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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KANG KYU SEO, et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v.

CHARLES MOON SUK OH, et al.,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-785 (RDM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs. See Dkt.

64. Plaintiffs seek $314,662.40 in attorneys’ fees and $7,862.08 for costs. See Dkt. 69 at 4. For 

the reasons below, the Court will grant the motion. Moreover, because the governing D.C. law 

requires the Court to “use the rates in effect at the time the determination [of the fee award] is 

made,” D.C. Code § 32-1308(b)(1), and because the relevant rates were recently increased, the 

Court will award Plaintiffs $365,548.80 in attorneys’ fees and $7,862.08 for costs.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs retained Matthew T. Sutter and Yeoup Ryu as counsel in 2017 to pursue 

payment for overtime worked as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et 

seq. (“FLSA”), and the D.C. Minimum Wage Act Revision Act, D.C. Code §§ 32-1001, et seq.

(“DCMWA”), from their employer Charles Moon Suk Oh and his corporation Wade Road Inc. 

(“Defendants”). See Dkt. 64 at 1. Plaintiffs filed suit in April 2018. See Dkt. 1. Discovery 

proceeded slowly due to Defendants’ failure to respond to Plaintiffs’ requests. See Dkt. 17.

In October 2022, this Court held a four-day jury trial in which the jury returned a verdict 

for Plaintiffs. See Dkt. 59. Plaintiffs filed the pending Motion for Attorneys’ Fees one month
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later. Dkt. 64. The parties spent the following three months briefing issues necessary to convert 

the jury verdict into a final judgment and to address Defendants’ motion for a new trial. See

Min. Order (Nov. 2, 2022) (ordering briefing on calculation of damages); Min. Order (Nov. 10, 

2022) (ordering briefing on Defendants’ demand for new trial); Dkt. 70 at 18 (ordering briefing 

on pre- and post-judgment interest). Plaintiffs added the attorneys’ fees accrued during that posttrial briefing to their demand in their reply in support of their motion. See Dkt. 69.

After resolving several other post-trial motions, the Court subsequently referred 

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs to Magistrate Judge Merriweather for a Report 

and Recommendation. Min. Order (Dec. 8, 2023). Upon Magistrate Judge Merriweather’s 

appointment to the Court of Federal Claims and resignation from her position on this Court, the 

referral of the pending motion to a magistrate judge was withdrawn. Min. Order (Aug. 8, 2024). 

The matter is now back before the undersigned and ripe for resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The FLSA and DCMWA both mandate an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs 

to a prevailing plaintiff. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); D.C. Code §§ 32–1012(c), 32–1308(b)(1)

(1993). “[P]laintiffs may be considered ‘prevailing parties’ for attorney’s fees purposes if they 

succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties 

sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (citation omitted); see 

also Falica v. Advance Tenant Servs., Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 75, 78 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that 

Hensley analysis applies in FLSA cases).

“The initial estimate of a reasonable attorney’s fee is properly calculated by multiplying 

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate,” 

known as the lodestar method. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984). For purposes of the 
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loadstar method calculation, the party seeking reimbursement bears the burden of showing that 

both the hours expended and the rate requested are reasonable. In re North (Bush Fee 

Application), 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The lodestar figure can be adjusted up or down 

where a party demonstrates that adjustment is warranted. See Jones v. Loc. 4B, Graphic Arts 

Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 595 F. Supp. 792, 793–94 (D.D.C. 1984). However, the Supreme Court 

has emphasized that “the determination of fees ‘should not result in a second major litigation.’” 

Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). “A district court is 

expressly empowered to exercise discretion in determining whether an award is to be made and 

if so its reasonableness.” Blum, 465 U.S. 902 n.19. 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs seek $314,662.40 in attorneys’ fees and $7,862.08 for costs. See Pls. Mot. at 2

(seeking $294,517.70 in fees); Pls. Reply at 4 (adding $20,144.70 in fees incurred since filing of 

fee motion). In response, Defendants merely argue that the size of the fee request is 

disproportionate to the compensatory damages that the jury awarded and that the proposed rate is 

excessive in light of counsels’ regular hourly rate and the simplicity of the case. Dkt. 68 at 1. 

For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs; that the number of hours expended was reasonable; and that, under 

D.C. law, the relevant rate is determined as a matter of law. Moreover, even though the Court 

has discretion to alter the lodestar to ensure that the award of attorneys’ fees is reasonable, 

Defendants—who bear the burden of justifying such a reduction—have failed to offer any 

persuasive basis to do so here.
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Because Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, and do 

not challenge the reasonableness of any specific time entries, the Court will assess only whether 

the attorneys’ fees and costs requested are reasonable. 

A. Attorneys’ Fees Award

1. The Proposed Hourly Rate is Reasonable 

“Determining the prevailing market rate is ‘inherently difficult.’” Eley v. District of 

Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. 895 n.11). The “fee 

applicant must ‘produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that 

the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by 

lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.’” Id. (quoting Blum, 465 

U.S. at 895 n.11) (emphasis in original). Applicants may submit fee matrices as one type of 

evidence of the prevailing market rates, the most common of which is the Laffey Matrix. Salazar 

ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 58, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The Laffey Matrix

comes in two variants. The first is referred to as the “USAO Laffey Matrix” and is based on the 

Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 

prepared by the Civil Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of 

Columbia. The second variant is referred to as the “LSI Laffey Matrix” and is based on the Legal 

Services Index of the Nationwide Consumer Price Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Here, 

Plaintiffs’ motion, which was filed in 2022, requested $829.00 per hour for Mr. Sutter and Mr. 

Ryu’s work on this matter pursuant to the LSI Laffey Matrix. See Pls. Mot. at 6.

For fee awards under the DCMWA, D.C. law requires the Court to award “attorney’s fees 

computed pursuant to the matrix approved in Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8, 

15 (D.D.C. 2000), and updated to account for the current market hourly rates for attorney’s 
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services.” D.C. Code § 32–1308(b)(1). Consistent with this direction, this Court applies the LSI 

Laffey Matrix rates to cases brought under the DCMWA. See, e.g., Serrano v. Chicken-Out Inc., 

209 F. Supp. 3d 179, 195 (D.D.C. 2016); Herrera v. Mitch O’Hara LLC, 257 F. Supp. 3d 37, 46

(D.D.C. 2017); Munoz v. Telligent Masonry LLC, 2023 WL 6389129, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 

2023).

Plaintiffs submit that the LSI Laffey Matrix is proper here, and although not necessary

given the statutory mandate, they support their proposition with “evidence of recent fees awarded 

by the courts or through settlement to attorneys with comparable qualifications handling similar 

cases.” Eley, 793 F.3d at 101 (citation omitted); see Pls. Mot. at 6 (citing fee awards to Mr. 

Sutter using LSI Laffey Matrix in Martinez-Cerna et al v. Nguyen et al, 1:18-cv-02149-TNM 

(D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2018), and Orellana et al v. Freeman et al, 1:18-cv-01186-CMH-JFA (E.D. 

Va. Aug. 22, 2019)). Defendants do not challenge use of the LSI Laffey Matrix.

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 Moreover, 

because the jury returned a verdict pursuant to both the DCMWA and the FLSA, the Court need 

not separately address the appropriate rate in FLSA cases. Finally, the Court notes that D.C. law 

requires application of “the rates in effect at the time the determination is made,” D.C. Code 

§ 32–1308(b)(1), and that LSI Laffey Matrix rates increased after Plaintiffs filed the pending 

motion but before the Court made its “determination.” 

Plaintiffs’ attorneys, Mr. Sutter and Mr. Ryu, were, at the time of filing the motion in 

2022, 19 and 17 years out of law school, respectively. See Dkt. 64-4 at 2, 3 (affidavits of Mr. 

Sutter and Mr. Ryu). Plaintiffs’ motion, therefore, requests $829 per hour consistent with the

1 Defendants do suggest that it is inappropriate for “Attorney Sutter and Ryu [to charge] $829.00 

per hour if their regular hourly rate on other cases is significantly less.” Dkt. 68 at 3. Given the 

statutory mandate to follow the LSI Laffey Matrix, however, the Court will construe that 

argument as a request for an adjustment to the lodestar figure. See infra Section III.A.3. 
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2022 LSI Laffey Matrix rate for attorneys with 11–19 years’ experience at the time of filing. See

Dkt. 64 at 6; Dkt. 64-1 (showing rates for 6/01/22 – 5/31/23 on www.laffeymatrix.com accessed 

on October 18, 2022). That rate, however, has now increased to $948 per hour. See Laffey 

Matrix, http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2024). Because the Court is 

required to apply the rate in place at the time the Court renders its fees “determination,” the 

Court will apply the $948 rate for purposes of the lodestar calculation. 

2. The Number of Hours Billed is Reasonable 

Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees for 385.6 hours expended by Mr. Sutter and Mr. Ryu on

this matter. Their initial motion requested attorneys’ fees for 361.3 hours, covering hours 

starting with client intake through the filing of the fee motion. See Dkt. 64-4 at 4–12. In their 

reply brief, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees for an additional 24.3 hours, reflecting their work 

after that filing. See Dkt. 69 at 3–4. Those further hours were spent preparing post-trial briefing 

on damages and reviewing and responding to Defendants’ opposition to their fee motion and

Defendants’ request for a new trial. See Dkt. 69-1 at 3, 5. Taken together, Plaintiffs seek 

attorneys’ fees based on a total of 385.6 hours of labor. See, e.g., Campbell v. District of 

Columbia, 202 F. Supp. 3d 121, 126 n.2 (D.D.C. 2016) (awarding fees for hours first 

documented in applicant’s reply spent on fee motion and opposing post-trial motion); 

Conservation Force v. Salazar, 916 F. Supp. 2d 15, 30–32 (D.D.C. 2013) (awarding fees for 

hours first documented in applicant’s reply spent on preparing fee reply brief and appeal). 

According to Plaintiffs’ counsel, they “litigated the case as efficiently as possible and 

made appropriate voluntary reductions in the hours spent,” by cutting any “excessive or 
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unnecessary work performed.”2 Dkt. 64 at 7–8. They further state that the submitted billing 

entries “were recorded contemporaneously with the work performed and . . . identif[y] the 

amount of time expended, the amount of work being sought, the tasks performed, and the rate of 

the particular timekeeper.” Id. at 7.

Defendants do not argue that any specific hours claimed were excessive, unnecessary, or 

unreasonable. Rather, they “summarily conclude that the time spent ‘was excessive and 

unreasonable’ without offering any basis, such as the length or scope of the filings or the issues 

presented therein, from which the court could conclude that the hours billed are unreasonable.” 

Bode & Grenier, L.L.P. v. Knight, 31 F. Supp. 3d 111, 122 (D.D.C. 2014) (awarding fees over

conclusory objection); see Dkt. 68 at 3. The Court is unpersuaded.

Plaintiffs have submitted billing records “sufficiently detailed to permit the . . . Court to 

make an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are justified.” Herrera, 

257 F. Supp. 3d at 47 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 

1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). In reviewing time entries, courts typically look at the total hours 

to determine whether they are excessive, and at individual entries to determine whether there are 

duplicate or unreasonable entries. See, e.g., id. After conducting a detailed review, the Court

finds that the total number of hours expended were not excessive for a case that proceeded 

through summary judgment, mediation, trial, and post-trial briefing. The only hours that are 

duplicative are for meetings, depositions, and the trial attended by both Mr. Sutter and Mr. Ryu, 

2 Plaintiffs argue that the DCMWA prohibits reduction “from the hours actually expended, 

except upon clear and convincing evidence that the reduction will serve [its] remedial purposes.” 

Dkt. 64 at 6 (quoting D.C. Code § 32-1308(b)(2)). However, that provision applies only when 

“the fees remain unpaid to the attorney at the time of any subsequent review, supplementation, or 

reconsideration of the fee award,” not upon consideration of the initial fee motion. D.C. Code 

§ 32-1308(b)(2).
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but those are permissible “on the theory that attorneys must spend at least some of their time 

conferring with colleagues” and because Mr. Sutter and Mr. Ryu acted as co-counsel. Nat’l

Ass’n of Concerned Veterans, 675 F.2d at 1337. Although the attendance of multiple lawyers at 

meetings, depositions, or trial is at times unnecessary, this is not such a case.

The Court, accordingly, finds that the total number of hours claimed is both supported 

and reasonable.

3. An Adjustment to the Lodestar Figure is Not Warranted

For the reasons explained above, the Court finds that the appropriate lodestar calculation 

results in a fee estimate of $365,548.80 for 385.6 hours of work at a rate of $948.00. There is a 

strong presumption that this “lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors 

constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee.” Keepseagle v. Perdue, 334 F. Supp. 3d 58, 64 

(D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553 (2010)). Thus, any

party requesting an adjustment to the lodestar figure bears the burden of justifying such an

adjustment. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 

Defendants assert that a reduction is justified here because (1) the hourly rate paid to

Plaintiffs’ attorneys should “reflect the nature of the wage cases;” (2) “their [] hourly rate on 

other cases is significantly less;” and (3) the requested fees are “grossly excessive” relative to the 

compensatory damages. Dkt. 68 at 3. Defendants cite no authority applying the DCMWA that 

would support a reduction based on these factors. Nor do they offer any evidence indicating Mr. 

Ryu’s or Mr. Sutter’s hourly rate charged in other cases is any lower than the LSI Laffey Matrix 

rate, and Mr. Ryu and Mr. Sutter have provided the Court with examples of cases in which they 

were awarded attorneys’ fees at the LSI Laffey Matrix rate. 
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Defendants imply that the factors that they invoke find support in the twelve-factor 

reasonableness test endorsed by the Supreme Court in Johnson, which includes factors like “the 

novelty and the difficulty of the questions” and the “results obtained.” Dkt. 68 at 1–2 (citing 

Hensley, 461 U.S. 424; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 

1974)). But the Supreme Court “specifically held in Blum that the ‘novelty [and] complexity of 

the issues,’ . . . and the ‘results obtained’ from the litigation are presumably fully reflected in the 

lodestar amount, and thus cannot serve as independent bases for [adjusting] the basic fee award.” 

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986), 

supplemented, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898–900 (1984)).

In addition, “calculating attorneys’ fees as a proportion of damages runs directly contrary 

to the purpose of fee-shifting statutes: assuring that civil rights claims of modest cash value can 

attract competent counsel. The whole purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to generate attorneys’ 

fees that are disproportionate to the plaintiff’s recovery.” Driscoll v. George Washington Univ.,

55 F. Supp. 3d 106, 114 (D.D.C. 2014) (awarding $387,710.48 in fees in FLSA case) (quoting 

Millea v. Metro–N. R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 169 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). In fact, this 

Court frequently awards reasonable attorneys’ fees in excess of the unpaid wages awarded in 

FLSA and DCMWA cases. See, e.g., Zaldaña v. Morrogh, No. 20-cv-3810, 2022 WL 203471 

(D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2022) (awarding $21,140.90 in attorneys’ fees and $13,096.60 in unpaid 

wages); Jackson v. Contemp. Fam. Servs., Inc., No. 18-cv-2349, 2019 WL 5653462 (D.D.C. Oct. 

31, 2019) (awarding $43,817.40 in attorney’s fees and $16,006.90 in unpaid wages). 

The Court thus determines that no variation from the lodestar figure is warranted. 
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B. Award of Costs 

Both the FLSA and DCMWA permit the reimbursement of litigation costs, although the 

DCMWA’s language is broader—mandating the award of “costs or fees of any nature,” which 

includes but is not limited to, “depositions fees, witness fees, juror fees, filing fees, certification 

fees, the costs of collecting and presenting evidence, and any other costs incurred in connection 

with obtaining . . . the judgment.” D.C. Code § 32-1308(b)(1), (3) (emphasis added); 29 

U.S.C.A. § 216(b). Plaintiffs request reimbursement for $7,862.08 in costs for filing fees, 

private investigators, process servers, court reporters, parking and transportation for attorneys 

and plaintiffs, and meals during depositions and trial days. See Dkt. 64-4 at 12–14. Defendants 

do not challenge the award of these costs, and the costs requested do not strike the Court as

unreasonable or outside of the scope of litigating this case. See Alabama Power Company v.

Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (awarding costs for postage, travel, and meals); Noble v.

Herrington, 732 F. Supp. 114, 119 (D.D.C. 1989) (awarding costs for telephone, postage, and 

local transportation).

Given the broad language of the DCMWA and the connection between each cost and the 

legal services performed, the Court will award $7,862.08 in costs, as requested. 

CONCLUSION

The Court will, accordingly, GRANT Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in 

the amount of $365,548.80 in attorneys’ fees and $7,862.08 in costs. 

SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Randolph D. Moss 

 RANDOLPH D. MOSS 

 United States District Judge 

Date: October 3, 2024