(1405)

APPENDIX L. MONITORING THE EFFECTS OF

PRE- AND POST-TANF WELFARE REFORM

INITIATIVES

CONTENTS

Introduction and Summary of Findings

Overview

Summary of Findings

Implications for TANF

Economic Status of Single-Mother Families

Overview

Cash Welfare Receipt

Rates of Employment

Work and Welfare Among Poor Single Mothers

Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Single Mothers’ Poverty

Earnings-Poor Single Mothers after Taxes and Transfers

Income Sources Among Poorest Single Mothers

Consumption Expenditures

Findings from Impact Studies of Welfare Reform Initiatives

Methodology Issues in Impact Studies

Welfare-to-Work Impacts

Family Formation and Structure Impacts

Economic Status Impacts

Child Well-Being Impacts

Cost Benefit Issues

Findings from Leaver Studies

Monitoring Studies

Welfare Leavers

Ongoing and Future Research

Efforts by Governmental Agencies

Efforts by Other Organizations

Ethnographic Studies

Detailed Tables

References

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

OVERVIEW

This appendix summarizes what has been learned from major

welfare reform efforts since the mid-1980s to promote work and responsibility by parents of needy children who receive cash aid. During this period, two major Federal welfare reform laws were enacted, the Family Support Act of 1988 (Public Law 100–485) and

the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation

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Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–193). In addition, there were numerous State and local welfare reform initiatives.

Welfare programs and pilot projects have tested such reforms as

work requirements, rewards and penalties, time limits on benefits,

education and training provisions, and personal behavior provisions

(for example, rules to promote marriage, school attendance, and immunization, and to penalize additional births). Some projects offered enriched support services. The object of this experimentation

was to find out what was successful in achieving the goals of public

assistance programs for needy families with children, especially the

goal of self-support. Congress and welfare administrators wanted to

know what worked and for whom and at what cost. Findings reported here are based primarily on programs and initiatives that

preceded the 1996 law, which replaced the program of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and its Job Opportunities

and Basic Skills (JOBS) Training Program with block grants for

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The pre-1996

State reforms tested many policy changes now found in State

TANF Programs.

The original (1935) purpose of AFDC was to encourage care of

needy children in their homes. Over the years, the goal of aiding

single-mother families changed, as the movement of American

mothers into the work force changed perceptions of mothers’ employability and as frustration mounted over the size and character

of AFDC rolls. Added to the AFDC law in 1956 were the goals of

strengthening family life and promoting ‘‘family self-support.’’ To

encourage self-support, Congress later created two work and training programs, the Work Incentive Program in 1967 and JOBS in

1988 (Family Support Act).

Initially, Congress permitted States to decide who must participate in the Work Incentive Program, but in 1971 it required States

to register mothers unless they were caring for a child under age

6. In 1988, Congress tightened the work rule, exempting from

JOBS mothers with a child under age 3 (and permitting States to

require mothers to work upon the first birthday of their youngest

child). The Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations gave many

States permission to experiment with welfare by waiving specific

AFDC rules. (These waivers allowed States to impose restrictions

on the receipt of benefits, increase financial work incentives, and

establish ‘‘personal responsibility’’ requirements for recipients.)

TANF has given States much more freedom to design their own

programs. Many States have built their TANF Programs on elements of their waiver programs and some have converted their

welfare-to-work waiver programs into their TANF Program. Thus,

while the evaluations discussed in this appendix are primarily of

programs that preceded the 1996 law, some of the findings reported

in these evaluations have application to TANF Programs.

The 1996 law also broadened the goals of family welfare. TANF

has four objectives: (1) enable needy parents to care for children in

their homes; (2) end dependence of needy parents on government

benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and (4) encourage formation and maintenance of two-parent families. Unlike JOBS,

TANF makes no exemptions from work requirements, but it allows

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States to exempt those with a child under age 1. States may exempt others if they wish, but those exempted must still be counted

in the denominator when work participation requirements are calculated.

To learn from AFDC/JOBS/TANF Programs and experiments,

Congress has mandated and supported national data collection efforts as well as evaluations of specific State or local initiatives. It

has even authorized specific demonstrations, including major reform projects in Washington (Sec. 9121 of Public Law 100–203),

New York (Sec. 9122 of Public Law 100–203), Minnesota (Sec. 8014

of Public Law 101–239), and Wisconsin (Sec. 233 of Public Law

103–432). All these projects included research designs. To help assess the effects of changes in welfare policy and programs, this appendix offers three complementary analyses from both national

data sources and State or local research efforts.

1. The first is an analysis of national data about female-headed

families with children, which provides the overall setting. It

examines single mothers’ receipt of welfare, their work, and

their economic well-being. It describes national trends from

1987 to 1998, a period during which the national AFDC/TANF

caseload soared to a historic peak in fiscal year 1994 and then

dropped by nearly half by 1999. However, this analysis does

not attribute changes over time in welfare receipt, employment, or economic well-being of single mothers in the general

population to any cause, including welfare policy.

2. The second analysis is a synthesis of findings from evaluations

of some of the State welfare reform initiatives. These evaluations examine the difference that policy changes made on selected outcomes, or their ‘‘impact.’’ They do so by comparing

outcomes, such as earnings and employment rates, under a set

of new policies versus what would have occurred without those

new policies. Though impact evaluations are designed to measure the effect a program has on selected outcomes, their results

are most valid for the particular place and time in which the

evaluation was conducted and the population examined in the

study. These evaluations were conducted on programs begun

before enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law, but many

have implications for current TANF Programs.

3. The third analysis is an examination of studies of former cash

welfare recipients (welfare ‘‘leavers’’). Like the national data,

these studies do not attribute their findings to welfare policy

changes as they do not make comparisons with groups that

were under prior policies. Nor do they cover the full population

of interest. Nonetheless, they are a population of particular interest and ‘‘leaver studies’’ constitute the bulk of research

available since enactment of TANF.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This appendix focuses on outcome measures, which are indicators

of how families with children are faring. We focus on four categories of outcomes:

1. Welfare to work, including employment rates, earnings, welfare

benefit amounts, and welfare recipiency rates;

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2. Family formation and structure, including marriage rates,

birth rates, and abortions;

3. Economic status, primarily measured by income, with supplementary information on consumption of goods and services and

measures of material well-being and hardship; and

4. Child well-being, primarily measures of a child’s development

and behavior.

Welfare to work

The employment rate of single mothers rose steadily from 57 percent in 1992 to almost 71 percent in 1999 (chart L–5), and their

employment rate now exceeds that of married mothers. The rise in

work by single mothers is especially dramatic for those with a child

under age 3; their employment rate was relatively flat (hovering

around 35 percent) from 1988 until 1993, then turned upward and

climbed to 56 percent by 1999 (chart L–6). At the same time, fewer

mothers, even very poor ones, are receiving cash welfare. In the

1987–93 period, cash welfare was received by about 63 percent of

mothers who were poor on the basis of pretransfer cash income; by

1998, the share dropped to 41 percent (chart L–3).

The overall trend of increasing work and declining welfare is consistent with policies that increase mandated work or job preparation for welfare mothers. Impact evaluations show the same trend.

Evaluations find that mandatory welfare-to-work programs generally increase employment, and often also increase average earnings and decrease cash assistance payments. These findings apply

both to programs with a strong employment focus (‘‘work first’’) as

well as to programs that provide education. Of course, the strong

economy over this period also had a positive impact on the employment of single mothers.

Family formation and structure

The number of single-mother families increased from 8.4 million

in 1989 to about 9.9 million in 1993, but remained relatively constant from 1993 to 1998, averaging between 9.8 and 10 million during those years (chart L–2). Some think this population ceased

growing because of changed attitudes and policies, but reasons are

unclear.

As noted above, one of TANF’s goals is to promote formation and

maintenance of two-parent families; another is to reduce out-ofwedlock pregnancies. In fiscal year 1996, the last full year of

AFDC, 60 percent of AFDC children for whom data were available

lived with a single parent who had not married the other parent,

and 13 percent lived with two parents (25 percent were with a divorced or separated parent, and 2 percent with a widowed parent).

Many of the evaluations did not examine family formation issues.

The majority of pre-TANF evaluations of welfare initiatives that

examine marriage report no impacts for single-parent families.

Evaluators did find that the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) decreased the percentage of marriage breakup and increased the rate of marriage among single or cohabiting parents.

One popular initiative aimed at reducing nonmarital pregnancies is

adopting a family cap (paying no benefit or a reduced benefit for

a new baby born to a mother already on welfare), but evaluations

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of programs that include family caps show inconclusive impacts.

Evaluations of programs targeted on teenage AFDC mothers found

no significant impacts on rates of pregnancies or childbearing.

Economic status

Overall, from 1987 to 1998, income has grown and poverty has

decreased among mothers raising children alone (data from the

Current Population Survey (CPS) of the U.S. Census Bureau).

These trends reflect, in part, increased work and less reliance on

welfare among these mothers. However, among the poorest mothers (the bottom 20 percent illustrated in chart L–9), income has

fallen because these mothers have lost more in cash welfare and

food stamps than they have gained in earnings and the earned income credit (EIC).

Many impact evaluations find that even welfare-to-work programs that succeed in moving recipients to jobs often do not raise

family income. For instance, the National Evaluation of Welfare-toWork Strategies (NEWWS), which covered 11 JOBS Programs in 7

sites, found no increases in combined income from earnings, cash

assistance, and food stamps in the second year of the programs. In

these programs, increases in earnings offset, but did not exceed, reductions in cash benefits and food stamps. However, the composition of income changed. A bigger share came from earnings, a

smaller share from welfare.

However, programs that combine mandated participation in

employment-focused activities with generous earnings disregards

(which permit working recipients to keep more of their welfare benefits) have been effective in raising earnings and employment. Two

of these programs (MFIP and Connecticut’s Jobs First) with especially generous treatment of earnings and relatively high welfare

payment levels have also raised total income of participants, and

the MFIP Program reduced the incidence of poverty. However,

their income gains have come at the cost of increasing welfare payments and prolonging the duration of welfare payments. Continued

welfare receipt may convey continued health insurance through

Medicaid for some participants. Because these programs allowed

participants to keep more of their benefits while they worked, they

could be said to increase ‘‘dependence’’ on welfare. However, because they decreased the share of participants who relied on welfare alone, they also could be said to decrease welfare dependence.

Studies of former welfare recipients conducted by the States

(‘‘leaver’’ studies) address the question of how those who have left

welfare are faring. Most families who left TANF or AFDC waiver

programs between 1995 and 1998 did so because of employment. In

the quarter after exit, administrative data indicate that employment rates ranged from 50 to 64 percent. Among welfare leavers

who worked, survey data indicate that average hourly wages

ranged from $5.50 to $8.16. Average wages in these States are

above the Federal minimum wage and are above the welfare guarantee (cash and food stamps) for the State. However, income from

these wages alone would leave a family of three below the poverty

level in most States. Within 1 year or at the time of the leaver

study, from 13 to 36 percent of leavers had returned to welfare.

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This count excludes ‘‘churners,’’ persons who returned to welfare

within 1 or 2 months of exit.

Measuring the economic well-being of a family raises some

issues. The CPS uses reports of annual family income to measure

income and poverty. However, analysis of income and spending

data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) shows that some of the poorest single mothers

actually buy more in goods and services than would be supported

by their income. This finding suggests that they have access to

funds from sources other than reported income (e.g., borrowing,

withdrawing savings, other family members, boyfriends, or informal support networks). Impact evaluations also encounter problems in measuring economic well-being. The most common measure

is the combination of a program participant’s earnings, cash welfare, and food stamps. This approach ignores the income of other

household members (e.g., husbands, boyfriends, roommates) who

might pool their economic resources with the participant, as well

as other sources of income such as Social Security or Supplemental

Security Income (SSI). Leaver studies have begun to report measures that examine whether welfare leavers have experienced any

types of ‘‘hardship.’’ Measures of hardship have included receipt of

other types of assistance to complement earnings, as well as measures that examine difficulties experienced since exiting cash welfare.

Child well-being

In recent years, the proportion of AFDC/TANF adults who work

has more than doubled, from 11 percent in fiscal year 1996 to 23

percent in fiscal year 1998, and there is growing interest in how

increased work by these parents affects their children. The

NEWWS evaluation found small and conflicting impacts, or no impact at all, on various measures of child well-being for respondents

with only school-aged children. For instance, 4 of the 11 programs

were reported to increase the percentage of children who attended

a special class for behavioral or emotional problems; 2 of the programs were reported to decrease this percentage. The MFIP Program that increased family income was found to decrease the incidence of problem behaviors; it also improved school performance.

The New Hope Program in Milwaukee, which failed to increase

family income, was found to improve the behavior of boys, but to

increase aggression among girls.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TANF

Findings presented in this appendix indicate that ending dependence on government benefits through job preparation, work, and

marriage—the second objective of TANF—may be an elusive goal.

Available evaluations generally show that welfare initiatives have

little or no impact on marriage. And although welfare-to-work programs generally increase earnings and employment, they do not

necessarily end dependence and raise income. Programs that increase incomes instead have been found to reduce dependence on

welfare; they continue at least partial welfare payments when recipients go to work. Evaluations indicate that, at least in the short

run, many TANF recipients will be unable to escape poverty

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through work unless taxpayers provide an earnings supplement of

some kind (see table 7–12 in section 7).

TANF’s lifetime time limit on eligibility for federally funded assistance conflicts with enhanced earnings disregards. The time

limit may induce some persons to leave welfare quickly and ‘‘bank’’

welfare months for later use in time of need (although research has

not found this effect), but generous earnings disregards are an incentive to remain on welfare while working. The disregards permit

recipients to increase income by combining work with a reduced

welfare grant. Generous earnings disregards also are an incentive

to join the rolls, and they may reward persons who would have

worked anyway, even if all earnings were used to reduce the grant.

Eventually, when a family reaches the Federal time limit, the State

can no longer pay an earnings supplement unless it uses its own

funds to pay the cost (or grants the family a hardship time limit

extension, within a Federal caseload cap set in the law). Under TANF, the $16.5 billion of Federal funding received by

States for aid to needy families is fixed each year through fiscal

year 2002. Federal welfare funding no longer is a function of the

caseload size, the benefit levels paid, the generosity or stringency

of program rules, or the State’s relative per capita income. Because

the national TANF caseload now is only about half the size of the

record-large AFDC caseload on which the fixed block grant is

based, States generally have available much larger Federal funding

per welfare family than before TANF. States may use these funds

for a wide array of aid and services, not restricted to cash recipients, provided they are related to one of TANF’s goals.

Rules about State funding have changed under TANF and also

give the States more discretion. No longer do States have to pay

a specified share of benefit expenditures, depending on per capita

income, and a flat share of administrative costs. Instead, they must

meet a ‘‘maintenance-of-effort’’ requirement of 75 or 80 percent of

their spending in a recent baseline year ($10.4 billion yearly, or

$11.1 billion if they fail work participation rates). These amounts

are below fiscal year 1994 State AFDC/JOBS spending levels by 25

percent and 20 percent, respectively.

Many welfare reform initiatives, such as the operation of a

welfare-to-work program, cost Federal and State governments

money. The costs of welfare reform initiatives can be recouped if

over the long run welfare payments are reduced. Employment-focused (‘‘work first’’) programs, on average, have lower costs than

those that promote education. Thus, it is more likely that costs of

a ‘‘work first’’ program can be recouped than those of an educationfocused program. Moreover, the benefits from a ‘‘work first’’ program tend to be immediate, while those from an education-focused

program take time to emerge. Additionally, earnings supplements

that encourage work and raise incomes also cost money; they prolong the duration of welfare.

Fixed funding is often viewed as an incentive for States to operate less expensive programs. However, the TANF Block Grant is

fixed at a level based on historically high caseloads. Should caseloads remain down, States would continue to have the resources to

engage in more costly welfare initiatives, as many of them appear

to be doing now.

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ECONOMIC STATUS OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES

OVERVIEW

This section examines trends in welfare, work, and economic

well-being among families headed by single mothers, the group

that is the main focus of TANF Programs. The analyses use national household survey data, specifically, the U.S. Census Bureau’s March CPS and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CEX. CPS

data were examined from March 1988 (income year 1987) to March

1999 (income year 1998). CEX data were examined from 1994

through 1997. (The most recent year for which public use files were

available in early 2000, when this analysis was completed, was

1997.)

The analyses seek to describe the changing circumstances of single mothers over the period, but do not attempt to isolate the effects of particular policy changes or to ascribe causation. These

analyses are presented to provide background and context for the

subsequent discussions of research focused specifically on welfare

reform initiatives. Given the precision of estimates obtained from

the CPS and CEX, this section focuses primarily on overall trends,

rather than specific year-to-year changes.

The number of single mothers grew by 17 percent over the 4-year

period from 1989 to 1993, but has since leveled off and remained

at around 10 million (chart L–2). Dramatic changes in work, welfare, and poverty among this population have occurred in recent

years, especially since 1992–93, as detailed in the following charts.

Highlights include:

—The percentage of single mothers who worked at some time

during the year rose from 67 percent in 1992 to 80 percent in

1998 (chart L–1). By March 1998, the employment rate for single mothers with children under age 18 surpassed that of comparable married mothers (chart L–5). Employment gains have

been greatest for single mothers with children under age 3

(chart L–6).

—The percentage of single mothers who received cash welfare,

based on CPS data, shrank from 35 percent in 1993 to 19 percent in 1998 (chart L–1).

—The percentage of poor single mothers (on the basis of

pretransfer income) who reported receiving cash welfare declined from 63 percent in 1993 to 41 percent in 1998 (chart L–

3). Declines occurred even among those with very low

pretransfer income (e.g., below 25 percent of poverty) (chart L–

4).

—The percentage of single mothers who were poor based on

money income, after cash transfers (the official poverty measure), declined from 45 percent in 1993 to 37 percent in 1998

(chart L–1 and chart L–8). If in-kind food assistance and the

EIC (net of taxes) were counted as income, the poverty rate

would have dropped from 41 percent in 1993 to below 30 percent in 1998 (chart L–8).

—1997 marked a transition year in which, for the first time over

the period examined, the share of poor single mothers who

worked during the year exceeded those who received welfare

(chart L–7).

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—Average total income of single mothers in the bottom quintile

declined from 1994 to 1998, despite a gain of $1,005 in net

earnings and EIC transfers, because of a greater decline

($1,788) in cash welfare and food stamps (chart L–10). However, in the second lowest quintile, gains in earnings and the

EIC by single mothers offset declines in cash welfare and food

stamps, resulting in higher total income in 1998 than at any

time during the preceding 11 years for this subset of the population (chart L–11).

—Between 1994 and 1997, consumption expenditures for singlemother families grew at a robust rate: 18 percent over the period, much higher than the increase in prices over the same period (8 percent). Some of this increase is attributable to workrelated expenses (transportation, child care, payroll taxes), as

welfare receipt decreased and work increased (table L–1). Consumption expenditures increased even for the poorest single

mothers (chart L–12).

CHART L–1. WELFARE, WORK AND POVERTY STATUS AMONG SINGLE MOTHERS, 1987–

98

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

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CASH WELFARE RECEIPT

CPS data show an increase in cash welfare receipt (AFDC,

TANF, or other assistance) among single mothers during the late

1980s and early 1990s and a decrease in the mid-to-late 1990s that

corresponds to the caseload rise and fall documented by administrative data. Chart L–2 shows that the total number of single

mothers increased from 8.4 million in 1989, to about 9.9 million in

1993, an increase of 1.5 million, or 17 percent. Since 1993, the

number of single mothers has remained fairly stable, between 9.8

and 10 million, but the number of single mothers receiving cash

welfare has fallen each year.

CHART L–2. SINGLE MOTHERS: POVERTY AND CASH WELFARE RECEIPT, 1987–98

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

The number of single mothers in families receiving cash welfare

increased from 2.5 million in 1989, to 3.4 million in 1993, an increase of 900,000, or 36 percent over the 4-year period. Since 1993,

the number of single mothers reporting cash welfare has fallen to

1.9 million (a 44 percent decline). Over the same period, the number of poor single mothers who reported receiving no cash welfare

increased by 532,000, from 1.721 million in 1993 to 2.253 million

in 1998 (the middle shaded area shown in chart L–2).

Chart L–3 shows that cash welfare recipiency rates among single

mothers overall, and among poor single mothers based on their

pretransfer income (cash income excluding cash welfare), remained

fairly steady during the 1987–93 period, but have fallen considerVerDate 20-JUL-2000 13:14 Sep 29, 2000 Jkt 061710 PO 00000 Frm 01414 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 J:\SKAYNE\GB96\61710.027 WAYS3 PsN: WAYS3
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ably since. Among single mothers who were poor based on their

pretransfer cash income, the share who received cash welfare generally hovered around 63 percent over the 1987–93 period. As the

chart shows, the likelihood of cash welfare receipt has decreased

since 1993 among this population. In 1993, the cash welfare

recipiency rate among single mothers with pretransfer income

below poverty was 63 percent; by 1998, it had fallen to 41 percent.

CHART L–3. SINGLE MOTHERS: CASH WELFARE RECIPIENCY RATES, 1987–98

* Pretransfer income is cash income other than cash welfare payments.

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

Chart L–4 shows cash welfare recipiency rates based on families’

pretransfer (i.e., precash welfare) income relative to poverty. The

top line of the chart depicts the share of single mothers without

other income who reported receiving cash welfare. The line shows

that nearly 90 percent of single mothers with no pretransfer income reported receiving cash assistance in 1987–90. However, since

1990, the reported rate of cash welfare recipiency for this group

has continuously declined, to 77 percent in 1996, and to 61 percent

by 1998. Similarly, for families with very low pretransfer income

(below 25 percent of poverty), and for families with pretransfer incomes between 25 and 50 percent of poverty, cash welfare

recipiency also shows dramatic declines: for the former group from

72 percent in 1996 to 56 percent in 1998, and for the latter group

from 60 percent in 1995 to 45 percent in 1998.

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CHART L–4. CASH WELFARE RECIPIENCY RATES AMONG SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES BY

PRETRANSFER INCOME POVERTY STATUS, 1987–98

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

Likewise, food stamp recipiency rates among low-income households have also fallen considerably since 1994. In 1994, 71 percent

of single-mother families with household income below 130 percent

of poverty (the Food Stamp Program’s gross income qualifying

limit) reported receiving food stamp benefits; by 1998, the share

fell to 57 percent. Among those with household incomes below 50

percent of the low-household income threshold, in 1994, 80 percent

reported food stamp receipt; in 1998, 70 percent reported food

stamp receipt.

RATES OF EMPLOYMENT

While welfare receipt has declined, dramatic gains in single

mothers’ employment have occurred since 1994. Chart L–5 shows

that for most of the period shown, the employment rate for single

mothers with children under the age of 18 was below that of comparable married mothers. However, by March 1998, the employment rate of single mothers surpassed that of married mothers.

The employment rate among single mothers rose steadily from a

recent low of about 57 percent in March 1992 and 1993, to about

71 percent in March 1999.

Most dramatic has been the increase in employment among single mothers who have a child under the age of 3; their employment

rate increased from a recent low of 35.1 percent in March 1993

(18.1 percentage points below the rate for married mothers) to a

high of 55.8 percent in March 1999 (just 1.2 percentage points

below their married counterparts) (chart L–6). Single mothers with

a youngest child age 3–5 also experienced marked employment

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gains over the mid-to-late 1990s. Their employment rate grew from

a recent low of 54.1 percent in March 1992, to 69.8 percent by

March 1999, a 15.7 percentage point increase, surpassing that of

their married counterparts by 6.7 percentage points (not shown).

Single mothers whose youngest child was of school age (age 6–17)

had employment rates about equal to those of their married counterparts over the 1988–99 period (not shown).

CHART L–5. EMPLOYMENT RATES OF MARRIED AND SINGLE MOTHERS WITH CHILDREN

UNDER AGE 18, MARCH 1988–MARCH 1999

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

The healthy economy, combined with a transformed welfare system, improvements in the EIC, and increases in the minimum

wage, are among the factors thought to have encouraged work

among single mothers in recent years. TANF, and the AFDC waivers that preceded it, transformed cash assistance from a needsbased entitlement to a program of temporary assistance, encouraging work and personal responsibility. Imposition of work requirements, time limits, and sanctions, and in some States, more generous earnings disregards, all serve to encourage work, either in lieu

of welfare, or for a temporary period, in conjunction with welfare.

The EIC, which is conditioned on earnings, is thought to encourage

work among most groups, especially single parents who were not

working, or who were marginally attached to the labor market. Increases in the EIC, passed by Congress in 1993 and phased in between 1994 and 1996, have increased the financial incentive for

many single mothers to work. Other factors, such as increased

funding for child care subsidies, may also have contributed to making work possible for more single mothers.

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CHART L–6. EMPLOYMENT RATES OF MARRIED AND SINGLE MOTHERS WITH CHILDREN

UNDER AGE 3, MARCH 1988–MARCH 1999

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

WORK AND WELFARE AMONG POOR SINGLE MOTHERS

As shown in the previous section, poor single mothers are less

likely to be receiving cash welfare than in previous years. Likewise,

like all single mothers, poor single mothers are now more likely to

be working. Changes in poor mothers’ participation in work and

welfare first became evident in the early-to-mid 1990s, with rates

of welfare receipt declining after 1993, and rates of employment increasing after 1992 (see chart L–7, top 2 lines). A crossover point

was reached between 1996 and 1997, when the chances that a poor

single mother would be working exceeded the chances that she

would be receiving welfare.

Chart L–7 shows that the share of poor single mothers who received cash welfare at any time during the year fell from about 60

percent in the 1987–93 period, to just over 40 percent in 1998. The

rate of decline in welfare receipt among poor single mothers was

greatest between 1996 and 1997, a period coinciding with the passage and implementation of national welfare reform legislation.

Similarly, the share of poor single mothers who were working at

any time during the year increased from just above 40 percent in

1992, to about 53 percent in 1998, with the greatest increases occurring in 1996 and 1997.

The share of poor single mothers who relied on cash welfare

without working dropped from a peak of 45 percent in 1991, to

about 22 percent in 1998, while the share who worked without relying on cash welfare has increased from a recent low of about 23

percent in 1993, to just above 34 percent in 1998. Most of the increase in work without welfare occurred in 1996 and 1997. The

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1 A comparison of AFDC/TANF administrative statistics and CPS-estimated caseload counts

suggests that the CPS undercounts actual cases, and that the CPS undercount has worsened

in recent years. From 1987 to 1991, the CPS accounted for roughly 80 percent of the AFDC administrative caseload count, but by 1998 the CPS was capturing only about 64 percent. Worsened reporting of cash welfare on the CPS makes it difficult to gauge how much of the drop

in welfare receipt among single mothers represents eligible families who do not receive assistance, rather than families who do not report actual welfare aid on the CPS. To at least some

extent, the declining welfare recipiency rates discussed in this section are likely due to increased

underreporting of cash welfare on the CPS. See Bavier (2000) for a detailed discussion of cash

welfare underreporting on the CPS and other surveys.

share of poor single mothers who combined work and welfare over

the year has remained relatively constant, between 17 and 19 percent, except for 1 year (1989, when the share was about 15 percent).

CHART L–7. POOR SINGLE MOTHERS: WORK AND WELFARE STATUS DURING THE YEAR,

1987–98

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

The share of poor single mothers who reported that they neither

worked, nor received cash welfare during the year (the dashed line

in chart L–7), has increased each year since 1993 (15.2 percent),

reaching nearly 25 percent in 1998. This surprising combination

may reflect a mix of circumstances, including income or support

from other sources such as family members, support from unrelated household members (which is not included in the official poverty measure), and other means of support from outside the household not counted on the CPS. It may also reflect income reporting

problems on the CPS, especially with regard to welfare income. 1

Finally, welfare sanction and diversion policies may have contributed to the increased number of poor mothers neither working nor

receiving welfare.

1420

EFFECTS OF EARNINGS, TRANSFERS, AND TAXES ON SINGLE

MOTHERS’ POVERTY

As shown in chart L–1, single mothers’ poverty status has improved since 1993. Changes in the economy and changes in welfare

policy and other programs, such as the EIC, have both direct and

indirect effects on poverty. However, the official U.S. poverty measure counts only family cash income (excluding capital gains and

lump-sum or one-time payments) against a family’s poverty threshold, which varies by family size and composition, to determine

whether a family is counted as poor. The definition does not include the value of in-kind benefits, such as food stamps, school

lunches, or public housing subsidies, nor does it include the effects

of taxes or tax credits such as the EIC. Inclusion of in-kind benefits

and the EIC provides a more comprehensive income definition than

the official definition. Additionally, other unrelated household

members may contribute to the family’s economic well-being, but

determining the extent to which resources are shared among unrelated household members is often difficult.

Chart L–8 shows the effects of income from these other sources

on poverty among all single mothers. Components of family income

are sequentially added and measured against families’ poverty

thresholds, as one moves from the top line of the chart to subsequent lines below:

CHART L–8. EFFECTS OF EARNINGS, TRANSFERS, AND TAXES ON FAMILY POVERTY AND

HOUSEHOLD LOW-INCOME STATUS ON SINGLE MOTHERS, 1987–98

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

—Line 1: The top line shows the percent of single mothers who

would be counted as poor if only family earnings were counted

against the poverty line.

1421

—Line 2: The second line down includes other sources of cash income, in addition to earnings, that were already counted above.

However, this line does not include cash welfare.

—Line 3: The third line down adds cash welfare to the other

sources already mentioned, and with those sources, represents

the income definition used in the official poverty measure.

—Line 4: The fourth line down shows the value of in-kind food

assistance (i.e., food stamps, free and reduced price school

lunches, Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,

Infants, and Children (WIC) payments) when added to cash income and compared to the family poverty threshold.

—Line 5: The fifth line down shows the effect of adding the value

of the EIC, less Federal and State income taxes and payroll

taxes, to line 4.

—Line 6: The bottom (dashed) line shows the effects of counting

all income in the household in which the single mother lives,

not just that of her own family, and comparing it to an unofficial ‘‘household low-income threshold.’’ The household lowincome threshold used here applies family poverty income

thresholds, which are based on family size and composition, to

households, based on household size and composition. It must

be noted that official poverty measurement is based on a family concept, which assumes that family members share income

and economies of scale that result from shared living arrangements. It is generally agreed among researchers that assumptions regarding income sharing and shared economies of scale

among related family members, who have ties based on blood,

marriage, and adoption, do not apply to the same extent among

unrelated household members. Consequently, these estimates

of household low-income status likely overstate the effect of

household income on reducing poverty among families headed

by single mothers.

In viewing chart L–8, note that the trend in earnings is the principal factor affecting the declining trend in poverty, whereas the

other income sources, with the exception of the EIC, affect the level

of poverty, more than its trend over time. Evidence of this effect

is that most lines in the chart, with the exception of the EIC,

roughly run parallel to the ones above.

Effect of earnings and other nonwelfare cash income on poverty

Chart L–8 shows that between 1993 and 1998, single mothers’

poverty, based on family earnings alone, fell from 56.2 percent to

47.9 percent (line 1). Adding other cash income, except cash welfare, to family earnings (line 2), reduces poverty in 1993 from 56.2

percent to 47.4 percent, and in 1998, from 47.9 percent to 38.8 percent.

Effect of cash welfare on poverty

When added to other income, cash welfare benefits have only a

small impact on the poverty rate, as these benefits generally are

not sufficient, even when combined with other cash income, to lift

families above the Federal poverty threshold. As shown by table 7–

13 (breakeven points) in section 7, in all but eight States, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) families that go to

1422

2 Note that the value of the EIC on the CPS is based on U.S. Census Bureau imputations,

rather than actual reported tax credits. Also, the EIC is different than most sources of income,

as most families receive the EIC as a lump-sum refund.

work lose eligibility for benefits before earnings reach the poverty

line, usually long before. Consequently, cash welfare benefits have

little impact on the poverty rate. The addition of cash welfare (line

3, representing the official income definition for measuring poverty)

reduces poverty only slightly, from 47.4 percent (line 2) to 45.2 percent in 1993, and from 38.8 percent to 37.3 percent in 1998. Nonetheless, cash welfare benefits can have a significant impact on the

level of poor families’ incomes, affecting the degree to which their

incomes fall below the poverty income standard. This impact is not

captured by changes in the poverty rate.

Effect of in-kind food assistance on poverty

The fourth line from the top in chart L–8 shows the effect on the

poverty rate of single mothers by counting government food assistance, in the form of food stamp benefits and school lunch benefits

and WIC payments. The line shows that food assistance reduces

the poverty rate of single mothers from about 2–3 percentage

points over the period. The antipoverty effectiveness of food assistance seems to have lessened somewhat in recent years. In 1995,

food assistance reduced the poverty rate from 40.2 percent (its official measure) to 36.9 percent, a 3.3 percentage point (8.1 percent)

reduction in poverty. In 1998, food assistance reduced the poverty

rate from its official rate of 37.3 percent, to 35.2 percent, a 2.1 percentage point (5.6 percent) reduction.

Effect of EIC and taxes on poverty

As noted above, the net effect of the EIC (after counting the effect of reductions in income from Federal and State income taxes

and FICA taxes) (line 5), when added to total family cash income

and food assistance (line 4), causes a divergence in trend from the

lines above. This is especially notable after 1993. A major expansion of the EIC, passed by Congress in 1993 and phased in between

1994 and 1996, increased the amount of the EIC work bonus families might receive. The antipoverty effectiveness of the EIC was approximately three times greater in 1998 than in 1993. In 1993, the

EIC reduced the poverty rate (counting food assistance) among single mothers from 42.7 percent (line 4), to 40.7 percent (line 5), a

2.0 percentage point (4.6 percent) reduction. In 1998, the EIC reduced poverty from 35.2 percent to 29.7 percent, a 5.5 percentage

point (15.7 percent) reduction.2

As receipt of the EIC is conditioned on earnings, the growing impact of the EIC in part reflects the rise in work rates among single

mothers. Among those who are working and poor (before counting

the EIC), the EIC helps lift the income of some above the poverty

line. Although the EIC expansion provided additional income to

low-income families who were already working, it may also have

helped induce increased employment among family heads with low

to moderate earnings potential, and thus contributed to the decline

in poverty based on earned income only that has occurred since

1993 (shown as the top line in the chart).

1423

Note too, that to the extent that changes in cash welfare programs in recent years have encouraged work, these changes may

have had an indirect effect on poverty by increasing earnings and,

through earnings, making the EIC available to a greater number

of families.

Effect of all household income on poverty

The household low-income line (bottom line) shows that if all

household members’ income were shared equally among household

members, the poverty rate among single mothers would drop by at

most 3–4 percentage points over the 1987–98 period. Adding other

members’ household income, and counting them as though they

were family members who shared income equally, reduced the postin-kind transfer, posttax, poverty rate in 1993 from 40.7 percent to

36.8 percent; in 1998 the post-in-kind transfer, posttax, poverty

rate would have dropped from 29.7 percent to 26.2 percent. Again,

this is most likely an overstatement of the possible effect that

shared household living arrangements might have on single mothers’ poverty status, because of uncertainty about the extent to

which such income is actually shared.

EARNINGS-POOR SINGLE MOTHERS AFTER TAXES AND TRANSFERS

This section focuses specifically on single mothers with family incomes below poverty, based on family earnings alone, to gauge the

effects of other income, transfers and taxes over time. This group,

shown in the top line in chart L–8 for the 1987–98 period, accounted for about half of all single mothers. Chart L–9 shows their

distribution, relative to the poverty threshold, after cash income

from all sources, in-kind food assistance, and taxes (including the

EIC) is taken into account. Unlike chart L–8 above, which simply

measured whether income was below poverty, chart L–9 examines

the degree of poverty after taxes and transfers, for families defined

as poor based on family earnings alone. The chart includes families

with no earnings, as well as those who have earnings but whose

earnings fall below poverty.

The chart shows that while the majority of ‘‘earnings-poor’’ single

mothers have seen improvements in income relative to poverty

since 1991, the improvement occurred mostly in 1994 and 1995 (although it continued after a slight decline in 1996). Since 1996, the

bottom 40 percent of these single mothers have seen no improvement in their income relative to poverty, and the bottom 20 percent

have actually seen declines in their income status relative to poverty.

The chart shows, for example, that over the 1987–98 period, the

top 20 percent of single mothers who were poor based on earnings

alone had income from other sources that helped bring their families’ incomes above the poverty line. Over the period, these families

became somewhat more economically secure: in 1987, the top 20

percent of earnings-poor mothers had a net in-kind aftertax income

that was 5 percent or more above the poverty line. By 1998, the

top 20 percent of earnings-poor single mothers had net income that

was 25 percent or more above poverty. The chart shows strong net

income gains relative to poverty among earnings-poor single mothers over the 1993–95 period, followed by a slight decline in 1996,

1424

3 In addition to the analysis which follows, see: Primus, et al. (1999); Bavier (1999); and

Haskins (in press) for other research discussing recent declines in income among the poorest

families.

for all but the bottom 20 percent of mothers. Since 1996, mothers

in the top half of the distribution show income gains relative to

poverty. However, those in the bottom 40 percent show no gain in

income security since 1996, and those in the bottom 20 percent

show a decline in their level of income security. The bottom 20 percent of earnings-poor single mothers show a comparatively large

decline in net income relative to poverty in 1997 (from 52 percent

of poverty in 1996, to 46 percent of poverty in 1997 and 1998).

CHART L–9. POSTTAX POST-IN-KIND TRANSFER INCOME AS A PERCENT OF POVERTY

AMONG SINGLE MOTHERS CONSIDERED POOR BASED ON FAMILY EARNINGS ALONE,

1987–98

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

INCOME SOURCES AMONG POOREST SINGLE MOTHERS 3

The composition and level of income among the poorest singlemother families has changed markedly in recent years, reflecting

increased earnings supplemented by increased earned income credits (EIC) and reductions in cash welfare and food stamps. For single mothers in the bottom fifth (bottom quintile), increased earnings and EIC have not been sufficient in recent years to offset

losses in cash welfare and food stamps, resulting in reduced income

since 1996. Families in the bottom 20–40 percent (second quintile)

also received less cash welfare and food stamps in recent years, but

in 1998, increased earnings and EIC were sufficient to offset these

losses.

1425

Charts L–10 and L–11 examine sources of income among the bottom quintile (bottom 20 percent) and the second lowest quintile

(bottom 20–40 percent) of single-mother families, respectively,

based on their pretax cash income relative to poverty. The charts

show the average annual income, in 1998 dollars, from the following sources: cash public assistance (Aid to Families with Dependent

Children (AFDC), TANF, and general assistance); Supplemental

Security Income (SSI); food stamps (market value); child support

and alimony; other cash income other than earnings; net earnings

(earnings net of the employee share of FICA payroll taxes and any

Federal or State income taxes); and the EIC. The employee share

of FICA payroll taxes, and any Federal or State income tax payments are also shown as negative values. Note that these estimates

are based on year-to-year income comparisons of cross-sectional

survey data, rather than a comparison of incomes for the same

families over time.

CHART L–10. BOTTOM QUINTILE OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES: AVERAGE ANNUAL

INCOME BY SOURCE, 1987–98 (IN 1998 DOLLARS)

Note.—Quintiles based on ranking of ratios of family cash, pretax income, relative to poverty. Taxes include Federal and State income taxes and FICA taxes.

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

Chart L–10 shows an upsurge in annual average income among

single mothers in the bottom quintile, from 1993 to 1994. Average

total income increased from $6,119 to $6,997; an increase of $878,

or 14 percent. Components of the increase were: cash public assistance, $97 (4 percent); food stamps, $257 (12 percent); SSI, $84 (56

percent); net earnings, $316 (50 percent); and EIC, $152 (131 percent).

From 1994 through 1996, average total income among the bottom

quintile of single-mother families remained essentially unchanged,

1426

drifting down slightly perhaps, despite dramatic changes in its

composition. In 1995 and 1996, earnings of single mothers in the

bottom quintile continued to increase, as did EIC, while cash assistance (AFDC and general assistance) and food stamps fell. The

growing importance of the EIC as an earnings supplement over the

1994–96 period can be illustrated by examining the average EIC as

a share of average earnings. From 1993 to 1996, the EIC ‘‘work

bonus’’ had doubled, from 18 percent to 37 percent of earnings.

CHART L–11. SECOND QUINTILE OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES: AVERAGE ANNUAL

INCOME BY SOURCE, 1987–98 (IN 1998 DOLLARS)

Note.—Quintiles based on ranking of ratios of family cash, pretax income, relative to poverty. Taxes include Federal and State income taxes and FICA taxes.

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March

1988–99 Current Population Survey data.

Chart L–10 further shows that average cash welfare and food

stamp benefits reported by single mothers in the bottom quintile

continued to decline in 1997 and 1998, and that earnings combined

with the EIC did not rise enough to offset this loss. As a result,

average total family income for this population was lower in 1997–

98 than in 1994–96; however, it was higher than in all years preceding 1994, with the exception of 1987. Average annual cash welfare assistance received by single mothers in the bottom quintile in

1998 was 43 percent below what this group had received, on average, in the most recent high year of 1994 ($1,410 versus $2,486).

Food stamps for this group in 1998 were 29 percent below their

1994 value ($1,710 versus $2,422). In contrast, net earnings were

67 percent higher in 1998 than in 1994 ($1,612 versus $966), and

nearly 21⁄2 times higher than in 1993 ($1,612 versus $650). Nonetheless, while combined cash assistance and food stamps fell by

$1,788 from 1994 to 1998, net earnings combined with EIC grew

1427

by $1,005, and offset only 56 percent of the loss in cash welfare and

food stamps over the period.

Chart L–11 is similar to chart L–10, but shows average income

by source for the second quintile of single-mother families, ranked

by their income relative to poverty. The chart shows comparatively

large gains in average total income from 1993 to 1995, due largely

to increased earnings and EIC. Over this period, average total income increased from $11,396 to $14,433, a gain of nearly 27 percent. With the exception of 1996, average earnings for single mothers in the second quintile continued to grow; however, earnings and

the EIC were insufficient to offset declines in cash assistance and

food stamps in 1996 and 1997. From 1995 to 1997, combined earnings and EIC gains ($792) offset only 63 percent of the loss in combined cash assistance and food stamp benefits ($1,253) over the period.

By 1998, average total income among single mothers in the second quintile reached a new high. In 1998, earnings in combination

with the EIC were more than offsetting the loss in combined cash

assistance and food stamps that occurred over the 1995–98 period.

The gain in average net earnings, in combination with EIC

($2,343), more than offset the $1,894 loss in combined cash assistance and food stamps. By 1998, average net earnings accounted for

over half of these families’ incomes ($7,329 in earnings out of a

total net income of $14,625) and cash assistance ($1,177) accounted

for just 8 percent. In contrast, in 1987, earnings accounted for

about 28 percent of this group’s income ($3,363 in earnings out of

a total net income of $12,013) and cash assistance ($4,157) comprised about 35 percent. In 1998, average total income for families

in the second quintile ($14,625) was nearly 22 percent above that

in 1987 ($12,013).

CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES

Though annual income information is the basis of most official

measures of economic well-being (e.g., poverty statistics), it suffers

some drawbacks. Income during any one period imperfectly measures the value of goods and services a family can consume, since

families may liquidate savings, borrow money, or access some other

sources of funds. This section presents information on consumer expenditures from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), as a complement to the preceding analysis

of income data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Consumption data are derived from the CEX, which has a relatively

small sample size of 5,000 households, compared to the CPS which

has a sample of 47,000 households. The small CEX sample size,

relative to the CPS, means that data from the CPS are likely to

be more reliable, and large year-to-year differences are required for

changes estimated from the CEX to meet standard tests of statistical significance. Differences noted in the text met tests of statistical significance, using ‘‘replicate sample’’ techniques (Mosteller &

Tukey, 1977).

Average consumption for single mothers

Table L–1 summarizes information on consumption expenditures,

welfare receipt, and work for single-mother families from 1994 to

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1997. The CPS data described above showed that poverty continued

to decline for these families over these years. The CEX data show

that consumer expenditures grew for this group over the period, by

18 percent. This is well above inflation during the 1994–97 period

(8 percent). The CEX information, like the CPS data, shows a

sharp decline in welfare receipt and an increase in work among

single mothers over this period.

TABLE L–1.—CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES, WELFARE RECEIPT, AND WORK

EXPERIENCE FOR SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES, 1994–97

Category

Year Percent

change,

1994 1995 1996 1997 1994–97

Average consumption expenditures .......................... $19,633 $19,830 $21,405 $23,245 18.4

Expenditures on ‘‘work-related’’ categories ................... 4,136 4,361 5,050 5,178 25.2

Other consumption expenditures ................................... 15,497 15,469 16,355 18,068 16.6

Welfare receipt (percent) ........ 33.9 32.8 23.2 20.3 ¥40.2

Average number of workers in

family ................................. 0.93 0.92 1.00 1.02 9.8

Note.—Data are from quarterly interview surveys; quarterly expenditures have been annualized for purposes of display; year noted represents year of the interview; actual expenditures may have occurred in

the prior year; dollars are not inflation-adjusted.

Source: Congressional Research Service tabulations of data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau

of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey.

The table shows overall consumption expenditures for singlemother families but also divides consumption expenditures into: (1)

a category that explicitly includes spending on items commonly associated with work (transportation, child care, and retirement contributions including the employee share of Social Security payroll

taxes); and (2) all other expenditures (including expenditures to

meet basic needs, such as food and shelter). As shown in the table,

some of the overall increase in consumption expenditures for single

mothers is attributable to work expenses. The work expenses category showed a 25 percent increase over the 1994–97 period, while

other expenses grew by 17 percent. The increase in work expenses

is consistent with other trends shown in the table, such as the decline in welfare receipt and increase in work.

Consumption expenditures for the poorest families

Analyses of national income surveys (for example, the CPS) have

shown that income growth among the poorest single mothers stagnated after 1994. Information from the CEX also shows that income for the poorest one-fifth of single mothers has not grown since

1994 (the estimates actually show a decline in income, but that decline is too small to meet standard criteria of statistical significance). However, even among the poorest single-mother families,

consumption expenditures have increased.

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Chart L–12 shows aftertax income, consumption expenditures

classified as work expenses, and other consumption expenditures

for the bottom quintile of single-mother families during 1994–97.

The chart shows that income remained relatively stable, while consumption expenditures—both those commonly thought of as work

expenses and other consumption expenditures—increased.

CHART L–12. AFTERTAX INCOME, WORK EXPENSES, AND OTHER CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES FOR THE POOREST FIFTH (INCOME QUINTILE) OF FEMALE-HEADED

FAMILIES; 1994–97

Note.—Data are from quarterly interview surveys; quarterly expenditures have been annualized for purposes of display; year noted represents year of the interview, actual expenditures may have occurred in

the prior year. Information is for ‘‘complete income reporters’’ only. Dollars are not inflation adjusted.

Source: Congressional Research Service tabulations of data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau

of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey.

The chart also shows that, for the low-income population, reported consumption expenditures typically exceed reported incomes. Over the 1994–97 period, this gap appeared to grow. There

are a number of possible explanations:

1. Some who have low incomes are temporarily poor. For those

families that are experiencing a temporary dip in income, withdrawing savings can finance consumption expenditures that

exceed income.

2. Some low-income people might access credit markets to pay for

spending that exceeds income. Poor families increased their

credit card debt in the early-to-mid 1990s (Bird et al., 1999) to

a greater extent than other families. If this trend continued

into the later 1990s, it could account for some of the growing

gap in spending and income among the low-income population.

3. Income might be underreported relative to spending, particularly for certain types of income. Edin and Lein (1997) discuss

various survival strategies that very low-income, single mothVerDate 20-JUL-2000 13:14 Sep 29, 2000 Jkt 061710 PO 00000 Frm 01429 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 J:\SKAYNE\GB96\61710.027 WAYS3 PsN: WAYS3
1430

ers use to make ends meet: network-based or agency-based

support, unreported work and work in the underground economy, and cash contributions from families, friends, boyfriends,

or former spouses who live elsewhere. These latter types of ‘‘income’’ are unlikely to be reported as income on household surveys.

Interpreting the consumption data

This analysis of consumption expenditures complements, but

does not substitute for, the analysis of income data presented earlier. However, its finding that many of the lowest income families

can consume well above their income underscores the difficulties in

measuring the economic well-being of single mothers and their

families.

FINDINGS FROM IMPACT STUDIES OF WELFARE

REFORM INITIATIVES

METHODOLOGY ISSUES IN IMPACT STUDIES

A large body of research on the effects of welfare reform initiatives is available from impact evaluations. Unlike the national data

discussed above, which show trends in outcomes related to welfare

reform but do not attribute these trends to any single cause, impact evaluations are designed to measure the difference a program

makes on outcomes related to its goals. For example, a welfare-towork program will be evaluated based on the difference between

employment, earnings, and welfare receipt under the program versus the outcomes produced by an alternative set of policies. The

focus of an impact evaluation is the incremental difference in outcomes observed under one set of policies versus another.

Random assignment experiments

There are a number of different techniques available to evaluate

the impact of policy changes, but most evaluations conducted after

the passage of the Family Support Act in 1988 used random assignment to experimental and control groups. These studies assign

potential participants to two or more groups. Individuals assigned

to a control group are subject to current policies (no policy change);

individuals assigned to the experimental group (or groups) are subject to a different package of policy initiatives, such as time limits

on assistance, or sanctions for failing to comply with a mandatory

work requirement. Because individuals are randomly assigned to

these groups, any differences between the experimental and control

groups may be attributed to the policy initiative itself. This difference is therefore the impact of these policy changes.

For a policy to have an impact, it must be determined that the

impact was not simply a chance occurrence. Differences between

experimental and control groups that pass statistical significance

tests are reported as policy impacts. Whether a difference is determined to be an impact generally depends on two factors: (1) the

size of the difference between the experimental and control groups,

and (2) the size of the sample in the evaluation. Impact evaluations

with smaller research samples tend to report fewer impacts. In

these smaller samples, the difference may need to be substantial

1431

in order to pass tests of statistical significance. On the other hand,

impact evaluations with larger research samples tend to report

more policy impacts.

Data used in impact evaluations

Most impact studies use one of two types of data: administrative

data or survey data. Administrative data are those used in administering Federal-State transfer programs. They are sometimes used

for research because it is possible to economically collect large

amounts of data on individuals over time without the response errors that occur if participants are asked about their public assistance receipt or work activities. However, administrative data come

from data systems used to determine eligibility and benefits, not

systems designed specifically for research. Therefore, evaluators

are limited to the outcomes collected as well as the format in which

these outcomes are collected.

Welfare and food stamp receipt generally come from public assistance data files used to store information on a recipient household’s characteristics, income, and benefit receipt. Employment and

earnings information generally are from unemployment insurance

(UI) wage files that track UI wages and taxes paid on behalf of an

employee and are used to determine UI eligibility and benefits

upon involuntary unemployment. These files do not collect information on all sources of employment, since the self-employed and Federal employees are not covered by the UI system. UI taxes and benefits are also based on quarters of earnings, and therefore UI wage

files contain information only about quarterly earnings (not hourly

wages, for example). Administrative data also do not capture information from outside the State. Therefore, if program participants

move, their work and welfare activity are not going to be reflected

in either the UI or public assistance administrative files.

Researchers also use survey data to examine the effects of policy

changes. Unlike administrative data, the primary purpose of survey data, which is collected through telephone surveys, mail surveys, or in-person interviews, is evaluation. Therefore, surveys are

designed by those involved in the evaluation effort to solicit information on the outcomes of interest to the evaluation team. In addition, compared to administrative data, the costs of collecting survey

data are higher. Because it is usually not possible to survey every

individual in the targeted population, surveys often focus on a representative sample of the population, with the goal of generalizing

these results to the larger group. For these results to be generalized, a large majority of the survey sample must participate. While

evaluation studies that measure the impact of welfare policies on

those who remain on the welfare rolls often obtain data on most

participants, studies of former welfare recipients almost always

have trouble with missing data because it is difficult to find participants once they leave the program. Another concern with survey

data is that individuals may fail to understand the questions asked

or respond truthfully and accurately.

Interpreting impact evaluations

The findings of impact evaluations are most valid for the particular place, time, context, and policy examined in the study. GenVerDate 20-JUL-2000 13:14 Sep 29, 2000 Jkt 061710 PO 00000 Frm 01431 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 J:\SKAYNE\GB96\61710.027 WAYS3 PsN: WAYS3
1432

erally, more confidence can be placed in findings that are replicated

in a number of different settings. The findings of a random assignment evaluation are also limited to the population studied. This is

often smaller than the entire population that might be affected by

a policy. Most random assignment evaluations of welfare policy

changes examine only those already receiving or applying for assistance. However, welfare policy changes might affect those not receiving assistance by making welfare more or less attractive to

them. Random assignment impact evaluations generally do not

measure these ‘‘entry effects.’’

In general, evaluation studies of welfare policy changes measure

the effect of a package of initiatives (for example, a State’s AFDC

waiver program), rather than the effect of a single policy initiative.

Researchers interested in the effect of a specific policy initiative

have turned to a more sophisticated method of analysis, often introducing a third comparison group. In the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) and the Vermont Welfare Restructuring

Project (WRP), for example, participants in a third comparison

group (besides the regular experimental and control groups) were

subject to the same policy initiatives as the experimental group,

but were also subject to an additional policy initiative (for example,

a requirement to work after 6 months of assistance). With the same

random assignment and basic assumptions, any observed differences between the two experimental groups may be attributed to

the additional policy initiative.

Researchers have also used a third comparison group to evaluate

an additional package of policy initiatives, an example being the

National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS). In

the NEWWS design, the control group was subject to the former

AFDC rules, one experimental group was subject to a package of

work first initiatives and a second experimental group was subject

to a package of basic education initiatives. Any observed differences

between each of the experimental groups and the control group

could be attributed to the different package of initiatives. The goal

of this evaluation design was to measure the effect of a program

that stressed work first versus a program that focused more specifically on education.

The limitations of random assignment experiments have led

some to use alternative methods to estimate the impact of policy

changes. A few evaluations have used a ‘‘quasi-experimental’’ design. While the experimental design allows researchers to evaluate

the program’s impact, measured as the difference between the experimental and control groups, the quasi-experimental design allows researchers to evaluate the program’s what-if effect. This is

measured by comparing outcomes, after implementation of the policy changes, to those that would have been expected without the

policy change, using administrative data as a baseline. Statistical

techniques are used to ‘‘control’’ for various factors that could affect

the examined outcomes (these factors would be controlled for in the

experimental design through random assignment). While quasiexperimental designs use administrative data and therefore allow

for a much larger sample, results can be sensitive to the specific

technique used as they rely on many assumptions.

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Included studies

The remainder of this section presents results from a review of

impact evaluations of programs undertaken since passage of the

Family Support Act of 1988 that serve the cash welfare population

and, in a few cases, other low-income individuals. The discussion

focuses on evaluations available as of June 2000. The discussion is

organized into four sections:

1. Welfare to work, which focuses on findings related to earnings,

employment, and receipt of cash assistance;

2. Family formation and structure, which focuses on findings related to marital status and childbearing;

3. Economic status, which focuses on findings related to the overall income and well-being of single mothers including health

assistance and child care; and

4. Child well-being, which focuses on findings related to child development, including academic achievement, behavior, and

health status.

These categories were chosen based on the stated purposes of

TANF, and on the types of outcomes evaluated in the studies. Each

of the four sections begins with a background discussion of the relevant policy issues, highlights evaluations with noteworthy results,

and provides a brief overview of evaluations that have reported information for outcomes relevant to that section. Since many of the

evaluations examined impacts on several different outcomes (e.g.,

welfare to work and child well-being), the same evaluations are discussed in more than one of the four sections.

Most of these evaluations are based on pre-TANF policies. However, their results have informed the creation of TANF and many

of the policy initiatives tested have been included in State TANF

Programs. States have broad flexibility to design their TANF Programs with minimal Federal requirements. Each TANF Program is

unique and therefore, the results for one study may not be generalizable to a program in another State. Ideally, the results highlighted in this appendix should be interpreted in the context of the

specific program’s environment (such as the State’s economy and

population), in addition to the overall design and implementation

of the program. Table L–2 describes major policies tested in these

evaluations.

WELFARE-TO-WORK IMPACTS

Promoting work to end dependence on government benefits is

part of the stated purpose of the Temporary Assistance for Needy

Families (TANF) Program. TANF requires recipients to engage in

work (as defined by the State) within 2 years, and requires States

to penalize recipients who fail to meet work requirements. In addition, States are subject to work participation standards.

The effect of welfare programs on work has been the focus of a

voluminous amount of research since the late 1960s. Studies that

concentrate on the effects on employment, earnings, and continued

welfare receipt constitute the bulk of the research undertaken since

the 1988 enactment of the Family Support Act.

1434

TABLE L–2.—POLICY CHANGES UNDER WELFARE REFORM

Asset limit increase ............ Set countable asset limit above the $1,000 of AFDC law

and/or permit recipients to have a vehicle of greater

value than allowed by AFDC law ($1,500 in equity

value).

Child support liberalization Disregard more than $50 monthly of child support.

Earnings disregard enhancement.Disregard more earnings than AFDC law allowed (after

4 months of work, the AFDC disregard was $120

monthly).

Education-focused programs Require participation in a program of education and

training.

Employment-focused program.Require participation in an employment-focused program, such as job search.

Family cap ........................... Deny increase in family benefit (or pay less than full

benefit) for new baby conceived or born to mother

already on welfare.

Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant.

Combine cash aid and food stamps into one cash

grant.

Mixed employment/education

program.

Assign recipients to either an employment-focused or

education/training program.

Personal responsibility

sanctions.

Penalize family for failure to meet personal responsibility rules like assuring school attendance or taking

the child for immunizations.

Time limit ............................ End family benefits when adult has received assistance

for a specified period.

Time limit (adult only) ........ Reduce family benefits (end adult share) when adult

has received assistance for a specified period.

Transitional benefits extension.Extend transitional Medicaid and/or child care beyond

the 12 months required by AFDC law (for those who

lose eligibility for cash aid due to increased earnings).

Two-parent family eligibility End special eligibility rules for two-parent families.

Wage supplementation ........ Use welfare benefit to subsidize wages of recipients.

Work requirements: younger

child.

Require mothers with children younger than age 3 to

participate in work/training (AFDC required work if

youngest child was 3, but permitted States to lower

this to age 1).

Work sanctions .................... Penalize work failure more severely than AFDC/Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) law allowed (e.g.,

loss of adult benefit and use of protective payee).

Work-trigger time limit ........ Require work as a condition of continued eligibility for

assistance after being on the rolls for a specified

period.

Generally, the post-Family Support Act research shows:

1. Mandatory welfare-to-work programs are associated with increased employment, and often also increased average earnings

and decreased cash assistance payments. This includes welfare-to-work programs with a strong employment focus (‘‘work

first’’) as well as programs that provide education. The magnitude of the impacts varies greatly among the programs evaluated.

1435

2. Though both employment- and education-focused programs

have succeeded in raising employment and earnings, their impacts show up at different times. ‘‘Work first’’ programs have

immediate impacts, but they sometimes fade. Such programs

often speed up the process of finding a job for those who would

have worked anyway, and some who find a job subsequently

lose it. Education-focused programs sometimes have delayed

impacts on raising employment and earnings. Two of the most

effective programs—California’s Greater Avenues for Independence Program (GAIN) in Riverside during the 1980s and early

1990s, and the Portland, Oregon program of the 1990s—were

mixed services programs that were ‘‘work first’’ for some participants, but provided basic education for those determined to

need it before entering the labor force.

3. Some programs that combine mandated participation in employment-focused activities with enhanced disregards of earnings (a financial incentive to work) have been particularly effective in raising earnings and employment. Moreover, these

impacts persist. However (especially in States with high case

benefit levels), they sometimes increase cash assistance payments and months on welfare as the enhanced earnings disregard permits working people to be on welfare at higher levels

of earnings. No increase in cash assistance was found in States

with low benefit levels.

4. Most of the evidence from programs that included time limits

(Connecticut, Florida, and Virginia) failed to show impacts on

receipt of cash benefits before families reached the time limits.

In other words, anticipation of benefit-termination time limits

did not cause recipients to leave welfare early. However, all

three programs also had enhanced earnings disregards that

could have offset any behavioral response to the time limit.

The disregards continue cash assistance eligibility for some

whose earnings otherwise would exceed program limits.

5. The ‘‘messages’’ and expectations that a program conveys to

participants affect its impact. Program messages, or the

strength of the messages, often vary from site to site. For example, all California GAIN Programs in the late 1980s and

early 1990s operated under the same statewide rules. However, the Riverside program projected a strong message that its

purpose was for recipients to get employed quickly. Probably as

a result of this message, the Riverside program also had some

of the largest employment and earnings impacts of evaluated

welfare-to-work programs. The program message might also affect how participants respond to time limits. Because of the

variation in program messages, even among programs with the

same rules, it is difficult to generalize evaluation findings from

a specific site to other programs that might nominally have

similar rules.

Background and analytical issues

Research shows that offering cash welfare to families reduces

work effort (Danziger, et al., 1981). The decision to work requires

a choice between the benefits that can be obtained in the work

force and those available from allocating time to domestic activities

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4For an overview of theoretical issues of the labor supply of women, see Killingsworth &

Heckman (1986). See Becker (1965) for a discussion of theory of the allocation of time between

market activities (work) and domestic activities.

(such as childrearing) or leisure. Though the low-income population

is diverse, the low wages that are offered to most make welfare an

economically more attractive option than a job. Additionally, some

who are working might decide to reduce their hours of work and

make up part of their lost earnings with the welfare payment.

The major issues in welfare-to-work evaluations can be classified

into two groups:

1. Can programs be designed to overcome the work disincentives

inherent in welfare? Specifically, can work efforts be increased

by lowering the rate at which earnings cause a cut in benefits,

or, can these disincentives only be overcome by requiring mandatory participation in a work or job preparation program?

2. Can programs be offered that increase the earnings capacities

of welfare recipients so that work becomes more attractive

than welfare? What type of programs are most effective, ‘‘work

first’’ or education-focused? 4

Work incentives/disincentives.—Empirical research dating back

to the 1960s provides evidence that welfare is a disincentive to

work (Danziger et al., 1981; Moffitt, 1992). To counteract the work

disincentives, policies have been sought to either lessen the disincentive or require some participation in work or job preparation

activities.

One set of policies seeks to ‘‘make work pay,’’ often by reducing

the rate at which a family loses welfare benefits as their earnings

increase. Under the former AFDC Program, after 4 months on a

job, cash benefits were reduced $1 for each additional $1 in earnings above $120 a month. Thus, a family’s total income did not

change with increased work effort, as it faced an implicit marginal

tax rate of 100 percent for earnings above $120 monthly.

Increasing the amount of earnings disregarded in calculating

welfare benefits lowers the implicit tax rate faced by recipient families. However, the bulk of empirical research on the effectiveness

of work incentives, for both increasing work and reducing welfare

receipt, was discouraging (Moffitt, 1992). Increasing earnings disregards raises the level of income at which a family loses eligibility

for benefits. This keeps more families on the rolls and could actually decrease work, through reductions in work effort that are at

least partially offset by the welfare payment. The welfare caseload

could increase, rather than decrease, as some who were previously

ineligible for benefits would be made eligible by increasing earnings disregards. Nonexperimental research indicates that any increase in work effort by those already on the rolls would be canceled out by reduced work effort among new recipients.

The disappointing findings of research on work incentives during

the 1970s and 1980s may have played a role in policymakers’ decisions to consider programs of mandatory participation in work activities or job preparation. Work incentives were sharply limited by

the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97–35),

which also permitted States to require welfare recipients to work

in exchange for their benefits. Mandatory welfare-to-work programs impose a ‘‘time cost’’ on welfare recipients, which reduces

1437

5 Earnings and earnings capacities of individuals are usually analyzed using ‘‘human capital

theory,’’ which relates wages to the skills individuals bring to a job (Becker, 1964). The most

common empirical model of wages was developed by Mincer and Polachek (1974), with earnings

estimated as a function of schooling and job experience. For estimates of earnings capacities for

single women with children, see Haveman and Buron (1993).

their ability to allocate more time to domestic activities or leisure.

For some programs (e.g., those that require work in exchange for

welfare), the imposition of this time cost makes welfare less attractive and theoretically should reduce welfare participation. However, if these activities also provide benefits to recipients (such as

education and training), the time costs might not result in reduced

participation.

Enhancing earnings capacities.—Higher earnings are associated

both with higher levels of formal education and training and job experience (Willis, 1986).5 Though the welfare population is quite diverse, the most disadvantaged recipients tend to have relatively

low levels of schooling as well as relatively little work experience.

Higher earnings capacities can be expected to make work more attractive than welfare. However, there has been an ongoing debate

about which of the following policies are more likely to move and

keep people off welfare by enhancing their earnings capacity:

—programs that quickly move recipients into work to acquire

work experience, often by forgoing formal education and training, with job search the most common first activity required,

—programs that encourage recipients to acquire education and

skills, often by deferring work and acquisition of job experience, or

—programs that provide a mix of services, with the first activity

determined by an assessment of individual skills and needs.

Highlights of selected evaluations

The post-Family Support Act welfare reform programs experimented with a wide variety of welfare-to-work strategies. In general, where evaluations compared participants assigned to a mandatory welfare-to-work program with recipients not assigned to the

program, those in the welfare-to-work program had higher employment rates, higher average earnings, and lower average welfare

benefits. Average earnings impacts are calculated based on the

earnings of all members of an experimental or control group, including nonworking members who have $0 earnings. Average earnings have been increased by: (1) increasing employment; (2) increasing hourly wages of those employed; or (3) a mix of both. The

followup period for these evaluations varies. For evaluations with

a followup period of 2 years or less, impacts reflect short-term effects of a program.

Mandatory welfare-to-work programs.—Almost all of the welfareto-work programs evaluated since passage of the Family Support

Act are mandatory work or job preparation programs. That is, welfare recipients were required to participate in activities or face a

financial sanction. The degree of the financial sanction varied from

program to program. Additionally, the degree to which participation requirements were enforced varied from program to program,

but most were at least nominally mandatory.

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The Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) Program created

by the Family Support Act of 1988 mandated participation of most

able-bodied Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) parents whose youngest child was age 3 or older in a program that

provided a wide array of employment and education and training

services. States had the option of mandating participation for parents with a child as young as age 1. Services were provided subject

to available funding. The purpose of JOBS was to assure that

needy families with children obtained education, training, and employment services to help them avoid long-term welfare dependence.

There were two major evaluations of the JOBS Programs—an

evaluation of the Nation’s largest JOBS Program, California’s

GAIN (Riccio et al., 1994); and NEWWS (U.S. Department, 2000a).

Both evaluations were fielded in multiple sites, and tested a number of different approaches to moving welfare recipients into the

work force. GAIN was a single program, but was implemented differently in different sites. NEWWS is an evaluation of 11 different

welfare-to-work programs. In the GAIN and NEWWS evaluations,

recipients assigned to the program group were subject to participation requirements and were provided services; those assigned to the

control group were not subject to participation requirements or provided services, but could otherwise seek employment and training

in their communities. These evaluations provide information about

the impact of welfare programs operating in the early-to-mid 1990s,

before widespread use of AFDC waivers and before the creation of

TANF.

Over a 3-year followup period, the GAIN Program produced employment gains in five out of six sites, earnings gains in three out

of the six sites, and reductions in cash welfare payments in four

out of the six sites. The GAIN Program provided basic education

for those assessed in need of education (i.e., they lacked a high

school diploma or basic skills) and job search for others. However,

county-by-county implementation of GAIN varied, with some counties emphasizing education more than others. The impacts in Riverside were particularly noteworthy; the employment rate was increased by 26 percent and average total earnings were increased by

49 percent over the 3-year followup period. The Riverside program

was characterized by a strong employment message provided to all,

even those assigned to basic education under GAIN’s rules.

Impacts from 2 years of followup data are available for all 11

programs in the NEWWS evaluation. NEWWS tested programs

that had an employment-focused approach as well as educationfocused programs. The 11 programs are: Atlanta, Georgia (employment-focused); Atlanta (education-focused); Grand Rapids, Michigan (employment-focused); Grand Rapids (education-focused); Riverside, California (employment-focused); Riverside (education-focused); Columbus, Ohio (integrated case management); Columbus

Ohio (traditional case management); Detroit, Michigan; Oklahoma

City (applicants only); and Portland, Oregon. Statistically significant increases in the percent ever employed in year 1 or 2 were

found in all programs except for Oklahoma City (a program that

evaluated impacts on applicants only) and the two Columbus, Ohio

programs (that tested integrated and traditional case manageVerDate 20-JUL-2000 13:14 Sep 29, 2000 Jkt 061710 PO 00000 Frm 01438 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 J:\SKAYNE\GB96\61710.027 WAYS3 PsN: WAYS3
1439

ment). However, by the last quarter of year 2, significant impacts

were found for the two Columbus programs, so that the evaluation

found increases in employment for all programs except Oklahoma

City.

The NEWWS evaluation provides a comparison of programs emphasizing job search with those emphasizing basic education. Participants without a high school diploma or general education degree

(GED) were less likely to enroll in basic education without mandated participation in a welfare-to-work program. However, education-focused programs had small impacts on participation in vocational and postsecondary education. This is due, in part, to many

participants with a high school diploma or GED in both the experimental and control groups enrolling in these activities on their

own. Evaluators also noted some other barriers to vocational and

higher education, such as failing to meet entrance requirements

(other than a high school degree) or the timing of required program

activities failing to coincide with the timing of an academic year or

semester.

Comparison of mandatory programs: ‘‘work first’’ versus education and training.—Though NEWWS found positive impacts

across both ‘‘work first’’ and education-focused programs, there

were differences in both the degree and timing of these impacts.

Chart L–13 shows the employment impacts of the 11 NEWWS

programs over the 2-year followup period. The impact is expressed

as the percent increase or decrease in the program group’s employment rate, compared with the control group’s employment rate. The

chart shows the overall impact (percent change in the percent ever

employed over the 2 years), as well as the impact in the last quarter of the second year. As shown in the chart, employment-focused

programs had somewhat larger percentage impacts, though it was

common for the impact to be less at the end of the 2-year period

than over the entire period. Education-focused programs, on the

other hand, tended to have their greatest impact at the end of the

2-year period.

The fading of program impacts in some ‘‘work first’’ programs reflects a combination of two factors. Some who find a job subsequently lose it. In addition, some control group members eventually

find jobs on their own without the aid of services provided to those

in the experimental group. That is, some of the impact of

employment-focused programs is simply an acceleration of the job

finding process for those who would have gone to work anyway.

The Portland, Oregon program is notable for relatively high overall impacts (18 percent increase in employment and 35 percent increase in average earnings over the 2-year period), as well as relatively high impacts at the end of the 2-year period. Portland represents a mixed services program, much like the Riverside program

included in the GAIN evaluation. Both programs emphasized employment as their goal. However, both programs also directed some

participants to basic education if they were determined to need

skill building before entering the work force. Though the importance of job finding was the goal of both programs, the messages

conveyed to participants differed. The Riverside message was that

recipients should try to obtain any job, even one with low pay and

no benefits as a ‘‘stepping stone’’ to a better job in the future. The

1440

Portland message was that recipients should try to find ‘‘good jobs,’’

those that pay above the minimum wage and provide benefits, and

that it was OK to turn down some jobs. Despite similarities in

earnings impacts, the Riverside GAIN and Portland NEWWS programs produced these impacts differently. Increases in employment

contributed to both programs’ impacts, but Portland also increased

average hourly pay for those who worked. In Riverside GAIN, employed members of the experimental group had slightly lower average hourly pay than employed members of the control group (U.S.

Department, 1998).

CHART L–13. NATIONAL EVALUATION OF WELFARE-TO-WORK STRATEGIES: IMPACTS ON

EMPLOYMENT RATE

* Denotes impact that is not statistically significant.

Note.—LFA on the chart denotes labor force attachment, employment-focused programs; HCD refers to

human capital development, the education-focused programs.

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on information from the U.S. Department

of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department of Education (2000a).

The best test, among available evaluations, of whether employment-focused or education-focused programs are more effective can

be found in the NEWWS evaluations in Atlanta, Grand Rapids,

and Riverside. As mentioned, the NEWWS evaluation had an experimental group subject to an employment-focused program and

an experimental group subject to an education-focused program.

Both treatment groups were measured against the same control

group. Therefore, the evaluators were able to measure the impact

of an employment-focused program, the impact of an educationfocused program, and the impact of the two approaches in comparison with each other.

Table L–3 shows the comparison of the impacts of the employment-focused and education-focused programs. Generally, both

1441

types of programs increased earnings. Exceptions were educationfocused programs for those without a high school diploma or GED,

and the employment-focused program in Grand Rapids for those

who had a high school diploma, though impacts for the programs

themselves are not shown in the table. However, when differences

between the two approaches were found, employment-focused programs tended to increase earnings more than education-focused

programs over the 2 years, especially among those without a high

school diploma or GED. Additional years of followup data might

change these results, since there is a pattern of declining impacts

for employment-focused programs as well as increasing impacts for

education and training programs. However, previous studies have

found that employment and earnings impacts of education-focused

programs sometimes also fade after 2 years, although one program

(Baltimore Options) did produce earnings increases at the end of 5

years (Friedlander & Burtless, 1995).

TABLE L–3.—NEWWS. COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT-FOCUSED WITH EDUCATIONFOCUSED PROGRAMS IN ATLANTA, GRAND RAPIDS, AND RIVERSIDE: IMPACT ON

EARNINGS OVER 2 YEARS

Comparison of employment-focused program and

education-focused program

Full sample

Atlanta ......................................... Employment-focused program impact greater

by $521.

Grand Rapids .............................. No difference.

No high school diploma or GED

Atlanta ......................................... No difference.

Grand Rapids .............................. Employment-focused program impact greater

by $1,063.

Riverside ...................................... Employment-focused program impact greater

by $707.

With high school diploma or GED

Atlanta ......................................... No difference.

Grand Rapids .............................. No difference.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on information from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department of Education (December 1997).

Comparison of mandatory welfare-to-work programs: AFDC waivers.—The findings from welfare-to-work experiments conducted in

the mid 1990s under AFDC waivers are not as consistent as those

from evaluations of JOBS Programs. Evaluations of waiver programs compare participants subject to the welfare reform initiatives with those subject to regular AFDC/JOBS rules. Unlike the

evaluations of JOBS Programs, which compared participants in a

welfare-to-work program with those not subject to welfare-to-work

rules, the waiver evaluations measured the incremental effect of

new program rules above and beyond the effects of AFDC/JOBS requirements.

A number of the waiver evaluations (Arizona, New Jersey, Texas)

failed to find consistent impacts on employment, earnings, and welfare receipt. However, some waiver programs did have considerable

1442

effects; they increased employment and earnings and reduced welfare receipt (Delaware and Indiana). Delaware’s ABC Program increased the employment rate of participants by 20 percent and increased earnings by 16 percent in the first year. Delaware also reduced cash assistance receipt by 5 percent in the first year. Indiana

increased employment by 2 percent over 2 years and earnings by

5 percent. Indiana’s program cut cash assistance payments by 20

percent, with impacts growing in the second year.

Another set of waiver programs in a number of States used enhanced earnings disregards as an inducement to work. These programs are discussed in the next section.

Combining mandatory participation and financial incentives.— Under waivers of AFDC requirements, States were permitted to experiment with higher earnings disregards than were set forth in

Federal law. These programs combined financial incentives with

mandatory work participation requirements, and their evaluation

results are useful for anticipating the effects of changes made

under TANF. Despite the disappointing evidence of earlier research

on the effect of increasing earnings disregards, most States have

coupled higher earnings disregards with mandatory work requirements in their TANF Programs.

Earnings disregards in selected evaluated programs.—Under

AFDC rules, States disregarded $120 plus one-third of remaining

earnings for the first 4 months on a job when calculating benefits.

For the next 8 months, the disregard was reduced to $120, and

thereafter (after 12 months) to $90, a standard work expense. Most

States under their TANF Programs have increased their disregards

from those that prevailed under AFDC.

—Connecticut: 100 percent of earnings up to the Federal poverty

level. This applies to both cash assistance and food stamps. —Florida Family Transition Program (FTP): $200 and 50 percent

of remaining earnings.

—Minnesota MFIP: Benefits equal the maximum grant, increased by 20 percent minus net income. Net income includes

an earnings disregard of 38 percent of gross earnings. MFIP

consolidated cash assistance and food stamps into a single benefit.

—Vermont WRP: $150 plus 25 percent of remaining earnings.

—Virginia Initiative for Employment Not Welfare (VIEW): 100

percent of earnings until the cash benefit plus net earnings

equal the Federal poverty level.

The combination of financial incentives and mandated participation in work or job preparation has produced higher employment

and earnings. Financial incentives alone, without a participation

mandate, tend to produce smaller or no impacts on employment

and often no impacts on earnings. MFIP and Connecticut’s Jobs

First, both programs that combined financial incentives and mandated participation, produced fairly large employment impacts. The

final report on MFIP showed a 35 percent increase in employment

and a 23 percent increase in earnings among long-term, single-parent recipients 9 quarters after the program began. Connecticut’s

Jobs First evaluation showed a 10 percent increase in the employment rate and an 11 percent increase in earnings over the 30-

month followup. The impacts of both programs were sustained over

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time. Additionally, both programs had large impacts on the most

disadvantaged participants, those without a high school degree,

without work experience, and with long spells on welfare.

In the case of MFIP and Connecticut’s Jobs First Program, increases in employment and earnings were accompanied by increases, not reductions, in welfare payments and receipt of assistance. In these programs, the enhanced earnings disregards permitted some working recipients who would have been ineligible for

AFDC to combine work and welfare. These programs could also

cause a reduction in work effort or earnings, as those who would

have worked anyway accept lower paying jobs or work fewer hours

than would otherwise be the case, making up the difference in lost

income with the increased welfare payment received while working.

Whether increases in work effort by those already on the rolls are

canceled out by reduced work effort by those not previously eligible

for benefits (as found in earlier nonexperimental research) cannot

be told from these evaluations. The findings of these evaluations

are limited to the population studied: those who already applied for

and/or received cash assistance. Thus, these evaluations cannot be

used to understand ‘‘entry’’ effects; i.e., how programs affect the

likelihood of low-income people to apply for welfare in the first

place.

Some evaluations of State programs that combined enhanced

earnings disregards with mandated participation yielded different

results than those found in Minnesota and Connecticut. Increased

cash assistance payments were not found in the Florida FTP, the

Vermont Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP), or the Virginia

VIEW Program. Florida and Virginia pay lower benefits than do

Minnesota and Connecticut, and the Vermont earnings disregard is

less generous than those found in Minnesota or Connecticut. Further, in Connecticut and Minnesota, the cash and food stamp earnings disregards were both changed, while the Food Stamp Program

in Florida, Vermont, and Virginia operated under Federal food

stamp earnings disregard rules.

Time limits: impacts before reaching the time limit.—Three evaluations are available on the possible effects of benefit-termination

time limits on welfare-to-work outcomes: the Florida FTP Program,

Connecticut’s Jobs First Program, and the Virginia VIEW Program.

The findings from the Florida, Connecticut, and Virginia programs

are useful in anticipating the effects of TANF’s time limit. All three

programs combined time limits with other welfare reform initiatives, particularly enhanced earnings disregards that allowed some

working participants who would have been ineligible for AFDC to

continue receiving assistance and combine work and welfare. Most

State TANF Programs are operating under policies that combine

increased earnings disregards with time limits. To the degree that

generous earnings disregards increase months of receipt for working recipients, they increase the risk of reaching the time limit,

though they also reduce the risk of reaching the time limit without

earnings.

Generally, there is little evidence that anticipation of time limits

spurred recipients to leave welfare early. No change in cash assistance receipt was recorded before participants reached the time

limit in Florida or in two of the three sites evaluated in Virginia.

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Cash assistance increased in Connecticut. It is possible that the behavioral effect of time limits, which serve as a spur to leave welfare

early, and the enhanced earnings disregards, which permit working

recipients to stay on welfare longer, cancel each other out. In Connecticut, the effect of the very generous earnings disregard might

have overwhelmed the effect of the short time limit.

One site in Virginia (Petersburg) did show reduced cash assistance receipt after recipients became subject to time limits. In Petersburg, program staff actively encouraged working participants to

leave the rolls, and save months of eligibility for future use. In

other Virginia sites and in Connecticut and Florida, evaluators

noted that staff did not actively encourage participants to save remaining months of eligibility. These results are further evidence

that the program message conveyed by local administrators affects

participant behavior.

Welfare time limits have also had a high profile in the media and

public discussions. Evaluations often found that many in the control group incorrectly thought they were subject to the time limit.

In Connecticut, for example, 23 percent of the control group

thought they were subject to a time limit. This misunderstanding

by control group members would have the effect of reducing the impact of the time limit, since it is measured as the difference in outcomes between the program group and the control group.

Programs for teenage parents.—Teen parents on welfare are at

particular risk of becoming long-term recipients. The New Chance

Demonstration, the Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD), and

Ohio’s Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) Program all targeted teenage parents. New Chance was a voluntary program of

education and services for AFDC mothers who had children as

teenagers and dropped out of high school. The TPD required participation and provided enhanced services to teen parents. Neither

set of programs produced lasting impacts on employment and earnings. New Chance slightly reduced employment and earnings early

in the program, as participants engaged in education. The TPD

produced some early impacts, but these did not last. Evaluators of

the TPD found that impacts that occurred while young mothers

were enrolled in the program were not sustained once the mandated participation requirements and expectations of the program

ended for them.

Ohio’s LEAP Program imposed financial sanctions on those who

failed to meet school attendance requirements, and provided bonuses for those who did attend school. Over the 4-year followup period, there were no employment and earnings impacts, but there

was a 5 percent decrease in cash welfare.

Detail for welfare-to-work impact evaluations.—For detailed information about the major impact evaluations conducted after the

passage of the Family Support Act of 1988, see table L–9 at the

end of this section.

FAMILY FORMATION AND STRUCTURE IMPACTS

Two of the objectives of TANF are to ‘‘prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies’’ and to ‘‘encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.’’ Policy initiatives

to promote these objectives have included imposing a family cap

1445

(paying no benefit or a reduced benefit for a new baby born to a

mother already on welfare) and removing special eligibility requirements for two-parent families. However, the bulk of post-Family

Support Act research has focused on broader efforts to alter welfare, especially by increasing work, and the impact of these efforts

on earnings and employment (as discussed in the previous section).

The impact of policy initiatives on nonmarital births and marriage

has received much less attention.

Available findings generally show:

1. The majority of evaluations of welfare-to-work programs that

examine marriage rates and birth rates for single-parent families report no impacts. One evaluation of an AFDC waiver program (Minnesota’s MFIP) did report an increase in marriage

among single-parent families and a decrease in marriage

breakup among two-parent families.

2. State AFDC waiver initiatives that included family cap policies

have produced inconclusive results. While New Jersey reported

a decline in birth rates for AFDC mothers, Arkansas reported

no impacts on birth rates for AFDC mothers as a result of family cap policies.

3. The few programs that have targeted teenage parents have, in

general, reported no impact on the number of births.

Background and analytical issues

Since the 1970s, the overall birth rate for married women has declined, but the number of nonmarital births has substantially increased (see appendix M). This increase in nonmarital births has

been attributed to women delaying the decision to marry, but not

the decision to have a child (Bachrach, 1998). Growth in the welfare caseload, to a historic peak in 1994, was driven in part by the

increase in the number of single female-headed households. Since

1994, caseloads have declined at a largely unexpected rate (almost

half by fiscal year 1999), but the number of single mothers has remained relatively constant (between 9.8 and 10 million each year).

Therefore, while the increase in single mothers may explain much

of the earlier increase in the welfare caseload, the decrease in the

welfare caseload has not been accompanied by a similar decrease

in the number of single mothers.

Economic models of marriage decisions contend that single people marry if the marriage provides a benefit to both individuals.

For couples to remain married, both individuals must continue to

benefit from the union (Becker et al., 1977). Welfare programs provide a means for single mothers to live independently, and therefore, like employment, may serve as a disincentive to marriage.

AFDC assisted single mothers and many believed AFDC and other

welfare programs encouraged divorce or single parenthood by offering a financial alternative to marriage. The Family Support Act of

1988 required every State to operate Aid to Families with Dependent Children—Unemployed Parent (AFDC–UP) Programs, which

provided assistance to eligible two-parent families but contained

special eligibility requirements for such families. Specifically, the

principal wage earner in the family was required to have a significant work history and was not allowed to work 100 hours or more

per month. Many believed these eligibility requirements had a negVerDate 20-JUL-2000 13:14 Sep 29, 2000 Jkt 061710 PO 00000 Frm 01445 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 J:\SKAYNE\GB96\61710.027 WAYS3 PsN: WAYS3
1446

ative impact on decisions to marry or remain married. Although

earlier nonexperimental research found no relationship between

the presence of State AFDC–UP Programs and marital stability

(Winkler, 1995). Under TANF, a significant number of States have

removed these special two-parent eligibility requirements in their

efforts to promote and support marriage.

In addition to being a possible disincentive to marriage, welfare

programs are seen by some as providing an incentive for nonmarital childbearing. In a purely economic sense, many argue that by

increasing the cost of having children by limiting or denying benefits to children born to mothers already on welfare (the ‘‘family

cap’’), public policy may be able to encourage people to postpone

having a child or to limit family size. Others argue that by providing easier access to family planning services, and also by enhancing

these services, public policy may decrease the cost of preventing

unwanted or unplanned pregnancies, which may decrease the number of births. Still others argue that family size decisions, as well

as decisions to marry or divorce, are subjective and personal and

have little to do with economic calculations.

The nonexperimental research examining the effects of welfare

on marriage and fertility produced mixed results. Earlier studies

led many to conclude that the welfare system had no effect on

these outcomes. However, recently, a slight majority of studies

have concluded that welfare has led to a decrease in marriage and

an increase in childbearing (Moffitt, 1998). These studies use various methodologies, different sources of data, and explore different

periods of time. Many contend that the findings reported are sensitive to the factors and methods used to examine this relationship.

Highlights of selected evaluations

The impact of policy initiatives on marriage and fertility has

proven difficult to examine. As discussed above, marriage and

childbearing decisions are highly personal, and it may be difficult

to directly influence these decisions through policy. In contrast,

many believe that certain policy changes may reduce welfare entry

by encouraging persons to marry or delay decisions to have children. However, welfare evaluations only capture the effect of policy

initiatives on those who already receive welfare. Therefore, these

evaluations measure only the effect of policy changes on encouraging marriage among single women who are already receiving welfare, and promoting marital stability among married couples that

also are already receiving welfare. Likewise, welfare evaluations

only discern the effect of policy changes on subsequent births; those

that occur after a woman has already been on welfare.

Impact on marriage.—The Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance

Experiment, conducted in the 1960s and 1970s, was the first experimental test of the impact of transfer programs on marriage. The

analysis suggested that this program, which guaranteed a minimum income level, increased marital dissolution among white and

black couples and increased rates of marriage or remarriage among

Hispanic single-parent families. However, reanalysis of these findings has led many to question the impacts originally reported. Further, differences between policy changes and the program structure

and environments make comparisons between the Seattle-Denver

1447

Income Maintenance Experiment and the more recent evaluations

difficult.

The Family Support Act of 1988 authorized a set of State experiments that liberalized eligibility for two-parent (unemployed) families by permitting them to work 100 or more hours monthly, without making other policy changes. By limiting other policy changes,

many hoped that the evaluations of the three approved State demonstrations—California, Utah, Wisconsin—would provide insight

into the impact of changes to the 100-hour rule. Reports on these

demonstrations have been completed, but have not been released.

The majority of the pre-TANF evaluations of ‘‘work first’’ and

education-focused programs, which examine marriage among individuals already receiving welfare, report no impacts for singleparent families. One evaluation of an AFDC waiver program, the

Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), reported an impact

on the percent of parents who were married 3 years after the program began. However, this impact varied depending on the population examined and the types of services individuals received, as

illustrated in table L–4.

TABLE L–4.—MINNESOTA FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM: IMPACTS ON MARITAL STATUS

3 YEARS AFTER THE PROGRAM BEGAN

Single-parent families Full MFIP Program (financial incentives plus mandatory participation)

Long-term welfare recipients .. Increase in percent currently married.

Recent applicants ................... No impact.

Single-parent families: subgroups Financial incentives

package

Full program (financial incentives plus

mandatory participation)

Effect of adding the

mandatory participation requirement

Long-term welfare recipients: urban counties.Increase in percent currently

married.

No impact ......... No impact.

Recent applicants: urban

counties.

No impact ......... No impact ......... No impact.

Child outcome sample: single mothers with children

ages 2–9 when program

began.

Increase in percent currently

married.

Increase in percent currently

married.

No impact.

Two-parent families Financial incentives package and elimination of special two-parent

eligibility requirements

Welfare recipients: urban

counties.

Increase in percent currently married.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on information in Miller et al.

(2000).

1448

Overall, among long-term recipients in urban and rural counties,

MFIP increased the percent who were married 3 years after the

program began. The program had no impact on the percent of recent applicants who were currently married 3 years after the program began. The evaluation of MFIP was unique in its design. In

addition to the control group, which was subject to the old AFDC

rules, single-parent families in the research sample were assigned

to one of two treatment groups. Those in the first treatment group,

the financial incentives package group, were subject to changes including the enhanced disregard of earnings (financial incentives).

Those in the second treatment group, the full program group, were

subject to these same changes, but were also required to participate in MFIP’s employment and training services once they had received assistance for 24 of the past 36 months. This three-way design allowed the researchers to disentangle the effects of the program’s two major components—financial incentives and mandatory

employment and training services.

The previous welfare-to-work section reported that programs like

MFIP, which combine mandatory participation in employment and

training with enhanced earnings disregards, have been particularly

effective in raising earnings and employment among single mothers

who are long-term welfare recipients. However, among long-term,

single-parent recipients in urban counties, this combined approach

in Minnesota produced no impact on marriage 3 years after the

program began. As table L–4 illustrates, while there was an increase in the percent of recipients who were currently married

among those subject to the financial incentives package, there was

no impact for those who were subject to the full package of MFIP

benefits. Again, there were no impacts on marriage reported for applicants in urban counties assigned to either of the treatment

groups.

The MFIP evaluation also included a survey of mothers who

were single and had children between the ages of 2 and 9 when

they entered MFIP. Among these women, the combined program

increased the percent who were married 3 years later. As table L–

4 illustrates, this increase is entirely a result of the financial incentives, as the addition of the mandatory participation requirement

had no impact on the percent who were currently married. While

these results are difficult to reconcile, they provide some evidence

that financial incentives, rather than mandatory employment and

training services, may have an impact on marriage among single

mothers.

Two-parent families in MFIP were subject to different provisions

than single-parent families, including the financial incentives package, a requirement that one parent work or participate in

employment-related activities when the family had received assistance for 6 of the past 12 months, and the removal of special twoparent eligibility requirements. Many believed the removal of these

eligibility requirements would promote marital stability by allowing two-parent families to remain together through difficult times

such as loss of work. While the research design does not disentangle the effect of this specific reform (the elimination of special twoparent eligibility requirements), there is some evidence that MFIP

enhanced marital stability. Among the sample of two-parent recipiVerDate 20-JUL-2000 13:14 Sep 29, 2000 Jkt 061710 PO 00000 Frm 01448 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 J:\SKAYNE\GB96\61710.027 WAYS3 PsN: WAYS3
1449

ent families, the evaluation reported an increase in the percent

who were currently married 3 years after the program began. The

evaluation also reported a decrease in the percent divorced or separated and a decrease in the percent cohabiting with a partner 3

years after the program began.

Impact on fertility.—A policy initiative designed to discourage repeat births to welfare mothers that has received a great deal of attention is the family cap. Family caps were implemented by 19

States through AFDC waivers and additional States added them

under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). State programs implementing the family cap deny additional cash assistance

for children conceived and born to mothers while they are receiving

welfare.

New Jersey and Arkansas, two of the States that received waivers from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

(DHHS) to implement a family cap, conducted evaluations of their

programs. The New Jersey evaluation reported a decrease in births

among both ongoing cases (those receiving welfare before implementation of the Family Development Program, FDP) and new

cases (those who joined the welfare rolls after implementation of

the FDP), as well as an increase in abortions among new cases

(Camasso et al., 1998a). Arkansas reported no impact on the number of births to Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)

mothers (Turturro et al., 1997). However, both studies indicate confusion among participants as to which rules and program services

applied to them. This potential ‘‘contamination’’ (i.e., individuals

believing they were subject to the family cap when they were not)

has led many to express concern about the validity of these results.

Evaluators in New Jersey supplemented their experimental evaluation with nonexperimental analysis, comparing outcomes, such

as birth and abortion rates, after implementation of the waiver

with those that would have been expected without the policy

change, and using statistical techniques to ‘‘control’’ for other factors that could affect births and abortions. This analysis supported

the results of the experimental evaluation by concluding that the

waiver program led to fewer births and more abortions than would

have been expected given demographic trends in New Jersey at the

time. However, given these mixed results and the limited amount

of available information, many contend that the effectiveness of the

family cap on discouraging births to women already receiving cash

assistance remains unclear.

Impact on teenage parents.—A few demonstration programs examined initiatives to promote education and training and to discourage nonmarital births among teenage parents. While these programs led to some short-term impacts, none reported long-term impacts on pregnancies, births, or use of birth control. Evaluators of

these programs contend that the ‘‘right’’ mix of interventions to

help teenage parents has not been found.

The TPD Program targeted teenage parents who were pregnant

with, or had given birth to their first child, and were receiving welfare for the first time. Participants were provided with case management services and workshops on employment and life planning,

in addition to an employment preparation and training component.

No impacts on pregnancies, births, or the use of birth control were

1450

reported. The TPD did report an increase in the number of abortions in Chicago, but no impact on the number of abortions was

found in Camden or Newark.

The New Chance Program, with a design similar to the TPD, was

undertaken in 16 sites around the country. Participation in the

program was voluntary. The goal of New Chance was to enable

participants to acquire education and vocational education to secure jobs and thereby postpone childbearing decisions. No longterm impacts on pregnancies, births, abortions or birth control

were reported 42 months after the program began. The evaluation

did report that women in the New Chance Program were more likely than women in the control group to be pregnant during 9 of the

first 24 months after random assignment. The evaluators attribute

this to the fact that at the 18-month point, although not at the 42-

month point, women in the New Chance group were more likely to

be living with a male partner.

A third teen intervention program, Ohio’s LEAP Program, targeted school attendance among teenage parents, with the hope of

increasing the number who would graduate from high school. While

the program did increase the rates at which participants completed

9th, 10th, and 11th grade, LEAP had no impact on the number of

subsequent births 3 years after followup.

Table L–5 provides a summary of the studies reviewed in this

section on family formation and structure outcomes. Additional information about the studies may be found in table L–9, at the end

of this appendix.

TABLE L–5.—FAMILY FORMATION AND STRUCTURE OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT

EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988

Marital status Births Abortions

National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS)

National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: Evaluating Alternative Welfare-to-Work Approaches: Two Year Impacts for Eleven Programs, June 2000

Of the 11 programs examined, only 1 program reported an impact. Riverside LFA reported a decrease of 20% (11% vs.

13%) in percent married

and living with spouse.

Of the 11 programs examined,

only 1 program reported an

impact. Columbus traditional program reported a

decrease of 41% (3% vs.

8%) in the percent who had

a baby since study entry.

Not reported.

New Chance Demonstration

New Chance: Final Report on a Comprehensive Program for Young Mothers in Poverty and Their

Children, October 1997

Not reported. No impact on pregnancies or

births during the 42-month

followup period. Decrease in

number of months between

last terminated pregnancy

at random assignment and

onset of next pregnancy of

1% (36 vs. 38).

No impact on percent who had

ever had an abortion by the

42-month followup interview.

1451

TABLE L–5.—FAMILY FORMATION AND STRUCTURE OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—

Continued

Marital status Births Abortions

Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD)

Moving into Adulthood: Were the Impacts of Mandatory Programs for Welfare-Dependent Teenaged Parents Sustained After the Programs Ended?, February 1998

Not reported. No impact on percent who had

pregnancies, births, or miscarriages over the 78-month

followup.

Increase in percent who reported an abortion 78

months after intake in Chicago of 23% (23% vs.

19%). No impact in Camden

and Newark.

Arizona: Employing and Moving People Off Welfare and Encouraging Responsibility (EMPOWER)

Arizona: Evaluation of the Arizona EMPOWER Welfare Reform Demonstration, May 1999

No impact. Decrease of 60% (2% vs. 4%)

in births to unwed minors.

Not reported.

Arkansas: Welfare Waiver Demonstration

Arkansas Welfare Waiver Demonstration Final Report, June 1997

Not reported. No impact on number of births

to AFDC case heads 5 years

after the program began.

Not reported.

California: Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)

GAIN: Benefits, Costs, and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work Program, September 1994

No impact. No impact on percentage who

have given birth within 2–3

years after program began.

Not reported.

Connecticut: Jobs First

Jobs First: Implementation and Early Impacts of Connecticut’s Welfare Reform Initiative, February 2000

No impact. No impact on the percentage

who gave birth or did not

give birth.

Not reported.

Minnesota: Family Investment Program (MFIP)

Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota Family Investment Program, Volume 1: Effects on Adults, June 2000

Long-term single-parent families

Increase of 51% (11% vs.

7%) in percent currently

married at the time of

the 3-year interview.

Not reported. Not reported.

Long-term single-parent families—urban counties

No impact. Not reported. Not reported.

Long-term single-parent families—urban counties: Without mandated participation

Increase of 89% (11% vs.

6%) in percent currently

married at the time of

the 3-year interview.

Not reported. Not reported.

1452

TABLE L–5.—FAMILY FORMATION AND STRUCTURE OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—

Continued

Marital status Births Abortions

Recent applicants—urban counties

No impact. Not reported. Not reported.

Two-parent recipient families

Increase of 40% (67% vs.

48%) in percent currently married at the

time of the 3-year interview.

Not reported. Not reported.

Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota Family Investment Program, Volume 2: Effects on Children, June 2000

Increase of 82% (11% vs.

6%) in percent currently

married at the time of

the 3-year interview.

No impact on percent who had

a child during the 3-year

followup period.

Not reported.

New Jersey: Family Development Program (FDP)

A Final Report on the Impact of New Jersey’s Family Development Program: Experimental-Control Group Analysis, October 1998

Not reported. Ongoing cases: Decrease in cumulative number of own

births per 1,000 individuals

December 1992–December

1996 for ongoing cases of

11% (319 vs. 358)

Ongoing cases: No impact

New cases: Decrease in cumulative number of own births

per 1,000 individuals December 1992–December

1996 of 12% (269 vs. 304).

New cases: Increase in cumulative number of abortions

per 1,000 individuals December 1992–December

1996 of 14% (356 vs. 312).

A Final Report on the Impact of New Jersey’s Family Development Program: Results from a PrePost Analysis of AFDC Case Heads from 1990–1996, October 1998

Not reported. Decrease in own births that

would have been expected

without the FDP of 32%

(35,785 vs. 24,469).

Increase in abortions that

would have been expected

without FDP of 3% (39,114

vs. 40,330).

Ohio: Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP)

Final Report on Ohio’s Welfare Initiative to Improve School Attendance Among Teenage Parents:

Ohio’s Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) Program, August 1997

Not reported. No impact on number of subsequent births 3 years after

followup.

Not reported.

Note: Some percentage changes reported in this table may differ if calculated based on the reported

findings, due to rounding. The percentage changes reported in this table reflect the percentage changes as

reported in the individual evaluations.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on a review of research evaluations. Information concerning the data, the target populations, and the package of initiatives included in

each evaluation is highlighted in the table of welfare-to-work outcomes in the previous section. The outcomes presented in this table should be supplemented with the details of the evaluation highlighted in the

welfare-to-work table.

1453

ECONOMIC STATUS IMPACTS

The previous sections discussed impacts of welfare reform initiatives on employment and earnings and on family formation and

structure. This section summarizes findings of evaluations about

the impact of welfare reform initiatives on the economic well-being

of families. It uses combined income from earnings, cash welfare,

and food stamps as the primary measure of families’ material status. This section also summarizes information on poverty, health

insurance status, and child care costs and arrangements as available from some evaluations.

Though raising a family’s income and reducing poverty are not

explicit TANF goals, Federal law requires TANF State plans to

outline how the States intend to provide needy parents with services to enable them to ‘‘leave the program and become selfsufficient.’’ Attainment of self-sufficiency implies a rise in family income. Additionally, other sections of TANF law (besides its explicit

goals) reflect interest in the overall economic well-being of TANF

families or families with children in general. For example, States

are required to report on their child poverty rate, and if their child

poverty rate increases by more than 5 percent over a year as a result of TANF implementation, the State is required to file a ‘‘corrective action’’ plan with the Federal Government. TANF also requires DHHS to include information on average income in its annual report to Congress on families that reached the TANF time

limit or had teen parents.

Generally, the available evaluations find:

1. Welfare-to-work programs often succeed in moving recipients to

employment but not in raising incomes. Studies of programs

from the AFDC/Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) era

(1988–96) show that increases in earnings generally offset but

did not exceed reductions in AFDC cash benefits and food

stamps.

2. Some welfare-to-work programs that combined mandatory participation requirements with enhanced earnings disregards

(which permit working recipients to keep more of their benefits) raised incomes and reduced poverty. However, the rise in

income most often occurred because of increases in earnings

and by increasing, not decreasing, welfare payments. Enhanced

disregards permitted families to combine work and welfare at

higher levels of earnings than were possible under AFDC.

3. Little can be said about the impact of family formation decisions on economic well-being from these evaluations. The available evaluations also do not show any impact of attempts to increase the incentives for mothers to cooperate with efforts to

obtain and enforce child support orders or increase the employment of noncustodial parents. The Parent’s Fair Share Demonstration showed an increase in child support payments without a corresponding increase in employment and earnings

(Doolittle et al., 1998).

4. Two evaluations of programs with time limits (Florida and

Connecticut) are available. Neither program produced evidence

that the group subject to the time limit had lower combined incomes than the comparison group not subject to the time limVerDate 20-JUL-2000 13:14 Sep 29, 2000 Jkt 061710 PO 00000 Frm 01453 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 J:\SKAYNE\GB96\61710.027 WAYS3 PsN: WAYS3
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its. This was true even after some in the group subject to time

limits could have actually reached the limit.

5. Some welfare-to-work programs increase children’s participation in formal child care. Welfare-to-work programs that increase employment and reduce cash assistance receipt sometimes reduce health insurance coverage. Medicaid coverage

while recipients are on cash assistance (and transitional Medicaid for those who have worked their way off cash aid) is not

always replaced by employer-provided health insurance.

Background and analytical issues

The economic well-being of a family is greatly affected by both

the employment status of its adult members and its family structure. Female-headed families with children are far more likely to

be poor than families with children headed by a married couple,

even when single mothers work. In 1998, a single mother who

worked full time year-round was eight times more likely to be poor

than her married counterpart, 13.3 percent compared to 1.6 percent

(U.S. Census Bureau, 1999). Though recent welfare reform initiatives have made some policy changes intended to promote marriage

or marital stability and reduce out-of-wedlock births, evaluations

have shown few impacts. In addition to marriage, other decisions

about living arrangements (e.g., cohabitation, living with extended

family members, living with others) and sharing economic resources affect the material well-being of families with children. In

fact, for single-mother families, the earnings of ‘‘other’’ members of

the household have been found to be particularly important in understanding their economic circumstances (Bane & Ellwood, 1986;

Schoeni & Blank, 2000).

Success of a welfare-to-work program in increasing earnings and

employment and reducing welfare receipt does not automatically

translate into increased economic resources available to a family to

raise its standard of living. Participants might not increase earnings enough to offset losses in needs-tested cash and food benefits.

Leaving welfare and going to work entails other losses:

—Using a portion of income to pay for work expenses.—The economic gain from working is reduced by work-related expenses,

such as taxes, child care, or transportation costs.

—Potential loss of health insurance.—Receipt of cash welfare

generally also conveys health care coverage in the form of Medicaid. (This was automatic under AFDC; it is no longer under

TANF, although Medicaid coverage is still required for certain

TANF families and former recipients.) Increased nonwelfare income can cause a loss of Medicaid coverage. Though transitional Medicaid is potentially available for those who lose coverage because of an increase in earnings, this transitional coverage is limited to 1 year (2 years in some States). Medicaid

coverage is sometimes not replaced by employer-provided

health insurance, as some former recipients find jobs that do

not offer health benefits.

A complete examination of the economic well-being of families

who participated in welfare-to-work programs would require a comprehensive measure of economic resources and work expenses of

participants, such as a measure of the family’s disposable money

1455

and near-money income after tax payments and work expenses

(Citro & Michael, 1995). None of the evaluations had such comprehensive measures.

The most common measure of income in these evaluations was

combined income from earnings, cash assistance, and food stamps,

probably because these data are readily obtained from administrative records. However, this is not a complete measure of total income, and it will be designated as ‘‘combined income’’ for the remainder of this section. The income of husbands, partners, and

other household members is not taken into account when examining economic well-being in studies based on administrative records.

Some evaluations survey program participants to obtain more comprehensive measures of income, including that of other household

members.

A comprehensive measure of economic resources would include

noncash benefits such as health insurance and child care subsidies,

and would subtract taxes paid but add benefits from Federal and

State earned income credits (EICs). Only the most recent studies

include this information, and EIC income must be estimated since

information about its receipt is unavailable from most of the data

sources used in these evaluations. It should also be noted that even

these recent studies are of programs in operation before the 1993

major expansion of the Federal EIC, the expansion of child care

funding in the 1996 welfare reform law, and establishment of the

State Children’s Health Insurance Program in the 1997 Balanced

Budget Act.

Highlights of selected evaluations

In examining the economic well-being of welfare families, evaluations of programs after the 1988 Family Support Act can be divided

into two groups:

1. Evaluations of programs operating under AFDC/JOBS rules

with recipients subject to former Federal rules for counting

earnings. After 4 months on a job, an AFDC recipient essentially lost $1 for each additional $1 in earnings. These programs, while successful in raising employment and earnings,

often failed to increase combined income from earnings, AFDC,

and food stamps by statistically significant amounts.

2. Recent evaluations of programs with enhanced earnings disregards, which permit recipients to keep more of their welfare

benefit as earnings increase. These programs sometimes did

raise income. Two of them (Jobs First in Connecticut and the

Minnesota MFIP) did so by increasing not decreasing welfare

payments, which supplemented earnings.

The second set of evaluated programs is important in anticipating the effects of the TANF Program, as 45 States had liberalized

the treatment of earnings under TANF, as of January 1, 2000.

However, TANF has a 5-year time limit on the use of Federal funds

to provide assistance, including earnings supplements in the form

of earnings disregards. States may continue to pay these supplements using their own funds. States also may use Federal TANF

money or State dollars outside their welfare program and its rules

(including the 5-year limit) to provide State EICs to low-income

families with children.

1456

AFDC/JOBS evaluations.—The National Evaluation of Welfareto-Work Strategies (NEWWS), which covered 11 programs in 7

sites, is the largest evaluation of programs operating under AFDC/

JOBS rules. The second largest evaluation of JOBS covered the

California program of Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN),

which was evaluated in six counties. Both evaluations showed that

under these programs, success in moving recipients from welfare to

work was not likely to increase combined income. For the California GAIN evaluation of the late 1980s and early 1990s, no significant impacts in combined income were found in five of the six sites

examined at the end of year 3. Across the 11 programs in the

NEWWS evaluation, there were no significant increases in combined income from AFDC, food stamps, and earnings in year 2 despite earnings increases in most programs (including Portland). If

estimated EIC income is added to combined income, significant increases are found in two NEWWS programs in year 2 (Portland

and the Atlanta education-focused program). Generally, these programs did change the composition of income so that participants

relied more on earnings and less on welfare. However, their earnings gains were offset by losses in welfare benefits, and the net effect was a statistical ‘‘wash’’ with no perceptible change in combined income. However, these programs did change the composition

of income so that participants relied more on earnings and were

less dependent on welfare.

These programs also did little to remove participants from poverty. However, some relatively small impacts on the share of participants above the poverty line were found in GAIN and NEWWS.

This occurred even in programs that had no change in average income.

Impact of more generous earnings disregards.—Increasing earnings disregards above those that existed under AFDC is often seen

as a work incentive. However, these increased earnings disregards

also permit participants to continue to receive cash assistance at

higher levels of earnings than they could under AFDC, thus

supplementing their earnings with a continued cash benefit. Earnings disregards, even when offered as a work incentive, might also

serve as income supports for working people.

The Connecticut Jobs First, Florida Family Transition Program

(FTP), Minnesota MFIP, Virginia Initiative for Employment Not

Welfare (VIEW), and Vermont WRP Programs all combined mandated participation with enhanced earnings disregards (see welfare-to-work section for details on the earnings disregards). In Vermont, no increase in total income was reported. Virginia’s VIEW

Program reported some increases in combined income for some

quarters of the followup, but no consistent pattern of increased income was found.

Connecticut, Florida, and Minnesota each showed comparatively

large impacts on combined income from earnings, cash assistance,

and food stamps. Minnesota’s MFIP Program is notable because of

its explicit goals to increase income and reduce poverty among families with children. MFIP showed a 15 percent increase in combined

income for single, long-term recipients over the 3-year followup.

MFIP also produced a 9 percent increase in combined income over

the followup for recent applicants. Programs that essentially set

1457

6For single-parent families, the estimated annual increase in MFIP costs to the government was about $2,000 per family. The two major components of this cost were higher welfare payments and the costs of continued Medicaid coverage. 7This reflects the percent in the report sample (for whom outcomes are reported) who reached

the time limit. The Florida FTP followup is for a 3-year period. Most recipients are subject to

a 24-month benefit limit in any 60-month period. However, certain disadvantaged recipients are

subject to a limit of 36 months within a 72-month period. None of the very disadvantaged recipients could have reached the time limit during the 3-year followup period. Additionally, many

who were subject to a 24-month limit had months of potential assistance remaining. They had

either been off the rolls for some months (e.g., working) or exempted from the time limit during

some months and had those months not count toward their 24-month limit.

welfare-to-work goals but offered enhanced earnings disregards

also showed increases in combined income. Connecticut showed a

10 percent increase in combined income over the 30-month followup, and Florida showed a combined income increase of 5 percent

over 3 years.

Raising the income of participants often comes at a cost. Only in

Florida did increased income result from a program with declines

in both cash and food stamp receipt. In Minnesota and Connecticut,

the increase in income came at the cost of increasing welfare payments. Thus, at least in the short run, these programs impose

costs, and do not provide savings, for the government.6 Additionally, these programs raised the incomes of some people who would

have worked anyway. The evaluations indicate that higher earnings disregards or income supports for working people actually

cause a reduction in work effort and earnings for some people who

would have worked without the policy change.

The findings of the Connecticut and Minnesota evaluations might

not be applicable to other States. The impact on income is a function of complex interactions that depend on the size of the cash

welfare grant, the Food Stamp Program, and the size of the program’s earnings impact. In Minnesota and Connecticut, the earnings disregards for food stamps, in addition to cash assistance,

were increased. Connecticut permitted a 100 percent disregard of

earnings below the Federal poverty income guidelines for both cash

and food stamps, while Minnesota combined cash and food aid into

a single grant. On the other hand, Florida, Vermont, and Virginia

increased earnings disregards only for cash aid. Virginia has one

of the larger earnings disregards for its cash benefit program, yet

its program failed to consistently increase total income. In Virginia,

increases in earnings produced income gains (with reductions, not

increases, in cash benefits) in only one of three sites evaluated.

Impact after reaching the time limit.—In only two programs evaluated thus far did some participants actually reach a Stateimposed time limit: Connecticut and Florida. The evaluation of Virginia’s VIEW has information on only 24 months. Its time limit is

24 months, so it only has information on participants before they

reach the time limit.

Florida’s FTP Program had the first recipients in the Nation to

reach time limits. However, during the course of the 3-year followup at the Florida evaluation site, only 7 percent of all participants

reached a time limit.7 Connecticut is the major evaluation available

with relatively large numbers of recipients who reached the time

limit. About 40 percent of participants reached the 21-month time

limit within the 30-month followup period, though many obtained

extensions of the time limit because they had low earnings.

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Connecticut grants unlimited 6-month extensions to those who

have complied with Jobs First rules and who make good faith efforts at finding employment but earn less than the old AFDC payment standard plus $90 (the old AFDC standard work expense deduction). Therefore, the time limit affects only those who would

have been ineligible for AFDC but retained eligibility for TANF because of the generous (100 percent of poverty) earnings disregard

or those who have not made good faith efforts to find employment.

The combined income impact in Connecticut differs early in the

followup (before recipients could reach the time limit) compared

with later in the followup, as some participants did reach the time

limits. At quarter 6 (before families could have reached the time

limit), the combined income of those in the experimental group was

15 percent higher than those in the control group. In quarter 10

(when some families reached the time limit), there was no impact.

That is, once the time limit is reached, Connecticut’s combined income impacts are similar to those in other welfare-to-work programs that do not have more generous earnings disregards.

Though the income gains vanished toward the end of the followup, the Connecticut program did not produce income losses. That

is, even after the time limit could have been reached, the group

subject to the time limit did not have average incomes lower than

the group not subject to the time limit. This is due, in part, to higher earnings in the group subject to new program rules that include

the time limit. It might also be due to the way in which the time

limit was implemented. Connecticut’s time limit essentially removes from the rolls those who would have been ineligible for

AFDC because their earnings are too high, but it leaves on the rolls

(via extensions) those who would have been income-eligible for

AFDC. The wider import of the findings from Connecticut’s program depends on how States implement their time limits, particularly for those recipients who are without earnings at the point

when they reach the time limit.

Supplements to increase the rewards from work.—During the

1990s, a number of national ‘‘make work pay’’ initiatives were enacted:

1. The Federal EIC was significantly expanded in 1993;

2. Federal funding to the States to help low-income parents pay

for child care was significantly increased in the 1996 welfare

reform law; and

3. Federal matching funds for a new State Children’s Health Insurance Program were provided in the Balanced Budget Act of

1997.

In addition, TANF-enhanced earnings disregards provide income

supplements for those who combine welfare and work. They also

keep families on welfare, which may convey benefits and services

in addition to cash assistance. For example, MFIP increased health

care coverage by keeping working families on cash assistance and,

hence, Medicaid, longer. (The MFIP evaluation was conducted preTANF, when AFDC recipients were automatically covered by Medicaid.)

There is considerable interest in how those who leave welfare for

work are faring. None of the available evaluations include data on

the use of recent initiatives to ‘‘make work pay.’’ However, some

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8The subgroup of working parents who paid for child care and lacked a high school diploma

or basic skills in the Riverside employment-focused program reported paying a very high 74 percent of weekly earnings for child care. However, the overall Riverside group in the employmentfocused program reported they paid 55 percent of their earnings for child care, more typical of

the other groups in Riverside who reported working and paying for child care.

evaluations of programs conducted before the expansion of work

supports showed that those who left welfare for work, not only

were likely to have no more income than they did while on welfare,

but were also at risk of being without health insurance and incurring child care costs.

The GAIN and NEWWS evaluations of AFDC/JOBS Programs

provided some evidence that success in moving welfare recipients

to work can actually result in reduced health insurance coverage.

Reduced coverage was found in two GAIN sites. Of the 11 programs evaluated in NEWWS, reduced health insurance coverage

was found in three. Though the programs increased receipt of

employer-provided health insurance and use of transitional Medicaid, this was not enough to offset the loss of automatic Medicaid

coverage while on cash assistance, as some jobs did not come with

employer-provided health insurance.

Additionally, NEWWS provided evidence that welfare-to-work

programs can increase the use of child care, particularly paid child

care. Parents who pay for child care also might incur substantial

costs. For those parents employed at the end of the 2-year followup

period for NEWWS who paid for child care, the average proportion

of weekly earnings used for child care ranged from about 30 percent in several sites, to 50 percent in Riverside, California, and Detroit.8 NEWWS also found that welfare-to-work programs could increase the use of subsidized child care. (Health insurance coverage

and child care costs for those who leave welfare are two issues

often discussed in State ‘‘leaver’’ studies, discussed later in this appendix.)

Though supplements for working poor families may raise family

incomes, this comes at a direct cost to the government. Additionally, people may change their behavior in response to these work

supports. The Wisconsin New Hope Program was a pilot that tested substantial work supports for low-income persons who worked

30 hours a week. The supports included a cash supplement, paid

health insurance, and paid child care. New Hope increased employment and earnings for those who were not working at the time

they entered the program. However, for those who were working

full time (or more) at the time they entered the program, there was

a reduction in their hours of work (although not the rate of employment). Those who were working more than full time tended to reduce their hours of work down to full-time schedules.

The New Hope Program generally succeeded in raising the economic well-being of program participants. For those who were already working full time when they entered the program, however,

there was a decrease in cash income of 8 percent in year 2, reflecting their reduced hours of work. Nonetheless, participants were

likely to be better off on average, because their health insurance

and child care were paid for. Additionally, the New Hope Program

resulted in a decrease in employer-provided health insurance coverage, since all participants working full time were given health inVerDate 20-JUL-2000 13:14 Sep 29, 2000 Jkt 061710 PO 00000 Frm 01459 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 J:\SKAYNE\GB96\61710.027 WAYS3 PsN: WAYS3
1460

surance through the program. Participants might have been more

willing to accept jobs without health insurance or not seek another

job that came with health insurance, because New Hope already

provided them with such coverage.

Child support.—That welfare-to-work programs might succeed in

raising employment and earnings but not income led to initiatives

to supplement a mother’s earnings. Supplements may be paid from

the government (discussed above). Another type of supplement is a

payment from the absent father in the form of child support payments.

Three types of initiatives that seek to increase child support payments have been evaluated:

1. Incentives for the custodial parents to help establish child support orders;

2. Increasing the amount of child support a family on welfare receives if the noncustodial parent pays child support (passing

through child support payments); and

3. Increasing the earnings potential of noncustodial parents.

The New York Child Assistance Program (CAP) provided financial rewards to custodial parents that established child support orders. The program succeeded in producing increases in the establishment of orders, but failed to increase collections.

Only preliminary (1-year) results are available from Wisconsin’s

demonstration of a 100 percent passthrough of child support to

families enrolled in its W–2 (welfare/work) program. No consistent

impacts were found on establishment of paternity, child support orders, or percentage of cases with a payment. There were no signs

during the 1-year followup period that noncustodial parents were

more apt to make child support payments if they knew the receiving family, and not the government, would be the beneficiary of the

payment. Families in the group that received the 100 percent passthrough did, of course, receive more child support than families

that received only the $50 passthrough. Moreover, families that received the 100 percent passthrough were more likely to leave W–

2 or ‘‘move up’’ in the program to higher levels of work activity.

The Parent’s Fair Share Demonstration (seven sites) attempted

to boost the incomes of noncustodial parents through employment

services (job search, education and training). Through a six-quarter

followup, the program increased employment in only three of the

seven sites (Dayton, Ohio; Los Angeles, California; and Springfield,

Massachusetts) and failed to increase the earnings of noncustodial

parents in any of the sites. This demonstration boosted the percent

of noncustodial parents that paid child support in only one site

(Grand Rapids) and boosted the average amount of child support

paid in two sites (Dayton and Grand Rapids).

Detail for economic status impact evaluations.—Table L–10, at

the end of this appendix, shows economic status impacts for evaluations conducted after passage of the Family Support Act of 1988.

Because economic well-being is affected by both welfare to work

and family formation and structure outcomes, the table also summarizes outcomes for these categories. The major economic wellbeing outcome shown in the table is income as measured in the

evaluation. Unless otherwise noted, the impacts shown are for the

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entire evaluation followup period. For detail on each evaluation

shown in the table, see table L–9.

CHILD WELL-BEING IMPACTS

Most Federal and State welfare policies apply directly to parents,

not children. They are aimed at promoting mothers’ work and reducing their dependence on welfare. At the time of passage of

TANF, some proponents maintained that the new program would

help children by increasing earnings and hence family income,

thereby providing more resources to meet children’s needs, and by

giving children the positive role model of a working parent. However, policies that promote and support work may also alter the

child’s well-being in other ways. For example, they may increase

tension or stress in the adult’s life because of the need to balance

work with home and child care responsibilities. In addition, requiring mothers to work reduces their time to nurture children and requires them to find other care givers. Some critics maintained that

TANF time limits and mandatory work requirements could result

in harmful outcomes for children. Thus far under TANF, there has

been a sharp rise in work by welfare mothers, and there is growing

interest in how welfare to work and other policies have affected

children.

With regard to outcomes for children, post-Family Support Act

research generally shows:

1. A small number of evaluations have reported child well-being

outcomes. Additional States will be releasing evaluations of

child well-being impacts over the coming months.

2. The few evaluations of policy changes that directly impact children provide mixed results. The Georgia Preschool Immunization Project increased the rate of immunizations among children subject to the requirement, but Michigan’s savings incentive for students produced no impacts on their earnings or employment.

3. Evaluations of policies that do not directly target child outcomes show few, if any, impacts on child well-being. The few

impacts found have been small. NEWWS reported favorable

impacts for children (e.g., school-related), but negative impacts

were also reported in some sites (e.g., removal from mother’s

care). The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) reported generally favorable impacts for children, and these impacts may be attributed to the financial incentives in this program. Unlike the programs in the NEWWS evaluations, MFIP

also reported positive impacts on measures of income.

Background and analytical issues

Research has illustrated the negative effects of poverty on children. Poor children generally score lower on assessments of health,

cognitive development, school achievement, and emotional wellbeing. Poor children are more likely to be raised by a single parent,

to be raised in neighborhoods with higher rates of crime, and to attend schools with fewer resources (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, &

Maritato, 1997). These findings have led many to contend that programs that raise the income of families may positively affect child

well-being.

1462

Under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), States

have designed programs that directly target outcomes such as employment, income, and receipt of cash assistance through work requirements, work incentives, and time limits on assistance. Measuring the impact of these welfare reform initiatives on children requires a look at the pathways through which they might indirectly

affect child well-being. This is difficult, as these pathways may be

directly or indirectly affected by policy (Child Trends, 1999).

Additional complexity is introduced because welfare policies may

affect children in different ways at different ages. For example,

many of the pre-TANF evaluations report results 2 years after the

welfare evaluation began. Therefore, children who were age 4 when

the evaluation began would be interviewed or assessed at age 6;

children who were age 2 when the program began would be interviewed or assessed at age 4. The impact of policies on children

needs to be interpreted in light of their age and developmental

stage.

Highlights of selected evaluations

In general, evaluations of welfare initiatives that report outcomes for child well-being have examined two types of policies:

1. Policies designed to directly target child outcomes, including

child immunization rates, school attendance, and employment

and earnings of children; and

2. Policies that may indirectly affect child outcomes, including the

child’s behavior, academic functioning, and health and safety.

Policies that directly target child outcomes.—Policies that directly

target child outcomes include requirements for up-to-date immunizations and exemption of a student’s earnings from a family’s

counted income and resources. The impact of these policy initiatives can be measured and interpreted in a relatively straightforward manner. For example, researchers interested in the impact

of up-to-date immunization requirements in the Georgia Preschool

Immunization Project examined differences in immunization rates

between an experimental group subject to the requirement and a

control group not subject to the requirement. An evaluation of the

Michigan waiver program, To Strengthen Michigan Families

(TSMF), employed the same type of experimental design. Highlights from these two evaluations include:

—Preschool Immunization Project.—In 1992, Georgia received a

waiver from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to implement a provision requiring up-to-date immunizations for welfare children. If children did not receive the

immunization, the welfare benefit was decreased by the

amount of that child’s benefit. The evaluation of this provision

found that immunization rates were higher for children in the

group subject to this requirement.

—TSMF.—The TSMF evaluation operated from October 1992

through September 1996. TSMF provided that earnings of children who were students were to be disregarded as resources

and thus could be put into savings accounts without counting

against the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)

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9 Under longstanding AFDC law, a child/student’s earnings also had to be disregarded as income.

asset limit.9 The program also created an incentive for families

to provide up-to-date immunizations for their children. While

no results were reported for immunizations, the evaluation

also reported no impact on the earnings or employment of children. At the same time, the program found no impacts on

placement in a foster home or on child abuse or neglect.

Policies that may indirectly impact child outcomes.—Evaluations

of policy changes that may indirectly affect child well-being are

often difficult for researchers, as collecting and interpreting appropriate outcome data is not straightforward.

When TANF was passed, some maintained that this new welfare

program would help children by increasing family earnings and

providing a role model of a working parent. Others maintained that

work requirements and time limits on assistance would harm children by increasing stress in the home environment and reducing

time for mothers to nurture and guide their children. Both statements indicate the importance of understanding and evaluating the

indirect effects of policy on children. By affecting their parents,

work requirements and time limits may indirectly affect overall

child well-being.

Impact of mandatory participation requirements.—The Family

Support Act of 1988 for the first time made single mothers with

children as young as age 3 subject to mandatory participation requirements. The Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD), which

began in 1987 and operated in three sites, required teenage mothers to participate in work or training activities, thereby increasing

their use of child care when their children were very young. Two

of the sites—Camden, New Jersey and Chicago, Illinois—reported

that these programs had neither harmful nor beneficial effects on

child development. In the third site—Newark, New Jersey—a few

negative impacts were reported, as children scored lower on math

and reading achievement tests and the mothers also rated their

children lower on a measure of social behavior. However, the differences were small and, the researchers contend, not developmentally meaningful.

NEWWS, which was mandated under the Family Support Act of

1988, also included mandatory requirements for participants in the

11 programs. The NEWWS evaluation is unique in that the evaluation provides results for labor force attachment programs (LFA, or

work first programs) and for human capital development programs

(HCD, or education-focused programs). Table L–6 presents results

from the 2-year followup survey of families with school-aged children from the NEWWS evaluation.

Impacts of these welfare-to-work programs on school-aged children differed among the 11 programs in the 7 sites evaluated. Most

of the programs had impacts on only one or two outcomes. Two programs, the Atlanta HCD and the Detroit program, had no impacts

on any of the measurable outcomes. Four of the programs which

operated in two sites (Grand Rapids and Riverside) increased the

percent of children who attended a special class for behavioral or

emotional problems, while two programs decreased the percent of

1464

children in these classes. Two programs, the Grand Rapids HCD

and the Columbus traditional, increased the percent of children

who were removed from their mother’s care because the mothers

could not handle or care for them, based on information provided

by the parents. There were no impacts reported by any of the 11

programs on the percent of children who were taken to the hospital

for accidents, injury, or poisoning.

TABLE L–6.—IMPACTS ON CHILD WELL-BEING FOR ALL SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN IN

THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF WELFARE-TO-WORK STRATEGIES (NEWWS)

Outcome Increase in occurrence Decrease in occurrence

Impact on percent suspended from

school.

Riverside LFA .......... No programs.

Impact on percent receiving or requiring

help for behavioral or emotional problems.

Oklahoma City ........ Atlanta LFA

Portland

Impact on percent who attended a special class for behavioral or emotional

problems.

Grand Rapids LFD ..

Grand Rapids HCD

Riverside LFA ..........

Riverside HCD 1 ......

Atlanta LFA

Columbus integrated

Impact on percent who repeated a grade No programs. .......... Riverside LFA

Impact on percent who attended a special class for learning problems.No programs. .......... Columbus integrated

Impact on percent who were removed

from mother’s care.

Grand Rapids HCD

Columbus traditional.

No programs.

Impact on percent who were taken to

hospital for accident, injury, or poisoning.

No programs. .......... No programs.

1 Unlike the other HCD programs included in this table, the Riverside HCD only includes individuals

who lack a high school diploma. Individuals in the other HCD programs were randomly assigned prior to

this skills assessment and therefore may or may not have a high school diploma.

Note.—Results based on a survey of recipients in the 11 programs participating in the NEWWS evaluation.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on a review of the NEWWS evaluation: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education (June 2000b).

While mandatory participation requirements are of interest to

policymakers, under TANF, States also are implementing policies

that ‘‘make work pay’’ through enhanced earnings disregards.

These disregards enable individuals to continue receiving welfare

at higher income levels. Programs that contain mandatory participation requirements (like NEWWS) increase earnings and employment, but do not appear to have any overall effect on income. However, programs that combine mandatory participation requirements

with enhanced earnings disregards (like MFIP) do appear to increase income.

As a component of the MFIP evaluation, the sample included single mothers with children who were between the ages of 5 and 12,

3 years after the program began. Among this sample of single

mothers, MFIP increased the percent who worked 30–34 hours per

week, but also increased the percent who worked 20–29 hours per

1465

week. MFIP also decreased the percent of these mothers who had

been abused by a domestic partner over the followup period (last

3 years). In general, MFIP had a favorable impact on children, by

decreasing the incidence of behavior problems, and had favorable

impacts on achievement measures such as performance in school

and engagement in school. These favorable impacts for children, as

well as the decrease in domestic abuse among the mothers, were

attributed to the financial incentives in the MFIP, as the mandatory participation requirement had no impact on these outcomes.

However, MFIP also increased the percentage of children who required a visit to an emergency room or clinic.

Table L–7 illustrates the impacts on child well-being in the MFIP

Child Report and the NEWWS Child Outcome Study Report. The

results for NEWWS differ from those discussed earlier for this evaluation, as the results shown in the table are based specifically on

the Child Outcome Study. In the NEWWS evaluation, the child

outcome sample includes children who were between the ages of 5

and 7 at the time of interview, with information provided for one

child (the ‘‘focal’’ child, who was randomly chosen) for each family.

Therefore, while table L–6 shows impacts for all school-aged children of the parents surveyed in the 11 programs, table L–7 shows

impacts for children in 6 programs in NEWWS between the ages

of 5 and 7 at the time of the interview. In the MFIP evaluation,

the child study sample was between the ages of 5 and 12 at the

time of the interview.

As table L–7 illustrates, MFIP found favorable impacts on behavior of children. Two programs in NEWWS (Atlanta LFA and Grand

Rapids LFA) reported unfavorable impacts on behavior. Both MFIP

and NEWWS reported favorable impacts on measures of academic

functioning such as school performance (MFIP) and school readiness (NEWWS). Two of the programs in the NEWWS evaluations

also reported unfavorable impacts on the health of the children, as

reported by the parents. While this impact was found in the

NEWWS Child Outcome Study, no impact was reported for any of

the programs in the NEWWS evaluation when the sample was extended to include all school-aged children (as illustrated in table L–

6).

Evaluators of the New Chance and New Hope Programs also reported impacts on child outcomes. At least initially, enrollment in

these programs was voluntary. Once in the programs, participants

were required to participate in specified activities to maintain eligibility.

Table L–8 highlights selected outcomes from the New Chance

and New Hope evaluations for all children, and also based on the

gender of the child. As with the previous evaluations highlighted

in this section, the few impacts found were small. Children in the

New Chance evaluation were between the ages of 5 and 10 at the

time of the interview (the table is limited to those who were 18

months or older when the program began). Children in the New

Hope evaluation were between the ages of 3 and 12 at the time of

the interview, 2 years after the program began. Unlike the

NEWWS and TPD evaluations, the child well-being outcomes in

these reports were based on information supplied by parents as

1466

well as teachers. The results are reported separately for parents

and teachers.

TABLE L–7.—IMPACTS ON WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN FROM THE MINNESOTA FAMILY

INVESTMENT PROGRAM (MFIP) EVALUATION AND THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF WELFARE-TO-WORK STRATEGIES (NEWWS)

Outcome MFIP: long-term recipients in

urban counties NEWWS: child outcome sample

Behavioral

measures/

adjustment

outcomes.

Favorable impact on incidence of problem behaviors and on likelihood of a high level of

behavioral and emotional problems.

Impacts were favorable and unfavorable, and were confined to two programs. The Atlanta LFA program

had an unfavorable impact on total

behavioral problems, but favorable

impacts on externalizing behavior

problems and positive behavior.

Grand Rapids LFA had unfavorable

impacts on externalizing behavioral

problems.

Academic functioning/cognitive functioning.Favorable impact on performance in school, performance in school

below average, and engagement in school.

Favorable programs impacts related to

academic functioning were found.

The Atlanta LFA program had three

favorable impacts, and the Atlanta

HCD and Riverside HCD programs

each had one favorable impact.

Health ............. No impacts were reported

for general health rating.

Unfavorable program impacts were reported for general health rating.

Two were reported in the Riverside

LFA and two in the Riverside HCD.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on information in: Gennetian and

Miller (2000), and U.S. Department Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education

(2000b).

In both New Chance and New Hope, most of the reported favorable impacts occurred primarily among boys. In the New Chance

Program, while parents reported unfavorable behavior among boys

(in decreased measures of autonomy and increased measures of depression), the teachers reported favorable impacts on their behavior. Similarly, a favorable impact on behavior for boys was found

in the New Hope Program. While few impacts were reported for

girls, these impacts were all negative and related to behavioral

problems. However, as table L–8 illustrates, the impacts vary

based on the source of information (parent or teacher). In addition,

while not illustrated in the table, women in New Chance rated

their children as having more behavior problems, but this impact

was concentrated among young women who were at risk of depression at baseline.

TABLE L–8.—SELECTED FINDINGS ON CHILD WELL-BEING FROM THE NEW CHANCE AND NEW HOPE EVALUATIONS

New Chance New Hope

Child sample

(Boys & Girls) Boys Girls Child sample (Boys & Girls) Boys Girls

School readiness/education progress:Parent report ........ Decrease in academic performance. No impact ............ Decrease in aca- demic perform- ance. No impact ............ No impact ............ No impact.

Teacher report 1 .... No impact ............ No impact ............ Decrease in measures of school

readiness.

Increase in measures of academic performance. Increase in meas- ures of aca- demic perform- ance and

classroom skills.

No impact

Social behavior:Parent report ........ Decrease in measures of total

behavior.

Decrease in measures of autonomy. No impact ............ No impact ............ Increase in meas- ures of total behavior. No impact.

Teacher report ...... No impact ............ Increase in measures of social

competence.

Decrease in measure of total

positive behavior.

Increase in measures of total

behavior.

Increase in measures of total

behavior.

No impact.

Problem behavior (externalizing and internalizing problems):Parent report ........ Increase in measure of total behavior problems. Increase in meas- ure of anxiousness/

depression.

Increase in measure of total behavior problems. No impact ............ No impact ............ No impact.

TABLE L–8.—SELECTED FINDINGS ON CHILD WELL-BEING FROM THE NEW CHANCE AND NEW HOPE EVALUATIONS—Continued

New Chance New Hope

Child sample

(Boys & Girls) Boys Girls Child sample (Boys & Girls) Boys Girls

Teacher report ...... No impact ............ Decrease in total

behavior problem score.

No impact ............ No impact ............ Decrease in measures of aggression, hyperactivity, and

frequency ofdisciplinary action.

Increase in 

ures of asion and quency ociplinary 

1 In New Chance, the teacher report cells contain results from a test of school readiness components.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on information in Bos et al. (1999) and Quint et al. (1997).

1469

The New Hope evaluation gathered additional information to further examine the different impacts reported among boys and girls

as part of their ethnographic study. Indepth interviews with members of the Child and Family Study sample were conducted to supplement the data collection. These interviews suggested that mothers in the program group believed that the boys were much more

threatened than the girls by outside pressures such as gangs, and

therefore spent more of the program’s resources (such as child care

subsidies for extended day programs) on the boys.

Role of child care.—Mandatory work programs that provide child

care assistance found evidence of increased placements in formal,

center-based care as illustrated in the MFIP evaluation and in

some programs in the NEWWS evaluation. The evaluations of New

Hope and New Chance also found increased placements in formal,

center-based care among families in the program group. The extent

to which formal, center-based child care is associated with greater

educational opportunities and cognitive and language gains for

children has been the subject of research (see section 9). This increase in the use of formal, center-based care has also been used

in some of the evaluations to explain increases in ‘‘unfavorable’’

outcomes for children.

Unlike changes in earnings and employment, impacts on measures of child well-being are difficult to interpret. While some evaluations simply report an impact as favorable or unfavorable, it is

generally not enough to report ‘‘unfavorable’’ impacts without further discussions of these outcomes. For example, as previously discussed, 2 of the 11 NEWWS programs increased the proportion of

children who were removed from their mother’s care, as reported

by their parents. No additional information on the placement of

these children is available, such as whether these children are in

foster care, living with their fathers, or living with other relatives,

and therefore, it is difficult to evaluate this finding.

Ongoing efforts

While MFIP and NEWWS have reported initial impacts of welfare policy changes on child well-being, additional States will be releasing evaluations of child well-being impacts over the coming

months. In addition to Minnesota, four States—Connecticut, Florida, Indiana and Iowa—have received grants from DHHS to evaluate child well-being impacts as part of their efforts to evaluate welfare reform.

COST BENEFIT ISSUES

Many welfare reform initiatives, such as the operation of a

welfare-to-work program, cost Federal and State governments

money. Evaluations of welfare reform initiatives often examine the

benefits achieved by a program in relation to their costs (cost benefit analysis). The costs of welfare reform initiatives can be recouped

if, over the long run, welfare payments are lowered. Employmentfocused (‘‘work first’’) programs, on average, have lower costs than

those that promote education. Thus, it appears more likely that

costs of a ‘‘work first’’ program can be recouped than costs of an

education-focused program. Moreover, the benefits from a ‘‘work

first’’ type of program tend to be immediate, while those from an

1470

education-focused program take time to emerge. However, the benefits of ‘‘work first’’ programs often peak in the first few years, and

longer followup reports indicate that overall impacts may be minimal. In education-focused programs, individuals forgo immediate

earnings for education and training services. The benefits of these

programs often come much later than programs that promote work

first, because individuals enter employment and often leave welfare

after they complete their education programs.

Under pre-TANF law, the Federal and State governments could

have recouped welfare reform costs over the long run if the program succeeded in reducing welfare rolls. Under TANF, States receive block grants and are required to maintain a minimum level

of State spending, regardless of changes in the size of their caseload. Nonetheless, States may continue to benefit from reducing

the rolls, as this ‘‘frees up’’ money for other purposes for which they

can use Federal TANF or State maintenance-of-effort funds.

Cost benefit analyses report both the benefits and costs to the

government and the benefits and costs to participants. Programs

that increase participant income provide a benefit to the participants. As discussed in previous sections, programs that provide enhanced earnings disregards (such as the Minnesota MFIP) create

an incentive to work by allowing welfare recipients to keep more

of their cash welfare benefit in combination with their earnings.

These programs increase participant income. However, they also

constitute a cost to the government.

Though cost benefit analyses are useful in examining some

TANF goals, such as reducing dependence on government benefits

through increased work, they are unlikely to be informative about

the benefits of achieving other TANF and welfare policy goals. Cost

benefit analysis is considered a much less effective tool for programs where many of the benefits cannot be quantified in monetary terms, and for programs where goals other than efficiency are

important (Boardman et al., 1996). Goals of the welfare programs

examined in this appendix include promotion of work and ending

dependence on cash welfare, but many of these programs also include self-sufficiency and child and family well-being among their

stated purposes. These goals are not easy to quantify in monetary

terms. For example, welfare reform initiatives may increase employment among single mothers, but may also require increased

use of formal child care arrangements. Although the financial cost

of child care may be known, its impact on child well-being is more

difficult to measure.

FINDINGS FROM LEAVER STUDIES

Since 1994, the welfare caseloads have dropped 48 percent, with

the fastest caseload declines occurring since passage of the welfare

reform law in 1996. As the caseloads have declined, there has been

growing interest in how former welfare recipients (‘‘leavers’’) are

faring. This section briefly summarizes more than 30 State studies

of the circumstances of families who left TANF, or AFDC waiver

programs with some TANF-like requirements. These studies constitute the bulk of research available since the enactment of TANF.

This section reviews only studies completed as of January 2000 and

focuses on families with an adult who formerly received cash welVerDate 20-JUL-2000 13:14 Sep 29, 2000 Jkt 061710 PO 00000 Frm 01470 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 J:\SKAYNE\GB96\61710.027 WAYS3 PsN: WAYS3
1471

10Grants were awarded to Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin, Cuyahoga County (Ohio),

Los Angeles County (California), and a consortium of San Mateo, Santa Clara and Santa Cruz

counties in California. Any reports available as of January 2000 are included in this appendix.

fare (that is, the results exclude cases in which the only recipient

was a child).

MONITORING STUDIES

The studies undertaken by the States to track those who have

left welfare are fundamentally different from the impact evaluations discussed in the previous sections. Impact evaluations are designed to measure the difference between two sets of policies to determine how policy changes have affected reported outcomes. Studies of welfare leavers are monitoring studies, which are not designed to determine the impact, or effect, of a policy initiative.

Rather, monitoring studies track those who have left welfare and

provide information on why they left welfare and how they are currently doing.

States are only required to provide information to DHHS on a recipient’s final month of cash welfare; they are not expected to track

closed cases in order to collect information on families for months

after the family has left the rolls. Nonetheless, many States have

chosen to examine the circumstances and characteristics of this

population. Because these studies have been initiated by individual

States, comparability across the studies is difficult. The studies

track recipients who left welfare during different periods of time

and remained off welfare for different periods of time; the studies

also have followed welfare leavers for different lengths of time. To

help standardize this information and support State data collection

efforts, DHHS has awarded funding to 14 sites in fiscal year 1998

to support monitoring studies.10 The 14 DHHS studies use a common definition of the ‘‘leaver’’ population, studying those who leave

cash assistance and remain off the rolls for at least 2 months (U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services, 2000).

State leaver studies have used both administrative data and survey data to monitor former welfare recipients. Studies that use administrative data are able to track a much larger number of former

recipients if they appear in the data sets. For example, most individuals who leave welfare for employment appear in the State’s unemployment insurance (UI) wage files. However, these files collect

quarterly data, and information on the hourly wage rate and number of hours worked per week is not available.

To collect information on outcomes such as the hourly wage rate,

States have conducted surveys of a sample of welfare leavers with

the goal of generalizing these results to the entire population of

leavers. However, studies that use survey data have found that

gathering information from individuals who no longer receive cash

welfare is difficult. Information collected through a survey represents the situations of those who respond to the survey. If a number of individuals do not respond, the results become difficult to interpret. Previous reviews of State leaver studies have not included

results from studies with low response rates, given the difficulty in

generalizing these results to a larger population (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999).

1472

All State leaver studies available as of January 2000 are included in this review, regardless of their response rate. It is important to be aware that the results shown reflect information about

individuals who responded to the surveys, and no information is

available on those who did not respond. If the nonrespondents differ from the respondents, these results should not be generalized

to a larger population. This section presents preliminary information about welfare leavers on a State-by-State basis.

WELFARE LEAVERS

Reason for case closing

The most common reasons for case closings among former welfare recipients are employment- and income-related. Those who left

for income-related reasons include those for whom income exceeded

cash welfare eligibility guidelines and those who report additional

income in the household, such as income from other household

members. Among those States that explicitly ask whether marriage

was a factor, fewer than 5 percent of former welfare recipients listed marriage as a reason for case closing.

With the new TANF requirements, there has been a growing interest in recipients who leave welfare for reasons other than employment. Three studies (Connecticut, North Carolina, and Virginia) included only recipients who left welfare because they hit a

State-imposed time limit that was shorter than the Federal 60-

month time limit. States also examined sanctions as reasons for

case closings. Two of the studies (Iowa and Tennessee) included

only recipients who left because of a sanction, and 20 percent of recipients leaving welfare in Arizona indicated that a sanction was

the reason for case closing. Some States also examined whether

failure to redetermine eligibility or failure to cooperate was a reason for case closing. In Maryland, one in four cases was closed for

failure to reapply or redetermine eligibility. Finally, a small number of States that used surveys to collect information asked about

‘‘hassle’’ affecting the desire to continue receiving assistance. However, hassle does not appear to be a common reason for case closing. In Florida, only 2 percent of former recipients expressed that

welfare was ‘‘too much hassle.’’

Employment and earnings

Highlights of the State welfare leaver studies related to employment and earnings include:

—Employment rates.—In studies based on administrative data

(11 States), employment rates ranged from 50 to 64 percent in

the quarter after exit but increased to 66–86 percent when

based upon employment at any time since exit. Studies using

survey data (29 States) found generally higher employment

rates and a broader range, from 35 to 83 percent, at the time

of the survey.

—Earnings.—In studies based on administrative data (11

States), quarterly earnings in the first quarter after exit

ranged from $2,192 to $3,393; by the fourth quarter earnings

had risen by about 12 percent, on average. Survey data (14

1473

States) reported that average hourly wages ranged from $5.50

to $8.16.

Survey data indicated that most welfare leavers were employed

in retail or clerical occupations. Studies that use survey data also

showed wide variation in self-reported reasons for unemployment

among welfare leavers. From 14 to 48 percent of unemployed leavers (in eight reporting States) cited inability to find a job or to find

one that paid enough. Other reasons included: physical or mental

illness (self) from 11 to 49 percent (8 reporting States); physical or

mental illness of another person from 7 to 49 percent (7 States);

child care problems from 5 to 45 percent (10 States); and transportation problems from 4 to 35 percent (10 States).

Income

One of the primary reasons for conducting monitoring studies of

welfare recipients is to determine their current economic circumstances. The impact evaluations discussed earlier show that

welfare-to-work programs have succeeded in increasing earnings

and employment among program participants, but the impact on

overall income depends on the types of program services. Those

programs that offer financial incentives to work through enhanced

earnings disregards, have succeeded in raising the overall income

of participants. However, a number of these individuals remain on

the rolls, as their increased income includes continued cash assistance. Programs that do not include financial incentives have not

seen an increase in overall income, but rather indicate that individuals are replacing welfare benefits with earnings.

The welfare leavers studies, which focus on those who have left

cash welfare, tell a similar story. Some of these studies indicate

that average hourly wages ranged from $5.50 to $8.16 an hour. In

these States, the average wages are above the minimum wage, and

are above the welfare guarantee for the State. However, income

from the wages alone would still leave a family of three below the

poverty level in most States.

There is growing interest in the need for ‘‘work supports.’’ Many

families that leave welfare are not covered by health insurance and

are having difficulty paying for, or acquiring, child care. The impact evaluations illustrate that welfare-to-work programs that provide financial incentives to work and keep people on welfare also

may keep them on Medicaid and, therefore, provide continuous

health insurance coverage. The leaver studies indicate that those

who have left welfare altogether for employment, have not always

replaced their previous Medicaid coverage with employer-provided

health insurance. In addition, individuals who have left welfare

have indicated some barriers to child care (Schumacher & Greenberg, 1999).

Returns to welfare

In nine States, from 13 to 36 percent of leavers returned to welfare within 1 year or at the time of the survey. This count excludes

‘‘churners,’’ or persons who returned to welfare within 1 or 2

months after exit. In two other States, some leavers said they

would return to TANF if it were possible.

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Hardship

Measures of hardship have included receipt of other types of assistance to supplement earnings, as well as difficulties experienced

since exiting cash welfare. The measures collected differ by State,

and there is substantial variation in the outcomes. For example,

survey data indicated that from 3 to 30 percent of former recipients

(in 10 reporting States) received help from food pantries. In addition, between 8 and 43 percent were unable to get medical attention (11 States), 5–22 percent had moved or been evicted since

exiting the rolls (12 States), and 10–59 percent had been behind in

paying, or unable to pay, 1 or more utility payments (12 States).

Detail for leaver studies

Table L–11, at the end of this appendix, presents selected outcomes from the State evaluations of former welfare recipients.

ONGOING AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Even before passage of the 1996 welfare reform law, numerous

governmental and other organizations were involved in efforts to

determine the effects of welfare policy changes. Many of these evaluations began under the old AFDC Program, but have continued

under TANF. The creation of TANF also led to a number of new,

ongoing projects to monitor the effects of welfare reform.

EFFORTS BY GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES

The welfare reform law of 1996 appropriated more than $200

million for fiscal years 1996–2002, for evaluation efforts related to

welfare reform. This includes $10 million annually for the U.S.

Census Bureau to collect data on families in the 1992 and 1993

panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. This

continuation of the Survey of Income and Program Participation,

called the Survey of Program Dynamics, is intended to provide a

nationally representative sample of the population to enable evaluations of the impact of TANF. The welfare reform law also appropriated $6 million annually for the U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services (DHHS) to conduct a longitudinal study of children and families who come in contact with the child protection

system, commonly referred to as the National Survey of Child and

Adolescent Well-Being (see section 11 for more details on this survey). As of June 2000, data collection for these efforts is underway,

and the U.S. Census Bureau has begun to release data files for the

Survey of Program Dynamics.

Amounts appropriated by the 1996 law also include $15 million

for each of fiscal years 1997–2002 to support ongoing efforts by

DHHS to monitor and evaluate various welfare reform initiatives.

At the point when TANF was created, DHHS had awarded waivers

to 43 States under section 1115 of the Social Security Act, allowing

them to waive certain Federal AFDC requirements but requiring

them to conduct an evaluation of the waiver programs. Initiatives

undertaken through these waivers include ending benefits for violations of work requirements (sanctions), imposing time limits on assistance, and offering generous work rewards. Under TANF, States

have the option of continuing these waivers for as long as they

1475

11For a more detailed list of projects planned and underway to monitor the effects of welfare

reform, see the 1998 Green Book Appendix L: Monitoring the Effects of Welfare Reform (Committee, 1998).

were initially approved, but are no longer mandated to evaluate

their programs. To date, most of the information available on the

impacts of welfare reform initiatives has been provided through

waiver evaluations begun under Aid to Families with Dependent

Children (AFDC) and sponsored by DHHS.

As part of its research agenda to evaluate the impact of welfare

reform, DHHS has provided support for various activities including:

—Continuation of 9 existing waiver evaluations and support of

10 ‘‘modified’’ waiver evaluations (to evaluate welfare reform

initiatives begun under waivers and subsequently incorporated

into State TANF Programs). Reports on the effects of policy

changes in eight of the existing waiver evaluations are reviewed in this appendix. However, most of these evaluations

are ongoing, and longer followup reports will be available in

the future.

—Evaluations of the effects of welfare reform on children. In addition to the National Survey of Child and Adolescent WellBeing, DHHS is funding child impact studies to augment the

welfare reform waiver evaluations in five States (Connecticut,

Iowa, Minnesota, Indiana, and Florida). As of June 2000, only

Minnesota had released a report on the effects of welfare reform on children.

—Evaluations of the effectiveness of new State investments to

improve job retention and advancement for low-income parents. This project provides planning grants to build knowledge

about alternative employment and retention and career advancement strategies to help welfare recipients sustain employment and advance. As of June 2000, DHHS had awarded

grants to five States ready to move into the phase of implementing and testing their strategies, and had awarded planning grants to six States for further development of their initiatives.

Congress has also appropriated specific funding for research on

welfare reform outcomes. These funds are being used by DHHS to

support a range of initiatives, including studies of single mothers

diverted from welfare (diversion) and studies of former welfare recipients (leavers). In fiscal year 1998, the welfare outcomes grants

awarded by DHHS emphasized former recipients of TANF, with all

14 awardees studying this population. The fiscal year 1999 welfare

outcomes grants awarded by DHHS have an emphasis on TANF diversion, with six of the seven grantees focusing their studies on the

applicant population, and one grantee studying former welfare recipients. Reports on both these efforts will continue to be released

in the future.

EFFORTS BY OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

In addition to DHHS, numerous organizations have undertaken

efforts to monitor the effects of welfare reform. These include: 11

1476

1. Assessing the New Federalism.—This project is being conducted

by the Urban Institute in Washington, DC, and is a major

foundation-funded, multiyear comprehensive assessment of

how State income support systems have changed as a result of

welfare reform. The project includes a National Survey of

America’s Families which interviews nearly 50,000 people to

provide comprehensive information on the well-being of adults

and children as welfare reform is being implemented in the

various States. The survey provides national estimates, as well

as State-specific estimates for 13 States selected for intensive

study. The Urban Institute has begun to release reports, as

well as data files from the National Survey of America’s Families.

2. State Policy Documentation Project.—This project, operated by

the Center for Law and Social Policy and the Center on Budget

and Policy Priorities in Washington, DC, monitors and reports

on program changes (administration, eligibility, services and

benefits provided) that States legislate and implement. The

project covers changes in food stamps, general assistance, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Medicaid

Programs.

3. Study of State Capacity.—Conducted by the Rockefeller School

of Government at the State University of New York in Albany,

this 4-year study focuses on State governments’ capacity to implement social programs, including family and children’s services, welfare, work force development programs, and Medicaid.

The study will conduct indepth case studies of up to 18 States,

and particular management topics will be addressed in all 50

States. DHHS has also funded a topical study to examine ‘‘culture’’ change at the caseworker level as part of this larger effort.

ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDIES

Many of the evaluation studies underway are conducting indepth

interviews with a small number of individuals to evaluate the effects of welfare reform. These ethnographic studies often complement larger data collection efforts and provide more detailed information on program participants. For example, the Manpower

Demonstration Research Corporation is conducting a 5-year study

of the effect of welfare reform in four large urban areas—Los Angeles, Miami, Cleveland, and Philadelphia. A component of this evaluation, the ethnographic study, will chronicle, indepth and over

time, how approximately 40 welfare-reliant families in each site

cope with the new rules and policies (Quint et al., 1999).

DETAILED TABLES

Table L–9 provides information about impact evaluations conducted after the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988. It includes information on the population that was studied (universe),

the time period when persons were assigned to experimental and

control groups (random assignment), the number of months or

years following random assignment for which data were collected

1477

(followup), and the source of the information used in the evaluation

(data type).

The table also includes information on the types of policy

changes that were evaluated. These policy changes are categorized

in the table using standardized terminology. However, it should not

be assumed that all programs are identical to one another. Rather,

there are likely numerous design and other differences among programs that all tested the same general policy approach (see table

L–2 preceding the discussion of welfare-to-work outcomes, for a description of policy changes under welfare reform).

Table L–9 shows three major welfare-to-work outcomes: earnings, employment rates, and cash assistance payments. Unless otherwise noted, the outcome shown is as measured over the entire

followup period. The outcomes are displayed as percentage

changes. Some percentage changes reported in this table may differ

if calculated based on the reported findings, due to rounding. The

percentage changes reported in the table reflect the percentage

changes as reported in the individual evaluations. Additionally, the

actual levels (e.g., earnings amounts, employment rates) are shown

in parentheses (outcomes for the experimental group versus outcomes for the control group) as reported in the individual evaluations. The table’s earnings data represent earnings over the entire

research sample and group, and include zero earnings for individuals for whom no work is reported. This illustrates the impact of

the program on average earnings. (Average earnings for only those

who actually did work would be higher.)

Table L–10 shows welfare-to-work, family formation, and economic status impacts for evaluations conducted after passage of the

Family Support Act of 1988. Table L–11 presents selected outcomes

from the State evaluations of former welfare recipients. For studies

that use administrative data, the length of followup is reported.

For studies that use survey data, the response rate is reported. Unlike the impact evaluations in tables L–9 and L–10, the average

earnings reported in table L–11 for former welfare recipients are

calculated among only those who report employment, rather than

the entire sample of former welfare recipients regardless of employment status.

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988

National Evaluation of Welfare-To-Work Strategies

National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: Evaluating Alternative Welfare-to-Work Approaches: Two

Year Impacts for Eleven Programs, June 2000

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation under contract for the U.S. Department of Health

and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education

Sites: Atlanta, GA; Grand Rapids, MI; Riverside, CA; Columbus OH; Detroit, MI; Oklahoma City, OK; Portland

OR

Atlanta

employmentfocused

Universe: JOBS mandatory

population (parents of

children age 3 or older)

Random assignment: 1/92–

1/94

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Employment-focused program

Earnings: Increase of 16%

($5,820 vs. $5,006)

Employment rate: Increase

of 7% (66% vs. 62%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 8% ($4,553 vs.

$4,922)

1478

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Atlanta

educationfocused

Universe: JOBS mandatory

population (parents of

children age 3 or older)

Random assignment: 1/92–

1/94

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Education-focused program

Earnings: Increase of 10%

($5,502 vs. $5,006)

Employment rate: Increase

of 5% (64% vs. 62%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 6% ($4,634 vs.

$4,922)

Grand Rapids

employmentfocused

Universe: JOBS mandatory

population (parents with

children age 1 or older)

Random assignment: 9/91–

1/94

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Employment-focused program

Earnings: Increase of 22%

($5,674 vs. $4,639)

Employment rate: Increase

of 11% (78% vs. 70%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 19% ($5,944 vs.

$7,347)

Grand Rapids

educationfocused

Universe: JOBS mandatory

population (parents with

children age 1 or older)

Random assignment: 9/91–

1/94

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Education-focused program

Earnings: Increase of 13%

($5,219 vs. $4,639)

Employment rate: Increase

of 8% (75% vs. 70%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 11% ($6,512 vs.

$7,347)

Riverside

employmentfocused

Universe: JOBS mandatory

population (parents of

children age 3 or older)

Random assignment: 6/91–

6/93

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Employment-focused program

Earnings: Increase of 30%

($5,488 vs. $4,213). Increase for those without

a high school diploma or

basic skills of 32%

($4,124 vs. $3,133)

Employment rate: Increase

of 34% (60% vs. 45%).

Increase for those without

a high school diploma or

basic skills of 43% (56%

vs. 39%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 14% ($8,292 vs.

$9,600). Decrease for

those without a high

school diploma or basic

skills of 14% ($8,894 vs.

$10,302)

Riverside

educationfocused

Universe: JOBS mandatory

population (parents of

children age 3 or older)

without a high school diploma or basic skills

Random assignment: 6/91–

6/93

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Education-focused program

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: Increase

of 24% (48% vs. 39%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 10% ($9,253 vs.

$10,302)

Columbus

integrated

case management

Universe: JOBS mandatory

population (parents of

children age 3 or older)

Random assignment: 9/92–

7/94

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Education-focused program

Earnings: Increase of 10%

($7,565 vs. $6,892)

Employment rate: No impact over 2-year followup

period. Last quarter of

year 2: increase of 11%

(52% vs. 47%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 13% ($4,775 vs.

$5,469)

1479

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Columbus

traditional

case management

Universe: JOBS mandatory

population (parents of

children age 3 or older)

Random assignment: 9/92–

7/94

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Education-focused program

Earnings: Increase of 10%

($7,569 vs. $6,892)

Employment rate: No impact over 2-year followup

period. Last quarter of

year 2: increase of 8%

(50% vs. 47%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 10% ($4,939 vs.

$5,469)

Detroit Universe: JOBS mandatory

population (parents with

children age 1 or older)

Random assignment: 5/92–

6/94

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Education-focused program

Earnings: Increase of 9%

($4,369 vs. $4,001)

Employment rate: Increase

of 7% (62% vs. 58%)

Cash assistance: No impact

Oklahoma City Universe: New applicants in

JOBS mandatory population (parents with children age 1 and older)

Random assignment: 9/91–

5/93

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Education-focused program

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: No impact

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 6% ($3,391 vs.

$3,624)

Portland Universe: JOBS mandatory

population (parents with

children age 1 and older)

Random assignment: 2/93–

12/94

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings: Increase of 35%

($7,133 vs. $5,291)

Employment rate: Increase

of 18% (72% vs. 61%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 17% ($5,818 vs.

$7,014)

New Chance Demonstration

New Chance: Final Report on a Comprehensive Program for Young Mothers in Poverty and Their Children,

October 1997

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Sites: Sixteen sites in ten States: California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New

York, Oregon, Pennsylvania

Universe: Mothers 16–22

years old who (1) had

first given birth age 19

or younger, (2) were receiving AFDC, (3) did not

have a high school diploma or GED, and (4)

were not pregnant when

they entered the program.

Participation in the New

Chance Demonstration

was voluntary

Random assignment: 8/89–

7/91

Followup: 42 months

Data type: Survey

Policy changes:

—Child care

—Enhanced family planning

services

—Parenting workshops

—Required participation in

education-focused program (first-year) then

employment

Earnings: No impact over

42-month followup period. Months 1–6: Decrease of 27% ($263 vs.

$358). Months 7–18: Decrease of 17% ($1,096

vs. $1,323). Months 18–

42: No impact

Employment rate: No impact over 42-month followup period. Months 1–

6: Decrease of 26%

(15% vs. 20%). Months

7–42: No impact

Cash assistance: Percent

who ever received AFDC

over 42-month followup

period: Increase of 1%

(99% vs. 98%)

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TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Parent’s Fair Share (PFS) Demonstration

Building Opportunities, Enforcing Obligations: Implementation and Interim Impacts of Parent’s Fair Share,

December 1998

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Sites: Los Angeles, CA; Jacksonville, FL; Springfield, MA; Grand Rapids, MI; Trenton, NJ; Dayton, OH; Memphis, TN

Universe: Noncustodial parents

Random assignment: 4/94–

12/95

Followup: 18 months

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Enhanced child support

establishment

—Mixed employment/education program

—Promote parent interaction

Earnings: No impact for

seven sites combined.

Site with impact: Jacksonville, FL: decrease of

13% ($7,843 vs. $8,990)

Employment rate: No impact for seven sites combined. Sites with impacts: Dayton, OH increase of 17% (81% vs.

70%), Los Angeles, CA

increase of 19% (70%

vs. 58%), Springfield, MA

decrease of 9% (78% vs.

86%)

Cash assistance: Not reported

Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD)

Moving into Adulthood: Were the Impacts of Mandatory Programs for Welfare-Dependent Teenaged Parents

Sustained After the Programs Ended?, February 1998

Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.

Sites: Chicago, IL; Camden, NJ; Newark, NJ

Universe: Teenagers who

were first-time parents

receiving AFDC

Random assignment: 7/87–

4/90

Followup: 6 years

Data type: Administrative

data, child development

assessments, survey

Policy changes:

—Child care

—Mixed employment/education program

—Provide for work-related

expenses

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: Camden:

Increase of 8% (75% vs.

70%). Newark: Increase

of 7% (75% vs. 70%).

Chicago: Increase of 4%

(78% vs. 76%)

Cash assistance: Camden:

No impact. Newark: No

impact. Chicago: Decrease of 5% ($11,645

vs. $12,216)

1481

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Alabama: Avenues to Self-Sufficiency through Employment and Training Services (ASSETS)

Evaluation of the Alabama Avenues to Self-Sufficiency Through Employment and Training Services (ASSETS)

Demonstration, January 1997

Author: Abt Associates Inc.

Sites: Three counties in Alabama: Clarke, Limestone, and Madison

Universe: AFDC and food

stamp cases. Focus on

participants age 16–59

for employment and

training services

Study duration: 7/90–6/94

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Applied AFDC child support cooperation requirement to food-stamp-only

households

—Asset limit increase

—Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant

(food stamp cashout)

—Mixed employment/education program

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

Earnings: Year 3 impacts:

Clarke County: Decrease

of 11% ($2,758 vs.

$3,096). Limestone County: No impact. Madison

County: Decrease of 5%

($2,925 vs. $3,076)

Employment rate: Percent

employed in 12th quarter:

Clarke County: Decrease

of 11% (37% vs. 41%).

Limestone County: Decrease of 8% (36% vs.

39%). Madison County:

Decrease of 5% (36% vs.

38%)

Cash assistance: Year 3

impacts Clarke County:

Increase of 9% ($1,930

vs. $1,779); Limestone

County: Decrease of 9%

($1,107 vs. $1,222);

Madison County: Increase

of 3% ($1,446 vs.

$1,409)

Arizona: Employing and Moving People Off Welfare and Encouraging Responsibility (EMPOWER)

Evaluation of the Arizona EMPOWER Welfare Reform Demonstration, May 1999

Author: Abt Associates Inc.

Sites: Three sites in Phoenix and one site on the Navajo Reservation

Universe: Ongoing recipients

as of 10/95

Random assignment: 10/95

Followup: 3 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Family cap

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—Required participation in

employment and training

services for minor parents

—Required unwed minor

parents to live with parent or responsible adult

—Time limit (adult only)

—Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid)

—Two-parent family eligibility

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: No impact

Cash assistance: Average

monthly cash benefit: Decrease of 6% ($137 vs.

$146)

1482

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

California: Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)

GAIN: Benefits, Costs, and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work Program, September 1994

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Sites: Six counties in California: Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, and Tulare

Alameda Universe: Long-term recipients who were GAIN mandatory (for single parents,

child age 6 or older)

Random assignment: 7/89–

5/90

Followup: 3 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings: Increase of 30%

($6,432 vs. $4,941)

Employment rate: Increase

of 20% (49% vs. 41%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 4% ($17,593 vs.

$18,375)

Butte Universe: GAIN mandatory

recipients (for single parents, child age 6 or

older)

Random assignment: 3/88–

3/90

Followup: 3 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: No impact

Cash assistance: No impact

Los Angeles Universe: Long-term recipients who were GAIN mandatory (for single parents,

with children age 6 or

older)

Random assignment: 7/89–

3/90

Followup: 3 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: Increase

of 13% (39% vs. 35%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 6% ($17,314 vs.

$18,319)

Riverside Universe: GAIN mandatory

recipients (for single parents, with child age 6 or

older)

Random assignment: 8/88–

3/90

Followup: 3 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings: Increase of 49%

($9,448 vs. $6,335)

Employment rate: Increase

of 26% (67% vs. 53%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 15% ($11,284 vs.

$13,267)

San Diego Universe: GAIN mandatory

recipients (for single-parent families, with child

age 6 or older)

Random assignment: 8/88–

9/89

Followup: 3 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings: Increase of 22%

($9,786 vs. $8,014)

Employment rate: Increase

of 10% (62% vs. 57%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 8% ($13,283 vs.

$14,419)

Tulare Universe: GAIN mandatory

recipients (for single parents, with child age 6 or

older)

Random assignment: 1/89–

6/90

Followup: 3 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: Increase

of 8% (60% vs. 55%)

Cash assistance: No impact

1483

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

California: Los Angeles Jobs-First Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)

Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN evaluation: First-Year Findings on Participation Patterns and Impacts, June

1998

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Site: Los Angeles County

Universe: Jobs First GAIN

mandatory recipients (for

single parents, caring for

a child age 3 or older)

Random assignment: 4/96–

9/96

Followup: 1 year

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Employment-focused program

Earnings: Increase of 31%

($3,187 vs. $2,438)

Employment rate: Increase

of 25% (54% vs. 43%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 8% ($5,363 vs.

$5,795)

Connecticut: Jobs First

Jobs First: Implementation and Early Impacts of Connecticut’s Welfare Reform Initiative, February 2000

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Sites: New Haven and Manchester

Universe: Jobs First enrollees

Random assignment: 1/96–

6/96

Followup: 30 months

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child age 1 or

older. For control group,

parents with child age 2

or older

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Child support liberalization

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Employment-focused program

—Family cap

—Time limit

—Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and

child care)

—Two-parent family eligibility

—Work requirements:

younger child

—Work sanctions

Earnings: Increase of 11%

($13,244 vs. $11,951)

Employment rate: Increase

of 10% (82% vs. 74%)

Cash assistance: Increase

of 10% ($9,256 vs.

$8,416)

Delaware: A Better Chance (ABC)

The Early Economic Impacts of Delaware’s ABC Welfare Reform Program, December 1997

Author: Abt Associates Inc.

Sites: Five of Thirteen Delaware welfare offices: Carroll’s Plaza, Georgetown, Hudson, Thatcher, and Williams

Universe: Ongoing cases

and new applicants

Random assignment: 10/

95–9/96

Followup: 1 year

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Enhanced family planning

services

—Family cap

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—Required minor parent to

live with adult guardian

—Time limit

—Two-parent family eligibility

—Work-trigger time limit

Earnings: No impact over 1-

year followup period. Increase in average total

earnings only in quarter

4 (for those enrolling

during ABC’s first 6

months of operation (11/

95–3/96) of 16% ($1,214

vs. $1,047)

Employment rate: Increase

of 20% (57% vs. 48%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 5% ($2,775 vs.

$2,930)

1484

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Florida: Project Independence

Florida’s Project Independence: Benefits, Costs, and Two-Year Impacts of Florida’s JOBS Program, April

1995

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Sites: Nine counties in Florida: Bay, Broward, Dade, Duval, Hillsborough, Lee, Orange, Pinellas, and Volusia

Universe: AFDC parents

(child age 3 and older)

Random assignment: 7/90–

8/91

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings: Increase of 4%

($5,766 vs. $5,539)

Employment rate: Increase

of 4% (66% vs. 64%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 6% ($4,028 vs.

$4,293)

Florida: Family Transition Program (FTP)

FTP: The Family Transition Program: Implementation and Three-Year Impacts of Florida’s Initial TimeLimited Welfare Program, April 1999

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Site: Escambia County

Universe: Single parents

subject to FTP work requirements (not disabled,

caring for a child age 7

months or older)

Random assignment: 5/94–

2/95

Followup: 3 years

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Child care

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Education-focused program

—Time limit

Earnings: Increase of 18%

($11,442 vs. $9,679)

Employment rate: Increase

of 5% (82% vs. 78%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 11% ($3,703 vs.

$4,147)

Illinois: Community Group Participation and Housing Supplementation Demonstration

Community Group Participation and Housing Supplementation Demonstration: Final Report, June 1995

Author: Abt Associates Inc.

Site: West Garfield Park neighborhood in Chicago, IL

Universe: Volunteers living

in severely distressed

neighborhoods

Random assignment: 7/88–

8/91

Followup: Varies from 35 to

54 months (analysis ends

6/94)

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Provision of services by

community-based organization

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: Decrease

of 15% (22% vs. 26%)

Cash assistance: No impact

1485

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Indiana: Welfare Reform Evaluation

The Indiana Welfare Reform Evaluation: Program Implementation and Economic Impacts After Two Years,

November 1998

Author: Abt Associates Inc. and the Urban Institute

Universe: AFDC recipients

and applicants

Random assignment: 5/95–

12/95

Followup: 2 years

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group,

changed in 6/97 from

parents with children age

3 or older to parents with

children age 2 or older

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Family cap

—Mixed employment/education program

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—Required minor parent to

live with adult

—Time limit (adult only)

—Two-parent family eligibility

—Work requirements:

younger child

—Work sanctions

Earnings: Increase of 5%

($7,344 vs. $6,967)

Employment rate: Increase

of 2% (79% vs. 77%)

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 20% ($2,339 vs.

$2,921)

Iowa: Family Investment Program (FIP)

Iowa’s Family Investment Program: Two-Year Impacts, December 1998

Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.

Sites: Nine counties in Iowa: Black Hawk, Linn, Polk, Pottawattamie, Woodbury, Clinton, Des Moines, Jackson, and Jones

Universe: Ongoing and applicant assistance cases.

Ongoing cases:

Random assignment: 10/93

Followup: 2 years

Applicant cases:

Random assignment: 10/

93–9/94

Followup: 1 year

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child age 3

months or older. For control group, parents with

child age 3 or older

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Benefit determination the

same for parents and

stepparents

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—Required participation in

employment and training

services for both persons

in two-parent family

—Transitional benefits extension (child care)

—Two-parent family eligibility

—Work requirements:

younger child

Earnings:

Ongoing cases:

Year 1: Increase of 8%

($2,923 vs. $2,714)

Year 2: Increase of 8%

($4,955 vs. $4,583)

Applicant cases:

Year 1: Increase of 12%

($6,828 vs. $6,126)

Employment rate:

Ongoing cases: No impact

Applicant cases: Increase of

6% (77% vs. 73%)

Cash assistance:

Ongoing cases:

Year 1: No impact

Year 2: Decrease of 4%

($2,468 vs. $2,569)

Applicants: No impact over

1-year followup period

Quarter 1: increase of 7%

($547 vs. $510)

1486

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Michigan: To Strengthen Michigan Families (TSMF)

Final Impact Report: The Evaluation of To Strengthen Michigan Families (TSMF), September 1997

Author: Abt Associates Inc.

Sites: Four local offices: Kalamazoo (Kalamazoo Co.), Madison Heights (Oakland Co.), McNichols/Goddard

(Wayne Co.), and Schaeffer/Six Mile (Wayne Co.)

Universe: Three cohorts

Ongoing cohort:

Random assignment: 10/1/

92

Followup: 4 years

Middle cohort:

Random assignment: 10/

92–9/94

Followup: 2 years

Last cohort:

Random assignment: 10/

94–9/95

Followup: 1 year

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Mixed employment/education program

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—Two-parent family eligibility

—Work sanctions

Earnings:

Ongoing cohort: Increase of

7% ($3,343 vs. $3,120)

Other cohorts: No impact

Employment rate:

Ongoing cohort: Increase in

average quarterly employment rate of 4% (37%

vs. 36%)

Other cohorts: No impact

Cash assistance—all cohorts: No impact

Minnesota: Family Investment Program (MFIP)

Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota Family Investment Program, June

2000

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Sites: Seven counties in Minnesota: Hennepin (Minneapolis), Anoka, Dakota, Mille Lacs, Morrison,

Sherburne, and Todd

Long-term

singleparent

families

Universe: Single, long-term

recipients in urban and

rural counties

Random assignment: 4/94–

3/96

Followup: 3 years

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child age 1 or

older (on welfare rolls for

2 years). For control

group, parents with child

age 3 or older

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Direct child care paid to

provider

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant

—Work requirements:

younger child

—Work-trigger time limit

Earnings: Increase of 23%

($955 vs. $779)

Employment rate: Increase

of 35% (50% vs. 37%)

Cash assistance: Increase

of 11% ($1,745 vs.

$1,569)

1487

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Long-term

single-parent families—

urban

counties

Universe: Single, long-term

recipients in urban counties

Random assignment: 4/94–

3/96

Followup: 3 years

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child age 1 or

older (on welfare rolls for

2 years). For control

group, parents with child

age 3 or older

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Direct child care paid to

provider

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant

—Work requirements:

younger child

—Work-trigger time limit

Earnings:

Quarterly earnings:

Year 1: Increase of 30%

($699 vs. $537)

Year 2: Increase of 24%

($1,129 vs. $913)

Year 3 (quarters 1–3): Increase of 11% ($1,441

vs. $1,298)

Employment rate:

Average quarterly employment rate:

Year 1: Increase of 41%

(46% vs. 33%)

Year 2: Increase of 35%

(53% vs. 39%)

Year 3 (quarters 1–3): Increase of 26% (56% vs.

45%)

Cash assistance:

Average quarterly benefits:

Year 1: Increase of 9%

($1,946 vs. $1,810)

Year 2: Increase of 10%

($1,627 vs. $1,484)

Year 3 (quarters 1–3): Increase of 13% ($1,380

vs. $1,227)

Long-term

single-parent families—

urban

counties,

without

mandated

participation

Universe: Single, long-term

recipients in urban counties

Random assignment: 4/94–

3/96

Followup: 3 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Direct child care paid to

provider

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: Average

quarterly employment

rate:

Year 1: Increase of 21%

(40% vs. 33%)

Year 2: Increase of 9%

(43% vs. 39%)

Year 3 (quarters 1–3): Increase of 8% (48% vs.

45%)

Cash assistance: Average

quarterly benefits:

Year 1: Increase of 13%

($2,035 vs. $1,810)

Year 2: Increase of 20%

($1,774 vs. $1,484)

Year 3 (quarters 1–3): Increase of 24% ($1,518

vs. $1,227)

1488

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Recent singleparent applicants—

urban

counties

Universe: Single applicants

(short-term recipients) in

urban counties

Random assignment: 4/94–

3/96

Followup: 3 years

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child age 1 or

older (on welfare rolls for

2 years). For control

group, parents with child

age 3 or older

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Direct child care paid to

provider

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant

—Work requirements:

younger child

—Work-trigger time limit

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: Average

quarterly employment

rate:

Year 1: Increase of 6%

(52% vs. 49%)

Year 2: Increase of 7%

(57% vs. 53%)

Year 3 (quarters 1–3): Increase of 5% (58% vs.

55%)

Cash assistance: Average

quarterly benefits:

Year 1: Increase of 26%

($1,289 vs. $1,024)

Year 2: Increase of 26%

($907 vs. $722)

Year 3 (quarters 1–3): Increase of 26% ($709 vs.

$561)

Long-term

single-parent families—rural

counties

Universe: Single, long-term

recipients in rural counties

Random assignment: 4/94–

3/96

Followup: 3 years

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child age 1 or

older (on welfare rolls for

2 years). For control

group, parents with child

age 3 or older

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Direct child care paid to

provider

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant

—Work requirements:

younger child

—Work-trigger time limit

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: Average

quarterly employment

rate:

Year 1: Increase of 37%

(44% vs. 32%)

Year 2: Increase of 13%

(50% vs. 45%)

Year 3 (quarter 10): No impact

Cash assistance: Average

quarterly benefits:

Year 1: Increase of 16%

($1,915 vs. $1,646)

Year 2: Increase of 33%

($1,583 vs. $1,192)

Year 3 (quarter 10): Increase of 37% ($1,345

vs. $983)

1489

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

New Jersey: Family Development Program (FDP)

A Final Report on the Impact of New Jersey’s Family Development Program: Experimental-Control Group

Analysis, October 1998

Author: Rutgers University

Sites: Ten counties in New Jersey: Atlantic, Camden, Cumberland, Essex, Hudson, Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth, Passaic, and Union

Universe: AFDC families

Random assignment: 10/

92–12/94

Followup: Varies. Up to 17

quarters (for cases ongoing 10/92)

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with children age 2

or older. For control

group, parents with children age 3 or older

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Continued benefits to

families with stepfathers

as long as family income

below 150% of State’s

need standard

—Family cap

—Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid)

—Work requirements:

younger child

Earnings:

Ongoing cases: No impact

over 4-year followup period

Year 1: Decrease of 25%

($522 vs. $695)

Year 2: Decrease of 18%

($1,522 vs. $1,848)

New cases: No impact over

4-year followup period

Year 3: Decrease of 13%

($2,953 vs. $3,407)

Year 4: Decrease of 14%

($3,966 vs. $4,605)

Employment rate: No impact

Cash assistance: No impact

New York: Child Assistance Program (CAP)

The New York Child Assistance Program: Five-Year Impacts, Costs, and Benefits, November 1996

Author: Abt Associates Inc.

Sites: Three counties in New York: Monroe (Rochester), Niagara (Niagara Falls) and Suffolk (Long Island)

Universe: Single-parent

AFDC cases

Random assignment: 4/89–

3/90

Followup: 5 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase (no

resource limit)

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Food stamp cashout

—No child support passthrough

Earnings: Increase of 20%

($15,882 vs. $13,268)

Employment rate: Increase

of 13% (29% vs. 26%)

Cash assistance: No impact

1490

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Ohio: Transitions to Independence Demonstration (Ohio JOBS)

JOBS Assignments in Ohio: Patterns and Impacts, December 1994

Author: Abt Associates Inc.

Sites: Fifteen counties in Ohio: Brown, Champaign, Clermont, Franklin, Lake, Lawrence, Montgomery, Perry,

Pickaway, Richland, Seneca, Stark, Summit, Trumbull, and Wyandot

Universe: JOBS mandatory

adults (for single parents

with child age 6 or older,

after 6/91, child age 3 or

older)

Random assignment: 1/89–

12/91

Followup: 3 years (early cohort), 2 years (later entrants)

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings: 12th quarter impacts for those assigned

to:

Basic education: Decrease

of 34% ($410 vs. $624)

Postsecondary education: No

impact

Job club: Increase of 22%

($991 vs. $811)

Job readiness: No impact

Community work experience:

No impact

Employment rate: Employed

in 12th quarter for those

assigned to:

Basic education: Decrease

of 17% (24% vs. 29%)

Postsecondary education: No

impact

Job club: Increase of 28%

(42% vs. 33%)

Job readiness: Increase of

14% (39% vs. 34%)

Community work experience:

No impact

Cash assistance: Not reported

Ohio Transitions to Independence

Final Impacts for JOBS and Work Choice, December 1994

Author: Abt Associates Inc.

Sites: 15 counties in Ohio for JOBS Demonstration: Brown, Champaign, Clermont, Franklin, Lake, Lawrence,

Montgomery, Perry, Pickaway, Richland, Seneca, Stark, Summit, Trumbull, and Wyandot; One county for

Work Choice: Montgomery County

Final Impacts

for JOBS

Universe: Mandatory JOBS

adults (for single parents, caring for a child

age 6 or older)

Random assignment: 1/89–

12/91

Followup: Successive cohorts assigned to treatment and control groups

beginning in 1989 and

followed for 1, 2, or 3

years

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings:

Early entrants: No impact

Later entrants:

Year 1: Decrease of 14%

($2,003 vs. $2,322)

Year 2: Decrease of 14%

($2,939 vs. $3,421)

Employment rate:

Early entrants: Increase of

8% (61% vs. 57%)

Later entrants: No impact

over followup period

Year 2: Decrease of 7%

(46% vs. 49%)

Cash assistance: No impact

1491

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Final Impacts

for Work

Choice

Universe: AFDC recipients

with young children (1–5

years old)

Random assignment: 1/89–

3/90

Followup: 18 months for

early entrants; 1 year for

later cohort

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Mixed employment/education program

Earnings:

Early entrants: Increase of

14% ($1,484 vs. $1,307)

Later entrants: Decrease of

19% ($800 vs. $992)

Employment rate:

Early entrants: Increase of

9% (41% vs. 38%)

Later entrants: No impact

Cash assistance: No impact

Ohio: Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP)

Final Report on Ohio’s Welfare Initiative to Improve School Attendance Among Teenage Parents: Ohio’s

Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) Program, August 1997

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Universe: Pregnant teenagers and custodial teen

parents who were on

AFDC

Random assignment: 8/90–

9/91

Followup: 4 years

Data type: Administrative

data, survey

Policy changes:

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—School attendance bonus

Earnings: No impact over 4-

year followup period. Increase in quarters 3–4 of

25% ($315 vs. $252)

Employment rate: No impact over 4-year followup

period. Increase in percent ever employed quarters 5–8 of 8% (44% vs.

41%)

Cash assistance: Years 3

and 4: Decrease of 5%

($5,185 vs. $5,459)

Texas: Achieving Change for Texans (ACT)/TANF

Achieving Change for Texans Evaluation: Net Impacts Through December 1997, August 1998

Author: Texas Department of Human Services

Time limits Universe: TANF recipients

Random assignment: 6/96–

12/97

Followup: Varies

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child age 4 or

older (5 in some cases).

For control group, parents

with child age 3 or older

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—Time limit (adult only)

—Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and

child care)

—Two-parent family eligibility

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: No impact

Cash assistance: No impact

Responsibilities, employment,

and resources in

choices

counties

Universe: TANF families

Random assignment: 7/96–

12/97

Followup: Varies

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child age 4 or

older (5 in some cases).

For control group, parents

with child age 3 or older

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and

child care)

—Two-parent family eligibility

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: No impact

Cash assistance: Decrease

in time on TANF. The proportion of time spent on

TANF out of the maximum

possible was 55% for the

experimental group, 57%

for the control group

1492

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Responsibilities, employment,

and resources in

nonchoices

counties

Universe: TANF recipients

Random assignment: 1/97–

12/97

Followup: Varies

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: Not

applicable, program not

offered in these counties

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Two-parent family eligibility

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: No impact

Cash assistance: Decrease

in time on TANF. The proportion of time spent on

TANF out of the maximum

possible was 64% for the

experimental group, 67%

for the control group

Vermont: Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP)

Forty-Two-Month Impacts of Vermont’s Welfare Restructuring Project, September 1999

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Sites: Statewide (VT) with detailed focus on 6 of Vermont’s 12 districts: Barre, Burlington, Newport, Rutland, Springfield, and St. Albans

Single-parent

families

Universe: Families applying

for and receiving assistance

Random assignment: 7/94–

6/95

Followup: 42 months

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Child support passthrough (only first $50

disregarded)

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and

child care)

—Work-trigger time limit

Earnings: Average quarterly

earnings: Increase of 8%

($1,162 vs. $1,071)

Employment rate: Increase

of 10% (85% vs. 77%)

Cash assistance: Quarterly

cash benefits: Decrease

of 6% ($772 vs. $820)

Single-parent

families,

without

mandated

participation

Universe: Families applying

for and receiving assistance

Random assignment: 7/94–

6/95

Followup: 42 months

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Child support passthrough (only first $50

disregarded)

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and

child care)

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: No impact

Cash assistance: No impact

Virginia: Independence Program

Early Impacts of the Virginia Independence Program, November 1999

Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.

Sites: Three counties in Virginia: Lynchburg, Prince William, and Petersburg (VIEW counties)

Lynchburg Universe: AFDC cases that

were on the rolls as of 7/

95

Random assignment: 7/95

Followup: 2 years

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child 18

months or older

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Employment-focused program

—Family cap

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—Required minor parents

to live with adult

—Time limit

—Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and

child care)

—Two-parent family eligibility

—Welfare diversion

—Work requirements:

younger child

—Work-trigger time limit

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate:

Year 1: Increase of 14%

(58% vs. 51%)

Year 2: No impact

Cash assistance:

Year 1: Decrease of 5%

($2,419 vs. $2,539)

Year 2: No impact

1493

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Prince William Universe: AFDC cases that

were on the rolls as of 7/

95

Random assignment: 7/95

Followup: 2 years

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child 18

months or older

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Employment-focused program

—Family cap

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—Required minor parents

to live with adult

—Time limit

—Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and

child care)

—Two-parent family eligibility

—Welfare diversion

—Work requirements:

younger child

—Work-trigger time limit

Earnings: No impact

Employment rate: No impact

Cash assistance: No impact

Petersburg

(Post-VIEW)

Universe: AFDC cases that

were on the rolls as of 7/

95

Random assignment: 7/95

Followup: 2 years

Participation in welfare-towork requirement: For

experimental group, parents with child 18

months or older

Data type: Administrative

data

Policy changes:

—Asset limit increase

—Earnings disregard enhancement

—Employment-focused program

—Family cap

—Personal responsibility

sanctions

—Required minor parents

to live with adult

—Time limit

—Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and

child care)

—Two-parent family eligibility

—Welfare diversion

—Work requirements:

younger child

—Work-trigger time limit

Earnings:

Year 1: Increase of 18%

($2,144 vs. $1,823)

Year 2: Increase of 20%

($3,553 vs $2,950)

Employment rate:

Year 1: No impact

Year 2: Increase of 11%

(60% vs. 54%)

Cash assistance: No impact

in post-VIEW year. However, decrease in last 2

quarters (2 out of 3 VIEW

quarters):

Quarter 8: Decrease of 10%

($345 vs. $381)

Quarter 9: Decrease of 13%

($294 vs. $336)

1494

TABLE L–9.—WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Wisconsin: Milwaukee’s New Hope Demonstration Project

New Hope for People With Low Incomes: Two-Year Results of a Program to Reduce Poverty and Reform Welfare, April 1999

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

Site: Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Universe: Low-income adult

volunteers (below 150%

of poverty) living in two

high-poverty neighborhoods in Milwaukee

Random assignment: 8/94–

2/95

Followup: 2 years

Data type: Administrative

data, ethnography survey

Policy changes:

—Paid child care

—Paid health insurance

—Wage supplementation

Earnings: Full sample: No

impact over 2-year followup period

Year 1: Increase of 9%

($6,833 vs. $6,250)

Employed full time entering

program: No impact

Not employed full time entering program: Increase

of 13% ($11,898 vs.

$10,509)

Employment rate: Full sample: Increase of 6% (96%

vs. 90%)

Employed full time entering

program: No impact

Not employed full time entering program: Increase

of 7% (94% vs. 87%)

Cash assistance: Full sample: No impact

Employed full time entering

program: No impact over

2-year followup period

Year 2: Decrease of 38%

($736 vs. $1,181)

Not employed full time entering program: No impact

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on a review of research evaluations.

TABLE L–10.—ECONOMIC STATUS OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988

Evaluation Welfare to work Family formation Economic status

National Evaluation of Welfare-To-Work Strategies

National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: Evaluating Alternative Welfare-to-Work Approaches: Two

Year Impacts for Eleven Programs, June 2000

Atlanta

employmentfocused

Earnings: Increase of 16%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 8%

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Atlanta

educationfocused

Earnings: Increase of 10%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 6%

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Grand Rapids

employmentfocused

Earnings: Increase of 22%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 19%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 8%

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income:

Year 2: Decrease of 4%

($7,443 vs. $7,746)

1495

TABLE L–10.—ECONOMIC STATUS OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Evaluation Welfare to work Family formation Economic status

Grand Rapids

educationfocused

Earnings: Increase of 13%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 11%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 3%

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Riverside

employmentfocused

Earnings: Increase of 30%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 14%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 13%

Marital status: Decrease of

20% (11% vs. 13%) in

percent married and living with spouse at end of

followup

Births: No impact

Income:

Year 2: Decrease of 5%

($7,516 vs. $7,874)

Riverside

educationfocused

Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 10%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 10%

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income:

Year 2: Decrease of 8%

($7,149 vs. $7,768)

Columbus

integrated

case management

Earnings: Increase of 10%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 13%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 9%

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Columbus

traditional

case management

Earnings: Increase of 10%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 10%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 7%

Marital status: No impact

Births: Decrease of 41%

(3% vs. 8%) in percent

who had a baby since

study entry

Income: No impact

Detroit Earnings: Increase of 9%

Cash assistance: No impact

Food assistance: Decrease

of 2%

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Oklahoma City Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 6%

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Portland Earnings: Increase of 35%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 17%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 9%

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

New Chance Demonstration

New Chance: Final Report on a Comprehensive Program for Young Mothers in Poverty and Their Children,

October 1997

Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: Increase

of 1%

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: Not reported

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD)

Moving into Adulthood: Were the Impacts of Mandatory Programs for Welfare-Dependent Teenaged Parents

Sustained After the Programs Ended?, February 1998

Camden Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: No impact

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: Not reported

Births: No impact

Income: Increase of 8%

($840 vs. $778)

Newark Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: No impact

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: Not reported

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

1496

TABLE L–10.—ECONOMIC STATUS OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Evaluation Welfare to work Family formation Economic status

Chicago Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 5%

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: Not reported

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Arizona: Employing and Moving People Off Welfare and Encouraging Responsibility (EMPOWER)

Evaluation of the Arizona EMPOWER Welfare Reform Demonstration, May 1999

Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 6%

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: No impact

Births: Decrease of 60%

(2% vs. 4%) in births to

unwed minors

Income: No impact

California: Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)

GAIN: Benefits, Costs, and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work Program, September 1994

Alameda Earnings: Increase of 30%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 4%

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Los Angeles Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 6%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 6%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: No impact

Riverside Earnings: Increase of 49%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 15%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 9%

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

San Diego Earnings: Increase of 22%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 8%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 6%

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Tulare Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: No impact

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: Quarter 13: Increase of 8% ($2,014 vs.

$1,865)

California: Los Angeles Jobs-First Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)

Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN evaluation: First-Year Findings on Participation Patterns and Impacts, June

1998

Earnings: Increase of 31%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 8%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 8%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: No impact

Connecticut: Jobs First

Jobs First: Implementation and Early Impacts of Connecticut’s Welfare Reform Initiative, February 2000

Earnings: Increase of 11%

Cash assistance: Increase

of 10%

Food assistance: Increase

of 6%

Marital status: No impact

Births: No impact

Income: Increase of 10%

($26,933 vs. $24,555)

1497

TABLE L–10.—ECONOMIC STATUS OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Evaluation Welfare to work Family formation Economic status

Delaware: A Better Chance (ABC)

The Early Economic Impacts of Delaware’s ABC Welfare Reform Program, December 1997

Earnings: Quarter 4: Increase of 16%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 5%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 6%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: No impact

Florida: Project Independence

Florida’s Project Independence: Benefits, Costs, and Two-Year Impacts of Florida’s JOBS Program, April

1995

Earnings: Increase of 4%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 6%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 3%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: No impact

Florida: Family Transition Program (FTP)

FTP: The Family Transition Program: Implementation and Three-Year Impacts of Florida’s Initial TimeLimited Welfare Program, April 1999

Earnings: Increase of 18%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 11%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 8%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: Increase of 5%

($20,083 vs. $19,215)

Indiana: Welfare Reform Evaluation

The Indiana Welfare Reform Evaluation: Program Implementation and Economic Impacts After Two Years,

November 1998

Earnings: Increase of 5%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 20%

Food assistance: Decrease

of 3%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: No impact

Iowa: Family Investment Program (FIP)

Iowa’s Family Investment Program: Two-Year Impacts, December 1998

Earnings: Increase of 8%

Cash assistance:

Year 1: No impact

Year 2: Decrease of 4%

Food assistance:

Year 1: Decrease of 1%

Year 2: Decrease of 3%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income:

Year 1: Increase of 4%

($6,668 vs. $6,425)

Year 2: Increase of 4%

($7,486 vs. $7,176)

Michigan: To Strengthen Michigan Families (TSMF)

Final Impact Report: The Evaluation of To Strengthen Michigan Families (TSMF), September 1997

Earnings:

Ongoing cohort: Increase of

7%

Other cohorts: No impact

Cash assistance: All cohorts: No impact

Food assistance:

Ongoing cohort: Decrease of

1% (average monthly receipt)

Other cohorts: No impact

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income:

Ongoing cohort: Increase of

1% ($8,849 vs. $8,967)

Other cohorts: No impact

1498

TABLE L–10.—ECONOMIC STATUS OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Evaluation Welfare to work Family formation Economic status

Minnesota: Family Investment Program (MFIP)

Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota Family Investment Program, June

2000

Note: The MFIP Program combined cash welfare and food stamps into one benefit, referred to in these entries as ‘‘welfare.’’

Long-term

single-parent families

Earnings: Increase of 23%

Welfare: Increase of 11%

Marital status: Increase of

51% (11% vs. 7%) married at the end of 3 years

Births: Not reported

Income: Increase of 15%

($2,700 vs. $2,348)

Long-term

single-parent families—

urban

counties

Earnings: Year 3 (quarters

1–3): Increase of 11%

Welfare: Year 3 (quarters

1–3): Increase of 13%

Marital status: No impact

Births: Not reported

Income: Year 3 (quarters

1–3): Increase of 12%

($2,882 vs. $2,525)

Long-term

single-parent families—

urban

counties,

without

mandated

participation

Earnings: No impact

Welfare: Year 3 (quarters

1–3): Increase of 24%

Marital status: Increase of

89% (11% vs. 6%)

Births: Not reported

Income: Year 3 (quarters

1–3): Increase of 10%

($2,769 vs. $2,525)

Recent applicants—

urban

counties

Earnings: No impact

Welfare: Year 3 (quarters

1–3): Increase of 26%

Marital status: No impact

Births: Not reported

Income: Year 3 (quarters

1–3): Increase of 6%

($2,740 vs. $2,578)

Two-parent

recipient

families

Earnings: Decrease of 18%

($2,193 vs. $2,682)

Welfare: Increase of 38%

($1,889 vs. $1,367)

Marital status: Increase of

40% (67% vs. 48%)

married at the end of 3

years

Births: Not reported

Income: Increase of 5%

($3,958 vs. $3,769)

Ohio: Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) Program

Final Report on Ohio’s Welfare Initiative to Improve School Attendance Among Teenage Parents: Ohio’s

Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) Program, August 1997

Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: Years 3

and 4: Decrease of 5%

Food assistance: Not reported

Marital status: Not reported

Births: No impact

Income: No impact

Vermont: Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP)

Forty-Two-Month Impacts of Vermont’s Welfare Restructuring Project, September 1999

Single-parent

families

Earnings: Increase of 8%

Cash assistance: Decrease

of 6%

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: No impact

Single-parent

families,

without

mandated

participation

Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: No impact

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: No impact

1499

TABLE L–10.—ECONOMIC STATUS OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988—Continued

Evaluation Welfare to work Family formation Economic status

Virginia: Independence Program

Early Impacts of the Virginia Independence Program, November 1999

Lynchburg Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: Year 1:

Decrease of 5%

Food assistance:

Year 1: Decrease of 5%

Year 2: Decrease of 12%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: No impact

Prince William Earnings: No impact (annual income, 2 quarters

did see increases)

Cash assistance: No impact

Food assistance: Year 2:

Decrease of 7%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: No impact

Petersburg Earnings:

Year 1: Increase of 18%

Year 2: Increase of 20%

Cash assistance: No impact. 2 of 3 post-VIEW

quarters, did see decreases

Food assistance: Year 1:

Increase of 3%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income:

Year 1: Increase of 7%

($7,041 vs. $6,612)

Year 2: Increase of 8%

($7,196 vs. $6,697)

Wisconsin: Milwaukee’s New Hope Demonstration Project

New Hope for People With Low Incomes: Two-Year Results of a Program to Reduce Poverty and Reform Welfare, April 1999

Employed full

time upon

entering

the program

Earnings: No impact

Cash assistance: Year 2:

Decrease of 38%

Food assistance: No impact

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income:

Year 1: Increase of 14%

($11,190 vs. $9,843)

Year 2: Decrease of 8%

($14,146 vs. $15,294)

Not employed

full time

upon entering the

program

Earnings: Increase of 13%

Cash assistance: No impact

Food assistance: Year 2:

Increase of 14%

Marital status: Not reported

Births: Not reported

Income: Year 2: Increase of

13% ($11,213 vs.

$9,915)

Note.—Some percentage changes reported in this table may differ if calculated based on the reported

findings, due to rounding. The percentage changes reported in this table reflect the percentage changes as

reported in the individual evaluations.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on a review of research evaluations.

Information concerning the data, the target populations, and the package of initiatives included in each

evaluation is highlighted in the table of welfare-to-work outcomes in the previous section (table L–9). The

outcomes presented in this table should be supplemented with the details of the evaluation highlighted in

table L–9.

1500

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Alabama: Alabama Welfare Reform Follow-up Survey, January 2000

Universe: All cases closed

between 7/98 and 11/98

that contained a valid

Alabama phone number

Data type: Survey conducted between 5/99 and

7/99, 7–12 months after

exit

Response rate: 416 respondents surveyed

Earnings: Average hourly wage: $6.08

Hours of employment: Average hours

per week: 33.9

Employment rate: At time of survey:

53.8%

Recidivism: Receiving cash assistance

at time of survey: 15.1%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid

(self/children): 33.7%/72.8%

Child care assistance: Receiving help

paying for child care: 20.4%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 59.9%

Receiving WIC: 34.9%

Arkansas: Evaluation of Arkansas’s Transitional Employment Assistance (TEA) Program, July 1999

Universe: Cases closed

between 6/96 and 12/98

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: Up to 4 quarters (varies)

Earnings (cases closed 7/97–9/

98):1st quarter after exit: $2,034; 4th

quarter after exit: $2,299

Employment rate (cases closed 7/

96–9/98): 1st quarter after exit: 50%;

Ever employed since exit: 66%

Recidivism: Ever received cash aid

from 6/96–12/98: 23.2%

Health assistance (cases closed 7/

98–9/98): Receiving Medicaid within 2

months of exit (adults/children): 56%/

60%

Arizona: Cash Assistance Exit Study: First Quarter 1998 Cohort Final Report, January 2000

Universe: All cases closed

between 1/98 and 3/98

that remained closed for

at least 2 months

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: 12 months

Earnings: 1st quarter after exit:

$2,211; 4th quarter after exit: $2,511

Employment rate: 1st quarter after

exit: 53.1%; 4th quarter after exit:

50.1%; Ever employed since exit:

73.3%

Recidivism: Ever received cash aid in

the 4 quarters since exit: 27.7%

Health assistance: Head of household

ever received Medicaid in the 4 quarters since exit: 71.7%

Child care assistance: Ever received

child care in the 4 quarters since exit:

21.8%

Food assistance: Ever received food

stamps in the 4 quarters since exit:

66.5%

Arizona: Cash Assistance Exit Study: First Quarter 1998 Cohort Final Report, January 2000

Universe: All cases closed

between 1/98 and 3/98

that remained closed for

at least 2 months

Data type: Survey conducted 12–18 months

after exit from cash assistance

Response rate: 72%

Earnings: Average hourly wage: $7.52;

Average total monthly household income: $1,467

Hours of employment: Average hours

per week: 34.9

Employment rate: At time of survey:

58.4%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid

at the time of survey (adult/children):

58.7%/71.8%

California: Examining Circumstances of Individuals and Families Who Leave TANF: Assessing the Validity of

Administrative Data (Interim Report), May 1999

Universe: One-parent

cases closed in 1997 that

remained closed for at

least 2 months

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: 12 months

Earnings: 1st quarter after exit:

$3,480; 4th quarter after exit: $3,869

Employment rate: 1st quarter after

exit: 55.4%; 4th quarter after exit:

54.0%; Ever employed since exit:

73.7%

Recidivism: Family member ever received cash aid in the 12 months

after exit: 19.4%

Health assistance: Ever received nonassistance Medi-Cal in the 12 months

since exit (adults/children): 34.6%/

35.9%

Food assistance: Percent of leavers

with a member of their family ever receiving nonassistance food stamps in

the 12 months since exit: 8.5%

1501

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS—Continued

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Colorado: Evaluation of the Colorado Works Program: First Annual Report, November 1999

Universe: Adult cases

closed 7/97–9/97 that

had not reopened as of

12/98

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: 5 quarters (15

months)

Earnings: 1st quarter after exit:

$2,400; 5th quarter after exit: $2,905

Employment rate: 1st quarter after

exit: 52.4%; 5th quarter after exit:

51.5%

Recidivism: Cases reopened by 12/98:

18.8%

Health assistance: Enrolled in Medicaid in the first 2 months after exit

(adults/children): 29%/36%

Colorado: Evaluation of the Colorado Works Program: First Annual Report, November 1999

Universe: Adult cases

closed 7/97–9/97 that

had not reopened as of

12/98

Data type: Survey conducted approximately 2

years after program exit,

mostly between 6/99 and

8/99

Response rate: 78%

Earnings: Median wage per hour for

respondent working: $8.16

Hours of employment: Less than 35

hours per week: 25.7%; 35 hours or

more per week: 74.3%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

65%; Ever employed since exit: 89%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid

at time of survey (adults/children):

14.9%/43.2%

Child care assistance: Employed respondents receiving government or

employer child care subsidy: 14%

Food assistance: Percent of eligible

respondents receiving food stamps:

47%

Connecticut: Connecticut Post-Time Limit Tracking Study: Six-Month Survey Results, January 1999

Universe: Cases closed

because of the 21-month

time limit on cash assistance in 9/97 or 10/97

that did not receive an

extension

Data type: Survey conducted 6 months after

exit

Response rate: 82%

Earnings: Average hourly wage (primary job): $7.82; Average per week

(from all jobs): $270

Hours of employment: Average hours

per week at all jobs: 34.9

Employment rate: At time of survey:

83.0%

Recidivism: Someone in the household

may have received TFA or AFDC in the

month before interview: 3.8%

Food assistance: Receiving food

stamps: 50.2%; Average amount of

food stamps: $218

Florida: After Leaving WAGES: Statewide Sample, March 1999

Universe: Cases closed

10/96–9/98

Data type: Survey conducted in 10/98 and 11/

98

Response rate: 51.5%

Earnings: $5.15 or less: 11.6%;

$5.16–$6.99: 43.9%; $7 or more:

36.1%

Hours of employment: Less than 40

hours: 43.9%; 40 or more: 53.6%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

56.9%

Recidivism: Would go back on WAGES

if they could: 32.4%

Health assistance:

Receiving health care (respondents/

children): 48.6%/69.7%

Receiving Medicaid (family): 67.7%

Child care assistance: Receiving government child care assistance: 17.8%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 56.6%

Receiving WIC: 28.9%

Receiving School Lunch Program:

55.1%

Receiving Summer Feeding Program:

7.4%

Georgia: Amended Quarterly Progress Report: Outcomes for Single-Parent Leavers by Cohort Quarter for January–March 1999 1st Quarter 1997 Leavers, April 1999

Universe: Single-adult

cases closed in 1997 that

remained closed to cash

aid for at least 2 consecutive months

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: 12 months

Earnings: 1st quarter after exit:

$2,193; 4th quarter after exit: $2,389

Employment rate: 1st quarter after

exit: 64.2%; 4th quarter after exit:

53.3%; Ever employed since exit:

73.9%

Recidivism: Returned in 4th quarter

after exit: 13.4%

Not reported

1502

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS—Continued

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Idaho: Project Self-Reliance: TAFI Participant Closure Study (II), March 1998

Universe: Cases closed 7/

97–12/97

Data type: Survey conducted in 1/98 between 1

and 5 months after exit

from cash assistance

Response rate: 16.5%

Earnings: Less than $5.25: 27%;

$5.25–$7: 51%; $7.01 or more: 21%

Hours of employment: 40 hours or

more per week: 32.7%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

52.9%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid: 80%

Child care assistance: Survey respondents receiving help from child

care program (government): 15.2% of

total

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 77%

Receiving WIC: 41%

Illinois: When Families Leave Welfare Behind: First Survey Findings, January 1999

Universe: Cases closed in

12/97 and 6/98 that remained closed for at

least 2 months

Data type: Survey conducted in 11/98 and 12/

98, 5–11 months after

exit from cash assistance

Response rate: 30.5%

Earnings: Average hourly wage: $7.78

Hours of employment: Average hours

worked per week: 35.8

Employment rate: At time of survey:

65.3%; Ever employed since exit:

85.2%

Recidivism: Returned to TANF since

leaving: 20.0%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid: (adult/children): 54.4%/59.1%

Private health insurance (families):

29.7%

Child care assistance: Receiving

State help with weekly out-of-pocket

child care expenses: 35.8%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 35%

Receiving WIC: 26.8%

Receiving School Lunch Program:

40.0%

Indiana: Who Is On and Who Is Off? Comparing Characteristics and Outcomes for Current and Former TANF

Recipients, September 1997

Universe: Families who

had received AFDC sometime between 5/95 and 5/

96

Data type: Survey conducted early in 1997, 12–

18 months after individuals enrolled in the

State’s welfare demonstration program

Response rate: Not reported

Earnings: Less than $6 per hour:

39.4%; $6–$7.99: 40.7%; $8 or more:

19.9%

Hours of employment: Full time employment (35 or more hours per week):

61.7%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

64.3%; Ever employed since exit:

84.3%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid

(families): 52.9%

Covered by health insurance (adults/

children): 46.0%/65.1%

Child care assistance: Received child

care assistance from a community organization since exit: 6.4%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 37.9%

Receiving WIC: 24.6%

Receiving School Lunch Program:

46.2%

Receiving School Breakfast: 34.7%

Iowa: Iowa’s Limited Benefit Plan (LBP), May 1997

Universe: Individuals in

active welfare cases who,

in 11/95, 12/95, or 1/96

entered month 7 of their

initial assignment to the

LBP

Data type: Survey conducted between 2/96 and

4/96 (during months 7

and 12 of the limited

benefit plan)

Response rate: Not reported

Earnings: Average weekly earnings:

$170.20

Hours of employment: Average number of hours worked: 31.27; percentage working 40 or more hours per

week: 38.1%

Employment rate: Ever employed

since exit: 52.6%

Health assistance:

Received Medicaid: 66.4%

Health insurance available from most

recent job held: 36.4%

Child care assistance: Child care is a

type of support received from family,

friends and neighbors since Family Investment Program benefits were terminated

Food assistance:

Received food stamps: 63.5%

Received WIC: 29.9%

1503

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS—Continued

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Kansas: Statistical Summary of Leaver Survey: Twelve Month Survey Results, June 1999

Universe: Cases closed

12/97–11/98

Data type: Survey conducted 12 months after

exit

Response rate: 51.8%

Earnings: Less than $5 per hour:

10%; $5.01–$7: 51%; $7.01 or more:

33%

Hours of employment: Full-time employment (more than 37.5 hours/

week): 65%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

36%

Recidivism: Temporary Assistance to

Families (TAF) cases reopened: 18%;

Average months off cash assistance:

7

Health assistance: Receiving medical

assistance (families): 60%

Child care assistance: Receiving

child care: 6%

Food assistance: Receiving food

stamps: 30%

Kentucky: From Welfare to Work: Welfare Reform in Kentucky (No. 2) Second Year Survey of Discontinued K–

TAP Recipients, January 1999

Universe: Cases closed 1/

97–11/97 that were still

closed at the time of the

survey

Data type: Survey conducted 10/98

Response rate: 42%

Earnings: $5.15 or less per hour:

13.1%; $5.16–$6.99: 46.1%; $7 or

more: 37.4%

Hours of employment: 40 or more

hours per week: 59.5%

Employment rate: Left program for

employment: 48.3%

Recidivism: Would return to K–TAP if

possible: 18.2%

Health assistance:

Receiving Medicaid (adult): 27.8%

Medical card or passport (children):

60.4%

Receiving other medical insurance

(adults/children): 27.0%/18.6%

Child care assistance:

Respondents using some type of child

care: 37.5%

Respondents using and paying for

child care: 69.9%

Respondents using and paying for

child care who receive payment assistance; 28.1%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 45.6%

Receiving WIC: 24.7%

Louisiana: Exiting Welfare: The Experiences of Families in Metro New Orleans, June 1998

Universe: Cases closed 1/

98–3/98

Data type: Survey conducted in 4/98 and 5/98

Response rate: 17.5%

Earnings: Average monthly income—

working: $802.59; Average monthly income—not working: $403.65; Average

total monthly household income:

$533.41

Hours of employment: Full time (40

or more hours per week): 18.7%; Part

time: 14.9%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

33.6%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid: 39.8%

Child care assistance: Receiving

child care assistance: 3.2%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 49.0%

Receiving WIC: 23.5%

Maryland: Life After Welfare: Fourth Interim Report, October 1999

Universe: Cases closed

for any period of time

from 10/96–3/99

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: Up to 30

months (varies)

Earnings: 1st quarter after exit:

$2,202; 4th quarter after exit: $2,545;

9th quarter after exit: $2,701

Employment rate 1st quarter after

exit: 52.5%; 4th quarter after exit:

51.0%; 9th quarter after exit: 52.7%

Recidivism: 24 months after exit (excludes ‘‘churners’’): 25.8%

Not reported

1504

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS—Continued

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Massachusetts: How Are They Doing? A Longitudinal Study of Households Leaving Welfare Under Massachusetts Reform: Round 4 Findings, April 1999

Universe: Cases closed

12/96–6/97 that were

closed for at least 30

days

Data type: Survey conducted 1 year after exit

Response rate: 63%

Earnings: Full-time average weekly

earnings: $323; Part-time average

weekly earnings: $172

Hours of employment: Full time (30

or more hours per week): 34.4%; Part

time (less than 30 hours per week):

18.6%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

53.0%; Someone in the household had

worked in the last 3 months: 73.0%

Recidivism: Returned to welfare at

the time of the survey: 20.9%

Health assistance:

Children’s medical coverage: 92.4%

Children receiving private insurance

coverage: 10.0%

Children receiving HMO coverage:

8.2%

Children receiving other coverage:

1.8%

Child care assistance: Used/using

transitional child care in the last 3

months: 12.6%

Food assistance: Receiving food

stamps: 6.5%

Michigan: Longitudinal Study of Family Independence Program (FIP) Recipients: 1998 Closed FIP Cases,

1998

Universe: Cases that

were receiving cash assistance (FIP) in 1/97,

but were closed at time

of survey

Data type: Survey conducted 6/98–9/98

Response rate: 44.5%

Earnings: Average hourly wage: $7.02

Hours of employment: Average hours

worked per week: 31.7

Employment rate: At time of survey:

71.1%

Recidivism: All of the cases included

in the analysis were closed at the

time of the survey.

Not reported

Mississippi: Tracking of TANF Clients: First Report of a Longitudinal Study, January 1999

Universe: Cases closed 1/

98–4/98 for any length of

time

Data type: Survey conducted 7/98–9/98

Response rate: 86.7%

Earnings: Average hourly wage: $5.77

($5.97 urban, $5.57 rural)

Hours of employment: Average hours

per week: 35; Full time (35 or more

hours per week): 67% (75% urban;

59% rural); Part time: 33% (25%

urban; 41% rural)

Employment rate: At time of survey:

35% (27% rural, 46% urban); Ever

employed in last 6 months: 47%

(52% urban; 43% rural)

Recidivism: Received TANF, Medicaid,

and food stamp benefits at least 1

month since originally leaving the

rolls: 47% (37% urban; 73% rural)

Health assistance:

Children receiving Medicaid: 44%

Children receiving private insurance:

10%

Child care assistance: Respondents

using child care in the last 6 months

who received State-sponsored payments: 56%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 58% (47%

urban, 67% rural)

Participate in School Lunch Program

(of families with school age children):

82%

Missouri: Preliminary Outcomes for 1996 Fourth Quarter AFDC Leavers, September 1999

Universe: All single- and

two-parent AFDC/TANF

caseheads (those receiving a cash payment) who

were active during 9/96,

10/96, and/or 11/96, and

who left AFDC during the

4th quarter of 1996 and

remained off the rolls for

at least the following

month

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: 2 years (8

quarters)

Earnings: 1st quarter after exit:

$2,192; 8th quarter after exit: $3,055

Employment rate: 1st quarter after

exit: 58.1%; 8th quarter after exit:

56.7%; Ever employed since exit:

79.5%

Recidivism: Returned to cash assistance at any time during the 8-quarter

followup period: 17.2%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid

at any time during the 8-quarter followup period (self/children): 48.0%/

59.2%

Food assistance: Receiving food

stamps at any time during the 8-

quarter followup period: 74.9%

1505

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS—Continued

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Montana: Montana’s Welfare Reform Project: FAIM February 1998 Update, February 1998

Universe: Cases closed

that remained closed

from 3/96 to 9/97

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: 18 months

Earnings: Over the 18-month period:

$5,908

Employment rate: Reported employment earnings: 57%

Not reported

Montana: Montana’s Welfare Reform Project: FAIM February 1998 Update, February 1998

Universe: Current and

former recipients at time

of survey

Data type: Survey conducted 12/97–1/98

Response rate: 208 respondents

Earnings: Earning less than minimum

wage: 11%

Hours of employment: More than 20

hours per week: 47%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

66%

Health assistance:

Receiving Medicaid: 74.5%

Employed respondents with health insurance: 39%

Child care assistance: 29 survey respondents were enrolled in Job Supplement Program, with 6 utilizing

publicly funded child care

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 63%

Receiving School Lunch Program:

55.3%

Receiving WIC: 47.6%

New Jersey: Work-first New Jersey (WFNJ) Evaluation: How WFNJ Clients are Faring Under Welfare Reform:

An Early Look: Leaver Sample, October 1999

Universe: Cases who entered the program from 7/

97 to 12/98, a subsample

of which were former welfare recipients

Data type: Survey conducted 21 months after

exit

Response rate: 81%

Earnings: Average total monthly income: $1,170

Employment rate: At time of survey:

56%

Health assistance: Receiving health

insurance: 73% (62% public and

11% private); 75% of the children of

leavers had health insurance

Child care assistance: Employed

former clients receiving government

child care subsidies: 22%

Food assistance: Receiving food

stamps: 33%

New York: After Welfare: A Study of Work and Benefit Use After Case Closing, December 1999

Universe: Cases closed 1/

97–3/97 that were closed

for at least 2 months

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: 12 months

Earnings: 1st quarter after exit:

$3,393; 4th quarter after exit: $3,602

Employment rate: 1st quarter after

exit: 50%; 4th quarter after exit:

48%; Ever employed since exit: 62%

Recidivism: Returned in 4th quarter:

19%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid

in the 4th quarter after case closing:

45%

Food assistance: Receiving food

stamps in the 4th quarter after case

closing: 26%

North Carolina: Evaluation of the North Carolina Work First Program: Status of Families Leaving Work First

After Hitting the 24-Month Time Limit, May 1999

Universe: Cases closed in

8/98 because of a time

limit

Data type: Survey conducted in 11/98 and 12/

98 (supplemented with

administrative data)

Response rate: 76.5%

Earnings: Median monthly earnings:

Self-employed: $259.80; Working for

an employer: $947.19

Hours of employment: Full-time employment (40 or more hours per week):

37.9%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

63.1%; Ever employed since exit:

80.5%

Recidivism: All cases closed because

of time limit are ineligible for TANF

cash benefits for 3 years

Health care:

Receiving Medicaid (families/children):

84.5%/93.2%

Receiving other health insurance

(families): 7.2%

Receiving insurance from employer:

5.1%

Child care assistance: Respondents

who use child care and receive a

child care subsidy from the county:

66.7%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 70.8%

Receiving WIC: 4.6%

1506

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS—Continued

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Ohio: How Are They Managing? A Six-Month Retrospective of Cuyahoga County Families Leaving Welfare,

1999

Universe: Cases closed in

the 4th quarter of 1998

and 1st quarter of 1999

for at least 2 months

Data type: Survey conducted 6 months after

exit

Response rate: 70%

Earnings: Total family income (including cash value of food stamps) greater than or equal to 100% of 1998

poverty level: 55%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

67%; Ever employed since exit: 87%

Recidivism: Returned at least once:

24%

Health assistance:

Receiving Medicaid (adults/children):

59%/69%

Receiving private health insurance

(adults/children): 17%/15%

Child care assistance: Receiving

child care assistance: 22%

Food assistance: Receiving food

stamps: 53%

Oklahoma: Family Health and Well-Being in Oklahoma: An Exploratory Analysis of TANF Cases Closed and

Denied October 1996–November 1997: Sample of Adult and Children, September 1998

Universe: Cases that

were closed or denied for

any reason from 10/96–

11/97 regardless of

whether they were receiving TANF at the time of

the survey

Data type: Survey conducted 1/98–4/98

Response rate: 53.3%

Earnings: Average hourly wage: $6.51

Hours of employment: Average hours

worked per week: 34; Full-time employment (40 or more hours per week):

50.3%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

50.3%; Respondents who live in

households with at least one employed individual: 68.5%

Recidivism: Received TANF at least

once since 10/96: 33.6%

Health assistance:

Receiving Medicaid only: 60.6%

Receiving private (work-related) and

Medicaid: 9.2%

Receiving private (work-related) only:

8.6%

Receipt by child—Medicaid, only:

62.6%

Medicaid/private insurance: 18.5%

Child care assistance: Eligible households receiving child care assistance:

33.9%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps only: 8.9%

Receiving WIC/other (including food

banks), only: 25.7%

Receiving food stamps and WIC:

40.1%

Pennsylvania: Welfare Reform After Two Years: Technical Report on Former Welfare Recipients in Pennsylvania (March 1997–March 1999), November 1999

Universe: Cases that

were closed 3/97–12/98

that remained closed.

Food stamp and Medicaid

participation data is reported from 3/97 to 4/99

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: Up to 8 quarters (varies)

Earnings: Annualized income: 4th

quarter after exit: $11,711; 8th quarter after exit: $13,759

Employment rate: Ever employed

since exit: 68%

Recidivism: Only cases that remained

closed were included in the sample

Health assistance: Received Medicaid

for some period of time since exit:

76%

Food assistance: Received food

stamps for some period of time since

exit: 65%

1507

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS—Continued

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Pennsylvania: Welfare Reform After Two Years: Technical Report on Former Welfare Recipients in Pennsylvania (March 1997–March 1999), November 1999

Universe: Cases that

were closed 2/98–11/98

that remained closed for

6 consecutive months

Data type: Survey

Response rate: 29%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

58.4%; Ever employed since exit:

80.8%

Recidivism: All of the cases in the

sample were still closed at the time

of the survey

Health assistance:

Receiving Medicaid (households):

81.6%

Receiving private insurance: 27.2%

Child care assistance: Respondents

with extended/afterschool care for

children who receive State child care

payment assistance: 42.1%; Respondents with preschool children and a

caretaker who receive State child care

payment assistance: 64.4%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 51.2%

Receiving WIC: 26.4%

Receiving School Lunch Program:

47.2%

Receiving Summer Feeding Program:

25.6%

Rhode Island: Where Are They Now? A Post-Cash Administrative Data Study, May 1999

Universe: Cases closed in

4/97 and 4/98 that remained closed for at

least 31 days

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: 12 months

Recidivism: Cases reopened within

the year: 4/97: 29.9%; 4/98: 30.5%

Not reported

South Carolina: Survey of Former Family Independence Program Clients: Cases Closed During January

Through March, 1998, June 1999

Universe: Cases with at

least one adult subject to

FIP work requirements

closed 1/98–3/98 that remained closed up to the

time of the survey

Data type: Survey conducted 1/99–4/99, 12–15

months after exit from

cash assistance

Response rate: 75.0%

Earnings: Average hourly wage: $7

Hours of employment: Average hours

worked per week: 35.1; Work 30 or

more hours per week: 81.4%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

54.7%; Ever employed since exit:

80.7%

Recidivism: Pretty sure they will not

need welfare again: 51.0%

Health assistance:

At least one household member covered by Medicaid: 77.6%

Receiving private insurance (adults/

children): 7.2%/7.4%

Child care assistance:

Receiving assistance (all households):

9.9%

Among those using care, 30% receive

subsidy for preschool; 27.4% for

school-aged

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 52.6%

Receiving School Lunch Program:

52.1%

Receiving WIC: 27.1%

Receiving Summer Feeding Program:

4.9%

1508

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS—Continued

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Tennessee: Summary of Surveys of Welfare Recipients Employed or Sanctioned for Non-Compliance, March

1998

Universe: Cases sanctioned/closed for noncompliance with Families

First Program requirements since 1/97

Data type: Survey with

data collected through

10/97

Response rate: 56%

Earnings: Average hourly wage: $5.50

Employment rate: At time of survey:

39%

Recidivism: Think they will return to

Families First: 47%

Health assistance: Receiving

TennCare: 88%

Child care assistance: Receiving

child care: 16%

Tennessee: Summary of Surveys of Welfare Recipients Employed or Sanctioned for Non-Compliance, March

1998

Universe: Cases sanctioned/closed for their refusal to sign a personal

responsibility plan since

1/97

Data type: Survey with

data collected through

10/97

Response rate: 59%

Hours of employment: Full time:

25%; Part time: 17%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

42%

Recidivism: Think they will return to

Families First: 25%

Health assistance: Receiving

TennCare: 91%

Child care assistance: Receiving

child care: 21%

Texas: The Impacts of Welfare Reform Changes in Texas: Early Findings, December 1998

Universe: Cases closed in

11/97 that remained off

TANF for 6 months, as

well as a sample of

cases redirected from

TANF through Texas Works

in 12/97

Data type: Survey, supplemented with administrative data

Response rate: 51%

Earnings: Average hourly wage: $6.28

($6.15 for redirects; $6.35 for leavers)

Hours of employment: Average hours

per week: 34 (34.1 hours/week for

leavers and 34.7 for redirects)

Employment rate: At time of survey:

55% (59% of leavers and 50% of

those redirected); Ever employed since

exit: 68% (75% of leavers and 62%

of those redirected)

Health assistance: Received Medicaid

since exit (leavers/redirected): 74%/

66%

Food assistance: Received WIC since

exit (leavers/redirected): 33%/42%;

received food stamps (leavers/redirected): 68%/64%

Texas: Why People Leave Welfare II: An Expanded Follow-up Study of the Effects of Welfare Reform, December 1998

Universe: Cases closed

11/97–2/98

Data type: Survey

Response rate: Ranged

from 54% to 66%

Earnings: Average monthly salary:

$771

Hours of employment (among the

48% who left cash assistance for

employment): Employed full time:

75%

Employment rate: Percent who left

cash assistance for employment: 48%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid

at time of interview: 62%

Child care assistance: Receiving

child care assistance at time of interview: 12%

Food assistance: Receiving food

stamps at time of interview: 56%

1509

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS—Continued

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Virginia: Experiences of Virginia Time-Limit Families in the Six Months After Case Closure: Results from an

Early Cohort, Final Report, November 1999

Universe: Cases closed 2/

99–6/99 due to the State

time limit

Data type: Survey conducted 6–12 months after

exit from cash assistance

Response rate: 78%

Earnings: Average hourly wage: $5.99

Hours of employment: Average hours

per week: 33.5

Employment rate: At time of survey:

71%; Ever employed since exit: 85.5%

Recidivism: Receiving income from

TANF in month before interview: 2.4%

Health assistance: Among working,

percent who enrolled in employer-provided health benefits: 28.8%

Child care assistance:

Among working or in training, percent

who receive at least some government

assistance: 28.7%

Among working or in training, percent

who were aware of government assistance but chose not to participate:

34.7%

Food assistance: Receiving income

from Food Stamp Program in month

before interview: 76.1%

Washington: A Study of Washington State TANF Departures and Welfare Reform: Cohort II, April 1999

Universe: Single- and

two-parent cases closed

in 4th quarter 1997 for at

least 2 months

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: 12 months

Earnings: 1st quarter after exit:

$2,710; 4th quarter after exit: $3,018

Employment rate: 1st quarter after

exit: 51%; Ever employed in 4 quarters after exit: 73.9%

Recidivism: Ever returned in the 4

quarters after exit: 23.2%

Food assistance: Receiving food

stamps 1 year after the selection

quarter: 30%

Washington: Washington’s TANF Single-Parent Families After Welfare, January 1999

Universe: Single-parent

cases closed in 8/97 that

remained closed at the

time of the survey

Data type: Survey conducted mid-10/98–11/98

Response rate: 52%

Earnings: Average hourly wage (currently employed and ever employed

since exit): $8.09

Hours of employment: Average number of hours worked per week (for the

current or most recent job): 36

Employment rate: At time of survey:

71%; Ever employed in the last 12

months: 87%

Recidivism: Likely to return to welfare

within 6 months (of those who said

they were worse off): 48%

Health assistance: Receiving Medicaid

(adults/children): 44%/64%

Child care assistance: Department of

Social and Health Services subsidies

in families with children under 13

whose parent is at work when child

not in school: 38%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 45%

Receiving help from food banks: 29%

Receiving help from charitable organizations: 12%

Wisconsin: Post-Exit Earnings and Benefit Receipt Among Those Who Left AFDC in Wisconsin, January 1999

Universe: Cases closed

for at least 2 consecutive

months between 8/95 and

7/96

Data type: Administrative

data

Followup: 15 months

Earnings: 1st quarter after exit:

$2,440; 5th quarter after exit: $2,751

Employment rate: 1st quarter after

exit: 72.4%; 5th quarter after exit:

75.8%; Ever employed in the year following exit: 81.7%

Recidivism: Returned to AFDC within

15 months of leaving: 30%

Health assistance (5th quarter after

exit):

Receiving Medicaid only: 23.4%

Receiving Medicaid and food stamps:

26.0%

Food assistance (5th quarter after

exit):

Receiving food stamps only: 2.3%

Receiving Medicaid and food stamps:

26.0%

1510

TABLE L–11.—SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE

RECIPIENTS—Continued

Study Earnings/recidivism Health care/child care/food

Wisconsin: Survey of Those Leaving AFDC or W–2 January to March 1998: Preliminary Report, January 1999

Universe: Cases closed

between 1/98 and 3/98,

that remained closed at

the time of the survey

Data type: Survey conducted 8/98–11/98, 6–9

months after exit from

cash assistance

Response rate: 69%

Earnings: Employed at time of interview—hourly wage $7.42

Hours of employment: Mean hours

per week at best job for those currently employed: 36; Mean hours per

week at best job for those who had

worked since their exit but are currently unemployed: 33

Employment rate: At time of survey:

62%; Ever employed since exit: 83%

Recidivism: Agree or strongly agree

that they are pretty sure they will not

need to be on welfare again: 60%

Health assistance:

Households receiving Medicaid or

Healthy Start: 87%

Private insurance (anyone in household): 26%

Child care assistance:

Receiving child care assistance: 17%

Leavers with preschool children who

said they needed child care: 66%

Leavers with school-age children who

said they had some kind of extended

or afterschool care: 30%

Food assistance:

Receiving food stamps: 49%

Receiving School Lunch Program: 47%

Receiving WIC: 38%

Receiving Summer Feeding Program

for Children: 5%

Wyoming: A Survey of Former POWER Recipients, May 1998

Universe: Cases closed 1/

97–3/98

Data type: Survey conducted in 3/98

Response rate: 31.8%

Earnings: (all respondents): Less than

$5 per hour: 3.5%; $5.01–$7.50:

47%; $7.51 or more: 9.0%

Hours of employment: 40 or more

hours: 47%

Employment rate: At time of survey:

61%

Recidivism: Back on POWER at the

time of the survey: 2.5%

Health assistance:

Receiving Medicaid (families): 82.5%

Receiving health insurance other than

Medicaid: 17%

Child care assistance: Receiving public assistance day care: 28%

Food assistance: Receiving food

stamps: 61%

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on information compiled from the individual State evaluations and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).

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