[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corp., Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1625.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1625

CALDWELL, APPELLANT, v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, APPELLEE; OHIO 

BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, APPELLANT.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Caldwell v. Whirlpool Corp., Slip Opinion No. 

2024-Ohio-1625.]

Workers’ compensation—When a workers’ compensation claimant perfects an 

appeal under R.C. 4123.512, subsequent expiration of R.C. 4123.52’s fiveyear continuing-jurisdiction limit does not cause a claim pending in a court 

to expire as a matter of law—Judgment reversed and cause remanded to the 

trial court.

(No. 2023-0809—Submitted February 7, 2024—Decided May 1, 2024.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Marion County,

No. 9-22-61, 2023-Ohio-1530.

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KENNEDY, C.J.

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Third District 

Court of Appeals, we are tasked with clarifying the effect, or lack thereof, of the 

Industrial Commission’s statutory jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims 

on a party’sstatutory right to appeal a commission decision that determines whether

an employee can participate in the workers’ compensation fund.

{¶ 2} Appellant Brian Caldwell suffered a work-related injury while he was 

employed with appellee, Whirlpool Corporation. After a successful initial workers’ 

compensation claim, Caldwell sought coverage for additional conditions a few 

years later. In pursuing a claim for these additional conditions, Caldwell exhausted

his administrative hearings before the commission, to no avail. So he appealed to 

a court of common pleas under R.C. 4123.512. The trial court and the court of 

appeals, in granting and affirming summary judgment in favor of Whirlpool, 

determined that Caldwell’s claim had expired as a matter of law because a separate 

statute, R.C. 4123.52, limited the commission’s continuing jurisdiction to five years 

from the date of the last payment of compensation on Caldwell’s initial claim and 

that five years had passed.

{¶ 3} We come to a different conclusion. Based on the plain language of 

the relevant workers’ compensation statutes, we hold that when a workers’ 

compensation claimant perfects an appeal under R.C. 4123.512, the subsequent 

expiration of the commission’s five-year period of continuing jurisdiction under 

R.C. 4123.52 does not cause the claim that is pending in court to expire as a matter 

of law.

{¶ 4} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Third District and remand

the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
January Term, 2024

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I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Caldwell’s Workers’ Compensation Claims

{¶ 5} In 2015, Caldwell, who at the time was an employee of Whirlpool, 

was injured on the job. As a result, Caldwell filed a claim with appellant Bureau 

of Workers’ Compensation for permanent-partial-disability compensation for the 

condition of “right inguinal hernia.” A staff hearing officer of the Industrial 

Commission awarded Caldwell compensation. Whirlpool, a self-insured employer, 

made its last payment of compensation to Caldwell on January 11, 2017.

{¶ 6} In December 2019, Caldwell sought coverage for the additional 

conditions of “disc protrusions or bulges.” A series of administrative decisions 

denying Caldwell’s claim for the additional conditions culminated in the 

commission’s refusal to hear his appeal, thereby administratively denying Caldwell 

the right to participate in the workers’ compensation fund for the additional 

conditions.

B. The Trial-Court Proceedings

{¶ 7} Around two months after receiving the commission’s decision, 

Caldwell timely appealed from it by filing a complaint in the Marion County Court 

of Common Pleas. He named as defendants the statutorily required parties, i.e., his 

employer, Whirlpool; and Stephanie B. McCloud, who at the time was the 

administrator of the bureau. See R.C. 4123.512(B). The trial-court proceedings 

progressed, but on April 30, 2021, Caldwell voluntarily dismissed his action 

without prejudice under Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(a).

{¶ 8} Just under a year later, on April 20, 2022, Caldwell invoked R.C. 

2305.19, the saving statute, to revive his action and refile his appeal in the court of 

common pleas. Caldwell again named Whirlpool and McCloud as defendants and 

again challenged the commission’s decision and argued that he was entitled to 

participate in the workers’ compensation fund.
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{¶ 9} Whirlpool responded with three simultaneous filings: (1) an affidavit 

of Pamela Holland, the person responsible for managing Caldwell’s workers’

compensation claim, (2) a motion for summary judgment, and (3) an answer. 

Relying on Holland’s affidavit, which explained that Caldwell received his last 

compensation payment on January 11, 2017, Whirlpool’s answer and motion for 

summary judgment argued that Caldwell’s claim had expired as a matter of law on 

January 11, 2022, because R.C. 4123.52 limited the commission’s continuing 

jurisdiction over Caldwell’s claim to five years from the date of the last payment of 

compensation.

{¶ 10} Once briefing on the issue of summary judgment concluded, a 

magistrate decided in favor of Whirlpool. Caldwell objected to the magistrate’s 

decision, but the trial court found those objections unpersuasive and ultimately 

granted summary judgment to Whirlpool. The trial court based its decision on the 

continuing-jurisdiction time limit in R.C. 4123.52 and Chatfield v. Whirlpool 

Corp., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-21-20, 2021-Ohio-4365, a recent Third District 

opinion. According to the trial court, R.C. 4123.52’s five-year limit is a statute of 

limitations and Chatfield requires a plaintiff “to not only file but prevail within the 

five year limitation period.”

C. Caldwell’s Further Appeals

{¶ 11} Caldwell appealed to the Third District. The Third District agreed 

with the trial court and affirmed its judgment on the authority of Chatfield. It held 

that “pursuant to * * * Chatfield, Caldwell’s claim had expired by operation of law 

by January 11, 2022.” 2023-Ohio-1530, ¶ 13. It also rejected any notion that R.C. 

2305.19, the saving statute, had any effect on the case, since that statute “does not 

change the fact that this type of claim expires by operation of law after the fiveyears allotted under the conditions set forth in R.C. 4123.52.” Id. at ¶ 14. Caldwell 

appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction to consider two propositions of 

law:
January Term, 2024

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[1.] The five-year limitation under R.C. 4123.52 does not 

apply to an R.C. 4123.512 appeal.

[2.] The savings statute applies to an R.C. 4123.512 appeal 

and R.C. 4123.52 does not.

See 171 Ohio St.3d 1405, 2023-Ohio-2972, 215 N.E.3d 559. After we accepted 

jurisdiction, the bureau, which had not actively participated in most of this 

litigation, filed a motion to be realigned as an appellant, which this court granted,

see 171 Ohio St.3d 1509, 2023-Ohio-4016, 220 N.E.3d 839.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 12} This court’s review of cases involving a grant of summary judgment 

is de novo. Transtar Elec., Inc. v. A.E.M. Elec. Servs. Corp., 140 Ohio St.3d 193, 

2014-Ohio-3095, 16 N.E.3d 645, ¶ 8. A court may grant summary judgment to a 

party when “(1) [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; 

(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears 

from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and 

viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion 

for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.” Temple 

v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977), citing Civ.R. 

56(C).

{¶ 13} To resolve this case, we return to a familiar place: statutory 

interpretation. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we also review de 

novo. State ex rel. Natl. Lime & Stone Co. v. Marion Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 152 

Ohio St.3d 393, 2017-Ohio-8348, 97 N.E.3d 404, ¶ 14. “The intention of the 

legislature is to be collected from the words they employ.” United States v. 

Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95 (1820). Therefore, “[t]he question is not what did the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did 

enact.” Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 64 N.E. 574 (1902), paragraph two of 

the syllabus. So “[w]hen the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, and 

conveys a clear and definite meaning, we must rely on what the General Assembly 

has said,” Jones v. Action Coupling & Equip., Inc., 98 Ohio St.3d 330, 2003-Ohio1099, 784 N.E.2d 1172, ¶ 12, and apply it as written, Summerville v. Forest Park, 

128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18.

B. Relevant Workers’ Compensation Statutes and Caselaw

{¶ 14} We ultimately conclude that the statutory time limit on the 

commission’s continuing jurisdiction did not cause Caldwell’s claim to expire as a 

matter of law. But before we explain why, an examination of the relevant law is in 

order.

1. Relevant Workers’ Compensation Statutes

{¶ 15} We begin with a brief overview of three relevant workers’ 

compensation statutes.

a. The administrative process for workers’ compensation claims

{¶ 16} First we look at R.C. 4123.511, which outlines the administrative 

procedure for workers’ compensation claims. If a claim is denied, a claimant may 

pursue a multistep administrative-appeal process that culminates with an appeal to 

the Industrial Commission. R.C. 4123.511(E). In those situations, the commission 

determines whether it will hear the appeal. Id. If the commission declines to hear 

the appeal, it issues an order to that effect. Id. Aside from some exceptions not 

relevant here, a party may appeal such an order to a “court pursuant to [R.C. 

4123.512] within sixty days after receipt of the order, subject to the limitations 

contained in that section.” Id.

b. Appeals to a trial court

{¶ 17} And so R.C. 4123.512 is the second relevant statute here. A party’s 

filing of a notice of appeal (of a commission order declining to hear an appeal of a 
January Term, 2024

7

claim denial) within 60 days in the appropriate court of common pleas “is the only 

act required to perfect the appeal.” R.C. 4123.512(A). The primary issue for the 

common pleas court to decide is whether the claimant has the right to participate or 

continue to participate in the workers’ compensation fund. See R.C. 4123.512(F) 

and (G). If the court or a jury finds that the claimant has a right to participate in the 

fund, “the commission and the [bureau] administrator shall thereafter proceed in 

the matter of the claim as if the judgment were the decision of the commission, 

subject to the power of modification provided by [R.C. 4123.52].” R.C. 

4123.512(G).

c. The Industrial Commission’s continuing jurisdiction

{¶ 18} This brings us to the third relevant statute, R.C. 4123.52, which

outlines the commission’s continuing jurisdiction over workers’ compensation 

cases. R.C. 4123.52(A). As part of that continuing jurisdiction provided for in 

R.C. 4123.52(A), the commission is allowed to make subsequent modifications or 

changes to its former findings and orders. In cases in which a claimant has received 

compensation from an initial successful claim and seeks additional compensation, 

any “modification, change, finding, or award shall be made within five years from 

the date of the last payment of compensation.” Id. As a brief aside, this quoted 

language comes from the version of R.C. 4123.52(A) that was in effect at the time 

Caldwell filed for additional compensation, see 2011 Sub.H.B. No. 123, but 

regardless, we note that subsequent amendments to that statute have not altered the 

language relevant to our discussion. Therefore, R.C. 4123.52(A) provides the 

commission with five years of continuing jurisdiction over cases.

2. Relevant Caselaw

{¶ 19} Our caselaw addressing a prior version of R.C. 4123.512 is helpful 

to our analysis here. In Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Mayfield, 11 Ohio St.3d 

70, 464 N.E.2d 133 (1984), we discussed workers’ compensation appeals under 

former R.C. 4123.519, which was renumbered as R.C. 4123.512 in 1993, 
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Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2990, 3153 (effective Oct. 20, 

1993). We explained that when a workers’ compensation claimant files a notice of 

appeal in a court of common pleas, jurisdiction over the claim vests in that court. 

Youghiogheny at 71. A few years later, we confirmed that a timely notice of appeal 

satisfies R.C. 4123.519’s (now R.C. 4123.512’s) jurisdictional requirements. 

Fisher v. Mayfield, 30 Ohio St.3d 8, 505 N.E.2d 975 (1987), paragraph one of the 

syllabus.

C. Caldwell’s Court Action Did Not Expire as a Matter of Law

{¶ 20} The answer to the issue presented here is a straightforward one—

Caldwell’s pending action in the trial court did not expire as a matter of law when 

the case passed the five-year mark established in R.C. 4123.52. We come to this 

conclusion for several reasons.

{¶ 21} For starters, R.C. 4123.52 does not have any impact on workers’ 

compensation appeals in courts. That statute is concerned solely with the 

commission’s continuing jurisdiction over workers’ compensation cases. There is 

no dispute that Caldwell’s claim for additional compensation in 2019 and the R.C. 

4123.511 administrative proceedings that followed were well within the 

commission’s continuing jurisdiction. And the dictates of R.C. 4123.52 do not 

reach beyond those administrative proceedings.

{¶ 22} R.C. 4123.512, on the other hand, governed Caldwell’s court case. 

That statute took the baton from Caldwell’s administrative efforts, which were

regulated by R.C. 4123.511 and 4123.52, and passed it to the judiciary for a fresh 

review in the form of a trial de novo. See Ferguson v. State, 151 Ohio St.3d 265, 

2017-Ohio-7844, 87 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 11 (explaining that a court handles an R.C. 

4123.512 appeal as a trial de novo); see also Lincoln Properties, Inc. v. Goldslager, 

18 Ohio St.2d 154, 159, 248 N.E.2d 57 (1969) (explaining that a trial de novo 

essentially treats a case as if it were a new action—one that had not been tried 

below). And Caldwell’s timely notice of appeal vested the trial court with 
January Term, 2024

9

jurisdiction over Caldwell’s claim. See R.C. 4123.512(A); Youghiogheny, 11 Ohio 

St.3d at 71, 464 N.E.2d 133; Fisher, 30 Ohio St.3d 8, 505 N.E.2d 975, paragraph 

one of the syllabus. Therefore, Caldwell’s properly filed case proceeded in the trial 

court under R.C. 4123.512, and R.C. 4123.52, which covers only administrative 

matters, could not intrude on that judicial action.

{¶ 23} It makes sense to focus on only R.C. 4123.512 when determining the 

viability of a workers’ compensation appeal to a court, since the General Assembly 

instructed that such an action is “subject to the limitations contained in [R.C. 

4123.512],” and not any other section. R.C. 4123.511(E). Therefore, any other 

alleged limitations, such as R.C. 4123.52’s five-year limitation, did not apply to

Caldwell’s appeal pending in court.

{¶ 24} Division (G) of R.C. 4123.512 further supports our conclusion. That 

division provides that when a claimant is successful in court, the commission and 

bureau must “proceed in the matter of the claim as if the judgment were the decision 

of the commission, subject to the power of modification provided by [R.C. 

4123.52].” R.C. 4123.512(G). The phrase beginning with “as if” in essence rights 

a wrong by allowing a claimant to participate in the fund for a condition for which 

he had previously been denied the right to participate. And the phrase beginning 

with “subject to” ensures that the commission can utilize its power to modify as set 

forth in R.C. 4123.52. In a nutshell, R.C. 4123.512(G) provides a successful 

claimant in court with the next steps in the workers’ compensation process by 

requiring the commission and bureau to allow the claimant to participate in the 

workers’ compensation fund for an additional condition while also permitting the

commission to make future modifications of the orders.

{¶ 25} Based on the foregoing, we hold that the expiration of R.C. 

4123.52’s five-year continuing-jurisdiction limit did not cause Caldwell’s claim 

pending in common pleas court to expire as a matter of law, and therefore, the lower 
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courts’ finding of summary judgment in favor of Whirlpool on that basis was 

improper.

D. The Saving Statute Is Irrelevant

{¶ 26} Finally, R.C. 2305.19, the saving statute, is irrelevant to this case. It 

is undisputed that Caldwell properly utilized the saving statute, and we have long

recognized that the saving statute applies to R.C. 4123.512 appeals, Lewis v. 

Connor, 21 Ohio St.3d 1, 487 N.E.2d 285 (1985), syllabus (citing former R.C. 

4123.519, which was subsequently renumbered as R.C. 4123.512). Because our 

resolution of Caldwell’s first proposition of law decides this case, and because the 

saving statute does not affect our decision, we need not address Caldwell’s second 

proposition of law.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 27} Caldwell did all that was required of him under R.C. 4123.512 to 

have his day in court. R.C. 4123.52, the statute that establishes the continuing 

jurisdiction of the commission, in no way affects R.C. 4123.512 court proceedings 

once they have been properly initiated. So, following the plain language of the 

workers’ compensation statutes, we hold that when a workers’ compensation 

claimant perfects an appeal under R.C. 4123.512, the subsequent expiration of R.C. 

4123.52’s five-year continuing-jurisdiction limit does not cause a claim that is 

pending in a court to expire as a matter of law.

{¶ 28} Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Third District Court of 

Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Judgment reversed

and cause remanded to the trial court.

FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., 

concur.

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January Term, 2024

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Philip J. Fulton Law Office and Chelsea F. Rubin, for appellant Brian 

Caldwell.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, T. Elliot Gaiser, Solicitor General, Michael 

J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor General, Stephen P. Carney and Mathura J. 

Sridharan, Deputy Solicitors General, and Natalie J. Tackett, Principal Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellant Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.

Bugbee & Conkle, L.L.P., Mark S. Barnes, and Robert L. Solt IV, for 

appellee.

Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin, Michael J. Hickey, and John 

D. Hance IV, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Chamber of Commerce.

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