T h e appe l l at e r ec or d does n ot con t ai n a t r an s cr i pt of t h e t r i al pr oce edi n g s n or doe s i t c on t ai n a s t at eme n t of 1
t h e ev i den ce
. T h er ef

or e, t h e f ac t s r ec i t ed at t h e ou t s et of t h i s O pi n i on a r e t ak en f r om t h e compl ai n t , t h e t ec h n i ca l r ec or d,
an d t h e ex h i bi t s i n t r odu ce d a t t r i al t h at w er e i n cl u ded i n t h e appe l l at e r ec or d.



### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 24, 200 6 S es sio n DOR IS BR ITT v. 

### JANNY RUSSEL L CHAMBE RS An Appeal f

romthe Chancer y Court for Hardem an Coun ty No. 15080 Dewey C. Whitenton, Chancellor

No. W2006-00061-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Janu ary 25, 2007

Th is i s a bo un da ry lin e dis pu te

. Th e pa

rt ie s ar e a dja c e nt la nd ow ne rs
. I n April 200 3, a dis pu te aro se betwee n t h e p ar t i es over

the exact boundary

line betwee n their prope rties. The pla intiff ere cted a seven- foot privac y

fenc e on what she perce i v ed to be the prope r boundary line. The de fendant dismantled the fenc e and remove d it. The plaintiff broug ht this ac tion for the trial c ourt to set the appropriate boundary

line and for

damage s relate d to the defe ndant’s re moval of her fenc e. Af

ter a hea ring , the trial court held in favor of the pl aintiff, dete rmining that the boundary line should be set acc ording to a 1997 survey conducte d when the plaintiff purchased her property and aw arding theplaint if

f d a ma g e s f

or there mov a l of

thefe nc e . T he de fe nda nt n ow app e a ls. We a ff irm, c on c lud ing that, i n the abs e nc e of a tria l tr a ns c ri pt o r a pr op e r s tate me nt o f the e vid e nc e , w e mus t presume that the trial court’ s decision was supported by the evidenc e. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court is Aff irm ed
H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., and D A V ID R. F ARMER , J ., joined.
J anny Russell Chambers, pro s e
. Ste ve n E . F are se , Jr. , A sh la nd , M iss iss ipp i, f or theapp e lle e , D oris B ri tt.
OP IN ION
I n J une 1995, Respondent/Appe llant J anny Russell Chambe rs (“Chambers”) purcha sed pr op e rt y at 35 Heb ron L ane i n M id dl eto n, Ten nes see. I n S ept emb er 19 97 , P eti ti on er/ App elle eDo ri s 1 Britt (“Britt”) purcha sed prope rty at 15 Hebr on L ane, a djace nt to Chambers’ property

. I n connec tion with the purcha se of he r prope rty , Chambers re ceive d a surve y conducte d b y Ge ne L . ShepardT h e re is so m e ind ic a tio n in the re c o rd tha t B ritt a n d C h a m b e rs e n g a g e d in a p h ysic a l alte rc a tio n , re su lti n g in 2
p hysi ca l i nju ry t o C ha m b ers. -2- (“Shepa rd”) dated May

22, 1995. Over two y ear s later, Britt rec eived a survey , also conduc ted by She p ar d , d ated Septembe r 17, 1997, whe n she purc hased he r prope rty . Unfortunately , as will be explained below, the 1995 and 1997 survey s of the two prope rties ar e in conf lict.
For about six or seve n y ears , t h e p ar t ies amica bly share d a drive way

that ran a long the so uth we st bou nd ary of B ri tt’ s pro pe rty a nd the no rthw e st bou nd ary of Chambe rs ’ p ro pe rty . In A pril 20 03 , a dis pu te aro se a s to thee xac t bo un da ry lin e be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s’ pr op e rty

in c on ne c tio n w ith t h i s d r i v e w a y. R e l yi n g o n t h e M a y 2 2 , 1 9 9 5 s u r v e y c o n d u c t e d w h e n s h e p u r c h a s e d h e r p r o p e rt y, 2 Chambe rs cla imedthat th e no rthw e st b ou nd ary of he r p ro pe rty

wa s a str a ig ht l ine , w hic h w ou ld allow her to use the drivew ay to acc ess her

home. Chambers w as of the vie w that she owne d the pr op e rty wi thi n th a t bo un da

ry lin e , a nd that she pe rm itt e d Britt to h a ve a c c e ss o ve r that pr op e rty in o r d e r f o r B r i t t t o g e tt o h e r

o w n p r o p e rt y. B r i t t , h o w e v e r , r e l yi n g o n t h e S e p t e mb e r 1 7 , 1 9 9 7 s u r v e y, claimed that the same boundary line was not straig ht, but that it turned south at a ce rtain point and cut ac ros s t h e drive way

that had bee n being used by Chambers. Thus, B ritt claimed that the southwest corne r of he r prope rty encompa ssed the entire driveway are a, and Cha mbers claimed that the northwe st corner

of her property encompa ssed that same driveway are a.
Acc ording to Britt, af

ter the pa rties’ dispute ar ose, she a sked Chamber s to retain a survey or o f h e r c h o i c e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e b o u n d ar y l i n e , a n d B r i t t a g r e e d t o p a y t h e c o s t o f t h e s u r v e y. There fore , in October

2003, Gre g ory

J . Perry (“Per ry ”), w as hired f

or this purpose. Perry

completed the su rv e y a nd wa s pa id by B ri tt. Th is su rv e y , th ou g h n ot i n th e re c or d, app are ntl y sh ow e d th a t B ri tt owned the disputed pr operty . Chambers re fused to honor t h e boundary line ref lected in Per

ry ’s s u r v e y.
I n Dec ember

2003, Britt ere cted a seven- foot wooden privacy fenc e along what she be lieved to be her southwest boundary

. I n approximately J anuary 2004, Chambers dismantled and r emoved the f e n c e e r e c te d b y B r itt, w ith o u t n o ti c e to B r itt, b e c au s e it b lo c k e d Ch a mb e r s ’ a c c e s s to her pr op e rty
. Chambe rs the n e re c te d a ba rb e d wi re fe nc e a lon g wh a t sh e be lie ve d to be he r n orthw e st b o u n d ar y. T h i s f

e n c e a l l e g e d l y o b s tru c t e d B r i t t ’ s a c c e s s t o h e r p r o p e rt y.
OnJune 3, 20 04 , B ri tt f

ile d th e ins ta nt l a ws uit

a gains t Chambe rs , a sking thetria l c ou rt to det e rmi n eth ec o r

r e c t b o u n d ary

line betwee n the parties, order the re moval of Chamber s’ bar bed-w ire fenc e, and awa

rd Britt dama g es sustained a s a re sult of Chambers’ r emoval of the seven- foot privac y fenc e. Chambers filed an answ er, pro s e , insisti ng that the bar bed-w ire fe nce w as built in accor dance with the corr ect surve y and the ag ree ment of t he owners, and that the privacy fenc e built by Britt was imp ro pe r becaus e it bl oc ke d h e r a c c e ss t o h e r p ro pe rty . Ch a mbe rs a lso a ve rr e d th a t, w he n B ri tt bo ug ht h e r p ro pe rty

fr om E . W. Mc Ki nn ie (“ Mc Ki nn ie ” ), Chambe rs tol d M c Ki nn ie that sh e wo uld a llo w B r i t tt o h a v e a n e a s e m e n to v e r t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e rt y , b u ts h e n e v e r r e l i n q u i s h e d o w n e r sh ip of the are a

in d isp ute . Ch a mbe rs c la ime d th a t th e sta ke s w e rese t in theg ro un d ina c c or da nc e wi th thepa rt ie s’ un de rs ta nd ing , an d that the pa rt ie s’ or a l ag re e me nt sho uld be re c og nize d b y thec ou rt

.R u le 2 4 (c ) p ro v id e s in p e rtine n t p a rt: 3
(c ) S ta t e m e n t o f th e E v id e n c e W h e n N o R e p o r t, R e c ita l, o r T r a n sc r ip t Is A v a ila b le

. If no ste n o g ra p h ic re p o rt, su b sta n tially ve rb a tim re c ital o r tra n sc rip t o f t h e e v id e n c e o r p ro c e e d ing s is (c o n tinu e d ...) -3- Chambers a lso claimed that she ha d been pay ing the taxes on the di sputed property

. Chambers stated that she wa s unable to pay Britt’s attorney ’s fees, bec ause she lives on a fixed income of $596.00 pe r month.
The trial c ourt conduc ted a he aring in the matter on Mar ch 7, 2005, and conduc ted another hearing on J uly 18, 2005. The recor d on appea l does not contain a tr anscript of either he aring , nor does it contain a state ment of the e vidence pursuant to Rule 24(c) of t h e T ennesse e Rules of Appellate Proc edure

. On J uly 27, 2005, the trial court entere d an orde r holding in favor of Britt, finding that “[t] he true a nd corr ect bounda

ry line betwee n the parties’ prope rty shall be g overne d exactly as surve y ed by Ge ne She pa

rd , R.L .S. on Se pte mbe r 16, 19 97

. . . . ” Th e tria l c ou rt fu rthe r o rd e re d Sh e pa

rd“ to re- survey the prope rty

line acc ording to the above c ited plat and to mark the line with at least six (6) perma nent stakes or marke rs.” I n addition, Chambers was order ed to pay Britt $300 in restitut ion for damag e to her

property for r emoval of the privac y fenc e. Subseq u en t ly , Shepard r e-sur vey ed the prope rty , as ordered by the trial court. This survey set the boundary

line in acc ordanc e with the September 1997 survey , pursuant to the trial court’s order. On October 7, 2005, Chambers filed a pleading objecting to the survey and seeking to present a dditional evidence . On Dec ember 13, 2005, despite the fa ct that a final order on the issue had alre ady been enter ed, the trial court c onducted a further hearing and allowed Shepa rd and Mc Kinnie to testify . No transc ript of this additional hearing is include d in the rec ord on appea l. On J anuary 20, 2006, the trial court entere d a fina l order c on fi rm ing theJuly

20 05 or de r. F ro m th is o rd e r, Chambe rs no w a pp e a ls, sti ll pro s e
. On appe al, Chambers c halleng es the trial court’s decision to a cce pt the boundary line as set out in the S eptember 17, 1997 survey , arg uing that it should have acc epted the bounda ry as set out i n t h e M a y 2 2 , 1 9 9 5 s u r v e y. O n t h i s b a s i s , C h a mb e r s c l a i m s t h a ts h e o w n s t h e d i s p u t e d p r o p e rt y, and that B ritt is not entit led to ere ct the priva cy fenc e to block Chamber s’ ac cess to her property

. Be cause the ca se wa s decide d by the trial court without a jury , we must revie w the trial c ou rt ’s fi nd in gs of fa c t de novo on the re cord, pr esuming those finding s to be corr ect, unless the evidenc e pre ponderat es ot herw ise. Be aty v . W right , N o
. M 2 0 0 5

- 0 1 4 5 2

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 6 WL 3071271, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2006). We revie w questi ons of law de novo , with no such presumption of cor

rec tness. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).
When review ing a

trial court’ s decision under this standard, particularly the trial court’s finding s of fa ct, it is essential that the appe llate court be provided wi t h a tra nscript of the tria l proce eding s or a state ment of the ev i d en ce t h at comports with R ule 24 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Proc edure

. Wit hout a t ransc ript or a state ment of the e vidence , the appe llate court cannot 3(

. . . con t i n u ed) 3

av ail ab l e, t he ap p ell an t shall p rep are a stat em en t o f t he ev i d en c e o r p ro ce ed i ng s f ro m t he b est a v a ilab le m e a n s, inc lud ing the a p p e llan t’s re c o llec tio n . T h e s ta te m e n t sh o u ld c o n v e y a fa ir, a c c u ra te and co m p l et e acco unt of what t rans p i red wit h respe ct to t ho se i ss ues t hat are t he b ases of ap p eal

. T he sta te m e n t, c e rtifi e d b y the a p p e llan t

. . . a s a n a c c u ra te a c c o u n t o f the p ro c e e d ing s, sh a ll b e fil e d w ith the c le rk o f th e tr ia l c o u rt w ithin 9 0 d a ys a fter filing th e no tice o f ap p e a l. U p o n fi ling the sta te m e n t, t he ap p el l ant s hal l s i m ul t aneo usl y s erve no t i ce o f t he f i l i ng o n t he ap p el l ee, acco m p ani ed by a s ho rt an d pl ai n de cl ar at i on of t h e i s s u es t h e a ppel l an t i n t en ds t o pre s en t on appe al

. Pr oof of s er v i ce s h al l be fil e d w ith the c le rk o f t h e trial c o u rt w ith the fi ling o f t h e sta te m e n t.

. . . ( d) P rocedure W hen N o T ransc ri pt or Stat ement I s t o B e Fi l ed

. If no t rans cri p t or st at em ent of t he
ev i den ce or pr oce edi n g s i s t o be f i l ed, t h e appe l l ant s h al l , w i t h i n 15 da y s a f t er f i l i n g t h e n ot i ce of appe al , f i l e wi t h t h e cl er k of t h e t r i al cou r t an d s er v e u pon t h e appe l l ee a n ot i ce t h at n o t r an s cr i pt or sta te m e n t i s to b e fi le d

. . . .
T enn. R

. A p p
. P

. 24 (c), (d). -4- kn ow wh a t e vid e nc e wa s p re se nte d to thetria l c ou rt , a ndthe reis n o means by wh ic h we c a n e va luate theapp e llant’ s a sse rt ion that the e vid e nc e did no t su pp ort thetria l c ou rt ’s de c isi on . T hu s, it i s w e llse ttl e d th a t, “ [i]n th e abs e nc e of a tr a ns c ri pt o r s tate me nt of the e vid e nc e , w e mus t c on c lus ive ly presume that every fac t a dmissibl e under the pleading s was found or should have be en found in fa vor of the Appe llee.” Le e k v . P owe ll , 8 84 S.W. 2d11 9, 12 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 6) ; se e als o L all e mand v . Smith , 667 S.W .2d 85, 87-88 (Te nn. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that, in a boundary line dispute, wh e rethe reis n o tr a ns c ri pt of the e vid e nc e , fi nd ing s of fa c t mus t bea c c e pte d a s tr ue by theapp e llate court).
We are mindful that Chambers is a pro s e litigant, and that she is e ntitled to fair and equal treatment. Howeve r, she i s “ n o t e x cused f rom comply ing w ith applicable substantive and proce dural law” imposed on li t i gan t s repr esente d by counsel. Pa e hle r v . U

nio n Pl ant e rs N at’ l Ba nk , 971 S.W .2d 393, 396 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). I n this c ase, in the absenc e of a transcript or a statement of the e vidence , we ha ve no means of eva luating the evidenc e pre sented to the trial co urt, and the lack of a tra nscript or stateme nt of the evide nce is fatal to Chambers’ a rg uments on appea l.
W e n ote that, in support of her appea l, Chambers pre sented this Court with evidence of photogr aphs, docume nts from the asse ssor’s off ice, and old deeds to the p ro p er ties in question. Howeve r, this is a

court of a ppellate r eview only , and we do not consider e vidence that was ne ither pr e se nte d to no r c on sid e re d b y thetria l c ou rt

un le ss i t ha s b e e n ma de a pa rt of there c or d a s a

po stjudgme nt fac t under Rul e 14 of t he Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e. Se e Kina rd v . Kinar d , 986 S.W .2d 220, 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). T here fore , we c annot consider any of t he additional e vid e nc e pr of

fe re d b y Chambe rs on app e a l.
B ri tt a rg ue s th a t sh e is e nti tle d to a tto rn e y ’s fe e s e xpe nd e d inde fe nd ing thi s f ri vo lou s a pp e a l, pa rt ic ula rl y in lig ht o f C ha mbe rs ’ f a ilu reto c omp ly

wi th the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Procedur e. The decision on whe ther to awa rd attorney ’s fees on appeal re sts in the sound discretion-5-

of this Court. Archer v. Archer , 907 S.W .2d 412, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). We decline to aw ard attorney ’s fe es to Britt under the circ umstances of this case.
The de cision of the trial c ourt is aff irmed. Costs on appea l are to be taxed to Appellant J anny Rus se ll Ch a mbe rs , for whic h execution may issue, if nec essary
.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE