alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 10.42A**

**AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO FLORIDA CHOICE BANK**

**OFFICERS’ AND EMPLOYEES’ STOCK OPTION PLAN**

THIS AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO THE FLORIDA CHOICE BANK OFFICERS’ ANDEMPLOYEES’ STOCK OPTION PLAN (the “Amendment”) is made as of the 1st day of May, 2002. 

WITNESSETH THAT: 

WHEREAS, the Boardof Directors and the shareholders of Florida Choice Bank (the “Bank”) have authorized, adopted and approved an Officers’ and Employees’ Stock Option Plan (the “Plan”); and 

WHEREAS, the Bank desires to amend the Plan in certain respects. 

NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows: 

1. Defined Terms. All terms used in thisAmendment which are defined in the Plan shall have the meanings specified in the Plan, unless specifically defined herein. 

2. Amendmentof Section 4.1. Section 4.1 of the Plan shall be amended to provide that, subject to adjustment pursuant to the provisions of Section 4.3 of the Plan, the number of shares of Stock which may be issued and sold under the Planpursuant to Stock Option Agreements shall not exceed Sixty Six Thousand Forty Four (66,044) shares. 

3. Effect of Amendment.Except as expressly modified by this Amendment, the terms, covenants, and conditions of the Plan shall remain in full force and effect. 

INWITNESS WHEREOF, the Bank has caused this Amendment to be duly executed by its officer thereunto duly authorized, all as of the date first above written.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alejandro Yliz AGUIRRE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-50226.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.*

Filed March 9, 2011.

Bruce R. Castetter, Matthew John Gardner, Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Timothy Allen Scott, Law Offices of Timothy A. Scott, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Alejandro Yliz Aguirre, San Diego, CA, pro se.

Before: CANBY, FERNANDEZ, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Alejandro Yliz Aguirre appeals from his conviction for various drug offenses. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Aguirre contends that the district court’s instruction to the grand jury violated the Fifth Amendment by improperly limiting the grand jury’s discretion. This contention fails because the instructions here substantially mirrored those approved in *United States v. Cortez-Rivera,*454 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir.2006), and *United States v. Navarro-Vargas,*408 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Maurice Delee, Appellant.

[987 NYS2d 590]

Motion for writ of error coram nobis denied.

Present — Scudder, EJ., Smith, Lindley, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.
#### THE MARK K. CAMPBELL. ROSS v. HOUGHTON et al.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 31, 1895.)

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

Wilcox, Adams & Green, for intervening mortgagee, appellant.

H. D. Hotchkiss, for appellees.

Appeal dismissed by consent.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Winston R. Martinez, Appellant. Commissioner of Labor, Respondent.

[862 NYS2d 127]

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed December 19, 2006, which, among other things, ruled that claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment insurance benefits because he was not totally unemployed.

Claimant filed original claims for benefits effective August 29, 2004 and September 26, 2005. As to the August 2004 claim, substantial evidence supports the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board’s finding that claimant’s request for a hearing was untimely. Although the underlying notice of determination was mailed to claimant on April 13, 2006, he did not request a hearing until more than three months later—well beyond the 30-day limit imposed by Labor Law § 620 (1) (a) *(see Matter of Jarrett [Commissioner of Labor],*13 AD3d 965 [2004]). Claimant’s proffered excuse for the delay—that he “had a lot going on” at that time—falls far short of demonstrating that he suffered from a mental or physical incapacity that precluded him from requesting a hearing within the 30-day period *(see id.).*

Turning to the September 2005 claim, the record reflects that claimant formed a corporation in November 2004 and thereafter performed computer research in furtherance of starting up his business and made up business cards. In October 2005, claimant amended the certificate of incorporation to change the corporation’s name and subsequently attended industry association meetings, opened a business checking account and began performing consulting services, for which the corporation received payment on October 30, 2005. Under such circumstances, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that claimant was not totally unemployed during the relevant time period. To the extent that claimant contends that his business was not active until late October 2005 or early November 2005, his testimony is belied by other evidence in the record and, in any event, presented a credibility issue for the Board to resolve *(see Matter of Cefalu [Commissioner of Labor],*41 AD3d 1088, 1089 [2007]). Finally, inasmuch as claimant failed to disclose his role in the corporation or his business activities, we find no basis upon which to disturb the Board’s finding that claimant *1138made a willful false statement to obtain unemployment insurance benefits *(see Matter of McVey [Commissioner of Labor],*42 AD3d 796, 797-798 [2007]).

Mercure, J.P, Spain, Rose, Malone Jr. and Stein, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
#### Richline Group, Inc., Appellant, v City of Mount Vernon et al., Respondents.

[987 NYS2d 222]

In an action to recover damages for negligence, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.), entered August 22, 2012, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and denied its cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. A municipal entity “is not liable for the negligent performance of a governmental function unless there existed ‘a special duty to the injured person, in contrast to a general duty owed to the public’ ” *(Metz v State of New York,*20 NY3d 175, 179 [2012], quoting *McLean v City of New York,*12 NY3d 194, 199 [2009]; *see Flagstar Bank, FSB v State of New York,*114 AD3d 138, 143 [2013]). The plaintiff must first establish the existence of a special duty owed to it by the entity before it becomes necessary to address whether the entity can rely upon the defense of governmental immunity *(see Metz v State of New York,*20 NY3d at 179; *Valdez v City of New York,*18 NY3d 69, 80 [2011]). A special duty arises when there is a duty to exercise reasonable care toward the plaintiff as a result of a special relationship between the plaintiff and the governmental entity *(see McLean v City of New York,*12 NY3d at 199; *Pelaez v Seide,*2 NY3d 186, 198-199 [2004]; *Flagstar Bank, FSB v State,*114 AD3d at 143). When a municipality assumes an affirmative duty to act on behalf of a specific party, and that party justifiably relies to its detriment on the direct assurances of the municipality’s agents, a special duty arises *(see Cuffy v City of New York,*69 NY2d 255, 260 [1987]; *Weisbecker v West Islip Union Free Sch. Dist.,*109 AD3d 657, 658-659 [2013]; *Jerideau v Huntington Union Free School Dist.,*21 AD3d 992, 993 [2005]).

The defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they did not owe a special duty to the plaintiff. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Weisbecker v West Islip Union Free Sch. Dist.,*109 AD3d at 658; *Jerideau v Huntington Union Free School Dist.,*21 AD3d at 993). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

*773Additionally, as the plaintiff was unable to establish that the defendant owed it a special duty, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment *(see Flagstar Bank, FSB v State,*114 AD3d at 148).

Balkin, J.R, Chambers, Cohen and Duffy, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                EXHIBIT 13.2


                             INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' REPORT


To the Board of Directors and Shareholders
  of Thomas-Davis Medical Centers, P.C.
Tucson, Arizona

We have audited the consolidated statements of operations, cash flows, and
changes in shareholders' equity of Thomas-Davis Medical Centers, P.C. and
Subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 1993.  These financial statements
are the responsibility of the Company's management.  Our responsibility is to
express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audit.  We did not
audit the financial statements of Intergroup Healthcare Corporation, a 62.6%
owned subsidiary, which statements reflect total revenues of $392,036,000 for
the year ended December 31, 1993.  Those statements were audited by other
auditors whose report has been furnished to us, and our opinion, insofar as it
relates to the amounts included for Intergroup Healthcare Corporation, is based
solely on the report of the other auditors.

We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material
misstatement.  An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting
the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements.  An audit also includes
assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by
management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.
We believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, based on our audit and the report of other auditors, the
consolidated financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all
material respects, the results of the operations and cash flow of Thomas-Davis
Medical Centers, P.C. and Subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 1993, in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.


STEVENSON, JONES & HOLMAAS, P.C.

Tucson, Arizona
April 27, 1994


                                      50
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 271 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 271

  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the standard 
  charitable mileage rate for delivery of meals to elderly, disabled, 
                     frail and at risk individuals.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 7, 2009

  Mr. Latta introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the standard 
  charitable mileage rate for delivery of meals to elderly, disabled, 
                     frail and at risk individuals.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. INCREASE IN STANDARD MILEAGE RATE FOR DELIVERY OF MEALS TO 
              ELDERLY, DISABLED, FRAIL AND AT RISK INDIVIDUALS.

    (a) In General.--Subsection (i) of section 170 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to standard mileage rate for use of 
passenger automobile) is amended by inserting ``(58.5 cents per mile in 
the case of the delivery of meals to homebound individuals who are 
elderly, disabled, frail or at risk)'' before the period at the end.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to miles driven on or after the date of the enactment of this 
Act.
                                 <all>
```
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11**  **- 7463** 

CLIFTON STALLINGS , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. WARDEN OF EVANS CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION , Respondent _ Appellee , and JON E. OZMINT, Director of SCDC , Res pondent
. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Charleston
. R. Bryan Harwell , District Judge. ( 2:10

- cv - 02668

- RBH )

Submitted : February 23, 2012 Decided: February 28, 2012

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion

. Clifton Stallings, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, William Edgar Salter, III, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Clifton Stallings seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petiti on. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (A) (2006) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional righ t.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debat able, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Stallings has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a cer tificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials3 before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

DISMISSED
[966 NYS2d 808]

#### Milliely Nieves, an Infant, by Her Parent and Natural Guardian, Milagros Vasquez, et al., Appellants, v 30 Ellwood Realty LLC, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

April 11, 2013

*64APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Jacoby & Meyers,*Newburgh, *anc[ Finkelstein & Partners (.Marie DuSault*of counsel) for appellants. *Smith Mazure Director Wilkins Young & Yagerman, PC.,*New York City *(Stacy I. Mali-now of*counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Per Curiam.

Order, entered March 12, 2012, modified to the extent of directing plaintiff to produce her Facebook records compiled on or after the date of the accident for an in camera review of those records, and thereafter for a de novo determination of defendant’s discovery motion; as modified, order affirmed, without costs.

The infant plaintiff claims damages for physical and psychological injuries, including the inability to engage in social activities, anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Defendant demonstrated that plaintiffs Facebook profile contained photographs that were probative of the issue of the extent of her alleged injuries, and it is reasonable to believe that other portions of her Facebook records may contain further evidence relevant to that issue *(see Patterson v Turner Constr. Co.,*88 AD3d 617 [2011]; *see also Richards v Hertz Corp.,*100 AD3d 728 [2012]). In these circumstances, and since “it is possible that not all Facebook communications are related to the events that gave rise to plaintiffs cause of action” *(Patterson v Turner Constr. Co.,*88 AD3d at 618), the appropriate course is to remand the matter for an in camera inspection of plaintiffs Facebook records, to determine which of those records, if any, are relevant to plaintiffs alleged injuries. To the extent that a thorough in camera inspection may prove unduly burdensome, the trial court retains broad discretion to set reasonable terms and conditions thereon *(see generally Downing v Moskovits,*58 AD3d 671 [2009]; *Gillen v Utica First Ins. Co.,*41 AD3d 647 [2007]), including the right to direct plaintiff to conduct an initial review of her own Facebook account, and limit the in camera inspection to items whose discoverability is contested by plaintiff *(see Offenback v L.M. Bowman, Inc.,*2011 WL 2491371, *3 n 3, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 66432, *8 n 3 [MD Pa 2011]).

Schoenfeld, J.E, Shulman and Hunter, Jr., JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

JOHNNY LEE ANDERSON, )

DOC #S33369, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-581

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

________________________________ )

Opinion filed August 23, 2019.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Manatee County, Brian Iten, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public 

Defender, and Pamela H. Izakowitz, 

Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for 

Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Kiersten E. Jenson, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, 

for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

VILLANTI, ATKINSON, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.
#### In the Matter of Sharon Lashley, Petitioner, v D. Scalise, Captain/Acting Superintendent, Albion Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.

[858 NYS2d 639]

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department by order of the Supreme Court, Orleans County [James P Punch, A.J.], entered December 10, 2007) to review a determination. The determination found after a tier II hearing that petitioner had violated various inmate rules.

It is hereby ordered that said proceeding is unanimously dismissed without costs as moot *(see Matter of Free v Coombe,*234 AD2d 996 [1996]). Present—Smith, J.P, Centra, Fahey, Peradotto and Pine, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          30,755
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   30,511
<ALLOWANCES>                                     4,403
<INVENTORY>                                      5,273
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                92,377
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<DEPRECIATION>                                  12,931
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 117,577
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           33,522
<BONDS>                                              0
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<CGS>                                           22,156
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                23,812
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 2,306
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,391
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  7,359
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (6,543)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             13,902
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
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<NET-INCOME>                                    13,902
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .32
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .32
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of WNC Housing Tax Credit Fund II, L.P. (the “Partnership”) for the year ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), and pursuant to 18 U.S.C., section1350, as adopted pursuant to section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, I, Wilfred N. Cooper, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer of WNC & Associates, Inc., general partner of Partnership’s general partner, hereby certify that:





1.
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





2.
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Partnership.








/s/ WILFRED N. COOPER, JR.


Wilfred N. Cooper, Jr.


President and Chief Executive Officer of WNC & Associates, Inc.


Date: June 28, 2011
# **EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

***CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18U.S.C. SECTION 1350***

*** ***

In connection with the September 30, 2007Form 10-Q of Cornell Companies, Inc. (the “Company”) as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James E.Hyman, Chief Executive Officer and the Chairman of the Board, certify pursuantto 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Actof 2002, that:

 

1.            TheReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, and

2.            Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respectsthe financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

 
|   | /s/ James E. Hyman                       |   |
|--------|------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | James E. Hyman, Chief Executive Officer, |
|   | President and Chairman of the Board      |
|   | November 9, 2007                         |

 

Note:  The certification theregistrant furnishes in this exhibit is not deemed “filed” for purposes ofSection 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or otherwisesubject to the liabilities of that Section. Registration Statements or otherdocuments filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission shall notincorporate this exhibit, except as otherwise stated in such filing.

 

----