In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-3144

ARTHUR J. BRYANT,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

RICHARD BROWN,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.

No. 2:13-cv-00218-WTL-WGH — William T. Lawrence, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 4, 2017 — DECIDED OCTOBER 23, 2017

____________________

Before POSNER,* EASTERBROOK, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Arthur John Bryant, an Indiana prisoner, was convicted of murdering his stepmother. He was 

17 years old at the time of the killing. Under Indiana law 

juveniles in police custody have a statutory right to “mean-

 * Circuit Judge Posner retired on September 2, 2017, and did not participate in the decision of this case, which is being resolved by a quorum of 

the panel under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
2 No. 15-3144

ingful consultation” with a parent before waiving their 

constitutional rights. See IND. CODE § 31-32-5-1. Bryant met 

with his mother and made an incriminating statement to her. 

Two detectives surreptitiously recorded their conversation, 

and the incriminating statement was introduced at Bryant’s 

trial through the testimony of both eavesdropping officers. 

Bryant’s counsel objected to the first detective’s testimony

but the objection was overruled. On direct appeal the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the statement should not 

have been admitted, but because Bryant’s counsel did not 

object to the second detective’s testimony about the same

statement, the error was both unpreserved and effectively 

harmless.

On state postconviction review, Bryant raised a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He identified five errors,

including his counsel’s failure to preserve the surreptitiousrecording issue and several other alleged missteps at trial. In 

a separate claim, he raised a Brady violation stemming from 

a falsehood in a police report. Finally, in a catch-all argument, he claimed a right to relief based on cumulative error.

The trial judge was not persuaded by these arguments. 

Neither was the Indiana Court of Appeals. Bryant then 

sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, reiterating the same claims. The district court denied relief, and we 

affirm the judgment. The state appellate court reasonably 

applied Strickland and Brady.

I. Background

On January 4, 2000, Carol Bryant went missing. A few 

days later the police discovered her body in the trunk of her 
No. 15-3144 3

abandoned car. At the time of her death, Carol was living 

with her husband, Lee Bryant, at their home in Harrison 

County in southern Indiana. Lee’s 17-year-old son, Arthur 

John Bryant, also lived with the couple; to avoid confusion 

we’ll refer to him as “Bryant” and use first names for other 

family members.

Bryant had previously lived with his mother, Kristi, but 

she kicked him out because she could no longer control his 

behavior. Among other things, he stole her truck, threatened

to kill her, chased her around the house with a baseball bat,

and choked her.

On the day of Carol’s disappearance, Lee came home 

midday to have lunch with his wife and son, then went back 

to work. When he returned home that evening, both Carol 

and Bryant were gone. Lee found a note from Bryant saying

he was spending the night at a friend’s house. Lee called

Carol’s family and friends in search of her, but no one knew 

where she was. When morning came without word from

her, Lee reported her missing.

Meanwhile, Bryant was driving around in Carol’s car, 

showing it off to friends. He had stolen her jewelry, some of 

which he sold to a pawnshop; the rest he gave away. After 

several days he abandoned the stolen car on the side of a 

rural road. When police recovered and searched it, they 

found Carol’s body in the trunk wrapped in a comforter. She 

had been strangled. Police also found a pair of Bryant’s jeans

in the trunk. The jeans were stained with bodily fluids. DNA 

analysis later confirmed that the bodily fluids were Carol’s.

Detectives soon learned that Bryant had an angry relationship with his stepmother. They discovered some rap 
4 No. 15-3144

lyrics he had written describing Carol in profane terms and 

discussing a plan to kill a woman and leave her body in the 

trunk of a car.

On January 8 sheriff’s deputies located Bryant in a nearby town and arrested him for Carol’s murder. When they

arrived at the Harrison County Sheriff’s Office, Bryant asked 

for a lawyer. In the meantime, he was allowed to meet with

his mother in accordance with an Indiana statute that gives 

juveniles in custody the right to consult with a parent before 

waiving their constitutional rights. See IND. CODE § 31-32-5-1. 

Sheriff’s Detectives Richard Bauman and William Whelan

secretly eavesdropped on the conversation using a hidden 

recording device. They overheard Bryant tell his mother: “I 

told dad I had a problem and if he didn’t take care of it, I 

would, and I did.”

The investigation continued after Bryant’s arrest. Detective Bauman interviewed Carol’s friend Tracy Beemer (neé 

Borden), who told him that Carol had confided to her that 

Lee was abusive and had threatened to kill her. She also told 

the detective that she and Carol had contacted domesticviolence shelters a few days before Carol’s death. Detective 

Bauman’s report wrongly stated that Beemer told him that 

Carol had identified Bryant, not Lee, as her abuser. The 

prosecution disclosed this report to the defense before trial. 

Bryant’s defense team—he had two attorneys—did not 

follow up by interviewing Beemer.

Bryant stood trial for murder, theft, and obstruction of 

justice. Some factual detail about the trial is necessary to 

understand the issues raised in this appeal. The prosecution 

called both Detective Bauman and Detective Whelan as 

witnesses. The detectives testified about Bryant’s incriminat-
No. 15-3144 5

ing statement to his mother at the Sheriff’s Office. Bryant’s 

counsel objected to this line of questioning during Detective 

Bauman’s testimony, raising the statutory violation. The 

objection was overruled. Bryant’s counsel did not reiterate 

the objection when Detective Whelan testified on the same 

subject.

As relevant here, the prosecution also called Alice 

Alcorn, a friend of Carol’s. She testified that Bryant told her 

he would kill Carol before he turned 18. This aspect of her 

testimony came as a surprise to everyone; Alcorn had not 

previously disclosed this information to the prosecution 

team.

Bryant’s defense at trial was to point the finger at Lee as 

the real killer. Bryant took the stand in his own defense and

told the jury that on the day of Carol’s disappearance, he left 

the house in the middle of lunch because she and Lee were 

fighting. He testified that he returned a short while later to 

find Lee standing over Carol’s dead body. Lee told him to 

“take care of this,” and Bryant left the home in Carol’s car 

with her body in the trunk. He admitted that he drove

around for several days with her body in the trunk before 

abandoning the car on the side of a road. He also admitted 

that he stole her jewelry, pawned some of it, and gave away 

the rest. Finally, he acknowledged that his relationship with 

his stepmother was strained and at times angry.

Before trial the judge had granted a defense motion to 

exclude evidence of Bryant’s threats and violence against his 

mother, Kristi. As Bryant’s testimony unfolded, the jury 

submitted a question asking why he went to live with his 

father. Bryant’s counsel objected based on the court’s pretrial 

ruling, and the judge sustained the objection.
6 No. 15-3144

The next day, however, during the direct examination of 

Bryant’s parole officer, Stephanie Ringer, defense counsel 

returned to this subject, asking Ringer why Bryant went to 

live with his father. She replied that his mother had kicked 

him out of her house because he stole her truck. Later when 

the defense called Kristi as a witness, the prosecutor crossexamined her about the other reasons why she kicked her 

son out—namely, that he had threatened her, chased her

with a baseball bat, and choked her. Over Bryant’s objection 

the judge allowed this line of questioning, ruling that the 

defense had opened the door by asking Ringer why Bryant 

went to live with his father.

Ringer also testified about Bryant’s prior convictions. 

During Bryant’s testimony, he had been impeached with his 

prior convictions; the defense team put the parole officer on 

the stand to supply some context. The jurors submitted a 

question asking what specific crimes he was on parole for. 

The question was allowed without objection. Ringer responded that he was on parole for theft, burglary, and a 

weapons offense.

The jury found Bryant guilty as charged. On direct appeal he challenged the admission of Kristi’s testimony about

his threats and violence toward her. He also challenged the 

admission of his incriminating statement to his mother

based on the detectives’ violation of his statutory right to 

meaningful consultation with a parent. 

The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected these arguments 

and affirmed. The court agreed with the trial judge that the 

defense had opened the door to Kristi’s testimony about her 

son’s violent behavior by asking Ringer why Bryant went to 

live with his father. The court reasoned that excluding this 
No. 15-3144 7

line of cross-examination would have left the jury with the 

false impression that Kristi kicked her son out solely because 

he had stolen her truck. The court also held that the covert 

recording of the conversation between Bryant and his mother violated his statutory right to parental consultation, so the

judge should have sustained the objection to the admission 

of Detective Bauman’s testimony about Bryant’s incriminating statement. But because the defense did not object to 

Detective Whelan’s identical testimony, the court held that 

the issue was waived, or at least not a reversible error. In 

other words, because Detective Bauman’s erroneously 

admitted testimony essentially duplicated Detective 

Whelan’s unchallenged testimony on the same subject, the 

error was both unpreserved and harmless.

Bryant then sought state postconviction relief based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel. He raised five alleged 

errors by his trial attorneys: (1) the failure to object to 

Detective Whelan’s testimony regarding his incriminating 

statement to his mother; (2) the failure to impeach Alcorn 

after she unexpectedly testified about his threat to kill Carol; 

(3) the failure to object to Ringer’s testimony regarding his

prior convictions; (4) opening the door to evidence about his 

violence and threats against his mother; and (5) the failure to 

interview Beemer, whose testimony regarding Lee’s abuse of 

Carol might have supported the defense that Lee was the 

killer. Bryant also asserted that Detective Bauman’s 

misleading police report about Beemer’s statement violated

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Finally, he argued that 

the combined effect of these errors warranted relief under 

the cumulative-error doctrine.
8 No. 15-3144

The trial judge rejected each of these claims, and the 

Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed. Bryant’s trial attorneys 

testified at the postconviction hearing that the challenged 

decisions could not be characterized as strategic trial judgments. The appellate court discounted this testimony as the 

product of hindsight bias and reasoned instead that the

decisions in question all dealt with matters of trial strategy. 

The court concluded that the performance of Bryant’s defense team was not objectively unreasonable when evaluated 

as of the time the decisions were made. 

For two of the five alleged errors, the appellate court also 

addressed the question of prejudice under Strickland. The 

court noted that the failure to object to Detective Whelan’s 

testimony about Bryant’s incriminating statement was not 

prejudicial in light of the abundant evidence of his guilt. The 

court also held that the failure to interview Beemer was not 

prejudicial because her testimony about Carol’s statements 

would have been inadmissible hearsay. 

The court rejected Bryant’s Brady claim as well, noting 

first that the prosecution had disclosed Detective Bauman’s 

report about his interview with Beemer, so the defense team

was aware that she was a potential witness and could have 

discovered her true account of Lee’s abuse. The court also 

held that because Beemer’s testimony about Carol’s statements to her would have been excluded as hearsay, the 

misleading police report was ultimately immaterial. And 

because there was no error at all, much less multiple errors, 

the court rejected Bryant’s claim of cumulative error. 

Bryant then moved for federal habeas relief under § 2254,

asserting the same Strickland and Brady claims. The district 

judge denied the motion, concluding that the state appellate 
No. 15-3144 9

court reasonably applied the Strickland standard to each of 

Bryant’s claims. The judge faulted the state court’s conclusion that the failure to interview Beemer was not deficient 

performance; that ruling, the judge thought, was unreasonable. But because the state court reasonably concluded that 

this error was not prejudicial, the judge found no basis for 

relief on any aspect of Bryant’s Strickland claim. The judge 

also concluded that the state appellate court reasonably 

applied Brady.

II. Discussion

The state courts adjudicated Bryant’s Strickland and Brady 

claims on the merits, so our review is governed by 

§ 2254(d)’s deferential standard. A federal habeas court may 

not grant relief unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law” or “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard requires the habeas 

petitioner to show that the state court’s ruling “was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Ward v. Neal, 835 F.3d 

698, 703 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The familiar Strickland standard for Sixth Amendment 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel considers whether 

counsel’s performance was deficient and, if so, whether the 

deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). The first step in this 
10 No. 15-3144

framework asks “whether, in light of all the circumstances, 

the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range 

of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. The 

prejudice inquiry asks whether there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

Because “[t]here are countless ways to provide effective 

assistance,” Strickland established a “strong presumption 

that counsel’s representation falls within a wide range of 

reasonable representation.” Hinesley v. Knight, 837 F.3d 721, 

732 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90). 

The deferential nature of the Strickland standard, combined 

with the deference owed state-court decisions under 

§ 2254(d), means that our review is “doubly deferential.” Id.

(quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)).

1. Failure to Preserve the Surreptitious-Recording Issue

The state appellate court held that counsel’s failure to object to Detective Whelan’s testimony about Bryant’s incriminating statement to his mother did not fall outside the range 

of competent representation. The court reasoned that the 

decision to make or withhold an objection is ordinarily a 

matter of trial strategy and often depends on factors unrelated to the merits—to avoid irritating the jury, for example, or

to refrain from highlighting unfavorable evidence or creating the impression that the defendant has something to hide.

The court also held that even if the failure to object fell below 

the constitutional standard, it was not prejudicial given the 

overwhelming evidence of Bryant’s guilt.

That was not an unreasonable way to resolve this aspect 

of Bryant’s Strickland claim. In hindsight the lack of an 
No. 15-3144 11

objection seems significant; after all, the appellate court said 

it was error to admit Bryant’s incriminating statement based 

on the detectives’ violation of his statutory right to parental 

consultation. But the court also found no reasonable probability of a different outcome, both because the error was 

ultimately harmless and the evidence of Bryant’s guilt was 

plentiful. The court’s no-prejudice ruling is well within the 

bounds of § 2254(d) reasonableness.

2. Failure to Impeach Alcorn

The state appellate court also reasonably concluded that 

the decision to forgo impeachment of Alice Alcorn was a 

matter of trial strategy. A “decision not to impeach a particular witness is normally considered a strategic choice within 

the discretion of counsel.” Jones v. Butler, 778 F.3d 575, 584 

(7th Cir. 2015). That is especially true here because it is far 

from clear that any impeachment would have been successful. Alcorn’s trial testimony about Bryant’s threat to kill Carol 

was a surprise to everyone. Her reasons for not reporting 

this to the prosecution team before trial were unknown. For 

all anyone knew, she may have had a good reason for not 

revealing this information sooner. And any impeachment 

attempt would have drawn more attention to this damaging 

testimony. Instead Bryant’s counsel limited his crossexamination to Alcorn’s knowledge of Lee’s abuse of Carol—

the foundation of Bryant’s primary defense theory. The state 

court reasonably characterized that approach as strategic 

and within the norms of professional competence.
12 No. 15-3144

3. Failure to Object to Ringer’s Testimony About 

Bryant’s Prior Convictions

Bryant’s counsel did not object to the jury’s inquiry during Ringer’s testimony about the specific crimes for which 

Bryant was on parole. Once again the state court held that 

this decision was a matter of trial strategy and not outside 

the range of competent representation. The court noted that 

it was important to avoid the appearance that Bryant had 

something to hide and to build the jury’s trust and receptiveness to Bryant’s version of events. These strategic goals

are especially strong in the face of a question posed by the 

jury itself. It was not unreasonable to conclude that counsel’s 

choice to withhold objection was within the range of professional competence.

4. Opening the Door to Kristi’s Testimony About 

Bryant’s Violent Behavior and Threats

Bryant’s defense team obtained a pretrial order excluding 

evidence of his violent behavior and threats against his 

mother. But this evidence came in anyway when the trial 

judge ruled that Bryant’s counsel had opened the door to it 

during Ringer’s direct examination. At the postconviction 

hearing, the attorney testified that she did not think her 

examination of Ringer opened the door. Evidence of Bryant’s 

criminal history and fraught relationships with his family 

was already before the jury through his own testimony; 

putting his parole agent on the stand was intended to provide some explanatory context. Counsel explained that at the 

time of trial, she did not think Ringer’s answer to the question about why Bryant was kicked out of his mother’s 

home—he had stolen her truck—would risk admission of his 

violent altercations with his mother.
No. 15-3144 13

Again, in hindsight this line of questioning was a mistake. But the state appellate court found it to be a reasonable 

strategic choice—not without risk certainly, but not outside 

the bounds of professional competence either. On § 2254(d) 

review, we cannot disturb a state-court judgment unless the

ruling was so far afield that no fair-minded jurist could find 

it reasonable. Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. We can’t say that about 

this ruling. A fair-minded judge could conclude that Bryant’s 

counsel reasonably thought that she could contain the scope 

of this line of questioning—in other words, that it was 

possible to put before the jury a partial explanation for why 

Bryant was kicked out of his mother’s house without risking 

admission of evidence of his more violent behaviors. Errors 

resulting from strategic miscalculations may fall within the 

wide range of competent representation. It was not unreasonable for the state appellate court to characterize counsel’s 

decision in that way.

5. Failure to Interview Beemer

Finally, the state appellate court concluded that the decision not to interview Tracy Beemer was not constitutionally 

deficient. A “heavy measure of deference” is owed to an 

attorney’s “particular decision not to investigate” certain 

witnesses. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. The state court gave the 

defense team the benefit of the doubt here. The court also 

found a lack of prejudice; even if Bryant’s counsel had 

interviewed Beemer, her testimony about Carol’s statements 

of spousal abuse would have been inadmissible hearsay. We 

see nothing unreasonable in this application of Strickland’s 

prejudice standard.

Before we move on, we pause to address a point Bryant 

raises about the testimony of his trial attorneys at the post-
14 No. 15-3144

conviction hearing. He makes much of the fact that both 

attorneys declined to characterize any of the challenged 

decisions as matters of trial strategy. But they also testified

that they were concerned about over-objecting and wanted 

to avoid creating the impression that Bryant had something 

to hide. These are aspects of trial strategy. 

More fundamentally, the Supreme Court has warned of 

the effects of hindsight bias in evaluating Strickland claims: 

“After an adverse verdict at trial even the most experienced 

counsel may find it difficult to resist asking whether a 

different strategy might have been better, and, in the course 

of that reflection, to magnify their own responsibility for an 

unfavorable outcome.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 109. But Strickland

“calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of 

counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective state of 

mind.” Id. That Bryant’s attorneys acknowledged making 

mistakes “merely [highlights] that the defense strategy did 

not work out as well as counsel had hoped, not that counsel 

was incompetent.” Id.

B. Brady Claim

The Brady rule holds that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request 

violates due process where the evidence is material either to 

guilt or to punishment.” 373 U.S. at 87. “Suppression” occurs 

when the prosecution “fail[s] to disclose evidence not otherwise available to a reasonably diligent defendant.” Jardine 

v. Dittmann, 658 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2011). And evidence is 

deemed “material” only when “a reasonable probability 

[exists] that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, 

the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
No. 15-3144 15

Bryant’s Brady claim centers on Detective Bauman’s police 

report about his interview with Tracy Beemer. The report 

stated that Beemer told him of Carol’s complaints about 

abuse by Bryant, when what she really said was that Carol 

had confided in her about abuse by Lee. The state appellate 

court held that Beemer’s actual statements were not suppressed in violation of Brady because they could have been 

discovered by trial counsel through reasonable diligence. 

The court also held that even if they were suppressed, the 

statements were not material because Beemer’s testimony 

about what Carol told her was inadmissible hearsay.

Bryant characterizes the first holding as an unreasonable 

application of Brady. Even if we agreed, the court reasonably 

rejected the claim on materiality grounds, so relief under 

§ 2254(d) is unwarranted. Bryant argues at length that 

Beemer’s testimony about what Carol told her would have 

been admissible under Indiana’s state-of-mind exception. See

IND. R. EVID. 803(3). But that’s a quarrel about the state 

court’s ruling on a matter of state law and not a basis for

§ 2254 habeas relief. Harper v. Brown, 865 F.3d 857, 861 (7th 

Cir. 2017).

Without Carol’s statements of spousal abuse, Beemer 

would have made a weak witness for the defense. It is not 

unreasonable to conclude that her residual testimony about

the phone calls she made to domestic-violence shelters 

would not have had much impact on this trial without its 

underlying foundation. Considering the mountain of evidence pointing to Bryant’s guilt, the state appellate court’s 

materiality ruling was well within the bounds of reason.
16 No. 15-3144

C. Cumulative Error

After resolving each of Bryant’s individual claims of error 

against him, the state court summarily rejected his argument 

about cumulative error. We do likewise.

AFFIRMED.