SIXTH D IVISI ON DECEMBER 23, 2010 No s. 1 -09 -00 38; 1 -09 -18 92; 1 -09 -32 95; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)
TIMOTHY HERLEHY and ) Appe al fro m the MICHAEL HERL

EHY, ) Ci rcu i t Cou rt of ) Co o k C o un t y. Plai ntif fs-Appel lan ts, )

) v. ) ) MA RIE V. B ISTERSK

Y TRU ST DA

TED ) MAY 5, 1989, and A

TG TRUST COMPANY, ) as Trustee, THE A

LZHEIMERS DISEASE ) No. 05 CH 15199 AND RELA

TED DISORDERS ASSOCIATION, ) AMERICA

N HEA RT A SSOCI

ATIO N, THE ) RES PIR ATORY HEALT H ASS OCI ATIO N OF ) MET ROP OLI TAN CHI CAGO (f/k /a T he America n ) Lun g A ssoc i ati on of

Metropol

i tan Chi cago), CATH OLIC ) CHARITIES OF THE ARCH DIOCESE OF CHICAGO, ) AMERICA

N CA NCER SOCIETY

– ILLINOIS ) Ho no r ab le DI VI SI ON, TH E I LLI NOI S AT TO RNE Y GE NE RAL ) Kathl een M. Pan

tle, and FIRST NA

TIONA L BA NK OF L AG RA NGE, ) Judge Presidin g. ) Defendan ts-Appellees. )

JUS TI CE ROB ER T E . G ORD ON d elivered t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Jus t ices Ca hill

and M cBr ide co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON Thes e c on sol

i da ted appe als a ri se f rom an acti on f or c on str uc ti on of a tr us t ag re em en t, breach of a f iduc ia ry duty by a trustee, First National

Bank of LaGrange (L aGrange Ban k), and a claim of unjust enr ichment o n behalf of t he t ru st agr eement ’s r esidu ar y beneficiaries, t he Alzheimer’s D isease and R elat ed D isor der s Asso ciat ion, t he America n Hea rt Asso ciat ion, t heNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

1 The Resp irat or y Healt h Asso ciat ion o f Met ro po litan Chica go is freq uent ly known a s t he A meri ca n L un g A ss oci ati on of Metropol

i tan Ch i cago. 2 Re sp i rator y He al th Ass oci ati on of Metropol

i tan Ch i cago, 1 Catholic Ch

arities of the Archdi

ocese of Chi cago, a nd A merican Can cer Soci ety (coll ecti ve l y , the Cha

ri tie s). Plaint iff s Timo t hy Herlehy ( Timot hy) and Michael He rlehy (M ichael) filed a sec ond
am ended com

pla in t allegi ng that their dece ased great-aunt, Marie V. Bistersky (Mari e), in tended t o ame nd h er t ru st befo re her de at h lea ving t hem w it h a la rg er sha re o f her t ru st as se t s. Pla int iffs allege t hat LaG ra nge B ank br eac hed it s fiduciar y dut y by f ailing to amend M ar ie’s t ru st agr eement pursuant t o her directions and, as a result, t he Chari ties wil l b e unj ustly en

riched to plain

tiff s’ detri men t. The tr i al cou rt gra n ted La Gr an ge Ba n k’ s m oti on to dism i ss wi th pr ej udi ce pu rsua n t to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Illi nois Code of Ci

vi l Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (We st 2006 )), f

i ndi ng th at LaG ran ge Ba nk h ad n o duty to ame nd Marie’s

trust. The

tria l court al so granted the Chari

ties’ motion f

or summ ary judgme

nt pursuant to sect ion 2-1005 of the Code (7 35 IL CS 5/

2- 10 05 (West 20 06 )), an

d den i ed pl ai n ti f f s’ cross -m

oti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t, f i ndi ng th at there wasno val

i d am endm en t to Mari e’s

trust an d, asa res ul t, the Ch ari tie s we re entitled to t hei

r equal portions i

n the trust’s resi duary as sets. The trial court further den

ie d pla in tif fs ’ m ot ion f or reim bursem ent of atto rney

fees and f ound that it lac

ked j urisdi

ction over LaG ran ge Ba nk’ s m otion f or rei m bursem en t for i ts attorney

f ees . In t his co nso lidat ed a ppe al, p laintiffs app eal claiming the t rial co ur t er re d in: ( 1) gr ant ingNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

3 LaG ra nge B ank’ s mot ion t o d ismiss; ( 2) gr ant ing t he Cha rit ies mot ion fo r su mmary judgment ; and ( 3) de nying t he ir mo t io n fo rr eimbu r se men t fo rit s a t t o rne y fee s. La Gr an ge Ba nkals o ap pe als cl ai mi ng that the trial

court erred in

fi ndi ng that it lacked j urisdi

ction to consider LaG

range Ba nk ’s mo t io n fo rr eimbu r se men t o f it s a t t o rne y fee s. We affir m. BACK GROUND Tim ot hy origi nal ly fi le d a verifi

ed “Com pla in t for Construct ion of

the Mari e V. Bis

tersky Trust” (o rigi

nal compl ai nt) and al le ged as f oll ows: On May

5, 1989, Marie estab li

shed a wri

tt en trust agreem

ent, iden tif yi ng he rsel f as settlor and Fi

rst Illin ois Ban k of LaGran

ge as trustee. Mar ie’s hus band p re dec eas ed he r a nd she did no t have o r a do pt any children. Ma r ie a men de d h er t rus t ag r ee men t six t imes wit hin 1 0 ye ar s. I n e ac h a men dme nt , Ma r ie
amen ded the specifi

c benef ici aries and the am

ount of money

they were to receive. She al so
am ended the n

am es of the ch

arities that would recei

ve the resi

due of the trust. Marie f

il ed her si xth am endm ent on Decem

ber 9, 1999, with B ank On e Trust Company

, NA (Bank On

e), whi ch was the successor tru stee at that t im e. That amen

dmen t pr ovided, in

pert in ent part , as foll

ows: “THIRD SECTION 1: Up o n t he de at h o f t he se t t lo rt he t rus t ee sha ll distribute the tr ust est ate as follows:

(a) Fi ve Thousan

d Doll ars ($5,000.00) t o RHONDA BALL A ***; (b) Fi f tee n Thous an d D oll ar s ( $1 5,0 00 .00 ) to VICTORIA WA

NDOLEWSK

I ***;Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

4 (c) Fi f teen Thous and Doll ars ($ 15,000 .00) to BON NIE STOLARCZ

YK ***; (d) Tw en

ty Thous an d D oll ar s ( $2 0,0 00 .00 ) to RICHARD B OGACZ

***; (e) Twenty

Thousan d Doll ars ($20,000 .00) to JOSEPH BOGACZ

***; (f) Tw o Hu

n dr ed Thous an d D oll ar s ( $2 00 ,00 0.0 0) to the settlor’s grandne

phew, TIMOTHY J. HERLEHY ***; (g) Tw o Hu

n dr ed Thous an d D oll ar s ( $2 00 ,00 0.0 0) to the settlor’s grandne

phew, MICHA

EL HERLEHY ***; (h) T he ba lan ce o f t he t rus t es t at e s ha ll be d ist r ibu t ed in equal shares to t he f

ollowi ng fi ve (5) charities: 1) ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE AND RELATED DISORDERS ASSOCIA TION ***; 2) AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION ***; 3) THE AMERICAN L UNG ASSOCIATION OF

METROPOLITAN CHICA GO ***; 4) CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE ARCHDIOC ESE OF CHICAGO ***;Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

5 5) AMERICA

N CA NCER SOCIETY ***.” In formul ating an am

endm ent to the tr ust, the tr ust agr eemen t pr ovided as f

ollows: “SEVENTH: Th e s ettl

or m ay at a ny ti me or ti mesam en d or
re vok e t his agr eement in whole o r in pa rt by [an] instr ument in writ ing (other than

a wi l l) del i ve red to the trus

tee. ” In a di scovery

depositi on, Tim

ot hy testifi ed that Rhonda Bal

la was Marie’s gran

d-niece
an d R ich ar d a nd Jo se ph Bo ga cz we r e M ar ie’ s ne ph ew s. He fur t he rt es t ified t ha t Vic t o r ia Wando lewsk i was a clos e friend of Ma rie, and B onnie S t olar czyk w as Ma rie’s friend a nd
ac cou n tan t. In 2001, Mari e was 89 y

ears old an

d move d to an ass is

ted li vi ng f acili ty i n LaGran ge. Timot hy tes t ifi

ed t hat he had a clo se r elat ionship w ith Ma rie, assist ed he r in re loca t ing t o t he assi sted li vi ng f acili ty an d with da il y tasks a nd drove her to her docto r’s off ic e. Tim ot hy had a master’s degree in f

in ance, and at Marie’s request, he reviewed the allocat ion of her trust asset s, and Marie granted hi

m power of att orney to manage her heal th care needs. He t est ifi ed t hat follow ing her move t o t he as sist ed living facility, Ma rie t old him that she di d n ot b el i ev e th at h er tru st ref l ected h er wish es an d th at B an k O n e’ s tr us t of f i cer, P atr i ce Gr an t,
wasnot acti

ng i n h er b est i ntere sts. Ti

mothy di scovered th

at 90% of Mari e’s trust ass ets we

re in vested i n stock and told a m

anager of B ank On

e’s trust department that such a hi gh stock al l oca ti on wa s to o ri sk

y f or a settl or of Ma rie’ s a ge . Ti moth y also d i sc ov ered th at d ue to fav o r ab le s t o ck mar ke t co nd it io ns d ur ing t he 19 90 s, Ma r ie’ s t rus t inve st men t s ha d in cr ea se d inNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

2 Nothing i

n the record detail s Marie’s origi nal trust in vestm ent val ue. 6 val ue to $1, 800,000. 2 He fur t her disco ver ed t hat due t o u nfavo ra ble mark et co ndit ions in t he ye ars of 2000 an

d 2001, the val

ue of the stock decreased i n va lue to approxim

ately $1,200,000. by m id-2001. Timothy test if

ied that Marie was not aware of the value fluctuat ion in her t rust ’s i nv estm en ts. Timo t hy t es t ified t hat in Aug us t o f 20 01 , h e a nd M icha el e ac h r ec eive d a $1 00 ,0 00 gift from Marie. At t hat time, Marie h ad also executed an “am

endm ent to the rest atement” of the t rust with the assi stance of Charles Jardi ne, who had been her atto rney si nce she f irst executed her t rust agree men t. The a men dm en t red uc ed the gif ts to Ti mothy an d M i ch ae l i n Mari e’ s tru st f rom $200,0 00 to $100,0 00 ea

ch
. Ad dit io na l ch an ge s t o sp ec ific b eq ue st s in t he ame nd men t inc lud ed r ep lac ing Rh o nd a B alla wi th C arm on K ei th, wh o wa s M ari

e’ s “ca reta ker.”Ma rie s i gned an d de l i ve red the am en dm en t on Au gust 9, 2 001, to Ban

k On e. Tim ot hy testifi ed that Marie conti

nued to express he

r diss atisf action wi th Bank On

e as her t ru st ee a nd exp re ssed dissat isfact ion wit h Jar dine as her at t or ney, a nd t old Timot hy that she de si re d to rep l ac e th

em b oth . Sh e a sk ed Ti moth y to h el p h er tra n sf er h er tru st f rom Ba n k O n e to La Gr an ge Ba nk , wh ich ha d b ee n c ho se n fo rit s p r o ximit y t o Ma r ie’ s a ss ist ed livin g f ac ilit y. T imo t hy t es t ified t ha t he co nt ac t ed William B o ylan, an at t o rne y he k ne w, fo rhis a ss ist an ce in f ormu l ati ng th e tran sf er. Boy l an testi f i ed i n a di scovery

depos i tion that he m et wi th Ma ri e to di scu ss h

er trust.Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

7 Boyl an testif ie d that he had ex

am in ed Mari e’s trust agreemen t and in form ed her that becaus e her
asse t s had gr ow n in value in the pr eviou s year s, t he major ity o f her t ru st asse t s wo uld be dis tributed through the residuary cl ause to t he Ch

arities. Boyl

an testif ie d that Marie told h

im that
such a res ul t wa s n ot h er i n ten t; th at sh e w an

ted onl y a “l ef tov er” p orti

on of th e tr us t as sets to pas s t o t he Cha rit ies and t he st oc k invest ments t o “g o t o T im.” Bo ylan also infor med T imot hy t hat t he major ity o f Marie’ s t ru st asse t s wo uld be d istr ibut ed t hro ugh t he r esidu ar y clause t o t he Char ities a nd Ma rie ag ain expr esse d t o B oylan, in Timot hy’s pr ese nce, t hat t he t ru st agr eement di d n ot re f l ect h er i n ten t. Chri stopher Joyce, an ex

ecutive vi ce president and trust offi cer of LaGran

ge Bank, t est ifi ed in a d isco ver y depo sitio n t hat he met wit h Mar ie and T imot hy on Ja nuar y 10, 200 2. At t hat meet ing, J oyce t est ifi ed t hat Mar ie explained t o him t hat she w ant ed t he st oc k invest ments be dist ribut ed t o T imot hy. He also t est ifi ed t hat Timot hy inf

or med him that Bo ylan wou ld be drafti ng an am endm ent to Marie’s trust to transfer the trust from B ank On e to LaGrange Bank. Joyce an d Boyl an b ot h testif

ie d in their discovery

depositi ons that they f

ormulated a plan of action, wi

th Mari e’s oral a

pproval, wh

ereby they would f irst rem ove Bank On

e as trustee, appoi n t La Gr an ge Ba n k a s s uc ce ss or tr

us tee an d i n i ti ate th e transf

er of Ma rie’ s tr us t as sets to LaGrange Bank. Seco nd, they would dis cuss with Mari e her concerns regarding her trust ag re em en t an d h er i n v estmen ts. Th i rd , they ag re ed th at af ter al l th e a ss ets

weretra n sf er re d to LaGrange B ank, any

am endm ents to Marie’s trust agreeme nt would then b e drafted to refl ect her i nten tions. Jo yce t est ifi

ed t hat in Febru ar y he rec eived a do cument ent itled “seco nd amend ment t o t heNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

8 re sta tem en t” ( se con d a men dm en t) to M ari e’ s tr

us t ag re em en t f rom Boy l an . In addi ti on to appoin ting L aGrange Ban

k as succes sor tr ustee, the second am endm ent al so provided that, after Ma r ie’ s d ea t h a nd pr io rt o full a nd fina l dis t r ibu t io n o f t he t rus t ’s as se t s, an y ac t ing t rus t ee co uld be r emove d by Timot hy. The sec ond amendment was dat ed Fe bru ar y 11, 200 2, and s igned by Mar ie. Jo yce signed t he se co nd amend ment o n behalf of La Gr ange Bank acc ept ing app oint ment
as succes sor tr ustee. Joy cetes ti f i ed LaGra ng e B an k re ce i ve d M ari e’ s tru st a ss etsf

rom Ba nk On e a t the en d of March 2002 an

d that t he del

ay in transferri ng the trust assets was caused b y B ank On

e. Joyce f urth er te sti f i ed tha t LaGra ng e re ce i ve d the re mai ni ng non stock a ss etsf

rom Ba nk On e i n J ul y of 2002, which i

ncl uded an insurance policy

and “EE” bonds. Jo yce fur t her t est ifi

ed t hat LaG ra nge hir ed Fe ldman Sec ur ities G ro up, an invest ment ad vi sor y f i rm, to perf

orm an an al y sis of Ma rie’ s tru st a ss etsan

d pr es en t i ts re com men da ti on f or reall ocating h er in vestm ents. On May

13, 2002, t he v

ic e president of Fel

dma n Securi ties Group, Bri an Mc Na mara , sta ted i n a n a f f i da vi t tha t he sent LaG ran gean i nv es tmen t rec om men da ti on f orm (Fel dm an i nv estm en t form ) that he prep ared c once

rni ng Marie’s

trust ass ets. Mc

Nam ara fur t he rst at ed in his affid av it t ha t he r ec eiv ed Ma r ie’ s inv es t men t info rmat io n a nd pla ce d h is
recomm endati ons i

n the Fe ldm

an i nve stmen t form, al though he n

ever m et with Mari

e. He further stated t hat he was n

ot an attor ney

and was n

ot asked to prepare a t rust amen dme nt for Mari e. McNamara al so t estifi

ed in a discovery

deposition that Feldman

Securities does not prepare t rust
ame nd men t s. T he fo llo win g d ay, Jo yce br o ug ht t he co mple t ed Fe ldma n inv es t men t fo rm t o Ma r ie fo rhe rr ev iew , an d M ar ie s ign ed an d a pp r o ve d t he fo rm.Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

9 The Fel dma n i nve stmen t form l is ted the amount of cash, bonds, and sto cks that Marie h ad invest ed in her t ru st . I t also listed McN amara ’s pr op os ed r ealloc at ion o f tho se invest ments . T he Feldman invest ment fo rm fur t her included a “co mments” sec t ion which s t at ed: “We und er st and this trust is for the ben

efi t o f [Mari e]. These assets wi

ll even tuall y go to her nephe

ws.” Stamped on the i nv estm en t recom mendation f

orm was the word “

Ap prove d” wi

th Ma ri e’s si gna ture unde rne at h. A ttorn ey Boy l an tes ti f i ed tha t he rec ei ve d n o f urth er c onta ct f rom Ma rie, J oyceor T imo t hy t o dr aft an y fur t he rame nd men t s t o Ma r ie’ s t rus t ag r ee men t . On Au gu st 19 , 20 02 , Ma r ie di ed. Accordin

g to the origi

nal compl ai nt, the val ue of the i nve stmen ts in her trust was ap pr o ximat ely $ 1, 25 0, 00 0 a t t he t ime o f he rde at h. Ap pr o ximat ely $ 30 0, 00 0 w er e d isbu r se d in
ac co r da nc e t o t he sp ec ific b eq ue st s c o nt ain ed in t he t rus t ag r ee men t . T he r es idu e o f t he t rus t is approxim ately $950,000. I n S ep t emb er 20 02 , T imo t hy d isc o ve r ed a h an dw r it t en no t e in a p ho ne bo o k lo ca t ed in Mari e’s n igh t t abl e nex t t o her bed. The h

andwri tt en n ot ed was unda

ted and unsi

gned an d li sted the fol lowi ng: “Tim Her lehy Sto ck Michael He rlehy 200,000 Ri ch Bugacz 15,000 J Bugacz 5,000 Vic ki 20,000Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

10 Bo nnie 15,000 Carm en 5,000” In O ct obe r 2 002 , p ur sua nt t o his p ow er enumer at ed in t he t ru st agr eement , T imot hy replac ed LaGrange

Bank as trust ee and appoi

nted Guaranty

Trust Co mpa

ny as succes sor tr ustee. Gu ar an t y T rus t wa s la t er r en ame d a s A T G T rus t Co mp an y. Procedu ral Hi story On S ep t emb er 7, 20 05 , T imo t hy file d h is o r ig ina l co mp lain t ag ain st AT G T rus t Co mp an y, the Charities, and the Ill

in ois Atto rney Gen

eral. Count I was a cause of action for t rust construction and count II for unj ust enri chm ent agai nst the Chari

ties. Ti mothy alle ged that Boylan acted as Mari e’s attorney an d LaGrange B ank acted as h er trust ee. Tim

ot hy further al le ged that Bo ylan wa s a wa r e o f t he ch an ge s s he so ug ht t o mak e t o he rt rus t ag r ee men t so t ha t o nly a relativel y sm all por tion would pass thro ugh the residuary cl ause to the Charities. On Novemb er 2, 20 06, Timothy f il ed a verif ied three-cou nt amended compl ain t (first
am ended com

pla in t) adding h

is brother Mich

ael as a plai ntif f an d LaGrange B ank as an

addi tional defen dant. The fi

rst amen ded compl

ai nt in cl uded nearl

y i dentic al alle gations as

the origi nal
co mplaint; ho weve r, plaint iff s also alleged t hat Mar ie’s wr itt en inst ru ct ions t o L aGr ange Bank were signed an

d deliv ered to LaGrange Bank an d accepted in

writi ng through the Fel

dma n i nv estm en t form . Pl ai

ntif f s al l eged that if the v al i d am endm en t was n ot eff ectuate d, the

f ail ure was caused b

y LaGrange Ban

k’s b reach of i ts fi duci ary duty

to act upon Marie’ s wri

tt en i nstructi ons. On Jul y 10, 2007, LaGran

ge Bank f il ed a m ot ion to dismi

ss pursuan

t t o sections 2-Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

11 619(a)(9) and 2-615 of the Code cla im in g that: (1) it was releas ed from any li abi li ty whe n Timot hy signed a re lease u po n re moving La Gr ange Bank as t ru st ee; a nd ( 2) LaG ra nge B ank leg ally c o uld no t dr aft an ame nd men t t o t he t rus t ag r ee men t fo rMa r ie u nd er t he I llino is Corpor ation Practice of

Law Prohi

bi tion Act (Act) (705 I LCS 220/0.01 et seq . (We st 2006 )), whi ch prohi bi ted i t from draf tin g am endm en ts to trust agree

men ts. On Novem

ber 26, 2007, plai

ntif fs fi le d a response argui

ng that their f

irst am ended compl ai nt is not based on an a

ll egation that LaGrange

Bank was

required to draft lega

l docum en ts, b ut th at i t b re ach ed

i ts f i duci ar y du ty b y f ai l i n g “ to en su re[that] a v

al i d a men dm en t to the trust was eff

ectuated.” On January 18, 2 008, the t rial court enter ed a wr itte n ord er gr anting LaGrange Bank’s motion to dism

is s wi thout prejudi

ce. In the wri

tt en order, the tr ia

l c ourt agreed wi

th LaGrange Bank that pursuant to t he A ct, LaGrange Bank c ould not draft l egal documen ts, such as an amendment t o a t ru st agr eement , a s LaG ra nge B ank is a co rp or at ion p ro hibited fro m pra ct icing law. The t rial co ur t also fou nd t hat it w as Bo ylan’s dut y as Mar ie’s at t or ney for est at e planning to draft any

am endm ents to Marie’s trust and that, under the Ill in ois Rul es of Profess iona

l Con duct, Boy l an wa s proh i b i ted f rom re ce i v i n g di re cti on s f rom La Gran ge to draf t am en dm en ts to Mar ie’s t ru st agr eement . Any amend ments had t o be dire ct ed by t he se t t lor , w ho w as Ma rie. The trial cou rt th en gr an ted pl ai n ti f f s l ea v e to f i l e a se con d a men de d c om pl ai n t. On Fe bruary 15, 2008, plai

ntif fs fi le d a verifi

ed second am

ended com

pla in t. The verif

ie d
se con d a men de d c om pl ai n t i n cl uded n ea rl y i den ti ca l al l eg ati on s a s th e or i gi n al com pl ai n t; how ever , p laintiffs alleged t hat Mar ie hired Bo ylan to unde rt ake only t he dr aft ing o f theNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

12 am en dm en t to app oi nt LaG ran geBa nk astrustee . Pl

ai nti f f s f urth er a l l eg ed tha t Boy l an wa s n ot emp lo yed by Ma r ie o rco nt ac t ed by La Gr an ge Ba nkt o dr aft an ame nd men t o rmee t wit h Ma r ie in Ma y 20 02 , i t wa s LaG

ra n ge Ba n k’ s f ai l ur e to c on

tact an attor n ey to prep are th

e a men dm en t to the trust which

resul ted in the fai lure to amen

d Mari e’s trust agreemen

t as she requested. Speci fi cally , plai ntif fs alle ged that Marie stated to Jo yc e that it was her wish that al l of her stocks be beq uea t hed t o T imot hy and t hat Jo yce re plied o n “at least t wo oc cas ions” t o M ar ie and Tim othy as f oll ows: “tha t her dire ct ives t o be que at h or gift a ll her st oc k t o T imot hy *** w ou ld be accompl is hed as s he i ntended an

d that no further steps would be necess ary on h

er par t . [ Jo yce] a ssu re d he w ou ld co or dinat e pr ofe ssio nals including c ont act ing atto rney s or inv estmen t advis ors as needed on h er beha lf and b rin g any required documen ts to her resi

dence f or signa ture.” On Ma rc h 14, 200 8, LaG ra nge B ank a gain filed its mo t ion t o d ismi ss p ur sua nt t o s ect ions 2- 61 9( a) (9 ) a nd 2 -6 15 o f t he C o de . L aG ra nge Ba nk a ga in ar gu ed t hat it had no du t y t o dr aft
am endm en ts to Marie’s

trust agre em

en t or retai n a n a ttorney to mak e such am endm en ts. Accordin g to LaGrange B ank’s

reply , plai ntif fs ’ f il ed a response on A

pril 14, 2008, but t hat resp onse i s n ot in cl uded i n the rec ord. On June 17, 2008, the t rial court enter ed a wr itte n ord er gr anting LaGrange Bank’s motion to dism

is s, with prej udic e. The trial court found the f

oll owing i nconsistencies between plaint iff s’ ver ifi ed firs t amende d co mplaint and t heir ver ifi ed s eco nd amend ed c omp laint: In t he
ver ifi ed firs t amende d co mplaint, plaint iff s allege t hat Bo ylan act ed a s her new a t t or ney and s heNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

13 di re cte d L aG

ra n ge Ba n k a n d B oy l an to i n i ti ate wh atev er ch an ge s n ec es sa ry to h er tru st a n d e sta te pla n to avoid a wi

ndf all to the resi duary b enef

ic ia ries . Whereas , in

the verifi ed second am

ended
co mplaint, plaint iff

s allege t hat Mar ie employed Bo ylan as her at t or ney to only und er t ake t he draf tin g of an am endm en t to chan ge L aGra nge Ban k to the su

cce ssor trustee. Furth er, i n the v erif

i ed f i rst am ended c omp l ai

nt, pl ai ntif f s al l ege th at Boy l an ’sactions were far b roader in sc ope and that he: (a) corresponded with Ban k One to inform

it of i ts removal

as trust ee; (b) as sured Mari e and Ti mothy that t he stocks would b e convey ed to T im ot hy without
an y ne ed to ac t f urth er;(c) woul d un

dertak e, wi th LaG ran geBa nk, th e tra

ns f er of the as sets or prepare further am

endm ents to t he trust as needed to eff ectuate Marie’s

in tent; and (d) advised Mari e that additi onal

am endm ents would n

ot be i mpl em ented unti l the Trust assets h ad been transferred f

rom Ban k One. Wh

ereas, i n the verif

ie d second am

ended com

pla in t, plai ntif fs alle ge that Boyl an was n

ot em ploy ed by decedent or contact ed by LaGrange B ank to draft an
am endm ent or meet with M arie i

n May 2002; an d it was L aGrange Ban

k’s f ai lure to contact an attor n ey wh i ch re su l ted i n th e tr us t ag re em en t n ot b ei n g a men de d to ref l ect Ma rie’ s i n ten t. The t rial co ur t fou nd t hat beca use t he first amende d co mplaint w as ve rified, t he allega t ions beca me judicial admissio ns and any incons iste nt allegat ions in t he se co nd amend ed c omp laint
wo uld be igno re d. As a r esu lt, t he t rial co ur t co nclude d t hat plaint iff s’ allega t ions in t he se co nd
am ended c omp l ai

nt ag ai nst LaGra nge Ban k m i rrored the f i rst am ended c omp l ai

nt. The tri al

court again f ound t hat LaGrange Bank had no dut y to advise Marie to make am endm ents to her tru st and ow ed no d ut y to hire an at to rney to verify that the t rust pro visi

ons co nformed with Marie’s i n ten t. M ore ov er , the tr

i al cou rt f oun d th at ev en i f La Gran ge Ba n k v ol un tar i l y as su med a d uty toNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

14 app oint an at t or ney for Mar ie, it was not t he failure t o mak e t he ap po intment t hat cau sed t he da mag e, b ut the f ai l ure to am en d the tru st. The

tri al cou rt th en gra nte d L aG ran geBa nk ’s moti on to dis mi ss wi th prejudi ce. On Nov em b er 20 , 20 08 , the Ch ari

ti es f i l ed a m oti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t pu rsua n t to
se ct io n 2
- 10 05 o f t he Co de ( 73 5 I LC S 5 /2
- 10 05 ( We st 20 06 ) ) o f t he I llino is C o de o f Civ il Procedure and subm

itted a supporting m

em orandum. The C

hari ties cl ai me d that: (1) t he Fe ldm

an in vestm ent form is not a valid a

me ndm ent to Marie’s trust as a m atter of law; (2) the han

dwritten
no t e w as no t a v alid ame nd men t t o Ma r ie’ s t rus t as a ma t t er o f law ; ( 3) t he lan gu ag e c o nt ain ed in t he t ru st is clear and u nambiguo us; a nd ( 4) t he Cha rit ies will not be unjus t ly enriched be cau se t he tru st grant s to them assets not bequeat hed to plai ntif fs or ot her in

div idual s. On No ve mbe r24 , 20 08 , La Gr an ge Ba nkfiled a mo t io n t o ad d la ng ua ge t ha t wo uld in clude an Il

li nois Supreme Court Ru le 304(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1989) fin din g “that t here is n

o just reason f or delay in g ei ther enf orcemen t o r appeal

or bot h” of the tri al

court ’s Jun

e 17, 2008 order gran tin g LaGran ge Ba nk’ s m otion to dis m i ss w i th pre j udice. On

Dece m ber 2, 200 8, the

tria l court gr ant ed t he mot ion. On Feb ruary 13, 200 9, pl

ai ntif f s f i l ed a re spon se a

nd a cross -m otion f or sum mary judg ment a gainst t he Cha rit ies claiming: (1 ) t he Feldman inves t ment fo rm wa s a va lid amendment to the trust; (2) t he h

andwri tt en n ot e found i

n Mari e’s n igh t t abl e after her death a

ls o constituted a val id a me ndm ent to t he trust; (3) the term “b al ance” as used i n the trust is am

bi guous; and (4) t he dist ribut ion o f the re maining asset s o f the Mar ie’s t ru st t o t he Cha rit ies wo uld r esu lt in t he unjust enr ichment fo r t he Cha rit ies at plaint iff s’ exp ense . P laintiffs arg ued t hat (1 ) a nd ( 2) abo veNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

3 A “ scri ven er” is defi ned as “ [a] writer; esp., a professi onal drafter of contracts or o ther docum en ts.” Bl ack’ s La w Di cti onary 1466 ( 9th e d. 2009 ).

15 com pl y wi th th e a men dm en t prov i si on i n th e tru st th at s tate s: “ [t]h

e s ettl or m ay at a ny ti me or tim es am end or revoke this

agreem ent in whole or in part by

[an] i nstrume nt in writi ng (other than a wi l l) del i vered to the trus

tee.” On Jul y 7, 2009, af

ter a hearin

g on the motions , the trial court entered a written order gra nti ng the Ch ari ti es ’ m oti on f or s um mary j udg men t an d de ny i ng pl ai nti f f s’ cros s- moti on f

or
su mmar y jud gme nt . T he t r ial c o ur t fo un d t ha t t he Fe ldma n inv es t men t fo rm wa s no t a v alid
am endm ent to Marie’s trust because M cNam ara, who drafted the Fel

dma n i nve stmen t form was
no t a la wye ran d t hu s if he ha d d r aft ed an ame nd men t t o Ma r ie’ s t rus t his a ct io ns w o uld be in vi olation of section 2BBof the Consum er Fraud and Dec eptive

Busi ness Practices A

ct (Consumer Fra ud Act) (815 ILCS 50 5/2B B (West 200 6)). More over, th e tri al court f ound th at McN am

ara could not h

av e ac ted asa “ scri

vener” 3 to doc

um en t Ma rie’ s a men dm en t to the tr us t ag re em en t, b ec au se h e n ev er sp oke wi th h er ; h e rec ei

v ed i n str uc ti on s a n d i n f orm ati on ab out th e i n v estmen ts only from Joyce an d never in tended to pr epare an am

endm ent to Marie’s trust, but rat her, an anal ys is of her i nve stmen ts at t he request of LaG

range Ban

k. T he t r ial c o ur t fur t he rfo un d t ha t pla int iffs’ cla im o f un jus t en r ich men t did no t ap ply beca use t her e wa s no evidenc e t hat plaint iff s we re t hird p ar t y beneficiaries t o a n agr eement be t we en Ma r ie a nd La Gr an ge Ba nk
. T he t r ial c o ur t co nc lud ed t ha t Ma r ie’ s t rus t “u na mbig uo us lyNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

16 ent itles t he Cha rit ies t o it s re sidua ry, a nd fo und t hat t he Cha rit ies have t he su per ior right t o t he
ass ets of [Mari e’s ] Trust.” As a re sul

t, the tri al court gran

ted the Chari tie s’ motion

f or sum mary j udgm en t an d den i ed pl ai n ti f f s’ cross -m

oti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t. On Jul y 22, 2009, LaGran

ge Bank f il ed a m ot ion f or reim bursem ent of i ts att orney f

ees cl ai m i ng i t i s enti tl ed to attorn ey f ee s purs ua nt to d ocu men t en ti tl ed “ Re ce i pt a nd A ppr ova l of Adm in is trat ion” of Marie’s trust, which

was si gned b y Ti mothy and del iv ered to LaGrange Bank. The do cument pr ovid ed t hat Timot hy releas ed a nd disc har ged LaG ra nge B ank fr om “any expenses or cost s (incl

uding l egal or ot her professional fees) i n connection wi

th” Marie’s trust after October 31, 2002. In additi on, LaGrange Ban k cl ai ms it i s enti tled to att orney f

ees under
com m on l aw b ec au se a tr us tee th at is n ot at f aul t i s e n ti tl ed to b e rei m b ur se d f or al l of i ts expenses properly

in curred in adm in is tering the trust, citin

g Kerner v. Pe terson , 368 Ill . 59, 81 (19 37) ; Patterson v. Norther n Trust Co. , 2 86 I ll. 564 , 5 67 ( 191 9) and Contine ntal Illinois National Bank &

Trust Co. of Chicago v. Sax , 199 Il l . Ap p. 3d 68 5, 696 ( 1990) . Furth er, La Gr an ge Ba nkcla ims “r eimbu r se men t ” in clu de s le ga l fee s a nd ex pe nse s inc ur r ed by a t rus t ee in defend ing act ions br ou ght by the be neficiaries a lleging wr ong do ing up on a finding exo ner at ing t he trust ee, citi

ng First Midw

est Bank/Joliet v. Dempsey , 157 Il l . Ap p. 3d 30 7, 316 ( 1987)
. On Aug ust 12, 200 9, plaint iff s filed a mot ion fo r r eimburse ment o f its at t or ney fees a nd
co st s. P laintiffs are claiming that at t or neys who re pr ese nt par t ies having a n inter est in the
constructi on of

a trust ag reem en t are en titl ed to reas onab l e f

ees f rom th e trust estate. Orme v. Northern Trust C

o. , 25 Ill . 2d 151 (1962). Ho wever, f ees are al lowab le from the trust est ate if

an
am bi guity exi sts, whi ch i s often def in ed as “a n hone st dif

feren ce of opin ion as to t he properNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

17 constructi on” of

the testamen

tary agree men t or am bi gui ty. In re Estate of Reeve , 393 Ill . 272, 294 (19 46) ; Northern Trust C o. v. Winona Lake School of Theology , 61 Il l . Ap p. 3d 96 6 (197 8). Plai ntif fs cl ai m that a j udic ia

l c onstruction of Marie’s trust was required an d that t here was an ho ne st diffe r en ce co nc er ning t ha t co nst ruc t io n; t he r efo r e, r eimbu r se men t o f t he ir a t t o rne y fee s is proper. On Novemb er 4, 20 09, after a hearing on the LaGrange Bank’s motion for att orney fees , the trial court entered a written order deny in g LaGrange B ank’s

motion f or at to rney

fees for l ack of j urisdi ction. The trial

court found that LaGran ge Bank’ s clai

m f or at to rney

fees was created when the trial court granted LaGrange B ank’s motion to dism

is s on June

17, 2008. LaGrange Bank then

requested the trial

court to in

cl ude Rule 304(a) lan

guage i n i ts decis ion, wh

ic h the trial court in cl uded on Novem

ber 24, 2008. LaGrange B ank’s motion f or at to rney

fees was not fi

le d until si x m onths af ter plai ntif fs fi le d their n ot ic e of appeal . The trial

court concl

uded that LaGrange B ank’s

motion f or at to rney

fees was not fi

le d withi n 30 day s of the en

try of the f

in al
or der , a nd as a r esu lt, it had lost jurisd ictio n. On De cem be r 10 , 20 09, the

tri al cou rt en tere d a wri tten orde r de ny i ng pl ai nti f f s’ moti on f or a ttorn ey f ee s. The tr

i al cou rt f oun d th at n o con str uc ti on of Ma rie’ s tr us t wa s n ec es sa ry to deter mi ne that t he Fel

dman in vestment form was n

ot an am endm ent to the tr ust and t hus, plai ntif fs were responsib le f

or t hei r own at to rney f

ees and costs. AN AL YSIS In t his co nso lidat ed a ppe al, p laintiffs claim that t he t rial co ur t er re d in: ( 1) gr ant ing La Gr an ge Ba n k’ s m oti on to dism i ss ; (2 ) gra

n ti n g th e Ch ari ti es ’ m oti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t;Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

18 and (3) deny

in g their m ot ion f or reim bursem ent for i ts att orney f

ees. LaGrange

Bank cl ai ms that the tri al cou rt er red i n f i nd i ng tha t i t l ac ke d j urisd

i cti on to c ons i der L aG

ran geBa nk ’s moti on f or rei m bursem en t of i ts attorney

f ees . Cro ss- Mo t ions fo r S ummary Jud gment Fi rs t, pl ai nti f f s c l ai m tha t the tri al cou rt er red i n g ran ti ng su m mary j udg men t i n f av or of t he Ch ar it ies an d d en ying t he ir c r o ss mo t io n fo rsu mmar y jud gme nt . Sp ec ifica lly, p laint iffs c laim t hat t he t rial co ur t er re d in finding tha t t he Feldman inves t ment fo rm wa s no t a valid amend ment t o M ar ie’s t ru st beca use it w as d ra fte d by a no nlawyer in vio latio n of se ct ion 2 BB o f the Cons um er F raud A

ct. A trial cour t is permi

tt ed to grant summary

judgm ent only “if the pleadings, depositions, and adm is si ons on f

il e, to gether with the a

ff ida vi ts, if any , show that there is n

o genui ne i ssue as to any ma terial fact an d that t he m

ovin g party i s enti

tled to a judgm

ent as a m atter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2006). The grant or denial of a sum ma ry j udgme nt motion is revi

ewed under a de novo stan

dard. Hernandez v. Alexian Brothers He alth Systems , 384 Ill . App. 3d 510, 519 (2 008). In

addi tion , a tri al

court’s constructi on of

a trust i nstrumen t is al so rev i ewed und er a de novo stan

dard. Altenh eim G

erm an Ho me v. Bank of Ame rica , N.A ., 376 Ill . App. 3d 26, 32 (2007 ). In granting the Charities’ m ot ion f or summary

judgm ent and denyi

ng plai ntiffs’ crossmotion f or summ ary judgme

nt, the trial c ourt found that secti on 2BB of the Cons ume r Fraud Act applied. 815 I LCS 505/2BB (West 2 008). Section 2BB pro vides, in pertinen t par t, as foll

ows: “The a ssembly, dr aft ing, e xecu t ion, and fu nding o f a livi ng t ru st do cument or anyNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

19 of t hos e ac t s by a co rp or at ion o r a nonlaw yer is an u nlawful pr act ice wit hin the
me ani ng of this Act. *** Thi s Section sh

all n ot appl y to any Stat e or national

ban k, Stat e or federal savi ngs an d loan associ ation, sav

in gs ban k, trust compan

y, or any ot her corp orati on th at hasrec ei

ve d a certi f i ca te of au thor i ty au thor izi ng the exerc i se of tru st po wers under t he Ill in ois Corpo rate Fiduciary

Act.” 815 ILCS 505/2BB (We st 2008 ). In it s wr itt en o rd er , t he t rial co ur t det er mined t hat , u nder sec t ion 2 BB, a t ru st agr eement tha t i s p rep are d by

a p ers on w

ho i s n ot an attorn ey i s u nl aw f ul an d th us , v oi d. A

ppl y i ng se cti on 2BB to t he f

acts of the case, the trial

court concl

uded that the Feldma

n i nve stmen t form that pla in tif fs ’ clai m c onstitutes an am

endm ent to Marie’s trust agreemen t was drafted by

McNam ara,
and i t is und i sputed that Mc Nam ara is n ot an attorne

y . Plaint iff s claim tha t sec t ion 2 BB is no t app licable to t his case beca use LaG ra nge B ank pre sente d M ari

e w i th th e F el dm an i nv es tmen t f orm an d L aG ran geBa nk i s exe m pt b ec au se

se cti on 2BB “shal

l n ot apply to any Stat e or nat ional

bank ***[or] tru st co mpan y.” 815 ILCS 505/2BB (We st 2008 ). We f in d not hi ng i n the transcripts o f the legisl ative debates that wo uld support plai ntif fs’ content ion that an ot herwise v oid trust amen

dmen t under sect ion 2BB would become a v ali d tr ust
amen dmen t because a bank or t rust co mpan y presented the amendm

ent to its cl

ien t, as in this case when LaGrange B ank gav

e Mari e the Fel

dma n i nve stmen t form. House Bill

2163 was proposed because m

emb ers of the Senat e commi tt ee were co ncerned with organizations sel li ng liv in g tr ustNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

20 documen ts to consum

ers wi thout regulation. 88th Ill . Gen. Ass em ., Senate Pro ceedi ngs, May 19, 19 93 , at 10 5. Se na t e A men dme nt No
. 1 t o Ho us e B ill 21 63 wa s a do pt ed t o cla r ify t ha t t he bill is not di rected at the d ay -to-day acti vi tie s of f i na nc i al i nstituti ons a nd trus t comp an i es, w hi ch are cl osely supervised by

governm ent regulators. 88th Ill . Gen. Ass em ., Senate Pro ceedi ngs, May 19, 1993, at 106. Ba se d on the l eg i sl ati ve hi story , we also f i nd pl ai nti f f s’ arg um en t tha t appl y i ng se cti on 2BB t o ba nks a nd t ru st co mpanies w ou ld cr eat e an u ndue bur den o n set t lor s t o d et er mine whether a trust document recei ved f rom a ban k or t rust company

was prepared by

an authorize d person not persuasive. The am endm ent to the bil

l was n ot to aff ect t he dail

y activ ities of those f i na nc i al i ns ti tutions , an

d J oycetes ti f

i ed tha t LaGra ng e B an k di d n ot draf t trust doc um

en ts on beh al f of its cl ie nts and di d not ret ai

n an atto rney to do so. S ee 705 ILCS 220/0.01 (West 2008) (prohi bi tin g corporati

ons f rom p ractici ng l aw, di rectl y or in di rectl y ). Plai ntif fs f urt her clai

m that section 2BB is n

ot appli cable to this case because i t is a cri m i na l sta tute w hi ch req ui res i nte nt a nd the re i s n o ev i denc e of cri m i na l i nte nt i n th e p rep ara ti on and execution of the Feldman in vestment form. We al

so fin d this argumen

t not persuasive. Trust agreem ents are construed in

the sam e m ann er as contracts and subj ect to the sam e lim itation that they wil l n ot be en forced i f contrary

to publ ic policy . See In re Estate of Mendelson , 29 8 I ll. App. 3d 1, 3 (1998). A contract t hat vi olates a val

id s tatut e i s void. Kim v. Citigroup, Inc. , 368 Il l . Ap p. 3d 29 8 (200 6). The t rial co ur t also re lied on Landheer v. Landheer , 383 Il l . Ap p. 3d 31 7 (200 8), a de cis io n fr o m t he T hir d D ist r ict o f t he I llino is Ap pe llat e C o ur t , in g r an t ing su mmar y jud gme nt inNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

21 the Chari ties’ fav or and agai

nst pl ai ntif fs . We f in d Landheer

i nstructi ve i n our a na l y si s here. In Landheer , an ail

in g father asked one o f h

is three sons to draft a do cument to amend hi s trust agreem ent. Defen

dant son testif

ie d that he spoke with h

is father an d to ok not es on what hi

s f ather
wa nt ed ame nd ed in t he t rus t ag r ee men t . De fen da nt fur t he rt es t ified t ha t he “d id n o t wa it fo r[ his father’ s] atto rney

” becaus e hi s f

ather had asked h

im to draft the documen

t “righ t away” as

he was
con cerned ab out h i s f ai l i n g h ea l th . In dr af ti n g th e docu men t, d ef en da n t de ci de d w h at l an gu ag e to
use and e ven ad ded so me det ails of his o wn. A “sho rt t ime” afte r d iscuss ing t he mat t er , d efenda nt broug ht the docum en t to hi s f athe r’shom e f or hi s f athe r to revi ew an d si gn. Landheer , 38 3 I ll. App. 3d at 319-20. Defend ant ’s br ot her , o ne o f the plaint iff s, w as p re sent at t he fat her ’s ho use along wit h a third party . The fa

ther to ld de fen

dant that the document “was what he wan

ted.” The father then signed the docum

ent and def

endan t’s brother and the thi

rd party si

gned the docum

ent as witne sses. A

few da ys la ter defendan

t t ook t he docum

ent to t he f

ather’s attor ney . The fa

ther died approx i matel y a wee k later. Landheer , 383 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 320. Defend ant ’s t wo bro t her s bro ught a su it t o ha ve a t rial co ur t ent er a de clara t or y judgment that the disput ed do cument dr afted by defendant was no t an effective amendm ent t o t heir father’s tru st. De fen

dant filed a counterclaim

to the cont rary. Plai

ntif fs f il ed a motion to dism

iss defen dant’s countercl ai

m pursua nt to section 2-619 of the C ode, asserting that the di sputed doc um en t i s v oi d b ec au se

i t wa s prep are d by

a p ers on w

ho i s n ot an attorn ey i n v i ol ati on of
sec t ion 2 BB o f the Co nsumer Fra ud Ac t . T he t rial co ur t gr ant ed p laintiffs’ mot ion and defend ant appe aled. Landheer , 383 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 319-20.Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

22 The appel la te court found that the statuto ry l anguage of

section 2BBof the Consum er Fraud Act was cl

ear and un

am bi guous and that it “ex

pressl y prohi bi ts the assem

bl y, draf ting, executi on, and f

undi ng of a l iv in g trust documen

t by a nonl awy er” in cl udin g a documen

t t hat “am ends a l iv in g trust for another person.” Landheer , 383 Ill . App. 3d at 320. Given the cl ear la nguage of the

statut e, the court concl

uded that the document drafted b y the defen dant vi olated sect ion 2BB of t he Consumer Fra ud Act and did not const itut e a vali d amendment to his f

ather ’s trust agre em

en t bec aus e def

endan t was n ot a la wy er. Landheer , 383 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 320. Her e, as in Landheer , the Feldma n i nve stmen t form, whi

ch pl ai ntif fs ’ clai m c onstitutes an
am en dm en t to Ma ri e’ s trust agre em

en t, wa s d raf ted by a n onl aw yer, Mc Na mara , i n v i ol ati on of
sec t ion 2 BB o f the Co nsumer Fra ud Ac t . B ase d o n t he r eas oning in Landheer , the Feldma n i n v estmen t f orm i s n ot a v al i d tr us t am en dm en t. Pl ai n ti f f s c l ai m th at Landheer

is dist inguishable be cau se t he de fendant who dr aft ed t he alleged amendment in Landheer would be nef it if the am

endm ent was determi

ned to be val

id, wher eas Jo yce and McN amara wo uld r ece ive no be nefit if the amendment was det er mined t o be val id. However, pl

ai ntif f does n ot show, and we can

not fi nd, any referen ce i n the Landheer decisi on where the co urt even consi dered t he concept o f b enefi t in i ts holdin g that section 2BB expressly pro hi bi ts a nonlawy

er from draftin

g tr ust amendm

ents. Her e, t her e ar e dist inguishing fact or s t hat sup po rt t he t rial co ur t ’s co nclusio n t hat t he Feldman invest ment fo rm wa s no t a valid amend ment. In Landheer , t he fat he rr eq ue st ed t ha t his defen dant son create an am

endm ent to his trust agreemen

t. Here, Marie did not hire L aGrange Bank to amen

d her trust agreemen

t o r to create the Feldma

n i nve stmen t form. LaGran

ge Bank,Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

23 act ing in its r ole a s t ru st ee, hired McN amara t o p re par e a d oc ument t o a dvise Ma rie o n chang ing her trust inv

estmen ts. McNamara n

ever spoke wi

th Mari e and the onl

y i nf ormation h

e recei ved concerni ng the trust inv

estmen ts was from

Joyce. McNam

ara stated t hat he h

as nev er prepared a trust am endm ent, that he and hi

s compan y do not prepare trust am endm ents, and that he n

ever in tended to pr epare an am

endm ent to Marie’s trust. In addition, there is n o evi dence that Joyc e acted as Mari e’s l

awy er or agent in gi

vi ng the Fe ldm

an i nve stmen t form to Marie f

or her appr ov al, or th

at J oy ce i n ten de d th e f orm to b e a n am en dm en t to the tr us t wh en h e g av e i t to Mari e for her approval . Joyce testif ie d that he does not draft legal documen ts and that LaGrange does n ot off er i ts cl i en ts an attorney to do so. Plaint iff s fur t her claim, as d id t he de fendant in Landheer , t hat McNamara acted as a “scri ven er” becaus e the Fel

dma n i nve stmen t form “ perfectl y ref le cted the in

tentions that [Mari e] had ex pressed so often.” We

fi nd thi s argum

ent not persuasiv

e, as di d the Landheer

cou rt. In Landheer , t he ap pellat e co ur t fou nd t hat altho ugh t he so n spo ke w ith his fat her and t he father ap pro ved the d rafted amendm ent wa s “what he want ed.” The co urt rejecte d defendant’s “scri vener” argument because, in drafting the document, t he son decided what lan guage t o use and e ven ad ded so me det ails of his o wn. Landheer , 383 Ill . App. 3d at 322. In t his case , it is undisp ut ed t hat McN amara never spo ke w ith Ma rie and t hat any in form ation he recei ved concern

in g Mari e’s i

nve stmen ts was recei

ved second-h

and f rom Joyc e. He also t esti f

i ed th at h e c oul d n ot re ca l l Joy ce ’s ex act l an gu ag e w h en h e w rote i n th e c om men ts
sec t ion o f the Feldman invest ment fo rm. M or eo ver , Mc Namar a st at ed t hat he had no id ea t hat he
wasprepa

ri ng a trust am endm en t, and there f ore, coul d not b e a “ scri

vener.”Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

24 In addi tion, pl ai ntif fs argue that the Feldm

an i nve stmen t form, whi

ch was s ign

ed by Mari e,
co mplie s w it h t he t rus t ’s r eq uir eme nt t ha t Ma r ie, as se t t lo r , may a men d t he t rus t “by ins t rume nt in writi ng (other than a wi

ll ).” Black’ s Law Di

ctionary defi nes an “i nstrume nt” as a “ written legal do cu men t t ha t de fine s r igh t s, du t ies , en t it leme nt s, o rliabilit ies , su ch as a c o nt r ac t , will, prom i ssory note, or sh

are c erti f i cate.” Black’ s La

w Di cti onary 869 (9 th ed . 2009)
. Plai ntif fs ci te Whittaker v. Stables , 33 9 I ll. A pp . 3d 94 3 ( 20 03 ) , fo rsu pp o r t . At iss ue in Whittaker was whether a letter from settlor t o her daught er which amen ded the t erms of h

er tr ust
co nst itu t ed a signed instr ument . T he da ught er admit t ed t o d est ro ying the let t er ; ho weve r, t he settlor’s daughter-in

-law testi fi

ed to t he contents of the l etter . In decidin

g whether the l

etter
consti tuted a s i gned i ns trum en t, th e Se con

d D i stri ct of the Il l i noi s A ppe l l ateCou

rt di d n ot
co nsider t his issue be cau se it “assu me[d ] t hat t he wr iting p os sess ed t he wo rd ing nece ssar y for t he status o f a s ign

ed i nstrume nt.” Whittaker , 339 Il

l . Ap p. 3d a t 947. In t his case , u nlike in Whittaker , we do not need to assum e any wording i

n the Fe ldm

an invest ment fo rm beca use it is include d in t he r eco rd . P laintiff doe s no t po int t o a ny wor ding in t he Fel dma n i nve stmen t form that “def

in es rights, duties, enti

tlem ents, or li abi

li ties” that would m

ake i t an “i nstrumen t.” Furth erm ore, ther e i s n o evi den ce that the F eldm

an i nv estm en t form const itut es a “legal document.” The Feldman i nvestment for m propo sed a re all oca tion o f Marie’s st oc k invest ments . I n add itio n, Jo yce and McN amara bot h t est ifi ed t hat t he Feldman inves t ment form was created to r ecomm

end to Marie h

ow to reall

ocate her sto ck i

nve stmen ts. They f urther testi f i ed th at h er si gn atu reun der the w ord

“ approv ed” on

th e F el dm an i n v estmen t f orm re f l ects her approv

al of the rea

l l ocati on rec omm

endation. See , e.g. , Northw estern Univers ity v.Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

25 McLoraine , 10 8 Il

l . A pp. 3d 3 10, 318 (19 82)(con cl udi ng an un si gned scrap of pa per an d a l i st of
nam es is n ot a formal

legal document t o co nstitute an instrument in writing f or amendin

g a tr ust agree men t). Plain tiff s further argu e that althoug h Joyce and McNamara co uld not remember Marie’s exact i nstructions, the Fel

dma n i nve stmen t form “ perfectl y ref le cted” Marie’ s i

ntent as i s, and thus is a val id a me ndm ent to t he trust. We do not fi nd an y e vi dence to support that argument. Under Il l i noi s l aw, a trus t mu st be spe ci f i c as to the be ne f i ciaries a nd “ how the trust i s to be p erf orme d.” Eychaner v. Gross , 2 02 I ll. 2d 2 28, 253 (2 002 ); se e also Rest at ement (T hird) of T ru st s §2 2( 1) (b) (2003 ) (stati

ng th at a trust m

ust “ reas onab l y i den tif y the trust property , the b enef i ciaries” ). In ot her wo rd s, it must sho w who t he bene ficiaries ar e and what eac h one will receive. The
comm ents secti on of the Fel

dma n i nve stmen t form states that the sto ck “ass ets wil l e ven tuall y go t o he r ne phew s.” Ho weve r, t he Feldman inves t ment fo rm do es no t ident ify t he “nep hews ” who are to rece i

ve the stock ass ets. A

t the ti me of Mari e’s death , she had two l

i vi ng n eph ews , Richard and Joseph

Bogacz. Even if “

neph ews” m eant grandn

ephews, as

pla in tif fs cl ai m, then the Fel dma n inve st men t fo rm co nt r ad ict s p laint iffs’ alle ga t io ns in t he se co nd ame nd ed co mpla int t ha t Ma r ie wanted the stock assets to “go to T im ,” or reflect Boyl an’s

or Joyce’s recolle ctions that the stock
as sets w ere

to be be que ath ed to Ti mothy i nd i vi dua l l y . F urth erm ore, the “ com men ts” se cti on of the F eldm an i nv estm en t form does n ot speci f y the proportion

each “ ne phe w” was to rece i

ve . In sum , there is n

o dispute that the Feldma n i nve stmen t form was prepared b

y a n
non l awy er i n v i ola tion of s ection 2B B of

the C onsu

mer F raud A

ct and asa res

ul t is voi d. Fu rther, t he Feldman inves t ment fo rm is no t a valid amend ment t o t he t ru st even if it had been p re par ed byNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

26 a l aw yer f or th e re as ons

sta ted . A cc ordi

ngl y , th e tri al cou rt properl y gra nte d the Cha

ri ti esmoti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t an d p rop erl y den i ed pl ai n ti f f s’ cross moti on f or sum mar y j udgm en t. Plaint iff s’ Mo t ion t o D ismi ss La Gr ange Bank Se con d, p l ai n ti f f s c l ai m th at th e tr i al cou rt erre d i n gr an ti n g L aG ra n ge Ba n k’ s m oti on to dis mi ss plai ntif fs ’ second am

ended com

pla in t pursuant to sections

2-619(a)(9) and section 2-615 be ca us e L aG ran ge Ba nk f ai l ed to ei the r retai n a n a ttorn ey to draf t the am en dm en t to the trust or contact or appoi

nt an attorney f or Mari e to do so. Section 2-61 9(a)( 9) permits in voluntary di smi

ssal wh ere “the clai

m asserted against def endan t is ba rred b y other af f i rm ati ve matter avoid

i ng th e legal ef f ect of or def eati ng th e cl ai m .” 73 5 I LC S 5 /2
- 61 9( a) ( 9) ( We st 20 08 )
. I n a mo t io n t o dis miss un de rse ct io n 2
- 61 9( a) ( 9) , all w ellplead ed fac t s and re aso nable infere nces ar e ac cep t ed a s t ru e fo r t he pu rp os e o f the mot ion and t he motion should be granted only if the plai ntif f can prove no set o f f

acts t hat wou ld support a cause of a cti on. Feltmeier v. Feltmeier , 207 I ll . 2d 263, 277-78 ( 2003). The pleadi ngs, depositions,
and af f i dav i ts m ust b e con strued

“i n the l i ght m ost fa vorabl e to the n

onm ovi ng p arty .” In re Chicago Flood Litigation , 17 6 Ill. 2d 179 , 18 9 (1 997 ); Fuller Family Hol dings, L LC v. Northern Trust Co. , 371 Ill . App. 3d 605, 613 (2007). When cons ide rin g an appeal

from a section 2-619 dis mi ssal , revi ewi

ng courts must determi

ne wh ether a genui

ne i ssue of m

aterial fact ex is ts whi ch should hav

e precluded dism

issal and, if no such iss

ue exis ts, whet her dism

issal was pro per as a
matter of l

aw. Lang v. Silva , 306 Ill . App. 3d 960, 970 (1999). Our r evi ew of di sm

is sal s under section 2-619 o f the Code is de novo
. Van Meter v. Darien Par k District , 207 Ill . 2d 359, 368 (20 03) ; Lang , 306 Ill . App. 3d at 970 (citin g Spie gel v. Holly

w ood To w ers Cond omini um As s’n ,Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

27 283 Il l . Ap p. 3d 99 2, 998 ( 1996) ). A m ot ion to dis

mi ss unde r section 2-615 of the Code is a chal le nge to the legal

suf fi ci ency
o f t he c o mplain t . 7 35 IL CS 5/ 2- 61 5 ( Wes t 20 08 ). In re view ing t he le ga l su fficienc y of a
co mplaint, we r ega rd all well-pled fact s as t ru e and dr aw a ll reaso nable infere nces in favor of t he
non-m ovi ng p arty . Wakulich v. Mraz , 20 3 Ill. 2d 223 , 22 8 (2 003 ); Iseberg v. Gross , 366 Ill . App. 3d 857, 860 (2006). We construe the compl ai nt li beral ly and di sm is s onl y w hen it appears that plai ntif f s ca nn ot recover under an

y set of f acts. Wakulich , 20 3 Ill. 2d at 228 ; Iseberg , 36 6 I ll. Ap p. 3d at 86 1. T he st an da r d o f r ev iew fr o m t he gr an t ing o f a s ec t io n 2
- 61 5 mo t io n t o dis miss is de novo
. Wakulich , 20 3 Ill. 2d at 228 ; Flournoy v. Ameritech , 351 Ill . App. 3d 583, 586 (2004) (citi ng Krilich v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago , 334 Il l . Ap p. 3d 56 3 (200 2)). As an initial mat t er , t he pa rt ies ar gue whet her t hat t he t rial co ur t pr op er ly f ou nd in consi stencies between

their v erif ie d fi rst amen ded compl

ai nt and thei

r veri fi ed second am

ended
com pl ai n t. Sp ec i f i ca l l y , L aG ra n ge Ba n k a rgue s th at i n pl ai n ti f f s’ f i rs t v eri f i ed am en de d c om pl ai n t, plaint iff s allege t hat Bo ylan was Ma rie’s est at e planning a t t or ney. H ow ever , in t he ver ifi ed s eco nd amende d co mplaint p laintiffs allege t hat Bo ylan was o nly hi re d t o a mend t he t ru st agr eement and appoi nt LaG ran geBa nk assucc es sor

trustee . Pl

ai nti f f s a rgue that the tw o com

pl ai nts are not incons iste nt but , r at her , sho w t hat Bo ylan’s employment was lim ited in sco pe t o o nly amending the tr ust agr eemen

t t o appo in

t LaGrange Bank as t rustee . Plain tiff s further argue t hat because Boylan was not employ

ed to make any

further amendm

ents, t he duty to amend Marie’s trust sh i f ted to LaGra

nge Ban k. We nee d no t dec ide t hat issue. Eve n if, in cons t ru ing all pleadings , d epo sitio ns, a ndNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

28 affidavits in the light most favo ra ble to plaint iff s, w e ag re e wit h plaint iff

s t hat t he allega t ions in t he two amended com

pla in ts are not inconsi

stent, we would stil

l c oncl ude that LaGrange Ban

k had no dut y to amend the trust and that t he trial court pr oper ly granted t he m

ot ion to dismi

ss. To st at e a c aus e o f act ion fo r br eac h of a fiduciar y dut y, a p laintiff must a llege and ulti ma tely prove: (1) a fiduci ary duty on part o f the def

endan t; (2) a breach of

that dut y;(3) damages; an

d (4) a pr oxim

ate cause bet ween the breach and the damages. Martin v. He inold Commodities, Inc. , 163 Il l . 2d 33, 5 3 (199 4); Alpha School Bus Co. v. Wagner , 391 Ill . App. 3d 72 2, 7 47 (2 00 9) . “

‘ “ A tru ste e owes

a f i duci ar y du ty to a tr us t’s b en ef i ci ari es an d i s obl i ga

ted to
ca rry out th e tr us t according to its terms and to act with the highest degrees of fi deli ty and utmost good f ai th.” ’ ” (Em

phasi s ad ded). Fuller Family Holdings, LLC v. Norther n Trust Co. , 37 1 I ll. App. 3d 605, 615 (2007) (quot in g In re Estate of Muppavarapu , 359 Ill . App. 3d 925, 929 (2005), quo ting Giagnorio v. Emmett C. Torkelson Trust , 292 Ill . App. 3d 318, 325(1997)). S ee also Stuart v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. , 68 Il

l . 2d 502 , 523 (1 977); Chicago Title &

Trust Co. v. Chief Wash Co. , 36 8 Ill. 14 6, 1 55 ( 193 8); Paul H. Schwendener, Inc. v. Jupiter Electric Co. , 358 Ill . App. 3d 65, 74 (2005); Restatemen t (Seco nd) of Trusts §2, Com men t b (1959 ); R

estatem en t (Second) of

Trusts § 170 (1 959). In the case at ba

r, plai ntif fs do not ci te any authority to support their cl ai m that LaGran

ge Bank , a s t ru st ee, ow ed t hem a du t y to eithe r: app oint or co nsult an at t or ney co ncer ning amending Ma rie’ s tr us t; com m un i ca te wi th Ma rie c on cern

i n g a men di n g h er tru st;or “i

n sti tute adeq ua te follow-up procedures” to amend Mari e’s trust. In additi on, havi ng f ound that t he Fe ldm

an i n v estmen t f orm i s n ot a v al i d a men dm en t to M ari e’ s tr

us t ag re em en t, p l ai n ti f f s a l so d o n ot ci teNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

29 any te rms in Mar ie’s t ru st agr eement t hat impose a lega l dut y for L aGr ange Bank t o a ct t o a mend the trust agreemen

t. Fu r t he r , La Gr an ge Ba nk , a c o r po r at io n, is p r o hibit ed fr o m pr ac t icing law an d t hu s, is prohib ited f

rom drafti ng trust agreemen

ts. 705 ILCS 220/0.01 et seq . (West 20 08). Jo yce also tes ti f i ed tha t LaGra ng e B an k doe s n ot draf t l eg al docum en ts f or i ts c l i en ts a nd doe s n ot em pl oy an attor ney

to do so. T he duty

to draft an am

endm ent was Marie’s obl

iga tion. Boyl an was h er attorney f or estate pl

an ni ng a t the ti me an d was never told b

y Mari e to prepa re an am endm en t. Thi s duty does not fal

l to LaGrange Ba

nk be cause LaGran

ge Bank was

aware that Marie i

ntended to am end h er trust and m

ay have not had an attorney that she trusted to effectuate that
amen dmen t. It is equall

y possi ble that she did not want Boylan or any atto rney to amend her trust at the p oin

t in tim e of her death
. Plai ntif f f urther clai

ms that LaGrange Ban

k volun taril y assum ed a duty b ecause Joy

ce “ass ured [Marie] h

e would coordina

te pro fes si onal s i

ncl udin g contacting attorneys *** as needed on he r be half *** .” A dut y asso ciat ed w ith a vo lunt ar y under t aking is limited t o t he ext ent of t he undertakin

g. Rice v. Wh ite , 374 I ll . App. 3d 87 0, 886 ( 2007). Thus, acco rding to plain tiff s’
se con d a men de d c om pl ai n t, L aG ra n ge Ba n k’ s b re ach of i ts v ol un tar y du ty i s th at i t f ai l ed to contact or retai

n a n a ttorney on her b ehalf

. How ever, to sta

te a ca us e of ac ti on f or brea ch of a f i duc i ary duty , pl ai nti f f s m us t sh ow t ha t t he br ea ch is a pr o xima t e c au se o f t he da mag es . Alt ho ug h p r o xima t e c au se is g en er ally a question of

fact f or t he trier of

fact, a court may

determi ne a l ack of proxi

ma te cause as a m

atter of law where the f

acts fai l to establis

h both a “ cause i

n f act” and “l

egal cause.” Rice , 374 Ill . App.Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

30 3d at 888 (citin

g First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman , 188 Il

l . 2d 252 , 257-5 8 (199 9)). A defend ant ’s co nduc t is a “cau se in fact ” o f the plaint iff ’s da mages if the d amage s wo uld no t have
occurre d ab sen

t def endan t’s c onduc

t. Abrams v. City of Chicago , 211 Il l . 2d 251 , 258 (2 004). A defend ant ’s co nduc t is a “legal ca use ” o f a plaint iff ’s da mages if a rea so nable pe rso n wo uld find the dam ages as a f oresee ab l e or li

kel y resu l t of de f endan t’s c onduc

t. Abrams , 211 Ill . 2d at 258. In the ca se at b ar, Joy

ce ’s f ai l ure to con tac t or retai

n a n a ttorn ey i s n ot the ca us e i n f ac t or leg al c au se o f pla int iffs’ da mag es . Ra t he r , t he failu r e t o ame nd Ma r ie’ s t rus t wit h a va lid
amen dmen t t hat wou ld sh

ow her intentions was the pro xi mate cause of plai

ntif f’s dam ages. In sum , dism is sal of plai ntif fs ’ second am

ended com

pla in t was proper under section 2- 619 (a )( 9) of t he Co de be cau se La Gr ange Bank is pre vent ed fr om p ra ct icing law und er t he Corpor ate Practice of Law Prohi bi tion Act (705 ILCS 220/0.01 (West 2008)). Dis mi ssal was also p rope

r un de r s ec ti on 2 -61 5 b ec au se pl ai nti f f s f ai l ed to sta te a ca us e of ac ti on f or brea ch of fiduciar y dut y becau se La Gr ange Bank had no dut y to plaint iff s and even if LaG ra nge B ank
as su m ed a v ol un tary duty , i t wa s n ot the prox i mateca us e of pl ai nti f f s’ da mag esasa m

atter of la w. Plai ntif f’ s Motion f

or Att orney F ees Thi rd, pl ai nti f f s req ue st th at w e re ve rs e the tri al cou rt’ s m oti on d en y i ng pl ai nti f f s’ moti on for re imbursement of a t t or ney fees a nd co st s if we find t hat t he t rial co ur t er re d in gr ant ing
summ ary judgment in

favor o f the Charities and against plaintif fs or gr anting LaGrange Bank’s motion to dism

iss. Havi ng aff irm ed the t rial

cour t’s decision on t hose two issues, we m ust also af f i rm th e tr i al cou rt’ s den i al of pl ai n ti f f s’ moti on f or re i m b ur se men t of attor n ey f ee s a n d c ost sNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

31 beca use we ha ve no t re ver sed t he t rial co ur t . We need not dec ide whe t her plaint iff s wo uld have
r ec eiv ed r eimbu r se men t o f at t o rne y fee s a nd co st s ha d w e r ev er se d t he t r ial c o ur t be ca us e t ha t did not o ccur here. LaGrange B ank’s Motion for Attorneys F ees LaGrange B ank cl

ai ms the trial court erred when i

t found that it l acked j urisdi ction to hear La Gr an ge Ba nk ’s mo t io n fo rr eimbu r se men t o f at t o rne y fee s be ca us e t he mo t io n w as un t imely fil ed. Whet her a mot ion wa s t imely fil ed a nd whe t her a co ur t has jur isdict ion t o he ar suc h a motion is a questi on of law whi ch we rev ie w under a de novo standard. See In re Estat e of A hern , 359 Ill. App. 3d 8 05, 809 (20 05) ; In re Esta te of Gebis , 186 Ill . 2d 188, 192 (1999) In thi s case, the trial

court granted LaGrange B ank m ot ion to dismi

ss on Jun e 17, 2008 wi th pre j udice. On

Dece m ber 2, 200 8, the

tria l court gran

ted LaGran

ge Ba nk’ s req ues t to in sert Rule 3 04( a) langua ge in t he Ju ne 17 or der , st at ing t hat t he o rd er is a final or der and “[ t ]he re is no just re aso n for delaying eit her enfo rc ement or app eal o r bo t h.” On Ju ly 22, 2 009 , La Gr ange Bank then fil ed a mot ion for at to rney fees. The tr ial cou rt found t hat, to be timel y, LaGrange Bank’s motion s hould h ave b een f

il ed wi thin 30 day s of Decem

ber 2, 2008, when

the trial court in serted l anguag e purs

uan t to Rule 304(a ) i nto the J une 17, 200 8, order. Ill in ois Suprem

e Court Rule 304(a) provides that “an appeal

ma y b e taken f

rom a f in al judgm ent as to o ne or more but f ewer than al

l of the parties or cl ai

ms only if the trial court has
mad e a n e xpres s w ri tten f i nd i ng tha t the re i s n o j us t rea son

f or de l ay i ng ei the r en f orce men t or appeal [or bot h].” Ill . S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff . Jan. 1, 1989). An order is “f in al ” i f i t either termi

nates t he litigat ion bet wee n t he pa rt ies o n t he merit s o r d ispo ses o f the right s o f the par t ies eit her on t heNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

32 en tire controv ersy

or on se parate and def i ni te part of i t. Ariola v. Nigro , 13 Ill . 2d 200, 207 (1958 ). A c i rcui t court retai

ns j uri sdi cti on f or 30 day s af ter i ts en try of a f i na l order or j udgm

en t. Brew er v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. , 16 5 Ill. 2d 100 , 10 5 (1 995 ); Suburba n Auto Rebuilders, Inc. v. Associated Tile Dealers Ware house, Inc. , 388 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 81 , 96 (20 09). A circu it co ur t has jur isdict ion t o e nt er t ain a mot ion fo r a t t or ney fees filed wit hin 30 d ays o f the
en try of a f i na l j udgm en t wi thout rega

rd to a prev

i ousl y f i l ed n otice of a ppea l
. John G. Phil lips & A ss o ci a t es v. B ro wn , 19 7 Ill. 2d 337 , 34 3 (2 001 ); Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdal e , 13 8 Ill. 2d 458 , 46 8-6 9 (1 990 ); Servio v. Paul Roberts Auto Sales, Inc. , 211 Ill . App. 3d 7 51, 760

(19 91) . In

addi ti on, a c i rcu i t cou rt h asj urisd

i cti on to a ddr es s a ti mel y-f i l ed moti on f or attor ne y f ee s reg ard

l es s of whether th

e re que st is c ons i dered

to be pa rt of the origi na l ac ti on or col l ateral

to the ori gi

na l clai m . John G. Phillips &

Associates , 19 7 Ill. 2d at 343 ; Marsh , 138 Ill. 2d a t 4 60; Physicians Insur ance Exchange v. Jennings , 316 Il l . Ap p. 3d 44 3, 453 ( 2000) ; B er g er v. M a t th ews , 21 6 Ill. App. 3d 9 42, 944 (19 91) ; Servio , 211 Ill . App. 3d at 759-60. LaG ra nge B ank a rg ues t hat its mo t ion fo r a t t or ney fees w as t imely fil ed be cau se t he motion is not a post trial

motion pursuan

t t o section 2-1203 of the Code, and thus, the 30-day li mi tation does not apply . See Brow n & Kerr, Inc. v. American Stores Pr operties, Inc. , 30 6 I ll. App. 3d 1 023 , 10 28 ( 199 9); F.H. Prince & Co. v. Tower

s Financial Corp. , 266 Ill . App. 3d 977, 983 (1994) (“a clai

m f or at to rney

fees is not a post -trial

motion wi

thin sections 2-1202 and 2- 1203 of the Code *** nor, even i f v ie wed as a m

ot ion to modi fy

the judgm

ent, is i t a post -trial
m otion ‘di rected agai nst the j udgm

en t’ wi thi n the m ean i ng of Supreme Court Ru

l e 303 (a).”).Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

33 Plai ntif fs agree that a motion f

or reim bursem ent is not a post trial

motion, b

ut argue t hat LaGrange Bank is st ill

subjec t t o a 30- day limi

t at ion t o file its mot ion. Section 2-1203 provi des that “[i ]n al l c ases tried wi

thout a j ury, an

y pa rty m ay , withi n 30 da y s af ter e ntr y of the j udg men t *** f i l e a moti on f or a reh ea ri ng , or a retr i al , or a modif i ca ti on of the j udgm en t or to vacate the j udgm

en t or for other

rel i ef .” 735 ILCS 5/2-12 03 (W est 200 8). We f in d LaGrange B ank’s

argumen t not persuasi

ve. LaGran

ge Bank’ s argum

ent im pli es that if a m ot ion i s not a post trial

motion pursuan

t t o sections 2-1202 or 2-1203, t hen the trial
co ur t re t ains jurisd ictio n wit hou t lim itat ion. A tr ial cou rt has jur isdict ion o ver t he und er lyi ng act ion u nt il “30 days a fte r e nt ry o f tha t final j udg ment [ cita t ions] ; o r 3 0 da ys afte r r uling o n t he last pendi ng post-t rial

motion [ci

tation].” F.H. Prince , 26 6 Ill. App. 3d at 988 ; People v. Flowers , 208 Ill . 2d 291, 303 (2003) (t rial court loses jurisdi

ction over a m

atter 30 day s af

ter
en try of f i na l j udgm en t, unl ess a ti mel y postj udgm

en t motion i s f

i l ed). In the case at ba

r, the tr ia l c ourt ’s Jun

e 17, 2008, or der becam

e a fi nal order o n Decem

ber 2, 2008 , wh en

the tri al court i ns erted R ule 304 (a) l

anguag e m

aki ng i t a f i na l and app eal

ab l e order. As a res ul t, the f i na l j udgm en t termi na ted the l i tig ati on b etween L aGra

nge Ban k an d pl ai ntif f s. See Glickman v. Teglia , 388 Il l . Ap p. 3d 14 1, 151 ( 2009)(when al l clai m s ag ai nst a party

are dis mi ssed that party i s no longer bef ore t he trial

court once the 30-day

period af ter t he di sm

is sal passes). Thus, La

Grange Ban

k had un til January 2, 2008, 30 days af

ter t he order becam

e a fi nal judgm ent, excludin

g the January 1, 2008, ho li day, i n whi ch to fil e its m ot ion f or at to rney f

ees. Ho weve r, LaG ra nge B ank d id no t fil e its mot ion fo r a t t or ney fees u nt il appr oximat ely six m ont hs l ate r, on Ju l y 22 , 20 09 . Th

eref ore , the tr i al cou rt c orre ctl y f oun d th at i t l acke d j uri sd

i cti on toNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

34 consider that motion beca use i t was untim

el y f il ed. La Gr an ge Ba n k n ex t ar gu es th at a trial cou rt re tai n s p ost -j udgm

en t j uri sd i cti on to determ i ne matters col

l ateral or in ciden tal to the j udgm

en t, such as a motion f or attorney

f ees . In re Estate of

Denaro , 112 Ill . App. 3d 872, 878 (1983) (“The general rule is that the fi

li ng of an appe al di v ests th e tr i al cou rt of j uri sd i cti on ; h owev er , the tr

i al cou rt re tai n s j uri sd i cti on to determi ne m atter s coll ateral or in

ci dental to the judgm

ent. [Citation]. Coll

ateral or supple

me ntal matt er s include t hos e lying out side t he issue s in the app eal o r a rising su bseq uent t o d elivery o f the judgm ent appealed from .”). LaGrange Ban k further argues that the tim e when a trial court loses jurisd ictio n t o he ar co llater al or incident al matt er s t o t he judg ment is no t unt il “30 days p ast t he date of the last order or judgm ent was i ssued i

n the case .” Gaynor v. Walsh , 219 Ill . App. 3d 996, 1002 (1991). LaGrange Ban k then concl

udes that its m

ot ion f or at to rney

fees was tim el y f il ed wi thi n 30 day s of the l ast order e

ntere d i n the ca se, the tri al

court’s order gra nti ng s um mary judgm ent in fav or o f the C

hari ties an d agai nst pl ai ntif fs on Jul y 7, 2009. We also find this ar gument not per sua sive. I n Gaynor , a plai ntif f f il ed a complai

nt against a defe ndan t allegi ng wrongf

ul trans fer of

partnershi

p assets. On Septem

ber 12, 1990, the trial court granted defen

dant’s m ot ion f or summ ary judgme

nt. On Septemb er 20, the plai ntif f f il ed a posttri al motion to recons i der wh

i ch wasden i ed on Novem ber 15, 19 90. Non

e of the orde rs
co nt ained R ule 30 4( a) langua ge. On De cember 10, 199 0, wit hin 30 d ays o f the t rial co ur t ’s r uling
o n p laint iff’s po st t r ial mo t io n, t he de fen da nt filed a mo t io n fo rat t o rne y fee s p ur su an t t o Su pr eme Court Rul e 137 (Ill . S. Ct. R. 137 (eff . Aug. 1, 1989)). The Gaynor court found that the trial
cou rt re tai ne d j urisd i cti on ov er th e m oti on f or attor ne y f ee s b ec au se

de f en da nt f i l ed the moti onNos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

35 wi thi n 3 0 da y s of the tri al cou rt’ s orde r de

ny i ng pl ai nti f f ’s pos ttri al moti on a nd tha t orde r di d n ot contai n R ule 304 (a) l

anguag e. Gaynor , 219 Ill . App. 3d at 998. Simil ar ly, in F.H. Prince , a

pl ai n ti f f ’s com pl ai n t so ug h t en try of a j udgm en t ag ai n st a defen dant in an am ount o f the pri

nci pal and i nterest due on a settlem

ent agreem

ent plus atto rney fees and costs. Af

ter a jury trial , the trial

court entered a j udgme

nt for pl ai ntif fs on February

6, 1991, for the prin

ci pal and i nterest due. On Feb

ruary 25, 1991, the plai

ntif f f il ed a petiti on for an award of i nterim atto rney fees based upon a f

ee shi fti ng provi si on in

the settlem

ent agreem

ent. On Apr il 4, 19 91, t he t rial co ur t ent er ed a judg ment fo r a t t or ney fees in favo r o f plaintiff. On t he same d ay, t he de fendant fil ed a po st t rial mot ion, which t he t rial co ur t denied on M ay 8, 199 1. The followi ng day , the plai ntif f f il ed a second peti

tion f or at to rney

fees coverin g the period through Ma y 8. On Ma y 13 , 19 91 th e def

en da n t f i l ed a n oti ce of appe al f rom th e ordersan

d j udgm en ts enter ed t hrou gh May 8, 1991 . The t rial court held that it had jurisdiction to hear t he plai ntiff ’s
m otion f or attorney

f ees f i l e on M ay

9, 1991 and en

tered j udgm

en t on that m

otion
. F.H. Prince , 266 Ill . App. 3d at 979-80. The a pp el l ate co ur t , w hich relied o n Gaynor i n i ts dec i si on, f oun d that the p eti

ti on f or attorn ey f ee s w asa ti

mel y f i l ed cl ai m be ca us e i t wa s f i l ed one da y af ter th e tri al cou rt’ s den i al of defend ant ’s po st t rial mot ion, “well within t he 30 -d ay per iod follow ing t hat denial, and w hile the [trial ] court retained jurisdi ction to set aside an

y f in al judgm ent or o rder.” A l thou gh the se two c as esare

di sti ng ui sh ab l e f rom the ca se at b ar b ec au se : (a

) th ey di d n ot involve mult iple par t ies; (b) none of t he o rd er s co nt ained lang uag e pu rsu ant t o R ule 30 4( a) and (c) motions f

or at to rney

s f ees was a s ancti on pursuant to Rule 137 (Ill . S. Ct. R. 137 (eff . Aug. 1,Nos. 1-0 9-003 8; 1 -09-18 92; 1-09-3 295; 1-09-3 431; 1-10-0 070; 1-10-0 071 (c ons.)

36 198 9) ), we d o no t find tha t t hey sup po rt LaG ra nge B ank’ s ar gument t hat a t rial co ur t re t ains jurisdi ction over a di sm

is sed party’s

cl ai ms until all c la im s i n the l iti gation are resol

ved. In a ddi tion , the c ase s La

Gran ge Ba nk c i tes f or addi tion al supp ort of i

ts argu men t are dis t ing uis ha ble fr o m t he ca se at ba rbe ca us e t he mo t io ns f o rat t o rne y fee s in t ho se ca se s w er e a ll fil ed w ithin 30 days o f the final j udg ment w hich allowe d t he t rial co ur t t o r et ain po st -jud gment j uri sdi cti on. See , e.g. , Tow

n of Libertyville v. Bank of Waukegan , 152 Ill . App. 3d 1066, 1072 (1987) (t rial

court retained jurisdi

ction to hear cla

im for atto rney

fees whi ch was f il ed wi thin 30 days o f the final j udg ment) ; Physicians Insur ance Exchange v. Jennings , 316 Ill . App. 3d 443, 453 (2000) (t rial

court retained jurisdi

ction to hear cla

im for tax costs and m

ot ion f il ed wi thin 30 day s of f i na l j udgm en t). American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Bus , 212 Ill . App. 3d 133, 138 (1991) (t rial

court retained jurisdi

ction to hear motion f

or Rule 137 san

ctions wh ic h was f i l ed wi thi n 30 day s of j udgm en t). In the ca se at b ar, the

Ju ne 17, 200 8 order d

i sm i ss i ng LaGra ng e B an k f rom the l i ti ga ti on beca me a final judgment on D ece mber 2 , 2 008 , w hen t he t rial co ur t insert ed int o t hat or der t he Rul e 3 04( a) l

an gua geat L aG ran geBa nk ’s req ue st. L aG ran geBa nk the n h ad a 3 0-day period f ol l owi ng tha t de ni al to f i l e i ts m oti on f or re i m bu rs em en t of attorn ey f ee s, b ut i t f ai l ed to do s o. Ac cordi ngl y , we f i nd th e tri al court correctly

f ound th at i t la cked j uri sdi cti on to he ar tha

t motion. CONCLUSION Fo rt he fo r eg o ing r ea so ns we af fir m t he ju dg men t o f t he cir cu it co ur t o f Co o k C o un t y. Af fi rmed.