alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18

- 10777

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
P laintiff

- Appell ee

v.
HOMERO MARTINEZ , Defendant

- Appell ant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:17

- CV

- 904

Before SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, and HO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
Homero Martinez, federal prisoner # 45120

- 177, was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The district court found that his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
was an unauthorized successive motion and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Later, the district court denied his motion for a certificate of appealability (COA) as moot because it had already denied a COA.

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED April 25, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 18-10777 Document: 00514931318 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/25/2019No. 18

- 10777

2 Martinez now seeks a COA. To obtain a COA, an applicant must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This requires him to show that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s decision to deny relief debatable or wrong, Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), or “that jurists could c onclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). T his court would lack jurisdiction over an appeal from the district court’s dismissal of Martinez’s § 2255 motion beca use he failed to file a timely notice of appeal from this judgment . Accordingly, Martinez fails to make the showing required for a COA to appeal from this judgment

. T o the extent that Martinez also seeks to appeal from the denial of a COA, t he denial o f a COA is not , by itself, a final and appealable order within the meaning of § 2253(c)(1)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . According ly , the appeal
is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

. APPEAL DISMISSED. Case: 18-10777 Document: 00514931318 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/25/2019
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2818 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2818

 To provide temporary housing during school breaks to students who are 
                      homeless or in foster care.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            August 12, 2011

                Ms. Fudge introduced the following bill

                           September 6, 2011

          Referred to the Committee on Education and Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide temporary housing during school breaks to students who are 
                      homeless or in foster care.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``No Child Left Outside Act of 2011''.

SEC. 2. TEMPORARY HOUSING DURING SCHOOL BREAKS FOR HOMELESS AND FOSTER 
              CHILDREN ATTENDING INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.

    (a) Expanding Required Services.--Subsection (b) of section 402D of 
the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (5);
            (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6) and 
        inserting ``; and''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(7) securing temporary housing during breaks in the 
        academic year for--
                    ``(A) students who are homeless children and youths 
                (as such term is defined in section 725 of the 
                McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 
                11434a)) or were formerly homeless children and youths; 
                and
                    ``(B) students who are in foster care or are aging 
                out of the foster care system.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 402D of such Act is further 
amended in subsection (c)--
            (1) by inserting ``and'' after the semicolon at the end of 
        paragraph (4);
            (2) by striking paragraph (5); and
            (3) by redesignating paragraph (6) as paragraph (5).
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this Act shall apply to 
grants awarded after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**Certification
      of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer**


**Pursuant
      to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted**


**Pursuant
      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**







I,
      Donald S. Robbins, certify to the best of my knowledge based upon a review
      of
      the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of CSMG Technologies, Inc. for the quarter
      ended June 30, 2007 (the “Form 10-Q”), that the Form 10-Q fully complies
      with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
      as amended, and that information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents,
      in
      all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
      CSMG
      Technologies, Inc. for the periods covered by the Form 10-Q.







Dated: August
      21, 2007      By: /s/
      Donald S. Robbins


Donald
      S.
      Robbins, Chief Executive Officer







I,
      K. Bruce Jones, certify to the best of my knowledge based upon a review of
      the
      Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of CSMG Technologies, Inc. for the quarter
      ended
      June 30, 2007 (the “Form 10-Q”), that the Form 10-Q fully complies with the
      requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
      amended, and that information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in
      all
      material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of CSMG
      Technologies, Inc. for the periods covered by the Form 10-Q.







Dated: August
      21, 2007      By: /s/
      K. Bruce Jones


K.
      Bruce
      Jones, Chief Financial Officer



















The
      above certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. §1350) and is not being filed as part of
      the Form 10-QSB or as a separate disclosure document.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       7,966,929
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             4,677,596
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 10,701,911
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                      24,864,640
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                        24,938,701
<LOANS>                                     99,426,691
<ALLOWANCE>                                  1,185,672
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             151,484,005
<DEPOSITS>                                 118,310,847
<SHORT-TERM>                                 7,405,451
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                          1,463,053
<LONG-TERM>                                  2,275,456
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        22,859
<OTHER-SE>                                  22,006,339
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>             151,484,005
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              8,777,209
<INTEREST-INVEST>                            2,343,898
<INTEREST-OTHER>                               201,741
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                            11,322,848
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                           4,578,120
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           5,394,104
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                        5,928,744
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                  145,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              4,213,605
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              2,575,936
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                   1,728,275
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,728,275
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .73
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .73
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    4.33
<LOANS-NON>                                    442,897
<LOANS-PAST>                                   252,163
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                444,594
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                               928,817
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                  109,486
<RECOVERIES>                                   221,341
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                            1,185,672
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                         1,185,672
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

JUDGMENT

William W. Frey, Appellant

No. 06-13-00086-CV v.

Donnie Foster, Sheriff of Fannin County, 

Fannin County, Dr. Jagdish Shah, 

Community Education Centers, Inc., 

Appellees

Appeal from the 336th District Court of 

Fannin County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. CV-12-

40619). Memorandum Opinion delivered 

by Justice Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss

and Justice Carter participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appeal should be dismissed. 

Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

We note that the appellant, William W. Frey, has adequately indicated his inability to pay 

costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED MARCH 14, 2014

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
<PAGE>   1


WORLDPORT COMMUNICATIONS,  INC.                                     EXHIBIT 12.1

         Statement Re: Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                                 (In thousands)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>


                                                      1996          1997          1998 
                                                    ------       -------       -------
 <S>                                                <C>          <C>           <C>
         FIXED CHARGES:

Interest expense (including                            (24)         (193)      (24,570)
amortization of debt issuance costs)
Capitalized interest                                    --            --            -- 
Interest element of rent expense                        --           (30)         (420)
                                                       (24)         (223)      (24,990)
                                                    ======       =======       =======

              EARNINGS:
Consolidated net loss                                 (260)       (3,492)      (76,772)
  Add back:
Minority interest                                       --            --          (903)
Provision (benefit) for income taxes                    --            --            -- 
Fixed charges excluding cap interest                   (24)         (223)      (24,990)
                                                      (236)       (3,269)      (52,685)
                                                    ======       =======       =======

       COVERAGE  (DEFICIENCY)                         (260)       (3,492)      (77,675)  
                                                    ======       =======       =======

</TABLE>
QUARTERING SOLDIERS

THIRD AMENDMENT

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,

without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a

manner to be prescribed by law.

IN GENERAL

There has been no Supreme Court explication of this Amendment, which was obviously one guarantee indicating a preference

for the civilian over the military.1

1 In fact, save for the curious case of Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir.

1982), on remand, 572 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d per curiam, 724 F.2d 28 (2d

Cir. 1983), there has been no judicial explication of the Amendment at all.

1373
## In t he

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 23

- 00044

- CV

MARK BRADFORD , MIKE CURTIS,

STEPHEN DUNCOMBE, AND LARRY NIKEL , Appellant s

V.

SHEREE ESTES

- STANLEY, COY CLAYTON, KATIE CLAYTON,

DEBORA STEVENS, OSCAR GONGORA

, JR., KARL ENGSTROM,

FELIX DELEON, DANETTE DELEON, SAMANTHA MCDONALD, JOSHUA

MCDONALD, AND KEVIN KINSER , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 278th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2130065

Before Stevens , C.J., van Cleef and Rambin , JJ.

Me morandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens2 

### ME MORANDUM OPINION

The appellant s filed a motion with this Court seeking to voluntarily dismiss t h is appeal. 1

Pursuant to Rule 42.1(a)(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the motion is granted.

Se e T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.1(a)(1). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal

.

Scott E. Stevens

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: May 1, 2023

Date Decided: May 2, 20 23

1 Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by t he Texas Supreme

Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN

. § 73.001.
EXHIBIT 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of AVAX Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30,
2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David L. Tousley, Chief Operating Officer and President (as such, the principal executive officer) of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|/s/DAVID L. TOUSLEYDavid L. Tousley
Chief Operating Officer
August 8, 2002
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------

18

---

QuickLinks
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA

#### Eldridge v. Michael Sloper et al.

December 27, 2007

Case No. CL07001428

By Judge John E. Kloch

This case presents an unusual set of facts, and some background is needed to clarify the relationship between the parties. All named litigants, the plaintiff and eleven defendants, have some interest in the estate of Lois Moffett. More specifically, they have an interest in the validity of Ms. Moffett’s testamentary documents. Defendant Michael Sloper is the executor of the Moffett estate, according to the document probated as the decedent’s will in March of 2006. That document, challenged as being a product of Michael Sloper’s undue influence, is the subject of this impeachment action filed by the plaintiff pursuant to Virginia Code § 8.01-88.

When the plaintiff filed the action, she served all of the named defendants. Thereafter, defendant Michael Sloper propounded discovery on the plaintiff and on defendants Walter, Dane, James, Gower, and Skillman (“the movants”), who then filed the pending motion by special appearance for a protective order. Although their motion is principally couched as an objection to the discovery propounded on them (the movants argue they are not *parties*to this action under the discovery rules), the clear intent of the movants is to assert a challenge to this Court’s jurisdiction over them by special appearance. For the following reasons, that challenge is ultimately unsuccessful.

The purpose of Virginia’s “long arm statute,” Virginia Code § 8.01-328.1, is to assert jurisdiction to the extent permissible under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States, over nonresidents who engage *514in some minimum but purposeful activity (minimum contacts) in Virginia. *Carmichael*v. Snyder, 209 Va. 451, 456, 164 S.E.2d 703 (1968). Although the movants are nominal defendants to this action - specific bequeaths to them will be wiped out by a successful will contest - they support the efforts of the plaintiff to invalidate the will. That is because, through Virginia counsel, they have reached an agreement with the plaintiff whereby they will evenly split the costs of this litigation and any resulting recovery from the Virginia estate. Given those facts, and assuming but not deciding that the movants in fact made a special rather than a general appearance. I find that this Court can nonetheless exercise jurisdiction over them because their purposeful actions directed toward the Commonwealth and carried out through their agent in Virginia are sufficient to confer jurisdiction over them.

The motion for a protective order is denied, and the defendants, as parties to this action, are hereby ordered to fully and completely respond to discovery within ten days of this order.
EXHIBIT
      32.2




CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      SECTION 1350,


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In
      connection with the Annual Report of Protein Polymer Technologies, Inc. (the
      "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the period ended December 31, 2006 as filed with
      the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
      undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant
      to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of
                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and





(2)
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
                Company.











/s/
      William N. Plamondon, III


William
      N. Plamondon, III


Principal
      Financial Officer


May 4, 2007
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2804 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2804

           To suspend temporarily the duty on stannic oxide.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             August 5, 2011

  Mr. Himes introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
           To suspend temporarily the duty on stannic oxide.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. STANNIC OXIDE.

    (a) In General.--Subchapter II of chapter 99 of the Harmonized 
Tariff Schedule of the United States is amended by inserting in 
numerical sequence the following new heading:

``     9902.12.81      Stannic oxide (CAS  Free         No change        No change        12/31/2014.....   ''.
                        No. 18282-10-5)
                        (provided for in
                        subheading
                        2825.90.20)......

    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies 
to goods entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or 
after the 15th day after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

                                                                 EXHIBIT 32.1

                           GTECH HOLDINGS CORPORATION
                        18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
                         PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Annual Report of GTECH Holdings Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending February 26, 2005 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Date hereof (the "Report"), I, W.
Bruce Turner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
      of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

                                    /s/  W. Bruce Turner
Date:  April 27, 2005               --------------------------------------
                                     W. Bruce Turner
                                     President and Chief Executive Officer
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS FOR D. C.

TWENTY-THIRD AMENDMENT

SECTIONS 1 AND 2. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as

the Congress may direct:

A number of electors of President and Vice President equal

to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State,

but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall

be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall

be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and

Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall

meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the

twelfth article of amendment.

The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

ENFRANCHISEMENT OF RESIDENTS OF THE

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

“The purpose of this . . . constitutional amendment is to provide the citizens of the District of Columbia with appropriate rights

of voting in national elections for President and Vice President of

the United States. It would permit District citizens to elect Presidential electors who would be in addition to the electors from the

States and who would participate in electing the President and Vice

President.”

“The District of Columbia, with more than 800,000 people, has

a greater number of persons than the population of each of 13 of

our States. District citizens have all the obligations of citizenship,

including the payment of Federal taxes, of local taxes, and service

in our Armed Forces. They have fought and died in every U.S. war

since the District was founded. Yet, they cannot now vote in national elections because the Constitution has restricted that privilege to citizens who reside in States. The resultant constitutional

2297
anomaly of imposing all the obligations of citizenship without the

most fundamental of its privileges will be removed by the proposed

constitutional amendment. . . .”

“[This] . . . amendment would change the Constitution only to

the minimum extent necessary to give the District appropriate participation in national elections. It would not make the District of

Columbia a State. It would not give the District of Columbia any

other attributes of a State or change the constitutional powers of

the Congress to legislate with respect to the District of Columbia

and to prescribe its form of government. . . . It would, however, perpetuate recognition of the unique status of the District as the seat

of Federal Government under the exclusive legislative control of Congress.” 1

1 H.R. REP. NO. 1698, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1960).

2298 AMDT. 23—PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS FOR D.C.