646 ("an 'adjudication' that a child 
16

has violated a law generally is not a 'conviction' of a crime"). 

Here, the judge was not bound by the language in G. L. c. 269, 

§ 10 (a), that prohibited suspended sentences for "any person 

convicted under [that] subsection."7 Cf., Commonwealth v. Hanson 

H., 464 Mass. 807, 813-814 (2013) (for purposes of sentencing 

statute, phrase "[a]ny person" did not include juveniles, but 

only adults, due to "the inherent differences between juvenile 

and adult offenders"). As a result, the judge was within his 

discretion in suspending the juvenile's commitment pursuant to 

G. L. c. 276, § 87. In so holding, we bear in mind that the 

ultimate "goal of our juvenile system is to act in the best 

interests of children by encouraging and helping them to become 

law-abiding and productive members of society, and not to label 

and treat them as criminals." Connor C., supra.

7 Nor does the language in G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a), third 

par., apply. That paragraph prohibits a judge from placing a 

juvenile aged fourteen to eighteen, who has been charged with a 

violation of § 10 (a), on probation before or after a trial or 

before a guilty plea, where the "court is of the opinion that 

the interests of the public require that [the juvenile] should 

be tried as an adult for such offense instead of being dealt 

with as a child." Under the youthful offender regime created by

the 1996 legislation, a juvenile proceeded against as a youthful 

offender and sentenced under G. L. c. 119, § 58 (c), is still 

considered a child within the juvenile justice system, not an 

adult. See St. 1996, c. 200, §§ 2, 7; G. L. c. 119, § 53 

("Proceedings against children under said sections shall not be 

deemed criminal proceedings"). Thus, a judge is not statutorily 

barred from placing on probation a juvenile who has been 

adjudicated as a youthful offender and sentenced to the least 

severe sentencing option for a firearms charge.
17

3. Conclusion. The order denying the Commonwealth's 

motion to revise the juvenile's sentence is affirmed.

So ordered.