IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs August 19, 2019

DEBORAH RUSSELL v. HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., ET 

AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 18-669-II Anne C. Martin, Chancellor

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No. M2019-01473-COA-T10B-CV

___________________________________

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the 

Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by Deborah Russell (“Plaintiff”), seeking to recuse the 

trial judge in this case which involves a foreclosure action. Having reviewed the petition 

for recusal appeal filed by Plaintiff, and finding no error in the Trial Court’s order 

denying recusal, we affirm.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B Interlocutory Appeal as of Right;

Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G. 

CLEMENT, Jr., P.J., M.S., and KENNY W. ARMSTRONG, J., joined.

Deborah Chandler Russell, Madison, Tennessee, appellant, pro se.

Jonathan Cole, John Spaulding Hicks, and Joy Longnecker, Nashville, Tennessee, for the 

appellees, Household Financial Services, Ben Adams, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, 

Caldwell & Berkowitz (Nashville), Jonathan Cole, Joy Longnecker, and Dana St. ClairHougham.

OPINION

Plaintiff filed a petition for recusal appeal in this Court on August 16, 2019, 

seeking review of the July 26, 2019 order of the Chancery Court for Davidson County 

(“the Chancery Court”) denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Immediate Disqualification and/or 

Recusal filed in the proceedings below on July 18, 2019.

08/28/2019
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This case arose from an agreement between Plaintiff and the defendant HSBC, 

Inc. d/b/a Household Financial Services, Inc. (“HSBC”) with regard to the refinancing of 

Plaintiff’s mortgage. The litigation originated in September of 2004, when Plaintiff filed 

an adversarial proceeding in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 

Tennessee. That case was dismissed without prejudice in March of 2006. 

Subsequently, a detainer action was filed in the General Sessions Court and a 

ruling issued, which Plaintiff then appealed to Circuit Court. Plaintiff then filed a 

complaint in Chancery Court, Part I seeking an injunction preventing HSBC from 

foreclosing on Plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at that time, and her 

complaint alleged claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, violations of the 

Truth in Lending Act, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and fraud. 

An initial temporary restraining order was entered by the Chancery Court, and the case 

was transferred to Circuit Court, where the appeal from the General Sessions Court was 

pending. The appeal of the General Sessions Court case was subsequently dismissed for 

being dormant.

In October of 2007, Plaintiff, now proceeding pro se, filed another complaint in 

Chancery Court, which was assigned to Part II. The new complaint addressed the 

foreclosure and also contained new allegations with regard to HSBC and its handling of 

litigation and discovery matters. This case was transferred to Circuit Court where the 

other cases still were pending. In October of 2013, the two Circuit Court cases were 

consolidated and were assigned to Sixth Circuit Court, with Judge Thomas W. Brothers 

presiding.

Plaintiff alleged that HSBC had induced her to refinance her mortgage in July of 

2000 by promising her terms that were not included in the actual loan agreement. 

Plaintiff complained that her monthly loan payments were different from the amounts 

that had been represented by HSBC, and she claimed that many of the loan documents 

that she had signed were blank when she signed the documents and that HSBC 

representatives had told her not to worry about the blanks. HSBC filed a counterclaim 

against Plaintiff based upon a claimed post-foreclosure deficiency on her loan.

In June of 2008, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment to HSBC with 

regard to all of Plaintiff’s claims and HSBC’s counterclaim. The case was appealed to 

this Court, and we affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to the Tennessee 

Consumer Protection Act claims, but reversed as to Plaintiff’s Truth in Lending Act 

claims and Plaintiff’s intentional and negligent misrepresentation claims. Russell v. 

Household Mortgage Servs., No. M2008-01703-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 2054388 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. Jun. 7, 2012), no appl. perm. appeal filed. The case was remanded to the 

Circuit Court.
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Upon remand, in October of 2014, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment to 

HSBC as to all of Plaintiff’s claims and as to HSBC’s counterclaim. The Circuit Court 

awarded HSBC a deficiency judgment in the amount of $35,278.22 and attorney’s fees in 

the amount of $150,000.

Again, the case was appealed to this Court. We affirmed the grant of summary 

judgment to HSBC on Plaintiff’s Truth in Lending Act claims, but reversed with regard 

to Plaintiff’s intentional and negligent misrepresentation claims due to disputed issues of 

material fact. Russell v. HSBC Mortgage Servs., Inc., No. M2015-00197-COA-R3-CV, 

2016 WL 1588091 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 15, 2016), Rule 11 appl. perm. appeal denied 

Sept. 22, 2016. This Court further vacated the judgment in favor of HSBC on its 

counterclaim. HSBC filed a Rule 11 application for permission to appeal to the 

Tennessee Supreme Court, which the Supreme Court denied by order entered on 

September 22, 2016. The case was remanded to the Circuit Court to adjudicate the 

claims of intentional and negligent misrepresentation and HSBC’s counterclaim. 

In January of 2017, the Circuit Court set the case for a one-week jury trial to begin 

October 30, 2017. On October 18, 2017, Plaintiff non-suited her case. HSBC’s 

counterclaim remained pending. Prior to non-suiting her claims, Plaintiff filed two 

motions seeking to recuse Judge Brothers. Plaintiff alleged that Judge Brothers had 

engaged in ex parte communications with the attorneys from Baker, Donelson, Bearman, 

Caldwell & Berkowitz (“the Baker Attorneys”). Judge Brothers denied those allegations 

and denied Plaintiff’s motions to recuse.

Plaintiff then filed another suit in Chancery Court and sued not only HSBC, but 

also HSBC’s attorneys, i.e., the Baker Attorneys; and an HSBC representative, Dana St.

Clair-Hougham. Plaintiff did not properly effect service on the Baker Attorneys. 

Plaintiff also failed to have the Clerk and Master issue process for defendants HSBC and 

Dana St. Clair-Hougham. Plaintiff’s complaint comprised four volumes containing 543 

pages and 1,582 paragraphs. 

The case was assigned to Chancery Court, Part II with Chancellor William Young 

presiding. Chancellor Young then transferred the case to the Sixth Circuit Court because 

of the Circuit Court’s history with the case and familiarity with it. In September of 2018, 

after Judge Brothers recused himself, the case was returned to Chancery Court, Part II.

In November of 2018, the current trial judge, Chancellor Anne C. Martin, heard 

motions in this case for the first time. Plaintiff had eleven pending motions, but the 

defendants asserted that due to lack of service upon them, the only motion properly 

before the court was the motion to enlarge time to obtain service. The Chancery Court 

allowed Plaintiff additional time to serve defendants. Plaintiff also had filed a motion 

seeking a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal with regard to the Circuit Court case, and the 

Chancery Court noted that Plaintiff had non-suited the claims in that case, so there was 
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no case pending from which Plaintiff could proceed. Additionally, Plaintiff objected to 

receiving emails or hand-service of pleadings from the defendants, and the Chancery 

Court instructed Plaintiff to provide the clerk with an email or facsimile number for 

service. Plaintiff’s remaining motions were scheduled for hearing at a later date. 

In December of 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend with regard to the 

Chancery Court’s instruction regarding providing an email or facsimile number for 

service. Plaintiff asserted that her safety and security would be compromised with any 

method of service other than U.S. mail. The Chancery Court entered an order directing 

Plaintiff to familiarize herself with the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and Twentieth 

Judicial District’s Local Rules of Court, and informed Plaintiff that if she insisted on 

service by mail, she would no longer be able to raise objections with regard to the timing

of her receipt of pleadings, unless Plaintiff could demonstrate that said pleadings were 

not be placed in the mail timely. 

In January of 2019, the Chancery Court heard the remaining motions held-over 

from November of 2018, as well as additional motions filed since that time. The 

Chancery Court granted the defendants’ motion to strike and allowed Plaintiff thirty days 

to refile her complaint. Specifically, the Chancery Court found that Plaintiff’s complaint 

was similar to one which this Court had determined was “a conglomeration of facts, legal 

arguments, conjecture, grandiloquent expressions, rhetorical questions, verbiage, 

impertinence, redundancy, immateriality, scandalous matter, innuendos, character 

assassination, and affirmative defenses to unasserted claims.” Collier v. Federal Land

Bk. of Louisville, No. 87-150-II, 1987 WL 18379, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 1987), 

Rule 11 appl. perm. appeal denied Dec. 4, 1989. The Chancery Court gave Plaintiff 

several examples of the information in the complaint considered scandalous or character 

assassination and cited specific examples in its order. Plaintiff filed an amended 

complaint that was 249 pages long and contained 871 paragraphs.

In May of 2019, a hearing was specially set for 11:00 a.m. after the Chancery 

Court’s regular motion docket. The Chancery Court finished the motion docket at 

approximately 9:30 a.m. and the Chancellor worked in chambers until 11:00 a.m. The 

Chancellor had no contact with the Baker Attorneys that morning during the time prior to 

the 11:00 a.m. hearing. Several motions were scheduled, and as part of her response to 

the motions, Plaintiff had filed a motion titled “Emergency Motion for Immediate 

Determination on Jurisdiction & Scope of Judicial Authority of this Court.” The 

Chancery Court took up Plaintiff’s motion first and explained that it was unclear what 

Plaintiff was seeking. The Chancery Court gave Plaintiff a chance to explain and share 

any concerns, and Plaintiff did not raise any issues with regard to allegations Plaintiff 

later made about ex parte communications between the Chancellor and the Baker 

Attorneys. Nor did Plaintiff request that the Chancellor recuse. 
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The Chancery Court then heard defendants’ motions, among which was a motion 

to strike Plaintiff’s complaint. The Chancery Court ruled that the complaint was 

impossible to understand and contained language inappropriate for a pleading. The 

Chancery Court did not strike the entire pleading, but instead went through the complaint 

paragraph by paragraph and struck the inappropriate portions. The Chancery Court then 

instructed Plaintiff to refile her complaint consistent with the court’s ruling within thirty 

days. 

The Chancery Court also heard defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted the 

motion dismissing the claims against the Baker Attorneys for various reasons including 

failure to state a claim and allegations that were barred by the statute of limitations. The 

Chancery Court also dismissed defendant Dana St. Clair-Hougham finding that the 

allegations against this defendant concerned affidavits submitted by Ms. St. ClairHougham and a deposition she had given and that those activities had occurred outside of 

the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend, which was 

set to be heard in July of 2019, but Plaintiff filed her motion to recuse the day prior to 

that hearing precluding the hearing on the motion to alter or amend.

By order entered on July 26, 2019, the Chancery Court denied Plaintiff’s motion 

to recuse in a very detailed, thorough, and well-reasoned order. The Chancery Court 

noted that many of Plaintiff’s complaints concerned other judges before whom Plaintiff 

had appeared, not the current Chancellor. The Chancery Court denied having ex parte

communications with the Baker Attorneys; denied that her rulings had consistently 

favored the Baker Attorneys; denied knowing the identities of contributors to her 

campaign; denied that her former law firm had represented HSBC while the Chancellor 

worked there; denied being influenced by Judge Brothers, Judge Binkley, and defendant 

Lupinacci, whom the Chancellor denied even knowing; denied having an “unethical 

relationship” with the Clerk & Master, and noted that Plaintiff waited until she had 

received an adverse ruling before raising the issue of recusal despite knowing about the 

facts alleged prior to the hearing. Furthermore, the Chancery Court stated: “The Court 

has a job to do and is doing it, and although [Plaintiff] is unhappy with the Court’s 

rulings, as she has been with rulings made by every trial judge she has encountered since 

2004, that is not a basis for recusal.” 

ANALYSIS

We have determined in this case after a review of the petition and supporting 

documents submitted with the petition, that an answer, additional briefing, and oral 

argument are unnecessary to our disposition because the record provided by Plaintiff does 

not demonstrate error by the Trial Court Judge. As such, we have elected to act 

summarily on this appeal in accordance with sections 2.05 and 2.06 of Rule 10B. See 

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.05 (“If the appellate court, based upon its review of the 

petition for recusal appeal and supporting documents, determines that no answer from the 
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other parties is needed, the court may act summarily on the appeal. Otherwise, the 

appellate court shall order that an answer to the petition be filed by the other parties. The 

court, in its discretion, also may order further briefing by the parties within the time 

period set by the court.”); § 2.06 (“An accelerated interlocutory appeal shall be decided 

by the appellate court on an expedited basis. The appellate court’s decision, in the 

court’s discretion, may be made without oral argument.”).

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for recusal under a de novo standard 

of review with no presumption of correctness. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 2.01. “The party 

seeking recusal bears the burden of proof, and ‘any alleged bias must arise from 

extrajudicial sources and not from events or observations during litigation of a case.’” 

Neamtu v. Neamtu, No. M2019-00409-COA-T10B-CV, 2019 WL 2849432, at *2 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. July 2, 2019), no appl. perm. appeal filed, (quoting Williams by & through 

Rezba v. HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. N., No. W2015-00639-COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL

2258172, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2015), no appl. perm. appeal filed). As this Court 

explained in Neamtu v. Neamtu:

The party seeking recusal bears the burden of proof. Williams, 2015 WL 

2258172, at *5; Cotham v. Cotham, No. W2015-00521-COA-T10B-CV, 

2015 WL 1517785, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2015) (no perm. app. 

filed). “[A] party challenging the impartiality of a judge ‘must come 

forward with some evidence that would prompt a reasonable, disinterested 

person to believe that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.’” Duke, 398 S.W.3d at 671 (quoting Eldridge v. Eldridge, 137 

S.W.3d 1, 7-8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). When reviewing requests for 

recusal alleging bias, “it is important to keep in mind the fundamental 

protections that the rules of recusal are intended to provide.” In re A.J., No. 

M2014-02287-COA-R3-JV, 2015 WL 6438671, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 

22, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 18, 2016). “The law on judicial 

bias is intended ‘to guard against the prejudgment of the rights of 

litigants and to avoid situations in which the litigants might have cause 

to conclude that the court had reached a prejudged conclusion because 

of interest, partiality, or favor.’” Id. (quoting Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 

798, 803 (Tenn. 2009)).

The terms “bias” and “prejudice” usually refer to a state of mind or 

attitude that works to predispose a judge for or against a party, but not 

every bias, partiality, or prejudice merits recusal. Watson v. City of 

Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919, 929 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Alley v. State, 

882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)). “‘Even though the judge 

is expected to have no bias at the beginning of the trial, he must, 

perforce, develop a bias at some point in the trial; for the decision at 

the conclusion of the trial is based upon the impressions, favorable or
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unfavorable, developed during the trial.’” Id. at 933 (quoting Spain v. 

Connolly, 606 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)). To merit 

disqualification, the prejudice must be of a personal character, directed at 

the litigant, and stem from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion on 

the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from 

participation in the case. Id. at 929. “A trial judge’s opinions of the parties 

or witnesses that are based on what he or she has seen at trial are not 

improper and ‘generally do[ ] not warrant recusal.’” Id. at 933 (quoting 

Neuenschwander v. Neuenschwander, No. E2001-00306-COA-R3-CV, 

2001 WL 1613880, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2001)).

Neamtu, 2019 WL 2849432, at **2-3 (quoting In re Samuel P., No. W2016-01592-COAT10B-CV, 2016 WL 4547543, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016), no appl. perm. 

Appeal filed.) (emphasis in original)

 

As this Court explained in Duke v. Duke:

“A trial judge's adverse rulings are not usually sufficient to establish bias.”

State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 308 (Tenn. 2008). “Rulings of a trial 

judge, even if erroneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without more, 

justify disqualification.” Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 821 (Tenn. Crim.

App. 1994). “If the rule were otherwise, recusal would be required as a 

matter of course since trial courts necessarily rule against parties and 

witnesses in every case, and litigants could manipulate the impartiality 

issue for strategic advantage, which the courts frown upon.” Davis v. 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 565 (Tenn.2001).

Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 671 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). 

“[A] judge should not decide to recuse unless a recusal is truly called for under the 

circumstances.” Rose v. Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr., No M2007-02368-COA-R3-CV, 

2008 WL 2078056, *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2008), no appl. perm. appeal filed. This 

is true because “‘[a] judge has as much of a duty not to recuse himself absent a factual 

basis for doing so as he does to step aside when recusal is warranted.’” Id. at *2 (quoting 

Mass v. McClenahan, No. 93 Civ. 3290 (JSM), 1995 WL 106106, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 

1995)). Recusal based upon an asserted appearance of bias or prejudice “is appropriate 

only if the facts provide what an objective, knowledgeable member of the public would 

find to be a reasonable basis for doubting the judge’s impartiality.” Id. at *2 (quoting In 

Re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981)).

In her petition for recusal appeal, Plaintiff has demonstrated no reason for recusal 

other than the fact that she is unhappy with some of the rulings of the Chancery Court. 

Such unhappiness is insufficient to justify recusal. Furthermore, Plaintiff has proven no 
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facts supporting recusal. Rather, Plaintiff simply provides unsubstantiated argument, 

most of which concerns things that occurred prior to the current Chancellor’s 

involvement with this case. 

Plaintiff has failed to produce “evidence that would prompt a reasonable, 

disinterested person to believe that the [Chancellor’s] impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.” Neamtu, 2019 WL 2849432, at *3 (quoting In re Samuel P., No. W2016-

01592-COA-T10B-CV, 2016 WL 4547543, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2016), no 

appl. perm. appeal filed). As such, we find no error in the Chancery Court’s order 

denying the motion for recusal. Plaintiff’s petition for recusal is DENIED. The costs of 

this appeal are taxed to Plaintiff, for which execution may issue. This case is remanded 

for further proceedings.

_________________________________

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF 

JUDGE