### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON June 6, 200 6 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. WILLIAM LA RR Y L ITTLES

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Tip ton County No. 5055 Joseph H. Walk er, III, Judge

No. W2005-02686-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Septem ber 7, 2006

This is a direct a

ppeal f rom a c onviction on a jury verdic t of driving under the in fl u ence of a n intox icant (D UI ), fourth or subsequent off ense. The Def

endant, W illiam L arry L ittles, filed a motion to suppress evidenc e obtained a s a re sult of a war rantless seizure, alleg ing the police did not have

rea sonable suspicion to conduc t the investigatory sto p t h at l ed to the seizure. The D efe ndant’s
mot ionto s up pr e ss w a s d e nie d. F oll ow ing his c on vic tio n he wa s se nte nc e d to e ig hte e n mo nth s in the custody of t he Tennessee Depa rtment of C orre ction (TDOC). T his sentence was suspende d, and he wa s order ed to serve 180 day s in jail followed by supervised pr obation. On appe al, the De fenda nt raises a single issue: t h at t h e trial court e rre d in deny ing his motion to suppress. We aff irm the judgme nt of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J., del ive re d the op ini on of the c ou rt , in w hic h J.C. M C L IN , J ., joined. G AR Y R. W ADE , P

. J

. , n o tp ar t i ci p at i n g.

J. Th oma s Ca ldw e ll, Rip le y , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Willi a m L arry L itt le s.

Paul G. Sum me rs , Attorne y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; B ri a n Cl a y John so n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and Elizabeth T. Rice, District Attorney Gene ral; and J ames Walter Free land, J r., Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

F AC TS

The c onviction at issue stems from an incide nt orig inating on H ighw ay 51 North in Tipton Countybetwee n M i l lington and A toka. The r ecor d reve als that shortly afte r 9:00 p.m. on the evening of Mar ch 1, 2004, Ms. Linda Sunderland was driving home when shewas ne arly run off the-2-

ro ad b y t h e D ef en d an tas h e pa s s ed h er v eh i cl e. Af t er o b s er v i n g t h e D ep en d an t ’s “e rr at i c” d ri v i n g, Ms. Sunderland c alled 911 on her cell phone to r eport the inc ident, and shortly there afte r she observe d an off

icer with the Atoka Police De partment follow the D efe ndant into a conve nience store parking lot. The Def

endant was confronted and subseque ntly arr ested for

driving under the influence

.

I n Marc h of 2005, a Tipton County g rand jury

indicted the De fendant on three c harg es: (1) driving u n d er t h e influence of an intox icant, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-401; (2) driving unde r the influenc e with prior DUI convictions, see id. § 55- 10-403; and (3) violating the implied conse nt la w, se e id. § 5 5- 10 -4 06 . T he De fe nd a nt f ile d a mot ionto s up pr e ss the e vid e nc e g a the re d f ro m hi s seizure, ar g uing the poli ce l ac k ed proba ble cause for

his arre st. I n J uly

of 2005, an e videntiary he ari ng wa s c on du c te d p ur su a nt t o th e De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss.
At this evidentiary

hearing, Ms. Sunder land t estified that on the date of the incide nt, she was driving home from a churc h meeting in Mill ington, tra veling north on Hig hway 51 throug h Tipton Cou n ty , w h e n “ a c ar w e n t p a s t me , r a n my ti r e s o f f th e r o a d

. ” M s

. Su n d e r lan d s tate d th a t the “d ri v i n g” o f t h e ma n i n t h e car t h at p as s ed h er wa s “j u s t erra t i c. I twa s j u s tb ac k an d fo rt h
, we av i n g. He a lmost ran off the r oad himself a c ouple of times.” Ms. Sunderla nd ex p l ai n ed t h at when she tried to pass this driver on the le ft, he swe rved into her lane and almost hit her ag ain.

Be cause she beli ev ed the driver of this vehicle to be a

dang er to himself a nd others on the road, Ms. Sunderla nd called 911 f rom her c ell phone to re port the in ci d en t

. T h e 911 dis patche r fo rw ard e d the in for matio n to the po lic e . A po lic e of fi c e r c a lle d M s. Sun de rl a ndba c k o n h e r c e ll phone and instruc ted her

to continue to follow the vehicle and a police office r would interc ept them wher e Kimbroug h Road crosse d Hig hway 51 near Crosstown. I n acc ordanc e with the pre arr ang ed instructions, Ms. S underla nd flashed he r hea dlights off and on as she appr oache d Kimbroug h Road and a police officer pulled out betwee n her and the Defenda nt’s vehicle. The police r epre sentative on the phone inst ructe d Ms. Sunderland to follow the police c ruiser into the pa rking lot of a convenie nce store , which she did. She observed th e d ri v er p u l l into the parking lot of the convenie nce store , the police c ar f ollow, and the drive r ex it the vehicle and “quic kly ” ente r the store

.

