IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1996 

WALTER J . MANULA, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

v. 

MIKE MAHONEY, Warden of the Montana 

State Prison, Department of Corrections. 

CRAIG THOMAS, Executive Secretary, 

BOARD OF PARDONS, et al., 

Respondents and Respondents. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Beaverhead, 

The Honorable Frank M. Davis, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Walter J. Manula, Pro Se, Deer Lodge, Montana 

For Respondents: 

Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, 

Jennifer Anders, Ass't Attorney General, 

Helena, Montana 

Lois Adams, Legal Counsel, Department of Corrections 

and Human Services, Helena, Montana 

Calvin J. Erb, Deputy County Attorney, Dillon, 

Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: November 14, 1996 

~~~id~d: December 10, 1996 

Filed: 
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing 

Company. 

Walter J. Manula (Manula), appearing pro se, appeals from the 

order of the Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County, 

denying his petition for postconviction relief. We affirm. 

The sole issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred 

in concluding that Manula was not entitled to the relief he 

requested and in denying his petition for postconviction relief on 

that basis. 

In August of 1990, the State of Montana (State) charged Manula 

with having committed the felony offenses of sexual intercourse 

without consent and aggravated kidnapping (the initial charges). 

The State subsequently charged Manula with additional felonies 

allegedly committed while he was free on bond after entering not 

guilty pleas to the initial charges, including sexual intercourse 

without consent and aggravated kidnapping (the second charges). 

Manula pleaded not guilty to the second charges in October of 1990. 

A jury convicted him of the second charges in the summer of 1991. 

Prior to sentencing on the second charges, Manula and the 

State entered into a plea bargain agreement to dispose of the 
initial charges. Among other things, Manula agreed not to appeal 

his convictions on the second charges in return for specific 

sentencing recommendations by the State on both the initial and 

second charges. Manula executed an Acknowledgement of Waiver of 

Rights by Plea of Guilty regarding the initial charges and entered 

Alford pleas on those charges. 

In October of 1991, the District Court accepted Manula's 

guilty pleas on the initial charges. The court adopted the terms 

of the plea agreement and sentenced Manula, on all charges, to 40 

years' imprisonment with the last 20 years suspended on conditions. 

In October of 1993, Manula filed a petition for postconviction 

relief with this Court alleging, among other things, a denial of 

his right to appeal, by reason of his attorney's failure to file an 

appeal, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Relying on 

decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit and other courts, we determined that a waiver of the right 

to appeal is not invalid so long as the waiver is done voluntarily, 

intelligently and with understanding of the consequences. Petition 

of Manula (1993), 263 Mont. 166, 168, 866 P.2d 1127, 1128 

(citations omitted). In Manula's case, his execution of the 

Acknowledgement of Waiver of Rights which contained an express 

waiver of the right to appeal, together with the district court's 

specific inquiry about the waiver, established that the waiver was 

done voluntarily, intelligently and with understanding of the 

consequences. On that basis, we held that Manula had effectively 

waived his right of direct appeal. Petition of Manula, 866 P. 2d at 
1129. 

With regard to Manula's other claims for postconviction 

relief, we looked to the procedural bar contained in § 46-21- 

105(2), MCA. Under that statute, a postconviction petitioner who 

has been afforded a direct appeal is precluded from raising grounds 

for relief via postconviction proceedings that could reasonably 

have been raised on direct appeal. Petition of Manula, 866 P. 2d at 

1129. Applied to Manula's circumstances, we determined that he had 

been afforded a direct appeal but voluntarily waived his right to 

take the appeal. On that basis, we held that Manula was 

procedurally barred under § 46-21-105 (2) , MCA, from raising the 

other claims contained in his petition for postconviction relief. 

Petition of Manula, 866 P.2d at 1129. 

Manula filed the petition for postconviction relief presently 

at issue on March 29, 1996, pursuant to § 46-21-101, MCA. He 

sought modification of the sentencing order on both the initial and 

second charges which was filed October 7, 1991, with regard to an 

alleged ambiguity in that order relating to completion of the 

sexual offender program at the Montana State Prison. The District 

Court denied his petition and Manula appeals. 

Did the District Court err in concluding that Manula was 

not entitled to the relief sought and in denying his 

petition for postconviction relief on that basis? 

We review conclusions of law contained in a district court's 

denial of a petition for postconviction relief to determine whether 

the court's interpretation of the law is correct. State v. Baker 

(1995), 272 Mont. 273, 280, 901 P.2d 54, 58. 
Postconviction relief proceedings in Montana are governed by 

statute. Manula's petition was filed under § 46-21-101, MCA, the 

statute generally authorizing petitions for postconviction relief. 

In addition, Manula's petition was timely filed pursuant to § 46- 

21-102, MCA, which requires such a petition to be filed "within 5 

years of the date of the conviction." 

However, § 46-21-105 (1) , MCA, provides in pertinent part that 

all grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner for postconviction 

relief must be raised in the original or amended petition. Section 

46-21-105 (I), MCA, also provides that grounds for relief not so 

raised "are waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent 

petition finds grounds for relief that could not reasonably have 

been raised in the original or amended petition." As discussed 

above, Manula filed a petition for postconviction relief with this 

Court in 1993. That petition did not raise the grounds for relief 

raised in Manula's current petition which relate to the sentencing 

order entered in 1991, and Manula advances no reasonable 

explanation why they could not have been raised in his original 

petition. Accordingly, we conclude that Manula's claim for relief 

relating to the 1991 sentencing order is barred by § 46-21-105(1), 

MCA . 

We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that 

Manula was not entitled to the relief requested and in denying his 

petition for postconviction relief on that basis. 

Affirmed. 
We concur: