46332 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 4, 2017 / Notices 

1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 

2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 

3Securities Exchange Act Release No. 81338 

(August 8, 2017), 82 FR 36049 (August 14, 2017) 

(SR–DTC–2017–014, SR–NSCC–2017–013, SR– 

FICC–2017–017) (‘‘Notice’’). 

4Notice, 82 FR at 37943. 

5 Id. 

6 Id. The parent company of the Clearing 

Agencies is The Depository Trust & Clearing 

Corporation (‘‘DTCC’’). DTCC operates on a shared 

services model with respect to the Clearing 

Agencies. Most corporate functions are established 

and managed on an enterprise-wide basis pursuant 

to intercompany agreements under which it is 

generally DTCC that provides a relevant service to 

a Clearing Agency. 

7Notice, 82 FR at 37943. 

8 Id. 

9 Id. 

10 Id. 

11 Id. 

12 Id. 

13 Id. 

14 Id. The Three Lines of Defense approach to risk 

management identifies the roles and responsibilities 

of different Clearing Agency Businesses or Clearing 

Agency Support Areas in identifying, assessing, 

measuring, monitoring, mitigating, and reporting 

certain key risks faced by the Clearing Agencies. 

The Three Lines of Defense approach is more fully 

described in a separate framework, the Clearing 

Agency Risk Management Framework. See 

Securities Exchange Act Release No. 81635 

(September 15, 2017), 82 FR 44224 (September 21, 

2017)(SR–DTC–2017–013, SR–NSCC–2017–012, 

SR–FICC–2017–016). 

rising interest rates. Applicant states 

that this projection also reflects 

anticipated increases in its holdings of 

investment securities should the 

Commission grant the requested Order; 

however, Applicant does not anticipate 

that its interest income from investment 

securities would ever represent other 

than a small amount as compared to its 

total revenues. Applicant further states 

that its projected increase in interest 

income will not result in any material 

increase in net income for Applicant 

because (a) it passes through to its 

Members substantially all of its earnings 

on Clearing Fund cash and (b) its 

earnings on CP Program proceeds are 

substantially offset by its interest 

expense on the commercial paper notes 

and extendible notes that are issued to 

holders. 

5. Applicant asserts that its historical 

development, its public representations 

of policy, the activities of its officers 

and directors and its sources of revenue, 

as discussed in the application, 

demonstrate that it is engaged primarily 

in the business of providing clearing, 

settlement, risk management, CCP and 

ancillary services to its Members, and 

not in an investment business. 

Applicant thus asserts that it satisfies 

the criteria for issuing an order under 

Section 3(b)(2) of the Act. 

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Investment Management, under delegated 

authority. 

Eduardo A. Aleman, 

Assistant Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2017–21282 Filed 10–3–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[Release No. 34–81745; File Nos. SR–DTC– 

2017–014; SR–NSCC–2017–013; SR–FICC– 

2017–017] 

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The 

Depository Trust Company; National 

Securities Clearing Corporation; Fixed 

Income Clearing Corporation; Order 

Approving Proposed Rule Changes To 

Adopt the Clearing Agency Operational 

Risk Management Framework 

September 28, 2017. 

I. Introduction 

On July 25, 2017, The Depository 

Trust Company (‘‘DTC’’), Fixed Income 

Clearing Corporation (‘‘FICC’’), and 

National Securities Clearing Corporation 

(‘‘NSCC,’’ each a ‘‘Clearing Agency,’’ 

and collectively with DTC and FICC, the 

‘‘Clearing Agencies’’), filed with the 

Securities and Exchange Commission 

(‘‘Commission’’) proposed rule changes 

SR–DTC–2017–014, SR–NSCC–2017– 

013, and SR–FICC–2017–017, 

respectively, pursuant to Section 

19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act 

of 1934 (‘‘Act’’) 1 and Rule 19b–4 

thereunder.2 The proposed rule changes 

were published for comment in the 

Federal Register on August 14, 2017.3

The Commission did not receive any 

comment letters on the proposed rule 

changes. For the reasons discussed 

below, the Commission approves the 

proposed rule changes. 

II. Description of the Proposed Rule 

Changes 

The proposed rule changes would 

adopt the Clearing Agency Operational 

Risk Management Framework 

(‘‘Framework’’) of the Clearing 

Agencies, as described below. 

A. Overview of the Framework 

The Framework would describe how 

each of Clearing Agency manages 

operational risk. Operational risk is 

defined by the Clearing Agencies in the 

Framework as the risk of direct or 

indirect loss or reputational harm 

resulting from an event, internal or 

external, that is the result of inadequate 

or failed processes, people, and systems 

(‘‘Operational Risk’’).4 More 

specifically, the Framework would 

describe how the Clearing Agencies (i) 

manage Operational Risk; (ii) manage 

their information technology risks; and 

(iii) manage their business continuity 

risks.5 The DTCC Operational Risk 

Management group (‘‘ORM’’) would 

maintain the Framework, on behalf of 

the Clearing Agencies.6

B. Operational Risk Management 

The Framework would describe how 

ORM is charged with establishing 

appropriate systems, policies, 

procedures, and controls to enable the 

Clearing Agencies to identify plausible 

sources of Operational Risk.7

Specifically, the Framework would 

describe how the Clearing Agencies 

identify key risks, including Operational 

Risk, and set metrics to categorize such 

risks (e.g., from ‘‘no impact’’ to ‘‘severe 

impact’’) through ‘‘Risk Tolerance 

Statements.’’ 8 The Framework would 

describe how the Risk Tolerance 

Statements identify the overall risk 

reduction or mitigation objectives of the 

Clearing Agencies, with respect to 

identified risks to the Clearing 

Agencies.9 The Framework would also 

explain how the Risk Tolerance 

Statements document the risk controls 

and other measures the Clearing 

Agencies would use to manage such 

identified risks (including escalation 

requirements in the event of risk metric 

breaches). The Framework would state 

that ORM would annually review, 

revise, update, and/or create, as 

necessary, each Risk Tolerance 

Statement.10

The Framework would also describe 

how the Clearing Agencies monitor key 

risks, including Operational Risk, 

through ‘‘Risk Profiles.’’ 11 The 

Framework would state that ‘‘Risk 

Profiles’’ identify how risk is assessed 

for each of the Clearing Agencies’ 

businesses and support areas (each a 

‘‘Clearing Agency Business’’ and/or 

‘‘Clearing Agency Support Area’’).12 The 

Framework would explain that the risk 

assessment documented in these 

profiles includes (1) assessment of 

inherent risk (i.e., risk without any 

mitigating controls); (2) evaluation of 

existing controls and, as appropriate, 

any new additional controls, as well as 

the evaluation of the same risk against 

the strength of such controls; and (3) 

identification of any residual risk and a 

determination to either further mitigate 

such risk or accept such risk by the 

applicable Clearing Agency Business or 

Clearing Agency Support Area.13

The Framework would then describe 

generally the responsibilities of ORM, 

which is part of the second line of 

defense within the Clearing Agencies’ 

‘‘Three Lines of Defense’’ approach to 

risk management.14 The Framework 

would identify ORM responsibilities 


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15Notice, 82 FR at 37943. 

16 Id. 

17 Id. 

18 Id. 

19 Id. 

20 Id. 

21 Id. 

22Notice, 82 FR at 37943–44. 

23Notice, 82 FR at 37944. 

24 Id. 

25 Id. 

26 Id. 

27 Id. 

28 Id. 

29 Id. 

30 Id. 

31 Id. 

32 Id. 

33 Id. 

34 Id. 

35 Id. 

36 Id. 

37 Id. 

including, but not limited to, 

management of the Risk Tolerance 

Statements, and working with the 

Clearing Agency Businesses and 

Clearing Agency Support Areas to create 

and monitor Risk Profiles.15

C. Information Technology Risks 

The Framework would describe how 

the Clearing Agencies address 

information technology risks.16 The 

Framework would state that the DTCC 

Technology Risk Management group 

(‘‘TRM’’), on behalf of the Clearing 

Agencies, is responsible for establishing 

appropriate programs, policies, 

procedures, and controls with respect to 

the Clearing Agencies’ information 

technology risks.17 The Framework 

would indicate that these 

responsibilities would help respective 

Clearing Agency’s management to 

ensure that systems have a high degree 

of security, resiliency, operational 

reliability, and adequate, scalable 

capacity.18 The Framework would 

describe some of the recognized 

information technology standards that 

TRM may use to execute its 

responsibilities (as applicable).19

The Framework would also identify 

some of TRM’s responsibilities, 

including (1) performing risk 

assessments to, among other things, 

facilitate the determination of the 

Clearing Agencies’ investment and 

remediation priorities; (2) facilitating 

annual mandatory and periodic 

information security awareness, 

education, training, and communication 

to personnel of Clearing Agency 

Businesses and Clearing Agency 

Support Areas and relevant external 

parties; and (3) creating, implementing, 

and managing certain programs, 

including programs that (i) address 

information security throughout a 

system’s lifecycle, (ii) facilitate 

compliance with evolving and 

established regulatory rules and 

guidelines that govern protection of the 

information assets of the Clearing 

Agencies and their participants, (iii) 

identify, prioritize, and manage the 

level of cyber threats to the Clearing 

Agencies, and (iv) assure that access to 

Clearing Agency information assets is 

appropriately authorized and 

authenticated based on current business 

need.20

Additionally, the Framework would 

note that TRM’s risk strategy is closely 

aligned to the Clearing Agencies’ 

business drivers and future strategic 

direction.21 The Framework would state 

that such risk strategy allows the 

Clearing Agencies to achieve 

information security threat mitigation 

objectives, resiliency of infrastructure 

supporting Clearing Agency critical 

business applications, and operational 

reliability.22 The Framework would also 

describe how TRM’s early and 

consistent involvement in initiatives to 

develop new products and systems 

establishes this priority.23 The 

Framework would state that TRM is 

involved from the initial planning phase 

through the design, build, and operative 

phases of those initiatives, to address 

certain requirements.24 The Framework 

would then explain that TRM’s 

involvement specifically addresses 

effectiveness, reliability, and availability 

requirements of those initiatives, 

incorporating those requirements into 

the initiatives’ design and execution 

(from both a technology and cyber 

security perspective).25

The Framework would next describe 

the Clearing Agencies’ security strategy 

and defense, stating that the Clearing 

Agencies’ network security framework 

and preventive controls are designed to 

support a reliable and robust tiered 

security strategy and defense.26 The 

Framework would state that these 

controls include modern and 

technically advanced security firewalls, 

intrusion detection, system and data 

monitoring, and data protection tools.27

The Framework would also describe the 

Clearing Agencies’ enhanced security 

features and the standards they use to 

assess vulnerabilities and potential 

threats.28

D. Business Continuity Risks 

Finally, the Framework would 

describe how the Clearing Agencies 

establish and maintain business 

continuity plans to address events that 

may pose significant business 

continuity risks (i.e., disrupting of 

Clearing Agency operations).29 The 

Framework would identify how the 

business continuity process for each 

Clearing Agency Business and Clearing 

Agency Support Area is ranked by the 

significance of a possible disruption to 

its operation.30 The Framework would 

explain that these rankings fall within a 

range of tiers, from 0 to 5, based on 

criticality to each applicable Clearing 

Agency’s operations (each a ‘‘Tier’’), 

where Tier 0 equates to critical 

operations or support of such operations 

for which virtually no downtime is 

permitted under applicable regulatory 

standards, and Tier 5 equates to nonessential operations or support of such 

operations for which recovery times of 

greater than five days is permitted.31

The Framework would state that each 

Clearing Agency Business and Clearing 

Agency Support Area annually updates 

its own business continuity plan, as 

well as reviews and ratifies its business 

impact analysis.32 The Framework 

would describe that the DTCC Business 

Continuity Management department 

(‘‘BCM’’) uses that analysis, on behalf of 

the Clearing Agencies, to validate the 

Business’ or Support Area’s current Tier 

ranking, described above.33 The 

Framework would identify the key 

elements of the business impact 

analysis, including (1) an assessment of 

the criticality of the applicable Clearing 

Agency Business or Clearing Agency 

Support Area, based on potential impact 

to the Clearing Agency; (2) an 

estimation of the maximum allowable 

downtime for the applicable Clearing 

Agency Business or Clearing Agency 

Support Area; and (3) the identification 

of dependencies, and the ranking of 

such dependencies to align with the 

criticality of the applicable Clearing 

Agency Business’s, or Clearing Agency 

Support Area’s, recovery.34

The Framework would describe the 

Clearing Agencies’ multiple data 

centers, and the emergency monitoring 

and back-up systems available at each 

site.35 The Framework would explain 

the capacity of the various data centers 

(including emergency monitoring and 

back-up systems).36 The Framework 

would also describe how the Clearing 

Agencies’ operating centers (which may 

include data centers) assist in recovery 

efforts, and explain how each Clearing 

Agency Business and Clearing Agency 

Support Area creates and deploys its 

own work-area recovery strategy to 

mitigate the loss of primary workspace 

and/or associated desktop technology, 

as well as for purposes of appropriately 

locating personnel.37 The Framework 

would further indicate how each workarea recovery strategy is developed and 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
46334 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 4, 2017 / Notices 

38 Id. 

39 Id. 

40 Id. 

41 Id. 

42 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(C). 

43 15 U.S.C. 78q–1(b)(3)(F). 

44 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(17)(i)–(iii). 

45 15 U.S.C. 78q–1(b)(3)(F). 

46 Id. 

47 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(17)(i). 

48 Id. 

49 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(17)(ii). 

executed (based on the applicable 

Clearing Agency Business’ and Clearing 

Agency Support Area’s current Tier 

ranking, as described above).38

The Framework would describe the 

responsibilities of BCM in managing a 

disruptive business event.39 The 

Framework would state that managing a 

disruptive business event would 

include coordination with a team of 

representatives from each Clearing 

Agency Business and Clearing Agency 

Support Area.40 Finally, the Framework 

would describe how the Clearing 

Agencies conduct regular exercises used 

to simulate loss of Clearing Agency 

locations, and would describe some of 

the preventive measures the Clearing 

Agencies take with respect to business 

continuity risk management.41

III. Discussion and Commission 

Findings 

Section 19(b)(2)(C) of the Act directs 

the Commission to approve a proposed 

rule change of a self-regulatory 

organization if it finds that such 

proposed rule change is consistent with 

the requirements of the Act and rules 

and regulations thereunder applicable to 

such organization.42 After carefully 

considering the proposed rule changes, 

the Commission finds that the proposed 

rule changes are consistent with the 

requirements of the Act and the rules 

and regulations thereunder applicable to 

the Clearing Agencies. Specifically, the 

Commission finds that the proposed 

rule changes are consistent with Section 

17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act 43 and Rules 

17Ad–22(e)(17)(i)–(iii) under the Act.44

A. Consistency With Section 

17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act 

Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act 

requires, in part, that the rules of a 

registered clearing agency be designed 

to assure the safeguarding of securities 

and funds which are in the custody or 

control of the Clearing Agencies or for 

which they are responsible.45

As described above, the Framework 

would describe how the Clearing 

Agencies manage their Operational Risk. 

Specifically, the Frameworks would 

describe how the Clearing Agencies 

address their technology risks, 

information security risks, and their 

business continuity risks. The 

Framework would describe the 

processes, systems, and controls (as well 

as the supporting policies and 

procedures) used by the Clearing 

Agencies to identify, manage, and 

mitigate risks which threaten the 

Clearing Agencies’ ability to function. 

By describing their Operational Risk 

practices in a clear and comprehensive 

manner, the Framework is designed to 

help the Clearing Agencies prevent and 

manage the risks that arise in, or are 

borne by, the Clearing Agencies. The 

Framework would explain how the 

Clearing Agencies identify and mitigate 

risks generally (through the Three Lines 

of Defense, Risk Tolerance Statements, 

and Risk Profiles), as well as how they 

specially identify and mitigate 

information technology risk (through 

the TRM’s efforts) and business 

continuity risk (through data centers 

and operational centers). By better 

managing the risks that arise in or are 

bone by the Clearing Agencies through 

such risk mitigation practices, the 

Framework is designed to help reduce 

the possibility that a Clearing Agency 

fails. By better positioning the Clearing 

Agencies to continue their critical 

operations and services, and mitigating 

the risk of financial loss contagion 

caused by a Clearing Agency failure, the 

Framework is designed to help assure 

the safeguarding of securities and funds 

which are in the custody or control of 

the Clearing Agencies, or for which they 

are responsible. Accordingly, the 

Commission believes that the proposed 

rule changes are consistent with Section 

17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act.46

B. Consistency With Rule 17Ad– 

22(e)(17)(i) 

Rule 17Ad–22(e)(17)(i) under the Act 

requires, in part, that each covered 

clearing agency establish, implement, 

maintain and enforce written policies 

and procedures reasonably designed to 

manage the covered clearing agency’s 

operational risks by identifying the 

plausible sources of operational risk, 

both internal and external, and 

mitigating their impact through the use 

of appropriate systems, policies, 

procedures, and controls.47

As described above, the Framework 

would describe how the Risk Tolerance 

Statements and the Risk Profiles assist 

the Clearing Agencies identify and 

mitigate the plausible sources of 

Operational Risk, both internal and 

external. As described above, the 

Framework explains how the Risk 

Tolerance Statements (i) identify both 

internal and external Clearing Agency 

risks; (ii) categorize the respective 

Clearing Agencies’ tolerance for those 

risks; and (iii) then identify governance 

process applicable to any breach of 

those tolerances. In this way, the Risk 

Tolerance Statements are designed to 

help the Clearing Agencies to identify 

and manage the internal and external 

risks. As also described above, the 

Framework would describe how the 

Risk Profiles are designed to serve a 

similar function, by serving as a tool for 

identifying and assessing inherent risks, 

and evaluating the controls around 

those risks. The Framework also 

describes the role of ORM, which 

includes oversight of both the Risk 

Tolerance Statements and Risk Profiles. 

By describing the functions of the 

Risk Tolerance Statements and Risk 

Profiles, (which, together, are designed 

to (i) assist the Clearing Agencies in 

effectively managing their operational 

risks by identifying the plausible 

sources of operational risk, both internal 

and external, and (ii) assist the Clearing 

Agencies in mitigating the impact of 

those risks), and by describing the role 

of ORM in overseeing the Risk 

Tolerance Statements and Risk Profiles, 

the Commission believes the Framework 

is consistent with the requirements of 

Rule 17Ad–22(e)(17)(i).48

C. Consistency With Rule 17Ad– 

22(e)(17)(ii) 

Rule 17Ad–22(e)(17)(ii) under the Act 

requires, in part, that each covered 

clearing agency establish, implement, 

maintain and enforce written policies 

and procedures reasonably designed to 

manage the covered clearing agency’s 

operational risks by ensuring that 

systems have a high degree of security, 

resiliency, operational reliability, and 

adequate, scalable capacity.49

As noted above, the Framework 

would describe how the Clearing 

Agencies manage their Operational Risk. 

Specifically, the Framework would 

describe TRM’s role and responsibilities 

in managing the Clearing Agencies’ 

information technology risks. In 

particular, the Framework would 

identify TRM’s (i) programs, systems, 

and controls; (ii) information technology 

risk management standards; and (iii) 

continuous role in product and project 

initiatives to address security issues 

through the lifecycle of Clearing Agency 

initiatives. 

The Framework thereby describes 

how TRM is designed to safeguard the 

integrity of the Clearing Agencies’ 

information technology, as well as the 

standards against which TRM’s 

safeguards would be evaluated. In this 

manner, the Framework is designed to 


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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 191 / Wednesday, October 4, 2017 / Notices 46335 

50 Id. 

51 17 CFR 240.17Ad–22(e)(17)(iii). 

52 Id. 

53 15 U.S.C. 78q–1. 

54 In approving the Proposed Rule Changes, the 

Commission considered the proposals’ impact on 

efficiency, competition and capital formation. 15 

U.S.C. 78c(f). 

55 17 CFR 200.30–3(a)(12). 

1Section 3(a)(34)(B) of the Exchange Act defines 

‘‘appropriate regulatory authority.’’ 

ensure that the Clearing Agencies’ 

systems have a high degree of security, 

resiliency, and operational reliability. 

Furthermore, as the Framework 

indicates TRM’s early and continuous 

involvement in the Clearing Agencies’ 

initiatives, the Framework reveals how 

TRM would enable the Clearing 

Agencies to grow and evolve while 

accounting for technology and cyber 

security concerns, thereby ensuring the 

Clearing Agencies’ adequate and 

scalable capacity. 

Therefore, by describing TRM’s role 

and responsibilities in helping the 

Clearing Agencies maintain systems 

with a high degree of security, 

resiliency, operational reliability, and 

adequate, scalable capacity, the 

Commission believes the Framework is 

consistent with the requirements of Rule 

17Ad–22(e)(17)(ii).50

D. Consistency With Rule 17Ad– 

22(e)(17)(iii) 

Rule 17Ad–22(e)(17)(iii) under the 

Act requires, in part, that each covered 

clearing agency establish, implement, 

maintain and enforce written policies 

and procedures reasonably designed to 

manage the covered clearing agency’s 

operational risks by establishing and 

maintaining a business continuity plan 

that addresses events posing a 

significant risk of disrupting 

operations.51

As described above, the Framework 

would describe how the Clearing 

Agencies establish and maintain 

business continuity plans. Specifically, 

the Framework would describe the 

critical features of the Clearing 

Agencies’ business continuity plans to 

demonstrate how they are designed to 

address events posing a significant risk 

of disrupting the Clearing Agencies’ 

operations. The Framework would also 

indicate how each Clearing Agency 

Business and Clearing Agency Support 

Area reviews and ratifies its respective 

plan and its business impact analysis, 

relative to its assigned Tier. Therefore, 

as the Framework describes how the 

Clearing Agencies establish and 

maintain their business continuity 

plans, which are designed to address 

events posing a significant risk of 

disrupting operations, the Commission 

believes that the Framework is 

consistent with the requirements of Rule 

17Ad–22(e)(17)(iii).52

IV. Conclusion 

On the basis of the foregoing, the 

Commission finds that the proposed 

rule changes are consistent with the 

requirements of the Act and in 

particular with the requirements of 

Section 17A of the Act 53 and the rules 

and regulations thereunder. 

It is therefore ordered, pursuant to 

Section 19(b)(2) of the Act, that 

proposed rule changes SR–DTC–2017– 

014, SR–NSCC–2017–013, and SR– 

FICC–2017–017 be, and hereby are, 

approved.54

For the Commission, by the Division of 

Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated 

authority.55

Eduardo A. Aleman, 

Assistant Secretary. 

[FR Doc. 2017–21273 Filed 10–3–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 

COMMISSION 

[SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 

Release No. 81760/September 28, 2017: 

INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 

Release No. 32842/September 28, 2017] 

Exemptive Relief for Individuals and 

Entities Affected by Hurricanes 

Harvey, Irma or Maria 

Order Under Section 15b, Section 17a And 

Section 36 Of The Securities Exchange Act 

Of 1934 Granting Exemptions From Specified 

Provisions Of The Exchange Act And Certain 

Rules Thereunder 

Order Under Section 6(C) And Section 

38(A) Of The Investment Company Act Of 

1940 Granting Exemptions From Specified 

Provisions Of The Investment Company Act 

And Certain Rules Thereunder 

In late August 2017, Hurricane Harvey 

caused catastrophic damage along the 

Texas and Louisiana coast, in early 

September 2017, Hurricane Irma caused 

catastrophic damage to the U.S. Virgin 

Islands, Puerto Rico and the Florida 

coast, and, in mid-September 2017, 

Hurricane Maria caused additional 

catastrophic damage to the U.S. Virgin 

Islands and Puerto Rico. The storms and 

subsequent flooding have displaced 

individuals and businesses and 

disrupted communications and 

transportation across the affected 

regions. We are issuing this Order to 

address the needs of companies and 

individuals with obligations under the 

federal securities laws who have been 

directly or indirectly affected by 

Hurricane Harvey, Hurricane Irma or 

Hurricane Maria and their respective 

aftermaths. 

Section 15B(a)(4) of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934 (the ‘‘Exchange 

Act’’) provides that the Securities and 

Exchange Commission (the 

‘‘Commission’’), by rule or order, upon 

its own motion or upon application, 

may conditionally or unconditionally 

exempt any broker, dealer, municipal 

securities dealer or municipal advisor, 

or class of brokers, dealers, municipal 

securities dealers, or municipal advisors 

from any provision of Section 15B or the 

rules or regulations thereunder, if the 

Commission finds that such exemption 

is consistent with the public interest, 

the protection of investors and the 

purposes of Section 15B. 

Section 36 of the Exchange Act 

authorizes the Commission, by rule, 

regulation or order, to exempt, either 

conditionally or unconditionally, any 

person, security or transaction, or any 

class or classes of persons, securities or 

transactions, from any provision or 

provisions of the Exchange Act or any 

rule or regulation thereunder, to the 

extent that such exemption is necessary 

or appropriate in the public interest, 

and is consistent with the protection of 

investors. 

Section 17A(c)(1) of the Exchange Act 

provides that the appropriate regulatory 

agency, by rule or by order, upon its 

own motion or upon application, may 

conditionally or unconditionally 

exempt any person or security or class 

of persons or securities from any 

provision of Section 17A or any rule or 

regulation prescribed under Section 

17A, if the appropriate regulatory 

agency 1 finds that such exemption is in 

the public interest and consistent with 

the protection of investors and the 

purposes of Section 17A, including the 

prompt and accurate clearance and 

settlement of securities transactions and 

the safeguarding of securities and funds. 

Section 17A(c)(1) also requires that the 

Commission not object to the use of 

exemptive authority in instances where 

an appropriate regulatory authority 

other than the Commission is providing 

exemptive relief. 

Section 6(c) of the Investment 

Company Act of 1940 (the ‘‘Company 

Act’’) provides that the Commission 

may conditionally or unconditionally 

exempt any person, security or 

transaction, or any class or classes of 

persons, securities or transactions, from 

any provision or provisions of the 

Company Act, or any rule or regulation 

thereunder, if and to the extent that 

such exemption is necessary or 

appropriate in the public interest and 

consistent with the protection of 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES