J-A16036-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES ANDREW DOLL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2074 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 4, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0001117-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 05, 2020

James Andrew Doll (“Doll”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following his conviction of nine counts of child pornography, and one 

count each of aggravated indecent assault – complainant less than 16 years

of age, aggravated assault without consent, indecent assault – complainant 

less than 16 years, indecent assault without consent, intercept 

communications, and corruption of minors.1 We affirm.

On July 19, 2017, Jean Schmid (“Schmid”) contacted the Pennsylvania 

State Police (sometimes hereinafter referred to as “PSP”), after her minor 

daughter, A.S., reported to Schmid that she had been sexually assaulted by 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6312(d); 3125(a)(1), (8); 3126(a)(1), (8); 5703(1);

6301(a)(1)(ii).
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Doll.2 See N.T. (Suppression), 11/26/18, at 5-6; see also Affidavit of 

Probable Cause, 8/4/17. Relevantly, during a forensic interview conducted by 

the Franklin County Children’s Advocacy Center on August 2, 2017, A.S. stated 

that Doll attempted to show her pornographic videos on his computers, and 

that she “believe[d] the girls in the video appeared to be very young.” 

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 8/4/17. Additionally, Pennsylvania State Trooper 

Joshua Crouse (“Trooper Crouse”) conducted an interview of Schmid. Schmid 

told Trooper Crouse that she had observed pornographic websites on Doll’s 

computer, and that she believed Doll’s computers may contain pornographic 

photographs of children, and possibly of A.S. Id. Schmid indicated that there 

was a laptop computer in A.S.’s bedroom and a desktop computer in a home 

office, and that she had recently found a bag of hard drives in the attic of their 

home. Id. 

Based on the information provided by Schmid and A.S., on August 4, 

2017, Trooper Crouse applied for a search warrant. The search warrant 

Application identified Schmid’s residence,3 and sought “Computers and related 

electronic equipment ([i.e.,] laptops, desktop computers, hardrives [sic], 

____________________________________________

2 Schmid and Doll were married, but separated, at that time. The couple 

separated in August 2017, when Schmid was granted a Protection From Abuse 

Order (“PFA”) against Doll. The couple divorced in December 2017. See N.T. 

(Suppression), 11/26/18, at 4. Doll is A.S.’s stepfather. See id. at 5.

3 Doll was evicted from the couple’s shared residence when Schmid obtained 

the PFA, but his computers remained at the home.
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external storage devices, flash[ ]drives, etc.); Portable electronic 

communications devices ([i.e.,] cellular phones); iPods[;] and tablet 

computers.” Application for Search Warrant, 8/4/17. In the supporting 

Affidavit of Probable Cause, Trooper Crouse alleged that 

[t]he collection and examination of the above[-]mentioned items 

could provide valuable evidence to establish probable cause for 

the crimes alleged. It is common for persons who engage in 

sexual misconduct with minors to also collect, store, and share 

sexual images that are illegal. [A.S.] has indicated that she 

watched such images with [Doll].

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 8/4/17. A magisterial district judge approved and 

signed the search warrant (“the first search warrant”).

The same day, police executed the first search warrant. Additionally, 

Schmid consented to the search.4 Police recovered 2 laptop computers, an 

Apple iPhone, an Apple iPod Touch, 11 external hard drives (7 of which were 

found in the attic), 2 computer towers, a power supply switch, 5 SD cards, 20 

photographs (found in a safe in the garage), 21 discs, and an SD card located 

in a Nikon digital camera. Schmid retrieved some of these items from the 

attic and brought them to the police officers; she also led the officers to the 

garage to help them recover the photographs.

____________________________________________

4

It is unclear from the record when Schmid provided consent for the search. 

See N.T. (Suppression), 11/26/18, at 34 (wherein Trooper Crouse testified 

that he could not recall whether Schmid consented to the search during the 

initial interview, or when they arrived at the home with the first warrant).
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The PSP’s Computer Crimes Unit analyzed the contents of the electronic 

devices recovered during the search. 

It was discovered during analysis that ten videos were found that 

consisted of a camera being placed in the bedroom of A[.]S. Two 

of the videos were [from] a camera that was placed in the 

bathroom. The two videos obtained from the bathroom were both 

audiobly [sic] and visually recorded and were of [A.S.] being 

partially or fully nude. Analysis of the evidence indicated that 9 

of the 10 videos consisted of [A.S.] being either partially or fully 

naked in the videos.

Affidavit of Probable Cause (Criminal Complaint), 4/25/18.

On April 25, 2018, Doll was charged, by Criminal Complaint, with the 

above-mentioned offenses. The Commonwealth filed a Criminal Information 

on July 9, 2018. 

On October 25, 2018, Doll filed an Omnibus Pretrial Motion, including a 

Motion to Suppress evidence recovered from the “searches of and in the 

electronic items[.]” Omnibus Pretrial Motion, 10/25/18, at 3. Doll asserted 

that although the police had authority to search for the electronic devices, 

they did not have authority to search their contents, and that the first warrant 

was not sufficiently specific. 

On November 21, 2018, Trooper Crouse applied for an additional search 

warrant. The warrant Application specifically listed the items recovered during 

the search of Schmid’s residence, and stated that the devices would be 

searched for “[i]mages of child pornography to include images of A.S.” 

Application for Search Warrant, 11/21/18. The supporting Affidavit of 
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Probable Cause contained the same facts alleged in the first warrant, and

additionally alleged as follows:

The examination of the above[-]mentioned items could provide 

valuable evidence to establish probable cause for the crimes 

alleged. It is common for persons who engage in sexual 

misconduct with minors to also collect, store, and share sexual 

images that are illegal. [A.S.] has indicated that she watched such 

images with [Doll]. The items to be searched were seized 

pursuant to a warrant executed on 08/04/17. The items seized 

on that date have been in the possession of the Pennsylvania State 

Police since that date and no persons outside of PSP personnel 

have had any access to those items[,] as they have been secured 

and preserved for evidence.

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 11/21/18. A magisterial district judge approved 

and signed the search warrant (“the second warrant”).

The suppression court conducted a hearing on November 26, 2018, and 

the court granted the parties additional time to file briefs. Doll and the 

Commonwealth each filed a brief in support of their respective positions 

concerning suppression. On January 8, 2019, the suppression court entered 

an Opinion and Order denying Doll’s Omnibus Pretrial Motion.

Counsel for Doll subsequently filed a Motion for Limited Intervention, 

requesting intervention in order to file a motion to strike. Counsel sought to 

strike certain language contained in the suppression court’s Opinion and 

Order, which, counsel believes, is “impertinent and scandalous and 

prejudicial[,]” and insinuates impropriety in his brief supporting his Motion to 

Suppress. The trial court denied the Motion. Counsel appealed. This Court 

quashed the appeal as interlocutory, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
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denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Doll, 346 MDA 2019

(Pa. Super. 2019) (per curiam order), appeal denied, 221 A.3d 184 (Pa. 

2019).

On October 23, 2019, Doll entered a conditional guilty plea to all 

charges. The parties made no agreement concerning sentencing, but agreed 

that Doll’s plea would be conditional upon the reservation of his right to 

challenge the denial of his Omnibus Pretrial Motion. The trial court accepted 

Doll’s plea by an Order entered on the same date.5 The trial court also 

deferred sentencing and ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence 

investigation report. 

On December 4, 2019, the trial court sentenced Doll to an aggregate 

term of 14 to 61 years in prison, with credit for time served, as well as fines 

and fees. The trial court also directed that Doll have no contact with A.S. or 

other females under the age of 18. Additionally, the trial court informed Doll 

of his requirements to register and report for his lifetime as a Tier III sexual 

offender. This timely appeal followed. 

On appeal, Doll raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the [suppression] court err when it denied Doll’s [M]otion 

to [S]uppress[,] where Doll’s wife lacked authority to consent to 

the searches and seizures of and in the electronic items, and as 

____________________________________________

5 The Order did not specify that Doll had entered a conditional guilty plea. 

Upon Motion by Doll, the trial court amended its Order accordingly. See 

Order, 11/8/19.
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to such items and their contents[;] the searches and seizures 

exceeded the scope of the first warrant[;] the first warrant was 

overbroad and insufficiently particular[;] and the second warrant 

was tainted by the first and also did not contain probable cause?

Brief for Appellant at 4.6

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth 

prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the 

evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for 

the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context 

of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record, the appellate court is bound 

by those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination 

of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an 

appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression 

court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions 

of law of the courts below are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation, 

brackets and ellipses omitted).

Doll claims that the suppression court erred in denying his Motion to 

Suppress. See Brief for Appellant at 17-63. Doll divides his Argument into 

four distinct issues, which we will address separately. In his first argument, 

Doll claims that his wife lacked authority to consent to the search and seizure. 

Id. at 18. Doll avers that the suppression court improperly concluded that 

____________________________________________

6

In his brief, Doll states that he reviewed the Affidavit of Probable Cause 

attached to the second warrant, and acknowledges that there is no issue 

concerning the sufficiency of particularity. Brief for Appellant at 6 n.1.
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Schmid, as Doll’s wife, had authority to consent to a search of the electronic 

devices, and the files contained on those devices, by virtue of her joint 

ownership. Id. at 20. According to Doll, the court should have instead 

considered whether Schmid had mutual use of and joint access to the 

electronic devices and files. Id. at 21. Doll asserts that Schmid “did not 

possess express, actual, or apparent authority to consent to seizure and 

search of the items that she did not identify as hers.” Id. at 29.

Doll claims that Schmid did not have express authority to consent to the 

search, because there is no evidence that Doll gave her permission to allow 

anyone to search his electronic devices. Id. Additionally, Doll argues that 

Schmid did not have common or actual authority to consent to the search. 

See id. at 30-39. Relying on case law from other jurisdictions, Doll urges this 

Court to hold that “a spouse may retain exclusive control over certain areas 

of his or her life.” Id. at 33; see also id. at 35-36 (drawing a distinction 

between third-party consent analysis and joint ownership analysis). Doll 

points to Schmid’s identification of all but two electronic devices as Doll’s 

personal computers in support of his assertion that Schmid did not have actual 

authority to provide consent to a search. Id. at 37; see also id. at 37, 38-

39 (asserting that when Schmid used Doll’s computer, she had to ask him for 

the password). Finally, Doll asserts that Schmid lacked apparent authority to 

consent to the search, where Trooper Crouse could not recall when Schmid 

gave her consent to the search; some electronics were located in a shared 
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office, but Doll had locked himself in that office after work; the police were 

aware the Doll was the primary user of all but two of the electronic devices; 

and Schmid indicated that the hard drives found in the attic were Doll’s, and 

she did not know why he kept them. Id. at 41-43. Doll also claims that the 

fact that his devices are password protected indicates that Schmid did not 

generally have authority to use his devices. Id. at 43.

Warrantless searches and seizures are considered to be 

unreasonable and therefore, prohibited, except for a few 

established exceptions pursuant to both the Fourth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution.

Both the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions permit third 

party consent to a search. When police officers obtain the 

voluntary consent of a third party who has the authority to give 

consent, they are not required to obtain a search warrant based 

upon probable cause. ... 

Commonwealth v. Hughes, 836 A.2d 893, 900 (Pa. 2003) (internal citations 

and quotation marks omitted). “The third-party consent to search is an 

exception to the exclusionary rule. To evaluate the voluntariness of the 

consent to a warrantless search, the court must examine the totality of the 

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Reese, 31 A.3d 708, 722 (Pa. Super. 

2011).

Third-party consent may be derived from common or apparent 

authority. See generally Commonwealth v. Basking, 970 A.2d 1181, 

1184 (Pa. Super. 2009) (describing the doctrines of common authority and 
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apparent authorities as “corollaries to the consent exception to the warrant 

requirement[]”). 

The United States Supreme Court has held that a third party 

has actual authority to consent to a search if he/she “possesses 

common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the 

premises or effects sought to be inspected.” [United States v.] 

Matlock, 415 U.S. 164[, ] 171 [(1974)].... The Matlock Court 

described “common authority” as follows:

Common authority is, of course, not to be 

implied from the mere property interest a third party 

has in the property. The authority which justifies the 

third-party consent does not rest upon the law of 

property, with its attendant historical and legal 

refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the 

property by persons generally having joint access or 

control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to 

recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right 

to permit the inspection in his own right and that the 

others have assumed the risk that one of their number 

might permit the common area to be searched.

Id. at n.7 (citations omitted).

 

Basking, 970 A.2d at 1188; see also Commonwealth v. Yancoski, 915 

A.2d 111, 114 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that “the Supreme Court of the 

United States explained that ‘the Fourth Amendment ... recognizes a valid 

warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary 

consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, 

authority over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to 

the use of evidence so obtained.’” (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 

103, 106 (2006)).
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At the suppression hearing, Schmid testified that she and Doll lived 

together in their home in Greencastle, Franklin County, until she obtained the 

PFA in early August 2017. N.T. (Suppression), 11/26/18, at 4-5. Schmid 

stated that she called the Pennsylvania State Police in July 2017, because her 

daughter, A.S., reported that “she was being molested by [] Doll[,]” and that 

he had watched pornography with her. Id. at 5-6; 7 (wherein Schmid stated 

that she had informed police that A.S. “felt there had been some things that 

were looked at that were underage.”). Additionally, Schmid testified that she 

was aware that Doll “frequently viewed pornographic sites[.]” Id. at 8.

According to Schmid, there were four computers located in the marital 

home at that time. Id. at 6; 13 (agreeing that the computers were brought 

into the home after she and Doll were married). Schmid also testified that all 

of the household computers were on one shared server. Id. at 7. Schmid 

stated that she had told police that she had access to all electronics recovered 

during the search. Id. at 9; see also id. (wherein Schmid testified, “They 

[the computers] were in our offices. They were things that I had common use 

of.”). Schmid explained that she had told police which member of the 

household was the primary user of each computer. Id. at 11-12. Additionally, 

Schmid testified that Doll primarily used two computers, which were 

password-protected, but that Doll provided her with the password whenever 

she needed to use one of those computers. Id. at 10.
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Further, Schmid testified that she had told police that “they were 

welcome to review [the electronics] for evidence....” Id. at 8. Schmid also 

told police that they could remove the electronic devices from the marital 

home. Id. at 9. 

Trooper Crouse testified at the suppression hearing that during his 

conversation with Schmid, Schmid “mentioned that [A.S.] told her that there 

was some pornography that she felt was underage[,] and that [Doll] had also 

been watching [A.S.] through a vent that adjoined her bedroom with the 

adjoining office.” Id. at 16. According to Trooper Crouse, Schmid believed 

there might be evidence on the computers in their home, and she “related 

that she would give [PSP] those computers.” Id.; see also id. at 34 (wherein 

Trooper Crouse testified that he could not recall whether Schmid gave her 

consent to the search during the initial interview, or when they arrived at the 

residence with a warrant). 

Trooper Crouse stated that based on their conversation, he procured a 

search warrant for Schmid and Doll’s marital home. Id. at 16-17. Trooper 

Crouse then detailed the items recovered during the search:

Item 1 is a compact laptop computer with a power cord. ...

* * *

Item 2 is the Dell laptop computer. Item 3 was an Apple iPhone. 

It was black in color. Item 4 was an Apple iPod Touch. Item 5 is 

a Next Star external hard drive. Item 6 would be a Seagate 

external hard drive with a power cord. Item 7 is also a Seagate 

external hard drive with a power cord. Item 8 is a Dell C-521 

tower computer tower with a power cord. Item 9 is a Systematic 
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tower computer tower with power cord and a mouse. Item 10, I 

believe, it’s a Matsunichi external hard drive. Item 11 is a Seagate 

external hard drive. Item 12, there’s a quantity of seven external 

hard drives that were found in the attic. Item 13 is a Delta power 

supply switch. Item 14 is a quantity of five SD cards. Item 15 

are 20 photographs from a safe. Item 16 is 21 compact discs, 

and Item 17 is a[n] SD card from [a] Nikon digital camera.

Id. at 17-18; see also id. at 18 (explaining that Schmid found various items

in the attic and brought them to the police officers conducting the search), 19 

(wherein Trooper Crouse stated that Schmid led the officers to the garage to 

recover the photographs).

During his testimony, Doll confirmed that he and Schmid were married

in 2011, and shared a home, which they had purchased together. Id. at 38, 

40.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Schmid 

possessed common authority over the marital home and the electronics at 

issue, and therefore, had authority to consent to the search and seizure.7 See

____________________________________________

7 We note the suppression court’s statement that Schmid had authority to 

consent to the search and seizure because the electronic devices were jointlyowned marital property. Opinion and Order, 1/8/19, at 4; see also id. at 8 

(stating that “Schmid was (at the time) [Doll’s] wife, she was a co-habitant 

and co-owner of the residence, she was the co-owner of the devices that were 

searched, so the [c]ourt can find no ambiguity arising from conversations 

about whether [Doll] was a primary user of a particular electronic device.”). 

The court also stated that Doll’s arguments concerning third-party consent 

were “red herrings,” and inapplicable to the instant case. See id. at 4-10. 

“This Court may affirm the lower court for any reason, including such reasons 

not considered by the lower court.” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 66 A.3d 

373, 381 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation, quotation marks and brackets 

omitted).
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Basking, 970 A.2d at 1188. The testimony presented at the suppression 

hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, showed 

that Schmid and Doll generally shared joint access to and control over the 

house and the electronics. Although some computers were used primarily by 

Doll, the record reflects that Schmid “always had access[.]” N.T. 

(Suppression), 11/26/18, at 10; see also Commonwealth v. Reese, 31 

A.3d 708, 724 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (concluding that the appellant’s 

housemate had authority to consent to a search of their shared bedroom, as 

the housemate had “joint access to and control of the same area of the house” 

as the appellant); Yancoski, supra. Thus, the suppression court did not err 

in denying Doll’s Motion to Suppress on this basis.

8

In his second and third arguments, which we address together, Doll 

raises challenges to the first warrant. Generally, “[w]hen police officers obtain 

the voluntary consent of a third party who has the authority to give consent, 

____________________________________________

8 Because we have concluded that Schmid had authority to consent to the 

search based on common authority, we need not fully address the issue of 

apparent authority. However, we would also conclude that, based on the 

testimony presented at the suppression hearing, the officers could reasonably 

believe that Schmid had apparent authority to provide consent. See

Commonwealth v. Strader, 931 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2007) (stating that “the 

apparent authority exception turns on whether the facts available to police at 

that moment would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe the 

consenting third party had authority over the premises.”); see also Basking, 

970 A.2d at 1191 (concluding that a reasonable person would believe that the 

appellant’s mother had apparent authority to consent to search, where mother 

told police that the appellant stayed on the third floor of the house; the door 

leading to the third floor was unlocked; and mother stated that if the police 

found anything, she wanted it out of the house).
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they are not required to obtain a search warrant....” Hughes, 836 A.2d at 

900. Nevertheless, we will address Doll’s claims regarding the first warrant, 

as the record does not clearly indicate when Schmid consented to the search 

and seizure. See N.T. (Suppression), 11/26/18, at 16 (wherein Trooper 

Crouse testified that Schmid related to police that she would give PSP the 

computers, then he prepared the search warrant), 34 (stating that he could 

not recall “exactly where” Schmid gave consent, and did not recall whether 

police had begun seizing items before they obtained consent).

Doll contends that the search and seizure of the electronic devices and 

their contents exceeded the scope of the first warrant. See Brief for Appellant 

at 44-48. Specifically, Doll argues that the suppression court improperly 

concluded that the contents of his “computers, a desktop computer, a laptop 

computer, and a bag of hard drives from the attic” fell within the scope of the 

first warrant. Id. at 45. According to Doll, the first warrant permitted only 

the seizure of the devices from the residence. Id. at 46. Doll therefore avers 

that the search of the contents of the electronic devices was illegal. Id. at 

47-48.

In his third argument, Doll argues that the first warrant was overbroad 

and insufficiently particular to support the search and seizure of the electronic 

items and their contents. Brief for Appellant at 48. Doll points to the trial 

court’s acknowledgement that the first warrant was overbroad, reiterates his 

assertion that Schmid did not provide valid consent to the search, and argues 
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that without valid consent, the search was illegal. Id. at 51. Doll also claims 

that the first warrant was insufficiently particular because it did not include a 

request to search the devices’ contents. Id. at 53. According to Doll, “the 

warrant description is much broader than any items for which probable cause 

existed.” Id. at 55. Doll argues that the Affidavit of probable cause 

supporting the warrant narrows the scope to the items listed, but does not 

provide any limitations on a search of their contents. Id.

The Fourth Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance 

of any warrant except one particularly describing the place to be 

searched and the persons or things to be seized. This requirement 

is meant to prevent general searches and ensures that the search 

will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on 

the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the 

Framers intended to prohibit. Along those lines, the scope of a 

lawful search is defined by the object of the search and the places 

in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.

Commonwealth v. Turpin, 216 A.3d 1055, 1063-64 (Pa. 2019) (internal 

citations, quotation marks and brackets omitted). As this Court has explained,

[i]t is a fundamental rule of law that a warrant must name or 

describe with particularity the property to be seized and the 

person or place to be searched.... The particularity requirement 

prohibits a warrant that is not particular enough and a warrant 

that is overbroad. These are two separate, though related, issues. 

A warrant unconstitutional for its lack of particularity authorizes a 

search in terms so ambiguous as to allow the executing officers to 

pick and choose among an individual’s possessions to find which 

items to seize. This will result in the general “rummaging” banned 

by the Fourth Amendment. A warrant unconstitutional for its 

overbreadth authorizes in clear or specific terms the seizure of an 

entire set of items, or documents, many of which will prove 

unrelated to the crime under investigation. ... An overbroad 

warrant is unconstitutional because it authorizes a general search 

and seizure.
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Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1002-03 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

and brackets omitted). Further, “the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 

instructed that search warrants should be ‘read in a common sense fashion 

and should not be invalidated by hypertechnical interpretations. This may 

mean, for instance, that when an exact description of a particular item is not 

possible, a generic description will suffice.’” Id. at 1003 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1012 (Pa. 2007), cert. denied, 522 

U.S. 1316 (2008)). “[W]here the items to be seized are as precisely identified 

as the nature of the activity permits ... the searching officer is only required 

to describe the general class of the item he is seeking.” Commonwealth v. 

Kane, 210 A.3d 324, 333 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). Specifically, regarding electronic devices, “a warrant may permit 

the seizure of electronic equipment so long as the search of the equipment is 

limited to looking for evidence of the specific crimes that the police had 

probable cause to believe the defendant committed.” Commonwealth v. 

Green, 204 A.3d 469, 481 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Here, the first warrant identified the following items to be searched: 

“Computers and related electronic equipment ([i.e.,] laptops, desktop 

computers, hardrives [sic], external storage devices, flash[ ]drives, etc.); 

Portable electronic communications devices ([i.e.,] cellular telephones), iPods, 

and tablet computers.” Application for Search Warrant, 8/4/17. The facts 

alleged in the Affidavit of Probable Cause refer to Doll’s computers and a bag 
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of hard drives located in the attic. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 8/4/17. In its 

conclusion, the Affidavit of Probable Cause referenced a search of the “above[-

]mentioned items” for evidence of the collection, storage, and sharing of illegal 

sexual images. Id. 

In its Opinion, the suppression court concluded that the phrase “above[-

]mentioned items,” as used in the Affidavit of Probable Cause, was limited to 

only those items specifically mentioned in the Affidavit (i.e., Doll’s computers, 

a desktop computer, a laptop computer, and the bag of hard drives from the 

attic). See Opinion and Order, 1/8/19, at 12, 14, 15.9

The suppression court determined that the first warrant was sufficiently 

particular, and was not overbroad, regarding Doll’s computers, a desktop 

computer, a laptop computer, and the bag of hard drives from the attic. See

Opinion and Order, 1/8/19, at 14-16. Regarding the particularity 

requirement, the court noted that the Affidavit of Probable Cause supporting 

the first warrant (1) described Schmidt’s belief that electronic devices in the 

home contained pornographic videos of children, including videos of A.S., who 

was 15 years old at the time; (2) stated that “collection and examination of 

the above[-]mentioned items could provide valuable evidence[]”; and (3) 

sufficiently informed the court that the police would be searching for child 

pornography on the mentioned electronic devices. Id. at 14. Concerning 

____________________________________________

9 However, as the suppression court correctly noted, Schmid consented to the 

search. See Opinion and Order, 1/8/19, at 12, 15.
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overbreadth, the suppression court additionally noted that the Affidavit of 

Probable Cause alleged that (1) Doll had admitted to a previous relationship 

with a minor; (2) A.S. claimed that Doll had touched her inappropriately; and 

(3) A.S. reported watching pornography on electronic devices with Doll. Id. 

at 15. 

We agree with the suppression court’s findings and conclusions, which 

are supported by the record and are free of legal error. The Affidavit of 

Probable Cause described the information provided by Schmid and A.S., and 

facts establishing probable cause to believe that child pornography would be 

found on the mentioned devices. Further, the Affidavit of Probable Cause 

supporting the first warrant limited the search of the electronic devices to 

evidence of the collection, storage and sharing of child pornography. See

Green, 204 A.3d at 482 (concluding that a search warrant was not overbroad 

where it contained a general description of electronic items to be seized, but 

limited the search of the seized devices to evidence relating to possession or 

distribution of child pornography); Kane, 210 A.3d at 333 (concluding that a 

search warrant authorizing the search of a particular external hard drive for 

files containing child pornography was not overbroad, where the affidavit of 

probable cause “describe[d] the investigation and the facts that lead [sic] to 

the conclusion that there was a fair probability that child pornography would 

be found on the external hard driven given the fact that links to the hard drive 

and evidence of contraband files were found on the home desktop 
J-A16036-20

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[computer].”); Commonwealth v. Dougalewicz, 113 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (concluding that search warrants sufficiently identified and 

limited items to be searched and seized as text message, phone calls and 

picture mail between two specified phones, regarding the defendant’s sexual 

misconduct with a 14-year-old girl). Thus, Doll’s challenges to the first search 

warrant lack merit. 

Finally, Doll challenges the validity of the second warrant. See Brief for 

Appellant at 56-63. Because we have determined that Schmid had authority 

to consent to the search, and we have rejected his challenges to the first 

warrant, we need not address this claim. 

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm Doll’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/05/2020