alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined that ora l argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 4/4/96 TENTH CIRCUIT

LEONARD RENAL ROBERTS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. MARY BEARS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. Case No. 95-5209 (D.C. 93-CV-676) (Northern District of Oklahoma)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-appellant Leonard Renal Roberts appeals in forma pauperis the granting of summary judgment for defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought pro se against several prison officials. 1 His action is based upon the strip search of some family members who came to visit him in prison and certain disciplinary actions taken by prison officials which he c laims were in retaliation for filing a grievance and exercising his right to practice his religion.2

The district court issued a thorough, well-drafted order granting summary judgment t o the defendants. We see little reason to add to this order, and almost no chance of improving upon it. Consequently, we AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons given by the district court in its order of September 26, 1995. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court, Robert Henry Circuit Judge
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-22-00139-CV

Richard WALKER,

Appellant

v.

SKYVUE APARTMENTS,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2021CV04545

Honorable J. Frank Davis, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARTINEZ, JUSTICE RODRIGUEZ, AND JUSTICE 

VALENZUELA

In accordance with this court’s memorandum opinion of this date, this appeal is 

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1) (allowing 

appellate courts to dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution when an appellant fails to timely file 

a brief); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c) (allowing appellate courts to dismiss an appeal when an 

appellant fails to comply with a court order). No costs are assessed against appellant because he is 

entitled to appeal without costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1.

Appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal is DENIED AS MOOT.

SIGNED December 7, 2022.

_________________________________

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

BRUCE L. WISHNEFSKY,

Petitioner

v.

FANELLI, EVANS AND PATEL, P.C.,

Respondent

:

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:

:

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No. 176 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of October, 2022, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
**Exhibit 23.1**
**CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS**
We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement(Form S-8 No. 33-45573) pertaining to the 1988 and 1990 Stock Option Plans, inthe Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-88590) pertaining to the 1992 StockOption Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 33-311419) pertainingto the 1995 Stock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No.33-333647) pertaining to the 1996 Stock Option Plan, in the RegistrationStatement (Form S-8 No. 333-81647) pertaining to the 1998 Stock Option Plan, inthe Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-101467) pertaining to the 2002Stock Option Plan, and in the Registration Statements (Form S-3 No. 333-97207and Form S-4 No. 333-107089) of Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation of ourreport dated August 14, 2003, with respect to the consolidated financialstatements and schedule of Medicis Pharmaceutical Corporation included in thisAnnual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended June 30, 2003. /s/ ERNST & YOUNG LLP
Phoenix, Arizona
**Exhibit 31.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Larry G. Gerdes, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Transcend Services, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2004; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared; 

 

b) [Paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986];

 

c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this annual report based on such evaluation; and 

 

d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrols over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s boardof directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and 

 

b) any fraud, whether ornot material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: March 9, 2005
CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

#### Caroline Beth Nelson v. Department of Welfare

December 18, 1980

Case No. (Chancery) 68018

By JUDGE THOMAS J. MIDDLETON

Upon consideration of the pleadings, the arguments of counsel and memoranda filed, it is the opinion of the Court, that th$ Motion ,to Strike the Demurrer filed on behalf of the. Petitioner should be denied and that the Demurrer filed on behalf of the Defendant should be sustained

It appears to the Court that Section 9-6.14:20(ii) of the Administrative Process Act,excludes from judicial review any agency action relating, to grants of funds. Section 63.1-119 of Chapter 6, Public Aid and Assistance, Article 2, Grants of Assistance, seems to support this conclusion.
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2946 

To require that vessels used to engage in drilling for oil or gas in ocean 

waters that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States must 

be documented under chapter 121 of title 46, United States Code. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 15, 2011 

Mr. COHEN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Transportation and Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To require that vessels used to engage in drilling for oil 

or gas in ocean waters that are subject to the jurisdiction 

of the United States must be documented under chapter 

121 of title 46, United States Code. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘American Coastal 

5 Waters and Shorelines Protection Act’’. 


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•HR 2946 IH

1 SEC. 2. DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENT FOR VESSELS 

2 USED FOR OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DRILL3 ING. 

4 Subsection (d) of section 12111 of title 46, United 

5 States Code, is amended— 

6 (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ‘‘MO7 BILE OFFSHORE DRILLING UNIT’’ and inserting 

8 ‘‘OFFSHORE DRILLING’’; 

9 (2) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ‘‘or’’ after 

10 the semicolon; 

11 (3) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking the period 

12 and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 

13 (4) by adding at the end of paragraph (1) the 

14 following new subparagraph: 

15 ‘‘(C) drilling for oil or gas in ocean waters 

16 subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 

17 or support of such drilling.’’. 

Æ 


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**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Braintech, Inc. (the "Company”) on Form 10-QSB for the three months ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Owen L.J. Jones the Principal Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge: 

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 

 
| /s/  Owen L.J. Jones |
|----------------------|

Owen L.J. Jones

Principal Executive Officer 

May 13, 2005
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-7380

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus GREGORY PETER HANSEN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge. (1:01-cr-00090-1; 1:06-cv-00220) Submitted: December 14, 2006 Decided: December 20, 2006 Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Gregory Peter Hansen, Appellant Pro Se. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Gregory Peter Hansen seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Hansen has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and di smiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Exhibit 10.29







 


 





THIRD AMENDMENT TO SEPARATION AGREEMENT


 


This Third Amendment to the Separation Agreement
(this “Third Amendment”) is effective as of the 1st day of January, 2018, between Enzon Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, with offices in Cranford, New Jersey (the “Company”), and Andrew Rackear (the “Executive”).


 


BACKGROUND


 


A.     This
Third Amendment constitutes the agreement between the Company and the Executive concerning certain terms set forth in the Separation
Agreement entered into between the Company and the Executive dated September 27, 2013, as amended on January 1, 2016 and March
31, 2016 (the “Separation Agreement”).


 


B.      The
Company desires to continue to ensure that it can rely on the services of the Executive.


 


C.      The
Executive desires to continue to provide services to the Company.


 


TERMS


 


In consideration of the foregoing premises
and for other good and valuable consideration, the Company and Executive agree as follows:


 


1.       The
fee set forth in paragraph 1 of the Separation Agreement is changed from $285 per hour to $300 per hour.


 


2.       All
other terms and conditions shall remain the same.


 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto
have executed this Amendment as of the date first set forth above.


 


	 	ENZON PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
	 	 
	 	 
	 	/s/ Jennifer McNealey
	 	By: Jennifer McNealey
	 	Dated: November 29, 2017
	 	 
	 	 
	 	
        

        /s/ Andrew Rackear

	 	ANDREW RACKEAR
	 	Dated: November 29, 2017
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2931 

To amend title 31, United States Code, to eliminate the statutory cap on 

the public debt and to place limitations on the purposes for which 

public debt may be issued. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 14, 2011 

Mr. NADLER (for himself, Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia, Mr. MORAN, and Mr. 

BLUMENAUER) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend title 31, United States Code, to eliminate the 

statutory cap on the public debt and to place limitations 

on the purposes for which public debt may be issued. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Full Faith and Credit 

5 Act of 2011’’. 

6 SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON OBLIGATIONS. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 3101 of title 31, United 

8 States Code, is amended to read as follows: 


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•HR 2931 IH

1 ‘‘§ 3101. Limitation on obligations 

2 ‘‘Obligations may only be issued under this chapter 

3 to fund commitments incurred by the Federal Government 

4 that require current funding.’’. 

5 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 

6 (1) Section 3130(e)(2) of title 31, United 

7 States Code, is amended by inserting ‘‘, as in effect 

8 on the day before the date of the enactment of the 

9 Full Faith and Credit Act of 2011’’ before the pe10 riod at the end. 

11 (2) The table of contents for chapter 31 of title 

12 31, United States Code, is amended by amending 

13 the item relating to section 3101 to read as follows: 

‘‘3101. Limitation on obligations.’’. 

Æ 


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# Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

June 14, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00198

- CR

Ju an Manuel GOMEZ, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 156th Judicial District Court

, McMullen County, Texas

Trial Court No. M

- 21

- 0013

- CR

- B Honorable Janna K. Whatley , Judge Presiding



### O R D E R

Appellant’s brief was originally due June 10, 2022. On June 13, 2022, appellant filed a motion requesting a sixty

- day extension of time to file the brief. After consideration, we GRANT the motion and ORDER appellant to file his brief by August 9, 2022

.

_________________________________ Beth Watkins , Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 14th day of June, 2022

.

___________________________________ MICHAEL A. CRUZ

, Clerk of Court
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3076 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code to qualify formerly homeless youth 

who are students for purposes of the low income housing tax credit. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

OCTOBER 3, 2011 

Mr. MCDERMOTT (for himself, Mr. PAULSEN, Mr. ELLISON, and Mr. TIBERI) 

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 

Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code to qualify formerly 

homeless youth who are students for purposes of the 

low income housing tax credit. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. FORMERLY HOMELESS YOUTH WHO ARE STU4 DENTS QUALIFIED FOR PURPOSES OF LOW 

5 INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Clause (i) of section 42(i)(3)(D) 

7 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by re8 designating subclauses (II) and (III) as subclauses (III) 


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•HR 3076 IH

1 and (IV), respectively, and by inserting after subclause (I) 

2 the following new subclause: 

3 ‘‘(II) a student who previously 

4 was a homeless child or youth (as de5 fined by section 725 of the McKinney6 Vento Homeless Assistance Act),’’. 

7 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

8 subsection (a) shall apply to determinations made before, 

9 on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

JAMEL JAIMLETT,

Petitioner

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No. 511 EAL 2018

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 9th day of July, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
Exhibit 13(a)

906 Certification

The certification set
forth below is being submitted in connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2014 (the Report) for the purpose of complying with Rule 13a-14(b) or Rule 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Richard Solomons, the Chief
Executive Officer, and Paul Edgecliffe-Johnson, the Chief Financial Officer of InterContinental Hotels Group PLC, each certifies that, to the best of his knowledge:



|1. | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of InterContinental Hotels Group PLC.
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: 26 February 2015



By:/s/ Richard SolomonsName:

Richard SolomonsTitle:

Chief Executive OfficerBy:/s/ Paul Edgecliffe-JohnsonName:

Paul Edgecliffe-JohnsonTitle:

Chief Financial Officer
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3052 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the exception to 

the treatment of consolidated groups under the personal holding company 

rules. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 23, 2011 

Mr. LARSEN of Washington (for himself, Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS, and Mr. 

HASTINGS of Washington) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal 

the exception to the treatment of consolidated groups 

under the personal holding company rules. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF EXCEPTION TO TREATMENT AS 

4 CONSOLIDATED GROUP UNDER PERSONAL 

5 HOLDING COMPANY RULES. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) of section 542 of 

7 the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended— 

8 (1) by striking paragraphs (2) and (4), and 


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•HR 3052 IH

1 (2) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (5) as 

2 paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively. 

3 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.— 

4 (1) Paragraph (1) of section 542(b) of such 

5 Code is amended by striking ‘‘paragraphs (2) and 

6 (3)’’ and inserting ‘‘paragraph (2)’’. 

7 (2) Clause (ii) of section 1504(c)(2)(B) of such 

8 Code is amended by striking ‘‘section 542(b)(5)’’ 

9 and inserting ‘‘section 542(b)(3)’’. 

10 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by 

11 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning on or 

12 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

Æ 


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CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

#### Patricia Ann Glenn v. Donald P. DeLorme and Fairfax Hospital Association

April 1, 1985

Case No. (Law) 63150

By JUDGE J. HOWE BROWN

This medical malpractice case is before me upon Defendant Fairfax Hospital Association’s Motion to Dismiss. Fairfax Hospital contends that Plaintiff has not given notice to the Hospital of the claim asserted in the Motion for Judgment. Virginia Code Section 8.01-581.2 states in part:

> No action may be brought. . . unless the claimant notifies such health care provider. . . prior to commencing the action. The written notification shall include. . . a reasonable description of the act or acts of malpractice. . . .

Plaintiff gave written notice pursuant to the statute on or about September 8, 1981. The notice alleges that Plaintiff entered the hospital on or about October 10, 1979; that she developed bacterial infection during an operation; that a nurse pulled an IV out of her arm and left her unattended; and that the nurse left a piece of the IV needle in her arm. No allegation is made as to how the bacterial infection was caused. The Motion for Judgment makes specific allegations of negligence against the Hospital: *350failure to complete culture reports; failure to complete sensitivity reports; improper and incorrect data kept; failure to complete laboratory reports; improper administering of medication.

The operative question deciding this Motion to Dismiss is whether the notice gives a reasonable description of the acts of malpractice alleged in the Motion for Judgment. I find that the notice does not give a reasonable description of the acts of malpractice alleged against the Hospital. The notice does not give any notice of an act or acts of malpractice resulting in the infection during the operation. The Motion for Judgment does not raise the claim of abandonment by the nurse or the leaving of a piece of IV needle in Plaintiff’s arm, the acts of malpractice that are specified in the notice. A person reading the notice and then reading the Motion for Judgment would not be able to tell that the two documents refer to the same events. The Hospital was entitled to better notice.

The Motion for Judgment is dismissed as to Defendant Fairfax Hospital Association.