### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A s s i gne d on B r i e f s O c t obe r 13, 2004

STA TE O F T E N N E S S E E v. L UCY T HOM P S ON

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Cannon County

No. F 03-80C J. S. Daniel, Jud ge

No. M2004- 00711-CCA -R3-C D - F iled October 29,2004

The defe n d an t , Lucy

Thompson, contends that the trial c ourt err ed in over ruling her motion for judicial diversion. Speci fi cally , she conte nds that the court a ccor ded contr olling we ight to the deter renc e value and the c ircumstance s of the cas e, while it ignor ed other fac tors that it was require d to consider. B eca use we conclude that the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion, the judgme nt is affirmed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J

. , delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., joined.

J ohn P. Partin a n d M ichae l D. Gallig an, McMinnville, Tenne ssee, f or the de fendant, Lucy Thompson.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a n d Reporter ; Kathy D. Asling er, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; W illiam C . Whit esell, Jr., District Attorney Gene ral; and D avid Puckett, Assistant District Attorney

Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F acts and P roce dural Hi story

The defe ndant was indicted, along with two co-de fendants, on one count o f i ntroduction of contra band into a pena l insti tution; t here afte r, she f iled a petition for pr etrial diver sion, which was de nied by

the District Attorney

Gene ral’s of

fice . The de fendant then enter ed a ple a of no lo

c on te nd e re to a re duced c harg e of attempted introduction of contra band into a pena l insti tution. Following a denial of the def endant’ s reque st for judicial diversion, the de fendant was sentenc ed to t wo y e ars of

pr ob a tio n. Th e de fe nd a nt the n f ile d a tim e ly app e a l to thi s Co urt.

At the time of the incide nt that is the basis of this appeal, the de fendant was employ ed as
a cor rec tional office r at the Cannon County J ail. I n M ay 2003, the def endant a rra ng ed a me eting-2-

wi th the wi fe of

on e of th e inm a te s, wh o d e liv e re d to the de fe nd a nt a ba g c on ta ini ng c ake s, tobacc o, and twenty -one ta blets of dihy drocode inone. The de fendant then took t h i s bag into the jail, intending to deliver the pac kag e to the inmate. Upon a rriving at the jail, the def endant dis c ov e re d th a t th e ba g c on ta ine d to ba c c o a nd pla c e d th e bag in a fi lin g c abin e t, p la nn ing to dispose of it later. She m ai n t ained that she did not see any pills i n the bag . When later confr onted by

her supe rvisor about the ba g , she told him that she thr ew the ba g away . Her supervisor a sked her

to retrieve the pac kag e; in s t ead she purcha sed additional ca kes and prese nted them to her supe rviso r. He r s u p er v isor was a war e of w hat she ha d done and f ired he r at that time.

Se ve ra l day s lat er, a de te c tiv e qu e sti on e d th e de fe nd a nt r e g ard ing the inc ide nt. She tol d the detec tive that she re ceive d the ca kes and toba cco f

rom the inmate’s w ife but that she ke pt the tobacc o in her c ar a nd later disposed of it in a dumpster. The ne x t d ay , afte r the de tective showed the de fenda nt the pills, t he def endant made a written statement.

At the sentenc ing he aring , the def endant testified i n h er ow n behalf and pre sented seve ral other witnesse s, including f riends, a f

ormer c o-worke r at the Warr en County J ail, and her brother. T he court found that, althoug h the def endant’ s persona l history weig hed in fav or of jud ic ia l di ve rs ion , t he f a c ts s ur ro un din g the inc ide nt w e ig he d mu c h mo re he a vil y a g a ins t g ranti ng the mot ion . T he de fe nd a nt n ow app e a ls t o th is C ou rt

. Ana lys is

A def endant is qualified f

or judicial diversion whe n he or she is f o u n d g uiltyor plea ds gu i l t y , or nolo contendere , to a Cl a s s C, D , o r E f e lo n y , if th e d e f

e n d a n t h a s n o t p r e v io u s ly had a felon y co n v i ction or a c onviction of a Class A misdemea nor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 313(a) (1)( B) (i ) (2004) . The judicial diver sion statute provides that the trial c ourt may defe r e ntry of jud g me nt u nti l a

de fe nd a nt s uc c e ssf

ull y c omp le te s a

div e rs ionpr og ram or

vio la te s a c on dit ion of

his or he r r e le a se . T e nn . Co de An n. 40 -3 5- 31 3( a )( 2) (2 00 4) . I f the de fe nd a nt i s i n d ee d s u cc es s fu l , t h e t ri al co u rt ca n t h en d i s ch ar ge t h e d ef en d an ta n d d i s m i s s t h e p ro ce ed i n gs ag ains t h im

o r h e r w ith o u t an a d

ju d ic a ti o n o f

g u il t. T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 3 1 3 ( a ) ( 2 ) (2004). The de fenda nt may

then a p p l yto have a ll recor ds of the proc eeding expunged f rom all offic ial
rec ords. Tenn. Code A nn. §40-35-313( b) (2004)

. A def endant who me ets the pre requisites of the statu t e i s n o t entitled to judicial diversion
a s a ma tte r o f rig ht; rathe r i t is a ma tte r w ith in the dis c re tio n o f t he tr ial c ou rt . St a te v. B on e ste l, 871 S.W .2d 163, 168 (Te n n

. C ri m

. App. 1993). Althoug h g ener ally , when a defe ndant chal le ng e s th e ma nn e r o f s e rv ic e of a se nte nc e , th e re vie w i s de novo w ith a p r e s u mp ti o n of
corr ectne ss, when the a ccuse d challenges the denial of judicial diversion, the standa rd of r eview is differe nt. State v. Parker, 932 S.W.2d 945, 956 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (c i t i n g S t at e v. Ander son, 857 S.W .2d 5 7 1 , 5 7 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) ; State v. Georg e, 830 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) ). Because the de cision to gr ant judicial diversion lies with the sound discretion of the trial court, that de cision will not be overturne d on appeal ab s ent an a buse of discretio n

. I d .; State v. Electroplating , I nc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Moreove r, this Court will not interfe re w ith the trial co u rt ’s d ecision i f there is “any substantial-3-

evidenc e to support the re fusal” in the r ecor d. Bone stel, 8 7 1 S.W .2d at 168 (quoting Ander son, 857 S.W .2d at 572).

I n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r j ud ic ia l di ve rs ionis a pp ro pria te, the t

ri a l c ou rt is r e qu ir e d to consider the fo l l o wing fac tors: (1) the de fendant’s amena bilityto corre ction; (2) the circ umsta n ces of the offe nse; (3) the defe ndant’s criminal recor d; (4) the de fendant’s social history ; (5) the de fendan t ’s p h y sical and me ntal health; (6) the deter renc e value to the defe ndant and other s; and (7) w hether judicial diver s i o n will serve the e nds of justice. Parke r, 932 S.W.2d at 958 (c iting B onestel, 871 S.W.2d at 168). Finally , “the rec ord must refle ct that the court has weig hed all of the fac tors in rea ching its determination.” Elec troplating , 990 S.W .2d at 229.

The de fendan t i n i t ially

contends that the tria l court abuse d its discretion when it did not rely on the full battery

of fa ctors listed in Bone stel. Ho we v er , we a re pe rsuade d that there was ample evide nce, notwithstanding the fa ctors not spec ifically men tioned, to support the court’s decision. During the hea ring , the court analy zed severa l fac t o rs including: the de fendant’s lack of a c rimin al re co rd, her social history , the circ umstances of the offe nse, and the deter renc e value that would r esult from denying the defe ndant’s re quest.

Th e c ou rt pa rt ic ula rl y no ted that th e c ir c ums ta nc e s su rr ou nd ing the c a se we re e sp e c ia lly eg reg ious. The court found that, despite the defe ndant’s knowledg e of the fa ci l i t y ’s policy reg arding the introduction of items from “ outside,” the de fendant knowingly b reache d her employ er’ s trust and disreg arde d the stated rule . The c ourt al s o noted that the introduction of contra band had be en an ong oing pr oblem in the subject fa cility an d i n other fa cilities of its kind. There fore , the court placed a premium on the d et er re n ce value whic h would result from de nial of the de fe nd a nt’ s r e qu e st

. Al th oug h th e c ou rt didno t me nti on the de fe nd a nt’ s h e a lth , a me na bil ity to corre ction, or the intere sts of the parties, w e believe there exis ted more t h an suff icient evidenc e f

ro m the fa ctors ana ly zed to just ify the court’s action. B eca use we believe the trial court did not abuse its discre tion in deny ing judicia l diversion, we will not disturb its decision.

The second contention that the defe ndant makes is that the court abused i t s d i s cre tion wh e n it we ig he d s ome fa c tor s mo re he a vil y than o the rs , w hil e faili ng to g ive a n e xpla nati on a s to wh y the c ou rt wei ghed the fa c tor s a s it did . We dis a g re e wi th the de fe nd a nt’ s a rg ume nt b e c aus e the re c or d r e fl e c ts t

hat th e c ou rt

did , infa c t, e xpla in i ts r e a so nin g su ff ic ie ntl y . T he c ou rt

state d: [T]he oth e r f

a c tor s, su c h a s so c ial hi st ory , ag e , la c k o f a c ri min a l r e c or d s pe aks in he r b e h a l f

. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d

. . . t h i s o f f e n s e i s c o m m i t t e d b y a p e r s o n w ho is entrusted with a high de g ree of re sponsibili ty for the sa fety

of those who a

re be ing inc arc e rate d a nda po sit ion of tr us t a s a

De pu ty of the Ca nn on Cou nty Sheriff’ s De p artment c harg ed with the re sponsibili ty of ensuring that the
c or re c tio na l f

a c ili ty c omp lie s w ith the s afet y stand ard s. An d o ne of tho se standards, of

course , would be the pr ohibition of the introduction of contraband.
And that particular c harg e that she ha s was violated by even bringing anything into the fa cility . But c ompoun ding that was her misrepre sentation, basica lly ly ing a bout her involvement in the a ctivity when she is confronte d.-4-

There for e, t h e court stated its reasoning in acc ording more we ight to these fac tors: the defe ndant
c on tr a ve ne d th e sta nd ard s th a t he r e mpl oy e r c ha rg e d h e r w ith pr otect ing a ndfu rthe r atte mpt e d to de c e ive he r e mpl oy e r re g ard ing the inc ide nt. Th e e g re g iou sn e ss of the se a c ts c a us e d t he se fac tors t o we i gh m o re he avily than the fa ctors in fa vor of the de fendant. Thus, we believe that the court stated a suff

icient re ason for

accor d i ng more we ight to the c ircumstance s of the incident and the trial court did not, there fore , abuse its discre tion.

Conclusion

Ba sed on the for eg oing, a s well as the r ecor d as a w hole, we a ffirm the judgment of the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI LL I AMS, J UDGE