1 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent section

references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all

Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and

Procedure.

T.C. Summary Opinion 2007-159

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

DIMITRIOS T. MANOUSOS AND ANNE M. MANOUSOS, Petitioners v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 22246-06S. Filed September 10, 2007.

Anne M. Manousos, pro se.

Aaron D. Gregory and Micah A. Levy, for respondent.

ARMEN, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to

the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in

effect when the petition was filed.1 Pursuant to section

7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any
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2 On their return, petitioners claimed five exemptions

($15,000) and itemized their deductions on Schedule A, Itemized

Deductions. Included among those deductions were State and local

taxes in the amount of $5,570 and various miscellaneous

deductions in the net amount of $17,074. See sec. 67, imposing a

2-percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions. 

other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent

for any other case.

This matter is before the Court on respondent’s Motion For

Summary Judgment, as supplemented. In his motion, respondent

moves for a summary adjudication in his favor in this collection

review case involving a proposed levy for 2002. For reasons

discussed hereinafter, we shall grant respondent’s motion.

Background

At the time that the petition was filed, petitioner

Dimitrios T. Manousos (Mr. Manousos) and petitioner Anne M.

Manousos (Mrs. Manousos) resided in Virginia Beach, Virginia. We

shall refer to Mr. and Mrs. Manousos collectively as petitioners.

Petitioners’ Income Tax Liability for 2002

Petitioners timely filed a Federal income tax return for

2002. On their return, petitioners reported a tax liability,

which they paid in full through a combination of withholding and

a remittance enclosed with their return.2

Subsequently, respondent examined petitioners’ return. By

notice dated July 29, 2004, respondent determined a deficiency of
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3 In computing the AMT, no deduction is allowed for various

deductions, specifically including: (1) State and local taxes

otherwise deductible on a Schedule A; (2) itemized miscellaneous

deductions; and (3) exemptions. See sec. 56(b)(1). Therefore,

for AMT purposes, petitioners were deprived of deductions worth

$37,644 that were otherwise allowable under the “regular”, i.e.,

sec. 1, income tax.

$2,636. The deficiency was attributable solely to the

alternative minimum tax (AMT).3 

Respondent mailed a notice of deficiency to Mr. Manousos and

a duplicate original to Mrs. Manousos. Both documents were sent

by certified mail, and each was mailed to petitioners’ Joplin

Lane address in Virginia Beach, Virginia. That address was at

the time, and has remained through the present day, petitioners’

mailing address.

Petitioners did not contest respondent’s deficiency

determination by filing a petition for redetermination with this

Court. See sec. 6213(a). Accordingly, upon petitioners’

default, respondent assessed the deficiency, together with

statutory interest, on December 6, 2004. On that same date,

respondent sent petitioners a statutory notice of balance due,

i.e., notice and demand for payment. See sec. 6303(a). 

Petitioners did not pay the full amount due. 

Final Notice of Intent To Levy

On March 18, 2006, respondent sent to petitioners a Final

Notice/Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a

Hearing (final notice). See sec. 6330(a). Respondent sent the
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final notice to petitioners in respect of their outstanding

liability for 2002, which, at that time, was approximately $1,407

(without regard to statutory accruals of interest and penalty).

Administrative Developments

Petitioners timely filed with respondent a Form 12153,

Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing. In the Form 12153,

petitioners focused only on the existence or amount of their

underlying liability.

By letter dated August 16, 2006, respondent’s settlement

officer advised petitioners that, inter alia:

For me to consider alternative collection methods such

as an installment agreement or offer in compromise, you

must provide any items listed below. In addition, you

must have filed all federal tax returns required to be

filed.

The “items listed below” included a completed Collection

Information Statement (Form 433-A for individuals and/or Form

433-B for businesses) and signed income tax returns for 2003,

2004, and 2005. Regarding the latter, the settlement officer

stated that “Our records indicate they have not been filed”.

The settlement officer subsequently conducted a telephonic

conference with Mrs. Manousos.

Petitioners never submitted a Collection Information

Statement or proposed a specific collection alternative, nor did

petitioners file all of the requested returns during the time

that their case was pending before respondent’s Appeals Office.
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Ultimately, on October 4, 2006, respondent’s Appeals Office

sent to petitioners a Notice of Determination Concerning

Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330. The notice

of determination sustained the proposed levy.

The Attachment to the notice of determination, authored by

the settlement officer, included the following statement:

You stated that you were not interested in the setting

up of a payment plan. It was explained to you that [a]

payment [plan] could not be considered as you were not

compliant in filing all your tax returns. You were

still interested in the liability issue. The

Settlement Officer explained that you had prior

opportunity to question the liability issue and this

could not be considered at the hearing.

Petitioners’ Petition

On October 31, 2006, petitioners filed a petition with this

Court, appealing from the October 4, 2006 notice of

determination. The petition focuses solely on the existence or

amount of petitioners’ underlying liability for 2002.

Respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment

As previously stated, respondent filed a Motion For Summary

Judgment, which motion was subsequently supplemented. In his

motion, respondent relies on section 6330(c)(2)(B). In that

regard, respondent states, in part, as follows:

In both their CDP [Collection Due Process] hearing

request and their petition, the petitioners challenged

the underlying tax liability for the tax year 2002. 

Pursuant to section 6330(c)(2)(B), the petitioners

cannot raise during the CDP hearing the existence or

amount of the underlying tax liability if petitioners
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received a statutory notice of deficiency for that tax 

liability.

* * * * * * *

The petitioners received a statutory notice of

deficiency for the tax year 2002. * * * More

specifically, as noted above, respondent properly

mailed the statutory notice of deficiency to the

petitioners’ last known address on July 29, 2004. 

* * * Respondent is entitled to rely upon presumptions

of official regularity and delivery where the record

reflects proper mailing of the statutory notice of

deficiency. * * * There is no evidence that the

statutory notice of deficiency was returned to the

Service, nor have the petitioners ever denied its

receipt. Thus, the presumptions of official regularity

and delivery have not been rebutted. * * * 

Accordingly, Settlement Officer Chapman properly

determined that the petitioner[s] [were] precluded from

disputing the underlying tax liability under section

6330(c)(2)(B).

Petitioners filed a Response to respondent’s motion. In

their Response, petitioners continue to focus on the underlying

tax liability, but they do not deny receipt of the July 29, 2004

notice of deficiency.

Hearing on Respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment

Mrs. Manousos and counsel for respondent appeared at the

hearing on respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment. At the

hearing, Mrs. Manousos stated that petitioners were unable to

specifically recall whether or not they had received the July 29,

2004 notice of deficiency. 
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Discussion

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and

avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. Fla. Peach Corp. v.

Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may be

granted with respect to all or any part of the legal issues in

controversy “if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,

depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be

rendered as a matter of law.” Rule 121(a) and (b).

After carefully reviewing the record, we are satisfied that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and a decision

may be rendered as a matter of law. Accordingly, we shall grant

respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment, as supplemented.

Respondent’s Proposed Levy

Section 6330 generally provides that the Commissioner cannot

proceed with collection by levy until the person has been given

notice and the opportunity for an administrative review of the

matter (in the form of an Appeals Office hearing) and, if

dissatisfied, with judicial review of the administrative

determination. See Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 37

(2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 179 (2000).

Section 6330(c) prescribes the matters that a person may

raise at an Appeals Office hearing. In sum, section 6330(c)
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provides that a person may raise collection issues such as

spousal defenses, the appropriateness of the Commissioner's

intended collection action, and possible alternative means of

collection. Section 6330(c)(2)(B) provides that the existence

and amount of the underlying tax liability can be contested at an

Appeals Office hearing only if the person did not receive a

notice of deficiency for the tax in question or did not otherwise

have an earlier opportunity to dispute the tax liability. See

Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000); Goza v.

Commissioner, supra. Section 6330(d) provides for judicial

review of the administrative determination. 

In the present case, petitioners seek only to challenge the

existence or amount of their underlying liability for 2002.

However, petitioners are legally precluded from doing so if they

received the July 29, 2004 notice of deficiency and chose not to

contest respondent’s determination by filing a petition for

redetermination with this Court. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). 

In this regard, there is nothing in the record to suggest

that petitioners did not receive the July 29, 2004 notice of

deficiency. Indeed, duplicate originals of the notice of

deficiency were mailed to petitioners by certified mail at their

last known address, which is also their current address. 

Respondent represents that there is nothing in his files to

suggest that either of the notices was returned undelivered to

respondent by the U.S. Postal Service. In addition, petitioners
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4 Respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment, and to a lesser

extent the settlement officer’s attachment to the notice of

determination, make plain respondent’s view that petitioners did,

in fact, receive the July 29, 2004 notice of deficiency. Thus, 

petitioners had every incentive to contest that matter if it were

not factually accurate. 

have never denied receipt, see Rule 121(d), and Mrs. Manousos

candidly admitted at the hearing that petitioners could not

recall whether or not they had received the notice of

deficiency.4 Moreover, other notices and letters, such as the

final notice, the settlement officer’s correspondence, and the

notice of determination were all sent to petitioners at the same

address as the notice of deficiency, and all such notices and

letters were received by petitioners.

In Zenco Engg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 318, 323

(1980), affd. without published opinion 673 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir.

1981), we held that “There is a strong presumption in the law

that a properly addressed letter will be delivered, or offered

for delivery, to the addressee.” Further, it is clear that in

general, and in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,

compliance with certified mail procedures raises a presumption of

official regularity in delivery and receipt with respect to

notices sent by the Commissioner. See United States v. Zolla,

724 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ahrens, 530

F.2d 781, 784-785 (8th Cir. 1976); Clough v. Commissioner, 119

T.C. 183, 187-188 (2002).
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The foregoing presumptions, coupled with the factors

previously discussed, oblige us to conclude that petitioners

received the July 29, 2004 notice of deficiency. As a

consequence, section 6330(c)(2)(B) bars petitioners from

challenging the existence or amount of their outstanding

liability for 2002. See Bailey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-

241.

Conclusion

Petitioners have failed to make a valid challenge to the

appropriateness of respondent’s intended collection action, offer

an alternative means of collection, or raise a spousal defense. 

See Rule 331(b)(4) (“Any issue not raised in the assignments of

error shall be deemed to be conceded.”). In the absence of a

valid issue for review, we conclude that respondent is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law sustaining the October 4, 2006

notice of determination. Accordingly, we shall grant

respondent’s Motion For Summary Judgment, as supplemented, and

thereby sustain the determination of the Appeals Office

permitting respondent to proceed with collection for 2002.

To give effect to the foregoing, 

An order granting respondent’s

Motion For Summary Judgment, as

supplemented, and decision for

respondent will be entered.