Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1608-CR-1786 | February 28, 2017 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. Burns

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lisa Crawford,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 28, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No. 

49A02-1608-CR-1786

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Amy M. Jones, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

49G08-1511-CM-41824

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Lisa Crawford (“Crawford”) was convicted in Marion Superior Court of Class 

A misdemeanor driving while suspended, Class A misdemeanor leaving the 
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scene of an accident causing bodily injury, and Class B misdemeanor false 

informing. On appeal, Crawford claims that the State presented insufficient 

evidence to support her convictions for leaving the scene of an accident and 

false informing. 

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 23, 2015, Roi Dawes (“Dawes”) was driving a truck for his 

employer, Trucker’s 24 Hour Road Service. Dawes left the company’s location 

on Holt Road in Indianapolis to pick up parts. Shortly after he left, his truck 

was hit in the rear by another vehicle, a Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck. This truck

did not stop at the scene of the accident; instead, the driver of the truck backed 

up, drove around Dawes’s truck, and drove away down Farnsworth Street.

[4] Dawes decided to pursue the S-10 and followed the truck for ten to fifteen 

blocks. At this point, the driver of the S-10 made a left turn, quickly stopped, 

jumped out of the truck, and ran away. The driver of the S-10 ran down an 

nearby alley. Dawes briefly gave chase and saw the driver’s face for a few 

seconds when she turned to look behind her, but he quickly decided the better 

option was to call the police. Dawes described the driver of the S-10 as a “late 

twenties, early thirty year old white female, [with] red hair.” Tr. p. 7.

[5] Indianapolis Police Department (“IMPD”) Officer David Janicijevic (“Officer 

Janicijevic”) responded to Dawes’s call and interviewed Dawes at the scene 

where the driver of the S-10 had abandoned her truck. Dawes informed him of 
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the accident and gave him a description of the driver. Officer Janicijevic ran a 

license plate check on the abandoned truck, which revealed that the truck was 

registered to Crawford and that Crawford’s license was suspended.

[6] In the meantime, IMPD received a call from Crawford, who claimed that her 

Chevrolet S-10 pickup truck had been stolen from a local restaurant. However, 

the officers who responded to Crawford’s call could not find anyone who could 

corroborate Crawford’s claim that her truck had been stolen from the 

restaurant. The police told Crawford to go to the scene where her truck had 

been found abandoned. When she arrived, Dawes identified her as the woman 

he had seen fleeing from the vehicle. The police then arrested Crawford.

[7] The following day, the State charged Crawford with Class A misdemeanor 

driving while suspended, Class A misdemeanor fleeing the scene of an accident 

causing bodily injury, and Class B misdemeanor false informing. A bench trial 

was held on July 12, 2016. At the trial, Dawes again identified Crawford as the 

woman who had been driving the truck that hit his vehicle. Officer Janicijevic

testified that Dawes identified Crawford at the scene. The State also presented 

Crawford’s driving record, which confirmed that her driver’s license was 

suspended on the date of the accident. Crawford testified on her own behalf and 

repeated her claim that her truck had been stolen and that she reported this to 

the police even though she knew that her license was suspended.

[8] The trial court determined that Crawford’s testimony was not credible and 

found her guilty as charged. The court sentenced Crawford to 363 days on the 
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conviction for driving while suspended, with all 363 days suspended to 

probation; a concurrent 363-day sentence on the conviction for leaving the 

scene of an accident, again with all 363 days suspended to probation; and a 

consecutive 180-day sentence on the conviction for false informing, with all 180 

days suspended and ninety days on probation. Crawford now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] On appeal, Crawford presents one issue for our review, namely whether the 

State presented evidence sufficient to establish that she was the person driving 

her pickup truck at the time it hit Dawes’s truck and then fled the scene.1 Our 

standard of review on claims of insufficient evidence is well settled but bears 

repeating:

When reviewing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to 

support a conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge 

the credibility of the witnesses; instead, we respect the exclusive 

province of the trier of fact to weigh any conflicting evidence. We 

consider only the probative evidence supporting the [judgment]

and any reasonable inferences which may be drawn from this 

evidence. We will affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable 

inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a 

reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

 

1 Crawford admits that the evidence was sufficient to convict her of driving while suspended. Appellant’s Br. 

p. 10.
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Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (citing 

McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005)). 

[10] Crawford claims that Dawes’s testimony identifying her as the driver of the S10 pickup truck should not be credited because Dawes saw the driver for only a 

short time and saw her face for only a few seconds. She also argues that 

Dawes’s identification was flawed because it was based on an improperly

suggestive showup instead of a more controlled photographic lineup. However, 

Crawford does not challenge the admissibility of Dawes’s identification; she 

claims only that the identification evidence was insufficient to prove that she 

was the one who was driving the S-10 at the time of the accident.

[11] It has long been held that the uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be 

sufficient by itself to sustain a conviction on appeal. Scott v. State, 871 N.E.2d 

341, 343-44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). If the identification evidence of the witness is 

unequivocal, the identification does not need to be supported by other 

circumstantial evidence. Id. at 344. However, if the identification is equivocal, 

then the identification must be supported by circumstantial evidence. Id.

[12] Here, Dawes’s identification of Crawford was unequivocal. He clearly testified 

that the person he saw run from the truck was Crawford “or her twin.” Tr. p. 8.

At no time did he back away from his testimony that Crawford was the 

individual he saw. Even if Dawes’s identification testimony were equivocal, his 

identification was further supported by the fact that the S-10 was registered to 
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Crawford, who, at the time of the offense, was a twenty-eight-year-old white 

female with red hair,

2 matching the description of the person Dawes saw.3

[13] The trial court was well within its role as the trier of fact to credit the eyewitness 

testimony of Dawes and to reject Crawford’s self-serving testimony. Thus, the 

evidence favorable to the trial court’s judgement, and the reasonable inferences 

that can be drawn from this evidence, were sufficient to establish beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Crawford was driving her truck at the time she rear-ended 

the truck driven by Dawes. See Gorman v. State, 968 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012) (holding that testimony of single eyewitness was sufficient to 

support defendant’s conviction for robbery where witness stated that she was 

“one hundred percent certain” that defendant was the one who robbed her and 

her friend).

[14] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur. 

 

2 We recognize that Crawford’s driving record indicates that her hair is brown. Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 1, p. 1.

However, the evidence at trial indicates that her hair was red. Immediately after describing Crawford as 

having red hair, Dawes identified her in court as the same red-haired individual he saw fleeing the truck. Tr. 

pp. 7-8. Officer Janicijevic also testified that Crawford had red hair. Tr. p. 28. 

3 Crawford claims that her testimony that her truck was stolen should be credited because her report to the 

police of her stolen truck would expose her to a charge of driving while suspended. However, while reporting 

her truck stolen might have exposed her to a charge of driving while suspended, it also provided her with a 

defense to the charge of fleeing the scene of an accident. The trial court was not required to credit her 

testimony.