UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4410

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

PIERCE YARNELL BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Chief

District Judge. (7:15-cr-00074-GEC-1)

Submitted: January 26, 2017 Decided: January 31, 2017

Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Randy V. Cargill, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for 

Appellant. John P. Fishwick, Jr., United States Attorney, 

Ashley B. Neese, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Pierce Yarnell Brown appeals his conviction for possession 

of a firearm by a convicted felon. He challenges the denial of 

his motion to suppress the firearm, arguing that the officer 

lacked probable cause to search his moped. We disagree, and 

thus, we affirm Brown’s conviction.

In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

suppress, we defer to the district court’s factual findings, 

setting them aside only if clearly erroneous, and review its 

legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 

331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009). When the district court has denied a 

motion to suppress, “the evidence must be construed in the light 

most favorable to the Government.” United States v. Uzenski, 

434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006). 

Warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established 

and well-delineated exceptions.” California v. Acevedo, 500 

U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). One exception to the warrant requirement concerns 

automobiles because of their inherent mobility and the risk that 

contraband inside the vehicle could disappear while officers 

obtained a search warrant. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 

390-91 (1985). “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause 

exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment 
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. . . permits police to search the vehicle without more.” 

Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); Carney, 471 U.S. at 393-94 (noting 

that vehicle exception should apply to all “movable vessels” 

subject to Government licensing and inspection). Probable cause 

to search exists if, given the totality of the circumstances, 

there is a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 

crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 

462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Whether the warrantless search is of 

an automobile or of a closed container within an automobile, the 

limitation is the same: the scope of the search is “defined by 

the object of the search and the places in which there is 

probable cause to believe that it may be found.” United 

States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). 

The district court found probable cause based on the small 

amount of marijuana recovered from Brown’s person, as well as 

Brown’s nervous behavior and his location in a high crime area. 

Brown relies on our decision in United States v. Baker, 719 F.3d

313 (4th Cir. 2013). In Baker, Baker’s passenger was found in 

possession of heroin, crack cocaine, and a digital scale. On 

the basis of this and the passenger’s behavior (trying to walk 

away, struggling with police officers), the police searched 

Baker’s car and seized heroin, crack cocaine, methadone, 

marijuana, and a handgun. Id. at 315. We held that probable 
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cause exists to search a vehicle when “a police officer lawfully 

searches a vehicle’s recent occupant and finds contraband on his 

person.” Id. at 319. Brown contends that, while this statement 

is broad, the facts of Baker are much narrower and the case 

should be understood to hold only that such a search is proper 

when, as in Baker, items are found “indicating involvement in 

the drug trade” prior to the search. Id. Brown also contends 

that his nervousness was of “limited significance” because most 

citizens would be nervous when confronted by the police. See

United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000).

Thus, Brown asserts that a small amount of marijuana found 

on the driver is insufficient to provide probable cause to 

believe the vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity. 

This argument finds no support in our precedent that the 

detection of marijuana odor is sufficient to establish probable 

cause. United States v. Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 

2016). Further, other circuits have found contrary to Brown’s 

assertion. See United States v. Johnson, 383 F.3d 538, 545-46 

(7th Cir. 2004) (finding that “discovery of a banned substance 

(drugs) on Johnson’s person clearly provided . . . probable 

cause to search the trunk of the vehicle . . . since the officer 

had a reasonable basis for believing that more drugs or other 

illegal contraband may have been concealed inside”); United 

States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1995) 
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(finding probable cause to search trunk based on smell of 

marijuana combined with corroborating evidence of contraband 

(powder residue and marijuana cigarette found on occupant)). 

Finally, probable cause in this case did not rest solely on the 

discovery of marijuana on Brown’s person; the officer also noted 

that Brown was unusually nervous and that Brown was stopped in 

an area known for drug trafficking. Given the totality of the 

circumstances, we find that the officer had probable cause to 

search Brown’s moped.*

For these reasons, we affirm Brown’s conviction. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 * The district court also upheld the search finding that the 

firearm would have been inevitably discovered during an 

inventory search of the moped. Brown challenges the towing of 

his moped as violative of police procedure. Because we find 

that probable cause existed to search Brown’s moped, we decline 

to address this issue.