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Filed 8/28/13 In re Sheila K. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FIVE 

In re SHEILA K., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law. 

ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL 

SERVICES AGENCY, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

J.W. et al., 

 Defendants and Respondents; 

SHEILA K., 

 Appellant. 

 A137166 

 (Alameda County 

 Super. Ct. No. OJ12019554) 

 The minor, Sheila K. (appellant), appeals the juvenile court’s disposition, which 

awarded custody of her to her presumed father Michael K. (Father), directed the Alameda 

County Social Services Agency (Agency) to provide him six months of informal services, 

and terminated its jurisdiction over appellant under Welfare and Institutions Code, 

section 300.1 We affirm, concluding appellant forfeited her objections to the disposition. 

 

1 All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
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BACKGROUND 

 Appellant, born in February 2010, was taken into protective custody on September 

8, 2012, and placed in a foster home after her mother J.W. (Mother), the custodial parent, 

was hospitalized from overdosing on Vicodin. The Agency filed a petition alleging 

appellant was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivisions 

(b) and (j). The allegations related to Mother’s current and past use of Vicodin, Mother’s 

history of housing instability, and Father’s criminal history, as well as the fact that two 

older siblings are dependents of the juvenile court in a legal guardianship. 

 Father was present at the detention hearing and was determined to be appellant’s 

presumed father. Father had recently been incarcerated for possession of a controlled 

substance with the intent to sell; he was released in June 2012. On September 18, 2012, a 

notice was filed reflecting that appellant had been released to Father’s care. In its 

September 24 jurisdiction/disposition report, the Agency recommended the section 300 

petition be dismissed and appellant remain in Father’s custody. The report indicated 

Father had demonstrated his ability to care for appellant and appellant was doing well and 

was bonded with Father. 

 Father was present at the November 14, 2012, contested disposition hearing; 

Mother was not present, despite having been ordered to appear. At the hearing, the 

juvenile court dismissed, on Agency’s motion, certain allegations against Father in the 

section 300 petition. All parties agreed to the court’s taking jurisdiction under the 

petition’s allegations pertaining to Mother. Appellant requested that the juvenile court 

retain jurisdiction after awarding custody to Father, in order to continue formal 

supervision. 

 The juvenile court found appellant was within the jurisdiction of the court under 

section 300, awarded custody to Father, directed the Agency to provide Father six months 

of “informal family maintenance services,” and terminated its jurisdiction over appellant. 

 This appeal followed. Mother and Father did not actively participate in the appeal. 
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DISCUSSION 

 Appellant contends the juvenile court lacked statutory authority to make the 

disposition in the present case. She contends section 360, subdivision (b) did not 

authorize the court to order informal supervision because Father was not the custodial 

parent at the time the section 300 petition was initially filed;2 the court’s order was not 

proper under section 361.23 because the court did not declare appellant a dependent, 

because the court did not make findings regarding the necessity of removing appellant 

from Mother’s custody as required under section 361, subdivision (c),4 and because 

section 361.2 does not provide for informal supervision; and section 245.5 did not 

provide the court authority for the disposition because the court terminated jurisdiction 

over appellant.5

 We need not and do not consider any of those contentions because appellant failed 

to raise any of them before the juvenile court. (In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 

Cal.App.4th 551, 558 [“In dependency litigation, nonjurisdictional issues must be the 

subject of objection or appropriate motions in the juvenile court; otherwise those 

arguments have been waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 

[Citations.]”]; see also In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1266-1267; In re 

Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-886.) At the hearing, appellant only argued that 

the evidence justified retaining jurisdiction and formal supervision of Father. Appellant 

 

2 Section 360, subdivision (b) authorizes the juvenile court to order that family 

maintenance services be provided for a limited period without declaring the minor a 

dependent of the court. 

3 Section 361.2 contains provisions regarding placement of a child with a parent with 

whom the child was not residing when the circumstances that justified the section 300 

petition arose. 

4 Section 361, subdivision (c) provides, “A dependent child may not be taken from the 

physical custody of his or her parents or guardian or guardians with whom the child 

resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and 

convincing evidence of any” of a number of specified circumstances. 

5 Section 245.5 provides the juvenile court broad authority to direct orders “as the court 

deems necessary and proper for the best interests of or for the rehabilitation of” “a minor 

who is subject to any proceedings under this chapter.” 
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did not argue the juvenile court was without authority to impose informal supervision, or 

to award custody to Father without a finding regarding the necessity of removing 

appellant from Mother’s custody. 

 In a supplemental brief, appellant requests that this court exercise its discretion to 

consider her claims despite her failure to raise them below. We decline to do so. (See In 

re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“the appellate court’s discretion to excuse 

forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal 

issue”]; see also In re Karla C., supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267.) Had appellant raised 

any of her objections below, the juvenile court could have considered whether to proceed 

differently and it could have made any findings required by statute. (In re S.B., at p. 1293 

[“The purpose of [the forfeiture] rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the 

attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]”].) 

 Moreover, this is not an instance where appellant’s substantive interests are at 

stake. (In re Karla C., supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267 [“ ‘[T]he underlying purpose of 

dependency law is to protect the welfare and best interests of the dependent child. 

[Citations.]’ [Citation.]”].) Appellant concedes there is no risk of detriment to her in 

Father’s custody. It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt the juvenile court would have 

made the section 361, subdivision (c) finding regarding removal of appellant from 

Mother’s custody, had the court been requested to do so. The evidence showed there is a 

substantial danger to appellant’s well-being in Mother’s custody because Mother abused 

controlled substances while appellant was in her custody; Mother had not been attending 

an outpatient drug program; there was testimony Mother was under the influence of drugs 

at a child’s birthday party; Mother told the child welfare worker she was not ready to 

have appellant returned to her custody; and Mother failed to appear at the disposition 

hearing despite being ordered to do so. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Moreover, Mother was 

unwilling to have physical custody of appellant. (§ 361, subd. (c)(2).) 

 Finally, any error in providing Father informal services was not to appellant’s 

detriment. Although appellant argued below that the juvenile court should retain 

jurisdiction, appellant does not contend on appeal that the juvenile court’s decision to 
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terminate jurisdiction and provide only six months of informal services is not supported 

by substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Instead, appellant points 

to the court’s decision to provide informal services as an indication the court believed 

some supervision of Father was necessary, and then appellant argues the court lacked 

authority to direct the Agency to provide informal services. Thus, even if the juvenile 

court lacked statutory authority to provide Father informal services, there is no showing 

that the disposition harmed appellant. 

DISPOSITION 

 The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed. 

 

 SIMONS, J. 

We concur. 

 

JONES, P.J. 

 

NEEDHAM, J.