Townsend's lack of criminal intent; (3) the State committed prosecutorial 

misconduct by asking the victim a misleading question; and (4) the State's 

expert witness gave improper testimony. The district court dismissed the 

ineffective-assistance claims as lacking in merit. Specifically, the district 

court determined that Townsend failed to provide any specific factual 

allegations to demonstrate that trial counsel had interfered with 

Townsend's right to testify in his defense, and that Townsend's allegations 

did not demonstrate that trial counsel acted deficiently by not calling 

certain witnesses to testify at trial, as much of their testimony would not 

have been admissible. The district court dismissed the remaining claims 

as procedurally barred because they could have been raised on direct 

appeal and Townsend failed to allege good cause. 

Townsend argues that the district court should have held an 

evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

for preventing Townsend from testifying at trial, as Townsend made this 

ineffective-assistance allegation in his petition under oath, the record does 

not indicate that Townsend was canvassed about his right to testify, and it 

is reasonable to assume that trial counsel did not discuss with Townsend 

his right to testify in light of Townsend's assertion that counsel met with 

him only once before trial. Townsend fails to demonstrate that his single 

statement in his petition—that trial counsel "denied [him] the opportunity 

to testify in [his] own defense"—warranted relief. See id. at 502, 686 P.2d 

at 225 (stating that a petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing 

on 'bare' or 'naked' claims for relief, unsupported by any specific factual 

allegations"). Townsend provided no explanation in his petition as to how 

counsel prevented him from testifying, he made no allegation that he was 

unaware of his• right to testify, and he did not assert that he actually 

wanted to testify or explain how his testimony would have affected the 

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outcome of the trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 

(1984) (requiring a petitioner to demonstrate both deficient performance 

and prejudice to establish ineffective assistance of counsel). Therefore, we 

conclude the district court did not err in denying this claim without 

holding an evidentiary hearing. 

Townsend also argues that the district court erred in denying 

his other claims without holding an evidentiary hearing. Townsend does 

not specifically dispute the district court's factual findings or conclusions 

of law as to those claims. Rather, he blames postconviction counsel for 

failing to request an evidentiary hearing, for failing to investigate and 

adequately supplement the claims raised in his petition, and for failing to 

allege good cause for the procedural default of the prosecutorial 

misconduct and expert testimony claims. Townsend's complaints about 

postconviction counsel's performance do not demonstrate that the district 

court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on these claims. 

Townsend appears to contend that, in declining to hold an 

evidentiary hearing, the district court should not have relied solely on the 

allegations contained in the petition and supplemental petition because 

other documents in the record indicated that Townsend was dissatisfied 

with trial counsel. Townsend lists numerous concerns about trial counsel, 

including counsel's failure to: (1) meet with Townsend more than once • 

before trial; (2) investigate evidence requested by Townsend; (3) subpoena 

an expert to negate any criminal intent; (4) qualify Townsend's counselor 

as an expert; (5) file pretrial motions to exclude evidence, including 

Townsend's statements to a detective; (6) request an independent 

psychological examination of the victim or of Townsend; and (7) file a 

motion for an independent defense expert. Townsend did not present any 

of these allegations to the district court in either his petition or 

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supplemental petition, and he provides no authority for his contention 

that the district court was required to infer these allegations from the 

record. Thus, he fails to demonstrate any error by the district court. To 

the extent that he seeks our review of these allegations on appeal, we 

decline to consider them in the first instance. See Davis v. State, 107 Nev. 

600, 606, 817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Means 

v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 103 P.3d 25 (2004). 

The remainder of Townsend's arguments on appeal relate to 

the performance of his postconviction counsel who represented him during 

the district court proceedings. Townsend alleges that postconviction 

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to meet with him, 

supplement all of the claims raised in his pro se petition, and investigate 

and raise additional claims. His claims of ineffective assistance of 

postconviction counsel were not raised before the district court, and we 

decline to consider them in the first instance. See id. 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Townsend has 

failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his claims 

without an evidentiary hearing, and we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

d4,4L - J. 

Gibbons 

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cc: Hon. Steve L. Dobrescu, District Judge 

Kirsty E. Pickering Attorney at Law 

Attorney General/Carson City 

White Pine County District Attorney 

Attorney General/Ely 

White Pine County Clerk 

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