Docket No . 108953.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

In re VE RO NI CA C

. , a M ino r( T he Pe o ple o f t he Stat e of Ill in ois, Ap pel l ee, v . Veron

i ca C ., Ap pel l an t).
Opinion filed September 23, 2010.–Modif ied upon denial of rehearing Novembe

r 22, 2010.

JUSTICE KA

RMEIER deli

vered t he j udgm

en t of th e c our t, w i th op inion. Chi ef Justice Fi tzgerald an

d Justice s Freem

an, Thom as, Ki lb ride, Gar man, a nd Bu rk e co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

The resp ondent-m

i nor, Veronica

C., was adj udic ated a delinque nt in t he cir cu it co ur t o f Ka ne Co un t y, t he co ur t having fo und t hat she violated se cti on 1 2–3 (a) (2) of

the Crim in al Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12–3(a)(2) (West 2006) (batt ery)). She was thereafter placed
on pr oba t ion f

or a pe rio d o f one year w ith at t enda nt co ndit ions a nd fees. Re sp ond

en t appe al ed , ar gui ng tha t se cti on 5 –61 5 of

t he Ju ve nile CourtAct of 198 7 (A ct) (705 ILCS 40 5/5–6 15(1) (W est 200 6)) violates co nst itu t ional pr ovisio ns pe rt aining t o e qua l pro t ect ion and
se pa rati on of powers in

sofar as i t prevents a m

in or from bei

ng pl aced
on s upe rvisio n wit hou t t he co nsent of t he State. The appe l l ate court rejected those contentions. No. 2–07–1155 (unpubl is hed order under-2- Su pr eme Cou

rt Ru l e 2 3). W e al l owe d re sp ond en t’s pe ti ti on f orleave to appeal (210 Ill . 2d R. 315), an d n ow affirm the jud gment of t he appe l l ate court without reachi

ng the consti

tut iona l i ssuesit addressed.

BACK GROUND On Octobe r 12, 2 006, i

n the ci rcui t court of K

ane Coun ty, a pe ti ti on was f il ed alle gin g that t he minor -r esp ond ent was delinque nt in t hat she had

com m i tted b atte ry . In

se pa rate cou nts , th e p eti

ti on charged t hat re spo ndent had vio late d se ct ion 1 2–3 (a )( 1) of t he Code, in t ha t she ha d k no win gly c au se d b o dil y har m t o Kr ila Cor t es, and section12–3(a)(2) of t he Code, in that sh e had ma de phy si cal contact of an i ns ul tin g or provoki

ng n aturewith C ort es. Though the conduct in question occurred

on t he propert y of

a publ ic school, as the ci

ted
sec t ions i nd

i ca te, th e Sta te c hos e to p urs

ueonl y m i sdem ea nor charges. A cti

ng i n p art u pon de f en se repres en tations tha t the m i nor had n o crim in al hi story, the court decided that t he minor r esp ond ent would not b e detai

ne d pen di ng tri al

. Th e m att er was t ried on M ay 22, 200 7. Afte r he ar ing t he evi dence, the c ourt foun

d re sp on de n t gui

l ty of the se con d c oun t of bat t er y–char ging phy

si cal contact of an

insulting o r p ro vok ing nature–butnot g

ui l ty of t he first co unt , a s t he St at e had add uce d no evi dence of bodily harm . As the detail s of the off ense are pe

riph eral to the issues rai sed by

the part ies, we will

sum ma rize the f in din gs of the tri al court, an d the ve rsi on of even ts those f i ndi ngs supp ort. The pr evailing te st imony indicat ed t hat t he vict im, ano t her st ude nt at respo ndent’s sc ho o l, was pus hed a nd pu nched by resp ond ent and her friends, and that respondent i ni tiated the attack. Resp ond ent and her gr oupf i rs t en ci rc l ed th e vi ctim

in the school’ s gy

mn asi um a fter
sc ho o l. Af

ter t he v ictim successf ul ly e xtricated he

rsel f f rom that
con f ron tati on , a n d w en t dow n i n to the locker

ro om, re spo ndent and another gi rl proceeded to the locker

ro om whe re t he r esp ond ent and t he victim “b umpe d shoulders” i

n pas sing , in citing an at t ack on t he vic t im in the s how er ar ea, wher ein res po ndent and three of her f rien ds partici pated. In an n oun ci n g i ts g ui l ty v erdi ct, t he cou rt singl

ed o ut respo ndent’s l ack of cred i b i l i ty f or c om men t: “[T ]he t est imony is not able bec aus e t he t est imony of t he-3- m i nor r es po nd en t ** * is actual

l y contrad i cted b y ev ery ot her sing le wit ness w ho t est ifi ed in t his case , includ ing t he defense’ s witness. I don ’t t h i n k th e te s tim ony of the mi nor respondent *** and the teacher who testif ie d can b e reconcile d. The t eac her
was very cl ear , th e r esp ond ent said, it’s on [ meaning t he attack on the

