21-6291

Jin-Lian v. Garland

BIA

Conroy, IJ

A206 636 124

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 12 3 th day of July, two thousand twenty4 three.

5

6 PRESENT:

7 JON O. NEWMAN,

8 SUSAN L. CARNEY,

9 JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

10 Circuit Judges.

11 _____________________________________

12

13 LIU JIN-LIAN,

14 Petitioner,

15

16 v. 21-6291

17 NAC

18 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

19 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

20 Respondent.

21 _____________________________________

22

23 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York, NY.
2

1 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant

2 Attorney General; Russell J. E. Verby, Senior 

3 Litigation Counsel; John D. Williams, Senior 

4 Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration 

5 Litigation, United States Department of 

6 Justice, Washington, DC.

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

8 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

9 DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10 Petitioner Liu Jin-Lian, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of 

11 China, seeks review of an April 30, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming an October 

12 9, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for 

13 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

14 (“CAT”). In re Liu Jin-Lian, No. A 206 636 124 (B.I.A. Apr. 30, 2021), aff’g No. A

15 206 636 124 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 9, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity 

16 with the underlying facts and procedural history.

17 Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s

18 opinions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 

19 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review adverse credibility determinations “under

20 the substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 

21 2018), and treat the agency’s fact-finding as “conclusive unless any reasonable 
3

1 adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. 

2 § 1252(b)(4)(B). 

3 “Considering the totality of the circumstances . . . a trier of fact may base a 

4 credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the 

5 applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and 

6 oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the 

7 consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard to 

8 whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the 

9 applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

10 “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the 

11 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an 

12 adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 

13 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Liu alleged that she was arrested and 

14 detained in China for attending an underground Christian church. Substantial 

15 evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination. 

16 We defer to the IJ’s demeanor finding, particularly where, as here, it is 

17 linked to inconsistent testimony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Li Hua Lin v. U.S. 

18 Dep’t of Just., 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We can be . . . confident in our review 
4

1 of observations about an applicant’s demeanor where, as here, they are supported 

2 by specific examples of inconsistent testimony.”). Liu was unresponsive and 

3 evasive during much of her testimony, including when asked if she had applied 

4 for a U.S. visa in 2008, years before her alleged persecution. Although she argues 

5 that the questions were confusing, she did not express such confusion before the 

6 IJ or on appeal to the BIA, and the record reflects straightforward questions about 

7 the visa application. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 480 F.3d 104, 122–23 (2d 

8 Cir. 2007) (explaining that “usually . . . issues not raised to the BIA will not be 

9 examined by the reviewing court”); Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 

10 2005) (noting that an IJ “is in the best position to discern, often at a glance, whether 

11 a question that may appear poorly worded on a printed page was, in fact, 

12 confusing or well understood by those who heard it”).

13 The adverse credibility determination was further bolstered by 

14 inconsistencies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Liu first testified that she never 

15 applied for a visa, but changed her testimony when confronted with the

16 application. Nor does she contest that her 2008 visa application stated that her 

17 husband was in China, which was inconsistent with her testimony that he has been

18 in the United States since 2005. Liu’s argument that she forgot that she applied 
5

1 for a visa is not compelling. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80 (“A petitioner must do more 

2 than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; 

3 he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his 

4 testimony.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

5 The agency also reasonably concluded that the lack of reliable corroboration 

6 further undermined Liu’s credibility. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 

7 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear 

8 on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant 

9 unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.”). The 

10 IJ did not err in relying on the lack of an affidavit or testimony from Liu’s husband 

11 because he was in the United States and would directly benefit from a grant of 

12 asylum. See Yan Juan Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2011). And the IJ 

13 did not err in giving limited weight to a letter from Liu’s mother who was an 

14 interested party who was not available for cross-examination. See Likai Gao v. 

15 Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (upholding an IJ’s decision to afford limited 

16 weight to letter from spouse and friend in China); Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 

17 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We defer to the agency’s determination of the weight afforded to 

18 an alien’s documentary evidence.”). 
6

1 In sum, the demeanor finding, the inconsistencies, and the lack of reliable 

2 corroboration provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility 

3 determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The 

4 adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of 

5 removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief are based on the same 

6 discredited factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 

7 2006).

8 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 

9 motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

10 FOR THE COURT: 

11 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

12 Clerk of Court

13