UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

CEMONE ANTENETTE BYNUM 

Plaintiff, 

 

v. 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 16-cv-1904 (EGS) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Plaintiff Cemone Antenette Bynum (“Ms. Bynum”), an AfricanAmerican woman and employee of the District of Columbia’s 

Department of Behavioral Health (“DBH”), brings this lawsuit 

against the District of Columbia (the “District”) and DBH under 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 

1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., claiming that she was 

harassed and retaliated against for reporting her male 

colleague’s behavior. Ms. Bynum also alleges that DBH unlawfully 

refused to accommodate her disabilities by denying her requests 

to transfer to an appropriate program area. 

 Pending before the Court are Ms. Bynum’s objections to 

Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather’s Report and 

Recommendation (“R & R”), which recommends that this Court 

dismiss without prejudice Counts II and IV of the First Amended 
2 

Complaint. See R & R, ECF No. 20 at 13.1 Raising no objections to 

the R & R, the District asks this Court to adopt the R & R in 

its entirety. Upon careful consideration of the R & R, 

Ms. Bynum’s objections, the District’s response, and the 

relevant law, the Court concludes that Ms. Bynum sufficiently 

alleges a retaliation claim under Title VII (Count II), and 

Ms. Bynum plausibly states a hostile work environment claim 

under Title VII (Count IV). Therefore, the Court ADOPTS IN PART

and REJECTS IN PART the R & R, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 

the District’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, and DISMISSES WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE Ms. Bynum’s retaliation claim under the ADA. Because 

DBH is a non sui juris entity that lacks the capacity to sue or 

be sued, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Ms. Bynum’s claims 

against DBH. 

I. Background 

The factual background and procedural history in this case 

are set forth in the R & R. See R & R, ECF No. 20 at 2-4.2 To 

briefly summarize, in 2005, the District hired Ms. Bynum, an 

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the 

Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the 

filed document. 

2 The Court accepts as true the allegations in the operative 

complaint for purposes of deciding this motion, and construes 

them in Ms. Bynum’s favor. See Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 

169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Ms. Bynum does not object to 

Magistrate Judge Meriweather’s recitation of the alleged facts. 

See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 22 at 1-3. 
3 

African-American female, as DBH’s Data Management Specialist. 

First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 14 at 3 ¶ 6, 4 ¶¶ 19-20. She 

later assumed a new role. Id. at 4 ¶ 21. At all relevant times, 

Ms. Bynum was employed at DBH as a Project and Data Management 

Specialist. Id. Ms. Bynum was diagnosed with anxiety disorder 

and major depression disorder in 2011, and then post-traumatic 

stress disorder in 2014. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 8-10. DBH was aware of 

Ms. Bynum’s disabilities. Id. at 3 ¶ 13. 

Between 2012 and 2015, Ms. Bynum filed complaints against 

her employer with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(“EEOC”), the District’s Office of Human Rights (“OHR”), and 

DBH’s manager of equal employment opportunity (“EEO”), alleging 

age and racial discrimination. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 24-27. The parties 

settled her EEOC complaint alleging age discrimination in 2012, 

and OHR rendered its decision in 2015 regarding Ms. Bynum’s 

racial discrimination complaint. Id. at 4 ¶ 25. Following those 

events, DBH isolated Ms. Bynum, excluded her from team projects, 

denied her opportunities to work on assignments, and refused to 

promote her several times. Id. at 4-5 ¶¶ 29-32. 

While at work on Tuesday, March 29, 2016, Ms. Bynum and 

approximately five other individuals attended a meeting for 

DBH’s Mental Health Statistics Improvement Program. Id. at 5 ¶¶ 

33, 35. At some point, Ms. Bynum, her supervisor, and her male 

colleague were the remaining three attendees in the meeting. Id. 
4 

at 5 ¶¶ 35, 37, 40. The male colleague, Colin Billett 

(“Mr. Billett”), was responsible for reviewing and approving 

invoices that were submitted by contractors to DBH. Id. at 5 ¶ 

39.3 After Ms. Bynum explained to Mr. Billett that certain 

invoices he had submitted were improperly filled out, id. at 5 ¶ 

41, “[Mr.] Billett suddenly bolted out of his chair, causing his 

chair to violently hit the wall behind him,” id. at 5 ¶ 43, and 

he “stood over [Ms. Bynum], pointed his finger at her, and 

shouted ‘I’m sick of you,’” id. at 5 ¶ 44. Mr. Billett also 

shouted that “you are immature, you are childish, and stupid,” 

id. at 5 ¶ 45, and “you need to go back to the South where you 

came from,” id. at 5 ¶ 46. 

Mr. Billett repeated those “epithets several times” during 

the incident, id. at 5 ¶ 47, and he started to approach 

Ms. Bynum as she was sitting in her chair before he began pacing 

back and forth around the room, id. at 5-6 ¶¶ 48-50. Ms. Bynum’s 

supervisor, Dr. Denise Wright, Ph.D., did not intervene in the 

incident, which lasted more than ten minutes, and Dr. Wright 

instructed Ms. Bynum to refrain from calling the police. Id. at 

6 ¶¶ 54-55, 58. Another employee entered the room and removed 

3 As noted in the R & R, the FAC refers to Ms. Bynum’s male 

colleague as “Colin Bissett” and “Colin Billett.” R & R, ECF No. 

20 at 2 n.2; see also FAC, ECF No. 14 at 5 ¶¶ 37, 40. The Court 

assumes that “Colin Billett” is the correct spelling of 

Ms. Bynum’s male colleague because Ms. Bynum’s objections refer 

to him as “Colin Billett.” Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 22 at 1. 
5 

Mr. Billett. Id. at 6 ¶ 56. Ms. Bynum feared for her safety, 

suffering a panic attack and emotional distress as a result of 

the incident. Id. at 6 ¶¶ 51-53. On or about March 29, 2016, 

Ms. Bynum reported Mr. Billett’s “assault” to her supervisor. 

Id. at 10 ¶ 104. Ms. Bynum also submitted an incident report, 

sought medical assistance, and returned to work on May 9, 2016. 

Id. at 6 ¶¶ 59, 61, 63. 

When she returned to work, Ms. Bynum felt threatened by 

Mr. Billett’s presence near her workspace, id. at 6 ¶ 67, and 

she reported to DBH the issue of Mr. Billett’s “unnecessary 

contact” with her, id. at 6 ¶ 68. DBH denied her requests to 

transfer to an appropriate program area to avoid Mr. Billett. 

Id. at 7 ¶ 70. DBH refused to order Mr. Billett to not harass, 

intimidate, or annoy Ms. Bynum. Id. at 7 ¶ 69. Without a 

“business or employer related purpose,” id. at 7 ¶ 76, 

Mr. Billett continued to approach Ms. Bynum’s workspace, id. at 

7 ¶ 78. 

On or about May 9, 2016, DBH issued a “Letter of Warning” 

to Ms. Bynum, which was signed by Dr. Wright, stating that: 

(1) Ms. Bynum’s conduct on the day of the incident failed to 

comply with professional standards of conduct for the District’s 

employees, id. at 7 ¶ 80; (2) Ms. Bynum violated DBH’s workplace 

violence prevention and response policy that prohibits 

“assaultive, intimidating, or harassing behavior in the 
6 

workplace,” id. at 7 ¶ 81; and (3) failure to comply with the 

warning could result in disciplinary action, including 

suspension or dismissal, id. at 8 ¶ 87. The letter, however, did 

not include Ms. Bynum’s alleged wrongdoing. Id. at 8 ¶ 84. 

Based on these events, Ms. Bynum filed a charge of 

discrimination against the District and DBH with the EEOC on May 

9, 2016. Id. at 8 ¶ 92. On September 26, 2016, Ms. Bynum brought 

Title VII and ADA claims against the District and DBH in this 

Court. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. On August 8, 2017, this 

Court denied as moot the District’s motion to dismiss the 

initial complaint in light of Ms. Bynum’s First Amended 

Complaint, and granted DBH’s motion to dismiss in view of 

Ms. Bynum’s lack of opposition. Min. Orders of Aug. 8, 2017. 

Ms. Bynum’s First Amended Complaint asserts four claims against 

the District and DBH: (1) denial of reasonable accommodation in 

violation of ADA (“Count I”); (2) retaliation in violation of 

Title VII (“Count II”); (3) retaliation in violation of Title 

VII (“Count III”); and (4) harassment in violation of Title VII 

(“Count IV”). FAC, ECF No. 14 at 9-14 ¶¶ 95-151. 

On August 17, 2017, the District moved to dismiss Counts II 

and IV of the operative complaint. See Def.’s Partial Mot. to 

Dismiss, ECF No. 15. Ms. Bynum filed her opposition brief, see

Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 17, and the District filed its reply brief, 

see Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 19. Magistrate Judge Meriweather, 
7 

having been referred the District’s motion and this case for 

full case management, issued the R & R on January 26, 2018. See 

R & R, ECF No. 20; see also Min. Order of Aug. 8, 2017. 

Ms. Bynum submitted objections to the R & R, and the District 

responded to her objections. The objections are ripe and ready 

for the Court’s adjudication. 

II. Standard of Review 

A. Objections to a Magistrate Judge’s R & R 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), a party 

may file specific written objections once a magistrate judge has 

entered a recommended disposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1)-(2). 

A district court “may accept, reject or modify the recommended 

disposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge.”). A district court “must 

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition 

that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 

“If, however, the party makes only conclusory or general 

objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the 

Court reviews the [R & R] only for clear error.” Houlahan v. 

Brown, 979 F. Supp. 2d 86, 88 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted). 

Proper objections “shall specifically identify the portions 

of the proposed findings and recommendations to which objection 
8 

is made and the basis for objection.” LCvR 72.3(b). 

“[O]bjections which merely rehash an argument presented to and 

considered by the magistrate judge are not ‘properly objected 

to’ and are therefore not entitled to de novo review.” Shurtleff 

v. EPA, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Morgan v. 

Astrue, No. 08-2133, 2009 WL 3541001, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 

2009)). 

B. Motion to Dismiss 

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal 

sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint.” Herron v. Fannie Mae, 

861 F.3d 160, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2017). “[T]he complaint is 

construed liberally in the plaintiffs’ favor, and [courts] grant 

plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that can be derived 

from the facts alleged.” Kowal v. MCI Comm’cns Corp., 16 F.3d 

1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). However, the court is “not bound to 

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 

A complaint survives a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) only if 

it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially 

plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is 
9 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint alleging 

facts that are “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability 

. . . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and 

plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557). 

III. Analysis 

The District advances two primary arguments for dismissal 

of the retaliation claim (Count II) and the hostile work 

environment claim (Count IV). See Def.’s Mem. of P. & A. in 

Supp. of Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 

15 at 5-7. First, Ms. Bynum fails to state a retaliation claim 

because her report to her supervisor about Mr. Billett’s alleged 

“assault” does not constitute protected activity under Title 

VII, and “nothing in the Amended Complaint shows that the 

alleged assault was linked to [Ms. Bynum’s] membership in a 

protected class.” Id. at 6. Next, Ms. Bynum fails to state a 

claim for harassment because she does not allege sufficient 

facts that link the alleged harassment to her membership in a 

protected class. Id. at 7. For the reasons explained below, the 

Court rejects the recommendations in the R & R to dismiss the 

retaliation and hostile work environment claims under Title VII. 

Before turning to Ms. Bynum’s objections to the 

recommendations in the R & R, the Court first addresses the 

issue of whether DBH is a proper defendant in this case. 
10 

A. DBH Lacks the Capacity to Sue or Be Sued 

Ms. Bynum sued both DBH and the District. Compl., ECF No. 1 

at 3 ¶ 14. DBH moved to dismiss the department as a defendant on 

the ground that DBH is non sui juris. See Def.’s Mot. to 

Dismiss, ECF No. 7 at 1; see also Non Sui Juris, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (Latin for “not of one’s own right”). 

Because Ms. Bynum did not oppose the dismissal of DBH as a 

party, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 9 at 1, this Court granted DBH’s 

motion, Min. Order of Aug. 8, 2018. Nonetheless, Ms. Bynum named 

the District and DBH as defendants in the First Amended 

Complaint. See FAC, ECF No. 14 at 3 ¶ 15 (“Defendant [DBH] is an 

agency/subsidiary/division of the government of the District of 

Columbia.”). The District argues—and Ms. Bynum does not dispute—

that DBH is not a proper defendant. See, e.g., Def.’s Mem., ECF 

No. 15 at 3 n.2; Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 17 at 1-11; Pl.’s Objs., 

ECF No. 22 at 3. The Court agrees. 

DBH is a department of the District. See D.C. Code § 7-

1141.02(a). “[I]t is well-settled that a department or agency of 

the District of Columbia cannot sue or be sued in its own name 

in the absence of a statutory provision to that effect.” 

Whitehead v. D.C. Child Support Servs. Div., 892 F. Supp. 2d 

315, 319 (D.D.C. 2012); accord Hunt v. District of Columbia, 

No. 02-7044, 2002 WL 1997987, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 

2002) (per curiam) (“The district court correctly concluded that 
11 

appellee Metropolitan Police Department is non sui juris.”). The 

Court therefore finds that DBH is a non sui juris entity that 

cannot be sued in its own name. The District is the only proper 

defendant in this case. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH 

PREJUDICE DBH as a defendant. 

B. Retaliation Claim 

The Court next considers Ms. Bynum’s objections to the 

R & R, which recommends that her retaliation claim be dismissed 

on the ground that she fails to allege facts establishing or 

supporting an inference that her incident report about 

Mr. Billett’s conduct concerned discrimination based on her 

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See R & R, ECF 

No. 20 at 8; see also Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 22 at 6-9. 

Title VII “both prohibits employers from engaging in 

employment practices that discriminate on the basis of race, see

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a), and bars them from retaliating against 

an employee ‘because [she] has opposed any [such] practice,’ id.

§ 2000e–3(a).” Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 

68 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “To establish a prima 

facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) that [she] 

engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that [she] 

suffered a materially adverse action by [her] employer; and 

(3) that a causal link connects the two.” Cruz v. McAleenan, 931 

F.3d 1186, 1193–94 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citation and internal 
12 

quotation marks omitted). “[A] plaintiff need not plead each 

element of [her] prima facie retaliation case to survive a 

motion to dismiss.” Jackson v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., No. 

CV 18-1978 (ABJ), 2019 WL 3502389, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2019).

As noted in the R & R, the District does not dispute that 

Ms. Bynum has sufficiently alleged facts for the last two 

elements of her retaliation claim. R & R, ECF No. 20 at 6 n.4. 

The District concedes that Ms. Bynum alleges sufficient facts to 

show that DBH took a materially adverse action against Ms. Bynum 

when she complained to her supervisor about Mr. Billett’s 

conduct. See, e.g., id.; Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 22 at 6; Def.’s 

Resp. to Pl.’s Objs. (“Def.’s Resp.”), ECF No. 24 at 2-3. 

Indeed, DBH “issued [Ms. Bynum] a reprimand and a warning 

letter” after she reported Mr. Billett’s conduct to her 

supervisor. FAC, ECF No. 14 at 10 ¶ 106. And DBH “threatened 

[Ms. Bynum] with sanctions including termination without 

informing [her] of the alleged infractions,” id. at 10-11 ¶ 114, 

causing her “unwarranted stress and harm,” id. at 11 ¶ 118. The 

remaining issue is whether Ms. Bynum has alleged enough facts to 

demonstrate the first element of her retaliation claim. 

1. Ms. Bynum Has Pled Sufficient Facts That She 

Engaged in Protected Activity Under Title VII 

Ms. Bynum alleges that, on the day of the incident at 

issue, Mr. Billett stood over her, pointed his finger at her, 
13 

and shouted comments directed at her. See id. at 5 ¶¶ 43-46. 

Specifically, Mr. Billett shouted: (1) “I’m sick of you,” id. at 

5 ¶ 44; (2) “you are immature, you are childish, and stupid,” 

id. at 5 ¶ 45; and (3) “you need to go back to the South where 

you came from,” id. at 5 ¶ 46 (emphasis added). Ms. Bynum 

further alleges that “[Mr.] Billett repeated these epithets 

several times.” Id. at 5 ¶ 47 (emphasis added). Mr. Billett made 

these “epithets” in the presence of Ms. Bynum’s supervisor. See 

id. at 5 ¶¶ 40-48, 6 ¶¶ 49-55, 11 ¶ 116. Dr. Wright did nothing, 

id. at 6 ¶ 55, 10 ¶ 111, and Ms. Bynum remained in her chair 

during the incident, id. at 6 ¶ 50. At some point, Ms. Bynum 

submitted an incident report, id. at 6 ¶ 59, and she “reported 

the assault by Mr. Billett against her to her supervisor,” id. 

at 10 ¶ 104. According to Ms. Bynum, her “action in reporting 

the attack on her by [Mr.] Billet[t] was a protected activity 

under Title VII and the ADA,” id. at 10 ¶ 105, and “[b]ut for 

[Ms. Bynum’s] above-referenced protected activity of filing 

complaints for alleged discrimination, [DBH] would not have 

retaliated against [her],” id. at 11 ¶ 121. 

The District argues that Ms. Bynum’s incident report does 

not qualify as “protected activity” under Title VII because 

Ms. Bynum fails to link Mr. Billett’s alleged assault to her 

membership in a protected class, and Ms. Bynum cannot show that 

she was “opposing or making a charge of discrimination in 
14 

violation of Title VII.” Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 15 at 6; see also 

Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 19 at 1-2. It is undisputed that 

Ms. Bynum, an African-American woman, is a member of two 

protected classes. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 17 at 10; 

Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 19 at 1-3. The R & R states that Ms. Bynum 

“suggests that the Court should infer that she engaged in 

protected activity simply because she is an African American 

woman.” R & R, ECF No. 20 at 8. Ms. Bynum argues that “the 

threshold for oppositional conduct is not onerous” under Title 

VII, Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 17 at 10; and she points to her 

“previous Title VII claim against her employer,” id. 

Magistrate Judge Meriweather articulated three reasons for 

why Ms. Bynum has failed to plead sufficient facts that she 

engaged in protected activity. R & R, ECF No. 20 at 8-9. First, 

“Ms. Bynum has failed to allege facts that establish or support 

an inference that her report regarding the incident with 

Mr. Billett concerned discrimination on the basis of her race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. at 8. Next, 

Ms. Bynum “does not claim to have believed that Mr. Billett’s 

conduct was discriminatory,” id. (citing FAC, ECF No. 14 at 6 ¶ 

59), and she does not “allege any facts attributing 

Mr. Billett’s conduct to her membership in a protected class in 

Count II or elsewhere in the complaint,” id. Finally, Ms. Bynum 

“does not contend that [her] past complaints [of discrimination] 
15 

played any role in DBH’s decision to issue her the reprimand or 

letter of warning.” Id. (citing Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 17 at 10; 

FAC, ECF No. 14 at 4 ¶¶ 24-27, 7-8 ¶¶ 79-90). Magistrate Judge 

Meriweather recommends that this Court dismiss without prejudice 

the retaliation claim under Title VII in Count II. Id. at 8-9, 

13.4 

Ms. Bynum specifically objects to the R & R’s findings 

that: (1) she fails to allege sufficient facts that support an 

inference that her incident report regarding Mr. Billett’s 

conduct concerned discrimination; and (2) she fails to allege 

her belief that Mr. Billet’s conduct was discriminatory. Pl.’s 

Objs., ECF No. 22 at 8-9. The Court will address each objection 

in turn. 

4 Magistrate Judge Meriweather found that Ms. Bynum failed to 

state a plausible retaliation claim under the ADA because the 

FAC “lacks any allegations indicating or supporting an inference 

that her complaint about Mr. Billet[t]’s conduct constituted 

protected activity under the ADA.” R & R, ECF No. 20 at 10; see 

also FAC, ECF No. 14 at 9-10 ¶¶ 102-122. Neither party objects 

to these findings, see, e.g., Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 22 at 6-9; 

Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 24 at 2 n.1, and this Court agrees that 

Count II should be dismissed without prejudice to the extent 

Ms. Bynum asserts an ADA retaliation claim. Having found no 

clear error in this portion of the R & R, the Court therefore 

ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Meriweather’s recommendation, and 

DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Ms. Bynum’s ADA retaliation claim in 

Count II. 
16 

a. The Court Reasonably Infers from 

Mr. Billett’s Alleged Epithets That 

Ms. Bynum’s Incident Report Constitutes 

Protected Activity 

Ms. Bynum has alleged sufficient facts for the Court to 

reasonably infer that DBH retaliated against her because she 

engaged in statutorily protected activity. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Ms. Bynum argues—and 

the Court agrees—that this Court can draw a reasonable inference 

that Mr. Billett’s comment—“you need to go back to the South 

where you came from,” FAC, ECF No. 14 at 5 ¶ 46—was a “racially 

tinged” comment given the historical context of the phrase. 

Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 22 at 8. Ms. Bynum refers to the peculiar 

institution of slavery that stains our nation’s history and the 

well-documented plight of African-Americans in migrating from 

the Jim Crow South to Northern cities in hopes of a better life. 

Id. at 6-8. Ms. Bynum argues that “the cat call ‘go back to the 

South’ is a racially tinged slur that conjures images of pitiful 

African American refugees forced out of the South,” id. at 8, 

and “the term ‘South’ is a thinly veiled reference to ignorant, 

poor African Americans who are also referred to as ‘Field 

Nig[**]s,’” id. at 6-7. 

The District responds that Ms. Bynum’s objections are 

“riddled with histrionics and irrelevant facts that are 

unsupported by the record.” Def.’s Resp., ECF No. 24 at 2. The 
17 

District contends that Mr. Billett’s phrase—“go back to the 

South where you came from”—cannot save Ms. Bynum’s retaliation 

claim because it is not included in Count II, and Ms. Bynum did 

not raise that argument in her opposition brief. Id. at 3. And 

the District argues that Ms. Bynum fails to allege that 

Mr. Billett’s “comment was related to her membership in a 

protected class or that she complained about it.” Id.; see also

Def.’s Mem., ECF No. 15 at 6. 

But Count II “adopts and incorporates all of the forgoing 

allegations into [the Title VII retaliation] claim,” FAC, ECF 

No. 14 at 9 ¶ 102, including the allegations in the “Facts 

Common to All Claims” section, see id. at 3-8 ¶¶ 19-94, 9-11 ¶¶ 

102-122. At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must construe 

the operative complaint liberally in Ms. Bynum’s favor, view the 

factual allegations therein as a whole, accept them as true, and 

grant her the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from 

the alleged facts. See Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. Contrary to the 

District’s assertion, Ms. Bynum’s position is supported by 

Supreme Court precedent. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 

454, 456 (2006) (per curiam) (explaining that a white manager’s 

use of the word “boy” to refer to African-American employees can 

be evidence of racial animus). 

 In Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., two African-American men 

worked as superintendents at a poultry plant, and they sought 
18 

promotions. Id. at 455. The white plant manager selected two 

white males for the vacancies. Id. The petitioners asserted, 

inter alia, Title VII claims, alleging that the defendantcorporation discriminated against them based on their race. Id. 

The Supreme Court noted that “there was evidence that [the] 

plant manager, who made the disputed hiring decisions, had 

referred on some occasions to each of the petitioners as ‘boy.’” 

Id. at 456. The petitioners argued that the use of “boy” was 

evidence of discriminatory animus. Id. In holding that the use 

of the term “boy” may give rise to an inference of racial animus 

under certain circumstances, the Supreme Court reasoned that 

“[a]lthough it is true the disputed word will not always be 

evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term, 

standing alone, is always benign. The speaker’s meaning may 

depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone of 

voice, local custom, and historical usage.” Id. 

Here, Mr. Billett made a series of comments to Ms. Bynum, 

an African-American woman, and she alleges that “[Mr.] Billett 

repeated [those] epithets several times,” id. at 5 ¶ 47 

(emphasis added). It is plausible that Mr. Billett’s use of the 

phrase “you need to go back to the South where you came from,” 

FAC, ECF No. 14 at 5 ¶ 46, was not benign when construing the 

allegations in the light most favorable to Ms. Bynum, see Kowal, 

16 F.3d at 1276. Indeed, “[t]he phrase ‘go back to where you 
19 

came from’ has a similar historical context to the term ‘boy.’” 

McCurdy v. Auburn Univ., No. 3:14CV226-MHT WO, 2015 WL 2064248, 

at *5 (M.D. Ala. May 4, 2015) (analyzing failure-to-promote 

claims under the same analytical framework for Title VII claims 

and explaining that “[i]t would be unnatural phrasing, at best, 

for a white manager to tell a black employee to ‘go back where 

you came from’ and mean ‘return to your work in the 

stockroom’”). The District does not offer a more likely 

explanation that challenges the inference that the phrase “you 

need to go back to the South where you came from” is a raciallytinged comment. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. 

b. The Court Reasonably Infers From the Alleged 

Facts That Ms. Bynum Opposed Mr. Billett’s 

Discriminatory Conduct 

Viewing the factual allegations as a whole, the Court can 

draw a reasonable inference from the alleged facts that 

Ms. Bynum opposed what she perceived as racial discrimination 

when she reported Mr. Billett’s conduct to her supervisor. See 

FAC, ECF No. 14 at 3 ¶ 6, 5-6 ¶¶ 40-68, 10 ¶ 105, 11 ¶¶ 119-121. 

The “opposition clause” in Title VII’s anti-retaliation 

provision makes it “‘an unlawful employment practice for an 

employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . 

because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 

practice by this subchapter.’” Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of 

Nashville & Davidson Cty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 274 (2009) 
20 

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a)). In Crawford, the Supreme Court 

explained that the ordinary meaning of the term “oppose” is 

“[t]o resist or antagonize . . .; to contend against; to 

confront; resist; withstand.” 555 U.S. at 276 (citation 

omitted). “An employee’s opposition to an employment practice is 

protected under Title VII when the employee ‘reasonably and in 

good faith believed [the practice] was unlawful under the 

statute.’” Grosdidier v. Broad. Bd. of Governors, Chairman, 709 

F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting McGrath v. Clinton, 666 

F.3d 1377, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 2012)); see also Lott v. Not-forProfit Hosp. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 3d 277, 282 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The 

employee’s ‘belief’ that the employer’s conduct was unlawful 

need not be certain.”). 

In this case, Magistrate Judge Meriweather found that 

“Mr. Bynum has failed to plead sufficient facts to satisfy even 

[the] modest threshold” that oppositional conduct is not 

onerous. R & R, ECF No. 20 at 8. Magistrate Judge Meriweather 

found that Ms. Bynum did not allege that she believed that 

Mr. Billett’s conduct was discriminatory. Id. To support the 

conclusion that Ms. Bynum’s operative complaint fails to indicate 

that she complained about discriminatory conduct when she reported 

Mr. Billett’s conduct, Magistrate Judge Meriweather cited Peters 

v. District of Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158, 202 (D.D.C. 2012) and

Moore v. Office of the Architect of the Capitol, 828 F. Supp. 2d 
21 

254, 257 (D.D.C. 2011). R & R, ECF No. 20 at 8-9. Peters and Moore

are distinguishable from this case. 

In Peters, the court found that the informal complaints of two 

African-American employees to management did not constitute 

protected activity. 873 F. Supp. 2d at 202. The plaintiffs 

complained about a supervisor “assigning them too many cases and 

then penalizing them for a backlog when other caseworkers were not 

penalized.” Id. The court reasoned that “[w]hile informal 

complaints to management may constitute protected activity, the 

plaintiffs must clearly complain about discriminatory treatment.”

Id. The court explained that the plaintiffs did “not allege that 

they complained about being targeted for [the] harsher treatment 

due to their race, age or national origin or even in retaliation 

for their prior complaints about her.” Id. 

In Moore, a white male employee alleged that he was unlawfully 

terminated in retaliation for “opposing defendant’s refusal to 

accept ‘Outstanding’ ratings on performance evaluations for two 

white men over the age of forty and a Guatemalan man over the age 

of forty.” 828 F. Supp. 2d at 256. The court found that the 

plaintiff “failed to allege that he ever communicated to his 

supervisors that he was opposing what he believed to be 

discriminatory conduct by them” because he “never told his 

supervisors that he believed their rejection of his ‘Outstanding’ 

ratings was the result of discrimination based on race, age, or 

nationality.” Id. at 257. The court further explained that the 
22 

plaintiff “concede[d] that he was silent as to his opposition to 

defendant’s allegedly discriminatory practices.” Id. 

Unlike the plaintiffs’ informal complaints in Peters, 873 F. 

Supp. 2d at 202, Ms. Bynum filed an incident report, intended to 

report the incident to the police, reported Mr. Billet’s “assault” 

to her supervisor, and requested that DBH order Mr. Billett to not 

harass, intimidate or annoy her following the “attack.” See FAC, 

ECF No. 14 at 6 ¶¶ 57-59, 7 ¶ 69, 10 ¶¶ 104-105. And, unlike the 

white male employee in Moore who conceded that he was silent as to 

his opposition to his employer’s allegedly discriminatory 

practices, see 828 F. Supp. 2d at 257, Ms. Bynum does not concede 

that she was silent in opposing Mr. Billett’s epithets and his 

behavior. Here, the operative complaint contains factual 

allegations that support the inference that Ms. Bynum complained 

to her supervisor that Mr. Billett’s words and actions were 

discriminatory based on her race. See FAC, ECF No. 14 at 5 ¶¶ 

43-48, 6 ¶¶ 59-60, 7 ¶ 69, 10 ¶¶ 104-105, 11 ¶ 121. After she 

received medical assistance for the incident at issue, Ms. Bynum 

alleges that she returned to work on May 9, 2016. Id. at 6 ¶¶ 

61-63. On that same day, Ms. Bynum filed an EEOC charge of 

discrimination. Id. at 8 ¶ 92. 

Ms. Bynum’s opposition of Mr. Billet’s alleged 

discriminatory conduct is similar to the plaintiff’s opposition 

of discrimination in Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F. Supp. 2d 25, 31 
23 

(D.D.C. 2010). In Bryant, the plaintiff alleged that his 

attendance at two informal meetings between management and other 

African-American employees about the lack of overtime 

compensation opportunities for them constituted protected 

activity under Title VII. Id. at 27, 31. In rejecting the 

defendant’s argument that the plaintiff had to allege that “he 

said something at [those] meetings or that he did something more 

than merely attend,” the court explained that the plaintiff 

“specifically allege[d] that the particular meetings he attended 

concerned allegations of racial discrimination” and that “his 

attendance at them certainly could be viewed by his supervisors 

as opposition to what he perceived as [the defendant’s] 

discrimination against him and other [African-American 

employees].” Id. at 31. 

Like the plaintiff’s attendance at the meetings in Bryant, 

Ms. Bynum’s actions of filing the incident report and reporting 

the incident to her supervisor can be viewed by DBH as 

opposition to what Ms. Bynum perceived as racial discrimination 

given that it is plausible Mr. Billett’s comments were racial 

epithets. See FAC, ECF No. 14 at 6 ¶ 59, 10 ¶¶ 104-105. The 

alleged facts in this case present a stronger case than in 

Bryant. Ms. Bynum alleges that Mr. Billett repeated “epithets” 

several times during the incident at issue, id. at 5 ¶ 47; she 

reported Mr. Billett’s “attack” to her supervisor, id. at 10 ¶¶ 
24 

104-105; she filed an incident report, id. at 6 ¶ 59; and she 

“asked [DBH] to order [Mr.] Billett not to harass, intimidate or 

annoy [her],” id. at 7 ¶ 69. Viewing the factual allegations as 

a whole, the Court can draw a reasonable inference from the 

alleged facts that Ms. Bynum opposed what she perceived as 

racial discrimination at DBH when she reported Mr. Billett’s 

conduct to her supervisor. See id. at 3 ¶ 6, 5-6 ¶¶ 40-60, 10 ¶¶ 

104-105, 11 ¶¶ 119-121. 

Although Ms. Bynum does not use the exact words that she 

“believed” that Mr. Billett’s conduct was discriminatory in the 

operative complaint, R & R, ECF No. 20 at 8, the United States 

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. 

Circuit”) has made clear that “no ‘magic words’ are required,” 

Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The 

D.C. Circuit has instructed that “the complaint must in some way 

allege unlawful discrimination, not just frustrated ambition.” Id. 

Ms. Bynum has alleged more than “just frustrated ambition” based 

on the alleged facts that she opposed Mr. Billett’s epithets at 

DBH. See id. Ms. Bynum specifically alleges that Mr. Billett 

shouted, among other things, that she needed to “go back to the 

South where [she] came from.” FAC, ECF No. 14 at 5 ¶ 46. As 

previously explained, Mr. Billett’s use of that phrase may 

demonstrate racial animus based on multiple factors, including 

the phrase’s historical usage, its context, Mr. Billett’s 
25 

inflection, and his tone of voice. See Ash, 546 U.S. at 456 

(explaining that modifiers or qualifications of racially neutral 

words are not necessary in every circumstance to render the word 

probative of bias). Mr. Billett’s epithets targeted at 

Ms. Bynum, an African-American woman, support the reasonable 

inference that she reasonably believed Mr. Billett’s conduct was 

racially discriminatory when she reported the incident to her 

supervisor. The Court therefore finds that Ms. Bynum has alleged 

sufficient facts to give rise to a reasonable inference of 

retaliation under Title VII. Accordingly, the Court rejects the 

R & R’s recommendation to dismiss without prejudice Ms. Bynum’s 

retaliation claim, and DENIES the District’s Partial Motion to 

Dismiss as to Count II. 

C. Hostile Work Environment Claim 

The Court next turns to Ms. Bynum’s harassment claim in 

Count IV, which the R & R correctly construes as a hostile work 

environment claim. See, e.g., R & R, ECF No. 20 at 11 (citing 

Knight v. Mabus, 134 F. Supp. 3d 348, 356 (D.D.C. 2015)); FAC, 

ECF No. 14 at 14 ¶¶ 147-48; Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 22 at 9-12. 

To state a hostile work environment claim, Ms. Bynum must 

show: 

(1) she is a member of a protected class; 

(2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; 

(3) the harassment occurred because of the 

plaintiff’s protected status; (4) the 

harassment affected a term, condition, or 
26 

privilege of employment; and (5) the employer 

knew or should have known of the harassment in 

question but nonetheless failed to either take 

steps to prevent it or afford the plaintiff 

prompt remedial action. 

Gordon v. Beers, 972 F. Supp. 2d 28, 36 (D.D.C. 2013). “Although 

a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of hostile work 

environment in the complaint, the alleged facts must support 

such a claim.” McKeithan v. Boarman, 803 F. Supp. 2d 63, 69 

(D.D.C. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Ms. Bynum must allege that her “employer subjected [her] to 

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 

[her] employment and create an abusive working environment.” 

Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Count IV alleges that Ms. Bynum was “harassed” at DBH 

in three ways: (1) “[b]y permitting [Mr.] Billet[t] to denigrate 

[Ms. Bynum] for more than ten minutes in a small meeting room,” 

FAC, ECF No. 14 at 14 ¶ 145; (2) “[b]y permitting 

[Mr.] Billet[t] to stalk [her] while she worked,” id. at 14 ¶ 

146; and (3) “[b]y threatening [her] with sanctions, including 

termination of employment, without just cause,” id. at 14 ¶ 149. 

Count IV asserts that Ms. Bynum was subjected to an “abusive 

work environment” at DBH in two ways: (1) “[b]y refusing to move 

[Ms. Bynum] to an area or a new assignment where she could avoid 
27 

unnecessary contact with [Mr.] Billet[t],” id. at 14 ¶ 147; and 

(2) “[b]y issuing [Ms. Bynum] a warning/reprimand letter,” id. 

at 14 ¶ 148. Count IV “adopts and incorporates all of the 

[previous] allegations into [the hostile work environment] 

claim.” Id. at 14 ¶ 144. 

Magistrate Judge Meriweather recommends that Count IV be 

dismissed without prejudice because Ms. Bynum has failed to 

allege facts to support the third element of the hostile work 

environment claim: the alleged harassment occurred because of 

Ms. Bynum’s protected status. R & R, ECF No. 20 at 13. 

Magistrate Judge Meriweather recognized that Ms. Bynum, an 

African-American woman, is a member of two protected classes. 

Id. at 11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). But Magistrate 

Judge Meriweather refused to “simply assume that . . . a 

connection [between the alleged harassment and Ms. Bynum’s race 

or sex] exists.” Id. at 11-12 (collecting cases). Magistrate 

Judge Meriweather disagreed with Ms. Bynum’s argument that the 

operative “complaint’s incorporation by reference of allegations 

made earlier in the complaint . . . purportedly demonstrate that 

she was ‘harassed . . . in numerous ways in connection with her 

protected activity.’” Id. at 12 (quoting Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 17 

at 11). In considering Ms. Bynum’s cited allegations, Magistrate 

Judge Meriweather found that none of them “establish a basis to 

infer that the alleged harassment at issue in Count IV was based 
28 

on her race or sex.” Id.; see also FAC, ECF No. 14 at 4 ¶¶ 24-

27, 4 ¶¶ 29-32, 5 ¶¶ 44-48, 6-7 ¶¶ 68-74, 7-8 ¶¶ 79-90. 

Magistrate Judge Meriweather found that Ms. Bynum fails to 

“connect the alleged harassment to her race or sex” because she 

does not “articulate any reason—discriminatory or otherwise—for 

the alleged harassment.” R & R, ECF No. 20 at 13. 

Ms. Bynum argues that the R & R disregards the previous 

factual allegations in the operative complaint that were 

incorporated in Count IV. Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 22 at 9-10. To 

support her objection, Ms. Bynum points to: (1) her EEOC charge 

of discrimination “in response to the harassment that was 

inflicted upon her by [Mr.] Billet[t] and [DBH],” id. at 10 

(citing FAC, ECF No. 14 at 8 ¶ 92); (2) her averment that the 

“retaliatory actions of [DBH] were proximate to [her] protected 

activity,” id. (citing FAC, ECF No. 14 at 10 ¶ 109); and (3) her 

allegation that DBH’s “motivation was to retaliate against [her] 

for . . . engaging in protected activity,” id. (citing FAC, ECF 

No. 14 at 11 ¶ 119). Ms. Bynum argues that the operative 

complaint alleges that DBH engaged in discrimination based on 

her race, sex, and disability. Id. Ms. Bynum contends that the 

allegations placed the District on “notice that [Mr.] Billett 

and Dr. Wright were engaging in conduct that was proximately 

related to [Ms. Bynum’s] numerous complaints of discrimination,” 

which were “expressly based on [her] race and sex.” Id. at 11. 
29 

The District does not dispute that Ms. Bynum is a member of 

two protected classes based on her race and sex. Def.’s Resp., 

ECF No. 24 at 3. Rather, the District argues that the operative 

complaint does not contain facts either alleging or supporting 

an inference that the alleged harassment occurred because of 

Ms. Bynum’s race or gender. Id. at 3-4. The District contends 

that neither Ms. Bynum’s EEOC charge of discrimination nor her 

argument that DBH engaged in discrimination based on her race, 

sex, and disability “save” her hostile work environment claim. 

Id. at 4. The District further contends that “[a]llowing 

[Ms. Bynum’s] claim to proceed on this conclusory allegation 

would require the Court to impermissibly assume a link between 

the claimed harassment and [her] membership in a protected 

class.” Id. But, as explained below, a reasonable inference can 

be drawn from the alleged facts, viewed as a whole, that 

connects the alleged harassment and Ms. Bynum’s race. 

1. The Court Reasonably Infers From the Alleged 

Facts That Ms. Bynum Was Harassed Because of Her 

Race 

Ms. Bynum alleges that DBH created a hostile work 

environment by: (1) permitting Mr. Billett to assault her on 

March 29, 2016; (2) allowing Mr. Billett to stalk her while she 

worked at DBH; (3) refusing to transfer her or assign her to a 

different program area; and (4) threatening her with termination 

or sanctions without just cause. FAC, ECF No. 14 at 5-6 ¶¶ 33-
30 

59, 10 ¶ 111, 14 ¶¶ 145, 147, 149-51; see also R & R, ECF No. 20 

at 10. These alleged events flow from Mr. Billett’s conduct on 

March 29, 2016, and these allegations have a connection to the 

alleged harassment because Mr. Billett allegedly shouted a 

racially-tinged comment and epithets during the alleged assault 

on the day of the incident at issue. See FAC, ECF No. 14 at 5 ¶¶ 

43-47, 6-7 ¶¶ 67-70, 14 ¶¶ 144-150. 

 Although the Court acknowledges that Ms. Bynum could have 

stated her hostile work environment claim more artfully, 

Ms. Bynum does allege facts from which a reasonable inference 

can be drawn that the post-assault harassment occurred because 

of Ms. Bynum’s race. The alleged facts, however, do not support 

an inference that the alleged hostility is linked to Ms. Bynum’s 

sex. The Court declines to adopt the R & R’s conclusion that the 

alleged facts do not connect the alleged harassment to 

Ms. Bynum’s race, but adopts the conclusion that the alleged 

facts fail to connect the alleged harassment to her sex. See

R & R, ECF No. 20 at 13. 

2. Ms. Bynum’s Allegations Are Sufficient to State 

a Hostile Work Environment Claim 

Having found that a reasonable inference can be drawn from 

the alleged facts that the alleged hostility occurred because of 

Ms. Bynum’s race, the Court next considers whether the alleged 

harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
31 

conditions of [Ms. Bynum’s] employment and create an abusive 

working environment.” Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1201. The Court must 

evaluate “the totality of the circumstances, including the 

frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its 

offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work 

performance.” Id.; see also Baird, 792 F.3d at 168 (“A hostile 

environment consists of several individual acts that ‘may not be 

actionable on [their] own’ but become actionable due to their 

‘cumulative effect.’” (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002)). Here, Ms. Bynum’s alleged 

incidents of harassment are sufficient to state a hostile work 

environment claim. See FAC, ECF No. 14 at 5-6 ¶¶ 43-68, 7 ¶¶ 69-

82, 8 ¶¶ 83-94, 14 ¶¶ 144-151. 

To begin, “isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) 

will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and 

conditions of employment.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 

U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (emphasis added); see also Boyer-Liberto v. 

Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding 

that a jury could find the “uses of the ‘porch monkey’ epithet—

whether viewed as a single incident or as a pair of discrete 

instances of harassment—were severe enough to engender a hostile 

work environment”). In George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 416–17 

(D.C. Cir. 2005), the D.C. Circuit held that statements by three 

employees over a six-month period telling a plaintiff to “go 
32 

back where she came from,” separate acts of yelling and 

hostility, and allegations that the plaintiff was not given the 

type of work she deserved, were isolated instances that did not 

rise to the level of severity necessary to find a hostile work 

environment. Seven years later, however, the D.C. Circuit 

recognized that the “single incident [of using the n-word] might 

well have been sufficient to establish a hostile work 

environment.” Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C. 

Cir. 2013) (per curiam); id. at 580 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) 

(“[I]n my view, being called the n-word by a supervisor—as 

[plaintiff] alleges happened to him—suffices by itself to 

establish a racially hostile work environment.”). 

In Ayissi-Etoh, an African-American employee brought 

various claims against his employer, including a hostile work 

environment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at 574.5 The 

plaintiff alleged that, after receiving a promotion, but being 

denied a salary increase, his manager told him: “For a young 

black man smart like you, we are happy to have your expertise; I 

think I’m already paying you a lot of money.” Id. The plaintiff 

also alleged that the vice president, on a separate occasion, 

shouted at him to “get out of my office nigger.” Id. The 

5 Courts analyze hostile work environment claims under Section 

1981 and Title VII using the same analytical framework. See

Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1114 n.3 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000). 
33 

plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint, his supervisor allegedly 

instructed him to either “drop the racial discrimination claim 

or be fired,” and the plaintiff was later terminated. Id. 

The D.C. Circuit held that the district court erred by 

granting summary judgment to the employer on the hostile work 

environment claim, concluding that “a reasonable jury could find 

[the manager’s] and [vice president’s] behavior sufficiently 

severe or pervasive as to create a hostile work environment.” 

Id. at 577. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the use of the n-word 

alone might have been sufficient to establish a hostile work 

environment claim, but the plaintiff alleged more than the 

“deeply offensive racial epithet.” Id. The plaintiff also 

alleged: (1) the “young black man” statement; (2) the plaintiff 

“having to continue working with [the manager] for nearly three 

months, until [the manager] was ultimately fired”; and (3) the 

plaintiff being forced to continue working with the manager 

“made [the plaintiff] ill and caused him to miss work on at 

least one occasion.” Id. 

Like the plaintiff in Ayissi-Etoh who missed work and 

became ill after being forced to work with the manager who used 

the deeply offensive racial epithet, see id., Ms. Bynum alleges 

that Mr. Billett’s behavior, including his alleged raciallytinged comment to “go back to the South where you came from,” 

resulted in her missing twenty-eight days of work, prompted her 
34 

to seek medical assistance, and caused her psychic injury, see 

FAC, ECF No. 14 at 6 ¶¶ 61-66. According to Ms. Bynum, she 

suffered emotional distress and a panic attack after the alleged 

incident with Mr. Billett. Id. at 6 ¶¶ 52-53. As in Ayissi-Etoh, 

Ms. Bynum alleges that she was forced to work in the program 

area where Mr. Billett threatened her with “unnecessary 

contact,” id. at 6 ¶ 68, and Mr. Billett “kept coming around[] 

[her] desk” even after her multiple requests to DBH for a 

transfer to an appropriate program area, id. at 7 ¶ 75. 

At the motion to dismiss stage, Ms. Bynum’s allegations of 

Mr. Billett’s behavior, the denial of her transfer request, the 

warning, and the reprimand letter sufficiently support that 

there was a significant level of offensiveness at DBH. 

Construing Mr. Billett’s comments and the post-incident actions 

in the light most favorable to Ms. Bynum as reflecting 

discriminatory animus, cf. Ash, 546 U.S. at 456, the Court can 

infer that Mr. Billett’s conduct and Dr. Wright’s actions were 

so extreme and pervasive that they altered the conditions of Ms. 

Bynum’s employment, see Rodgers v. W.–S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 

668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Perhaps no single act can more 

quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive 

working environment than the use of an unambiguously racial 

epithet . . . by a supervisor in the presence of his 

subordinates.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
35 

Ms. Bynum alleges that Mr. Billett’s presence near workspace her 

after the incident was stressful, intimidating, and annoying. 

FAC, ECF No. 14 at 7 ¶¶ 69, 77. Indeed, Ms. Bynum alleges that 

the actions that occurred on the day of the incident and on the 

day that she received the warning and reprimand caused her to 

“relapse in her mental health treatment.” Id. at 8 ¶ 90. DBH 

allegedly did nothing in response to the alleged harassment. See

id. at 14 ¶ 146. The Court therefore finds that Ms. Bynum’s 

hostile work environment claim passes muster. Cf. Ayissi-Etoh, 

712 F.3d at 577. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the District’s 

Partial Motion to Dismiss as to Count IV.6 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court ADOPTS IN PART

and REJECTS IN PART the R & R, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

the District’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, DISMISSES WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE Ms. Bynum’s retaliation claim under the ADA, and 

DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Ms. Bynum’s claims against DBH. An 

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

SO ORDERED. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

United States District Judge 

January 30, 2020 

6 Having found that Ms. Bynum’s Title VII claims survive the 

District’s partial motion to dismiss, the Court need not address 

Ms. Bynum’s request for leave to amend the operative complaint 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. See Pl.’s Objs., 

ECF No. 22 at 9, 11.