2021 UT App 59

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LANE HALVERSEN,

Appellee,

v.

ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND

CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20200085-CA

Filed June 4, 2021

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy

No. 170906110

Lynn S. Davies, Rafael A. Seminario, and Samantha 

E. Wilcox, Attorneys for Appellant

Justin M. Hosman and Joshua S. Baron, Attorneys

for Appellee

JUDGE DIANA HAGEN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

GREGORY K. ORME and MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER

concurred.

HAGEN, Judge:

¶1 Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company

appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to dismiss Lane 

Halversen’s complaint. Halversen sought a trial de novo in the 

district court after arbitration because he was dissatisfied with 

the arbitration award he received on his underinsured motorist 

(UIM) claim. Allstate moved to dismiss, arguing that Utah’s UIM 

statute allows for a trial de novo only where the arbitration 

award “was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue 

means.” See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(o)(i) (LexisNexis 

2017)). We disagree with Allstate’s interpretation of the UIM 
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statute and hold that either party, within twenty days of service 

of the arbitration award, may request a trial de novo for any 

reason. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s denial of Allstate’s

motion to dismiss and the resulting judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Halversen was injured when an underinsured driver rearended his vehicle. Because the policy limits of the at-fault 

driver’s insurance did not fully cover his damages, Halversen 

submitted a claim to Allstate, his own motor vehicle insurance 

carrier, under his policy’s UIM coverage provision.1 When

Allstate declined to pay Halversen the limits of his UIM 

coverage, Halversen elected to resolve his claim in binding 

arbitration as authorized by the UIM statute. See Utah Code 

Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2017).

¶3 Halversen received an arbitration award, but within 

twenty days of receiving that award, he filed a complaint in 

district court requesting a trial de novo. At the time the 

complaint was filed, the relevant portion of the UIM statute 

provided as follows:

(o) An arbitration award issued under this section 

shall be the final resolution of all claims not 

excluded by Subsection (8)(l) between the parties 

unless:

 

1. Underinsured motorist coverage is insurance provided by the 

insured’s own auto insurance provider. See generally Utah Code 

Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(1)(b)(i), (2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020)). 

“The purpose of UIM coverage is to provide a source of 

indemnification for accident victims when the tortfeasor does 

not have adequate coverage.” See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. 

v. Green, 2003 UT 48, ¶ 31, 89 P.3d 97.
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(i) the award is procured by corruption, 

fraud, or other undue means;

(ii) either party, within 20 days after service

of the arbitration award:

(A)Files a complaint requesting a trial 

de novo in the district court; and

(B) Serves the nonmoving party with 

a copy of the complaint 

requesting a trial de novo under 

Subsection (8)(o)(ii)(A).

Id. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(o).2 In a prior version of the statute, 

subparts (i) and (ii) were separated by the word “or.” See id.

§ 31A-22-305.3(7)(o) (LexisNexis 2010). In 2011, the legislature 

deleted the word “or,” leaving the two subparts connected only 

by a semicolon without a conjunction. See id. (LexisNexis Supp. 

2011).

¶4 On the eve of trial, Allstate moved to dismiss the 

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that a 

trial de novo was authorized only when the arbitration award 

was both “procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue 

means” and a complaint seeking a trial de novo was filed within 

twenty days. See id. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(o)(i) (LexisNexis 2017). 

Allstate asserted that by removing the word “or,” the legislature 

effectively replaced “or” with “and,” creating both a substantive 

and a procedural requirement for a party to request a trial de 

novo in district court.

 

2. The relevant provisions are currently codified in subsection 

(8)(p). See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(p) (LexisNexis

Supp. 2020).
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¶5 The district court rejected that argument, explaining that 

“if what the legislature had intended was to remove the ‘or’ and 

replace it with ‘and,’ . . . that’s what the legislature would have 

done.” Instead, the court reasoned that the legislature “created a 

hopelessly ambiguous statute because [it] took what was 

previously a complete sentence and [it] removed a necessary 

connector.” The court concluded that removing the conjunction 

“was a mistake; this was a drafting error by the legislature.” In 

light of the resulting ambiguity, the court looked to “the 

underlying legislative policy and legislative history” to interpret 

the statute. The court observed that “underinsured motorist 

statutes are designed to protect insureds” and should “be 

liberally construed in favor of coverage.” In addition, it pointed 

out that Allstate’s interpretation would “dramatically narrow[]” 

the ability to review arbitration awards, yet nothing in the 

legislative history suggested that “the legislature had intended 

to make a policy shift [that] dramatic.” The court concluded that

the legislature had not intended to make subpart (i) a 

substantive requirement for seeking a trial de novo and 

accordingly denied the motion to dismiss.

¶6 The case proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a 

verdict in favor of Halversen. Allstate moved for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict based on the same arguments raised 

in its motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion and 

entered a final judgment. Allstate timely appealed, challenging 

only the denial of its motion to dismiss and the resulting 

judgment. 

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 Allstate appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to 

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on the 
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court’s interpretation of Utah Code section 31A-22-305.3(8)(o).3

Whether the district court “has subject matter jurisdiction 

presents a question of law, which [we] review under a correction 

of error standard.” Amundsen v. University of Utah, 2019 UT 49, 

¶ 19, 448 P.3d 1224 (cleaned up). Similarly, we “review questions 

of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording no deference 

to the district court’s legal conclusions.” State v. Gallegos, 2007 

UT 81, ¶ 8, 171 P.3d 426.

ANALYSIS

¶8 Allstate argues that by removing the word “or” between 

the two statutory circumstances in which an arbitration award is 

not final, the legislature narrowed the UIM statute and allowed

litigants to seek a trial de novo in district court only if both: (1) 

“the arbitration award was ‘procured by corruption, fraud, or 

undue means,’” (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(o) 

(LexisNexis 2017)), and (2) “the party seeking the trial de novo 

complied with the procedural requirements for such a request.”

We disagree with Allstate’s interpretation and affirm the district 

court’s ruling denying the motion to dismiss.

¶9 “Our courts use a ‘plain meaning’ approach to statutory 

interpretation.” Oliver v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2017 UT 39, ¶ 19, 

424 P.3d 22. “Under this approach, we need not look beyond the 

statute’s text to secondary considerations—such as legislative 

history or the canon that we interpret statutes to avoid absurd 

results—unless there is ambiguity in the statute.” Id. A statute is 

ambiguous when “its terms remain susceptible to two or more 

 

3. Our analysis pertains to the 2017 version of the UIM statute in 

effect at the time Halversen filed the complaint. See State v. Clark, 

2011 UT 23, ¶ 14, 251 P.3d 829 (explaining that the law 

governing the parties’ procedural rights and responsibilities is 

“the law in effect at the time of the procedural act”).
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reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain 

language analysis.” Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 

UT 50, ¶ 15, 267 P.3d 863. Only then do we “resort to other 

modes of statutory construction and seek guidance from 

legislative history and other accepted sources.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶10 The district court ruled that when the legislature 

“removed a necessary connector”—the word “or”—it 

“render[ed] the statute ambiguous.” To resolve that ambiguity, 

the district court relied on legislative policy and history to 

interpret the statute. We afford no deference to the district 

court’s conclusion that the statute is ambiguous. See State v. 

Gallegos, 2007 UT 81, ¶ 8, 171 P.3d 426. Although we disagree 

with that conclusion, the district court’s reading is the only 

reasonable interpretation of the statute’s plain language, and we 

affirm on that basis. See Olguin v. Anderton, 2019 UT 73, ¶ 20, 456 

P.3d 760 (“It is within our discretion to affirm a judgment on an 

alternative ground if it is apparent in the record.” (cleaned up)).

¶11 The absence of any conjunction between subparts (i) and 

(ii) may well have been “a drafting error by the legislature,” but 

we disagree that the omission renders the statute “hopelessly 

ambiguous.” We read statutory text not in isolation but “in light 

of the relevant context of the statute (including, particularly, the 

structure and language of the statutory scheme).” Bright v. 

Sorensen, 2020 UT 18, ¶ 59, 463 P.3d 626 (cleaned up). “Put 

another way, the fact that the statutory language may be 

susceptible of multiple meanings does not render it ambiguous; 

all but one of the meanings is ordinarily eliminated by context.” 

Oliver, 2017 UT 39, ¶ 20 (cleaned up). Here, that context 

eliminates the potential ambiguity.

¶12 Under the “scope-of-subparts” canon of statutory 

construction, “[m]aterial within an indented subpart relates only 

to that subpart; material contained in unindented text relates to 

all the following or preceding indented subparts.” Antonin 
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Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 

Texts 156 (2012); see also Vanderwood v. Woodward, 2019 UT App 

140, ¶ 27, 449 P.3d 983 (explaining that an unindented paragraph 

“terminating in a colon, followed by a series of indented lettered 

subparts . . . indicates that the subparts following the initial 

paragraph are all related to the prefatory paragraph and its 

objective”). This principle is illustrated by subsection (8)(o)(ii), 

which provides that an arbitration award is not final when:

(ii) either party, within 20 days after service of the 

arbitration award:

(A) files a complaint requesting a trial de 

novo in the district court; and

(B) serves the nonmoving party with a copy 

of the complaint requesting a trial de novo

under Subsection (8)(o)(ii)(A).

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(o)(ii) (LexisNexis 2017). The 

formatting indicates that the material in subpart (ii) relates to 

indented subparts (A) and (B), but does not apply to subpart (i). 

See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 156 (2012). Therefore, the twenty-day 

time limit in subpart (ii) applies both to filing the complaint in 

the district court and serving the nonmoving party with the 

complaint. But it has no bearing on the separate exception to the 

finality rule identified in subpart (i).

¶13 In contrast, subsection (8)(o) does not purport to delineate 

two circumstances in which a party may request a trial de novo, 

but rather two circumstances in which the arbitration award is 

not final. The text in subsection (8)(o), which relates to all of the 

indented subparts to follow, provides that the arbitration award 

“shall be the final resolution of all claims” except in two 

circumstances. The first exception—indented subpart (i)—

applies when “the award was procured by corruption, fraud or 
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other undue means.” See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(o)(i)

(LexisNexis 2017). The second exception—indented subpart

(ii)—applies when, within twenty days, either party “files a 

complaint requesting a trial de novo” and serves it on the 

nonmoving party. See id. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(o)(ii). Both exceptions 

set forth circumstances under which the award is not final. But 

only the second exception addresses the right to request a trial 

de novo. 

¶14 Thus, the legislature’s removal of the word “or” does not 

render the statute ambiguous as to whether subpart (i) is a 

substantive requirement for seeking a trial de novo. Applying 

the scope-of-subparts canon of construction, only subpart (ii) 

concerns the right to request a trial de novo. And that subpart

requires only that the complaint seeking a trial de novo be filed 

in the district court and served on the nonmoving party “within 

20 days after service of the arbitration award.” Id. No more is 

required to invoke the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 

¶15 This reading of subsection (8)(o) is consistent with the 

UIM statute as a whole as well as related statutory provisions.

See Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail v. Third Dist. Court, 2007 UT 24, 

¶ 9, 156 P.3d 801 (“Pursuant to our rules of statutory 

construction,” we interpret a statutory provision “in light of the 

statute as a whole and in harmony with related statutory 

provisions.”). Allstate contends that unless subsection (8)(o)(i) is 

read as the “substantive basis” required for a trial de novo, a 

party would be able to seek a trial de novo on any grounds or for 

no reason at all, which would subvert the finality of arbitration 

awards. But the UIM statute has a built-in disincentive to 

seeking a trial de novo: if the moving party does not receive a 

significantly better outcome following trial, that party is 

responsible for the nonmoving party’s costs. See Utah Code Ann. 

§ 31A-22-305.3(8)(q)(i) (LexisNexis 2017). By including this 

provision, the legislature struck what it apparently deemed to be 

the appropriate balance between promoting the finality of
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arbitration awards and allowing parties to seek a trial de novo

when confident of a more favorable verdict.

¶16 The ability to seek a trial de novo for any reason within

twenty days is also consistent with the related statute governing 

arbitration in third-party motor vehicle accident cases. Much like 

the UIM statute, the third-party arbitration statute provides: 

(11) An arbitration award issued under this section 

shall be the final resolution of all bodily injury 

claims between the parties and may be reduced to 

judgment by the court upon motion and notice 

unless:

(a) either party, within 20 days after service 

of the arbitration award:

(i) files a notice requesting a trial de 

novo in the district court; and

(ii) serves the nonmoving party with 

a copy of the notice requesting a trial 

de novo under Subsection (11)(a)(i); 

or

(b) the arbitration award has been satisfied.

Id. § 31A-22-321(11). The language in subpart (a) is almost 

identical to the language in subsection 31A-22-305.3(8)(o)(ii) and 

requires no “substantive basis” for seeking a trial de novo. Like 

the UIM statute, the third-party arbitration statute discourages 

meritless trials de novo by requiring the moving party to pay 

costs if it does not obtain a significantly better result. See id.

§ 31A-22-321(13)(a). We read both subsection 31A-22-

305.3(8)(o)(ii) and subsection 31A-22-321(11)(a) as allowing 

either party to request a trial de novo within twenty days for any 
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reason, so long as it is willing to gamble on the possibility of 

being responsible for costs.

¶17 Allstate asserts that this reading would provide an 

“unlimited statute of limitations” for raising the “issue of 

corruption, fraud, or other undue means in a UIM arbitration” 

and yet would provide no remedy if the complaining party does 

not have the right to seek a trial de novo. But both a time limit

and a remedy are provided by the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 

(UUAA), which governs UIM arbitration proceedings unless 

otherwise provided. See id. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(g). The UUAA 

provides that an arbitration award may be vacated in certain 

circumstances, including where “the award was procured by 

corruption, fraud, or other undue means,” which is identical to 

the language used in subpart (8)(o)(ii). See id. § 78B-11-124(1)(a) 

(LexisNexis 2018). In such circumstances, a party may file a 

motion with the court to vacate the award. See id. § 78B-11-

124(1). Furthermore, such a motion must be filed within ninety

days of receiving notice of the award or within ninety days after 

the basis for alleging corruption, fraud, or other undue means 

was “known or by the exercise of reasonable care would have 

been known by the movant.” See id. § 78B-11-124(2). It is not 

necessary to read subparts (i) and (ii) together to provide either a 

time limit or a remedy for challenging an arbitration award 

procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means because the 

UUAA supplies provisions that address those concerns.4

 

4. Allstate argues that there would be no reason to include 

subsection (8)(o)(i) in the UIM statute if section 78B-11-124 of the 

UUAA applies whenever a party asserts that an arbitration 

award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue 

means. In an appropriate case, a court will need to grapple with 

whether subsection (8)(o)(i) is superfluous or whether the 

legislature intended to limit the circumstances under which a 

(continued...)
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20200085-CA 11 2021 UT App 59

¶18 In sum, by removing the word “or” between subparts (i) 

and (ii) of subsection (8)(o), the legislature did not render the 

UIM statute ambiguous. The statute provides two separate and 

independent exceptions to the finality of a UIM arbitration 

award. Within twenty days, either party may request a trial de 

novo in district court for any reason, but the moving party risks 

liability for costs if it does not obtain a significantly better result 

at trial. Separately, either party may move to set aside an 

arbitration award procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue 

means. Such a motion is subject to the UUAA, which governs 

arbitration procedures generally. Because an allegation of 

corruption, fraud, or other undue means is not required to seek a 

trial de novo, the district court correctly denied Allstate’s motion 

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

CONCLUSION

¶19 An allegation of fraud, corruption, or other undue means

is not a prerequisite to seeking a trial de novo within the time 

limits set forth in Utah Code section 31A-22-305.3(8)(o).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Allstate’s 

motion to dismiss.

 

(...continued)

party could seek to vacate a UIM arbitration award to instances

in which the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other 

undue means, while excluding the other circumstances listed in 

section 78B-11-124. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-124(1)(b)–(f)

(LexisNexis 2018). But we do not need to interpret subsection 

(8)(o)(i) in this case because Halversen did not challenge the 

finality of the award based on corruption, fraud, or other undue 

means; instead he sought a trial de novo, which is governed 

solely by subsection (8)(o)(ii). See id. § 31A-22-305.3(8)(o)(ii).