If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re BAUR, Minors. May 7, 2019

No. 345518

Montmorency Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 13-003381-NA

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and METER and FORT HOOD, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the circuit court’s termination of her parental rights to 

three of her children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Respondent is the biological mother of four children, all with the same father. Only 

respondent’s three youngest children—a daughter, CB (born 2001) and two sons, TRB (born 

2006) and ZB (born 2013)—are at issue in this appeal. Nevertheless, petitioner’s involvement 

with respondent’s family dates back to 2013, at which time respondent’s eldest daughter, TIB 

(born 1998), reported that respondent had punished her for the last seven years by punching her 

in the stomach and striking her head, back, and face. TIB also disclosed that her father had 

sexually abused her for the past four years.

The circuit court took jurisdiction over the children and TIB was removed from 

respondent’s care. Eventually, the father’s parental rights to all four children were terminated 

and he was ordered to have no contact with them. Respondent was ordered to comply with a 

treatment plan requiring her to protect her children from sexual abuse, support her children, 

obtain financial and emotional stability, and acquire appropriate parenting skills. Respondent 

complied with her treatment plan, TIB was returned to her care, and the circuit court terminated 

its jurisdiction over the children in August 2014.

In early 2016, however, the circuit court removed the three younger children from 

respondent’s care, finding that respondent was not attending to the children’s medical and 

educational needs. Additionally, respondent had been delegating care of TRB and ZB to CB, 

who was only 14 years old at the time, and had allowed TRB and ZB to visit with their father. 
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Respondent had instructed the children not to disclose the visitation and had become angry at 

them when they did so. The circuit court again ordered respondent to comply with a treatment 

plan, which contained nearly identical goals to the previous plan.

Over the next 18 months, respondent’s progress on her treatment plan was inconsistent. 

While respondent did complete a parenting program, caseworkers reported that respondent did 

not appear to benefit from the strategies discussed therein. Respondent sporadically attended 

individual counseling and her emotional stability was poor; moreover, respondent cancelled 

many family-therapy sessions. Respondent continued to struggle financially and had poor 

money-management skills. The children’s father had been incarcerated for his sexual abuse of 

TIB, but was released in 2014. From 2014 to 2017, the father lived across the street from 

respondent. Respondent continued to struggle to maintain her housing and sporadically attended 

parenting time.

Given respondent’s inconsistent compliance, in February 2018, petitioner filed a 

supplemental petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Between the filing of the 

petition and the August 2018 termination hearing, respondent reengaged with her services. 

Nevertheless, respondent was still financially unstable, and had not provided a pay stub to 

caseworkers in several months. Moreover, respondent had moved into a home that was just 

down the road from where the children’s father had moved. Respondent did, however, begin 

attending therapy consistently and appeared to be progressing mentally.

The circuit court found statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), based particularly on respondent’s history of inconsistent 

compliance with her treatment plan. The circuit court noted that respondent had little bond with 

her three youngest children1 and that the children were thriving in their placements and found 

that termination was in their best interests. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing 

evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been 

met.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). Once a ground for 

termination is established, the trial court must order termination of parental rights if it finds that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 

144 (2012); MCL 712A.19b(5). “We review for clear error both the court’s decision that a 

ground for termination has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and, where 

appropriate, the court’s decision regarding the child’s best interest.” In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 

356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); see also MCR 3.977(K). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous 

if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, 

giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 

Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 NW2d 505 (2004).

 1 TIB had reached the age of majority several years earlier.
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Respondent first challenges the trial court’s conclusion that statutory grounds supported 

termination of her parental rights. The circuit court terminated respondent’s parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j), which provide:

(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the 

court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:

* * *

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this 

chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial 

dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either 

of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do 

so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable 

expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within 

a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of 

the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the 

home of the parent.

Regarding the first ground—continuing conditions—the children were brought into care 

most recently because respondent was unable to provide them with financial and housing 

stability, was unable to maintain a safe and appropriate home environment, and lacked emotional 

and parenting skills. These were the same conditions that had been present since petitioner 

became involved with the family five years earlier. Despite periods of compliance with her 

treatment plan, including a period of progress after the filing of the termination petition, 

respondent had still failed to rectify several conditions at the time of trial. Although respondent 

had recently reengaged with therapy, respondent was largely absent from her therapy sessions for 

significant periods of time during the course of petitioner’s involvement. Moreover, despite 

petitioner’s assistance, respondent had failed to maintain financial stability. Most recently, 

respondent was working weekends as a dishwasher, earning $200 per week and, in the months 

preceding the termination trial, had not provided verification of this income to petitioner.

Shortly before trial, respondent did obtain a home that appeared appropriate for the 

children, but that home was on the same street as the home of the children’s father, who had 

sexually abused respondent’s eldest daughter. This move is particularly troublesome given 

indications that respondent had earlier allowed the father to contact the children and had 
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reprimanded the children for failing to keep the contact a secret. Respondent completed some 

parenting courses, but failed to benefit from these courses. Indeed, respondent’s son reported 

that respondent was “physically hitting, yelling and swearing at him, and drinking big beer 

bottles” as recently as February 2017. Respondent’s caseworkers reported that, despite attending 

parenting classes, respondent had no viable plan to care for her children’s special needs and had 

not found appropriate childcare. Respondent had not demonstrated an ability to engage the 

substantial state resources offered to her—including food, cash, and Medicaid assistance—and, 

perhaps most egregiously, respondent was absent from numerous parenting-time sessions during 

the last five years.

This Court has long viewed child-protective proceedings as continuous actions. See In re 

LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 391; 210 NW2d 482 (1973). Despite respondent’s efforts in recent 

months to prevent the termination of her parental rights, we are unable to overlook respondent’s 

lengthy history of sporadic compliance with her treatment plan. Despite five years of services, 

respondent is in little better position to provide for her children’s financial, emotional, or 

physical well-being. Because the conditions leading to adjudication continue to exist, we agree 

with the trial court that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) supported termination of respondent’s parental 

rights. Given that “the petitioner need only establish one ground for termination,” we need not 

address MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) or (j). In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 360.

Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by finding that termination was in her 

children’s best interests. “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the 

child must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 

836 NW2d 182 (2013). “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the 

children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). “To 

determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, the court should 

consider a wide variety of factors that may include ‘the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s 

parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a 

foster home over the parent’s home.’ ” Id., quoting In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. 

Other relevant factors include any relevant “history of domestic violence, the parent’s 

compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the 

children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption.” Id. at 714.

Given respondent’s inconsistent attendance at parenting time, none of the children had a 

strong bond with her. Moreover, as recognized by the circuit court, TRB and ZB both have 

special medical needs which respondent was ill equipped to address, particularly given 

respondent’s failure to benefit from the services provided by petitioner. Despite struggling 

academically and socially while in respondent’s care, in her foster placement, CB was receiving 

straight “A’s” in school, was involved in sports, and had developed a circle of friends. TRB and 

ZB were similarly thriving in their placement. At the time of termination, the children had been 

in non-relative foster care for more than two and a half years and deserved stability and finality. 

As evidenced by respondent’s history of only partial compliance with her treatment plan and the 

considerable financial, housing, parenting, and emotional issues respondent still needed to 

address, it is clear that respondent was unlikely to be able to provide her children with a suitable
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home within any reasonable time. The trial court did not err by finding that termination was in 

the children’s best interests.

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

/s/ Patrick M. Meter

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood