NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. WEI LIN,
Defendant

- Appellant. No. 19

- 10032
D.C. No. 1:12

- cr - 00012

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of the Northern Mariana Islands David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 20, 2020 * * Honolulu, Hawaii Before: WALLACE, BEA, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges. Defendant Wei Lin pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit sex trafficking , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c). Lin appeal s from his 120

- month sentence, arguing that the district court erred in applying United States Sentencing Guideline § 2G1.1( c) for the first time on resentencing. He also challenges the district

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

OCT 22 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We have jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.
1. As relevant here, § 2G1.1(c) applies if an offense involve s conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2242. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1 (c)

. Conduct described in § 2242 includes “causing another person to engage in . . . a sexual act with another person by threatening or pla cing the victim in fear (other than by threatening or placing the victim in fear that any person will be subject to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping ).

. . . ” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1, cmt. n. 4(B). Lin argues that “fear” as used in § 2242 must be construed narrowly to mean fear of bodily harm , excluding other types of fear such as fear of deportation. We
need not decide whether “fear” under § 2242 i ncludes fear other than fear of bodily
harm because the district court correctly found that Lin threatened his victims with physical violence to force them to engage in commercial sex. We review the
district court’s factual finding s for clear error. See U nited States v. Yi , 704 F.3d 800, 805 (9th Cir. 2013)

. The victims all told very similar stori es in their written statements

. Lin lured the victims to travel to Saipan under the false promise of lawful employment and charged them thousands of dollars in fees

. O nce the victims arrived in Saipan , Lin took their passports and told them that they would be “hostesses” who had sex with

customers . T hey were afraid of Lin because, among other things, he threatened3

them with physical harm. The victims’ statements were consistent with one
another , and th ey were also corroborated by statements of other witnesses. For example , Yanchun Li ( Lin’s co

- conspirator ) signed a plea deal in which Li
admitted that the conspirators caused the victims to engage in commercial sex acts by “verbally abusing them; threatening them with physical violence; and falsely claiming to have favorable relationships with corrupt government officials.” The district court properly c onsidered the victims’ and Li’s hearsay statements because they were accompanied by at least “some minimal indicia of reliability.” United States v. Berry , 258 F.3d 971 , 976 (9th Cir. 2001) ( quoting United States v. Petty , 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 19 93) )

. Based on the substantial evidence showing that Lin threatened his victims with physical harm , the district court did not clearly err in finding that clear and convincing evidence 1 supported that Lin threatened his victims with physical harm to caus e them to engage in commercial sex

. We are unpersuaded by Lin’s remaining arguments challenging the application of § 2G1.1(c). Lin does not identify a ny case that has held the government violated due process by relying on a new guideline during
resentenci ng. Indeed, such a position goes against our general rule that “[o]n remand, the district court generally should be free to consider any matters relevant

1 The parties agree that the government needed to present clear and convincing evidence to support the application of § 2G1.1(c) becaus e it greatly increased Lin’s base offense level from 14 to 30.4

to sentencing, even those that may not have been raised at the first sentencing hearing, as if it were sentencing de novo.” United States v. Matthews , 278 F.3d 880, 885

– 86 (9th Cir. 2002). Lin cannot rely on the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee , as the Supreme Court has held that the right does not apply once the defendant has pleaded guilty. See Betterman v. Montana , 136 S. Ct. 1609 , 161 7

– 18 (2016). Lin also argues that the defense of laches bars the government
from requesting the application o f a new sentencing guideline on resentencing

. B ut he fails to identify a ny case that has applied laches in the criminal context , and he offers no convincing policy reason wh y laches should apply

. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the distri ct court did not err in applying § 2G1.1(c) on resentencing.
2. Lin argues that his guilty plea cannot stand because his attorney failed
to inform him accurately of the sentencing range he faced . The district court
denied Lin’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the record shows that Lin understood his sentencing exposure before pleading guilty. We review the district
court’s denial for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Garcia , 909 F.2d 1346, 1348 (9th Cir. 1990)

. The district cou rt did not abuse its discretion

. T he record shows that although Lin’s attorney provided him with an erroneous sentencing prediction , Lin
was well

- aware that he was facing a potential sentence of up to life in priso n
. See5

id. ( “[I]t is well established that an erroneous prediction by a defense attorney concerning sentencing does not entitle a defendant to challenge his guilty plea.” ). Lin’s plea agreement clearly informed him that he faced a “maximum statutory sentence [of] life imprisonment , ” and that “the Court [had] not yet determined a sentence and that any estimate of the advisory sentencing range . . . the defendant may have received from the defendant’s counsel . . . is a prediction, not a promise, and is not binding on

. . . the Court .” The colloquy between the court and Lin during the change of plea hearing also shows that he was aware of his sentencing

exposure. Finally, Lin’s own declaration shows that his attorney advised him that
the maximum potential sentence was life in prison

. AFFIRMED.