alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-6805

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TERRY RANDALL BELK,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (8:11-cr-00337-HMH-1; 8:13-cv-00318-HMH)

Submitted: September 26, 2013 Decided: September 30, 2013

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Terry Randall Belk, Appellant Pro Se. Maxwell B. Cauthen, III, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, 

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Terry Randall Belk seeks to appeal the district 

court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2013) motion and his motion to alter or amend that 

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). These orders are not 

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006);

Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004). A 

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Belk has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we 

grant his motion to take judicial notice of Alleyne v. United 

States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), and Descamps v. United States, 

133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013),* deny a certificate of appealability, and 

 * We conclude that, even in light of these two recent 

Supreme Court cases, Belk has failed to meet the standard for 

the issuance of a certificate of appealability.
3

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**MICHAEL W. TROLLINGER,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 892 MAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 10th day of August, 2016, the Petition for Al lowance of Appeal is** 

DENIED

**.**
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Arrangement regarding severance for Dr. Jan Lundberg



 Exhibit 10.14 
 Arrangement regarding severance for Dr. Jan Lundberg 
 Dr. Lundberg joined the
company in January 2010 as Executive Vice President, Science and Technology and President, Lilly Research Laboratories, following a long career with AstraZeneca. In connection with his joining the company, it was agreed that if he is involuntarily
terminated for reasons other than cause during the first 24 months of employment, he will receive a cash payment equal to two years of his then-current salary plus annual target bonus. This arrangement expires in January 2012.
#### McGEE v. WARD.

Appbai, — Dismissal—Reinstatement.—When appeal is dismissed by clerk for failure to file return after notice, it will not be reinstated.

Motion to reinstate appeal dismissed by clerk, under Rules 1 and 2.

The facts are as follows: Judgment of foreclosure was signed December 1st, 1897. Notice of appeal was duly served, and the proposed “Case” was served December 28th, 1897. Respondent . submitted certain amendments to “Case,” which, not being accepted by appellant, were referred to Circuit Judge for settlement. Order settling “Case” is dated January 21st, 1898; was filed January 25th, 1898; and on back is this indorsement, “Received March 1st, 1898. B. B.” On February 22d, 1898, the respondent served notice that he would move clerk of Supreme Court to dismiss appeal on March 4th, unless “Return” were filed in that time. No “Return” being filed, on the 4th the appeal was dismissed by the clerk, under Rules 1 and 2. The appellant moves to reinstate, because he was under the impression that the amendments allowed by order settling the “Case” should be incorporated in the “Return,” and did not have time to complete the “Return” from March 1st to March 4th. He states that the “Re*438turn” was brought to the clerk’s office on March 5th, but upon learning that the appeal was dismissed, he retained it until March 18th, when it was filed.

*Messrs. Blythe &*Blythe, for the motion.

*Messrs. Shuman &*Dean, contra.

June 4, 1898.

PER Curiam.

On hearing the motion of the appellant herein to reinstate her appeal, dismissed by the clerk of this Court, under Rules 1 and 2, after argument of counsel for appellant and respondent, it is ordered, that said motion be, and the same is hereby, refused.
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</TABLE>
<PAGE>
TRIDENT MICROSYSTEMS, INC.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



                                  EXHIBIT 99.2
                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER


I, Peter Jen, the principal accounting officer of Trident Microsystems, Inc.
(the "Registrant"), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based
on my knowledge:

        (1) the Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Registrant, to which this
        certification is attached as an exhibit (the "Report"), fully complies
        with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
        1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and

        (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
        material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
        the Registrant.


Dated: September 27, 2002                     /s/ PETER JEN
                                              ----------------------------------
                                              Peter Jen
                                              Chief Accounting Officer
                                              (Principal Accounting Officer)



                                       60
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<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Balance Sheet at December 31, 1998 and the Statement of Operations for the
Year Ended December 31, 1998 and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
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<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                14,672
<PP&E>                                       3,846,817
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<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           32,329
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   183,103
<SALES>                                        288,182
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               288,218
<CGS>                                          311,871
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  311,871
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               240,197
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (263,850)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (263,850)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (263,850)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (24.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (24.03)
        

</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH CIR
. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH CIR
. R. 47.5.4. 

### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-10303 Summary Calendar

WILLIAM FREDRICK COLEMAN Petitioner-Appellant

v. NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION Respondent-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:06-CV-1507 USDC No. 3:06-CV-1508
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * William Fredrick Coleman, Texas prisoner # 1175205, appealsthedistrict court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application for habeas relief, in which Coleman challenged his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. A certificate of appealability (COA) was granted as to whether Coleman’s guilty United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

### F I L E D July 18, 2008 Charles R. Fulbruge III ClerkNo. 07-10303

2 plea was voluntary. This court also directed the parties to address whether Coleman’s application was time barred. Coleman devotes his entire appellate brief to the time bar issue and merely concludes in his reply briefthat his plea was involuntary and refers this court to arguments he raised in previous district court pleadings. Even if Coleman has not waived review of this issue, see Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987), he has fai led to demonstrate that his guilty plea was involuntary and that the district court erred in denying him habeas relief based on the merits of this claim. Resolution of the remaining question specified in the grant of the COA regarding the timeliness of Coleman’s § 2254 application is therefore unnecessary. See Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 262 (5th Cir. 2000). The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
The State of



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

July 9, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00331

- CR

Fernando TORRES

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, T exas Trial Court No. 2015CR1546W Honorable Melisa Skinner, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

On June 16, 2015, we issued an order based on the trial court’s certification signed on March 5, 2015 stating that “this criminal case is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” We ordered appellant to cause an amended trial court certification to be filed by July 15, 2015, showing that appellant has the right of appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(d); 37.1 ; see also Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Daniels v. State , 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2003, no pet.). Appellant ’s counsel subseque ntly brought this Court’s attention to an amended trial court certification signed on May 22, 2015 in which the trial court granted permission to appeal the matters raised in appellant’s motion for new trial.

See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 25.2(a)(2)(B). According ly, we have jurisdiction and this appeal is retained on this Court’s docket. The reporter’s record is due thirty (30) days from the date of this order.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Justic e

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 9th day of July, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
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</TABLE>
POWER OF ATTORNEY
OF OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF
UNIVERSAL GUARDIAN HOLDINGS, INC.



The undersigned officer and/or director of Universal Guardian Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the "Corporation"), which anticipates filing, with respect to its fiscal year ending December 31, 2004, an Annual Report on Form 10-KSB ("Annual Report") with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., hereby constitutes and appoints Michael J. Skellern, Mark Asdourian and Marian J. Barcikowski, and each of them, severally, with full power of substitution and resubstitution, as attorneys or attorney to sign the Annual Report for the undersigned in any and all capacities, and any and all applications or other documents to be filed pertaining to the Annual Report with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and with full power and authority to do and perform any and all acts and things whatsoever required and necessary to be done in the premises, as fully to all intents and purposes as the undersigned could do if personally present.  The undersigned hereby ratifies and confirms all that said attorneys-in-fact and agents, or any of their substitute or substitutes, may lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof.

EXECUTED this 12th day of April, 2005.

|    |                    
|--- | -------------------
|/s/ |                    
|    | Michael J. Skellern
|    |                    
|/s/ |                    
|    | Michael J. Stannard
|    |                    
|/s/ |                    
|    | Mel R. Brashears   
|    |
## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

September 13, 2024 SC-2024-0502 Ex parte Herbert Dewayne Hosea PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re:Herbert Dewayne Hosea v. State of Alabama) (Mobile Circuit Court: CC19-4464; Criminal Appeals: CR-2022-1049).

CERTIFICATE OF JUDGMENT WHEREAS, the petition for writ of certiorari in the above referenced cause has been duly submitted and considered by the Supreme Court of Alabama and the judgment indicated below was entered in this cause on September 13, 2024: Writ Denied. No Opinion. Parker, C.J. -- Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and Mitchell, JJ., concur. NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 41, Ala. R. App. P., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court's judgment in this cause is certified on this date. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, unless otherwise ordered by this Court or agreed upon by the parties, the costs of this cause are hereby taxed as provided by Rule 35, Ala. R. App. P.

I, Megan B. Rhodebeck, certify that this is the record of the judgment of the Court, witness my hand and seal.

Clerk, Supreme Court of Alabama
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6142

LESTER YOUNG, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

MICHAEL MOORE, Director of South Carolina

Department of Correction; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. David C. Norton, District Judge.

(CA-96-570-4-18BE)

Submitted: May 1, 1997 Decided: May 8, 1997

Before WIDENER and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lester Young, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief

Deputy Attorney General, Lauri J. Soles, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 &

Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's

opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. Young v. Moore, No. CA-96-570-4-18BE (D.S.C. Jan. 13, 1997).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED