Docket No. 108953.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

In re VERONICA C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois,

Appellee, v. Veronica C., Appellant).

Opinion filed September 23, 2010.–Modified upon denial of

rehearing November 22, 2010.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Kilbride,

Garman, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

The respondent-minor, Veronica C., was adjudicated a delinquent

in the circuit court of Kane County, the court having found that she

violated section 12–3(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720

ILCS 5/12–3(a)(2) (West 2006) (battery)). She was thereafter placed

on probation for a period of one year with attendant conditions and

fees. Respondent appealed, arguing that section 5–615 of the Juvenile

Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5–615(1) (West 2006))

violates constitutional provisions pertaining to equal protection and

separation of powers insofar as it prevents a minor from being placed

on supervision without the consent of the State. The appellate court

rejected those contentions. No. 2–07–1155 (unpublished order under
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Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed respondent’s petition for leave

to appeal (210 Ill. 2d R. 315), and now affirm the judgment of the

appellate court without reaching the constitutional issues it addressed.

BACKGROUND

On October 12, 2006, in the circuit court of Kane County, a

petition was filed alleging that the minor-respondent was delinquent

in that she had committed battery. In separate counts, the petition

charged that respondent had violated section 12–3(a)(1) of the Code,

in that she had knowingly caused bodily harm to Krila Cortes, and

section12–3(a)(2) of the Code, in that she had made physical contact

of an insulting or provoking nature with Cortes. Though the conduct

in question occurred on the property of a public school, as the cited

sections indicate, the State chose to pursue only misdemeanor

charges. Acting in part upon defense representations that the minor

had no criminal history, the court decided that the minor respondent

would not be detained pending trial. 

The matter was tried on May 22, 2007. After hearing the

evidence, the court found respondent guilty of the second count of

battery–charging physical contact of an insulting or provoking

nature–but not guilty of the first count, as the State had adduced no

evidence of bodily harm. As the details of the offense are peripheral

to the issues raised by the parties, we will summarize the findings of

the trial court, and the version of events those findings support. 

The prevailing testimony indicated that the victim, another student

at respondent’s school, was pushed and punched by respondent and

her friends, and that respondent initiated the attack. Respondent and

her group first encircled the victim in the school’s gymnasium after

school. After the victim successfully extricated herself from that

confrontation, and went down into the locker room, respondent and

another girl proceeded to the locker room where the respondent and

the victim “bumped shoulders” in passing, inciting an attack on the

victim in the shower area, wherein respondent and three of her friends

participated. 

In announcing its guilty verdict, the court singled out respondent’s

lack of credibility for comment:

“[T]he testimony is notable because the testimony of the
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minor respondent *** is actually contradicted by every other

single witness who testified in this case, including the

defense’s witness.

I don’t think the testimony of the minor respondent ***

and the teacher who testified can be reconciled. The teacher

was very clear, the respondent said, it’s on [meaning the

attack on the other student]. That’s what the minor said. So

either Veronica is not telling the truth or the teacher is not

telling the truth. 

Krila testified that when she went upstairs to the gym, she

was surrounded by the minor respondent and her friends in the

gym, they made a circle around her. I think that’s how the

testimony about her saying, it’s on, is relevant. I think that’s

what it refers to.” 

The court also stated that it did not believe respondent when she

testified she went to the locker room to get her gym uniform. The

court concluded its comments on respondent’s credibility by noting

that “respondent is the only one who testified that she both didn’t

push Krila first and also that she didn’t hit Krila.” As indicated, the

court found the respondent “guilty” of battery and set the matter over

for what the court referred to as a “sentencing hearing.” 

At that hearing, the minor respondent’s mother, Saint, testified to

the minor’s domestic activities and her scholastic status. Further, the

witness stated that the minor was seeing a psychiatrist at Streamwood

Behavior Center and claimed that she had been diagnosed with

“ADHD and impulse disorder.” Saint testified that, subsequent to the

coordinated attack on the victim at school, and during the time the

minor respondent was awaiting sentencing, she had been in no trouble

at school, no trouble with the law, no trouble at home, and no trouble

with friends or neighbors. Asked about the possibility of community

service, the witness responded: “I really don’t think that she would be

able to do the community service because of her disability and no one

being there to actually *** , can I say, certified, to handle a situation

if there’s like, you know, outbursts and whatever.” 

