Filed 12/16/13 Avetisyan v. Nat. S pecialty Ins. C o. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b) . This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

ARTAK AVETISYAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

NATIO NAL SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent. B245738
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC467133)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ronald
M. Sohigian, Judge. Revers ed. Jeffrey Ko rn for Plaintif

f and Appellant. Law Offices of Adrienne D. Cohen, Adrienne D. Cohen and Philip G. Dorn for Defendant and Respondent.

____________ __ ________2 INTRODUCTION

P laintiff Artak Avet i s yan appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court

gr anted a motion by defendant National Specialty Insurance Company (National) for summary judgment

. Avetisyan argues that the trial court err ed in granting summary judgment because whether National’s handling of his uninsured motorist claim breached the imp lied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a question of fact . We agree and

reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A

. Avetisyan ’ s A ccident and Uninsured Motorist Claim On May 4, 2009 Avetisyan suffered severe head injuries when he lost contro l of the car he was driving, and the car went over the side of the freeway and rolled down an
embankment. On June 16, 2009 Avetisyan made a claim with his insurer
, National
, under his uninsured motorist coverage for $60,000, the policy ’ s limit for that co verage. 1 Avetisyan claimed that the cause of the accident was another vehicle that hit him fr om behind and then drove away.

B. The A ccident and Medical Report s Officer James Oberlander arrived a t the accident scene and subsequently prepared
a traffic c ollision report. Officer Oberlander wrote in his report that, during an interview

1 Avetisyan’s business auto policy included $60,000 in coverage for

“ uninsured/underinsured motorists .” The d efinition of an “ uninsured motor vehicle ” included “ a land motor vehicle or t railer ” that “ is a hit

- and

- run vehicle and neither the driver nor owner can be identified. The vehicle must make physical contact with an

‘ insured ’, a covered ‘ auto ’ or a vehicle an ‘ insured ’ is ‘ occupying ’

. . . . ” The policy provided that disagreements regarding a claim would be settled by arbitration, initi ated by either party.3

with Avetisyan at the hospital, Avetisyan “ related he simultaneously felt an impact from
the rear and on the left side of his vehi cle

. . . . [H]e lost control of his vehicl e but doesn ’ t remember anything else. ” Officer Oberlander , who did not see the accident, wrote in his report that he “ was unable to substantiate if [Avetisyan ’ s car] was hit by any vehicle before or after [Avetisyan] lost control. ” O fficer Oberlander als o wrote in his report that Avetisyan “ lost control of [his car] as a result of making an unsafe turning movement t o the right for unknown reasons

. ” On the traffic collision coding page of the report, the
officer marked an “ x ” by “ L Uninvolved Vehicle
, ” an d wrote that Avetisyan “ caused this collision by driving in violation of [Vehicle Code section] 22107 [] , which states[:] no person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course or move right or left upon a roadway until
such movement can be made with reasonabl e safety

. . . . ” The officer stated that his

summary of the accident and conclusions “ were determined by the damage to the
involved vehicle and statements obtained. ” The accident report included summaries of statements by f our witnesses who spoke with O fficer Oberlander. None of the witnesses reported seeing another vehicle hit Avetisyan ’ s car. Officer Oberlander reported that w itness Craig Walendy told him a t the
scene that “ he did not see any vehicles affect [ Avetisyan ’ s car] prior to the collision. ” Officer Oberlander reported that he also spoke later on the phone with witnesses Tamara Levy, Michelle Castro, and Andrea Goldman. Officer Oberlander wrote that Levy told
him that “ she first heard a ‘ thunk ’ and then saw [Avetisyan ’ s car] come across lan es [and
she ] hit her brakes to avoid colliding into the [car] as it crossed her path. ” He also wrote
that Goldman told him that she “ was driving in the #3 lane

. . . behind [ Avetisyan ’ s car] that was in the #2 lane. [She] related it looked like the drive r of [ Avetisyan ’ s car] got

‘ spooked ’ and then swerved to the right. [The car ] began fishtailing side to side, possibl[y] hit a car in the #1 lane and then went across all lanes to the right. [Goldman] related it appeared to be [ Avetisyan ’ s] own fault. ” And he wrote that Castro told him that

“ she observed [ Avetisyan ’ s car] in the #1 lane begin skidding across all lanes to the right.

. . . [S]he did not see any vehicle affect the [car] prior to it losing control. ”4

One of the physicians who treated Avetis yan at the hospital prepared a medic a l report. The “H istory ” section of the report stated: “ The patient

. . . was the restrained driver of a Lincoln town car that was involved in a high

- speed solo spin out with rollover. According to law enforcement aut horities, the vehicle rolled over several times before coming to rest.

. . . T he patient

. . . was conscious when paramedics arrived

. . . . Nevertheless, his level of consciousness was altered.

. . . He seemed relatively
confused

. ”

C

. National Denie s Avetisyan ’ s Claim ; Avetisyan Prevails in the Arbitration On approximately June 16, 2009 Avetisyan sent a letter to National demanding payment of the $60,000 uninsured motorist benefits. On th e basis of Officer
Oberlander ’ s accident report and the physi cian ’ s medical report
, National , through its third party administrator Knight Management Insuranc e Services, LLC (Knight), denied Avetisyan ’ s uninsured motorist claim “ since there was a genuine dispute between the claimant and the insurance company as to w hether the claimant ’ s vehicle was struck by
another vehicle

. . . . ” On August 7, 2009 Eric Cervantes, a claims representative at Knight, wrote to counsel for Avetisyan: “ Please be advised that Knight Management Insurance Services, LLC has completed its investigation in regard s to the matter

. . . . Based on our investigation, we have determined that your client was not involved in a collision with another vehicle but lost control and collided into the freeway guardrail.
This letter will serve as a form al denial of liability of your client ’ s claim for Uninsured Motorist coverage. ”
O n October 27, 2009 Avetisyan , this time through counsel, again demanded the $60,000 uninsured motorist policy limit or in the alternative demand ed arbitration. On
December 2 1, 2010 t he parties participated in a formal arbitration hearing

. The arbitrator
issued an award in Avetisyan ’ s favor for $60,000 , the policy limit for uninsured motorist
benefits. National paid the amount promptly.5

D

. Avetisyan Files This Action
On A ugust 8, 2011 Avetisyan filed this a ction against National and Knight alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 2 Avetisyan alleged that a vehicle hit hi s car and then “ fled the scene and was
never ident ified

. . . . ” Avetisyan alleged that there was “ [s]ubstantial evidence available to [National and Knight] during the time period May 4, 2009 to August 7, 2009 indicating that the probable cause of the accident was a hit and run vehicle impacting [his] ve hicle, ” that “ [c]ontact information for the several witnesses

. . . was readily available to [National and Knight] but [National and Knight] made no effort to contact or interview the witnesses, ” and that had National and Knight “ conducted an appropriate
i nvestigation, they in fact would have confirmed [Avetisyan] was entitled to benefits. ” Avetisyan alleged that National denied him benefits “ with no investigation into the facts
of the incident ” and “ based on a policy of denying benefits so that its insure ds would give up their claims regardless of merit
, ” and as part of a pattern and practice of deman d ing arbitration rather than timely investigating and paying meritorious claims

. Avetisyan alleged that National “ knew that [he] was in a vulnerable position , injured and unable to work, and would have difficulty obtaining the money necessary to investigate and pursue his claim and gain policy benefits. ” National ’ s answer asserted several affirmative
defense s, including that there was a genuine dispute “ as to whether there was any contact between the vehicle [ Avetisyan ] was d r iving and an alleged phantom vehicle, ” and that
National “ was justified in taking the position that it did based upon the advice of
counsel. ”
National filed a motion for summary judgment or in the alternative for summary adjudication on the grounds that there was a genuine dispute whether Avetisyan ’ s claim was covered and that National had relied on the advice of counsel in denying Avetisyan ’ s

2 Knight is not a party to this appeal.6

claim and recommending arbitration

. 3 Nationa l submitted the declaration of Warren

“ Chip ” Dean , an insurance defense lawyer who had “ handled over 100 Uninsured or Underinsured Motorist Claims in [his] career. ” Avetisyan submitted the declaration of
Richard Masters
, an expert in the insurance industr y

. National filed evidentiary objections to Masters ’ declaration. At the hearing on the summary judgment motion the court sustained most of
National ’ s evidentiary objections to Masters ’ declaration. The trial court then granted
National ’ s motion, statin g : “ My view is that

. . . , there is no triable issue of material fact concerning whether there was a genuine dispute as to the existence of liability or coverage liability.

. . . Both the tort and contract causes of action arise out of the same
behavior by [ National ]. ” “ [Avetisyan] claims he was struck by another vehicle. The traffic collision report, which appeared to com b ine the observation[s] of numerous
witnesses and included the officer ’ [s ] conclusion that it was a single vehicle accident.
The fi ndings of that

. . . report appeared to me to hold up or stick together under scrutiny during the deposition of the

. . . officer and the witnesses. The reasoning or conclusion of
the

. . . report obviously is not dispositive.

. . . [T]he question is whe ther that was

3 National moved for summary judgment and summary adjudication pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision ( o )(2), on the ground that its affirmative defenses of genuine dispute and advice of counsel barred Avetisyan’s bad faith cause of action, and pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision ( o )(1), on the ground that Avetisyan could not establish the element of breach of his bad faith cause of action. The existence of a genuine dispute and the reliance on the advice of counsel are ways of showing that an insurer’s conduct was reasonable. (See Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co

. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 723 [genuine dispute rule is a “close corollary” of the principle that “an insurer’s denial of or delay in paying benefits gives rise to tort damages only if the insured shows the denial or delay was unreasonable”]; F

EI Enterprises, Inc. v. Yoon (2011) 194 Ca l.App.4th 790, 804 [“the genuine dispute doctrine is ‘subsumed within the concept of what is reasonable and unreasonable’”]; Croskey et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group 2012) ¶

¶ 12: 837, 12:837.1 , p p. 12C

- 8, 12C

- 9 (rev. # 1 2 013) [“[g]enuine dispute doctrine” is “[p]art of ‘reasonableness’ analysis” and “one way” the insurer can go “forward with evidence negating ‘unreasonableness’”].)7

sufficient for [ National ] to have been reasonable in its behavior because of the existence of a good faith, reasonably positioned dispute. It did.

. . . It turned out to be unmeritorious, but it was not unreasonable , and it does not cancel the existence of a good faith dispute which I think existed on this record. ”
The trial court entered j udgment in favor of National on October 16, 2012. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Avetisyan contends that the trial court erred in ruling tha t National ’ s investigation
and denial of his claim w ere reasonable as a matter of law, and that therefore National

was not entitled to summary judgment . We agree that the reasonableness of National ’ s conduct in this case is a factual issue that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.

A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court ’ s order granting a motion for summary judgment “ de novo, liberally construing the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolving doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. ” ( State of California v.
Allstate Ins. Co. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1008, 1017

- 1018; Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 499; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826 , 8 43 .) Code of Civil
Procedure section 437c, su bdivision (c), provides that a “ motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ” (See
Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (20 09 ) 47 Cal.4th 610, 618 [court may grant a summary judgment motion only “ if no triable issues of material fact appear ” ] ; Aguilar
, supra , at
p. 843 .) A moving defendant “‘ bears the burden of showing the court that the plaintiff “ has

not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish, ” ’ the elements of his or her cause of action. [Citation.] ” ( Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. , supra , 42 Cal.4th at8

p. 720; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. ( o ) & (p) (1 ) .) If the defendant meets this initial burden, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists. ( S ee Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2) ; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
, supra , 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 .) “ When a defendant moves for su mmary judgment on the ground there is an affirmative defense to the action, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show there is one or more triable issues of material fact regarding the defense after the defendant meets the burden of establishing all the e lements of the affirmative defense. ” ( Jessen v. Mentor Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1484.) “ There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the p arty opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. ” ( Aguilar
, supra , at p. 850, fn. omitted

. ) “ Where the evidence submitted by a moving defendant does not support judgment in his favor, the court must deny the motion without lo oking at the opposing evidence, if any, submitted by the plaintiff. ” ( Y.K.A. Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San Jose (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 339, 354.)

B

. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
“I mplied in every contrac t is a covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. ” ( PPG Industries, Inc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 310, 314; accord, Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 720; Brehm v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2008)
166 Cal. App.4th 1225, 1235.) If an insurer “‘ unreasonably and in bad faith withholds payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject to liabilit y in tort ’” for breach of the implie d covenant. ( Wilson
, supra , at p. 720; accord
, PPG Industries, Inc.
, supra , at
p. 315 ; Howard v. American National Fire Ins. Co. (20 10) 187 Cal.App .4th 498, 524.)