On cr oss-examination, Ms. S underla nd admitted she could not i dentify the Def endant a s the driver of the vehicle that night nor

could she de scribe the vehicle, but she stated: “I followed the c ar, I never left sight of the ca

r. So whoeve r g ot out of that car , that’s the per son that [t he police] wer e afte r.” Ms. S underla nd further stated that while she c ould not remember the spec ifics of the c ar at the hea ring , she “pr obably

described it to the office r at the time.”

L ieutenant Mike Durham of the Atoka Pol ice De partment testified that while he neve r spoke dir e c tly wi th M s. Sun de rl a ndthat ni g ht, he re c e ive d a c a ll f ro m di sp a tc h a nda g re e d th a t he wo uld i n t er ce p ta v eh i cl e s u s p ec t ed o f e rr at i c d r i v i n g at t h e i n t er s ec t i o n o f H i gh wa y 5 1 an d Ki m b ro u gh Road. He was t old that he would know i t was the suspe ct vehicle beca use it was being followed by a citizen who would flash he r hea dli gh t s

. Offic er D urham found the vehicle in que stion and followed it for a

pproxi mately

a quarter mile bef

ore it “ma de a quick rig ht turn” into a conve nience-3-

store par king lot. During the short time he followed the vehicle, Offic er Durham observed that the driver of the v eh i cl e “j erke d the steering w heel ove r to off [sic] the white line, the fog line” two times. Acc ording to Offic er Durham, there was “not a lot of t raf fic at the time.” Of

fice r Durham followed the D efe ndant into the parking lot, where the Def endant pa rked by the front door . Offic er Durha m first activate d his blue lights af ter the D efe ndant had parke d but before the Def endant e x ited his vehicle.

Offic er Durha m e x plained that the Def endant exit ed his ve hicle and “re al q u i ck

. . . went toward the door and w ent in the store.” Offic er D urham followe d the Def endant into the store, a sked him to st ep outside, and onc e outside, the two talke d for a few minutes. Offic er Durham stated that when he first made c ontact with the De fendant in the store, he “ noticed” a “strong intox icating odor” about the De fendant and that the Defenda nt’s “spee ch was slurred.” Once outside the store, Of fice r Durha m observed the Def endant more closely

and determined that the Def endant wa s “more intox icated than [he] thought he was in the s tore.” The Defendant stood as i f he was trying to br ace him s el f an d “st ag g ere d” whe n he wa lked. Off icer Durha m asked the D efe ndant to perf orm three separ ate f ield sobriety

tes t s , b u t t h e Def

endant de clined to per form all thre e. The Def endant wa s then informed of

his rights pursuant to the impl i ed co n s en t l aw but refused to sig n the implied consent form. When asked if he ha d been drinking, the D efe ndant re plied in the aff irmative.

At the c on c lus ionof

the he ari ng , th e tr ia l cou rt de nie d th e De fe nd a nt’ s mo tio n to su pp re ss, noting that the police had re asonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the Def

endant due in la rg e part to the information provided by Ms. Sunderland. I n its order, the tria l court found the

war rantless seizure w as ac cepta ble pursuant to the “concerned citiz en on a cell phone exception.”

I n Aug ust of 2005, the Def endant r ece ived a jury

trial, during which evidenc e was introduce d that was consistent with that prese nted at the hearing on the m otion to suppress. At the conclusion of the tr ia l, the jury

fi rs t f ou nd the De fe nd a nt g uil ty of DU I , a ndin a se pa rate pr oc e e din g , f

ou ndhim g uil ty of a fo urth or su bs e qu e nt o ff

e ns e of DU I . T he De fe nd a nt w a s su bs e qu e ntl y se nte nc e d to eig hteen months in the custody of the TDOC, suspended, and place d on probation af ter service of 180 day s in jail. The Def

endant was also assessed a fine of $15,000 by the jury , which wa s reduc ed to $3,000 by

the trial court, and his driver’ s licence was suspende d. The judg ment of convic tion ref lects that the violation of the implied c onsent law included in the De fendant’s indictment was “not char g ed as a

criminal off

ens e. ” T he De fendant timelyfiled a motion for a new tria l in August of 2005, which wa s denied. This appe al followed.

AN AL YSI S On app e a l, the De fe nd a nt a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inde nying his mot ionto s up pr e ss evidenc e discove red a s a re sult of the investigatory stop and seizure. To s upport this claim, the Def endant a rg ues that “from the s tandpoint of the off icer ,” the only

basis on which to conduc t the inv e sti g a tory

sto p a nd se izur e wa s wi tne ssi ng the De fe nd a nt c ro ss the fo g lin e tw o ti me s, hu rrie dly walking into a store, and the “hea rsay ” information supplied by a citizen on a cell phone. Thus, the Def endant asserts, the police lacke d “re asonable suspicion” to be lieve that an offe ns e w as being

c omm itt e d a ndthe re fo re vio la te d th e De fe nd a nt’ s c on sti tut ion a l rig hts to be fr e e fr om w arr a ntl e ssT h e F o u rth A m e n d m e n t t o the U n ited S ta te s C o n stitutio n p ro v id e s a s fo llo w s: 1

U nre aso na b l e se arc he s and seizure s. T he ri gh t o f t he p eo p l e to b e se cu re in t he i r p erso ns, h ou s es , pa per s , a n d e f

fec t s , ag ai n s t un r ea s on abl e s ea r ch es an d s ei zu r es , s h al l not be v i ol at ed, and no w arrant s shal l i ss ue, b ut upo n pro b ab l e cause, s up p o rt ed by oath o r af f i rma t i o n, and
p a rtic u la rly d e sc rib ing the p la c e to b e se a rc h e d , an d the p e rs o n s o r th ing s to b e se iz e d

. A rtic le 1 , se c tio n 7 o f t h e T e n n e sse e C o n stitutio n gu a ra n te e s tha t:
t h e peopl e s h al l be s ec u r e i n t h ei r pe r s on s , h ou s es , pa per s and p o ss es s i on s , f r om

u n r ea s on abl e s ea r ch es a n d s ei zu r es ; a n d t h at g en er al w ar r an t s , w h er eby a n of f i ce r ma y be

com manded t o s ear ch s us pect ed pl ace s , wi t hout evi dence of t he f act comm i t t ed, or t o s ei ze any p ers o n or p ers o ns no t nam ed
, who se offences are not pa rti cul arl y de scr i b ed and

s u ppor t ed by e v i den ce , a r e dan g er ou s t o l i ber t y a n d ou g h t n ot t o be g r an t ed.

-4- se arc he s a ndse izur e s. As su c h, the De fe nd a nt f urthe r a rg ue s th a t th e e vid e nc e ob ta ine d f ro m hi s seizure should have be en suppre ssed and the c ase a g ainst him dism issed. We disag ree

.

I. Stand ard of Review Whe n r e vie wi ng the c or

re c tne ss o f a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s g rant o r d e nia l of a pr e trial mo ti on to suppress, an a

ppellate c ourt must uphold the trial court’s fin d i n gs of fa ct “unless the e vidence preponde rate s otherwise.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1 9 9 6 ). This standar d

rec og nizes that the credibility of the witnesse s, the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, and r esolution of conf licts in the evidence are matters “e ntrusted to the tri al j u d ge as t he trier of fa ct.” I d. Mo re ov e r, it i s se ttl e d la w that th e part y pre va ili ng a t th e tr ia l c ou rt is e nti tle d to the str on g e st le g iti ma te vie w o f the e vid e nc e a nda ll r e a so na ble i nfere nc e s d ra wn fr om that e vid e nc e , s e e State

v

. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tenn. 2001), and the defe ndant has the bur den of e stablishing that the eviden c e c o n tain e d in th e r e c o r d p r e p o n d e r a te s a g a in s t th e f in d in g s o f f

a c t ma d e b y th e trial court, see Br aziel v. State, 529 S.W .2d 501, 506 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975)

.

Howeve r, this Court is not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law . See State v. Randolph, 74 S.W .3d 330, 333 (Tenn. 2002). The a pplication of the law to the fac ts as found by the tr ia l c ou rt

is a qu e sti on of

la w w hic h a n a

pp e llate c ou rt

re vie ws de no vo . Se e Sta te v. Danie l, 12 S.W. 3d42 0, 42 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 0)

. B e c a us e the fa c ts pr e se nte d at the su pp re ssi on he ari ng in this

case wer e undisputed, only questions of law are befor e this Court. There fore
, ou r r ev i ew o f t he

rec ord bef

ore us is pure ly

de novo. See State v. G onzalez, 52 S .W.3d 90, 94 (Tenn. C ri m. App. 2000).

II. Constitutional P rote ctions from Unlaw fu l Searches and Seizures A. Ge ne ra l Ru le Both the F ourth Amendment to the Unit ed S tates C onstitut ion and article 1, section 7 of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ionpr oh ibi t “ un re a so nab le se arc he s a ndse izur e s. ” Th e int e nt andpu rp os e 1 be hin d th e se c on sti tut ion a lly pr ote c te d rig hts is to “sa fe g ua rd the priva c y

a ndse c urity

of ind ivi du a ls ag ainst arbitra

ry invasions of g overnme nt officials.” Camara v. Municipal Court of San Fr ancisc o,T he i nt ent an d purpos e of t he prohi bi t i ons agai ns t unr eas onabl e se ar che s and s ei zur es f ound i n t he T enn es s ee 2

C ons t i t ut i on ha ve been found t o be t he s ame as t hat behi nd t he provi s i on found i n t he Fourt h Amendm ent t o t he U ni t ed S ta te s C o n stitutio n . S e e S ta te v. S im p so n , 9 6 8 S .W .2 d 7 7 6 , 7 7 9 (T e n n . 1 9 9 8 ).

T he D ef endan t ha s not al l ege d an un l awf ul sea r ch. O n app eal
, t he D ef endan t ar gu es onl y t hat he was s ubj ect ed 3

t o an unl awf

ul sei zure when t he p o l i ce “s t o p p ed hi s vehi cl e, ” and t hat t he evi d ence ob t ai ned s ub sequent t o t hi s sei zure

w a s ta inte d a n d sh o u ld b e su p p re sse d

.
-5- 387 U.S

. 5 2 3
, 5 28 (1967). As a g ener al rule, w arr antless sea rche s or seizures ar e pre sumed 2

unrea sonable, a nd any

evidenc e discove red thereby is subject t o suppression unless the prose cution demonstrates by

a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e that the sear ch or seizure was c onducted pur suant to a nar rowly define d exception to the warr ant requirement. See C oolidge v. New H ampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Ga rcia , 123 S.W .3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2003)

.

B. Seizure B e fo re the c on sti tut ion a l pr ote c ti o n s a g ai n s t anu nr e a s o n a

b l es e izur e are tr ig g e re d, the re mus t be a se izur e

. Ou r c ou rt s h a ve re c og nize d th re e ty pe s of pol ic e -c iti zen int e ra c tio ns : (1) a fu ll s c a le 3
sto p a ndarr e st, wh ic h must be su pp orte d b y

pr ob able c a us e , s e e Whr e n v . U nit e d St a te s, 51 7 U .S. 806, 8 0 9 -1 0 (1996); (2) a brie f investig atory stop, which must be based on r easona ble suspicion supported by

specific and articulable fa cts, see T erry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1968); a nd (3) a brief p o li c e

- c it

iz e ne n c o u n ter , w h ich re quires no objec tive justification, see United States v. Dr ayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2002). See also Daniel, 12 S.W .3d at 424. Of the three cate g ories, only the first two raise to the level of a “seizure” for c onstitut ional analy sis purposes.

An en co u n ter be tween a

g overnme nt official a nd a citizen is a seizure “[o]nl y when the office r, by means of phy sical for ce or show of authority , has in some way restra ined the liberty

of a citizen[.] ” Te rry , 392 U.S. at 20 n.16. I n determining whether an encounte r between a citiz en and the police is a c onsensual enc ounter or a seizure, courts are instruc ted t o l o o k t o the surrounding

c ir c ums ta nc e s a nd“ de te rm ine wh e the r the po li c ec o n d u c t w ou ld h a ve c ommun ic a te d to a re a so na ble person that the pe rson was not fr ee t o d ecline the office rs’ re quests or otherw ise terminate the
encounte r.” F lorida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) . See also Gonzalez, 52 S.W .3d 52 at 96.

Both the U nited States Supreme Court and our state supre me court have he ld that a stop of an automobile and the detention of its occupants constitutes a seiz ure even if the pur pose of the stop is lim ited and the de tention is brief. See Whren, 517 U .S. at 809-10; State v. Viney ard, 958 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Tenn. 1997) . I n the ca se at hand, the trial court noted in its order de ny ing the Def endant’ s motion to s uppress that the “ office r did not initi ate a ‘stop’ of the de fendant’s vehicle. . . . T he de fe nd a nt’ s v e hic le wa s st op pe d b e fo re the of fi c e r a c tiv a te d h is l ight s. ” Non e the le ss, it i s

e sta bli sh e d la w i n T e nn e sse e that “ [w]he n a n off ic e r turns on his blu e lig hts , he or sh e ha s c le arl y initiated a stop[,] “and the vehicle’ s driver is” ‘seized’ withi n the m eaning of t he Terry decision.” State v. Pulley , 863 S.W .2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993) . There fore , the Def endant wa s “seized”a s he sat in h is p ark e d v e hic le in the lot of the co nv e nie nc e sto re wh e n th e of fi c e r a c tiv a te d h is b lue lig hts
, a ndthe prima

ry iss ue be fo re thi s Co urt is wh e the r o r n ot this wa rr a ntl e ss se izur e wa s c on sti tut ion a lly “unre asonable .”T h e D ef en dan t h as n ot a l l eg ed on a ppea l t h at t h e pol i ce l ac k ed t h e h i g h er s t an dar d of “ pr obabl e ca u s e” t o s t op 4

an d a r r es t h i m, a s w as a l l eg ed i n h i s or i g i n al mot i on t o s u ppr es s

. Fu r t h er mor e, t h e D ef en dan t h as n ot a l l eg ed t h at u pon

c o n c lus io n o f t h e inv e stiga to ry sto p , t h e p o lice lac k e d “p ro b a b le c a u se ” to a rr e st him fo r th e o ff e n se o f D U I.

-6- III. Investigatory Stop I n th e c a se a t ha nd
, the De fe nd a nt wa s se ize d wi tho ut a wa rr a nt. Whil e a wa

rr a nt is no rm a lly

re qu ir e d wh e n a g ov e rn me nt of fi c ia l int ru de s up on the priva c y of a c iti zen , the re are se ve ra l na rr ow ly define d exceptions to thi s warr ant re quirement. One s u ch rec og nized ex ception exists when the p o l i c e m ak e a

b r i e f i n v e s t i g a t o r y

s t o p

. S e e T e rr y , 3 9 2 U

. S

. a t2 1 ; G ar c i a , 1 2 3 S

. W

. 3 d a t3 4 3

. In order for such a warra ntless seizure t o be deemed reasonable , the Unites States Supreme Court ha s held that the dete ntion must have be en base d on “re asonable ” suspicion, supported by “spec ific and articula ble fa cts” that a

criminal off

ense ha s been c ommitt ed or is about to be committed. Ter ry , 392 U.S. at 20-21.

Th e la ng ua g e of

the De fe nd a nt’ s cla im on ap pe a l cle arl y ind ic a te s tha t he c on sid e rs the fi rs t interac tion between himself and the police the nig ht of his arre st to h av e b ee n an “inve stigatory sto p, ” bu t he arg ue s su c h a sto p wa s un

jus tif ie d a s it wa s no t a de qu a te ly su pp orte d b y

“ re a so na ble suspicion.” The De fendant arg ues that (1) t h e m i n o r vi olations of crossing the fog line in the

4 absenc e of tra ffic, ( 2) the fa ct hat he “ quickly ” ente red the con v i en i en ce s t ore, and (3) the informant’s “ hear say ” tips, were all inadequate t o support a reasonable suspicion that he committed

a crime, and therefor e, the investigatory stop was an unrea sonable seiz ure. The S tate arg ues that the police did have rea sonable suspi cion under the circumstances in this case to initi ate a n investigatory stop based upon reliable testimony from a c itiz en-informant and other objective f

actor s. We ag ree with the State.

A. Re a so na

ble Sus pic ionAn a ly sis De te rm ini ng wh e the r o r n ot r e a so na ble su sp ic ione xiste d ina pa rt ic ula r s top “ is a

fa c tint e ns ive a ndob

je c tiv e a na ly sis .” Ga

rc ia
, 12 3 S.W. 3d

. a t 34 4. Th e lik e lih oo d o f c ri min a l a c tiv ity

re qu ir e d f or re a so na ble su sp ici on is c le arl y

no t a s g re a t a s th a t r e qu ir e d f or pr ob able c a us e a ndis “conside rably

less” than would be neede d to satisfy a pre pon derance of

the evidenc e standa

rd. United States v. Soklow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). See a lso State v. Keith, 978 S.W .2d 861, 866 (Tenn. 1998).

When e valuating whether a police office r’s rea sonable suspicion is supporte d by specific and articula ble fa cts, a c ourt “must consider the totalityof the c ircumstance s.” Sta t e v. Hord, 106 S.W. 3d 68 , 7 1 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 02 ). Th is i nq uiry loo ks to s uc h f

a c tor s a s th e pu bli c int e re st

serve d by the seizure, the nature a nd scope of the intrusion, and the objective fac ts on which the law enfor ceme nt office r re lied in light of his experienc e. See Pulley , 863 S. W

. 2 d at 3 0-31. The objecti v e fa ct s o n which an of fice r re lies can inc lude, but is not li mited to, his or her own observations, information obta ined from other office rs or ag encie s, offe nders’ patterns of operation, and-- most crucial in this case --information from informants. See State v L awson, 929 S .W.2d 406, 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996)

.-7-

B. Informant Information I t is well e stablished that the fac ts f orming the basis of a n office r’s re asonable suspicion need not rest upon the per sonal knowledg e or obse rvations of the of fice r. See K eith, 978 S.W .2d at 865 (c iti ng Ad a ms v . Wil lia ms, 40 7 U .S. 14 3, 14 7 ( 19 72 )) . H ow e ve r, wh e n a se izur e is b a se d o n th e tip of an informant, the dang er of a false r eport is a r ecog nized concern. See, e.g , Gonzalez, 52 S.W .3d

a t 99 . B e c aus e of

thi s p ote nti a l dang e r, the ve ra c ity of the inf orma nt u po n w ho se state me nt a seizure is initi ated is subject to scr utiny . I n conducting this analy sis, Tennessee courts have distinguished anonymous or confide ntial informants from c itiz en informa nts.

Our supreme court has held that whe n considering whether or not information obtained f rom an anonymous informant adequately supports an officer ’s reasonable suspicion, “some showing of both the informant’s vera city or cre dibilit y and his or her basis for knowledg e” is r equire d. Keith, 978 S.W .2d at 8 6 6 (citi ng State v. J acumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989)). H oweve r, a dif fe re nt s ta nd ardis a

pp lie d to a

“ c iti zenin for ma nt. ” I nf orma tio n f

ro m a c iti zeninf

orma nt i s pr e su me d r e lia

ble a nd no t su bje c te d to the sa me le ve l of sc ru tin y a s that of a n a no nymou s in fo rm a nt. See State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 354 (Tenn. 1982). Thus, information obtained from a citizen informant is not subject to the two-prong reliability test. Citi zen informant information is presume d reliable beca

use the informant has nec essarily g ained their

i n fo rm at i on throug h first-hand experience , and their motivation for communicating with the authorities is ba sed on the “ interest of society or per sonal safe ty .” State v. L uke, 995 S.W.2d 630, 636 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).

I n the case at hand, a conce rned citizen diale d 911 to r eport the Def endant af t er h e was witnessed driving err atically and in a m anner that the citizen believed pose d a dang er f or the Def endant a nd others tra veling the public roads of Tenne ssee. The c itiz en-informant followed the Def endant a nd maintained conta ct wit h either the 911 dispatcher or law e nforc ement, providing the proper authorities with a desc ription of the Def endant’ s vehicle and its l o ca tion. This citiz eninformant wa s prese nt when the police interce pted the De fendant, and she was also prese nt when the police ef fec ted the investi gatorystop and ultimate arr est of the De fendant. The citizen-informant also g ave a

formal state ment to the police.

Th e re c or d r e ve a ls that th e c iti zen

- i n f o rm an t i nthis c a se g a ine d h e r i nf

orma tio n th ro ug h f

ir stha ndob se rv a tio n a ndhe r m oti vatio n for c ommun ic a tin g wi th the a uth oriti e s is ba se d inthe “ int e re st of society or per sonal safe ty .” L

uke, 995 S.W.2d at 636. Acc ording ly , the citizen-informant pr ov ide d r e lia

ble , s pe c if

ic a ndart ic ulate fa c ts f

ro m w hic h the po lic e of

fi c e r c ou ld f

orm a re a so na ble suspicion that the Def

endant wa s driving unde r the influence. See State v. Fred Tay lor Smit h, No. W2002-02199-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22309485, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., J ackson, O ct. 8, 2003) (upholding an investig atory stop where “a c itiz en who had seen the defe ndant at close rang e and w ho had observ e d h is d r iv in g o n a p u b li c r o a d
, r e p o r te d h is s u s p ic io n th a t th e d e f e n d a n t w a s d r iving under the influence to the police”)

.

C. T ota lit y

of the Cir c ums ta nc e s. The De fendant also claims that neither the minor infra ction of driving acr oss the fog line when ther e wa s no dang er to other traffic, citing St ate v. Smit h, 21 S.W .3d 251 (Tenn. Crim. App.B o th th e e v id e n c e p re se n te d a t the su p p re ssio n h e a rin g a n d the p ro o f ad d u c e d a t t ria l m a y b e c o n sid e re d in 5

revi ewing a t ri al co urt ’ s rul i ng on a m o t i o n t o s up p res s. See S t at e v. H enni ng, 97 5 S.W

. 2 d 29 0
, 29 9 (T enn. 19 9 8 ).

-8- 1999), nor his “flig ht” into the store, citing G rey v. State, 542 S.W .2d 102 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976)
, c on sti tut e d s pe c if

ic a ndart ic ula

ble fa c ts that w ou ld s up po rt a re a so na ble su sp ic ionthat a n o ff

e ns e had occ urre d or wa s about to occur . Howeve r, as stated above , when e valuating whether a police office r’s re asonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable fa cts, a court “must consider the totality

of the circ umstances.” Hord, 106 S.W .3d at 71. I n this case, the police office r obser ved the Def endant c ross the white fog line twice in only a quarter of a m i l e. T h i s observation

co rr o b o ra t ed t h e c i t i z en -i n fo rm an t ’s ey e- wi t n es s re p o rt s o f e x t en s i v e a n d d an ger o u s erra t i c d ri v i n g. Offic er D urham testified at trial that afte r activating his blue lights, the De fendant “looked bac k at me and ke pt walking on into the store.” Be cause the Defenda nt’s “flig ht” occurre d afte r the off icer 5 activate d the blue lights, we will not conside r this fac t in determining whether there was suff

icient

rea sonable suspicion to justify an investig atory

stop.

Ba sed on t he tot ality of t he circumstance s, we find the pol ice of fice r had ample specific and

art ic ula bl e fact s up on wh ic h to ba se a re a so na ble su sp ic ionthat th e De fe nd a nt w a s in vo lve d in criminal ac tivity , specific ally drivi n g wh ile under the influence of an intoxi cant. The citizeninformant’s initial 911 call and subsequent reports to law enforce ment are presumed reliable. See Melson, 638 S.W .2d at 354. Additionally , the fa ct that the citizen-informant m aintained c ontact with law enf

orce ment throug hout the entire inc ident and wa s p re s en t when the D efe ndant was confr onted by

the police we igh he avily

in favor of further acc rediting her reports of the Defe ndant’s criminal activity

. The arr esting police office r’s own observations of the Def endant’ s err atic driving fu rthe r b ols te re d th e sp e c if ic a ndart ic ula

ble fa c ts u po n w hic h th e of fi c e r c ou ld b a se a

re a so na ble susp i ci o n s u ff

i ci en tt o co n d u ctan i n v es t i gat o rys t o p

. Ac co rd i n gl y , t h e D ef en d an t ’s s ei z u re p u rs u ant to an in v e s ti g a to r y

s to p w a s n o t u n la w f

u l w ith inth e p u r v ie w o f

th e T e n n e s s e e a n d U n it e d State s Constit utional protections ag ains t unrea sonable sea rche s and seizures, and the evidenc e re sulting fr om this se izur e wa s p ro pe rl y a dmi tte d at tria l. T his iss ue is w ith ou t me ri t.

CO NC LU SION B a se d o n th e fo rg oin g re a so nin g a nda uth oriti e s, we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt pr op e rl y denied the D efe ndant’s motion to suppress evidenc e discove red a s a re sult of the invest i gat o ry seizure. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE