UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 96-4186

LASHAN DENEICE MILLER,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

Richard L. Voorhees, Chief District Judge.

(CR-95-3-V)

Submitted: November 21, 1996

Decided: December 9, 1996

Before HALL, WILKINS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Sharon D. Jumper, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark T.

Calloway, United States Attorney, Kenneth M. Smith, Assistant

United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Lashan Deneice Miller pled guilty to conspiracy to commit credit

card fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). She contends that

the district court erred by allowing the Government to rescind the plea

agreement on the ground that she had materially breached the terms

of that agreement and in failing to grant her a two-level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility under United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 3E1.1 (Nov. 1994). Finding no reversible

error, we affirm.

Miller was indicted in January 1995 for multiple counts of credit

card fraud. In May 1995, Miller entered into a plea agreement with

the government in which she agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to

commit credit card fraud. Paragraph seventeen of the plea agreement

provided that "[t]he defendant understands that if he [sic] violates this

agreement, any federal, state or local law, or any order of any court,

including any condition of pre-trial, pre-sentence, or post-sentence

release, the United States may void this agreement, and that the

defendant's plea of guilty and the resulting guilty verdict will stand."

In September 1995, the Government informed Miller by letter that

it considered the plea agreement null and void on the basis of her continuing criminal activity and that it did not consider her to be entitled

to any benefits of the plea agreement. The Government then moved

to revoke Miller's bond. The Government contended that Miller continued to engage in fraudulent criminal activity and committed several

additional violations of state and federal law. In support of the Government's motion to revoke Miller's bond, FBI Agent Mueller submitted an affidavit to the district court reciting that her investigation

revealed that Miller deposited checks into her open checking account

drawn on an account from another bank that she had closed, provided

false information to car dealerships attempting to obtain financing for

a new car, used a fraudulent social security number on various credit

applications, and furnished checks to a car dealership drawn on her

closed account to serve as a down payment. The district court denied

the motion to revoke Miller's bond.

 2
At Miller's sentencing, she admitted that after she pled guilty, she

kited checks, presented a false social security card, and passed checks

written on a closed account. The district court found unrefuted evidence that Miller had violated the terms of the plea agreement. As a

result, the district court rescinded Miller's plea agreement and refused

to award a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Miller

appeals, maintaining that the district court erred by relieving the government of its obligation to request a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

We find that the district court did not clearly err in its finding that

Miller materially breached the terms of her plea agreement. See

United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d 1073, 1076 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

502 U.S. 958 (1991) (setting standard). Therefore, the Government

was no longer obligated to move for the reduction based upon that

agreement. See United States v. David, 58 F.3d 113, 114 (4th Cir.

1995); see also United States v. West, 2 F.3d 66, 69 (4th Cir. 1993)

(defendant who breaches terms of plea agreement forfeits any right to

its enforcement). Further, based on Miller's continued criminal activity, the district court did not err in denying her request for an

acceptance-of-responsibility reduction. See United States v. Harris,

882 F.2d 902, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1989).

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 3