Filed 6/24/15 In re Michael Z. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and pa rties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication o r ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
MICHAEL Z.,
Defendant and Appellant. 2d Crim. No. B256569 (Super. Ct. No . 2010029230) (Ventura County)

Michael Z. appeals from a juvenile court order declaring him a ward of the court and committing him to the Divi sion of Juvenile Facilities (DJF) for a maximum term of eight years and six mont hs. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602 (section 602).) The court based the instant comm itment on several sustained section 602 petitions. Appellant contends that the juve nile court abused its discretion because
the evidence is insufficien t to support its finding of probable benefit from the commitment to the DJF; and it unreasonably re jected alternative placements without giving them sufficient consideration. We affirm.2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND In August 2010, the Ventura County District Attorney filed a section 602 petition, alleging that appellant committed two a ssaults by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen . Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)). 1 The prosecution amended the petition to add a charge of br andishing a weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)). Appellant, then age 13, admitted he bra ndished a knife. The juvenile court dismissed the assaults, sustained th e petition, and gran ted him probation. Between September 2010 and January 2014, the juvenile court sustained eight petitions which collectively charged appellant with three, second degree robberies (§ 211); unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)); second degree burgl ary (§ 459); vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)); petty theft (§ 484, subd. (a)); a nd escape (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 871, subd. (d)). While on probation, the court placed appellant on electronic monitoring for seven terms; he successfully completed only three terms. The court also sustained three petitions alleging appellant had violated the terms of his probation. Prior to 2014, the court committed appellant to the ju venile justice facility (JJF) on several occasions for varying time periods. In April 2013, after sustaining a petition which charge d appellant with robbery, the juvenile court committed him to JJF for 365 days. In September 2013, the probation department charged him with violations of prob ation. Appellant admitted that he started two fights w ith other minors in JJF. The probation department recommended that the court ex tend appellant's co mmitment to JJF for 45 days. The prosecution urge d the court instead to co mmit appellant to the DJF
because he had failed to be rehabilitated "at the local level." The court extended appellant's commitment to JJF for 45 days , after making the following statement: "Well, where I'm going is I'm not going to commit him to the [D JF] quite yet, but

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.3 [appellant] should be aware that the next time he comes before me with a problem like this that would be strongly consid ered. Okay?" Appellant responded by nodding his head "up-and-down." The JJF released appellant on Decem ber 14, 2013. Three days later, he and a fellow gang member attacked a you nger student on the school bus, without apparent provocation. Ap pellant claimed that the vi ctim had made him feel "disrespected." Appellant also used marijuana several times in December and January; failed to report to probation; an d did not attend school regularly. The probation department filed a notice of char ged violations of probation in January
and recommended the court add 12 0 days to his JJF commitment. Appellant admitted that he used controlled substances; failed to cooperate with school officials by attack ing a younger student on the school bus; associated with gang memb ers; and possessed a weapon (a screwdriver) at school. The juvenile court encouraged the parties to submit whatever ev idence they wanted
the court to consider before it selected a disposition. The prosecution recommended that appellant be committed to the DJF. Appellant's counsel urged the court to place appellant in a residential treatm ent facility and submitted a memorandum proposing three possible facilities. The court asked the probation department to consider a DJF commitment for appellant. It again recommended an extension of appellant's JJF commitment. It also advise d the court that if he were committed to the DJF, appellant could "continue his e ducation, obtain varied mental health services, attend small group counseling, and individual counseling . . ., anger management classes, underg o substance treatment, and participate in gang and
victim awareness education." During disposition proceedings, the juven ile court stated it had considered the memorandum from appellant 's counsel proposing suitable placement and "every document in [appellant's] c ourt file more than once." The court4 summarized appellant's criminal history, and the many graduated sanctions it had provided for his rehabilitation. The cour t observed that appellant continued to demonstrate a propensity for violence, a nd to react to perceived disrespect by assaulting people. It further noted he used gang slogans while instigating assaults in JJF. After finding it probable that appella nt would benefit from the "reformatory, educational [opportunities], discipline, and . . . treatment" at DJF, the court
committed him there for a maximum te rm of eight years, six months.
DISCUSSION Appellant contends that the juveni le court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJF because the evid ence is insufficient to support its finding of probable benefit to him. We disagree. "A decision by the juvenile cour t to commit a minor to the [DJF]
will not be deemed to constitute an ab use of discretion where the evidence 'demonstrate[s] probable benefit to th e minor from commitm ent to the [DJF]
and that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inap propriate. . . .' [Citation.]" ( In re Pedro M . (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556, disapproved on another ground by People v. Gonzales (2013) 56 Cal.4th 353, 375, fn. 6.) "'We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. . . .'" ( In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 432.) "A DJF commitment is not necessarily contrary to a minor's welfare," as it "has many rehabilitative programs th at can benefit delinquent wards." ( In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 417.) Some minors "may be best served by the
structured institutional environment and special programs available only at the DJF." ( Ibid. ) In determining the best interests of a minor, the juvenile court "must look at the totality of the child's circumstances." ( Ibid. )5 Citing In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, appellant contends that the juvenile court erred by focusing on public safe ty rather than less
restrictive alternatives wh ich would benefit him. Teofilio A . is unavailing. Teofilio lacked a prior criminal reco rd, and the court had relied upon unsupported statements in the probation report which suggeste d that Teofilio's criminal acts were sophisticated. In addition, the record lacked any evidence that the court had imposed less restrictive dispositions prio r to committing Teofilio to the California Youth Authority (CYA, which is now called DJF). In contrast, appellant committed multiple crimes and received many oppor tunities to reform before the court committed him to the DJF. Appellant also demonstrated that he needed a more structured setting to reform. For exampl e, appellant was on probation in 2010, when he attacked a pizza delivery man and st ole his car. In 2013, appellant assisted a friend who approached an unaccompanie d man at night, displayed a knife, and robbed him of his cell phone. The cour t sent him to JJF again, although the prosecution had urged the court to commit hi m to DJF. Within three days of his subsequent release from JJF, appellant and a fellow gang member assaulted a younger minor on the school bus. In arguing that the juvenile court abused its discreti on by ordering his commitment to DJF, appellant stresses that the probation department did not recommend a DJF commitment. The probation department did, however, advise the court that appellant could participate in a variety of programs in DJF, including anger management classes and substance abus e treatment. After examining "all the relevant circumstances," the court found appellant would "be best served by the structured institutional environment and sp ecial programs availa ble [at DJF]." ( In re Greg F. , supra , 55 Cal.4th at p. 417.) Substantia l evidence supports that finding. The record belies appellant's relate d claim that the court did not give any serious consideration to the reside ntial programs described in counsel's6 memorandum or the probation department 's JJF recommendation. The court expressly indicated it had cons idered such alternatives.
DISPOSITION The judgment (order committing a ppellant to DJF) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

YEGAN, J.David R. Worley, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura

________________ ______________

Stephen P. Lipson, Public Defende r, Michael C. McMahon, Chief Deputy, William Quest, Senior Deputy Public Defender, for Defenda nt and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney Gene ral, Mary Sanchez, Zee Rodriguez, Deputy Attorneys Gene ral, for Plaintiff and Respondent.