Filed 1/20/22 In re Katherine J. CA2/1

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re KATHERINE J.,

a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B313191

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. DK17951)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN 

AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

NICHOLAS J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Linda Sun, Judge. Affirmed.

Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
2

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, 

Assistant County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy 

County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_____________________

The question raised by this appeal is whether the juvenile 

court properly concluded that Nicholas J. (father) had failed to 

prove that a “beneficial parental relationship” under Welfare and

Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i)1 existed 

between him and his eight-year-old daughter, Katherine J., when 

terminating his parental rights and freeing Katherine for 

adoption by her maternal grandparents.

Katherine was in dependency court for five years—more 

than half of her young life—while her parents struggled with 

significant ongoing issues of domestic violence and substance 

abuse. Following multiple failed efforts at reunification, the 

juvenile court eventually terminated services and, thereafter, 

terminated the parental rights of both parents,

2 rejecting father’s 

beneficial relationship argument.

In order to avoid termination of parental rights, the 

statutory beneficial relationship exception requires a parent to 

prove three elements: (1) regular visitation; (2) the existence of a 

beneficial parental relationship; and (3) that severing that

relationship would be detrimental to the child. (§ 366.26, subd. 

(c)(1)(B)(i).) While recognizing that father had maintained 

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory citations are to the 

Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Mother’s parental rights were also terminated, but she 

has not appealed.
3

regular visitation, the juvenile court concluded that these visits 

created only an “incidental benefit” to Katherine, that his 

ongoing instability had resulted in two separate removals of 

Katherine from his care, and that father’s violent and contentious 

relationship with his own parents, very recent and in the 

presence of Katherine, had caused additional instability and 

trauma to her.

The juvenile court’s ruling, which we review for substantial 

evidence, is amply supported in the record. Among other things,

father’s substance abuse was rampant by the time of the selection 

and implementation hearing. He had previously concealed a

crash caused by driving under the influence (DUI) and then 

refused to implement protective measures for Katherine’s benefit. 

He refused to move out of his parents’ home, which resulted in a 

series of abrupt changes of Katherine’s placement. He physically 

assaulted his own mother, in the presence of Katherine, resulting

in multiple facial injuries requiring medical assistance, which he 

concealed and downplayed. Juxtaposed against this evidence was 

solely father’s testimony about his beneficial relationship with 

Katherine. But that, too, was contradicted by Katherine herself 

who confided at times she feared father and did not want to 

speak to him.

Father claims that part of the juvenile court’s analysis 

impermissibly criticized his absence as a “parental role” in 

Katherine’s life, phraseology that was shortly after the juvenile 

court’s ruling cast into doubt by the Supreme Court in In re 

Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640 (Caden C.) and subsequent 

appellate cases. This argument is unavailing.

Caden C. prohibits juvenile courts from finding against a

beneficial relationship solely because a parent has failed to 
4

surmount the issues that initially brought the child into 

dependency care—a standard that few parents facing termination 

of parental rights could hope to meet. (Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 640.) But that case does not prohibit the juvenile 

court from determining, as it did here, that the negative impact of 

father’s unresolved issues on Katherine were antithetical to the 

kind of beneficial parental relationship required by section 

366.26. Caden C. expressly approves this type of reasoning. 

(Caden C., supra, at p. 637 [“A parent’s struggles may mean that 

interaction between parent and child at least sometimes has a 

‘ “negative” effect’ on the child”].) The juvenile court’s conclusion 

on this issue is supported by substantial evidence.

Given our ruling on the beneficial relationship issue, we 

reject father’s claim that he affirmatively established a beneficial 

relationship by a preponderance of the evidence and we decline to 

address as unnecessary father’s second argument regarding the 

third prong of the beneficial relationship exception.

Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating parental rights.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Referral and Voluntary Family Maintenance Case

After 13 years of dating, father and Lisa G. (mother) 

learned that they were expecting their first child. Katherine was 

born in 2012. Father and mother married in 2015.

By 2016, the family was having serious problems. 

According to one of their neighbors, father and mother fought 

regularly; during these fights, the neighbor could hear father 

“beat the tar out of the mother.”

On February 24, 2016, mother called the police after father

repeatedly punched her in the back of the head. Father was 
5

arrested, and mother was granted a three-year restraining order. 

Five days later, a third party called the Los Angeles County 

Department of Children and Family Services (the Department)

about the incident. The caller expressed concern about father 

and mother’s apparent issues with mental health and alcohol 

abuse, describing father as “delirious” on the night of his arrest.

On February 26, 2016, the Department began investigating 

these allegations. Mother told a social worker that father had 

never physically abused Katherine, but she admitted that the 

child had been present during past incidents of domestic violence. 

She later said that she “c[ould]n’t even count how many times he 

physically assaulted me in front of Kat[herine] and away from 

her. He has pushed me while she was in my arms.”

On March 9, 2016, the Department opened a voluntary 

family maintenance case with the family to address these issues.

On March 15, 2016, the Department learned that father 

had plead no contest to criminal charges of domestic violence. 

Father reported that on March 11, he was admitted to a 

residential substance abuse program.

B. Removal, Detention, and Initial Jurisdiction Petition

While father attended residential drug treatment, he 

visited Katherine several times. Mother initially retained 

custody of Katherine, but ongoing concerns about her sobriety led 

to Katherine’s removal on June 15, 2016. Katherine was placed 

with her maternal grandmother.

On June 20, 2016, the juvenile court detained three-yearold Katherine from her parents. That same day, the Department 

filed a petition alleging jurisdiction over Katherine pursuant to 
6

section 300.3 Three of these allegations involved father’s 

conduct.4 Count a-1 alleged that mother and father’s history of 

domestic violence placed Katherine at risk of physical harm

inflicted nonaccidentally by her parents. Count b-2 repeated the 

domestic violence allegations, contending that such violence 

posed a substantial risk that Katherine would be harmed as a 

result of her parents’ failure to adequately protect her. Finally, 

count b-3 alleged that father’s substance abuse issues rendered 

him unable to care for Katherine, placing her at risk of serious 

physical harm.

Father initially denied that he ever fought with or attacked 

mother in Katherine’s presence. He also denied ever using 

substances in Katherine’s presence. On July 27, 2016, however, 

at the jurisdictional hearing, both parents pled no contest to the 

(amended) petition. Accordingly, the juvenile court sustained 

counts a-1 and b-3, as well as another count related to mother’s 

substance abuse. Father received reunification services and 

monitored weekly visitation.

C. Father’s Resumption of Custody

On September 21, 2017, the juvenile court found that 

father had made substantial progress and granted him 

unmonitored visitation.

3 This paragraph describes the jurisdiction petition as 

amended by the juvenile court. These amendments modified the 

phrasing and removed some facts from the original petition, but 

did not substantially change the character of the Department’s 

allegations.

4 The remaining two counts concerned mother’s alleged 

substance abuse and mental instability.
7

On May 15, 2018, the juvenile court again found that father 

had continued making substantial progress towards alleviating 

the issues causing Katherine’s removal and detention. 

Accordingly, the court placed Katherine in father’s custody on the 

conditions that father reside with the paternal grandparents, 

continue to participate in services, and submit to drug testing.5

In early 2018, father started to show signs of regression, 

falling out of compliance with drug testing. Between March 1 

and April 24, father had only one negative drug test.6 Four other 

tests came back provisionally negative but were too diluted to 

produce definitive results.

On May 4, 2018, one day after his first overnight stay with 

Katherine, the Department was notified that he had tested 

positive for alcohol on March 22, 2018.

These issues persisted through the year; between June and 

October 2018, father had tested positive for marijuana five times 

and had failed to report for testing three times.

On June 6, 2018, father was arrested for a DUI. Because 

he did not report his arrest to the Department, it did not find out 

about the DUI until November 2, 2018. When questioned, father 

admitted that he had gotten into an accident and had smoked 

marijuana earlier that day, but said that he did not believe he 

was under the influence when driving.

5 Mother’s progress had been minimal, and her 

reunification services were terminated.

6 Father had submitted to a separate drug testing regime 

through his sober living program, and reportedly tested negative 

throughout this period.
8

The police report tells a different story. When police 

arrived at the scene of the incident, father was about to be 

transported to the hospital. He “appear[ed] confused, his speech 

was slow and slurred[,] and his eyes were bloodshot.” At the 

hospital, father admitted to taking “ ‘a couple hits’ of marijuana 

prior to driving,” and failed a field sobriety test. The officer 

concluded that father’s intoxication had caused him to “ma[k]e 

[an] unsafe turning movement” into a parked car. Father 

subsequently refused to sign an affidavit agreeing that he would 

not drive with Katherine in the car.

Despite these issues, father and Katherine’s relationship 

remained largely positive. The Department reported that, during 

monthly in-person visits, social workers observed “well

developed” bonding and “appropriate emotional attachment” 

between father and Katherine. A family counselor opined that 

father and Katherine “appear to have a close relationship.” At a 

review hearing on November 13, 2018, the court maintained 

Katherine’s placement, but ordered father not to drive while 

intoxicated and not to transport Katherine without a valid 

driver’s license.

Notwithstanding, father continued to struggle with his 

sobriety, recording five unexcused absences from drug testing 

between November 2, 2018 and February 25, 2019.

On March 5, 2019, father tested positive for cocaine. 

Father’s next drug test was negative, but diluted. He did not 

show up for his next five scheduled tests.

D. Second Removal and Supplemental Jurisdiction 

Petition

Given the significant ongoing and unresolved substance 

abuse issues and credibility concerns, the Department 
9

determined that Katherine could no longer remain in paternal 

grandparent’s home unless father moved out. But by March 26, 

2019, father had not relocated. Instead, he called the 

Department multiple times, requesting permission to continue 

living in the home with Katherine. Due to father’s ongoing lack 

of cooperation, Katherine was placed with her maternal 

grandparents.

On March 28, 2019, the Department filed a supplemental 

petition asserting that, due to father’s recurrent substance abuse 

in violation of court orders, the court’s prior disposition no longer 

effectively protected Katherine.

On May 30, 2019, the juvenile court once again removed 

Katherine from father’s custody and ordered continued 

reunification services. Thereafter, although father continued to 

visit with Katherine, he did not take advantage of these courtordered continued services.

On July 30, 3019, the Department lost contact with father.

On August 13, 2019, Katherine’s paternal grandfather 

informed a social worker that father “no longer desire[d] to have 

reunification services.”

On September 19, 2019, the Department again tried to 

contact father. He responded via text, stating that he was “living 

in a tent” on his parents’ property and accusing the Department 

of “abusing [its] power” by “put[ting] [him] in the street.” The 

Department phoned him the next day, but father refused to listen 

to other people; instead, he erratically continued to “blam[e] the 

system” for his present circumstances. Things continued to 

degrade. Father lost his job and stopped submitting to scheduled 

drug tests altogether. His visits with Katherine became 

“sporadic.”
10

On October 28, 2019, Katherine’s paternal grandparents 

informed the Department that they were considering evicting 

father from their property. Although father continued to refuse 

to meet with social workers, the Department nevertheless

provided paternal grandparents with information about housing 

services that could assist father.

E. Father Assaults Paternal Grandmother in Front of 

Katherine

On November 7, 2019, Katherine’s maternal grandmother 

reported that she had recently been informed about a physical 

altercation between father and Katherine’s paternal 

grandmother. The maternal grandmother stated that father had 

started arguing with his mother while the pair were out shopping 

at Walmart with Katherine, and that father had concluded the 

argument by assaulting and injuring paternal grandmother. 

Maternal grandparents expressed concern that paternal 

grandparents had failed to report the incident, indicating a 

potential inability to protect Katherine from their son’s violent 

excesses.

Paternal grandmother later confirmed maternal 

grandmother’s report. The argument began as a disagreement 

over Katherine’s level in her gymnastics class. As father became 

increasingly upset, paternal grandmother tried to walk away, 

holding Katherine’s hand in one hand and shopping bags in the 

other. Father walked up from behind her and pushed paternal 

grandmother to the ground, causing her to fall face first onto the 

pavement. She bled from her nose and face, and sustained a 

black eye. Paternal grandmother said that father apologized, but 

quickly “disappear[ed] because he knew police were in route.”
11

When police arrived, Katherine told them that she was 

scared by father’s behavior and did not want to speak to father.

Her therapist said that although Katherine brought up the 

incident during therapy, she had not wanted to talk about it. 

Paternal grandmother said that Katherine had a bad dream 

about the incident, and maternal grandparents later reported 

that Katherine refused to return to the Walmart.

As of April 21, 2020, Katherine had enrolled in additional 

mental health services to help her overcome her trauma.

When the Department interviewed father about the 

incident, he behaved erratically. The interviewer noted that 

father could not sustain eye contact, appeared wide-eyed, 

stuttered, and seemed to struggle to speak. He admitted to 

“slightly pushing” paternal grandmother, but denied that he 

pushed her hard enough for her to fall. He felt that paternal 

grandmother “must have tripped.” Father also denied fleeing the 

scene, and instead claimed to leave after paternal grandmother 

told him to. Father claimed that he desperately wanted to 

reunify with Katherine, but he declined to submit to an ondemand drug test when asked.

After Katherine’s maternal grandmother brought this 

incident to the Department’s attention, all grandparents 

attended a child and family therapy meeting. At the meeting, 

paternal grandmother “minimized the incident[,] stating [that] 

the child was not hurt and the child only had one bad dream 

about the incident.” However, paternal grandmother agreed to 

obtain a restraining order against father.

Paternal grandparents also agreed to disconnect a voiceactivated communication device from Katherine’s room in their 

home to prevent father from speaking to her without a monitor 
12

present. These changes disrupted father’s visitation schedule, as 

paternal grandfather was now father’s only available monitor 

and meetings could no longer be held in the family home.

F. Termination of Reunification Services

Because father had fallen so far out of compliance with his 

case plan, the Department recommended termination of 

reunification services and a permanent plan of adoption by 

maternal grandparents, with whom Katherine had been placed 

for three of the last four years.

On December 23, 2019, the juvenile court adopted the 

Department’s recommendation. Thereafter, father resumed 

weekly supervised visits with Katherine at the Department’s 

offices. Katherine told her maternal grandmother that the visits 

were going okay.

By January 2021, Katherine and father were having visits 

at public parks, and Katherine told social workers that the visits 

were good.

Father objected to Katherine’s potential adoption by 

maternal grandparents, telling the Department that he wanted 

his parents to adopt her instead. He feared that maternal 

grandmother, with whom he did not have a good relationship, 

would prevent him from seeing Katherine. He believed that 

maternal grandmother was “mentally unstable,” and accused her 

of being “negative” towards Katherine. However, he was not able 

to articulate any actual safety concerns.

G. Termination of Parental Rights

On May 4, 2021, the juvenile court held a section 366.26 

hearing. Father argued that his parental rights should be 

protected by the beneficial relationship exception to termination. 

He testified about his strong attachment to Katherine, saying 
13

that he had never missed a meeting with her and that “seeing 

[Katherine] every week” was “the highlight of [his] life.” He went 

so far as to say that “there’s never been a time that we’ve had a 

bad time or anything like that.” He talked at length about the 10 

months when he had lived with Katherine and his parents, 

discussing how involved he was in every aspect of her daily life. 

He described himself as Katherine’s “primary parent” during that 

time.

He also told the court that he was “the only parent in 

[Katherine’s] life, so it means a lot to her whenever [they] see 

each other.” He described how Katherine “comes running up” 

and “jumps in [his] arms” when he arrives for a visit, and “gives 

[him] a big hug and says she loves [him] and that she misses 

[him] and that she can’t wait to see [him]” when he has to leave.

Father thought that it was “tough” for both him and Katherine 

“when [they] don’t see each other for a few days[,] even.” He 

opined that terminating his parental rights “would have a 

negative effect on [Katherine] and that she would feel like she 

was losing something if her father would no longer be in her life.”

Both the Department and Katherine’s counsel argued that 

the beneficial relationship exception should not apply because 

father failed to prove that he had a strong, beneficial relationship 

with Katherine. Specifically, they argued that father had not 

played a parental role in Katherine’s life. Father’s counsel 

disagreed, arguing that father had occupied a parental role for 

Katherine to the maximum extent allowed by the judicial 

constraints on their relationship.

Ultimately, the juvenile court held that father “ha[d] not 

been able to establish that his regular visits created benefit to the 

child,” aside from the “incidental benefit” necessarily conferred by 
14

a parent’s interaction with a child. The court discussed how “the 

instability that [father] created . . . caused the child to be taken 

away from him” twice, resulting in Katherine moving back and 

forth between placements for much of her young life. It also 

stated that father had “created a violent and contentious 

relationship between himself and his own parents” leading to a 

restraining order that caused additional instability by disrupting 

Katherine’s visitation schedule. The court concluded that father 

“has not occupied a significant parental role and that, even if 

there is a beneficial relationship, there is no compelling reason to 

determine that the termination of parental rights would be 

detrimental” such that they outweighed the benefits of 

permanency and security that would be gained through adoption. 

Accordingly, the court terminated father’s parental rights.

Father timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Relevant Law and General Standard of Review

“ ‘At a permanency plan hearing, the court may order one of 

three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster 

care. [Citation.] If the dependent child is adoptable, there is a 

strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency 

plans.’ [Citation.]” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224.) 

In other words, if the trial court finds that the child is adoptable, 

it must terminate parental rights unless a statutory exception 

applies. (§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1).)

One of these exceptions is the beneficial relationship 

exception, which applies if “[t]he court finds a compelling reason 

for determining that termination would be detrimental to the 

child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation 
15

and contact with the child and the child would benefit from 

continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)

To successfully invoke this exception, the moving parent 

must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, each of the 

following elements: (1) that the parent has regularly visited with 

the child; (2) that the child would benefit from continuing the 

relationship; and (3) that terminating the relationship would be 

detrimental to the child. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Evid. 

Code, § 115.)

Mere weeks after the juvenile court issued its order 

terminating father’s parental rights, our Supreme Court 

published an opinion clarifying how juvenile and appellate courts 

should interpret and apply the parental benefit exception. 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) The court discussed each 

element of the parental benefit exception in detail. Because 

father’s arguments heavily rely on Caden C., we will summarize 

its holdings briefly here.

“The first element [of the exception]—regular visitation and 

contact—is straightforward. The question is just whether 

‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent 

permitted by court orders.’ [Citation.]” (Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 632.)

The second element, in which the court must determine 

whether the child would benefit from continuing the relationship 

with her parent, is more complicated. “[T]he relationship may be 

shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the 

portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the 

“positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and 

child, and the child’s particular needs.’ [Citation.]” (Caden C., 

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) “[C]ourts often consider how 
16

children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their 

parents.” (Ibid.) Caden C. instructs us that “it is not necessary—

even if it were possible—to calibrate a precise ‘quantitative 

measurement of the specific amount of “comfort, nourishment or 

physical care” [the parent] provided during [his or] her weekly 

visits.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Expert opinions or bonding studies 

provided by psychologists who have observed and/or reviewed the 

parent-child relationship are often “an important source of 

information about the psychological importance of the 

relationship for the child.” (Id. at pp. 632-633, fn. omitted.) 

Ultimately, the court’s role is to decide whether the child has a 

“ ‘significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent.]’ ” 

(Id. at p. 633)

The third and final element asks the court to ascertain 

whether severing parental ties—and thus “terminating [the]

parental relationship”—would be detrimental to the child.7 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) “What courts need to 

determine, therefore, is how the child would be affected by losing 

the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for 

the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child’s 

life.” (Ibid.) Because any harm caused by loss of this 

relationship may be significantly mitigated by the child’s 

adoption into a stable, loving home, the court must then perform 

a delicate balancing act. The “subtle, case-specific inquiry [that]

the statute asks courts to perform [is]: does the benefit of 

7 The second and third elements of the beneficial 

relationship exception significantly overlap. For example, 

evidence that terminating the parental relation would cause 

harm indicates that the child would lose important relational 

benefits if severed from her parent.
17

placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm [the 

child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, 

emotional relationship with [the parent?]’ ” (Ibid.) “When the 

relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the 

security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, 

termination would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s 

beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Id. at pp. 633-634.)

In addition to these substantive clarifications, Caden C.

also establishes a hybrid standard of review for the beneficial 

relationship exception. The first two elements, which require the 

juvenile court to “make a series of factual determinations” 

regarding visitation and the parent-child relationship, “are 

properly reviewed for substantial evidence.” (Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 640.) These determinations should “be upheld if . . . 

supported by substantial evidence, even though substantial 

evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have 

reached a different result had it believed other evidence.” (In re 

Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)

But “the ultimate decision—whether termination of 

parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the 

child’s relationship with his parent—is discretionary and 

properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 640.) Accordingly, we will not disturb the juvenile 

court’s decision unless it “exceed[s] the limits of legal discretion 

by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 

determination.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
18

B. The Trial Court’s Determination that Father Failed 

to Establish the Beneficial Relationship Exception Is 

Supported by Substantial Evidence

Father’s primary argument relates to the second element of 

the beneficial relationship exception. He claims that the juvenile 

court unreasonably discounted the benefits Katherine gained 

from her relationship with father because he could not occupy a 

traditional parental role in Katherine’s life. Father contends that 

Caden C. definitively rejects this approach to analyzing the 

beneficial relationship exception. He therefore asks that we 

remand this case so that the juvenile court may reconsider 

father’s evidence under the correct standard.

Courts have long struggled to apply the beneficial 

relationship exception to the complex sets of facts that inevitably 

accompany decisions about terminating parental rights. 

Analyzing the second element of the exception—whether a child 

would benefit from a continued relationship with her parent—can 

be particularly challenging. A parent facing termination of 

parental rights has necessarily failed to reunify with his child, 

presumably because he has not sufficiently overcome the issues 

leading to his child’s dependency. Therefore, as Caden C. holds, 

it is paradoxical to conclude “that the [beneficial relationship] 

exception can only apply when the parent has made sufficient 

progress in addressing the problems that led to dependency.” 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637.) Courts must keep in 

mind that the benefits a child derives from her relationship with 

such a parent, whose presence in the child’s life is often limited to 

supervised visitation, are typically much subtler than the 

benefits the child could expect from a custodial parent.
19

Yet the beneficial relationship exception demands 

something more than the incidental benefit a child gains from 

any amount of positive contact with her natural parent. (In re 

Dakota H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 229 [a parent must 

demonstrate something “more than frequent and loving contact, 

an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits”]; In re Angel 

B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 [“for the exception to apply, the 

emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that 

of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or 

friendly nonparent relative, such as an aunt”].) The exception 

requires the existence “ ‘of a substantial, positive emotional 

attachment’ ” between parent and child. (Caden C., supra, 11 

Cal.5th at p. 632, quoting In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 

567, 575.)

One popular way in which courts have tried to discern the 

presence of “the mysterious X factor” that transforms a person

from a mere “friendly visitor” to a parent with “ ‘a substantial, 

positive, emotional attachment’ ” to his child is by analyzing

whether the person occupies a “parental role” in the child’s life. 

(In re L.A.-O. (Dec. 27, 2021, E077196) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, ___

[2021 WL 6112442 at p. *7].) However, this analytic tool has the 

potential to create more problems than it solves.

“[T]he words ‘parental role,’ standing alone, can have 

several different meanings,” ranging from “the person whom the 

child regards as his or her parent,” the person who demonstrates 

the “nurturing, supportive, and guiding” characteristics 

traditionally associated with “good” parenting, or “giving parental 

care” through such activities as “changing diapers, providing toys 

and food, and helping with homework.” (In re L.A.-O, supra, ___ 

Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2021 WL 6112442 at p. *7].) While each of 
20

these definitions may be useful as factors to determine the 

strength of a parent’s relationship with their child, none is

dispositive on its own. Therefore, problems arise when juvenile 

courts use the phrase “parental role” without explaining which 

meaning(s) they impart to it.

We agree with father that Caden C. requires juvenile 

courts to do more than summarily state that a parent has not 

occupied a parental role in his child’s life. (See In re L.A.-O., 

supra, ___ Cal.App.5th at p. ___ [2021 WL 6112442 at p. *8]

[reversing termination of parental rights when the juvenile 

court’s “terse” determination that the parents “ ‘ha[d] not acted in 

a parental role in a long time’ ” could have been interpreted as an 

impermissibly narrow evaluation of the parent-child 

relationship]; In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, 269

[reversing termination of parental rights when the juvenile 

court’s analysis amount to a comparison of the “ ‘parent’s 

attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential 

adoptive parent(s)’ ”].) But we do not agree that the juvenile 

court committed this error here.

In rejecting father’s arguments for the beneficial 

relationship exception, the juvenile court concluded that father 

“has not occupied a significant parental role.” Critically, it also 

explained what it meant by this. The court determined that 

father’s unresolved issues with substance abuse and violence had 

consistently destabilized Katherine’s life for years, fatally 

compromising father’s attempts to maintain a strong, positive 

emotional attachment with her. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

p. 638 [“the parent’s struggles with issues such as those that led 

to dependency are relevant only to the extent they inform the 

specific questions before the court,” including the question of 
21

whether “the child [would] benefit from continuing the 

relationship”].)

The record amply supports this finding. For example, by 

the time of the section 366.26 hearing, father had essentially 

abandoned any attempt at maintaining sobriety. When he was 

arrested for a DUI after crashing into a parked car—an arrest 

which he concealed from the Department for months—father 

refused to agree that he would not drive with Katherine in the 

car. This demonstrates a troubling lack of personal responsibility 

as well as a lack of parental concern for Katherine’s safety. 

When father later tested positive for cocaine use, he stopped 

showing up for drug tests altogether. He then refused to move 

out of the family’s home, causing Katherine to be sent back to her 

maternal grandmother’s home less than one year after moving in 

with father and her paternal grandparents. (Compare In re S.B. 

(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 294-295, 298 [reversing the juvenile 

court’s termination of parental rights where the father 

acknowledged that his drug use was inexcusable, fully complied 

with his case plan, remained drug free, and regularly visited his 

daughter].)

Father maintained that he never used drugs around 

Katherine, and admittedly, the record of his pleasant visits with 

Katherine largely corroborates this claim. However, father 

ignores one bright red flag amidst all his smooth interactions 

with Katherine. The record shows that father once became so 

angry with his mother that he pushed her to the ground, in 

public, while she was holding Katherine’s hand. The fall was not 

trivial; paternal grandmother sustained multiple injuries to her 

face which needed to be treated by her personal physician. The 

rapidity with which father escalated from a minor disagreement 
22

about Katherine’s progress in gymnastics class to physical 

violence belies father’s assertion that “there’s never been a time 

that [Katherine and he] [ha]ve had a bad time or anything like 

that.” Troublingly, the incident is reminiscent of father’s first

reported incidents of domestic violence, when his substance abuse 

led him to lash out and beat his wife, even when she was holding 

Katherine.

Father and his parents initially concealed the altercation 

from the Department; after maternal grandmother reported it, 

father and paternal grandmother downplayed the severity of the 

incident and its effect on Katherine. Again, this apparent lack of 

concern for Katherine’s well-being contradicts father’s claims of a 

substantial, positive emotional attachment.

The trial court specifically cited this incident of recent 

violence as evidence that father had “created a violent and 

contentious relationship between himself and his own parents” 

causing additional instability for Katherine by disrupting father’s 

visitation schedule, to say nothing of the trauma she suffered 

from witnessing her father injure her grandmother. All in all, 

these problems not only prevented father from taking Katherine 

back into his custody, but they also traumatized Katherine, 

significantly impacting the quality of the relationship with her 

father.

In opposition to this evidence, and in an effort to 

demonstrate that his relationship with Katherine had thrived in 

spite of these issues, father proffered solely his own testimony, 

consisting largely of his opinions about the daughter-father 

relationship.8 (Compare with Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 

8 We do not miss the irony in father’s protestations about 

the juvenile court’s use of the “parental role” analysis, while at 
23

p. 632 [“courts often consider how children feel about, interact 

with, look to, or talk about their parents”] (italics added).)

Father’s testimony regarding his relationship with 

Katherine was contradicted by recent evidence of the times 

Katherine told others that she was “afraid” of father and that she 

did not want to speak to him following incidents like the one at 

Walmart. (Compare with In re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 1228-1229 [reversing termination when the juvenile court had 

no evidence to support a finding that there was not a substantial, 

positive emotional attachment to parents, particularly in light of 

parent’s testimony which, if credited, indicated a strong 

attachment].)

Father also adduced no expert testimony or current 

opinions (for example from social workers or therapists) who 

might have supported the strength of his relationship with 

Katherine. (Compare Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 627-628 

[relying on bonding study from mother’s expert when concluding

that severing the parental relationship would be detrimental to 

the child]; In re S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 295-296 

[relying in part on a bonding study which indicated a strong bond 

between father and child].)9

the same time dedicating much of his argument to explaining 

how he played traditional parenting roles in Katherine’s life. In 

some sense father is tacitly acknowledging that whether he 

behaved as Katherine’s parent is probative of the strength of 

their parent-child relationship.

9 We do not suggest that father was required to submit a 

bonding study to prove the beneficial relationship exception. 

This is but one example of evidence that could have bolstered 

father’s claims of Katherine’s allegedly strong attachment.
24

Although the juvenile court acknowledged that father and 

Katherine have maintained a warm and loving relationship, 

there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the juvenile 

court’s conclusion that father’s failure to resolve the substance 

abuse and violence issues that led to and existed throughout 

Katherine’s five-year odyssey in dependency court diminished

any benefits she derived from a continuing relationship with him,

aside from the incidental benefit necessarily conferred by a 

parent’s fun, playful interactions with his child.10

10 Given our primary ruling on the second prong, we 

necessarily reject father’s argument that the beneficial 

relationship exception applies as a matter of law. Suffice it to say 

that, when reviewing factual determinations for substantial 

evidence, we are not permitted to “resolve evidentiary conflicts” 

in favor of the movant, even if “substantial evidence to the 

contrary also exists and the trial court might have reached a 

different result had it believed other evidence.” (In re Dakota H., 

supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 228.)

Father also argues that the juvenile court erroneously 

required him to prove that a “compelling reason” other than his 

relationship with Katherine supported continuation of his 

paternal rights. However, a parent must prove all three

components of the beneficial relationship exception. A failure of 

proof on any one of them is fatal. (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 

Cal.App.5th 636, 646-647, disapproved on other grounds in 

Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 637, fn. 6, 638, fn. 7; compare 

In re D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 271 [remand appropriate 

where primary source of error is in the third element of the 

analysis, it thus being unclear “how the [juvenile] court would 

have exercised its discretion” to balance the potential detriment 

of termination against the potential benefits of adoption without 

“the benefit of the Caden C. analysis”].) Therefore, in light of our 

ruling on the second prong, we need not address father’s 
25

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CRANDALL, J.*

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

CHANEY, J.

“compelling reason” contention. (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 

Cal.App.4th 824, 833, fn. 4 [when an appeal can be definitively 

resolved on one basis, the reviewing court need not reach an 

appellant’s alternative contentions].)

* Judge of the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of 

the California Constitution.