( Slip Opinio n) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of t he Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.


## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SER VICES, LTD.

v. NEWTON

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 18

– 389

. Argued April 16, 2019

— Decided June 10, 2019

Respondent Brian Newton worked for petitioner Parker Drilling Ma nagement Services on drilling platforms off the California coast. Ne wton was paid for his time on duty but not for his time on standby, during which he could not leave the platform. Newton filed a class
action in state court , alleging, as relevant here, that California’s mi nimum

- wage and overtime laws required Parker to compensate him
for his standby time . Parker removed the action to Federal District Court. The parties agreed that Parker’s platforms were subject to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which provides that
all law on th e Outer Continental Shelf ( OCS ) is federal law, admini stered by federal officials; denies States any interest in or ju risdiction over the OCS; and deems the adjacent State’s laws to be federal law only “[t]o the extent that they are applicable and not inco nsistent
with” other federal law , 43 U. S. C. § 1333(a)(2)(A). The District
Court concluded that the state laws relevant here should not be a pplied as federal law on the OCS because the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA)

, a comprehensive federal wage

- and

- hour scheme

, left no significant gap in federal law for state law to fill. It thus granted Parker judgment on the pleadings. The Ninth Circuit vaca ted and remanded. It held that state law is “applic able” under the
OCSLA if it pertains to the subject matter at issue , a standard sati sfied by California wage

- and

- hour laws . It also held that those state
laws were not “inconsistent” with federal law because they were not incompatible with the federal scheme

. Held : 1. W here federal law addresses the rele vant issue, state law is not adopted as surrogate federal law on the OCS . Pp. 3– 14.2 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD. v. NEWTON
Syllabus

(a) After this Court held that the Federal Government has excl usive jurisdiction over the entire continental shelf, see, e.g., United
States v. Louisiana , 339 U. S. 699, 705

, Congress enacted the Su bmerged Lands Act, which ceded certain offshore lands to the coastal
States , and passed the OCSLA, which affirmed the Federal Gover nment ’s exclusive control over the OCS . Pp. 3– 4. (b) Newton argues that state law is “applica ble” on the OCS whenever it pertains to the subject matter at issue and that it is “i nconsistent” only if it would be pre

- empted under ordinary pre

emption principles. Parker counters that state law is not “applicab le”
absent a gap in federal law that nee ds to be filled and that state law
can be “inconsistent” with federal law eve n if it is possible to satisfy both sets of laws. Parker’s approach is more persuasive . Th is Court
read s the statute’s words “ ‘in their context and with a view to their place i n the overall statutory scheme.’ ” Roberts v. Sea

- Land Se rvices

, Inc. , 566 U. S. 93, 101

. The Court’s pre

- OCSLA decisions made
clear that f ederal law controlled the OCS in every respect, and the
OCSLA reaffirmed th at role. Taken together, the OCSLA’s prov isions convincingly show that state laws can be “applicable and not i nconsistent” with federal law under §1333(a)(2)(A) only if federal law
does not address the relevant issue. The OCSLA makes apparent
“that feder al law is ‘exclusive’ .

. . and that state law is adopted only as surrogate federal law.” Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.

, 395 U. S. 352, 357. It borrows only certain state laws, which are then
declared to be federal law and administered by federal officials. It
would thus make lit tle sense to treat the OCS as a mere extension of the adjacent State, where state law applies unless it conflicts with federal law. That type of pre

- emption analysis applies only where overlapping, dual state and federal jurisdiction makes it necessary to decide which law takes precedence. But federal law is the only law
on the OCS and there is no overlapping state and federal jurisdiction,

so the reference to “not inconsistent” state laws presents only the question whether federal law has already address ed the relevant i ssue . If so, state law on the issue is inapplicable. Pp. 5– 8. (c) This interpretation is supported by several other consider ations. Pp. 8– 14. (1) Newton ’s interpretation

— that the choice

- of

- law question on
the OCS is the same as i t would be in an adjacent State

— would d eprive much of the OCSLA of any import, violating the “ ‘cardinal principle’ of interpretation that courts ‘must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’ ” Loughrin v. United States , 573
U. S. 351, 358 . Pp. 8– 9. (2) This Court’s interpretation is consistent with the federal

enclave model and the historical development of the statute. TheCite as: 587 U. S. ____ (20 19 ) 3

