IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-60237

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MICHAEL WAYNE MCPHERSON,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 4:13-CR-188-3

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Michael Wayne McPherson appeals his conditional guilty plea conviction 

for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. He filed 

a motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of a traffic stop and search 

of a vehicle in which McPherson was a passenger. The motion was denied, and 

McPherson appeals that denial.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 13, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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In our assessment of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review 

“factual findings for clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of law 

enforcement action de novo.” United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594 (5th 

Cir. 2014). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 

party, which in this case is the Government. See United States v. Pack, 612 

F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2010).

At the suppression hearing, the Government elicited evidence that Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent Don Douglas obtained sufficient 

information to establish probable cause to believe that a vehicle would be 

traveling across Arkansas toward Mississippi and that it contained a quantity 

of methamphetamine. Douglas contacted DEA agent Dale Vandorple in 

Arkansas, advised him that agents in Mississippi had obtained sufficient 

information to establish probable cause to stop and search the vehicle, provided 

identifying information about the minivan and two of the three occupants, and 

asked for assistance in conducting the traffic stop. Vandorple then contacted 

Corporal Chris Goodman and provided him with pertinent information about 

the vehicle to be stopped; upon stopping the vehicle, Goodman identified 

McPherson as one of the occupants of the vehicle and discovered five pounds of 

methamphetamine. The district court denied the motion to suppress, 

concluding that under the collective knowledge doctrine, the information 

possessed by Douglas could be attributed to Goodman and that Goodman had 

received sufficient facts to support the stop and search.

Reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle, or probable cause to conduct a 

search, may arise through the collective knowledge of the officers involved in 

the operation. United States v. Powell, 732 F.3d 361, 369 (5th Cir. 2013); 

United States v. Clark, 559 F.2d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 1977). Under the collective 

knowledge doctrine, an officer initiating the stop or conducting the search need 

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not have personal knowledge of the evidence that gave rise to the reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause, so long as he is acting at the request of those who 

have the necessary information. See United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 

753, 759 (5th Cir. 1999). The collective knowledge theory applies so long as 

there is “some degree of communication” between the acting officer and the 

officer who has knowledge of the necessary facts. United States v. Ibarra, 493 

F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007).

McPherson does not dispute that Douglas possessed sufficient 

information to support probable cause to search the minivan or that he 

communicated that information to Vandorple. He also does not argue that 

Vandorple failed to advise Goodman of the necessary facts to support the stop 

and search. Instead, he argues that the collective knowledge has been 

narrowed in this circuit by Ibarra and requires that “the officer who has 

knowledge of the necessary facts” must communicate directly with “the acting 

officer.” Id. McPherson maintains that because Douglas and Goodman never 

spoke directly to each other, there was not a sufficient “degree of 

communication” that would permit application of the collective knowledge 

doctrine. Id. He has not shown that the doctrine requires such direct 

communication. See id. at 529. Because “there was communication” between 

Douglas, Vandorple, and Goodman, and because Douglas knew sufficient facts 

supporting the stop and search of the vehicle, the district court properly 

applied the collective knowledge doctrine. Id. at 531; Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 

at 759. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

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