Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of estab lishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : SUZY ST. JOHN GREGORY F. ZOELLER Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana RICHARD C. WEBSTER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


## IN THE COU RT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JUAN WILLIAMS , ) ) Appellant

- Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A05

- 1307

- CR

- 373 ) STATE OF INDIANA , ) ) Appellee

- Plaintiff

. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Deborah J. Shook, Commissioner Cause No. 49F07

- 130 1

- CM

- 6762

M arch 10, 2014 MEMORANDUM DECISION

– NOT FOR PUBLICATION BAKER, Judge2

The victim of a Battery, 1 a class A misdemeanor, testified that appellant

- defendant
Juan W illiams punched him in the eye causing pain, swelling, and redness. A po lice officer who was dispatched to the scene interviewed the victim and observed the injuries

. This evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams committed the offense, and his claim
that the conviction must be set as ide under the doctrine of incredible dubiosity fails. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS Abdelsalam Samara manages the Shell gas station on Illinois Street in Indianapolis. On January 29, 2013, Williams entered the store to purch ase a cigar. The cigar was priced at .99 but the sales tax made the final cost $1.06. However, Williams handed Samara $1 and asked for change. When Samara informed Williams of the total price, the two began to argue.
Samara stepped out from behind the security area and told Williams to leave. In response, Williams punched Samara in the eye , causing it to swell and turn red . The injury also caused Samara pain that lasted for nearly a week. After Williams punched him, Samara went back into the securit y cage, locked the door to the building, and called the police. Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) Officer Robert Carver was dispatched to the Shell station to investigate. Samara told Officer Carver that Williams hit him in the eye. O fficer Carver noticed that Samara’s eye was red and swollen. In

1 Ind. Code § 35

- 42

- 2

- 1.3

Officer Carver’s experience in investigating battery cases, he concluded that Samara’s injuries were consistent with being struck in the eye. As a result, Williams was charged with battery on January 29, 2013. Following a bench trial on July 25, 2013, Williams was found guilty as charged and sentenced to 365 days of incarceration with 359 days suspended to probation. He now appeals.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION As noted above, Williams argu es that his battery conv iction must be set aside because the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, Williams maintains that Samara’s testimony is incredibly dubious, in that “he gave contradictory testimony about how the events unfolded, and there is no circumstantial evidence to support his story.” Appellant’s Br. p. 2.
I. Standard of Review When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we will not reweigh the evidence or asses s the credibility of witnesses. McHenr y v. State , 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We will consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable and logical in ferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. The conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidenc e of probative value to support the conviction. Id. The uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Carter v. State , 754 N.E.2d 877, 880 (Ind. 2001). The offense of battery is defined in Indiana Code section 35

- 42

- 2

- 1 as follows:4

(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor. However, the offense is: (1) a Class A misdemeanor if: (A) it results in bodily injury to any other person.

. . . Indiana Code section 35

- 31.5

- 2

- 29 defines bodily injury as “any impairment of physical condition, including physical pain.”
II. Williams’s Claims In this case, the evidence presented at trial established that Williams became angry with Samara an d hit him in the eye. Tr. p. 10

- 11, 14

- 16. As discussed above, Samara’s eye became swollen, turned red, and was painful for nearly a week. Id. at 10

- 11, 16. This was sufficient evidence to establish that Williams committed battery on Samara that
result ed in bodily injury. Notwithstanding the above, W illiams seeks to invoke the incredible dubiosity rule by arguing that Samara’s testimony was not worthy of credit because he gave contradictory testimony about how the events unfolded, and there was “no c ircumstantial evidence to support his story.” Appellant’s App. p. 2. Thus, Williams asserts that his
conviction must be vacated on this basis. Under the incredible dubiosity rule, our Supreme Court has observed that Within the narrow limits of the “in credible dubiosity” rule, a court may impinge upon a jury’s function to judge the credibility of a witness. If a sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence, a defendant’s conviction may be reversed. This is appropriate only where the court has confronted inherently improbable testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible dubiosity. Application of this rule is rare and the standard to be applied is whether the5

testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.
Love v. State , 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002) (emphasis added). In addition, inconsistencies between the testimonies of multiple witnesses do n ot make the evidence “incredible” as a matter of law, and only go to the weight of the evidence. Morell v.
State , 933 N.E.2d 484, 492

- 93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Notwithstanding Williams’s contentions, Samara unequivocally testified that Williams hit him in the eye and caused the i njuries. Tr. p. 10

- 11, 16. Additionally, Officer Carver arrived at the scene to investigate and noticed that Samara’s eye was red
and swollen

. Id. at 21. Officer Carver’s testimony is evidence that corroborates Samara’s testimony that Williams injured him. Thus, Williams’s reliance on the incredible dubiosity rule fails. In short, Williams’s arguments amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. McHenry , 820 N.E.2d at 1 26. The judgment of th e trial court is affirmed. NAJAM, J., and CRONE, J., concur.