Docket No . 106496.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOPLE OFTHE STATE OFILLINO IS, Appel l ant, v. JOSE J. SANDOVA

L, Appel le e.
Opinion filed January 22, 2010.

JUSTICE KA

RMEIER deli

vered t he j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justice Fi tzgerald an

d Justice s Freem

an, Thom as, Ki lb ride, Gar man, a nd Bu rk e co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

De f en da n t, Jo se J. Sa nd o va l, was cha rgedi n th e Du P ag e C oun

ty cir cu it co ur t und er t wo se pa ra t e c as e nu mber s w it h mult iple t ra ff i c off enses ar is in g o ut o f three se

parate tr aff

ic stops. T he ch

arges in cl uded three coun

ts of d ri vi ng u nde r the i nf l uen ce of alcohol (DUI). Af ter he wa s inc ar ce r at ed in t he I llino is Depar t ment o f Cor re ct ions (DOC) for a Co ok Co unt y DUI , d efenda nt fil ed a for m do cument entitled “ De m an d f orSpee dy Tr ial and/o r Q uas h Warr ant ,” citing
se cti on 103 –5( b) o f the C ode of Crim in al Procedure o f 1963 (725 I LCS 5 /103–5(b) (West 2004)) and section 3–8–10 of the Uni fi ed Code of Co rr ect ions (the Co de) (730 ILCS 5/3–8– 10 (West 2004) ), and n oting as char ge p ending, “Du P age Co unt y D.U .I .” Defend ant did n ot specify the case to whic

h t he de man d w as int en de d t o ap pl y.-2- Wh en de fe ndan t was not brought t o t rial on any charge wi

thin 160 da ys thereafter, defe

ndan t file d a mot ion t o d ismi ss in o ne o f the pend ing c ase s. Af

ter gaini ng di sm is sal of those charges, h

e fi le d a
sec ond mo t io n t o dis miss in t he o t he rca se , su cc ee din g in having those ch arges di sm

i ss ed as we l l . Th e S tate appe al ed . Th e a pp el l ate court , wi th one jus ticedissen

ting, aff irm ed the dism

issal of all DUI charges, but reversed as t o non-DUI charges arisi ng from the sam

e in cidents. 381 Ill. App . 3 d 14 2. We re ver se t he ap pellat e co ur t as t o t he dis miss al o f t he DU I ch ar ge s, an d o t he rwis e a ffir m.

BACK GROUND On June 14 , 20 03 , de f

en da n t wa s a rre ste d i n Du Page Cou n ty and charged by unifor m tr affic cita t ions w ith se par at e violat ions o f the DUI stat ute ( 625 ILCS 5/1 1–501(a) (2) (West 2002); 625 I LCS 5/11– 50 1(a)(1) (West 2002)), drivi ng wh il e lic ense rev

oked (625 ILCS 5/6 –30 3 (W es t 200 2)) , an

d i m prop er la ne usage (625 ILCS 5/11–709 (West 2002)). Defen dant ultim

ately posted a $300 c ash bond an d s ign ed a b ail bo nd fo rm dir ec t ing him to ap pe ar to answer chargeson Jul

y 11, 2003. Defend ant fai

le d to appear on the appoin ted date, hi s bond was

ordered forfei

ted, and abench w ar ra nt was i ssued. On Ju ly 15, 2003, a notice of f

orfei ture was ge ne r at ed by t he cir cu it cl er k an d ma iled t o t he ad dr es s d efe nd an t ha d s up plie d o n his bai l bond. Th e n

oti ceof f orf ei ture bor e D u Pa geCou nty ca se No. 03–DT–293 7. A su bse qu en t no t ice o f fo r feit ur e– be ar ing t he sa me case num ber–was se

nt to that address on June 21, 2005. On Decem ber 27, 2004, a fi

ve-count crim

in al compl ai nt was f il ed in the ci rcuit court o f Du

P ag e C o un t y, under case No. 04–CF–3607, char ging defen

dant wi th mul tiple t raff ic off enses aris in g from two
se pa ra te traffic sto ps: one on March 25, 2004; the other on Decem ber 16 , 20 04 . It was

al l eg ed th at def en da n t, on t he fi

rst date, comm

itted t he offense s o f agg ra vat ed d rivingunder the in fl uence of al cohol (625 ILCS 5/ 11 –5 01 (d)(1 )(A

) (W est 2 004)) and obstructing j ustice (720 ILCS 5/31–4(a) (West 2004)). On the latter date, defend ant alle ge dly
comm itted three traf

fi c vi olations: i m

pro per lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11–709 (West 2004)) , failure to signal (625 ILCS 5 /11–804 ( West 2004) ), and dri

vi ng wh il e lic ense rev

oked (625 ILCS 5/6–303(a) (West 2004)). On February 3, 2005, indi

ctmen ts were fi le d under case Nos. 04–CF–3607–01, 04–CF–3607–02, an d 04

– CF–3607–06,-3- char ging de f

en da n t wi th obs tructi ng j us ti cean d two c oun

ts of felony DUI (6 25 IL CS 5/ 11 –5 01 (a)(2 ), ( c– 1) (1 ) (W est 20 04 )). The s ep arate i n di ctm en ts s up er se de d c oun

ts I an d I I of th e c om pl ai n t. On October 3, 2005, defen dant ma il ed to the Stat e’s A

tt orney in Du Page County, an

d t o t he Du Page Coun

ty c i rcui t cl erk, pro se f orm docum en ts enti tl ed “ Moti on to D i sm

i ss ” a nd “ De man d f or Speedy Tr ial and/o r Q uas h Warr ant .” The do cument s in t h e c irc uit
cou rt ’s f i l e are f i l e stam ped O ctober 2 0, 2005 , and the ci rcui t cl erk generated a responsi ve l etter acknowl edgi

ng recei pt an d f i l i n g of b oth docum en ts asof th at d ate. The motion to dism is s–whi ch was in eff ectual at that p oi

nt , as it was fil

ed c ont empo ra neo usly with a demand in

tended to co mmenc e the speedy-trial term–bore no case
num ber at all. In t he c ap t io n o f t he d em and, i n a space designated “CaseNo . _ __, ” de fendant had w rit t en “WO5 A488 44” –t he relev ance o f wh ich is not c l ea

r. In dif f ere nt h an dw ri ti ng , i n th e m arg i ns of b oth docum en ts in t he circuit clerk’ s f

i l e, som eone wrote “0 4 CF

3607.” The record

sug ges t s t hat so meone in the clerk’s off ice wrote t hat case
num ber on t he do cument s t he cler k r ece ived. Ho weve r, t her e is no i nd i ca ti on in the record that t he doc uments mail ed t o t he St ate ’s At to rney bore any

ide ntif ia ble case n

umb er, ot her than the on e def endan t assi gne d to the demand: “

WO 5A 48844 .” In his October 3, 2 00 5, mo tion to dism is s–the f irst of three defend ant ult imately fil

ed– defend ant re fere nced hi s ac co mpanying “Demand for Speedy Trial and/or Qu ash

Warr ant pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/103 –5 (20 01),”acknowl edgi ng that he f

il ed that doc um

en t on October 3, 200 5. Defend ant m ov ed to “di smi ss the foll owing charges: D.U.I.,” a verring that 160 da ys had elapsed “since Pet itioner’s Demand For A Speedy

Trial An d/Or Quash W

arran t wa s f i l ed.” Ob vio us ly, no tim

e had pass ed as the docume nts were f

il ed
co nt emp o r an eo us ly. In h i s “ Deman d f or S pe ed y Tri al an d/or Q ua sh

W ar ra n t” defend ant i

n v oke d b oth

se cti on 10 3– 5(b ) of

th e s pe ed y-tri al sta tute (725 ILCS 5/103 –5(b ) (We st 2004 )) and secti on 3–8–10 of the Code (730 ILC S 5 /3 –8– 10 ( West 200 4) ). In t he sp ace s pr ovid ed, defend ant i ndi cated th at he wasi nc arce rated a t Lawre nc e Correc

tion al Cen ter, that he h ad been convi cted of a DUI in C ook Co unty on J une 15, 2005, and th at he h

ad be en sente nc ed to f i ve yea rs ’ i nc arc era ti on t her eo n. Accordin

g to defen dant, he had

21⁄2 y ears re maining to ser ve-4- on that sentence. Under a s ection address in g “ch arges *** pendi

ng agains t De fen da nt in

your coun

ty,” de f en da n t wrote “ Du Page Cou n ty D.U.I. ” Fin ally, de fe nd an t de man de d t ha t t he S t at e’ s A t t o rne y o f Du Pag e Co unt y bring him to t rial “o n t he abo ve st at ed c har ge(s) wit hin 16 0 d ays as allo we d b y law

. ” A s no t ed , de fen da nt fill ed in a blank for the case n

umb er with the n

ume rical /let ter co mbinatio n: “W O5A 48844 .” The r ec o r d in dic at es t ha t t he cir cu it cle rk o f D u P ag e C o un t y, subs equ ent t o t he first ack now ledgment of filing on October 20, 2005, generated a second acknowledgment, under the same case n um b er , to refl ect the fil ing of defendant’s se con

d m oti on to dis mi ss on May 19, 2006. That m

oti on i s s i m i l ar to t he o ne de fendant had previ ously fi le d wi th the exc eption tha

t “Case N o. 04 CF

3607" i s wri

tte n in the cap t ion, apparently

in defen dant’s h and, and de f

endan t doe s n ot in dicate what charges he is m oving to dism

iss. On Augu st 9, 200 6, co unse l appe ar ed fo r d efenda nt in ca se No. 04–C F–3607, subm

itted a supporting m

em orandum, an

d move d t o dism iss t he cha rges, arguin

g that defenda

nt was not brought to trial wit hin t he t ime r eq uir e d b y t he sp ee dy- t r ial s t at ut e. I n his
memo r an du m, defend ant alle ged that an assistant Stat e’s A tt orney h ad “adm itted i n argu men t b ef ore[the cour t] th at the Sta te w asnot dispu t ing that t he Notice a nd De mand mos t likely were r ece ived by ‘s o me se cr et ar y’ a t t he Du Pa ge Co un t y St at e’ s At t o rne y’s Offic e in October of 2 005.”

A ccording to defen

dant, the Stat e’s “ chi

ef dispu t at ion” wi

th reg ard to defend an

t’s f i li ng wa s th at i t did n ot in cl ude a corr ect case nu

m be r i n th e c ap ti on of

the ple adi

ng, and that t he om i ss i on consti tuted a v i ol ati on of Ru l e 3 0.0 6 of

th e E i gh tee n th Judi cial Ci rcui t. 18th J ud. Ci r. Ct. R. 30 .06(b ) (ef

f . Jul y 15, 200 3). The ci rcuit court granted defen

dant’s m ot ion. W ith res pect t o t he appl i ca b i l i ty o f t he cir cu it courtru le, t he co ur t re fere nced an ap par ent
con ce ss i on by t he S t at e t hat it had re ce ived no t ice o f a de man d s o me t ime in October of 2005. Based upon that co nces sion, t he co ur t fou nd that the re qui

rem en ts of th e local rule wer e m et, ass um i ng, arguendo , that they were enf orceabl e at all, insofar as the State had “ actual noticeand the

i nte res t of j us ti cereq

ui res rec ogn i ti on of the dem and.” The court ide

ntif ie d the critical

is sue t o be whether the dem and was in pr o pe rfo rm. In t hat re gar d, t he co ur t ack now ledge d t hat defend ant had mu lti ple DUIs pendi

ng, but rej ected the Stat e’s argum ent that-5- defendant’s dem

and was i ns uf f i cien t for l ac k of a ca se nu mber. The courtexcu sed t he lac k o f sp ec ificit y in defend ant ’s de mand wit h t he foll owing observations: “It is entirel y possi ble that the defe

ndan t im prisone dwi

l l not have t he inf

ormat io n r eg ar din g a ca se nu mbe ras sig ne d h is
case. He onl

y kn ows he has

been arrested pr evi ous l

y on charges , and they

are stil l pen di ng.” The circu it co ur t expr esse d it s view a s t o t he St ate ’s obligat ion in t he
matter:

“ On

ce th e S tate r ec eiv es a d ema nd fo rsp ee dy t r ial, it is a si m ple matter t o put the defendant’s nam e in to our DUCT system and r et r iev e h is p en din g c as es ; it should take less than
a mi nute. If su ch a s ear ch r evea ls mor e t han o ne pe nding case, t he defen dant should be i

mm edi ately writtedi n t o d et er mine whether he is de mand i ng trial on those cases and if he i s, whi ch cas e the State el ects to proce ed on .” Co ncluding that t he def

endan t’s dem and was i n pr o per for m, t he ci rcu it co urt g

ran ted de f en da nt’ s m oti on to d

i sm i ss i n c as e N o. 04–CF–3607. Having succeeded i

n gai ni ng di sm is sal of t he ch arg esi n c as e N o. 04–CF–3607, defen

dant, on September 1, 20 06 , fi l ed a m oti on to dism iss in case No. 03–DT–2937. He atta ch ed th ereto, as

an ex h i b i t, t he demand he had mailed on O ct obe r 3 , 2 005 , t he de mand t hat h e had designated

as p er t inent t o “C ase No . WO 5A48 844 ,” t he de mand upon w hi ch som eone el se h ad wri tten “ 04 CF

3607.” A hear ingwas he ld on S ept ember 2 9, 200 6, dur ing which de fens e coun sel noted, inter ali a , a d iff

er ent judg e’s r uling in case No . 0 4–C F–3 607 , “t he ot her case that [ defendan

t] intended t hi s de mand t o a pply t o. ” T he pros ecutor

objec t ed t o t he re levancy o f the ru ling in that cas e and to defen se counsel ’s ref

erence to what defen

dant in tended: “I think def

ensecou nsel’s

words are poignan

t. She said wh

at he in tended . I t hink

t he po int is no one kno ws w hat t he Defe ndan t intends unless he cl early

pla ces thaton the speedy trial dem and. *** State statut e requires as wel l as case l aw supports clear and un

equi vocal dem and. That’s n

ot what we ha ve here.”-6- The circu it co ur t disag re ed, st at ing: “I t hink t he Defend ant in this case did , in f ac t, co mply with t he st at ut e and effect ively assert ed his r ight to a speedy

trial demand an

d based upon that the Cour t will dism iss thi s ca se.” The Sta te s ep arate l

y appe al ed i n b oth ca se s, an

d th e a pp el l ate courtco nso lidat ed t he ap pea ls for dispo sitio n. As no t ed, t he appe l l ate
cou rt, wit h o ne j ust ic e di ssen ting, af fi rmed the di

sm is sal of al l DU I charges, but reversed as t o no n- DU I ch ar ge s a r ising fr o m t he sa me in cidents. 381 Ill . App. 3d 142. The appel la te maj ority concl

uded that defendant’s ref

eren ce to a “DuPa

ge Coun ty DUI” was, u

nder t he circumstances, a s uffic ie n t sp ee dy- t r ial d ema nd fo rpu r po se s o f all pend ing DUI chargesin t ha t co un t y, and det ermin ed t hat de fendant’s demand was not invalid for failingto c omply with the loca l rule’s requiremen

ts. 381 Ill. App. 3d 148-52. The disse n t re ject ed t he maj or ity’s view that “a de mand ident ify ing an uns pec ifi

ed a nd sing le ‘Du Page DUI’ wassuf

fi ci ent under

section 3–8–10 to deman

d speedy trial fo rmult iple DUI charges i n m ulti ple cases,” sugges

ting that such
a res ul t rel i eved the de f en da nt of hi s bur den o f making a clea r a nd unequi vocal speedy -trial dem and. 381 Ill. A

pp. 3dat 154 (Mc Lar en, J., disse nti ng)

.

AN

AL YSIS Giv en our di sposi

tion , as wi l l

be made c l ear h

ereaf ter, we find it
unn ece ssa ry t o d iscuss t he enfo rc eability of Ru le 30. 06 o f the Eigh tee n th Judi cial Ci rcui t. 18th J ud. C i r. Ct

. R. 30

. 06 ( b) ( eff. Ju ly 15, 20 03 )

. Ou rdis cu ss io n w ill fo cu s p r imar ily up on th e req ui re men ts of section 3–8–10 of

the Code. As we are concern ed her e wit h t he
constru cti on of a statute, and there are n o contr overted fac ts, o ur reviewis de novo
. People v. Van Schoyck , 232 Ill . 2d 330, 335 (20 09) ; People

v. Woodd

ell , 219 Il l . 2d 166 , 171 (2 006). W i th re sp ec t to s pe ed

y-tri al sta tute s, th e l

eg i sl atu reh as se en f i t to provide dif f eren t ti me p eri ods

an d dem an d r eq ui re men ts f or off enders who ared i f

f eren tly si tuated. People v. Staten , 159 Ill . 2d 419, 424, 430 (19 94) . W e a ss

um e that di f f ere nti ati on i s the resul

t o f reas oned
consi de rati on an d i s n ot w i thou t con se que

nc e. G en era l l y , se cti on 103 –5( b) of the speedy

-trial statut e provides

that “[e ]ve

ry pe rs on on ba il or re co gni zance sh

al l be tri ed by the cou rt h av i ng j urisd i cti on-7- wit hin 16 0 d ays fr o m t he da t e d efe nd an t de man ds t r ial u nle ss de lay is occasione d

by the def enda nt.” 725 ILC S 5 /10 3–5(b) (We st 2004 ). Howev er, we are co nc ern ed here wi th the additional

demand req ui rem en ts of se cti on 3 –8– 10 of

the Code, whi ch appl

ie s to those, li ke de f en da n t, who have be en co mmi

t t ed t o a DOC facility and who have ch arges pending i

n any count y. Section 3–8–10 pr ovides: “[The person de

ma ndi ng speedy trial] shal l i ncl ude in the demand unde r su bsec t ion ( b) [of s ection 103 –5], a st at ement of the p l ace of pre s en

t com m i tmen t, th e term, an

d len gth of t he r ema ining t er m, t he ch ar ge s p en din g a ga inst him or herto be t r ied an d t he co un t y o f t he ch ar ge s, an d t he de man d s ha ll be addr essed t o t he stat e’s attor n ey of th e c oun ty where he or she i s ch arge d w i

th a c op y to the cl erk of that court and a copy to the chi

ef adm in is trat iv e off ic er of the De pa rtm en t of Co rr ect ions inst it ut io n o rfac ilit y t o wh ich he o rshe is
com m i tted.” 730ILCS 5/3–8 –10 (W est 200 4). As t his co ur t obs er ved in Staten , although our “case s su bscr ibe to t he pr inc iple that speedy-tria

l statut es implement co nst itu t ional r ight s and
areto be l i beral l y construed,”

as a t hr es ho ld inq ui ry, we mu st alw ays consider whether a de mand, or at t empt ed d emand, is sufficient to start t he runni ng of the 160 -day

tim e period set f

ort h i n section 3–8–10. Staten , 159 Ill . 2d at 427. T his cou rt has repeatedly

recogniz ed that “ ‘def

endan ts ***
ser vingprison terms f

or existing conv

ictions at the tim

e they face trial
on addi tional charges *** do not suffer a los s o f li ber t y while await ing trial on t he pe nding charges. ’ ” Woodde ll , 2 19 I ll. 2d a t 175 , q uo t ing Staten , 159 Ill . 2d at 428. T he l egi sl atur e has chosen to impose addi tional de man d r eq uir eme nt s o n t ho se ind ividua ls not appl i ca b l e to ot hers. In Staten , t hi s court rejected the notion that the additional
co ndit ions i m

posed by the l egi slature i

n s ection 3–8 –10 a

re

“ mean in gless” or m ere te ch n i ca li ti es , f i n di n g th at th e i n f orm ati o n required wa s p rope

rl y man da ted “ f orthe adm

in is trat iv e conven ie nce of t he Sta te” an d th at th e l eg i sl atu rei n ten de d to pl ac e the b urden of compl ia nce o n t he de man din g d efe nd an t wh o , as no t ed , is alr eady in carceratedan d t hu s s uf

fe r s n o ad di t io na l lo ss o f libe r t y. Staten , 159 I ll. 2d a t 428 . I n Staten , th i s court insisted that a demand un der
se cti on 3–8–1 0 be

una m bi guous. Staten , 159 I ll. 2d at 428-29 (citin g,-8- ap pr o vin gl y, appella

te court cases that

put t he dem

and b urden upon the def endan t and requi re a “clear a

nd u ne qui voca l ” dem and). As t his co ur t obs er ved in Staten : “[A] de f en da nt w ho c l ai m s a vi ol at ion of a speedy

-trial right ca nn ot pr ev ail if t he de man d fo rt r ial fa ils t o co mply wi th t he t er ms of t he go ver ning spe edy- t rial pr ovisio n. T o t re at t he in form ational requirem ents of section 3–8–10 as surpl usage w o uld be to in

fri nge on the l

egi sl ative prerogat iv

e to set
r ea so na ble con

di ti on s on an i n ca rc erate d def

en da n t’s ri gh t to
re ceive a t r ial w it hin16 0 d ays of the dem and.” Staten , 15 9 I ll. 2d at 429-30. We not e, t oo , t hou gh t hey are not co ext ensive, Illino is’ sp ee dytrial st at ut es imple men t a d efe nd an t ’s co nst it ut io nal righ t t o speedy t r ial. People v. Gooden , 189 Ill . 2d 20 9, 21 6-17 (2000). As we observed in People v. Crane , 195 Ill . 2d 42, 47 (20 01), in the c ont ext of t he balanc inganal

ys is pertinen t t o t he constitutional righ t t o speedy t r ial: “Becauseof t he seriousness of t he r emedy–‘a defend ant who
may b e g ui l ty of a seri ous crim e wi ll go free, wi

thout having been tried’–the right t o a speedy trial sh ould alway

s b e in bal ance, an d n ot i nc ons i stent, wi

th th e ri gh ts of pu blic j ustice.” Crane , 195 I ll. 2 d a t 47 , qu o t ing in part Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 522, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 112, 92 S. Ct . 2182, 2188 (1972 ). The balancing inhe r en t in

our s pe ed y-tri al sta tute i s th e p rer oga ti ve of the le gis la ture. T aking into acc ou nt t he pe rt inent s t at ut es, aut hor ities, and princi ples, it is o ur op inion, gi

v en th e f ac ts o f t his c as e, t ha t t he cir cu it courthas rev

ersed t he bur den o f co mpliance wit h st at ut or y cond itio ns t he leg islat ur e int end ed fo r t he “ ad minist ra t ive c o nve nienc e o f t he State,” pl ac i ng the bu rde n i ns tead on t he ve ry pa r t y fo rwh o se be ne fit those co ndit ions wer e ena ct ed. We see t he re sult her e as incons iste nt with the ri

ghts of publ

ic jus tice. It is not unreasonabl

e to r equi

re that defenda

nts dem andi ng a speedy trial under the provisions o f s ect ion 3 –8– 10 s pec ify t he chargesto which their dem ands pertain. That is n ot to say that case
num bers ar e n ec es sa r ily

required i n the dem and; h owev er, if they are-9- not in cl uded, ot her adequate i

ndici a of ide nt ifi cat ion must be provided, such as

the nam e of the ch arge and the date upon whi ch t he offense was al

le gedl y c omm itted. It is not en ough

to say “Du Page Cou n ty DUI” if a defe ndan t has 10 such charges pendi ng–or even three i n two di f f ere nt cas es. The deficiency her e is co mpo unde d by defendant’s provisi

on of a case n

umb er (“WO5A

48844 ”) t hat had
no t hing to do wit h eithe r c ase , a nd ap pea rs t o ha ve initially l ed t he ci rc uit cle rk t o be lieve t he de man d mig ht r ela t e t o a mu nic ip a l pr os ecu t ion. In any

even t, such la

xi ty i s i nconsistent witht he addi tional burden the legi slature has seen f it to place upon those al ready in carcerat ed for ot her offenses, those who suff er no addi tional loss of li berty because of the pendi ng charges. It is also incons iste nt wi th t he implementa t ion o f sta t ut or y cond it i ons enac t ed fo r t he ad m i n i strati v e b en ef i t of th e S tate to require the State to track down defendant’s pe nd

i ng ca se s or wri t hi m i nto court t o figu re ou t what he
means. It is particul ar ly pro blematic fo r t his defend ant t o a rg ue t hat he
was una ware of hi s c as e n um be r, or oth er i de nti f y i ng i nd i ci a, f ort he two DUIs ch

arged i n Du Pa ge County cas e No. 03–DT–2937, because , when

he f ai l ed to appe ar to a

ns wer ch arg esi n th at c as e on Ju ly 15, 2003, he was mai

l ed a n oti ceof f orfe i ture b eari ng th at ve ry case num ber. We b elie

ve routine docum

entation serv

ed on or maile d to def endan ts i n s i m i l ar ci rcum stan ces , i.e. , chargi

ng i nstru me n ts, notices, and warrants, wi ll adequ at ely a ppr ise de fendant s o f the i nf orm ati on they n ee d to c om

pl y wi th se cti on 3 –8– 10. If

the y are not in po ss es sio n o f su ch do cu men t s, ho w d o t he y know t he y have ch arges pendi

ng ? How ever, even

i f tha t i s n ot the ca se , we are not
awar e of, nor have

we been appris ed of a

ny , p ra cti ca l i m pe di men ts that would preven

t an in carcerated defen

dant from

ascertain

in g, through com

m uni cation wi th the ci rcui t cl erk, r el evan

t i nf orm ati on id en t ifying his pe nd ing ch ar ge s w it h s pe cif icit y. In passin g, we not e that t here may be i nst ances wher e t he appl i ca ti on of a t oo l iberal

constructi on to a gen

eral, ha pha zard demand m i ght actual

l y work to a defe ndan t’s dis advan

tage and thwa

rt his in tention. There m

ay be valid s

trat egi c re aso ns why a d efenda nt mightnot want a speedy

trial on all h is pendi ng cases : witnes ses m

ay be co me unavai la

ble wi th the passage

o f t ime; t he irmem

ori esf ad e; f or-10- purposes of

sente nc i ng , th e s eq

ue nc e of con vic t ions might have sign if ican t co nsequences. In an y ev en t, w e f i n d th at thisdefend ant’s dem and was i n suf f i ci en t, un de r th e p rovi si

ons of se cti on 3– 8– 10 , to co mmence t he
ru nningo f t he sp ee dy- t r ial t er m. We exp re ss no op inion re gar ding t he
en f orc ea b i l i ty o f Ru le 3 0. 06 o f t he E igh t ee nt h Ju dic ial C ir cu it

. Con se qu en t ly, we

re v er se th e j udgm

en t of th e c i rc ui t cou rt o f Du Page Co unty, and we reverse that por tion o f the appellate co urt ’s judgm ent t ha t up ho lds t he dis miss al o f DU I ch ar ge s a ga inst t his de f en da n t.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part an d reve

rsed in part; circuit court judgment reve rsed.