Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2346 | June 22, 2020 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Valerie K. Boots

Marion County Public Defender Agency 

– Appellate Division

Timothy J. O’Connor

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tina L. Mann

Samantha M. Sumcad

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ken Gunn, Jr.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 22, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2346

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Lisa F. Borges, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G04-1810-F1-34611

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Following a jury trial in Marion Superior Court, Ken Gunn, Jr. (“Gunn”) was 

convicted of one count of Level 1 felony child molesting, one count of Level 1 
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felony attempted child molesting, five counts of Level 4 felony child molesting, 

and one count of Class A misdemeanor intimidation. The jury also found Gunn 

to be an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Gunn to an aggregate term 

of ninety-two years of incarceration. Gunn appeals and presents two issues, 

which we restate as: (1) whether the State presented evidence sufficient to 

support Gunn’s conviction for Level 1 felony attempted child molestation, and 

(2) whether two of Gunn’s convictions for child molesting constitute double 

jeopardy. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support Gunn’s

conviction for Level 1 felony attempted child molesting but that two of Gunn’s 

convictions constitute double jeopardy, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and 

remand. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] At the time relevant to this appeal, Gunn and his long-term girlfriend Ni.G. 

were living together in Marion County, Indiana with their biological children, 

K.G., N.G., and K.J.G. Gunn’s child with another woman, N.W., also lived 

with the family. 

[3] In September 2018, Gunn drove his thirteen-year-old daughter, K.G., and her 

younger siblings N.G. and K.J.G. to a local convenience store, where he got 

out of the car and spoke with a woman for some time. He then returned to the 

car and parked the car in a different part of the parking lot. When K.G.’s 

younger siblings fell asleep, Gunn pulled up his daughter’s shirt, reached into 

her bra, and touched her breast. K.G. smacked her father’s hand away. After 

this incident, Gunn drove the children back home. 
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[4] Later that same month, Gunn drove the same children to a video rental store to 

rent movies. Again, the younger children fell asleep in the car. When they did, 

Gunn put his hands inside K.G.’s pants and inserted his finger into her vagina. 

K.G. told him to stop because it was uncomfortable. Gunn stopped, became 

angry, and drove away. At around the same time that month, Gunn drove K.G. 

and her friend home from a softball game one evening. After dropping the 

friend off at her home, Gunn parked the car in a parking lot and again touched 

K.G.’s breasts. K.G. told Gunn that she did not like what he was doing, which 

again caused Gunn to become angry and drive away. 

[5] Sometime later in 2018, when Gunn was alone in the car with K.G., he 

exposed his penis to K.G. and told her to lick it. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 142. K.G. 

refused, causing Gunn to become angry. Gunn attempted to force K.G.’s head 

down toward his penis as she pushed him away. In early October 2018, Gunn 

volunteered to go to the store to get K.G.’s grandmother a drink. The children 

wanted candy and accompanied Gunn to the gas station convenience store. 

Again, when the younger children fell asleep, Gunn put his hands down K.G.’s 

pants and rubbed the outside of her genital area. K.G. wanted to tell her 

grandmother about Gunn’s actions but was afraid to do so because Gunn had 

warned her not to tell and had threatened to hurt K.G.’s grandmother if K.G. 

told anyone. 

[6] On the evening of October 3, 2018, K.G. went to the bedroom she shared with 

N.G. and got into the top bunk of the bunk bed. When K.G. got out of bed to 

use the restroom, Gunn was standing outside of the bathroom door. When 
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K.G. came out of the bathroom, Gunn followed her back to the bedroom. 

Gunn stood on the bottom bunk while K.G. got into the top bunk. Gunn tried 

to grab K.G. while she attempted to pull away. Gunn put his hands inside of 

K.G.’s pants and inserted his finger into her vagina. K.G.’s mother, Ni.G., then 

came into the bedroom and saw Gunn’s hand moving toward K.G.’s pajama 

shorts. Ni.G. then pulled Gunn off the bed, struck him in the mouth, and asked 

if she was “touching on [her] daughter.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 94. 

[7] Ni.G. noticed that K.G. had been crying and asked if Gunn had touched her. 

Gunn told K.G. to “shut the f**k up,” and warned her that she “better not say 

nothing.” Id. at 97, 130. K.G. admitted to her mother that Gunn had been 

touching her. Ni.G. told one of the other children to telephone the police. Gunn 

then pushed his way out of the bedroom, exited through the patio doors, and 

jumped off the second floor balcony and ran away. 

[8] On October 9, 2018, the State charged Gunn with two counts of Level 1 felony 

attempted child molesting, two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting, five 

counts of Level 4 felony child molesting, and one count of Class A 

misdemeanor intimidation. The State later added an allegation that Gunn was 

an habitual offender. 

[9] A jury trial was held on August 5–6, 2019. At the conclusion of the trial, the 

jury found Gunn guilty of one count of Level 1 felony attempted child 

molesting, one count of Level 1 felony child molesting, five counts of Level 4 

felony child molesting, and Class A misdemeanor intimidation. The jury also 
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found that Gunn was an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Gunn on 

September 30, 2019, to an aggregate term of ninety-two years of incarceration. 

Gunn now appeals. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[10] Gunn first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for 

Level 1 felony attempted child molesting. When addressing a claim of 

insufficient evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility 

of witnesses. McAllister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 558 (Ind. 2018). We instead look 

only to the evidence most favorable to the verdict, along with all reasonable 

inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Id. If there is substantial evidence of 

probative value to support the verdict, and the evidence could have allowed a 

reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will 

not disturb the verdict. Barger v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1304, 1306 (Ind. 1992).

[11] “A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age, knowingly or 

intentionally performs or submits to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct 

(as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) commits child molesting, a Level 3 felony.” 

Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a). The offense is elevated to a Level 1 felony if “it is 

committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age[.]” Id. § 3(a)(1). 

“Other sexual conduct” is defined to include “an act involving . . . a sex organ 

of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another person[.]” Ind. Code § 35-

31.5-2-221.5(1). Furthermore, “A person attempts to commit a crime when, 

acting with the culpability required for commission of the crime, the person 

engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the 
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crime.” Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1(a). And “an attempt to commit a crime is a 

felony or misdemeanor of the same level or class as the crime attempted.” Id.

[12] Thus, to convict Gunn of Level 1 felony attempted child molesting, the State 

was required to prove that Gunn, a person over the age of twenty-one, 

knowingly or intentionally took a substantial step toward performing or 

submitting to an act involving his sex organ and the mouth of K.G., a child 

under the age of fourteen. Here, K.G. testified that Gunn exposed his penis to 

her, told her to lick it, and attempted to push her head toward his penis when 

she refused. K.G.’s uncorroborated testimony is sufficient by itself to support 

Gunn’s conviction for Level 1 felony attempted child molesting. See Young v. 

State, 973 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting the longstanding rule 

that a conviction for child molesting may rest on the uncorroborated testimony 

of the victim) (citing Barger, 587 N.E.2d at 1308), trans. denied. 

[13] Nevertheless, Gunn insists that K.G.’s testimony regarding the incident that led 

to his conviction for Level 1 felony attempted child molesting cannot be 

believed because it was incredibly dubious. Under the “incredible dubiosity” 

rule, a reviewing court may “impinge on the jury’s responsibility to judge the 

credibility of the witness only when it has confronted ‘inherently improbable 

testimony or coerced, equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible 

dubiosity.’” Id. at 1226 (quoting Rodgers v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1211, 1213 (Ind. 

1981)). Under this rule, we may reverse a conviction if a sole witness presents 

incredibly dubious or inherently improbable evidence such that no reasonable 
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person could believe it and if there is a complete lack of circumstantial 

evidence. Id. (citing White v. State, 706 N.E.2d 1078, 1079–80 (Ind. 1999)). 

[14] Gunn notes that, with regard to the incident where her father attempted to force 

her head toward his penis, K.G. testified at a pre-trial deposition that she 

“d[id]n’t think so,” when asked if she had seen her father’s genitals. Tr. Vol. 2, 

p. 158. But at trial, K.G. testified that she had seen her father’s “nuts,” “dick,” 

or “thing.” Id. at 143–44. Gunn claims that these two versions of events are 

irreconcilable, and that, given the uncorroborated nature of K.G.’s testimony, 

renders her testimony incredibly dubious. We disagree. 

[15] “The fact that a witness gives trial testimony that contradicts earlier pre-trial 

statements does not necessarily render the trial testimony incredibly dubious.” 

Young, 973 N.E.2d at 1226–27 (citing Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ind. 

2002)). Moreover, there is nothing inherently improbable about K.G.’s 

testimony such that no reasonable person could believe it. In short, there is 

nothing incredibly dubious about K.G.’s testimony, and the jury could 

reasonably conclude that, based on her testimony, Gunn committed Level 1 

felony attempted child molesting. 
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II. Double Jeopardy

[16] Gunn next claims that his convictions on Counts VII and VIII, as amended at 

trial,1constitute double jeopardy under the actual evidence test. Under the 

actual evidence test announced in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 53 (Ind. 

1999), to establish a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the Indiana 

Constitution, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the 

evidentiary facts used by the jury to establish the essential elements of one 

offense may also have been used to establish all of the essential elements of a 

second challenged offense. Application of this test requires the court to identify 

the essential elements of each of the challenged crimes and to evaluate the 

evidence from the jury’s perspective. Singh v. State, 40 N.E.3d 981, 986 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015) (citing Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Ind. 2008)), trans. denied. 

In determining whether two or more convictions constitute double jeopardy 

under the actual evidence test, we consider the essential elements of the 

offenses, the charging information, the jury instructions, the evidence, and the 

arguments of counsel. Id. The term “reasonable possibility” turns on a practical 

assessment of whether the jury may have latched on to exactly the same facts 

for both convictions. Id. 

[17] In the present case, amended Count VII alleged: 

1 At trial, the State dismissed the original Count VI, causing original counts VII, VIII, IX, and X to be 

renumbered for the jury as VI, VII, VIII, and IX, respectively. The abstract of judgment, however, still refers 

to the counts according to their original numbering. 
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On or about September 23, 2018, Ken Gunn, Jr., a person at least 

twenty-one (21) years of age, did perform other sexual conduct 

(as defined in Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-221.5) with 

[K.G.], a child under the age of fourteen years (14), to-wit, twelve 

(12) years old. 

Appellant’s App. p. 134. Amended Count VIII alleged that: 

On or about September 23, 2018, Ken Gunn, Jr., a person at least 

twenty-one (21) years of age, did perform fondling or touching 

with [K.G.], a child under the age of fourteen years (14), to-wit, 

twelve (12) years old, with the intent to arouse or satisfy the 

sexual desires of Ken Gunn, Jr., or [K.G.]. 

Id.

[18] The acts supporting both of the convictions under these counts occurred on the 

same date,2 and were based on the same incident where Gunn took the children 

to the video store. With regard to this incident, K.G. testified at trial as follows: 

A. I was talking to a friend and then that’s when, I guess, she 

might have [fell] asleep because she stopped texting back. 

So that’s when he had put his hands in my pant[s] and he 

started, like, messing with my vagina. 

Q. And when you say messing with your vagina, can you 

describe for the jurors what that means? 

2 The charging information alleged that the acts in question occurred “on or about September 23, 2018.” 

Appellant’s App. p. 134. K.G.’s testimony, however, indicated that the incident occurred on September 26, 

2018. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 135–36. Gunn raises no argument about this variance between the information and the 

proof adduced at trial. And it has long been held that time is not of the essence to a charge of child molesting. 

Gaby v. State, 949 N.E.2d 870, 876 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
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A. Uhm, he was messing with, like the inside of it. 

Q. And when you say “messing with the inside of it,” what 

parts on his body were connecting with what parts on your 

body, if that question[] makes sense? 

A. His finger. 

Q. And his finger was where?

A. On my vagina.

Q. When you say on your vagina, what do you mean?

A. The inside.

Q. The inside?

A. Yeah.

Q. And when this was happening, do you remember anything 

about — what did that — what did that — uhm, what did 

that feel like? Do you remember anything about that?

A. Weird. 

Tr. pp. 136–37. 

[19] During the State’s closing argument, the prosecuting attorney attempted to 

distinguish the evidence supporting Count VII from that supporting Count VIII, 

stating to the jury: 

Count VII is the incident that I just described. The molest at the 

Family video. She said — K.G.’s testimony was, again, while it’s 

still dark, sitting out there in the parking lot, testimony was “for a 

long time,” the defendant starts messing round with her vagina. I 

had to ask her, K.G., what does that mean? What do you mean 

messing around with your vagina? You saw her demeanor. She’s 
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talking about the incident and just as she gets close and having to 

talk about what she has to talk about, she gets quiet, a little more 

withdrawn, but she answers the question that she’s asked. “He 

put his finger in my vagina.” That is her testimony. She said she 

was on the phone texting a friend, she remembers everything that 

happened around it. Her friend must have fallen asleep because 

there was no more texting. And then, uh, she also said that her 

siblings were asleep in the backseat of the car. Count VIII. This 

is also for the Family Video. For what he was doing with her 

vagina, quite frankly, before he put his finger in it. Messing 

around with the vagina before the finger actually goes in. 

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 225 (emphasis added). 

[20] On appeal, the State similarly argues that the actual evidence supporting Count 

VII was K.G.’s testimony that Gunn inserted his finger into her vagina, 

whereas the evidence supporting Count VIII was K.G.’s testimony that Gunn 

“started . . . messing with my vagina.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 136. Based on this 

evidence, and the prosecuting attorney’s argument distinguishing these acts, the 

State argues that the jury relied on evidence of penetration separate from the 

evidence of fondling to convict Gunn of Counts VII and VIII. We agree with 

Gunn. 

[21] K.G. did not testify that Gunn started “messing around” with her vagina, then 

separately inserted his finger into her vagina. Instead, she testified that Gunn 

started “messing around” with her vagina, and when asked what she meant by 

“messing with [her] vagina,” K.G. explained that Gunn was “messing with . . . 

the inside of it,” using his finger. Tr. pp. 136–37. In other words, K.G.’s 

testimony regarding the “messing around” and the digital penetration describe 
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the very same act. We therefore conclude that there was a reasonable 

probability that the jury relied on the same actual evidence to support Gunn’s 

convictions on both Count VII and VIII.3 To remedy this double-jeopardy 

violation, we reverse Gunn’s conviction on the lesser offense of Level 4 felony 

child molesting and remand with instructions that the trial court vacate the 

judgment of conviction and the sentence entered on this count.4

Conclusion 

[22] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Gunn’s conviction for Level 

1 felony attempted child molesting. However, we agree with Gunn that his 

convictions on amended Counts VII and VIII constitute double jeopardy. We 

therefore reverse his conviction on amended Count VIII and remand with 

instructions that the trial court vacate the judgment of conviction and the 

sentence entered on this count.

[23] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur. 

3 We also note that, under the series of rules of statutory construction and common law that are often 

described as “double jeopardy,” Gunn’s convictions on both Counts VII and VIII constitute, “[c]onviction 

and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has 

been convicted and punished.” Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Richardson, 717 

N.E.2d at 56 (Sullivan, J., concurring)). That is, under either the common-law test, or the actual evidence 

test, Gunn’s convictions on both of these counts cannot stand. 

4 The trial court ordered Gunn’s six-year sentence on amended Count VIII to be served concurrently with the 

thirty-year sentenced imposed on amended Count VII. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 63–64. Thus, Gunn’s aggregate 

sentence should remain the same even after his sentence on amended Count VIII is vacated.