2016 UT App 199

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ROGER BRYNER,

Appellee and Cross-appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,

DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION,

Appellant and Cross-appellee.

Per Curiam Decision

No. 20150564-CA

Filed September 22, 2016

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Andrew H. Stone

No. 140906147

Sean D. Reyes and Brent A. Burnett, Attorneys for

Appellant and Cross-appellee

Roger Bryner, Appellee and Cross-appellant Pro Se

Before JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR., STEPHEN L. ROTH, and

JILL M. POHLMAN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 The Driver License Division appeals the district court’s 

decision on judicial review of informal agency action to remand

the case to the Division rather than conduct a trial de novo. 

Cross-appellant Roger Bryner argues that this court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider the Division’s appeal and also asks that 

“the entire statutory basis for suspension [of driving privileges] 

due to a warrant be declared unconstitutional.” We reverse the 

decision and remand to the district court to conduct a trial de 

novo.

¶2 The proceedings before the Division that resulted in 

suspension of Bryner’s driving privileges were informal agency 
Bryner v. Department of Public Safety

20150564-CA 2 2016 UT App 199

proceedings. Bryner sought district court review of the license 

suspension. The district court determined that procedural issues

existed relating to the notice provided to Bryner by the Division 

and that the existing agency record was inadequate to allow the 

district court to determine whether the Division had considered 

facts related to an outstanding warrant issued by the Holladay 

Justice Court. Based on its review of the agency record from the 

informal proceedings, the district court remanded the case to the 

Division for clarification of the record.

¶3 Utah’s Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) governs 

judicial review of administrative agency decisions. “Section 63G4-402(1)(a) of UAPA sets forth the scope of a district court’s 

authority to review informal administrative adjudications.” 

Christensen v. Rolfe, 2014 UT App 223, ¶ 5, 336 P.3d 40. “The 

district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all 

final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative 

proceedings.” Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402(1)(a) (LexisNexis

2011). “This section requires that the district court’s review of 

informal adjudicative proceedings be performed by holding a 

new trial rather than by reviewing the informal record.” Archer 

v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1144 (Utah 1995) 

(citing Cordova v. Blackstock, 861 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah Ct. App. 

1993)). A district court “does not have discretion to review an 

informal adjudicative proceeding by any method other than a 

trial de novo, as mandated by UAPA.” Id. at 1145. In the trial de 

novo, the district “shall determine all questions of fact and law 

and any constitutional issues presented in the pleadings.” Utah 

Code Ann. § 63G-4-402(3)(a).

¶4 The district court erred by reviewing the informal 

adjudicative proceedings on the record rather than by 

conducting a trial de novo as required by UAPA. Because the 

proceedings before the Division were informal, the district court 

was required to conduct a trial de novo to determine all 

questions of fact and law and any constitutional issues presented 
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20150564-CA 3 2016 UT App 199

by the pleadings filed in that court. See id. The district court did 

not have discretion to remand to the Division for clarification of 

the agency record because de novo review does not include a 

records review to determine whether the Division followed the 

applicable law or abused its discretion. Instead, in the trial de 

novo, the district court was required to determine whether a 

warrant that had been issued by the Holladay Justice Court 

supported a suspension of Bryner’s driving privileges. In

making that determination, the district court was not required to 

extend deference to the Division’s determination or to take it 

into account in any way. Indeed, if there were defects in the 

Division’s proceedings, the mechanism for setting things right 

was simply to rehear the matter afresh with due regard to the 

procedural requirements.

¶5 Bryner’s claim that this court lacks jurisdiction over the 

appeal and cross-appeal lacks merit. The district court’s order 

concluded proceedings seeking judicial review of the Division’s 

order and was final and appealable. See Mike’s Smoke, Cigar 

& Gifts v. St. George City, 2015 UT App 158, ¶ 11, 353 P.3d 626 

(“[A]lthough the controversy still exists between the parties in 

the administrative forum, the order is final because nothing is

left pending before the district court.”). The attempted collateral 

challenge to this court’s decision in Mike’s Smoke, Cigar & Gifts is 

beyond the scope of his appeal. Finally, to the extent that 

Bryner’s cross-appeal raises constitutional claims, those claims 

must first be raised before the district court on trial de novo in 

order to preserve them for our review following remand from 

this court. See State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 13, 353 P.3d 55 

(stating that as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial 

court may not be raised on appeal); see also Utah Code Ann. 

§ 63G-4-402(3)(a) (providing that in a trial de novo, the district 

court “shall determine all questions of fact and law and any 

constitutional issues presented in the pleadings”).
Bryner v. Department of Public Safety

20150564-CA 4 2016 UT App 199

¶6 The Division requests that we strike Bryner’s opening 

brief because it contains disrespectful and offensive statements. 

We decline to do so at this time, although we warn Bryner that 

personal attacks on the integrity of judges of this or any other 

court or statements that are generally disrespectful of the 

judiciary or ascribe improper motives to a court or judges 

“overstep[] the bounds of appropriate appellate advocacy,” 

Peters v. Pine Meadow Ranch Home Ass’n, 2007 UT 2, ¶ 8, 151 P.3d 

962, and may subject him to sanctions that can include, among 

other things, striking the filings in which they appear, id. ¶ 9.

¶7 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s decision and 

remand to that court for proceedings by a trial de novo on 

Bryner’s petition seeking judicial review of the Division’s order 

suspending his driving privileges.