[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-11290

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

LISA JACKSON-CRAWFORD, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SCHOOL BOARD OF SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA, 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00641-WWB-DCI

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11290

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Lisa Jackson-Crawford appeals the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment to the School Board of Seminole County 

Florida (“SBSC”) in her civil action for retaliation in violation of 

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and the Florida Civil Rights 

Act (“FCRA”). She argues that the district court erred in finding 

that she failed to prove causation and, should this court decide to 

address whether SBSC’s allegations were pretextual, there is a 

disputed issue of fact precluding summary judgment. After review, 

we affirm. 

I. Background

In 2021, Jackson-Crawford sued SBSC, alleging unlawful

retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and the 

FCRA. The complaint alleged that Jackson-Crawford, a black 

female, began working for SBSC in 2010 as an Exceptional Student 

Education (“ESE”) Support Facilitator. In August 2016, Lake 

Brantley High School (“LBHS”) hired Jackson-Crawford, where 

she remained until the non-renewal of her annual contract in May 

2020. 

Jackson-Crawford alleged that the non-renewal of her 

contract was unlawful retaliation for engaging in protected 

conduct—the filing of an Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) charge alleging racial discrimination. 

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Discovery revealed the following. Brian Blasewitz became 

principal of LBHS in June 2019. Prior to the start of the 2019–2020 

school year, the school issued Jackson-Crawford’s new schedule, 

assigning her to Elaine Kaub’s and Kimberly Wheeler’s respective 

classrooms, which required Jackson-Crawford to move between 

two different classroom buildings throughout the day1 and gave 

her a seventh period planning period. Jackson-Crawford was 

dissatisfied with this schedule and met with Principal Blasewitz to 

discuss changing it. Specifically, she requested that her schedule be 

changed (1) to move her planning period to first period so that she 

could take her child to school, as she had historically had a first 

planning period; (2) to place all of her classes in the same building 

so that she did not have to move between buildings between class 

periods; and (3) to be assigned to Wheeler’s classroom. Blasewitz 

reviewed her request and offered her an alternate schedule that 

would give her first period planning and place all of her classes in 

the same building, but she would be assigned to Norma Pelezo’s 

classroom, another LBHS teacher, instead of Wheeler. However, 

Jackson-Crawford had previously taught with Pelezo and became 

frustrated with an unexpected leave of absence Pelezo took during 

that time, which caused more work for Jackson-Crawford. After 

considering the options, Jackson-Crawford chose to retain her 

original schedule assignment, which provided her with a seventh 

1 According to Jackson-Crawford, the two classroom buildings were “more 

than a football field or quarter mile apart.” 

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period planning period and required her to move between 

buildings multiple times throughout the day. 

That fall, Jackson-Crawford began experiencing issues with 

Assistant Principal McIntyre, who was her direct supervisor. For 

instance, between August and mid-October 2019, McIntyre 

observed the classrooms that Jackson-Crawford worked in on 

multiple occasions,2 and yet, no notes or feedback on the 

observations appeared in the relevant online portal. JacksonCrawford said that McIntyre’s demeanor was “very cold” and 

“calculated.” According to Jackson-Crawford, McIntyre did not say 

anything during these observations. Instead, she just sat in the back 

of the class watching, with a “very terrifying . . . look on her face.” 

Jackson-Crawford felt that McIntyre’s behavior “became 

harassment,” resembled “stalking,” and was “racially motivated.” 

Jackson-Crawford was aware that another black male teacher had 

the same experience with McIntyre. 

On October 17, 2019, Jackson-Crawford arrived for work 

after her first period class had started. She maintained in her 

deposition that, as an ESE support facilitator, she was not required 

to be in the classroom from “bell to bell”—in other words, the fact 

that she arrived after school had started and the first period bell had 

2 Part of McIntyre’s duties included observing the teachers she supervised. 

Although Assistant Principal McIntyre’s observations of Jackson-Crawford are 

not at issue in this case, we note that Principal Blazewitz stated that he had 

asked the assistant principals “to increase” their observations of teachers and 

“to regularly observe [them] as much as possible.” 

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rung did not matter.3 Jackson-Crawford also explained that she had 

an “understanding” with Knaub that she would be “running 

behind” relatively regularly. However, Jackson-Crawford had not 

talked to McIntyre about this arrangement because, according to 

Jackson-Crawford, the ESE teachers were told to work things out 

directly with their paired teachers. Jackson-Crawford had 

informed Knaub that she would be late on October 17, but 

unbeknownst to Jackson Crawford, Knaub had called out that day. 

Due to Knaub calling out that day and Jackson-Crawford being late, 

the first period students assigned to Knaub’s class were unattended 

for a period of time. 

As Jackson-Crawford approached the classroom building on 

the morning of October 17, Assistant Principal McIntyre and 

Assistant Principal Colleen Windt were standing outside, and 

McIntyre started shouting something at Jackson-Crawford and 

pointing to her wrist area where a watch typically would be 

located. Jackson-Crawford could not make out what McIntyre was 

saying, and she did not like the way McIntyre was speaking or 

acting towards her. As she got closer to McIntyre, JacksonCrawford told her that “[i]f you need to speak to me, . . . [t]his is 

not the time and the place for it. . . . We can have a conversation in 

3 However, the school’s employee handbook provided that each teacher’s 

contracted “hours of work” were from 7:05 a.m. to 2:35 p.m., and no 

exceptions were listed for ESE teachers. No one disputes that these hours 

were incorporated by reference into the Seminole Education Association 

(“SEA”) teacher’s union agreement that governed the conditions of 

employment for its members, including Jackson-Crawford. 

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your office, and we can sit down and speak like adults 

professionally.” According to Jackson-Crawford, McIntyre 

continued to speak over Jackson-Crawford and criticize her for 

being tardy. Jackson-Crawford stated that she told McIntyre this 

was not “the appropriate place for this” conversation, and she went 

to report the situation to Principal Blasewitz. 

Jackson-Crawford was “bawling” when she got to 

Blasewitz’s office. She reported the incident and her belief that 

McIntyre was harassing her and that McIntyre’s behavior had 

reached a “stalking” level. Blasewitz said that he would speak with 

McIntyre, but Jackson-Crawford was dissatisfied with his response 

and told him that she intended to file a complaint with the district. 

Jackson-Crawford filed a formal complaint with Human 

Resources (“HR”) against McIntyre for “discrimination and 

harassment” concerning the October 17, 2019, incident and the 

perceived harassment from the classroom observations. The 

district conducted an investigation and was “unable to substantiate 

discrimination and/or harassment on the part of [Assistant 

Principal] McIntyre.” According to the investigative report, both 

Assistant Principal McIntyre and Principal Blasewitz had observed 

Jackson-Crawford arriving to her classes after the bell rang on a 

regular basis, particularly her first period class, and moving slowly 

between classes. Assistant Principal Windt, who was present 

during the October 17 encounter between McIntyre and JacksonCrawford, confirmed McIntyre’s version of events and that 

McIntyre spoke calmly and professionally to Jackson-Crawford. 

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The report also relayed that McIntyre informed Jackson-Crawford 

that she needed to “be in the classroom on time and when the class 

starts.” Thus, after speaking to a number of witnesses and 

gathering evidence, the district concluded that the alleged behavior 

did not rise to the level of harassment or discrimination. However, 

as a result of the complaint, McIntyre ceased interacting with 

Jackson-Crawford, consistent with Jackson-Crawford’s request, 

and Principal Blasewitz took over supervising Jackson-Crawford. 

Unhappy with the outcome of the investigation, JacksonCrawford filed a complaint for racial discrimination with the EEOC 

on January 13, 2020. Blasewitz and McIntyre learned of the EEOC 

charge around January 31, 2020. 

According to Jackson-Crawford, after she filed the charge,

“the tone of the workplace changed.” “[N]o one wanted to speak 

to [her,]” and fellow teachers stopped coming to her for things. 

McIntyre avoided her completely, and Blasewitz “kind of did the 

same,” although he would exchange “pleasantr[ies]” on occasion. 

Jackson-Crawford confirmed that she completed the school year, 

that her schedule and duties remained the same, and that she did 

not experience any other incidents of discrimination or 

harassment. At no point did the school formally issue any type of 

disciplinary or corrective action for Jackson-Crawford’s alleged 

tardiness.4 

4 Blazewitz characterized the October 17, 2019, incident—where students 

were left unattended because Knaub called out and Jackson-Crawford was 

late—as “a serious and dangerous incident,” and he stated that he verbally 

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Jackson-Crawford was notified on May 27, 2020, that the 

school was not renewing her annual contract for the upcoming 

school year.5 She believed that her contract was not renewed in 

retaliation for her filing the EEOC charge, although she never 

spoke to Blasewitz or McIntyre about the non-renewal or the 

reasons for it. Although she did not receive the notice of nonrenewal until late May 2020, Jackson-Crawford maintained that the 

decision to not renew her contract was made “sometime between 

February 2020 and April 2020.” 

In a sworn affidavit, Principal Blazewitz stated that, between 

August 2019 and October 2019, he “personally observed” JacksonCrawford arriving to school after the start of first period “on 

multiple occasions[.]” On these occasions, he observed her 

“walking very slowly and without haste.” He also received reports 

from other school personnel that Jackson-Crawford was 

“habitually late to work in the mornings and to her assigned classes 

throughout the day.” Her tardiness in the morning and in-between 

“counsel[ed] [Jackson-Crawford] about her tardiness” when she came to his 

office to complain about McIntyre. Jackson-Crawford disputes that he 

counseled her on her tardiness, and for purposes of this opinion, we accept her 

version of events. See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (explaining that, at the summary judgment stage, we “view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party”). 

5 It is undisputed that Jackson-Crawford had an annual contract of 

employment, which SBSC had no obligation to renew, and there was “no 

expectancy of continued employment beyond the terms of [the contract].” 

Her contract for the 2019–2020 school year ran from August 6, 2019, to May 

29, 2020. 

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classes continued after October 17, 2019, up until the LBHS campus 

shut down in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 

According to Blazewitz, arriving after the start of class was a

violation of Jackson-Crawford’s employment contract and the 

collective bargaining agreement, as “[t]eachers [were] required and 

expected to be in class on-time and to be prepared to instruct and 

supervise students from bell-to-bell.” 

Blazewitz averred that “[o]n May 27, 2020[,] [he] made the 

decision” to not renew Jackson-Crawford’s annual contract, and he 

e-mailed her to notify her of his decision. He explained that his 

decision to not renew Jackson-Crawford’s contract was based on

[her] continued disregard of her employment 

requirements[,] which put the safety of students at 

risk and resulted in violations of numerous School 

Board policies[,] her Employment Contract, and the 

collective bargaining agreement; Comments made by 

[Assistant Principal] McIntyre regarding her 

supervision of [Jackson-Crawford] from August 

through October 17, 2019; Comments by other 

administrators of their observations of [JacksonCrawford] throughout the school year; [JacksonCrawford]’s unreliableness; [Jackson-Crawford]’s 

work attitude which indicated a complete lack of 

respect for [the] administration, colleagues, and 

students; and [his] desire to find a better suited 

candidate. 

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Blazewitz confirmed that his decision to not renew JacksonCrawford’s contract “was not based on her complaints nor her 

[EEOC] Charge of Discrimination.” 

Assistant Principal McIntyre submitted an affidavit in which 

she stated that, between August and October 2019, she observed 

“Jackson-Crawford habitually arrive late to work, most times more 

than [15] minutes past the start of her contracted hours.” Knaub, 

as well as the assistant principal that supervised Knaub, spoke to 

McIntyre about Jackson-Crawford’s tardiness. According to 

McIntyre, she “calmly and quietly” approached Jackson-Crawford 

on the morning of October 17, 2019, explained the “seriousness” of 

the students being left unsupervised, and communicated the 

expectation that Jackson-Crawford should be in her assigned 

classes from “bell-to-bell.” She said that Jackson-Crawford became 

“agitated,” “yelled at [her],” “accus[ed] [her] of acting 

unprofessionally by not having the conversation . . . in private,” 

and went to the principal’s office. Because Jackson-Crawford 

requested that she no longer have contact with McIntyre, McIntyre 

ceased supervising Jackson-Crawford and had “no further contact 

with her.” 

Blazewitz said that “[t]he decision to recommend 

reappointment of a LBHS teacher after the expiration of their 

annual contract rest[ed] solely with [him].” And McIntyre stated

that she “did not actively participate in the decision to not 

reappoint Ms. Jackson-Crawford.” Regarding the timing of his 

decision, Blazewitz explained that “[a]lthough [he] [thought] about 

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employee re-appointments as early as mid-April of 2020, [he] did 

not make [his] final decision until May 27, 2020.” But in response 

to interrogatories, SBSC said that “the persons who participated in 

the decision to non-renew [Jackson-Crawford’s] expired annual 

contract are [] McIntyre and [] Blasewitz. The communication 

occurred in person and orally sometime between February and 

April, 2020[.]” 

In a deposition, a fellow teacher and union representative 

testified that it would not be surprising to hear that “JacksonCrawford was retaliated against for making her complaints” 

because the representative “[had] seen it happen in other cases with 

different administrators[.]” And the president of the teacher’s 

union testified that, at the time, Florida was experiencing “a 

teacher shortage” and that he found it “mind boggling” not to 

renew a contract amid such a shortage. 

SCBS moved for summary judgment, arguing that it decided 

not to renew Jackson-Crawford’s contract because of her “failure 

to comply with the terms of various School Board policies, 

handbooks, Official Agreements and Contracts[,] coupled with the 

School Board’s desire to appoint the best suited candidate”—not 

“as a retaliatory action[.]” 

The district court granted the motion for summary

judgment. It found that Jackson-Crawford could not establish a 

causal connection between Blasewitz’s and McIntyre’s knowledge 

of the EEOC charge on January 31, 2020, and the decision not to 

renew her contract on May 27, 2020, due to the four-month gap 

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12 Opinion of the Court 23-11290

between these dates. It explained that, without temporal 

proximity, Jackson-Crawford needed to show other evidence to 

support causation but she failed to do so, as her other proffered 

evidence did not show “a pattern of antagonism” connected to the 

contract non-renewal. The district court therefore concluded that 

Jackson-Crawford “failed to establish a sufficient prima facie case 

of retaliation[.]” 

Jackson-Crawford timely appealed. 

II. Standard of Review 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de 

novo, “view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party.” Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 

1363 (11th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is proper if the evidence 

shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). When a movant shows that no genuine dispute of 

material fact exists, the burden shifts to the non-movant to 

demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact that 

precludes summary judgment. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 

604, 608–09 (11th Cir. 1991). “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence 

supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there 

must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find 

for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990)

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). 

Further, “unsupported speculation . . . does not meet a party’s 

burden of producing some defense to a summary judgment 

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23-11290 Opinion of the Court 13

motion,” as it does not create a genuine issue of material fact, but 

instead, “creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary 

goal of summary judgment.” Cordoba v. Dillard’s Inc., 419 F.3d 

1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quotations 

omitted).

We may “affirm for any reason supported by the record, 

even if the district court did not rely on that reason.” Wright v. City 

of St. Petersburg, 833 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotations 

omitted).

III. Discussion

Jackson-Crawford argues on appeal that the district court 

erred in finding a lack of temporal proximity between the filing of 

the EEOC charge in January 2020 and the non-renewal of her 

contract because conversations related to the non-renewal of her 

contract occurred between February and April 2020—not May.6 

But even if we accept Jackson-Crawford’s contention and assume 

that she established a prima facie case of retaliation, her retaliation 

6 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show, among 

other things, a causal relationship between the protected expression (the filing 

of the EEOC charge) and the adverse action (the non-renewal of JacksonCrawford’s contract). Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1363. We have held that a three-tofour-month gap between the protected activity and the adverse employment 

action is too attenuated to satisfy the causation element of a retaliation claim, 

id. at 1364, but that a one-month period “is not too protracted,” Higdon v.

Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004).

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claims still fail because, contrary to her assertions otherwise, she 

cannot show pretext. 

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, an employer may not 

retaliate against an employee because she has opposed any practice 

made unlawful under the Act or because she has made a charge or 

participated in a proceeding thereunder. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).

When, as here, a plaintiff attempts to use Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 1981 and 1983 as parallel remedies for the same allegedly 

unlawful retaliation, the elements of the causes of action are 

identical and analyzed under the same framework. See Johnson v. 

Miami-Dade Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing 

claims under Title VII and § 1983); Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., 

Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (“Retaliation 

claims are also cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and are analyzed 

under the same framework as Title VII claims.”). Likewise, 

retaliation claims under the FCRA7 are analyzed under the same 

7 The relevant text of the FCRA is materially identical to Title VII. The FCRA 

provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any 

person because that person has opposed any practice which is an unlawful 

employment practice under this section, or because that person has made a 

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 

proceeding, or hearing under this section.” Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7). While that 

similarity does not necessarily mean that the two statutes are in lockstep, or 

that Eleventh Circuit cases control similar legal issues under the FCRA, 

Jackson-Crawford’s failure to differentiate the two statutes gives us little 

choice but to consider them together.

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framework as Title VII. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 

1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010). 

A retaliation claim based on circumstantial evidence is 

commonly analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas8 burden-shifting 

framework. Johnson, 948 F.3d at 1325. Under McDonnell Douglas, a 

plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. To 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, “a plaintiff must show: (1) 

that [she] engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) that [she]

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there is some 

causal relationship between the two events.” Id. (quotations 

omitted). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, 

“the employer then has an opportunity to articulate a legitimate, 

non-retaliatory reason for the challenged employment action.” 

Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001).

If the employer meets that burden, then the burden shifts back to 

the plaintiff to prove that “the reason provided by the employer is 

a pretext for prohibited, retaliatory conduct[.]” Id. To satisfy this 

burden, a plaintiff “must present actual evidence . . . because 

conclusory allegations of [retaliation], without more, are not 

sufficient to raise an inference of pretext.” Ctr. v. Sec’y, Dep’t of 

8 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). But see Tynes v. Florida 

Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 88 F.4th 939, 947 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that “we 

are [always] answering the same question” when assessing Title VII claims, 

regardless of whether we analyze the claim under McDonnell-Douglas or look 

for a so-called convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence).

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Homeland Sec., Customs & Border Prot. Agency, 895 F.3d 1295, 1303 

(11th Cir. 2018) (alteration adopted) (quotations omitted).

A plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating “weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies[,] or contradictions” 

in the proffered reason for the employment action such that “a 

reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” 

Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348 

(11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). “If the proffered reason is 

one that might motivate a reasonable employer,” the plaintiff must 

“meet it head on and rebut it” instead of merely quarreling with it. 

Id. at 1350 (quotations omitted). “A reason is not pretext for 

retaliation unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that 

retaliation was the real reason.” Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1136 (en banc) 

(alterations adopted) (emphasis in original) (quotations omitted). 

We have “repeatedly and emphatically held” that employers may 

terminate an employee “for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason 

based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action 

is not for a [retaliatory] reason.” Flowers v. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. 

Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). 

And an employer’s honest, good-faith belief based on information 

that the employee violated its policies can constitute a legitimate 

reason for termination, even if the employer’s belief may have been 

mistaken. Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th 

Cir. 1991). 

Further, “a plaintiff making a retaliation claim . . . must 

establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the 

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alleged adverse action by the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr.

v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013). “Stated another way, a plaintiff 

must prove that had she not complained, she would not have been 

fired.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924 (11th Cir. 2018).

Here, SBSC “articulate[d] a legitimate, non-retaliatory 

reason” for not renewing Jackson-Crawford’s contract. Pennington, 

261 F.3d at 1266. Blasewitz stated that he decided not to 

recommend her contract for renewal for various, non-retaliatory

reasons, including (1) her “continued disregard of her employment 

requirements[,] which put the safety of students at risk and resulted 

in violations of numerous School Board policies[,] her 

Employment Contract, and the collective bargaining agreement”;

(2) comments throughout the year by McIntyre and other 

administrators about Jackson-Crawford; (3) Jackson-Crawford’s 

“unreliableness”; and (4) Jackson-Crawford’s “work attitude[,] 

which indicated a complete lack of respect for [the] administration, 

colleagues[,] and students[.]”9 

The burden then shifted to Jackson-Crawford to prove that 

SBSC’s reasons are “pretext for prohibited, retaliatory conduct[.]” 

9 Although Jackson-Crawford contends that she “was never disciplined” or 

warned about her alleged tardiness, she was on notice that the administration 

took issue with her habitual tardiness. She stated in her deposition that she 

saw McIntyre gesturing toward her watch as she spoke to her on October 17, 

2019, and she said in her declaration that McIntyre “criticized [her] for being 

tardy.” Furthermore, the HR investigation into Jackson-Crawford’s complaint 

documented that McIntyre informed Jackson-Crawford that she needed to “be 

in the classroom on time and when the class starts.” 

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Id. But Jackson-Crawford failed to present actual evidence showing 

that SCBS’s proffered reasons were false and that “retaliation was 

the real reason.” Gogel, 967 F.3d at 1136 (en banc). Rather, the 

evidence shows that Jackson-Crawford was in fact habitually late to 

her first-period class in violation of policies that required her to be 

on campus between 7:05 A.M. and 2:35 P.M. She admitted in her 

deposition to regularly arriving late in the morning, and Blasewitz 

and McIntyre also stated that they personally observed her 

continued tardiness. 

Although Jackson-Crawford argues that, as an ESE support 

facilitator, she was not required to be in the classroom from bellto-bell, she presented no evidence aside from her conclusory 

allegations to support this contention.10 And regardless, our 

inquiry 

centers on the employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s 

beliefs and, to be blunt about it, not on reality as it 

exists outside of the decision maker’s head. . . . The 

question is whether [the] employers were dissatisfied 

with [the employee] for these or other nondiscriminatory reasons, even if mistakenly or unfairly 

so, or instead merely used those [reasons] as cover for 

discriminating against her. . . .

10 Further, Jackson-Crawford did not present any concrete evidence showing 

that she was late because, rather than arriving behind schedule, she was 

pursuing other duties as an ESE support facilitator. 

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Id. at 1148 (en banc) (quotations omitted). Here, there was ample 

evidence that the employer believed that Jackson-Crawford was 

habitually late and that her behavior violated school policy, which 

is a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for not renewing her contract. 

While Jackson-Crawford disagrees, “it is not enough to quibble” 

with SBSC’s reasons. Yelling v. St. Vincent’s Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 

1341 (11th Cir. 2023). She presented no evidence to undermine the 

genuineness of SBSC’s beliefs or that tends to demonstrate that 

unlawful retaliation was the real reason for the non-renewal of her 

contract. 

Nor are Jackson-Crawford’s retaliation claims saved by her 

arguments that her contract non-renewal is inconsistent with 

SBSC’s teacher shortage and that a union representative believed 

her non-renewal was retaliation. First, the teacher shortage is 

not—without more—relevant evidence to whether SBSC’s 

decision was based on a retaliatory reason. And second, the 

testimony of the union representative did not rely upon specific, 

concrete evidence. Walker, 911 F.2d at 1577 (“A mere ‘scintilla’ of 

evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; 

there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably 

find for that party.” (quotations omitted)). Instead, it relied upon 

“conclusory allegations” and speculation, which are insufficient to 

“raise an inference of pretext.” Customs & Border Prot. Agency, 895 

F.3d at 1303. Accordingly, we disagree with Jackson-Crawford’s 

position that the evidence establishes a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to whether SBSC’s proffered reasons for not renewing her

employment were pretextual. 

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20 Opinion of the Court 23-11290

Moreover, even if we accept that Jackson-Crawford’s 

arguments show that retaliation may have been a motivating factor 

among others in the decision to not renew her contract, her claim 

still fails. “[I]t is not enough to show simply that retaliation was a 

motivating factor among others in the adverse action.” Bailey v. 

Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265, 1277 (11th Cir. 2021); 

Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1340 (“Where but-for causation is required, a 

plaintiff with evidence of only a tagalong forbidden consideration 

cannot meet her summary judgment burden because she cannot 

show that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the 

absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.”

(quotations omitted)). “The but-for standard asks whether a 

particular outcome would not have happened but-for the 

purported cause.” Yelling, 82 F.4th at 1338 (quotations omitted). 

And Jackson-Crawford failed to show that “had she not 

complained, she would not have been fired.” Jefferson, 891 F.3d at

924. 

IV. Conclusion

We conclude that Jackson-Crawford cannot show that 

SBSC’s reasons for not renewing her contract were pretext for 

unlawful retaliation, or that unlawful retaliation was the but-for 

cause of the non-renewal, even though the district court did not 

reach these issues. Wright, 833 F.3d at 1294. We therefore affirm 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment to SBSC. 

AFFIRMED. 

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