MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2023 ME 31

Docket: Was-22-284

Argued: April	6,	2023

Decided: May	23,	2023

Panel: STANFILL,	C.J.,	and MEAD,	JABAR,	HORTON,	CONNORS,	LAWRENCE,	and	DOUGLAS, JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

THOMAS	G.	BONFANTI

CONNORS,	J.

[¶1]	 Thomas	G.	Bonfanti	appeals	from	a	judgment	of	conviction	for	three	

counts	of	intentional	or	knowing	murder in	violation	of	17-A	M.R.S.	§ 201(1)(A)

(2023);	 one	 count	 of	 aggravated	 attempted	murder (Class	 A)	in	 violation	 of

17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 152-A(1)(A)-(B),	 (2) (2023);	 and	 one	 count	 of	 elevated	

aggravated	 assault (Class	 A)	 in	 violation	 of	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 208-B(1)(A),	 (2)

(2023), entered	by	the	trial	court	(Washington	County,	Mallonee,	J.)	after	a	jury	

trial.		Bonfanti	asserts that	the	trial	court	erred	in	admitting a statement	that	he	

made	to	 police in	which	 he	identified the	 number	 and	 names	 of	his victims,	

arguing	that(1)	the circumstances	under which	the	statement	was	made	do	not	

bring	it	within	the	ambit	of	the	public	safety	exception	to	Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966); and (2) his	ingestion	of	a	large	quantity	of	prescription	
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drugs	rendered	his	statement	involuntary.		He also	argues	that	the	trial	court	

committed	obvious	error	by	instructing	the	jury	on	the	third-party-provocation	

exception	to	the	use	of	deadly	force	when	that	instruction was	not	generated	

by	the	evidence.		We	affirm	the	judgment.

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		Viewing	the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	the	jury’s	verdict,	

the	record	supports	the	following	facts.		See	State v. Hansley, 2019 ME 35, ¶ 2,

203 A.3d 827.

[¶3]	 	 On the	 morning	 of February	 3,	 2020,	 Bonfanti	 went to	 visit	 his	

friend,	 Samuel	 Powers,	who	 lived	 with	 his	 mother	 on	 Roque	 Bluffs	 Road	 in	

Jonesboro.		Bonfanti	and	Powers	were	talking when	Powers’s	mother	left	the	

house	to	run	errands.		Shortly	thereafter,	Bonfanti	shot	Powers	in	the	back	of	

the	head.

[¶4]	 	 After	 shooting	 Powers,	 Bonfanti	 drove	 to	 the	 home of	 another

friend,	Jennifer	Bryant-Flynn, who	lived	with	her	husband	on	Kennebec	Road	

in	Machias.		Bonfanti	wanted	to	give	Bryant-Flynn	“a	piece	of	[his] mind.”		After	

being	invited	in	the	house,	Bonfanti	shot Bryant-Flynn	in	the	head	and	took	her	

dog.

[¶5]		After	shooting	Bryant-Flynn,	Bonfanti	drove	to	the	home of	another	
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friend,	Regina Long,	who	also	lived	on	Kennebec	Road	in	Machias.		Long invited

Bonfanti inside	to	have coffee	with	her	and	her	boyfriend,	Shawn	Currey,	whom	

Bonfanti	had	not met before.		Long,	Currey,	and	Bonfanti	chatted for	about	ten	

to	fifteen	minutes at	the	kitchen	table.		When	Long stood	up	to	put her coffee	

cup	in	the	sink,	she	heard	Bonfanti“rustling	around”	in	his	coat.		Bonfanti	pulled	

out	a	gun,	shot	Long in	the	neck, and	shot	Currey in	the	neck	and	back.		Bonfanti	

then	shot	Long in	the	face.		After	being	shot	a	second	time,	Long fell	to	the	floor	

and	pretended	to	be	dead.		Bonfanti	shot	her	a	third	time	as she	lay	on	the	floor.

[¶6]		After	Bonfanti	left,	Long	called 9-1-1.		The	call	came	into	the	dispatch	

center	 at	 10:44 a.m.	 	 A police	 officer from the	 Washington	 County	 Sheriff’s	

Office	quickly	arrived	at	the	Long	residence and	 found Long	severely	injured	

and	Currey dead.		Almost	immediately	after	arriving,	the	officer was	dispatched	

to	 the	 Powers	 residence while	 other	 officers	 remained	 on	 scene.	 	 Powers’s	

mother	had	called	9-1-1	after	returning	home	and	finding	her	son	dead,	placing	

the	call	at	10:51	a.m.		Before	the	officer reached	the	Powers	residence,	however,	

he was	diverted	to	the	American	Legion	in	Machias. The	bartender	who	worked	

there	called	9-1-1	to	report	that	Bonfanti	was	at	that	location	and	had claimed	

to	 have	 killed	 “seven	 or	 several	 people.”	 The	 bartender	 placed	 the call	 at	

11:05 a.m.
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[¶7]	 	 After	 the	 shootings,	 Bonfanti	 had	 gone to	 the	 American	 Legion,

where	he	placed	a	wad	of	cash on	the	bar	top	and	told	one	of	the	patrons,	“This	

is	for	my	cremation.”		He also	said	that	he	“just	snapped”	and	that	he	had	killed	

several	 people.	 	 The	 bartender	 overheard	 Bonfanti	 make	 these	 statements.		

Bonfanti	then	took	“a	 bunch	 of	 pills”	 and	went	 outside	 to	 sit	 in	 his	 vehicle.		

Another	 patron	 of	 the	 American	 Legion	 saw	 Bonfanti	in	 the	 parking	lot and	

walked	 over	 to	 speak to	 him.	 	Bonfanti	 told	him	that	 he	was	waiting	 for	 the	

police	because	he	had	“just	killed	some	people.”

[¶8]	 	Upon	 arriving	 at	 the	 American	 Legion,	 at	 11:15 a.m.,	the	 officer

arrested	Bonfanti, placed him in handcuffs, and	seated him	in	the	police cruiser.		

After	being	read	his	Miranda rights, Bonfanti	invoked	his	right	to	remain	silent,

but	the	officer nevertheless	asked	Bonfanti the	following	questions:

Officer: The	only	thing	I’m	looking	for	right	now, Tom, is	I	just	

need	to	know	how	many	victims	we’re	looking	for

because	apparently	I’m	getting	mixed	numbers?

Bonfanti: Four.

Officer: And	that’s	it?

Bonfanti: Yeah.

Officer: And	who	would	that	be?

Bonfanti: Uh,	Jennifer	Bryant.
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Officer: Okay.

Bonfanti: Regina	Hall.

Officer: Okay.

Bonfanti: Sam	Powers.

Officer: Sam	Powers,	yep.

Bonfanti: Yeah,	and	the	other	one,	I	don’t	know	his	name.

Officer: Don’t know	his	name.		Okay,	but	there’s	no	more	than	

four?

Bonfanti: No.

Officer: Okay,	all	right.

[¶9]		The	officer relayed to	dispatch what	Bonfanti	had	told	him. A	few	

minutes	 later,	 the	 final	 9-1-1	 call	 was	 made	 when	 Bryant-Flynn’s	 husband	

arrived	home to	find his	wife	dead.

[¶10]	 	 In	 a	 five-day	 trial, Bonfanti	 personally	 delivered	 his	 opening	

statement	and	testified	in	his	own	defense	that	he had	accidentally	shot	Powers	

and	Bryant-Flynn	and	that	he	had	shot	Long	and	Currey	in	self-defense.		The	

jury,	after	deliberating	for	approximately	two	hours,	returned	a	verdict	of	guilty	

on	all	counts. The	court	sentenced	Bonfanti	to	life	imprisonment,

1 and Bonfanti	

1 The	court	entered	a	judgment	on	the	jury’s	verdict	and	imposed	concurrent	sentences	of	life	

imprisonment	for	the	murders	and	aggravated	attempted	murder.		The	court	also	sentenced	Bonfanti	
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timely	appealed.		See 15	M.R.S.	§ 2115	(2023);	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(b)(1).

II.		DISCUSSION

A. Because there	was	overwhelming	evidence	of	Bonfanti’s	guilt aside	

from	 his	 challenged	 statement,	the	 error,	 if	 any,	 in	 admitting	 his	

statement	was	harmless	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt.

[¶11]		Bonfanti	argues	on	appeal	that	his	statement	to	the	officer should	

have	been	suppressed	because	(1)	the	public	safety	exception	to	Miranda did	

not	permit	admission	of	his	statement	and	(2)	his	ingestion	of	a	large	quantity	

of	prescription	drugs	“deprived	him	of	his	rationality	and	own	free	will	to	make	

voluntary	statements.”		Bonfanti	invokes	only the	United	States	Constitution.

[¶12]		We	need	not	address	the	merits	of	these	arguments	because	were	

there any	error	in	the	trial	court’s	admission	of	his	statement,	the	error	would	

be harmless beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt.	 	 See M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(a); State v.

Johnson, 2009 ME 103, ¶ 18, 982 A.2d 320 (“For	errors	involving	constitutional	

rights,	a	reviewing	court	conducting	a	harmless error analysis	must	be	satisfied	

that	the	record	as	a	whole	demonstrates	beyond a reasonable doubt that	the	

error	did	not	affect	the	substantial	rights	of	the	defendant	or	contribute	to	the	

verdict	obtained.”); City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1985)

(“[W]e avoid	expressing	opinions	on	constitutional questions	when	 the	issue	

to	a	concurrent	thirty-year	term	for	the	elevated	aggravated	assault.		The	court	ordered	Bonfanti	to	

pay	$3,181	as	restitution	to	the	Victims’	Compensation	Program.
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before	 us	 on	 appeal	 may	 be	 otherwise	 resolved .	 .	 .	 .”); see also Arizona v.

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991) (reviewing for harmless error the

admission of an involuntary confession at trial).

[¶13]		As	noted	in	the	factual	summary	above,	Bonfanti’s statement	was	

limited,	identifying	only	the number	and	names	of	the	victims;	the	statement	

was consistent	with	his defense that he	had	shot	the	victims;2 and	the	evidence	

of	 his	 guilt	 irrespective	 of	 his	 statement	 was	 overwhelming,	 including	 that

Bonfanti was the last person seen with Powers before Powers was murdered,

Bryant-Flynn’s dog was in Bonfanti’s vehicle when he was arrested, Long told

the 9-1-1 operator and the officer that Bonfanti had shot her and Currey, Long

testified to the same at trial, the gun that was used in the murders was found in

Bonfanti’s vehicle, Bonfanti’s DNA was on the gun, and three witnesses from the

American Legion heard Bonfanti admit to shooting several people.

B. Given the jury instructions as a whole, the	trial	court	did	not	commit	

obvious	error	by	reciting	a	portion	of	the	self-defense	statute that	

was	not	generated	by	the	evidence.

[¶14]	 	 Relying	 on	 State	 v.	 Daley,	 440	 A.2d	 1053	 (Me. 1982),	 Bonfanti	

argues	that	the	trial	court	committed	obvious	error	by	instructing	the	jury	on	

the	third-party-provocation	exception	to	the	justified	use	of	deadly	force	when	

2		Bonfanti did not claim until oral argument before us that he would have presented his defense

differently if the statement had been suppressed.
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that	 exception was	 not	 generated	 by	 the	 evidence.	 	 See 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 108(2)(C)(2)	 (2023).	 	 Bonfanti	 asserts that	 because	 he	 “conceded	 the	

charges” and	 rested	 his	 defense,	 at	 least	 in	 part, on	 the	 justification	 of	

self-defense,	the	error	was	highly	prejudicial.3

[¶15]		Because	Bonfanti	did	not	object	 to	 the	alleged	error	at	 trial,	we	

review for	 obvious	 error.	 See M.R.U. Crim. P. 52(b); State v. Pabon, 2011

ME 100, ¶ 18, 28 A.3d 1147.		“For	an	error	or	defect	to	be	obvious	for	purposes	

of	Rule	52(b),	there	must	be	(1)	an	error,	(2)	that	is	plain,	and	(3)	that	affects	

substantial	rights.		If	these	conditions	are	met,	we will	exercise	our discretion	

to	 notice	 an	 unpreserved	 error	 only	 if	 we also	 conclude	 that	 (4)	 the	 error	

seriously	 affects	 the	 fairness	 and	 integrity	 or	 public	 reputation	 of	 judicial	

proceedings.”		Pabon,	2011	ME	100,	¶	29,	28	A.3d	1147.

[¶16]	 	 Title	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 108(2)	 governs	 the	 use	 of	 deadly	 force in

self-defense.		Section 108(2)(A)(1)	provides	that	a	person	is	justified	in	using	

deadly	force	upon	another	when he	reasonably	believes	such	other	person	is	

about	to	use	unlawful	deadly	force	against	him	and	he reasonably	believes	that	

3		Bonfanti	also	contends	that	the	trial	court	“relieved	the	State	of	its	obligation	to	disprove	[his]	

defense	 beyond	 a	 reasonable	 doubt”	 and	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 did	 not	 inform	 the	 jury	 of	 “the	

exculpatory	effect	of self-defense.”		Contrary	 to	Bonfanti’s	contentions,	 the	 trial	court	emphasized	

that	 the	State—and	not	Bonfanti—had	 the	burden	of	proving	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	 that	 the	

crimes	were	not	committed	in	self-defense,	and	the	trial	court	expressly	instructed the	jury	that	it	

had	to find	Bonfanti	not	guilty	if	the	State	failed	to	carry	its	burden.		See State v. Villacci, 2018 ME 80,

¶ 10, 187 A.3d 576.
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the	 use	 of	 deadly	 force	 is	 necessary.	 	 Section	 108(2)(C)	 lists	 several	

circumstances	under	which	the	use	of	deadly	force	is	not justified.		Among	those	

circumstances	 is one	 described	 in section	 108(2)(C)(2),	 which	 “makes	 the	

self-defense	 justification	 unavailable	 to	 a	 defendant	 who	 uses	 deadly	 force	

against	a	victim	in	aid	of	a	 third	person	if	 the	defendant	knew	 that	 the	 third	

person	 intentionally	 and	 unlawfully	 provoked	 the	 victim	 into	 using	 deadly	

force.”		Daley,	440 A.2d	at 1055 (quotation	marks	omitted).

4

[¶17]	 	 In	 Daley, the	 defendant and	 the	 victim	 described in	 markedly	

different	ways the	assault	with	which	the	defendant	was	charged, but neither	

version involved	 a	 third	 party.	 	 Id. at 1054-55.	 	 After	 his	 conviction,	 the	

defendant	appealed,	arguing	that	the	trial	court	erred by	instructing	the	jury on

section	108(2)(C)(2).		Id. at	1055.		In	vacating	 the	conviction,	we considered	

several	factors, including	that	the	defendant	“rest[ed] his	entire	defense	on	the	

justification	of	self-defense,”the	instruction	on	third-party	provocation	was	not	

generated	by	the	evidence,	the	trial	court	stated	the	“exact reverse”	of	the	law	

of	self-defense	in	explaining	how	the	law	applied	to	the	case,	and	“[t]he	whole	

charge	was	lengthy	and	confusing.”		Id. at	1055-56.

4		See	also	State v. Uffelman, 626 A.2d 340, 342 (Me. 1993) (concluding that the trial court did not

err when it instructed the jury that the defendant would not have been permitted to use deadly force

in response to the victims’ use of such force if the defendant had known that another person, such as

the defendant’s wife or children, had intentionally and unlawfully provoked the victims).
10

[¶18]		In	contrast,	the	trial	court’s	charge	to	the	jury	here	was	accurate,	

clear, and	 concise.	 	 The	 trial	 court	 began	 its	 self-defense	 instructions	 by	

properly	instructing	the	jury	on	the	general	rule	governing	when	a	person	may	

use	deadly	force.		The	court	then	instructed	the	jury	on	some	exceptions	to	the	

general	rule,	including	the	exceptions	related	to provocation	by	the	defendant,	

provocation	 by	 a	 third	 party,	 and	 the	 defendant’s	 duty	 to	 retreat.	 	Next,	 the	

court	explained	to	the	jury	how	the	law	applied	to	the	circumstances	of	the	case.		

In	doing	so,	the	court correctly	identified	the	four	circumstances	that the	State	

could	prove	that	would	disprove	Bonfanti’s	claim	of	self-defense—namely, that	

(1) Bonfanti	did	not	reasonably	believe	that	deadly	force	was	about	to	be	used	

against	him,	(2) Bonfanti did	not	reasonably	believe	that	his use of	deadly	force	

was	necessary,	(3) Bonfanti	provoked	the	victims	so	that	he	could	cause	them	

harm,	or	(4) Bonfanti	knew	that	he	could	have	safely	retreated.		Although	the	

trial	court	ought not	have	recited	the	portion	of	the	self-defense	statute	related	

to	third-party	provocation,	importantly,	the	trial	court	did	not	state	that	that

exception	applied	under	the	circumstances	of	this	case.

[¶19]	 	Viewing	 the	instructions	 as	 a	 whole,	we	 conclude	 that	the	 trial	

court’s	 accurate	 description	 but	 unnecessary	 inclusion of	 the	

third-party-provocation	exception	in	its	recitation	of	the	law	was	not obvious	
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error.

5	 	 See State v. Baker, 2015 ME 39, ¶ 11, 114 A.3d 214 (stating that a

defendant is entitled	to	relief	only	“when	jury instructions,	viewed as a whole,	

are	affected	by	highly	prejudicial	error	tending	to	produce	manifest	injustice”	

(quotation	marks	omitted)).

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

David	 Paris,	 Esq. (orally),	 Bath, and	 Thomas	 G.	 Bonfanti	 personally,	 for

appellant	Thomas	G.	Bonfanti

Aaron	M.	 Frey,	 Attorney	 General, and	 Donald	W.	Macomber,	 Asst.	 Atty.	 Gen.

(orally),	Office	of	the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Washington	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2020-39

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY

5		Bonfanti	notes	 that,	at	one	point,	the	 trial	court	replaced	 the	word	 “and”	with	 the	word	 “or”

when	reciting	the	self-defense	statute	during the	jury	instructions.		Although	such	a	misstatement	

could	be	prejudicial	in	other	contexts,	it	is	of	no	import	here.