Cite as 2022 Ark. App. 315

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION IV

No. CR-21-566

CHRISTOPHER M. PARKER

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

Opinion Delivered September 7, 2022

APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT 

SMITH DISTRICT

[NO. 66FCR-06-652]

HONORABLE R. GUNNER DELAY, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, Judge

Christopher Parker appeals from a sentencing order entered by the Sebastian County 

Circuit Court on November 9, 2021, that revoked his suspended imposition of sentence 

(SIS), sentenced him to one year in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), and 

imposed an additional seven years’ SIS. On appeal, Parker argues that the circuit court erred 

in revoking his SIS because the warrant pursuant to which he was arrested was stale. We 

affirm.

I. Background

In January 2007, Parker pled guilty in case No. CR-06-652 to one count of possession 

of cocaine, a Class C felony; one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class C felony; 

and one count of possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to six 
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years’ SIS on the felonies and one year SIS for the misdemeanor. In November 2012, Parker 

pled no contest to a petition to revoke his SIS in case No. CR-06-652 and also entered a nocontest plea in two additional new cases: No. CR-07-1275, a D Felony second-degree battery; 

and No. CR-10-811, a D Felony count of possession of marijuana. Parker was sentenced to 

two years in the ADC on each count, with a total additional eight years’ SIS.1

On March 22, 2018, the State filed a petition to revoke Parker’s SIS, and a bench 

warrant for Parker’s arrest was issued. The State alleged that Parker had violated the terms 

and conditions of his SIS by committing the offense of second-offense driving while 

intoxicated. For reasons that are not clear from the record, Parker was not served with the 

revocation warrant until September 4, 2021, a span of nearly three-and-a-half years after it 

was issued.

The circuit court held a hearing on the State’s revocation petition in November 2021. 

At the hearing, Parker argued that the revocation petition should be dismissed because the 

arrest warrant was stale. Parker noted that the warrant had been issued in March 2018. 

Subsequent to its issuance, Parker appeared in district court in December 2018 but was not 

served at that time. Parker then appealed his district court conviction to the circuit court. 

When he appeared in person in circuit court for the district court appeal, he once again was 

not served with the revocation warrant. Moreover, during the time the warrant was pending 

 

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Parker was also sentenced to one year in the county jail for the misdemeanor, with 

that time being satisfied by his ADC sentence. He was ordered to surrender to the ADC on 

December 17, 2012, and he was released on April 19, 2013.
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but unserved, Parker argued, he “religiously” paid off the balances of his court fees and costs, 

completing his payments in February 2021. Parker conceded that there was not a “bright 

line” regarding the reasonableness of serving an arrest warrant, but he argued that the circuit 

court had some discretion in determining whether the delay in serving a warrant was 

unreasonable. Given the facts of his case––Parker had contact with law enforcement and 

with the court several times without being served with a previously issued warrant––he urged 

that it was unreasonable to validate the warrant “since so much time has passed and [he had] 

actually satisfied all of the other terms [of his SIS].” As to the sufficiency of the evidence in 

support of the petition to revoke, Parker acknowledged that he had been convicted of secondoffense driving while intoxicated in violation of the terms of his SIS. 

After considering the arguments of counsel, the court stated that it was “not 

persuaded on the stale-warrant argument.” Accordingly, the court revoked Parker’s SIS and 

sentenced him to one year in the ADC with the remaining seven years of his sentence 

suspended. Parker timely appealed the sentencing order and now argues that the circuit court 

erred in revoking his SIS because of the unreasonable delay in the execution of the arrest 

warrant.

II. Standard of Review

In order to revoke probation or a suspended imposition of sentence, the circuit court 

must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably violated a 

condition of the probation or suspension. Sparks v. State, 2021 Ark. App. 407. To sustain a 

revocation, the State need only show that the defendant committed one violation. Id. We 
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will not reverse the circuit court’s findings unless they are clearly against the preponderance 

of the evidence. Id. Issues concerning pre-arrest delays, however, are reviewed under an abuseof-discretion standard. See Hillard v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 583.

III. Discussion

On appeal, Parker does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

revocation of his SIS; indeed, as he acknowledged at the revocation hearing, he was convicted 

of a criminal offense in violation of the terms and conditions of his SIS. Instead, Parker 

argues that the State’s delay in executing the arrest warrant was unreasonable and that his 

revocation should therefore be reversed and dismissed. 

Within this appeal, certain things are undisputed. The State undisputedly issued a 

warrant for Parker’s arrest. The State undisputedly delayed arresting Parker for more than 

three years. During this period of delay, Parker undisputedly presented himself to a court on 

at least two different occasions while the warrant was pending but unserved. Parker argues 

that these undisputed facts warrant a reversal and dismissal of his revocation. Under our 

analysis of case law, we disagree.

Both our supreme court and this court have expressed the principle that prosecutorial 

delay may cause prejudicial error that requires dismissal of the charges against the accused. 

See, e.g., Bliss v. State, 282 Ark. 315, 668 S.W.2d 936 (1984); Scott v. State, 263 Ark. 669, 566 

S.W.2d 737 (1978); Forgy v. State, 16 Ark. App. 76, 697 S.W.2d 126 (1985). For example, in 

Scott, supra, the supreme court noted that the State may not delay the filing of charges in 

order to gain a tactical advantage over the accused. If the State delays the filing of charges in 
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order to gain a tactical advantage and the defendant is able to show prejudice to his defense 

because of prosecutorial delay, the charges should be dismissed, unless the State can come 

forward with a satisfactory reason for the delay. Scott, 263 Ark. at 674, 566 S.W.2d at 740 

(citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977)).

This does not mean, however, that every delay by the State in bringing charges will 

result in a dismissal. Rather, in order to gain advantage from the State’s delay, the accused 

must first demonstrate that he or she has thereby been prejudiced. In Young v. State, 14 Ark. 

App. 122, 685 S.W.2d 823 (1985), we held that it is “clear . . . that mere preindictment delay 

is not a sufficient ground for aborting a criminal prosecution with the period of limitation. 

The accused has the burden of first showing prejudice resulting from the loss of witnesses or 

physical evidence or the dimming of the witnesses’ memory and how that loss is prejudicial 

to him. The burden is then on the government to give a satisfactory reason for the delay.” 

Young, 14 Ark. App. at 127, 685 S.W.2d at 826 (emphasis added). Likewise, in Forgy, supra, 

this court stated that “due process considerations do not arise until prejudice resulting from 

the delay is proven and it further appears that the State intentionally delayed the proceedings 

to gain some tactical advantage over the accused.” 16 Ark. App. at 82, 697 S.W.2d at 130.

Here, Parker does not explain how the delay in the State’s execution of the arrest 

warrant on the revocation petition prejudiced his defense. Clearly, Parker was prohibited 

from violating “any federal, state, or municipal law” under the terms and conditions of his 

SIS. The State moved to revoke Parker’s SIS because he had violated its terms and conditions 

by committing the offense of second-offense driving while intoxicated. Parker concedes that 
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he had, in fact, been convicted of that offense. Because Parker conceded that he had violated 

the terms and conditions of his SIS, he had no defense to the revocation. As such, the State’s 

delay in executing the arrest warrant did not prejudice his defense, and because Parker 

cannot demonstrate prejudice, reversal is not warranted.2

Affirmed.

HARRISON, C.J., and MURPHY, J., agree.

Dusti Standridge, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

 

2The reasons for the delay in executing the arrest warrant are entirely unclear from 

the record. However, because Parker has neither asserted nor demonstrated prejudice either 

before the circuit court or this court, the burden did not shift to the State to give a reason 

for the delay. See Young, supra.