alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-13-00724-CR

James Wesley ROORK,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of 

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 38th Judicial District Court, Medina County, Texas

Trial Court No. 13-09-11343-CR

Honorable Camile G. Dubose, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 18, 2013

DISMISSED

On November 4, 2013, we notified the appellant that the trial court’s certification in this 

appeal states that “this criminal case is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of 

appeal.” Additionally, the clerk’s record contains a written waiver signed by the appellant 

pursuant to which he entered a plea of guilty. The trial court’s judgment also shows that there was 

a plea bargain agreement, and the punishment assessed did not exceed the punishment 

recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. Therefore, the trial court’s 
04-13-00724-CR

certification accurately reflects that this criminal case is a plea-bargain case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

25.2(a)(2).

In our November 4, 2013 order, we warned the appellant that “[this] appeal must be 

dismissed if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part 

of the record under these rules.” See id.R. 25.2(d). We ordered that this appeal would be dismissed 

pursuant to Rule 25.2(d) unless the appellant caused an amended trial court certification to be filed 

by December 4, 2013 that showed the appellant has the right of appeal. See id. R. 25.2(d), 37.1; 

see also Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Daniels v. State, 110 

S.W.3d 174, 176 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). No response was filed. Accordingly, 

we dismiss this appeal.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish

- 2 -
#### In re: James A. ROSE, III, Debtor. Algernon Lee Butler, III, Trustee in Bankruptcy for James A. Rose, III, Trustee-Appellant, v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, as Trustee; Residential Funding Company, LLC, Defendants-Appellees, and William Walt Pettit, Defendant.

No. 10-1285.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 15, 2011.

Decided: March 21, 2011.

*245Algernon L. Butler, III, Butler & Butler, L.L.P., Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant. Alan B. Powell, Christopher C. Finan, Roberson, Haworth & Reese, P.L.L.C., High Point, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Algernon L. Butler, III, as trustee in bankruptcy for the estate of James A. Rose, III, appeals from the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying the trustee’s motion seeking to invalidate — on the basis of a typographical error — the deed of trust currently held by Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas on certain real property of the estate. The bankruptcy court and the district court held that a bona fide purchaser would have been on notice as to the error in the deed and, therefore, the trustee may not avoid the lien under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2006). We have reviewed the record included on appeal, the parties’ briefs, and all supplemental materials before the court and we find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated below. *In re Rose (Butler v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co.),*Nos. 7:09-cv-00145-FL; L-08-00080-8-AP, 2009 WL 2226658 (E.D.N.C. July 20, 2009); (Feb. 9, 2010). We deny the Appellant’s motion for reconsideration of this court’s order entered June 10, 2010, and we dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
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<SECURITIES>                                12,672,348
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,143,432
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    532,731
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            14,244,560
<PP&E>                                       9,342,431
<DEPRECIATION>                             (1,593,505)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              24,260,786
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        3,950,544
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                24,260,786
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<CGS>                                        3,790,141
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             9,182,220
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             269,763
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (1,754,577)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
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<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.13)
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 21.0

Vermillion, Inc. Subsidiaries

December 31, 2009



|                                         |  |                                         
|---------------------------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------
|Subsidiary                               |  | State/Country of
Incorporation/Formation
|IllumeSys Pacific, Inc.                  |  | California                              
|Ciphergen Technologies, Inc.             |  | California                              
|Ciphergen Biosystems Ltd.                |  | United Kingdom                          
|Ciphergen Biosystems A/S                 |  | Denmark                                 
|Ciphergen Biosystems AG                  |  | Switzerland                             
|Ciphergen Biosystems KK                  |  | Japan                                   
|Ciphergen Biosystems International, Inc. |  | Delaware                                
|Ciphergen (Beijing) Biosystems Co., Ltd. |  | China                                   

Ciphergen Biosystems
International, Inc. Subsidiaries

December 31, 2009



|                            |  |                                         
|--------------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------
|Subsidiary                  |  | State/Country of Incorporation/Formation
|Ciphergen Biosystems GmbH   |  | Germany                                 
|Ciphergen Biosystems S.r.l. |  | Italy                                   
|Ciphergen Biosystems EURL   |  | France
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-20343

ERIC SAMUEL TUCKER, 

 Petitioner - Appellant

v.

LORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL 

JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, 

 Respondent - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CV-1470

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and HO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Eric Samuel Tucker was convicted in Texas of aggravated assault of a 

family member and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. Tucker v. State, 2016 

WL 3162367, at *1 (Tex. App. June 2, 2016). In May 2018, Tucker filed a

habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court dismissed 

without prejudice as duplicative of an already pending petition, filed in 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 4, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 18-20343 Document: 00515185302 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/04/2019
No. 18-20343

2

September 2017. In its order dismissing the petition, the district court did not 

rule whether a certificate of appealability (COA) was warranted. Tucker now 

appeals to this court without a COA.

A COA is required to appeal the denial of an unauthorized successive 

habeas petition under § 2254. See Cardenas v. Thaler, 651 F.3d 442, 443 (5th 

Cir. 2011). Because the district court did not issue a COA determination, we 

lack jurisdiction over Tucker’s appeal. We decline to remand this case to the 

district court for a COA ruling because remand would be futile. See United 

States v. Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2000). The district court will only 

grant a COA when “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the 

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000). No reasonable jurist could find the district court’s procedural 

ruling dismissing Tucker’s petition debatable. Claims raised in a successive 

habeas petition that were raised in the initial petition must be dismissed. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). And, any new claim must be dismissed unless the “factual 

predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the 

exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). Here, all but one of 

Tucker’s claims were raised in his first petition, and the lone new claim is an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which no reasonable jurist could find

was undiscoverable when Tucker filed his first petition. Because remanding 

for the district court to rule on the COA would be pointless, we dismiss for lack 

of jurisdiction. 

For the forgoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

 Case: 18-20343 Document: 00515185302 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/04/2019
#### In the Matter of Joseph C. Gallo, Appellant, v Brion Travis, as Chairman of the New York State Board of Parole, et al., Respondents.

[666 NYS2d 478]

—In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of mandamus to compel the respondents to discharge him from parole, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Lockman, J.), dated November 20, 1996, which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition. The discretionary decisions of the Board of Parole to reinstate active supervision of the petitioner and defer the determination as to whether he should be discharged from parole were made in accordance with law, and therefore are not subject to judicial review *(see, Matter of Secilmic v Keane,*225 AD2d 628; *Matter of Ganci v Hammock,*99 AD2d 546, 548).

The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit. Rosenblatt, J. P., Altman, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.
#### Hallmark Capital Corporation, Appellant, v Adrian H. Courtenay, III, et al., Respondents.

[859 NYS2d 435]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Charles E. Ramos, J.), entered July 8, 2005, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously modified, on the law, the motion denied with respect to the claim for certain unpaid monthly retainer fees, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiff, a provider of financial advisory services, commenced this action against one of its clients, the publisher of various print and online material, to recover monthly retainer fees purportedly owed under the agreement between the parties, as well as a transaction fee for the development of a certain publication. The motion court appropriately dismissed so much of the complaint as sought the transaction fee, inasmuch as the activity was found not to constitute a transaction under the agreement.

The agreement in question was for a minimum period of two years, thereby obliging the corporate defendant to pay a monthly retainer fee to plaintiff for the entire term of the transaction. Nevertheless, the court’s decision in this matter did not address the corporate defendant’s contractual duty to pay such a monthly retainer fee. Since the complaint seeks not only a transaction fee but also recovery of the amount owed for unpaid retainer fees, this matter must be remanded for a determination of that question. Concur—Lippman, EJ. Williams, Moskowitz and Acosta, JJ.
EXHIBIT 10.14
**AMENDMENT TO THE EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT**
This Amendment, hereinafter referred to as “Amendment” is made and entered intoeffective as of this the 17th day of December 2003, to that certain EquipmentLease Agreement and, together herein referred to as “Agreement”, which was madeand entered into on or about the 9 April, 2003, between Mitcham Industries,Inc., a Texas Corporation “MITCHAM”, and Sercel, Inc. with its principal placeof business at Houston, Texas, U.S.A. (Sercel).
     Sercel and MITCHAM have entered into the Agreement of which the term is 31December 2003;
     Sercel and MITCHAM are now willing to renew their relationship under thefollowing terms and conditions:
**W I T N E S S E T H :**
     **NOW, THEREFORE,**in consideration of the premises and the mutual promisesand undertakings set forth below and intending to be legally bound hereby, theparties agree as follows:
1. Both parties mutually agree to extend the Agreement for an additionalyear from January 1st to December 31, 2004. Any further renewal may onlybe agreed upon between the Parties through written agreement signed byboth Parties.
2. Except, as specifically mentioned herein, all other Terms and Conditionsof the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
**IN WITNESS WHEREOF**MITCHAM and Sercel each has caused this Amendment to beexecuted and effective as of the date first written above.       For and on behalf of Sercel:  For and on behalf of Mitcham Industries, Inc. By: /s/ Mark Farine By: /s/ Billy F. Mitcham, Jr.      Printed Name: Mark Farine Printed Name: Billy F. Mitcham, Jr.       Title: Vice President of Sales Title: President — CEO       Date: 31 Dec. 2003 Date: Dec. 31, 2003
Exhibit 4.8


 


PROMISSORY NOTE EXTENSION AGREEMENT


  


	$100,000.00	February 6, 2018




 


This Promissory Note
Extension Agreement, hereinafter referred to as “Extension Agreement,” entered into this Sixth day of February, 2018,
by and between DERMAdoctor, LLC, a Missouri corporation (“Maker”), and Papillon Partners, Inc., a Missouri corporation,
or its successors or assigns (“Holder”),


 


WHEREAS, Maker and
Holder have entered into a Promissory Note dated November 9, 2017 for the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000), hereinafter
referred to as the “Note”. The Note is due and payable on a date that is ninety (90) days from the original date of
the Note.


 


WHEREAS, Maker and
Holder desire to enter into this Extension Agreement in order to extend the date when all the outstanding principal and accrued
and unpaid interest is due and payable to one hundred eighty (180) days from the original date of the Note.


 


NOW, THEREFORE, it
is duly agreed by both Maker and Holder to extend the due date of the Note to May 8, 2018.


 


All other provisions
the original Note shall prevail unless otherwise written.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
the undersigned Maker and Holder have duly executed this Extension Agreement, extending the due date of the Note as of the day
and year first written above.


 





	 	MAKER:
	 	 	 
	 	DERMAdoctor, LLC
	 	 	 
	 	By:	 /s/ Audrey Kunin
	 	Name:	 Audrey Kunin
	 	Title:	 
	 	 	
	 	HOLDER:
	 	 	 
	 	Papillon Partners, Inc.
	 	 	 
	 	By:	/s/ Jeff Kunin
	 	Name:	 Jeff Kunin
	 	Title:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 282 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 282

    To prevent Members of Congress from receiving any automatic pay 
                          adjustment in 2010.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 7, 2009

  Mr. Sestak introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on House Administration, and in addition to the Committee on 
   Oversight and Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To prevent Members of Congress from receiving any automatic pay 
                          adjustment in 2010.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Delay Congressional Pay Raise Act''.

SEC. 2. NO AUTOMATIC PAY ADJUSTMENT FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN 2010.

    For purposes of the provision of law amended by section 
704(a)(2)(B) of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (5 U.S.C. 5318 note), no 
adjustment under section 5303 of title 5, United States Code, shall be 
considered to have taken effect in fiscal year 2010 in the rates of pay 
under the General Schedule.
                                 <all>
```
#### JOHN TYSON *v.*COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 30078)

Gruendel, Harper and Schaller, Js.

Argued October 16

officially released November 3, 2009

Per Curiam.

The appeal is dismissed.
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 189 (Monday, October 2, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 45921]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-21159]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-81733; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2017-081]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; 
Notice of Withdrawal of a Proposed Rule Change To Extend the 
Implementation Date for Certain Changes to the Rule 5700 Series and 
Rule 5810

September 27, 2017.
    On August 7, 2017, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``Nasdaq'') filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission''), pursuant 
to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 \1\ and Rule 
19b-4 thereunder,\2\ a proposed rule change to extend the 
implementation date for certain changes concerning the continued 
listing requirements for exchange-traded products in the Nasdaq Rule 
5700 Series and related changes to Nasdaq Rule 5810. The proposed rule 
change was published for comment in the Federal Register on August 22, 
2017.\3\ The Commission received one comment letter on the proposed 
rule change.\4\ On September 22, 2017, Nasdaq withdrew the proposed 
rule change (SR-NASDAQ-2017-081).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 81406 (August 16, 
2017), 82 FR 39920.
    \4\ See letter from Jane Heinrichs, Associate General Counsel, 
Investment Company Institute, to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, 
Commission, dated September 1, 2017.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Eduardo A. Aleman,
Assistant Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-21159 Filed 9-29-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
#### Mina Becher, Respondent, v Yehudah Becher, Appellant.

[667 NYS2d 50]

—In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant husband appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rigler, J.), dated March 13, 1996, which, *inter alia,*denied his motion for a judgment declaring Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (h); (6) (d) unconstitutional.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on-the law, without costs or disbursements, and the husband’s motion is dismissed.

Prior to the trial of this action, the husband moved for a judgment declaring Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (h); (6) (d) unconstitutional. These statutes provide that, where appropriate, the court shall consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage when determining equitable distribution and maintenance. Here, the husband had refused to deliver to the wife a Get (a Jewish religious divorce). In response to the husband’s motion the wife waived all of her rights under Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (h); (6) (d). The wife requested that the court dismiss the husband’s motion as moot. The court found that the motion was not moot, but denied the motion to declare the statutes unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court should have found that the underlying controversy had been rendered moot and that the judicial determination sought would constitute the rendering of an advisory opinion. “ ‘ “[I]t is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that our duty to declare the law only arises out of and is *409limited to determining actual controversies between litigants before us”’” *(Matter of Schulz v State of New York,*200 AD2d 936, 937, quoting *Matter of Schulz v State of New York,*182 AD2d 3, 4-5). In this case, because the wife waived her rights to have the husband’s failure to deliver a Get considered on the issues of equitable distribution and maintenance, there is no dispute between the parties which must be resolved. Moreover, this case does not qualify as an exception to the mootness doctrine *(see, Matter of Gold-Greenberger v Human Resources Admin.,*77 NY2d 973). Bracken, J. P., Thompson, Krausman and Luciano, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          33,160
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   17,901
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                83,070
<PP&E>                                      11,300,769
<DEPRECIATION>                               2,755,349
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,771,520
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          630,026
<BONDS>                                      6,154,278
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,776,217
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,771,520
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,083,361
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  570,109
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             522,698
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (496,109)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (496,109)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (496,109)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (97.60)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>