other s tuden

t]. That’ s wh

at the m i nor sai d. So ei ther Veronica is

not t ell in g the t rut h or t he teacher is n ot tel l i ng th e truth. Kr ila testifi ed t hat when s he went ups t airs t o t he gym, she
was sur ro unde d by t he minor re spo ndent and he r friend s in the gym, t he y m ade a circ le aro und he r. I t hink t hat ’s ho w t he t est imony ab out h er sa y i n g, i t’s on , i s rel ev an t. I think that ’s what i t refers to.” The cour t al so st at ed t hat it d id no t believe re spo ndent when s he te stif ie d sh e we nt t o t he loc ker ro om t o g et her gym uniform. The courtconcluded its comm ents o nre spo ndent ’s cr edibility by not ing that “res po ndent is the only o ne who t est ifi ed t hat she bo t h didn’ t push Krila fi rst and al so that she didn ’t hi t Kril a.” As i ndicat ed , t he courtfound the responde

nt “gui lty ” of battery an

d sett he ma

tt er over for what the court referred to as a “s entenci ng he arin g.” At tha t he ari ng , th e m i nor re sp on den

t’s m oth er , Sa i n t, testi f i ed to t he mino r ’s do mes t ic activ ities and he r sc holas t ic st at us. Fur t her , t he witnessstated that t he m

in or was seeing a psych

iatrist at Strea m wood Beha vi orCenter and cl

ai me d that she had

been d i ag

n ose d w i th “A DHD and i

m pul se d i sorder.” Saint t est ifi

ed t hat , su bseq uent t o t he
co or dina ted attack o n the v ictim at school, and duri

ng the tim

e t h e m i nor respondent was awai

ting s entenci

ng, she h ad been in no t r o ub le at sc ho o l, no t ro uble wit h t he law, no t r o ub le a t ho me, an d n o t r o ub le wi th f ri en dsornei ghbors. Asked about th e p oss i b i l i ty of com m un i ty servi ce, t he wit ne ss r es po nd ed : “ I r ea lly do n’t t hink t ha t she wo uld be ab le to do th

e c om m un i ty se rvi ce b ec au se of h er disa b i l i ty and no one be ing t he r e t o ac t ua lly

** * , c an I s ay , c er ti f i ed , to ha nd l e a si tua ti on if there’s l ike , you know, outbursts and whatever.” Under cr os s-e xaminatio n by

the Stat e, respondent’s m ot her
r eit erated he

r b el i ef tha t com m un i ty servi cewoul d n

ot be an option because the mi nor “has an impu lse dis o r de r , ” “ so meo ne wo uld have-4- to wat ch he r,” an

d th ere w oul d b e p rob l em

s “ se n di n g h er out w i th ot her kids. ” T he wit ne ss wa s then as ked about supervi si on after
sc ho o l: “THE ST ATE : S o w hat happ ens w hen sc ho oli s ove r, who supervises her between h er las t class wh enthe teacher sees h er and when sh

e m akes i t t o your home? WITNESS: We l

iv e righ t next door to the scho ol, we’re ri ght n ex t door. THE ST ATE : S o yo u’r e sa ying she has c ons t ant sup er vision? WITNESS: Wel

l, actual ly her sister was at sch ool

wi th he r , so sh e w alk s r ig ht ho me e ve ryda y. THE STATE: So why was n’t she bei ng super vis ed

on October 10t h, 2 006 , w hen she was in a fightin a l ocker r o o m? WITNESS: You know I ca n ’t answer that beca

use I wasn’t the

re a t the school , so I don ’t know what happen ed that da y o rwh at t r ig gered her t o go dow nstairs. I can’t
answ er th at. THE STA

TE: S o the

re a re ti meswhen

sh e i s n ot compl etely supervised? WITNESS: As f

ar as like ma yb e standi ng wi th fri ends at
sc hool or somethi

ng l ike that. I r eally

don’t know as fa

r as with s chool, but I know at home sh e’s superv

is ed.” Asked i f he r da ugh ter “ sh oul d have a ny conse que nc e f orher be ha vi or on October 10th,” t he wi

tness responded: “

As f ar as wri ting an apology l ette r, I mean, thi

s is h er f i rs t ti me eve r b ei ng i n a si tua ti on l i ke thi s.” Af ter res pon dent’s mother testif

ie d, the court stated t hat it was prepared to h ea r a rgum en t, b ut f i rs t aske d th

e S tate i f i t ob j ec ted to courtsupe

rvision. The Stat e responded af fi rmati vel y, an d was then di rected to proceed. In ar g ume nt, the Stat e urged the court to im pose a term of 12 months’ pr ob ati

on wi th appr opri ate

con di ti on s. In su pp ort o f t hat po sitio n, the Stat e observed that the m in or respondent had i

nci ted t he attack on the vi

ctim in the locker room , w hen

respondent and h

er fri ends“did no t have a r ea so n t o be in that locker roo m.” Conti

nui ng,-5- th e S tate poi n ted out: “[T ]he purpos e of

the J uve ni l e Court Act i s to hol

d m i nors ac co un t ab le f

or th ei r u n l aw f ul b eh av i or a n d n ot to al l owthem to thin k that t hei

r deli nquen t acts have no conseque

nce s f or themsel ves. And the State be l i ev es a

t thi s ti me i f you were simp ly to close this mi nor’s case, sh

e would b elieve t hat her act s have
no conseq uences. T he mi

nor’s m other s tated tha

t [the m inorre sp on den

t] has i mpul se di sorder and t hat she has outburst s. And the Stat e wo ul d s ub mit she ’s no t be ing pr o pe r ly supervised i

f thi s is the case an

d she has outburst s.
*** She sh

ouldn’ t t hi

nk that her beh

avi or was okay and that she’s gonn

a get a pass on i

t.” F orhe rpa r t , r es po nd en t ’s at t o rne y ac kn o wle dg ed t es t im on y co ncer ningthe minor’s “impulse diso rd er ,” but not ed t hat t he m i nor had no t be en in a ny t r o ub le pendi ng he r sentenci ng, and ref

erenced t he mother ’s testim

ony tha t t he m in or hadno t be en in t r o ub le p r io rt o t his off ense. Cou nsel argued t hat t he mi nor’s mother

was “v ery conc erned about her and h

er beha vior” and had

“ tak en mea su re s to impro ve t he situ at ion” in

sofar as sh

e had taken

her daughter to see apsych iatrist and had gotten h er

da ug h ter on appr opri ate

medi cation. Co unsel

also argued, n otwi

th stan di ng the i nc i de nt i n q ue sti on, tha t the m i nor re spo ndent was “wel

l-supervi se d” when at sc hool. Counsel concl uded: “We wo uld as k, in li

ght of this bei ng he r fi rst case and h

er young age and t he exc ellent ca reth at h er m oth er h as tak en to in sure that this ty

pe of thi ng does not occur agai

n, as well as Veronica maki ng th e ch oic e to ma

ke sure that, in

spite of st ru ggling wi

th som e of thes e di sab i l i

tie s, m aki ng s ure t ha t t his does n ot re

pe at i t self, w e wo uld as k t hat you a djud icat e and cl ose this c ase.” Having h ea

rd argu men ts o f cou n se l , the cou

rt a n n oun ce d i ts sent enci ng deci sion: “ She ’sa f

i rst of f ender, I w oul d gi

ve her court su pe rvi si on i f I cou l d, b ut I’ m not all owed t o if the State objects, so she’ s gonna b e pl aced on a y ear of probation.” On August 23, 2007, the respondent fi le d a m ot ion to reconsi der sentence , ar guing t hat her sent ence was exce ssive, t hat it vio late d t he pr opor ti on ate pe na l ti escl au se of t he I llino is C o nst it ut io n ( I ll. Con st.-6- 1970, art. I, § 11)–qu

oti ng f rom tha t prov i si on , but citi

ng the due pro cess an

d e qua l prote cti on cl au se (Il l . C on st. 197 0, ar t . I , § 2) –and th at, “b ased on the ev

ide nce presen

ted and t he law , t he Co ur t sho uld have ma de a fi ndi ng that adj udic ating h

er a de linquent and clos ing t he
case was an

appropriate puni shm

ent for the Mi

nor.” A heari ng washe ld o n t he mo t io n o n O ct o be r10 , 20 07 , in whi ch
coun sel argue d, inter al

ia , that respo nden

t’s sentence

was exce ssive and dis pr oportion at e t o t ha t r ec eiv ed by o ne o f t he o t he rgir ls par t icipat ingin t he at t ac k. Re fer r ing t o t ha t gir l, co un se l st at ed , “in t he en d her case was adj udic ated and closed.” Counsel suggested “theresh oul d b e s om e sy m metr y b etw een ” th

e s en ten ce s. The S tate responded

th at “t he se nt en ce wh ich is d isp r o po r t io na t e t o t he cr ime is tha t of [th e other of

f ender].” The ass is

tant St ate’s Attorney reiteratedhe

r pos i ti on th at b oth of the mi nors should have been

pla ced
on pr o ba t io n; h o we ve r , she no t ed , in su pp o r t o f t he di sp ar it y, t ha t t his
re spo ndent ac t ua lly i

nci ted the attack. I n the en

d, the court agreed wi th th e S tate : “

Veron i ca i s th e on e th at star t ed t his. I t hink she deserves what I gave h

er, and the m

ot ion i s deni ed.” Resp ond ent appe aled, a

r gui ng , as sh e doeshe

re, tha t se cti on 5–615 of t he Act “is an unco ns ti tutiona l vi ol ati on of se pa rati on of powers and equ al pr ot ect ion bec aus e it a llows t he St at e t o p re vent t he juv en ile courtf

rom pl ac i ng a m i nor on s upe rvisio n.” Befo re re aching t he merit s, t he ap pellat e co ur t first add re ssed and rejected the S tat e’s
ar gument that t he m

atter was m

oot because

res po nd en

t’s pe riod of prob ati on h ad en de d, rel y i ng upon the coll ateral-legal -consequence s exce ption to the moot nes s doctri

ne . Ci ti ng se pa rate su bs ec ti ons of
se cti on 5–9 15 of t he Ac t , t he co ur t o bse rve d t ha t a ju ve nile pl ac ed on courtsu pervi si on wou l d h av e b een el i gi b l e to pe ti

ti on f or expu ngement of he r law enfo rc ement and juve nile cou rt re co rd s at t he age of 17 (705 ILCS 405 /5 –91 5(1)(c) (West 2006)); whereas, an off ender, li ke the respondent, who was “c ha rg ed with a Class A
m i sdem ea nor an d [ wa s] se n ten ce d to probation, *** may not p eti ti on f orexpun gem ent until the age of 21. See 705 ILCS 405/5–915(2)(a) (West 2 006 )

. ” N o
. 2– 07 –1 15 5 ( un pu blish ed o r de run de rSu pr eme Court Rul e 23). Qu o t ing fr o m t his co ur t ’s de cision in People ex rel

. Devinev. Stralka , 226 Ill . 2d 445 (2007), t he appel la te cou rt n ot ed that the ex ten de d pr es erv ati on of j uven i l e re cord s is on

e of “a num ber of col l ateral wa y s th at the p ub l i c i s p rotected by the f i nd i ng of-7- de linq ue nc y” and t he ap pellat e co ur t co nc lu ded “[t ]o hold t hat t he di sti nc ti on is not a coll ateral l

egal consequenc e in

regard t o moo tness wo uld es senti

al l y i gn ore th at the l eg i sl atu re v i ew ed the di sti nc ti on as impor t ant to both the publ ic and the j uven

il e.” No. 2– 0 7–1155 (un pub l i shed order

und er Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 23). The appell

ate co urt also rej ec ted

the sugge sti on that respo ndent’s constitutional

con ten ti ons on a ppe al were f orf ei ted , as the y were n ot ar gu ed in t he cir cu it court. The appe l l ate court ci

ted, inter al

ia , t his
co ur t ’s ho lding in People v. Wright, 194 Ill . 2d1, 23 ( 200 0) (st at ing that the constitutional

ity of a cri mi nal statut e m

ay b e r aised at any tim e). No. 2–07–1155 ( un pu blish ed o r de run de rSu pr eme Co ur t Ru le 23). On t he mer it s, t he ap pe llat e c o ur t up he ld the consti tutiona l i ty of
se cti on 5–6 15( 1) aga inst bo th sepa ration of powers and e qual protecti on ch

al l enges
. W i th resp ect to the f

orme r, the a ppel l ate court observed t ha t t his
cou rt, in In re T

.W. , 101 Ill . 2d 43 8 (198 4), “ uph el d a ch al l en geon se pa rati on of p owersgrounds to t he i dentic al sta tutor y pr edec es sor

to se cti on 5–615(1).” The appell

ate court considered T. W. “binding pr ec eden t” in t his c as e. No

. 2– 07 –1 15 5 ( un pu blis hed order under Su pr eme Co ur t Ru le 23) . As fo r mo re re cent pr ec eden t, the a pp el l ate courtwent on to not e that th i s c ourt in Stralka , th ough i t did n ot address the c onsti

tution al i ty of section 5–615 (1), none t he les s “h eld that a j uven

il e court co uld n

ot pla ce a m in or o n pr obation an

d la ter
v ac ate the deli nquency fi ndi ng, in part because doing so is ta nt amou nt to gr an t ing su pe rvisio n ‘a nd it es se n ti al l y ci rc um v en ts t he St at e’s r ight to rej ect su

perv i sion.’ ” No. 2–0 7–115 5 (u npubl is hed order under Supreme Court

Rul e 23), qu oti

n g i n pa rt Stralka , 226 Ill . 2d at 454. The ap pe llat e c o ur t ag ain qu o t ed fr o m t his c o ur t ’s dis pos it io n in Stralka , wh erei

n th i s court concl uded: “ ‘[ T]h e s tatute si m pl y doe s n ot give the [circui

t] co urt aut hority

to deci de, in

the fac e of

an obj ec ti on by the Stat e, that ev en t ho ug h a juv en ile i s gui l ty of a cri me, the na ture of the conduct does not warra nt prose cution or a

fi nding of guil

t. ’ ” No. 2–07– 1155 (

unp ubl i shed order

und er Suprem

e Court Ru

l e 23), quot in g Stralka , 226 Il

l . 2d at 45 5. As f orre sp on den

t’s eq ual pr otecti on

ch al l en ge , the a pp el l ate court r eli ed upon its o wn de cision in In re T.D. , 81 Ill . App. 3d 369, 372 (1980 ), where i

n i t obs erv ed tha t ad ul t of fen de rs and j uven

il es-8- adj udic ated delin

quent are not sim

il arly si tuat ed. Ci ting this cou rt ’s opi ni on in In re Presley , 47 Il

l . 2d 50 , 56 (1 97 0) , the a

pp el l ate court observed: “I nd ee d, t he pu r po se o f t he Ju ve nile C o ur t Ac t is to treat juv eni le s as dif ferently situated, because the Juven il e Court Act has a l eg i ti mate an d s al uta ry goal to prov i def or th e re ha bi l i tati on of delinque nt m

i norsbe f ore th ey ha ve em ba rke d up on the com m i ss i on of subs t ant ivecrim

in al off enses .” No. 2–07–11 55 (unpubl is hed order under Supreme Court Ru l e 2 3). Th e c ourt c onc l ude d that s ec ti on 5–615 (1) does

not vi ola te pri nc i pl es of equa l protecti on.

AN AL YSIS Of t he ar gument s ad vance d by t he St at e in this a ppe al, w e find o ne dis positi ve, obviat ing t he nee d t o a ddr ess a ny ot he r issu es r aised by t he pa rties . Th e S tate submits t hat t he r esp ond ent h as n o st an di n g to chal le ngethe “ consent”

req ui rem en t of se cti on 5– 61 5 b ec au se it was not t he prosec ut or ial object ion t hat dep rived t he r esp ond ent of t he opp ortu n i ty t o ha ve her case co nt inued u nder sup er vision. Acco rd ing to the Stat e, by

the tim e t he ci rc uit co ur t inquire d as t o t he pro secut or ’s pos it ion on s upervi sion, supervi si on was no longer an option un der the p roc ed

ur al f ra mew ork of th e A ct, a s a

f i nd i ng of gu ilt had al ready been enter ed. I n the St ate ’s view, the pr osec ut or ’s pos i ti on on supervisi on was at that po intirre levant . We agr ee w ith t he Stat e. We have repeatedly

em phas iz ed the di stin

ct nature of the three phases of j uven il e delin quency proceedin

gs as o ut lined in t he Ju ve nile CourtAct: the fi

ndi ngs phas e, t he ad

judicat or y phase , a nd t he dis positi onal phase. See In re S amant ha V. , 234 Il l . 2 d 3 59, 365 (20 09) ; Stralka , 2 26 I ll. 2d a t 451 . As we no t ed in Samantha V

. a nd Stralka , t he find ings pha se co nsis t s o f a“ trial ”– pr ev i ous l y re f er re d to
as an “adj udicator y h

earing” (see 705 ILCS 405/5– 19 (West 19 96 ) ) –in whi

ch the trial

court applie s t he r ea so nable doubt standard of pr oo f and t he ru les o f evidence t hat wo uld be followed i n a cri mi nal case, t o d et er mine whet her t he m i n or i s g ui l ty as ch ar ge d a nd sho uld thus be adj udge d del

i nqu en t. Samantha V. , 2 34 I ll. 2d a t 365 (c iting 705 ILCS 405/5– 605(3) (a) (West 2004 ), and Stralka , 226 Ill . 2d at 452). In a j uve ni l e del i nqu ency cas e, a fi ndi ng of gui lt and a f i nd i ng of delin quency are one and the sa

me
. Stralka , 226 Ill . 2dat 456 . I n t he event a find ing o f d el

i n qu en cy i s e n tered , the m

atte r p roc ee dsto1 For purp ose s of cl arifi catio

n, w e n ote that the “adjudication” to wh ich the legislat ur e refers in section 5 –615 is ap pa rently a n adjudic at ion of de li nq ue nc y, t he fo rmal c ul m in atio n o f f irst phase pro ce ed in gs
. -9- sentenci ng. Saman t ha V. , 234 I ll . 2d at 365 (citing 705 ILCS 405/5–620 (West 2 004), and Stralka , 2 26 I ll. 2d a t 452 ). The
se nt encing pr oce ed

i n g i n cl udes th e adj udi ca

ti on ph as e, wh ere th e courtdet er mines whet her it is in the best inter est s o f the minor a nd t he pu blic to make the m

i nor a w ard of the c ourt. Saman tha V. , 23 4 I ll. 2d at 365 (citi

ng 705 ILCS 405/5–705(1) (West 2004), and Stralka , 226 Ill. 2d at 453 ). If t he m i nor i s ad j udge d a wa

rd of t he co ur t , t he
ma tt er proceeds t o t he disp os itio nal phas e, wher e t he co ur t fashions
an appropriate sentence that wi ll best serve the

mi nor and the publ

ic

. Samantha V. , 234 I ll . 2d at 365 (citing 705 ILCS 405/5–70 5(1) ( West 2004) , and Stralka , 226 Ill . 2d at 45 3). We rei terat e the di stin

ct phases of juv eni le proceedin

gs because

im port ant le gal

consequenc es attend each one, as

thi s ca se a

m pl y dem onstra tes. Se cti on 5– 61 5 of th e A ct prov i de s i n perti n en t pa rt: “( 1 ) The court may

