IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 13-1893

Filed August 27, 2014

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

NICHOLAS JOSEPH GARZA,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Thomas G. Reidel, 

Judge.

Nicholas Garza appeals from his conviction, judgment, and sentence for 

third-degree sexual abuse following his guilty plea. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Heather R. Quick, Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Kimberly Shepherd and Melisa 

Zaehringer, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.

Nicholas Garza appeals from his conviction, judgment, and sentence for 

third-degree sexual abuse following his guilty plea. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

We filed our opinion in this case on July 30, 2014, but subsequently 

granted Garza’s petition for rehearing. Our July 30 decision is therefore vacated, 

and this decision replaces it.

In 2012, twenty-four-year old Garza met a female online, who told him she 

was eighteen when she was actually fifteen. They began a relationship and 

eventually met in person. They continued to meet and ultimately had sexual 

intercourse on numerous occasions. At some point, the girl told Garza she was 

only fifteen. They continued their relationship, including having sex.

On June 24, 2013, the State filed a trial information charging Garza with 

sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C” felony, in violation of Iowa Code 

sections 709.1 and 709.4(2)(c)(4) (2013). Garza initially pled not guilty and 

waived his right to a speedy trial. However, in October 2013, Garza entered into 

a plea agreement with the State, whereby he would plead guilty as charged in 

exchange for the State not making any sentencing recommendations at his 

sentencing hearing.

At the plea hearing, the court conducted a colloquy with Garza. 

Thereafter, the court accepted the agreement, finding Garza had voluntarily 

entered into the guilty plea and that he understood the consequences of his guilty 

plea. The court did not specifically advise Garza of his right to compel witnesses 

at trial.
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A sentencing hearing was held thereafter in November 2013. As agreed, 

the State made no sentencing recommendation. Garza requested the court 

grant him a deferred judgment. The court declined Garza’s request and 

sentenced him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment not to exceed ten years. 

The court also imposed a special sentence of lifetime parole and notified Garza 

of his duty to register as a sex offender.

Garza now appeals. He contends his guilty plea was not entered 

knowingly and voluntarily because the district court failed to substantially comply 

with the rules of criminal procedure in accepting his plea. Additionally, he argues 

the district court abused its discretion when it considered an unproven offense 

and sentenced him to prison instead of placing him on probation. He also 

maintains the court only considered one factor—the seriousness of his offense—

in making its sentencing determination. Finally, he asserts the special sentence 

of lifetime parole, imposed pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.1, is grossly 

disproportionate to the crime he committed and violates his right to be free from 

cruel and unusual punishment under the Iowa and Federal Constitutions.

II. Discussion.

A. Error Preservation.

Garza first argues the district court failed to substantially comply with the 

Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting his plea, and consequently, his 

guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. The State argues Garza 

failed to preserve this issue for our review, pointing out that Garza failed to file a 

motion in arrest of judgment and that Garza has not raised the claim as a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree.
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To preserve a direct challenge to his guilty plea on appeal, Garza must 

have filed a motion in arrest of judgment. See State v. Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 

49 (Iowa 2013). Absent such a filing, Garza must show the court did not 

adequately notify him of the requirement of doing so under Iowa Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 2.8(2)(d). See State v. Oldham, 515 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1994) 

(“Failure by a judge to comply with this rule operates to reinstate the defendant’s 

right to appeal the legality of his plea.”). We employ a substantial compliance 

standard in determining whether a district court has discharged its duty under 

rule 2.8(2)(d). State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d 141, 150 (Iowa 2003). The court must 

ensure the defendant understands the necessity of filing a motion to challenge a 

guilty plea and the consequences of failing to do so. Id.

Here, the district court’s comments were sufficient to discharge its duty 

under rule 2.8(2)(d). Instead of quoting the rule verbatim, the court performed its 

duty by using plain language to explain the motion in arrest of judgment, stating:

If you think I made a mistake in accepting the guilty plea, Mr. 

Garza, you have to raise that in a motion in arrest of judgment. It 

has time periods and has to be filed within forty-five days of today’s 

date and no later than five days before your date of sentencing.

The court’s statement sufficiently indicated that Garza had to file a motion in 

arrest of judgment if he wanted to appeal or challenge his guilty plea. It also 

indicated the time within which this motion had to be filed. In whole, it conveyed 

the pertinent information and substantially complied with the requirements of rule 

2.8(2)(d).1 We therefore find this colloquy sufficiently notified Garza of the motion 

 

1 We have found similar statements to have substantially complied with the

requirements of the rule. See State v. Burden, 445 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1989); see also State v. Stamps, No. 13-0989, 2014 WL 1494957, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 
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in arrest of judgment filing requirements, and as such, the direct challenge to the 

guilty plea was not preserved for review.

B. Unproven Offense.

In rejecting Garza’s request that, in lieu of prison time, he be granted a 

deferred judgment, the sentencing court stated:

Mr. Garza, my duty under the law is to review what is 

available to me in terms of community resources and to determine 

what the appropriate rehabilitative plan for you would be, but to also 

consider that the public must be protected. In doing so, I look at 

the seriousness of the crime, the effect that this crime has upon 

members of the community, your willingness to accept change and 

treatment, and what is available in this community to assist you in 

the process. In this entire thought process, I look at the least 

restrictive alternatives first and then proceed to the more restrictive 

alternatives.

I have reviewed the entire presentence investigation report. 

I have also given consideration to the letter from your employer. I 

have not given any consideration to any entries in the criminal 

history section that do not show an admission or adjudication of 

guilt. Mr. Garza, this is a very serious crime. If I read the reports 

correctly, you were twenty-four years old when you engaged in 

multiple acts of sexual intercourse with a fifteen-year-old child. You 

provided alcohol to that child. The victim impact statement 

indicates that the child has suffered as a result of those actions on 

your part. The court has considered your scores on the [sex 

offender risk assessment test], and your limited—limited criminal 

record, along with the fact that you are employed. The court is not 

convinced of your willingness to change and accept treatment. The 

court does believe it is necessary to protect the public. The court 

believes that this is a very serious crime, as it involves the sexual 

exploitation of a minor by you having sex with someone you were 

nine years older than while she was fifteen years of age. The court

believes that for the protection of the community, to maximize your 

rehabilitation, and to provide for the maximum deterrent effect, that 

incarceration is appropriate.

 

April 16, 2014); State v. Jefferson, No. 11-1826, 2012 WL 3860755, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Sept. 6, 2012); State v. Fries, No. 11-2082, 2012 WL 3590033, at *1-2 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Aug. 22, 2012); but see State v. Pine, No. 13-0051, 2013 WL 5951192, at *2 (Iowa Ct. 

App. Nov. 6, 2013); State v. Clark, No. 11-0240, 2011 WL 3480967, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. 

Aug. 10, 2011).
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Garza argues the district court considered an unproven offense because it 

mentioned that he “provided alcohol to that child.” We review sentencing 

decisions for errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.

“[A] district court’s sentencing decision enjoys a strong presumption in its 

favor.” State v. Jose, 636 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Iowa 2001). “To overcome the 

presumption, we have required an affirmative showing the sentencing court relied 

on improper evidence.” State v. Washington, 832 N.W.2d 650, 660 (Iowa 2013). 

Unproven and unprosecuted offenses are considered “improper evidence” in 

sentencing determinations “unless (1) the facts before the court show the 

defendant committed the offense, or (2) the defendant admits it.” Jose, 636 

N.W.2d at 41. “The standard of proof during the sentencing stage is lower than 

the standard used during trial.” State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 

2000). In determining whether the facts before the court show the defendant 

committed the unproven or unprosecuted offense, the court must only find the 

record sufficiently establishes the matters it is relying on. Id. “There is no 

general prohibition against considering other [established] criminal activities by a 

defendant as factors that bear on the sentence to be imposed.” State v. Longo, 

608 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Iowa 2000).

“In determining a defendant’s sentence, a district court is free to consider 

portions of a presentence investigation report that are not challenged by the 

defendant.” Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d at 402. Iowa Code section 915.21(1)(a) 

provides that a filed victim impact statement is considered part of the 

presentencing investigation report.
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The presentence investigation report in this case was entered without 

objection or any corrections by Garza. The report states Garza “denies any 

current alcohol issues; however, it is noted in the [v]ictim [i]mpact [s]tatement that 

alcohol was involved during some of the meetings with [Garza] and the victim.” 

Additionally, the report later states, in referencing the victim impact statement, 

that “both [Garza] and the victim were under the influence of alcohol” during 

several of their sexual liaisons. Garza concedes in his brief that the victim impact 

statement referred to Garza returning the victim to her home “in a state of 

intoxication.” Upon our review, we agree with the State that the low burden of 

proof required to show Garza provided the victim with alcohol has been 

sufficiently met under this record. Consequently, we conclude the district court 

did not consider an unproven offense when it mentioned in its sentencing 

colloquy that Garza gave alcohol to his victim. We therefore affirm on this issue.

C. Sentencing Factors.

When a sentence is not mandatory, the district court must exercise its 

discretion in determining what sentence to impose. State v. Thomas, 547 

N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996). The sentencing court may not base its decision 

on one factor. State v. DeWitt, 426 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988). Iowa 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) requires a sentencing court to demonstrate 

its exercise of discretion by stating “on the record its reason for selecting the 

particular sentence.” Failure to state on the record the reasons for the sentence 

imposed requires the sentence be vacated and the case remanded for 

amplification of the record and resentencing. State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 

589 (Iowa 1980); State v. Freeman, 404 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987). 
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While the reasons need not be detailed, the court must provide enough 

explanation to allow appellate review of the district court’s discretion. See State 

v. Hennings, 791 N.W.2d 828, 838 (Iowa 2010). The sentencing court, however, 

is generally not required to give its reasons for rejecting particular sentencing 

options. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d at 225. In considering sentencing options, the 

court is to determine, in its discretion, which of the authorized sentences will 

provide both the maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant and 

for the protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and 

others. Iowa Code § 901.5; see also State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 395 

(Iowa 1979). We may look to the court’s overall sentencing rationale to glean the 

reasoning for imposing consecutive sentences. See Hennings, 791 N.W.2d at 

838-39 (“[I]t is apparent to us that the district court ordered the defendant to 

serve his sentences consecutively as part of an overall sentencing plan.”).

At the sentencing hearing, Garza requested the court suspend his 

sentence based on his lack of criminal history, his prior success under 

supervision and in treatment, his favorable academic and employment history, 

his healthy family relationships, his low risk to reoffend, and the presentence 

investigation report’s recommendation of probation. Garza maintains the court 

did not consider any of these factors and only considered the seriousness of the 

offense. We disagree.

To be sure, the sentencing court took into consideration the seriousness 

of the offense. However, a thorough review of the court’s sentencing comments 

reveals the court also took note of the other factors listed by Garza. The fact the 

court did not accept Garza’s request does not evidence an abuse of discretion by 
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the court. The sentence pronounced was reasonable under the circumstances 

and within the parameters of the court’s discretion in sentencing. See State v. 

Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010). We therefore affirm on this issue.

D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

Finally, Garza argues the special sentence of lifetime parole imposed 

pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.1 is grossly disproportionate to the crime he

committed and violates his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment 

under the Iowa and Federal Constitutions. The State asserts his parole sentence 

is not ripe for our review under State v. Tripp, 776 N.W.2d 855 (Iowa 2010). We 

agree.

In Tripp, Tripp similarly challenged the constitutionality of the imposition of 

the special sentence of lifetime parole under Iowa Code section 903B.1. See 

776 N.W.2d at 858. However, Tripp was not on parole at the time he asserted

his constitutional challenge to the lifetime-parole-sentence statute. See id. Our 

supreme court discussed the various considerations that come into play in a 

parole sentence, such as the possibility that Tripp may violate the terms of his 

parole in the future or that he may be discharged from parole in the future, thus 

requiring the court to speculate on what would happen in Tripp’s future. See id. 

The court also noted it would “be analyzing the sentence without the benefit of 

any conditions that may be placed on [Tripp] in the future. Both issues involve 

administrative decisions that have yet to be made.” Id. at 858-59. For these 

reasons, the court concluded Tripp’s case was not ripe for its review because it 

did not present an actual, present controversy, only a hypothetical or speculative 

controversy. Id. at 859. The court found that “until the length of [Tripp’s] parole 
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and the extent of his supervision are determined, Tripp’s challenge is not ripe.” 

Id.

The same is true here. Garza is not on parole, and until the length of his 

parole and the extent of his supervision are determined, Garza’s challenge is not 

ripe for our review.

III. Conclusion.

Upon our review, we conclude Garza’s claim that his guilty plea was not 

entered knowingly and voluntarily was not preserved for our review. Additionally, 

we conclude Garza’s claim that the special sentence of lifetime parole, imposed 

pursuant to Iowa Code section 903B.1, is unconstitutional is not ripe for our 

review. Finally, because we conclude the court did not improperly consider an 

unproven offense or one factor in making its sentence determination, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm Garza’s conviction, 

judgment, and sentence.

AFFIRMED.