Docket No. 102550.



### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IL LINOIS

TH E PEOPLE

OF THE ST

ATE OF I

LLINO IS, Ap

pelle e, v

. JACOBY WHEELER, A ppellant

. Opinion filed June 21, 2007.

J USTI CE GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, wit h opinion. Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Karmeier, and Burke conc urred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

OnMarch 12, 1999, Demetrian Forrest was found dead, slumped

over in the driver’s side of his ca r, in Decatu

r, Il linois. The

State alleged that def

endant, Ja

coby Wheeler , and his c odefend ant, S han nonHunter, murdered Forrest to prevent him from testify ing agains tWheeler in a separate criminal case. B oth men were charged with first degree murder. 720 I LCS 5/9–1(a)(1) (West 1998). OnSeptember 19, 2001, a jury in the circuit court of Macon County found defend a nt and Hunter guilty . Subsequently, the jury found th em bo th el ig ib le fo r t he de at h p en al ty becau se they (1) murdered Forrest to prevent him from te stify ing (720 IL CS 5/9–1(b)(8) (W est

1998)), and (2) committed the murder in a cold, calculated

and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan-2- (720 IL CS 5/9–1(b)(11) (We st 1998)). Defendant waived a jury for sente ncing. OnJanuary 2, 2002, t he trial court sentenced defendant to 55 ye ars’ imprisonment, finding sufficient mitigating factors to prec lude

a sentence of death. Defendant appe aled his conviction and sentence. The appellate court initially af firmed unanimously. After de fend ant petitioned

for rehearing, one justice dissented. No. 4–02–0131 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant

appeale d to this co

urt pursu ant to Rule 315 (210 Ill. 2d R. 315). De fendant

c ontends that: (1)the State failed to prove him guilty bey ond a reasonable dou

bt; (2) the prosecu tor’s co mments in closing arguments denied him a fair trial; (3) the trial c ou rt err ed in refusingto allow evidence t hat William Ellzey killed Forrest; (4) defense counsel was ineffective for eliciting de t ail s of other-crimes evidenc e; an d (5) the trial court erred in not excusing juror Br ian Thomas.

BACKGROUND Onthe evening of March 12, 1999, Deca tur police officer Shane Brandel and Detective Daniel Street were investig ating a burglary , unrelated to this case. As Brandel and Street were speaking with the occupa nts of a house at 1329 East Main Street in Decatur, they

heard gunshots. Stepping outside onto the front porch and heading toward the street, Brandel and Street saw two men running toward them through a vacan t lot. Brandel testified that the faces of the two men were dark and thus he inferred they

were black. One suspect wore a black coat while the other wore a dark coat and seemed t o be three or four inches taller thanthe other. Street testified that both men wore dark clothing and, at the time, he believed

them to be roughly

the same height

and build. Brandel stated tha

t the man in

the black coat li ft ed his coat and reached under his waistban d. Thoug h he did notsee the black-coated

manpull any

th ing out, Brandel reached for his pistol. At that point both suspects turned

around and began running north. Street testified that after Bra ndel said s ometh

ing a long the li nes o f “Sto

p, pol ice[! ]” the two suspects turned and ran north. Brandel pursue d the suspe cts-3- onfoot while

Street re turned to his vehic le and dr

ove west on Main Street, listening to Brandel’s reports on the radio. While Brandel was pursuing the suspects on foot he lost sig htof themtwice. The first time, he lost sight of them for four to f iv e seconds as he rounded a corner into an alley

way betwee n East Mai

n and East Prairie Street. The second time, he lost sight of the suspects for about 20 seconds when they darted between some houses on East Main. Brandel testified

that, when the suspects again came into view, he was certain, based

on their clothing and build, they

were the same suspects he had been chasing. Eventually , the suspects parted, eac h running on an opposite side of a motor home parked in a lot between 1212 and 1228 East Main Street. Bra n del followed the cl osest suspect, the one in

the blue c oat, and arrested him on the front porch of the house

at 1212 Ea st Main. That su s pect was Shannon Hunter. Brandel testified that he did not see any other pe rsons dur ing his pursuit. Brandel was unab le to rec all whether Hunte r was short of bre ath

or perspiring when he was arre sted. Brandelstated that he did not see either suspect discard

anything dur

ing the chase. He did not believe the suspects were wearing masks or e yewea r and did not notice any stripes or different

colors on their c oats, des cribing them only

as solid blue or black. Defendant’s counsel showed Br andel a black coat

with white stripes that other police officers found ina driveway

between the houses at

1229 and 1 237 East Ma in Str eet, a few blocks away fromthe scene of

the shooting. Brandel could not identify it as a coat worn by either su spect. During the chas e, Bra

ndel notic ed a car

parked 1 50 feet n

ortheas t of the point w

here he first spot

ted th e susp ects. The police later discove red Forrest’s dead body in that car. He had been shot in the head, left arm, l eft thig

h, and rig

ht thigh. Though t

he car was in neutral and the stereo w as blaring , it was not running. The driver’s side window was shattered and shar ds of glas s were strewn on the street in front of

120 North Stone Street and at the point where the car had come to r est sligh tly northwest of that location. Two bullet holes

were f ound in the driver’s door, one bullet was found on the front passenger floorboard, an d one wa s found in the panel of the front passenger door.-4- Street testified t hat as he drove west on Main Street he noticed police cars with lights on at Jasper Street. He turned left (sou th) onto Jasper Street and contin

ued to the intersection of Wood and Jasper. At the intersection, Street saw a black man in dar

k clothing run onto Wood Street from the north. The man crossed Wood Street and ra n t oward the east side of Walgreens at 1201 East Wood. Atthat point, Street los tsight of him behind a fence. Street continued south on Jasper Street and, turning east onto Clay

Street, s topped mid-block with his car headlights off. Str eetsa w the man emerge from betwee n some houses, stop on the sidewalk, and then walk on Clay Stree t at a normal pace. Ev en tu al ly, the man crou

ched an d hid unde

r a bush a

t 1304 Eas t Clay

Street. Street testified that, at

that point, he had not se en any other fo ot traff

ic on Clay Street. After he saw the man hide under the bush, Street radioed police dispatch. Not a minut

e later, another

Decatu r police offic er, S hawn Guenther, pulled the man out from und er the bush. That man was defenda nt, Jacoby Wheel er. St

reet tes tified tha

t this was the same
manhe saw r

unning toward him a

fter he aring g

unshots wh

ile he and Brande l were a

t 1329 Eas t Main Stre et. Howe ver, Street was not able to identify H unter as the other suspect he saw running toward him. Additionally , he did not not ice either suspect make any

drastic c hange of clothin

g, nor d id he notice stripes or hoods on the suspe cts’ coa ts. Street further admitted

that the black coat shown to him at trial had white stripes down each sleeve which, ha d he notic ed, he wo

uld have d

escribe d in his re

port. Jason Derbort, another Decatur police off icer, also testified. Derbort responded to a report of shots fired, p arked h is car at the intersection

of Main and Jasper

Streets, and turne d off his h eadlig hts. Seeing a black man in dark clothing and a dark c oat run out of

the lot where the motor home was parked, Derbort turned onhis headl ights and emergency

lights, got out of

his squad car, and y

elled at the man to stop. Der

bort testi fied tha

t th e man t hen headed southeast. Soon after the event, however, Derbort wrote i n hi s police report that the

manran south. Regardless, Derbort testified that he followe d the man and could see that the dark coat he was wea ring had white stripes down the s leeves.-5- As the man c ontinued t

o run, Der bort lost si ght of hi

m for around two seconds as he ran through the driveway between 1229 and 1237 East Main Street. When he saw the man again, he was n o longer wearing the dark coat but was now clad in a gre enand y ellow jac ket. The man continued

running, crossed Wood Street, fled between 1295 and 1305 Wood Street, and jumped a chai n-link fence. Derbor t, unable to jump the fe nce du e to the weight of his full winter gear, went around th e fence in pursuit. He testified that he saw no other foot traffic as he pursued the man. When Derbort again saw the man, Officer Guenther was ordering him out from under the bush at 1304 East Clay. As noted, that man was Jacoby Wheeler and he was wearing the gre en and

ye llow jack

et Derbo rt had se en while i

n pursuit. Retracing the route the suspects had taken, police found various items. Where the suspects initially turned and ra n from Brandeland Street, police found a .22-caliber revolver conta ining five live rounds and one spent round. Along the suspects’ route of flight, police f ound

a ski m ask lined with a pair of ny lon stockings, a black neopre n e mask , a stocking cap, and a .357 Mag num chrome revo lve r containing two live rounds and four spent rounds. The neoprene mask, stocking cap, and .357 Magnum revolver were not found in the initial police se arch. I

nstead, t hose items

were found in a

search just after midnight on March 13, 1999, when police discovered that more thanone gun might

have b een in volv ed in t he sho otin g. Brandel noted that those items were found at a time when the area was no longer secured. B randel e

xplained th at to be se cured me ans that a n area i s controlled

in such a

way tha t the integ

rity of the cr

ime scen e is maintained

and no unauthorized persons are allowed into or out of the

area. Inaddition to the above, police also found two right-hand brown jersey gloves on the front bumper of the motor ho me where the suspects parted company

. Furt her, they f ound a black coat with the sleeves turne d ins ide ou t and t he whi te li ning fa cing upw ard in the

area where Officer

Derbort had lost sight of the man who he claimed turned out to b e Jacoby Wheeler. Police wor e gloves in picking up each item of evidence, but did not change their gloves from one item to the next. Addition all y, eac h item was photographed where it lay and the ph

otogra phs were admitted i

nto evide nce at tr ial.-6- The day afte

r the murder, Deosha Singleton, defen dan t’s girlfriend of seven ye ars, told De tect ive Gannon that she overheard defendant and Hunter speaking to each other on the da y of the murder. Accord

ing to Sing

leton, she heard someone sa

yin g “I ’ll do it. I’ll do it” an d someone saying “do it” and the other say ing “no.” At trial, however, she testified that she had lied to Gannon because she want edto leave th e police intervie w room. Te

ronica Jones, with whomcodefe

ndant had a son, te s tified that Hunter used her car on March 12, 1999. She further testified that she picked up the car the next mor ning a t Main and East Streets. Jones acknowledged, however, that she had made a contradictory writtenstatement that she retrieved the car about 21⁄2 b locks so ut hwest of where Forrest was killed. Two women, neither of whom knew defendant or Hunter , bu t both of whom lived

near the alley

where F orrest w as found d ead, als o testified. Misty Gilman testified that she heard gunshot s the night of March 12, 1999. Af

ter hearing the shots, she looked outside her apartment at 1423 East Prairie Street and saw two persons in thealley and three persons on the sidewalk head toward Prairie Street. One of the men in the al ley wore a r ed and black Chica go Bulls jack et. Gilmanacknowledg e d that she made a contradictory written statement that she had

seen only three

persons, two in the bushes right off the alley and a

nother going north. Tamara Hodg es tes tified that she heard a

car pull up near her home a

t 1363 Eas t Prair

ie around 8:45 p.m. on March 12, 1999, and just sit there. She heard g unshots, l ookedout her window, and saw two black men run north on Stone Street, jump into a s

ports ca r, and dr ive west on Prairie

Street. H odges further testified that when the car drove of f in a westerl y direction she did notremember hearing any tires squealing or similar noises. Little forensic evidence tied defendant dire ctly to the items of evidence found by

police. E

ric Youn

g, a forensic s cientist specializing in trace chemistry , testified that if someone had stepped

on b roken g lass, it wa s likely, though not cert ain, that fragme nts o f the glass would bec ome embe dded in the soles of that pe rson’s shoes. He furth er test ified, however, that such fragments coul d become dislod ged by running. While some glass was found in defendant’s-7- shoes, that glass did not

matchthe glass from Forrest’s shattered c ar window. The ski mask and

stocking cap found by

police contained human head hairs t hat did not come from either defendant or Hunter. No blood was found on ei ther man ’s clothing. The firearms and

a mm unition recovered by police did not yield finge rprints. No gunshot residue was found on the jacket defendant was wearing when he was apprehended. Ho wev er, gunshot residue was found on Hunter’s coat, the brown g loves, and the black coat with white stripes police found along def

endant’ s purport

ed path of fl ight. Defendant challenged

the accuracy

of the residu e fi nding, though, by introducing testimony establishing that failure to change glove s or clean evidenceprocessing surfacescan result in gunshot particles being transferred from one exhibit to another. Travis L. Hindman, a forensic pa thologist called by the S tate, testifie d that it was his opinion that Forrest suffered a fatal hea d wound at poi nt-bl ank ran ge from either a .22- or a .25-cal iber bulle

t. Moreover, he testified that the leg wounds Forrest suffe red came from

a medium-c lass pistol

such as a .357 Mag

num or a .3 8 calibe

r while the hollow-po int bullet i

nForrest’s left arm

definitiv ely

came fr om a .357 Magnum handgun. Robert J. Hunton, a forensic scientist called by the State, also conclude d that t he bullet from Forrest’s left arm

came from a .357 Magnum handgun. Moreove r, Hunton conclude d that the bullet came from the exact .357 Magnum chrome revolver pol ice recov ered in this case. His opinion was based upon rifling marks on the bullet tha t were distinctive to bullets fired from that particular weapon. Using the rifling-mark tec hnique a second time, Huntonconcluded that the bullet on the passenger floorboard

and the one in the passenger front door also ca me from that revolver. Evidence at trial indicated that defendant and

Hunter associated with each other before the mu rder. Win

ifred Forrest, Demetrian Forres t ’s g randmother, testified that defendant and Hunter play ed billiards togethe

r multiple times a we ek during

the summer

and fall of 1998. She a

lso testif ied that d efenda nt had pre viously been friends with Demetrian. Micha el C unningham, an acquaintance of def endant, saw defendant and Hunter at

a p ar ty d ays before the murder. Cunningham testified that everyone

at the pa rt y, including himself, was drinking-8- alcohol and smoking marijuana. Though his memory wa s h az y, Cunn ingh am remembered mentioning that if he were Jacoby Wheeler, he would pay

Forres t not to testi fy . Though he was no t complete ly certain, Cunningham

also remembered Wheeler, or perhaps someone else, remark

ing that he did not want to go back to pr

iso n

. Cunningham furthe

r testifie d that he s aw that de fendant had at le ast one handgun with him when he left the party with Hunter. Though Cunningham denied making an y deal with the State for his te st im on y, he did indi catethat he could not remember every thing that happened. Further calling into question his testimony, a defense investigator, De an Paisley , testifie d that Cunn ingham a dmitted to h

im that anything he had to ld the police was a “combination of what he

rec alle d from his me

ntal state of drinki ng and u sing dru

gs and h is desire to ge t a ny s en te nc e h e m ay receive reduce d.” Cunnin gham, however , denied making that statement. Insupport of its case, the State elicited testimony to e stablish that defendant had a moti

ve to murd

er Deme trian Forrest. Macon Cou

nty State’s Attorney Scott Rueter testified that in 1998, while he was an assistantState’s A ttorney, he wa s assigned to prosecute a case, eventua lly scheduled to go to trial on March 16, 1999, in which de fendant was charged with the attempted first deg ree mur der an d aggravated

battery with a f

irearm of An g elo Williams. Rueter testified t hat during discovery

in that case, he disclosed Demetrian Forre st as a witness. Rueter indicated that it was his belief that Forrest’s testi mony woul d, alo ng wi th other e vidence , implicat

e defenda nt. Lisa Holder Whi te, defe ndant’s a ttorney at the time

Forres t
was disclose d as a

witness, testified

that while she was aware that the State might call Forrest as a witness she did not know that for sure. To rebut any sugge stion that F orrest w as killed b ecause he was to be a witness against defendant in the Williams case, t he defe nse proffered evidence that Forrest was an inf orma nt in other cases and had te st if ie d a ga in st Wi ll ia m E ll ze y, the highest ranking member of the Gangster

Disciples in Decatur. That evidence would have shown that Ellzey had rece ived a sentence of imprisonment for life in an unrelated crim inal pr oceeding; that Forrest had “lost” some of Ellzey’s drugs; t

hat Forr est hadbe en be hi nd in pa yme nt s t o E ll ze y; that Forres t had be en physically “disciplined” for coming to Ellzey with a gold necklace instead of a cash payme

nt; and that Forrest had-9- some relationship with Ellzey’s girlfr iend. In addition to the above evidence , Hunter made an offer of proof that De metrian Forrest’s grandmother

Wi ni fr ed Fo rr es t f

ea re d f or hi s s af

et y and wa s uncomfor tablebecause of his testimony agains tWilliam Ellzey. The defense contended

that their proposed evidence would have shown a theory for which the jury

could infer t

hat so meone other than defenda nts murde red Deme trian Forrest. The trial court ruled

that the information regarding Ellzey was too speculative to b e allowed before the jury . The court ruled that the defense could not ask Winifred Forrest if she feared for Demetrian’s

sa fe ty. Moreove

r, the co urt told de fendant s that whil e they were free to argu e that some one else

murdere d Forre st, “as far as arguing that

someone else in pa

rticular did it” such evidence was “way too speculative to allow to go before the jury .” At the beginning of his closing arg ument, after thanking the jury for its attention and determination, the prosecutor made the following comment, which de fendant now chal lenges

before this cour t: “MR. CURRENT [Prosecutor]: A murder case is an unusually difficult type of ca se for the prosecution to prov e because the defendant has killed the main prosecution witness. The deceased neve r gets to testify . The deceased

ne ve r g et s t o t el l h is si de of th e s to ry. Then, who is left to take up his cause and try to speak for him? Often, it’s a lone prosecut or, a stranger , who is lef t to champ ion the deceased. A solitary figure appears in Court bearing the burden of avenging a

nother’s death a

nd present i ng the truth to a jury

and the Co

urt. But, often time [ sic ], justice only requires a solitar

y champion be cause

truth and justice is nota load as heavy

as it appea

rs. The lo ad has an

unspeak able lightness.” T hrou ghout

the course of the rest of his argument, the pr osecutor made a nu

mber of o ther com

ments that

defenda nt also challeng es: “MR. CURRENT: I

would suggest to y

ou that you jurors lead sheltered lives. You stepped into a world, over a month ago, that to many of y

ou never existed. Yo u have no idea what kind of criminals and serious crime are lurking out there. There ar e da ngerous people. There are mean streets. Not-10- everyone lives in a peacefulneighborhood like y ou or has safe neighb orhoods. Th e police are often referred to a s ‘the thin blue line’. Well, what does that mean, ‘the thin bl u e line’? The police

are there to protect y

ou from the likes of Kennet h Lo velace, Gregory Williams, Andre Eubanks, SeanMarshal l, Timothy Glass, Franklin Small. Who do citizens call–c iti zens of this County callwhen they ne ed

assistanc e? Who do citize ns call when someone is breaking into their house or assaulting them? The polic e do not call Kenneth Lovelace , Gregory Williams, Andre Eubanks, etc. When you ge

t up in the morning or

your spouse g ets up in the morning or a family

member gets up in the morning and you go to work, are y

ou risking your life

to earn a pay

check? Are you putting y

our life on the line when you g o to the office

or your work? Yet, police-bashing seems to be a semi-popular sport until a citizen i s in distre ss. Then, that same office r is expected to come to a citizen’s salvation. Well, who do citizens want to serve and pro t ect them i n times of need? I would submit they want officers like Shane Brande l and Dan

Street a nd Jason De

rbort. Shane Brandel, y

ou look at him, he looks like the boy who grew up next-door. The boy

who grew up in the neighborhood who’s finally

an adult. Dan Street. Here’s a man who served 4 ye ars in the United States Marine Corps and then continued his service with the Decatur Police De

partmen t. A rese rved, de liberate , lo w -key

man. That’s the adva

ntage o f a Jury

Trial. You

get to e ye ball a witness when he t

estifies . You ge

t to see him

. You

get to see how he reac

ts to questi ons, pr osecution question s, defen se questions

. You get an idea fo r what ki nd of person you a re dealing with. Iwould suggest

to you that Shane Br

andel and Dan Street

are part of the new breed of policeman. These a re men who

are educa ted, intelligent, and well-spoken. They ’re not the-11- coarse, musclebound

brutes who can’t find any other way of makin g a livi ng. * * * MR. CURRENT: Your eye s have, also, noticed that each defendant has two attorneys f

or a total of four a

ttorne ys representing

these defendants. And contrary to representation s made to y ou durin g the jury selection or voir dire, y

ou have

seen with y our own e

ye s these a

re not t wo com pletely different independ ent teams of lawy ers. You watch with your

owneye s a s they converse frequently . One will go back and

a sk an ot he r f

or as si st an ce ; o ne wi ll ta lk to an ot he r a tt or ne y; thengo back and start asking the same questions or

different questions

. MR. BAXTER [counsel for Wheeler]: Objection, y our honor. THE COURT: Sustained. MR. BAXTER: Thank you. MR. CURRENT: Y ou have f our lawy ers with i n excess of 100 years

of legal practice and 75 years of school grilling Shane Br andel. MR. MATTINGL

EY [counsel for Hun te r]: Again, objection. THE COURT: Sustained. MR. BAXTER: Thank you. MR. CURRENT: Consider wh o was que stioning

Sh an e Brandel and

Dan Street; for Shane Brandel, an entire afternoon and an entire morning, and for Dan St reet, four hours. MR. BAXTER: Same objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. MR. CURRENT: Don’t you think that vast array of legal talent who have had

21⁄2 years to study

this case inside out, top to bottom, is going to find some discrepancy

with whichthey

can hu rl th ei r m ig ht y h a rpoons? If y ou didn’t know it now, you do know trial lawyers a

re Monday morning

quarter backs.-12- MR. CURR ENT: E very Mond ay mornin g, they can tell you all the bad decisio ns the quarterback made the previous day while he was being double-blitzed. A trial lawyer

can dissect, bisect, and magnify any p ast action, all with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight and all with the benefit of time an

d numbers . But, in the final a nalysis, the attorne ys w eren’t

there r isking th eir lives

on March

the 12th of 1999. They we

re not in the arena. MR. BAXTER: Objection, Your Honor. MR. MATTINGL

EY: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. You may continue , Mr. Curr

ent. MR. CURRENT: The policemen were in the arena. So, in li gh t o f a ll th is , i s i t t oo su rp ri si ng th at th e d ef en se at to rn eys obtained what they thoug htwere so me pointsin their favor? But, the rules of

the game at which attorney s defend, operate, and go unde r seem to require a complete perfection on the part of a witness. If a wi

tness i sn’t perfect, then, the skill of the attorne

y ha s revea

led the wi tness to be a liar, the witness to be stupid, or the witness to be confused– MR. BAXTER: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. MR. CU RR ENT: –any

of which

render the witne ss unworthy of belief. But, in the every day rea l life wor ld in whichwe all live, t

here isno perfection. In the r eal world, we judge e ach othe

r by a less exacting standard. We realize that most people are hard-working, c onscient ious, capable, honest , and good-he a rted people who do their best in a difficult and trying wo rld. Can you

think of a

ny 2minutes in y

our life i n whichyou could withstand a full day of cross-examinationby a four- lawy

er team? MR . D AV IS: Ju dg e, I ob

je ct . H e’ s p la ci ng th e J ur y– THE COURT: Sustained. MR. CURRENT: Could you withstand– MR. DAVIS: I

ob ject, Judg e. He’s asking–he’s putting the Jury in the pla

ce of the parties.-13- THE COURT: That objection is overruled. MR. CURRENT: The attorneys made a great deal to[-]do about the police r eports of

Shane Br

andel an d Dan Stre et. Now, as a citizen, when you c all the po lice, you expect an instantresponse. Even sooner if y our l ife is at stake. You don’t want to call 911 only to be told by the d ispatcher

the following message: ‘All available police offi ce rs are typing police reports at their type writers and word

processors at the pre sent time . As so on as t hey are don e perfo rming t hei r secretarial duties, they

will be sent out on the street. And for your informat ion, most of

these of fic ers j ust came

in from a

mu rder case, and we know how exacting[ly ] the defens e attorneys will cross-e

xamine them.’ MR. BAXTER: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. MR. BA XT ER : A sk th e J ur y t o be instructe d and to disreg ard that

. THE COURT: The Jury

is instructed to disreg ard the l ast comment. Proceed , Mr. Curr

ent. MR. CURRENT: ‘ We k

now how clos ely their

words will be examine

d; so, you can exp ect an additi onal 4 or 5 h ours bef ore t he office

rs will be av

ailable sothey can

make sur

e that every word i[s] perfect, all syntaxes .’ MR. BAXT ER: I o

bject to that. THE COURT: Overruled. MR. CURRENT: Your honor– THE COURT : Continue, Mr. Curre nt. MR. CURRENT: –I would like to– THE COURT: Go ahead. MR. CURRENT: ‘ Every

word is perfect, all syntaxes are acceptable, and all paragraphs are sufficiently long enough to gain approbation from anyone .’

* * *-14- Mr. CURRENT: *** Then , l ast Thursday, y ou experienced

a very sad and disgusting day

when Lisa Holder White took the Witness Stand. A judge is a la wy er, but a judge, also, takes an oath to support an d defe nd the Constitution of the United States andthe Constitution of the State of Il linois and

to enforce the laws of this State. Her te st im on y, last Thur sday, at the behe st of Jacoby Wheeler’s attorney wa s revolting to any person who values the truth. MR. DAVIS: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. MR. BAXTER: Ask the Jury to be instructed to disregard. THE COURT: Disregard that comment, L adies and Gentlemen. MR. BAXTER: Thank you. MR. CURRENT: *** As she [Lisa Holder White] testi fie d, one had visions of William Jefferson Clinton flashing before our ey es. MR. DAVI S: I ob

ject to tha

t. THE COURT: Overruled. MR. CURRENT: W

he ther one is a Democrat, a Republican, or Independen t, her perform ance wa s vintag e Bill Clinton. While testifying befor e a Federal Grany

Jury an d when pressed on an issue, Clinton responded, ‘ It depends on what your defi

nitio n of ‘is’ is .’ At a ne ws confe rence, Bill Clinton pointed his finger at th e camera, while discussing Monica Lewinski, and declare d, ‘ I never had sexual

relations with that woman .’ MR. BAXTER: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. MR

. CURRENT: I guess it depends on what y our definition of what

‘sexual re lations’ i s.

*** MR. CURRENT: If y

ou want a frank assessment of John Platzbecker, the police officer, may be, his elevator does n’ t run all the way to the top f loor.-15- * * * MR. CURRENT: Mr . Demetr ian Forr est dies March 12 th of 1999, and

Dean Pai sley

is going out June 26th of 2001, in the middle of the summer, to take some pictures for y ou. Two years and three months later, somebody decides, well, it might be nice to ha

ve some pi ctures a

nd it might be nicer if we took themin the summe

rtime whic

h is c omp letely differ

ent from the winter as far as foliage a nd growth and , maybe, t

he Jury will fall for it. Donald Hopper– MR. BAXTER: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Overruled. MR. CURRENT: Donald Hopper. He wai ts u ntil after jury se le ct io n s ta rt s. We ’r e a ll in he re tr yin g t o p ic k a ju ry, and he’s out there snapping pictures. Now, it’s two years a nd five months later, and he’s out there taking pictur es. N ow, how serious a

re th ey about g iving y

ou accu rate an d fair information? * * * MR. CU RRENT: *** You’ve also noticed from closing argume nts from the defense, you hear everything

twice. You hear the prosecution’s story onc e. You hear the defense twice. It’s almost like bein g in a ro om being brainwa shed. Just because you hear it over

and over and over doesn’t mean it’s true. All it means is you’re hea ring it more times than

you’ve heard it from the other side.” (Emphases in origina l.) T he jury found the

defenda nts guilty as char ged an d eligib le fo r the death penalty in Septembe r 2001. Both defendant and Hunter waived a jury for se

ntencing. Having fou

nd sufficient mitigating factors to precl

ude a sen

tence of death, the trial c ourt s entenced defendant (as well a s Hunter)to 55 y

ears’ im prisonme nt. We will consider each of defendant’s a rguments in turn.

ANA LYSIS I. Sufficiency

of the Evidence Defendant claims that the evidence in this cas e is insuffic ient to prove him guilty

of first deg ree mu rde r be yond a re aso nab le d oub t. If-16- he is correct, his conviction must be reversed. The Criminal Code of 1961 provides:

“A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performingthe acts which cause the death: (1) he either in

tends to kill or do g

reat bod ily harm to that individua

l or anoth er, or kn

ows th at such act s will cause death to that individual or another; or (2) he knows that such

acts cr eate a s trong pr

obability of death or great bodily

harm to that individual or another[.]” 720 IL CS 5/9–1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998). With this stat

ute in mind, we will co

nsider de fendant ’s claim. As this cour

t has note d, “[t ]h e due process clause of the fourtee nth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that

a person may not be c onvicted in state court ‘except upon proo f bey ond a reasonable dou

bt of eve ry fact ne cessar

y to constitu te th e crimewith which he is charged.’ ” People v. Cunningham , 212 I ll. 2d 274, 278 (2004 ), quo ting In re W inship , 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068 , 1073 ( 1970) . Whe n revi ewing a challen ge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court consider s whether, viewing the evidence in thelight most favorable to the State,

“ ‘ anyrational trier of fact could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be

yon d a reas onable do

ubt. (Emphasis in ori gin al.)’ ” People v. Co llins , 106 Ill . 2d 23 7, 261 (1985 ), quo ting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); s ee alsoPeople v. Smi th , 1 85 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). The United Sta

tes Supre me Court has stated that “the criticalinquiry

onreview o f the su fficien cy of the e vidence to support a criminal convicti on must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properl y inst ru cted, but to determine whether the record e vidence could reasonably

support a finding of guilt bey ond a re aso nable doubt.” Jackson v. Virgini a , 443 U.S. at 318, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2788- 8 9. This standard of review applies, “reg ardless of wheth er the evidence is direct or circumstantial [citation], an d regar dless of whether the defendant rece ives a bench or ju ry trial [citation].” People v. Cooper , 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000).-17- This court

will not re try a defen dant w hen co nsid ering a sufficiency

of the ev

idence c halle nge. People v

. Smith , 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). The trier of fact is best equipped to judge the credibi lity

of witnesses, and du e con sideration must be given to the fact th at it wa s t he tr ia l c ou rt an d j ur y that saw a nd heard the witnesse s. Smith , 185 Ill. 2d at 541-42. Accordingly , a jury’s fi ndin gs concerning credibility

are entitled to great weight. Smith , 185 Ill. 2d at 542. The simple fact that a judge or jury accepted the v eracity of certain testimony

does not g

uarante e reasonablene ss, however. As we have p reviously stated, “[r]easonable pe ople may on occ asion act

unrea sonably

” and, thus, while a fact finder’s decision to acce pt testimony is entitled t

o defere nce, i t is n eithe r concl usiv e nor b indi ng. Cunningham , 212 Ill. 2d at 280. According ly, a co nviction will be reversed where the eviden ce is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory

that it justi fies a re asonable doubt of de fendant ’s guilt. Smith , 185 Ill. 2d at 542. Supporting defendant’s conviction, the State argues that, viewed inthe lig ht most favorable to the prosecution, evidence at trial showed that: (1) defendant

knew and had assoc iated wit

h Hunter and Forres t; (2) For

rest was a likely State’s w

it ness in a murder trial agains tthe defe

ndant; (3 ) defen

dant’s at torney

knew tha

t Forre st would likely testify

against defendant in the murder tr ial; (4) defendant found out that Forrest was going to testify agains t him; (5) defendant told peopl e that he

did n ot want to go to prison; (6) def endant had acc ess to and

possesse d handg

uns; (7) two me n matching defendan

t’s and Hunter’s general desc riptions ran away fromthe murder

scene and were spotted by police officers; (8) the police officers gave chase and found

defendant

hiding in the bushe s; and (9) gunpowder res i due was found on a jacket that defendant discarded as he fled from

police. All of this, the State argues, makes it neithe r improbable nor irrational that a jury would convict defendant of first degree

murder. Defend ant, on the other hand, argues that the State’s evidence was insufficient to meet its burden of proof. Defend ant points out a lack of eyewitnesse s. Moreover, defendant believes the lack of fore nsic evidence to be critical . As not ed in the background, no gunshot residue was fou

nd on def

endant. Though there was a g ood deal of-18- blood in Forrest’s car

and evide

nce indic ated he was killed a t close range, d efenda

nt had no blo od on him. Whi le defe ndant wor

e softsoled shoes conducive to picking up glas s and the driver’s side window of Forrest’s car was shattere d, leaving glass strewn about the street, the only

glass f ound in de fendant ’s shoes c ame fro m some other source . No f

ingerprints were found ty ing defendant to the murder. Though some human head hairs were f ound in the mask and sto cking cap recovered by police, those hairs did not belon g t o defenda nt. Ad di ti on al ly, defenda

nt attempt s t o reanaly

ze the evidence, pointing out situations where the jury could have dr awn inferences tending to ex culpate defendant. For example, where the State expl ain s the lack of blood found on defendant by noting expert testimony that any blood would have ejected away from the shooter

in this situation, defendant notes tha

t the exper

t refuse d to say

that no blo od came fromthe entrance woun d and photos in e vidence did show sma

ll amounts o f blood on the driver’s side roof of the car. This, the defense c ontends, could support an inference that whoever shot Forres twould have been spattered with some blood. Since no blood

was found on defendant, then, it could further be inferred that defendant was not the murderer. While defend ant’s argu m ents are well-taken, a reviewing court must give the Stat e t he bene fit of all reasona ble infe rences

. Cunni ngha m , 212 Ill. 2d at 280. As already discussed, the evidence

ana lyzed in challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence must be considered

in the light most fav orable to the prosecution. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319 , 61 L. Ed. 2d at 5 73, 99 S. Ct. a t 2789; Cunningham , 212 Ill. 2d at

280 (c itin g Jackson for the same proposition). This court has stated that this “means the rev iewing court mus t allow al l

reasona ble inferences from the reco rd in favor of the prosecution.” Cunningham , 212 Ill. 2d at 280. Defen d ant

contends that the State, and the appellate court on review, failed

to properly consider

all of the evidence. In Jackson , the Supreme Court stated that on appeal “the factfinder’s role as weigher of the ev idenc e is pr eserve d thro ugh a lega l conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidenceis to be considered in the light most favora ble to t he prosecution.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson , 443 U.S. a t 319, 61 L . Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. D efenda nt t hu s-19- argue s that app ellate r

eview mus tinclude consideration of all of the evidence, not just

the evide nce con venient t o the State’s theory of

the case. We agree. However, the mandate to consider all the evidence on review does notnecessitate a point-by-point discussion of every piece of evidence

as well as every possible infe rence that could be drawn therefrom. To engage in such an

activity would ef fective ly amou nt to a retrial on appeal, an improp er task

expressly inconsistent

with past precede

nt. Smith , 185 I ll. 2d

at 541. Indeed, this court has stated that e ven “the trier of fact i s not required to disregard inferenc es which flow normally from the evidence and to s earch o ut all possi

ble explanations consiste

nt with in n ocence and raise them to a level of

rea son able doubt.” People v . Hall , 194 I

ll. 2d 305, 3 32 (2 000) . We have also s tated tha

t “[t]he trier of fact need not *** be satisfied bey ond a reasonable doubt as to each link in the c hain o f circumstances.” Hall , 194 I ll. 2d at 330. Accordingly , this court is not required to s earch o

ut all possi

ble explanations consistent w ith in n ocence or be satisfied bey ond a reasonable doubt as to each link inthe chain of circumstances. On the contrar y, we must ask, after consideringall of the

evidenc e in th e li ght most favorable to the prosecution, whether

the rec ord evide

nce cou ld reasonably

support a finding of guilt bey ond a rea sonable d

oubt. Inthe pres ent case , we answ er that q uestion in the affirmative. W inifred Forres t and Michael Cunnin gham te stified r

egard in g defendant and Hunter’s association. Further, Deosha Singleton made

a st atement t

o Detec tive Gann

on where in she sta

ted that she overheard defendant and

Hunter speaking on the day of the murder. Considering this evidence i n the light most favorable to the p rosecut ion, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that defendant and Hunter we re associates who both knew Demetrian Forres t. Scott Rueter testified

that Forrest was a witness prepared to testify and implicate defendant at defendant’s trial for the mur der of Angelo Williams. Mic

hael Cunn

ingham t estified that he to ld

defendant

that if he were in defen dant’s sit uation he would pay

Forres tno t t o t es ti fy. Cunningham

further testified

that defendant expressed his desire not to go back t o prison. Consideri ng this e vidence in the lig

ht most favora ble to the prosecution, it w ould be re asonable for a jur y to-20- conclude that defendant knew Forrest was pre pared to implicate

him inthe murder of Angelo Williams. From this, it would a l so be

reasona ble for a jur

y to infer tha t defend ant had a strong motive to kill Forres t. Cunningham

also testified to seeingdefendant in possession of at least one handgun. Considering that testimony in the lig

ht most favora ble to the pros ecut ion, it woul d be rea sonable f or a jury to conclude that defendant possessed or had ac cess to a handgun. Officers Bran del , Street, and Der bort testi fied to the

events surrounding the chas e and eventual capture of defenda nt and Hunter. Moreover, the officers testified to their actions in recovering various items of ev idence. Consideri ng this e vidence in the lig

ht most favora ble to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to infer that defendant and Hunter had just murdered Deme trian Forrest, were running from the scene of the crime w hen they we

re seen by

police, and thereafter fled, dropping evide nce along their

path (including the murder weapons and clothing). The offi cers’ te stimony also supports the inference that defendant was hiding when he was found in the bu sh es at 13 04 Ea st Cl ay. Forens ic pathologist Travis Hindman and forensi c scientist R obert Huntontestifie d rega

rdin g t he types of ha

ndguns and ammunition they believe d were u sed in the murder o f Forre st. Co nsiderin g their testimony in the lig ht most favorable t

o the pros ecution, it

would be

reasona ble for a jur

y to c onclude that the guns recovered by police

were a ctually used to kil l Forre st. Teronica Jones testified regarding her rela tionship wi th Hunter, including the fact tha

t she had a

child with

him. She al so testifi ed to the fact that she had lent Hunter her car and picked it up the morning after the murder. At trial, Jones’ testimony rega rding the location of the car was inconsistent with a written statement she had completed shortly after the murder occurre d, wh ich indic ated she found it somewhere southwest of the sce ne of the crime. Considerin

g this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it would be

reasona ble fo r a ju ry to tr

ust Jones’ written statement over her trial testimony and thus infer that defendant was running towa rd a getaway
car when he was caug

ht at 1304 E ast Clay, southwe st of the scene of the crime.-21- Misty Gilman testified that, after hearing g unshot s, she l ooked out her window at

1423 East Prairie and saw five persons, including one wearing a Ch i cago Bulls jacket. Gilman had completed a written statemen t, however , that con

tradicte d th is testimony and indicated that she only saw thre e person s. Conside ring he r test i mony , as well

as her cont

radictory written s tatement , in the light most favora ble to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that her testi mony sh ould carry

little weight or that two of the persons she reported seeing inher written statement weredefendant and Hunter. Tamara Hodges testified that upon hearing gunshots, shelooked outher wind

ow at 1363 East Prai

rie Stree t and sa w two men run north on Stone Str

eet, hop i nto a car, and drive off. She also testified, however, that the car did not squeal its tires or make any

remark able sound as it drov e off. Considerin g this inthe ligh

t most favorable to the prosecution, it would be reasonable for a jury to conclude that Hodges ’ testimony shed little light at all on the case, or even that the two individua

ls she observed jump into a sports car had nothing to do with the murder. The above c onclusio ns and infe rences are not t

he only conclusions and

inferences that could be drawn. They are reasonable, however, and taken together they support a find ingthat defendant was guilty beyond a re asonable doubt of the first degree murde r of Demetrian

Forrest. This finding

is further supported by

the fact that this court has “consistently he ld thata conviction may be based solely

oncircumstantial evidence.”People v. Patterson , 217 Ill. 2d 407, 435 (2005); Hall , 194 Ill. 2d at 330 (“Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, provided that such evidence satisfies proof beyond a re asonable d oub t of the e lements of the crime charged”). Moreove

r, we have previously

utilized motive and flight insu ppo rt of a fi

nding tha t the evid ence wa s suffici ent to supp ort a finding of murder bey

ond a reasonable doubt. People v . Moore , 171 Ill. 2d 74, 95-96 (1996). After considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, then, we hold that the record evidence reasona

bly supportsa f

in di ng th at de fe nd an t w as gu il ty of fi rst degree murder beyond a reasonable dou

bt in th at : (1) defendant or someone for whoseconduct

he was le gally

responsi ble performed acts that caused Forrest’s death; and (2) when d efenda nt or some one for w

hose-22- conduct he was leg ally

responsi ble perf ormed tho se acts, he intended to kill or do g

reat bod ily harm to F orrest, knew his a cts would ca

use Forres tto die, or knew his acts created a strong prob abili ty that Forres twou ld die or suf fer gr eat bodil y ha rm. See 72 0 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1998).

II . Propriety of the Prosec utor’s Closing Argument Havingfound the

evidenc e in this ca se suffic ient to convict, we still must analyze defenda nt’s claim that the prosecutor’s closing statemen ts violated

his fede ral and s tate constitutional rights to a fair trial, thus entitling him to a new tria l. U.S. Cons t., amend . XIV ; Ill. Const. 1970, ar

t. I, §2 ; People v. Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (2003). Defendant

asserts that reversal of his con

viction is r

equired because of what he contends was the prosecutor’s repe ated a nd inte ntional misconduc

t. In his brief before

this court, defendant argue s tha t the prosecutor

improperly vouch e d for police credibility, a ttacked the in te gr it y, tact ics, an d number of defense counsel, and disparag ed def end ant ’s f orm er c oun sel . In his motion for a new trial, defendant also argued

that the prosecutor improperly persisted in stating that

he

was re pr es en ti ng th e v ic ti ms . W he th er st at em en ts ma de by a prosecutor

at closing argument were so e gregious that they warr ant a
newtrial is a

legal i ssue this c ourt rev ie ws de novo

. People v. Graham , 206 Ill. 2d 465, 474 (2003). This court has expressed concern w ith the problem of prosecutorial misconduct several times in recent y ears. See, e.g. , Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d

at 64-67 (describing the problem of prosec utorial misconduct

in great detail); see also People v. Blue , 189 Ill. 2d 9 9 (2000); People v

. Moss , 205 Ill. 2d 1 3 9, 191 (2001) (Freeman, J., concurring

inpart and

disse nting in pa rt, jo ined by Kilbr ide, J.). We have pointed out that a criminal defendant, regar dles s of gu ilt or innocence, is en ti tl ed to a f ai r, or de rl y, and impartial trial. Blue , 189 Ill. 2d a t 138. Fur

ther, we have note d an “into leranc e of per vasi v e prosecutorial misconduct

that deliberately unde

rmines the process by whichwe determine a

defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d at 66. Additionally, we have noted that “threats of reversal, and-23- words of condemnat ion and dis approval, have been less than effec tive incurbing prosecutorial misconduct.” Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d at 66-67. Withthis case, we reaffirm our intolerance of prosecutorial misconduc

t. As an initial matter, we address the State’s contention that many of the prose c utor’s statements to which defendant now objects are f orfeited. To preserve claimed improper statements during closing

ar gument for review, a defendant must object to the of fendin g statemen ts both at tri al and in a

written p osttrial moti on. P eople v. Enoch , 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 ( 1988) (“ Bo th a trial objection and a writte npost-tria

l motion ra

ising the issue ar e requir ed for a lle ge d

errors that could have been raised dur ing t rial” (e

mphases i

n original)). De fe nd an t f

ai le d t o p ro pe rl y o bse rve the a bove rule regardi ng c ertain specific statements, including all of the prosec utor’s statemen ts concer ning the credibi l ity of

the police officers, the prosecutor’ s “sole champion” statement conc erning his repres entatio n of the victim, and the pr osecut or’s “brainwashing” statement

c oncerning

the integ

rity , tactics , and numb er of de fense c ounse l

. Ad di ti on al ly, defendant failed to properly object to the cumulative effec t of the c losing a

rgumen t. Consideri ng th e above we will focus our attention on the statemen ts properly objec

ted to. We note, however, that closing argume nts must be viewed in their entirety , and the challenged remarks must be viewed in context. People v. Caffey , 205 Ill. 2d 52, 131 (2001 ), cit ing People

v. Macri , 185 Ill. 2d 1, 62 (1998) (and cases cited therein). Accordingly, the simple fact that defendant did not properl y object to a stateme

nt does not

render that state me nt as if it

never existed. Inde ed, all sta

tementsmust be considered as part of the entirety of a prosecutor’s closing arg ument, and even statements not properl y objecte d to may

add to the conte

xt of a rema

rk prope rly objected to. Prosecutors are afford e d wide lat itude in c losing a

rgumen t. Caffe y , 205 Ill. 2d at 131. I

n reviewing comments made at cl osin g argume nts, this court asks whether or not the c omm ents engender substantial prejudic e aga

inst a defendant such that

it is impossib le to say whether or not a ve

rdict of guilt

r esulted from them. People v. Nieves , 193 I ll. 2d 513, 533 (2000). Misconduct in closing argument is substantial and warrants revers al and a new trial if the improper-24- remarks constitu

ted a m aterial factor in a defendant’s c onviction. People v. Linscot

t , 142 Ill. 2d 22, 28 (1991) . If the jury could have reached a contrary

verdict had the improper remarks not been made,

or the revi ewing c ourt can not say that the prosecut

o r’s i mproper remarks did

not contribute to the defendant’s conviction, a new trial should be granted. Linscott , 142 Ill. 2d at 28. Defendant

argue s that the p

rosecut or in this case improper ly attempted to gain sy

mpathy from the jury

by implying that

the State

was di sa dv an ta ge d c on si de ri ng th at ea ch de fe nd an t h ad tw o a tt or ne ys working together, seeking to trick and dece ive the jury. The prosecutor

pointed out that “contrary to representations made to you during the jury selection or vo ir dire , you have see n with your own eyes, these ar

e not two c ompletely

differe nt indepe ndent t eam s of lawyers.” The prosecu

tor further aske d the jurors to “watch with our

owneyes as the

y c onverse freque

ntly . One will

go back and ask another for assis tance; o

ne will ta lk to an ot he r a tt or ne y; then, go back and start asking the same questions or differ ent q uestions.” Defendant p oints out that while the prosecutor made the above arg uments, h e
a l so opposed severance and sought the de ath penalty, entitling defendant and Hunte

r to two at

torney s e ach by supreme c ourt rule. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 41 6(d) (“ In all cases wher ein the State has given notice of its inten tion to see k the d eath p enalt y *** the t rial j udge shall appoint an indigent defendant two qualified counsel”). Later in his closing, the p rosecut or noted t hat the f our defe nse at to rn eys had “in excess of 100 years of legal practice and 75 y

ears of school grilling Shane Bra n del.” The defense objected, the cour t susta in ed the objection, and t

he prose cutor re

phrased his statement, asking the juro r s to consider who was questioning Officers B randel and Street. Again the

defense objected. This time the court overruled the objection. Still lat er , the pros ecutor a nalogize d the def

ense law ye rs to “Monday morning quarterbacks,” who ca n “dissect, bisect, and magnify any past action, all with the benefit of 20/20 h indsight a nd all with the

benefit of time in n

umbers. B ut in

the fina l analy sis, the at to rn eys weren’t

there risking their lives on March [12, 1999]. They

were not in the arena.” After the court overruled an objection

by the defense, the prosecutor continued, noting that “[t]he policeman were inthe arena.” He st at ed th at “t he ru le s o f t he ga me at wh ic h a tt or ne ys-25- defend, operate, and go under seem to require a complete perfection

onthe part of

a witness.” He argued that th es e r ul es al lo w a tt or ne ys to reveal an imperfect

witness “to be a liar, the witness to be stupid,

ort he witness to be confused.” When another objection wa s
o verrule d, the prose cutor not ed that th

is “rend er[ed] the

witness unworthy of belief. But in the every day rea l life wor ld in which

we all live, there is no perfection. I n the real world, we judge eac h other by a less exacting standard.” The prosecu

tor aske d the jurors to “think of any 2 minutes in y

our life inwhich y

ou could withstand a full day of c

ross-examination by

a four-la wy er team. ” Following a br ief excha nge, th e prose cuto r noted that the defense attacked the police repor ts completed by Officers Brande l and Stre et a nd the n pointed out that “as a citizen, when you call the police, y

ou expect an instant response. Even sooner if y our life i s at stake .” At this p oint, the prosecutor argued that y

ou do not want to call 911 only to be to ld by dispatch that the police officers are busy

typ ing rep orts, will n

ot be sent out to the stree

t until th e reports

are fin ished, an d “ ‘for you r informa tion, just c ame in froma murder case, a

nd we know how exacting[ly ] the defe

nse attorneys will cross-e

xamine them.’ ” The court sustained a defen se objection and informed the jury to disreg ard the c omment. Inhis very

next statement , however, the prosecutor continued with his performance as a dispatcher stating: “ ‘ We know how c losely their words

will be ex

amined; so, you c an expect an addit ional 4 or 5 hours befo re the offi

cers will b e availab le so they can m ake sure that eve ry word i[s] perfect, all syntaxes .’ ” (Emphasis in original). This time the court overruled the defense objection and allowed the prosecutor

to continue. The pr

osecuto r obliged, stating, “ ‘ Every wo rd is perfect , all synta

xes are a cceptab le, and all paragraph

s are sufficien tly

long enoug

h t o gain approbation from anyone .’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Sometime after the above comments, the pro secut or took issue with defenda nt’s former couns el, who te stified a t trial th at she had “an idea” that

Forre st would be a witness against defendant in a separa te murde r trial, but did not “know” this to be the case. The prosecutor

characterized her testimony as conducted “at

the behest of Jacoby Wheeler ’s attorney” and “r evolting to any person

who values the truth.” After the co urt sustained an objection to that-26- characterization

and instructed the jury

to disregard the comment, the prosecutor

continue d, compar

ing th e tes timony of defenda nt’s former counsel to that of f

ormer Pr esident Cl inton in re gards t o the Monica Lewinsky affair. S ti ll later, the prosecutor brought up photogr aphs introduced by the de fe ns e a nd sh ow in g t he al le y w here Bran del claimed to have chased the suspects. During trial, the prosecutor had objected to the photographs on the g

round tha t the folia

ge was differe nt. Defe nse counsel responded

that the photos were offered only to show physical structures and

layout and

offered to stipulate that the pictures did not fairly and accurately

portray the ve getation around the alley in Marc h 1999. The court found defendant’s arg ument persuas ive an d noted that the photos were not admitted to show the vegetation around the al le y. Inclosing argument, theprosecutor argued that over two y ears later “somebod

y de cides, w ell, it mig

ht be nice to have some pictures and it might be

nic er if we took th em in the su

mmertime w

hich is complete ly

different from the winter as far as f oliage and growth and, maybe, th e Jury will fall for it.” After a defense objection wa s overruled, the prose cutor rh etorica lly a sked, “H ow se rious are they ab out givin g y ou a cc ur at e a nd f ai r info rma

tio n?” Defendant

asserts t hat these statemen

ts c ons tituted personal attacks upon the d

efense attorne ys, bey ond the limi

ts of pr op ri et y, and

were calculat ed solely to inflame the passions and pre judice of the jurors. Defendant

argues that the prosecutor’s strategy was to attack the honesty

, inte grity, and intelligence of those who opposed or inconvenienced

his efforts to win a

conviction. The jury c ould either rely on the tes timony

of the te stify

ing poli ce office rs or face a situation where no office rs were availab le to resp ond to 911 c alls because they were too busy

wasting their time

writing painstak ingly

co mpleteand acc

urate po lice rep orts. Def ense cou nsel, lik e defendant’s former attorney , were dishonest beca use th ey parse d words like former President Clinton and introduced evidence that inaccur ately portray ed the fa cts. Defendant

argues tha

t i n a close ly b alance d case su ch as this , where no forensic evidence tied defendant directly to the crime, and the credibility of police testimony was key, the imprope

r tactics used by the prosecutor amounted to a material fac tor in t he conviction. Without the prose cutor’s use of pe

rsonal a ttack s, undermining-27- defense co un se l’ s e ff

or ts to qu es ti on po li ce cr ed ib il it y, the jury could have acquitted the defendant. Supporting his position defendant points to People v. Beringer , 151 Ill. App. 3d 558 (1987). In that case, the defenda

nt, Joseph B eringe

r, was tr ied for mu

rder join tly with his brother. Though the court believed the evidence sufficie nt to sustai

n
a conviction , itreversed because “[t]he State’s brazen misconduct insu red that the defendant would not receive a fair trial.” Beringer , 151 Ill. App. 3d at 564. Evaluating var ious challenged remarks made by the prosecution, the Beringer court noted that “[a]cc us ations of deceptions between the defense counsels and personal attacks on defendant’s attorney ser ve d n o purpose except to prejudice the jury.” Beringer , 151 Ill. App. 3d at 564. The State argues that the portions of the pro secutor’s closing argument that were preserved for re

view, even if viewed as improper,

were not so egregious that they cr eated an unfair trial or were a material factor in the verd ic t. According to the State, the jury ’s verdict was based upon the fact that defendant had a str ong motiv e to kill Forrest, fled

from the police leaving a trail of evidenc e, and was eventua lly caught hiding in a bush. The prosecutor’ s rhetoric, the State ass erts, ha

d nothing to do with the verdict. Ad di ti on al ly, the State argues that defendant’s reliance on People

v. Beringer

is misplaced. In Beringer , the pros ec utor per sonally attacked a de fense a ttorney, stating he thought her “ ‘incapable of courtesy to other people.’ ” Beringer , 151 Ill. App. 3d at 563. Moreover, the prosecutor in Beringer violated this court’s decision

in People v. Nucci o , 43 Ill. 2d 375 , 381 ( 1969) , by suggest ing th rough cross-examinationthat a witness solicited payment for his testimony withoutpresenting rebuttal evidence to support the charge. Beringer , 151 Ill. App. 3d at

559-60. H ere, the

State poin

ts out, the prosecutor’s conduct did not amount to a direct personal attack on defens e attorne ys, the prosecutor did not commit a Nuccio violation, and the pr os ec ut or di d n ot ar gu e t ha t d ef en se co un se l s ub or ne d p er ju ry. Further, t he S tate asserts that the trial court acted to reduce a ny chance of prejudice by

sustaining several of

defenda nt’s obje ctions, instructing the jury

to disreg ard some

of the pr osecutor ’s commen

ts, and by instructing the

jury on the prope r view of attorne y a rgumen ts. The State points out that in People v . Moore , 171 Ill. 2d

74, 105-06 (1996), this cour

t held tha t “[t]he ac t of sustai

n ing an objection and-28- properl y admonishi

ng the ju ry is usually viewed as sufficient to cure any prejudice .” We agree with the State that there are significant differences between this case and Beringer . Fu r ther, we acknowledge and reaffirm the proposition that the act of sustaining an objection and properl y admonishing a jury

is generally

sufficient to cure prejudice engendered

by improper clos ing ar gument. We do not believe that ends the analysis, howe

ver. Closing argume

nt must ser

ve a purp ose bey

ond infla min g the emotions of

th e j ur y. People v. Nicholas , 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2005); Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d at 87-88 (“Our sy stem of justice requires that a defendant’s guilt o r innocence be determined based upon rele vant evidence and le ga l pr inciples, upon the application of reason and deliberation

by a jur y, not th e exp r ession of misdirected emotion or outra ge by a mob”). A prosecutor cannot use closing argume nt simply to “inflame the passions or develop the prejudices of the jury without throwing any light upon the issues.” Peopl e v. Halteman , 10 Ill. 2d 74, 84 (1956). Moreover, i t is impro per f or a prose cuto r to ut

ilize closing argume

nt t o for ge an “

us-vers us-them” mentality

that is inconsistentwith the c

riminal tr ial princ iple that a

jury fulfills a nonpartisan

role, under the presumption that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Johnson , 208 Ill. 2d at 80. The prosecutor’s closing

argume nt in this case, consi dered in its entirety , ap pears de liberate ly d

esigne d to forg e just the s ort of “u sversus- them”mentality

decrie d by

this cour t in Johnson and foster

a situation where jurors might feel compelled to side with the State and its witnesse s in

order to ensure their own safety . At the very outset of his remark s, the prosecutor suggested that he wa s the “lone” and “solitary figure” left to “champion the deceased”while “bearing the burden” of “ave

nging another ’s death.” Later, he proposed tha t he was outnumbered by

the defense attorneys, who were not interested inpresent ing the j ury

wit h accura te information but only

strove to p rove the police witnesses as liars. Moreover, through his moc k presentation

of a 911 call, he suggested that if the jurors felt that previous ly

completed written police report s had to pr ecisely corroboratepolice te stimony at trial, police officers will no longer be able to effectively

respond to emergencies, and the ju rors mig ht, in effec t, compromise their own safety in the future. This strategy flows-29- throughout

the prosecutor’s closing

and is particularly e

vident when the statemen

ts proper ly o bjected to are c onsidere d in view o f the re st of his clo sing ar

gument a nd in conte

xt. The prosecutor

told the jurors that they lived “she ltered lives” but

a different dangerous world existed, “full of dangerous people” and “mean streets.” He argued that while Shane Brandel and Dan St

reet, “the new bre ed of poli ceman,” “men who

are edu cated, i ntellige nt, and well-spoken,” formed the “thin blue line” to pr otect th e jurors , witnesses called

by the defe

nse would not be called when “someone is breaking into their house or assaulting them.” The prosecutor

stated that h is opinion o f a witne ss who test ified unf avorabl y to the St at e
was t hat “h is elevator doesn’t run all the way to the top floor.” Fi na ll y, in wrapp ing up his argume nt on rebu

ttal, the p rosecutor cautioned the jury awa

y from “be ing brainwashed” by the fact that “you hear ev ery

thing twi ce” fr

om the def

ense whi le it only ge

ts the chance to “hear the prosecution’s story once.” We acknowl edge that the tri al court sustaine d so me o f defendant’s objec tion s duri ng t he p rosecutor’s closing arguments a nd instructed the jury that closing a

rguments are not evidence and a ny sta tementsor arguments made at closing that ar e not based on t

h e evidence should

be disregarded. We point

out, however, that we have previous ly

held that “[i]nstr uc ting the jury that a

rguments are not evidence will not, in every instance, c ure the de fect caused by introduction of such evidence.” Blue , 189 Ill. 2d at 132. Further, we have held that the salutary effect of sustai nin g an objectionis eliminated where a prosec utor per sists in

continuing that improper argument. People v. W einstein , 35 Ill. 2d 467, 471 (1966). Inthis case, while some

of defe ndant’s o bjection s were su stained, in certain situations , the tria

l court improperly

allowed the prose cutor to continue the sam e line of a rgumen t unchecked. This

situation i s clearly evident in the exchange between de f ense cou nsel, the court, and the pr osecutor regar ding the mock 911 c all. Considering th e above, we find that a chief goa l of the prosecutor’s closing argument in this case was to inflame the pa ssions and preju dices of the jury, uni ting the inter ests of the jurors in t

heir

ownsafety

with th at of the interests of the State in convicting defendant. Such a

goal is improper. The prosecutor in this case was not conte nt to rely upon the st

rength of the State’s evidence. Hedid-30- notma ke a f

ew so li ta ry imprope r remarks. Instea d, he utilized improper remark s, some unsupported by the evide nce, to advance an “us-versus-them”

theme. This theme was built piece by p iece an d is eviden t from the v ery

beginn ing as the prosec

utor launched his closin g by portray

ing himself as a lone avenging champion. The themecontinued througho ut th e prosecutor’s argument and wa s advanced over objection and in spite of admonishment. The prosecutor

suggested that po lice efficienc y and expedience were more importantthan acc ura cy, and ther eby urg ed the jurors to consider their own saf ety in d eliberation rather than deliberating only on the actual guilt or innocenc e of defendant. See People v. Erickson , 117 Ill. 2d 271, 290 (1987) (where this cour t noted that the jury serves a truth- seeking r ole and is impaneled to decide a defendant’s g uilt or innocence). We believe that in a case like thi s, rely ing heavily

on the credibi lity

of the testi fying police witnesses, the prosecutor’s utilization of closing ar guments to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury constituted a mate rial factor in defendant’s conviction. Without those arguments, a contrary ver dict could have been reache d. We cann

ot say with conf

id en ce that the prosecutor’s improper remark s did not contribute t o defend ant’s convi ction. Ac co rd in gl y, a new trial should be grante d. This fin

ding mak es it unnecessary

for this court to address defendant’s ar guments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and trial error in refus ing to exc

use juror Brian Thomas. We still must consider, however, defen dant’s

ar gu me nt s r eg ar di ng th e o ff er s o f p ro of

co nc er ni ng Wi ll ia m E ll ze y.

III. Refusal of the Def

endants’ Offers of Proof Rega rding William Ellzey Finding that

defenda nt is entitle d to a new tri al, we wi ll addre ss, fo r the purposes of that new trial, defendant’s claims regarding cer tai n offers of proof. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow evidence showing that William Ellzey, a reputed gang leader and drug su pplier a gainst w hom Forr est had tes tified, also had a motive to kill For

rest. Thi s c our t has recognized that evidentiary rulin gs are within the sound discretion of the trial court and

will not be distu rbedabsent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Robinson , 217 Ill. 2 d 43, 62 (2 005); People v. Pulliam , 176 I ll. 2 d 261, 276-31- (1997). The cont

r olling principles concerning the admissibility of evidence are well settled. The cou rt mus t ask whether the proferred evidence fairly

tends to pr

ove or dis

prove the offense charge d and whether that evidence is relevant

in that it tends to make the question of guilt more or less probable. People v. Caffey , 205 Ill. 2d 52, 114-15 (2001), quot ing People v

. War d , 101 I ll. 2d 443, 4 55-56 (19 84). I t is entirely within the discretion of the trial co urt t o “reject offered evidence on grou

nds of irr elevanc y if it has little probative value due to its remoteness, uncertainty, or possibly unfair prejudicial na ture.” People v. Harvey , 211 Ill . 2d 36 8, 392 (2004 ), cit ing Ward , 101 I ll. 2d at 455. De fendant

points to the

principle that eac h party is entitl ed t o present evidence which is relevant to its theory of the case. People v. Molsby , 66 Ill. App. 3d 647 (1978). Moreover, de fendant notes that

one accused of a crime may prove facts and

circumst ances te nding to show that the crime was committed by someone other than himself. People v. Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d 432, 450 (1974), quoting People v . Nitti , 312 Ill. 73, 90 (1924). While this is true, it is also true that defining the precise

limits contr

olling th e admission of such e vidence is difficul tand if the evidence is too remo te in time or too speculative to shed light on the fact to be found, it should be excluded. Dukett, 56 Ill. 2d a t 450 , quot ing Nitti , 312 Ill. at 90. The defense argues that its proffe red evidence re garding Ellzey would have countered and

weakened

the motive evidence presented by th e S ta te . S pe ci fi ca ll y, defendant argues that showing the jury

that Forres twas an in formant i n other c ases and

had testif

ied aga inst William Ellzey, the highest ra nking Gangster

Disc iple in Decatur, would show that s omeone ot

her than defenda nt had a mo tive to kill Forres t. This evidence would have been bo ls tered by the r ejected evidence that For

rest lost s ome of El lzey ’s drug s; was beh ind in pay ments to Ellzey ; had bee n phy sically

disci plined for presenting Ellzey with agold necklace instead of a cash pay ment; and had some relationship with Ellz ey’s girlfriend. Additionally, the evidence woul d hav e been supported by

testimony from Forre st’s grandmother, wh ic h the trial court did not allow, expressing her appr ehension about De me tr ia n’ s s af

et y af te r h e t es ti fi ed ag ai ns t E ll ze y. Evaluating e videnti ary ruling s, this court only finds an abuse of discretionwhere “the trial co urt’s ruling i s arbitra ry , fancif ul,-32- unreasonable, or wher

e no rea sonable p erson wo uld ta ke the view adopted by the trial court.” Caffey , 205 Ill. 2d at 89. This is not such

a case. In People v. Morgan , 142 Ill. 2d 410, 440 (199 1), rev’ d on other grounds , Morgan v. Illinois , 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), we held that the fact that a third party had threatened

t he v ictim with a handgun a week before the victim’s murder was no t enou gh to link that third par ty to the murde

r. We held the evidence concerning the third party ’s threa

t “remote ly

speculative

*** at best”

because the defe ndant i n tha t case presented no other evidence linking the third party to the crime. Accordingly , we found the proffered evidence proper ly excluded. Morgan , 142 I ll. 2d at 442. Inthis case, t he evi dence c oncern ing El lzey is even more speculative. As our ap

pellate c ourt p ointed o ut, Ellzey had no connection

to the scene of the crime and, in fact, was in prison at

the time of the murder. No evidence was offe red that Ellzey arr

anged for Forrest’s murder. No evidence was offered establishing that any other member of the Gangster Disciples was prese nt at the scene of the crimenor was any

evidence offered indicating tha t other members of the Gang ster Disc iples eve n cared about Ellze

y’ s downfa

ll. Further, we agree with the appellate c ourt that the testimony of De met rian

Forrest’s grandmother conc erning her apprehension due to his testimony a

gainst E llzey

was irre levant. H er testimony did not tend to make the existence of any fac t o f consequence to the determination

of defendant’s guilt more or less probabl e than it wou ld be without the evidence. See People v. Illgen , 145 I ll. 2d 353, 365-66 (1991). Furthermore, we note that the trial court

informed defendant that he was free to argue

that someone else murdered Forrest, just not Ellzey in particular. Acc ordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing defendant’s off ers of proof.

CONCLUSIO

N Becau se we believ e that sta tements made by the pr

osecutor during closing argume

nts in this casewarrant the granting of a new trial, we

revers e the judgmen

ts of the a ppellate and circuit courts and remand to the trial

court. We

do so, howe

ver, hav ing esta bli shed that the appella te court was correct in deciding that the evidenc e in this ca se
was sufficient to convict defendant and that the trial court acted-33- within its discretion when it excluded evidence offered

by defenda

nt to show tha

t William Ellze

y, i n partic ular, kill ed Forr

est. We note that

because we found the evide nce in thi s case sufficient to convict defendant, there is no do uble j eopardy impediment to a

newtrial. People v

. Roberts , 214 I ll . 2 d 106, 126 (2005); People v. Fornear , 176 I ll. 2d 523, 535 (1997). We further note, however, that

our analysis reg arding the sufficiency of the evidence is not indicative of any finding as to def endant’ s guilt

that would be b inding on

retrial

. Roberts , 214 I ll. 2d at 12 6; Fornear , 176 Ill. 2d at 535.

Judgments reversed; cause remanded.