Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04

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### MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

A TTORNEY FOR A PPELLANT Cara Schaefer Wieneke Wieneke Law Office, LLC Brooklyn, Indiana A TTORNEY S FOR A PPELLEE Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Attorney General of Indiana Caryn N. Szyper Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana



### I N T H E 

# COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeffery L. Taylor , Appellant

- Defendant,

v.


### State of Indiana , Appellee

- Plaintiff

. April 25, 2017 Court of Appeals Ca se No. 84A04

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Robb , Judge
.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04

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# Case Summary and Issue

[1] Following a jury trial, Jeffrey Taylor was convicted of battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Leve l 5 felony. On appeal, Taylor raises the sole issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Concluding the State presented sufficient evidence, we affirm Taylor’s conviction.



# Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts most favorabl e to the verdict reveal that o n September 5, 2015, Taylor and his girlfriend, Aurora Garcia, began drinking malt liquor around 12:00 p.m.
A fter drinking all day, Taylor became angry and verbally abusive during an argument that evening

. Taylor then grabbe d a knife and tried to stab Garcia, but she blocked his attempt with her left wrist. The knife left a gash in Garcia’s left wrist and she was “bleeding all over the place.” Transcript , Volume 1 at 8. Garcia wanted to call an ambulance, but Taylor had ta ken her phone and would not let her leave or call for help. Garcia attempted to stop the bleeding with toilet paper and a rag, but was unsuccessful. Taylor then told Garcia they were going to bed; she waited for him to fall asleep and ran to her neighbor ’s house to call the police. When law enforcement arrived, Garcia told them Taylor stabbed her.

[3] The State charged Taylor with criminal confinement, a Level 3 felony ; battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony ; and domestic battery, a Class A
mi sdemeanor. At trial and on cross

- examination, Taylor’s attorney elicitedCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04

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testimony from Garcia concerning her physical and mental health. Garcia testified she has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, autism, bipolar disorder, and that she often has trouble remembering things. While at the hospital several hours after calling the police, Garcia had a blood alcohol content of 0.161. When asked why she did not tell the 911 operator she had been stabbed or request a paramedic, Garcia responded, “[y]ou have to understand I was drunk that day, I could of said something, I don’t even remember what happened from that date to now. I don’t even remember what I did yesterday and people want me to remember what I did eight . . . months ago.” Id. at 22. Taylor’s att orney and Garcia also engaged in colloquy that went as follows:
[Counsel]: So what you are telling this jury is that you really

don’t remember everything that happened? [Garcia]: Yes I am. [Counsel]: And what you’re telling the jury is, is that they can’t

believe that your testimony is one

- hundred percent accurate, right?

. . . [Garcia]: Yes.

Id. at 38. Taylor’s attorney also asked Garcia if her recollection of the events was mistaken, and Garcia responded, “ [No,] I had been stabbed.” Id. at 22. In addition, Taylor’ s attorney asked Garcia why she lied to the police, telling them Taylor arrived at her house around 11:00 p.m. Garcia responded that her housing situation does not permit others to live with her, so she told the police Taylor was just visiting.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04

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[4] A jury found Taylor guilty of battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony, and the trial court sentenced Taylor to five years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Taylor now appeals. Additional facts will be added
as necessary.


# Di scussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[5] In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to su pport a conviction , we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Wright v. State , 828 N.E.2d 904, 905

- 06 (Ind. 2005). It is the job of the fact

- finder to determine whether the ev idence in a particular case sufficiently proves each element of an offense, and we consider conflicting evidence mo st favorably to the trial court’ s ruling. Id. at 906.



## II. Incredible Dubiosity

[6] Taylor’s sole contention on appeal is that Garcia’s testimon y was incredibly dubious and, as such, there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Our supreme court has explained the incredible dubiosity rule as follows:
Appellate courts may impinge upon a jury’ s function to judge the credibility of a wi tness

. . . by applying the “incredible d ubiosity” rule. Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is limited to cases with very specific circumstances because we are extremelyCourt of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04

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hesitant to invade the province of the jury.

. . . [T]o warrant applicatio n of the incredible dubiosity rule, there must be: 1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete abse nce of circumstantial evidence.

Smith v. State , 34 N.E.3d 1211, 1221 (Ind. 2015) (citations and some internal quotations omitted). Although not impossible, the “incredible dubiosity” test is a difficult standard to meet and requires great ambiguity and inconsistency in the evidence. Moore v. State , 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (In d. 2015 ). “The testimony must be so convoluted and/or contrary to human experience that no reasonable person could believe it.” Id. (citation omitted).

[7] The incredible dubiosity rule does not apply to Garcia’s testimony because her testimony was not so co nvoluted or contrary to human experience such that no reasonable person could believe it. Garcia’s testimony was not inherently contradictory, as she never wavered in her claim Taylor stabbed her. Cf. Gaddis
v. State , 253 Ind. 73, 80, 25 1 N.E.2d 658, 66 1

- 6 2 (1969) (holding “[w]here the state’s chief prosecuting witness, by his own admission is unsure as to the identity of the criminal, and where other evidence or lack thereof would support such uncertainty . . . such identification, as a matter of law, is insufficient evidence”). When the police arrived on the evening of September 5, 2015, Garcia told them Taylor stabbed her, and her allegation remained the same all the way through trial. As to why she was untruthful with the police regarding when Taylor arrived to her apartment , Garcia explained her concerns about being evicted if her landlord discovered Taylor had been living with her.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04

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[8] Moreover, we cannot say Garcia’s mental health diagnoses and level of intoxication make her testimony incredibly dubiou s. Garcia openly discussed her numerous diagnoses and acknowledged her high blood alcohol content and struggles to remember all the details of the evening. The potential uncertainty of Garcia’s testimony “was put squarely before the jury, [and] the jury had the ability to perform its role as a trier of fact and determine the extent to which it affected the integrity of [ her ] testimony.” Edwards v. State , 753 N.E.2d 618, 623 (Ind. 2001). Therefore, we cannot conclude Garcia’s testimony was incredibly dub ious.



# Conclusion

[9] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Taylor’s conviction. According ly , we affirm.

[10] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur

.