UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 99-4784

DARRELL LAMONT MCCOY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville.

Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge.

(CR-98-67-V)

Submitted: October 12, 2000

Decided: October 19, 2000

Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Christopher F. Cowan, COWAN, NORTH & LAFRATTA, L.L.P.,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert Jack Higdon, Jr., OFFICE

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,

for Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Darrell Lamont McCoy appeals from his conviction and the 120-

month sentence imposed by the district court following his guilty plea

to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West Supp. 2000). McCoy’s

counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious issues for appeal.

Although advised of his right to do so, McCoy has not filed a pro se

supplemental brief. We dismiss. 

McCoy signed a written plea agreement in which he agreed to

waive his right to appeal his sentence or conviction, except for claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. A

defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver is knowing and

intelligent. See United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 731 (4th Cir.

1994). In determining whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent,

we examine the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant. If the district court fully questions a defendant during the plea

colloquy pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, regarding the waiver of his right to appeal, generally the waiver

is valid and enforceable. See United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165,

167-68 (4th Cir. 1991). 

The transcript of McCoy’s’s Rule 11 hearing reveals that he understood the full significance of the waiver provision of his plea agreement. McCoy stated that he had reviewed the written plea agreement

with his attorney and that he was satisfied with counsel’s services. 

The Government summarized the plea agreement, including the

waiver provision. McCoy acknowledged that it was his signature on

the plea agreement. He stated that he understood and agreed with the

Government’s summary. When the magistrate judge specifically

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asked McCoy about the waiver, he stated that he understood he was

waiving his right to appeal. On these facts, we find that McCoy’s

waiver was knowingly and intelligently given. Because the only

claims McCoy’s counsel raised are claims regarding the validity of

his guilty plea and the calculation of his sentence, they are precluded

by McCoy’s valid waiver of his appeal rights and we dismiss the

appeal on that basis. 

We have examined the entire record in this case in accordance with

the requirements of Anders, and find no meritorious issues for appeal.

We therefore dismiss the appeal of McCoy’s conviction and sentence.

The court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED

UNITED STATES v. MCCOY 3