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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

IN RE: P.R.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: J.M., A/K/A J.M., FATHER : No. 601 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order dated March 21, 2014, 

Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 158 of 2013 

IN RE: L.M.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: J.M., A/K/A J.M., FATHER : No. 602 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order dated March 21, 2014, 

Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 160 of 2013 

IN RE: A.L.M., MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: J.M., A/K/A J.M., FATHER : No. 603 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order dated March 21, 2014, 

Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 159 of 2013 
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*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

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IN RE: P.R.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: L.C.S., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 638 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order March 21, 2014, 

Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 158 of 2013 

IN RE: A.L.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: L.C.S., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 639 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order March 21, 2014, 

Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 159 of 2013 

IN RE: L.M.M., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: L.C.S., BIRTH MOTHER : No. 640 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order March 21, 2014, 

Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court at No. TPR 160 of 2013 

BEFORE: DONOHUE, ALLEN and STRASSBURGER*, JJ. 

 
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MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2014 

Appellants, J.M. (“Father”) and C.L.S. (“Mother”), appeal from the 

orders dated March 21, 2014, granting the petitions of Appellee, Allegheny 

County Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) to terminate their parental 

rights to PRM (born June 2007), ALM (born July 2010), and LMM (born 

March 2013). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s orders. 

On July 15, 2012, CYF took custody of PRM and ALM after receiving a 

report that the two children were found walking by railroad tracks. Mother 

and Father each pled guilty to one count of endangering the welfare of a 

child, and on August 6, 2012, PRM and ALM were adjudicated dependent. At 

the time of LMM’s birth in March 2013, CYF immediately obtained an 

emergency custody authorization. LMM was adjudicated dependent on 

March 27, 2013. 

CYF established the following Family Service Plan (FSP) goals for 

Mother and Father: learn and use non-violent means of discipline, eliminate 

verbal and physical family abuse, maintain contact and cooperation with 

agency and service providers, address mental health issues, maintain safe 

and stable housing, address developmental delays and physical disabilities of 

the children, and maintain regular visits. CYF referred Mother and Father to 

several service providers, including Achieva and Project Star, both of which 
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have expertise in helping parents and children with disabilities.1 Mother and 

Father made substantial progress with respect to certain of the FSP goals. 

Father completed anger management classes and showed a marked 

improvement in managing his anger. N.T., 3/21/2014, at 141. An 

extermination service assisted with the housing issues. Id. at 142. Both 

Mother and Father achieved all of their visitation goals with the children and 

were extremely cooperative with both CYF and the assigned service 

providers. Id. A CYF caseworker testified that he had never met parents 

that were more cooperative and that their level of communication 

throughout the process was “unheard of.” Id. at 141. 

Nevertheless, after an evidentiary hearing on March 21, 2014, on 

March 31, 2014 the trial court issued orders terminating the parental rights 

of Mother and Father to the three children. In its written opinion in support 

of the orders, the trial court emphasized that for Mother and Father, “[i]t is a 

matter of ‘cannot,’ as opposed to ‘will not,’” noting that “the issue is that the 

parents are intellectually impaired to such a degree that they are unable to 

provide care for the three children, all of whom have significant health 

concerns and special needs.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/2014, at 4. 

 

1

 PRM has a disorder on the autism spectrum reflecting pervasive 

developmental delays. N.T., 3/21/2014, at 33. ALM has muscular 

dystrophy and Charcot Marie Tooth Syndrome, both of which are 

degenerative disorders. Id. at 19, 199. LMM may also have muscular 

dystrophy and Charcot Marie Tooth Syndrome. Id. at 197-98. Mother has 

mild to moderate mental retardation. Id. at 7. Father has expressive 

language disorder and articulation disorder. Id. at 10. 
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On appeal, Father raises the following four issues for our consideration 

and determination: 

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred 

as a matter of law in finding that [CYF] proved by 

clear and convincing evidence that they provided 

reasonable services to Father to reunify [him] with

his children? 

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred 

as a matter of law in finding that the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by Father? 

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred 

as a matter of law in finding that Father was not 

likely to remedy the conditions which led to the 

removal of the children within a reasonable period of 

time? 

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred 

as a matter of law in finding that termination of 

parental rights would best serve the developmental,

physical, emotional needs and welfare of the 

children? 

Father’s Brief at 1-2. Mother raises a single issue on appeal: 

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden

of proving by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the children pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). 

Mother’s Brief at 9. 

When considering an appeal from a trial court’s termination of parental 

rights, our standard of review is as follows: 
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[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion 

standard when considering a trial court’s 

determination of a petition for termination of 

parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility 

determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. As 

has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does 

not result merely because the reviewing court might

have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion

only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. 

... [U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on 

a cold record, where the trial judges are observing

the parties during the relevant hearing and often 

presiding over numerous other hearings regarding 

the child and parents. Therefore, even where the 

facts could support an opposite result, as is often the 

case in dependency and termination cases, an 

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess 

the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer 

to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are 

supported by the record and the court’s legal 

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an 

abuse of discretion. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–27 (Pa. 2012) (citations 

omitted). 

We begin with Father’s first issue on appeal, in which he argues that 

CYF failed to provide “reasonable services” to reunify him with his children. 

Father’s Brief at 6. Father does not contend that CYF failed to provide any 
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services to him, but rather that the services provided “were not specific 

enough to be meaningful to this family and in particular to Father,” and that 

instead of helping, the services provided “were frustrating and confusing to 

the family.” Id. at 6, 10. Father alleges that when he complained about his 

frustration with the services being provided, his concerns were not taken 

seriously and that he was accused of being belligerent and rude. Id. at 10. 

Father did not preserve this issue for appeal, as it was not included in 

his statement of issues complained of on appeal filed pursuant to Rule 

1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. As a result, it is 

waived. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Cobbs v. SEPTA, 985 A.2d 249, 256 

(Pa. Super. 2009); Southcentral Employment Corp. v. Birmingham Fire 

Ins. Co. of Pa., 926 A.2d 977, 983 n. 5 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that 

issue not raised in statement of matters complained of on appeal is waived 

for purposes of appeal). 

Even if not waived, however, we would not grant relief on this basis. 

This Court recently reiterated a petitioner must make reasonable efforts to 

reunify a parent with his child prior to seeking to terminate a parent's rights. 

In re D.C.D., 91 A.3d 173, 179 (Pa. Super.), appeal granted, 93 A.3d 802 

(Pa. 2014); see also In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (“Before filing a petition for termination of parental rights, the 

Commonwealth is required to make reasonable efforts to promote 

reunification of parent and child.”); Fallaro v. Yeager, 528 A.2d 222, 229 
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(Pa. Super. 1987) (“Ultimately, the goal is to rehabilitate the family, reunite 

the child with his family or, after reasonable efforts over an appropriate 

period of time have failed, to terminate parental rights and free the child for 

adoption[.]”). 

Based upon our review of the certified record, CYF met its obligation to 

provide reasonable efforts to reunify Father with his children. During 

permanency reviews in the dependency proceedings, the trial court 

repeatedly ruled that “[r]easonable efforts have been made by [CYS] to 

finalize this child’s permanency plan.”2 Moreover, the record reflects that 

CYF made referrals for multiple service providers, including Family Resources 

and the East Allegheny Family Support Center, which provided parenting 

services to both Mother and Father. N.T., 3/21/2014, at 132. With respect 

to Father’s contention that the services provided to him were not specific 

enough to be meaningful to this family, the trial court found that the 

services provided by Achieva and Project Star are the best available in 

Allegheny County for the types of needs of the parents and children in this 

case. Id. at 222. Dr. Angela Pepe (“Dr. Pepe”), a licensed clinical 

psychologist who evaluated and worked with both the parents and the 

 

2

 For ALM, the certified record contains four such Permanency Review 

Orders, dated November 21, 2012, February 21, 2013, June 10, 2013, and 

September 20, 2013. For PRM, the certified record contains three such 

orders (for reasons unclear, the docket does not contain a February 2013 

Permanency Review Order for PRM). Due to her later birth, for LMM the 

certified record contains two such orders, dated June 10, 2013 and 

September 20, 2013. 
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children, testified that she recommended Achieva for Father because it 

provided interactive therapy services to help Father develop the ability to 

address his own, and his children’s, special needs. Id. at 34. Colleen Sokira 

(“Sokira”), a parenting educational specialist at Achieva, testified that 

Achieva evaluated PRM’s behaviors and provided Mother and Father with 

recommendations on how to best respond to them, establishing a clear 

routine for the parents to follow when working with him. Id. at 99-100. 

Finally, while Mother and Father initially voiced some frustration with what 

they considered to be conflicting advice from Achieva and Project Star 

(which was working with PRM), Sokira testified that the two agencies came 

together and concluded that while their advice was essentially the same, 

they were using different words to express the same recommendations. Id.

at 107. After the two agencies came together and agreed on common 

verbiage, Mother and Father stopped expressing confusion, and in fact 

seemed to be more comfortable after seeing representatives from the two 

agencies communicating with each other before the beginning of visits with 

them. Id. 

For his second issue on appeal, Father contends that CYF did not 

produce sufficient evidence to permit termination of his parental rights under 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs the 

termination of parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. CYF bears the 

burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the asserted 
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grounds for termination are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. 

Super. 2009). “[C]lear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that 

is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to 

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.” Id. 

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights based 

upon section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), which state the following: 

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds: 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for 

a period of at least six months 

immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to 

a child or has refused or failed to 

perform parental duties. 

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of 

the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control 

or subsistence necessary for his physical 

or mental well-being and the conditions 

and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent. 

 * * * 

(5) The child has been removed from the 

care of the parent by the court or under 

a voluntary agreement with an agency 

for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or 
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placement of the child continue to exist, 

the parent cannot or will not remedy 

those conditions within a reasonable 

period of time, the services or assistance 

reasonably available to the parent are 

not likely to remedy the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the 

child within a reasonable period of time 

and termination of the parental rights 

would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child. 

(8) The child has been removed from the 

care of the parent by the court or under 

a voluntary agreement with an agency, 

12 months or more have elapsed from 

the date of removal or placement, the 

conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child continue to exist 

and termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child. 

 * * * 

(b) Other considerations. The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the 

basis of environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the 

conditions described therein which are first initiated 

subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the 

petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. 
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Father contends that the trial court erred in finding that CYF had 

produced clear and convincing evidence to satisfy subsection 2511(a)(2).3 

Parental rights may be terminated under subsection 2511(a)(2) if three 

conditions are met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied. In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing In re 

Geiger, 331 A.2d 172, 174 (Pa. 1975)). 

The grounds for termination of parental rights under section 

2511(a)(2) are “not limited to affirmative misconduct.” In re A.L.D., 797 

A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). Unlike subsection 2511(a)(1), subsection 

2511(a)(2) does not emphasize a parent's refusal or failure to perform 

parental duties, but instead focuses on the child's present and future need 

for essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical 

or mental well-being. In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d at 82. Thus, while “sincere 

efforts to perform parental duties” can preserve parental rights under 

subsection 2511(a)(1), those same efforts may be insufficient to remedy 

 

3

 Satisfaction of any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with 

consideration of section 2511(b), will suffice for the involuntary termination 

of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Because we conclude infra that CYF established sufficient grounds 

for termination of parental rights under subsection 2511(a)(2), we need not 

address Father’s third issue on appeal, which challenges the sufficiency of 

the evidence under subsections 2511(a)(5) and 2511(a)(8). 
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parental incapacity under subsection 2511(a)(2). In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 

1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010); see also Matter of Adoption of C.A.W., 

683 A.2d 911, 916 (Pa. Super. 1996); In re Adoption of M.J.H., 501 A.2d 

648 (Pa. Super. 1985). 

In this case, the trial court, after an extensive review of the evidence 

presented at the March 21, 2014 evidentiary hearing, found that Father, 

despite genuine and diligent efforts to do so, could not obtain the necessary 

parenting skills to allow for reunification with the children. 

One of the driving concerns which led to the 

children’s removal was the parents’ inability to 

properly supervise their children. [N.T., 3/21/2014], 

at 145. Even before the incident leading to the 

children’s removal, there were previous reports 

made to the police concerning the lack of 

supervision. Id. at 156. ‘Parenting’ is a general 

term, as the caseworker suggested. Id. at 144. In 

this context, the ‘parenting’ goal, and consequently 

the crux of the case, revolved around the [parents’] 

abilities to address their own impairments while 

simultaneously addressing the rather extraordinary 

needs of their children. This Court agrees with CYF 

that this goal has not and cannot be met by the 

parents. Id. 

CYF recruited the assistance of Achieva, which is a

large, private non-profit organization whose mission 

is to work with individuals with disabilities from birth 

to death. Id. at 70. Specifically, Achieva, and its 

service worker [Sokira], were asked to assess the 

parents’ independent living and parenting skills and 

to supervise the children’s visits at the Children’s 

Institute. Id. Achieva attempted to provide the 

parents with additional parenting skills. The services 

began in May 2013. Id. at 71. But despite these 

services, the concerns about the parties’ ability to 
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parent remained. [Sokira] testified that the primary 

and overarching issue during supervised visits is the 

parent’s ability to identify what each and all of their 

children are doing at any given time. Id. at 74. 

After this initial identification, the question then 

becomes whether the respective child’s activity is a 

health, safety or welfare concern. Id. Sokira 

testified that the parents could not make these 

diagnoses without a cue from the supporting staff. 

Id. That is, the parents were unable to identify 

dangerous situations. By way of example, Sokira 

testified that, during a visit, [PRM] started playing 

with the cords of a CD player that sat on a table. Id.

at 75. The cord was wrapped around the child’s 

neck, and the CD player was poised to fall on the 

child’s head. Id. Achieva or Project Star staff would 

point out that [PRM] was playing with the CD player, 

but the parents lacked the ability to recognize the

situation for what it was. Id. Not only do the 

parents have difficulty recognizing situations as 

hazardous, but they also lack the necessary skills to 

rectify the situation. Id. at 76. 

Achieva sought to address this problem by helping 

the parents create a routine. Id. at 77. The routine 

was created with the hope that if the parents and the 

children knew what was supposed to be next, it 

would decrease the stress of the visit. Id. at 79. 

And if the children experienced less stress, then 

hopefully there would be less behavioral problems 

for the parents to have to address. Id. Sokira 

testified that, at the time of the hearing, there are 

less behavioral problems coming from the children, 

but that there are also more services being provided. 

Id. For example, [PRM] had his own behavior 

specialist consultant [Project Star]. Id. Still, both 

parents struggled throughout the visits directing the 

children what to do. Id. at 82. They would rather 

let the children be and then only engage with the 

children if the kids were having difficulty or if the 

staff prompted them to partake. Id. at 82-83. The 

problem with this approach is that if they cannot 

direct the children, the children will be harder for the 
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parents to supervise. Id. at 83-84. If the [parents’] 

cannot supervise, they cannot ensure that the 

children are safe. Id. at 103. Again, parental 

supervision was a primary concern if not the primary 

concern behind the removal of the children. Amanda

Frey of Project Star, who also observed the visits,

noted that the parents are often unaware when 

[ALM] would run off. Id. at 195. Sokira testified 

that on many visits, Father scrolled through his 

phone, not talking or paying attention to the 

children. Id. at 84-85. During other visits, Father 

wanted to discuss the court case with the staffers. 

The staff attempts to redirect Father were often 

fruitless. Id. at 85. Another reason the parents had 

trouble engaging with the children is because 

engagement requires verbal interaction and both 

parents have difficulty communicating. Id. at 87. 

When Achieva became involved with the parents. 

Father’s verbal interactions consisted of repeating

the child’s name. Id. at 96, At the time of the 

[termination of parental rights] hearing, Father was 

able to give two and three word phrases to direct the 

children. Id. Given Father’s inabilities, Sokira 

considered this development to be “significant 

progress. Id. at 97. 

Though the parents communication, and thus their 

skillset has advanced somewhat, Sokira testified that 

it was still Achieva’s conclusion that the parents do 

not have the ability to be aware of what all the 

children are doing at the same time. Id. at 87. This 

failure impedes the parents’ ability to recognize 

danger or assess whether an activity is hazardous for 

the children. Even when the parents are cued in, 

they do not possess the ability to intervene. Id. at 

88. The parents struggled to understand how to 

properly discipline the children. Id. at 119. They 

had difficulty understanding how to provide the 

children with the proper [instruction]. Id. at 118. 

Indeed there were still other concerns about the 

parties’ ability to live independently. ... 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/2014, at 5-7. 
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The certified record on appeal supports the trial court’s analysis, and 

thus we must conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred with respect to 

the trial court’s finding that Father cannot remedy the conditions that led to 

the removal of the children from the home. CYF produced sufficient 

evidence to permit the termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 

subsection 2511(a)(2). 

For Father’s fourth issue and Mother’s only issue on appeal, both 

contest the trial court’s finding that CYF met its evidentiary burden pursuant 

to section 2511(b), which requires consideration of whether the child's needs 

and welfare will best be met by termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 

994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010). This Court has described the 

nature of the analysis under section 2511(b) as follows: 

Before granting a petition to terminate parental 

rights, it is imperative that a trial court carefully 

consider the intangible dimension of the needs and 

welfare of a child—the love, comfort, security, and 

closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship, as 

well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of 

relationships is also important to a child, for whom 

severance of close parental ties is usually extremely 

painful. The trial court, in considering what situation 

would best serve the child[ren]'s needs and welfare, 

must examine the status of the natural parental 

bond to consider whether terminating the natural 

parents' rights would destroy something in existence 

that is necessary and beneficial. 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). A parent's own feelings of love and 
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affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. In 

re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

Both parents insist that termination of their parental rights is not in 

the best interests of the children. They argue that they have established 

(or, with respect to LMM, are establishing) strong bonds with the children, 

and that termination would unnecessarily result in a permanent loss of these 

bonds. Mother’s Brief at 21; Father’s Brief at 20. They insist that continued 

visitation with the children is the best course for all concerned, and thus the 

trial court, rather than terminating their parental rights, should have 

considered less drastic alternatives. Mother’s Brief at 21; Father’s Brief at 

22. Father contends that the trial court should have placed the children in a 

permanent legal custodianship (“PLC”), which would have permitted the 

parents to retain their rights to continued visitation without requiring them 

to resume custody. Father’s Brief at 22. 

As indicated hereinabove, when contemplating the termination of 

parental rights, a trial court must consider whether terminating the natural 

parents' bond with their children “would destroy something in existence that 

is necessary and beneficial.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. The mere 

existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent, however, is not 

outcome determinative and is instead just one of many factors that must be 

considered. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). One of these 

additional factors is whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and 
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whether they have an emotional bond with their foster parents. Id. (citing 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012)). 

In this case, Dr. Pepe testified that the children’s primary attachment 

is with their foster parents, and that while with their foster parents, they 

have all made “tremendous progress” in dealing with their special needs. As 

a result, Dr. Pepe testified that given their ages, primary attachments to the 

foster parents, and developmental needs, termination of Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights best serves the children’s needs and welfare. N.T., 

3/21/2014, at 29. Moreover, Dr. Pepe indicated that while a bond does exist 

between the children and their biological parents, if the children would never 

see them again they would likely only be “sad” for a period of time but it 

would not seriously impact their psychological functioning. Id. at 27, 56-57. 

Accordingly, the certified record supports the trial court’s determination that 

termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children, 

particularly given the unique facts presented here.

We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not 

to place the children in a PLC. Based upon our review of the certified record, 

the trial court thoroughly reviewed the case, heard expert witnesses, and 

considered permanent legal custody as an option, but concluded that 

adoption best suits the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the 

children. To this end, the trial court specifically referenced the testimony of 
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Dr. Pepe regarding the children’s need for the stability and permanency that 

only adoption can provide them. 

It [adoption] provides the children with a level of

stability that they need of knowing what to anticipate 

in the future. For example, what school they are 

going to go to, who their friends are going to be, 

what they can expect in their future. It is very 

important as opposed to being in limbo and not 

knowing how long is this going to last. ... They have 

just a very high degree of insecurity without the 

level of permanency that I believe adoption offers 

them after a period of time. ... Now, while a legal

arrangement, for example, could occur until the 

children are 18, it doesn’t have the same level of 

emotional reinforcement for the children. If they are 

able to comprehend that these are now my parents 

versus these are now my caregivers. ... There is 

just a difference in their perception regarding the

degree of stability that adoption provides. 

N.T., 3/21/2014, at 54-55; Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/2014, at 10. The special 

needs of the children take on added significance in the present 

circumstances, as they will likely continue to require parental assistance 

beyond the age of 18. N.T., 3/21/2014, at 19. 

Finally, the trial court was influenced by Dr. Pepe’s testimony that a 

refusal to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father would actually 

have a negative effect on the children’s long-term well-being, as the foster 

parents are more capable of meeting the unique challenges presented here 

and providing the necessary care for special needs children. Trial Court 

Opinion, 6/6/2014, at 10 (citing N.T., 3/21/2014, at 38). 
J-A29014-14 

J-A29015-14 

- 20 - 

For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 

decision to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. This was an 

extremely difficult case fraught with the reality that the love and affection 

Mother and Father have for their children cannot overcome the stark fact 

that they are incapable of parenting their children, who have extraordinary 

needs. We commend the trial court for its thorough and thoughtful analysis 

of the situation and the needs and welfare of the children. 

Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 11/7/2014