United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted May 3, 2018*

Decided May 7, 2018 

Before 

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge

No. 17-2799 

DARYISE L. EARL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

RICHARD KARL, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 15-C-282 

William C. Griesbach, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R 

Daryise Earl, an inmate at Wisconsin’s Green Bay Correctional Institution, 

pursues two claims on appeal concerning a knee injury he sustained while working in 

the prison’s kitchen. First he contends that his supervisor, Richard Karl, violated the 

Eighth Amendment by declining Earl’s request for sick leave once the medical unit had 

cleared Earl to return to work. Second Earl argues that Dave Brooks, the food-service 

manager, fired Earl from his kitchen position in retaliation for his complaint about 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 17-2799 Page 2 

unsafe work conditions. The district court entered summary judgment for the 

defendants. Because Karl reasonably relied on the advice of medical staff in denying the 

sick-leave request, and because Brooks did not know about Earl’s complaint when he 

fired Earl, we affirm the judgment. 

We review the evidence supporting Earl’s claims in the light most favorable to 

him. Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d 752, 754 (7th Cir. 2013). Earl was working as a cook in 

the prison’s main kitchen when he slipped and fell on the wet floor on 

September 25, 2014, tearing a ligament in his left knee. He received immediate medical 

care from the health services unit, follow-up appointments, and a referral to a physical 

therapist. But Earl was concerned about another matter. He filed an inmate complaint 

about the kitchen’s wet floors—a repeat of complaints he had filed before his fall. A 

complaint examiner received the grievance on October 20, but he later dismissed it after 

Brooks, the manager, told him that measures already were in place to prevent accidents. 

Karl, the supervisor, expected Earl to return to work on October 14. As part of his 

medical care, Earl was issued a “no work” restriction that expired on October 13. When 

Earl realized that Karl had scheduled him to work on October 14, Earl asked to see 

medical staff to extend his work restriction, but the request was not received in time. 

When October 14 arrived, Earl reported to the main kitchen “with a noticeable hobbled 

gait,” and asked Karl for a sick day. Karl called the health services unit, confirmed that 

Earl had no outstanding medical work restrictions, and denied Earl’s request. Earl 

showed Karl his “enlarged and deformed knee,” but Karl was not convinced. Knowing 

what health services had just said, he called Earl a liar and warned that he would 

submit a conduct report if Earl did not work. Earl struggled to work for three hours, 

after which he was granted sick leave for the remainder of his shift. A few hours later, 

Earl went to the medical unit and received an extended “no work” restriction. 

Later on October 14, Brooks sought to replace Earl. He explained to a prison 

administrator that the operational needs of the main kitchen were too great to leave 

Earl’s position vacant for his extended leave. The administrator approved the request 

and told Earl that he could reapply for the position once he recovered. When Earl was 

cleared to work, he tried applying to work in the main kitchen, but ended up assigned 

to a different kitchen by mistake. An administrator told Earl that he could reapply to 

the main kitchen after a mandatory wait period. He began working for the other kitchen 

and does not state if he ever reapplied to work in the main kitchen. 
No. 17-2799 Page 3 

On appeal Earl argues that for two reasons Karl violated the Eighth Amendment. 

First, Earl says, Karl was deliberately indifferent when he forced Earl to work with a 

knee injury. But the district court ruled that Karl was not deliberately indifferent 

because, as a layperson, he reasonably relied on the advice of medical professionals 

when he called the health services unit to confirm that Earl did not have any work 

restrictions. See McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 483 (7th Cir. 2013); Hayes v. Snyder, 

546 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 

2004)). Earl now disputes whether Karl made that call, but to no avail. In the proposed 

undisputed facts submitted in support of their motion for summary judgment, the 

defendants stated that Karl called the medical staff on October 14 and verified that Earl 

had no medical work restrictions. Earl did not dispute that fact in his response. 

Moreover, in his complaint, Earl alleged that Karl had called medical staff and 

confirmed that Earl was cleared to return to work. Earl may not belatedly dispute a fact 

that he left unchallenged in the district court and admitted in his complaint. See Dunn v. 

Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d 899, 910 (7th Cir. 2018). 

Second, Earl argues that Karl acted with deliberate indifference by denying his 

sick-leave request. Earl believes that it is required under the prison’s policy to grant any 

requested sick leave. But Earl’s belief is factually unfounded. Wisconsin’s prison policy 

provides that an inmate may request sick leave if he feels he is unable to work, but the 

assignment supervisor has sole discretion to grant or deny the request. Karl consulted 

with medical staff and concluded that Earl was capable of performing his work duties. 

As we just explained, laypersons like Karl may reasonably rely on advice from medical 

professionals in assessing an inmate’s fitness. See Hayes, 546 F.3d at 527. His decision to 

deny Earl’s request for sick leave did not violate Wisconsin’s policy. And, even if it did, 

a policy violation is not itself an Eighth Amendment violation. See Estate of Simpson v. 

Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2017) (rejecting contention that violation of policy 

supports inference that defendants violated Eighth Amendment).

That brings us to the retaliation claim. Earl contends that Brooks violated his 

First Amendment rights by firing him in retaliation for filing a grievance about the 

kitchen’s wet floors. Earl is assuming that the First Amendment protects an inmate's 

right to complain about internal work practices in prison, even though public 

employees out of prison do not always enjoy constitutional protections for speech 

related to their work activities. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006); 

see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (declining to extend First Amendment 

protections to “an employee grievance concerning internal office policy”). But even if 

we assume that the First Amendment applies in this case, Earl’s claim still fails. Earl 
No. 17-2799 Page 4 

bears the initial burden of offering evidence showing that “the defendants knew of the 

protected speech,” see McGreal v. Village of Orland Park, 850 F.3d 308, 313 (7th Cir. 2017), 

but he has not furnished evidence that Brooks knew about the inmate complaint. 

Inmate complaints are generally confidential, see WIS. ADMIN. CODE DOC § 310.16(1), 

and the report documenting the investigation of Earl’s complaint does not show that the 

examiner revealed the source of the complaint to Brooks. In any case, by the time the 

complaint examiner received Earl’s complaint (on October 20), Brooks already had 

submitted his request to remove Earl on October 14. Because Brooks could not possibly 

have known about speech that had not yet occurred, Earl has not met his burden of 

presenting evidence that Brooks knew about the protected speech. 

AFFIRMED