This decision was not selected for publication inthe New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of non-precedential dispositions. Please also note that this electronic decision may contain computer-g enerated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Supreme Court. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 2 Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee, 3

v. No. 35,165 4 PERRY A. KESLER, 5 Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellant, 6 and 7 TAXATION AND REVENUE DEPARTMENT 8 OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO; and 9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (IRS) , 10 Defendants. 11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY 12 Abigail Aragon, District Judge 13 McCarthy & Holthus, LLP 14 Karen Weaver 15 Joshua T. Chappell 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellee 18 Perry A. Kesler 19 Rowe, NM 20 Pro Se Appellant 212 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 VARGAS, Judge. 2
{1} Defendant Perry Kesler appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment 3 to Plaintiff U.S. Bank (the Bank), and the dismissal of his counterclaims with 4 prejudice. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 5 I. BACKGROUND 6
{2} In February 2008 Defendant Perry Kesler borrowed $150,000 from First 7 Community Bank to refinance the construc tion financing he took to build his home 8 in Rowe, New Mexico. As security for the loan, Defendant gave First Community 9 Bank a mortgage on the home. First Commun ity Bank subsequently failed, and the 10 FDIC, as its receiver, sold several of First Community Bank’s assets to the Bank. 11
{3} At the end of February 2012, Defendantwas four months delinquent on his 12 mortgage and mailed a single payment to the Bank (February payment). Defendant 13 spoke with the Bank’s representative on the phone and advised that he had mailed the 14 payment. The Bank’s representative told De fendant that the payment was insufficient 15 and that it would be returned to him. Wh en it received Defendant ’s payment in March 16 2012, the Bank immediately returned the check , noting that it was for an amount “less 17 than the amount needed for th e total payment due[.] The amount due as of the date of 183 this letter is $3,889.24.” Two weeks after re turning Defendant’s partial payment, the 1 Bank sent notice to Defendant that foreclosure proceedings had begun. 2
{4} In support of its complaint for foreclos ure, the Bank attached a copy of the 3 promissory note signed by Defendant beari ng a special indorsement to the Bank from 4 Nancy K. Jordan, Senior Vice President of First Community Bank, as well as an 5 allonge to note, paying the note referenced inthe allonge to the order of the Bank. The 6 allonge listed the amount of the note at $300,000, rather than the $150,000 set out in 7 the note, and was signed by Kim Kintop, A ssistant Vice President of U.S. Bank, as 8 attorney-in-fact for the FDIC, receiver for First Community Bank. The Bank also 9 attached to the complaint a copy of the recorded mortgage to First Community Bank, 10 as well as a copy of the recorded assignment of mortgage to the Bank. 11
{5} In response to the Bank’s foreclosure comp laint, Defendant filed an answer and 12 counterclaim. Quoting NMSA 1978, Sec tion 58-21A-4(K)(5) (2009), of the Home 13 Loan Protection Act (HLPA) requiring credito rs to post payments on the day they are 14 received, but erroneously referring to it as the Mortgage Loan Company Act (MLCA), 15 Defendant alleged in his counterclaim that the Bank wrongfully rejected and returned 16 the February payment. Defe ndant attached his February 29, 2012 letter questioning 17 the Bank’s policy of rejecting loan payments and the Bank’s letter returning his check. 18 Ten months later, Defendant reiterated his claim that the Bank wrongfully rejected the 194 payment in his discovery responses to th e Bank, quoting the same language from the 1 HLPA, but again erroneously referring to the MLCA. Defendant also raised claims for 2 slander of title, fraud, interfere nce with contractual relations, and violations of the 3 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi zations Act (RICO), and the Fair Debt 4 Collections Act. 5
{6} Two years after filing its complaint, the Bank filed a motion for summary 6 judgment on its claims and on Defendant’s counterclaims, offering the affidavit of 7 Melanie R. Manalansan in support of the motion. Ms. Manalansan stated that her 8 affidavit is “based on [her ] personal knowledge, [her] experience as a[n] officer [of 9 U.S. Bank], and [her] knowledge and reviewof U.S. Bank’s record-keeping systems 10 and its business records created and kept in the regular course of U.S. Bank’s 11 business.” 12
{7} Defendant responded to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment by arguing 13 that the Bank failed to demonstrate that it had standing to sue, failed to demonstrate 14 that Ms. Manalansan had pers onal knowledge to testify about the matters set out in her 15 affidavit, and engaged in a history of questionable practices nationwide that resulted 16 in action by the United States Department of the Treasury. Finally, Defendant again 17 asserted that the Bank wrongfully refused his payment, referencing the letters and 18 returned payment attached to his answer and counterclaim, but this time correctly 195 attributed the quoted language to the HL PA and argued thatthe Bank’s actions 1 violated the HLPA. Other than his referen ce to the letters and returned payment and 2 the attachment of the consent order ex ecuted between the Bank and the Department 3 of the Treasury and its subsequent amendments to his response to the motion for 4 summary judgment, Defendant provided no other evidence to rebut the Bank’s 5 evidence offered in support of its motion for summary judgment. Instead, Defendant 6 argued that he requi red additional discovery to respond to the Bank’s claims and 7 prove his counterclaims, but he failed to identify specifically what that discovery 8 might be or provide an affidavit setti ng out the reasons he was prevented from 9 obtaining evidence necessary to justify his position. 10
{8} A few weeks after responding to the Bank’s summary judgment motion, 11 Defendant filed a motion to amend his an swer and counterclaim to correct his 12 erroneous reference to the MLCA. At th e hearing on the Bank’s motion for summary 13 judgment, Defendant again argued that th e Bank wrongfully refu sed to take his 14 payment, that the HLPA protected him from that type of activity, and that the Bank’s 15 violation was the basis for his counterclaim. At the close of the hearing, the district 16 court granted the Bank’s motion for summaryjudgment on its claims and Defendant’s 17 counterclaims. Defendant appealed. 186 II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 1
{9} Defendant asserts twelve different points of error purportedly committed by the 2 district court in granting the Bank’s moti on for summary judgment. We have distilled 3 them to five, including: (1) whether the Bank had standing to bring its foreclosure 4 action; (2) whether the affidavit submitted in support of the Bank’s motion was 5 prepared based on the affiant’s personal knowledge; (3) whether the district court 6 erred when it granted summary judgment before ruling on discovery motions and 7 before discovery was comple te; (4) whether Defendant properly raised claims under 8 the HLPA and Unfair Practices Act (UPA) su ch that a genuine issue of material fact 9 existed on Defendant’s claims; and (5) whether the district c ourt erred by granting 10 summary judgment to the Bank when it failed to rule on the motion for more than 11 sixty days, contrary to Rule 1-054.1 NMRA. Wetake each of these issues in turn and 12 affirm the district court on all grounds w ith the exception of its grant of summary 13 judgment on Defendant’s HLPA and UPA claims . We reverse the district court’s grant 14 of summary judgment on these two claims, alone, and remand the matter for further 15 proceedings. 16 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 17
{10} “Summary judgment is appropriate wh ere there are no genuine issues of 18 material fact and the movant is en titled to judgment as a matter of law.” Bank of N.Y. 197 Mellon v. Lopes , 2014-NMCA-097, ¶ 6, 336 P.3d 443 (internal quotation marks and 1 citation omitted). “On appeal from the gran t of summary judgment, we ordinarily 2 review the whole record in the light mo st favorable to the party opposing summary 3 judgment to determine if there is any evid ence that places a genui ne issue of material 4 fact in dispute.” City of Albuquerque v. BPLW Architects & Eng’rs, Inc. , 2009- 5 NMCA-081, ¶ 7, 146 N.M. 717, 213 P.3d 1146. “The movant need only make a prima 6 facie showing that he is entitled to summary judgment. Upon the movant making a 7 prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to 8 demonstrate the existence of specific evid entiary facts which would require trial on 9 the merits.” Lopes , 2014-NMCA-097, ¶ 6 (internal quotation marks and citation 10 omitted). “A party may not simply argue thatsuch evidentiary facts might exist, nor 11 may it rest upon the allegations of the complaint.” Horne v. Los Alamos Nat’l Sec., 12 L.L.C. , 2013-NMSC-004, ¶ 15, 296 P.3d 478 (alterati on, internal quotation marks, and 13 citation omitted). 14 IV. DISCUSSION 15 A. Summary Judgment on The Bank’s Claims 16 1. Standing 17
{11} Our Supreme Court has held that to foreclose a mortgage, a party must 18 “demonstrate under New Mexico’s Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) that it had 198 standing to bring a foreclosure action at the time it filed suit.” Bank of N.Y. v. Romero , 1 2014-NMSC-007, ¶ 17, 320 P.3d 1; see Deutsche Bank Nat’ l Tr. Co. v. Johnston , 2 2016-NMSC-013, ¶¶ 20-23, 369 P.3d 1046. To es tablish standing, the foreclosing 3 party “must demonstrate that it had the ri ght to enforce the note and the right to 4 foreclose the mortgage at the time the foreclosure suit was filed .” PNC Mortg. v. 5 Romero , 2016-NMCA-064, ¶ 19, 377 P.3d 461 (empha sis added) (alteration, internal 6 quotation marks, and citation omitted). “[A] mortgage holder must produce proof that 7 it was entitled to enforce the underlying promissory note prior to the commencement 8 of the foreclosure action by, for example, attaching a note containing an undated 9 indorsement to the initial complaint or produc ing a note dated before the filing of the 10 complaint at some appropriate time in the litigation.” Johnston , 2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 11 23; see PNC Mortg. , 2016-NMCA-064, ¶ 25. A promisso ry note may be enforced by 12 the holder. PNC Mortg. , 2016-NMCA-064, ¶ 20; see NMSA 1978, § 55-3-301 (1992) 13 (defining “ ‘[p]erson entitled to enforce’ [a negotiable] instrument” to include “the 14 holder of the instrument,” inter alia ). The holder is the person in possession of a note 15 that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person in possession. See NMSA 16 1978, § 55-1-201(b)(21)(A) (2005). An indorse ment made payable by the holder that 17 identifies a person to whom it makes the instrument 189 payable is “specially indorsed.” NMSA1978, § 55-3-205(a) (1992). “When specially 1 indorsed, an instrument becomes payable to the identified person and may be 2 negotiated only by the indorsement of that person.” Id. 3
{12} In this case, the Bank attached to its complaint a copy of a specially indorsed 4 promissory note naming the Bank, as well as an allonge paying the note to the order 5 of the Bank. The Bank also attached a c opy of the recorded assignment of mortgage 6 to the Bank. By attaching all three documents to its complaint, the Bank properly 7 demonstrated that it was the holder of the note and the assignee of the mortgage at the 8 time its complaint was filed. See Johnston , 2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 23; PNC Mortg. , 9 2016-NMCA-064, ¶ 25. 10
{13} In response to the Bank’s evidence submitted in support of summary judgment, 11 Defendant questions the validity of the special indorsements on the note and the 12 allonge, arguing that the indorsements are not dated, that the loan amount of the note 13 is different from the amount listed on the allonge, and that the Bank failed to properly 14 establish the authority of the individuals who indorsed the note. Defendant’s 15 arguments, however, are without merit. 16
{14} First, we are not persuaded by Defe ndant’s argument that the conflicting 17 amounts set out in the note and the allonge created a genuine issu e of material fact 18 requiring a trial on the Bank’s claims. Whilethe allonge referenced an original 1910 obligation of $300,000, rather than the $150,000 contained in the note, the Bank 1 explained that the allonge erroneously referenced the maximum amount secured by 2 the mortgage, rather than the amount of the loan. Notwithstanding this error, the 3 allonge correctly referenced a note dated February 15, 2008, liste d Defendant as the 4 borrower, listed the address of the property, and then indorsed that note to the Bank. 5 Defendant has provided no evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that the 6 note referenced in the allonge was di fferent from the February 15, 2008 note he 7 executed to First Community Bank. 8
{15} Next, by attaching a copy of the note and the allonge to its complaint, both 9 already affixed with special indorsements, the Bank established that the note had been 10 indorsed before the action was commenced. See Johnston , 2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 23 11 (noting that attaching a note containing an undated indorsement to the initial 12 complaint is sufficient to demonstrate possession of the instrument); PNC Mortg. , 13 2016-NMCA-064, ¶ 25 (same). Once the Bank produced the specially indorsed note 14 and allonge and established th at they were indorsed prior to the filing of the Bank’s 15 complaint, regardless of whether the actual date of the indorsement was set out on the 16 documents, the burden shifted to Defendant to show that a genuine issue of material 17 fact existed for trial as to the authority of the individuals who executed the note and 18 allonge. See Lopes , 2014-NMCA-097, ¶ 6, 336 P.3d 443 (The movant need only make 1911 a prima facie showing that he is entitled to summary judgment. Upon the movant 1 making a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to 2 demonstrate the existence of specific evid entiary facts which would require trial on 3 the merits.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). To show the existence 4 of a genuine issue of material fact, “[a] party opposing a motion for summary 5 judgment must make an affirmative showing by affidavit or other admissible 6 evidence.” Associated Home & RV Sales, Inc. v. Bank of Belen , 2013-NMCA-018, ¶ 7 29, 294 P.3d 1276 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) . “A party may not 8 simply argue that such evidentiary facts might exist, nor may it rest upon the 9 allegations of the complaint.” Horne , 2013-NMSC-004, ¶ 15 (alteration, internal 10 quotation marks, and citations omitted). 11
{16} Defendant failed to provide any eviden ce to rebut the Bank’s showing that it 12 had the right to enforce the note at the time it filed its complaint. While he questioned 13 the authority of those who had executed th e indorsement and the allonge, he provided 14 no evidence that they were not authori zed to execute those documents. Defendant 15 further argues that he is entitled to perform additional discovery regarding the 16 authority of the signatories; however, he fails to explain why, after the matter had 17 been pending for two and a half years, he had not performed that discovery. 18 Defendant repeatedly blames the Bank for his lack of disc overy necessary to prove his 1912 case, but Defendant’s discovery requests do not seek any specific information from 1 the Bank about the individuals who execute d the indorsement and the allonge; and he 2 points to no other specific info rmation he requested but did not receive that is relevant 3 to the authority of those who executed the indorsement and allonge. 4 2. Affidavit Lacking Personal Knowledge 5
{17} Defendant next contends that the district court erred when it entered summary 6 judgment on the Bank’s claims based on the affidavit of Ms. Manalansan, claiming 7 that Ms. Manalansan did not have personal knowledge of the facts set out in her 8 affidavit. Defendant argues that Ms. Manalansan’s reference to a deed of trust in her 9 affidavit evidences her lack of knowledge of his loan documen ts and renders her 10 incompetent to testify in support of the Bank’s claims. In her affidavit, Ms. 11 Manalansan makes reference, both generally and specifically, to “promissory note[s] 12 and mortgage[s]/deed[s] of trust” sh e manages and reviews. However, Ms. 13 Manalansan’s identification of Defendant ’s loan documents in her affidavit 14 specifically points to the “promissory note and mortgage” and the “assignment of 15 mortgage” offered in support of the Bank’s claims, making no reference to a deed of 16 trust. While Defendant correctly argues th at our summary judgment rule requires that 17 affidavits be made on personal know ledge, his argument is misplaced. See Rule 1- 18 056(E) NMRA (“Supporting and opposing affi davits shall be made on personal 1913 knowledge, shall set forth such facts as w ould be admissible in evidence, and shall 1 show affirmatively that the affiant is co mpetent to testify to the matters stated 2 therein.”). In this instance, the Bank produced a properly specially indorsed note and 3 a proper assignment of mortgage showing the Bank’s interest in both instruments. Ms. 4 Manalansan’s identification of those busine ss records, offered in support of the Bank’s 5 motion, along with her testimony about her familiarity withthe Bank’s loan servicing 6 and document maintenance systems estab lish sufficient personal knowledge of the 7 relevant mortgage documents to satisfy the requirements of Rule 1-056(E). 8 3. Discovery Rulings 9
{18} Defendant claims that the districtcourt erred when it entered summary 10 judgment in favor of the Bank before disc overy was complete and before it ruled on 11 two discovery motions filed by Defendant. At the time the district court entered 12 summary judgment, the matter had been pendi ng for more than two years. During that 13 time period, Defendant propounded discovery to the Bank and the Bank responded to 14 that discovery more than a year and a half before the hearing on the Bank’s motion for 15 summary judgment. Seventeen months after the Bank served its discovery responses 16 on Defendant, and days after the Bank filed its summaryjudgment motion, Defendant 17 filed a motion asking the court to compel the Bank to provide answers. Defendant, 18 however, failed to advise the court that the Bank had previ ously served responses. The 1914 district court conducted a hearing on Defendant’s motion to compel at which time the 1 court directed the Bank to file a sur-reply to the motion to compel further explaining 2 its responses to certain discovery requests and advising that the court would then rule 3 on the pleadings. The Bank filed its sur-repl y, providing additional explanation for its 4 discovery objections, but providing no additional information. 5
{19} Just a few weeks before the hearing on the Bank’s motion for summary 6 judgment, Defendant also served a subpoe na duces tecum on Barry L. Martin, a 7 representative of the Bank located in Si oux Falls, South Dakota, instructing Mr. 8 Martin to provide documents related to the Bank’s purchase of assets of First 9 Community Bank, including Defendant’s loan. The Bank filed a notice of non10 appearance, as well as a motion for a protective order and motion to quash the 11 subpoena to Mr. Martin. Fi nally, in response to the Bank’s motion for summary 12 judgment, Defendant repeatedly alleged that he was in need of additional discovery 13 and that he would prove his claims at trial following the completion of discovery. 14 Without conducting a hearing, the districtcourt entered an order on March 10, 2015, 15 denying Defendant’s motion to compel and granting the Bank’s motion for a 16 protective order and motion to quash the subpoena. 17
{20} We review the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to compel and grant 18 of the Bank’s motion for protective order and to quash subpoena for abuse of 1915 discretion. Villalobos v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs , 2014-NMCA-044, ¶ 14, 322 P.3d 439 1 (“We review a district court’ s discovery orders for an abus e of discretion.”). An abuse 2 of discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is against the facts, logic, and 3 circumstances of the case or is untenable or unjustified by reason. See State v. Rojo , 4 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 41, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. We find no abuse of discretion 5 under the circumstances of this case. Defe ndant served one set of fairly generic 6 discovery requests on the Bank, which the Bank timely answered. While Defendant 7 challenges the Bank’s standing to sue, he chose not to depose or seek additional 8 discovery regarding the individuals whose names appeared on the indorsement of the 9 promissory note or the assignment of mortgage and may have specific knowledge 10 about his loan, instead focusing on the i ndividual who executed documents related to 11 the Bank’s purchase of tens of millions of dollars worth of First Community Bank’s 12 assets from its receiver and was much le ss likely to have any knowledge of the 13 transfer of his particular loan to the Bank. Under the circumstances, the district court’s 14 decision to deny Defendant’s motion to comp el and grant of the Bank’s motion for a 15 protective order and to quash subpoena is not contrary to the facts, logic, and 16 circumstances of this foreclosure case and will therefore not be disturbed. See id. 17
{21} Finally, Defendant’s claim that the di strict court improperly granted summary 18 judgment before discovery was complete is without merit. Prior to the filing of the 1916 Bank’s summary judgment motion, Defendant had done limited written discovery and 1 had not sought to depose any other witnesses. While Rule 1-056(F) does provide a 2 mechanism whereby the district court may delay the entry of summary judgment to 3 allow a party to obtain discovery, Defendantfailed to submit the required affidavit 4 setting out the specific information he was unable to obtain and the reasons he was 5 prevented from obtaining th e evidence essential to justify his position. See Rule 6 1-056(F). The district court’s effective deni al of additional disc overy before granting 7 summary judgment in favor of the Bank, under the circumstances, was not an abuse 8 of discretion. See Villalobos , 2014-NMCA-044, ¶ 14. 9 B. Summary Judgment on Defendant’s Counterclaims 10
{22} In his counterclaim, Defendant rais ed claims for slander of title, fraud, 11 interference with contractual relations, and violations of RIC O, the HLPA, the UPA, 12 and the Fair Debt Collections Act. In its order granting the Bank summary judgment, 13 the district court also dismissed Defendant’s counterclaims with prejudice. On appeal, 14 with the exception of his claim under the HL PA and, by association, his claim under 15 the UPA, Defendant makes mention of some of these claims, but fails to explain why 16 we should reverse the ruling of the district court. This Court will not review an 17 argument that is not adequately developed. Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 18 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d1076 (declining to entertain a 1917 cursory argument that included no explanation of the party’s argument and no facts 1 that would allow this Court to evaluate the claim). “To rule on an inadequately briefed 2 issue, this Court would haveto develop the arguments itself, effectively performing 3 the parties’ work for them.” Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock , 2013-NMSC-040, 4 ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53. “It is of no be nefit either to the parties or to future litigants for this 5 Court to promulgate case law based on our own speculation rather than the parties’ 6 carefully considered arguments.” Id. 7 1. HLPA and UPA Claims 8
{23} Beginning with his answer and counterclaim and continuing through discovery, 9 his response to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment, and the summary judgment 10 hearing, Defendant complained that th e Bank wrongfully refused to credit his 11 February payment and, instead, returned it to him. Section 58-21A-6(A)(2) (2009) of 12 the HLPA provides as follows: 13 A. Before an action is filed to foreclose or collect money due 14 pursuant to a home loan or beforeother action is taken to seize or 15 transfer ownership of property subj ect to a home loan, the creditor or 16 creditor’s assignee of the loan shall deliver to the borrower a notice of 17 the right to cure the default informing the borrower of : 18

. . . . 19 (2) the borrower’s right to cu re the default by paying the 20 sum of money required, provided thata creditor or assignee shall accept 21 any partial payment made or tendere d in response to the notice. If the 22 amount necessary to cure the default w ill change within thirty days of the 2318 notice, due to the application of a daily interest rate or the addition of 1 late fees, as allowed by the [HLPA] , the notice shall give sufficient 2 information to enable the borrower to calculate the amount at any point 3 within the thirty-day period[.]” 4 Further, Section 58-21A-4(K)(5) of the HLPA states: 5 K. No creditor shall make a home loan that provides for a late 6 payment fee except as follows: 7

. . . . . 8 (5) a creditor shall treat each payment as posted on the 9 same business day as it was received by the creditor, servicer, creditor’s 10 agent for making payments or at th e address provided to the borrower by 11 the creditor, servicer or cred itor’s agent for making payments. 12 The Legislature has provided borrowers witha civil remedy for violations of the 13 HLPA, allowing borrowers to recover actual damages, including consequential and 14 incidental damages, statutory damages e qual to two times the finance charge paid 15 under the loan and forfeiture of the re maining interest under the loan, punitive 16 damages for malicious or reckless violati ons, costs and reasonabl e attorneys fees, as 17 well as injunctive, declaratory and other e quitable relief the court deems necessary to 18 enforce compliance with the HLPA. See NMSA 1978, § 58-21A-9 (A) (2003). Finally, 19 the HLPA provides that “[a] violation of the [HLPA] constitutes an unfair or deceptive 20 trade practice pursuant to the [UPA].” See NMSA 1978, § 58-21A-12 (2003). 21
{24} In its motion for summary judgment on Defendant’s claims, the Bank correctly 22 argues that Defendant does not have standing to bring cl aims under the MLCA, which 2319 was erroneously cited by Defe ndant in his counterclaim. The Bank does not address 1 Defendant’s claim that the Bank failed to timely credit his payment, and instead, 2 wrongfully rejected it. The Bank’s failure is understandable in light of Defendant’s 3 erroneous citation to the wrong act. However, in his response to the Bank’s motion 4 for summary judgment, Defendant corrects his errant reference to the MLCA and 5 correctly identifies the HLPA, repeating hi s claim that the Bank failed to credit his 6 payment and wrongfully rejected it and as king for permission to file an amended 7 answer to correct his errors. The Bank’ s reply fails to address the merits of 8 Defendant’s HLPA claims, arguing instead th at the erroneous reference to the MLCA 9 requires dismissal of the claim with prejudice. In light of our obligation to “review the 10 whole record in the light most favorableto the party opposing summary judgment to 11 determine if there is any evidence that pl aces a genuine issue of material fact in 12 dispute,” we conclude that Defendant estab lished a genuine issue of material fact for 13 trial on his HLPA and UPA claims. See BPLW Architects & Eng’rs, Inc. , 2009- 14 NMCA-081, ¶ 7. 15
{25} While the Bank argues that Defendant failed to preserve his claim that the 16 district court erred when it granted summary judgment on his HLPA claims, we 17 disagree. In his counterclaim and in his di scovery responses, Defendant pointed to the 18 Bank’s obligation to immediately credit payments received, quoting from the correct 1920 statute, but referring to the wrong one. Inresponse to the Bank’s motion for summary 1 judgment and at the hearing on that motion, Defendant corrected his error and argued 2 that the Bank’s rejection of his payment wa s a violation of the HLPA, a claim, the 3 Bank concedes, Defendant raised again wh en he sought to amend his counterclaim. 4 Thus, Defendant properly preserved his clai m that the district court erred when it 5 granted summary judgment on Defendant’s HLPA and UPA claims. Benz v. Town Ctr. 6 Land, LLC , 2013-NMCA-111, ¶ 24, 314 P.3d 688 (“To preserve an issue for review 7 on appeal, it must appear that appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on the 8 same grounds argued in the appellate court.” (internal quotation marks and citation 9 omitted)). 10 C. The District Court’s Failure to Rule in Sixty Days 11
{26} Finally, Defendant argues that the district court erred when it filed summary 12 judgment in favor of the Bank more than sixty days after the matter was taken under 13 advisement, contrary to Ru le 1-054.1. The Bank responds that any failure to comply 14 with Rule 1-054.1 was harmless error. We agree with the Bank. 15
{27} The hearing on the Bank’s motion for summary judgment was held on 16 November 12, 2014, at the c onclusion of which the district court announced its ruling 17 granting the Bank’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Almost four months 18 later, on March 3, 2015, the summary judgment was filed. Defendant argues that the 1921 district court’s delay in the entry of su mmary judgment had a two-fold effect. First, 1 he argues that the delay interfered w ith his ability to file his motion for 2 reconsideration. Second, he claims the court’s failure to hold a hearing and rule on his 3 motion to amend his complaint and lag in the entry of the judgment forced him to file 4 a separate complaint against the Bank for violations of the HL PA to avoid running 5 afoul of the statute of limitations on those claims. 6
{28} Neither argument offered by Defendant is persuasive. As the district court 7 announced its ruling at the conclusion of th e hearing, disposing of the case in its 8 entirety, Defendant was free to file his mo tion for reconsideration or take whatever 9 steps he felt appropriate at any time thereafter. While Defendant fails to tell us what 10 relief he believes is appropriate in light of the districtcourt’s failure to file its 11 judgment within the sixty-day time frame se t out in Rule 1-054.1, our rules are clear 12 that judgments and orders will not be vacated , modified or otherwise disturbed “unless 13 refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice,” 14 and “[t]he court . . . must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 15 not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Rule 1-061 NMRA. Further, “[a] party 16 must show prejudice before reversal is warranted.” El Paso Elec. Co. v. Real Estate 17 Mart, Inc. , 1982-NMCA-117, ¶ 25, 98 N.M. 570, 651 P.2d 105. We see no prejudice 1822 or harm to the substantial rights of Defendant and will not disturb the district court’s 1 judgment absent such a showing. 2 CONCLUSION 3
{29} With the exception of the entry of summary judgment on Defendant’s claims 4 under the HLPA and the UPA, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary 5 judgment in favor of the Bank. Defendant’s claims under the HLPA and UPA are 6 remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 7
{30} IT IS SO ORDERED. 8

9 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 10 WE CONCUR: 11

12 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 13

14 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 15