1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

___________________________________ 

 ) 

DENNIS JOHNSON, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action 

 ) No. 15-1851(EGS) 

v. ) 

 ) 

PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC, et al., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

___________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Paragon Systems, Inc.’s 

(“Paragon”) motion for attorney’s fees. Upon consideration of the 

parties’ memoranda, the applicable law, and the entire record, the 

Court GRANTS in PART and DENIES in PART Paragon’s motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

A brief history of this litigation makes clear that Mr. 

Johnson’s lawsuit against Paragon was meritless, and that his 

counsel’s conduct wasted Paragon’s time and resources as well as 

those of this Court. 

Mr. Johnson, represented by Kevin J. McCants, initiated this 

action against Paragon in October 2015. See Compl., ECF No. 1. On 

February 1, 2016, Paragon filed a partial motion to dismiss. ECF 

No. 6. When no opposition to that motion was filed, the Court 

issued an Order directing Mr. Johnson to respond to Paragon’s 

motion by no later than March 31, 2016. See Minute Order of Mar. 
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17, 2016. Mr. Johnson failed to comply with that deadline but did 

file a two-page opposition on April 1, 2016. See Pl.’s Opp. to 

Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 7. The Court subsequently granted 

Paragon’s motion, dismissing Mr. Johnson's claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress after concluding that Mr. Johnson 

had failed to sufficiently allege that his injury resulted from 

“extreme and outrageous conduct.” See Johnson v. Paragon Sys., 

Inc., 195 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2016). 

After conducting discovery, Paragon moved for summary 

judgment on its remaining claims on the ground that Mr. Johnson 

had “mistakenly and improperly included Paragon as a partydefendant in this litigation.” See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. 

for Summ. J., ECF No. 18-1 at 7. When no opposition to that motion 

was filed, the Court directed Mr. Johnson to file his opposition 

by no later than March 23, 2017. See Minute Order of Mar. 9, 2017. 

Despite the Court’s Order, Mr. Johnson never filed an opposition. 

The Court entered judgement in Paragon’s favor on the merits 

on September 27, 2017. See Johnson v. Paragon Sys., Inc., 272 F. 

Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2017). In so doing, the Court noted that, on 

the record before the Court, it appeared that the lawsuit against 

Paragon was “ill-conceived and a waste of this Court’s time and 

resources.” Id. at 5. Accordingly, the Court ordered Mr. Johnson 

and his counsel, Mr. McCants, to show cause why 
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sanctions, including significant monetary 

sanctions, should not be imposed against them 

both pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

11(b) and why Mr. McCants should not be referred 

to the Committee on Grievances of the United 

States District Court for the District of 

Columbia for any investigation or proceedings 

that the Committee may deem appropriate. Id. 

The next day, Mr. McCants, on behalf of himself and his 

client, filed a cursory five-sentence response to that Order. See 

Pl.’s Resp. to Order of the Court, ECF No. 26. Mr. McCants stated 

that Paragon was “sued in good-faith” and that he “didn’t know” 

that Paragon was not involved in the underlying incident leading 

to Mr. Johnson’s alleged injuries “until the depositions.” Id. at 

1. Mr. Johnson further stated that “[w]hen it became clear that 

Paragon was not the liable party,” Mr. McCants thought Mr. Johnson 

“was being responsible” by informing Paragon’s attorney that he 

“would not oppose [Paragon’s] motion for summary judgment.” Id. 

 The remaining defendants1 timely filed their motions to 

dismiss, ECF Nos. 22 and 23, and, again, Mr. Johnson failed to 

file an opposition to these motions until the Court ordered him to 

do so, see Minute Order of Oct. 6, 2017. Although Mr. Johnson 

complied with the Court’s Order, his response was cursory at best. 

See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 29 (a three-page 

 

1 After the Court granted Paragon’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Johnson 

filed an amended complaint adding a number of defendants. See Am. 

Compl., ECF No. 12.
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memorandum with a six-sentence “argument” section). Thereafter, 

the Court dismissed the remaining defendants on March 29, 2018. 

See Order, ECF No. 35. 

Shortly after dismissing the remaining defendants in this 

litigation, see Johnson v. Paragon Sys., Inc., No. 15-1851, 2018 

WL 1542134 (Mar. 29, 2018), the Court directed Paragon to file its 

motion for attorney’s fees, see Minute Order of April 3, 2018. Mr. 

Johnson was directed to file his response to Paragon’s motion by 

no later than April 27, 2018; in keeping with his pattern of 

dilatory conduct in this case, Mr. Johnson’s counsel failed to 

file a timely opposition. Four days after the deadline for an 

opposition had passed, Mr. Johnson requested additional time to 

respond to Paragon’s fee petition, see Emergency Mot. for 

Extension of Time, ECF No. 38, which the Court reluctantly 

granted, see Minute Order of May 2, 2018. Mr. Johnson filed his 

response on May 4, 2018, see Pl.’s Opp. to Fee Shifting, ECF No. 

39, asserting that a fee award is not warranted or, in the 

alternative, that fees should be limited to expenses incurred 

after the date of Mr. Johnson’s deposition. See id. 

II. ANALYSIS 

The Court agrees that Paragon is entitled to attorney’s fees, 

however Paragon’s requested fee must be reduced to only expenses 

incurred following Mr. Johnson’s deposition. “Federal courts 

possess certain ‘inherent powers,’ not conferred by rule or 
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statute, ‘to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly 

and expeditious disposition of cases.’” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 

v. Haeger, 137 S.Ct. 1178, 1186 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R. 

Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631 (1962)). Those powers include “the 

ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which 

abuses the judicial process.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 

32, 44–45 (1991). Accordingly, a court may issue “contempt 

citations, fines, awards of attorneys’ fees, and such other orders 

and sanctions” when necessary to reimburse a party for frivolous 

litigation conducted against it. Parsi v. Daioleslam, 778 F.3d 

116, 130 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).2 Generally, “a finding of bad faith is required for an 

award of attorney’s fees under the court’s inherent power.” Id. at 

131. 

In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, the Supreme Court 

held that a fees award issued pursuant to a court’s inherent 

authority to sanction a litigant for bad-faith conduct must be 

 

2 Although Paragon urges the Court to consider issuing sanctions 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, see Paragon’s Mot. 

for Fees, ECF No. 37 at 2, the misconduct here does not involve 

“any pleading or paper submitted to the court.” Ali v. Tolbert, 

636 F.3d 622, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Rather, as explained more 

fully below, it involves plaintiff’s “failure to present a 

document” dismissing claims he knew to be meritless. Id. Because 

Rule 11, on its face, only applies to representations made to the 

Court made in a “pleading, written motion, or other paper,” the 

Court concludes that sanctions in this case are not authorized 

under Rule 11. 
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“limited to the fees the innocent party incurred solely because of 

the misconduct.” 137 S.Ct. at 1184. In other words, there must be 

a “causal link” between “the litigant’s misbehavior and legal fees 

paid by the opposing party.” Id. at 1186. Accordingly, before 

awarding fees, a court must “determine whether a given legal fee — 

say, for taking a deposition or drafting a motion — would or would 

not have been incurred in the absence of the sanctioned conduct.” 

Id. at 1187. 

On the record before it, the Court cannot definitively 

conclude that Mr. Johnson’s suit against Paragon was initiated in 

bad faith. See Pl.’s Resp. to Order of the Court, ECF No. 26 at 1 

(stating that, when Mr. McCants started investigating Mr. 

Johnson’s claims, the guards at the facility “were wearing Paragon 

uniforms” and that the contract had “switched from Paragon to MVM 

six days after the incident” underlying Mr. Johnson’s complaint). 

Mr. Johnson and Mr. McCants assert that they did not know that 

Paragon was an improper party “until the depositions” were taken 

in this case. Id. Although they do not specify the “depositions” 

to which they refer, Paragon’s billing records indicate that Mr. 

Johnson was deposed on October 3, 2016. See Paragon’s Mot. for 

Fees Ex. 1, ECF No. 37-1 at 6. As the Court noted in granting 

Paragon’s motion for summary judgment, Mr. Johnson conceded at 

that deposition that he had no knowledge or information to support 

his belief that Paragon caused his alleged injuries. See Johnson 
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v. Paragon Sys., Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2017). Indeed, 

shortly after the conclusion of the deposition, Paragon’s counsel 

emailed Mr. McCants and asked that, “[g]iven [his] client’s 

deposition testimony,” he “voluntarily dismiss his Complaint 

against Paragon Systems.” ECF No. 27-1 at 10. Mr. Johnson and Mr. 

McCants’ decision to continue this litigation despite Mr. 

Johnson’s concession that he had no knowledge or information to 

support his belief that Paragon caused his alleged injuries 

constitutes bad-faith. Mr. Johnson refusal to dismiss the claims 

against Paragon forced Paragon to continue incurring expenses 

defending itself until the Court granted summary judgment in its 

favor on September 27, 2017. See Order, ECF No. 25. Accordingly, 

the Court concludes that fees incurred by Paragon after Mr. 

Johnson’s deposition on October 3, 2016 were caused by Mr. 

Johnson’s and Mr. McCants’s bad-faith conduct in this litigation. 

Because the Court finds that both Mr. Johnson and Mr. McCants 

acted in bad faith during the course of these proceedings, the 

Court will impose the fee award against Mr. Johnson and Mr. 

McCants jointly and severally. See Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 

U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980) ("The power of a court over members of its 

bar is at least as great as its authority over litigants. If a 

court may tax counsel fees against a party who has litigated in 

bad faith, it certainly may assess those expenses against counsel 

who willfully abuse judicial processes."). 
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The Court has reviewed Paragon’s billing records and finds 

that Paragon’s counsel spent 40.7 hours after the deposition on 

October 3, 2016 in connection with the defense of this case. This 

includes time spent drafting and filing a motion for summary 

judgment that Mr. Johnson or Mr. McCants admit they had no 

intention of opposing. See Pl.’s Resp. to Order of the Court, ECF 

No. 26 at 1 (“When it became clear that Paragon was not the liable 

party, counsel thought I was being responsible by telling 

Paragon[‘s] attorney I would not oppose their motion for summary 

judgment and that’s why I didn’t respond to it.”). The Court 

further concludes that Paragon’s hourly rate of $175 comports with 

prevailing community standards and is eminently fair and 

reasonable. See U.S. Attorney’s Office Attorney’s Fees Matrix, 

2015-2018 (providing for hourly rates between $302 and $602 

depending on years of experience), https://www.justice.gov/usaodc/file/796471. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 11, it is hereby 

ORDERED that Paragon’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED 

in PART and DENIED in Part; and it is 

FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff and/or his attorney shall pay 

$7,122.50 in attorney’s fees and costs to Paragon by no later than 

December 31, 2018. Any request for an extension of time for 

payment of this fee shall be viewed with disfavor. 
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SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

United States District Judge 

October 17, 2018