### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A pr il 6, 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. S HA WN EDWARD HAZ ELT INE

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Marshall County

No. 15272 Charles Lee , Judge

No. M2003- 01292-CCA -R3-C D - F iled May 17, 2004

A Marsha ll Count y

ju ryconvicted the Def

endant, Shawn E dwar d Hazeltine, of thre e counts of

a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult a ndthr e e c ou nts of re c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt. Th e tr ia l c ou rt me rg e d th e re c kle ss endang erme nt convi c ti ons with the ag g ravated assault convic tions and then sentenc ed the De fenda nt to a n a g g re g a te se ve n y e ars a ndse ve n mo nth s in pr iso n. On app e a l, the De fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t: (1) insuff icient evidence e x ists to s upport the convic tions; (2) the trial court erre d in not consolidating the three counts of re ckless enda ng erme nt; and (3) the tr ial court e rre d by not ordering alternative sentenc ing a nd by ordering c onsecutive se ntencing . We conclude tha t suffici e n t e v ide nce

e xists in the re c or d to su pp ort th e De fe nd a nt’s con vi cti on s a ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in

se nte nc ing the De fe nd a nt. Ho we ve r, we c on c lud e tha t th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d b y fa ili ng to c on so lid a te the three rec kless endang erme nt convictions into one conviction. We f urther conclude that the trial
court e rre d by

enter ing a

judgme nt form for Count 2 showing a conviction for reckle ss ag g ravated

a ssa ult , b e c a us e the tr ia l cou rt dis mis se d Coun t 2 of the ind ic tme nt. Th e re fo re , w e re ma ndthe c a se to the trial court f

or further proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed in Par t; Reve rsed in Par t; and Rem anded

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P

. J. and A L AN E. G L EN N , J ., joined.

Hay ley E. Fults, Shelby ville, Tennesse e (on a p p ea l ) an d Andre w Hoover , Pulaski, Tennessee (at trial) for the appe llant, Shawn Edwar d Hazeltine.

Pa ul G . Su mm ers , At torne y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; J. Ros s D y e r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam Michael McCown, D istrict Attor n ey Gene ral; Weakley

E. Ba rnar d, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION I. F acts-2-

This case arises f

rom an incide nt that oc curr ed during the ear ly morning hours of Nove mber 3, 2002, in the parking lot of a bar located in M ar s h all County . The De fenda nt, ang ry from alterc ations in the bar a nd the par king lot, drove his car towa rd the mana g er of

the bar and anothe r

man and stopped shortly

befor e hitting them. The Def endant then ba cked his c ar up, dr ove towar d the men ag ain and hit Martie G ottschalk, a de signa ted driv er wh o h ad j u s t left the ba r. A jury

c on vic t e d t h e D e f

e n d a n to f t h r e e c o u n t s o f

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l ta n d t h r e e c o u n t s o f r e c kle ss endang erme nt. The trial court merg ed the r eckle ss endang erme nt convictions with the ag g ravated assault convictions and the n sentenc ed the De fenda nt to a n ag g reg ate se ven y ear s and seve n months in p ri so n. Th e De fe nd a nt n ow app e a ls.

A. Trial

Th e fo llo wi ng e vid e nc e wa s p re se nte d a t th e De fe nd a nt’ s tria l. K e ith Jolle y , a de pu ty wi th the Marsha ll Count y

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment, testified that he r esponded to a call to assist a person a t Big J im’s Country , a bar

located on Hig hway 50 in Ma rshall County
, on November 3, 2002, at 2:11 a.m. Deputy

J olley stated that he saw a woman na med Martie G ottschalk ly ing on the g round in the
g rave l parking l o t o f t h e bar , and then the pa rame dics arrived and took her to the hospital. He explained t h at h e as k ed witnesses at the sc ene w hat had ha ppened a nd lear ned that a c ar struc k Go tts c ha lk i n th e pa

rking lot . The de pu ty te sti fi e d tha t the De fe nd a nt’ s bro the r, L e s H a zel tin e , to ld him that the De fe nd a nt’ s car hit Go tts c ha lk an d the n g a ve him a de sc ri pti on of

the c ar. Th e de pu ty confirme d that the ca

r’s lice nse plate w as reg istered to the Def endant. Deputy

J olley stated that he

c on ta c te d h is d isp a tc he r a ndre qu e ste d th a t a n ale rt be pu t out fo r the De fe nd a nt’ s r e d F or d E sc ort.

B e tty Pr inc e , a ba rt e nd e r a ndc oo k a t B ig Jim’s Cou ntry , te sti fi e d th a t sh e te nd e d th e ba r i n the e ar ly mo r n in g h o u r s o f N o v e mb e r 3
, 2 0 0 2
, a n d s tay e d u n ti l c lo s in g

. Sh e te s ti f ie d that she observe d the Defenda nt play ing pool that evening

. Be tty Prince ex plained that, as she was c leaning
up the ba r a t abo ut 1:4 5 a .m. , the De fe nd a nt thr e w a be e r b ott le a t th e ba

r c a sh re g ist e r a ndit a lmo st hit her. She reported t hat s he im mediately called for security to escort the Defenda nt out of the ba r, stating, “ Gra

b him. He threw a bee r bottle.” She explained tha t, a fter throwing the beer bottle, the Def endant wa l k ed swiftly

toward the door of the ba r bec ause “ [h] e wa nt[ ed] to ge t out of there.” Be tty Prince testified tha t her son, Jerry Prince, wa s the manag er of the bar that ni ght and he followed the D efe ndant out of t he bar. She stated t hat s he did not leave the bar are a af ter c alling f

or

security and did not see w hat happe ned in the par king lot.

Ke lly Cla rk , a ba rt e nd e r at B ig Jim’s Cou ntry , te sti fi e d th a t sh e te nd e d th e ba r w ith B e tty Princ e d u r in g th e e ar ly mo r n in g h o u r s o f N o v e mb e r 3
, 2 0 0 2

. Cl ark s tate d th a t s h e s e r v e d the Def endant a drink in the pool room, and he ma de a pa ss at her. She r eporte d that she saw the Def endant throw a bee r bottle toward the bar a nd then saw him wa lk toward the e x it. She ex plained, “He hesitated g oing towa rd the door, looking back to se e if the othe r two g entl em en that he ha d thrown the be er bottle a t [ wer e g oing] to take off afte r him . . . .” Cl ar k testified that J erry Prince fo llo we d th e De fe nd a nt o uts ide int o th e pa rking lot

.

J erry Prince, the ma nag er of

Big J im’s Country , testified that he supe rvised sec urity during-3-

the e arl y mornin g ho ur s of No ve mbe r 3, 20 02

. He e xpla ine d th a t, a s se c ur ity a t th e ba r, it w a s h is duty to decide w hether

trouble-make rs in the bar should leave the premises. He stated that he sa w the Def endant near the bar ear lier that evening but did not se e the De fenda nt throw the bee r bottle. J erry Prince e x plained that, at around 2:00 a.m., he hear d a beer bott le s hatter, and then hi s mother, Be tty Prince, pointed a t the Def endant a nd y elled, “H e threw something.” He stated that he then sa w the Def endant r unning out the f

ront door. Jerry

Prince testified that he ran afte r the De fenda nt and stopped him in the parking lot ne x t to the bar. He testified that a g roup of men came out of the bar and into the par

king lot with hi m , i n cl u ding D onnie L ocke, B eau Schillig and Marty Parrish. He stated that he a sked the Defenda nt why he threw the beer bot tle, and the Def endant r eplied, “T hey called me a quee r.” Jerry Prince reported that he tol d the Defenda nt that he almost hit his m other, B e tty Pr inc e , w ith the be e r b ott le a ndthe n to ld h im, “ Ge t in y ou r c ar a nd jus t le a ve .” He state d th a t, afte r he told the De fenda nt to leave
, the Defenda nt “g ot mad and . . . jumped in his car .” Jerry Prince
reported that the De fenda nt’s car was a red For d Escort. He explained, “Afte r [the Defe ndant] got in the car , he started the car up, rolled the window down, and said, ‘I will g et y ou gu y s

. ’” J erry Prince stated tha t the Def endant wa s looking at him a nd Schillig when he made that statement. He stated that he r eplied to the De fenda nt, “J ust ge t out of here .”

Je rr y Pr in c e te s ti f

ie d th a t th e D e f

e n d a n t th e n “ [t o o k ] o f

f s p in n in g [h is ] t ir e s , a n d [m a d e ] a big tur n, spinning [ his] tires.” He ex plained that the Defenda nt “made a donut” in the par king lot and then a cc el er at ed towar d him and Schillig. J erry Prince testified tha t the Def endant’ s car

was

acc eler ating and throwing g rave l as he drove toward them and then stopped a few inches awa y from Schillig and “ about ten or f ifteen f eet” from him.

J erry Prince e x plained that the De fenda nt then backe d his car up a bout twenty -five f

eet a nd then “c ame a t us a g ain, spinning [hi s] tires.” He stated that he and Schillig moved closer to the car s to be “a littl e saf er.” J erry Prince e x plained, “When he started c oming a t us the second time, I saw [S chillig] coming off of

the . . . left-ha nd

. . . passeng er side

. . . . And t hen he ke pt on coming. A nd then I saw [Gottschalk]. Ididn’t know it was [Gottschalk] at first. I saw somebody coming off the hood of the c ar . .

. .” He stated that the closest the Defenda nt’s car came to him the s econd time wa s

se ve n to te n f

e e t be c aus e “ I

mov e d a wa y fr om it, tow ard s the lin e of c ars that we re pa rk e d. ” He sa id that both times the Defe ndant’s ca r ca me towar d him, he fea red tha t he was g oing to be injured. J erry Prince e x plained that, af ter the c ar pa ssed him and Schillig, the De fenda nt’s car trave led another ten to fiftee n fee t and he “ saw somebody coming off of

the h o o d

. ” He said that the Def endant wa s looking stra ight ahead as he drove his c ar toward him and Schillig the sec ond time. He state d that, afte r the De fe n d ant hit Gottschalk, the De fenda nt stopped his car, ba cked up a nd
sta rt e d to dr ive a wa y . Jer

ry Pr inc e state d that he the n r a n a ft e r the c ar b e c a us e “ [the De fe nd a nt] j us t hit somebody

in my parking lot.” He testified that he attempted to ope n the passeng er door to the Def endant’ s car , but the door wa s locked. He explained, “As the c ar started l ea v i n g, I k icked the [pa sse ng e r] s ide of

the c ar. ” He sa id th at he kic ke d th e De fe nd a nt’ s c ar t o ma rk it “ so the y

c ou ld fi ndit l a te r. ” He state d th a t th e De fe nd a nt’ s c ar w a s “ sp inn ing g ra ve l” wh e n he le ft the pa rking lot

. H e s a i d t h a th e g o ta

p ar t i a l l i c e n s e p l a t e n u m b e r f r o m t h e D e f

e n d a n t ’ s c ar

a s i td r o v e a w a y.

J erry Prince testified tha t, after the Def endant dr ove aw ay , he che cked on Gottschalk, who-4-

was ly ing on the g round. He said that she was “scr eaming that her leg s had been broke[n] . . . .” He stated that seve ral pe ople wer e assisting Go t t s chalk in the parking lot, including her brother a nd Sc hil lig . Jer

ry Pr inc e te sti fi e d th a t he the n c a lle d th e a mbu la nc e a nd the po lic e abo ut the inc ide nt. He sa id that the police questioned him about the inc ident a fe w day s later.

Be au Schillig testified tha t he ar rived a t his brother’s eng ag ement party at Big J im’s Country

o n th e e v e n in g o f

N o v e mb e r

2
, 2 0 0 2
, a t a

r o u n d 8 :3 0 p

. m. a n d s tay e d u n til b ar c lo s e d th e n e xt

mornin g

. He state d th a t he sa w the De fe nd a nt at th e ba r d ur ing the nig ht, bu t he didno t kn ow him

. Schillig said that, while he was playing pool in the ear ly morning hours of Nove mber 3, 2002, he saw the Def endant pick up a

beer bottle and throw it ac ross the counte r of the ba r, hitting a neon sig n and

a ca sh reg ister. He sta ted that the De fenda nt ran out the fr ont door of the ba r af ter he threw the bee r bottle. He testified that he hear d a lady at the bar y ell, “Somebody

threw a beer bottle,” and then he saw Jerry Prince follow the D efe ndant out of t he bar. Schillig testified that he w ent outside the bar to chec k on J erry

Prince a nd to se e whether he neede d assistance with the Def endant. He e x plained that he “[ w]ent out there to help [ J erry Prince] calm the [Defenda nt] down.” He said that he stood
next t o Je rr y Pr in c e a s Pr in c e a s k e d th e D e f e n d a n t to le a v e , a n d th e D e f e n d a n t g o t in to his car. Schillig stated that the Def endant “looked like he was g oing out [of the par king lot], and he e nded up coming towards us.” He reported tha t, as the De fenda nt came towa rd them in his car , “we tr[ied] to ge t out of the way .” He said that the De fenda nt’s car came within two inches of hitting him and he may have “ scra

ped by it.” Schillig testified that the De fenda nt was “ [ s ] p i n n i n g [ h is] tires and
acte d like he wa nted to hit us.” He e x plained that the De fenda nt was “c oming a t us pretty fast,” a nd he wa s conce rned tha t he might g et injured if the D efe ndant hit him with t he ca r.
Schillig said that, af

ter the D efe ndant stopped his car
, he “put[] i t in rever se and [took] off ba c kw ard s” abo ut t e n f

e e t. H e state d th a t th e De fe nd a nt the n d ro ve tow ardJer ry Pr inc e a ndhim
ag ain, with his tires spinning and “ throwing g rave l every wher e.” He said that the Defenda nt’s car

came within two feet of him on the De fenda nt’s second attempt to hit him, and he had to move out of the way to a void g etting hit. Schillig testified that he was scar ed that he would be injure d if the Def endant hit him, so he jumped out of the wa y of t he car. He stated that he heard J erry Prince kick the Def endant’ s car

as it was lea ving the parking lot. Schill i g s t at ed t h at he did not see the Def endant’ s car

hit Gottscha lk, but afte r the Def endant spe d off a nd left the pa rking lot he rea liz ed
t h a ts h e h a d b e e n h i t

. H e e x p l a i n e d
, “ I g o td o w n t h e r e a n d w a s a s k i n g [ G o t t s c h a l k ] i f s h e w a s o k a y, and just try ing to g et her t o ca l m down. [I ] [ s]t ay ed over there with her until the ambulanc e g ot the re .” Sc hil lig sa id tha t Gott sc ha lk ap pe are d to be in pa in an d wa s “ y e lli ng a ndsc re a min g [tha t] he r l e g s h urt.” He e xpla ine d that Go tts c ha lk wa s h is d e sig na te d d ri ve r a ndwa s “ g oin g to [d ri ve ] me home.”

Martie Gottscha lk t es t i fi ed t hat she a ttended an e ng ag ement party for Schillig’ s brother a t Big J im’s Country

on the eve ning of

November

2 , 2002. She stated that she a g ree d to be the desig nated dr iver for Schillig beca use “he had been drinking a littl e bit and [S chillig’ s pare nts] didn’t want him driving . . . .” She said that, during the ea rly morning hours of Nove mber 3, 2002, “ [t ]here

was afig ht or c o n f

r o n tati o n in s id e

. I w a s o n th e o th e r s id e [o f th e b ar ]. A n d s o me b o d y s a id tha t [Sch ill ig ] ha d g ott e n th ro wn ou t.” Go tts c ha lk ex plai ne d th a t sh e we nt o uts ide to g e t Sc hil lig-5-

“ be c a us e we ha d to [dr ive ] h im ho me .” She te sti fi e d, “ I we nt ou t the fr on t do or a ndturne d b a c k to
my left and w ent bac k toward the back [ of t he buil ding]. Ba ck ther e I could see there was a

crow d

. . . a ndI a ssu me d it

wa s [Sc hil lig ]. A ndI

jus t w e nt t ow ardthe m to g o g e t hi m.” Go tts c ha lk explained that she walke d past two rows of c ars a nd “then the ne x t thing I know is I

[saw] headlig hts.” She said that the ca r was coming at her fast and she “didn’t have time to think.” She stated that she c ould not reme mber the c ar hitting her a nd rea liz ed that she w as on the g round in the parking lot. She ex plai n ed
, “I m u s t have bla cked out be cause when I woke up, I

was in the ambulance .” She said that he r rig ht knee “ was hurting pretty g ood. They

told me th at I h ad bee n hit.” Gottschalk testified that, in addition to her kne e, her stomach wa s sore fr om being hit by the

car . She stated that the a mbulance took he r to the hospital for tre atment. She explained that she had
to wear a strap- on cast on h er ri g ht leg for a bout three w eeks a nd had to use c rutche s during that time. Gottschalk said that she no long er ha s any problems with her kne e.

Ry a n D e rry

be rry , Go tts c ha lk’ s old e r br oth e r, te sti fi e d that he a tte nd e d the e ng a g e me nt p art y with Gottschalk at B ig Jim’s Count ry on the eve ning of November

2, 2002. He state d that he fo llo we d G ott sc ha lk o uts ide int o th e pa rking lot a t aro un d 2 :00 a .m. on No ve mbe r 3 , 2 00 2, be c a us e

“ I kn e w the re wa s so me tr ou ble sta rt ing .” He e xpla ine d that sh e wa s abo ut fi ft y y ard s in f ro nt o f h im in the parking lot. Derry

berry stated that he sudde nly saw Gottscha lk in the headlig hts of a ca r, and then the ca

r hit her. He said that he caug ht a glimpse of a “re ddish-maroonish car” backing up, and then ra n direc tly to G ottschalk, who was ly ing in the parking lot. He explained that she wa s “on the
g round, scre aming in pa in,” so he held her and place d his swe ater underne ath her head. H e said that he followe d her to the hospital and the n broug ht her home.

Marty Parrish testified that he was at B ig Jim’s Count ry during the ea

rly morning hours of November 3, 2002, and witnessed Gottschalk being hit by a car

. He said that he w en t o u t s i de beca use he sa w “every

body g oing toward the door, and I knew something wa s g oing on, so I went out there.” He state d that, when the car hit her, she “we nt on the hood . . . [a] nd then he slammed on the brakes, and she fell off on the g round.” Par

rish said that, afte r hitting Gottscha lk, the driver “put it in reve rse and backe d up and took off.” He reported that the car t hat hi t Gottschalk was a re d For d Escort. He stated that he w rote the lice nse plate numbe r on his hand and the n g ave it to the police whe n they

arrived at the sc ene.

The De fen d an t t estified that he a rrived at Big J im’s Country at about 10:00 p.m. on November

2, 2002, with his brothe r and his br other’s wife to c elebr ate their anniver sary

. He state d that he ha d a

bo ut f ive or six be e rs ov e r the c ou rs e of the e ve nin g . T he D e fe nd a nt r e po rt e d th a t, wh ile he wa s si tti ng wi th h is b ro the r ne ar the po ol t able s, a ma n p la y ing po ol s a id t o th e De fe nd a nt, “What are y ou, some kind of quee r? ” He ex p l ai n ed, “I was kind of mad a

bout it so Ipicked up a beer bottle. Yes, I

did throw a be er bottle.

. . . I t wa s stupid of me to do [ it] . I should have ne ver [done] it. [ I ] [ t] hen proce eded to r un out of the bar .” The Def endant state d that he ra n out of the bar

“ be c a us e I

kn e w I ha d ma de a

ba d mi sta

ke , a ndI wa s mo re tha n li ke ly g oin g to g e t in tr ou ble fo r i t, so I just wanted to leave .” He testified that, as he ran out to his car , J erry Prince wa s running afte r him. The Defenda nt said that he unlocked his car , g ot inside and then locked the c ar. H e explained that J erry Prince “ was not a ha

ppy person. He was mad. I

knew he was try in g t o come a fter me

.-6-

I did n’ t kn ow a t th e tim e that th e be e r b ott le ha d a lmo st h it h is mothe r, a nd I a m ve ry so rry fo r tha t. . . . I was just try ing to g et out of there .” The Def endant e x plained that he c ould not understand wha t J erry Prince wa s y elling at him in t he par king lot. The Defe ndant said that he w ould have stay ed at the bar and apolog ized for throwing the bee r bottle if he had known that it almost hi t Be tty Prince.

Th e De fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t, a s h e wa s b a c kin g up his c ar, Jer ry Pr inc e a tte mpt e d to op e n h is

car doors on the driver’s side a nd then on the passe ng er’ s side. The De fenda nt said that J erry Prince kicked his ca

r as he drove away

. He e x plained, “I didn’t see Ms. Gottscha lk out there. . . . I did not hit [an y bo dy ]. I f I

did[hit so me bo dy ,] I

wo uldha ve sto pp e d. I

a m not tha t ki ndof

pe rs on . I wo uld [ n o t ] h a v e j u s t

. . . ru n s o m e b o d y d o w n a n d [ t h e n l e f

t ] t h e m t h e r e

. ” T h e D e f e n d a n ts a i d
, “ If [Gott schalk] was hit by

my vehicle, I never knew it. I

had no idea. And t hat i s why I just procee ded to leave.” The De fenda nt testified that J erry Prince stood in front of his ca r at one point, and he ba c ke d th e c ar away fro m hi m in a n a tte mpt to l e a ve . T he De fe nd a nt d e nie d u sin g his c ar a s a

wea pon ag ainst J erry

Prince a nd Schillig, stating , “I have never

intentionally

tried to run any

body down.” He explained, “I just wanted to leave the ba r, and I didn’t want to g et in [any ] t rouble. Tha t is all I wanted to do.” He de nied “c utting donuts” in the pa rking lot because “if a ny

bod y knows
anything a

bout a front- whee l drive ca r, y ou cannot c ut a donut in it. Iwasn’t sliding around.” The De fe nd a nt a lso de nie d te lli ng Jer ry P ri nce, “I am g oin g to g e t y ou .” He state d th a t he ke pt h is windows rolled up and did not say anything to Jerry

Prince or a ny one else

.

The De fenda nt testified that, as he dr ove throug h the pa rki ng lot to leave, “I was kind of
g oing a littl e bit fast, but I

wasn’t g oing tha t fast. I mean, I didn’t have . . . the acc eler ator pushed

a ll o f the wa y

do wn to the fl oo r. ” He state d that he be lie ve d that he did no t hi t a ny bo dy that ni g ht. He e x plained, “I

know [I ] m ade a

mistake throwing the bee r bot t l e, but I did not knowingly

and intentionally

try to run somebody

down out there in that parking lot, espec ially a woman. I

wouldn’t

even r aise my

hand to a woma n, much less try to run her dow n with a ca r.”

On cr oss-examination, the Defe ndant admitted that he was c onvicted of a g g ravated burg lary and theft on Fe bruary 20, 1997. He denied hi tting Gotts chalk in the pa rking lot with his car . The Def endant state d that, at the bar , he “ha d a buzz,” and he wa s mad at the two men a t the pool tables beca use they called him a “quee r,” so he threw a beer bottle at them. The Def endant e x plained that he wa nted to hit them with the beer bottle, a nd he admitted that he committed a c rime by throwing the bottle at t he men. He stated that he waited until he was on the other side of the ba

r to throw the beer bottle. The De fenda nt said that he did not try to run over Jerry

Prince a nd Schillig and did not threa ten them i n any way

. He stated that he was not “spinning g rave l” as he left the par king lot. He testified that he looked out of the windshield as he drove his c ar f orwa rd in the par

king lot and ne ver saw Gottscha lk.

B e fo re su bmi tti ng the c a se to the jury , th e tr ia l c ou rt dis mis se d Co un t 2 o f the ind ic tme nt, which cha

rg ed the De fenda nt with ag g ravated assault for plac ing G ottschalk in rea sonable fe ar of imminent bodil y

injury throug h the use or display of a deadly wea

pon. There afte r, t he jury

convicted the Def endant o f o n e co u n t of re ckless ag g ravated assault, a Class D f elony , two counts of int e nti on a l or

kn ow ing ag g ra va te d a ssa ult , Cl a ss C fe lon ie s, a ndthr e e c ou nts of re c kle ss-7-

endang erme nt, Class E felonies.

B. Se nt e nc ing He ar ing

Th e fo llo wi ng e vid e nc e wa s p re se nte d a t th e De fend ant ’s sen te nc ing he ari ng . T he Sta te intro d u ce d t he De fenda nt’s pre- sentenc e re port into evidence . J im Grimes, a super visor in the probation and parole department f or the State of Tenne ssee, testified that the Def endant had twelve prior misdemea nor convictions and one felony conviction in G iles County betwee n 1994 and 1999. Grimes stated tha t the Def endant ha d been placed on probation approx imately ten t imes during that tim e pe ri od , a ndthe De fe nd a nt ha d a tot a l of thr e e re vo c a tio n wa rr a nts “ that we re fi le d a g a ins t hi m

a ndsu sta ine d. ” He te sti fi e d th a t th e De fe nd a nt ha d fa ile d to pa y $2 ,5 98 in “ ba la nc e du e s” fo r h is misdemeanor c ases in Giles County . Grimes stated tha t the victim asked for $1,000 in re stitut ion for he r injuries. He t es t i fi ed that the Def endant ha d been c onvicted of a ssault on two previous

occa sion s

. Grimes said that the D efe ndant re ported a history of drinking alcohol and using marijuana and crac k coca ine. On cr oss-examination, Grimes stated that the victims in the Def endant’ s case showed little interest in the De fenda nt’s sentenc ing. H e testified that the De fe nd a nt e xpre sse d r e mor se fo r h itt ing Go tts c ha lk i n th e pa rking lot

.

J ames Edwa

rd Ha zeltine, the Defe ndant’s father, testified tha t the Def endant had an alc ohol
pr ob le m w he n h e wa s y ou nger. He s ta te d th a t he pu t th e De fe nd a nt i n a re ha bil ita tio n c e nte r i n Knoxvi lle, and, whe n the Def endant r eturne d home, “He was doing a lo t b et t er

. . . .” James Ha zel tin e te sti fi e d th a t th e De fe nd a nt ha s live d with him fo r mos t of the De fe nd a nt’ s life . He sa id that the Def

endant worke d for Va lley

Packag ing in Pulaski in November of 2002. He explained that the Def endant “ was moving rig ht along up the ladder there .” J am es Ha z el t i ne re ported that the Def endant ha s not been c onvicted of any crimes from 1999 to the prese nt. He testified that, if the trial court plac ed the De fenda nt on probation, the De fenda nt would reside at his house.

Tr a c y Mit c he ll, the De fe nd a nt’ s si ste r, te sti fi e d th a t th e De fe nd a nt “ ba by -s its fo r m e a ny

tim e I work during the wee kends, when he is of f work.” She said that she has no he sitation about leaving her c hild alone with the Def endant. L es Ha zeltine, the Defe nd an t ’s brother, testified that the Def endant we nt to drug and alc ohol reha bilitation and turned his life around. H e explained, “It was night a nd day

. I mean, when he g ot out [of r ehabilitation], he g ot a g ood job. H e had a steady job, worke d hard e very

day . . . . and he w as an upstanding citizen.” L es Ha zeltine said that, if the Def endant wa s place d on probation, he wa s ce rt ai n that the Def endant would f

ollow all of the require ments of proba tion. On cross-e x amination, he testified that he acc ompanied the De fenda nt to Big J im’s Country on November 2, 2002. L es Hazeltine stated that the Def endant wa s not drunk, but he had “ a g ood buzz g oing” at the bar

.

F oll ow ing the pr esen tatio n o f this e vid e nc e , th e tr ia l c ou rt me rg e d th e thr e e re c kle ss endang erme nt convictions with the corr esponding three ag g ravated assault convic tions for ea ch victim. The rec ord shows that the trial c ourt included a n addit i o n al j u d gm ent form f or Count 2,

rec kless ag g ravated assault, with the notation, “Me rg e with Count One,” e ven thoug h the trial court d i s m i s s e d C o u n t2 b e f

o r e s u b m i t t i n g t h e c a s e t o t h e j u r y.-8-

After considering the evidenc e pre sented a t the sentenc ing he aring , the trial court found the following enhanc ement fa cto r s to b e a p p li c a b le to th e D e f e n d an t’ s convictions pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-114 ( 1997 & Supp. 2002):

(2) The defe ndant has a previous history of criminal convic tions or criminal beha vior in addition to thos e nec essary to establish the appropriate ra ng e; . . . (9) The defe ndant has a prev i o u s h i s t ory

of unwillingne ss to comply with the conditions of a sente nce involving rele ase in the c ommunity ; . . .[ and] (17) The crime w as committed under c ircumstance s under w h i ch t h e potential for bodily injury to a victim was g reat. . . .

The trial c ourt found that no mitigating fac tors applied to the De fenda nt’s case . The trial c ourt then deter mined that consec utive sentenc ing was appropriate under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40 -3 5- 11 5( b) (2 ) ( 19 97 & Sup p. 20 02 ) b e caus e it fou ndthat th e De fe nd a nt “ is a n o ff e nd e r w ho se

re c or d o f c ri min a l a c tiv ity is e xten siv e .” Th e re a ft e r, the tr ia l c ou rt imp os e d th e fo llo wi ng se nte nc e s: two y ear s and nine months for r eckle ss ag g ravated assault; and f our y ear s and ten months for e ach

rema ining c onviction of ag g ravated as s au lt, to be served c oncurr ently with eac h other, but

consec utively

to the sentenc e for

rec kless ag g ravated assault. The tri al court then denied the De fe nd a nt’ s r e qu e st f

or a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing , f

ind ing that the De fe nd a nt wa s not a g oo d c a nd idate for a lternative se ntencing “bec ause of the num erous tim es t hat the [D]efendant ha s been pla ced on probation . . . and the revoc ations which he suffe red in the past.” The trial court f urther f ound that alternative sentenc ing w as not appro p ri ate be cause of “the [D] efe ndant’s past fa ilures at

re ha bil ita tio n, a nda

pp are ntl y his pr e se nt f

a ilu re a t r e ha

bil ita tio n. ” Th e De fe nd a nt n ow app e a ls.

II. Ana lys is

On app e a l, the Defend a nt c on te nd s th a t: ( 1) ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e e xists to s up po rt his

c on vic tio ns ; (2 ) the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in no t c on so lid a tin g the thr e e c ou nts of re c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt; and (3) the trial court erre d by not ordering alternative sentenc ing a nd by ordering c onsecutive
sentenc ing.

A. Suf fi ciency of the Evidence

First, the Def

endant contends that the e vidence prese nted at trial wa s insufficient to support his convictions for ag g ravated assault and rec kless endang erme nt. When an acc used cha lleng es the sufficie ncy

of t he evidence, an appellate court’s standard of revie w is whether , afte r considering the evidenc e in the lig ht most fa vorable to the prosec ution, any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential elements of t he crime bey ond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Vi rg ini a , 44 3 U .S. 30 7, 32 4 ( 19 79 ); Sta te v. Smith, 24 S.W. 3d27 4, 27 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . T his ru le applies to findin gs of g uilt based upon direc t evidence , circ umstantial evidence , or a c ombination of bo th d ir e c t a ndc ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e . St a te v. Pe nd e rg ra ss , 13 S.W .3d 389, 392-93 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1999).-9-

I n d e te rm ini ng the su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , th is Cou rt sh ou ld n ot r e -w e ig h o r re -e va luate the evidenc e. State v. Matthew s , 80 5 S. W.2 d 7 76 , 7 79 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 90 ). No r m a y thi s C o u rt s u b s t i t u t e it s i n fe re n ce s fo r t h o s e dr aw n b y t h e tr i er o f fa ct fr o m t h e ev i d en ce

. S t at e v. Bu ggs , 99 5 S. W.2 d 1 02 , 1 05 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ; L iaka s v . St a te
, 286 S.W .2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 1956) . Questions

c on c e rn ing the c re dibil it y of th e wi tne sse s, the we ig ht a ndva lue of the e vid e nc e , a s w e ll a s a ll fac tual issues raised by

the evidenc e ar e re solved by the trier of

fac t. L iakas

, 286 S

. W .2d at 859. This Court must aff

ord the State of T ennesse e the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence contained in the r ecor d, as well as all rea sonable infe renc es which ma y be dra wn from the e vidence

. State v. Evans

, 838 S.W .2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992) . Be cause a verdic t of g uilt aga inst a defe ndant

remove s the pre sumption of innocence and ra ises a pre sumption of guilt, the convicte d criminal de fe nd a nt b e ars the bu rd e n of sho wi ng that the e vid e nc e wa s leg a lly ins uf fi c ie nt to sus ta in a g uil ty verdic t. I d.

1. Ag gr av at e d As sa ult

A per son commits agg ravated assault who:

(1 ) Inte nti on a lly

or kn ow ing ly

c omm its a n a ssa

ult a s d e fi ne d in § 3 9- 13 -1 01 a nd : (A) Causes serious bodily injury to another; or (B ) Uses or

display s a dea dly

wea pon; or (2) Rec klessly

commits an assault as def ined in § 39-13-101( a)( 1), and: (A) Causes serious bodily injury to another; or (B ) Uses or

display s a dea dly

wea pon.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-102(a )(1) , (2) ( 1997 & Supp. 2002). Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-101( a) ( 1 9 9 7) states that a person c ommits assault who: “( 1) I ntentionally , knowing ly or

re c kle ssl y c a us e s b od ily

inj ury to a no th er; (2) I nte nti on a lly or kn ow ing ly

c a us e s a no the r t o

rea sonably

fea r imm i nent bodily

injury ; or (3) Intentionally or knowing ly

cause s phy sical conta ct with another a nd a re asonable person would r eg ard the contac t as extremely o ff en s ive or
provocative.” “ De a dly

we apo n” me a ns “ [a]n y thi ng that in the ma nn e r of its us e or int e nd e d u se is
capa ble of c ausing death or

serious bodily injury .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106( a)( 5)(B ) (1997)

. “B odily injury ” includes “a cut, abra sion, br uise, burn or disfig ureme nt; phy sical pain or te mporary illness or impairment of the func tion of a bodily member, or g an, or me ntal fac ult y

. ” T enn. C ode Ann. § 39-11-106( a)( 2).

I n th is c a se , th e De fe nd a nt w a s c on vic te d f or re c kle ss a g g rava ted assau lt f or re c kle ssl y causing bodily

injury to Gottschalk while using a deadly wea pon. The De fenda nt also was convic ted fo r t wo c ou nts of

a g g ra va te d a ssa

ult fo r int e nti on a lly or kn ow ing ly c a us ing Jer ry Pr inc e a ndSc hil lig
to r e a so na

bly fe ar i mmi ne nt b od ily inj ury wh ile us ing a

de a dly we apo n. Vi e wi ng the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the pr os e c uti on , the pr oo f sho we d tha t the De fe nd a nt g ot int o his ca r i n the parking lot a nd told J erry Prince, “ I will ge t y ou g uy s.” The Defenda nt then “cut a donut” in the parking lot and then “spun g rave l” as he acc eler ated towa rd Jerry Prince a nd Schillig. The Def endant’ s car

stopped a fe w inches f

rom Schillig, and the n the Defenda nt backe d his car up about-10-

twenty -five f

eet in the pa

rking lot. The Def

endant then “ spun g rave l” aga in as he acc eler ated towa rd J erry Prince a nd Schillig a second time. J erry Prince a nd Schillig manag ed to dodg e the De fenda nt’s

car , but the Def

endant hit Gottschalk a s she was c rossing the par king lot, ca

using G ottschalk sever e pain in her right leg and re quiring her to wea r a strap-on cast for about three wee ks. J erry Prince a nd Sc hil lig te sti fi e d t hat they fe are d b od ily

inj ury a s th e De fe nd a nt d ro ve tow ardthe m on bo th

occa sions. The “de adly

wea pon” in this case was t he Defenda nt’s car , which wa s capa ble of c ausing death or serious bodily

injury if it were to hit a person. Ba sed upon this e vidence
, we conclude that

a ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld f

indbe y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e De fe nd a nt c omm itt e d r e c kle ss aggr av at ed as s au l taga i n s tGo t t s ch al k an d aggr av at ed as s au l taga i n s tJ er ryP ri n ce an d S ch i l l i g.

