aAn 					No. 2--01--0554			

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

	SECOND DISTRICT

In re MARRIAGE OF MICHELLE 	   )  Appeal from the Circuit Court

FLANNERY,					   )  of McHenry County.

						   )

	Petitioner-Appellee,	   )  

						   )       

and						   )	 No. 01--OP--67  	 

					 	   )

KEVIN FLANNERY,		 	   )  Honorable

						   )  Sharon L. Prather,

	Respondent-Appellant. 	   )  Judge, Presiding.

.

	JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

	Petitioner, Michelle Flannery, filed a petition for order of protection on behalf of her minor daughter, Amanda, against

respondent, Kevin Flannery, Amanda's father.  Following a hearing,

the trial court entered a plenary order of protection.  On appeal,

respondent argues (1) the trial court erred in admitting Amanda's

hearsay allegations of sexual abuse; (2) Amanda's hearsay

statements lacked sufficient corroboration; (3) he was not given

reasonable notice of Amanda's hearsay statements; (4) the trial

court abused its discretion with respect to certain evidentiary

rulings; and (5) the trial court's decision was against the

manifest weight of the evidence and an abuse of discretion.  For

the reasons that follow, we reverse.

I.  BACKGROUND

	On March 14, 2001, petitioner filed a verified petition for an

order of protection against respondent.  Petitioner alleged that her then three-year-old daughter told social worker Regina Lumpkins

that "daddy put his finger in my buddy butt (vagina) and hurt me." 

Among other things, petitioner requested that respondent stay away

from Amanda and that she (petitioner) be granted "physical care" of

the child.  A hearing on the petition commenced on April 3, 2001. 

At the hearing, petitioner, petitioner's mother, petitioner's

father, and Lumpkins testified about statements made to them by

Amanda between August 2000 and April 2001 regarding the alleged

sexual abuse.

	At the close of petitioner's case, respondent moved to strike

the hearsay statements attributed to Amanda.  Respondent asserted

that there were three possible bases for the admission of the

hearsay statements: (1) section 213.1 of the Illinois Domestic

Violence Act of 1986 (Domestic Violence Act) (750 ILCS 60/213.1

(West 2000)); section 606(e) of the Illinois Marriage and

Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/606(e) (West

2000)); or (3) section 8--2601 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/8--2601 (West 2000)).  However, respondent

suggested that none of these statutory provisions applied to the

instant case.  Section 213.1 of the Domestic Violence Act did not

apply because that section pertains exclusively to hearsay

statements made by high-risk adults with disabilities.  Respondent

argued that neither section 606(e) of the Marriage Act nor section

8--2601 of the Code applied because both of those statutory

provisions allow the admission of hearsay statements only if there

is corroboration.  Respondent contended that there was no physical

or other corroboration of the statements attributed to Amanda.  In addition, respondent pointed out that section 8--2601 of the Code

requires that any statement have sufficient safeguards of

reliability, which the hearsay statements in this case lacked.  In

response, petitioner, relying on Daria W. v. Bradley W., 317 Ill. App. 3d 194 (2000), argued that section 606(e) of the Marriage Act

allows the admission of a child's hearsay statements of abuse at an

order-of-protection hearing.

	The trial court ruled that the hearsay statements were

admissible under section 606(e) of the Marriage Act.  The court

commented that in Daria W. the appellate court "made it clear that it is [section] 606(e) that controls hearsay statements of a child

dealing with abuse."  Accordingly, the trial court denied

respondent's motion to strike Amanda's hearsay statements. 

Respondent then presented his case.  At the close of the evidence,

the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence to corroborate

Amanda's hearsay statements.  Specifically, the court noted that

there were two types of corroborating evidence, "physical evidence"

and "testimony of the physical actions of the child when that child

relayed statements of abuse."  The court issued a plenary order of

protection against respondent for two years.  The order allowed

respondent to have supervised visitation with Amanda.  This appeal

followed.

