J-S70034-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

NARO ENTERPRISES, INC. 

Appellant

v.

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE 

GROUP & CHRISTOPHER SLEZAK

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 875 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered June 30, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2009-10981

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2018

Naro Enterprises, Inc. (Naro) appeals from the order entered on June 

30, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County denying summary 

judgment in favor of Naro and granting summary judgment in favor of Great 

American Insurance Group (Great American).1 In this appeal, Naro claims the 

trial court erred in determining that because Naro’s stolen trailer was not in 

“transit” at the time of the theft, it was not covered under Great American’s 

insurance policy. After a thorough review of the submission by the parties, 

relevant law, and the certified record, we affirm.

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1 This matter was appealed prematurely in 2015, as the grant of summary 

judgment did not address any of the claims against Slezak. That appeal was 

discontinued. On May 19, 2017, Naro discontinued all claims, with prejudice, 

against Slezak. This action made the June 30, 2015 order appealable. The 

instant appeal was timely commenced on June 2, 2017.
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The underlying facts of this matter are not in dispute. Naro is a trucking 

company that was insured by a policy issued by Great American. At issue is 

the interpretation of the definitions of “transit” and “transit ends” as found in 

the insurance policy. We will discuss these definitions after we relate the 

factual history of the occurrence at issue.

On May 8, 2008, beginning at approximately 8:00 a.m., a driver for 

Naro picked up a trailer loaded with steel rods from Sandvick Materials. These 

steel rods were to be delivered to a location in Houston, Texas. Prior to setting 

out for Texas, the driver returned to the Naro location at approximately noon 

on May 8, 2008, to allow for a pre-trip inspection. Some damage to the trailer 

was discovered and an independent welder was brought to the Naro site to 

make the needed repair. This repair was done on May 10, 2008. The laden 

trailer remained at the Naro site in anticipation of continuing the delivery trip 

on Monday, May 12, 2008. The trailer was last seen at Naro on Sunday, May 

11, 2008, sometime after noon. There is no dispute that at least 75 hours 

passed from the time the trailer arrived at Naro until it was last seen at Naro. 

At approximately 1:00 a.m., Monday, May 12, 2008, at least 85 hours after 

arrival at Naro, the trailer and the steel rods were discovered to have been 

stolen. 

On May 13, 2008, Naro submitted a claim to Great American seeking in 

excess of $210,000.00 for the goods. Ultimately, Great American denied the 

claim, asserting coverage was only provided for such goods while in transit. 

Great American further asserted that transit ended after 72 hours passed with 
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the trailer at the Naro site. The denial of the claim led to this litigation and 

the appeal currently before us.

As noted above, there is no dispute that the trailer in question, laden 

with the steel rods destined for Houston, remained at the Naro location for 

more than 72 hours. There is no dispute that transit of the steel rods had 

begun when the trailer left Sandvick. What is at dispute is, if and when that 

transit ended.

We quote the relevant definitions found in the Great American insurance 

policy.

Covered Property means property of others that you have 

accepted for transportation as a motor carrier under your tariff 

and bill of lading or other written contract.

We cover property only while it is:

a. contained in or on a land vehicle while in “transit” and/or 

during “loading” and “unloading”[2]

See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, Policy, Motor Truck 

Cargo Coverage Form, at 1.

“Transit” begins with the actual movement of the goods from point 

of shipment bound for a specific destination. It remains in transit 

during the ordinary, reasonable and necessary stops, 

interruptions, delays or transfers incidental to the route and 

method of shipment.

“Transit” ends when any of the following occurs:

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2 Words in quotation marks are separately defined in the policy.
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1. Covered Property is accepted by, or on behalf of, the consignee 

at the intended destination or at any intermediate point short 

of the original intended destination; or

2. seventy-two hours after arrival at destination; or

3. any other stop that exceeds seventy-two hours.

Id. at 5-6.

We note that when viewing the policy, the two “Transit” definitions are 

separate entries; they are not part of the same entry.

Our analysis is guided by the following principles of law.

Th[e] scope of review of an order granting summary

judgment is plenary. Our standard of review is clear: the 

trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is 

established that the court committed an error of law or 

clearly abused its discretion. Summary judgment is 

appropriate only in those cases where the record clearly 

demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. The reviewing court must view the record in 

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving 

all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material 

fact against the moving party. When the facts are so clear 

that reasonable minds cannot differ, a trial court may 

properly enter summary judgment.

Valentino v. Phila. Triathlon, LLC, 150 A.3d 483, 490 (Pa. 

Super. 2016) (citing Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 

571 Pa. 580, 812 A.2d 1218, 1221-22 (2002)).

Moreover,

the non-moving party must adduce sufficient evidence on 

an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the 

burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in 

his favor. Failure to adduce this evidence establishes that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Ertel v. Patriot-News Company, 544 Pa. 93, 674 A.2d 1038, 

1042 (1996).

When reviewing an insurance contract on appeal, we note that our 

Court's scope of review is plenary. Cresswell v. Pennsylvania 

National Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 820 A.2d 172 (Pa. Super. 

2003).

Moreover,

[i]n interpreting the terms of an insurance contract, the 

appellate court examines the contract in its entirety, giving 

all of the provisions their proper effect. The court's goal is 

to determine the intent of the parties as exhibited by the 

contract provisions. In furtherance of its goal, the court 

must accord the contract provisions their accepted 

meanings, and it cannot distort the plain meaning of the 

language to find an ambiguity. Moreover, it will not find a 

particular provision ambiguous simply because the parties 

disagree on the proper construction; if possible, it will read 

the provision to avoid an ambiguity.

Burton v. Republic Ins. Co., 845 A.2d 889, 893 (Pa. Super. 

2004).

Brown v. Everett Cash Mutual Insurance Company, 157 A.3d 958, 962 

(Pa. Super. 2017).

The underlying issue is straightforward, was the trailer and the cargo in 

transit at the time of loss, or had the transit ended. Naro argues that the 

trailer and cargo were in transit pursuant to the definition of “Transit” found 

in the policy. Specifically, Naro claims the repair of the trailer was a necessary 

interruption or delay, and therefore, the trailer and cargo were still in transit 

when the cargo was stolen, and thus Great American is required to indemnify 

the loss. Further, Naro claims that the 72-hour limit imposed in the definition 

of “Transit ends” does not apply. Naro posits that condition number 3, which 
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states that transit ends when “any other stop exceeds 72 hours”, applies to 

stops “other” than those stops that are “ordinary, reasonable and necessary” 

pursuant to the definition of “Transit” found in the preceding policy definition.

Countering Naro’s argument, both Great American and the trial court 

assert the 72-hour limit set in the definition of “Transit ends” is clear and 

unambiguous. Because the trailer and cargo had been at rest for more than 

72 hours, it was no longer in transit and, therefore, no longer covered by the 

insurance policy. Both Great American and the trial court cite Inter City 

Express v. Canal Indemnity Company, 709 So.2d 1021 (La. App. 4th Cir. 

1998) to support that interpretation. The Canal Indemnity policy, as related 

in that decision, has similar, but not identical, language regarding a 72-hour 

delay.3

However, the 72-hour provision was not directly at issue in Inter City 

Express. There, the trial court found no coverage because the trailer at issue 

was not attached to a tractor at the time of loss. Accordingly, the lost cargo 

in Inter City was not, by definition, “covered cargo.” Nonetheless, the 

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3 As related in Inter City Express, the 72-hour clause in the Canal Indemnity 

policy stated:

“[c]argo on a vehicle at a terminal, garage or depot for more than 

seventy-two hours (excluding Sundays and holidays) from the 

time the vehicle arrives at the terminal, garage or depot” is not 

covered.

Id. at 1023.
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Louisiana Appellate Court found nothing ambiguous about the 72-hour 

exclusion. Rather, it stated, 

A reading of the various provisions simply means that cargo is 

insured if it is on a scheduled vehicle or a trailer attached to a 

scheduled vehicle or at a location scheduled on the declarations 

page. And, coverage, if it existed, will cease if the cargo is left at 

the terminal, garage or depot for more than seventy-two hours. 

It would make no sense for us to reform the policy to say that 

cargo left at the terminal or garage less than seventy-two hours 

is covered, regardless of the policy definition of “covered cargo.”

Id. at 1023.

We agree with this reasoning, as far as it is applicable to the instant 

policy. However, neither the argument of Great American nor the rationale of

the trial court, nor the discussion in the Inter City Express decision,

expressly addresses Naro’s argument and the instant policy’s use of the word 

“other” in regards to “any other stop that exceeds seventy-two hours.” 

Our reading of the policy convinces us that the definition of “Transit 

ends” includes three types of stop. First, when the cargo is accepted by the 

consignee. Second, when 72 hours expires after the arrival of the cargo at 

the destination. See Definition of “Transit ends”, 1 and 2. The third definition 

of transit ending is when any “other” stop takes places that exceeds 72 hours. 

Accordingly, “other” as used in the definition of “Transit ends” refers to the 

immediately preceding conditions 1 and 2, and not, as Naro contends, to the

ordinary, reasonably and necessary stop referred to in the definition of 

“Transit begins.” 
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This interpretation leads to an unambiguous reading of the policy, 

similar to the result found in Inter City Express. Relevant to this matter, 

cargo is covered as long as it is in transit. Transit includes any ordinary, 

reasonable and necessary stop, as long as that stop is less than 72 hours long. 

Once a stop lasts more than 72 hours, transit has ended, and coverage for the 

cargo ceases.4 

In light of the foregoing, we find no error of law or abuse of discretion 

in the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Great American.

Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/20/2018

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4 The trailer did not pass inspection and was required to be repaired before 

the journey could continue. Allowable stops under the definition of “Transit” 

must be ordinary, reasonable and necessary. All three conditions must be 

met for the cargo to remain in transit. While the stop to perform the repair 

on the trailer would have been necessary, it is unclear if this repair, requiring 

the hiring of an outside welder to make the trailer travel-worthy, could be 

considered “ordinary” under the policy definition.