Affirmed and Opinion filed June 25, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-14-00523-CR

CRAIG ANTHONY GILDER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 177th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1388541

O P I N I O N

Appellant Craig Anthony Gilder appeals his conviction for failure to comply 

with a sex-offender registration requirement. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

62.102 (West Supp. 2014). In a single issue, he contends the evidence is legally 

insufficient to support his conviction because no rational juror could have found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense with the requisite 

culpable mental state. We affirm.
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BACKGROUND

In 1988, appellant was convicted of sexual assault, which subjected him to 

registration as a sex offender under article 62.102 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure. Officer C.R. Black of the Houston Police Department Sexual 

Compliance Unit testified that by being subject to sex-offender registration,

appellant was required to register once a year. On May 14, 2013, at 10:30 in the 

morning, Black conducted a compliance check at appellant’s registered address, 

7601 Curry Rd., No. 2. Appellant had registered this address on July 24, 2012. The 

apartment appellant had listed as his residence was vacant; the apartment manager 

informed Black that the apartment complex was being renovated, which is why the 

apartment was vacant. A Sex Offender Compliance Report that was admitted into 

evidence at trial recites that this apartment was vacated on January 3, 2013. After 

finding the apartment vacant, Black determined that appellant was not registered at 

any other address in the State of Texas or the United States, and he was not in 

custody. 

Andrea Jenkins, the apartment manager at 7601 Curry Rd., testified that the 

property was federally subsidized and required vouchers issued by the Department 

of Housing and Urban Development to be issued as a condition of residence. In 

order to comply with federal regulations, the apartment complex underwent 

renovation beginning in November 2012. The renovation was completed in 

January 2014. Jenkins testified that appellant was never a legal resident at the 

apartment complex, but his mother lived in apartment number 2 until she had to

relocate due to the renovation. Jenkins testified that appellant was living in the 

apartment illegally. She explained that because the housing was subsidized,

appellant’s mother could only have an overnight guest for a period of 30 days. 

After the 30-day period, appellant was required to move. On August 13, 2012, a 
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trespass warning was issued to appellant because he was living at the apartment 

illegally.

The jury found appellant guilty of failure to comply with sex-offender 

registration and assessed punishment at seven years’ confinement in the 

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. 

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his sole issue on appeal, appellant asserts the evidence is insufficient to 

support his conviction. Appellant argues the State did not prove he intentionally or 

knowingly failed to comply with the requirement that he report in person to the 

appropriate authority and provide the authority with appellant’s anticipated move 

date and new address at least seven days prior to an anticipated change of address.

Appellant challenges the State’s proof that appellant intended to change his 

address.

In a sufficiency review, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to 

the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Salinas v. State, 163 

S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The jury, as the sole judge of the 

credibility of the witnesses, is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness’s 

testimony. Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The jury 

reasonably may infer facts from the evidence presented, credit the witnesses it 

chooses to credit, disbelieve any or all of the evidence or testimony proffered, and 

weigh the evidence as it sees fit. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1986). Reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the jury’s 

discretion. Losada v. State, 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). An 

appellate court may not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence 

produced at trial or substitute its judgment for that of the jury. King v. State, 29 
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S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Inconsistencies in the evidence are 

resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2000). We do not engage in a second evaluation of the weight and credibility 

of the evidence, but only ensure the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz v. 

State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

When the indictment alleges that a defendant “intentionally and knowingly” 

failed to comply with a requirement of the sex-offender registration program, as in 

the present case, we review the record for evidence the defendant’s failure was 

intentional or knowing. See Tatum v. State, 431 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as 

direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence 

alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152, 155 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Proof of a culpable mental state generally relies on 

circumstantial evidence. Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex. Crim. App.

1989) (“Establishment of culpable mental states is almost invariably grounded 

upon inferences to be drawn by the factfinder from the attendant circumstances.”); 

see also Varnes v. State, 63 S.W.3d 824, 833 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2001, no pet.). Intent may be determined from a defendant’s words, acts, and 

conduct, and “is a matter of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances.” 

Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); see also Kelley v. 

State, 429 S.W.3d 865, 872 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d).

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 62.102(a) states that a person 

commits an offense if the person is required to register and fails to comply with 

any requirement of Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, entitled 

“Sex Offender Registration Program.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(a).

There are two alternative manners and means of violating the requirement 
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contained in Texas Code of Criminal Procedure section 62.055(a): (1) a person 

required to register intends to change address and fails to report in person, not later 

than the seventh day before the intended change, to the applicable authorities and 

to provide then with the person’s anticipated move date and new address (“Failing

to Report an Intended Move”); and (2) a person required to register changes 

address and fails to report in person to the applicable authority in the municipality 

or county in which the person’s new residence is located, not later than the later of 

the seventh day after changing the address or the first date the applicable authority 

by policy allows the person to report, and fails to provide the authority with proof 

of identity and proof of residence (“Failing to Report an Actual Move”). See Tex. 

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.055(a); Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 9 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2014). Although there was evidence that would support a conviction of 

appellant based on Failing to Report an Actual Move, appellant was charged only 

with intentionally and knowingly Failing to Report an Intended Move.

An individual acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of 

his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire 

to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (West 

2013). An individual acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature 

of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the 

nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. Id. § 6.03(b). An individual 

acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he 

is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id.

Appellant argues the State did not prove that he intended to move to a 

known new address; therefore, appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to 

support appellant’s conviction based on Failing to Report an Intended Move. 

Appellant cites this court’s opinion in Green v. State, 350 S.W.3d 617, 630–34
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(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d), in support of his argument. In 

Green, the defendant, similar to appellant in this case, was charged only with 

intentionally and knowingly Failing to Report an Intended Move. Id. at 631. Green 

lived in Texas, but worked in Arizona for extended periods of time. Id. at 633.

Green’s wife testified that while Green was working in Arizona, she moved to 

another address in Texas without telling Green, and took his possessions with her. 

Id. Under the legal-sufficiency standard of review, this court presumed that the 

jury did not believe the wife’s testimony, which indicated that appellant had no 

intent to change his address that would require him to report his anticipated move 

date and new address. Id. Nonetheless, this court concluded that the evidence was 

legally insufficient to support a finding that appellant ever had an intent to change 

his address that triggered a duty to report under 62.055(a). Id. This court found the 

evidence legally insufficient despite evidence that, more than two weeks after the 

move, appellant reported to the applicable authority that he had moved from the 

prior address and was currently living at a different address. See id. at 619 

(plurality op.); id. at 632–33 (majority op.). In concluding that the evidence was 

legally insufficient, this court noted as follows:

There are various ways that a person’s belongings can be moved out 

of a residence in the absence of that person intending to move. The 

testimony of Guthrie and Graham that appellant had moved out of the 

602 Highland Avenue residence on or about April 15, 2007, is not 

evidence that appellant had an intent to move out during this time that 

he failed to report at least seven days before the date of the intended 

move.

Id. at 633.

In Thomas v. State, the defendant registered the address of an apartment 

leased by the daughter of his girlfriend. Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 6. After a police 

officer contacted the property manager to ask if she was aware that Thomas lived 
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on the premises, the manager requested that local police officers issue a criminal 

trespass warning. Id. Ultimately, Thomas was given a trespass warning and 

arrested on other outstanding warrants. Id. When he was booked into the county 

jail, Thomas gave an address different than his registered address. Id. On June 25, 

2012, after Thomas was released, a police officer went to this address and found 

Thomas there. Id. Thomas told the officer that he was living there and that he had 

updated his sex-offender registration address by a telephone call. Id. As in Green

and the case under review, the defendant (Thomas) was charged only with Failing 

to Report an Intended Move. Id. at 10. Thomas appealed his conviction, and the 

court of appeals reversed, holding that the State did not prove that Thomas 

intended to change his address and that the evidence was insufficient to support a 

finding that Thomas intentionally or knowingly failed to register an intended 

change of address seven days before the intended change. Thomas v. State, 411 

S.W.3d 685, 693 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013), rev’d 444 S.W.3d 4, 6 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2014). 

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals, concluding 

that the evidence was legally sufficient to support Thomas’s conviction based on 

Failing to Report an Intended Move. See Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 6. The high court 

concluded that, because there was evidence that appellant was living at a new 

address as of June 25, 2012, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Thomas 

intended to change address on June 25, 2012, and that he violated article 62.055(a) 

by failing to report this intended address change on or before June 18, 2012. See id. 

at 10–11. In so holding, the Thomas court effectively abrogated the part of Green

in which this court concluded that evidence the defendant was living at a different 

address at some point in time did not, by itself, justify a reasonable inference that 

the defendant ever had an intent to change his address that he failed to report not 

later than the seventh day before the date of the intended address change. Compare 
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Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 10–11, with Green 350 S.W.3d at 633. 

In the case under review, Officer Black testified that appellant registered 

7601 Curry Rd., No. 2 as his address on July 24, 2012. On May 14, 2013, that 

apartment was vacant. The evidence is sufficient to support a finding that appellant 

was living at a new address as of January 3, 2013. Under Thomas, because there 

was evidence that appellant was living at a new address as of January 3, 2013, the 

jury reasonably could have concluded that appellant intended to change address on 

this date and that he violated article 62.055(a) by failing to report this intended 

address change on or before December 27, 2012. See Thomas, 444 S.W.3d at 10–

11. Under this precedent, the evidence was legally sufficient to support appellant’s

conviction based on Failing to Report an Intended Move. See id. Accordingly, we 

overrule appellant’s sole issue on appeal.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Busby.

Publish —Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).