[Cite as State v. Veon, 2023-Ohio-3333.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COLUMBIANA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JACK ROWLAND VEON, II,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 22 CO 0045

Criminal Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio

Case No. 2021 CR 533

BEFORE:

Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.

Atty. Vito J. Abruzzino, Columbiana County Prosecutor, and Atty. Alec A. Beech,

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Columbiana County Prosecutor's Office, 135 South 

Market Street, Lisbon, Ohio 44432, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Atty. Charles A.J. Strader, Attorney Charles Strader, LLC, 175 Franklin Street SE,

Warren, Ohio 44481, for Defendant-Appellant.

Dated: September 14, 2023
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Case No. 22 CO 0045

HANNI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jack Rowland Veon, II, appeals from a Columbiana 

County Common Pleas Court judgment finding him guilty of two counts of aggravated 

possession of drugs, following a jury trial.

{¶2} As a result of an investigation by the Columbiana County Drug Task Force 

(task force) of suspected drug activity at Appellant’s residence, the task force obtained a 

search warrant for Appellant’s home. The task force executed the warrant on February 

11, 2021. 

{¶3} When the task force entered the house, Appellant, his girlfriend Mary Beth 

Kiehl, and her juvenile son were in the kitchen. Another housemate, Robert Crespo, was 

in the basement. The search was led by Detective Sergeant Brett Grabman.

{¶4} During the search, methamphetamine, Psilocyn, and drug paraphernalia 

were found in the master bedroom, a room shared by Appellant and Kiehl. Drug 

paraphernalia was also found throughout the home. Paraphernalia included smoking 

pipes, vials, and digital scales. Multiple cell phones and money were also found. 

{¶5} A Columbiana County Grand Jury indicted Appellant by way of secret 

indictment on October 13, 2021. The indictment charged Appellant with two counts of 

aggravated possession of drugs, fifth-degree felonies in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). The

indictment identified the drugs as methamphetamine and Psilocyn. Kiehl was also 

charged separately with drug possession. 

{¶6} The case proceeded to a jury trial on October 12, 2022. The jury found 

Appellant guilty as charged. The trial court subsequently sentenced Appellant to 

consecutive 11-month prison sentences. 

{¶7} Appellant filed this timely appeal on November 2, 2022. He now raises four 

assignments of error. We will address Appellant’s assignments of error out of order for 

ease of discussion.

{¶8} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:
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Case No. 22 CO 0045

THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, JACK 

ROWLAND VEON, II, WAS AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE 

EVIDENCE, AND, AS A RESULT, THEREOF, MUST BE REVERSED. 

{¶9} Appellant contends Plaintiff-Appellee, the State of Ohio, failed to present 

any evidence that indicated he knowingly possessed the drugs. Appellant argues the 

evidence did not demonstrate constructive possession.

{¶10} Sufficiency of the evidence is the legal standard applied to determine 

whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient as a 

matter of law to support the verdict. State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 113, 684 N.E.2d 

668 (1997). Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict 

is a question of law. Id. In reviewing the record for sufficiency, the relevant inquiry is 

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d at 113. When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to 

prove the elements, it must be remembered that circumstantial evidence has the same 

probative value as direct evidence. State v. Thorn, 7th Dist. Belmont Nos. 16 BE 0054,

17 BE 0013, 2018-Ohio-1028, ¶ 34, citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 272-273, 

574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) (superseded by state constitutional amendment on other 

grounds).

{¶11} A sufficiency of the evidence challenge tests the burden of production while 

a manifest weight challenge tests the burden of persuasion. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., 

concurring). Therefore, when reviewing a sufficiency challenge, the court does not 

evaluate witness credibility. State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 2002-Ohio-2126, 747 

N.E.2d 216, ¶ 79. Instead, the court looks at whether the evidence is sufficient if believed.

Id. at ¶ 82.

{¶12} The jury convicted Appellant of aggravated possession of drugs in violation

of R.C. 2925.11(A), which provides: “No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use 

a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” Pursuant to R.C. 2925.01(K), 

to “possess” means “having control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred 
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Case No. 22 CO 0045

solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the 

premises upon which the thing or substance is found.”

{¶13} In the context of drug offenses, “possession” may be either actual 

possession or constructive possession. State v. Carter, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 97-JE-24, 

2000 WL 748140, *4 (May 30, 2000). “Constructive possession exists when an individual 

exercises dominion and control over an object, even though that object may not be within 

his immediate physical possession.” State v. Wolery, 46 Ohio St.2d 316, 329, 348 N.E.2d 

351 (1976).

{¶14} Det. Sgt. Grabman was the State’s sole witness. Thus, we must examine 

his testimony to determine if the State presented evidence going to each element of 

aggravated drug possession.

{¶15} Det. Sgt. Grabman testified that the task force came to believe drugs were 

being stored or sold from 36358 Teagarden Road. (Tr. 117). This belief was partially 

due to two traffic stops of vehicles leaving this residence. (Tr. 117). One traffic stop was 

of Kiehl, who was charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence. (Tr. 118). 

Kiehl confirmed that she and Appellant both resided at the Teagarden Road address. (Tr. 

120). During another traffic stop, the driver had drugs on him that he stated he had 

purchased from the Teagarden Road address. (Tr. 119). The task force also retrieved a 

receipt from the trash outside of the Teagarden Road residence that had Appellant’s 

name and address on it. (Tr. 120).

{¶16} Det. Sgt. Grabman testified that when the task force entered Appellant’s 

house, Appellant was in the kitchen with Kiehl and her young son. (Tr. 123). Another 

man was in the basement. (Tr. 123). 

{¶17} The task force searched the master bedroom, which contained both men’s 

and women’s clothing and personal items. Inside a dresser drawer that contained men’s 

underwear, the task force found a bag containing crystal methamphetamine. (Tr. 129). 

On a different dresser, the task force located vials with a “crystal-like” substance in them. 

(Tr. 130). Additionally, they found white powder on the dressers. (Tr. 130). And they 

found drug pipes, pills, a cut straw, and other drug paraphernalia. (Tr. 129-130, 135-136). 

These items were all in plain view in the master bedroom. (Tr. 136). 
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Case No. 22 CO 0045

{¶18} Det. Sgt. Grabman sent some of the items to the Bureau of Criminal 

Identification and Investigation (BCI) for testing. (Tr. 131). The BCI report concluded that 

the items tested included: .21 grams of methamphetamine; .22 grams of 

methamphetamine; .17 grams of methamphetamine; .15 grams of Psilocyn, a 

hallucinogenic mushroom; and Suboxone, a prescription medication prescribed to help 

with withdrawal symptoms for opiate users. (Tr. 132-133). 

{¶19} A defendant's conviction for drug possession can be based upon 

circumstantial evidence of possession. State v. DeSarro, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 13 

CO 39, 2015-Ohio-5470, ¶ 41. When drugs are readily usable and found in very close 

proximity to a defendant these facts may constitute circumstantial evidence and support 

a conclusion that the defendant had constructive possession of the drugs. State v. 

Barker, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 05-JE-21, 2006-Ohio-1472, ¶ 78, quoting State v. Kobi, 

122 Ohio App.3d 160, 174, 701 N.E.2d 420 (1997).

{¶20} In this case, the evidence indicated that Appellant and Kiehl shared the 

master bedroom. The drugs were located in the master bedroom. Some of the 

methamphetamine was found in a dresser drawer containing men’s underwear, indicating 

it was in Appellant’s constructive possession. As for the remainder of the drugs found,

“two persons may constructively possess the same thing.” State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. 

Summit Nos. 22378 and 22394, 2005-Ohio-5184, ¶ 19, citing State v. Galindo, 6th Dist. 

No. L-98-1242, 1999 WL 461749, *3 (July 9, 1999). So the fact that there were two people 

who shared the bedroom where the drugs were found does not detract from Appellant’s 

possession.

{¶21} The circumstantial evidence presented by the State in this case was 

sufficient to demonstrate that Appellant had constructive possession of the drugs found 

in the master bedroom. 

{¶22} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled.

{¶23} Appellant’s third assignment of error states:

THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED THE 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL, PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL 
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Case No. 22 CO 0045

RULE 29(A) AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE CASE BY THE STATE OF 

OHIO. 

{¶24} Appellant challenges the denial of his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal 

contending there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain a conviction.

{¶25} At the close of the State’s case, Appellant’s counsel moved for an acquittal 

based on Crim.R. 29(A). (Tr. 164). Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A):

The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the evidence 

on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of 

one or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, 

if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or 

offenses.

{¶26} An appellate court reviews a denial of a motion to acquit under Crim.R. 29 

using the same standard that an appellate court uses to review a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim. State v. Rhodes, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 99-BA-62, 2002-Ohio-1572, at ¶ 

9; State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 553, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995).

{¶27} As discussed above, the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain 

Appellant’s convictions. The same analysis applies here. 

{¶28} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶29} Appellant’s first assignment of error states:

THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, JACK 

ROWLAND VEON, II WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE, AND, AS A RESULT, THEREOF, MUST BE REVERSED.

{¶30} Appellant argues his convictions were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Appellant contends the jury erred in their interpretation of what constitutes 

knowingly possessing the drugs involved. Appellant further contends the evidence in this

case does not satisfy the requirements for constructive possession.

{¶31} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all 
– 7 –

Case No. 22 CO 0045

reasonable inferences and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the 

jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. 

“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible 

evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” Id.

(Emphasis sic.). In making its determination, a reviewing court is not required to view the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution but may consider and weigh all of 

the evidence produced at trial. Id. at 390.

{¶32} Still, determinations of witness credibility, conflicting testimony, and 

evidence weight are primarily for the trier of the facts. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 

230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus.

{¶33} Appellant took the stand in his defense. Thus, in addition to the evidence 

put forth by the State and set out previously, we must also consider Appellant’s testimony 

in determining whether Appellant’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

{¶34} Appellant admitted that the drugs were found in his bedroom. (Tr. 175, 

182). He stated he had probably been in that bedroom two hours before the search 

warrant was executed. (Tr. 175-176, 182). He stated that he had not seen the crystal 

meth in the drawer with the men’s underwear. (Tr. 176). He also denied ever seeing the 

Psilocyn. (Tr. 177). As to the crystal meth that was found in a vial on the dresser, 

Appellant stated Kiehl had a lot of little vials with actual crystals that she used for crafts. 

(Tr. 177). 

{¶35} Appellant admitted he had struggled with drugs in the past but that he had 

been sober since October 2019. (Tr. 172). Appellant testified that he had suspected 

Kiehl was using drugs. (Tr. 176). When asked how the drugs got into his house, 

Appellant stated that he suspected Robert Crespo, who was staying with Appellant at the 

time, brought the drugs in. (Tr. 178). 

{¶36} Considering the State’s evidence and Appellant’s testimony, we cannot 

conclude the jury clearly lost its way in finding Appellant guilty of aggravated drug 

possession. As noted above, a defendant's conviction for drug possession can be based 

upon circumstantial evidence of possession. DeSarro, 2015-Ohio-5470, ¶ 41. Appellant 
– 8 –

Case No. 22 CO 0045

admitted that the drugs were found in his bedroom, both in his dresser and in plain view. 

He also admitted to previously having a drug problem. Thus, the drugs would have been 

easily recognizable to him. Appellant further acknowledged that he had been in his 

bedroom just two hours prior to the execution of the search warrant. While he claimed 

he did not see the drugs in his bedroom at that time, this was a question of credibility for 

the jury to determine. 

{¶37} This analysis hinges on a credibility determination. The jury was tasked 

with evaluating whether Appellant was telling the truth when he testified that the drugs 

found in the bedroom were not his and that he had no knowledge that they were there. 

The jurors were in the best position to observe Appellant's gestures, voice inflections, and 

demeanor. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230. The jury clearly found Appellant's testimony to 

be not credible.

{¶38} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled. 

{¶39} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error states:

THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 

SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, JACK ROWLAND VEON, 

II, TO CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR THE CONVICTION OF TWO (2) 

COUNTS OF AGGRAVATED POSSESSION OF DRUGS. 

{¶40} Appellant contends the trial court failed to take into account the two counts 

of drug possession were of the same stature, with the same penalties, and occurred out 

of a single course of conduct. Appellant asserts the court should have ordered him to 

serve his sentences concurrently instead of consecutively. 

{¶41} An appellate court's standard for review on sentencing matters is not 

whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Instead, when 

reviewing a felony sentence, an appellate court must uphold the sentence unless the 

evidence clearly and convincingly does not support the trial court's findings under the 

applicable sentencing statutes or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. State v. 

Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1.
– 9 –

Case No. 22 CO 0045

{¶42} The Ohio Supreme Court recently addressed an appellate court's standard 

when reviewing consecutive sentences:

[A]ppellate review of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does 

not require appellate courts to defer to the sentencing court's findings in any 

manner. Instead, the plain language of the statute requires appellate courts 

to review the record de novo and decide whether the record clearly and 

convincingly does not support the consecutive-sentence findings.

State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4607, ¶ 1.

{¶43} In this case, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 11 months on each of the 

two aggravated drug possession convictions. It ordered him to serve the sentences 

consecutively.

{¶44} As to the issue of consecutive sentences, R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a 

trial court to make specific findings:

(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of 

multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison 

terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is 

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender 

and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness 

of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, 

and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the 

offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed 

pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or 

was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or 

more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the 

multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single 

prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses 

of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
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Case No. 22 CO 0045

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender.

{¶45} It has been held that although the trial court is not required to recite the 

statute verbatim or utter “magic” or “talismanic” words, there must be an indication that 

the court found (1) that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from 

future crime or to punish the offender, (2) that consecutive sentences are not 

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger posed to 

the public, and (3) one of the findings described in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c). State 

v. Bellard, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12-MA-97, 2013-Ohio-2956, ¶ 17. The court need not 

give its reasons for making those findings however. State v. Power, 7th Dist. Columbiana 

No. 12 CO 14, 2013-Ohio-4254, ¶ 38. A trial court must make the consecutive sentence 

findings at the sentencing hearing and must additionally incorporate the findings into the 

sentencing entry. State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Mahoning, 2015-Ohio-4100, 43 N.E.3d 797, 

¶ 33-34, citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 

37.

{¶46} In sentencing Appellant to consecutive sentences, the trial court made the 

required statutory findings. The court recited each of the statutory factors on the record. 

(Tr. 256-258). It continued on to find that consecutive sentences were necessary, the 

seriousness of Appellant’s conduct and his continued criminal conduct warranted 

consecutive sentences, and Appellant committed these offenses while on a community 

control sanction. (Tr. 258-259).

{¶47} Appellant argues that the record does not support the findings the 

sentencing court made to justify consecutive sentences. 

{¶48} In Gwynne, the Ohio Supreme Court held “that based on the language of 

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the consecutive-sentence findings are not simply threshold findings 

that, once made, permit any amount of consecutively stacked individual sentences. 

Rather, these findings must be made in consideration of the aggregate term to be 

imposed.” Gwynne, 2022-Ohio-4607, at ¶ 1.

{¶49} The Gwynne Court elaborated on the appellate review standard, noting that 

while an appellate court essentially functions in the same manner as the trial court when 
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Case No. 22 CO 0045

imposing consecutive sentences, there are three differences the appellate court must 

heed. Id. at ¶ 21. First, “the appellate court is constrained to considering only the findings 

in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) that the trial court has actually made.” Id. The Court explained 

that an appellate court cannot determine for itself which of the three R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) findings might apply. Id. Second, while the trial court's standard of 

proof under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) is a preponderance of the evidence, the appellate court's 

standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. Id. Third, “is the inversion of the 

ultimate question before the court.” Id. The Court elaborated on this point noting that 

while “the trial court is tasked with determining whether the proposition of fact represented 

by each finding is more likely—or more probably—true than not, an appellate court's task 

is to determine whether it has a firm belief or conviction that the proposition of fact 

represented by each finding is not true on consideration of the evidence in the record.” 

Id.

{¶50} The Ohio Supreme Court went on to set out “practical guidance” for 

appellate review. Here, it emphasized the steps set out above and then elaborated on 

some points. Specifically, the Court noted that “[a] record that is devoid of evidence 

simply cannot support the findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); there must be an 

evidentiary basis upon which these findings rest.” Id. ¶ 28. The Court stated that 

whatever evidentiary basis there is, it must be adequate to fully support the trial court's 

consecutive-sentence findings. Id. at ¶ 29. It emphasized that an “appellate court is, in 

fact, authorized to substitute its judgment for the trial court's judgment if the appellate 

court has a firm conviction or belief, after reviewing the entire record, that the evidence 

does not support the specific findings made by the trial court to impose consecutive 

sentences, which includes the number of consecutive terms and the aggregate sentence 

that results.” Id.

{¶51} Prior to sentencing Appellant, the court reviewed his presentence 

investigation (PSI). (Tr. 249). The court relied heavily on Appellant’s criminal record, 

which is included in the record. After a juvenile record from 1993-1996, his adult criminal 

record began in 1998. Appellant’s misdemeanor offenses included underage 

consumption, criminal trespass, breaking and entering, disorderly conduct, passing bad 

checks, and possession of drugs. (Tr. 249-251). At the time of the most recent offense, 
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Case No. 22 CO 0045

Appellant was on probation from a single felony count of aggravated possession of drugs. 

(Tr. 250-251). The trial court stated, “[s]eriousness and recidivism factors, the Court finds, 

are both high.” (Tr. 256). The court also considered the fact that when it told Appellant it 

was going to drug test him, Appellant stated that the test would be positive. (Tr. 240-

241). The court pointed out then that Appellant’s claim of sobriety was a lie. (Tr. 241).

{¶52} Given Appellant’s vast criminal history and drug use and the trial court's 

reliance on this information, the evidence supports the trial court's findings and the 

imposition of consecutive sentences.

{¶53} Accordingly, Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit and is 

overruled.

{¶54} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

Robb, J., concurs.
[Cite as State v. Veon, 2023-Ohio-3333.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error 

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed 

against the Appellant.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.