1 Filed 8/28/13 In re Sheila K. CA1/5


### NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re SHEILA K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. J.W. et al., Defendants and Respondents; SHEILA K., Appellant. A137166

(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. OJ12019554)

The minor, Sheila K. (appellant), appeals the juvenile court’s disposition, which awarded custody of her to her presumed fath er Michael K. (Father), directed the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) to provide him six months of informal services, and terminated its jurisdiction over appella nt under Welfare and Institutions Code,
section 300. 1 We affirm, concluding appellant forfeited her objections to the disposition.

1 All undesignated section references ar e to the Welfare and Institutions Code.2 BACKGROUND Appellant, born in February 2010, was ta ken into protective custody on September 8, 2012, and placed in a foster home after he r mother J.W. (Mother), the custodial parent, was hospitalized from overdosi ng on Vicodin. The Agency filed a petition alleging appellant was within the jurisd iction of the juvenile court un der section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The allegations related to Mother’s current and past use of Vicodin, Mother’s history of housing inst ability, and Father’s crim inal history, as well as the fact that two older siblings are dependents of the j uvenile court in a legal guardianship. Father was present at the detention hear ing and was determined to be appellant’s presumed father. Father had recently been incarcerated for posse ssion of a controlled
substance with the intent to se ll; he was released in June 2012. On September 18, 2012, a notice was filed reflecting that appellant had been released to Fath er’s care. In its September 24 jurisdiction/disposition report , the Agency recommended the section 300 petition be dismissed a nd appellant remain in Father’s custody. The report indicated Father had demonstrated his ability to care fo r appellant and appella nt was doing well and
was bonded with Father. Father was present at the November 14, 2012, contested disposition hearing; Mother was not present, despite having been ordered to appear. At the hearing, the juvenile court dismissed, on Agency’s motion, certain allegations against Father in the section 300 petition. All parties agreed to the court’s taking jurisdiction under the petition’s allegations pertaining to Mother. A ppellant requested that the juvenile court retain jurisdiction after awarding custody to Father, in order to continue formal supervision. The juvenile court found appellant was w ithin the jurisdiction of the court under section 300, awarded custody to Father, direct ed the Agency to provide Father six months of “informal family maintenance services,” a nd terminated its jurisdiction over appellant. This appeal followed. Moth er and Father did not activel y participate in the appeal.3 DISCUSSION Appellant contends the juvenile court lacked statutory authority to make the disposition in the present case. She conten ds section 360, subdivision (b) did not authorize the court to order informal superv ision because Father was not the custodial parent at the time the secti on 300 petition was initially filed; 2 the court’s order was not proper under section 361.2 3 because the court did not de clare appellant a dependent, because the court did not make findings rega rding the necessity of removing appellant from Mother’s custody as required under section 361, subdivision (c), 4 and because section 361.2 does not provide for informal supervision; and se ction 245.5 did not provide the court authority for the dispositio n because the court terminated jurisdiction over appellant. 5 We need not and do not consider any of those contentions because appellant failed to raise any of them before the juvenile court. ( In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558 [“ In dependency litigati on, nonjurisdictional i ssues must be the subject of objection or appr opriate motions in the juve nile court; otherwise those arguments have been waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. [Citations.]”]; see also In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1266-1267; In re
Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885-886.) At the hearing, appellant only argued that the evidence justified retaining jurisdiction and formal superv ision of Father. Appellant

2 Section 360, subdivision (b) authorizes the juvenile court to order that family maintenance services be prov ided for a limited period wi thout declaring the minor a dependent of the court.
3 Section 361.2 contains provi sions regarding placement of a child with a parent with whom the child was not residing when the ci rcumstances that justified the section 300 petition arose.
4 Section 361, subdivision (c) provides, “A dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents or guardian or guardians with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated, unless the juve nile court finds clear and convincing evidence of a ny” of a number of specified circumstances.
5 Section 245.5 provides the j uvenile court broad authority to direct orders “as the court deems necessary and proper for the best intere sts of or for the rehabilitation of” “a minor who is subject to any proceedings under this chapter.”4 did not argue the juvenile court was without au thority to impose informal supervision, or to award custody to Father without a findi ng regarding the necessity of removing appellant from Mother’s custody. In a supplemental brief, appellant requests that this court exercise its discretion to consider her claims despite her failure to rais e them below. We decline to do so. (See In
re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“the appellate court’s discretion to excuse
forfeiture should be exercise d rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue”]; see also In re Karla C.
, supra , 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 12 67.) Had appellant raised any of her objections below, th e juvenile court could have co nsidered whether to proceed differently and it could have made a ny findings required by statute. ( In re S.B. , at p. 1293 [“The purpose of [the forfeiture] rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected. [Citation.]”].) Moreover, this is not an instance where appellant’s substantive interests are at stake. ( In re Karla C., supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267 [“ ‘[T]he underlying purpose of dependency law is to protect the welfare an d best interests of the dependent child. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”].) Appellant concedes there is no risk of detriment to her in Father’s custody. It is clear beyond a re asonable doubt the juvenile court would have made the section 361, subdivision (c) findi ng regarding removal of appellant from Mother’s custody, had the court been requested to do so. The eviden ce showed there is a substantial danger to appellant ’s well-being in Mother’s cu stody because Mother abused controlled substances while appe llant was in her custody; Mother had not been attending an outpatient drug program; there was testim ony Mother was under the influence of drugs at a child’s birthday party; Mother told th e child welfare worker she was not ready to have appellant returned to her custody; and Mother failed to appear at the disposition hearing despite being ordered to do so. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Moreover, Mother was unwilling to have physical custody of appellant. (§ 361, subd. (c)(2).) Finally, any error in providing Father in formal services was not to appellant’s detriment. Although appellant argued belo w that the juvenile court should retain jurisdiction, appellant does not contend on ap peal that the juvenile court’s decision to5 terminate jurisdiction and provid e only six months of informal services is not supported by substantial evidence. ( In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 .) Instead, appellant points to the court’s decision to provide informal services as an indica tion the court believed

some supervision of Father was necessary, a nd then appellant argues the court lacked authority to direct th e Agency to provide informal services. Thus, even if the juvenile court lacked statutory authority to provide Fa ther informal services , there is no showing that the disposition harmed appellant.
DISPOSITION The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

SIMONS, J.

We concur.

JONES, P.J.

NEEDHAM, J.