1 John T. Boyd, Chi ef Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Ap peals, sitting by

assignment . Tex. Gov ’t Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002). NO. 07-99-0176 -CR IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L E DECEM BER 20, 2002

______________________________ TRAVIS RAY WOODS, APPELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT 4 OF DALLAS COUNTY; NO. 9853153-IK; HONORAB LE JOHN C . CREUZOT, J UDGE

_______________________________ Before REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ., and BOYD, SJ. 1 Presenting a single issue for our determ inati on, app ellant Travis Ray W oods challenges his conviction of po sse ssi on of coc ai ne an d t he re su lt in g p un is hmen t o f two yearsconfi nemen t in the county j ail and a $500 fine. In his issue, he contends the trial2

court reversibl y erred by refusi ng to suppress evidenceacquired b y Dallas po lice officers because at the tim e the events giving rise t o that eviden ce occurred, they di d not have specifi c, articul able facts suffi cient to gi ve rise to a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been, or was ab ou t t o b e, co mm itted. Disagr eeing, we affirmthe judgm ent of the trial court.
The relevant evidence was that about 4:40 p.m . on Septem ber 26, 1 998 , D alla s Po lice Officer Sam uel Scott Mc Donnold and his partner were on patrol southbound o n DuBoisAven ue in Dallas, a “know n drug loca tion.” A s they approac hed appe llant’s ca r, theysaw that it w as parked on th e side of the str eet fac ing oncom ing tra f fic in front of a house at 3 31 D uB ois. Theoff icer tho ugh t th at p ark ing t he car f acin g on com ing t raf

fic was a traffic v iolation . A

s th e of fice rs cont inue d dr iving tow ard thecar , th ey s aw

Felic ia W alton, a wom an known to delive r narcoti cs out of the house at 331 DuBois, leaning into appell ant’s car. As they approac he d, they saw appellant take som ething with his right hand out of W alton’s l eft hand. Office r McDonnold testi fied that he belie ved this was a drug transaction.
The officers angled their patrol car across the front o f appel lant’s car, and Mc Don nold and his partner got out. His partner s topped Wal ton while McDonn old went around to the dr iver’s si de of appel lant’s car. As he d id so, he saw a crack cocaine pipe laying on the front seat. As the offi cer was tal king to appellant, he saw a s mall baggy under appellant’s right leg. He then asked appellant to ex it the vehicle. The officer2 Although appellant cites case law that refers to both the fourth am endme nt of the federal constitution and article I, section 9 of the stateconstitution, he does not argue that , in thecon tex

t of this case, the stateconstitution provides m ore protection to him than t he federal constitution. We will not, therefore, address any state claims separately. Brown v. State, 943 S.W.2d 35, 36 n.3 (Tex.Crim .App. 1997); Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Te x. Crim .App . 1992), cert. deni ed, 510 U.S. 852, 114 S.Ct. 154, 126 L.Ed.2d 115 (1993). 3 averred that the pipe and the baggy wer e in plain view . After appellant got out of the car, the officer retrieved the crack pipe and the baggy , and arrested appellantfor the offense of which he w

as later convicted. Appellant argues aseizureoccurred w hen the officers blocked the front of his car with their patrol car so he could not leave. He reasons that this was

illegal because at the time, the officers di d not have sufficient articulable reasons to believe a criminal activity was tak ing place. 2 He contendsthat the “seizure” was illega l because the activity which the officer observed was as consistent w ith innocent activity as it waswith crim inal activity and cites severa l cas es t hat spe ak to th at p rop osit ion. Ho w eve r, in Woods v. State , 956 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997), the court held that const ruct wasno longer a viabl e test for determ ining reasonable suspicion. Id. at 38. Rather, it held:
We hold that the reasonableness of a te mporary detention m ust be exam ined in terms of the totali ty of the circumstance s and will be justified when the detaining off i cer has specific articulable facts, which taken together w it h r ational inferences from thos e facts, lead him to conclude that the person detained a ctuall y is, has been, or soon will be engaged in cr i minal activi ty.
Id. Thus, the rule is now es tablished as set out above in Woods

.4

The State initi ally r esp onds to a ppe llant ’s arg um ents by con ten ding tha t his detent ion w

as j ust ified becaus e th e of fice r ob ser

ved himcom mitting a traffic violation. It also argues that appellant’s detention was jus tified by sufficient art icula ble facts to m eet the Woods test.
Standard of Review
The standard of review of issues like t hat befor e us is well settled. Instead of reiterating it, we ci te the parties to Garcia v . State, 43 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tex.Crim .App. 2001) ;Statev. Ross , 32 S.W.3d 853, 85 5-56 (Tex .Crim .App. 2000); and Guz man v. State , 955 S. W .2d 85, 89 ( Tex .Cr im .A pp. 199 7) f or exp lana tion s of

thesta nda rd w hich w e w ill fo ll ow.
Traffic Violation
The State’s contention that th e officerobs erv ed a ppe llant com m ittin g a t raf

fic offense is based upon section 545.303(b) of t he Transportation Code. That statute ma kes itan offense tosto p or

par k a veh icle on aone -way r oad w ay in the direction of oncom ing traffic. Tex. Transp. C ode Ann. § 545.303(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003). H owever, t here is no evidence that the street u pon w hic h appellant’s car wasparked was a one-way street. In deed, Mc Don nold , sp ecif icall y an d re pea ted ly, tes tifie d th at a ppe llant ’s veh ic le wa s parked on the “wrong side” of the roa d. B eca usesec tion 545 .30 3(b ) do es n ot m akeitan off ense me rely to park on one side of the street or the other w ithout a show ing that th e5

streetwas a one-way s treet, McD onnold’s testim ony wasnot sufficient to show that a vio lation of the statute had occurred. Acco rdingly, we do not agree that the S tat e est ablis hed that a traffic violation had occurred at the tim e McDonnold saw an d approached appellant’s car. Reasonable Suspicion
In considering whether M cDonnold was in possession of articulable facts sufficient to j ust ify a re aso nab le su spic ion t hat app ellan t was, had bee n, o r was a bou t toeng agein criminal act iv it y, we consider the informa tion and circums tances know n to McDo nnold and his background and ex perience as an officer. Un it e d St a te s v . Co r

te z, 449 U.S. 411, 417- 18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.E d.2d 621 (1981); Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38.
In this cas e, the fac tors that w ould support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity include: 1) appellant was parked at a known drug location; 2) the officer knew t hat drugs had bee n so ld at that location; 3) the officer had m ade prior arrests at the location; 4) the officer knew

that the w

oman at appellant’s car was a drug courier; 5) the officer saw the wom an lean into appellant’s car and it appeared that an ex change of

som e sort had taken place; and 6) when she saw the police car approaching, the woman attem pted t o leave the scene. Additiona lly, once t he office rs appro ached t he car, the crack pipe and the baggy were in plain sight.6

The record before us is sufficient to show tha t th e of

fice rs h ad s uff

icien t ar ticu lable facts to jus tify a reasonable expecta tion t hat appellan t was, had been, or was about to engage in a dru g tr

ans act ion. Asthe y ap pro ach ed t he car, thedru g co ntr aba nd w as in plain view. The “plain view” doctrine requires that: 1) the police officers have a right to be where they

are, and 2) it m ust be im mediately apparent that the item s seized constitute evidence, i.e. , there is probable cause to assoc iate the items with criminal activity. Ramos
v. St ate , 934 S. W .2d 358, 365 (Tex .Crim.A pp.1996), cert. deni ed, 520 U.S. 1198, 117 S.Ct. 1556, 137 L.Ed.2d 704 (1997); see al so Wi lli ams v. State , 726 S.W.2d 99, 100-01 (Tex.Crim .App. 1986). Under the fac ts in this cas e , the of

ficers ha d a right to be w here theywere w hen they saw the contraband item s, and w hen they did, they w ere entitled to seize them and arrest appellant. Appellant’s issue is overruled, and the j udgme nt of the trial court is affirmed.
John T. Boyd Senior Justi ce Do not publish.