### In the



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 19

‐ 2870

S ARAH J OHNSON

, Plaintiff

‐ Appellant

,

v.

N ORTHEAST S CHOOL C ORPORATION

, Defendant

‐ Appellee

.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.

No. 2:18

‐ cv

‐ 68

— James R. Sweeney, II

, Judge

.

____________________

S UBMITTED M AY 20, 2020 *

— D ECIDED A UGUST 26, 2020

____________________

Before S YKES

, Chief Judge

, and R IPPLE and K ANNE

, Circuit

Judges

.

K ANNE

, Circuit Judge

. Sarah Johnson sued North Central

High School and Northeast School Corporation (“NESC”) in

* We agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the

briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and

oral argument would not significantly aid the court. Fed. R. App. P.

34(a)(2)(C).2 No. 19

‐ 2870

2018, claiming that their inadequate response to her allega

‐

tions of sexual harassment violated Title IX, 20 U.S.C.

§ 1681(a). The district court entered summary judgment for

North Central 1 and NESC on all claims. Johnson now takes

issue with two of the district court’s evidentiary determina

‐

tions and its disposition of her Title IX claim. Because Johnson

has waived any arguments regarding the district court’s evi

‐ dentiary rulings and because NESC was not deliberately in

‐

di ff erent to Johnson’s claims of sexual harassment, we a ffi rm.

I. B ACKGROUND

On November 5, 2015, Johnson—a student at North Cen

‐

tral—told her grandmother, Leslie Hawker, that she had been

raped in 2014 at an apartment complex by two classmates,

Garre tt Froschauer and Romeo Risley. Hawker, after hearing

Johnson’s allegation, went to North Central, informed Princi

‐ pal Monty Kirk about the o ff‐ campus rape, and said that she

would report this allegation to the police.

This wasn’t the fi rst time that Principal Kirk was made

aware of a rape allegation against Froschauer. Harley Gilliam,

one of Johnson’s friends, alleged that Froschauer raped her in

her bedroom the year before. Gilliam’s mother reported this

incident to Principal Kirk just a few months before Hawker

reported Johnson’s incident. But Gilliam’s mother did not al

‐

low school o ffi cials to interview Gilliam, so the school waited

to hear the results of the investigations being conducted by

the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and the sheri ff ’s

department. Although Principal Kirk did not receive or seek

1 Johnson failed to respond to North Central’s argument that it is not

a legal entity with the capacity to be sued. The district court therefore held

that “NCHS is entitled to dismissal from this action.” [Doc. 67 p. 10.]No. 19

‐ 2870 3

DCS’s o ffi cial report, he remembers someone from DCS in

‐ forming him that Gilliam’s claim was determined to be un

‐

substantiated. The o ffi cial DCS report, however, concluded

that “[s]exual abuse is recommended to be substantiated”

against Froschauer as to Gilliam.

Principal Kirk responded to Gilliam’s allegation by issu

‐ ing a no

‐ contact order between Gilliam and Froschauer,

which prevented them from touching or speaking to each

other at school. Gilliam withdrew from North Central a

month later but did not report that she had been bullied or

harassed by Froschauer during this time.

Shortly after Gilliam’s withdrawal, Principal Kirk began

responding to Hawker’s report that Johnson—like Gilliam—

had been raped o ff‐ campus by Froschauer. The same night

Hawker came to Principal Kirk with this allegation, Principal

Kirk told Superintendent Mark Baker, and they began con

‐ sulting with the school’s a tt orneys about how to handle the

situation. Also that same night, Hawker and Johnson went to

the sheri ff ’s department and reported the rape. The sheri ff ’s

department assigned Deputy Carl Melchert to handle the

ma tt er.

Hawker spoke with Principal Kirk again the next morn

‐ ing. She informed Kirk that the police were having Johnson

interviewed by a trained professional at a child advocacy cen

‐

ter, Susie’s Place, and she did not want Johnson interviewed

by North Central o ffi cials. Hawker also wanted Froschauer

immediately removed from school. Principal Kirk told her

that an investigation needed to occur before any disciplinary

decisions were made. He then con fi rmed with Deputy

Melchert that the sheri ff ’s department was aware of Johnson’s4 No. 19

‐ 2870

allegation and that Johnson would be interviewed at Susie’s

Place.

That same day, Principal Kirk issued a no

‐ contact order

between Johnson and Froschauer. This order prevented John

‐

son and Froschauer from touching or speaking to each other

at school and from using electronic communication to talk

about each other. The order did not, however, prevent John

‐

son and Froschauer from si tt ing near each other in class. John

‐

son and Froschauer were aware that the order prevented

them from talking to one another.

Johnson and Froschauer had morning classes together, so

Principal Kirk considered moving Froschauer out of these

classes and placing him in homebound schooling. But based

on Froschauer’s schedule, he could not be moved out of these

classes without it a ff ecting his ability to graduate on time. The

school’s lawyers advised Principal Kirk not to “negatively im

‐

pact [Froschauer’s] track to graduate on time based on unsub

‐

stantiated allegations.” And Johnson’s physician and Hawker

had requested that Johnson be placed in homebound school

‐ ing. So, a few weeks after Johnson reported her rape to the

school, Principal Kirk placed Johnson in homebound school

‐ ing so that she could avoid her morning classes with

Froschauer. She still went to school in the afternoons.

Meanwhile, Deputy Melchert continued his investigation.

Principal Kirk contacted Deputy Melchert over a dozen times

seeking details about the investigation. Deputy Melchert told

Principal Kirk only that “the complaining student was going

to give a forensic interview.” After Johnson’s interview, the

prosecutor decided not to fi le criminal charges against

Froschauer. Principal Kirk noted that, around this time, “all

communication stop[ped]” with Deputy Melchert.No. 19

‐ 2870 5

A few months later, Principal Kirk learned that the prose

‐

cutor decided not to criminally charge Froschauer. He also

learned that the sheri ff ’s department would not release details

of the investigation to the school. Principal Kirk reached out

to Hawker and again asked if the school could interview John

‐

son for a Title IX investigation; Hawker again refused this re

‐

quest. Principal Kirk also reached out to Froschauer, but he

declined to be interviewed.

Around the same time, Johnson and Hawker informed

Principal Kirk that Johnson was being harassed at school.

Hawker fi rst emailed Principal Kirk in January, informing

him that a girl at school “had told ‘others’ that she was going

to ‘kick [Johnson’s] ass.’” As a result of this threat, Johnson

did not want to go to the cafeteria for lunch. Principal Kirk

made sure that Johnson could eat lunch “in the o ffi ce” or “oth

‐

erwise sit in the o ffi ce if she wanted a break from class.” He

spoke with the girl who made the threat and told her to not

have any communication with Johnson that could be per

‐

ceived as negative.

The next month, Hawker emailed Principal Kirk because

one of Johnson’s fellow cheerleaders sent an unkind tweet

about Johnson. Hawker wanted immediate action taken

against the girl; Principal Kirk informed Hawker that he was

discussing the issue with the school’s a tt orneys and he would

be following their instructions. Principal Kirk met with the

girl who sent the tweet and told her to “knock it o ff .”

Later that afternoon, Hawker called Principal Kirk to tell

him that Johnson was harassed and chased down the hallway

by students—including Froschauer—after she opened a door

for them. Johnson’s story was slightly di ff erent: while she

thought other students laughed at her and chased her down6 No. 19

‐ 2870

the hallway, she did not identify Froschauer as one of those

students. Principal Kirk reviewed video of this incident and

concluded that Hawker’s and Johnson’s allegations did not

re fl ect what occurred.

A few weeks later, Hawker and Johnson obtained a pro

‐

tective order against Froschauer that prevented him from be

‐ ing at school with Johnson. So Principal Kirk sent Froschauer

home. The judge soon amended the protective order to allow

Froschauer back in school, but Froschauer was still prevented

from incidentally contacting Johnson. A police o ffi cer in

‐

formed Hawker of this change and told her that if Froschauer

“so much as looked at [Johnson],” Hawker could have

Froschauer arrested.

Shortly after Froschauer was allowed back in school,

Hawker and Johnson complained to Principal Kirk and the

sheri ff ’s department that Froschauer intentionally crossed

paths with Johnson in the hallway, in violation of the protec

‐

tive order. Deputy David Holmes responded and met with

Hawker and Principal Kirk. Principal Kirk allowed Deputy

Holmes to review video of the incident. Deputy Holmes con

‐

cluded that “[Froschauer] passed by [Johnson] in a manner

that was more consistent with someone trying to avoid her as

opposed to someone a tt empting to be close to her or other

‐

wise intimidate her.” Froschauer was not arrested by Deputy

Holmes or disciplined by Principal Kirk.

Johnson and Hawker also alleged that Froschauer har

‐

assed them at a North Central basketball game. Hawker al

‐ leged that Froschauer sat directly behind them at the game.

Johnson remembered Froschauer si tt ing behind them, but he

was a few risers above them. Principal Kirk was at this game

and paid “special a tt ention to ensure [Froschauer] did notNo. 19

‐ 2870 7

interact with [Johnson].” Principal Kirk stated that

Froschauer did not sit directly behind Johnson, but instead sat

“about 4 rows behind [Johnson] and o ff to the side.”

Johnson eventually withdrew from North Central.

Hawker fi led a complaint with the United States Department

of Education O ffi ce for Civil Rights (“OCR”). Johnson sued

NESC and North Central. She alleged NESC and North Cen

‐

tral subjected her to discrimination on the basis of sex in vio

‐

lation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). She also claimed they

violated state law by failing to have an anti

‐ bullying policy.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims

and objected to some evidence that Johnson relied on. John

‐

son cited a declaration from the Executive Director of the non

‐

pro fi t organization Stop Sexual Assault in Schools, Dr. Esther

Warkov, who stated that she had knowledge of North Cen

‐

tral’s failure to enforce Title IX in this case. Johnson also cited

the OCR’s report detailing the fi ndings of its Title IX investi

‐ gation.

The district court excluded the declaration of Dr. Warkov

and the OCR report and granted summary judgment to the

defendants on all claims. Johnson appeals the district court’s

decisions.

II. A NALYSIS

Johnson raises three issues on appeal. First, Johnson ob

‐ jects to the district court’s decision to exclude Dr. Warkov’s

declaration. Second, she objects to the exclusion of the OCR

report. Finally, she argues that NESC was not entitled to sum

‐

mary judgment on her Title IX claim.8 No. 19

‐ 2870

A. Evidentiary Rulings

In its order granting summary judgment, the district court

also excluded Dr. Warkov’s declaration and the OCR report.

The court excluded Dr. Warkov’s declaration because she was

not timely disclosed as an expert witness “as required by the

Case Management Plan” and she was not disclosed on John

‐

son’s fi nal witness list. The court excluded the OCR report be

‐

cause it was not properly authenticated. Johnson now claims

that the district court erred by striking Dr. Warkov’s declara

‐

tion and that the “court did not consider the impact of the Set

‐

tlement Agreement in its ruling regarding the OCR Report.”

But to present an argument on appeal, “a party must de

‐ velop its position by providing citation to

... supporting au

‐ thority.” Long v. Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of Ill.

, 585 F.3d 344, 349 (7th

Cir. 2009). Here, Johnson does not identify a standard of re

‐

view or the legal standards applicable to the district court’s

decisions to exclude Dr. Warkov’s declaration and the OCR

report. In fact, Johnson does not cite a single legal authority

supporting her claims about this evidence. “It is not our job to

do the legal research that [Johnson] has omi tt ed.” Bretford

Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp.

, 419 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir.

2005).

Any arguments that Johnson a tt empts to make about Dr.

Warkov’s declaration and the OCR report are undeveloped

and unsupported; these arguments are waived. See Schaefer v.

Universal Sca ff

olding & Equip., LLC

, 839 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir.

2016).No. 19

‐ 2870 9

B. Title IX Claim

The district court granted summary judgment to NESC on

Johnson’s Title IX claim. We review a district court’s grant of

summary judgment de novo

, viewing the facts in a light most

favorable to the non

‐ moving party, in this case Johnson. See

Beardsall v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.

, 953 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir.

2020). Summary judgment is appropriate only when “the mo

‐

vant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a ma tt er of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States

shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be

denied the bene fi ts of, or be subjected to discrimination under

any education program or activity receiving Federal fi nancial

assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). And under Title IX, a school

may be held liable for the sexual harassment of one of its stu

‐

dents “when the harasser is a student.” Davis ex rel. LaShonda

D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ.

, 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999).

But the Supreme Court has set a “high bar for plainti ff s

seeking to hold schools and school o ffi cials liable for student

‐

on

‐ student harassment.” Doe v. Galster

, 768 F.3d 611, 617 (7th

Cir. 2014). To prove a Title IX sexual

‐ harassment claim be

‐

tween students, a plainti ff must demonstrate that the school

was “deliberately indi ff erent to sexual harassment, of which

they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and

objectively o ff ensive that it can be said to deprive the victims

of access to the educational opportunities or bene fi ts pro

‐

vided by the school.” Davis

, 526 U.S. at 650.10 No. 19

‐ 2870

Johnson argues that the district court erred by granting

summary judgment to NESC on her Title IX claim. Speci fi

‐ cally, she contends that the district court “drew inferences

more favorably to NESC than to her” in determining that

summary judgment was appropriate. She argues that the en

‐

tire course of events—starting with the sexual assault of

Gilliam—constitutes severe, pervasive, and objectively o ff en

‐

sive harassment, of which NESC had actual knowledge. John

‐

son fi nally argues that NESC was deliberately indi ff erent to

Gilliam’s rape allegation, Johnson’s rape allegation, and the

additional alleged harassment that Johnson su ff ered while at

school.

We agree that NESC had knowledge of Johnson’s alleged

harassment. We are skeptical, however, that the conduct John

‐

son describes occurring at North Central rises to the level of

severe, pervasive, and objectively o ff ensive sexual harass

‐

ment. But we need not resolve these issues because, assuming

the entire course of conduct in this case amounts to severe

sexual harassment, NESC was not deliberately indi ff erent to

this harassment.

Title IX requires Johnson to prove that the school was de

‐ liberately indi ff erent to known acts of harassment. See Davis

,

526 U.S. at 633. To ensure that school administrators “con

‐

tinue to enjoy the fl exibility they require” in making discipli

‐

nary decisions, the school will not be held liable unless its re

‐

sponse to harassment is “clearly unreasonable in light of the

known circumstances.” Id. at 648. A negligent response is not

unreasonable, and therefore will not subject a school to liabil

‐ ity. See Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.

, 956 F.3d 1093, 1105

(9th Cir. 2020). And we will not second guess a school’s disci

‐ plinary decisions—even a school’s decision not to impose anyNo. 19

‐ 2870 11

disciplinary measures—so long as those decisions are not

clearly unreasonable. See id. at 1109; Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grain

‐

ger Cty., Tenn.

, 819 F.3d 834, 849 (6th Cir. 2016). Indeed, judges

“make poor vice principals.” Estate of Lance v. Lewisville Indep.

Sch. Dist.

, 743 F.3d 982, 996 (5th Cir. 2014). And in appropriate

cases, courts can “identify a response as not ‘clearly unreason

‐

able’ as a ma tt er of law.” Davis

, 526 U.S. at 649.

Johnson fi rst takes issue with NESC’s response to

Gilliam’s rape allegation. Johnson argues that if NESC would

have conducted a proper investigation, it would have ex

‐ pelled Froschauer, and therefore Johnson would not have

been subjected to some of the alleged harassment she faced at

school.

NESC’s response to Gilliam’s allegation was not clearly

unreasonable. Gilliam’s mother reported to Principal Kirk

that Gilliam’s “incident with [Froschauer] was not consensual

and that they had reported the ma tt er to law enforcement.”

Gilliam’s mother did not want Gilliam interviewed by school

o ffi cials and instead had her interviewed by professionals at

Susie’s Place. Principal Kirk never received a report about

Gilliam’s allegation from DCS, and he did not receive infor

‐

mation relating to the criminal investigation. Principal Kirk

issued a no

‐ contact order between Froschauer and Gilliam

and continued to monitor the situation. Gilliam and her

mother did not report that Froschauer harassed Gilliam dur

‐ ing school or at school

‐ related events.

This is not a situation where the school “learned of a prob

‐

lem and did nothing.” Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE–

2 Sch. Dist.

, 511 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2008). Instead, it was

reasonable for Principal Kirk to defer to law enforcement and

DCS where the sexual assault occurred o ff‐ campus and12 No. 19

‐ 2870

criminal charges were a possibility. Id. at 1121. Still, Principal

Kirk did not stand by and do nothing: he issued a no

‐ contact

order preventing Froschauer from speaking to Gilliam at

school. And after the no

‐ contact order was in place, Gilliam

was not harassed by Froschauer.

Johnson faults NESC here for not conducting a more thor

‐ ough investigation of Gilliam’s allegation. Johnson believes

Principal Kirk was required to reach out to DCS and obtain a

copy of its report rather than rely on the alleged DCS em

‐ ployee who verbally informed Principal Kirk that Gilliam’s

claim was unsubstantiated. It’s true that Principal Kirk could

have done more to investigate Gilliam’s speci fi c claims. As

Johnson suggests, he could have reached out to DCS employ

‐

ees to get a copy of the report and con fi rm the results of the

investigation. But blaming NESC for failing to take the spe

‐

ci fi c actions that Johnson would have preferred it to take

“sounds in negligence, not deliberate misconduct.” Id. at 1126.

And in light of the circumstances known to Principal Kirk at

that time, including being told by someone he believed to be

a DCS employee that Gilliam’s claims were unsubstantiated,

it was not clearly unreasonable for him not to follow up with

DCS.

Johnson also suggests that NESC’s course of action was

not enough and insists that Froschauer should have been im

‐ mediately expelled. But school administrators are not re

‐ quired to expel every student accused of sexually harassing

another student to avoid Title IX liability. See Davis

, 526 U.S.

at 648. In fact, schools are not required to engage in any spe

‐

ci fi c forms of discipline, and we will defer to the school’s de

‐

cisions so long as the school’s response is not clearly unrea

‐

sonable. Galster

, 768 F.3d at 619. And it was not clearlyNo. 19

‐ 2870 13

unreasonable for NESC to decline to expel Froschauer after

Gilliam’s individual, uncorroborated allegation. NESC’s

overall response to Gilliam’s allegation of o ff‐ campus sexual

harassment was therefore not clearly unreasonable. 2

Johnson next takes issue with the way NESC responded to

her own rape allegation. She argues that NESC refused to in

‐ vestigate and “deliberately decided not to interview or

change Froschauer’s schedule.” This, she argues, shows that

NESC was deliberately indi ff erent to sexual harassment.

But undisputed facts in the record show that school o ffi‐

cials did not refuse to conduct an investigation. Principal Kirk

a tt empted to interview Froschauer, but Froschauer refused.

And Principal Kirk, on multiple occasions, a tt empted to inter

‐

view Johnson. But Hawker denied his requests. Johnson can

‐

not now claim that NESC conducted a lackluster investigation

that amounts to deliberate indi ff erence when it was others

who sti fl ed its a tt empt to conduct one. See Rost

, 511 F.3d at

1122.

And the remainder of Principal Kirk’s response to John

‐

son’s initial sexual harassment claim is not clearly unreason

‐

able either. As soon as Principal Kirk learned of Johnson’s

claim that she had been raped by Froschauer, he con fi rmed

with law enforcement that an investigation was taking place.

He also remained in contact with the investigating o ffi cer and

a tt empted to procure details of the investigation. But the pros

‐

ecutor declined to charge Froschauer and also did not allow

Deputy Melchert to share details of the investigation with

2 Because NESC’s response to Gilliam’s rape allegation was not clearly

unreasonable, we need not delve further into whether this allegation and

NESC’s response would provide support for Johnson’s Title IX claim.14 No. 19

‐ 2870

Principal Kirk. And with Hawker refusing Principal Kirk’s re

‐

quests to interview Johnson, he was left without any way to

substantiate Johnson’s allegations, making it di ffi cult to disci

‐ pline Froschauer.

Principal Kirk then entered a no

‐ contact order between

Froschauer and Johnson, and he considered changing

Froschauer’s schedule. But changing Froschauer’s schedule

would have delayed his graduation. The school’s lawyers ad

‐

vised Principal Kirk not to “negatively impact [Froschauer’s]

track to graduate on time based on unsubstantiated allega

‐

tions.” Cf. Galster

, 768 F.3d at 621 (“School

‐ age bullies also

have legal rights.”). And Johnson’s physician and Hawker

both asked that Johnson start homebound schooling. Because

Principal Kirk agreed to place Johnson in homebound school

‐ ing, he did not ultimately have to decide if Froschauer’s

schedule should be changed. Cf. Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest

‐ Chi

‐

cago Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163

, 315 F.3d 817, 825 (7th Cir. 2003)

(a school’s decision to grant a student’s request to transfer

schools was not clearly unreasonable). Johnson, after request

‐ ing that she be placed in homebound schooling before the

school had an opportunity to investigate her claim, should not

now be able to claim that NESC “privileged” Froschauer by

not changing his schedule.

In response to Johnson’s rape allegation, Principal Kirk

immediately issued a no

‐ contact order, stayed in contact with

law enforcement concerning a pending investigation, at

‐ tempted to conduct his own investigation, and made di ffi cult

decisions about how to approach a complicated situation that

involved the rights of both Johnson and Froschauer. See

Galster

, 768 F.3d at 621 (“Federal law gives school o ffi cials

wide discretion in making disciplinary decisions, especiallyNo. 19

‐ 2870 15

as they have to balance the interests of all concerned.”). It’s

true that, even with the measures put in place by Principal

Kirk, Johnson still had to see Froschauer in the halls of North

Central. We do not take lightly the fact that it may have been

di ffi cult, even traumatic, for Johnson to have to face her al

‐ leged rapist every day at school. But under these circum

‐

stances, we do not think Principal Kirk was required to take

any speci fi c form of disciplinary action—like expulsion—

against Froschauer. And based on the circumstances NESC

was aware of at the time, its course of conduct in response to

Johnson’s rape allegation was not clearly unreasonable.

Finally, NESC’s response to harassment directed towards

Johnson at school in 2015 was also not clearly unreasonable.

Johnson fi rst informed the school that another student threat

‐

ened to “kick [her] ass.” Principal Kirk communicated with

Johnson and Hawker and gave Johnson the option to eat

lunch in the o ffi ce or “otherwise sit in the o ffi ce if she wanted

a break from class.” Even though that student denied making

the threat, Principal Kirk told her that she could not have any

communication with Johnson that could be perceived as neg

‐

ative.

Johnson and Hawker also reported to Principal Kirk that

a student sent an unkind tweet about Johnson. Principal Kirk

met with Johnson and Hawker about the tweet and informed

them that Superintendent Baker was discussing the issue with

the school’s lawyers. Principal Kirk asked Johnson if anyone

else was harassing her and reminded her “if something hap

‐

pens, to report it immediately.” Principal Kirk sent the tweet

to law enforcement and communicated to Hawker that this

action had been taken.16 No. 19

‐ 2870

As to the next allegation, Hawker reported to Principal

Kirk that Johnson had been chased by Froschauer and other

students. Principal Kirk reviewed video of this incident and

determined that the allegation did not match what actually

occurred. He observed that Johnson was walking at a normal

pace the entire time and no students were chasing or follow

‐ ing her. Principal Kirk therefore concluded that “[Johnson]

was not harassed in the hallway by [Froschauer] or anyone

else.” As a result, Principal Kirk did not take disciplinary ac

‐

tion against Froschauer or any other student.

Hawker and Johnson also informed Principal Kirk and the

sheri ff ’s department that Froschauer violated a protective or

‐

der by walking up to Johnson, smirking at her, and brushing

past her. Principal Kirk allowed the responding o ffi cer to re

‐

view video footage of the alleged incident. But the o ffi cer de

‐

termined that “[Froschauer] passed by [Johnson] in a manner

that was more consistent with someone trying to avoid her as

opposed to someone a tt empting to be close to her or other

‐

wise intimidate her.” So the o ffi cer did not arrest Froschauer

for violating the protective order, and Principal Kirk did not

discipline him.

Hawker’s fi nal complaint to Principal Kirk concerned al

‐ leged harassment at a basketball game. Hawker stated that

Froschauer sat directly behind Johnson at this game. But Prin

‐ cipal Kirk remembered it di ff erently: he noticed Froschauer at

the game, but he was “4 rows behind [Johnson] and o ff to the

side.” And Principal Kirk noted that, because he saw

Froschauer at the game, he was paying close a tt ention to make

sure that Froschauer did not interact with Johnson. Hawker

complained to Principal Kirk that Froschauer was allowed to

be at the game. But at that time, she did not mention thatNo. 19

‐ 2870 17

Froschauer made comments at Johnson, or otherwise both

‐

ered her. Principal Kirk did not discipline Froschauer based

on this incident.

Principal Kirk investigated each of these reported inci

‐

dents of harassment by: speaking to Hawker, Johnson, and

the other students involved; reviewing video footage when

necessary; involving the police department when necessary;

and relying on what he personally witnessed. See Doe v. Co

‐

lumbia Coll. Chi.

, 933 F.3d 849, 857 (7th Cir. 2019); Stiles

, 819

F.3d at 849 (school was not deliberately indi ff erent when it

promptly investigated individual claims of harassment). Prin

‐ cipal Kirk verbally warned students to leave Johnson alone

when he felt it was required. He also determined at times,

based on his investigation, that discipline was not necessary.

Based on Principal Kirk’s willingness to communicate with

Johnson and Hawker, to investigate all claims of harassment,

and to communicate with the school’s lawyers and the police

department, we cannot say that his responses to Johnson’s

claims of harassment were unreasonable. So, we will not sec

‐

ond guess his disciplinary decisions.

In sum, NESC responded to Johnson’s claims of harass

‐

ment immediately after Hawker informed Principal Kirk that

Johnson had been raped o ff‐ campus. Its overall response in

‐

cluded complying with and a tt empting to get information

from a police investigation, a tt empting to conduct its own Ti

‐

tle IX investigation, issuing a no

‐ contact order, and respond

‐ ing to individual claims of harassment each time Johnson or

Hawker reported them to Principal Kirk. This response is not

clearly unreasonable, and therefore NESC was not deliber

‐ ately indi ff erent to Johnson’s alleged sexual harassment.

The district court’s judgment is thus AFFIRMED.