[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 19-14497

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cv-01428-RBD-GJK

STACI-JO BARNES, ENA BARNES, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 versus

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 

COMMISSION, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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(August 17, 2020)

Before WILSON, BRASHER and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Staci-Jo Barnes,1 proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order 

dismissing her amended complaint with prejudice for failure to either (1) pay the 

required filing fee or (2) comply with the district court’s order to file a renewed 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Federal Communications 

Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Security Agency 

have moved for summary affirmance and to stay the briefing schedule. Upon 

consideration, the agencies’ motion for summary affirmance is due to be 

GRANTED. Accordingly, the accompanying motion to stay the briefing schedule is 

DENIED as moot.

BACKGROUND

Barnes filed this lawsuit against the Federal Communications Commission, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Security Agency alleging 

various claims for invasion of privacy and misappropriation of private information. 

Barnes alleges that the three agencies have tampered with her mail, wiretapped her

phone, hacked her computer, and monitored the interior of her home through 

cameras placed in cable boxes for almost ten years. She further alleges that the 

agencies misappropriated and illegally disseminated the information learned through 

these activities to film producers for the creation of film characters and plots. Finally, 

1 This appeal was administratively dismissed as to co-plaintiff Ena Barnes for want of 

prosecution on January 6, 2020. 

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she claims that the agencies have obstructed justice by preventing her from 

corresponding with the court and retaining legal counsel and by defaming her as part 

of a wider campaign of harassment and intimidation. 

Along with her complaint, Barnes filed a form application to proceed IFP, in 

which she alleged that her gross wages totaled $400 per month. Barnes also included 

a handwritten statement, explaining that she had been “blacklisted” by the agencies 

and, as a result, had been unable to find regular employment. She stated that she had 

$30 in her checking and savings accounts, spent $250 per month on utilities and 

transportation, and had debt totaling $35,000.

A magistrate judge recommended denying Barnes’s IFP motion and 

dismissing her complaint with prejudice. The magistrate judge concluded that 

Barnes’s complaint was frivolous and did not contain a short and plain statement 

establishing a right to relief as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. On 

that basis, and because it was Barnes’s third complaint asserting these claims against 

the agencies, the magistrate judge recommended that her IFP motion be denied and 

her complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Barnes objected, arguing that she had 

adequately pled her complaint and that dismissal with prejudice would violate her 

due process rights. 

On September 10, 2019, the district court entered an order adopting the 

magistrate judges’ report and recommendation in part but declining to dismiss the 

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case with prejudice. The district court instead ordered Barnes to file an amended 

complaint and a renewed IFP motion by September 24, 2019. The district court 

explained that Barnes’s claims were not plausible on their face and that additional 

factual allegations were needed “to push the [c]omplaint beyond mere conclusions 

and into plausibility.” The court warned Barnes that “[f]ailure to timely file will 

result in the closure of this action without further notice.”

On September 23, 2019, Barnes filed an amended complaint nearly identical 

to the original complaint. On September 27, 2019, the district court entered an order 

acknowledging Barnes’s amended complaint and noting that, as of that date, Barnes 

had failed to file a renewed IFP motion. The district court then extended the deadline 

for Barnes to either file the renewed IFP motion or pay the filing fee to October 3, 

2019. The court again warned Barnes that it would close the case if she did not timely 

file her renewed IFP motion.

On October 8, 2019, the district court entered an order dismissing the amended 

complaint with prejudice and closing the case. The court noted that, although Barnes 

had filed an amended complaint as ordered, she failed to either timely file a renewed 

IFP motion or pay the filing fee. That same day, Barnes filed the renewed IFP 

motion, which was signed and dated October 3, 2019. Barnes included a statement 

advising the court that she had not received the court’s September 27th order until

October 4th, and that the agencies had been tampering with her mail. 

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On October 11, 2019, the district court entered another order acknowledging 

that Barnes had filed her renewed IFP motion prior to entry of its dismissal order but 

noting that the motion was still untimely. On that basis, the district court denied 

Barnes’s renewed IFP motion. Barnes filed a notice of appeal that designated the 

order entered on October 11, 2019 as the order appealed from. However, she 

attached to her notice a copy of the court’s October 8, 2019 order dismissing her 

amended complaint with prejudice and presented arguments challenging that order.

Barnes filed her opening brief on February 18th, 2019, to which the agencies 

responded by moving for summary affirmance. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of one of the parties 

is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to 

the outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the appeal is 

frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).2

We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with a district court’s 

order for abuse of discretion. Foudy v. Indian River Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 845 F.3d 

1117, 1122 (11th Cir. 2017). That discretion is especially broad here because

2 We are bound by cases decided by the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981. 

Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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Congress has given district courts a “broad grant of discretion” when managing in 

forma pauperis cases. Moreland v. Wharton, 899 F.2d 1168, 1169 (11th Cir. 1990). 

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than counseled pleadings 

and, therefore, are liberally construed. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 

1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Nevertheless, pro se litigants are still required to conform to 

procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).

DISCUSSION

When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on 

which the district court based its judgment, she is deemed to have abandoned any 

challenge of that ground. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 

(11th Cir. 2014). Insofar as she appeals the district court’s denial of her renewed IFP 

motion, she has abandoned any argument challenging that denial by failing to raise 

them in her brief. 

Barnes responds to the district court’s order dismissing her amended 

complaint by making several arguments, none of which have merit. First, she argues 

that by dismissing her case with prejudice the district court has deprived her of due 

process. Second, she argues that her failure to timely file a renewed IFP motion was 

due to the agencies’ “obstruction of justice tactics” that resulted in her untimely 

receipt of the district court’s order setting the deadline for October 3rd, 2019. She 

claims these tactics include tampering with her mail and hacking her computer. She 

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argues that the district court abused its discretion by not considering these

extenuating circumstances and granting her additional time. We address each 

argument in turn.

First, the district court’s dismissal with prejudice did not violate Barnes’s due 

process rights. Barnes was given an opportunity to object to the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation that the case be dismissed with prejudice. See Vanderberg v. 

Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, rather than adopting 

the report and recommendation entirely, the district court allowed Barnes an 

opportunity to amend her complaint and file a renewed IFP motion. The district court 

even gave Barnes an extension of time to file her renewed IFP motion after it 

received only her amended complaint.

Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the 

amended complaint with prejudice. A district court may sua sponte dismiss a case 

for failure to obey court rules and orders “based on two possible sources of authority: 

Rule 41(b), or the court’s inherent power to manage its docket.” Betty K Agencies, 

LTD v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Jefferson 

Fourteenth Assocs. v. Wometco de Puerto Rico, Inc., 695 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 

1983) (Under Rule 41(b) a court may dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to comply 

with court orders). “While dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon 

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disregard of an order, especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally 

is not an abuse of discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). 

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Barnes’s 

amended complaint for failure to timely comply with its order to file a renewed IFP 

motion. First, the district court warned Barnes multiple times – both in its September 

10th order partially adopting the report and recommendation and its September 27th 

order extending the deadline to file a renewed IFP motion – that her failure to comply 

could result in dismissal of her complaint. Second, Barnes’s contention that 

extenuating circumstances prevented her from complying with the court’s order is 

belied by the record. Specifically, although Barnes alleged that she did not receive 

the district court’s September 27th order until October 4th, the day after the extended 

deadline had run out, her renewed IFP motion was signed and dated October 3rd 

(though not filed until October 8th). Moreover, that order was the second time the 

district court had ordered Barnes to file a renewed IFP motion. Barnes has not 

alleged that she did not receive the district court’s first order instructing her to do so, 

filed on September 10th, in a timely manner. That order also required Barnes to 

amend her complaint, which she did. 

Finally, dismissal with prejudice is proper in this case. Typically, dismissal 

with prejudice is “plainly improper unless and until the district court finds a clear 

record of delay or willful conduct and that lesser sanctions are inadequate to correct 

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such conduct.” Betty K Agencies, LTD, 432 F.3d at 1339; see also Gratton v. Great 

Am. Commc'ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). The district court may make 

those findings implicitly. Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 484 (11th Cir. 2006).

Here, Barnes’s unexcused delay in filing a renewed IFP motion despite twice being 

ordered to do so establishes “a clear pattern of delay.” Furthermore, the magistrate 

judge noted in his recommendation that this was Barnes’s third civil action against 

these agencies based on the same set of “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” 

allegations. The two prior complaints were also dismissed – one for frivolousness. 

These facts support a finding that lesser sanctions, including dismissal without 

prejudice, would not have sufficed. 

CONCLUSION

Because there is no substantial question that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion by dismissing Barnes’s complaint with prejudice, the agencies’ motion 

for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Accordingly, the motion to stay the briefing schedule is DENIED as moot. 

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