alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 10.1 SECOND AMENDMENT
TOEMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
(WALLER) THIS SECOND AMENDMENT(this Amendment) is made as of April 19, 2004, to
the Employment Agreement dated May 25, 1996 by and between WILSONS THE LEATHER
EXPERTS INC., a Minnesota corporation (the Company), and JOEL WALLER, a
resident of Minnesota (the Executive), as amended by that First Amendment to
Employment Agreement dated as of April 3, 2000 (the Agreement). WHEREAS, the Company wishes to continue to secure the Executives services
as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company under the terms of the
Agreement as modified by this Amendment; WHEREAS, the Executive wishes to continue to provide such services to the
Company; and WHEREAS, the Executive and the Company desire to modify certain terms of
Section 6(c) in the Agreement. NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the mutual
covenants and undertakings stated herein, the Executive and the Company hereby
agree to amend the Agreement as follows: A.     The introduction to Section 6(c) and Section 6(c)(i) of the Agreement
are hereby amended in their entirety to read as follows: (c)   If the Executives employment hereunder ends prior to the end of the
Employment Period by reason of resignation by the Executive for Good Reason or
termination by the Company without Cause, then:  (i)
    
    the Company shall continue to pay, or cause one
or more of its Subsidiaries to continue to pay, to the
Executive, in accordance with, and at the times provided in,
Section 3(a) hereof, the Executives Base Salary for a period
of 24 months after the Termination Date even if such 24-month
period does not end at or prior to the end of the Employment
Period; B.     Section 6(c)(iv) of the Agreement is hereby amended in its entirety to
read as follows:  (iv)
    
    the Executive and his dependents shall continue,
for a period of 24 months after the Termination Date, even if
such 24-month period does not end at or prior to the end of
the Employment Period, to be entitled to all medical,




---



##### 



dental, life insurance and disability benefits of the type
that they received immediately prior to the Termination Date
(or, in the event their participation in a plan pursuant to
which any such benefits are provided is barred by the terms
of such plan, benefits which are no less favorable to them
than the benefits under such plan), except to the extent
essentially equivalent and no less favorable benefits are
provided to them by a subsequent employer; and C.     All references in the Agreement and this Amendment to this Agreement,
the Agreement, hereunder, herein, or hereof shall be deemed to be
references to the Agreement, as amended by this Amendment and as hereafter
amended by any other amendment adopted in accordance with Section 22 of the
Agreement. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be
duly executed as of the date and year first above written. WILSONS THE LEATHER
EXPERTS INC./s/ Joel N. Waller
    
    By:
    
    /s/ Michael CowhigName: Joel N. Waller
    
    Name:
    
    Michael CowhigTitle:
    
    Chair, Compensation Committee
 2
AGREEMENT

This Agreement between Industri-Matematik International (IMI) and Per
Edstrom (PEED), personal ID number 570315-0036, has been made and entered
into as follows:

1.  Effective from January 1, 1999 a base salary of SEK 68,000 per month
will be paid to PEED

2.  The pension-based salary amounts to SEK 829,600 per year effective from
January 1, 1998.

3.  Pension premiums shall be cost neutral towards the SPP/ITP plan for
salaried employees.

4.  PEED is entitled within the framework of the ITP plan to discuss
alternative pension plan solutions with The Company's insurance agent.

INDUSTRI-MATEMATIK INTERNATIONAL
/s/ Lars-Goran Peterson
- ---------------------------------                     981231
Lars-Goran Peterson                                           Date

The above Agreement is hereby accepted and agreed to:
/s/ Per Edstrom
- ---------------------------------                     981231
Per Edstrom                                              Date

<PAGE>
                                 Bonus Plan FY99
                                   Per Edstrom

This document describes your bonus plan for FY99 (980501-990430)

A guaranteed bonus will be paid out monthly at the amount of SEK 14.225 per
month.


Other terms and conditions:

- -   If Per Edstrom terminates employment during the budget year, no bonus
is payable.

- -   Vacation compensation is not accrued on bonus payments

- -   Should the company's budget be changed, especially as a result of a
business acquisition or divestiture, then the calculations contained herein
shall be changed in the corresponding month for that period for which the
change applies.


For Industri-Matematik International Corp.
/s/ Lars-Goran Peterson
- ------------------------------------------                 981231
Lars-Goran Peterson                                                Date

The above bonus plan is hereby accepted and agreed to:
/s/ Per Edstrom
- ------------------------------------------                 981231
Per Edstrom                                                   Date
JONATHAN HARRIS

,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Appellee

. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 14

- 4999

________ _____________________/

Opinion filed March 18, 2015.

An appeal from an order of the Circuit Court for Gadsden County

. Barbara K. Hobbs , Judge

.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant Public Defender,

Tallahassee , for Appellant.

Pa mela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, C.J., MARSTILLER and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  UIH
AUSTRALIA/PACIFIC, INC.'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1997 AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                          45,689   
<SECURITIES>                                     2,031   
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,519
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                53,047
<PP&E>                                         258,945
<DEPRECIATION>                                  67,449
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 323,929
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           51,737
<BONDS>                                        370,183
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0 
<COMMON>                                           139
<OTHER-SE>                                    (102,982)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   323,929    
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                49,052
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   35,857
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                57,797
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              29,676
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (114,420)  
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0    
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (114,420) 
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (114,420) 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (8.25)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DALE W. DUGGER,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

 v.

EDMUND G. BROWN, Jr., California

Attorney General; et al.,

 Respondents - Appellees.

No. 11-16432

D.C. No. 2:07-cv-02674-BJR

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 21, 2012** 

Before: FERNANDEZ, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

California state prisoner Dale W. Dugger appeals from the district court’s

judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

FILED

FEB 24 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 11-16432

Dugger contends that the state trial court deprived him of his Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment right to present a defense when it precluded testimony,

pursuant to California Evidence Code § 352, related to the reputation of the law

enforcement rangers who arrested him.

Contrary to Dugger’s contention, the record reflects that the California Court

of Appeal, which rendered the last reasoned state court decision in this case,

addressed Dugger’s federal constitutional claim. Accordingly, we do not review

Dugger’s claim de novo, as we would if the state court had clearly indicated that it

had not reached the merits of his claim. See Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 990

n.6 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 

Dugger is not entitled to habeas relief based on the trial court’s exclusion of

reputation testimony because Dugger cannot maintain that the discretionary

exclusion of this testimony warrants federal habeas relief under clearly established

federal law. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 757-60 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Supreme Court has not established “a controlling legal standard” to evaluate

discretionary decisions involving such evidence. See id. at 758-59 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

AFFIRMED.
No. 89-503 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1990

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF LINDA J. GARRYMORE, f/k/a LINDA J. WILLIAMS, Petitioner and Appellant, and MICHAEL W. WILLIAMS, Petitioner and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and for the County of Missoula, The Honorable JohnW. Henson, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Michael Donahoe,Helena, Montana For Respondent: ThomasW. Trigg, Missoula, Montana

CLERKOFSUPREMECOURT STATE OF MOdTANA Submitted on Briefs: June 20, Decided: July 19,Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. LindaJ. Garrymore appeals the order of theDistrict Court for the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, modifying custody of thepartiestdaughter,S.M.W., by placing S.M.W. in the custody of Michael W. Williams. We affirm. The issue is whether the District Court had jurisdiction. When the marriage between Garrymore and Williams was dissolved, custody of their daughter, S.M.W., was placed with Garrymore. The order from which this appeal is taken modified custody so that S.M.W. isnow in the custody of her father. At the time the modification order was entered, a separate dependent and neglect proceeding was pending before theYouth Court forMissoula County relating to Garrymorelscustody of S.M.W. Garrymorels argument that the District Court waswithout jurisdiction isbased solelyupon the existence of that dependent and neglectproceeding in Youth Court. Section 41-3-103, MCA, provides that a youth court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in dependent and neglect proceedings. We concludethat the District Court retained jurisdiction to modify custody in this case. See also Matter of C.C. (Mont. 1989), 772 P.2d 857, 46 St.Rep. 773. Further,wepoint out that there is no conflict between the orders of the District Court and the Youth Court in these matters and that the recordcontains substantial evidence to support the District Court's findings and conclusions. Pursuant to Section I,Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1988 Internal Operating Rules, this decision shall not be cited as precedent and shallbe publishedby its filing as apublic document with the Clerk of this Court and by a report of its result to the West Publishing Company. ~ffirmed. Let remittitur issue forthwith.

We Concur:

Justices 

# /'
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Rajindranauth Susankar, Appellant.

[858 NYS2d 607]

Judgment of resentence, Supreme Court, New York County (James A. Yates, J.), rendered January 12, 2007, resentencing defendant upon his conviction, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, attempted murder in the second degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees and reckless endangerment in the first degree, to an aggregate term of 26 years to life, unanimously modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, to the extent of directing that all sentences be served concurrently, and otherwise affirmed.

We find the sentence excessive. The above reduction results in an aggregate term of 22 years to life, equal to the term imposed on the murder conviction. Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P, Catterson, Moskowitz and Acosta, JJ.
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 SECTION 906
CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, the undersigned officer of National
Processing, Inc. (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge,
that the Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March
31, 2004 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Dated: May 7, 2004
    
    /s/ Jon L. Gorney

Name: Jon L. Gorney
Title: Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature
that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written
statement required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission
or its staff upon request.
[Cite as State v. Collier, 2017-Ohio-7802.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

BUTLER COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2017-04-050 

 : D E C I S I O N 

 - vs - 9/25/2017 

 : 

MONTGOMERY C. COLLIER, : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

Case No. CR2016-07-0984 

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Lina N. Alkamhawi, Government 

Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appellee 

Neal D. Schuett, 121 West High Street, Oxford, Ohio 45056, for defendant-appellant 

 Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This cause came on to be considered upon a notice of appeal, the transcript of 

the docket and journal entries, the transcript of proceedings and original papers from the 

Butler County Court of Common Pleas, and upon a brief filed by appellant's counsel. 

{¶ 2} Counsel for appellant, Montgomery C. Collier, has filed a brief with this court 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967), which (1) indicates that 

a careful review of the record from the proceedings below fails to disclose any errors by the 
Butler CA2017-04-050 

- 2 - 

trial court prejudicial to the rights of appellant upon which an assignment of error may be 

predicated; (2) lists five potential errors "that might arguably support the appeal," Anders at 

744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; (3) requests that this court review the record independently to 

determine whether the proceedings are free from prejudicial error and without infringement of 

appellant's constitutional rights; (4) requests permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant 

on the basis that the appeal is wholly frivolous; and (5) certifies that a copy of both the brief 

and motion to withdraw have been served upon appellant. 

{¶ 3} Having allowed appellant sufficient time to respond, and no response having 

been received we have accordingly examined the record and find no error prejudicial to 

appellant's rights in the proceedings in the trial court. The motion of counsel for appellant 

requesting to withdraw as counsel is granted, and this appeal is dismissed for the reason that 

it is wholly frivolous. 

 HENDRICKSON, P.J., PIPER and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-03-00652-CR
John Tracy Josey, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 51981, HONORABLE JOE CARROLL, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
John Tra cy Josey seeks to appeal from a judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine. The trial court has certified that this is a plea bargain case and Josey has no right of appeal, and also that Josey waived his right of appeal. S ee Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The appeal is dismissed. See id . rule 25.2(d).

__________________________________________ David Puryear, Justice Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Kidd and Puryear Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction Filed: December 4, 2003 Do Not Publish
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 1**  **2 -**  **7891**

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , P laintiff

- Appell ee ,
v. ERIC DARNELL REESE , Defendant

- Appell ant .

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt
. J. Frederick Motz , Senior District Judge. ( 8:01

- cr - 00135

- JFM

- 1; 1:12

- cv - 02484

- JFM )

Submitted : September 17, 2013 Decided: September 25, 2013

Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and THACKER , Circuit Judges.

Dismiss ed by un published per curiam opinion
.
Eric Darnell Reese , Appellant Pro Se. Sujit Raman, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland , for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Eric Darnell Reese seek s to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as unauthorized his successive 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2013) motion . The district court’s dismissal order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisf ies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

– El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

– 38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutio nal right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

– 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Reese has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument beca use the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Henry Diaz, Appellant.

[666 NYS2d 684]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Golia, J.), rendered May 13, 1996, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (two counts), robbery in the second degree (two *527counts), and grand larceny in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.

In the instant case, the trial court, in its *Allen*charge *(Allen v United States,*164 US 492), instructed the jury that “[ijf you have a reasonable doubt * * * and one or more of your fellow jurors questions you about it, you should be willing and able to give that juror what you believe is a fair, calm explanation for your position based upon the evidence or lack of evidence”. Given that this language is virtually identical to the language which was condemned by the Court of Appeals in *People v Antommarchi*(80 NY2d 247), reversal is warranted, as this charge implicitly imposed on the defendant the burden of supplying the jurors with the arguments they needed to legitimize their votes to acquit *(see, People v Roche,*239 AD2d 270; *People v Jones,*216 AD2d 324, 325; *People v Arce,*215 AD2d 277, 278). Further, the formerly deadlocked jury announced its verdict convicting the defendant within a relatively brief interval subsequent to the delivery of the *Allen*charge and without any intervening communication with the court. Under these circumstances, there is “no way of conclusively discounting the erroneous instruction as a factor in the eventuation of the guilty verdict” *(see, People v Roche, supra,*at 271).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Bracken, J. P., Copertino, Thompson and Luciano, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT
32.2 – SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER




In
connection with this Annual Report of Tix Corporation (the “Company”) on Form
10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “Report”), I, Matthew Natalizio, Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:




1. The
report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




2. The
information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:
      March 16, 2010By:
              /s/ Matthew NatalizioMatthew
      Natalizio
                Chief
      Financial Officer
                (Principal
      Financial and Accounting Officer)




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.