enter an order of contin

uance un der
su pe rvi si on *** (a ) u po n an ad mission o r st ipulat ion by t he appr opri ate

re spo nd en

t or m i n or re sp on den

t of th e f ac ts sup po rt ingt he pe t itio n and be for e pr oc eed ing to adjud icat ion,
orafter heari

ng the ev ide nce at t he t rial, a nd

(b) i n the ab sence of obje ction m

ade i n open court by the min or, his or her pa re n t, gu ar dian, or leg al

cu stod i an , th e m i nor ’s attorn ey or t he S t at e’ s A t t o rne y. (2) If t he min or, his or her parent, guardi an, or legal
cus t od ian, t he mino r ’s at t o rne y o rSt at e’ s At t o rne y o bje ct s in opencou rt to an y con ti nu an cean d i ns i sts upon pr oc eed ingto fi ndi ngsan d a dju dic at io n, t he co ur t sha ll so pr oceed.” 705 ILCS 405/5 –615( 1), (2) (W est 200 6). The cl ear in tent of the legi

sl ature, as expressed

in subse ction (2) of sec t ion 5 –61 5, is tha t t he po ssibili t y of sup er vision be br oa ched and considered, if

at all, before “proceed

i ng to f i ndi ngs and adj udication.” 1 At that junct ur e, if the c ou rt is so inclined, a nd bar ring o bject ion by any of the p art ie s lis

ted in s ubsection (1), t he court “ma y” enter an order of s

uperv i sion. We hav e f

ound n o statutory provi sion or rul e-10- that requires

the cou rt to rai se the pros pe ct of sup er vision sua sponte. Here, t he co ur t had a lread y found respondent guilty and h ad set t he cause over

f or adj udi catory an d d isp o sit io na l ph as es , inq uir ing , in t he course o f those pr oce ed i n gswh eth er th e S tate

ob j ec ted to sup er vision. At that point, i t no longer m

atter ed whether th

e Sta te or anyone else

obje cted as the

ti me f or a c onti nu an ceun de r s upe rvi si on had passed , and the on

l y di sposi tion al al terna tiv es re mai ni ng were those set for t h in sect ion 5 –71 0 o f the Act. See 705 ILCS 405/5–710 (West 2006)

. A “co nt inuance unde r su per vision” is not listed among them

. Re sp ond en t arg ue s th at “ se cti on 5 –61 5 doe s n

ot bar su pe rvi si on f ormi nors who are found gu

ilt y.” S he no t es t hat an “ad mission in a juv en ile de linq ue nc y ca se is t he eq uiv ale nt o f a g uilt y ple a in an ad ult
cr imi na l pr oc eed ing,” and fr om t hat obs er vat ion r eas ons t hat “the pla inwordi ng o f se ct io n 5 –6 15 co nt emp lat es t ha t a fin din g o f gu ilt (deli nquen cy i n th i s c as e) d oesnot pre cl ude su pe rvi si on. ” Th i s l i ne of reasoni ng, wh i ch i s n ot even relev ant here, where the m

atter proceededt o tr ia

l, i gnores the di stin

ction be tween a res

ponde nt’s
ac ti on in admitt ing o r st ipulat ingto the facts support in g a pet itio n and t he subse quent action of a court in e nt er in g a fi ndi ng of gui lt or an ad j udi ca ti on o f de linq ue nc y o n t he ba sis o f t he ad miss io n. A si mi la r err oror unwarranted in

feren ti al le ap in a na lysis is ev ide nt in respo ndent’s co nt ent ion th at t he statute’ s ref

eren ce to a court co nsider ingsu pe rvisio n “ a ft er he ar ing t he ev ide nc e a t t he t r ial”
ne ce ss ar ily

enco mpasse s a finding of g uil t or deli nqu ency there af ter. It does n ot. Wh ere a s here, the m atter procee ds to tri al , a court o bvio us ly would he ar the evi

dence, and t hen, befo re ent er ing a finding of guil t o r deli nquen cy , conside

rthe opt ion of

a contin uance un der sup er vision. That is the

procedural sequen

ce the l egi sl ature intende d. Any am b i gui ty tha t m i gh t res ul t f rom the l eg i sl atu re’ s om i ss i on of t he term “f in din gs” i n sub section (1) of se ction 5–615 i s c la r ified in
su bs ec ti on (2 ), wher ein the legislat ur e sp ecifies t hat sup er vision, and
a ny ob j ec ti on s th

ereto, m us t b e c on si

dere d b ef ore“pr oce ed

i ng to fi ndi ngs an d adj udic ation.” In this case, no one broached t he poss ibi li ty of a conti

nuan ce under supe rvision pr ior t o t he cou rt ’s fi nding of guil

t. The St ate ’s obj ec ti on t her et o d ur ingthe phases that foll owed was irre levant and thus did not ad

versel y af f ect res ponde nt.-11- A party m ay not raise a constitutional

ch al l en ge to a p rovi si

on of
a statute tha

t does n ot aff ect h i m or her. People v. Malchow, 193 I ll. 2d 415 , 4 25 ( 200 0) . S ince re spo ndent ar gue s neit her ineffect ive assi stanceo f co un se l, n or p l ai n er ror, we are n ot co m pe l l ed to consider whether trial

counsel ’s f

ai lure to rai

se the pos si bi l i ty of
su pe rvi si on prejudi ced respondent–if i

n f act we were t o find t he prov i si on in question un

constitutional

–or wh eth er t he tr ial

cou rt ’s f ail ure to rais e the option of supervi si on at an earlie

r stag e in the proceedin gs aff ectedthe f ai rnes s of proceedin

gs bel ow and chal

le nged the i nteg ri ty of the j udicial

proces s. We no t e in passi

ng responden

t’s nomi nal argumen t–t wo page s of her bri ef–that

“the Juv eni le Court Act

ac tua l l y au thor ize s s upe rvi si on de sp i te a pr os ecu t or ial veto ,” and her related suggestion that our

“ ca se l aw rec ogn ize s th at the re stri

cti on whi ch the trial judge pla ced
on his authority [to continuethe m atte r un de r s upe rvi si on] doe s n

ot exi st.” In su pp ort of h er sk el eta l con ten ti on, re spondent quo tes, pa r t iall y, and out of context, so me what i mpreci se language em

ploy ed in t his co ur t ’s co ncluding r emark s in T.W. W e h ere q uote t he sentence i n i ts enti rety: “We held in In re J.N. (1 982 ), 91 I ll. 2d 1 22, 127 -2 8, t hat se cti on 5–3( 2) (o) (Il l . Rev . Stat. 1981, c h. 37 , par. 705–3 (2)(o)), wh

i ch i s a su bs ec ti on of

th e statu te de al i n g w i th juv en ile probation, allows the court to im pose c on di

ti ons of
su pe rvi si on aft er findings and adj udic ation.” T.W. , 101 Ill . 2d at 442. Of course, responden

t’s propo sed

i nte rpreta ti on of thi s sen

tence is dia met r ica lly

opposed to the cl ear statutory

prescription that a case ca nn ot be con ti nu ed un de r s upe rvi si on after findings and a djud icat ion. Moreov er, that interpretation would com ple tely evi scer a te t his court ’s holdi ngsin T.W. and Stralka

. I f t he r e w er e a n ind ep en de nt ba sis in t he Act th at w ould al

low the ci

rcuit court t o continue a cas e under
su pe rvi si on over t he o bje ct io n o f t he St at e, t he n t he pr o visio n u ph eld in T.W. and e ssent ial to t he re sult in Stralka would be m eani ngl ess. Cle ar ly, T.W

. di d n ot intend suc h an inte rp re t at ion and we findnone such is warranted, as e

ven a curs ory exa minat io n o f J.N. and T.W. will
co nfir m. In J.N. –a c ase which r esp ond ent un de r st an da bly does not discuss
oreven me ntion–this court found, no t wit hst an din g t he cir cu it cou rt ’s-12- us e o f t he t er m “su pe rvisio n” in it s o r de r s, t ha t t he cir cu it court had, in substance, placed the mi nor resp on de nt on

“prob ati on” or “condi tional dis charge.” In re J.N. , 91 Il l. 2d 12 2, 12 8 ( 19 82 )

. T his courtca me t o t ha t co nc lus io n be ca us e t he cir cu it co ur t ha d p r ev io us ly entered a find ing o f g uil

t–t he eq ui va l en t of a f i nd i ng of delinque ncy–and had ref

erenced assta tutory au thor i ty se cti on 5 –3 of th e Ac t (now s ection 5–7 15(u), u pon w hi ch resp ondent rel

i es), a prov i si on which pr ovid es fo r d ispo sitio nal or der s o f pro ba t ion and cond i tion al di sch arge. T his court o bse rve d t ha t t he cir cu it court had not mentioned section 4–7, the predeces sor of section 5–615, whi ch allowed a contin uance u nder su pe rvis io n o nly before a f i nd i ng of de linq ue nc y. See J.N. , 91 Ill . 2d at 128; Ill . Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 70 4 –7. The minor in J.N. wa s p l ac ed on prob ati

on, not supe r visio n, an

d the c ond

i ti ons orde red un de r s ec ti on 5 –3 (

now sec ti on5 –7 15 (u )) we re co ndit io ns o f probation , no t sup er vision. Si mply put, J.N. doe s n

ot prov i depre ce de nt f

or pl ac i ng a m i nor on supe rvision un der these ci rcum stan ces
. Nor can we r eas ona bly const ru e t he si ngle, eni gma tic sen tence at t he en d of this c ou rt ’s o pinion in T.W. as the gene si s of an indepe ndent basis f

orj uven i l e s up er v i si on . F i rs t, as previ

ously noted, to do so wo uld un

dermi ne the h oldi ng of that dispo sitio n, a resul

t t hat
was o bvio us ly no t int en de d. Mo r eo ve r , t he se nt en ce in ques ti on ac t ua lly acknowl edges that t he sub section at i ssueis o ne ap pe ar ing in
a s ec ti on pertaini ng to “juv eni le probation.” T.W. , 101 Ill . 2d at 442. Sec ti on 5–3(2)(o) , now codif

ie d as se cti

on 5– 71 5( 2) ( u) , is e ss en t ially
a ca tc ha ll p r o vis io n ina lis t o f p er miss ible co nd it io ns t ha t may b e ordered in conjunc t ion wit h “pr obati on” or “ cond

i tion al di sch arge.” Section 5–715(2)(u) doe s i nd ee d al l owa co ur t t o impo se c ond itio ns con sistent

with court supervisi on after f in din gs and adjudic ation, as T.W. suggests, but t hose conditions are ancill ary to a disp os i

ti on of prob ati on or co ndit ional disc har ge, not a co nt in uan ce under sup er vision. We ack no wle d ge, in

passi ng, respondent’s c ontention that our li teralread in

g o f sect ion 5 –61 5’s s equ encing s cheme inhibits t he abi li ty of “ mi nor’s counsel

to freel y a rgue t ha t his cl

i en t i s n ot gu i l ty withoutrun

ni ng the ri sk tha t the m i nor wi l l l ose the oppor tun i ty f or courtsup er vision, ” t hus “r est ra in[ing] t he minor fro m freely exer cising his righ t to con tes t hi s g ui l t.” R es pond en t’s c once rn is su rel y more-13- hyp er bo lic t ha n r ea l, fo ran y pa r t y, or t he court, canrais e the prospect of a c o nt inua nce und er su pe rv isio n at any t ime pr io r t o t he e nt ry o f a fi ndi ng of gui lt. If, f or exampl e, a minor r esp ond ent cho os es t o ha ve his case tried , cou

n se l i s f re e, at th e c on cl us i on of th e ev i den ce , to argue his c lient ’s inno ce nc e, wh ile sug ges t ing t ha t su pe rvisio n w o uld be appropriate should the c ourt be i

ncl in ed to fin d the Stat e had pr ovenits c ase . Alt er nat ively, the co ur t might sha re its view of t he evi dence with the pa

rties an d broach th e p oss i

bi l i ty of su pe rvi si on pri orto enterin

g a fi ndi ng o f de l i nq ue nc y . In f ac t, su bs ec ti on ( 2) of
se cti on 5–6 15 a ppe ars to assume

con sul tation of the partiesand t he
co ur t aft er a t rial, bu t pr ior t o t he en try of findings and a djud icat ion, in sofar as i t sta

te s, upon an obj ection to a continuan ce under
su pe rvi si on by any pa rty en ti tl ed to ob j ec t, the c our

t sh al l pr oce ed “ to f inding s and adj udic ation.” Cl early , consultation i

s env is ione d after tria l , but b ef ore ther e is a fo rmal find ing o f de linq ue nc y. I nd ee d, it is not a no vel mode of p ro ced ur e fo r a co ur t t o s igna li ts i n ten ti on s to t he pa rt ies u nde r c er t ain c irc ums t anc es . A nalo go us “wh at if” discu ssio ns are comm

onpla ce between

the parties an

d the court when t ent at iveple a

ag r ee men t s a r e u nd er t ak en pu r su an t t o Su pr eme Court Rule 4 02( d) (1 77 I ll. 2d R . 4 02( d) ). We thus reject t he respo ndent’s cla im t hat t he se que ncing manda t es o f sect ion 5 –61 5 “r est ra in” the
m i n or f rom f re el y exercisi n g h i s r i gh t to co n test h i s g ui l t. In sum , re spo ndent lacks st anding t o c hallenge t he
con sti tuti on al i ty of the sta tutory prov i si on i n q ue sti on beca use she was not adve r se ly a ff

ected by its operation. See Malchow , 193 Ill . 2d at 425. Co ns eq ue nt ly, we w ill not add re ss t he co nst itu t ional claims she raises. We recogniz e th at l ack of sta n di n g w as n ot rai se d b

y th e S tate in the appella

te court ; however, an appel le e m ay ra ise any ar gument orbasis supported by the record to show t he correc t nes s o f t he judg ment be lo w, ev en t ho ug h he ha d n o t pr ev io us ly advan ced such an argu men t. People v. P.H. , 145 Ill . 2d 209, 22 0 ( 19 91 )

. Mo r eo ve r , t his
cou rt, in determi ni ng the correct n ess o f the re sult re ache d by t he appe l l ate cou rt, i s i n n o wa y const rained by the appellate co urt ’s
re aso ningand m

ay aff irm on any basis supported by the record. People v. Durr , 215 Ill . 2d 283, 296 (2005 ). Inso far a s it a ffi rmed t he-14- judg ment of t he circu it co ur t , t he r esu lt r eac hed bythe a ppel l ate court was co rr ect . O n t hat basi s, we af f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e a pp el l ate cou rt.
Aff irmed.