### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE June 21, 200 5 S es sio n STATE OF TENNESS EE v . ROBERT ANTH ONY STEW ART, JR.

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Bedf ord County Nos. 15374, 15377, and 15379 Ch arles Lee , Judge

No. M2004- 02122-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Novem ber 17, 2005

The state a

ppeals the B edfor d CountyCircuit Court’s suppression of statements made by the defe ndant at the de fenda nt’s second se nten ci n g hearing. It claims that despite its failure during dis c ov e ry to g ive the de fe nd a nt n oti c e of his state me nts , th e tria l c ou rt abu se d it s d isc re tio n in su pp re ssi ng the state ’s e vid e nc e , w hic h it c on te nd s is the mos t dr a sti c me a su re a va ila ble a ndsh ou ld only b e e mp lo y e d w h e n n o o th e r ap p r o p r iate r e me d y e xis ts

. T h e s tate ar g u e s th a t g r a n ti n g the defe ndant a c ontinuance w ould ha ve been an appropriate reme dy . We conclude the trial court e rre d in s up pres si ng th e state me nts a ndre ma ndthe c a se fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w iththi s opinion.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f the Ci r c uit Co ur t R e ve r se d, C as e Rem anded
J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P

. J. , a n d J. C. M C L IN , J ., joined.
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Pr e sto n Sh ip p, Assis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam Michael McCown, D istrict Attorney Gene ral; and Michae l D avid Randles and Ann L . Filer , Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llant, State of Tenne ssee.
Fletc her W. L ong and Mattie L ee B hela, Spring field, Tenne ssee, f or the appellee , Robert Anthony Stewart, Jr.
OP IN ION
This case relates to the defendant’s convictions on Marc h 9, 2004, for se lling coc aine. The evidenc e produced at trial showed that the Seve nteenth Judi cial Dr ug Task F orce (“dr

ug task forc e”) rec eived informat i o n fr o m a conf idential informant that the de fendant was selling cocaine to her. Ba sed upon this information, the drug task forc e arr ang ed controlled purcha ses of c ocaine from the de fe nd a nt, wh ic h c on c lud e d w ith the de fend a nt s e lli ng the inf orma nt c oc a ine on thr e e se pa rate occa sions.-2-

At the sentenc ing he aring , Direc tor Tim L ane of the drug task forc e testified that a fter the defe ndant’s ar

rest, he spoke to the defe ndant. He said the defe ndant told him that he was involved reg ularly in the distribution of c rac k cocaine, ac quiring and selling betwee n one-ha lf ounce and one ounce of cocaine per

wee k. He sa id the defe ndant admitted selling cocaine for a pproxi mately

two a nd on e -h a lf y e ars
. B a se d in part up on the se state me nts , th e tr ia l c ou rt se nte nc e d th e de fe nd a nt t o concur rent terms o f ei gh t y ear s and two months for the f irst two convictions to be serve d consec utively

to a term of e ight y ear s and ten months for the third c onviction for an e ffe ctive sentenc e of se ventee n y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction.
On Ma y 13 , 20 04 , the de fe nd a nt fi le d a mot ion fo r ne w tr ia l, a lle g ing , a mon g oth e r thin g s, that the state violated discove ry rules by failing to notify

the def endant o f t he stateme nts he made to D irec tor L ane. The trial court denied the defe ndant’s motion for new trial on J une 28, 2004, but order ed a ne w sentenc ing he aring based upon the state’s discove ry violation. On J uly

2, 2004, the state provided an amende d discovery response to the defe ndant informing him of the statements he made to Dire ctor L ane. O n J uly 9, 20 0 4 , t h e trial court conducte d a sec ond sentenc ing he aring at which it suppre ssed the defe ndant’s statements based upon the state’s discovery violation. It then imposed a sentenc e of ten y ear s and four months for the first two convic tions and eleve n y ear s for the third conviction and or dere d the sentenc es to be served conc urre ntly for a n eff ective se ntence of eleve n y ear s.
The sta t e co n tends the trial court erre d in suppressing the def endant’ s statements at the second se ntencing hearing. I t c laims that the suppression of evidenc e is a drastic r emedy

and that the trial court abused its discr etion beca use other r easona

ble alternatives existed to the suppression of the stateme nts. I t arg ues that the trial c ourt could have g rante d the def endant a continuance . The de fe nd a nt r e sp on ds that th e state me nts mus t be su pp re sse d b e c a us e the state ’s failu re to n oti fy him of the state me nts pu rs ua nt t o h is d isc ov e ry re qu e st pr e c lud e d him fr om fi lin g a mot ion to s up pr e ss those statements at the trial, resulting in prejudice to him at the sente ncing hearing. H e also c ontends that the trial co u rt ’s order suppressing the statements is justified in order to discour ag e the prosec ution from eng ag ing in similar misconduct in the future. He c laims that the trial court did not abu se its discret io n in su pp re ssi ng the state me nts a ndthat su pp re ssi on wa s n ot the mos t dr a sti c reme dy available to the trial court. We ag ree with the state.
I nitially , we note that the s tate arg ued in the t rial court that it was not obligated to turn over the def endant’ s sta t em en t s under Rule 16( a)( 1)(A) of the Te nnessee Rules of Criminal Procedure beca use it did not use the defe ndant’s ora l statement at the trial. I t claimed that the se ntencing hearing was not a part of the trial a nd that Rule 16 did not mandate disclosure of the statement to the defe nse. On a

ppeal the state claims that whether the “at the trial” langua g e of the rule a pplies to the sentenc ing he aring is a question of first impression in Tenne ssee. I t does not , howeve r, arg ue for any pa rt ic ula r o utc ome . In r e sp on se , th e de fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t th e “ a t th e tr ia l” la ng ua g e of the ru le applies to the sentenc ing he aring , there b y re q u i ri ng the state to have disclosed the def endant’ s statement. We believe we must addre ss this i ssue.-3-

Rule 16(a) (1)( A) of the Tenne ssee Rules o f C riminal Procedur e provide s for discove ry of state me nts ma de by

the de fe nd a nt. I t pr ov ide s, in r e le va nt p art , th a t Up on re qu e st o f a

de fe nd a nt the state sh a ll p e rm it the de fe nd a nt t o inspect and c opy

or photog raph: . . . the substanc e of any oral statement which the state intends to offe r in evidenc e at the trial made by the de fe nd a nt w he ther b e fo re or a ft e r a rr e st i n r e sp on se to interrog ations by

any person then know n to the defe ndant to be a lawenfor ceme nt office r . . . . Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1) (A) ( emphasis adde d). This court has pr eviously stated t h at Rule 16 applies to sentenc ing he aring s. See State v. Cottrell, 868 S.W .2d 673, 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (“A dhere n ce t o the rules g overning discovery is often as important at the se ntencing stag e as it is at the trial stag e.”)

. I n State v. Max Eug ene Ma

rtin, No. 01C01-9609-CR-00415, Putnam Count y , slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. April 20, 1998), the de fenda nt pled g uiltybut left for the trial court to dete rmine all questions reg arding sentenc ing. A t the sentenc ing he aring , the def endant objec ted p u rs u an t to Rul e 16 to the state’ s introduction of expert testimony . The trial court overr uled the def

endant’ s objection on the g round that Rule 16 discovery

did not apply

to sentencing hearings. O n appea l, this court stated,
To the contra

ry , the discovery ru l es are applicable in sentencing proce eding s. See State v. B uck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tenn. 1984) ; State v. Cottrell, 868 S.W .2d 673, 677 (Tenn. C ri m. App. 1992) (stressing i mp o rt an ce o f c o m p l y i n g wi t h d i s co v er y ru l es at s en t en cing stag e, as w ell as trial).
Te nn e sse e Rul e of Cr imi nal Pr oc e du re 16 (a )( 1) (D ) p ro vid e s: Rep o r ts o f

E xa mi n a ti o n s a n d T e s ts

. - - U p on requ e s t o f a d e f

e n d a n t, th e s tate s h a ll p e r mi t the defe ndant to inspect and c opy or ph o t og raph any re su lts or re po rt s o f ph y sic a l or

me nta l e xami natio ns , and of sc ientific tests o r experiments, or copie s there of, which a

re w ithin the pos s essi on, custody or control of the state, t he existence of w hich is known, or by the e xer c ise of

du e dil ig e nc e ma y

be c ome known, to the district attorney g ener al and whic h are materia l to the prepa

ration o f the def

ense or are intended for

use by the stat e as ev i dence in chief at tr ia l.
I n the contex t of appe llant’s case , this subsection require d the State to pr oduce rec ords, reports, or notes of Dr. Ka rlosky which she-4- may have pr epar ed in the course of her treatment of the victim. The State prese nted Dr. K arlosky to de monstrate the impact the r ape ha d on the victim and he r notes with respe ct to her dia g nosis and treatment of the victim were discovera ble by the def ense. H oweve r, any err or was harmless beca use it is appar ent from the r ecor d that the trial court did not take into a ccount Dr. Karlosky ’s testimonyin any way in deciding the l eng th or t he manner of service of the appe llant’s sentenc e. Martin, slip op. at 4-5 (e mphasis added) (footnote omitted). We note that the l ang uag e in (a )(1) (A) pr ov ide s f

or dis c ov e ry

wh e n th e state int e nd s to us e the e vid e nc e “ a t th e tr ia l,” bu t th e la ng ua g e in (a) (1)( D) provide s for discove ry only when the state i ntends to use the e vidence “as e vidence in chief at t ri al .” Ne verthe less, this court conclude d in Martin that Rule16(a) (1)( D) a pplied to sentencing he ari ng s, a ndwe lik e wi se c on c lud e that th e “ a t th e tr ia l” la ng ua g e in R ule 16 (a )( 1) (A ) a pp lie s to sentenc ing he aring s.
I n suppressing the statements, the tria l court stated, What . . . y ou are asking me to do is allow the State to–I am not acc using the State of this in this case , but y ou are asking me to allow the State to g o until they

g et caug ht, then be able to go a g ain.
B e c a us e y ou ha ve g ott e n c a ug ht. I a m no t a c c us ing the Sta te of do ing a nythi ng bu t pe rh aps no t be ing famil iar w ith the ru le s. But this statement should have been g iven to the def endant befor e the he aring . On that y ou will ag ree ?
I f a pa rt y fails to c omp ly wi th a de fe nd a nt’ s dis c ov e ry re qu e st, the tr ia l c ou rt “ ma y or de r su c h p art y to permit the discovery

or inspection, g rant a

continuance , or prohibit t h e p ar t y from introducing evidenc e not disclosed, or it may enter such ot her order as it deems just under the circ umstances.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2).
Howeve r, a tria l court should avoid the dra stic reme dy of suppressing evidence based upon a discove ry

violation “unless there is no other re asonable alternative.” State v. Smith, 926 S .W.2d 2 6 7 , 2 7 0 ( T e n n
. C r i m
. A p p
. 1 9 9 5 ) ( c i t i n g S t a t e v
. H o u s e , 7 4 3 S

. W

. 2 d 1 4 1 , 1 4 7 ( T e n n
. 1 9 8 7 ) )

. In fashioning a re medy , the trial court should consider the pre judice, if any , resulting to the def endant a s a re su lt o f the state ’s dis c ov e ry vio la tio n. Se e Sta te v. B ake r, 75 1 S. W.2 d 1 54 , 1 60 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1987). The appropriate re medy for a discovery violation is often a continuance . See State v. Cottrell, 868 S.W .2d 673, 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

. We note t he record is devoid of any evidenc e of the state’s intentionally violating Rule 16. We c on c lud e no jus tif

ic a tio n e xists fo r the tr ia l c ou rt to h a ve su pp re sse d t he evi den ce i n o rd e r t o deter the state fr om future c onduct in derog ation of the rule

.-5-

The de fenda nt contends that suppre ssion was the appr opriate r emedy beca use he w as prejudice d by

the state’s f

ailure to inform him of hi s statements. He claims he would have soug ht to suppress the stateme nts by way of pre -trial motion had he known a bout them. We disag ree that the def endant wa s prejudice d beca use we conclude that the trial court could have g iven him the op po rtun ity

to s up pr e ss the state me nts . Se e Te nn . R. Cr im. P. 1 2(f ) (“ F a ilu re by

a pa rt y to r a ise defe nses or objec tions or to make reque sts whic h must be made prior to trial, at the time set by the c ou rt pu rs ua nt t o s ub div isi on (c ), or prior to any e xten sio n th e re of

ma de by the c ou rt , s ha ll c on sti tut e waiver there of, but the court for cause shown may g rant relief from the waive r.”) (empha sis added). We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt abu se d it s d isc re tio n insu pp re ssi ng the state me nts

. Ba sed on the foreg oing and t he re cord a s a whole, w e re verse the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re mand this case f

or further proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.

___________________________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE