1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 11-1972 (JEB)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In March 2011, American Immigration Council submitted a Freedom of Information Act 

request to Customs and Border Protection, a component agency of the Department of Homeland 

Security. AIC sought information about individuals’ access to counsel during their interactions 

with federal immigration authorities. Dissatisfied with the response to its request – the agency

produced just two pages of records after six months of discussion – AIC filed suit in this court 

against CBP and DHS. Defendants then conducted a broader search, which ultimately produced 

at least 156 additional responsive documents. 

The merits litigation now completed, AIC moves for an award of attorney fees and costs. 

Because Plaintiff substantially prevailed in its suit and the multi-factor entitlement inquiry favors 

a fee award – at least for a portion of the underlying litigation – the Court will grant its Motion in 

part. AIC’s requested sum, however, will be reduced to account for various billing-related 

deficiencies. 
2

I. Background

Past Opinions detail the full background of this suit, so the Court will recount here only 

the facts relevant to the pending Motion for Attorney Fees. In March 2011, AIC submitted a 

FOIA request to CBP asking for:

[A]ny and all records which have been prepared, received, 

transmitted, collected and/or maintained by the U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security and/or U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP), whether issued or maintained by CBP Headquarters offices, 

including any divisions, subdivisions or sections therein; CBP 

offices at ports of entry, including any divisions, subdivisions or 

sections therein; and/or any other CBP organizational structure; 

and which relate or refer in any way to any of the following:

• Attorneys’ ability to be present during their 

clients’ interactions with CBP;

• What role attorneys may play during their clients’ 

interactions with CBP;

• Attorney conduct during interactions with CBP on 

behalf of their clients;

• Attorney appearances at CBP offices or other 

facilities.

Mot., Exh. B (March 14, 2011, Letter from Emily Creighton to CBP’s FOIA Division) at 1 

(footnote omitted). The request “include[d], but [was] not limited to” ten specific types of 

records. Id. at 1-2. 

After “consult[ing] with several component offices within CBP,” the agency’s FOIA 

Division informed Plaintiff that “much of the information” it sought was “already publicly 

available.” Compl., Exh. C (May 12, 2011, Letter from Dorothy Pullo to Emily Creighton) at 1. 

The letter further stated that responsive information could be found online in one of three places: 

the Code of Federal Regulations, the “Personal Search Handbook,” or the soon-to-be-released 

“Inspector’s Field Manual.” Id.
3

Questioning the adequacy of Defendants’ search for responsive documents, Plaintiff 

immediately filed an administrative appeal. See Compl., Exh. D (May 26, 2011, Letter from 

Emily Creighton to CBP’s FOIA Appeals Division) at 2 (“The May 12, 2011, response merely 

includes general documents that are publicly available and does not reflect a search reasonably 

calculated to uncover documents relevant to the guidance outlined in the request.”). Upon 

receipt of this filing, the Appeals Division contacted three internal offices “in which responsive 

records were likely to have been created and be maintained” – namely, the Office of the Border 

Patrol (OBP), the Office of Field Operations (OFO), and the Office of Chief Counsel (OCC). 

See id., Exh. F (Sept. 29, 2011, Letter from Shari Suzuki to Emily Creighton) at 10. The 

cumulative efforts of those three offices produced just two pages of responsive records. See id., 

Exh. G (Excerpts from Agency Guidance Materials). The agency explained that it was “unable 

to provide [AIC] with any further information because no such information exists.” See Suzuki 

Letter at 10. 

In November 2011, believing that Defendants had failed to comply with the obligations 

imposed by FOIA, AIC brought suit in this court. Shortly thereafter, Defendants filed their first 

Motion for Summary Judgment, maintaining that the search CBP had conducted was “reasonably 

calculated to uncover all information responsive to Plaintiff’s request.” ECF No. 9 (First Motion 

for Summary Judgment) at 10. AIC opposed the Government’s Motion, arguing that the agency 

had failed to adequately justify the limited nature of its search. See ECF No. 12 (First AIC 

Opposition). In particular, Plaintiff noted that Suzuki’s Declaration never explained why the 

three component offices searched were the only ones likely to contain responsive records, and 

that the Declaration lacked sufficient detail as to the search methods employed. See id. at 3-8. 
4

AIC also highlighted a number of responsive documents likely to be in CBP’s possession that, 

inexplicably, had not been produced. See id. at 8-16. 

After reviewing Plaintiff’s Opposition, Defendants withdrew their Motion. See ECF No. 

18 (Notice of Withdrawal). Deeming it “in the best interest of this litigation” to “expand their 

search beyond the CBP offices originally believed to have responsive records,” Defendants 

agreed to “conduct a nationwide search of CBP offices for records responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA 

request . . .[,] involv[ing] over 300 Ports of Entry, approximately 130 Border Patrol Stations and 

20 Border Patrol Sectors, CBP Field Operations Offices as well as the following additional 

offices at CBP headquarters: Office of Training and Development, Office of Diversity and Civil 

Rights, Office of Policy and Planning, and Office of Executive Secretariat.” Id. at 2-3.

This ramped-up effort yielded a richer harvest of more than 300 documents, of which the 

Government subsequently released some in full, disclosed others in part, and withheld still others 

altogether pursuant to various FOIA exemptions. See ECF Nos. 20-25, 27-29, 31, 38 (status 

reports updating the Court on progress of production). During this period of rolling productions 

– which occurred between October 2012 and July 2013 – the parties frequently met and 

conferred regarding the adequacy of Defendants’ searches and the propriety of various 

redactions. See Mot. at 2. These conferences bore fruit: the Government subsequently produced 

certain records with fewer redactions, and AIC determined that it would no longer challenge the 

adequacy of the search. See id. at 2-3. Despite continued negotiations, however, the parties 

could not reach an agreement on the redactions contained in seven of the documents. With 

progress at a standstill, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining documents, 

which the Court granted on March 21, 2014. See Am. Immigration Council v. United States 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (AIC I), No. 11-1972, 2014 WL 1118353 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2014).
5

Plaintiff now seeks to recover attorney fees and related expenses for the work its 

attorneys performed prior to Defendants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties 

began negotiating such fees almost a year ago, back in April of 2014. On August 28, nearly five 

months after this discussion began and after multiple e-mails and conference calls, Defendants 

abruptly notified AIC that “[u]pon further reflection,” they “do[] not believe [AIC] is entitled to 

attorneys’ fees.” ECF No. 49 (Motion for Briefing Schedule), Att. 1 (Declaration of Melissa 

Crow), Exh. 8 (August 28, 2014, Letter from Marian Borum). The letter explained that because 

AIC had failed to file a motion for fees within fourteen days after the entry of judgment, as 

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B)(i), “Defendant considers this matter 

closed.” Id. 

Taken aback by the Government’s sudden change of heart, AIC immediately filed a 

Motion to set a briefing schedule to resolve the issue of attorney fees. See ECF No. 49. 

Agreeing with Plaintiff that Rule 54 poses no bar to an attorney-fee award in this case, the Court 

granted the Motion. See ECF No. 52 (Memorandum Opinion & Order) (AIC II). With briefing 

now complete, the Court turns to the merits of AIC’s request.

II. Analysis

FOIA provides that courts “may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees 

and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case . . . in which the complainant has 

substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i); see Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade 

Rep., 641 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “This language naturally divides the attorney-fee 

inquiry into two prongs, which our case law has long described as fee ‘eligibility’ and fee 

‘entitlement.’” Brayton, 641 F.3d at 524 (citing Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 470 

F.3d 363, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). The Court, therefore, first decides whether AIC has 
6

“substantially prevailed” and is therefore “eligible” to receive fees. See id.; Judicial Watch, 470 

F.3d at 368; Negley v. FBI, 818 F. Supp. 2d 69, 73 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 2011). If so, the Court must 

then “consider[] a variety of factors” to determine whether it is “entitled” to fees. Brayton, 641 

F.3d at 524-25; Judicial Watch, 470 F.3d at 369; Davy v. CIA, 550 F.3d 1155, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). Put another way, the Court will first determine whether AIC may receive fees; if so, it 

will then decide whether it should receive them. See Brayton, 641 F.3d at 524. Finally, upon 

determining that AIC is both eligible and entitled to fees, the Court must “analyze whether the 

amount of the fee request is reasonable.” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 

Sec. (EPIC I), 811 F. Supp. 2d 216, 237 (D.D.C. 2011).

A. Eligibility

A FOIA “complainant has substantially prevailed” and, consequently, is eligible for a fee 

award if it “has obtained relief through either – (I) a judicial order, or an enforceable written 

agreement or consent decree; or (II) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if 

the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). AIC invokes the latter 

subsection as the basis for its fee request. The key question under this aptly named “catalyst 

theory” is whether “the institution and prosecution of the litigation cause[d] the agency to release 

the documents obtained during the pendency of the litigation.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. 

Harris, 653 F.2d 584, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also Davis v. DOJ, 610 F.3d 750, 752 (D.C. Cir. 

2010) (“FOIA plaintiffs [are] eligible for a fee award if the lawsuit substantially caused the 

agency to release the requested records,” regardless of whether the plaintiff obtained any courtordered relief.). 

To recover fees, “a litigant must . . . show[ ] that the lawsuit was reasonably necessary 

and the litigation substantially caused the requested records to be released.” Burka v. HHS, 142 
7

F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Although “the mere filing of the complaint and the 

subsequent release of the documents is insufficient to establish causation,” Weisberg v. DOJ, 745 

F.2d 1476, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1984), it is nonetheless a “‘salient factor’ in the analysis.” EPIC I,

811 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (citation omitted); accord Pub. Law Educ. Inst. v. DOJ, 744 F.2d 181, 

184 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“While the temporal relation between [a] FOIA action and the release 

of documents may be taken into account in determining the existence vel non of a causal nexus, 

timing, in itself or in conjunction with any other particular factor, does not establish causation as 

a matter of law.”). If, instead of “the threat of an adverse court order . . .[,] an unavoidable delay 

accompanied by due diligence in the administrative process was the actual reason for the 

agency’s failure to respond to a request, then it cannot be said that the complainant substantially 

prevailed in [its] suit.” Church of Scientology of Cal., 653 F.2d at 587.

In opposing Plaintiff’s eligibility for fees, Defendants principally contend that no change 

in agency position occurred as a consequence of the litigation. According to CBP, it has 

consistently and “steadfastly” striven to produce responsive records since the moment it received 

AIC’s FOIA request. See Opp. at 10-11. The agency says it made a “good faith effort to search 

out material” prior to Plaintiff’s initiation of this suit, and its decision to “cast a wider net and 

conduct even more searches” upon realizing that additional responsive documents might exist is 

consistent with its earlier approach. See id. at 11. 

The facts, however, speak for themselves – and they do not speak in Defendants’ favor. 

The agency produced not a single document in response to AIC’s initial FOIA request, instead 

informing Plaintiff that “much of the information it sought” was publicly available online. See

Pullo Letter at 1. Even after Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal, the agency produced a mere 
8

two pages of records, stating that it was “unable to provide [AIC] with any further information 

because no such information exists.” Suzuki Letter at 2.

It was plainly reasonable for Plaintiff to conclude at that point – in light of CBP’s initial 

response and its subsequent disposition of the administrative appeal – that no further material 

would be released absent judicial involvement. Indeed, the agency had emphatically declared in 

no uncertain terms that no additional responsive material existed. Cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 878 F. Supp. 2d 225, 232 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[I]t was reasonable for Judicial 

Watch to believe that the records would not be unconditionally released absent a lawsuit, given 

the DOJ’s initial invocation of Exemptions 5 and 7 in response to Judicial Watch’s FOIA 

request.”). 

AIC, accordingly, filed suit. Even then CBP held fast to its position that it had conducted 

an adequate search and released all responsive documents, going so far as to move for summary

judgment on the issue. In a Declaration accompanying that Motion, Suzuki again averred that 

CBP was “unable to provide further responsive information to the Plaintiff because no such 

information exists.” First Mot. for Summary Judgment, Att. 1 (Declaration of Shari Suzuki) at 

10-11. 

Not until after AIC filed its Opposition did the Government change its tune. That is, after 

Plaintiff expended significant time and energy spelling out the deficiencies in CBP’s search 

efforts, Defendants withdrew their initial Motion for Summary Judgment and agreed to conduct a 

significantly expanded “nationwide search of CBP offices for records responsive to Plaintiff’s 

FOIA request.” Notice of Withdrawal at 2. That augmented search, of course, led to the rolling 

production of over 300 documents, at least 156 of which Defendants admit were directly 

responsive to AIC’s initial request. See Opp. at 6. 
9

It is baffling – and hardly helpful to their credibility here – that Defendants still 

adamantly assert that no change in position occurred during the pendency of the litigation. On 

the contrary, Defendants’ release of at least 156 additional responsive documents manifests a 

180-degree reversal from their initial position that no further responsive records existed. The 

sequence of events – as well as the Government’s representations throughout – makes clear, 

moreover, that Plaintiff’s lawsuit served as a necessary catalyst for the agency’s release of this 

significant body of responsive material. Indeed, this Court recognized as much in an earlier 

opinion. See AIC I, 2014 WL 1118353, at *1 (AIC’s “suit apparently prompted Defendants to 

conduct a more thorough search.”). Because Plaintiff has amply demonstrated that CBP would 

not have released these spoils absent the threat of an adverse judgment, it has “substantially 

prevailed” and is eligible for fees. See Dasilva v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 

13-13, 2014 WL 775606, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2014) (“[P]laintiff is eligible to receive 

attorney’s fees because this set [of records] was disclosed after approximately five months and, 

more importantly, after defendant submitted a declaration, sworn under penalty of perjury, to the 

effect that all documents had already been disclosed and defendant then reconsidered its position 

after plaintiff moved for summary judgment.”). 

Not inclined to go gently into that good night, Defendants raise three further objections, 

none of which has merit. They first emphasize their substantial efforts to cooperate with Plaintiff 

after withdrawing their original Motion for Summary Judgment. See Opp. at 6, 11-12. The 

Court applauds, as it did in its previous Opinions, the Government’s accommodating conduct 

and both parties’ attempts to narrow the dispute without undue court involvement. But the fact 

that Defendants went above and beyond after the filing of suit and an initial round of summaryjudgment briefing hardly supplants the inadequacy of their efforts prior to that point. 
10

Defendants’ assertion that they emerged victorious on their Second Motion for Summary 

Judgment, see id. at 12, while indisputably correct, is also beside the point. To be eligible for 

fees, a complainant must only substantially – not completely – prevail. That the Court ultimately 

acquiesced to Defendants’ withholdings in seven documents does not mean that AIC is stripped 

of its eligibility for fees. Because Plaintiff’s suit caused CBP to release at least 156 responsive 

records – 154 more than they produced before litigation ensued – AIC “substantially prevailed” 

as a result of bringing suit. As mentioned earlier, moreover, Plaintiff does not seek remuneration 

for the time spent opposing the Government’s Second Motion. 

Finally, to the extent Defendants invoke the agency’s good faith in responding to AIC’s 

request, they similarly miss the mark. Although bad faith on the part of the Government can be 

relevant to whether a complainant substantially prevailed, see Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1496, it is 

in no sense necessary. The eligibility inquiry focuses on whether a plaintiff obtained relief – i.e., 

his requested records – through litigation. AIC has satisfied that inquiry here. Whether the 

agency’s initial shortcoming resulted from bad faith, laziness, or human error is of no moment. 

B. Entitlement

The Court now asks whether AIC is “entitled” to an award of fees. In doing so, it again 

notes that Plaintiff does not seek fees for the hours it expended opposing Defendants’ Second 

Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court will thus limit its analysis to the preceding phase of 

the litigation. 

The goal of the entitlement inquiry is to ensure that attorney fees are distributed in a 

manner consistent with the purpose of FOIA’s fee provision, which “‘was not enacted to 

provide a reward for any litigant who successfully forces the government to disclose 

information it wished to withhold.’” Davy, 550 F.3d at 1158 (quoting Nationwide Bldg. Maint., 
11

Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing S. REP. NO. 93-854, at 17 (1974))). 

Instead, it serves the “more limited purpose” of “remov[ing] the incentive for administrative 

resistance to disclosure requests based not on the merits of exemption claims, but on the 

knowledge that many FOIA plaintiffs do not have the financial resources or economic 

incentives to pursue their requests through expensive litigation.’” Id. (quoting Nationwide, 559 

F.2d at 711 (citing S. REP. NO. 93-854, at 17)).

With this purpose in mind, the Court must make a determination as to attorney-fee 

entitlement by considering at least four different factors: “(1) the public benefit derived from the 

case; (2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in the 

records; and (4) the reasonableness of the agency’s withholding of the requested documents.” 

Id. at 1159; see also Tax Analysts v. Dep’t of Justice, 965 F.2d 1092, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1992); 

Negley, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 72. No one criterion is dispositive, see Davy, 550 F.3d at 1159, and 

“[t]he sifting of those criteria over the facts of a case is a matter of district court discretion.” 

Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1094 (citing Church of Scientology v. Harris, 653 F.2d 584, 590 

(D.C. Cir. 1981)). The Court here will begin with the second and third factors, then move to the 

first, and finish with the fourth.

1. Factors Two and Three

Factors (2) and (3) – the “commercial benefit” and “plaintiff’s interest” factors, which 

“are closely related and often considered together” – favor AIC. Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 

1095. Plaintiff is a nonprofit organization whose “mission is to educate the American public 

about immigrants’ contributions to American society, to promote sensible and humane 

immigration policy, and to advocate for the just and equitable enforcement of immigration 

laws.” Compl., ¶ 8; see EPIC I, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 235 (“Fee recovery is often appropriate . . .
12

when the plaintiff is a nonprofit public interest group.”). In keeping with its mission, AIC has 

long focused on access-to-counsel issues. Specifically, it “educate[s] the immigration bar about

the relevant laws, advocat[es] for fair standards and procedures to remedy ineffective assistance 

of counsel, and encourag[es] better access to counsel in proceedings before DHS and its 

agencies, including CBP.” Id. Plaintiff’s FOIA request in this case – which sought information 

about individuals’ access to counsel during their interactions with federal immigration 

authorities – sprung directly from these public-minded aspirations.

AIC, moreover, disseminates to the public the records it acquires through FOIA requests. 

See, e.g., Mot. at 9 (“Plaintiff summarized, indexed, and posted Defendants’ documents on its 

website, allowing the public to access and examine these documents free of charge.”). As an 

entity that “‘gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses [its] 

editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an 

audience,’” AIC is “among those whom Congress intended to be favorably treated under 

FOIA’s fee provision.” Davy, 550 F.3d at 1161-62 (quoting Tax Analysts, 925 F.2d at 1095); 

see also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (EPIC III), 999 F. Supp. 2d 61, 

69 (D.D.C. 2013) (“These [second and third] factors also favor non-profit organizations like 

EPIC, which aim to ferret out and make public worthwhile, previously unknown government 

information – precisely the activity that FOIA’s fees provision seeks to promote.”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

The Government essentially concedes that both of these factors favor Plaintiff. It does

not address the third factor at all, and it makes only the most cursory of arguments with regard 

to the second. Notwithstanding the fact that AIC has disseminated the material free of charge 

on its website, Defendants maintain that it could potentially garner a commercial benefit from 
13

its request. See Opp. at 16 n.8. They point to the appeal for donations posted on AIC’s website, 

arguing that the requested records might drive increased traffic to the site and thus bolster 

donations. See id. It is precisely because Plaintiff is a nonprofit organization that does not 

commercially benefit from its work, however, that it must solicit donations on its website in 

order to survive. A possible increase in such donations as a result of a successful, interestprovoking FOIA request does not constitute a commercial benefit or a “private advantage,” 

Davy, 550 F.3d at 1160, that weighs against granting a fee award. The Court would be remiss, 

moreover, if it failed to note that Defendants’ current stance flatly contradicts the position it 

took when granting Plaintiff’s request for a fee waiver. There, the agency expressly found that 

“AIC did not have a commercial interest that would be furthered by release of the information 

requested.” Suzuki Letter at 8. That earlier conclusion was the correct one, and the Court 

affirms it here.

2. Factor One

Like factors two and three, the first factor – the “public benefit derived from the case” –

also militates in AIC’s favor. This factor “requires consideration of both the effect of the 

litigation for which fees are requested and the potential public value of the information sought.” 

Davy, 550 F.3d at 1159. In evaluating this criterion, it is important to note that “[t]he simple 

disclosure of government documents does not satisfy the public interest factor.” Alliance for 

Responsible CFC Policy, Inc. v. Costle, 631 F. Supp. 1469, 1471 (D.D.C. 1986) (citing Fenster 

v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). Instead, the Court must determine whether “the 

complainant’s victory is likely to add to the fund of information that citizens may use in making 

vital political choices.” Cotton v. Heyman, 63 F.3d 1115, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Fenster, 617 F.2d at 744) (internal quotation marks omitted).
14

AIC’s FOIA request concerned a matter of undeniable public import. Plaintiff sought 

information on “policies regarding a noncitizen’s access to counsel in interactions with [CBP and 

DHS].” Creighton Letter at 1. Immigration policy – including treatment of noncitizens seeking 

entry to this country – has long been at the forefront of the national conversation. See generally, 

e.g., R.I.L-R v. Johnson, No. 15-11, 2015 WL 737117 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2015); Wil S. Hylton, 

The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps, N.Y. Times Magazine MM25 (February 8, 

2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americasfamily-detention-camps.html?_r=0 (describing conditions in family detention centers). Access 

to counsel is a significant aspect of this discourse, and the requested documents were plainly 

intended to enlarge and inform that debate. See EPIC III, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 68 (finding public 

benefit “was exceptional” because documents obtained were related “to a matter subject to an 

ongoing national debate: the tension between individual privacy interests and the nationalsecurity needs of our government in the digital age”). 

The Government released over 300 documents as a result of Plaintiff’s request. See Mot. 

at 2; Opp. at 6. AIC then summarized those documents and posted them on its website, which 

receives more than 112,000 average monthly page views. See Mot. at 7. Such widespread 

dissemination of the fruits of the request cements a public-benefit finding here. See Elec. 

Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (EPIC II), 892 F. Supp. 2d 28, 50-51 (D.D.C. 

2012) (holding that public-benefit factor weighed in favor of FOIA plaintiff when records were 

posted to plaintiff’s website and in its newsletter that over 8000 people received); see also

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (CREW I), 820 F. 

Supp. 2d 39, 46-47 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that availability of requested documents on plaintiff’s 

various websites weighed in favor of public-benefit factor).
15

Defendants attempt to circumvent this relatively straightforward conclusion by arguing 

that the requested documents are of interest only to a “relatively small segment of the 

population” – noncitizens, “whose specific numbers cannot be quantified,” and immigration 

attorneys, “a small community of attorneys practicing in a niche area of the law.” Opp. at 14. 

The Court disagrees. As previously explained, the issue of noncitizens’ access to counsel is an 

important component of a vigorous political debate over immigration and is, therefore, of 

widespread public interest. Perhaps even more telling are the Government’s prior inconsistent 

statements. In granting AIC’s request for a fee waiver, CBP recognized that “[i]mmigration has 

been and continues to be a significant issue in the United States,” that AIC has “expertise in the 

subject area and the ability and intention to effectively disseminate the information to the 

public,” and that the requested disclosures “were likely to contribute to the understanding of a 

reasonably broad audience of persons interested in immigration issues.” Suzuki Letter at 6-7. 

Defendants cannot retreat from this conclusion in order to avoid paying attorney fees. 

3. Factor Four

The fourth factor – the reasonableness of the agency’s withholding – is a closer call. This 

factor requires consideration of “whether the agency’s opposition to disclosure ‘had a reasonable 

basis in law,’ Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1096, and whether the agency ‘had not been recalcitrant 

in its opposition to a valid claim or otherwise engaged in obdurate behavior,’ LaSalle Extension, 

627 F.2d [481,] 486 [(D.C. Cir. 1980)].” Davy, 550 F.3d at 1162. Significantly, the burden 

remains with the agency: “The question is not whether [Plaintiff] has affirmatively shown that 

the agency was unreasonable, but rather whether the agency has shown that it had any colorable 

or reasonable basis for not disclosing the material until after [Plaintiff] filed suit.” Id. at 1163.
16

The Court recognizes that CBP expended a significant amount of effort and resources 

searching through documents, particularly after the initial round of summary-judgment briefing. 

It might even be fair to say that – after withdrawing its initial Motion – the Government

surpassed the call of duty in searching for documents that might be of interest to Plaintiff. See

ECF Nos. 34, 36 (status reports detailing Defendants’ search efforts). For example, at the 

request of Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendants conducted additional searches at ten ports of entry 

chosen by AIC, using six specific search terms identified by the organization. See Opp. at 11.

This yeoman’s work, however, is immaterial to CBP’s failure to cast a wider net in 

response to Plaintiff’s initial request. The agency has not satisfactorily explained why its earlier 

efforts were so cabined, nor shown “beyond material doubt” that those limited searches were 

“reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast 

Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325-26 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Indeed, in justifying its initial decision to search only three CBP component offices, it said only

that “responsive records were likely to have been created and be maintained” in those offices, not 

that they were the only locations likely to contain such records. See Suzuki Letter at 10; Suzuki 

Decl., ¶ 14; see Elkins v. Fed. Aviation Admin., No. 14-476, 2014 WL 4243152, at *4 (D.D.C. 

Aug. 28, 2014) (“[A]n agency’s attestation that it has searched all offices likely to contain 

responsive records is sufficient justification for its decision to limit its search to certain 

locations.”) (emphasis added). 

In any event, the Court need not dwell too long on the reasonableness of Defendants’ 

actions. The D.C. Circuit “has repeatedly asserted that ‘the court must be careful not to give 

any particular factor dispositive weight.’” Campaign for Responsible Transplantation v. Food 

& Drug Admin., 593 F. Supp. 2d 236, 244 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Sampson, 559 F.2d at 714). 
17

The only time when the fourth factor would control is “when the agency has demonstrated that 

it had a lawful right to withhold disclosure.” Davy, 550 F.3d at 1159; see also Chesapeake Bay 

Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric., 11 F.3d 211, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[T]here can be no doubt 

that a party is not entitled to fees if the Government’s legal basis for withholding requested 

records is correct.”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. 

v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2001). AIC’s success on

the first three factors, combined with some degree of success on the fourth, is more than 

sufficient to establish its entitlement to fees. See CREW I, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 47-48.

C. Calculating Fees

Having determined that AIC is entitled to an award of attorney fees, the Court must now 

calculate the precise size of that award. The “usual method of calculating reasonable attorney’s 

fees is to multiply the hours reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly fee, 

producing the ‘lodestar’ amount.” Bd. of Trs. of Hotel and Rest. Emps. Local 25 v. JPR, Inc., 

136 F.3d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council 

for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564 (1986)). That number may then be adjusted to reflect “the 

significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 774 F. Supp. 2d 225, 233 (D.D.C. 2011).

Plaintiff requests $106,499.90 in fees for the underlying litigation. It further requests 

$24,131.25 in “fees on fees” – i.e., for work on this Motion for Attorney Fees. Defendants take 

issue with both the hourly rates assessed and the number of hours billed. The Court considers

each variable in turn and then forges ahead with the necessary computations.
18

1. Reasonable Hourly Rates

Almost a dozen attorneys represented Plaintiff in this case. In addition to three in-house 

counsel who worked on the matter, AIC received pro bono representation from eight attorneys 

employed by a national law firm, Dorsey & Whitney LLP. Those attorneys have provided a 

table of their normal, undiscounted hourly rates for the years worked on this matter: 

Table A: Established Dorsey Rates

Timekeeper Law School 

Graduation

10/2010-

9/2011

10/2011-

9/2012

10/2012-

9/2013

10/2013-

9/2014

10/2014-

9/2015

Creighton Magid 

(Partner)

1987 555 570 595 620 650

Theresa Bevilacqua 

(Partner)

2001 390 400 410 430 455

Michelle Grant 

(Partner)

2001 390 400 410 440 465

Erin Davenport 

(Associate)

2008 255 275 305 340 375

Shannon Bjorklund 

(Associate)

2009 235 265 295 340 370

Andrew Brantingham 

(Associate)

2009 235 265 295 340 370

Michael Stinson 

(Associate)

2011 210 235 260 295 325

Katherine Arnold 

(Associate)

2013 -- -- -- 250 280

Mot., Exh. A (Declaration of Michelle Grant), ¶¶ 6-8. Defendants do not oppose their

application in this case. See Opp. at 22 (Defendants “have no significant quarrels about the 

hourly rates Dorsey has proposed.”). The Court, accordingly, adopts those rates wholesale. See

Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying a firm’s 

“established rates” because they “represent the opportunity cost of what the firm turned away in 
19

order to take the litigation”), overruled on other grounds by Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. 

Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).

Lest one believe that amity prevails on the rate issue, the parties hotly dispute the 

appropriate hourly rates for the trio of attorneys from AIC who worked on this case. To 

calculate fees for public-interest attorneys who have no customary hourly rates, courts often look 

to prevailing market rates in the community. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896-97 (1984); 

Local 25, 136 F.3d at 800-01. In fleshing out those rates, this Circuit has frequently employed 

the Laffey Matrix, “a schedule of fees based on years of attorney experience that was developed 

in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 

746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).” ACLU v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 810 F. Supp. 2d 267, 277 

(D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Judicial Watch, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 232).

This merely frames, but does not resolve, the issue. That is because the parties in this 

case advance dueling matrices. AIC argues that its in-house attorneys should be awarded fees 

based on an updated Laffey Matrix developed by economist Dr. Michael Kavanaugh. See Reply

at 14, 20. To build his matrix, Kavanaugh took a sample of legal-services costs from 1989 and 

adjusted them using the Legal Services Index (LSI) constructed by the Department of Labor. 

See id.; see also Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice 

(CREW II), No 11-1021, slip op. at 15-16 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2014). In recent years, various 

courts in this district (including this one) have approved use of this so-called “LSI Matrix.” See

Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 11-754, slip op.

at 9-10 (D.D.C. Aug 4, 2014) (“[T]his Court has, for many years, accepted the appropriateness of 

and greater accuracy of rates based on the LSI Index [of the Laffey matrix].”); Salazar v. Dist. of 

Columbia, 991 F. Supp. 2d 39, 48 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2014) (“[T]he LSI-adjusted matrix . . .
20

appears to be a more accurate reflection of the cost of legal services both in this community and 

nationwide.”); accord Eley v. Dist. of Columbia, 999 F. Supp. 2d 137,154 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 

2013).

Defendants counter, however, that the LSI-indexed version of the Laffey Matrix results in 

“overly generous rates, comparable to or exceeding the very top rates in the D.C. legal market.” 

Opp. at 23 (pointing out that “the hourly rate for the work one AIC attorney performed, from 

June 2013 to the present, is from $121 to $139 more than the highest rate for the senior partner at 

the Dorsey law firm who worked on this case, and who has over twenty-five years of 

experience”). They urge the Court to look instead to the Laffey Matrix maintained by the U.S 

Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia. This matrix is based on 1982 rates and adjusted 

using the “All-Items Regional [Consumer Price Index],” also constructed by the Department of 

Labor. See CREW II, slip op. at 16. According to Defendants, this CPI Matrix “better tracks the 

actual inflation of the legal market for complex federal litigation in D.C.” Opp. at 25. They 

further note that the U.S. Attorney’s Office, which prepares and issues the CPI matrix, was not 

involved in the cases adopting the LSI Matrix, and “it appears that critical information” was thus

“not presented to the Court in those cases.” Id.

Thankfully, this hornets’ nest need not be poked here. Instead, in the interest of both 

efficiency and fairness, the Court will treat Dorsey’s rates as a yardstick by which to gauge 

suitable rates for the in-house AIC attorneys. See Rosie D. ex rel. John D. v. Patrick, 593 F. 

Supp. 2d 325, 330-31 (D. Mass. 2009) (“[T]he court will award the rates actually requested by 

the WilmerHale lawyers. . . . The hourly rates established for the WilmerHale group provide a 

benchmark for the hourly rates applicable to the public interest attorneys who also worked on the 

case.”). Dorsey’s rates reflect a private firm’s market-based assessment of the value of its time 
21

for the precise work performed in this case, and they have been universally endorsed by Plaintiff, 

Defendants, and even other courts. There is no cause to ignore this tailor-made framework for 

appropriate hourly rates.

So, to calculate reasonable hourly rates for Melissa Crow, an AIC attorney who 

graduated law school in 1994, see Mot., Exh. B (Declaration of Melissa Crow), ¶ 13, the Court 

averages the rates charged by Dorsey’s Creighton Magid (a 1987 graduate) and Theresa 

Bevilacqua (a 2001 graduate). See Grant Decl., ¶ 9. AIC’s Beth Werlin, who graduated in 2000, 

see Crow Decl., ¶ 13, is entitled to the same hourly rates as Dorsey’s Michelle Grant, an attorney 

of roughly comparable experience. See Grant Decl., ¶ 9. And AIC’s Kristin MacLeod-Ball, who 

graduated in 2012, see Crow Decl., ¶ 13, will be assigned the same rates as Dorsey’s Michael 

Stinson. See Grant Decl., ¶ 9. Those adjusted rates are memorialized in the following table:

Table B: AIC Adjusted Rates

Timekeeper Law School 

Graduation

10/2010-

9/2011

10/2011-

9/2012

10/2012-

9/2013

10/2013

-9/2014

10/2014

-9/2015

Melissa Crow 1994 472.5 485 502.5 525 552.5

Beth Werlin 2000 390 400 410 440 465

Kristin 

MacLeod-Ball

2012 -- -- 260 295 325

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Defendants next raise a pastiche of objections to the number of hours billed by AIC’s 

attorneys. They argue that the number of attorneys involved in the case was “excessive,” and 

that the billing records reflect duplication of effort. See Opp. at 33. They further maintain that 

Plaintiff should not recover for work performed at the administrative stage; for work related to 

pro hac vice motions; or for the review of documents produced in response to its FOIA request.

See id. at 35-36, 40. In similar fashion, they contend that certain billing entries are insufficiently 
22

detailed, that Plaintiff’s attorneys logged too much time drafting certain filings, and that the fees 

sought are simply too high in light of AIC’s settlements with other agencies. See id. at 38, 41-

45. Finally, they assert that the number of hours expended in litigating the issue of attorney fees 

– i.e., fees on fees – was unreasonable. See id. at 35. 

The Court takes up these objections seriatim. Ultimately, it finds some of Defendants’

broader concerns to be justified and reduces the fee award accordingly. It declines, however, to 

engage in the kind of “nitpicking” invited by CBP’s smaller-scale objections. CREW I, 825 F. 

Supp. 2d at 229; accord Baker v. D.C. Public Schools, 815 F. Supp. 2d 102, 109, 2011 WL 

4507251, at *4 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 

F.2d 1319, 1337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).

a. Number of Attorneys

As noted, eight attorneys from Dorsey and another three from AIC participated in this 

litigation. That number, Defendants say, is patently excessive. See Opp. at 33. They are 

correct. Nothing about this case is so complex as to require so many hands on deck; on the 

contrary, having eleven attorneys working on and billing their time in a non-extraordinary FOIA 

case seems beyond the pale. Overstaffing this case, moreover, led to overbilling. Plaintiff’s time 

sheets are replete with conferences among co-counsel attempting to coordinate case strategy and 

instances in which multiple attorneys billed for performing the same task. See, e.g., Grant Decl., 

Exh. A (entries dated 10/19/11 and 5/20/13). This redundancy in attorney structure must be 

accounted for in determining an appropriate fee award.

It is unnecessary – and a waste of judicial resources – however, to scrutinize each 

individual billing entry. See Copeland, 641 F.2d at 903. Instead, the Court will reduce AIC’s 

total fee award by 25% as a commensurate counterweight to the surplus of attorneys. See, e.g., 
23

Davis Cnty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. EPA, 169 F.3d 755, 

761 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (reducing sought fees by approximately 50%, citing as one 

reason the “unusually high number of attorneys reviewing and editing briefs”); Smith v. D.C., 

466 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158-59 (D.D.C. 2006) (concluding that a 25% across-the-board reduction in 

fees was appropriate to account, in part, for “significant overstaffing”). 

b. Administrative Work, Pro Hac Vice Motions, and Document Review

In its Motion, Plaintiff sought fees for work performed at the administrative stage of 

litigation, in addition to work associated with filing pro hac vice motions. In response to 

Defendants’ objections, AIC conceded both requests. See Reply at 23. The Court will follow 

suit and exclude those amounts.

On the other hand, Plaintiff preserved its request for fees incurred in reviewing the 

records ultimately produced by CBP. It claims that such compensation is warranted because it 

“was forced to determine whether the documents were relevant to its request, whether 

Defendants’ search terms were yielding adequate results, and whether Defendants’ asserted 

exemptions were appropriate.” Reply at 21. This Court has held, however, that a “[p]laintiff is 

not entitled to recover for time spent reviewing the documents it instituted [a] lawsuit to obtain.” 

CREW I, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 231. FOIA provides that a plaintiff may recover “attorney fees and 

other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (emphasis 

added). This case concerned AIC’s demand for and CBP’s nonproduction of certain documents. 

AIC received the relief it sought when the documents were produced, and “[t]he time [it]

expended reviewing the documents . . . [was] a post-relief activity, separate from the litigation.” 

CREW I, 825 F. Supp. 2d at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Steenland v. CIA, 

555 F. Supp. 907, 911 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (compensation for work performed after records were 
24

released “would assess a penalty against defendants which is clearly unwarranted”). Indeed, 

Plaintiff would have had to expend this time had CBP timely produced the documents without 

litigation; the cost of reviewing documents produced in response to a FOIA request – to see if 

they are responsive or for other reasons – is simply the price of making such a request. The 

Court will thus deduct these charges as well.

c. Block Billing, Excessive Hours on Filings, and Settlement Evidence

Defendants challenge the hours billed in the underlying litigation in three further 

respects. None holds water. First, they argue that Plaintiff provided insufficient information or 

engaged in “block billing” practices in “several” entries. See Opp. at 39, 44. A survey of 

Plaintiff’s billing entries reflects, however, that the vast majority are appropriately detailed and 

allow the Court to discern “with a high degree of certainty” the work for which the attorney is 

requesting compensation. See Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 970, 975 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004). No reduction is warranted to account for a handful of entries that could have perhaps

benefitted from slightly more detail. 

Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s attorneys spent an excessive amount of time 

drafting certain filings. Specifically, they take issue with the 19 hours logged on the Complaint

and the 73.75 hours spent on opposing the initial Motion for Summary Judgment. See Opp. at 

41-42. The Court is loath to “‘conduct a minute evaluation of each phase or category of 

counsel’s work.’” Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Lindy 

Bros. Builders of Philadelphia v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 116 

(3d Cir. 1976)). Although the number of hours expended here seems slightly high at first blush, 

it is not outrageously so. Because the Government vigorously and substantively litigated this 

case, moreover, the Court is satisfied by Plaintiff’s representations that the time spent preparing 
25

each filing was reasonably necessary. Any overbilling that resulted from overstaffing and 

redundancy, furthermore, has already been accounted for by the 25% reduction authorized in 

Section II.C.2.a, supra.

Third, the Government notes that Plaintiff filed a nearly identical FOIA request against 

U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE). In the USCIS matter, the parties ultimately settled fees and costs for $45,000, and, in the 

ICE matter, the parties settled for $35,000. These amounts, claims the Government, are evidence 

that the threefold increase in Plaintiff’s request here is “excessive and unreasonable.” Opp. at 

45. Defendants’ argument compares apples to oranges. Of course, parties routinely settle cases 

for less than their true value – that is, at a discount – to account for the elimination of risk and 

uncertainty and energy expended that inhere in further litigation. That is the very nature of 

settlement. Here, Defendants were given numerous opportunities to settle this matter but 

rejected all of them, including AIC’s most recent attempt after this Court issued its September 

24, 2014, Opinion allowing briefing on fees to proceed. See Reply, Exh. A (Second Declaration 

of Michelle Grant), ¶ 2. The Government cannot now insist that any fee award be anchored to 

the amount Plaintiff settled for in other comparable cases. AIC is entitled to seek all amounts 

reasonably billed.

d. Fees on Fees

Finally, Defendants challenge the hours Plaintiff logged in litigating the attorney fee

issue – 52.05 – as unreasonably high. In one major respect, the Court sides with the 

Government. As noted above, see Part II.C.2.a, this entire case suffered from significant 

overstaffing, including AIC’s motion practice on the issue of fees. The 25% across-the-board 

haircut will, therefore, be applied to this aspect of Plaintiff’s request as well.
26

Insofar as the Government asks that the hours associated with AIC’s fees-on-fees work 

be further reduced, the Court disagrees. Plaintiff initially sought to resolve the issue of attorney

fees without further judicial involvement. It was Defendants who – five months after the start of 

negotiations – reversed course and necessitated a motions practice on this issue. In the course of 

those filings, they raised a variety of threshold and substantive objections to fees. Plaintiff 

appropriately responded to those arguments, ultimately prevailing on many of them, as 

evidenced by this Opinion and the Court’s prior Opinion granting AIC’s Motion for a briefing 

schedule. Aside from the issue of overstaffing, accordingly, the Court believes the hours

Plaintiff spent litigating this issue were not excessive.

The Government last asserts that “to the extent the Court reduces Plaintiff’s fee request 

for the bulk of the litigation, the fees charged for the attorneys’ fee issue should be reduced as 

well.” Opp. at 35. Courts in this District have concluded that awards of “fees on fees” should be 

reduced to exclude the amount of time spent unsuccessfully defending fee requests denied by the 

court. See, e.g., Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 1999 

WL 33740260, at *5-*6 (D.D.C. 1999); see also Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 

163 n.10 (1990) (“[F]ees for fee litigation should be excluded to the extent that the applicant 

ultimately fails to prevail in such litigation.”). “Where a lawsuit consists of related claims,” 

however, “a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced 

simply because the district court did not adopt each contention raised.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 

461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983).

Here, although the Court has not accepted Plaintiff’s fee request on the underlying 

litigation in toto, it will not, as a consequence, further reduce Plaintiff’s fees-on-fees request. 

Cf., e.g., EPIC I, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 240 (declining to reduce the fees-on-fees award despite 
27

rejecting some of the plaintiff’s requests for fees). AIC prevailed on the two major issues raised 

in the Motion for Attorney Fees: the questions of whether it was eligible for and entitled to fees 

in the first place. Of the issues on which it did not fully succeed, two of them – the rates for 

AIC’s in-house counsel and overstaffing – already have given rise to reduced fees on fees. Only 

a very small proportion of its briefing related to the other issues on which it did not prevail –

namely, the fees it requested for work associated with the administrative stage of litigation, pro 

hac vice motions, and reviewing documents. On close scrutiny of the record, therefore, the 

Court concludes that no further reduction of “fees on fees” beyond the global 25% discount 

explained above is appropriate. The hours spent by Plaintiff were, on the whole, “reasonably 

devoted to [its] request for fees,” Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 

521, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1985); EPIC I, 811 F. Supp. 2d at 240, and would not constitute a “windfall” 

for the attorneys. Id. (citing Heard v. Dist. of Columbia, 2006 WL 2568013, at *19 (D.D.C. 

2006)). 

3. Calculations

Having wrapped up the legal heavy lifting, the Court whips out its abacus and starts 

tallying up the numbers. It pauses to note that the parties have made this task decidedly 

laborious. AIC requests fees for eleven attorneys over the course of five years, with each 

attorney claiming a unique set of yearly rates. Aside from multiple appendices containing pages 

upon pages of individual billing entries, Plaintiff has provided only the most general breakdown 

of the hours its attorneys allocated to this litigation. See Crow Decl., ¶¶ 14, 15. It neither 

aggregates the number of hours billed by a particular attorney at a particular rate, nor furnishes

the cumulative hours spent on particular objected-to tasks. Defendants’ itemizations, while 

somewhat more helpful, are riddled with inaccuracies, some ridiculous. See, e.g., Opp. at 40 
28

(“Crow’s improper entries for time spent reviewing the documents received total $79,875.”). As 

alluded to earlier, had judges desired to don green eyeshades instead of robes, they would not 

have gone to law school. Indeed, the judicial role is not to comb through endless lists of billing 

entries to gather data the parties have not seen fit to make clear. The Court will, therefore, do its

best with the figures provided.

It begins with Plaintiff’s fee request for work performed on the underlying litigation. 

That request totals $106,499.90, which breaks down further into $55,174.75 for the Dorsey 

attorneys and $51,325.15 for AIC’s in-house counsel. See Crow Decl., ¶ 14; Grant Decl., ¶ 11. 

The latter sum reflects AIC’s reliance on the LSI Matrix in designating hourly rates and, as such, 

must be reduced to reflect the Court’s conclusion that Dorsey-scaled rates are more appropriate. 

See Part II.C.1, supra. Implementing these rate reductions, however, is somewhat challenging. 

As previously noted, in summarizing its billing for the Court, AIC did not catalog how many 

hours its attorneys billed per annum – i.e., at a particular rate. Instead, it simply provided the 

total hours billed and total fees sought for each attorney:

Table C: AIC’s Requested Fees

Timekeeper Hours Worked Hourly Rate Fees Sought

Melissa Crow 51.25 $589 for 6/2010-5/2011

$609 for 6/2011-9/2012

$625 for 6/2012-5/2013

 $771 for 6/2013-5/2014

$33,423.25

Beth Werlin 9.9 $609 for 6/2011-9/2012

 $625 for 6/2012-5/2013

$6,033.90

Kristin 

MacLeod-Ball

37.8 $312 for 6/2012-5/2013

 $320 for 6/2013-5/2014

$11,868.00

Total Hours 98.95 -- $51,325.15
29

Crow Decl., ¶ 14. Due to this unfortunate lapse, the Court cannot ascertain with precision the

number of hours to be multiplied by each of the newly discounted rates in order to yield a 

reduced award.

To arrive at appropriate fees for AIC counsel, accordingly, the Court instead calculates

each attorney’s average reduction in rates and discounts her total fees sought by that percentage. 

So, for Crow, a comparison of the rates contained in Table B and Table C indicates that her rates 

are, on average, being reduced by 23%: 

1 - (472.5/589 + 485/609+ 502.5/625 + 525/771) / 4 = 23%

Her fees sought, $33,423.25, will be discounted proportionately, netting her $25,735.90. 

Werlin’s hourly rates are being reduced by 34%:

1 - (400/609 + 410/625) / 2 = 34%

Discounting her fees sought ($6,033.90) by that percentage, she draws $3,982.37. 

Finally, MacLeod-Ball’s overall rate reduction averages to 12%:

1 - (260/312 + 295/320) / 2 = 12%

Because she seeks $11,868.00 in fees, her reduced total amounts to $10,443.84. 

Accounting for these discounts, Plaintiff’s total requested fees – for both the Dorsey and 

AIC attorneys – add up as follows:

55,174.75 + 25,735.9 + 3,982.37 + 10,443.84 = $95,336.86

The Court must now exclude Plaintiff’s requests for tasks not compensable. With regard 

to pro hac vice work, the Dorsey attorneys billed $654.00 and AIC counsel Werlin requested 

$182.08. See Opp. at 36-37. The former amount will be excluded in full. It would be unfair, 

however, to similarly deduct the whole of the latter sum, which is based on the fee scale 
30

requested by the AIC attorneys, not the fees actually awarded. The Court, therefore, discounts 

the figure charged to reflect Werlin’s Dorsey-calibrated rates: 

182.08 * (1 - .34) = $120.17

For review of records, Defendants state that Crow billed $79,875, that MacLeod-Ball 

charged $5,442.40, and that Davenport sought $123.75. See Opp. at 40. The Government’s 

representation as to Crow is facially absurd: it far exceeds the total amount requested by Crow 

for the whole of this litigation. Nor does it appear – from a brief glance at the individual billing 

entries – that the figure provided is simply off by a factor of ten. Once again, the Court will not

sift through every record to extrapolate whence this figure derives. Since it cannot deduct a 

plainly inappropriate amount, it will make no exclusion for time associated with Crow. For 

MacLeod-Ball, as with Werlin, the Court marks down the amount charged in proportion to the 

amount by which her rates have been reduced:

5,442.40 * (1 - .12) = $4,789.31

For Davenport, a Dorsey attorney receiving her requested rates, $123.75 will be deducted in full.

As to work performed at the administrative stage of litigation, Defendants state that 

Dorsey attorneys requested $1,670.50. See Opp. at 36. The Court will exclude that amount in its 

entirety.

Subtracting down, Plaintiff is left with the following tab:

95,336.86 - 654 - 120.17 - 4,789.31 - 123.75 - 1,670.5 = $87,979.13

That amount is then discounted by 25% to reflect the general overstaffing of the case. 

AIC is thus entitled to the following fees for work associated with the underlying litigation:

87,979.13 * (1-.25) = $65,984.35
31

As to the award for fees on fees, Plaintiff seeks a total of $24,131.25, which breaks down 

into $11,503.75 for AIC’s in-house counsel and $12,627.50 for the Dorsey attorneys. Crow 

Decl., ¶ 15; Grant Decl., ¶ 12. The Court must again reduce the fees sought by AIC’s in-house 

counsel to reflect the rates actually awarded. Crow requested $10,848.75. See Crow Decl., ¶ 15. 

Reducing that amount by 23% yields $8,353.54. Werlin, for her part, requested $655.00. See

Crow Decl., ¶ 15. Discounted by 34%, she nets $432.30. MacLeod-Ball did not participate in 

the fees-on-fees component of the litigation.

These sums, in addition to the $12,627.50 requested by the Dorsey attorneys, are then 

similarly discounted by 25% to arrive at an appropriate fees-on-fees award:

(8,353.54 + 432.30 + 12,627.50) * (1 - .25) = $16,060.01

Finally, to calculate the total fee award (together with $469.06 in costs), the Court adds it 

all up as follows: 

65,984.35 + 16,060.01 + 469.06 = $82,513.42

III. Conclusion

In sum, after all disputes have been resolved and all discounts have been applied, 

Plaintiffs sought $131,100.21 in attorney fees and will receive $82,513.42. A separate Order so 

stating shall issue this day.

 /s/ James E. Boasberg 

 JAMES E. BOASBERG

 United States District Judge

Date: March 10, 2015