No. 2--00--0928

_________________________________________________________________

	IN THE

	APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS	

	SECOND DISTRICT

_________________________________________________________________

In re CYNTHIA S., Alleged     	) Appeal from the Circuit Court

to be a Person in Need of     	) of Kane County.

Authorized Involuntary  			)

Treatment                     	)					

							) No. 00--MH--271

							)

(The People of the State of   	)          

Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,	) Honorable                  

v. Cynthia S., Respondent-    	) Roger W. Eichmeier,

Appellant).                   	) Judge, Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

	Cynthia S. was a mental health patient.  Her psychiatrist

filed a petition pursuant to the Mental Health and Developmental

Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code or Code) seeking a court

order authorizing the involuntary administration of nonemergency

psychotropic medication.  405 ILCS 5/2--107.1 (West 2000). The

matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing.  The trial court found

that respondent was a person who qualified for the involuntary

administration of psychotropic medication.  The trial court entered

a preprinted, typewritten order that respondent "shall receive

psychotropic medication (including the necessary lab work and

medical examinations) to be administered by the Illinois Department

of Human Services for a period not to exceed 90 days, by those

staff whose license allows them to administer psychotropic

medication pursuant to Illinois law."  The order further reflected

the medications and doses that could be administered.  On appeal, respondent asserts that the judgment must be reversed because the

order did not specify the persons authorized to administer the

medication.  We reverse.

	At the outset, we determine that this case is moot.  In re Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167, 172 (2000).  The trial court's order granting the involuntary administration of psychotropic

medication was entered on July 28, 2000.  The terms of the order

limited the duration of the administration of medication to 90

days.  This time has since passed.  At this point, respondent could

be forced to take psychotropic medication against her will only if

a new petition were filed and a new hearing conducted.  The

original judgment no longer has any force or effect.  

	However, when a challenged action is of short duration whichand is

" 'capable of repetition, yet evading review,' " it may be reviewed

on the merits, even if otherwise moot, if (1) the duration of the

challenged action is too short to be fully litigated prior to its

cessation; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that

respondent would be subjected to the same action again.  In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998), quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 258 (1989).  Both criteria are satisfied here.  By

statute, psychotropic medication cannot be administered

involuntarily for more than 90 days without an additional hearing. 

405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(5) (West 2000).  This period of time is far

too brief to permit appellate review.  In virtually every case, the

challenged medication orders would expire before appellate review

was completed, as occurred here.  To apply the mootness doctrine

under such circumstances would deprive recipients of involuntary administration of psychotropic medication of legal recourse in

challenging the trial court's orders and render the right to appeal

as provided by the Mental Health Code a nullity. 405 ILCS 5/3--816

(West 2000).  

	The second requirement to apply the exception to the mootness

doctrine is also present.  Although respondent's current status is

not revealed by the record filed on appeal, it does indicate that

she was diagnosed with a schizo-affective disorder of a bipolar

type and exhibited numerous associated symptoms.  Additionally, she

refused to take psychotropic medications and suffered from a

deterioration in her ability to function.  Given this history, it

is reasonable to expect that another petition may be filed against

respondent in the future.  Therefore, we will address the issue on

the merits.

	Respondent contends that the trial court's order authorizing

the administration of medications must be reversed because it

failed to name specific individuals authorized to administer the

medication as required by section 2--107.1 of the Act.  This issue

was considered in In re Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1060 (1998).  There, the trial court entered an order that unidentified staff

members at Zeller Mental Health Center or Provena United Samaritans

Medical Center were to administer psychotropic medication to

respondent for a period not to exceed 90 days.  On appeal, the

court agreed that an order for the administration of involuntary

treatment should designatedesignate and specifiacally name individuals

authorized to administer such treatment.  However, the court found

that respondent failed to preserve such error for review by failing to object when the order was entered, the evidence showed that

respondent's physician was intimately familiar with his treatment,

and respondent did not assert that he was prejudiced by such

omissions.

	While we agree with Miller's determination that the order should have been more specific, we do not agree with Miller's

conclusion that no prejudice occurred.  As in Miller, the record here does not reflect that respondent objected to the form of the

order when it was entered.  Additionally, from her brief, it does

not appear that respondent has claimed actual prejudice as a result

of the form of the order. Nevertheless, under the plain error

doctrine, this court may address a waived issue if the evidence is

closely balanced or the error affects substantial rights.  134 Ill.

2d R. 615(a);  People v. McVeay, 302 Ill. App. 3d 960, 966 (1999). Fundamental liberty interests are involved in the involuntary

administration of medication for mental health purposes.  In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 498, citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368-69, 134 L. Ed. 2d 498, 515, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1384 (1996). 

Because of the important liberty interests involved, we will

consider this issue on the merits under the plain error exception

to the general waiver rule. See, e.g., In re Rovelstad 281 Ill. App. 3d 956 (1996); In re Len P., 302 Ill. App. 3d 281 (1999). 

	Section 2--107.1 of the Mental Health Code contains the

following requirement for the written court order authorizing the

involuntary administration of psychotropic medication:

		"An order issued [authorizing the involuntary

administration of psychotropic medication to an adult recipient] *** shall designate the persons

authorized to administer the authorized involuntary treatment under the standards and procedures of this subsection (a--5). 

Those persons shall have complete discretion not to administer

any treatment authorized under this Section."  405 ILCS 5/2--

107.1 (a)(6) (West 2000).  

	Here, the preprinted order read, in pertinent portion:

		"The petition is granted, and Cynthia [S.] shall receive

psychotropic medication (including the necessary lab work and

medical examinations) to be administered by the Illinois

Department of Human Services for a period not to exceed 90

days, by those staff whose license allows them to administer

psychotropic medication pursuant to Illinois law." 

	In Miller, the court explained that the practice of designating specific persons authorized to administer treatment

involuntarily on court orders reflects the "legislature's concern

about the 'substantially invasive nature of psychotropic substances

and their significant side effects.' "  Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1072, quoting In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 214 (1994).  In the court's view, the requirement serves to "ensure that only a limited

number of designated--and presumably well-trained--individuals will

be able to administer these powerful drugs, pursuant to a court

order, to an unwilling recipient."  Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1072.

	We agree with this analysis.  The term "administer" as

utilized in the Code is broad.  Due to the sweeping manner in which

this term is utilized, it is clear that the legislature intended it

to encompass the entire process by which an individual receives

medication on an involuntary basis, including the act of prescribing the medication.  Requiring the court order authorizing

involuntary administration of psychotropic medication to

specifically list named individuals authorized to administer such

medication ensures involvement by a qualified professional familiar

with respondent's individual situation and health status.  By

requiring the order to name specific health case professionals

involved in respondent's care, the statute serves to protect the

individual in that only a limited and specific number of qualified

persons will provide consent to such treatment on respondent's

behalf.  In our view, this requirement is consistent with the

purpose behind the Code.  

	In mental health cases, strict compliance with statutory

provisions is compelling, as liberty interests are involved.  The

Code's procedural safeguards are not mere technicalities, but

essential tools to safeguard liberty interests of mental health

patients.  In re Janet S., 305 Ill. App. 3d 318, 320 (1999).  Thus, procedural safeguards are construed strictly in favor of the

respondent. Janet S., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 320.  The failure to comply with procedural rules requires the reversal of court orders

authorizing involuntary treatment.  See In re Michael D., 306 Ill. App. 3d 25, 27 (1999).

	Here, the order did not specifically designate individual

persons authorized to administer psychotropic medication to

respondent.  The order is unduly vague in that it authorizes

virtually anyone with the proper license to administer the

psychotropic drugs, regardless of that person's prior involvement

with or knowledge of respondent's case.  The order does not comply with the Code and must be reversed.  Were we to conclude that there

was error and no resulting prejudice, we would essentially

emasculate the portion of the statute in contention.

	Nevertheless, the administration of the medication has been

terminated according to the terms of the trial court's order.  A

remand is not in order since the proceedings have concluded.  A new

petition and hearing must proceed if the State or respondent's

physician seeks to administer additional psychotropic medication to

respondent against her will.  Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 498.  

	The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.

	Reversed.

	GEIGER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.