### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N O V E MB E R 1 8, 200 3 S es sio n
MOHAMMAD RAFIE ETARY v . MARYAM KHOSH ROO RAFIE ETARY

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-003821-01 John R. Mc Carr oll, Jr., Judge

No. W2003-00121-C OA-R3-C V - F iled April 29, 2004

This case conce rns issues of alimony , child support, and depe ndency exemptions , arising from the divorce of Husband a

nd Wife. Following a hea ring , the trial cour

t awar ded W i fe r ehabilitative alimony , order ed Husba

nd to pay 80% of Child’s uninsured medic al expenses over $500, awa

rded
eac h party the depe ndency

exemption for Chil d on alternating y ear s, and order ed Husband to pa y for Chi ld’ s v iol in l e sso ns and B oy Sc ou t expe ns e s. F or the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , w e a ff ir m in pa rt , r e ve rs e in part, and r emand f

or fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in Par t, Reve rsed in Par t, and Rem anded

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io no f

th e c o u rt, in

w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined.

Kathlee n D. Norf

leet, J. Mi chae l Fletche r, Steven R. Walker, Memphis, TN, f or Appe llant

Stevan L . Bla ck, John C . Ry land, Vickie H ardy J ones, Memphis, TN, for Appellee

OP IN ION

F acts and P roce dural Hi story
Mohammad Rafieet ary

(“ Hu s b an d ”) an d

M ary am R af

i ee t ary (“ W i fe ”) were both born in I ran, wher e they

wer e mar

ried in 1985. F or appr ox imately eig ht y ear s prior to t h e mar riag e, howe ver, Hu sb and ha d b e e n a

stu de nt i n the U ni ted S tat es. A t th e tim e of the marr ia g e , H us ba

nd wa s in op tom e tr y sc ho ol at th e Un ive rs ity

of Mis so ur i in St. L ou is. Wif e mov e d wi th Hu sb and to S t. L ou is, wh e re the pa

rt ie s re sid e d unti l H us ba

nd g ra du a te d f

ro m op tom e tr

y sc ho ol i n 1 98 8. Whil e in S t. L ouis, W ife took E n g lish and other cla sses at the Unive rsity of Missouri in pursuit of an underg raduate deg ree , which she did not complete at the time.-2-

Up on Hu sb and ’s g ra du a tio n in 19 88 , the pa rt ie s move d to Me mph is s o th a t H us ba nd c ou ld enroll in a post-doc torate r esidenc y prog ram at the Southern Co l leg e of O ptometry (“SCO”)

. Following completion of hi s residenc y prog ram, Husba

nd acc epted a

job at SCO, where he worke d for six y ear s. Husband then lef t SC O to work for

his curre nt employ er, the Charles Retina I nstitut e, in M e mph is. Duri ngthi s tim e , Wif e c on tin ue d to take c la sse s, fi rs t at th e Un ive rs ity of Me mph is and then at the University of Tennessee in Memphis, wher e she g raduated wit h a deg ree in medical technolog y . Wife then took a job as a medical technolog ist at Methodist Hospit al in Ger mantown.

I n Aug ust 1990, while still a student, W i fe gav e birth t o the par ties’ only child, Salar (“Child”). B oth pare nts were active in the r aising of Child, with Wife assuming many of the da y -today responsibilities and Husband e ng ag ing in a ctivities with Chi ld such as B oy Scouts. The par

ties enrolled Child in private school at Bria rcr est Christian School, which he still attends.

On J une 21, 2001, Husband filed for divorce in the Circuit Court of Shelby County , alleg ing irrec oncilable differe nces and inappropriate m arital conduct. On October 30, 2001, Wife filed he r ans we r a nd c ounte r- c omp la int

fo r d ivo rc e , a lso a lle g ing ir re c on c ila ble dif fe re nc e s and

ina pp ro pr iate marital conduc t. T he parties enter ed into an ag ree d Permane nt Parenting Plan on Dece mber 7, 2001. Unde r t h e t er ms of the plan, neither pare nt was desig nated a s the primary residential pa

rent, a nd Husband e njoy ed substantial re siden t i al t i me with his son. Although not re quired by the plan, Hu sb and c on tin

ue d to pa y a ll Ch ild ’s e xpe ns e s d

ur ingthi s ti me , e xce pt t

he c os t of fo od wh e n Ch ild stay ed with Wife. These expenses included the cost of Boy Scout activities and violin lessons for Child.

On Octobe r 11, 2002 a final decr ee of divorce was enter ed, thoug h the lower court re serve d issues reg ardingcustody , child support, and division of marital prope rty for a later date. The trial court a ddresse d t h es e re maining issues in two he aring s that took place on Septe mber 12 a nd November

6, 2002. Much of the e vidence d ev el o p ed at these he aring s dealt with the income a nd
e xpe ns e s o f e a c h p art

y . Sp e c if ic a lly , H us ba

nd ind ic a te d th a t he e arn e d a

pp ro xima te ly

$1 6, 00 0 g ro ss pe r mon th, wh ile Wif

e te sti fi e d that she g ro sse d a pp ro xima te ly

$4 ,0 00 pe r m on th. Wif

e ’s mon thl y expenses proved to be a sourc e of c ontention, with Husband question i n g t h e accura cy of Wife’s aff idavit list ing some $8,000 in monthly expenses.
At these he aring s, the parties ag ree d on, and the court approved: (1) a divi sion of the mar ital proper ty awa rding Wife 52.5% of the pr operty and Husba

nd 47

. 5 %; (2 ) Husband pa ying $25,000 of Wif e’ s attorney ’s fe es; (3) H usband pay ing Wife $1,779 pe r month in child support; and (4) Husband pa

y ing f or Child’s pr ivate school expenses. Howeve r, seve ral issues re mained upon which the par ties could not rea ch an a g ree ment. The lowe r cour t ruled as f

ol l o ws o n these issues: (1) Hu sb and mus t pa y fo r vio lin le sso ns and B oy Sc ou t expe ns e s for Chi ld, in a dd iti on to c hil d s up po rt ; (2) Husba nd and Wife wil l alternate t ax y ear s taking the dependency exemption for Child; (3) the parties will s plit the first $500 in medical costs for Chi ld in any g iven y ear , with the Husband pa y ing 80 % o f a ny a dd iti on a l me dic a l e xpe ns e s; a nd (4 ) H us ba

nd wi ll p ay Wif e $1 ,5 00 pe r m on th i n reha bilitative alimony

for a period of f

ive y ear s. On Dec ember

16, 2002, the lower

court e ntere d an-3-

amende d final dec ree of divorce ref lecting its rulings on the issues listed above . Husband then timely filed this appea l, raising the following issues for our c onsideration:

I. W h e t h e r

t h e t r i a l c o u rte r

r e d i naw ar d i n g r e h a

b i l i t a t i v e a l i m o n y. A. Whether the trial court e rre d by fore closing Husband fr om presentingproof t h a tW i f e h a d n o n e e d f o r r e h a b i l i t a t i v e a l i m o n y. B. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in deter mining Wife had a need f or r e h a b i l i t a t i v e a l i m o n y.
I I

. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in re quiring Husband to pay the cost of B oy

Scout expenses and violin lessons for Child.

I I I

. Whether t he trial court erre d in requiringHusband to pay 80% of Child’s uninsured medical e x penses ove r $500.00.

I V. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in deter mining that the de pendenc y exemption for fede ral income taxes could only be cla imed by

Husband in alter

nate y ear s, rather

than
ever y y ear

. Wif e , a s App e lle e , r a ise s o ne a dd iti on a l is su e on a pp e a l:

V. Whether Husband should be re quired to pay Wife’s attorney ’s fe es incurr ed in d e fe nd ingthe ins tant a pp e a l.

Stand ard of Review When this C ourt re v i ew s t h e finding s of fa ct by a trial c ourt sitting without a jury , such
re vie w i s de novo upon the re cord, w ith a presumpti o n o f correctne ss unless the evidenc e pr e po nd e rate s o the rw ise . T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Langschmidt v . L a ngschmidt , 81 S.W .3d 741, 74 4- 45 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; Br own v . B ro wn , 9 1 3 S. W. 2 d 1 6 3 , 1 6 7 ( T e n n

. Ct

. A p p

. 1 9 9 4 )

. F u rth e r , we e mpl oy an a bu se of dis c re tio n s tand ard

wh e n r e vie wi nga

tr ia l c ourt ’s awa

rd of sp ou sa l su

pp or t. W alker v . W alker , No. E2001-01759- COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1063948, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2 9 , 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Robertson v. Robe rtson , No. E200-01698- S C -R11-CV, 2002 Tenn. L EXI S 172, at *11 (Te nn. Apr. 4, 2002)) . L ikewise, we will not dis turb a trial court’s dete rmination reg arding depende ncy

exemptio n s absent a showing that the lower c ourt abused its discre tion. Barabas v. Ro ge rs , 868 S.W .2d 283, 289 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). F inally , this Court affords the trial court defe renc e in matters of

child support and re views such issues under an abuse of discretion standa rd. Hanselman v . Hanselman , No. M1998-00919-COA- R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 166, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar . 15, 2001). “This s tandar d require s us to consider (1) whether the decision has
a s u f f i c i e n te v i d e n t i ar

y f o u n d a t i o n , ( 2 ) w h e t h e r

t h e t r i a l c o u rtc o r

r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d an d p r o p e rl y applied the a

ppropriate leg al principle s , and (3) whether the dec ision is wit hin the rang e of
acc eptable a lternatives.” Id

. (c i t i n g State ex re l. Vaughn v. Kaatrude , 21 S.W .3d 244, 248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). Spou sal Su pport-4-

I n his first issue on appea l, Husban d ch al l en ges the lowe r cour t’s awa rd of r ehabilitative alimony to Wi fe. H e premises his c halleng e on two differ ent g rounds. First, Husband maintains that the low e r c ourt

imp e rm iss ibl y fore c los e d h is c ro ss- e xami natio n o f Wi fe , th e re by pr e ve nti nghim from showing that Wife has no nee d for a limony

. Next, he simpl y argues that the lowe r cour t abused its dis c re tio n in aw ard ing Wif e $1 ,5 00 pe r mon th fo r fi ve y e ars

. We wil l add re ss ea c h a

rgume nt i n turn.

F orec losure of Cross-Exam ination

Hu sb and mainta ins that th e tr ia l c ourt de nie d h im the op po rt

un ity to c on du c t a

c omp le te
c ro ss- e xami natio n o f Wi fe a t th e No ve mbe r 6 , 2 00 2 h e ari ngand , a s a re su lt, he wa s una

ble to f ull y develop his evide nce r eg arding Wife’s nee d for a limony . Specifica lly , Husband a rgue s t h at he
a tte mpt e d to qu e sti on

Wif e re g ard ingc e rt a in ba

nk state me nts that de mon str a te d lo we r m on thl y e xpe ns e s th an th os e Wif

e pr ov ide d in

he r R ule 14 (c ) a ff

ida vit and tha t the low e r c ourt

pr e ve nte d th is questioning. H usband points to the following e x chang es in support of his contention:

HUSBA ND’S COUNSEL : . . . So what I ’m examining [W ife] on is what her needs
are , Your Honor. And Your Honor, that’s the only way Iknow how to g et to it [ by using t h e b an kstatements] and to finally let Your Honor

g o ahea d and make y our decision.

WI FE’ S COUNSEL : . . . I know wher e counsel is g oing with this. He is goingto try to utili ze [ Wife’s bank stateme nt] to show what her expenses have be en -
THE COURT: I don’t want to g et i nto that. We have 30 minutes left this afte rnoon, y ou know. I

don’t nee d to ge t into a discussion about those ki n d s of thing s. Ido need to know w hat the pa rt i es ar e as k i ng for. What is his posit ion? What is he saying he thinks about paying he r?

. . . . THE COURT: Okay . All rig ht. Well, we will go ahead and you pu t on w hatever pro o f y o u a re going to pu t on . And I don’t know what ag ree ments reg arding attorney fee s are but at the end of the day , Dr. Raf ieetar y is probably

g oing to e nd up paying mor e attorne y

fee s than he ha s ag ree d to rig ht now.

HU SB AN D’ S CO UN SEL : Y our H on or , th a t ha s a rathe r c hil lin g e ff

e c t on my c ro sse xami natio n, pe rh a

ps

. THE COURT: I ’m just telling y ou the way the world wor

ks. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . H us ba nd ma int a ins that, i n th is l a st e xch ang e , the tr ial co ur t e ff e c tiv e ly fo re c los e d a

ny fu rt he r c ro ss- e xami natio n by te lli ngc ouns e l th a t a dd iti on a l qu e sti on s c ou ld l e a d to a g reater a

war d of attorney ’s fees for Wife. We disag ree

. Whil e it is true the trial c ourt raise d the-5-

possibili ty of additi onal attorney ’s fees as a consequenc e of continued cross-examination, the lower
cour t n ev er m ade any

ruling that forba de Husba nd’s counse l from continuing . I ndeed, the lower court’s ruling , as emphasized above, was that counsel could “put on whateve r proof you are g oing to put on.” The burde n then fe ll to counsel to conduct the c ross-examination and to then appe al any
awa rd of attorney ’s fe es thoug ht to be excessive. In sum, though the trial court may have se emed less than enthused r eg ardingthe proposed r oute of cross-e x amination, it r uled in H usband’s fa

vor on the issue. Husband c annot there afte r cha lleng e the r uling in his favor

simply beca use he f ailed to a c t up on

it.

Awa r d of R e habi lit at ive Al im ony
We have he ld that “[t] rial cour ts ha ve broad discretion to de termine whether spousal support is neede d and, if so, its nature , amount, and duration.” Anderton v. Ande rton , 988 S.W .2d 675, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “ Appellate c ourts are g ener ally disinclined to second-guess a tria l judge ’s sp ou sa l su

pp or t de c isi on un le ss i t is no t su

pp or te d b y the e vid e nc e or is contr ary to t he pu bli c policies ref

lected in the applicable statutes.” Id . As such, we g ener ally decline to a lter a tria l court’s deter mination r ega rd i n g s p ousal support unless the lower court a bused its discretion. W

alker v

. W alker , No. E2001-01759- COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL1063948, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. M ay 29, 2002) (c i t i n g Robertson v. Robe rtson , No. E2000-01698- SC-R11-CV, 2002 Tenn. L EXI S 172, at *11 (Tenn. A pr. 4, 2002))

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( d)(1) (2001) provides the rele vant fac tors to be considere d by
a t r i a l c o u rtw h e nd e t e r

m i n i n g aw ar d s o f

a l i m o n y:
I n deter mining whe ther the g rantingof an or der f or pay ment o f s upport and
ma int e na nc e to a pa rt y is a pp ro pr iate , a

nd in d e te rm ini ngthe natur e , amou nt, le ng th of te rm , a nd mann e r o f p ay

me nt, the c ourt

sh a ll c on sid e r a ll rel evant fa c tor s, i n cl u d i n g: (A) The relative earning capa city , obligations, needs, and f inancial r esourc es of
eac h party , including inc ome from pe nsion, profit sharingor retirement plans and
a ll o the r s ourc e s; (B ) T he re lativ e e du c a tio n a nd tr a ini ng of e a c h part

y , the a bil ity and op po rt un ity of e a c h p art y to s e c ur e su c h e du c a tio n an d tra ini ng , an d the ne c e ssi ty of a pa rt y to s e c ur e fu

rt he r e du c a tio n a

nd tr a ini ngto i mpr ov e su c h p art y ’s e arn ingc a

pa c ity to a re a so na ble le ve l; (C) The dur ation of the mar riag e; ( D ) T h e a g e an d

m e n t a l c o n d i t i o no f

e a c h p art y; (E) The phy sical condition of ea ch par ty , including, but not limit ed to, phy sical disability or inca pacity due to a c hronic de bilitating disease ; (F ) The e x tent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek e mploy ment outside th e h o me b e c a

u s e s u c h p arty

w il l b e c u s to d ia

no f a mi n o r c h il d o f the marria g e;-6-

(G) T he sepa

rate asse t s of ea ch par

ty , both rea l and per sonal, tang ible and intang ible; (H) T he provisions ma de with reg ard to the ma rital proper

ty as def ined in § 36-4- 121; (I ) The sta

ndard of living of the parties e stablished during the marr iag e; (J) Th e e xten t to wh ic h e a c h pa rt y ha s ma de su c h ta

ng ibl e and

int ang ibl e contributi o n s to the marria g e as mone tary and homemake r contributions, and t ang ible and intang ible contributions by a par ty to the education, training or i n c r e a s e d e ar n i n g p o w e r

o f t h e o t h e r p art y; (K) T he re lative fa

ult of t h e p ar t ies in case s where the cour t, in its discretion, deems it appropr iate to do so; and (L ) S u ch o ther fa ctors, including the tax consequenc es to ea ch par ty , as ar e ne c e ssa ry to c on sid e r t

he e qu iti e s b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s.
Whil e a tr ial court must consider e ach of these f actor s in making its deter mination, need and the ability to pay are the cr itical fac tors. Anderton v. Ande rton , 988 S.W .2d 675, 683 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Husband a

rg ues that the lowe r cour

t erre d in gr anting Wife $1,500 per month for f ive y ear s in reha bilitative alimony . He c laims that W ife ha s no need for thi s much support and that she ha s no need f or re h ab i l i t ati on. We are not persuade d by Husband’s a

rg ument. When we re view the
rec ord in light of the rele vant s tatutory fac tors, we cannot s ay that the t rial court abused its discre tion in either the a

mount, duration, or ty

pe of alimony

awa rded. Evide nce w as pre sented that Husba nd’s income is four tim es t hat of Wife; that Husband ha s more educ ation and a g reater long -term e arning capa city ; that Wife suffe rs from chronic back pain that sometimes makes working fo r e x t en ded periods diffic ult; that W ife is the custodian of the par ties ’ m inor child; that Wi fe ha s made contributions to the seventee n-y ear marria g e as both wa g e ea

rner and homemake r; and that Wife has
ne e d of su pp or t to me e t he r m on thl y

e xpe ns e s. Con sid e ri ngthi s e vid e nc e , th e tr ia l c ourt wa s w ith in its di s c r e t i o n t o aw ar d W i f e $ 1 , 5 0 0 f

o r f i v e y e ar s

. H u s b an d ar g u e s t h a t W i f e i s n o t e nti tle d to reha bilitative alimony , beca

use there is no indication she i ntends to seek additional job training or education, and, thus, there is nothing to reha bilitate. We note, however , that reha bilitative alimony “may also provide tempor ary

income to support the disadva ntag ed spouse during the post-divorce economic a djustment.” Robertson v. Robe rtson , 7 6 S

. W

. 3 d 3 3 7 , 3 4 1 (T en n

. 2 0 0 2 ) ( ci t i n g Crabtree v. Crabtree , 16 S.W

. 3 d 3 5 6 , 360-61 (Te nn. 2000)). Conseque ntly , we do not find that the lowe r co u rt erre d

i ncl as s i fy i n g W i fe ’s al i m o n y i n t h i s ca s e as “r eh ab i l i t at i v e. ” In l i gh to f t h e f o re go i n g, we a ffirm the lowe r cour

t’s awa rd of spousal support to Wife.

Violin L essons and Boy Scout Exp enses-7-

I n his nex t issue on appea l, Husband challeng es the lowe r cour t’s order obligating Husba

nd to pay for Child’s violin lessons and Boy Scout e x penses, in addition to child support pay ments of $1,779 per month. Husband a rg ues that the $ 1 ,779 pay ment ref lects the amount mandated by the Child S upport Guidelines and that these miscellane o u s expenses constitute an upwa rd deviation. He m ai n tains that the trial cour t erre d in orderingthe upwar d deviation bec ause it fa iled to make written finding s rebutting the pre sumption i n fa v o r o f t he guideline amount, as re quired by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(e) (1). We ag ree

. We previously

addre ssed this issue in High v. High , No. W2001-01558-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21643353, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 8, 2003). In High , the father was order ed by the trial cour

t to pay the g uid e lin e a mou nt in mon thl y c hil d sup po rt , a s w e ll a s th e c os ts o f s umm e r c a mp f or his minor children. Id . He c halleng ed his obligation to pay for summer c amp, ar g uing that it constit uted an upwa rd deviation and that the trial cour t ha d failed to make a wr itten finding that “application of the

. . . g uidelines would be unjust or inappropriate,” as require d for an upwar d deviation. Id . at *7 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(e )(1) ; Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1 2 40-2-4- .01(3)) . As we conducte d our ana ly sis, we noted that the g uidelines provide f

or mandatory

upwar d deviations in the
case of “[e]x traordina

ry educa tional expenses and ex traordina ry medical ex penses not cover ed by insurance .” Id

. (quoting Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .04-(1) (c) ). We found, howeve r, that the summer ca

mp expenses did not constitute “extraordinar y educational expenses,” and, ther efor e, no mandatory

upwar d deviation was a

ppropriate

.
I nstead, we found that the summer camp expenses re prese nted another class of e x penses contemplated b y the g uidelines, “other extraordinary

expenses.” Id . at *8. “Othe r extraordinar y expenses” ar e not ex penses mandated by the g uidelines to be borne by the child support obligor , unlike “extraordinar

y educa tional expenses and extraordinar y medical e x penses no t cover ed by insurance .” Id . (citing Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4- .04(d))

. To the contra ry , it is assumed that the obligor

will not bear these expenses, unless the trial cour t finds that “equity

require s it.” Id

. (citing Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s. 1240-2-4-.04( d)). Ac cording ly , we he ld: [W]he n a n o bli g or pa re nt i s o rd e re d to pa

y so me or a ll of su c h expe ns e s, the re su lt is a deviation fr om the Guidelines. Such a deviation, in turn, trigg ers the r equire ment of “a written finding th at t h e application of the child support g uidelines would be
un jus t or ina pp ro pr iate in t

hat par tic ula r ca se , in ord e r t o p ro vid e fo r t he be st i nte re st of the c hild or the equity

betwee n the par

ties.”In H i gh , we co nt i nue o ur anal y si s regardi ng t he rel at i o nshi p of “ot her ext raord i nary exp enses ” t o t he 1
pres umed gu i del i ne awar d. O ur an al y s i s s ug ges t s t hat t hes e e xpens es do not co ns t i t ut e “ chi l d s uppo r t , ” a s cont emp l at ed b y t he chi l d s up p o rt gui d el i nes, unl ess t he exp enses a re q uant i f i ed a nd a d d ed to t he p eri o d i c “ chi l d s up p o rt ” p ayment
o rd e re d b y the trial c o u rt. H i gh , 2 0 0 3 W L 2 1 6 4 3 3 5 3 , a t *9

. If the e x p e n se s a re no t q u a n tif ie d a n d a d d e d to the “c h ild
s u ppor t ” pay men t , t h en t h e ex pen s es do n ot r epr es en t an u pwa r d dev i at i on i n “ ch i l d s u ppor t , ” an d t h e t r i al c ou r t i s n ot
o b liga te d to m a k e a n y sp e c ifi c fi n d ing s. Id

. I t i s cri t i cal t o note, how ever, t hat t hi s ad d i t i o nal anal y si s i s l i m i t ed t o t he ci rcum st ances of t he case, i n whi ch t he p art i es ent ered i nt o an ag r eed o rd e r re g a rd ing c h ild su p p o rt o b liga tio n s. Id

. at *9 -1 0 . A s the p a rtie s in th e p re se n t ca se d id no t en te r in to a n a g re e d o rd e r, the a d d iti o n a l an a lysis is i n a p p o site.
-8- Id . (citations omitted). I n the pre sent ca se, the violin lessons and B o y Scout expenses eac h 1
c on sti tut e “ oth e r e xtra or din ary e xpe ns e s. ” As su c h, imp os ing the se e xpe ns e s o n H us ba nd re pr e se nts an upwa rd deviation from the pre sumed g uideline awa rd. The lowe r cour

t, conseque ntly , err ed whe n it failed to make “ a wr itten finding that the application of the child support g u i d el i n es would be unjust or inappropriate in that pa rticular case , in or der to pr ovide for the best interest of the child or the equity betwee n the par

ties.” W e, therefor e, reverse and re mand on this issue, with inst ructions that the lower court quantify these additional expenses and make a deter mination reg ardingupwar d deviation, supported by

written finding s where appropr iate.

Child ’s Uninsu red Me dical Costs

I n it s d e c re e , th e tr ia l c ourt or de re d H us ba

nd to p ay 80 % of Chi ld’ s unin sure d me dic a l c os ts over $500. H usband conte sts this ruling , arguing that both parties bea r an e qual and joint obligation to support their child. Having re viewed the rele vant authority , we c annot find that the trial c ourt abused its discretion in this matter. As we ac knowledg ed in Rice v . Rice , No. M1998-00973-COAR3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 509, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 19, 2001), “Te nn Code Ann. § 36- 5- 10 1( f) (1 ) .

. . sp e c if

ic a lly e mpo we rs tr ia l c ourt s to or de r a pa re nt to be re sp on sib le fo r [u p to ] al l of a child’s uncove red me dical expenses.” I n Rice , th is C ourt

fo un d th a t a

dif fe re nc e of $2 5, 70 0 in the pare nts’ annual income was sufficie nt to justify the trial court’s decision to hold t h e father responsible for all

the child’s uncove red me dical expenses. Id

. at *9-10. I n th e p re s en t case , Husband’s a

nnual income e x cee ds Wi fe’ s by more than $100,000. A ccor d i ng ly , we f ind that the tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in o rd e ri ngHu sb and

to c ov e r 8 0% of

Chi ld’ s unin sure d me dic a l c os ts. Dependency Exem ption

I n his final issue on appea l, Husband challeng es t he trial court’s decision to have the parties alternate y ear s in which they use the de pend ency

tax ex emption for Child. Specifically , Husband
ma int a ins that he sh ou ld have be e n awa rd e d the e xemp tio n o utr ig ht, a s h e wo uld re a p s ub sta nti a lly
mor e ta x be ne fi t th an Wif e du e to h is s ig nif

ic antl y hig he r i nc ome . H us ba

nd po int s o ur

a tte nti on to t h e case of Tra v is v . Trav is , No. E2000-01043- COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. A pp. L EXI S 175, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p

. M ar

. 1 6 , 2001), in which this Court affir med the trial c ourt’s aw ard of the depende ncy

exemption t o the father, the non- custodial pare nt. We affirme d the trial cour t’s awa rd on two g rounds. Id . at *13-14. F irst, the fathe r ea rned a pproxi mately

$34,000 annually , while the mother ea rned less than $4,000 in a y ear

. Id . at *13. We found that the e x emption would be of g reat benef it to the father a

nd of re latively

littl e use to the mother

. Id

. Next, we noted that the father wa s-9-

“re sponsible for a sig nificant portion of his childre n’s expenses,” voluntar ily assuming othe r expenses with reg ard to his childr en in addition to his child support pay ments. Id . at *14. Consequently , we he ld that “it seems to us that he should be allowed the de pendenc y exemptions as a matter of equity .” Id . I n the pre sent ca se, Hu s b an d ar gu es that his significa ntly highe r income, coupled with his assumption of many of C h i l d ’s ex penses, e ntitles him to use the depe ndency exemption every

y ear

. As noted earlier, a trial court’s decision reg arding the allocation of depende ncy exemptions is discretionary

and re sts on the fac ts of the particula r ca se. Ba ra ba s v . R oge rs , 868 S.W .2d 283, 289 (Tenn. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 3 ). Having r eviewe d the fa cts of this case , we c annot say that the trial cour

t abused its discretion in having the parties alternate us e of the depende ncy exemption. The Tra v is decision is only

par t l y i n s t ructive in the pr esent c ase. H usband, like the father in Tra v is , d oe s, ind e e d, be ar m any

of Chi ld’ s f ina nc ia l e xpe ns e s. Ho we ve r, Wif e e a r ns a c on sid e ra bly hig he r i nc ome than the mother in Tra v is , ne arl y tw e lve tim e s as muc h, and , as suc h, the de pe nd e nc y e xemp tio n is of muc h mo re us e to Wi fe un de r t hes e cir cum st anc e s. As su c h, the low e r c ourt a c te d w ith in i ts discretion by

awa rding eac h party

use of the de pendenc y

exemption i n alternating y ear s.
Attor ney’s F ees
I n her only issue on appea l, Wife asks us to awar d her attorney ’s fe es incurr ed in def ending this appeal. She a

rg ues that she is e ntitled to attorney ’s fee s on two bases. First, she maintains that sh e sh ou ld be awa

rd e d he r attor

ne y ’s fe e s inc ur

re d on ap pe a l as a

fo rm of a lim ony . Sh e the n a

rgue s, in t he a lte rn a tiv e , th at atto rn e y ’s fe e s are a pp ro pr iate be c a

us e of the fr ivo lou s n a tur e of

thi s a pp e a l. We disag ree with bo t h gro u n ds. Each c ase c ited by Wife, reg ardingattorney ’s fe es as a form of alimony , contemplates a

n awa rd of attorney ’s fe es for

proce eding s at the trial leve l. See H oughland v. Houghland , 844 S.W .2d 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Raskind v. Rask ind , 325 S.W .2d 617 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959). I n Houghland , a ft e r dis c us sin g the awa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to wi fe a t th e tr ia l le ve l,
we a ddresse d wife’ s reque st for attorne y ’s fe es incurr ed due to he r husband’ s appea l. Houghland , 8 4 4 S

. W

. 2 d

a t6 2 3

. W e n e v e r

c o n s i d e r e d aw ar d i n g h e r

f e e s i n c u r r e d o na p p e a l a s a f o r m o f a l i m o n y. Id . Ins te a d, we si mp ly

he ld t hat an a wa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s is ina

pp ro pr iate wh e re e a c h p art y is partially succe ssful on appea l. Id . We note that, as Husband w as succ essful in one of his issues on appea l, our

holding in Houghland actua lly disposes of W ife’s second ground f or attorne y ’s fe es, as we ll. Ac c or din g ly , w e de c lin e to awa rd Wif e he r a tto rn e y ’s fe e s inc ur re d a s a re su lt o f t

his a pp e a l.-10- Conclusion

F o r t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , w e a f

f i r m t h e r u l i n g o f t h e t r i a l c o u rt a s t o t h e i s s u e s o f a l i m o n y, uninsured medical cost s, and depe ndency exemptions . We reve rse a nd rema nd for f urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion on the issue of Child’s violin l essons and B oy Scout
e x p e n s e s

. C o s t s o f

t h i s a p p e a l ar e t a x e d e qu a l l y t o A p p e l l an t , M o h a m m a d R a f i e e t ar y, an d h i s s u r e t y, an d t o A p p e l l e e , M ar

ya m K h o s h r o o R a f

i e e t ar y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ AL AN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE