IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21

- 1300 Filed June 29, 2022

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,

vs. DEANTHONY ALLEN ECHOLS , Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, T om Reidel , Judge.

A defendant challenges his prison sentence. A FFIRMED.

Raya D. Dimitrova of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C. , Des Moines , for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Linda J. Hines , Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J. , and Tabor and Badding, JJ.2

TABOR , Judge

. The sentencing court considered Deanthony E chols ’s disrespect toward his
childrens’ mothers “very disturbing .” E chols plead ed guilty to two counts of
domestic abuse assault and harassment in the first degree. The court sentenced
Echols to a prison term not to exceed two years

. He now claims the court abused its discretion in not granting probation. B ecause the court weighed many factors , including the need to deter future violence against the two victims , we find a proper
exercise of discretion and af firm the sentence.
I. Facts and Prior P rocedures Twenty

- four

- year - old Echols has a child in common with both P

. D

. and S

. R

. In separate incidents, Echols committed acts of aggression against both women.
In May 2020, Echols confronted S.R. at her home, bludgeoned her car , bit
her neck , and struck her with a chair

. The State charged Echols with d omestic

a buse a ssault with a w ea pon

. 1
Then in September, E chols messaged P

. D : “ I’m just coming to your house to kill you .” After P.D. contacted police, t he State charged Echols with h arassment
in the f irst d egree

. And there is more. 2 O ne month later, Echols showed up at
P.D

. ’s home “purportedly to retrieve items belonging to him.” According to the

1 The State also charged Echols with c riminal m ischief in the s econd d egree but dismissed that charge as part of the plea agreement. 2 The State also brought charges for two other incidents. F irst, Echols allegedly tackled and strangled P.D. , leading to a charge of d omestic abuse a ssault i mpeding air or blood flow causing bodily i njury. Next, he attacked P.D. in her bed , leading to a charge of burglary in the first d egree. The S tate dismissed both those charges as part of th e plea agreement.3

minutes of testimony, while there, he struck P.D. in the face, causing a laceration.
T he State charged Echols with d omestic abuse a ssault c ausing bodily i njury. 3 In all, Echols faced seven charges stemming from his criminal acts directed
at S.R. and P.D. The State and Echols reached a plea agreement. The State
d ismissed four counts , and Echols plead ed guilty to three offenses : ( 1) domestic
abuse assault with a w eapon, (2) domestic a buse a ssault causing bodily injury, and (3) harassment in the f irst degree

. At the sentencing hearing , Echol s asked the court for two days of credited jail time , minimum fines, and work release

. As part of the plea agreement , t he
S ta te did not recommend a particular sentence

. Even without the State’s recommendation , Echols’ s mistreatment of these
victims disturbed the court. The court reasoned: We have two counts, two different cases, both involving domestic abuse, and they each involve different victims. . . . [Y]ou don’t seem to understand that when you’re in a relationship, that is a person the legislature has deemed to require be worthy of additional protections, and that that should be the case. I understand that you have h ad a certain relationship with both of these women at different times, and they probably have a greater right to expect you to treat them more respectfully than what you have done. Given those circumstances, the court did not find probation to be an appropriate

sentence. S o the court sentenced Echols to two indeterminate two

- year prison

terms , to run concurrently

. It challenged Echols to become a better parent : If you want to cont inue to be a person who perpetrates domestic violence and be in and out of jail or prison for the remainder of your life, or if you want to be a good father and a good significant other to whomever you’re in a relationship with. Ultimately, that decision will be yours.

3 The State also charged Echols with theft in the f ourth d egree but dismi ssed the charge as part of the plea agreement.4
Echols now appeals his sentence. He “bears the burden of establishing

‘ good cause ’ to pursue an appeal of [his] conviction based on a guilty plea.” State
v. Damme , 944 N.W.2d 98, 10 4 (Iowa 2020). Good cause exists when a defendant appeals the sentence rather than the guilty plea. Id. at 105.
II. Standard of R eview
W e review Echols’ s sentence for an abuse of discretion

. See id. at 103.
W e will find an abuse if the court exercises its discretion o n grounds clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Evans , 672 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 2003)

. Unless the court fails to exercise its discretion or considers inappropriate matters, we rarely find abuse. State v. Pappas , 337 N.W.2d 49 0, 494 (Iowa 1983)

. In other words, we entertain a strong presumption i n favor of the sentencing court’ s decision. Id

. Echols bears the “heavy” burden of overcoming
this presumption. See i d

. III. Analysis A sentencing court must examine “all pertinent information” and then determine an authorized sentence providing the “maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses by the defendant and others.” Iowa Code § 901.5 (202 0). It should consider the societal goals for sentencing a criminal offender, like rehabilitation and community protection. State v. Formaro , 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).
And it must consider an offender’s age, chances of reform, employment status, family circumstances, character and propensity , the nature of the offense, attending circumstances, and other relevant factors. Id. at 725.5

E chols claim s that the sentencing court relied on the nature of his offense s at the expense of other necessary factors. S ee State v. Dvorksy , 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982). H e contends that rather than weigh all the factors , the court focused on the disrespect of the victims underlying the domestic abuse assaults
and relied on boilerplate statements for the remaining considerations

. We disagree with Echol s ’s contentions. T he sentencing court weigh ed the
necessary factors when se ntencing Echols. F or instance, the court acknowledged
Echols’ s age , just not as a mitigating circumstance

. That is, the court told Echols that he was old enough to behave better: “ Y ou’re 24 years old. You should know
that violence of this type is inappropriate.” The cour t also noted that the offenses “each involve different victims.” Those attending circumstances were proper
considerations. See State v. Millsap , 704 N.W.2d 426, 435 (Iowa 2005) ( “ T he existence of two victims is clearly a circumstance of the crime. ”). True, t he offenses’ disrespectful nature s disturbed the sentencing court. And in that vein, the court found a prison term necessary to “deter this type of
conduct in the future.” But “ [p]art of the court ’ s sentencing responsibility was to
determine wheth er its sentence would deter defendant from future offenses. ” See
State v. Wright , 340 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 1983) . The court did not abuse its discretion in highlighting the nature of the offense and attending circumstances. A

court need not mention each sentencing factor it considered. State v. Bradley , No

. 21

- 1149, 2022 WL 1488545, at * 2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2 022) ( citing State

v. Boltz , 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) )

. Resentencing is not necessary

. AFFIRMED.