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2020 IL App (1st) 190904 

THIRD DIVISION 

September 9, 2020 

No. 1-19-0904 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

MARIANNE GIOVENCO-PAPPAS, Individually and as ) 

Guardian of the Person and Estate of Rosemary Giovenco, ) 

) Appeal from the 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of 

) Cook County 

) 

v. ) 15 CH 12484 

) 

MATTHEW BERAUER, PATTY KEHL and THE ) Honorable 

KENNETH YOUNG CENTER, a Not-for-Profit ) Robert E. Senechalle Jr., 

Corporation, ) Judge Presiding 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Howse and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiffs sued a private “provider agency” and two of its social workers, working under 

contract with the Illinois Department on Aging, for their alleged negligent investigation of an 

allegation of elder abuse. Before trial, defendants asserted the defense of sovereign immunity. 

¶ 2 The court agreed that sovereign immunity barred this lawsuit and dismissed the matter 

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We likewise agree that defendants’ alleged misconduct 

were actions of the State and thus protected by sovereign immunity. We affirm the judgment. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 In 1998, Rosemary Giovenco (Rosemary) suffered a traumatic brain injury after she was 

involved in a car accident. This injury caused significant neurological disability and required her 
 

 

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to be placed in adult guardianship. Plaintiff Marianne Giovenco-Pappas, Rosemary’s daughter 

(Marianne), was appointed as her mother’s guardian in 2000. At all relevant times, Judge 

Carolyn Quinn, a judge in the Circuit Court of Cook County, oversaw Rosemary’s guardianship. 

¶ 5 Although Rosemary was significantly disabled, she was able to communicate in a limited 

manner, walk (with the assistance of a walker), and provide basic care for herself such as 

dressing, cooking, and eating. Although she had some expressive language, as result of the 1998 

injury, in Marianne’s words, “when someone tries to communicate verbally with Rosemary[,] 

she turns her head and makes a wincing, grimincing [sic] face[,] especially when she is nervous, 

interacting with strangers, or any disruption of her normal routine.” This “is not an expression of 

pain, fear, or negativity.” 

¶ 6 In late 2014, Rosemary underwent knee replacement surgery. During the rehabilitation on 

her knee, she developed a methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) infection in her 

skull. This infection had a devastating effect on Rosemary’s cognitive abilities. “Because of the 

MRSA infection Rosemary cannot walk; she is incontinent and wears diapers, she cannot speak 

and is non-verbal.” After extended treatment and rehabilitation for the MRSA infection, 

Rosemary was able to return to Marianne’s care sometime in the middle of 2015. 

¶ 7 On August 8, 2015, while serving dinner, Marianne noticed that Rosemary’s right hand 

and wrist had become swollen and red and was warm to the touch. There were also “2 small 

blister like areas on the dorsal aspect of her right hand.” As the family ate dinner, Marianne 

become increasingly concerned about her mother’s hand. She called 911, and the emergency 

responders took Rosemary to St. Alexius Hospital in Hoffman Estates (Hospital). The Hospital’s 

emergency room physician diagnosed Rosemary with cellulitis, a skin infection. Because this 

infection required treatment with two potent antibiotics, Rosemary was admitted. After her 

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admission, she came under the care of Dr. Gopal Rao. Dr. Rao also diagnosed Rosemary’s hand 

condition as cellulitis. Rosemary received the antibiotic treatment and was scheduled for 

discharge on August 12. 

¶ 8 The Hospital is within the service area of The Kenneth Young Center (KYC). KYC is a 

“provider agency,” selected by the Illinois Department of Aging (Department) to receive and 

assess reports of alleged or suspected abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of the elderly. 

KYC, as a provider agency, is tasked with assisting the Department in administering a protective 

services program for the elderly in Illinois. See 320 ILCS 20/3 (West 2014). These provider 

agencies “are agents of the Illinois Department on Aging.” 89 Ill. Adm. Code 270.215(c), 

amended at 39 Ill. Reg. 2156 (eff. Jan. 23, 2015). To accomplish their work on behalf of the 

Department, provider agencies may assign caseworkers to investigate allegations of elder abuse. 

Defendants Matthew Berauer and Patty Kehl are two of KYC’s caseworkers. 

¶ 9 The day before Rosemary’s scheduled discharge, a Hospital social worker, Paul Kutylo, 

reported his suspicion that Rosemary was the victim of neglect or abuse to KYC. Kutylo 

specifically reported a suspicion that Marianne had burned Rosemary’s hand. The KYC 

investigation was assigned to Berauer. 

¶ 10 The same day that Kutylo reported his suspicions, Berauer began his investigation. He 

reviewed some of Rosemary’s medical records and interviewed Rosemary. While interviewing 

Rosemary, Berauer noted that she would grimace when he mentioned Marianne. Specifically, 

when he asked Rosemary if she wanted to go home, she “became tearful and curled into the fetal 

position.” These grimaces caused him to believe that Rosemary was fearful of Marianne. 

¶ 11 The next morning, the date of Rosemary’s expected discharge, Berauer called Marianne. 

What was said during this call is highly contested. Marianne claims that Berauer told her that his 

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investigation had determined that Marianne had burned, abused, and otherwise neglected 

Rosemary. Berauer claims that he simply told her that there had been allegations of a burn, 

abuse, and neglect. According to Marianne, she was shocked by these allegations, especially 

since no doctor had diagnosed a burn. Later that day, Marianne went to the Hospital and met 

with Berauer. Their accounts of that meeting differ, but ultimately, after speaking with both 

Marianne and Rosemary, Berauer still had concerns about the allegations of abuse. 

¶ 12 Berauer’s response to his investigation is also hotly contested. Most notably, Marianne 

contends that Berauer refused to allow Rosemary to be discharged into Marianne’s care. Instead, 

Marianne claims that Berauer, personally, cancelled Rosemary’s August 12 discharge and 

ordered her to be discharged to a subacute rehabilitation facility. The record is clear, and even 

Berauer admits, that Berauer did not possess the authority to cancel Rosemary’s discharge. 

¶ 13 From his perspective, Berauer did not cancel or order anything. His deposition testimony 

on this point is difficult to follow, but he claims that he only made recommendations about 

Rosemary’s discharge. Kutylo testified that Berauer did not cancel Rosemary’s discharge—the 

Hospital did, because its policy was not to discharge a patient into a potentially harmful 

environment. In an affidavit, Dr. Rao states “[t]hat on August 12, 2015, Matthew Berauer 

advised me that he cancelled my order discharging Rosemary Giovenco on August 12, 2015.” 

Dr. Rao “believe[d] that [Berauer] had the power and authority to take that type of action as an 

Adult Protective Service Worker.” 

¶ 14 Rosemary remained in the Hospital until August 16. On August 16, Rosemary was 

transferred from the Hospital to the Glenview Terrace Nursing Center. Dr. Rao signed the 

discharge to the nursing center “because [he] believed that Matthew Berauer, as an Adult 

Protective Service Worker, had the power and authority to require [him] to take those actions.” 

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The Glenview nursing center was outside the “jurisdiction” of KYC, and thus, Rosemary’s file 

was transferred to the North Shore Senior Center, another provider agency. 

¶ 15 On August 18, Marianne, through her lawyer, faxed a letter to Kehl, complaining about 

Berauer’s handling of the investigation. This letter specifically contends that the medical records 

directly refuted Berauer’s “claims.” This letter demanded the immediate release of Rosemary 

into Marianne’s custody and threatened a lawsuit otherwise. Within hours of reading Marianne’s 

demand, Berauer sent a letter, addressed to Judge Quinn, recommending that the court appoint a 

guardian ad litem (GAL) over Rosemary’s estate. The same day, Judge Quinn appointed Ruben 

Garcia as Rosemary’s GAL. 

¶ 16 Garcia investigated the claims that Rosemary was being abused. On August 24, he issued 

his report to Judge Quinn. Garcia’s investigation did not find any evidence of abuse or neglect. 

The only “negative” result was that “[Rosemary] was able to communicate with [Garcia] that she 

would like to have more attention and more care at her daughter’s house. [Rosemary] 

communicated to me that she believes that she is sometimes left alone for longer periods of time 

than she likes.” Ultimately, the court dismissed the GAL and allowed Marianne to remain as 

Rosemary’s guardian. 

¶ 17 The day after the GAL was appointed, August 19, Rosemary filed this action, seeking an 

injunction requiring defendants to immediately release Rosemary into Marianne’s custody. (Note 

that Marianne sued both in her individual and official capacities, so as a litigant, we will refer to 

her in the plural “plaintiffs.”) Due to developments that occurred after the initial filing, plaintiffs 

made numerous amendments to the complaint. The complaint at issue on appeal, the verified 

fifth amended complaint, no longer sought injunctive relief. Instead, plaintiffs made 24 claims 

arising from defendant’s handling of the investigation into the allegations of elder abuse, 

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including negligence, false imprisonment, intentional inflection of emotional distress, 

defamation, and false light. 

¶ 18 The circuit court declined to dismiss the complaint on the merits, and the case proceeded 

toward trial. As the trial date was approaching, defendants filed a “trial brief regarding sovereign 

immunity.” Recognizing that sovereign immunity implicated its subject-matter jurisdiction, the 

trial court construed the brief as a motion to dismiss. The court ordered briefing and allowed 

argument on the issue of sovereign immunity. 

¶ 19 The circuit court concluded that sovereign immunity applied. Although plaintiffs argued 

that defendants “exceeded their authority,” the court determined that “there simply are not 

allegations in this complaint that either Mr. Berauer or Ms. Kehl exceeded their authority in a 

way that would take this case outside of the protections in the immunity statute of sovereign 

immunity.” Instead, the court believed the allegations were that Berauer made “mistakes in 

judgment.” The court noted its 

“serious concern in this case were the Court to find that the sovereign immunity didn’t 

protect Mr. Berauer as an elder abuse case worker, when it’s such a difficult, difficult 

task, particularly in a situation like this, where time is very short, things are happening 

fast, and his job, at least until he can get his arms around the issue, is to protect the person 

that is his responsibility.” 

¶ 20 The court dismissed the case, and plaintiff moved to reconsider. In its written order on 

reconsideration, the court declined to reconsider the decision that the claim was barred by 

sovereign immunity. However, the court also made specific determinations about the effect and 

applicability of other immunity statutes, specifically the State Lawsuit Immunity Act and the 

qualified-immunity provision of the Adult Protective Services Act. 

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¶ 21 Plaintiffs timely appealed. 

¶ 22 ANALYSIS 

¶ 23 I 

¶ 24 Sovereign immunity implicates a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Leetaru v. Board of 

Trustees of the University of Illinois, 2015 IL 117485, ¶¶ 41-42; Currie v. Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 

157 (1992). Thus, the circuit court construed the defendants’ “trial brief” on sovereign immunity 

as a section 2-619 motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 735 ILCS 5/2-

619(a)(1) (West 2014) (authorizing dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). We review 

a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 41. 

¶ 25 The 1970 Illinois Constitution abolished sovereign immunity “ ‘[e]xcept as the General 

Assembly may provide by law.’ ” Parmar v. Madigan, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 19 (quoting Ill. Const. 

1970, art. XIII, § 4). The General Assembly reinstituted sovereign immunity for the State via the 

State Lawsuit Immunity Act (745 ILCS 5/0.01 et seq. (West 2014)). See Leetaru, 2015 IL 

117485, ¶ 42. 

¶ 26 The State Lawsuit Immunity Act states that, except as provided in various statutes, 

including the Court of Claims Act, the State “shall not be made a defendant or party in any 

court.” 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2014). The Court of Claims Act, in turn, establishes a court with 

exclusive jurisdiction to hear most matters against the State. 705 ILCS 505/8 (West 2014). For 

example, “[a]ll claims against the State founded upon any law of the State of Illinois or upon any 

regulation adopted thereunder by an executive or administrative officer or agency” (id. § 8(a)) 

and “[a]ll claims against the State for damages in cases sounding in tort, if a like cause of action 

would lie against a private person or corporation in a civil suit” (id. § 8(d)). 

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¶ 27 Whether an action is “against the State,” thus implicating sovereign immunity, does not 

depend on the formal identification of the parties “but rather on the issues involved and the relief 

sought.” Healy v. Vaupel, 133 Ill. 2d 295, 308 (1990). A plaintiff cannot avoid sovereign 

immunity simply by filing “an action against the state’s servants or agents when the real claim is 

against the state itself.” Swanigan v. Smith, 294 Ill. App. 3d 263, 269 (1998); see Healy, 133 Ill. 

2d at 308. As to the issues raised, “an action is against the state when there are: 

‘(1) no allegations that an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the scope of his 

authority through wrongful acts; (2) the duty alleged to have been breached was not owed 

to the public generally independent of the fact of State employment; and (3) where the 

complained-of actions involve matters ordinarily within that employee’s normal and 

official functions of the State ***.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jinkins v. Lee, 

209 Ill. 2d 320, 330 (2004) (quoting Healy, 133 Ill. 2d at 309). 

Regarding the relief sought, a court must consider whether “a judgment for the plaintiff could 

operate to control the actions of the State or subject it to liability.” Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 158. 

¶ 28 Plaintiffs do not deny that defendants here would qualify as State actors who ordinarily 

would be entitled to sovereign immunity. And rightly so. In Toth v. England, 348 Ill. App. 3d 

378, 380-82 (2004), sovereign immunity barred a suit against a private nursing association (and 

one of its employees, England) that provided care to the plaintiff’s elderly mother pursuant to a 

contract with the Illinois Department on Aging. The plaintiff sued the defendants for defamation, 

abuse of process, and malicious prosecution for filing a petition for guardianship of the 

plaintiff’s disabled mother. Id. at 379. 

¶ 29 We held that the nursing association and its employee, England, though private actors, 

were acting as agents of the State. Id. at 386. First, the State Employee Indemnification Act’s 

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definition of “employee” included an “ ‘individual representative[ ] of or organizations 

designated by the Department on Aging.’ ” Id. (quoting 5 ILCS 350/1(b) (West 2000)). And the 

enabling statute, the Elder Abuse and Neglect Act (the predecessor to the Adult Protective 

Services Act applicable here), provided (as it still does today) that the Department on Aging may 

implement the Act through provider agencies. Id.; see 320 ILCS 20/3 (West 2014). Likewise, 

under the applicable administrative rules, “the provider agencies and their employees are 

performing the State’s work pursuant to the State’s direction.” Toth, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 386; see 

89 Ill. Adm. Code 270.215, amended at 39 Ill. Reg. 2156 (eff. Jan. 23, 2015) (providing for 

control and coordination over provider agencies). 

¶ 30 We reasoned that “[t]he case at bar is exactly the type of action where sovereign 

immunity bars the action. England is a social worker who is working on behalf of the State’s 

elderly people when she has reason to suspect abuse, neglect, or exploitation.” Toth, 348 Ill. 

App. 3d at 389. “Accordingly, when a social worker that is acting on behalf of the Department is 

sued by another for work-related statements, the suit necessarily threatens to control the actions 

of the State.” Id. at 389-90. 

¶ 31 Toth was well-reasoned and, in our view, correctly decided. And as noted, the provisions 

of the Adult Protective Services Act and the applicable administrative rules that underlay our 

conclusion in Toth are in substantially the same form today. Thus, there can be no question—nor 

do plaintiffs raise one—that defendants here were acting as agents of the State in providing care, 

which ordinarily would trigger sovereign immunity’s bar. 

¶ 32 But plaintiffs argue that their lawsuit fits within an exception to sovereign immunity— 

when the complained-of actions of the State agent exceed his or her authority under state law. 

See, e.g., Jinkins, 209 Ill. 2d at 330 (sovereign immunity applies when, among other things, there 

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are “no allegations that an agent or employee of the State acted beyond the scope of his authority 

through wrongful acts” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Parmar, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 22; 

Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 45; Healy, 133 Ill. 2d at 309. The reason for this exception is that 

“conduct taken by a State officer without legal authority strips the officer of his or her official 

status.” Parmar, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 22; see also Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, ¶¶ 45-46. 

¶ 33 Plaintiffs say that, in two different ways, their complaint adequately alleged that 

defendant Berauer exceeded his authority as an investigator. First, he allegedly overrode a 

physician’s order to discharge Rosemary, something everyone (including Berauer) agrees he 

lacked the authority to do. And second, he wrote that letter to Judge Quinn, requesting the 

appointment of a guardian ad litem for Rosemary. 

¶ 34 The trial court ruled that these allegations are not of the sort that would typically 

constitute a State officer “exceeding” his or her authority for the purposes of this exception to 

sovereign immunity. We are likewise skeptical. Even if Berauer did these things (he denies the 

first allegation), and even if he acted improperly in doing so, he was doing them in furtherance of 

his State work, and any duty he breached was a duty he owed only by virtue of the State work he 

was performing. See, e.g., Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, ¶ 47 (“not every legal wrong committed by 

an officer of the State will trigger” this exception; exception is aimed “at situations where the 

official is not doing the business which the sovereign has empowered him or her to do or is doing 

it in a way which the law forbids”); Jackson v. Alverez, 358 Ill. App. 3d 555, 561 (2005) 

(“Because sovereign immunity presupposes the possibility of a legal wrong by a state employee 

[citation], and legal wrongs are, per se, unauthorized, the relevant question cannot be whether the 

employee had authority to commit the legal wrong. Instead, the question is whether the employee 

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intended to perform some function within the scope of his or her authority when committing the 

legal wrong.”); Currie, 148 Ill. 2d at 159-60; Toth, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 387-88. 

¶ 35 But that analysis is not always straightforward, and as discussed below, we can resolve 

this matter on a far simpler ground. So for the sake of argument, we will assume, without 

deciding, that the complaint here adequately pleaded that Berauer exceeded the authority 

delegated to him by the State in allegedly overriding the physician’s discharge order and in 

penning a letter to a circuit judge seeking a guardian for Rosemary. 

¶ 36 This exception to sovereign immunity for State officers who exceed their authority, and 

thus are not truly acting on behalf of the State when they commit their wrongful acts, is 

interchangeably styled the “officer suit exception” or the “prospective injunctive relief 

exception.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parmar, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 22. While the former 

moniker is more popularly used (id.), the latter one previews why plaintiffs here cannot avoid the 

bar of sovereign immunity, regardless of the sufficiency of their allegations. A suit against an 

officer or agent of the State may avoid the sovereign-immunity bar only if the lawsuit seeks to 

enjoin future conduct by the State agent. Id. ¶ 26 (“a complaint seeking damages for a past 

wrong does not fall within the officer suit exception to sovereign immunity”); Ellis v. Board of 

Governors of State Colleges & Universities, 102 Ill. 2d 387, 395 (1984) (tenured professor’s suit 

for damages for wrongful discharge was barred by sovereign immunity; court recognized that if 

plaintiff instead “seeks to enjoin a State officer from taking future actions in excess of his 

delegated authority, then the immunity prohibition does not pertain”); Leetaru, 2015 IL 117485, 

¶ 51 (lawsuit not barred by sovereign immunity because “[plaintiff’s] action does not seek 

redress for some past wrong” but, rather, “seeks only to prohibit future conduct *** undertaken 

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by agents of the State in violation of statutory or constitutional law or in excess of their 

authority”). 

¶ 37 Here, plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin defendants’ future conduct. Their complaint only 

seeks monetary damages for past actions of State agents that allegedly constituted negligence, 

false imprisonment, intentional inflection of emotional distress, and various forms of defamation. 

The “officer suit exception” to sovereign immunity does not apply. The bar of sovereign 

immunity remains. 

¶ 38 The trial court thus correctly dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

¶ 39 II 

¶ 40 We briefly address two final issues raised by plaintiffs. 

¶ 41 A 

¶ 42 First, plaintiffs claim that we should not apply the sovereign-immunity bar in the State 

Lawsuit Immunity Act (745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2014)). Instead, they say, we should apply the more 

specific immunity provision in section 4(b) of the Adult Protective Services Act, which provides 

that any person or agency that reports or investigates a claim of elder abuse “in good faith” shall 

have “immunity from any civil, criminal or other liability in any civil, criminal or other 

proceeding.” 320 ILCS 20/4(b) (West 2014). Plaintiffs say this provision is more specific than 

the general grant of immunity in the State Lawsuit Immunity Act, and thus the more specific law 

should control over the general one. See Moore v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470, 480 (2006) (“Where a 

general statutory provision and a more specific statutory provision relate to the same subject, we 

will presume that the legislature intended the more specific provision to govern.”). 

¶ 43 But the doctrine of applying the more specific statute over the general has no application 

here, because the sovereign-immunity statute and the immunity provision in the Adult Protective 

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Services Act are addressing two fundamentally different things. See Janes v. Albergo, 254 Ill. 

App. 3d 951, 956 (1993) (“sovereign immunity and public official immunity are two separate 

doctrines”); Campbell v. White, 207 Ill. App. 3d 541, 548-49 (1991) (same). Indeed, other than 

the word “immunity,” these two concepts share nothing in common. 

¶ 44 Sovereign immunity protects the State from being hauled into court in the first place. Just 

as the State Lawsuit Immunity Act plainly says: With a few exceptions not relevant here, “the 

State of Illinois shall not be made a defendant or party in any court.” 745 ILCS 5/1 (West 2014). 

It speaks not to liability but to the court’s jurisdiction. See Parmar, 2018 IL 122265, ¶ 20; 705 

ILCS 505/8(a) (West 2014) (Court of Claims “shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and 

determine *** [a]ll claims against the State founded upon any law of the State of Illinois” 

(emphasis added)). It is immunity from suit—in a court, at least—not immunity from liability. 

Indeed, as just noted, the State remains potentially liable for its agents’ misconduct, subject to 

the constraints of the Court of Claims Act. 

¶ 45 In contrast, other “immunity” provisions based on statute or the common law allow 

defendants to avoid liability for their wrongful conduct, but they are not barriers to suit. A 

public-official immunity provision, like section 4(b) of the Adult Protective Services Act, may 

make it difficult or impossible to obtain a damages award against a particular defendant, but a 

circuit court may still hear the case. A tort-immunity statute may insulate a municipality from 

liability or impose a higher burden to impose such liability, but those provisions do not prevent 

the bringing of a lawsuit in the first place. 

¶ 46 These sort of immunity statutes are not jurisdictional in nature. See Janes, 254 Ill. App. 

3d at 957. In fact, unlike subject-matter jurisdictional objections, which can never be forfeited 

and may be raised at any time (In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 414-15 (2009)), the defense of 

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immunity from liability may be forfeited if not asserted (Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 

186 Ill. 2d 381, 387-88 (1998)). 

¶ 47 All of which is to say that sovereign immunity and public-official immunity are neither 

overlapping nor antagonistic. Subject-matter jurisdictional questions like sovereign immunity 

will always predominate in court; if there is no subject-matter jurisdiction, the case is over. But if 

subject-matter jurisdiction exists, a defendant remains free to assert any defense like publicofficer immunity. And for that matter, if a case in court is dismissed based on sovereign 

immunity, a defendant remains free to assert an immunity defense, like section 4(b) of the Adult 

Protective Services Act, before the Court of Claims. See Campbell, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 555. 

¶ 48 B 

¶ 49 Finally, plaintiffs challenge other rulings by the trial court. Given the court’s lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction, this matter—at least in the courts—is at an end. There is no need for 

us to individually examine each of these other orders. But because this dispute may find its way 

to the Court of Claims, we will say this much: These other challenged orders—and indeed, all 

orders entered below, other than the one dismissing the case for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction—are void, as the circuit court lacked the inherent power to enter them. See M.W., 

232 Ill. 2d at 414 (if court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, “any order entered in the matter is 

void ab initio”). 

¶ 50 CONCLUSION 

¶ 51 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

¶ 52 Affirmed. 

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No. 1-19-0904 

Cite as: Giovenco-Pappas v. Berauer, 2020 IL App (1st) 190904 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 15-CH12484; the Hon. Robert E. Senechalle Jr., Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys John J. Pappas Sr. and Stephen J. Healy, The Pappas Law Group, 

for LLC, of Chicago, for appellant. 

Appellant: 

Attorneys John W. Patton Jr. and James A. Garfield, of Patton & Ryan 

for LLC, and Melinda S. Kollross and Paul V. Esposito, of Clausen 

Appellee: Miller P.C., both of Chicago, for appellees. 

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