NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

TARRIE RUCKER, SR.,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2021-2237

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 20-5256, Judge Scott Laurer.

______________________

Decided: October 17, 2022

______________________

JOHN D. NILES, Carpenter Chartered, Topeka, KS, for 

claimant-appellant.

 GALINA I. FOMENKOVA, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

BRIAN M. BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, LOREN MISHA 

PREHEIM; JULIE HONAN, Y. KEN LEE, Office of General 

Counsel, United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 

Washington, DC.

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2 RUCKER v. MCDONOUGH

______________________

Before PROST, REYNA, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PROST, Circuit Judge.

Tarrie Rucker, Sr., appeals a decision of the U.S. Court 

of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming a Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) decision denying him an earlier effective date for his service-connected 

depressive disorder. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I

Mr. Rucker served on active duty in the U.S. Army 

from January 1980 to March 1990. In August 2008, 

Mr. Rucker filed a claim with the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (“VA”) seeking service-connected compensation for, 

among other things, depression. In November 2009, a VA 

regional office (“RO”) denied his depression claim but deferred adjudicating a claim concerning a kidney condition. 

Then, in September 2010, the RO denied the previously deferred kidney-condition claim (along with a claim concerning lupus, which Mr. Rucker had filed after the November 

2009 RO decision). 

In October 2010, Mr. Rucker submitted to the VA (1) a 

Notice of Disagreement (“NOD”), stating that he “disagree[d] with the [VA’s] decision dated September 17, 2010,” 

and identifying the issue(s) in disagreement as “LupusKindey [sic] condition,” J.A. 74, and (2) a letter that similarly expressed “disagreement on the decision” concerning 

the “claimed lupus kidney condition,” J.A. 71. Mr. Rucker’s 

October 2010 submission resulted in an April 2012 VA decision awarding service connection for his kidney condition. 

On May 8, 2013, Mr. Rucker filed another claim with 

the VA seeking service-connected compensation for a mental condition. In July 2017, the VA awarded service 

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RUCKER v. MCDONOUGH 3

connection for a depressive disorder. And, in a subsequent 

decision, the VA assigned an effective date of May 8, 2013, 

for the service-connected depressive disorder. 

II

Mr. Rucker appealed to the Board, seeking an effective 

date for his service-connected depressive disorder earlier 

than May 8, 2013. The Board denied an earlier effective 

date. It first cited the general rule that an effective date 

for a service-connection award can be no earlier than the 

date on which the VA received the corresponding claim. 

J.A. 14–15 (first citing 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a); and then citing 

38 C.F.R. § 3.400). The Board then found that, although 

Mr. Rucker filed a claim concerning depression as early as 

August 2008, the VA denied that claim in November 

2009—and that decision became final after Mr. Rucker 

failed to appeal it within a year. J.A. 17. Because “[o]nce 

an [RO] decision becomes final, the earliest effective date 

of service connection generally is the date of the application 

to reopen rather than the date of the initial claim,” the 

Board examined whether anything after the November 

2009 final decision but before his current effective date of 

May 8, 2013, could be construed as a claim for service connection. J.A. 17–18. The Board found nothing in that regard; rather, in the Board’s view, the May 8, 2013 claim 

supplying his current effective date was the next communication that could “conceivably” be construed as a claim 

for his service-connected depressive disorder. See J.A. 18. 

The Board accordingly kept the effective date at May 8, 

2013.

Mr. Rucker then appealed to the Veterans Court, arguing that the Board erred by failing to discuss whether his 

October 2010 submission was a timely NOD with the November 2009 RO decision on the depression claim so as to 

preclude that decision’s finality and potentially support an 

earlier effective date. But the Veterans Court held that, 

even “if the Board erred by not providing a more robust 

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4 RUCKER v. MCDONOUGH

discussion or not addressing the October 2010 submission,” 

J.A. 3, any such error didn’t prejudice Mr. Rucker because, 

“as a matter of law,” the October 2010 submission “did not 

satisfy regulatory requirements for what constitutes [a]

NOD,” J.A. 5. 

The Veterans Court observed that the relevant regulation required that a NOD identify “the specific determinations with which [the claimant] disagrees.” J.A. 3 (quoting 

38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (2010)). Yet, as the court noted, the October 2010 submission did not specifically identify—or even 

suggest dissatisfaction or disagreement with—the November 2009 RO decision. Instead, it “clearly identified the 

September 2010 [RO] decision”—the one that denied 

Mr. Rucker’s lupus and kidney-condition claims. J.A. 4 

(emphasis added). The court also cited the various instances where the October 2010 submission specifically 

identified the lupus and kidney-condition claims as the relevant issue(s) of disagreement. J.A. 4–5. And it further

observed that the submission included medical information 

“that exclusively addressed lupus and kidney problems.” 

J.A. 5. Given the wording and context of the October 2010 

submission, the Veterans Court concluded that the submission “could not support an earlier effective date” for 

Mr. Rucker’s depressive disorder. J.A. 5. Therefore, any 

Board error in not discussing it wasn’t prejudicial. J.A. 5.

Mr. Rucker timely appealed the Veterans Court’s decision to this court.

DISCUSSION

This court has limited jurisdiction to review Veterans 

Court decisions. We “may not review (A) a challenge to a 

factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2). This court does, however, have jurisdiction to 

“decide all relevant questions of law, including interpreting 

constitutional and statutory provisions.” Id. § 7292(d)(1).

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RUCKER v. MCDONOUGH 5

The Veterans Court must “take due account of the rule 

of prejudicial error” in reviewing Board decisions. 

38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2). Mr. Rucker’s appeal to this court 

challenges only the legal standard the Veterans Court used 

to determine there was no prejudicial error here. We have 

jurisdiction to address his challenge to that legal standard. 

E.g., Slaughter v. McDonough, 29 F.4th 1351, 1355 

(Fed. Cir. 2022). But because he has not demonstrated 

that the Veterans Court used an incorrect legal standard, 

we affirm.

Mr. Rucker argues that the Veterans Court applied an 

“erroneously restrictive standard” in determining there 

was no prejudicial error here. Appellant’s Br. 5. He maintains that, instead of the Veterans Court asking simply 

whether the alleged Board error could have been prejudicial, the Veterans Court improperly took it upon itself to 

determine that correcting the alleged error would not have 

changed the Board’s decision in Mr. Rucker’s favor. See, 

e.g., Appellant’s Br. 24–25 (“But for the Board’s error, at a 

bare minimum it could have reached a result . . . other 

than denial. The Veterans Court exceeded its jurisdiction 

when reviewing not merely whether the Board could have 

reached that different result but, instead, whether in the 

Veterans Court’s own view of the law and facts the Board 

would have done so.” (emphasis in original)).

Mr. Rucker is correct that showing prejudice does not 

require a claimant to establish that, but for the error, the 

result absolutely would have been different. See Slaughter, 29 F.4th at 1355 (“[P]rejudice can be shown by demonstrating that the error affected or could have affected the 

outcome of the determination.” (emphasis added) (cleaned 

up) (quoting Simmons v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 267, 279 

(2018), aff’d, 964 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2020))); cf. Shinseki 

v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 410–12 (2009) (observing that the 

burden of showing prejudice is not a “particularly onerous 

requirement” and identifying a potential factor for 

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6 RUCKER v. MCDONOUGH

consideration as “an estimation of the likelihood that the 

result would have been different” (emphasis added)). 

That said, the Veterans Court may affirm in the face of 

an error if “the entire record makes evident that the Board 

could not have reached any other decision.” Tadlock v. 

McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (emphasis 

added); id. at 1336 (collecting cases and confirming the Veterans Court’s ability to affirm on a ground not considered 

by the VA or Board “if it is clear that the factual basis for 

such conclusion is not open to debate and the Board on remand could not have reached any other determination on 

that issue”). 

The Veterans Court did just that here. The October 

2010 submission was in the record, and it says what it says. 

The Veterans Court looked to its wording and context, compared it to the relevant regulation’s requirements, cited instances of the submission’s deficient specificity as to any 

disagreement with the November 2009 RO decision on 

Mr. Rucker’s depression claim, and ultimately concluded—

“as a matter of law”—that it “did not satisfy regulatory requirements for what constitutes [a] NOD.” J.A. 4–5. In 

other words, the Veterans Court considered the October 

2010 submission’s status as a depression-claim NOD “not 

open to debate.” See Tadlock, 5 F.4th at 1336. Indeed, its 

conclusion makes that understanding clear: “[T]he submission could not support an earlier effective date for 

[Mr. Rucker’s] depressive disorder.” J.A. 5 (emphasis 

added).

Accordingly, we see no error in the legal standard the 

Veterans Court used for assessing prejudicial error.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Mr. Rucker’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Because Mr. Rucker’s

appeal to this court challenged only the legal standard the 

Veterans Court used to determine there was no prejudicial 

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RUCKER v. MCDONOUGH 7

error here, and because we see no error in that legal standard, we affirm.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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