[Cite as Ross v. Hornack, 2013-Ohio-1901.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

No. 98961

KAREN ROSS 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

WILLIAM HORNACK, JR.

 DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Probate Division 

Case No. 2012 ADV 179487 

BEFORE: Stewart, A.J., Celebrezze, J., and Rocco, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 9, 2013 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Joseph J. Corso 

Joseph M. Percio 

19111 Detroit Road, Suite 302 

Rocky River, OH 44116 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 

Dean M. Boland 

Boland Legal, L.L.C. 

1475 Warren Road, Unit 770724 

Lakewood, OH 44107 
MELODY J. STEWART, A.J.:

{¶1} This case came to be heard upon the accelerated calendar pursuant to App.R. 

11.1 and Loc.R. 11.1, the record from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and 

the brief and oral argument of appellant’s counsel. 

{¶2} Decedent Marian Hornack’s will left her entire estate to her son, William 

Hornack, by specifically disinheriting her daughter, Karen Ross. When Hornack sought 

to have the estate relieved of administration on grounds that it did not exceed $35,000 in 

value, Ross responded by filing three separate actions in the probate division: a will 

contest; a complaint for concealment of estate assets; and a complaint against Hornack for 

intentional interference with her expectancy of inheritance. Hornack filed a motion to 

dismiss the interference with expectancy of inheritance claim on ripeness grounds, 

arguing that it would be premature to address that claim until the court determined the 

validity of the will. The court granted the motion to dismiss, but on different grounds, 

finding that it lacked plenary jurisdiction to hear a claim for intentional interference with 

an expected inheritance. Ross’s sole assignment of error contests this conclusion. 

{¶3} The court did not err by dismissing the interference with expectancy of 

inheritance complaint. It correctly concluded that it had no statutory authority to hear 

that complaint, nor did its plenary jurisdiction extend to encompass that claim. See Roll 

v. Edwards, 156 Ohio App.3d 227, 2004-Ohio-767, 805 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.); 
Hoopes v. Hoopes, 5th Dist. No. 2006 CA 00220, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 1582 (Apr. 9, 

2007). In any event, we agree in principle with Hornack’s argument that resolution of 

the will contest is a necessary predicate to the interference claim — if the will is declared 

valid, Ross cannot establish the essential element of that tort by showing that her 

inheritance would have been realized but for the alleged interference by Hornack. Roll, 

supra, at ¶ 31. 

{¶4} Moreover, although appellant’s counsel argues that the current version of 

R.C. 2101.24, the statute setting forth jurisdiction of the probate court, does give the court 

authority to hear the interference claim, we note that the current version of R.C. 

2101.24(B)(1)(c) was not in effect at the time Ross filed her action. The complaint was 

filed June 8, 2012, so the version of R.C. 2101.24 in effect at that time was 2011 Ohio 

S.B. 117, effective Mar. 22, 2012. That version does not contain the language used in 

the current version of R.C. 2101.24 (2012 H.B. 479, effective Mar. 27, 2013). Inasmuch 

as the probate court is a creature of statute and only has the jurisdiction specifically 

conferred on it by statute, Corron v. Corron, 40 Ohio St.3d 75, 531 N.E.2d 708 (1988), 

paragraph one of the syllabus, the version of R.C. 2101.24 in effect at the time Ross filed 

her complaint controlled the probate court’s jurisdiction. Nothing in the statute granted 

the court authority to determine an interference with inheritance claim. 

{¶5} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant his costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Cuyahoga 

County Court of Common Pleas — Probate Division to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

 

MELODY J. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., and 

KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR