### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE O ct obe r 9, 200 3 S es sio n

DANA FR IE DENSTAB, ET AL 

### . v. MARTHA SH ORT

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Willi am son Coun ty No. II-01386 Donald P. Harr is, Jud ge

No. M2003- 00603-COA-R 3-CV - F iled May 27, 2004

Th e pla int if

fs br ing thi s app e a l fr om the tr ia l cou rt ’s su mma ry jud g me nt in fa vo r of

the de fe nd a nt. We a ff ir m.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed as Modif

ied

W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , joined. F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., filed a se parate dissenting opinion.

Pamela M. Spicer, N ashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellants, Dana

Friedenstab a nd Michae l Friedenstab.

Alan M. Sowell, M. Kristin Selph, Nashville, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, Mar

tha Short.

OP IN ION

Dana Friedenstab a nd her husband sued her employ er, Martha Short, for injuries sustained when Mrs. Friede nstab sli p p ed and fe ll at the Short home, where Mrs. Friedenstab pe rformed housekee ping duties f

or Martha Short. Mrs. Friedenstab’ s duties often took her up and down a set of stairs lea ding f

rom the S hort kitchen to the g ara g e. The undisputed fac ts in the recor d show that the sta ir s w e re we ll l it, wh e n o n July 19 , 2 00 0, wh ile de sc e nd ing the ste ps , Pl a int if f s lip pe d a ndfe ll. A complaint was f

iled J une 13, 2001, and alleg ed neg lige nce and a fa ilure to warn of a da ng erous condition on the property , i.e. , newspa pers plac ed “on the stairs.” Discove ry commenced, and by the time Def

endant f iled her Motion for

Summary

J udg ment on Dec ember

13, 2002, the following fac ts were established and undisputed:

1. Plaintiff fell when she slippe d o n n ew s p ap er s on the floor of the g ara g e at the f

oot of the

s t a i r w a y.-2-

2

. Al t h o u gh De fe n d an tn o rm al l y p u tac cu m u l at ed n ew s p a p er s n ea r t h e s t ep s i n t h e ga ra ge pe nd ing la te r r e c y c lin g of the m, P la int iff had nev er seen the pa pe rs ne ar the ste ps be fo re . It is unknown how many

newspa pers were near

the steps. Althoug h Plaintiff had testified in deposition that sh e didno t kn ow ho w s he mis se d s e e ing the pa pe rs un til sh e ste pp e d o n th e m, i n r e sp on se to Def endant’ s motion, Mrs. Friede nstab swore by aff idavit that he r view of the paper s was obstructe d by the last of the thre e steps. De fenda nt moved for summary judgme nt, arg uing la ck o f d uty and compar ative fault.

On Fe bruary

18, 2003, the t ri al court gr anted summary judgme nt to Defe ndant on the fo llo wi ng g ro un ds :

1. Th a t th e ne ws pa

pe rs we re op e n a ndob vio us ; 2. That Plaintiff had a n obligation to watch her step; 3. That nothing distracted Plaintiff’ s view of the ne wspape rs; and 4. That a reasona

ble j ury would have to find that Plaintiff was more tha n 50%

a t f a ult fo r h e r i nju ri e s.

I t is f r o m th is s u mm ar y ju d g me n t g r a n t, th a t Pl a in ti f f s ap p e a l ar g u in g th e e xis te nce of materia l fac tual issues prohibiting the g rant of summary judgme nt. See Te nn . R. . Ci v. P. 5 6; se e als o By rd v . H all , 847 S.W .2d 208, 214 - 16 (Te nn. 1993).

Th e su pr e me c ou rt

pr ov ide s g uid a nc e c on c e rn ing the g rant o f s umm ary jud g me nt:

Sum mary Judg me nt i s to be g rante d w he n “ the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, a ns we rs to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the affidavits, i f any , show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law.” T.R.C.P

. 56.03. “The court’s role in r uling on the
mot ion is s imi lar t o its ro le in ru lin g on a mot ion fo r a

dir e c te d v e rd ic t, andit m us t view the ... e vidence befor e it in the light most favor able to t he opponent of the motion.” Stone v. Hinds , 541 S.W .2d 598 (Tenn. A pp. 1976).

Lindsey v. Miami De velopme nt Corp. , 689 S.W .2d 856, 858 (Tenn. 1985)

.

Both p ar t i es agr ee that the question of the existence of a duty betwee n Def

endant a nd Plaintiff is a question of law. See Coln v. City of Savannah
, 966 S.W .2d 34, 39 (Tenn. 1998) . The exis tence of t hat dut y is the i nitial requireme nt of proof to e stablish a neg lige nce c laim. As the court in Col n stated:

The de termination of whe ther a d u t y is owed re quires a ba lancing of the fo re se e abil ity

a ndg ra vit y

of the po ten tial h arm

a g a ins t th e bu rd e n impo se d in preve nting that harm. Mc Clu ng v

. De lta Sq ua re Ltd . P ar tne rsh ip , 937 S.W .2d 891, 901 (Tenn. 1996) . Assuming a dut y o f ca re i s o wed, be it a duty to refr ain from

cre atin g a d a n g e r o r a d u ty to w ar n a g a in s t a n e xis ti n g d a n g e r , it mu s t then be-3-

deter mi n e d w h e th e r a d e f e n d a n t h a s c o n f

o r me d to th e ap p li c ab le s tan d ar d o f car e, which is g ener ally rea sonable car e under the circ umstances. “Or dinary
, o r r easonable, c are is to be estimated by the risk entailed thr oug h probable dang ers attending to the particula

r situation and is to be commensurate with the risk of injury .” Doe v

. Linder Const . Co., Inc. , 845 S.W .2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1992)

. Coln v. City of Savannah , 966 S.W .2d at 39.

The c ourt in Doe provided this analy sis of fore seea bilityand risk:

“ [ T ] h e p l a i n t i f

f m u s ts h o w t h a tt h e i n

j u r y w a s a r e a s o n ab l y f

o r e s e e ab l e p r o b ab i l i t y, not just a remote possi b i l i t y , and that some a ction within the [ defe ndant’s] power more probab ly

than not would have pr evente d the injury .” Tedder , 728 S.W .2d at 348. For esee ability

must be determined a s of th e t i m e o f the ac ts or omissions

c la ime d to be ne g lig e nt. Neg lige nce a lrea dy

has bee n define d as conduct which falls below a
sta nd arde sta

bli sh e d b y

the la w f or the pr ot ect ion of

oth e rs a g a ins t

un re a so na

ble ri sk of ha

rm

. Th e ide a

of ri sk in this c on te xt ne c e ssa

ri ly involves a re cog nizable dang er, based upon some know ledg e of the

e xistin g fa c ts, a ndso me re a so na ble be lie f that ha

rm ma y po ssi bly follow. Risk, for this purpose
, may then be define d as a da ng er w hich is appare nt, or should be appar ent, to one in the position of the a ctor. The actor’s c onduct must be judg ed in the lig ht of the possibilit ies appar ent to him at the time, and not by looking backw ard “w i t h the wisdom born of the e vent.” The standard i s one of c onduct, rather than conse quence s. I t is not enoug h that every one can see now that the risk was gr eat, if it was not appa rent whe n the conduc t occur red. 5 Pr o s s e r a n d Kee ton, The Law o f To rts § 31, p. 170 (1984) (footnotes omitted).

Doe v . Linder Const r. Co., Inc. , 845 S.W .2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1992) (empha sis added).

Kee ping in mind that there is no liabili ty for the re s u l t s o f an acc ident that could not have been f orese en by

a re asonably

prudent pe rson, and that “ negli g ence is not to be presumed by the

mere happening of an injury or ac cident,” Brackm an v. Adrian , 472 S.W .2d 735, 739 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1971), and t h at t h e b u rd en rests upon Pl aintiff to establish a duty owed by Def endant to him, a brea ch of that duty and inj ury resulting from the br eac h, Smith v. Roane- Anderson Co. , 207 S.W .2d 35 3 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp . 1 94 7) ; Nelson v. Richardson , 626 S.W .2d 702 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1981), w e now look to the rec ord in this case.

Be lieving that she was f iling suit ag ainst her phy sician for medical malpr actice
, Dana F ri e de ns ta

b w e nt t o h e r atto rn e y ’s of fi c e a ndfo un d th a t sh e wa s, in f a c t, s uin g Ma

rtha Sho rt

.-4-

I n her c omplaint she alleg ed:

4. The incide nt occur red at approximately

noontime when Plaintiff, Dana Friedenstab, w as in De fendant’s home providing housekee ping se rvice s and attempted to neg o t i ate a flig ht of three steps from the a lcove of f the De fenda nt’s kitchen into Def

endant’ s g ara g e to obtain an ironing board. Prior to June 19, 2000, Plaintiff, Dana Friede nstab was familiar with D efe ndant’s home and had utiliz ed the stairs from Def

endant’ s g ara g e into the alcove of f De fenda nt’s kitchen on numer ous

occa sions. Unknown to Plainti ff Dana Friede nstab, howeve r, De fenda nt had place d
a stac k of new spaper s on the bottom step leading into her g ara g e and Plaintiff slipped on this stack of newspaper s and fe ll into t he floor of Def endant’ s g ara g e sustaining

se ve re a ndde bil itatio n in

jurie s. 5. Def

endant, Ma

rtha Short, was g uilty of one or more of the following
acts of neg lige nce which constitute a direc t and proxi mate ca use of a ll injuries and damag es alleg ed her ein:

a. Said Defe ndant place d newspa pers on the ste ps leading from the alcove off he r kitchen into her g ara g e whe n Def

endant kne w, or in the e x erc ise of

rea sonable c are should have known, that said newspa pers c reated an obstruc tion on the ste ps a nda

da ng e ro us c on dit ion fo r p e op le a tte mpt ing to t ra ve rs e tho se ste ps ; b. Said Defe ndant fa iled to warn Plaintiff Dana Friedenstab tha t she had placed n ew s p apers on the steps leading from the a lcove of f her kitchen into her g ara g e whe n said Def

endant knew, or in the exercise of rea sonable car e should have known
, t hat said new spaper s cre ated a n obstruction on the steps and a dang erous condition for people using the steps, and that Plaintiff Dana Friedenstab w ould be using those ste ps i n p er forming the houseke eping service s that Defe ndant had

re qu e ste d Pl a int if

f t o p e rf or m. 6. As a dire ct and pr ox imate re sult of Defe ndant’s for eg oing a cts of

ne g lig e nc e , Pl a int if

fs ha ve inc ur

re d d oc tor , h os pit a l, andme dic a l e xpe ns e s, a ndwi ll continue to incur suc h expenses in the future.

Sixte e n mo nths a ft e r f

ili ng he r c omp la int , Pl a int if f t e sti fi e d, by

dis c ov e ry

de po sit ion , in

re le va nt p art :

Q. I s it fair to say that during the two y ear s that y ou had bee n working with her a t her house that y ou wer e fa miliar with her house? A. Very . And it’s a big house. Q. No w, thi s in c ide nt o c c ur re d in the g ara g e ; is that c or re c t? A. Yes, it did. Q How many

times had y ou been in the ga rag e bef ore during those two y e ars ? A. Ma ny

tim e s.

. . . .-5- Q. And y ou went into the g ara g e, wa s there lig ht in the ga rag e? A. There was l i ght like it alway s was but mainly coming from the sky light and f

rom the storag e room that wa s open. Q. Di d th a t pr ov ide y ou wi th a de qu a te lig ht? A. Sure, it was. I

never rea lly - - it was ne ver da

rk. Q. Al l r ig ht. So y ou did n’ t ne e d to turn o n a lig ht? A. No, it was - - it was plenty lit up. Q. All rig ht. Tell me what ha ppened. A. B oy , it’s all a blu r, bu t I jus t did n’ t se e a ny pa pe rs un til my

fo ot h it them and fle w out from under me. I didn’t see - - I

was just - - a nd I

was looking wh e re I wa s g oin g be c a us e I a lw a y s dida ndI did n’ t ha ve a ny

re a so n to thi nk

that it would be any

differ ent that day

beca use she ha d never had paper s there befor e, eve r. Q. No w, wh e n y ou sa y pa pe rs , a re y ou re fe rring to n e ws pa pe rs ? A. Th e y

we re ne ws pa

pe rs

. Q. And they

wer e at the bottom of the steps on the g ara g e floor? A. They

wer e at the bottom the steps on the g ara g e floor? Q. So the y

we re no t on the ste ps ? A. No, not on the step. It w as at the bottom. I know that I

had see n that

so me wh e re wh e re the y

sa id o n th e ste p. I t’ s n ot s o, it w a s o n th e bo tto m. Q. How many

newspa pers we re at the bottom - - A. I don’t know. Q. L et me finish my question. How many newspa pers we re at the bottom of the sta ir s? A. I have no ide a. I just know there was newspa pers that my

fee t fell on. Q. No w, wh a t pr e ve nte d y ou fr om s e e ing the se ne ws pa pe rs ? A. I don’t know. They

just weren’ t that visible until I hit them. I t was just three steps and I ’m g oing dow n - - down the steps and by the time my

foot hit the bottom, it slid out from under me. Q. I think of newspape rs as being fairly larg e and w hite. I s that what they

wer e? A. Yes, they

wer e. I ’m sorry , I

didn’t see them until my

fee t was hitting the m. I jus t di dn ’t

. Q. I u n d er s tand y ou didn’t see them, but if y ou had bee n looking f or the m, y ou wo uldha ve se e n th e m. A. Well, there’s no ne ed to look for them. Th er e h ad never be en any paper s at the bottom of the stairs bef ore, e ver. Q. So y ou felt that there wasn’t a ny rea son to look at the bottom of the
sta ir s? A. Well, Iwas looking wher e I was g oing, but no, I wasn’t looking to see if there was pa

pers laying dow n there

. Q. Well, what did y ou see? A. I saw my fee t fly out from under

me. Q. What did y ou see be fore y ou saw y our fe et fly out from under

y ou?-6- A. I sa w the ste ps

. Q. An d th e n a ft e r the ste ps the re ’s the g ara g e fl oo r; is that r ig ht? A. Th a t’ s it

. Q. And that’s whe re the newspa pers we re? A. Under

the l ast step g oing to the g ara g e on the f loor, under the last step. Q. Are y ou say ing y ou couldn’t see the newspa pers be cause - - A. Well, they

wer en’t ther e to see

. Q. Wait, wait, wait. Are y ou say ing that y ou couldn’t see the newspa pers be c a us e the ste p b loc ke d y ou r v ie w o f the m? A. No . I ’m

sa y ing that I

did n’ t se e the m a t a ll u nti l my fo ot h it the m. Q

. Iun d e r s t a n d w h a t y o u j u s t t o l d m e

. W h a t I ’ m tr y i n g t o f i n d o ut i s wh y y ou did n’ t se e the m. A. I do n’ t kn ow , b ut I

didno t se e the m. Q. Nothing bloc ked y our view? A. No thi ng . I

jus t di dn ’t

se e the m. Th e y we re no t th a t vi sib le un til my fo ot w a s h itt ing the m. Q

. Y o u s a y t h e y w e r e n ’ t t h a t v i s i b l e , b u t t h e r e w a s l i g h t t o s e e t h e mb y? A. There was - - there was light in the re. I would have turned on the lig ht if the re wa sn ’t

lig ht. Q. So y ou jus t do n’ t kn ow wh y y ou did n’ t se e the m? A. I was looking wher e I was going

. I was see ing the steps, but when I

s aw t h e p ap er s i t

wa s t o o l at e. I

wa s h i t t i n g th em an d fa l l i n g. Q. Wer e y ou c arry ing a nythi ng in y ou r a rm s? A. No
, n o ta t h i n g. Q. Wer e y ou ru sh ing do wn the sta ir s? A. J ust like normal, like I had alway s went down.

