J-S02014-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANTWAIN WELLS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1034 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0000120-2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: Filed: April 8, 2021

Appellant, Antwain Wells, appeals from the judgment of sentence of 20-

50 years’ imprisonment, imposed after a jury convicted him of involuntary 

deviate sexual intercourse with a person less than 16 years of age (IDSI), 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7); aggravated indecent assault of a person less than 16 

years of age, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(8); and unlawful contact with a minor as 

a sexual offense, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1). We affirm. 

The trial court summarized the background of this case as follows:

Procedural History

On April 23, 2019, Appellant ... proceeded to trial before this 

[c]ourt, sitting without a jury. He was convicted of [the abovestated offenses]. Sentencing was deferred for a presentence 

report and mental health evaluation.

A sentencing memorandum, with exhibits, was filed by counsel for 

Appellant on October 16, 2019. A sentencing memorandum, with 

exhibits, was filed by the Commonwealth on October 17, 2019.
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On October 18, 2019, Appellant was sentenced to 8-20 years[’] 

incarceration on the IDSI conviction[,] 8-20 years[’] incarceration 

on the [u]nlawful [c]ontact with a [m]inor conviction, and 4-10 

years[’] incarceration on the [a]ggravated [i]ndecent [a]ssault 

conviction. All of the sentences were imposed consecutively, for 

an aggregate sentence of 20-50 years[’ imprisonment].

On October 25, 2019, Appellant filed a timely motion for 

reconsideration of sentence. That motion was denied by operation 

of law on February 24, 2020. 

A timely notice of appeal was filed on March 12, 2020. 

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2) and (3), the [c]ourt entered an 

order on June 8, 2020, directing the filing of a [s]tatement of 

[e]rrors complained of on [a]ppeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), 

not later than [21] days after entry of the order, or after 

preparation of all necessary transcripts. 

A timely [Rule] 1925(b) statement of errors was filed on July 7, 

2020.[1, 2]

____________________________________________

1 The trial court subsequently issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

2 The record does not conform to the trial court’s statements regarding its 

Rule 1925(b) order and Appellant’s response. Our review of the record shows 

that, on June 8, 2020, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise 

statement within 21 days after entry of its order, i.e., on or before June 29, 

2020, and warned that any issue not properly included in the statement, 

timely filed and served, would be deemed waived. See Rule 1925(b) Order, 

6/8/20, at 1. In that order, the court additionally directed that Appellant file 

within 10 days, a certification, with supporting documents, attesting that he 

ordered and paid for the relevant transcripts. Id. The court’s order also 

stated that, “upon filing of the foregoing certification, Appellant is granted 

leave to file a Supplemental Statement of Errors not later than [21] days after 

all ordered transcripts have been posted to the Court Reporting System....” 

Id. Subsequently, Appellant filed his certification on June 17, 2020, 

representing that he was still waiting for certain transcripts. He did not file a 

Rule 1925(b) statement until July 7, 2020, about a week after he said he 

received the transcripts. 

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was facially untimely; he did not file 

it within 21 days of the trial court’s order and then supplement it after he 
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Factual History 

Trial Evidence1

1 On [a]ppeal, Appellant only raises issues relating to 

sentencing. Accordingly, the recitation of the trial evidence 

will, for the most part, be limited to a summary of the 

conduct giving rise to the offenses or otherwise relevant to 

sentencing. 

The complainant, A.D., was a 15-year old, ninth grade high school 

student in November of 2017. She lived with her mother, and 

younger brother and sister. A.D. had an older sister who did not 

live with her. A.D. travel[ed] to and from school by trolley and 

bus. The trip to school took A.D. about an hour and a half. 

At the time of the incident, Appellant had been the boyfriend of 

A.D’s[] mother for several years. Appellant lived with A.D. and 

her family at a prior address, but he was not living with them at 

____________________________________________

received the transcripts, as directed. However, the docket does not set forth 

the date of service of the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order. Pa.R.Crim.P.

114(C)(2) (providing that docket entries shall contain, inter alia, the date of 

service or court notice). Consequently, we cannot conclude that Appellant 

failed to timely comply with the court’s order and, therefore, we do not find 

waiver. See Commonwealth v. Andrews, 213 A.3d 1004, 1009-10 (Pa. 

Super. 2019) (“[I]f the [trial court] docket does not show that notice of the 

entry of a Rule 1925(b) order was provided to an appellant, then we will not 

conclude that the appellant’s issues have been waived for failure to file a Rule 

1925(b) statement. The fact that the appellant actually received notice of the 

Rule 1925(b) order is irrelevant if the docket does not reflect that notice was 

sent.”) (cleaned up); Commonwealth v. Chester, 163 A.3d 470, 472 (Pa. 

Super. 2017) (“Based upon the lack of recordation in the docket, we are 

unable to determine the date of service of the Order, as required under 

Criminal Rule 114, and cannot conclude that [the appellant] failed to comply 

with the ... court’s directive to file a concise statement.”). Moreover, even if 

the docket indicated proper service, we would still not find Appellant’s issue

waived due to his untimely Rule 1925(b) statement. It is well-established 

that, “if there has been an untimely filing, this [c]ourt may decide the appeal 

on the merits if the trial court had adequate opportunity to prepare an opinion 

addressing the issues being raised on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 

973 A.2d 428, 433 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc). Thus, Appellant’s untimely 

filing of his Rule 1925(b) statement is of no moment here. 
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their then[-]current address. Although Appellant was not her 

biological father, A.D. called Appellant “Dad” for a time. 

On the morning of November 29, 2017, A.D. left home to catch 

the trolley to school. While walking to the trolley, Appellant called 

out to A.D. from his car and offered her a ride to school. While en 

route, Appellant told A.D. [that] he had to make a stop. He pulled 

into a parking area and left the car for about two minutes, while 

A.D. remained in the car playing a game on her phone.

Upon returning to the car, Appellant spoke on his phone for a 

minute, and then locked the car doors. Feeling uncomfortable, 

A.D. started talking nervously about the game she was playing, to 

which Appellant responded, [“Y]ou’re not advanced enough for the 

game I want to play.[”] Appellant then said to A.D.: “[Y]ou’re 

about to suck my dick.” When A.D. said she was not, Appellant 

pulled out a screwdriver, which he held to A.D.’s neck. He then 

demanded that A.D. perform oral sex. Appellant pulled his pants 

down[,] and A.D. then proceeded to do so. As she was describing 

these events at trial, A.D. stopped and asked the [c]ourt[,] “[C]an 

we take a break?”

At some point, Appellant told A.D. to pull her pants down and then 

to get in the back seat of the car, which she did. Appellant went 

to the back seat with A.D., said he was going to make her vagina 

wet[,] and proceeded to put his mouth on her vagina. Appellant 

then placed his fingers in A.D.’s vagina, before attempting to place 

his penis in her vagina. Appellant’s efforts were extremely painful 

to A.D.[,] and he was not able to insert his penis into her vagina. 

Appellant then ordered A.D. to turn around and he stood behind 

her, outside the car, as she lay face-down on the back seat, with 

her lower body outside of the car.

Appellant then inserted his penis into A.D.’s rectum and proceeded 

to move it back and forth inside her. Appellant then made A.D. 

suck his penis again, at which point he ejaculated.

Appellant then ordered A.D. into the back seat of the car, and told 

her to lie flat. At some point[,] she climbed back into the front 

seat. Appellant then drove A.D. to school and dropped her about 

a block from school. On the way, Appellant asked A.D. if she was 

mad at him and told her that if she said anything he will [sic] kill

her mother. Appellant then gave A.D. $12 or $13. He also told 

A.D. that if she didn’t say anything, he would give her money and 

get her the iPhone he knew she wanted. 
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When A.D. arrived at school, she told her older sister, who was 

also a student there, that a friend had been raped and that the 

man threatened to kill her mother, and asked for advice on what 

to do. Her sister advised A.D. to tell the friend to tell someone, 

then they parted. After about 20 minutes, A.D. texted her sister 

that the friend was actually her. Also, while A.D. was in school, 

Appellant was texting her that she was a liar. He continued to 

text A.D., saying he was sorry, then calling her a liar and 

reminding her of a deal she had made, apparently referring to 

getting her the iPhone and giving her money if she didn’t tell 

anyone what happened.

A.D. left school and went with her sister to her sister’s 

godmother’s house. From there[,] the police were called. A.D. 

was taken to the hospital for an examination and [was] later 

interviewed by the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance.... Appellant’s 

DNA was found in ... A.D.’s pants and underwear, with protein from 

seminal fluid.

Sentencing 

Prior to sentencing, the [c]ourt received the [p]re[-s]entence 

[i]nvestigation [r]eport, the [m]ental [h]ealth [e]valuation, and 

the sentencing memorandum of each side. Additionally, the 

[c]ourt heard the arguments of counsel, heard from Appellant’s 

mother, and heard a letter written by A.D. Appellant declined the 

opportunity for allocution.

A.D.’s letter was read at sentencing as follows:

Dear Judge Campbell, my name is [A.D.], and I’m about to 

be 17 years old. Currently, I’m living in the foster care 

system after I was sexually abused by [Appellant] just after 

my 15th birthday. I’m here today because I want you to 

know how it[ has] affected my life so that you understand 

why I would like to see [Appellant] locked up for as long as 

possible. I met [Appellant] from my mother. That was her 

boyfriend and I knew him for some time. My mom didn’t 

have a job so every time she needed money[,] she would 

run to him. He used to pay most of the bills. When there 

was no food in the house, he’d bring us food. As time went 

on, we got really close and we developed a bond. I called 

him dad and I really trusted him. When the assault 

happened, it took a toll on my life. I became very depressed 

and not myself. I was happier before. I now have my wall 

up and I find it hard to trust people. I always feel mad now 
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and I’m easily irritated. I didn’t think about what people 

thought of me before, but now I have to. I could wear what 

I wanted and not be worried. Now I feel very sensitive and 

cry very easily. Since this happened[,] I don’t like being 

home alone. I can’t be around men without feeling 

uncomfortable. It’s affected my ability to be in a 

relationship because when other men try to touch me[,] I 

think of [Appellant]. I also get triggered by shows and 

hearing other stories of sexual assault. Before this 

happened[,] I was living with my family and not feeling like 

an orphan. Now I am in foster care where I worry about 

where I’m going to live and who I’m going to live with. I 

haven’t seen my younger sister or brother for two years. I 

think they’re mad at me for telling the truth about what 

happened. This changed my relationship with my mother 

too. I am unable to forgive her for not believing me and 

putting things in people’s head[s] about me that weren’t 

true. This ruined her too because now she’s homeless, sad, 

and saying she wants to kill herself. It[ has] led to her 

depression and need for medication. She hasn’t been able 

to recover enough to do what’s needed so that we can go 

home if we wanted to. When I found out that I had to testify 

in front of the judge, the man that did this to me, and 

everybody, I felt really scared and emotional. I didn’t want 

to talk about it. I wanted to push it to the back of my head 

and pretend it never happened. When I found out I had to 

testify, I felt broke[n]. I wanted to kill myself. I felt that 

everyone will [sic] look at me different[ly]. It was really 

stressful. I didn’t want to see his face. I was also scared to 

testify because [Appellant] told me that if I said anything[,] 

there would be consequences. He said he would kill my 

family and even if he was in jail[,] he knew people to do his 

dirty work. The reason I did testify is because I wanted 

[Appellant] to be in jail. I don’t want him on the street. I 

know what kind of person he is, and I didn’t want him out 

there, out so that he could do this to other people like his 

nieces and nephews. I was scared but I had to get through 

it because I needed him to pay for what he did. He’s messed 

up my whole life and I don’t know if I’ll ever feel normal 

again. Thank you for taking this into consideration when 

sentencing [Appellant]. [Signed, A.D.]
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Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 8/3/20, at 1-6 (internal citations omitted; most 

brackets added). 

On appeal, Appellant raises a single issue for our review:

Did not the lower court impose a manifestly excessive and 

unreasonable sentence of 20 to 50 years[’] confinement, which 

was contrary to the fundamental norms that underlie the 

sentencing process and to a specific provision of the Pennsylvania 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9721(b), which requires in part 

that a sentencing court consider a defendant’s background and 

rehabilitative needs?

Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

Appellant’s claim implicates the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v. 

Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke 

this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

[the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the] 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006), 

appeal denied, ... 909 A.2d 303 ([Pa.] 2006). Objections to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they 

are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify 

the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788,

794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, ... 831 A.2d 599 ([Pa.] 

2003).

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must 

be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 

925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question 
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exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument 

that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent 

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 

Sierra, supra at 912–13.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

Here, the record demonstrates that Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal, properly preserved this claim in his post-sentence motion, and 

included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief in compliance with our 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, we proceed to determining whether 

Appellant has raised a substantial question to meet the fourth requirement of 

the four-part test set forth above. 

Appellant advances in his Rule 2119(f) statement that the trial court 

“imposed a manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence that runs 

contrary to the fundamental norms that underlie the sentencing process and 

misapplied provisions of ... 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b)[,] and the Sentencing Code, 

204 Pa. Code § 303.13.” Appellant’s Brief at 12; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9721(b) (providing general standards for sentencing); 204 Pa. Code § 303.13 

(addressing guideline sentence recommendations for aggravated and 

mitigated circumstances). He says that “[t]he lower court imposed a statutory 

maximum sentence of 50 years (with a minimum of 20 years or 240 months), 

outside of the Sentencing Guidelines, based solely on the nature of the crime 

and ignored both Appellant’s mitigation and rehabilitative needs.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 12-13. We determine that Appellant’s claim that the trial court 
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imposed a manifestly excessive sentence, based solely on the nature of the 

crime he committed and outside of the Sentencing Guidelines, raises a 

substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 152 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (“In [the a]ppellant’s [Rule] 2119(f) statement[,] he alleges that 

the trial court imposed a manifestly excessive sentence and focused solely on 

the serious nature of the crimes he committed. We find that [the a]ppellant 

has raised a substantial question....”) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. 

Hanson, 856 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2004) (“Under 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 

9781(c)(3), a claim that ‘the sentencing court sentenced outside the 

sentencing guidelines,’ ... presents ... a substantial question.”) (citation 

omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(3) (“The appellate court shall vacate 

the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if 

it finds ... the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines 

and the sentence is unreasonable.”). 

Accordingly, we will review the merits of Appellant’s claim, mindful of 

the following standard of review:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Johnson-Daniels, 167 A.3d 17, 28 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(citation omitted). 
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Further, our Supreme Court has stated:

Through the Sentencing Code, the General Assembly has enacted 

a process by which defendants are to be sentenced. As a 

threshold matter, a sentencing court may select one or more 

options with regard to determining the appropriate sentence to be 

imposed upon a defendant. These options include probation, guilt 

without further penalty, partial confinement, and total 

confinement. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a). In making this selection, the 

Sentencing Code offers general standards with respect to the 

imposition of sentence which require the sentencing court to 

impose a sentence that is “consistent with the protection of the 

public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the 

life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative 

needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Thus, sentencing 

is individualized; yet, the statute is clear that the court must also 

“consider” the sentencing guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania 

Commission on Sentencing. Id. If the court imposes a sentence 

outside of the sentencing guidelines, it must provide a written 

statement setting forth the reasons for the deviation and the 

failure to do so is grounds for resentencing.

The Sentencing Code also sets forth express standards regarding 

appellate review of a defendant’s sentence. As is apparent from 

the statutory provision setting forth the parameters of appellate 

review, the central focus of substantive appellate review with 

respect to a sentence outside of the guidelines is whether the 

sentence is “unreasonable”:

(c) Determination on appeal.—The appellate court shall 

vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing 

court with instructions if it finds:

***

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing 

guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

In all other cases[,] the appellate court shall affirm the 

sentence imposed by the sentencing court.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) (emphasis supplied).

In making this “unreasonableness” inquiry, the General Assembly 

has set forth four factors that an appellate court is to consider:
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(d) Review of record.—In reviewing the record the 

appellate court shall have regard for:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Thus, under the Sentencing Code[,] an appellate court is to 

exercise its judgment in reviewing a sentence outside the 

sentencing guidelines to assess whether the sentencing court 

imposed a sentence that is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c), 

(d).

Yet, what makes a sentence “unreasonable” is not defined in the 

statute. Generally speaking, “unreasonable” commonly connotes 

a decision that is “irrational” or “not guided by sound judgment.” 

The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2084 (2nd 

ed. 1987); see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903 (words to be construed according 

to their common and approved usage). While a general 

understanding of unreasonableness is helpful, in this context, it is 

apparent that the General Assembly has intended the concept of 

unreasonableness to be a fluid one, as exemplified by the four 

factors set forth in Section 9781(d) to be considered in making 

this determination. Indeed, based upon the very factors set out 

in Section 9781(d), it is clear that the General Assembly intended 

the concept of unreasonableness to be inherently a circumstancedependent concept that is flexible in understanding and lacking 

precise definition. Cf. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 

115 (2[d] Cir. 2005) (explaining concept or reasonableness in 

context of sentencing matters).

Thus, given its nature, we decline to fashion any concrete rules as 

to the unreasonableness inquiry for a sentence that falls outside 

of applicable guidelines under Section 9781(c)(3). We are of the 

view, however, that the Legislature intended that considerations 

found in Section 9721 inform appellate review for 

unreasonableness. That is, while a sentence may be found to be 

unreasonable after review of Section 9781(d)’s four statutory 
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factors, in addition a sentence may also be unreasonable if the 

appellate court finds that the sentence was imposed without 

express or implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the 

general standards applicable to sentencing found in Section 9721, 

i.e., the protection of the public; the gravity of the offense in 

relation to the impact on the victim and the community; and the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). 

Moreover, even though the unreasonableness inquiry lacks precise 

boundaries, we are confident that rejection of a sentencing court’s 

imposition of sentence on unreasonableness grounds would occur 

infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline 

ranges, especially when the unreasonableness inquiry is 

conducted using the proper standard of review.

Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 962-64 (Pa. 2007) (footnote 

omitted). 

Here, Appellant — who had a prior record score of zero and was 36 years 

old at the time of sentencing — complains that he received “virtually a life 

sentence[,] as the lower court’s fifty[-]year sentence likely extends beyond 

his life expectancy.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. He characterizes this sentence 

as “disproportionate and unreasonable.” Id. at 15. In addition, he states that 

the trial court sentenced him “based solely on the severity of the offense, 

despite [his] substantial rehabilitative needs due to his childhood trauma as a 

result of the extreme violence that he witnessed, the parental violence he 

endured, and his own alcohol abuse and unchecked bipolar disorder.” Id. 

In sentencing Appellant, the trial court explained:

This court has considered the arguments of both counsel, 

the presentence report, the mental health evaluation report, 

the sentencing guidelines form, the sentencing 

memorandums of both parties; this court[] considered the 

testimony of Linda Wells, [Appellant’s] mother; this court[]

considered the victim impact statement; this court[] also 

considered [Appellant’s] criminal history as a whole; this 
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court[] considered a number of mitigating factors including 

[Appellant’s] tragic personal history, his consistent work 

history, his good behavior and engagement while in custody 

so far; this court has also considered aggravating factors, 

which are numerous in this case. They include[,] but are 

not necessarily limited to[,] the impact on the victim in 

multiple ways. The circumstances of this offense are 

particularly troubling. Any rape case is troubling but this 

situation is distinguished from many other rapes in multiple 

ways that includes [Appellant’s] abuse of his custodial 

authority and trust to accomplish his crimes, his behavior of 

constant humiliation not only during the act but afterwards, 

his demonstrated manipulation, and his threats and 

everything that he did to keep this incident from coming to 

court. His behavior[] also confirms his lack of remorse, 

depravity of heart, and the danger that he does pose to 

society. [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs will require 

substantial confinement although that purpose, admittedly, 

will be overcome by the need to protect society.

N.T.[,] 10/18/19[, at] 31-32. 

The record is clear that the [c]ourt considered all relevant factors 

in imposing [the] sentence. The sentence imposed was not unduly 

harsh under the circumstances, and was based on careful 

consideration of the factors for sentencing under 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9721.

TCO at 7-8.3 

We discern no manifest abuse of discretion. Despite Appellant’s 

assertions, the trial court considered his background and rehabilitative needs

in rendering its sentence. We also point out that it reviewed Appellant’s presentence investigation report prior to sentencing him, and note that, “where 

the sentencing judge had the benefit of a pre[-]sentence investigation report, 

____________________________________________

3 We note that, for the most serious offenses, IDSI and unlawful contact with 

a minor, the parties agreed at sentencing that the offense gravity score was

a 12, and the guidelines were 48 to 66 months, plus or minus 12 months’ 

confinement. See TCO at 7 (citing N.T. at 4); Appellant’s Brief at 9. 
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it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information 

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along 

with mitigating statutory factors.” Boyer, 856 A.2d at 154 (citation omitted). 

In addition, the trial court provided a reasonable explanation for why it 

imposed a substantial term of imprisonment, noting the abuse of trust, 

threats, and remorselessness of Appellant, as well as the danger he poses to 

society. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not manifestly abuse 

its discretion in sentencing Appellant and, therefore, we affirm his judgment 

of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/8/21