Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 25, 2023.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-21-00751-CR

GUOJIAN WEI, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 458th District Court

Fort Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 19-DCR-089085

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Guojian Wei appeals his conviction for sexual assault. See Tex. 

Penal Code Ann. § 22.011. In four issues, appellant argues (1) the evidence is legally 

insufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of sexual assault, (2) the jury’s 

conclusion that appellant was the cause of the sexual assault violates the equalinference rule, (3) the jury was not free to ignore DNA evidence conclusively 

establishing that appellant did not “cause” his finger to “penetrate” the 

complainant’s vagina, and (4) the evidence was factually insufficient to prove the 
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offense of sexual assault. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 23, 2019, appellant was indicted for the offense of sexual 

assault by intentionally or knowingly causing the penetration of the complainant’s 

sexual organ with appellant’s finger without the complainant’s consent. See id. He 

pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.

At trial, the evidence showed that appellant worked as a masseuse at 88 Foot 

Massage. The complainant testified that prior to the massage session with appellant

on July 8, 2019, at the request of appellant, she changed out of her leggings and put 

on shorts provided by 88 Foot Massage. During the massage session, appellant slid 

his hand inside the complainant’s shorts and underwear and inserted at least two 

fingers into the complainant’s sexual organ. The complainant immediately told 

appellant to leave her alone and get away from her, changed clothes quickly, exited 

the room, and asked the receptionist to call the police. The complainant was 

instructed to go outside, where she called the police. When Officer Joshua 

Manriquez of the Rosenberg Police Department responded to 88 Foot Massage, the 

complainant reported that she had been sexually assaulted. The complainant 

identified appellant at trial as the person who had sexually assaulted her.

The jury also heard testimony from Sergeant Wade Wehring of the Rosenberg 

Police Department; Lori Long, a sexual assault nurse that examined the complainant 

on the day of the assault; Jacaranda Solis, a forensic scientist with the Texas 

Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory; Jennifer Young, a DNA analyst with 

the Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory in Houston; Lieutenant 

Joseph Rogers of the Rosenberg Police Department; and appellant, who denied 

assaulting the complainant.
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The jury found appellant guilty of the offense as charged and assessed 

appellant’s punishment at seven years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of 

Criminal Justice. This appeal followed.

II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

In his first issue, appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to 

support his conviction. In his third issue, appellant argues the jury was not free to 

ignore DNA evidence conclusively establishing that appellant did not “cause” his 

finger to “penetrate” the complainant’s vagina. We will address these issues 

together. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Legal sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a 

hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2009). “Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is 

authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of 

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theory of liability, and adequately 

describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.

In a legal sufficiency review, we consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational finder of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Chambers v. 

State, 580 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 

893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979)). In our analysis, we defer to the trier of fact to fairly resolve 

conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences 

from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). When the record contains 
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conflicting inferences, we presume that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts 

in favor of the prosecution, and we must defer to that resolution. Padilla v. State, 

326 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).

B. APPLICABLE LAW 

A hypothetically correct jury charge would instruct the jury to find appellant 

guilty if he (1) intentionally or knowingly (2) caused the penetration of 

complainant’s sexual organ (3) with his finger and (4) without the complainant’s 

consent. (CR 7). See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(1)(A). Additionally, 

[a]ny conviction under . . . Section 22.011 . . . is supportable on the 

uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense if the 

victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the alleged 

offense within one year after the date on which the offense is alleged to 

have occurred.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(a).

C. ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his 

conviction because there was insufficient evidence that he caused his finger to 

penetrate the complainant’s sexual organ and because the jury was not free to ignore 

evidence that his DNA was not found inside the complainant’s vagina.

Here, the complainant testified that appellant inserted at least two fingers into 

her sexual organ without her consent during a massage on July 8, 2019. Additionally, 

the complainant informed the police of the offense that same day, as testified to by 

the complainant, Officer Manriquez, and Sergeant Wehring. This testimony 

constitutes legally sufficient evidence supporting appellant’s conviction. See id.;

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(1)(A); Chambers, 580 S.W.3d at 156; Hooper, 

214 S.W.3d at 13; see, e.g., Garcia v. State, 563 S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1978) (holding that victim’s testimony of penetration by appellant, standing alone, 
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was sufficient).

We overrule appellant’s first and third issues. 

III. EQUAL-INFERENCE RULE

In his second issue, appellant argues that the jury’s “conclusion” that appellant 

was the cause of the sexual assault violates the equal-inference rule because the 

evidence presented at trial showed that it was just as likely that he did not cause his 

finger to penetrate the complainant’s sexual organ. 

In Texas civil law, the equal-inference rule prevents a jury from inferring an 

ultimate fact from minimal circumstantial evidence which could give rise to any 

number of inferences, none of which is more probable than another. Hancock v. 

Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59, 70–71 (Tex. 2013); see Suarez v. City of Tex. City, 465 

S.W.3d 623, 634 (Tex. 2015). Appellant has not cited any criminal case applying the 

equal-inference rule, nor have we found one. 

Additionally, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the legalsufficiency standard of review is “the only standard that a reviewing court should 

apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a 

criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894. We are bound to follow the precedent of the Texas Court

of Criminal Appeals where, as here, that court has deliberately and unequivocally 

interpreted the law in a criminal matter. Mayer v. State, 494 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals has held that if evidence gives rise to at least two reasonably equal, 

plausible inferences when viewed in a vacuum, then it is the jury that makes the 

choice of which inference to accept. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 165 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2006).
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Finally, the equal-inference rule applies when there is only minimal 

circumstantial evidence, and here there is direct evidence of appellant’s guilt. “[T]he 

distinction between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence is that the latter 

applies directly to the ultimate fact to be proved, while circumstantial evidence is 

the direct proof of a minor fact which, by logical inference, demonstrates the fact to 

be proved.” Crawford v. State, 502 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); see 

also Frazier v. State, 576 S.W.2d 617, 619–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (“The test is 

not whether the evidence is more or less probative, or even conclusive, but whether 

it applies directly or inferentially to the main fact to be proved.”). It is well 

established that eyewitness testimony constitutes direct evidence rather than 

circumstantial evidence. See Helms v. State, 493 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1973). 

The complainant’s testimony that appellant inserted his fingers in her sexual 

organ without her consent is direct evidence of his guilt. See id. Accordingly, we 

reject appellant’s argument based on the equal-inference rule and again conclude 

that the evidence was legally sufficient. See Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (noting that appellate courts defer to the responsibility of 

the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weight the evidence, and draw 

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts); see also, e.g., Duke v. State, 

365 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d) (rejecting argument 

based on equal-inference rule because there was direct evidence of guilt); Salazar v. 

State, No. 11-15-00007-CR, 2017 WL 469379, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 2, 

2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). 

We overrule appellant’s second issue. 

IV. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY

In his fourth issue, appellant asks this court to conduct a factual sufficiency
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review of the evidence adduced at trial. However, the Texas Court of Criminal 

Appeals has expressly rejected this standard of review. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 894. 

As noted, the Court has adopted the legal sufficiency standard as the only standard 

applicable in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal 

conviction. Id. at 912 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-20 (1979)). We 

therefore reject appellant’s invitation to conduct a factual-sufficiency review and 

overrule his fourth issue.

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

/s/ Margaret “Meg” Poissant

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Jewell, and Poissant.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).