IMPORTANT NOTICE

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.” 

PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 

PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), 

THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE

CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER

CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, 

UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,

RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR 

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED

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BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION

BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED

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ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE

DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE 

ACTION.

 
RENDERED: DECEMBER 16, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2020-SC-0236-WC

ANTHONY HELTON APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS

V. NO. 2019-CA-1757

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD 

NO. WC-15-81290

TM POWER ENTERPRISES, INC.; 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX 

REL. DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY 

GENERAL; HONORABLE. GRANT S. 

ROARK, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; 

AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD

APPELLEES

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

I. BACKGROUND

On June 9, 2013, Anthony Helton fell from a thirty-six-foot ladder in the 

course of his employment for TM Power Enterprises, Inc. As a result of the fall, 

Helton is now a paraplegic. Helton and Power Enterprises settled his workers’ 

compensation claim in an agreement that requires Power Enterprises to pay 

Helton permanent disability benefits. The settlement agreement approved by 

the Administrative Law Judge provides: “[t]he parties recognize that KRS 

342.730(4) states such benefits shall terminate when [Helton] reaches the age 
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of 70 . . . . Helton reserves the right to appeal the application of KRS 

342.730(4) retroactively to his claim both on grounds of statutory construction 

and constitutionality of retroactive application of the statute.” 

Helton filed a motion asking the ALJ to rule on the issues not decided by 

the settlement agreement to determine the duration of his benefits pursuant to 

KRS 342.730(4). The ALJ determined Helton’s benefits terminate when he 

reaches seventy years of age, but noted an administrative body may not 

address issues concerning the constitutionality of a statute. Helton appealed 

the ALJ’s decision to the Workers’ Compensation Board, which affirmed the 

ALJ and acknowledged it could not rule on the issues concerning the 

constitutionality of KRS 342.730(4). 

Helton appealed the Board’s decision to the Court of Appeals, which 

affirmed and held the statute was constitutional. He now appeals to this 

Court, arguing: (1) the application of the current version of KRS 342.730(4) to 

his award violates the contracts clauses of the federal and state constitutions; 

(2) the retroactive enactment of KRS 342.730(4) is an exercise of absolute and 

arbitrary power, in violation of Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution; and (3) 

that KRS 342.730(4) is severable from the remainder of the statute and he 

should, therefore, be entitled to lifetime benefits. We disagree and affirm the 

Court of Appeals. 

II. ANALYSIS

KRS 342.730(4) concerns the termination of workers’ compensation 

benefits. In Parker v. Webster Cnty. Coal, LLC (Dotiki Mine), 529 S.W.3d 759 
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(Ky. 2017), this Court found the then-current 1996 version of KRS 342.730(4) 

unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The 1996 version of the statute 

tied the termination of workers’ compensation benefits to the time at which the 

employee qualified for normal old-age Social Security benefits. This Court held 

this was an arbitrary distinction with no rational relation to a legitimate state 

interest.

In Holcim v. Swinford, 581 S.W.3d 37 (Ky. 2019), we considered whether 

a 2018 version of KRS 342.730(4) could be applied retroactively. Quoting a 

Legislative Research Commission comment beneath the statute, this Court

held in Holcim that the amendment “applies to those cases which ‘have not 

been fully and finally adjudicated, or are in the appellate process, or for which 

time to file an appeal [h]as not lapsed, as of the effective date of this Act.’” Id. 

at 44. 

Whereas the pre-Parker version of KRS 342.730(4) linked workers’ 

compensation benefit termination to the time at which the worker qualified for 

old-age Social Security benefits (and thereby violated an individual’s right to 

equal protection under the law by arbitrarily treating similarly-situated 

individuals differently), the 2018 version of the statutory subsection links the 

termination of benefits to the injured employee attaining a particular age. 

Under the amendment, a claimant’s benefits terminate on his or her seventieth 

birthday or four years after his or her work injury or last injurious exposure, 

whichever occurs later. Helton argues this statute is constitutionally infirm on 

numerous grounds.
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A. Contracts Clause

Helton first argues the retroactive application of KRS 342.730(4) denies 

his rights under the contracts clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 

Both the Constitution of the United States and the Kentucky Constitution 

protect citizens of our Commonwealth from the state’s infringement on their 

right to contract. Article 1, Section 10, Clause 2 of the United States 

Constitution reads, in pertinent part, “[n]o State shall . . . pass any Bill of 

Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . 

.” Likewise, Section 19 of the Kentucky Constitution provides, “[n]o ex post 

facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be enacted.” 

Helton argues KRS 342.730(4) violates these contracts clauses.

In Dowell v. Matthews Contracting, 627 S.W.3d 890, 895 (Ky. 2021), this 

Court stated if “the fundamental premise of a Contracts Clause analysis—the 

existence of a contract—is absent . . . our analysis ends.” See Gen. Motors 

Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 190 (1992) (holding Contracts Clause 

inapplicable because employer and employee did not assent to specific 

statutory terms). Therefore, we must first determine whether a contract exists 

in this case. 

Helton “point[s] to no contract or place within the statutory scheme 

where [he is] guaranteed certain benefits that were mutually assented to and 

bargained for.” Dowell, 627 S.W.3d at 895. This Court has held “the Workers’ 

Compensation Act (WCA) does not constitute a contract between Kentucky 

workers and their employers or the state.” Id. at 894. Rather than providing 
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contractual rights, we explained, “the WCA is a statutory scheme that may be 

amended as the General Assembly chooses, provided it fits within our 

constitutional framework.” Id. at 894–95. “The workers’ compensation system 

is controlled by the state and is governed by legislative enactments. It is not a 

contract . . . between employers and their employees. Changes to the relevant 

statutes, therefore, do not create a Contracts Clause issue.” Id. at 896. 

Since the Workers’ Compensation Act does not constitute a contract, “a 

complete Contracts Clause analysis is unnecessary.” Id. at 894. The 

protections of the clauses simply do not apply. “Because the WCA does not 

form a contract, there are no contractual rights that the amendment to KRS 

342.730(4) could infringe.” Id. at 895. Just as in Dowell, we hold there was no 

contracts clause violation.

B. Absolute and Arbitrary Power

Helton also makes a fleeting reference to Section 2 of the Kentucky 

Constitution, which reads, “[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty 

and property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in the largest 

majority.” Courts in this Commonwealth have recognized for half a century 

that when a “legislative body acts in a purported policy-making or law-making 

function . . . the concept of what is ‘arbitrary’ is much more narrowly 

constricted . . . .” City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Ky. 

1971). Such an action is only “arbitrary if there is no rational connection 

between that action and the purpose for which the body’s power to act exists. 
6

Where the existence of such rational connection is ‘fairly debatable’ the action 

will not be disturbed by a court.” Id. 

This Court has “consistently held that treating older injured workers 

differently from younger injured workers is rationally related to the legitimate 

government interests in preventing a duplication of benefits and saving money 

for the workers’ compensation system.” Cates v. Kroger, 627 S.W.3d 864, 869 

(Ky. 2021). KRS 342.730(4) does not amount to an absolute and arbitrary 

exercise of power. 

C. Severability and Lifetime Benefits 

Helton also argues that KRS 342.730(4) is severable from the remainder 

of the statute and that benefits should be paid for the duration of his life. 

Because the latest version of the statute applies and because there is no 

constitutional violation, this Court need not address these arguments due to its

resolution of the contracts clause issue. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals.

All sitting. All concur. 
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Christopher P. Evensen

Evensen Law Office, LLC

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, TM POWER ENTERPRISES, INC.:

Douglas A. U’Sellis

U’Sellis Mayer & Associates, PSC

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, EX REL. 

DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL:

Matthew F. Kuhn

Brett R. Nolan

Alexander Y. Magera

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE:

Hon. Grant S. Roark

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:

Michael W. Alvey

Chairman