FILED

October 19, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

SEPTEMBER SESSION, 1998

JESSIE LAFRANTZ JACKSON, ) C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9711-CR-00523

)

Appellant, )

) DAVIDSON COUNTY

V. ) 

)

) HON. J. RANDALL WYATT, JR.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) JUDGE 

)

Appellee. ) (POST-CONVICTION)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

JESSIE LAFRANTZ JACKSON, pro se JOHN KNOX WALKUP 

Special Needs Facility Attorney General & Reporter

7575 Cockrill Bend 

Industrial Road LISA A. NAYLOR 

Nashville, TN 37243-0469 Assistant Attorney General

2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building

425 Fifth Avenue North 

Nashville, TN 37243

VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III

District Attorney General

NICK BAILEY 

Assistant District Attorney General

Washington Square 

222 Second Avenue North, Suite 500

Nashville, TN 37201-1649

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Petitioner, Jessie LaFrantz Jackson, appeals the order of the Davidson

County Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In this

appeal, Petitioner raises the following three issues: (1) whether the State obtained

the first degree murder conviction through the perjured testimony of the key

eyewitness; (2) whether the State failed to produce certain exculpatory information;

and (3) whether his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to offer

impeachment and exculpatory evidence at the first post-conviction hearing. We

affirm the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. 

On March 16, 1987, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and

sentenced to life imprisonment. On August 25, 1987, Petitioner filed a notice of

appeal, but the appeal was dismissed in May of 1988 at the request of Petitioner

and his counsel. On March 29, 1989, Petitioner filed his first petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The evidentiary hearing

on the petition was held on various dates beginning in July 1990. The trial court

denied relief on July 28, 1994. On December 19, 1995, this Court affirmed the

dismissal. On June 10, 1996, our supreme court denied Petitioner’s application for

permission to appeal. On March 31, 1997, Petitioner filed a second petition seeking

post-conviction relief. On May 28, 1997, the trial court summarily dismissed the

petition from which Petitioner now appeals. 
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We will not address Petitioner’s issues on the merits as we conclude that his

petition for post-conviction relief is time-barred by the statute of limitations. At the

time Petitioner’s convictions became final, the statute of limitations applicable to

post-conviction proceedings was three years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102

(repealed 1995). His conviction became final in May 1988 when he withdrew his

direct appeal for the murder conviction. He therefore needed to file his petition by

May 1991 in order to toll the running of the statute. However, Petitioner did not file

this petition for post-conviction relief until March 31, 1997, thus barring any claims

he might have had. 

The new 1995 Post-Conviction Act governs this petition and all petitions filed

after May 10, 1995. Petitioner’s petition is not revived by the new Post-Conviction

Procedure Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-201 et seq. Petitioners “for whom the

statute of limitations expired prior to the effective date of the new Act, i.e., May 10,

1995, do not have an additional year in which to file petitions for post-conviction

relief.” Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tenn. 1997). Also, Petitioner’s claims

do not fall into any of the three recognized exceptions to the new Act in which a trial

court can have jurisdiction to consider a petition filed outside the statute of

limitations. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-202(b). Furthermore, pursuant to Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-30-202(c), a Petitioner may only file one post-conviction petition

attacking a single judgment. However, a petitioner may file a motion in the trial court

to reopen a previously filed post-conviction petition in four limited circumstances.

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a). After a careful review of the record, we find
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that Petitioner’s allegations in the case sub judice, even if true, would not support the

applicability of any of those circum stances. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-217(a).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s summary dismissal

of the petition was appropriate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-206(b).

____________________________________

THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________

GARY R. WADE, Presiding Judge

___________________________________

J. CURWOOD WITT, JR., Judge