IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER § 

OF THE BAR OF THE SUPREME § No. 111, 2022 

COURT OF DELAWARE, § 

 § 

ANDRE M. BEAUREGARD, § 

 § 

Respondent. § 

 

 Submitted: November 16, 2022 

Decided: January 23, 2023 

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 

Upon Review of the Report of the Board on Professional Responsibility. 

RECOMMENDATION ACCEPTED. TWO YEAR SUSPENSION IMPOSED 

WITH CONDITIONS. 

David A. White, Esquire, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, and Kathleen V. Vavala, 

Esquire, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 

Wilmington, Delaware. 

John S. Malik, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, for Respondent. 
2

PER CURIAM: 

A panel of the Board on Professional Responsibility (“Board”) found that the 

Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”) had established by clear and convincing 

evidence that Andre C. Beauregard, Esquire violated Rule 5.3(a)1 and thereby Rule 

3.5(c),2 Rule 5.3(c)(2),3 and Rule 8.4(c)4 of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct (“DLRPC”). The Board also concluded that the ODC had not 

established by clear and convincing evidence that Beauregard violated Rules 

5.3(c)(1)5 or 8.4(a).6 The violations arose from a private investigator’s post-trial 

contact with a juror without court permission and Beauregard’s statements to the 

Superior Court about the juror contact. 

1

 Rule 5.3(a) provides that “[w]ith respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated 

with a lawyer . . . a partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other 

lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to 

ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct 

is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.” 

2

 Rule 3.5(c) provides that a “lawyer shall not . . . communicate with a juror . . . after discharge of 

the jury unless the communication is permitted by court rule.” 

3

 Rule 5.3(c)(2) provides that a lawyer is responsible for the conduct of a nonlawyer retained by 

the lawyer if the nonlawyer’s conduct “would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 

if engaged in by a lawyer if . . . the lawyer . . . has direct supervisory authority over the person, 

and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to 

take reasonable remedial action.” 

4

 Rule 8.4(c) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” 

5

 Rule 5.3(c)(1) provides that a lawyer is responsible for the conduct of a nonlawyer retained by 

the lawyer if the nonlawyer’s conduct “would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 

if engaged in by a lawyer if . . . the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, 

ratifies the conduct involved.” 

6

 Rule 8.4(a) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate or attempt to 

violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so 

through the acts of another.” 
3

After a sanctions hearing, the Board recommended that Beauregard be 

suspended from the practice of law for two years with the opportunity to apply for 

limited reinstatement after one year to serve as counsel for indigent defendants in 

the Office of Conflicts Counsel (“OCC”) program and with the opportunity to apply 

for full reinstatement after two years. The ODC did not object to the Board’s 

findings or recommendations. Beauregard objects to the Board’s finding that he 

violated Rule 8.4(c) by making several knowing misstatements. He also argues that 

none of his misstatements were material to an issue before the court, he should not 

be subject to enhanced disciplinary penalties based on his disciplinary record 

because his prior violations were different, and the proposed sanction was 

excessively punitive and contrary to public policy. 

After our independent review of the Board’s recommendations, we agree with 

the Board’s findings and adopt the Board’s sanction recommendation. 

I. 

A. 

We recount what are, for the most part, undisputed facts. Beauregard was 

admitted to the Bar in 1986. He is a partner with Brown, Shiels, and Beauregard, 

LLC (“the Firm”). In 2019 and 2020, the Firm employed Christine Truitt as 

Beauregard’s secretary and paralegal. 
4

 Beauregard’s primary practice area is criminal defense. He has a contract with 

the OCC to represent indigent criminal defendants. About 60% of Beauregard’s 

workload are OCC cases and 40% are private cases. Before COVID-19, Beauregard 

was in court most days, usually for one to two hours in the morning and one to two 

hours in the afternoon. When in the courthouse, Beauregard regularly used his cell 

phone to communicate with Truitt by email. 

 In March 2019, Beauregard accepted a case from the OCC to represent Ahmir 

Bailey. The State charged Bailey with first-degree murder. On October 8, 2019, 

after a two-week trial, a Superior Court jury found Bailey guilty of first-degree 

murder. On October 14, 2019, Beauregard filed a motion for a new trial. He based 

the motion on possible juror bias stemming from a connection between a juror (“the 

Juror”) and Bailey’s co-defendant Eugene Riley. A secretary and a paralegal had 

discovered the possible connection by searching Facebook. 

B. 

 On October 18, 2019, Beauregard retained O’Rourke Investigative Associates 

(“ORIA”), a private investigative agency owned by Michael O’Rourke, to search for 

online evidence of a connection between the Juror and Riley. Although Beauregard 

had not previously used ORIA,7 the OCC and other criminal defense attorneys had 

7

 Beauregard typically used two other “old-school” investigators who lacked expertise to conduct 

online database searches needed in the Bailey case. Amended Appendix to Respondent’s Opening 

Brief (hereinafter “App. to Opening Br.”) at A467–70 (Liability Hr’g Tr.). 
5

regularly worked with ORIA and recommended ORIA to Beauregard. In an email 

copied to Beauregard, O’Rourke recognized that “[o]bviously we can’t speak to the 

juror or the co-defendants....”8 

After the OCC authorized ORIA’s cost estimate, O’Rourke conducted the 

online investigation. On October 31, 2019, O’Rourke called Truitt to inform her 

that he had identified twenty-five common Facebook friends between the Juror and 

Riley. He suggested that ORIA employee Andrew Stack interview twenty-two of 

the common friends with a Dover address. Stack was a retired Delaware State 

Trooper who joined ORIA in September 2019. 

In an October 31 email at 1:26 p.m. to Beauregard, Truitt summarized her 

telephone call with O’Rourke, including O’Rourke’s suggestion of in-person 

interviews of the twenty-two individuals: 

Mike O’Rourke called re our Bailey case. 

He has found 25 common friends on Facebook with Desan Riley and 

[the Juror]. He has addresses for 22 of them and found several that 

work in the mall here in Dover. 

He is sending his guy down one afternoon to try and speak with them 

to see what the relationship is. . . . 

The PI that is working on the case is Andy Stack. . . . 

[H]e asked for additional 1500 for him to complete this investigation.9

8

 App. to Opening Br. at A5. 

9

Id. at A59. 
6

Beauregard replied to Truitt at 1:29 p.m.: “Ok. See if we get get [sic] it done ...”10 

The OCC approved the additional cost in a 3:38 p.m. email to Truitt with a subject 

line reference “Authorization Request Approved.”11 A few minutes later, Truitt sent 

an email to O’Rourke at 3:44 p.m., with a copy to Beauregard, forwarding the OCC’s 

email authorizing the additional expense and conveying Beauregard’s approval to 

conduct the interviews: 

Hello Mike, 

Here is the authorization 

I informed Andre today of our conversation and he wants to have to 

[sic] move forward with the interviews of the 22 individuals.12

At 3:47 p.m., O’Rourke responded to this email, copying Beauregard and Stack, and 

asked: “One more question: am I permitted to speak to [] (the juror)?”13 O’Rourke 

raised the issue because Stack, who was new to ORIA, suggested to O’Rourke that 

the trial was over, meaning that it was permissible to contact jurors, and that made 

sense to O’Rourke.14 Truitt needed Beauregard to answer the question, so at 3:50 

p.m. she sent an email only to Beauregard asking: 

Hello Andre, 

Can you answer this question? 

I am not sure if he is allowed to speak directly with the Juror.15

10 Id. 

11 Id. 

12 Id. 

13 Id. Neither O’Rourke nor Stack was aware that there was a prohibition against juror contact 

without court permission after discharge of the jury. Id. at A206–7, A210, A255. 

14 Id. at A210. 

15 Id. at A52–54. 
7

The email included all the emails preceding it with the subject line “Authorization 

Request Approved.”16

At 4:52 p.m. Beauregard responded “Sure he can” in an email he sent only to 

O’Rourke, not Truitt.17 According to Beauregard, he mistakenly and carelessly 

believed that he was re-confirming his instructions for ORIA to proceed with the 

interviews of the twenty-two non-juror witnesses, not that he was authorizing ORIA 

to contact the Juror.18 At 4:58 p.m., O’Rourke responded “Thx” to Beauregard’s 

email.19 

On November 5, 2019, Stack called Beauregard and reported that he had 

interviewed the Juror and that the Juror was willing to speak with Beauregard 

directly.20 According to Beauregard, he was shocked that Stack had contacted the 

Juror and directed Stack to shut down the investigation and have no further contact 

with the Juror.21 Truitt, who overheard Beauregard on this call, testified that 

“[Beauregard] was absolutely not happy” and made it clear he was terminating 

ORIA.22 According to Stack, Beauregard did not express disapproval of his contact 

16 Id.

17 Id. at A131–32. 

18 Id. at A515–20, A518 (Liability Hr’g Tr.). 

19 Id. at A133–36. 

20 Id. at A665 (Liability Rep.). 

21 Id. at A486 (Liability Hr’g Tr.). 

22 Id. at A390. Truitt testified that there was “no question in [her] mind” that Beauregard was 

terminating ORIA’s services. Id. at A396. 
8

with the Juror or fire ORIA, but he could not recall if Beauregard directed him to 

stop working on the matter.23 Beauregard testified that he was “dumbfounded” to 

learn of the juror contact: 

[W]hen he told me about it, it was like, in my mind like they broke into 

a house and were doing things illegal. I mean, it just, it just blew my 

mind because I knew O’Rourke said we are not supposed to talk to the 

juror.24

On November 12, 2019, O’Rourke emailed Beauregard and Truitt a draft of 

his report, which included Stack’s summaries of his interviews.25 O’Rourke thanked 

them for the assignment and said to advise him if they required additional work on 

the file.26 The Juror is identified on the first page of O’Rourke’s report.27 Stack’s 

summary of his interview with the Juror appears on page three of Stack’s 

summaries.28 

After Beauregard received the report, he did not tell O’Rourke he disapproved 

of Stack’s contact with the Juror.29 Between November 5, 2019, and December 13, 

2019 (the date of the hearing discussed below), Beauregard did not inform the 

Superior Court or the prosecutor of ORIA’s contact with the Juror.30

23 Id. at A257, A312–13. 

24 Id. at A486. 

25 Id. at A60–70. 

26 Id. at A61. 

27 Id. at A64. 

28 Id. at A69. 

29 See id. at A111. 

30 Id. at A670 (Liability Rep.). 
9

C. 

On December 13, 2019, the Superior Court held a hearing on the motion for 

new trial.31 Beauregard requested a continuance to file an amended motion.32 

Beauregard reported that he had hired O’Rourke as the private investigator and 

represented that “Mr. O’Rourke has been working diligently, but we’re not there yet 

and there’s more people to be investigated.”33 

The trial judge stated that he was “somewhat reluctant” but nevertheless 

granted the continuance.34 In granting the continuance, the court emphasized that “I 

am not authorizing any interviews of any jurors who were sitting in the trial.”35 The 

judge repeated: 

There will be no grant of authority to do that [interview jurors] based 

on speculation. That’s all that’s been submitted to the Court. 

So the Court will not authorize any investigation that is by contacting 

any jurors that served in this case. 

So I will grant the extension, but I’m not authorizing any contact of 

jurors at this stage.36 

31 Id. at A671. 

32 Id. at A139–40 (Dec. 13 Hr’g Tr.). 

33 Id. at A142; see also id. at A139 (“Mr. O’Rourke . . . is doing the investigation . . . .”). 

34 Id. at A142–43. 

35 Id. 

36 Id. at A142–43. 
10

Beauregard did not reveal the juror contact but instead inquired about filing motions 

“with the presentment of evidence,” which the court rejected as not currently 

proper.37 

The prosecutor then stated that he assumed no juror contact had occurred 

during the defense investigation and said, “I’m hoping Mr. Beauregard will confirm 

that and represent that to the Court as well.”38 At this point, Beauregard finally 

disclosed the contact with the Juror: 

Well, Your Honor, herein lies the rug [sic], is that the initial 

investigation that was taking place by Mr. O’Rourke had contact, a 

limited contact with [the Juror]. And it wasn’t extensive.39 

In response to the court’s surprise upon hearing this, Beauregard stated that he 

“didn’t direct the investigator on who to speak to.”40 He added: 

I did not direct the private investigator to contact anyone. I left it up to 

him to do the investigation. And I can instruct him now, obviously, 

absolutely no contact and we have to go around it. 

But at the time, Your Honor, I just instructed him to find out the issues. 

I wasn’t micro managing his investigation. I want to be candid to the 

Court.41 

Later in the hearing, the trial judge stated: 

I will authorize a short recess, but I’m not authorizing any contact with 

any juror who was called in this case or any of the jurors who were 

dismissed from the case. There’s no authorization for Mr. Beauregard’s 

37 Id. at A143. 

38 Id. at A143–44. 

39 Id. at A144. 

40 Id. 

41 Id. at A144–45. 
11

investigator to do that. Apparently he took it on his own, I guess, at 

this point.42 

Beauregard replied, “Your Honor, that’s the representation to the Court.”43

On March 16, 2020, the Superior Court denied the motion for new trial.44 The 

court concluded that the Juror and Riley having a mutual Facebook friend who was 

Riley’s cousin and who was also related to the Juror was insufficient for a new trial 

or an evidentiary hearing.45 The court also found a violation of Rule 3.5 by 

Beauregard based on ORIA’s improper contact with the Juror without the court’s 

permission.46

II. 

 On November 5, 2020, the ODC filed a petition for discipline against 

Beauregard. The petition asserted the following counts: 

Count I—a violation of Rule 3.5(c) based on Beauregard authorizing 

ORIA to contact the Juror without permission by court rule; 

Count II—a violation of Rule 8.4(a) based on Beauregard authorizing 

ORIA to contact the Juror without permission by court rule; 

Count III—a violation of Rule 8.4(c) based on Beauregard telling the 

court he did not direct ORIA to contact anyone and failing to disclose 

that he had authorized ORIA to contact the Juror; 

Count IV—a violation of Rule 5.3(a) based on Beauregard failing to 

make reasonable efforts to ensure that his firm had in effect measures 

giving reasonable assurance that ORIA complied with Rule 3.5(c); 

42 Id. at A146–47. 

43 Id. at A147. 

44 See id. at A92–104 (Mar. 16, 2020 Order). 

45 See id. at A99–103. 

46 See id. at A98. 
12

Count V—a violation of Rule 5.3(c)(1) based on Beauregard directing 

Stack to contact the Juror or ratifying that contact; and 

Count VI—a violation of Rule 5.3(c)(2) based on Beauregard’s failure 

to take reasonable remedial action when he had knowledge of Stack’s 

interview of the Juror. 