Whil e De fenda nt testified that for y ear s she routinely stacke d newspa

pers on one side or the oth e r o f the ste ps le a din g fr om the kit c he n to the g ara g e un til e no ug h p ape rs we re a c c umu la te d to justify a trip t o t h e recy cling cente r, there is no evidence that she plac ed any newspa pers on the landing below th e la s t s te p le a d in g d o w n f r o m th e k it c h e n

. Wh e n D e f e n d a n t f il e d a M o ti o n f or Sum mary Judg me nt P la int if

f r e sp on de d w ith a n a ff

ida vit , a sse rt ing in p e rt ine nt p art :

5. As I

wa s d e sc e nd e d th e sta ir s I wa s lo oking wh e re I

wa s g oin g a nddid not rush. 6

. I wa s b ei n g ca re fu l as I

d es ce n d ed t h e s t ai r s a n d I wa s n o tca rr y i n g

an y t h i n g. 7. There was a dequate light in the g ara g e as pr ovided by the window and op e n s tor a g e ro om. 8. I didno t se e the ne ws pa

pe rs a s I de sc e nd e d th e sta ir s u nti l my fo ot h it the m. 9. At the time my foot hit the ne wspape rs, the new spaper s were loc a te d a t th e bo tto m of

the sta ir s.-7- 10. My view of the newspapers was obs tructed by the l ast step, as whe n I slipped on the newspa

pers, the ne wspape rs wer e at the bottom of the
sta ir s a ndI

c ou ld n ot s e e the m.

There is no proof off

ere d in the rec ord by

which any trier of fac t or t rier of law can determine wh e the r o ne sh e e t of ne ws pa pe r wa s on the g ara g e fl oo r, imm e diate ly be low the la st ste p, or a mul tiinch stack of

newspa pers. The re is no evide n ce in the rec ord as to how suc h newspa per or newspa pers g ot into thi s location. Ther e is no evidenc e of a ny substance, e ither on the ne wspape r, on the steps, or beneath the newspa per that would make the landing below the last step hazardous or def ective. O ne would have to find the newspa per itself c onstitut ed the ha zard - - a rathe r nebulous assumption - - thoug h possible.

B e f o r e a d d r e s s i n g t h e “ tr a d i t i o n a l o p e n a n d o b v i o u s ru l e ” a s t h a t ru l e w a s m o d i f i e d b y Col n v. City of Savannah , 966 S.W .2d 34 (Tenn. 1998) , it is necessary to a ddress the dire ct contra diction be tw e e n th e de po sit ion te sti mon y of Pla int if f and he r state me nt un de r oath in he r a ff ida vit fi le d in response to the Motion for Summary J udg ment. The c ritical q u es t i o n is the ext ent to which the bottom st ep obstructe d her view of the ne wspape rs re sting on the g ara g e floor immediate ly bey ond and below the bottom st ep. I n deposition, Pl aintiff testified:

Q. What did y ou see be fore y ou saw y our fe et fly out from under

y ou? A. I sa w the ste ps

. Q. An d th e n a ft e r the ste ps the re ’s the g ara g e fl oo r; is that r ig ht? A. Th a t’ s it

. Q. And that’s whe re the newspa pers we re? A. Under

the last step g oing to the g ara g e on the floor, under the last step. Q. Are y ou say ing y ou couldn’t see the newspa pers be cause - - A. Well, they

wer en’t ther e to see

. Q. Wait, wait, wait. Are y ou saying that y ou couldn’t see the newspa pers b e c a u s e t h e s t e p b l o c k e d y o u r v i e w o f t h e m ? A. No . I ’m

sa y ing that I

did n’ t se e the m a t a ll u nti l my fo ot h im the m. Q. I un de rs ta nd wha t y ou jus t to ld m e . Wh a t I ’m try ing to f

indou t is wh y y ou did n’ t se e the m. A. I do n’ t kn ow , b ut I

didno t se e the m. Q. Nothing bloc ked y our view? A. No thi ng

. I jus t did n’ t se e the m. T he y we re no t th a t vi sib le un til my fo ot w a s h itt ing the m. Q

. Y o u s a y t h e y w e r e n ’ tt h a t v i s i b l e , b u t t h e r e w a s l i g h tt o s e e t h e mb y? A. There was - - there was li g ht in there

. I would have turned on the lig ht if the re wa sn ’t

lig ht. Q. So y ou jus t do n’ t kn ow wh y y ou did n’ t se e the m? A. I was looking wher e I

was g oing. I was seeing the s teps, but when I

s aw t h e p ap er s i t

wa s t o o l at e. I

wa s h i t t i n g th em an d fa l l i n g. Q. Wer e y ou c arry ing a nythi ng in y ou r a rm s?-8- A. No
, n o ta t h i n g. (empha sis added)

I n h e r a ff ida vit in r e sp on se to D efen dan t’ s Mo tio n f or Sum ma ry Judg me nt, sh e sa id “ my view of the newspa

pers wa s obstructed by t h e l ast step, as whe n I slipped on the newspa

pers, the newspa pers we re at the bottom of the stairs and I could not see the m.” (e mphasis added)

No e xpla na tio n is of

fe re d a s to thi s vit a l c on tr a dic tio n. Whe n Pla int if f a tte mpt s to e sta

bli sh that a disputed question of fa ct exist s as to he r failure to se e what was otherwise open and obvious to her by claiming in her a ffidavit that her view of the newspa

per w as obstructe d by the bottom step, she fa ils as a matter of

law.

“T wo s wo rn i n co n s i s t en ts t at em en t s b y a p a r t y a r e o f

n o p ro b at i v e v al u e i n es t ab l i s h i n g a disputed issue of material fac t.” Price v . Bec ker
, 812 S.W .2d 597 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991). So it i s that the Col n analy sis must be made acc epti ng as fa ct that nothing obstruc ted the view of Plaintiff of what wa s immediately

in front of a nd below her and nothing distracted he r attention.

I n Col n , Tenne ssee a

bandon ed t h e traditional “open and obvious” r ule in favor

of the Restatement appr oach. U nder this appr oach: “ A possessor of la nd is not li able to his i n v i tees for phy sical harm cause d to them by any activity or condition o n the land whose dang er is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate t h e h ar m despite such knowle dg e or obviousness.” Restateme nt (2nd) of Torts, § 343A(1).

Whil e as the court rec og nized in Col n , some jurisdictions ha ve entirely abrog ated the ope n and obvious r

ule, the Restatement rule, a s adopted in Col n , is still de pe nd e nt upo n the du ty a na ly sis

.

Th is R e state me nt d uty

a na ly sis inc lud e s a

c omm e nt that:

Such rea son to ex pect ha rm to the visitor from known or o b v ious dang ers

ma y ari se , f or e xamp le , w he re the po ss essor ha s r e a so n to e xpe c t th a t th e inv ite e s’

a tte nti on ma y

be dis tr a c te d, so that he wi ll n ot d isco ve r w hat is ob vio us , o r w ill forg et what he had discovere d, or will f ail to protect himself a g ainst it. S uch re ason may also arise where the pos sessor has rea son to expect that the invitee will proce ed
to e nc ou nte r the k no wn or ob vio us da ng e r b e c a us e to a re a so na ble ma n in his position t he adva ntag es of doing so would outweig h the appa rent risk. Restate ment (2nd) of Torts, § 343A(c omment f).

Col n , 966 S.W .2d 34 at 41 (Te nn. 1998).

The re sult of Col n is: “ Th e a na ly sis , the re fo re , as i n a ny ne g lig e nc e c a se , is fi rs t up on du ty in acc ordanc e with the for esee ability an d gra v i t y of harm, and the fe asability and availabilityof alternatives; if a duty is imposed, then s urrounding circ umstances are a naly zed under the principles of compa rative f ault.” Col n , 966 S.W .2d at 42.-9-

First, the c ourt must answe r t he question of l aw as to whether or not a duty exis ts under the fac ts of this case. I f such a d u t y ex i s t s , then the court must determine whethe r or not the r ecor d establishes, as a m at t er o f l aw , t hat Plaintiff is 50% or more at fault for he r own injuries. I f so, jud g me nt i s re nd e re d f

or De fe nd a nt. I f n ot, su mma ry jud g me nt m us t be re ve rs e d a ndthe c a se

re ma nd e d f

or tr ia l on the me ri ts. I n a na ly zing the e xisten c e of a du ty , th e fi rs t a ndfo re mos t consideration is “forese eability and g ravity

of harm.” A landowne r is not an insurer of his premises

as re lates to invitees. Mc Cormic k v . W ate rs , 594 S.W .2d 385, 387 (Tenn. 1980) . The c ondition causing the injury

in this case wa s newspape r ly ing on the landi n g at the bottom of the three -step stairway . There is no alleg ation or proof of any defe ct or obstruction exis ting on the sta irway . There was no for eig n substance of any type on the stairw ay . Th ere is no proof of a ny substance or condition of the surfa ce o r s u b s u rfa ce of the base ment floor bene ath the last step of the stairway which could ha ve c o mbined with the newspa per lying on the floor surf ace to cre ate a

slippery condition. Plainti ff did not catch her heel in the ne wspape rs or s t u m b l e o v er thenewspa pers, but

asserts onlythat she “slipped a nd fell” a s she stepped on the newspa per.
Certain long standing rules of la w did not come to an e nd with the advent of Col n . The adoption of the R es t at ement rule in Col n rea ffirms, rather than a brog ates, the r equire ment of an

a na ly sis of

fo re se e abil ity

by the cou rt in de te rm ini ng the qu e sti on of la w o f w he the r o r n ot a

du ty exis ts. I n this “fore seea

bilityanaly sis” the rules laid down in Il lin ois Ce ntr al R y . Co . v . Ni c ho ls , 118 S.W .2d 213 (Tenn. 1938) are still viable.

I n order to impute to the owner knowledg e of a dang erous thing, or place , the dang er the ref

rom must be such as i s re co gn ized by common experience , or mig ht

re a so na bly be e xpe c te d or a nti c ipate d b y a pe rs on of or din ary pr ud e nc e a ndfo re sig ht. Neg lige nce c onsists i n a fa ilure to provide a g ainst the ordinary occur renc es of life
, and the f act that the provisi on made (here the ventilated slat floor ) is insufficient a s ag ainst an eve nt such as mig ht happen once in a life time (her e that this customer for
tom a toe s w ou ld e nte r this fr e ig ht c ar w e ari ng a so ft a ndwo rn ru bb e r h e e l, andtw ist it between the slat s , an d fa l l throug h the ca r door) does not make out a case of actionable neg lige nce. Th es e ru l es, t hus stated in 20 R.C.L . p. 16, have be en

a nn ou nc e d in nu me ro us op ini on s c ite d in the no te s. As sa id b y Mr . Just ic e Ho lme s, when on the Ma ssachuse tts Court, “I f m en were held answer able f or eve rything they did which was da ng erous in fa ct, they would be held f

or all their a cts from whic h harm in fa ct ensue d. The use of the t hing must be dange rous according to common experience
, a t le a s t to th e e xte n t th a t th e r e is a man if e s t a n d ap p r e c ia

b le c h a n c e of harm fr om what is done, in view e ither of the ac tor’s knowledg e or of his conscious i gn o rance.” Com. v. Pierc e , 1 3 8 M a s s

. 1 6 5
, 5 2 A m. Re p

. 2 6 4

. I n h ar mo n y ar e the holdings in this State that to r ender one liable f or neg lige nce, it must be shown that the d a ma g e s w a s th e o r d in ar y o r p r o b ab le c o n s e q u e n c e o f th e a c t, o r

o mi s sion. Y oungstown Bridge Co. v. Barnes
, 98 Te nn

. 40 1, 39 S.W. 714; East Tennessee Railroad Co. v. De Armond , 8 6 T e nn . 7 3, 5 S. W., 60 0, 6 A m.S t.R e p. 81 6; W eek s v. Mc Nul ty , 101 Tenn. 495. 496, 48 S.W. 809, 43 L .R.A. 185, 70 Am.St.R ep. 693.-10-

Il lin ois Ce ntr

al R y . Co . v . Ni c ho ls , 118 S.W .2d at 217 (Te nn.Ct.App. 1938).

As stated by the supreme court in Gentry v . Taylor , 185 S.W. 2d52 1 ( Te nn . 1 94 5) , “ a s w e ll

e xpre sse d b y

Mr . Sa lmo nd (L a w of To rt s, p. 14 1) , in the la ng ua g e of a le a din g En g lis h au tho ri ty , ‘ to determine whether

or not an a ct [ of commission or omission] is neg lige nt it is rele vant to determine whether any rea sonable pe rson could for esee that the ac t woul d ca u s e damag e; if it would not the act is not neg lige nt.’ ” 185 S.W.2d 521 at 525 (Tenn. 1945).

This Court has held, “whe ther there is a duty owed by one per son to another is a que stion of law to be de cided by

the court.” Howe ver, onc e a duty is established, the sco p e o f d uty or the standard of car e is a question of fac t to be decide d by the trier of

fac t. Do ole

y v . E v e re tt , 805 S.W .2d 380, 384 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1990). The line to be draw n betwee n “duty as law” and “scope of duty as fac t” is difficult to see a nd in some case s all but imper ceptible. Whil e the a pproac h of Jus tice Holder

concur ring in Col n would, for a ll practica l purposes, eliminate the line of demar cation, the a doption by the majority

in Col n of

the Re stat eme nt app ro a c h r e a ff ir ms the de marc a tio n a ndre a ff ir ms

“ f o r e s e e ab i l i t y” a s t h e p r i m ar y t e s tf o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f

a d u t y.

On e ha s b ut t o c omp are the fa c ts of the tw o c a se s a ndthe n a pp ly the fo re se e abil ity

a na ly sis of Ri c e v . Sab ir
, 9 7 9 S

. W

. 2 d 3 0 5 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 8 ) t o c o n c l u d e t h a ts u m m ar y j u d g m e n to n t h e “ d u t y” question is mandated in this case. In Rice
, the landowner
, Sabir, had no ac tual knowledg e that seve re mildew had ac cumulated on the roof, or that it was extremely slippery and any more da ng erous than

no rm a l. S abir

on ly ha d k no wl e dg e that mi lde w e xiste d in sid e the ho us e . In th e c a se a t ba r, Mr s. Sho rt ha d n o a c tua l kn ow le dge of ne ws pa pe rs on the fl oo r l a nd ing of the ba se me nt i mme diate ly bey ond the last step. She had only knowledg e that she ha d, throug h the y ear s, place d newspa pers

o n ei t h er s i d e o f t h e s t ai rw ay i n co n t em p l at i o n o f re cy cl i n g t h em

. I n re co n ci l i n g Rice with Col n , the supreme c ourt said:

As we sa id in C o ln
, 966 S.W .2d at 34, mere ly labeling the injury -causing condition ‘open a nd obvious’ does not end the inquiry as to duty

. I nstead, the court must weig h the fore seea

ble risk and g ravity of harm ag ainst the burden pla ced on the defe nd ant to e ng a g e in a lte rn a tiv e c on du c t w hic h w ou ld h a ve pr e ve nte d th e ha rm

. Her e, w e c o n c lu d e th a t th e h ar m w a s n o t r e a s o n ab ly f o r e s e e ab le a n d th a t no alternative conduct wa s require d of the de fenda nt.

Ri c e v . Sab ir , 979 S.W .2d 305, 310 (Tenn. 1998)

.

Pos t- Col n and Rice , J udg e F arme r writing for this Court held:

I n a pr e mis e s li abi l i ty

a c t i o n , lia bil ity ste ms f ro m th e su pe ri or

kn ow le dg e he ld by the owner

or occ upier re g arding th e condition of the premises. Ogle v. WinnDi xie, Greenv ille, Inc. , 919 S.W .2d 45, 46 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995). T he owne r or

oc c up ie r ha s a duty to exe rc ise re a so na ble c are to pr e ve nt inj ury

to p e rs on s la wf

ull y on the pre mises. Ri c e v . Sab ir
, 979 S.W .2d 305, 308 (Tenn. 1998) . The duty of an-11-

owner or occ upier to exercise rea sonable c are includes the responsibilit y to remove

or w ar n a g a in s t th e late n t o r h id d e n d a n g e r o u s c o n d it io n s o n th e p r e mi s e s that the

owner or occupie r is a war e of or should ha ve been awa re of throug h the exercise of

rea sonable dilig ence

. Id. “T h e d u t yimposed on the premises owne r or oc cupier
, howeve r, does not include the responsibility to remove or warn ag ainst ‘conditions from which no unr easona ble risk was to be anticipated, or from those whic h the occupie r neither

knew a bout nor could have discovere d and with re asonable car e.’” Id. (quoting W. P ag e Ke eton, Pr osser & Ke eton on Tor ts , § 61 at 426 (5th ed. 19 84 )) . F urthe r, “me re ex iste nc e of a de fe c t or da ng e r i s g e ne ra lly

ins uf fi c ie nt t o establish liability , unless it is shown to be of such a c hara cter or of suc h duration that the jury may rea sonably

conclude that due ca

re wo u ld have discove red it.” Id. (quoting Kee ton, su

pr a at 426-427).

Ne e v . B ig C re e k

Pa rtn e rs , 106 S.W .3d 650, 653 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002).

Wit h no other proof

in the rec ord of a ny d an ger o r d efective c ondition, other than a newspa per on the floor, this case fails the for esee ability test of Il lin ois Ce ntr

al R. R. Co. v . Ni c ho ls and its prog eny , and summary judgme nt was prope rly

g rante d on the basis that Plaintiff has

e sta bli sh e d n o d uty

ow ing to P la int if

f f ro m D e fe nd a nt.

Whil e, as in Rice , the “ope n and obvious” rule is a part of the fores ee abil ity

analy sis, the

same rule, as modified by the adoption in Col n of theru le in R e state me nt ( 2n d) of To rt s § 34 3A , is likewise included in comparing fault. The proof in this case by Def endant is unc ontradicte d that she

never place d newspa

pers on the bas ement floor in front of the fir st step, but alway s stacked the m either to the le ft or rig ht of the stairs. Her testimony is buttre ssed by the testimonyof Plaintiff that she had ne ver be fore seen newspa pers on the floor in f

ront of the steps - - a nd indeed, ha d never seen newspa pers in the ba sement at a ll. I t i s simplyassumed that somehow it wa s Defe ndant who had pla c e d th e ne ws pa

pe rs on the ba se me nt f

loo r i n f ro nt o f the ste ps

.

Sin c e tim e imm e moria l, the lia bil ity of the ow ne r o f p re mis e s h a s bee n pre dic a te d u po n h is assumed superior knowledg e.

L iabilityis gr ounded on the superior knowledge o f t h e o wner of the da ng er to the invitee. It is when the perilous condition i s known to the owner and not known to t he person injure d that a re covery is permitted. I n the lang uag e of Mr . J ustice Ha rlan, the

owner is liable t o his invitees for injuries “occ asioned by the uns afe condition of the land or its approa ches, if suc h condition was known to him and not to them, and wa s neg lige ntly

suffe red to e x ist, without timely notice to the public, o r t o t h o s e who

wer e likely

to act upon such invitation.” Benne tt v. Louisvill e & N. R. Co. , 1 02 U. S. 577, 580, 26 L .Ed. 235. We quote t h i s p er t inent lang uag e fr om 20 R.C.L . p. 57, citing case s: “ I t ha s been said that the phrase ‘implied invitation’ in its rea l meaning

a ndsig nif

ic a nc e , a s d e ri ve d f

ro m it s a pp lic a tio n to the a dju dg e d c a se s, imp orts knowledg e by

the def endant of the proba

ble use by

the plaintiff of the def

endant’ s-12-

property so situated and conditioned as to be open to, and likely to be subjecte d to,

su c h u se . A nd , h e nc e , th e re is n o li abil ity fr om d a ng e rs tha t are ob v iou s, or as we ll k no wn to th e pe rso n in

jure d a s to the own e r. ”

Il lin ois Ce nt. R. Co. v . Ni c ho ls , 118 S.W .2d 213, 217-18 (Te nn.Ct.App. 1938).

S ec t i o n 3 4 3 A o f t h e R es t at em en t ca n b e d i v i d ed i n t o t wo p ar t s wi t h t h e f i rs tp ar tas s er t i n g, “a posse ssor of land is not liable to his invitees for phy sical harm cause d to the m by any activity or condition on the land whose dang er is know n or obvious to them.” I n this c ase, if the prese nce of the ne ws pa

pe r o n th e fl oo r b e fo re the fi rs t ste p ca n be re fe rr e d to as a “d a ng e r” the re is n o p ro of in the re co rd t h at Defendant landlord e ver kne w the condition exist ed. The condition, however - - whether it be a dang er or

not - - wa s open and obvious to Plaintiff. No under ly ing c ondition was h i d d en fr o m h er v i ew

. Un d er ca s es i n T en n es s ee p re d at i n g Col n , an invitee c ould not recove r for injuries sustained from c onditions of t he pre mises that were obvious and as we ll known to the plaintiff as to the de fenda nt. Kendall Oil Co. v. Payne , 2 93 S.W. 2d p. 40 (Tenn. 1 95 5) ; Park v. Sinclair Refining Co. , 1 42 S.W. 2d32 1 ( Te nn .Ct .A pp . 1 94 0)

. Th is fir st p art of the ru le state d in section 343A of the Restatement is simplya re iteration of the pr e- Col n “open an d o bvious” rule.

I t is the second part of the Restateme nt rule that cha ng es the pre

- Col n “ op e n an d o bv iou s” rule. This part states, “unless the possessor should anticipate the ha

rm despite such knowledg e or obviousness.” F or it to be said, under the fa cts of this case , that Def endant should anticipate that
ste pp ing on a

ne ws pa pe r, on the fl a t su rf

a c e of the fl oo r jus t be low the la st s te p, c ou ld r e su lt i n h arm , stretche s t h e i m agination. I n Col n , afte r re citing the fac ts and the Restateme nt rule, the c ourt

re v er s ed s u m m ar y

j u d gm en tfo r D ef

en d an th o l d i n g:
We find that the Cityowed a duty of ca re unde r the fa cts of this case . The deviation betwe en the surf ace of the bric k pave rs and c oncre te sidewa lk cre ated a fo re se e able pr ob abil ity

of ha rm

. Al tho ug h the de viatio n wa s op e n a ndno tic e able to

a de g re e , it is s ig nif

ic a nt tha t th e de viatio n w a s in a n a re a that ha d to be na vig a te d in order to g ain acc ess to the City Hall building. I t is also signific ant that the Cityhad
actua l knowledg e of the deviation when the paver s were installed and wa s awa re of the a va ila bil ity of c or

re c tiv e a c tio n. De sp ite su c h kno wl e dg e a ndthe fo re se e able ri sk of ha rm to per so ns who ente re d th e City Ha ll b uil din g , th e City

too k n o s te ps to

re mov e or

wa rn a g a ins t th e da ng e r. I n o ur vie w, the ri sk

of ha rm wa s u nr e a so na

ble de sp ite i t s o p e n a n d o b v i o u s n a t u r e a n d t h e f o r e s e e ab i l i t y

a n d g r a v i t y

o f h arm , there fore , outweig hed the bur den imposed in protecting ag ainst that harm. See McCall v. W

ilder , 913 S.W .2d at 153.

Col n , 966 S.W .2d at 44 (Te nn. 1998).

Under the fa cts of this case how ca n the landlord be char g ed with s uperior knowledg e of the exis tence of the c ondit i o n t h at cause d Plaintiff to sli p and fa ll? Def endant ha d never

place d newspa pers on the f

loor landing bey ond the first step. Plaintiff had never seen ne wspape rs on the-13-

floor landing bey ond the first step bef ore. There is no evidenc e of the ex istence of any substance on the s t ep s o r o n or bene ath the new spaper s which could ha ve ca used them to be slippery . I f the newspa per itself c ould be slippery
, there is no pr oof that De fenda nt could somehow have superior knowledg e over

and above the knowledg e of Plaintiff.

I n this case, the pr oof must show neg lige nce on the part of some body as the mere happening of an a ccide nt provides no basis for liability

. Brackm an v. Adrian
, 4 72 S.W .2d 735, 739 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1971). I f De fenda nt is to be charg ed with neg lige nce under the facts of this ca se, such finding must be based on some inhere ntly slippery condition within the newspape r itself. None of the Col n fac tors for a

pply ing the second part of the Restatement rule appea r in this case

. I n Col n , the de viatio n be tw e e n the su rf a c e of the bric k pa ve rs a nd the c on c re te sid e wa lk cr e a te d a f or e se e able probability of harm. Such fac tor does not appea r in this case. In Col n , t h e c i t y h ad ac t u al k n o wl ed ge of the de viation and was a war e of the availability of cor rec tive action. I n this case, ther e is no proof that D e fe nd a nt w a s a wa

re of ne ws pa pe rs loc a te d o n th e la nd ing be low the ste ps

.

Given the f

acts in this case that Def

endant had no ac tual knowledg e of the prese nce of the

ne ws pa pe rs on the la nd ing be ne a th the ste ps , a nd no e vid e nc e is pr e se nte d that c ou ld est abl ish

cons t ru ct i v e noti ce, c oupled with the fa ct that the new spaper s were in the plain and unobstructe d view of Plaintiff, if ne g lige nce e x ists, it is clear that Plaintiff is guilty

of at least 50% of fault for her own injuries. Ea ton v . M c Lai n , 891 S.W .2d 587 (Tenn. 1994)

.

No du ty ha vin g be e n e sta

bli sh e d s umm ary

jud g me nt w a s p ro pe rl y

g rante d f or De fenda nt. Ev e n if a du ty ha d b e e n est abli sh e d it is cl e ar und e r the fa c ts that Plai nti ff wa s r e sp on sib le fo r n o le ss than 50% of he r own injuries. I n either c ase, summary j u d g ment was prope rly g rante d and the judgme nt of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of the c ause a re a ssessed to Plaintiff.

___________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE