L-1 

APPENDIX L-ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF 

WELFARE REFORM INITIATIVES 

INTRODUCTION 

The 1996 welfare reform law set sweeping goals of reducing welfare 

dependency, and addressing both out-of-wedlock pregnancies and single 

parenthood. In creating the block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy 

Families (TANF), the 1996 law gave States broad latitude to design programs 

that promote work among those receiving welfare assistance as a way to meet 

the goals. TANF was created at a time when a large number of States were 

already experimenting with welfare-to-work programs, and many State TANF 

programs are the product of these experiments. Further, the 1996 welfare law 

gave States the authority to use TANF funds to address other social issues 

commonly associated with welfare dependency but which extend beyond the 

immediate population receiving cash assistance. 

No single study can provide a complete and definitive assessment of the 

effects of welfare reform and the broad social initiatives undertaken both before 

and after the enactment of the 1996 welfare law. However, a large body of data 

and research has been developed to help policy makers determine what is 

happening and which provides a sense of the likely impact that some of the 

changes in both Federal and State policy have had. Each data source or study is 

like a piece of a puzzle B a small piece of the overall picture with its own 

limitations and requiring caveats about the implications of its findings. 

However, when these pieces are put together, a picture does emerge of the 

changes that have taken place since the mid-1990s. As a whole, the research 

provides the ability to assess whether Federal and State policy initiatives have 

influenced these changes. 

Much of this research has been supported by Federal funds. General 

indicators of the low-income population come from national surveys of the U.S. 

Census Bureau and other agencies. Further, the Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) has long sponsored research on the effects of welfareto-work initiatives and required an evaluation of the welfare-to-work 

experiments of the mid-1990s that preceded TANF. This appendix focuses on 

these federally-funded efforts. It provides a summary of trends in the indicators 

of work, welfare, and economic well being from national survey data. It then 

summarizes findings from research completed through December 2002 from 

federally-funded studies of specific welfare populations and evaluations of 

program changes. The last part of this appendix outlines research currently 

planned or ongoing, focusing on federally-funded efforts to fill in some of the 

“missing” pieces of the puzzle that would help the public and policymakers 

assess the effects of welfare reform. 
L-2 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM EXISTING RESEARCH 

Generally, States have used TANF funds to promote and support work for 

low-income families. For the most part, States have implemented Awork-first@

programs that stress job search and rapid entry into employment. State 

programs also have focused on supporting work, by permitting recipients to 

keep a part of their welfare check when they get a job. Progress toward 

reducing welfare dependency has been made, as welfare-to-work effortstogether with the economic boom of the mid- and late-1990s-succeeded in 

sharply reducing welfare rolls and in increasing work by mothers raising 

children alone. 

All available data from both national surveys and administrative data 

sources document the dramatic plunge in the cash welfare rolls. National survey 

data show that the proportion of single mothers receiving cash welfare was 

relatively steady in the late 1980s and early 1990s (at about 1/3), but after 1993 

fell precipitously to 10.6 percent in 2002. Coinciding with the fall in the cash 

welfare rolls, employment among single mothers increased sharply in the midto late-1990s. In 1993, 68 percent of single mothers worked at some point 

during the year, a proportion that had risen to 83 percent in 2000. 

Federal and State policy changes likely influenced the trends in work and 

welfare following enactment of welfare reform. Program evaluations have 

consistently found that mandatory participation in job search or other job 

preparation activities increases employment and decreases welfare receipt. This 

finding has been replicated over and over again in evaluations of such initiatives 

from the 1980s to the present. This is not to say that the healthy economy did 

not also affect the trends in welfare and work that occurred during the economic 

boom of the mid- and late-1990s. In fact, the trend toward higher work and 

lower welfare receipt rates actually preceded enactment of the 1996 welfare 

reform law, though many States were experimenting with their welfare 

programs at the time. However, the available evidence shows that the type of 

policies implemented at the Federal and State level in welfare reform did have a 

part in decreasing welfare dependence and increasing work. Poverty rates have 

declined since the mid-1990s, though the decline in poverty has not been as 

great as the decline in the cash welfare rolls. 

National survey data show that the percent of single mothers who were 

poor peaked at 45 percent in the early-to-mid 1990s, but fell to 32 percent in 

2002. However, the cash welfare rolls declined faster during the same period, 

and an increasing proportion of poor single mothers did not receive cash 

welfare. 

It is harder to make the connection between policy changes and trends in 

poverty than it is between policy changes and welfare receipt and work. 

Program evaluations consistently have shown that requiring workBwhile 

increasing earnings and decreasing cash welfare receiptBoften does not change a 

recipient=s combined income. That is, earnings gains are offset by declines in 

welfare benefits. Those programs that increased recipients= income generally 

did so by expanding welfare eligibility for families with earnings (as many 
L-3 

States have done). Further, evidence from studies of those who leave welfare 

(Aleaver studies@) shows that the earnings of single mothers often are by 

themselves insufficient to lift a family out of poverty and many remain poor. 

These research findings generally come from studies of families who had 

entered the welfare system; evidence is lacking to assess how TANF may have 

affected the economic well-being of families who never sought assistance. 

Some evaluations of welfare-to-work programs included assessments of 

the well-being and development of the family=s children. These studies examine 

a broad range of child outcomes. Requiring work of single mothers generally 

does not appear to have unfavorable impacts on the behavior, academic 

functioning, or health and safety of children. For younger children, there is no 

consistent pattern, with some favorable and some unfavorable impacts. 

However, a number of studies have pointed out unfavorable academic and 

behavioral outcomes for adolescent children. 

There is little definitive evidence of the effect of TANF on progress 

toward its family formation goals of decreasing out-of-wedlock pregnancies and 

promoting two-parent families. Progress toward these goals is perhaps the most 

difficult to assess. TANF gives broad latitude to States to address family 

formation issues, permitting States to do so not only for cash welfare and lowincome families but for the population in general. To date, States have spent 

very little of their TANF money directly on such activities and there is very little 

research available to assess the impact that such programs would have on family 

formation outcomes such as reducing out-of-wedlock child-bearing and 

marriage. 

Much of the available research on the effect of welfare reform on family 

formation comes from broader assessments of welfare-to-work programs. Most 

provisions of these programs were not intended to directly affect child-bearing 

or marital status, but might indirectly have done so. A few evaluated programs 

included such policy initiatives as a family cap (no increase in the cash payment 

upon the birth of a new baby) or elimination of restrictions for two-parent 

families. These programs have not produced consistent impacts on births or 

marital status outcomes. Programs without such provisions also sometimes 

have, but sometimes do not have, impacts on births and marital status. 

 

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 

 In 2003, welfare policy and research stands at the end of one era and the 

beginning of another. A large body of research shows that mandatory 

participation requirements can be effective in moving recipients from welfare to 

work. However, the limits of such policies also have been learned, as these 

programs tend not to increase incomes for those who come through the welfare 

system. 

In great part, the protracted debate on welfare reauthorization in 2002 and 

2003 focused on policies that were seen as addressing the limitations of Aworkfirst@ programs. Reauthorization proposals generally would raise work 

standards, require additional hours of activity, and allow States to engage more 
L-4 

of their caseload in activities that would go beyond pre-employment job search. 

The debate over promoting marriage in part reflects a recognition of the 

difficulty that single mothers have in achieving economic well being. 

Many of the ideas discussed in Congress during this two-year period are 

the subject of research projects already underway. The concluding section of 

this appendix discusses ongoing or planned research sponsored by HHS. It 

discusses the initiatives in the areas of post-employment services, specialized 

services for certain welfare populations, and new policies and programs to affect 

family formation decisions that represent the Federal welfare research agenda 

for the future. 

ECONOMIC STATUS OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES: NATIONAL 

SURVEY DATA 

OVERVIEW 

This section examines trends in welfare, work, and economic well-being 

among families headed by single mothers, the group that is the main focus of 

TANF Programs. The analyses use national household survey data, specifically, 

the U.S. Census Bureau's March Current Population Survey (CPS) and the 

Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). CPS data 

were examined from March 1988 (income year 1987) to March 2002 (income 

year 2001). CEX data were examined from 1994 through 2001. 

The analyses seek to describe the changing circumstances of single 

mothers over the period, but do not attempt to isolate the effects of particular 

policy changes or to ascribe causation. These analyses are presented to provide 

background and context for the subsequent discussions of research focused 

specifically on welfare reform initiatives. Given the precision of estimates 

obtained from the CPS and CEX, this section focuses primarily on overall 

trends, rather than specific year-to-year changes. 

 The number of single mothers grew by 17 percent over the 4-year period 

from 1989 to 1993, but has since leveled off and remained at around 10 million 

(Chart L-2). Dramatic changes in work, welfare, and poverty among this 

population have occurred in recent years, especially since 1992-93, as detailed 

in the following charts. Highlights include: 

 The percentage of single mothers who worked at some time during the year 

rose from 67 percent in 1992 to 83 percent in 2000, dropping somewhat to 

81 percent in 2001 (Chart L-1). Single mothers’ employment rates, once 

below those of married mothers, now exceed those of their married 

counterparts (Chart L-5). Employment gains have been greatest for single 

mothers with children under age 3 (Chart L-5). 

 The percentage of single mothers who received cash welfare, based on CPS 

data, shrank from 35 percent in 1993 to 11 percent in 2001 

(Chart L-1). 

 The percentage of poor single mothers (on the basis of pretransfer income) 

who reported receiving cash welfare declined from 63 percent in 1993 to 25 
L-5 

percent in 2001 (Chart L-3). Declines occurred even among those with very 

low pretransfer income (e.g., below 25 percent of poverty) 

(Chart L-4). 

 The percentage of single mothers who were poor based on money income, 

after cash transfers (the official poverty measure), declined from 

45 percent in 1993 to 32 percent in 2001 (Chart L-1 and Chart L-7). If inkind food assistance and the EIC (net of taxes) were counted as income, the 

poverty rate would have dropped from 41 percent in 1993 to 

26 percent in 2001 (Chart L-7). 

 1997 marked a transition year in which, for the first time over the period 

examined, the share of poor single mothers who worked during the year 

exceeded those who received welfare (Chart L-6). 

 Average total income of poorest single mothers (mothers in the bottom 

income quintile) has yet to reach its 1994 peak-level (Chart L-9). Growth 

in net earnings and EIC transfers since 1994 ($1,760) have not been 

sufficient to offset concurrent losses in cash welfare and food stamps over 

the period (-$2,981), resulting in lower net income in 2001 ($6,960) than in 

1994 ($7,602). 

 However, among single mothers in the second lowest income quintile, gains 

in earnings and the EIC have more than offset declines in cash welfare and 

food stamps, resulting in higher average total income in 2000 ($17,789) 

than at any time during the preceding 13 years for this subset of the 

population (Chart L-10). Average total income for this group fell somewhat 

in 2001, to $17,324. 

 Single-mother families appear better off when compared on the basis of 

their reported consumption expenditures than when compared on the basis 

of their reported incomes. Among single-mother families overall, 

36.1 percent were considered poor in 2001 based on their incomes reported 

on the CEX, whereas 26.7 percent were considered poor based on their 

level of consumption expenditures relative to the poverty income threshold. 

Under both measures, single-mother families appear to be economically 

better off in 2001 than in 1994 (Table L-1). Consumption expenditure data 

suggest that in spite of declining welfare receipt the poorest one-fifth 

(bottom quintile) of single-mother families maintained their level of 

consumption over the 1994-2000 period, and had somewhat higher 

consumption levels in 2001 when compared to 1994, even after counting 

increased work-related expenses (transportation, child care, payroll taxes) 

over the period (Table L-2). 
L-6 

CHART L-1 -- WELFARE, WORK AND POVERTY STATUS AMONG 

SINGLE MOTHERS, 1987-2001 

r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial census derived weights. 

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census 

Bureau March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data. 

 

CASH WELFARE RECEIPT 

CPS data show an increase in cash welfare receipt (AFDC, TANF, or 

other assistance) among single mothers during the late 1980s and early 1990s 

and a decrease in the mid-to-late 1990s that corresponds to the caseload rise and 

fall documented by administrative data. Chart L-2 shows that the total number 

of single mothers increased from 8.4 million in 1989, to about 9.9 million in 

1993, an increase of 1.5 million, or 17 percent. Since 1993, the number of 

single mothers has remained fairly stable, between 9.7 and 10.1 million, but the 

number of single mothers receiving cash welfare has fallen each year. 

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000r

2001

Year

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100% Percent

Single mothers who worked

at any time during the year

Received cash welfare but 

did not work during year

Worked and received cash 

welfare during year

Poverty rate among single 

mothers

Received cash welfare

during the year
L-7 

CHART L-2 -- SINGLE MOTHERS: POVERTY AND CASH 

WELFARE RECEIPT, 1987-2001 

r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial census derived weights. 

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. 

Census Bureau March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data. 

The number of single mothers in families receiving cash welfare increased 

from 2.5 million in 1989, to 3.4 million in 1993, an increase of 900,000, or 36 

percent over the 4-year period. Since 1993, the number of single mothers 

reporting cash welfare has fallen to 1.1 million (a 69 percent decline). Over the 

same period, the number of poor single mothers who reported receiving no cash 

welfare increased by 532,000, from 1.7 million in 1993 to 2.5 million in 2001 

(the middle shaded area shown in Chart L-2). 

Chart L-3 shows that cash welfare recipiency rates among single mothers 

overall, and among poor single mothers based on their pretransfer income (cash 

income excluding cash welfare), remained fairly steady during the 1987-93 

period, but have fallen considerably since. Among single mothers who were 

poor based on their pretransfer cash income, the share who received cash 

welfare held relatively steady, around 63 percent, over the 1987-93 period. As 

the chart shows, the likelihood of cash welfare receipt has decreased since 1993 

among this population. In 1993, the cash welfare recipiency rate among single 

mothers with pretransfer income below poverty was 63 percent; by 2001, it had 

fallen to 25 percent. 

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000r

2001

Year

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Number (in millions)

Receiving cash welfare,

including those who are not poor

Poor, but not receiving cash welfare

Neither poor nor receiving cash welfare
L-8 

CHART L-3 -- SINGLE MOTHERS: CASH WELFARE RECIPIENCY 

RATES, 1987-2001 

* Pretransfer income is cash income other than cash welfare payments. 

r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial census derived weights. 

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 

March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data. 

Chart L-4 shows cash welfare recipiency rates based on families' 

pretransfer (i.e., precash welfare) income relative to poverty. The top line of the 

chart depicts the share of single mothers without other income who reported 

receiving cash welfare. The line shows that nearly 90 percent of single mothers 

with no pretransfer income reported receiving cash assistance in the years 1987 

to 1990. However, since 1990, the reported rate of cash welfare recipiency for 

this group has continuously declined, to 77 percent in 1996, and to 35 percent by 

2001. Similarly, for families with very low pretransfer income (below 25 

percent of poverty), and for families with pretransfer incomes between 25 and 

50 percent of poverty, cash welfare recipiency also shows dramatic declines: for 

the former group from 72 percent in 1996 to 33 percent in 2001, and for the 

latter group from 60 percent in 1995 to 31 percent in 2001. 

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000r

2001

Year

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70% Percent

Cash welfare recipiency rate among 

single mothers with pre-transfer 

income* below poverty

Cash welfare recipiency rate

all single mothers
L-9 

CHART L-4 -- CASH WELFARE RECIPIENCY RATES AMONG 

SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES BY PRETRANSFER INCOME POVERTY 

STATUS, 1987-2001

r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial census derived weights. 

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 

March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data. 

Likewise, food stamp recipiency rates among low-income households also have 

fallen considerably since 1994. In 1994, 71 percent of single-mother families 

with household income below 130 percent of poverty (the Food Stamp 

Program's gross income qualifying limit) reported receiving food stamp benefits; 

by 2000, the share fell to 50 percent, where it has since remained. Among those 

with household incomes below 50 percent of the low-household income 

threshold, in 1994, 80 percent reported food stamp receipt; in 2001, 61 percent 

reported food stamp receipt. 

RATES OF EMPLOYMENT 

While welfare receipt has declined, dramatic gains in single mothers' 

employment have occurred since 1993. Chart L-5 shows employment rates of 

single and married mothers by age of youngest child in March, from 1988 to 

2002. The chart shows single mothers’ employment rates, once lower than those 

of married mothers, now exceed those of their married counterparts. 

 

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000r

2001

Year

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100% Percent receiving cash welfare

Pre-transfer income between $0 

and 25% of poverty

Pre-transfer income between

25% and 50% of poverty

Pre-transfer income between

 50% and 100% of poverty

$0 in pre-transfer income
L-10 

CHART L-5--EMPLOYMENT RATES OF SINGLE AND MARRIED 

MOTHERS, BY AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD, MARCH 1988-MARCH 2002 

r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial census derived weights. 

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census 

Bureau March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data. 

 The increase in employment among single mothers with very young 

children (under age 3) has been most dramatic. Their employment rate 

increased from a recent low of 35.1 percent in March 1993 (18.1 percentage 

points below the rate for married mothers) to a high of 59.1 percent in March 

2000 (exceeding the rate for their married counterparts by 2.3 percentage 

points). Their employment rate has dropped slightly since, to 57.9 percent in 

2002. Single mothers with a youngest child age 3-5 also experienced marked 

employment gains over the mid-to-late 1990s. Their employment rate grew 

from a recent low of 54.1 percent in March 1992, to a high of 74.4 percent by 

March 2000, a 20.3 percentage point increase, surpassing that of their married 

counterparts by 9.7 percentage points. Single mothers whose youngest child 

was of school age (age 6-17) have had employment rates slightly above those of 

their married counterparts since 1988. 

The healthy economy during much of the 1990s, combined with a 

transformed welfare system, improvements in the EIC, and increases in the 

minimum wage, are among the factors thought to have encouraged work among 

single mothers in recent years. TANF, and the AFDC waivers that preceded it, 

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001r

2002

Year

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

60%

65%

70%

75%

80%

85%

90%

Percent employed

Under age 3

Age 6 to 17

Age 3 to 5

Married mothers

Single mothers
L-11 

transformed cash assistance from a needs-based entitlement to a program of 

temporary assistance by encouraging work and personal responsibility. 

Imposition of work requirements, time limits, and sanctions and, in some States, 

more generous earnings disregards, all serve to encourage work either in lieu of 

welfare or for a temporary period, in conjunction with welfare. The EIC, which 

is conditioned on earnings, is thought to encourage work among most groups, 

especially single parents who were not working or who were marginally 

attached to the labor market. Increases in the EIC, passed by Congress in 1993 

and phased in between 1994 and 1996, have increased the financial incentive for 

many single mothers to work. Other factors, such as increased funding for child 

care subsidies, also may have contributed to making work possible for more 

single mothers. 

WORK AND WELFARE AMONG POOR SINGLE MOTHERS 

As shown in the previous section, poor single mothers are less likely to be 

receiving cash welfare than in previous years. Likewise, like all single mothers, 

poor single mothers are now more likely to be working. Changes in poor 

mothers' participation in work and welfare first became evident in the 

early-to-mid 1990s, with rates of welfare receipt declining after 1993, and rates 

of employment increasing after 1992 (see Chart L-6, top 2 lines). A crossover 

point was reached by 1996, after which time the chances that a poor single 

mother would be working exceeds the chances that she would be receiving 

welfare. 

Chart L-6 shows that the share of poor single mothers who received cash 

welfare at any time during the year fell from about 60 percent in the 1987-93 

period, to about 23 percent in 2001. The rate of decline in welfare receipt 

among poor single mothers has been greatest since 1996, a period coinciding 

with the passage and implementation of national welfare reform legislation. 

Similarly, the share of poor single mothers who were working at any time during 

the year increased from 44 percent in 1992, to a peak of 64 percent in 1999, but 

has fallen since, to about 59 percent in 2001. 

The share of poor single mothers who relied on cash welfare without 

working dropped from a peak of 43 percent in 1991, to about 13 percent in 2001 

(an over two-thirds drop from the 1991 rate). The share of poor single mothers 

who worked without relying on cash welfare has increased from a recent low of 

about 25 percent in 1993, to 48 percent in 2001 (nearly double the 1993 rate). 

The share of poor single mothers who combined work and welfare over the year 

had remained relatively constant, around 20 percent, until dropping to 14 

percent in 2000 and 10 percent in 2001. 

The share of poor single mothers who reported that they neither worked 

nor received cash welfare during the year (the dashed line in Chart L-6) has 

increased from a low of about 13 percent in 1991 to a high of about 29 percent 

in 2001. This surprising combination may reflect a mix of circumstances, 

including income or support from other sources such as family members, 

support from unrelated household members (which is not included in the official 
L-12 

poverty measure), and other means of support from outside the household not 

counted on the CPS. It also may reflect income reporting problems on the CPS, 

especially with regard to welfare income.1

 Finally, welfare sanction and 

diversion policies may have contributed to the increased number of poor 

mothers neither working nor receiving welfare. 

CHART L-6 -- POOR SINGLE MOTHERS: WORK AND WELFARE 

STATUS DURING THE YEAR, 1987-2001 

r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial census derived weights. 

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census 

Bureau March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data. 

EFFECTS OF EARNINGS, TRANSFERS, AND TAXES ON SINGLE 

MOTHER’S POVERTY 

As shown in Chart L-1, single mothers' poverty status has improved since 

 

1

 A comparison of AFDC/TANF administrative statistics and CPS-estimated caseload counts 

suggests that the CPS undercounts actual cases, and that the CPS undercount has worsened in recent 

years. From 1987 to 1991, the CPS accounted for roughly 80 percent of the AFDC administrative 

caseload count, but by 2001 the CPS was capturing only about 60 percent. Worsened reporting of 

cash welfare on the CPS makes it difficult to gauge how much of the drop in welfare receipt among 

single mothers represents eligible families who do not receive assistance, rather than families who 

do not report actual welfare aid on the CPS. To at least some extent, the declining welfare 

recipiency rates discussed in this section are likely due to increased underreporting of cash welfare 

on the CPS. See Bavier (2000) for a detailed discussion of cash welfare underreporting on the CPS 

and other surveys. 

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000r

2001

Year

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70% Percent

Received cash welfare 

during year

Worked during year

Received cash welfare during year,

did not work

Worked during year, 

did not receive cash welfare

Received cash welfare

and worked during year

Neither worked, nor 

received cash welfare 

during the year
L-13 

1993. Changes in the economy and changes in welfare policy and other 

programs, such as the EIC, have both direct and indirect effects on poverty. 

However, the official U.S. poverty measure counts only family cash income 

(excluding capital gains and lump-sum or one-time payments) against a family's 

poverty threshold, which varies by family size and composition, to determine 

whether a family is counted as poor. The definition does not include the value 

of in-kind benefits, such as food stamps, school lunches, or public housing 

subsidies, nor does it include the effects of taxes or tax credits such as the EIC. 

Inclusion of in-kind benefits and the EIC provides a more comprehensive 

income definition than the official definition. Additionally, other unrelated 

household members may contribute to the family's economic well-being, but 

determining the extent to which resources are shared among unrelated household 

members is often difficult. 

Chart L-7 shows the effects of income from these other sources on poverty 

among all single mothers. Components of family income are sequentially added 

and measured against families' poverty thresholds, as one moves from the top 

line of the chart to subsequent lines below: 

CHART L-7 -- EFFECTS OF EARNINGS, TRANSFERS, AND TAXES ON 

FAMILY POVERTY AND HOUSEHOLD LOW-INCOME STATUS ON 

SINGLE MOTHERS, 1987-2001 

r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial census derived weights. 

 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 

March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data. 

19871988

19891990

199119921993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000r

2001

Year

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

55%

60% Percent poor

+ cash income other than cash welfare

+ cash welfare (Official Poverty Definition)

+ EITC less FICA and income taxes

+ food stamps

Household cash + food stamps + EITC less 

FICA and income taxes

Household Income Below Low-Income 

Threshold:

Poor based on:

Earned income only
L-14 

--Line 1: The top line shows the percent of single mothers who would 

be counted as poor if only family earnings were counted against the 

poverty line. 

--Line 2: The second line down includes other sources of cash income, 

in addition to earnings that were already counted above. However, this 

line does not include cash welfare. 

--Line 3: The third line down adds cash welfare to the other sources 

already mentioned, and with those sources, represents the income 

definition used in the official poverty measure. 

--Line 4: The fourth line down shows the value of in-kind food 

assistance (i.e., food stamps, free and reduced price school lunches, 

Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and 

Children (WIC) payments) when added to cash income and compared 

to the family poverty threshold. 

--Line 5: The fifth line down shows the effect of adding the value of the 

EIC, less Federal and State income taxes and payroll taxes, to line 4. 

--Line 6: The bottom (dashed) line shows the effects of counting all 

income in the household in which the single mother lives, not just that 

of her own family, and comparing it to an unofficial “household lowincome threshold.” The household low-income threshold used here 

applies family poverty income thresholds, which are based on family 

size and composition, to households, based on household size and 

composition. It must be noted that official poverty measurement is 

based on a family concept, which assumes that family members share 

income and economies of scale that result from shared living 

arrangements. It is generally agreed among researchers that 

assumptions regarding income sharing and shared economies of scale 

among related family members, who have ties based on blood, 

marriage, and adoption, do not apply to the same extent among 

unrelated household members. Consequently, these estimates of 

household low-income status likely overstate the effect of household 

income on reducing poverty among families headed by single mothers. 

In viewing Chart L-7, note that the trend in earnings is the principal factor 

affecting the declining trend in poverty, whereas the other income sources, with 

the exception of the EIC, affect the level of poverty, more than its trend 

overtime. Evidence of this effect is that most lines in the chart, with the 

exception of the EIC, roughly run parallel to the ones above. 

Effect of earnings and other nonwelfare cash income on poverty 

Chart L-7 shows that between 1993 and 2000, single mothers' poverty, 

based on family earnings alone, fell from 56.2 percent to 40.8 percent (line 1). 

In 2001, their “earned-income poverty rate” increased to 41.9 percent, 

presumably due to the effects of the economic recession. Adding other cash 

income, except cash welfare, to family earnings (line 2), reduces poverty in 

1993 from 56.2 percent (line 1) to 47.4 percent (line 2), and in 2001 from 41.9 

percent to 33.3 percent. 
L-15 

Effect of cash welfare on poverty

When added to other income, cash welfare benefits have only a small 

impact on the poverty rate, as these benefits generally are not sufficient, even 

when combined with other cash income, to lift families above the Federal 

poverty threshold. As shown by Table 7-16 (breakeven points) in section 7, in 

all but nine States, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) families 

that go to work lose eligibility for benefits before earnings reach the poverty 

line, usually long before. Consequently, cash welfare benefits have little impact 

on the poverty rate. The addition of cash welfare (line 3, representing the 

official income definition for measuring poverty) reduces poverty only slightly, 

from 47.4 percent (line 2) to 45.2 percent (line 3) in 1993, and from 33.3 percent 

to 32.4 percent in 2001. Nonetheless, cash welfare benefits can have a 

significant impact on the level of poor families' incomes, affecting the degree to 

which their incomes fall below the poverty income standard. This impact is not 

captured by changes in the poverty rate. 

Effect of in-kind food assistance on poverty 

The fourth line from the top in Chart L-7 shows the effect on the poverty 

rate of single mothers by counting government food assistance, in the form of 

food stamp benefits and school lunch benefits and WIC payments. The line 

shows that food assistance reduces the poverty rate of single mothers from about 

2-3 percentage points over the period. The antipoverty effectiveness of food 

assistance seems to have lessened somewhat in recent years. In 1995, food 

assistance reduced the poverty rate from 40.2 percent (its official measure) to 

36.9 percent, a 3.3 percentage point (8.1 percent) reduction in poverty. In 2001, 

food assistance reduced the poverty rate from its official rate of 32.4 percent, to 

30.9 percent, a 1.5 percentage point (5.6 percent) reduction. 

Effect of EIC and taxes on poverty

As noted above, the net effect of the EIC (after counting the effect of 

reductions in income from Federal and State income taxes and FICA taxes) (line 

5), when added to total family cash income and food assistance (line 4), causes a 

divergence in trend from the lines above. This is especially notable after 1993. 

A major expansion of the EIC, passed by Congress in 1993 and phased in 

between 1994 and 1996, increased the amount of the EIC work bonus families 

might receive. The antipoverty effectiveness of the EIC was approximately 

three times greater in 1998 than in 1993. In 1993, the EIC reduced the poverty 

rate (counting food assistance) among single mothers from 42.7 percent (line 4), 

to 40.7 percent (line 5), a 2.0 percentage point (4.6 percent) reduction. In 2001, 

the EIC reduced poverty from 30.9 percent to 26.2 percent, a 4.7 percentage 

point (15.2 percent) reduction.2

 

As receipt of the EIC is conditioned on earnings, the growing impact of 

the EIC in part reflects the rise in work rates among single mothers. Among 

 

2 Note that the value of the EIC on the CPS is based on U.S.Census Bureau imputations, rather than 

actual reported tax credits. Also, the EIC is different than most sources of income, as most families 

receive the EIC as a lump-sum refund 
L-16 

those who are working and poor (before counting the EIC), the EIC helps lift the 

income of some above the poverty line. Although the EIC expansion provided 

additional income to low-income families who already were working, it also 

may have helped induce increased employment among family heads with low to 

moderate earnings potential, and thus contributed to the decline in Aearnedincome poverty@ that has occurred since 1993 (shown as the top line in the 

chart). 

Note too, that to the extent that changes in cash welfare programs in recent 

years have encouraged work, these changes may have had an indirect effect on 

poverty by increasing earnings and, through earnings, making the EIC available 

to a greater number of families. 

Effect of all household income on poverty 

The household low-income line (bottom line) shows that if all household 

members' income were shared equally among household members, the poverty 

rate among single mothers would drop by at most 3-4 percentage points over the 

1987-2001 period. Adding other members' household income, and counting 

them as though they were family members who shared income equally, reduced 

the post-in-kind transfer, posttax, poverty rate in 1993 from 40.7 percent (line 5) 

to 36.8 percent (line 6); in 2001 the post-in-kind transfer, posttax, poverty rate 

would have dropped from 26.2 percent to 22.5 percent. Again, this is most 

likely an overstatement of the possible effect that shared household living 

arrangements might have on single mothers' poverty status, because of 

uncertainty about the extent to which such income is actually shared. 

EARNINGS-POOR SINGLE MOTHERS AFTER TAXES AND TRANSFERS 

This section focuses specifically on single mothers with family incomes 

below poverty, based on family earnings alone, to gauge the effects of other 

income, transfers, and taxes over time. This group, shown in the top line in 

Chart L-7 for the 1987-2001 period, accounted for between 56 and 41 percent of 

single mothers over the period depicted. Chart L-8 shows their distribution, 

relative to the poverty threshold, after cash income from all sources, in-kind 

food assistance, and taxes (including the EIC) is taken into account. Unlike 

Chart L-7 above, which simply measured whether income was below poverty, 

Chart L-8 examines the degree of poverty after taxes and transfers, for families 

defined as poor based on family earnings alone. The chart includes families 

with no earnings, as well as those who have earnings but whose earnings fall 

below poverty. 

Chart L-8 shows that while the majority of Aearnings-poor'' single 

mothers have seen improvements in income relative to poverty since 1991, the 

improvement occurred mostly in 1994 and 1995. Since 1995, the bottom 50 

percent of these single mothers have seen no improvement in their income 

relative to poverty, and the bottom 20 percent have actually seen declines in 

their income status relative to poverty since 1996. 

Chart L-8 shows, for example, that over the 1987-2001 period, the top 20 
L-17 

percent of single mothers who were poor based on earnings alone had income 

from other sources that helped bring their families' incomes above the poverty 

line. Over the period, these families became somewhat more economically 

secure: in 1987, the top 20 percent of earnings-poor mothers had a net in-kind 

aftertax income that was 5 percent or more above the poverty line. Since 1995, 

the top 20 percent of earnings-poor single mothers had net income that was 20 

percent or more above poverty. The chart shows strong net income gains 

relative to poverty among earnings-poor single mothers over the 1993-95 period, 

but little or no progress afterwards. After 1996, those in the bottom 20 percent 

show a decline in their level of income security, with net income relative falling 

from 52 percent of poverty in 1996, to 39 percent of poverty in 2001. 

CHART L-8 -- POSTTAX POST-IN-KIND TRANSFER INCOME AS A 

PERCENT OF POVERTY AMONG SINGLE MOTHERS CONSIDERED 

POOR BASED ON FAMILY EARNINGS ALONE, 1987-2001 

r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial census derived weights. 

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 

March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data. 

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000r

2001

Year

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

110%

120%

130%

140% Income as a percent of poverty

Poverty threshold

Top 20 

percent

Bottom 20 percent

Bottom 40 percent

Top 40 

percent

Median (50th percentile)
L-18 

INCOME SOURCES AMONG POOREST SINGLE MOTHERS3

 

The composition and level of income among the poorest single-mother 

families has changed markedly in recent years, reflecting increased earnings 

supplemented by increased earned income credits (EIC) and reductions in cash 

welfare and food stamps. For single mothers in the bottom fifth (bottom 

quintile), increased earnings and EIC have not been sufficient in recent years to 

offset losses in cash welfare and food stamps, resulting in reduced income since 

1996. Families in the bottom 20-40 percent (second quintile) also received less 

cash welfare and food stamps in recent years, but since 1998, increased earnings 

supplemented by the EIC have more than offset these losses. 

Charts L-9 and L-10 examine sources of income among the bottom 

quintile (bottom 20 percent) and the second lowest quintile (bottom 20-40 

percent) of single-mother families, respectively, based on their pretax cash 

income relative to poverty. The charts show the average annual income, in 2001 

dollars, from the following sources: cash public assistance (Aid to Families with 

Dependent Children (AFDC), TANF, and general assistance); Supplemental 

Security Income (SSI); food stamps (market value); child support and alimony; 

other cash income other than earnings; net earnings (earnings net of the 

employee share of FICA payroll taxes and any Federal or State income taxes); 

and the EIC. The employee share of FICA payroll taxes, and any Federal or 

State income tax payments are also shown as negative values. Note that these 

estimates are based on year-to-year income comparisons of cross-sectional 

survey data, rather than a comparison of incomes for the same families over 

time. 

Chart L-9 shows declining reliance on cash welfare and food stamps since 

1994, and increased reliance on earnings, supplemented by the EIC, among 

families headed by single mothers in the bottom income quintile. However, 

earnings gains, even when supplemented by the EIC, have not been sufficient to 

offset the losses in income from cash welfare and food stamps since 1994. In 

2000, increased earnings and EIC helped to raise average total income of single 

mother families in the bottom income quintile to $7,384, still short of total 

family income for this group of $7,602 in 1994. Total income of mothers in the 

bottom quintile fell from 2000 to 2001 to $6,960, due to reductions in earnings 

and EIC as well as most other income sources. Increased food stamp benefits 

helped offset these losses somewhat. 

Average cash welfare and food stamp benefits reported by single mothers 

in the bottom quintile have fallen since 1994. In 1994, combined average 

AFDC and General Assistance benefits were $2,701 for this population; by 2001 

combined TANF and General Assistance had fallen to $815, 30 percent of their 

1994 value. Similarly, in 1994, average food stamp benefits amounted to 

$2,632; by 2001 they had fallen to $1,537, 58 percent of their 1994 value. In 

spite of increased earnings, supplemented by increased EIC benefits, earnings 

 

3 In addition to the analysis which follows, see: Primus et al. (1999); Bavier (1999); and Haskins 

(2001) for other research discussing recent declines in income among the poorest families. 
L-19 

gains have been insufficient to offset reductions in cash welfare and food stamp 

aid that have occurred since 1994. 

CHART L-9 -- BOTTOM QUINTILE OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES: 

AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME BY SOURCE, 1987-2001 (IN 2001 

DOLLARS) 

r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial census derived weights. 

Note- Quintiles based on ranking of ratios of family cash, pretax income, relative to poverty. Taxes 

include Federal and State income taxes and FICA taxes. 

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 

March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data. 

The growing importance of the EIC as an earnings supplement can be 

illustrated by comparing the average EIC as a share of average earnings shown 

in Chart L-9. Legislative expansions to the EITC in 1990 (phased in between 

1991 and 1992) and in 1993 (phased in from 1994 through 1996) expanded the 

credit=s Awork bonus@ to families with children, amounting to a supplement of as 

much as 40 cents on each dollar earned. In 1990, the average EIC depicted in 

Chart L-9 amounted to about 13 percent of average earnings of mothers in the 

bottom income quintile. By 1993, the EIC “work bonus” increased to 18 

percent of earnings, and then doubled to 37 percent of earnings by 1996, once 

legislative expansions had completely phased in. In 2001, the average EIC 

($819) received by families headed by single mothers in the bottom income 

quintile about equaled the average cash assistance ($815) families in this income 

category received. In addition to providing needed income to low-income 

$2,912 $2,584 $2,719 $2,884 $2,837

$2,468 $2,595 $2,701 $2,442 $2,168 $1,933

$1,532 $1,258 $974 $815

$112

$87 $105 $96 $97

$157 $163 $254

$297

$250

$217

$293

$320

$419 $420

$2,391

$2,076

$2,255

$2,306 $2,524

$2,407 $2,353

$2,632

$2,274

$2,231

$2,102

$1,858

$1,604

$1,479 $1,537

$241

$223

$230

$197 $168

$211 $232

$267

$306

$342

$277

$234

$364

$501 $477

$431

$380

$483 $338 $303

$393 $474

$408

$477

$442

$645

$623

$647 $681 $611

$857

$1,020

$857 $915 $749

$735 $707

$1,050

$1,321

$1,517

$1,312

$1,752 $2,240 $2,425

$2,282

$108

$122

$114 $120 $119

$123 $126

$291 $438 $563

$498 $681

$834 $906

$819

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000r 2001

Year

$0

$1,000

$2,000

$3,000

$4,000

$5,000

$6,000

$7,000

$8,000 Net Income

EITC

Earnings (net of taxes)

Other income

Child support/alimony

Food Stamps

SSI

AFDC, TANF, GA

Taxes

$7,051 Total (Net) Income

$6,492

$6,763 $6,855 $6,796

$6,493

$7,602 $7,555 $7,512

$6,984 $6,973

$7,268 $7,384

$6,960

$6,648
L-20 

working families, the EIC has also likely encouraged work and increased 

earnings. 

Chart L-10 is similar to Chart L-9, but shows average income by source 

for the second quintile of single-mother families, ranked by their income relative 

to poverty. Chart L-10 shows comparatively large gains in average total income 

from 1993 to 1995, due largely to increased earnings and EIC. Over this short 

period average total net income increased from $12,382 to $15,681, a gain of 

nearly 27 percent. With the exception of 1996 and 2001, average earnings for 

single mothers in the second quintile have grown each year since 1993. 

CHART L-10 -- SECOND QUINTILE OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES: 

AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME BY SOURCE, 1987-2001 

(IN 2001 DOLLARS) 

r Revised estimates based on expanded CPS sample and 2000 decennial census derived weights. 

Note-Quintiles based on ranking of ratios of family cash, pretax income, relative to poverty. Taxes 

include Federal and State income taxes and FICA taxes. 

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 

March 1988-2002 Current Population Survey data. 

Average total income among single mothers in the second quintile 

reached its highest level over the 15-year period examined in 2000. Average 

total income of mothers in the second income quintile fell somewhat in 2001, as 

a result of declines in earnings and the EIC, brought about, most likely, by the 

recession. In 2000, the peak-income year, earnings in combination with the EIC 

more than offset the loss in combined cash assistance and food stamps that 

$4,517 $4,321 $4,015 $3,953 $3,893 $3,540 $3,650 $3,026 $2,651 $2,261 $1,718 $1,278 $963 $649 $623

$517 $469 $595 $487 $499 $480 $731

$855 $988

$844

$807 $901 $803 $653 $789

$1,775 $1,774 $1,536 $1,865 $1,953 $1,876 $1,874

$1,761 $1,801

$1,517

$1,333

$1,116

$809

$711 $753

$432 $380 $492 $492 $414 $549 $483

$616 $645

$660

$795

$578

$745

$888 $960

$1,754 $1,605 $1,534 $1,554 $1,492 $1,497 $1,568

$1,550 $1,922

$1,773

$1,750

$1,795

$1,614 $1,855 $1,989

$3,654

$3,614 $4,655 $4,371 $3,858 $3,742 $3,493 $4,589

$6,084

$5,740 $6,517 $7,963 $9,323

$10,625 $9,879

$403

$417

$512 $501

$596 $591 $582

$1,161

$1,591

$1,687 $2,020

$2,259

$2,410

$2,409 $2,331

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000r 2001

Year

$0

$1,000

$2,000

$3,000

$4,000

$5,000

$6,000

$7,000

$8,000

$9,000

$10,000

$11,000

$12,000

$13,000

$14,000

$15,000

$16,000

$17,000

$18,000

-$1,000

Net Income

EITC

Earnings (net of taxes)

Other income

Child support/alimony

Food Stamps

SSI

AFDC, TANF, GA

Taxes

Total (Net) Income

$13,052

$12,850

$13,338 $13,223

$12,705$12,275$12,382

$13,559

$15,681

$14,482

$14,939

$15,891

$16,667

$17,789

$17,324
L-21 

occurred over the 1995 to 2000 period. Over the period, the gain in average net 

earnings, in combination with EIC ($5,358), more than offset the $3,092 loss in 

combined cash assistance and food stamps. By 2000, average net earnings 

($10,625) accounted for 60 percent of these families= incomes ($17,789) and 

cash assistance ($649) accounted for just under 4 percent. In contrast, in 1987, 

earnings accounted for about 28 percent of this group=s income ($3,654 in 

earnings out of a total net income of $13,052) and cash assistance ($4,517) 

comprised about 35 percent. In 2000, average total income for families in the 

second quintile ($17,789) was 36 percent above that in 1987 ($13,052). 

CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES 

Though annual income information is the basis of most official measures 

of economic well-being (e.g., poverty statistics), it suffers some drawbacks. 

Income during any one period imperfectly measures the value of goods and 

services a family can consume, since families may liquidate savings, borrow 

money, or access some other sources of funds. This section presents 

information on consumer expenditures from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 

Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), as a complement to the preceding 

analysis of income data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). 

Consumption data are derived from the CEX, which has a relatively small 

sample size of approximately 7,500 households, interviewed quarterly, 

compared to the annual demographic survey of the CPS, which has an annual 

sample of nearly 100,000 households interviewed in March 2002. Families 

headed by single mothers amount to approximately 1,500 respondents 

accumulated over 4 quarters of the 2001 CEX and 8,700 on the March 2002 

CPS. The small CEX sample size, relative to the CPS, means that data from the 

CPS are likely to be statistically more reliable, and large year-to-year differences 

are required for changes estimated from the CEX to meet standard tests of 

statistical significance. In the CEX tables that follow, values that statistically 

differ from their 1994 estimates at the 90 percent statistical confidence level are 

noted. All dollar amounts are shown in 2001, inflation-adjusted, constant 

dollars. 

Single mothers income and consumption levels 

Table L-1 summarizes information on income, consumption expenditures, 

welfare receipt, and work for single-mother families from 1994 to 2001. The 

table shows, for example, that median after-tax income of these families 

(including the value of food stamps), increased from $16,578 in 1994 to $19,651 

in 2001, or 18.5 percent. The table shows lower rates of income poverty among 

single-mother families in later years than in earlier years, as their estimated 

poverty rates in 1998, 2000 and 2001 are statistically lower than in 1994. 

According to the CEX data, 36.1 percent of single-mother families were poor in 

2001, compared to 45.2 percent in 1994, based on their after-tax cash income 

and food stamps, about a 20 percent decline. Income-based poverty measures 

on the CEX generally tend to be higher than those derived from the CPS, most 
L-22 

likely due to the poorer accounting of income on the CEX than on the CPS 

(discussed further below). Nonetheless, the CEX income poverty rate trend is 

similar to the CPS-based poverty trend shown earlier, which fell by 22 percent 

over the same period. 

The CEX data, like the CPS data depicted earlier, show declining rates of 

cash welfare (in 2001, down 67 percent from 1994 levels) and food stamp 

receipt (in 2001, down 46 percent from 1994) among single-mother families, as 

well as an increasing probability of having earned income (up 21 percent in 

2001, compared to 1994) over the period. 

Table L-1 shows overall consumption expenditures for single-mother 

families but also divides consumption expenditures into: (1) a category that 

explicitly includes spending on items commonly associated with work 

(transportation, child care, and retirement contributions including the employee 

share of Social Security payroll taxes); and (2) all other expenditures (including 

expenditures to meet basic needs, such as food and shelter). As shown in the 

table, some of the increase in overall consumption expenditures is attributable to 

increased work-related expenses. Median work-related expenses among singlemother families are statistically higher in all years since 1997, compared to 

1994, whereas other consumption expenditures are statistically higher only in 

2000, when compared to 1994. The increase in work-related expenses is 

consistent with other trends in the table, such as declining welfare receipt and 

increased work among single-mother families. 

The table shows that median consumption expenditures reported on the 

CEX tend to be somewhat higher than median income over the period examined. 

For example, in 2001, median consumption expenditures of single-mother 

families amounted to $21,303, compared to median after-tax income of $19,651. 

The median ratio of consumption to income among single-mother families 

ranged from between 1.07 (2001) and 1.22 (1997) over the period depicted in 

the table. 

Single-mother families appear less likely to be poor based on their 

spending than based on their income. For example, in 2001, 36.1 percent of 

single-mother families appeared to be poor based on their income, whereas 26.7 

percent appeared to be poor based on their spending. Table L-1 shows that 

poverty based on single mother-families’ spending was statistically lower in all 

years (except for 1998) since 1997, when compared to 1994 levels. 

The table shows that in spite of increased likelihood of single-mother 

families’ working in more recent than in past years, the percent of families with 

child care expenses has not differed from 1994 levels, with the exception of 

2001. In 2001, 18.9 percent of single-mother families reported having child care 

expenses, compared to 25.7 percent in 1994. Among families with child care 

expenses, at the median those expenses amounted to between 7.8 percent and 

10.4 percent of family after-tax income over the period. 

Income and consumption expenditures for the poorest families 

Analyses of national income surveys (for example, the CPS) have shown 

that income growth among the poorest single mothers stagnated after 1994. The 
L-23 

CEX also shows that income of the poorest one-fifth of single mothers has not 

grown since 1994; the data indicate that poorest single mother families’ incomes 

were actually below their 1994 levels in 1998 and 1999, when compared on a 

price-adjusted basis, and below their 1994 level from 1996 through 1999, when 

compared on an income relative to needs basis (see Table L-2). When compared 

on the basis of consumption, poorest single mother families appear better off 

than when compared on the basis of their income. Yet, with the exception of 

2001, consumption expenditures on a price-adjusted basis have not differed 

significantly from their 1994 levels for these families. Unlike the income data, 

which showed a decline in the poorest single mothers’ incomes in some years, 

compared to 1994, the consumption expenditure data suggest that these poorest 

families at least maintained consumption levels attained in 1994, measured 

either on a price-adjusted dollar basis or on a consumption to needs basis, and in 

2001 exceeded 1994 consumption levels. It should be noted that even though 

the consumption expenditure data suggests a more favorable picture for single 

mother families than does income data, only in 2001 have consumption 

expenditures exceeded 1994 levels. Additionally, these families’ consumption 

levels fall short of meeting basic needs, as measured against the poverty 

standard (i.e., consumption expenditures to needs ratio). The median 

consumption to needs ratio for these families ranged from a low of 0.76 in 1994 

to a high of 0.87 in 2001. 

A note on income and consumption patterns 

Data from the CEX show that consumption expenditures among single 

mother families tend to exceed their reported income. This is especially true 

among the poorest families, for whom median consumption expenditures ranged 

from 1.8 to 2.5 times families’ reported incomes. These observed differences in 

consumption, relative to income, appear not just among single mother families, 

depicted in this analysis, but among families generally on the CEX who are in 

the bottom two-thirds of the income distribution (Rogers and Gray, 1994). 

There are several possible explanations for the gap between consumption and 

income seen on the CEX: 

1. Income on the CEX, as with most surveys, tends to be underreported. 

The CEX does a much better job at measuring consumption than 

income. Consumption expenditures are recorded by quarterly interview 

for each month in the quarter and by use of weekly expenditure diaries. 

In contrast, CEX sample households are asked to report income 

information by recounting income received over the prior 12 months. 

Besides being prone to error in accounting, income received over the 

prior 12 months may not accurately reflect current income. Families 

appearing at the bottom of the income distribution especially may be 

comprised of families for whom income underreporting is an issue, thus 

in part accounting for their appearance in the bottom of the income 

distribution. The analysis in this section has been restricted to families 

who provided responses to major income sources on the CEX. These 

families are referred to as “complete income reporters.” However, 
L-24 

even among these families, income from all sources may not be 

accounted for fully. Very-low income single mothers may use a variety 

of survival strategies to make ends meet, such as network-based or 

agency-based support, unreported work and work in the underground 

economy, and cash contributions from families, friends, boyfriends, or 

former spouses who live elsewhere (Edin and Lein 1997). These types 

of “income” are unlikely to be reported as income on household 

surveys. 

2. Some who have low incomes are temporarily poor. For those families 

that are experiencing a temporary dip in income, with savings 

withdraws can finance consumption expenditures that exceed income. 

However, it is unlikely that most families who are identified as 

“income poor” have substantial assets/savings upon which they can 

draw to fund current consumption. 

3. Some low-income people might access credit markets to pay for 

spending that exceeds income. Poor families increased their credit card 

debt in the early-to-mid 1990s (Bird et al., 1999) to a greater extent 

than other families. If this trend continued into the later 1990s, it could 

account for some of the growing gap in spending and income among 

the low-income populations. To the extent which the poor are funding 

current consumption by increasing debt, consumption data may 

overstate the true level of economic well-being. 

EXAMINATIONS OF FAMILIES THAT EXITED THE WELFARE 

SYSTEM: THE WELFARE LEAVERS 

 The previous section examined how single mothers on the whole are 

faring. This section turns to how families who were once on welfare and left the 

rolls, commonly referred to as “welfare leavers,” fare. (See Section 7, TANF, 

for information about those who are on the rolls.) Since the mid-1990s, many 

States have conducted studies of welfare leavers, capturing information about 

employment, earnings, and receipt of government benefits for those who leave 

the welfare rolls. These studies have varied a great deal, in terms of their 

methods, populations examined, and so on, and have been reviewed elsewhere 

(including the 2000 edition of the Green Book). Though these studies have 

provided a relatively consistent picture of how welfare leavers fare, making 

inferences from them is hampered by differences in their methods and data. 

Using funding from the special welfare outcomes appropriations, HHS provided 

grants to 15 States and localities to conduct a series of leaver studies with more 

consistent methods and data. The HHS leaver studies generally confirmed what 

had been found in the State-developed leaver studies: 
TABLE L-1 -- INCOME, CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES, WELFARE RECEIPT, AND WORK EXPERIENC

SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES, 1994-2001 

[In constant 2001 dollars] 

Year 

Category 

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 

Perce

cha

1994 t

After-tax income (median amount) $16,578 $16,068 $16,021 $17,646 $18,750 $17,819 $18,9561 $19,6511 18Consumption expenditures (median amount) 19,558 19,495 19,887 22,1611 21,210 20,893 $21,8971 21,303 8

Consumption expenditures on "work related categories" (median amount) 3,069 3,249 3,442 4,1261 3,9211 3,8971 4,0291 3,7031 20

Other consumption expenditures (median amount) 16,218 15,394 15,626 17,345 16,473 15,744 17,3741 16,488 1

Percent with after-tax income (including value of food stamps) below poverty income threshold 45.2 46.0 44.2 42.1 38.31 39.3 35.71 36.11 -20

Percent with consumption expenditures below poverty income threshold 33.0 31.0 31.4 27.01 27.8 27.31 24.81 26.71 -19

After-tax income to needs ratio (median) 1.16 1.14 1.12 1.21 1.31 1.26 1.321 1.30 12

Consumption expenditures to needs ratio (median) 1.41 1.37 1.36 1.53 1.51 1.46 1.51 1.46 1

Consumption expenditures other than "work-related" relative to needs ratio (median) 1.13 1.07 1.1 1.16 1.17 1.12 1.18 1.15 1

Consumption to income ratio (median) 1.10 1.16 1.181 1.221 1.11 1.09 1.12 1.07 -2

Cash welfare receipt (percent) 34.5 31.2 22.71 20.01 17.31 14.61 10.51 11.31 -67

Food stamp receipt (percent) 39.7 38.4 33.51 31.51 27.11 24.71 24.21 21.31 -46Percent of families with one or more earners 73.6 74.5 79.0 81.51 84.81 86.51 87.71 89.21 21

Percent of families with child care expenses 25.7 22.6 22.5 28.8 26.9 26.2 23.4 18.91 -26

Percent of family income spent on child care among families with child care expenses (median) 8.7 10.4 8.3 9.4 8.3 7.8 8.6 8.5 -1

1 Indicates value is significantly different from 1994 value at the 90 percent statistical confidence level. Note-Data are from quarterly interview surveys. Quarterly expenditures have been annualized for purposes of display. Year represents the year 

expenditures occurred. Income is from the 12 months prior to the survey. The estimates exclude families with incomplete income reporting. A

amounts have been inflation-adjusted to 2001 dollars. Source: Congressional Research Service tabulations of data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure S
TABLE L-2 -- INCOME, CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES, WELFARE RECEIPT, AND WORK EXPERIENC

AMONG THE POOREST FIFTH (AFTER-TAX INCOME TO NEEDS QUINTILE) OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMIL

1994-2001 

[In constant 2001 dollars] 

Year 

Category 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 

Percen

change 

to 2

After-tax income (median amount) $6,173 $5,992 $5,636 $5,703 $5,3021 $5,4491 $6,241 $6,005 -2Consumption expenditures (median amount) $12,018 $12,550 $12,457 $13,016 $12,641 $12,856 $12,754 14,1511 17

Consumption expenditures on "work related categories" (median amount) $576 $655 $529 $658 $837 $883 $9121 $1,1601 101

Other consumption expenditures (median amount) $10,734 $11,504 $11,071 $11,916 $11,515 $11,629 $11,632 $12,1491 13

Percent with after-tax income (including value of food stamps) below poverty income threshold 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.Percent with consumption expenditures below poverty income threshold 69.1 65.0 72.4 65.8 65.1 63.9 66.3 58.01 -16

After-tax income to needs ratio (median) 0.44 0.39 0.371 0.361 0.351 0.361 0.41 0.42 -4

Consumption expenditures to needs ratio (median) 0.76 0.83 0.79 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.81 0.87 14

Consumption expenditures other than "workrelated" relative to needs ratio (median) 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.79 11Consumption to income ratio (median) 1.81 2.251 2.19 2.361 2.521 2.431 2.271 2.291 26

Cash welfare receipt (percent) 70.1 60.3 43.91 39.31 35.91 35.21 21.71 19.91 -71

Food stamp receipt (percent) 70.5 67.2 60.6 64.1 55.51 46.91 53.81 42.91 -39Percent of families with one or more earners 41.4 38.9 49.6 57.21 57.51 58.11 63.61 69.01 66

Percent of families with child care expenses 13.2 10.3 9.9 12.4 17.2 13.7 13.3 11.2 -15Percent of family income spent on child care among families with child care expenses (median) NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR N

1 Indicates value is significantly different from 1994 value at the 90 percent statistical confidence level. NR- Not reported. Standard error of estimate considered too large for estimate to be deemed statistically meaningful. Note- Data are from quarterly interview surveys. Quarterly expenditures have been annualized for purposes of display. Year represents the year in expenditures occurred. Income is from the 12 months prior to the survey. The estimates exclude families with incomplete income reporting. All amounts have been inflation-adjusted to 2001 dollars. Source: Congressional Research Service tabulations of data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure S
L-27 

--The majority of those who leave welfare have a job after leaving the 

rolls; 

--However, many former recipients do not have steady employment 

after leaving and some eventually do return to the rolls; 

--The average earnings of welfare leavers tend to be low–with earnings 

in many States and localities insufficient to raise the average former 

welfare family above the poverty line; and 

--Because the earnings and incomes of former recipients tend to be low, 

many may still qualify for government assistance other than cash aid. 

A large share of former recipients continue to receive government help 

in the form of food stamps and Medicaid, though there has been 

concern that some who are eligible for these benefits fail to receive 

them. 

 Because the HHS leaver studies were developed to facilitate cross-state 

comparisons, this section will focus on these 15 leaver studies.4

FROM WELFARE TO WORK: EMPLOYMENT AND RECIDIVISM OF 

WELFARE LEAVERS 

The majority of those who leave welfare work. Among the 15 States and 

localities examined in the HHS leaver studies, many studies reported 

employment rates in the first quarter after leaving the rolls of just under 60 

percent. The “median study”– the midpoint of the ranking of all 15 studies, 

showed 57 percent of its leavers employed in the first quarter after exiting the 

rolls. Employment rates tended to remain fairly constant when examining the 

second, third, and fourth quarters after exit. In most States and localities 

examined, more than half the leavers were reported employed in each of the four 

quarters examined. However, as discussed below, this does not mean that the 

same leavers were employed in each of the four quarters. 

 Though most work after leaving the rolls, most studies report that only 

between 30 percent and 40 percent of those who left the welfare rolls worked in 

all four quarters after leaving welfare. (Cuyahoga County, Cleveland, Ohio, 

reported that 47 percent of its leavers worked in all four quarters after exiting the 

rolls.) Work reported in all four quarters does not necessarily mean steady work 

for the entire year, as these former recipients might have experienced weeks of 

unemployment within a quarter. 

 Because not all welfare leavers find work or steady work, some of those 

who exit the rolls return to welfare. In the fourth quarter after leaving welfare, 

many of the States and localities reported that about one-fifth (20 percent) of 

their leavers had returned to the rolls. Over the course of the year after leaving, 

even more had returned to spend at least a month on welfare. 

 Table L-3 shows the employment rates (percent working) and recidivism 

rates (percent returning to the rolls) for leavers in the 15 HHS leaver studies. 

The table identifies the study, quarter of exit for leavers in the study, 

 

4 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001). 
L-28 

employment rates, and returns to welfare. 

TABLE L-3 -- EMPLOYMENT RATES AND RETURNS TO WELFARE 

RATES: HHS LEAVERS STUDIES 

Employment rates Returns to welfare 

State/locality Quarter of 

exit 

1st 

quarter 

after 

exit 

4th 

quarter 

after 

exit 

Continuously 

employed 

Ever 

employed 

4th 

quarter 

after 

exit 

Ever 

returned 

Arizona 1Q98 53 50 NA 73 20 28 

District of Columbia 4Q97 62 60 39 79 19 21 

Florida 2Q97 50 54 31 71 11 25 

Georgia 1Q98 64 57 NA NA 14 22 

Illinois 3Q97-4Q98 54 55 39 70 16 29 

Iowa 2Q98 57 38 25 69 24 30 

Massachusetts Dec98-Mar99 60 NA NA NA 16 19 

Missouri 4Q96 58 58 NA NA 21 29 

New York 1Q97 50 48 40 62 19 NA 

South Carolina Oct98-Mar99 67 63 34 90 11 17 

Washington 4Q97 57 57 NA NA 16 23 

Wisconsin 2Q98-4Q98 67 67 NA 82 21 29 

Cuyahoga Co 

(Cleveland, OH) 3Q98 68 64 47 82 25 38 

Los Angeles Co. (CA) 3Q96 47 47 35 57 NA NA 

Bay Area (CA) 4Q98 55 NA NA NA NA NA 

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001). 

EARNINGS AND INCOME OF WELFARE LEAVERS 

The average earnings of welfare leavers vary widely by State. Among the 

15 States and localities in the HHS leaver studies, 12 of the studies reported 

average quarterly earnings of those working in the quarter after leaving welfare 

that were below the Federal poverty line for a family of three. The 

3 jurisdictions where earnings were above poverty were the District of 

Columbia, New York, and Los Angeles. 

These findings should not be interpreted as indicating that welfare leavers 

were worse off working and not on welfare than being on welfare and not 

working. In none of the jurisdictions noted above were cash assistance benefits 

greater than poverty. These findings do indicate that the earnings of welfare 

leavers were typically low–insufficient by themselves to raise a family of three 

above the poverty line. Further, while there was some growth in average 

earnings over the year after leaving welfare, earnings remained low. 

Table L-4 shows the earnings of cash welfare leavers by State and 

locality. It shows average earnings of working welfare leavers in both the 

quarter after exit and the 4th quarter after exit. It also compares these earnings to 

the Census poverty threshold for a family of 3 (one adult, two children) for the 

quarter in which earnings are examined. 

The variation in the earnings of welfare leavers is in part explained by 

differences in State policies. The key policy affecting the average earnings of 

leavers is the level of earnings at which eligibility for cash benefits ends, often 

called the “breakeven level” of earnings. This level of earnings varies widely by 
L-29 

State (see Section 7, TANF). In States such as New York and California, this 

level of earnings is relatively high; in States such as Arizona and South 

Carolina, this level of earnings is fairly low. In States like New York and 

California, a recipient who takes a low paying job can remain on the welfare 

rolls while working (i.e., they do not become welfare leavers). It takes a higher 

paying job to end eligibility for welfare in these two States than it does in many 

of the others studied here, accounting for their relatively high average earnings 

for welfare leavers. 

TABLE L-4 -- AVERAGE QUARTERLY EARNINGS OF WELFARE 

LEAVERS 

Average quarterly 

earnings of working 

leavers 

Average earnings of 

working welfare leavers: 

by quarter after exit as a 

State/locality Quarter of exit percent of poverty 

1st 

quarter 

4th 

quarter 

1st 

quarter 

after exit 

4th 

quarter 

after exit 

Arizona 1Q98 $2,211 $2,511 67% 76% 

District of Columbia 4Q97 3,416 3,934 106% 120% 

Florida 2Q97 2,163 2,496 67% 76% 

Georgia 1Q98 2,185 2,327 67% 71% 

Illinois 3Q97-4Q98 2,663 2,959 81% 90% 

Iowa 2Q98 2,481 2,712 76% 81% 

Massachusetts Dec98-Mar99 2,834 NA 84% NA 

Missouri 4Q96 2,192 2,698 69% 83% 

New York 1Q97 3,393 3,602 105% 111% 

South Carolina Oct98-Mar99 1,941 2,332 58% 69% 

Washington 4Q97 2,678 3,275 83% 100% 

Wisconsin 2Q98-4Q98 2,272 2,561 69% 76% 

Cuyahoga Co (Cleveland OH) 3Q98 2,744 2,754 84% 82% 

Los Angeles Co. (CA) 3Q96 3,414 3,576 108% 111% 

Bay Area (CA) 4Q98 3,144 NA 96% NA 

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001). 

Of the 15 HHS leaver studies, eight (Arizona; the District of Columbia; 

Illinois; Iowa; Missouri; Washington; Cuyahoga County, Cleveland, Ohio; and 

the San Francisco Bay Area in California) surveyed leavers and captured 

information on household income. Unlike the earnings information cited above, 

total household income captures the earnings of a spouse or other household 

member as well as additional cash income benefits (e.g. Supplemental Security 

Income). The studies found that average total household income too tends to be 

near the poverty line in great part because a former recipient’s own earnings 

were the most important source of income for her household. 

RECEIPT OF OTHER GOVERNMENT BENEFITS 

 A goal of the TANF block grant is to reduce dependency on government

benefits by promoting work, job preparation, and marriage. Therefore, the 

ultimate goal of Federal policy is to move a family away from all benefits–not 

just cash welfare. However, as discussed above, the average earnings and 
L-30 

income of former recipients tend to be low. Many former cash assistance 

families continue to be eligible for benefits from other programs, most notably 

food stamps. Most cash recipients are also eligible for medical assistance from 

the Medicaid program while they receive cash welfare. Further, Federal law 

provides “transitional medical assistance” (TMA) under the Medicaid program 

for former cash welfare recipients who lost eligibility for cash because of 

increased earnings. TMA is generally available for one year, but could be 

available for a longer period of time under “waivers” of Federal law. 

 Table L-5 shows the percent of leavers in households receiving food 

stamps and the percent of families in which the adults were recipients of 

Medicaid for States and localities in the HHS leaver studies. For Medicaid, only 

adult recipients are shown because eligibility for children is less restrictive than 

for nondisabled and nonelderly adults. Most children can be covered by 

Medicaid by virtue of being poor or near poor. The table shows this 

information for the first quarter and fourth quarter after exit as well as whether 

the benefit was received at any time during the year after exit. 

The table shows that receipt of Medicaid was somewhat more common 

than receipt of food stamps. This should be expected given the TMA rules. 

However, the percentage of families with adults receiving Medicaid was lower 

by the fourth quarter after exit, when Medicaid covered half or fewer welfare 

leavers in most States. 

TABLE L-5 -- PERCENT OF WELFARE LEAVERS RECEIVING 

MEDICAID AND FOOD STAMPS 

Percentage of leaver 

families receiving food 

stamps 

Percentage of 

families with adults 

receiving Medicaid 

State/locality Quarter of exit

1st 

quarter 

4th 

quarter

Ever 

during 

the year 

after exit 

1st 

quarter 

4th 

quarter 

Ever 

during 

the year 

after exit 

Arizona 1Q98 51 42 67 60 45 72 

District of Columbia 4Q97 40 41 53 44 50 58 

Florida 2Q97 45 35 67 55 45 74 

Georgia 1Q98 NA NA NA NA NA NA 

Illinois 3Q97-4Q98 33 33 56 57 40 69 

Iowa 2Q98 50 56 67 54 46 68 

Massachusetts Dec98-Mar99 42 44 51 NA NA NA 

Missouri 4Q96 57 40 70 41 31 NA 

New York 1Q97 NA NA NA NA 35 NA 

South Carolina Oct98-Mar99 78 61 84 69 45 69 

Washington 4Q97 46 36 NA 53 43 NA 

Wisconsin 2Q98-4Q98 70 63 83 80 76 87 

Cuyahoga Co (Cleveland 

OH) 3Q98 56 47 68 60 46 70 

Los Angeles Co. (CA) 3Q96 NA NA NA NA NA NA 

Bay Area (CA) 4Q98 26 NA NA 74 NA NA 

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001). 

Food stamp recipiency dropped rapidly upon exit from welfare. In many 

places, less than half of welfare leavers were receiving food stamps in the 
L-31 

quarter after exit. There has been concern that some who leave welfare but have 

income low enough to qualify for food stamps fail to receive them because they 

do not know they remain eligible for food aid. The 2002 Farm Bill adopted 

provisions that seek to retain more eligible families on food stamps when they 

leave cash welfare. 

THE IMPACT OF PROGRAMS: FINDINGS FROM WELFARE REFORM 

EVALUATIONS 

 The period between the enactment of the Family Support Act of 1988 

(P.L. 100-485) and the passage of the 1996 welfare reform law was 

characterized by a large number of States and localities experimenting with 

welfare reform initiatives to promote work and responsibility by parents of 

needy children who receive cash aid. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act 

permits HHS to waive certain Federal requirements of certain programs for 

experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects that are “likely to promote the 

objectives” of the program. HHS required formal evaluations of any such 

waiver program. During this era of experimentation, States tested a variety of 

policy changes such as stronger work requirements, time limits on benefits, 

rewards and penalties, and personal behavior rules which ultimately were 

adopted in the design of State TANF programs. Therefore, these evaluations 

can be used to assess the impacts of similar policies adopted in the wake of 

Federal welfare reform. With the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law, 

States no longer needed waivers to continue such policies and Federal law 

permitted States to end their waiver programs. 

 However, the 1996 welfare law permitted States to continue their waiver 

programs to expiration and provided funding to continue their evaluations if 

they opted to do so. Some States did continue their waiver evaluations; for 

many of these States, final reports are now available. However, many States 

chose to cut short their waivers and their evaluations and therefore there are no 

findings from these experiments. 

THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF METHOD 

AND LIMITATIONS OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS 

There are a number of different techniques available to evaluate the 

impact of policy changes, but most evaluations conducted after the passage of 

the Family Support Act in 1988 used random assignment to experimental and 

control groups. Random assignment experimental studies assign potential 

participants to two or more groups. Individuals assigned to a control group are 

subject to current policies (no policy change); individuals assigned to the 

experimental group (or groups) are subject to a different package of policy 

initiatives, such as time limits on assistance, or sanctions for failing to comply 

with a mandatory work requirement. Because individuals are randomly 

assigned to these groups, any differences between the experimental and control 
L-32 

groups may be attributed to the policy initiative itself. This difference is 

therefore the impact of these policy changes.5

Though the experimental method has advantages over other research 

methodologies in determining a program’s impact, there are some drawbacks to 

using it in a social policy context. The findings of impact evaluations are most 

valid for the particular place, time, context, and policy examined in the study. 

Generally, more confidence can be placed in findings that are replicated in a 

number of different settings. The findings of a random assignment evaluation 

are also limited to the population studied. This is often smaller than the entire 

population that might be affected by a policy. Most random assignment 

evaluations of welfare policy changes examine only those already receiving or 

applying for assistance. However, welfare policy changes might affect those not 

receiving assistance by making welfare more or less attractive to them. Random 

assignment impact evaluations generally do not measure these “entry effects.” 

Further, some welfare reform evaluations–particularly those of programs 

operated under “waivers” of pre-welfare reform Federal rules–are for programs 

that combine several different policy changes. For example, many waiver 

programs (and the TANF program) combined stricter work requirements and 

time limits with enhanced financial incentives to work and more generous 

welfare benefits for working families. The experimental group-control group 

comparison gives the impact of the entire package of changes (work 

requirements, time limits, and financial incentives).6

 Therefore evaluations of 

programs with, for example, time limits, should be interpreted as evaluations of 

programs with time limits, but not evaluations of time limits per se. 

Finally, the impacts most commonly reported from experimental 

evaluations are average impacts over the entire population studied. The welfare 

population is quite diverse, and average impacts may mask positive program 

 

5

 For a policy to have an impact, it must be determined that the impact was not simply a chance 

occurrence. That is, the difference must be determined to be “statistically significant.” Differences 

between experimental and control groups that pass statistical significance tests are reported as policy 

impacts. Whether a difference is determined to be an impact generally depends on two factors: the 

size of the difference between the experimental and control groups, and the size of the sample in the 

evaluation. Impact evaluations with smaller research samples tend to report fewer impacts. In these 

smaller samples, the difference may need to be substantial in order to pass tests of statistical 

significance. On the other hand, impact evaluations with larger research samples tend to report more 

policy impacts. 

6 A few evaluations used more than one “experimental group” to attempt to disentangle the effects of 

a package of policy initiatives. For example, in the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP) 

and the Vermont Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP), participants in a third comparison group 

(besides the regular experimental and control groups) were subject to the same policy initiatives as 

the experimental group, but were also subject to an additional policy initiative (for example, a 

requirement to work after 6 months of assistance). With the same random assignment and basic 

assumptions, any observed differences between the two experimental groups may be attributed to the 

additional policy initiative. In the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS) 

evaluation, the control group was not subject to a work requirement, one experimental group was 

subject to a package of work first initiatives and a second experimental group was subject to a 

package of basic education initiatives. Any observed differences between each of the experimental 

groups and the control group could be attributed to the different package of initiatives. The goal of 

this evaluation design was to measure the effect of a program that stressed work-first versus a 

program that focused more specifically on education. 
L-33 

impacts for some that are offset by negative impacts for others. 

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED FROM WELFARE-TO-WORK 

EVALUATIONS?

This section presents results from a review of impact evaluations of 

programs undertaken since passage of the Family Support Act of 1988 that serve 

the cash welfare population and, in a few cases, other low-income individuals. 

Most of these evaluations were supported, at least in part, by Federal funds. The 

discussion focuses on evaluations available as of December 2002. 

Welfare-to-Work Findings

Promoting work to end dependence on government benefits is part of the 

stated purpose of the TANF program. TANF requires recipients to engage in 

work (as defined by the State) within 2 years, and requires States to penalize 

recipients who fail to meet work requirements. In addition, States are subject to 

work participation standards. 

 Research shows that offering cash welfare to families reduces work effort.7

The decision to work requires a choice between the benefits that can be obtained 

in the workforce and those available from allocating time to domestic activities 

(such as child-rearing) or leisure. Though the low-income population is diverse, 

low wage offers can make welfare an economically more attractive option than a 

job. Additionally, some who are working might decide to reduce their hours of 

work and make up part of their lost earnings with the welfare payment. 

 The major issues in welfare-to-work evaluations can be classified into two 

groups: 

- Can programs be designed to overcome the work disincentives inherent 

in welfare? What are the effects of programs that require work or provide 

incentives to work? 

- Can programs be offered that increase the earnings capacities of welfare 

recipients so that work becomes more attractive than welfare? What type 

of programs are most effective, “work-first” or education-focused 

programs?8

Requiring Participation and Encouraging Work 

Empirical research dating back to the 1960s provides evidence that 

welfare is a disincentive to work.9

 To counteract the work disincentives, 

 

7

 Danziger, S., Haveman, R. & Plotnick, R. (1981) How income transfer programs affect work, 

savings, and the income distribution. Journal of Economic Literature, 29, 975-1028. 8 For an overview of theoretical issues of the labor supply of women, see: Killingsworth, M. & 

Heckman, J. (1986). Female labor supply: A survey. In O. Ashenfelter & P. Layard (Eds.), 

Handbook of Labor Economics (Volume 1). New York: North Holland. For a discussion of theory of 

the allocation of time between market activities (work) and domestic activities, see: Becker, G. 

(1965). A theory of the allocation of time. Economic Journal, 75, 493-517. 9 Ibid. See also Moffitt, R. (1992). Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review. Journal 

of Economic Literature, 20, 1-61. (Hereafter cited as, “Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare 

System.”) 
L-34 

policies have sought to require work or participation in job preparation 

activities. Federal TANF law requires States to operate mandatory welfare-towork programs, requiring States to sanction families with a noncomplying 

member. It also gives States the freedom to provide financial incentives to 

recipients to encourage work, and almost all States have adopted policies to 

increase the financial reward for taking a job. 

The findings of most evaluated welfare-to-work programs show that 

requiring participation in a pre-employment activity – be it a job search or an 

education program – increases employment and reduces welfare receipt. Most 

programs evaluated since the passage of the Family Support Act required 

participation, rather than made participation in job preparation activities 

voluntary. Required participation means that if a family fails to engage in 

activities, it faces at least a partial loss of benefits (a sanction). The impact 

evaluations indicate that there must be at least some enforcement of the 

participation requirement to be effective. However, these evaluations have not 

provided evidence that one type of sanction (such as a total loss of benefits) is 

more effective than other forms of sanctions (such as partial loss of benefits); 

sanctions were one of many policy changes made as part of a State’s waiver 

program, which limits the ability to determine if the impact occurred because of 

the sanction or because of some other change. 

As mentioned, most States have adopted policies to increase the reward to 

work by reducing the amount by which benefits are reduced when a family 

receives additional earnings. Increasing the amount of earnings disregarded in 

calculating welfare benefits lowers the implicit tax rate faced by recipient 

families. However, the bulk of empirical research on the effectiveness of work 

incentives for both increasing work and reducing welfare receipt was 

discouraging.10 Increasing earnings disregards raises the level of income at 

which a family loses eligibility for benefits. This keeps more families on 

welfare and could actually decrease work, through reductions in work effort that 

are at least partially offset by the welfare payment. The increased length of time 

allowed for families with earnings also has implications for welfare time limits. 

Programs that combine financial incentives and mandated participation in 

work or job preparation have produced some of the highest positive impacts on 

employment and earnings among those programs that have been evaluated. 

Financial incentives alone, without a participation mandate, tend to produce 

smaller or no impacts on employment and often no impacts on earnings. For 

example, in evaluations of both the Minnesota Family Investment Program 

(MFIP) and Connecticut’s Jobs First program, the combination of financial 

incentives and mandated participation produced fairly large employment 

impacts. The final report on MFIP showed a 35 percent increase in employment 

and a 23 percent increase in earnings among long-term, single-parent recipients 

9 quarters after the program began. Connecticut’s Jobs First evaluation showed 

a 10 percent increase in the employment rate and an 11 percent increase in 

earnings over the 30-month follow-up. The impacts of both programs were 

 

10 Moffitt, Incentive effects of the U.S. welfare system. 
L-35 

sustained over time. Additionally, both programs had large impacts on the most 

disadvantaged participants: those without a high school degree, without work 

experience, and with long spells on welfare. However, evaluations of both 

MFIP and Connecticut’s Jobs First program showed that increases in 

employment and earnings were accompanied by increases, not reductions, in 

welfare payments and receipt of assistance. 

Some evaluations of State programs that combined enhanced earnings 

disregards with mandated participation yielded different results from those 

found in Minnesota and Connecticut. Increased cash assistance payments were 

not found in the Florida Family Transition Program (FTP), the Vermont Welfare 

Restructuring Project (WRP), or the Virginia Initiative for Employment Not 

Welfare (VIEW) program. Florida and Virginia pay lower benefits than do 

Minnesota and Connecticut, and the Vermont earnings disregard is less generous 

than those found in Minnesota or Connecticut. Further, in Connecticut and 

Minnesota, the cash and food stamp earnings disregards were both changed, 

while the food stamp program in Florida, Vermont, and Virginia operated under 

Federal food stamp earnings disregard rules. 

“Work-First” Versus Education-First Strategies 

Under TANF, most States have developed “work-first” programs that 

emphasize rapid entry into a job. Under the “work-first” program model, the 

first and most common activity for unemployed recipients is job search. Job 

search may be supplemented by other strategies if that initial job search is 

unsuccessful. The TANF “work-first” approach contrasts with the pre-1996 

welfare law Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) training program, which 

emphasized an “education-first” strategy for those determined in need of 

additional education and training. 

Higher earnings are associated with both higher levels of formal education 

and training and job experience.11 Though the welfare population is quite 

diverse, the most disadvantaged recipients tend to have relatively low levels of 

schooling as well as relatively little work experience. Higher earnings capacities 

can be expected to make work more attractive than welfare. However, there has 

been an ongoing debate about which of the following policies are more likely to 

move and keep people off welfare by enhancing their earnings capacity: 

 

11 See: Willis, R. (1986). Wage Determinants: A Survey and Reinterpretation of Human Capital 

Earnings Functions. In O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics 

(Volume I). New York: North Holland. Earnings and earnings capacities of individuals are usually 

analyzed using “human capital theory,” which relates to wages to the skills individuals bring to a 

job. See Becker, G. (1964). Human Capital. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. The most 

common empirical model of wages was developed by Mincer and Polachek (1974), with earnings 

estimated as a function of schooling and job experience. See: Mincer, J., & Polachek, S. (1974). 

Family investments in human capital: Earnings of women. Journal of Political Economy, 82, S76-

S108. For estimates of earnings capacities for single women with children, see: Haveman, R., & 

Buron, L. (1993). Escaping poverty through work: The problem of low earnings capacity in the 

United States, 1973-88, Review of Income and Wealth (Series 39), 141-157. 
L-36 

 “Work-first” programs that quickly move recipients into work to 

acquire work experience by emphasizing immediate job search, often 

by forgoing formal education and training; 

 “Education-first” programs that encourage recipients to acquire 

education and skills, often by deferring work and acquisition of job 

experience; or 

 “Mixed” approach programs that provide a mix of services, with the 

first activity determined by an assessment of individual skills and 

needs. 

The JOBS program was created by the Family Support Act of 1988, 

which also mandated an evaluation of alternative welfare-to-work strategies. 

That evaluation, known as the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work 

Strategies (NEWWS) was completed in late 2001. NEWWS included a direct 

comparison of work-first versus education-first strategies as these two types of 

programs, and a third without mandated participation, were operated side-byside in the same places (Atlanta, Georgia; Grand Rapids, Michigan; and 

Riverside, California). 

Work-First -- The findings of the NEWWS evaluation confirmed those of 

previous research which showed that work-first programs increase employment 

and reduce welfare receipt relative to not having such a program in place. 

Further, work-first programs often have immediate impacts, reflecting the focus 

of such programs on rapid entry into the workforce. However, the major effect 

of these programs is to speed entry into a job. Over time, the effects of workfirst programs tend to fade. Employment rates for those not subject to the 

program (the control group) tend to catch up with the rates found in the workfirst program. Note that the fading of the impacts over time is not an 

uncommon finding in evaluations of social programs. Moreover, in the timelimited setting of TANF, speeding entry into the labor force and off of welfare 

might be seen in and of itself a positive impact as families accumulate less time 

toward their potential limit. 

Though the evidence is that work-first programs can achieve certain 

policy objectives -- raising employment and reducing the welfare rolls -- the 

policy successes from them have been limited. In particular, the evaluations 

show that a work-first strategy alone is unlikely to raise the income of the 

average participant. Studies of such programs show that increases in earnings 

generally offset but did not exceed reductions in cash benefits and food stamps. 

Under TANF, the work-first focus on job search is generally supplemented by 

“make work pay” policies. Such policies, and their effects on income, will be 

discussed below. 

Education-First -- The NEWWS evaluation also found that educationfirst programs increase employment and reduce welfare receipt relative to not 

having such a program in place. That is, programs that provide up-front 

education to those determined in need of such services also can help achieve 

policy goals of increasing employment and reducing welfare receipt. However, 

the impacts on employment and welfare receipt come later under an educationfirst strategy than they do under a work-first approach. While a recipient is in 
L-37 

education, she is more likely than those in a work-first program to remain on 

welfare and not be working in a job. The policy question of interest is whether, 

on average, the long-run benefits of investing in education-first outweigh its 

costs. 

 Table L-6 provides a comparison of earnings in both the work-first and 

education-first programs operated under the NEWWS evaluation in Atlanta, 

Grand Rapids, and Riverside over 5 years. Where there were differences in 

impacts, the work-first programs increased work and earnings and reduced 

welfare receipt by more than the education-focused programs. However, for 

many programs and groups, there was no difference in the impacts between 

work-first programs and education-focused groups. It also should be noted that 

none of the education-first programs increased incomes. 

In interpreting the findings comparing work-first and education-first 

programs, it should be noted that they do not measure the effect of education per 

se on a recipients’ earnings. They measure the effects of programs focused on 

education on recipients’ earnings. Many recipients further their education with 

or without the aid of a program. Education-first programs tended to raise 

participation in adult basic education for those recipients without a high school 

diploma or equivalent. However, not all such programs raised participation 

rates in either vocational education or in post-secondary education beyond those 

that would have prevailed in the absence of the program. 

“Mixed” Approach Program -- Among the programs in the NEWWS 

evaluation, the one with the greatest increase in earnings and decrease in cash 

assistance was in Portland, Oregon. Over the 5-year period, the Portland 

program produced an increase in earnings of 25 percent (over that in the control 

group without the program) and a decrease in cash assistance of 24 percent. 

The Portland program is considered a mixed approach program, 

incorporating some education into a work-first program. Its focus and message 

was employment, but it was distinguished from other work-first programs 

evaluated in NEWWS in a number of ways. Portland gave its case managers 

discretion in making short-term education a first activity assignment. Case 

managers also tended to encourage recipients to look for “good jobs” and even 

to delay entry into the workforce until they obtained such a job. 

An earlier evaluation of California’s welfare-to-work programs (Greater 

Avenues for Independence, or GAIN program) also found relatively large 

impacts in a mixed approach program. GAIN was California’s JOBS program, 

which had a greater emphasis on education than do today’s TANF programs. 

However, the GAIN program in Riverside, compared with GAIN programs 

evaluated elsewhere in the State, was notable for its strong message that the goal 

of GAIN was to get employment. Over a 3-year period, the Riverside program 

produced a 49 percent increase in earnings and a 15 percent decrease in cash 

assistance benefits. These impacts were larger than for other GAIN programs. 

However, despite the relatively large earnings increases and decreases in 

receipt of cash assistance in both the NEWWS Portland and GAIN Riverside 

evaluations, neither of these programs produced an increase in incomes. Here 
L-38 

too, increases in earnings generally offset but did not exceed reductions in cash 

benefits and food stamps. 

TABLE L-6 -- NATIONAL EVALUATION OF WELFARE-TO-WORK 

STRATEGIES COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS, AND 

WELFARE RECEIPT IMPACTS OF EMPLOYMENT-FOCUSED WITH 

EDUCATION-FOCUSED PROGRAMS IN ATLANTA, GRAND RAPIDS, 

AND RIVERSIDE 

Site Average Quarters Employed Total 5 Year Earnings Total Welfare Receipt 

Full impact sample 

Atlanta No impact. No impact. No impact. 

Grand 

Rapids 

Increase of 0.4 quarter in work 

first over education program. 

No impact. Decrease of $785 in work 

first program compared to 

education program. 

No high school diploma or GED 

Atlanta Increase of 0.7 quarters in work 

first over education program. 

No impact. Decrease of $531 in work 

first program compared to 

education program. 

Grand 

Rapids 

Increase of 0.9 quarters in work 

first over education program. 

Increase of $1,945 in 

work first over 

education program. 

Decrease of $905 in work 

first program compared to 

education program. 

Riverside Increase of 0.5 quarters in work 

first over education program. 

No impact. No impact. 

With high school diploma or GED 

Atlanta No impact. No impact. No impact. 

Grand 

Rapids 

No impact. No impact. Decrease of $737 in work 

first program compared to 

education program. 

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education (2001). 

The Importance of the “Message”-- As noted above, both the NEWWS 

Portland and the California GAIN programs imparted a strong message to 

recipients that the purpose of their participation in the program was to find a job. 

The employment-focused message of both programs was considered an 

important part of the program, even though both programs allowed for up-front 

education or training for some participants. 

Program messages, or the strength of the messages, often vary from site 

to site. For example, all California GAIN programs in the late 1980s and early 

1990s operated under the same statewide rules. However, the Riverside 

program projected a strong message that its purpose was for recipients to get 

employed quickly. Probably as a result of this message, the Riverside program 

also had some of the largest employment and earnings impacts of evaluated 

welfare-to-work programs. 

The program message might also affect how participants respond to time 

limits (see discussion below). Because of the variation in program messages, 

even among programs with the same rules, it is difficult to generalize evaluation 

findings from a specific site to other programs that might nominally have similar 

rules. However, the fact that messages are important has policy implications in 

and of itself: one avenue to a program that moves recipients from welfare to 
L-39 

work is to convey to participants the expectations of the program and their 

ultimate goals. 

Time Limits, Stronger Sanctions, and Other Policy Initiatives -- Three 

evaluations are available on the possible effects of benefit-termination time 

limits on welfare-to-work outcomes: Florida’s FTP program, Connecticut’s 

Jobs First program, and Virginia’s VIEW program. These were evaluations of 

pre-1996 law waiver program, that combined time limits with other welfare 

reform initiatives such as enhanced earnings disregards. Most State TANF 

programs are operating under policies that combine increased earnings 

disregards with time limits. 

Generally, there is little evidence that anticipation of time limits spurred 

recipients to leave welfare early. No change in cash assistance receipt was 

recorded before participants reached the time limit in Florida or in two of the 

three sites evaluated in Virginia. Receipt of cash assistance increased in 

Connecticut. It is possible that the behavioral effect of time limits, which serve 

as a spur to leave welfare early, and the enhanced earnings disregards, which 

permit working recipients to stay on welfare longer, cancel each other out. In 

Connecticut, the effect of the very generous earnings disregard might have 

overwhelmed the effect of the short time limit. 

One site in Virginia (Petersburg) did show reduced cash assistance receipt 

after recipients became subject to time limits. In Petersburg, program staff 

actively encouraged working participants to leave welfare, and save months of 

eligibility for future use. In other Virginia sites and in Connecticut and Florida, 

evaluators noted that staff did not actively encourage participants to save 

remaining months of eligibility. These results are further evidence that the 

program message conveyed by local administrators affects participant behavior. 

The evidence from other initiatives begun under waiver programs that 

tested various policy changes such as stronger sanctions for refusal to work and 

limited exemptions from work, suffer from some of the same issues that make it 

difficult to interpret results from programs with time limits: it is not possible to 

separate the effects of the “package” of reforms initiated under the waiver into 

its component parts. Moreover, unlike the NEWWS and some earlier 

evaluations, the control groups for the studies of waiver programs were already 

subject to a mandatory participation requirement. 

 Some waiver programs did have considerable effects; they increased 

employment and earnings and reduced welfare receipt (Delaware and Indiana). 

Delaware’s ABC program increased the employment rate of participants by 20 

percent and increased earnings by 16 percent in the first year. Delaware also 

reduced cash assistance receipt by 5 percent in the first year. Indiana increased 

employment by 2 percent over 2 years and earnings by 5 percent. Indiana’s 

program also cut cash assistance payments by 20 percent, with impacts growing 

in the second year. However, a number of the waiver evaluations (Arizona, 

New Jersey, Texas) failed to find consistent impacts on employment, earnings, 

and welfare receipt. 
L-40 

IMPACT ON INCOME 

 Though raising a family’s income and reducing poverty are not explicit 

TANF goals, Federal law requires TANF State plans to outline how the States 

intend to provide needy parents with services to enable them to “leave the 

program and become self-sufficient.” Attainment of self-sufficiency implies a 

rise in family income. Additionally, other sections of TANF law (besides its 

explicit goals) reflect interest in the overall economic well-being of TANF 

families or families with children in general. For example, States are required to 

report on their child poverty rate, and if their child poverty rate increases by 

more than 5 percent over a year as a result of TANF implementation, the State is 

required to file a “corrective action” plan with the Federal government. TANF 

also requires HHS to include information on average income in its annual report 

to Congress on families that reached the TANF time limit or had teen parents. 

Impact of Requiring Work Participation -- As discussed above, programs 

that require participation in work or job preparation alone tend to increase 

employment and reduce welfare receipt. However, even among the programs 

with the greatest increases in earnings and decreases in cash welfare receipt 

(NEWWS Portland, Oregon and California GAIN Riverside programs), earnings 

generally offset but did not exceed reductions in cash benefits and food stamps, 

leaving total incomes unchanged. While some evaluated programs increased 

incomes, generally they did so by increasing rather than decreasing welfare 

receipt. 

Making Work Pay -- TANF programs are work-first programs in that the 

most common activity for unemployed recipients is job search. However, it is 

just as apt to describe State TANF programs as work support programs, which 

offer both cash welfare benefits and supportive services such as child care for 

some recipients who go to work (and supportive services for other low-income 

families as well). In their cash welfare programs, most State TANF programs 

have expanded eligibility for working families by enhancing their cash welfare 

earnings disregard. The earnings disregard is the amount of earnings not 

considered (deducted from gross income) when a family’s eligibility and cash 

benefits are determined. The increase permits recipients to continue to receive 

cash aid at higher levels of earnings than they could under previous policies, 

thus supplementing earnings with a continued cash benefit. 

As discussed above, the increase in earnings disregards is sometimes 

viewed as a financial incentive to work. Evaluated programs that combined 

financial incentives with a participation requirement had some of the largest 

increases in employment and earnings. Among the evaluated programs 

discussed in this appendix, Connecticut’s Jobs First program; Florida’s Family 

Transitions Program (FTP); and Minnesota’s MFIP program did report 

increased incomes. All three of these programs had enhanced earnings 

disregards as part of their program. In two of these three programs, 

Connecticut’s Jobs First and Minnesota’s MFIP program, cash welfare payments 

were increased by the program, rather than reduced. 

Minnesota’s MFIP program is notable because it had explicit goals to 
L-41 

increase incomes and reduce poverty among families with children. MFIP 

showed a 15 percent increase in combined income for single, long-term 

recipients. During the period that MFIP was evaluated, there was no time limit 

on cash assistance benefits. Connecticut’s Jobs First and Florida’s FTP 

programs also raised incomes, but the increase was smaller than that shown for 

MFIP. Both Connecticut and Florida’s programs had relatively large impacts on 

income before families reached their time limit. However, once families could 

begin reaching the time limit and began to be removed from the rolls, the 

average income impact began to fall until there was no difference between 

program and control groups. 

CHILD WELL-BEING

 Most Federal and State welfare policies apply directly to parents, not 

children. They are aimed at promoting mothers’ work and reducing their 

dependence on welfare. Research has illustrated that poverty is associated with 

unfavorable development of children. Poor children generally score lower on 

assessments of health, cognitive development, school achievement, and 

emotional well-being. Poor children are more likely to be raised by a single 

parent, to be raised in neighborhoods with higher rates of crime, and to attend 

schools with fewer resources.12 These findings have led many to contend that 

programs that raise the income of families may positively affect child wellbeing. However, requiring mothers to work reduces their time to nurture 

children and requires them to find other caregivers. 

 Under TANF, States have designed programs that directly target outcomes 

for adults such as employment and receipt of cash assistance through work 

requirements, work incentives, and time limits on assistance. Measuring the 

impact of these welfare reform initiatives on children requires a look at the 

pathways through which they might indirectly affect child well-being. This is 

difficult, as these pathways may be directly or indirectly affected by policy.13

 Mandatory Work and Development of Young Children -- Most programs 

that required work increased employment but not incomes. These programs 

have not produced either consistently favorable or consistently unfavorable 

impacts on the development of young (pre-teen) children. Therefore, it has not 

been shown that requiring participation in welfare-to-work programs either 

systematically harms or helps children. For this age group, evaluations of 

welfare-to-work programs that included a child development study have found a 

smattering of impacts either favorable or unfavorable on measures of behavior, 

academic achievement, and health and safety. However, few patterns if any are 

discernable in the existing research. 

 

12 Brooks-Gunn, J., Duncan, G., & Maritato, N. (1997). Poor families, poor outcomes; The well 

being of children and youth. In G. Duncan and J. Brooks-Gunn (Eds.), Consequences of Growing 

up Poor. New York: Russell Sage. 

13 Child Trends. (1999). Children and welfare reform: A guide to evaluating the effects of State 

welfare reform policies. Washington, DC: Author. 
L-42 

Increasing Incomes -- As noted above, few welfare-to-work programs 

succeeded in raising combined incomes. The Minnesota MFIP program did 

increase incomes, and produced favorable impacts on both behavior and 

academic achievement. Connecticut’s Job First program also had some positive 

impacts on the behavior of young children. However, the Florida FTP program 

had mixed impacts (some positive and some negative). As discussed above, 

both Connecticut and Florida’s program included time limits, and the positive 

income impact of the program faded away with families reaching the time limit; 

Minnesota’s program did not have a time limit. 

Adolescents -- One finding that has appeared in several studies is 

unfavorable impacts on school outcomes for adolescent children. Two of the 

four NEWWS evaluation sites that conducted a child outcome study (Grand 

Rapids and Riverside), as well as evaluations of Connecticut’s Jobs First, 

Florida FTP, and Vermont’s welfare restructuring project, all reported a negative 

effect on adolescents’ academic performance or behavior in school. 

FAMILY FORMATION AND THE PROMOTION OF MARRIAGE 

Two of the objectives of TANF are to “prevent and reduce the incidence 

of out-of-wedlock pregnancies” and to “encourage the formation and 

maintenance of two-parent families.” Since the 1970s, the overall birth rate for 

married women has declined, but the number of nonmarital births has 

substantially increased. This increase in nonmarital births has been attributed to 

women’s delaying the decision to marry, but not the decision to have a child.14 

Growth in the welfare caseload, to an historic peak in 1994, was driven in part 

by the increase in the number of single female-headed households. 

 Economic models of marriage decisions contend that single people marry 

if the marriage provides a benefit to both individuals. For couples to remain 

married, both individuals must continue to benefit from the union.15 Welfare 

programs that provide a means for single mothers to live independently may 

serve as a disincentive to marriage. It should be noted that employment of 

mothers also provides the means to live independently. Additionally, welfare 

programs that pay larger families bigger benefits are seen by some as an 

incentive for nonmarital child-bearing. 

 The bulk of post-Family Support Act research has focused on broader 

efforts to alter welfare, especially by increasing work, and the impact of these 

efforts on earnings and employment (as discussed in the previous section). In 

recent years, the impacts of welfare reform efforts on family formation has 

received more attention. The “family cap,” a policy that denies a benefit 

increase for the birth of a child while on welfare, has been evaluated. In 

addition, some evaluated State programs have included the elimination of 

 

14 Bachrach, C. (1998). The changing circumstances of marriage and fertility in the United States. 

In R. Moffitt, (Ed.), Welfare, the family, and reproductive behavior: Research perspectives. 

Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 

15 Becker, G., Landes, E., & Michael, R. (1977). An economic analysis of marital instability. 

Journal of Political Economy, 85(6), 1141-1188. 
L-43 

special eligibility restrictions for two-parent families. However, these policy 

initiatives were part of broader welfare reform efforts, and the evaluations 

provide evidence on the whole package of reforms – not just family caps or 

reducing eligibility restrictions for two-parent families. 

Family Caps -- The most noted study on family caps is the evaluation of 

the New Jersey Family Development Program (FDP). New Jersey was the first 

State to institute the family cap policy and it conducted both a traditional 

experiment (program and control group) and a statistical analysis for its impact 

evaluation [Camasso, M., Harvey, C., Jagannathan, R., and Killingsworth, M. 

(1999b)]. Evaluators found that the New Jersey program decreased births and 

increased abortions. Both the experimental study and the statistical study had 

the same findings lending support to the impacts reported for the program. 

However, the New Jersey findings study one program in one place at one 

time. These findings have not been replicated elsewhere. A family cap program 

in Arkansas was also evaluated, and no impacts on births were found. The 

programs in Arizona and Connecticut included family caps, but no impact on 

births was found. (Some other pre-1996 waiver programs also included family 

caps, but impacts on births were not reported.) 

Promoting Marriage -- There has recently been a great deal of attention 

on promoting marriage. None of the programs discussed in this appendix 

focused on promoting marriage. Some programs included eliminating special 

eligibility restrictions that applied to 2-parent families under pre-1996 welfare 

law. Other welfare-to-work programs might have had indirect effects on marital 

outcomes. 

Minnesota’s MFIP showed an increase in marriage for some groups. For 

long-term single parent families, there was an increase in the percent who were 

married three years after entering the program, though the percent married in the 

MFIP programs was still rather low (11 percent). However, for some subgroups 

MFIP showed no impact on marriage. For example, the MFIP program was 

associated with no increase in marriage among long-term single parent families 

in urban counties who were subject to mandated requirements. On the other 

hand, long-term single parents who were given financial incentives but not 

subject to a work requirement did have an increase in the percent married after 3 

years. Other welfare-to-work programs that reported marital outcomes produced 

no impact on marriage. 

Future Directions in Welfare Research 

Much has been learned about the impact of welfare to work programs, 

with post-1996 welfare reform trends consistent with the findings of impact 

evaluations that show that work-first programs can be effective in moving 

families from welfare to work. This has been done without any systematic 

evidence of harm to the development of their children. However, the available 

research also shows the limits of the policy successes of current welfare reform 

programs. Only those programs that provide government-funded earnings 

supplements through continued welfare checks for working families have been 

found to raise incomes. 
L-44 

State and Local Area Indicators: The American Community Survey 

The information in the appendix which examines trends in welfare, work, 

and economic well-being among the broader population of single mothers comes 

from national household surveys. The main survey for examining these trends is 

the March Current Population Survey (CPS), a national household survey 

conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. While providing a broad overview of 

trends for the nation as a whole, the March CPS is very limited in providing 

State-specific information. State-specific information is obviously of interest in 

assessing welfare reform, which devolved a great deal of responsibility for 

designing welfare programs to the States. 

 The American Community Survey (ACS) was designed to help provide 

more timely information specifically for State and local areas than available 

through other Census surveys. Its sample design and size is to be sufficient for 

making annual estimates of income, poverty, and welfare receipt for all 50 

States and the District of Columbia, as well as for cities, counties, metropolitan 

areas, and population groups of 65,000 people or more. 

Studies of Programs for Specific Subgroups of Recipients 

The bulk of the evidence on the impacts of welfare-to-work programs 

comes from broad-based programs that covered large numbers of recipients. 

Research has shown that the welfare population is diverse: some recipients leave 

the rolls quickly while others might take a longer time to move to selfsufficiency. Though some of the evaluated programs did do individual 

assessments of employability and needs, and tailored activities to individualized 

needs, they still tended to be programs intended for the welfare population as a 

whole. 

 Some of the research underway is intended to address the special needs of 

specific groups of recipients. HHS is currently fielding an experimental study of 

programs that provide special services for the “hard-to-employ,” including 

services for adults with substance abuse and/or mental health problems, 

disabilities, and women who had been the victim of domestic violence. Another 

study currently underway will address employment strategies for families in 

rural areas. 

 HHS is currently funding the Employment Retention and Advancement 

(ERA) Project, a major multi-site experimental evaluation of numerous 

strategies to assist welfare recipients and low-income persons in the workforce. 

Some sites in the ERA project provide services for specific groups of recipients. 

One of the ERA demonstrations in New York City is a program (called the 

Personal Roads to Individual Development, or PRIDE program) that provides 

vocational rehabilitation and work-based education to recipients with physical or 

mental health problems. 
L-45 

Post-Employment Services 

 Most of the evaluated welfare-to-work programs provided preemployment services; that is, they were programs for adult recipients who were 

not working and required of them job search or provided them with education or 

training to increase their chances of finding work. Many programs also 

provided work supports such as continued cash assistance and child care. These 

supports would not in themselves help a recipient acquire additional job skills 

and increase their earnings potential. However, such work supports might assist 

in helping a recipient retain a job and acquire additional work experience. 

 A post-employment services demonstration experiment was fielded in the 

1990s. This program focused primarily on continued case management (e.g. 

contact with the welfare office and provision of supportive services), but the 

experiment did not increase employment and earnings or raise incomes. 

 The Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) Project, discussed 

above, includes several sites that provide post-employment services. For 

example, one of the two experiments conducted in Riverside, California as well 

as the Jacksonville, Florida site will test alternative strategies for promoting 

education and training for working parents. 

Family Formation 

For the most part, the existing research does not address the impact of 

programs on TANF’s family formation goals of reducing out-of-wedlock births 

and encouraging two-parent families. Most of the programs were welfare-towork programs and relatively few of their evaluations even reported family 

formation impacts. Further, the program interventions that could be considered 

as seeking to further a family formation goal (e.g., eliminating stricter eligibility 

standards for two-parent families) tended to be only a part of a package of policy 

interventions and, therefore, their independent impacts are difficult to assess. 

 HHS is currently funding a number of initiatives assessing programs that 

aim to directly affect family formation outcomes. It is funding an experimental 

evaluation examining programs to help low-income couples who have a child 

out of wedlock who wish to marry and sustain their marriage. It is also funding 

a number of different projects to help inform policymakers and researchers of 

the types of programs that might further TANF’s family formation goals. 

Developing New Types of Program 

 In many of these projects the development of new program models is an 

important component of the demonstration or evaluation. Unlike the preemployment, welfare-to-work programs, in which basic components such as 

requiring participation or promoting job search or education activities are well 

known, new program models to provide post-employment services for job 

retention and advancement as well as programs to address family formation 

issues are in the process of being developed. 

 Table L-7 summarizes major HHS-funded ongoing research and 

evaluation projects related to welfare reform. The table is organized by subject 
L-46 

area (e.g., employment-related and family formation topics) and provides 

tentative data for the publication of project findings. 

TABLE L-7 -- SELECTED ONGOING FEDERALLY FUNDED 

RESEARCH PROJECTS 

Project Description Project coordinator Impact findings due 

Employment Strategies for Special Populations 

Interim Report: Late 

2007 

Services for the 

hard-to-employ 

An experimental evaluation of 

strategies to help the “hard-toemploy” find and sustain 

employment and improve 

family and child well-being. 

Populations of interest includes 

adults with substance abuse 

and/or mental health problems, 

physical and developmental 

disabilities, low basic skills, 

and women who had been 

victims of domestic abuse. 

MDRC 

Final Report: Early 

2010 

Interim Report: Late 

2005 

Rural welfare-towork strategies 

demonstration 

An experimental evaluation of 

strategies to improve 

employment and family wellbeing for rural populations. 

The evaluation is being 

conducted in two sites: Illinois 

and Nebraska. 

Mathematica Policy 

Research, Inc. 

Final Report: Late 

2006 

Employment Retention and Job Advancement 

Interim Report: Mid 

2004/2005 

Employment 

Retention and Job 

Advancement 

(ERA) Evaluation 

Experimental evaluation of 

post-employment and preemployment strategies to 

promote job retention and/or 

advancement. Strategies to be 

tested in 15 sites. 

MDRC 

Final Report: 2007 

Family Formation and the Promotion of Marriage 

Building Strong 

Families 

Experimental evaluation of 

strategies to help low-income, 

unwed new parents improve 

their relationships and for those 

who wish to marry to gain the 

knowledge and skills necessary 

to enter and sustain healthy 

marriages. The experiment 

will focus on improving child 

and family well-being. 

Mathematica Policy 

Research, Inc. 

Interim Early 

Implementation 

Report: 2005 

Interim Impact 

Report: 2007 

Final Report: Late 

2011 

Interim Report: Late 

2006 

Evaluation of 

Community 

Healthy Marriage 

Initiative 

Non-experimental evaluation 

of effectiveness of community 

level demonstrations to 

promote healthy marriages. 

RTI International 

Final Report: Late 

2010 
L-47 

TABLE L-7 -- SELECTED ONGOING FEDERALLY FUNDED 

RESEARCH PROJECTS- continued

Project Description Project coordinator Impact findings due 

Strengthening Interim Report: NA 

Families with 

Children Born 

Out-of-Wedlock 

A review of research literature 

and field experience to 

develop a conceptual 

framework for intervention 

and design for evaluating 

relationship and marriage 

services to low-income 

couples who have a child born 

out of wedlock. 

Mathematica Policy 

Research, Inc. 

Final Report: January 

2003 

First Interim Report: 

Late 2008 

Follow-up Report: 

Late 2010 

Supporting 

Healthy Marriage 

Experimental evaluation of 

strategies to help low-income 

couples who are married or 

planning to marry, who are in 

their childrearing years, to 

gain the knowledge and skills 

necessary to sustain healthy 

marriages. The experiment 

will focus on improving child 

and family well-being. 

MDRC 

Final Report: Late 

2012 

Service delivery Interim Report: NA 

and evaluation 

design options for 

promoting healthy 

marriages 

Project to inform developing 

demonstrations and 

evaluations of services to 

promote healthy marriages. 

This project examines existing 

and potential service delivery 

systems and settings and the 

implications for evaluation. 

The Urban Institute 

Final Report: Mid 

2004 

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on information provided 

by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 

Detailed Table on Welfare-to-Work Impact Evaluations 

Table L-8 details impact findings of welfare reform program evaluations 

undertaken since the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988. It includes 

information on the population that was studied (universe), the time period when 

persons were assigned to experimental and control groups (random assignment), 

the number of months or years following random assignment for which data 

were collected (followup), and the source of the information used in the 

evaluation (data type). 

The table also provides information on the policy changes tested in each 

of the evaluations. These policy changes are categorized in the table using 

standardized terminology. However, it should not be assumed that all programs 

are identical to one another. Rather, there are likely numerous design and other 

differences among programs that all tested the same general policy approach. 

In the national NEWWS evaluation, the policies examined were either 

employment-focused programs (programs emphasizing job search), educationfocused programs (programs emphasizing up-front education), or Portland, 

Oregon’s “mixed” employment/education program. These evaluations 

examined mandated programs compared with recipients who were not subject to 

a participation mandate. 
L-48 

Evaluations of individual State programs (often under waivers of pre1996 welfare law) also included a package of policy changes that represented 

deviations from programs then in existence. These include: 

- Earnings disregard enhancement: In determining financial eligibility 

and benefit amounts, these initiatives disregarded more earnings than 

allowed under pre-1996 Federal welfare rules. Some States also 

allowed families to accrue more assets and remain eligible for 

benefits than allowed in pre-1996 law through the Asset Limit 

Increase. 

- Time Limit: The time limit ends benefits (either to the adult or to the 

entire family, depending on the program) when assistance has been 

received for a specified period. In some of the earlier welfare reform 

experiments, the time limit did not specify a date the benefits would 

end; it specified when a family had to be engaged in work in order to 

continue to qualify for benefits. This type of time limit was called a 

Work-Trigger Time Limit. 

- Work requirements/younger child: Pre-1996 law permitted States to 

exempt mothers with children under the age of 3 from participation in 

work or training. Some States experimented with requiring mothers 

of younger children to participate in activities. 

- Work Sanctions: Pre-1996 law sanctioned families in breach of 

participation requirements by ending the adult portion of the welfare 

benefits. Some States experimented with different sanctions for 

failure to comply with work participation requirements. 

- Family Cap: States with “family cap” policies do not increase the 

family’s benefit for a new baby conceived or born to a mother already 

on welfare. 

- Two-parent eligibility: Pre-1996 welfare law had special restrictions 

on eligibility for two-parent families. As part of their welfare reform 

experiments, some States eliminated all or some of these restrictions. 

- Transitional Benefit Extension: Federal law allows transitional 

Medicaid for one year; pre-1996 law allowed transitional child care 

for up to 1 year. Some States experimented with longer periods for 

these transitional benefits. 

The table shows impacts for welfare-to-work outcomes (employment, 

earnings, and welfare receipt) and, for those evaluations that reported them, 

impacts on income, family formation, and child well-being measures. Unless 

otherwise noted, the outcome shown is as measured over the entire followup 

period. The outcomes are displayed as percentage changes. Some percentage 

changes reported in this table may differ if calculated based on the reported 

findings, due to rounding. The percentage changes reported in the table reflect 

the percentage changes as reported in the individual evaluation. Additionally, 

the actual levels (e.g., earnings amounts, employment rates) are shown in 

parentheses (outcomes for the experimental group versus outcomes for the 

control group) as reported in the individual evaluations. The table’s earnings 

data represent earnings over the entire research sample and group, and include 
L-49 

zero earnings for individuals for whom no work is reported. This illustrates the 

impact of the program on average earnings. (Average earnings for only those 

who actually did work would be higher.) 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988 

National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies 

National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: How Effective Are Different Welfare-to-Work 

Approaches? Five Year Adult and Child Impacts for Eleven Programs, December 2001. 

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation under contract for the U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education. 

Sites: Atlanta, GA; Grand Rapids, MI; Riverside, CA; Portland, OR; Columbus, OH; Detroit, MI; 

Oklahoma City, OK. 

Atlanta Employment-Focused 

Policy Changes: Employment-focused program. 

Earnings: Increase of 14% ($19,838 vs. $17,380). 

 

Employment: Quarters employed -- Increase of 10% (worked in 8.5 

vs. 7.8 out of 20 potential quarters). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 9% ($9,064 vs. $9,946). 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents of children 

age 3 or older). 

Random assignment: 1/92–1/94.

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents of children 

age 3 or older). 

 

Combined income: No impact. 

Family structure: No impact. 

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts for academic 

functioning for adolescents; unfavorable impacts for health 

outcomes for children of preschool age at random assignment. 

Favorable impacts for development of social skills for young 

children; unfavorable impacts for health for young children; 

increase in days late to school for children in special child 

outcomes sample (age 8 to 10 at follow-up). 

Atlanta Education-Focused 

Policy Changes: Education-focused program. 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents of children 

age 3 or older). 

Earnings: Increase of 12% ($19,397 vs. $17,380). 

Employment: Quarters employed -- Increase of 7% (worked in 8.3 

vs. 7.8 out of 20 potential quarters). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 7% ($9,236 vs. $9,946). 

Combined income: No impact. 

Family structure: No impact. 

Random assignment: 1/92 - 

1/94. 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Data type: Administrative data 

survey. Child well-being outcomes: Unfavorable impact for health and 

outcomes for children of preschool age at random assignment. 

Favorable impacts for development of social skills for young 

children; unfavorable impacts for health of young children; 

increase in days absent from school for children in special child 

outcomes sample (aged 8 to 10 at follow-up). 
L-50 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Grand Rapids Employment-Focused 

Policy Changes: Employment-focused program.

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents with children 

age 1 or older). 

Random assignment: 9/91 - 

1/94. 

Earnings: Increase of 8% ($22,322 vs. $20,770). 

Employment: Quarters employed -- Increase of 8% (worked in 9.8 

vs. 9.1 out of 20 potential quarters). 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Data Type: Administrative Data 

Survey. 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 20% ($10,414 vs. $12,966). 

Combined income: Decrease of 3% ($40,739 vs. $42,172). 

Family structure: Decrease in percent separated, divorced, or 

widowed. 

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts on school 

attendance for young children. Unfavorable impacts on academic 

outcomes for school-age children and adolescents. Favorable 

impact on health for preschool children. Unfavorable impacts for 

social skills outcomes, academic functioning and health (though 

one favorable impact on academic achievement) for children in 

special child outcomes sample (age 8 to 10 at follow-up). 

Grand Rapids Education-Focused 

Policy changes: Education-focused program. 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents with children 

age 1 or older). 

Random assignment: 9/91 - 

1/94. 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Data type: Administrative 

survey. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment: Quarters employed -- Increase of 4% (worked in 9.5 

vs. 9.1 out of 20 potential quarters). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 14% ($11,199 vs. $12,966). 

Combined income: No impact. 

Family structure: No impact. 

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts for school 

attendance for young children; unfavorable impacts on health for 

children of preschool age; unfavorable impact on academic 

function for adolescents. Unfavorable impacts on social skills 

development and academic functioning for special child outcomes 

sample (aged 8 to 10 at follow-up). 
L-51 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Riverside Employment-Focused 

Policy changes: Employment-focused program. 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents of children 

age 3 or older). 

Random assignment: 6/91 - 6/93.

 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Data Type: 

Administrative data Survey. 

Earnings: Increase of 17% ($17,438 vs. 

 $14,889). Increase for those without a high school diploma or 

basic skills of 21% ($13,193 vs. $10,912). 

Employment: Quarters employed--Increase of 20% (worked in 6.8 

vs. 5.6 out of 20 potential quarters). Increase for those without a 

high school diploma or basic skills of 27% (worked in 6.0 vs. 4.7 

out of 20 potential quarters). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 15% ($15,584 vs. $18,294). 

Decrease for those without a high school diploma or basic skills of 

15% ($17,171 vs. $20,126). 

Combined income: No impact. 

Family structure: Increase in percent cohabiting. Increase in 

percent with a new baby for those without a high school diploma 

or basic skills. 

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts for academic 

functioning for groups other than adolescents; unfavorable impact 

on adolescents academic functioning. Favorable heath impact for 

children of preschool age and those who were adolescents at 

random assignment. Unfavorable impacts for social skills and 

behavior and mixed impacts for academic functioning for children 

in special child outcomes sample (aged 8 to 10 at follow-up). 

 

Riverside Education-Focused 

Policy Changes: Education-focused program. 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents of children 

age 3 or older) without a high 

school diploma or basic skills. 

Random assignment: 6/91 - 6/93. 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey 

Earnings: Increase of 13% ($12,273 vs. $10,912). 

Employment: Quarters employed--Increase of 17% (worked in 5.5 

vs. 4.7 out of 20 potential quarters). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 15% ($17,176 vs. $20,126). 

Combined income: Decrease of 6% ($35,924 vs. $38,311). 

Family structure: No impact. 

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts on academic 

functioning for young children and school age children; 

unfavorable impacts on academic functioning for adolescents. 

Favorable impact on health for young school-aged children and 

adolescents. Favorable impact on social skills development but 

unfavorable impacts on school attendance and health and safety for 

special child outcomes sample (aged 8 to 10 at follow-up). 
L-52 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Columbus Integrated Case Management 

Policy Changes: Education-focused program. 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents of children 

age 3 or older). 

Random assignment: 9/92 - 

7/94. 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: Increase of 8% ($27,621 vs. $25,566). 

Employment: Quarters employed--Increase of 4% (worked in 10.2 

vs. 9.8 out of 20 potential quarters). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 17% ($7,481 vs. $9,005). 

Combined income: No impact. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Columbus Traditional Case Management 

Policy Changes: Education-focused program. 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents of children 

age 3 or older). 

Random assignment: 9/92 - 

7/94. 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Earnings: Increase of 6% ($26,977 vs. $25,566). 

Employment: Quarters employed--Increase of 3% (worked in 10.1 

vs. 9.8 out of 20 potential quarters). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 12% ($7,899 vs. $9,005). 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Combined income: No impact. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Detroit 

Policy Changes: Education-focused program. 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents 

with children age 1 or older). 

Random assignment: 5/92 - 

6/94. 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Earnings: Increase of 7% ($21,968 vs. $20,508). 

Employment: No impact. 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 4% ($15,686 vs. $16,247). 

Combined income: No impact. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 
L-53 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Oklahoma City 

Policy Changes: Education-focused program. 

Universe: New applicants in 

JOBS mandatory population 

(parents with children age 1 and 

older). 

Random assignment: 9/91 - 5/93.

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment: No impact. 

Cash assistance: Not reported. 

Combined income: Not reported. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Portland 

Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program. 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

population (parents 

with children age 1 and older). 

Random assignment: 2/93 - 

12/94. 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: Increase of 25% ($26,041 vs. $20,891). 

Employment: Quarters employed--Increase of 21% (worked in 9.4 

vs. 7.8 out of 20 potential quarters). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 24% ($8,940 vs. $11,686). 

Combined income: No impact. 

Family structure: No impact. 

Child well-being outcomes: No impact. 

New Chance Demonstration 

New Chance: Final Report on a Comprehensive Program for Young Mothers in Poverty and Their 

Children, October 1997. 

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Sites: 16 sites in 10 States: California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 

New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania. 

Policy Changes: 1) Child care; 2) Enhanced family planning services; 3) Parenting workshops; 

4) Required participation in education-focused program (first-year) then employment. 

Universe: Mothers 16 to 22 years 

old who 

(1) had first given birth age 19 or 

younger, 

(2) were receiving AFDC, 

(3) did not have a high school 

diploma or GED, and (4) were 

not pregnant when they entered 

the program. Participation in the 

New Chance demonstration was 

voluntary. 

Random Assignment: 

8/89 - 7/91. 

Earnings: No impact over 42-month follow-up period. 

Months 1-6: Decrease of 27% ($263 vs. $358). 

Months 7-18: Decrease of 17% ($1,096 vs. $1,323). 

Months 18-42: No impact. 

Employment rate: No impact over 42-month follow-up period. 

Months 1-6: Decrease of 26% (15% vs. 20%). 

Months 7-42: No impact. 

Cash assistance: Percent who ever received AFDC over 42-month 

period: Increase of 1% (99% vs. 98%). 

Income: No impact. 
L-54 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988 -

continued

Follow-up: 42 months. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

 

Family structure: Marital status not reported. Decrease in number 

of months between last terminated pregnancy and onset of next 

pregnancy. No impact on pregnancies, births or abortions. 

Child well-being outcomes: Unfavorable impacts on behavior 

measures and academic functioning. Teachers report favorable 

impacts for boys on social competence and behavior. Teachers also 

report favorable impacts for behavior of girls, but unfavorable 

impacts for girls’ school readiness. 

Parents’ Fair Share (PFS) Demonstration 

Working and Earning: The Impact of Parent’s Fair Share on Low-Income Fathers’ Employment, 

October 2000. 

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Sites: Los Angeles, CA; Jacksonville, FL; Springfield, MA; Grand Rapids, MI; Trenton, NJ; Dayton, 

OH; Memphis, TN. 

Policy Changes: 1) Enhanced child support establishment; 2) Mixed employment/education program; 

3) Promote parent interaction. 

Universe: Noncustodial parents. 

Random assignment: 4/94 - 

6/96. 

Follow-up: 2 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: Administrative data show no impact for 7 (combined) 

sites. Survey data show increase of 24% ($7,150 vs. $5,779) in 

year 2. Administrative data also show increases in some quarters 

for Dayton and Grand Rapids, but a decline in earnings in a single 

quarter in Trenton. 

Employment rate: Administrative data show no impact for 7 

(combined) sites. Survey data show a decrease of 7% (75% vs. 

81%) for year 2. Administrative data show employment rate 

increases in Dayton in some quarters, but decreases in Trenton. 

Income: Not reported. 

Cash assistance: Not reported. 

 Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD) 

Moving Into Adulthood: Were the Impacts of Mandatory Programs for Welfare-Dependent Teenaged 

Parents Sustained After the Programs Ended?, February 1998. 

Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 

Sites: Chicago, IL; Camden, NJ; Newark, NJ. 

Policy Changes: 1) Child care; 2) Mixed employment/education program; 3) Provide for workrelated expenses. 
L-55 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988 –

continued

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: 

Camden: Increase of 8% (75% vs. 70%). 

Newark: Increase of 7% (75% vs. 70%). 

Chicago: Increase of 4% (78% vs. 76%). 

Cash assistance: 

Camden: No impact. 

Newark: No impact. 

Chicago: Decrease of 5% ($11,645 vs. $12,216). 

Income: 

Camden: Increase of 8% ($840 vs. $778) 

Newark: No impact. 

Chicago: No impact. 

Family structure: Marital status not reported. No impact on births. 

Increase in percent who reported an abortion within 78 months of 

entering the program in Chicago of 23% (23% vs. 19%). No 

impact on abortions in other sites. 

Child well-being outcomes: Unfavorable impacts in Newark for 

behavior and academic achievement outcomes. Favorable impact 

in Chicago on percent of parents who report their children do “very 

well” in school. 

Universe: Teenagers who were 

first-time parents receiving 

AFDC. 

Random assignment: 7/87 - 4/90.

Follow-up: 6 years. 

Data Type: 

Administrative data 

Child development assessments 

Survey. 

Alabama: Avenues to Self-Sufficiency through Employment and Training Services (ASSETS) 

Evaluation of the Alabama ASSETS Demonstration, January 1997. 

Author: Abt Associates Inc. 

Sites: Three Counties in Alabama: Clarke, Limestone, and Madison. 

Policy Changes: 1)Applied AFDC Child support cooperation requirement to food stamp only 

households; 2) Asset limit increase; 3) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant (food stamp 

cashout); 4) Mixed employment/education program; 5) Personal responsibility sanctions. 

Universe: AFDC and Food 

Stamp cases. Focus 

on participants age 16 to 59 for 

employment and training 

services. 

Study Duration: 7/90 - 6/94. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: Year 3 impacts– 

Clarke County: Decrease of 11% ($2,758 vs. $3,096). 

Limestone County: No impact. 

Madison County: Decrease of 5% ($2,925 vs. $3,076). 

Employment rate: Percent employed in 12th quarter: 

Clarke County: Decrease of 11% (37% vs. 41%). 

Limestone County: Decrease of 8% (36% vs. 39%). 

Madison County: Decrease of 5% (36% vs. 38%). 

 
L-56 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988- 

continued

 

 

Cash assistance: Year 3 impacts– 

Clarke County: Increase of 9% ($1,930 vs. $1,779). 

Limestone County: Decrease of 9% ($1,107 vs. $1,222). 

Madison County: Increase of 3% ($1,446 vs. $1,409). 

Income: Not reported. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Arizona: Employing and Moving People Off Welfare and Encouraging Responsibility (EMPOWER) 

Evaluation of the Arizona EMPOWER Welfare Reform Demonstration, May 1999. 

Author: Abt Associates Inc. 

Sites: Three sites in Phoenix and one site on the Navajo Reservation. 

Policy Changes: 1) Family cap; 2) Personal responsibility sanctions; 3) Required participation in 

employment and training services for minor parents; 4) Required unwed minor parents to live with 

parent or responsible adult; 5) Time limit (adult-only; 6) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid); 7) 

Two-parent family eligibility. 

Universe: Ongoing recipients as 

of 10/95. 

Random assignment: 10/95. 

Follow-up period: 3 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: No impact. 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 6% in average monthly cash benefit 

($137 vs. $146). 

Income: No impact. 

Family structure: No impact on marriage. Decrease of 60% (2% vs. 

4%) in births to unwed minors. No other impacts on child-bearing. 

No impact on abortions. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

California: Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) 

GAIN: Benefits, Costs, and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work Program, September 1994 

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Sites: Six Counties in California: Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, and Tulare. 

Alameda 

Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program. 

Universe: Long-term recipients 

who were GAIN mandatory (for 

single parents, child age 6 or 

older). 

Random assignment: 7/89 - 

5/90. 

Follow-up: 3 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: Increase of 30% ($6,432 vs. $4,941). 

Employment rate: Increase of 20% (49% vs. 41%). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 4% ($17,593 vs. $18,375). 

Income: No impact. 

Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 
L-57 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988- 

continued

Butte 

Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program. 

Universe: GAIN mandatory 

recipients (for single parents, 

child age 6 or older). 

Random assignment: 3/88 - 

3/90. 

Follow-up: 3 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: No impact. 

Cash assistance: No impact. 

Income: No impact. 

Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Los Angeles 

Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program. 

Universe: Long-term recipients 

who were GAIN mandatory (for 

single parents, with children age 

6 or older). 

Random assignment: 7/89-3/90. 

Follow-up: 3 years.

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: Increase of 13% (39% vs. 35%). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 6% ($17,314 vs. $18,319). 

Income: No impact. 

Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Riverside 

Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program. 

Universe: GAIN mandatory 

recipients (for single parents, 

with child age 6 or older). 

Random assignment: 8/88 - 

3/90. 

Follow-up: 3 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: Increase of 49% (9,448 vs. $6,335). 

Employment rate: Increase of 26% (67% vs. 53%). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 15% ($11,284 vs. $13,267). 

Income: No impact. 

Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 
L-58 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988- 

continued

San Diego 

Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program. 

Earnings: Increase of 22% ($9,786 vs. $8,014). 

Employment rate: Increase of 10% (62% vs. 57%). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 10% ($13,283 vs. $14,419). 

Income: No impact. 

Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Universe: GAIN mandatory 

recipients (for single-parent 

families, with child age 6 or 

older). 

Random assignment: 8/88 - 

9/89. 

Follow-up: 3 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Tulare 

Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program. 

Universe: GAIN mandatory 

recipients (for single parents, 

with a child age 6 or older). 

Random assignment: 1/89 - 

6/90. 

Follow-up: 3 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: Increase of 8% (60% vs. 55%). 

Cash assistance: No impact. 

Income: Quarter 13: Increase of 8% ($2,014 vs. $1,865) 

Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

California: Los Angeles Jobs-First Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN) 

The Los Angeles Jobs First-GAIN Evaluation: Final Report on a Work First Program in a Major 

Urban Center, June 2000 

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation 

Site: Los Angeles County 

Policy Changes: Employment-focused program. 

Universe: JOBS-First GAIN 

mandatory recipients (for single 

parents, caring for a 

child age 3 or older). 

Random assignment: 4/96 - 

9/96. 

Follow-up: 2 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: Increase of 26% ($8,012 vs. $6,385). 

Employment rate: Increase of 17% (67% vs. 58%). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 10% ($9,092 vs. $10,064). 

Income: No impact. 

Family structure: No impacts on marital status or births. Abortions 

not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Unfavorable impacts on measures of 

behavior and academic achievement for children aged 5 to 7 at 

follow-up. Unfavorable impacts on percent attending a special 

class for a physical, emotional, or mental condition for children 

aged 8 to 11 at follow-up. No impacts for adolescents. 
L-59 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988- 

continued

Connecticut: Jobs First 

JOBS First: Final Report on Connecticut’s Welfare Reform Initiative, February 2002. 

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Sites: New Haven and Manchester. 

Policy changes: 1) Employment-focused program; 2) Asset limit increase; 3) Child support 

liberalization; 4) Earnings disregard enhancement; 5) Family cap; 6) Time limit; 7) Transitional 

benefits extension (Medicaid and child care); 8) Two-parent family eligibility; 9) Work requirement: 

younger child; 10) Work sanctions. 

Universe: Jobs First enrollees. 

Random assignment: 1/96 - 2/97.

Follow-up: 4 years. 

Earnings: Increase of 7% ($26,673 vs. $24,861). 

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rate–increase of 

15% (56% vs. 49%). 

Cash assistance: No impact. 

Income: Increase of 6% ($43,870 vs. $41,506). 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: 

For experimental group, parents 

with child age 1 or older. For 

control group, parents with child 

age 2 or older. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Family Structure: No impacts. 

Child well-being outcomes: Positive impacts on behavior of young 

children. Negative impact on academic outcomes of adolescents. 

Reduction in adolescent encounters with police. 

Delaware: A Better Chance (ABC) 

The Early Economic Impacts of Delaware’s ABC Welfare Reform Program, December 1997. 

Author: Abt Associates Inc. 

Sites: 5 of 13 Delaware welfare offices: Carroll’s Plaza, Georgetown, Hudson, Thatcher, and 

Williams. 

Policy Changes: 1) Earnings disregard enhancement; 2) Enhanced family planning services; 

3) Family cap; 4) Personal responsibility sanctions; 5) Required minor parent to live with adult 

guardian; 6) Time limit; 7) Two-parent family eligibility; 8) Work-trigger time limit. 

Universe: Ongoing cases and 

new applicants. 

Random Assignment: 10/95 - 

9/96. 

Follow-up: 1 year. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: No impact over 1-year follow-up period. Increase in 

average total earnings only in quarter 4 (for those enrolling during 

ABC’s first 6 months of operation 11/95 -3/96) of 16% ($1,214 vs. 

$1,047). 

Employment rate: Increase of 20% (57% vs. 48%). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 5% ($2,775 vs. $2,930). 

Income: No impact. 

Family structure: No impact. 

Child well-being outcomes: No impact. 
L-60 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988- 

continued

Florida: Project Independence 

Florida’s Project Independence: Benefits, Costs, and Two-Year Impacts of Florida’s JOBS Program: 

April 1995. 

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Sites: Nine Counties in Florida: Bay, Broward, Dade, Duval, Hillsborough, Lee, Orange, Pinellas, 

and Volusia. 

Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program. 

Universe: AFDC parents (child 

age 3 and older). 

Random assignment: 7/90 - 8/91.

Follow-up: 2 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: Increase of 4% ($5,766 vs. $5,539). 

Employment rate: Increase of 4% (66% vs. 64%). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 6% ($4,028 vs. $4,293). 

Income: No impact. 

Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Florida: Family Transition Program (FTP) 

FTP: The Family Transition Program: Final Report on Florida’s Initial Time-Limited Welfare 

Program, December 2000 

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation 

Site: Escambia County 

Policy Changes: 1) Child care; 2) Earnings disregard enhancement; 3) Education-focused program; 

4) Time limit. 

Universe: Single parents subject 

to FTP work 

requirements (not disabled, 

caring for a child age 7 months 

or older). 

Random assignment: 

5/94 - 10/96. 

Follow-up: 4 years. 

Data Type: 

Administrative data Survey. 

Earnings: Increase of 17% ($16,666 vs. $14,288). 

Employment rate: Increase in average percent employed per 

quarter of 10% (48% vs. 44%). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 15% ($3,987 vs. $4,698). 

Income: Increase of 5% ($26,744 vs. $25,606). 

Family structure: No impact. 

Child well-being outcomes: Unfavorable impacts on behavior but 

favorable impact on health for children aged 5 to 12 at follow-up. 

Unfavorable impacts on percent ever suspended from school and 

academic achievement for adolescents. 

Illinois: Community Group Participation and Housing Supplementation Demonstration 

Community Group Participation and Housing Supplementation Demonstration. Final Report, June 

1995 

Author: Abt Associates Inc. 

Site: West Garfield Park neighborhood in Chicago, IL 

Policy Changes: Provision of services by community-based organization. 
L-61 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Universe: Volunteers living in 

severely distressed 

neighborhoods. 

Random Assignment: 7/88 - 

8/91. 

Follow-up period: Varies from 

35 to 54 months (analysis ends 

6/94). 

Data Type: Administrative Data 

Survey. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: Decrease of 15% (22% vs. 26%). 

Income: No impact. 

Cash assistance: No impact. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Indiana: Welfare Reform Evaluation 

The Indiana Welfare Reform Evaluation: Program Implementation and Economic Impacts After 

Two Years, November 1998 

Author: Abt Associates Inc. and the Urban Institute 

Policy Changes:1 ) Asset limit increase; 2) Family cap; 3) Mixed employment/education program; 4) 

Personal responsibility sanctions; 5) Required minor parent to live with adult; 6) Time limit (adultonly); 7) Two-parent family eligibility; 8) Work requirements: younger child; 9) Work sanctions. 

Universe: AFDC recipients and 

applicants. 

Random Assignment: 5/95 - 

12/95. 

Follow-up: 2 years. 

Earnings: Increase of 5% ($7,344 vs. $6,967). 

Employment rate: Increase of 2% (79% vs. 77%). 

Cash assistance: Decrease of 20% ($2,339 vs. $2,921). 

Income: No impact. 

Participation required in welfareto-work program: For 

experimental group, changed in 

6/97 from parents with children 

age 3 or older to parents with 

children age 2 or older. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Iowa: Family Investment Program (FIP) 

The Evaluation of Welfare Reform in Iowa: Final Impact Report, June 2002 

Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 

Sites: Nine counties in Iowa: Black Hawk, Linn, Polk, Pottawattamie, Woodbury, Clinton, Des 

Moines, Jackson, and Jones. 

Ongoing cases 

Policy Changes: 1) Earnings disregard enhancement; 2) Work requirements: younger child; 3) Asset 

limit increase; 4) Benefit determination the same for parents and stepparents; 5) Personal 

responsibility sanctions; 6) Required participation in employment and training services for both 

persons in two-parent family; 7) Transitional benefits extension (child care); 8) Two-parent family 

eligibility. 
L-62 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Universe: Cases active in 

September 1993. 

Random assignment: 10/93. 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: For experimental 

group, parents with a child age 3 

months or older. For control 

group, parents with a child age 3 

or older. 

Data type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: Year 1-5, No impact. (Increase in earnings during years 

1 and 2). 

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rate–Increase of 

4% (52% vs. 51%). 

Cash assistance: Average quarterly benefit amount–Decrease of 

4% ($499 vs. $521). 

Income: No impact. 

Family structure: No impacts. 

Child well-being outcomes: No impacts. 

Applicant Cases 

Universe: Cases that applied 

between September 1993 and 

March 1996 in three cohorts. 

Random Assignment: 

Cohort 1: 10/93-9/94. 

Cohort 2: 10/94-9/95. 

Cohort 3: 10/95-3/96. 

Follow-up: 

Cohort 1: 4 years. 

Cohort 2: 3 years. 

Cohort 3: 2 years. 

Survey conducted -1998 and 

1999.

Earnings: 

Cohort 1: No impact over years 1-4. Increase in year 1. 

Cohort 2: No impact over years 1-3. 

Cohort 3: No impact over 2 years. Decrease in earnings in year 2. 

Employment rate: 

Cohort 1: Increase of 6% over years 1-4 (56.6% vs. 53.5%). 

Cohort 2: No impact. 

Cohort 3: No impact. 

Cash assistance: 

Cohort 1: No impact. 

Cohort 2: Average quarterly benefit--Decrease of 7% ($240 vs. 

$258). 

Cohort 3: Average quarterly benefit–Increase of 22% ($268 vs. 

$219). 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: For experimental 

group, parents with a child age 

3 months or older. For control 

group, parents with a child age 3 

or older. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Income: 

Cohort 1: No impact over 4 years. (Increase in years 1 and 2.) 

Cohort 2: No impact. 

Cohort 3: No impact. 

Family Structure: 

For applicants 27% increase in percent never married (30% vs. 

24%). 

Child well-being outcomes: 

For children age 5 to 12: Increases in school absences. For all 

children, small increase in children in foster care. 

Michigan: To Strengthen Michigan Families (TSMF) 

Final Impact Report: The Evaluation of To Strengthen Michigan Families (TSMF), September 1997 

Author: Abt Associates Inc. 

Sites: 4 local office: Kalamazoo (Kalamazoo Co.), Madison Heights (Oakland Co.), 

McNichols/Goddard (Wayne Co.), and Schaeffer/Six Mile (Wayne Co.) 
L-63 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Earnings disregard enhancement; 3) Mixed employment/ 

education program; 4) Personal responsibility sanctions; 5) Two-parent family eligibility; 6) Work 

sanctions. 

Universe: Three cohorts. 

Ongoing cohort: Random 

assignment: 10/92 

Follow-up: 4 years . 

Middle cohort: 

Random assignment: 10/92 - 

9/94. 

Follow-up: 2 years. 

Last cohort: 

Random assignment: 

10/94 - 9/95 

Follow-up: 1 year. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Earnings: 

Ongoing cohort: Increase of 7% ($3,343 vs. $3,120). 

Other cohorts: No impact. 

Employment rate: 

Ongoing cohort: Increase in average quarterly employment rate of 

4% (37% vs. 36%). 

Other cohorts: No impact. 

Cash assistance: All cohorts- No impact. 

Income: All cohorts- No impact. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: No impact. 

Minnesota: Family Investment Program (MFIP) 

Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota Family Investment 

Program, September 2000 

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation 

Sites: Seven counties in Minnesota: Hennepin (Minneapolis), Anoka, Dakota, Mille Lacs, Morrison, 

Sherburne, and Todd 

Long-term single- parent families 

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Direct child care paid to provider; 3) Earnings disregard 

enhancement; 4) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant; 5) Work requirements: younger 

child; 6) Work-trigger time limit. 

Universe: Single, long-term 

recipients in urban and rural 

counties 

Random Assignment: 4/94 - 

3/96. 

Earnings: Increase of 23% ($955 vs. $779). 

Employment rate: Increase of 35% (50% vs. 37%). 

Cash assistance: Increase of 11% ($1,745 vs. $1,569). 

Follow-up: 3 years. 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: For experimental 

group, parents with a child age 1 

or older (on welfare rolls for 2 

years). For control group, 

parents of child age 3 or older. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Income: Increase of 15% ($2,700 vs. $2,348). 

 

Family structure: Increase of 51% (11% vs. 7%) in percent 

currently married. Births and abortions not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Long-term single- parent families - urban counties 

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Direct child care paid to provider; 3) Earnings disregard 

enhancement; 4) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant; 5) Work requirements: younger 

child; 6) Work-trigger time limit. 
L-64 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Universe: Single, long-term 

recipients in urban counties 

Random Assignment: 4/94 - 

3/96. 

Follow-up: 3 years. 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: For experimental 

group, parents with a child age 1 

or older (on welfare rolls for 2 

years). For control group, 

parents of child age 3 or older. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: Quarterly earningsYear 1: Increase of 30% ($699 vs. $537). 

Year 2: Increase of 24% ($1,129 vs. $913). 

Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 11% ($1,441 vs. $1,298). 

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rateYear 1: Increase of 41% (46% vs. 33%). 

Year 2: Increase of 35% (53% vs. 39%). 

Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 26% (56% vs. 45%). 

Cash assistance: Average quarterly benefits– 

Year 1: Increase of 9% ($1,946 vs. $1,810). 

Year 2: Increase of 10% (1,627 vs. $1,484) 

Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 13% ($1,380 vs. $1,227). 

Income: Average quarterly income- Year 1: Increase of 14% 

($2,663 vs. $2,346) 

Year 2: Increase of 15% ($2,756 vs. $2,396) 

Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 12% ($2,822 vs. $2,525). 

Family structure: No impacts on marital status. Births and 

abortions not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts on behavioral and 

academic achievement. Unfavorable impact on percentage of 

children who had an accident and required a trip to the emergency 

room. 

Long-term single-parent families - urban counties: Without mandated participation 

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Direct child care paid to provider; 3) Earnings disregard 

enhancement; 4) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant. 

Universe: Single, long-term 

recipients in urban counties. 

Random Assignment: 4/94 - 

3/96. 

Follow-up: 3 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rateYear 1: Increase of 21% (40% vs. 33%). 

Year 2: Increase of 9% (43% vs. 39%). 

Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 8% (48% vs. 45%). 

Cash assistance: Average quarterly benefits– 

Year 1: Increase of 13% ($2,035 vs. $1,810). 

Year 2: Increase of 20% ($1,774 vs. $1,484). 

Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 24% ($1,518 vs. $1,227). 

Income: Average quarterly incomeYear 1: Increase of 12% ($2,621 vs. $2,346) 

Year 2: Increase of 10% ($2,636 vs. $2,396) 

Year 3: Increase of 10% ($2,769 vs. $2,525). 

Family structure: Increase of 89% (11% vs. 6%) in percent 

married. Impacts on births and abortions not reported. 
L-65 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Child-well being outcomes: Favorable impacts on behavioral and 

academic achievement. Unfavorable impact on percentage of 

children who had an accident and required a trip to the emergency 

room. 

Recent single-parent applicants - urban counties 

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Direct child care paid to provider; 3) Earnings disregard 

enhancement; 4) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant; 5) Work requirements: younger 

child; 6) Work-trigger time limit. 

Universe: Single applicants 

(short-term recipients) in urban 

counties. 

Random Assignment: 4/94 - 

3/96. 

Follow-up: 3 years 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: For experimental 

group, parents with a child age 1 

or older (on welfare rolls for 2 

years). For control group, 

parents of child age 3 or older. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rate: 

Year 1: Increase of 6% (52% vs. 49%). 

Year 2: Increase of 7% (57% vs. 53%). 

Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 5% (58% vs. 55%). 

Cash assistance: Average quarterly benefits-- 

Year 1: Increase of 26% ($1,289 vs. $1,024). 

Year 2: Increase of 26% ($907 vs. $722). 

Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 26% ($709 vs. $561). 

Income: Average quarterly income– 

Year 1: Increase of 9% ($2,434 vs. $2,467) 

Year 2: Increase 7% ($2,562 vs. $2,547) 

Year 3 (quarters 1-3): Increase of 6% ($2,740 vs. $2,578). 

Family structure: No impact on marital status. Births and 

abortions not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Long-term single-parent families - rural counties 

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Direct child care paid to provider; 3) Earnings disregard 

enhancement; 4) Food stamp benefit combined with cash grant; 5) Work requirements: younger 

child; 6) Work-trigger time limit. 

Universe: Single, long-term 

recipients in rural counties 

Random Assignment: 4/94 to 

3/96. 

Follow-up: 3 years. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment rate: 

Year 1: Increase of 37% (44% vs. 32%). 

Year 2: Increase of 13% (50% vs. 45%). 

Year 3 (quarter 10): No impact. 

Cash assistance: Average quarterly benefits: 

Year 1: Increase of 16% ($1,915 vs. $1,646). 

Year 2: Increase of 33% ($1,583 vs. $1,192). 

Year 3 (quarter 10): Increase of 37% ($1,345 vs. $983). 
L-66 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: For experimental 

group, parents with a child age 1 

or older (on welfare rolls for 2 

years). For control group, 

parents of child age 3 or older. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Income: Average quarterly income: 

Year 1: Increase of 18% ($2,579 vs. $2,182). 

Year 3 (quarter 10): Increase of 20% ($2,563 vs. $2,143). 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

New Jersey: Family Development Program (FDP) 

A Final Report on the Impact of New Jersey’s Family Development Program: Experimental - 

Control Group Analysis, October 1998. 

Author: Rutgers University 

Sites: Ten Counties in New Jersey: Atlantic, Camden, Cumberland, Essex, Hudson, Mercer, 

Middlesex, Monmouth, Passaic, and Union. 

Policy Changes: 1) Continued benefits to families with stepfathers as long as family income below 

150% of state’s need standard; 2) Family cap; 3) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid); 4) 

Work requirements: younger child. 

Universe: AFDC families. 

Random assignment: 10/92 - 

12/94 

Follow-up: Varies. Up to 17 

quarters (for cases ongoing 

10/92). 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

program: For experimental 

group, parents of children age 2 

or older. For control group, 

parents of children age 3 or 

older. 

Data Type: 

Administrative data 

Earnings: Ongoing cases: No impact over 4-year follow-up 

period. 

Year 1: Decrease of 25% ($522 vs. $695). 

Year 2: Decrease of 18% ($1,522 vs. $1,848). 

New cases: No impact over 4-year follow-up period. 

Year 3: Decrease of 13% ($2,953 vs. $3,407). 

Year 4: Decrease of 14% ($3,966 vs. $4,605). 

Employment rate: No impact. 

Cash assistance: No impact. 

Income: Not reported. 

Family structure: Decrease in births. For new cases an increase in 

abortions and in use of contraception. Marital status not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

New York: Child Assistance Program (NY CAP) The NY CAP: Five-Year Impacts, Costs, and Benefits, November 1996 

Author: Abt Associates Inc. 

Sites: Three Counties in New York: Monroe (Rochester), Niagra (Niagra Falls) and Suffolk (Long 

Island). 

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase (no resource limit); 2) Earnings disregard enhancement; 3) 

Food stamp cash out; 4) No child support pass-through. 

Universe: Single-parent AFDC 

cases. 

Random Assignment: 4/89 - 

3/90. 

Follow-up: 5 years. 

Earnings: Increase of 20% ($15,882 vs. $13,268). 

Employment rate: Increase of 13% (29% vs. 26%). 

Cash assistance: No impact. 
L-67 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Income: Not reported. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Ohio: Transitions to Independence Demonstration (Ohio JOBS) 

JOBS Assignments in Ohio: Patterns and Impacts, December 1994 

Author: Abt Associates Inc. 

Sites: 15 counties in Ohio: Brown, Champaign, Clermont, Franklin, Lake, Lawrence, Montgomery, 

Perry, Pickaway, Richland, Seneca, Stark, Summit, Trumbull, and Wyandot 

Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program. 

Universe: JOBS mandatory 

adults (for single parents, child 

age 6 or older, after 6/91, child 

age 3 or older). 

Random Assignment: 1/89 - 

12/91. 

Follow-up: 3 years (early 

cohort), 2 years (later entrants). 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Earnings: 12th quarter impacts for those assigned to – 

Basic education: Decrease of 34% ($410 vs. $624). 

Post-secondary education: No impact. 

Job club: Increase of 22% ($991 vs. $811). 

Job readiness: No impact. 

Community Work Experience: No impact. 

Employment rate: Employed in 12th quarter for those assigned to: 

Basic education: Decrease of 17% (24% vs. 29%). 

Post-secondary education: No impact. 

Job club: Increase of 28% (42% vs. 33%). 

Job readiness: Increase of 14% (39% vs. 34%). 

Community Work Experience: No impact. 

Cash assistance: Not reported. 

Income: Not reported. 

Family Formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Ohio: Final Impacts for JOBS and Work Choice, December 1994 

Author: Abt Associates Inc. 

Sub-State: Fifteen counties in Ohio for JOBS Demonstration: Brown, Champaign, Clermont, 

Franklin, Lake, Lawrence, Montgomery, Perry, Pickaway, Richland, Seneca, Stark, Summit, 

Trumbull, and Wyandot; One County for Work Choice: Montgomery County 

Ohio Transitions to Independence: Final Impacts for JOBS 

Policy Changes: Mixed employment/education program. 

Universe: Mandatory JOBS 

adults (for single parents, caring 

for a child age 6 or older). 

Random Assignment: 1/89 to 

12/91. 

Follow-up: Successive cohorts 

assigned to treatment and control 

groups, beginning in 1989, and 

followed for 1, 2, or 3 years. 

Earnings: Early entrants: No impact. 

Later entrants– 

Year 1: Decrease of 14% ($2,003 vs. $2,322). 

Year 2: Decrease of 14% ($2,939 vs. $3,421). 

Employment rate: Early entrants: Increase of 8% (61% vs. 57%). 

Later entrants: No impact over follow-up period. 

Year 2: Decrease of 7% (46% vs. 49%). 

Cash assistance: No impact. 
L-68 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Data Type: Administrative data. Income: Not reported. 

Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Ohio Transitions to Independence: Final Impacts for Work Choice 

Policy Changes: 1) Mixed employment/education program.

Universe: AFDC 

recipients with young children 

(1-5 years old). 

Random Assignment: 1/89 - 

3/90. 

Follow-up: 18 months for early 

entrants; 1 year for later cohort. 

Data Type: Administrative data. 

Earnings: Early entrants: Increase of 14% 

($1,484 vs. $1,307). 

Later entrants: Decrease of 19% ($800 vs. $$922). 

Employment rate: Early entrants: Increase of 9% (41% vs. 38%). 

Later entrants: No impact. 

Cash assistance: No impact. 

Income: Not reported. 

Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Ohio: Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) 

Final Report on Ohio’s Welfare Initiative to Improve School Attendance Among Teenage Parents: 

Ohio’s Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) Program, August 1997 

Author(s): Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation 

Policy Changes: 1) Personal responsibility sanctions; 2) School attendance bonus. 

Universe: Pregnant teenagers 

and custodial teen parents who 

were on AFDC. 

Earnings: No impact over 4-year follow-up period. 

Increase in quarters 3-4 of 25% ($315 vs. $252). 

Random Assignment: 8/90 - 

9/91. 

Follow-up: 4 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Survey. 

Employment rate: No impact over 4 year follow-up period. 

Increase in percent ever employed quarters 5-8 of 8% (44% vs. 

41%). 

Cash assistance: Years 3 and 4: Decrease of 5% 

($5,185 vs. $5,459). 

Income: No impact. 

Family formation: No impact on births or marital status. 

Among teens who were applicants, decrease in pregnancy 

(8% v. 15%). 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Texas: Achieving Change for Texans (ACT)/TANF 

Achieving Change for Texans Evaluation: Net Impacts Through December 1997, August 1998 

Author: Texas Department of Health and Human Services

Texas ACT: Time Limits 
L-69 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Personal responsibility sanctions; 3) Time limit (adultonly); 4) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and child care); 5) Two-parent family eligibility. 

Universe: TANF recipients. 

Random assignment: 

6/96 - 12/97. 

Follow-up: Varies. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: No impact. 

Cash assistance: No impact. 

Income: Not reported. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: 

For experimental group, parents 

of child age 4 or older (5 in some 

cases). For control group, 

parents of child age 3 or older. 

Data Type: Administrative data. 

Texas ACT: Responsibilities, Employment, and Resources in Choices Counties 

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Personal responsibility sanctions; 3) Transitional benefits 

extension (Medicaid and child care); 4) Two-parent family eligibility. 

Universe: TANF families. 

Random assignment: 7/96 - 

12/97. 

Follow-up: Varies. 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: For experimental 

group, parents of child age 4 or 

older (5 in some cases). For 

control group, parents of child 

age 3 or older. 

Data Type: Administrative data. 

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: No impact. 

Cash assistance: Decrease in time on TANF. The proportion of 

time spent on TANF out of the maximum possible was 55% for the 

experimental group, 57% for the control group. 

Income: Not reported. 

Family formation: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not 

reported. 

 

Vermont: Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP): 

Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation 

Sites Statewide (VT) with detailed focus on 6 of Vermont’s 12 districts: Barre, Burlington, 

Newport, Rutland, Springfield, and St. Albans . 

Single-parent families 

Policy Changes: 1) Work-trigger time limit (30 months work or community service); 2) Earnings 

disregard enhancement; 3) Asset limit increase; 4) Child support pass-through (only first $50 

disregarded); 5) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and child care). 
L-70 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Universe: Families applying for 

and receiving assistance. 

Random assignment: 7/94 - 

6/95. 

Follow-up: 6 years (Family 

structure and child well-being 

outcomes at 42 months). 

Data Type: Administrative Data.

Earnings: Average annual earnings-- Increase of 9% ($6,005 vs. 

$5,497). 

Employment rate: Average quarterly employment–Increase of 12% 

(52% vs. 47%). 

Cash assistance: 

Average annual cash benefits–Decrease of 12% ($2,310 vs. 

$2,609). 

Income: No impact. 

Family structure: No impact. 

Child well-being outcomes: Reduced school absences for children 

age 10 to 13. Increase percent of adolescents that had trouble with 

the police. 

Single-parent families: Without mandated participation 

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Child support pass-through (only first $50 disregarded); 

3) Earnings disregard enhancement; 4) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and child care). 

Universe: Families applying for 

and receiving assistance. 

Random assignment: 7/94 to 

6/95. 

Follow-up: 6 years (Child wellbeing outcomes at 42 months. 

Data Type: Administrative Data.

Earnings: No impact. 

Employment rate: No impact. 

Cash assistance: No impact. 

Income: No impact. 

 

Family Structure: Increase in likelihood of being married and 

living with a spouse. No impact on childbearing. 

Child well-being outcomes: Increase in absenteeism from school 

for adolescents. Increase in percent of adolescents having trouble 

with the police. 

Virginia: Independence Program 

Impacts of the Virginia Initiative for Employment, Not Welfare, January 2002 

Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 

Sites: Three counties in Virginia: Lynchburg, Prince William, and Petersburg (VIEW counties). 

Lynchburg 

Policy Changes: 1) Work requirements: younger child; 2) Work-trigger time limit (Work or 

community service after 90 days); 3) Asset limit increase; 4) Earnings disregard enhancement; 5) 

Employment-focused program; 6) Family cap; 7) Personal responsibility sanctions; 8) Required 

minor parents to live with an adult; 9) Time limit; 10) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and 

child care); 11) Two-parent family eligibility; 12) Welfare diversion. 

Universe: AFDC cases that 

were on the rolls as of 7/95 and 

were Virginia Initiative for 

Employment Not Welfare 

(VIEW) mandatory (ablebodied, child 18 months or 

older.) 

Earnings: Quarter 9–No impact. 

Employment rate: Quarter 9–Increase of 9 percentage points or 

16% (65% vs. 56%). 

Cash assistance: Quarter 9–No impact. (Statistically significant 

reductions in cash receipt in quarters 12-14 as recipients began 

reaching the time limit.) 
L-71 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Random Assignment: 7/95. 

View implemented in 10/95. 

Follow-up: 3 1⁄2 years from 

random assignment. Control 

group subject to VIEW rules 

beginning quarter 10. 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: Applies to all 

VIEW mandatory recipients (full 

study sample). 

Data Type: Administrative Data.

Income: Quarter 9- No impact. (No impact in later quarters even 

after application of the time limit.) 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Prince William 

Policy Changes: 1) Work requirements: younger child; 2) Work-trigger time limit 

 (Work or community service within 90 days); 3) Asset limit increase; 4) Earnings disregard 

enhancement; 5) Employment-focused program; 6) Family cap; 7) Personal responsibility sanctions; 

8) Required minor parents to live with an adult; 9) Time limit; 10) Transitional benefits extension 

(Medicaid and child care); 11) Two-parent family eligibility; 12) Welfare diversion.

Universe: AFDC cases that 

were on the rolls as of 7/95 and 

were VIEW mandatory (ablebodied, child 18 months or 

older). 

Random Assignment: 7/95. 

VIEW implemented 4/96 

(Quarter 4). 

Follow-up: 3 1⁄2 years from 

random assignment. Control 

group subject to VIEW rules 

beginning in quarter 10. 

Participation in welfare-to-work 

requirement: All VIEW 

mandatory recipients (full study 

sample). 

Data Type: Administrative Data.

Earnings: Quarter 9–No impact. 

Employment rate: Quarter 9–Increase of 5 percentage points or 9% 

(58% vs. 53%). 

Cash assistance: Quarter 9- No impact. 

Income: Quarter 9–No impact. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Petersburg (Post VIEW) 

Policy Changes: 1) Asset limit increase; 2) Earnings disregard enhancement; 3) Employmentfocused program; 4) Family cap; 5) Personal responsibility sanctions; 6) Required minor parents to 

live with an adult; 7) Time limit; 8) Transitional benefits extension (Medicaid and child care); 9) 

Two-parent family eligibility; 10) Welfare diversion; 11) Work requirements: younger child; 12) 

Work-trigger time limit. 
L-72 

TABLE L-8 -- OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED 

SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988-

continued

Universe: AFDC cases 

that were on the rolls as 

of 7/95 and VIEW 

mandatory (able-bodied and 

child 18 months and older). 

Random Assignment: 7/95. 

VIEW 

implemented 1/97 . 

(Quarter 7) 

Follow-up: 3 1⁄2 years 

from random assignment. 

Control group subject to VIEW 

rules beginning in quarter 10. 

Data Type: Administrative data. 

Earnings: Quarter 9– Increase of 17% ($1,394 vs. $1,191). 

Employment rate: Quarter 9–Increase of 12 percentage points or 

23% (65% vs. 53%). 

Cash assistance: No impact. 

Income: No impact. 

Family structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Not reported. 

Wisconsin: Milwaukee’s New Hope Demonstration Project New Hope for People With Low Incomes: Two-Year Results of a Program to Reduce Poverty and 

Reform Welfare, April 1999 Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation 

Site: Milwaukee, Wisconsin 

Policy Changes: 1) Paid child care; 2) Paid health insurance; 3) Wage supplementation. 

Universe: Low-income adult 

volunteers (below 150% of 

poverty) living in two highpoverty neighborhoods in 

Milwaukee. 

Random Assignment: 8/94 - 

2/95. 

Follow-up: 2 years. 

Data Type: Administrative data 

Ethnography 

Survey. 

Earnings: Full sample: No impact over 2-year follow-up period. 

Year 1: Increase of 9% ($6,833 vs. $6,250). 

Employed full-time entering program: No impact. 

Not employed full-time entering program: Increase of 13% 

($11,898 vs. $10,509). 

Employment rate: Full sample: Increase of 6% (96% vs. 90%). 

Employed full-time entering program: No impact. 

Not employed full-time entering program: Increase of 7% (94% vs. 

87%). 

Cash assistance: Full sample: No impact. 

Employed full-time entering program: No impact over 2-year 

follow-up period. 

Year 2: Decrease of 38% ($736 vs. $1,181). 

Not employed full-time entering program: No impact. 

Income: Not reported for the full sample. 

Employed full-time entering program: Decrease of 8% ($14,146 

vs. $15,294) in year 2. 

Not employed full-time entering program: Increase of 13% 

($11,213 vs. $9,915). 

Family Structure: Not reported. 

Child well-being outcomes: Favorable impacts on some behavioral 

measures from both parents and teachers, though teachers reported 

unfavorable impacts on aggression and frequency of disciplinary 

action for girls. Favorable impact on academic achievement 

reported for boys. 

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service. 
L-73 

REFERENCES 

Bachrach, C. (1998). The changing circumstances of marriage and fertility in the 

United States. In R. Moffitt (Ed.), Welfare, the family, and reproductive 

behavior: Research perspectives. Washington, DC: National Academy 

Press. 

Bavier, R. (1999). An early look at the effects of welfare reform (unpublished 

manuscript). Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget. 

Bavier, R. (2000). Accounting for increases in failure to report AFDC/TANF 

receipt (unpublished manuscript). Washington, DC: Office of 

Management and Budget. 

Becker, G., Landes, E., & Michael, R. (1977). An economic analysis of marital 

instability. Journal of Political Economy, 85(6), 1141-1188. 

Becker, G. (1964). Human capital. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 

Bird, E., Hagstrom. P., & Wild, R. (1999). Credit cards and the poor. Focus, 

20(2), 40-43. 

Bloom, D., Kemple, J., Morris, P., Scrivener, S., Verma, N., & Hendra, R. 

(2000). FTP: Final report on Florida's initial time-limited welfare 

program. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Bloom, D., Scrivener, S., Michalopoulos, C., Morris, P., Hendra, R., AdamsCiardullo, D., & Walter, J. (2002). Jobs First: Final report on 

Connecticut’s welfare reform initiative. New York: Manpower 

Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Bos, J., & Fellerath, V. (1997). Final report on Ohio's welfare initiative to 

improve school attendance among teenage parents: Ohio's Learning, 

Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) Program. New York: Manpower 

Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Bos, J., Huston, A., Granger, R., Duncan, G., Brock, T., McLoyd, V. (1999). 

New Hope for people with low incomes: Two-year results of a program 

to reduce poverty and reform welfare. New York: Manpower 

Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Brooks-Gunn, J., Duncan, G., & Maritato, N. (1997). Poor families, poor 

outcomes: The well-being of children and youth. In G. Duncan & J. 

Brooks-Gunn (Eds.), Consequences of Growing Up Poor. New York: 

Russell Sage. 

Camasso, M., Harvey, C., Jagannathan, R., & Killingsworth, M. (1998a). A final 

report on the impact of New Jersey's Family Development Program: 

Experimental-control group analysis. New Brunswick, New Jersey: 

Rutgers University. 

Camasso, M., Harvey, C., Jagannathan, R., & Killingsworth, M. (1998b). A 

final report on the impact of New Jersey's Family Development Program: 

Results from a pre-post analysis of AFDC case heads from 1990-96. New 

Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University. 

Child Trends. (1999). Children and welfare reform: A guide to evaluating the 

effects of State welfare reform policies. Washington, DC: Author. 
L-74 

Danziger, S., Haveman, R., & Plotnick, R. (1981). How income transfer 

programs affect work, savings, and the income distribution. Journal of 

Economic Literature, 29, 975-1028. 

Edin, K., & Lein, L. (1997). Making ends meet: How single mothers survive 

welfare and low-wage work. New York: Russell Sage. 

Fein, D. (1994). JOBS assignments in Ohio: Patterns and impacts. Cambridge, 

MA: Abt Associates Inc. 

Fein, D., Beecroft, E., Blomquist, J. (1994). Final impacts for JOBS and Work 

Choice. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc. 

Fein, D., Beecroft, E., Hamilton, W., Lee, W., Holcomb, P., Thompson, T., & 

Ratcliffe, C. (1998). The Indiana welfare reform evaluation: Program 

implementation and economic impacts after two years. Washington, 

DC: Abt Associates Inc. and Urban Institute. 

Fein, D., & Karweit, J. (1997). The early economic impacts of Delaware's ABC 

welfare reform program. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc. 

Fraker, T., Ross, C., Stapulonis, R., Olsen, R., Kovac, M., Dion, M., & 

Rangarajan, A. (2002). Welfare reform in Iowa: Final impact report. 

Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 

Freedman, S., Knab, J., Gennetian, L., & Navarro, D (2000). Los Angeles Jobsfirst GAIN evaluation: Final report on a work first program in a major 

urban center. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research 

Corporation. 

Gennetian, L., & Miller, C. (2000). Reforming welfare and rewarding work: 

Final report on the Minnesota Family Investment Program (Volume 2: 

Effects on children). New York, NY: Manpower Demonstration Research 

Corporation. 

Gordon, A., & James-Burdumy S. (2002). Impacts of the Virginia initiative for 

employment not welfare: final report. Princeton, NJ: Mathematica 

Policy Research, Inc. 

Hamilton, W., Burstein, N., Baker, A., Earle, A., Gluckman, S., Peck, L., & 

White, A. (1996). The New York Child Assistance Program: Five-year 

impacts, costs, and benefits. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc. 

Haskins, Ron. (2001). Effects of welfare reform at three years. In P.ChaseLansdale & G. Duncan (Eds.), For better and for worse: State welfare 

reform and the well-being of low-income families and children. New 

York: Russell Sage. 

Hargreaves, M., Kornfeld, R., & Mills, G. (1995). Community group 

participation and housing supplementation demonstration: Final report. 

Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc. 

Haveman, R., & Buron, L. (1993). Escaping poverty through work: The problem 

of low earnings capacity in the United States, 1973-88 Review of Income 

and Wealth (Series 39), 141-157. 

Kemple, J., Friedlander, D., & Fellerath, V. (1995). Florida's Project 

Independence: Benefits, costs, and two-year impacts of Florida's JOBS 

Program. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 
L-75 

Killingsworth, M., & Heckman, J. (1986). Female labor supply: A survey. In O. 

Ashenfelter & P. Layard (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics (Volume 

1). New York: North Holland. 

Kisker, E., Rangarajan, A., & Boller, K. (1998). Moving into adulthood: Were 

the impacts of mandatory programs for welfare-dependent teenaged 

parents sustained after the programs ended? Princeton, NJ: Mathematica 

Policy Research, Inc. 

Kornfeld, R., Peck, L., Porcari, D., Straubinger, J., Johnson, Z., Cabral, C., & 

Mills, G. (1999). Evaluation of the Arizona EMPOWER Welfare Reform 

Demonstration. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc. 

Martinez, J. & Miller C. Working and Earning: The impact of Parents’ Fair 

Share on Low Income Fathers’ Employment. New York: Manpower 

Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Miller, C., Knox, V., Gennetian, L., Dodoo, M., Hunter, J., & Redcross, C. 

(2000). Reforming welfare and rewarding work: Final report on the 

Minnesota Family Investment Program--Volume 1: Effects on adults. 

New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Mincer, J., & Polachek, S. (1974). Family investments in human capital: 

Earnings of women. Journal of Political Economy, 82, S76-S108. 

Moffitt, R. (1992). Incentive effects of the U.S. welfare system: A review. 

Journal of Economic Literature, 20, 1-61. 

Moffitt, R., (Ed.). (1998). The effect of welfare on marriage and fertility. 

Welfare, the family, and reproductive behavior: Research perspectives. 

Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 

Primus, W., Rawlings, L., Larin, K., & Porter, K. (1999). The initial impacts of 

welfare reform on the economic well-being of single-mother families 

with children. Washington, DC: Center for Budget and Policy Priorities. 

Quint, J., Bos, J., & Polit, D. (1997). New chance: Final report on a 

comprehensive program for young mothers in poverty and their children. 

New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Riccio, J., Friedlander, D., & Freedman, S. (1994). GAIN: Benefits, costs, and 

three-year impacts of a welfare-to-work program. New York: Manpower 

Demonstration Research Corporation. 

Rogers, J. & Gray, M. (1994). Consumer expenditure data: quintiles of income 

versus quintiles of outlays. Monthly Labor Review. Dec., 1994, 32-37. 

Schexnayder, D., Olson, J., Schroeder, D., Betsinger, A., & Sim, S. (1998). 

Achieving change for Texans evaluation: Net impacts through December 

1997. Austin, TX: Texas Department of Human Services. 

Scrivener, S., Hendra, R., Redcross, C., Bloom, D., Michalopoulos, C., & 

Walter, J. (2002). WRP: Final report on Vermon’t Welfare Restructuring 

Project. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation. 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2001). Final synthesis 

reporting of findings of ASPE’s “leavers” grants. Washington D.C.: 

Authors. 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of 

Education (2001). National evaluation of welfare-to-work strategies: How 
L-76 

effective are different welfare to work approaches? Five year adult and 

child impacts for eleven programs. Washington, DC: Authors. 

Werner, A., & Kornfeld, R. (1997). Final impact report: The evaluation of to 

strengthen Michigan families (TSMF). Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates 

Inc. 

Werner, A., Rodda, D., Pan, E., & Plimpton, L. (1997). Evaluation of the 

Alabama avenues to self-sufficiency through employment and training 

services (ASSETS) demonstration. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc. 

Willis, R. (1986). Wage Determinants: A Survey and Reinterpretation of Human 

Capital Earnings Functions. In O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (Eds.), 

Handbook of Labor Economics (Volume 1). New York: North-Holland.