Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1604-CR-756 | September 16, 2016 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

James Harper

Harper & Harper, LLC

Valparaiso, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Sprague,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 16, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

64A03-1604-CR-756

Appeal from the Porter Superior 

Court

The Honorable Roger V. Bradford, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

64D01-1208-FA-8168

Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Michael Sprague appeals his forty-year sentence for Class A felony aiding in 

burglary. We affirm.

Issues

[2] Sprague raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

sentencing Sprague; and

II. whether his sentence is inappropriate in light 

of the nature of the offense and the character 

of the offender.

Facts

[3] On August 8, 2012, Dominick Fazzini, Jordan Wilkerson, and Shawn Duffy 

forced their way into the residence of Cheri Baruch in Valparaiso. Sprague had 

driven the men to the residence, and he waited in the car. Wilkerson knocked 

Baruch to the ground, held her down, and beat her head against the floor. 

Duffy and Fazzini were armed with guns and made her open a safe. The men 

took guns and cash from the safe. They also ripped Baruch’s shirt off and 

ordered her to put on another shirt. 

[4] Sprague, who was still waiting outside of the residence, saw a neighbor 

approaching and warned the other men. They left the residence with Sprague 

driving, and the neighbor followed them. The neighbor chased them on U.S. 

30, and Sprague crashed the vehicle at an intersection. When the neighbor also 
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stopped and pointed a gun at one of the men, the man shot the neighbor in the 

hand. An FBI agent who witnessed the crash exchanged gunfire with Duffy, 

and Duffy shot himself in the head and died. Sprague, Wilkerson, and Fazzini 

were all apprehended. 

[5] The State charged Sprague with Class A felony aiding in burglary, Class B 

felony aiding in robbery, and Class B felony aiding in criminal confinement. 

Sprague pled guilty to Class A felony aiding in burglary, and the State 

dismissed the remaining charges. The plea agreement capped his sentence at 

forty years. The trial court found Sprague’s remorse and acceptance of 

responsibility by pleading guilty to be mitigators. The trial court found the 

following aggravators—Sprague’s history of criminal activity, the fact that the 

harm suffered by the victim was far greater than the harm necessary to prove 

the elements of the offense, and the fact that Sprague was responsible for danger 

to the community by engaging in a high-speed chase. The trial court concluded 

that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Sprague to forty 

years in the Department of Correction with five years suspended to probation. 

Sprague now appeals.

Analysis

I. Sentencing

[6] Sprague argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. 

Sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial court. 

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 
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218. However, a trial court may be found to have abused its sentencing 

discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing 

statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for 

imposing a sentence where the record does not support the reasons; (3) entering 

a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the 

record and advanced for consideration; and (4) entering a sentencing statement 

in which the reasons given are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. The 

reasons or omission of reasons given for choosing a sentence are reviewable on 

appeal for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 491. The weight given to those reasons, 

i.e. to particular aggravators or mitigators, is not subject to appellate review. Id. 

[7] Sprague first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enter a 

sentencing statement that explains the reasons for the sentence imposed. A 

sentencing statement “must include a reasonably detailed recitation of the trial 

court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Id. at 490. Sprague 

describes the sentencing statement as “barebones” and argues that the trial 

court failed to explain how Baruch’s injuries were greater than those necessary 

to prove the offense and how the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating 

factors. Appellant’s Br. p. 17. 

[8] The trial court here discussed each of the aggravators and mitigators, stated that 

the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, and explained that it was adding ten 

years to the advisory sentence. Although the sentencing statement may not 

have been extremely lengthy, it was not required to be. Our review of the 
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sentencing statement reveals that it was adequate and included a reasonably 

detailed recitation of the reasons for imposing the sentence. 

[9] Next, Sprague argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding the 

victim’s injuries as an aggravator. Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1) notes 

that the trial court may consider harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the 

victim that was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the 

commission of the offense. The Class A felony burglary conviction required 

proof of bodily injury to Baruch. Bodily injury is defined as “any impairment 

of physical condition, including physical pain.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-29. The 

trial court found that “the harm suffered by this victim was far greater than the 

harm necessary to prove the elements of the offense.” Tr. p. 29. The trial court 

noted “there was well beyond mere bodily injury to the victim.” Id. at 30. The 

probable cause affidavit indicates that Baruch had injuries to her head, knee, 

and back as a result of the beating during the burglary. Baruch’s victim’s 

statement, which was read during the sentencing hearing, made it clear that she 

was severely traumatized by the incident and had constant nightmares. Given 

the multiple injuries and severe emotional trauma sustained by the victim, we 

cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by considering this 

aggravator.

[10] Sprague also disputes the trial court’s use of danger to the community as a 

result of the vehicle chase as an aggravator. The trial court noted that Sprague 

was “responsible for . . . the danger to the community caused by his taking off 

in a high-speed vehicle chase.” Tr. p. 30. The nature and circumstances of the 
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crime can be an aggravating factor. Gleason v. State, 965 N.E.2d 702, 711 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2012). Sprague argues that “nothing in the record establishes the 

nature of the vehicle chase or that the chase endangered the community.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 18. The probable cause affidavit indicates that Sprague drove 

a vehicle in a high-speed chase on U.S. 30 and crashed into another vehicle.1 

This evidence is sufficient to show that his conduct was a danger to the 

community, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding this fact to 

be an aggravating factor.

[11] Sprague next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

identify all significant mitigating circumstances. A trial court is not obligated to 

accept a defendant’s claim as to what constitutes a mitigating circumstance. 

Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ind. 2000). A claim that the trial court 

failed to find a mitigating circumstance requires the defendant to establish that 

the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. 

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. 

[12] The trial court found two mitigating circumstances—Sprague’s remorse and the 

fact that he accepted responsibility by pleading guilty. According to Sprague, 

the trial court should have also found undue hardship to his mother as a 

mitigator. Many persons convicted of serious crimes have dependents and, 

absent special circumstances, trial courts are not required to find that 

 

1 Both Sprague and the State rely on the probable cause affidavit for the relevant facts.
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imprisonment will result in an undue hardship. Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 

1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999). In the pre-sentencing investigation report, Sprague 

indicated that he had no source of income and had been dependent on his Pell 

grants, his mother, and his sister for several years. At the sentencing hearing, 

Sprague’s mother testified that she had several surgeries and is disabled. She 

testified that Sprague’s imprisonment had made it more difficult for her to 

operate her dog rescue business and that she was “doing the best that [she] 

can.” Tr. p. 9. Although Sprague apparently physically assisted his mother 

with her business and chores, we cannot say that special circumstances are 

present here to require the trial court to find undue hardship. The mitigating 

evidence regarding undue hardship is not significant and the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by failing to find undue hardship as a mitigator. 

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[13] Sprague argues that his forty-year sentence is inappropriate under Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B). Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a 

sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offenses and the character of the offender. When considering whether a 

sentence is inappropriate, we need not be “extremely” deferential to a trial 

court’s sentencing decision. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2007). Still, we must give due consideration to that decision. Id. We also 

understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its 

sentencing decisions. Id. Under this rule, the burden is on the defendant to 
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persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress 

v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

[14] The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the 

outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged 

with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived 

‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 

2008). We “should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than 

the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the 

sentence on any individual count.” Id. When reviewing the appropriateness of 

a sentence under Rule 7(B), we may consider all aspects of the penal 

consequences imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, including 

whether a portion of the sentence was suspended. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 

1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).

[15] The nature of the offense reveals that Sprague and his cohorts engaged in a 

home invasion where they beat the victim and stole guns and cash. Sprague 

emphasizes that he was only the get-away driver, but that argument minimizes 

his conduct. Sprague was well aware of what the other men were doing in the 

house, warned them that a neighbor had arrived, and engaged in a high-speed 

chase while attempting to escape the area. After Sprague wrecked into another 

vehicle at a highway intersection, one of Sprague’s cohorts engaged in a gun 

fight with officers at the intersection and ultimately turned his gun on himself, 

resulting in his death. Another of his cohorts shot the neighbor who had 

pursued them. Although Sprague may not have been in the house terrorizing 
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Baruch or shooting at anyone, he was clearly an active participant in the 

offense.

[16] As for the character of the offender, we acknowledge twenty-seven-year-old 

Sprague’s remorse and guilty plea. However, we must also acknowledge his 

criminal history. As an adult, Sprague has been arrested eight times, including 

the current offense. Sprague has a 2009 felony conviction in Illinois for Class 4 

felony possession of cannabis. He was found guilty in 2005 of Class A 

misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and Class A misdemeanor 

possession of cannabis. The trial court withheld judgment and sentenced him 

to one year of supervision. In 2009, he was charged with Class A misdemeanor 

carrying/possession of a firearm, and he was sentenced to one year 

“conditional discharge.” App. Vol. II p. 28. Sprague acknowledged that, at the 

time of the offense, he was smoking marijuana on a daily basis. 

[17] Sprague attempts to compare his sentence to that imposed on Fazzini. Fazzini, 

who has been described as the ringleader of the offense, apparently received the 

same sentence as Sprague. Our supreme court has held that we “need not 

compare” sentences of codefendants. Knight v. State, 930 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind. 

2010). Even if we were to attempt comparing the sentences, we have no 

information regarding Fazzini’s criminal history or character. We cannot say 

that Sprague was entitled to a lesser sentence. Given the serious nature of the 

offense and Sprague’s criminal history, we cannot say that his sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.
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Conclusion

[18] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Sprague, and his 

forty-year sentence is not inappropriate. We affirm.

[19] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.