NUMBER 13-20-00349-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG 

 

CALLIE RENEE INMAN, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 56th District Court 

of Galveston County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

Appellant Callie Renee Inman pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide, a 

state jail felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05. The trial court placed her on deferred 

adjudication community supervision. Following the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt, the 

trial court found the allegations in the State’s motion to be true, adjudicated guilt, revoked 

Inman’s community supervision, and assessed punishment at eight years’ imprisonment. 
2

By four issues, Inman argues that: (1) the trial court committed reversible error by 

depriving her of her Confrontation Clause rights and admitting inadmissible testimony; (2) 

the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that she violated the terms 

of her community supervision; (3) her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and 

(4) the trial court erred by failing to grant her motion for new trial. We affirm.1

I. BACKGROUND

The State charged Inman with intoxication manslaughter and manslaughter.

2

Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Inman pleaded guilty to criminally negligent 

homicide. On July 20, 2015, the trial court deferred adjudication and placed her on 

community supervision for five years.

On May 17, 2019, the State filed an amended motion to adjudicate guilt alleging 

that Inman violated the conditions of her community supervision by: (1) committing the 

offenses of possession of marijuana and possession of a controlled substance; (2) leaving

Galveston County without permission; (3) admitting to using marijuana via brownie

ingestion and possessing marijuana; (4) testing positive for THC, opiates, marijuana, and

benzodiazepines, and (5) failing to report to drug tests on January 24, 2019, and April 29, 

2019.

The trial court held a hearing on June 18, 2020. Viviann Boyer, mental health 

1 This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston by 

order of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (granting the supreme court the 

authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for 

the transfer). 

2 The indictment alleged that Inman was driving while intoxicated when she collided with a 

motorcycle, thereby killing a retired police officer and injuring his wife.
3

coordinator for Chambers County, testified that on April 12, 2017, Inman tested positive 

for marijuana and claimed “she un[know]ingly ate a bite of the brownie . . . around the 

middle of March that had marijuana in [it].” Boyer further stated that on May 5, 2018, 

Inman “admitted using of T.H.C” and on May 8, 2018, Inman again tested positive for 

marijuana. 

Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper Daniel Hebert testified that he was on 

patrol on February 23, 2019, when he observed a vehicle pass him with a piece of paper 

obscuring the license plate. Trooper Hebert made a traffic stop, and he smelled an odor 

of marijuana permeating the vehicle. He observed Inman in the driver’s seat and two other 

highly intoxicated occupants, her brother and his girlfriend, Sadie Paschall. Trooper 

Hebert’s dashcam video was admitted into evidence. In the video, the officer can be seen 

recovering a white purse and a red purse from the stopped car. He located the red purse 

in the driver’s side of the vehicle. When Trooper Hebert asked whom the red purse

belonged to, Inman immediately raised her hand and then placed her hands behind her 

back. Inside the purse, Trooper Hebert found a prescription bottle with Inman’s name on 

it and marijuana inside. He asked her if the red purse was hers and Inman responded, 

“Yes, but everything was just thrown in there.”

Galveston County Community Supervision and Corrections Department Officer 

Alexandra Hon testified that Inman was supervised in both Galveston County and Liberty 

County. According to Inman’s casefile, which was admitted into evidence, on January 24, 

2019, Inman did not provide a drug test because the “quantity provided was not sufficient,” 

and on April 29, 2019, she failed to report to a drug test. Officer Hon stated that Inman
4

left Texas without permission to attend a rehab facility in Louisiana. On May 28, 2019, 

Inman told Officer Hon that she left Texas “because somebody else had told her it was 

okay.” According to Officer Hon, “it was suspected that [Inman] was abusing her 

prescription medication,” and on May 28, 2019, Inman “admitted to [Officer Hon] that she 

had begun using drugs again due to her mental state.”

Regarding the February 23, 2019 incident, Paschall testified that the red purse and 

the marijuana inside it belonged to her. According to Inman, she took the blame to prevent 

Paschall going to jail because Paschall “wasn’t in her right mind. So I just took it. And I 

figured when [Paschall] got in her right mind she could possibly fix it, and she has chosen 

to do that.” Inman denied she possessed marijuana: “Yeah, I was using [Paschall’s] purse 

at the time but it was her purse and her weed.” 

Regarding the failed drug tests, Inman denied using marijuana or THC during her 

period of community supervision. She stated that she merely took “one bite” of the 

brownie, but she thought it contained “CBD” not marijuana. She further stated that Boyer 

was mistaken regarding Inman’s use of THC because Inman did not “fail a drug test for 

Ms. Viviann Boyer.”

Inman further testified that there was a misunderstanding about her traveling to 

Louisiana because although her community supervision officer did not tell her specifically 

whether she could travel to Louisiana, her officer told her stepfather that she was allowed 

to leave the state. Regarding the failed drug test on January 24, 2019, Inman explained 

“I think that might have been a misunderstanding on [the officer’s] part because I did show 

up.”
5

The trial court revoked Inman’s community supervision, adjudicated her guilty of

criminally negligent homicide and sentenced her to eight years’ incarceration. Inman filed 

a motion for new trial alleging the State failed to prove she violated the terms of her

community supervision. It was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed. 

II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

By her first issue, Inman argues the trial court deprived her of her “Confrontation 

Clause rights and prejudic[ed her] through the introduction of otherwise inadmissible 

testimony.” The State asserts that Texas courts have held confrontation rights are not 

implicated in revocation proceedings. We agree with the State. 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 

right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 

Admission of hearsay statements made by a non-testifying declarant violates the Sixth 

Amendment if the statement was testimonial, and the defendant did not have the 

opportunity to cross-examine the witness. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 

(2004); Wall v. State, 184 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). However, several 

Texas courts have held that the right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment does 

not apply during revocation proceedings. See Olabode v. State, 575 S.W.3d 878, 881

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. ref’d) (“This Court has concluded the right to confrontation 

under the Sixth Amendment does not apply during revocation proceedings.”); Sabella v. 

State, 578 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.); Mauro v. State, 235 

S.W.3d 374, 375–76 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, pet. ref’d); Trevino v. State, 218 S.W.3d 
6

234, 239 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Diaz v. State, 172 S.W.3d 668, 

669 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.); Smart v. State, 153 S.W.3d 118, 121 (Tex. 

App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. ref’d) see also Corona v. State, No. 14-17-00821-CR, 2019 

WL 1768598, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication) (“A community supervision revocation hearing is not part 

of a criminal prosecution.”).

Inman contends we should deviate from this established precedent because the 

court of criminal appeals has yet to consider this issue. However, we find this argument 

unavailing, as the Fourteenth Court of Appeals “has consistently held in light of the 

Confrontation Clause’s focus on criminal prosecutions, that the clause does not apply to 

post-conviction proceedings.” 3 Trevino, 218 S.W.3d at 239; see also Corona, WL 

1768598, at *3. Accordingly, we overrule Inman’s first issue.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

By her second issue, Inman argues that there is insufficient evidence supporting 

the following violations: (1) possessing marijuana on February 23, 2019; (2) leaving 

Galveston County without permission; (3) admitting, in writing, to ingesting marijuana via 

brownie in mid-March; and (4) failing to report to a drug test on April 29, 2019.

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

We review a trial court’s order revoking deferred adjudication community 

supervision for an abuse of discretion. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. 

3 This case was transferred from our sister court in Houston, and we decide it in accordance with 

the precedent of that court to the extent required by TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
7

App. 2013) (citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). The 

trial court has discretion to revoke community supervision when the State proves by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated at least one condition of 

community supervision. Id. at 864–65. “[A] preponderance of the evidence” means “that 

greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the 

defendant has violated a condition of [community supervision].” Id. at 865 (citing Rickels, 

202 S.W.3d at 764). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a revocation, 

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. The trial 

judge serves as the sole judge of credibility of the witnesses and in assessing the weight 

of the testimony. Id.

B. Discussion

Here, Trooper Hebert testified that he found marijuana inside a red purse, which 

Inman admitted at the scene belonged to her, and there was a strong odor of marijuana 

permeating from the vehicle. The trial court viewed Trooper Hebert’s dash camera video. 

Although Inman testified at the revocation hearing that the purse was not hers and she 

was merely borrowing it, the trial judge serves as the sole judge of credibility of the 

witnesses and could have disbelieved her hearing testimony. See id. Thus, the trial court 

could have reasonably inferred by a preponderance of evidence that Inman was in 

possession of marijuana on February 23, 2019. Accordingly, we conclude there was 

sufficient evidence to support this finding.

Furthermore, there was evidence that Inman tested positive for marijuana on April 

12, 2017, according to her casefiles and testimony from the State’s witnesses. When the 
8

State asked Inman whether she “admitted to probation in writing something about 

marijuana via brownie,” Inman responded, “Yes, sir. But I told her it was a brownie I got 

from the smoke shop . . . . So when I failed the test I did tell her that I did eat a brownie.” 

Thus, Inman admitted to ingesting a brownie from a smoke shop shortly before she failed 

the April 12, 2017 drug test. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to support this 

violation. See Olabode, 575 S.W.3d at 880.

Lastly, Officer Hon unequivocally testified that Inman did not have permission to 

travel to Louisiana. As the sole judge of the witness’s credibility, the trial court could have 

credited this testimony and revoked Inman’s community supervision for this reason alone. 

See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Garcia v. State, 387 

S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (providing that that proof of a single violation of 

community supervision will support the trial court’s decision to revoke); Allbright v. State, 

13 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we 

conclude there was sufficient evidence that Inman violated the terms of her community 

supervision. See Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in revoking Inman’s community supervision based on these violations, and we 

overrule Inman’s second issue. See id.

IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

By her third issue, Inman argues that her trial counsel was ineffective during the 

revocation proceeding. Specifically, she asserts that her trial counsel: (1) was unprepared 

for her revocation hearing, (2) was unable to confer with her prior to the final hearing, and 
9

(3) failed to communicate with her during the final hearing. 

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, an appellant must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that (1) trial counsel’s performance was deficient by falling 

below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) trial counsel’s deficiency caused 

the appellant prejudice such that there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 694 (1984); Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 892–

93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). An appellant must prove both prongs of the Strickland test by 

a preponderance of the evidence. See Perez, 310 S.W.3d at 893.

Often a claim of ineffective assistance may not be addressed on direct appeal 

because the record is not sufficient to conclude that trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient under the first Strickland prong. See Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005); see also Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 

“Review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and the reviewing court indulges 

a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable 

representation.” Salinas, 163 S.W.3d at 740. “To overcome the presumption of 

reasonable professional assistance, any allegation of ineffectiveness must be firmly 

founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged 

ineffectiveness.” Id. (quotation omitted). If trial counsel has not had an opportunity to 

explain its actions, we may not find deficient performance unless the conduct was “so 

outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Goodspeed v. State, 
10

187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quotation omitted).

B. Discussion

Although Inman filed a motion for new trial, she did not allege in that motion that 

her trial counsel was ineffective in representing her at the revocation proceeding, and 

there is no record of a hearing on that motion. See Salinas, 163 S.W.3d at 740. Thus, this

record is insufficient to conclude that trial counsel’s performance was deficient under the 

first Strickland prong. See Andrews, 159 S.W.3d at 103; Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392. 

Moreover, Inman does not explain, much less prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that a reasonable probability exists that, absent trial counsel’s alleged errors, 

the outcome of the revocation proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. Here, the trial court heard Trooper Hebert testify regarding finding marijuana 

in Inman’s purse after smelling an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle. In the 

video, Trooper Hebert can be seen recovering marijuana from a container with Inman’s 

name on it, and Inman admitted the red purse belonged to her. Admitted into evidence 

were Inman’s community supervision reports reflecting that she tested positive for 

marijuana on April 12, 2017, and failed another drug test on May 5, 2018. Moreover, 

Boyer and Officer Hon testified that Inman admitted to using drugs on May 5, 2018. 

Inman’s casefile also reflected that she failed to report for drug testing on April 29, 2018.

Inman further testified that she failed the April 12, 2017 drug test because she ingested 

a brownie containing marijuana that she purchased from a smoke shop. See Smith, 286 

S.W.3d at 342–44 (finding no prejudice from the failure to adduce evidence that related 

to only one of four violations of the conditions of community supervision because, even 
11

assuming that the defendant could have successfully challenged one of the violations, 

the trial court was justified in revoking community supervision based on the other 

violations).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that trial counsel’s 

alleged errors do not undermine the confidence in the outcome of the revocation 

proceedings. See Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26; Bessard v. State, 464 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d). Inman has not established prejudice because 

the purported violations would have had no effect on the trial court’s findings that Inman 

violated a condition of community supervision. Accordingly, we overrule her third issue.

V. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

By her last issue, Inman asserts that the trial court erred by failing to grant her 

motion for new trial.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

A defendant has a right to move for a new trial. Hamilton v. State, 563 S.W.3d 442, 

448 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d). A defendant does not, however, 

have an “absolute right to a hearing on his motion for new trial.” Hobbs v. State, 298 

S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “[A] hearing is not required when the matters 

raised in the motion for new trial are subject to being determined from the record.” Reyes 

v. State, 849 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). We review a trial court’s ruling on 

a motion for new trial under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gonzalez v. State, 616 

S.W.3d 585, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). We will reverse only if the trial court’s ruling falls 

outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339. 
12

B. Discussion

On appeal, Inman asserts that her motion for new trial “points to new evidence that 

shows the State failed to prove one or more of the essential elements of the crime of 

possession of marijuana, mainly identity of the substance of marijuana in [her] 

possession.” She attached a DPS lab submission form wherein Trooper Hebert submitted 

for analysis the following items he discovered from the red purse: clear plastic baggies 

containing a green leafy substance, multiple baggies containing one large white pill, three 

green pills, four small white pills, one yellow pill, one white capsule, three orange pills, six 

blue pills, one large bottle with liquid inside. According to Inman, this report contradicts

Trooper Hebert’s testimony that the “green leafy substance” was marijuana because the 

substance could have been hemp.

4 However, as previously discussed, we determined 

that there was sufficient evidence to revoke Inman’s community supervision on other 

grounds. Thus, the DPS analysis request which Inman attached as “discovered evidence” 

is not a reasonable ground showing that Inman could potentially be entitled to relief

because proof of a single violation will support the trial court’s decision to revoke. See id. 

at 338–39; Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in failing to grant Inman’s motion for new trial. See Holden v. State, 201 S.W.3d 761, 763 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (providing that a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a 

motion for new trial only when no reasonable view of the record could support the trial 

4

Inman did not support the motion for new trial with an affidavit setting forth the factual basis for 

the relief sought. See Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (providing that the motion 

for new trial requires an affidavit specifically setting out the factual basis for the claim as a prerequisite to a 

hearing when the grounds listed in a motion for new trial are based on matters not already in the record).
13

court’s ruling). We overrule her last issue.

VI. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

JAIME TIJERINA

Justice

Do not publish.

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the

10th day of March, 2022.