J-A29038-22

2023 PA Super 25

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL J. CONIKER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 23 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 18, 2021,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0014079-2018.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL J. CONIKER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 24 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 18, 2021,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006879-2018.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 15, 2023

Michael Coniker appeals from the judgments of sentence entered 

against him following his convictions at two criminal dockets for harassment, 

disorderly conduct, and criminal trespass. He challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence for every conviction. We reverse in part and affirm in part.
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Background

These cases concern two separate incidents, which gave rise to separate 

criminal complaints, docket numbers, and dispositions. We will refer to the 

case at CP-02-CR-0006879-2018, No. 24 WDA 2022 as “the Office Case” and

the case at CP-02-CR-0014079-2018, No. 23 WDA 2022 as “the Church Case.”

The trial court set forth the facts at the Office Case as follows:

Some time prior to March 1, 2017, Attorney James Herb 

represented Mr. Coniker. Mr. Coniker and Attorney Herb 

eventually had a falling out, and Attorney Herb informed Mr. 

Coniker that he was not permitted to enter Attorney Herb’s offices 

and that if Mr. Coniker did so, Attorney Herb would have him 

arrested. Knowing that he was not permitted to enter Attorney 

Herb’s offices, Mr. Coniker called Attorney Herb’s offices and 

started to record the telephone conversation. The call was then 

disconnected, and neither Attorney Herb, nor anyone from his 

office elected to call back Mr. Coniker.

Accordingly, after being told he was not permitted to enter 

Attorney Herb’s offices and having also unsuccessfully tried to 

speak to Attorney Herb and his office by telephone, Mr. Coniker, 

knowing he was not welcome, decided to try to communicate 

again with Attorney Herb by entering Attorney Herb’s offices on 

March 1, 2017. Mr. Coniker made this entrance immediately after 

leaving the local magisterial district judge’s offices, where he 

made threats regarding a weapon because his case therein had 

been postponed. Despite his incredible assertions to the contrary, 

Mr. Coniker’s intent when entering Attorney Herb’s offices was to 

cause disruption and to frighten, scare, and alarm its occupants, 

just like he had intended to and did moments before at the 

magistrate’s office.[1]

Mr. Coniker’s conduct inside Attorney Herb’s office achieved 

Mr. Coniker’s intent. He was threatening and frightening to the 

office’s occupants. Attorney Herb’s staff, including Janet Knochel, 

who encountered Mr. Coniker in the offices, were, in fact, so 

concerned about Mr. Coniker that they called the police and fled 

____________________________________________

1 Coniker disputes this factual finding of his intent, as described infra.
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the offices. Mr. Coniker was screaming [into a cell phone, “I’m at 

Attorney Herb’s office and I got a gun.”]

The impact on Attorney Herb’s office was such that following 

the incident with Mr. Coniker, the “format of [the] office” changed. 

Attorney Herb explained:

Subsequent thereto ... I put a metal door in at the top of the 

ramp and bullet proof glass in to protect the front office 

assistants. And so nobody can get into the interior offices 

without us buzzing them in or letting them in. And there’s 

a speaker box on the bullet proof glass that allows the front 

office assistant to speak and hear the people who come in 

... from the outside. And the wall goes up to the ceiling now, 

so that the front is secure. You can’t enter in, you can’t get 

into the offices without someone letting you in . . . .

Eventually, the police arrived at Attorney Herb’s offices. 

Notably, prior to being dispatched to Attorney Herb’s offices, the 

police had been forced to respond to the local magistrate’s office 

to deal with Mr. Coniker’s conduct there, where they took the 

magisterial district judge and his staff into safety and placed the 

courtroom in lockdown. Once at Attorney Herb’s offices, law 

enforcement caught up to Mr. Coniker and saw and heard him 

screaming, yelling, and berating Attorney Herb. Mr. Coniker was 

ultimately arrested. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/22, at 4–6 (record citations omitted).

Approximately 18 months after the events in the Office Case, Coniker 

was involved in an incident at Assumption Church. The trial court set forth 

the facts from the Church Case as follows:

Mr. Coniker has a turbulent relationship with Assumption Church. 

Indeed, prior to September 20, 2018, the police had been 

summoned to escort Mr. Coniker from the church’s property on 

multiple occasions.

Before September 20, 2018, Mr. Coniker had also been 

informed by the church’s Priest that he was not to videotape or 

take pictures inside the church. Mr. Coniker also knew prior to 

September 20, 2018, that he was not permitted to “bring the 

[Holy Communion] host out of [the] church” once he had received 

it. Mr. Coniker understood that he was to consume the host 
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immediately if received in his mouth or within two steps if received 

in his hand. Mr. Coniker was aware that if he did not follow the 

foregoing practices regarding the host, his disobedience would 

cause a disturbance at the church. 

On [Thursday,] September 20, 2018, Mr. Coniker went to 

Assumption Church for morning services. Knowing the 

disturbance it would cause and that he had been forbidden from 

doing so, Mr. Coniker nevertheless intended that morning to take 

pictures and to record the goings on in the church. He also, 

despite his incredible assertions to the contrary, intended to 

violate the host-practices set forth above by removing the host 

from the church so that he would have God with him later in the 

day at a court proceeding in Ohio.

After giving Confession before morning services began, Mr. 

Coniker took out his camera and started to take pictures and 

videotape of the church. The Priest again told Mr. Coniker that he 

was not permitted to do so and—given Mr. Coniker’s reaction and 

his history with the church—called the police.

Mass then began, and Mr. Coniker refused to consume the 

host after receiving it. That refusal caused the Eucharistic Minister 

to tell Mr. Coniker that he was required to consume the host. Mr. 

Coniker told the Eucharistic Minister that he was “going to take 

th[e] host with [him] to court” later that day.[] The Priest then 

confronted Mr. Coniker, and Mr. Coniker testified that the 

following occurred:

[H]e stopped me. He says, You can’t do that. I said, well 

then, Father, you come to court—with me to court today. I 

need a true father in my life. My dad was biologically dead 

at that point and there's falsehoods—I need God the Father. 

And so [H]e’s in this host, so, I’m going to bring God the 

Father with me in this host to be physically with me. He 

said, you can’t do that. I said—I knew I was committing a 

spiritual act of disobedience. . . .

[H]e’s telling me I can’t do that. He has people surround 

me. He says, don’t let him leave the church.

Accordingly, Mr. Coniker knew he could not leave the church 

with the host and had been repeatedly told the same, yet he 

repeatedly refused to listen and repeatedly tried to take the host 

out of the church without consuming it. The Priest, along with 
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other parishioners, then attempted to prevent Mr. Coniker from 

leaving with the host.

After receiving the report of a disturbance at Assumption 

Church, law enforcement arrived on the scene. Police Chief 

Matthew Sentner found the Priest and the entire congregation 

surrounding Mr. Coniker, whose back was up against a wall as he 

faced about a dozen or so people. After speaking with the Priest, 

Chief Sentner proceeded to arrest Mr. Coniker for theft of the host. 

During the arrest, Mr. Coniker was not compliant and, instead, 

became aggressive with Chief Sentner, who was required to 

wrestle Mr. Coniker to the ground. [Officer James Dold responded 

to the church after Mr. Coniker was handcuffed.]

Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/22, at 7–10 (record citations omitted, Chief Sentner’s 

name corrected).

Police charged Coniker in connection with both incidents.2 On August 

18, 2021, the trial court heard both cases in separate non-jury trials. In the 

Office Case, the trial court found Coniker guilty of harassment of Attorney 

Herb and of Ms. Knochel, disorderly conduct at the magistrate’s office and at 

Attorney Herb’s office, and defiant trespass. In the Church Case, the trial 

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2

In the Office Case, police initially charged Coniker with terroristic threats and 

disorderly conduct, under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2706(a)(3) and 5503(a)(1). The 

Commonwealth amended the charges before trial to four counts of 

harassment, two counts of disorderly conduct, and simple trespass, under 18 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2709(a)(3), 5503(a)(4), and 3503(b.1)(1)(i).

In the Church Case, police initially charged Coniker with terroristic 

threats, resisting arrest, harassment, defiant trespass, and theft by unlawful 

taking, under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2706(a)(1), 5104, 2709(a)(4), 3503(b)(1)(i), 

3921(a), respectively. The theft charge was dismissed at Coniker’s 

preliminary hearing. The Commonwealth amended the charges before trial to 

disorderly conduct, simple trespass, and two counts of harassment, under 18 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5503(a)(4), 3503(b.1)(1)(i), and 2709(a)(3).
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court found Coniker guilty of harassment of Chief Sentner and of Officer James 

Dold, as well as disorderly conduct.

The trial court sentenced Coniker to consecutive 90-day periods of 

probation for an aggregate term of 720 days of probation. Coniker filed timely

post-sentence motions, a premature notice of appeal, and an amended postsentence motion. The trial court ultimately denied Coniker’s post-sentence 

motions, providing: “Mr. Coniker’s sentences of probation are terminated, and 

the Court closes interest in the same.” Order, 12/28/21, at 1. Coniker timely 

appealed. Coniker and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925. 

This Court consolidated Coniker’s cases sua sponte. Coniker raises the 

following challenges in his combined brief for both cases, which we have 

reordered for ease of disposition:

Did the Commonwealth provide sufficient evidence to support Mr. 

Coniker’s convictions? More specifically:

a. At [the Office Case], did the Commonwealth fail to produce 

sufficient evidence to support the Harassment conviction in 

that it failed to establish that (1) Mr. Coniker had the intent to 

harass, annoy or alarm anyone, (2) ... Mr. Coniker had no 

legitimate purpose to be at Attorney Herb’s office, and (3) ... 

multiple acts supported the “course of conduct” charge?

Further, did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to 

support the conviction for Disorderly Conduct by establishing 

that Mr. Coniker [(1) had] an intent to cause public 

inconvenience, (2) had created any hazardous or physically 

offensive condition, and (3) did not have a legitimate purpose 

for his actions?

Finally, as to the Criminal Trespass conviction, did the 

Commonwealth present sufficient evidence that Mr. Coniker (1) 
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was aware that he could not enter attorney Herb’s office, and 

(2) ... had a criminal intent to threaten or terrorize anyone in 

the office?

b. At [the Church Case], did the Commonwealth fail to produce 

sufficient evidence to support the Disorderly Conduct charge in 

that it failed to demonstrate that Mr. Coniker (1) had the 

specific intent to create a public inconvenience, annoyance, or 

alarm; (2) ... created a hazardous or physically offensive 

condition by his actions; and (3) ... did not have a legitimate 

purpose for his presence in the church?

Further, was the Harassment conviction supported by sufficient 

evidence of (1) Mr. Coniker’s intent to harass, annoy, or alarm 

anyone, (2) Mr. Coniker not having a legitimate purpose for his 

actions, and (3) a “course of conduct,” i.e., multiple acts?

Coniker’s Brief at 10–11.

Mootness

Before turning to the substantive issues in this appeal, we note that 

Coniker has completed his probationary sentence. In denying Coniker’s 

amended post-sentence motions, the trial court ordered that its interest in his 

sentences was closed. Accordingly, we directed Coniker to show cause why 

his appeals should not be dismissed as moot. Coniker replied that there is no 

statutory basis to preclude review of a completed sentence on direct appeal, 

unlike in a petition for post-conviction collateral relief. Cf. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(1) (limiting eligibility for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA)). Further, he indicates that overturning his convictions would benefit 

him by preventing collateral consequences that flow from convictions.

A case becomes moot when there is no longer an actual case or 

controversy to be resolved. In the Interest of Y.W.-B., 265 A.3d 602, 612 
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n.8 (Pa. 2021); e.g., Commonwealth v. Beaudoin, 182 A.3d 1009, 1010 

(dismissing appeal as moot based on defendant’s death, a discretionary 

decision by this Court). However, the collateral consequences doctrine 

recognizes that a person with a criminal conviction may face legal 

consequences beyond serving the sentence imposed for the conviction. 

Commonwealth v. Markley, 501 A.2d 1137, 1141–42 (Pa. Super. 1985) 

(citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)).3 Notably, adverse 

consequences are presumed; “a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that 

there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed 

on the basis of the challenged conviction.” Id. at 1141 (quoting Sibron, 392 

U.S. at 57).

Here, Coniker suggests that his convictions could damage his ability to 

hold professional licenses, to own a firearm, to obtain public benefits or 

student loans, and to serve on a jury, as well as increasing his prior record 

score in future cases. Coniker’s Brief at 29.4 He also speculates that these 

____________________________________________

3 Markley involved a petition under the former Post Conviction Hearing Act. 

Section 9543(a)(1) of the PCRA has now superseded Markley’s holding about 

petitions for post-conviction collateral relief. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 

579 A.2d 963, 964–65 (Pa. Super. 1990) (rejecting application of the collateral 

consequences doctrine to a PCRA petition). However, no statute precludes 

review on direct appeal of a judgment of sentence that has been completed. 

Moreover, a criminal defendant enjoys a constitutional right to such an appeal. 

Pa. Const. Art. V, § 9.

4 These consequences would not flow from Coniker’s convictions for summary 

offenses. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 9124(b)(3) (prohibiting consideration of 

summary offenses for professional licensing); id. § 6105(b) (listing offenses 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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convictions could damage his reputation. Id.; see Markley, 501 A.2d at 

1140, 1141 n.4; see also Pa. Const. Art. 1, § 1 (recognizing an inherent right 

to reputation). The Commonwealth has not challenged mootness. Given the 

possibility that Coniker’s convictions will damage his reputation, we conclude 

that he could suffer collateral consequences as a result. As such, we agree 

with Coniker that the collateral consequences doctrine applies and his cases 

are not moot. Markey, supra. Therefore, we will address substantive issues. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Coniker’s claims all challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Evidence 

is sufficient if “it establishes each material element of the crime charged and 

the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 751 (Pa. 2000) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1993)). Because 

sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law, the standard of review is de 

novo, and the scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Smith, 234 

A.3d 576, 581 (Pa. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 

37 (Pa. 2011)). A reviewing court views all the evidence from trial in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, including the benefit 

____________________________________________

that bar a person from owning firearms); 24 P.S. § 5104.1(a) (providing for 

denial of student loan assistance to students convicted of felonies, certain 

misdemeanors, and other offenses related to higher education institutions); 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4502(a)(3) (disqualifying from jury service citizens convicted 

of crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than one year); 204 Pa. Code 

§ 303.8(g)(1) (excluding summary offenses from a prior record score).
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of all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. Widmer, 744 A.2d at

751 (citing Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630 (Pa. 1991)).

Office Case – Harassment 

In the Office Case, Coniker first challenges his two convictions for 

harassment of Attorney Herb and of Ms. Knochel. Coniker argues that the 

evidence is insufficient to establish that he had the requisite intent or that he 

engaged in a course of conduct. Coniker’s Brief at 51–56, 56–57. The 

Commonwealth responds that Coniker’s actions were reprehensible in light of 

recent mass shootings and that he engaged in a course of conduct starting 

with entering the office in the first place. Commonwealth’s Brief at 38–39.

Subsection 2709(a)(3) of the Crimes Code defines harassment, charged 

here, in relevant part: “A person commits the crime of harassment when, with 

intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the person . . . engages in a course 

of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which serve no legitimate purpose . . . 

.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(3). A “course of conduct” is defined in part as “A 

pattern of actions composed of more than one act over a period of time, 

however short, evidencing a continuity of conduct. The term includes lewd, 

lascivious, threatening or obscene words, language, drawings, caricatures or 

actions, either in person or anonymously.” Id. § 2709(f).

To sustain harassment convictions, the evidence must show that the 

defendant had the specific “intent to harass, annoy or alarm another.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2709. Such an intent “may be inferred from the totality of the 
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circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 961 (Pa. Super.

2002)).

Attorney Herb testified that Coniker told the 911 operator, “I’m at 

Attorney Herb’s office and I got a gun.” N.T., 8/18/21, at 4–5. Coniker 

testified that he told police that he had “non-violent” “weapons of mass 

construction,” id. at 33–34.5 However, the trial court as finder of fact was 

free to believe Attorney Herb’s testimony. Although Coniker testified that he 

was merely trying to notify the government about a perceived wrong, his

statements about a gun and weapons support the reasonable inference that 

he intended to alarm other people, such as Attorney Herb and Ms. Knochel, 

who were in the office. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove 

Coniker’s intent.

Regarding the course of conduct requirement, we reject Coniker’s 

invitation to consider only an isolated statement from the 911 call in Attorney 

Herb’s office. Although a single act is not a course of conduct, “more than 

one act over a short period of time” can be. Lutes, 793 A.2d at 961. Coniker 

made multiple statements that could (and did) alarm the people who heard 

them. This is sufficient to prove a course of conduct, and we will therefore 

affirm Coniker’s convictions for harassment in the Office Case.

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5 The 911 recording was not included in the certified record on appeal.
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Office Case – Disorderly Conduct

Coniker challenges both disorderly conduct convictions arising from the 

Office Case, which concern the events at the Magistrate’s office and at 

Attorney Herb’s office. Regarding the Magistrate’s office, Coniker asserts that 

there was no testimony about these events. Coniker’s Brief at 58. As for 

Attorney Herb’s office, Coniker argues that the evidence did not reflect an 

intent to cause alarm, did not show that he created a hazardous or physically 

offensive condition, and did not involve a course of conduct. Id. at 58–62.

The Commonwealth responds that Officer Pavlecic and Coniker both 

testified to the events at the Magistrate’s office, which involved threats about 

a weapon and caused the courtroom to be locked down. Commonwealth’s 

Brief at 36–37. At Attorney Herb’s office, the Commonwealth argues that 

Coniker was at least reckless that he would cause a risk of public 

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, and that he created a hazardous and 

physically offensive condition without a legitimate purpose by yelling at an 

attorney’s office that he had a gun.

The statute defines the offense: “A person is guilty of disorderly conduct 

if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly 

creating a risk thereof, he . . . creates a hazardous or physically offensive 

condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). Section 5503’s goal is to protect the public from 

public unruliness leading to tumult or disorder; it is not a “catchall for every 

act which annoys or disturbs people.” Commonwealth v. Mauz, 122 A.3d 
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1039, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Maerz, 879 A.2d 

1267, 1269 (Pa. Super. 2005)). We will address the elements in turn.

First, Section 5503 requires proof that the defendant had one of two

alternative mental states: “intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance 

or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503 

(emphasis added). The Commonwealth can thus sustain a disorderly conduct

conviction with evidence that the defendant recklessly created a risk of public 

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, even if he lacked the intent to do so. 

Commonwealth v. Troy, 832 A.2d 1089, 1094 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Kidd, 442 A.2d 826, 827 (Pa. Super. 1982)).

This Court held an act of protest to be disorderly conduct in 

Commonwealth v. Roth, 531 A.2d 1133 (Pa. Super. 1987). The defendants, 

informed that they were not welcome to do so, attempted to leave a steel 

beam on a church altar during Easter Sunday services. Id. at 1136. Although 

they argued that they merely intended to raise awareness, this Court held that 

the record supported an intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or 

alarm. Id. at 1136–37. The defendants’ disregard of the notice that the 

church did not want them to bring in their steel beam showed their intent.

Second, Section 5503(a)(4) requires proof that a defendant “create[d] 

a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no 

legitimate purpose of the actor.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4). Our cases 

illustrate a patchwork of conditions that are hazardous or physically offensive. 

A condition is “hazardous” if it “involves danger or risk” of “the possibility of 
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injuries resulting from public disorders.” Roth, 531 A.2d at 1137 (citation 

and internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 574 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. Super. 1990). By contrast, the meaning 

of “physically offensive condition” “encompasses direct assaults on the 

physical senses of members of the public” as opposed to “merely morally 

offensive” conduct. Commonwealth v. McConnell, 244 A.3d 44, 49 (Pa. 

Super. 2020). The Commonwealth needs to prove that the defendant created 

either a hazardous condition or a physically offensive condition, not both. See 

id. at 49 n.3. 

For example, this Court found the defendants in Roth created a 

hazardous condition by disrupting Easter Sunday services with a symbolic act 

of protest. Roth, 531 A.2d at 1137. Noting the “emotionally charged 

atmosphere,” we reasoned that the protestors’ approach could have caused 

altercations with the church members. Id. We reached the same conclusion 

in another case, where a witness acted irrationally in a protection from abuse 

proceeding. Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

There, after the trial court ruled against the defendant, the witness jumped 

from his seat and yelled, struggling against the deputy sheriff who then 

removed him from the crowded courtroom. Commonwealth v. Love, 896 

A.2d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2006). We held that heightening the tension of 

a court proceeding was sufficient to prove a hazardous condition. Id. at 1286. 

Further, the defendant created a risk by confronting the deputy sheriff who 

was escorting him from the courtroom. Id.
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Here, the trial evidence included Officer Pavlecic’s testimony that police 

were dispatched to the Magistrate’s office for a 911 report of a male “making 

threats with a weapon.” N.T., 8/18/21, at 14–15. After locking down the 

courtroom, they proceeded to Attorney Herb’s office to find Coniker “berating” 

Attorney Herb. This was the basis for both disorderly conduct convictions in 

the Office Case.

As noted above, the Commonwealth can sustain its convictions for 

disorderly conduct with evidence that Coniker had the specific intent to cause 

public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or that he recklessly created “a 

risk thereof.” Troy, 832 A.2d at 1094. We have little difficulty concluding 

that making statements about having weapons (even “non-violent” weapons) 

in a courtroom and an attorney’s office evinces at least recklessness about 

creating a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. Furthermore, 

such a statement can cause a “hazardous” condition, one that “involves 

danger or risk” of “the possibility of injuries resulting from public disorders.” 

Roth, supra; Williams, supra. Here, the police locked down the courtroom, 

and Attorney Herb’s assistant, Ms. Knochel, retreated out a back exit. The 

court could infer that this increased the risk of injury to people at the 

Magistrate’s office or in the back of Attorney Herb’s office.

With respect to the “course of conduct” requirement, our Court has 

explained an analogous provision in the former stalking statute to encompass 

at least two “related but separate” acts. Commonwealth v. Leach, 729 A.2d 

608, 611 (Pa. Super. 1999); see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(f) (defining “course of 
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conduct”). Although the elements are not established until a second act

occurs, each act constitutes a separate completed offense. Id. at 612. Here, 

Coniker’s statements at the Magistrate’s office and at Attorney Herb’s office 

separately created hazardous conditions, each being sufficient to prove 

disorderly conduct. Therefore, we affirm Coniker’s convictions for disorderly 

conduct in the Office Case.

Office Case – Criminal Trespass

Coniker next challenges his conviction for criminal trespass/simple 

trespasser in the Office Case. The statute provides: “A person commits an 

offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or 

remains in any place for the purpose of . . . threatening or terrorizing the 

owner or occupant of the premises . . . .” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b.1)(1)(i).

Coniker argues that there was no testimony to establish that he knew

that he was not permitted in Attorney Herb’s office, and that Attorney Herb 

even testified that Coniker did not make specific threats to him or his staff. 

Coniker’s Brief at 62–65. Coniker also points to two statutory affirmative 

defenses, which he indicates went unrebutted at trial:

It is a defense to prosecution under this section that:

* * *

(2) the premises were at the time open to members of the 

public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed 

on access to or remaining in the premises; or

(3) the actor reasonably believed that the owner of the 

premises, or other person empowered to license access 

thereto, would have licensed him to enter or remain.
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(c)(2), (3).

The Commonwealth responds that by his own testimony, Coniker 

acknowledged that Attorney Herb had previously told him never to come into 

his office again, which was never revoked. Commonwealth’s Brief at 29–33. 

Further, the Commonwealth indicates that Coniker’s statements to the 911 

operator reflect his intent to terrorize people. Id. at 26–29.

To violate this section, a defendant must know that he is not licensed or 

privileged to enter or remain in a place. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b.1); see

Commonwealth v. Namack, 663 A.2d 191, 194 (Pa. Super. 1995) (defiant 

trespass, Section 3503(b)(1)). If the Commonwealth does not rebut a 

defendant’s good faith, reasonable mistake of fact that he was permitted to 

be on property, then the evidence is insufficient to prove that the defendant 

knew he was not licensed or privileged to be there. Id. at 194–95.

Here, Coniker testified that Attorney Herb had previously told him not 

to come into his office:

James Herb got mad at me at Allegheny County Court because he 

was in the process of railroading me into mental health court. 

After I observed all of the information and it came down to the 

point to make a final addition, I decided not to. So, he got mad 

at me and he said, never come into my office or I’m going to have 

you arrested. I said, could you give that to me in writing? He 

said, no. So, that’s the only time that that’s happened.

N.T., 8/18/21, at 28. Based on this unambiguous statement from Attorney 

Herb, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that Coniker’s belief 

that he could enter the office was not a good faith, reasonable mistake of fact.
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The statute also requires the Commonwealth to prove that Coniker 

entered or remained in Attorney Herb’s office “for the purpose of . . . 

threatening or terrorizing the owner or occupant of the premises.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(b.1)(1)(i). In describing “intent to terrorize” language in 

the terroristic threats statute, we have recognized that this language protects 

against “the psychological distress that follows from an invasion of another’s 

sense of personal security.” Commonwealth v. Kline, 201 A.3d 1288, 1291 

(Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting In re B.R., 732 A.2d 633, 636 (Pa. Super. 1999)).

Here, although Coniker’s statements were not threats made directly to 

Attorney Herb or his staff, they could cause the sort of psychological distress 

that flows from invading their sense of personal security—the stress that 

comes from the possibility that a person has entered a law office with a gun. 

Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Coniker entered Attorney 

Herb’s office with the purpose of terrorizing the people inside.

As to the affirmative defenses in Section 3503(c), Coniker did not argue

their applicability before the trial court. By not doing so, he has waived their 

applicability. Commonwealth v. Wanner, 158 A.3d 714, 717 (Pa. Super. 

2017). We will therefore affirm Coniker’s conviction for criminal 

trespass/simple trespasser in the Office Case.

Church Case – Harassment

The trial court convicted Coniker of harassment of Chief Sentner (who 

first reported to the church and arrested Coniker) and of Officer Dold (who 
J-A29038-22

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responded to the church after Coniker was handcuffed). Coniker disputes the 

sufficiency of the evidence to prove both that he intended to harass, annoy, 

or alarm others and that he engaged in a course of conduct or repeatedly 

committed acts that served no legitimate purpose. Coniker’s Brief at 32–42.

Coniker likens his case to three prior cases in which this Court held the 

evidence to be insufficient to prove harassment. First, in Commonwealth v. 

Wheaton, 598 A.2d 1017 (Pa. Super. 1991), a defendant homeowner 

confronted two excavators working on a nearby water line and two trustees 

of the water association that served his home, warning that he would sue 

them or have them arrested. Id. at 1018. This Court reasoned that he had 

a legitimate purpose in maintaining water services to his home. Id. at 1020. 

“[T]he import of [requiring ‘no legitimate purpose’] is broadly to exclude from 

this subsection any conduct that directly furthers some legitimate desire or 

objective of the actor. This element of the residual offense should limit its 

application to unarguably reprehensible instances of intentional imposition on 

another.” Id. at 1019 (quoting Model Penal Code § 250.4 cmt. 5 (Am. Law 

Inst. 1980)). Further, because the defendant intended to maintain water 

services, his complaining did not support an intention to harass, annoy, or 

alarm the people whom he thought could shut off his water. Id.

Second, in Commonwealth v. Bender, 375 A.2d 354 (Pa. Super. 

1977), two police officers privately charged a defendant with harassment after 

he complained about how they handled his gun permit application. This Court 

held that the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant’s 
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“ostensibly lawful and constitutionally protected” acts served “no legitimate 

purpose.” Id. at 358–59. Additionally, the Court determined that the 

evidence did not establish that the defendant’s acts would “seriously offend 

the average person” to alarm or seriously annoy the officers. Id. at 359 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Duncan, 363 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. 1976)).

Coniker stresses that this Court in Bender required the officers to have 

thicker skin:

[The officers testified to reputational and health damages.] 

However, we cannot say that appellant’s apparently baseless 

complaints would so seriously offend an average police officer as 

to result in such illness. Indeed, police officers must expect, as 

part of their jobs exposing them to daily contact with distraught

individuals in emotionally charged situations, to confront and 

answer accusations of rudeness and improper conduct.

Id. at 359–60 (footnote and citations omitted).

Third, in Commonwealth v. Battaglia, 725 A.2d 192 (Pa. Super. 

1999), a defendant landscaper was arrested after refusing to clean up leaves 

and saying he would sue the police for bothering him. Id. at 193. At the 

police station, he touched the officer’s hand while grabbing a pen. Id. On 

appeal, this Court held that none of the defendant’s actions supported the 

inference that he intended to harass the officer: his threat to sue was 

“responsive, not provocative,” his snatching the pen and refusing to rake also 

lacked proof of intent to harass. Id. at 194–95.

Coniker argues that his behavior with the Communion host did not show 

an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm, similar to the defendants’ behavior in 

Wheaton and Battaglia. He emphasizes that his purpose in being at church 
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was legitimate. Finally, he disputes that he engaged in a “course of conduct” 

as required for harassment under subsection 2709(a)(3).

The Commonwealth responds that “a course of conduct can be based on 

words alone, and that intent to harass may be inferred from the totality of the 

circumstances.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 20 (quoting In re M.J.M., 858 A.2d 

1259, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2004)). It details Coniker’s interactions with Chief 

Sentner: Coniker refused to give the consecrated host to Chief Sentner, 

“assumed a defiant posture and forced the Chief to reach into his pocket to

retrieve the host,” resisted Chief Sentner’s attempts to remove him from the 

church, and complained about other grievances with the church and with Chief 

Sentner once he was arrested. Id. at 20–23. The Commonwealth concludes 

that Coniker could have avoided the whole situation by simply consuming or 

surrendering the host. Id. at 23.

In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for harassment of Chief 

Sentner, we first note that the Wheaton, Bender, and Battaglia cases were 

decided under prior versions of the harassment statute, which required the 

Commonwealth to prove that a defendant, with intent to harass, annoy, or 

alarm another person, “engage[d] in a course of conduct or repeatedly 

commit[ted] acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which 

serve no legitimate purpose.” Bender, 375 A.2d at 357 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2709(3) (amended)6). Presently, subsection 2709(a)(3) does not require 

____________________________________________

6 Act No. 1999-59 (S.B. No. 167), effective Feb. 13, 2000, removed the “which 

alarm or seriously annoy such other person” phrase.
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the Commonwealth to prove that the victim was contacted, let alone alarmed 

or seriously annoyed. Commonwealth v. Collins, 2022 PA Super 195, ___ 

A.3d ____, 2022 WL 17073286, at *4–5 (Pa. Super. Nov. 18, 2022). 

Therefore, the Commonwealth was not required to prove that Coniker’s 

actions actually offended Chief Sentner. As such, Bender’s discussion of a 

police officer’s ability to be alarmed or annoyed is not relevant to the elements 

of the present version of Section 2709(a)(3).

This leaves the two disputed elements: whether Coniker intended to 

harass, annoy, or alarm another7 and whether he engaged in a course of 

conduct or repeatedly committed acts that served no legitimate purpose. To 

prove specific intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another, the Commonwealth 

must show that it was Coniker’s “conscious object to engage in conduct of that 

nature or to cause such a result.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(1)(i). Such an intent

“may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” Cox, supra.

We find the evidence to be insufficient to prove Coniker’s intent. As in 

Battaglia, Coniker’s actions while Chief Sentner questioned and arrested him 

were “responsive, not provocative.” While Coniker’s refusal to surrender the 

consecrated host could reflect any number of intentions, it is not clear how it 

____________________________________________

7 The Commonwealth explained that Chief Sentner was the victim for this 

count. For mens rea purposes, nothing in the statute requires the named 

victim to be the person the defendant intended to harass, annoy, or alarm. 

Nevertheless, it is logical to consider Coniker’s actions related to Chief Sentner 

in determining whether he had the requisite intent. The Commonwealth did 

not name the priest or members of the congregation as victims at trial.
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would reflect an intent to harass.8 And although Coniker’s repeatedly asking 

Chief Sentner why he didn’t respond to his meeting request was undoubtedly 

annoying, nothing supports the inference that Coniker had the conscious 

object to cause this result; like the homeowner in Wheaton, Coniker was 

seeking redress from an authority figure for a perceived wrong.

Therefore, we reverse Coniker’s conviction in the Church Case for 

harassment of Chief Sentner. As the Commonwealth concedes that the 

evidence is insufficient to prove the charge of harassment against Officer Dold, 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 24, we will also reverse Coniker’s conviction in the 

Church Case for harassment of Officer Dold.

Church Case – Disorderly Conduct

We next address the sufficiency of the evidence for Coniker’s conviction 

of disorderly conduct in the Church Case. This relates to his decision during 

Holy Communion to remove the host from his mouth and keep it despite the 

admonitions of the eucharistic minister and the priest.9 Coniker emphasizes 

that he did not physically act out or fight back when he removed and retained 

the host, characterizing his actions as only “morally offensive to some.” 

Coniker’s Brief at 45. The Commonwealth responds that Coniker created a 

____________________________________________

8

It is telling that the charge for which Chief Sentner arrested Coniker—theft 

of the host from the sanctuary—was dismissed at the preliminary hearing.

9 Although the actions analyzed herein occurred during a Mass in a Catholic 

church, there is no religious dispute so intertwined as to prevent resolution of 

this issue based on neutral legal principles. Connor v. Archdiocese of 

Phila., 975 A.2d 1084 (Pa. 2009); see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
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hazardous or physically offensive condition by disrupting Mass and forcing the 

priest to summon the congregation to surround him. Commonwealth’s Brief 

at 11–18.

As above, the Commonwealth can sustain its conviction for disorderly 

conduct with evidence that Coniker either had “intent to cause public 

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm” or “recklessly create[ed] a risk thereof” 

and that he “create[d] a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any 

act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5503(a)(4).

Here, the record supports the inference that Coniker was reckless that 

his conduct would create a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. 

Coniker’s testimony demonstrates that he understood the significance of 

removing the consecrated host from his mouth and the alarm that it would 

cause. N.T., Trial, 8/18/21, at 30, 35. He refused to return it despite 

commands from the eucharistic minister and the priest. Under these facts, it 

is reasonable to infer that Coniker was reckless as to the risk of his actions.

Likewise, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Coniker created a 

hazardous condition. In church, receiving Communion during morning Mass, 

Coniker removed the host from his mouth, aware of the grave nature of doing 

so. He then refused the directives of the priest and eucharistic minister to 

consume or surrender the host. Instead, he held onto the host, causing the 

worshipers to surround him and summon the police. The setting is akin to the 

emotionally charged atmosphere of the church in Roth and the courtroom in 
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Love. Coniker caused and then escalated a tense situation, where a group of 

people closed in on him, creating the risk that someone would be injured. 

Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove that Coniker caused a 

hazardous condition.

Coniker also disputes that he had “no legitimate purpose” for his actions, 

characterizing his actions as a private decision made in search of spiritual 

guidance. Coniker’s Brief at 49. A legitimate purpose refers to “conduct which 

is lawful and constitutionally protected.” Roth, 531 A.2d at 1137 (citing 

Duncan, 363 A.2d at 808). Coniker does not argue how his decision to accept 

the host and then remove it—while believing such to be grounds for 

excommunication—is legitimate. Rather, Coniker’s disruptive actions caused 

the priest to direct the other people in church to surround him to prevent the 

host from being removed from the church. Because the evidence supports 

that Coniker had no legitimate purpose, it is sufficient to prove disorderly 

conduct in the Church Case. Having found the evidence sufficient to prove 

every element of disorderly conduct, we affirm this conviction.

Conclusion

We hold that under the collateral consequences doctrine, Coniker’s

direct appeal from his judgment of sentence is not moot. Because Coniker’s 

convictions for summary offenses could damage his reputation, there is a 

present case or controversy to resolve in this appeal. We therefore address 

Coniker’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence as described above.
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In the Office Case, CP-02-CR-0006879-2018, No. 24 WDA 2022: 

Judgments of sentence affirmed.

In the Church Case, CP-02-CR-0014079-2018, No. 23 WDA 2022:

Judgment of sentence affirmed at Count 1, disorderly conduct. Judgments of 

sentence vacated and convictions reversed at Count 3, harassment and at 

Count 4, harassment. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/15/2023