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(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2015 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 13–1339. Argued November 2, 2015—Decided May 16, 2016 

The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA) requires consumer reporting agencies to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum 

possible accuracy of” consumer reports, 15 U. S. C. §1681e(b), and

imposes liability on “[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with 

any requirement [of the Act] with respect to any” individual, 

§1681n(a). 

Petitioner Spokeo, Inc., an alleged consumer reporting agency, operates a “people search engine,” which searches a wide spectrum of

databases to gather and provide personal information about individuals to a variety of users, including employers wanting to evaluate

prospective employees. After respondent Thomas Robins discovered 

that his Spokeo-generated profile contained inaccurate information,

he filed a federal class-action complaint against Spokeo, alleging that

the company willfully failed to comply with the FCRA’s requirements. 

The District Court dismissed Robins’ complaint, holding that he 

had not properly pleaded injury in fact as required by Article III. The 

Ninth Circuit reversed. Based on Robins’ allegation that “Spokeo violated his statutory rights” and the fact that Robins’ “personal interests in the handling of his credit information are individualized,” the 

court held that Robins had adequately alleged an injury in fact. 

Held: Because the Ninth Circuit failed to consider both aspects of the

injury-in-fact requirement, its Article III standing analysis was incomplete. Pp. 5–11. 

(a) A plaintiff invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing by

demonstrating (1) an injury in fact, (2) fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) likely to be redressed by a 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

Syllabus 

favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 

555, 560–561. Pp. 5–6.

(b) As relevant here, the injury-in-fact requirement requires a 

plaintiff to show that he or she suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, supra, at 560. 

Pp. 7–11.

(1) The Ninth Circuit’s injury-in-fact analysis elided the independent “concreteness” requirement. Both observations it made concerned only “particularization,” i.e., the requirement that an injury

“affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way,” Lujan, supra,

at 560, n. 1, but an injury in fact must be both concrete and particularized, see, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. ___, 

___. Concreteness is quite different from particularization and requires an injury to be “de facto,” that is, to actually exist. Pp. 7–8.

(2) The Ninth Circuit also failed to address whether the alleged

procedural violations entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the

concreteness requirement. A “concrete” injury need not be a “tangible” injury. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460. 

To determine whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact, 

both history and the judgment of Congress are instructive. Congress

is well positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum

Article III requirements, but a plaintiff does not automatically satisfy

the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a right and

purports to authorize a suit to vindicate it. Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.

This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy that requirement. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 

U. S. ____. The violation of a procedural right granted by statute can

be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute injury in fact; in

such a case, a plaintiff need not allege any additional harm beyond 

the one identified by Congress, see Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 

524 U. S. 11, 20–25. This Court takes no position on the correctness

of the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate conclusion, but these general principles demonstrate two things: that Congress plainly sought to curb

the dissemination of false information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that risk and that Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation. Pp. 8– 

11. 

742 F. 3d 409, vacated and remanded. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

and KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., 

filed a concurring opinion. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in 

which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

 


 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 13–1339 

SPOKEO, INC., PETITIONER v. THOMAS ROBINS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 16, 2016] 

JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. 

This case presents the question whether respondent

Robins has standing to maintain an action in federal court 

against petitioner Spokeo under the Fair Credit Reporting

Act of 1970 (FCRA or Act), 84 Stat. 1127, as amended, 15 

U. S. C. §1681 et seq.

Spokeo operates a “people search engine.” If an individual visits Spokeo’s Web site and inputs a person’s name, a 

phone number, or an e-mail address, Spokeo conducts a 

computerized search in a wide variety of databases and 

provides information about the subject of the search.

Spokeo performed such a search for information about

Robins, and some of the information it gathered and then

disseminated was incorrect. When Robins learned of these 

inaccuracies, he filed a complaint on his own behalf and on

behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals. 

The District Court dismissed Robins’ complaint for lack 

of standing, but a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. The 

Ninth Circuit noted, first, that Robins had alleged that

“Spokeo violated his statutory rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” and, second, that “Robins’s

personal interests in the handling of his credit information 
 

 

 

2 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

Opinion of the Court 

are individualized rather than collective.” 742 F. 3d 409, 

413 (2014). Based on these two observations, the Ninth 

Circuit held that Robins had adequately alleged injury in

fact, a requirement for standing under Article III of the

Constitution. Id., at 413–414. 

This analysis was incomplete. As we have explained in 

our prior opinions, the injury-in-fact requirement requires

a plaintiff to allege an injury that is both “concrete and 

particularized.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 

Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 180– 

181 (2000) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s analysis 

focused on the second characteristic (particularity), but it

overlooked the first (concreteness). We therefore vacate 

the decision below and remand for the Ninth Circuit to 

consider both aspects of the injury-in-fact requirement. 

I 

The FCRA seeks to ensure “fair and accurate credit 

reporting.” §1681(a)(1). To achieve this end, the Act 

regulates the creation and the use of “consumer report[s]”1 

by “consumer reporting agenc[ies]”2 for certain specified 

—————— 

1The Act defines the term “consumer report” as:

“any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a

consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, 

credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal 

characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or

collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in

establishing the consumer’s eligibility for— 

“(A) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or 

household purposes;

“(B) employment purposes; or

“(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.”

15 U. S. C. §1681a(d)(1). 2 “The term ‘consumer reporting agency’ means any person which, for

monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly

engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating

consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the 

purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses 
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

purposes, including credit transactions, insurance, licensing, consumer-initiated business transactions, and employment. See §§1681a(d)(1)(A)–(C); §1681b. Enacted 

long before the advent of the Internet, the FCRA applies to 

companies that regularly disseminate information bearing 

on an individual’s “credit worthiness, credit standing,

credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal 

characteristics, or mode of living.” §1681a(d)(1).

The FCRA imposes a host of requirements concerning 

the creation and use of consumer reports. As relevant 

here, the Act requires consumer reporting agencies to

“follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible

accuracy of ” consumer reports, §1681e(b); to notify providers and users of consumer information of their responsibilities under the Act, §1681e(d); to limit the circumstances

in which such agencies provide consumer reports “for

employment purposes,” §1681b(b)(1); and to post toll-free

numbers for consumers to request reports, §1681j(a).

The Act also provides that “[a]ny person who willfully 

fails to comply with any requirement [of the Act] with

respect to any [individual3] is liable to that [individual]” 

for, among other things, either “actual damages” or statutory damages of $100 to $1,000 per violation, costs of the 

action and attorney’s fees, and possibly punitive damages. 

§1681n(a).

Spokeo is alleged to qualify as a “consumer reporting

agency” under the FCRA.4 It operates a Web site that

allows users to search for information about other individuals by name, e-mail address, or phone number. In response to an inquiry submitted online, Spokeo searches a 

—————— 

any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.” §1681a(f). 3This statutory provision uses the term “consumer,” but that term is

defined to mean “an individual.” §1681a(c). 4For purposes of this opinion, we assume that Spokeo is a consumer 

reporting agency. 
 

 

 

4 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

Opinion of the Court 

wide spectrum of databases and gathers and provides 

information such as the individual’s address, phone number, marital status, approximate age, occupation, hobbies, 

finances, shopping habits, and musical preferences. App.

7, 10–11. According to Robins, Spokeo markets its services to a variety of users, including not only “employers

who want to evaluate prospective employees,” but also

“those who want to investigate prospective romantic partners or seek other personal information.” Brief for Respondent 7. Persons wishing to perform a Spokeo search 

need not disclose their identities, and much information is 

available for free. 

At some point in time, someone (Robins’ complaint does

not specify who) made a Spokeo search request for information about Robins, and Spokeo trawled its sources and 

generated a profile. By some means not detailed in Robins’ complaint, he became aware of the contents of that 

profile and discovered that it contained inaccurate information. His profile, he asserts, states that he is married, 

has children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively affluent,

and holds a graduate degree. App. 14. According to Robins’ complaint, all of this information is incorrect. 

Robins filed a class-action complaint in the United

States District Court for the Central District of California, 

claiming, among other things, that Spokeo willfully failed 

to comply with the FCRA requirements enumerated

above. 

The District Court initially denied Spokeo’s motion to 

dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, but later

reconsidered and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a. The court found that Robins 

had not “properly pled” an injury in fact, as required by

Article III. Ibid. 

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 
 


 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

Relying on Circuit precedent,5 the court began by stating

that “the violation of a statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing.” 742 F. 3d, at 412. 

The court recognized that “the Constitution limits the 

power of Congress to confer standing.” Id., at 413. But 

the court held that those limits were honored in this case 

because Robins alleged that “Spokeo violated his statutory

rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,” and

because his “personal interests in the handling of his

credit information are individualized rather than collective.” Ibid. (emphasis in original). The court thus concluded that Robins’ “alleged violations of [his] statutory 

rights [were] sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Id., at 413–414. 

