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Filed 4/19/16 In re A.N. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

In re A. N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

C079501

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A. N.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. JV135293)

Minor A. N. appeals following the denial of her request to seal records outside the 

custody of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code1section 786. She 

contends the juvenile court erred by failing to grant her request to seal records in the 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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possession of all law enforcement agencies, the district attorney’s office, and the 

Department of Justice. We conclude the juvenile court did not err, and therefore affirm.

DISCUSSION

We dispense with a recitation of the facts because they are unnecessary to the 

resolution of this appeal. It suffices to say that a section 602 petition alleged that A. N.

committed burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459. Following her admission to 

this charge and her failure to comply with the terms of informal probation, A. N. was

declared a ward and placed on probation. 

In June 2015, after finding that A. N. had completed probation, the juvenile court 

dismissed the section 602 petition and ordered all records in the custody of the court 

sealed pursuant to section 786. On appeal, A. N. contends the juvenile court erred by 

failing to grant her request to seal records in the possession of all law enforcement 

agencies, the district attorney’s office, and the Department of Justice. According to A. 

N., the juvenile court improperly interpreted the scope of the sealing requirement under 

section 786. We disagree.

At the time the section 602 petition was dismissed, section 786 provided, in 

relevant part: “If the minor satisfactorily completes . . . probation under Section 725, . . . 

the court shall order the petition dismissed, and the arrest . . . shall be deemed not to have 

occurred. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to that dismissed petition in 

the custody of the juvenile court . . . .” (§ 786.)

“In construing a statute, our role is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to 

effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citation.] In determining intent, we must look first to 

the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. 

[Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the 

statute governs.” (People v. Lopez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1051, 1056.) In other words, if 

there is “no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have 
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meant what it said,” and it is not necessary to “resort to legislative history to determine 

the statute’s true meaning.” (People v. Cochran (2002) 28 Cal.4th 396, 400-401.)

We find no error. Effective January 1, 2016, section 786 provides, in relevant 

part: “If a minor satisfactorily completes . . . probation under Section 725, . . . the court 

shall order the petition dismissed. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to 

that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of law 

enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice.” (§ 786, 

subd. (a).) However, this amended statute was not in effect at the time the juvenile court 

issued its sealing order.

When the sealing order was issued, the unambiguous language of section 786 only 

required the juvenile court to seal records in the custody of the court. A. N. has not cited, 

and we are unaware of, any controlling or persuasive authority supporting the conclusion 

that section 786 required the juvenile court to seal records outside its custody at the time 

the order was made. We are not persuaded by A. N.’s contention that the statute should 

be interpreted to require a juvenile court to seal all case-related records, regardless of 

which agency maintains them. Doing so would require us to include language omitted 

from the statute in violation of “the cardinal rule that courts may not add provisions to a 

statute or rewrite it to conform to an assumed intent that does not appear from its plain 

language.” (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 692.) If the Legislature had 

intended the interpretation urged by A. N., it knew how to do so, as evidenced by the 

amended version of section 786. We presume the Legislature meant exactly what it said 

and need not look to the legislative history as A. N. does to support her argument. This is 

not an extreme case in which it is appropriate to disregard unambiguous statutory 

language. (Gorham Co., Inc. v. First Financial Ins. Co. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1532, 

1544 [courts should disregard unambiguous language “only in ‘extreme cases’--those in 

which, as a matter of law, the Legislature did not intend the statute to have its literal 

effect”].)
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A. N. requests remand and, although the People argue that the records to be sealed 

were correctly limited to the records in the juvenile court’s custody, the People also 

suggest we remand for further proceedings given the subsequent amendment. Neither the 

People nor defendant offer any authority for this request. And we have found none.

We reject the parties’ assertion that remand is appropriate. “A new or amended 

statute applies prospectively only, unless the Legislature clearly expresses an intent that it 

operate retroactively.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 664.) There is no 

expression of any intent that the amended version of section 786 operate retroactively. 

Nor does the rule of retroactivity announced in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 apply. 

In Estrada, our Supreme Court held that when the Legislature enacts a provision 

lessening punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is that the amendment will 

operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed. (Id. at p. 748.) We 

conclude that section 786, as amended, does not qualify as an amendatory statute 

lessening punishment within the meaning of Estrada. The issue is whether the 

Legislature has deemed a lesser punishment sufficient. (People v. Brown (2012) 54 

Cal.4th 314, 325.) Accordingly, because the amendments to section 786 do not operate 

to reduce punishment, we find no basis to remand under Estrada.

We note, however, that 16-year-old A. N. is not totally without a remedy. She

may petition to expand the scope of the sealing order upon turning 18. (See § 781, 

subd. (a)(1)(A); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.830.)
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DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s sealing order is affirmed.

/s/ 

Robie, J.

We concur:

/s/ 

Nicholson, Acting P. J.

/s/ 

Renner, J.