alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[862 NYS2d 510]

#### In the Matter of Gary S. Shaw (Admitted as Gary Stuart Shaw), an Attorney, Respondent. Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District, Petitioner.

Second Department,

June 17, 2008

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Rita E.*Adler, Hauppauge *(Robert H. Cabble*of counsel), for petitioner.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

*40On September 25, 2007, the respondent pleaded guilty before the Honorable Abraham Gerges, in the Supreme Court, Kings County, to one count of falsifying business records in the first degree, in violation of Penal Law § 175.10, a class E felony. On November 14, 2007, he was sentenced to time served, and directed to pay a mandatory surcharge in the sum of $250, a crime victim’s fee in the sum of $20, and the sum of $50 for DNA testing. The Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District (hereinafter the Grievance Committee) moves pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (b) to strike the respondent’s name from the roll of attorneys based upon his felony conviction.

By virtue of his felony conviction upon his entry of a plea of guilty, the respondent ceased to be an attorney and counselor-at-law pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (a) and was automatically disbarred on September 25, 2007. Accordingly, the Grievance Committee’s motion to strike the respondent’s name from the roll of attorneys is granted, without opposition.

Prudenti, P.J., Mastro, Rivera, Spolzino and Dillon, JJ., concur.

Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (a), the respondent, Gary S. Shaw, admitted as Gary Stuart Shaw, is disbarred, effective September 25, 2007, and his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (b); and it is further,

Ordered that the respondent, Gary S. Shaw, admitted as Gary Stuart Shaw, shall comply with this Court’s rules governing the conduct of disbarred, suspended, and resigned attorneys *{see*22 NYCRR 691.10); and it is further,

Ordered that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, the respondent, Gary S. Shaw, admitted as Gary Stuart Shaw, is commanded to desist and refrain from (1) practicing law in any form, either as principal or as agent, clerk, or employee of another, (2) appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission, or other public authority, (3) giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) holding himself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law; and its is further,

Ordered that if the respondent, Gary S. Shaw, admitted as Gary Stuart Shaw, has been issued a secure pass by the Of*41fice of Court Administration, it shall be returned forthwith to the issuing agency and the respondent shall certify to the same in his affidavit of compliance pursuant to 22 NYCRR 691.10 (f).
February 3, 2016 

### STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN SUPREME COURT Al6-0066 In rePetition for Disciplinary Action against Jorge Luis Sanchez, a Minnesota Attorney, Registration No. 0388556. ORDER ORmiEOF AJII!IB.lAJECcuns



### The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed a petition for disciplinary action seeking reciprocal discipline under Rule 12(d), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility (RLPR), based on an order ofthe Nevada Supreme Court suspending respondent Jorge Luis Sanchez for 5 years, effective as ofDecember 8, 2014, followed by 3 years ofprobation ifhe is reinstated to the practice oflaw. See In re Sanchez, No. 67182,2015 WL 5568072, at* 1-2 (Nev. Sept. 21, 2015) (order). The Nevada suspension was based on Sanchez's admissions that he violated Nev. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, 1.17, 3.2, 8.1(b), and 8.4. Sanchez, 2015 WL 5568072, at *1. The Director and respondent have entered into a stipulation in which respondent unconditionally admits the allegations in the petition for disciplinary action and waives his rights under Rule 12(d), RLPR. The parties jointly recommend that the appropriate discipline is reciprocal discipline. The court has independently reviewed the file and approves the jointly recommended disposition. 

### Based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,

1IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. Respondent Jorge Luis Sanchez is indefinitely suspended from the practice oflaw, effective as ofDecember 8, 2014, with no right to petition for reinstatementuntil 5 years afterthe beginning ofhis suspension; 2. Respondent shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of suspensionto clients, opposingcounsel, andtribunals), and shallpay $900in costspursuant to Rule 24, RLPR; 3. Respondentmaypetition for reinstatementpursuanttoRule 18(a)-(e), RLPR. Reinstatement is conditioned on: (a) successful completion of the professional responsibility portion of the state bar examination; (b) satisfaction of continuing legal education requirements pursuant to Rule 18(e), RLPR; and (c) compliance with all the conditions set forth in the Nevada Supreme Court's September21, 2015, order suspending respondent, except that respondent is notrequired to take and pass the Minnesota state bar examination in orderto be reinstated; 4. Ifrespondent is reinstated in Nevada before he is reinstated in Minnesota, then at the time respondent seeks reinstatement in Minnesota, the parties may recommend thatthereinstatementhearing inRule 18, RLPR, bewaived. The courtretains the authority to decide ifthe reinstatement hearing shall be waived; and 5. Ifrespondent is reinstated in Minnesota, he will be subject to at least 3 years ofsupervised probation.

2

### Dated: February 3, 2016

3 

### BYTHE COURT:

David R. Stras Associate Justice
**CECIL BANCORP, INC**

**Incentive Compensation Plan**

 

Effective January 1, 1994, the Board of Directors adopted the Cecil Bancorp, Inc. Incentive Compensation Plan (the “Incentive Compensation Plan”). The Incentive Compensation Plan is administered by the Compensation Committee of the Board. Selection of the participants will be directed by the Compensation Committee.

 

The mathematical formula set forth in the Incentive Compensation and summarized below determines the amount of incentive compensation that the participants may receive in bonuses. Each calendar year in which the Incentive Compensation Plan is in effect, each participant will receive a bonus in an amount equal to 7% of the participant’s annual base compensation, times a multiplier calculated as the sum of: (1) the percentage by which the Company’s and the Bank’s Return-on-Assets (ROA) exceeds .50, and (2) one half of the percentage by which 1.1% exceeds the Company’s and the Bank’s nonperforming loans (loans over 90 days delinquent) as a percentage of total assets (NPA’s). In no event will the multiplier be less than one. The Multiplier will be increased by .4 for any year in which the Bank receives a CAMEL rating of 1 or 2, and will be increased by an additional .4 for any yearin which the Company and the Bank receives a CAMEL rating of 1. The Company may decide to adjust the Company’s ROA and NPA to take into account extraordinary events (such as mergers/acquisitions). The aggregate amount of Bonuses payable for any calendar year will be proportionately reduced to (to zero, if necessary) to the extent that the payment would cause the Company’s and the Bank to cease to be “well-capitalized” bank for the year. Bonuses are payable from the Company’s general assets. Annual maximum awards under the incentive compensation plan for each participant is 38% of base salary. 

The Incentive Compensation Plan has an indefinite term. The Company has the right at any time to terminate or amend the Incentive Compensation Plan in any manner and for any reason; provided, that no amendment or termination shall, without the consent of the participants or, if applicable, the participant’s beneficiary, adversely affect such participant’s or beneficiary’s rights with respect to benefits accrued as of the date of such amendment or termination.
THE  DIAL  CORPORATION
EXHIBIT  11  -  COMPUTATION  OF  EARNINGS  PER  SHARE
(000  omitted)
<TABLE>

<CAPTION>



                                                              1998             1997
                                                              ----             ----
   <S>                                                     <C>              <C>
            Basic:
             Net Income                                    $22,911          $18,323
                                                           =======          =======
             Weighted average basic shares outstanding      97,898           89,877
             Net income per share - basic                    $0.23            $0.20
                                                             =====           ======

            Diluted:
             Net Income                                    $22,911          $18,323
                                                           =======          =======
             Weighted average basic shares outstanding      97,898           89,877
             Weighted average equivalent shares              2,126            2,066
                                                             -----           ------
             Weighted average diluted shares outstanding   100,024           91,943
                                                           =======           ======
             Net income per share - diluted                  $0.23            $0.20
                                                             =====            =====
</TABLE>
#### Taushieya Keene, Appellant, v Marketplace et al., Respondents.

[987 NYS2d 590]

Motion for reargument or leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied.

Present — Scudder, EJ., Centra, Carni, Sconiers and Whalen, JJ.
Order filed October 24, 2017. 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-17-00324-CV

____________

JESSE ANDREW LOPEZ, Appellant

V.

SHARI GRACE OCCHIOGROSSO, Appellee

On Appeal from the 328th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 17-DCV-240212

O R D E R

Appellant’s brief was due October 11, 2017. No brief or motion for 

extension of time has been filed. 

Unless appellant files a brief with this court on or before November 24, 

2017, the court will dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. See Tex. R. App. P. 

42.3(b). 

PER CURIAM
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                         364,214
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  185,468
<ALLOWANCES>                                    14,602
<INVENTORY>                                     76,657
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               752,720
<PP&E>                                      11,870,943
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,809,738
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               9,823,419
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,700,658
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        29,989
<OTHER-SE>                                   6,092,772
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 9,823,419
<SALES>                                      3,181,195
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            18,202,216
<CGS>                                        1,577,618
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               17,898,019
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (6,243)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             166,252
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                144,188
<INCOME-TAX>                                     8,400
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            135,788
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   135,788
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .05
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .04


</TABLE>
#### The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v Chu Zhu, Respondent.

[670 NYS2d 122]

—Appeal by the People from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Green-berg, J.), dated January 23, 1997, which, upon amending a prior order of the same court (Brill, J.), dated November 26, 1996, granted the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment *(see, People v Chu Zhu,*171 Mise 2d 298).

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 is denied, and the indictment is reinstated.

We agree with the People that they were improperly charged with the eight-day period of delay from May 20 to May 28, 1996. In opposing the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 30.30, the Assistant District Attorney averred that this adjournment had been occasioned by the defense counsel’s desire to engage in plea negotiations. This assertion was supported by the submission of a copy of a plea negotiation letter which he received from defense counsel which made reference to the adjourned date. Therefore, the evidence indicated that the defendant acquiesced in the delay of the proceedings for the purpose of conduct in plea negotiations, and the period of delay was excludable *(see, People v Crogan,*237 AD2d 745; *People v Rodriguez,*184 AD2d 317). Review of the transcript of the May 20, 1996, proceedings *(see,*Fisch, New York Evidence § 1065 [2d ed]; *see, e.g., People v Notholt,*242 AD2d 251; *People v Rowe,*227 AD2d 212) further supports this conclusion, since that transcript demonstrates that defense counsel consented to the delay so that plea negotiations could be pursued. Upon deducting this period from that total amount of delay, the total delay does not exceed six calender months. Accordingly, the defendant’s motion must be denied and the indictment must be reinstated.

*297In view of the foregoing, we have no occasion to consider the other periods of delay discussed by the parties. Copertino, J. P., Sullivan, Pizzuto and Lerner, JJ., concur.
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 17

- 1533 V

UNPUBLISHED

CONNIE RAINBOLT

,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND

HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent. Chief Special Master Corcoran

Filed: July 27, 2020

Special Processing Unit (SPU) ;

Rul ing on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;

Guillain

- Barre Syndrome (GBS)

Richard Gage, Richard Gage, P.C., Cheyenne, WY , for petitioner.

Linda Sara Renzi , U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

On October 16, 2017

, Connie Rainbolt filed a petition for compensation under the

National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa

- 10, et seq

. , 2 (the

“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccination

administered on November 26, 2014, she s uffered Guillain

- Barre Syndrome (“GBS”)

. Petit ion at 1 . The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of

Special Masters.

On July 23, 2020

, R espondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes

that P etitioner is entitled to compensa tion in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report

at 1. Specifically, R espondent has concluded that Petitioenr suffered the Table injury of

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am

required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E

Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of

Electronic Government Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to

t he internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to

redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of

privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identif ied material fits within this definition, I will redact such

material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99

- 660, 100 Stat. 3755

. Hereinafter, for

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subpara graph of 42 U.S.C. §

300aa (2012 ).2 GBS following a flu vaccine within the Table time period Id. at 4 . Respondent further

agr ees that Petitioner has satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the

Vaccine Act

. Id.

In view of R espondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that

P etitioner is entitle d to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Chief Special Master
Dismissed and Opinion Filed June 15, 2015 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-15-00170-CV 

ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, Appellant 

V. 

SERRANO PROPERTIES, Appellee 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-15-00255-B 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Chief Justice Wright, Justice Lang-Miers, and Justice Stoddart 

Opinion by Chief Justice Wright 

The clerk’s record in this case is overdue. By letter dated April 8, 2015, we informed 

appellant that the Dallas County Clerk notified the Court that the clerk’s record had not been 

filed because appellant had not paid for or made arrangements to pay for the clerk’s record. We 

directed appellant to provide verification of payment or arrangements to pay for the clerk’s 

record or to provide written documentation that he had been found entitled to proceed without 

payment of costs. We cautioned appellant that if he did not file the required documentation 

within ten days, we might dismiss the appeal without further notice. To date, appellant has not 

provided the required documentation or otherwise corresponded with the Court regarding the 

status of the clerk’s record. 

 
 –2– 

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(b). 

150170F.P05 

 

/Carolyn Wright/ 

CAROLYN WRIGHT 

CHIEF JUSTICE 
 –3– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, Appellant 

No. 05-15-00170-CV V. 

SERRANO PROPERTIES, Appellee 

 On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 2, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. CC-15-00255-B. 

Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Wright. 

Justices Lang-Miers and Stoddart 

participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee SERRANO PROPERTIES recover its costs of this appeal 

from appellant ALEXANDER AGUIRRE. 

Judgment entered June 15, 2015.
Exhibit 23.01 

 

CONSENT OF GRANT THORNTON LLP 

 

We have issued our report dated August 16, 2002, accompanying the consolidated financial statements of Cyberguard Corporation and Subsidiaries on Form 10-K for the yearended June 30, 2002. We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference of said report in the Registration Statements of Cyberguard Corporation and Subsidiary on Form S-8 (File No.’s 333-87347, 333-39573, 333-28813, 33-88446, 33-88448,333-50042, 333-56768, 333-58262 and 333-73852). 

 

/s/    Grant Thornton LLP 

 

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 

July 9, 2003
Exhibit 32

                    CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                     18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In connection with the Annual Report of Sanguine Corporation (the
"Registrant") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2003, as
filed with the Commission on the date hereof (the "Annual Report"), we,
Thomas C. Drees, President and Chief Executive Officer and David Nelson, Chief
Financial Officer of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

     (1) The Annual Report fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2) The information contained in the Annual Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Registrant.

Dated: 5/5/2005                           /s/Thomas C. Drees
      -----------------                    -------------------------------
                                           Thomas C. Drees
                                           President, Chief Executive Officer
                                           and Director

Dated: 5/5/2005                            /s/David E. Nelson
      -----------------                    -------------------------------
                                           David E. Nelson
                                           Chief Financial Officer,
                                           Secretary/Treasurer and
                                           Director
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

November 29, 2018

No. 04-18-00903-CR

Monisha Monique JOHNSON,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CR11334W

Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

A Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal has been filed in this appeal 

in which the trial court judge certifies that the underlying criminal case “is a plea-bargain case, 

and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” It is therefore ORDERED that the trial court clerk 

file an electronic clerk’s record within ten days from the date of this order containing the 

following documents:

1. All pre-trial orders and the related pre-trial motions;

2. The Court Admonishments, the Waiver, Consent to Stipulation of Testimony and 

Stipulations, and all other documents relating to the defendant’s plea bargain;

3. The judgment;

4. All post-judgment motions and orders;

5. The notice of appeal;

6. The Trial Court’s Certification of Defendant’s Right of Appeal; and

7. The criminal docket sheet.
All other appellate deadlines are suspended pending further order of this court. The clerk of this 

court is ORDERED to send a copy of this order to the attorneys of record, the trial court clerk, 

and the court reporter(s) responsible for preparing the reporter’s record in this appeal.

_________________________________

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 29th day of November, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
#### Silvina REYMAN, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Respondent.

No. 2011-3045.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

May 9, 2011.

Antonia R. Soares, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Silvina Reyman, Zambales, Philippines, pro se.

ON MOTION

ORDER

Silvina Reyman moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and to file his Fed. Cir. R. 15(c) statement concerning discrimination. The court treats Reyman’s submission as a motion for reconsideration of the February 4, 2011 order dismissing this appeal for failure to pay the filing fee and for failure to file the Fed. Cir. R. 15(c) statement concerning discrimination.

Upon consideration thereof,

*967It Is Ordered That:

(1) The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

(2) The motion for reconsideration will be granted, the dismissal order will be vacated, and the petition will be reinstated, if Ryman files her brief within 45 days of the date of filing of this order.