AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed April 2, 2020 

# S

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-00022-CR No. 05-19-00023-CR IBRAHEIM KADAR STROGGINS, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F12-72353-Q; F12-61723-Q MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Molberg, and Partida-Kipness Opinion by Justice Bridges Ibraheim Kadar Stroggins appeals his aggravated robbery convict ion in cause number 05-19-00022-CV a nd his burglary with intent to commit ro bbery conviction in cause number 05-19-00023-CV. The trial court adjudicated ap pellant’s guilt and sentenced him to fifteen years’ confinement in each case. In t wo issues, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to fifteen years’ confinement because that punishme nt violates the objectives of the penal code. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.–2– In late 2012, appellant was charged by indictment with the und erlying offenses. At a hearing in May 2015, appellant entered a guilty plea to each offense. Appellant testified he ran into his cousin and another man at a bus station. The three went to a house they had heard contained “dope and money.” App ellant testified he did not have a gun, and “all [he] did was grab stuff in the hou se.” Appellant also testified he was in the room wh ile a girl in the house was bein g raped by one of his accomplices. In response to que stioning, appellant testified that he had been in jail most of the time these cases were pending except for three mont hs when appellant was released and put “on the mon itor.” However, appellant “vio lated [his] monitor” and went back to jail. Appellant testified he understood that, if the judge gave him deferred adjudication and he “me ssed up,” he could come back an d the judge could give him “life in prison.” The trial court placed appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of ten years in each case. In September 2017, the State filed a motion to re voke appellant’s probation and pr oceed with an adjudication of guilt in each ca se, alleging, among other thing s, that appellant had failed to report to the community supervision office in June, J uly, or August 2017. In October 2017, at a hearing befo re the same judge who had pla ced appellant on community supervision, the tri al judge admonished appellant tha t he “would be looking at prison time” if he continued to fail to report. The State filed a motion to withdraw its motions to revoke and proceed with adjudication, a nd the trial court granted the motions and contin ued appellant on probation.–3– In July 2018, the State again filed motions to adjudicate alle ging, among other things, appellant failed to repor t to the community supervision office in March, April, and June 2018. At a hearing on the motions, appellant e ntered pleas of true to the allegations in the motions and admitted that he was the same individual who was placed on community supervis ion. Appellant testified he wo rked in landscaping and could not always report, but his probation officer told him keeping in contact was “the only thing” that he h ad to do. Appellant testified he kept in contact or left a message on the answering machine. Appellant testified he tol d his employer he was on probation, and his employer told him not to come into wo rk on the days he had to go to his probation appointments. Appellant admitted he tested positive for marijuana in May 2018, but the positive test resulted from an “ accident” in which appellant ate an “edible” at a party. The trial court stated a note from appellant’s probation officer said appellant had not contacted his probatio n officer for eightynine days. The trial court also noted appellant had “tested po sitive for weed so many times,” the court sent him to a class, but appellant “was still testing positive.” The trial court adjudicated appellant guilty of each offense and se ntenced him to fifteen years’ confinement in each ca se. These appeals followed. In two issues, appellant argues his fifteen-year sentence in e ach case violates the objectives of the Texas Penal Code. Specifically, appellan t argues that, given his youth and the minor nature of his violations, the trial cou rt abused its discretion–4– in sentencing him to fifteen yea rs in the penitentiary instead of continuing him on community supervision. We give a great deal of discretion to a trial judge’s determin ation of the appropriate punishment in any given case. Jackson v. State , 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Foster v. State , 525 S.W.3d 898, 911 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, pet. ref’d). Additionally, th e general rule is that as l ong as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on app eal. Jackson , 680 S.W.2d at 814; Foster , 525 S.W.3d at 911. Aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and burglary with inte nt to commit a felony are both first-degree felonies punishable by imprisonm ent for 5 to 99 years and an optional fine not to exceed $10,000. T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN . §§ 12.32, 29.03(b), 30.02(d). Appellant’s fifteen-year sentence in each case was well within the proper range of punishment. See Jackson , 680 S.W.2d at 814; Foster , 525 S.W.3d at 911. Appellant emphasizes the “minor n ature of his violations,” pres umably the violations of the conditions of his community supervision. How ever, appellant ignores the fact that he failed to report to the community supe rvision office for months at a time, despite being given a second chance and place d back on community supervision after he r epeatedly failed to report in 2 017. Appellant further cites Jackson for the proposition that there must be evidence or facts available to the court and upon which the court could have relied in assessing–5– punishment. See Jackson , 680 S.W.2d at 814. The facts before the court were that appellant went to a residence w ith two accomplices and “grab[be d] stuff.” Appellant was in the room when one of his accomplices raped a girl in the residence. Appellant was temporarily released “on the monitor,” but he violated the terms of his release and went back to jail. When placed on community supervision, a ppellant failed to report for months at a time, leading the State to file a motion to revoke. The trial judge held a hearing and ultima tely gave appellant another chan ce at community supervision. Again, appellant fa iled to report for months at a time. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a fifteen-year sentence in each case. See Jackson , 680 S.W.2d at 814;
Foster , 525 S.W.3d at 911. Moreover, w e cannot conclude appellant’s sentences violate the objectives of the Texas Penal Code. See Jackson , 680 S.W.2d at 814. We overrule appellant’s f irst and second issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Do Not Publish T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b)
190022F.U05 /David L. Bridges/ DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE–6– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
IBRAHEIM KADAR STROGGINS, Appellant

No. 05-19-00022-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F12-72353-Q. Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. Justices Molberg and Partida-Kipness participating. Based on the Court’s opinion o f this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered April 2, 2020–7– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
IBRAHEIM KADAR STROGGINS, Appellant
No. 05-19-00023-CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 204th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F12-61723-Q. Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. Justices Molberg and Partida-Kipness participating. Based on the Court’s opinion o f this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered April 2, 2020