alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2961 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2961

 To amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to have Early 
    Innovator grant funds returned by States apply towards deficit 
                               reduction.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 15, 2011

Mr. Pompeo (for himself, Mr. Lankford, Ms. Jenkins, Mr. Huelskamp, Mr. 
 Yoder, Mr. Lucas, Mr. Boren, Mr. Cole, Mr. Sullivan, and Mr. Griffith 
 of Virginia) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to have Early 
    Innovator grant funds returned by States apply towards deficit 
                               reduction.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. APPLICATION OF RETURNED PPACA EARLY INNOVATOR GRANT FUNDS 
              TOWARDS DEFICIT REDUCTION.

    Section 1311(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(42 U.S.C. 18031(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph:
            ``(6) Application of returned funds towards deficit 
        reduction.--If an award is made to a State under this 
        subsection and the State subsequently notifies the Secretary in 
        writing that it will not use any remaining funds under the 
        award, any such remaining funds shall be deobligated and 
        rescinded and shall be returned to the general fund of the 
        Treasury for the purpose of deficit reduction.''.
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 23.1****CONSENTOF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**     Weconsent to the incorporation by reference in Registration StatementNos. 333-110207, 333-146108 and33-81976 on Form S-3, and Registration Statement Nos. 333-143554 and 333-141919 on Form S-8 of ourreports dated February 28, 2008, relating to the consolidated financial statements of TEPPCOPartners, L.P. and subsidiaries, and the effectiveness of TEPPCO Partners, L.P. and subsidiaries’internal control over financial reporting, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K of TEPPCOPartners, L.P. and subsidiaries for the year ended December 31, 2007./s/ Deloitte & Touche LLPHouston, Texas
**Exhibit 99.2**

** **

Certification ofChief Financial Officer ofGold Banc Corporation, Inc.

 

I, Rick J.Tremblay, Chief Financial Officer of Gold Banc Corporation, Inc., herebycertify, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(a)                                  The AmendmentNo. 1 to the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A for the quarterly periodended June 30, 2002, which accompanies this certification, fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

 

(b)                                 The informationcontained in the Amendment No. 1 to the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/Afor the quarterly period ended June 30, 2002, which accompanies thiscertification, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of Gold Banc Corporation, Inc.

 

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 hasbeen provided to Gold Banc Corporation, Inc. and will be retained by Gold BancCorporation, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission orits staff upon request.

 

 
| Dated:  July 25, 2003 |
|----------------------------|
|                       |
|                       | /s/ Rick J. Tremblay |   |
|                       | Rick J. Tremblay |
|                       | Chief Financial Officer |

 

1

----
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK

#### Richard Rigg v. Gene Old

September 10, 1981

Case No. (Law) L-81-1683 (Civil Appeal)

By JUDGE EDWARD L. RYAN, JR.

Proceedings and chronology in District Court:

*July 15, 1981*- Plaintiff’s action dismissed for failure to appear and prosecute on return date.

*July 30, 1981*- Plaintiff filed and gave notice of motion to "re-open"; return date August 20, 1981.

*August 20, 1981 -*District Court ordered case "reopened" and set new trial date for September 11, 1981.

*August 21, 1981*- Defendant gave notice of appeal of reopening order to Circuit Court.

On appeal, defendant says that the District Court erred as it had no authority to order a reopening after the expiration of thirty days from the date of dismissal and cites:

> Section 16.1-97. *When a new trial granted. After thirty days*from any judgment in a district court *no new trial shall be granted*therein (except for fraud on the court; a void judgment; proof of an accord and satisfaction - Section 8.01-428). No new trial shall be granted *within the thirty days*(unless proper notice given). (Italics added.)

It appears that the provisions of the above statute are clearly mandatory.

> *10If by the use of *negative words*the statute requires a particular proceeding to be *taken in a particular time*or manner, makes it void if not so done, or gives it effect provided it is not so done, *or declares that unless it is so taken subsequent proceedings shall not be had,*or prohibits its being done except at the time the statute prescribes *or if any terms plainly imperative are employed,*the intent is clear and no discretion can be permitted in construction. 17 M.J., *Statutes,*§ 75. (Italics added.)

> A statute will be regarded as *mandatory*where it contains *words of positive prohibition,*or where it is *couched in negative terms*importing that the act required *shall not be done otherwise than as designated.*73 Am. Jur. 2d, *Statutes,*§ 22. (Italics added.)

Section 16.1-106 of the Code authorizes an appeal from *"any*order entered" or "judgment rendered" by the District Court as a matter of right, hence this court concludes that this appeal is not premature.

This court concludes that the District Court had no authority to reopen the case and that the ordering of a new trial date on September 11, 1981, is a nullity.
#### Alfred GOTTESMAN, Plaintiff, Murray Knobel, Intervenor-Plaintiff, v. TEXAS PETROLEUM CO., Defendant.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Jan. 6, 1961.

Sidney Orseck, New York City, for plaintiff.

Rothstein & Korzenik, New York City, for intervenor-plaintiff.

Webster, Sheffield & Chrystie, New York City, for defendant.

MaeMAHON, District Judge.

This is a motion by the plaintiff, under Rule 39(b) F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A., for an order directing trial by jury of the issues in the action notwithstanding the failure of plaintiff to make a timely demand for a jury trial as required by Rule 38(b).

 There is no question that this action for damages for breach of contract is one in which a demand for a jury trial might have been made as of right. The sole ground asserted by plaintiff’s counsel as a basis for the exercise of the Court’s discretion to relieve plaintiff from the statutory waiver imposed by Rule 38(d), F.R.C.P. is that “Through inadvertence, and purely, by oversight, my secretary was under the impression that a demand for a trial of this action by jury would be timely if such jury demand was made with the service and filing of the note of issue herein, pursuant to the Rules of Civil Practice governing the New York State Supreme Court instead of Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Practice.”

Reliance by a member of the bar on a layman’s “impression” of federal procedures is patently • inexcusable. Such neglect is not “inadvertence and mistake” calling for the extraordinary relief sought here. Timely demand for a jury trial is essential to the fair and efficient administration of justice, and a failure to comply with the rules should not be lightly excused especially where, as in this case, issue has been joined for more than two years. This Court has consistently granted such relief only where exceptional circumstances compel it. Polak v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, etc., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1956, 19 F.R.D. 87; Whelan v. Covert, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1956, 22 Federal Rules Service, 39b, Case 3, at page 568; Mason v. British Overseas Airways Corp., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1957, 20 F.R.D. 213; Steiger v. Mullaney, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1948, 8 F.R.D. 486.

*624Nor does the fact that the action was commenced in the state court and removed by the defendant alter this salutary principle. Second-79th St. Co. v. U. S. Steel Corp., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1958, 22 F.R.D. 98.

Accordingly, the motion is in all respects denied. So ordered.
Summary of Executive Compensation



 Exhibit 10.15 

Summary of Compensation of Named Executive Officers 

 

					
	 Name
	  	Base Salary	 
	 Thomas E. Gottwald

President and Chief Executive Officer
	  	$	775,000	  
		
	 C. S. Warren Huang

President of Afton Chemical Corporation
	  	$	630,000	  
		
	 Stephen M. Edmonds

Vice President and General Counsel
	  	$	310,300	  
		
	 Bruce R. Hazelgrove, III

Vice President, Corporate Resources
	  	$	309,800	  
		
	 David A. Fiorenza

Vice President, Treasurer and Principal Financial Officer
	  	$	307,800
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-21-00426-CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 233rd District Court

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 233-708854-21

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

BRENT SHOCKLEY, Appellant

V.

KRISHA MARIE VALK, Appellee
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

On December 22, 2021, and January 10, 2022, we notified appellant, in 

accordance with rule of appellate procedure 42.3(c), that we would dismiss this appeal 

unless appellant paid the $205 filing fee. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c), 44.3. Appellant

has not done so. See Tex. R. App. P. 5, 12.1(b).

Because appellant has not complied with a procedural requirement and the 

Texas Supreme Court’s order of August 28, 2015,1 we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 42.3(c), 43.2(f).

Appellant must pay all costs of this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.4.

Per Curiam

Delivered: February 3, 2022

1See Supreme Court of Tex., Fees Charged in the Supreme Court, in Civil Cases 

in the Courts of Appeals, and Before the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation, 

Misc. Docket No. 15-9158 (Aug. 28, 2015) (listing courts of appeals’ fees).
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 23

                          INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT

To the Partners of
TEPPCO Partners, L.P.:

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement on
Form S-3 (No. 333-100494), the registration statement on Form S-3 (No.
33-81976), and the registration statement on Form S-8 (No. 333-82892) of TEPPCO
Partners, L.P. of our report dated January 22, 2003, except as to Note 22 which
is as of February 10, 2003, related to the consolidated financial statements of
TEPPCO Partners, L.P., included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal
year ended December 31, 2002 filed on March 21, 2003.

Our report on the consolidated financial statements refers to a change in the
method of accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedging activities
in 2001 and the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142,
Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets in 2002.

                                                KPMG LLC

Houston, Texas
March 21, 2003
#### Frances SCHWARTZ v. AMERICAN STORES COMPANY.

No. 22598.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

May 5, 1958.

Norman Shigon, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

James Paul Domberger, J. Paul Erwin, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

EGAN, District Judge.

The defendant moves to amend its answer so as to plead the statute of limitations. ’ It relies on Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A., which states *inter alia*that “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.”

Justice so requires where the granting of the motion results in no prejudice to the opposing party. Budd Co. v. United States. D.C.E.D.Pa.1956, 19 F.R.D. 346; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing & Supply Co., D.C. E.D.Wis.1956, 19 F.R.D. 334; Bella v. Marine Transport Lines, D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1956, 18 F.R.D. 410; Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., D.C.N.D.Ill.1953, 15 F.R.D. 354, 356; Kraushaar v. Leschin, D.C.E.D.Pa.1944, 4 F.R.D. 144.

It is apparent that in this case, the only prejudice that may result is that the plaintiff’s claim will be barred. If this were a valid ground for objection, Rule 15(a) would be nugatory. Obviously, this was not contemplated by the Rules.

The Court does not take the position that the defendant should be penalized because of an apparent oversight on behalf of its counsel. The sporting element of pleading is no longer with us. See, Kraushaar v. Leschin, D.C.E.D.Pa.1944, 4 F.R.D. 144; Downey v. Palmer, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1939, 27 F.Supp. 993, reversed on other grounds.

Accordingly, the motion to amend is granted.
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2723 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2723

  To amend title IV of the Budget Control Act of 2011 to protect the 
   Social Security and SSI programs from budget cuts under such Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             August 1, 2011

Ms. Wilson of Florida introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                       to the Committee on Rules

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend title IV of the Budget Control Act of 2011 to protect the 
   Social Security and SSI programs from budget cuts under such Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Social Security Protection Act of 
2011''.

SEC. 2. NO SOCIAL SECURITY OR SSI CUTS.

    (a) In General.--Title IV of the Budget Control Act of 2011 is 
amended by adding at the end the following new section:

``SEC. 405. NO SOCIAL SECURITY OR SSI CUTS.

    ``(a) In General.--The joint committee shall not include in its 
proposed legislative language submitted pursuant to section 
401(b)(3)(B)(iv) any provision that--
            ``(1) reduces eligibility, payments, or benefits, or 
        otherwise reduces outlays, under title II of the Social 
        Security Act (42 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) (including eligibility, 
        payments, benefits, or outlays with respect to annuities under 
        subsection (a), (c), or (d) of section 2 of the Railroad 
        Retirement Act of 1974 (45 U.S.C. 231a(a), (c), (d)) or lump 
        sum payments under section 6(b) of such Act (45 U.S.C. 
        231e(b))); or
            ``(2) reduces eligibility, payments, or benefits, or 
        otherwise reduces outlays, under title XVI of the Social 
        Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq.).
    ``(b) No Application of Expedited Procedures.--If the joint 
committee bill includes a provision that violates subsection (a), the 
expedited procedures in section 402 shall not apply to such bill.''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in section 1(b) of 
such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 404 
the following new item:

``405. No Social Security or SSI cuts.''.
                                 <all>
```
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1

                          WESTERN GAS RESOURCES, INC.
                       COMPUTATION OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                               DECEMBER 31, 1997


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                  Weighted
                                                                   Average
                                                                  Shares Of                      Earnings
                                                                    Common                       Per Share
                                                                    Stock           Net          Of Common
                                                                 Outstanding       Income         Stock
                                                                -------------    -----------    ----------
<S>                                                             <C>              <C>            <C>
Net income.................................................                      $ 1,487,000

Weighted average shares of common stock outstanding........     $  32,134,011

Less preferred stock dividends:
   $2.28 cumulative preferred stock........................                       (3,194,000)
   $2.625 cumulative convertible preferred stock...........                       (7,245,000)
                                                                -------------    -----------
                                                                   32,134,011    $(8,952,000)
                                                                =============    ===========

Basic earnings per share of common stock...................                                     $    (.28)
                                                                                                =========

(Assume no conversion of anti-dilutive convertible
preferred stock)

Assume exercise of common stock equivalents:
   Weighted average shares of common stock outstanding.....        32,134,011

   (Anti-dilutive common stock equivalents are not used
   in this calculation)

$5.40 employee stock options...............................             3,792 
                                                                -------------    -----------
                                                                   32,137,803    $(8,952,000)
                                                                =============    ===========

Fully diluted earnings per share of common stock...........                                     $    (.28)
                                                                                                =========
</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

The undersigned, as
Chief Financial Officer of Transcend Services, Inc., certifies that to the undersigneds knowledge, the Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2007, which accompanies this certification fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the annual report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Transcend Services,
Inc. at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code.



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|                                     
|/s/    LANCE
CORNELL                 
|Lance Cornell Chief Financial Officer

Date: March 14, 2008
ex10-55.htm


Exhibit 10.55


 










Summary of Compensation for Executive Officers







The executive officers of Frontier Oil Corporation (“Frontier”) are “at will” employees, and none of them has an employment agreement.  The unwritten arrangements under which Frontier’s executive officers are compensated include:








	
  ·

	
a salary, reviewed annually by the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors of Frontier;













	
  ·

	
eligibility for an annual cash bonus, as determined by the Compensation Committee;













	
  ·

	
eligibility for awards under Frontier’s Omnibus Incentive Compensation Plan, as determined by the Compensation Committee;













	
  ·

	
health, life, disability, death and other insurance and/or benefits;













	
  ·

	
defined contribution pension and savings plan; and













	
  ·

	
vacation, paid sick leave and all other employee benefits.












In addition, each of the executive officers of Frontier have entered into an Executive Change in Control Severance Agreement and an Executive Severance Agreement.







The table below sets forth the base salaries, effective as of January 1, 2011, for the executive officers of Frontier who held office as of January 1, 2011, as well as, their incentive target for 2011 (as a percentage of base salary).








	
 


 


Executive Officer

	
 


2011


Annual Base Salary

	
Incentive Target for 2011


 (Percentage for Base Salary)


	
Michael C. Jennings


Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer

	
 


$800,000

	
 


100%


	
Douglas S. Aron


Executive Vice President-Chief Financial Officer

	
 


$395,000

	
 


60%


	
Jon D. Galvin


Vice President

	
 


$320,000

	
 


50%


	
Nancy J. Zupan


Vice President-Chief Accounting Officer

	
 


$335,000

	
 


50%


	
J. Currie Bechtol


Vice President-General Counsel & Secretary

	
 


$350,000

	
 


50%
- ----=--··**~.---;_~~----:.~----~--**



### Order issued September 

# Ji , 2012

In 

### The 

# Oiourt of Appeals lf.ift}f 

# 1llistrict of IDexas at 1llallas No. 05-12-00250-CV JOVITA OPARA, Appellant 

## V. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION A/KIA FANNIE MAE, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court atLaw No. 3 Dallas County, Texas Trial CourtCause No. CC-11-08783-C 

## ORDER By order dated July 30,2012, the Court ordered Janet Wright, Official Court Reporter ofCounty Court at Law No. 3 of Dallas County, Texas, to file either: (l) the reporter's record; (2) written verification-that no hearings were recorded; or(3)written verification thatappellanthas notrequested ormadepaymentarrangements for the record. We cautioned appellant that ifwe received verification ofno request, we would order the appeal submitted without the reporter's record. 

### See TEx. R. APP. P. 37.3(c). On August 10, 2012, the Court received a letter from Ms. Wright informing the Court that she did not receive a request to prepare the reporter's record. Accordingly, we ORDER the appeal submitted without the reporter's record. Appellant's brief is due THIRTY DAYS from the date ofthis order.