*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances

set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 14, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-50977

Summary Calendar

 

STEVEN F. ESPINOZA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER

OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court for

the Western District of Texas

(USDC No. SA-01-CV-1014-EP)

_______________________________________________________

Before REAVLEY, SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Steven Espinoza appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. §

405(g) suit appealing the Social Security Administration Commissioner’s denial of Title
1

 We note that Espinoza moved to have the onset date changed from

December 28, 1999 to October 8, 2000 because he returned to work from April 4,

2

II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI supplemental security income. We affirm.

1. Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether that

decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether

the Commissioner employed the correct legal standards. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d

552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less

than a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We may not reweigh evidence or

substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. 

2. The ALJ found that Espinoza suffers from a medically determinable physical

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce Espinoza’s pain and

other symptoms. Accordingly, he was required to evaluate the credibility of

Espinoza’s statements regarding his symptoms and limitations based on a

consideration of the entire case record. SSR 96-7p, 61 F.R. 34483, 34485 (1996). 

The ALJ’s finding that Espinoza’s subjective complaints regarding pain and

physical limitations were exaggerated is grounded in the evidence, and his reasons

are sufficiently articulated in his decision. See id. at 34485-86. Although the

decision of the ALJ does not explore each of the seven factors listed in SSR 96-7p,

the record demonstrates that the ALJ considered those factors. In light of

Espinoza’s continuing to work after the alleged onset date,1 his prior statements to
2000 to October 8, 2000. Although the ALJ did not rule on this motion at the

hearing, he found that Espinoza “engaged in substantial gainful activity since the

alleged onset of disability.” Thus, it is clear that the ALJ declined to change the

onset date initially claimed by Espinoza. 

2

 Espinoza argues that a claimant’s monetary interest in the outcome of a

disability claim is not an adequate reason to disregard the claimant’s testimony. 

However, the ALJ did not find Espinoza’s statements not credible because of his

financial interest; rather, the ALJ found that Espinoza’s working after the alleged

onset date “demonstrates an ability to perform light/sedentary work for up to 30

hours a week,” calling into doubt Espinoza’s statements of his disabling pain and his

physical restrictions and limitations. 

3

a Social Security Administration employee that he wanted to quit his job so that it

would not interfere with his disability claim,2 and his statement at the hearing that

he did not even know that gainful employment might prevent him from recovering

benefits, the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence

in the record as a whole. See id. at 34486 (requiring ALJs to consider, among

other things, the internal consistency of a claimant’s statements when evaluating

that claimant’s credibility).

3. We find no merit in Espinoza’s argument that the ALJ failed to adequately

consider the testimony of the medical expert in assessing Espinoza’s residual

functional capacity. While the medical expert made some statements which

favored Espinoza, considered in its entirety his testimony supports the ALJ’s

finding that Espinoza is capable of light work with some restrictions. 

Accordingly, the hypothetical question posed to the Vocational Expert by the ALJ
4

was appropriate and was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. 

4. Lastly, Espinoza claims that the district court and the ALJ erred by failing to apply

the holding of Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2002), to the facts of his

case. We disagree. In determining whether a claimant is unable to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

impairment, the ALJ is required to follow a five-step process. Id. at 216. The

claimant has the burden of proof with respect to the first four factors. Id. A

determination that the claimant is not disabled at any step of the process is

generally conclusive and terminates the analysis. At step four, the ALJ determined

that Espinoza is capable of engaging in his past relevant work as a telephone

operator. Thus, the burden of proof never shifted to the Commissioner to prove

that Espinoza is capable of engaging in another substantial gainful activity, and

Watson is distinguishable. In that case, the Commissioner was required at step

five to establish that Watson was capable of engaging in substantial gainful

activity, and the ALJ was required to determine whether Watson could not only

obtain but maintain such employment. Watson, 288 F.3d at 217. In this case, the

burden was on Espinoza to prove that his impairment rendered him episodically or

periodically unable to work, preventing him from maintaining employment. As

the record does not demonstrate that Espinoza’s impairment might periodically

prevent him from working, we find no error in the ALJ’s determination that
5

Espinoza is not disabled. See id. at 218.

AFFIRMED.