alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-2197
JOSEPH GLOVER, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, versus U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES; FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Defendants - Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert D. Potter, Senior District Judge. (CA-97-107-3-P) Submitted: November 6, 1997 Decided: November 19, 1997 Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Joseph Glover, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. James Michael Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Joseph Glover, Jr., appeals the district court's order dismissing his suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1994), as barred under the statute of limitations. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Glover v. HHS , No. CA-97-107-3-P (W.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 193 (Friday, October 6, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 46811]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-21564]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION


Notice of Agreement Filed

    The Commission hereby gives notice of the filing of the following 
agreement under the Shipping Act of 1984. Interested parties may submit 
comments on the agreement to the Secretary, Federal Maritime 
Commission, Washington, DC 20573, within twelve days of the date this 
notice appears in the Federal Register. A copy of the agreement is 
available through the Commission's Web site (www.fmc.gov) or by 
contacting the Office of Agreements at (202) 523-5793 or 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#5b2f293a3f3e3a353a37222832281b3d3638753c342d"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="0773756663626669666b7e746e7447616a6429606871">[email protected]</span></a>.
    Agreement No.: 012492.
    Title: Schuyler Line/US Ocean Space Charter and Cooperative Working 
Agreement.
    Parties: Schuyler Line Navigation Company, L.L.C. and U.S. Ocean, 
L.L.C.
    Filing Party: Bryant Gardner; Winston & Strawn LLP; 1700 K Street 
NW., Washington, DC 20006.
    Synopsis: The Agreement would authorize the parties to charter 
space to each other and cooperate in a pooling arrangement between the 
U.S. and certain countries in Africa, Europe, the Mediterranean, South 
and Central America, and the Caribbean.

    By Order of the Federal Maritime Commission.

    Dated: October 3, 2017.
Rachel E. Dickon,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-21564 Filed 10-5-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6731-AA-P


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#### Deborah P. CODY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee, Social Security Administration, Party-in-Interest.

No. 10-2431.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 31, 2011.

Decided: April 4, 2011.

Deborah P. Cody, Appellant pro se. Gill Paul Beck, Sr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, Lisa G. Smoller, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

PER CURIAM:

Deborah P. Cody seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting the Commissioner of Social Security judgment on the pleadings and dismissing Cody’s complaint. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded sixty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment where the United States or its officer or *244agency is a party, Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). This appeal period is “ ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’ ” *Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr.,*434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) (quoting *United States v. Robinson,*361 U.S. 220, 229, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (I960)).

The district court’s judgment was entered on October 18, 2010. The notice of appeal was filed on December 20, 2010, three days out of time. Because Cody failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### Jane Anderson, Appellant, v James V. Gilliland, Jr., Respondent.

[665 NYS2d 126]

Peters, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Donohue, J.), entered February 5, 1997 in Albany County, which denied plaintiffs motion to restore the case to the trial calendar.

In September 1988, plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident when the vehicle in which she was a passenger was struck from behind by defendant’s vehicle. In September 1991, she commenced this personal injury action against defendant.

Scheduled for trial in May 1994, an adjournment was granted due to the unavailability of a witness. Plaintiff agreed to strike her note of issue and Supreme Court, in turn, removed the case from the trial calendar. In April 1995, the case was scheduled for a calendar call at which time Supreme Court directed plaintiff’s attorney to refile the note of issue if the matter could not be settled. Nothing further transpired until February 1996 when plaintiff moved to have her case restored *655to the trial calendar. Plaintiff died on March 22, 1996, three days after the return date on the motion. Supreme Court denied the motion and this appeal ensued.

We note that after plaintiff’s death, numerous documents were filed with the court, including an affidavit of Michael Anderson, decedent’s son who was appointed, coadministrator for her estate, as well as an affidavit of decedent’s counsel in further support of the motion. However, no motion for substitution was made by the coadministrators (see, CPLR 1015, 1021). Accordingly, “ [n] otwithstanding [the court’s] legitimate interest in bringing the action to conclusion” *(Brown v Konczeski,*242 AD2d 847), the order made by Supreme Court between plaintiff’s death and the substitution of a qualified personal representative is a nullity since, upon the death of a party, all proceedings are automatically stayed *(see,*Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C102L2, at 238). Having no jurisdiction to hear and determine this appeal *(see, Pavone v Walters,*214 AD2d 1052; *Forth v McQuire,*193 AD2d 1146), we must dismiss it.

Crew III, J. P., Yesawich Jr., Spain and Carpinello, JJ., concur. Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, without costs.
The Honorable John B. Jones, United State s District Judge for 1 the District of South Dakota. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 96-3226

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of South Dakota Tracy C. Sazue, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: January 31, 1997 Filed: February 19, 1997

___________ Before McMILLIAN, FAGG and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
Tra cyC. Sazue appeals the 84-month sentence imposed by th e di strict court following a jury trial finding Sszue guilty o f 1 assault with a dangerous weapo n, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a)(3), and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a)(6). We affirm. At sentencing, the district court adjusted Sazue's baseoffense level under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(3)(E) (1995), which calls

for a five-level increase whenthe degree of the victim's injuries falls between the categories of serious bodily injury and pe rmanent or lif e-threatening injury. Sazue argues on appeal that th e dis trict court erred in assessing the enhancement. Given th e evidence in the record that the victim lost a considerable amount of blood, suffered scalp and hand lacerations that would produc e scarring, endured a verbal threat to her life, and has sinc e experienced residual bodily pa in and psychological injury, we hold the district court did not clearly err in concluding that th e fivele vel increase was appropriate. See U.S.S.G.§ 1B1.1, comment . (n.1(h), (j)) (1995) (definitions); United States v. Thompson , 60 F.3d 514, 518 (8th Cir. 1995) (standard of review).
Sazue also argues the court erred in assessing an increas e under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3A1.3 (1995) for p hysical restraint of the victim. The record shows that Sazue dragged the victim b y the hair from room to room and beat her while she wa s pinned underneath him. We conclude the district court did no t clear lyerr in finding Sazue's actions constituted physica l res traint warranting the increase. We do not address Sazue' s remaining arguments, because they were not raised below and n o plain error appears. See Fritz v. United States , 995 F.2d 1 36, 137 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , 510 U.S. 1075 (1994). Accordingly, we affirm.-3- A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
**Exhibit 31.1**

**Certification ofChief Executive Officer**

I, Samuel J. Heyman, certify that:

1.                I have reviewedthis annual report on Form 10-K of Building Materials Corporation ofAmerica;

2.                Based on myknowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.                Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.                The registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)                Designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)               Evaluated theeffectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

c)                Disclosed in thisreport any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reportingthat occurred during the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and

5.                The registrant’sother certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):

a)                All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and reportfinancial information; and

b)               Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.

| Date: March 29, 2006                   |   |   |
|---------------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| /s/  SAMUEL J. HEYMAN             |   |   |
| Name: Samuel  J. Heyman                |   |   |
| Title: Acting  Chief Executive Officer |   |   |

 

----
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                           5,350
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                              91
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 112,830
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<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                               2,045
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,205
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                            1,792
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<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         390
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<EPS-BASIC>                                        .48
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .44
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    8.38
<LOANS-NON>                                        296
<LOANS-PAST>                                         4
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<CHARGE-OFFS>                                       28
<RECOVERIES>                                         1
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                  930
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                               930
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
**Exhibit21**

 

SUBSIDIARIES OFCANTERBURY PARK HOLDING CORPORATION

 
| **Subsidiaries**                                  | ** ** | **Jurisdiction  of  Incorporation** | ** ** |
|---------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|------------|
|                                              |       |                                |       |
| Canterbury Park  Concessions, Inc.                |       | Minnesota                           |       |
| Shakopee Valley RV Park  Acquisition Company, LLC |       | Minnesota                           |       |

 

The subsidiaries are100%-owned directly by Canterbury Park Holding Corporation.  The financial statements of such subsidiariesare included in the Consolidated Financial Statements of Canterbury ParkHolding Corporation.

 

----
CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCESS ANNE COUNTY

#### Commonwealth of Virginia v. Aubrey Simms

February 16, 1960

By Judge H. W. Mackenzie, Jr.

In the course of the cross-examination of the defendant in this case, it developed that the accused had caused trouble for the police at the time of his arrest for the offense for which he was being tried. In response to a question by the Commonwealth’s Attorney, the accused replied to the effect that he “didn’t generally give cops that hard a time.” The Commonwealth’s Attorney followed with a question “where is it you usually speak to policemen?” to which the accused’s counsel objected, and the objection was overruled. It thereupon developed that on other occasions, the defendant had been arrested for similar assault charges.

There is no question that evidence of other arrests or convictions of the defendant for the same type of crime would not have been admissible in this case, and the testimony was allowed to come in because the accused has “opened up the subject” himself.

Upon full reflection and examination of the authorities, I am satisfied that the rule of evidence which permits testimony to be received which would otherwise be irrelevant because one of the parties has “opened up the subject” is limited to the offsetting of the effect of the testimony “opened up.” As applied to this case, I believe it was error to permit the testimony having to do with other offenses to come in simply because the accused stated he “didn’t generally give cops that hard a time.” If this statement had been such that it would have tended to weaken the Commonwealth’s case or had tended to excuse or justify the accused in the action he had taken, the Commonwealth’s Attorney would have been permitted to follow this through with a complete examination tending to offset the damage created by the answer. But this was *478not the case here. The answer was a rather flippant remark which had no direct bearing on either the Commonwealth’s case or the accused’s defense and would not justify the admission of otherwise irrelevant and prejudicial testimony.

Authority for this position will be found in *Michie’s Law of Evidence in Virginia and West Virginia,*p. 130, and *Compton*v. *Commonwealth,*190 Va. 48 (1949).

Since a new trial must be awarded on the above ground, it is not necessary to consider the refusal to grant instruction “A” tendered by the accused.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                        DIGITAL DESCRIPTOR SYSTEMS, INC.
                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
      AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Digital Descriptor Systems, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-KSB/A-3 for the period ended December 31, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, Anthony Shupin, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer, of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The Quarterly Report on Form 10-KSB/A-3 of the Company fully complies with
      the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
      of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Digital Descriptor Systems, Inc. and will be retained by Digital
Descriptor Systems, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.


Date: April 11, 2006


/s/ Anthony Shupin
-------------------------------------
Anthony Shupin
President and Chief Executive Officer
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED FEBRUARY 5, 2014

NO. 03-12-00792-CR

Leeroy Suarez, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE JONES, JUSTICES PEMBERTON AND FIELD

AFFIRMED -- OPINION BY JUSTICE PEMBERTON

This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction entered by the trial court on November 1, 

2012. Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court holds that there was no 

reversible error in the trial court’s judgment of conviction. Therefore, the Court affirms the trial 

court’s judgment of conviction. Because appellant is indigent and unable to pay costs, no 

adjudication of costs is made.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
balance sheets and statements of loss found on pages 3 and 4 of the
Company's Form 10-QSB for the year to date, and is qualified in its entirety
by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                         258,270
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  274,308
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               532,578
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 716,857
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          233,782
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                     4,413,035
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<OTHER-SE>                                  (3,929,960)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   716,857 
<SALES>                                        206,192
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               206,192
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               649,008
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (442,816)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0 
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (442,816)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0 

</TABLE>
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-16-00066-CV

All Star Mitsubishi

v.

Patricio G. Castillo and Maria Refugio Castillo

On appeal from the

County Court at Law No. 1 of Nueces County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 2015-CCV-60122-1

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes the appeal should be dismissed. The Court orders the appeal 

DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion. Each party shall bear their own costs 

relating to this appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

June 16, 2016.