Syllabus

OCSLA treats the OCS as “an upland federal enclave.” Rodrigue,

supra, at 366. Generally, w hen an area in a State becomes a federal enclave, “only the [state] law in effect at the time of the transfer of jurisdiction continues in force” as surrogate federal law, James Ste wart & Co. v. Sadrakula , 309 U. S. 94, 100 , provided that the state law
does not conflict with “federal policy, ” Paul v. United States , 371 U. S. 245, 269 . G oing forward, state law presumptively does not apply to
the enclave . See Sadrakula

, supra, at 100 . As originally enacted, the
OCSLA both treated the OCS as a federal enclave and adopted only the “applicable and not inconsistent” laws of the adjacent State in e ffect as of the Act’s effective date

. This suggests that, like the general enclave rule, the OCSLA sought to make all OCS law federal yet also “provide a sufficiently detai led legal framework to govern life” on the
OCS. Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dept. of Revenue , 488 U. S. 19

, 27. Providing a sufficient legal structure to accomplish that purpose
eliminat ed the need to adopt new state laws. The OCSLA’s text and
context thus su ggest that state law is not adopted to govern the OCS where federal law is on point. The later amendment of the OCSLA to adopt state law on an ongoing basis confirms the connection between
the OCSLA and the federal enclave model. Pp. 9– 11. (3) This Co urt’s interpretation accords with precedent constr uing the OCSLA. In Rodrigue , supra, at 352

– 353 ; Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson , 404 U. S. 97 ; and Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. , 453
U. S. 473 , the Court viewed the OCSLA as adopting state law to fill
in federal

- law gaps . Pp. 11

– 14.

2. Under the proper standard, some of Newton’s present claims can be resolved, though others have not been analyzed by the Ninth Ci rcuit. Some claims are premised on the adoption of California law r equiring payment for all standby time

. Because federal law already
addresses this issue

, California law does not provide the rule of dec ision on the OCS . T o the extent Newton’s OCS

- based claims rely on that law, they necessarily fail. Likewise, to the extent his OCS

- based claims rely on the adoption of California’s minimum wage, the FLSA already provides for a minimum wage, so the state minimum wage is not adopted as federal law and does not apply on the OCS. Pp. 14

– 15.

881 F. 3d 1078 and 888 F. 3d 1085, vacated and remand ed.

T HOMAS

, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (20 19 ) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to

press. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________
No. 18

– 389

_________________ PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LTD.,
PETITIONER v. BRIAN NEWTON

O N WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[ June 10, 2019 ]

J USTICE T HOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 67 Stat. 462, 43 U. S. C. §1331 et seq. , extends federal law to the subsoil and seabed of the O uter Continental Shelf and all attachments thereon (OCS). Under the OCSLA, all law on the OCS is federal law, administered by federal officials. The OCSLA denies States any interest in or juri sdiction over the OCS, and it deems the adjacent State’s laws to be federal law “[t] o the extent that they are appl icable and not inconsistent with” other federal law. §1333(a)(2)(A). Th e question before us is how to dete rmine which state laws meet this requirement and ther efore should be adopted as federal law. Applying familiar tools of statutory interpretation, we hold that where fe deral law addresses the relevant issue, state law is not adopted as surrogate federal law on the OCS.

I
Respondent Brian Newton worked for petitioner Parker Drilling Management Services on drilling platforms off the
coast of California. Newton’s 14

- day shifts involved 122 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVIC ES, LTD. v. NEWTON
Opinion of the Court

hours per day on duty and 12 hours per day on standby, during which he could not leave the platform. He was paid well above the California and federal minimum wages for his time on duty, but he was not paid for his standby
time.
Newton filed a class action in California state court allegi ng violations of several California wage

- and

- hour
laws and related state

- law claims. Among other things,
Newton claimed that California’s minimum

- wage and overtime laws required Parker to compensate him for the time he spent on standby. Parker removed th e action to Federal District Court. The parties agreed that Parker’s platforms were subject to the OCSLA. Their disagreement
centered on whether the relevant California laws were “applicable and not inconsistent” with existing federal law
and thus deemed to be the applicable federal law under
the OCSLA. § 1333(a)(2)(A). The District Court applied Fifth Circuit precedent providing that under the OCSLA, “state law only applies to the extent it is necessary ‘to fill a significant void or gap’
in federal law .” App. to Pet. for Cert. 51 (quoting Cont inental Oil Co. v. London S team

- Ship Owners’ Mut. Ins.

Ass n. , 417 F. 2d 1030, 1036 (1969)). It determined that the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq. , constitutes a c omprehensive federal wage

- and

- hour scheme and thus left no significant gap for state law to fill. Because all of Newton’s claims relied on state law, the court granted Parker judgment on the pleadings.
The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded. It first he ld
that state law is “ ‘applicable’ ” under the OCSLA whenever it “pertain[s] to the subject matter at hand.” 881 F. 3d 1078, 1090, amended and reh’g en banc denied, 888 F. 3d 1085 (2018). The court found that California wage

- and

hour laws satisfied this standard and turned to “the d eterminative question in Newton’s case”: “whether Califo r-Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 3

Opinion of the Court

nia wage and hour laws are ‘inconsistent with’ existing
federal law.” 881 F. 3d, at 1093. According to the Ninth Circuit, state laws are “inconsistent” with federal la w under the OCSLA only “if they are mutually incompatible, incongruous, [or] inharmonious.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying that standard, the court dete rmined that no inconsistency exists between the FLSA and California wage

- and

- hour law because the FLSA saving clause “explicitly permits more protective state wage and
hour laws.” Id.

, at 1097 (citing 29 U. S. C. §218(a)). Given the disagreement between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, we granted certiorari. 586 U. S. ___ (2019).

II

Be fore the OCSLA, coastal States and the Federal Go vernment disputed who had the right to lease submerged
lands on the continental shelf. Some coastal States even asserted jurisdiction all the way to the outer edge of the
shelf. See Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa D ept. of Revenue , 488 U. S. 19, 26 (1988) . The disputes eventually reached this Court,
which held in a series of decisions that the Federal Go vernment has exclusive jurisdiction over the entire cont inental shelf. See United States v. California , 332 U. S. 19,

38

– 39 (1947) ; United States v. Louisiana , 339 U. S. 699, 705 (1950) ; United States v. Texas , 339 U. S. 707, 717

– 718 (1950)

. After these decisions, Congress divided jurisdiction over the shelf. In 1953, Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U. S. C. §1301 et seq. , which ceded to the coastal States offshore lands within a spec ified distance of their coasts. A few months later, Congress passed the OCSLA, which affirmed that the Federal Go vernment exercised exclusive control over the OCS, defined as “all submerged lands” beyond the lands reserved to the States up to the edge of the United States’ jurisdiction a nd control. §1331(a). Specifically, the OCSLA declares that4 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVIC ES, LTD. v. NEWTON
Opinion of the Court

“the subsoil and seabed of the [OCS] appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition.” §1332(1). The OCSLA then sets forth “detailed provi sions for the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction in the area and for the leasing and develo pment of the resources of the seabed.” United States v. Maine , 420 U. S. 515, 527 (1975); see §§1334

– 1354. Of primary relevance here, the OCSLA defines the body
of law that governs the OCS. First, in §1333(a)(1), the OCSLA extends “[t]he Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States” to the OCS. Section 1333(a)(1) provides that federal law applies “to the same extent as if the [OC S] were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State.” Then, §1333(a)(2)(A) provides:

“ To the extent that they are applicable and not i nconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State, now in effect or hereafter adopted, amended, or repealed are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and se abed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial i slands and fixed structures erected thereon, which
would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the
outer Continental Shelf

. . . .”

Section 1333(a)(2)(A) also states that “[a]ll of such appl icable laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States.” Finally, §1333(a)(3) emphasizes that “[t] he provisions of this section for adoption of State law as the law of the
United States shal l never be interpreted as a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any
Sta te for any purpose over” the OCS.Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 5

Opinion of the Court

III
A
The question in this case is how to interpret the OCSLA’s command that state laws be adopted as federal
law on the O CS “[t] o the extent that they are applicable
and not inconsistent ” with other federal law. §1333(a)(2)(A). Echoing the Ninth Circuit, Newton argues that state law is “applicable” on the OCS whenever it pertains to the subject matter at issue. Newton fur ther argues that state law is only “inconsistent” with federal law if it is incompatible with the federal scheme. In e ssence, Newton’s argument is that state law is “inco nsistent” only if it would be pre

- empted under our ordinary

pre

- emption principles. Parker, on the other hand, argues that state law is not “applicable” on the OCS in the absence of a gap in federal law that needs to be filled. Moreover, Parker argues that
state law can be “inconsistent” with federal law even if it is possible for a party to satisfy both sets of laws. Specifically, Parker contends that, although the FLSA normally accommodates more protective state wage

- and

- hour laws, such laws are inconsistent with the FLSA when adopting state law as surrogate federal law because federal law
would then contain two different standards.

