1

CASE NO 05-14-00441-cr

IN THE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS 

IN AUSTIN 

__________________________________________________________________ 

CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL DUNLOP PETITIONER 

VS. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS RESPONDENT

__________________________________________________________________ 

PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW 

__________________________________________________________________

On Petition for Discretionary Review from the Fifth District Court of Appeals in 

Cause No. 05-14-00441-CR in Affirming Conviction in cause No. 296-82462-

2012 from the 296th District Court of Collins County, Texas. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

Christopher M. Dunlop 

435 Merrimac court

Roselle, IL 60172 

Pro se PETITIONER 

ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED 
2

Identity of Parties and Counsel 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICES: Before Justices Bridges, Fancis, and Lang 

Opinion by Justice Lang 

TRIAL JUDGE: Honorable John Roach, Jr.

APPELLANT–PETITIONER: Christopher M. Dunlop

ATTORNEY FOR THE PETITIONER AT TRIAL: 

William H. Underwood 

1413 Harroun Avenue 

McKinney, TX 75069 

ATTORNETY FOR PETITIONER ON APPLEAL: 

William H. Underwood 

1413 Harroun Avenue 

McKinney, TX 75069 

APPELLEE-RESPONDANT: The State of Texas

ATTORNEY AT TRIAL FOR THE STATE: 

Wes Wynne 

Collin County District Attorney's Office 

2100 Bloomdale Road, Ste 100 

McKinney, TX 75071 

ATTORNEY ON APPEAL FOR THE STATE: 

John Rolater 

Collin County District Attorney’s Office

2100 Bloomdale Road, Ste 100 

McKinney, TX 75071 
3

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Cover Page...........................................................................................1

Identity of Justices, Judge, Parties, and Counsel................................................2 

Table of Contents....................................................................................3 

Statement Regarding Oral Argument...............................................,.............4

Statement of the Case..............................................................................4 

Statement of Procedural History.......................................................................5

Ground for Review...................................................................................5 

Statement of the Facts.............................................................................6

GROUND FOR REVIEW ONE................................................................14

The appeals court erred in finding that the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain a 

conviction where there was no physical evidence that anyone was injured but the 

defendant himself. The suspicion of guilt was due to the defendant inflicting harm 

upon himself, but the complaining witness testified that she had drugged him. The 

appeals court erred because they only took into account the police offices 

testimony that both the complaining witness and the 911 callers written statements 

were consistent and therefore factual when the appeals court did not compare the 

original 911 call with the 911 callers written statement which is completely 

different. If they would have done that and considered all of the evidence they 

would have seen that the complaining witnesses testimony of how they were left 

alone for over an hour before they were even spoken to by the Plano police 

department then they would have known that the complaining witnesses falsified 

the police report as she stated on the stand. 

GROUND FOR REVIEW TWO...............................................................14

The trial appeals court erred in not taking into account all of the evidence as stated 

in GROUND FOR REVIEW ONE and noting that the defendant wordlessly cut 

his own throat in front of the Plano officers because he had been involuntarily 

drugged and not in his right mind as the complaining witness testified to drugging 

him during the trial. 

Prayer of Relief.........................................................................................14

Certificate of Compliance..........................................................................................15
4

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 

Because this case presents novel issues this Court has not previously addressed, 

oral argument would be helpful. Argument would assist the Court because 

resolution of the grounds for review depends upon a detailed exploration of the 

facts of the cases. Further, oral argument would provide this Court with an 

opportunity to question the parties regarding their positions. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Appellant, Christopher M. Dunlop, was charged by indictment with the felony 

offense of assault family violence by impeding the normal breathing or circulation 

of blood of Laura Free by applying pressure to Laura Free's throat or neck. 1 After 

a jury trial, Mr. Dunlop was acquitted of the 3rd degree felony offense of Assault 

by Impeding, but was convicted of the lesser-included Class A offense of Assault 

Causing Bodily Injury to a Family Member. 2 Mr, Dunlop was sentenced to 1 

year incarceration in the county jail, but the sentence was suspended and Mr. 

Dunlop was placed on community supervision for 2 years. 3 This is a direct appeal 

from that conviction and sentence. 

______________________ 

1 (Clerk's Rat 11) 

2 (Clerk's Rat 77) 

3 (Clerk's Rat 78-80) 
5

STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

The judgment of Petitioner's conviction was entered on March 18, 20

I 4. Petitioner's notice of appeal was timely filed on April 10, 20 I 4 , the Fifth 

District Court of Appeals its affirmation of conviction on July 31, 2015. 

Motion for rehearing was not filed in time due to appellant not being notified 

until 2 weeks after the verdict and was unware of his rights that he could 

have still requested a hearing Pro se 15 days after his counsels notification of 

the verdict. 

GROUND FOR REVIEW 

The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in this case despite the 

lack of any physical evidence of wrongdoing and not considering the actual 

testimony of the complaining witness herself stating the charges were 

falsified because the complaining witness thought she and her daughter had 

killed the defendant by drugging him. The Fifth Court of Appeals did not 

discharge its duty of review to conscientiously and impartially apply the law 

of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.319 (1979) and Brooki v. State, 323 S.W.3d 

893 (Tex. Crim. App. 20!0), to a fair consideration of all the evidence. See 

Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357, 360-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 
6

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

In the early morning hours of July 11, 2012, Officers David Thornsby and Kevin 

Gendron of the Plano Police Department responded to a domestic disturbance call 

from a residence located at 3829 Carrizo Drive in Plano, Texas. 4 Upon arrival at 

the location, officers made contact with the 911 caller, Kirstin Reigelsperger, who 

allowed them entry into the home. 5 As soon as the officers entered the residence, 

they observed the suspect, Christopher M. Dunlop, wordlessly pick up a large 

kitchen knife, place the knife to his own throat, and make a deep incision in his 

neck. 6 Mr. Dunlop then went into a bedroom and shut and locked the bedroom 7

door. Officer Thomsby immediately ordered both of the females (Laura Free, the 

complaining witness, and Kirsten Reigelsperger, the 911 caller) to exit the house 

and go across the street to a neighbor's yard. 8 Eventually, the officers gained 

entry into the bedroom and medical treatment was started by Emergency Medical 

Technicians on Mr. Dunlop. 9 

________________

4 (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 128: 13-15); (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 131: 6-10)

5

(Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 136: 15-19); (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 177: 23-178: 4) 

6

(Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 139: 2-10); (Rep.'s R. vol 3at 181: 21-23) 

7

(Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 139: 22-25) 

8

(Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 142: 3-4); (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 169: 10-19); (Rep's R. vol 3at 186: 4-18) 

9

(Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 143: 19-144: 4) 
7

During the estimated 30 minutes to an hour that Officers Thonsby and Gendron 

were attempting to gain entry into the bedroom and tend to Mr. Dunlop's injury, 

no contact was made with either Laura Free or Kirsten Reigelsperger by anyone 

from law enforcement. 10 In fact. Officer Gendron had no contact or interaction 

whatsoever with the complaining witness, Laura Free. 11 Once Mr. Dunlop had 

been stabilized and loaded onto a gurney for transport to the hospital, Officer 

Thomsby resumed contact with Laura Free and Kirsten Reigelsperger. 12 Officer 

Thomsby testified that Laura Free claimed that Mr. Dunlop had pulled her hair to 

the point that a chunk of her hair had come out of the backside of her scalp, and 

that she had been choked. 13 Officer Thomsby also stated that Laura Free had 

complained of pain in her head and neck area. 14 In his observations of Laura 

Free, Officer Thomsby stated that he observed no bruising or redness or scratches 

on her person the night of the incident. 15 

________________ 

10 (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 157: 5-15); (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 181:6-14) " 

11(Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 186: 1-9) 

12 (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 144: 14-22) 

13 (Rep.'sR.vol3 at l62: 2-8) 

14 (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 145: 18-22) 

15 (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 156: 1-4) 
8

As part of his investigation, Officer Thornsby also had Ms. Free fill out a 

Voluntary Witness Statement (State's Exhibit 57) 16, an Assault Supplement 

Packet (State's Exhibit 57) 17, and a page detailing "background information" 

contained within the Assault Supplement Packet (State's Exhibit 59) 18.. 

When Laura Free appeared before the court, she stated her intention to assert her 

Fifth Amendment privilege. 19 The state's prosecutor, Wes Wynne, offered Ms. 

Free testimonial (use) immunity. 20 Judge John Roach, Jr. appointed counsel to 

advise Ms. Free in regard to her 5th Amendment rights and the Grant of Use 

Immunity offered to her by the prosecution. 21 Ultimately, Ms. Free accepted the 

Grant of Use Immunity and opted to testify. 22

_________________ 

16(Rep.'s R, vol 3 at 146: 10-19) 

17 (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 142: 21-25) 

18 (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 148: 25-149:10) 

19 (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 201: 13-16) 

20 (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 203: 24-204: 19);(Clerk's R. at 65-66) 

21(Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 205: 8-14); (Rep/s R. vol 3 at 206: 1-15) 

22 (Rep.'s R. vol 3 at 228: 13-23); (Clerk's R. at 67) 
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Prior to the trial, Ms. Free had also filled out an Affidavit of Non-Prosecution, and 

she flatly stated that she did not want to see Mr. Dunlop prosecuted for this 

offense as he did nothing wrong and she was afraid for having drugged him. 23

Ms. Free's trial testimony was contradictory to the and verbal statements she had 

provided to the police on July 11, 2012. In regard to written hair-pulling, Ms. Free 

testified that the hair-pulling in question was done in a playful, sexual manner and 

denied that it caused any pain, or if it caused pain, she stated it was the type of 

pain she had encouraged and wanted. 24 When pressed about the "chunk ofhair" 

that had reportedly been ripped out, she stated that only 4-5 strands of hair may 

have been pulled out, but that they also may have just fallen out on their own. 25

Ms. Free admitted that she had drugged Mr. Dunlop that night, without his 

knowledge, by pouring Hydrocodone cough syrup initially into a Four Loko, then 

later into a pot of coffee Mr. Dunlop was drinking. 26 She stated that she and her 

daughter, Kristen, decided to pour the rest of the bottle of hydrocodone cough 

syrup into Mr.

_________________

23(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 21: 9-14) 

24 (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 32: 17-33:9); (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 84: 3-20) 

25 (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 33: 10-24) (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 34: 23-35: 24) 
10

Dunlop's coffee because the first attempt at drugging him had no effect. 27 Ms. 

Free claimed to have fabricated the story about Mr. Dunlop assaulting her because 

she believed Mr. Dunlop had actually died from his injuries, 28 and because she 

was worried that she would now be forced to pay all the bills at the residence. 29 

Ms. Free testified that not only had she fabricated the details of her written 

voluntary Witness Statement, she had also lied about her description of the night's 

events when she was verbally questioned by the police on July 11, 2012. 30

In regard to the allegation of hair pulling, in her written statement Ms. Free wrote 

that Mr. Dunlop "grabbed me by the back of the hair and yanked my head 

backward ripping out a fistful of my hair. 31 During her trial testimony, however, 

she denied that Mr. Dunlop ripped out a fistful of her hair,but she confirmed that 

Mr. Dunlop had yanked her hair and yanked her head backwards,and that she felt 

pain when he ripped her hair out. 33 

_______________________ 

27(Rep.'s R. vol 4at37: 25-39: 24) 

28(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 49: 18-24) 

29(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 50: 3-22) 

30 (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 51: 4-52: 14) 

31State's Exhibit 58, Voluntary Witness Statement, page 3) 

32(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 64: 16-25) 

33(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 72: 17-18); (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 73: 3-5) 
11

In regard to the allegation of assault by strangulation, in her voluntary statement 

Ms. Free wrote, "he put his hands around my neck and squeezed; but I could still 

breathe, it was just a bit harder." 34 In her trial testimony, Ms. Free initially stated 

that Mr. Dunlop never put his hands on her neck. 35 Later, she clarified that Mr. 

Dunlop had put his hands on her clavicle area, trying to calm her down, but all she 

felt was the "heat from hands near my neck, but I could not state with certainty 

there was ahand on my neck.” 36 When specifically asked whether her breathing 

was impeded, Ms. Free again stated that Mr. Dunlop did not have his hands 

around her neck. 37 "They were near my neck, and he never squeezed and 

impeded my air flow." 38 When the prosecutor questioned Ms. Free about the 

Assault Supplement Report she had filled out on the night of the incident, 39 Ms. 

Free again denied that Mr. Dunlop put his hands around her neck, and she further 

denied any pain associated with her neck or neck area." 40 

_________________ 

34(State's Exhibit 58, Voluntary Witness Statement,page 3)

35 (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 65: 3-4) 

36(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 66: 1-10) 

37(Rep.'s R. vol 4at66; 25-67: 7) 

38(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 66: 18-20) 

39(State's Exhibit 59,Assault SupplementReport) 

40(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 72: 17-73:24); (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 86: 14-24
12

On cross-examination, Ms. Free stated that she had lied to the police about the 

assault allegations concerning Mr. Dunlop because she and her daughter had 

drugged Mr. Dunlop, because they believed he was deceased or about to die, and 

because she feared she would be stuck in a lease she could not afford on her own."

41 She also stated that she had lied in the Victim's Assistance portion of the 

Assault Supplement Packet in order to qualify for victim's assistance money, and 

to allow her to terminate the lease." 43 Ms. Free stated that she concocted her 

fabricated story during the time period of"at least an hour" when she and Kirsten 

Reigelsperger were left unattended by the police." 44

Ms. Free was shown all the photographs of her neck and body that were taken by 

the police the night ofthe incident." 45 Ms. Free confirmed that there was no 

discoloration or bruising depicted in any of the photographs." 46

_________________________ 

41 (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 79: 24-81:20); (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 94: 19-95:5). 

42 (State's Exhibit 59, Assault Supplement Report) 

43(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 81: 12-82: 10) 

44(Rep.'sR.vol4at82: 11-23) 

45 (State's Exhibits 2-4, 6-8,12 and 13) 

46(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 89: 19-92: 18) 
13

Ms. Free stated that she lied about Mr. Dunlop assaulting her because of the"fear 

factor" of getting into trouble herself due to having drugged him." 47 She also 

stated that when she gets angry or upset, she tends to embellish and lie about the 

facts." 48

Christopher Dunlop elected not to testify during the case in chief." 49 

After closing arguments and deliberation the jury returned a verdict of Guilty on

the lesser-included offense of misdemeanor assault. 50 However, the Charge of 

the Court submitted to the jury required a finding as to the manner and means of 

the misdemeanor assault, specifically, "by applying pressure to Laura Free's throat 

and neck." 51 Punishment was assessed by the court at 1 year in county jail 

probated for 2 years; completion of a batterer's intervention prevention program; 

completion of a psychological exam; no consumption of alcohol: no contact with 

Laura Free or her children; 100 hours of community service; and 30 days term and 

condition time with authorization for off-work hours. The court also made an 

affirmative finding of family violence. 52 

________________________ 

47(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 87: 1-5) 

48(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 108:11-14) 

49(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 97: 13-21) 

50(Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 147: 15-19) 

51 (Clerk”s R.at 74)

52 (Rep.'s R. vol 4 at 158: 5-17) 
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GROUND FOR REVIEW NO. 1. RESTATED 

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE 

IS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A FINDING OF GUILTY OF THE 

OFFENSE OF ASSAULT FAMILY VIOLENCE. 

GROUND FOR REVIEW NO. 2. RESTATED 

COMPLAINING WITNESS TESTIFIED OF FALSIFYING POLICE REPORT 

BECAUSE HER AND HER DAUGHTER DRUGGED THE DEFENDANT 

AND THOUGHT THEY KILLED HIM. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

For the reasons stated, the Petitioner was denied a fair trial in Cause No. 296-82462-

2012. Therefore, Appellant prays that this Court grant his petition for discretionary 

review and upon reviewing the judgment entered below, reverse this Cause and dismiss 

the prosecution or remand it for a new trial. 

Very Respectfully submitted,

Chris Dunlop 

435 Merrimac ct 

Roselle, IL 60172 

Pro se 
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

I, Chris Dunlop, Appellant, hereby certify that this document contains 2,837

Words, exclusive of the content excepted by Tex. R. App. Pro. 9.4(i)(3). This is a 

computer-generated document, and I have relied on the word count of the 

computer program used to prepare this document. 
AFFIRMED; and Opinion Filed July 31, 2015.

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-14-00441-CR

CHRISTOPHER M. DUNLOP, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 296-82462-2012 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Bridges, Francis, and Lang 

Opinion by Justice Lang 

Christopher M. Dunlop appeals his conviction for misdemeanor assault involving family 

violence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (West 2011); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 

art. 42.013 (West 2006). After a jury found Dunlop guilty, the trial court made an affirmative 

finding of family violence, assessed punishment at one year confinement, suspended 

confinement, and placed Dunlop on community supervision for two years. In two issues, Dunlop 

argues (1) a fatal variance exists between the manner and means alleged in the indictment and 

the injury proved at trial, and (2) because this fatal variance exists, the evidence is insufficient to 

support the conviction of misdemeanor assault involving family violence. We decide against 

Dunlop on both issues. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 
–2–

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Dunlop was charged by indictment with the third-degree felony offense of assault 

involving family violence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(B). The indictment states 

that on or about July 11, 2012, Dunlop did 

then and there intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly cause bodily injury to 

Laura Free, a member of the defendant’s family, member of the defendant’s 

household, and person with who defendant had and has had a dating relationship, 

by intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly impeding the normal breathing and 

circulation of the blood of the said Laura Free by applying pressure to the throat 

and neck of said Laura Free. 

According to the record, at approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 11, 2012, Officers David 

Thornsby and Kevin Gendron, of the Plano Police Department, were dispatched to the home of 

Dunlop and Laura Free, Dunlop’s girlfriend, in response to a 911 call placed by Free’s daughter. 

After the officers arrived, Thornsby spoke with Free and her daughter. He testified that they 

seemed “very frightened,” “very, very upset,” “very scared,” and “were crying.” Both women 

described to Thornsby what had happened and voluntarily gave written witness statements. 

Thornsby testified that the statements made by Free and her daughter “were matching.” He also 

stated that Free complained of pain to her “head and neck area.” According to Free’s witness 

statement from July 11, 2012, which was admitted into evidence, after she refused to go to bed at 

Dunlop’s request, Dunlop “grabbed [her] by the back of the hair and yanked [her] head backward 

ripping out a fistful of [her] hair. He put his hands around [her] neck and squeezed but [she] 

could still breathe it was just a bit harder. He then told [her] he should just snap [her] neck.” 

At trial, Free recanted and stated that she had lied to the police on July 11, 2012. She 

testified that she had been the aggressor and Dunlop had never placed his hands on her throat or 

neck. Free stated that Dunlop did pull her hair, but he did so in a “sexual way,” and “if it hurt, it 

was a pain that [she] wanted.” 
–3–

Following a plea of not guilty, the jury found Dunlop guilty of the lesser included offense 

of misdemeanor assault. The trial court made an affirmative finding of family violence, assessed 

punishment at one year confinement, suspended confinement, and placed Dunlop on community 

supervision for two years. 

II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY & FATAL VARIANCE 

In two issues, Dunlop argues that the evidence adduced at trial supports a conviction for 

misdemeanor assault only by means of pulling Free’s hair, whereas the indictment alleges assault 

by means of “applying pressure to the throat and neck of [Free].” Therefore, Dunlop argues a 

fatal variance exists and renders the evidence insufficient to support the verdict. The State 

responds that no variance exists because the evidence is sufficient to support “the lesser injury 

alleged in the indictment, specifically, injury to the victim’s neck.”

A. Standard of Review 

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

318–19 (1979); Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “Circumstantial 

evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of the actor, and 

circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt.” Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170 

(citing Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The jury is the sole 

judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of witnesses. Id. As such, the 

jury “can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties.” 

Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). “When the record supports 

conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and 

we defer to that determination.” Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170. 
–4–

A “variance” occurs when there is a discrepancy between the allegations in the 

indictment and the proof at trial. Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 

When reviewing a variance claim, the “‘sufficiency of the evidence should be measured by the

elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.’” Id. at 

253 (quoting Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). This charge “‘would 

be one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily 

increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and 

adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. at 253 

(emphasis omitted) (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). To render the evidence insufficient to 

support the verdict, the variance must be “fatal,” meaning “it is material and prejudices [the 

defendant’s] substantial rights.” Id. at 256–57.

B. Applicable Law 

A person commits assault if he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily 

injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1). “‘Bodily injury’ means physical pain, 

illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 1.07(a)(8); see also Lane v. State, 763 

S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (“This definition [of bodily injury] appears to be 

purposefully broad and seems to encompass even relatively minor physical contacts so long as 

they constitute more than mere offensive touching.”). 

C. Application of the Law to the Facts 

Dunlop argues that because “the only uncontroverted testimony regarding an assault” was 

that Dunlop pulled Free’s hair, the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for assault 

by the means alleged in the indictment, “applying pressure to the throat and neck of [Free].” 

However, the testimony concerning pulling Free’s hair was not the only evidence offered at trial. 
–5–

According to Free’s witness statement from July 11, 2012, which was admitted into 

evidence without objection, Dunlop “put his hands around [her] neck and squeezed but [she] 

could still breathe it was just a bit harder. He then told [her] he should just snap [her] neck.” 

Thornsby testified that he spoke with Free and her daughter after the incident, and that both 

women gave “matching” accounts of the events that day. He also stated that both women 

seemed “frightened,” “upset,” and “scared” and that Free had complained of pain to her “head 

and neck area.” See Lane, 763 S.W.2d at 786; York v. State, 833 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1992, no pet.) (concluding evidence was sufficient to support assault conviction 

when the record showed appellant “choked” complainant, which restricted her breathing and 

“scared [her] to death,” and no evidence suggested appellant’s actions were accidental or 

involuntary). 

Although Free recanted at trial and stated she had lied to the police on July 11, 2012, the 

jury observed Free’s demeanor and was entitled not only to reconcile any conflicts, but also to 

disbelieve her recantation. See Chambers, 805 S.W.2d at 461; Michael v. State, No. 05-12-

00895-CR, 2013 WL 1729280, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 22, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication) (concluding evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s 

conviction for assault of his wife when wife’s recantation at trial conflicted with officer’s 

testimony and wife’s statements immediately following the assault). Contrary to Dunlop’s 

argument on appeal, the evidence need not be uncontroverted to support his conviction. In fact, 

when the record supports conflicting inferences, we are required to presume that the jury 

resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. See Dobbs, 434 

S.W.3d at 170; Chambers, 805 S.W.2d at 461. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict of guilty, we 

conclude any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Dunlop 
–6–

“intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury” to Free “by applying pressure to 

[her] throat and neck,” as alleged in the indictment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1); 

Chambers, 805 S.W.2d at 461; Michael, 2013 WL 1729280, at *1–2; York, 833 S.W.2d at 736. 

Because we have concluded the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support Dunlop’s 

conviction for misdemeanor assault family violence based on the manner and means alleged in 

the indictment, we also conclude there is no variance between the facts alleged in the indictment 

and the proof offered at trial. See Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 246; Mitchell v. State, No. 05-12-

00211-CR, 2013 WL 3771374, at *5–7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 16, 2013, pet. ref’d) (not 

designated for publication) (concluding the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding 

of sexual assault as alleged in the indictment, so there was no variance, despite the fact that the 

State’s evidence also related to another means by which appellant may have assaulted the 

complainant). We decide against Dunlop on both issues. 

III. CONCLUSION 

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47 

140441F.U05 

/Douglas S. Lang/

DOUGLAS S. LANG

JUSTICE
–7–

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

CHRISTOPHER M. DUNLOP, Appellant

No. 05-14-00441-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District 

Court, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 296-82462-2012.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices 

Bridges and Francis participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 

Judgment entered this 31st day of July, 2015.