Opinion issued December 19, 2017

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-17-00792-CV

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KAREN MCANDREWS AND JOHN LOWE, Appellants

V.

JODY CRYSTAL LOWE, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law

Austin County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 2014L-6013

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Karen McAndrews and John Lowe, have filed a notice of appeal 

of an order denying a motion to recuse the trial court judge in a suit affecting the 

parent-child relationship. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
2

John Lowe moved for recusal of the Honorable Daniel W. Leedy, the 

presiding judge of the county court at law. Judge Leedy declined to recuse himself 

and referred the motion to the regional presiding judge, the Honorable Billy Ray 

Stubblefield, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a. Judge Stubblefield 

assigned the Honorable Terry Flenniken “to preside in the Motion to Recuse” Judge 

Leedy. John Lowe then moved for recusal of Judge Flenniken. On August 27, 2017, 

Judge Stubblefield signed an order denying the motion to recuse Judge Flenniken.

And, on October 3, 2017, Judge Flenniken held a hearing on the motion to recuse 

Judge Leedy and signed an order denying the motion. Lowe and McAndrews then

filed a notice of appeal of the “[d]enial of the [m]otion to recuse Judge Dan Leedy.”

Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final 

judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); N. E.

Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966). A judgment is final 

for purposes of appeal if the judgment disposes of all pending parties and claims 

before the trial court. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d at 895. The clerk’s record filed in this 

appeal does not show that the trial court has signed a final judgment that disposes of 

all parties and claims before the Court.

An appellate court also has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from an 

interlocutory order if a statute explicitly provides jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 967 

S.W.2d 352, 352–53 (Tex. 1998); see, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 
3

51.014 (West Supp. 2017) (authorizing appeals from certain interlocutory orders).

However, an order denying a motion to recuse is not an appealable interlocutory 

order. See Rizk v. Gray, No. 01-16-00374-CV, 2016 WL 7104020, at *1 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citations omitted). To 

the contrary, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(j)(1)(A) expressly provides that 

“[a]n order denying a motion to recuse may be reviewed only for abuse of discretion 

on appeal from the final judgment.” TEX. R. CIV. PROC. 18a(j)(1)(A); see Rizk, 2016 

WL 7104020, at *1 (explaining interlocutory order denying motion to recuse “is 

appealable only on appeal of the final judgment”).

The Clerk of this Court notified appellants that the appeal was subject to 

dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless they filed a written response showing how 

this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a). Appellants

have not responded to the notice.

1

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We dismiss as 

moot all pending motions.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Brown, and Lloyd.

 

1 Within the time to respond to this Court’s notice, appellants filed a brief in this 

appeal. Their brief, however, does not demonstrate that this Court has jurisdiction 

over their appeal or address the jurisdictional question.