NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 18-1105

___________

MANORCARE OF EASTON PA LLC

v.

THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH A. NAGY

THE ESTATE OF JOSEPH A. NAGY; JOSEPH EUGENE NAGY, Counter-Plaintiffs

v.

MANORCARE OF EASTON PA LLC; KENNEDY PC; NORTHAMPTON COUNTY; 

AETNA, INC.; HEARTLAND HOSPICE; DR. EDWARD CUMBO; DR. DILIP BERA; 

BRAKELEY PARK CENTER; NEW EASTWOOD CARE AND REHAB; 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; DR. KEYURKUMAR DALSANIYA;

DR. STEPHEN KSIAZEK; ST. LUKE’S WARREN HOSPITAL

The Estate of Joseph A. Nagy,

 Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 5:13-cv-05957)

District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 21, 2018

Before: MCKEE, COWEN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 31, 2019)
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___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Joseph E. Nagy (“Appellant”) seeks to appeal pro se from the District Court’s 

December 13, 2017 order denying a filing titled “Motion to Tax Attorney in Fact and Pro 

Se Fees, Costs.” For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss this appeal.

I.

In 2013, Manor Care of Easton, PA, LLC (“Manor Care”) sued Appellant’s father, 

Joseph A. Nagy (“Nagy”), in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County, 

Pennsylvania. Nagy, proceeding pro se, removed the case to federal court and filed 

counterclaims against several individuals and entities, including Manor Care. Appellant, 

also proceeding pro se, purported to join Nagy as a defendant/counter-plaintiff. After 

Nagy passed away in 2015, Nagy’s Estate (“the Estate”) was substituted for Nagy as a 

party to this case. The Estate was not represented by an attorney; rather, Appellant, who 

is a co-executor and co-beneficiary of the Estate, submitted filings on its behalf.

The District Court ultimately dismissed all of the counterclaims. Thereafter, 

Manor Care moved to voluntarily dismiss its complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(a)(2). In October 2017, the District Court granted that motion and closed 

the case. Later that month, Appellant, on the Estate’s behalf, filed a document titled 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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“Motion to Tax Attorney in Fact and Pro Se Fees, Costs.” This filing appeared to ask the 

District Court to order Manor Care to pay the Estate approximately $77,000 in “attorney 

fees” for Appellant’s work on the case. On December 13, 2017, the District Court denied 

that motion. Thirty days later, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal, which stated that 

the Estate was appealing from the December 13, 2017 order.

II.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 requires that a notice of appeal “specify the 

party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the caption or body of the 

notice.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(A). This rule is construed liberally, see Witasick v. 

Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 803 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2015), and “[c]ourts employ a 

commonsense, purposive approach to determine whether a notice of appeal complies with 

the rule[],” Lee v. Houtzdale SCI, 798 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In this case, the one-sentence notice of appeal clearly and unequivocally 

stated that the Estate was the party appealing. Even construing the notice liberally, 

nothing in that filing indicates that Appellant also intended to appeal on his own behalf.1 

Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over any arguments brought by Appellant on his own 

 

1 On numerous occasions, Appellant submitted filings in the District Court that included 

language indicating that he was proceeding on behalf of both the Estate and himself. He 

was certainly capable of doing the same in his notice of appeal, but he chose not to do so, 

instead listing the Estate as the only appellant. Although he signed the notice of appeal, 

that fact alone is not enough to persuade us that he intended to appeal on his own behalf. 

Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(2) (“A pro se notice of appeal is considered filed on behalf of the 

signer and the signer’s spouse and minor children (if they are parties), unless the notice 

clearly indicates otherwise.” (emphasis added)). 
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behalf. See Witasick, 803 F.3d at 190.2 As for the arguments that Appellant brings on 

behalf of the Estate, those arguments are not properly before us either. Appellant, who is 

not an attorney, may not represent the Estate pro se. See Murray ex rel. Purnell v. City of 

Philadelphia, 901 F.3d 169, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2018).

In light of the above, we will dismiss this appeal.3 Appellant’s motion for 

sanctions is denied.

 

2 Even if we were to liberally construe Appellant’s two motions to proceed in forma 

pauperis (“IFP”) and/or his appellate briefing as a notice of appeal, we would still lack 

jurisdiction to review any arguments brought by Appellant on his own behalf. 

Appellant’s first IFP motion does not indicate that he seeks to appeal on his own behalf, 

and the second IFP motion and his appellate briefing were filed after the expiration of the 

30-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); see also

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007) (explaining that the time to appeal is 

“mandatory and jurisdictional” (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 

U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam))).

 

3 To the extent that Appellant asks us to strike Manor Care’s briefing and/or supplemental 

appendix, that request is denied.