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Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

C hief Justice Justices

Maura D. Corrigan	 Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly

Clifford W. Taylor

Robert P. Young, Jr. Opinion Stephen J. Markman 

FILED JUNE 12, 2002
 

NANCY KOONTZ,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

v	 No. 116366
 

AMERITECH SERVICES, INC.,
 

Defendant-Appellant,
 

and
 

UNEMPLOYMENT AGENCY of the 


MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER
 

AND INDUSTRY SERVICES, formerly


MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 


AGENCY,
 

Appellee.
 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except MARKMAN, J.).
 

CORRIGAN, C.J.
 

This case requires that we interpret a statute directing
 

coordination of unemployment benefits with pension benefits.
 

Plaintiff received a lump-sum pension payment under an
 

employer-funded retirement plan. When plaintiff sought
 

unemployment compensation, the Unemployment Agency1
 

1 The Unemployment Agency was formerly known as the


Michigan Employment Security Commission.
 
coordinated her weekly benefits with her prorated weekly
 

amount of pension payments (i.e., the amount of pension
 

benefits plaintiff would have received weekly had she not
 

opted for a lump-sum payment). The ensuing reduction rendered
 

plaintiff ineligible to receive any unemployment benefits.
 

The Employment Security Board of Review and the circuit court
 

upheld the reduction. The Court of Appeals reversed and held
 

that coordination was not required. 


We hold that the governing statute, MCL 421.27(f)(1),
 

mandates coordination of plaintiff’s unemployment benefits
 

with her pension benefits. We therefore reverse the judgment
 

of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the
 

Board of Review and the judgment of the circuit court.
 

I. Underlying Facts and Procedural History
 

Plaintiff began working for Ameritech in its Traverse
 

City office in 1965. Thirty years later, Ameritech closed its
 

Traverse City office and offered to continue plaintiff’s
 

employment in another office. She declined, electing instead
 

to retire. Ameritech’s retirement incentive program entitled
 

plaintiff to a $1,052.95 monthly pension allowance, which
 

Ameritech fully funded. In lieu of monthly payments, however,
 

plaintiff elected to receive her pension in a lump-sum in the
 

amount of $185,711.55. Plaintiff also chose to transfer the
 

lump-sum directly into her individual retirement account
 

(IRA).
 

Plaintiff then applied for unemployment compensation.
 

Ameritech argued in response to plaintiff’s application that
 

MCL 421.27(f) of the Michigan Employment Security Act, MCL
 

2
 
421.1 et seq., allowed coordination of plaintiff’s
 

unemployment benefits with the amount of pension payments
 

plaintiff would have received if she had elected the monthly
 

payment option. The Unemployment Agency agreed and directed
 

coordination under MCL 421.27(f). This coordination resulted
 

in a reduction in plaintiff’s unemployment benefits in the
 

amount of $243 weekly, rendering her ineligible to receive any
 

unemployment benefits.2 Plaintiff timely protested this
 

determination, but the Unemployment Agency upheld its decision
 

on redetermination. 


Plaintiff thereafter appealed the redetermination. A
 

referee reversed the decision of the Unemployment Agency on
 

the ground that neither MCL 421.27(f)(1) nor (5) required
 

coordination since plaintiff had transferred the pension funds
 

directly into her IRA and thus had not “received” the funds
 

within the meaning of the act. The referee relied on the
 

Unemployment Agency’s Revised Benefit Interpretation No.
 

20.641, which indicates that an employee who rolls a pension
 

amount over into an IRA does not incur immediate income tax
 

liability because the Internal Revenue Service does not
 

consider the payment “received” for income tax purposes.
 

Ameritech appealed the referee’s decision to the Michigan
 

Employment Security Board of Review, which reinstated the
 

Unemployment Agency’s determination in a split decision. The
 

Board of Review ruled that the taxability of plaintiff’s
 

2 Because plaintiff’s pro-rata retirement benefits would


have been equal to or greater than her weekly unemployment


benefits, she was not eligible to receive unemployment


benefits chargeable to Ameritech. See MCL 421.27(f)(1)(a). 


3
 
pension benefit did not affect the operation of MCL 421.27(f)
 

and that the lump-sum distribution was a “retirement benefit”
 

under the plain language of the act. Accordingly, the board
 

concluded that coordination was required under MCL
 

421.27(f)(1)(a).
 

One member of the Board of Review dissented, finding that
 

plaintiff did not receive a retirement benefit because the
 

lump-sum distribution had been rolled over into an IRA. The
 

dissenting member relied on Revised Benefit Interpretation No.
 

20.641 and the United States Department of Labor’s (USDOL)
 

Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 22-97. The USDOL
 

Letter No. 22-97 stated that pension amounts rolled over into
 

an IRA within sixty days of receipt are not gross income for
 

purposes of federal income taxation and thus are not
 

“received” for purposes of 26 USC 3304(a)(15)(A) of the
 

Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 USC 3301 et seq.3 The
 

dissenting member concluded that MCL 421.27(f) did not require
 

coordination of plaintiff’s weekly benefit amount.
 

The circuit court affirmed the Board of Review’s
 

decision. The Court of Appeals then granted leave to appeal4
 

and reversed the circuit court order. 239 Mich App 34; 607
 

NW2d 395 (1999). It held that another subsection, MCL
 

421.27(f)(5), governed and did not require coordination of
 

benefits. Alternatively, the court stated in dictum that even
 

3
 The Unemployment Agency issued Revised Benefit
 

Interpretation No. 20.641 on November 29, 1995, in an apparent


attempt to comply with USDOL Letter No. 22-87.
 

4
 Unpublished order, entered July 7, 1998 (Docket No.


208176).
 

4
 
if MCL 421.27(f)(1) applied, coordination was not required
 

because 1) plaintiff had not received a “retirement benefit”
 

within the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(4), and 2) the phrase
 

“receive or will receive” in MCL 421.27(f)(1) does not include
 

the direct rollover of a pension fund to an IRA. 


II. Standard of Review
 

This case requires us to ascertain the meaning and proper
 

application of MCL 421.27. Issues of statutory interpretation
 

are questions of law that we review de novo. Oade v Jackson
 

Nat’l Life Ins Co, 465 Mich 244, 250; 632 NW2d 126 (2001);
 

Donajkowski v Alpena Power Co, 460 Mich 243, 248; 596 NW2d 574
 

(1999).
 

III. Relevant Statutes
 

MCL 421.27(f)(1) has existed in essentially the same form
 

since 1954 PA 197. It states:
 

[N]otwithstanding any inconsistent provisions


of this act, the weekly benefit rate of each


individual who is receiving or will receive a
 

“retirement benefit,” as defined in [MCL


421.27(f)(4)], shall be adjusted as provided in


subparagraphs (a) . . . . However, an individual's


extended benefit account and an individual's weekly


extended benefit rate under [MCL 421.64] shall be


established without reduction under this subsection
 

unless [MCL 421.27(f)(5)] is in effect . . . .
 

(a) If and to the extent that unemployment


benefits payable under this act would be chargeable


to an employer who has contributed to the financing


of a retirement plan under which the claimant is


receiving or will receive a retirement benefit
 

yielding a pro rata weekly amount equal to or


larger than the claimant's weekly benefit rate as


otherwise established under this act, the claimant


shall not receive unemployment benefits that would


be chargeable to the employer under this act.
 

MCL 421.27(f)(1) thus requires an offset in unemployment
 

compensation for retirement benefits if the employer charged
 

5
 
with unemployment benefits funded the retirement plan. This
 

type of reduction is known as “narrow coordination.”
 

Before 1980, federal law did not address coordination of
 

unemployment and retirement benefits. In March 1980, Congress
 

amended 26 USC 3304(a)(15) of the FUTA to require the
 

coordination of unemployment benefits with employer-funded
 

retirement benefits, regardless of whether the employer who
 

had funded the retirement benefits was the same employer whose
 

account would be charged for the unemployment benefits. This
 

type of coordination is known as “broad coordination.”
 

Section 3304, particularly subsection (a)(15), of the FUTA
 

requires the states to conform to federal policy regarding
 

coordination of unemployment benefits to insure eligibility
 

for federal funds or tax credits. See Gormley v General
 

Motors Corp, 125 Mich App 781, 785-786; 336 NW2d 873 (1983).
 

In response to the federal amendment, the Michigan Legislature
 

promptly adopted broad coordination to the extent required by
 

federal law. MCL 421.27(f)(5) states:
 

Notwithstanding any other provision of this


subsection, for any week that begins after March 31,


1980, and with respect to which an individual is


receiving a governmental or other pension and


claiming unemployment compensation, the weekly


benefit amount payable to the individual for those


weeks shall be reduced, but not below zero, by the


entire prorated weekly amount of any governmental or


other pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity,


or any other similar payment that is based on any


previous work of the individual. This reduction
 

shall be made only if it is required as a condition


for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the


federal unemployment tax act, chapter 23 of subtitle


C of the internal revenue code of 1986, 26 USC 3301


to 3311.
 

The federal mandate for broad coordination was shortlived. In September 1980, Congress amended 26 USC 3304(a)(15)
 

6
 
to its present form, which requires only narrow coordination,
 

i.e., that coordination specified in MCL 421.27(f)(1).
 

Despite the federal amendment, the Michigan Legislature has
 

never amended MCL 421.27(f)(5). MCL 421.27 thus retains both
 

broad and narrow coordination provisions. We now address the
 

interplay of those provisions. 


IV. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
 

When interpreting statutory language, our obligation is
 

to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be
 

inferred from the words expressed in the statute. Wickens v
 

Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686
 

(2001). When the Legislature has unambiguously conveyed its
 

intent in a statute, the statute speaks for itself, and
 

judicial construction is not permitted. Huggett v Dep’t of
 

Natural Resources, 464 Mich 711, 717; 629 NW2d 915 (2001);
 

Donajkowski, supra at 248. Because the proper role of the
 

judiciary is to interpret and not write the law, courts simply
 

lack authority to venture beyond the unambiguous text of a
 

statute. 


Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause
 

in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation that would
 

render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.
 

Wickens, supra at 60. Further, we give undefined statutory
 

terms their plain and ordinary meanings. Donajkowski, supra
 

at 248-249; Oakland Co Road Comm’rs v Michigan Property &
 

Casualty Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751
 

(1998). In those situations, we may consult dictionary
 

definitions. Id.
 

7
 
V. Analysis
 

A. Interpretation of MCL 421.27(f)
 

The Court of Appeals determined that MCL 421.27(f)(5)
 

controlled over MCL 421.27(f)(1):
 

We conclude that subdivision 27(f)(5) is
 

controlling with regard to the coordination of
 

plaintiff’s retirement benefits. Its purpose was to


conform with the federal government’s goal of


maintaining certain uniformity among the state


programs regarding the coordination requirements for


unemployment compensation, which purpose would be


defeated were Michigan to default to its own
 

interpretations for coordination under its previous


statutory provisions and, in this case, circumvent


the clear result under subdivision 27(f)(5) that


coordination of plaintiff’s benefits is not
 

required. 


Moreover, the express statutory language


mandates a conclusion that subdivision 27(f)(5)


controls over subdivision 27(f)(1). Subdivision
 

f(5) was enacted after f(1) and provides:


“Notwithstanding any other provision of this
 

subsection . . . .” [Emphasis in original.] To
 

apply subdivision 27(f)(1) independently of
 

subdivision 27(f)(5) and deny plaintiff unemployment


benefits is inconsistent with the result under
 

federal law. Such an interpretation also creates an


inconsistency within the statute, contrary to the


rules of statutory construction. In construing


statutes, seeming inconsistencies in the various
 

provisions should be reconciled if possible.


[Citation omitted.]
 

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that MCL 421.27(f)(5)
 

exempted plaintiff’s benefits from coordination. 


The Court of Appeals failed to give effect to every word
 

and phrase of MCL 421.27(f). While the court acknowledged the
 

phrase, “Notwithstanding any other provision of this
 

subsection” in MCL 421.27(f)(5), it failed to give effect to
 

similar language in MCL 421.27(f)(1), stating,
 

“notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of this act.” In
 

addition, in finding that MCL 421.27(f)(5) controls over MCL
 

8
 
421.27(f)(1), the Court rendered nugatory MCL 421.27(f)(1),
 

contrary to established rules of interpretation.
 

We believe that the language of MCL 421.27(f) is clear
 

and unambiguous and must therefore be enforced as written.
 

Huggett, supra at 717; Donajkowski, supra at 248. MCL
 

421.27(f)(1) provides, in pertinent part: 


[N]otwithstanding any inconsistent provisions


of this act, the weekly benefit rate of each


individual who is receiving or will receive a
 

“retirement benefit,” as defined in [MCL


421.27(f)(4)], shall be adjusted as provided in


subparagraph (a) . . . .
 

(a) If and to the extent that unemployment


benefits payable under this act would be chargeable


to an employer who has contributed to the financing


of a retirement plan under which the claimant is


receiving or will receive a retirement benefit
 

yielding a pro rata weekly amount equal to or


larger than the claimant's weekly benefit rate as


otherwise established under this act, the claimant


shall not receive unemployment benefits that would


be chargeable to the employer under this act.


[Emphasis added.]
 

This text requires coordination where the claimant’s
 

unemployment benefits are chargeable to the employer who
 

contributed to the financing of the claimant’s retirement
 

benefits. Thus, “narrow coordination” is required
 

“notwithstanding any inconsistent provisions of this act
 

. . . .”
 

MCL 421.27(f)(5), on the other hand, requires “broad
 

coordination” where necessary to conform to federal law:
 

Notwithstanding any other provision of this


subsection, for any week that begins after March 31,


1980, and with respect to which an individual is


receiving a governmental or other pension and
 

claiming unemployment compensation, the weekly


benefit amount payable to the individual for those


weeks shall be reduced, but not below zero, by the


entire prorated weekly amount of any governmental or


other pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity,
 

9
 
or any other similar payment that is based on any


previous work of the individual. This reduction
 

shall be made only if it is required as a condition


for full tax credit against the tax imposed by the


federal unemployment tax act, chapter 23 of subtitle


C of the internal revenue code of 1986, 26 USC 3301
 

to 3311. [Emphasis added.]
 

This provision broadens the coordination required in MCL
 

421.27(f)(1) by compelling a reduction not only with regard to
 

pension funds that the chargeable employer contributes, but
 

also with regard to pension funds “based on any previous
 

work,” regardless of whether the chargeable employer
 

contributed the funds. MCL 421.27(f)(5) requires such “broad
 

coordination” only when necessary to conform to federal law.
 

Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals analysis, MCL
 

421.27(f)(1) and (5) are not inconsistent, but can be
 

harmonized. While MCL 421.27(f)(1) always requires
 

coordination of pension benefits that the chargeable employer
 

contributed, MCL 421.27(f)(5) may also require coordination of
 

pension benefits on the basis of the claimant’s previous work
 

if such broad coordination is necessary to conform to federal
 

law.
 

Our application of the plain language of these provisions
 

does not render MCL 421.27(f)(5) nugatory. If Congress again
 

chooses to require broad coordination, the additional
 

reduction prescribed in subsection 27(f)(5) will be triggered.
 

That federal law does not presently require the reduction does
 

not render MCL 421.27(f)(5) nugatory and does not compel the
 

Michigan Legislature to amend the statute.
 

B. The Meaning of “Liquidation”
 

10
 
 

Because MCL 421.27(f)(5) does not apply here,5 the
 

question remains whether MCL 421.27(f)(1) required
 

coordination of plaintiff’s benefits. The Court of Appeals
 

stated in dictum that even if MCL 421.27(f)(1) governed, it
 

did not require an offset because plaintiff did not receive a
 

“retirement benefit” within the meaning of MCL
 

421.27(f)(4)(a). That subdivision provides:
 

(4)(a) As used in this subdivision, “retirement


benefit” mean a benefit, annuity, or pension of any
 

type . . . that is:
 

(i) Provided as an incident of employment under
 

an established retirement plan, policy, or
 

agreement, including federal social security if


subdivision (5) is in effect.
 

(ii) Payable to an individual because the
 

individual has qualified on the basis of attained


age, length of service, or disability, whether or


not the individual retired or was retired from
 

employment. Amounts paid to individuals in the
 

course of liquidation of a private pension or


retirement fund because of termination of the
 

business or of a plant or department of the business


of the employer involved shall not be considered to


be retirement benefits. [Emphasis added.]
 

The Court of Appeals determined that plaintiff’s pension was
 

not a retirement benefit within the meaning of MCL
 

421.27(f)(4)(a) because the fund was liquidated upon
 

plaintiff’s termination when Ameritech closed its Traverse
 

City office. This factual conclusion was erroneous.
 

Although the Ameritech Traverse City office was closed,
 

5 Even if MCL 421.27(f)(5) applied, it would not change


the result. Plaintiff did not receive extended benefits, but,


rather, Ameritech contributed to all the pension benefits paid


to plaintiff. Plaintiff did not receive benefits from any


employer other than Ameritech, the chargeable employer. Thus,


even if federal law mandated broad coordination under MCL
 

421.27(f)(5), the facts of this case implicated only the


narrow coordination already required by MCL 421.27(f)(1).
 

11
 
 

the record does not reflect that the pension fund was
 

liquidated. Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2000)
 

defines “liquidate” as “to settle or pay (a debt),” “to reduce
 

(accounts) to order,” “to dissolve (a business or estate) by
 

apportioning the assets to offset the liabilities,” “to
 

convert (inventory, securities, or other assets) into cash,”
 

“to get rid of, esp. by killing,” “to break up or do away
 

with,” and “to liquidate debts or accounts.” The more
 

pertinent of these definitions contemplate the elimination of
 

an entire entity or the abolition of all assets or accounts
 

within an entity. As such, liquidation would involve the
 

Ameritech pension fund distributing all its assets. The
 

distribution of a single employee’s vested interest is not a
 

liquidation of the pension fund. In addition, plaintiff could
 

have elected to accept her pension benefits as a monthly
 

annuity, which clearly refutes the Court of Appeals conclusion
 

that the fund had been liquidated.
 

Our dissenting colleague maintains that we misconstrue
 

the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a) by failing to consider the
 

entire sentence in which “liquidation” appears. She attempts
 

to generate an ambiguity in the phrase “liquidation of a
 

private pension or retirement fund” by asserting that the
 

phrase could refer either to an individual’s personal account
 

or fund or to the collective pension fund. We reject the
 

dissent’s view.
 

The meaning of the phrase in MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a)(ii)
 

hinges on the word “liquidation.” As discussed, the plain
 

meaning of that term requires distribution of all assets held
 

12
 
 

in the pension fund for all employees. The dissent contends
 

that the term “liquidate” has many definitions, some of which
 

may be interpreted to apply to a sole pension account, such as
 

that belonging to plaintiff. A word is not rendered
 

ambiguous, however, merely because a dictionary defines it in
 

a variety of ways. Upjohn Co v New Hampshire Ins Co, 438 Mich
 

197, 208-209, n 8; 476 NW2d 392 (1991). Rather, the doctrine
 

of noscitur a sociis requires that the term “liquidation” be
 

viewed in light of the words surrounding it. Herald Co v Bay
 

City, 463 Mich 111, 130, n 10; 614 NW2d 873 (2000).
 

“Contextual understanding of statutes is generally grounded in
 

the doctrine of noscitur a sociis: ‘[i]t is known from its
 

associates,’ see Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 1060.
 

This doctrine stands for the principle that a word or phrase
 

is given meaning by its context or setting.” Brown v Genesee
 

Co Bd of Comm’rs (After Remand), 464 Mich 430, 437; 628 NW2d
 

471 (2001), quoting Tyler v Livonia Schs, 459 Mich 382, 390­

391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999).
 

In the context of the statute, the term “liquidation”
 

pertains to multiple accounts rather than to an individual
 

account. The statute exempts from the category of “retirement
 

benefits” those amounts “paid to individuals in the course of
 

liquidation of a private pension or retirement fund.”
 

Therefore, the text contemplates that liquidation pertains to
 

multiple accounts and not merely the single account of an
 

individual pensioner. In addition, the liquidation must occur
 

because of “termination of the business or of a plant or
 

department of the business.” Such a termination would involve
 

13
 
all employees within the business, plant, or department, and
 

not merely a single employee. Therefore, in accordance with
 

the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the phrase “liquidation of
 

a private pension or retirement fund” is not ambiguous; the
 

language clearly refers to the distribution of all assets
 

within the fund. Moreover, the dissent does not explain how
 

the fund was liquidated where, as discussed above, plaintiff
 

could have chosen to collect her pension benefits as a monthly
 

annuity.
 

Further, the dissent asserts that MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a) is
 

a remedial statute that we should construe liberally in favor
 

of plaintiff. We do not apply preferential rules of statutory
 

interpretation, however, without first discovering an
 

ambiguity and attempting to discern the legislative intent
 

underlying the ambiguous words. Crowe v Detroit, 465 Mich 1,
 

13; 631 NW2d 293 (2001). Only if that inquiry is fruitless,
 

or produces no clear demonstration of intent, do we resort to
 

a preferential or “dice-loading” rule.6 Because no ambiguity
 

exists, the remedial rule of preference does not apply. Id.
 

The dissent also asserts that our interpretation of the
 

statute produces “unconscionable results.” It is not the role
 

of the judiciary, however, to second-guess the wisdom of a
 

legislative policy choice. Our constitutional obligation is
 

to interpret, not to rewrite, the law. The Legislature
 

apparently determined that the same result should obtain
 

regardless of whether an employee opts for a monthly annuity
 

6
 See also Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal


Courts and the Law (Princeton, NJ, 1997) pp 27-29.
 

14
 
 

or for a lump-sum payment. Here, if plaintiff had elected a
 

monthly annuity in lieu of the lump-sum payment, no question
 

would exist that she would have been ineligible to receive
 

unemployment benefits.
 

Moreover, plaintiff chose to accept her pension benefits
 

instead of relocating to another Ameritech office. Ameritech
 

had offered plaintiff the opportunity to continue her
 

employment in another location, but she declined to do so.
 

The payout followed plaintiff’s decision to retire rather than
 

relocate. While the dissent contends that plaintiff had no
 

choice but to accept her pension benefits, the record does not
 

support this assertion. Accordingly, the condition set forth
 

in MCL 421.27(f)(4)(ii), providing an exception to the term
 

“retirement benefit,” does not apply in this case.
 

Thus, whether Ameritech’s payment to plaintiff was a
 

“retirement benefit” depends on whether it was “a benefit,
 

annuity, or pension of any type” payable to her “because [she]
 

has qualified on the basis of attained age [or] length of
 

service . . . .” In defining a “retirement benefit,” the
 

Legislature has used words of common and ordinary meaning, and
 

we apply them accordingly. Donajkowski, supra at 248-249;
 

Oakland Co Rd Comm’rs, supra at 604. It is undisputed that
 

plaintiff received a pension benefit on the basis of her age
 

and years of service. Thus, she received a “retirement
 

benefit” as contemplated in MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a). 


C. The Meaning of “Receive or Will Receive”
 

The Court of Appeals also stated, in dictum, that even if
 

plaintiff’s distribution were a retirement benefit, it was
 

15
 
exempt from coordination because “the Legislature did not
 

intend the terms ‘receive or will receive’ under § 27(f)(1) to
 

include the direct rollover of a pension fund to an IRA
 

. . . .” The Court stated:
 

This construction of the statute is the most
 

reasonable and comports with the benefit
 

interpretations of both the UA and the USDOL. MESC
 

Revised Benefit Interpretation No. 20.641 (November


29, 1995); USDOL Unemployment Insurance Program


Letter No. 22-87, Change 1 (June 19, 1995). In
 

reaching our conclusion, we are mindful that the


role of the judiciary is not to engage in judicial


legislation, but rather to determine the way chosen


by the Legislature. [Citation omitted.] We decline
 

to interpret the statute to incorporate any change


that overrides requirements clearly adopted by the


Legislature. [239 Mich App 47.]
 

While this issue is one of first impression in the
 

context of unemployment compensation, it has been addressed in
 

the somewhat analogous context of worker’s compensation.
 

White v McLouth Steel Products, decided sub nom Corbett v
 

Plymouth Twp, 453 Mich 522; 556 NW2d 478 (1996).7 In White,
 

this Court construed MCL 418.354(1)(d), of the Worker’s
 

Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq., which
 

directs that worker’s compensation benefits be coordinated
 

with “[t]he after-tax amount of the pension or retirement
 

payments received or being received . . . .” The employee in
 

White rolled his lump-sum pension distribution into an IRA.
 

The question was whether the nontaxable nature of the rollover
 

transfer precluded coordination of the retirement payments
 

with the worker’s compensation benefits. This Court ruled in
 

7 See, generally, Drouillard v Stroh Brewery Co, 449 Mich


293, 304-305; 536 NW2d 530 (1995) (holding that the employer


could coordinate a lump-sum pension distribution with worker’s


compensation benefits where the employee had been “forced” to


accept the pension distribution). 


16
 
favor of the employee. It rejected as “literalism” the
 

employer’s contention that the employee “received” the
 

transferred amount. This Court also stated that its
 

interpretation was consistent with the language of MCL
 

418.354(1)(d), limiting coordination to the after-tax amount
 

of the pension:
 

By reason of the tax-free aspect of a rollover


into an IRA, there is no taxable event and, hence,


no tax or “after-tax amount” that is “received or
 

being received.” [Id. at 547.]
 

Three justices dissented in White. They opined:
 

The [majority] opinion dismisses the statute’s


language by labeling as “literalism” defendant


McLouth Steel Products’ argument that under the


statute White has received his pension payment.


Ante at 544. [T]he better phrase would be plain


meaning. Subsection 354(1)(d) provides that weekly


worker’s compensation benefits may be reduced by


the “after-tax amount of the pension or retirement


payments received” by the employee and does not


condition the coordination of pension benefits on


whether the employee actually begins to use these


funds or invests them in a plan in which he will


only later receive payments. . . .
 

The majority attempts to justify its
 

interpretation . . . by noting the statute’s use of


the “after-tax amount,” but fails to note that [MCL
 

418.354(13)] defines “after-tax amount” as the
 

amount remaining after subtracting the estimated
 

tax the employee would pay on the benefit, not the


actual tax the employee incurred . . . . [Id. at
 

562-563 (emphasis in original).[8]
 

MCL 421.27(f)(1) is the unemployment compensation
 

counterpart of MCL 418.354(1)(d), but it lacks the “after-tax
 

amount” language on which the White majority relied in part.
 

The question here is whether plaintiff “received” the
 

8
 More precisely, MCL 418.354(13) defines “after-tax


amount” as the gross amount remaining after subtracting the


amount “which would have been paid, if any, under . . . state


income tax and federal income tax . . . .” [Emphasis added.]
 

17
 
transferred amounts. Random House Webster’s College
 

Dictionary (2000) defines “receive” as “to take into one’s
 

possession,” “to have (something) bestowed, conferred, etc.,”
 

“to hold, bear, or contain,” and “to take, get, accept, or
 

meet with something.” In light of these definitions, we
 

conclude that plaintiff received her retirement benefits
 

within the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(1), notwithstanding the
 

fact that Ameritech transferred the funds directly into her
 

IRA. We disagree with our dissenting colleague that plaintiff
 

did not take the pension funds into her possession within the
 

meaning of the dictionary definition of “receive.” The funds
 

were transferred at plaintiff’s direction. She is able to
 

withdraw the funds at any time and use them as she sees fit.
 

Ameritech clearly conferred the funds upon plaintiff, and
 

plaintiff accepted those funds by directing them into an
 

account of her choice. Accordingly, it is inescapable that
 

plaintiff received the funds. Because the dissenting opinion
 

in White is better reasoned, following that approach, we
 

conclude that plaintiff “received” the distribution at issue
 

within the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(1).9
 

9 We overrule White to the extent that it is inconsistent
 

with our present holding. The White majority also relied in


part on the statutory language “after-tax amount” in MCL


418.354(1)(d) in support of its decision. We do not decide
 

whether that aspect of White was decided correctly because it


is irrelevant to our determination in this case. 


Our concurring colleague asserts that overruling White in
 

part is unnecessary because, unlike the statute in White, the


statute before us does not contain the “after-tax amount”
 

language. He fails to acknowledge, however, that in addition


to the “after-tax amount” language, the White majority relied


in part on an erroneous definition of “receive,” conditioned


on the taxable nature of the funds in question. The
 

concurring opinion, therefore, overlooks part of the reasoning
 

18
 
 

Like, the Court of Appeals, the dissent would erroneously
 

elevate a construction from an extratextual source above the
 

unambiguous language of the statute itself. As we have stated
 

repeatedly, courts may not look beyond the clear text of a
 

statute to discover an unexpressed legislative intent. Sun
 

Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119
 

(1999). Although this Court generally accords due deference
 

to an administrative agency charged with executing a
 

particular statute, we grant no deference here because the
 

plain meaning of the statute controls. “An agency
 

interpretation cannot overcome the plain meaning of a
 

statute.” Consumers Power Co v Public Service Comm, 460 Mich
 

148, 157, n 8; 596 NW2d 126 (1999). The plain and ordinary
 

meaning of “receive” provides no basis to differentiate
 

between funds that are taxable and those that are not.
 

Therefore, MCL 421.27(f)(1) requires coordination whether or
 

not the funds are subject to taxation when plaintiff received
 

them by directing their deposit into her IRA account.
 

VI. Conclusion
 

We conclude that MCL 421.27(f)(1) required coordination
 

of plaintiff’s unemployment benefits with her pension
 

benefits. Plaintiff received a “retirement benefit” within
 

the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(1). That subsection required
 

coordination, whether or not the funds were subject to
 

taxation at the time of their receipt. Accordingly, we
 

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the
 

decision of the Board of Review and the judgment of the
 

upon which the majority in White based its decision.
 

19
 
circuit court.
 

WEAVER, TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with CORRIGAN, C.J.
 

20
 
________________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

NANCY KOONTZ,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

No. 116366
 

AMERITECH SERVICES, INC.,
 

Defendant-Appellant,
 

and
 

UNEMPLOYMENT AGENCY of the
 

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER
 

AND INDUSTRY SERVICES, formerly


MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 


AGENCY,
 

Appellee.
 

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).
 

I concur with the result in this case that MCL
 

421.27(f)(1) required coordination of plaintiff’s unemployment
 

benefits with her pension benefits. However, I write
 

separately because in reaching this result, it is not
 

necessary for the majority to adopt the dissent’s approach
 

from White v McLouth Steel Products, decided sub nom Corbett
 

v Plymouth Twp, 453 Mich 522; 556 NW2d 478 (1996), and to
 

overrule White to the extent that it is inconsistent with
 

today’s holding. In White, this Court construed MCL
 

418.354(1)(d) of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act
 
(WDCA), which provided that worker’s compensation benefits be
 

coordinated with “[t]he after-tax amount of the pension or
 

retirement payments received or being received . . . .”
 

(Emphasis added.) The White Court stated:
 

The construction that we adopt is consistent


with the language of the statute, which provides


for an offset “of the after-tax amount of the
 

pension or retirement payments received or being


received by the employee . . . .” (Emphasis added.)


By reason of the tax-free aspect of a rollover into


an IRA, there is no taxable event and, hence, no


tax or “after-tax amount” that is “received or
 

being received.” [White, supra at 547.]
 

The instant case involves an unemployment benefits
 

statute that is similar to the worker’s compensation statute
 

in White, but does not contain the “after-tax” language.
 

Although the remaining language in these statutes is similar,
 

it is not identical. The two statutes are clearly different;
 

they contain materially different language and arguably serve
 

different purposes.
 

Because of the differences between these statutes, the
 

majority does not need to address White. The White Court
 

clearly stated that its holding was based on the “after-tax”
 

language in the WDCA statute it was construing. 


2
 
___________________________________ 

v 

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
 

SUPREME COURT
 

NANCY KOONTZ,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

No. 116366
 

AMERITECH SERVICES, INC.,
 

Defendant-Appellant,
 

and
 

UNEMPLOYMENT AGENCY of the
 

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER
 

AND INDUSTRY SERVICES, formerly


MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
 

AGENCY,
 

Appellee.
 

KELLY, J. (dissenting).
 

I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion
 

that plaintiff's unemployment compensation benefits should be
 

eliminated because she has received retirement benefits as
 

defined by the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA). MCL
 

421.1 et seq. The majority reads the relevant statutory
 

language as unambiguous, despite strong indications to the
 

contrary. It fails to consider the entirety of the sentence
 

in which the word "liquidation" appears and disregards
 

interpretive letters that define "receive." In so doing, the
 
 

majority misconstrues the meaning of MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a).
 

The Court of Appeals advanced the correct interpretation.
 

I would affirm its holding that plaintiff did not receive a
 

"retirement benefit" within the meaning of the act and that
 

her unemployment compensation benefits should not be
 

eliminated as a consequence. 


I. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
 

When construing a statute, our primary goal is to
 

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature in
 

writing it. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 448 Mich 22, 27;
 

528 NW2d 681 (1995). While judicial interpretation usually is
 

not permitted where statutory language is clear, a literal
 

construction must yield when it produces absurd and unjust
 

results. See Salas v Clements, 399 Mich 103, 109; 247 NW2d
 

889 (1976). Judicial interpretation is also appropriate when
 

reasonable minds can differ regarding the meaning of the
 

language. Adrian Sch Dist v Michigan Pub Sch Emp Retirement
 

System, 458 Mich 326, 332; 582 NW2d 767 (1998). If judicial
 

interpretation is necessary, legislative intent is determined
 

by giving the statutory language a construction that is both
 

reasonable and that best accomplishes the purpose of the
 

statute. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456
 

Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998).
 

A. THE TERM "LIQUIDATION"
 

The MESA allows unemployment benefits payable under it to
 

be reduced or eliminated where a claimant is receiving a
 

"retirement benefit." MCL 421.27(f)(1). It defines that term
 

as "a benefit, annuity, or pension of any type . . . payable
 

2
 
 

[when] . . . the individual was retired from employment." MCL
 

421.27(f)(4)(a)(ii). But the act expressly excludes as a
 

retirement benefit any amounts paid to individuals "in the
 

course of liquidation of a private pension or retirement fund
 

because of termination of the business or of a plant or
 

department of the business of the employer involved . . . ."
 

1
 Id.


In this case, plaintiff lost her job with defendant
 

because defendant closed the facility where she worked. The
 

question is whether her retirement funds fall within the
 

statutory definition of "retirement benefit" or within the
 

exception. 


The expression "liquidation of a private pension or
 

retirement fund" in § 27(f)(4)(a)(ii) could mean a
 

distribution of all pension monies that an employer holds for
 

1
 MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a) provides:
 

As used in this subdivision, "retirement
 

benefit" means a benefit, annuity, or pension of


any type or that part thereof that is described in


subparagraph (b) that is:
 

(i) Provided as an incident of employment


under an established retirement plan, policy, or


agreement, including federal social security if


subdivision (5) is in effect.
 

(ii) Payable to an individual because the


individual has qualified on the basis of attained


age, length of service, or disability, whether or


not the individual retired or was retired from
 

employment. Amounts paid to individuals in the


course of liquidation of a private pension or


retirement fund because of termination of the
 

business or of a plant or department of the


business of the employer involved shall not be


considered to be retirement benefits.
 

3
 
all its employees. Defendant here maintains that it did not
 

liquidate its entire pension fund monies when it closed the
 

facility where plaintiff worked and that the fund continues to
 

exist. Under this interpretation and in this factual
 

situation, plaintiff's pension distribution would constitute
 

retirement benefits and she could not be paid unemployment
 

benefits. 


On the other hand, the clause "liquidation of a private
 

pension or retirement fund" could mean a distribution of all
 

pension monies that an employer holds for one or more but not
 

all of its employees.2 As noted by the majority, the word
 

"liquidate" has many definitions, including "to settle or pay
 

(a debt)" and "to convert (inventory, securities, or other
 

assets) into cash."3 Applying that definition here, defendant
 

"liquidated" plaintiff's retirement fund when it distributed
 

the entire contents and closed the account, settling its debt
 

to plaintiff and converting her pension into cash. Hence, the
 

distribution would not constitute retirement benefits and
 

plaintiff could draw unemployment benefits.
 

The majority offers no persuasive reasoning to support
 

its conclusion that the "more pertinent" definition of
 

"liquidate" is that contemplating the elimination of all
 

corporate pension assets. The mere fact that it prefers this
 

2
 It is not clear from the record whether defendant
 

distributed retirement funds to all employees in the facility


that it closed. It is known that five other employees were


affected in the same way as plaintiff.
 

3
 See Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001).
 

4
 
to a definition more favorable to plaintiff has no bearing on
 

what the Legislature intended "liquidate" to mean. The varied
 

definitions of the word leave room for reasonable minds to
 

differ. It is inescapable that the statutory language is
 

ambiguous.
 

The majority's interpretation, that "liquidation" means
 

a distribution of all pension monies held for all its
 

employees, produces unconscionable results. For example, in
 

this case, Ameritech would never "liquidate" all its pension
 

fund monies by shutting down one or some of its facilities. 


Hence, no employee in plaintiff's situation could ever collect
 

unemployment benefits. As an extreme example, if defendant
 

discharged all its employees, it could distribute all but one
 

dollar of the funds in the pension fund. Then, the fund would
 

not have been liquidated under the majority's reading because
 

all the assets would not have been distributed. In so doing,
 

defendant could reduce or eliminate all its employees'
 

unemployment benefits. The Legislature could not have
 

intended the result in either example.
 

The practical implications of the majority's reading of
 

§ 27(f)(4)(a)(ii) are enormously detrimental to employees like
 

plaintiff. During plaintiff's hearing before the Michigan
 

Employment Security Board of Review, defendant's human
 

resources manager testified that there is a single common
 

trust fund for pension monies to which both defendant and
 

Michigan Bell contribute. Absent closure of the entire
 

corporation and all its pension funds, whenever defendant
 

shuts down one facility, it will always escape paying
 

5
 
unemployment benefits to the employees who worked there. 


The majority distorts the facts of this case by
 

portraying plaintiff's acceptance of her pension funds as a
 

choice. Defendant offered plaintiff two other jobs in its
 

corporation. However, both were located approximately two
 

hours from her residence. When plaintiff declined them
 

because the commute would be unreasonable, defendant
 

distributed her retirement funds. She did not have the option
 

to leave them in defendant's trust fund. She was obliged to
 

have them rolled into an IRA or paid to her in a monthly
 

annuity.4 It is in light of these facts that defendant
 

believes the funds were not liquidated within the meaning of
 

MCL 421.27(f)(4)(a)(ii).
 

My construction of § 27(f)(4)(a)(ii) is in keeping with
 

the fact that the MESA is a remedial statute. As such, by
 

principle, it should be liberally construed to afford benefits
 

to a displaced employee. Empire Iron Mining Partnership v
 

Orhanen, 455 Mich 410, 415-416; 565 NW2d 844 (1997). My
 

construction also furthers the purpose of the act, which is
 

"to lighten the burden of economic insecurity on those who
 

become unemployed through no fault of their own." Id. at 417.
 

B. THE PHRASE "IS RECEIVING OR WILL RECEIVE"
 

I also disagree with the majority's rejection of the
 

Court of Appeals finding that, within the meaning of MCL
 

4
 Defendant did not at any point during the trial and


appellate proceeding contest this. Accordingly, there is no


reason for this Court to question the accuracy of plaintiff's


assertion that she was required to see her retirement funds


distributed. The record supports the claim. 


6
 
421.27(f)(1), the funds were not "received." Once again, the
 

majority brushes aside reasonable interpretations other than
 

its own and characterizes a word as unambiguous. 


The facts of this case show that plaintiff did not take
 

the pension funds into her possession within the dictionary
 

definition of "receive." Instead, defendant transferred the
 

funds directly into an individual retirement account in her
 

name. 


The Court of Appeals decision interpreted "receive" by
 

relying in part on interpretive letters issued by the United
 

States Department of Labor (USDOL)5 and the Michigan
 

Employment Security Commission.6 Both conclude that, when an
 

employer transfers an employee's retirement funds into an
 

individual retirement account, the employee does not receive
 

them for purposes of the relevant unemployment compensation
 

laws. 


The majority ignores these letters, choosing instead to
 

construct a definition of "receive" on the basis of a
 

dissenting opinion7 and dictionary definitions. However, it
 

is a long-established principle of law that "'[t]he
 

5 USDOL Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 22-87,


Change 1 (June 19, 1995).
 

6 Michigan Employment Security Commission Revised Benefit


Interpretation No. 20.641 (November 29, 1995).
 

7
 The majority adopts the reasoning from the dissenting


opinion in White v McLouth Steel Products, decided sub nom


Corbett v Plymouth Twp, 453 Mich 522; 556 NW2d 478 (1996). In
 

so doing, it reverses that part of White that is inconsistent
 

with its holding. There is no reason to reach White. That
 

case is easily distinguishable on the basis of the statutory


provisions involved. 


7
 
 

construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty
 

of executing it is always entitled to the most respectful
 

consideration and ought not to be overruled without cogent
 

reasons.'" Oakland Schs Bd of Ed v Superintendent of Pub
 

Inst, 401 Mich 37, 41; 257 NW2d 73 (1977), quoting United
 

States v Moore, 95 US (5 Otto) 760; 24 L Ed 588 (1877). 


The majority offers no cogent reason to deviate from the
 

administrative agencies' interpretations, which provide a
 

reasonable construction of the statutory language consistent
 

with the purpose and the policy of the MESA. This Court
 

should accord that interpretation due deference and hold that
 

plaintiff did not receive a retirement benefit within the
 

meaning of § 27(f) of the MESA.
 

II. PUBLIC POLICY
 

The controversy here regarding the correct interpretation
 

of the statutory definition of "retirement benefit" is best
 

resolved by considering the public policy expressly declared
 

in the MESA. It provides:
 

Economic insecurity due to unemployment is a


serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare


of the people of this state. Involuntary


unemployment is a subject of general interest and


concern which requires action by the legislature to


prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which


so often falls with crushing force upon the
 

unemployed worker and his family, to the detriment


of the welfare of the people of this state. Social
 

security requires protection against this hazard of


our economic life. Employers should be encouraged


to provide stable employment. The systematic


accumulation of funds during periods of employment


to provide benefits for periods of unemployment by


the setting aside of unemployment reserves to be


used for the benefit of persons unemployed through


no fault of their own, thus maintaining purchasing


power and limiting the serious social consequences


of relief assistance, is for the public good, and
 

8
 
the general welfare of the people of this state.


[MCL 421.2.]
 

The majority disregards this part of the act despite the
 

fact that the Legislature's declaration of public policy
 

contained there is of paramount importance. Plaintiff lost
 

her position with defendant as a result of defendant's
 

decision to close the facility where she worked. She had
 

vested pension benefits that defendant distributed and treated
 

as hers prematurely. 


Had defendant offered plaintiff reasonable employment,
 

plaintiff could have left her pension benefits undisturbed.
 

Instead, it terminated plaintiff's employment and prevented
 

her from drawing unemployment benefits. It required her to
 

choose between paying her current living expenses or preseving
 

her retirement monies, contrary to the explicit public policy
 

of the state. Defendant's scheme only exacerbated plaintiff's
 

economic insecurity.
 

III. CONCLUSION
 

Ambiguity exists in the statutory language of
 

§ 27(f)(4)(a) of the MESA that defines a "retirement benefit"
 

as not including an amount paid in the course of liquidation
 

of a private pension or retirement fund. The Court should
 

ascertain the Legislature's intent in using that expression by
 

referring to the stated purpose of the MESA and the underlying
 

public policy. With these in mind, the only reasonable
 

construction is one that defines a pension distribution made
 

under the circumstances of this case as not constituting a
 

"retirement benefit." 


9
 
The meaning of "receive" is also subject to differing
 

reasonable interpretations. In construing it, this Court
 

should defer to the meaning that the state and federal
 

agencies responsible for administering unemployment
 

compensation have given to it. The majority ignores this
 

principle, preferring a definition constructed from a
 

dissenting opinion and dictionary definitions, which it
 

contends is in keeping with the plain meaning of the statute.
 

This approach is contrary to the reasonable interpretation
 

advanced by the administrative agencies and to the purpose of
 

and the policy underlying the MESA. The term should be
 

construed as not inclusive of retirement funds transferred
 

directly into an individual retirement account. 


I would affirm the Court of Appeals holding that
 

plaintiff was entitled to unemployment compensation benefits
 

under the MESA.
 

MARKMAN, J., took no part in the decision of this case.
 

10