DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

AISY ALEU, PHARM. D.,

Appellant,

v.

NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, INC.,

a Florida not-for-profit-corporation,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-697

[February 15, 2023]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Sandra Perlman, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE21-

005185(04).

William R. Amlong, Karen Coolman Amlong, and Jennifer Daley of The 

Amlong Firm, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Richard A. Beauchamp and Benjamin P. Bean of Panza, Maurer & 

Maynard, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

Aisy Aleu (“the employee”) appeals from the circuit court’s final 

summary judgment in favor of Nova Southeastern University (“the 

employer”) on the employee’s statutory civil rights action against the 

employer. The employee argues the circuit court erred in finding the 

employee’s action was time-barred under the one-year limitation period 

provided in section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes (2015) (“A civil action 

brought under this section shall be commenced no later than 1 year after 

the date of determination of reasonable cause by the commission.”). 

According to the employee, under the circumstances of this case, the fouryear limitation period in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (2015), for 

“[a]n action founded on a statutory liability” should have applied to her 

action.

We disagree with the employee’s argument. Therefore, we affirm the 

circuit court’s summary judgment.
2

We will present this case’s procedural history before turning to our 

review. Our review will include our reconciliation of: (1) Woodham v. Blue 

Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 829 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2002), upon 

which the employer primarily relies; and (2) Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 

768 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1984), upon which the employee primarily relies.

Procedural History

On February 16, 2016, the employee filed with the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) a complaint describing acts by which 

her employer allegedly had discriminated against her based on sex and 

family status, and had retaliated against her after she had complained of 

the employer’s discrimination.

By filing her discrimination complaint with the EEOC, the employee 

effectively had filed her discrimination complaint with the Florida 

Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”), pursuant to section 760.11(1), 

Florida Statutes (2015):

Any person aggrieved by a violation of ss. 760.01-760.10 

may file a complaint with the [FCHR] .... In lieu of filing the 

complaint with the [FCHR], a complaint under this section 

may be filed with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission .... The date the complaint is filed with the 

[FCHR] for purposes of this section is the earliest date of filing 

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ....

§ 760.11(1), Fla. Stat. (2015); cf. Wells Fargo Guard Servs. Inc. of Fla. v. 

Lehman, 799 So. 2d 252, 254 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (“[W]hen a charge is 

dually filed with the EEOC and the FCHR, the date of filing with the EEOC 

shall also be considered the date of filing with the FCHR.”).

On December 28, 2017, the employee filed with the EEOC a 

supplemental discrimination complaint describing other acts by which her 

employer allegedly had discriminated against her based on sex, age,

national origin, and family status, and had retaliated against her after she 

had complained of the employer’s discrimination.

On June 21, 2018—more than two years after the employee had filed 

her original discrimination complaint, but within 180 days of the employee 

having filed her supplemental discrimination complaint—the EEOC issued

a “Dismissal and Notice of Rights,” informally known as a “right-to-sue 

notice.” The right-to-sue notice informed the employee:
3

On March 11, 2021—nearly three years after the EEOC had issued its 

right-to-sue notice to the employee—the employee filed a statutory civil 

rights action against the employer for sex and pregnancy discrimination 

and retaliation in violation of sections 760.10(1)(a)-(b) and (7), Florida 

Statutes (2015), which provide:

(1) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:

(a) To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or 

otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 

to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment, because of such individual’s ... sex [or] 

pregnancy ....

(b) To limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants for 

employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 

deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or 

adversely affect any individual’s status as an employee, 

because of such individual’s ... sex [or] pregnancy ....

(7) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer ...

to discriminate against any person because that person has 

opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment 

practice under this section, or because that person has made 

a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in 

an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this section.
4

§ 760.10(1)(a)-(b), (7), Fla. Stat. (2015).

The employer filed a summary judgment motion arguing the employee’s 

statutory civil rights action was time-barred under section 760.11(5), 

Florida Statutes (2015), because the employee had failed to commence the

action no later than one year after the date when the EEOC issued the 

right-to-sue notice. See § 760.11(5), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“A civil action 

brought under this section shall be commenced no later than 1 year after 

the date of determination of reasonable cause by the commission.”).

The employee responded that, under the circumstances of this case, 

the four-year limitation period in section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes 

(2015), for “[a]n action founded on a statutory liability” should have 

applied to her action.

The circuit court entered an order granting the employer’s summary 

judgment motion. The circuit court later entered a final judgment in the 

employer’s favor. This appeal followed.

Our Review

Our review is de novo. See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond 

Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000) (standard of review of a 

summary judgment is de novo); Hardee County v. FINR II, Inc., 221 So. 3d 

1162, 1165 (Fla. 2017) (standard of review for statutory interpretation is 

de novo).

Section 760.11, Florida Statutes (2015), provides various time limits by 

which an employee may pursue their civil rights claim after having filed 

the prerequisite administrative complaint. Which time limit applies 

depends upon the type of response which the employee has received from

the administrative commission with whom the employee has filed their 

administrative complaint. Section 760.11 describes those responses and

time limits as shown in bold here:

(3) ... [T]he commission shall investigate the allegations in the 

complaint. Within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the 

commission shall determine if there is reasonable cause to 

believe that discriminatory practice has occurred in violation 

of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. When the commission 

determines whether or not there is reasonable cause, the 

commission by registered mail shall promptly notify the 

aggrieved person and the respondent of the reasonable cause 
5

determination, the date of such determination, and the 

options available under this section. 

(4) In the event that the commission determines that 

there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory 

practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights 

Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either:

(a) Bring a civil action against the person named in the 

complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or

(b) Request an administrative hearing under ss. 120.569 

and 120.57.

....

(5) ... A civil action brought under this section shall be 

commenced no later than 1 year after the date of 

determination of reasonable cause by the commission. ...

....

(7) If the commission determines that there is not

reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Florida Civil 

Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the commission shall 

dismiss the complaint. The aggrieved person may request 

an administrative hearing under ss. 120.569 and 120.57, 

but any such request must be made within 35 days of the 

date of determination of reasonable cause ... 

(8) In the event that the commission fails to conciliate or 

determine whether there is reasonable cause on any 

complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of 

the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed under 

subsection (4), as if the commission determined that 

there was reasonable cause.

§ 760.11(3), (4)(a)-(b), (5), (7), (8), Fla. Stat. (2015) (emphasis added).

Although the foregoing sections refer to a determination by “the 

commission”—defined as the “Florida Commission on Human Relations”

in section 760.02(2), Florida Statutes (2015)—we understand “the 

commission” in this context may include the EEOC for two reasons.
6

First, as we stated above, section 760.11(1) provides, in pertinent part: 

“In lieu of filing the complaint with the commission, a complaint under 

this section may be filed with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission.” Reading these statutes together, if the complaint may be 

filed with the EEOC under section 760.11(1), then logically the 

determination of that complaint may be made by the EEOC under sections 

760.11(3), (4)(a)-(b), (5), (7), and (8). See Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach 

Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992) (“Where possible, 

courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related 

statutory provisions in harmony with one another.”).

Second, as we will describe in more detail below, in Woodham v. Blue 

Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 829 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2002), the 

Florida Supreme Court applied sections 760.11(3), (4)(a)-(b), (5), (7), and 

(8) to the EEOC’s response to a discrimination complaint. At no point did 

the supreme court hold that that the EEOC’s response could not be 

applied to those statutes. Thus, as the supreme court did in Woodham, 

we shall similarly apply sections 760.11(3), (4)(a)-(b), (5), (7), and (8) to the 

EEOC’s response in this case.1

Here, the employer’s motion argued, because the EEOC’s right-to-sue 

notice expressly informed the employee that the EEOC was “unable to 

conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the 

statutes,” “does not certify that the [employer] is in compliance with the 

statutes,” and made “[n]o finding ... as to any other issues that might be 

construed as having been raised by this charge,” the scenario provided in 

section 760.11(8) applied. And proceeding under section 760.11(4) and, 

in turn, section 760.11(5), the employee had to commence her civil action 

no later than one year after the date when the EEOC had issued the rightto-sue notice.

We agree with the employer’s argument. The employer’s argument 

follows the Florida Supreme Court’s holding in Woodham.

1 In a footnote, the supreme court in Woodham observed that the employee had 

“raise[d] the issue that without the FCHR’s adoption or ratification of the EEOC 

determination, the EEOC determination [was] not binding on her.” 829 So. 2d at 

893 n.1. However, the supreme court declined to address that issue because the 

issue was “not the basis for our jurisdiction and ... beyond the issues necessary 

for the resolution of the conflict issue and certified question [presented].” Id.
7

1. Woodham v. Blue Cross

In Woodham, an employee filed with the EEOC a discrimination 

complaint against her employer. Id. at 892-93. After receiving no response 

from the EEOC for over 300 days, the employee requested a right-to-sue 

notice from the EEOC. Id. at 893. The EEOC provided the employee with

the same right-to-sue notice which the instant employee received in this 

case, stating in pertinent part:

The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon 

its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the 

information obtained establishes violations of the statutes. 

This does not certify that the Respondent is in compliance 

with the statutes. No finding is made as to any other issues 

that might be construed as having been raised by this charge.

Id. The employee then filed a statutory civil rights action in circuit court. 

Id.

The employer filed a summary judgment motion. Id. In the motion, the 

employer argued the right-to-sue notice’s above-quoted statement 

constituted the EEOC’s determination that no reasonable cause existed to 

believe the employer had committed a statutory civil rights violation. Id.

at 896. Thus, the employer argued, the employee’s receipt of the right-tosue notice foreclosed her ability to sue in court, and her only remedy was 

to request an administrative hearing within 35 days after receipt of the 

notice, as required under section 760.11(7), which she failed to do. Id.

The circuit court granted the employer’s motion. Id. at 893. The Third 

District affirmed, but certified the following question of great public 

importance:

Whether a claimant must pursue the administrative 

remedies provided in section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes, 

when the claimant has filed a complaint under the Florida 

Civil Rights Act ... and has received an EEOC “Dismissal and 

Notice of Rights” stating: “Based upon its investigation, the 

EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained 

establishes violations of the statutes. This does not certify 

that the respondent is in compliance with the statutes. No 

finding is made as to any other issues that might be construed 

as having been raised by this charge.”?

Id. at 892 (certified question converted to lower case).
8

The supreme court “answer[ed] the certified question in the negative.”

Id. The supreme court later stated its reasoning:

We construe the language of section 760.11(7) to require a 

specific determination “that there is not reasonable cause” to 

believe a violation occurred. § 760.11(7). The [EEOC’s]

determination in this case was only that it was “unable to 

conclude that the information obtained establishes violations 

of the statutes.” We cannot and will not equate “unable to 

conclude” with a determination that “there is not reasonable 

cause.” ...

....

[T]he EEOC dismissal and notice of rights form in this case 

does not satisfy the requirements of a “no cause” 

determination under section 760.11(3) and (7). Without 

having received a proper “no cause” determination, [the 

employee] was not required to make the subsection (7) request 

for an administrative hearing within 35 days. Rather, [the 

employee] was permitted to proceed under subsection (4) 

“as if the [commission] made a ‘reasonable cause’ 

determination,” because the [commission] failed to make 

a determination either way regarding whether reasonable 

cause existed. See § 760.11(8).

Id. at 897 (bold and underline emphasis added).

Woodham controls the instant case. As in Woodham, the EEOC’s

determination in this case was only that it was “unable to conclude that 

the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes.” Pursuant 

to Woodham, we cannot equate “unable to conclude” with a determination 

that “there is not reasonable cause.” Thus, the scenario provided in 

section 760.11(8) applies to this case. See § 760.11(8), Fla. Stat. (2015) 

(“In the event that the commission fails to conciliate or determine 

whether there is reasonable cause on any complaint under this section 

within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, an aggrieved person may

proceed under subsection (4), as if the commission determined that 

there was reasonable cause.”) (emphasis added). And proceeding under 

section 760.11(4) and, in turn, section 760.11(5), the employee had to 

commence her civil action no later than one year after the date when the 

EEOC had issued the right-to-sue notice.
9

2. Joshua v. City of Gainesville

The employee primarily relies upon the Florida Supreme Court’s earlier 

opinion in Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2000). 

However, Joshua is distinguishable from Woodham and the instant case.

In Joshua, the employee filed with the FCHR a discrimination complaint 

against her employer in January 1995. Id. at 433. In July 1995, the 

employee filed a supplemental discrimination complaint against her 

employer. Id. at 433-34. The commission never responded to the 

employee’s complaints. Id. at 434.

In January 1998, the employee filed a statutory civil rights action in 

circuit court against the employer based on the allegations raised in the 

administrative complaints. Id.

The employer filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the employee’s action 

was time-barred under section 760.11(5). Id. The employer maintained 

the employee should have filed her action by January 1997, which the 

employer calculated by adding section 760.11(3)’s 180-day investigation 

period to section 760.11(5)’s one-year limitation period. Id.

The employee responded that because the commission never responded 

to her complaints, section 760.11(5)’s one-year limitation period never 

commenced. Id. Instead, the employee contended, section 95.11(3)(f)’s 

four-year limitation period for statutory causes of action governed, and she 

had filed her statutory civil rights action within that period. Id.

The circuit court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss, finding that 

the last day of section 760.11(3)’s 180-day period also marked the 

beginning of section 760.11(5)’s one-year limitation period, whether or not 

the employee receives a reasonable cause determination. Id. The First 

District affirmed the dismissal, but certified the following question of great 

public importance:

Does the section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes (1995), oneyear statute of limitations for filing civil actions “after the date 

of determination of reasonable cause by the commission” 

apply also upon the commission’s failure to make any 

determination as to “reasonable cause” within 180 days as 

contemplated in section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes (1995), so 

that an action filed beyond the one-year period is time barred?

Id. at 433 (certified question converted to lower case).
10

The supreme court “answer[ed] this certified question in the negative,” 

and held “the general four-year statute of limitations for statutory 

violations, section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1995), applies to actions 

filed pursuant to chapter 760, Florida Statutes, if the [commission] does 

not make a reasonable cause determination on a complaint within the 180 

days contemplated by section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes (1995).” Id. The 

supreme court reasoned, in pertinent part:

[D]espite the language of section 760.11(8), which allows a 

complainant to proceed to circuit court without a reasonable 

cause determination, the entire statutory scheme seems to 

favor exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to court 

action. It would appear contrary to that scheme to require a 

person to proceed to court without any indication from the 

Commission of the progress, or lack thereof, in investigating 

the complaint filed with that body.

....

The [Florida Civil Rights] Act demonstrates the 

Legislature’s intent that one claiming a deprivation under its 

terms would have the Commission make a preliminary 

reasonable cause determination, notify the claimant of its 

findings, and inform the claimant of the possible next steps 

that can be taken. See § 760.11(3), (4). Prohibiting claimants 

from seeking redress for statutory violations of this interest 

prior to allowing them sufficient procedural due process—

both notice and the opportunity to be heard—constitutes a 

deprivation of constitutionally protected rights.

....

[The employee’s] constitutionally protected rights should 

not be denied because the Commission failed to give her 

adequate notice. A claimant should not be penalized for 

attempting to allow a government agency to do its job. Since 

the legislative intent is to uproot discrimination, we now seek 

to preserve that intent by finding [the employee’s] civil action 

timely filed under section 95.11(3)(f).

