2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

10-1-2010

R.E. L-P. v. Atty Gen USA

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 09-1960

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"R.E. L-P. v. Atty Gen USA" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 348.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/348
PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1520

No. 09-1760

No. 09-1960

___________

EUDULIO DE LEON-OCHOA, a/k/a Roger Reyes-Oliva, 

a/k/a Roger Armando Reyes-Bolivar, a/k/a Roger Armando

Reyes-Oliva, 

Petitioner No. 09-1520

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 

Respondent

___________

EUFEMIA FLORES-DOMINGUEZ; ARELY

MAGDALENA

RIVERA-FLORES; ELIDA YAMILET RIVERA-FLORES, 

Petitioners No. 09-1760
2

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 

Respondent

___________

R.E. L-P, 

Petitioner No. 09-1960

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 

Respondent

___________

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

(Agency No. A098-501-296)

(Agency No. A094-902-120/1/2)

(Agency No. A094-934-034)

Immigration Judge: Margaret Reichenberg 

(Nos. 09-1520, 09-1760)
3

Immigration Judge: Annie S. Garcy (No. 09-1960)

___________

Argued on July 13, 2010

___________

Before: FUENTES, ALDISERT and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: October 1, 2010)

DOUGLAS S. EAKELEY, ESQ. (ARGUED)

MAUREEN A. RUANE, ESQ.

CARL M. GREENFELD, ESQ.

KRISTIN A. MUIR, ESQ.

LOWENSTEIN SANDLER PC

65 Livingston Avenue

Roseland, NJ 07068

Attorneys for Petitioner Eudulio De Leon-Ochoa

REX CHEN, ESQ. (ARGUED)

CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF

NEWARK

976 Broad Street

Newark, NJ 07102

Attorney for Petitioners Eufemia Flores-Dominguez,

Arely Rivera-Flores, and Elida Rivera-Flores

AYODELE GANSALLO, ESQ. (ARGUED)

HIAS AND COUNCIL MIGRATION SERVICE OF

PHILADELPHIA
4

2100 Arch Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Attorney for Petitioner R.E. L-PTONY WEST, ESQ.

Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division

DOUGLAS E. GINSBURG, ESQ.

EMILY ANNE RADFORD, ESQ.

TERRI J. SCADRON, ESQ.

Assistant Directors

AVIVA L. POCZTER, ESQ. (ARGUED)

GREG D. MACK, ESQ.

Senior Litigation Counsel 

DEREK C. JULIUS, ESQ.

Trial Attorney

JAMES A. HUNOLT, ESQ.

GARY J. NEWKIRK, ESQ.

Office of Immigration Litigation

Civil Division

U.S. Department of Justice

P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, D.C. 20044

Attorneys for Respondent

___________
The Board had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1

1003.1(b)(3) & 1240.15. We have jurisdiction over final orders

of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).

5

O P I N I O N 

___________

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.

In this consolidated appeal, Petitioners Eudulio De

Leon-Ochoa, Arely and Elida Rivera-Flores, Eufemia FloresDominguez, and R.E. L-P- petition for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA” or “Board”) denial of their

applications for Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) for failure

to personally satisfy the statutory requirements of “continuous

residence” and “continuous physical presence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1

1254a. On appeal, Petitioners contend that they fulfill the

statutory requirement of “continuous residence,” 8 U.S.C. §

1254a(c)(1)(A)(ii), via imputation of their parents’ residence.

Petitioners additionally contend that they satisfy the statutory

requirement of “continuous physical presence,” 8 U.S.C. §

1254a(c)(1)(A)(i), because the statutory term “most recent

designation” rightfully is read to encompass TPS extensions as

well as designations. We disagree on both counts. Because

Petitioners fail to meet the requirements of “continuous

residence” and “continuous physical presence,” they are

statutorily ineligible for TPS. For the following reasons, we will
 The Government argues, in the petition for review of 2

Flores-Dominguez, et al., that we should dismiss this case for

lack of jurisdiction because the question whether a parent’s

residency can be imputed for purposes of the TPS program is a

nonjusticiable political question. Curiously, the Government

does not make this argument in De Leon-Ochoa and L-P-’s

petitions for review. We determine that there is no merit to this

argument.

 Originally the Attorney General was empowered to 3

designate a foreign state for the TPS program. Pursuant to the

Homeland Security Act of 2002, the administration of the TPS

program was transferred to the Department of Homeland

Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296,

116 Stat. 2135; see Cervantes v. Holder, 597 F.3d 229, 231 n.2

6

deny review.2

I.

Temporary Protected Status is authorized by Section 244

of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 8 U.S.C. §

1254a. It permits eligible nationals of a foreign state to

temporarily remain in and work in the United States while the

state is designated by the TPS program. Id. The Attorney

General, “after consultation with appropriate agencies of the

Government,” may issue a TPS designation with respect to a

foreign state under certain circumstances such as ongoing armed

conflict, natural disaster, or other conditions preventing safe

return of aliens. Id. § 1254a(b)(1). “There is no judicial review 3
(4th Cir. 2010).

7

of any determination of the Attorney General with respect to the

designation, or termination or extension of a designation, of a

foreign state under this subsection.” Id. § 1254a(b)(5)(A). By

statute, aliens are eligible for Temporary Protected Status if they

are nationals of a state designated under § 1254a(b)(1) and they

meet the following requirements:

(i) the alien has been continuously

physically present in the United States

since the effective date of the most recent

designation of that state; 

(ii) the alien has continuously resided in

the United States since such date as the

Attorney General may designate; 

(iii) the alien is admissible as an

immigrant, except as otherwise provided

under paragraph (2)(A), and is not

ineligible for temporary protected status

under paragraph (2)(B); and 

(iv) to the extent and in a manner which

the Attorney General establishes, the alien

registers for the temporary protected status

under this section during a registration

period of not less than 180 days. 
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(4): 4

(4) Treatment of brief, casual, and innocent departures and

certain other absences 

(A) For purposes of paragraphs (1)(A)(i) and (3)(B), an alien

shall not be considered to have failed to maintain continuous

physical presence in the United States by virtue of brief, casual,

and innocent absences from the United States, without regard to

whether such absences were authorized by the Attorney General.

(B) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A)(ii), an alien shall not be

considered to have failed to maintain continuous residence in the

United States by reason of a brief, casual, and innocent absence

described in subparagraph (A) or due merely to a brief

8

Id. § 1254a(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Pursuant to §

1254a(c)(2), in the determination of an alien’s admissibility for

purposes of requirement (iii), the Attorney General may waive

certain provisions of section 1182(a) for humanitarian purposes,

to assure family unity or for other public interest purposes, with

the exception of certain sections relating to criminals, drug

offenses, and national security. By the terms of the statute, this

waiver provision does not apply to the requirements of

continuous residence and physical presence. Id. § 1254a(c)(2).

The TPS statute instructs that brief, casual, and innocent

departures generally do not effect a failure to maintain

continuous physical presence and continuous physical residence

for purposes of the TPS program. Notably, the statute 4
temporary trip abroad required by emergency or extenuating

circumstances outside the control of the alien. 

9

specifically prescribes that “[n]othing in this section shall be

construed as authorizing an alien to apply for admission to, or to

be admitted to, the United States in order to apply for temporary

protected status under this section.” Id. § 1254a(c)(5).

The applicable regulations repeat the requirements for

TPS and also provide for late registration, specifically by

children of eligible grantees. An alien from a designated state

may apply for Temporary Protected Status in accordance with

applicable regulations:

Except as provided in §§ 1244.3 and 1244.4, an alien

may in the discretion of the director be granted

Temporary Protected Status if the alien establishes that

he or she:

(a) Is a national, as defined in section 101(a)(21)

of the Act, of a foreign state designated under

section 244(b) of the Act;

(b) Has been continuously physically present in

the United States since the effective date of the

most recent designation of that foreign state;

(c) Has continuously resided in the United States

since such date as the Attorney General may

designate;
10

. . . . 

(f)(1) Registers for Temporary Protected Status

during the initial registration period announced by

public notice in the Federal Register, or

(2) During any subsequent extension of

such designation if at the time of the initial

registration period: 

. . . . 

(iv) The applicant is a spouse or

child of an alien currently eligible

to be a TPS registrant. 

(g) Has filed an application for late registration with the

appropriate Service director within a 60-day period

immediately following the expiration or termination of

conditions described in paragraph (f)(2) of this section.

8 C.F.R. § 1244.2. Under the regulations, the child or spouse of

a person who was eligible for TPS during the initial registration

period may apply for TPS during any subsequent extension

thereof.

II.

A. Eudulio De Leon-Ochoa, etc., v. Attorney General, No.

09-1520
11

Petitioner Eudulio De Leon-Ochoa is a national and

citizen of Honduras. He entered the United States on or about

November 30, 2005, without proper documentation. He was

served with a Notice to Appear on November 30, 2005, and

charged with removability pursuant to Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i)

of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). He applied for

asylum, withholding of removal, protection under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and TPS. The IJ issued

an oral decision finding Petitioner removable on November 27,

2007. 

(1) Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT

Protection

At the IJ hearing, De Leon-Ochoa testified that he is part

of the Turcios family and that his family is embroiled in a blood

feud with the Najera family in Rio Chito, Honduras. Petitioner

alleged that the Najera family killed three different members of

his family and that the police failed to investigate these deaths.

Two of the death certificates omitted cause of death. Petitioner

claimed there was political tension between the two families

based on the Turcios’ support of the National Party and the

Najera’s support of the Liberal Party. Petitioner testified to

participating in politics twice between 2002 and 2004. He

claims the Liberal Party told him to move or leave his polling

station both times. He also testified that no one in his family has

held office with the National Party. Petitioner testified that the

Najera family was suspected of other political murders. 

De Leon-Ochoa testified that he believed he would be

killed by the Najera family if he returned to Honduras. He
12

testified that he could not be protected due to the Najera

family’s political power and did not have anywhere to stay in

Honduras besides his hometown. Petitioner claimed his older

brother told him he has no freedom because he fears the Najera

will attack him. He admitted that his father did not have trouble

with the Najera family before his father left Honduras in 1998,

and that his father is not a member of the Turcios family.

Petitioner’s father testified that there was a blood feud between

the Turcios family and the Najera family, and described several

killings. The father conceded that neither his wife nor his sons

had problems with the Najera family. He explained that women

were not targeted in the conflict, and that the sons were not

harmed because they did not enter Najera territory. Nonetheless,

the father claimed that he still feared for his sons’ safety and that

the Najera family was still searching for them. 

The IJ found Petitioner’s testimony to be credible and

consistent with his written asylum application, but ultimately

found that Petitioner did not show he was a victim of past

persecution, nor did he prove an objective fear of future

persecution. The IJ held that Petitioner failed to show a

likelihood of persecution because his immediate family had not

been harmed, he left Honduras six years after the most recent

killing of a member of the Turcios family, and there was no

evidence that the feud continued past 1996. Although the IJ

accepted that “family” could be a social group for purposes of

the statute, the IJ found that Petitioner failed to establish an

objective fear of future persecution, was not persuaded by

Petitioner’s minimal political activity, and did not believe that

the Honduran government was complicit in any of the alleged

activity. Ultimately the IJ denied Petitioner’s asylum,
13

withholding of removal and CAT claims. 

(2) Temporary Protected Status

The IJ held De Leon-Ochoa to be ineligible for TPS

because of his failure to personally satisfy the continuous

physical presence and continuous residence requirements.

Honduran TPS applicants must demonstrate continuous

residence from December 30, 1998, and they must demonstrate

physical presence from January 5, 1999. See 8 U.S.C. §

1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (requiring a TPS applicant to be

“continuously physically present” since the “most recent

designation” and to have “continuously resided” since the date

the Attorney General designates); 64 Fed. Reg. 524 (Jan. 5,

1999) (designating Honduras for the TPS program). Petitioner

did not arrive in the United States until November 2005, and the

IJ therefore concluded that he was prima facie ineligible for

TPS. 

Petitioner appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, which

dismissed his appeal on January 30, 2009. The BIA found the IJ

did not err in determining that Petitioner failed to establish a

well-founded fear of persecution or a likelihood of torture

should he return to Honduras. The BIA agreed, additionally, that

Petitioner was ineligible for TPS because he could not meet the

continuous residence and physical presence requirements,

rejecting arguments based on imputation and humanitarian

concerns. The BIA dismissed his appeal and the instant petition

for review followed.

B. Eufemia Flores-Dominguez, et al., v. Attorney
14

General, No. 09-1760

Petitioners Arely Rivera-Flores, Elida Rivera-Flores, and

Eufemia Flores-Dominguez are the 14 year-old and 13 year-old

daughters and the mother of Rosa Flores, a current TPS grantee.

Petitioners are nationals and citizens of El Salvador who entered

the United States on or about November 1, 2006, without proper

documentation. They were served Notices to Appear on

November 16, 2006, and charged with removability under

Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA. Petitioners applied to United

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) for TPS

on June 10, 2007. El Salvadoran TPS applicants must establish

continuous physical presence in the United States since March

9, 2001, and continuous residence since February 13, 2001. See

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); 66 Fed. Reg. 14,214 (Mar. 9,

2001) (designating El Salvador for the TPS program). On

August 16, 2007, an IJ issued orders of removal, denying their

request for a continuance to permit adjudication of the TPS

applications. The IJ stated she had authority only to review

USCIS denial of a TPS application, with no power of de novo

review. Petitioners appealed to the BIA on September 7, 2007.

Subsequently, on November 19, 2007, USCIS sent Petitioners

a Notice of Intent to Deny, requesting additional information.

Petitioners failed to respond and USCIS denied their TPS

applications on April 10, 2008, for failure to meet the

continuous physical presence and continuous residence

requirements. On May 8, 2008, Petitioners moved for a remand

to permit the IJ to adjudicate their TPS applications. On

February 23, 2009, the BIA dismissed their appeal as moot

because USCIS had denied the TPS applications. The BIA

dismissed the Petitioners’ motion to remand for a de novo
15

review of the TPS applications for failure to meet the prima

facie statutory requirements, and the instant petition for review

followed.

C. R.E. L-P- v. Attorney General, No. 09-1960

Petitioner L-P- is the 16 year-old daughter of Maria M.

Montane, a current TPS grantee. She and her mother are

nationals and citizens of El Salvador. Petitioner entered the

United States on or about March 31, 2007, at the age of 13,

without proper documentation. She was served a Notice to

Appear on April 4, 2007, and charged with removability

pursuant to Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA. On January 18,

2008, Petitioner filed an application for TPS with USCIS as the

child of a current TPS grantee. El Salvadoran TPS applicants

must establish continuous physical presence in the United States

since March 9, 2001, and continuous residence since February

13, 2001. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); 66 Fed. Reg.

14,214 (Mar. 9, 2001) (designating El Salvador for the TPS

program). Petitioner’s application was denied by USCIS for

failure to demonstrate satisfaction of the statutory requirements.

There was no administrative appeal. Petitioner asserted her

eligibility for TPS before the IJ, who denied her application by

oral decision on July 28, 2008. The IJ found that Petitioner

failed to meet the continuous physical presence and continuous

residence requirements and was therefore not eligible for TPS.

Petitioner appealed to the BIA, arguing her mother’s residency

and physical presence should be imputed to her and that the

physical presence requirement should be read to encompass the

most recent extension of TPS designation, not the date of initial

designation. She additionally argued the IJ’s denial was
16

erroneous on humanitarian grounds. The BIA dismissed the

appeal on March 6, 2009, holding that Petitioner was statutorily

ineligible for TPS and that both the BIA and IJ were constrained

by the statute and regulations and did not have the discretion to

grant TPS on humanitarian or family-unity grounds. The instant

petition for review followed.

III. 

As a threshold matter, we must determine what

deference, if any, to accord the BIA’s single-member,

unpublished and nonprecedential decisions from which

Petitioners seek review. When the Board issues its own opinion,

as here, and does not adopt the IJ’s findings, we review only the

decision of the Board. Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d

Cir. 2005). We review legal questions de novo, with appropriate

deference for the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of statutes it

is charged with administering. Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473

F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526

U.S. 415 (1999) and Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see also Duvall v. Att’y

Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 386 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We have jurisdiction

to consider the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), and exercise plenary review over

questions of law, with due deference to the agency’s

interpretation of the Immigration and Naturalization Act

(INA).”). 

Under the familiar two-step Chevron inquiry, first, if the

statute is clear we must give effect to Congress’ unambiguous

intent, and, second, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
17

respect to a specific issue, we defer to an implementing agency’s

reasonable interpretation of that statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843

(1984). After United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001),

we accord Chevron deference only to agency action

promulgated in the exercise of congressionally-delegated

authority to make rules carrying the force of law. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S. at 226-227. Agency action that does not qualify for

Chevron deference may still deserve a lesser amount of

deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944),

under which respect is granted to agency action according to its

power to persuade. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Mead

resuscitated Skidmore, because “Chevron did nothing to

eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation

may merit some deference whatever its form, given the

‘specialized experience and broader investigations and

information’ available to the agency . . . , and given the value of

uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of

what a national law requires.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-235

(citations omitted).

Although we routinely accord Chevron deference to

published decisions of the BIA,see INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526

U.S. 415, 424 (1999), this Court has never announced the

deference due an unpublished decision rendered by a single

member of the BIA. In Smriko v. Ashcroft, we declined to

determine the deference due an IJ’s decision affirmed through

the BIA’s streamlining procedure, but observed in dictum that

“[a]lthough the BIA has directed us to review the IJ’s opinion in

streamlined cases, deferring to the reasoning of an IJ from

which the BIA would be free to depart in other cases would
18

seem highly problematic.” 387 F.3d 279, 289 n.6 (3d Cir. 2004).

No consensus exists among our sister Courts of Appeals

as to what quantum of deference, if any, should be accorded to

these opinions. After Mead, several Courts of Appeals

affirmatively rejected application of Chevron deference to

unpublished BIA decisions. See Quinchia v. Att’y Gen., 552

F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that an unpublished

BIA decision that does not rely on BIA or Court of Appeals

precedent does not receive Chevron deference); Rotimi v.

Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that an

unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on precedent for its

definition of a contested term does not receive Chevron

deference, because it is not “promulgated under [the agency’s]

authority to make rules carrying the force of law”) (internal

quotation marks omitted); Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455

F.3d 1006, 1012-14 (9th Cir. 2006) (opining that an unpublished

BIA decision does not have the force of law and therefore does

not receive Chevron deference). But see Gutnik v. Gonzales,

469 F.3d 683, 689-690 (7th Cir. 2006) (according Chevron

deference to BIA’s streamlined adoption of IJ decision).

Some Courts of Appeals have declared that unpublished

opinions of the BIA are to be accorded Skidmore deference. See

Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1097-1098 (10th Cir. 2010)

(“If the interpretation is not precedential within the agency, then

the interpretation does not qualify for Chevron deference. . . .

Because the BIA’s decision does not ‘carry the force of law,’

Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226, we must examine the BIA’s

decision in [petitioner’s] case under the framework set forth in

Skidmore.”) (citations omitted); Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d
19

849, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (“A single-member BIA panel affirmed

the IJ’s decision in an unpublished, nonprecedential decision.

Such decisions are entitled to only Skidmore, rather than

Chevron, deference.”). Many Courts of Appeals have declined

to announce a standard. See Dobrova v. Holder, 607 F.3d 297,

300 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Whether unpublished BIA opinions are

entitled to Skidmore deference or whether they are reviewed de

novo is an open question in this Circuit. . . . We need not answer

that question here, however, because even on de novo review,

we find the meaning . . . to be clear and unambiguous.”);

Cervantes v. Holder, 597 F.3d 229, 233 n.5 (4th Cir. 2010) (“We

need not resolve in this proceeding whether nonprecedential

BIA decisions are entitled to Chevron deference, or merely to

Skidmore deference. As explained below, we would deny the

petition for review under the less deferential standard of

Skidmore.”); Mushtaq v. Holder, 583 F.3d 875, 877 (5th Cir.

2009) (“We need not resolve this question, because Mushtaq’s

claim fails under either standard. Thus, we review it under the

less-deferential Skidmore standard.”); Guo Qi Wang v. Holder,

583 F.3d 86, 90 n.2 (2d Cir. 2009) (“While we have not yet

decided whether unpublished, single-member BIA decisions are

entitled to the lesser form of deference described in Skidmore,

we need not consider the issue here as we would reach the same

result reviewing this petition de novo.”) (citations omitted);

Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 2008)

(“We need not address it here, as we hold that even applying the

lesser Skidmore deference, we affirm the persuasive BIA

decision.”).

We note parenthetically that unpublished, single-member

BIA decisions have no precedential value, do not bind the BIA,
By brief and at oral argument, Petitioners argue that 5

under Cruz v. Attorney General, 452 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir.

2006), we are obligated to order the Board to accord

precedential value to its unpublished decision in Matter of Reyes

(BIA, Feb. 9, 2005) (unpublished), wherein a single member of

the BIA issued a nonprecedential opinion finding the spouse of

an eligible TPS applicant to be eligible for TPS under the

applicable regulations notwithstanding her failure to meet the

“nationality” requirement. Alternatively, Petitioners argue that

no deference is due the BIA’s nonprecedential opinions from

which they seek review because they effect an unexplained

20

and therefore do not carry the force of law except as to those

parties for whom the opinion is rendered. We agree with the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that, “[i]n light of Mead,

the ‘essential factor’ in determining whether an agency action

warrants Chevron deference is its precedential value.” GarciaQuintero, 455 F.3d at 1012. An unpublished BIA opinion is not

issued pursuant to the BIA’s authority to make rules carrying the

force of law. We further agree that

[t]he unpublished designation of the decision also

makes it clear that it was not issued pursuant to

the BIA’s authority to make rules that carry the

force of law. Again, according to the Board’s own

internal policies, “[u]npublished decisions are

binding on the parties to the decision but are not

considered precedent for unrelated cases.”

Id. at 1013 (citations omitted).5
deviation from Matter of Reyes. In Cruz, we opined that

[w]hile the unpublished BIA decisions we have

consulted are not necessarily in the category of

“selected decisions . . . designated to serve as

precedents in all proceedings involving the same

issue or issues,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g), agencies

should not move away from their previous rulings

without cogent explanation. . . . Where there is a

consistent pattern of administrative decisions on

a given issue, we would expect the BIA to

conform to that pattern or explain its departure

from it. 

452 F.3d at 250 (citations omitted). Cruz and Matter of Reyes

do not assist Petitioners. First, Matter of Reyes has absolutely

no binding precedential value. Cf. Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286

F.3d 696, 700 (3d Cir. 2002) (requiring reason to depart from

established “precedents”). Second, the issues of “continuous

physical presence” and “continuous residency” are factually

distinct from that of “nationality” and therefore do not

implicate “the same issue or issues.” Cruz, 452 F.3d at 250.

Third, Matter of Reyes does not comprise a “consistent

pattern of administrative decisions on a given issue,” to which

we would expect the BIA to conform or from which a

departure should be justified. Fourth, we have before us three

consistent unpublished BIA opinions requiring late registrants

under the guidelines to personally comply with the statutory

requirements. Accordingly, under Cruz, if the BIA is required

21
to explain its departure from a position taken in an

unpublished decision, it would be that of the three congruous

opinions before us today, not the anomalous position adopted

in Matter of Reyes. Finally, because “unpublished precedent

is a dubious basis for demonstrating the type of inconsistency

which would warrant rejection of deference,” De Osorio v.

INS, 10 F.3d 1034, 1042 (4th Cir. 1993), “[w]e will not bind

the BIA with a single non-precedential, unpublished decision

any more than we ourselves are bound by our own

unpublished orders.” Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939,

946 (7th Cir. 1993).

Although the parties similarly failed to propose it, we 6

have considered remanding to the BIA for a precedential

opinion in the first instance. See Smriko, 387 F.3d 279

22

All parties before the Court failed to brief the issue of

appropriate deference for unpublished BIA decisions. This is an

open question in our Court with widespread ramifications for

appellate review of all such non-precedential BIA decisions. See

Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 296 (3d Cir. 2004) (observing

that finding of jurisdiction to review BIA streamlining decisions

is of “substantial importance” because of the number of possible

invocations). Because it was not briefed, barely argued, and is

not dispositive for the issues before us, we decline to resolve

this question. For the reasons that follow, we hold that under any

standard of review, we cannot grant Petitioners relief.6
(remanding petitioner’s appeal of BIA’s streamlined affirmance

of IJ’s opinion to allow the BIA to address petitioner’s novel

issue of law, in the first instance, in a precedential opinion); see

also Dobrova v. Holder, 607 F.3d 297, 300 (2d Cir. 2010)

(“[S]ince here we determine that the text of the relevant statute

is clear, and the only question presented on appeal is a purely

legal one, remand to the BIA for precedential interpretation in

the first instance is unnecessary.”); Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469

F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 2006) (reading 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)-

(5) together to require only that the BIA not review cases

resolving novel issues by affirmance without opinion, but not

requiring a single BIA member to refer an appeal to a threemember panel). We decline to do so because, as in Dobrova, the

questions presented are purely legal and therefore properly

before us. 

23

IV. 

Applying de novo review, we now turn to the arguments

of the parties. In their petitions for review, Petitioners argue that

the IJ and the BIA erred in denying Temporary Protected Status

for failure to meet the “continuous residence” and “continuous

physical presence” requirements for TPS eligibility. 8 U.S.C. §

1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Petitioners concede that they fail to

personally meet the statutory requirement of “continuous

residence” from “such date as the Attorney General [has]

designate[d],” but argue in their petitions that they have

constructively met the requirement through imputation of their

parents’ residence. Id. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(ii). Petitioners contend

additionally that under the plain meaning of the statute, they
24

have met the “continuous physical presence” requirement,

because the statutory term “most recent designation”

encompasses extensions of a TPS designation. Id. §

1254a(c)(1)(A)(i). We disagree, for the reasons that follow. 

A.

Petitioners argue that their parents’ undisputed

satisfaction of the “continuous residence” requirement should be

“imputed” to them for purposes of their own TPS eligibility. The

Government argues that the plain text of the statute, the

implementing regulations, and the consistent position of the

Attorney General require applicants to individually satisfy the

“continuous residence” requirement. We agree with the

Government.

1.

We note at the outset that we are only the second Court

of Appeals to address the question of imputation for the

purposes of the TPS program. In a case running on all fours with

our own, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently

affirmed, under the less deferential Skidmore standard, a singlemember, nonprecedential opinion of the BIA rejecting the

petitioner’s argument that he met the statutory TPS requirements

via imputation. Cervantes v. Holder, 597 F.3d 229 (4th Cir.

2010). Relying on statements in the Federal Register that a late

registration is “not intended to extend to persons who arrived in

the United States . . . after the [TPS] designation was made” and

the failure of the statute to affirmatively permit imputation, the

Cervantes court found the BIA’s construction permissible under

Skidmore deference. Id. at 237 (quoting 63 Fed. Reg. 63,593,

63,594 (Nov. 16, 1998)). As in Cervantes, Petitioners urge us to

rely on a series of cases out of the Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit to distinguish both Cervantes and our own
In 2007, the BIA declined to apply Cuevas-Gaspar, 7

refusing to impute a parent’s residency to satisfy the seven-year

residence requirement of the cancellation of removal statute.

Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 231 (BIA 2007); see also Augustin,

520 F.3d at 269 (discussing Escobar). The BIA expressly

disagreed with Cuevas-Gaspar, agreeing instead with the

position of the dissenting opinion and finding that residence

differs from domicile because it contains no element of intent,

and thus imputation is not proper. Escobar, 24 I. & N. Dec. at

25

precedent in Augustin v. Attorney General, 520 F.3d 264 (3d

Cir. 2008). We decline to do so.

Petitioners rely primarily on a line of case law,

interpreting several incarnations of the cancellation of removal

statute, permitting imputation for both domicile and residency.

This line originates with Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021 (9th

Cir. 1994), in which the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

held that a parent’s domicile is imputed to an unemancipated

minor child for the purposes of the domicile requirement of the

statutory precursor to the current cancellation of removal statute.

Id. at 1022. According to the court, domicile “incorporates the

concept familiar in other areas of law,” impelling the conclusion

that a child’s domicile follows that of his or her parents because

children are legally incapable of forming the requisite intent. Id.

at 1025 (quotations and citations omitted). That court has since

equated parental domicile to residence as used in the

cancellation of removal statute. See Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder,

580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (permitting imputation of parent’s

lawful permanent resident status to satisfy cancellation of

removal statute’s five-year requirement of lawful permanent

residence); Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.

2005) (permitting imputation of parent’s residence to satisfy

seven-year continuous residence requirement for cancellation of

removal).7
233. The petitioner appealed the BIA’s adverse ruling to the

Ninth Circuit which subsequently filed Escobar v. Holder, 567

F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2009), overturning the BIA. Apparently

unbeknownst to the Ninth Circuit, however, the BIA re-opened

the case on April 21, 2009, to hear argument on the respondent’s

prior motion to suppress, unrelated to Escobar’s TPS

application. 2009 WL 1364840 (BIA Apr. 21, 2009)

(unpublished decision). The Ninth Circuit then vacated its

opinion in Escobar v. Holder and dismissed the petition for

rehearing as moot. Escobar v. Holder, 572 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.

2009). The Ninth Circuit was not to be deterred. In MercadoZazueta v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit quoted verbatim the vast

majority of the vacated Escobar opinion, 567 F.3d 466, thereby

resuscitating it. 580 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009). The BIA

continues to rely on Escobar outside the jurisdiction of the Ninth

Circuit. See, e.g., Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 599 (BIA

2008).

26

Under our own precedent in Augustin, we disagree. In

Augustin, under Chevron deference, we affirmed the BIA’s

refusal to impute a parent’s lawful permanent resident status to

an alien for purposes of cancellation of removal. Augustin, 520

F.3d at 270; see also Cervantes, 597 F.3d at 236-237; Deus v.

Holder, 591 F.3d 807, 811-812 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming BIA’s

refusal to impute parent’s “residence”); Cuevas-Gaspar, 430

F.3d at 1032 (Fernandez, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no legal

reason for us to turn to [petitioner’s] parents to determine

[petitioner’s] intent[.]”). We observed that the INA, as amended,

did not expressly address the issue of imputation. Augustin, 520

F.3d at 269. It neither permitted it nor disallowed it. We

determined the BIA’s interpretation to be a reasonable

construction of the statute. Id. at 270-272. We distinguished

residence from domicile, because under the INA, residence is

defined as an alien’s “principal, actual dwelling place in fact,

without regard to intent.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) (emphasis
27

added). Thus, “any authority regarding the imputation of a

‘domicile’ is unavailing to the Petitioners [in establishing the

statutory ‘residence’].” Cervantes, 597 F.3d at 236 (citing

Augustin, 520 F.3d at 271). In Augustin, we rejected the Ninth

Circuit’s trajectory, and Petitioners before us present no

compelling argument for a change in course.

2.

As in Augustin, Petitioners here fail to identify statutory

language, regulatory language, or legislative history even

suggesting, much less mandating, that a parent’s residency be

imputed to minor children for purposes of satisfying the TPS

requirements. Although we are sympathetic to their plight,

Petitioners have failed to persuade us that the plain language of

the statute does not control. On our reading, the statutory

requirements of TPS “could not be more clear.” Cuevas-Gaspar,

430 F.3d at 1032 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). A TPS applicant

must show that he or she “has continuously resided in the United

States since such date as the Attorney General may designate.”

8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). We have

recognized that the Chevron inquiry ends if Congress has

spoken directly to the question at issue, in which case “both the

agency and the court must give effect to the plain language of

the statute.” Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir.

2008). Although we do not here apply Chevron deference, we

review the statute to determine whether Congress has directly

spoken to the question at issue.

a.

Petitioners contend that § 1254a is “ambiguous”

regarding imputation simply because the statute does not

explicitly permit or disallow it, and there is therefore no “plain

meaning.” We disagree. The statute unquestionably articulates
Petitioners argue that under the statutory scheme, the IJ 8

and BIA have discretion to grant TPS for humanitarian reasons,

28

a requirement that a TPS applicant continuously reside in the

United States from the date designated by the Attorney General.

The statute then specifies that brief, casual, and innocent

departures generally do not effect a failure to maintain

continuous residence for purposes of the TPS program. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(c)(4). Notably, § 1254a(c)(4) makes no mention of

alternate methods of satisfying the residence requirements. We

do not consider § 1254a to be “ambiguous” merely because it

does not expressly forbid every possible mechanism for

functional – but not actual – satisfaction of statutory

requirements. Else, near every statute would be “ambiguous”

and courts would have unfettered freedom to fashion creative

mechanisms for satisfying the otherwise clear requirements

mandated by Congress. This we decline to do.

b.

By the terms of the statute, the TPS program was

designed to shield aliens already in the country from removal

when a natural disaster or similar occurrence has rendered

removal unsafe. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1). We simply will not

read into an unambiguous statutory requirement an exception

that converts this statute into a program of entry for an alien. Id.

§ 1254a(c)(5) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as

authorizing an alien to apply for admission to, or to be admitted

to, the United States in order to apply for temporary protected

status under this section.”). And, although we agree with

Petitioners that our immigration framework values family unity,

we cannot on that basis alone read into the unambiguous TPS

statute an instruction by Congress to permit satisfaction of clear

statutory requirements via the disputed mechanism of

imputation. Compare Augustin, 520 F.3d 264, with Cuevas- 8
and moreover they erred in not exercising it. This is

demonstrably false. The provision cited by Petitioners, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(c)(2)(A)(ii), permits waiver of provisions of § 1182,

which applies exclusively to 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(iii)’s

requirement that the applicant be admissible as an immigrant,

“except as otherwise provided under paragraph (2)(A).”

(emphasis added). This provision is inapplicable to the

“continuous residence” and “continuous physical presence”

requirements at issue here. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).

29

Gaspar, 430 F.3d 1013.

c.

Petitioners attempt to evade our compelling precedent in

Augustin by distinguishing the underlying statutory frameworks.

We are unpersuaded. On the contrary, we find the different

purposes of the statutes to render imputation even less

appropriate for the TPS program than for cancellation of

removal. The cancellation of removal residency requirement is

designed to gauge the extent of an alien’s ties to the United

States. A minor’s parent’s residence in the United States, though

not dispositive, is relevant to a minor’s ties to the country. The

TPS program, by contrast, is designed to temporarily prevent

removal of aliens during extraordinary and temporary conditions

that prevent safe return. 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(1)(C). A minor’s

parent’s residence in the United States is not relevant to whether

that minor can be “safely returned” at the time of the initial

designation. As in Augustin, “[a]lthough [this] ruling does deny

relief to certain aliens, that alone cannot render [it]

unreasonable. Congress restricted relief to those aliens who had

[continuously resided in the United States from the designated

date.] The BIA’s refusal to create an exception simply heeds the

statute’s plain requirements.” Augustin, 520 F.3d at 271.
30

3.

Finally, our conclusion as to the plain language of the

statutory requirements is bolstered by the consistent position of

the Attorney General and the BIA. See, e.g., 73 Fed. Reg.

57,128, 57,132 (Oct. 1, 2008) (explaining that extension of TPS

eligibility for nationals of El Salvador does not expand

eligibility to those who have not continuously resided in the

United States since February 13, 2001, and who have not been

continuously present since March 9, 2001); 63 Fed. Reg. 63,593,

63,594 (Nov. 16, 1998) (stating that late registration is not

intended to extend to persons who arrived in the United States

after the program designation was made); see also Escobar, 24

I. & N. Dec. 231 (BIA 2007) (rejecting Cuevas-Gaspar and

refusing to allow imputation for residency requirement of

cancellation of removal). The Cervantes court was similarly

persuaded, observing that “since 1998, when the regulations

providing for late initial TPS registration were first adopted, the

Attorney General has consistently applied this interpretation”

and “the INS was emphatic that those applying for late initial

TPS registration . . . must meet all other requirements of TPS

including presence in the United States at the time the foreign

state in question was designated for TPS.” Cervantes v. Holder,

597 F.3d 229, 235 (4th Cir. 2010) (citations and quotations

omitted).

B.

Petitioners additionally contend that the phrase “most

recent designation” under the “continuous physical presence”

requirement, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i), should be read to

refer not to the initial designation of a state for TPS, but instead

to the most recent extension of a state’s TPS designation.

Petitioners’ argument is unavailing.
31

Under the plain language of the statutory scheme, an

extension of TPS does not constitute a “designation.”

Designation of a foreign state for TPS takes effect “upon the

date of publication of the designation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(2).

The statute specifically provides for an “[e]xtension of

designation,” stating that the Attorney General may extend the

period of designation. Id. § 1254a(b)(3)(C). To the extent

Petitioners seek to emphasize the phrase “most recent,” we

agree with the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that “the

statutory phrase ‘most recent designation’ merely distinguishes

the current designation of a foreign state for the TPS program

from any prior TPS program designations of that same foreign

state.” Cervantes, 597 F.3d at 235 (providing as an example the

possibility of two separate disasters in the same state leading to

two separate designations).

Indeed, reading “most recent designation” to apply to

each extension would convert the TPS program into a program

of entry, whereby each extension of TPS would continually and

substantially expand the category of eligible aliens. We decline

to read the statute in a manner so at odds with its narrowly

circumscribed requirements regarding eligibility for Temporary

Protected Status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A).

Additionally, while not dispositive to our reading of the

statute, we note that the BIA and Attorney General have taken

the consistent position that an extension of TPS does not change

the date of designation for purposes of the “continuous physical

presence” requirement. See, e.g., 72 Fed. Reg. 29,529, 29,533

(May 29, 2007) (“An extension of a TPS designation does not

change the required dates of continuous residence and

continuous physical presence . . .”) (emphasis added); see also

Cervantes, 597 F.3d at 234-235 (summarizing the BIA and

Attorney General’s consistent position and observing that the

extension notices have expressly required registrants to meet the
32

dates set by the original designation of TPS).

C.

Without the necessity of resorting to Chevron or even

Skidmore deference, we determine that Congress spoke

unambiguously when it required that TPS applicants

demonstrate continuous residency from the date designated by

the Attorney General and continuous physical presence from the

most recent designation. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that

is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,

must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of

Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984). “[A] statute’s silence on a

given issue does not confer gap-filling power on an agency

unless the question is in fact a gap–an ambiguity tied up with the

provisions of the statute.” Lin-Zheng v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d

147, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Sun Wen Chen v.

Att’y Gen., 491 F.3d 100, 113 (3d Cir. 2007), overruled on other

grounds by Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d 147). We are in accord with the

Cervantes concurrence, and reach “the same result [as the

Cervantes court] simply by concluding that Congress spoke

unambiguously as to this particular requirement for temporary

protected status.” Cervantes, 597 F.3d at 237-238 (Traxler, C.J.,

concurring) (citing Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540

U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (“[D]eference to [the agency’s] statutory

interpretation is called for only when the devices of judicial

construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of

congressional intent.”)); see also Cuevas-Gaspar, 430 F.3d at

1032 (Fernandez, J., dissenting). 

We hold that the “continuous residence” requirement

cannot be met via imputation and that the statutory term “most

recent designation” applies to the original designation of a state

for TPS and not to subsequent extensions. Accordingly, because
33

Petitioners have indisputably failed to personally satisfy the

“continuous residence” and “continuous physical presence”

requirements, they are statutorily ineligible for TPS and

therefore we will deny their petitions for review. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).

V.

We are left with the matter of De Leon-Ochoa’s petition

for review of the BIA’s denial of his applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and CAT protection. For the reasons

that follow, we will deny review of the BIA’s order on this

issue.

We review the BIA’s decision for substantial evidence,

and factual determinations are “conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). An alien may be granted

asylum if he is a “refugee” who is “unable or unwilling” to

return to his native country “because of persecution or a

well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). De Leon-Ochoa conceded

that he did not suffer past persecution and therefore to prevail on

his claim he must establish a well-founded fear of persecution

if returned to Honduras, by demonstrating both a subjective and

an objective fear of future persecution. See, e.g., Lie v.

Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005). 

We have reviewed the record and conclude that there was

substantial evidence to support the IJ and BIA’s denial of De

Leon-Ochoa’s application for asylum. Petitioner claims he is in

danger of future persecution based on a long-standing interfamily blood feud. His contentions are belied by the record.

Petitioner’s brothers have remained in Honduras, unmolested.
 We note that the attorneys representing Petitioners on 9

these petitions for review have done so on a pro-bono basis and

we thank them for these services, which have been in the highest

tradition of the bar.

34

Petitioner himself lived in Honduras for six years after the last

alleged feud-based murder, unmolested. Petitioner’s own

documentary evidence indicates that the blood feud upon which

his asylum claim is premised ended in 1996, and he has

presented no evidence of additional inter-family strife in the last

decade. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the IJ and BIA

erred in denying De Leon-Ochoa’s application for asylum. De

Leon-Ochoa’s failure to meet his burden of proof for asylum

necessarily impels the conclusion that he cannot satisfy his

burden of proof for withholding of removal. See, e.g., Guo v.

Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 561 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004). 

Finally, to qualify for protection under the CAT, De

Leon-Ochoa must prove that “it is more likely than not that he

[] would be tortured if removed to [Honduras].” 8 C.F.R. §

1208.16(c)(2); see Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-175

(3d Cir. 2002). Petitioner has identified no evidence to compel

the conclusion that it is more likely than not that he will be

tortured upon return to Honduras. Accordingly, we agree with

the BIA’s denial of his application for protection under the CAT

and will deny the petition for review.

*****

For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petitions for

review.9