MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 20 2 3 ME 31 Docket: Was

- 22

- 284 Argued : April	6,	2023 Decided: May	23,	2023
Panel: STANFILL ,	C.J.,	and MEAD, JABAR , HORTON , CONNORS , LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS , JJ.

STATE	OF MAINE

v.
THOMAS	G.	BONFANTI

CONNORS ,	J. [¶1] Thomas	G.	Bonfanti	appeals	from	a	judgment	of	conviction	for	three counts	of	intentional	or	knowing	murder in	violation	of 17

- A	M.R.S.	§ 201(1)(A) (2023) ; one	 count	 of	 aggravated	 attempted	murder (Class	 A)	in	 violation	 of
17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 152

- A(1)(A)

- (B) , ( 2 ) (2023) ; and	 one	 count	 of	 elevated aggravated	 assault (Class	 A)	 in	 violation	 of 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 208

- B(1)(A) , ( 2 ) (2023) , entered	by	the	trial	court	(Washington	County, Mallonee,	J. )	after	a	jury
trial. Bonfanti	asserts that	the	trial	court	erred	in	admitting a statement that	he
made to	 police in	which	 he	identified the	 number	 and	 names	 of his victims , arguing	that (1) the circumstances under which	the	statement	was	made	do	not bring	it	within	the	ambit	of	the public	safety	exception	to Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; and (2) his	ingestion	of	a	large	quantity	of	prescription2 drugs	rendered	his	statement	involunt ary. He also argues	that	the	trial	court committed	obvious	error	by	instructing	the	jury	on	the	third

- party

- provocation exception	to	the	use	of	deadly	force	when	that instruction was	not	generated by	the	evidence. We	affirm	the	judgment.

I. BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ]		Viewing	the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	jury’s	verdict, the	record	supports	the	following	facts. See State v. Hansley , 2019 ME 35, ¶ 2,
203 A.3d 827. [¶ 3 ] On the	 morning	 of February	 3,	 2020, Bonfanti went to visit his friend,	 Samuel	 Powers , who	 lived	 with	 his	 mother on	 Roque	 Bluffs	 Road	 in Jonesboro. Bonfanti	and	Powers	were talking when	Powers’s	mother	left	the
house	to	run	errands

. Shortly	thereafter ,	Bonfanti	shot	Powers	in	the	back	of
the	head. [¶ 4 ] After	 shooting	 Powers,	 Bonfanti	 drove	 to	 the home of another friend,	Jennifer	Bryant

- Flynn, who	lived with	her	husband on	Kennebec	Road
in	Machias.		Bonfanti wanted	to	give	Bryant

- Flynn “ a	piece	of [ his ] mind.”		After being	invited	in	the	house,	Bonfant i	shot Bryant

- Flynn	in	the	head	and	took	her dog

. [¶ 5 ] After	shooting	Bryant

- Flynn,	Bonfanti	drove	to	the home of	another3 friend, Regina Long,	who	also	lived	on	Kennebec	Road	in	Machias. Long invited
Bonfanti inside to	have coffee	with	her	and	her	boyfriend,	Shawn	Curr e y,	whom
Bonfanti	had not met before

. Long , Curr e y ,	and	Bonfanti chatted for	about	ten
to	fifteen	minutes at	the	kitchen	table

. When	Long stood	up	to put her coffee cup	in	the	sink , she	heard Bonfanti “rustli ng	around”	in	his	coat.		Bonfanti	pulled
out	a	gun , shot Long in	the	neck , and shot Curr e y in	the	neck	and	back.		Bonfanti
then	s hot Long in	the face .		After	being	shot	a	second	time, Long fell	to	the	floor and	pretended	to	be	dead.		Bonfanti	shot	her	a	third	time as she	lay	on	the	floor. [¶ 6 ] After	Bonfanti	left,	Long call ed 9

- 1

- 1.		The	call	came	into	the	dispatch
center	 at	 10:44 a.m. A police	 officer from the	 Washington	 County	 Sheriff’s Office	quickly arrived at	the	Long	residence and	 found Long severely	injured
and	Curr e y dead

. Almost	immediately	after	arriving,	the officer was	dispatched
to	 the	 Powers	 residence while	 other	 officers	 remained	 on	 scene

. P owers’s
mother had	called	9

- 1

- 1 after	returning	home	and	finding	her	son	dead ,	placing
the	call	at	10:51	a.m. Before	the officer reached	the	Powers	residence, however,
he was	diverted	to	the	American	Legion	in	Machias

. T he	bartender	who	worked
there called	9

- 1

- 1	to	report	that	Bonfanti	was at	that	location	and	had claimed to	 have	 killed	 “seven	 or	 several	 people.” The	 bartender placed the call	 at
11:05 a.m.4 [¶ 7 ] After the	 shootings ,	 Bonfanti had	 gone to	 the	 American	 Legion , where	he placed	a	wad	of cash on	the bar	top and told	one	of	the	patrons ,	“This is	for	my	cremation.” He also said	that	he	“just	snapped”	and that	he	had killed
several people.	 	 The	 bartender over heard	 Bonfanti	 make	 these	 statements.
Bonfanti then took “ a	 bunch	 o f	 pills”	 and went	 outside	 to	 sit	 in	 his	 vehicle

. A nother	 patron	 of	 the	 Amer ic an	 Legion	 saw	 Bonfanti in	 the	 parking	lot and
walked	 over	 to speak to	 him

. Bonfanti	 told him that	 he	was	waiting	 for	 the police	because	he had “ just	killed	some	people

. ” [¶ 8 ] U pon	 arriving	 at	 the	 American	 Legion , at	 11:1 5 a.m., the officer

a rrested	Bonfanti , plac ed him in handcuffs , and	seat ed him in	the police cruiser.
After being	read his Miranda rights , Bonfanti	invoked	his	right	to	remain	silent , but	the officer nevertheless asked Bonfanti the	following	questions :
Officer : The	only	thing	I ’ m	looking	for	right	now , Tom , is	I	just need	to	know	how	many victims we’re	looking	for because	apparently	I ’ m	getting	mixed	numbers?
Bonfanti: Four

. Officer : And	that’s	it?
Bonfanti: Yeah.
Officer : And who would	that	be?
Bonfanti: U h , Jennifer	Bryant

.5
Officer : Ok ay
. Bonfanti: Regina	Ha ll.
Officer : Ok ay
. Bonfanti: Sam	Powers.
Officer : Sam	Powers,	yep.
Bonfanti: Yeah,	a nd	the	other	one, I don’t	know	his	name.
Officer : Don’t know	his	name.		Ok ay ,	but	there ’ s	no	more	than four?
Bonfanti: No

. Officer : Ok ay ,	al l right. [¶ 9 ] The officer relayed to dispatch what	Bonfanti	had	told	him

. A	few

m inutes	 later,	 the	 final	 9

- 1

- 1	 call	 was	 made	 w hen	 Bryant

- Flynn’s	 husband
arrived	home to	find his	wife	dead. [¶1 0 ] In	 a five

- day	 trial , Bonfanti	 personally	 delivered	 his	 opening

statement and	testified	in	his	own	defense	that	he had accidentally	shot	Powers and	Bryant

- Flynn	and	that	he had shot	Long	and	Curr e y	in	self

- defense

. The jury,	a fter	deliberating	for	approximately	two	hours,	ret urned	a	verdict	of	guilty
on	all counts

. T he	court	sentenced	Bonfanti	to	life	imprisonment , 1 and Bonfanti

1 The	court	entered	a	judgment	on	the jury’s verdict	and	imposed	concurrent	sentences	of	life imprisonment	for	the	murders	and	aggravated	attempted	murder.		The	court	also	sentenced	Bonfanti6 timely	appealed. See 15	M.R.S.	§ 2115	(2023);	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(b)(1).

II. DISCUSSION
A. Because there	was	overwhelming	evidence	of Bonfanti’s	guilt aside from	 his	 challenged	 statement , the	 error,	 if	 any, in	 admitting	 his statement	was	harmless	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt. [¶1 1 ] Bonfanti	argues	on	appeal	that his	statement	to	the officer should have	been	suppressed because (1)	the	public	safety	exception	to Miranda did

not permit	admission	of	his statement and	(2)	his ingestion	of	a	large	quantity of	prescription	drugs	“deprived	him	of	his	rationality	and	own	free	will	to	make voluntary	statements.” Bonfanti invokes	only the	United	States	Constitution. [¶1 2 ] We	need	not	address	the	merits	of these arguments	because w ere
there any	error	in	the trial	court’s admission	of	his	statement, the	error w ould
be harmless beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt

. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(a); State v. Johnson , 2009 ME 103, ¶ 18, 982 A.2d 320 (“ For	errors	involving	constitutional rights,	a	reviewing	court	conducting	a harmless error analysis	must	be	satisfied
that	the	record	as	a	whole	demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that	the error	did	not	affect	the	substantial	rights	of	the defendant	or	contribute	to	the verdict	obtained.”) ; City of Portland v. Jacobsky , 496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985) (“ [W]e avoid	expressing	opinions	on constitutional questions	when	 the	issue

to	a	concurrent thirty

- year	term	for	the	elevated	aggravated	assault.		The	court	ordered	Bonfanti	to pay	$3,181	as	restitution	to	the	Victims’	Compensation	Program.7 before	 us	 on	 appeal	 may	 be	 otherwise	 resolved

.	 .	 .	 . ”) ; see also Arizona v.
Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991) ( reviewing for harmless error the
admission of a n involuntary confession at trial). [¶1 3 ]		As	noted	in	the factual summary	above, Bonfant i ’s statement	was limited, identifying only the number	and	names	of	the	victims;	the	statement

wa s consistent	with his defense that he	had	shot	the	victims ; 2 and	the	evidence of	 his	 guilt	 irrespective	 of	 his	 statement	 was	 overwhelming ,	 including	 that
Bonfanti was the last person seen with Powers befor e Powers was murdered , Bryant

- Flynn’s dog was in Bonfanti’s vehicle when he was arrested , Long told
the 9

- 1

- 1 operator and the officer that Bonfanti had shot her and Currey , Long
testified to the same at trial , the gun that was used in the murders was found in
Bonfanti’s vehicle , Bonfanti’s DNA was on the gun , and three witnesses from the
American Legion heard Bonfanti admit to shooting several people.

B
. Given the jury instructions as a whole, t he	trial	court	did	not	commit obvious	error	by reciting	a	portion	of	the self

- defense statute that was	not	generated	by	the	evidence

. [¶1 4 ] Relying	 on State	 v.	 Daley ,	 440	 A.2d	 1053	 (Me. 1982) ,	 Bonfanti argues	that	the	trial	court	committed obvious	error	by	instructing	the	jury	on
the	third

- party

- provocation	exception	to	the justified use	of	deadly	force	when

2 Bonfanti did not claim until oral argument before us that he would have presented his defense differentl y if the statement had been suppressed.8 that	 exception was	 not	 generated	 by	 the	 evidence. See 17

- A	 M.R.S. § 108(2)(C)(2)	 (202 3 ) .	 	 Bonfanti asserts that	 because	 he	 “conceded	 the charges ” and	 rest ed his	 defense ,	 at	 least	 in	 part, on	 the	 justification	 of
self

- defense,	the	error	was	highly	prejudicial. 3 [¶1 5 ] Because	Bonfanti	did	not	object	 to	 the	alleged	error	at	 trial, we
review for	 obvious	 error. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b) ; State v. Pabon , 2011

ME 100, ¶ 18 , 28 A.3d 1147

. “ For	an	error	or	defect	to	be	obvious	for	purposes of	Rule	52(b),	there	must	be	(1)	an	error,	(2)	that	is	plain,	and	(3)	that	affects substantial	rights.		If	these	conditions	are	met, we will	exercise our discretion to	 notice	 an	 unpreserved	 error	 only	 if we also	 conclude	 that	 (4)	 the	 error seriously	 affects	 the	 fairness	 and	 integrity	 or	 public	 reputation	 of	 judicial proceedings.” Pabon ,	2011	ME	100,	¶	29,	28	A.3d	1147. [¶1 6 ] Title	 17

- A	 M.R.S.	 §	 108(2)	 governs	 the	 use	 of	 deadly	 force in
self

- defense

. Sect ion 108(2)(A)(1)	provides	that	a	person	is	justified	in	using deadly	force	upon	another	when he	reasonably	believes	such	other	person	is about	to	use	unlawful	deadly	force	against	him	and he reasonably	believes	that

3 Bonfanti	also	contends	that	the	trial	court	“relieved	the	State	of	its	obligation	to	disprove	[his] defense	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt”	 and	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 inform	 the	 jury	 of	 “the exculpatory	effect	of self

- defense.”		Contrary	 to	Bonfanti’s	contentions,	 the	 trial	court	emphasized that	 the	State

— and	not	Bonfanti

— had	 the	burden	of	proving	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	 that	 the crimes	were	not	committed	in	self

- defense,	and	the	trial	court	expressly	instructed the	jury	that	it had	to find	Bonfanti	not	guilty	if	the	State	failed	to	carry	its	burden. See State v. Villacci , 2018 ME 80, ¶ 10 , 187 A.3d 576

.9 the	 use	 of	 deadly	 force	 is	 necessary.	 	 S ection	 108(2)(C)	 lists	 several circumstances	under	which	the	use	of	deadly	force	is not justified. Among	those

circumstances	 is one	 described	 in section	 108(2)(C)(2) ,	 which “makes	 the
self

- defense	 justification	 unavailable	 to	 a	 defendant	 who	 uses	 deadly	 force against	a	victim	in	aid	of	a	 third	person	if	 the	defendant	knew	 that	 the	 third person	 intentionally	 and	 unlawfully	 provoked	 the	 victim	 into	 using	 deadly
force.” Daley ,	440 A.2d at 1055 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. 4 [¶1 7 ] In Daley , the	 defendant and	 the	 victim	 described in	 markedly different	ways the	assault with	which	the	defendant	was	charged , but n either

version involved	 a	 third	 party. Id. at 1054

- 55. After	 his conviction,	 t he defendant	appealed,	arguing	that	the	trial	court	err ed by	instructing	the	jury on section	108(2)(C)(2). Id. at	1055. In vacating	 the	conviction , we considered
several	factors , including	that	the	defendant “ rest [ ed ] his	entire	defense	on	the justification	of	self

- defense, ” the	instruction	on	third

- party	provocation	was	not generated	by	the evidence ,	the	trial	court	stated	the	“exact reverse”	of	the	law
of	self

- defense	in	explaining	how	the	law	applied	to	the	case,	and “[t]h e	whole charge	was	lengthy	and	confusing. ” Id. at	1055

- 56.

4 See	also State v. Uffelman , 626 A.2d 340, 342 (Me. 1993) (concluding that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that the defendant would not have been permitted to use deadly force in response to the victims’ use of such force if the defendant had known that another person, such as the defendant’s wife or children, had intentionally and unlawfully provoked the victims).10 [¶1 8 ] In	contrast, the	trial	court’s	charge	to	the	jury	here	was accurate,
clear , and	 concise .	 	 T he	 tr ial	 court	 began	 its	 self

- defense	 instructions	 by properly instructing	the	jury	on	the	general	rule	governing	when	a	person	may use	deadly	force.		The	court	then	instructed	the	jury	on	some	exceptions	to	the general	rule,	including	the	exceptions	related	to provocation	by	the	defendant, provocation	 by	 a	 third	 party,	 and	 the	 defendant’s	 duty	 to	 retreat.	 	Next,	 the court	explained	to	the	jury	how	the	law	applied	to	the	circumstances	of	the	case. In	doing	so, the	court correctly	identified the four	circumstances that the	State could	prove that	would	disprove Bonfanti’s	claim	of	self

- defense

— namely, that (1) Bonfanti	did	not	reasonably	believe	that deadly	force	was	about	to	be	used against	him ,	(2) Bonfanti did	not	reasonably	believe	that	his use of	deadly	force was	necessary,	(3) Bonfanti	provoked	the	victims	so	that	he	could	cause	them harm,	or	(4) Bonfanti knew	that	he could	have	safely	retreated. Although	the
trial	court ought not	have	recited	the	portion	of	the	self

- defense	statute	related

t o	third

- party	provocation,	i mportantly,	the	trial	court	did	not	state	that that exception	applied	under	the	circumstances	of	this	case. [¶1 9 ] V iewing	 the	instructions	 as	 a	 whole, we	 conclude	 that the	 trial
court’s	 accurate description but	 unnecessary inclusion of	 the
third

- party

- provocation	exception in	its	recitation	of	the	law wa s	not obvious11

error
. 5 See State v. Baker , 2015 ME 39, ¶ 11, 114 A.3d 214 (stating that a
defendant is entitled	to	relief	only “ when jury instructions , viewed as a whole , are	affected	by	highly	prejudicial	error	tending	to	produce	manifest	injustice” (quotation	marks	omitted)). The	entry	is: Judgment	affirmed.

David	 Paris,	 Esq. (orally) ,	 Bath, and	 Thomas	 G.	 Bonfanti	 personally, for appellant	Thomas	G.	Bonfanti Aaron	M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General , and	 Donald	W.	Macomber,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen. (orally) ,	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Washington	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR

- 2020

- 39 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY

5 Bonfanti	notes	 that ,	at	one	point, the	 trial	court	replaced	 the	word	 “and”	with	 the	word	 “or” when	reciting	the self

- defense statute	during the	jury	instructions. Although	such	a	misstatement could	be	prejudicial	in	other	contexts,	it	is	of	no	import	here.