Filed 3/5/14 In re S.B. CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re S.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B247833, B250138 (Ventura County Super. Ct. No. J068923, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK78619)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
MARY B.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Conditionally revers ed and remanded with directions. Lisa A. Raneri, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Coun sel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

________________ _______________2 In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300 et seq.), 1 Mary B. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to her then 10-month-old daughter,
S.B. Mother contends we must reverse the order because (1) she did not receive proper notice of the section 366.26 hearing and (2) the juvenile court erred in finding the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Fa mily Services (DCFS) complied with the notice requirements of the I ndian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). With respect to her contention regarding noti ce, Mother argues DCFS failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate he r and should have provided notice of the section 366.26 hearing to her parents (S.B.’s ma ternal grandparents). We reject Mother’s challenge regarding notice. We agree with Mother’s contention—and DCFS concedes on appeal—that the juvenile court erred in finding DCFS complied with the notice requirements of the ICWA. Accordingly, we conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for the limited pur pose of allowing the juvenile court to comply with the notice provisions of the ICWA.
BACKGROUND The Ventura County Human Services Agen cy (the Agency) re ceived a referral
about S.B. from the sta ff at the hospital where she was born. As stated in the Agency’s Emergency Response Report, nursing staff at the hospital reported Mother displayed paranoid behavior, was antsy and had a hard time following directions , did not appear to
know how to care for an infa nt although she stated she ha d two other children, and was evasive in answering questions about herself. Mother told hospita l staff she had been staying with a friend near the hospital in Ventur a County, but she planned to take a taxi to Pasadena with S.B. The Emergency Resp onse Report lists an Altadena address for Mother and includes a telephone number wh ich the Agency stated was not a working
number. After Mother reluct antly provided an alternat e last name, the Agency discovered Mother had two open dependency cases in Los Angeles County involving her

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 other children, with allegations regarding he r chronic mental health issues. When the hospital discharged S.B., the Agency pl aced the newborn in foster care. On July 5, 2012, the Agency filed a dependency petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g), involving S.B. (Case No. J068923). The Agency alleged in the petition that Mother has a history of mental and emotional problem s, including bipolar disorder, depression and schizoaffective diso rder, “which periodically render her unable to provide adequate care for th e child” (count b-1). The Agen cy also alleged that S.B.’s half siblings, M.B. and E.B., “were made dependents of the Juvenile Court in Los Angeles County due to the mother’s mental health issues” and Mother had not “made reasonable efforts to treat the problems whic h led to the removal of the half-sibling[s]” (count b-2). The petition states that the juve nile court in Los Ange les County terminated
Mother’s reunification services in M.B.’s case in March 2 011 and terminated Mother’s
reunification services in E.M.’s case in Octo ber 2011. The Agency further alleged in the petition that the identity and wh ereabouts of S.B.’s father were unknown and he had not visited or provided care or support to S.B. (count g-1). Mother appeared at the detention hearing in Ventura County on July 6, 2012, and the juvenile court appointed counsel to repres ent her. The court found a prima facie case existed for detaining S.B. from Mother. Th e court also found the ICWA may apply. The Agency prepared a jurisdiction repor t, dated July 31, 2012, with several attachments including a July 1, 2012 letter fro m a person named Brianna W. In the letter, Brianna explained she had agreed to allow Mo ther and her children to live in Brianna’s
three-bedroom house located on West Howard Street in Pa sadena. Brianna provided a telephone number, stating she could be reached at that number to answer questions about the arrangement. The Agency st ated in the jurisdiction report that the ICWA does or may apply, listing S.B.’s potential tribal affilia tion as Cherokee Nati on and Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians. On August 1, 2012 , the Agency sent the ICWA notice (form ICWA-030) by certified mail with return receipt requested to Mother at the Altade na address, to the Sacramento Area Director of the BIA, to th e Secretary of the Interior, to the Cherokee4 Nation, to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indi ans, and to the United Keetoowah Band of
Cherokee Indians. In the notic e, the Agency listed Mother’s name as Mary B[.], but did not list the alternate last name she had prov ided while at the hosp ital (O[.]), which she indicated was her “legal name.” The ICWA notice lists the names of S.B.’s maternal grandmother and maternal great-grandmother, but does not include th eir maiden names. On September 25, 2012, the juvenile cour t in Ventura County held the jurisdiction hearing and sustained the allegations in th e dependency petition set forth above. The court declared S.B. a dependent of the court, ordered her placed un der the supervision of the Agency, and transferred the matter to Los Angeles County for disposition. On October 17, 2012, the juvenile court in Los Angeles County accepted transfer of the case (Case No. CK78619), and set the disposition hearing for November 7, 2012. DCFS prepared a disposition report for the November 7, 2012 hearing, noting that S.B. was still placed with a foster family in Ventura County. DCFS listed Mother’s
address as the West Howard Street address in Pasadena referenced above. DCFS sent notice of the November 7, 2012 disposition h earing to Mother at that address. DCFS listed Mother’s telephone number as the num ber the Agency had pr eviously found was not a working number, as discussed above. Mother had not provided information on the identity of S.B.’s Father so DCFS c ould not conduct a se arch for him. DCFS stated in the disposition report that the ICWA does or may apply. DCFS attached to the report letters from the Ch erokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the United Keetoowah Band of Ch erokee Indians stating the tribes would not
intervene in this matter base d on the information DCFS had provided in the ICWA notice. The August 16, 2012 letter from the Cherokee Nation includes a list of names and aliases of S.B.’s relatives, including the ma iden names of S.B.’s grandmother and greatgrandmother. The Cherokee Nation used the information DCFS provided in the ICWA notice to trace S.B.’s maternal ancestry. The letter from the Cherokee Nation lists a woman named Edna M[.] as S.B.’s great-great-grandmother. Edna M[.] is listed on the
final roll of the Eastern Band of Cherokee In dians of North Carolina, prepared by United5 States Agent Fred A. Baker, purs uant to an act of the 68th Congress, (43 stat., 376), June 4, 1924 (the 1924 Baker Roll). 2
DCFS also stated in the disposition report that the dependency investigator made contact with Mother by telephone on October 30 and November 1, 2 012, for purposes of scheduling an interview for the report, but Mother refused to make herself available for an interview. The investig ator was able to reach Mother using the cell phone number Mother provided, which the Agency previously had found was not a working number. As set forth in the disposition report, S.B .’s maternal grandpar ents informed DCFS they would like to have S.B. placed in their home in Illinois with a permanent plan of adoption. The maternal grandparents were in the process of adopting S.B.’s half sister, M.B. (age 2). S.B.’s half brother, E.B. (age 3), had been adopted by non-relatives. The maternal grandparents inform ed the dependency investigator that they “limit their
interaction with” Mother due to Mother’s anxiety and anger. According to the disposition report, the maternal grandparents stated “the y do not have any updated
information as to mother’s cu rrent mental health status, but they can only guess that she hasn’t done anything to improve her situa tion based on mother calli ng to rant and rave about the world being against her. Maternal gr andparents state that they wish things were different and that they are uneasy about mother’s ability to care fo r S[.B.]” DCFS recommended the juvenile court not offer Mo ther reunification services because her parental rights to S.B.’s two half siblings had been terminated af ter Mother failed to comply with court orders regarding her ment al health issues, incl uding an order for a psychological evaluation which Mother did not complete. Mother appeared at the November 7, 2012 hearing, and the juvenile court appointed counsel to represent her. Mother filled out and si gned the Parental Notification of Indian Status form (ICW A-020), indicating she may have Cherokee Indian ancestry

2 On September 23, 2013, this court gran ted Mother’s unopposed September 16, 2013 request for judicial notic e, attaching materials demonstr ating Edna M[.] is listed on the 1924 Baker Roll.6 from a band “possibly” locat ed in Oklahoma. Mother also filled out and signed a Notification of Mailing Address form, listing he r address as the West Howard address in
Pasadena that Brianna W. had identified in her July 1, 2012 letter discussed above. Mother listed her telephone number as th e cell phone number at which the dependency investigator had reached Mother on Octobe r 30 and November 1, 2012. The form instructed the parent to info rm DCFS or the court of any change in mailing address. During the hearing, Mother in formed the juvenile court her mailing address was not the
West Howard address listed on the Notifi cation of Mailing Addre ss form she submitted earlier that day, but was a post office box in Pa sadena. Mother stated the post office box
address on the record. Mother told the court she was unable to provide a name or contact
information for S.B.’s father. Also at the November 7, 2012 hearing, the juvenile court made findings under the
ICWA. The court noted that on December 22, 2010, in depe ndency proceedings involving S.B.’s half sibling, the juvenile court found the ICWA did not apply. Mother requested additional “time to trace the [Indi an] ancestry.” She explained that an “American Indian activist”—a person with whom the court was familiar—was assisting her. The court declined to gr ant Mother additional time. In making its findings in this case, the court stated: “The court finds th at the ICWA notice is proper and complete.
There has been no new information from th e Mother subsequent to December 20th [ sic ] of 2010. [¶] In addition, the Agency in Ventur a County did new ICWA notices, and all of the tribes have responded indicating that the children are not elig ible for membership based upon the information available. [¶] The court does not have reason to know or
believe the child is an Indian child as defined by the Indi an Child Welfare Act. The Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply.” The juvenile court continued the dispos ition hearing to Janua ry 2, 2013, and
ordered Mother back to court on that date. The court explained to Mother that it could proceed without her if she did not return to court and “could deny [her] services and go directly to a permanent plan that could even include adoption.” The court ordered DCFS to provide reunification services to Mother in the interim as well as a “detailed written7 visitation schedule.” Counsel for DCFS and Mo ther asked the court to order that Mother be interviewed by DCFS pr ior to the continued disposition h earing, but the court stated it
would not make such an order because an in terview of Mother at this stage of the proceedings was unnecessary. In a last minute information for the court, dated January 2, 2013, DCFS informed the juvenile court that Mother had not had an y visits with S.B. since October 2012. On November 19 and December 3, 2012, DCFS sent Mother information regarding visits by certified mail. On November 9, 2012, DC FS sent Mother counseling referrals by certified mail to the post office box address Moth er had provided during the November 7, 2012 hearing. Also on November 9, 2012, the dependency investigator called Mother at the cellular telephone number Mother had provided, but the number was disconnected. On November 16 and November 30, 2012, the dependency investigator called Mother at the same number and it was working, but th e investigator could not leave a message
because Mother’s voice mail box was full. DCFS believed Mother was trying to “evade”
DCFS. DCFS continued to recommend the cour t not offer Mother reunification services. Mother did not appear at the continue d disposition hearing on January 2, 2013 even though the juvenile court had ordered he r to return during the previous hearing at which she was present. Mother’s counsel requested the court continue the hearing
because he had been un able to reach Mother since the la st court date. The court denied counsel’s request, noting the disposition he aring already had be en continued from November 7, 2012 at Mother’s counsel’s request. Mother’s counsel requested the court
order reunification services for Mother. S.B. ’s counsel joined DCFS’s request that the
court not offer Mother reunification services . The court removed S.B. from Mother and
denied reunification services. The court no ted that Mother’s reunification services and parental rights had been terminated in th e dependency proceeding s involving E.B. and M.B. The court further explained: “The Mo ther has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the . . . half-siblings from her. [¶] The court cannot find by clear an d convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of8 this child to grant th e mother reunification services. The mother’s denied reunification services under [section] 361. 5(b)(10) and (b)(11).” At the January 2, 2013 disposition hearing, the court also ordered an expedited Interstate Compact on the Placement of Child ren regarding S.B.’s potential placement with the maternal grandparents in Illinois. The court set the sec tion 366.26 hearing for May 2, 2013, finding a possibility of guardianship or adoption for S.B. The court ordered DCFS to provide notice to Mother of her right to file a writ petition at the post office box
address in Pasadena. The court also set a he aring for February 13, 2013 on the de facto parent request S.B.’s foster pare nts had filed in November 2012. On January 4, 2013, DCFS served the January 2, 2013 minute order and the requisite notice regarding the right to file a writ petition on Mother at the post office box address in Pasadena. On January 28, 2013, DCFS served notice of the February 13, 2013 hearing on Mother at the post office box address in Pasadena and at the street address in Altadena that Mother had provided at the outset of these dependency proceedings. In a supplemental report, dated February 13, 2013, DCFS stated it had been unable to reach Mother by telephon e or mail, and Mother had not contacted DCFS regarding visitation with S.B. DCFS also reported that S.B.’s maternal grandparents in Illinois had withdrawn their request to adopt S.B. and in formed DCFS they believed it would be in S.B.’s best interest to be adopted by her fo ster parents. The foster parents told DCFS they wanted to adopt S.B. and maintain an open rela tionship with her maternal grandparents (who were adopting M.B.) and the family who had adopted E.B. On February 13, 2013, the juvenile court granted th e foster parents’ de facto parent request. On February 15, 2013, Mother filed a Notic e of Appeal in this matter, stating she was appealing from the termination of her pa rental rights (which had not occurred yet)
and the termination of “‘services.’” Mother listed an address for herself on West Howard Street in Pasadena, although she crossed out the street number she had previously provided to DCFS and the juve nile court and listed a different street number on West
Howard Street. Mother also listed the ce llular telephone number she had previously provided to DCFS and the court.9 On February 25, 2013, the juvenile court advanced and vacated the section 366.26 hearing and set it for May 9, 2013. In the section 366.26 report, dated May 2, 2013 and prepared on or about April 9, 2013, DCFS stated it had been unable to locate Mother. DCFS found the address on
West Howard Street in Pasadena that Mo ther had initially provi ded to DCFS and the juvenile court (and that Bria nna W. had listed in her July 1, 2012 letter) was a vacant home. Voice mail messages could not be le ft at the cellular telephone number Mother had provided to DCFS and the juvenile cour t, and an automated outgoing message stated the person called was unavailable. DCFS planne d to conduct a field visit to the alternate
address on West Howard Street that Mother had listed on her February 15, 2013 Notice of Appeal. A Declaration of Due Dilig ence DCFS prepared on or about April 25, 2013 and submitted with the section 366.26 report stat es that DCFS found the post office box in Pasadena that Mother had provided as he r mailing address was closed and Mother’s
“name was not found on file.” On April 24, 2013, a DCFS adoptions assistant made
visits to both addresses on West Howard Street that Mother had provided. At the first address Mother had provided, and Brianna W. had listed in her July 1, 2012 letter, the assistant spoke to a resident who had recently moved in and stated she had sent back mail
addressed to Mother because Mo ther did not live at that addr ess. At the alternate West
Howard Street address Mother had listed on her Notice of Appeal, the assistant found a vacant home. The 12-pag e Declaration of Due Diligence details all the various searches DCFS conducted to locate Mother (e.g., U.S. Postal Service, California Department of Motor Vehicles, LexisNexis, etc.).
DCFS also stated in the section 366.26 re port that Mother had not contacted DCFS to check on S.B.’s welfare or to request vi sits since the case was transferred to Los Angeles County in October 2012. DCFS recommended the juvenile court terminate Mother’s parental rights upon approval of the adoption home study of S.B.’s foster parents. DCFS attached to the report the notice of the May 2, 2013 section 366.2610 hearing it had served on Mother on February 7, 2013 by certified ma il with return receipt requested at the address of her counsel. On May 2, 2013, DCFS submitted a last minute information for the court stating the adoption home study of S.B.’s foster pare nts had been approved. The juvenile court held a hearing on May 2, 20 13, even though it previously had vacated the May 2, 2013 section 366.26 hearing and set the matter fo r May 9, 2013, because the section 366.26 hearing had been noticed for May 2, 2013. DCFS’s counsel informed the court that, before she could represent notice to Mother was proper, she needed to verify whether Mother was receiving mail at the alternate We st Howard Street address even though
DCFS found the home to be vacant. The cour t ordered DCFS to update its Declaration of Due Diligence regarding its search for Mother in advance of the Ma y 9, 2013 hearing. On May 9, 2013, DCFS submitted an updated Declaration of Due Diligence regarding its search for Mother. The declara tion states an adoptions assistant visited the alternate West Howard Street address on May 8, 2013, and spoke to a resident who had
moved in two weeks before. The resident co nfirmed Mother did not live at that home.
At the outset of the section 366.26 hear ing on May 9, 2013, Mother’s counsel stated: “I have no direction from my client . I have had no recent contact with her.” Mother’s counsel did not request a continuance of the hearing or argue that notice to his client was improper. Nor did he argue against termination of Mother’s parental rights over S.B. The juvenile court found notice was proper, return of S.B. to her parents would be detrimental, and S.B. was adoptable. The court terminated parental rights. On May 24, 2013, Mother’s appellate c ounsel filed a Notice of Appeal from the
orders made under section 366.26. The Notice of Appeal lists an address for Mother in
Pacoima. This address is list ed in DCFS’s Declaration of Due Diligence. In April 2013, a DCFS adoptions assistant called a telephone number associated with this address and a
resident informed her Mother di d not live at that address.11 DISCUSSION Notice of Section 366.26 Hearing Mother contends her due process and stat utory rights were violated because DCFS
failed to exercise reasonable d iligence in attempting to loca te her and failed to provide notice of the section 366.26 hearing to S.B .’s maternal grandparents. Mother argues
DCFS should have asked Briann a W. and S.B.’s maternal grandparents if they knew
Mother’s whereabouts or had contact information for her. DCFS argues Mother forfeited this issue because her counsel did not make an objection below regarding improper notice of the section 366.26 hearing, which would have allowed the juvenile court to consid er and address Mother’s arguments before proceeding with termination of parental rights. ( In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754 [“defective notice and the consequen ces flowing from it may easily be corrected if promptly raised in the juvenile court”].) In her reply appellate brief, Mother does not dispute her counsel failed to preserve the notice issue for appeal by failing to object below. Nor does she argue her counsel render ed ineffective assistan ce in failing to raise such an objection. Inst ead, she asks this court to exerci se its discretion and consider the issue (see In re Wilford J. , supra , 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 754 [“forfeiture is not automatic, and the appellate court has discretion to excuse a party’s failure to properly raise an issue in a timely fashion”]) because she asserts “lack of notice of a hearing to terminate parental rights is of constitutional dimens ion and of great pu blic interest.”
We will exercise our discretion and consider the issue. As Mother points out, this is not a case in which a parent failed to rais e a notice objection at s ubsequent hearings at which the parent was present. (See In re Wilford J. , supra , 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 754 [“Notwithstanding the juvenile court’s erro r in proceeding w ith the unscheduled jurisdictional hearing, Wilford J. appeared with counsel at subsequent disposition hearings and had the opportunity during each one to challenge the court’s earlier finding that notice had been properly gi ven. He did not and thus de prived the juvenile court of the opportunity to corr ect the mistake. [Citation.] A ccordingly, he has forfeited that issue on appeal”].) Here, Mother contends she did not receive proper notice of the12 section 366.26 hearings and she did not have an opportunity to raise the issue at a subsequent hearing. As discussed above, DCFS sent Mother not ice of the May 2, 2013 section 366.26 hearing at the address of her counsel by certif ied mail with return receipt requested. (§ 294, subd. (f)(7)(A) [“If the court determines that there has been due diligence in attempting to locate and serve the parent an d the probation officer or social worker recommends adoption, service shall be to that parent’s attorney of record, if any, by certified mail, return receipt requested. . . .” ].) DCFS did not send a subsequent notice to
Mother at the address of her counsel of the continued May 9, 2013 section 366.26 hearing. Counsel did not know how to co ntact Mother. DCFS confirmed—and Mother does not dispute—that service could not be ma de on Mother at any of the addresses she had provided to DCFS and the juvenile court. Nor could Mother be contacted at the cellular telephone numb er she had provided.
Mother asserts DCFS shou ld have contacted Brianna W. and S.B.’s maternal grandparents to determine if they were awar e of Mother’s whereabouts or had contact information for her. As discussed above, th e Agency in Ventura Co unty attached to its July 31, 2012 jurisdiction report a July 1, 2012 letter from Br ianna stating she had agreed
to allow Mother and her ch ildren to live in Brianna’s three-bedroom house located on West Howard Street in Pasadena. An adoptions assistant made two visits to that home in April 2013, and first found it to be vacant and then found a new resident there who did
not know Mother. Mother argues DCFS should have called the telephone number Brianna listed in her July 1, 2012 letter to see if Brianna was aware of Mother’s
whereabouts or had contact information for her. Given the July 1, 2 012 letter is the only mention of Brianna in the record, we canno t agree with Mother’s assertion that a telephone call to the number listed in the lette r was a “likely means of locating” Mother in April or May 2013. With regard to S.B.’s mate rnal grandparents in Illinoi s, Mother cites an excerpt from a DCFS report in a proceeding involving S.B.’s half sibling, dated November 18, 2010, one and one-half years before S.B.’s birth, in which DCFS reported Mother13 “considers her relationship close to her parent s and speaks to them about once a week by telephone.” The same November 18, 2010 re port states Mother had not seen her parents for about two years. In the disposition repor t in this matter, dated November 7, 2012, DCFS stated S.B.’s maternal grandparents in formed the dependency investigator that they “limit their interaction w ith” Mother due to Mo ther’s anxiety and anger. There is no
indication in the record that Mother had seen the maternal grandpar ents since 2009, but there is evidence of at least one telephone call after the matter was transferred to Los Angeles County. There is no indication in the record that the matern al grandparents were
aware of Mother’s whereabouts or had contact information for her in April or May 2013. Nonetheless, we conclude DCFS had a statutory duty to send notice to S.B.’s grandparents regarding the section 366 .26 hearing, as explained below. Section 294, subdivision (a)(5), provides DCFS must give notice of the section 366.26 hearing to the “grandparents of the ch ild, if their address is known and if the parent’s whereabouts are unknown.” Mothe r’s whereabouts were unknown and DCFS knew the address of S.B’s maternal grandp arents. DCFS did not send notice of the section 366.26 hearing to the ma ternal grandparents. Thus, we cannot conclude notice of
the section 366.26 h earing was proper. We will reverse the order terminating pare ntal rights for error in providing notice of the section 366.26 hearing only if the error was prejudi cial. We reject Mother’s assertion this error is structural requiring au tomatic reversal. “Unless there is no attempt to serve notice on a parent, in which case the e rror has been held to be reversible per se [citations], errors in notice do not automatically require reve rsal but are subject to the [ Chapman ] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prejudice.” ( In re J.H. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 174, 183; In re Angela C. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 389, 393-396; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.) As disc ussed above, DCFS attempted to locate Mother for purposes of serving notice of the section 366.26 hearing and when its efforts failed, served notice of the May 2, 2013 hearing at the a ddress of her counsel. “The primary issue in a section 366.26 he aring is whether the dependent child is likely to be adopted.” ( In re Angela C. , supra , 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.) S.B.’s foster14 parents, who had cared for her since shortly af ter her birth, wanted to adopt her and had an approved home study. There is no dis pute this 10-month-old was adoptable. “We therefore find beyond a reasonabl e doubt that the error in no tice was harmless as to the court’s finding of [S.B.]’s adoptability.” ( Id . at p. 396.)
“Once the court finds the lik elihood of adoption, termina tion of parental rights is the preferred permanent plan absent proof th at termination would be detrimental to the child’s best interests. [Cita tions.] The court may find such detriment when a parent
establishes that he or she ha s maintained regular visitation and contact with the minor and
the minor would benefit from con tinuing the relationship.” ( In re Angela C. , supra , 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 396, citing § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) Mother does not argue she could establish this parent-child re lationship exception to termina tion of parental rights. She
had not visited S.B. since the matter was tr ansferred to Los Angele s County in October 2012, more than six months before the sec tion 366.26 hearing. Nor had she contacted
DCFS since the case was transferred to discuss visitation or S.B.’s welfare. “Thus, we can likewise find beyond a reasonable doubt th at the error in notice was harmless to any detriment claim.” ( In re Angela C. , supra , 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 396.) Mother argues proper notice of the sec tion 366.26 hearing would have provided her “the ‘renewed’ opportun ity to seek reunification services by implementing the constitutional protections afford ed by section 388.” We are confident the juvenile court
would have denied a secti on 388 petition requesting a change in the order denying
Mother reunification services. Mother failed to appear at the January 2, 2013 continued disposition hearing at which th e court denied her reunification services, even though the
court had ordered her to be present during a prior hearing she attended. Mother never
contacted DCFS to discuss the mental health issu es which led to S.B.’s removal. There is nothing in the record indicating Mother had made or planned to make any effort to reunify with S.B. Any error in providing notice to Moth er of the section 366.26 hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.15 II. ICWA Notice Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding DCFS complied with the notice requirements of the ICWA. DCFS concedes the error and does not oppose a
conditional reversal of the order terminati ng parental rights and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the juvenile court to co mply with the notice pr ovisions of the ICWA. As discussed above, the ICWA notice the Agency sent did no t include Mother’s alias, Mary J. O[.], which Mother told th e Agency was her legal name. Nor did the
ICWA notice include the maiden names of S.B.’s maternal grandmother and maternal great-grandmother. As set forth above, the Cherokee Nation’ s August 16, 2012 le tter to the Agency provided a list of Mother’s maternal relative s and included Mother’s alias and the maiden names of S.B.’s maternal grandmother and maternal great-grandmother. The same letter lists S.B.’s great-great-grandmother as E dna M[.], a woman listed on the 1924 Baker Roll
of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians of North Carolina. DCFS did not provide any
of this additional information to the East ern Band of Cherokee Indians or the United
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians and ther e is no indication in the record that these tribes were aware of any of this additional information when they made the decision they
would not intervene in this matter. The letters fro m the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians and the United Keetoowah Band of Cher okee Indians do not indicate these tribes
were able to trace S.B.’s an cestry in the same manner as the Cherokee Nation. “‘[B]oth the federal ICWA regulations (25 C.F.R. § 23.11 (d)(3) (2008)) and section 224.2, subdivision (a) require the agency to provide all known information concerning the child’s parents, grandparents and great-grandp arents . . . .’ [Citation.] If known, names (maiden, married, former, and a liases), current and former addresses, birth dates, places of birth and death, tribal enro llment numbers, and any other information is to be provided. [Citation.] Notice given by DCFS pursuant to the ICWA must contain enough information to permit the tribe to conduct a meaningful review of its records to determine the child’s eligib ility for membership.” ( In re S.E. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 610, 614-615.) Under section 224.3, subdivis ion (a), the juvenile court and DCFS “have16 an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire wh ether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child . . . .” The August 16, 2012 lette r from the Cherokee Nation provided new information indicating S.B. may be eligible fo r membership in a tribe, given her maternal great-great-grandmother was listed on the 1924 Baker Roll of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians of North Carolina. (§ 224.3, subd. (b)(1) [there may be reason to know
a child is an Indian child wh en a tribe “provides informa tion suggesting the child is a member of a tribe or eligible for membership in a tribe or one or more of the child’s biological parents, grandparents, or great-g randparents are or were a member of a tribe”].) The juvenile court erred in finding DC FS complied with the notice requirements
of the ICWA. We cannot find the error was harmless given DC FS did not notify the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians that S.B .’s maternal great-great-grandmother was
listed on the 1924 Baker Roll of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians of North Carolina,
and there is no indication in the record th at the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians was otherwise aware of this information. ( In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 571, 576 [“where notice has been received by the tr ibe, as it undisputedly was in this case,
errors or omissions in the notice are revi ewed under the harmle ss error standard”].) We conditionally reverse the order termin ating parental rights and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the juvenile court to comply with the noti ce provisions of the ICWA. ( In re Francisco W. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 695, 7 05.) The juvenile court shall
direct DCFS to send a new ICWA notice (form ICWA-030) to the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians. The notice must include Mother’s alias (Mary J. O[.]), the ma iden names of S.B.’s maternal grandmother and great-grandmother, information regarding Edna M[.]’s inclusion in the 1924 Baker Roll, and the list of other names, maiden name s and aliases of S.B.’s relatives provided by the Cherokee Nation in its August 16, 2012 letter.17 DISPOSITION The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions to order DCFS to se nd a new ICWA notice (form ICWA-030) to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the United Keetoowah
Band of Cherokee Indians. The notice must include Mother’s alias (Mary J. O[.]), the maiden names of S.B.’s maternal grandm other and great-grandmother, information regarding Edna M[.]’s inclusion in the 1924 Baker Roll, and the list of other names,
maiden names and aliases of S.B.’s relative s provided by the Ch erokee Nation in its August 16, 2012 letter. If, af ter receiving proper notice, no tribe indicates S.B. is an
Indian child within the meani ng of the ICWA, then the juven ile court shall reinstate the order terminating parent al rights. If, on the other hand, a tribe claims S.B. is an Indian child, the juvenile court shall proc eed in conformity with the ICWA.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, Acting P. J.

JOHNSON, J.