### IN TH E CO URT O F C R IM IN AL A PP EA L S O F TEN NES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ma y

6, 200 8

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. LA RR Y D AR NN ELL P INEX
Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2005-C- 2514 Mark J. F ishb urn, Jud ge

No. M2007- 01211-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Novem ber 6, 2008

D AVI D G. H AYES , S R .J ., dissenting.

Irespe ctfully

dissent from the majority ’s hol d i n g t hat the De fenda nt’s dual convictions of
a tte mpt e d a g g ra

vate d ra pe and a tte mpt e d a g g ra

vate d se xua l batte ry imp lic a te pr inc ipl e s of do ub le jeopar dy protec tions. My

rea sons are two-fold.
First, the majority ’s holding is in conflict with the case law dec isions of State v. Elder , 982 S.W .2d 871, 875 n.2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) and Pa rri s v . S tat e , 236 S.W .3d 173, 182 n.5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007), and other unpublished decisions of this court which r ecog nize t h ree distinct statutory means by

which a c riminal attempt may be commit ted, ea ch depe ndent upon the fa ctual
c ir c u ms ta n c e s p r e s e n te d

in th e p arti cular case

. See, e .g., State v. He zekiah Cooper , No. W2005- 02 48 1- CCA -R 3- CD (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. a t Jac ks on , D e c . 2 0, 20 07 ); State v. Victor Euge ne Tyson , No . M 20 06 -0 16 52 -C CA -R 3- CD (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. a t N a sh vil le , July 10 , 2 00 7) . T he ma

jor ity
c on c lud e s in

bo th i ts a

na ly sis of the su ff ic ie nc y of the evi den ce and

wi thi n it s ana ly sis of

do ub le jeopar dy protec tions that, “t h e S t at e m u st only prove that the Def

endant took a substantial step toward those c ompleted cr imes [of at t em p t ed agg ravated ra pe and attempted ag g ravated sexual battery ]” citing Te nnessee Code Annotated subsection 39-12-101( a)( 3) as the re levant def inition of crimi nal attempt. The de cisions of Elder and Pa rri

s c o mp e l th e h o ld in g th a t b a s e d u p o n the evidenc e pre sented in this case , the applicable criminal attempt provision is subsection (a)( 2), not (a) (3). As obse rved in Elder , 9 82 S.W. 2d a t 87 5 n .2 , w he n a

de fe nd ant “ [a]c ts w iththe int e nt t o cause a re sult that is an element of the of fense ,” i.e. , sexual penetration, and “ believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduc t ,” the attempted crime is cha rg eable only

under subsection (a )(2) when, a s in this case , the defendant’s conduct i s thwarte d by the phy sical re sistance of t he victim

. Subsection (a) (2) involves those attempts wher e the accuse d has done e very thing that he intended to do but the c rime wa s not completed, i.e. , in a homicide prosec ution, the bullet mis sed the int e nd e d v ic timor , a s in thi s c a se , th e fo rc e fu l a c ts o f t he accus ed are re sis te d b y the vic tim

. Subsection (a) (3) is applica ble only to attempts whe re the acc used has not y et done all that he intends to do in the commission of the crime; however, the conduct of the ac cused “ constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of t he offense.” T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (a)( 3),(b)

. Although I find the-2-

tr ia l c ourt ’s jur

y ins tr uc tio n w ithre g ard

to c ri min a l a tte mpt

to b e inc or

re c t, I fi nd the e rr or

ha rm le ss within the sufficienc y

of evide nce c ontex t

. Nonethele ss, Iam unable to a g ree with the majority ’s utiliz ation of subsec tion (a)( 3) within the double jeopa rdy analy sis as discussed inf

ra

. Second, the majority conclude s under the Denton test “that the same evidence was re quired to prove both th e attempted a g g ravated ra pe and the attempted ag g ravated sexual battery .” Fur thermore , the majority conclude s that “it require s speculation to conclude that t h e D ef endant attempted two discre te ac ts which could re asonably be viewe d as constituting diff eren t offe nses.” As observe d by

the majority , our supre me cour t in Stat e v. Philli

ps , 924 S.W .2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1996), urg ed conside ration of ( 1) the nature of the act, ( 2) the a rea of the victim ’s body

invaded by the s exually assaultive behavior, (3) the elapsed time betwee n the di scre te conduc t, (4) the a ccuse d’s int e nt, and (5 ) the c umu la tiv e punis hme nt, in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r c on vic tio ns are mul tip lic ito us

. I n the light most favor able to the State, the proof established sepa

rate acts of c onduct supporting the Def endant’ s dual convictions. The Defenda nt’s act of g rabbingthe victim’s throat and de manding that s h e “b o w down” in addition to hi s attempt to forcibly remove her unde rwe ar suppor ts the
c on vic tio n f

or a tte mpt e d a g g ra

vate d r a pe wh ile the De fe nd ant’ s a c tio n o f bit ing the vic tim ’s br e a st supports the conviction for attempted ag g ravated sexual battery . Thus, the nature of t he two acts are distinguished, the a cts occ urre d at s ep arate times, and involved two sepa rate are as of the vic tim’s body . Moreove r, the issue of intent is a jury question and the jury could reasonably have inf err ed from the proof that the De fenda nt abandone d his init ial intent to rape a fter be ing inf ormed by the vic tim th at he wo uld

fi rs t “ have to k ill [he r]” and that hi s b iti ngof

the vic tim ’s br e a st c ou ld “rationally

[be] construed a s being for the pur pose of sexual . . . g ratification.” Tenn. Code Ann. 39- 13-501(6) . For

these re asons, I

wou l d af

fi rm the Def

endant’ s convictions for both attempted ag g ravated ra

pe and attempted ag g ravated sexual battery . I n all other res p ec t s , Ijoin with the
m a j o r i t y.

___________________________________ DA VID G

. HA YE S , S en i o r J u d ge