1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
ET AL

. v . ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL

.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 19–177. Argued May 5, 2020—Decided June 29, 2020
In the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and

Malaria Act of 2003, as relevant here, Congress limited the funding of American and foreign no ngovernmental organizations to those with “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” 22 U. S. C. §7631(f). In 2013, that Policy Requirement, as it is known, was held to be an unconstitutional restrain t on free speech when applied to American organizations. Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc. , 570 U. S. 205. Those American organizations now challenge the requirement’s co nstitutionality when applied to their legally distinct foreign affiliates. The District Court held that the Government was prohibited from enforcing the requirement against the foreign affiliates, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
Held : Because plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates possess no First Amendment

rights, applying the Policy Requirement to them is not unconstitu

tional. Two bedrock legal principles lead to this conclusion. As a mat

ter of American constitutional law, foreign citizens outside U. S. terri

tory do not possess rights under the U. S. Constitution. See, e.g. , Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U. S. 723, 770–771. And as a matter of Amer

ican corporate law, separately incorp orated organizations are separate legal units with distinct legal rights and obligations. See, e.g. , Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U. S. 468, 474–475. That conclusion cor

responds to Congress’s historical practice of conditioning funding to foreign organizations, which helps ensu re that U. S. foreign aid serves U. S. interests.

Plaintiffs’ counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, they claim2 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC. Syllabus
that because a foreign affiliate’s po licy statement may be attributed to them, American organizations them selves possess a First Amendment right against the Policy Requirement’ s imposition on their foreign af

filiates. First Amendment cases in volving speech misattribution be

tween formally distinct speakers, see, e.g. , Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 574– 575, however, are premised on something missing here: Government compulsion to associate with another entity. Even protecting the free speech rights of only those foreign organizations that are closely iden

tified with American organization s would deviate from the fundamen

tal principle that foreign organiza tions operating abroad do not pos

sess rights under the U. S. Consti tution and enmesh the courts in difficult line-drawing exercises. Second, plaintiffs assert that the Court’s 2013 decision encompassed both American organizations and their foreign affiliates. That deci sion did not facially invalidate the Act’s funding condition, suggest th at the First Amendment requires the Government to exempt plaintiffs ’ foreign affiliates or other foreign organizations from the Policy Requ irement, or purport to override longstanding constitutional law an d corporate law principles. Pp. 3– 9. 911 F. 3d 104, reversed.

K

AVANAUGH , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS , C. J., and T HOMAS , A LITO , and G ORSUCH , JJ., joined. T HOMAS , J., filed a concurring opinion. B REYER , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which G INS

BURG and S OTOMAYOR , JJ., joined. K AGAN , J., took no part in the consid

eration or decision of the case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other form al errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 19–177

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 29, 2020]

J USTICE K AVANAUGH delivered the opinion of the Court. In 2003, Congress passed and President George W. Bush signed the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act, known as the Leadership Act. 117 Stat. 711, as amended, 22 U. S. C. §7601 et seq. Aiming to enhance America’s response to the ravages of the global HIV/AIDS crisis, the Leadership Act launched “the largest international public health program of its kind ever created.” §7601(29). The Act has helped save an estimated 17 million lives, primarily in Africa, and is widely viewed as the most successful American foreign aid program since the Marshall Plan. To advance the global relief effort, Congress has allocated billions of dollars to American and foreign nongovernmen

tal organizations that combat HIV/AIDS abroad. As rele

vant here, Congress sought to fund only those organizations that have, or agree to have, a “policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” §7631(f ); see also §7631(e); 45 CFR §89.1 (2019). Congress imposed that con

-2 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC. Opinion of the Court dition on funding, known as the Policy Requirement, be

cause Congress found that prostitution and sex trafficking “are additional causes of and factors in the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic” and that prostitution and sex traffick

ing “are degrading to women and children.” §7601(23). Plaintiffs are American nongovernmental organizations that receive Leadership Act funds to fight HIV/AIDS abroad. Plaintiffs have long maintained that they do not want to express their agreement with the American com

mitment to eradicating prostitution. Plaintiffs consider a public stance of neutrality toward prostitution more helpful to their sensitive work in some parts of the world and also to their full participation in the global efforts to prevent HIV/AIDS. After enactment of the Leadership Act, plaintiffs chal

lenged the Policy Requirement, al leging that it violated the First Amendment. In 2013, this Court agreed, concluding that the Policy Requirement ran afoul of the free speech principle that the Government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally pro

tected . . . freedom of speech.” Agency for Int’l Development

v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc. , 570 U. S. 205, 214 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Policy Requirement no longer applies to American organi

zations that receive Leadership Act funds, meaning that American organizations can obtain Leadership Act funds even if they do not have a polic y explicitly opposing prosti

tution and sex trafficking. But as has been the case since 2003, foreign organizations that receive Leadership Act funds remain subject to the Pol

icy Requirement and still must have a policy explicitly op

posing prostitution and sex trafficking. Following this Court’s 2013 decision barring the Government from enforc

ing the Policy Requirement against American organiza

tions, plaintiffs returned to court, invoking the First3 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

Opinion of the Court Amendment and seeking to bar the Government from en

forcing the Policy Requirement against plaintiffs’ legally distinct foreign affiliates. The U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York agreed with plaintiffs and prohibited the Government from enforcing the Policy Re

quirement against plaintiffs’ fo reign affiliates. The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Judge Straub dissented. He described as “startling” the proposi

tion that the First Amendment could extend to foreign or

ganizations operating abroad. 911 F. 3d 104, 112 (2018). The Second Circuit’s decision was stayed pending this Court’s review, meaning that foreign organizations cur

rently remain subject to the Policy Requirement. We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ___ (2019), and now re

verse the judgment of the Seco nd Circuit. Plaintiffs’ posi

tion runs headlong into two bedrock principles of American law. First , it is long settled as a matter of American constitu

tional law that foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not possess rights under the U. S. Constitution. Plaintiffs do not dispute that fundamental principle. Tr. of Oral Arg. 58–59; see, e.g. , Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U. S. 723, 770– 771 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U. S. 507, 558–559 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); United States v. Verdugo-Ur

quidez , 494 U. S. 259, 265–275 (1990); Johnson v. Eisen

trager , 339 U. S. 763, 784 (1950); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams , 194 U. S. 279, 292 (1904); U. S. Const., Preamble. As the Court has recognized, foreign citizens in the United States may enjoy certain constitutional rights—to take just one example, the right to due process in a criminal trial. See, e.g. , Verdugo-Urquidez , 494 U. S., at 270–271; Plyler v. Doe , 457 U. S. 202, 210–213 (1982); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding , 344 U. S. 590, 596 (1953); Bridges v. Wixon , 326 U. S. 135, 148 (1945); Yick Wo v. Hopkins , 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886); cf. Bluman v. Federal Election4 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC. Opinion of the Court

Comm’n , 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286–289 (DC 2011), aff ’d, 565 U. S. 1104 (2012). And so too, the Court has ruled that,under some circumstances, foreign citizens in the U. S. Territories—or in “a territory” under the “indefinite” and “complete and total control” and “within the constant jurisdiction” of the United States—may possess certain constitutional rights. Boumediene , 553 U. S., at 755–771. But the Court has not allowed foreign citizens outside the United States or such U. S. territory to assert rights under the U. S. Constitution. If the rule were otherwise, actions by American military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel against foreign organi zations or foreign citizens in foreign countries would be constrained by the foreign citizens’ purported rights under the U. S. Constitution. That has never been the law. See Verdugo-Urquidez , 494 U. S., at 273–274; Eisentrager , 339 U. S., at 784.* To be sure, Congress may seek to enact laws that afford foreign citizensabroad statutory rights or causes of action against misconduct by U. S. Government offici als, or laws that otherwise regulate the conduct of U. S. officials abroad. See Verdugo-

——————

* As Justice Jackson stat ed for the Court in Eisentrager : “If the Fifth Amendment confers its rights on all the world . . . , the same must be true of the companio n civil-rights Amendments, for none of them is limited by its express term s, territorially or as to persons. Such a construction would mean that during military occupation irreconcilable enemy elements, guerrilla fi ghters, and ‘werewolves’ could require the American Judiciary to assu re them freedoms of speech, press, and assembly as in the First Amendmen t, right to bear arms as in the Second, security against ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures as in theFourth, as well as rights to jury trial as in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. “Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so significant an innovation in the practi ce of governments that, if intendedor apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite contemporary comment. Not one word can be cited. No decision of this Court supports such a view. Cf. Downes v. Bidwell , 182 U. S. 244. None of the learned commentators on our Constituti on has even hinted at it.” 339 U. S., at 784– 785.5 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

Opinion of the Court
Urquidez , 494 U. S., at 275; cf. 10 U. S. C. §§2734(a), 2734a(a); 18 U. S. C. §2340A; 21 U. S. C. §904; 22 U. S. C. §§2669, 2669–1; 42 U. S. C. §2000dd; but see 28 U. S. C. §2680(k) (Federal Tort Claims Act’s exception for torts “arising in a foreign country”). Plaintiffs did not raise any such statutory claim in this case. Second , it is long settled as a matter of American corpo

rate law that separately incorporated organizations are separate legal units with di stinct legal rights and obliga

tions. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson , 538 U. S. 468, 474– 475 (2003); Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King , 533 U. S. 158, 163 (2001); P. Blumberg, K. Strasser, N. Geor

gakopoulos, & E. Gouvin, Corporate Groups §§6.01, 6.02, 6.05 (2020 Supp.). Plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates were incorporated in other countries and are legally separa te from plaintiffs’ American organizations. Even though the foreign organizations have affiliated with the American organizations, the foreign or

ganizations remain legally distinct from the American or

ganizations. Plaintiffs do no t ask this Court to pierce the corporate veil, nor do they invoke any other relevant excep

tion to that fundamental corporate law principle. Tr. of Oral Arg. 54. Those two bedrock principles of American constitutional law and American corporate law together lead to a simple conclusion: As foreign organizations operating abroad, plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates possess no rights under the First Amendment. That conclusion corresponds to historical practice regard

ing American foreign aid. The United States supplies more foreign aid than any other nation in the world. Cong. Re

search Serv., Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U. S. Programs and Policy (2020) (Summary). Acting with the President in the legislative process, Congress sometimes imposes conditions on foreign aid. See 22 U. S. C. §§2271, 2272, 2371, 7110(g)(2). Congress may condition funding on6 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC. Opinion of the Court a foreign organization’s ideol ogical commitments—for ex

ample, pro-democracy, pro-wo men’s rights, anti-terrorism, pro-religious freedom, anti-sex trafficking, or the like. Do

ing so helps ensure that U. S. foreign aid serves U. S. inter

ests. By contrast, plaintiffs’ approach would throw a con

stitutional wrench into American foreign policy. In particular, plaintiffs’ approa ch would put Congress in the untenable position of either cutting off certain funding pro

grams altogether, or instead funding foreign organizations that may not align with U. S. values. We see no constitu

tional justification for the Federal Judiciary to interfere in that fashion with American foreign policy and American aid to foreign organizations. In short, plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates are foreign organiza

tions, and foreign organizations operating abroad have no First Amendment rights. To overcome that conclusion, plaintiffs advance two main arguments. But neither persuades us. First , plaintiffs theorize that the foreign affiliates’ re

quired statement of policy against prostitution and sex traf

ficking may be incorrectly attributed to the American or

ganizations. Therefore, the theory goes, the American organizations themselves possess a First Amendment right against imposition of the Policy Requirement on their for

eign affiliates. As support, plaintiffs point to First Amendment cases in

volving speech misattribution between formally distinct speakers. See, e.g. , Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. , 515 U. S. 557, 574–575 (1995); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal. , 475 U. S. 1, 15 (1986) (plurality opinion); cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins , 447 U. S. 74, 87 (1980). But the constitutional issue in those cases arose because the State forced one speaker to host another speaker’s speech. See Hurley , 515 U. S., at 572–573; Pacific Gas , 475 U. S., at 15; cf. PruneYard , 447 U. S., at 85, 87. Here, by7 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

Opinion of the Court contrast, the United States is not forcing plaintiffs to affili

ate with foreign organizations. Plaintiffs are free to choose whether to affiliate with foreign organizations and are free to disclaim agreement with the foreign affiliates’ required statement of policy. Any alleged misattribution in this case and any effect on the American organizations’ message of neutrality toward prostitution st ems from their choice to af

filiate with foreign organizati ons, not from U. S. Govern

ment compulsion. Because the First Amendment misattribution cases are premised on government compul

sion to associate with another entity, those cases do not ap

ply here. In support of their misattribution argument, plaintiffs also cite Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash.

, 461 U. S. 540, 544–545, and n. 6 (1983). But as relevant here, that case simply explained that a speech restriction on a corporate entity did not prevent a separate affiliate from speaking, a point that is not disputed in this case. We appreciate that plaintiffs would prefer to affiliate with foreign organizations that do not oppose prostitution. But Congress required foreign or ganizations to oppose pros

titution in return for American funding. And plaintiffs can

not export their own First Amendment rights to shield for

eign organizations from Congress’s funding conditions. Stressing that their position is limited, plaintiffs empha

size that the Court could narrowly decide to protect the free speech rights of only those fo reign organizations that are closely identified with American organizations—for exam

ple, those foreign affiliates that share similar names, logos, and brands with American organizations. According to plaintiffs, those “closely identified” scenarios greatly in

crease the risk of misattribution. But again, the First Amendment cases involving speech misattribution arose when the State forced one speaker to host another speaker’s speech. No compulsion is present here. Moreover, plain

tiffs’ proposed line-drawing among foreign organizations8 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC. Opinion of the Court would blur a clear rule of American law: Foreign organiza

tions operating abroad do not possess rights under the U. S. Constitution. Plaintiffs’ carv e-out not only would deviate from that fundamental principle, but also would enmesh the courts in difficult line-drawing exercises—how closely identified is close enough?— and leave courts without any principled basis for making those judgments. We discern no good reason to invent a new and legally unmoored excep

tion to longstanding principles of American constitutional and corporate law. Second , plaintiffs argue that the Court’s 2013 decision in this case encompassed both plaintiffs’ American organiza

tions and their foreign affiliates, meaning that, in plaintiffs’ view, the Court has already reso lved the issue before us. That is not correct. The plaintiffs in the 2013 case were these same American organizations. It is true that the Court considered the possibility that an American organi

zation could work through affiliates to potentially avoid the burdens of the otherwise-uncon stitutional application of the Policy Requirement. But the Court rejected that alter

native, which in essence would have compelled the Ameri

can organizations to affiliate with other organizations. The Court instead ruled that the Policy Requirement may not be applied to plaintiffs’ American organizations. Therefore, plaintiffs’ current affiliations with foreign organizations are their own choice, not the result of any U. S. Government compulsion. Stated simply, in the prior decision, the Court did not fa

cially invalidate the Act’s condition on funding. The Court did not hold or suggest that the First Amendment requires the Government to exempt plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates or other foreign organizations from the Policy Requirement. And the Court did not purport to override the longstanding constitutional law principle t hat foreign organizations op

erating abroad do not possess co nstitutional rights, or the elementary corporate law principle that each corporation is9 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

Opinion of the Court
a separate legal unit. The dissent emphasizes that this case concerns “the First Amendment rights of American organizations.” Post , at 1 (opinion of B REYER , J.). We respectfully disagree with that characterization of the question presented. The Court’s prior decision recognized th e First Amendment rights of American organizations and he ld that American organiza

tions do not have to comply with the Policy Requirement. This case instead concerns foreign organizations that are voluntarily affiliated with American organizations. Those foreign organizations are legally separate from the Ameri

can organizations. And becaus e foreign organizations oper

ating abroad do not possess cons titutional rights, those for

eign organizations do not have a First Amendment right to disregard the Policy Requirement. In sum, plaintiffs’ foreign affiliates are foreign organiza

tions, and foreign organizations operating abroad possess no rights under the U. S. Constitution. We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. It is so ordered.

J USTICE K AGAN took no part in the consideration or de

cision of this case._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

T HOMAS , J., concurring 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 19–177

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 29, 2020]

J USTICE T HOMAS , concurring. I agree with the Court that the Policy Requirement does not violate the First Amendment as applied to respondents’ foreign affiliates, and I agree that nothing about this Court’s decision in Agency for Int’l Development v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l, Inc. , 570 U. S. 205 (2013) ( AOSI I ), suggests otherwise. See ante , at 8–9. I write separately to note my continued disagreement with AOSI I and to ex

plain that the Policy Requirement does not violate the First Amendment for a far simpler reason: It does not compel an

yone to say anything. In AOSI I , the Court erred by holding that the Policy Re

quirement violated respondent s’ First Amendment rights by conditioning their receipt of Leadership Act* funds on the affirmation of certain program objectives. “The First Amendment does not mandate a viewpoint-neutral govern

ment.” AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 221 (Scalia, J., joined by T HOMAS , J., dissenting). Thus, the Government may re

quire those who seek to carry out federally funded programs

——————

* As the Court explains, the Unit ed States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (Leadership Act), 22 U. S. C. §7601 et seq. , “allocate[s] billions of dollars to American and for

eign nongovernmental organizations that combat HIV/AIDS abroad.” Ante, at 1.2 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
T HOMAS , J., concurring to support the Government’s objectives with regard to those
programs. Ibid. After all, the Constitution itself “impos[es] affirmative ideological commitmen ts prerequisite to assist

ing in the government’s work.” Id. , at 227. It excludes view

points such as communism and anarchism, stating that those engaged in government work must swear an oath to support our Constitution’s rep ublican form of government. See Art. VI, cl. 3. Moreover, the mere conditioning of funds on “ ‘the affir

mation of a belief’ ” tied to the purpose of a government pro

gram involves “no compulsion at all.” AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 226 (Scalia, J., joined by T HOMAS , J., dissenting). Such a condition is “the reasonable price of admission to a limited government-spending program that each organization re

mains free to accept or reject.” Ibid. Just as respondents are not compelled to associate with their foreign affiliates,

see ante , at 6–8, they are not compelled to participate in the Leadership Act program. The Policy Requirement does not violate the First Amendment, regardless of whether it is applied to respond

ents, respondents’ legally distinct foreign affiliates, or any other organization, foreign or domestic. Because the Court properly rejects respondents’ attempt to extend our errone

ous precedent, I join its opinion in full._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 19–177

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL

.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[June 29, 2020]

J USTICE B REYER , with whom J USTICE G INSBURG and J USTICE S OTOMAYOR join, dissenting. The Court, in my view, asks the wrong question and gives the wrong answer. This case is not about the First Amend

ment rights of foreign organizations. It is about—and has always been about—the First Amendment rights of Ameri

can organizations. The last time this case ca me before us, those American organizations vindicated their constitutional right to speak freely, both at home and abroad. In Agency for Int’l Devel

opment v. Alliance for Open Society Int’l

, Inc. , 570 U. S. 205 (2013) ( AOSI I ), we held that the First Amendment forbids the Government from distorti ng their speech by requiring, as a condition of receiving federal funds, that they “pledge allegiance” to a state-sponsored message. Id. , at 220. This time, the question is whether the American organi

zations enjoy that same constitutional protection against government-compelled distortion when they speak through clearly identified affiliates that have been incorporated overseas. The answer to that question, as I see it, is yes. I dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusion.2 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting

I To understand the issue now before us, one must appre

ciate how it got here. Given this litigation’s lengthy history, that requires a rather detailed look at why this dispute first arose, what we decided in our prior decision (namely, AOSI I ), and where the case proceeded from there.

A As we explained in AOSI I , the plaintiffs in this action (respondents in this Court then and now) “are a group of domestic organizations engaged in combating HIV/AIDS overseas.” Id ., at 210. Their lifesaving work spans multiple continents. Id. , at 211. For example, respondents run “pro

grams aimed at limiting injection drug use in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission in Kenya, and promoting safer sex prac

tices in India.” Ibid. Respondents also counsel high-risk populations such as sex workers, encourage foreign govern

ments to adopt beneficial public policies, and share infor

mation about best practices in publications and at confer

ences. See ibid. ; App. 171, 217, 222, 419. To support these international efforts, respondents must make fundraising appeals to donors worldwide. See, e.g. , id ., at 366, 384, 431– 433, 457. But crucially for both their mission and for this case, respondents also “receive billions [of dollars] annually in financial assistance from the United States.” AOSI I

, 570 U. S., at 210. One of respondents’ primary sources of federal funding is the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tubercu

losis, and Malaria Act of 2003. 117 Stat. 711, as amended, 22 U. S. C. §7601 et seq. (Leadership Act). Congress en

acted the Leadership Act with the goal of creating “a ‘com

prehensive, integrated’ strategy to combat HIV/AIDS around the world.” AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 209 (quoting §7611(a)). To that end, the statute allocates considerable federal dollars to nongovernmental organizations fighting3 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting

HIV/AIDS abroad. Id. , at 209–211. But Leadership Act funding comes with strings attached. Two, in particular. First, no Leadership Act funds “ ‘may be used to promote or advocate the legalization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking.’ ” Id. , at 210 (quoting §7631(e)). Second, with some exceptions not relevant here, any recipient of Leadership Act funds must have “ ‘a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.’ ” Id. , at 210 (quoting §7631(f )). The first condition limiting how Leadership Act funds may be spent has never been chal

lenged in this litigation. Id. , at 210. What has driven this decades-long dispute is the second condition, the “Policy Re

quirement” that requires recipi ents to espouse a govern

ment message. Ibid. Concerned that “adopting a policy explicitly opposing prostitution” could “alienate ce rtain host governments” and “mak[e] it more difficult to work with prostitutes in the fight against HIV/AIDS,” respondents sued. Id. , at 211. They asserted that the Policy Requirement put an uncon

stitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds and was thus unenforceable. Id. , at 212

. Accordingly, as the case came to us in AOSI I , the question was whether this fund

ing condition violated respondents’ First Amendment rights. Id. , at 211.

B The answer, we held in AOSI I , was yes. Our reasoning then demands close inspection now. To begin, we observed in AOSI I that “the Policy Require

ment would plainly violate the First Amendment” if it op

erated “as a direct regulation of speech.” Id ., at 213. Com

manding someone to speak a government message contravenes the “basic First Amendment principle that ‘freedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must say.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights

, Inc. , 5474 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting

U. S. 47, 61 (2006) ( FAIR )); see also, e.g. , West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette , 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U. S. 705, 717 (1977). That the Policy Requirement is a funding condition, ra

ther than a direct command, complicated the analysis in AOSI I but did not change the outcome. True, Congress’ Article I spending power “includes the authority to impose limits on the use of [federal] funds to ensure they are used” as “Congress intends,” even conditions that “may affect the recipient’s exercise of its First Amendment rights.” AOSI I

, 570 U. S., at 213–214. That is all the first (and unchal

lenged) Leadership Act conditio n does by forbidding federal funds from being used to promote prostitution or sex traf

ficking. See id. , at 217–218. Congress may not, however, “leverage funding to regulate speech outside the contours” of the program it has chosen to subsidize. Id. , at 214–215. That , as we will see, is what the Policy Requirement does— and why we held in AOSI I that this second condition vio

lated respondents’ First Amendment rights. The constitutional line is whether a funding condition helps “specify the activities Congress wants to subsidize” or instead seeks to “reach [speech] outside” the federal pro

gram. Id. , at 214, 217. We recognized in AOSI I that this line “is not always self-evident.” Id. , at 217. To “hel[p] il

lustrate the distinction,” our decision gave two examples from our precedents. Id. , at 215. As an example of what the Government may not do, we pointed to our decision FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal. , 468 U. S. 364 (1984). There, the Government required noncommercial broadcasters re ceiving federal financial as

sistance to refrain from editorializing entirely; they could not even “establish [an] ‘affiliate’ organizatio[n]” to editori

alize on their behalf “with nonfederal funds.” Id. , at 400. By giving a broadcaster no way “to make known its views on matters of public importance,” the funding condition in League of Women Voters violated the First Amendment.5 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting

Id. , at 400–401. That condition, as we put it in AOSI I

, “went beyond” ensuring that federal funds did not subsidize the broadcasters’ editorial content and therefore distorted their “speech outside the scope of the program.” 570 U. S., at 216. Just the opposite was true in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash. , 461 U. S. 540 (1983), the case we cited in AOSI I as an example of what the Government may do. In Regan , a nonprofit group received tax-exempt status as a §501(c)(3) organization on the condition that the organ

ization not engage in lobbying. AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 215 (citing Regan , 461 U. S., at 544). Even though this condi

tion on federal financial assistance affected the nonprofit’s exercise of First Amendment rights, the condition was con

stitutional because it “did not prohibit [the nonprofit] from lobbying Congress altogether.” 570 U. S., at 215. Specifically, the nonprofit in Regan —unlike the broad

casters in League of Women Voters —was permitted to es

tablish an affiliate to carry on its lobbying activities as a §501(c)(4) organization. AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 215 (citing Regan , 461 U. S., at 544). The nonprofit could thus act (and speak) through two corporate entities: The §501(c)(3) organization could get the tax exemption (but not lobby), while the §501(c)(4) organization could lobby (but not get the tax exemption). 570 U. S., at 215. Since requiring the nonprofit to adopt this “ ‘dual structure’ ” was not “ ‘unduly burdensome,’ ” the condition in Regan “did not deny the [nonprofit] a government benefit ‘on account of its intention to lobby.’ ” 570 U. S., at 215 (quoting Regan , 461 U. S., at 545, and n. 6). The condition was thus constitutional, even though it essentially compelled the nonprofit to affiliate with other organizations. See 570 U. S., at 215

. In AOSI I , we held “that the Policy Requirement falls on the unconstitutional side of the line” separating League of Women Voters (unconstitutional) and Regan (constitu

tional). 570 U. S., at 217. Like the funding condition in6 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting League of Women Voters , we explained, the Policy Require

ment affects protected speech outside the scope of the fed

eral program. 570 U. S., at 218. “By requiring recipients to profess a specific belief,” it “goes beyond defining” the pro

gram “to defining the recipient” in the eyes of their global audience. Ibid. Respondents cannot “avow [a] belief dic

tated by” the Government “when spending Leadership Act funds, and then turn around and assert a contrary belief, or claim neutrality,” when acting on their “own time and dime.” Ibid. The Policy Requirement thus conditioned funding on an across-the-board distortion of respondents’ message. See ibid. We further explained in AOSI I —and this is critical— why we could not accept the Government’s suggestion that the case was just a redux of Regan . In AOSI I , the Govern

ment suggested a similar “dual-structure” solution to the First Amendment problem. Like the nonprofit in Regan

, the Government noted, respondents could act (and speak) through two corporate entities: One organization could re

ceive Leadership Act funds on respondents’ behalf (and comply with the Policy Requirement), while a legally sepa

rate affiliate could communicate respondents’ preferred message (and not receive Leadership Act funds)—or vice

versa. AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 219. True enough. But we rejected the Government’s argument all the same. Why did we reject it? Because corporate formalities do nothing to ward off speech distortion where—like AOSI I

, but unlike Regan —the Government has required a speaker to “espouse a specific belief as its own.” 570 U. S., at 219. “If the affiliate is distinct from the recipient,” we reasoned, “the arrangement does not afford a means for the recipient to express its beliefs.” Ibid. And if “the affiliate is more clearly identified with the recipient, the recipient can ex

press those beliefs only at the price of evident hypocrisy.” Ibid. With respect to the latter situation, in other words, compelling a recipient to disa vow a message involuntarily7 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting uttered by its clearly identified affiliate is forced hypocrisy, not free speech. See ibid. In sum, the Policy Requirement conditioned federal funds on an unavoidable and irreversible distortion of respond

ents’ protected speech. We therefore held in AOSI I that the Policy Requirement “violates the First Amendment and cannot be sustained.” Id ., at 221.

C
On remand from our decision , the District Court did what district courts ought to do. It “tailor[ed] ‘the scope of the remedy’ to fit ‘the nature and extent of the constitutional violation’ ” that we identified in AOSI I

. Hills v. Gautreaux

, 425 U. S. 284, 294 (1976) (quoting Milliken v. Bradley , 418 U. S. 717, 744 (1974)). The District Court, like our Court, recognized that re

spondents’ work—and with it their protected speech—has a global reach. But respondent s, it turns out, use different organizational structures to de liver services in different places. 106 F. Supp. 3d 355, 360–361 (SDNY 2015). Some

times, particularly when fore ign governments (or our own government) require, responde nts operate through legally separate affiliates incorporated abroad. Ibid. ; see also, e.g. , App. 368, 373–375. In the District Court’s view, those corporate formalities did not meaningfully change the First Amendment calcu

lus. See 106 F. Supp. 3d, at 360–361. Respondents, to

gether with their affiliates, co nvey a clear, consistent mes

sage to high-risk populations, government officials, healthcare professionals, prospective employees, and pri

vate donors across the globe. See, e.g. , App. 370–371, 391, 460–461. They share the same name, logo, and branding— all of which use identical colors, fonts, and imagery. See,
e.g. , id. , at 445–455. They adhere to shared values, work towards common goals, and coordinate their collective mes

-8 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting sage. See, e.g. , id. , at 385–386, 404–429. To an outside ob

server, respondents and their affiliates are a single, cohe

sive unit. They speak as one. The District Court consequent ly concluded that imposing the Policy Requirement on respondents’ affiliates—wher

ever they happen to have been incorporated—would force respondents to “expres[s] contrary positions on the same matter through [their] different organizational compo

nents.” 106 F. Supp. 3d, at 361. To prevent that from hap

pening, and in keeping with the principles we set forth in AOSI I , the District Court enjoined enforcement of the Pol

icy Requirement against respondents and their clearly identified affiliates, including affiliates that were incorpo

rated overseas. Id. , at 363. The District Court thought that remedial order necessary to protect respondents’ own First Amendment rights—rights that, as American organiza

tions, respondents unquestionably have. Id. , at 361. The Court of Appeals understood the District Court’s or

der that way, too. “The na rrow issue before” us, the Court of Appeals explained, “is whether applying the Policy Re

quirement to [respondents’] cl osely aligned foreign affili

ates violates [respondents’] own First Amendment rights.” 911 F. 3d 104, 109 (CA2 2018). The Court of Appeals held that the answer was yes and affirmed on that basis. Ibid. We granted certiorari to re view the Court of Appeals’ decision.

II The road has been long, but we have arrived at the spe

cific question now before us: whether enforcing the Policy Requirement against respondents’ clearly identified foreign affiliates violates respondents’ own First Amendment rights. Like the District Cou rt and the Court of Appeals, I believe the answer is yes. Our reasoning in AOSI I , along with the body of prece

dent on which it relied, should decide this case. Just as9 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting compelling a clearly identified domestic affiliate to espouse a government message distorts respondents’ own protected speech, AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 219, so too does compelling a clearly identified foreign affiliate to espouse the same gov

ernment message. Either way, federal funding conditioned on that affirmative avowal of belief comes at an unconstitu

tionally high “price of evident hypocrisy.” Ibid. Properly understood, our speech-misattribution cases— in particular Hurley v. Irish-American Gay

, Lesbian and Bi

sexual Group of Boston

, Inc. , 515 U. S. 557 (1995)—confirm that common-sense conclusion. Any other result would un

dermine First Amendment protections for the countless American speakers who address audiences overseas.

A Respondents should prevail here for the same reasons they prevailed in AOSI I . When respondents speak through legally separate but clearly identified affiliates, we held, that speech is attributed to respondents for First Amend

ment purposes. AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 219. So when the Government demands as a condition of federal funding that their clearly identified affiliate “espouse a specific belief as its own,” respondents may express a contrary view through some other corporate channel only on pain of appearing hypocritical. Ibid. Leveraging Congress’ Article I spending power to distort respondents’ protected speech in this way therefore violates respondents’ First Amendment rights— whatever else might be said about the affiliate’s own First Amendment rights (or asserted lack thereof ). Ibid. These principles apply with full force to the dispute now before us. Respondents and their affiliates receive federal funding to fight HIV/AIDS overseas . What has been at stake in this case from the beginning, then, is protected speech often aimed at audiences abroad. Our decision in AOSI I shielded respondents’ global message from govern

-10 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting ment-compelled distortion in the eyes of those foreign audi

ences, as well as listeners here at home. Ibid. Yet in the wake of our ruling, respondents have continued to suffer that exact same First Amendment harm. True, respondents’ international mission sometimes re

quires that they convey their message through affiliates in

corporated in far-off countries, rather than registered here at home. But so what? Au diences everywhere attribute speech based on whom they perceive to be speaking, not on corporate paperwork they will never see. What mattered in AOSI I was thus how “clearly identified” the affiliates were with respondents, not the fact that the affiliates were incor

porated as separate legal entities. Ibid. And what matters now is once again how “clearly identified” the affiliates are with respondents, not the fact that the affiliates were incor

porated as foreign legal entities. The First Amendment question therefore hinges, as it did before, on what an objective observer sees, hears, and un

derstands when respondents speak through their foreign affiliates. As to that, not even the Government meaning

fully disputes that respondents and their foreign affiliates are clearly identified with one another. Their appearances are the same. Their goals are the same. Their values are the same. Their message is the same. Leveraging Congress’ spending power to demand speech from respondents’ for

eign affiliates distorts that shared message—and violates respondents’ First Amendment rights. So while respond

ents and their clearly identified foreign affiliates may be technically different entities with respect to such matters as contracts, taxes, and torts, they are constitutionally the same speaker when it comes to the protected speech at is

sue in this case. This two-entities-one-speaker principle is an established part of our First Amendment jurisprudence. Take Regan. To refresh, in that case we upheld a ban on engaging in cer

tain protected speech (lobbying) that the federal tax code11 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting imposed on a nonprofit’s §501(c)(3) organization because the nonprofit could still speak through a separate §501(c)(4) organization. See 461 U. S., at 544. Put simply, one speaker (the nonprofit) could act (and speak) through two legally separate entities (the §501(c)(3) and §501(c)(4) or

ganizations). Recall also our similar observation in League of Women Voters . There we noted that a funding condition’s ban on editorializing would have been constitutional if, in contrast to the law at issue, the statute let noncommercial broad

casters “make known” their “views on matters of public im

portance” by speaking through legally separate “editorial

izing affiliate[s].” 468 U. S., at 400. Once again, we made clear that a single speaker can act (and speak) through two legally separate entities. But because the speaker in League of Women Voters was not free to do so, we held that the Government’s funding condition violated the First Amendment. Id. , at 400–401. Regan and League of Women Voters are far from our only precedents recognizing this firmly entrenched First Amendment principle. See Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez , 531 U. S. 533, 546 (2001) (observing that organ

izational affiliates may provid e “alternative channel[s] for expression” by a single speaker); Rust v. Sullivan , 500 U. S. 173, 196–198 (1991) (similar). We reiterated that rule once again in AOSI I . See 570 U. S., at 215–217, 219. Thus, in the First Amendment context, the corporate veil is not an iron curtain. Just the opposite. We attribute speech across corporate lines all the time. Rightly so. When a funding condition restricts speech, this familiar framework often avoids First Amendment problems by allowing “alternative channel[s]” for speakers to express themselves. Velazquez , 531 U. S., at 546. And when a funding condition compels speech, the same logic leads to a similarly sensible result: The Government may not require you to speak out of both sides of your mouth,12 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting even if each side happens to have been incorporated as a separate legal entity. See AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 219. A contrary approach would have led to a rather surpris

ing result in AOSI I . Assume for a moment that the Policy Requirement simply commanded respondents’ clearly iden

tified affiliates to speak—the kind of “direct regulation of speech” that we said “would plainly violate the First Amendment,” id. , at 213. Treating corporate lines as iron

clad would mean that responde nts could not object to that direct distortion of their own message. Under all the cases just discussed, however, that cannot be right. And as dis

cussed below, it is equally wrong under our cases involving speech misattribution.

B The First Amendment protects speakers from govern

ment compulsion that is likely to cause an audience to mis

take someone else’s message for the speaker’s own views. See, e.g. , Hurley , 515 U. S., at 572–573; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal. , 475 U. S. 1, 15–16 (1986). Corporate separation makes no meaningful difference in this speech-misattribution context, either. Consider our unanimous decision in Hurley . In that case, a group called the South Boston Allied War VeteransCouncil organized a parade. 515 U. S., at 560. The IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston—a separate group who called th emselves “GLIB” for short— wanted to participate. Id. , at 561. After the Veterans Council said no, GLIB obtained a court order directing the Veterans Council to let GLIB march in the parade. Id. , at 561–562. Recognizing that “every participating unit affects the message conveyed by the parade organizers,” we held in Hurley that the order distorted the Veterans Council’s pro

tected speech. Id. , at 572–573. Because GLIB wanted to “carr[y] its own banner” with its own message, and because13 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting onlookers would understand GLIB as “contribut[ing] some

thing to” the parade’s “common theme,” the order “essen

tially requir[ed]” the Veterans Council “to alter the expres

sive content of their parade.” Id. , at 572–573, 576. That violated the First Amendment. Id. , at 573. The First Amendment violation in this case is even more apparent. In Hurley , the Veterans Council had merely “combin[ed] multifarious voices” of disparate groups with

out bothering to “isolate an exact message,” yet the FirstAmendment protected its message from governmentcompelled distortion all the same. Id. , at 569. Respondents in this case have done the Veterans Council one better. They have carefully constructed a cogent message and mar

shaled their clearly identified foreign affiliates to express it across the globe. See supra , at 7–8, 10. Furthermore, in Hurley we could only speculate about what GLIB’s exact message was and why the Veterans Council did not want to be associated with it. See 515 U. S., at 574–575. But here we know exactly what the challenged message is (“a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking”) and why respondents don’t want to be as

sociated with it (the message, among other things, purport

edly “ ‘stigmatizes one of the very groups whose trust [re

spondents] must earn to conduct effective HIV/AIDS prevention’ ”). 22 U. S. C. §7631(f ); Brief for Respondents 11. For that reason as well, the First Amendment injury in this case is open, obvious, and unusually well defined. True, Hurley and our other speech-misattribution cases dealt with a speaker complain ing about being forced to af

filiate with someone else’s speech, rather than (as here) their pre-existing affiliate being forced to speak. Cf. ante , at 6. But that factual distinction makes no constitutional difference. From a First Am endment perspective, the latter situation is just as bad or even worse, not better. Consider Hurley again. If, rather than requiring the Vet

erans Council to let GLIB march while carrying its banner,14 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting the state court had ordered a previously invited marcher (or worse still, all previously invited marchers) to display GLIB’s banner, the Veterans Council would have prevailed all the same. By compelling speech from an existing affili

ate (or all of them), that order would have required, even more brazenly, that the Veter ans Council “alter the expres

sive content of their parade” in violation of the Veterans Council’s First Amendment rights. 515 U. S., at 572–573. So too if the state court had decreed that GLIB’s banner must adorn a horse, oxen, or for that matter R2–D2, a robot—even though those entities lack their own First Amendment rights. Whether the transmitter of a speaker’s protected message does (or does not) have its own First Amendment rights is beside the point. Cf. Wooley , 430 U. S., at 717 (prohibiting New Hampshire from requiring that the state motto adorn a driver’s car, even though cars do not have First Amendment rights). There is a reason why, until today, we had not confronted a case like the one just described. Cf. ante , at 6. Requiring someone to host another person’s speech is often a perfectly legitimate thing for the Go vernment to do. See, e.g. , FAIR

, 547 U. S., at 65 (holding that the Government may require law schools to host speech from military recruiters); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins , 447 U. S. 74, 87–88 (1980) (holding that the Government may require the owner of a private shopping mall to host speech from politically minded pamphleteers). Even the court order at issue in Hurley was an understandable (though unconstitutional) application of a “venerable” civil rights law. See 515 U. S., at 571. But because compelling people to profess a belief they do not hold is almost always unconstitutional, see AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 213, the Government rarely dares try. The Government’s well-founded reticence in the past is no reason to bless its boldness at present. Bottom line: The critical question here, as in Hurley , is15 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting simply whether the Government has demanded a profes

sion of belief that will distort the speaker’s message. How the Government causes that distortion makes no constitu

tional difference. And as explained, enforcing the Policy Re

quirement against respondents’ clearly identified foreign affiliates would plainly distort respondents’ message. See

supra , at 7–8, 10. That violates respondents’ First Amend

ment rights.

C So far as I am aware, we have never before held that an American speaker forfeits First Amendment protection when it speaks though foreign affiliates to reach audiences overseas. It is easy to understand why. Many American news networks operate through clearly identified foreign affiliates when speaking abroad. Viewers attribute that speech to an American speaker: the network. That is the whole point of using clearly identified foreign affiliates. For example, CNN speaks to audiences in the Philippines, Brazil, Indonesia, and other countries using foreign affiliates, usually styled as CNN Philippines, CNN Brazil, CNN Indonesia, and so on. See CNN Worldwide Fact Sheet (Oct. 2019), https:// cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/cnn-fact-sheet . But does that corporate structure mean that CNN— i.e. , the American parent organization—has no First Amendment protection against a Government effort to , say, prevent CNN Mexico from covering the fatal shooting of a Mexican child by a U. S. Border Patrol agent? Cf. Hernández v. Mesa , 589 U. S. ___ (2020) ( Hernández II ). Or to compel CNN Mexico to run a different story, perhaps one produced by Govern

ment personnel, that praises American policy at the border? We should be highly skeptical. If the Government com

mandeered CNN’s clearly identified foreign affiliate in these or similar ways, whether by monetary pressure or16 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting
some other means, CNN should have constitutional re

course. Some critical foreig n policy interests might compli

cate the First Amendment calculus—say, a wartime need to keep future battle plans secret. But nothing like that is present here. And it is difficult to accept the notion that the First Amendment permits the Government to suppress, compel, or otherwise distort any and all American speech transmitted abroad through a clearly identified foreign af

filiate.

III The upshot is: (1) The messages at issue here belong to American speakers; (2) clearly identified foreign affiliates are a critical means of conveying those messages overseas; and (3) enforcing the Policy Requirement against those af

filiates distorts respondents’ own protected speech—and thus violates respondents’ own First Amendment rights. The majority justifies its contrary result on three main grounds, two of which it says are “bedrock principles” of American law. See ante , at 3–6, 8. I do not find these ar

guments persuasive.

A The first “bedrock principle” on which the majority relies is the supposedly long-settled, across-the-board rule “that foreign citizens outside U. S. territory do not possess rights under the U. S. Constitution.” Ante , at 3. That sweeping assertion is neither relevant to this case nor correct on the law. It is not relevant because, as I have said, this case does not concern the constitutional rights of foreign organiza

tions. This case concerns the constitutional rights of Amer

ican organizations. Every respondent here is—and has al

ways been—American. AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 210; see also Brief for Petitioners 7, 19 (ackno wledging as much). No for

eign entities are party to this case, and respondents have17 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting

never claimed that the Polic y Requirement violates any

one’s First Amendment rights apart from their own. Both the District Court and the Cou rt of Appeals decided the case on that basis. The question before us is clear: whether the First Amendment protects Americans when they speak through clearly identified foreign affiliates to reach audi

ences overseas. See supra , at 8. Whether the foreign affil

iates themselves have their ow n First Amendment rights is not at issue. See Brief for Respondents 36, n. 3. Even taken on its own terms, the majority’s blanket as

sertion about the extraterritorial reach of our Constitution does not reflect the current state of the law. The idea that foreign citizens abroad never have constitutional rights is not a “bedrock” legal principle. At most, one might say that they are unlikely to enjoy very often extraterritorial protec

tion under the Constitution. Or one might say that the mat

ter is undecided. But this Court has studiously avoided es

tablishing an absolute rule that forecloses that protection in all circumstances. In Hernández v. Mesa , 582 U. S. ___ (2017) (per curiam) ( Hernández I ), for example, we specifically declined to de

cide the “sensitive” question whether, on the facts then be

fore us, a Mexican citizen standing on Mexican soil had Fourth Amendment rights—precisely because the answer to that extraterritoriality que stion “may have consequences that are far reaching.” Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 5). Hernández later came to this Court again, and we decided the case on alternative grounds. See Hernández II , 589 U. S., at ___– ___ (slip op., at 19–20). Were the majority’s categorical rule of (non)extraterritoriality etched in stone, we could have disposed of Hernández the first time around in a few short
sentences. Nor do the cases that the majority cites support an abso

lute rule. See ante , at 3. The exhaustive review of our prec

edents that we conducted in Boumediene v. Bush , 553 U. S. 723 (2008), pointed to the opposite conclusion. In18 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting

Boumediene , we rejected the Government’s argument that our decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager , 339 U. S. 763 (1950), “adopted a formalistic” test “for determining the reach” of constitutional protection to foreign citizens on foreign soil. 553 U. S., at 762. This is to say, we rejected the position that the majority propounds today. See ante , at 4, and n. (quoting Eisentrager at length). Its “constricted reading” of Eisentrager and our other precedents is not the law. See Boumediene , 553 U. S., at 764; see also, e.g. , Neuman, Un

derstanding Global Due Process, 23 Geo. Immigration L. J. 365, 400 (2009) (describing our cases as rejecting any abso

lute view). The law, we confirmed in Boumediene , is that constitu

tional “questions of extraterri toriality turn on objective fac

tors and practical concerns” pr esent in a given case, “not formalism” of the sort the majority invokes today. 553 U. S., at 764. Those considerations include the extent of de facto U. S. Government control (if any) over foreign ter

ritory. See ante , at 4. But they also include the nature of the constitutional protection sought, how feasible extending it would be in a given case, and the foreign citizen’s status vis-à-vis the United States, among other pertinent circum

stances that might arise. 553 U. S., at 766; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez , 494 U. S. 259, 278 (1990) (Ken

nedy, J., concurring) (providing the decisive fifth vote for rejecting a foreign citizen’s cl aim to constitutional protec

tion on foreign soil outside U. S. control because “[t]he con

ditions and considerations of this case would make adher

ence to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement impracticable and anomalous” (emphasis added)). Our precedents reject absolutism. Indeed, even our most sweep

ing statements about foreign citizens’ (lack of ) constitu

tional rights while outside U. S. Territory have come with limits. See, e.g. , Landon v. Plasencia , 459 U. S. 21, 32 (1982) (noting that “an alien seeking initial admission to”19 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting this country “has no constitutional rights regarding his ap

plication ” (emphasis added)); Kleindienst v. Mandel , 408 U. S. 753, 762 (1972) (similar). There is wisdom in our past restraint. Situations where a foreign citizen outside U. S. Territory might fairly assert constitutional rights are not di fficult to imagine. Long-term permanent residents are “foreign citizens.” Does the Con

stitution therefore allow American officials to assault them at will while “outside U. S. territory”? Many international students attend college in the United States. Does the First Amendment permit a public uni versity to revoke their ad

mission based on an unpopular political stance they took on social media while home for th e summer? Foreign citizens who have never set foot in the United States, for that mat

ter, often protest when Presidents travel overseas. Does that mean Secret Service agents can, consistent with our Constitution, seriously injure peaceful protestors abroad without any justification? We have never purported to give a single “bedrock” an

swer to these or myriad other extraterritoriality questions that might arise in the future. To purport to do so today, in a case where the question is not presented and where the matter is not briefed, is in my view a serious mistake. And there is no need to set forth an absolute rule here. Respondents have conceded that their foreign affiliates lack First Amendment rights of their own while acting abroad. See ante , at 3. If in spite of everything else, the majority considers this point material to its decision, all that need be said is: “We accept respondent s’ concession and proceed on that basis.” To say so much more “run[s] contrary to the fundamental principal of judicial restraint,” a principle that applies with particular force to constitutional interpreta

tion. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Repub

lican Party , 552 U. S. 442, 450 (2008); see also, e.g. , Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. , 485 U. S. 439,20 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting 445 (1988); Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reser

vation v. Wold Engineering

, P. C. , 467 U. S. 138, 158 (1984); United States v. Raines , 362 U. S. 17, 21 (1960); Liverpool

, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Em

igration , 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885).

B The majority’s second supposedly “bedrock principle” is that “separately incorporated organizations are separate le

gal units with distinct legal rights and obligations.” Ante

, at 5. Sometimes true, sometimes not. This baseline rule gives way in many contexts, and our First Amendment precedents (including AOSI I ) refute any suggestion that a workaday principle of corporate law somehow resolves the constitutional issue here in dispute. As the majority acknowledges, corporate law itself per

mits courts to pierce or ot herwise disregard the corporate veil in a variety of circumstances. See ante , at 5. Those narrow exceptions, however, are not the only time the law looks past corporate formalities. For instance, we have treated “several nominally separate business entities” as “a single employer” for purposes of federal labor law. Radio & Television Technicians v. Broadcast Service of Mobile

, Inc.

, 380 U. S. 255, 256 (1965) ( per curiam ). Earlier this Term, we reaffirmed that one corporate entity may sometimes in

voke the right of another, legally separate entity to compel arbitration. See GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS

v. Outokumpu Stainless USA

, LLC , 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 4). And these are far from the only rele

vant examples. See, e.g. , American Needle

, Inc. v. National Football League , 560 U. S. 183, 196 (2010) (observing that, in many antitrust cases, corporate formalities are “not de

terminative”). More to the point, our Firs t Amendment precedents leave no doubt that corporate formalities have little to say about the issue now before us. We have made clear again and21 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting again (and again) that speech may be attributed across cor

porate lines in the First Am endment context—including in our previous opinion in this very case. See AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 219 (concluding that speech uttered involuntarily by legally separate affiliates may be attributed to respond

ents if the affiliates are “clearly identified” with respond

ents); League of Women Voters , 468 U. S., at 400 (observing that funding conditions that restrict speech can survive constitutional scrutiny if the speaker may “make known its views on matters of public importance through” a legally separate affiliate—and if not, not); Regan , 461 U. S., at 544 (similar); Rust , 500 U. S., at 196–198 (similar); Velazquez

, 531 U. S., at 546–547 (similar). And these precedents fur

ther establish that merely requiring speakers to work through affiliates is “not unduly burdensome” and can therefore cure, rather than create, First Amendment con

cerns. Regan , 461 U. S., at 545, n. 6. Contra, ante , at 8 (suggesting that such a requirement would be unconstitu

tional). Small wonder the majority can muster only two context-specific and statute-sp ecific cases—one addressing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the other involving the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act— as affirmative support for its conclusion that corporate for

malities somehow control the First Amendment question before us. See ante , at 5 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson

, 538 U. S. 468 (2003), and Cedric Kushner Promotions

, Ltd.

v. King , 533 U. S. 158 (2001)). The majority also attempts to distinguish the facts before us now from the facts that were before us last time. It as

serts that, in contrast to the affiliations we addressed in AOSI I , respondents’ “current affiliations with foreign or

ganizations are their own choice.” Ante

, at 8. There are two problems with this. First, the description is not accurate. Foreign governments—and increasingly, the U. S. Govern

ment—often require respondent s to work through foreign22 AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC.
B REYER , J., dissenting
affiliates. See, e.g. , App. 368, 373–375. Second, even if re

spondents’ associations with foreign affiliates were volun

tary, it would not solve the First Amendment problem. In Wooley , for example, it was the drivers’ choice to own a car, but that did not mean they could be compelled to con

vey the Government’s message on their car’s license plate. See 430 U. S., at 717. And in Hurley , as explained, the Gov

ernment would have violated the parade organizers’ First Amendment rights just the same if it had compelled speech from a previously invited marcher, whether human, ani

mal, or droid. See supra , at 13–14. Can the majority really mean to suggest otherwise, simply because the parade or

ganizers’ decision to invite the marcher in the first place was “their own choice”?

C The majority also makes two practical arguments, but neither justifies the First Amendment costs of its decision. The majority first says that a ruling in respondents’ favor would disrupt American foreig n policy by requiring the Government to fund “organizations that may not align with U. S. values.” Ante , at 6. We dismissed this same concern in AOSI I . The Policy Requirement, we explained, does not merely help the Government “e nlist the assistance of those with whom it already agrees.” AOSI I , 570 U. S., at 218. It pressures funding recipients “ to adopt a particular belief.” Ibid. (emphasis added). All that is at stake here, in other words, is whether the Govern ment may leverage the power of the purse to win converts to its cause. That bare desire to regulate protected speech is far from any foreign policy interest that could concei vably overcome a speaker’s First Amendment right to convey its message free from government-compelled distortion. Cf. New York Times Co.

v. United States , 403 U. S. 713 (1971) ( per curiam ). The majority also fears that determining whether Gov

ernment action creates a risk of speech misattribution (and23 Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020)

B REYER , J., dissenting with it speech distortion) is a “legally unmoored” standard rife with “difficult line-drawing exercises.” Ante , at 8. But we have drawn just this kind of line many times. See, e.g. , PruneYard , 447 U. S., at 87 (holding that “views expressed by members of the public” in a privately owned shopping mall “will not likely be identified with those of the owner”); Hurley , 515 U. S., at 572 (holding that a marcher’s message will likely be attributed to the parade organizer’s, since “every participating unit” in a parade “affects the [overall] message”); FAIR , 547 U. S., at 65 (holding that nothing about having military recruiters on campus “suggests that law schools agree with any speech by recruiters”). I should think that the price of making difficult judgment calls is well worth paying to protect First Amendment rights. See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n , 572 U. S. 185, 209 (2014); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner , 407 U. S. 551, 570 (1972). And “on the facts presented in this case,” at any rate, “the answer is clear.” Id. , at 570. Enforcing the Policy Require

ment violates respondents’ First Amendment rights, just as it did before.

* * * The Court today concludes that respondents’ foreign af

filiates “do not have a First Amendment right to disregard the Policy Requirement.” Ante , at 9. Respondents have never argued otherwise. Rath er, throughout this litigation they have asserted their own First Amendment right to speak their mind, rather than the Government’s message. Here, respondents claim First Amendment protection when they speak through foreign affiliates to address audiences abroad. By denying respondents that protection, I fear the Court’s decision will seriously impede the countless Ameri

can speakers who communicate overseas in a similar way. That weakens the marketplace of ideas at a time when the value of that marketplace for Americans, and for others, reaches well beyond our shores . With respect, I dissent.