Under cross-examination by the State, respondent’s mother

reiterated her belief that community service would not be an option

because the minor “has an impulse disorder,” “someone would have
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to watch her,” and there would be problems “sending her out with

other kids.” The witness was then asked about supervision after

school:

“THE STATE: So what happens when school is over,

who supervises her between her last class when the teacher

sees her and when she makes it to your home?

WITNESS: We live right next door to the school, we’re

right next door.

THE STATE: So you’re saying she has constant

supervision?

WITNESS: Well, actually her sister was at school with

her, so she walks right home everyday.

THE STATE: So why wasn’t she being supervised on

October 10th, 2006, when she was in a fight in a locker room?

WITNESS: You know I can’t answer that because I

wasn’t there at the school, so I don’t know what happened

that day or what triggered her to go downstairs. I can’t

answer that.

THE STATE: So there are times when she is not

completely supervised?

WITNESS: As far as like maybe standing with friends at

school or something like that. I really don’t know as far as

with school, but I know at home she’s supervised.” 

Asked if her daughter “should have any consequence for her behavior

on October 10th,” the witness responded: “As far as writing an

apology letter, I mean, this is her first time ever being in a situation

like this.”

After respondent’s mother testified, the court stated that it was

prepared to hear argument, but first asked the State if it objected to

court supervision. The State responded affirmatively, and was then

directed to proceed. 

In argument, the State urged the court to impose a term of 12

months’ probation with appropriate conditions. In support of that

position, the State observed that the minor respondent had incited the

attack on the victim in the locker room, when respondent and her

friends “did not have a reason to be in that locker room.” Continuing,
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the State pointed out:

“[T]he purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to hold minors

accountable for their unlawful behavior and not to allow them

to think that their delinquent acts have no consequences for

themselves.

And the State believes at this time if you were simply to

close this minor’s case, she would believe that her acts have

no consequences. The minor’s mother stated that [the minorrespondent] has impulse disorder and that she has outbursts.

And the State would submit she’s not being properly

supervised if this is the case and she has outbursts.

*** She shouldn’t think that her behavior was okay and

that she’s gonna get a pass on it.” 

For her part, respondent’s attorney acknowledged testimony

concerning the minor’s “impulse disorder,” but noted that the minor

had not been in any trouble pending her sentencing, and referenced the

mother’s testimony that the minor had not been in trouble prior to this

offense. Counsel argued that the minor’s mother was “very concerned

about her and her behavior” and had “taken measures to improve the

situation” insofar as she had taken her daughter to see a psychiatrist

and had gotten her daughter on appropriate medication. Counsel also

argued, notwithstanding the incident in question, that the minor

respondent was “well-supervised”whenatschool. Counsel concluded:

“We would ask, in light of this being her first case and her

young age and the excellent care that her mother has taken to

insure that this type of thing does not occur again, as well as

Veronica making the choice to make sure that, in spite of

struggling with some of these disabilities, making sure that this

does not repeat itself, we would ask that you adjudicate and

close this case.” 

Having heard arguments of counsel, the court announced its

sentencing decision: “She’s a first offender, I would give her court

supervision if I could, but I’m not allowed to if the State objects, so

she’s gonna be placed on a year of probation.” 

On August 23, 2007, the respondent filed a motion to reconsider

sentence, arguing that her sentence was excessive, that it violated the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
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1970, art. I, §11)–quoting from that provision, but citing the due

process and equal protection clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2)–and

that, “based on the evidence presented and the law, the Court should

have made a finding that adjudicating her a delinquent and closing the

case was an appropriate punishment for the Minor.” 

A hearing was held on the motion on October 10, 2007, in which

counsel argued, inter alia, that respondent’s sentence was excessive

and disproportionate to that received by one of the other girls

participating in the attack. Referring to that girl, counsel stated, “in

the end her case was adjudicated and closed.” Counsel suggested

“there should be some symmetry between” the sentences. The State

responded that “the sentence which is disproportionate to the crime

is that of [the other offender].” The assistant State’s Attorney

reiterated her position that both of the minors should have been placed

on probation; however, she noted, in support of the disparity, that this

respondent actually incited the attack. In the end, the court agreed

with the State: “Veronica is the one that started this. I think she

deserves what I gave her, and the motion is denied.” 

Respondent appealed, arguing, as she does here, that section

5–615 of the Act “is an unconstitutional violation of separation of

powers and equal protection because it allows the State to prevent the

juvenile court from placing a minor on supervision.” Before reaching

the merits, the appellate court first addressed and rejected the State’s

argument that the matter was moot because respondent’s period of

probation had ended, relying upon the collateral-legal-consequences

exception to the mootness doctrine. Citing separate subsections of

section 5–915 of the Act, the court observed that a juvenile placed on

court supervision would have been eligible to petition for

expungement of her law enforcement and juvenile court records at the

age of 17 (705 ILCS 405/5–915(1)(c) (West 2006)); whereas, an

offender, like the respondent, who was “charged with a Class A

misdemeanor and [was] sentenced to probation, *** may not petition

for expungement until the age of 21. See 705 ILCS 405/5–915(2)(a)

(West 2006).” No. 2–07–1155 (unpublished order under Supreme

Court Rule 23). Quoting from this court’s decision in People ex rel.

Devine v. Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d 445 (2007), the appellate court noted

that the extended preservation of juvenile records is one of “a number

of collateral ways that the public is protected by the finding of
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delinquency” and the appellate court concluded “[t]o hold that the

distinction is not a collateral legal consequence in regard to mootness

would essentially ignore that the legislature viewed the distinction as

important to both the public and the juvenile.” No. 2–07–1155

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 

The appellate court also rejected the suggestion that respondent’s

constitutional contentions on appeal were forfeited, as they were not

argued in the circuit court. The appellate court cited, inter alia, this

court’s holding in People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2000) (stating

that the constitutionality of a criminal statute may be raised at any

time). No. 2–07–1155 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule

23).

On the merits, the appellate court upheld the constitutionality of

section 5–615(1) against both separation of powers and equal

protection challenges. 

With respect to the former, the appellate court observed that this

court, in In re T.W., 101 Ill. 2d 438 (1984), “upheld a challenge on

separation of powers grounds to the identical statutory predecessor to

section 5–615(1).” The appellate court considered T.W. “binding

precedent” in this case. No. 2–07–1155 (unpublished order under

Supreme Court Rule 23). As for more recent precedent, the appellate

court went on to note that this court in Stralka, though it did not

address the constitutionality of section 5–615(1), nonetheless “held

that a juvenile court could not place a minor on probation and later

vacate the delinquency finding, in part because doing so is tantamount

to granting supervision ‘and it essentially circumvents the State’s right

to reject supervision.’ ” No. 2–07–1155 (unpublished order under

Supreme Court Rule 23), quoting in part Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 454.

The appellate court again quoted from this court’s disposition in

Stralka, wherein this court concluded: “ ‘[T]he statute simply does not

give the [circuit] court authority to decide, in the face of an objection

by the State, that even though a juvenile is guilty of a crime, the nature

of the conduct does not warrant prosecution or a finding of guilt.’ ”

No. 2–07–1155 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23),

quoting Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 455. 

As for respondent’s equal protection challenge, the appellate court

relied upon its own decision in In re T.D., 81 Ill. App. 3d 369, 372

(1980), wherein it observed that adult offenders and juveniles
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adjudicated delinquent are not similarly situated. Citing this court’s

opinion in In re Presley, 47 Ill. 2d 50, 56 (1970), the appellate court

observed: “Indeed, the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to treat

juveniles as differently situated, because the Juvenile Court Act has a

legitimate and salutary goal to provide for the rehabilitation of

delinquent minors before they have embarked upon the commission of

substantive criminal offenses.” No. 2–07–1155 (unpublished order

under Supreme Court Rule 23). The court concluded that section

5–615(1) does not violate principles of equal protection. 

ANALYSIS

Of the arguments advanced by the State in this appeal, we find one

dispositive, obviating the need to address any other issues raised by

the parties. The State submits that the respondent has no standing to

challenge the “consent” requirement of section 5–615 because it was

not the prosecutorial objection that deprived the respondent of the

opportunity to have her case continued under supervision. According

to the State, by the time the circuit court inquired as to the

prosecutor’s position on supervision, supervision was no longer an

option under the procedural framework of the Act, as a finding of

guilt had already been entered. In the State’s view, the prosecutor’s

position on supervision was at that point irrelevant. We agree with the

State.

We have repeatedly emphasized the distinct nature of the three

phases of juvenile delinquency proceedings as outlined in the Juvenile

Court Act: the findings phase, the adjudicatory phase, and the

dispositional phase. See In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 365

(2009); Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 451. As we noted in Samantha V. and

Stralka, the findings phase consists of a “trial”–previously referred to

as an “adjudicatory hearing” (see 705 ILCS 405/5–19 (West

1996))–in which the trial court applies the reasonable doubt standard

of proof and the rules of evidence that would be followed in a criminal

case, to determine whether the minor is guilty as charged and should

thus be adjudged delinquent. Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at 365 (citing

705 ILCS 405/5–605(3)(a) (West 2004), and Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at

452). In a juvenile delinquency case, a finding of guilt and a finding of

delinquency are one and the same. Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 456. In the

event a finding of delinquency is entered, the matter proceeds to
 

1For purposes of clarification, we note that the “adjudication” to which

the legislature refers in section 5–615 is apparently an adjudication of

delinquency, the formal culmination of first phase proceedings. 

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sentencing. Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at 365 (citing 705 ILCS

405/5–620 (West 2004), and Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 452). The

sentencing proceeding includes the adjudication phase, where the

court determines whether it is in the best interests of the minor and the

public to make the minor a ward of the court. Samantha V., 234 Ill.

2d at 365 (citing 705 ILCS 405/5–705(1) (West 2004), and Stralka,

226 Ill. 2d at 453). If the minor is adjudged a ward of the court, the

matter proceeds to the dispositional phase, where the court fashions

an appropriate sentence that will best serve the minor and the public.

Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d at 365 (citing 705 ILCS 405/5–705(1) (West

2004), and Stralka, 226 Ill. 2d at 453). We reiterate the distinct

phases of juvenile proceedings because important legal consequences

attend each one, as this case amply demonstrates. 

Section 5–615 of the Act provides in pertinent part:

“(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under

supervision *** (a) upon an admission or stipulation by the

appropriate respondent or minor respondent of the facts

supporting the petition and before proceeding to adjudication,

or after hearing the evidence at the trial, and (b) in the absence

of objection made in open court by the minor, his or her

parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor’s attorney or

the State’s Attorney.

(2) If the minor, his or her parent, guardian, or legal

custodian, the minor’s attorney or State’s Attorney objects in

open court to any continuance and insists upon proceeding to

findings and adjudication, the court shall so proceed.” 705

ILCS 405/5–615(1), (2) (West 2006). 

The clear intent of the legislature, as expressed in subsection (2)

of section 5–615, is that the possibility of supervision be broached and

considered, if at all, before “proceeding to findings and adjudication.”1

At that juncture, if the court is so inclined, and barring objection by

any of the parties listed in subsection (1), the court “may” enter an

order of supervision. We have found no statutory provision or rule
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that requires the court to raise the prospect of supervision sua sponte.

Here, the court had already found respondent guilty and had set

the cause over for adjudicatory and dispositional phases, inquiring, in

the course of those proceedings whether the State objected to

supervision. At that point, it no longer mattered whether the State or

anyone else objected as the time for a continuance under supervision

had passed, and the only dispositional alternatives remaining were

those set forth in section 5–710 of the Act. See 705 ILCS 405/5–710

(West 2006). A “continuance under supervision” is not listed among

them. 

Respondent argues that “section 5–615 does not bar supervision

for minors who are found guilty.” She notes that an “admission in a

juvenile delinquency case is the equivalent of a guilty plea in an adult

criminal proceeding,” and from that observation reasons that “the

plain wording of section 5–615 contemplates that a finding of guilt

(delinquency in this case) does not preclude supervision.” This line of

reasoning, which is not even relevant here, where the matter

proceeded to trial, ignores the distinction between a respondent’s

action in admitting or stipulating to the facts supporting a petition and

the subsequent action of a court in entering a finding of guilt or an

adjudication of delinquency on the basis of the admission. A similar

error or unwarranted inferential leap in analysis is evident in

respondent’s contention that the statute’s reference to a court

considering supervision “ after hearing the evidence at the trial”

necessarily encompasses a finding of guilt or delinquency thereafter.

It does not. Where as here, the matter proceeds to trial, a court

obviously would hear the evidence, and then, before entering a finding

of guilt or delinquency, consider the option of a continuance under

supervision. That is the procedural sequence the legislature intended.

Any ambiguity that might result from the legislature’s omission of the

term “findings” in subsection (1) of section 5–615 is clarified in

subsection (2), wherein the legislature specifies that supervision, and

any objections thereto, must be considered before “proceeding to

findings and adjudication.” 

In this case, no one broached the possibility of a continuance

under supervision prior to the court’s finding of guilt. The State’s

objection thereto during the phases that followed was irrelevant and

thus did not adversely affect respondent. 
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A party may not raise a constitutional challenge to a provision of

a statute that does not affect him or her. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.

2d 415, 425 (2000). Since respondent argues neither ineffective

assistance of counsel, nor plain error, we are not compelled to

consider whether trial counsel’s failure to raise the possibility of

supervision prejudiced respondent–if in fact we were to find the

provision in question unconstitutional–or whether the trial court’s

failure to raise the option of supervision at an earlier stage in the

proceedings affected the fairness of proceedings below and challenged

the integrity of the judicial process. 

We note in passing respondent’s nominal argument–two pages of

her brief–that “the Juvenile Court Act actually authorizes supervision

despite a prosecutorial veto,” and her related suggestion that our

“case law recognizes that the restriction which the trial judge placed

on his authority [to continue the matter under supervision] does not

exist.” In support of her skeletal contention, respondent quotes,

partially, and out of context, somewhat imprecise language employed

in this court’s concluding remarks in T.W. We here quote the sentence

in its entirety: 

“We held in In re J.N. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 122, 127-28, that

section 5–3(2)(o) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par.

705–3(2)(o)), which is a subsection of the statute dealing with

juvenile probation, allows the court to impose conditions of

supervision after findings and adjudication.” T.W., 101 Ill. 2d

at 442. 

Of course, respondent’s proposed interpretation of this sentence

is diametrically opposed to the clear statutory prescription that a case

cannot be continued under supervision after findings and adjudication.

Moreover, that interpretation would completely eviscerate this court’s

holdings in T.W. and Stralka. If there were an independent basis in the

Act that would allow the circuit court to continue a case under

supervision over the objection of the State, then the provision upheld

in T.W. and essential to the result in Stralka would be meaningless.

Clearly, T.W. did not intend such an interpretation and we find none

such is warranted, as even a cursory examination of J.N. and T.W. will

confirm.

In J.N.–a case which respondent understandably does not discuss

or even mention–this court found, notwithstanding the circuit court’s
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use of the term “supervision” in its orders, that the circuit court had,

in substance, placed the minor respondent on “probation” or

“conditional discharge.” In re J.N., 91 Ill. 2d 122, 128 (1982). This

court came to that conclusion because the circuit court had previously

entered a finding of guilt–the equivalent of a finding of

delinquency–and had referenced as statutory authority section 5–3 of

the Act (now section 5–715(u), upon which respondent relies), a

provision which provides for dispositional orders of probation and

conditional discharge. This court observed that the circuit court had

not mentioned section 4–7, the predecessor of section 5–615, which

allowed a continuance under supervision only before a finding of

delinquency. See J.N., 91 Ill. 2d at 128; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37,

par. 704–7. The minor in J.N. was placed on probation, not

supervision, and the conditions ordered under section 5–3 (now

section 5–715(u)) were conditions of probation, not supervision.

Simply put, J.N. does not provide precedent for placing a minor on

supervision under these circumstances. 

Nor can we reasonably construe the single, enigmatic sentence at

the end of this court’s opinion in T.W. as the genesis of an

independent basis for juvenile supervision. First, as previously noted,

to do so would undermine the holding of that disposition, a result that

was obviously not intended. Moreover, the sentence in question

actually acknowledges that the subsection at issue is one appearing in

a section pertaining to “juvenile probation.” T.W., 101 Ill. 2d at 442.

Section 5–3(2)(o), now codified as section 5–715(2)(u), is essentially

a catchall provision in a list of permissible conditions that may be

ordered in conjunction with “probation” or “conditional discharge.”

Section 5–715(2)(u) does indeed allow a court to impose conditions

consistent with court supervision after findings and adjudication, as

T.W. suggests, but those conditions are ancillary to a disposition of

probation or conditional discharge, not a continuance under

supervision.

We acknowledge, in passing, respondent’s contention that our

literal reading of section 5–615’s sequencing scheme inhibits the

ability of “minor’s counsel to freely argue that his client is not guilty

without running the risk that the minor will lose the opportunity for

court supervision,” thus “restrain[ing] the minor from freely exercising

his right to contest his guilt.” Respondent’s concern is surely more
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hyperbolic than real, for any party, or the court, can raise the prospect

of a continuance under supervision at any time prior to the entry of a

finding of guilt. If, for example, a minor respondent chooses to have

his case tried, counsel is free, at the conclusion of the evidence, to

argue his client’s innocence, while suggesting that supervision would

be appropriate should the court be inclined to find the State had

proven its case. Alternatively, the court might share its view of the

evidence with the parties and broach the possibility of supervision

prior to entering a finding of delinquency. In fact, subsection (2) of

section 5–615 appears to assume consultation of the parties and the

court after a trial, but prior to the entry of findings and adjudication,

insofar as it states, upon an objection to a continuance under

supervision by any party entitled to object, the court shall proceed “to

findings and adjudication.” Clearly, consultation is envisioned after

trial, but before there is a formal finding of delinquency. Indeed, it is

not a novel mode of procedure for a court to signal its intentions to

the parties under certain circumstances. Analogous “what if”

discussions are commonplace between the parties and the court when

tentative plea agreements are undertaken pursuant to Supreme Court

Rule 402(d) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d)). We thus reject the respondent’s

claim that the sequencing mandates of section 5–615 “restrain” the

minor from freely exercising his right to contest his guilt.

In sum, respondent lacks standing to challenge the

constitutionality of the statutory provision in question because she was

not adversely affected by its operation. See Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at

425. Consequently, we will not address the constitutional claims she

raises. We recognize that lack of standing was not raised by the State

in the appellate court; however, an appellee may raise any argument

or basis supported by the record to show the correctness of the

judgment below, even though he had not previously advanced such an

argument. People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 220 (1991). Moreover, this

court, in determining the correctness of the result reached by the

appellate court, is in no way constrained by the appellate court’s

reasoning and may affirm on any basis supported by the record.

People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 296 (2005). Insofar as it affirmed the
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judgment of the circuit court, the result reached by the appellate court

was correct. On that basis, we affirm the judgment of the appellate

court.

Affirmed.