****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andbound volumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************R.I. POOLS, INC. v. PARAMOUNT CONCRETE, INC. (AC 34363)
Lavine, Sheldon and Keller, Js. Argued October 24, 2013—officially released May 6, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Complex Litigation Docket,

Blawie, J.)
Michael S. Taylor, for the appellant (defendant). Raymond J. Plouffe, Jr., for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion KELLER, J. The plaintiff, R.I. Pools, Inc., brought this action under the Connecticut Product Liability Act (act), General Statutes § 52-572m et seq., seeking damages against the defendant, Paramount Concrete, Inc., for having sold it an allegedly defective product that it used in its construction of several luxury swimming pools for homeowners in Fairfield County.1 The defendant appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered following ajury trial, in favor ofthe plaintiff. The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied its motion to set aside the verdict, and (2) awarded the plaintiffpunitive damages. We agree withthe defendant that thejury’s award ofcompensatory damages and the court’s award of punitive damages must be reversed. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court for a hearing in damages on the plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages, and a separate hearing to determine the plaintiff’s award of punitive damages.2 By means of its amended complaint dated February 14, 2011, the plaintiff alleged that it purchased a concreteproduct, Shotcrete, fromthe defendant. Theplaintiff installed the Shotcrete in several pools and spas that it built for homeowners in the course of its pool andspaconstructionbusiness. Theplaintiffallegedthat the Shotcrete ‘‘hasthusfarcrackedinatleastseventeen pools,’’ causing property damage. The plaintiff, expressly invoking the act, alleged that the defendant
was liable for all damages and losses it had sustained
as a result of the defective Shotcrete, in that (1) ‘‘the Shotcrete should have been made with concrete sand only, not masonry sand or a combination of masonry sand and concrete sand’’; (2) ‘‘the Shotcrete was improperly mixed’’; (3) ‘‘the Shotcrete was made, distributed and/or delivered by machines and equipment that were not properly maintained, repaired and/or equipped’’; (4) ‘‘improper amounts and/or grade of ingredients were utilized’’; and (5) ‘‘[the defendant] failed to warn or advise [the plaintiff] of the foregoing and ofthe potential for danger and damage it posed to the pools and spas being constructed by [the plaintiff],
as well as the potential for damages and losses to the surrounding real and personal property in the vicinity of these pools.’’
The plaintiff alleged that, ‘‘even though [the defendant] knew or should have known that the Shotcrete it was selling was not in compliance with industry standards and deviated from product design requirements and recommendations, [the defendant] made representationsto the contrary, therebypurposefullymisleading its customers, including [the plaintiff], despite knowing thatsuchcustomerswererelyingupontheirrepresentations andthepurportedqualityandfitness oftheirproduct in building substantial construction projects, including pools, spas and other structures

. . . .’’ Fur-thermore, the plaintiff alleged that ‘‘[the defendant] operated a concrete/Shotcrete plant without personnel that had sufficient expertise and/or training in the propermixture and/oramounts and/orgrade ofingredients for Shotcrete, and/orproper delivery for Shotcrete when it knew or should have known that the operation of a concrete/Shotcrete plant without such sufficient expertise created ahigh probability ofcausing substantial injury to product users, and consumers, including theplaintiff, andtheirrespectiveproperty.’’ Onthebasis oftheseallegations, aswellasthe allegationspreviously set forth, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s
course of conduct ‘‘was in reckless disregard for the safety ofproductusers, consumers andthe plaintiffand their respective property which were injured by the product

. . . .’’
Theplaintiffallegedthat, asaresultofthe defendant’s defective product as well as its ‘‘egregious conduct,’’ it had sustained substantial financial losses and damages, ‘‘including the costs of repair and/or replacement of seventeen pools, spas, landscaping, and hardscaping, and the potential for additional losses and damages if cracking and other related failures occur in some or all of the other pools and spas it built with Shotcrete supplied by the defendant.’’ The defendant denied having sold the plaintiffa defective product and, by means ofspecial defense, alleged that any losses sustained by the plaintiff had resulted from ‘‘its misuse, alteration and/or modification of the product at issue

. . . .’’3
At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence of varying degrees of crack damage in nineteen completed swimming pools it had built using Shotcrete manufactured by and purchased from its subcontractor, the defendant.4 The plaintiff presented evidence that the cracks found in all of the pools at issue had been caused by Shotcrete that had not been mixed to a proper consistency, which, in turn, had led to excessive shrinking in completed pools. The defendant, denying that it had sold defective Shotcrete, attempted to prove that the cracking at issue had resulted from the defective construction practices of the plaintiff. During closing argument, the plaintiff’s attorney statedthattheplaintiffwantedto ‘‘repair’’ and ‘‘rebuild’’ the pools at issue. During argument, he referred to a chart that was displayed as a visual aid that, among otherthings, described the location ofeach ofthe nineteen pools at issue as well as the amount of damages, whether past, present or both, that had been incurred
or would be incurred by the plaintiff with regard to each pool. Referring to damage amounts specified for each ofthe nineteen pools at issue, the plaintiff’s attorney referred to the evidence and explained the method by which his client had calculated its damages, and arguedthatthetotalamountofpastandfuture damages supported by the evidence was $2,760,208.5 Thisamount, which included lost profits to the plaintiff as well as miscellaneous damages listed in the amount of $7680.64, was labeled as the ‘‘total’’ on the chart.
The plaintiff’s attorney, however, cautioned that because the plaintiff was not seeking lost profits in its complaint, this ‘‘total’’ amount should be adjusted appropriately. Thus, the plaintiff’s attorney argued that the amount ofdamages proven and sought bythe plaintiff, minus lostprofits, was $2,365,562. One ofthe issues submitted to the jury was whether the plaintiff was entitled to an award of punitive damages pursuant to the act and, during argument, the plaintiff’s attorney argued in support of such an award. During its charge, the court stated, in relevant part, that the jury was to consider evidence concerning the nineteen pools about which it had heard evidence and to complete thejury verdict forms, including interrogatories, provided to it. The court stated that part of the jury’s obligation would be to provide a ‘‘breakdown of [damages related to] each of the nineteen pools about which [it] heard evidence.’’ The court instructed the jury that, in the event that it awarded the plaintiffdamages, the amount ofdamages reflected in its completed interrogatories should be the same figure reflected on the plaintiff’s verdict form. Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $2,760,207.90, and found that the plaintiff
was entitled to punitive damages. By means ofjury interrogatories, thejury, in the context ofawarding aplaintiff’sverdict, was askedto specify both the ‘‘total damages’’ and the defendant’s percentage of fault for each of the nineteen pools for which damages were sought by the plaintiff. The completed interrogatories reflect that, with respect to each of the nineteen pools at issue, the jury found that the defendant was 100 percent at fault and the plaintiffwas entitled to recover damages in the identical amount of $145,274.10. The completed interrogatory forms reflect that the jury did not award any ‘‘miscellaneous damages,’’ as had been requested by the plaintiff. The total damages were specified both in the interrogatories and
on the plaintiff’s verdict form as $2,760,207.90. After the verdict was announced, the jury was polled and each juror expressed his or her agreement with the verdict. The court did not conduct any further inquiry of the jury concerning its verdict. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict. Following ahearing, the court denied the motion. Later, the court awarded punitive damages inthe amountofattorney’sfeesincurredbytheplaintiff, less costs.6 The court denied the defendant’s motion to reargue this decision. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary. IFirst, on a variety of grounds, the defendant challenges the court’s denial of its motion to set aside the verdict. Before addressing the defendant’s arguments,
we set forth our standard of review. ‘‘The standard of review governing our review of a trial court’s denial of
a motion to set aside the verdict is well settled. The trial court possesses inherent power to set aside ajury verdict [that], in the court’s opinion, is against the law
or the evidence.

. . . [The trial court] should not set aside a verdict [when] it is apparent that there was some evidence [on] which the jury might reasonably reach [its] conclusion, and should not refuse to set it aside [when] the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles.

. . . Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside
averdict entails the exercise ofabroad legal discretion

. . . that, in the absence of clear abuse, we shall not disturb.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weyant

v. Kristy, 126 Conn. App. 180, 183, 10 A.3d 119 (2011).
A
The first part of the defendant’s claim relates to the jury’s finding as to liability. The defendant argues, as it did before the trial court in the context of its motion to set aside the verdict, that the award cannot stand because the plaintiff failed to present evidence that it proximately caused damage to four of the nineteen pools at issue.7 The gist of the argument is that the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness with regard to causation, licensed structural engineer Gerard Feldman, reflects that, in connection with four ofthe pools at issue, he did not conduct any firsthand evaluation oftheir condition and, in rendering his expert opinion, did not rely on evidence of a type reasonably relied
on by experts in his field. Thus, the defendant argues, Feldman’s opinion that defective Shotcrete caused the cracking in these pools cannot support the verdict with regard to these four pools. ‘‘[I]n order to recover under the doctrine of strict liability in tort the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the defendant was engaged in the business of selling the product; (2) the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user; (3) the defect caused the injury for which compensation
was sought; (4) the defect existed at the time of the sale; and (5) the product was expectedto and did reach the consumerwithout substantial change in condition.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 241 Conn. 199, 214, 694 A.2d 1319 (1997). It is not in dispute that the plaintiff was bound to present expert opinion evidence in the present case with regard to causation. ‘‘The mere fact that a witness has been qualified as an expert in a particular field does not itself give theexpert information needed to state an opinion relevant to the case. There remain two additional elements before that opinion may be rendered

. . . [a] knowledge of the facts of the case, to which the expert’s training and experience may then be applied [and]

. . . [t]heperceivedreliabilityortrustworthiness oftheprinciples and theories from the field of expertise which the expert employs to render the opinion

. . . . ‘‘The opinions of experts must be based upon facts which have been proved, assumed, or observed, and which are sufficient to form a basis for an intelligent opinion.

. . . Opinion evidence should be accompanied by a statement of the facts on which it is based, and as a general rule, an expert must state facts from which thejury may draw [its] conclusions. Conversely,
a witness qualified as an expert may not only testify as to the conclusions based upon his skill and knowledge, but also as to the facts from which such conclusions
are drawn.

. . . [W]here the factual foundation for an expert opinion is not fully disclosed, it cannot be assaileduponappealifacceptedbythejuryassufficient in weight and credibility to support the verdict.

. . . ‘‘The fact that an expert opinion is drawn from
sources not in themselves admissible does not render the opinioninadmissible, providedthesourcesarefairly reliable and the witness has sufficient experience to evaluate the information.

. . . An expert may base his
orheropinion onfacts ordatanotinevidence, provided they are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field.

. . . This is so because ofthe sanction given by the witness’s experience and expertise.

. . . An expert may give an opinion based on sources not in themselves admissible in evidence, provided (1) thefacts ordatanotinevidence are ofatypereasonably relied on by experts in the particular field, and (2) the expertisavailableforcross-examinationconcerninghis
or her opinion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) National Publishing Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 94 Conn. App. 234, 251–53, 892 A.2d 261 (2006), rev’d on other grounds, 287 Conn. 664, 949 A.2d 1203 (2008); see also Conn. Code Evid. § 7-4.
Feldman testified about the types of information on which he relied in forming his opinion that defective Shotcrete caused the cracking at issue in all of the pools. With regard to some of the pools, he testified that the information on which he relied included his firsthand observations of damage and the results of various scientific testing of concrete. With regard to other pools, he testified that the information on which he reliedincludedfacts aboutthe condition ofthepools that he learned from others. The evidence does not reflect that Feldman personally observed, performed any testing, or in any other manner studied the four pools at issue in this claim. Feldmantestified, however, that he heard the trial testimony of John Kavanaugh,who, during the time at which the pools at issue were constructed, worked at the defendant’s concrete plant. Kavanaughtestifiedwithregardtothe deficientmanner in which the defendant customarily manufactured and transported Shotcrete to job sites, including the location of the four pools at issue in this claim.
The plaintiff’s attorney asked Feldman: ‘‘To areasonable degree ofstructural engineering probability, based upon what you observed at the pools, the nature ofthe cracks, the size ofthe cracks, the pattern ofthe cracks, the shoot date ofthe pools, the core testing performed, and the commonality of the use of Paramount Shotcrete, did the subject pools [sustain] excessive shrinkage cracks due to nonuniform and different Shotcrete mixes used in the same pool structures?’’ Feldman replied, ‘‘Yes.’’ During cross-examination, the defendant’s attorney asked Feldman about the four pools at issue in this claim, specifically, whether he had ever visited and inspected the four pools personally. Feldman testified that he had not, but that someone had told him that these pools exhibited the same types of cracks as the other pools made with the defendant’s Shotcrete that he personally had studied. In response to questions concerningFeldman’sabilitytorenderanopinionabout pools that he had not examined personally, Feldman stood by his earlier opinion that defective Shotcrete had caused the cracking in all of the pools. During redirect examination, the plaintiff’s attorney asked Feldman to render an expert opinion on the basis of hypothetical facts that were supported by the evidence presented at trial. The plaintiff’s attorney asked Feldman: ‘‘To a reasonable degree of engineering probability, if you take everything that you learned from your studies, regarding these pools, even ifyou didn’t go to
aparticularpoolsuchas thepoolthatwejustdiscussed where there were repairs and photographs of repairs, if you combined your knowledge of the general timing of the shoot, engineer designs involved, the materials coming from the same concrete plant, similar cracks and crackpatterns being reported and/oractuallybeing observed by you, can you say to a reasonable degree of engineering probability that the cause of the excessive cracking inthis case was the bad andinconsistent Shotcrete material coming out of [the defendant’s] plant at that general time period?’’ (Emphasis added.) Feldman replied, ‘‘Yes.’’
Feldman identified the factual basis for his opinion, revealing that he relied on many types of information about the pools in question, including, but not limited to, certain trial testimony concerning the Shotcrete manufactured by the defendant that was common to all of the pools at issue in this case. He had studied
some ofthe poolspersonally, buttestifiedthat he relied
on statements from athird party in assessing the defec-tive condition ofsome ofthe pools at issue. The defendant has not demonstrated that, as a matter of law, Feldman’s testimony was not supported by a sufficient factualbasis because itwas based onfactsperceived or made known to him by others. At length, the defendant cross-examinedFeldmanconcerningthefacts onwhich he had relied. Anyweaknesses that such questions may have exposed in Feldman’s testimony were fodder for the jury’s consideration in evaluating his testimony.
The defendant appears to suggest that Feldman’s opinion was legally insufficient because, with regard to the four pools at issue, he neither observed the pools personally nor conducted any testing with regard to them. This requirement, however, does notfind support in our law. As previously discussed, an expert witness need not personally study or observe conditions, but may apply his or her specialized knowledge to facts perceived or made known to him at or before the proceeding. Conn. Code Evid. § 7-4 (b). With regard to the pools he did not study personally, the evidence reflects that Feldman did not base his opinion on the expert opinion of others, but on material information that he learned from others concerning both the physical condition of the pools and the nature of the concrete used in their construction. The expert’s reliance on information of such character does not necessarily undermine the reliability of the expert opinion. See, e.g., Milliun v. New Milford Hospital, 310 Conn. 711, 729–30, 80 A.3d 887 (2013) (reliable medical opinion may be based on inadmissible hearsay). Moreover, we reiterate that an expert witness may renderan opinion onthe basis ofhypothetical factsthat fairly are supported by the evidence. Absent objection, Feldman provided an expert opinion that was based
on hypothetical questions, as previously set forth. The defendant has not demonstrated that these questions
were not fairly based on facts in evidence. See Conn. Code Evid. § 7-4 (c) (expert witness may give opinion in response to hypothetical questions). On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that thejury fairly could have reached the liability determination that it did.
B
Thesecondpartofthe defendant’sclaimrelatestothe jury’sassessmentofcompensatorydamages. Relyingon the arguments it advanced before the trial court, the defendant claims that, in several respects, the evidence
was insufficientto supportthejury’s awardofdamages. The defendant argues that the court improperly upheld thejury’sverdictbecause (1) withregardto fourpools,8 the jury awarded the plaintiff damages absent any evidence that the plaintiffhad performed any repair work or, thus, sustained any damages; (2) with regard to four pools9 for which respective homeowners had reached settlements with the parties by the time of trial andthereby established the only possible and proper measure of the plaintiff’s damages, the jury awarded damages that exceeded the amounts to which the plaintiff
was entitled; (3) the verdict reflects that the jury awarded full replacement costs for all nineteen pools, yettheevidencedemonstratedthatonlysixpoolsarguably needed to be replaced; and (4) the jury’s verdict, which was ten cents less than the gross damages figure
on which the plaintiff relied in argument, reflects that the jury improperly included an award for lost profits in its calculation of damages in contravention of the court’s instructions. We agree with the defendant that the verdict reflects error on the part of the jury and that the jury’s award of damages must be overturned. Previously in this opinion, we set forth the details relatedto thejury’sverdict. Plainly, the amount ofdamages awarded by the jury exceeded the damages suggested during closing argument by the plaintiff’s attorney. Further, the completed interrogatories reflect that, forpurposes ofawardingdamages, thejurytreated each of the nineteen pools identically. Essentially, the plaintiff urges us to view the defendant’s claim as being premised on a flawed interpretation of the verdict. The plaintiff argues that, at trial, it suggested a gross award of damages that was based
on the evidence and totaled $2,760,208. As discussed previously in this opinion, this amount was set forth duringtheplaintiff’sclosingargumentandwasreflected
on the chart used as a visual aid during closing argument. The plaintiff argues that the jury’s overall award of$2,760,207.90,justtencentslessthanthisgrossaward that its counsel suggested in argument, demonstrates that thejury agreed with the plaintiff’s overall interpretation of the evidence and its evaluation of reasonable damages.
The plaintiff acknowledges, however, that ‘‘the jury may have taken a mathematical ‘shortcut’ by dividing
an overall fair verdict, which was supported by the evidence [and suggested by the plaintiff’s attorney], by the total number ofpools to respond to the interrogatories, which resulted in anet award [for damage] to each pool of $145,274.10.’’ The plaintiff, in essence, urges us torejectthe defendant’sclaimbecause ‘‘thejury’sintent
was clear and manifested in its verdict. Thejury determined that the defendant was 100 percent liable forthe damages caused to each of the nineteen pools. The gross award ofdamages matched almost identicallythe grossamountofdocumentedpastrepaircosts, the2005/ 2006pricesofthethirteenpoolsforwhichreplacements
weresought, andthe supplementaldemolitionandlandscape restoration costs. Thejury’s mathematical shortcut in allocating the gross fair award is at best a defect in ‘form’ and the verdict must be deemed intelligible based on the evidence, arguments, and totality of this case.’’ The plaintiff also suggests that we should lookwith disfavor on the present claim because the defendant did not object to the form in which the jury returned its verdict at the time it was returned, and did not seek a remittitur.
As a starting point ofour analysis, it does not appear to this court that the jury’s verdict was defective as a matter of form. ‘‘We note that if a verdict is defective in form alone, ratherthan as amatter oflaw, the parties should have objected at a time when the mistake could have been corrected.’’ Tisdale v. Riverside Cemetery Assn., 78 Conn. App. 250, 257–58, 826 A.2d 232, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 909, 832 A.2d 74 (2003). ‘‘A verdict is not defective as a matter oflaw as long as it contains
an intelligible finding so that its meaning is clear.

. . . A verdict will be deemed intelligible if it clearly manifests the intent of the jury.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 257.
There is no claim regarding the propriety ofthe interrogatories or the verdict forms provided to thejury. In accordance with the court’s instructions, the jury fully completed the interrogatories and verdict forms with which it was provided. Nothing on the face ofthe completed interrogatories or verdict forms suggests that the jury did not perform its role, insofar as it related to reporting its verdict, properly. Consistent with its completedinterrogatories, thejurycompletedtheplaintiff’s verdict form, awarding $2,760,207.90 in damages. Thus, the verdict forms returned by thejury were complete, consistent, and intelligible. The verdict appeared to manifest the will of the jury.10
In several respects, however, the defendant’s claim exposes questions related to the propriety ofthejury’s damage award. The court properly instructed the jury that ‘‘[i]njuries and losses for which the plaintiffshould be compensated include those it has suffered up to and including the present time, and those it is reasonably likely to suffer in the future as a proximate result of the defective product.’’ In this product liability action, the plaintiff reduced to exact figures the damages it sought. Thus, the plaintiff presented detailed evidence of the cost of repairs it had undertaken with regard to pools for which it sought the recovery of such costs. Likewise, the plaintiff presented evidence of what it would cost, at the time oftrial, to replace the pools for which it sought replacement costs. Additionally, the plaintiffpresentedevidence ofwhatitdeemedmiscellaneous costs related to the litigation. In argument, the plaintiffpresentedthese figurestothejuryasthe extent of its damages that were proven by the evidence. This
was not a case in which thejury was asked to consider
a type of injury for which neither the parties nor the court could readily suggest either an award ofdamages
or a method by which to calculate such damages.
The plaintiff asserts that the overall award of damages is proper because it nearly mirrored the grossamountofdamagesthatwerepermittedbythe evidence andsoughtbytheplaintiff. Theplaintiffdoesnotappear to suggest that the jury’s finding of damages for each pool is supported by the evidence. Instead, the plaintiff appears to invite us to disregard the finding ofdamages for each pool, as set forth in the completed interrogatories, and asks that we evaluate the verdict by looking to the overall award of damages. As stated previously in ourdiscussion, theplaintiffpositsthatthe completed interrogatories should be viewed as aharmless ‘‘mathematical shortcut’’ by which the jury apportioned its award of damages among the nineteen pools at issue. Contrary to the plaintiff’s arguments, there is no authority for the proposition that we should not interpret the jury’s interrogatories literally, that is, as an accurate reflection that thejury determined there to be and awarded the plaintiff $145,274.10 in damages for each pool. There is no basis in law for this court to disregard the jury’s findings therein as we undertake judicial review of the jury’s verdict. ‘‘[T]he purpose of interrogatories [is] to elicit a determination ofmaterial facts, [and] to furnish the means oftesting the correctness of the verdict rendered, and of ascertaining its extent.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted). Viera v. Cohen, 283 Conn. 412, 449–50, 927 A.2d 843 (2007). The assessment of damages was contested at trial, and the jury was called upon to set forth its findings as to the damages, ifany, relatedto eachpool. ‘‘Specialinterrogatories test the jury’s general verdict against its conclusions as to the ultimate controlling facts. Special questions are propounded to a jury to bring out some orall ofthe determinativefactswhichshouldbe considered in the formation of a jury’s general verdict. Such questions

. . . may show how closely, or otherwise, the jury has followed the trial court’s instructions

. . . .’’ (Footnotes omitted.) 75B Am. Jur. 2d 383 Trial § 1590 (2007). ‘‘Aspecialverdict, findingoranswermust be construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances. It is to be construed in the light of, and in connection with, the pleadings, the issue or question submitted, the instructions, jury interrogatories, and

. . . the evidence.’’ 89 C.J.S. Trials § 1177 (2012).
The record supports the plaintiff’s observation that, given the size of the jury’s award and the fact that it is
amere ten cents less thanthe gross amount ofdamages suggestedbytheplaintiff’sattorneyduringclosingargument, it appears that thejury awarded damages consistent with that gross damages figure and, as nearly as practicable, divided that figure by nineteen to arrive at its findings of damages for each pool. This is problematic for anumber ofreasons. First, such an approach to completing the interrogatories would have disregarded the court’s instructions thatthejuryfind damages separately for each pool and record its separate findings
on the interrogatory forms. Second, our review of the evidence doesnotexplain orsupportthejury’sidenticalfindings of damages for all nineteen pools, particularly where the plaintiff had carefully detailed in the course of argument what it believed to be the full extent ofits claimed and proven damages with regard to each pool. Third, the courtinstructedthejurythatlostprofitswere not a proper component of damages in this case, yet the gross amount of damages explicitly suggested by the plaintiff’s attorney included lost profits. Additionally, the gross damages figure suggested by the plaintiff’s attorney included miscellaneous expenses for which the jury, in its responses to the interrogatories, made a finding of zero dollars. Setting aside the impossibility of reconciling the amounts of damages awarded for the nineteen pools with the amounts sought by the plaintiff, the plaintiff suggests that thejury was not bound by the gross damages figure suggested by its attorney during argument, which, adjusted to exclude a claim for lost profits, was $2,365,562. In arguing that a higher gross damages award was not necessarily improper, the plaintiffrelies
on the principle, reflected in the court’s instructions, thatthe arguments ofcounsel are not evidence andthat the determination of damages is within the province of the jury. The fact remains, however, that with regard to six pools for which the plaintiff did not seek any future damages, the jury’s award exceeded the maximum award made possible by the evidence of past damages. For four of these pools, the parties had reached settlementspriorto trial andtheplaintiffasked only for the cost of prior repairs that had been undertaken, which, in each case, was far less than the $145,274.10awardedbythejury.11Withregardtoseveral other pools, the plaintiff sought future damages in the form of replacement costs, yet the amounts awarded exceeded the amounts sought by the plaintiff. At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence that the pools that needed to be replaced in the future could be replaced at the cost for which the plaintiff initially constructed the pools. Evidence of these costs was presented, yet
our review of such evidence does not shed light on or explainthejury’s uniformfindings ofdamages. Further,
as the defendant argues, this evidence appears to support an award of future damages that was less, not
more, than that suggested by the plaintiff’s counsel in argument. The plaintiff also presented evidence that it would cost an additional $25,000 to $35,000 to remove each of the damaged pools. Yet, the plaintiff suggests that the jury, having reviewed these materials in evidence, reasonably could have found that replacement costs actually exceeded these amounts. Insofar as the jury was bound to base its findings on the evidence, rather than speculation, such an argument is not persuasive. Here, there is no rational view of the evidence that supports the identical finding of damages with regard to each of the nineteen pools at issue. These findingsreflectthatthejurydidnotmakeanindependentassessment of damages with regard to each pool. Furthermore, the jury made a total award of damages that nearly matched the gross damages figure suggested by the plaintiff’s counsel before subtracting lost profits. For the reasons previously set forth, such an award is not supportedbythe evidence. The completedinterrogatories, as well as the overall amount of the award, undermine confidence in the manner in which thejury assessed damages overall; they reflect that the jury either failed or declined to follow the court’s instructions. For these reasons, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in failing to set aside the verdict solely as to the jury’s assessment of damages. See Schroeder v. Triangulum Associates, 259 Conn. 325, 332, 789 A.2d 459 (2002).
II Next, we address the defendant’s claimthatthe court improperlyawardedthe plaintiffpunitive damages. The defendant argues that: (1) the act does not contemplate
an award of punitive damages when a plaintiff’s cause of action is based on property damages only; (2) the evidence did not permit such an award in the present
case because there was no evidence that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or others who were injured by the Shotcrete; and (3) the amount of punitive damages awarded exceeded the maximum possible award of punitive damages that was supported by the evidence. We will address each aspect of the claim, in turn. A First, the defendant challenges the propriety of the award of punitive damages on the ground that the act does not contemplate an award of punitive damages when a plaintiff’s cause of action is based on property damages only. Furthermore, the defendant argues that,
even ifpunitive damages maybe awardedwhen aplaintiff’s cause ofactionisbased onpropertydamages only, such damages may be awarded only ifthere was a risk that consumers or others could sustain bodily injury by means of the defective product. The defendant’s arguments are not persuasive. General Statutes § 52-240b provides: ‘‘Punitive damages may be awarded if the claimant proves that the harm suffered was the result of the product seller’s reckless disregard for the safety ofproduct users, consumersorotherswhowereinjuredbytheproduct. Ifthe trieroffactdeterminesthatpunitive damages shouldbe awarded, the court shall determine the amount ofsuch damages not to exceed an amount equal to twice the damages awarded to the plaintiff.’’ Several statutorily defined words applicable to the act are relevant.

‘‘ ‘Harm’ includes damage to property, including the product itself, and personal injuries including wrongfuldeath. As between commercial parties, ‘harm’ does not include commercial loss.’’ General Statutes § 52-572m (d).12 A ‘‘ ‘[p]roduct liability claim’ includes all claims
oractionsbroughtforpersonalinjury, deathorproperty damage caused by the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, installation, testing, warnings, instructions, marketing, packaging or labeling of any product.

. . .’’ General Statutes § 52- 572m (b).
There is no dispute that the plaintiff’s cause ofaction is based on a claim of property damage. In rejecting the defendant’s interpretation ofthe act in its thorough memorandum of decision concerning punitive damages, the court reasoned that the legislature intended to permit an award of punitive damages in connection with product liability claims involving only property damage. The court relied on its interpretation of the relevant statutory language previously set forth, as well
as a Superior Court decision that reached the same legal conclusion, American Airlines, Inc

. v. National Automatic Products Co., 39 Conn. Supp. 269, 272, 477 A.2d 171 (1984).13
The issue presents a question ofstatutory interpretation that warrants our plenary review. See Felician Sisters ofSt. Francis of Connecticut, Inc

. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838, 847, 937 A.2d 39 (2008). ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.

. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in areasoned manner, the meaning ofthe statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question ofwhetherthe language actually does apply.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning ofsuch text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.

. . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7, 882 A.2d 597 (2005).
Like the trial court, we conclude that a fair reading ofthe governing statute, § 52-240b, in conjunction with the relevant definitional provisions expressly made applicabletothatstatute andpreviouslysetforth, yields
aplain and unambiguous interpretation that the statute permits an award of punitive damages in connectionwith aproduct liability claim involving damage to property only. The defendant goes on to argue that even if § 52-240b permits an award ofpunitive damages in the context of a claim based on property damage only, the text ofthe statute reflectsthat such damages mustarise in a case in which there was, in fact, arisk that product users, consumers, orothers could sustain bodilyinjury by means of the defective product. The defendant argues that, here, ‘‘the plaintiff

. . . presented no evidence that the safety of consumers was ever at risk or that injury to consumers was even a possibility.’’
The defendant’s argument is based on the language of § 52-240b, which provides: ‘‘Punitive damages may be awarded if the claimant proves that the harm suffered was the result of the product seller’s reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or others who were injured by the product.

. . .’’ (Emphasis added.) The defendant suggests that the use ofthe words ‘‘safety’’ and ‘‘injured’’ inthe statute reflect that, at the very least, the legislature intended to permit
an award of damages in cases in which bodily injury
was at risk. The defendant argues that, although there
was evidence of property damage, there was no evidence of a risk of bodily injury in the present case. Underthe circumstancesofthepresentcase, weneed not determine whetherthe defendant’s suggested interpretation of § 52-240b, requiring a risk ofbodily injury, is correct. To demonstrate reversible error, it is not enough for the defendant to demonstrate as a matter of law that punitive damages may be awarded only if there was a risk that product users, consumers, or others couldsustainbodilyinjurybymeans ofthe defective product. The defendantbears the burden ofdemonstrating that any claimed error in the court’s interpretation and application ofthe law affected the verdict returned in the present case. ‘‘Whether an error is harmful or harmless dependsuponwhetheritaffectedtheverdict.’’ Beinhorn v. Saraceno, 23 Conn. App. 487, 494 n.3, 582 A.2d 208 (1990), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 809, 585 A.2d 1233 (1991). Thus, to demonstrate reversible error, the defendant must demonstrate that the jury did not base or was precludedfrombasingits awardon afindingthatbodily injurywas at risk, but the record does not support such
an interpretation ofthejury’s findings. When the court instructed thejury concerning punitive damages under the act, it cannot be said to have limited the jury to consider either property damage or bodily injury. Instead, the court instructed the jury by referring to the statutory language of § 52-240b that, as previously discussed, refers to ‘‘the product seller’s reckless disregard for the safety ofproduct users, consumers or others who are injured by the product.’’14 The defendant did not file a request to charge related to the issue of punitive damages, did not take any exceptions to thecourt’s charge, and, on appeal, does not attempt to challenge thepropriety ofthe court’s charge. Moreover, the interrogatories presented to thejury did not require it to provide findings in this specific regard concerning the facts on which it based its punitive damage award.15 Thus, with regard to this discrete issue concerning the nature of the risk posed by the defendant’s product, thejuryreturnedwhatmaybe deemedageneralverdict. Consequently, the record does not provide a basis on which to determine whether or not the jury based its punitive damage award on a finding that bodily injury
was at risk. Because the record does not demonstrate that the verdict resulted from the issue that the defendant seeks to adjudicate on appeal, we need notresolve that issue.16 Additionally, contrary to the stated premise of the defendant’s argument, the evidence readily supported
afindingthatits defectiveproductriskedcausingbodily injury to product users. There was ample evidence of substantial cracking in various surface areas of pools that were constructed with Shotcrete manufactured by the defendant, suchasstairs, benches, swim outs, walls, and floors. The undisputed evidence reflects that the Shotcrete at issue was intended to be used in such recreationalswimmingpools, whichmade itreasonable to infer that persons were likely to come in contact with the various surface areas of the pools. The Shotcrete was delivered to the pool sites by the defendant. On the basis ofthis evidence, we readily conclude that the evidence reasonably supported afinding bythejury that the defendant had acted in reckless disregard of
aforeseeableriskthatothers couldsustainbodilyinjury by means ofthe defective Shotcrete. For the foregoing reasons, we concludethatthis aspect ofthe defendant’s claim is unavailing.
B Next, the defendant argues that the evidence did not permit an award of punitive damages in the present
case because there was no evidence that the defendant acted in reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or others who were injured by the Shotcrete. We disagree.
As previously stated in this opinion, thejury in completing its interrogatories made afinding that the plaintiffhadprovenby apreponderance ofthe evidence that the defendant acted with a reckless disregard for the safety ofproduct users, consumers or others who were injured by the product. In its memorandum of decision concerning punitive damages, the court observed that its role with regard to punitive damages was limited to determiningthe amountofthepunitive damages award. The court stated: ‘‘While thejuryfoundthatthe plaintiff

. . . had proven its entitlement to punitive damages, the amount itselfis aresponsibility and a duty reserved to the court.’’ Nonetheless, in its lengthy memorandumofdecision concerning punitive damages, the court did not merely address the defendant’s contention, discussedinpartIIAofthis opinion, thatpunitive damages
were not permitted as a matter of law and determine the amount of its damage award, but it purported to make findings concerning the conduct ofthe defendant
on the basis of the evidence presented at trial. Also, it did so after it had summarily denied the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict. Ultimately, the court concluded that ‘‘a reasonable person could readily arrive at the same conclusion [with respect to the issue ofpunitive damages as that] agreed upon by thisjury.’’
In this portion of its appeal, the defendant appears to focus on these findings made by the court, but also argues generally that the evidence, ‘‘at best demonstrates that the owners of [the defendant] may have been less involved in the day-to-day operations of [the defendant’s Shotcrete] facility than they might have been.’’ The defendant asserts that the plaintiff did not present evidence that it acted ‘‘more than negligently with respect to the operation ofthe plant and the delivery of the Shotcrete to the plaintiffs. As a result, the award of punitive damages should be set aside.’’
Insofar as this aspect ofthe defendant’s appeal challenges the propriety of the finding that it acted with
a reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or others who were injured by the defendant’s product, it essentially challenges the court’s denial of its motion to set aside the finding of thejury. The record of the trial proceedings reflects that the defendantraisedthe evidentiaryclaimhereininconnectionwiththatmotion. Althoughthe court, inthe context ofits memorandum ofdecision awarding punitive damages, referred to the propriety of that finding and the evidence that supported it, we will regard the claim as challenging the court’s summary denial of the motion to set aside the verdict. The applicable standard of review is set forth in part I of this opinion.
We conclude that the evidence supported the jury’s finding offact. The statute expresslyprovidesthatpunitive damages may be awarded ‘‘if the claimant proves that the harm suffered was the result of the product seller’s reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or others who were injured by the product.

. . .’’ General Statutes § 52-240b. With regard to the reckless disregard requirement, this court has stated: ‘‘As a general matter, [p]unitive damages

. . . are awarded when the evidence shows a reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation ofthose rights.

. . . In fact, the flavor ofthe basic requirement tojustify an award ofpunitive damages is described in terms ofwanton and malicious injury, evil motive and violence.

. . . In a products liability action, [p]unitive damages may be awarded ifthe claimant proves that the harm suffered was the resultofthe product seller’s reckless disregard for the safety ofproductusers, consumersorotherswhowereinjured by the product.

. . . As a general rule, punitive damages may be awarded only for outrageous conduct.

. . . The conduct must be outrageous, either because the defendant’sactsare donewithanevilmotive orbecause theyare done withreckless indifference to the interests ofothers.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ames v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 8 Conn. App. 642, 655, 514 A.2d 352, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 809, 515 A.2d 378 (1986). ‘‘The occasionforawardingpunitive damagesis quite different from that ofawarding compensatory damages under our long-standing rules governing the award of punitive damages.

. . . Punitive damages are awarded when the evidence shows areckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional or wanton violation of those rights.

. . . If awarded, they are restricted to cost of litigation less taxable costs of the action.

. . . Moreover, punitive damages generally have the flavor ofpunishment against a defendant for the quality ofhis conduct and of deterrence to a defendant or others against such conduct in the future.

. . . Such damages are, therefore, not doctrinally duplicative ofcompensatorydamages, butratherserve special, limitedpurposes otherthan compensation.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 212 Conn. 509, 532–33, 562 A.2d 1100 (1989).
The defendant suggests in argument that the jury’s findingisunsupportablebecausetherewasno evidence that it intentionally violated the plaintiff’s rights. Yet,
as previously stated, reckless disregard may be proven by evidence of conduct by a defendant that is outrageous because it was done with reckless indifference to the interests of others. There was ample evidence concerningthe defendant’sprincipals, employees, plant operations, procedures, equipment and methods of delivery. On the basis ofthe evidence presented attrial, thejuryreasonablycouldhavefoundthatthe defendant lacked trained employees and quality control procedures to produce and deliver quality Shotcrete consistently. The evidence supported a finding that persons in positions of control for the defendant even lacked a basic understanding of how Shotcrete was manufactured andwere seeminglyunconcerned eitherwithproducing a product that was manufactured and delivered according to industry standards or with how their pattern of conduct would negatively affect the interests of the consumers who purchased this critical building material from their company. In its decision concerning punitive damages, the court aptly discussed evidence that is relevant to our analysis. The court stated in relevant part: ‘‘Given [the] essential function for concrete in its several manifesta-tions, and the readily foreseeable damages wrought by defectively formulated and/or manufactured concrete, the court was surprised to learn during the course of the trial that some principals of the defendant

. . . demonstrated a cavalier or indifferent attitude toward their company’s product offered for sale. This attitude
was exemplified and borne out by the sworn testimony of some ofthe officers of [the defendant], Richard and Grace Vona, as well as Carlo Vona, each ofwhom professed ignorance in the key areas like the specifics of the concrete manufacturing process itself.’’
The court went on to observe: ‘‘John Kavanaugh was formerly employedas aconcrete batchmixerand delivery driver for [the defendant] after a short earlier stint working at Paramount Stone. He worked for the Vonas [at the defendant] for approximately two and one-half years. During that time, although not required by law, the defendant concrete plant never met the specifications for industry certification by the American Concrete Institute. Despite a trip to a Las Vegas concrete convention with Richard Vona, [a vice president ofthe defendant], and his attendance at two other classes, Kavanaugh did not consider himself properly trained
as a batch mixer by [the defendant]. Nonetheless, it became his job to ensure that the raw materials used in making Shotcrete were properly mixed in the defendant’s trucks. Kavanaugh testified to problems and shortcomings with the defendant’s equipment. These included the lack of a ‘moisture meter,’ which could accurately measure water content in the sand the company stored outdoors, and the lack of any drum counters, which measure the number ofrevolutions made by the rotating concrete drums of the defendant’s mixing trucks.17 Certain maintenance issues at the plant and with the concrete trucks also adversely affected the finished product sold by the defendant to the plaintiff. Thejury also heard deposition testimony of Steve Riviere, theformerpresidentof[the defendant], who lefthis job at the enterprise abruptly. It reinforced the picture painted by both Kavanaugh and the circumstantial evidence of a small, poorly run and poorly equipped companylacking quality control, adequate staffandtraining and equipment maintenance, leading to the delivery of
an inconsistent concrete product, all to the plaintiff’s detriment.

. . . ‘‘[Theevidencedemonstratedthat] [c]oncreteisproperly made with concrete sand, which is a sand formulated for concrete and containing three-eighths inch stone. However, Kavanaugh

. . . testified that [the defendant] also used masonry sand in its concrete mixes on a random basis, a sand which has a different granularityand consistency. Without otheradjustments to the mix, masonry sand and concrete sand therefore
are not interchangeable in Shotcrete, and Kavanaugh’s testimony was supported by the evidence, not only in thefaultsinthe cracked Shotcrete, butbythe defendantcompany’s owninternal documentation obtainedbythe plaintiff during discovery. A delivery ticket showed masonry sand delivered to [the defendant] on more than one occasion. In light of all the other evidence of defective Shotcrete, the jury obviously chose not to credit the defense explanation that this masonry sand
was actually delivered to Paramount Stone [which was located] across the street [from the defendant’s plant].’’
The court went on to observe, accurately, that the trial testimony of Richard Vona, the defendant’s vice president; Grace Vona, the defendant’s owner; and Carlo Vona, a longtime mason who had some involvement in the defendant and is married to Grace Vona,
was damaging to the defendant’s case. Richard Vona testified, in part, that after coming up with the idea to create the defendant company in 2003, he only visited the defendant’s plant on a couple of occasions and did not even discuss the operations of the company with others. Hetestifiedthathelackedabasicunderstanding ofhow Shotcrete was made. Despite evidence that she
was involved intimately inthe defendant’s finances, the defendant’s owner, Grace Vona, testified that she had
never visited the defendant’s plant and was unaware if the defendant ever was profitable. ‘‘The court is convinced, andthejurylikelybelieved, thatoncethe cracks in all the pools came to light, the Vonas were

. . . eager to distance themselves from their own concrete companyandwhatwent onthere as away ofdistancing themselves from any liability for the defendant’s defective Shotcrete, the Shotcretethatwentintothenineteen cracked pools built by the plaintiff. ‘‘The jury also heard testimony from Mel Thorne, who has served as the chief operating officer of [the defendant] since the 2009 departure of Steve Riviere. While not employed by the defendant at the time ofthe manufacture and sale of the defective Shotcrete used by the plaintiffin nineteen ofits pools, Thorne testified that he has been unable to verify the existence of any formal quality control process used by the defendant company during that time frame.’’
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, accurately set forth by the trial court, we readily conclude that the evidence reasonably permitted a finding that the defendant, through its officers and employees, acted in
an outrageous manner. The evidence showed that the defendantwas notmerelynegligent orinadvertentinits manufacturingprocess, butthatits business operations reflected a wholesale lack of concern for the interests of the purchasers of its product, which was a critical building material in pools. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s claim that the evidence did not permit a finding of reckless disregard on its part. C Last, as it did before the trial court, the defendantargues that the court’s punitive damage award was improper because it exceeded the amount of punitive damages that was supported by the evidence. We agree withthe defendantthatthe courtimproperly calculated punitive damages.
The court held a hearing on the matter of its award ofpunitive damages. At that hearing, the attorneys representing the plaintiff, Thomas P. O’Dea, Jr., and Raymond J. Plouffe, argued in support of an award of punitive damages in this case. Plouffe and O’Dea presented the court with affidavits concerning their attorney’s fees as well as redacted bills concerning legal services rendered in the course of their representation ofthe plaintiffin this matter. By way ofa supplemental affidavitconcerningattorney’sfees datedApril 15, 2011, O’Dea averred that he had expended 1360 hours on the present case. He stated: ‘‘My customary hourly rate for services rendered is $325.00. In this matter we agreed to a discounted rate of $150 per hour for my rate.’’ Additionally, he averred, in relevant part, that these figures did not include time expended after March 1, 2011, which was estimated to be twenty hours. There
was no objection to this submission, and the defendant did not dispute the accuracy of the representations therein.
In its memorandum of decision, the court found that attorney’sfeesattributableto Plouffe andanotherattorney associated with his law firm were $252,392.50. On appeal, the defendant does not challenge this finding. Withrespectto O’Dea, thecourtstated: ‘‘AttorneyO’Dea stated in his affidavit that his customary hourly rate for legal services is $325, and that in this matter he agreed with the plaintiffto a discounted rate of $150 per hour. However, this was a discount intended to inure to the benefit ofthe plaintiff, not the defendant. Forpurposes of this order, the court finds that counsel worked a minimum of 1360 hours on these cases, and the court also finds that the regular hourly rate of $325 for Attorney O’Dea’s services is both reasonable and appropriate. The attorney’s fees for Attorney O’Dea are therefore found to be $442,000.’’
The defendant asserts that the award of $442,000 cannot standbecause there was no evidence that O’Dea
ever charged the plaintiff this amount for attorney’s fees. Instead, the defendant argues, the evidence ‘‘supports at most an award of $204,000,’’ representing 1360 hours billed at the hourly rate that O’Dea represented he had billedthe plaintiff, $150 perhour. The defendant arguesthatthe court’sawardofmorethantheplaintiff’s actual litigation expenses exceeded a proper measure of punitive damages applicable in a case such as the present case and amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of its property in violation of the due process clause of the federal constitution.
In determining the proper method by which to calcu-late damages in the present case, the court observed that, beyond stating in § 52-240b that punitive damages ‘‘[shall] not

. . . exceed an amount equal to twice the damages awarded to the plaintiff,’’ the legislature did not provide a method by which to calculate such damages under the act. The court, relying on precedent including Lynn v. HaybusterMfg., Inc., 226 Conn. 282, 289–90, 627 A.2d 1288 (1993), Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 825–27, 614 A.2d 414 (1992), and Arnone v. Enfield, 79 Conn. App. 501, 521, 831 A.2d 260, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 932, 837 A.2d 804 (2003), reasoned that it was proper to follow the common-law rule limiting punitive damages to the plaintiff’s litigation expenses minus taxable costs. On appeal, neither party takes issue with the court’s legal determination that, faced with legislative silence
astothepropermethodofcalculatingpunitive damages under the act, it is appropriate to follow the commonlaw rule and award the plaintiff its litigation expenses, lesstaxable costs. Forthis reason, we do notadjudicate the issue.18 The issue, as framed by the defendant, is whetherthecourtproperlyassessedtheplaintiff’slitigation expenses in accordance with the evidence.
In determining whetherthe courtproperly calculated damages under the common-law rule, we begin by observing that in Berry v. Loiseau, supra, 223 Conn. 827, our Supreme Court, in upholding the viability of the common-law rule, stated: ‘‘In WaterburyPetroleum Products, Inc

. v. Canaan Oil&Fuel Co., [193 Conn. 208, 236, 477 A.2d 988 (1984)], we declined [an] invitation to stray from our well settled rule regarding the measurement ofpunitive damages. We affirmed the continuing viability of a long line of cases holding that common lawpunitive damagesserveprimarilyto compensatethe plaintiffforhisinjuriesand, thus, areproperlylimitedto the plaintiff’s litigation expenses less taxable costs

.

. . . We recognized, moreover, that our rule, when viewed in the light of the increasing costs of litigation, also serves to punish and deter wrongful conduct.

. . . In recent years, we have continued to adhere to the view that our traditional rule remains viable.

. . . We remain convinced that a rule limiting punitive damages awards to the expenses of litigation less taxable costs fulfills the salutary purpose of fully compensating a victim for the harm inflicted on him while avoiding the potential for injustice which may result from the exercise of unfettered discretion by ajury.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.); see also Anastasia v. General Casualty Co. ofWisconsin, 307 Conn. 706, 709n.2, 59A.3d207 (2013); Harty v. CantorFitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 96–97, 881 A.2d 139 (2005); Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 826 n.5, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). It is clear in our law that an award ofpunitive damages ‘‘cannot exceed the amount of the plaintiff’s expenses of litigation in the suit, lesshistaxablecosts.’’Hannav.Sweeney, 78Conn.492, 494, 62 A. 785 (1906); see also Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 378, 42 A. 67 (1899) (plaintiff’s expenses limit amount of punitive damages which can be awarded).
In the present case, the court was presented with evidence of the plaintiff’s litigation expenses. With regard to the expenses related to O’Dea, which are the subjectofthisclaim, O’Deamadeavermentsconcerning the number ofhours that he had worked on the present
case (1360 hours) as well as the hourly rate at which he had agreed to perform legal services for the plaintiff ($150 per hour). O’Dea submitted redacted bills related to the 1360 hours in legal services rendered by him. He averred that, with regard to these bills, the Scottsdale Insurance Company had paid $130,727.99 in fees and his firm was owed $48,337.91 in fees from either the Scottsdale Insurance Company or the plaintiff.
The court properly stated that it was permitted to award punitive damages limited to the plaintiff’s litigation expenses, less costs. Yet, the court went on to undertake an independent assessment of the value of O’Dea’sfees, atype ofinquirythatisappropriatewhena court is authorized to award statutory attorney’s fees.19 Thus, it based its award on a lodestar calculation and considerations related thereto. See Ernst v. Deere & Co., 92 Conn. App. 572, 576, 886 A.2d 845 (2005).20
The court’s award, therefore, cannot be upheld as being limited to the plaintiff’s litigation expenses. It is clear from the evidence presented to the court that the plaintiff’s expenses were limited to the fees it incurred pursuant to its agreement with O’Dea, namely, fees billed at an hourly rate of $150. It was contrary to the evidence for the court to award the plaintiff litigation expenses billed at $325 an hour. Accordingly, we reverse the award of punitive damages and, as part of the proceedings on remand, orderthe courtto consider the plaintiff’s litigation expenses in accordance with the foregoing analysis.21 Additionally, we note that of the 1360 hours of legal services rendered by O’Dea in the present case as of thetime ofthepunitive damageshearing, O’Deaaverred that the Scottsdale Insurance Company (Scottsdale) hadpaidsome ofthefeesandthatthe companypossibly owed him more fees. In its memorandum of decision, the court referred to the legal fees incurred by the plaintiff in defending ‘‘four other civil suits brought against it by its customers,’’ and determined that such fees hadbeenproximately causedbythe defendant and should be borne by the defendant as punitive damages in this case. Yet, the court neither referred specifically to Scottsdale nor set forth clear findings concerning how the services rendered by O’Dea for which he was paid orexpectedto bepaidby Scottsdale were incurred in connection with the prosecution ofthe present case. Because we remand the case for a new hearing beforethe court to reassess the amount ofthe plaintiff’s punitive damages, the court, on remand, must revisit the issue and make appropriate findings concerning the legal services for which fees were incurred by Scottsdale and determine whether the fees associated with such servicesproperlymaybe includedinthe plaintiff’s litigation expenses in the present case. The judgment is affirmed with respect to the jury’s findings that the defendant is liable for violating the act and that the plaintiffis entitled to punitive damages under the act. The judgment is reversed with respect to the jury’s award of compensatory damages and the trial court’s award of punitive damages. The case is remanded for a hearing in damages before a jury—or before the court, ifthe parties agree to waive a hearing before ajury—ontheplaintiff’s claimfor compensatory damages, and for a separate hearing, to be held before the trial court, to determine, in accordance with this opinion, the award of punitive damages to which the plaintiff is entitled under the act.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff’s original complaint, dated May 21, 2009, and its amended complaint, dated February 14, 2011, were brought solely against Paramount Concrete, Inc. Thejudgment from which Paramount Concrete, Inc., appeals

was rendered solely against Paramount Concrete, Inc. During the course of the litigation, the trial court consolidated this action with other actions that

were brought against the plaintiff by other parties, namely, homeowners seeking damages arisingfrom defective swimmingpools. The recordreflects that settlements were reached inthose otheractionspriorto the commencement of the trial. Because Paramount Concrete, Inc., is the only defendant inthis appeal, werefertothatpartyasthe defendantthroughoutthisopinion.

2 We conclude inpartI B ofthis opinionthatthejury’s award ofcompensatory damages must be set aside. We are not persuaded, however, that the jury’s error in awarding damages affects or calls into doubt the propriety ofits findings concerning liability orpunitive damages. Accordingly, inparts I A and II B of this opinion, we consider and reject the defendant’s claims concerningthosefindingsmade bythejury. Asidefromthe issue ofdamages,

our remand order does not implicate those findings made by the jury. Thejury’s errorin awarding compensatory damages does notrequire usto setasidethecourt’sdeterminationthatpunitivedamageswereappropriatein the present case. In part II A of this opinion, we uphold that aspect of the trial court’s judgment. In part II C of this opinion, however, we agree with the defendant that the court improperly calculated the punitive damage award. Accordingly, we will remandthe case to the trial courtwith direction that it reassess the amount ofpunitive damages consistent with this opinion and General Statutes § 52-240b following the hearing in damages.
3 Consistent with its special defenses, the defendant attempted to prove, among other things, that the plaintiff arranged for delivery ofthe Shotcrete under conditions that reduced its strength and usefulness; added water to the Shotcrete afterit was delivered, such that it could not function properly; utilized persons who did not apply the Shotcrete appropriately; and failed to utilize a sufficient quantity of steel in the construction of the pools at issue, such that the Shotcrete did not function in the manner for which it

was intended.

4 Although the plaintiff, in its complaint, alleged damages with regard to seventeenpools, attrial,theplaintiffpresentedevidenceandsoughtdamages with regard to nineteen pools. The disparity is not an issue in this appeal.

5 Withregardto the nineteenpools atissue, the dollaramounts ofdamages sought by the plaintiff varied significantly. The amounts of past damages ranged from zero dollars to $138,763.89. The amounts offuture damages ranged from zero dollars to $293,660. The total damages amounts ranged from $17,297.19 to $306,563.81

6 The court found that the plaintiff incurred attorney’s fees totaling $694,392.50.7 Attrial, thepoolsatissuewereidentifiedasbeinglocatedat 19 Deerwood Lane, Westport; 917 Merwins Lane, Fairfield; 220 Greenfield Hill Road, Fairfield; and 62 Weston Road, Westport.
8 At trial, the pools at issue were identified as being located at 220 Greenfield Road, Fairfield; 17 Apple Tree Lane, Darien; 19 Deerwood Lane, Westport; and 917 Merwins Lane, Fairfield.
9 At trial, the pools at issue were identified as being located at 17 Joanne Lane, Weston; 17 Twelve O’Clock Road, Weston; 47 Appletree Lane, New Canaan; and 9 Marc Lane, Westport.
10 ‘‘Subjectto the provisions ofSection 16-17, thejudicial authority shall, if theverdictisin orderandistechnicallycorrect, acceptitwithout comment.’’ Practice Book § 16-31.

11 As supported by the evidence, the plaintiff argued for an award of $40,765.08 for 17 Joanne Lane, Weston; $34,596.08 for 17 Twelve O’Clock Road, Weston; $49,622.43for47Appletree Lane, New Canaan; and $67,938.14 for 9 Marc Lane, Westport.

12 ‘‘Commercial loss’’ does not include costs incurred by a commercial party in repairing damage to property caused by a defective product, nor is it limited to property owned by the party seeking to recover under the act. See Sylvan R. Shemitz Designs, Inc

. v. Newark Corp., 291 Conn. 224, 240–41, 967 A.2d 1188 (2009).

13American Airlines, Inc., was cited approvingly in Ames v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 8 Conn. App. 642, 655, 514 A.2d 352, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 809, 515 A.2d 378 (1986).

14 The courtstatedinrelevantpart: ‘‘Now, inadditionto seekingcompensatory damages, the plaintiff seeks an award of punitive damages. Punitive damages are damages awardednotto compensate the plaintiffforanyinjury

or losses, but to punish the defendant for outrageous conduct and to deter it and others like it from similar conduct in the future. ‘‘Punitive damagesmaybeawardedforconductthatisoutrageousbecause of the defendant’s reckless indifference to the rights of others or an intentional and wanton violation of those rights. ‘‘You may award punitive damages only if you unanimously find from facts established by a preponderance of the evidence that the conduct of the defendant was, in fact, outrageous. ‘‘The law does not require you to award punitive damages. It is instead

a matter for your sound discretion. An award of punitive damages or any award ofdamages, forthatmatter, mustnotreflectbias, prejudice orsympathywith respect to anyparty. It must instead be fairlybased on the evidence in this case. ‘‘Pursuant to statute, punitive damages may be awarded in a Product Liability Act case ifthe plaintiffproved by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the harm suffered was the result of the product seller’s reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or others who are injured by the product. ‘‘If the jury determines that punitive damages should be awarded, the court in its discretion shall determine the actual amount of such damages in an amount not to exceed twice the damages awarded to the plaintiff. ‘‘You should consider the reprehensibility ofthe defendant’s conduct and the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff, and you must unanimously find it necessary for achieving the objectives of punitive damages that I have described.’’

15 The interrogatory states: ‘‘Has the plaintiff R.I. Pools, Inc., proven by a preponderance of the evidence its entitlement to punitive damages in that you find that the defendant Paramount Concrete, Inc., acted with a reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers or others who were injured by the product? (Ifyou find for the plaintiff as to punitive damages, the court will determine the amount of any award).’’ The jury responded to this interrogatory by inscribing a check mark on the line marked ‘‘Yes.’’

16 ‘‘In a typical general verdict rule case, the record is silent regarding whether the jury verdict resulted from the issue that the appellant seeks to have adjudicated.

. . . Under the general verdict rule, if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and [the party raising a claim of error on appeal did not request] interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party.

. . . Thus, in a
case in which the general verdict rule operates, ifany ground for the verdict is proper, the verdict must stand; only if every ground is improper does the verdict fall.

. . . Even in a case with a single count complaint, the general verdict rule applies when reliance is placed upon grounds of action

. . . which are distinct, not because they involve specific sets of facts forminga part ofthe transaction but in the essential basis of the right replied upon

. . . . [T]he general verdict rule would apply in a case in which a single count of a complaint alleged both wanton misconduct and negligence.

. . . The applicability ofthe general verdict rule does not depend on the niceties ofpleadingbutonthedistinctnessandseverabilityofthe claimsanddefenses raised at trial.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Konesky v. Post Road Entertainment, 144 Conn. App. 128, 132–33, 72 A.3d 1152, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 915, 76 A.3d 630 (2013).

17 There was evidence presented attrialthatsuch qualitycontrolmeasures
were integral to the proper manufacture and delivery of Shotcrete.

18 We observe, however, that there is no binding precedent on the issue of whether the common-law punitive damages rule applies to an award of statutory punitive damages under § 52-240b. See Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., United States District Court, Docket No. 3:06cv1768 (SRU) (D. Conn. February 14, 2014) (order certifying question to Connecticut Supreme Court).

19 See, e.g., General Statutes § 52-240a, which permits an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a product liability action upon a finding by the court that a claim or defense made in connection with such action is frivolous. The court was not asked to award such fees in the present case, and it did not rely on § 52-240a in its award of damages.
20 ‘‘[T]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorney’s fee is properly calculated by multiplying the number ofhours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.

. . . The courts may then adjust this lodestar calculation by other factors.

. . . For guidance in adjusting attorney’s fees, Connecticut courts have adopted the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974). The Johnson factors are (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty ofthe questions, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legalserviceproperly, (4)thepreclusionofotheremploymentbytheattorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee for similar work in the community, (6) whetherthefeeisfixedorcontingent, (7)timelimitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys, (10) the undesirability of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client and (12) awards in similar cases.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ernst v. Deere & Co., supra, 92 Conn. App. 576; see also Laudano v. New Haven, 58 Conn. App. 819, 822–23, 755 A.2d 907 (2000).

21 In light of the foregoing, we agree with the defendant that the court violated notions of basic due process by awarding punitive damages far in

excess of the attorney’s fees incurred by the plaintiff. It appears from the record that the defendant lacked fair notice that the court could impose an award that exceeded that permitted under the common law.