United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 19-2272

___________________________ 

United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Daniel J. Richardson, Jr.

 Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of South Dakota - Rapid City

____________ 

Submitted: April 15, 2020

Filed: September 3, 2020

[Unpublished] 

____________ 

Before KELLY, WOLLMAN, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Daniel Richardson, Jr., who pleaded guilty to possessing unregistered firearm 

silencers, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845(a)(7), 5861(d), 5871, received a 60-month prison 

sentence. He argues that the district court1

 did not do a good enough job explaining 

1

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the 

District of South Dakota.
- 2 - 

why it gave him a sentence above the recommended range of 18 to 24 months. He 

also claims that the sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

Richardson donated money to Red Cloud Indian School. He later learned, 

however, that it was run by the Jesuits. This development apparently upset him so 

much that he made a threatening YouTube video, which showed him holding a large, 

machete-like knife to the throat of a stuffed frog, and then sent it to one of the 

school’s administrators. He declared that he was “coming up to clean house” and 

that he “[had] a sword” for anyone who “want[ed] to be a Jesuit.” 

Justifiably alarmed, school administrators notified law enforcement, which

discovered more YouTube videos. In one, Richardson said that he had “plenty of 

weapons in [his] truck” and that he “does things this way, public and messy, 

[because] it’s the only way [he] can.”

His threats were more than just idle talk. He traveled approximately 1,000 

miles from his home in Tennessee to South Dakota to visit the school. He packed 

his truck with a machete, a handgun, and a 5-foot-long Samurai sword. When he 

arrived at the school, an administrator went out to the parking lot to confront him, 

but soon saw his collection of weapons. Fortunately, an officer arrived on the scene 

and took him into custody. But a later search of his trailer, which he had parked at 

a South Dakota campsite, revealed that he also had two other handguns with 

unregistered silencers. 

The government charged Richardson with several crimes, but he eventually 

pleaded guilty to possessing unregistered firearm silencers, see 26 U.S.C. 

§§ 5845(a)(7), 5861(d), 5871, in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining 

charges. The district court imposed a 60-month prison sentence, well above the 18

to 24 months recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, through two alternative 

paths. One was an upward variance resting on the court’s overall assessment of the 
- 3 - 

statutory sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The other was an upward 

departure “based on conduct . . . underlying” the dismissed charges. U.S.S.G. 

§ 5K2.21. 

Richardson’s primary argument is that the district court did not adequately 

explain either path, particularly in light of the possibility that the videos contained 

protected speech.2

 During sentencing, the court mentioned the videos, but 

emphasized one in which he said that he was coming to South Dakota to “light up 

this candle.” For us to have enough for “meaningful appellate review,” Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007), Richardson suggests that the district court 

needed to do more than just say that statements like this one were true “threats.”

 But the district court did say more—much more. In particular, it connected 

Richardson’s statements to his conduct. It noted, for example, that the school 

administrator who first encountered him that day would have “see[n] [the]

firearm . . . as a threat” after viewing “the YouTube video clips.” The district court 

discussed a number of other facts too, including the large number of weapons he had

and a post-arrest call he made to his wife telling “her not to respond and not to 

cooperate with law enforcement.” In short, this explanation was more than sufficient 

to show that the court fully considered the statutory sentencing factors before 

varying upward, especially because the court was not required to “respond to every 

argument.” United States v. Black, 670 F.3d 877, 881–82 (8th Cir. 2012); see also 

2

To the extent Richardson claims that the district court erred by considering 

the videos at all, he has two hurdles to overcome. He must both convince us that 

the videos were protected speech and that the court could not consider them if they 

were. Cf. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution does 

not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one’s beliefs and 

associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are 

protected by the First Amendment.”). His briefs at least mention the first point, but 

they completely miss the second. In short, he has not done enough to meaningfully 

bring this issue before us on appeal. See Waters v. Madson, 921 F.3d 725, 744 (8th 

Cir. 2019); Cox v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 685 F.3d 663, 674 (8th Cir. 

2012).
- 4 - 

United States v. Timberlake, 679 F.3d 1008, 1011–12 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that 

any error in failing to adequately explain an upward departure was harmless because 

the court gave a sufficient explanation for an upward variance). 

The sentence is also substantively reasonable. See United States v. Feemster, 

572 F.3d 455, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (applying an abuse-of-discretion 

standard). The district court considered the statutory sentencing factors, as 

explained above, and determined that an upward variance was necessary to protect 

the public and to deter future criminal conduct. Although Richardson believes that 

the court should have given less attention to some factors (like his threatening and 

erratic behavior) and more to others (like his advanced age and lack of a criminal 

history), there is nothing to suggest that it exceeded its “wide latitude” in this area. 

United States v. Abrica-Sanchez, 808 F.3d 330, 335 (8th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks 

omitted). 

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________