Filed 8 / 20 / 20 3558 Sagunto Street, LLC v. County of Santa Barbara CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

3558 SAGUNTO STREET, LLC,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY O F SANTA BARBARA

,
Defendant and Respondent

. 2d Civil No. B297383 (Super. Ct. No. 15CV00606) (Santa Barbara County)

Appellant 355 8 Sagunto Street, LLC is the owner of property at 3558 Sagunto Street in Santa Ynez (Sagunto Property)

. Af

ter a dispute with an adjoining property owner ( Edison Property ) regarding parking spaces, a ppellant placed “reserved ” signs on and blocked access to parking spaces located in front of the Sagunto Property.

T he County of Santa Barbara (County) issued a

no tice of violation to appellant for restricting parking in violation
of the Development Plan applicable to the property (88

- DP

- 14)2

( Development Plan)

. Appellant filed a complaint alleging the Development Plan did not apply to the Sagunto Property. The
tri al court found otherwise and entered judgment in favor of the County. We affirm.

FACT UAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Tom and Joan Bohlinger (Bohlingers) owned the Sagunto and Edison Properties

. In 1977

, they built a commercial building on the Sagunto Propert y , leaving the Edison Property undeveloped

. In 1988, the Bohlingers submitted an application for approval of the Development Plan. The Development Plan
included “facelifting the exterior of the existing building ” on the Sagunto Property “ and the addition of 6,040 squa re feet of new commercial space ” on the Edison Property. The application noted there were 11 existing parking spaces , with a plan to build 11

more , for a total of 22 onsite parking spaces

.

In July 1988, the County’s Planning C ommission

appr oved the Developm ent Plan with conditions, including the following : “The use of the property, size, shape, arrangement, and location of the buildings, walkways, parking areas, and landscaped areas shall be developed in substantial conformity with the appr oved dev elopment plan marked Planning
Commission [Attachment] A . . . Substantial conformity shall be determined by the Director of the Resource Management Department. In the event of disagreement, such a determination shall be made by the Planning Commis sion.” Attachment A was

a “Site Plan and Grou nd Floor Plan

, ” which depicted the project
site incorporating both the Sagunto and the Edison Properties

, including 22 parking spaces

.

In 1996, the Bohlingers recorded a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions an d Restrictions Concerning Private3

Reciprocal Parking (CC & R s ). The purpose of the CC&Rs was to “provide for reciprocal parking on each parcel for the benefit of
b oth improved legal parcels.” The CC&Rs identified the property as “two (2) contiguous legal p arcels, each containing parking

areas , . . . with all parking spaces adequate in size per the
De velopment Plan by the County.” The CC&Rs identified the

“ contiguous parcels ” by the Sagunto and Edison Properties’
Assessor ’s Parcel Number (APN). The CC&Rs s tated that “no reserved parking or hedge, fence, wall or similar barrier may be placed, installed or constructed on either parcel if the reserved parking or barrier would block or otherwise interfere with the primary objective of [the CC&Rs ] to prov ide ful l reciprocal parking.” The CC&Rs were to “run[] with the land” and were “binding on the successor owners thereof.”

In 1996, t he Bohlingers sold the Sagunto Property to Jon and Kathryn ( Bowens )

. T he Bowens recorded a Notice of
Consent to Use Land

. T he n otice stated that “Bohlinger developed and improved both [the Sagunto and Edison] properties generally conforming to a Development Plan (88

- DP

14) approved by the County of Santa Barbara on July 21, 1988. ”

In 2007, a ppellant pu rchased the Sagunto Property

. At the time of the purchase, t he title report referenced both the
CC&Rs and the Notice of Consent to Use Land as “exceptions” to
title

. In 2008, a ppellant installed “ reserved ” signs on parking spaces on the Sagunto Property. In 2013, it blocked

access to the parking spaces that were marked “reserved” on the Sagunto Property.

In 2015, County officials sent a Notice of Violation to the owners of the Sagunto and Edison Properties , stating that the4

“chains/barriers . . . placed in front of” parking spaces on the Sagunto Property violated the Development Plan and the County Land Use and Development Code

. The Notice of Violation noted that the “investigation revealed that [the Edison Property] was included in the approved [Attachment A ] which depicts the
bo undaries of [the Sagunto Property] and [the Edison Property] and incorporates their combined area into a single development. ” “The alteration of the approved parking configuration and the loss or the selective availability of parking spaces violated the

c onditions of the operating Development Plan.”

Superior Court Proceedings Appellant filed a complaint against the County for
decla ratory and injunctive relief. It alleged that the Development Plan did not apply to the Sagunto Property. It sought a
“decla ratory order that [the County] may not enforce the development plan against [a ppellant] and an injunction prohibiting [the County] from enforcing the development plan against [a ppellant].”

The County file d a demurrer, arguing that a ppellant
did not exhaus t its administrative remedies and there was no final order or decision with respect to the Notice of Violation. The trial court stayed the superior court case until the County completed the administrative process.

In April 2016, the County filed a Notice of Determination, finding that the Development Plan applied to both the Sagunto and Edison Properties and that both properties

were in violation of the Development Plan ’s parking requirements

. The County im posed a $300 fine. Appellant appealed the Notic e of Determination to the Plann ing and Development Director. Following a hearing, the hearing5

examiner found that the Development Plan applied to the Sagunto Property. The examiner found that a review of the Development Plan files “clearly include the Sa gunto Property within the permit limits.”

Appellant filed a first amended c omplaint which
added a cause of action challenging the administrative decision.
This cause of action was bifurcated from the remaining causes of action for declaratory and injunct iv e relief.

The trial court conducted a de novo review of the final administrative decision pursuant to Government Code
section 53069.4. I t determined that the Development Plan

app lied to the Sagunto Property. The court found the
administrative record “ clearly establishes that the site plan
labeled ‘Attachment A’ to the Development Plan supports t he applicants’ intent that the ‘Bohlinger Commercial Addition’ encompassed both [the Sagunto and Edison Properties].” Moreover, in light of the “transactional history of [the] adjoining parcels,” the court found that, “at a minimum, constructive notice pursuant to Civil Code [section] 1213, has been provided to subsequent purchase r s of each of these parcels that Development
Plan 88

- DP

- 14 and the conditions conta ined within it, apply to both parcels.” The court noted that the Notice of Consent to Use
Land and the CC&Rs referenced the Development Plan , and the title report listed these two documents as “exceptions” to the Sagunto Property title.

Appellant subsequ ently fi led a second amended

c omplaint

. The parties stipulated that the first cause of action regarding the administrative decision “had already been decided,” but was included again in t he second amended

c omplaint to preserve “ appellate rights ” on that c ause of action.6

Appellant also added a fourth cause of action for inverse condemnation against the County and the owners of the Edison Property. It alleged that the County “effectively approved
Edison’s over

- leasing” of parking spa ces when the County rul ed
that a ppellant violated the Development Plan.

T he County demurred to the declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and inverse condemnation causes of action

. The
trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. It found there was no “taking” t o support the inverse condemnat ion
cause of action. The demurrer to the declaratory and injunctive relief causes of action were “sustained on the ground that those causes of action fail with the substantive causes of action for [the appeal of the administ rative decisio n] and Inverse
Condemnation.” The court entered final judgment in favor of the
Co unty on all causes of action.
DISCUSSIO N
Administrative Decision Sagunto contends the trial court erred when it upheld the County’s administrative decision that the Development Plan applied to the Sagunto Property. We disagree.

Following a final administrative decision, a party “may seek review by filing an appeal to be heard by the superior court, where the same shall be heard de novo, except that the

cont ents of the local agency’s files shall be received into evidence.” (Gov. Code, § 53069.4, subd. (b).) In interpreting the Development Plan , we apply the same standard of review employed in interpreting contracts and review de novo . (See Bear
Creek Plann ing Committee v. Ferwerda (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1183; National City Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of National City (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1278 ( National City ) .)7 In interpreting the Development Plan , we ascertain
the intent of the parties as it existed at the time the plan was approved. (See National City

, supra , 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1279 .)
We first look to the plain lan guage of the Development Plan and
the documents related to its approval. We consider these
documents “as a whole and const rue the language in the context

, rather than interp ret a provision in isolation. ” ( Westrec Marina Management, Inc. v. Arrowood Indemnity Co. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 138 7, 1392 ( Westrec ) .)

Here, the plain language of both the Development
Plan and the appr oval documents show that the C ounty and the Bohlingers intended the plan to apply to both p roperties

. Bohlingers ’ application for the Development Plan shows this
intent

. ( Sports Arenas Properties, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1985) 40 Cal.3d 808, 815

- 816 [ a permit must be interpreted “in light of the application for it”].) In the application , the Bohlingers explained the Development Plan consisted of “ facelifting the exterior of the building ” on the Sagunto Property and “the addition of 6,040 square feet o f new commercial space” on the Edison Property. The Bohlingers submitted statistical
information , which included the combined square footage of the structures, building cover age, parking, and landscaping for both

p ro perties. The application also indicate d that there was an “existing commercial building” “on the [Sagunto] prop erty” that
would be retained in the Development Plan.

The Planning Commission Staff Report and
Recommendation further supports our conclusion . The project description stated that th e “applicant is proposing a 6,240 square foot commercial/office addition to an existing 4,000 square foot building.” The report stated the Development Plan consisted of8

total structures of 10,240 square feet and a tot al area of 20,000 square feet, which i s the combined square footage of both

p roperties. The report also stated the Development Plan included 22 parking spaces, which was the combined number of

spaces on both p roperties. The report included Attachment A,
which shows both the properties as par t of the development site.

T he Planning Commission’s approval shows that the County intended the Development Plan to incorporate the Sagunto Property. The approval set forth several conditions, including that the “use, size . . . location of buildings, w alkways, parking areas . . . shall be developed in substantial conformity with the approved development plan marked [Attachment A], ”
which included both properties.

Appellant contends the Development Plan did not apply to the Sagunto P roperty because the documents do not reference the Sagunto Property’s APN

. But in construing these documents “as a whole,” it is apparent that the Bohlingers and the County intended the Development Plan to apply to both properties. ( Westrec

, supra , 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 13 92.)

Appellant also contends it lacked adequate notice that the Development Plan applied to the Sagunto Property. But,

as t he trial court properly found, a ppellant had “constructive
notice” when it purchased the property. The title report specifically reference d the CC&Rs and the Notice of Consent to
Use Land as “exceptions” to the Sagunto Property title. Both documents indicated that the Development Plan applied to the Sagunto Property.
Demurrer

Appellant contends the trial court erred when it

sust ained the dem urrer without leave to amend the declara tory9

and injunctive relief and inverse condemnation causes of action. We disagree.

We independently review the order sustaining the
demurrer , accepting the truth of material facts properly pleaded
but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. ( Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.) A demurrer should be sustained where the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action, or discloses a defense that would bar recovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10; Balikov v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 816, 819

- 820.) “ A judgment of dismissal after a demurrer has been sustained without leave to amend will be affirmed if proper

on any gro unds stated in the demurrer , whether or not the court acted on that ground.” ( Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 324.)
T he trial court pr operly sustained the demurrer to
the inver se condemnation cause of action because a ppellant has

not show n the Coun ty’s action constitutes a “taking .” For a taking to occur, there must be “an invasion or an appropriation of some valuable property right which the landowner possesses and
the invasion or appropriation must directly and specially affect
the landowner to h is injury. ” ( Selby Realty Co. v. City of San
Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 119

- 120 ; see also Golden
Gate Water Ski Club v. County of Contra Costa (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 249, 267 ( Golden Gate Water Ski Club ). ) “‘“Regulations regarding and restriction s upon the use of property in an exercise of the police power for an authorized purpose, do not constitute the taking of property without compensation or give rise to constitutional cause for complaint.”’ [Citation.]” ( Golden Gate Water Ski Club , at p. 2 67.)10 In Golden Gate Water Ski Club

, supra , 165 Cal.App.4th at p ages 253

- 254
, the plaintiff built unpermitted

structures on property that was designated “open space” f o r which land use permit s were required

. Contra Costa County
issued a notic e of violation and ordered the removal of al l
structures that were built on the property without permits . ( Id

. at pp. 254

- 255.) The plaintiff sued Contra Costa County, arguing the abatement order constituted a taking.

The Court of A ppeal held that there was no takin g because the plaintiff “ never had a property right to develop [the property] in violation of [ Contra Costa ] County’ s land use requirements. ” ( Golden Gate Water Ski Club

, supra , 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 267.) Thus, Contra Costa County’ s action to enforce th e permit restrictions was not a taking. ( Ibid

. ) Similarly

, a ppellant did not have property rights to block access to the parking spaces on the Sagunto and Edison properties in violation of the Development Plan. ( Ibid .)

Appellant contends the County’s action effectively permitted the Edison Property owners to overlease parking and

was thus tantamount to a taking

. This argument lacks merit. Here, t he County enforce d the Devel opment Plan, which required 22 unrestricted parking spaces ; i t did not give th e Edison Property owners rights over all the parking spaces. To the extent

a ppellant alleges the County’s failure to take an enforcement action against the Edison Property for overleasing constituted a taking, we reject this argument

. “ [ A ] bsenc e of the e nforcement of

a particular restrictive covenant against anothe r owner’s property” does not amount to “ a governmental expropriation of
one’ s ow n property.” (Barrett v. Dawson (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1054
, origina l italics

. )11 The trial court properly sus tained the demurrer to the declaratory and injunctive relief causes of action . Appellant
seeks an order (2) declaring that the “Development Plan does no t apply to the Sagunto Property ” ; and (2) enjoining the County from “taking any action to apply the Dev elopment Plan to the Sagunto Property” and “from assessing any fines or ta king any other action against [a ppellant] for having installed the reserve d parking signs and chains.” But th is relief is “ w holly derivative”
of a ppellant’s other causes of action. In light of our conclusion

t hat the Development Plan applies to the Sagunto Property and that there was no governmental taking , “there are no grounds for granting an injunction or declaratory relief.” ( Ochs v. Pacif i Care of California (2004 ) 115 Cal.App. 4th 782, 794 ( Ochs ).) 1
Leave to Amend Appellant also contends the trial court erred when it did not grant it leave to amend the complaint. We review the
court’s order for abuse of discretion, “which is demo nstrated if
there is a reasonable possibility tha t the pleading court could be cured by amendment. ” ( Ochs

, supra , 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 796.)

“ The plaintiff has the burden of showing that the pleading can be cured, but may make this showin g for the first ti me on appeal. ” ( Ibid

. ) Appellant has not carr ied its burden to show that the pleading could be cured by an amendment. The trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied leave to amend.

1 Appellant’s request for judicial notice filed on July 2, 2020
, is denied.12 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. The County shall recover

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLIS HED.

TANGEMAN, J. We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.Timothy J. Staffel, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

______________________________

Cappello & Noel, A. Barry Cappello and David L. Cousineau, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

A mber Holderness, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.