(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

ET AL. v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

No. 19–177. Argued May 5, 2020—Decided June 29, 2020 

In the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 

Malaria Act of 2003, as relevant here, Congress limited the funding of 

American and foreign nongovernmental organizations to those with “a

policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” 22 U. S. C. 

§7631(f). In 2013, that Policy Requirement, as it is known, was held

to be an unconstitutional restraint on free speech when applied to

American organizations. Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for 

Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U. S. 205. Those American organizations

now challenge the requirement’s constitutionality when applied to 

their legally distinct foreign affiliates. The District Court held that the 

Government was prohibited from enforcing the requirement against 

the foreign affiliates, and the Second Circuit affirmed. 

Held: Because plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates possess no First Amendment 

rights, applying the Policy Requirement to them is not unconstitutional. Two bedrock legal principles lead to this conclusion. As a matter of American constitutional law, foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not possess rights under the U. S. Constitution. See, e.g., 

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 770–771. And as a matter of American corporate law, separately incorporated organizations are separate

legal units with distinct legal rights and obligations. See, e.g., Dole 

Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468, 474–475. That conclusion corresponds to Congress’s historical practice of conditioning funding to

foreign organizations, which helps ensure that U. S. foreign aid serves 

U. S. interests. 

Plaintiffs’ counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, they claim 
2 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR 

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Syllabus 

that because a foreign affiliate’s policy statement may be attributed to 

them, American organizations themselves possess a First Amendment 

right against the Policy Requirement’s imposition on their foreign affiliates. First Amendment cases involving speech misattribution between formally distinct speakers, see, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American 

Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 574– 

575, however, are premised on something missing here: Government

compulsion to associate with another entity. Even protecting the free

speech rights of only those foreign organizations that are closely identified with American organizations would deviate from the fundamental principle that foreign organizations operating abroad do not possess rights under the U. S. Constitution and enmesh the courts in

difficult line-drawing exercises. Second, plaintiffs assert that the 

Court’s 2013 decision encompassed both American organizations and 

their foreign affiliates. That decision did not facially invalidate the 

Act’s funding condition, suggest that the First Amendment requires 

the Government to exempt plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates or other foreign 

organizations from the Policy Requirement, or purport to override 

longstanding constitutional law and corporate law principles. Pp. 3– 

9. 

911 F. 3d 104, reversed. 

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a 

concurring opinion. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. KAGAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
 

 

 

 

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Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that 

corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 19–177 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN 

SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[June 29, 2020] 

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court. 

In 2003, Congress passed and President George W. Bush

signed the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, 

Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act, known as the Leadership 

Act. 117 Stat. 711, as amended, 22 U. S. C. §7601 et seq.

Aiming to enhance America’s response to the ravages of the 

global HIV/AIDS crisis, the Leadership Act launched “the 

largest international public health program of its kind ever

created.” §7601(29). The Act has helped save an estimated 

17 million lives, primarily in Africa, and is widely viewed 

as the most successful American foreign aid program since 

the Marshall Plan. 

To advance the global relief effort, Congress has allocated 

billions of dollars to American and foreign nongovernmental organizations that combat HIV/AIDS abroad. As relevant here, Congress sought to fund only those organizations

that have, or agree to have, a “policy explicitly opposing 

prostitution and sex trafficking.” §7631(f ); see also 

§7631(e); 45 CFR §89.1 (2019). Congress imposed that con-
2 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR 

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Opinion of the Court 

dition on funding, known as the Policy Requirement, because Congress found that prostitution and sex trafficking 

“are additional causes of and factors in the spread of the 

HIV/AIDS epidemic” and that prostitution and sex trafficking “are degrading to women and children.” §7601(23).

Plaintiffs are American nongovernmental organizations

that receive Leadership Act funds to fight HIV/AIDS

abroad. Plaintiffs have long maintained that they do not

want to express their agreement with the American commitment to eradicating prostitution. Plaintiffs consider a 

public stance of neutrality toward prostitution more helpful 

to their sensitive work in some parts of the world and also 

to their full participation in the global efforts to prevent 

HIV/AIDS.

After enactment of the Leadership Act, plaintiffs challenged the Policy Requirement, alleging that it violated the 

First Amendment. In 2013, this Court agreed, concluding 

that the Policy Requirement ran afoul of the free speech 

principle that the Government “may not deny a benefit to a 

person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech.” Agency for Int’l Development 

v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U. S. 205, 214 

(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the 

Policy Requirement no longer applies to American organizations that receive Leadership Act funds, meaning that 

American organizations can obtain Leadership Act funds

even if they do not have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking. 

But as has been the case since 2003, foreign organizations

that receive Leadership Act funds remain subject to the Policy Requirement and still must have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking. Following this 

Court’s 2013 decision barring the Government from enforcing the Policy Requirement against American organizations, plaintiffs returned to court, invoking the First 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

Amendment and seeking to bar the Government from enforcing the Policy Requirement against plaintiffs’ legally 

distinct foreign affiliates. The U. S. District Court for the 

Southern District of New York agreed with plaintiffs and 

prohibited the Government from enforcing the Policy Requirement against plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates. The U. S. 

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Judge 

Straub dissented. He described as “startling” the proposition that the First Amendment could extend to foreign organizations operating abroad. 911 F. 3d 104, 112 (2018). 

The Second Circuit’s decision was stayed pending this 

Court’s review, meaning that foreign organizations currently remain subject to the Policy Requirement.

We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ___ (2019), and now reverse the judgment of the Second Circuit. Plaintiffs’ position runs headlong into two bedrock principles of American

law. 

First, it is long settled as a matter of American constitutional law that foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not 

possess rights under the U. S. Constitution. Plaintiffs do 

not dispute that fundamental principle. Tr. of Oral Arg. 

58–59; see, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U. S. 723, 770– 

771 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 558–559 

(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 265–275 (1990); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763, 784 (1950); United States ex rel. 

Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279, 292 (1904); U. S. Const., 

Preamble. 

As the Court has recognized, foreign citizens in the 

United States may enjoy certain constitutional rights—to 

take just one example, the right to due process in a criminal

trial. See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S., at 270–271; 

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 210–213 (1982); Kwong Hai 

Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 596 (1953); Bridges v. 

Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 148 (1945); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 

U. S. 356, 369 (1886); cf. Bluman v. Federal Election 
4 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR 

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Opinion of the Court 

Comm’n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286–289 (DC 2011), aff ’d, 

565 U. S. 1104 (2012). And so too, the Court has ruled that, 

under some circumstances, foreign citizens in the U. S. Territories—or in “a territory” under the “indefinite” and “complete and total control” and “within the constant jurisdiction” of the United States—may possess certain 

constitutional rights. Boumediene, 553 U. S., at 755–771. 

But the Court has not allowed foreign citizens outside the 

United States or such U. S. territory to assert rights under 

the U. S. Constitution. If the rule were otherwise, actions 

by American military, intelligence, and law enforcement 

personnel against foreign organizations or foreign citizens 

in foreign countries would be constrained by the foreign citizens’ purported rights under the U. S. Constitution. That 

has never been the law. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S., 

at 273–274; Eisentrager, 339 U. S., at 784.* To be sure, 

Congress may seek to enact laws that afford foreign citizens 

abroad statutory rights or causes of action against misconduct by U. S. Government officials, or laws that otherwise 

regulate the conduct of U. S. officials abroad. See Verdugo-

—————— 

*As Justice Jackson stated for the Court in Eisentrager: 

 “If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world . . . , the 

same must be true of the companion civil-rights Amendments, for none 

of them is limited by its express terms, territorially or as to persons. 

Such a construction would mean that during military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements, guerrilla fighters, and ‘werewolves’ could require the American Judiciary to assure them freedoms of speech, press, 

and assembly as in the First Amendment, right to bear arms as in the 

Second, security against ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures as in the 

Fourth, as well as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 

 “Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so 

significant an innovation in the practice of governments that, if intended 

or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No decision of this Court supports such 

a view. Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244. None of the learned commentators on our Constitution has even hinted at it.” 339 U. S., at 784–

785. 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Urquidez, 494 U. S., at 275; cf. 10 U. S. C. §§2734(a),

2734a(a); 18 U. S. C. §2340A; 21 U. S. C. §904; 22 U. S. C.

§§2669, 2669–1; 42 U. S. C. §2000dd; but see 28 U. S. C.

§2680(k) (Federal Tort Claims Act’s exception for torts

“arising in a foreign country”). Plaintiffs did not raise any 

such statutory claim in this case. 

Second, it is long settled as a matter of American corporate law that separately incorporated organizations are 

separate legal units with distinct legal rights and obligations. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468, 474– 

475 (2003); Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 

U. S. 158, 163 (2001); P. Blumberg, K. Strasser, N. Georgakopoulos, & E. Gouvin, Corporate Groups §§6.01, 6.02, 

6.05 (2020 Supp.).

Plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates were incorporated in other 

countries and are legally separate from plaintiffs’ American

organizations. Even though the foreign organizations have

affiliated with the American organizations, the foreign organizations remain legally distinct from the American organizations. Plaintiffs do not ask this Court to pierce the 

corporate veil, nor do they invoke any other relevant exception to that fundamental corporate law principle. Tr. of 

Oral Arg. 54. 

Those two bedrock principles of American constitutional 

law and American corporate law together lead to a simple

conclusion: As foreign organizations operating abroad, 

plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates possess no rights under the First 

Amendment. 

That conclusion corresponds to historical practice regarding American foreign aid. The United States supplies more 

foreign aid than any other nation in the world. Cong. Research Serv., Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U. S. 

Programs and Policy (2020) (Summary). Acting with the

President in the legislative process, Congress sometimes 

imposes conditions on foreign aid. See 22 U. S. C. §§2271, 

2272, 2371, 7110(g)(2). Congress may condition funding on 
6 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR 

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Opinion of the Court 

a foreign organization’s ideological commitments—for example, pro-democracy, pro-women’s rights, anti-terrorism, 

pro-religious freedom, anti-sex trafficking, or the like. Doing so helps ensure that U. S. foreign aid serves U. S. interests. By contrast, plaintiffs’ approach would throw a constitutional wrench into American foreign policy. In 

particular, plaintiffs’ approach would put Congress in the 

untenable position of either cutting off certain funding programs altogether, or instead funding foreign organizations 

that may not align with U. S. values. We see no constitutional justification for the Federal Judiciary to interfere in 

that fashion with American foreign policy and American aid 

to foreign organizations.

In short, plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates are foreign organizations, and foreign organizations operating abroad have no

First Amendment rights. 

To overcome that conclusion, plaintiffs advance two main 

arguments. But neither persuades us. 

First, plaintiffs theorize that the foreign affiliates’ required statement of policy against prostitution and sex trafficking may be incorrectly attributed to the American organizations. Therefore, the theory goes, the American 

organizations themselves possess a First Amendment right

against imposition of the Policy Requirement on their foreign affiliates.

As support, plaintiffs point to First Amendment cases involving speech misattribution between formally distinct 

speakers. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 

and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 574–575 

(1995); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of 

Cal., 475 U. S. 1, 15 (1986) (plurality opinion); cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 87 (1980). 

But the constitutional issue in those cases arose because 

the State forced one speaker to host another speaker’s 

speech. See Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572–573; Pacific Gas, 475 

U. S., at 15; cf. PruneYard, 447 U. S., at 85, 87. Here, by 
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

contrast, the United States is not forcing plaintiffs to affiliate with foreign organizations. Plaintiffs are free to choose 

whether to affiliate with foreign organizations and are free

to disclaim agreement with the foreign affiliates’ required 

statement of policy. Any alleged misattribution in this case

and any effect on the American organizations’ message of

neutrality toward prostitution stems from their choice to affiliate with foreign organizations, not from U. S. Government compulsion. Because the First Amendment 

misattribution cases are premised on government compulsion to associate with another entity, those cases do not apply here.

In support of their misattribution argument, plaintiffs

also cite Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 

461 U. S. 540, 544–545, and n. 6 (1983). But as relevant 

here, that case simply explained that a speech restriction

on a corporate entity did not prevent a separate affiliate

from speaking, a point that is not disputed in this case.

We appreciate that plaintiffs would prefer to affiliate 

with foreign organizations that do not oppose prostitution.

But Congress required foreign organizations to oppose prostitution in return for American funding. And plaintiffs cannot export their own First Amendment rights to shield foreign organizations from Congress’s funding conditions.

Stressing that their position is limited, plaintiffs emphasize that the Court could narrowly decide to protect the free

speech rights of only those foreign organizations that are 

closely identified with American organizations—for example, those foreign affiliates that share similar names, logos, 

and brands with American organizations. According to 

plaintiffs, those “closely identified” scenarios greatly increase the risk of misattribution. But again, the First

Amendment cases involving speech misattribution arose 

when the State forced one speaker to host another speaker’s 

speech. No compulsion is present here. Moreover, plaintiffs’ proposed line-drawing among foreign organizations 
 

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Opinion of the Court 

would blur a clear rule of American law: Foreign organizations operating abroad do not possess rights under the U. S. 

Constitution. Plaintiffs’ carve-out not only would deviate 

from that fundamental principle, but also would enmesh

the courts in difficult line-drawing exercises—how closely 

identified is close enough?—and leave courts without any

principled basis for making those judgments. We discern 

no good reason to invent a new and legally unmoored exception to longstanding principles of American constitutional 

and corporate law. 

Second, plaintiffs argue that the Court’s 2013 decision in

this case encompassed both plaintiffs’ American organizations and their foreign affiliates, meaning that, in plaintiffs’ 

view, the Court has already resolved the issue before us. 

That is not correct. The plaintiffs in the 2013 case were 

these same American organizations. It is true that the 

Court considered the possibility that an American organization could work through affiliates to potentially avoid the 

burdens of the otherwise-unconstitutional application of 

the Policy Requirement. But the Court rejected that alternative, which in essence would have compelled the American organizations to affiliate with other organizations. The 

Court instead ruled that the Policy Requirement may not

be applied to plaintiffs’ American organizations. Therefore, 

plaintiffs’ current affiliations with foreign organizations are 

their own choice, not the result of any U. S. Government

compulsion.

Stated simply, in the prior decision, the Court did not facially invalidate the Act’s condition on funding. The Court 

did not hold or suggest that the First Amendment requires

the Government to exempt plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates or 

other foreign organizations from the Policy Requirement.

And the Court did not purport to override the longstanding 

constitutional law principle that foreign organizations operating abroad do not possess constitutional rights, or the

elementary corporate law principle that each corporation is 
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

a separate legal unit.

The dissent emphasizes that this case concerns “the First 

Amendment rights of American organizations.” Post, at 1 

(opinion of BREYER, J.). We respectfully disagree with that

characterization of the question presented. The Court’s 

prior decision recognized the First Amendment rights of 

American organizations and held that American organizations do not have to comply with the Policy Requirement.

This case instead concerns foreign organizations that are

voluntarily affiliated with American organizations. Those 

foreign organizations are legally separate from the American organizations. And because foreign organizations operating abroad do not possess constitutional rights, those foreign organizations do not have a First Amendment right to 

disregard the Policy Requirement. 

In sum, plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates are foreign organizations, and foreign organizations operating abroad possess

no rights under the U. S. Constitution. We reverse the 

judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit. 

It is so ordered. 

JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
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THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 19–177 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN 

SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[June 29, 2020] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 

I agree with the Court that the Policy Requirement does

not violate the First Amendment as applied to respondents’

foreign affiliates, and I agree that nothing about this 

Court’s decision in Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance 

for Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U. S. 205 (2013) (AOSI I),

suggests otherwise. See ante, at 8–9. I write separately to

note my continued disagreement with AOSI I and to explain that the Policy Requirement does not violate the First

Amendment for a far simpler reason: It does not compel anyone to say anything.

In AOSI I, the Court erred by holding that the Policy Requirement violated respondents’ First Amendment rights

by conditioning their receipt of Leadership Act* funds on 

the affirmation of certain program objectives. “The First 

Amendment does not mandate a viewpoint-neutral government.” AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 221 (Scalia, J., joined by 

THOMAS, J., dissenting). Thus, the Government may require those who seek to carry out federally funded programs 

—————— 

*As the Court explains, the United States Leadership Against 

HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), 22

U. S. C. §7601 et seq., “allocate[s] billions of dollars to American and foreign nongovernmental organizations that combat HIV/AIDS abroad.” 

Ante, at 1. 
 

2 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR 

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THOMAS, J., concurring 

to support the Government’s objectives with regard to those 

programs. Ibid. After all, the Constitution itself “impos[es] 

affirmative ideological commitments prerequisite to assisting in the government’s work.” Id., at 227. It excludes viewpoints such as communism and anarchism, stating that

those engaged in government work must swear an oath to 

support our Constitution’s republican form of government. 

See Art. VI, cl. 3. 

Moreover, the mere conditioning of funds on “‘the affirmation of a belief’” tied to the purpose of a government program involves “no compulsion at all.” AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 

226 (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting). Such a 

condition is “the reasonable price of admission to a limited 

government-spending program that each organization remains free to accept or reject.” Ibid. Just as respondents

are not compelled to associate with their foreign affiliates, 

see ante, at 6–8, they are not compelled to participate in the 

Leadership Act program. 

The Policy Requirement does not violate the First

Amendment, regardless of whether it is applied to respondents, respondents’ legally distinct foreign affiliates, or any

other organization, foreign or domestic. Because the Court 

properly rejects respondents’ attempt to extend our erroneous precedent, I join its opinion in full. 
 

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BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 19–177 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 

ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN 

SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[June 29, 2020] 

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting. 

The Court, in my view, asks the wrong question and gives

the wrong answer. This case is not about the First Amendment rights of foreign organizations. It is about—and has 

always been about—the First Amendment rights of American organizations.

The last time this case came before us, those American 

organizations vindicated their constitutional right to speak 

freely, both at home and abroad. In Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc., 570 U. S. 205 

(2013) (AOSI I ), we held that the First Amendment forbids

the Government from distorting their speech by requiring,

as a condition of receiving federal funds, that they “pledge 

allegiance” to a state-sponsored message. Id., at 220. 

This time, the question is whether the American organizations enjoy that same constitutional protection against

government-compelled distortion when they speak through 

clearly identified affiliates that have been incorporated 

overseas. The answer to that question, as I see it, is yes.

I dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusion. 
 

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BREYER, J., dissenting 

I 

To understand the issue now before us, one must appreciate how it got here. Given this litigation’s lengthy history,

that requires a rather detailed look at why this dispute first

arose, what we decided in our prior decision (namely, 

AOSI I ), and where the case proceeded from there. 

A 

As we explained in AOSI I, the plaintiffs in this action 

(respondents in this Court then and now) “are a group of

domestic organizations engaged in combating HIV/AIDS 

overseas.” Id., at 210. Their lifesaving work spans multiple 

continents. Id., at 211. For example, respondents run “programs aimed at limiting injection drug use in Uzbekistan, 

Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, preventing mother-to-child

HIV transmission in Kenya, and promoting safer sex practices in India.” Ibid. Respondents also counsel high-risk 

populations such as sex workers, encourage foreign governments to adopt beneficial public policies, and share information about best practices in publications and at conferences. See ibid.; App. 171, 217, 222, 419. To support these

international efforts, respondents must make fundraising 

appeals to donors worldwide. See, e.g., id., at 366, 384, 431– 

433, 457. But crucially for both their mission and for this

case, respondents also “receive billions [of dollars] annually 

in financial assistance from the United States.” AOSI I, 

570 U. S., at 210. 

One of respondents’ primary sources of federal funding is

the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. 117 Stat. 711, as amended, 

22 U. S. C. §7601 et seq. (Leadership Act). Congress enacted the Leadership Act with the goal of creating “a ‘comprehensive, integrated’ strategy to combat HIV/AIDS

around the world.” AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 209 (quoting 

§7611(a)). To that end, the statute allocates considerable 

federal dollars to nongovernmental organizations fighting 
 

 

 

 

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BREYER, J., dissenting 

HIV/AIDS abroad. Id., at 209–211. 

But Leadership Act funding comes with strings attached.

Two, in particular. First, no Leadership Act funds “‘may be

used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of

prostitution or sex trafficking.’” Id., at 210 (quoting

§7631(e)). Second, with some exceptions not relevant here,

any recipient of Leadership Act funds must have “‘a policy 

explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.’” Id., at 

210 (quoting §7631(f )). The first condition limiting how

Leadership Act funds may be spent has never been challenged in this litigation. Id., at 210. What has driven this 

decades-long dispute is the second condition, the “Policy Requirement” that requires recipients to espouse a government message. Ibid. 

Concerned that “adopting a policy explicitly opposing 

prostitution” could “alienate certain host governments” and 

“mak[e] it more difficult to work with prostitutes in the 

fight against HIV/AIDS,” respondents sued. Id., at 211. 

They asserted that the Policy Requirement put an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds and was 

thus unenforceable. Id., at 212. Accordingly, as the case 

came to us in AOSI I, the question was whether this funding condition violated respondents’ First Amendment

rights. Id., at 211. 

B 

The answer, we held in AOSI I, was yes. Our reasoning

then demands close inspection now. 

To begin, we observed in AOSI I that “the Policy Requirement would plainly violate the First Amendment” if it operated “as a direct regulation of speech.” Id., at 213. Commanding someone to speak a government message

contravenes the “basic First Amendment principle that

‘freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling 

people what they must say.’” Ibid. (quoting Rumsfeld v. 

Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 
 

 

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U. S. 47, 61 (2006) (FAIR)); see also, e.g., West Virginia Bd. 

of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943); Wooley v. 

Maynard, 430 U. S. 705, 717 (1977).

That the Policy Requirement is a funding condition, rather than a direct command, complicated the analysis in 

AOSI I but did not change the outcome. True, Congress’

Article I spending power “includes the authority to impose 

limits on the use of [federal] funds to ensure they are used”

as “Congress intends,” even conditions that “may affect the

recipient’s exercise of its First Amendment rights.” AOSI I, 

570 U. S., at 213–214. That is all the first (and unchallenged) Leadership Act condition does by forbidding federal

funds from being used to promote prostitution or sex trafficking. See id., at 217–218. Congress may not, however,

“leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours”

of the program it has chosen to subsidize. Id., at 214–215. 

That, as we will see, is what the Policy Requirement does—

and why we held in AOSI I that this second condition violated respondents’ First Amendment rights.

The constitutional line is whether a funding condition

helps “specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize” or

instead seeks to “reach [speech] outside” the federal program. Id., at 214, 217. We recognized in AOSI I that this 

line “is not always self-evident.” Id., at 217. To “hel[p] illustrate the distinction,” our decision gave two examples 

from our precedents. Id., at 215. 

As an example of what the Government may not do, we 

pointed to our decision FCC v. League of Women Voters of 

Cal., 468 U. S. 364 (1984). There, the Government required

noncommercial broadcasters receiving federal financial assistance to refrain from editorializing entirely; they could 

not even “establish [an] ‘affiliate’ organizatio[n]” to editorialize on their behalf “with nonfederal funds.” Id., at 400. 

By giving a broadcaster no way “to make known its views 

on matters of public importance,” the funding condition in 

League of Women Voters violated the First Amendment. 
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BREYER, J., dissenting 

Id., at 400–401. That condition, as we put it in AOSI I, 

“went beyond” ensuring that federal funds did not subsidize 

the broadcasters’ editorial content and therefore distorted 

their “speech outside the scope of the program.” 570 U. S., 

at 216. 

Just the opposite was true in Regan v. Taxation With 

Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540 (1983), the case we 

cited in AOSI I as an example of what the Government may

do. In Regan, a nonprofit group received tax-exempt status

as a §501(c)(3) organization on the condition that the organization not engage in lobbying. AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 215 

(citing Regan, 461 U. S., at 544). Even though this condition on federal financial assistance affected the nonprofit’s 

exercise of First Amendment rights, the condition was constitutional because it “did not prohibit [the nonprofit] from

lobbying Congress altogether.” 570 U. S., at 215. 

Specifically, the nonprofit in Regan—unlike the broadcasters in League of Women Voters—was permitted to establish an affiliate to carry on its lobbying activities as a 

§501(c)(4) organization. AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 215 (citing 

Regan, 461 U. S., at 544). The nonprofit could thus act

(and speak) through two corporate entities: The §501(c)(3) 

organization could get the tax exemption (but not lobby),

while the §501(c)(4) organization could lobby (but not get 

the tax exemption). 570 U. S., at 215. Since requiring the 

nonprofit to adopt this “‘dual structure’” was not “‘unduly 

burdensome,’” the condition in Regan “did not deny the

[nonprofit] a government benefit ‘on account of its intention 

to lobby.’” 570 U. S., at 215 (quoting Regan, 461 U. S., at 

545, and n. 6). The condition was thus constitutional, even 

though it essentially compelled the nonprofit to affiliate 

with other organizations. See 570 U. S., at 215.

 In AOSI I, we held “that the Policy Requirement falls on 

the unconstitutional side of the line” separating League of 

Women Voters (unconstitutional) and Regan (constitutional). 570 U. S., at 217. Like the funding condition in 
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League of Women Voters, we explained, the Policy Requirement affects protected speech outside the scope of the federal program. 570 U. S., at 218. “By requiring recipients to

profess a specific belief,” it “goes beyond defining” the program “to defining the recipient” in the eyes of their global 

audience. Ibid. Respondents cannot “avow [a] belief dictated by” the Government “when spending Leadership Act

funds, and then turn around and assert a contrary belief, or 

claim neutrality,” when acting on their “own time and 

dime.” Ibid. The Policy Requirement thus conditioned

funding on an across-the-board distortion of respondents’ 

message. See ibid. 

We further explained in AOSI I—and this is critical— 

why we could not accept the Government’s suggestion that 

the case was just a redux of Regan. In AOSI I, the Government suggested a similar “dual-structure” solution to the

First Amendment problem. Like the nonprofit in Regan, 

the Government noted, respondents could act (and speak) 

through two corporate entities: One organization could receive Leadership Act funds on respondents’ behalf (and

comply with the Policy Requirement), while a legally separate affiliate could communicate respondents’ preferred 

message (and not receive Leadership Act funds)—or vice 

versa. AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 219. True enough. But we 

rejected the Government’s argument all the same. 

Why did we reject it? Because corporate formalities do 

nothing to ward off speech distortion where—like AOSI I, 

but unlike Regan—the Government has required a speaker 

to “espouse a specific belief as its own.” 570 U. S., at 219. 

“If the affiliate is distinct from the recipient,” we reasoned,

“the arrangement does not afford a means for the recipient 

to express its beliefs.” Ibid. And if “the affiliate is more 

clearly identified with the recipient, the recipient can express those beliefs only at the price of evident hypocrisy.” 

Ibid. With respect to the latter situation, in other words,

compelling a recipient to disavow a message involuntarily 
 

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BREYER, J., dissenting 

uttered by its clearly identified affiliate is forced hypocrisy,

not free speech. See ibid. 

In sum, the Policy Requirement conditioned federal funds 

on an unavoidable and irreversible distortion of respondents’ protected speech. We therefore held in AOSI I that 

the Policy Requirement “violates the First Amendment and 

cannot be sustained.” Id., at 221. 

C 

On remand from our decision, the District Court did what 

district courts ought to do. It “tailor[ed] ‘the scope of the

remedy’ to fit ‘the nature and extent of the constitutional 

violation’” that we identified in AOSI I. Hills v. Gautreaux, 

425 U. S. 284, 294 (1976) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 418 

U. S. 717, 744 (1974)).

The District Court, like our Court, recognized that respondents’ work—and with it their protected speech—has

a global reach. But respondents, it turns out, use different

organizational structures to deliver services in different 

places. 106 F. Supp. 3d 355, 360–361 (SDNY 2015). Sometimes, particularly when foreign governments (or our own

government) require, respondents operate through legally 

separate affiliates incorporated abroad. Ibid.; see also, e.g., 

App. 368, 373–375.

In the District Court’s view, those corporate formalities 

did not meaningfully change the First Amendment calculus. See 106 F. Supp. 3d, at 360–361. Respondents, together with their affiliates, convey a clear, consistent message to high-risk populations, government officials, 

healthcare professionals, prospective employees, and private donors across the globe. See, e.g., App. 370–371, 391,

460–461. They share the same name, logo, and branding—

all of which use identical colors, fonts, and imagery. See, 

e.g., id., at 445–455. They adhere to shared values, work 

towards common goals, and coordinate their collective mes-
 

 

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sage. See, e.g., id., at 385–386, 404–429. To an outside observer, respondents and their affiliates are a single, cohesive unit. They speak as one.

The District Court consequently concluded that imposing 

the Policy Requirement on respondents’ affiliates—wherever they happen to have been incorporated—would force 

respondents to “expres[s] contrary positions on the same 

matter through [their] different organizational components.” 106 F. Supp. 3d, at 361. To prevent that from happening, and in keeping with the principles we set forth in 

AOSI I, the District Court enjoined enforcement of the Policy Requirement against respondents and their clearly

identified affiliates, including affiliates that were incorporated overseas. Id., at 363. The District Court thought that 

remedial order necessary to protect respondents’ own First 

Amendment rights—rights that, as American organizations, respondents unquestionably have. Id., at 361. 

The Court of Appeals understood the District Court’s order that way, too. “The narrow issue before” us, the Court 

of Appeals explained, “is whether applying the Policy Requirement to [respondents’] closely aligned foreign affiliates violates [respondents’] own First Amendment rights.”

911 F. 3d 104, 109 (CA2 2018). The Court of Appeals held 

that the answer was yes and affirmed on that basis. 

Ibid. We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ 

decision. 

II 

The road has been long, but we have arrived at the specific question now before us: whether enforcing the Policy 

Requirement against respondents’ clearly identified foreign 

affiliates violates respondents’ own First Amendment 

rights. Like the District Court and the Court of Appeals, 

I believe the answer is yes. 

 Our reasoning in AOSI I, along with the body of precedent on which it relied, should decide this case. Just as 
 

 

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compelling a clearly identified domestic affiliate to espouse

a government message distorts respondents’ own protected 

speech, AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 219, so too does compelling a 

clearly identified foreign affiliate to espouse the same government message. Either way, federal funding conditioned 

on that affirmative avowal of belief comes at an unconstitutionally high “price of evident hypocrisy.” Ibid. 

Properly understood, our speech-misattribution cases—

in particular Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557 (1995)—confirm 

that common-sense conclusion. Any other result would undermine First Amendment protections for the countless 

American speakers who address audiences overseas. 

A 

Respondents should prevail here for the same reasons 

they prevailed in AOSI I. When respondents speak through

legally separate but clearly identified affiliates, we held, 

that speech is attributed to respondents for First Amendment purposes. AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 219. So when the 

Government demands as a condition of federal funding that

their clearly identified affiliate “espouse a specific belief as

its own,” respondents may express a contrary view through 

some other corporate channel only on pain of appearing 

hypocritical. Ibid. Leveraging Congress’ Article I spending 

power to distort respondents’ protected speech in this way

therefore violates respondents’ First Amendment rights—

whatever else might be said about the affiliate’s own First 

Amendment rights (or asserted lack thereof ). Ibid. 

These principles apply with full force to the dispute now 

before us. Respondents and their affiliates receive federal 

funding to fight HIV/AIDS overseas. What has been at 

stake in this case from the beginning, then, is protected 

speech often aimed at audiences abroad. Our decision in 

AOSI I shielded respondents’ global message from govern-
 

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ment-compelled distortion in the eyes of those foreign audiences, as well as listeners here at home. Ibid. Yet in the 

wake of our ruling, respondents have continued to suffer 

that exact same First Amendment harm. 

True, respondents’ international mission sometimes requires that they convey their message through affiliates incorporated in far-off countries, rather than registered here

at home. But so what? Audiences everywhere attribute 

speech based on whom they perceive to be speaking, not on 

corporate paperwork they will never see. What mattered in 

AOSI I was thus how “clearly identified” the affiliates were

with respondents, not the fact that the affiliates were incorporated as separate legal entities. Ibid. And what matters 

now is once again how “clearly identified” the affiliates are

with respondents, not the fact that the affiliates were incorporated as foreign legal entities.

The First Amendment question therefore hinges, as it did 

before, on what an objective observer sees, hears, and understands when respondents speak through their foreign

affiliates. As to that, not even the Government meaningfully disputes that respondents and their foreign affiliates

are clearly identified with one another. Their appearances 

are the same. Their goals are the same. Their values are 

the same. Their message is the same. Leveraging Congress’ 

spending power to demand speech from respondents’ foreign affiliates distorts that shared message—and violates 

respondents’ First Amendment rights. So while respondents and their clearly identified foreign affiliates may be

technically different entities with respect to such matters

as contracts, taxes, and torts, they are constitutionally the 

same speaker when it comes to the protected speech at issue in this case. 

This two-entities-one-speaker principle is an established 

part of our First Amendment jurisprudence. Take Regan.

To refresh, in that case we upheld a ban on engaging in certain protected speech (lobbying) that the federal tax code 
 

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BREYER, J., dissenting 

imposed on a nonprofit’s §501(c)(3) organization because 

the nonprofit could still speak through a separate §501(c)(4)

organization. See 461 U. S., at 544. Put simply, one

speaker (the nonprofit) could act (and speak) through two

legally separate entities (the §501(c)(3) and §501(c)(4) organizations).

Recall also our similar observation in League of Women 

Voters. There we noted that a funding condition’s ban on 

editorializing would have been constitutional if, in contrast

to the law at issue, the statute let noncommercial broadcasters “make known” their “views on matters of public importance” by speaking through legally separate “editorializing affiliate[s].” 468 U. S., at 400. Once again, we made

clear that a single speaker can act (and speak) through two 

legally separate entities. But because the speaker in 

League of Women Voters was not free to do so, we held that 

the Government’s funding condition violated the First 

Amendment. Id., at 400–401. 

Regan and League of Women Voters are far from our only 

precedents recognizing this firmly entrenched First 

Amendment principle. See Legal Services Corporation v. 

Velazquez, 531 U. S. 533, 546 (2001) (observing that organizational affiliates may provide “alternative channel[s] for 

expression” by a single speaker); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 

173, 196–198 (1991) (similar). We reiterated that rule once 

again in AOSI I. See 570 U. S., at 215–217, 219. 

Thus, in the First Amendment context, the corporate veil

is not an iron curtain. Just the opposite. We attribute 

speech across corporate lines all the time.

Rightly so. When a funding condition restricts speech,

this familiar framework often avoids First Amendment 

problems by allowing “alternative channel[s]” for speakers

to express themselves. Velazquez, 531 U. S., at 546. And 

when a funding condition compels speech, the same logic 

leads to a similarly sensible result: The Government may 

not require you to speak out of both sides of your mouth, 
 

 

 

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even if each side happens to have been incorporated as a 

separate legal entity. See AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 219. 

A contrary approach would have led to a rather surprising result in AOSI I. Assume for a moment that the Policy

Requirement simply commanded respondents’ clearly identified affiliates to speak—the kind of “direct regulation of 

speech” that we said “would plainly violate the First 

Amendment,” id., at 213. Treating corporate lines as ironclad would mean that respondents could not object to that

direct distortion of their own message. Under all the cases 

just discussed, however, that cannot be right. And as discussed below, it is equally wrong under our cases involving 

speech misattribution. 

B 

The First Amendment protects speakers from government compulsion that is likely to cause an audience to mistake someone else’s message for the speaker’s own views. 

See, e.g., Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572–573; Pacific Gas & Elec. 

Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1, 15–16 (1986).

Corporate separation makes no meaningful difference in 

this speech-misattribution context, either. 

Consider our unanimous decision in Hurley. In that case, 

a group called the South Boston Allied War Veterans 

Council organized a parade. 515 U. S., at 560. The IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston—a 

separate group who called themselves “GLIB” for short—

wanted to participate. Id., at 561. After the Veterans 

Council said no, GLIB obtained a court order directing the 

Veterans Council to let GLIB march in the parade. Id., at 

561–562. Recognizing that “every participating unit affects

the message conveyed by the parade organizers,” we held in 

Hurley that the order distorted the Veterans Council’s protected speech. Id., at 572–573. Because GLIB wanted to 

“carr[y] its own banner” with its own message, and because 
 

 

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BREYER, J., dissenting 

onlookers would understand GLIB as “contribut[ing] something to” the parade’s “common theme,” the order “essentially requir[ed]” the Veterans Council “to alter the expressive content of their parade.” Id., at 572–573, 576. That 

violated the First Amendment. Id., at 573. 

The First Amendment violation in this case is even more 

apparent. In Hurley, the Veterans Council had merely 

“combin[ed] multifarious voices” of disparate groups without bothering to “isolate an exact message,” yet the First

Amendment protected its message from governmentcompelled distortion all the same. Id., at 569. Respondents 

in this case have done the Veterans Council one better. 

They have carefully constructed a cogent message and marshaled their clearly identified foreign affiliates to express it

across the globe. See supra, at 7–8, 10. 

 Furthermore, in Hurley we could only speculate about

what GLIB’s exact message was and why the Veterans 

Council did not want to be associated with it. See 515 U. S., 

at 574–575. But here we know exactly what the challenged 

message is (“a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and 

sex trafficking”) and why respondents don’t want to be associated with it (the message, among other things, purportedly “‘stigmatizes one of the very groups whose trust [respondents] must earn to conduct effective HIV/AIDS

prevention’”). 22 U. S. C. §7631(f ); Brief for Respondents 

11. For that reason as well, the First Amendment injury in 

this case is open, obvious, and unusually well defined. 

True, Hurley and our other speech-misattribution cases

dealt with a speaker complaining about being forced to affiliate with someone else’s speech, rather than (as here)

their pre-existing affiliate being forced to speak. Cf. ante, 

at 6. But that factual distinction makes no constitutional 

difference. From a First Amendment perspective, the latter

situation is just as bad or even worse, not better. 

Consider Hurley again. If, rather than requiring the Veterans Council to let GLIB march while carrying its banner, 
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the state court had ordered a previously invited marcher (or 

worse still, all previously invited marchers) to display

GLIB’s banner, the Veterans Council would have prevailed 

all the same. By compelling speech from an existing affiliate (or all of them), that order would have required, even 

more brazenly, that the Veterans Council “alter the expressive content of their parade” in violation of the Veterans 

Council’s First Amendment rights. 515 U. S., at 572–573. 

So too if the state court had decreed that GLIB’s banner 

must adorn a horse, oxen, or for that matter R2–D2, a 

robot—even though those entities lack their own First

Amendment rights. Whether the transmitter of a speaker’s 

protected message does (or does not) have its own First 

Amendment rights is beside the point. Cf. Wooley, 430 

U. S., at 717 (prohibiting New Hampshire from requiring 

that the state motto adorn a driver’s car, even though cars

do not have First Amendment rights). 

There is a reason why, until today, we had not confronted

a case like the one just described. Cf. ante, at 6. Requiring

someone to host another person’s speech is often a perfectly 

legitimate thing for the Government to do. See, e.g., FAIR, 

547 U. S., at 65 (holding that the Government may require

law schools to host speech from military recruiters); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 87–88 (1980) 

(holding that the Government may require the owner of a

private shopping mall to host speech from politically 

minded pamphleteers). Even the court order at issue in 

Hurley was an understandable (though unconstitutional)

application of a “venerable” civil rights law. See 515 U. S., 

at 571. But because compelling people to profess a belief

they do not hold is almost always unconstitutional, see 

AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 213, the Government rarely dares try. 

The Government’s well-founded reticence in the past is no

reason to bless its boldness at present. 

Bottom line: The critical question here, as in Hurley, is 
 

 

 

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simply whether the Government has demanded a profession of belief that will distort the speaker’s message. How 

the Government causes that distortion makes no constitutional difference. And as explained, enforcing the Policy Requirement against respondents’ clearly identified foreign

affiliates would plainly distort respondents’ message. See 

supra, at 7–8, 10. That violates respondents’ First Amendment rights. 

C 

So far as I am aware, we have never before held that an 

American speaker forfeits First Amendment protection

when it speaks though foreign affiliates to reach audiences 

overseas. It is easy to understand why. 

Many American news networks operate through clearly 

identified foreign affiliates when speaking abroad. Viewers 

attribute that speech to an American speaker: the network.

That is the whole point of using clearly identified foreign

affiliates. For example, CNN speaks to audiences in

the Philippines, Brazil, Indonesia, and other countries

using foreign affiliates, usually styled as CNN 

Philippines, CNN Brazil, CNN Indonesia, and so on. 

See CNN Worldwide Fact Sheet (Oct. 2019), https:// 

cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/cnn-fact-sheet. But does that 

corporate structure mean that CNN—i.e., the American 

parent organization—has no First Amendment protection 

against a Government effort to, say, prevent CNN Mexico 

from covering the fatal shooting of a Mexican child by a 

U. S. Border Patrol agent? Cf. Hernández v. Mesa, 589 

U. S. ___ (2020) (Hernández II ). Or to compel CNN Mexico 

to run a different story, perhaps one produced by Government personnel, that praises American policy at the border? 

We should be highly skeptical. If the Government commandeered CNN’s clearly identified foreign affiliate in

these or similar ways, whether by monetary pressure or 
 

16 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR 

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some other means, CNN should have constitutional recourse. Some critical foreign policy interests might complicate the First Amendment calculus—say, a wartime need

to keep future battle plans secret. But nothing like that is 

present here. And it is difficult to accept the notion that the 

First Amendment permits the Government to suppress,

compel, or otherwise distort any and all American speech

transmitted abroad through a clearly identified foreign affiliate. 

III 

The upshot is: (1) The messages at issue here belong to 

American speakers; (2) clearly identified foreign affiliates

are a critical means of conveying those messages overseas; 

and (3) enforcing the Policy Requirement against those affiliates distorts respondents’ own protected speech—and 

thus violates respondents’ own First Amendment rights.

The majority justifies its contrary result on three main 

grounds, two of which it says are “bedrock principles” of

American law. See ante, at 3–6, 8. I do not find these arguments persuasive. 

A 

The first “bedrock principle” on which the majority relies 

is the supposedly long-settled, across-the-board rule “that

foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not possess rights 

under the U. S. Constitution.” Ante, at 3. That sweeping

assertion is neither relevant to this case nor correct on the 

law. 

It is not relevant because, as I have said, this case does 

not concern the constitutional rights of foreign organizations. This case concerns the constitutional rights of American organizations. Every respondent here is—and has always been—American. AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 210; see also 

Brief for Petitioners 7, 19 (acknowledging as much). No foreign entities are party to this case, and respondents have 
 

Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 17 

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never claimed that the Policy Requirement violates anyone’s First Amendment rights apart from their own. Both 

the District Court and the Court of Appeals decided the case 

on that basis. The question before us is clear: whether the 

First Amendment protects Americans when they speak 

through clearly identified foreign affiliates to reach audiences overseas. See supra, at 8. Whether the foreign affiliates themselves have their own First Amendment rights is 

not at issue. See Brief for Respondents 36, n. 3. 

Even taken on its own terms, the majority’s blanket assertion about the extraterritorial reach of our Constitution 

does not reflect the current state of the law. The idea that 

foreign citizens abroad never have constitutional rights is

not a “bedrock” legal principle. At most, one might say that

they are unlikely to enjoy very often extraterritorial protection under the Constitution. Or one might say that the matter is undecided. But this Court has studiously avoided establishing an absolute rule that forecloses that protection 

in all circumstances. 

In Hernández v. Mesa, 582 U. S. ___ (2017) (per curiam) 

(Hernández I ), for example, we specifically declined to decide the “sensitive” question whether, on the facts then before us, a Mexican citizen standing on Mexican soil had 

Fourth Amendment rights—precisely because the answer

to that extraterritoriality question “may have consequences 

that are far reaching.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5). Hernández 

later came to this Court again, and we decided the case on 

alternative grounds. See Hernández II, 589 U. S., at ___– 

___ (slip op., at 19–20). Were the majority’s categorical rule 

of (non)extraterritoriality etched in stone, we could have

disposed of Hernández the first time around in a few short 

sentences. 

Nor do the cases that the majority cites support an absolute rule. See ante, at 3. The exhaustive review of our precedents that we conducted in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 

U. S. 723 (2008), pointed to the opposite conclusion. In 
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Boumediene, we rejected the Government’s argument that

our decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763 (1950),

“adopted a formalistic” test “for determining the reach” of

constitutional protection to foreign citizens on foreign soil. 

553 U. S., at 762. This is to say, we rejected the position

that the majority propounds today. See ante, at 4, and n. 

(quoting Eisentrager at length). Its “constricted reading” of 

Eisentrager and our other precedents is not the law. See 

Boumediene, 553 U. S., at 764; see also, e.g., Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 Geo. Immigration L. J.

365, 400 (2009) (describing our cases as rejecting any absolute view).

The law, we confirmed in Boumediene, is that constitutional “questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns” present in a given case, “not

formalism” of the sort the majority invokes today. 553 

U. S., at 764. Those considerations include the extent of 

de facto U. S. Government control (if any) over foreign territory. See ante, at 4. But they also include the nature of 

the constitutional protection sought, how feasible extending 

it would be in a given case, and the foreign citizen’s status 

vis-à-vis the United States, among other pertinent circumstances that might arise. 553 U. S., at 766; see also United 

States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (providing the decisive fifth vote for 

rejecting a foreign citizen’s claim to constitutional protection on foreign soil outside U. S. control because “[t]he conditions and considerations of this case would make adherence to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement

impracticable and anomalous” (emphasis added)). Our 

precedents reject absolutism. Indeed, even our most sweeping statements about foreign citizens’ (lack of ) constitutional rights while outside U. S. Territory have come with 

limits. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U. S. 21, 32 

(1982) (noting that “an alien seeking initial admission to” 
 

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this country “has no constitutional rights regarding his application” (emphasis added)); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 

U. S. 753, 762 (1972) (similar).

There is wisdom in our past restraint. Situations where 

a foreign citizen outside U. S. Territory might fairly assert 

constitutional rights are not difficult to imagine. Long-term

permanent residents are “foreign citizens.” Does the Constitution therefore allow American officials to assault them 

at will while “outside U. S. territory”? Many international

students attend college in the United States. Does the First 

Amendment permit a public university to revoke their admission based on an unpopular political stance they took on

social media while home for the summer? Foreign citizens

who have never set foot in the United States, for that matter, often protest when Presidents travel overseas. Does 

that mean Secret Service agents can, consistent with our 

Constitution, seriously injure peaceful protestors abroad 

without any justification?

We have never purported to give a single “bedrock” answer to these or myriad other extraterritoriality questions 

that might arise in the future. To purport to do so today, in

a case where the question is not presented and where the 

matter is not briefed, is in my view a serious mistake. 

And there is no need to set forth an absolute rule here. 

Respondents have conceded that their foreign affiliates lack 

First Amendment rights of their own while acting abroad.

See ante, at 3. If in spite of everything else, the majority 

considers this point material to its decision, all that need be

said is: “We accept respondents’ concession and proceed on 

that basis.” To say so much more “run[s] contrary to the 

fundamental principal of judicial restraint,” a principle that

applies with particular force to constitutional interpretation. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 450 (2008); see also, e.g., Lyng v. 

Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, 
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445 (1988); Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C., 467 U. S. 138, 158 (1984); 

United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 21 (1960); Liverpool, 

New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885). 

B 

The majority’s second supposedly “bedrock principle” is

that “separately incorporated organizations are separate legal units with distinct legal rights and obligations.” Ante, 

at 5. Sometimes true, sometimes not. This baseline rule 

gives way in many contexts, and our First Amendment 

precedents (including AOSI I ) refute any suggestion that a

workaday principle of corporate law somehow resolves the 

constitutional issue here in dispute.

As the majority acknowledges, corporate law itself permits courts to pierce or otherwise disregard the corporate 

veil in a variety of circumstances. See ante, at 5. Those 

narrow exceptions, however, are not the only time the law 

looks past corporate formalities. For instance, we have 

treated “several nominally separate business entities” as “a

single employer” for purposes of federal labor law. Radio & 

Television Technicians v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 

380 U. S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam). Earlier this Term, 

we reaffirmed that one corporate entity may sometimes invoke the right of another, legally separate entity to compel 

arbitration. See GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS 

v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 590 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2020) (slip op., at 4). And these are far from the only relevant examples. See, e.g., American Needle, Inc. v. National 

Football League, 560 U. S. 183, 196 (2010) (observing that, 

in many antitrust cases, corporate formalities are “not determinative”).

More to the point, our First Amendment precedents leave

no doubt that corporate formalities have little to say about

the issue now before us. We have made clear again and 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 21 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

again (and again) that speech may be attributed across corporate lines in the First Amendment context—including in 

our previous opinion in this very case. See AOSI I, 570 

U. S., at 219 (concluding that speech uttered involuntarily 

by legally separate affiliates may be attributed to respondents if the affiliates are “clearly identified” with respondents); League of Women Voters, 468 U. S., at 400 (observing 

that funding conditions that restrict speech can survive 

constitutional scrutiny if the speaker may “make known its

views on matters of public importance through” a legally 

separate affiliate—and if not, not); Regan, 461 U. S., at 544 

(similar); Rust, 500 U. S., at 196–198 (similar); Velazquez, 

531 U. S., at 546–547 (similar). And these precedents further establish that merely requiring speakers to work

through affiliates is “not unduly burdensome” and can

therefore cure, rather than create, First Amendment concerns. Regan, 461 U. S., at 545, n. 6. Contra, ante, at 8 

(suggesting that such a requirement would be unconstitutional). Small wonder the majority can muster only two

context-specific and statute-specific cases—one addressing 

the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the other involving

the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act—

as affirmative support for its conclusion that corporate formalities somehow control the First Amendment question

before us. See ante, at 5 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 

538 U. S. 468 (2003), and Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. 

v. King, 533 U. S. 158 (2001)).

The majority also attempts to distinguish the facts before

us now from the facts that were before us last time. It asserts that, in contrast to the affiliations we addressed in 

AOSI I, respondents’ “current affiliations with foreign organizations are their own choice.” Ante, at 8. There are two 

problems with this. First, the description is not accurate. 

Foreign governments—and increasingly, the U. S. Government—often require respondents to work through foreign 
 

22 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR 

OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC. 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

affiliates. See, e.g., App. 368, 373–375. Second, even if respondents’ associations with foreign affiliates were voluntary, it would not solve the First Amendment problem. 

In Wooley, for example, it was the drivers’ choice to own 

a car, but that did not mean they could be compelled to convey the Government’s message on their car’s license plate.

See 430 U. S., at 717. And in Hurley, as explained, the Government would have violated the parade organizers’ First 

Amendment rights just the same if it had compelled speech

from a previously invited marcher, whether human, animal, or droid. See supra, at 13–14. Can the majority really

mean to suggest otherwise, simply because the parade organizers’ decision to invite the marcher in the first place

was “their own choice”? 

C 

The majority also makes two practical arguments, but

neither justifies the First Amendment costs of its decision. 

The majority first says that a ruling in respondents’ favor

would disrupt American foreign policy by requiring the

Government to fund “organizations that may not align with

U. S. values.” Ante, at 6. We dismissed this same concern 

in AOSI I. The Policy Requirement, we explained, does not 

merely help the Government “enlist the assistance of those 

with whom it already agrees.” AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 218. It 

pressures funding recipients “to adopt a particular belief.” 

Ibid. (emphasis added). All that is at stake here, in other 

words, is whether the Government may leverage the power

of the purse to win converts to its cause. That bare desire 

to regulate protected speech is far from any foreign policy

interest that could conceivably overcome a speaker’s

First Amendment right to convey its message free from 

government-compelled distortion. Cf. New York Times Co. 

v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).

The majority also fears that determining whether Government action creates a risk of speech misattribution (and 
Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 23 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

with it speech distortion) is a “legally unmoored” standard

rife with “difficult line-drawing exercises.” Ante, at 8. But 

we have drawn just this kind of line many times. See, e.g., 

PruneYard, 447 U. S., at 87 (holding that “views expressed 

by members of the public” in a privately owned shopping 

mall “will not likely be identified with those of the owner”); 

Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572 (holding that a marcher’s message

will likely be attributed to the parade organizer’s, since 

“every participating unit” in a parade “affects the [overall]

message”); FAIR, 547 U. S., at 65 (holding that nothing

about having military recruiters on campus “suggests that

law schools agree with any speech by recruiters”). I should 

think that the price of making difficult judgment calls is

well worth paying to protect First Amendment rights. See 

McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 209 

(2014); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U. S. 551, 570 (1972). 

And “on the facts presented in this case,” at any rate, “the

answer is clear.” Id., at 570. Enforcing the Policy Requirement violates respondents’ First Amendment rights, just as 

it did before. 

* * * 

The Court today concludes that respondents’ foreign affiliates “do not have a First Amendment right to disregard 

the Policy Requirement.” Ante, at 9. Respondents have 

never argued otherwise. Rather, throughout this litigation 

they have asserted their own First Amendment right to

speak their mind, rather than the Government’s message.

Here, respondents claim First Amendment protection when 

they speak through foreign affiliates to address audiences

abroad. By denying respondents that protection, I fear the 

Court’s decision will seriously impede the countless American speakers who communicate overseas in a similar way. 

That weakens the marketplace of ideas at a time when the 

value of that marketplace for Americans, and for others, 

reaches well beyond our shores. With respect, I dissent.