NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0742n.06 F iled: October 17, 2007 Case No. 06- 5877 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT M IC HA EL LEE SHOR TS, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. BEN DE LL BA RT HOLO M EW, indiv idua lly and i n his offic ialc apa c it y a s C ARRO LL COUNTY SHERIFF ; COUNTY of CA RR OLL, TEN NE SSEE, De fend ant s- App e lle e s.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN DI STRIC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEF ORE: G UY , BA TC HELD ER , a nd G ILM AN , C ir c uitJudg e s. ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, Circ uit Jud ge. Michae l L ee Shorts appe als the orde r of the district court g rantingsummary judgme nt to the C o unty of Carr oll, Tennessee (her einaf ter “ the County” ), and

B e nd e ll B art

ho lom e w, the Carr oll County She ri ff . Sh or ts w a s an inmate in t

he Carr oll County ja il w ho fi le d a

42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3 a c tio n s tatin g a sin g le c la im; that someone , somehow , had

c a us e d h im t o r e ma in i nc arc e rat ed be y on d h is c ourt or de re d r e le a se date . In p ur su ingthi s c la im, Shorts named two def

endants, B artholomew a

n d the County , and asse rted two wa y s by which the County might be liable . Both de fenda nts moved for summary

judgme nt, a s to a ll theories, and the district court g rante d the motion. Shorts a lso move d for summary judgme nt, which the cour t denied. We a ffirm in par

t, reve rse in par

t, and re mand for f

urther pr ocee dings c onsistent with thi s opinion. I.T he cour t i mp ose d t he f ol l owi ng s ent enc es : C ount 1 , aggr ava t ed r ob bery , ei gh t y ear s ( s pl i t bet ween one y ear 1 i ncarcerat i o n a nd seven y ears p rob at i o n); C o unt 2 , a ggravat ed b urgl ary , thr ee y ears (s p l i t wi t h one y ear i ncarcerat i o n); C o u n t 3 , b u rg la ry o f a v e h ic le , o n e y e a r ( s ix m o n ths inc a rc e ra tio n ); C o u n t 4 , t h e ft, 1 1 m o n ths a n d 2 9 d a ys (3 0 d a ys i nca r cer at i on) ; Co un t 5, t hef t , 11 mo nt hs and 29 day s ( 60 day s i nca r cer at i on) ; C ount 6, 7, 8, and 9, f org er y , one y ear ea ch (s i x m o nt hs i ncarcerat i o n f o r each); C o unt 10 , burgl ary of a vehi cl e, one y ear (s i x m o nt hs i ncarcerat i o n). I n h i s bri ef

on appeal , Short s of

f

- han dedl y as s er t s t hat i t i s “ un di s put ed” t hat he was al s o ent i t l ed t o “ progr am 2 a n d b e h a v io ra l cr e d its,” w h ic h w o u ld furth e r re d u c e his se n te n c e . W e d o no t ag re e tha t t h is is “un d isp u te d .” W h ile it m igh t b e c o rr e c t, s ee T enn . Co de Ann. § 41

- 21

- 23 6(c) , i t ha s not been as s er t ed, ar gu ed, cons i dere d, or deci ded and we d ecl i ne t o de ci d e i t now . U l t i m at el y , we f i nd t hat t he avai l ab i l i t y of sent ence red uct i o n credit s i s i rr el evant t o our a n a lysis o r th e o u tc o m e o f t h is a p p e a l, b u t w e r e c o g n iz e th a t it m a y b e r e le v a n t o n r e m a n d

. T h is a sse rtio n is no te w o rth y, h o w e v e r, b ecause i t m ay exp l ai n a dis crep ancy m o re pert i nent t o t he p res ent dis cuss i o n, and whi ch was l ef t e n tire ly un r es ol ved by t he di s t r i ct co ur t
. Short s was i nca r cer at ed on Ju l y 10, 200 2, an d re l eas ed on Febru ar y 13, 200 4, wh i ch we cal cul at e a s bei ng 218 day s bey ond t he pres cr i bed se nt enc e of one y ear . Shor t s i ns i s t s t hat he was he l d f or more t han 3 0 0 d a ys b e yo n d the o n e ye a r se n te n c e , an d in se e k ing to r e c o n c ile the se n u m b e rs , w e fin d th a t i f S h o rts a w a rd e d him se lf c re d it e q u a l t o o n e -q u a rte r o f his o n e ye a r se n te n c e , s ee § 4 1

- 2

- 1 1 1 (b), t hen t he ad d i t i o nal 91 da y s, when ad d ed t o t he 218 da y s , w ou l d c ompu t e t o 309 day s bey on d t h e pr es cr i bed s en t en ce . As s t at ed pr ev i ou s l y , t h i s di f f er en ce be t we en 218 day s a n d 309 da y s i s i r r el ev an t t o t h e pr es en t a ppea l a n d we wi l l not con s i der i t f u r t h er . W e wi l l c on cl u de, h owe v er , by not i ng t hat t hi s ass umpt i on o f sen t enc e reduc t i on credi t s st i l l d oes not expl ai n Short s ’ s o r i gi nal i ns i s t enc e t hat he was hel d f or 346 d ay s bey ond t he pres cr i bed o ne y ear s ent enc e. Aga i n , w e s u r mi s e f

r om t h i s c on du ct t h at Sh or t s be l i ev ed t hat he was e n t i t l ed t o i n mat e s en t en ce r edu ct i on 3 c re d its, w h ic h c o u ld ha v e p ro v id e d fo r h is re le a se a s e a rly a s A p ril 1 0 , 2 0 0 3

. See no te 2 , su p ra . 2 Mr . Sh or ts w a s arr e ste d o n July

10 , 2 00 2, and

re ma ine d in

the Carr oll Cou

nty ja il unti l F e br ua ry 13 , 2 00 4, so me 58 3 day s. Duri ng that per iod , he a pp e are d tw ic e be fo re the Carr oll County Circuit Court, pleading g uilty to three felonies and two misdemeanors on September 9, 2002, and to five additional felonies on J anuar y 13, 2003. The c ourt imposed “split confinement” sentenc es for e ach of

the ten counts, pursuant to Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-306( a), ordere d that the sentenc es 1

run concurre ntly , and g rante d cre dit for time serve d. As a re sult, the court essentially sentenc ed Sho rt s to on e y e ar o f i nc arc e ratio n — wh ic h b e g an o n July

10 , 2 00 2, and the re fo re , w ou ld presumably

have c oncluded by

J uly 10, 2003 — followed by seven year s of probation. 2 I n April 2003, Shorts be g an to inquire of the Tenne ssee De partment of Corr ections (“TD OC”) a s to when he would be r elea sed, and on May 10, 2003, he re ceive d a twelve -word le tter 3 fr om on e Am

be r Phi lli ps of the TD OC , s tatin g : “ Yo u a re se rv inga

sp lit c on fi ne me nt. Th e ja il w ill

c a lc ulate y our s e nte nc e .” Sho rt s th e n b e g an to inq uir e of Sue B arn e s, the Chi e f Ja ilo r f or the Carr oll3

County J ail, as to when he would be re lease d. Sue Ba rnes attested, by

way of af fidavit, that: “On

se ve ra l oc c a sio ns Ic on ta c te d Jef f B arn e tt, wh o is a

State of Te nn e sse e B oa

rd of Pr ob a tio n a

nd Paro le [O] ffice r, inquiring as to when Micha el L ee Shorts should be re lease d. Iwas not g iven an answ er by the State as to when Michae l L ee Shorts should be rele ased from the Carroll County J ail.” When his one y ear

anniver sary

passed on J uly 10, 2003, Shorts rema ined i n jail with no prospect of r elea se, de sp ite his inq

uir ie s to Sue B arn e s and

he r e ns uin g inq

uir ie s to Jef

f B arn e tt. On F e br ua ry 11 , 2 00 4, a ft e r s e ve ra l mo nths of in a c tiv ity — w he the r d

ue to a n in a bil ity to calc ulate a r elea se date or sheer indiffe renc e — on the pa rt of Sue B arne s and Jeff B arne tt, Shorts’s family reta ined l eg al counse l to investigate the situation. The next day , Donna Me g g s, an employ ee of Shorts’s counsel, c ontacted Sue B arne s and obtained Short s ’s re cords. Ms. Meg g s attested, by way of af fidavit, that she also “ spoke with J ef f Ba rn et t , Parole Of

fice r for the TDOC[,] and he

a dv ise d me tha

t a s a TD OC re pr e se ntativ e , h e ha d n o invo lve me nt w ithMic ha e l Sh or ts [s ic ] spl it

se nte nc e , r e le a se date .” Th e ne xt day wa s a F ri da y , F e br ua ry 13 , 2 00 4, and Ms. Me g g s sp ok e wi th Terr y Dickey , Chief Deputy

of the Car

roll County

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment. She informed D ickey of her c onversation with J eff Ba rnett, in wh i ch Ba rn ett had indicate d that local jail offic ials were responsible for

Shorts’s relea se. Ms. Meg g s directe d Terr y Dickey to cer tain info rm ati on alre ady in his possession, i ncluding : (1) the judg ment, which wa s a split sentence with a pre deter mined rele ase date; (2) the jail roster, which noted a se ntence of one year and a be g inning date of July 10, 20 02 ; ( 3) the le tte r f

ro m A mbe r P hil lip s o f t

he TD OC ; and

(4 ) t he inq uir ie s b y Sho rt s. I n th e ir a ff ida vits, ne ith e r T e rr

y Di c ke y no r S ue B arn e s a dmi tte d to sp e akin g wi th M s. Meg g s, but eac h attested to speaking w ith the other on that Fr iday , Fe bruar y 13, 2004. Terr

y Dickey stated in his affida

vit that Sue Bar

nes conta cted him re g ardingthe re lease date f or Shorts; that heO f f i ci al

- cap aci t y sui t s are, f o r al l i nt ent s and purp o ses , t reat ed as sui t s agai nst t he m uni ci p al i t y and we i nt end 4 a s m u c h he re . H a

fe r v . M e lo , 502 U

. S. 21, 25 (199 1). I n c ons t r uct i on of t hi s an al y s i s , we ar e no t d raw i ng a n ew d istinc tio n ; we a d d re ss th e se two the o rie s se p a ra te ly o n ly b e c a u se S h o rts h a s d o n e so in h is p le a d ing s. S p e c ifi c a lly, Sho rt s m ad e t wo sep arat e, a l b ei t rel at ed , a rgume nt s: (1 ) t he C o unt y — in som e vague and unde f i ned m ani f

est at i o n — i s l i abl e f

or f ai l i ng t o i ns t r uct , s uper vi se, c o ntro l , o r di s ci pl i ne th e S h e riff ; an d (2) t he Sher i f

f i s l i abl e i n h i s of

f i ci al cap aci t y f

o r f ai l i ng t o i nst ruct , supervi se, co nt rol, o r d i sci p l i ne hi s subo rdinat es at t he jai l

. Fo r t he reasons st at ed i n t he 4 c on ta c te d Jef

f B arn e tt that sam e da

y re g ard ingthe re le a se date ; and that Jef f B arn e tt i nf

or me d h im that he ha d a lr e a dy

sp ok e n w ithSue B arn e s r e g ard ing the same . Su e B arn e s st a te d in he r a ff ida vit : “On F ebrua

ry 13, 20 0 4 , I contacted Chief De puty Terr y Dickey of the Car

roll County

Sheriff’ s De pa rtment regardin g Mic ha e l L e e Sho rt ’s [sic ] time se rv e d. On F e br ua ry 13 , 2 00 4, Jef

f B arn e tt contac ted me and told me that Micha el L ee Shorts ha d serve d his time and to re lease him. Michael L ee Shorts wa s relea sed fr om the Carroll County J ail on Fe bruar

y 13, 2004.” On Februa

ry 10, 2005, Shorts filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in federa l court, cla iming that the two named de fenda

nts, the County and Sheriff Ba rtholomew, in both their individual and offic ial capa cities, had violated Shorts’s c onstitut ional rig hts by causingShorts to remain incar cer ated be y on d h is r e le a se date , in vio latio n o f t

he F ourt h an d Fo ur

te e nth Am e ndme nts . Sh or

ts d id n ot n ame Sue Ba rnes, Jeff Bar

nett, Terr y Dickey , Amber Phi llips, or t he TDOC as defendants in the s uit. As be st w e un de rs tand

Sho rt s’ s p oo rl y

dr a ft e d c omp la int , w e ide nti fy a t le a st thr e e se pa

rate the or ie s to this claim: (1) Sheriff Ba

rtholomew, i n his individual capa city , either caused or failed to prevent the ha rm (C omp . ¶

8, 10 , 1 5) ; ( 2) the Cou

nty , in an “ ind ivi du a l and /or of fi c ia l” c a pa c ity , f a ile d to ins tr uc t, s up e rv ise , c on tr ol, or dis c iplin e She ri ff

B art ho lom e w, a

nd the re by br e a c he d it s d

uty to preve nt the harm (Comp. at ¶ 28); and (3) the County , in the person of the Sheriff ( i

. e. , S h er iff B art ho lom e w, in h is of

fi c ia l c a pa c ity ), e ith e r c a

us e d the ha

rm — thro ug h a

n o ff ic ia l po lic y , c us tom , pr a c tic e , o r u sa g e — o r f

a ile d to pr e ve nt t

he ha rm — b y br e a c hin g the duty to imp le me nt a re qu isi te policy or proc ess (Comp. ¶ 4, 22, 24). Shorts sought compe nsatory damag es, punitive damag es, and 4t ext , we ul t i m at el y co ncl ud ed t hat Sho rt s can sur vi ve summ ary judgm ent on t he l at t er, t ho ugh not o n t he f o rme r. 5 injunctive relief

, including the implementation of some ty pe of training prog ram a

nd documentation

a t th e ja il f

or pr op e r r e le a se pr oc e dure s. The de fenda

nts filed a joint answer , denying the al l ega tions and assertingaff irmative de fe ns e s, and

e ve ntu a lly

fi le d a joi nt m oti on

fo r summa

ry jud g me nt. In th e mot ion , th e de fe nd ants

argue d that be c a

us e the TD OC ha s th e e xclu siv e re sp on sib ili ty fo r s e tti ngpr iso ne r r e le a se date s, pursuant to Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-501( o), Shorts’s claim must f ail as a matter of law . Towar ds thi s end , the y pr od

uc e d the a ff

ida vit s of Su e B arn e s and

Te rr y Di c ke y a s e vid e nc e that th e County (i.e., the ja il) sought a

rele ase date from Jeff B arne tt at the TDOC. Sheriff Ba rtholomew asse rted qualified immunity

to the claims direc ted ag ainst him in hi s individual capac ity

. Shorts, on the other ha nd , c on te nd e d th a t th e de fe nd ants ’ le g a l duty aro se fr om Te nn . Code Ann. § 40- 35 -3 07 (d ), no t § 40-35-501( o). He claimed that a genuine issue of fact re mained re g ardingwho was r esponsible for

se tti ngthe re le a se date fr om ja il, and po int e d to the state me nts by Am be r Phi lli ps and

Jef f B arn e tt of TD OC , b oth

of wh om s a id t

hat th e ja il w a s r e sp on sib le fo r s e tti ngthe re le a se date . B a se d o n th is

same re asoning , Shorts moved for summary judgme nt in his own rig ht, modify ing his a rgument and insisti ng that Sheriff B artholomew “ was re sponsible for the pr ocedur es for the re lease of such defe ndant at the time spec ified in the order of judgme nt,” and that Sheriff Ba rtholomew had f

ailed to i ns tit ute or fo llo w s uc h p ro c e dure s. I n s up po rt , Sh or ts atta c he d th e affi davit o f D onna Me g g s. The defe ndants replied by reiter ating that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-501(o) is the applicable statute, and that § 40-35- 307(d), whic h applies to “pe riodic conf inement,” is wholly

inapplicable. Ultimately , the di s t ri ct court gr anted the de fenda nts’ motion for summary judgme nt and den ie d Sh o rts ’ s mo ti o n . T h e c o u rt f ir s t d e te r mi n e d th a t T e n n . Co d e A n n . § 4 0

- 3 5

- 5 0 1 ( o ) is the6

a pp lic a ble statut e , b ut t

hat it g ov e rn s o nly

the c a lc ulatio n o f r e le a se d ate s, an d th e re fo re , it wo uld not excuse a jailor who stands idly by afte r beingaler

ted th at t h e inmate’s re lease date may have passed. The court ex plained that Shorts’s failing was “not his inability to overc ome the application of the st at u t e [but was instead] his complete failure to produce even a ‘scintilla’ of e vidence supporting his a ccusation that Sheriff B artholomew a ctually ‘stood idly

by ’ in the fa ce of

known and numerous complaints of the err oneous, prolonged detention of i nmates i n the County J ail.” B ased

on thi s la c k o f e vid e nc e , th e c ourt c on c lud e d that Sho rt s h a d f a ile d to su bs tanti a te his c la im, a g a ins t either Sher i ff Ba rt h o lomew or the County , and that it was unne cessa ry to consider Sher iff Ba rtholomew’s qualified immunit y defe nse. Shorts appea led, asser ting that the district c ourt err ed by g rantingthe def

endants’ motion for summar y judgme nt and by

denying his motion. II. We review de novo the g rant or de nial of summary judgme nt. W

alton v. F ord Motor Co. , 42 4 F .3 d 48 1, 48 5 (6 th Cir

. 20 05 ). Sum mary jud g me nt is a pp ro pr iate “ if

the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s,

answe rs to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, t og ether with the affidavits, if any , show that there is n o g e nu i n e i s s u e a s t o an y m a t e r i a l f a c t an d th a t th e m o v i n g p arty i s e n t i t l e d t o j u d g m e nt a s a

matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 77 U. S. 31 7, 32 5 ( 19 86 ). Th e pa rt y moving f or summary

judgme nt bear s the initial burden and t h at b u rden ma y be satisfied by aff irmative evide nce that neg ates an element of the non-movi ng party ’s claim or by “an a bsence of evidenc e to support the non-movingparty ’s ca se.” Celotex , 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving pa

rty has met this burden, the non-movingparty , in order to avoid summary judgme nt, must counter by “set[ting] forth the spec ific fa cts showing that t h er e i s a g enuine issue fo r t ri a l.” Fed. R. Civ . P. 56 (e ); Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322. The substantive law identifies which7

specific fac ts are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc ., 477 U.S. 2 42, 248 (1986). “ The evidenc e of the non-mov[ing par ty ] i s to be believe d, and all jus tifiable infer ence s are to be dra wn in his fa vor,” Anderson , 477 U. S. at 256 , but he mus t “do mor e tha n simp ly sh ow that the re is s ome metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.” Ma tsu sh ita El e c . I nd us . Co . v . Ze nit

h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “[T] he mere exis tence of some alleg ed fa ctual disputes betwe en the pa rties will not defeat an otherw ise proper ly supported motion.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247-48. I n conducting our review, we need not scour the rec ord or make a c ase f or a pa rty who has failed to do so on his own behalf , but e ven so, we are still oblige d to protect a viable ca use of a ction that a plaintiff has in fact r aised. See G uarino v. Brookfield Twp. Tr ustees , 980 F.2d 399, 404- 07 (6th Cir. 1992). In the pre sent case , we recognize the district court’s diff iculty with Shorts’s inartful pleading s and incomplete arguments, and we acknow ledg e the district cour t’s proper relianc e on the non-moving party ’s burde n at summary judgme nt. See Ce lotex , 477 U.S. at 322. Under our de novo revie w, howeve r, we cannot ig nore a leg itimate claim or deprive Shorts of hi s rig ht to have g enuine issues decide d by

a jury when those issues a

re othe rwise e vident from the r ecor d. III . “To state a

claim under

§ 1983, a plainti ff must alleg e [1] the violation of [2] a rig ht secure d by the Constitut ion and laws of the United States, and must show [3] that the alleg ed violation was

co m mitted by

a per son actingunder c olor of state la w.” W est v. Atkins , 4 8 7 U

. S. 42, 48 (1988) (ci ti ng 42 U.S.C. § 19 83 ); Mezibov v . Allen , 4 1 1 F

. 3 d 7 1 2 , 7 1 6

- 1 7 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 5 )

. “ I f

a p la inti ff fa i l s to make a show ing on a ny essential ele ment of a § 1983 c laim, it mus t fail.” R e d di n g v . St. Ewa rd , 2 41 F .3 d 5 30 , 5 32 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) . T he fi rs t e le me nt, the de fe nd ant’ s v iol a tio n o f a ri g ht, is m e a sure d a g a ins t a bac kg ro un d of co mmo n law tor t pri nc ipl e s, inc lud ingthe tr a dit ion a l e le me nts8

of t ort liability

as we ll as the defe nses to liability

. Pierson v. Ray , 38 6 U .S. 54 7, 55 6- 57 (1 96 7) ; see also Cit y of Montere

y v. D el Monte Dune

s at Monterey

, Ltd. , 526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999) (“ [T] here can be no doubt that claims broug ht pursuant to § 1983 sound in tort. J ust as common-law tort actions provide r edre ss for interf ere nce w ith pr o te c te d

p e r s onal or prope rty

interests, § 1983 provides

re lie f fo r inv a sio ns of ri g hts pr ote c te d und e r f e de ra l la w . . . and [we ] have int e rp re te d th e statut e in lig ht o f t he ba c kg ro un d o f t or

t li a bil ity .” (i nte rn a l c itatio ns and qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ). Sho rt s

c la ims that so meone v i o l a t e d h i s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l b y somehowcausinghim to remain incar cer ated beyond his relea se date , and has proposed multiple theories of who and how. I

n the subsections that follow, we c onsider ea ch of his sepa rate theories in turn. The second ele me n t, th a t t h e r igh t at i s s u e is s e c ur e d b y th e Co n s ti tuti o nan d

la w s o f the United States, is beyond dispute: when a prisoner’ s sentence has expired, he is entitled to rele ase. W hir l v . Ke rn , 4 07 F .2 d 7 81 , 7 91 (5 th C ir . 1 96 9) (h old ingtha t “ [t]he re is n o pr ivi le g e in a ja ile r t o keep a pris o n er i n j ai l b ey ond the per iod of his lawful sentenc e”) . Perhaps more to the point, an incar cer ated inmate ha s “a liber ty interest in beingrele ased at the end of his te rm of imprisonment.” Schultz v. Egan , 1 03 F . App ’x 43 7, 44 0 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 4) ; Da v is v . H

all , 375 F.3d 703, 712- 13 (8th Cir. 20 04 ). Th is l ibe rt

y int e re st i s m os t of

te n attr ibute d to the Du e Pr oc e ss C la us e of the F ourt e e nth Amendment. See , e.g. , Jones v . Jack son , 2 03 F .3 d 8 75 , 8 80 -8 1 ( 5th Cir . 2 00 0) ; Cannon v. Macon Cou nty , 1 F .3 d 1 55 8, 15 63 (1 1th Cir . 1 99 4) ; Patton v . Przybylski , 822 F.2d 697, 701 ( 7th Cir. 1987); see also Sample v . Dieck

s , 8 8 5 F. 2 d 1 0 9 9 , 1 1 0 8 (3 d C i r. 1 9 8 9 ) ( ci t i n g Hutto v. Finney , 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978)) (Eig hth Amendment); H a y g o o d v . Younge r , 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 ( 9th Cir. 1985) (en ba nc ) ( Ei g hth

Am e ndme nt) ; cf. Foucha v . Lousiana , 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992) (“ unconstitutional for

a State to c on tin

ue to c on fi ne a

ha rm le ss, me nta lly

ill pe rs on ” ); Mc

Ne il v . D ir. , P atu

x e nt I ns t. , 407T h e Fi f t h Ci r cu i t a pt l y di s t i n g u i s h ed Bake r v . M cCol l an i n a c as e wi t h f ac t s s u bs t an t i al l y s i mi l ar t o t h os e of 5 t he p res ent case, exp l ai ni ng:

T h i s c a s e pr e s e n t s a s u bs t a n t i a l l y di f f e r e n t f a c t u a l c on t e x t f

r om B aker si nce D out hi t ha s al l ege d t hat the d e fen d a n ts im p riso n e d him fo r th irty d a ys b e yo n d the se n te n c e im p o se d up o n h im w itho u t a v a lid co m m i t m ent ord er. D et ent i o n of a p ri soner t hi rt y da y s b eyond t he exp i rat i o n of hi s sent en c e i n t he ab sen ce of a f

aci al l y val i d c our t order or war r ant cons t i t ut es a depri vat i on of due process. T hu s, D o ut hi t ass ert ed a pri m a f aci e vi o l at i o n of [§] 1 9 8 3 b y a l l egi ng that the d ef end ant s, a ct i ng und er t he aut hor i t y gr ant ed t o t hem by T exa s l aw, del i bera t el y conf i ned h i m wi t hout a v al i d com mi t ment order b etwe en N o ve m b er 1 , 1 9 7 3 , an d N o ve m b er 3 0 , 1 9 7 3 , ag ainst his wil l an d o ve r his o b je cti o ns. D ou t hi t v. Jones , 61 9 F.2d 52 7 , 53 2 (5t h C i r. 19 8 0 ).

W e r ecogn i ze t hat t he Sher i f f , i n t hi s capaci t y , m ay not b e t he f i nal pol i cy maker f

or t he C o u n ty , but rat her, 6 may be f un ct i oni ng as an ar m of t he St at e, i n whi ch cas e El eve nt h Amendm ent i mm un i t y may bar t hi s s ui t f r om f eder al c o u rt. S e e g e n e ra lly M c M ill ia n v . M o n ro e C o u n ty , 5 2 0 U .S

. 7 8 1 (1 9 9 7 ). W e a lso re c o g n iz e c a se law fro m this c irc u it au t h or i zi n g c ou r t s t o “ su a sp o n te ra ise the iss u e o f la c k o f ju risd ic tio n b e c a u se o f t h e a p p lica b ili ty o f t h e [E ]le v e n th [ A ] mendm ent , ” M ix o n v . O h io , 1 9 3 F .3d 3 8 9 , 3 9 7 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 9 ), an d t he o st en si b l y co ntrad i cto ry Su p rem e C o urt case la w a u tho riz ing th e S ta te to w a ive a p p lica b ili ty o f t h e E le v e n th A m e n d m e n t, C ol l ege Sav. B an k v

. F l a. P r epai d P ost s ec. 9 U. S. 2 45 , 2 46 (1 97 2) (“ wh e n h is s e nte nc e e xpir e d, the State los t th e po we r t o h old him , a nd [] his continued dete ntion violates his rights under the Four teenth Amendme nt”). B u t s ee Bake r v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 143-45 (1979) ( holding that thre e d ay s o f admittedly improper pr e-tria l detention did not amount to a deprivation of liberty without due proce ss). 5 Th e thi rd e le me nt, that the vio latio n wa s c omm itt e d b y a pe rs on a c tin g un de r c olo r o f s tate law, is similarly

beyond dispute. Shorts was incar cer ated in the County J ail, which is opera

ted under the authority

of the County

Sheriff. See Te nn . Cod e An n. § 8 -8 -2 01 (a )( 3) (“ I t is the sh e ri ff ’s duty to . . . [ t] ake c h ar ge and custody of the jail of the she riff’ s county , and of the prisoners ther ein;

rec eive those la

wfull y committed, and kee p them persona lly , or by deputies or jailer , until dis char g ed by law[.] ”); § 8-8-221( a) (“Except for state prisoners held in the county jail, no perso n s h al l be incar cer ated in the c ounty jail without the approval of the sheriff , or the sherif

f’s de signe e, subjec t to approva l of the cour

t ha ving criminal jurisdiction ove r the sheriff ’s jurisdiction, a s provided by regulation.”). The parties do not dispute that the Sherif f is the final poli cy

maker over the operation of the ja il. See , e.g. , Heflin v. Stewart County, Tenn. , 958 F.2d 709, 713 ( 6th Cir. 1992).

6Educ. Expe ns e Bd. , 5 2 7 U .S . 6 6 6 , 6 7 5 (1 9 9 9 ). B e c a u se w e fi n d tha t t h is i s n o t c le a r ly a ju risd ic tio n a l m a tter , s ee

Ar baugh v

. Y & H

Cor p. , 54 6 U

. S. 50 0, 51 4 (2006 ) ( “ s ubj ect
- mat t er j ur i s di ct i on, becau s e i t i nv ol ves t he cour t ’ s power t o hea r a c as e, ca n n eve r be f orf ei t ed or w ai ved”) , we decl i ne t o ra i s e or cons i der t hi s i s s ues at t hi s s t age .

10 Be cause it is cle ar that this rig ht is secur ed by the Constit ution a nd the action was take n under color of state law, w e turn to Shorts’s individual theories of r ecove ry to determine whether , under

c omm on law t or t pr inc ipl e s, he ha s st a te d a c la im that ma

y surv ive summa

ry jud g me nt. A. Sho rt s a lle g e s that Sh e ri ff B art ho lom e w, in h is individual capa city , either dire ctly

cause d the ha rm or fa ile d to pr e ve nt t

he ha rm of inc arc e ra tin g Sho rt s b e y on d th e te rm of his se nte nc e . It is we ll established that “[d]amag es ac tions ag ainst public o ff i ci als requir e a c are ful adhe renc e to the distinction between pe rsonal and of ficial-c apac ity

suits.” Gean v . Hattaway , 33 0 F .3 d 75 8, 76 5 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) (e d i t s o m i t t ed ) ( qu o t i n g Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). N otably , there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, suc h as “where the alleg ation of liability is based upon a mer e fa ilure to ac t. Rather, the supervisors must have ac tively eng ag ed in unconstitutional behavior .” Gr e

go ry v . Lo uis v ill e , 444 F.3d 725, 751 ( 6th Cir. 2006). The law is c lear that liability of supervisory personne l must be base d on more than mere ly the rig ht to control employ ees. F urther, a claim of fa i l u re t o supervise or proper ly train under section 1983 cannot be based on simple neg lige nce. Afailure of a supe rvisory

officia l to supervise, c ontrol, or train the of fendingindividual employ ees is not actionable absent a showing t hat t he off icial either

encour ag ed or in some way

direc tly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the officia l at least implicitly authorized, approve d[,] or knowing ly acquies ce din the un c on sti tut ion a l c on du c t of the of fe nd inge mpl oy e e s. Le ac h v . Sh e lby Count

y Sh e rif f , 8 91 F .2 d 1 24 1, 12 46 (6 th C ir . 1 98 9) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s, citations, and edits omitted). A “pla intiff in a personal-ca pacity suit need not establish a c onnection to gove rnmental policy

or custom,” Ha

fe r v . M e lo , 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991), but cor responding ly , aW e re a c h the sa m e c o n c lu s io n t h e d istric t co u rt d id w ith re g a rd to q u a lif ie d im m u n ity. B e c a u se S h o rts is 7 un abl e t o s et f

ort h e vi dence t hat woul d s uppo r t a pri m a f aci e c a se a g a ins t S h e riff B a rth o lo m e w in h is ind ivid u a l ca p a c ity, su m m a ry j u d g m e n t i s w a rr a n te d o n tha t b a sis a n d it is un n e c e ssa ry fo r u s to re a c h the q u a lif ie d im m u n ity a rg u m e n t. 11 defe ndant in a per sonal-ca pacity suit, unli ke t

h e in d iv id u a l defe ndant in an off

icial-c apac ity

suit, may invoke the prote ction of qualified immunity to defe at the ac tion. Gean , 330 F.3d at 776. 7 Her e, Shorts failed to produc e or ide ntify any evidenc e that Sheriff Bar

tholomew direc tly

and p er s o n al l y imprisoned Shorts bey ond the term of his sente nce, or was e ven aw are of Shorts’s pr e se nc e in the Carr oll County Jail a t any tim e . On the c on tr ary , the e vid e nc e (i .e. , aff id avi ts) pr ov ide d b y

bo th s ide s le a ds to t

he c on c lus ion th at Ch ief Jail or Sue B arn e s w a s p e rs on a lly responsible for

Shorts’s imprisonment, and that Sheriff B artholomew w as fur ther insulated from the sit ua tio n b y Chi e f D e puty

Te rr y Di c ke y . The re is n o e vid e nc e that Sh e ri ff B art ho lom e w p e rs on a lly acte d in any way to c ause any eff ect on Shorts a

nd there is no merit to this ac cusation. See Patton , 822 F.2d at 701 (holding that the wrong fully -jailed plaintiff ma y not sue the sher iff on a the ory of superior’ s liabilit y , but must sue those actually responsible). Sho rt s a lso a lle g e s, ho we ve r, that Sh e ri ff B art ho lom e w p e rs on a lly

fa ile d to pr e v e nt th e ha

rm , du e to his de lib e rate ind if

fe re nc e . To pr e va il on a de lib e ra te ind if fe re nc e the or

y , “ [the ] pla int if

f m us t demonstrate that a municipal dec ision reflec ts deliberate indiffer ence to the risk that a violation of a par ticular c onstitut ional or statutory rig ht will follow the dec ision.” Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cou nty v . B ro wn , 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). “[D]eliberate indiffer ence is a stringen t s t an d ar d of fa ult , r e qu ir ingpr oo f t

hat a mun ic ip al act or di sr e g ard e d a kn ow n o r o bv iou s c on se qu e nc e of his action [or inact i o n ].” Id . (interna l quotation marks omitted). “De liberate indiffer ence has bee n de mon str a te d in

tho se c a se s w he re pr iso n o ff ic ia ls w e re put on

no tic e and

the n s imp ly

re fu se d to investigate a prisoner’ s claim of sente nce misca lculation.” Moore v . Tartl er , 986 F.2d 682, 686 ( 3d12

Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). I n Moore v . Tartl er , 9 8 6 F

. 2 d a t6 8 5 , th e T h i r d

C i r c u i tc o n s i d e r e d

a § 1 9 8 3 c l a i mb y a prisoner who had bee n improperly held for six mont hs beyond the completion of his sentence due the par ole boar d’s misinterpretation of his sentencingorder . Th e c o u r t c o nsidered whether

the prison officia ls had bee n put on notic e an d t h en s imply ref used to investigate Moore’ s complaint of sentenc e miscalc ulation. Id

. at 686. The court found that the “ parole board of ficials did not stand ‘idly by ’ af ter Moore [had] raised his c oncer ns about the parole boar d’s interpre tation of the disputed sentenc ing o rd er b u t instead re sponded to Moore’ s complaints by beg inning a

n inquiry that culminated in [the judge ’s] clarifying his sente ncing i n writing .” Id . at 687. Ther efor e, the c ourt

e xp la in e d , “ aninv e s ti g a ti o n , h o w e v e r s lo w an d

in c o mp e te n t[ , ] was c on du c te d .

. . purs ua nt t o standard parole board operating procedures . Significa nt was the fa ct that the par ole boar d did not reje ct Moore’ s initi al complaint outrig ht, or suspend its searc h once it wa s begun.” Id . ( e mph a sis added)

. Ba sed on these finding s, the court conclude d that the def endants “ wer e attemptingto resolve th e c o n f u s io no v e r

th e s e n te n c in g o r d e r

an d w e r e ta

k in g a f f ir mati v e s te p s . . . to w ar d

th a t e n d

. We cannot sa y that this investigation was so inept or ineffe ctual that deliber ate indiffe renc e [on] the par t of the pa role boa rd off icials may

be infe rre d from the e vidence here .” Id . (footnote omitted). I n Haygood v . Y

ounger , 76 9 F.2d at 1354, the Ninth Circuit considered a § 1983 claim by a prisoner who had be en improper ly held for f ive year s bey ond the completion of his sentenc e due to an incorr ect c alculation of his re lease date. The en banc court stated that “[d] etention beyond the termination of a se ntence could constitute cru el an d u n usual punishment if it is t he re sult of ‘deliber ate indiffe renc e’ to the pr isoner’s liber ty interest,” an d fo und that Hayg ood “pre sented

cre dible evidenc e that the de fenda nts, after being put on notice, simply ref used to investigate [the]13

computational er

ror.” Id . at 1354-55. The cour t n o t ed t h at Hay g ood had wr itten a letter to the

wa rd e n, a le rt ing hi m of th e e rr or , b ut t hat th e wa

rd e n h a d p a sse d it

of f t o c e rt a in r e c or ds of

fi c e rs , who re jected the claim out of hand and denied f urther r eview until Hay

g ood filed a habeas petition. Id . at 1353. The c ourt conc luded that “ther e wa s adequate evidenc e fr om which the jury could have found liability

under the appropr iate standa rd of ‘ deliberate indiffer ence .’” Id . at 1355. I n Sample v. D ieck

s , 8 8 5 F

. 2 d

a t1 1 0 2

- 0 3 , th e T h i r d C i r c u i t c o n s i d e r e d a § 1 9 8 3 c l a i mb y a prisoner who had been i mproperly held for nine m onths beyond the completion of his sentenc e due to a misapprehe nsion by the state prison re cords of fice r that th er e wa s t i m e remaining on the sentenc e. The prison e r , Joseph Sample, protested his improper incar cer ation to his probation office r, various cor

rec tions offi ce rs , his state repr esentative, and other s. Id . at 1104-05. Sample made

sever al inquires of Er

nest Diec ks, the state prison re cords of fice r, who at one point contacte d the sentenc ing judg e’s c hamber s, but “admitted that he did nothing further reg ardingSample’s ca se.” Id . at 1105. Sample wrote to Wi lliam R o b i n s o n , the Commiss ioner of the State Bur eau of Correc tions, but t he letter

was dire cted to a subordinate and R obinson never r ece ived it or eve n knew of it. Id

. Sample also wrote to the Parole B oard, a nd rec eived a

response that “conf

irmed Sample’s view that his co n t i n u ed im prisonment was incor rec t,” which Sample se nt to Diecks, whe reupon Diecks or dere d him relea sed immediately

. Id . Samp le su e d D ie c ks and Rob ins on , e a c h in

the ir i n d i v i d u al cap ac i t i es . T h e T h i rdC i rc u i t , ci t i n g Haygood , 769 F.2d at 1354-55, held that the app r o p r iate s ta

n d ar d f o r d e te r mi n in g w h e th e r

Samp le h a d

d e mo n s tr a te d

anE igh th

A me n dme nt vio latio n w a s th a t of

“ de lib e rate ind if

fe re nc e .” Th e c ourt

the n s e t out a

thr e e -p art

te st: To establish § 1983 liability in this context, a plaintiff must [1] first demonstrate that a prison off

icial had knowle dg e of the pri s o n er ’s problem a nd thus of the risk that unwar rante d punishment was being , or would be, inflicte d. [2] Second, the plaintiffT h e cou r t c on s i der ed t wo t h eor i es u n der w h i ch R obi n s on c ou l d h av e bee n l i abl e: ( 1) t h at h e appr ov ed a 8 d ef ect i ve p roce ss , and (2) t hat he f ai l ed t o enf

o rce an y p ro c e ss. S e e S a m p le , 88 5 F.2d at 11 1 3

- 1 8

. N ei t her t heo ry requir ed any know l ed ge o f Sam p l e’ s p art i cul ar s i t uat i o n. 14 must show that the officia l e ither failed to a ct or took only ineffe ctual ac tion under circ umstances indicating that his or he r re sponse to the problem wa s a produc t of de lib e rate ind if

fe re nc e to the pr iso ne r’ s p light. [3] F ina lly , th e pla int if f m us t demonstrate a causa l connec tion between the officia l’s response to the problem and the infliction of the unjustified detention. Id . at 11 10 . T he c ourt

c on c lud e d th a t D ie c ks wa s d e lib e ra te ly ind if fe re nt, no tin g that: Diecks (1) believed Sample’s inquiry might we ll have mer it, (2) knew that the matter neede d to be clar ified, (3) believed Sample ha d to rely on his ( Diecks’ ) ef

forts alone to rec tify the problem, (4) did not follow the releva nt proce dures mandated by the Pennsy lvania B urea

u of Corre ction, (5) took no other reme dial action, and (6) did not inf or m Sampl e of

any oth e r a c tio n h e (S ampl e ) m ig ht t ake to r e so lve his pr ob le m. Id . at 1111. The c ourt applied it s three -par t test to Diecks and conc luded that he ha d knowledg e of Sampl e ’s pr ob lem, had fai led to a c t, a nd that hi s f a ilure de lay e d Sampl e ’s re le a se by ne arl y six months. Id

. at 1112. Be cause there was no evidenc e that Robinson had any knowledg e of Sample’s pr ob le m, t

he c ourt did no t ana ly ze R ob ins on

un de r t his te st. Se e id . at 1112-13.

8 I n the pre sent ca se, S heriff Ba rtholomew is analog ous to Comm issioner Robinson, above, while J eff Ba

rnett, the State of Tenne ssee B oard of Probation and Parole O ffice r (or perha ps Chief J ailor Sue B arne s) would be a nalog ous to Ernest Diec ks. When the Thi rd Circuit’s test is applied to Sheriff B artholomew, Shorts’s theory unrave ls beca

use Shorts has neither

produce d nor identified any e v id e n c e to “ d e mo n s tr a te th a t [ th e n ame d ] p r is o no f f ic ia l [ i. e . , Sh e r if

f B arth o lo me w ] h ad knowledg e of the prisoner’s [i .e., Shorts’s] problem.” Se e id . at 11 11 . We the re fo re re a c h th e same conclusion as the district c ourt rea ched a nd find that Shorts has failed to pr oduce evidenc e to support his acc usation that Sheriff B artholomew w as deliber ate ly indiffer ent to a known or obvious conseque nce of

his inaction. Se e Br

y an Cou nty , 5 20 U. S. at 41 0; Mo or e , 9 86 F .2 d at 68 7. B e c a us e15

Shorts cannot meet his burde n of proof on this indi vidual-ca

pacity theory , Be ndell Ba

rtholomew’s motion for summary

judgme nt — denying liability in his indi vidual capa city — is well taken. B. As discussed at the outset, Shorts’s c omplaint c ontains three distinct theories in support of his § 1983 claim: one theory implicating the Sheriff in his individual capa city , and two implicating the County . The fir st acc u s at i o n against the County is that it i s liable for f

ailing to supe rvise the Sheriff; the se cond, which is tende red as an ac cusation ag ainst the Sheriff in his off icial ca pacity , but is in fact also an accusation ag ainst the C ounty , is that the C ounty is liable for the Sher iff’s f ailure to h ave a po lic y or pr oc e dure to pr ote c t inm a te s fr om be ing he ld pa st the ir dis c ha rg e date s. Sho rt s has pre sented no evidenc e whatsoeve r to suppor t the first acc usation, but ha s made a color able — althoug h meag er — showingof the sec ond, and the County has pre sented nothingto counter. Ba sed on this finding, we ultimately conclude that, althoug h Shorts cannot survive the County ’s motion for summary judgme nt as to his first theory , it rema ins possible that he could make

a su ff ic ie nt s ho wi ngto p re va il o n th e se c on d. He nc e , b a se d o n th e re c or d b e fo re us , th e County cannot obtain summary judgme nt on Shorts’s a ccusation that the Sheriff is liable in his o ff i cial capa city . Our re asoning is detailed in the subsec tions that follow. 1. Shorts alleg es that the County is liable under § 1983 beca use i t failed to instruct, super vise, control, or discipline Sherif f B artholomew, and there by brea ched a dut y owed to Shorts to prevent his wr on g fu l c on fi ne me nt b e y on d th e pr e sc ri be d te rm of inc arc e ra tio n. Sho rt s a c c us e d th e County in both an “individual and/or off icial” c apac ity ; however , Shor t s did not name any particula r individual or body

within the County , other than Sher iff B artholomew.16

A m u n i c i p a l i t y d o e s n o t e x i s t i n an“ i n d i v i d u a l ” c a p a c i ty, b u to n l y i nan“ o f

f i c i a l ” c a p a c i ty, such that “[l] iability

under § 1983 attaches only wher e a poli cy o r cu stom of the municipality has

cause d a violation of t he plainti ffs’ constituti onal rig hts.” See Thompson v . Ashe , 250 F.3d 399, 409 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Mo ne ll v . Ne w York City De pt. of S oc ial Se rv s. , 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978))

. [I ]t is no t e no ug h f

or a § 1 98 3 p la int if

f m e re ly to i de nti fy

c on du c t pr op e rl y a ttr ibuta ble to t he mun ic ipa lity . T he pla int if f m us t a lso de mon str a te tha

t, t hr ou g h it s deliberate conduc t, the mu n ic ip a li ty w a s th e ‘movingforc e’ be hind the injury alleg ed. Th a t is , a pla int if f m us t sh owthat th e mun ic ipa l a c tio n w a s ta ke n w iththe re qu isi te deg ree of cu l p ab i l i t y

and must demonstrate a direc t causa l link between the mun ic ipa l a c tio n a

nd the de pr ivatio n o f f

e de ra l r ig hts

. Br yan Cou nty , 5 2 0 U

. S

. a t4 0 4

. “ W h e r e a p l a i n t i f f c l a i m s th a tth e mun i c i p a l i ty h a s n o tdir e c tly inf lic te d an inj ur

y , but no ne the le ss ha s c a

us e d an e mpl oy e e to do so , ri g or ou s sta nd ard s of c ulp a bil ity and causation must be applied to e nsure that the municipa lity is not held liable solely

for the a ctions of its employ ee.” Id . at 40 5 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; Knott v. Sullivan , 418 F.3d 561, 575 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (“a municipality

li k e At h en s C ounty

cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a re spondeat super ior theory” (inter

nal quotation marks omitted)). The poli cies or customs implicated by a § 1983 plaintiff

“ may be se t by the [mun ic ipa lity ]’s lawm ake rs , o r b y tho se wh os e e dic ts o r a c ts m ay fa ir ly be sa id to r epre sent offic ial policy .” Mc Mi lli an v . Mon ro e Cou nty , 5 20 U. S. 7 81 , 7 84 (1 99 7) . O ur ta sk is, there fore , to “identify

those offic ials or g overnme ntal b o dies who speak with final policy making authority for the local g overnme ntal actor [i .e., municipality ] concerningthe ac tion alleg ed to have

cause d the particula

r constitutional or statutory violation at issue.” J

e tt v . D all as In de p. Sc h. Di st ., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989). In this case, the obvious off icial is the Sheriff. But Shorts alleg ed that there is “ someone” above the Sheriff. One problem with this t heory i s t h a tS h o rt s f

a i l e d t o i d e n t i f y anyone from the County with “fina l policy making authority ” over the17

She rif f

. A s e c o n d i s t h a t , d e s p i t e h i s a l l e g a t i o n s o f an a dv e r s e p o l i c y o r c u s t o m , S h o rt s f a i le d to pr od uc e , ide nti fy , or e ve n su g g e st a ny e vid e nc e of

any su c h p oli c y

or c us tom . Sh or

ts c on se qu e ntl y faile d to pr od

uc e any e vid e nc e of

wh o, if anyon e , w ith in t

he County

ha d a ny duty to i ns tr uc t, supervise, c ontrol, or discipline the Sheriff . There fore , Shorts c annot meet his bur den of proof on either the culpability

or causation requireme nts, see Br y an Cou nty , 520 U.S. at 404-05, and, so f ar as this particular

theory is conce rned, the County ’s motion for summary judgme nt is well taken. 2. Shorts all e g e s th a t th e County She ri ff , in his official

capa city , either c aused — through an of fi c ia l po lic y

or c us tom — o r f a ile d to pr e ve nt — by brea c hin g a duty to i mpl e me nt a

re qu isi te policy or proce ss — the harm of incar cer ating Shorts be yond the term of his sentenc e. Althoug h we

rea ch no dec ision on the merits, we find that the district c ourt err ed by g rantingsummary

judgme nt

o nt h i s t h e o r

y, a s i ti s p r o p e r l y a

qu e s t i o nf

o r a j ur y.

“ [O]f fi c ia l- c a pa c ity su its g e ne ra lly re pr e se nt on ly ano the r w ay

of ple a din g an a c tio n a g a ins t

an entity of which an office r is a n ag ent.” Hafer , 502 U. S. at 25 . “ Sui ts a g a ins t [munic ipa l] of fi c ia ls in their offic ial capa city there fore should be treated as suits ag ainst the [muni cipalit y ] ,” and there fore , “the e ntity ’s ‘policy or custom’ must have played a pa rt in the violation of fede ral law .” Id

. (q u o t i n g Graham , 4 73 U. S. at 16 6) ; accord G ean , 33 0 F .3 d a t 76 6. “ A ‘ po lic y ’ i s a de lib e rate

c ho ic e to f

oll owa c ours e of a c tio n ma de fr om a

mon g va ri ou s a lte rn a tiv e s by

the of fi c ia l or of fi c ia ls responsible for

establishing f

inal policy

with respec t to the subject matter in question.” Fairley v. Luman , 2 81 F .3 d 9 13 , 9 18 (9 th C ir . 2 00 2) ; se e Gr e go ry v . S he lby Cou nty , 22 0 F .3 d 43 3, 44 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 0) (s tatin g that a

po lic y is “f

or ma lly a pp ro ve d b y

an a pp ro pr iate de c isi on make r” ); Brown v. Shaner , 1 7 2 F

. 3 d

9 2 7 , 9 3 0 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 9 9 ) ( a p o l i c y i s “ a

d e l i b e r a t e o r

c o n s c i o u s c h o i c e b y a18

mun ic ipality” ); se e als o M on e ll , 436 U.S. at 690 (discussing a “policy statement, ordinanc e, regulation, or dec ision officially adopted and promulg ated by that body ’s offic ers” ). A “ custom,” howeve r, nee d not be forma lly approve d, but must be so permane nt, widesprea d, or we ll-settled as to have the “ forc e of la

w.” Br y an Cou nty , 5 20 U. S. at 41 0; Do e v . Cla ibo rn e Cou nty , 103 F.3d 495, 507-08 (6th Cir. 1996). I n order to support an offic ial-ca pacity theory , Shorts needed to co n n ec t h i s wrong ful imprisonment with a Sheriff’s D epar tment policy

or custom. Readingthe pleading s g ener ously , we

c on c lud e that Sh or

ts ha s a lle g e d, a t mos t, a po lic y or c us tom of de lib e ra te ind if fe re nc e to t

he tim e ly rele ase of prisoners f

rom the County J ail at t he end of their ter ms. Under the r eleva

nt case law, the

ma nif e s t a t i o no f

s u c ha p o l i c y m i g h th av e tw o a s p e c t s : ( 1 ) th e S h e r i f f f a i l e d t o s u p e r v i s e h is

e mpl oy e e s a de qu a te ly

wh e n h e kn e w o r s ho uld

have kn ow n o f the da

ng e r that inmate s w e re lik e ly to be detaine d beyond the end of their sentenc es, or ( 2) the Sherif f fa iled to investigate this incident and punish those re sponsible, in effe ct ratifying the ir ac tions. See Leac h , 891 F.2d at 1247. I n Le ac h v . S

he lby Cou nty Sh e rif f , 891 F.2d at 1242-43, this co u rt co n s i d er ed a § 1983 officia l-ca

pacity action ag ainst a Tenne ssee County Sheriff, in whic h a par apleg ic prisoner claimed th a t h e h a d b e e n m i s t r e a t e d b y g u ar d s d ur i n g h i s s t ay i n th e c o un ty j a i l

. W e n o t e d th a t, “ [i ]n Tenne ssee, the Sheriff has the ‘custody and char g e’ of the County J ail and all prisoner s committed there to,” and ther efor e, the Sher iff had a constitutional, as well as a state law, obligation to provide adequate ca

re. Id . at 1247 (c iti n g Tenn. Code Ann. § 41- 4-101). We found that “there had bee n enoug h simil ar inc idents to put the Sheriff, in his officia l capa city , on notic e t h at L eac h would be subject to constitutional deprivation [at the hands of the guards].” Id

. (noting 14 prior incidents of abuse reporte d by para

pleg ic or phy sically infirm inmates). B ased on the se finding s, we de termined19

that “th e She ri ff wa s del ibe rate ly ind if fe re nt to L e a c h’ s n e e ds ,” but e mph a size d th a t “ the de lib e rate indiffer ence must amount to a policy of the municipality .” Id

. (c i t i n g City of Can ton v . H arris , 489 U. S. 3 78 (1 98 9) ). We he ld, ba se d on the re c or d ev ide nc e of the se 14 pr ior inc ide nts , that “it is f a ir to say that the nee d for more adequate supervision wa s s o o b v i o u s and the likelihood that the inadequa cy

would result in the violation of constitutional rights wa s so gr eat that the County as an entity can be held liable her e for the extent of L eac h’s deter mined damag es.” Id . at 12 48 . We a lso explained that “[f] urther e vidence of a p o l i cy of deliber ate indiffe renc e is found in the Sheriff ’s failure to investigate t his incident and punish the responsible par ties.” Id

. (c i t i n g Marche

se v. Lucas , 758 F.2d 181, 188 ( 6th Cir. 1985)). Thus,“[t] he S h eriff’s fa ilure to supervise a nd corr ect the situation in vi ew of

the numerous si m i l ar incidents and his failure subsequently to punish the

re sp on sib le ind ivi du a ls i s mo re tha n s uf fi c ie nt e vid e nc e of a po lic y or c us tom to r e nd e r t

he County liable for L eac h’s damag es in this official ca pacity suit.” Id

. The c ase nowbefor e us pre sents a stark c ontrast to Leach in t e rm s o f the e vid e nc e ava ila ble to support the theory . Shorts produced no e vidence of any simil ar incidents in which an inmate w as held in the Carr oll Count y J ail beyond the end of his or her se ntence , and ac cording ly , no evidenc e that any such incidents we re e ver r eporte d to the curr ent, or any former , Sheriff. Shorts has produce d

no ba sis up on wh ic h we mig ht inf e r that the She ri ff sh ou ld have kn ow n th at a pr iso ne r s uc h a s Sh or

ts would likely

be subjected to a

ny constitutional de privation. Shorts similarly produce d no evidenc e that Sheriff Bar

tholomew failed to investigate t he incident or puni sh the offending parties, suc h as Sue Ba rnes or Terr y Dickey . I n fac t, Shorts did not even sug g est as much. B ased on this lack of evidenc e, we conclude that Shorts has failed to demonstrate a tria ble question of fa ct as to the

e xiste nc e of

any imp lic it p oli c y

or c us tom of deli be ra

te ind if fe re nc e that w ou ld b e su ff ic ie nt t o20

re nd e r t he She ri ff

’s De pa rtme nt l ia ble fo r S ho rt s’ s d ama g e s f ro m th is o ff

ic ia l- c a pa c ity vie wp oint. Sho rt s a lso a lle g e s, ho we ve r, that th e Cou nty She ri ff (i .e ., She ri ff

B art ho lom e w, a c tin g in h is of fi c ia l c a pa c ity ) f a ile d to imp le me nt th e re qu isi te po lic y or pr oc e ss t o p re ve nt t

he ha rm . Specifica lly , Shorts a

rgues that the Sheriff’ s leg al duty arises f rom Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35-307( d), which re q u i res a county

sheriff with custody

over a n inmate on periodic confinem ent to “adopt proce dures f

or the re lease o f t h e d ef

endant at the time specified in the or der of judgme nt and for

rec eiving the def

endant ba ck into custody at the spec ified times.” Our revie w o f t h e statute, howev er, confi rm s th e c on c lus ion re a c he d b y

the dis tr ic t c ourt . Sp lit

c on fi ne me nt a

nd pe ri od ic confine ment are separ ate a nd distinct thi ng s. Com pa reTe nn . Co de Ann. § 40- 35 -3 06 (s pli t confine ment), with § 40 -3 5- 30 7 (p e ri od ic c on fi ne me nt) ; c f. T e nn esse e v . R uiz , 204 S.W .3d 772, 776 n.3 (Tenn. 2006) (noting that § 306(c) applies to split confine ment, while cor respondingprovision § 307 ( f ) a p p li e s to p e r io d ic c o n f

in e me n t)

. Se c ti o n 3 0 7 ( d ) a p p li e s to p e r io d ic c o n f

in e me n t, but Sho rt s w a s se nte nc e d to sp lit c on fi ne me nt; the re fo re , § 30 7( d) do e s n ot a pp ly to S ho rt s. De sp ite the ina

pp lic a bil ity of § 3 07 (d ), ho we ve r, we fi nd that th e She ri ff

do e s h ave a

duty to c are for the pr isoners under his watch. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 8- 8-201(a )(3) (“It is the sheriff’ s duty to . . . [ t] ake c harg e and c ustody of the jail of the she riff’ s county , and of the prisoners ther ein;

rec eive those la

wfully committed, and kee p them persona lly , or by deputie s or jailer, until dischar g ed by law[.] ”). Moreover , an inca rce rate d inmate has “ a liberty interest in beingrele ased at the end of his term of imprisonment.” Sc hu ltz , 10 3 F . App ’x at 44 0; Da v is , 3 75 F .3 d at 71 3; W hir l , 407 F.2d

a t 79 1. F ina lly , “ wh e n the state its e lf c re a te s a statut or y ri g ht t o r e le a se fr om p ri so n, the state a lso

c re a te s a lib e rt y int e re st a nd mus t fol low min imum due pr oc e ss a pp ro pr iate to t

he c ir c ums tanc e s to

ensure that l i b erty

is not arbitrarily

abrog ated.” Haygood , 769 F.2d at 1355 (footnote omitted)21

(c i t i n g Vitek v . Jones , 445 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1980))

. The re spons i b i l i t y

for a failure of communication between the courts and the jailhouse ca

nnot justi fiably

be plac ed on the he ad of a man immured in a lockup when the a ction of the c ourt has bec ome a m at t er o f publ ic re cord. I g noranc e and alibis by a jailer should not vit iate the r ights of a man ent i t l ed t o his free dom. A jailer, unlike a

policeman, a cts at his l ei s u re . He is not subject to the stresse s and split second decisions of an arresting office r, and his acts in discharg ing a prisoner are purely minist eria l. Moreover , unlike his prisoner, the jailer has the means, the fre edom, and the duty to make nec essar y inquiries. W

hile not a surety for the legal correc tness of a pris o n er ’s comm itment, he is most certainly unde r an obligati on, often statutory, to carry out the functions of his offi ce. Those func tions include not on ly thedu ty to p ro te c t a p ris on e r, bu t al so thedu ty

to e ffe c t hi s ti me ly re le as e . W hir l , 407 F.2d at 792 (internal c itations and footnote omitted; emphasis added)

. I n F a ir le yv . Luman , 2 81 F.3d 913, 915 ( 9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit considere d a § 1983 action ag ainst a city police depar

tment, in which a suspect was held in ja il f or 12 day s on an

ar r e s t w ar r an t i s s u e d f

o r h i s t w i n b r o t h e r , d e s p i t e h i s r e p e a t e d e x p l an a t i o n s an d p r o t e s t s . U l t i m a t e l y, a jury exon er ated the individual officer s, but found the city liable for its fa ilure to implement pr oc e dure s f

or c he c kin g to e ns ur e that pe rs on s d e ta ine d o n warr ants we re the ind ivi du a ls n ame d in such wa rra nts. Id . at 916. On appe al, the Ninth Circuit explained: J ohn [Fairley ] had a liberty interest in beingfre e fr om a twelve- day incar cer ation without a ny proce dural safe g uard in pla ce to ve rify the war rant he was de tained on w a s h is an d in th e f

a c e o f h is r e p e a te d p r o te s ts o f inn o c e n c e . In li g h t of [1] the importa n ce o f J o h n’s liberty interest, [2] the sig nificant risk of de privation of that interest throug h the City ’s war rant proc edure s, and [3] the minimum burden to the City of instituti ng rea dily

available proce dures for decr easing the risk of er roneous de te nti on , the pr oc e dure s af fo rd e d b y the City to John [F a ir le y ] fa ile d to pr ov ide him du e pr oc e ss u

nd e r t he F ourt e e nth

Am e nd me nt. Id

. at 9 1 8 (f

o o t n o t es o m i t t ed ) ( ci t i n g Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) . Thus, when the mun ic i p a l i t y

t ak e s i tu

p o ni t s e l f t o ar r e s tan d d e t a i ni t s c i t i z e n s , t h a tm un i c i p a l i ty m u s ta lso imp le me nt pr oc e dure s suf fi c ie nt to sa tis fy min imum due pr oc e ss to en sure that th e c iti zen ’s lib e rt y22

is not arbitrarily

abrog ated. Id. ; Haygood , 769 F.2d at 1355. I n the prese nt c ase, the County moved for summary judgme nt on Shorts’s theor y that the final decision-make r for

the County

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment (i.e., the Sher iff in his official capa city ) had failed to implement the proc edure s nece ssary to protect his rig ht to due proce ss. I n moving f or

summa ry jud g me nt, ho we ve r, the County did no t pr od uc e or ide nti fy

any e vid e nc e to d e mon str a te the exist ence of an

ypr oc e du reat a ll , let alone a proce dure that would ensure due proce ss. There i s n o e v i d e n c e i nt h e r e c o r d a s t o w h a t , i f an yth i n g , C h i e f J a i l o r S u e B ar n e s w a s a c tu a l l y required to do under the prese nt c ircumstance s; what proce ss, if any , exis ted by

which Sue B arne s (or Te rry Dickey ) would investig ate the f

acts a sserted by S h o rt s or over come the a ppare nt indiffere nce or inc omp e te nc e of

Jef f B arn e tt an d the TD OC ; or what pro c e ss, if any , e xiste d f

or Sho rt s h ims e lf

to

overc ome the appa

rent indiffe renc e or inc ompetence of Sue B arne s. Absent such e vidence , we cannot de termine at this st ag e of the proce eding s whether the Sheriff

’s Depa rt m en t p o licy

(or

a pp are nt l a c k o f p oli c y

) s atis fi e s th e She ri ff

’s duty to p ro te c t th e ri g hts of

inm a te s su c h a s Sh or

ts. We co n c lu d e th a t th e Ca r r o ll Co u n ty Sh e r if

f f a il e d to me e t h is in it ia l b ur d e n in h is mo tion for summary judgme nt, see Celotex , 477 U.S. at 325, and there fore , the district c ourt’s g rant of summar y jud g me nt o n th is i ssu e wa s im pr op e r a nd we re ve rs e thi s p or

tio n o f t he jud g me nt. IV. We AF F IRM th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s d e n ia l o f s u mm a r y ju d g me n t to M ic h a e l L e e Sh o rts
. We also AF F IRM the district c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt to defenda

nt Be ndell Ba

rtholomew in his indi vidual capa ci t y . We RE VE RSE the district court’s grant of summar y judgme nt to the C o u n t y w i t h r e g ar d t o S h o rt s ’ s a l l e g a t i o n a g a i n s tt h e C ar r o l l C o un ty S h e r i f

f i nh i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i ty, and REMAND this case to the district cour t for fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.23

RAL PH B. GUY, JR ., c onc ur r ing in t he ju dgm e ntof r e m and. Although I join the oth e r two pa

ne l memb e rs in d e c idi ngto r e mand thi s c a se fo r f

ur the r p ro c e e din g s, Iwr ite se pa rate ly beca use t h e b as i s of the re mand is relianc e on a statutory section not relied upon or cited by the plaintiff in the district c ourt. Prior to placingrelianc e on Te nn. Code Ann. § 8-8- 201(a) (3), the c ourt

re je c te d e ve ry

ba sis fo r r e ve rs a l ur g e d b y the pla int if

f i n th is a pp e a l. By joining in the judg ment, Ido not mean to imply that Iag ree that Tenn. Code Ann. § 8- 8- 201 is controll i n g o r ev en relevant. The best place for this to be thrashe d out, however , is in the district court whe re the defe ndant will h av e an o p portunity to respond and the district judge can make a n initial evaluation of the import of this statutory section.