### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TE NNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE A pr il 23, 200 8 S es sio n

GA R Y F LA N A R Y , on b eh alf of h im se lf an d all ot he r sim ila rl y si tu at ed , v. CARL GREGO RY DODGE OF J OHNS ON CIT Y, L.L.C.

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Washin gton County No. 34497 Hon. G. Richard Joh nson , Chancellor

No. E2007-01433-COA- R3-CV - FILED JUNE 17, 2008

This a ction char ged the de fenda nt with engaging in unfair a nd dece ptive prac tices in violation of the Tenne ssee Consum er Protection Act, and engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. The Trial Court gr anted defe ndant summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiff fa iled to establish that he
su ff e re d a los s o f m on e y o r p ro pe rt y. On app e a l, w e a ff ir m th e su mma

ry jud gme nt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P .3 App e al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t A ff ir me d.

H ER S CHEL P ICK EN S F R ANKS , P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which C H A RL ES D. S US ANO , J R ., J., and D. M I CHAEL S W I NEY , J., joined.

Go rd on Ba ll, Kn ox vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or app e lla nt. Linda J. Hamilton Mowles, Knoxville, Tenne ssee, f or appe llee.

OP IN ION

BACKGROUND

Plaintif f b ro u gh t this action ag ainst defe ndant, alleg ing that he had pur chase d a vehicle f rom defe ndant and was char g ed certain amounts of money that wer e designated a s “fe es”, but wer e rather additional profit for the defendant, and defe ndant was thus eng ag ing in unf air a nd-2-

dece ptive prac tices in violation of the Tenne ssee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff soug ht to bring his a c tio n o n h is o wn

be ha lf and on beh alf of

oth e rs sim ila

rl y sit uate d, and

so ug ht d a ma g e s, decla ratory and injunctive re lief, and attorney ’s fe es.
De fe nd ant m ov e d f

or Sum mary

Judg me nt, a sse rt ingthat pl aint if f w a s r e qu ir e d to submit hi s claims to binding ar bitration, pursuant to the parties’ ag ree ment. The Tr ial Court ruled the arb itr a tio n a g re e me nt wa s no t va lid , bu t that thi s Court ha d dic tate d that arb itr a tio n a g re e me nts
wer e to be e nforc ed, and “ reluc tantly ” g rante d the motion to compel arbitration.

Plaintiff filed an appea l, and this Court determined that ther e wa s a g enuine issue of materi al fa ct as t o whether there was mutuality

with respec t to the ag ree ment to arbitrate , and defe ndant was not e ntitled to sum mary judgme nt on that issue.

On re mand , de fe nd ant fi le d an An sw e r, de nying any wr on g do ing , a nd in r e sp on se to plaintiff’s Reque st for Admissions, admitted that it charg ed def endant a $349.00 fee when he purcha sed his vehicle that was labeled an “administrative fee” , but denied that this was all prof it, and denied that this was a dded to the pric e paid by ever y member of

the proposed c lass.

SUMMAR

Y JUDG MENT

De fe nd ant m o v e d

f o r S u mm a r y Ju d g m e nt , a

n d a tt a c he d a c op y of the sa le s a g re e me nt. The a g ree ment shows the selling price of t he vehic le, adds on va rious char g es including the $349.00 administrat i v e fe e, s u btrac ts the trade- in allowance , and then shows a balanc e due of

$12,000.00. De fe nd ant a

tta c he d e xce rp ts f

ro m pl a int if

f’ s d e po sit ion , whe re in p la int iff adm itted that he pa id $12,000.00 for the ve hicle, and this wa s what he ag ree d to pa y and that he looked at the number s on the ag ree ment b ef

o re h e si g ned it. He a dmitted that he did not ask any questions about the adminis t rative f

ee, a nd that the par

ties rea ched a

n ag ree ment to trade in his vehicle , and that the deale r would add ne rf ba rs and a hitch to the vehicle he was pur ch as i n g, an d that he would pay $12,000.00 as additional consider ation. He s t at ed that he w as only interested in the bottom line number, and that if it ha d been more than $12,000.00, he would not ha ve taken the ve hicle. F urther, that no one at the defe ndant’s deale rship ever told him what the administrative fee was, be cause he had neve r inquired.

Def endant a lso attache d ex ce rpt s from the de position of Michael Collins, who te sti fi e d th a t th e a dmi nis tr a tiv e fe e wa s o ft e n c a lle d a do c fe e or pr oc e ssi ng fe e , an d w a s ju st a c os t of doing business. He a dmitted that this was simply a fe e that wa s char g ed to the customer that he lpe d pa y the ov e rh e a d. F ur

the r, that the “ AD M” c ha rg e lis te d on the sti c ke r pr ic e of the ve hic le
was a dditional dealer ship markup.

Def endant a lso filed a Statement of U ndisputed M ater ial Fa cts, and stated that plaintiff agr ee d

to p ay $ 1 2 , 0 0 0

. 0 0 f

o r th e v e h ic le h e p u r c h a s e d , an d th a t t h is w a s w h a t h e w as c ha rg e d, and tha t th e a dd e d f

e e s did not inc re a se wh a t pla int if f ag re e d to pa

y . A lso a tta c he d w a s a work shee t which plaintiff and the salesman c om p l et ed, indicating plaintiff’s ag ree ment to pay-3-

$12,000.00 “out the door” with the nerf bars installed.

The Tr ial Court ent er ed an Or der G rantingDef endant’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment, and plaintiff f

iled a Notice of Appe al.

ISS UES ON APP EAL

Plaintiff’s iss u e o n ap p eal is “W hether the Trial Court er

red in g rantingsummary j u d g m e n ti nf

a v o r o f d e f e n d an to na l l o f

p l a i n t i f f ’ s c l a i m s ?”

As this Court has often stated:

A trial cour t s h o u l d g rant a motion for summary

judgme nt only

if the movant de mon str a te s th a t th e re are no g e nu ine iss ue s o f m a te ri a l f a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt as a

matte r o f l aw. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 3; By rd v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210-11 (Te nn.1993). A fact is materia l if it "must be dec ided in order to res ol ve t he subs tan ti ve cla im or defe ns e at whi ch th e mo ti on is di rect ed. " Byrd, 84 7 S. W.2 d at 21 1. To de te rm ine wh e the r a g e nu in e is sue o f m a te ri a l f a c t e xists , "the trial court must take the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence in favor of the nonmoving pa

rty , allow all reasonable infere nces in favor of that par ty , and disca

rd
a ll c ounte rv a ili nge vid e nc e ." I d. a t 21 1. I f a co ur t det e rm ine s eithe r that a

dis pu te exis ts as to any

materia l fac t or that any doubt exi sts a s t o t he conc lusions to be draw n from the f

acts, the mova

nt's motion for s u m m ary

judgme nt must be denied. I d. L ikewise, whe re the rec ord shows that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fa c t, j ud g me nt fo r the mov ing pa rt y " sh a ll be re nd e re d f

or thw ith ." Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56.04. Luther v. Compton , 5 S.W .3d 635, 639 (Tenn. 1999)

Pla int if f a rgue s th a t th e Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d in g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt o n h is c la im that de fe nd ant vio late d the Te nn e sse e Con sume r Pr ote c tio n Ac t. To state a c la im un der th e Act, plaintiff must show that defe ndant eng ag ed in unfa ir or dec eptive ac ts or prac tices and that the defe ndant’s conduc t cause d an “a scer tainable loss of money

or prope rty ” to plaint iff. Tucker v

. Sie rra Bu ild

e rs , 180 S.W .3d 109, 115 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). A dec eptive ac t or prac tice has be en define d as “one that cause s or tends to c ause a consume r to believe what is false or that misleads or tends to mislea d a consumer as to a matter of fa ct.” Id. This Court has stated that “a n act or prac tice should not be deeme d unfair ‘unless the act or prac tice cause s or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers whic h is not re asonably avoidable by

consumers the mselves and not outweig hed by counter vailing be nefits to consumers or to competition.’” Id.

I n this case, plaintiff did not show injury by listi ng the additional fe es on the sale s a g re e me nt a

nd the sti c ke r o f t

he ve hic le . He te sti fi e d that he ne g oti a te d a n “ ou t th e do or ” pr ic e wi th the sa le sma

n f or the ve hic le , and that is e vid e nc e d by the wo rk sh e e t th a t w a s f

ile d w iththe Court

.-4-

He a g ree d to pa

y $12,000.00 betwee n the vehicle s, which is prec isely what he pa id. He testified that he ag ree d to the price for the ve hicle, and thus did not question the cha rg e li s t ed as an “administrative f

ee” on the contra ct, but simply looked at the bottom line number. As such, there was no showingthat plaintiff was injure d or suffe red an “asc erta inable los s of m oney or prope rty ”,
a s is re qu ir e d to state a

c la im und e r t

he TCP A. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.
Pla int if f a lso argue s that the Tr ia l Co ur t e rr e d in g ra nti ngsu mma

ry jud g me nt o n h is
c la im that de fe nd ant e ng a g e d in the bu sin e ss o f l aw, be c a us e de fe nd ant p re pa

re d le g a l do c ume nts , i.e ., a po we r o f atto rn e y

and an a rb itr a tio n a g re e me nt, and

c ha rg e d f or it a s p art of the ov e rh e a d c os t delineate d as an a dminist rative f ee. Reg arding what constitutes the unauthorized prac tice of law in T ennesse e, it has bee n explained:

The Te nnessee Supreme Court has held that "[t]he purpose of our statutes re g ulating the pra ctice of

law is to preve nt the public' s being prey ed upon by those who, for valuable c o n s i deration, seek to perf orm servic es which r equire skill, t raining and char acte r, without adequate qualifications." I t has additionally adopted the following
e thi c a l c on sid e ratio n c on c e rn ingthe pr a c tic e of law:
I t is neithe r n e c e ssa

ry no r d e sir a

ble to atte mpt

the fo rm ulatio n o f a

sin g le sp e c if

ic defini t ion of what c onstitut es the pra ctice of law. F unctionally

the pra ctice of

law relates to the rendition of ser vices for others that call for the profe ssional judgment of a la wy er. The essenc e of the profe ssional judg ment of the lawy er is his educated ability to relate the general body and philosophy

of law to a

specific leg al problem of a c lient; and thus, the public interest will be better s er v ed i f only lawy ers a

re permitted to ac t in matter s involving prof essional judg ment. Where this profe ssional j u d g m e n ti s n o ti n v o l v e d , n o n
- l aw y e r s , s u c h a s c o u rtc l e r k s , p o l i c e o f

f i c e r s, abstrac ters, and ma

ny g overnme n t al employ ees, ma y eng ag e in occ upations that require a spec ial knowledg e of la w in cer tain are as. But the service s of a lawy er a re essential in the public interest whene ver the exercise of profe ssional leg al judg ment is require d.
"[R] egulations proscribing the unauthorized practice of law are designe d to protect

' the public from be ing a dvised and re prese nted in leg al matters by incompetent and unreliable persons ove r whom the judicial de partment c ould exercise little control.' " It is the court' s responsibility to " ' regulate the pr actice of law and to restra in such pr a c tic e by

lay me n in a c omm on -s e ns e wa

y in or de r t o p ro te c t pr ima

ri ly the int e re st
o f t h e p u b l i c[

. ] ' "

Under those g uidelines, the Tenne ssee Supreme Court ha s rec ently held that " [t ]he prepa ration and filing of a complaint require s ' the profe ssional judgment of a lawyer,' and is, there fore , the pra ctice of law." Following that lead, the Tenne ssee Court of-5- Ap pe a ls s ub se qu e ntl y

de te rm ine d th a t " the dr a ft ingof ple a din g s and

l e g a l d o c ume nts or the sele ction and completion of form documents constit utes the pra ctice of law." Fifteenth Judicial Dis t. Unified Bar Ass'n v. Glasgow , No. M1995-00020-COA- R3- CV , 1 99 9 T e nn . App . L EX I S 81 5, a t *12- * 13, 19 99 WL 11 28 84 7, a t *4 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. De c .1 0, 19 99 ) ( ho ldi ngthat " mor e tha n me re c le ri c a l w or

k .

.. [an d] no t si mpl y reduc ing [the] clients' words to writing or filling in blanks on pr eprinted f orms at the
s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o no f

[ t h e ] c l i e n t s " c o n s t i tu t e s t h e u n a u t h o r i z e d p r a c t i c e o f

l aw )

. In
makin g its de te rm inatio n, the c ourt of a pp e a ls a c kn ow le dg e d th e fo llo wi ng : As a g ener al matter, othe r cour ts h av e held that the sale of se lf-help kits or printed leg al forms doe s not constitute the unauthorized prac tice of law as longas the seller pr ov ide s the buy e r no a dv ic e re g ard ingwh ic h f or ms t o u se or

ho w the fo rm s sh ou ld be filled out. Converse ly , sellers who do advise customers on which forms to use and how to fill them out have bee n found to be e ng ag ing in the pr actice of law. Glasgow , 1999 Tenn.App. L EXI S 8 1 5 , at * 9 n. 4, 1999 WL 1128847, at *3 n. 4 (interna l citations omit ted).

In re Ro se , 314 B.R. 663, 703-704 ( Bkr tcy . E.D. Tenn.,2004) (citations omitted).

I n this case, the pla intiff’s claim that defe ndant eng ag ed in the unauthor ized practice of business of lawwas not supported by proof that defe n d an t d i d any thing akin to advising or repr esentingplaintiff in any capa city , nor that def

endant did any

thing that would r equire the profe ssional judgment of

a lawyer. The simple act of filli ng in the bl anks on for m documents that have be e n p re pa

re d f or a bu sin e ss u se do e s n ot c on stitu te the una uth or ize d p ra c tic e of

law. Th is iss ue is a lso wi tho ut m e ri t.

Nex t, plai nti ff

argue s th e Tr ia l Co ur

t e rr e d in g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt o n h is claim of intentional misrepre sentation/fra udulent inducement, a s the unexplained “admini strative f e e ” an d “ A D M ” c h ar g e w e r e m i s r e p r e s e n t e d t o p l a i n t i f f a s l e g i t i m a t e / n o n
- n e g o t i a b l e c h ar g e s

. In order for plaintiff to pr oceed o n a claim of fra ud/misreprese ntation, he or she must show damag e/injury

. See Lamb v. Me gaflight, Inc., 26 S.W. 3d

62 7 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 2 00 0) ; Metro Gov ’t v. Mc Kinney , 852 S.W .2d 233 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Since plaintiff did not offer evidenc e that he was injured in this transa ction, this claim also fails.

Finally , plaintiff seeks to pr ocee d with a claim of unjust enric hment/money had and
rec eived ( which plaintiff c oncede d are essentially the s ame cause of action), but plaintiff must show that defe ndant re ceive d a bene fit, under c ircumstance s rende ring it inequitable to reta in it . Be nn e tt v. Visa USA, Inc
., 19 8 S.W. 3d 74 7 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 06 ); CPB Mg mt ., In c . v . E

v e rly , 939 S.W .2d 78 (T e nn . Ct . App . 1 99 6) . As we pr e vio us ly ob se rv e d, the pr oo f w a s und isp ute d th a t pl a int if f p a id a price f o r th e v e h ic le th a t w a s h is “ o u t t h e d o o r ” f

igu r e , th a t i s a

b o tt o m l in e p r ic e th a t p la in tiff ag ree d to pay , and as suc h, he ca nnot show that defe ndant was unjustly enric hed.-6- We affir m the J udg ment of t he Trial Court and remand, with the cost of the appea l
a s s e s s e d t o G ar y F l an ar y.

______________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , P

. J.