Id. at 437, 439.
11

Joshua’s facts and reasoning are distinguishable from the instant case 

and, therefore, Joshua is inapplicable to the instant case. Unlike the 

employee in Joshua who never received “any indication from the 

Commission of the progress, or lack thereof, in investigating the 

complaint,” the employee in the instant case received a right-to-sue notice 

from the EEOC. The right-to-sue notice, in plain language, expressly 

informed the employee that the EEOC was “unable to conclude that the 

information obtained establishes violations of the statutes,” “does not 

certify that the [employer] is in compliance with the statutes,” and made 

“[n]o finding ... as to any other issues that might be construed as having 

been raised by this charge.”

As the supreme court held in Woodham, that plain language falls 

squarely under the scenario provided in section 760.11(8). See § 

760.11(8), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“In the event that the commission fails to 

conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable cause on any 

complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, 

an aggrieved person may proceed under subsection (4), as if the 

commission determined that there was reasonable cause.”) (emphasis 

added). Thus, as the employer argues:

[The employee] started her own clock to proceed under 

[s]ection 760.11(4), as if the [EEOC] had determined that there 

was reasonable cause. Once she actively started that clock, 

[the employee] was obligated to commence her suit within one 

(1) year. [The employee] failed to do so and, consequently, the 

[circuit court] correctly ... dismissed [her statutory civil rights 

action] with prejudice.

Interestingly, the supreme court, in Woodham, noted its holding in 

Joshua. 829 So. 2d at 898. And yet the supreme court still found on 

Woodham’s facts that the EEOC’s right-to-sue notice permitted the 

employee, pursuant to section 760.11(8), to proceed under section 

760.11(4) “as if the [commission] made a ‘reasonable cause’ 

determination.” Id. at 897.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the final summary judgment in the 

employer’s favor on the employee’s statutory civil rights action. We certify 

conflict with Hines v. Whataburger Restaurants, LLC, 301 So. 3d 473 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2020). In Hines, the First District held that, pursuant to Joshua, 

section 95.11(3)(f)’s four-year limitation period, rather than section 

760.11(5)’s one-year limitation period, applied to an employee’s statutory 
12

civil rights action, even though the employee had received a notice of 

dismissal stating that the employee was provided a right-to-sue notice. Id.

at 475-76. However, our sister court’s review, for whatever reason, did not 

mention Woodham, which we conclude is controlling on these facts.

Affirmed.2

KLINGENSMITH, C.J., and WARNER, J., concur.

* * *

2 In the instant case, the parties’ filings before the circuit court appeared to 

suggest the Legislature’s 2020 amendment to section 760.11 applied to the 

court’s review. Under the 2020 amendment, section 760.11(8) now provides:

If the commission fails to conciliate or determine whether there is 

reasonable cause on any complaint under this section within 180 

days after the filing of the complaint:

(a) An aggrieved person may proceed under subsection (4) as if the 

commission determined that there was reasonable cause.

(b) The commission shall promptly notify the aggrieved person of 

the failure to conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable 

cause. The notice shall provide the options available to the 

aggrieved person under subsection (4) and inform the aggrieved 

person that he or she must file a civil action within 1 year after the 

date the commission certifies that the notice was mailed.

(c) A civil action brought by an aggrieved person under this section 

must be commenced within 1 year after the date the commission 

certifies that the notice was mailed pursuant to paragraph (b).

§ 760.11(8), Fla. Stat. (2020).

However, all of the actions preceding the employee’s statutory civil rights 

action in the instant case occurred before the 2020 amendment, commencing 

with the employee’s February 2016 administrative complaint, through and 

including the EEOC’s June 2018 right-to-sue notice. Therefore, we have not 

applied the 2020 amendment to our review in this case.

The employee’s initial brief nevertheless argues that section 760.11 and its 

2020 amendment are remedial, and therefore should be applied retroactively. 

However, the employee did not raise that argument to the circuit court. We note, 

though, that even if we had applied the 2020 amendment to our review in this 

case, our conclusion would have remained the same, based on Woodham’s 

controlling application to this case’s facts.
13

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.