We granted certiorari. 575 U. S. ___ (2015). 

II
 

A 

The Constitution confers limited authority on each 

branch of the Federal Government. It vests Congress with

enumerated “legislative Powers,” Art. I, §1; it confers upon 

the President “[t]he executive Power,” Art. II, §1, cl. 1; and 

it endows the federal courts with “[t]he judicial Power of

the United States,” Art. III, §1. In order to remain faithful 

to this tripartite structure, the power of the Federal Judiciary may not be permitted to intrude upon the powers 

given to the other branches. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. 

Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341 (2006); Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 559–560 (1992). 

Although the Constitution does not fully explain what is 

meant by “[t]he judicial Power of the United States,”

Art. III, § 1, it does specify that this power extends only to 

—————— 

5See Edwards v. First American Corp., 610 F. 3d 514 (CA9 2010), 

cert. granted sub nom. First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards, 564 

U. S. 1018 (2011), cert. dism’d as improvidently granted, 567 U. S. ___ 

(2012) ( per curiam). 
 

 

 

6 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

Opinion of the Court 

“Cases” and “Controversies,” Art. III, §2. And “ ‘[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in 

our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.’ ” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997).

Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the traditional

understanding of a case or controversy. The doctrine 

developed in our case law to ensure that federal courts do

not exceed their authority as it has been traditionally

understood. See id., at 820. The doctrine limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in

federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong. See Valley 

Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 473 (1982); 

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498–499 (1975). In this 

way, “[t]he law of Article III standing . . . serves to prevent

the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of

the political branches,” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 

U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 9); Lujan, supra, at 576– 

577, and confines the federal courts to a properly judicial

role, see Warth, supra, at 498. 

Our cases have established that the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing consists of three elements. 

Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560. The plaintiff must have (1) 

suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the 

challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely 

to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id., at 

560–561; Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U. S., at 180–181. 

The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, 

bears the burden of establishing these elements. 

FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990). Where, 

as here, a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must 

“clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating” each element. 

Warth, supra, at 518.6 

—————— 

6 “That a suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing to the question 
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

B 

This case primarily concerns injury in fact, the “[f]irst

and foremost” of standing’s three elements. Steel Co. v. 

Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 103 (1998). 

Injury in fact is a constitutional requirement, and “[i]t is

settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing 

requirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a

plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” Raines, 

supra, at 820, n. 3; see Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 

555 U. S. 488, 497 (2009); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 

Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event . . . may 

Congress abrogate the Art. III minima”).

To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he 

or she suffered “an invasion of a legally protected interest” 

that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 

560 (internal quotation marks omitted). We discuss the 

particularization and concreteness requirements below. 

1 

For an injury to be “particularized,” it “must affect the

plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Ibid., n. 1; see 

also, e.g., Cuno, supra, at 342 (“ ‘plaintiff must allege 

personal injury’ ”); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 

155 (1990) (“ ‘distinct’ ”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 

751 (1984) (“personal”); Valley Forge, supra, at 472 (standing requires that the plaintiff “ ‘personally has suffered 

some actual or threatened injury’ ”); United States v. 

Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, 177 (1974) (not “undifferentiated”); Public Citizen, Inc. v. National Hwy. Traffic Safety 

Admin., 489 F. 3d 1279, 1292–1293 (CADC 2007) (collect-

—————— 

of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must 

allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury 

has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which 

they belong.’ ” Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 

U. S. 26, 40, n. 20 (1976) (quoting Warth, 422 U. S., at 502). 
 

8 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

Opinion of the Court 

ing cases).7 

Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact,

but it is not sufficient. An injury in fact must also be 

“concrete.” Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, however, 

that independent requirement was elided. As previously

noted, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Robins’ complaint 

alleges “concrete, de facto” injuries for essentially two 

reasons. 742 F. 3d, at 413. First, the court noted that 

Robins “alleges that Spokeo violated his statutory rights,

not just the statutory rights of other people.” Ibid. Second, the court wrote that “Robins’s personal interests in

the handling of his credit information are individualized 

rather than collective.” Ibid. (emphasis added). Both of 

these observations concern particularization, not concreteness. We have made it clear time and time again

that an injury in fact must be both concrete and particularized. See, e.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 

U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 8); Summers, supra, at 

493; Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc., 

554 U. S. 269, 274 (2008); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 

497, 517 (2007).

A “concrete” injury must be “de facto”; that is, it must 

actually exist. See Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed. 

