United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

January 25, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_______________



### m 05-30621

Summary Calendar

_______________



### I N THE 

### M ATTER OF 

### :

J ERRY 

### J ACKSON 

### S TAMPS AND 

### T HERESA 

### L YNN 

### W ITT 

### -S TAMPS



### ,

Appellants,

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana



### m 2:04-MC-1831

______________________________

Before S MITH , G ARZA and P RADO

, Circuit Judges.

P ER C URIAM : *

Jerry Stamps and Theresa Witt -Stam ps, a

married couple, challenge the district court’s

order disbarring them from the practice of law

in the Easter n District of Louisiana. Finding

no error, we affirm. I.

The order arises from the Stampses’ disbarment by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The

principal basis for the state di sbarment decisio n is that court’s finding that the Stampses

purposefully excluded, from their Lou isiana

bar applications, information regarding past

legal employment. The court also found that

the legal employment the Stampses sought to

conceal constituted the unauthorized practice

of law and that disbarment was the only appropriate sanction.

After being notified of the state disbarment

order, the federal district court dir e cted the

Stampses to show cause why an identical sanc- * Pursuant to 5 TH C IR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.2

tion should n o t be imposed on them in the

Eastern District of Louisiana. After holding an

oral hearing and considering the Stam pses’

objections to the state disbarment proceeding,

the district court ordered them disbarred.

II.

The Stampses correctly point out that discipline imposed by federal courts does not automatically flow from discipline in state courts.

Theard v. United States , 354 U.S. 278, 282

(1957). A federal court, however, should recognize, and give effect to, the “condition created by the judgment of the state court unless,

from an intrinsic consideration of the state record,” it appears that

(1) the sta t e proceeding was wanting

in due process;

(2) the proof

o f facts relied on by the

state court to establish want of fair character was so infirm as to give rise to a

clear conviction on the federal court’s part

that it could not, c o nsistent with its duty,

acc e pt the state court’s conclusion as final; or

(3) that to do so would, for som e other

grave and sufficient reason, conflict with

the court’s duty

not to disbar except upon

t he conviction that, under the principles

or right and justice, it is constrained t o do

so.

Selling v. Radford

, 243 U.S . 46, 51 (1917).

The Selling factors continue to be the standard

by which federal courts determine whether

they will impose reciprocal discipline based on

a state court proceeding and ha ve been expressly employed by this circuit. 1

III.

The Stampses’ main objection to the district

court’s order is that, they claim, the state court

proceedings o n which it was based denied

them due process. They argue that the evidentiary standards used by t he Louisiana Supreme Court were unconstitutionally lax, and

t hey urge this court to require that state disbarment proceedings employ evidentiary

standards akin to criminal prosecutions if they

are to be afforded de ference by the federal

courts. The Stampses also argue, without any

elaboration, that the state decision was based

on insufficient proof of misconduct.

A.

On t he due process claim, the Stampses

contend that the Louisiana Supreme Cour t

should have strictly employed the state’s rules

of evidence throughout the disbarment proceedings. They object to the introduction of a

variety of hearsay evidence that would probably not have been admitted in a criminal trial;

they contend that their rights under the United

States Constitut i

on to confrontation and crossexa mination were repeatedly violated by the

Louisiana Supreme Court’s procedures. They

also attack the disbarment procedures used in

their case as in consistent with that court’s

rules.

This latter contention is irrelevant. Whether the procedures were adequate under Louisiana law is not a proper question for this court.

The Stampses conce de as much in their brief

when they note that we have no au thority , at

1 In re Wilkes , 494 F.2d 472, 476-77 (5th Cir.

1974); In re Dawson

, 609 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th

Cir.1980); see In re Watson

, 2000 WL 34507666,

at *2 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).3

this stage, to review directly the propriety of

a state cour t disbarment order. S ee Selling

, 243 U.S. at 50. The question properly posed

by this appeal is whether we should decline to

give reciprocal fo rce to the state court’s di sbarment order because it allegedly is based on

procedures that fall short of the due process

guarantees of the United States Constitution.

Attorneys facing disciplinary proceedings

are not entitled to receive all the guarantees afforded the accused in a criminal case. Sealed

Appellant 1 v. Sealed Appellee 1

, 211 F.3d

252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000). Although due process does include notice and an opportuni ty to

b e heard in these cases, only rarely will more

be required. C rowe v. S mith , 151 F.3d 217,

229 (5th Cir.1998). “That attorney discipline

proceedings require proof only by clear and

convincing evidence, as opposed to ‘beyond a

reas o nable doubt,’ is indicative of the mere

quasi-criminal natu re of such proceedings,

which nature would not implicate all of the due

process requirements attendant purely criminal

proceedings.” S ealed Appellant 1

, 211 F.2d at

254.

In its opinion disbarring th e Stampses, the

Louisiana Supreme Court correctly noted the

principal justification for allowing relaxed evidentiary rules in di sbarment proceedings:

“Unlike a lay jury, this court, in its role as trier

of fact in disciplinary cases, has the abilit y to

c onsider the entire record and evaluat e and

weigh the probative value of evidence based

o n the totality of the circumstances.” In re

Stamps , 874 So. 2d 113, 123 (La. 2004).

By adopting the rule urged by the Stampses, requiring strict application of the rules of

evidence, we essen t ially would be telling the

members of the Louisiana Supreme Court that

they are not able objectively to weigh the evidence before them and should be shielded from certai n evidence because of its potential to

influence their decis i on improperly. We decline to do so; that court is eminently qualified

to consider any and all evidence before it in a

disbarment proceeding and to ascribe the appropriate weight to that evidence. There is no

reason, in t he record before us, to doubt that

the court did exactly that in the Stampses’

proceeding.

Regarding their rights to cross-examination

and confrontation of witnesses, the Sta m pses

ask this c o urt to announce a new rule of law

granting such rights to attorney s facing disciplinary action. As stated above, we have never required more than notice and an opportunity to be heard in these cases. It is undisputed that the Stampses received notic e and a

hearing at the st ate court and federal district

court levels.

There is no justification to depart from our

precedent. The Stampses were afforded all the

process that is due to attorneys facing disbarment.

B.

The Stampses contend, without serious explanation or elaboration, that their disbarment

was based on insufficient proof of misconduct.

Our standard of review on this claim is heightened by Supreme Court law. Under S elling

, such a challenge will su cceed only if the evidence relied on by the state court was “so

infirm as to give rise t o a clear conviction on

the federal court’s part that i t coul d not . . .

accept the state court’s decision

. . . .” S elling , 243 U.S. at 51.

The summary of the evidence against the

Stamps es provided in the Louisiana Supreme

Court ’s o pinion accurately reflects the contents of the state court record. Our review of

that record does not reveal ev i dence so scant4

as to give rise to a clear con v iction that the

state court decision was faulty. The evidence

accumulated against the Stampses is sufficient

under Selling to allow us to accept the state

court’s finding that the Stampses lied on their

bar exam applications to hide the fact that they

had engaged in the unauthorized prac tice of

law.

C.

The third Selling factor requires this court

not to defer to the state disbarment order if “to

do so would, for so me other grave and sufficient reason, conflict with the court’s duty not

to disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles or right and justice, it is constrained to do so.” I

d

. Other than the alleged

due process violations and insufficient evidence claim, the Stampses provide no rationale

why we should doubt the state court’s reasoning. Finding no “grave and sufficient” reasons ourselves, we are constrained by law to

defer to the decision of the Louisiana Supreme

Court.

AFFIRMED.