United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 23-3147

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Ramona Cook

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

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 Submitted: October 20, 2023

Filed: December 7, 2023 

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Before LOKEN, KELLY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Ramona Cook has been charged with arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). 

After a detention hearing conducted as part of her initial appearance and arraignment,

the magistrate judge1 issued a pretrial detention order under 18 U.S.C. § 3142, a

1The Honorable Rodney H. Holmes, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.
section of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,

742 (1987). The district court,2 conducting de novo review, agreed that a

preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Cook presents a serious risk of

flight if she is released, § 3142(f)(2)(A), and that “no condition or combination of

conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of [Cook] as required and the safety

of any other person and the community,” § 3142(e)(1). Cook has filed an

interlocutory expedited appeal challenging the detention order. See § 3145(c); Fed.

R. App. P. 9(a). “We apply the clearly erroneous standard to factual findings of the

district court but independently review the ultimate conclusion that detention is

required.” United States v. Cantu, 935 F.2d 950, 951 (8th Cir. 1991); accord United

States v. Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

I.

On December 22, 2022, Cook was fired from her job at a St. Louis hotel for

being intoxicated at work. Police were called to escort Cook from the hotel property. 

The government alleges that she soon returned and started seven separate fires in

stairwells of the hotel, which was then occupied by some 400 guests. In May 2023,

Cook was charged by indictment with maliciously damaging and destroying the hotel

by means of fire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). That same day, the government

filed a Motion for Pretrial Detention and Hearing. 

Section 3142(e)(1) provides that the presiding judicial officer “shall order”

pretrial detention if the officer finds, “after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of

subsection (f),” that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably

assure the appearance of [Cook] as required and the safety of any other person and

the community.” As relevant here, subsection 3142(f) provides:

2The Honorable Ronnie L. White, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

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[t]he judicial officer shall hold a [detention] hearing . . . (2) upon motion

of the attorney for the Government or upon the judicial officer’s own

motion, in a case that involves -- 

(A) a serious risk that such person will flee; or

(B) a serious risk that such person will obstruct or attempt to 

obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to 

threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.

Subsection (g) sets forth factors the judicial officer shall consider “in determining

whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of

the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.” 

Cook appeared with counsel before the magistrate judge on June 28 for her

initial appearance, arraignment, and the detention issue. The government requested 

a detention hearing, invoking § 3142(f)(2)(A) as the basis for the hearing. Cook,

through counsel, argued “that a detention hearing cannot even be held” because she

did not pose a “serious risk of flight.” The magistrate judge then asked for the

pretrial services office’s position. The pretrial services officer stated that her office

was “preliminarily recommending” detention but had not completed its pretrial

services report. The magistrate judge, without objection, continued the proceeding

for two days to allow pretrial services to complete its report.3

3

§ 3142(f) provides that the detention hearing “shall be held immediately upon

the person’s first appearance before the judicial officer unless that person, or the

attorney for the Government, seeks a continuance.” However, “[a] fair reading of the

statute is not that a detention hearing must be held ‘immediately’ when a defendant

first appears in court . . . but rather that once a motion for pretrial detention is made,

a hearing must occur promptly thereafter.” United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479,

1483 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); accord United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S.

711, 717 (1990) (“[A] failure to comply with the first appearance requirement does

not defeat the Government’s authority to seek detention of the person charged.”).

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The Pretrial Services Report was completed on June 29 and distributed before

the detention proceedings resumed on June 30. The Report includes detailed findings

regarding Cook’s residence, family ties, employment history, financial resources,

health and mental health, and criminal history. The Report concludes that no

condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure Cook’s appearance as

required and the safety of other persons and the community because:

-- the underlying federal offense presents a danger to the community;

-- a suspended sentence was imposed by a Missouri state court in 2018 for a

charge of drug distribution, probation was suspended in December 2020 because

Cook absconded, and she has not reported to the Missouri Board of Probation and

Parole for three years. She committed the underlying federal offense while under

supervision for this prior offense; 

-- Cook has a history of failing to appear, including being arrested for a felony

Failure to Appear; 

-- she “has a pending charge in St. Louis City for Resisting/Interfering with

Arrest for a Felony and Assault 3rd Degree-Special Victim”;

-- she has an arrest for an offense involving a weapon and arrests or charges

that are violent in nature;

-- she “has ties outside of the Eastern District of Missouri” and “a criminal

history in Texas and Missouri, making her a multi-state offender”;

-- she “was the respondent in three Orders of Protection filed by the father of

one of her children”; 

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-- she has no property ownership in the District and a history of unstable

housing;

-- she has a substance abuse history and a mental health history that, if left

untreated, “may impair her ability to remain abreast of her Court appearances.”

At the outset of the resumed hearing, the magistrate judge stated that the

“threshold” issue was whether Cook poses a serious risk of flight “under Section (f)”

and adopted the factual findings in the Pretrial Services Report, to which Cook did

not object. The government argued that its initial concerns based on Cook’s lack of

stable housing, homelessness, and lack of employment history “have only grown”

with the Pretrial Services Report. The probation absconding summarized in the

Report shows “a serious risk that she’s not going to comply with the Court’s orders.” 

She was on probation and stopped contacting her probation officer, which led to

probation being suspended. In response, defense counsel emphasized Cook’s

recurring mental health issues, noted her absconding occurred during the height of

the pandemic, and pointed to her current stable housing. Counsel argued that, given

these mitigating factors, the government had not established a serious risk of flight

and therefore a detention hearing could not be held. 

The magistrate judge agreed that a “serious risk of flight” is “above and beyond

just the person might not show up.” However, “what we have here is she’s absconded

for three years. And I know you gave a lot of reasons for that, but the bottom line is

she’s been gone for three years. She’s an absconder right now as she sits in my

courtroom.” Thus, the magistrate judge concluded, the government has met its

burden under § 3142(f)(2)(A) “and we can just move on to the ultimate issue of

whether she’s going to be detained or given a bond.” Defense counsel objected and

stated that Cook would appeal this ruling. The magistrate judge then adopted the

§ 3142(e)(1) conclusions in the Pretrial Services Report -- that setting fire in the

stairwells of a hotel full of people shows that Cook poses a danger to the community,

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and the strength of the government’s case plus her history of absconding and failures

to appear show that no conditions would reasonably assure Cook’s appearance and

the safety of the community -- and ordered Cook detained after considering the

factors set forth in § 3142(g). 

Cook appealed to the district court by filing a Motion to Revoke Prior

Detention Order as Detention is Not Authorized Under the Bail Reform Act. Cook

argued the government failed to present evidence establishing a serious risk of flight;

therefore, the detention order should be revoked and the court should find that

reasonable conditions are available to reasonably assure Cook’s appearance and the

safety of the community.

In an eleven-page written order, the district court recited the factual and

procedural background in detail and observed that the § 3142(g) detention factors

“are relevant to determining whether Defendant presents a serious risk of flight and

if there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance.” 

Applying the facts to the relevant considerations de novo, the district court denied

Cook’s motion to revoke the detention order and ordered that she remain in custody:

the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that [Cook] presents

a serious risk of flight or nonappearance if she were released. See 18

U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A). Based primarily on [Cook’s] history and

characteristics, but considering all of the relevant factors, the Court does

not believe any condition or combination of conditions will reasonably

assure [Cook’s] appearance. 

II.

On appeal, Cook argues the district court “ignored the threshold inquiry” of

whether a detention hearing should have been held at all under § 3142(f)(2)(A),

“improperly fusing it with the subsequent detention hearing and its factors to be

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considered under 3142(g).” Therefore, we should order Cook’s immediate release

from custody or remand for a properly conducted hearing. We disagree. 

While we agree the government has the burden to show that the case “involves”

one of the circumstances defined in § 3142(f)(1) or (2), we have never held that a

detention order may not be entered unless the judicial officer conducts the rigid “twostep inquiry” urged by Cook. There are good reasons to reject this contention. First,

as the statute directs, pretrial detention is an issue that should be resolved at the outset

of the criminal case. Delay either keeps a person in post-arrest detention that may be

unnecessary, or keeps a person who should be detained prior to trial at large in the

community. Requiring the judicial officer to conduct a § 3142(f)(2)(A) hearing and

then a second § 3142(e)(1) hearing is in our view both a waste of judicial resources

and contrary to the Bail Reform Act’s purposes. Second, the two inquiries, while not

identical, substantially overlap. As the district court noted, the § 3142(g) factors,

which govern the § 3142(e)(1) inquiry, are relevant both “to determining whether

Defendant presents a serious risk of flight and [whether] there are conditions of

release that will reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance.” See Santos-Flores, 794

F.3d at 1090. 

Here, the magistrate judge permissibly conducted the two inquiries in a single

detention hearing. We reject Cook’s assertion that the district court failed to conduct

a § 3142(f)(2)(A) inquiry into whether the government established a serious risk of

flight. In denying Cook’s Motion to Revoke Prior Detention Order, the district court

expressly “[found] by a preponderance of the evidence that [Cook] presents a serious

risk of flight or nonappearance if she were released. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(A).” 

By including a reference to the risk of nonappearance, a critical § 3142(e)(1) issue,

the district court clarified that it had separately considered two issues, risk of flight

and risk of nonappearance. 

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The district court reviewed the magistrate judge’s order de novo. See Maull,

773 F.2d at 1481-82. Reviewing without deference does “not require[] [the district

court] to start over in every case, and proceed as if the magistrate’s decision and

findings d[o] not exist.” United States v. Koenig, 912 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.

1990). If the district court agrees fully with the magistrate’s order and reasons, it may

adopt the order. United States v. Femia, 983 F.2d 1046, at *4 (1st Cir. 1993)

(unpublished) (citations omitted); accord United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 490

(11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Vortis, 785 F.2d 327, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Here,

the district court reviewed the same record and factual findings and agreed fully with

the magistrate judge’s decision. Adopting that decision “obviate[d] the need for the

district court to prepare its own written findings of fact and statement of reasons.” 

King, 849 F.2d at 490.

III.

Cook further argues that the government’s “evidence is insufficient” to

establish that she is a serious flight risk. Based on our de novo review of the abovesummarized risk factors described in the Pretrial Services Report, we agree with the

district court and the magistrate judge that Cook poses a serious risk of flight. 

Cook absconded from probation for three years, leaving the jurisdiction in

which she had been ordered to report to probation. Her status as an absconder and

her history of failing to appear weigh heavily in favor of finding “a serious risk that

such person will flee,” § 3142(f)(2)(A). Not surprisingly, other courts have found a

defendant’s previous abscondment highly relevant in assessing risk of flight. See

United States v. Anderson, 177 F. Supp. 3d 458, 466 (D.D.C. 2016). Cook is charged

with committing a serious federal offense that endangered the safety of 400 people,

while she was under supervision for a prior drug distribution charge. She faces a

potentially lengthy prison sentence if convicted. As she has not served a prison term

before, and has a criminal history in Texas as well of Missouri, the serious risk of

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flight and nonappearance is obvious. See United States v. Abad, 350 F.3d 793, 799

(8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Stenger, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1026 (S.D. Iowa

2008). Her mental health history, while mitigating in some respects, may also impair

her ability to make required appearances and avoid unsafe conduct. Her recent efforts

to address these issues and obtain stable, independent housing are commendable but

do not overcome the numerous facts that weigh in favor of a serious-risk-of-flight

determination. See United States v. Campbell, No. 17-CR-7, 2021 WL 1733395, at

*5 (E.D. Wis. May 3, 2021). 

As we have discussed, while the § 3142(e)(1) and (g) inquiry is not identical

to the § 3142(f)(2)(A) inquiry, many of the same considerations apply. To the extent

that § 3142(f)(2)(A) requires a more serious risk of flight, we have that here. Thus,

we agree with the district court that the government met its burden to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that Cook presents a serious risk of flight. 

The district court’s Order of Detention Pending Trial dated July 5, 2023, is

affirmed. We grant Cook’s motion to seal and the government’s motion to file an

overlength response and to seal the response. 

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