B
Although this is a close question of statutory interpret ation, on the whole we find Parker’s approach more persu asive because “ ‘the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall stat utory scheme.’ ” Roberts v. Sea

- Land Services

, Inc. , 566
U. S. 93, 101 (2012) . That rule is particularly relevant here, as the terms “applicable” and “not inconsistent” are susceptible of interpretations that would deprive one term or the other of meaning. If Newton is right that “applic able” merely means relevant to the subject matter, then the6 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVIC ES, LTD. v. NEWTON
Opinion of the Court

word adds nothing to the statute, for an irrelevant law would never be “applicable” in that sense. Cf. Ransom v. FIA Card Service s , N. A. , 562 U. S. 61, 70 (2011) (declining to interpret the word “applicable” in such a way that Congress “could have omitted the term .

. . altogether”). And if Parker is right that “applicable” means “necessary to fill a gap in federal law,” it is har d to imagine circu mstances in which “not inconsistent” would add anything to the statute, for a state law would rarely be inconsistent with a federal law that leaves a gap that needs to be filled. Moreover, when the OCSLA was enacted, the term “inco nsistent” could mean either “incompatible,” as Newton contends, or merely “inharmonious,” as Parker argues.
Webster ’ s New International Dictionary 1259 (2d ed. 1953); see also Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictio nary 1245 (1957) ( “ logically discrepant ” or “ disagreeing ”
and “ discordant ” ); The New Century Dictionary 811 (1953) (“ self- contradictory ” or “a t variance ”) ; 5 Oxford English Dictionary 173 (1933) ( “incongruous” or “ not agreeing in substance, spiri t, or form” ) . In short, the two terms stan ding alone d o not resolve the question before us. Partic ularly given their indeterminacy in isolation, the terms should be read together and interpreted in light of the
entire statute. See Star Athletica

, L

. L

. C

. v. Varsity
Brands

, Inc.

, 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) ( slip op., at 6) (“ ‘[I]nterpretation of a phrase of uncertain reach is not confined to a single sentence when the text of the whole statute gives instruction as to its meaning’ ”). Our pre

- OCSLA decisions made clear that the Federal
Government controlled the OCS in every respect, and the
OCSLA reaffirmed the central role of federal law on the
OCS. See supra , at 3– 4. As discussed, the OCSLA gives the Federal Government complete “jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition” over the OCS, while giving t he
States no “ interest in or jurisdiction ” over it. §§1332(1), 1333(a)(3). The statute applies federal law to the OCS “toCite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 7

Opinion of the Court

the same extent as if the [OCS] were an area of exclusive Federal jurisd iction located within a State.” §1333(a)(1). Accordingly, the only law on the OCS is federal law, and state laws are adopted as federal law only “[t] o the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with ” federal law. §1333(a)(2)(A). Taken together, these provisions convince us that state
laws can be “applicable and not inconsistent” with federal law under §1333(a)(2)(A) only if federal law does not a ddress the relevant issue. As we have said before, the OCSLA makes apparent “ that federal law is ‘exclusive’ in its regulation of [the OCS] , and that sta te law is adopted only as surrogate federal law.” Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. , 395 U. S. 352, 357 (1969) . The OCSLA extends all federal law to the OCS, and instead of also extending state law writ large, it borrows only certain
state laws. T hese laws, in turn, are declared to be federal law and are administered by federal officials. Given the primacy of federal law on the OCS and the limited role of state law, it would make little sense to treat the OCS as a mere extension of the adjacent St ate, where state law applies unless it conflicts with federal law. See PLIVA

, Inc. v. Mensing , 564 U. S. 604, 617

– 618 (2011). That type of pre

- emption analysis is applicable only where the ove rlapping, dual jurisdiction of the Federal and State Go vernmen ts makes it necessary to decide which law takes precedence. But the OCS is not, and never was, part of a State, so state law has never applied of its own force. Because federal law is the only law on the OCS, and there has never been overlapping state an d federal jurisdiction there, the statute’s reference to “not inconsistent” state laws does not present the ordinary question in pre

emption cases

— i.e.

, whether a conflict exists between federal and state law. Instead, the question is whether federal law has already addressed the relevant issue; if so, state law addressing the same issue would necessarily be8 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVIC ES, LTD. v. NEWTON
Opinion of the Court

inconsistent with existing federal law and cannot be adopted as surrogate federal law. Put another way, to the extent federal law applies to a particular issue, state law is inapplicable.

C
Apart from §1333(a)(2)’s place in the overall statutory scheme, several other considerations support our interpr etation, which accord s with the standard long applied by the Fifth Circuit, see Continental Oil , 417 F. 2d , at 1036

– 1037. First, if Newton were correct that the choice

- of

- law question on the OCS is the same as it would be in an adjacent State, much of the OCSLA would be unnecessary. Second, our interpretation is consistent with the federal

enclave model

— a model that the OCSLA expressly i nvokes— and the historical development of the statute. And third, the Court’s precedents have treated the OCSLA in accord with our interpretation.

1
Under Newton’s interpretation, state law would apply unless pre

- empted b y federal law, meaning that the OCS would be treated essentially the same as the adjacent State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 49. But that interpretation would render much of the OCSLA unnecessary. For e xample, the statute would not have needed to adopt state
l aw as federal law or say that federal law applies on the
OCS as if it “ were an area of exclusive Federal jurisd iction located within a State.” §§1333(a)(1)

– (2). It could have simply defined which State’s law applied on the OCS and given federal officials and courts the authority to enforce
the law. And the statute would not have needed to limit state laws on the OCS to those “applicable and not inco nsistent” with federal law (as Newton understands those words), for irrelevant laws never apply and federal law is always “supreme,” U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. Newton’sCite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 9

Opinion of the Court

interpretation deprives much of the statute of any import, violating the “ ‘ cardinal principle’ of interpretation that courts ‘must give effect, if possible

, to every clause and
word of a st atute. ’ ” Loughrin v. United States , 573 U. S. 351, 358 (2014).

2
Further support for our interpretation comes from the
statute’s treatment of the OCS as “an area of exclusive
Federal jurisd iction located within a State”

— i.e.

, as “an upland federal enclave.” §1333(a)(1); Rodrigue

, supra , at
366

. It is a commonplace of statutory interpretation that “Congress legislates against the backdrop of existing law.” McQuiggin v. Perkins , 569 U. S. 383, 398

, n. 3 (2013 ). Generally, when a n area in a State becomes a federal enclave, “only the [state] law in effect at the time of the transfer of jurisdiction continue s in force” as surrogate federal law. James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula , 309 U. S. 94, 100 (1940). Existing state law typically does not co ntinue in force, however, to the extent it conflicts with “federal policy.” Paul v. United States , 371 U. S. 245, 269 (1963) ; see Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn , 114 U. S. 542, 547 (1885) . And going forward, state law presum ptively does not apply to the enclave. See Sadrakula

, s upra, at 100; see also Paul

, supra, at 268 ; Pacific Coast Dairy

, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture of Cal. , 318 U. S. 285, 294 (1943). This approach ensures “that no area
however small will be without a developed l egal system for private rights,” while simultaneously retaining the primacy of federal law and requiring future statutory changes to be made by Congress. Sadrakula

, supra , at 100; United
States v. Tax Comm’n of Miss. , 412 U. S. 363, 370 , n. 12 (1973 ). 1

——————

1 These general rules “may be qualified in accordance with agre ements reached by the respective governments.” Sadrakula , 309 U. S., at 99; see also Paul , 371 U. S., at 268 (“[A] St ate may not legislate with10 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVIC ES, LTD. v. NEWTON
Opinion of the Court

The original version of the OCSLA both treated the OCS as a federal enclave and adopted only the “ applicable and
not inconsistent ” laws of the adjacent State that were in
effect as of the effective date of the Act . 43 U. S. C. §1333(a)(2) (1970 ed. ) ; see § 1333(a)(1) (1970 ed.) (deeming the OCS “an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State”)

. This textual connection between the OCSLA and the federal enclave model suggests that, like the generally applicable enclave rule, the O CSLA sought to make all OCS law federal yet also “provide a sufficiently detailed legal framework to govern life ” on the OCS. Shell
Oil , 488 U. S., at 27. Once that framework was esta blished, federal law (including previously adopted state law) provided a sufficient legal structure to accomplish that purpose, eliminating the need to adopt new state
laws. The federal

- state balance in a typical federal e nclave is quite different than in a State, and that difference is all the more striking on the OCS, whic h was never
under state control. The text and context of the OCSLA therefore suggest that state law is not adopted to govern the OCS where federal law is on point. Although Congress later amended the OCSLA to adopt state law on an ongoing basis , this ame ndment only co nfirms the connection between the OCSLA and the federal enclave model. Beginning in 1825, when “federal statutory law punished only a few crimes committed on federal enclaves,” Congress enacted several Assimilative Crimes
Acts (ACAs) that “b orrow[ed] state law to fill gaps in the
federal criminal law” on enclaves. Lewis v. United States

, 523 U. S. 155, 160 (1998) ; see 18 U. S. C. §13(a) (crimina lizing “any act or omission which, although not made pu nishable by any enactment of Congress, would be punish

able if committed or omitted within the jurisdiction of the”

—————— respect to a federal enclave unless it reserved the right to do so when it gave its consent to the purchase by the United States”).Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 11

Opinion of the Court

relevant State or territory). Mirroring the general enclave rule discussed above, the first ACA was limited to state laws in existence when the Act was passed. United States

v. Sha rpnack , 355 U. S. 286, 291 (1958) . Because of this limitation, the initial ACA “gradually lost much of its effectiveness in maintaining current conformity with state criminal laws,” and Congress eventually provided for the adoption of the state laws in ef fect at the time of the
crime. Id.

, at 291

– 292. After this Court upheld this ong oing adoption of state criminal law against a nondelegation challenge, see id.

, at 294, Congress amended the OCSLA
to borrow state law s “ ‘in effect or hereafter adopted,

ame nded, or repealed.’ ” §19(f ), 88 Stat. 2146. At the same time, Congress left unchanged the features of the OCSLA that we have emphasized above

— i.e.

, that the only law on the OCS is federal, and that state law is adopted only when it is “applicable and not inconsistent” with existing federal law. Thus, we do not understand the statutory amendment to alter our conclusion. If anything, this history rein forces that the OCS should be treated as an exclusive federal enclave, not an extension of a State, and that the OCSLA, like the ACAs, does not adopt state law “where there is no gap to fill.” Lewis

, supra , at 163.

3
Finally, our interpretation accords w ith the Court’s precedents construing the OCSLA. We first interpreted
the OCSLA’ s choice

- of

- law provision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. , where we considered whether suits brought by the families of men killed on OCS drilling rigs

c ould procee d under only the federal Death on the High
Seas Act or also under state law

. 395 U. S., at 352

– 353. We emphasized that under the OCSLA , the body of law applicable to the OCS “was to be federal law of the United States, applying state law only as federal law and then only when not inconsistent with applicable federal law.”12 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVIC ES, LTD. v. NEWTON
Opinion of the Court

Id.

, at 355

– 356. We explained that “federal law, because of its limited function in a federal system, might be inad equate to cope with the full range of potential legal pro blems,” and that the OCSLA “supplemented gaps in the federal law with state law through the ‘ adoption of State
law as the law of the Un ited States.’ ” Id. , at 357 (quoting §1333(a)(3)). We reiterated that the statutory language
makes it “evident” “that federal law is ‘ exclusive ’ ” on the
OCS and that “state law could be used to fill federal
voids.” Id.

, at 357

– 358. After concluding that the Death on the High Seas Act did not apply to accidents on the OCS and thus left a gap related to wrongful deaths, we
held that state law provided the rule of decision. We explained that “the inapplicability of the [federal Act] removes any obstacle to the application of state law by incorporation as federal law through” the OCSLA. Id.

, at 366. Two years later, in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson , 404 U. S. 97 (1971) , the Court again viewed the OCSLA as adopting
state law to fill in federal

- law gaps. In Huson , the que stion was whether federal admiralty law or a state statute governed a tort action arising from an injury that occurred
on the OCS. Id.

, at 98

– 99. Describing Rodrigue ’s anal ysis, we explained that where “there exists a substantial ‘gap’ in federal law,” “state law remedies are not ‘inco nsistent’ with applicable federal law.” 404 U. S., at 101. We highlighted that “state law was needed” as surrogate federal law because federal law alone did not provide “ ‘a complete body of law,’ ” which is why “Congress specified that a comprehensive body of state law should be adopted by the federal courts in the absence of existing fed eral
law.” Id.

, at 103

– 104. In other words, the OCSLA “made clear provision for filling in the ‘gaps’ in federal law.” Id.

, at 104. And because Congress had decided not to apply federal admiralty law on the OCS, leaving a gap on the relevant issue, we held that it was appropriate to “a b-Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 13

Opinion of the Court

sor[b]” the state law as federal law. Id. , at 104, 109.
In Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. , 453 U. S. 473 (1981) , we once again emphasized that “[a]ll law applic able to the [OCS] is federal law” and that the “OCSLA borrows the ‘applicable and not inconsistent’ laws of the adjacent States” “to fill the substantial ‘gaps’ in the cove rage of federal law.” Id. , at 480. We noted that under the OCSLA, the Federal Government “retain[ed] exclusive .

. . control of the adm inistration of the [OCS],” and that state law is incorporated “to fill gaps in federal law.” Id.

, at
479

– 480, n. 7. These precedents confirm our understanding of the OCSLA. Although none decided the precise question before us, much of our prior discussi on of the OCSLA would make little sense if the statute essentially treated the OCS as an extension of the adjacent State. In R odrigue , for example, there was no question that the state law at issue pertained to the subject matter or that the
relevant fede ral law expressly preserved state laws reg ulating the same subject. See 395 U. S., at 355; 46 U. S. C. § 767 (1964 ed.). Under Newton’s interpretation, that
should have ended the case. Yet the Court instead an alyzed at length whether the federal law exte nded to the
OCS. See 395 U. S., at 359

– 366. It would be odd for our decisions to focus so closely on the gap

- filling role of state law under the OCSLA if, as Newton argues, the existence
of a federal

- law gap is irrelevant. Our consistent unde rstanding o f the OCSLA remains: All law on the OCS is federal, and state law serves a supporting role, to be adopted only where there is a gap in federal law’s

coverage. In sum, the standard we adopt today is supported by the statute’s text, structure, and history, as well as our prec edents. Under that standard, if a federal law addresses the issue at hand, then state law is not adopted as federal law14 PARKER DRILLING MANAGEMENT SERVIC ES, LTD. v. NEWTON
Opinion of the Court

on the OCS. 2

IV
Applying this standard, some of Newton’s present claims are readily resolvable. For instance, som e of his claims are premised on the adoption of California law requiring payment for all time that Newton spent on standby. See Mendiola v. CPS Sec urity Solutions

, Inc. , 60 Cal. 4th 833, 842, 340 P. 3d 355, 361 (2015); Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 510(a) (West 20 11) . But federal law already
addresses this issue. See 29 CFR § 785.23 (2018) (“A n employee who resides on his employer’s premises on a permanent basis or for extended periods of time is not considered as working all the time he is on the premises” );

see also 29 U. S. C. §207(a)

. Therefore, this California law does not provide the rule of decision on the OCS, and to
the extent Newton’s OCS

- based claims rely on that law, they necessarily fail. Likewise, to the extent Newton’s OCS

- based claims rely
on the adoption of the California minimum wage (currently $12), Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §1182.12(b) (West Supp. 2019)

, the FLSA already provides for a minimum wage, 29
U. S. C. § 206(a)(1) , so the California minimum wage does not apply. Newton points out that the FLS A sets a min imum wage of “ not less than

. . . $7.25 an hour,” ibid. (e mphasis added), and does not “excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State law .

. . establishing a [higher] min imum wage,” §218. But whatever the import of these provisions in an ord inary pre

- emption case, they do not help Newton here, for the question under the OCSLA is

——————

2 Of course, it is conceivable that state law might be “inconsistent” with federal law for purpos es of §1333(a)(2) even absent an on

- point federal law. For example, federal law might contain a deliberate gap, making state law inconsistent with the federal scheme. Or, state law might be inconsistent with a federal law addressing a different issue.
W e do not foreclose these or other possible inconsistencies.Cite as: 587 U. S. ____ (2019) 15

Opinion of the Court

whether federal law addresses the minimum wage on the OCS. It does. Therefore, the California minimum wage is not adopted as federal law and does not apply on the O CS. Newton’s other claims were not analyzed by the Court of Appeals, and the parties have provided little briefing on those claims. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that Newton should be given leave to amend his complaint. Because we cannot finally r esolve whether Parker was entitled to judgment on the pleadings, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.