Filed 8/20/20 3558 Sagunto Street, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

3558 SAGUNTO STREET, 

LLC,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA 

BARBARA,

 Defendant and Respondent.

2d Civil No. B297383

(Super. Ct. No. 15CV00606)

(Santa Barbara County)

Appellant 3558 Sagunto Street, LLC is the owner of 

property at 3558 Sagunto Street in Santa Ynez (Sagunto 

Property). After a dispute with an adjoining property owner 

(Edison Property) regarding parking spaces, appellant placed 

“reserved” signs on and blocked access to parking spaces located 

in front of the Sagunto Property. 

The County of Santa Barbara (County) issued a 

notice of violation to appellant for restricting parking in violation 

of the Development Plan applicable to the property (88-DP-14) 
2

(Development Plan). Appellant filed a complaint alleging the 

Development Plan did not apply to the Sagunto Property. The 

trial court found otherwise and entered judgment in favor of the 

County. We affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Tom and Joan Bohlinger (Bohlingers) owned the 

Sagunto and Edison Properties. In 1977, they built a commercial 

building on the Sagunto Property, leaving the Edison Property 

undeveloped. In 1988, the Bohlingers submitted an application 

for approval of the Development Plan. The Development Plan 

included “facelifting the exterior of the existing building” on the 

Sagunto Property “and the addition of 6,040 square feet of new 

commercial space” on the Edison Property. The application noted

there were 11 existing parking spaces, with a plan to build 11 

more, for a total of 22 onsite parking spaces. 

In July 1988, the County’s Planning Commission 

approved the Development Plan with conditions, including the 

following: “The use of the property, size, shape, arrangement, 

and location of the buildings, walkways, parking areas, and 

landscaped areas shall be developed in substantial conformity 

with the approved development plan marked Planning 

Commission [Attachment] A . . . Substantial conformity shall be 

determined by the Director of the Resource Management 

Department. In the event of disagreement, such a determination 

shall be made by the Planning Commission.” Attachment A was

a “Site Plan and Ground Floor Plan,” which depicted the project 

site incorporating both the Sagunto and the Edison Properties, 

including 22 parking spaces.

In 1996, the Bohlingers recorded a Declaration of 

Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions Concerning Private 
3

Reciprocal Parking (CC&Rs). The purpose of the CC&Rs was to 

“provide for reciprocal parking on each parcel for the benefit of 

both improved legal parcels.” The CC&Rs identified the property 

as “two (2) contiguous legal parcels, each containing parking 

areas, . . . with all parking spaces adequate in size per the 

Development Plan by the County.” The CC&Rs identified the 

“contiguous parcels” by the Sagunto and Edison Properties’ 

Assessor’s Parcel Number (APN). The CC&Rs stated that “no 

reserved parking or hedge, fence, wall or similar barrier may be 

placed, installed or constructed on either parcel if the reserved 

parking or barrier would block or otherwise interfere with the 

primary objective of [the CC&Rs] to provide full reciprocal 

parking.” The CC&Rs were to “run[] with the land” and were

“binding on the successor owners thereof.” 

In 1996, the Bohlingers sold the Sagunto Property to

Jon and Kathryn (Bowens). The Bowens recorded a Notice of

Consent to Use Land. The notice stated that “Bohlinger

developed and improved both [the Sagunto and Edison] 

properties generally conforming to a Development Plan (88-DP14) approved by the County of Santa Barbara on July 21, 1988.” 

In 2007, appellant purchased the Sagunto Property. 

At the time of the purchase, the title report referenced both the 

CC&Rs and the Notice of Consent to Use Land as “exceptions” to 

title. 

In 2008, appellant installed “reserved” signs on 

parking spaces on the Sagunto Property. In 2013, it blocked 

access to the parking spaces that were marked “reserved” on the 

Sagunto Property. 

In 2015, County officials sent a Notice of Violation to 

the owners of the Sagunto and Edison Properties, stating that the 
4

“chains/barriers . . . placed in front of” parking spaces on the 

Sagunto Property violated the Development Plan and the County 

Land Use and Development Code. The Notice of Violation noted 

that the “investigation revealed that [the Edison Property] was 

included in the approved [Attachment A] which depicts the 

boundaries of [the Sagunto Property] and [the Edison Property] 

and incorporates their combined area into a single development.” 

“The alteration of the approved parking configuration and the 

loss or the selective availability of parking spaces violated the 

conditions of the operating Development Plan.” 

Superior Court Proceedings

Appellant filed a complaint against the County for 

declaratory and injunctive relief. It alleged that the Development 

Plan did not apply to the Sagunto Property. It sought a 

“declaratory order that [the County] may not enforce the 

development plan against [appellant] and an injunction 

prohibiting [the County] from enforcing the development plan 

against [appellant].” 

The County filed a demurrer, arguing that appellant 

did not exhaust its administrative remedies and there was no 

final order or decision with respect to the Notice of Violation. 

The trial court stayed the superior court case until the County 

completed the administrative process. 

In April 2016, the County filed a Notice of 

Determination, finding that the Development Plan applied to 

both the Sagunto and Edison Properties and that both properties 

were in violation of the Development Plan’s parking 

requirements. The County imposed a $300 fine. Appellant 

appealed the Notice of Determination to the Planning and 

Development Director. Following a hearing, the hearing 
5

examiner found that the Development Plan applied to the 

Sagunto Property. The examiner found that a review of the 

Development Plan files “clearly include the Sagunto Property 

within the permit limits.” 

Appellant filed a first amended complaint which 

added a cause of action challenging the administrative decision. 

This cause of action was bifurcated from the remaining causes of 

action for declaratory and injunctive relief. 

The trial court conducted a de novo review of the 

final administrative decision pursuant to Government Code 

section 53069.4. It determined that the Development Plan 

applied to the Sagunto Property. The court found the 

administrative record “clearly establishes that the site plan 

labeled ‘Attachment A’ to the Development Plan supports the 

applicants’ intent that the ‘Bohlinger Commercial Addition’

encompassed both [the Sagunto and Edison Properties].”

Moreover, in light of the “transactional history of [the] adjoining 

parcels,” the court found that, “at a minimum, constructive notice 

pursuant to Civil Code [section] 1213, has been provided to 

subsequent purchasers of each of these parcels that Development 

Plan 88-DP-14 and the conditions contained within it, apply to 

both parcels.” The court noted that the Notice of Consent to Use 

Land and the CC&Rs referenced the Development Plan, and the 

title report listed these two documents as “exceptions” to the 

Sagunto Property title. 

Appellant subsequently filed a second amended 

complaint. The parties stipulated that the first cause of action 

regarding the administrative decision “had already been 

decided,” but was included again in the second amended 

complaint to preserve “appellate rights” on that cause of action.
6

Appellant also added a fourth cause of action for inverse 

condemnation against the County and the owners of the Edison 

Property. It alleged that the County “effectively approved 

Edison’s over-leasing” of parking spaces when the County ruled 

that appellant violated the Development Plan. 

The County demurred to the declaratory relief, 

injunctive relief, and inverse condemnation causes of action. The 

trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. It

found there was no “taking” to support the inverse condemnation 

cause of action. The demurrer to the declaratory and injunctive 

relief causes of action were “sustained on the ground that those 

causes of action fail with the substantive causes of action for [the 

appeal of the administrative decision] and Inverse 

Condemnation.” The court entered final judgment in favor of the 

County on all causes of action. 

DISCUSSION

Administrative Decision

Sagunto contends the trial court erred when it upheld 

the County’s administrative decision that the Development Plan 

applied to the Sagunto Property. We disagree. 

Following a final administrative decision, a party 

“may seek review by filing an appeal to be heard by the superior 

court, where the same shall be heard de novo, except that the 

contents of the local agency’s files shall be received into 

evidence.” (Gov. Code, § 53069.4, subd. (b).) In interpreting the

Development Plan, we apply the same standard of review 

employed in interpreting contracts and review de novo. (See Bear 

Creek Planning Committee v. Ferwerda (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 

1178, 1183; National City Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of National 

City (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1278 (National City).) 
7

In interpreting the Development Plan, we ascertain 

the intent of the parties as it existed at the time the plan was 

approved. (See National City, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279.) 

We first look to the plain language of the Development Plan and 

the documents related to its approval. We consider these 

documents “as a whole and construe the language in the context, 

rather than interpret a provision in isolation.” (Westrec Marina 

Management, Inc. v. Arrowood Indemnity Co. (2008) 163 

Cal.App.4th 1387, 1392 (Westrec).) 

Here, the plain language of both the Development 

Plan and the approval documents show that the County and the 

Bohlingers intended the plan to apply to both properties. 

Bohlingers’ application for the Development Plan shows this 

intent. (Sports Arenas Properties, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1985) 

40 Cal.3d 808, 815-816 [a permit must be interpreted “in light of 

the application for it”].) In the application, the Bohlingers

explained the Development Plan consisted of “facelifting the 

exterior of the building” on the Sagunto Property and “the 

addition of 6,040 square feet of new commercial space” on the 

Edison Property. The Bohlingers submitted statistical 

information, which included the combined square footage of the 

structures, building coverage, parking, and landscaping for both 

properties. The application also indicated that there was an 

“existing commercial building” “on the [Sagunto] property” that 

would be retained in the Development Plan. 

The Planning Commission Staff Report and 

Recommendation further supports our conclusion. The project 

description stated that the “applicant is proposing a 6,240 square 

foot commercial/office addition to an existing 4,000 square foot 

building.” The report stated the Development Plan consisted of 
8

total structures of 10,240 square feet and a total area of 20,000 

square feet, which is the combined square footage of both 

properties. The report also stated the Development Plan 

included 22 parking spaces, which was the combined number of 

spaces on both properties. The report included Attachment A, 

which shows both the properties as part of the development site. 

The Planning Commission’s approval shows that the 

County intended the Development Plan to incorporate the 

Sagunto Property. The approval set forth several conditions, 

including that the “use, size . . . location of buildings, walkways, 

parking areas . . . shall be developed in substantial conformity 

with the approved development plan marked [Attachment A],” 

which included both properties. 

Appellant contends the Development Plan did not 

apply to the Sagunto Property because the documents do not 

reference the Sagunto Property’s APN. But in construing these 

documents “as a whole,” it is apparent that the Bohlingers and 

the County intended the Development Plan to apply to both 

properties. (Westrec, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1392.) 

Appellant also contends it lacked adequate notice 

that the Development Plan applied to the Sagunto Property. But, 

as the trial court properly found, appellant had “constructive 

notice” when it purchased the property. The title report 

specifically referenced the CC&Rs and the Notice of Consent to 

Use Land as “exceptions” to the Sagunto Property title. Both 

documents indicated that the Development Plan applied to the 

Sagunto Property. 

Demurrer

Appellant contends the trial court erred when it 

sustained the demurrer without leave to amend the declaratory 
9

and injunctive relief and inverse condemnation causes of action. 

We disagree. 

We independently review the order sustaining the

demurrer, accepting the truth of material facts properly pleaded 

but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law.

(Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 

924.) A demurrer should be sustained where the complaint fails 

to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action, or discloses a 

defense that would bar recovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 

430.10; Balikov v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 

816, 819-820.) “A judgment of dismissal after a demurrer has 

been sustained without leave to amend will be affirmed if proper 

on any grounds stated in the demurrer, whether or not the court 

acted on that ground.” (Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 

324.)

The trial court properly sustained the demurrer to

the inverse condemnation cause of action because appellant has 

not shown the County’s action constitutes a “taking.” For a 

taking to occur, there must be “an invasion or an appropriation of 

some valuable property right which the landowner possesses and 

the invasion or appropriation must directly and specially affect 

the landowner to his injury.” (Selby Realty Co. v. City of San

Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 119-120; see also Golden

Gate Water Ski Club v. County of Contra Costa (2008) 165 

Cal.App.4th 249, 267 (Golden Gate Water Ski Club).)

“‘“Regulations regarding and restrictions upon the use of property 

in an exercise of the police power for an authorized purpose, do 

not constitute the taking of property without compensation or 

give rise to constitutional cause for complaint.”’ [Citation.]” 

(Golden Gate Water Ski Club, at p. 267.)
10

In Golden Gate Water Ski Club, supra, 165 

Cal.App.4th at pages 253-254, the plaintiff built unpermitted

structures on property that was designated “open space” for

which land use permits were required. Contra Costa County

issued a notice of violation and ordered the removal of all 

structures that were built on the property without permits. (Id. 

at pp. 254-255.) The plaintiff sued Contra Costa County, arguing 

the abatement order constituted a taking. 

The Court of Appeal held that there was no taking 

because the plaintiff “never had a property right to develop [the 

property] in violation of [Contra Costa] County’s land use 

requirements.” (Golden Gate Water Ski Club, supra, 165 

Cal.App.4th at p. 267.) Thus, Contra Costa County’s action to 

enforce the permit restrictions was not a taking. (Ibid.) 

Similarly, appellant did not have property rights to block access 

to the parking spaces on the Sagunto and Edison properties in 

violation of the Development Plan. (Ibid.) 

Appellant contends the County’s action effectively 

permitted the Edison Property owners to overlease parking and 

was thus tantamount to a taking. This argument lacks merit. 

Here, the County enforced the Development Plan, which required 

22 unrestricted parking spaces; it did not give the Edison 

Property owners rights over all the parking spaces. To the extent 

appellant alleges the County’s failure to take an enforcement 

action against the Edison Property for overleasing constituted a 

taking, we reject this argument. “[A]bsence of the enforcement of 

a particular restrictive covenant against another owner’s 

property” does not amount to “a governmental expropriation of 

one’s own property.” (Barrett v. Dawson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 

1048, 1054, original italics.)
11

The trial court properly sustained the demurrer to

the declaratory and injunctive relief causes of action. Appellant 

seeks an order (2) declaring that the “Development Plan does not 

apply to the Sagunto Property”; and (2) enjoining the County

from “taking any action to apply the Development Plan to the 

Sagunto Property” and “from assessing any fines or taking any 

other action against [appellant] for having installed the reserved 

parking signs and chains.” But this relief is “wholly derivative” 

of appellant’s other causes of action. In light of our conclusion 

that the Development Plan applies to the Sagunto Property and 

that there was no governmental taking, “there are no grounds for 

granting an injunction or declaratory relief.” (Ochs v. PacifiCare 

of California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 782, 794 (Ochs).)1

Leave to Amend

Appellant also contends the trial court erred when it 

did not grant it leave to amend the complaint. We review the 

court’s order for abuse of discretion, “which is demonstrated if 

there is a reasonable possibility that the pleading court could be

cured by amendment.” (Ochs, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 796.) 

“The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the pleading can be 

cured, but may make this showing for the first time on appeal.” 

(Ibid.) Appellant has not carried its burden to show that the 

pleading could be cured by an amendment. The trial court did 

not abuse its discretion when it denied leave to amend. 

1 Appellant’s request for judicial notice filed on July 2, 

2020, is denied. 
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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The County shall recover 

costs on appeal. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.
Timothy J. Staffel, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Cappello & Noel, A. Barry Cappello and David L. 

Cousineau, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Amber Holderness, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Defendant and Respondent.