DLD-018

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 13-3647

___________

LEE J. ROWLAND,

 Appellant

v.

WARDEN THOMAS DURAN; DEPUTY WARDEN JACQUELINE 

MOTTER; DEPUTY HARKEY; SUPERINTENDENT MARIROSA 

LAMAS; DEPUTY ROBERT MARSH, Jr.; JEFFERY HORTON, Deputy 

Superintendent; TED WILLIAMS, Medical Department, Head Administration; C. 

SPANGLER, Medical Administration; MR. RACKOVAN, PA. State Facility 

Grievance Coordinator; T. MILLER, P.R.C. Committee; MS. C. REEDER, Medical 

Record; MS. RUPERT, Medical Nurse; DR. GREENBERG; P.A. SCHRACK

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 1-12-cv-02299)

District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

October 24, 2013

Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: November 1, 2013)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Lee J. Rowland appeals pro se from the order of the District Court dismissing his 
2

complaint. We will affirm.

Rowland, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 

numerous employees of the Clinton County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) and SCIRockview alleging that he received inadequate medical care at those facilities. In brief, 

Rowland alleges that he injured his left foot in December 2010 when a step collapsed at 

CCCF and that personnel at that facility told him to treat it by icing it and keeping it 

elevated. Rowland further alleges that he later received an x-ray in February 2011 while 

at SCI-Rockview, which revealed that his foot was broken, followed by a March 2011 

videoconference with an outside orthopedic doctor, who told him that the break appeared 

to be healing and recommended that he not apply extreme force or pressure on his injured 

foot. Rowland alleges that he should have received an x-ray earlier and that his treatment 

was otherwise inadequate, though he does not claim that defendants should have 

provided him with any other kind of treatment in particular. The defendants filed 

motions to dismiss on various grounds, and the District Court granted their motions and 

dismissed Rowland’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) after concluding that it does not 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted and that amendment would be futile. 

Rowland appeals, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

After reviewing Rowland’s complaint de novo, we will affirm for the reasons 

adequately and thoroughly explained by the District Court. In particular, we agree that 

Rowland’s allegations, accepted as true, do not raise an inference that any defendant 

acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 105-06 (1976). To the contrary, Rowland’s allegations make it clear that he received 
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medical care for his foot, and neither his mere disagreement with that treatment nor its 

mere alleged inadequacy raises an inference of deliberate indifference. See, e.g., id. at 

107 (explaining that “the question whether an X-ray or additional diagnostic techniques 

or forms of treatment is indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment” 

and that “[a] medical decision not to order an X-ray . . . does not represent cruel and 

unusual punishment” because, at most, it might constitute malpractice). Thus, we agree 

with the District Court both that Rowland’s complaint failed to state a claim and that any 

amendment of his complaint would be futile.

Rowland’s cursory arguments in his notice of appeal lack merit. Rowland argues 

that the defendants’ briefs in support of their motions to dismiss were late and that the 

District Court “disregarded” his response in opposition to their motions, but we perceive 

no irregularity in that regard. Rowland also asserts that the District Court’s “assessment 

that a broken foot can be treated and healed by faulty verbal and written communication 

. . . defies logic, medical treatment, and legal principles.” The District Court, however, 

made no such assessment. Instead, the District Court examined Rowland’s allegations 

regarding the assessments made and treatment provided by the medical defendants and 

properly concluded that they do not raise an inference of deliberate indifference.

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.