1 COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS

I N RE THE ESTATE OF BUFORD SCOTT , JR. , DECEASED Appellant

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§ § No. 08

- 1 9

- 00 011

- CV Appeal from the Probate Court No. 2

o f Tarrant County, Texas ( TC # 201 5PR02393

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- A )

O P I N I O N This is a will contest. Actually, it is a wills contest (plural) because three wills are at issue and a jury found two were signed without testamentary capacity, and all three were signed as the result of undue influence. The decedent and maker of the wi lls is Buford Scott, Jr. (Buford). The proponents of the wills are the Appellants here, Geoffrey Tait and Irene Rueda . The antagonists of the wills, and Appellees here, are John Paul Scott, III and Vinnie V. Dungan

. T he jury also found that the will pro ponents did not act in good faith in opposing the will contest, and that they were therefore not entitled to attorney’s fees. On appeal, the will proponents argue that the evidence was both factually and legally insufficient to support the jury’s findings . Because we find sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that all three wills were signed as the result
of undue influence , and that Appellants did not act in good faith in defending the wills, we affirm. Our view of the undue influence findin gs means that we need not address challenges to the jury’s2

testamentary capacity finding s , or a question on revocation of one of the wills. It does mean , however, that we need to supply the reader with a detailed recitation of the evidence

. 

### I. B ACKGROUND
A. Factual Background Buford Scott, Jr. , who never married and had no children, grew up on a ranch in Cresson, Texas, where he lived until his death in August of 2015. For most of his life Buford lived a sheltered existence with his immediate family members

. Buford who had a below average IQ and some cognitive impairments, did not graduate from high school until he was 22 years old, and was never regularly employed outside of working on his family’s ranch. H is parents and his only

s ibling predeceased him , each dying intestate

. When his mother passed away in 2003 or 2004, Buford inherited a substantial estate, but was left to live alone on the ranch.

1. The Creation of the m anagement t rust in 2008
A fter Buford’s mother passed away , his mother’s attorney expressed concern about Buford’s ability to live on his own, and thereafter initiated a guardianship proceeding in the Hood County Court

. I n 2007, th at court appointed both a guardian ad litem and an attorney ad litem to represent Buford’s interests . Th e guardian ad litem filed an application to place Buford under a guardianship m anagement t rust pursuant to the then applicable S ection 867 of the Texas Probate Code

. 1 The cou rt ordered Buford t o undergo a mental health evaluation by Dr. Larry Padget, a local general practitioner, who determined that Buford was “ mentally re t ar d ed, ” and suffered from substance or alcohol abuse or both

. 2 Dr. Padget further reported that Buford was unable to make

1 The Texas Probate Code was repealed and replaced with the Texas Estates Code by Act of June 17, 2011 , 82 nd Leg., R.S., ch. 823 , 2011 Tex.Gen.Laws 1901. The current Code provision relating to management trusts is found in Chapter 1301 of the Texas Estates Code. See T EX .E ST .C ODE A NN
. § 1301.051 , et. seq.

2 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM

- 5) now uses the term intellectual disability. American Psychiatric Association, D IAGNOSTIC AND S TATISTICAL M ANUAL OF M ENTAL D ISORDERS , 5th ed. (2013)

.3

his own financial, medical , or other decisions, and was totally incapacitated. The cou rt agreed, and issued an order creating a management trust, expressly finding that Buford was “completely without capacity as provided by the Texas Probate Code to manag e his property [.] ” The court placed all of Buford’s assets into a trust managed by a local bank. Upset about the b ank’s control of his money, Buford retained an attorn ey wh o filed a motion to set aside the trust on Buford’s behalf in March of 2009. The m otion attacked the court’s order creating the trust on several procedural grounds, including that the cou rt did not follow the proper procedures in appointing the guardian ad litem or in making its determination that Buford was incapacitated. The court thereafter re placed Buford’s guardian ad litem with a new ad litem who requested a psychiatric report to determine Buford’s mental capacity. The cou rt granted the request and a ppointed psychiatrist Dr. Lisa Clayto n to perform the psychiatric evaluation.

2. Dr. Clayton ’s p sychiatric r eport Dr. Clayton evaluated Buford on February 22, 2010 . In her report, Dr. Clayton note d that Buford admitted that he had not taken very good care of his financial affairs after his mother died, and that he “did need help” with his finances

. Although she disagreed with Dr. Padget’s assessment that Buford was “mentally retarded,” she believed that Buford ’ s IQ was below average, that he suffered from learning disabilit ies , and evidenced various cognitive impairments . He also exhibited some degree of paranoi a , poor insight, and impaired personal judgment

. Dr. Clayton concluded that Buford was unable to tak e care of himself independently, noting , among other things, that Buford had rotting teeth, did not have a primary care doctor, and did not appear to be well

- groomed. In addition, she concluded that Buford was “extremely susceptible to the manipulation an d control by others ” due in part to his below average intelligence and paranoid

See also Ex parte Cathey , 451 S.W.3d 1, 11 n.23 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014) (noting change from “mental retardation” to “intellectual disability” by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities)

.4

tendencies. She noted that Buford had previously been manipulated by an individual who convinced him to pay for assist ance in obtaining some unclaimed property located in Okla homa. In her report, Dr. Clayton advised t he court that she believed Buford was “ partially incapacitated ” and needed a partial guardianship with regard to managing his financial and business affairs

.

3. The August 2011 s ettlement a greement In August of 2011, Buford settle d the dispute raised in his pending motion to terminate the management trust . H e agreed to allow the management trust to continue with modifications , which allowed him to retain his personal property and to open his own ban k account . The b ank trustee agreed to pay Buford $800.00 a week f or his personal use

. The agreement further stated that the “temporary guardianship” under which Buford had been placed was to be dismissed , as were all court appointees.

4. Buford h ires Geoffrey Tait and Irene Rueda Despite signing the settlement agreement , Buford continued to be dissatisfied with the b ank ’s control of his assets . After unsuccessfully asking his friends for assistance, in June 2012 Buford contacted a private investi gator, Geoffrey Tait, whose name he found in a phone book

. Tait, and his assistant, Irene Rueda, agreed to assist Buford with his efforts to have the management trust lifted. I n addition , Tai t and Ru e da soon began providing Buford with other services,
in cluding cleaning , cooking, bill paying , shopping , and running errands

. I n fact, Rueda testified that she saw Buford almost every day for three years until his death in August of 2015. During these three years, Tait and Rueda submitted numerous invoices to Buford, billing him tens of thousands of dollars for their investigation and other services

. In addition, Buford gave both Tait , Rueda, and their family members bonuses and gift s, including a $5,000.00 gift to Tait’s wife, despite the fact that Buford had admittedly never met his wife

. In addition, the record contains5

evidence that Buford made large cash withdrawals from his account during the time that Tait and Rueda were providing services to him, some of which were signe d by Tait, acting on Buford’s
behalf.
5. The March 23, 2013 Holographic Will Buford did not have a will when he first met Tait and Rueda , and as early as August 2012, Tait began discussing the need for Buford to sign various legal documents, including a will, a trust instrument, and a power of attorney. In February of 2013, Tait contacted attorney S cott Mos el ey to discuss the possibility of hiring him to assist Buford with l iftin g the management trust , and with drafting a will or trust documents for Buford to sign

. During one of their discussions, Mos e ley informed Tait that Buford could draft a handwritten holographic will, rather than a formal will , and further explained to Tait the legal requirements for making such a will

. 3
On March 23, 2013, Buford signed a three

- page will that was all in his own handwriting

. That document stated that he wished to create the “ Buford Scott, Jr., Charitable Trust, ” in which all of his assets would be placed at the time of his death

. In the will, Buford stated that he was aware that he had cousins, un cles and aunts, but that he did not wish to leave any of his money or property to them

. A t the time, Buford actually did not have any living aunts and uncles , but he did have cousins . He was upset with the cousins as he believed they had either initiated or participated in the earlier guardianship proceedings , and that they were trying to take his money. 4

3 Although a will must typically be signed by a testator in the presence of two witnesses, who must then subscribe their names to the will, a holographic will need not be so witnessed. T EX .E ST .C ODE A NN
. §§ 251.051 , 251 .052. Thus, if an instrument is wholly in the testator’s handwriting and signed by the testator, with the intent to dispose of his property, the will is generally considered to be valid. See Lemus v. Aguilar , 491 S.W.3d 51, 56 (Tex.App.

-- San Antonio 2016, no pe t.)

.
4 Although there is no evidence that Buford’s cousins actively sought the guardianship, there is evidence that some of them spoke with the guardian ad litem about the court proceedings and that some of them, including the two will contestants, may h ave attended court hearings in the guardianship case.6

On the same da y that Buford signed the will , Tait emailed a copy of it to Mos e ley , asking
if it met the legal requirements for a holographic will

. Mos ele y responded that although the will appeared to comply with the basic legal requirements for a holographic will , he believed that the will could be improved by naming an executor or trustee , a nd by naming the charity or charities that Buford wished to benefit by the proposed trust

. Mos e ley offered to assist Buford by drafting a “formal will” for him, and in particular, recommended the creation of a trust with a pour over will. T he original of the H olographic W ill was never found, and Appellants later used the copy sent to attorney Moseley as proof that it was made. A short time later, Tait a dvised Mos e ley that Buford had “added a lot more to his will” and
that he would “ have him finish his holographic will ” and send it to Mos e ley for review. I n addition, Tait advised Moseley that he had already drafted yet another will

-- presumably a formal

one -- for Buford to sign after the management trust was lifted, together with trust documents which would create a new trust into which all of Buford’s assets were to be transferred. Mosel e y ultimately declined to represent Buford. Tai t thereafter contacted attorney Pam Walker, and in March of 2014, she agreed to assist Buford with filing an application to restore him to full legal capacity. 6. The m anagement t rust is l ifted in November of 2014 Tait contacted t wo psychologists , Drs. Ea rl Johnson and Stephen Karten , as well as a psychiatrist, Dr. Jeffrey Schlueter, to conduct mental status evaluations of Buford in aid of establishing that he was not in need of a management trust or a guardianship

. In their written reports, all three experts agreed that despite Buford’s below

- average IQ, Buford was not incapacitated and had sufficient mental capacity to make his own financial, medical and other decisions. Based on these reports, on November 4, 2014 the trial court restor ed Buford to full7

legal capacity

. Thereafter, attorney Walker suggested that Buford create a formal will, but Tait sent an email to Walker, stating that Buford did not need her assistance, as he (Tait) had already prepared a will for Buford to sign . Tait explained he had downloaded a will template from the internet and that he was “working on” convincing Buford to sign the will as well as various trust documents that he had also prepared. Although Tait indicated that he would bring the will and trust documents for Walker to review, Walker stated that Tait never did and that he essentially “disappeared” a fter the management trust was lifted. A month later, Buford sign ed a “Limited P ower of A ttorney ” giving Tait the right to make personal, financial , and other decisions on Buford’s behalf.

7. The July 10, 2015 “Annie Green Will ” In early July of 2015, both Tait and Rueda noticed that Buford lost a significant amount of weight and they became concerned about his health. At that ti me, Tait drafted a will for Buford to sign, using a will template that he had obtained some years earlier

. On July 10, 2015, Tait videotaped Buford at his home signing the will; however, Tait failed to arrange for a notary public

or for any individuals to be present to witness Buford’s signature

. Despite being a notary public himself , and admittedly knowing that it was against the rules, Tait took the will to notary Annie Green and asked her to notarize it for him . S he refused. Although the parties discussed the so

- called “Annie Green W ill ” at trial, neither the will nor the videotape recording was introduced at trial

. Tait claimed that the recording had inadvertently been destroyed due to problems with Rueda ’s computer where it had bee n store d

. However, T ait testified that the “ Annie Green Will ” made substantially the same bequests as did the next two wills that Buford signed in July and August of 2015, both of which are described below , and both of which left significant bequests to Tait and Rueda

.8 8. The July 2 1 , 2015 Will Buford was admitted to the hospital on July 19 , 2015 and diagnosed with terminal esophageal cancer ; he died a month later. O n his second day at the hospital ( July 2 1 , 2015 ) Buford signed another will that Tait had drafted (the “July Will”)

. Tait was unable to produce a copy of the July W ill, and stated that he believed it was destroyed when Buford signed his last and final will the next month. However, Tait videotaped the signing of the July W ill, and that videotape

was played for the jury. In the videotape, Buford is seen lying in a ho spital bed as Tait summarized the terms of the will

. In his summary , Tait t old Buford : “You’ve made bequests to several different people, you’ve made bequests to me, you’ve made bequests to [ Rueda ] [and] you’ve made the majority of your bequests to the Bu ford Scott Charitable Trust, right?” Buford agreed, and Tait next confirmed that Buford was not leaving anything to his cousins

. Buford then explained that he believed his cousins had attended two hearings when the court was considering whether to place his assets in the management trust, and he faulted them for not opposing the trust and for allowing the judge to take his property away from him

.

9. The August 13, 2015 Will Tait next consulted with another attorney , Paul Wieneskie , regarding the validity of the July W ill, and was told that although the will was valid, it would have been preferable to include

a self

- proving affidavit , and to have included more specificity with regard to the creation of the charitable trust. Tait subsequently re vised the will to include the affidavit and to “ [ add ] more meat to the charitable trust” provision s . Tait arranged for another formal will signing on August 13, 2015 , while Buford was in an assisted nursing facility

. Ac cording to Tait, the July and August
W ills were virtually identical to each other with t h e two exceptions discussed above

.9

Although Tait did not videotape the entire signing of the August W ill, he did c onduct a videotaped interview with Buford after wards

. I n th is video tape , Buford acknowledged his

aware ness of the will’s provisions. Tait then summarized the provisions of the will, stating that Buford had left a “large bequest” to the Charitable Trust, to be distributed in accordance with Buford’s wishes, and that he had also “left things” to Tait, Rueda , and five others mentioned in the will. Buford expressly denied being coerced into signing the will, and stated that he had intentionally not left anyt hing to his cousins because “they didn’t want me to have a country to live in,” further explaining that he believed his cousins had supported the c ourt in taking away his rights when the management trust was imposed

. The August W ill, which revoked all prior wills and named Tait as Executor, requested that Tait create “The Buford Scott, Jr. Charitable Trust, or the Buford Scott, Jr. Charitable Foundation .” Tait was named as the “initial and permanent Trustee, Administrator, Executive or over seer of whatever such business he shall create, until such time as he is replaced by death or operation of law.” It further state d that Tait “shall have the sole and final authority to determine what type of business entity

. . . shall be formed and what provisions it shall include, so long as it fulfills my desire to provide help to people who face an unfair judicial system, or incompetent and unscrupulous lawyers.” The will provided that the Charitable T rust was to be funded by certain mineral and leasi ng rights that Buford owned in both Texas and Oklahoma. The record contains evidence that Tait was aware at the time Buford signed the August Will that the leasing rights were not producing, and that they were valued at only $32,500. 00. With the exception of Buford’s household furniture and clothing, which he gave to Goodwill, the August Will gave Tait and Rueda all of his real property and his personal property, in addition to $350,000 in cash to Tait, and $200,000 in cash to Rueda . The Will further name d10

Rueda ’s children and Tait’s wife as alternate beneficiaries in the event they predeceased him. In the will, Buford stated that the bequests were made to Tait and Rueda , due to his gratitude to them for assisting him with his legal problems and for helpi ng him through his final illness

. T he bequests given to Rueda and Tait in the August Will were valued at approximately 2.4 million dollars

. And finally, Buford included a paragraph expressly disinheri t ing his cousins, stating that he was doing so because they had failed to speak up on his behalf during the guardianship proceedings, and had allowed the Hood County Court to set up the management trust

. Buford died five days after he signed the August Will. Buford’s cousins , however, were unaware of Buford’s death until several months later when Tait returned one of their calls to tell them of his passing.
B. Procedural History
After Buford ’s death , Tait submitted the August Wi ll to probate, and the court n amed him

as executor of Buford’s estate. 5 Upon learning of the court proceedings, Buford’s cousins, John Paul Scott, III and Vinn i e Dungan, filed a p etition to c ontest the will

. The petition alleged that Buford lacked the requisite testamentary capacity to sign the August W ill and that he had been “unduly influence d ” into signing it by Tait and Rueda

. They sought a declaration that the w ill was invalid and that Buford had died intes tate. As the cousins were Buford’s only remaining family members, if Buford died intestate, his entire estate would pass to them under the Texas intestate succession laws. T EX .E ST
. C ODE A NN
. § 201.001

. Tait and Rueda thereafter filed a

5 Although Tait and Rueda w ere given all of Buford’s real property in the August Will, they nevertheless billed the estate for thousands of dollars as “property management fees” for their efforts in cle aning up the property11

conditional counter application seeking to admit the July W ill or the March 2013 H olographic W ill to probate in the event that the August W ill was found to be invalid. The matter w as tried to a jury that found : 1. Buford lacked testamentary capacity to sign the August 13, 2015 will, and signed it as the result of undue influence.
2. Buford lacked testamentary capacity to sign the July 21, 2015 will, and signed it as the result of undue influence.
3. Buford had testamentary capacity to sign the March 23, 2013 H olographic W ill, but signed it as the result of undue influence. The jury otherwise found that the H olographic W ill was wholly in Buford’s handwriting, and was intended to dispose of his propert y. 4. Buford subsequently revoked the March 23, 2013 H olographic W ill.
5. Tait and Rueda did not act in good faith or with just cause in submitting the wills to probate or defending the wills during the will contest proceedings. The trial court ’s final judgmen t declared all three wills invalid and denied probate as to each of them

. The court further denied Tait and Rueda ’s request for attorney’s fees and expenses in defending against the will contest.
On appeal Tait and Rueda (hereinafter Appellants) raise 17 issues , contending that the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to support any of the jury’s findings as
summarized above. We distill Appellants’ arguments into three broad categories , starting with the jury’s findings with respect to (1) the validity of the March 2013 H olographic W ill , (2) the validity of the July and August Wills , and (3) the jury’s finding that Appellants did not act in good faith in submitting the wills to probate and/or in defending against the will contest

. As Appellants arguments all turn on challenges to either the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury ’s findings, we start with our standard of review.12 

### II. S TANDARD OF 

### R EVIEW A legal insufficiency challenge claims that there is “no evidence” to support a finding

. City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005)

. We sustain a legal sufficiency challenge only i f the “ record discloses one of the following situations: (a) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact

. ” Id. at 810 . In reviewing the record for legal sufficiency, we credit the evidence favorable to the judgment if a reasonable fact finder could, disregard contrary evidence unless a re asonable fact finder could not, and reverse the fact finder’s determination only if the evidence presented in
the trial court would not enable a reasonable and fair

- minded fact finder to reach the judgment under review. Id . at 827

. Appellants also raise f actual sufficiency challenges. When considering a factual sufficiency challenge brought by a party without the burden of proof at trial, we consider all of the evidence and set aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. City of El Paso v. Parsons , 353 S.W.3d 215, 225 (Tex.App

. -- El Paso 2011, no pet.) , citing Cain v. Bain , 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) ; see also Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson , 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) ( requiring appellate court that overturn s a verdict on factual insufficiency grounds to explain why evidentiary discrepancy is “manifestly unjust; why it shocks the conscience; or clearly demonstrates bias”). Under either standard, the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Parson s , 353 S.W.3d at 225

. The jury may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another, and we must not impose our opinion to the contrary. Id. ,13

citing Cit y of Keller , 168 S.W.3d at 819

. The inferences drawn from the evidence are also within the province of the jury, and w e must assume that the jurors made all inferences in favor of the verdict if reasonable minds could do so and disregard all other inferen ces not so drawn. Id. at 820

- 21

. “If the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair

- minded people to differ in their conclusions, then jurors must be allowed to do so. A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trier

- of

- fact, so long as the evidence falls within this zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. at 822

. 

### I II . D ISCUSSION
A. The Validity of the March 2013 Holographic Will In Issues Two through Four, Appellants contend that there was both legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Buford was unduly influenced into signing
the March 2013 Holographic Will

. In addition, Appellants argue in Issue One that the record contains no evidence to support the jury’s finding that Buford subsequently revoked the
H olographic W ill. If we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding
on undue i nfluence, we need not reach the issue of whether Buford revoke d the H olographic W ill. We therefore start with whether the H olographic W ill was signed as the result of undue influence.

1

. The l aw on u ndue i nfluence
G eneral ly, the term undue influence desc ribes “ such influence or dominion as exercised at the time, under the facts and circumstances of the case, which destroys the free agency of the testator, and substitutes in the place thereof the will of another. ” Long v. Long , 125 S.W.2d 1034,
1035 (Tex. 1939)

. As this Court has recognized, “[t]he exercise of undue influence may be accomplished in many different ways

-- directly and forcibly, as at the point of a gun; but also by fraud, deceit, artifice and indirection; by subtle and devious, but none

- the

- less forcible and14

effective means.” In re Olsson's Estate , 344 S.W.2d 171, 173

- 74 (Tex.Civ.App

. -- El Paso 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e. ) . Or a s the Texas Supreme Court stated, undue influence may take the form of

“ force, intimidation, duress, excessive imp ortunity or deception used in an effort to overcome or subvert the will of the maker of the testament and induce the execution thereof contrary to his will.” Rothermel v. Duncan , 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963)

. To pr ove undue influence, the contestant mu st convince the fact finder of : (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) th at the influence subvert ed or overpower ed the mind of the testator at the time of the execution of the testament; and (3) the maker would not have executed the testament but for that influence. Id

. T he burden is upon the contestant to prove each of the se allegation s by a preponderance of the evidence. Woods' Estate , 542 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex. 1976) ; see also Matter of Kam , 484 S.W.3d 642, 651

- 53 (Tex.App

. -- El Paso 2016, pet. denied) ( recognizing that once evidence established that will was signed in compliance with all statutory requirements, the burden shifted to will contestant to establish that the will should be voided as the product of undue influence)

. U ndue i nfluence can be establish ed by direct or circumstantial evidence. Olsson’s Estate , 344 S.W.2d at 175 ; see also Rothermel , 369 S.W.2d at 922 (recognizing that undue influence may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence). However, when relying on ci rcumstantial evidence, the evidence must be of a “reasonably satis factory and convincing character, and they must not be equally consistent with the absence of such influence.” Rothermel , 369 S.W.2d at 922 . “This is so because a solemn testament executed under the formalities required by law by one mentally capable of executing it should not be set aside upon a bare suspicion of wrongdoing.”
Id

. at 922

- 23

. Because undue influence may be part of a continu ing scheme , the jury may consider15

events occurring both before and after the will execution

. Id. at 922 (recognizing that proof of undue influence often involves an “extended course of dealings and circumstances”)

. Some evidence, however, falls short of t he mark. “ M ere requests or efforts to execute a favorable instrument are not sufficient to establish undue influence unless the requests or efforts are so excessive so as to subvert the will of the maker.” Matter of Kam , 484 S.W.3d at 652 , quoting In re Estate of Clifton, No. 13

- 11

- 00462

- CV, 2012 WL 3139864, at *2 (Tex.App

. -- Corpus Christi Aug. 2, 2012, no pet. ) ( mem. op., not designated for publication)

. Similarly, the fact that an individual had the opportunity to influence the testator, such as by being the testator’s caregiver, is insufficient to establish undue influence

. Rothermel , 369 S.W.2d at 923 ; see also Woods' Estate , 542 S.W.2d at 848

. In Rothermel

, the Texas Supreme Court laid out a non

- exhaustive list of ten factors that courts should consider in assessing undue influence: (1) the nature and type of relationship existing between the testator, the contestants, and the party accused of exerting such influence; (2) the opportunities existing for the exertion of the type or deception possessed or employed; (3) the circumstances surrounding the drafting and execution of the testament; (4) the existence of a fraudulent motive; (5) whether there had been a habitual subjection of the testator to the control of another; (6) the state of the testator's mind at the time of the execution of the testament; (7) the testator's mental or physical incapacity to resist or the susceptibility of the testator's mind to t he type and extent of the influence exerted; (8) words and acts of the testator; (9) weakness of mind and body of the testator, whether produced by infirmities of age or by disease or otherwise;16

(10) whether the testament executed is unnatural in its terms of disposition of property. Matter of Kam , 484 S.W.3d at 651

- 53 , citing Rothermel , 369 S.W.2d at 923

. T he first five factors on this list “ address the first element of undue influence (i.e., whether such influence existed and was exerted with respec t to the testament at issue); the next four factors concern the second element (i.e., whether the testator ’ s will was subverted or overpowered by such influence); and the tenth factor is relevant to the third element (i.e., whether the testament would have been executed but for such influence).” Kam , 484 S.W.3d . at 652

- 653 , citing In re Estate of Clifton, 2012 WL 3139864, at *3

.

2. The existence and exertion of an influence Appellants argue that the evidence fails to support a finding that they exert ed any influence

over Buford’s decision to draft the H olographic W ill , contending that, at most, the evidence suggested that Tait was merely present when Buford drafted the will

. This argument, however, overlooks several key items of evidence. First, the undisputed evidence demonstrated that when Buford first met Tait and Rueda , he did not have a will, and had not expressed any intent to draft a will; to the contrary , in his 2010 meeting with Dr. Clayton , Buford told her that his family did not write will s and that they had all died intestate. Tait himself admitted that when he initially suggested to Buford that he should draft a will, Buford was resistant to th e idea , and that he spent several months trying to convince Buford of the need to do so. Tait’s efforts were documented in two emails that he sent to attorney Pam Walker in October of 2014, in which he stated that he had been “working on” Buford for two years to get Buford to “trust” him enough to follow his advice, and that it took “ several months ”17

before he “finally got [Buford] to write out a holographic will.” 6 In addition, Tait submitted an invoice to Buford billing him for his assistance in prepar ing the H olographic W ill, expressly stat ing that Tait spent four and a half hours at Buford’s home on March 23, 2013, “to help him prepare will.” 7
Moreover , the record demonstrates that by the time Buford signed the H olographic W ill, Tait had taken over virtually all of Buford’s legal affairs , was correspond ing directly with the attorneys and experts who had been retained to assist Buford in lifting the management trust, and Tait accompanied Buford to virtually every meeting he had with his attorneys to discuss his legal issues. We therefore conclude that there was both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support a finding that Appellants , and Tait in particular, had a clear opportunity to exert their influence on Buford’s decision to sign the Holographic W ill. Appellants , however, contend that ev en if t he y had an opportunity to influence Buford ’s decision to sign the H olographic W ill, there was no evidence to support a finding that they had an “improper or fraudulent motive” for doing so, as the will did not name either of them as beneficiaries. Appellants are correct that the H olographic W ill d id not make a direct bequest to either of them. However, there is evidence that Appellants could have indirectly benefitted by the Holographic W ill , based on the will’s creation of the “Buford Scott, Jr. C haritable Trust,” into which all of Buford’s assets were to be placed upon his death

. In particular, the first draft of the trust document n amed Tait as trustee

. The trust documents which were eventually signed as part of the August Will also name d Tait as the trustee and gave him unfettered decision

- making

6 As well, Tait’s own time

- log indicates that he began discussing the need for a will with Buford as early as August 13, 2012, two months after he and Rueda first met with Buford.

7 Tait also submitted a bill to Buford for assisting him with making changes or additions to the Holographic Will after he received feedback from Moseley about the will’s deficiencies

.18

authority with respect to how to conduct the business of the trust

. A fter Buford’s death , Tait filed

a certificate of formation of a non

- profit corporation creating t he “ Buford Scott, Jr. Charita ble Foundation, ” in which he listed himself , Rueda , and one other person as the sole members on the Board of Directors. From this, t he jury could have inferred that Appellants influenced Buford to sign the Holographic Will that would in turn place them in control of the trust and its assets.

3. Appellants’ i nfluence was e ffectively a sserted Appellants next argue that the evidence was in sufficient to support a finding that their influence was effectively asserted , or in ot her words, there was no evidence that Buford’s will was
overborne by them at the time h e signed the H olographic W ill

. In particular, Appellants contend that there was no evidence to suggest that “Buford’s mind was weak or that he was easily subjected

to t he influence of others at the time the Holographic Will was adopted.” In making this argument, Appellants first contend that the jury impliedly rejected the notion that Buford had any mental weakness because they found he had testamentary capacity to sign the Holographic W ill. Yet testamentary capacity and undu e influence are separate and distinct questions. Rothermal , 369 S.W.2d at 922 ( noting that u ndue influence in the procurement of a will is a ground for contesting a will “separate and distinct from the ground of testamentary incapacity ” )

. Accordingly, the jury’s finding that Buford had testamentary capacity d oes not foreclose a finding that he was controlled by Appellants’ actions. Next, Appellants argue that the uncontroverted eviden ce demonstrated that they did not overpower Buford’s decision

- making process

. In particular, Appellants contend that t he evidence demonstrated that Buford was an unusually stubborn individual, who was not easily influenced or controlled, and that he gener ally did not trust others, especially when it came to his finances

. Several witnesses, including three of Buford’s long

- time family friends and his former attorney ,19

Pam Walker, described Buford as being “quite stubborn ” and “ damn hard

- headed

. ” 8 True as that may be, there was also evidence that Buford was susceptible to the very type of influence that Tait and Rueda exerted o ver him. For example, Dr. Clayton, who examined Buford in 2010, believed that Buford exhibited signs of paranoia and was di strustful which, combined with his cognitive impairments, made him “extremely susceptible to the manipulation and control by others.” In addition, at trial, Dr. Clayton opined that Buford did “not have the cognitive ability to access and
determine the mot ives of others,” and that in particular, he was “very susceptible to being taken advantage [ of

] by people that he thought were his friends and yet were only using him for his
money . ” This had happened in the past when a person Buford believed was his frie nd manipulated him into giving away a significant amount of money. She further testified that Tait and Rueda had manipulat ed Buford by “feeding into [Buford’s] paranoid delusions” about his cousins’ role in the guardianship proceedings , in order to influence Buford’s decision to disinherit
them

. Appellants, however, contend that Dr. Clayton’s opinion should not be considered because her examination was done some three years before execution of the H olographic W ill

. Dr. Clayton explained at trial, however, th at the traits that she described in her report, ( Buford’s learning disabilities, his paranoia , and his susceptibility to undue influence ) were of a “permanen t” nature and were not likely to change or improve. In fact , she opined that, if anything, these traits were likely to get worse over time. Moreover, a ttorney Pam Walker , who represented Buford shortly after he signed the
H olographic W ill, testified that she believed Buford had “paranoid ” tendencies, and found him to be “s usceptible ” to being influenced by someone he trusted. She further believed

-- after learning

8 E ach of the three friends or their spouses were named as beneficiaries in Buford’s August Will, and therefore had a veste d interest in convincing the court that Buford was not unduly influenced by Appellants.20

that Buford had left the bulk of his estate to Appellants in his August Will

-- that Appellants had taken advantage of Buford’s paranoid tendencies, and had fueled his suspicions about the cousins’ role in the earlier guardianship proceedings to serve their own purposes. 9 In particular, Walker recalled that on at least two occasions Tait “bad

- mouthed” Buford’s cousins in front of Buford

. Tait himself admitted that Buford exhibited irrational and paranoid tendencies, had a general distrust of the judicial system, and often did not understand what was necessary to protect his assets. More importantly, Tait admitted at trial that despite Buford’s paranoid tendencies and his stubborn nature, he was a ble to “ influence ” Buford to do what he thought was in his best interest to “protect” Buford’s financ es and in particular to draft the Holographic Will.
T he record also contains evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Tait did more than simpl y convince Buford to draft the H olographic W ill

. In particular, attorney Pam Walker and Buford’s cousins testified that based on their experience with Buford, they did not believe he was capable of writing the H olographic W ill on his own , and that they believed it may have been dictated to him , or that Buford had copied it from ano ther writing. And Tait all but admitted that he was in control of dictating the terms of the Holographic Will to Buford, as he responded to attorney Scott Mos e ley’s criti que of the H olographic W ill in an email as follows: “If I’d known [the Holographic W ill] should include most the [sic] same language of a more formal Texas will as you now indicate, I’d have had him write it differently ,” and that he intended to have Buford “add additional provisions to his Will as you suggest.” ( e mphasis added)

.

9 In addition, Walker testified at trial that she felt “duped” by Appellants and believed that they had misled her and the experts they retained in the action to lift t he guardianship into believ ing that Buford was living more independently than he actually was . In particular, she believed that Appellants had not disclosed to her, or to the expert witnesses that they were providing significant assistance to Buford, making it seem as if he was managing his life on his own, and ensuring that he presented in a well

- groomed fashion when he met with them.21

Accordi ngly, we conclude that the record contains both factually and legally sufficient evidence to support a finding that Buford was susceptible to Appellants’ influence and that Appellants effectively asserted t heir influence by not only convincing Buford to draft the
H olographic W ill but by controlling and directing hi s actions in doing so.

4. Buford would not have e xecuted the Holographic Will but for Appellants’ i nfluence Appellant s next contend that the eviden ce was in sufficient to support a finding that Buford would not disinherit his cousins and leav e his entire estate to charity , but for Appellants’ influence. According to Appellants, there was nothing “unnatural” about Buford’s decision to do so, and that to the contrary, the decision was reasonably explained by the fact that Buford was upset with his cousins for their alleged role in the prior guardianship proceedings and by the fact that he did not have any significant relationship with them. Appellants further contend that Buford told both attorneys Mos e ley and Walker of his intent to d isinherit his cousins and of his intent to leave his estate to charity, thereby demonstrating that the Holographic Will expressed his “true wishes.” And according to Appe llants, there is nothing in the record to rebut these assertions. We disagree. First, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Buford made any statements to either
Mos e ley or Walker expressing his intent to disinherit his cousins or his intent to l eave his money to charity. A lthough Moseley recalled that Buford informed him that he was angry with his cousins for their alleged involvement in the guardianship proceedings, he did not recall if Buford

ever expressed any intent to disinherit them

. Simi larly, Walker testified that when she spoke with Buford about the possibility of drafting a formal will in November of 2014 , Buford did not tell her how he wanted to dispose of his estate , and instead indicated that he had not yet decided what to do with h is money and that he needed time to think about it . He made this statement despite the fact that he had signed the H olographic W ill over a year and half prior to that meeting

. Further,22

Walker recalled that although she suggested to Buford that he had the option of leaving his money to charity, Buford never indicated that he intended to do so.
We nevertheless recognize that Buford’s decision to disinherit his cousins and to give his money to charity, without more, is not necessarily indicative of an unnatural disposition and does
not prove that the decision was the product of undue influence. See generally Estate of Davis v. Cook , 9 S.W.3d 288, 294 (Tex.App

. -- San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (recognizing that test ator’s decision to exclude nieces and nephews in favor of charities, without more, did not establish an unnatural disposition or the existence of undue influence) . Ho wever, there are several factors that the jury could have considered in finding that Bufo rd’s disposition was in fact unnatural and was the result of Appellants’ undue influence. B efore m eeting Appellants, Buford had expressed an intent to die intestate, which meant that his cousins would have inherited his entire estate

. The jury could have concluded that Appellants spent months fueling Buford’s animosity towards his
cousins and convinc ed him to sign the Holographic Will disinheriting them. I n addition, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Buford had previously given any considera tion to leaving his
estate to charity before he met Appellants , or that he had even donated to a charity in the past. Thus, the jury was presented with two alternative explanations for why Buford signed the Holographic Will

-- e ither Buford had formulate d a true intent to disinherit his cousins and leave his estate to charity, or his decision to do so was influenced by Appellants’ long

- term plan to take control of his estate. When, as here, a jury is presented with two reasonable explanations f or why a testator might draft a will that appears unnatural, the jury is free to cho o se between those explanations. See, e.g ., In re Estate of Johnson , 340 S.W.3d 769, 783

- 784 (Tex.App

. -- San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (when a jury is faced with alternativ e explanations for why a testator might otherwise draft a will that appears unnatural, the jury is free to determine which of23

the explanations it finds more credible ); see also In re Estate of Luthen , No. 13

- 12

- 00576

- CV, 2014 WL 6632952, at *7

- 8 (Tex.App

. - - Corpus Christi Nov. 24, 2014, no pet.) ( mem. op., not designated for publication) (recognizing that when “ competing explanations are advanced ” by the partie s with regard to a testator’s reason for disinheriting a family member, “the jury must determine which explanation should be given more weight and which explanation is more credible.”)

. In th is case, there was both factually and legally sufficient evidence for the jury to choose Appellees’ theory that Buford was in fact influ enced by Appellants’ plan to take control of his estate, and that Buford would not have drafted the Holographic Will disinheriting his cousins bu t for Appellants’ undue influence. 10 Appellants’ Issues One through Three are Overruled.
B. Validity of the Jul y and August Wills
T he trial court invalidated the July 21, 2015 and the August 13, 2015 wills based on jury findings that for both, Buford lacked testamentary capacity and that he si gned the m as the result of undue influence. In Issues Four through Eleve n, Appellants contend that the evidence was both factually and legally insufficient to support these jury findings. Because Appellants’ arguments are virtually identical with respect to both W ills, we address the m together. We begin with the issue of undue influence

.

1. Appellants had the o

pportunity to e xert i nfluence over Buford Although Appellants contend that there was no evidence to support a finding that they pressured Buford into signing the July and August Wills, they do not contest that they had the opportunity to do so , or a motive for exerting their influence over him. Notably, the opportunity

10 And because of t his finding, we conclude that it is unnecessary to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to support the finding that Buford subsequently revoked the Holographic Will

.24

to influence Buford increased after the management trust was lifted in November of 2014. And within days after the management trust was l ifted, Buford signed a Limited Power of Attorney giving Tait control over virtually all of Buford’s financ ial , legal , and medical decisions. In addition, despite the fact that both Walker and Mosel e y offered to assist Buford with drafting a formal will to replace the H olographic W ill, Tait declined their offers, and instead spent the next few months assisting Buford with making changes or additions to his Holographic Will . He later took it upon himself to draft the various formal wills that Buford signed in July and August of
2015 during his final illness

. In effect, the jury could have inferred that Appellants were engaging in a course of conduct to ensure that they retained com plete control over his decision

- making process with respect to the future wills that he drafted

. As well, Appellants’ motive for influencing Buford to sign the July and August Wills was obvious, as they received bequests exceeding two million dollars in both the July and August Wills. Accordingly, we conclude that there was both factually and legally sufficient evidence to support a finding that Appellants had a clear opportunity and motive to exert their influence over Buford in the drafting of these two wills.

2. Appellants e

ffectively a sserted their i nfluence over Buf ord Appellants next contend the evidence was insufficient to prove that they effectively asserted influence over Buford or that he was susceptible to influence at the time that he signed the two wills. In particular, they contend that Dr. Clayton was the only witness to discuss Buford’s susceptibility to influence at the time he signed the wi lls, but that her testimony should be disregarded. First, Appellants o nce again point out that Dr. Clayton only evaluated Buford one time in 2010, and th ey argue that she therefore had no basis for opining on his mental status five years25

later when the wills were signed. But as we explain above, Dr. Clayton testified that Buford’s vulnerability and susceptibility to undue influence was of a permanent nature and if anything, was likely to get worse over time. Moreover, Dr. Clayton testified that Buford’s susceptibility increase d due to his physical ailments and the medication that he was taking during his final illness in the hospital. By the time of his ho spital stay, Buford had tumors in both his liver and lungs

. He was in liver and kidney failure, had low oxygen levels, and had toxins in his blood. A treating physician noted that Buford did not appear to understand his diagnosis, was anxious and in pain , and exhibited “scattered thinking” during his hospital stay. Dr. Clayton further pointed out that while in the hospital, Buford was being treated with narcotic pain medicine s that would have affected his cognitive abilities

. Dr. Clayton concluded that Buford’s physical condition and his medications wou ld have likely increased his preexisting paranoid tendencies, making it even easier to manipulate or take advantage of him

. A testator’s physical ailments may inform the jury of the testator’s mental statu s , if the evidence sufficiently link s the two at th e time of a will signing

. See, e.g. , Croucher v. Croucher , 660 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. 1983) (upholding trial court’s finding that testator lacked testamentary capacity where evidence of occlusion of the carotid arteries was consistent with mental incapacity at the t im e o f will signing); see also Kinsel v. Lindsey , 526 S.W.3d 411, 420 (Tex. 2017) ( recognizing that “evidence of physical problems that are consistent with or can contribute to mental incapacity is probative” on the issue of an individual’s mental capacity). But Appellants argue that Dr. Clayton’s testimony did not sufficiently link B uford’s physical condition to his
mental status on the exact days that he signed the two wills

. In support of th is argument , Appellants rely on our sister court’s holding in Horton v. Horton , 965 S.W.2d 78, 86 (Tex.App

. -- Fort Worth 1998, no pet.)

. But Ho rton is inapposite . In Horton , a testator , who was dying of26

cancer, was taking pain medication and suffering from periodic hallucinations during the general time period in which he had signed a will

. Id. at 8 6

. There was no evidence, however, that the
testator was on medication or that he was suffering from any hallucina tions on the particular day that he signed his will. Id. The court therefore concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the will signing. Id

. However, the court used a differen t analysis when discussing the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the testator had been unduly influenced into signing the will . The court noted that in making a determination of undue influence, the jury could consid er more general evidence that the testator had cancer and was in considerable pain in the days leading up to the will signing , as that evidence was relevant to his “physical incapacity to resist or the susceptibility of his mind to an influence exerted.” 11 Id. at 88

. We agree with this analysis, and we conclude that the jury was entitled to rely on Dr. Clayton’s testimony concerning Buf ord’s weakened physical condition during the general time period in which he signed the July and August Wills, as evidence of his enhanced susceptibility to Appellants’ influence over him. Beyond that , the jury could have observed Buford ’s weakened conditi on from the videotaped recordings of the will signings

. Dr. Clayton had in fact observed that Buford appeared confused and “kind of dazed” in the videotape recordings . Dr. Clayton also testified that Tait was essentially leading Buford through his respon ses on the recordings to make it appear that he was more lucid tha n he actual ly was. We recognize that Appellants presented conflicting evidence regarding Buford’s mental state on the day of the w ill signings. For example, Appellants presented the testimo ny of the

11 In Horton , however, the court found that, despite the testator’s weake ned physical state, there was no evidence to support a finding of undue influence, as there was no evidence that the will proponent had an opportunity or did exert influence over him

. 965 S.W.2d at 88

. Unlike the situation in Horton , we have already conc luded that Appellants did have the opportunity to influence Buford’s decision to sign the wills, as well as a clear motive for doing so.27

notary public and two of the witnesses who were present at the will signing s , all of whom testified that they believed Buford appeared , (1) to understand what he was doing, (2) determined to sign the wills, and (3) not to have been coerced into signing the wills

. 12 N one of th o se witnesses , however, had any knowledge of Buford’s pre

- existing vulnerabilities, or the history of his relationship with Appellants.
W e also find sufficient evidence that Appellants t ook advantage of Buford’s weakened
mental state while he was in his final illness to maintain control over his decision

- making process. First, although Buford had already signed a Limited Power of Attorney in November of 2014 giving Tait control of Buford’s legal, business , and medical affairs, the day after his hospital admission, Buford signed a medical power of attorney naming Tait as his agent for making medical decisions, and Rueda as his first alternate agent. Shortly thereafter, Buford signed a Texas Statutory Durable Power of Attorney, designating Tait as his agent for virtually all of his legal, financial, business, and personal matters

. In addition, Tait took it upon himself to draft at least three different formal wills for Buford to sign once Appe llants realized that he was dying and arranged for the will signing to take place during Buford’s hospital stay

. Tait also mispresented the terms of the will s to Buford during the will signings by falsely claiming that Buford was leaving t he “majority” of his estate to a c haritable
t rust, when in fact only one minor asset was placed in the trust and the valuable assets were devised

12 Appellants also presented the testimony of an emergency room doctor , Dr. Kathleen Delaney, who saw Buford in the hosp ital on August 15, 2015, the day that he signed the August Will . She believed that Buford appeared “completely oriented” and “very alert” that day. Dr. Delaney , however, did not conduct a mental status examination of Buford, and there was no evidence tha t she was aware of any of Buford’s pre

- existing mental limitations, his paranoid tendencies , or his susceptibility to the influence of others. As well, she admitted that she was not aware of all of the medications that Buford was taking at that time.28

to Appellants

. 13 The jury could have inferred that this misrepresentation was the final st ep in a purposeful scheme to ensure that Appellant left the bulk of his estate to them.
A ccordingly, we find that the record contains both factually and legally sufficient evidence to support a finding that Appellants effectively exercise d their influence over Buford and effectively manipulated him into signing the July and August Will s .

3. Buford would not have e xecuted the July and August Wills but for Appellants’ i nfluence Appellants also contend that the record does not support a finding that Buford would not have signed the July and August Wills but for Appellants’ influence, contending that there was nothing unnatural about the disposition s that Buford made in those wills. In particular , Appellants once again contend that Bufo rd had consistently expressed his intent to disinherit his cousins prior
to signing the July and August Wills , and tha t he had further expressed to various individuals how grateful he was to Appellants for assisting him with hi s legal issues and that he h ad developed a great affection for them. Appellants further argue that there is no evidence in the record that Buford had ever expressed an intent to dispose of his property in any other manner. For the same reasons, and evide nce noted in Section I II (A)(4) of this opinion, we likewise conclude the evidence supports the jury’s finding. And for the July and August W ills, there was evidence to suggest that Appellants had misled Buf ord into believing t hat the bulk of his estate wa s going to his c haritable
t rust, when in fact the express terms of the July and August Wills gave the bulk of his estate to Appellants. The jury therefore could have infer red that Buford was n o t aware of the actual terms of the w ills and that they did not express his true intent. Accordingly, we conclude that there was

13 App ellants contend that Tait did not mislead Buford on this point

. In particular, Tait testified that the mineral interests given to the Charitable Trust would be worth 10 to 20 million dollars over the course of 20 years. Appellants also claimed that t he land they received was only worth approximately 1.6 million dollars. Tait, however, did not support those opinion s with any facts and the jury therefore could have discounted the claim.29

both factually and legally sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that Buford signed the July and August Wills as the result of Appellants’ undue influe nce. 14 Appellant’s Issues Four through Eleven are Overruled.

C. The Request for Attorney’s Fees At trial, Appellants requested $416,978.75 in attorney’s fees, and $29,509.09 in expenses with regard to submitting the August W ill to probate, and for defendi ng against Appellees’ will
contest. Section 352.052 of the Texas Estates Code allows for the payment of a designated executor’s or beneficiary’s legal expenses when that person defends or prosecutes a will in good faith and with just cause, whether or not that person was successful in doing so. See
T EX .E ST
. C ODE A NN
. § 352.052

. The jury, however, found that Appellants did not act in good faith or with just cause in doing so , and the trial court therefore denied Appellants’ request for fees and expenses

. In Issues 12 through 17, Appellants contend that the evidence was both legally and factually in sufficient to support the jury’s determination that they did not act in good faith , and that the trial court therefore erred in denying their request for attor ney’s fees. Although Appellants raise separate issues with respect to whether they acted in good faith and just ca u se with regard to defending each of the three wills, we address these arguments in a more global fashion.
1. The l aw on a ttorney’s f ees Whe ther an executor act s in good faith and with just cause in prosecuting or defending a will i s a question of fact, to be determined by the jury upon a consideration of all of the circumstances of a case. Huff v. Huff , 124 S.W.2d 327, 330 (1939) ; see also Russell v. Moeling , 526 S.W.2d 533, 536 (Tex. 1975) (recognizing that the question of whether executor acted in good

14 Having reached this conclusion, we need not address Appellants’ alternate argument that the evidence did not support a finding that Buford lacked testamentary capacity to sign those two wills.30

faith and with just cause is a question for jury that should be determined in the original probate proceeding) ; Matter of Kam , 484 S.W.3d a t 654 (recognizing that good faith is ordinarily a question of fact and th at an appellate court should uphold a jury finding u nless the evidence conclusively established the party’s good faith)

. To be sure, a finding that an individual procured a will by undue influence does not preclude a finding that the individual acted in good faith and with just cause in attempting to admit the will to probate or in defending the will against a will contest

. Harkins v. Crews , 907 S.W.2d 51, 62 (Tex.App.

-- San Antonio 1995, writ denied) , citing Huff , 124 S.W.2d at 330

. 2. A pplication Appellants contend that there was no evidence that they acted in bad faith or with a fraudulent intent in offering the various wills to probate

. Rather , the “uncontroverted evidence” demonstrated that they submitted the wills to probate in good faith because they genuinely believed that the wills expressed Buford’s “true intent

. ” This argument, however, is essentially a rehash of the arguments set forth above, with Appellants contending that they had reason to believe that Buford wished to disinherit his cousins, that Buford wished to leave part of his estate to charity, and that Buford also wanted to benefit Appellants due to his gratitude for assisting him with his legal and other issues over the years. Although the jury was free to believe Appellants’ theory that they acted in good faith in defending the wills, the jury was also presented with an alternative theory that Appellants did so in bad faith b y perpetrating a long

- term scheme to gain access to Buford’s not insignificant estate

. The record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that implicitly accepts the existence of such a scheme . That scheme negates any good faith or just cause in submitting any31

of the wills to probate or in d efending against Appellees’ will contest . W e conclude that t he jury’s findings were supported by both factually and legally sufficient evidence

. Appellants’ Issues Twelve through Seventeen are Overruled. V. CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice April 7, 2020 Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.