alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 181 (Wednesday, September 20, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 43950]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-20013]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Navy


Notice of Extension of Scoping Period for the Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement/Overseas Environmental Impact Statement 
for Northwest Training and Testing

AGENCY: Department of the Navy, DoD.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: A notice of intent was published by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency in the Federal Register (82 FR 39779) on August 22, 
2017 for the supplement to the 2015 Final Northwest Training and 
Testing (NWTT) Environmental Impact Statement/Overseas Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS/OEIS). The 30-day scoping period ends on 
September 21, 2017. This notice announces a 15-day extension of the 
scoping period until October 6, 2017.

DATES: Public comments will be accepted during the 45-day scoping 
period from August 22, 2017 to October 6, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be provided via mail to the address provided 
below or through the project Web site at http://nwtteis.com/. Comments 
must be postmarked or received online by October 6, 2017 for 
consideration during the development of the Supplemental EIS/OEIS. 
Anyone interested in receiving electronic project updates can subscribe 
on the project Web site to receive notifications via email for key 
milestones throughout the environmental planning process.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. John Mosher, 360-257-3234, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#244e4b4c4a0a430a494b574c4156644a45525d0a494d48"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="85efeaedebabe2abe8eaf6ede0f7c5ebe4f3fcabe8ece9">[email protected]</span></a>. U.S. Pacific Fleet, Attention: NWTT 
Supplemental EIS/OEIS Project Manager, 3730 North Charles Porter 
Avenue, Building 385, Oak Harbor, Washington 98278-3500.

    Dated: September 14, 2017.
S.E. Milewski,
Deputy Division Director, Administrative Law Division, Judge Advocate 
General's Corps, U.S. Navy, Alternate Federal Register Liaison Officer.
[FR Doc. 2017-20013 Filed 9-19-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 3810-FF-P


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#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jorge Alberto CORTEZ-JIMINEZ, also known as Jorge Alberto Cortez-Jimenez, Appellant.

No. 07-2904.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: June 27, 2008.

Filed: July 2, 2008.

Emily K. Nydle, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, Des Moines, IA, for Appellee.

Jorge Alberto Cortez-Jiminez Des Moines, IA, pro se.

Dennis McKelvie, McKelvie Law, Grinned, IA, for Appellant.

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

A jury found Jorge Alberto Cortez-Jiminez guilty of conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams of a methamphetamine mixture, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A); and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). CortezJiminez also pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States after having been deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He faced an advisory Guidelines imprisonment range of 210-262 months on the drug offense and a statutory minimum of 60 months (consecutive) on the firearm offense. Granting a 30-month variance as to the drug offense, the district *486court1 sentenced him to a total of 240 months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the district court erred in applying a role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.l(b) because, while the co-conspirators acted to benefit Cortez-Jiminez, they did not act under his authority, and there were not five participants in the conspiracy.

Reviewing the district court’s determination that Cortez-Jiminez was a manager or supervisor for clear error, *see United States v. Plancarte-Vazquez,*450 F.3d 848, 853 (8th Cir.2006), we conclude that the court did not err in applying the enhancement. Undisputed facts established that at least five persons were involved in the conspiracy, and that Cortez-Jiminez exercised decision-making authority over the activities of some of the participants. *See United States v. Rosas,*486 F.3d 374, 376 (8th Cir.2007) (citing factors from U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment, (n.4)); *United States v. Erhart,*415 F.3d 965, 973 (8th Cir.2005) (“[T]he simple fact that a defendant recruits new members into a conspiracy supports a finding of the defendant being a manager or supervisor.”).

Having reviewed the record under *Pen-son v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

1

. The Honorable Ronald E. Longstaff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa.
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                           3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                       DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                          JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                            APR-01-2000
<CASH>                                        5183
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                               163729
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                            9639
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 31.2  
 I, Patricia Hayes, certify that:
 
 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the registrant, Digital Lightwave, Inc.
 
 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
 
 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
  4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
  (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
  (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
  (c) d isclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and
 
 5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):
 
 (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize, and report financial information; and
 
 (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal controls over financial reporting.
 
 
 
 Date: November 17, 2003By:/s/ Patricia HayesPatricia HayesChief Accounting Officer(Principal Financial Officer)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                          12,808
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    4,219
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     34,381
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                           5,361
<DEPRECIATION>                                   2,834
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  72,463
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                         58,094
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             6
<OTHER-SE>                                       2,790
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    72,463
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               108,777
<CGS>                                            3,852
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   98,910
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 5,192
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,555
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,880)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    1,040
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,840)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,840)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (3.34)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (3.34)


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CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH

#### Commonwealth of Virginia v. Tony Darrell Waites

June 2, 1971

Case No. Cr. 1242

By JUDGE PHILIP L. RUSSO

The defense is relying mainly upon the case of *Adkins v. Commonwealth,*175 Va. 590 (1940), which among other things, stated as follows:

> A fact once determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a criminal proceeding cannot again be litigated between the same parties unless a different rule applies in criminal proceedings from that which obtains in civil proceedings, but it is well settled that the rule is the same in both classes of cases.

Counsel for the defendant contends that this is a proposition of law laid down by the *Adkins*case *(supra)*and the attorney for the Commonwealth maintains that this is merely dicta and that the case does not lay down as a proposition of law that res adjudicata applies in criminal cases.

Among other authorities, the attorney for the Commonwealth has cited the case of *Dykeman v. Commonwealth,*201 Va. 807 (1960). In that case, counsel for Dykeman pleaded double or former jeopardy but did not raise the defense of res adjudicata. The *Dykeman*case *(supra),*therefore, stands for the proposition that reckless driving and involuntary manslaughter are two separate and distinct *483offenses and that a trial of a person for involuntary manslaughter after having been acquitted of reckless driving does not constitute double jeopardy. In the opinion of this court, the *Dykeman*case *(supra)*does not deal with the question of res ad judicata since this defense was not raised.

In the instant case, counsel for the defendant has raised both defenses.

The court cannot agree that the aforesaid statement from the *Adkins*case *(supra)*is dicta. It is stated in unequivocal terms and if the court were not relying upon that proposition in arriving at its decision, it would and could have left it out.

This court is of the opinion that in Virginia the defense of res adjudicata applies to criminal as well as civil cases and that the plea is well taken in the instant case and must be sustained. It appears to the court that since it has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant was not guilty of reckless driving and since involuntary manslaughter carries a burden of proof of recklessness greater than does the charge of reckless driving, that this necessary element has already been adjudicated.
<PAGE>   1
                                   EXHIBIT 12

                       RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES

       The ratio of earnings to fixed charges for each of the years in the
five-year period ended December 31, 1998 is presented below. Ratio of Earnings
to Fixed Charges means the ratio of pretax income from continuing operations
(with certain adjustments described below) to the total of: (i) interest and
(ii) such portion of rental expense as can be demonstrated to be representative
of the interest factor in the particular case.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                         YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31,
                                          ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              1994              1995              1996              1997              1998
                                              ----              ----              ----              ----              ----
<S>                                       <C>               <C>               <C>               <C>               <C>          
EARNINGS BEFORE FIXED CHARGES:
    Net Loss                              $( 8,805,280)     $( 6,061,758)     $( 1,894,244)     $( 1,840,210)     $( 3,310,870)
    Add: Interest Expense                    8,492,134         9,717,511         8,878,285         9,646,679        11,383,449
         Interest factor in rental
            expense                            201,224           223,099           233,243           243,890           252,106
                                          ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

EARNINGS BEFORE FIXED CHARGES             $(   111,922)     $  3,878,852      $  7,217,284      $  8,050,359      $  8,324,685
                                          ====================================================================================

FIXED CHARGES:
    Interest Expense                      $  8,492,134      $  9,717,511      $  8,878,285      $  9,646,679      $ 11,383,449
    Interest factor in rental expense          201,224           223,099           233,243           243,890           252,106
                                          ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

TOTAL FIXED CHARGES                       $  8,693,358      $  9,940,610      $  9,111,528      $  9,890,569      $ 11,635,555
                                          ====================================================================================

RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES                  --                --                --                --                --

DEFICIENCY IN EARNINGS AVAILABLE TO
   COVER FIXED CHARGES                    $  8,805,280      $  6,061,758      $  1,894,244      $  1,840,210      $  3,310,870
                                          ====================================================================================
</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FOR FYE 9-30-96
FORM 10-K AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1995
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                       3,187,920
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,945,277
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                 32,522,684
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,147,656
<PP&E>                                       1,108,891
<DEPRECIATION>                               (238,640)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              39,673,788
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       27,405,943
<BONDS>                                      4,973,836
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        38,603
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,255,406
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                39,673,788
<SALES>                                     37,391,780
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            37,773,097
<CGS>                                       35,425,713
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               37,953,281
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,716,026
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              65,836
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,962,046)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,962,046)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,962,046)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.81)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### Jacquelin Harris, Respondent, v New York City Housing Authority, Appellant.

[986 NYS2d 858]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Saitta, J.), dated July 9, 2013, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that it did not have constructive notice of the existence of the black plastic on which the plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell as she was descending a staircase in its building *(see Nesterenko v Starrett City Assoc., L.P.,*111 AD3d 806 [2013]; *Rui-Jiao Liu v City of White Plains,*95 AD3d 1192 [2012]; *Muniz v New York City Hous. Auth.,*38 AD3d 628 [2007]; *see also Gordon v American Museum of Natural History,*67 NY2d 836 [1986]). However, the Supreme Court properly concluded that, in opposition, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant had constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition.

Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Skelos, J.E, Balkin, Hall and Maltese, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kentrel Whitaker, Appellant.

[987 NYS2d 138]

*484Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Bonnie G. Wittner, J.), rendered March 12, 2012, as amended April 17, 2012, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of attempted rape in the first degree and assault in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to consecutive terms of 15 years and seven years, respectively, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of directing that the sentences run concurrently, and otherwise affirmed.

Concurrent sentences were required because the two convictions were based on the same act *(see*Penal Law § 70.25 [2]). Defendant’s act of punching the victim in the face while he was on top of her was the force necessary to subdue her in furtherance of the attempted rape *(see e.g. People v Carmona,*205 AD2d 443 [1st Dept 1994], *lv denied*84 NY2d 866 [1994]; *People v Bolden,*83 AD2d 921 [1st Dept 1981], *affd*58 NY2d 741 [1982]).

Concur—Tom, J.P, Friedman, Renwick, Gische and Clark, JJ.
<PAGE>   1
                                                               EXHIBIT  23


                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements of
Frederick Brewing Company on Form S-3 (File No. 333-25743 and File No.
333-35655) of our report dated March 30, 1998, on our audits of the financial
statements of Frederick Brewing Company as of December 31, 1997 and 1996 and for
the years then ended, which report is included in this Annual Report on
Form 10-K.



                                                        Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P.


McLean, Virginia
March 31, 1998