### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Jul y 17, 200 7 S es sio n
THE ESTA TE OF ELDO RA BURKES, by and t hrough it s Adm inistrator, C. T.A ., CA LVIN BU RKE S

v. ST. PE TER

VILL A, INC ., d/b/a ST. PE TER VILL A N UR SING HOM E
An Appeal f

rom the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-005655-02 D 'Arm y Bailey, Jud ge

No. W2006-02497-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Septem ber 12, 2007

Th is a pp e a l invo lve s an aw ard of dis c re tio na ry c os ts af te r a v olu nta ry dis mis sa l. T he pla int if

f e state filed a la wsuit ag ainst the defe ndant nursinghome, alleg ing a buse and ne g lect of the plaintiff’ s de c e de nt. Th e de fe nd ant n ur sin g ho me fi le d a

mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt a

nd a mot ion to e xclu de the pla int if

f’ s e xpe rt . T he mot ion f

or summa ry jud g me nt w a s d e nie d, but th e mot ion to e xclu de the pla int if

f’ s e xp ert was g ra

nte d. Th e pla int if

f t he n f ile d a no tic e of vo luntary

no ns uit

. Consequently , the trial cour t entere d an orde r of voluntar y dismiss al without pr ejudice. A fter e ntry of thi s o rd e r, the de fe nd ant n ur sin g ho me fi le d a

mot ion fo r d isc re tio na

ry c os ts, purs ua

nt t o Ru le 54.04(2) of

the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedur e. The trial court g rante d the motion, and enter ed an orde r asse ssing the c osts ag ainst the plaintiff estate . The plaintiff e state now a ppeals, a rguing that the def endant nursing home was not entitled to an awa rd of discr etionary

costs beca

use it obtained no relief on the merits of the c ase a nd there fore was not a “ preva iling par ty .” We af

firm, findingthat Rul e 54 .0 4( 2) e xpre ssl y a uth or ize s the tr ia l c ourt , in its dis c re tio n, to a

wa rd dis c re tio na

ry c os ts t o a def endant in a la

wsuit that is volunt arily

dismiss ed without prejudice

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e ntof t he Cha nc e r y C our t i s A ffirm e d.

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., and B EN H. C A N T RE LL , S R

. J ., joined.
M. Chad Trammel a

nd S. Drake Martin, J ackson, Te nnessee , and B rian G. B rooks, Gr eenbr ier, Arka nsas, for app el l ant, The Estate of Eldora Bur kes, by and throug h its Admini strator, C.T.A., Ca lvi n B ur

ke s.
Donna L . Boyce a

nd Br ian S. Faughnan, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or appe llee, St. Peter Villa, Inc., d/b/a St. P eter

Villa NursingHome.-2- OP IN ION

I n N ov e mbe r 2 00 1, Ms. El do ra B ur ke s (“ De c e de nt” ) wa s adm itt e d to a nurs ingho me fa c ili ty owned a nd controlled by

Def endant/A p p el l ee St. Peter V illa, I nc., d/b/a St. Peter Villa Nursing Home (“ St. P eter ”). At the t ime of her admission, the Decede nt was in poor health and in need of total car e; she ha d rec ently suffe red a stroke, which left her partially para ly zed, and suffe red f

rom a numbe r o f o the r m e dic a l c on dit ion s.
A m onth later, on Dec ember 29, 2001, the Decede nt was transported to the Reg ional Medica l Center. At the time she was a dmitted, the Dece dent’s temperature was e levated, he r fe edingtube insertion site was lea

king, a nd she had a decubitus ulcer , or pre ssure sore , on the scoliotic portion of her ba ck. While at the Medica l Center, the De cede nt was diag nosed with sepsis, a bloodstream infec tion. After tre atment, the De cede nt returne d to St. P eter on J anuar

y 15, 2002.
The De cede nt’s condition deteriorated; the ul cer on her back wor sened a nd, in addition, she de ve lop e d s or e s o n h e r f a c e and he r t oe s, a s w e ll a s g ang re no us are a s o n h er r ig ht f oo t. Con se qu e n t l y , o nJanu ar y 1 8 , 2 0 0 2 , s h e w a s tr an s p o rt e d t o th e U n i v e r s i ty

o f T e n n e s s e e B o wl d Hospital. She died at the hospital seve ral da y s later, on January

23, 2002, at the ag e of 88.

On Oc tob e r 2 , 2 00 2, Pla int if f/Ap pe lla nt T he Es tate of

El do ra B ur

ke s, by and thr ou g h it s Ad min istrator , C. T. A. , Ca lvi n B ur ke s (“ B ur ke s” ), fi le d a laws uit a g a ins t St. Pe te r, a lle g ing that St. Peter ne g lige ntly

failed to provide proper

car e and treatment to the Dece dent. B urkes a lleg ed that the ne g lig e nt a c ts of St. Pe te r d ir e c tly and pr oximate ly

c a us e d th e De c e de nt t o s uf

fe r p re ssu re so re s, se ps is, and

oth e r b loo d- bo rn e toxic inf e c tio ns , wh ic h re su lte d in pa in and su ff e ri ngand ult imate ly hastene d the Dec edent’ s death. B urkes soug ht compensatory and punitive damag es. St. P eter filed
an answ er de nying a ll alleg ations of neg lige nce.
Di sc ov e ry

e ns ue d. I n F e br

ua ry 20 04 , Burk e s des ig nate d two e xpe rt wi tne sse s e xpe c te d to te sti fy a t tr ia l, G e ra ld G ow itt , M .D ., and Te re sa L ow e ry , R.N

. Th e de sig natio n in dic a te d th a t Ms

. L ower y was e x pecte d to testify

conce rningalleg ed brea ches of the standar d of ca

re ow ed to nursing home residents. It indicated that Dr . Gowitt was expected to testify on whether

St. P eter brea ched the standar d of ca

re a pp l i ca b l e t o the Dec edent’ s treatment a nd medical c ondition, as well as
causati o n o f th e D e c e d e n t’ s in ju r ie s

. H o w e v e r , d

ur in g a d e p o s it io n ta

k e n o n Ju n e 7 , 2 0 0 4, Dr. Gowitt repe atedly declined to offe r any medical opinion that St. P eter ’s alleg ed deviations from the sta nd ard of c are pr oximate ly

c a us e d th e De c e de nt’ s in

jur ie s.
On M arc h 27, 2006, St. Peter filed a motion for summary judgme nt. For pur

poses of ruling on the summary

judgme nt motion, it was undisput ed that Dr. Gowitt ref used t o testify

that the ca

re provided to the De cede nt by St. P eter was the prox imate cause of her injuries. Be cause Bur kes fa iledIn a m ed i ca l m alp rac t i ce suit , t he p l ainti f f m ust pu t f

o rth exp ert p ro o f

o n e ac h e l em en t o f

t he claim , un l ess 1 the ne g lige n t ac t o r o m issio n is with in the c o m m o n k n o w le d g e o f an o rd ina ry p e rs o n

. A yer s v. Ru ther f ord H osp. , I

nc. , 6 8 9 S.W

. 2 d 15 5 , 16 0 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 19 8 4 ).

-3- to establish a g enuine issue of fact by offe ring competent ex pert testim ony on the i ssue of c ausation, St. P eter argued that it was e ntitled to judgment as a matter of la

w. 1 On April 21, 2006, approximately one mont h prior to trial, Bur kes desig nated a

new e x pert wi tne ss, Dr . Abs a lom

Ti lle y , a nd fi le d a re sp on se in opp os iti on to the mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. I n an aff idavit attache d to Burke s’ re sponse, Dr. Tilley opined that the substandar d car e St. Peter provided wa s a “sig nificant c ontributing fa ctor to the c ontinue d m ed i cal de cline suff ere d by [t he Dec edent], which ultimately cause d and/or c ontributed to her untimely death. ” R el y ing on D r. Tilley ’s af

fidavit as we ll a s the deposition te stimony of Ms. L ower

y , Bur kes ar g ued that the r ecor d
c on ta ine d s uf

fi c ie nt e xpe rt

pr oo f t o e sta

bli sh a g e nu ine iss ue of

fa c t a s to the ne g lig e nc e and lia bil ity of St. Peter. B urkes a lso argued that St. Peter’s summary judgme nt motion i g nored B urkes’ other claims, including ordinary neg lige nce, ne g lige nce pe r se , i n t en tional misconduct, and wrong ful death. Ac cording ly , Bur

kes ar g ued that St. Peter’s motion should be denied.

B e fo re the tr ia l c ourt ru le d on the mot ion fo r summa ry jud g me nt, St. Pe te r fi le d a mot ion to exclude Dr. Tilley ’s testimony . St. P eter argued that Bur

kes fa iled to timely

desig nate Dr . Tilley

as an e xpe rt wi tne ss a nd that B ur ke s f a ile d to se a so na

b l y s u p p l e m e nt i nt e r r o g a tor y re sp on se s to dis c los e Dr. Tilley as an expert witness. On M ay 2, 2006, the t rial court entere d an orde r deny ing St. Peter’ s motion for summary

judgment. The next day , the trial cour t entere d an orde r g rantingSt. P eter ’s mot ion to e xclu de Dr . T ill e y

a s an e xpe rt

wi tne ss. Appar ently

di v i ning the likely

outcome of the trial in light of the tr ial court’s e x clusion of Dr. Tilley , Bur

kes filed a

notice of voluntar

y nonsuit without prejudice . On J une 2, 2006, the trial court e ntere d an orde r of voluntar y dismiss al without prejudice

. In the interim, St. P eter had filed a motion f or re considera

tion of the denial of summar y judgme nt or, in the alternative, for pe rmission to seek a n interlocutory

appea l. The trial cour

t did not rule on this mot ion.

On J une 20, 2006, St. Peter filed a mot ion for discretionary costs, pursuant to Rule 54.04(2) of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure. St. Peter soug ht $5,173.70 in disc retionar y costs, which inc lud e d th e e xpens e s and e xpe rt fe e s in c ur

re d in the c ours e of

the e ig ht d e po sit ion s ta ke n in p re p ar at i o nfo r t ri al

. On S ep t em b e r 2 8 , 2 0 0 6 , th e t ri al co urt en t er edan o rd er gra n t i n g S t

. P et er 's motion and awa

rding it the full amount of di scre tionary costs soug ht. From this order , Bur kes now
a pp e a ls.S t. P e te r ra ise s a n issu e o n a p p e a l as w e ll. S t. P e te r ask s this C o u rt to re v ie w w h e the r t h e tria l co u rt e rr e d in 2
d enyi ng i t s m o t i o n f

o r s um m ary judgm ent , af t er excl ud i ng t he o nl y s o urce of exp ert t est i m o ny on ca usat i o n. W e d ecl i ne t o add r es s t hi s i s s ue on appeal

. A t r i al cour t ’ s deni al of a mot i on f

or s ummary judgment i s an i nt er l ocut ory deci s i on t hat d o e s n o t re su lt in a fi n a l an d a p p e a la b le ju d g m e n t un d e r R u le 3 o f th e T e n n e sse e R u le s o f C ivil P ro c e d u re

. Se e, e . g. , Wi ll i am s on Count

y Br oad. Co. v. Wi ll i am s on Count y Bd. of Ed. , 5 4 9 S .W .2 d 3 7 1 , 3 7 3 (T e n n . 1 9 7 7 ); see a l so In re E st a t e o f M cC o rd , 661 S. W

. 2d 890, 891 ( T en n

. Ct

. A p p

. 19 8 3 ); M arti n v. Washm ast er Au t o C t r . , I nc. , N o. 01A01- 9305- CV

- 00224, 1993 W L 241315, a t * 2 ( T en n

. Ct

. App. J u l y 2, 1993)

. “ T ak i n g a v ol u n t ar y n on s u i t doe s n ot
r ender t he deni al of

a s ummary j udgment an y mo r e s ui t abl e f or a pp el l at e r evi ew. ” M a rtin , 1 9 9 3 W L 2 4 1 3 1 5 , at *2

.

-4- B ur ke s p re se nts a

sin g le iss ue fo r appe llate re vie w, na me ly , w he the r S t. P e te r w a s a

“ pr e va ili ngpa

rt y ” e nti tle d to an awa

rd of c os ts und e r R

ule 54 .0 4( 2) of

the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Procedur e, whe n the ca se ag ainst it was voluntarily dismiss ed without prejudice

. 2

Or din ari ly , th e sta

nd ard of re vie w fo r a tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on to awa rd dis c re tio na

ry c os ts i s an abuse of discre tion standard. Long v. HCA H ealth Servs. of Tenn. , Inc. , No. M2001-00505- C OA -R3-CV, 2002 WL459009, at *6 (Te nn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2002) ( citing Pl ac e nc ia v . P lac e nc ia , 3 S.W .3d 497, 503 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999)) . In this appeal, howe ver, the issue prese nted re quires interpre tation of Rule 54.04(2) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedure , which is a pure que stion of law. Lacy v. Cox , 152 S.W .3d 480, 483 (Tenn. 2004) ; Gre e n v . M oo re , 101 S.W .3d 415, 418 (Tenn. 2003) . Questions of l aw a re r eviewe d de novo on the appe llate re cord,
acc ording no presumption of cor rec tness to the conclusions of the tria l court. Ta y lor v . Fe ze ll , 158 S.W. 3d 35 2, 35 7 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) ; Wellm ont Heal t h S ys . v. Te nn. H

ealth Facili ties Com m ’n , No. M2002-03074-COA- R 3 -C V, 2004 WL 193074, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 29, 2004). The ref ore, we a pply a de novo standard of

revie w.
I n this appeal, B urkes doe s not challeng e the amount of the costs awa rded to St. Peter, nor does he a ssert that the trial c ourt ab u s ed its discretion in deciding to awar d such costs. Rather , B ur ke s c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ourt did no t ha ve a uth or ity to a wa rd c os ts i n th e fi rs t in sta

nc e , b e c a us e St. P eter is not a “pre vailing pa

rty ” within the meaningof Rule 54.04(2) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedur e.
Bur kes’ a rgument is predicated on two premises: (1) under Rule 54.04(2), only a “pr evailing party” may

rec over c osts, and (2) a

defe ndant in a ca se such a s this, which is voluntarily dismiss ed for strateg ic reasons and ca n be re filed, does not fit the tra ditional definition of “pre vailing pa rty .” Fr om these two pre mises, B urkes conclude s that a def endant in a c ase suc h as this cannot re cover c os ts.

I n arguing that only a “pr evailingparty” ma

y r e c over c osts under Rule 54.04(2), B urkes looks first to Rule 54.04(1), which addre sses the costs included in t he cour t clerk’ s bill of costs. Burke s notes that subsection (1) states that the cle rk is to allow such costs “to the pr e v ail ing pa rty un le ss t h e c o u r t o t h e r w i s e d i r e c t s

. . . . ” T e n n

. R

. C i v
. P

. R u l e 5 4

. 0 4 ( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 5 ) ( e mp h a s i s a d d e d )

. In subsection (2) of Rule 54.04, the term “pre vailing party” is use d in the last sentenc e; the subsection state s th a t, i f a

n a pp e a l of the tr ia l cour t’s ju dg me nt r e su lts in a de c isi on un de r whic h “ the re is a-5-

differ ent pre vailing pa

rty

. . . .,” then the ne w pre vailing pa rty may reque st discretionary

costs. Tenn. R. C iv. P. 5 4. 04 (2 ) ( 20 05 ). B ur ke s a lso relie s o n c a se s invo lvi ngan a wa rd of dis c re tio na

ry c os ts following a judg ment on the merits, in which the a ppellate c ourt outlines the fac tors to be consider ed in de c idi ng wh e the r to awa rd su c h c os ts, wh ic h fa c tor s in c lud e wh e the r t he pa rt y se e kin g c os ts i s a “pre vailing party .” For example, in Russ e ll v . Brown , N o

. E 2 0 0 4

- 0 1 8 5 5

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 5 WL 1991609 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 18, 2005), the c ourt stated:

I n deter mining whe ther to aw ard discr etionary costs, a trial c ourt is instructed to (1) determinewhether the party see king costs is the “prevailing party;” (2) limit awar ds to t ho se c os ts s pe c if

ic a lly e nume ra te d in the ru le ; (3 ) de te rm ine if the re qu e ste d c os ts are “nec essar

y and rea sonable;” a

nd (4) de termine whe ther the pr e v ail ing pa rty has
e ng a g e d in

c on du c t du

ri ngthe lit ig a tio n th a t w arr ants de pr ivi ngit o f t he c os ts t o which it might other

wise be e ntitled.

Id. at *11 (e mphasis added)

. I f t hat pr e mis e is a c c e pte d, B ur ke s g oe s o n to argue that de fe nd ant S t. P e te r i s n ot a

“ pr e va ili ng pa

rt y ” de sp ite the dis mis sa l of B ur ke s’ laws uit , b e c a

us e St. Pe te r d id n ot o bta in at le a st so me re lie f o n th e me ri ts o f t he c a se . B ur

ke s a g a in r e lie s p ri mari ly on c a se s in wh ic h th e re wa s a jud g me nt o n th e me ri ts, so me inv olv ingan a wa rd of a tto rn e y ’s fe e s r a the r t

ha n d isc re tio na

ry c os ts. I n th e se c a se s, the te rm

“ pr e va ili ngpa

rt y ” is de fi ne d a s on e wh o ob ta ins so me re lie f on the me ri ts of the c ase or

a mater ial alteration in the leg al relationship of the parties. See Consol. Wast e Sys., LL C v . M e tro . G ov 't o f N as hv ill e& D av ids on Co unty , N o

. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 2 5 8 2

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 5 WL 1541860, at *46-48 (T enn. Ct. App. J une 30, 2005) (“[A] pre vailing party [i s] one who suc cee ded ‘o n an y sig nif

i c an ti s s u e i nl i t i g a t i o nw h i c ha c h i e v e s s o m e o f th e b e n e f

i tth e p art i e s s o u g h tin b ri n gi n g s u i t

. ’ ” ) ( qu o t i n g He nsle y v . Ecke rha rt , 4 61 U. S. 4 24 , 4 31 (1 98 3) ); see also Daron v. De p’t of Corr. , 4 4 S. W.3 d 4 78 , 4 80 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; Dairy Gold, Inc. v. Thom as , No. E2001-02463-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 1751193, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 29, 2002). A dismissal without prejudice is not considere d an adjudication on the merits. Se eMil am v. Wa l-

Ma rt St ores, Inc. , No. 02A01-9208- CV-11224, 1993 WL90388, at *1 (T en n

. C t

. App. Mar. 30, 1993) (“The words ‘w ithout prejudice’ . . . show s that the judicial ac t is not i ntended to be r es ju dicata of the merits of the c ontroversy .”) ( quoting B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary 1437 (5th ed. 1979))

. Appar ently

anticipatingprotest that this a rgument results in the conclusion that a de fenda nt in a ca se that i s v oluntarily dismiss ed will never

be conside red a

“pre vailing pa

rty ” and thus c an never obtain an awa

rd of discretionar

y costs, Bur

kes allows that a defe ndant such as St. Peter may be conside red a

“pre vailing pa

rty ” el i gible for a

n awa rd of c osts “[i ]n cases whe re a plaintiff
vo luntari ly dis mis se s and c ann ot or wi ll no t re fi le the c a se

. . . . ” I n th e ins tant c a se , B ur ke s n ote s, the laws uit

ha s a lr e a dy

be e n r e fi le d, and

the c os ts a

wa rd e d a re fo r d e po sit ion s whi c h can be us e d in t h e r e f i l e d c a s e , s o S t

. P e t e r

s h o u l d n o tb e c o n s i d e r e d

a p r e v a i l i n g p arty.Su bs ec t i on (2) of Rul e 54. 04 w as pr omu l g at ed by t h e T en n es s ee Su pr eme Cour t i n 1986
. Loc k v
. Nat ’ l Uni on 3 Fi r e I ns . Co. , 8 0 9 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 3 , 4 8 9 (T enn. 19 9 1 ); M as s . Li f e I ns . Co. v . Je

f f er s on , 1 0 4 S .W .3 d 1 3 , 3 3 -3 4 (T e n n . C t. A p p

. 20 0 2 ). P ri o r t o 19 8 6 , t he o nl y l i t i gat i o n- rel at ed e xp enses al l o wed unde r Rule 54

. 0 4 were t he co st s i ncl ud ed i n t he b ill o f co sts, w h ic h a re a llo w e d to the p re v a ili n g p a rty u n le ss o the rw ise d ire c te d b y the tr ia l c o u rt. I d. ; Te n n

. R. Ci v
. P. 5 4

. 0 4 (1).
-6- I n analy zing this issue, we look first to the languag e of the Rule at issue:
Rul e 54 .0 4 Co sts (1) Costs included in the bill of costs prepa red by the cler k shall be allowe d to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs, but costs ag ainst the state, its officer s, or its ag encie s shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. (2 ) Cos ts no t inc lud e d in the bil l of c os ts pr e pa re d by the c le rk

are a llo wa

ble only in the court' s discretion. Discre tionary costs allowable are : r eason ab l e a nd
nece ssary court re porter e x penses f

or depositions or trials, reasonable a nd nece ssary e xpe rt wi tne ss f e e s f or de po sit ion s ( or

sti pu late d r e po rt s) and

fo r t ri a ls, reas on a

ble
and ne c e ssa ry int e rp re te r f

e e s f or de po sit ion s o r t

ri a ls, and g ua rd ian a d li te m f

e e s; trave l expenses are not allowable discr etionary costs. Subject to Rule 41.04 , a pa rt y r e qu e s t i n g d i s c r e t i o n ar

y c o s t s s h a l l f

i l e an d s e r

v e a m o t i o n w i th i n th i rt y ( 3 0 ) d ays afte r entry

of judg ment. The trial c ourt reta ins j urisdiction over a motion for dis c re tio nary cos ts e ve n th ou g h a pa rt y ha s f ile d a no tic e of a pp e a l. The court may tax d i s cr et i o n ary costs at the time of voluntary dismissal . In the eve nt an appe al results in the final dis position of t he case, under which there is a diffe rent pre vailing party than the preva iling party under the trial court' s judgme nt, the new p re v ai l ing party may reque st discretionar y cost s by filing a motion in t he trial c ourt, which mot ion sh a ll b e fi le d a

nd se rv e d w ith in t

hir ty (3 0) day s a ft e r f

ili ngof the a pp e llate c ourt ' s ma

nd a te in t he tr ia l c ourt

purs ua nt t o Ru le 43 (a ), Te nn . R. Ap p. P.

Te nn . R. Civ

. P. 54 .0 4 (2 00 5) (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Thus , wh ile su bs e c tio n (1 ) of

Rul e 54 .0 4 d ir e c ts 3 the c le rk t o awa

rd the c os ts i n th e bil l of

c os ts t o th e “ pr e va ili ngpa rt y ” un le ss t

he c ourt dir e c ts otherwise, subse ction (2) contains no such languag e. The only place in which the ter m “pre vailing pa rt y ” a pp e ars in s ub se c tio n ( 2) is i n th e la st s e nte nc e , a dd e d by ame ndme nt i n 2 00 5. Th e ph ra se does not appe ar at all in the sentenc e under which the costs in this case wer e awarde d: “The c ourt may tax discre tionary costs at the time of voluntary dismiss al.” Both the la ng uag e of Rule 54.04( 2)
and the a dv iso ry

c omm e nt t o Rule 54 .0 4( 2) dir e c t us to c on sid e r t his pr ov isi on

in c onne c tio n w ith Rul e 41 .0 4, wh ic h s tate s:
I f a plaintiff who has once dismiss ed an action in a ny court commence s an a ct ion based upon or including the same claim ag ainst the same de fenda nt, the Court may make suc h order

for the pa y ment of costs of the a ction previously dismiss ed as it m ay deem pr oper a

nd may stay the proceeding s in the new a ction until the plaintiff has complied with the orde r.T he A d viso ry C o m m en t t o R ule 5 4 .04 st ates: 4

If t he p l ai nt i f

f t akes a vol unt ary nonsui t , R ul e 4 1

. 0 4 gi ves t he t ri al judge d i scr et i o n t o requi re payme nt
o f c o sts u p o n re c o m m e n c e m e n t o f t h e a c tio n . R e v ise d R u le 5 4 .0 4 w o u ld p e rm it a sse ssm e n t o f co sts at an earl i er date, ass um i ng t he d ef end ant s ub m i t s and t he co urt ent ers an ord er f o rma l l y dis m i ss i ng the c a se p u rs u a n t t o p la intiff ’s no n su it.

T e n n . R . C iv. P . 5 4 .0 4 a d v iso ry c m t. to 1 9 9 3 a m e n d m e n t.
-7- Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.04 (2005). Thus, Rule 41.04 provides that, upon rec ommenceme nt of an ac tion 4 voluntarily

dismiss ed, whe re the second action is ba sed upon or include s the same c laim ag ainst the
same de fe nd ant, a tr ia l c ourt “ may make su c h or de r f or the pa y me nt o f c os ts o f t

he a c tio n p re vio us ly dismiss ed as it may

deem pr oper.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.04 (2005).

Th e se nte nc e , “ Th e c ourt

may ta x disc re tio na

ry c os ts at the time of voluntary dismissal ,” wa s a dd e d to Rul e 54 .0 4( 2) by the 19 95 ame ndme nt. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . T his sente nc e wa s a dd e d in order to clarify

that the re feren ce t o Ru l e 4 1.04 did not mean that a tria l court could not tax discretionar

y costs at the time of the v o l u n t ary dismiss al, provided that the defe ndant timely filed
and se rv e d a mot ion fo r su c h c os ts. Te nn

. R. Civ

. P. 5 4. 04 , a dv iso ry c mt. to 1 99 5 ame ndme nt; see also Robert B anks, Jr. and J une F . Entman, Tennessee Civil Procedure § 4-9(b) (1999). Thus, in the
e ve nt o f a vo luntary

dis mis sa l w ith out pr e

jud ic e , th e tr ia l c ourt may , in its dis c re tio n, awa rd c os ts either at the time of voluntary dismiss al or upon re filing of the lawsuit. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04(2);
see Robert B anks, Jr., and J une F . Entman, Te nn esse e Civ il Pro c e du re§§ 4-9(b) , 9-2(h) (1999).

Bur kes maintains that the provision of Rule 54.04(2) perta ining to an awa rd of c osts at the t i m e o f v o l u n t ar y d i s m i s s a l r e qu i r e s t h e c o urt t o d e t e r m i n e i f th e d e f

e n d an t i s th e p r e v a i l i n g p arty, despite the fa ct that neither Rule 54.04(2) nor Rule 41.04 expressly require s such a de termination. Certainly , in case s in which there has bee n a judg ment on the merits or a dismiss al with prejudice , a de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t he pa rt y se e kin g dis c re tio na

ry c os ts i s a pr e va ili ngpa

rt y is r e le va nt, if not pivotal, in deciding whether to awar d such costs. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. C o. v. Jef ferson , 104 S.W. 3d 13 , 3 6-3 7 (Ten n. Ct. Ap p. 20 02 ) ( no tin g that c ourt s sh ou ld “ de te rm ine wh e the r t he pa rt y re qu e sti ng th e c os ts i s th e ‘p re va ili ngpa rt y .’ ” ); Long v. HCA H

ealth Servs. Of Tenn., Inc. , No. M2001-00505-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 459009, at *6 (Te nn. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2002).
A number of case s have a ffirme d an aw ard of discretionar

y costs in the context of a voluntary dismiss al, without directly addre ssing whe t h er Ru le 54.04(2) r equire s a dete rmination of whethe r the par ty seeking the costs is a pre vailing pa rty

. See , e.g. , Whit

e v. Albritton , No. W2000-03068- CO A-R 3-C V, 2 00 1 W L84 60 61 (Ten n. Ct . Ap p. J ul y 26 , 200 1) ; Ye ub a nk

s v . M e th odist Health careMemphis H

os pit als , No. W2001-02051-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL21392411 (Tenn. Ct

. Ap p. J une 10, 2003).

I n a re c e nt d e c isi on , th is C ourt he ld that, fo r pu

rp os e s of Rul e 54 .0 4( 2) , a de fe nd ant i n a c a se that was voluntarily

dismiss ed wa s the preva iling par ty . I n JP Mo rg an Ch as e Bank v

. Frank lin Na t’ l Ba nk , No. M 2005-02088-COA- R3-CV, 2007 WL2316450 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 13, 2007),T h e pl ai nt i f f ba nk i n J

P M or gan al so argued t hat t he at t o rney ’ s f ees could b e award ed as p art of t he 5 di s cr et i on ar y c os t s pu r s u an t t o Rul e 41. 04. T h i s a r g u men t w as rej ect ed bec au s e an a wa r d u n der Rul e 41. 04 mu s t be
m a d e b y the c o u rt in w h ic h the su b se q u e n t a c tio n is c o m m e n c e d , in t h a t c a se the fed e ra l co u rt. JP M or gan , 2 0 0 7 WL 2316450, a t * 5.
-8- one bank f

iled a lawsuit ag ainst another ba nk. The plainti ff bank voluntarily dismiss ed it s state cour t lawsuit and re -filed in fe d er al cour t. Soon after the pla intiff bank filed its notice of voluntary dismiss al, the def

endant f iled a motion re questing discretionar y costs. The state tr ial court g rante d the motion for discre tionary costs , an d the plaintiff appe aled. JP Morgan , 2007 WL 2316450, at *2.
The appellate court first disallowed the tria l court’s inclusion of attorney ’s fe es in the aw ard of discre tionary

costs, finding that attorney ’s fe es could not be awa rded pur suant to Rule 54.04(2). 5 Id. at *4. The a

ppellate c ourt then addr essed the r ema i n d er of the discr etionary costs awa

rded pursuant to Rule 54.04(2).
The JP Morgan Court note d first that courts should, a s a g ener al matter, a war d discretionar

y costs to a pre vailing pa

rty if the costs are rea sonable a nd the motion seekingcosts was timely filed. Id. at *7. I t then stated, without elaboration, “For the p u rp o se of Te nn. R. Civ. P . 54.04(2) [the defe ndant bank] was the pr evailingparty beca use [the plaintiff bank] voluntarily dismiss ed its suit.” Id. at *8. The Court f

ound that the awa

rd of discretionar

y costs (excluding the attorne y ’s fe es) wa s not an abuse of discre tion, and aff irmed it. Id. Thus , ir

re sp e c tiv e of

wh e the r the de fe nd ant ba nk fi t the def inition of “preva iling par t y ” uti liz ed in ca ses involving a n adjudication on the mer its or a dismiss al with prejudice , the JP Morgan Court f ound that the defe ndant ba n kwa s a “ preva iling party” bec ause it had obta ined a dismissal of the plaintiff’ s lawsuit, albeit without prejudice.

I n th is a pp e a l, B ur

ke s invit e s th is C ourt to a do pt a sta nd ard in wh ic h a de fe nd ant in a c a se that is vo luntari ly dis mis se d with out pre jud ic e may be de e me d a “pr e va ili ng pa rt y ,” and thu s o bta in dis c re tio na

ry c os ts, on ly

“ in c a se s wh e re a pla int if

f vo luntari ly dis mis se s and c ann ot o r w ill no t r e fi le t h e ca s e. ” T h i s we d ec l i n e t o d o

. S u ch a s t an d ar d i s p at en t l y

un wo rk ab l e a n d

re qu i re s th e t ri al j u d ge to e ith e r m ake de c isi on s o n is su es no t befo re the c ourt or be c la ir vo y ant. F or

the tr ia l c ourt

to deter mi n e whether

the plaintiff “c annot” r efile the case would require the trial cour t to determine issues such as whe ther the savings statute w ould apply to the ref iled case , issues normally decide d only if and whe n the ca se is ref iled. E v en m o re fa r-f

etche d is the proposal that the trial c ourt deter mine, at the time the ca se is voluntarily dismiss ed, whether the plaintiff will re fi le the laws uit

. Ho w c an th e tr ia l ju dg e kn owthi s? I n this cas e , th e str a te g ic re a so n f or B ur ke s’ de c isi on

to voluntarily

dismiss was obvious, and B urkes pr omptly ref iled the lawsuit. In many case s, howeve r, the re ason for

the voluntary dismiss al is not known by the def endant or the trial cour

t, and whethe r the pla int if

f i nte nd s to re fi le may

no t be a pp are nt.

Moreove r, Bur

kes’ sug g ested analy sis is at odds with Rule 41.04, which e x pressly provides fo r a n a wa rd of di scre tio na

ry c os ts when the lawsuit is refiled . Obviously , under Rule 41.04, a n awa rd of dis c re tio na

ry c os ts is app ro pr iate wh e re the pla int if f ca n an d doe s re fi le the laws uit . Ru le-9-

54 .0 4( 2) pla inl y

dir ect s u s to int e rp re t it

in c onne c tio n w ithRul e 41 .0 4. I t make s mo re se ns e to simply hold, as did the Court in JP Morgan , that a defe ndant in a case that is voluntarily dismiss ed is nece ssarily

the “pr evailing party” simply beca use the plaintiff “ voluntarily dismiss ed its suit.” JP Morgan , 2007 WL 2316450, at *8.

Re g ard le ss, Rul e 54 .0 4( 2) pla inl y a uth or ize s an a

wa rd of dis c re tio na

ry c os ts i n p re c ise ly

thi s c ir c ums tanc e . Wh e the r t he Rul e is i nte rp re te d to me an th a t no de te rm inatio n o f p rev a ili ngpa rt y sta tu s i s r e qu i r e d i n t h e c a s e o f a v o l un t ar y d i s m i s s a l , o r w h e th e r a d e f e n d a n t i n a c a se tha t is voluntarily

dismiss ed is nec essari l y

al wa y s th e “ p re v ai l i n g p arty , ” Ru l e 5 4

. 0 4 (2 ) e x p re s s l y au th orizes the tr ia l c ourt

to “ ta x disc re tio na

ry c os ts at th e tim e of vo lu nt ary dis mis sa l.” Ap ply

ingthe pla in langua g e of

Rul e 54 .0 4( 2) a s w ri tte n, we mus t c on clu de th a t th e tr ia l c ourt in t his c a se ha d f

ull
a uth or ity to gra nt S t. P e te r’ s mo tio n f

or dis c re tio na

ry c os ts.
Th e de c isi on

of the tr ial cou rt is a ff

ir me d. Cos ts o f t

his a pp e a l are to b e ta xed

to Pla int if f/Ap pe lla nt T he Es tate of

El do ra B ur ke s, by and thr ou g h its Ad min istra tor , C. T. A. , Ca lvi n B u r k e s , an d i t s s u r e t y, f

o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e , i f n e c e s s ar y.

_________________________________________ HOL L Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE