COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

DEBORAH A. WILLIAMS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2443-97-1 JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

 JUNE 30, 1998 

WILEY D. WILLIAMS 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

John K. Moore, Judge 

 Carl W. Isbrandtsen (Carl W. Isbrandtsen, P.C., 

 on briefs), for appellant. 

 Moody E. Stallings, Jr. (Kevin E. Martingayle; 

Stallings & Richardson, P.C., on brief), for 

appellee. 

 In this appeal from a decree of divorce entered by the 

Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach (trial court), 

Deborah A. Williams (wife) contends the trial court 

(1) erroneously classified common stock of B. R. Williams & Son, 

Inc. (the company), registered in the name of Wiley D. Williams 

(husband), as separate property, or, in the alternative, 

(2) erroneously classified as separate property real estate known 

as Lot 72, Section 6, Corova (Lot 72), and (3) erroneously valued 

husband's interest in real property known as Mandan Road. 

Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

 As the parties are familiar with the record, we state only 

those facts necessary to an understanding of this opinion. In 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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doing so, we separately discuss the applicable facts relating to 

the issues raised and view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party below. The evidence was heard 

by a commissioner in chancery, to whom the matter was referred by 

the trial court. 

 Pursuant to Code § 20-107.3, the trial court is authorized 

to make monetary awards. See Day v. Day, 8 Va. App. 346, 349, 

381 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1989). The trial court's findings are 

presumed correct on appeal and are given "great weight" by this 

Court. See Rowe v. Rowe, 24 Va. App. 123, 140, 480 S.E.2d 760, 

768 (1997) (quoting Panlock v. Gallop, 207 Va. 989, 994, 154 

S.E.2d 153, 157 (1967)). The party who asserts the trial court 

erred in making such findings "is required to overcome the 

presumption by record proof." Broom v. Broom, 15 Va. App. 497, 

504, 425 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1992). Therefore, in reviewing the 

record and wife's claims, we must accord great deference to the 

trial court's findings, and its judgment will not be disturbed 

unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. See, 

e.g., Keyser v. Keyser, 7 Va. App. 405, 409, 374 S.E.2d 698, 701 

(1988) (citing Code § 8.01-680). 

Stock of B. R. Williams & Son, Inc.

 Husband and his parents formed the company in 1972, prior to 

husband's marriage to wife. Husband, his father, and his mother 

each received one-third of the outstanding shares of the 

company's stock. Upon his father's death in 1982, husband 
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inherited his father's one-third share in the company. 

Subsequently, husband's mother loaned the company a total of 

$85,000, which has never been repaid. 

 In 1986, husband and wife borrowed and advanced $4,500 to 

the company, which, with $16,500 of the company's money, was used 

to purchase two real estate lots in Currituck, North Carolina, 

identified as Lot 72, Section 6 (Lot 72), and Lot 6, Section 4 

(Lot 6). Husband's original intent was to title each lot in the 

company's name; however, "during closing," at which wife was not 

present, husband directed Lot 6 be titled jointly to him and wife 

and Lot 72 be titled in the company's name only. Wife testified 

she was unaware Lot 72 had not also been titled jointly in the 

parties' names. 

 The commissioner accepted husband's testimony that Lot 72 

was intended to be corporate property and recommended it be 

declared separate property owned solely by the company and valued 

at $41,282. Wife claimed Lot 72, titled to the company, was an 

asset she contributed to the company which transmuted husband's 

stock to marital property. However, the trial court rejected 

that claim, and we cannot say its decision was clearly wrong. 

 In addition, the commissioner reported the evidence 

disclosed that the company stock had no fair market value other 

than the value of the lot, and the record confirms that the 

company had no assets other than Lot 72. The trial court 

accepted the commissioner's appraisal. Because no evidence 
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supports a contrary view and the debt to husband's mother was 

twice the amount of the sole corporate asset, we cannot say the 

trial court's decision was clearly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. 

The North Carolina Property

 The commissioner reported Lot 6 was marital property, and 

the trial court agreed. The parties do not contest that 

decision. The commissioner noted, and in fact the record shows, 

there was considerable dispute over whether the parties intended 

Lot 72 to be owned by the corporation or by the parties jointly. 

 While the evidence is conflicting, the trial court accepted 

husband's evidence when it declared Lot 72 and the company stock 

owned by husband to be separate properties. The commissioner 

noted the property was titled in the corporate name and accepted 

the testimony presented by husband that only corporate assets 

were used to purchase Lot 72 and that it was always the parties' 

intent to title it in that manner. He implicitly rejected wife's 

assertion that the corporate monies paid for the lots were salary

to husband rather than funds for purchase of an asset (Lot 72) 

for the company. He also rejected wife's claims of resulting 

trust, fraud, and transmutation. 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to husband 

as the prevailing party below, we cannot say the trial court 

erred in making that decision. 

Mandan Road
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 Wife contends the trial court made an erroneous monetary 

award in favor of husband when it approved the commissioner's 

proposed division of the equity in the Mandan Road property. The 

commissioner's report, approved by the trial court, contained the 

following analysis: 

 Mandan Road, Virginia Beach, Virginia. The 

marital home is legally titled in the [wife]. 

 It has a fair market value of $89,000.00 and 

secures a debt of approximately $53,000.00, 

leaving an equity of $36,000.00. It is 

marital property. Considering sale expenses, 

the equity would be reduced by at least 

$7,000.00, for an equity of $29,000.00, or 

Defendant's share of $14,500.00. 

Wife does not dispute the classification of the property as 

marital, although it was titled in her name only. Rather, she 

contends husband's share had no value. 

 In this appeal, the burden is upon wife to show by the 

record that the trial court's finding constituted reversible 

error. We hold wife failed to show by this record that the trial 

court erroneously valued husband's marital interest in Mandan 

Road. 

 The parties do not dispute that, when they resided together 

in the Mandan Road house, the property was titled in wife's name 

only. Originally, the property secured two loans made to the 

parties jointly. A first mortgage favored Life Savings Bank. 

The balance owed was $23,351.12. The second lien secured a loan 

made to the parties by Seaboard Savings Bank with a $28,754.29 

balance owed. Seaboard demanded payment of the balance due it, 
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causing the parties to refinance the debts. For reasons 

disputed, the new lender would not accept husband as a borrower, 

and wife became sole owner of the property and solely responsible 

for the amount borrowed. An exhibit discloses this loan was in 

the amount of $55,000; $23,351.12 of the loan paid Life Savings 

and $28,754.29 of the loan paid Seaboard. Wife concedes the loan 

from Life Savings was for the mutual benefit of the parties. 

However, she asserts the $28,754.29 paid to Seaboard was for 

monies borrowed solely for the benefit of the company. Wife's 

exception to the commissioner's valuation was as follows: 

 The Commissioner failed to account for 

$28,000.00 in debt of B.R. Williams & Son, 

Inc. (a corporation solely owned by the 

defendant and his mother). The plaintiff 

will have to pay back this debt by repayment 

of the Note secured by the property, although 

the benefit of same accrued to the 

corporation. 

 Wife was equally liable with husband on the Seaboard loan. 

The evidence concerning use of the Seaboard loan proceeds is 

tenuous, at best. Viewed in the light most favorable to husband, 

wife did not know for what purpose the Seaboard loan monies were 

used, and husband testified some of the money was "for use in my 

business," some was "to pay house payments" when the parties were 

living in LagoMar, and at least $1,000 went toward the purchase 

of the Corova lots. Wife excepted to the commissioner's 

recommendation, but the trial court overruled her exception. 

Because wife failed to file a transcript of the proceedings held 

in the trial court on those exceptions, we cannot determine 
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whether the trial court erroneously valued the parties' 

respective interests in Mandan Road.1

 Wife has not met her 

burden of proving the trial court committed reversible error when 

it approved the commissioner's recommended division of the equity 

in Mandan Road. Therefore, we cannot say the trial court erred 

in holding wife solely responsible for the balance from the 

Seaboard loan. 

 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

 

 1Code § 20-107.3 mandates that the court determine the 

ownership and value of all real and personal property of the 

parties. The determination must go beyond mere guesswork. See, 

e.g., Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App. 132, 136, 354 S.E.2d 812, 814 

(1987); Hodges v. Hodges, 2 Va. App. 508, 516, 347 S.E.2d 134, 

139 (1986).