This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE 2 COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 3 COUNCIL 18, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 3022, 2692 4 and 624 5 Petitioners-Appellants, 6

v. NO. 31,365 7
ALBUQUERQUE BERNALILLO COUNTY 8 WATER UTILITY AUTHORITY, 9 Respondent-Appellee. 10

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 11 Alan M. Malott, District Judge 12 Youtz & Valdez, P.C. 13 Shane C. Youtz 14 Stephen Curtice 15 Albuquerque, NM 16 for Appellants 17 Stelzner, Winter, Warburton, 18 Flores, Sanchez & Dawes, P.A. 19 Nann M. Winter 202 Albuquerque, NM 1 for Appellee 2 MEMORANDUM OPINION 3 HANISEE, Judge. 4
{1} Petitioners American Federation of Stat e, County, and Municipal Employees, 5 Council 18 (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, and AFSCME Local 3022, 2962, and 624 6 (collectively, the Unions) are labor unions and exclusive bargaining representatives 7 for members employed by Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority 8 (Respondent). The Unions challenge the district court’s dismissal of their claims as 9 moot following a breakthrough in negotiations that culminated in new collective 10 bargaining agreements (CBAs) between th e Unions and Respondent. The Unions also 11 seek reversal of district court rulings re garding the availability of grandfather status 12 to Respondent’s Labor Management Relations Ordinance (LMRO), WUA Ord. §§ 10- 13 2-1 to -17 (2007) under the Public Empl oyee Bargaining Act (the PEBA), NMSA 14 1978, §§ 10-7E-1 to -26 (2003, as ame nded through 2005), and whether the LMRO’s 15 exclusion of an evergreen provision and binding arbitration in the event of impasse 16 is fatal to its enforceability. Because we agree with the district court that claims 17 before it became moot upon the Unions’ entry into new CBAs with Respondent, we 18 decline to address the remaining points of appeal and affirm. 193 I. BACKGROUND 1
{2} In 2010, the Unions and Respondent enga ged in negotiations to replace CBAs 2 set to expire on July 13 of that year. The expiring CBAs established requirements 3 associated with member salaries, insurance programs, retirement benefits, vacation 4 and sick leave, seniority protection of positions, occupational health and safety, 5 furlough and layoff protection, and disciplinary protection. The parties experienced 6 a breakdown in negotiations to replace the expiring CBAs, and failed to reach new 7 agreements prior to expiration of the existi ng ones. On July 15, 2010, the Unions filed 8 a verified petition for a temporary restraini ng order and preliminary injunction, which 9 was later amended to additionally seek declaratory judgment. 10
{3} At issue in the petition was the broader question of whether Respondent’s 11 LMRO was required to adhereto the PEBA, which would necessitate an evergreen 12 provision in Respondent’s LMRO and ob lige Respondent to engage in binding 13 impasse arbitration with the Unions. It is not disputed that neither requirement of the 14 PEBA was present within Respondent’s LMR O. The Unions contended that without 15 these provisions, Respondent impermissibly possessed “superior bargaining strength.” 16 We note that an evergreen provision woul d have continued the pre-existing CBA’s 17 beyond their looming expiration date and until the parties’ differences could be 18 resolved through mediation. The binding impasse arbitration would likewise compel 194 Respondent to create new CBAs with the Unions. 1
{4} On the other hand, Respondent argued th at it was exempt from those provisions 2 under the PEBA’s grandfather clause. The grandfather provision states that the PEBA 3 is inapplicable to a municipal entity with labor ordinances in effect prior to 1991, or 4 to newly created entities that provide previously existing services that are 5 substantively unchanged, use essentially the same employees as its predecessor entity, 6 and maintain a framework for labor or ganization and collective bargaining. See 7 NMSA 1978, §§ 10-7E-24, -24. 1 (2005). Pursuant to NM SA 1978, Section 72-1-10 8 (2005), Respondent had assumed water and wa stewater duties previously performed 9 by the City of Albuquerque. The district court agreed with Respondent by way of 10 Order filed on August 12, 2010, finding th at the grandfather provision exempted 11 Respondent from compliance with the PEBA. It dissolved the previously issued 12 preliminary injunctions extending the e xpiring CBAs, and certified the question of 13 grandfather status for appellate review. 14
{5} Against this ongoing litigative backdrop, the parties nonetheless continued their 15 negotiations. In early October 2010, Local 624 and 2962 and its members reached 16 separate agreements with Respondent on new CBAs covering the period of time 17 between October 4, 2010 through June 30, 2013. Shortly th ereafter, Local 3022 18 memorialized its own replacement CBA with Respondent, also extending through 195 June 2013 but commencing on N ovember 17, 2010. All told, four months had passed 1 between the inception of the Unions’ legal claims and execution of the contracts that 2 resolved the labor standoff. 3
{6} On May 4, 2011, Respondent submitted its motion to dismiss. It maintained 4 that the new CBAs rendered all claims moot, and alternatively sought summary 5 judgment as to Local 3022 based upon language in its agreement that deemed all 6 pending litigation between Local3022 and Respondent to be re solved. Six days later, 7 the district court entered its order of dismissal. The court found that because the “new 8 [CBAs] have been entered into by the parties, and that [Petiti oner] Local 3022 settled 9 its claims . . . as part of its . . . agr eement[,] no actual controversy exists and [the 10 Unions’ claims are] dismissed with prejudice on grounds of mootness.” The Unions 11 now appeal from the order of dismissal and previous rulings made by the court prior 12 to the agreements being reached. 13 II. DISCUSSION 14
{7} We review de novo whether the Unions’ claims are moot. Am. Fed’n of State, 15 Cnty., and Mun. Emps. (AFSCME), Council 18 v. Cityof Albuquerque , 2013-NMCA16 012, ¶ 24, 293 P.3d 943, cert. granted , 2013-NMCERT-001, 299 P.3d 863. “A case 17 will be dismissed for mootness if no actual controversy exists.” City of Las Cruces 18 v. El Paso Elec. Co. , 1998-NMSC-006, ¶ 16, 124 N.M. 640, 954 P.2d 72. An actual 196 controversy exists where (1) there is “a controversy involving rights or other legal 1 relations of the parties seeking declaratory relief”; (2) there is “a claim of right or 2 other legal interest asserted against one w ho has an interest in contesting the claim;” 3 (3) the “interests of the parties [are] real and adverse; ” and lastly, (4) “the issue 4 involved [is] ripe for judicial determination.” Id. 5
{8} In this case, the Unions’ contentions became moot when the Unions entered 6 into new CBAs with Respondent. At that j uncture, the parties no longer had real and 7 adverse interests, because the parties overcame the temporary breakdown in 8 negotiations and separately contracted with Respondent. As well, there was no longer 9 a controversy to which the judicial system could offer redress following the Unions’ 10 successful entry into new CBAs with Responde nt. As such, no “actual controversy” 11 exists in this case. See Gunaji v. Macias , 2001-NMSC-028, ¶ 9, 130 N.M. 734, 31 12 P.3d 1008 (“As a general rule, this Court does notdecide moot cases. A case is moot 13 when no actual controversy exists, and the court cannot grant actual relief.” (internal 14 quotation marks and citations omitted)). 15
{9} We nonetheless “may review moot cases th at present issues of (1) substantial 16 public interest or (2) which are capableof repetition yet evading review.” Cobb v. 17 N.M. State Canvassing Bd. , 2006-NMSC-034, ¶ 14, 140 N.M. 77, 140 P.3d 498; City 18 of Las Cruces , 1998-NMSC-006, ¶ 16 (“If no actual controversy exists, a case may 197 not be heard unless the issue is of substan tial public interest and is likely to reappear 1 before the court. In such a situation, an exception may be made by a court and the 2 question decided.”). “Among the criteria c onsidered in determining the existence of 3 the requisite degree of public interest are th e public or private nature of the question 4 presented, the desirability of an authoritative determination for future guidance of 5 public officers, and the likelihood of future recurrence of the question.” Mowrer v. 6 Rusk , 1980-NMSC-113 ¶13, 95 N.M. 48, 618 P. 2d 886 (internal quotation marks and 7 citation omitted). Our “review of moot cases that either raise an issue of substantial 8 public interest or are capable of repetiti on yet evading review is discretionary.” 9 Republican Party of New Mexico v. N.M. Taxation and Revenue Dep’t , 10 2012-NMSC-026, ¶ 10, 283 P.3d 853. 11
{10} Substantively at issue in this case is the applicability of the PEBA to 12 Respondent and the legality of its LMRO. More specifically, the Unions ask us to 13 determine whether the grandfather provisi on of the PEBA would apply to Respondent 14 and secondarily, whether an evergreen provision and a binding impasse provision are 15 impermissibly excluded from the LMRO. As explained above, the PEBA is 16 inapplicable to otherwise qualifying newly created municipal entities whose 17 predecessor entities had labor ordinances ineffect prior to 1991 by virtue of the 18 PEBA’s grandfather provision. If that provision does not apply, then the PEBA 198 would control collective bargaining betweenthe parties, and the Unions would 1 succeed in their suit. At oral argument in this Court, the Unions conceded that the 2 only item that would disqualify Respondent’s LMRO from grandfather status is the 3 elimination of a guidelines committee provision from Respondent’s LMRO. Counsel 4 for the Unions stated that the limited issu e is “whether or not the exclusion of a 5 guidelines committee constitutes a substantial change.” 6
{11} This particularly narrow, moot issue fails in this instance to establish the basis 7 for exception to the mootness doctrine. Whether the absence of the guidelines 8 committee provision is a substantial change is not an issue of substantial public 9 importance. See Bradbury & Stamm Constr. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bernalillo 10 Cnty. , 2001-NMCA-106, ¶ 11, 131 N.M. 293, 35 P.3d 298 (concluding that the 11 substantial public interest exception to m ootness was satisfied where the “dispute is 12 not unique to the County[,] involves all governmental entities and their competing 13 legal obligations to resident New Mexico contractors and to the public at large[, and] 14 potentially has a far-ranging impact on publicfinance and public administration”). 15 We note that this is the first collectiv e bargaining lawsuit brought against Respondent, 16 and at oral argument, the litigants were unaware of any identically situated municipal 17 entity which likewise could generate the same issue if sued and a breakdown in its 18 own collective bargaining negotiations were to occur. Nor would what amounts to an 199 advisory resolution of this narrow issue aff ect the public at large: the answer would 1 only impact negotiations for three small Locals (3022, 2962, and 624) composed of 2 less than 500 workers in the speculative, fu ture occurrence of an impasse in labor 3 negotiations. Moreover, the three Locals share a history of success in collective 4 bargaining with Respondent, including the agreements reached in 2010 and those 5 which the 2010 agreements replaced. 6
{12} Also important to our determination today is the fact that overlapping issues 7 have been accepted on certiorari by, and are set to be ar gued on August 12, 2013 8 before, our New Mexi co Supreme Court inAFSCME, Council 18 v. City of 9 Albuquerque , 2013-NMCA-012, cert. granted , 2013-NMCERT-001, 299 P.3d 863. 10 The issues to be considered include whether an evergreen provision is required even 11 in CBA negotiations that are governed by LMROs which are plainly entitled to 12 grandfather status, as well as whether binding impasse procedures must also be 13 included in all, not just PEBA-adherent, LMROs. Final resolution of these issues 14 could well affect future litigation regarding the PEBA’s applicability to Respondent 15 in the context of its future collective barg aining with the Unions. That future ruling 16 could also definitively resolve other disputed issues between these litigants, wholly 17 distinct from our own ruling, and potentiallycreate an altogether different landscape 18 for future collective bargaining negotiati ons. Any opinion now on the mooted issues 1910 in which we are asked by the Unions to opine could at this juncture be wholly 1 superfluous. As such, we conclude that the negligible chance this issue recurs as a 2 dispositive point of breakdown in labor negotiations between the Unions and 3 Respondent does not warrant our discretionary application of exceptions to the 4 mootness doctrine in this case, particularly in light of the probable resolution of 5 overlapping issues currently on certiorari to our Supreme Court. 6
{13} For these reasons, we hold that the Un ions’ case is moot and we decline to 7 exercise our discretion to otherwise consid er the issue presente d by this case under an 8 exception to the mootness doctrine. See AFSCME, Council 18 , 2013-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 9 24-27 (concluding in part that the appeal re garding labor negotiations was moot where 10 the union reached an agreem ent with the city). 11 IV. CONCLUSION 12
{14} For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the 13 Unions’ case as moot. 14
{15} IT IS SO ORDERED. 15

________________________ 16 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 1711 WE CONCUR: 1

2 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 3

4 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 5