### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nua ry 25, 200 5

GRE GOR Y C HRIS TOP HERFL EEN OR v. ST ATE OF TEN NES SEE

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty

No. C46,705 R. Je rry Be ck, Judge

No. E2004-00943-CC A-R3- P C - F iled Jun e 16, 2005

Th e pe tit ion e r, Gr e g ory

Christ op he r F le e no r, ple d g uil ty in the Sul liv a n Cou nty Cr imi na l Co urt to fi rs t de g re e fe lon y

mur de r a nde sp e c ia lly agg ra va te d r ob be ry , a ndthe tr ia l c ou rt se nte nc e d h im t o

concur rent sente nces of

life and f

ifteen y ear s respe ctively . Subsequently , the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction re lief, alleg ing (1 ) t h at h e re ceive d the ineff ective a ssistance of tr ial counsel a nd (2) that his g uiltypleas we re not knowing ly and voluntarily en t er ed

. After an

e vid e nti ary he ari ng , the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt dis mis se d th e pe tit ion , a ndthe pe tit ion e r n ow app e a ls. Upon re view of the rec o rd and the parties’ brie fs, we a ffirm the judg ment of the post-c onviction

c ou rt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the op i n i o n o f the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., joined.

Keith A. Hopson, King sport, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Gre g ory

Christopher Fle enor.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral an d R eporte r; Wil liam G. L amberth, I I , Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and H . Gre eley

Wells, J r., District Att orney Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

Th is c a se re la te s to the pe tit ion e r’ s partic ipatio n in the kil lin g a nd ro bb e ry of John T. B us se ll in Aug ust 2001. At the g uiltyplea hearing, the state g ave the following fac tual acc ount of the crimes: The eig hty -one- y ear -old victim owned a ba it shop a nd restaur ant in Sulli van County . On Au g us t 21 , 2 00 1, the pe tit ion e r, his g ir lf ri e nd , St e ve n Ro lli ns , a ndRol lin s’ g ir lf ri e ndwe nt t o th e ba it shop, intending to rob the victim. Whil e the pe titioner and his g irlfriend w aited in the ca r, Rollins

a ndhis g ir lf

ri e ndwe nt i nto the ba it s ho p. Th e pe tit ion e r h e arda c omm oti on a ndhe ardthe vic tim pleading for his life. The pe titioner g ot out of the ca r, wa lked to the bait shop door, and sa w RollinsSt eve n Rol l i ns was conv i ct ed of f i r s t degr ee premedi t at ed mur der, f el ony m ur der, an d es peci al l y ag gr ava t ed 1

r obber y a n d w as s en t en ce d t o de at h

. T h i s c ou r t a f f i r med t h e con vi ct i on s

. Se e St at e v

. St ev en J ame s Rol l i n s , N o. E 20 03

- 01 81 1- C C A

- R 3- D D
, 200 5 T enn

. Cri m. Ap p. LE X I S 37 3 (K noxv i l l e, Ap r. 2 1
, 20 05 )

. Purs uan t t o T enn es s ee C o d e A n n o ta te d se c tio n 3 9 -1 3 -2 0 6 (a )( 1 ), h is c a se is cu rr e n tly b e fo re o u r su p re m e c o u rt.

-2- bending over be hind a ca sh reg ister. The pe titioner did not see the victim. Rolli ns and the petitioner left the ba it shop and walked to the victim’s c amper

. They stole items from the ca mper a nd left the

scene

. Acc ording to the petitioner’s statement to police
, Rolli ns told the pe titioner that he stabbed the victim and cut the victim’s throa t when the victim re ache d for a g un. The pe titioner also said that Rolli ns threate ned to ki ll the petit ioner if he went to the pol ice. Pursuant to a plea a g ree ment, the petitioner pled g uiltyon Marc h 14, 2002, t o fi rs t deg ree felony murder a nd espec ially

ag g ravated robbery , a Class A fe lony

. The trial c ourt s en t enced him to concurr ent sentenc es of life for the 1 murder c onviction and fiftee n y ear s for the e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction.

At the po st- c on vic tio n e vid e nti ary he ari ng , the pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d that he wa s c ha rg e d w ith the cr imes in October 2001 a nd that the s tate filed a noti ce of intent to seek the de ath pena lty . The
tr ia l c ou rt app oin te d two a tto rn e y s to re pr e se nt him , an d the pe tit ion e r dis c us se d his c a se wi th the m. T h e a t t o r n e ys t o l d t h e p e t i t i o n e r t h a tt h e y f

i l e d m o t i o n s i n t h e c a s e , i n c l u d i n g a m o t i o n f o r d i s c o v e r y. The a tto rn ey s g ave the petitioner docume nts they rec eived dur ing disc overy and re viewed the do c ume nts br ie fl y

wi th h im. Th e pe tit ion e r state d that the sh e ri ff ’s de pa rt me nt re c or de d so me of

his telephone c onversa tions whi l e h e was in jail and that he aske d his attorney s to give him copies of
t h e a u d i o t ap e s

. H o w e v e r , t h e p e t i t i o n e r s t a t e d t h a t h e n e v e r r e c e i v e d t h e t ap e s a n d t h a th i s a t t o r n e ys

ne ve r t oldhim

wh a t wa s on the tape s. Whe n th e pe tit ion e r d e c ide d to ple a d g uil ty , h is atto rn e y s to ld him that he w o u ldb e ma k in g a n A lf

o r d p le a b u t th a t h e w o u ld“ s ti ll h a v e s o me o f [h is ] r ig h ts .” Ho we ve r, the y

did no t e xpla in wh a t a n Al fo rd ple a wa s a nd did no t te ll him that he wo uld los e his ri g ht t o a pp e a l his co nv ic tio ns

. B e fo re the pe tit ion e r d e c ide d to ple a d g uil ty , h is atto rn e y s se nt h im a letter explaining that they

believed he would g et the death penalty i f h e went to trial. The
pe tit ion e r’ s a tto rn e y s a lso ta lke d to his mothe r. The pe tit ion e r r e la te d th a t hi s a tto rn e y s to ld h im

a bo u t l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f

f e n s e s b u t t o l d h i m t h a t l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s “ w o u l d n o t ap p ly ” in h is

case . He sa id that if he had know n that the trial cou rt would have instructed the jury on lesser inc lud e d o ff

e ns e s, he wo uldno t ha ve ple d g uil ty a ndwo uldha ve g on e to t ri a l.

On c ro ss- e xami na tio n, the pe tit ion e r a c kn ow led ge d th a t hi s c od e fe nd a nt, Ste ve n Ro lli ns , went to trial, was convicted, and rec eived the de ath pena lty . The state introduc ed into evidenc e the Request for A cce ptance of Plea of G uiltyWaiver of Rig hts form signed b y the petitioner. The petitioner ac knowledg ed that the f orm stipulates “this c ase is at a n end.” Howeve r, he stated that he only rea d part o f t h e form and did not know he wa s g iving up his rig ht to a direc t appea l. The petitioner ac knowledged tha t at the g uiltyplea he aring , he told the trial court that he had r ead the fo rm . He sa id, ho we ve r, that he lie d to the tr ia l cou rt be c a us e his a tto rn e y s to ld h im t o s a y , “ Ye s, Sir ” wh e n th e tr ial cou rt a sk e d h im q ue sti on s d uring the g uil ty ple a he ari ng . T he pe tit ion e r a lso acknow ledg ed that he met with his attorney s one we ek bef ore the g uiltyplea he aring and told them he wa nted to acc ept the state’ s p l ea offe r. Reg arding lesser inc luded offe nses, the petitioner

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t hi s a tto rn e y s se nt hi m a le tte r i n w hic h th e y

state d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt wo uld-3-

ins truc t th e jury

on le sse r inc lud e d off

e ns e s if the pe tit ion e r de c ide d to go to tr ia l. Th e pe tit ion e r a lso

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt a sk e d h im a t th e g uil ty

ple a he ari ng if

he wa s p le a din g g uil ty knowing ly

and voluntarily

and that he r esponded, “ Yes.”

On re dir e c t e xami na tio n, the pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d tha t the fi rs t time he sa w the wa ive r o f rig hts fo rm wa s o n th e mor

nin g of the g uil ty ple a he ari ng a nd tha t he did no t re a d th e e nti re fo rm . H e sa id that his attorney s told him the trial court would instruct the jury on lesser inc luded offe nses but that the jury wo uld ne ve r co nv ic t him of a les se r inc lud e d off e ns e

. He a c kn ow le dg e d th a t a t th e g uil ty plea he aring , the trial court advised him that if he pled not guilty
, he would have the rig ht to appeal his c on vic tio ns

.

B arb ara An n Sm ith
, the pe tit ion e r’ s mothe r, te sti fi e d that sh e a ndthe pe tit ion e r h a d a c los e rela tionship and that the petitioner aske d her to mee t with his attorney s to discuss t h e state’ s plea of fe r. Du ri ng the me e tin g , the pe tit ion e r’ s a tto rn e y s sh ow e d h e r g ru e so me ph oto g ra ph s o f the vic tim

an d o n e o f t h e a t t o rn ey s t o l d h er , “I do n ’t t h i n k [ t h e p et i t i o n er ] wa n t s y o u w a t c h i n g h i m get t i n g a lethal injection on the table.” After the meeting, she told t he petitioner to a cce pt the state’s off er. She said that if she ha d known about lesser included off

en s es, she may

have sug g ested to the
p e t i t i o n e r t h a th e g o t o t r i a l

. O n c r o s s

- e x a m i n a t i o n , M s

. S m i t h t e s t i f i e d t h a tt h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s a t t o r n e ys told her they

thought the pe titioner would be convict ed o f first degr ee mur der a nd would be
sentenc ed to dea th.

One of the petit ioner’s trial attorney s testified t hat he ha d been pr acticing law since 1981 and primarily prac ticed criminal law. He a nd co-c ounsel filed si x ty -six motions in the petitioner’s c ase, including a

discovery

motion. The state turned ove r discovery materia l, including twe lve audiotape s of the pe titioner’s telephone conver sations rec orded by the sherif f’s de partment while the petitioner was in jail. Co-counsel re viewed the tapes, a nd both attorney s discussed the tape s with the petitioner. The pe titioner’s attorney testified that the tape s wer e not exculpatory
, that the state wa s not going to use them ag ainst the petitioner at tria l, and that the petitioner kne w what wa s on the tapes. The attorney s told the petitioner that if he we nt to trial, the trial court would instruct the jury on lesser incl u d ed o ff

en s es . Howeve r, counse l did not thi nk that a jury would find the petitioner
g uiltyof any

lesser inc luded offe nses. At some point, the state made a plea offe r to the petitioner. Cou ns e l th ou g ht tha t a

jury wo uldc on vic t th e pe tit ion e r of fi rs t de g re e mur de r a ndse nte nc e him to death be cause photogr aphs of the vic tim showed “a ve ry elder ly man who had be en butche red.” Moreove r, the pe titioner’s g irlfriend w as g oing to testify ag ainst him at trial.

Th e a tto rn e y te sti fi e d that he tol d the pe tit ion e r he wo uld los e his ri g ht t o a dir e c t app e a l if he ple d g uil ty

. Ho we ve r, he a lso tol d the pe tit ion e r that the pe tit ion e r c ou ld app e a l his se nte nc e s if the trial court sentenc ed him outside the guilty plea ag ree ment or gave him an il leg al s entenc e. He stated that he we nt over the state ’s plea of fer and the wa iver of rights form with the petitioner and
t h a tt h e p e t i t i o n e r

u n d e r s t o o d t h e o f

f e r a n d t h e f o r m

. C o u n s e l t e s t i f

i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e t h e a t t o r n e ys

me t w ith the pe tit ion e r’ s mothe r, the state ha d no t y e t ma de a ple a of fe r. Du ri ng the ir

me e tin g wi th the petitioner’s mother, the petitioner’s attorney s discussed the evide nce a g ainst the petitioner and tol d h e r w hy

the y tho ug ht a

ple a a g re e me nt w ou ld b e in the pe tit ion e r’ s b e st i nt eres ts . T he y a lso-4-

showed the petitioner’s mot her photogra phs of t he victim and dis cussed possibl e punishments the petitioner would re ceive . The pe titioner’s attorney testified that because the petitioner di d not stab the victim, he thoug ht the jury likely would convict the petitioner of f irst deg ree murder a nd sentenc e him to l if e wi tho ut the po ssi bil ity

of pa ro le

. Ho we ve r, he state d tha t the pe tit ion e r “c ou ld ve ry we ll

rec eive the de ath pena lty .”

On cr oss-examination, the petitioner’s attorne y testified that the petitioner was easy to work

w ith a n d w a s c o o p e r a ti v e

. H e a n d c o

- c o u n s e l d is c u s s e d w ith th e p e ti ti o n e r th e q u e s tions that the
tr ia l c ou rt wo ulda sk

the pe tit ion e r at th e g uil ty ple a he ari ng a ndthe ri g hts that th e pe tit ion e r w ou ld be wa iving. At some point, the a ttorney mailed a lett er to the pe titioner rec ommending tha t the petitioner ac cept the sta te’s off er. The attorney

enclose d a copy of t he plea ag ree ment and wa iver of rig hts form with the letter. Reg arding the audiotape s, the attorn ey testified that the petitioner

never asked to listen to the tapes and that he would have allowed the pe titioner to list en to the tape s if the petitioner ha d asked to do so.

I n d e ny ing the pe titio n for po st- c on vic tio n r e lie f, the po st- c on vic tio n c ou rt e xpre ssl y dis c re dit e d th e pe tit ion e r’ s te sti mon y a nda c c re dit e d h is t

ri a l a tto rn e y ’s te sti mon y . T he po stc onvi cti on c ou rt

fo un d th a t th e pe tit ion e r w a s n ot p re ssu re d in to p le a din g g uil ty a ndvo lun tari ly
enter ed his g uiltypleas. The trial court also held t hat his attorney s discussed lesser included off

enses with him and that the trial court a dvised him at the g uiltyplea he aring that he wa s g iving up his right to appea l his convictions. Finally , the trial court concluded tha t the petitioner’s a t t o rn ey s “did an

e xce lle nt j ob ” in r e pr e se nti ng him

.

Th e pe tit ion e r c la ims that he re c e ive d the ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of tr ia l c ou ns e l be c a us e his

a tto rn e y s f

a ile d to pr ov ide him wi th the a ud iot ape s of his te le ph on e c on ve rs a tio ns , f a ile d to te ll h im that lesser inc luded offe nses would be instructe d to the jury if he went to trial, and fa iled to inform him that he wo uldlos e his ri g ht t o a dir e c t app e a l if

he ple d g uil ty . I n a dd iti on , h e c on te nd s th a t hi s g uilty pleas wer e not know ingly and voluntarily enter ed beca use his attorney s used his mother and the thr e a t of

the de a th p e na lty to co e rc e him int o p le a din g g uil ty . F ina lly , h e c la ims that hi s g uil ty pleas we re not knowing and voluntary beca use the trial court failed to te ll him during the g uiltyplea hearing tha t the judgme nts of conviction would be use d to enhanc e punishments he re ceive d for a ny sub s eq u ent convictions and failed to ask him if his willingness to plea d g uiltyresulted f rom prior discussions be tween the district attorney and the petitioner or his attorney as require d by Rule 11(d), Tenn. R. Crim. P.

II. Ana lys is

I n a post-convic tion proce eding
, the petit ioner be ars the bur den of pr oving the g rounds ra ised in the pe tit ion by cle ar and con vin c ing e vid e nc e . T e nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 30 -1 10 (f ). “ Ev ide nc e is clea r an d co n v i ncing when ther e is no serious or substantial doubt about the c orre ctness of the conclusions dra wn from the e vidence. ” Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (c iting Hodg es v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992)) . I ssues reg arding the cr edibilityof witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be acc orded the ir testi m o n y , and the factua l-5-

questions raised by

the evidenc e adduc ed at tria l are to be re solved by the pos t-conviction court as the trier of

fac t. Henley

v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). T h er ef o re , we aff

ord the post-convict i o n court’s findings of f act the w eig ht of a jury

verdic t, with such findings be ing

c on c lus ive on app e a l abs e nt a sho wi ng that the e vid e nc e in the re c or d p re po nd e rate s a g a ins t th os e finding s. I d. at 578.

A. I neff ective A ssistance of Counsel

On appe al, a c laim of

ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel prese nts a mix ed question of law and fac t su b j ec t t o d e n o v o revie w. State v. B urns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). As such, the post-conviction court’s finding s of fa ct ar e entitled to a pr esumption of co rre ctness unless the evidenc e pre pondera tes ag ainst those finding s. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). Howeve r, a post-c onviction court’s c onclusions of law, such as whether counsel’s perf ormanc e wa s defic ient or whe ther that de ficienc y was pre judicial, are subject t o a purely de novo re view with no presumption of cor

rec tness. I d.

When a petition er s eeks post-c onviction relief on the basis of ineff ective a ssistance of counsel, “ the petitioner be ars the burden of proving both that counsel’s performance was de ficient and that the de ficienc y

prejudice d the def

ense.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)).

Be cause a petitioner must establish both prong s of the test, a f ailure to pr ov e e ith e r de fi c ie nc y or pr e jud ic e pr ov ide s a suf

fi c ie nt ba sis to deny relief on the i neff

ective assistance claim. I ndeed, a court need

no t a dd re ss the c omp on e nts in a ny pa rt ic ul ar order

or e ve n a dd re ss both if the [petiti oner] m ak es an insuffic ient showing of one

c omp on e nt.

I d. at 370.

To establish constitutionally d ef i cient performa nce, the petitioner must demonstrate that

c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n f e ll b e low a n o bje c tiv e sta ndardof re a so na ble ne ss. Str ic kla nd , 4 66 U. S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064; Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462. Spec ifically
, the petitioner must show that counsel’s pe rfor mance was not w ithin “the rang e of c ompetence demande d of attorne y s in criminal

case s.” B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 93 6 (T en n. 1975). On a ppeal, this court will neither second g uess the tac tical and strateg ic decisions of de fense counsel, nor me asure the re prese ntation by “20-20 hindsig ht.” Cooper v. St ate, 849 S.W.2d 744, 746 (Tenn. 1993). To e stablish prejudice, the petitioner must show that “ther e is a re asonable probability that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional

e rr or s, the re su lt o f the pr oc e e din g wo uldhave been di ffer e nt. A r e a so na ble pr ob abil ity

is a probability

sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Strickla nd, 4 6 6 U. S. at 694, 104 S. Ct . at 2068; see a lso Dean v. State, 59 S.W.3d 663, 667 (Tenn. 2001).-6-

I n this case, the pe titioner claims that he re ceive d the ineff ective a ssistance of c ounsel beca use his trial attorney s failed to provide him with audiotapes of h i s t elephone conver sations

re c or de d wh ile he wa s in ja il, fa ile d to te ll him that le sse r inc lud e d of fe ns e s wo uld be ins truc te d to the jury if he we nt to tri a l, an d fa ile d to inf or m him tha t he wo uld los e his ri g ht to a dir e c t app e a l if he p l ed gu i lty . Reg arding the audiotape d telephone c onversa tions, the petitioner’s trial attorne y testified at the post-c onviction hear ing tha t the tapes we re not e x culpatory , that th e S t at e wa s not g oing to use the tapes a g ainst the petitioner at tria l, that cou nsel discussed the tape s with the
pe tit ion e r, a ndthat the pe tit ion e r kne w wh a t wa s on the tape s. Th e tape s hav e no t be e n in c lud e d in the re cord on appea l. The trial court accr edited the petitioner’s testim ony over that of the pe titioner. The pe titioner has failed to show that his attorney s rende red defic ient perf ormanc e for failing to give h i m t h e t ap e s o r

t h a th e w a s p r e

j u d i c e d b y a n y d e f

i c i e n c y.

Re g ard ing le sse r i nc lud e d o ff e ns e s, the pe tit ion e r ad mit te d at the e vid e nti ary he ari ng that hi s

a tto rn e y s to ld h im l e sse r i nc lud e d o ff ens es wou ld b e c ha

rg e d to the jury

if he we nt t o tria l. Moreove r, the trial court noted t hat it informed the pe titioner at the g uiltyplea he aring that the jury would be instructed on le ss er i n cl u d ed offe nses. Our r eview of the g uiltyplea he aring transcript shows that the t rial court informed the petitioner t hat t he jury would be ins tructed on lesser included offe n s es of first deg ree murder a nd espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry

if he we nt to trial. As to the petitioner’s c laim that his attorney s failed to inform h i m that he would lose his rig ht to a direc t

app e a l if he ple d g uil ty , the pe tit ion e r’ s a tto rn e y te sti fi e d that he tol d the pe tit ion e r he wo uldlos e his rig ht to a direc t appea l. I n its order de ny ing post-c onviction relief, the trial cour t n o t ed that the petitioner sig ned a g uiltyplea a g ree ment and wa iver of rights form. T h e form provide s that by pleading g uilty “t h er e wi l l n ot be a tria l; and this case is at a n end, other than the imposing of

the

abo ve se nte nc e on me .” Al tho ug h the pe tit ion e r te sti fi e d a t the po st- c on vic tio n h e ari ng that he did
not rea d the entire form and that his attorney s never told him t hat he would lose his rig ht to a direc t

app e a l, the tr ia l c ou rt

a c c re dit ed th e pet iti on e r’ s a tto rn e y , a ndthe re c or d d oe s n ot p re po nd e rate ag ainst the trial court’s conclusion that the pe tit i oner kne w he wa s waiving his right to a dir ect appea l by pleading g uilty

.

B. K nowing and Voluntary Guilty Pleas

I n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r a

pe tit ion e r’ s g uil ty

ple a wa s k no wi ng a nd

vo lun tary , this c ou rt

mus t look at the totality

of the circ umstances. State v. Turner
, 919 S.W .2d 346, 353 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). “T h is c o u r t i s b o u n d b y th e p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n c o u r t’ s f in d in g s u n le s s th e e v id ence preponde rate s otherwise.” Bates v. State, 973 S.W .2d 615, 631 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

.

When a def

endant e nters a plea of g uilty , certain constitutional rights ar e wa ived, including
t h e p r i v i l e g e a g a i n s t s e l f

- i n c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t w i t n e s s e s , a n d t h e r i g h t t o a t r i a l b y j u r y. B oy kin v. Al aba ma , 39 5 U. S. 23 8, 24 3, 89 S. Ct . 1 70 9, 17 12 (1 96 9) . T he re fo re , in or de r t o c omp ly with constituti onal re quirements, a g uilty plea must be a “voluntary and intellige nt choice a mong the alternative course s of ac tion open to the defe ndant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct . 160, 164 (1970). I n order to ensure that a defenda nt understands the c onstitut ional rig hts being-7-

relinquished, the tria l court must advise the de fenda nt of t he consequenc es of a guilty plea. B oykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44, 89 S. Ct. at 1712.

I n State v. Macke y , 553 S.W .2d 337, 341 (Tenn. 1977)
, s u perse ded on other g rounds by Tenn. R. Crim. A pp. 37(b) and Tenn. R. A pp. P. 3( b), our supreme court set out the pr ocedur e trial courts should follow when a cce pting a g uiltyplea. Prior to ac cepting the guilty plea, the tr ial court must advise the def

endant of the conse quence s of a g uilty plea and deter mine whether the def endant understands those c onsequenc es. See id.; see also Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(c). A ve rbatim rec ord of the g uil t y p lea must be made and must include, without limi tation, “(a ) the c ourt’s advic e to the de fe nd a nt, (b ) the inq uiry int o th e vo lun tari ne ss o f the ple a inc lud ing a ny

ple a a g re e me nt a ndint o the def endant’ s understanding of the c onsequenc es of his entering a plea of g uilty , and (c ) the inquiry into the acc urac y

of a g uiltyplea.” Macke y , 553 S.W .2d at 341.

I n deter mining whe ther the pe titioner’s g uiltyplea wa s knowing and vol u n tary , this court loo ks to the fo llo wi ng fa c tor s:

Th e re la tiv e int e lli g e nc e of the [pe tit ion e r]; th e deg re e of his familiarity

with criminal proce eding s; whether he wa s repr esente d by competent c ounsel and ha d the opportunity to confe r with counsel about the options available to him; the extent of advice f rom counsel and the c ourt conce rning the charg es aga inst him; and the r easons f or his decision to pl ea d g uilty , including a desire to a void a g reater pe na lty that mi g ht r e su lt f

ro m a jury tr ia l.

Bla nkenship v. State, 858 S.W .2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993)

. The pe titioner claims that his guilty pleas we re not knowing ly and voluntarily enter ed beca use his attorney s used his mother and the threat of the death pe nalty to coer ce him into pleading
g uilty

. The post-conviction court held that the petitioner voluntarily enter ed his pleas. We ag ree

. Ac c or din g to the g uil ty

ple a he ari ng tr a ns c ri pt, the tr ia l c ou rt sp e c if ic a lly a sk e d th e pe tit ion e r i f h is pl eas w ere v ol un tar y , an d t he p eti ti on er an sw ered , “Y es, y ou r ho no r.” A lt ho ugh t he p etition e r c laims that his attorney s used the thre at of the de ath pena lty to coer ce him into pleading g uilty , we note tha t if an a ttorney

believes i t t o be in the appe llant’s best interest to plea d g uiltyin order to a void the death pe nalty , the attorne y should a dvise the appe llant to do so. P arha m v. State, 885 S.W .2d 375, 381 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). I n this case, the pe titioner’s trial attorne y testified that he thoug ht the petitioner would be convicted of first deg ree murder and “could very well re ceive the dea th penalty .” Although the petitioner conte nds that he wa s coer ced into plea ding g uilty , g iven the totality of the

c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e p e t i t i o n e r h a s f a i l e d t o s h o w t h a th i s g u i l t y p l e a s w e r e n o tk n o w i n g l y, intelligently , and voluntarily enter ed.

The pe titioner also claims fo r t h e fi rs t t ime in this appeal that his g uiltypleas we re not knowing ly a n d v o lu n ta

r il y e n te r e d b e c a u s e th e tria l c o u r t f a il e d to te ll h im d u r in g th e g u il ty plea hearing tha t the judgme nts of conviction would be use d to enhanc e punishments he rec eived f or any-8-

subsequent convic tions

. Se e State v. McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Tenn. 1987) (pr oviding that when a cce pting a

g uiltyplea, a

trial court “ must make it clear to the defe ndant that the re sulting judgme nt of conviction may be used in a

subsequent proc eeding to enhanc e the p u n i shment for

su bs e qu e nt o ff

e ns e s” ). I n a dd iti on , h e c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt fa ile d to a sk

him if his wi lli ng ne ss to ple a d g uil ty re su lte d fr om pr ior dis c us sio ns be tw e e n the dis tr ic t atto rn e y a ndthe pe tit ion e r o r h is attorney as re quired by

Rule 11(d), Te nn. R

. C ri m. P. However , we note tha t “[t] o the extent the petitioner’s c laim is based upon the re quirements for the taking of g uiltypleas imposed by Macke y

a ndRul e 11 , T e nn . R. Cr im. P., bu t no t r e la te d to c on sti tut ion a l ri g hts
, it is no t c og niza ble in a su it for post-c onvictio n re l i ef

. ” M at t h ew M el t o n J ac k s o n v

. S t at e, No

. M 2 0 0 4 -0 1 3 42-CCA-R3-PC, 2005 Tenn Crim. App. LEXI S 481, at *31 (Nashville, May 18, 2005).

I n any event, r eg arding the p et i t i o n er ’s claim that the tria l court fa iled to tell him t hat the judgme nts of conviction would be use d to enhanc e punishments for subseque nt crimes, our r eview

o f t h e gu i l t y

p l eah ea ri n g t ra n s cr i p ts h o ws t h at t h e t ri al co u rt s t at ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:

No w, do y ou un de rs ta ndthat if I a c c e pt y ou r p le a s o f g uil ty here today , there will be resulting rec ords of convic tion, and if in the f u tu r e y o u s h o u ld b e c o n v ic te d o f s o me n e w c r im in a l o f f e n s e , the Se nte nc ing Judg e wi ll g ive y ou a lon g e r s e nte nc e be c a us e of the se ple a s o f g uil ty

he re tod a y ? Do y ou fu lly un de rs ta ndthat?

Th us , th e re is n o me ri t to the pe tit ion e r’ s c la im tha t th e tr ia l c ou rt fa ile d to inf or m him that his g uil ty pleas c ould be used to enha nce a ny punishments for subsequent c onvictions.

M o r e o v e r , a s to h is c la im th a t th e tria l c o u r t f a il e d to a s k h im if h is w il li n g ness to plead
g uiltyresulted from prior discussions betwee n the district attorney and the pe titioner or his attorney

as re qu ir e d b y Ru le 1 1 ( d )
, T e n n

. R. Crim

. P.
, th e p e ti ti o n e r h a s ma d e n o s h o w in g th a t the trial court’s f ailure r esulted in his pleas being unknowing and involuntary

. To the contra ry , our re view of the g uiltyplea he aring transcript sh ows that trial court substantially complied with Rule 11, thoroug hly

qu est ioned the petitioner a bout his guilty

pleas, a nd asked him seve ral times if he w as ple a din g g uil ty

vo lun tari ly

. Se e Parh a m, 8 85 S.W. 2da t 38 1 ( pr ov idi ng that a tr ia l c ou rt

“ mus t a sk a suff icient number of questions to ensure that the ac cused is voluntarily enter ing the g uiltyplea” ). T h e p e t i t i o n e r

h a s f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a th e d i d n o tp l e a d g u i l t y v o l u n t ar i l y.

III. Conclusi on

B a se d u po n th e re c or d a ndthe pa rt ie s’ br ie fs , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEE OGLE, J UDGE