1 The Department’s brief does not menti on the f orgery c onviction or sent ence, alt hough an aff

idavi t fi led by the Department below recit es that Mr. Bonner was sent enced t o a minimum of two years and a m aximum of two years for forg ery o n the sam e date that his o ther se nten ces w ere im pos ed. Mr. Bon ner’s petiti on includes this two-year forgery sentence. 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on

Briefs A ugust 16, 2000
KENNETH L. BONNER v. TENNESSEE DEPARTME NT

OF CORRECTION Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 2656-III Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

No. M1999-00343-COA-R3-CV - Filed August 17, 2001

The petitioner

contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition regarding the Department of Correct ion’s ca lculation of his release eligibility da te. An ad justment o f the re leaseeligibility date, made subsequent to the filing of this appe al, has r

endere d most of the

petitione r’s arguments moot. As to the re

maining iss ue, we a

ffirm the dismissal o f the pet

ition bec ause we

agree with the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

P ATRIC IA J. C OTTRELL , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in whichB EN H. C ANTRELL , P.J., M.S., and W ILL IAM C. K OCH , J R ., J., joined. Kenneth L. Bonner, Mountain City, Tennessee, Pro se.
Paul G. Summers , Attorney General, Michael Moore, Solicitor General, Pamela S. Lorch, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Te nnessee Department of Correction.
OPINION

The petitioner, Kenneth L. Bonne r, is an inmate in the custody of the TennesseeDepartment of Correction (“the Department”). He pledguilty and wa s sentenced in 1984 to the following: life imprisonmentfo r f

ir st de gr ee mu rd er , t en yea rs fo r g ra nd la rc en y, eight ye ars for writing a bad check, andtwo years f

or fo rg er y. 1 The s entences are consecutive. Mr. B onner must first serve the life2 Mr. Bon ner respo nded to this state ment by dis puti ng most of t he fact s or e xplai ning why the y were not applicab le to his claims.
-2- sentence, then the ten yea

r sentence for grand lar

ceny, then the

eight ye ars for

bad checks, followed by the two y

ear forgery

sentence.
The petitioner contends that his re lease eligibility

date (“ RED”), th

e earlie st date he might be considered for parole, was origina l ly calculated as February 21, 2017, “30 yea

rs on the life sentence; 4 years c ombined time on the remaining sentences.” He claims the Department extended his releas e eligi

bility date in 19 86 by

adding tw o years; in 198 9 by adding nine year s “for a disciplinary

conviction of assault;” and in 1992 by “re- extending the release eligibility date that had already been extended.” The petitioner contends that the 1986 a

nd 1992 exte

nsions we re illeg al “in the sense that [he] had not received any type of disciplinary

convictions that calledfor or mandated extension to his release eligibility date.”
The petitioner filed a “Petition for Common LawWrit of Certiorari and/or Petition for J udicial Review” in the Chancery Court in Davidson County, “pursuant to Tennessee Cod e Annotated27-8-101, 27-8-102, and 4-5-322.” The Depar tment responded with a Motion for Summary Judgment, asking the court to “enter summary judgmen t in [the De

partmen t’s] favor and dismiss this petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for which relief may be gra nted.” A ttached to the motio n for summary judgme nt were a statement of undispute d facts 2 and the affidavit of a sentence ana lyst of the Depar

tment of Correction.
The trial court granted the Department’s motion on three grounds: 1) thepetition for writ of certiorari regarding the imposition of the 30% extension of

his RED was time-barred, depriving the court of jurisdi ction ove

r the matt er; 2) the petitioner’s alternative petition under Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322 could not be considered because this wasnot a “contested case” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-106 (b); and

3) the pe titioner e rroneou sly claimed that the 30% exte nsion of hi s relea se eligibility should have been calculated on only one of his sentences when, pursuant to statute, the 30% extension applies to each separate sentenc e.
The petitioner

filed a motion to con sider pos t-judgmen t facts, w hich this court granted after the Department responded that it did not object to our consideration as long as Mr. Bonner did not rely on those facts to raise new issues before this court. The petitioner’s motion stated:
The respondent in this cause of action modified the release e ligibility date of the appellant from 12/23/2050, to reflect a new RED date of March 1 2, 2016. A copy of said act ion is her eto anne xed as Ex hibit A. The appellant further contends that he still has a cause of action in that his re

lease eligibility da

te remains incorr

ect.
The attached

“Exh ibit A” is a photocopy of a letter from the manager of Sentenc e Informa tion Servi ces of the Depar tment of Co

rrectio n to the petitioner’s wife. The letter states in part:3 The letter co ntain ed n o ex plan ation for th e m odif ication

. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40 -3 5- 501 (k ) a nd TD OC

Policy 502.02, the Commiss ioner has di scre ti on to extend rel ease eli gibi li ty up t o the maxi mum for th e spe cific viol ati on found. -3- EffectiveJune 7, 1999, your husband’s record was modified 3 to reflect a on e-year RED extension. The modification was approved by Commissioner Campbell, and replaced the origin al exten sion due to the guilty v erdict f

or assault in July, 1989. The current releas e eligibil

ity date (RED) is Ma

rch 12, 2 016. This d ate will reduce each month credits are earned and re

tained. When your husband reaches a time-f rame for parole consideration, his na me will be submitted to the Board of Parole. He is not eligible at this time.
The one-year RED extension has been applied to the Life sentence only, even though the sentence structure ref lects a string of consecutive sentences, for which the summary RED is based. Despite this signif

icant re duction in

his relea se eligibility date a fter the trial cou rt enter ed its order, the petitioner pursues his appeal, alleging that his RED is still incorrectly calculated.
I. Calcul ations of

the Relea se Eligibil

ity Date

Mr. Bonner’s original

complaint was that

his RED had been extended three times, in 1986, in 1989, and in 1992 while there was a legitimate basis for only one extension. His petition makes it cl ea r t ha t t he la st tw o e xt en si on s w er e r el at ed to hi s c on vi ct io n b y a disciplina

ry board fo r assaul t on a guard. He did not contest the merits of that disciplinary finding or the authority of the commissioner

to extend a

releas e eligi

bility date by up to thirty

percent (30%) for such

a violation of Department rules. He challenge s the way the Department

calculated the 30% extension in 1992, and the 1986 calculation of the RED.
A. The 1992 Calculation

In the affidavit submittedin su pport of its motion for summary judgment, the D epartment explained the extens ion due to t

he discip linary

violation a s follows:
On July 17, 1989, Mr. Bonner was found g uilty by the disciplinary

board of Assault on an Employee, whic

h occurred on July 4, 1989.
Per Policy 502.02(F, G ) th e release eligibility date (RED) was to be extended by thirty percent (30%) of the maximum sentence the offende r was serving at

the time of the infraction. Due to the fa ct that Mr . Bonner

is serving

consecu tive sente nces, the RED was extended on each sentence. His Life sentence was extend

ed by thirty percent (30%) of

99 years ( 29 years 8 months 12 day s); 10-year sentence (3 years); and his 8-yea

r sentence (2 years 4 months 24 days).4 The Depart ment and t he tr ial court int erpre ted t

his argument a s a contenti on th atth e 30% i ncr eas e i n hi s RED sho uld have appl ied onl y to t he li fe s entenc e and not to the ot her sent ences. Regardl ess of the corre ct i nterpret ati on of Mr. Bonner’s posit

ion, t he answer is the s ame: re leas e el igi bil it y is computed on the cumulat ive c onsecutive sentence s. The Comm iss ioner has dis cretion t o exte nd, for cert ain rule vi olations, the r elea se el igi bil it y date “in a ny amount not to exceed the f

ull s entence ori ginall y imposed by the court” as long as such exten sion is done in c ompliance with t he Departm ent’s regulations. Tenn. Code An n. § 40-35-5 01(k).
-4- His current probable parole date is Marc h 25, 2051.
This expl anation relates to the 1992 extension complained of by Mr. Bonner, who makes several arguments regarding the m e thod by which the Depa rtment applied the 30%. Both Mr. Bonner andthe Department

rely on Tenn. Cod

e Ann. § 40 -35-501(

j), which require s computa

tion of re lease eligibil ity f or consecutive se

ntenceson one cu

mulative s entence . That sta tute provides:
The releas e eligi

bility date pro vided for

herein i s separa

tely calcula ted for e ach offense for which a defenda nt is convicted. For

consecutive sentences, the periods of ineligibility for

release are

calcula ted for e ach sent

ence and are ad

ded tog ether to determine the release eligibility date for the consecutive sentence.
Mr. Bonner argues that the De partment’s application of

a thirty perce

nt extension to each of his consecutive sentences was contrary to this statute and thus not authorized by law. He appears to argue that the 30% should have been added to his cumulative sentence, whe n instead the Department

calculated and

added the 30% to each of his separate consecutive se ntences to arrive at
one new RED. 4 We fail to see how that distinction makes a difference. Thirty percent of the total sentence (life plus 10 years plus 8 y ears) is the same as 30% of life plus 30% of 10 yea

rs plus 30% of 8 ye ars. I

n any event, we find n o irreg

ularity in the methodology

employ ed by the Depa rtment, as explained in its affidavit, because it complies with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(j) and with § 40-35- 5 01(k), which authorizes the commissioner of correction, for violation of the rules of the Departm ent, to defer a release eligibility date in any amount not to exceed the full se

ntence o rigina lly imposed by the court, pursua n t to reg ulati ons giving notice of the length of incr eases possible for each vio lation. Th

e regu lation in effect a

t the time o f the 1989assault authorized adding “30% of the offender’s original maximum sentence.” The trial court correctly found that the 30% extension was properly

calculated.
Mr. Bonner also asserted in the trial court that the 1992 changes to his RED were made as
a result of the Department’s implementation of a new co mputer system and “doubled ba ck” and added30% extensions to sentences which had alread y been extended in 1989 because of the assa ult. The affida

vit indica tes that on

e extensi on of th irty

percen t (30%) w as made d

ue to the a ssault findi ng. The 1992 extension, as described by Mr. Bonne r, reflects the extensions which are explained in the affidavit.
Mr. Bonner’s basic argument in this reg ard is that ther e was no ba sis, such a s a new r ule violation, for the 1 992 extensi on. The D epartme nt does not assert that there was. I nstead, the Department

does not acknowledge there wa s an extension other than the 30% extension in July 1989.5 Another s entenc e repor t, date d earl ier , i ndicates no s uch ext ensi on. -5- The record

includes the disciplinary re port authorizing a 30% extension of Mr. Bonner’s RED, and the affidavit indicates that is the basis for the extension of Mr. Bonner’s RED.
The problem, as it appears to us, is that the Department provided Mr. B onner wi th a computation in 1989 purporting to be a 30% extension which reflected an incorrect number

of years (9) to be added to his RED. To the extent that Mr. Bonner’s complaint is based on documentation he receiv ed in 1989that inco rrectly calcula ted the e xtension due

to the disciplinary infra

ction, we find no basis for requiring the Department to cha nge its correct application of the extension.

In the trial court, Mr. Bonner also arg uedthat the Dep artment had improperly applied the 30% extension to his two yea r s en te nc e for fo rg er y. He asserts that the 30% extension could not be applied t o his 2-year

forgery conviction because that offense was committed prior to enactment of the statut e a uthorizing extension of parole eligibility for prison disciplinary offe

nses, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501. Such application, he contends, would violate the ex post facto clause.
As he corr

ectly points out, the Department did not directly address this issue. However, the Department’s affidav it clear ly states that the 30% extension was applied to the murde r, grand la rc en y, a n d bad check sentences. Bec ause the affidavit also recognizes the existence of Mr

. Bonner’s two year se

ntence for forgery , the clear implication is that no part of the 30% extension of his RED was r

elated to the forg ery

sente nce. However, attached to Mr. Bonner’ s filings are Department

sentence reports which reflect that the two -y ear se ntence for forgery carried a disciplinary

extension of 30%. 5 Th e Depar tment did not explain thi s discre pancy in its document ation supp orting its motion fo r summary

judgmen t.
On appeal, but not ra

ised in the

trial cou rt, Mr. Bonner also complains that the Department incorrectly

applied t he 30% exte

nsion to a 9 9 ye ar sente

nce, whe n it should have used 60 ye ars as the presumptive term of a life sentence pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35 -109( d)(1). Alth ough notdirectly re sponding to the statutory issue raised by Mr. Bonner, the Depa

rtment ha s bolstered its calculation of the 30% extension by relying on Depar tment policies rela

ting to e xtensions of

parole eligibil ity for rule violations which result in injury to employ ees. The relevant portion states that for purposes of calculating an extension, “a life sentence shall be considered ninety -nine yea rs.” TDOC policy 502.02(G).
All of the preced ing a rgum ents raised by Mr. B onner have been rendered moot by the Department’s action replacing the 30% extens ion with a o ne-y ear exte nsion of hi s RED. Because Mr. Bonner asked us to consider this action as a post-judgme nt fact, it is properly be

fore us for determination of mootness. Mr. Bonner readily concedes that the Department had the authority to extend his RED up to 30% of his sentence if the Department applied that 30% corr ectly. Even

if we
were to ag re e w it h a ll hi s a rg um en ts , a nd or de r t he De pa rt me nt to re ca lc ul at e h is RE D a cc or di ng ly, 30% of only

his life se

ntence, calcula

te d a t 60 y ears ashe mainta ins it should

be, is 18 y

ears. Ob vi ou sl y, a one-y

ear exte nsion is withinthe Department’s authority even under Mr. Bonner’s6 In 1984, when the peti tioner was sentenced, he was appar ently cred ited for his “jail time” a waiting trial. Th us,

his sentence had t

he “effective date 2/21/83.” He was sentence d to li fe in pri son, and requir ed to serve thi rty years before he was eligible for parole. He was also sentenced to two y ears for forgery and required to serve the entire sentence. He was to serv e 35% of his con victions for g rand larce ny (ten y ears) and bad chec ks (e ight years ) befor e he
was el i gi bl e f

orpa ro l e. Th us , ac co rd i ng t o o urca l cu l at i on s at t he t i me of se ntenci ng, the petiti oner was to serve m ore than thirty ei ght years before his RED (3 0 + 2 + 3 .5 (35% o f 10) + 2.8 (35% of 8) = 38.3 yea rs) . The af fida vit fil ed by the Department does not provide t he calcula tion for

his RED at his entr y int o pris on. Beca use an RED can be reduced by vari ous se ntence reduct ion cr edi ts , t

he De par tmen t’ s s ta te ment of Mr . Bo nner ’s curre nt RED does not provide the in fo rma ti on n ec es sa ry fo r u s t o ca lc ul at e the o ri gi nal RED.
-6- version of its authority. Theref ore, we concl ude Mr. B onner’sclaims regarding extensi on of his RED based on his disciplinary violation are moot.
B. The 1986 Calculation
Mr. Bonner’s claim with regard to the 1986 c alculation of his RED whi c h he calls an “extension” is unaffec ted by the Depa rtment’s recent modification of the RED. Mr. Bonner’s complaint is that when he entered

prison in 1984, he was given sent encing informat ion, inclu ded in the record, which stated that his RED was Februar y 21, 2017. Another docume nthe submitted, a 1986 sentenc ing rep ort generated by t he Depa rtment, r eflected his RED asJune 6, 2019 . It isthis chang e that Mr. Bonner

characterizes, understandably, a s an “extensio n.” No expl anation f or this change appears on the Department’s documents filed by Mr. Bonner. The Department did not addressthis issue in its motion for summary judgment or on appea l. The Department’s affida vit explains Mr. Bonner’s original sentence and the application of the 30% extension, and providesa conclusory

statemen t as to his correct RED. However, the affidavit does not disclose the origina l RED as calculated by

the Department. Without the starting point for application of the extension, this court has no basis for determin ing the a ccuracy of

the Depa rtment’sconclusi on as tohis RED.
Even though the record provides no basis for us to determine, a s a matter of law, whether Mr. Bonner’s RED has been calculated c orrect ly, the spec ific comp laint he r aises, the 1986 “extension,”
can be e xplained by the record. The first sentence calculation document provided to Mr. Bonne r, under the section for calculation of his RED, indicated that he was req

uired to s erve 30 y

ears on h is life sentence and 4 years on all other sentences before becoming eligible for parole consideration. The next docume

nt submitte d by

Mr. Bonner indic ates his parole e ligibility for the sentenc es consecutive to the life sentence was based on 35% of the 10 y ear sentence, 35% of the 8 y ear sentence and t hat he was required to serve two y ears on the forgery

conviction before becoming eligible for parole. The Department’s aff idavit is consistentwith these statemen ts. 6 Obviously , this information would indi cate t hat th e origi nal cal culat ion u sing 4 years f or all sentences other than the life sent ence fo r calculation of t

he RED wa s incorr

ect.
The Departm

ent is req uired to c alculate

sentences in accordance with the sentencing court’s judgment and with a

pplicabl e sentencin g sta

tutes. Te nn. Code A

nn. § 40-3 5-501; see State v. Shelton , No. E2000-01632-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1858996, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2000) (perm. app. denied Apr. 9, 2001) (remanding for correction

of record “so that

the Department7 In fact , the pet it ion i n the t ria l cour t s tat ed, “[ T]he pet it ioner

. . . does not s eek j udici al r eview of the responden t’s decisio n to extend his releas e eli gibil ity dat e, but does c ontest the il legal manner in whic h the r espondent [has] exten ded his relea se eligib ility date . . . .”
-7- of Correction will be able to properly calculate the releas e eligibility date). The refore, the Department

cannot be required to alter correct sentence calculations because information based on
an in co rr ec t c al cu la ti on ha s b ee n p ro vi de d t o t he pr is on er . C on ve rs el y, a prisoner is not precluded from seeking correction of

a Department mistake which incorrectly prolongs his RED. As we have stated, the courts’ interest in sentence ca lculation issues is simply

“in seeing to it th at the law is properl y applied.” Jones v. Reynolds , No. 01A01-9510-CH-00484, 1997 WL 367661, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 2, 1997) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

II . Jurisdicti on to Consid

er the Cla ims
The trial court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment based on its lack of jurisdiction and its determination that the petition failed to state a claim. A trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment present s a question of law that we review de novo without a presumption of correctness. Finister v. Humbolt Gen. Hosp., Inc. , 970 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tenn. 1998). The questions a court m ust consid

er in det ermining w

hether t o grant or deny a motion for summary judgment are: (1) whether a factual dispute exists; (2) whether that fact is materia l; and (3) whether that fact create s a

genuine issue for trial . Byrd v. Hall , 847 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Tenn. 1993). “A disputed fact is material it if must be decided in order to resolv e the subs tantive c laim or defense at which the motion is directed.” Id . at 215. Summary judgment shall be denied if there is “any doubt w hether or not a genuine issue exists.” Id . at 211. Thus, a summary judgment should b e grantedonly when the undisputed facts reasonably support one conclusion - that

the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. McCall v. Wilder , 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995).

Mr. Bonner contends that the Department was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that the trial court misc onstrued

his argum

ent when it d etermined that he petitioned for a writ of certiorari regarding the 1989 extension in his RED. Instead, he asserts that hechallenged the 1986 and 1992 “illegal increases” in his RED. 7

A challenge to a disciplinary board dec ision is properly brought through a petition for common la

w writ of certiorari. Bishop v. Conley , 894 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). The tr ial cour

t constru ed Mr. Bon

ner’s pe tition as a challenge to the 3 0% exten sion for th e 198 9 disciplinary action, andconcluded that the petition was time barred. As the trial court found, Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-9-102 provides a sixty (60) day statute of limitations for such actions. Mr. Bonner’s petition was obviously filed y ear s after the 1989 determination of the disciplinary board. Consequently, the trial

court dis missed the

petition f or writ of cert iorari. To the extent Mr. Bonner’s petition can be construed as seek ing judicia

l review of the 198 9 disciplin ary find ing, we a gree it is time barred.8 Mr. Bonn er mentions “petitioning the departmen t for a declaratory order” in his brief; however hi s pet it ion

to the tr ial court

and the recor d before thi s cour t cont ain no ment ion of such a pe ti ti on. -8- The trial court also determined that the petition must be dismissedbecause Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-322, relied on by Petitioner, applied only to contested case proceedings under t h e Administrative Procedures Act (APA ). We ag ree tha t the statu te cited d id not provide Mr. Bonner witha mechanism for judicial review. However, a nother section o f the APA w as appro priate for Mr. Bonner’s claim. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-22 3. Mr. Bo nner maintains that his RED has been incorrectly

ca lc ul at ed . H e s pe ci fi ca ll y q uest ions the change reflected on the doc ument dated September

17, 1986, which appears to extend his RED without any explanation. He contends he has continua lly asked for an explanation and has recei ved none. The Department provided no explanation or other

response to this cla

im in the la

wsuit bef ore us. It is settled that an inmate may seek judicial r

eview of th e Ten nessee Department of Correction’s calc ulation of the prisoner’s sentence, including reduction credits, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-101 et seq , but that in

mate must first seek a declaratory order r egarding the sentence calculation from the De partment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5 -225(b) ; Watson v. Tennessee Dep’t of C orr. , 970 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see also J

ones , 1997 WL 367661, at *2 (the manner of calculation of prisoner ’s sentence, including credits, was subject to review by petition for declaratory judgment)

. The plain language of

Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225 requires a petitioner to seek a decla ratory order from the agency as a prerequisite to filing a petition for declaratory judgment with the court. Absent evidence that such an order was sought, the petition m ustbe dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Wa tson , 970 S.W.2d at 497. We find no indication that the petitioner ever soughta declaratory order from the Depa rtment regarding the calculation. 8 Thus, the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider the claimed “illegal increases” to Mr. Bonner’s RED. Regardle ss of whether the challenge is to the 1989 disciplinar y action or to the apparent changes to calculation of t he RED mad

e in 1986 a

nd 1992, w e must agr

ee with th

e tria l co urt’s dismissal of this action. S ee Basily v. Ra in, Inc. , 29 S.W.3d 879, 884 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“We may affirm a judgment upon different grounds than those relied on by the trial court when the trial court has reached the correct result.”).

III.

Mr

. Bonner’ s petition w as prompt ed by his c oncern o ver whe ther the Departm e nt ha s correctly calculated his release eligibi lity date, a matter of great importance to an incarce rated individua l. This concern was appare ntly cre ated by th

e Depar tment prov

iding him with docume

nts which reflect inconsistent calculations and appear to cha nge his RED without justifi c ation for the ch ange. His petition reflects frustration with his inability to get the Department to explain t hes e inconsiste ncies.-9-

Although, based on

the rec ord befo

re us, we have no r

eason to c onclu de that his RED has been incorrectly calc

ulated, t hat same record makes us s ympathet

ic to Mr. Bo nner’s f

rustrati o n. Thi s court h as previously discussed the problems caused by “the Depar tment’s preference for dilatory pleadings rath er than direct responses to [a prisoner petitioner’s] asse rtions.” Jones , 1997 WL 367 661, at *1. In Jones , we vac ated, fo r the sec ond time, a

grant of summary ju dgment to th e Department

in an action wherein the prisoner challenged the D epart ment ’s calculation of his sentence reduction credits. Theresult wa s requir ed beca use the r ecord di d not includ

e the spe cific information ne cess ary for a deter mination of

the issue s. The De

partmen t had prov

ided aff idavits which reached differ

ent results, and ne

ver off ered an explana tion of the

inconsiste

ncies. Commenting on the fact that the Department had provided results without providing the calculations themselve s, we state d, “this r esponse i s inadequ ate bec ause it does not e

nable the courts to review in any meaningful way how the Department arrived a t [its figure].” Id . at *7.

Jones involved sentence reducti on credi ts, the calculation of which involves a large number of variabl es. Such is not the case he rein, where est

ablishmen

t and exte nsion of a releas e eligibil

ity date, without reduction for earned senten ce c redits, is based on statute and documented admin istrative ac tion. Nonetheless, neither the trial court nor this court was provided with the Department’s explanation and re sult of its initial calculation of Mr. Bonner’s RED. Neither have
we been provided with an explanation of the inconsistencies ap pearing i n the var

ious docum

ents prepared by the Department

and given

to Mr. Bonner. If, as we sus pect, tho se inconsistencies were the result of

plain mis take, thatexplana tion is suff

icient. Mr . Bonner h as no righ t or legitimate expectationto any shorten ed RED calcul ation which does not comply with the law. While we cannot conclude that the time and ex

pense of this litigation could have been avoided by a thorough explanation of the various documents provi de d to Mr. Bonner, we suggest that the Department provide such an e

xplanati on if it hasnot previ ously done so. Mr. Bon

ner is not precluded f

rom seeking a declaratory order regarding his sentence calculation in the future.

IV.

We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Department of Correction. Thi s case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be nece ssary. Co sts are ta xed to the appella nt, Kenneth L. Bonner, for which execution may issue if nec essary.

___________________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE