O pinion i ssued June 13 , 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

NO . 01
- 13
- 0 0 428
- CV

____________ D. PATRICK SMITHERMAN , Appellant

V. COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE , Appellee
On Appeal from the 129th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca u se No. 2010
- 10256

MEMORANDUM O PINION This is an attempted appeal from an interlocutory order finding that appellant, D. Patrick Smitherman, committed professional misconduct as defined by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct

. Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har

- Con Corp ., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.2

2001). Interlocutory orders may be appeale d only if authoriz ed by statute. Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson , 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001)

. Here, t he record reveals that no final judgment has been entered in this pending case. The order signed by the trial court explicitly states that it is not final, and indicates that a final judgment will be entered after the trial court holds a separate sanctions hearing, as permitted by the Texas Rule s of Disciplinary Procedure. See T EX
. R. D ISCIPL INARY P. 3.09 (after a finding of professional misconduct, the trial court determines the appropriate sanction or sanctions) , reprinted in T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. , tit. 2, subtit. G app. (West 2013 ) , 3.10 ( trial court may, in its discretion, conduct a separate hearing and receive evidence as to the appropriate s anctions to be imposed ) , reprinted in T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. , tit. 2, subtit. G app. (West 2013 ).
On May 24, 2013 , the Court notified the parties of its intent to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction unless appellant filed a response demonstrating t his court’s jurisdiction on or before June 3, 2013

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.3( a). Appellant responded, arguing among other things that because Texas Rule of Disciplinary Procedure 3.10 authorizes the trial court to hold a separate hearing regarding sanctions, sanctions are not required to be included in a judgment from a disciplinary proceeding in order for that judgment to be final

. See T EX
. R.3

D ISCIPLINARY P. 3.10. Appellant states that “a sanction is merely a way to enforce a final judgment in the context of attorney disciplinary matters” and that a sanction is “akin to an abstract of judgment or some type of post

- judgment writ.” He asserts that a sanctions hearing in the attorney disciplinary context is “a post

- judgment proceeding, separate and apart from the act of making a judgment on underlying claims final.” He further argues that the interlocutory order “disposed of the is sues for which the trial proceeding was brought , ” and therefore should be appealable. To the contrary, sanctions are a necessary part of the final judgment in disciplinary proceeding s where there has been a finding of professional misconduct.
See T EX
. R. D ISCIPLINARY P. 3.09 (after a finding of professional misconduct, the trial court shall determine the appropriate sanction or sanctions). In order for a judgment from a disciplinary proceeding to be final, the order must actually dispose of every pending claim and party or unequivocally state that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties

. See Lehman , 39 S.W.3d at 205; see also T EX
. R.
D ISCIPLINARY P. 3.16 , reprinted in T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN
. , tit. 2, subtit. G app. (West 2013 ) (“A final judgment of the district court . . . may be appealed as in civil cases generally

. ”)

. Here, in its petition, the Commission for Lawyer Discipline sought a finding that appellant committed professional misconduct and sought various forms of rel ief, including sanctions. The interlocutory order only makes4

findings regarding professional misconduct, and explicitly states that a separate hearing will be held to determine sanctions , as permitted by the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. See T EX
. R. D ISCIPLINARY P. 3.10. Accordingly, until the trial court has made a determination regarding sanctions , there is no final judgment in the underlying trial court cause. See T EX
. R. D ISCIPLINARY P. 3.09 , 3.10. W e have found no authority supporting appellant’s claims that sanctions are merely a way to enforce a final judgment in a disciplinary proceeding or that a sanctions hearing in a disciplinary proceeding is a post

- judgment proceeding

. Likewise, appellant’s claim that the interlocutory order di sposes of the “ issues for which the trial proceeding was brought” ignores the fact that sanctions are part of the relief sought by the Commission in its petition , and that the trial court explicitly noted in the interlocutory order that a separate hearing on sanctions would be held prior to the execution of a final judgment , as permitted

. Appellant’s response does not demonstrate grounds for continuing this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See T EX
. R.
A PP
. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). We dismiss any other pending motions as moot.
P ER CURI A M Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Brown, and Huddle

.