[Cite as State v. Mack, 2014-Ohio-1387.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

DANIEL R. MACK 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 26859 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR 12 10 2837 (B) 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 31, 2014 

 

MOORE, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Daniel Mack, appeals his convictions in the Summit County Court of 

Common Pleas. This Court affirms in part and reverses in part. 

I. 

{¶2} For two months, Mr. Mack lived in a Kenmore Boulevard townhouse with his 

girlfriend, Kaitlyn Carpas. Mr. Mack decided to move out after a fight with Ms. Carpas, and 

their landlord saw Mr. Mack load some of his possessions into a white car and drive away on the 

afternoon of October 1, 2012. Within a few hours, Akron police approached the residence after a 

tip that methamphetamine was being produced and used at the location. Ms. Carpas consented to 

a search and, while inside, police detected an odor distinct to the manufacture of 

methamphetamine and found numerous items related to its production in close proximity to one 

another. Ms. Carpas was arrested, and she implicated Mr. Mack. A warrant then issued for Mr. 

Mack’s arrest as well. 
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{¶3} Ms. Carpas and Mr. Mack were charged with illegal manufacture of drugs in 

violation of R.C. 2925.04(A), a second-degree felony; illegal assembly or possession of 

chemicals for the manufacture of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.041(A), a third-degree felony; 

and aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)/(C)(1), a fifth-degree felony. 

Ms. Carpas pleaded guilty to illegal assembly or possession of chemicals and aggravated 

possession. The charge of illegal manufacture was dismissed, and the trial court sentenced Ms. 

Carpas to two years of community control. She agreed to testify against Mr. Mack, whose case 

proceeded to a jury trial. During the trial, Ms. Carpas testified that although she used 

methamphetamine, Mr. Mack was solely responsible for the manufacturing that took place in 

their apartment. The trial court did not instruct the jury regarding accomplice testimony, and the 

jury found Mr. Mack guilty of all charges. The trial court sentenced him to four years in prison, 

and Mr. Mack appealed. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION 

TO THE JURY IN FAILING TO GIVE THE JURY THE REQUIRED 

CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF AN 

ALLEGED ACCOMPLICE UNDER R.C. 2923.03(D). 

{¶4} Mr. Mack’s first assignment of error is that the trial court erred by failing to 

instruct the jury regarding the accomplice testimony of Kaitlyn Carpas. Because Mr. Mack did 

not object to the jury instructions at trial, he has forfeited all but plain error, and consequently, 

we may only recognize error that affects a substantial right as necessary to prevent a manifest 

miscarriage of justice. State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶15-16. 

{¶5} When an alleged accomplice testifies against a defendant in a jury trial, the trial 

court must instruct the jury substantially as follows: 
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The testimony of an accomplice does not become inadmissible because of his 

complicity, moral turpitude, or self-interest, but the admitted or claimed 

complicity of a witness may affect his credibility and make his testimony subject 

to grave suspicion, and require that it be weighed with great caution. 

It is for you, as jurors, in the light of all the facts presented to you from the 

witness stand, to evaluate such testimony and to determine its quality and worth 

or its lack of quality and worth. 

R.C. 2923.03(D). “When considering whether failure to instruct a jury under R.C. 2923.03(D) 

amounts to plain error, this Court considers the scope of cross-examination of the accomplice; 

whether the accomplice’s plea agreement was presented to the jury; whether the trial court 

substantially complied with R.C. 2923.03(D); and whether trial counsel may have made a tactical 

decision not to object in light of favorable testimony by the accomplice.” State v. Smith, 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 25650, 2012-Ohio-794, ¶ 21, citing State v. Simpson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 

25363, 2011-Ohio-2771, ¶ 19 and State v. Davis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22395, 2005-Ohio-4083, 

¶ 16. The ultimate question is whether in the absence of the alleged error, the defendant would 

have obtained a different result at trial. State v. Ross, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009742, 2012-

Ohio-536, ¶ 46, 48. 

{¶6} The existence of “error * * * [is] the starting point for a plain-error inquiry,” State 

v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d 191, 200 (2001), and so our analysis begins with the requirements of R.C. 

2923.03(D). “At minimum, an accomplice must be someone who has been indicted for the crime 

of complicity.” Smith at ¶ 22, citing State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, ¶ 131-

132. In this case, Ms. Carpas qualifies as an accomplice because she not only was charged with 

the crime of complicity to commit the charged offenses, but as a codefendant in the commission 

of the offenses themselves. As such, R.C. 2923.03(D) required the trial court to instruct the jury 

in a manner substantially consistent with the instruction provided therein. The parties agree that 
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the trial court did not instruct the jury regarding Ms. Carpas’ testimony. By the plain terms of 

R.C. 2923.03(D), the trial court erred in this omission. 

{¶7} With respect to plain error, therefore, we turn to the factors set forth in Smith and, 

ultimately, to the question of whether the trial court’s error determined the outcome of Mr. 

Mack’s trial. In this case, counsel for Mr. Mack vigorously cross-examined Ms. Carpas in 

relation to her decision to testify against Mr. Mack and her credibility in general. Ms. Carpas 

testified that her agreement to testify was, at least in part, consideration for the recommendation 

of a community control sentence instead of a prison term. On the other hand, with respect to 

whether the failure to object to the omitted jury instruction may have been a tactical maneuver on 

the part of defense counsel, Ms. Carpas’s testimony was entirely unfavorable to Mr. Mack: she 

squarely placed the blame for the manufacture of methamphetamine in the residence upon him, 

disavowed any interest in the components found in the house, and denied that she herself had any 

involvement in the manufacturing process. See State v. Davis, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22395, 

2005-Ohio-4083, ¶ 20. The trial court’s jury instructions “left [the jury] to consider [Ms. 

Carpas’s] credibility in the identical manner it judged the testimony of all other witnesses” and 

did “not comply in any meaningful way with the instructions the legislature has chosen to 

mandate for accomplice testimony.” Id. at ¶ 19. 

{¶8} Finally, we consider the evidence at trial to determine whether the trial court’s 

error determined the outcome of Mr. Mack’s trial. See id. We first consider Mr. Mack’s 

convictions for illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs and 

aggravated possession of drugs. Under R.C. 2925.041(A), “[n]o person shall knowingly 

assemble or possess one or more chemicals that may be used to manufacture a controlled 

substance in schedule I or II with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance in schedule I 
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or II in violation of section 2925.04 of the Revised Code.” Under R.C. 2925.11(A), “[n]o person 

shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance[.]” These statutes share the 

common element of possession, which requires “control over a thing or substance, but may not 

be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of 

the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). 

{¶9} Nonetheless, a defendant who enjoys dominion and control over drug 

paraphernalia in a residence may be found to have constructive possession. State v. Woods, 9th 

Dist. Wayne No. 07CA0067, 2008-Ohio-1468, ¶ 7. “While mere presence in the vicinity of the 

item is insufficient to justify possession, ready availability of the item and close proximity to it 

support a finding of constructive possession.” (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Lamb, 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 23418, 2007-Ohio-5107, ¶ 12. Some facts standing alone, such as access to 

drugs, are insufficient to establish constructive possession on their own, but when viewed 

together, these factors may constitute circumstantial evidence that demonstrates constructive 

possession. Woods at ¶ 7, citing State v. Owens, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23267, 2007-Ohio-49, ¶ 

23. 

{¶10} In this case, the owner of the Kenmore Boulevard property testified that Mr. 

Mack and Ms. Carpas assumed possession of their apartment from the previous tenants, with 

whom they had been staying for an extended period of time. According to the landlord, Mr. 

Mack and Ms. Carpas were the only residents of the apartment for about two months before Mr. 

Mack moved out. The landlord had regular interaction with Mr. Mack on the premises up to and 

including the day that he moved out. Within a matter of just a few hours after Mr. Mack left the 

apartment, police found pervasive evidence of methamphetamine use and production in the 

residence. According to Lieutenant Brian Simcox, who searched the apartment, the telltale odor 
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of methamphetamine production was present in the bedroom and basement of the home. 

Lieutenant Simcox also found numerous items consistent with a “shake and bake” method of 

methamphetamine production, including loose pseudoephedrine tablets, coffee filters that tested 

positive for methamphetamine, a razor blade and a “snort straw,” muriatic acid, cold packs, and 

coffee filters soaked with solvent. Lieutenant Simcox opined that the evidence he found 

indicated recent methamphetamine production and, in the case of the solvent-soaked coffee 

filters, “very recent” activity. 

{¶11} Even without Ms. Carpas’s testimony, the testimony of Mr. Mack’s landlord and 

Lieutenant Simcox established that methamphetamine and the components necessary for its 

manufacture were pervasive within the residence that he shared with Ms. Carpas and that he was 

present in that residence only two hours before the evidence was seized. In light of this 

evidence, we cannot say that Mr. Mack would not have been convicted of illegal assembly or 

possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs and aggravated possession of drugs in the 

absence of the trial court’s error. 

{¶12} Mr. Mack’s conviction for illegal manufacture of methamphetamine, however, 

presents a different situation. R.C. 2925.04(A) prohibits any person from knowingly 

manufacturing or otherwise engaging in any part of the production of controlled substances. 

“‘Manufacture’ means to plant, cultivate, harvest, process, make, prepare, or otherwise engage in 

any part of the production of a drug, by propagation, extraction, chemical synthesis, or 

compounding, or any combination of the same, and includes packaging, repackaging, labeling, 

and other activities incident to production.” R.C. 2925.01(J). When there is evidence indicating 

that drugs are being cultivated or produced by someone, the mere presence of a defendant on 

property also accessible to others, without more, does not establish a violation of R.C. 
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2925.04(A). See State v. Jones, 6th Dist. Lucas Nos. L-00-1231, L-00-1232, L-00-1233, 2003-

Ohio-219, ¶ 103. Compare State v. Inskeep, 2nd Dist. Champaign No. 2003 CA 22, 2004-Ohio4927, ¶ 13-19 (concluding that there was sufficient evidence of cultivating marijuana when the 

defendant had lived alone for many years on property under his exclusive control and his actions 

in response to the presence of police officers demonstrated his knowledge and participation in 

cultivation). 

{¶13} Lieutenant Simcox testified that he observed significant evidence demonstrating 

the presence of methamphetamine production at the Kenmore Boulevard townhouse. Mr. Mack 

shared the apartment with Ms. Carpas for two months, but Mr. Mack’s landlord testified that he 

received complaints from other tenants regarding significant traffic in and out of the rental unit. 

Ms. Carpas is an acknowledged drug user who, despite her protestations to the contrary, 

displayed detailed knowledge of the methamphetamine production process during her testimony. 

Yet her testimony alone points to Mr. Mack as the person responsible for the methamphetamine 

production. Police did not recover any physical evidence that would demonstrate a connection, 

nor did any other witnesses testify in that regard. The State introduced letters written to Ms. 

Carpas by Mr. Mack and has argued that they contain statements that implicate him independent 

from her testimony. Those letters, however, are ambiguous. Without Ms. Carpas’s 

accompanying testimony, they are subject to many possible interpretations other than an 

admission of Mr. Mack’s guilt. 

{¶14} Without Ms. Carpas’s testimony, there is no evidence that points to Mr. Mack as a 

person responsible for manufacturing the methamphetamine. With respect to Mr. Mack’s 

conviction for illegal manufacture of methamphetamine, therefore, the trial court committed 

plain error by failing to instruct the jury as required by R.C. 2923.03(D). Mr. Mack’s first 
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assignment of error is sustained in part. With respect to his convictions for illegal assembly or 

possession of chemicals for the manufacture of drugs and aggravated possession of drugs, 

however, his first assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

[MR.] MACK WAS RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY DEFENSE 

COUNSEL AT TRIAL. 

{¶15} Mr. Mack’s second assignment of error is that he was denied effective assistance 

of counsel by his attorney’s failure to request a complicity instruction. Because this Court has 

sustained Mr. Mack’s first assignment of error with respect to his conviction for illegal 

manufacture of methamphetamine, his second assignment of error is moot in connection with 

that conviction. See State v. Jamhour, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-20, 2006-Ohio-4987, ¶ 14. 

We consider Mr. Mack’s second assignment of error, therefore, in connection with his remaining 

convictions. 

{¶16} In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant most show 

(1) deficiency in the performance of counsel “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” and (2) that the errors made by 

counsel were “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial[.]” Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate prejudice by showing that, but for 

counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been 

different. Id. at 694. “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not 

warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the 

judgment.” Id. at 691. “Speculation regarding the prejudicial effects of counsel’s performance 

will not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Cromartie, 9th Dist. Medina No. 
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06CA0107-M, 2008-Ohio-273, ¶ 25, citing State v. Downing, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22012, 

2004-Ohio-5952, ¶ 27. 

{¶17} As discussed in our analysis of Mr. Mack’s first assignment of error, the evidence 

supported his convictions for illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of 

drugs and aggravated possession of drugs even if Ms. Carpas’s testimony is disregarded entirely. 

Consequently, his argument that he would have obtained a different result at trial on these 

charges had a complicity instruction been given is speculative, at best. Mr. Mack has not 

demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted of these charges in the 

absence of counsel’s error, and his second assignment of error is overruled in part. 

III. 

{¶18} Mr. Mack’s first assignment of error is sustained with respect to his conviction for 

illegal manufacture of methamphetamine, but overruled with respect to his other convictions. 

His second assignment of error is moot with respect to his conviction for illegal manufacture of 

methamphetamine, but is overruled with respect to his other convictions. The judgment of the 

Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is 

remanded for a new trial on the charge of illegal manufacture of methamphetamine. 

Judgment affirmed in part, 

reversed in part, 

and cause remanded. 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
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 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed equally to both parties. 

 

 CARLA MOORE 

 FOR THE COURT 

BELFANCE, J. 

HENSAL, J. 

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

JEFFREY N. JAMES, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.