A. 

The Board bifurcated the disciplinary hearing, with the first part addressing 

the charges and the second part addressing the appropriate sanctions. On June 25, 

2021, the Board issued a unanimous report finding that the ODC had proven by clear 

and convincing evidence that Beauregard violated Rule 5.3(a), Rule 3.5(c) by 

operation of Rule 5.3(a), Rule 5.3(c)(2), and Rule 8.4(c).47 The Board found that the 

ODC had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Beauregard violated 

Rule 5.3(c)(1) or Rule 8.4(a). 

The Board first addressed whether Beauregard violated Rule 3.5(c) 

(prohibiting juror contact without approval) and Rule 3.5(c) by operation of Rule 

8.4(a) (violation of a rule through the acts of another) by authorizing Stack to contact 

the Juror. The Board was not persuaded by the ODC’s argument that Rule 3.5(c) 

was a strict liability rule, and therefore concluded that the ODC had to show by clear 

and convincing evidence that Beauregard knowingly assisted or induced Stack to 

contact the Juror. The Board found that the ODC had not satisfied this burden 

because Beauregard, an experienced criminal defense attorney, was well-aware of 

47 See id. at A726 (Liability Rep.); see id. at A851 (Sanctions Recommendation). 
13

the prohibition against juror contact without court permission, and negligently sent 

the “Sure he can” email “using his iPhone at the end of a busy day involving court 

appearances in different matters in both the morning and afternoon.”48 The Board 

accepted Beauregard’s explanation that he meant to send the email as reconfirmation that ORIA could conduct non-juror interviews, not to authorize ORIA 

to contact a juror. 

Next, the Board addressed whether the ODC had shown by clear and 

convincing evidence that Beauregard violated Rule 3.5(c) by (i) failing to make 

reasonable efforts to ensure that ORIA’s conduct was consistent with his 

professional obligations as required by Rule 5.3(a) and (ii) ordering ORIA to contact 

the Juror or knowingly ratifying that contact as prohibited by Rule 5.3(c)(1). The 

Board concluded that Beauregard had violated Rule 5.3(a) by negligently failing to 

make reasonable efforts to ensure that ORIA did not contact jurors and by 

negligently sending the “Sure he can” email to O’Rourke. The Board acknowledged 

ORIA’s expertise and initial statement that there would be no juror contact, but 

emphasized that Beauregard had never previously worked with ORIA and that the 

nature of the investigation placed the responsibility on Beauregard to reinforce the 

48 Id. at A679–81. 
14

requirements of Rule 3.5(c) with ORIA.49 As to Rule 5.3(c)(1), the Board found that 

ODC had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that Beauregard knowingly 

ordered ORIA to contact the Juror or knowingly or impliedly ratified that contact. 

The Board also found that Beauregard violated Rule 5.3(c)(2) by failing to 

take remedial action after learning on November 5th that Stack had contacted the 

Juror. Although Beauregard ended the investigation and chose not to act on the 

Juror’s willingness to speak to him, he did not inform the Superior Court or the 

prosecutor of the contact until the prosecutor asked him directly at the December 

13th hearing.50 Nor did he inform O’Rourke of what happened so O’Rourke could 

ensure that juror contact would not be repeated in ORIA’s work for OCC contract 

attorneys.51

Finally, the Board considered whether the ODC had shown by clear and 

convincing evidence that Beauregard’s representations to the Superior Court at the 

December 13th hearing violated Rule 8.4(c) (prohibiting lawyer “conduct involving 

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”). The Board, relying on In re 

49 Id. at A694 (“Respondent had never worked with ORIA before this engagement. . . . ORIA’s 

entire investigative effort would be focused specifically on [the] Juror. Yet Respondent gave no 

instruction to ORIA at the outset of the engagement regarding Juror contact.”). 

50 See id. at A706–08 (“In the view of the Panel, Respondent’s failure after his November 5th

telephone call with Stack to promptly, if not immediately, report to the court and DAG Babowol 

the improper Juror contact by Stack was a failure by Respondent to take reasonable remedial action 

to mitigate the consequences of this misconduct.”). 

51 Id. at A708 (“At a minimum, Respondent could have contacted O’Rourke to alert him about the 

. . . improper interview of [the Juror] and to reinforce with ORIA . . . that such juror contact – even 

after discharge of the jury – is expressly prohibited in Delaware . . . .”). 
15

Doughty,

52 held that both negligent and knowing misrepresentations could violate 

Rule 8.4(c).53 The Board found that Beauregard’s representation that O’Rourke 

acted on his own in contacting the Juror was a negligent misrepresentation in 

violation of Rule 8.4(c).54 Further, the Board decided that Beauregard’s 

representations that ORIA was still investigating, that he did not direct ORIA on 

whom to speak to, and that he did not direct ORIA to contact anyone were knowing 

misrepresentations in violation of Rule 8.4(c). 

B. 

The Board held the sanctions hearing on October 14, 2021.55 Beauregard’s 

witnesses included the prosecutor in the Bailey case, retired judicial officers, the 

current and former heads of the Office of Defense Services, and Chief Conflict 

Counsel. ODC recommended a two-year suspension and, upon reinstatement, 

prohibiting Beauregard from operating a solo law practice and requiring the 

supervision of his cases by another lawyer. Beauregard requested a public 

reprimand or private admonition. 

52 832 A.2d 724, 735 (Del. 2003). 

53 App. to Opening Br. at A715 (Liability Rep.) (“The Panel disagrees with Respondent that only 

clear and convincing evidence of a knowing misrepresentation, and not a negligent one, can 

support a finding that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c).”). 

54 See id. at A718 (“A reasonable lawyer would not have appeared at the December 13th hearing 

without having conducted a full inquiry into what errors resulted in Stack making contact with [the 

Juror].”). 

55 See id. at A728 (Sanctions Hr’g Tr.). 
16

In recommending the appropriate sanction, the Board first addressed the four 

factors set forth in the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer 

Sanctions (the “ABA Standards”). Those factors are: (i) the ethical duty violated; 

(ii) the attorney’s mental state; (iii) the extent of the actual or potential injury caused 

by the attorney’s misconduct; and (iv) aggravating and mitigating factors. For the 

first three factors, the Board concluded that Beauregard violated Rule 5.3(c) by 

violating Rule 5.3(a) ) and violated Rule 5.3(c)(2) and Rule 8.4(c); the violations 

involved negligent and knowing conduct; the violations of Rules 3.5(c) and 5.3(a) 

caused potential injury to the public and legal system; the violation of Rule 5.3(c)(2) 

caused actual and potential injury to the legal system and profession; and the 

violation of Rule 8.4(c) caused actual and potential harm to the public, the legal 

system, and the profession. 

The Board next made a preliminary determination of sanctions. The Board 

found that: (i) admonition was the presumptive sanction for Beauregard’s violation 

of Rule 3.5(c) under ABA Standard 6.34; (ii) reprimand was the presumptive 

sanction for Beauregard’s violation of Rule 5.3(a) under ABA Standard 7.3; (iii) 

suspension was the presumptive sanction for Beauregard’s violation of Rule 

5.3(c)(2) under ABA Standard 7.2; and (iv) suspension was the presumptive sanction 

for Beauregard’s violation of Rule 8.4(c) under ABA Standard 6.12. 
17

Finally, the Board considered aggravating and mitigating factors. The Board 

found that the following aggravating factors under ABA Standard 9.22 were present: 

(i) prior disciplinary offenses, which included a public reprimand in 2005 for 

violations of Rules 1.15, 5.3, and 8.4, consent to a private admonition in 2014 for 

violations of Rules 1.1 and 1.16, consent to a private admonition in October 2017 

for violation of Rule 1.4, and a six-month suspension starting in June 2018 for 

violations of Rules 1.15 and 5.3; (ii) dishonest or selfish motive in making the 

misrepresentations at the December 13th hearing; (iii) multiple offenses; (iv) refusal 

to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct;56 and (v) substantial experience 

in the practice of the law. 

For mitigating circumstances under ABA Standard 9.32, the Board found: (i) 

full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board; and (ii) his character or reputation. 

After reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Board 

recommended that Beauregard be suspended from the practice of law for two years 

with the opportunity to apply for a limited reinstatement after one year to serve as 

counsel for indigent defendants in the OCC program and with the opportunity to 

apply for full reinstatement after two years. In recommending a two-year sanction, 

56 The Board agreed that Beauregard was entitled to mount a vigorous defense to ODC’s charges 

and stated “[w]e will neither disregard nor overweigh Respondent’s refusal to acknowledge 

wrongdoing or his decision to conduct a vigorous defense in our deliberations.” Id. at A875–76. 
18

the Board noted this Court’s “incremental system of sanctions based on the lawyer’s 

prior history of discipline.”57

III.

Beauregard objects to the Board’s report and recommendations on four 

grounds: (i) the record does not support the Board’s finding that Beauregard acted 

with a “knowing” mental state when he made representations to the court; (ii) his 

misstatements to the court were immaterial to any issue before the court and were 

made negligently and not knowingly; (iii) the Board’s findings did not support a 

pattern of similar prior misconduct to justify an increased sanction; and (iv) a two 

year suspension is excessively punitive and contrary to public policy. 

ODC responds that the Board’s finding that Beauregard made knowing 

misstatements in violation of Rule 8.4(c) is supported by substantial evidence and 

resulted from the Board’s assessment of Beauregard’s credibility, to which we 

should defer. ODC also contends that the Board applied ABA Standard 6.12 

correctly, used Beauregard’s prior disciplinary offenses properly as an aggravating 

factor, and recommended an appropriate sanction. Finally, ODC argues that the 

Board’s recommended sanction is not excessive or contrary to the purposes of 

attorney discipline. 

57 Id. at A880. 
19

A. 

 This Court has the inherent and exclusive authority to discipline members of 

the Delaware Bar.58 Although the Board’s recommendations are helpful, the Court 

is not bound by them.59 The Court must review the record independently and 

determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s factual 

findings.60 The Court reviews the Board’s conclusions of law de novo.

61

After our independent review of the record, there is substantial evidence to 

support the Board’s findings that Beauregard violated DLRPC 3.5(c), 5.3(a), and 

5.3(c)(2). As the Board found, and Beauregard does not contest, Beauregard failed 

to take reasonable steps to ensure that the non-lawyers assisting him acted consistent 

with his ethical duties; was negligent when he sent the “Sure he can” email; and 

failed to take any remedial action to mitigate ORIA’s improper juror contact until it 

was exposed at the December 13th hearing. Thus, we turn to Beauregard’s arguments 

relating to violations of Rule 8.4(c) and the Board’s recommended sanction. 

B. 

The Board found that Beauregard made several knowing misrepresentations 

to the Superior Court at the December 13th hearing – ORIA was still investigating, 

58 In re Nadel, 82 A.3d 716, 719 (Del. 2013). 

59 Id. at 720. 

60 In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 484 (Del. 2007). 

61 Id.
20

he did not direct ORIA to speak to anyone, and he did not direct ORIA to contact 

anyone.62 Beauregard argues that those findings lack substantial evidence to support 

them, but our review of the record demonstrates otherwise. As the Board found, 

Beauregard represented in his answer to the ODC’s petition for discipline that he 

terminated ORIA before the December 13th hearing,63 but represented to the court at 

the December 13th hearing that their investigation was ongoing. In an email he 

authorized ORIA to conduct interviews and to speak to some or all the twenty-two 

individuals,64 but represented to the court at the December 13th hearing that he did 

not. 

Beauregard claims that the Board misinterpreted his statement that he “didn’t 

direct the investigator on who to speak to” and “did not direct the private investigator 

to contact anyone.”65 As he argues, the statement was not meant literally, but was 

only intended to convey, however “unartfully,” that he was not directing the details 

or order of ORIA’s interviews.66 Beauregard’s statement was, however, 

significantly broader than what he now says he intended to convey and, in the 

62 See App. to Opening Br. at A719–25. 

63 Id. at A179. 

64 Id. at A59. 

65 Id. at A78–79 (Dec. 13 Hr’g Tr.). 

66 Opening Br. at 38. 
21

Board’s judgment after hearing the witnesses, reflected an effort to distance himself 

from any blame for ORIA’s contact with the Juror.67 

For his false statement that the ORIA investigation was ongoing, Beauregard 

argues that he did not knowingly misrepresent the facts because he sought to 

supplement his “bare bones” motion for a new trial and additional investigation was 

necessary.68 He claims that “[n]o final decision had been made by [him] on how or 

whether the investigation would continue.”69 As we see the record, however, 

Beauregard told the court at the December 13th hearing that O’Rourke was still 

investigating but never followed up after O’Rourke’s November 12th email to 

contact him for additional work.70 Beauregard also testified that he “shut down 

Stack[’s]” investigation after learning of the juror contact.71 The Board was entitled 

to make an adverse determination after considering the credibility of the witnesses 

and their testimony. 

Finally, Beauregard contends that the Board had no basis to find that, at the 

December 13, 2019 hearing, he was trying to distance himself from his negligent 

authorization of Stack’s contact with the Juror. According to Beauregard, he was 

67 App. to Opening Br. at A725 (Liability Rep.). In making this determination, the Board 

considered Beauregard’s failure to be candid at the December 13th hearing when the subject of 

juror contact first arose. Id. at A723. 

68 Opening Br. at 33. 

69 Id. at 39. 

70 App. to Opening Br. at A668 (Liability Rep.) (“If you should require additional work on this 

file, please contact me directly.”). 

71 Id. at A179; id. at A522 (Liability Hr’g Tr. at 1041–46) (“I shut down Stack.”). 
22

not aware of the “Sure he can email” until April 2020, making it “an impossibility” 

in December 2019 to distance himself from his negligent authorization of the juror 

contact.72 But Beauregard sought to distance himself from the juror contact, not his 

negligent authorization of it.73 And even if he was unaware of the authorization 

provided in his email, Beauregard knew about the improper juror contact before the 

December 13th hearing and would have been motivated to conceal the improper 

contact – as confirmed by the fact that he did not reveal the contact until forced to 

do so by the prosecutor.74 

The Board’s conclusion that he made knowing misstatements at the December 

13th hearing in violation of Rule 8.4(c) is supported by substantial evidence. 

C. 

 Beauregard’s remaining objections relate to the recommended sanction. First, 

he contends that none of the alleged misstatements were material to any issue before 

the Superior Court and thus do not provide a basis for his suspension under ABA 

Standard 6.12. He relies on references to materiality in ABA Standard 6.12 and in 

72 Opening Br. at 37. 

73 App. to Opening Br. at A725 (Liability Rep.) (“Through these statements, Respondent was 

attempting to distance himself from the details of the ORIA investigation in light of the unexpected 

revelation to the court that Stack contacted [the] Juror.”). 

74 Beauregard also argues that he did not follow up on the improper juror contact because he was 

busy with hearings and trials, and the contact was immaterial to the new trial motion. Given the 

seriousness of improper juror contact, however, an experienced criminal defense attorney like 

Beauregard would have known that it demanded his immediate attention and disclosure to 

opposing counsel and the court. 
23

DLRPC 3.3, regarding candor toward the tribunal. The plain language of the 

Standard and the Rule do not, however, support his argument that a false statement 

to the court must be material to factor into the appropriate sanction. 

ABA Standard 6.12 states: 

Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows that false 

statements or documents are being submitted to the court or that 

material information is improperly being withheld, and takes no 

remedial action, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the 

legal proceeding or causes and adverse effect or potentially adverse 

effect on the legal proceeding. 

DLRPC 3.3(a)(1) states: 

A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law 

to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law 

previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer[.] 

In each case, a materiality qualifier attaches only after the conjunction “or” followed 

by further independent actions. It would be a strange interpretation of the ABA 

Standard and the Rule to ignore false statements to the court so long as they were 

not material. And in any event, Beauregard’s statements related to, and were 

material to, the Superior Court’s questions concerning the new trial motion and the 

juror contact. 

 Next, Beauregard contends that the Board should not have considered his 

prior disciplinary actions as suggestive of “a de facto pattern of conduct” to support 
24

a recommended sanction of suspension.75 Beauregard agrees, however, that 

“[s]uspension is generally deemed appropriate when a lawyer knows false 

statements are submitted to a court.”76 The Board found, and we have agreed with 

its findings, that Beauregard made several knowing misrepresentations to the court 

at the December 13th hearing. Under ABA Standard 6.12, suspension is the 

presumptive sanction when an attorney makes knowing misrepresentations to the 

court. 

 Beauregard also objects to the Board’s findings related to various other 

aggravating factors. He claims that the Board gave insufficient weight to character 

and reputation evidence as a mitigating factor. Viewing the aggravating and 

mitigating factors as a whole, however, the aggravating factors are supported by the 

record77 and not only outnumber but also outweigh the mitigating factors in 

Beauregard’s favor.78 In particular, the aggravating factor of Beauregard’s dishonest 

75 Opening Br. at 41. 

76 Id. at 42. 

77 Beauregard’s other objections to the Board’s aggravating-and-mitigating-factor analysis are 

unpersuasive. As discussed previously, some of his actions were knowing violations made with a 

dishonest and selfish motive. He also downplays the multiple offenses as springing from one event 

but overlooks the fact that his handling of the ORIA investigation and failure to mitigate its 

consequences unfolded over a period of weeks and months. Finally, the Board acknowledged 

Beauregard’s due process challenge for his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his 

conduct, and “neither disregard nor overweigh [the factor] . . . in [its] deliberations.” App. to 

Opening Br. at A876 (Sanctions Recommendation). 

78 See In re Howard, 765 A.2d 39, 44 (Del. 2000) (“We recognize that the mitigating circumstances 

significantly outnumber the aggravating circumstances. . . . Nonetheless, we do not believe the 

mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances in this case.”). 
25

and selfish motive implicated foundational elements of the legal system.79 Also 

important is the extent of his prior disciplinary history given the “principle of 

progressive discipline” for assigning increasing penalties to reoccurring disciplinary 

violations.80 The fact that Beauregard had just recently completed a six-month 

suspension was a significant factor in the Board’s recommendation of an increased 

suspension.81 Because the presumptive sanction was suspension, the Board noted 

correctly that “these partially offsetting factors . . . militate toward an upward 

adjustment” to Beauregard’s sanction.82 

79 In re Favata, 119 A.3d, 1283, 1292 (Del. 2015) (“Two fundamental ethical principles in the 

Delaware oath are to act with fidelity to the Court and to use no falsehood.”); In re Amberly, 996 

A.2d 793, at *8 (Del. 2010) (TABLE). 

80 App. to Opening Br. at A881 (Sanctions Recommendation); see In re Guy, 756 A.2d 875, 887–

88 (Del. 2000) (explaining Delaware’s system of progressive attorney discipline). 

81 When it recommended a two-year suspension, the Board considered cases where this Court 

imposed less than a two-year suspension and noted that they not involve attorneys who had been 

suspended previously. See, e.g., In re Poliquin, 49 A.3d 1115, 1118 (Del. 2012) (approving six 

months and one day suspension of attorney who had been previously the subject of two private 

admonitions and who corrected his counsel’s misrepresentations regarding his disciplinary record 

one day after those misrepresentations were made); In re McCann, 669 A.2d 49, 58 (Del. 1995) 

(imposing one-year suspension where the lawyer had been previously the subject of a public 

reprimand and private admonition). 

82 App. to Opening Br. at A878 (Sanctions Recommendation). Beauregard also contends that “[t]he 

loss, even temporarily, of one’s ability to earn income . . . cannot be characterized as anything but 

punitive.” This Court has stated, however, that the effect of losing one’s ability to earn income 

ordinarily do not factor into disciplinary sanctions. See, e.g., In re Lyle, 74 A.3d 654 (Del. 2013) 

(“Lyle would also have us give consideration in our sanction recommendation to the fact that he 

has young children, and what effect his suspension, if any, would have on them. Unfortunately, 

we are not permitted to give consideration to this factor.”). 
26

Finally, Beauregard contends that the recommended sanction is punitive and 

contrary to the reason for attorney discipline – to protect the public.83 Beauregard 

contends that there was no actual harm because the Juror was not bothered by the 

contact and there was no adverse impact on the Bailey case.84 He also dismisses the 

potential harm his misconduct caused as “theoretical.”85 

The Board determined that the 8.4(c) violations “caused actual and potential 

harm to the public, the legal system, and the profession” because they “undermin[ed] 

the public trust in the legal system and the profession” and misled the Superior 

Court.86 In our view, false statements and a lack of candor have a “significant 

adverse effect on legal proceedings” given their impact on the administration of 

justice.87 It is critical for lawyers “to maintain the standards of personal integrity 

and honesty” to uphold public confidence in the law, which itself “is the foundation 

of our entire system of justice.”88 As we have observed before, “the potential for 

harm in misrepresentations to the court is enormous.”89 The recommended sanction 

83 In re Tos, 610 A.2d 1370, 1373 (Del. 1992) (the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings is 

“to protect the public” and to “foster public confidence in the Bar, to preserve the integrity of the 

profession, and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.”). 

84 Reply Br. at 10–11. 

85 Id. at 12. 

86 App. to Opening Br. at A863 (Sanctions Recommendation). 

87 In re Vanderslice, 116 A.3d 1244, 2015 WL 3858865, at *15–16 (Del. June 19, 2015) (ORDER). 

88 Howard, 765 A.2d at 44–45. 

89 Amberly, 996 A.2d at *8; see also Matter of Clyne, 581 A.2d 1118, 1125 (Del. 1990) 

(“Moreover, Clyne’s misrepresentations to this Court indicate the strong possibility that other 

clients might be similarly injured in the future.”); In re Davis, 43 A.3d 856, 863 (Del. 2012) 

(“Maintaining high standards of professional and personal conduct for persons admitted to the Bar 
27

was proportional to the violations and properly considered Beauregard’s disciplinary 

record and the recency of his latest violations. 

IV. 

The record supports the Board’s finding that Beauregard violated Rule 5.3(a) 

and thereby Rule 3.5(c),) as well as Rule 5.3(c)(2), and Rule 8.4(c). The Court 

approves the Board’s findings and adopts the recommended two-year suspension 

with the opportunity for limited reinstatement after one year to represent OCC 

clients.90 ODC and Beauregard shall confer on the starting date for Beauregard’s 

suspension to permit an orderly transition of his pending matters to other attorneys. 

of this Court is essential to ensure the proper administration of justice within the judicial branch 

of our government.”). 

90 See, e.g., Matter of Beauregard, 189 A.3d 1236, 1255 (Del. 2018) (allowing Beauregard to 

continue providing criminal defense representation through OCC while suspended); In re 

Pankowski, 2009 WL 2044803, at *1 (Del. July 15, 2009) (permitting suspended lawyer to 

“provide legal services under the supervision of and in connection with the Superior Court 

Criminal Conflicts Program”).