2014 IL App (2d) 130532WC

No. 2-13-0532WC

Opinion filed September 30, 2014

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

Workers’ Compensation Commission Division

_____________________________________________________________________________

WALTER MATUSZCZAK, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of

) Du Page County.

Appellee, )

)

v. ) No. 12-MR-1631

)

THE ILLINOIS WORKERS’ )

COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. ) Honorable

) Bonnie M. Wheaton,

(Wal-Mart, Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Hoffman, Hudson, and Stewart concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Presiding Justice Holdridge specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 On March 26, 2010, claimant, Walter Matuszczak, filed an application for adjustment of 

claimant pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 to 30 (West 2008)), 

seeking benefits from the employer, Wal-Mart. Following a hearing, the arbitrator determined 

claimant sustained accidental injuries that arose out of and in the course of his employment on 

March 7, 2010, and awarded him (1) 232

/7 weeks’ temporary total disability (TTD) benefits from 

June 13 to November 22, 2011; (2) $14,227.41 in medical expenses; and (3) prospective medical 

expenses in the form of a surgical procedure recommended by one of claimant’s doctors.
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¶ 2 On review, the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) vacated the 

arbitrator’s TTD award but otherwise affirmed and adopted his decision. On judicial review, the 

circuit court of Du Page County reversed the portion of the Commission’s decision that vacated 

the arbitrator’s TTD award. The employer appeals, arguing the Commission correctly 

determined claimant was not entitled to TTD after June 12, 2011, the date of his for-cause 

termination from employment. We affirm the circuit court’s judgment, reversing the portion of 

the Commission’s decision that vacated the arbitrator’s award. We reinstate the arbitrator’s TTD 

award and remand to the Commission for further proceedings pursuant to Thomas v. Industrial 

Comm’n, 78 Ill. 2d 327, 399 N.E.2d 1322 (1980).

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 At arbitration, claimant testified he worked for the employer for over three years as a fulltime night stocker. His job duties included taking 5- to 100-pound boxes off skids and neatly 

placing products in proper areas. On March 7, 2010, claimant injured his neck, back, and right 

arm at work when several fully stocked shelves of glass cleaner fell on top of him.

¶ 5 On March 9, 2010, claimant began seeking medical care. Thereafter, he received 

conservative treatment from various providers and was consistently given modified-duty work 

restrictions. Following his accident, claimant returned to work for the employer in a light-duty 

capacity. On May 23, 2011, claimant saw Dr. Mark Lorenz, who recommended surgery on 

claimant’s cervical spine.

¶ 6 Claimant testified, on June 12, 2011, he was terminated from his employment for an 

incident unrelated to his work injury. Thereafter, claimant remained unemployed. On crossexamination claimant agreed that, at the time of his termination, he prepared a handwritten 

statement acknowledging that he stole cigarettes from the employer on June 3, 2011, and on a 
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“couple of days” in May 2011. He agreed that, at the time he took the cigarettes, he understood 

that stealing is a crime and stealing from his employer could result in termination. Further, 

claimant acknowledged that, had he not stolen cigarettes, he might still have been working for 

the employer in a light-duty capacity at the time of arbitration. Claimant asserted he had looked 

for work within his light-duty restrictions but had not been successful.

¶ 7 On January 25, 2012, the arbitrator issued his decision in the matter. As stated, he 

determined claimant sustained accidental injuries that arose out of and in the course of his 

employment on March 7, 2010, and awarded him (1) 232/7 weeks’ TTD benefits; (2) $14,227.41 

in medical expenses; and (3) prospective medical expenses in the form of the surgery 

recommended by Dr. Lorenz. The arbitrator’s TTD award extended from June 13, 2010, the day 

after claimant was terminated from his employment for stealing, to November 22, 2011, the date 

of the arbitration hearing. With respect to TTD, the arbitrator noted claimant was subject to 

light-duty restrictions that were being accommodated by the employer at the time of his 

termination, he did not return to work after being terminated, and claimant testified that he tried 

looking for work within his restrictions. He further stated as follows:

“In Interstate Scaffolding Inc. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission, 

236 Ill[.] 2d 132, 923 N.E.2d 266 (2010), the court found that the employer was obligated 

to pay TTD benefits even when the employee has been discharged, whether or not the 

discharge was for cause, and that when an injured employee has been discharged by his 

employer the inquiry for deciding his entitlement to TTD benefits remains, as always, 

whether the claimant’s condition has stabilized. More to the point, the court noted that if 

the injured employee is able to show that he continues to be temporarily totally disabled 

as a result of his work[-]related injury, the employee is entitled to these benefits.”
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The arbitrator based his TTD award on findings that claimant had “remained under the same 

light[-]duty restrictions imposed at the time of his termination.” Further, he determined 

claimant’s condition had not stabilized at the time of arbitration and claimant had not reached 

maximum medical improvement (MMI).

¶ 8 On October 5, 2012, the Commission vacated the arbitrator’s award of 232/7 weeks’ TTD 

benefits but otherwise affirmed and adopted his decision. It noted that a claimant’s benefits may 

be terminated or suspended if he refuses work within his physical restrictions and agreed with 

the employer's position that claimant’s theft of cigarettes from the employer, coupled with 

claimant’s knowledge that his theft could lead to termination, constituted a refusal of work 

within his physical restrictions by claimant. The Commission further stated as follows:

“We do not believe the Interstate Scaffolding court was proscribing all use of discretion 

in cases involving employment termination; rather, as stated previously, we believe the 

court was rejecting an analysis of the propriety of the discharge and rejecting an 

automatic suspension or termination of [TTD] benefits in cases involving employment 

termination.”

¶ 9 On April 23, 2013, the circuit court of Du Page County reversed the portion of the 

Commission’s decision that vacated the arbitrator’s TTD award.

¶ 10 This appeal followed.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, the employer argues the Commission’s finding that claimant was not entitled 

to TTD benefits following his June 2011 termination from employment was neither contrary to 

law nor against the manifest weight of the evidence. It maintains that, although Interstate 

Scaffolding prohibits the automatic suspension or termination of TTD benefits when a claimant 
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is fired for reasons unrelated to his injury, it does “not proscribe all use of discretion [by the 

Commission] when deciding whether an employer remains liable for TTD” following an 

employee’s discharge. Thus, the employer contends the Commission was free to exercise its 

discretion in the instant case to determine that claimant’s decision to steal from the employer 

when he admittedly knew such action could result in his termination was the equivalent of 

refusing work within his physical restrictions and a valid basis for suspending or terminating 

TTD.

¶ 13 Claimant argues the analysis used by the Commission to deny him TTD benefits 

following his termination from employment was contrary to law pursuant to Interstate 

Scaffolding. He contends that case is factually similar to the present case and prohibits the 

Commission from delving into the reasons for termination, which he alleges the Commission 

impermissibly did in this case.

¶ 14 “A claimant is temporarily totally disabled from the time an injury incapacitates him 

from work until such time as he is as far recovered or restored as the permanent character of his 

injury will permit.” Westin Hotel v. Industrial Comm’n, 372 Ill. App. 3d 527, 542, 865 N.E.2d 

342, 356 (2007). “It is a well-settled principle that when a claimant seeks TTD benefits, the 

dispositive inquiry is whether the claimant’s condition has stabilized, i.e., whether the claimant 

has reached [MMI].” Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 142, 923 N.E.2d at 271. Further, “[t]o 

be entitled to TTD, a claimant must show not only that he did not work but that he could not 

work.” Residential Carpentry, Inc. v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 389 Ill. App. 3d

975, 981, 910 N.E.2d 109, 115 (2009). TTD benefits may be suspended or terminated if the 

employee (1) refuses to submit to medical, surgical, or hospital treatment essential to his 

recovery; (2) fails to cooperate in good faith with rehabilitation efforts; or (3) refuses work 
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falling within the physical restrictions prescribed by his doctor. Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 

2d at 146, 923 N.E.2d at 274.

¶ 15 “Before a reviewing court may overturn a decision of the Commission, the court must 

find that the award was contrary to law or that the Commission’s factual determinations were 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Beelman Trucking v. Illinois Workers’ 

Compensation Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 364, 370, 909 N.E.2d 818, 822 (2009). Generally, the period 

during which a claimant is entitled to TTD benefits is a factual determination for the 

Commission and its decision will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Westin Hotel, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 542, 865 N.E.2d at 356. However, “if the 

Commission relies on a legally erroneous premise to find a fact, the resulting decision is contrary 

to law and must be reversed.” Franklin v. Industrial Comm’n, 211 Ill. 2d 272, 282-83, 811 

N.E.2d 684, 691 (2004). “On questions of law, review is de novo, and a court is not bound by 

the decision of the Commission.” Beelman Trucking, 233 Ill. 2d at 370, 909 N.E.2d at 822.

¶ 16 Here, the parties disagree on whether the Commission utilized the correct legal analysis 

in vacating the arbitrator’s award of TTD benefits following claimant’s termination from his 

employment. This issue presents a question of law and is subject to de novo review.

¶ 17 In Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 136, 923 N.E.2d at 268, the claimant sustained 

work-related injuries to his head, neck, and back but was able to return to work for the employer 

in a light-duty capacity. Following his return to work, a conflict arose between the claimant and 

the assistant to the employer’s president, culminating in the claimant’s termination from 

employment. Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 136-37, 923 N.E.2d at 268-69. The stated 

reason for the claimant’s dismissal was defacement of the employer’s property due to the 

claimant writing religious graffiti in the employer’s storage room. Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 
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2d at 137-38, 923 N.E.2d at 269. Although the claimant admitted to writing religious slogans in 

the storage room, he did not believe those writings were the reason for his dismissal, stating 

other employees had written on the shelves or walls of the storage room without repercussion. 

Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 138-39, 923 N.E.2d at 269-70.

¶ 18 Following a hearing, the arbitrator determined the claimant was not entitled to TTD 

benefits subsequent to his termination. Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 139, 923 N.E.2d at 

270. The Commission modified that portion of the arbitrator’s decision, finding the claimant’s 

condition had not stabilized as of the date of arbitration and he was entitled to TTD benefits for 

the period of time between his termination and the arbitration hearing. Interstate Scaffolding, 

236 Ill. 2d at 140, 923 N.E.2d at 270. On appeal, this court reversed the Commission’s award of 

TTD benefits, “holding that an employer may cease paying TTD benefits if the injured employee 

commits a volitional act of misconduct that serves as justification for his termination.” Interstate 

Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 142, 923 N.E.2d at 271 (citing Interstate Scaffolding, Inc. v. Illinois 

Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 385 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1047, 896 N.E.2d 1132, 1139 (2008)).

¶ 19 Ultimately, the supreme court reversed this court's decision and reinstated the 

Commission's TTD award, holding “that when an employee who is entitled to receive workers’

compensation benefits as a result of a work-related injury is later terminated for conduct 

unrelated to the injury, the employer’s obligation to pay TTD workers’ compensation benefits 

continues until the employee’s medical condition has stabilized and he has reached [MMI].” 

Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 135-36, 923 N.E.2d at 268. In reaching its decision, the 

court rejected this court’s finding that the critical inquiry in determining a claimant’s entitlement 

to TTD benefits when leaving the workforce was whether the departure was voluntary. 

Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 143-45, 923 N.E.2d at 272-73. The court noted that 
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“worker’s compensation is a statutory remedy” and “[a]ny action taken by the Commission must 

be specifically authorized by statute.” Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 145, 923 N.E.2d at 

273-74. Further it stated as follows:

“Looking to the Act, we find that no reasonable construction of its provisions 

supports a finding that TTD benefits may be denied an employee who remains injured, 

yet has been discharged by his employer for ‘volitional conduct’ unrelated to his injury. 

A thorough examination of the Act reveals that it contains no provision for the denial, 

suspension, or termination of TTD benefits as a result of an employee's discharge by his 

employer. Nor does the Act condition TTD benefits on whether there has been ‘cause’

for the employee’s dismissal. Such an inquiry is foreign to the Illinois workers’ 

compensation system.” Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 146, 923 N.E.2d at 274.

¶ 20 The supreme court held “that an employer’s obligation to pay TTD benefits to an injured 

employee does not cease because the employee had been discharged—whether or not the 

discharge was for ‘cause’ ” and “[w]hen an injured employee has been discharged by his 

employer, the determinative inquiry for deciding entitlement to TTD benefits remains, as always, 

whether the claimant’s condition has stabilized.” (Emphasis added.) Interstate Scaffolding, 236 

Ill. 2d at 149, 923 N.E.2d at 276. Further, the court stated as follows:

“It remains the law in Illinois that an at-will employee may be discharged for any 

reason or no reason. [Citation.] Whether an employee has been discharged for a valid 

cause, or whether the discharge violates some public policy, are matters foreign to 

workers’ compensation cases. An injured employee’s entitlement to TTD benefits is a 

completely separate issue and may not be conditioned on the propriety of the discharge.” 

Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 149, 923 N.E.2d at 276.
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¶ 21 Cleary, the supreme court’s holding in Interstate Scaffolding prohibits the automatic

denial of TTD benefits to an injured employee when the employee has been discharged from 

work by the employer. However, that is not the extent of the court’s holding. In addition to 

proscribing the denial of TTD based solely on an employee’s discharge, the court also clearly 

held that when an employee who is entitled to benefits under the Act is terminated for conduct

unrelated to his injury, the employer's TTD obligation continues “until the employee’s medical 

condition has stabilized.” Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 135-36, 923 N.E.2d at 268. This 

is true even in cases of for-cause dismissal. In so holding, the court expressly rejected an 

interpretation of the Act that would support a denial of TTD where an employee’s volitional 

conduct was the basis for termination.

¶ 22 Here, the employer agrees claimant sustained a compensable work injury on March 7, 

2010. Also, it is undisputed that claimant was discharged by the employer for acts unrelated to 

his injury. Thus, the appropriate inquiry for the Commission was whether claimant’s medical 

condition had stabilized at the time of his termination. As to that issue, the undisputed facts 

show claimant was placed on light-duty work restrictions following his accident and he remained 

under light-duty restrictions after his June 2011 termination. Both the arbitrator and the 

Commission determined claimant was entitled to prospective medical expenses for surgery 

necessary to treat his work injury, that claimant had not reached MMI, and that claimant’s 

condition had not stabilized. These findings are not challenged on appeal. Thus, the evidence 

was sufficient to show, at the time of his termination, claimant continued to be temporarily 

totally disabled as a result of his work-related injury. Such a showing entitled him to TTD 

benefits from the time of his termination to the date of arbitration. Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill.

2d at 149, 923 N.E.2d at 276 (“If the injured employee is able to show that he continues to be 
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temporarily totally disabled as a result of his work-related injury, the employee is entitled to 

TTD benefits.”).

¶ 23 Nevertheless, despite finding claimant’s condition was not stabilized, the Commission 

determined it had discretion to find the conduct that resulted in claimant’s termination amounted 

to a refusal of light-duty work and was, therefore, a sufficient basis for denying TTD benefits. In 

Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 146-47, 923 N.E.2d at 274, the supreme court acknowledged 

that TTD benefits may be suspended or terminated when a claimant refuses work within his 

physical restrictions; however it also determined such a situation did not exist in the case before 

it—a case where the claimant was entitled to benefits under the Act and had returned to lightduty work for the employer but was later terminated for conduct unrelated to his injury. We find 

these circumstances are the same as those presented in the case at bar.

¶ 24 On appeal, the employer argues Interstate Scaffolding is factually distinguishable because 

claimant in this case acknowledged that he knew his conduct (stealing from the employer) could 

have resulted in his termination. We disagree. Like the claimant in Interstate Scaffolding, 

claimant in this case sustained compensable work-related injuries, returned to work in a lightduty capacity for the employer (for over a year in the case at bar), and was terminated by the 

employer for conduct unrelated to his work injury. Just as the facts of Interstate Scaffolding did 

not amount to a refusal of light-duty work, the facts here also fail to present such a situation.

¶ 25 Additionally, we find nothing in the supreme court’s decision that would show the result 

in Interstate Scaffolding was dependent upon the claimant’s knowledge, or lack thereof, as to 

whether his conduct could result in termination. As the supreme court pointed out, in Illinois, an 

at-will employee may be discharged for any reason or no reason and whether an employee is 

justifiably discharged is a matter “foreign to workers’ compensation cases” and completely 
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separate from issues related to an injured employee's entitlement to TTD. Interstate Scaffolding, 

236 Ill. 2d at 149, 923 N.E.2d at 276. Whether claimant was appropriately discharged, or knew 

he could be as a result of his conduct, was not an appropriate consideration for the Commission 

under the circumstances presented.

¶ 26 The record shows claimant was entitled to benefits under the Act as a result of his workrelated injury but was terminated from his employment for conduct unrelated to his injury. Per 

Interstate Scaffolding, the critical inquiry for the Commission when determining claimant’s 

entitlement to TTD was whether his medical condition had stabilized and he had reached MMI. 

The Commission went beyond such considerations in vacating the arbitrator’s award of TTD and 

its decision is contrary to law.

¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment, reversing the portion of the 

Commission’s decision which vacated the arbitrator’s award. We reinstate the arbitrator’s TTD 

award and remand to the Commission for further proceedings pursuant to Thomas, 78 Ill. 2d 327, 

399 N.E.2d 1322.

¶ 29 Judgment affirmed and arbitrator’s award reinstated; cause remanded.

¶ 30 PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring.

¶ 31 I agree that the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed and the arbitrator’s 

award should be reinstated with the cause remanded to the Commission. I write separately in 

order to clarify the majority’s analysis of Interstate Scaffolding, Inc. v. Illinois Workers’ 

Compensation Comm’n, 236 Ill. 2d 132 (2010). In that case, a majority of this court held that an 

employer could cease payment of TTD benefits if the injured employee committed a volitional 

act of misconduct that justified his termination. Interstate Scaffolding, Inc. v. Illinois Workers’ 
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Compensation Comm’n, 385 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1047 (2008). As the majority herein points out, 

our supreme court subsequently rejected this analysis, holding that an employer’s obligation to 

pay TTD benefits does not cease when an employee has been discharged. Interstate Scaffolding, 

236 Ill. 2d at 145. Rather, “the determinative inquiry for deciding entitlement to TTD benefits 

remains, as always, whether the claimant’s condition has stabilized.” (Emphasis added.) 

Interstate Scaffolding, 236 Ill. 2d at 149.

¶ 32 I write separately to point out that the appellate court's decision in Interstate Scaffolding 

was not unanimous. The dissent pointed out that the determinative inquiry should not be 

whether the employer had just cause to terminate the employee, but whether the employer’s 

refusal to continue to pay TTD benefits after the termination was permissible under the Act. 

Interstate Scaffolding, 385 Ill. App. 3d at 1052 (Donovan, J., dissenting, joined by Holdridge, J.). 

The dissent further pointed out that, even if the employer could establish that a claimant’s 

employment was terminated for misconduct, the claimant should nonetheless be allowed to 

establish that his work-related injuries and medical restrictions “prevent[ed] him from securing 

employment at pre-injury work levels.” Id. If so, the dissent reasoned, he should be allowed to 

continue receiving TTD benefits. Id. While our supreme court did not expressly adopt the 

analysis articulated in the dissent, I maintain that the analysis in the dissent is fully consistent 

with the supreme court’s holding.