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*********************************************** 
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

v. ABU HASHEM MALICK ET AL.

(SC 20662)

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js.

Syllabus

Pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 23-18 (a)), in any action to foreclose a

mortgage, ‘‘where no defense as to the amount of the mortgage debt is

interposed, such debt may be proved by presenting to the judicial authority the original note and mortgage, together with the affidavit of the

plaintiff . . . stating what amount, including interest to the date of the

hearing, is due . . . .’’

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property

owned by the named defendant, M, after he defaulted on a promissory

note secured by the mortgage. After the trial court granted the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment as to liability, the plaintiff moved for

judgment of strict foreclosure and submitted an affidavit of debt pursuant to Practice Book § 23-18 (a) to establish the amount of the debt

owed. M objected, claiming that the affidavit contained hearsay and

incorrectly calculated his municipal tax liability and the outstanding

interest that he owed on the loan. The trial court granted M additional

time to obtain and submit verified documentation to support his claims,

but M did not do so. Instead, M filed another objection to the plaintiff’s

affidavit of debt, further claiming that municipal records indicated that

the plaintiff had overstated M’s municipal taxes and incorrectly calculated the interest he owed. M’s objection included an exhibit containing

a year-to-year breakdown of what he claimed were the taxes actually

owed on the property, which M had obtained from the records of the

municipal tax collector. At a subsequent hearing to consider M’s offer

of proof in support of his objection, the trial court relied on the plaintiff’s

affidavit of debt and other submissions in rendering judgment of strict

foreclosure. In doing so, the court accepted the figure that the plaintiff

represented in its affidavit of debt as the amount of interest M owed,

but the court did not consider, or require the plaintiff to provide, any

evidence in support of that amount. M appealed to the Appellate Court,

and that court reversed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the

trial court had improperly relied on the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt under

§ 23-18 (a), which provides an exception to the general prohibition on

hearsay evidence when the amount of the debt is not in dispute. The

Appellate Court reasoned that, because M had objected to the stated

amount of the municipal taxes and interest that was due, the hearsay

exception in § 23-18 (a) was inapplicable, and the plaintiff thus was

required to present evidence regarding the amount of the debt beyond

the affidavit it had submitted. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff

appealed to this court.

Held that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the trial court improperly had relied on the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt to establish the amount

of debt M owed instead of requiring the plaintiff to present evidence

as to the amount of the debt:

1. This court clarified the standards applicable to trial court rulings on the

admissibility of affidavits of debt offered under Practice Book § 23-18 (a):

To preclude the admission of a plaintiff’s affidavit of debt pursuant to

§ 23-18 (a), a defense challenging the amount of the mortgage debt must

be actively made, must specifically concern the amount of the debt, and

must be based on some articulated legal reason or fact as to why the

amount of debt asserted is incorrect.

Moreover, a defense is insufficient if it focuses on matters ancillary to

the amount of the debt, such as issues involving liability, that is, whether

the loan is actually in default, involving the credibility of the affiant, or

involving defects in the execution of the affidavit itself.

2. In the present case, M’s objection to the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt properly
implicated the amount of the debt by challenging the plaintiff’s calculation of interest and municipal taxes that M allegedly owed.

3. The plaintiff could not prevail on its claim that, to properly interpose a

defense within the meaning of Practice Book § 23-18 (a), an objection

to an affidavit of debt must be accompanied not only by legal or factual

argument, but also by supporting, admissible evidence:

In construing the phrase ‘‘where no defense as to the amount of the

mortgage debt is interposed,’’ as used in § 23-18 (a), this court looked

to the commonly accepted usage of the words ‘‘defense’’ and ‘‘interpose,’’

and concluded that § 23-18 (a) merely requires a defendant to advance

a stated reason, in law or fact, as to why the amount of the debt is

incorrect, an objection clearly falls within the broad scope of the term

‘‘interpose,’’ insofar as an objection interferes with a plaintiff’s ability

to rely on an affidavit to prove the amount of indebtedness, this broad

definition of ‘‘interpose’’ was supported by Appellate Court case law,

and M’s specific objection to the affidavit of debt in the present case

satisfied the requirements of § 23-18 (a) because it advanced a supporting

legal or factual argument, namely, that the plaintiff incorrectly calculated

the interest that M owed and failed to include certain property tax

abatements that the municipality had allegedly afforded M.

Moreover, the plaintiff’s contention that an objection to an affidavit of

debt must be accompanied by supporting, admissible evidence, in addition to legal or factual argument, was not supported by this state’s

appellate case law, and this court’s construction of § 23-18 (a) as not

requiring that supporting, admissible evidence accompany an objection

to an affidavit of debt was consistent with the fact that it is the plaintiff

in a foreclosure action that bears the burden of establishing the amount

of the debt owed, and that burden remains with the plaintiff after the

defendant sufficiently interposes a defense as to the amount of the debt.

In the present case, M went beyond what the rules of practice required

when he attached to his objection the year-to-year breakdown of what

he claimed were the accurate taxes, that objection was based on an

articulated reason and sufficed to prevent the trial court from relying

on the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt alone to support the calculation of the

amount of property tax that M owed, and, although M did not provide

official records from the municipal tax collector to support his calculation of the amount of property tax he owed, neither this court nor

the language of § 23-18 (a) has ever required a defendant to provide

such evidence.

Argued January 10—officially released July 4, 2023

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain of the

named defendant’s real property, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Fairfield, where the defendant Shujaat Malick was

defaulted for failure to appear; thereafter, the court,

Bruno, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability; subsequently, the case was tried to

the court, Bruno, J.; judgment of strict foreclosure,

from which the named defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Moll, Alexander and Bishop, Js., which

reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the

case for further proceedings, and the plaintiff, on the

granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Brian D. Rich, with whom, on the brief, was Logan

A. Carducci, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Jeffrey Gentes and Theresa Dudek filed a brief for

the Connecticut Fair Housing Center as amicus curiae.

Joseph R. Dunaj filed a brief for USFN as amicus
curiae.
Opinion

D’AURIA, J. The sole issue in this certified appeal

concerns the applicability of the hearsay exception contained in Practice Book § 23-18 (a), which allows a

creditor to prove the amount of the debt in a foreclosure

action by submitting an affidavit ‘‘of the plaintiff or

other person familiar with the indebtedness,’’ rather

than through live testimony, ‘‘where no defense as to

the amount of the mortgage debt is interposed . . . .’’

The plaintiff, JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, appeals from the Appellate Court’s judgment

reversing the trial court’s judgment of strict foreclosure

rendered against the named defendant, Abu Hashem

Malick.1 The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court

incorrectly held that, because the defendant had

objected to the amount of the mortgage debt, § 23-18

(a) did not apply as a matter of law in the present

case. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that, because the

defendant failed to provide admissible evidence to support his claims that the plaintiff had miscalculated the

amount of interest and municipal taxes he owed, the

defendant’s objection did not suffice to bar the application of § 23-18 (a), and thus the trial court properly

allowed the plaintiff to establish the amount of the debt

by affidavit.2 We disagree with the plaintiff and affirm

the Appellate Court’s judgment.

The Appellate Court’s opinion contains most of the

undisputed facts and procedural history required to

resolve this appeal; see JPMorgan Chase Bank, National

Assn. v. Malick, 208 Conn. App. 38, 39–41, 263 A.3d 920

(2021); which we summarize along with other facts in

the record. ‘‘The defendant is the owner of real property

in Fairfield (property). In [its] complaint . . . the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had executed and delivered to Washington Mutual Bank, N.A., its predecessor

in interest, a note in the principal amount of $417,000,

of which the plaintiff became the holder, secured by a

mortgage on the property. The plaintiff further alleged

that the defendant was in default on the note and that

it had elected to accelerate the debt. The plaintiff sought

a judgment of foreclosure. The defendant filed an

answer in which he alleged in part that he had ‘no

monetary obligations’ to the plaintiff.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 39–40.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment as to liability, which the trial court granted. The plaintiff then

moved for a judgment of strict foreclosure. Prior to the

trial court’s hearing that motion, ‘‘the plaintiff filed an

affidavit of debt, signed by . . . an [a]uthorized

[s]igner of the plaintiff, attesting that the defendant

owed the plaintiff $749,420.60 as of June 13, 2019. . . .

[Two weeks later] the plaintiff updated its affidavit of

debt to include the interest that had accumulated since

[it filed the first] affidavit.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 40.
After the plaintiff filed its updated affidavit, the defendant ‘‘object[ed] to the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt on

the grounds that it contained hearsay and inaccurate

calculations as to the defendant’s municipal tax liability

and the interest owed on his loan. . . . [T]he court

held a hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for judgment

of strict foreclosure, and [it] issued an order granting

the defendant [one week of] additional time . . . to

obtain and submit verified documentation to support

his contention that the plaintiff had miscalculated the

outstanding interest due, as well as the defendant’s

municipal tax liability. The defendant thereafter filed

another objection to the plaintiff’s affidavit in which he

claimed that according to ‘town records,’ the plaintiff

had overstated his municipal taxes by $4208.83, and that

it had miscalculated his interest by ‘tens of thousands

of dollars.’ The defendant also claimed an offset for

damages in the amount of $5,810,000.’’ (Footnote omitted.) Id., 40–41. The defendant’s objection included an

exhibit listing the property taxes owed on the property

for the years 2009 through 2017, which he had obtained

from the records of the town tax collector.

One week later, the trial court conducted a second

hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of strict

foreclosure for the purpose of considering the defendant’s offer of proof in support of his objection to the

amount of the mortgage debt established by the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt. Id., 41. At the hearing, the defendant3 discussed with the court alleged discrepancies in

the municipal tax records, relying on the exhibit he had

filed with his most recent objection to the affidavit. The

court stated that it was ‘‘able to make a finding that

the property taxes that are owed on the [property] are

somewhere between $49,185.64, which is . . . what

[the defendant] believes they are based upon his investigation, and $43,394.47, which is what they were stated

to be in the affidavit of debt . . . .’’ As to the alleged

miscalculated interest, the defendant did not provide

the court with the documentation it had requested at the

first strict foreclosure hearing. Instead, the defendant

asked the court to order the plaintiff to provide him

with a breakdown of the interest rate that had been

applied for each year of his loan. The court declined to

order the plaintiff to do so, indicating that the defendant

should have had bank statements displaying the interest

rates for the duration of the loan. The court gave the

defendant an additional two weeks to come forward

with proof that the amount of the interest calculated

by the plaintiff was inaccurate.

Before adjourning that hearing, and relying on the

plaintiff’s affidavit of debt and other submissions, the

court rendered judgment of strict foreclosure, making

‘‘all of the necessary findings except as to the amount

of the interest and the taxes.’’ The court then directed

the plaintiff to clarify via documentation the breakdown
of the escrow payments to resolve the discrepancy

between the parties’ calculations of property taxes. It

requested the plaintiff to do so within two weeks. As

to amount of interest the defendant owed, the court

accepted the figure in the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt,

stating that it would adjust this finding only if the defendant ‘‘provide[d] any proof and documentation of that

interest figure being inaccurate.’’ Nine days later, the

plaintiff moved for an extension of time to prepare a

year to year summary of the disputed tax charges in

response to the court’s order that it do so. Notwithstanding its earlier direction to the plaintiff to provide

this information, the court denied the motion, stating

that ‘‘no extension is necessary, as no action is necessary on the part of counsel. The plaintiff owes the court

nothing. Judgment has entered.’’ Thus, the trial court

did not require the plaintiff to provide, and did not

consider, any evidence in support of the amount of the

debt stated in the affidavit. Nor did the defendant ever

provide the court with the documentation it requested

regarding the allegedly miscalculated interest.

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming

that the trial court erred as a matter of law by accepting

the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt and relying on it to establish the amount of the defendant’s indebtedness over his

objections to the interest and property tax calculations.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Malick, supra,

208 Conn. App. 39. The Appellate Court agreed with

the defendant and reversed the trial court’s judgment;

id.; based on this court’s decision in Burritt Mutual

Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn.

369, 374–75, 439 A.2d 396 (1981). The plaintiff sought

certification to appeal to this court, which we granted,

limited to the issue of whether ‘‘the Appellate Court

incorrectly determine[d] that an objection to an affidavit of debt is sufficient to challenge the affidavit under

Practice Book § 23-18 (a) . . . when the . . . defendant failed to advance any evidence as to the amount

of the debt . . . .’’ JPMorgan Chase Bank, National

Assn. v. Malick, 340 Conn. 912, 264 A.3d 1001 (2021).

We now affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

We agree with the Appellate Court’s helpful and lucid

statement in Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani, 174

Conn. App. 476, 483–84, 166 A.3d 670 (2017), of the

applicable standard of review of trial court rulings on

the admissibility of affidavits of debt offered under

Practice Book § 23-18 (a). Specifically, ‘‘[t]he scope of

our appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court. . . .

[T]he proper characterization of the trial court’s ruling

is clarified by examining the nature of an affidavit of

debt and the function of . . . § 23-18 (a) in foreclosures. Without question, an affidavit of debt is hearsay

evidence because it is an out-of-court statement, by an
absent witness, that is offered to prove the truth of the

amount of the debt averred in the affidavit. . . . As is

relevant here, the purpose of § 23-18 (a) is to serve

as an exception to the general prohibition of hearsay

evidence when appropriate circumstances arise,

namely, that the amount of the debt is not in dispute.

. . . Therefore, the [plaintiff’s] claim that the [Appellate

Court] erred in determining that § 23-18 (a) [does not]

appl[y] is most properly characterized as challenging

the trial court’s determination that an exception to the

general prohibition of hearsay applies to the affidavit

of debt.

‘‘A trial court’s decision to admit evidence, if premised on a correct view of the law . . . calls for the

abuse of discretion standard of review. . . . In other

words, only after a trial court has made the legal determination that a particular statement . . . is subject to

a hearsay exception, is it [then] vested with the discretion to admit or to bar the evidence based upon relevancy, prejudice, or other legally appropriate grounds

related to the rule of evidence under which admission

is being sought. . . . Therefore, a trial court’s legal

determination of whether Practice Book § 23-18 (a)

applies is a question of law over which our review

is plenary.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;

footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id.; see, e.g., Weaver v. McKnight, 313 Conn. 393, 426,

97 A.3d 920 (2014) (whether hearsay exception applies

is legal question demanding plenary review).

Practice Book § 23-18 (a) provides that, in any foreclosure action, ‘‘where no defense as to the amount of

the mortgage debt is interposed, such debt may be

proved by presenting to the judicial authority the original note and mortgage, together with the affidavit of the

plaintiff or other person familiar with the indebtedness,

stating what amount, including interest to the date of

the hearing, is due, and that there is no setoff or counterclaim thereto.’’

Thus, to preclude the admission of an affidavit of

debt pursuant to Practice Book § 23-18 (a) to establish

the amount of mortgage debt, a defense to the mortgage

debt must concern the amount of the debt. See Burritt

Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, supra,

183 Conn. 375. Moreover, we agree fully with the Appellate Court’s survey of applicable case law as making

‘‘clear that a defense challenging the amount of the debt

must be actively made to prevent the application of

§ 23-18 (a).’’ Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani, supra,

174 Conn. App. 486. A defense is insufficient if it focuses

on ‘‘matters that are ancillary to the amount of the debt,

such as whether the loan is in default, which is a matter

of liability, or [matters] that attack the credibility of

the affiant or defects in the execution of the affidavit

itself.’’ Id., 487; see, e.g., HSBC Bank USA, National

Assn. v. Gilbert, 200 Conn. App. 335, 351, 238 A.3d 784
(2020) (defendants’ objection to affidavit of debt on

grounds that affiant had no personal knowledge of and

relied on hearsay source in calculating starting loan

balance was insufficient to bar application of § 23-18

(a)); Suffield Bank v. Berman, 25 Conn. App. 369, 374,

594 A.2d 493 (trial court’s acceptance of affidavit of debt

under § 23-18 (a) was proper when defendant failed to

disclose defense to liability), cert. dismissed, 220 Conn.

913, 597 A.2d 339 (1991), and cert. denied, 220 Conn.

914, 597 A.2d 340 (1991). Additionally, ‘‘a defense to

the amount of the debt must be based on some articulated legal reason or fact.’’ Connecticut National Bank

v. N. E. Owen II, Inc., 22 Conn. App. 468, 472–73, 578

A.2d 655 (1990); id., 473 (defendants’ claim that they

lacked knowledge as to correctness of amount of debt

was insufficient to raise challenge that requires evidentiary hearing). A defendant not only must object to the

amount of the debt but must specifically object as to

why the amount of the debt is incorrect: for example,

whether late charges should have been waived or money

had been advanced for taxes. See Burritt Mutual Savings

Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, supra, 375.

The plaintiff recognizes that the defendant’s objection in this case correctly implicated the amount of the

debt by challenging the plaintiff’s calculation of interest

and municipal taxes. Instead, it argues that, to ‘‘interpose’’ a ‘‘defense,’’ as those words are used in Practice

Book § 23-18 (a), a defendant must raise not only a

specific defense regarding the amount of the debt but

must present legal argument and admissible evidence

that sufficiently support that defense. According to the

plaintiff, the hearsay exception in § 23-18 (a) applies in

the present case because the defendant’s objection was

not properly supported by an evidentiary proffer.4

II

The Appellate Court concluded that this court’s holding in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v.

Tucker, supra, 183 Conn. 369, required it to reject the

trial court’s admission of the affidavit of debt in the

present case because the defendant had objected to

the amount of the debt. See JPMorgan Chase Bank,

National Assn. v. Malick, supra, 208 Conn. App. 41–42.

A review of Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain is beneficial to our analysis because, although that

case is not solely dispositive in resolving the present

case, it requires us to address a critical aspect of the

plaintiff’s claim that was not sufficiently considered by

the Appellate Court.

After the trial court in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank

of New Britain rendered a default judgment, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit to establish the amount of

the mortgage debt. Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of

New Britain v. Tucker, supra, 183 Conn. 374. The defendant objected to the affidavit, specifically disputing ‘‘the

amounts shown thereon for principal, interest, taxes,
and late charges.’’ Id. After allowing the defendant to

testify as to his own calculation of the debt, the trial

court found the debt to be the amount claimed in the

affidavit. Id. The court did not require the plaintiff to

present any additional evidence as to the amount of the

debt. Id., 374–75. On appeal to this court, the defendant

claimed that the trial court had improperly relied on

the affidavit the plaintiff submitted to establish the

amount of the debt and argued that, because he had

raised a defense to the debt, Practice Book (1978–97)

§ 527 (now § 23-18 (a)) did not apply and a ‘‘bank officer

should have been [at the hearing] to testify.’’ Id. 374.

The plaintiff countered that the only dispute the defendant had raised concerned the accuracy of mathematical calculations, which the trial court could easily verify.

Id., 375. This court held that the record did not support

the plaintiff’s contention because the defendant also

claimed a waiver of late charges and disputed whether

money had been advanced for taxes. Id. This court held

that ‘‘[i]t [was] clear that the defendant did raise a

defense concerning the amount of the mortgage debt

before the trial court.’’ Id. The predecessor to Practice

Book § 23-18 (a) therefore did not apply, and the general

rule against admitting hearsay evidence precluded use

of the affidavit. Id. As a result, this court vacated the

trial court’s judgment in part, and, on remand, the plaintiff was required to present evidence to establish the

amount of the debt instead of merely relying on the

hearsay contained in the affidavit. Id., 382.

In the present case, the defendant objected in relevant part on the ground that the plaintiff’s accounting of

his property tax payments and interest was inaccurate.

Based on these challenges, the Appellate Court correctly held that the defendant had raised a specific

objection ‘‘concerning the amount of the mortgage

debt’’ established by the plaintiff’s affidavit. (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) JPMorgan Chase Bank,

National Assn. v. Malick, supra, 208 Conn. App. 43.

What the Appellate Court did not sufficiently address,

however, was whether, to properly ‘‘interpose’’ a

‘‘defense,’’ Practice Book § 23-18 (a) also required the

defendant to support his objection with legal argument

and admissible evidence. We now turn to that issue.

III

The plaintiff argues that, to constitute a defense

under Practice Book § 23-18 (a), a defendant’s objection

to a plaintiff’s affidavit of debt must be ‘‘supported with

evidence and arguments challenging the amount of the

debt.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff

is correct that a defendant’s objection must include a

legal or factual argument. However, its contention that

the rules of practice also require that a defendant provide evidence in support of his objection exceeds what

the rules of practice and relevant case law require.

When construing our rules of practice, we apply the
rules of statutory construction. E.g., Meadowbrook Center, Inc. v. Buchman, 328 Conn. 586, 594, 181 A.3d 550

(2018). ‘‘[W]e follow the clear meaning of unambiguous

rules, because [a]lthough we are directed to interpret

liberally the rules of practice, that liberal construction

applies only to situations in which a strict adherence

to them [will] work surprise or injustice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 595.

Practice Book § 23-18 (a) provides in relevant part:

‘‘In any action to foreclose a mortgage where no defense

as to the amount of the mortgage debt is interposed,

such debt may be proved by presenting to the judicial

authority the original note and mortgage, together with

the affidavit of the plaintiff or other person familiar

with the indebtedness . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Our

rules of practice do not define the word ‘‘defense’’ in the

context of § 23-18 (a). Thus, we look to the commonly

approved usage of the word. See, e.g., Ugrin v. Cheshire, 307 Conn. 364, 380, 54 A.3d 532 (2012). Black’s Law

Dictionary defines ‘‘defense’’ as ‘‘[a] defendant’s stated

reason why the plaintiff or prosecutor has no valid case

. . . a defendant’s answer, denial, or plea . . . .’’

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) p. 528. The

Appellate Court has cited an earlier edition of Black’s

Law Dictionary as defining the word ‘‘defense’’ for purposes of § 23-18 (a) as ‘‘[t]hat which is offered and

alleged by [the] party proceeded against in an action

or suit, as a reason in law or fact why the plaintiff

should not recover or establish what he seeks.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut National

Bank v. N. E. Owen II, Inc., supra, 22 Conn. App. 472,

quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) p. 377.

A ‘‘stated reason’’ ‘‘in law or fact’’ that challenges a

plaintiff’s right to recover includes a legal or factual

argument raised in opposition to that party. Additionally, as discussed in part I of this opinion, a defendant’s

‘‘defense’’ under § 23-18 (a) must specifically concern

the amount of the mortgage debt.

Moreover, because the plaintiff challenges the sufficiency of the defendant’s defense, we also must define

what it means to ‘‘interpose’’ a defense. Our rules of

practice do not define the word ‘‘interpose,’’ and this

court has not defined the word in the context of Practice

Book § 23-18 (a) or in any other context. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines ‘‘interpose’’ as ‘‘to

place in an intervening position’’ or ‘‘to put forth by

way of interference or intervention . . . .’’ MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2014) p. 654.

To ‘‘intervene’’ is defined as ‘‘to occur, fall, or come

between points of time or events,’’ ‘‘to interfere with

the outcome or course . . . of a condition or process,’’

or ‘‘to come in or between by way of hindrance or

modification.’’ Id., p. 655. This is a broad definition that

merely requires a defendant to advance a defense.

Appellate Court case law supports this broad defini-
tion. Although the Appellate Court has not defined the

term ‘‘interpose,’’ it has addressed how a defense to the

amount of the debt may be interposed. Specifically, the

Appellate Court has held that a defense to the amount

of the mortgage debt may be raised by an objection

challenging the amount of the debt when the plaintiff

attempts to introduce the affidavit into evidence; see

Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani, supra, 174 Conn.

App. 486; as defenses relating to the mathematical calculation of the mortgage debt need not be disclosed

before the foreclosure hearing.5 Suffield Bank v. Berman, supra, 25 Conn. App. 374. An objection clearly

falls within the broad scope of the plain meaning of the

word ‘‘interpose,’’ as an objection interferes with the

plaintiff’s ability to rely on the affidavit to prove the

amount of indebtedness. See Black’s Law Dictionary

(11th Ed. 2019) p. 1290 (defining ‘‘objection’’ as ‘‘[a]

formal statement opposing something that has occurred,

or is about to occur, in court and seeking the judge’s

immediate ruling on the point’’).

The defendant in the present case objected to the

amount of the debt listed in the plaintiff’s affidavit,

arguing that the plaintiff incorrectly calculated the interest and property taxes he owed, and, therefore, the

plaintiff’s calculation of debt was not valid. Using the

previously mentioned definitions of ‘‘defense’’ and

‘‘interposed,’’ we conclude that the defendant’s objections to the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt satisfied the plain

meaning of those words in Practice Book § 23-18 (a).

Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that case law applying

§ 23-18 (a) requires that a defense as to the amount of

the mortgage debt be supported by legal argument and

admissible evidence before the court may find the affidavit inadmissible. The plaintiff is correct that § 23-18

(a) requires a supporting legal or factual argument, i.e., a

specific argument about why the debt amount is incorrect.

But the defendant’s objection satisfied that requirement

in the present case. The defendant specifically objected

that the plaintiff’s failure to include property tax abatements the municipality had allegedly provided him for

at least three years. Additionally, the defendant

objected to the plaintiff’s calculation of interest and

requested that the court require the plaintiff to provide

a breakdown of his variable interest rate for the years

that he was not paying his mortgage. See National City

Mortgage Co. v. Stoecker, 92 Conn. App. 787, 798, 888

A.2d 95 (‘‘defendant’s claim seeking to establish the

chronology and specific nature of the payments was

well articulated and is therefore readily distinguishable

from a vague claim of insufficient knowledge’’), cert.

denied, 277 Conn. 925, 895 A.2d 799 (2006).

As for its contention that supporting evidence must

accompany the objection, the plaintiff emphasizes that

the defendant in Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New

Britain testified in support of his assertions that the

mortgage debt was incorrect, whereas the defendant
in the present case failed even to appear at the hearing

at which he could have testified in support of his objection. As mentioned previously, the defendant did appear

at the strict foreclosure hearing to testify in support of

his objection. Moreover, our holding in Burritt Mutual

Savings Bank of New Britain does not require that a

defendant testify, as the defendant did in that case, for

his objection to an affidavit of debt to suffice to prevent

its admissibility. Nor did we hold in Burritt Mutual

Savings Bank of New Britain that a defendant must

provide documentation to support his defense, and,

thus, the defendant’s failure in the present case to do

so, as the trial court ordered, does not distinguish his

objection from the defendant’s objection in Burritt

Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain. See Burritt

Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, supra,

183 Conn. 374–75.

The plaintiff places greater reliance on Bank of

America, N.A. v. Chainani, supra, 174 Conn. App. 476,

to support its argument that the defendant’s objection

to its affidavit did not suffice because he did not provide

evidence to support his objections. In Chainani, the

first stage of the foreclosure action focused on whether

the plaintiff had standing to commence the action. Id.,

480. The defendant’s answer in that case denied that the

mortgage loan was in default and pleaded insufficient

knowledge to admit or to deny the alleged amount of

the debt. Id., 479–80. At the hearing in which the court

addressed the issue of standing, the trial court admitted

the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt over the defendant’s

objection that he had advanced a defense implicating

the amount of the debt in his answer to the plaintiff’s

complaint. Id., 480.

The trial court thereafter conducted a hearing to

determine the amount of the debt and the form of judgment it would render. Id. Prior to that hearing, the

plaintiff had submitted an updated affidavit of debt in

support of its motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, and the defendant once again objected on the

same grounds he had objected to the first affidavit. Id.,

480–81. The defendant did not ‘‘inform the court of any

new legal arguments, evidence, or witnesses that he

anticipated presenting to dispute the amount of the

debt contained in the . . . [second] affidavit.’’ Id., 481.

The trial court again overruled the objection and admitted the affidavit under Practice Book § 23-18 (a). Id.

The trial court then found in the plaintiff’s favor, determined the amount of the debt based on the affidavit,

and rendered judgment of strict foreclosure. Id.

On appeal to the Appellate Court, the defendant in

Chainani claimed that his answer to the plaintiff’s complaint contained responses to the allegations sufficient

to bar the affidavit’s admission. Id. The defendant

argued that the trial court ‘‘should have understood

these responses to be a challenge to the amount of the
debt . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 485. Holding that

the trial court properly relied on the affidavit of debt,

the Appellate Court reiterated what it previously had

held in numerous cases—to preclude the admission of

an affidavit of debt under Practice Book § 23-18 (a), a

defendant must raise a defense ‘‘squarely focused’’ on

the amount of the debt. Id., 487; see also Suffield Bank

v. Berman, supra, 25 Conn. App. 374 (trial court’s acceptance of affidavit of debt under § 23-18 (a) was proper

when defendant failed to disclose defense to liability).

Applying this rule, the Appellate Court in Chainani

determined that the defendant’s objection could not be

considered a defense under § 23-18 (a) because it did

not specifically challenge the amount of the debt but

merely pleaded insufficient knowledge as to the amount

of the debt. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani,

supra, 174 Conn. App. 487.

The plaintiff argues that the present case is ‘‘on all

fours’’ with Chainani. We cannot agree. First, the plaintiff asserts that the Appellate Court in Chainani

rejected the defendant’s argument that Practice Book

§ 23-18 (a) should not apply because it is ‘‘not enough

to merely object to the amount of debt.’’ But, in fact, the

defendant in Chainani never objected to the amount

of the debt at all. Instead, he pleaded insufficient knowledge as to the amount of the debt and a general denial

of liability. Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani, supra, 174

Conn. App. 487. The plaintiff also inaccurately argues

that the trial court overruled the defendant’s objection

in Chainani because he ‘‘failed to ‘respon[d] to the

court’s questions regarding his objections’ and failed

to introduce ‘legal arguments, evidence, or witnesses’

regarding [the] same.’’ See Bank of America, N.A. v.

Chainani, supra, 488. The trial court in Chainani was

merely providing the defendant the opportunity to

respond to the second affidavit with new legal arguments, evidence, or witnesses to encourage arguments

that went beyond his previous assertions of insufficient

knowledge and denial of default. Id. In other words,

the trial court gave the defendant an opportunity to

sufficiently interpose a defense by specifically challenging the amount of the debt. Id. Thus, the issue in Chainani

was not the sufficiency of the defendant’s objection to

the affidavit of debt, including whether admissible evidence was required to interpose a defense. The issue

was that the defendant failed to object to the amount

of the debt at all.

The plaintiff focuses on the following sentence in

Chainani to support its claim that the defendant’s

objection was insufficient: ‘‘It is axiomatic that such a

defense may be raised by pleading a special defense

attacking the amount of the debt claimed, but it may

also be raised by objection, supported with evidence

and arguments challenging the amount of the debt,

upon the attempted introduction of the affidavit in

court.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 486. It is true, as we have
explained, that a defendant must provide argument as

to why he or she is objecting to the amount of the debt,

‘‘based on some articulated legal reason or fact,’’ as this

is supported by our rules of practice and case law.

Connecticut National Bank v. N. E. Owen II, Inc.,

supra, 22 Conn. App. 472–73. The defendant did so in

this case. It is arguable whether, through the previous

statement in Chainani, the Appellate Court was suggesting that, in support of a defendant’s objection to

an affidavit of debt, both argument and evidence are

required to prevent the affidavit from being admitted

into evidence. However, to the extent Chainani suggests both argument and evidence are necessary, we

disagree. The court in Chainani cited Suffield Bank v.

Berman, supra, 25 Conn. App. 372–74, in support of its

statement that an objection to the amount of debt must

be ‘‘supported with evidence and arguments.’’ Bank of

America, N.A. v. Chainani, supra, 174 Conn. App. 486.

However, the issue in Suffield Bank was whether the

defendants’ failure to disclose a defense to the mortgage

debt prior to the foreclosure hearing barred them from

later contesting liability at the hearing. Suffield Bank

v. Berman, supra, 373. The defendants in Suffield Bank

claimed that Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, supra, 183 Conn. 369, supported their

contention that the trial court, over their objection, had

improperly accepted the plaintiff’s affidavit as proof

of the debt. Suffield Bank v. Berman, supra, 373–74.

However, the defendants in Suffield Bank failed to dispute the affidavit’s accuracy; rather, they sought to offer

‘‘evidence that their obligation to pay interest [had been]

discharged . . . .’’ Id., 373. The holding in Suffield

Bank prevented the defendants from offering evidence

that ‘‘went to the issue of the defendants’ liability for

interest,’’ which required the disclosure of their defense

to liability prior to the foreclosure hearing. (Emphasis

added.) Id., 374. The court in Suffield Bank did not hold

that a defendant must proffer evidence to successfully

interpose a defense to the amount of the debt. The court

in Chainani cited no other case law for its proposition

that evidence is required for an objection to be sufficient

under Practice Book § 23-18 (a), and we have found

none.6

This construction is further supported by the fact

that, in a foreclosure action, it is the plaintiff’s burden

to establish the amount of the debt. See 59A C.J.S. 216,

Mortgages § 986 (2009) (‘‘[a]s with civil matters generally, the plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action has

the burden to establish the facts necessary to entitle

the plaintiff to the relief sought’’). Practice Book § 23-

18 (a) provides plaintiffs with an efficient method of

meeting their burden to establish the amount of the

debt if no defense is interposed. Although it is the defendant’s burden to sufficiently interpose a defense to the

claimed amount of the debt, once a defense is interposed, the burden remains on the plaintiff to prove the
amount of the debt. At no point does the burden shift

to the defendant to prove that the plaintiff’s affidavit

is incorrect. In other words, once the defendant has

sufficiently interposed a defense as to the amount of

the debt, the plaintiff is required to satisfy its burden

under the Connecticut Code of Evidence, without the

benefit of § 23-18 (a). The purpose of this procedure is

to allow a defendant to cross-examine the witnesses

presented on the issue of the amount of the debt, as

well as to allow a defendant an opportunity to present

his or her own evidence. See National City Mortgage

Co. v. Stoecker, supra, 92 Conn. App. 798 (defendant

sought to cross-examine plaintiff as to timing and precise nature of expenditures claimed by plaintiff).

By attaching to his objection to the plaintiff’s affidavit

a document with a year to year breakdown of what he

claimed were the accurate property taxes, the defendant went beyond what our rules of practice require.

Along with argument based on an articulated reason,

this objection certainly sufficed to prevent the court

from relying on the affidavit for these calculations.

Although the defendant did not provide official records

from the town tax collector to support his calculation

of the amount of property tax he owed, we have never

required, and the language of Practice Book § 23-18 (a)

does not require, a defendant to provide any evidence.7

The plaintiff contends that a determination by this

court that the defendant’s objection to the affidavit

of debt sufficed will effectively eliminate the hearsay

exception in Practice Book § 23-18 (a). Specifically, the

plaintiff argues that, if the defendant prevails in the

present case, a foreclosure defendant can trigger an

evidentiary hearing simply by objecting to the affidavit

of debt without providing supporting evidence or

appearing for a hearing designed to give him or her the

opportunity to do so.8

In this opinion, however, this

court clearly holds that a general objection does not

suffice under § 23-18 (a). Rather, a defendant must raise

a specific defense as to the amount of the debt—for

example, that the interest or taxes were incorrect.

The trial court in the present case improperly placed

the burden on the defendant to prove that the amount

of interest listed in the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt was

inaccurate. At all times, it was the plaintiff’s burden to

prove the amount of the debt. The defendant sufficiently

objected to the amount of interest and municipal taxes,

and it was not his burden to provide further evidence

to ‘‘prove’’ his objection. By placing the burden on the

defendant to establish that the affidavit of debt was

inaccurate, the trial court prevented the defendant from

having an opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff’s

witnesses, including the affiant. Accordingly, the Appellate Court correctly held that the trial court had improperly relied on the plaintiff’s affidavit of debt rather than

having required the plaintiff to present evidence as to
the amount of the debt.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The defendant also is known as Abu Hashem W.Q. Malick. The plaintiff

also named Shujaat Malick and HOP Energy, LLC, as defendants in the trial

court, but they are not parties to this appeal. In the interest of simplicity,

we refer to Abu Hashem Malick as the defendant.

2 Although the defendant filed a brief in the Appellate Court and appeared

through counsel at oral argument before that court, he did not file a brief

in or appear at oral argument before this court after failing to comply with

our order requiring him to file a brief by August 16, 2022. We, therefore,

have considered this appeal in light of the record and the plaintiff’s brief

and oral argument only. See, e.g., Walsh v. Jodoin, 283 Conn. 187, 191 n.4,

925 A.2d 1086 (2007).

3 The Appellate Court stated that the defendant did not attend the hearing;

see JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Malick, supra, 208 Conn. App.

41; but the record shows that he did attend, although he did not provide the

trial court with the verified documentation it had requested. The Appellate

Court’s statement may have been made in reliance on the trial court’s

incorrect statement in its denial of the plaintiff’s motion for an extension

of time, in which the court stated that the defendant had not been present

at the second hearing.

4 The plaintiff also argues that the defendant waived any valid objection

he may have had by failing to appear at the July 15, 2019 hearing to provide

verified documentation as to his calculation of the debt. This is incorrect.

The record clearly shows that the defendant appeared at the strict foreclosure hearing and presented arguments on his objections to the affidavit of

debt. To the extent that the plaintiff’s waiver argument extends to the

defendant’s failure to provide documentation as to the allegedly incorrect

interest calculations, as discussed in part III of this opinion, the trial court

erroneously placed the burden on the defendant to prove that the plaintiff’s

affidavit of debt was incorrect. Therefore, the defendant’s failure to provide

the documentation the trial court requested does not constitute a waiver

of his objection.

5 The Appellate Court has held that a defendant may challenge the amount

of the debt by way of a special defense. See Bank of America, N.A. v.

Chainani, supra, 174 Conn. App. 486. We note that trial courts have disagreed

about whether a defendant may properly challenge the amount of the debt

by pleading a special defense. See Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Amatulli,

Docket No. CV-19-6032676-S, 2023 WL 1794235, *8 (Conn. Super. February

1, 2023) (defendants’ special defense disputing amount of debt was ‘‘not a

special defense but rather constitute[d] part of a general denial’’). But see

Ingomar Ltd. Partnership v. Packer, Docket No. CV-020-467401, 2007 WL

1675846, *11–12 (Conn. Super. May 23, 2007) (adjudicating named defendant’s special defense asserting that holders of note and mortgage misstated

principal, amounts of installment payments, interest and late charges).

Because the defendant in the present case interposed his defense by way

of an objection, we do not need to address the validity of pleading a special

defense related to the amount of mortgage debt owed.

6 Whether evidence is required for an objection to be sufficient was not

relevant to the court’s holding in Chainani, as the primary issue was whether

the defendant’s objection implicated the amount of debt at all. See Bank

of America, N.A. v. Chainani, 174 Conn. App. 480–81.

7

In fact, because of the defendant’s objection and argument, the trial

court itself ordered the plaintiff to determine whether the property taxes

listed in the affidavit of debt were incorrectly calculated. When the plaintiff

moved for an extension of time to provide the court with that information,

the court ruled that the plaintiff owed the court nothing, contrary to its

previous order. See footnote 3 of this opinion.

8 The plaintiff’s argument is supported by the amicus brief submitted by

USFN. That brief argues that, if the defendant prevails, a party would need

to file only a pro forma objection to the amount of the debt, even a frivolous

objection, to render Practice Book § 23-18 (a) inapplicable. USFN argues

that this court should require that a defendant present some evidence,

via testimony, an affidavit or other compelling documentation, to support

its objection.

Not only are we not persuaded that our holding today contradicts Practice

Book § 23-18 (a), but we are not persuaded that our holding will unduly

burden courts or litigants. Many foreclosure cases are settled through the
Judicial Branch’s Foreclosure Mediation Program. See State of Connecticut

Judicial Branch, Ezequiel Santiago Foreclosure Mediation Program: Report

to the Banking Committee of the General Assembly (March 1, 2021) pp. 4–5

(91 percent of foreclosure cases eligible for mediation between July 1,

2013, and December 31, 2020, were settled), available at https://jud.ct.gov/

statistics/fmp/FMP Report bank 2021.pdf (last visited June 30, 2023). Of

the cases that ultimately move to foreclosure judgment, many are uncontested. Thus, it is not often that a defendant in a foreclosure action will

challenge the use of an affidavit of debt pursuant to § 23-18 (a). Moreover,

the purpose of § 23-18 (a) is to serve as a hearsay exception when the

appropriate circumstances arise: circumstances that we hold did not arise

in this case. See Bank of America, N.A. v. Chainani, supra, 174 Conn. App.

484. In cases in which a defendant’s challenge to an affidavit of debt is

successful, that ruling promotes the public policy of providing homeowners—many of whom are self-represented—with opportunities to avoid foreclosure and provides transparency and fairness throughout the judicial

process. See State of Connecticut Judicial Branch, Ezequiel Santiago Foreclosure Mediation Program, supra, p. 14.