SIXTH DIVISION                                                                  May 23, 1997Nos. 1-95-2637) Consolidated     1-95-2638)______________________________________________________________________No. 1-95-2637                           )                                        )WILLIAM R. KRAUSS, TRUDY O'CONNOR,      )         Appeal fromELIZABETH E. HENDRICKSON, RODNEY BELL,  )      the Circuit CourtDIANA L. MESLE, ELIZABETH A. CARTAGENA, )       of Cook County.FLORENCE HARRIS, MARGARET HELLYER,      )MICHAEL J. HOPKINS, SHELBY SHADD,       )NORMAN C. ZWEIBRUCK, TOMISE HUBBARD,    )and EMMA HUBBARD,                       )                                                )          Plaintiffs-Appellants,        )                                               )     v.                                 )        No. 95-CO-119                                        )THE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF  )   22nd Precinct of 46th WardTHE CITY OF CHICAGO,                    )                                        )          Defendant-Appellee,           )                                        )     and                                )                                        )BEVERLY WARNER, JAE LEE, THOMAS CAMERON )and YVETTE LIFSCHULTZ,                  )         Honorable                                        )       Curtis Heaston,          Intervenors-Appellees.        )      Judge Presiding.______________________________________________________________________No. 1-95-2638                           )                                        )AMELIA T. GREEN, ROSIE M. HARRISON,     )         Appeal fromEARLINE MURPHY PEARSON, CARMELLA E.     )      the Circuit CourtFOSTER, and ARNITTA EDMONDSON,          )       of Cook County.                                        )          Plaintiffs-Appellants,        )                                               )        No. 95-CO-120     v.                                 )                                          )   21st Precinct of 21st WardTHE BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS OF  )THE CITY OF CHICAGO,                    )          Honorable                                        )       Curtis Heaston,          Defendant-Appellee.           )      Judge Presiding.______________________________________________________________________                      MODIFIED UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING                                            JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:     Appellants, 13 registered voters of the 22nd Precinct of the 46thWard and five registered voters of the 21st Precinct of the 21st Wardin the City of Chicago (voters), present a consolidated appeal fromthe dismissal of their complaints challenging the validity of ballotsused in local option elections held on April 4, 1995.  The localoption elections were held to determine whether to allow the retailsale of alcoholic liquor in those precincts.  Afterwards, voters fromboth precincts promptly filed suit in the circuit court of Cook Countychallenging the validity of the election ballots and seeking to havethe elections declared void.  ILCS 5/23-24 (West 1994); 235 ILCS 5/9-1(West 1994).  The Board of Election Commissioners of the City ofChicago (Board) filed motions to strike and dismiss the voters'complaints.  735 ILCS 5/2-615, 5/2-619 (West 1994).  The trial courtgranted the Board's motions and dismissed the voters' complaints withprejudice.  On appeal, the voters contend that the trial court erredin dismissing their complaints.  We agree and reverse the trialcourt's decision.     The voters alleged that the election ballots did not comply withthe format as required by section 9-6 of the Liquor Control Act, andthus, the elections were void.  235 ILCS 5/9-6 (West 1994); Smith v.Calhoun Community Unit School District No. 40, 16 Ill. 2d 328, 332,157 N.E.2d 59, 61 (1959).  The Board filed motions to strike anddismiss the voters' complaints.  The Board argued that no prejudice oractual voter confusion was alleged by the plaintiffs.  In addition,the Board asserted that the ballots substantially complied with therequired statutory form, and that laches barred the voters frombringing suit.  Four registered voters in the 22nd precinct intervenedin support of the Board's position.  The trial court granted theBoard's motions and dismissed the voters' complaints with prejudice. The trial court then stayed the order pending appeal.     The first issue on appeal is whether the voters' complaintsfailed to state a cause of action because they failed to allegeprejudice or actual voter confusion.  735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1994). We review section 2-615 motions de novo.  Lawson v. City of Chicago,278 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634, 662 N.E.2d 1377, 1382 (1996).  On review,the court looks to whether the complaint alleged the essentialelements of a cause of action and accepts all well-pleaded facts andall reasonable inferences as true.  Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 634,662 N.E.2d at 1382.     Suits seeking to contest the validity of a local option electionare governed by the specific procedures of the Illinois Liquor ControlAct.  235 ILCS 5/9-19 (West 1994); Chambers v. Board of ElectionCommissioners of the City of Chicago, 183 Ill. App. 3d 567, 569, 571,539 N.E.2d 267, 269, 270 (1989).  Section 9-19 of the Liquor ControlAct provides the procedures for contesting the validity of a localoption election:               "Any 5 legal voters *** may within 10 days          after the canvass of the returns *** contest the          validity of such election ***. *** Any registered          voter in the political subdivision or precinct in          which the election has been held may appear in          person, or by counsel, in any such contest to          defend or oppose the validity of the election."           235 ILCS 5/9-19 (West 1994).     Nothing in the Liquor Control Act requires plaintiffs contestingthe validity of local option elections to allege prejudice or actualvoter confusion.  Further, no cases addressing the validity of aballot proposition have required a plaintiff to allege actual voterconfusion.  The rationale is that challenges to the validity of anelection question the basic legality of the election, not the outcome. Ross v. Kozubowski, 182 Ill. App. 3d 687, 694, 538 N.E.2d 623, 628(1989), citing Village of Hinsdale v. Du Page County Court, 281 Ill.App. 571 (1935).  We find that the voters stated a cause of actionchallenging the validity of the ballot used in the local optionelections.     The next question is whether the trial court erred in dismissingthe voters' complaints on the ground that the ballots were legallysufficient.  735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1994).  This court also reviewssection 2-619 motions under a de novo standard.  Lawson, 278 Ill. App.3d at 634, 662 N.E.2d at 1382.      When a special statute dictates the form of the ballot, theremust be substantial compliance with the special statutory mandate orthe election is void.  Smith v. Calhoun Community Unit School DistrictNo. 40, 16 Ill. 2d 328, 332, 157 N.E.2d 59, 61 (1959).  Substantialcompliance, rather than exact compliance, with this type of statutoryballot is sufficient.  People ex rel. Davis v. Chicago, Burlington &Quincy R.R. Co., 48 Ill. 2d 176, 182, 268 N.E.2d 411, 414-15 (1971).     Determination of substantial compliance is a question of law forthe court.  The test is whether the voter was given as clear analternative as if the statutory form had been identically followed. Dick v. Roberts, 8 Ill. 2d 215, 221, 133 N.E.2d 305, 309 (1956).  Thefocus is on the existence of a meaningful choice for the voters.  Aballot is sufficient if the voter has a clear opportunity to express achoice either for or against it.  Hoogasian v. Regional TransportationAuthority, 58 Ill. 2d 117, 123, 317 N.E.2d 534, 538 (1974).  AccordKnappenberger v. Hughes, 377 Ill. 126, 132, 35 N.E.2d 317, 320 (1941);People ex rel. Howard v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois R.R. Co., 296 Ill.246, 251, 129 N.E. 846, 848 (1921).       Thus, courts consider whether the deviation in the ballot wasmisleading or confusing to the voters.  Davis, 48 Ill. 2d at 182, 268N.E.2d at 415; Smith, 16 Ill. 2d at 336, 157 N.E.2d at 63.  In Peopleex rel. Davis v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., when theballot provided "for" and "against" rather than "yes" and "no." theCourt found the deviation acceptable because "there is no contentionor likelihood that the deviation in wording confused the voters orobstructed them in voting either for or against the proposition, inaccordance with their inclinations."  Davis, 48 Ill. 2d at 182, 268N.E.2d at 415.  Moreover, deviations consisting merely of additionalinformation not affecting the voters' choice do not void the election. Smith, 16 Ill. 2d at 335, 157 N.E.2d at 63; Dick, 8 Ill. 2d at 222,133 N.E.2d at 309; Knappenberger, 377 Ill. at 132-33, 35 N.E.2d at320.     Section 9-6 of the Illinois Liquor Control Act (235 ILCS 5/9-6(West 1994)) specifies the format of local referenda on the retailsale of alcoholic liquor and provides:  "The proposition shall be insubstantially the following form:"  Shall the sale at retail ofalcoholic liquor (or alcoholicliquor other than beercontaining not more than 4% ofalcohol by weight) (oralcoholic liquor containingmore than 4% alcohol by weightin the original package andnot for consumption on thepremises) be prohibited in (orat) ..............?                                     YES--------------                                      NO--------------Except for the territorial descriptions, the actual ballots for bothwards were identical.  Thus, the ballot for the 46th Ward appeared asfollows:     The voters argue that the "totality of deviations" defeatsubstantial compliance because the ballots were invalid as to bothsubstance and form.  As to substance, the voters argue that theerroneous and nonsensical Spanish translations did not substantiallycomply with the statute.  As to form, the voters complain that thehorizontal line extending between the English and Spanish versions ofthe questions and answers created both a physical and psychologicalbarrier for voters.  The Board contends that the ballots substantiallycomplied with section 9-6 of the Liquor Control Act because adequateinformation was provided and the voters had a clear choice of "yes" or"no."  The Board also argues that any mistranslation of the questionsinto Spanish was irrelevant and did not change the election outcome.     We first consider the sufficiency of the substance of the ballotpropositions.  The content of the English questions was sufficient. More troubling, however, are the Spanish versions of the propositions,which did not present the same questions as were presented in English. As alleged in the voters' complaints, the Spanish versions:  (1) usedthe word "Debida," which means "to owe" in English rather than"Bebida," which means "to drink" in English; (2) twice used the word"Recinto," which has no Spanish meaning, instead of the Spanish word"Precinto," which means "precinct" in English; and (3) used anexpression "de la ultima eleccion," which means "of the last election"in English, rather than "desde la ultima eleccion," which means "sincethe last election" in English.  The voters charged that the result ofthese mistakes was a proposition which read:          "Should the sale of alcoholic [a owing to] in this          21st [misspelled word] area of 21st [misspelled          word] be prohibited in the City of Chicago?  (As          such precinct existed [of] the last general          election[.])"The 46th Ward question was similarly phrased.      The Board concedes that the Spanish versions were misleading butcounters that the Spanish versions were merely additional, helpfulinformation.  The Board explains that it was attempting to comply withthe Voting Rights Language Assistance Act.  42 U.S.C. �1973aa-1a(1994).  The Board also argues that there were too few Spanish-speaking voters in those precincts to affect the election outcomes.     We find no merit in either of the Board's explanations for theimproper Spanish translations.  We first reject the Board's argumentthat few voters were affected.  Section 9-19 of the Liquor Control Actmakes clear that any five voters may contest the validity of anelection.  235 ILCS 5/9-19 (West 1994).  "[A]ll qualified citizenshave a constitutionally protected right to vote and to have theirvotes counted."  Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 305-06, 664 N.E.2d43, 48 (1996).  The Board may not argue that a littledisenfranchisement is harmless.  We also reject the Board's argumentthat it was attempting to comply with the Voting Rights LanguageAssistance Act.  Whether the Board complied with the Voting Rights Actis irrelevant.  Once the Board affirmatively undertook to provide theSpanish versions of the local option referenda, it had an obligationto do so correctly.  The Board can make no argument that the Spanishtranslations complied with section 9-6 of the Liquor Control Act.     The trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that theSpanish versions of the local option propositions substantiallycomplied with section 9-6 of the Liquor Control Act.  Thus, we neednot address whether the form of the propositions complied with section9-6.  Moreover, because our decision is based on compliance with theLiquor Control Act, we need not consider the validity of the localoption ballots with respect to the Voting Rights Language AssistanceAct.       The voters' final argument on appeal is that the trial courterred by imposing the equitable doctrine of laches to bar the voters'claims of invalid ballot formation.  The voters argue that theybrought suit within the 10-day period specified under section 9-19 ofthe Liquor Control Act.  The Board counters that its publication ofthe ballot several days prior to the election gave the voters eitheractual or constructive notice of the ballot to defeat any challenges.     Typically, laches requires a showing of a lack of diligence onthe part of the plaintiffs and that defendant was prejudiced byplaintiff's lack of diligence.  Kurtz v. Solomon, 275 Ill. App. 3d643, 653, 656 N.E.2d 184, 192 (1995).  The Election Code provides: "Ballots shall be printed *** at least two days before each electionand subject to the inspection of candidates and their agents; if anymistakes be discovered they shall be corrected without delay."  10ILCS 5/16-5 (West 1994).  Courts applying laches in the electioncontext have enforced the statutory option of candidates or theirpolitical parties to inspect the ballots.  In re Contest of Electionfor Governor, 93 Ill. 2d 463, 488, 444 N.E.2d 170, 181 (1983); Peopleex rel. Goldberg v. Delaney, 39 Ill. 2d 474, 481, 236 N.E.2d 689, 693(1968).       In contrast, election provisions governing constitutionalamendments or public questions do not indicate who should inspect theballot.  See 10 ILCS 5/16-6, 16-7 (West 1994); 235 ILCS 5/9-5 (West1994).  Thus, while the Liquor Control Act requires ballots to beprinted and available for inspection prior to the actual election, thestatute specifically indicates that failure to publish does not affectthe validity of the election.  235 ILCS 5/9-5 (West 1994).  Nothing inthis case indicates that the voters had a duty to inspect thereferendum ballots prior to election day.  Therefore, laches is not anappropriate bar to the voters' claims.     In summary, the voters stated a valid cause of action contestingthe validity of ballots used on April 4, 1995, in the local optionselections held in the 22nd Precinct of the 46th Ward and the 21stPrecinct of the 21st Ward in the City of Chicago.  Further, we cannotsay, as a matter of law, that the ballots presented in these localoption elections substantially complied with section 9-6 of theIllinois Liquor Control Act.  Because our decision is based oncompliance with the Liquor Control Act, we need not address theapplicability of the federal Voting Rights Language Assistance Act. We also find that laches is not a proper bar to the voters' suits.  Wereverse the trial court's order granting the Board's motions to strikeand dismiss and remand the cause.     Reversed and remanded.     GREIMAN, P.J., and ZWICK, J., concur.