Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1607 | January 24, 2020 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Roberta L. Renbarger

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of H.M. and S.B. (Minor 

Children);

W.C. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

January 24, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-1607

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Charles F. Pratt, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

02D08-1809-JT-335

02D08-1809-JT-336

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1607 | January 24, 2020 Page 2 of 12

Statement of the Case

[1] W.C. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights 

over her two minor children, H.M. and S.B. (“the Children”).1

 Mother raises 

two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded

that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal 

from Mother’s care were unlikely to be remedied.2

2. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights over the Children 

was in the Children’s best interests.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 27, 2018, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) 

filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights over the Children. The trial 

court held a fact-finding hearing on the DCS’s petitions, after which it entered 

1

 Each child’s father has separately appealed the termination of his own parental rights. Although our 

motions panel denied a request to consolidate the three appeals, the appeals were assigned to the same 

writing panel, and we have decided each appeal on the same date.

2

 Mother mistakenly characterizes this issue as whether the trial court erroneously found that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to the well-being of the Children. The trial court 

entered no such finding, and the substance of Mother’s argument on this issue makes clear that she intended 

to challenge the finding the court did enter, namely, that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s 

removal were unlikely to be remedied. Accordingly, that is the issue we address.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1607 | January 24, 2020 Page 3 of 12

the following undisputed facts with respect to Mother’s relationship with the 

Children:

5. . . . [T]here was a physical altercation between the Mother 

and a man on or about July 12, 2016. The incident of domestic 

violence occurred in the presence of the [C]hildren and [one of 

the Children] was struck. On or about August 16, 2016, another 

incident of domestic violence took place in the presence of the 

[child who had been struck]. The Mother was arrested for 

domestic battery. The Mother tested positive for cocaine on or 

about November 11, 2016. The father of the [struck child] tested 

positive for cocaine as well. . . .

* * *

8. A Dispositional Hearing [in the ensuing child-in-need-ofservices (“CHINS”) case] was held on October 25, 2017[,] as to 

[M]other. The [Children3 were] continued in licensed foster care. 

The Dispositional Decree incorporated a Parent Participation 

Plan that required her to [comply with fifteen different 

requirements].

9. The Mother was granted supervised visitation with [each 

of the Children]. . . .

10. A Review Hearing was held on February 8, 2017. The 

Court found that the Mother failed to secure a psychiatric 

evaluation and was not participating in therapy. . . .

3

 The court entered one order for each of the Children. At least with respect to Mother, the orders are 

substantially similar, and for ease of readability we have substituted an order’s use of the singular “child” 

with the plural “Children” where appropriate.
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11. On July 10, 2018[,] a Permanency Hearing was held. The 

Court found that the Mother had not demonstrated an ability to 

benefit from services . . . .

12. The Mother has tested positive for methamphetamine 

during the pendency of the underlying CHINS case. From the 

testimony of the toxicologist . . . , the Court finds that the Mother 

tested positive for methamphetamine on November 2, 2018, 

November 28, 2018, and[] December 18, 2018. She also tested 

positive for methamphetamine on January 16, 2019. She tested 

positive for cocaine on March 14, 2017, August 3, [2]017[,] and 

September 4, 2018.

13. From the testimony of [DCS] case manager Joshua Meyer, 

the [C]ourt finds that the Mother was enrolled in an in-patient 

residential rehabilitation program from July 2018 [through] 

August 2018. Shortly after her release from that program[,] she 

tested positive for cocaine.

14. The Mother was referred for outpatient therapy and home 

based services to Park Center, Inc. From the testimony of 

[Meyer, t]he Mother did not engage in the services there. The 

Mother was then referred for an assessment and services for 

substance abuse and home based support to Dockside. That 

referral was discontinued due to the Mother’s noncompliance. 

Additionally[,] Dockside determined that the level of care the 

[M]other required was more than that which they could provide.

15. From the testimony of [Meyer,] the [C]ourt finds that the 

Mother was first referred for medication management to Park 

Center, Inc. She was unsatisfactorily discharged from that 

agency and a new referral was made for her to the Bowen Center.

16. [DCS] referred the Mother [for] a drug and alcohol 

assessment at C.A.P., Inc. She completed the assessment [i]n 
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December[] 2018. The assessment recommended that the 

Mother enroll in an “inpatient treatment program with a follow 

up in a sober living house[.”] She has not enrolled in an 

inpatient program.

17. The Mother is receiving home based services through 

C.A.P., Inc. based on a December 2018 referral from [DCS]. 

Her home based service provider, Pat Geimer, testified that the 

Mother is making an effort in that on or about the week before 

the [f]actfinding [hearing], the Mother admitted that she needed 

help. Her admission, Ms. Geimer testified, is a first step.

18. Ms. Geimer testified that she has provided the Mother 

with transportation.

19. At the time of the [f]actfinding [hearing,] the Mother was 

living in a motel, . . . having recently moved from another motel 

that [Geimer] described as “not a good place[.”] The current 

motel residence is not large enough for a family residence. 

[Geimer] testified that the motel is in the proximity of “strip 

joints” and is in a “rough part of town[.”]

20. The Department has provided referrals to multiple 

agencies for the supervision of Mother’s visits with the 

[Children]. The Mother asserted that she had transportation 

issues with regard to the referral to SCAN, Inc. A second referral 

was made to Dockside. Again[,] she asserted that she lacked 

transportation but was unsure if she had been provided with bus 

passes. A third referral was made to Lifeline and a fourth was 

made to Whittington Services.

21. The Mother’s assertions regarding transportation issues are 

not entirely supported by the testimony of Lifeline Family 

Consultant, Ashley Bienz. From her testimony[,] the Court finds 

that[,] on October 1, 2018, the [M]other cancelled explaining she 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-1607 | January 24, 2020 Page 6 of 12

had car trouble. However, on the third scheduled visit in 

November the Mother called and advised she was in 

Indianapolis. The Mother advised she would be present for the 

next scheduled visits. However, the Mother texted the agency 

and advised that she was again in Indianapolis . . . . Similarly, 

the Court finds from the testimony of Bruno Taylor of 

Whittington that[,] between November 2018[] and January 16, 

2019, the Mother cancelled her scheduled visits with the 

[Children].

22. The Mother visited the [Children] one time in July 2018[] 

and one time in November 2018. She has not seen the [Children] 

since.

* * *

29. The [Children have] been placed outside the home under a 

dispositional decree for more than six (6) months.

30. From the testimony [of] Tracy Kearns, the [Children’s] 

licensed foster care provider, the Court finds that [H.M.] was 

suffering from nightmares and anxiety when . . . first placed into 

her care in August 2016 [and S.B. had multiple screaming temper 

tantrums each day]. Since then[, H.M.’s] nightmares have 

decreased and he is less anxious [and S.B. is no longer displaying 

the extreme behaviors].

31. [H.M.’s] issues and progress in foster care are supported by 

the testimony of Whittington Homes and Services[] therapist[] 

Annette Cook. Therapist Cook provides therapy for [H.M.] She 

is addressing his anxiety and coping mechanisms. She testified 

that [H.M.] is stable in his foster home. . . .
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32. [H.M.’s] therapist also testified that the child exhibits 

Attention [D]eficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) symptoms 

and is “very order oriented” and requires consistency.

33. Should parental rights be terminated[,] [DCS] has an 

appropriate plan, that being adoption. The [Children are] in a 

potential pre-adoptive home.

34. The [Children’s] Guardian ad Litem has concluded that 

the [Children’s] best interests are served by the termination of 

parental rights. In support of his conclusion[,] he testified that 

the parents have not demonstrated . . . continuity of life stability

[sic]. He also cited the Mother’s recent positive drug screens.

Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 69, 71-74 (H.M.); 76-80 (S.B.) (record citations 

omitted). 

[4] In light of its findings, the court concluded as follows:

By the clear and convincing evidence[,] the [C]ourt determines 

that there is a reasonable probability that [the] reasons that 

brought about the [Children’s] placement outside the home will 

not be remedied. Shortly after her inpatient treatment in 2018, 

[Mother] tested positive for cocaine. The Mother has continued 

to use methamphetamine and had a positive test for the illegal 

substance on or about January 26, 2019, a few weeks before the 

commencement of the [f]actfinding [hearing]. The Mother is 

residing in a motel in a neighborhood that is described as being in 

a rough part of town and which is inadequate for the care of the 

[Children]. She only recently took a “first step” toward 

rehabilitation by her admission that she needs help. She has not 

visited her [Children] since November 2018. . . .
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Id. at 74 (H.M.); 80-81 (S.B.). The court further concluded that DCS had a 

satisfactory plan in place for the care and treatment of the Children and that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. 

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[5] Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights over the 

Children. The court’s termination order recites findings of fact and conclusions 

thereon following an evidentiary hearing before the court. As our Supreme 

Court has explained, in such circumstances 

[w]e affirm a trial court’s termination decision unless it is clearly 

erroneous; a termination decision is clearly erroneous when the 

court’s findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or 

when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. 

We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and 

we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

support the court’s judgment. 

M.H. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re Ma.H.), 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) 

(citations omitted).

[6] “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not 

absolute.” Id. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental 

responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45-46. To 

terminate parental rights, Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019) requires 

DCS to demonstrate, as relevant here, that “[t]here is a reasonable probability 
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that the conditions that resulted in the [Children’s] removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied” and that the 

“termination is in the best interests of the [Children].”

Issue One: Whether The Conditions That Resulted 

In Removal Will Not Be Remedied

[7] Mother first asserts on appeal that the trial court’s conclusion that the 

conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal will not be remedied is 

clearly erroneous. In determining whether the conditions that led to a child’s 

placement outside the home will not be remedied, a trial court is required to (1) 

ascertain what conditions led to the child’s removal or placement and retention 

outside the home; and (2) determine whether there is a reasonable probability 

that those conditions will not be remedied. R.C. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re 

K.T.K.), 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). Here, the trial court found that 

DCS had removed the Children from Mother’s care because of incidents of 

domestic violence in the presence of the Children while they were in Mother’s 

care and also because of Mother’s drug use.

[8] In order to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in removal will not be remedied, the court should assess 

a parent’s “fitness” at the time of the termination hearing, taking into 

consideration any evidence of changed conditions. E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs. (In re E.M.), 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). The court must weigh any 

improvements the parent has made since removal against the parent’s “habitual 

patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of 
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future neglect or deprivation.” Id. When making such decisions, courts should 

consider evidence of a “parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, 

history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing, and 

employment.” Evans v. St. Joseph Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re A.L.H.), 774 

N.E.2d 896, 990 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[9] The evidence demonstrates that Mother continued to test positive for illegal 

substances throughout the proceedings before the trial court. Indeed, Mother 

tested positive for methamphetamine on four different occasions after DCS had 

filed its petitions for the termination of her parental rights. And she tested 

positive for cocaine on three occasions during the CHINS proceedings.

[10] Mother also failed to successfully complete recommended services. She did not 

engage in the home-based services with Park Center; her referral to Dockside 

was discontinued due to her noncompliance; she was unsatisfactorily

discharged from Park Center’s medication management program; and she never 

enrolled in a recommended inpatient treatment program. Further, she lacked 

adequate housing at the time of the fact-finding hearing, as she had been living 

in a motel that was not large enough for a family and was located near several 

strip clubs and otherwise in an unsafe area for the Children. Finally, Mother 

visited the Children one time following the DCS’s filings on the petitions to 

terminate.

[11] The evidence supports the trial court’s findings, and the findings support the 

court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 
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resulted in the Children’s removal will not be remedied. Mother’s argument on 

appeal is simply a request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we 

cannot do. The trial court did not clearly err when it concluded that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s 

removal or the reasons for placement outside of Mother’s home will not be 

remedied.

Issue Two: Children’s Best Interests

[12] Mother next contends that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that 

the termination of her parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. In 

determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a 

child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v. 

Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). 

“A parent’s historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability[,] and 

supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a 

finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best 

interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an 

important consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re A.K., 

924 N.E.2d at 224.

[13] When making its decision, the court must subordinate the interests of the 

parents to those of the child. See Stewart v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re J.S.), 

906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “The court need not wait until a 

child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.” 
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Id. Moreover, this Court has previously held that recommendations of the 

family case manager and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, 

coupled with evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be 

remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. Id.

[14] Here, the Children’s court-appointed special advocate testified that termination 

of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests due to her life 

instability and continued drug use. Further, the Children’s therapist testified 

that each child’s mental health had improved since removal from Mother’s care 

and placement in foster care. And, as explained above, the evidence is 

sufficient to show that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal 

will not be remedied. 

[15] Children need consistent and reliable care as well as permanency. The totality 

of the evidence, including Mother’s continued substance abuse issues, 

instability, and failure to successfully complete recommended services, supports 

the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the 

Children’s best interests. Mother’s argument on this issue is, again, simply a 

request for this Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. We affirm 

the trial court’s termination of her parental rights.

[16] Affirmed.

Vaidik, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.