In ke e p ing w ith the C o u rt’s p o licy, w e id e n tif y the vic tim s o f sex u a l o ff e n se s b y the ir initials. 1 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 3, 200 3 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . ALLEN PRENTI CE BLYE
App e al b y pe r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty Nos. S42, 293 R. Jerry Beck, Judge

No. E2001-01227-SC-R11- CD - F iled Fe bruary 25, 2004

We gr anted pe rmission to appeal in this case to c onsider whe ther the Six th Amendment entitles the defe ndant to participate, through counsel, in the deter mination of the exis tence of proba ble ca use for the issuance of a w arr ant to seize a s am p le of the de fenda nt’s blood. Be cause we f ind that the de fe nd ant h a s n o s uc h e nti tle me nt, we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al B y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e ntof t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Aff irm ed

A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which F R ANK F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and E. R I L EY ANDE R S ON , J ANI CE M. H OL DER , and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined.

Kenne th F. Irvine, Jr., and J ulie A. Rice, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee (on appea l); Terr y J ordan, A ssistant Pub lic De fe nd e r, B lou

ntv ill e , Te nn e sse e (a

t tr ia l and on a

pp e a l) ; and Ma

rk To oh ey , Ki ngspor

t, Tenne ssee ( at trial), f

or the a ppellant, Allen Prentice Blye.
Paul G. S ummers, Att orney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Michael E. Moore , Solicitor Genera l; Mark A. Fulks, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; H. Gre eley Wells, Jr., District Attorney Gene ral; and Joseph E. Perrin, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

I . Fa cts and Proce dural History

On J une 19, 1998, the victim, R.C., was awake ned when she felt someone in bed with her. 1 The male attacke r put his hands around he r nec k and beg an choking h er

. R

. C

. strug g led with her attacke r, and the two fell off the bed and onto the floor, with the victim landing on he r stomach a ndT he Fir st Jud i ci al D i st ri ct i ncl ud es Johnso n C o unt y , t he co unt y i n whi ch t he d ef end ant was i ncarcerat ed at t he 2 tim e . S e e T e n n . R . C rim . P

. 4 1 (a ) (p ro v id ing “[a ] se a rc h w a rr a n t au tho riz e d b y this ru le m a y b e issu e d b y a m a g istra te wi t h jur i sdi ct i o n wi t hi n t he co unt y wherei n t he p rop ert y s o ught i s l o cat ed ”).
-2- the man landingon her ba ck. Rea chingback, R.C. fe lt some ty pe of soft fabric coveringhis head. The at t ac k erforc ibly

remove d R.C.’s panties, pulled his pants down, and pene trated he r. After war ds, he put a pillowcase ove r her head a nd drag g ed her

into the bathroom. The attacker filled the sink with hot water and tried to forc e the victim to sit in the s ink. When she resisted, he put her on the floor a

nd attempted to rinse her g enital area with water from the sink. After the attacker ha d left the bathroom, R.C. esca ped through the bathroom window and went to a ne ighbor ’s re sidence

. The ne ighbor

called the police.

R.C. never saw her attacker’ s fac e. She noticed, however, that he was wea ringloose-fitting g lov e s, and

sh e e sti mate d th at he wa s a pp ro ximate ly

fi ve fe e t, t e n in c he s to six f e e t ta ll. She a lso stated that she ha d smelled the odor of g asoline or ke rosene about him. When the police ar

rived at the scene , they

found a pa ir of nylon jogg in g p ants in R.C.’s kitchen sink, with water

runningover the m. The pants, which w ere not the v i ct im’s, were later deter mined to have g asoline and ke rosene on them. R.C. was taken to the hospital wher e medica l personnel pe rfor med a r ape kit examination. The tre atingphy sician testified that R.C. had bruises on her ne ck, a la rg er br uise on her le ft buttock, and abr asions on her le ft flank. Police c ollected the a rticles that R.C. had worn during the attack.

In J anuar y 1 9 99, the Sullivan Count y Gra nd J ury issued a pre sentment cha rg ing the defe ndant, Allen Prentice Blye, with ag g ravated burg lary and ag gravated ra

pe. Coun s el was appointed to re prese nt the defe ndant. In J uly 1999, the State filed a motion in the Criminal Court for Sullivan County , Second Judi cial Circuit, see king a sear ch wa

rra nt to obtain a blood sample from the def endant to conduc t DNA (de ox y ribonucleic a c id) testing. A fter a n evidentiar

y hearing, the trial court de nied the State’s motion, finding that the State had failed to e stablish pr obable c ause f or the iss ua nc e of the se arc h w arr ant. Th e State fi led a su pp lementa l mo tio n in Ap ri l 20 00 in whic h it alleg ed that since the trial cour t’s earlier rulingdenying the State’s reque st, the State had obtained
a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e that w ou ld e sta bli shpr ob a

ble c a us e fo r t he iss ua nc e of a se arc h w arr ant t o o bta in a blood sample.
The c riminal case was a ssigne d to J udg e R. J err y Be ck in the Criminal Court for Sullivan County , Se c on d Jud ic ial Di st ri ct. A ft e r t he dis tr ic t atto rn e y

ha d f ile d th e su

pp le me nta l mo tio n in that c ourt , b ut b e fo re tha t mo tio n w a s sc he du le d for a he a ri ng , th e po lic e inv e sti g ator so ught t o ob ta in a se arc h wa

rr ant fr om Judg e Ly

nn B ro wn , a jud g e in the F ir st Judic ia l Di stric t. Th e a ff ida vit 2
su bmi tte d b y

the inv e sti g ator

to Jud g e B ro wn

state d, in p e rt ine nt p art : [a] s part of this investig ation, it was lear ned that the de fenda

nt had contac ted a f

riend, Debor ah McD owell, and ha d corr esponded with he r by letters, with the purpose of-3-

havingher c ontact the victim for him. On Fe bruar y 28, 2000, I[t he investig ating detec tive] went to the Tennessee Prison [ f]or Wom en, in N ashville and intervie wed Ms. McDowe ll. Duringthis int ervie w, she a dvised t h at s h e still had a letter a nd envelope sent to her by

the def endant. She voluntar ily

rele ased the se items to me, and I took them to the TBI L ab. Isubmitt ed the e nvelope f or ana ly sis, and saliva wa s found. DNA, isolated and ana ly zed from the saliva, w as compa red to the D NA profile of the s eminal flui d [recover ed from the ra pe kit and fr om the tee shirt wor n by the victim on the night she wa s rape d]. The results of this test revea led that the saliva, fr om the envelope, had the sa me profile a s the seminal fluid, rec overe d from the scene of the rape

. The odds of it be ing someone unrelated would be beyond the known population of the wor ld.

Th is l e tte r w a s se nt t o M s. Mc Do we ll, and c onta ine d th e ret ur

n a dd re ss be lon g ingto [the de fe nd ant], and the ha nd writi ng wa s c on fi rm e d by Ms. Mc Do we ll
a s b e lon g ingto [the de fe nd ant]. Yo ur a ff iant is pre se ntl y

awa re of [the de fe nd ant’ s] addres s and of his handwriting, both matc hing what is display ed on the e nvelope. Yo ur a ff iant h a s p ro ba

ble c a us e to b e lie ve that [th e de fe nd ant] s e nt thi s le tte r to M s. Mc Do we ll, and tha

t th e sa liv a

re c ov e re d f

ro m th e e nv e lop e is h is. Yo ur a ff iant a lso has proba ble ca use to believe that the blood of [ the defendant] will be matched, by DNA, to the se minal fluid left by the ra pist.

Ba sed upon the a ffidavit, Judge B rown issued a sea rch w arr ant authorizing the takingof a blood sample from the de fenda nt. The investig ator t h en we n t t o the Northe ast State Correc tional Fa cility in J ohnson County , wher e the de fenda nt was inca

rce rate d. The investig ator, a long w ith one
or more c orre ctional offic ers, met with the de fenda nt in the prison infirmary . After the def endant ref used to submit to t he dra wingof blood, the investig ator r et u rn ed to J udg e B rown, who the n authorized the takingof a blood sample “by whateve r m eans may be nec essar

y or by any nece ssary restra int.” The investigator returne d to the Northeast State Correc tional Fac ility . The investig ator
and the pr iso n w ard e n in fo rm e d th e de fendan t th at the jud g e ha d a uth or ize d th e us e of

fo rc e , if
nece ssary , to obtain a blood sample. The defe ndant then agree d to submit to the draw ing of blood, but only afte r sig ning a

handwr itten document statingthat he wa s doing so “ under dur ess.” Me dical pe rs onne l ob ta ine d th e blo od sampl e fr om t

he de fe nd ant.
The T en nessee Bur eau of Investig ation (TB I ) ana ly zed the defe ndant’s blood sample a nd deter mined that the defe ndant’s DNA matched the DNA f ound in the seminal fluid rec overe d from the ra pe examination of the victim a nd from the victim’s te e shirt. In September 2000, the defe ndant fi l eda m o t i o nt o s u

p p re s s th e D NA ev i d en ce o b t ai n ed p urs u an t t o th e se ar ch warr an ti s s u edb y J u d ge B ro wn . H e argue d th at th e e x part e pr oc e dure us e d to ob ta in t he se arc h warr ant vio late d his Si xth Amendment right t o counsel. The trial court de nied the motion to suppress, and the DNA proof
su bs e qu e ntl y

wa s intr od

uc e d into e vid e nc e at tr ia l.

A jury convicted the def

endant of ag g ravated burg lary

and ag g ravated ra

pe. The trial court sentenc ed him a s a Rang e I I I , persistent off ender to fifteen year s imprisonment for the ag g ravatedT h is C o u rt a p p o inte d K e n n e th F . Irv ine to re p re se n t t h e d e fen d a n t i n this a p p e a l. 3

T he d efen d an t reli es up o n the right- t o - co un sel p ro visi o ns o f b o t h t he fed era l a nd state co nsti t uti o ns. F o r ea se 4

o f re fer e n c e , ho w e v e r, w e w ill re fer to b o th p ro v isio n s a s the “S ixth A m e n d m e n t righ t t o c o u n se l.”

T h e Si x t h A men dmen t prov i des : “ I n al l cr i mi n al pros ec u t i on s , t h e ac cu s ed s h al l e n j oy t h e r i g h t t o a s pee dy 5 and publ i c t r i al , by an i mp ar t i al j ur y of t he s t at e a nd di s t r i ct wh er ei n t he cr i me s hal l have b een co mm i t t ed, wh i ch di s t r i ct
s h al l h a v e b e e n p r e v i o u s l y a s c e r t a i n e d b y l a w , a n d t o b e i n f o r m e d o f t h e n a t u r e a n d c a u s e o f t h e a c c u s a t i on ; t o be
co nf ronted wi t h t he wi t ness es agai nst hi m ; t o have co m p ul sory p roce ss f o r o b t ai ni ng wi t ness es i n hi s f avo r, and t o have the a ssista n c e o f co u n se l f o r h is d e fen c e .”

A rti cle I, sec t i o n 9 p ro vid es: “ R i gh t o f t he ac cu sed i n c rimina l p ro sec uti o ns.– T ha t i n a l l crim i na l p ro sec uti o ns, 6
t h e ac cu s ed h at h t h e r i g h t t o be h ea r d by h i ms el f a n d h i s c ou n s el ; t o de man d t h e n at u r e and ca u s e of t h e ac cu s at i on agai nst hi m , and t o have a co p y t hereo f , t o m eet t he wi t ness es f ace t o f ace, t o hav e c o m p u ls o ry pro cess f o r ob t ai ni ng wi t n es s es i n h i s f

av or , a n d i n pr os ec u t i on s by i n di ct men t or pr es en t men t , a s pee dy pu bl i c t r i al , by an i mpar t i al ju r y of the C o u n ty i n w h ic h the c rim e sh a ll h a v e b e e n c o m m itt e d , a n d s h a ll n o t b e c o m p e lled to g ive e v id e n c e a g a ins t him se lf. ”
-4- burg lary co n viction, and as a Rang e I I , violent offende r to forty year s imprisonment for the ag g ravated ra

pe convic tion. The trial cour t ordere d that the s entenc es be serve d consec utively , for an ef fec tive sentenc e of f

ifty -five y ear s. The Court of Criminal Appea ls affirme d the trial cour t’s judgme nt, c oncluding , in pa rt, that the defe ndant was not e ntitled to notice and a he aringbefor e the
se arc h w arr ant w a s is su e d. Th e de fe nd ant , act ingpr o s e , f ile d a n a pp lic atio n f

or pe rm iss ion

to appea l to this Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Te nnessee Rules of Appellate Procedur e. We grante d permission to a

ppeal in this case to c onsider whe ther the Six th Amendment entitles the def endant 3 to partici p at e, t hrough counsel, in the de termination of the e x istence of probable cause for the issuance of

a wa rra nt to seiz e a sa

mple of the de fenda

nt’s blood.

I I . Standard of Re view
The fa cts conc erningthe issuance and exec u t i o n o f the sea rch w arr ant ar e not in dispute; instead, the issue pre sented–whe ther the Six th Amendment entitles the defe ndant to an adve rsar ial hearing on the issuance of the sea rch w arr ant–is a question of l aw. W e re view questions of law de
novo with no presumption of cor rec tness g iven to the lower courts. State v. Turc o, 108 S.W .3d 244, 246 (Tenn. 2003)

. I I I . Ana ly sis
The de fenda

nt c ontends that bec ause his Six th Amendment right to counsel had attac hed at 4 the time the pre sentment was r eturne d, the ex part e ap p lication for a nd the issuance of the sea rch
wa rr ant v iol ate d h is Si xth A me ndme nt right to the a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l. Both the Six th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Ar ticle I , Section 9 of the Te nnessee Constitution guara ntee 5 6 the right to assistance of c ounsel at “c ritical stag es” of the prosec u t i on “whe re c ounsel’s abse nce might der og ate f

rom the ac cused’ s rig ht to a fair tr ial.” State v. Mar tin, 950 S.W .2d 20, 25 (Tenn. 19 97 ) ( qu oti ngUn ite d St ate s v . Wa de , 3 88 U. S. 2 18 , 2 26 (1 96 7) ). Th e c on sti tut ion a l r ight t o assistance of counse l attache s at the t i m e ad v er s aria l judicial proce eding s are initiated ag ainst theF o r d isc u ssio n s o f wh e the r a n a rr a ign m e n t i s a c ritica l stag e fo r p u r p o s e s o f th e S ixth A m e n d m e n t righ t t o 7

coun s el , s ee St at e v
. Su t t on , 761 S. W

. 2d 763, 768- 69 ( T en n

. 1988) , a n d St at e v
. St r ee t , 768 S. W

. 2d 703, 709 ( T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. 19 8 8 ).
-5- defe ndant. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985); Kirby v. I llinois , 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972); Ha

rtman v. State, 896 S.W .2d 94, 99 (Tenn. 1995) . Thus, the right to counsel attac hes “at the time a n arr est war

rant issues, a preliminary hearing is he ld ( if no arr est war rant is issued), or a

n indictment or prese ntment is returned.” State v. J ackson, 889 S.W .2d 219, 222 (Tenn. Crim. App. 199 3 ) (c i t i n g S tate v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn. 1980)). Clea rly , the right to counsel attache d in this case with the re turn of the pr esentment.
A d e fe nd ant i s e nti tle d to the a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l at e ve ry

c ri tic a l st a g e of

the pr oc e e din g s. The pre -trial “c ritical stag es” at which the defe ndant is e ntitled to the assistance of counse l include: preliminary

hearings, post-indictment lineups, and a ny post-indictment proce eding s on motions for
court- o r d e r e d me n ta l e v a lu ati o n s o f th e d e f e n d an t. Se e Co le ma

n v
. A la b ama , 3 9 9 U

. S. 1, 9-10 (197 0 ) (c o n cludingthat the pre liminary hearing is a

“critical stag e”) ; Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37 (holding that post-indictment lineup was a “critical stag e” of prosec ution); State v. Huskey , 964 S.W .2d 892, 898 (Tenn. 1998) (findingthat a def endant ha s a constitutional rig ht to have counse l prese nt duringproce eding s on a motion for the menta l e valuation of defe ndant); McKe ldin v. State, 516 S.W .2d 82, 85 (Tenn. 1974) (holding that the Tenne ssee pr eliminary hearing is a

pretria l ty

pe of arr a ignme nt whe re c e rt a in rights may be sa c ri fi c e d o r l os t su c h th at a de fe nd ant h a s th e ri g ht t o c ouns e l) ; se e a lso Mo ult on, 4 74 U. S. 1 59 , 1 76 (h old ingtha t, o nc e Sixth Ame ndme nt right t o 7
c ouns e l has atta c he d, law en fo rc e me nt of fi c ia ls ar e ba

rr e d fr om obt a ini ng inc ri min atin gstate me nts from def endant through third parties); a ccor d Har tman, 896 S.W .2d at 99.

Howeve r, not e very prepa ratory step in the evidenc e-g ather ing pr ocess is a “ critica l stag e” that w ou ld i mpl ic ate the Sixth Ame ndme nt right t o c ouns e l. F or ins tance, the re is n o Si xth Am e ndme nt right t o h ave de fe ns e c ouns e l pre se nt whe n th e State pr ov ide s a pr e tr ia l ph oto g ra

ph ic d i s p l ay t o a witness. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973); Houston v. State, 567 S.W .2d 485, 488 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)

. L ikewise, there is no Six th Amendment right t o have defe nse counse l present dur ing a court-or dere d mental ex amination of t he def endant. Huske y , 964 S.W. 2d at 89 7- 98 ; Ma

rt in, 95 0 S. W .2 d at 27 . In Unit e d St ate s v . Wa de , th e Sup re me Court , distinguishing betwee n a post -indictment lineup and other pretria l steps in the gathering of evidenc e, noted that ce rtain pre paratory steps are not critical stag es of the pr osecution:
The Gove rnment cha

rac terizes the l ineup as a mere preparatory step in the g ather ing of the prose cution’s evidenc e, not diffe rent–for Six th Amendment purpo s es–fr om various other

prepa ratory steps , s uch as sy stematized or scientific a naly zing of the
acc used’s fing erprints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like. We think there ar e differ ence s which pre clude suc h stag es beingchar acte rized as critica l stag es at whic h the ac cused ha s the right to the presenc e of his counsel. Knowledg e of the tec hniques of scienc e an d

te c hn o lo g y

is s u f f ic ie n tl y av a il a b le , an d th e v ar ia b le s in te c hn iq u es few enough, that the ac cused has the opportuni ty for a meaning ful confr ontation ofT h e S i x t h Ame n dm e n t i s s u e de c i de d b y t h e Cou r t of App e a l s i n Di c k e r s on w a s n ot a pp e a l e d t o t h e S u pr e me 8 C our t of G eorg i a; t he l at t er cour t ’ s r evi ew per t ai ned onl y t o a s epar at e i s s ue. -6- the Gover nment’s ca se at trial through the ordinar y proce sses of cr oss-examination of the Gove rnment’s e x pert witnesse s and the pre sentation of the evidenc e of his own experts. The denia l of a right to have his c ounsel prese nt at such ana ly ses does not the re fo re vio late the Sixth Ame ndme nt; the y are no t c ri tic a l stages sinc e the re is minimal risk that his counsel’s absence at s uch st ag es m ight derog ate from his right to a fa ir tr ia l.

388 U.S. at 227-28.
We must now determine whe ther a post-prese ntment se arc h war rant proce eding in which the g overnme nt seeks to obt ain a blood sample from the defendant is a critical stag e of the prosec ution. Th e Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls a llu de d to thi s is su e in S tate v. B ake r, 95 6 S. W.2 d 8 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1997). In that case , the defendant argued that he was entitled to an a dversa rial hea ringwhen office rs sought a sea

rch w arr ant to obtain “a qua ntity of blood, saliva and pubic and hea d hairs” f rom him. I d. at 13. In reje ctingthat argument, the cour t stated:

It is clear the investigating of fi ce rs had two pr ocedur al methods for obta ining the samples from the ap p el l an t. First, the off icer s could obtain a sea rch w arr ant authorizing them to obtain the samples f rom the appe llant’s body . Second, the office rs could have enlisted the assistance of the District Attorne y Gene ral’s O ffice , filed a motion in the trial court seeking the entry of an order pe rmitting the off icer s to obtain the samples, and both par ties could have litigated the issues at an adver sarial e videntiary

hearing. The officer s opted to obtain a sea rch w arr ant. The appellant was not entitled to be prese nt or litigate the issue of whe ther the of fice rs had proba ble ca use to support the issuance of the war rant prior to the war

rant be ing issued.

I d. Th e dis c us sio n in

B ake r, ho we ve r, do e s n ot m e nti on the Sixth Am e ndme nt, no r d oe s it state wh eth er o r n o tth e s earc h warr an t wa s s o u gh t b ef o re o r af t er th e i n i t i at i o no f c ri m i n al p ro ce ed i n gs ag ainst the defe ndant. Be cause of these two unanswe red que stions, Bake r does not provide perf ect guidance

. The pre cise issue he re, how ever , h as been a ddresse d by courts in other jurisdictions. See Dicker son v. State, 5 2 6 S

. E

. 2 d443, 446 (Ga . Ct. App. 1999), aff ’d 542 S.E.2d 487 (Ga . 2001); 8 McClain v. State, 410 N.E.2d 1297, 1302-03 ( I nd. 1980); State v. Delisle, 630 A.2d 767, 767- 68 (N.H. 1993) ; State v. Me yers, 546 P.2d 771, 772-73 (Or. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Mata, 30 S.W.3d 486, 4 8 8

- 8 9 ( T e x. Ct

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 0 ) ; S tate v
. K e nn is o n , 5 4 6 A

. 2 d 1 9 0 , 1 9 2

- 9 3 ( V t. 1 9 8 7 ) ; S tate v. Kalakosky , 852 P.2d 1064, 1069 (Wa. 1993). In the fore g oing case s, the respe ctive cour ts concludedM c C la in d i d not i nvo l ve a b l o o d s am p l e, but i nvo l ved a “ swab em i ss i o n t est ” t o de t erm i ne whet her t he 9 def en dan t h ad a s ex u al l y t r an s mi t t ed di s ea s e. 410 N. E. 2d a t 1301.
-7- that an ex pa

rte application for a sear ch war rant to obta in a

blood sample from a de fenda nt, sought 9 after the def endant had been charg ed, was not a critica l stag e of the proce eding s. As the Court of Ap pe a ls o f T e xas s tate d in Mata : To deter mine whether

a par ticular stag e is critica l, “we must scr utiniz e [the] pre-trial event with a vie w to asce rtainingwhether prese nce of

counsel is nec essar

y to assure fairne ss a nd the ef fec tive assistance of counse l at trial.” Gr een v. State, 872 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex . Crim. App. 1994) . . . . A pre -trial stag e is not critical whe n “conf rontation with counsel at tria l can se rve a s a substitute for counsel at the pre trial
c o n f r o n tati o n

. ” [Un it e d

St ate s v
. A s h , 4 1 3 U

. S. 3 0 0 , 3 0 9 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ].

3 0 S. W. 3 d

at 48 8

. A lo n gth e s ame li n e s , th e Co urt o f Ap p e a ls o f

O r e g o ns tate d

in M e ye r s : “ [w ]e see no pr ejudice to de fenda nt’s rights where t h e s t at e i s proper ly authorized to take spec imens of body samples and de fenda

nt has the opportunity

to challeng e any

violation of th at authorit y by moving to suppre ss specimens improper ly seized.” 546 P.2d at 773. Thus, the above -mentioned
c ourt s h e ld t

hat th e e x part e natur e of the se a rc h w arr ant d id n ot violate the de fe nd ant’ s Sixth Am e ndme nt right t o c ouns e l. We now hold that a post-pre sentment, ex parte sea rch warr ant proceedingto obtain a blood sample fr om the defe ndant is not a critica l stag e of the prosec ution, and two compellingrea sons inf or m our ho ldi ng

. F ir st, we c on c lud e that an e x part e se arc h w arr ant p ro c e e din gdo e s n ot d imi nis h the defendant’s right to a f air trial. Consistent with the analy sis in Mata and Meyers, we note that the def endant in this case was pe rmitted to, and did in fac t, file a motion to suppress the evide nceT en ne ssee R ule o f C rimina l P ro ce d ure 4 1 (f ) p ro vid es: 10
M o tio n fo r R e tur n o r S u p p re ssio n o f P ro p e rty. A p e rs o n a g g rie v e d b y a n u n la w ful o r in v a lid
s ear ch or s ei zur e may mo ve t he cour t pur s uan t t o R ul e 12(b) t o s uppres s an y ev i dence ob t ai ned i n s uch un l awf ul s ear ch or s ei zur e. I f

proper t y was un l awf

ul l y s ei zed, t he agg r i eve d pers on may mo ve f

or t he r et ur n of

t he propert y ; an d t he mo t i on s hal l b e gr ant ed, ex cept as to the re tur n o f co n tra b a n d , i f t h e e v id e n c e in su p p o rt o f t h e m o tio n sh o w s tha t: ( 1) t he s ear ch or s ei zur e wa s ma d e i l l eg all y wi t hout a s ear ch war r ant , or i l l ega l l y wi t h a n i n v al i d s ea r ch wa r r an t , or i n an y ot h er wa y i n v i ol at i on of t h e con s t i t u t i on al pro t ect i on ag ai n s t u n r ea s on abl e s ea r ch es a n d s ei zu r es ; or (2 ) a se a rc h w a rr a n t wa s re lied up o n , b u t t h e se a rc h w a rr a n t o r su p p o rting a ff id a v it is leg a lly i n s u f f i ci en t on i t s f

ac e an d h en ce i n v al i d; or ( 3) t h e s ea r ch w ar r an t r el i ed up o n w as i s s u ed u pon e v i den ce c on s i s t i n g i n ma t er i al pa r t of
w ill ful o r re c k le ss m isre p re se n ta tio n s o f the a p p lica n t to the issu ing m a g istra te , re su lti n g in
a f r au du l en t pr ocu r eme n t ; or ( 4) t h e s ea r ch w ar r an t doe s n ot de s cr i be t h e pr oper t y s ei ze d, a n d t h e s ei ze d pr oper t y i s n ot
o f suc h a c h a ra c te r a s to b e su b je c t t o law ful se iz u re w itho u t a w a rr a n t.

T en ne ssee R ule o f

C rimina l P ro ce d ure 1 2 (b ) p ro vid es: 11 Pre t r i al M ot i on s

. An y de f en s e, obj ec t i on , or r equ es t w h i ch i s c apa bl e of de t er mi n at i on wi t h ou t t h e t r i al of

t h e g en er al i s s u e may be ra i s ed be f or e t r i al by m ot i on

. M ot i on s ma y be
w ritten o r o ra l at the d isc re tio n o f t h e ju d g e . T h e fo llo w ing m u st b e ra ise d p rio r to trial: ( 1) D ef en s es a n d obj ec t i on s ba s ed on de f ec t s i n t h e i n s t i t u t i on of t h e pr os ec u t i on ; or ( 2) D ef en s es an d obj ec t i on s ba s ed on de f ec t s i n t h e i n di ct men t , pr es en t men t or i n f or mat i on ( ot her t han t hat i t f

ai l s t o s how j ur i s di ct i on i n t he co urt o r t o cha r ge an of f ens e wh i ch
o b ject i o ns shal l be noti ced by t he co urt a t any t i m e d uri ng t he p end ency o f t he p roce ed i ngs) ; or ( 3) M ot i on s t o s u ppr es s e v i den ce ; or ( 4) Requ es t s f

or di s cov er y u n der Rul e 16; or ( 5) Requ es t s f

or a s ev er an ce or c on s ol i dat i on of c h an g es or de f

en dan t s u n der Rul e 14.

-8- p ur s u an tt o R

u l e s 4 1 ( f ) an d 1 2 ( b ) o f

th e T e nn e s s e e R

u l e s o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d

ur e

. C o n s e qu e n t l y, 10 11 the def endant se ized the opportunity to challeng e the e vidence that was obtained pursuant to the
sear ch wa rra nt in question. Second, the nature of the e vidence -g ather ing pr ocess c ompels this result. An effe ctive sea rch
war rant proc ess re quires sec rec y , confide ntiality , and exclusion of the per son or p er s ons under inv e sti g atio n. I f a de fe nd ant an d co un se l we re pe rm itt e d to pa rt ic ipate in t

he se arc h w arr ant p ro c e ss at the mag istrate level, then the State would no longe r be able to e x tend to a ffiants and witnesses the
se c re c y and c on fi de nti a lity the State re lie s on to e lic it the te sti mony ne c e ssa ry to m e e t it s p ro ba

ble
cause require ment. Thus, the efficac y of search warr ants as a tool to uncove r evide nce of criminal activity would be lost to the State.W e e xpr es s no opi ni on on t he s epar at e i s s ue of wh et her an adve r s ari al p r oceedi ng i s r equi r ed f or a s ear ch 12

war r ant au t hor i zi ng mo r e maj or medi cal procedur es , e. g. , f orce d surg ery t o r ecove r a bul l et f i r ed by t he vi ct i m. See general l y , W i nst o n v. Lee, 47 0 U

. S. 75 3 (19 8 5 ).
-9- For the fore g oing r easons, we hold that the Six th Amendment does not entitle the de fenda nt to a n a dv e rs ari a l he ari ngon

the iss ua nc e of the se arc h wa

rr ant. Thus , the tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr in 12 de nyingthe de fe ndant’s mot ion to s up pr e ss t

he DNA e vid e nc e de ri ve d f ro m th e blo od

sampl e ob ta ine d p ur su ant t o th e e x part e se arc h w arr ant.

IV. Conclusion The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is aff irmed. It appea

ringthat Allen Prentice B lye is i nd igent, the c os ts a re taxed to t he State of

Te nn e sse e , f

or wh ic h e xec uti on

may iss ue if
n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ AD OLPHO A. B I RCH , JR., JUSTI CE