### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 12, 200 6

CHR ISTOP HERNE IL SC HUL TZ v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2003-A- 432 J. Randall Wyatt, Jr ., Judge

No. M2005- 02464-CCA -R3-P C - F iled Janu ary 5, 2007

On Marc h 3, 2004, Petitioner, Christopher Schultz , pled g uilty to two counts of first deg ree murder. The trial c ourt sentenc ed Petitioner to serve two concur rent life se ntence s. On Novembe r 30, 2004, Pe tit ion e r f

ile d a pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f w hic h th e post -con vi ctio n c ou rt su bs e qu e ntl y de nie d. I n th is a

pp e a l, P e tit ion e r a

rg ue s th a t th e po st -c on vic tio n c ou rt e rr e d in de nying him

po stconviction re lief bec ause his g uiltypleas we re not knowing ly and voluntarily

enter ed. Af

ter a thoroug h revie w of the r ecor d, the judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed

T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D H. W ELLES and J ERRY L. S MI TH , J J ., joined.
Ry a n C. Ca ld w e ll , N a s h v il le , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll a n t, Ch ris to p h e r N e il Sc h u lt z.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; C. Da nie l L ins , As sis ta nt At torne y Ge ne ra l; Victor S. (Torry ) Johns o n I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and K athy

Morante, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, the State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION
I. Guilty P lea

A t th e g u il ty p le a p r o c e e d in g s , th e tria l ju d g e e xp lain e d to Pe ti ti o n e r th a t h e w as plea ding g uiltyto two coun t s o f fi rs t -degr ee mur der, a nd that as a r esult he would be r equire d to serve
c on c ur re nt l if e se nte nc e s a ndwo uld no t be e lig ibl e fo r pa ro le un til a ft e r s e rv ic e of

fi ft y -o ne y e ars

. Pet i t ioner a cknowledg ed that he unde rstood what he w as plea ding g uiltyto and the sente nce he
wo uldre c e ive in e xch a ng e fo r h is p le a . T he tr ia l jud g e the n e xpla ine d th a t Pe tit ion e r h a d a ri g ht t o
a tr ia l by jury . T he jud g e de sc ri be d th e pr oc e ss o f s e le c tin g a jury a ndc on du c tin g a

tr ia l, a lon g wi th the pre sumption of innoce nce c loaking Petitioner, the State’s burde n of proof , the rig ht to present
e vid e nc e , a ndthe ri g ht t o c on fr on t th e wi tne sse s a g a ins t him sh ou ld De fe nd a nt op t fo r a jury tr ia l.-2-

Pe ti ti o n e r a g a in a c k n o w le d g e d h is u n d e r s tan d in g o f th e s e r ig h ts a n d h is u n d e r s tan d in g that by entering a plea of g uiltyhe wa s relinquishing the se rig hts.

Pe tit ion e r a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he ha d r e a d o ve r the gu ilt y ple a pe tit ion in d e ta il w ith his lawy er. H e aff

irmed that his la wy er had explained the provisions of the petition to him, and that he ha d s ig ne d th e pe tit ion a c kn ow le dg ing his un de rs ta nd ing of the pr ov isi on s a s we ll a s his a c tio ns in entering a g uiltyplea. He aff

irmed that his de cision to e nter a g uilty plea was voluntary . Petitioner’s trial counsel a cknowledg ed th at h e h ad spoken to Petitioner, and that Petiti oner’ s plea wa s voluntari l y , k n o wi ng ly , and under standing ly enter ed af

ter discussion with counsel. Trial counsel expressed his own rese rvations about the plea, but Petitioner re- aff irmed that it wa s his ow n persona l decision, and tha t he was making the decision voluntarily

.
F oll ow ing the g uil ty

ple a c oll oq uy , th e fo llo wi ng fa c ts w e re sti pu la te d:
The proof in this case would show that on Nove mber 25th of 2002, witnesse s saw an ind ivi du a l, a

ma le , g o u p to a c ar, wh ic h wa s pa rk e d in the Ou te r Limi ts’ pa rking lot , which is a c lub her e o n Nolensville Road in Davidson County , Tenne ssee. The y watc he d a s th is ind ivi du a l w e nt u p to the a uto mob ile that w a s p ark e d, sta ndne ar i t and fire five to six times into t hat aut o m o bile. There was a pause, pe rhaps f

or reloa ding, a nd then there wer e additional shots. The individual who wa s doing the shooting ve ry

calmly stopped, rea ched to the g round and p i ck ed up something believed to be shell casing s, ag ain, ac cording to several ey ewitnesses

. That individual then got into the passe ng er side of a Saturn ve hi cl e, which w as par ked
near by

.
One of the witnesses was a security g uard, who was employ ed by Outer Limits , who witnessed this. He immediately g ot into his ve hicle, which just so happened to have a video c amer a in it. He followe d the vehicle as it drove out of t he par king lot. he fo llo we d it

fo r q uit e so me way s o nto the int e rs tate . H e wa s a ble to g e t th e lic e ns e plate on the vi deo, as well as some depiction of the individual who wa s sitti ng in the pa sse ng e r s ide of

the c ar, wh o w a s, in f

a c t, the sh oo te r. He e ve ntu a lly wa s - - h a d to
s to p p u r s u it

o f th a t v e h ic le b e c a u s e it h a d p u ll e d in to w h a t h e b e li e v e d w a s a d e a d [- ]end la ne and he was afr aid for his sa fety

. This information, including the video tape and the state ments of other w itnesses, wer e g iven to the police.

The police wer e able to locate the ide ntityof that vehic le. I t belong ed to the mother of the c o-def

endant in this case , M au ri ce Ty ler. It was lea rned, how ever , that the mother had, in fac t, g iven that car to this defendant, Mr. Schultz. Mr. Schultz was broug ht in for questi oning. He admitted that the S aturn, in fa ct, was his ca r. He , at that point, denied involvement with the shooting. H e denie d that there was a ny body else in t h e car, a lthough, a g ain, witnesses a nd the videotape indicated that involvement.-3-

Ad dit ion a l e vid e nc e , in c lud ing vario us state me nts that w e re take n b y wi tne sse s,
cause d the pol ice to believe that the s hooter in this case was, in fact, Mr. Ty ler. The y we re able to d e te rm ine that on e of the vic tim s, Mr . Mon te Ca mpb e ll, the ma le vic tim , ha d a fe w y e ar s b e f

o r e , c o m m i t t e d a

h o m e i n v a s i o n o f

D e f e n d a n tT y l e r ’ s h o m e in L ewisburg , Tenne ssee. Mr. Ca mpbell did approxi mate ly thr e ey ear s in prison for that crime. H oweve r, on the da y that the pl ea in that c ase w as take n, Mr. Ty ler wa s hear d by a poli ce o ff

i ce r, a L ewisburg police off icer , to say

that he wa s g oing to kill Mr. Campbell when Mr. Campbell was rele ased f rom prison. I n fac t, Mr. Campbell had be e n r e le a se d f

ro m p ri so n ju st a sho rt

tim e prior

to this mur de r. Th e oth e r v ic tim , Ms. Kyra Carew , was simply an innocent victim who was in the wrong place at the wrong time and Mr. Ty ler simply did not car e, beca

use it is the State’s belief

that he was out on a r eveng e killing to kill Mr. Campbell.

Th e re fo re , it

is the Sta te ’s pr oo f - - i t w ould be th e S ta te ’s pr oo f at tria l, w hic h is
curr ently set a short time fr om now, that Mr. Ty ler was the s hooter, Mr. Schultz was the dr ive r o f the ve hic le a nd , in fa c t, d ro ve the getaway c ar a ft e r the se tw o v ic tim s wer e murde red.

I wo uldstate fo r the re c or d th a t, q uit e ob vio us ly , Mr. Ty le r ha s bee n sev e re d a ndhis
case will go f

orwa rd. I would also point out that family members of both victims are here in the Court today

and obviously

are awa re of this plea.
The trial judg e cla

rified that Petitioner wa s being convicted on a t h eory of criminal responsibilityin that, as the driver of t he geta way car , he aided and abetted the shooter, Mr . Ty ler. B a se d o n th e sti pu la te d f a c ts, Pe tit ion e r s ta te d th a t he wa s p le a din g g uil ty to t wo c ha

rg e s o f f ir st deg ree murder.

II. P os t- Co nvi c ti on H e ar ing
At the post-conviction hea ring , Petitioner testified that six months after the incident, he wa s inc arc e rate d a nda wa iti ng tr ia l a t th e Cr imi na l Just ic e Ce nte r ( CJC) w he n h e g a ve a state me nt t o Detec tive Crumby

confe ssing his involvement in the murder s. He said that his l aw y er was not prese nt and he wa s on medication at the time of his c onfession. Petitioner could not remembe r what medicine he was taking

.
Pe tit ion e r s a id tha t w he n h e e nte re d h is g uil ty ple a , “ [he] th ou g ht [h e ] wa s p le a din g to
a c tua lly be ing the sh oo te r in the c a se

. An d, the on ly re a so n [he] wa s ple a din g to that w a s [be ]caus e [he] was be ing thr eate ned.” H e explained that he wa s b ei n g p ersonally threatened by

his codefe ndant, Mr. Ty ler. These threa ts w ere also the re ason he te stified that he wa s the shooter at Mr. Ty ler’s tria l. He said that members of Mr. Ty ler’s “entoura g e” or “cr ew” wer e present at eve ry court appe ar a n c e

. Pe ti ti o n e r

s a idth a t a lth o u g h th e s ti p u late d f a c ts c le ar ly

in d ic a te d h e w a s b e ing
c on vic te d f

or his ro le a s d ri ve r, he wa s “ me dic a te d” a nd“ did n’ t r e a lly thi nk

. . . that he wa s su pp os e to be liste n i n g t o t h at

. ” He thought he was plea ding g uiltyto being the shooter ba sed on prior-4-

discussions between he and counse l. He assumed that counsel had r elay ed t h ei r di scussions and
rea ched a n ag ree ment with the district attorney . Petitioner said that he would not have ag ree d to two life sentenc es for

driving a ca

r.

Petitioner testified that as a y outh he had be en tre ated f or mental illness. He sa id that in the months leading up to his guilty plea he aring and at the he aring , h e wa s on various forms of medication which “ rea lly

slowed [him] down” a nd made him less coher ent. At the time of his plea, Petitioner felt “de presse d” and “thre atene d,” and like “if [he] didn’t acce pt the plea, then some thing would of happe ned to [him] or [hi s] fa mily .” Petitioner said that althoug h he denied be ing f orce d to ple ad g uilty at his he aring , this de nial was out of fea r that Mr. Ty ler would do something to hurt him if he reported the thre ats.

On cr oss-examination, P etitioner testified that he did not tell his attorney that he wa s being threatened in prison out of fe ar tha t he would be a ssaulted by Mr. Ty ler. He did request that the pr iso n auth or iti e s mo ve him to a no th er area, but be c a us e he didno t sp e c if y the re a so n f

or his reque sts to be moved, he w as repeatedly place d in prox imityto Mr. Ty ler. He was fina lly moved to sol ita ry or ma ximum

se c ur ity a ft e r h e wa s in vo lve d in se ve ra l f ig hts . H e re ite rate d th a t he wo uld not have plea d g uilty

had it not b ee n for the thr eats he was re ceiving from Mr. Ty ler. Ne ither the State, the detec tives, or the attorne y s involved threate ned or pr essure d Petitioner to plead g uilty

.
Pe tit ion e r’ s tr ia l c ou ns e l, Jona than Wing , te sti fi e d that he ha d be e n a n atto rn e y a t th e pu bli c defe nder’ s office for nine y ear s, prac ticing sole ly criminal law. Du ri n g h i s representa tion of Petitioner, he dete rmined Petitioner to be a “very rational” and “compe tent” individual. He sa id that the ca se wa s unusual beca use fr om the beg inning Petitioner wan t ed t o p lead g uiltyto being the shooter. He was c oncerned about this bec ause the State’s theory was that Petitioner was the driver, not the shooter, and a ll the evidence indicated that Mr. T y ler wa s the shooter.

Be cause of his difficulty in comprehe nding Petitioner’ s decision to plead g uilty , trial counsel
arr a n g e d f

o r Pe ti ti o n e r

to b e e xa mi n e d b y

a p s y c h iatris t. T h e p s y c h iatris t f o u n d Pe ti ti o n er

“ int e lli g e nt” a nd“ art ic ulate ” a ndre po rt e d n o me nta l de fi c iency that w ou ld s e rv e a s a de fe ns e in Petitioner’s ca se or e x plain his de ci s i o n to plead g uiltyto something he did not do. Trial counsel repe atedly

advised Petitioner that he w as m aking a bad decision by pleading g uiltyto a life sente nce in what was a

“pre tty d ef

en s i b l e case .” He told Petit ioner that it would be “ terrible” to take the blame fo r s o me o n e e ls e

. Pe ti ti o n e r p e r s is te d in w a n ti n g to p le a d g u il ty , a n d s a id h e w a n te d to be sentenc ed to a menta l health treatment fac ility

.
Trial counse l said that althoug h Petitioner never said that he wa s b ei ng threatened, he suspected that he was a nd asked Petitioner, a s often as possible, whether this was the ca se. Petitioner maintained his g uilt and never acknow ledg ed any

threa ts. Trial counsel sa id that prior to entering his guilty plea, Petitioner ha d many visitors at the CJ C. Most of the visitors we re me mbers of Mr

. Ty ler’s f amily as we re most of the te lephone c alls Petiti oner rec ei v ed

. T h ere wer e no visits by Petitioner’s own family members. Trial counsel continued to try to persua de P etitioner not to plead g uiltybeca

use of thre ats or pre ssure. He also spo k e wi t h t h e District Attorne y ’s offic e to try and-5-

work out a de al base d on his be lief that Petitioner was being pressure d. The State ag ree d to sever the defend a n ts o n ly

if Pe ti ti o n e r

a g r e e d to p le a d g u il ty

to b e in g th e d r iv e r , n o t th e s h o o te r

. T r ia l
c ou ns e l a ndPe tit ion e r d isc us se d th e a g re e me nt an d exac tly wh a t Peti tio ne r w ou ld b e ple a din g g uil ty to, including the State’ s stipulated fac ts, should P etitioner g o fo rw ar d with the plea. When aske d if Petitioner understood the stipulated facts and the charg es aga inst him, trial counsel state d, “I can’ t imag ine he didn’t know.”

III . A nal ys is

Petitioner claims that he is entitled to post-conviction relief beca use his g uiltypleas we re not knowing ly

and voluntarily

enter ed. Specif

ically , he ar g ues that he e ntere d a g uilty plea as a dire ct
re su lt o f M r. Ty le r’ s th re a ts a nda ssa ult s a g a ins t hi s pe rs on

. He re lie s on me dic a l re c or ds fr om h is incar cer ation as proof

that he wa s being threa tened and assaulted by Mr. Ty ler at the CJ C. Petitioner
a lso arg ue s th a t be c a us e the CJC f a ile d to a c t to pr ote c t hi m f ro m Mr . T y le r’ s th re a ts a nda ssa ult s by ro uti ne ly

pla c ing Pe tit ion e r andMr . T y le r i n c los e pr oximi ty to one a no the r, the Sta te is responsible for

the threats which induced Petitioner to plea d g uilty

.
Un de r ou r statut ory la w, the pe tit ion e r be ars the bu rd e n of pr ov ing the a lle g a tio ns in h is p os tconviction petition by

clea r and convincing evidenc e. T. C. A. § 40-30-110( f) (2003). “Evide nce is clear an d convincing when ther e is no serious or substantial doubt about the c orre ctness of the conclusions dra wn from the e vidence .” Hi c k s v . S tat e , 983 S.W .2d 2 4 0, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). On a

ppeal, the f

indings of fac t made by the pos t-conviction court are conclusive and will not be disturbed un le ss the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord pr eponder ates a g ainst them. Br oo k s v . S tat e , 756 S.W .2d 288, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) . The burde n is o n t h e petiti oner to show that the
e v id e n c e p r e p o n d e r a te d a g a in s t th o s e f in d ings. Cle nn

y v . S tat e , 5 76 S.W. 2d12 , 1 4 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1978).

I n Boyk in v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. C t

. 1 7 0 9 , 2 3 L

. E d . 2d 274 (1969), the U nited States Supreme Court ruled tha t defe ndants should be advised of certain constitutional rights bef ore entering ple as of g uilt. I ncluded a mong those are admonitions re g arding the rig ht ag ainst selfincrimination, the right to confr ont witnesses, and the right to trial by jury

. Boy k in , 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S. Ct . at 1712. “[T]he core r equire ment of Boy k in is ‘that no g uilty plea be acc epted without an aff irmative showing t hat it was intellige nt and voluntary .’” Bl an k e ns hip v . S tat e , 858 S.W .2d 897, 9 0 4 (T en n

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( q u o t i n g Fontaine v. United States , 526 F.2d 514, 516 ( 6th Cir. 1975)). The ple a
mus t re pr e se nt a

“ vo lun tary

a ndint e lli g e nt c ho ic e a mon g the a lte rn a tiv e c ou rs e s o f a c tio n o pe n to the def endant.” Nor th C

aroli na v . A lfo rd , 400 U.S

. 2 5 , 3 1 , 91 S. Ct . 160, 164, 27 L . Ed. 2d 162 (1970). I f t he proof establishes t hat t he petiti oner was aware of hi s constitutional rig hts, he is not entitled to relief. J

oh ns on v . S tat e , 834 S.W .2d 922, 926 (Tenn. 1992). A pl ea which i s the product of “ig noranc e, incompre hension, coe rcion, ter ror, induce ments, [or] subtle or blatant threats” is not voluntary

. Boy k in , 395 U.S. at 242-43, 89 S. Ct. 1712.-6-

I n a cceptin g a

g uil ty ple a , th e tr ia l c ou rt

mus t a sc e rt a in w he the r the de fe nd a nt f ull y understands the signific ant conseque nces of his or her plea. State v. Pe ttus , 986 S.W .2d 540, 542 (Tenn. 1999) . I n making this determination , t h e trial court may consider a

number of f

actor s inc lud ing the de fe nd a nt’ s re la tiv e int e lli g e nc e , his or he r famil iari ty wi th c ri mi nal pro cee din g s, wh e the r the de fe nd a nt wa s re pr e se nte d by c omp e te nt c ou ns e l a ndha d th e op po rtun ity to c on fe r w ith counsel a bout options, t he advic e g iven by counsel a nd the trial court about the char g es ag ainst the defe ndant and the pe nalty

to be imposed, and the de fenda nt’s rea sons for plea ding g uilty

. Bl ake ns hip

v . S tat e , 858 S.W .2d at 904.

Th e po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt fo un d a s f

oll ow s:

The Court finds that the Petitioner asserts that his plea of g uiltywas involuntary ba se d o n th e ph y sic a l ha

rm a ndthr e a te ne d p hy sical ha rm fr om M r. Ty le r andhis cohorts. The Court relies on its above f indings that the Petitioner wa s fully awa re of the rig hts he was wa iving by entering the g uilty plea, as well as the c onsequenc es of
e nte ri ng the g uil ty

ple a . The Cou rt

fi nd s th a t th e Pe tit ion e r n e ve r i nf orme d th e Cou rt , his attorney , the staff

at C J C, the i nvestig ators, or any one of any threa ts of violence he re ceive d prior to or on the d ay o f t he plea . The Court finds that the Petitioner acknow ledg ed that he w as plea ding g uiltyof his own voluntary decision. The Court finds th a t M r

. Wi n g a ls o a c k n o w le d g e d th a t a f te r ta lkin g w ith th e Pe ti ti o n e r and g oing ove r the plea petition on the day of the plea, he believed that the Petitioner was pleading g uiltyof his own voluntary decis ion. The court is of the opinion that the Petitioner understood t hat entering a plea of g uiltywas his own dec ision and that no one could f

orce or compe l him to enter the plea of g uilty

. The Court is of the opinion that the Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty and ac cept a

life sentenc e, althoug h not the dec ision c ompletely endorse d by his attorney , was ne verthe less his decision and enter ed with full awa

rene ss of his rig hts and the resulting conseque nces. The Court i s o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r ’ s d e c i s i o n t o p l e a d g u i l t y r e p r e s e n t s a v o l u n t ar y, kn ow ing , a ndint e lli g e nt c ho ic e a mon g the a lte rn a tiv e c ou rs e s o f a c tio n a va ila ble to the Petitioner.
Upon re viewin g t h e g rounds containe d in the Petition and considering the proof at the hea ring , the Court is of the opinion that, for the a fore mentioned re asons, the Petition for Post -Conviction Relief should be denie d.

I t is our view that nothing in the r ecor d preponde rate s aga i n s t t h e post -convic tion court’s fi nd ing s. As su c h, the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt pr op e rl y de nie d th e pe tit ion . T he re c or d o f the g uil ty plea pr ocee dings r efle cts that Petitioner voluntarily plead g uilty

. He aff irmed the fa cts as stipulated by the State. He acknow ledg ed that he understood the cha rg es ag ainst him as well as his rig ht to a trial in order

to defe nd himself ag ains t t h o s e ch arge s and conf ront his acc users. He further acknow ledg ed that he w as re linquishi ng those rig hts by submitt ing a

g uiltyplea.-7-

The re cord f

rom the post-convic tion hearing likewise re flec ts t hat Petitioner’s plea was voluntary . Specifica lly , the record indicates that Petitioner was re prese nted by competent c ounsel with e x tensive experience

. Trial counsel hired a psy chiatrist to e x amine Petitioner prior to his plea in order to de termine whe ther he was capable of m aking a rational decision. Both trial counsel a nd t h e p s y ch i at ri s tfo u n d P et i t i o n ert o b e c o m p et en t , ra t i o n al , an d ca p ab l e o f m ak i n g a k n o wi n g, voluntary decision. The psy chiatrist also found P etitioner articulate and intelligent. Trial counse l and Petitioner had sever al discussions in which trial counsel pleade d with Petitioner to g o to trial and fo re g o h is g uil ty

ple a . D e sp ite the e vid ence and tr ia l c ou ns e l’ s e xten siv e e ff orts t o p e rs ua de him otherwise, Petitioner insisted on proc eeding with his guilty plea.
As noted by

the pos t -c o n v i ct i on court, trial c ounsel testified that it was his opinion that Pe tit ion e r’ s p le a

wa s k no wi ng ly a nd vo lun tari ly e nte re d. Al tho ug h Pe tit ion e r n ow c on te nd s th a t hi s plea wa s involuntarily

enter ed bec ause it wa s g iven under threats of assault and a ctual assault from Mr. Ty le r, a ndthat th e Sta te e na ble d th e se thr e a ts, he faile d to inf orm a ny on e of

thi s f a c t prior to entering his g uiltyplea. Additionally , althoug h Petitioner offe rs his medical re cords a s proof that the State w a s a w ar e h e w a s b e in g a s s a u lt e d b y M r

. T y le r , th e r e is n o th in g in th e me d ic a l r ecor ds linking Mr. Ty ler with P etitioner’s injuries. Applying the above stated principles, we conclude that Pe tit ion e r h a s f

a ile d to e sta

bli sh by c le ar an d co nv inc ing e vid e nc e that hi s p le a s w e re inv olu nta ri ly enter ed. Ac cording ly , Petitioner is not entitl ed to re lief.

CO NC LU SION

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the post-c onviction court is aff irmed.

___________________________________ THOMAS T. WOODAL

L , J UDGE