UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4178

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CLINTON GREEN, a/k/a Clinton Greene,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, 

Jr., District Judge. (2:09-cr-00041-1)

Submitted: December 20, 2010 Decided: February 7, 2011

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.

Andrew J. Katz, THE KATZ WORKING FAMILIES’ LAW FIRM, L.C., 

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Monica Lynn Dillon, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Clinton Green pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea 

agreement, to one count of distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) (2006), and was sentenced to a 27-month term of 

imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in his 

opinion, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but raising 

three potential issues: (1) whether the district court erred in 

denying Green’s motion to suppress; (2) whether the district 

court erred in denying Green’s motion to dismiss the superseding 

indictment; and (3) whether Green should have received a lesser 

sentence. Although informed of his right to file a supplemental 

pro se brief, Green has not done so. The Government has moved 

to dismiss the appeal based on a waiver provision in Green’s 

plea agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that 

waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Blick, 408 

F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir. 2005). Generally, if the district court 

fully questions a defendant at his Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 

proceeding regarding the waiver of his right to appeal, the 

waiver is both valid and enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 

410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wessells, 

936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). Whether a defendant 
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validly waives his right to appeal is a question of law that we 

review de novo. Blick, 408 F.3d at 168.

After reviewing the record, we conclude that Green 

knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his 

sentence, retaining only his right to appeal a sentence beyond 

the statutory maximum of twenty years. Green was sentenced to 

less than the statutory maximum and, therefore, he retained no 

appellate rights with respect to his sentence. Accordingly, we 

grant, in part, the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss 

Green’s appeal to the extent that it seeks appellate review of 

his sentence.

The express terms of the waiver provision, however, do 

not prevent our review of any errors in Green’s conviction. To 

the extent that Green challenges the denial of his motion to 

suppress and his motion to dismiss the indictment, we find such 

claims waived. When a defendant enters a voluntary plea of 

guilty, he waives his right to challenge antecedent, 

nonjurisdictional errors not logically inconsistent with the 

establishment of guilt. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-

63 (1975); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); see 

also United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 52 (4th Cir. 1990) 

(“[D]irect review of an adverse ruling on a pre-trial motion is 

available only if the defendant expressly preserves that right 

by entering a conditional guilty plea.”). Because our review of 
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the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy reveals that Green’s guilty 

plea was both knowing and voluntary, he has waived appellate 

review of these issues.

After reviewing the entire record in accordance with 

Anders, we conclude that there are no issues not covered by the 

waiver that are meritorious. Thus, we deny, in part, the 

Government’s motion to dismiss and affirm Green’s conviction.

This court requires that counsel inform his client, in 

writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the 

United States for further review. If the client requests that a 

petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition 

would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for 

leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must 

state that a copy of the motion was served on his client. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART; 

AFFIRMED IN PART