2. Re c kle ss E ndang e r m e nt

A per son commits reckless e ndang erme nt “ who rec klessly eng ag es in c onduct which plac es or may place another

person in imminent da ng er of death or serious bodily injury .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 1 0 3 ( a ) ( 1 9 9 7 )

. R e c k l e s s e n d a n g e r m e n tc o m m i t t e d w i t h a d e a d l y w e ap o n i s a

C l a s s E f e l o n y. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-103(b)

. “Rec kless” ref ers to a per son “who a cts rec klessly with respec t to circ umstances surrounding the conduct or t he result of t he conduct when the person is aware of but consciously

disreg ards a

subst an t i al and unjust ifiable risk that the c ircumstance s exi st or the result will occur .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-11- 106(a) (31). The risk “must be of suc h a natur e and deg ree th at i t s disreg ard c onstitut es a g ross deviation fr om the standard of car e that an or dinary person would exercise under all the circ umstances a s viewed f rom the ac cused pe rson’s standpoint.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-103(a )(31)

.

Viewe d in the light most favor able to the prosec ution, the evidenc e shows that the De fenda nt

rec klessly drove his vehic le at a high rate of speed in the parking lot of Big J im’s Country , there by placing other pe ople in the parking lot in imminent dang er of death or serious bodily

injury . The De f e n d a n t a l m o s t h i t Je rr y P r i n c e a n d S c h i l l i g a n d s t ru c k G o t t s c h a l k d u r i n g t h e c o u r se of his

rec kless driving in the parking lot. Thus, the evidence wa s sufficient f or the jury to conclude be y ond

a re asonable doubt that the Def endant wa s g uilty of recklessly endang ering Gottschalk, Jerry Prince and Schillig. How ever , beca use of our

holding with re spect to t h e De fendant’s second issue, w e

re ve rs e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nts fo r C ou nts 5 a nd7 s ho wi ng the con vi ctions of re c kle ss

en d an ger m en tu p o n J er ryP ri n ce an d S ch i l l i g.

B. C ons oli dat ion of R e c kle ss E ndang e r m e nt Co nvi c ti ons

Th e De fe nd a nt n e xt co nte nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in no t c on so lid a tin g the thr e e c ou nts of re c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt s inc e the y aro se fr om the De fe nd a nt’ s si ng le act of drivi ng . T he Sta te

conce des in its appellate br ief that the Defe ndant’s convic tions for rec kless endang erme nt upon J erry Prince a nd Schillig must be merg ed into a si ng le count, but the S tate arg ues t hat t he convic tion for

re ckless enda ng erme nt upon Gottschalk must stand. The State contends tha t the Def endant committed two separate ac ts of rec kless endang erme nt in the parking lot because he drove toward Jer ry Pr inc e a ndSc hil lig , ba c ke d up an d the n dro ve a t the m ag a in, hit tin g Go tts c ha lk. We a g re e wi th the Def endant.-11-

I n St a te v. Ra mse y , 9 03 S.W. 2d 70 9, 71 3 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 5) , this Cou rt he ld tha t, i n

certain circ umstances, a defe ndant’s continuous operation of a vehic le may only result in one ac t of

re c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt u nd e r the statut e . T his Cou rt no te d th a t “ the fa c t th at th e re c kle ss

e nd a ng e rm e nt s ta tu te sp eak s in te rm s o f a pe rs on re c kle ssl y

e ng a g ing in c on du c t in dic a te s th a t a

course of conduct, comprised of se vera l acts, would constitute the off ense.” Ramsey , 903 S.W .2d at 713; see also State v. Davis, 654 S.W .2d 688, 696 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983) (holding that if the statute prohibits a course of conduc t, as opposed to individual acts, then ther e can b e o n l y one conviction eve n though se vera l acts constituting the course of conduc t may be prove n). Howe ver, this Court declined to “fa shion a blanket rule that provides that a defenda nt’s continuous opera tion

o f a v e h i c l e m a y on ly result i n one act of reckless enda ng erme nt under the statute. Ma ny scena rios could b e cre ated whe re suc h a rule would not be prude nt.” Ramsey , 903 S.W .2d at 713. I nstead, the de te rm inatio n o f w he the r the c on tin uo us op e ratio n o f a ve hic le ma y c on sti tut e on e a c t of re c kle ss endang erme nt depends upon the unique fac ts of eac h case . I d.

I n Ramsey , the def

endant wa s speeding in his car a long a two lane r oad and ve ere d into the oncoming lane, ne arly

hitting a pick- up truck tra veling in t h at l an e. I d. at 711. The de fenda nt continued spee ding a nd veer ed into the oncoming lane ag ain, colliding with a second pick-up truc k. I d. Th e de fe nd a nt wa s c on vic te d of thr e e c ou nts of re c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt f

or thr e e se pa

rate vic tim s. I d. Th is C ou rt

de te rm ine d th a t, u nd e r tho se fa c ts, the tr ia l c ou rt sh ou ld h a ve me rg e d th e thr e e c ou nts of re ckless enda ng erme nt into one. This Court ex plained:

Due to the ve ry

short distance betwee n the two trucks a nd the very short amount of time that passed betwe en swerving into the oncoming la ne of tra ffic in f ront of the Tripletts and the crash with Mr. S tory , the re ckless conduc t eng ag ed in by the de fe nd a nt w a s o ne c on tin uo us a c t, a sin g le c ou rs e of c on du c t, an d th e re fo re su pp orts only one convic tion for that ac t. I n this case, . . . we find th at al t h o ug h the defe ndant’s re ckless conduc t victimiz ed more t h an one pe rson, it does not justify mul tip le c on vic tio ns

.

I d. at 713.

I n this case, the e vidence shows that the Def endant “ cut a donut” in the pa rking lot and then “spun g rave l” as he acc eler ated towa rd Jerry Prince a nd Schillig. The Defe ndant’s car stopped a few inches fr om Schilli g , and then the Def endant backe d his c ar up about twenty -five fee t in the pa rking l o t

. T h e D ef

en d an tt h en “s p u n gra v el ” a gai n as h e a cc el er at ed t o wa rd J er ryP ri n ce an d S ch i l l i g a

se c on d tim e

. Jer

ry Pr inc e a nd Sc hil lig ma na g e d to do dg e the De fe nd a nt’ s c ar, bu t th e De fe nd a nt h it Go tts c ha lk a s s h e w a s c r o s s i n g t h e p ark i n g l o t

. T h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e ar e s i m i l ar

t o t h e f a c t s in Ramsey beca use these e vents occ urre d during a very short period of time, a nd the v i ct ims were wi thi n c los e ph y sic a l pr oximi ty of e a c h o the r. We c on c lu de th at, und e r the se fa c ts, the re c kle ss conduct en gag ed in by

the Def endant wa s one continuous ac t, a sing le cour se of c onduct, and, there fore , supports only

one convic tion for that ac t. Although t he De fenda nt’s rec kless conduct vic tim ize d mo re tha n o ne pe rs on , w e c on c lud e that it do e s n ot j us tif

y mul tip le c on vic tio ns

. Acc ording ly , we r ever se t he trial court’s judgments for Counts 5 and 7 showing the convictions of-12-

rec kless endang erme nt upon J erry Prince a nd Schillig.

After thoroug hly examining the rec ord in this case , we also conclude that the trial court erre d as to Count 2 by enter ing a j udg ment form for Count 2 showing a conviction for reckle ss ag g rava ted assault with the notation, “Mer g e with Count One.” Be fore the t rial court submitt ed the case to the jury , the trial court dismi ssed Count 2 of t he indi ctment. The jury convicted the Def endant of one count of re ckless ag g rav at ed assault. Theref ore, w e re mand the ca se to the trial court to enter a n order vacating this extraneous judg ment perta ining to Count 2.

G . Se nt e nc ing

Finally , the Def

endant contends that the trial court err ed in se ntencing the Def endant. The trial court imposed the following sentenc es: two y ear s and nine months for rec k l es s ag g ravated assault; and four

y ear s and ten months for e ach c onviction of ag g ravated assault, to be se rved

c on c ur re ntl y wi th e a c h o the r, bu t c on se c uti ve ly to the se nte nc e fo r rec kle ss a g g ra va te d a ssa ult

. Specifica lly , the Def

endant a rg ues t hat t he trial court erre d by imposing conse cutive sente ncing and de ny ing his re qu e st f

or a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing . T he Sta te c on te nd s tha t the tr ia l cou rt didno t a bu se its discretion by

ordering c onsecutive se ntencing beca use t he Defenda nt has an extensive historyof

c ri min a l a c tiv ity . T he Sta te a lso arg ue s th a t th e tr ia l cou rt pr op e rl y de nie d the De fe nd a nt’ s r e qu e st fo r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nci ng bec a us e the De fe nd a nt’ s p ro ba tio n h a s b e e n r e vo ke d mo re tha n o nc e in the past, and he has fa iled at his attempts to rehabilitate himself. We ag ree with the State.

Whe n a de fe nd a nt ch a lle ng e s the le ng th an d man ne r of se rv ic e of a se nte nc e , it is the du ty of this court to conduc t a de novo r eview on the rec ord with a presumption that “the de terminations made b y th e c o u r t f

r o m w h ic h th e ap p e a l i s ta k e n ar e c o rr e c t. ” T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0 -35-401( d) (2003). This presumption is “conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial

c ou rt c on sid e re d th e se nte nc ing pr inc ipl e s a nda ll r e le va nt fa c ts a ndc ir c ums ta nc e s. ” Sta te v. Ros s, 49 S.W .3d 833, 847 (Tenn. 2001) ; State v. Pettus, 986 S .W.2d 540, 543 (Tenn. 1999) ; State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991)

. The pre sumption does not apply to the leg al conc lusions

rea ched by

the trial court in sentencing a defe ndant or to the deter minations made by the trial court wh ic h a re pr e dic a te d u po n u nc on tr ov e rt e d fa c ts. Sta te v. De a n, 76 S.W. 3d35 2, 37 7 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 2001); State v. B utler, 900 S.W.2d 305, 311 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Sta t e v. Smit h 891 S.W. 2d92 2, 92 9 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 94 ). I n co nd uc tin g a de no vo re vie w o f a se nte nc e , w e mus t

c on sid e r: (a ) a ny

e vid e nc e re c e ive d at the tr ia l and /or se nte nc ing he ari ng ; ( b) the pr e se nte nc e re po rt ; (c) the principles of sentenc ing; (d) the arg uments of counsel rela tive to se ntencing alternatives; (e) the natu r e a n d c h ar a c te r is ti c s o f th e o f f e n s e ; ( f ) a n y mi ti g a ti n g o r e n h a n c e me n t f a c to r s ; ( g ) any
statements made by the defe ndant on his or her own behalf ; a nd (h) the de fenda nt’s potential or lac k of potential for

reha bilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210 (2003); State v. Ta y lor, 63 S.W .3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The party challeng ing a s entenc e im posed bythe trial court ha s the burden of establishing that the s entenc e is err oneous. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Cm ts.

A def en d a n t is e li g ib le f

o r a lt e r n a ti v e s e n te n c in g if th e s e n te n c e a c tu a ll y imp o s e d is eig ht-13-

y ear s or l ess. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-303( a) ( 2003). A de fenda nt who is an espec ially mitigated

or sta nd ard of

fe nd e r co nv ic te d of a Cla ss C, D or E f e lon y is p re su me d to be a

fa vo ra ble c a nd idate for alternative sentenc ing options in the absenc e of evidenc e to the contr ary . Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-102(b) (6). I n deter mining whe ther to g rant or de ny probation, the trial c ourt m ay consider the following : the circ umstances of the offe nse; the defe ndant’s criminal re cord; ba ckg round and soc ial h i s t o r y; t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s p h ys i c a l a n d m e n t a l h e a l t h ; t h e d e t e rr e n t e f f e c t o n o t h e r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y;

a ndthe lik e lih oo d tha t pro ba tio n is in the be st i nte re sts of bo th t he pu bli c a ndthe de fe nd a nt. Sta te v. Parker , 932 S.W .2d 945, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 199 6 ). T h e De fenda nt bear s the burden of establishing suitability

for pr obation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303( b); Ashby
, 823 S.W .2d at 169.

Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d s e c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 03 (1 ) ( 19 97 ) s ta te s th a t:

Se nte nc e s in vo lvi ng c on fi ne me nt s ho uldbe ba se d o n th e fo llo wi ng c on sid e ratio ns : (A) Confine ment is nece ssary to protect socie ty

by restra ining a

defe ndant who has

a lon g his tory

of c ri min a l c on du c t; (B ) C on fi ne me nt i s n e c e ssa ry to a vo id de pr ecia tin g the se ri ou sn e ss o f the of fe ns e or c on fi ne me nt i s p art ic ula

rl y su ite d to
pr ov i d e a n e f

f e c t i v e d e t e rr e n c e t o o t h e r s l i k e l y t o c o m m i t s i m i l ar o f f e n s e s ; o r (C ) Measur es less re strictive than conf inement have fre quently

or re cently

been a pplied

unsucce ssfully

to the defe ndant; . . . .

Additionally
, “[t] he potential or lac k of potential for the re habilitation or treatment of the def endant should be consider ed in determining the se ntence alternative or leng th of a term to be imposed. . . .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 4 0 -3 5 -1 0 3 (5). The trial court may consider mitig ating fac tors and enhancement f

actor s when de termining a def endant’ s sentence . Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40- 35-113, -114. A trial c ourt may order sentenc es to run consec utively if a de fenda nt is charg ed with more tha n

one criminal offense and it fin d s , by a pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e, that one or more of se vera l criteria ar e met as se t forth in Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40- 35-115 (1997). State v. Ke rn, 909 S.W .2d 5, 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993). These criteria include a finding by the trial court that the defe ndant is “an of

fende r whose rec ord of criminal activity is ex tensive.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 115(b)( 2). Whether se ntence s are to be serve d consec utively or concur rently is a matter within the sound discretion of the tr ial court. State v. J ames, 688 S.W .2d 463, 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984)

.

I n this case, afte r considering the evidenc e prese nted at the sentenc ing hearing, the trial court found the following enhanc ement fa ctors to be applicable to the Def endant’ s convictions pursuant to Tennesse e Code Annota ted sec tion 40-35-114:

(2) The defe ndant has a previous his tory of criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to thos e nec essary to establish the appropriate ra ng e; . . . (9) T h e d ef

en dant has a

previous history

of unwillingne ss to comply with the conditions of a sente nce involving rele ase in the c ommunity ; . . .[ and] (17) The cr i m e wa s committed under c ircumstance s under whic h the potential for bodily injury to a victim was g reat; . . .In hi s ap p el l at e b ri ef
, t he D ef end ant f ai l ed t o argue any s ent enci ng i ss ues ot her t han whet her t he t ri al co urt 1

e rr e d in o rd e rin g c o n se c u tive se n te n c ing a n d in d e n ying the D e fen d a n t’s re q u e st fo r a lter n a tive se n te n c ing . A c c o rd ing ly,

we c on cl u de t h at t h e D ef en dan t h as w ai v ed an y ot h er s en t en ci n g i s s u es

. T en n

. R. App. P. 13( b) ; T en n

. R. Ct

. Cr i m. App. 10 ( b). H owever , we not e t hat t he t r i al cour t err ed by ap pl y i ng t he enh anc ement f act or t hat “ t he cr i me was comm i t t ed

u n der c i r cu ms t an ce s u n der w h i ch t h e pot en t i al f or bodi l y i n j u r y t o a v i ct i m wa s g r ea t

. ” T en n

. Code An n

. § 40- 35- 11 4(17). I n St at e v. I mf el d, 70 S. W

. 3d 69 8, 70 6 ( T enn

. 20 02 )
, t he T enn es s ee Supre me C our t he l d t hat t he “ po t ent i al f o r b o d i l y i nju ry” en ha nc em en t f ac t o r wa s i na p p l i ca b l e t o en ha nc e the se nten ce s fo r ag gra va t ed assau l t b ec au se “el em ent s o f

an aggravat ed ass aul t agai nst a s p eci f i c, nam e d v ic tim a re ref l ect ed i n t he st at ut o ry l anguage o f t he enh anc ement f act or, t hu s r ender i ng i t s appl i cat i on t o enh anc e t he s ent enc e i nappropri at e. ” E ven i f we wer e t o f

i nd t hat
t hi s i ss ue was not waived, t he t ri al co urt ’ s error i n ap p l y i ng t hi s enhancem ent f act o r wo u ld n o t h a v e res ul t ed i n a red uc t i o n in t he D efen d an t ’ s senten ce b ec au se the tri al co urt p ro p erly ap p l i ed t he t w o o t he r en ha nc em en t f ac t o rs.

-14- The trial c ourt found that no mitigating fac tors applied to the Def endant’ s case

. The trial c ourt then deter mined that consec utive sentenc ing was appropriate under Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b)(2) beca

use it found that the De fenda nt “is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal

ac t i v i t y i s ex t en s i v e. ” T h e t ri al co u rt t h en d en i ed t h e De fe n d an t ’s re q u es tfo r a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g, finding that the Def

endant wa s not a g ood candida te for a lternative se ntencing “bec ause of the numerous times that the [D] efe ndant has be en placed on probation .

. . and the revocations which he

su ff e re d in the pa st. ” Th e tr ia l c ou rt fu rthe r f ou ndthat a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing wa s n ot a pp ro pr ia te beca use of “ the [D] efe ndant’s past fa ilures at re habilitation, and appar ently his present fa ilure at reha bilitation.”

On appe al, the De fenda nt does not c ontest the trial court’s imposit ion of any enhanc ement fa c to r s ; r a th e r h e c h a ll e n g e s th e imp o s it io n o f c o n s e c u ti v e s e n te n c in g a n d th e tria l c o u r t’ s denial

1 of the De fenda nt’s reque st for alter native sente ncin g. After thoroug hly

revie wing the evidenc e prese nted at the se ntencing hearing, we conclude that the t rial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering c onsecutive se ntencing in this case. The re cord shows tha t the Def endant is “a n offe nder whose re cord of

criminal ac tivityis ex t en sive.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 115(b)( 2). The De fe nd a nt’ s r e c or d s ho ws the fo llo wi ng c on vic tio ns : e v a d i n g a r r e s t ; l e a v i n g the sc e ne of

a n a c c ide nt; two convictions for disorde rly conduct; two convic tions for public intox ication; two convictions for

va nd a lis m; d ri vin g un de r the inf lue nc e ; two co nv ic tio ns fo r as sault ; ag g ra va te d bur g lary ; a ndthe ft

. Thes e thirtee n convictions demonstrate that the Def endant ha s an extensive rec ord of c riminal activity . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that the tr ial court did not ab u s e i t s discretion by imposing

consec utive sentenc ing in this ca se.

The De fenda nt next contends that the trial court err ed by deny ing his re quest for a lternative

se nte nc ing

. Th e tr ia l cou rt fo un d tha t the De fe nd a nt wa s not a g oo d ca nd idate fo r p ro ba tio n b e c a us e of his prior probation revocations and his past fa ilures at re habilitation. The trial court noted that the Def endant “ falter ed conside rably ” in his reha bilitation on t h e n i gh t o f the incide nt and “[t] hat

a lmo st c a us e d a t le a st on e

. . . pe rs on to be se ri ou sly
, se ri ou sly inj ur e d, wh o [di d n ot h a ve a ] dog in the fig ht, so to speak. She was just g oing to h er ca r, and the [D]efenda nt rec klessly ran ove r her beca use of this.” W e agr ee wi t h the trial court’s finding s. The De fenda nt has bee n g iven the

o p p o rt u n i t y

t o re h ab i l i t at e h i m s el f u n d erl es s re s t ri ct i v e m ea n s , an d h e h as fa i l ed t o t ak e a d v an t age-15-

of t hese opportunities. His actions i n the parking lot of Big J im’s Country injured Gottschalk a nd could have seriously

injured other pe ople i n the area. Moreove r, t he Defenda nt’s extensive recor d of criminal activity

indicates that he is not a good candidate f or alternative sente ncing . The re cord fully supports the trial court’s finding s and its determination denying the Def endant a n alterna tive
sentenc e. There fore
, we conclude that the Defenda nt has not met his burden of de monstrating the i m p ro p ri et y

o f t h e t ri al co u rt ’s d en i al o f a l t er n at i v e s en t en ci n g.

III. Conclusi on

I n acc ord ance with the fore g oing a uthorities and re asoning , we AF FI RM the trial court’s judgme nts for Counts 1, 4 and 6, the ag g ravated assault convic tions, a nd for Count 3, the conviction of re c kle ss e nd a ng e rm e nt u po n Got tsc ha lk. We R EV ERS E the tr ia l c ou rt ’s jud g me nts fo r C ou nts 5 a n d 7 s h o w in g th e c o n v ic ti o n s o f r e c k le s s e n d a n g e r me n t u p o n Je rr y Pr in c e a n d Sc h il li g

. We REMAND the c ase to the tria l court to enter an order vacating the extraneous judgme nt pertaining to Count 2 and for further proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.

___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE