UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1994

HAROLD H. HODGE, JR., 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

DOUGLAS F. GANSLER, Attorney General, Maryland Department 

of State Police; CHRISTOPHER ESNES; LT. RANDY L. STEPHENS; 

STATE OF MARYLAND; CALVERT COUNTY, (local government). 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District 

Judge. (8:13-cv-01949-AW) 

Submitted: November 21, 2013 Decided: November 25, 2013

Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Harold H. Hodge, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Harold H. Hodge, Jr., appeals the district court’s 

order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) civil rights action 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006) for failure to state a 

claim on which relief could be granted, confining his appeal to 

the district court’s dismissal of his claim against Defendant 

Christopher Esnes for racial profiling1 in connection with a 

traffic stop. We affirm.2

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a 

claim for failure to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted. Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248 

(4th Cir. 2005). Although a pro se litigant’s pleadings are to 

be construed liberally, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 

(4th Cir. 1978), his complaint must contain factual allegations 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

 1 Although there exists no federal claim for “racial 

profiling,” in adherence to our obligation of construing the 

filings of a pro se party liberally, Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151, 

we construe Hodge’s claim as one for a violation of the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

2 In his informal appellate brief, Hodge does not present 

any specific arguments challenging as error the district court’s 

dismissal of his complaint as to his remaining claims and the 

remaining Defendants. Accordingly, Hodge has forfeited 

appellate review of these issues. 4th Cir. R. 34(b); Wahi v. 

Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 

2009); Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4 

(4th Cir. 2004). 
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level” and that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 

(2007). This “plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to 

demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 

(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). He must 

articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate he has 

stated a claim entitling him to relief. Id. 

To state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the 

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff

must allege facts sufficient to show that he has been treated 

differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and 

the unequal treatment resulted from intentional or purposeful 

discrimination. Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 

(4th Cir. 2001). Hodge’s complaint, however, does not 

articulate facts demonstrating that a racially discriminatory 

intent or purpose was a factor in Esnes’ decisions to stop his 

vehicle, to issue a citation for his failure to possess a valid 

change-of-address card, or to issue a warning ticket for his

failure to yield the right-of-way. Accordingly, as Hodge did 

not state a plausible claim under § 1983 for an equal protection 

violation, we affirm the district court’s order. Hodge v. 

Gansler, No. 8:13-cv-01949-AW (D. Md. July 18, 2013). 
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED