T.C. Memo. 1996-503

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

LES B. MARTIN AND MILLIE A. MARTIN, Petitioners v

. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 21214-93. Filed November 7, 1996.

Les B. Martin and Millie A. Martin, pro sese.

T. Keith Fogg and Veena Luthra , for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

JACOBS, Judge : In a notice of deficiency, dated August 12,

1993, respondent determined the following deficiencies and

penalties with respect to petitioners' Federal income taxes:

Accuracy-Related Penalty

Year Deficiency Sec. 6662(a)

1989 $12,672 $2,399

1990 9,276 1,855-2-

Following concessions by the parties, the issues for decision

are: (1) Whether petitioners properly deducted as job expenses and

other miscellaneous deductions on Schedule A (itemized deductions)

of their 1989 tax return: $3,272 in moving expenses, $5,020 for

country club d ues and expenses, $14,542 in unreimbursed employee

business expenses, $2,101 in investment expenses, $15,355 in jobsearch expense s, and $3,612 for tax-work (audit) expenses; (2)

whether p etitioners properly deducted $11,540 as Schedule C

business expenses for 1989; (3 ) whether petitioners properly

deducted miscellaneous expenses totaling $7,174 on Schedule A of

their 1990 tax return; (4) whether petitioners properly deducted

$12,489 as business expenses on Schedule C of their 1990 tax

return; and (5) whether petiti oners are liable for the accuracyrelated penalty under section 6662(a) for 1989 and 1990.

All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code for

the years under consideration. All Rule references are to the Tax

Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All dollar amounts have

been rounded.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The

stipulation of facts and th e attached exhibits are incorporated

herein by this reference.

Petitioners, husband and wife, resided in Charlottesville,

Virginia, at the time they filed their petition. They timely filed

joint returns for 1989 and 1990. They submitted amended 1989 and-3-

1990 tax returns (Form 1040X) to respondent's counsel on August 26,

1995, which was approximately 10 days prior to trial.

In January 1987, Mr. Martin accepted employment with Woodhead

Industries, Inc. (Woodhead), as president of Aero-Motive Co. (AeroMotive), a subsidiary of Woodhead. As such, Mr. Martin was

responsible for overseeing a 250-person, $25 million manufacturing

plant in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He was hired to "do a turnaround and

save the com pany." Prior to accepting employment with Woodhead,

Mr. Martin worked for Allen Bradley Co. in Cleveland, Ohio.

Mr. Martin was relieved of his duties as president of AeroMotive on September 20, 1989; he remained in Woodhead's employ, as

a consultant, until June 8, 1990. As part of Mr. Martin's

severance package, Woodhead ag reed to continue paying Mr. Martin

from June 8, 1990, until September 7, 1990, in the event he found

no other employment during that period of time.

Moving Expenses

In January 1987, Mr. Martin moved from Cleveland to Kalamazoo,

living in an apartment made available to him by Woodhead (the

company apartment). Mrs. Martin joined her husband in Kalamazoo

following the sale of their house in Cleveland in April or May of

1987. Because Mrs. Martin brought the family pets (a dog and a

cat) with her to Kalamazoo, petitioners were required to move from

the company apartment to another apartment. The furniture and

personal belongings of the Martins were shipped from Cleveland to

Kalamazoo at the time Mrs. Martin joined her husband; most of the-4-

1 Because Woodhead paid the country club fees and

(continued...) furnishings and belongings were placed in storage. Woodhead paid

approximately $1,700 of the expenses of shipping; Mr. Martin paid

the expenses incurred in moving from the company apartment to the

second apartment. The record does not reveal the year in which

Woodhead paid the $1,700, but apparently the $1,700 was reported on

Mr. Martin's Form W-2 in the year paid.

Petitioners purchased a house in K a lamazoo that required

refurbishing. Refurbishing was completed in 1989; thereafter,

petitioners moved into the refurbished house.

On Schedule A of their 1989 return, petitioners claimed $3,272

in moving expenses. The moving expenses were for costs incurred in

1989 in moving petitioners' furniture and belongings from storage

and their apartment to petitioners ' newly refurbished house.

Respondent d isallowed this deduction claiming (1) the expenses

incurred were not reasonably proximate in time to the commencement

of Mr. Martin' s employment with Woodhead, and (2) the storage

expenses were not in-transit storage expenses.

Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses

On Schedul e A of their 1989 return, petitioners claimed

$19,562 in unreimbursed employee business expenses. Of this

amount, $5,020 was for membership fees and expenses in Gull Lake

Country Club (the country club) paid for by Woodhead and reported

on Mr. Martin's 1989 Form W-2. 1 Mr. Martin joined the country club-5-

1 (...continued)

expenses and reported the payment as income to Mr. Martin on his

W-2, the claimed deduction for the country club fees and expenses

should have been characterized as "other expenses" rather than

unreimbursed employee business expenses. in July 1989, and resigned in December 1989, when it was apparent

that his position as president of Aero-Motive would be terminated.

Approxima tely $5,000 of the country club expenses represents an

i nitiation fee; the balance is for client entertainm ent.

Respondent disallowed the deduction for country club fees and

expenses claiming (1) the membership fees are a capital expenditure

and (2) they are not ordinary and necessary business expenses.

On petitioners' amended 1989 tax return, the amount claimed as

unreimbursed employee business expenses, other than co untry club

fees and expenses, was reduced from $14,542 ($19,562 - $5,020) to

$1,936. At trial and in their posttrial brief, petitioners state

they are willing to concede 60 percent of the $1,936, so that now

they claim $774 for unreimbursed e mployee business expenses.

Respondent disallowed the deduction for unreimbursed employee

business expenses claiming (1) petitioners failed to substantiate

these expenses and (2) petitioners did not prove Mr. Martin's

employer would have denied reimbursement for these expenses had Mr.

Martin sought it.

Investment Expenses

On Schedule A of their 1989 return, petitioners deducted

$2,101 as investment expenses. On petitioners' amended 1989 tax-6-

return, the amount claimed as investme nt expenses was reduced to

$872. At trial and in their posttrial brief, petitioners state

they are willing to concede 40 percent of the $872, so that now

they claim $349 for investment expenses. The investment expenses

were incurred with respect to Mr. Martin's inv estigating

petitioners' possible purchase of stock in publicly held companies.

Respondent dis allowed this deduction primarily on the basis of

petitioners' failure to substantiate, and on the alternative basis

that even if the expenses are substantiated, they were incurred in

connection with search ing for or acquiring new investments and

should be added to the basis of the stock acquired.

Job-Search Expenses

On Schedule A of their 1989 return , petitioners claimed

$15,355 in job-search expenses. These expenses were incurred prior

to and following the termination of Mr. Martin's position as

president of Aero-Motive. At trial and in their posttrial brief,

petitioners state they are willing to concede 40 percent of the

$15,355, so that now the y claim $9,213 for job-search expenses.

Respondent disallowed this deduction on the basis of petitioners'

failure to substantiate and petitioners' failure to show the

business purpose of the expenditures.

Tax-Work Expenses

On Schedule A of their 1989 return, petitioners claimed $3,612

in tax-work (audit) expenses. The expenses are for travel to their

attorney's office and related activities relative to prior years'-7-

taxes. On petitioners' amended 1989 tax return, the amount claimed

for tax-work expenses was reduced to $1,800. At trial and in their

posttrial brief, petitioners state they are willing to concede 60

percent of the $1,800, so now they claim $720 for tax-work

expenses. Respondent disallowed this deduction on the basis of

failure to substantiate.

Schedule C Expenses

After Mr. Martin was relieved of his duties as president of

Aero-Motive, he started a consulting business known as M.L.

Associates.

During 1989 and 1990, and for 6 or 7 years prior thereto, Mrs.

Martin operated a business, known as MAM Leasing-R.E., that leased

2 personal computers which had been acquired in 1983. Starting in

1989, petitioners decided to change the business direction of MAM

Leasing-R.E. to that of real estate development. T he Schedules C

filed with p etitioners' original returns for 1989 and 1990

aggregated the income and expenses of M.L. Associates and MAM

Leasing-R.E. On petitioners' amended tax returns for 1989 and

1990, the income and expenses of M.L. Associates and MAM LeasingR.E. were separately reported on separate Schedules C. The income

and expenses reported on Schedules C of petitioners' original and

amended returns are as follows:

GROSS INCOME EXPENSES

1989 1990 1989 1990

Original Return $ 1,778 -0- $11,540 $12,489

Amended Return 40,840 -0- 21,774 13,297-8-

The increase in the amount of income for 1989 ($39,062) between

that reported on the amended return and that reported on the

original return is the gain (short-term) from the sale of Woodhead

stock which had originally been re ported on Schedule D of

petitioners' 1989 tax return. At trial and in their posttrial

brief, petitioners state they are willing to concede 30 percent of

the expenses claimed on their amended returns, so that now they

claim expenses of $15,241 for 1989 and $9,30 8 for 1990. The

majority of these expenses represents home office expenses

(including the purchase of furniture) and automobile expenses.

Respondent disallowed this deduc tion on the ground that the

expenditures were not ordinary and necessary expenditures.

Further, as to those deductions claimed in connection with the use

of petitioners' residence as a home offic e, the deductions were

disallowed, in part, on the basis that some of the claimed expenses

were personal, and on the basis that petitioners failed to prove

their home office was used exclusively for business purposes.

Miscellaneous Itemized Deductions

On Schedule A of their 1990 return, petitioners claimed $7,174

in miscellaneous itemized expenses. Apparently the majority of the

expenses with regard to this deduction consist of travel and meal

expenses in connection with Mr. Martin seeking new employment. On

petitioners' amended 1990 tax return, the amount of the deduction

was increased to $7,176; no explanation was given for the $2

difference. Respondent disallowed the deduction for lack of

substantiation.-9-

OPINION

Deductions are a matte r of legislative grace. N ew Colonial

Ice Co. v. Helvering

, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). Taxpayers bear the

burden of establishing that they are ent itled to the claimed

deductions. Rule 142(a); W elch v. Helvering

, 290 U.S. 111, 114

(1933). This includes the burden of substantiating the amount and

purpose of the item claimed. Sec. 6001; H radesky v. Commissioner

,

65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.

1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. If claimed deductions

are not adequately substantiated, we may estimate them, provided we

are convinced that the taxpayer has incurred such expenses and we

have a basis upon which to make an estimate. C ohan v.

Commissioner

, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); Vanicek v. Commissioner

,

85 T.C. 731, 743 (1985).

Moving Expenses

Section 217 permits a deduction for moving expenses paid or

incurred during th e taxable year in connection with the

commencement of work by the taxpayer as an employee at a new

principal place of work. To qualify as being in connection with

the commencement of work, the move must be reas onably proximate

both in time and place to the commencement of work at the new

workplace. In general, moving expenses incurred within 1 year of

the commencement of work are considered to be reasonably proximate

in time to such commencement. Moving expenses incurred after the

1-year per iod may be considered reasonably proximate in time if-10-

there are circumstances which prevented the taxpayer from incurring

the expenses of moving within the 1-year period. Sec. 1.217-

2(a)(3), Income Tax Regs. Costs of storage are not deductible

unless incurred in transit, which is defined as within any

consecutive 30-day period after the goods are moved from the

taxpayer's former residence and before delivery at the new

residence. Sec. 1.217-2(b)(3), Income Tax Regs.

Petitioners moved from Cleveland to Kalamazoo in early 1987,

when Mr. Martin began a new jo b. Petitioners claim a $3,273

deduction for moving expenses th at were incurred in 1989. We do

not believe that these expenses were reasonably proximate in time

to the commencement of Mr. Martin's new employment i n Kalamazoo.

Petitioners claim that there were circumstances beyond their

control which dictated the amount of time for the move: (1) The

local real estate market was very tight and no houses were

available, and (2) business related job activities required all of

Mr. Martin's time. We have considered these arguments and reject

them. There was no showing that a suitable house in the Kalamazoo

area could not have been acquired within a 1-year period, and

although Mr. Martin's job acti vities might have required a

substantial portion of his time, there was no showing that Mrs.

Martin could not have looked for suitable housing. Further, the

expenses of moving the goods from storage to petit ioners' newly

refurbished house were not incurred in transit, but rather are

storage related expenses. Therefore, respondent's determination-11-

with respect to the di sallowance of the deduction for moving

expenses is sustained.

Employee Business Expenses

We now turn our attention to petitioners' deduction for

employee business expenses. Pursuant to section 162(a), a taxpayer

may deduct a ll ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred

during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business. In

general, an expense is ordinary if it is considered "normal, usual,

or customary" in the context of the particular business out of

which it arose. D eputy v. duPon t , 308 U.S. 488, 495-496 (1940).

The term "ordinary" is also used to distinguish currently

deductible items from capital expenditures. C ommissioner v.

Tellier

, 383 U.S. 687, 689-690 (1966). An expense is necessary if

it is appropriate and helpful to the operation of the taxpayer's

trade or business. C arbine v. Commissioner

, 83 T.C. 356, 363

(1984), affd. 777 F.2d 662 (11th Cir. 1985); Heineman v.

Commissioner

, 82 T.C . 538, 543 (1984). Only the portion of an

expense that is reasonable in amount is deductib le under section

162. U nited States v. Haskel Engg & Supply Co.

, 380 F.2d 786, 788-

789 (9th Cir. 1967).

Petitioners deducted $5,020 for membership fees and expenses

in Gull Lake Country Club. Mr. Martin was an active member of the

country club from July to December 1989. Mr. Martin testified that

he joined the country club only because he was "strongly

encouraged" to do so in connection with his employment. He further-12-

testified that he and his wife never belonged to a country club

prior to the time he joined Gull Lake Country Club and have not

belonged to one since. He used the country club solely to

entertain business customers, and ne ver on social occasions; his

wife and family never used the facilities of the club. Mr. Martin

further testified:

frankly, Mrs. Martin did not want to join a country club.

We're not country club type people and she was very much

against it, always has been against it, still is against

it * * * But after I received some pressure, I said,

hey, it's going to be one way or the other, so I'll join

and we'll try it. And I finally joined it.

We found Mr. Martin's testimony in this regard to be credible.

Respondent argues that a one-time club membership is not

currently deductible, but is a capital expenditure. Mercantile

Natl. Bank v. Commissioner , 30 T.C. 84 (1958), affd. 276 F.2d 58

(5th Cir. 1960). As a general proposition, we agree that a onetime c lub membership fee is a capital expenditure because the

benefits of the payment will last beyond a 1-year period. However,

here, Mr. Martin both joined and terminated his membership in the

country club in 1989.

Because we find that Mr. Martin's expenses and fees in the

country club were business expenses , and because Mr. Martin both

joined and terminated his country club membership in the same year,

we hold that petitioners are entitled to a deduction of $5,020 on

Schedule A of their 1989 tax return.-13-

Petitioners also claim for 1989 $774 as a deduction for

unreimbursed emp loyee business expenses. These expenses are for

" [taking] employees for refreshments after work to summari ze the

events from the day and plan the next day".

Ordinary and necessary business expenses generally may not be

deducted under section 162(a) if reimbursement is available from a

taxpayer's employer. Lucas v. Commissioner , 79 T.C. 1, 7 (1982).

Mr. Martin testified that most of the expenses he incurred for

taking employees for refreshments after work were submitted to and

reimbursed by his employer, but that he was required to "pocket

[the claimed expenses] because of budget constraints". Petitioners

presented no other evidence in this regard.

We are not convinced that had Mr. Martin sought reimbursement

for the claimed "pocketed" expenses in 1989, his request would have

been denied. Accordingly, except for the country club fees and

expenses, we sustain respondent's disallowance of petitioners'

claimed deductions for unreimbursed employee business expenses for

1989.

Investment Expenses

The next matter for our attention is whether petitioners are

entitled to deduct $348 in i nvestment expenses for 1989. The

expenses were incurred in Mr. Martin's investigating publicly held

companies with a view towards the possible purchase of their stock.

Respondent disallowed a deduction for these costs on the ground-14-

that they are nondeductible capital ex penditures, to be added to

the basis of the stock acquired. Wagner v. Commissioner , 78 T.C.

910, 915 (1982). Petitioners failed to show error in respondent's

determination. Thus, we sustain respondent's disallowance of the

deduction for investment expenses.

Job-Search Expenses

Petitioners claim entitlement to deduct in 1989 $9,213 in jobsearch expenses. Although respondent argued that petitioners

failed to show the business purposes of these expenditures, Mr.

Martin testified that when he realized that his position with AeroMo tive was in jeopardy, he began to look for other work. We

believe him, but we do not find that the entire amount of jobsearch expenses that petitioners claim is deductible.

A review of petitioners' receipts shows a number of items that

a re not ordinary and necessary expenses, as required by section

162(a). For instance, petitioners submitted receipts for the

purchase of People magazine and the Enquirer, and for gifts to

friends visited by petitio ners. There is a $65 check payable to

Video Land, with no notation as to its purpose. Petitioners also

submitted receipts for the purchase of insecticide, charcoal, and

charcoal starter.

Based on the record presented, and using our best estimate, we

find, and thus hold, that petitioners are entitled to a deduction

for job-search expenses in the amount of $8,000 for 1989.-15-

2 The requirements imposed by sec. 274(d) are in addition

to those of sec. 162. Furthermore, in the case of travel

expenses, sec. 274(d) overrides the Court's ability to

approximate a taxpayer's allowable expenses under the Cohan

doctrine. Sanford v. Commissioner , 50 T.C. 823, 826-828 (1968),

affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969).

3 Sec. 179(a), in general, allows a taxpayer to elect to

expense the cost of certain property (known as sec. 179 property)

for the taxable year in which the property is placed in service.

In general, sec. 179 property is tangible property used in the

active conduct of a taxpayer's trade or business that would be

subject to depreciation but for the election. Tax-Work Expenses

Petitioners now claim entitlement to deduct $720 as tax-work

(audit) expenses for 1989. Most of these expenses are for travel

to petitioners' attorney's office and re lated activities for

earlie r years. Respondent argues that petitioners did not

substantiate mileage expenses as requ ired by section 274(d). 2 We

agree with respondent; accordingly, we sustain respondent's

disallowance of the deduction for tax-work (audit) expenses.

Schedule C Expenses

Petitioners originally claimed a $9,763 Sche dule C business

loss for 1989, that resulted from their claiming $11,540 in

business expenses and $1,778 in income. The statutory notice

disallowed $9,361 of the expenses claimed as a section 179

deduction. 3 On their original 1989 return, petitioners claimed

$12,860 in expenses r elating to the business of Mr. Martin. On

their amended 1989 return, petitioners claimed $12,860 in expenses

relating to the business of Mr. Martin and $8,914 in expenses-16-

4 Mr. Martin used his claimed home office in connection

with his work as president of Aero-Motive until Sept. 20, 1989. relating to the business of Mrs. Martin. Thus, the total expenses

petitioners claimed for 1989 on their amended return fo r both

businesses was $21,774. Respondent contends that petitioners

should be allowed no Schedule C expe nses for the year 1989 other

than those expenses already allowed by respondent in the statutory

notice.

Petitioners originally claimed a $12,489 Schedule C business

loss for 1990 that resulted from their claiming $12,489 in business

expenses and no gross receipts. The statutory notice disallowed

all of the claimed expenses. On their amended 1990 return,

petitioners claimed $8,349 in expenses relating to the business of

Mr. Martin, and $4,948 in expenses relating to the business of Mrs.

Martin. Thus, the total expenses petitioners claimed for 1990 on

their amended return for both businesses was $13,297. Respondent

contends that petitioners are entitled to no Sched ule C expenses

for 1990.

Petitioner and Mrs. Martin each claimed a home office

deduction. Respondent contends that with respect to 1989, Mr.

Martin used his office until September 20, 1989, both for his

consulting business and as an employee, thus violating the

exclusive-use requirement of section 280A(c)(1) because his use of

a home office as an employee was not for the convenience of his

employer. 4-17-

Respondent also argues that many of the expenses petitioners

are claiming for business appear to be household expenses, and that

they did not prove that these expenses are ordinary and necessary

business expenses. For example, Mr. Martin claimed expenses for

plumbing, installing a fireplace door, snow removal, pest spraying,

and repair and maintenance of a deck. Mrs. Martin claimed expenses

for sewage and garbage collection and stress training. Respondent

also argues that most of the furniture Mr. Martin purchased for his

home office was more of a personal nature than for business.

Respondent notes that Mr. Martin had no income from his Schedule

C activity during 1989 and 1990.

Section 262 denies a deduction for any personal, living, or

family expenses. With respect to deductions under section 162, the

taxpayer bears the burden of proving that an expense was incurred

for business, rather than personal reasons

. Walliser v.

Commissioner

, 72 T.C. 433, 437 (1979). Specifically, the taxpayer

must show that the expense was incurre d primarily to benefit

his/her business, and there must be a proximate, rather than a

remote or incidental, relationship between the claimed expenses and

the taxpayer's business. I d. In the instant case, petitioners

failed to substantiate that some of the claimed expenses were

incurred primarily to benefit their Schedule C businesses.

Further, we do not find that petitioners used (as required by sec.

280A(c)) that portion of their residence claimed as a home office

either (a) as the principal place of business for their claimed-18-

5 Mr. Martin contends his income from Woodhead from the

time he was relieved as president of Aero-Motive in September

1989 until September 1990, should be characterized as Schedule C

income. We disagree. Mr. Martin received a W-2 with respect to

his income, which petitioners reported as wages on their original

1989 and 1990 tax returns. business activities, or (b) as a place of business to meet or deal

with clients. Moreover, petitioners have not satisfied the

limitation of section 280A(c)(5), which provides that the amount of

the home office deduction is limited to the excess o f the gross

income generated from the business activity conducted in the home

office, less all other deductible expenses attributable to such

activity which are not allocable to the use of the home office

itself. In other words, the deduction may not create or increase

a net loss from the business activity to which it relates.

Grinalds v. Commissioner , T.C. Memo. 1993-66 (citing H. Rept. 99-

426, at 134-135 (1985), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) 135). In the instant

case, Mr. Martin derived no income from his consulting business in

1989 or 1990 5 and Mrs. Martin only derived $1,778 in 1989 from her

Schedule C activity and no income for 1990.

Petitioners also claim entitlement to a business deduction for

the use of their 1988 Honda Accord for business activities.

Petiti oners both testified that their 1988 Honda was used almost

exclusively for business. However, on the application for the

insurance policy on the automobile, petitioners stated the car was

used for pleasure and not for business. In this regard, we do not

find petitioners' testimony credible. In sum, petitioners are not-19-

entitled to a deduction for any of the claimed Schedule C expenses

for 1989 or 1990, except to t he extent allowed in the statutory

notice of deficiency.

Miscellaneous Itemized Deductions

For 1990, petitioners claimed $7,176 of miscellaneous itemized

deductions. Petitioners provided no documentary evidence to

support their conclus ory testimony that they incurred these

deductions. Although sworn testimony may suffice as proof, when it

is so general and conclusory in character (as it was here), it will

not be sufficient to satisfy pet itioners' burden of proof. See

Hearn v. Commissioner

, 36 T.C. 672, 673-674 (1961), affd. 309 F.2d

431 (9th Cir. 1962).

In addition, since the majority of these expenses are for

travel and entertainment, they are subject to the special

substantiation provisions of section 274(d), and hence normally can

not be substantiated by testimony alone. Consequently, we sustain

respondent's disallowance of petitioner's claimed deduction in 1990

for miscellaneous itemized deductions.

Accuracy-Related Penalty

Finally, we must decide whether petitioners are liable for the

accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for 1989 and 1990.

Section 6662 imposes a penalty equal to 20 percent of the portion

of the underpayment that is attributable to negligence or disregard

of rules or regulations. Sec. 6662(a) and (b)(1).-20-

Negligence is defined as the failure to exercise the due care

that a reasonable, prudent person would ex ercise under similar

circumsta nces. Z muda v. Commissioner

, 731 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th

Cir. 1984), affg. 79 T.C. 714 (1982); Neely v. Commissioner

, 85

T.C. 934, 947 (1985). A taxpayer has the burden of proving that

respondent's determination is in error. Rule 142(a); L uman v.

Commissioner , 79 T.C. 846, 860-861 (1982).

Petitioners claimed numero us Schedule A and Schedule C

expenses on their 1989 and 1990 returns. At trial, they

substantially reduced the amount of the deduction for most of these

expenses. For the most part, their documentation to substantiate

these expenses was lacking. Indeed, petitioners presented no

documentary evidence to support their claim of $7,174 in

miscellaneous itemized deductions for 1990.

Considering all the facts, we find that petitioners were

negligent and disregarded rules and regulations in preparing their

1989 and 1990 returns. Thus, we sustain respondent's determination

that petitioners are liable for the accuracy-related penalty on the

amount of the underpayment for 1989 and 1990.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered

under Rule 155

.-21-