readministration. Appellant argues that, while the exact reasons for 

reopening the bankruptcy proceedings are unclear, it is possible that the 

trustee will seek to revoke the abandonment and bring the property back 

into the bankruptcy estate. 

Since the property at issue in this appeal was abandoned by 

the bankruptcy trustee, it is not currently property of the estate. See In re 

Hermosillo, 375 B.R. 20, 25 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (recognizing that 

property abandoned by the bankruptcy trustee was no longer a part of the 

bankruptcy estate). As a result, we conclude that the automatic stay does 

not prevent the continuation of this appeal. See 11 U .S.0 § 362(a) (2012) 

(providing that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates to stay, 

automatically, the continuation of any judicial action against the 

bankruptcy debtor and various other acts with respect to property of the 

estates). Thus, no action will be taken on the notice. 

Motion to dismiss 

Appellant filed its first notice of appeal in the district court on 

April 17, 2013, challenging an interlocutory order dismissing its 

counterclaims. That appeal was docketed as Jess Arndell Construction Co. 

v. Mogul 41 Lots, Docket No. 63029. On October 8, 2013, the district court 

entered a final judgment dismissing the entire action below. Notice of the 

October 8 judgment's entry was served electronically that same day, but 

no notice of appeal from the October 8 judgment was filed. Shortly 

thereafter, appellant's appeal in Docket No. 63029 was dismissed for lack 

of jurisdiction, and remittitur issued on November 25, 2013. After 

remittitur was received by the district court two days later, appellant filed 

a motion in the district court seeking reentry of the October 8 final 

judgment on the basis that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the 

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matter while the appeal was pending. That motion was granted in a 

March 19, 2014, order, and appellant then filed this appeal from the 

March 19 order. In its motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction, respondent argues that the October 8 judgment was the final 

judgment and that appellant's April 18, 2014, notice of appeal was thus 

untimely. Appellant maintains that the district court lacked jurisdiction 

to enter the October 8 judgment, rendering the October 8 judgment void. 

In Buffington v. State, a criminal case, we recognized that this 

court retains sole jurisdiction over a matter on appeal until remittitur 

issues transferring jurisdiction back to the district court. 110 Nev. 124, 

126, 868 P.2d 643, 644 (1994) (citing NRS 177.155 and NRS 177.305). 

Four years later, however, we further explained in Dickerson v. State that 

when remittitur issues in an appeal over which we lack jurisdiction, its 

purpose is not to transfer jurisdiction back to the district court but to 

notify the district court that the notice of appeal did not divest it of 

jurisdiction in the first place. 114 Nev. 1084, 1087, 967 P.2d 1132, 1134 

(1998). Moreover, our opinions in the civil context have long recognized 

that notices of appeal from nonappealable orders do not divest the district 

court of jurisdiction. See Rust v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 688, 

747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987) (explaining that the proper and timely filing of 

a notice of appeal is jurisdictional); Knox v. Dick, 99 Nev. 514, 516, 665 

P.2d 267, 269 (1983) ("An appeal from a non-appealable order does not 

divest the trial court of jurisdiction."); Wilmurth v. Dist. Court, 80 Nev. 

337, 340-41, 393 P.2d 302, 303 (1964) (same); see also NRAP 4(a)(6) ("A 

premature notice of appeal does not divest the district court of 

jurisdiction."). Therefore, the October 8 judgment was proper and 

constituted the final judgment in the case below, appealable under NRAP 

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3A(b)(1), and appellant's failure to timely appeal from that judgment 

renders this court without jurisdiction. NRAP 4(a)(1); cf. Campos-Garcia 

u. Johnson, 130 Nev. , 31 P.3d 890, 890 (2014) ("[A]n appeal must 

be taken from an appealable order when first entered; superfluous or 

duplicative orders and judgments—those filed after an appealable order 

has been entered that do nothing more than repeat the contents of that 

order—are not appealable."). Accordingly, we grant respondent's motion 

and 

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED. 

J. 

Ptickering 

Pitim 

eribOaare., , J. 

Parra irre 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. Brent T. Adams, District Judge 

Charles R. Kozak 

Walsh, Baker & Rosevear, P.C. 

Early Sullivan Wright Gizer & McRae, LLP 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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