“ Before an insurer can be found to have acted in bad faith for its delay or denial in the p ayment of policy benefits, it must be shown that the insurer acted unreasonably or without proper cause

. ” ( Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1072.)

“‘ [A] n insurer denying or delaying the payment of policy benefits due to the existe nce of9

a genuine dispute with its insured as to the existence of coverage liability or the amount
of the insured ’ s coverage claim is not liable in bad faith even though it might be liable for
breach of contract. ’ [Citation.] ” ( Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. , supra , 42 Cal.4th at

p. 723; Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335, 347.) In addition, if an insurer reasonably relied on the sound advice
of competent counsel in determining to delay or deny a claim, the insurer may not be liable for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ( State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 721, 725.) “‘[ T ] he reasonableness of an insurer ’ s claims

- handling conduct is ordinarily a question of fact
, ’ ” except in the “ exceptional instance when ‘ only one reasonable
inference can be drawn from the evidence. ’ [Citation.] ” ( Lee v. Fidelity Nat ional Title
Ins. Co. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 58 3 , 5 99 ; see Nieto v. Blue Shield of C alifornia Life &
Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 86 ; Brehm v. 21st Century Ins. Co.
, supra , 166 Cal. App.4th at p. 1241, fn. 8 [ “ the question whether an insurer unreasonably withheld benefits due under the policy in a first party coverage context

. . . is ordinarily an issue to be determined by the trier of fact ” ] .) An insurer is not entitled to judgment as
a matter of law on a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where, viewing the evidence in the lig ht most favorable to the plaintiff, a jury could conclude the insurer acted unreasonably. ( Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co.
, supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 724 ; accord, McCoy v. Progressive West Ins. Co. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 785, 794 .)

C. Whether National Act ed R easonably in Denying Avetisyan ’ s Claim Is a Question of Fact for the Jury Avetisyan contends that, under the circumstances of this case, whether National ’ s denial of his claim was reasonable is a factual issue for the jury

. Avetisyan argues that
Na tional failed to conduct a full, fair
, and thorough investigation of all factual bases of
hi s claim, failed to consult counsel prior to denying the claim, and failed to treat hi s interests with the same consideration National gave to its i nterests

. Nation al argue s that10

the undisputed evidence shows that its action was reasonable because there was a g enuine
factual dispute over whether another car hit Avetisyan’s car and because National relied
on advice of counsel. Although the implied covenant of good fa ith an d fair dealing does not require an insurer “ to pay every claim its insured makes, the insurer cannot deny the claim ‘ without fully investigating the grounds for its denial. ’ [Citation.] ” ( Wilson v. 21st Century Ins.
Co. , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p p. 72 0

- 721 ; see Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24
Cal.3d 809
, 818

- 819.) “ Among the most critical factors bearing on the insurer ’ s good faith is the adequacy of its investigation of the claim. ” ( Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative
Products Sales & Marketi ng, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 879.) “ The genuine dispute rule does not relieve an insurer from its obligation to thoroughly and fairly investigate, process and evaluate the insured ’ s claim. ” ( Wilson
, supra , at p. 723; accord, Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. AMZ Ins. Services, Inc. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 401, 428; see Brehm v. 21st Century Ins. Co.
, supra , 166 Cal. App.4th at p. 1238 [ “ an important limitation on the genuine dispute rule ” is that the insurer must still thoroughly investigate the claim] .) “ T he insurer cannot claim a ‘ genuine dispute ’ regarding coverage in such cases because, by failing to investigate, it has deprived itself of the ability to make a fair
evaluation of the claim. ” ( Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co.
, supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072 .)
Whether an insurer ’ s investigation was reasonable depends on the circumstances. (See
Wilson
, supra , at p. 723 [ “ [a]n insurer ’ s good or bad faith must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding its actions ” ]; Bosetti v. Unit ed States Life
Ins. Co. in City of New York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1237 [ “ delay or denial of policy benefits[] must be ‘ founded on a basis that is reasonable under all the
circumstances ’” 

### ] .) An insurer’s investigation can be unreasonable because it is limited to one or two

sources of information about the claim and does not include a review of other available
information . For example, in Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1617, the insurer claimed that its investigation was reasonable because it had

“ obtained every writing in existence ” describing the event giving rise to the claim. ( Id. at11

p. 1624.) The court disagreed, stating that the insurer “ did not fulfill its duty to obtain the readily available statements of all th e percipient witnesses ” or to contact the insured ’ s treating physician. ( Ibid. ) “ Instead of considering all the evidence available to it with a view towards coverage, ” the insurer relied on one document (a death certificate stating
the cause of deat h). ( Id. at p. 1625; see Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co.
, supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 721 [summary judgment for insurer was inappropriate because a jury could find the
insurer ’ s exclusive reliance on a medical report and claims examiner ’ s opinion was an unreasonab le investigation]; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.
, supra , 24 Cal.3d at p. 819 [ investigation of the claim was unreasonable because the insurer failed to consult
with the insured ’ s physicians or obtain an independent medical examination ] ; Bosetti v.
Unite d States Life Ins. Co. in City of New York
, supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 123 7 [ “ [a]n insurer cannot claim the benefit of the genuine dispute doctrine based on an investigation
or evaluation of the insured ’ s claim that is not full, fair and thorough ” ]; Jord an v. Allstate
Ins. Co. , supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072 [summary judgment was improper where
there were factual issue s regarding the reasonableness of the insurer ’ s limited investigation] .) Here, National relied solely on the accident report by Officer Oberlander and the medical report by an emergency room physician, without further investigation, to deny Avetisyan ’ s claim. The accident report , however, was the product of one person, Officer Oberlander, who was not present at the time of the accident. The accident report included conflicting information about whether another vehicle was involved in the
accident

. The report included a statement by Avetisyan, who was present at the time of
the accident
, that there was another car involved in the acciden t that hit his car and
caused h im to lose control. Although the officer wrote that he thought it was a single

vehicle accident caused by Avetisyan making an unsafe turning movement , he also included the qualifier that he was unable to substantiate if Avet isyan ’ s car was hit by
another vehicle. In addition, a lthough none of the four witnesses whose hearsay statements Officer Oberlander included in his report saw another vehicle hit Avetisyan ’ s

car, one of the witnesses (Levy) told the officer that she hear d a sound (a “ thunk ” ) that12

could indicate a collision with another car. The medical report, written by an emergency

room physician who also did not witness the accident and who reported that it “ was difficult to obtain [a] history from the patient initial ly due to his confusion
, ” does not

s tate how or from whom the doctor obtained the information in the report about the
accident

. The doctor a lso acknowledged that Avetisyan was confused
, had an altered
level of consciousness , and “ was oriented to his name but did not give reproducible answers with respect to his age or the date

. ”
National ’ s decision to deny Avetisyan ’ s claim based on the conflicting
information in a single police report and the conclusion s of two people who were not witness es to the accide nt is not enough to show that National ’ s investigation was complete, thorough, and reasonable as a matter of law. National did not present any evidence that it made any efforts to contact any of the four witnesses to the accident
, Officer Oberlander, or e ven Avetisyan, to obtain any additional information. In particular, National did not take any steps to follow up on Levy ’ s statement about the
loud “ thunk ” o r inquire about whether the witnesses were even in a position to see
whether another car collided with Avetisyan ’ s car. National did not contact Castro, who subsequently testified in a deposition in connection with the arbitration : “I did see .

. . a large SUV, I don’t know if it was a Lincoln or a Navigator, a black SUV, that was in the
first lane n ear the center divider, near [Avetisyan’s] car.

. . . He must have been behind, I think. I’m not sure. But I remember as soon as the car started rolling I did notice that black large SUV, either a Lincoln or a Navigator, right in that lane.
National di d not even speak with or interview Avetisyan to ask about the impact
he said he felt, why he believed another car had hit him on the freeway, or even to evaluate Avetisyan ’ s credibi li ty and make an informed decision about whether he was telling the truth. National admitted in discovery responses that it did not interview anyone or obtain any statements regarding Avetisyan ’ s claim. Indeed, the evidence showed that National did not do anything to investigate Avetisyan ’ s claim other than
have one claims repr esentative and his supervisor read two reports by individuals with second and third hand knowledge. This is not one of those “ exceptional ” situations13

where a court can conclude that the insurer ’ s investigation was reasonable as a matter of
law. ( Lee v. F idelity Nat. Title Ins. Co.
, supra , 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 5 99 ; see Frommoethelydo v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1986) 42 Cal.3d 208, 220 [insure r breached implied covenant where it “ failed to investigate

. . . after

. . . it learned of the existence of
the witnes ses ” who had knowledge about the claim] .) 4
The trial court found that some of the evidence subsequently obtained from
d epositions taken in connection with the arbitration appeared to support Officer
Oberlander ’ s conclusions

. National also points to arbit ration testimony and to the fact
that , after the arbitrator ruled in favor of Avetisyan and awarded him full policy benefits,
National “ then promptly paid the arbitration award. ” This evidence is not relevant to the
evaluation of the reasonableness of Nat ional ’ s denial of Avetisyan ’ s claim because, as noted above, “‘ [ t ] he reasonableness of the insurer ’ s decisions and actions must be evaluated as of the time that they were made

. . . . ’ [Citation.] ” ( Jordan v. Allstate Ins.
Co. , supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1073 , quoting Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn.
v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co.
, supra , 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 .) Moreover , “‘ [ e ] ven an insure r that pays the full limits of its policy may be liable for breach of the implied covenant, if improper cla ims handling causes detriment to the insured

. ’ [Citations.] ” ( Brehm v. 21st Century Ins. Co.
, supra , 166 Cal. App.4th at p. 1236.) “ [A]n insurer ’ s obligations extend beyond simply paying the benefits to which its insured is entitled:

‘ [W]hen benefits ar e due an insured, “ delayed payment based on inadequate or tardy investigations, oppressive conduct by claims adjusters seeking to reduce the amounts legitimately payable and numerous other tactics may breach the implied covenant
because ” they frustrate the insured ’ s right to receive the benefits of the contract in

“ prompt compensation for losses. ” ’ [Citations.] ” ( Ibid. )

4 There are “some cases [where] review of the insured’s submitted medical records might rev eal an indisputably reasonable basis to deny the claim without further investigation.” ( Wilso n v. 21st Century Ins. Co. , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 723; accord, Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City of New York
, supra , 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1240, fn . 27.) This is not one of those cases.14

Moreover, National ’ s duty to investigate was not limited to obtaining information to support the denial of Avetisyan ’ s claim . National had a duty to seek information that might support Avetisyan ’ s claim. “[I]n order to protect the interests of its insured, it [is]
‘essential that an insurer fully inquire into possible bases that might support the insured’s claim.’” ( Jordan v. Allstate I ns. Co. , supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072, quoting Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.
, supra , 24 Cal.3d at p. 819 ; accord, Frommoethelydo v. Fire
Ins. Exch ange , supra , 42 Cal.3d at p. 220.) This is because an insurer must consider “ all
the evidence availab le to it with a view towards coverage. ” ( Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. , supra , 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1625.) “‘ An insurance company may not ignore evidence which supports coverage. If it does so, it acts unreasonably towards its insured
and breac hes the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. ’” ( Jordan
, supra , at p. 1074.)

“ A trier of fact may find that an insurer acted unreasonably if the insurer ignores evidence available to it which supports the claim. The insurer may not just focus on
thos e facts which justify denial of the claim. ” ( Mariscal
, supra , at p. 1623; see Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. , supra , 42 Cal.4th at p

. 721.) National did not make any effort to investigate possible bases of support for Avetisyan ’ s claim beyond the report s of Officer Oberlander and the emergency room physician, neither of whom was seeking information that might support Avetisyan ’ s claim. National failed to investigate information contained in the police report that might support the claim , such as Avetisy an ’ s statement that there was a collision and Levy’s
statement about a noise that could indicate that there was a coll i sion

. As Avetisyan argued in the trial court, it was a reasonable inference that National “‘ cherry picked ’ the strongest ‘ evidence ’” and “ ignored all other sources of information so that it could deny
the claim

. . . . ” (See Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co.
, supra , 42 Cal.4th at p. 724 & fn. 8 [“a jury could reasonably find” that the insurer “had unfairly ignored

. . . evidence
submitted b y its insured”]; Gentry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (E.D.Cal. 2010) 726 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1166 [“[a]n insurer cannot just focus on facts that support its position”].)15

Finally, Avetisyan ’ s policy, like t he policy in Brehm
, required a disagreement
betwe en the insurer and the insured before either side could demand an a rbitration. 5 ( See Brehm v. 21st Century Ins. Co.
, supra , 166 Cal. App.4th at p. 124 2 .) Th is court in Brehm
held that “ by making lack of agreement as to the value of the claim an express

pr econdition to demanding arbitration, the policy itself contemplates the parties will first make an affirmative effort to resolve their dispute, in effect creating a contractual duty to discuss the claim to which the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing properly
attaches. ” ( Id. at p. 1242.) Therefore, National had an obligation not only to investigate
and “ honestly assess [Avetisyan ’ s] claim, ” but also “ to make a reasonable effort to resolve any dispute with him

. . before invoking ” the right t o arbitrate under the policy. ( Ibid. ) National has not cited to any evidence in the record that it made a reasonable effort to resolve its dispute with A vetisyan prior to arbitration.

“ ‘ The genuine [dispute] rule in the context of bad faith claims allow s a [trial] court to grant summary judgment when it is undisputed or indisputable that the basis for the
insurer ’ s denial of benefits was reasonable

— for example, where even under the plaintiff ’ s version of the facts there is a genuine issue as to the insur er ’ s liability under California law. [Citation.] ’ ” ( Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co.
, supra , 42 Cal.4th at

p. 724.) Under the circumstances of this case, i t wa s for a trier of fact to decide “ whether the disputed position upon which the insurer denied th e claim was reached reasonably and in good faith. ” ( I

bi d. ) V iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Avetisyan, a jury could conclude that National a cted unreasonably in its limited investigation and its lack of effort to resolve the coverage d ispute prior to arbitration

.

5 T he arbitration provision, section 5a, states “ If we and an ‘ insured ’ disagree whether the ‘ insured ’ is legally entitled to recover damages

. . . or do not agree as to the amount of damages

. . . , the disagreemen t will be settled by arbitration. Such arbitration may be initiated by a written demand for arbitration made by either party.”16

D. Whether National Acted Reasonably in Relying on the Advice of Counsel
National also argues that its denial of Avetisyan ’ s claim was reasonable as a
matter of law because National relied on its attorney ’ s advice to arbitra te rather than pay the claim. Citing the declarations of John Duffy, National ’ s counsel in the arbitration,
and Howard Hirsch, Knight ’ s Vice

- President and General Counsel, National argues : “ In the underlying claim, [National], after denying liability bas ed upon the aforementioned genuine dispute, hired competent and experienced defense counsel who, consistently advised that the underlying claim should be arbitrated because the defense counsel did not believe that [Avetisyan] would be able to meet his burd en of proof at the arbitration. ” It is undisputed, however, that National did not obtain or rely on any advice of
counsel until after National had already denied Avetisyan ’ s claim on August 7, 2009. As
National conceded in its motion and concedes on appe al , National “ hired defense counsel
after it denied the claim

. ” Hirsch explained why: “ It is not our practice to have outside
counsel review factual issues
, ” like the one in this case. National ’ s reliance on the advice
of counsel cannot support its argu ment that it acted reasonably in denying Avetisyan ’ s claim
, because counsel gave the advice a fter National had denied the claim. ( See Jordan
v. Allstate Ins. Co.
, supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1073 ; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court , supra , 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 725 [advice of counsel defense requires that

“ the insurer relied on the advice of competent counsel ” ] .) Therefore, National was not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that it relied on the advice of counsel. 6

6 The trial court granted National’s motion “in its entirety,” including on Avetisyan’s claim for punitive damages. Avetisyan does not present any argument in his briefs that the trial court erred in summarily adjudicating his claim for punitive damages. Therefore, he has forfeited any claim of error relating to this claim. (See Frittelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP (201 1) 202 Cal.App.4th 35, 41 & fn. 1 [failure to challenge trial court rulings on appeal “forfeit[s] any contentions of error regarding them”]; Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1410 [insured waived challenge to order granting s ummary adjudication on punitive damages claim against insurer by failing to raise the issue in his opening brief].) In addition, because we conclude that National did not meet its burden in moving for summary judgment,17 DISPOSITION

The judgment is revers ed

. The trial court is directed to vacate its order granting National’s motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order granting National’s motion for summary adjudication on Avetisyan’s claim for punitive damages, denying
National ’s motion for summary adjudication on Avetisyan’s cause s of action for breach
of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and denying National’s motion for summary judgment. Avetisyan is to recover his costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J. *

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

WOODS, J.

Avetisyan’s challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings sustaining National’s objections to Masters’ declaration are moot.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.