Docket No. 88224----–--Agenda 35----–May 2000.

								THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.

								LAWRENCE CARTER, Appellant.

	JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:

	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Vermilion County,

the defendant, Lawrence Carter, was convicted of driving with a

suspended license and of operating an uninsured vehicle and was

acquitted of illegal transportation of alcohol. The defendant filed

a post-trial motion, seeking a judgment of acquittal

notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, a new trial, with

regard to the conviction for driving with a suspended license. At a

hearing, the court orally granted the defendant'’s motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed the public

defender to prepare an appropriate order. The next day, however,

the judge sua sponte vacated the judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict and ordered a new trial on the charge

of driving with a suspended license.

	The defendant filed a motion to bar the new trial, arguing that

the court'’s order violated the double jeopardy clauses of the

federal and state constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, §sec. 10). The trial judge denied the motion. The defendant

then appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the circuit court.

306 Ill. App. 3d 867 (1999). We allowed the defendant'’s petition for leave

to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the reasons that follow, we

reverse the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court.

	The defendant was stopped and ticketed on December 2,

1997, for driving with a suspended license, among other offenses.

During the defendant'’s trial, in May 1998, Danville police officer

Nathan Howie testified that he stopped the defendant'’s vehicle

because he believed that the defendant'’s driver'’s license had been

suspended. Officer Howie further testified that when he asked the

defendant for identification and for an insurance card, the

defendant was not able to produce either one. The officer then

asked the defendant for his full name and date of birth. The officer

testified that after receiving information regarding defendant from his communication center, he arrested the defendant for driving

with a suspended license.

	After the officer testified, the State sought to admit into

evidence an abstract of the defendant'’s driving record. Defense

counsel objected on the ground that the document was hearsay

because it was not a certified copy of the abstract, as required by

statute. The trial judge sustained the objection, and the State

rested. The defendant then moved for a directed verdict, arguing

that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the offense of

driving with a suspended license. The court denied the defendant'’s

motion, explaining that the elements of the offense were shown by

the officer'’s testimony that he believed that the defendant'’s license

had been suspended.

	The defendant testified that he has diabetes. According to the

defendant, on the day he was stopped by the police, he became ill

and needed to go to the hospital because he did not have any

insulin at home. The defendant said that he first attempted to

telephone two friends and a taxi company to obtain a ride to the

hospital. His condition worsened, however, and he then decided to

drive himself.

	The trial judge denied the defendant'’s request that the jury be

instructed on the defense of necessity. The jury found the

defendant guilty of driving with a suspended license, as well as of

another offense, operating an uninsured vehicle; the jury found the

defendant not guilty of a third charge, the illegal transportation of

alcohol. The defendant filed a post-trial motion, seeking a

judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict with regard to

the conviction for driving with a suspended license, or, in the

alternative, a new trial on that charge.

	At a hearing on June 4, 1998, the trial court granted the

defendant'’s motion for a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the

verdict on the charge of driving with a suspended license. The

judge found that insufficient evidence existed to support a

conviction for that offense. The docket entry from that date states,

in pertinent part:

				"“Judgment of acquittal is entered as to the charge of

DAS [driving after license suspension]. Written order to

follow from PD Scott Lerner."”

	The next day, June 5, the public defender presented to the

court a written order memorializing the previous day'’s ruling. The

judge agreed that the proposed order reflected the view he had

expressed the previous day. The judge, however, sua sponte vacated the judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict. The

judge explained that the driving abstract, issued by the Secretary of

State'’s office, had appeared in a new format unfamiliar to him,

leading him to erroneously exclude it from evidence. The judge

found that without the driving abstract there was insufficient

evidence to support the defendant'’s conviction for driving with a

suspended license. The judge stated that, in an attempt to correct

his erroneous evidentiary ruling excluding the abstract, he was

going to allow the defendant'’s motion for a new trial. The

defendant objected to the new trial on grounds of double jeopardy,

but the judge denied the defendant'’s motion to preclude retrial on

that ground.

	The defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed. The

appellate court believed that retrial would not subject the defendant

to double jeopardy. The court construed the trial judge'’s actions

here as indicating that the judge believed "“that the jury'’s verdict

was merely against the weight of the evidence."” 306 Ill. App. 3d at

873. The appellate court concluded that the new trial was not

barred by double jeopardy, and in support of that proposition cited Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652, 102 S. Ct. 2211 (1982), which held that retrial may occur if a reviewing court

determines that a conviction is not supported by the weight of the

evidence, rather than the sufficiency of the evidence. We allowed

the defendant'’s petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

	The defendant renews here his argument that retrial in this

case would violate the double jeopardy provisions of the federal

and state constitutions. In support of this contention, the defendant

cites Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 57 L. Ed. 2d 43, 98 S. Ct. 2170 (1978), which held that a judgment of acquittal

stemming from an evidentiary ruling, however erroneous, bars

further prosecution on any aspect of the charge. Further, the defendant argues that the trial judge could not reconsider his

decision to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In support

of that proposition, he refers to this court'’s opinion in People v. Van Cleve, 89 Ill. 2d 298 (1982), which ruled that article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §sec. 6)

prohibits the State from appealing a trial court'’s decision to enter

a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding a guilty verdict. In

response, the State contends that the trial judge had the authority

to reconsider his decision to correct the erroneous evidentiary

ruling without putting the defendant twice in jeopardy. The State

also contends that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the

defendant'’s conviction for driving with a suspended license, and

the State suggests that the proper course in this case is simply to

reinstate the jury'’s verdict of guilt on that charge.

	At the outset, we reject the State'’s invitation to determine

whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain the

defendant'’s conviction for driving with a suspended license and, if

it was, to reinstate the jury'’s verdict on that charge. We believe

that our consideration of that question would be inconsistent with

our decision in Van Cleve, which held that the State may not appeal from a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict.

The Van Cleve court based its holding on a provision in article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution, which states that "“after a trial

on the merits in a criminal case, there shall be no appeal from a

judgment of acquittal."” Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §6. Although there

is no double jeopardy bar to an appeal by the State from a

judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict (see Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 n.8, 90 L. Ed. 2d 116, 122 n.8, 106 S. Ct. 1745, 1749___ n.8 (1986); United States v. Wilson (1975), 420 U.S. 332, 43 L. Ed. 2d 232, 95 S. Ct. 1013 (1975)), article VI,

section 6, separately prohibits such review. We recognize that in

this case the question comes before us as a result of the defendant'’s

appeal from the order of the circuit court denying his motion to bar

retrial. We believe, however, that our consideration of the issue

would be tantamount to hearing it in violation of the rule

announced in Van Cleve, and therefore we do not believe that the question is properly before us.

	 Because of our resolution of the question whether the trial

judge could order a new trial under the circumstances here, we

need not decide whether the judge had the authority to reconsider

his order granting a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the

verdict. We would note that the authority barring this court'’s

review of a judgment of acquittal in those circumstances would not

appear by itself to preclude the trial judge from reconsidering such

an order. But whether or not the trial judge could reconsider the

entry of the judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, the

order entered by the judge on reconsideration----–ordering a new trial

to correct an evidentiary ruling unfavorable to the prosecution----–was

improper. Having found the evidence of the defendant'’s guilt

insufficient, the trial judge could not order a new trial to correct

what he perceived to be the error in his ruling at trial barring part

of the State'’s evidence. Retrying the defendant on the charge of

driving with a suspended license a second time would improperly

subject defendant to double jeopardy. The fifth amendment to the

United States Constitution provides that no person shall "“be

subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

limb."” U.S. Const., amend. V. Article I, section 10, of the Illinois

Constitution similarly provides, in part, that no person shall "“be

twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."” Ill. Const. 1970, art.

I, § sec. 10.

	Unlike the appellate court, we believe that the trial judge in

this case determined that, in the absence of the driving abstract,

there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant'’s

conviction for driving with a suspended license. Here, the trial

judge entered the judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the

verdict, acknowledging that without the admission of the

defendant'’s driving abstract insufficient evidence existed to support

a charge of driving with a suspended license. See Van Cleve, 89 Ill. 2d at 303 ("“judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered by a

judge who theretofore denied a motion for a directed verdict is

often regarded as a reconsideration of the order of denial"”). The

judge later vacated his judgment of acquittal and then granted the

defendant'’s motion for a new trial, stating that his error in

excluding the defendant'’s driving abstract had caused substantial

inequity to the State.

	We believe that the present case is similar to Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 57 L. Ed. 2d 43, 98 S. Ct. 2170 (1978), cited by the defendant. In Sanabria, the trial court made an erroneous evidentiary ruling that resulted in the presentation of

insufficient evidence of the offense charged. At the close of the

prosecution'’s case, defense counsel made a motion for a judgment

of acquittal, which was denied. Defense counsel next moved to

exclude evidence, and the court also denied that motion. Later,

however, the judge sua sponte reconsidered its ruling on the motion to exclude evidence. Defense counsel then made a second

motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial judge granted.

Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 58-60, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 50-51, 98 S. Ct. at ___2176. The government appealed, and the court of appeals ordered

a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court concluded,

"“[W]hen a defendant has been acquitted at trial, he may not be

retried on the same offense, even if the legal rulings underlying the

acquittal were erroneous."” Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 64, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 54, 98 S. Ct. at ___ 2179. As this court explained in People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 1794 (1990), "“The trial court could not give the

State a second opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to

muster in the first proceeding."” Yet that is what the trial judge

attempted to do in this case. Thus, we conclude that the trial judge

was barred by principles of double jeopardy from subjecting the

defendant to a second trial as a means of correcting the erroneous

exclusion of the State'’s evidence at the first trial.

	For the reasons stated, the judgments of the appellate court

and circuit court are reversed. The cause is remanded to the circuit

court of Vermilion County so that the court may reinstate its

judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict on the

defendant'’s conviction for driving with a suspended license.

									Judgments reversed;

									Ccause remanded.