J-S22001-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: S.D.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 37 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 017 of 2023

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: M.D.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 38 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 018 of 2023

ADOPTION OF: B.S.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 39 WDA 2024
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Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 064 of 2023

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: T.D.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 40 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): No. 020 of 2023

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: M.J.-M. S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J. C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 41 WDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered December 13, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): No. 019 of 2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2024

J.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the December 13, 2023 orders

involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her five biological sons, T.D.S., 

born in January 2011; M.J.-M.S., born in December 2012; M.D.S., born in 

November 2013; S.D.S., born in March 2020; and B.S.S., born in June 2021, 
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(collectively, “the Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), 

and (b).

1

In addition, Mother’s appointed counsel, Tyler Schultz, Esquire

(“Counsel”), has filed a petition to withdraw and an accompanying brief,

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and 

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). After review, we

grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the December 13, 2023 

orders.

Our review of the certified record indicates that, in January 2021, due

to concerns of “incorrigibility and truancy” related to the three oldest children, 

as well as allegations of Mother’s substance abuse, the Westmoreland County 

Children’s Bureau (“the Agency”) provided Mother with services, including 

drug and alcohol screening and counseling. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 5-6; 

Agency Exhibit 12. In April 2021, prior to B.S.S.’s birth, the Children’s 

maternal aunt, M.C. (“Maternal Aunt”), privately obtained custody of the four 

oldest children when Mother entered inpatient treatment for substance abuse. 

Thereafter, as Maternal Aunt needed financial assistance, the court placed the 

____________________________________________

1 The court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of H.L.S., IV, the father 

of M.D.S., T.S.S., and M.J.-M.S., pursuant to the same orders. H.L.S., IV,

likewise appealed, and we address his appeals by separate memorandum at 

Superior Court Docket Nos. 108-110 WDA 2024. 

The court additionally involuntarily terminated the parental rights of S.W., the

putative father of S.D.S., as well as those any unknown father, and J.A.M., 

the father of B.S.S. Neither S.W., J.A.M., nor any unknown father, appealed 

or participated in the instant appeals.
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Children in the legal and physical custody of the Agency on July 23, 2021, and 

they remained in kinship care with Maternal Aunt. The court adjudicated the 

Children dependent on August 23, 2021.2 See N.T., 11/16/23, at 4-5, 30, 81-

82; Agency Exhibit 12. 

The court established an initial permanency goal of return to parent or

guardian.3In furtherance of reunification, Mother was ordered to submit to a 

drug and alcohol evaluation and comply with the recommendations; submit to 

random drug screens; undergo a parenting assessment and follow the 

recommendations; and obtain/maintain a stable and appropriate household.

See Agency Exhibit 12. Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, 

Mother was additionally ordered to complete mental health treatment and take 

any medication as prescribed; to complete offender’s treatment; to obtain a 

verifiable and legal source of income; and to participate in services while 

incarcerated. See id.

Mother successfully completed drug and alcohol treatment. However, 

following her return to Westmoreland County in January 2022, she relapsed

and was homeless. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 5, 7-8; see also Agency Exhibit 

____________________________________________

2 H.L.S., IV, was incarcerated at the time of his children’s adjudication. See

N.T., 11/16/23, at 5, 21, 67-68, 71; see also Agency Exhibit 12. S.W., the 

putative father of S.D.S., never responded to outreach from the Agency. See

N.T., 6/29/23, 112-17.

3 The court established a concurrent permanency goal of adoption on 

November 1, 2021. See Agency Exhibit 12.
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12. Subsequent to completion of another evaluation in March 2022, Mother

failed to complete the recommended further treatment and was unsuccessfully 

discharged in May 2022. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 7-8; see also Agency Exhibit 

12. Additionally, Mother tested positive for, inter alia, methamphetamines

and/or amphetamines on approximately seven occasions from February 

through May 2022. See N.T., 6/29/23, at 28-30, 45-46; see also N.T., 

11/16/23, at 8; Agency Exhibit 2.

On May 10, 2022, the Agency obtained emergency custody of B.S.S., to 

whom Mother gave birth during inpatient treatment, due to reports of neglect 

and substance abuse. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 4-5, 32; see also Agency 

Exhibit 12. Significantly, Mother essentially left B.S.S. strapped in his car seat

and exposed to drugs. See N.T., 11/2/23, at 41-42, 185-87; N.T., 11/16/23,

at 78. Hair follicle testing of B.S.S. conducted subsequent to his removal and 

placement yielded positive results for amphetamines and methamphetamines. 

See Orphans’ Court Opinion (B.S.S.), 12/13/23, at 4; see also N.T., 6/29/23, 

at 175-77; N.T., 11/2/23, at 41. He was found to be severely malnourished 

and ultimately diagnosed with failure to thrive. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 41-42.

The court adjudicated B.S.S. dependent on May 27, 2022, and 

established a permanency goal of return to parent or guardian and a 
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concurrent goal of adoption.

4 B.S.S. was placed in a separate kinship foster 

home from his siblings, where he remained at the time of the subject 

proceedings. See N.T., 11/16/23, 4, 40; Agency Exhibit 12. 

Moreover, while Mother was afforded supervised visitation, both inperson and virtual, her participation, while initially robust, became infrequent 

until the court then suspended all contact between Mother and the Children in 

May 2022, pending resolution of outstanding Child Protective Services (“CPS”) 

reports and a parenting assessment.5 See Agency Exhibit 12; see also N.T., 

11/2/23, at 57, 166-69, 179-182; N.T., 11/16/23, at 10-12, 74. Specifically, 

“[t]he [three oldest] children [] disclosed sexual abuse, mental injury, related 

to the fact that there was drug use while they lived with [M]other, that they 

lacked food while they lived with [M]other, and that there was physical abuse 

while they were with [M]other.” Agency Exhibit 12, RecommendationPermanency Review, 5/10/22, at 2. These disclosures resulted in seven CPS 

reports that were outstanding at the time and were ultimately indicated. See 

id.; see also N.T., 11/16/23, at 49. As a result, the court found contact with 

Mother to be a “grave risk of harm,” based on testimony from the Children’s 

____________________________________________

4 B.S.S.’s father remained incarcerated throughout the time of the subject 

hearings. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 5, 16; see also Agency Exhibit 12.

5 As best we can discern, the court did not suspend Mother’s contact with 

B.S.S. until December 2022. See Agency Exhibit 12. Notwithstanding, her 

confirmation of and participation in visitation with him was limited. See N.T., 

11/2/23, at 180, 182-83; N.T., 11/16/23, at 12.
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providers. See Agency Exhibit 12; see also N.T., 11/16/23, at 10-12. This 

“no contact” order remained in effect at the conclusion of the subject 

proceeding, approximately a year and a half later. See Agency Exhibit 12; 

see also N.T., 11/16/23, at 11, 49.

Specifically, the Agency discovered that Mother had operated a meth lab

out of the basement, exposing the Children to a web of drugs and alcohol, 

sex, weapons, violence, and unknown people. They were subject to physical 

discipline, sexual abuse, and instability. Their health, hygiene, and education 

were neglected. They had access to limited food and had to cook and care for 

themselves. Meanwhile, they had to also attempt to care for and comfort

S.D.S., who was a baby and left in his crib. See N.T., 6/29/23, 61-63, 68, 72-

73, 91, 125-31; N.T., 11/2/23, at 35-41, 43, 53, 59, 126-27. 

Given the resulting complex developmental trauma6 as a result of this 

experience, the Children exhibited behavioral problems, including aggression,

tantrums, and issues with urination and defecation, and/or developmental 

delays and were all engaged in ongoing trauma therapy. See N.T., 6/29/23, 

at 58, 60-61, 65-66, 68, 71; N.T., 11/2/24, at 6-8, 32, 35-43, 45, 124-26,

129-34. Notably, the three oldest children were all diagnosed with, inter alia,

post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and were treated with medication.

See N.T., 11/2/23, at 6, 8, 45-46, 49, 134; N.T., 11/16/23, at 32, 42. In 

____________________________________________

6 This was defined as trauma that occurs in “developmentally significant times, 

like childhood.” N.T., 11/2/23, at 45, 84.
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addition, T.D.S. had even been hospitalized on several occasions for mental 

health reasons. See N.T., 11/2/23, at 46, 57. 

At regular permanency review hearings conducted from May 2022 

through December 2022, Mother’s compliance and progress were 

characterized as none to minimal. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 24-26; see also

Agency Exhibit 12. 

On February 1, 2023, the Agency filed petitions to involuntarily 

terminate Mother’s parental rights to the four older children pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Subsequently on June 27, 2023, the 

Agency filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to 

the youngest child, B.S.S., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), 

and (b). The court held evidentiary hearings on the Agency’s petitions on June 

29, 2023, November 2, 2023, and November 16, 2023.7 Over the course of 

the three hearings, the Agency presented the testimony of its caseworker, as 

well as numerous service providers. Specifically, the Agency presented the 

testimony of the following witnesses: Jean DeFilippis, of ARC Point Labs, who 

performed drug testing services; Dr. Neil Rosenblum, clinical psychologist, of 

Allegheny Forensic Associates, who conducted mental health evaluations of 

____________________________________________

7 The Children were represented by a separate guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and 

legal counsel, both of whom argued for termination of Mother’s parental rights 

at the conclusion of the subject proceedings. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a);

see also N.T., 11/16/23, at 91, 99-100. Neither filed briefs with this Court 

related to the instant appeals. 
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the three oldest children and was stipulated as an expert in mental health 

evaluations; Richelle O'Malley, of In-Clusion, who conducted a parenting 

assessment of Mother; Nicole LaValle, school-based therapist, of Excela

Health, who provided outpatient individual therapy to the three older children; 

Dr. Christine Mahady, certified attachment and trauma-focused clinician, who 

conducted assessments of the Children and provides individual and family 

therapy and was stipulated as an expert witness in trauma therapy and 

assessments; Ashley McKoy, certified trauma and attachment clinician, who 

provides individual therapy and was stipulated as an expert in the field of 

trauma therapy and therapeutic play; Thomas Sibel, family resource 

specialist, of JusticeWorks; and Amber Wannamaker, Agency caseworker.

8

Mother, who was represented by counsel but only appeared for the first 

hearing date,9 did not testify or offer any evidence.

By orders dated December 13, 2023, the orphans’ court involuntarily 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

____________________________________________

8 The Agency additionally presented the testimony of two providers related to 

the Children’s fathers. 

9 Mother was incarcerated at the time of the June 29, 2023 hearing, having 

been imprisoned since April 2023. See Agency Exhibit 12. As best we can

discern, she was released prior to the November 2023 hearings. Counsel was 

able to reach Mother via telephone at the beginning of the hearing on 

November 2, 2023. Despite indicating that she was on her way to court, 

Mother never appeared. See N.T., 11/2/23, at 30, 46; see also N.T., 

11/16/23, at 13-14.
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§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). The court filed contemporaneous opinions 

setting forth its rationale. On December 21, 2023, Mother filed timely notices

of appeal.

10 On the same date, Counsel filed what we deem to be a statement 

of the intent to withdraw in lieu of filing a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(c)(4). The court filed responsive Rule 1925(a) opinions on December 

28, 2023, wherein it referred this Court to its prior filings. 

Thereafter, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw, as well as an Anders 

brief.11 By memorandum filed on August 26, 2024, this Court denied Counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and directed Counsel to file an amended Anders brief, 

along with a new petition to withdraw within 14 days. Counsel timely complied 

on August 28, 2024.

When counsel seeks to withdraw pursuant to Anders and its progeny,

this Court may not review the merits of the appeal without first addressing 

counsel’s request to withdraw. See In re Adoption of M.C.F., 230 A.3d 1217, 

1219 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590,

593 (Pa. Super. 2010)) (“‘When presented with an Anders brief, this Court 

may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on 

the request to withdraw.’”) (cleaned up). 

____________________________________________

10 This Court consolidated Mother’s appeals sua sponte on January 31, 2024.

11 This Court extended the Anders procedure to appeals from decrees 

terminating parental rights involuntarily in In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 

(Pa. Super. 1992). 
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To procedurally withdraw, counsel must:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the 

[appellant] that he or she has the right to retain private counsel 

or raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems worthy 

of the court’s attention. 

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). Counsel must also “attach to their petition to 

withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client advising him or her of their 

rights.” Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, our Supreme Court has set forth the following requirements 

for Anders briefs:

[W]e hold that in the Anders brief that accompanies courtappointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) 

provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Anders and Santiago require substantial, not 

perfect performance. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934 A.2d 1287, 1290 

(Pa. Super. 2007); see also Commonwealth v. Redmond, 273 A.3d 1247, 

1252 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Instantly, in his petition to withdraw, Counsel certified that he made a 

conscientious review of the record and determined that Mother’s appeals are 
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frivolous. He further attached copies of a Millisock letter informing Mother of 

her rights. Likewise, Counsel's amended Anders brief substantially complies 

with the requirements set forth in Santiago, supra.

12

 

Having concluded that Counsel complied with the procedural 

requirements of Anders/Santiago, we must next “conduct a review of the 

record to ascertain if on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel, 

intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 

A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc). 

Counsel’s Anders brief raises the following issues for our review: 

I. Did the [orphans’ c]ourt err when it terminated the parental 

rights of [Mother] pursuant to The Adoption Act and specifically 

23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511 (a)(2)?

II. Did the [orphans’ c]ourt err when it terminated the parental 

rights of [Mother] pursuant to The Adoption Act and specifically 

23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(5)?

III. Did the [orphans’ c]ourt err when it terminated the parental 

rights of [Mother] pursuant to The Adoption Act and specifically 

23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 251 1(a)(8)?

V. Did the [orphans’ c]ourt err when it terminated the parental 

rights of [Mother] pursuant to The Adoption Act and specifically 

23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b)?

Anders Brief at 8-9 (suggested answers omitted).

Our standard of review in this context is well-established:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, 

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the 

____________________________________________

12 Mother has not responded to Counsel’s petition to withdraw and Anders

brief. 
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decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must 

accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility 

determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the 

orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, 

an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling 

unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the 

facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court 

may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration 

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial 

courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple 

hearings.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’ 

court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make 

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her 

child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, 

protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has 

significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and 

child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving 

party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing 

evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section 

2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The trial court must initially determine whether the conduct 

of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven enumerated 

grounds set forth at Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the 

petitioner has established grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) does 

it then engage in assessing the petition under Section 2511(b), which focuses 
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upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 

2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the petitioner must satisfy 

both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing evidence. See In re 

Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of M.E., 

283 A.3d at 830.

In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm the underlying 

decrees, however, we need only agree with the court’s decision as to any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W.,

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). As such, we will focus our 

discussion on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 
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With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

To prove the applicability of subsection (a)(2), the party petitioning for 

termination must establish: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3)

that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot and will not 

be remedied. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 

2021). Section 2511(a)(2) emphasizes the child’s present and future needs, 

not the parent’s refusal to perform their duties and thus “should not be read 

to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong 

continuous parental ties. . . . This is particularly so where disruption of 

the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect 

for reuniting it.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (cleaned 

up) (emphasis in original). Section 2511(a)(2) grounds are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct; they may also include acts of refusal and incapacity 

to perform parental duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 

2021), abrogated on other grounds by Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1110 

n.23 (Pa. 2023). We have long recognized that “[p]arent are required to make 
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diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

duties.” A.H., 247 A.3d at 443. 

In concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was warranted 

under Section 2511(a)(2), the orphans’ court considered Mother’s failure to 

make progress toward reunification and remedy the reasons for the Children’s 

removal. The court stated, in relevant part:

Mother has not taken sufficient corrective action to alleviate the 

concerns of the [A]gency. . . . [M]other continues to struggle with 

substance abuse issues. Mother, despite utilizing the services 

provided, continued to test positive for illegal substances and due 

to a lack of staying clean, had been discharged from services. 

Mother has failed to submit to any random drug screens in 

months, therefore; her use of illegal substances remains in 

question. Additionally, [M]other was never able to secure a 

verifiable and legal source of income. Mother, despite having been 

provided with services to secure stable and appropriate housing, 

never followed this court[’s] directive. Further, [M]other never 

completed her offender’s treatment or her parenting. Visits 

between [M]other and the [Children] were never resumed due to 

concerns [for continued trauma to the Children]. Mother continues 

to demonstrate a lack of willingness to cooperate with the 

[Agency]. Mother hasn’t taken any recent steps to indicate . . . 

her capabilities to provide the [Children] with essential parental 

care, control, or subsistence that would be necessary to provide

for [the Children’s] physical or mental well-being. Further, 

[M]other has not remedied the reasons leading to [the Children’s]

removal nor has there been any recent progress which would elicit 

a desire for the issues to be remedied in the near future.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/13/23, at 8-9 (unpaginated).

13

____________________________________________

13 For purposes of this memorandum, we refer to the opinions submitted 

contemporaneously with the subject termination orders as “Orphans’ Court 

Opinion.” While the court filed separate opinions at each lower court docket 

number, as they are substantially similar, we cite generically and without 

differentiation.
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A review of the record supports the termination of Mother’s parental 

rights under Section 2511(a)(2). The record unequivocally reveals and 

definitively establishes that the Children suffered abuse and neglect while in 

the care of Mother.

Specifically, “[t]he [C]hildren [] disclosed sexual abuse, mental injury, 

related to the fact that there was drug use while they lived with [M]other, that 

they lacked food while they lived with [M]other, and that there was physical 

abuse while they were with [M]other.” Agency Exhibit 12, RecommendationPermanency Review, 5/10/22, at 2. These reports were indicated by the 

Agency. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 49.

Dr. Rosenblum, who was tasked with conducting mental health 

evaluations of the three oldest children and determining whether they suffered 

emotional abuse or serious mental injury as a result of the reported 

maltreatment of Mother, opined, “[T]he boys showed behavior[al] concerns

and a history consistent with both emotional abuse and serious mental injury 

as defined by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for child neglect.” N.T., 

6/29/23, at 78. He further elaborated as follows:

After completing these evaluations there is significant 

evidence and documentation to confirm that all three boys 

were exposed to ongoing emotional abuse, serious mental 

injury and child neglect while in the care of [M]other. All 

three boys spoke of being exposed to ongoing drug use by 

[M]other over an extended period of time. The boys were aware 

of where [M]other stored the drugs and possibly prepared drugs 

in her basement. It was also mentioned the boys may well have 

delivered packages containing drugs to other homes. All three 

boys also spoke about [being] afraid of [M]other, who was 
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described as displaying very limited patience and engaging in 

repeated physical discipline and beatings of the boys. They 

described strangers coming in and out of the home, with [T.D.S.] 

mentioning waking up to a stranger lying in his bed. He also spoke 

about observing [M]other having sex with another woman. The 

boys reportedly had limited food in the home, often having to fix 

simple foods for themselves such as “Oodles of Noodles.” They 

were also exposed to numerous evictions and a pattern of 

homelessness. The boys also spoke about a lack of structure and 

the absence of consistent discipline as well. It is also my 

understanding that [M]other neglected and failed to address the 

boys concerning mental health difficulties and behavior problems

while they were in her care. The boys were also not sent to school 

by [M]other for virtually the entire school year prior to being 

placed. . . . According to [Maternal Aunt], the boys were even 

unfamiliar with how to take care of their basic hygiene needs, such 

as regular bathing, brushing their teeth.

Agency Exhibit 3 at 11 (emphasis added). 

These accounts were echoed by the Children’s providers, who 

additionally indicated that, during this time, the three oldest children tried to 

care for and comfort S.D.S., who was a baby and left in his crib in a dark 

room. This included changing his diaper, as it went unchanged, soothing him 

when he cried, and providing him milk, when able. See N.T., 11/2/23, at 35-

41, 126-27. This resulted in parentification of the three oldest children and

“pretty severe developmental delays” in S.D.S., including language delays. 

See id. at 40, 43, 53, 59, 126.

Furthermore, Ms. Wannamaker attested that the three oldest children 

remained fearful of Mother’s continued behaviors. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 46-

47. She stated, in part, “They are fearful of being abused. They are fearful of 

individuals that they don’t know or are not comfortable with being around 
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them, that they would never have food or an appropriate or safe place to live.” 

Id. at 46-47. She continued, “They are fearful of an environment that would 

consist of a meth lab, as [M.D.S.] specifically has that fear, given that when 

he was with [M]other, that he would be sent in an Uber by himself to deliver 

meth when it was dark out.” Id. at 47.

Additionally, Dr. Mahady testified that B.S.S., who remained in Mother’s 

care after the removal of the four oldest children, suffered “severe neglect.”

Following his removal, he tested positive for drugs and was found to be

severely malnourished and diagnosed with failure to thrive. See N.T., 

11/2/23, at 41-42. 

Moreover, at regular permanency review hearings conducted from May 

2022 through December 2022, Mother’s compliance was characterized as 

none to minimal. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 24-26; Agency Exhibit 12. Ms. 

Wannamaker’s testimony reveals that, despite the provision of “extensive” 

services, Mother failed to complete that which was required for reunification

with the Children and to remedy the conditions that led to the Children’s 

removal. See N.T., 11/16/23, at 7-13, 28, 35. Specifically, Mother had no 

stable housing or verifiable income. See id. at 12-13. She successfully 

completed curriculum-based parenting but did not complete any of the 

recommended services following a subsequent comprehensive parenting 

assessment. See id. at 9-10. Likewise, she did not successfully complete a 

mental health evaluation or offender’s treatment. See id. at 9, 13. Perhaps 
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most importantly, although Mother initially completed inpatient substance 

abuse treatment, following completion of a substance abuse evaluation in 

March 2022 after relapse, she failed to complete the recommended treatment

and was unsuccessfully discharged in May 2022. See id. at 7-8; Agency 

Exhibit 12. During this time period, Mother tested positive on multiple 

occasions for methamphetamines and amphetamines. She last participated in 

a drug screen on June 6, 2022. See id. at 8-9; see also Agency Exhibits 2

& 12. Of note, Ms. Wannamaker testified that when she met with Mother in 

January of 2023 and discussed Mother’s uncompleted services and the 

potential for termination of parental rights, Mother was not receptive. See 

N.T., 11/16/23, at 50-51.

Based on the foregoing, given the blatant and egregious nature of 

Mother’s actions and inactions, we without hesitation discern no abuse of 

discretion by the court in concluding that Mother’s repeated and continued 

abuse, neglect, or refusal caused the Children to be without essential parental 

care, control or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being.

Further, the conditions and causes of Mother’s abuse, neglect, or refusal

cannot or will not be remedied. Significantly, at the conclusion of the subject 

proceedings, the Agency had unsuccessfully afforded Mother services for 

almost three years and the four older children had formally been placed for 

almost two and a half years. This belies any suggestion of future compliance 

and progress. In fact, Ms. Wannamaker testified that, given the amount of 
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time that had elapsed, Mother was unlikely to remedy the conditions leading 

to the Children’s removal within a reasonable period of time. See N.T., 

11/16/23, at 36. As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in 

abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of 

progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 

513 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2), we now turn to the orphans’ court’s finding that termination was 

proper under Section 2511(b). Specifically, Section 2511(b) affords “primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Our Supreme Court has generally 

outlined this inquiry, as follows:

[C]ourts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, 

placing her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare above concerns for the parent.

Accordingly, the determination of the child’s particular 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must 

be made on a case-by-case basis. We have observed the law 

regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied 

mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests 

and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved. 

Thus, the court must determine each child’s specific needs.

Moreover, the child’s emotional needs and welfare include 

intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability. As 

further guidance, we have identified factors, i.e., specific needs 

and aspects of the child’s welfare, that trial courts must always 
J-S22001-24

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consider. The courts must consider whether the children are in a 

pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster 

parents. And, if the child has any bond with the biological parent, 

the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which is not 

always an easy task.

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105-06 (cleaned up). 

Specifically, the child’s bond with the parent, “plus permanency, stability 

and all ‘intangible’ factors may contribute equally to the determination of a 

child’s specific developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and 

thus are all of ‘primary’ importance in the Section 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 

1109. While our Supreme Court has directed that a Section 2511(b) inquiry 

must include consideration for the bond between the parent and the child, the

Court has explained that “[i]t is only a necessary and beneficial bond, after 

all, that should be maintained.” Id. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of 

a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing 

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

Thus, the extent of the “bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.” J.M., 991 A.2d at 324 (cleaned up). 

Rather, it is within the province of the orphans’ court to “consider the totality 

of the circumstances when performing a needs and welfare analysis.” M.E., 

283 A.3d at 839 (cleaned up). This Court has clarified that it is “within the 

discretion of the orphans’ court to prioritize the safety and security” of children 

“over their bonds with their parents.” Id. We will not disturb such an 
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assessment if the orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the 

record. Id.

In concluding that the Children’s developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare supported termination of Mother’s parental rights, the 

orphans’ court emphasized Mother’s continued lack of progress. The court 

stated:

The permanency goal for the [Children] since removal has 

always been for [them] to return to the parent. Mother has 

continued to demonstrate a lack of cooperation and 

communication with the [A]gency even when [M]other was 

showing some progress in this case, it was minimal and never

consistent enough to prove that reunification would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the [Children]. Mother continues to struggle 

with the same issues which initially led to the removal 28 months

ago. Mother has not made any notable progress since the case 

was opened despite having been offered various services from the 

[A]gency.

. . .

The [Children]’s needs are being addressed and the 

[Children are] reported to be making progress in areas where 

there was struggle at the time of removal. The court does not base 

its decision upon the environmental factors that are outside 

[parental] control but rather bases its decision on whether or not 

termination of parental rights ... will best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the [Children]. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/13/23, at 13-14 (unpaginated).

Upon review, the record substantiates that the Children do not share a

necessary and beneficial relationship with Mother and instead share such a 

relationship with their foster parents. While we refer to the testimony of 

specific providers where necessary, we find the testimony of Ms. 
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Wannamaker, which is largely reflective of that of the Children’s various 

providers, to be particularly helpful and instructive in this regard.

Mother’s visitation with the Children, except for B.S.S., consisted of two 

in-person visits, which were part of Mother’s parenting assessment, and was 

otherwise largely virtual. Her participation started strong but waned upon her 

return to Westmoreland County in January 2022. See N.T., 11/2/23, at 166-

69, 179-82. Such visitation never progressed beyond supervised, and the 

court ultimately suspended all contact with Mother in May 2022.

14

 See Agency 

Exhibit 12; see also N.T., 11/16/23, at 10-12, 45, 51, 74. 

Significantly, Ms. Wannamaker testified that she observed the Children’s 

fear and refusal during visitation with Mother, as follows:

I have observed both visitation between the four [older] boys and 

[M]other as well as [B.S.S.] and [M]other. The [C]hildren have 

expressed great fear of [M]other and often during Zoom visitation 

when those were occurring, some of the boys would not want to 

participate or would refuse to get on the video to even speak with 

[M]other.

Id. at 11. She further described an in-person visit in April 2022 where [T.D.S.] 

“did not want to visit with [M]other and sat in a completely separate room 

with [Mr. Sibel] for quite some time.” Id. Although Mr. Sibel reported Mother’s 

behavior during visitation to be generally appropriate, he explained that there 

____________________________________________

14 As noted supra, as best we can discern, the court did not suspend Mother’s 

contact with B.S.S. until December 2022. See Agency Exhibit 12. 

Notwithstanding, her confirmation and participation in visitation with B.S.S. 

was limited. See N.T., 11/2/23, at 180, 182-83; N.T., 11/16/23, at 12.
J-S22001-24

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was a lack of attention and interaction with the youngest two children. See 

N.T., 11/2/23, at 169-70, 177, 180-81.

Following suspension by the court, Ms. Wannamaker acknowledged that 

Mother attempted to violate the “no contact” order on several instances, which 

yielded negative reactions by the three oldest children. See id. at 33-34, 45, 

75-76. Specifically, Ms. Wannamaker described, “[T.D.S. and M.J.-M.S.] 

wanted to fight [Mother]. They essentially grabbed golf clubs or bats or 

something along those lines, and they said like they will fight her. They don’t 

want to—they don’t want her to be coming here and causing fear for them.” 

Id. at 75. Furthermore, if contact were resumed, Ms. Wannamaker expected

“to see a lot of behavioral and emotional outbursts,” given the trauma endured 

by the Children. Id. at 36.

Ms. Wannamaker testified that the three oldest children, who are able 

to articulate their desires, are fearful of Mother and do not want to live with 

her. See id. at 37, 39, 46. In fact, they do not want to see her. See id. at 75.

Ms. Lavalle went so far as to state that there was no bond between them and 

Mother. See N.T., 11/2/23, at 18, 23. Ms. Wannamaker also explained that 

the two youngest children have no recollection of and no relationship with 

Mother. See N.T., 11/15/23, at 31, 37. Overall, she averred that the Children 

had suffered no negative impact as a result of their lack of contact with 

Mother. See id. at 45-46, 76-77.
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Moreover, Ms. Wannamaker opined that Mother was not capable of 

meeting the Children’s special needs, which were the result of the “severe 

emotional and behavioral trauma” they had suffered while in Mother’s care.

See id. at 32, 42-43, 83. Specifically, Ms. Wannamaker testified that the three 

oldest children had been diagnosed with PTSD, and T.D.S. had been diagnosed 

with autism. See id. at 32, 42.

In contrast, Ms. Wannamaker indicated that the Children are in preadoptive foster homes where they are doing well, and their needs are being 

met. See id. at 38-41. She stated, “All of the [C[hildren’s needs and welfare 

are being met in their foster homes. ... The foster parents make sure that they 

have a safe and appropriate home that’s filled with love and nurturing.” Id. at 

39-40; see also id. at 37. Ms. Wannamaker continued, “From the adults, they 

have consistency and routines in their schedules. The foster parents engage 

with the [C]hildren appropriately and ensure that they are involved in 

developmentally appropriate experiences. . . .” Id. at 40. 

Additionally, Ms. Wannamaker observed that the Children “are so 

attached and bonded to their foster homes.” Id. at 38. She stated, “The 

children that can voice their wants and needs consistently voice to me that 

they never want to leave [the] home, and they do not want to live with either 

parent. ...” Id. at 37; see id. at 38-39. Despite acknowledging ongoing 

behavioral issues as a result of the trauma they experienced, Ms. Wannamaker 

observed that “[Maternal Aunt] is that safe space and safe person” for these 
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children. Id. at 41-42. Further, as to the two youngest children, Ms. 

Wannamaker indicated that their foster families are the only family they know. 

See id. at 39, 46. She acknowledged the “very, very strong connection” 

between S.D.S. and Maternal Aunt and stated, “[S.D.S.] looks at Maternal 

Aunt as his mother, and that is his safe space.” Id. at 37, 45; see also N.T., 

11/2/23, at 129. Similarly, “[B.D.S.] looks at his parents as the foster parents, 

and that is where his secure and stable attachment lies.” Id. at 37; see id. at 

41-45. Noting this secure attachment, as to B.S.S. and his foster mother, Ms. 

McKoy described, “When he sees her, he runs to her with his arms up. He’s 

smiling. He just wants to be near her. ...” N.T., 11/2/23, at 138.

While acknowledging the Children’s ongoing treatment, Ms. 

Wannamaker testified that the Children were showing improvement. See id.

at 41, 78-79. As to the three oldest children, she stated:

The boys overall are doing well in their foster home. They also 

have severe mental health and trauma that they are—they 

continue to work through, and that is extensive, so we can’t say 

how long it will take for that, but they do well. They work well with 

the providers.

They all report to be safe and that they have their needs met. The 

children, again, do have mental health diagnoses and work with 

the contracted providers, and [Maternal Aunt] ensures all their 

needs are being met.

Id. at 41. Further, with respect to their overall progress, Ms. Wannamaker 

further testified, in part:

All three children have much better grades, school staff, 

teachers, principals have reached out to us stating specifically 

[Maternal Aunt], what a wonderful job she does, all the effort she 

puts into these children. 
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. . . 

When these children came to [Maternal Aunt], they all did 

have some delays of some sort. They were not attending school 

in [M]other[’s] and [F]ather’s care.

And since then, they just have made a ton of developmental 

and emotional improvements, being able to voice their needs, 

being able to begin to talk about their trauma and the fear and 

the things that these children have been put through and 

experienced with their parents.

Id. at 76-77. 

Likewise, as to the youngest child, B.S.S., Ms. Wannamaker testified 

that he is “thriving.” Id. at 41. She reported, “He demonstrates healthy and 

appropriate attachment to his foster parents and his foster siblings, and he 

responds to age[-]appropriate direction as needed. He also attends a child[-

]care facility where he’s able to engage with children his own age, appropriate 

activities, and begin to form other relationships.” Id. at 41. Significantly, while

B.S.S. displayed “almost no emotion” when he came into care, which Ms. 

Wannamaker explained was a “concern for [] neglect and maltreatment,” he 

now “cries and reacts appropriately.” Id. at 79. Despite the exhibition of some 

emotional dysregulation,15 such as frustration, biting, and hitting, Ms. 

Wannamaker stated that this behavior is being addressed in therapy. See id. 

____________________________________________

15 In particular, Ms. Wannamaker testified,

One of [B.S.S.]’s biggest triggers is a car seat. When he was in 

[M]other’s care, he was stuck in a car seat for a long period of 

time. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S22001-24

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Accordingly, Ms. Wannamaker opined that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare and would 

not result in harm. See id. at 37-39, 46. 

Based on the foregoing independent analysis of the orphans’ court’s 

termination of Mother’s parental rights, we agree with Counsel that the 

appeals from the orders terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

Section 2511(a)(2) and (b) are wholly frivolous and our review of the record 

does not reveal any overlooked non-frivolous issues.

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and 

we affirm the termination orders.

Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Orders affirmed. 

DATE: 9/24/2024

____________________________________________

So now when he’s in a car seat and they have to travel more than 

five minutes, he is getting sick numerous times. He screams. He 

cries. He’s inconsolable.

Id. at 78.