Rel: May 17, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

CL-2023-0561

_________________________

J.L.W.

v.

C.J.P.

Appeal from Jefferson Juvenile Court

(CS-22-900165)

FRIDY, Judge.

J.L.W. ("the mother") appeals from a judgment of the Jefferson 

Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") awarding her and C.J.P. ("the 

father") joint legal and joint physical custody of their child, R.W. ("the 

child"). She also challenges several other provisions of the juvenile court's 
CL-2023-0561

2

judgment, including the provision directing that the child's last name be 

hyphenated to include the father's surname, the provision directing that 

the mother be responsible for maintaining the health-insurance coverage 

for the child, and its failure to establish "tiebreaker" authority as between 

the parents regarding decisions concerning the child's medical care and 

his academic, religious, cultural, civic, and athletic activities. For the 

reasons discussed herein, we affirm the judgment in part, reverse it in 

part, and remand the cause to the juvenile court.

Background

The child was born in May 2015 to the mother and the father, who 

have never been married to each other. On March 1, 2022, the father filed 

a petition to establish paternity in the Jefferson Juvenile Court in which 

he sought legal and physical custody of the child and asked that the 

child's surname be changed to his surname. On March 23, 2022, the 

mother filed an answer and a counterclaim in which she, too, requested 

"primary" custody of the child, as well as child support. Before the trial, 

the father submitted to genetic testing. The results of that testing 

indicated that his probable paternity was 99.99%. 
CL-2023-0561

3

The juvenile court held a trial over two days in December 2022 and 

April 2023. Much of the evidence that the juvenile court received was 

conflicting. The mother testified that she and the father were dating 

when the child was conceived. She acknowledged that, when she learned 

that she was pregnant with the child, she received a text message from 

another man saying that he believed that he was the child's father. She 

said that the father did not immediately accept that he was the child's 

biological father, and she said that she could not recall whether the father 

began sending her baby supplies once the child was born. 

The mother said that the father asked her to put his name on the 

child's birth certificate but that she did not recall when he first made the 

request. The father testified that he attempted to have his name added 

to the child's birth certificate in 2015. The child's last name was the 

mother's maiden name, but when the trial took place, she was married 

and no longer used that name. The mother's parents also did not have 

the same last name as the child. The mother acknowledged that, 

although the child's sibling shared the last name of the mother and her 

husband, T.V. ("the husband"), the child did not. However, she said, 

others in her family had the same last name as the child.
CL-2023-0561

4

The father was in school in Orlando, Florida, when the baby was 

born. He testified that, at that time, he and the mother were no longer in 

a romantic relationship. When he finished school in January 2017, the 

father said, he returned to Birmingham but was unable to find a job in 

his field, so he joined the military. He said that he registered the child as 

a dependent and enrolled him in benefits to which he was entitled. Upon 

his enlistment, the father said, he provided the mother with a TriCare 

card, which served as health insurance for the child, although no court 

had required him to do so. The father testified that, after his training 

period ended, he began regularly sending the mother money for the 

child's benefit. The mother said that she received only sporadic financial 

support from the father.

While the father was stationed outside of Alabama, the mother 

said, his mother ("the paternal grandmother") spent time with the child, 

taking him on Wednesday nights and on some weekends.1 The father said 

that, while he was gone, the paternal grandmother had regular visitation 

with the child every other weekend and at other times as well. When he 

1In her brief, the mother refers to times when the father was 

stationed in Tennessee; however, as the father points out, no evidence 

was presented indicating that he was ever stationed there. 
CL-2023-0561

5

returned to Alabama on leave, the father said, he would spend most of 

his time with the child. 

The mother said that while the father was in the military, she 

would take the child to visit him. For example, she said, she took the child 

to Fort Benning, Georgia, to visit the father for Thanksgiving in 2017. In 

July 2018, the child went with the father to a family reunion in North 

Carolina. When the father left the military in 2020, he said, he returned 

to Birmingham and began seeing the child every other weekend. 

After the child was born, the mother and the child lived with the 

mother's mother ("the maternal grandmother") in Vestavia. The mother 

testified that, in March 2019, when the child was three or four years old 

and she was nineteen years old, she married the husband. In April 2019, 

they moved to Tennessee, and the father and the paternal grandmother 

would visit the child. The father took the child to the beach for a week in 

December 2019. The mother and the father agreed that they had had a 

cordial relationship throughout his time in the military and, indeed, had 

enjoyed that relationship up until there was a confrontation between her 

stepfather ("the maternal step-grandfather") and the father in January 

2022. 
CL-2023-0561

6

In March 2020, the mother and the husband had a child ("the 

sibling"). The father said that, when the mother was pregnant with the 

sibling, she told him that her marriage to the husband was "rocky." He 

also said that the mother "hit on" him and sent him suggestive 

photographs of herself. The mother explained that, when she sent the 

father the photographs, she was at a low point and that her marriage was 

in what she called "a light patch." At the time of the trial, though, the 

mother said that her marriage with the husband was "great."

The mother said that she, the husband, and the children, who she 

described as inseparable, moved back to Alabama from Tennessee, once 

again living with the maternal grandmother, but that she "really ha[d] 

no idea" when that move took place. She first indicated it was in October 

2019, then changed her response to October 2020. They moved back to 

Alabama because the husband was promoted, she said. 

When the mother, the husband, and the child moved back to 

Alabama, the mother said, the father resumed seeing the child at least 

every other weekend, and the father took the child to the beach again in 

December 2020. She said that the father was involved in Boy Scouts with 

the child and, through the Scouts, took the child camping overnight. The 
CL-2023-0561

7

father testified that from 2020 until the litigation began, he saw the child 

every other weekend. He also attended the child's extracurricular 

activities, including the child's karate classes and Cub Scout events; they 

would talk on FaceTime regularly; and, they took vacations together. 

In April or May 2021, the mother, the husband, and the sibling 

moved to South Carolina because of the husband's job. The mother said 

that they left the child with the maternal grandmother so that he could 

finish the schoolyear. The mother testified that it was more important for 

her to leave the child with the maternal grandmother for two weeks so 

that she could unpack and have his room ready for him than to wait for 

him to finish school before going. During the summer, when the child was 

in South Carolina, the father came to visit, the mother said. She said that 

she did not recall whether the father wanted to have the child for summer 

visitation, but, regardless, she did not let the child go with the father for 

a visit during the summer of 2021. 

In August 2021, the mother said, she returned the child to live with 

the maternal grandmother in Alabama because, she said, she did not 

believe that the schools in South Carolina were adequate. She returned 

to South Carolina with the husband and the sibling but, she said, the 
CL-2023-0561

8

family never intended to stay there permanently. The mother said that 

she mentioned the child's return to Alabama to the paternal grandmother 

but that she did not tell the father because, she said, when the father and 

the child were "on FaceTime," she heard the child tell the father that he 

was returning to Alabama. 

The father testified that he first learned that the child had returned 

to live at the maternal grandmother's house in Vestavia when he asked 

the mother if he could FaceTime or talk on the phone with the child. The 

mother responded that he would have to contact the maternal 

grandmother because the child was living with her again. He said that 

he talked with the maternal grandmother so that he could resume his 

regular visitation schedule with the child, but she denied him visitation 

for a few weeks, until the end of August, when Cub Scouts started. At 

that time, the father said, he and the child returned to doing what he said 

were their "regular activities."

While the mother was living in South Carolina without the child, 

the father and the paternal grandmother asked if they could have the 

child for a week at Christmas. The mother said that she refused that 

request because, at that time, they were seeing the child more than she 
CL-2023-0561

9

was and she would be in Birmingham to see him. The father testified 

that, while the mother lived in South Carolina, she told him that she was 

deferring to the maternal grandmother's decisions regarding visitation. 

The mother, however, denied that she had told the father that he would 

have to arrange visits with the child through the maternal grandmother. 

The mother said that the maternal step-grandfather and the father 

had a confrontation in January 2022. The father testified that, on the 

occasion of that confrontation, he had gone to the child's karate class and 

"noticed that things seemed to be a little off." He said he approached the 

maternal step-grandfather to ask whether everything was okay, and the 

maternal step-grandfather "pretty aggressively" made accusations 

against him that he said were not true. The father said that he asked the 

maternal step-grandfather whether the child had seen a doctor, but the 

maternal step-grandfather did not respond. The father said he was 

"extremely concerned" about the child and reached out to the mother, 

who initially spoke with him on the phone. He said that, after that initial 

contact, the mother did not respond to him again for two weeks. In the 

texts and voice messages he left for the mother during that interim, the 

father said, he told the mother that the maternal grandparents were no 
CL-2023-0561

10

longer communicating with him and that he wanted her to help him 

address those issues. 

The mother testified that, in January 2022, the father sent her a 

text message asking her to return to Alabama so that they could deal 

with an issue the child was having. She said that she responded to the 

father, saying that the child's issues, including bedwetting, did not alarm 

her. She said that living away from the child with the sibling and the 

husband were not the cause of the child's problems, adding that that 

thought "absolutely did not" cross her mind. The mother returned to 

Alabama the second week of February 2022, when, she said, she was 

served with papers regarding this case. 

The juvenile court asked the mother why the child was receiving 

therapy. The mother said she thought "he was being groomed or had been 

sexually -- something sexually [sic] had happened" with the father or 

someone at the house where the child was staying. The juvenile court 

asked the father's attorney to respond, and she said that the mother 

knew the allegation was not true. She added that the child was urinating 

and defecating in the bed and that the father was concerned that the 

problem arose because the mother was living in another state while the 
CL-2023-0561

11

child lived with the maternal grandparents. She also observed that the 

mother had agreed to allow the father to have unsupervised overnight 

visits with the child. 

The father told the juvenile court that he was asking for the parents 

to share custody of the child every other week and to be able to FaceTime 

with him regularly without interference from the mother. He also said 

that he would like for the child to have his surname. The father said that 

he lived less than ten minutes from the child's elementary school in 

Vestavia, but, in the past, the mother had not allowed him to pick up the 

child from school or to go to the school. He said that she had also failed 

to advise the father of the times for some of the child's extracurricular 

activities. He told the juvenile court that he would like access to the 

school and to the schedule of the child's extracurricular activities. 

The mother told the juvenile court that she would like both legal 

and physical custody of the child and that she wanted to keep her maiden 

name as his last name. She testified that the child knew his last name 

and could read and write that name, that the child's school and medical 

records and awards were in that name, and that she thought he would be 

confused if his last name were changed. She also requested child support. 
CL-2023-0561

12

After the first day of testimony, the juvenile court entered an order 

on December 20, 2022, adjudicating the father's paternity and 

establishing a Christmas-visitation schedule. On April 28, 2023, the 

juvenile court entered a judgment finding that the mother and the father 

had both been involved in the child's life and that both were "equally able 

to provide love, care, nurturing and stability" to the child. Based on that 

finding, it awarded the mother and the father joint legal and joint 

physical custody, rotating physical custody week to week. The juvenile 

court also established a holiday and school-vacation schedule for the 

parents to follow. Additionally, the juvenile court ordered that the 

mother to continue to provide health-insurance coverage for the child and 

directed the parties to equally divide all noncovered medical expenses, 

including, but not limited to, dental, orthodontic, and optical care 

expenses incurred on behalf of the child. It also ordered that the father's 

last name be added to the child's as a hyphenated name, making the 

child's last name W.-P.

The mother filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment 

and a motion to stay the judgment on April 30, 2023. The juvenile court 
CL-2023-0561

13

denied both motions on May 3, 2023. The mother appealed to the circuit 

court and ultimately to this court. 

Standard of Review

When a juvenile court makes a custody determination based on ore 

tenus evidence, its findings in support of that determination are accorded 

a presumption of correctness on appeal. Ex parte Bryowsky, 676 So. 2d 

1322, 1324-26 (Ala. 1996). An appellate court will not reverse the juvenile 

court's custody judgment "unless the evidence so fails to support the 

determination that it is plainly and palpably wrong, or unless an abuse 

of the trial court's discretion is shown. To substitute our judgment for 

that of the trial court would be to reweigh the evidence. This Alabama 

law does not allow." Phillips v. Phillips, 622 So. 2d 410, 412 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 1993).

Analysis

The mother first contends that the trial court erred in awarding the 

parties "equal legal and physical custody" and an every-other-week 

custody schedule, calling the custody change "drastic." 

Because there had been no previous court order concerning the 

custody of the child, the April 28, 2023, judgment constituted an initial 
CL-2023-0561

14

custody determination. In Steed v. Steed, 877 So. 2d 602, 604 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2003), this court explained that, when a trial court makes an initial 

custody determination, neither party is entitled to a presumption in his 

or her favor. The trial court must decide what custody arrangement is in 

the best interests of the child. Steed, 877 So. 2d at 604. To determine the 

child's best interests, trial courts are to consider a number of factors, 

including but not limited to, the age and sex of the children, 

"the characteristics and needs of each child, including their 

emotional, social, moral, material and educational needs; the 

respective home environments offered by the parties; the 

characteristics of those seeking custody, including age, 

character, stability, mental and physical health; the capacity 

and interest of each parent to provide for the emotional, 

social, moral, material and educational needs of the children; 

[and] the interpersonal relationship between each child and 

each parent," 

as well any other relevant matter the evidence demonstrates. Ex parte 

Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. 1981). 

In 1996, after Devine was decided, our legislature made clear that, 

when deciding issues of child custody after parents separate or divorce, 

"[i]t is the policy of this state to assure that minor children have frequent 

and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in 

the best interest of their children and to encourage parents to share in 
CL-2023-0561

15

the rights and responsibilities of rearing their children." § 30-3-150, Ala. 

Code 1975. Thus, in every case involving custody, the trial court must 

consider whether to order joint custody, and, 

"[i]n determining whether joint custody is in the best interest 

of the child, the court shall consider the same factors 

considered in awarding sole legal and physical custody and all 

of the following factors:

"(1) The agreement or lack of agreement of 

the parents on joint custody.

"(2) The past and present ability of the 

parents to cooperate with each other and make 

decisions jointly.

"(3) The ability of the parents to encourage 

the sharing of love, affection, and contact between 

the child and the other parent.

"(4) Any history of or potential for child 

abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnapping.

"(5) The geographic proximity of the parents 

to each other as this relates to the practical 

considerations of joint physical custody."

§30-3-152(a), Ala. Code 1975.

In support of her contention that an award of joint physical custody 

is not in the child's best interests, the mother asserts that the child had 

lived primarily with her since his birth, that she had been responsible for 

the child's primary care since his birth, that the parties had been 
CL-2023-0561

16

operating under the same visitation schedule for most of the child's life 

and the child was doing well under that schedule, and that the father did 

not live in the same school district as the child, who had attended only 

one elementary school. 

As mentioned, the juvenile court found that both parents had been 

"very involved" in the seven-year-old child's life and were equally able to 

provide love and care for the child. Evidence indicated that the father 

took an active role in sharing Cub Scout activities with the child, as well 

as other extracurricular activities like karate. As the mother noted, the 

father had regularly exercised visitation with the child and the two had 

spent vacations, holidays, and extended-family gatherings together.

Before any court order was in place, the father provided health insurance 

for the child and secured benefits for him as a dependent when he was 

serving in the military. The father also regularly provided financial 

support for the child for numerous years, again without having been 

ordered to do so.

When the child was six years old, the mother returned him to 

Birmingham to live with the maternal grandparents while she, the 

husband, and the sibling lived in South Carolina. Evidence suggests that, 
CL-2023-0561

17

during that time, the mother ceded decisions regarding the child to the 

maternal grandmother. The child's living arrangement during that time 

cuts against the mother's assertions that she had been the child's 

primary caregiver his entire life and her claim that the child and the 

sibling were "inseparable." The mother also denied that living in a 

different state than her six-year-old child could have caused that child to 

resume wetting the bed or the other unspecified problems that the father 

was told about. Additionally, evidence indicates that, after the January 

2022 confrontation between the father and the maternal stepgrandfather at the child's karate lesson, the relationship between the 

father and the mother was not as cordial as it had been, and the mother 

came to believe that the child was being "groomed" by the father or 

someone connected to the father. She did not present any evidence to 

support that belief. 

Before the confrontation, the parties agreed, they had been able to 

cooperate and make joint decisions regarding the care of the child. When 

the trial took place, the child was enrolled in elementary school in 

Vestavia, and, the father said, the school was less than ten minutes from 

his house. 
CL-2023-0561

18

Based on the evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could have 

been convinced that joint legal and joint physical custody, including an 

every-other-week custody schedule, could be implemented easily and that 

spending equal time with both parents was in the child's best interests. 

Nothing in the record suggests that that decision was plainly and 

palpably wrong. Therefore, the juvenile court's custody award is due to 

be affirmed. 

The mother next contends that the juvenile court erred in changing 

the child's surname from W. to W.-P. because, she says, the father failed 

to demonstrate that good cause existed for the name change. Section 26-

16-636(e) of the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act, § 26-17-101 et seq., 

Ala. Code 1975, provides that, in an action to adjudicate paternity, "[o]n 

request of a party and for good cause shown, the court may order that the 

name of the child be changed." See also J.M.V. v. J.K.H., 149 So. 3d 1100, 

1104-05 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014). In J.M.V., this court reversed the judgment 

of the trial court changing the child's surname, concluding that "a parent 

petitioning to change the name of the child must present evidence 

showing that the change would benefit the child in some positive manner" 

and that the father, who was seeking the name change, had failed to meet 
CL-2023-0561

19

that burden. J.M.V., 149 So. 3d at 1105-06. In support of our holding, we 

pointed out that, among other things, the child knew his last name as the 

mother's surname, that all of his records identified him by that name, 

and, while not dispositive, that "the father waited over three years to 

establish his paternity, all the while knowing that the child was not 

bearing his surname and that the child would become accustomed to his 

given name." Id. at 1106. See also K.G. v. M.E., 355 So. 3d 344, 348-49

(Ala. Civ. App. 2021) (reversing judgment changing child's last name 

because father seeking name change failed to present evidence that such 

a change would promote child's best interests). 

Here, the mother testified that the child knew his last name and 

could read and write that name, that the child's medical and school 

records and his awards were in that name, and that she thought he would 

be confused if his last name were to be changed. The father elicited 

evidence demonstrating that the mother, the sibling, and the child's 

maternal grandparents did not share the child's last name, but he 

presented no evidence demonstrating that a name change would promote 

the child's best interests. Although the father argues in his brief that 

"[t]here was no evidence presented that the change of the minor child's 
CL-2023-0561

20

name would have a detrimental effect," this court has previously rejected 

that argument as sufficient to support a name change, writing that "[a] 

court may not change the name of a child on the ground that the change 

would not cause the child any particular detriment." J.M.V., 149 So. 3d 

at 1106.

Because the father failed to demonstrate that a change of last name 

would promote the child's best interests, we must reverse the judgment 

as to this issue. Accordingly, we need not address the mother's contention 

that the juvenile court erred by not appointing a guardian ad litem to 

represent the child's best interests regarding the father's request to 

change the child's last name. 

The mother next contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to 

establish what she called "tiebreaker" authority for the parents in case 

they are unable to agree on certain decisions regarding the child, 

including medical decisions and decisions regarding the child's

participation in academic, religious, cultural, civic, and athletic 

activities. In support of her argument, the mother cites § 30-3-153, Ala. 

Code 1975, which provides that, "to implement joint custody, the court 

shall require the parents to submit, as part of their agreement, provisions 
CL-2023-0561

21

covering matters relevant to the care and custody of the child," including

decisions regarding the child's education, medical and dental care, 

holidays and vacation time, and religious, civic, cultural, and athletic 

activities. (Emphasis added.) The statute further provides that, as part 

of their agreement, the parents are to designate the parent who is to have 

primary decision-making authority over those decisions, failing which 

the trial court "shall set the plan." § 30-3-153(b). It is undisputed that the

parties did not reach an agreement regarding joint custody in this case, 

and that the mother had, in fact, opposed joint custody in the juvenile 

court, just as she does on appeal. 

The mother relies on Ford v. Ford, 3 So. 3d 872 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2008), to support her argument. In that case, the father had argued that 

the trial court erred by awarding the parties joint custody of their 

children without setting out a plan for joint custody, id. at 874, although 

nothing in the opinion indicates that the parties had agreed to joint 

custody. This court agreed with the father's argument, relying on § 30-3-

153(a) to hold that, "in cases in which joint custody is awarded, a plan for 

implementing the joint-custody arrangement is required." Id.
CL-2023-0561

22

Shortly thereafter, however, in Ratliff v. Ratliff, 5 So. 3d 570 (Ala. 

Civ. App. 2008), this court reached the opposite conclusion. In that case, 

we declined to reverse a trial court's judgment awarding the parties 

"shared custody" with "shared parental responsibility" for their minor 

children based on the wife's argument that the trial court had erred by 

failing to designate which parent should have final decision-making 

authority if they disagreed. We explained: 

"§ 30-3-153[, Ala. Code 1975,] applies solely to joint-custody 

agreements; the parties did not agree to joint custody in this 

case. Section 30-3-151(2) gives the trial court the discretion to 

establish a parenting plan when awarding joint custody. See

Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3-151(2) ('The court may designate one 

parent to have sole power to make certain decisions while both 

parents retain equal rights and responsibilities for other 

decisions.' (emphasis added))."

Id. at 585. 

We cannot reconcile the holding in Ford with the holding in Ratliff. 

In neither case did the parents agree to a joint custody arrangement, but,

in Ford, we determined that the trial court was required to implement a 

joint custody plan and in Ratliff, we held that it was not. The decision in 

Ratliff was based on the plain language of § 30-3-153 and § 30-3-151 that, 

when taken together, provides that when there is no joint-custody 

agreement between the parents, the trial court has the discretion 
CL-2023-0561

23

whether to give one parent the authority to make certain decisions 

regarding the child's medical, educational, and extracurricular activities, 

and that only when the parties have entered into an agreement providing 

for joint custody is the trial court required to ensure the inclusion of a 

parenting plan in its custody judgment. Today, we conclude that the 

rationale for the holding in Ratliff is the better reasoned, and we overrule 

Ford insofar as it is inconsistent with Ratliff.

As noted above, the parties in this case did not agree to joint 

custody. Thus, the juvenile court had discretion whether to include a 

parenting plan designating a "tiebreaker" with final decision-making 

authority regarding the child in its judgment providing for joint custody. 

In light of the evidence indicating that, before the confrontation between 

the father and the maternal step-grandfather, the mother and the father 

were able to work together to make decisions on behalf of the child, we 

conclude that the juvenile court did not exceed its discretion in declining 

to do so.

Finally, the mother contends that, in light of its award of joint 

physical custody, the juvenile court erred in making her solely 

responsible for maintaining and purchasing health insurance for the 
CL-2023-0561

24

child. However, the mother failed to raise this issue at trial or in her 

motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. It is well settled that an 

appellate court's "review is restricted to the evidence and arguments 

considered by the trial court." Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 

410 (Ala. 1992). By failing to preserve this issue for appellate review, the 

mother has waived it. Even if she had preserved it, however, we find no 

merit to her argument.

The mother contends that, because the evidence showed that the 

father earned approximately $4,000 per month and that she was a "stayat-home mother" who was no longer earning an income as a dental 

assistant, the juvenile court should not have ordered her to continue to 

maintain health-insurance coverage for the child. The evidence indicated 

that the mother was already providing health insurance for the child, and 

she had not sought assistance from the father to cover its cost, nor did 

she ask the juvenile court during the trial to have the father pay the cost 

or any portion of the cost of that insurance. Based on the evidence and 

the mother's argument, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court's 

order directing the mother to continue to provide the child with health 
CL-2023-0561

25

insurance constituted an abuse of discretion or was plainly and palpably 

wrong. See Burkett v. Burkett, 367 So. 3d 409, 418 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022).

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the juvenile court 

is reversed insofar as it ordered a change to the child's last name. The 

remainder of the judgment is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the 

juvenile court for it to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion.

The father's request for an attorney fee on appeal is denied.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson and Lewis, JJ., concur.

 Edwards, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.