NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

JACQUELYN FAY DAVIS, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

JASON RICHARD LANSDON, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0645 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC 2014-071553

The Honorable Lisa Ann VandenBerg, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Joseph M. Huey PLC, Scottsdale

By Joseph M. Huey

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

John W. Bain PLLC, Phoenix

By John W. Bain

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

FILED 10-1-2019
DAVIS v. LANSDON

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Jacquelyn Fay Davis (“Mother”) challenges the 

family court’s parenting time order and its allocation of associated travel 

costs. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties’ marriage was dissolved by consent decree in 

2014. At that time, Mother resided in Arizona and Jason Richard Lansdon 

(“Father”) resided in California. The decree designated Mother as the 

primary residential parent for the parties’ two minor children and 

implemented a parenting plan under which Father received reasonable 

parenting time. 

¶3 In 2016, the parties agreed to an amended parenting plan that 

provided Father parenting time “every other week beginning on Friday 

after the children are released from school, or 3 p.m. if the children are not 

in school, continuing through Tuesday at 8 a.m.” The plan also gave each 

party “two weeks of uninterrupted parenting time during [each] summer 

commencing on a mutually agreed-upon date” and divided holiday 

parenting time as follows:

Mother: Children’s birthdays, Mother’s Day, Easter, 

Halloween, Independence Day, Christmas Eve, 

Christmas, New Year’s Eve, New Year’s Day.

Father: Father’s Day, Thanksgiving break, other 

portions of the children’s winter break.

¶4 Approximately two years later, Father moved to Kentucky. 

Asserting his move rendered the parenting plan “logistically impossible,” 

Father petitioned to modify parenting time and child support. He requested

parenting time during the summer, spring break every year, and winter 

break in alternating years. In response, Mother proposed that Father receive 

“up to 42 days of summer parenting time . . . each year” and requested for 
DAVIS v. LANSDON

Decision of the Court

3

herself two uninterrupted weeks of parenting time during summers “for 

her vacation with the children.” She also proposed that the parties split each 

winter break such that the children would be with her for Christmas and 

with Father for New Year’s Day. Finally, Mother requested that the children

“travel on direct flights” and be “escorted by a parent” when traveling

between Arizona and Kentucky, with Father bearing all transportation 

costs. 

¶5 Following an evidentiary hearing, the family court ordered 

that Mother would remain the primary residential parent. The court 

granted Father summer parenting time but gave Mother “at least 1 week of 

consecutive summer vacation [with the children] during this period,” with 

her paying “the costs of this summer week transportation both on leaving 

and returning to Father.” The court also ordered that the parties split winter 

break each year and set a holiday parenting time schedule as follows, with 

the parties “shar[ing] the costs of such [travel] equally”:

Mother: Mother’s Day, Halloween, Thanksgiving in 

even years, the children’s birthdays in odd 

years, Mother’s birthday.

Father: The children’s spring break, Father’s Day, 

Thanksgiving in odd years, Father’s birthday.

¶6 Mother moved to amend the order, arguing the holiday 

parenting time schedule was “impractical or financially burdensome” and 

“award[ed] parenting time not requested by the parties.” She also 

contended the court should not have ordered her to share the children’s 

travel costs with Father or denied her request for two weeks uninterrupted 

summer parenting time. The family court made minor changes to its order

relating to winter break and spring break but denied all other relief. Mother 

timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 We uphold a family court’s parenting time determinations 

absent an abuse of discretion. Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 11 (App. 

2013). An abuse of discretion exists if the record lacks any competent 

evidence to support the court’s decision. Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520, 

¶ 5 (1999).
DAVIS v. LANSDON

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I. Summer Parenting Time

¶8 Mother contends the court should have given her two 

uninterrupted weeks of summer parenting time. The court acknowledged

her request in its A.R.S. § 25-403(A) analysis but gave her only one week of 

summer parenting time. Mother asserts one week is inadequate “to shop 

for school clothes and supplies, get the kids in for haircuts and medical or 

dental appointments, and be able to take them on a minimal vacation.” She 

also broadly argues the children will miss out on “being able to spend an 

extended time with Mother . . . for vacations.” She presented no evidence

to support either of these contentions. She also conceded on crossexamination that she could take the children on vacation at other times of 

the year during her parenting time. Therefore, we find no abuse of 

discretion on this issue.

II. Holiday Parenting Time

¶9 Mother also insists the court abused its discretion by setting a 

holiday parenting time schedule that requires travel for the children’s 

birthdays, the parties’ birthdays, school breaks, and alternating 

Thanksgivings. In cases where parents cannot agree on a parenting plan, 

the court “shall adopt a plan that provides for both parents to share legal 

decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective 

parenting time.” A.R.S. § 25-403.02(A) & (B). The parenting plan must 

include “[a] practical schedule of parenting time for the child, including 

holidays and school vacations.” A.R.S. § 25-403(C)(3). If the parties cannot 

agree on a schedule, the court must set one. A.R.S. § 25-403.02(D). 

¶10 Mother first alleges the holiday parenting time schedule is 

“contrary to that requested by the parents.” While both parties made 

specific holiday parenting time requests at the hearing, the court 

determines parenting time based on the children’s best interest, which may 

not align with either parent’s demands. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 102 Ariz. 352, 

354 (1967) (“The final determination of custody in a divorce action is and 

must be determined by what the court considers to be in the best interest of 

the child. The wishes of the parents, of course, may and should be 

considered; but their happiness and their desires will never be allowed to 

interfere with the child’s true welfare.”). The court’s decision not to fully 

adopt either party’s requested schedule is therefore not an abuse of 

discretion. Armer v. Armer, 105 Ariz. 284, 289 (1970) (the superior court is 

in the best position to determine the parenting measures that are in a child’s 

best interests and therefore has broad discretion to determine parenting 
DAVIS v. LANSDON

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time). Indeed, it appears the court simply adopted the holiday schedule the 

parties included in their earlier parenting plans. 

¶11 Lastly, Mother asserts the holiday parenting time schedule is 

impractical because it “require[s] the children to travel between Arizona 

and Kentucky a total of six round trips each year for their respective 

birthdays and each parent’s birthday, for only one day of parenting time 

each trip,” which she contends the parties cannot afford. She offered no 

evidence, however, to substantiate this alleged financial burden. She also 

testified that she did not believe additional air travel would be more 

burdensome for the children. Moreover, we note that Father addressed this 

concern in his response to Mother’s motion, stating that he may not exercise 

his “holiday parenting time on the children’s birthdays and [his] birthday 

because of the short amount of time that he would have the children versus 

the burden it may be on the parties and children.” Given these facts, we 

cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s motion to 

amend the holiday parenting schedule.

III. Travel Costs

¶12 Mother argues the court abused its discretion by not ordering 

Father to pay all travel costs associated with his parenting time minus onehalf the cost of escorting the children during air travel. As support for this 

contention, Mother cites Father’s testimony that he was willing to “bear . . . 

three-quarters of the price,” but Father’s willingness to pay more than half 

of the children’s airfare does not demonstrate that the court abused its 

discretion by not ordering him to pay all travel costs. Because Mother

presented no other evidence to show why Father should bear those costs,

we again find no abuse of discretion.

IV. Attorney Fees on Appeal

¶13 Both parties request their attorney fees incurred on appeal 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324(A), which authorizes an award upon 

considering “the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness 

of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings . . . .” 

Having considered these matters, we decline to award fees to either party. 
DAVIS v. LANSDON

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶14 Based on the foregoing, we affirm. Father may recover his

taxable costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.