2009). When we have used the adjective “concrete,” we

have meant to convey the usual meaning of the term—

“real,” and not “abstract.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 472 (1971); Random House Dictionary of 

the English Language 305 (1967). Concreteness, therefore, is quite different from particularization. 

2 

“Concrete” is not, however, necessarily synonymous with 

—————— 

7The fact that an injury may be suffered by a large number of people

does not of itself make that injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance. The victims’ injuries from a mass tort, for example, are widely

shared, to be sure, but each individual suffers a particularized harm. 
 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

“tangible.” Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier

to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous

cases that intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.

See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460 

(2009) (free speech); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 

Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993) (free exercise).

In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes

injury in fact, both history and the judgment of Congress

play important roles. Because the doctrine of standing

derives from the case-or-controversy requirement, and

because that requirement in turn is grounded in historical

practice, it is instructive to consider whether an alleged 

intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that 

has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a

lawsuit in English or American courts. See Vermont 

Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 775–777 (2000). In addition, because 

Congress is well positioned to identify intangible harms 

that meet minimum Article III requirements, its judgment 

is also instructive and important. Thus, we said in Lujan

that Congress may “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” 504 U. S., at 578. Similarly,

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in that case explained that 

“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate

chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.” Id., at 580 (opinion 

concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 

Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible 

harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute 

grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right. Article III 

standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a 

statutory violation. For that reason, Robins could not, for 

example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from 
 

 

10 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

Opinion of the Court 

any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. See Summers, 555 U. S., at 496 

(“[D]eprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation . . . is 

insufficient to create Article III standing”); see also Lujan, 

supra, at 572. 

This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm 

cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness. See, e.g., 

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. ____. For example, the law has long permitted recovery by certain tort

victims even if their harms may be difficult to prove or 

measure. See, e.g., Restatement (First) of Torts §§569

(libel), 570 (slander per se) (1938). Just as the common 

law permitted suit in such instances, the violation of a 

procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in 

some circumstances to constitute injury in fact. In other 

words, a plaintiff in such a case need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified. See 

Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 20–25 

(1998) (confirming that a group of voters’ “inability to 

obtain information” that Congress had decided to make

public is a sufficient injury in fact to satisfy Article III); 

Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 449 

(1989) (holding that two advocacy organizations’ failure to

obtain information subject to disclosure under the Federal 

Advisory Committee Act “constitutes a sufficiently distinct

injury to provide standing to sue”).

In the context of this particular case, these general

principles tell us two things: On the one hand, Congress 

plainly sought to curb the dissemination of false information by adopting procedures designed to decrease that 

risk. On the other hand, Robins cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by alleging a bare procedural violation. A violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may result in no harm. For example, even if a

consumer reporting agency fails to provide the required 
 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

notice to a user of the agency’s consumer information, that 

information regardless may be entirely accurate. In addition, not all inaccuracies cause harm or present any material risk of harm. An example that comes readily to mind

is an incorrect zip code. It is difficult to imagine how the

dissemination of an incorrect zip code, without more, could

work any concrete harm.8 

Because the Ninth Circuit failed to fully appreciate the

distinction between concreteness and particularization, its 

standing analysis was incomplete. It did not address the 

question framed by our discussion, namely, whether the 

particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail 

a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement. We take no position as to whether the Ninth

Circuit’s ultimate conclusion—that Robins adequately 

alleged an injury in fact—was correct. 

* * * 

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and

the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 

8We express no view about any other types of false information that

may merit similar treatment. We leave that issue for the Ninth Circuit 

to consider on remand. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 


 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 13–1339 

SPOKEO, INC., PETITIONER v. THOMAS ROBINS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 16, 2016] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 

The Court vacates and remands to have the Court of 

Appeals determine “whether the particular procedural

violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.” Ante, at 11. 

In defining what constitutes a concrete injury, the Court

explains that “concrete” means “‘real,’” and “not ‘abstract,’” but is not “necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’” Ante, at 8–9. 

I join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to explain

how, in my view, the injury-in-fact requirement applies to 

different types of rights. The judicial power of commonlaw courts was historically limited depending on the nature of the plaintiff ’s suit. Common-law courts more 

readily entertained suits from private plaintiffs who alleged a violation of their own rights, in contrast to private 

plaintiffs who asserted claims vindicating public rights.

Those limitations persist in modern standing doctrine. 

I 

A 

Standing doctrine limits the “judicial power” to “‘cases

and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to,

and resolved by, the judicial process.’” Vermont Agency of 

Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 

U. S. 765, 774 (2000) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
 

2 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102 (1998)). To understand the limits that standing imposes on “the judicial

Power,” therefore, we must “refer directly to the traditional, 

fundamental limitations upon the powers of commonlaw courts.” Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, 

J., dissenting). These limitations preserve separation

of powers by preventing the judiciary’s entanglement in

disputes that are primarily political in nature. This concern is generally absent when a private plaintiff seeks to

enforce only his personal rights against another private 

party.

Common-law courts imposed different limitations on a 

plaintiff ’s right to bring suit depending on the type of 

right the plaintiff sought to vindicate. Historically,

common-law courts possessed broad power to adjudicate suits

involving the alleged violation of private rights, even when

plaintiffs alleged only the violation of those rights and 

nothing more. “Private rights” are rights “belonging to 

individuals, considered as individuals.” 3 W. Blackstone, 

Commentaries *2 (hereinafter Blackstone). “Private 

rights” have traditionally included rights of personal

security (including security of reputation), property rights,

and contract rights. See 1 id., at *130–*139; Woolhander 

& Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 

Mich. L. Rev. 689, 693 (2004). In a suit for the violation of 

a private right, courts historically presumed that the

plaintiff suffered a de facto injury merely from having his

personal, legal rights invaded. Thus, when one man 

placed his foot on another’s property, the property owner 

needed to show nothing more to establish a traditional 

case or controversy. See Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 

K. B. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (1765). Many traditional remedies for private-rights causes of action—such

as for trespass, infringement of intellectual property, and

unjust enrichment—are not contingent on a plaintiff ’s 

allegation of damages beyond the violation of his private 
 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

legal right. See Brief for Restitution and Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae 6–18; see also Webb v. Portland Mfg. 

Co., 29 F. Cas. 506, 508 (No. 17,322) (Me. 1838) (stating 

that a legal injury “imports damage in the nature of it”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Common-law courts, however, have required a further

showing of injury for violations of “public rights”—rights

that involve duties owed “to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity.” 4 

Blackstone *5. Such rights include “free navigation of 

waterways, passage on public highways, and general 

compliance with regulatory law.” Woolhander & Nelson, 

102 Mich. L. Rev., at 693. Generally, only the government 

had the authority to vindicate a harm borne by the public

at large, such as the violation of the criminal laws. See 

id., at 695–700. Even in limited cases where private

plaintiffs could bring a claim for the violation of public 

rights, they had to allege that the violation caused them 

“some extraordinary damage, beyond the rest of the [community].” 3 Blackstone *220 (discussing nuisance); see 

also Commonwealth v. Webb, 27 Va. 726, 729 (Gen. Ct. 

1828).* An action to redress a public nuisance, for example, was historically considered an action to vindicate the 

violation of a public right at common law, lest “every 

subject in the kingdom” be able to “harass the offender 

with separate actions.” 3 Blackstone *219; see also 4 id., 

at *167 (same). But if the plaintiff could allege “special 

damage” as the result of a nuisance, the suit could proceed. The existence of special, individualized damage had

the effect of creating a private action for compensatory 

relief to an otherwise public-rights claim. See 3 id., at 

—————— 

*The well-established exception for qui tam actions allows private 

plaintiffs to sue in the government’s name for the violation of a public

right. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. 

Stevens, 529 U. S. 765, 773–774 (2000). 
 

 

4 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

*220. Similarly, a plaintiff had to allege individual damage in disputes over the use of public lands. E.g., Robert 

Marys’s Case, 9 Co. Rep. 111b, 112b, 77 Eng. Rep. 895,

898–899 (K. B. 1613) (commoner must establish not only 

injuria [legal injury] but also damnum [damage] to challenge another’s overgrazing on the commons). 

B 

These differences between legal claims brought by private plaintiffs for the violation of public and private rights

underlie modern standing doctrine and explain the Court’s

description of the injury-in-fact requirement. “Injury in

fact” is the first of three “irreducible” requirements for 

Article III standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 

U. S. 555, 560 (1992). The injury-in-fact requirement

often stymies a private plaintiff ’s attempt to vindicate the 

infringement of public rights. The Court has said time 

and again that, when a plaintiff seeks to vindicate a public 

right, the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered a 

“concrete” injury particular to himself. See Schlesinger v. 

Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221–223 

(1974) (explaining this where plaintiffs sought to enforce

the Incompatibility Clause, Art. I, §6, cl. 2, against Members of Congress holding reserve commissions in the

Armed Forces); see also Lujan, supra, at 572–573 (evaluating standing where plaintiffs sought to enforce the Endangered Species Act); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 

Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 183– 

184 (2000) (Clean Water Act). This requirement applies

with special force when a plaintiff files suit to require an

executive agency to “follow the law”; at that point, the 

citizen must prove that he “has sustained or is immediately 

in danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of that 

[challenged] action and it is not sufficient that he has

merely a general interest common to all members of the

public.” Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633, 634 (1937) (per 
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 5 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

curiam). Thus, in a case where private plaintiffs sought to

compel the U. S. Forest Service to follow certain procedures when it regulated “small fire-rehabilitation and 

timber-salvage projects,” we held that “deprivation of a

procedural right without some concrete interest that is

affected by the deprivation . . . is insufficient to create 

Article III standing,” even if “accorded by Congress.” 

Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488, 490, 

496–497 (2009).

But the concrete-harm requirement does not apply as

rigorously when a private plaintiff seeks to vindicate his 

own private rights. Our contemporary decisions have not

required a plaintiff to assert an actual injury beyond the 

violation of his personal legal rights to satisfy the “injuryin-fact” requirement. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 

247, 266 (1978) (holding that nominal damages are appropriate when a plaintiff ’s constitutional rights have been

infringed but he cannot show further injury).

The separation-of-powers concerns underlying our publicrights decisions are not implicated when private individuals sue to redress violations of their own private

rights. But, when they are implicated, standing doctrine 

keeps courts out of political disputes by denying private 

litigants the right to test the abstract legality of government action. See Schlesinger, supra, at 222. And by

limiting Congress’ ability to delegate law enforcement

authority to private plaintiffs and the courts, standing 

doctrine preserves executive discretion. See Lujan, supra, 

at 577 (“‘To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with

the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is

to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the 

courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional

duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’”).

But where one private party has alleged that another 

private party violated his private rights, there is generally 
 

6 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

no danger that the private party’s suit is an impermissible 

attempt to police the activity of the political branches or,

more broadly, that the legislative branch has impermissibly delegated law enforcement authority from the executive to a private individual. See Hessick, Standing, Injury 

in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 275, 317–

321 (2008). 

C 

When Congress creates new private causes of action to 

vindicate private or public rights, these Article III principles circumscribe federal courts’ power to adjudicate a suit 

alleging the violation of those new legal rights. Congress

can create new private rights and authorize private plaintiffs to sue based simply on the violation of those private 

rights. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975). A 

plaintiff seeking to vindicate a statutorily created private

right need not allege actual harm beyond the invasion of 

that private right. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 

455 U. S. 363, 373–374 (1982) (recognizing standing for a 

violation of the Fair Housing Act); Tennessee Elec. Power 

Co. v. TVA, 306 U. S. 118, 137–138 (1939) (recognizing 

that standing can exist where “the right invaded is a legal 

right,—one of property, one arising out of contract, one

protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a 

statute which confers a privilege”). A plaintiff seeking to

vindicate a public right embodied in a federal statute, 

however, must demonstrate that the violation of that 

public right has caused him a concrete, individual harm

distinct from the general population. See Lujan, supra, at 

578 (noting that, whatever the scope of Congress’ power to

create new legal rights, “it is clear that in suits against the 

Government, at least, the concrete injury requirement

must remain”). Thus, Congress cannot authorize private

plaintiffs to enforce public rights in their own names, 

absent some showing that the plaintiff has suffered a 
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 7 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

concrete harm particular to him. 

II 

Given these principles, I agree with the Court’s decision 

to vacate and remand. The Fair Credit Reporting Act

creates a series of regulatory duties. Robins has no standing to sue Spokeo, in his own name, for violations of the 

duties that Spokeo owes to the public collectively, absent 

some showing that he has suffered concrete and particular

harm. See supra, at 4–5. These consumer protection

requirements include, for example, the requirement to

“post a toll-free telephone number on [Spokeo’s] website 

through which consumers can request free annual file

disclosures.” App. 23, First Amended Complaint ¶74; see

15 U. S. C. §1681j; 16 CFR §610.3(a)(1) (2010). 

But a remand is required because one claim in Robins’ 

complaint rests on a statutory provision that could arguably establish a private cause of action to vindicate the

violation of a privately held right. Section 1681e(b) requires Spokeo to “follow reasonable procedures to assure 

maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning 

the individual about whom the report relates.” §1681e(b)

(emphasis added). If Congress has created a private duty

owed personally to Robins to protect his information, then 

the violation of the legal duty suffices for Article III injury 

in fact. If that provision, however, vests any and all consumers with the power to police the “reasonable procedures” of Spokeo, without more, then Robins has no standing to sue for its violation absent an allegation that he has 

suffered individualized harm. On remand, the Court of 

Appeals can consider the nature of this claim. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

 

 


 
 

Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 1 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 13–1339 

SPOKEO, INC., PETITIONER v. THOMAS ROBINS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[May 16, 2016] 

JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR 

joins, dissenting. 

In the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA or Act),

15 U. S. C. §1681 et seq., Congress required consumer

reporting agencies, whenever preparing a consumer report, to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum 

possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” §1681e(b). To 

promote adherence to the Act’s procedural requirements, 

Congress granted adversely affected consumers a right

to sue noncomplying reporting agencies. §1681n (willful 

noncompliance); §1681o (negligent noncompliance).1 

Thomas Robins instituted suit against Spokeo, Inc., alleging that Spokeo was a reporting agency governed by the 

FCRA, and that Spokeo maintains on its Web site an 

inaccurate consumer report about Robins. App. 13.

In particular, Robins alleged that Spokeo posted “a

picture . . . purport[ing] to be an image of Robins [that] 

was not in fact [of him],” and incorrectly reported that 

Robins “was in his 50s, . . . married, . . . employed in a

professional or technical field, and . . . has children.” Id., 

at 14. Robins further alleged that Spokeo’s profile of him

continues to misrepresent “that he has a graduate degree, 

—————— 

1Congress added the right of action for willful violations in 1996 as

part of the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act, 110 Stat. 3009–426. 
 

 

 

2 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

that his economic health is ‘Very Strong[,]’ and that his

wealth level [is in] the ‘Top 10%.’ ” Ibid. Spokeo displayed 

that erroneous information, Robins asserts, when he was 

“out of work” and “actively seeking employment.” Ibid. 

Because of the misinformation, Robins stated, he encountered “[imminent and ongoing] actual harm to [his] 

employment prospects.” Ibid.2 As Robins elaborated on 

brief, Spokeo’s report made him appear overqualified for 

jobs he might have gained, expectant of a higher

salary than employers would be willing to pay, and less

mobile because of family responsibilities. See Brief for 

Respondent 44.

I agree with much of the Court’s opinion. Robins, the 

Court holds, meets the particularity requirement for 

standing under Article III. See ante, at 8, 11 (remanding 

only for concreteness inquiry). The Court acknowledges

that Congress has the authority to confer rights and delineate claims for relief where none existed before. Ante, at 

9; see Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 19– 

20 (1998) (holding that inability to procure information to

which Congress has created a right in the Federal Election

Campaign Act of 1971 qualifies as concrete injury satisfying Article III’s standing requirement); Public Citizen v. 

Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 449 (1989) (holding

that plaintiff advocacy organizations’ inability to obtain

information that Congress made subject to disclosure

under the Federal Advisory Committee Act “constitutes a 

sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue”); 

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363, 373 (1982) 

—————— 

2Because this case remains at the pleading stage, the court of first 

instance must assume the truth of Robins’ factual allegations. In 

particular, that court must assume, subject to later proof, that Spokeo

is a consumer reporting agency under 15 U. S. C. §1681a(f ) and that, in

preparing consumer reports, Spokeo does not employ reasonable 

procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy, in violation of the 

FCRA. 
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 3 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

(identifying, as Article III injury, violation of plaintiff ’s 

right, secured by the Fair Housing Act, to “truthful information concerning the availability of housing”).3 Congress’ connection of procedural requirements to the prevention of a substantive harm, the Court appears to agree, 

is “instructive and important.” Ante, at 9; see Lujan v. 

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 580 (1992) (KENNEDY, 

J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“As 

Government programs and policies become more complex 

and far reaching, we must be sensitive to the articulation 

of new rights of action . . . .”); Brief for Restitution and 

Remedies Scholars et al. as Amici Curiae 3 (“Congress 

cannot authorize individual plaintiffs to enforce generalized rights that belong to the whole public. But Congress

can create new individual rights, and it can enact effective

remedies for those rights.”). See generally Sunstein,

Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: 

Akins and Beyond, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 613 (1999). 

I part ways with the Court, however, on the necessity of 

a remand to determine whether Robins’ particularized

injury was “concrete.” See ante, at 11. Judged by what we 

have said about “concreteness,” Robins’ allegations carry 

him across the threshold. The Court’s opinion observes 

that time and again, our decisions have coupled the words

“concrete and particularized.” Ante, at 8 (citing as examples, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. ___, ___ 

(2014) (slip op., at 8); Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 

555 U. S. 488, 493 (2009); Sprint Communications Co. v. 

APCC Services, Inc., 554 U. S. 269, 274 (2008); Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U. S. 497, 517 (2007)). True, but true 

—————— 

3 Just as the right to truthful information at stake in Havens Realty 

Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363 (1982), was closely tied to the Fair

Housing Act’s goal of eradicating racial discrimination in housing, so

the right here at stake is closely tied to the FCRA’s goal of protecting

consumers against dissemination of inaccurate credit information about

them. 
 

 

4 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

too, in the four cases cited by the Court, and many others,

opinions do not discuss the separate offices of the terms 

“concrete” and “particularized.” 

Inspection of the Court’s decisions suggests that the

particularity requirement bars complaints raising generalized grievances, seeking relief that no more benefits the 

plaintiff than it does the public at large. See, e.g., Lujan, 

504 U. S., at 573–574 (a plaintiff “seeking relief that no

more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the

public at large does not state an Article III case or controversy” (punctuation omitted)); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 

310 U. S. 113, 125 (1940) (plaintiffs lack standing because 

they failed to show injury to “a particular right of their

own, as distinguished from the public’s interest in the

administration of the law”). Robins’ claim does not present a question of that character. He seeks redress, not 

for harm to the citizenry, but for Spokeo’s spread of misinformation specifically about him.

Concreteness as a discrete requirement for standing, the

Court’s decisions indicate, refers to the reality of an injury,

harm that is real, not abstract, but not necessarily tangible. See ante, at 8–9; ante, at 1 (THOMAS, J., concurring).

Illustrative opinions include Akins, 524 U. S., at 20 

(“[C]ourts will not pass upon abstract, intellectual problems, but adjudicate concrete, living contests between

adversaries.” (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted)); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 67 (1986) 

(plaintiff ’s “abstract concern does not substitute for the 

concrete injury required by Art[icle] III” (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 

461 U. S. 95, 101 (1983) (“Plaintiffs must demonstrate a

personal stake in the outcome . . . . Abstract injury is not 

enough.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Babbitt v. 

Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 297–298 (1979) (“The difference between an abstract question and a ‘case or controversy’ is one of degree, of course, and is not discernable by 
Cite as: 578 U. S. ____ (2016) 5 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

any precise test. The basic inquiry is whether the conflicting contentions of the parties present a real, substantial 

controversy between parties having adverse legal interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical or 

abstract.” (citation, some internal quotation marks, and 

ellipsis omitted)); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 

Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 40 (1976) (“organization’s 

abstract concern . . . does not substitute for the concrete 

injury required by Art. III”); California Bankers Assn. v. 

Shultz, 416 U. S. 21, 69 (1974) (“There must be . . . concrete adverseness”; “[a]bstract injury is not enough.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Railway Mail Assn. v. 

Corsi, 326 U. S. 88, 93 (1945) (controversy must be “definite and concrete, not hypothetical or abstract”); Coleman 

v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (“[I]t [is] not for courts to pass upon . . . abstract,

intellectual problems but only . . . concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries call[ing] for the arbitrament of

law.”).

Robins would not qualify, the Court observes, if he

alleged a “bare” procedural violation, ante, at 10, one that 

results in no harm, for example, “an incorrect zip code,” 

ante, at 11. Far from an incorrect zip code, Robins complains of misinformation about his education, family situation, and economic status, inaccurate representations that

could affect his fortune in the job market. See Brief for 

Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae 

13 (Spokeo’s inaccuracies bore on Robins’ “ability to find 

employment by creating the erroneous impression that he 

was overqualified for the work he was seeking, that he

might be unwilling to relocate for a job due to family

commitments, or that his salary demands would exceed 

what prospective employers were prepared to offer him.”); 

Brief for Restitution and Remedies Scholars et al. as Amici 

Curiae 35 (“An applicant can lose [a] job for being overqualified; a suitor can lose a woman if she reads that he is 
 

 

 

 

6 SPOKEO, INC. v. ROBINS 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

married.”). The FCRA’s procedural requirements aimed to 

prevent such harm. See 115 Cong. Rec. 2410–2415 (1969).

I therefore see no utility in returning this case to the

Ninth Circuit to underscore what Robins’ complaint already conveys concretely: Spokeo’s misinformation 

“cause[s] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.”

App. 14. 

* * * 

For the reasons stated, I would affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment.