### MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-07-00882-CR
Maureen HAMPTON , Appellant

v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee From the 227th Judicial Distri ct Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2002-CR-6015 Honorable Philip A. Kazen, Jr., Judge Presiding Opinion by: Rebecca Simmons, Justice Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice Rebecca Simmons, Justice Steven C. Hilbig, Justice Delivered and Filed: December 10, 2008
AFFIRMED After several alleged violations of the term s of her deferred adjudication, and a plea of true to one of the alleged violations, the tria l court adjudicated Appe llant Maureen Hampton’s guilt and sentenced her to eight years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On appeal, Ha mpton contends that the trial court abused its discretion in adjudica ting her guilt and sentencing her to eigh t years confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.04-07-00882-CR

F ACTUAL B ACKGROUND On May 14, 2004, Hampton entered a plea of no contest to the char ge of Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon stemming from Hampton’s vehi cle striking Debra Garza, a girlfriend of Hampton’s husband. The trial cour t deferred a finding of guilt and placed Hampton on ten years deferred adjudication community supervision. After several alleged violations, on August 28, 2007, the State filed a motion to adjudi cate guilt. Two months later, Hampton entered a plea of true to the vi olation of condition No. 1, possession of marijuana, and the State abandoned the remaining allegations. The trial court adjudicated Hampton guilty of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. At the conclusion of the punishment hearing, the trial court noted Hampton’s extensive criminal history and sentenced Hampton to ei ght years confinement and a fine of $2,500.00. After the trial court announced the sentence, Hampt on asked the court to reconsider in light of a recent incident in which her son was left paraly zed after having his throat cut during a robbery. She pleaded that prison would “ not do [her] any good for the mar ijuana charge” explaining that she had been attending classes. The trial cour t considered Hampton’s request and then ordered that the sentence be executed as previous ly announced. This appeal followed.
D EFERRED A DJUDICATION The hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicat e was conducted after the June 15, 2007, effective date of the amendmen t to article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure allowing an appeal from the determination to adjudicate. T EX
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. A NN . art. 42.12 § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008) (reviewing decision to adjudicate guilt “in the same manner” as review of the revocation of community supervision). Therefore, former article 42.12 § 5(b), and its prohibition concerning appeals from the dete rmination to proceed with the adjudication of guilt, do not apply. Davis v. State , 195 S.W.3d 708, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Hargesheimer

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v. State , 182 S.W.3d 906, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “After an adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, including assessment of punishme nt, pronouncement of sentence, granting of community supervision, and defendant’s appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.” T EX
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. A NN . art. 42.12 § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2008). A. Standard of Review Appellate review of a probation revocation is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Rickels v. State , 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Additionally, we view the evidence adduced at the revocation heari ng in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings. Cardona v. State , 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (T ex. Crim. App. 1984). The State bears the burden to prove, by a prepondera nce of the evidence, that appellant violated the conditions of her probation. Cobb v. State , 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). An abuse of discretion requires th at “the trial judge’s decision was so clea rly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which r easonable persons might disagree.” Cantu v. State , 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). B. Adjudication of Guilt To support a court’s order to revoke deferre d adjudication community supervision, the evidence need only show one violation of a de fendant’s terms of community supervision. Moore v. State , 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim . App. 1980). A plea of true to even one allegation is sufficient to support a revocation of defe rred adjudication community supervision. T EX
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. A NN . art. 42.12 § 21 (Vernon Supp. 2008); s ee Cole v. State , 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding plea of true to one allegation is sufficient to support revocation of probation); Lewis v. State , 195 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). Here, Hampton entered a plea of true to viola ting condition No. 1. That admission alone is

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sufficient to support the trial court’ s judgment adjudicating her guilt. Lewis , 195 S.W.3d at 209. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating Hampton’s guilt. C. Sentencing A trial court is given wide latitude to determ ine the appropriate sentence in a given case. Jackson v. State , 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Where deferred adjudication probation is revoked, the trial court is not limited to imposing the original term recommended but may impose any term authorized by statute. Von Schounmacher v. State, 5 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) . Generally, a sentence will not be di sturbed as long as it is within the proper range of punishment. Jackson , 680 S.W.2d at 814. Aggravated assault is a seconddegree felony with a punishment range of two to twenty years’ imprisonment. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN . § 12.33(a) (Vernon 2003) (range of c onfinement for second degree felony), id . § 22.02(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007) (aggravated a ssault with a deadly weapon is second degree felony). Moreover, when the “punishment [assessed] is within that prescribed by the statute, it is beyond the province of [an appellate c]ourt to pass upon the question of excessive punishment.” Darden
v. State , 430 S.W.2d 494, 496 (T ex. Crim. App. 1968). CONCLUSION The trial court’s decision did not fall outsi de the zone of reasonable disagreement and Hampton’s sentence is not excessive. See Cantu, 842 S.W.2d at 682. We, therefore, hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the j udgment of the trial court.

Rebecca Simmons, Justice Do Not Publish

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