alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.1**
**Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**
In connection with the Quarterly Report of Boykin Lodging Company (the“Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2004 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, RobertW. Boykin, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company.
/s/ Robert W. Boykin
EXHIBIT 13.1

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, each of the undersigned officers of
Tata Motors Limited (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:



|i. | the Companys annual report on Form 20-F for the year ended March 31, 2017 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|ii. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: July 28, 2017



|                                                           |  | 
|---------------------------------------------------------- |  | 
|/s/ Guenter Butschek                                       |  | 
|Guenter Butschek
CEO and Managing Director                 |  | 
|                                                           | 
|/s/ C. Ramakrishnan                                        |  | 
|C. Ramakrishnan
Tata Motors Group Chief Financial Officer |  |
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dura Automotive Systems, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
David R. Bovee, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial
Officer) of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted
pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
              or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
              material respects, the financial condition and result of
              operations of the Company.



/s/ David R. Bovee
------------------
David R. Bovee
Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
November 14, 2002
EXHIBIT 23.1


               CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

To the Board of Directors and Shareholders
of The Savannah Bancorp, Inc.

      We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statement File on Form S-8 (No.333-69175) of The Savannah Bancorp, Inc. of our
report dated January 24, 2003 relating to the consolidated financial statements
which appear in the Annual Report to Shareholders, which is incorporated in this
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002.

/s/ BDO SEIDMAN, LLP

BDO Seidman, LLP

Atlanta, Georgia
March 24, 2002
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

_________________________________ 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

April 6, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

129206(51) Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

GREGORY HAYNES, Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 SC: 129206 

v CoA: 249848

 Wayne CC: 01-137330-NO 

MICHAEL J. NESHEWAT, 

ROBERT J. MURRAY, and 

BRIAN PELTZ, 

Defendants, 

and 

OAKWOOD HEALTHCARE, INC., 

and OAKWOOD HOSPITALSEAWAY CENTER, 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion by plaintiff-appellant for 

extension of the time for filing his brief and appendix is considered and it is GRANTED. 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

April 6, 2006 

Clerk
* After examining the briefs and the records, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeals are submitted on the briefs and the records. See F ED

. R. A PP

.

P. 34(a)(2). 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 13, 2008 *

Decided November 14, 2008

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 08

‐ 1988

AARON HYCHE,

Petitioner

‐ Appellant,

v.

NEDRA CHANDLER,

Respondent

‐ Appellee. Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 07 CV 380 WDS

William D. Stiehl,

Judge

.

O R D E R

Aaron Hyche appeals from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he challenges the refusal of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board

to release him on parole. The district court concluded that Hyche’s petition is premature

because he did not exhaust his state remedies before turning to federal court. We conclude,

however, that Hyche does not state a claim under federal law. 

### NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 08

‐ 1988 Page 2

Hyche currently is serving indeterminate prison terms on his 1976 convictions in

Effingham County, Illinois, for murder (250 to 300 years) and attempted murder (25 to 75

years). After he was denied parole for the fourteenth time, Hyche petitioned for a writ of

habeas corpus, claiming that the review board had denied him due process. The district

court referred the petition to a magistrate judge and without objection adopted his

recommendation to dismiss the case without prejudice. The magistrate judge reasoned that

Hyche had not exhausted his state

‐ court remedies and thus his § 2254 petition was

premature.

In this court Hyche continues to insist that he exhausted his state remedies. But he

waived that contention by not objecting to the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn

, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985);

United States v. Hall

, 462 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2006). More importantly, though, the

exhaustion issue is irrelevant. Illinois prisoners have no entitlement to parole, and a hope to

be released on parole in a discretionary system does not create a protected “liberty” or

“property” interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Heidelberg v. Ill. Prisoner Review Bd.

,

163 F.3d 1025, 1027 (7th Cir.1998); see Montgomery v. Anderson

, 262 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir.

2001) (explaining that parole system making release entirely discretionary “means that the

setting of a parole

‐ release date does not entail ‘liberty’ or ‘property’”). Thus, Hyche’s

contention that the review board denied him due process does not state a claim under

§ 2254, see Heidelberg

, 163 F.3d at 1027, and for that reason the district court should have

dismissed the petition with prejudice.

The dismissal is modified to be with prejudice, and as MODIFIED the judgement is

AFFIRMED.
**RB** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 19 - 0613 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. RYAN PATRICK MORRIS and TROY NELSON,

Defendant s and Appellants .

**GRANT OF EXTENSION** Upon consideration of Appellee’s motion for a 30 - day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, Appellee is gran ted an extension of time to and including December 1 , 20 20 , within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief.

Electronically signed by: Bowen Greenwood Clerk of the Supreme Court October 22 2020

10/22/2020
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Dura Automotive Systems, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending April 2, 2006 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Keith
R. Marchiando, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial
Officer) of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuanT to Section  906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.


/s/ Keith R. Marchiando
-------------------------------------
Keith R. Marchiando
Vice President and
Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
May 11, 2006
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2602 

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to study the suitability and feasibility 

of designating the Ka’u Coast on the island of Hawaii as a unit of 

the National Park System. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 21, 2009 

Ms. HIRONO (for herself and Mr. ABERCROMBIE) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Natural Resources 

A BILL 

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to study the suitability 

and feasibility of designating the Ka’u Coast on the 

island of Hawaii as a unit of the National Park System. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. KA’U COAST STUDY; REPORT. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Ka’u Coast Preservation Act’’. 

6 (b) STUDY.— 

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Inte8 rior shall complete a study to determine the suit9 ability and feasibility of designating the Ka’u Coast 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
2 

•HR 2602 IH

1 on the island of Hawaii, as a unit of the National 

2 Park System. 

3 (2) STUDY AREA.—The study area shall extend 

4 generally from Kapaoo Point to Kahuku Point, Ha5 waii. 

6 (3) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER LAW.—Para7 graphs (2) and (3) of section 8(c) of Public Law 91– 

8 383 (16 U.S.C. 1a–5(c)(2) and (3); commonly 

9 known as the National Park System General Au10 thorities Act) shall apply to the study. 

11 (c) REPORT.—Upon completion of the study required 

12 by subsection (b), the Secretary of the Interior shall trans13 mit to the Committee on Natural Resources of the House 

14 of Representatives and the Committee on Energy and 

15 Natural Resources of the Senate a report containing the 

16 conclusions of the study. 

Æ 


sroberts on PROD1PC70 with BILLS
Opinion issued March 14, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-12-01109-CV ____________

BARBARA J. ELLIS, Appellant

V.

FIESTA MART INC. D/B/A FIESTA STORE NO. 18, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1008730

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an attempted appeal from an interlocutory summary judgment order. 

Appellee, Fiesta Mart Inc. d/b/a Fiesta Store No. 18 (“Fiesta”), filed a motion to 

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction on the grounds that the order is a non-
2

appealable interlocutory order. We requested a response to the motion from the 

appellant, and the appellant did not file a response.

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. 

Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Interlocutory orders may be 

appealed only if authorized by statute. Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 

S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001). 

The record in this case demonstrates that the appellant named two defendants 

in her amended petition, Fiesta and Robert Ronald Davis. Subsequent to the filing 

of the amended petition, the trial court granted Fiesta’s motion for summary 

judgment, and the appellant filed a notice of appeal. The record does not reflect 

that appellant’s claims against Robert Ronald Davis have been resolved, nor is there 

any evidence in the record that there has been any severance of the judgment 

entered in favor of Fiesta. Under these circumstances, the order at issue is 

interlocutory and non-appealable, and we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal. 

See Lehmann, 29 S.W.3d at 195; see also Johnson v. Pierre, No. 01-09-00820-CV, 

2011 WL 743110, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2011, no pet.) (“A 

summary judgment that does not dispose of all parties and causes of action is not 

final and appealable absent a severance.”). 
3

Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion and dismiss the appeal for want of 

jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss any other pending 

motions as moot. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Massengale.
**Exhibit 23.1****CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 Nos. 33-45573,33-88590, 33-311419, 33-333647, 333-81647, 333-101467, 333-126785, and 333-135675), and in theRegistration Statements (Form S-3 No. 333-97207 and Form S-4 No. 333-107089) of MedicisPharmaceutical Corporation of our reports dated February 26, 2007, with respect to the consolidatedfinancial statements and schedule of Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation, Medicis PharmaceuticalCorporation management’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financialreporting, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting of MedicisPharmaceutical Corporation, included in its Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December31, 2006./s/ Ernst & Young LLPPhoenix, Arizona
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 192 (Thursday, October 5, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 46518]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-21387]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Cancer Institute Amended; Notice of Meeting

    Notice is hereby given of a change in the meeting of the National 
Cancer Institute Special Emphasis Panel, November 07, 2017, 2:00 p.m. 
to November 08, 2017, 6:00 p.m., Bethesda North Marriott Hotel & 
Conference Center, Montgomery County Conference Center Facility, 5701 
Marinelli Road, North Bethesda, MD, 20852 which was published in the 
Federal Register on September 22, 2017, 82 FR 44430.
    This meeting notice is amended to change the meeting location to 
the DoubleTree Hotel Bethesda, 8120 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, MD 
20814. The meeting is closed to the public.

    Dated: September 29, 2017.
Melanie J. Pantoja,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2017-21387 Filed 10-4-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4140-01-P
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                 APR-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         1,727
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  2,654
<ALLOWANCES>                                   386
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               6,187
<PP&E>                                         5,679
<DEPRECIATION>                                 1,529
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 14,209
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          2,642
<BONDS>                                        5,071
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
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<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (289)
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<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (189)
<EPS-BASIC>                                  (0.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.03)



</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                              91,690
<SECURITIES>                                             0
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<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
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<CGS>                                              182,008
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,088,215
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,253,007 
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (4,541,292)
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        (0.72)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (0.72)
        


</TABLE>
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 2291** 

IN RE: ALEXANDER MATTHEWS , Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus
. ( 1:12

- cv - 00132

- LO ; 1:11

- cr - 00348

- LO

- 1 ; 1:11

- cr - 00087

- LO

- 1 )

Submitted : April 16, 2015 Decided: April 20, 2015

Before AGEE and KEENAN , Circuit Judges , and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by un published per curiam opinion
.
Alexander M atthews , Petitioner Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Alexander Matthews petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the district court to fully address all claims in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. We conclude that Matthews is not entitled to mandamus rel ief. Mandamus relief is a drastic remedy and should be used only in extraordinary circumstances. Kerr v. U . S
. Dist. Court , 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) ; United States v. Moussaoui , 333 F.3d 509, 516

- 17 (4th Cir. 2003) . Further, mandamus relief is available only when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief sought. In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass ’ n , 860 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1988)
. Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re Lockheed Martin C orp. , 503 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2007 ). The relief sought by Matthews is not available by way of mandamus. Accordingly, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus and all associated supplemental and am ended petitions . We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
## State of N ew York Su p reme Cou rt, A p p ellate Division Third J u dicial Dep artment Decided and Entered: November 12, 2015 520607

________________________________ In the Matter of SHIRWYN JOSEPH, Petitioner, v MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT ALBERT PRACK, as Director of Special Housing and Inmate Disciplinary Programs, Respondent.

________________________________ Calendar Date: September 22, 2015 Before: Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Egan Jr. and Clark, JJ.

__________ Shirwyn Joseph, Malone, petitioner pro se. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Marcus J. Mastracco of counsel), for respondent.

__________ Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the Commissioner of Corrections and Community Supervision finding petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule. Petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with drug use after his urine twice tested positive for the presence of buprenorphine. Following a tier III disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty and that determination was affirmed upon administrative appeal. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.-2- 520607

We confirm. The misbehavior report, positive urinalysis test results, related documentation and testimony at the hearing provide substantial evidence to support the determination of guilt (see Matter of Paddyfote v Fischer, 118 AD3d 1240, 1241 [2014]; Matter of Cane v Fischer, 115 AD3d 1097, 1098 [2014]). Petitioner's claim that prescribed medication caused the positive test results was contradicted by testimony from the correction officer who testified that the medication was not denoted on the manufacturer's reactivity list of medications that would cause a false positive, thus creating a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve (see Matter of Curry v Fischer, 93 AD3d 984, 984 [2012]; Matter of Conway v Commissioner of Dept. of Correctional Servs., 278 AD2d 636, 637 [2000]). Petitioner's procedural challenges were not raised at the hearing and, therefore, are not preserved for our review. Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Egan Jr. and Clark, JJ., concur.

ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger Clerk of the Court