II.  ANALYSIS

A.  Applicable Statute

	Respondent first argues that the trial court erred in

admitting Amanda's out-of-court statements under section 606(e) of

the Marriage Act.  According to respondent, section 8--2601 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/8--2601 (West 2000)) governs the admissibility of

a minor's hearsay statements in cases brought pursuant to the

Domestic Violence Act.  Section 8--2601 requires (1) the court to conduct a hearing to establish the reliability of the statements

and (2) corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of

the statement if the child is unavailable to testify.  Respondent

asserts that Amanda's statements were not admissible under section

8--2601 because the trial court failed to determine whether

Amanda's statements were reliable.  Petitioner responds that the

trial court properly admitted Amanda's hearsay statements pursuant

to section 606(e) of the Marriage Act and Daria W.

	Our task is to determine whether section 606(e) of the

Marriage Act or section 8--2601 of the Code applies in assessing

the admissibility of a minor child's hearsay statements where a

party seeks an order of protection.  The resolution of this issue

involves a question of statutory construction, a question of law

that is subject to de novo review.  Overlin v. Windmere Cove Partners, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 75, 77 (2001).  The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the

intent of the legislature.  Forest Preserve District v. Loren & Gisela Brown Family Trust, 323 Ill. App. 3d 686, 692 (2001).  The best indication of the legislature's intent is the plain language

of the statute.  Westcon/Dillingham Microtunneling v. Walsh Construction Co. of Illinois , 319 Ill. App. 3d 870, 875 (2001).  After carefully reviewing the applicable statutory provisions, we

conclude that section 8--2601 applies in determining the admissibility of Amanda's out-of-court statements of sexual abuse

by respondent.

	The Domestic Violence Act (750 ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2000)) governs orders of protection.  Section 205(a) of the

Domestic Violence Act (750 ILCS 60/205(a) (West 2000)) provides in

pertinent part:

		"Any proceeding to obtain, modify, reopen or appeal an order of protection, whether commenced alone or in conjunction with a civil or criminal proceeding, shall be governed by the rules of civil procedure of this State.  The standard of proof in such a proceeding is proof by a preponderance of the

evidence, whether the proceeding is heard in a criminal or civil

court.  The Code of Civil Procedure [(735 ILCS 5/1--101 et seq. (West 2000))] and Supreme Court and local rules applicable to civil proceedings, as now or hereafter amended, shall apply, except as otherwise provided by this law."  (Emphasis added.)  750 ILCS 60/205(a) (West 2000).

Initially, we note that section 8--2601 is a part of the Code of

Civil Procedure.  Furthermore, use of the term "shall" ordinarily

denotes a mandatory obligation.  In re Marriage of Takata, 304 Ill. App. 3d 85, 95 (1999).  Accordingly, we find that the plain

language of section 205(a) mandates the application of section 8--

2601 in assessing the admissibility of a minor's out-of-court

statements in cases brought under the Domestic Violence Act.

	We point out that nothing in the Domestic Violence Act

provides that the Marriage Act applies in determining the

admissibility of a minor's hearsay statements in order-of- protection cases.  Notably, section 214(b) of the Domestic Violence

Act (750 ILCS 60/214(b) (West 2000)) contains 18 subsections

listing various remedies that a court may grant in issuing an order

of protection.  Seven of those subsections refer to the Marriage

Act in some capacity.  See 750 ILCS 60/214(b)(2), (b)(6), (b)(7),

(b)(10), (b)(11), (b)(12), (b)(13) (West 2000).  However, none of

those subsections require application of section 606(e) in a case

brought under the Domestic Violence Act.

	Section 214(b)(2) provides that, in deciding whether to grant

exclusive possession of the marital residence to the petitioner,

the court shall not be limited by the standards set forth in

section 701 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/701 (West 2000)). 

Section 214(b)(6) provides that a court may award temporary legal

custody of the child to the petitioner in accordance with, inter alia, the Marriage Act.  However, in her petition, petitioner did not seek "temporary legal custody" of Amanda.  Section 214(b)(7)

pertains to visitation rights and provides that the court shall not

be limited by section 607.1 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/607.1

(West 2000)) in deciding whether to grant visitation to the

respondent.  Section 214(b)(10) provides that a court may award

marital property to the petitioner only if a proper proceeding has

been filed under the Marriage Act.  Similarly, section 214(b)(11)

provides that a court may enter an order protecting the parties'

marital property only if a proper proceeding has been filed under

the Marriage Act.  Section 214(b)(12) allows the trial court to

order the respondent to pay child support in accordance with the

Marriage Act.  Finally, section 214(b)(13) allows the court to order the respondent to pay certain losses as authorized by section

501(a)(3) of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/501(a)(3) (West 2000)).

	Conceding that she did not seek "temporary legal custody" of Amanda, petitioner nevertheless notes that she did request

"physical care" of the minor in her petition.  Petitioner equates

"physical care" with the term "temporary legal custody" as found in

section 214(b)(6) of the Domestic Violence Act.  Thus, she posits

that the trial court correctly determined that provisions of the

Marriage Act, including section 606(e), governed this case.  We

disagree.

	Petitioner's contention ignores another principle of statutory

construction.  It is well settled that a statute should be

construed so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous or

meaningless.  Khan v. Van Remmen, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 49, 61 (2001); Village of Mundelein v. Franco, 317 Ill. App. 3d 512, 520 (2000); People v. Lueloff, 161 Ill. App. 3d 432, 435 (1987).  The legislature has differentiated between "temporary legal custody"

and "physical care."  Section 214(b)(5) of the Domestic Violence

Act (750 ILCS 60/214(b)(5), (b) (6) (West 2000)) expressly provides

that, in issuing an order of protection, a court may award

"physical care and possession of the minor child."  Unlike section

214(b)(6) of the Domestic Violence Act, which governs the remedy of

"temporary legal custody," section 214(b)(5), by its own terms,

does not incorporate any provisions of the Marriage Act. 

Obviously, the legislature meant to distinguish between "physical

care and possession" and "temporary legal custody" or it would not have included both provisions in the statute.  Adopting

petitioner's position would require us to ignore section 214(b)(5).

	We recognize that in Daria W., 317 Ill. App. 3d 194, the Third District concluded that section 606(e) of the Marriage Act

controlled the admission of a child's hearsay statement in an

order-of-protection case.  Daria W., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 200.  The court reasoned that section 606(e) of the Marriage Act was more

specific than section 8--2601 of the Code because (1) section

606(e) addresses the admission of hearsay statements of a minor

child when the alleged abuser is the parent and (2) section 606(e)

applies to hearings concerning visitation with the child.  Daria W., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 199-200.  However, the Daria W. court never discussed the effect of section 205(a) of the Domestic Violence

Act.  While petitioner points out that the trial court was bound to

follow Daria W., we are not required to follow a decision rendered by another district of this appellate court.  See Appelhans v. McFall, 325 Ill. App. 3d 232, 239 (2001).  Therefore, to the extent that Daria W. differs with our conclusion in this case, we decline to follow it.

	We now turn to the statutory provisions at hand.  The trial

court found Amanda's hearsay statements admissible under section

606(e) of the Marriage Act, which provides:

		"Previous statements made by the child relating to any

allegations that the child is an abused or neglected child

within the meaning of the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting

Act, or an abused or neglected minor within the meaning of the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987, shall be admissible in evidence in a hearing concerning custody of or visitation with the child. 

No such statement, however, if uncorroborated and not subject

to cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support

a finding of abuse or neglect."  750 ILCS 5/606(e) (West

2000).

We, on the other hand, have concluded that section 8--2601 is

applicable to cases seeking an order of protection under the

Domestic Violence Act.  Section 8--2601 of the Code provides:

		"An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age

of 13 describing any act of child abuse or any conduct

involving an unlawful sexual act performed in the presence of,

with, by, or on the declarant child, or testimony by such of

an out-of-court statement made by such child that he or she

complained of such acts to another, is admissible in any civil

proceeding, if: (1) the court conducts a hearing outside the

presence of the jury and finds that the time, content, and

circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards

of reliability; and (2) the child either: (i) testifies at the

proceeding; or (ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is

corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the

statement."  735 ILCS 5/8--2601 (West 2000).

While both statutory provisions require corroboration, section 8--

2601 of the Code adds the further requirement that, in order for

the statements to be admissible, the court must conduct a hearing

and find sufficient indicia of reliability.  See In re Marriage of Rudd, 293 Ill. App. 3d 367, 373-74 (1997) (noting that in order for a child's hearsay statements to be admissible under section 8--2601 of the Code, the court must conduct a reliability hearing and the

statements must be corroborated).  In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990), the Supreme Court

held that the "indicia of reliability" requirement may be met (1)

where the statement falls in a " 'firmly rooted hearsay

exception' " or (2) where it is supported by " 'a showing of

particularized  guarantees of trustworthiness.' " Wright, 497 U.S. at 816, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 653, 110 S. Ct. at 3147, quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (1980).  This court has applied the Wright guidelines for reliability in assessing the admissibility of hearsay statements

under section 115--10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(725 ILCS 5/115--10 (West 2000)), the criminal counterpart to

section 8--2601.  See People v. Edwards, 224 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1028-29 (1992).  As a result, such guidelines also apply in

assessing the admissibility of hearsay statements under section 8--

2601.

	As discussed, the trial court found that Amanda's statements

were admissible under section 606(e) of the Marriage Act.  Section

606(e) does not require the trial court to conduct a reliability

hearing.  Thus, it necessarily follows that the trial court did not

consider whether the "time, content, or circumstances of the

statement[s] provide sufficient safeguards of reliability" as

required by section 8--2601 of the Code.

	Petitioner claims that the court's failure to hold a

reliability hearing does not require reversal because the record

suggests that the court considered the time, content, and circumstances under which Amanda's statements were made. 

Petitioner notes that, at the close of the evidence, the court

stated that "the hearsay statements of the child in this case were

clear and concise to various different people.  There were some

variants of those statements, but the main elements were always

clear and consistent."  Petitioner reads these comments out of

context.  These remarks related to the court's discussion regarding

whether there was any evidence to corroborate Amanda's hearsay

statements.  In any event, to the extent that the court's remarks

relate to the reliability of Amanda's hearsay statements, we find

that they only pertain to the statements' content as opposed to the

time and circumstances under which they were made.

	Ordinarily, we would remand the proceeding so that the trial

court could hold a reliability hearing.  However, respondent raises

the additional argument that Amanda's hearsay statements lacked

corroboration.  As noted above, both section 606(e) of the Marriage

Act and section 8--2601 of the Code require corroboration of the

child's hearsay statements where the minor is unavailable to

testify.  If we find that Amanda's hearsay statements lack

corroboration, a remand would be unnecessary.  

B.  Corroboration

	As previously discussed, the trial court found two types of

corroborating evidence: (1) "physical evidence" and (2) "testimony

of the physical actions of the child when that child relayed

statements of abuse."  Respondent argues that there was

insufficient corroboration of Amanda's hearsay statements. 

Respondent's argument is twofold.  First, he claims that there was insufficient physical evidence to corroborate Amanda's hearsay

statements.  Second, he argues that testimony of the physical

actions of the child upon relaying statements of abuse does not

constitute corroboration.  We first address whether there was

sufficient physical evidence to corroborate Amanda's hearsay

statements.

	In In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184 (1997), our supreme court discussed the evidence necessary to corroborate a minor's hearsay

statement of sexual abuse.  The purpose of presenting corroborating

evidence, the court wrote, was to balance the welfare interests of

minors and the rights of those accused of abuse or neglect.  A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 197.  The court noted that sufficient corroboration

requires more than witnesses testifying that a minor related

instances of abuse to them.  A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 198.  The court stated:

	"[C]orroborating evidence of *** abuse or neglect requires

there to be independent evidence which would support a logical

and reasonable inference that the act of abuse or neglect

described in the hearsay statement occurred.  In essence,

corroborating evidence is evidence that makes it more probable

that a minor was abused or neglected.  The form of the

corroboration will vary depending on the facts of each case

and can include physical or circumstantial evidence."  A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 199.

	In A.P., the court concluded that the minor's hearsay statements were sufficiently corroborated by the medical evidence

presented.  A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 199.  In A.P., the medical evidence showed that the minor's hymen was torn, it was stretched

past its point of elasticity, and its opening was larger than

normal for a girl A.P.'s age.  A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 199.  Based on this evidence, the examining physician concluded that A.P.'s vagina

had been penetrated by a finger or foreign object approximately two

weeks before the examination.  A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 199-200.  The supreme court held that this evidence was sufficient to corroborate

A.P.'s hearsay statements of sexual abuse.  A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 200.

	A.P. involved the interpretation of what is now section 2-- 18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act)

(705 ILCS 405/2--18(4)(c) (West 2000)).  Section 2--18(4)(c)

governs the admission of a minor's out-of-court statements

regarding allegations of abuse or neglect.  Like section 2--8601 of

the Code and section 606(e) of the Marriage Act, section 2--

18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act requires corroboration of the

child's hearsay statements.  Given the similarity of these three

statutory provisions, we find the reasoning of A.P. applicable here.

	In the instant case, the only testimony regarding Amanda's

physical condition came from Dr. Michelle Reinstein, a board-

certified pediatrician practicing at Pediatric Care Associates. 

Petitioner testified that she took Amanda to see Dr. Reinstein in

August 2000, after Amanda allegedly had an unusual conversation

with petitioner's mother.  However, Reinstein testified that

petitioner brought Amanda to her office on July 26, 2000, for

treatment of vaginal redness.  Reinstein stated that she is mandated by state law to report any allegations of physical or

sexual abuse.  Accordingly, whenever a child suffers from vaginal

redness, she asks the parent if he or she suspects any

inappropriate touching.  Reinstein asked petitioner whether she

suspected any inappropriate touching with respect to Amanda. 

Petitioner responded in the negative.

	Reinstein further testified that the presence of vaginal

redness does not indicate sexual abuse and that vaginal redness is

"quite common" among 21⁄2-year-old girls.  Reinstein explained that

in Amanda's age group there are a lot of things that can cause

vaginal redness.  Reinstein elaborated that "[a] young lady

starting to potty train can have some redness if [she does not]

wipe well, and a lady touching herself, putting things down below. 

Not--It's not specific to abuse."

	Reinstein testified that she examined Amanda by spreading the

child's labia and inspecting Amanda's hymenal ring and labia with

a bright light.  Except for the vaginal irritation, Reinstein was

unable to find anything abnormal.  Reinstein noted that there was

no distortion or deformity of the labia, and everything up to the

hymenal ring "was intact and appropriate."  According to Reinstein,

there was no indication that Amanda had been sexually abused. 

Reinstein admitted that she had the capacity to perform only an

external digital examination of Amanda.  An internal examination

would require a visit with a specialist.  Reinstein diagnosed

Amanda with "vaginal irritation"--in layman's term, "diaper rash."

Reinstein prescribed Lotrimin because Amanda had a history of yeast

infections.  She also recommended that Amanda return for a visit the following week.  However, petitioner did not bring Amanda in

for a follow-up examination.

	Amanda did not return to Pediatric Care Associates until

December 6, 2000.  At that time, Reinstein conducted Amanda's

three-year checkup.  During Amanda's examination, petitioner did

not raise any concerns regarding sexual abuse.  As part of the

checkup, Reinstein examined Amanda's vaginal area by spreading the

labia.  Reinstein did not find anything unusual.  In particular,

Reinstein noted that there was no redness and there was no

indication that indicated Amanda had been sexually abused.

	We conclude that this medical testimony is insufficient to

corroborate Amanda's hearsay statements of sexual abuse.  The

evidence demonstrates that Amanda's July 26, 2000, visit to Dr.

Reinstein was for the treatment of a diaper rash.  When asked by

Dr. Reinstein, petitioner denied any concerns regarding the sexual

abuse of Amanda.  More importantly, Dr. Reinstein's examination

revealed no physical evidence of abuse.  At Amanda's December

checkup, petitioner voiced no concern of abuse, and Dr. Reinstein

did not find any signs of abuse at that time.  Based on this

evidence, we do not believe that this evidence makes it more

probable that Amanda was sexually abused.

	The trial court also found that testimony regarding Amanda's

physical manifestations when she related the allegations of sexual

abuse constituted sufficient corroboration.  Although the trial

court did not specify which physical manifestations it relied upon,

we have combed the record and note the following.

	Petitioner testified that sometime in August 2000 Amanda

pointed to her genitals and told petitioner that "Daddy--daddy put

his finger there and hurt me."  Petitioner also testified that, as

of April 2001, Amanda had been toilet trained for a little more

than a month.  However, according to petitioner, Amanda started

having accidents at the end of February.  Petitioner further

recounted that for about a year Amanda had been waking up in the

middle of the night and that the night prior to her testimony

Amanda woke up crying but would not tell petitioner what was wrong. 

Eventually, Amanda placed her hand down her pants and stated, "This

is what daddy did."

	Petitioner's mother, Joanne Mitchell, testified that late in

November 2000 she was changing Amanda's diaper when Amanda stated,

"that hurts."  Mitchell asked Amanda why, and Amanda responded,

"because my daddy puts his finger in there and hurts me." 

Following these statements, Amanda put her hand on her vagina.  A

similar incident occurred late in December 2000.  Mitchell also

recalled an incident on February 17, 2001, as she was preparing

Amanda for bed.  While in the bathroom, Mitchell took off Amanda's

clothes and, using a washcloth, wiped down the child's hands and

face.  Mitchell then placed Amanda on the floor to wash the front

of her body and her legs.  Mitchell testified that when she

attempted to wash Amanda's private parts, the girl started to shake

and stated, "please don't hurt me like daddy does."

	Social worker Regina Lumpkins conducted a sexual-abuse-victim

assessment of Amanda on March 13, 2000.  Upon entering Lumpkins's

office, Amanda was very excited.  However, a short time later, Amanda became quiet and stuck her fingers in her mouth, telling

Lumpkins that she has more toys at home than Lumpkins has in her

office.  Lumpkins testified that, during a body-part-identification

assessment with Lumpkins, Amanda stated, "my daddy puts his finger

in my buttie butt and it hurts."  Amanda then began rubbing her

genital area with her hands.  Lumpkins described Amanda's reaction

at the time as "scared."  According to Lumpkins, Amanda "pulled

back" and was "hesitant."  Amanda also told Lumpkins that the

incident happened in the bathtub and that it occurred five times. 

Amanda then told Lumpkins she no longer wished to talk about it. 

Amanda proceeded to another part of the room, turned away from

Lumpkins, stuck her fingers in her mouth, and became very quiet. 

About a minute later, Amanda said, "you're going to be in big

trouble."  Lumpkins asked Amanda to whom she was referring, and

Amanda said she did not want to talk about it.  Lumpkins described

Amanda's behavior as "a very different way of reacting to me or

interacting with me."  A short time later, Amanda resumed playing

with Lumpkins.  Lumpkins attempted to engage Amanda in conversation

again, asking her if there were any other incidents.  Amanda

responded that she did not remember.  Amanda then reiterated that

she did not want to talk about it anymore.  At that point, Lumpkins

ended the assessment.

	The following day, on March 14, 2000, Lumpkins conducted a

videotaped interview of Amanda.  When Lumpkins asked Amanda about

respondent, she indicated that she did not want to talk about him. 

Because Lumpkins was sitting beside Amanda, she was unable to observe her face.  However, Lumpkins did report that the child was

fidgeting at the time.

	With respect to Amanda's physical actions, respondent urges

that such evidence does not constitute corroboration within the

meaning of section 8--2601 of the Code.  Alternatively, assuming

that such evidence does constitute corroboration, respondent argues

that the trial court's finding was against the manifest weight of

the evidence.

	We find that this testimony regarding Amanda's physical

manifestations is insufficient to corroborate the child's hearsay

statements of sexual abuse under either section 606(e) of the

Marriage Act or section 8--2601 of the Code.  In A.P., the supreme court stated that a minor's hearsay statement of abuse or neglect

must be either subject to cross-examination or corroborated by

other evidence.  A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 196.  Here, there was no cross-examination.  As a result, there must be some corroboration

of Amanda's hearsay statements.  Corroborating evidence requires

the presence of "independent evidence which would support a logical

and reasonable inference that the act of abuse or neglect described

in the hearsay statement occurred."  A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 199.

	As a preliminary matter, we point out that we have been unable

to find, nor has petitioner cited, any case law holding that the

physical conduct that accompanied a child's hearsay statement of

abuse or neglect is sufficient, by itself, to corroborate the

child's out-of-court statement.  Moreover, this court has

previously determined that evidence that is itself hearsay cannot

provide the corroboration required by the statute.  In re Alba, 185 Ill. App. 3d 286, 290 (1989).  Although hearsay is defined as testimony of an out-of-court "statement" that is offered to

establish the truth of the matter asserted (People v. Garcia, 195 Ill. App. 3d 621, 626 (1990)), we have applied this definition to

physical manifestations as well.  See Alba, 185 Ill. App. 3d at 290 (finding that child's drawing indicating where her father placed

his penis was insufficient to corroborate the child's hearsay

statement of sexual abuse; the drawing constituted hearsay because

it was offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted).  In

this case, Amanda's physical actions were offered to prove

petitioner's claim that Amanda was sexually abused.  Accordingly,

the actions fit within the definition of hearsay and could not, by

themselves, corroborate Amanda's out-of-court statements of sexual

abuse.  A contrary holding would effectively nullify the

corroboration requirement.  Thus, we hold that testimony regarding

the physical manifestations that accompany a child's hearsay

statements of abuse is insufficient to corroborate the out-of-court

statements when the child's conduct is the only corroborative

evidence presented.  Consequently, we must reverse the judgment of

the trial court.

	Petitioner cites two cases, which she claims dictate a

contrary result.  Both cases involved what is now section 2--

18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act)

(705 ILCS 405/2--18(4)(c) (West 2000)).  As previously noted,

section 2--18(4)(c) governs the admission of a minor's out-of-court

statements regarding allegations of abuse or neglect.  Further,

like section 2--8601 of the Code and section 606(e) of the Marriage Act, section 2--18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act requires the

corroboration of the child's hearsay statements.  After a careful

examination, we find petitioner's reliance on these cases

unpersuasive. 

	Petitioner first relies on In re K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d 489 (1986).  In K.L.M., the court found that the minor child's hearsay statements of sexual abuse by her father were corroborated by (1)

testimony of a caseworker for the Department of Children and Family

Services and a psychotherapist that the girl was anxious when she

related the allegations of abuse; (2) the testimony of the child's

father, who indicated that the four-year-old had limited

opportunity to have learned about the sexual matters that she

purported to have described; (3) testimony that the minor's mother

had no opportunity to arrange for the child to provide false

testimony; and (4) testimony that the girl had a skin irritation in

the genital area.  K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d at 493-94.  Importantly, however, the court pointed out that the child was able

to describe semen.  K.L.M., 146 Ill. App. 3d at 494.  The court believed that the child would have been unable to describe semen

unless she had seen it and that it would have been unlikely that

she had seen semen unless the events she related had actually taken

place.

	Petitioner also cites In re C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d 207 (1991).  C.C. involved the alleged sexual abuse of two minors, R.C. and C.C., by their father.  In C.C., the court found that the minors' out-of-court statements of sexual abuse were corroborated by

testimony that C.C. had used anatomically correct puppets to recreate a "secret game" he played with R.C. and his father. 

Moreover, the five-year-old C.C. was able to describe semen, and

there was testimony that the behavior of C.C. and R.C. began to

change while living with their father.  For instance, C.C. began

crying over insignificant things, he wet his pants every day, he

became less affectionate, he did not want to be touched, he stopped

doing schoolwork, and he was hard to motivate.  The seven-year-old

R.C. frequently wet his pants, had bowel movements in his pants,

had frequent tantrums, often cried and whined, and would not let

anyone hug him.  Further, a medical team interviewed, observed, and

psychologically tested both boys.  The team then compiled a

"composite picture" of the children and concluded that they had

been sexually abused.  Based on this evidence, the court concluded

that it was more probable than not that the children were sexually

abused by their father.  C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d at 215.

	We find petitioner's reliance on K.L.M. and C.C. misplaced.  In both of those cases there was a myriad of factors beyond the

children's physical manifestations that, when taken together, could

support a finding of corroboration.  Here, the trial court found

only two factors corroborated Amanda's hearsay statements. 

However, we have already concluded that there was no physical

evidence to corroborate Amanda's hearsay statements of sexual

abuse.  Thus, we are left only with Amanda's physical

manifestations.  As noted above, there is no authority supporting

a finding of corroboration based on the child's physical conduct

alone, and we decline to impose such a finding here.

	Respondent raises several additional issues.  For instance, he

argues that there was insufficient corroboration concerning the

identity of the alleged abuser.  However, since we have found that

there is insufficient evidence to corroborate Amanda's out-of-court

statements regarding the acts of abuse, we need not address whether

there was sufficient evidence to corroborate the identity of the

alleged abuser.  Respondent also claims that several of the trial

court's evidentiary rulings resulted in reversible error.  However,

our resolution of this case renders these issues moot.

III.  CONCLUSION

	For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the judgment of the

circuit court of McHenry County.

	Reversed.

	McLAREN and GEIGER, JJ., concur.