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SJC-12181

BHARANIDHARAN PADMANABHAN vs. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID

SERVICES.

January 24, 2017.

Practice, Civil, Stay of proceedings, Moot case. Moot Question.

The petitioner, Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, appeals from a 

judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition

pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. We affirm.

In October, 2014, the petitioner commenced an action in the 

Superior Court, naming as defendants the respondent and certain 

individuals associated with Cambridge Health Alliance, the city 

of Cambridge, the Executive Office of Health and Human Services, 

and others. As best as we can discern from the record before 

us, his complaint alleged claims of, among other things,

Medicare or Medicaid fraud, which he became aware of during the 

course of his employment with some of the defendants; and 

retaliation by his employer when he spoke up about the perceived 

fraud. In March, 2015, the case was removed to the United 

States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. A 

judge in that court subsequently allowed a motion to dismiss 

certain Federal defendants and then remanded the case to the 

Superior Court. The petitioner appealed from both the allowance 

of the motion to dismiss and the remand order to the United 

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and that appeal

remains pending. Meanwhile, in the Superior Court, shortly 

after the remand order, the remaining defendants filed motions 

to dismiss, which, it appears, the petitioner opposed. The 

docket further indicates that on June 7, 2016, a status 

conference was scheduled for July 19, 2016.
2

On July 11, 2016, the petitioner filed an "emergency motion 

to stay improper proceedings in State court" in the county 

court, which the single justice treated as a petition pursuant 

to G. L. c. 211, § 3. He argued that the State court lacked 

jurisdiction because his appeal from the remand order remained 

pending in the Federal court, and he asked this court to stay 

further proceedings in the Superior Court. He also asked the 

court to order that the status conference scheduled for July 19, 

2016, be canceled. While his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition was 

pending, the July 19, 2016, status conference proceeded as 

scheduled. A docket entry dated July 20, 2016, indicates that 

because the petitioner's appeal to the First Circuit remained

pending, the status conference would be continued to October 18, 

2016. The single justice subsequently denied the G. L. c. 211, 

§ 3, petition.

The petitioner has now filed what appears to have been 

intended as a memorandum and appendix pursuant to S.J.C. Rule 

2:21, as amended, 434 Mass. 1301 (2001). Technically speaking, 

that rule does not apply here because the petitioner is not 

seeking relief from any interlocutory ruling of the trial court. 

Rather, he seeks a stay of the trial court proceedings. It is 

unclear from the record whether he has sought such a stay in the 

trial court, but he has, in any event, essentially received the 

relief that he seeks: at the July 19, 2016, status conference, 

the conference was continued to October 18, 2016, because of the 

petitioner's pending appeal to the First Circuit. Subsequently, 

at the October 18 conference, which has since occurred, the 

matter was again continued "until the [F]ederal appeal is 

resolved." The petitioner's request for a stay of the 

proceedings is therefore moot. See Rasten v. Northeastern 

Univ., 432 Mass. 1003, 1003 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1168 

(2001). Even if the trial court proceedings had not been 

stayed, and if at some point in the future, after resolution of 

the petitioner's Federal appeal, the trial court proceedings 

continue, the petitioner has an adequate alternative remedy: he 

may appeal, in the regular course, from any adverse judgment 

against him in the trial court. Relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, 

is properly denied where, as here, "there are adequate and 

effective routes other than c. 211, § 3, by which the 

petitioning party may seek relief." Greco v. Plymouth Sav.

Bank, 423 Mass. 1019, 1019 (1996), and cases cited.

This case does not, in short, present a situation where 

extraordinary relief from this court is required, and the single 
3

justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief 

under G. L. c. 211, § 3.1

Judgment affirmed.

The case was submitted on papers filed, accompanied by a 

memorandum of law.

Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, pro se.

 

1 In his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, the petitioner also 

asked the court to "[order] bar counsel" to investigate the 

"filing of a fraudulent pleading" by his former attorney. 

According to the petitioner, the attorney, who had previously 

represented him, was no longer his attorney at the time she 

filed a certain motion in the Superior Court. The single 

justice did not err or abuse her discretion in declining to 

issue an order to compel an investigation on this record and in 

these circumstances. The petitioner is free to file a complaint 

with the Office of Bar Counsel should he wish to do so.