NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KARLA PATRICIA GOMEZ DE 

CHACON, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General, 

Respondent.

No. 22-1629

Agency No.

A201-426-637 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 6, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: M. SMITH, LEE, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Karla P. Gomez de Chacon, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for 

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying her motion 

to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and 

we deny the petition. Because we assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts, we 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel grants the Petitioner’s unopposed motion to submit the case 

on the briefs and record without oral argument (Dkt. 27). 

FILED

DEC 8 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

do not recount them here. 

1. The BIA did not err in declining to apply equitable tolling to the motion to 

reopen deadline. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of 

discretion. Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2010). We recognize 

“equitable tolling of deadlines . . . on motions to reopen . . . during periods when a 

petitioner is prevented from filing because of deception, fraud, or error, as long as 

the petitioner acts with due diligence in discovering the deception, fraud, or error.” 

Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1230 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting 

Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003)). As here, claims for equitable 

tolling “typically arise in conjunction with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

. . . .” Id. 

First, Gomez de Chacon has not alleged that she was “prevented from filing” 

her motion to reopen due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Each alleged act of 

ineffective assistance occurred after March 18, 2020, the date her motion to reopen 

was due. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (requiring a “motion to reopen [to be] 

filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order of removal”); 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i) (specifying when an order of removal “become[s] 

final”). Thus, no alleged ineffective assistance could have affected Petitioner’s 

ability to meet the filing deadline. 

Second, the agency leaves the BIA with the power to “determine the scope” 
3 

of whether “its discretion to reopen removal proceedings includes the power to 

consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on conduct of counsel that 

occurred after a final order of removal had been entered.” Matter of Compean, 25 I. 

& N. Dec. 1, 3 (A.G. 2009). The BIA permissibly exercised its discretion in

declining to exercise jurisdiction over claims occurring in outside tribunals after the 

conclusion of removal proceedings. See id. Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Gomez de Chacon’s motion to reopen because of its 

untimeliness. 

2. The BIA also maintains sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings if it is 

persuaded “that the respondent’s situation is truly exceptional.” Lona, 958 F.3d at 

1230 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) and quoting Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 585 

(9th Cir. 2016)). The BIA declined to do so here, and we affirm. We have authority 

to review a denial of a sua sponte reopening for “legal or constitutional error.” 

Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 588. However, Petitioner did not raise a challenge to the BIA’s 

denial to reopen proceedings sua sponte in her opening brief and thus waived the 

argument. See United States v. Kirilyuk, 29 F.4th 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2022). 

PETITION DENIED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART.