J-A10013-18  

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*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37  

DANA HARLEY AND PAUL P. BUTLER  

  v.  

RIDERS’ CLUB COOPERATIVE AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 

INSURANCE COMPANY  

 APPEAL OF: PAUL P. BUTLER 

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  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF            PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 3651 EDA 2017 

Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2017 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s):  2016-01325 

DANA HARLEY AND PAUL P. BUTLER 

   v. 

 RIDERS’ CLUB COOPERATIVE AND 

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY 

APPEAL OF: RIDERS’ CLUB 

COOPERATIVE 

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  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

           PENNSYLVANIA  

No. 3680 EDA 2017  

Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2017 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at No(s):  2016-01325 

BEFORE:  GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM*, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JUNE 21, 2018 

 Appellants, Paul P. Butler and Riders’ Club Cooperative (“RCC”), appeal 

from the order entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, 

which granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, State Farm Mutual 

Automobile Insurance Company, in this declaratory judgment action.  We 

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affirm.   

 In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant 

facts and procedural history.  Therefore, we have no need to restate them.  

We add that on November 2, 2017, Appellant Butler and Appellant RCC timely 

filed separate notices of appeal.  The trial court ordered Appellant RCC on 

November 8, 2017, and Appellant Butler on November 9, 2017, to file 

respective concise statements of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b); both Appellants timely complied on November 29, 2017.  This Court 

consolidated the appeals on February 16, 2018.   

 Appellant Butler raises one issue for our review: 

WHEN A MEMBER PARTICIPANT OF A RIDESHARING 

ARRANGEMENT IS OPERATING A VEHICLE AS PART OF THE ARRANGEMENT AS DEFINED IN THE [RIDESHARING 

ARRANGEMENTS] ACT, 55 P.S. § 695.1 ET SEQ....AND IS INVOLVED IN AN ACCIDENT MAY THE MEMBER’S 

INSURANCE COMPANY ENFORCE A HIRED CAR EXCLUSION TO DENY COVERAGE TO THE MEMBER AND THOSE WHO 

CLAIM INJURY ARISING OUT OF THE ACCIDENT, WHEN THE AFORESAID [RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS] ACT 

SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT SUCH EXCLUSIONS SHALL 

NOT APPLY TO A VEHICLE USED IN A RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENT[?] 

 (Appellant Butler’s Brief at 5). 

  Appellant RCC raises two issues for our review: 

 WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED/ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION IN DENYING [APPELLANT RCC]’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND HOLDING THAT THE VEHICLE IN 

WHICH THE ACCIDENT AT ISSUE OCCURRED COULD NOT BE DEEMED TO BE “OPERATED BY” [APPELLANT RCC], SO 

AS TO BRING IT WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS ACT, 55 [P.S.] § 695.1 ET 

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SEQ., BECAUSE THE MEMBER-DRIVER OPERATING THE VEHICLE WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, AND NOT 

AN EMPLOYEE OF [APPELLANT RCC], IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY STATUTORY LANGUAGE OR CASE AUTHORITY 

DICTATING SUCH A CONCLUSION?  

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED/ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING [APPELLANT RCC]’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND HOLDING THAT THE EXCLUSION FOR “CAR FOR HIRE” SITUATIONS IN [APPELLANT 

BUTLER’S] STATE FARM INSURANCE POLICY IS ENFORCEABLE, NOTWITHSTANDING CLEAR LANGUAGE IN 

THE RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENTS ACT, 55 [P.S.] § 695.5, THAT “PROVISIONS IN AN INSURANCE POLICY 

WHICH DENY COVERAGE FOR ANY MOTOR VEHICLE USED 

FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES OR AS A PUBLIC OR LIVERY CONVEYANCE SHALL NOT APPLY TO A VEHICLE USED IN A 

RIDESHARING ARRANGEMENT”?  

(Appellant RCC’s Brief at 4). 

Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment requires 

us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law.  Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 908 A.2d 344, 347 

(Pa.Super. 2006).   

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on 

facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration.  Consequently, the court abuses its 

discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking 

reason.  Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it does not follow legal procedure. 

 Miller v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 753 A.2d 829, 832 (Pa.Super. 2000) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Our scope of review is 

plenary.  Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa. 407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001), 

cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct. 2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002).  In 

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reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, 

[W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists 

a genuine issue of material fact.  We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts 

as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.  Only where there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law will summary judgment be entered.  All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be 

resolved against the moving party.    

Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly 

implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of action.  Summary judgment is proper if, after the 

completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will 

bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or 

defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury.  In other words, whenever there is no 

genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense, which could be established 

by additional discovery or expert report and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary 

judgment is appropriate.  Thus, a record that supports summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are 

undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to 

make out a prima facie cause of action or defense.    

Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions.   

 Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).   

 After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Steven C. 

Tolliver, Sr., we conclude Appellants’ issues merit no relief.  The trial court 

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opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented.  (See Trial Court Opinion, filed October 4, 2017, at 8-15) (finding: 

sole consideration is whether Appellant Butler was acting as independent 

contractor at time of accident; Appellant Butler was not officer or employee of 

Appellant RCC; Appellant Butler’s membership in Appellant RCC is irrelevant 

to whether Appellant Butler acted as agent or independent contractor of 

Appellant RCC; Appellant Butler’s actions as independent contractor cannot be 

imputed to Appellant RCC; Appellant RCC did not operate Appellant Butler’s 

vehicle via directives to or communications with Appellant Butler; Appellant 

RCC’s only role was to ask Appellant Butler if he was available to drive Mses. 

McDonald and Harley to specific location on specific date at specific time for 

fee; Appellant RCC did not dictate routes and/or speed or any other aspect of 

incident; Appellant RCC had no other role except to collect and distribute fees 

paid for ride; Appellant RCC’s Member Agreement, Additional Memorandum of 

Understanding, payment structure, and lack of control over activities of 

member drivers all indicate drivers are independent contractors; drivers’ 

independent contractor status shields Appellant RCC from liability in event of 

accident; Appellant RCC designed its service to avoid potential legal liabilities, 

including respondeat superior tort liability, obligation to pay payroll taxes, and 

other responsibilities flowing from master-servant relationship; because 

Appellant RCC’s arrangement with Appellant Butler did not constitute 

ridesharing agreement within meaning of Ridesharing Arrangements Act, “car 

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for hire” unambiguous exclusion in Appellee’s automobile insurance policy 

applies in these circumstances to deny coverage and is enforceable; Appellee 

is legally permitted to disclaim coverage for accident and is entitled to 

summary judgment).  The record supports the trial court’s rationale, and we 

see no reason to disturb it.  Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial 

court opinion.   

 Order affirmed.   

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 6/21/18