No. 2--00--0510

_________________________________________________________________

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS	

	SECOND DISTRICT

_________________________________________________________________

In re FRANCES K.             	) Appeal from the Circuit Court

                              ) of Kane County.                 

						)

     					) No. 00--MHK--46

     					)      

(The People of the State      )          

of Illinois, Petitioner-      ) Honorable                  

Appellee, v. Frances K.,      ) James C. Hallock,   

Respondent-Appellant).        ) Judge, Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:	

	Frances K. was a mental health patient.  Her psychiatrist

filed a petition pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental

Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/1--100 et seq. (West 1998)) seeking a court order authorizing the involuntary

administration of nonemergency psychotropic medication.  405 ILCS

5/2--107.1 (West 1998).  The matter proceeded to trial before a

jury of six.  The jury returned a verdict finding that respondent

was a person who qualified for the involuntary administration of

psychotropic medication.  The trial court entered judgment on the

verdict, authorizing the involuntary administration of five 

specific medications over a period of 90 days.  On appeal,

respondent asserts that the judgment must be reversed since, in

violation of the Mental Health Code, the State improperly commented on her failure to attend the trial; she also asserts that the

court's judgment authorizing the administration of specific medications in specific doses was inconsistent with the general

verdict.  For the following reasons, we reverse.

	The following facts were adduced from the record. Respondent

was admitted for mental health treatment at the Elgin Mental Health

Center on January 20, 2000.  She was diagnosed with a

schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which is a mental illness. 

During her admission to the Elgin Mental Health Center, respondent

exhibited symptoms of psychosis, including hallucinations, paranoid

delusions, disorganized thoughts and behavior, and affective

symptoms of sleep disturbance, irritability, and affective

lability, or mood swings.  

	While respondent was a resident at the Elgin Mental Health

Center, her psychiatrist noticed that she paced the halls

continuously while talking loudly to herself and answering under

her breath.  She would not allow a physician to examine her but

insisted that she had "belly" cancer and that wearing a pink knit

winter hat helped the cancer.  She had delusions of grandeur,

characterized by comments that she was a police officer and was

going to send the staff at the mental health center to jail.

Respondent's psychiatrist characterized her as hostile,

distrustful, and irritable.  She became angry and verbally

threatening to any person who approached her.

	Respondent was encouraged to take medication while at the

mental health facility.  When the subject was broached, she became

angry and irritable, yelled, screamed, and raised her arm in a

threatening manner.  She tore the written authorization for administration of medication and refused to speak about the subject

with her psychiatrist.

	Respondent's condition deteriorated.  Prior to her admission

to the mental health center, she had been working, lived

independently, and had no contact with the police.  During her

admission, however, respondent lost her housing, had no money, was

not able to get along with others due to her verbal threats and

angry disposition, and would not accept medical care.  She could

not be released because her psychiatrist did not believe she could

take care of herself safely.

	On January 31, 2000, Elizabeth Tomar, M.D., respondent's

psychiatrist, filed a petition seeking the involuntary

administration of the following psychotropic medications:  Haldol,

Cogentin, Risperdal, Zyprexa, and lithium.  The matter proceeded to

a jury trial on May 8, 2000.  Dr. Tomar gave testimony concerning

respondent's mental illness, her refusal to take medication, and

the risks and benefits of the medications she sought to administer. 

She also testified that respondent's refusal to attend the trial

exemplified respondent's disorganized thoughts or behaviors. 

	The jury returned a general verdict, finding in favor of

petitioner and against respondent and further finding that

respondent was a person who qualified for the involuntary

administration of psychotropic medication.  The trial court entered

judgment on the verdict that specifically authorized the

involuntary administration of Haldol, Cogentin, Risperdal, Zyprexa,

and lithium.  The order also authorized lab work for the safe administration of such medications.  Respondent timely appealed. 

Her motion for a stay of the judgment pending appeal was denied.

	At the outset, we determine that this case would normally be

moot.  See In re Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167, 172 (2000).  The trial court's order granting the petition for involuntary

administration of psychotropic medication was entered on May 8,

2000.  The terms of the order limited the duration of the

administration of medication to 90 days.  This time has since

passed.  At this point, respondent could be forced to take

psychotropic medication against her will only if a new petition was filed and a new hearing was conducted.  The original judgment no

longer has any force or effect.  As a result, our review of the

propriety of the evidence concerning respondent's failure to attend

the hearing or the court's order authorizing the administration of

specific medications would not affect the outcome of the

controversy. 

	However, when a challenged action is of short duration and is

" 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' " (In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998), quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 258 (1989)), it may be reviewed on the merits, even if

otherwise moot, if (1) the duration of the challenged action is too

short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there is

a reasonable expectation that respondent would be subjected to the

same action again.  In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, at 491 (1998).  Both criteria are satisfied here.  By statute, psychotropic medication

cannot be administered involuntarily for more than 90 days without

an additional hearing.  405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(5) (West 1998).  This period of time is far too brief to permit appellate review. 

In virtually every case, the challenged medication orders would

expire before appellate review was completed, as occurred here.  If

the mootness doctrine were applied under such circumstances, 

recipients of involuntary administration of psychotropic medication

would be deprived of legal recourse in challenging the trial

court's orders.  The right to appeal as provided by the Mental

Health Code would be a nullity. 405 ILCS 5/3--816 (West 1998).

	The second requirement to apply the exception to the mootness

doctrine is also present.  Although respondent's current status is

not revealed by the record filed on appeal, it does indicate that

she had a history of mental illness and hospitalization for such

illness as recently as 21⁄2 years prior to the hospitalization at

issue.  Given this history, it is reasonable to expect that another

petition may be filed against her in the future.  Therefore, we

will address the issues raised on appeal on the merits.

	Respondent asserts that she was denied procedural due process

when the State introduced evidence that her failure to attend the

trial illustrated disorganized thought, a symptom of  mental

illness.  A respondent's presence at any hearing under the Mental

Health Act is not mandatory.  If the respondent refuses to attend,

the hearing may proceed in her absence.  405 ILCS 5/3–--806(b) (West 1998).  According to the precise terms of the statute, "[n]o

inference may be drawn from the recipient's non-attendance."  405

ILCS 5/3--806(c) (West 1998).

	The record reflects that Dr. Tomar testified on direct

examination, without objection, that respondent's failure to attend the trial demonstrated disorganized thought, a symptom of mental

illness.  The record further reflects that respondent's own

attorney pursued the same line of testimony on cross-examination of

Dr. Tomar.  Yet, respondent takes issue with the State's reference

to such testimony in its closing argument.

	When a party does not object to the admission of testimony on

direct examination and proceeds to pursue the same line of

questioning on cross-examination, any errors concerning the

admission of such evidence are waived on appeal.  People v. Gully, 151 Ill. App. 3d 795, 799 (1986).  However, under the plain error

doctrine, this court may address a waived issue if the evidence is

closely balanced or the error affects substantial rights.  134 Ill.

2d R. 615(a);  People v. McVeay, 302 Ill. App. 3d 960, 966 (1999). Fundamental liberty interests are involved in the involuntary

administration of medication for mental health purposes.  See In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 498, citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69,  134 L. Ed. 2d 498, 515, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1384 (1996).  Therefore, we will consider this issue on the merits.  

	In mental health cases, strict compliance with statutory

provisions is compelling, as liberty interests are involved. 

Noncompliance with statutory provisions of the Code renders a

judgment entered under such circumstances erroneous and of no

effect.  In re Price, 152 Ill. App. 3d 960, 961 (1987).

	The language of the Mental Health Code clearly and

unequivocally provides that "[n]o inference may be drawn from the

[respondent's] non-attendance [at any hearing held under the Mental

Health Code]."  405 ILCS 5/3--806(c) (West 1998).  We do not agree with the State's representation that it was harmless error to 

introduce evidence that respondent's failure to attend the hearing

demonstrated a symptom of mental illness.  Although other evidence

was introduced to demonstrate respondent's symptoms of mental

illness, it was improper for the State to make reference to her

failure to attend through its witnesses and in its closing

argument.  By the admission of such testimony and argument in

closing, the State invited the jury to infer that respondent's

nonattendance demonstrated her need for medication.  By statute,

respondent had a constitutional right not to appear at the hearing. 

The record reflects that the State and respondent's own attorney

violated her constitutional right by ignoring the express terms of

the statute to her detriment.

	Next, respondent contends that the trial court's judgment

entered on the verdict, which specified the medications and dosages

to be administered, was inconsistent with the general verdict. 

Respondent asserts that the use of a general verdict form invaded

the province of the jury because it prevented it from making the

determination of whether the benefits of each of the five proposed

medications outweighed their risks.

	The record reflects that respondent failed to object to the

verdict form or tender an alternate verdict form during the

instruction conference.  However, we will review this issue on the

merits under the plain error doctrine.  See In re Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 176.

	The verdict form signed by the jury reads as follows: "We, the

Jury, find for the Petitioner, and against the Respondent, Frances [K].  We find that the Respondent is someone who qualifies for the

involuntary administration of psychotropic medication."  Signature

lines for the six members of the jury followed.  The verdict form

did not include any space for the jury to determine the medications

or doses to be administered.

	Following the jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgment

on the verdict.  The court's order, which appears to have been

entered with respondent's counsel present, reads as follows:

		"The State's petition is granted.  Dr. Tomar and Elgin

Mental Health Center is [sic] authorized to administer the following medications and conduct lab work for the safe and

effective administration of those medications:

	Haldol < 50 mg/day by mouth or injection

	Cogentin < 10 mg/day		Zyprexa < 30 mg/day

	Risperdol [sic] < 16 mg/day	Lithium < 2500 mg/day

	This Court enters judgment on verdict.  Respondent's motion to

stay enforcement pending appeal is denied."

	In a proceeding to authorize the administration of

psychotropic medication against a patient's will, the State must

prove the existence of seven factors provided in section 2--107.1

of the Mental Health Code.  405 ILCS 5/2--107.1 (West 1998).  By

statute, the trier of fact is to determine whether the benefits of

the proposed medication outweigh the harm.  405 ILCS 5/2--

107.1(a)(4)(D) (West 1998).  Since this case was tried before a

jury, the issue of whether the benefit of the proposed medications

outweighed the harm was a question of fact for the jury to

determine.  Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 176-77.

	The petitioning psychiatrist, Dr. Tomar, testified about the

purpose, side effects, and benefit of each of the medications

listed on the petition and on the court's judgment on the verdict. 

However, the jury's verdict does not show that the jury made a

determination that the benefits of the medications outweighed the

harm.  Since the verdict form did not ask the jury to conclude the

medications and doses to be administered, the verdict fails to

illustrate that the jury intended to authorize all five of the

medications.

	As this court determined in Nancy M., the jury, as the trier of fact, should make findings concerning the medications the State

seeks to involuntarily administer, either in a special

interrogatory or within its verdict.  Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 178.  Those findings should include whether the benefits of a

particular medication outweigh the harm.  Nancy M. , 312 Ill. App. 3d at 178.  If the jury finds in favor of the State on the issue of

the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, its

verdict should clearly illustrate that it intended to authorize the

administration of the specific medications in a dose consistent

with the evidence presented at trial.  Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 178.  

	The record is devoid of any indication that the jury made a

risk/benefit analysis of each of the medications listed on the

trial court's judgment entered on the verdict.  Because the record

does not indicate that the jury determined that the benefit of each

medication listed on the court's order, in the dose specified, outweighed its harm, respondent was denied the right to a fair

trial.  

	As the dissent notes, the requirement of section 2--107.1(a)

(6) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(6) (West

1998)) that the treatment order specify the medications and

anticipated range of dosages was added by Public Act 90--538 (Pub.

Act 90--538, eff. December 1, 1997).  Slip op. at 14.  In our view,

the legislature did not intend to remove consent from the

physician-patient relationship by this addition to the statutory

scheme.  Instead, we believe the legislature created a procedure

whereby substituted consent would be given by the appropriate tribunal, namely, the judge or the jury.  As such, informed

consent, as determined by the finder of fact, should weigh not only

whether treatment should be given but also the manner in which the

treatment should be administered.  The finder of fact may decide,

based on the evidence presented, that all, some, or none of the

drugs the physician has considered should be administered to the

patient.  Without this safeguard, the ultimate determination of the

manner in which treatment is prescribed is taken out of the hands

of the trier of fact and, in our view, denies the respondent due

process.

	In our view, the provisions of the Mental Health Code were not

followed, and respondent was denied a fair trial.  However, the

administration of the medication has been terminated according to

the terms of the trial court's judgment on the verdict.  A remand

is not in order since the proceedings have concluded.  A new

petition and hearing must proceed if the State or respondent's physician seeks to administer additional psychotropic medication

against respondent's will.  Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 498.  

	The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.

	Reversed.

	RAPP, J., concurs. 

	JUSTICE GROMETER, dissenting:

	I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority decision holding that the use of a general verdict form was

improper and that the jury was required to make findings, either in

a special interrogatory or within its verdict, as to the

medications and dosages the State seeks to involuntarily

administer.  In rendering its opinion, the majority followed this

court’s previous position as stated in In re Nancy M., 317 Ill.  App. 3d 167 (2000).  Since I believe that Nancy M. incorrectly expanded the requirements of section 2--107.1(a)(4)(D) of the

Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health

Code) (405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(4)(D) (West 1998)), I dissent.

	As the majority decision points out, this matter commenced on

a verified petition filed by respondent’s psychiatrist, Dr. Tomar,

seeking the involuntary administration of the following

psychotropic medications: Haldol, Cogentin, Risperdal, Zyprexa, and

lithium.  Dr. Tomar gave extensive trial testimony as to the risks,

benefits, and range of dosages of the medications she proposed to

administer to respondent.  She explained what each drug was

designed to treat and what the side effects might be.  Dr.  Tomar

opined that the benefits of the psychotropic medications would

outweigh the risks.  The jury returned a verdict finding respondent to be a person who qualified for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.  The trial court then entered a treatment

order that provided in part for the specific medications and range

of dosages and authorized their administration by Dr. Tomar and the

Elgin Mental Health Center.

	In a proceeding to authorize the involuntary administration of

psychotropic medication, the State must prove by clear and

convincing evidence each of the seven factors listed in section 2--

107.1(a)(4) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a)(4)

(West 1998)).  In the instant case, the trial court properly

submitted to the jury a burden of proof and issue instruction

incorporating these seven factors along with a general verdict

form.  The verdict, signed by the jury, stated, "We, the Jury, find

for the Petitioner, and against the Respondent, Frances K[ ].  We

find that the Respondent is someone who qualifies for the

involuntary administration of psychotropic medication."  In signing

the verdict, the jury by necessity found the State proved by clear

and convincing evidence each of the seven factors enumerated in

section 2--107.1(a)(4) of the Mental Health Code.  One of these

seven factors is "[t]hat the benefits of the treatment outweigh the

harm."  405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(4)(D) (West 1998).  I note that

section 2--107.1(a)(4) was recently rewritten by the legislature. 

See Pub. Act 90--538, §10, eff. December 1, 1997.  Section 2--

107.1(a)(4)(D) formerly read "[t]hat the benefits of the

psychotropic medication will outweigh the harm."  405 ILCS 5/2--

107.1(a)(4)(D) (West 1996).

	The majority opinion, following the language of Nancy M.,  adds the requirement that the jury must also specify the

medications and anticipated range of dosages that have been

authorized.  The holding of Nancy M. reads in pertinent part as follows:

	"Likewise, in a jury trial, the jury, as the finder of fact,

should make findings regarding the medications the State seeks

to involuntarily administer to a respondent, either in special

interrogatories or within its verdict.  These findings should

include whether the benefits of a particular medication

outweigh the harm.  See 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(4)(D) (West

1998).  Thereafter, should a jury ultimately decide a case in

favor of the State on the issue of the involuntary

administration of psychotropic medication, its verdict should

show that it clearly intended to authorize the involuntary

administration of specific medications."  Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 178.

	Generally, in civil cases, unless the nature of the case

requires otherwise, the jury shall render a general verdict.  See

735 ILCS 5/2--1108 (West 1998).  Nothing in my reading of section

2--107.1(a)(4) of the Mental Health Code requires the more

specialized verdict required by Nancy M.  I note that section 2-- 107.1(a)(6) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(6)

(West 1998)), which pertains to the treatment order issued by the trial court after the trier of fact renders its verdict, requires

the order to designate, among other things, the medications and the range of dosages that have been authorized.  Section 2--107.1(a)(6)

provides:

		"(6) An order issued under this subsection (a) shall

designate the persons authorized to administer the authorized

involuntary treatment under the standards and procedures of

this subsection (a).  Those persons shall have complete

discretion not to administer any treatment authorized under

this Section.  The order shall also specify the medications

and the anticipated range of dosages that have been

authorized."  405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(6) (West 1998).

Section 2--107.1(a)(6) does not require the State to prove by clear

and convincing evidence which medications are to be administered or

their respective dosages any more than the statute requires the

State to prove by clear and convincing evidence who shall

administer these medications or when they need not be given.

	I note that section 2--107.1(a)(6)'s requirement that the

order specify the medications and anticipated range of dosages was

added by Public Act 90--538, the same public act that rewrote

section 2--107.1(a)(4).  Accordingly, it is only logical to assume

that, if the legislature had intended the State to prove by clear

and convincing evidence the medications to be administered and

their respective range of dosages, it would have added that

provision as part of section 2--107.1(a)(4).  Instead, the

legislature added the requirement as part of section 2--

107.1(a)(6), the section that pertains to the trial court's order.

I would further note that, under the holding of Nancy M., the jury is, in effect, being asked to prescribe the medication and treatment these individuals shall receive.  Such a requirement, I

believe, goes far beyond the clear legislative scheme.

	Finally, I would note that respondent did not specifically

object to the general verdict form and she did not tender an

alternate jury instruction.  Generally, the trial court has the

discretion to determine the appropriate jury instructions, and its

determination will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.  (In re Timothy H., 301 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1015 (1998)).  However, a party waives the right to object later, on appeal, to the verdict forms or instructions submitted to the jury where no objection was

raised at the time of submission.  See People v. Davis, 313 Ill. App. 3d 585, 589 (2000); Forrester v. Patrick, 167 Ill. App. 3d 105, 109 (1988).  The majority avoids this problem by finding that

the failure to object constituted plain error.  I disagree and

point out that other panels of the appellate court have found that

the failure to list in the treatment order the medications to be

administered and the range of dosages authorized was harmless and

not reversible error where, as here, there was ample evidence at

trial as to the various medications to be administered, their

effects, and their proposed dosages.  See In re Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1060 (4th Dist. 1998); In re Barry, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1080 (2nd Dist. 1998) (decided prior to effective date of Pub. Act 90-- 538).

	For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.