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1 A sampling of the diverse literature in which the same historical, linguistic, 

and case law background is the basis for strikingly different conclusions is: Staff of 

Subcom. on the Constitution, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Congress, 2d 

Sess., The Right to Keep and Bear Arms (Comm. Print 1982); DON B. KATES, HANDGUN PROHIBITION AND THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT (1984);

GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND

AMENDMENT (Robert J. Cottrol ed., 1993); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN

BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984); Symposium, Gun

Control, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1986); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing 

Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND

BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995); William Van Alystyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Bear 

Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994). 2Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). See also Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 

535 (1894); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-282 (1897). The non-application 

of the Second Amendment to the States was more recently reaffirmed in Quilici v. 

Village of Morton Grove, 695 F. 2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 

(1983). 3 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 

BEARING ARMS 

SECOND AMENDMENT 

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 

a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms 

shall not be infringed. 

IN GENERAL 

In spite of extensive recent discussion and much legislative action with respect to regulation of the purchase, possession, and 

transportation of firearms, as well as proposals to substantially 

curtail ownership of firearms, there is no definitive resolution by 

the courts of just what right the Second Amendment protects. The 

opposing theories, perhaps oversimplified, are an ‘‘individual 

rights’’ thesis whereby individuals are protected in ownership, possession, and transportation, and a ‘‘states’ rights’’ thesis whereby 

it is said the purpose of the clause is to protect the States in their 

authority to maintain formal, organized militia units. 1 Whatever

the Amendment may mean, it is a bar only to federal action, not 

extending to state 2 or private 3 restraints. The Supreme Court has 

given effect to the dependent clause of the Amendment in the only 

case in which it has tested a congressional enactment against the 

constitutional prohibition, seeming to affirm individual protection 

1274 AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS 

4 307 U.S. 174 (1939). The defendants had been released on the basis of the trial 

court determination that prosecution would violate the Second Amendment and no 

briefs or other appearances were filed on their behalf; the Court acted on the basis 

of the Government’s representations. 5 Id. at 178. 

6 Id. at 179. 

7 Id. at 178. In Cases v. United States, 131 F. 2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. 

denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943), the court, upholding a similar provision of the Federal 

Firearms Act, said: ‘‘Apparently, then, under the Second Amendment, the federal 

government can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single individual as well 

as by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the possession or use of any 

weapon which has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of 

a well-regulated militia.’’ See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (dictum: Miller holds that the ‘‘Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and 

bear a firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation 

or efficiency of a well regulated militia’’’). See also Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98 

(9th Cir.) (plaintiff lacked standing to challenge denial of permit to carry concealed 

weapon, because Second Amendment is a right held by states, not by private citizens), cert. denied 519 U.S. 912 (1996); United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 770, 775 

n. 7 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting federal prohibition on possession of firearm by a 

felon as having a justification defense ‘‘ensures that [the provision] does not collide 

with the Second Amendment’’). United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir.), 

cert. denied 522 U.S. 1007 (1997) (member of Georgia unorganized militia unable 

to establish that his possession of machine guns and pipe bombs bore any connection to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia). 

but only in the context of the maintenance of a militia or other 

such public force. 

In United States v. Miller, 4 the Court sustained a statute requiring registration under the National Firearms Act of sawed-off 

shotguns. After reciting the original provisions of the Constitution 

dealing with the militia, the Court observed that ‘‘[w]ith obvious 

purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second 

Amendment were made. It must be interpreted with that end in 

view.’’ 5 The significance of the militia, the Court continued, was 

that it was composed of ‘‘civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.’’ 

It was upon this force that the States could rely for defense and 

securing of the laws, on a force that ‘‘comprised all males physically 

capable of acting in concert for the common defense,’’ who, ‘‘when 

called for service . . . were expected to appear bearing arms supplied 

by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.’’ 6 Therefore, ‘‘[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches in 

length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, we cannot say that 

the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such 

an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this 

weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its 

use could contribute to the common defense.’’ 7

AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS 1275

8 Enacted measures include the Gun Control Act of 1968. 82 Stat. 226, 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 921-928. The Supreme Court’s dealings with these laws have all arisen in the 

context of prosecutions of persons purchasing or obtaining firearms in violation of 

prohibitions against such conduct by convicted felons. Lewis v. United States, 445 

U.S. 55 (1980); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976); Scarborough v. United 

States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). 9 E.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON.REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 1031-1058 (1970), and FINAL REPORT 246-247 (1971). 10Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937-39 (1997) (quoting 3 Commentaries 

§ 1890, p. 746 (1833)). Justice Scalia, in extra-judicial writing, has sided with the 

individual rights interpretation of the Amendment. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER

OF INTERPRETATION, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 136-37 n.13 (A. Gutmann, ed., 

1997) (responding to Professor Tribe’s critique of ‘‘my interpretation of the Second 

Amendment as a guarantee that the federal government will not interfere with the 

individual’s right to bear arms for self-defense’’). 

Since this decision, Congress has placed greater limitations on 

the receipt, possession, and transportation of firearms, 8 and proposals for national registration or prohibition of firearms altogether 

have been made. 9 At what point regulation or prohibition of what 

classes of firearms would conflict with the Amendment, if at all, 

the Miller case does little more than cast a faint degree of illumination toward an answer. Pointing out that interest in the ‘‘character 

of the Second Amendment right has recently burgeoned,’’ Justice 

Thomas, concurring in the Court’s invalidation (on other grounds) 

of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, questioned whether 

the Second Amendment bars federal regulation of gun sales, and 

suggested that the Court might determine ‘‘at some future date . . . 

whether Justice Story was correct . . . that the right to bear arms 

‘has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a 

republic.’’’ 10