alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             FEB-02-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JAN-31-1998
<CASH>                                          21,561
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   12,853
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    419,682
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               506,182
<PP&E>                                         646,209
<DEPRECIATION>                                 209,551
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 949,120
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          461,195
<BONDS>                                        272,155
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           169
<OTHER-SE>                                   (282,845)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   949,120
<SALES>                                      2,496,747
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             2,496,747
<CGS>                                        1,828,343
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,828,343
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               756,349
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              43,864
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (131,809)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       800
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (132,609)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (132,609)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (7.84)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (7.84)
        

</TABLE>
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Juan Trevizo, * From the 244th District

 Court of Ector County,

 Trial Court No. C-37,761.

Vs. No. 11-11-00145-CR * May 16, 2013

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Wright, C.J.

 (Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

 McCall, J., and Willson, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is 

no error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s 

opinion, the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
<PAGE>   1



                                                                      Exhibit 11


                            TRANSCEND SERVICES, INC.
                       COMPUTATIONS OF EARNINGS PER SHARE





<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                             1993                1994                  1995
                                             ----                ----                  ----
<S>                                       <C>                 <C>                    <C>
Net loss                                   (966,000)          (1,406,000)            (3,896,000)

Weighted Average
Shares Outstanding (2)                    8,866,000            9,733,000             17,576,000

Net loss per common share                    ($0.11)              ($0.14)                ($0.22)
</TABLE>



(2) In 1993, 1994 and 1995, the common stock equivalents related to stock
options were not included in the computation due to there being an antidilutive
effect.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1


DYNAMEX INC.
CALCULATION OF NET INCOME PER COMMON SHARE
(in thousands except per share data)
(Unaudited)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                     Three months ended
                                         October 31,
                                     ------------------
                                        1999      1998
                                     --------- ---------
                                               (Restated)
<S>                                   <C>       <C>
Net income                            $   405   $   177
                                      =======   =======

Weighted average common
   shares outstanding                  10,207    10,069

Common share equivalents related
   to options and warrants                 --        58
                                      -------   -------

Common shares and common share
   equivalents                         10,207    10,127
                                      =======   =======

Common stock price used under
   treasury stock method              $    --   $  2.99
                                      =======   =======

Net income (loss) per common share:
   Basic                              $  0.04   $  0.02
                                      =======   =======

   Diluted                            $  0.04   $  0.02
                                      =======   =======
</TABLE>


On September 16, 1999, the American Stock Exchange suspended trading in the
Company's common stock. As a result, the Company is unable to determine the
number, if any, of common share equivalents related to options and warrants for
the three months ended October 31, 1999. See Note 2 of Notes to Condensed
Consolidated Financial Statements.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

October 24, 2011 

p1017 

Order 

 

October 24, 2011 

143126 

ROBERT SCOTT, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

and SC: 143126 

 COA: 296077 

 Wayne CC: 09-002233-CK 

NATALIE SCOTT, 

Plaintiff, 

v 

SHERI ZIMMERMAN, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 14, 2011 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
**Exhibit 32.1**

** **

**CEO CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

** **

In connection with the Annual Report of EmclaireFinancial Corp. (the “Corporation”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31,2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof(the “Report”), I, William C. Marsh, Chief Executive Officer of theCorporation, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adoptedpursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 
| 1.     |   | The Report fully complies  with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                    |
|--------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   |                                                                                                                                                      |
| 2.     |   | The information contained  in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition  and result of operations of the Corporation. |

 
| /s/William C. Marsh     |   |
|-------------------------|--------|
| William C. Marsh        |
| Chief Executive Officer |
| March 27, 2009     |

 

----
|    |                                                                                      |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A of Transcend Services, Inc.; and |

|    |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report. |

|        |
|--------|
|        |  |
|   | /s/ Lance Cornell |
|   | Lance Cornell |
|   |   |
|   | Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer) |
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3033 

To amend the Anti-Smuggling Act to subject vehicles, other conveyances, 

and instruments of international traffic to seizure and forfeiture for 

smuggling, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 22, 2011 

Mr. REYES (for himself and Mr. MCCAUL) introduced the following bill; which 

was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means 

A BILL 

To amend the Anti-Smuggling Act to subject vehicles, other 

conveyances, and instruments of international traffic to 

seizure and forfeiture for smuggling, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. VEHICLES, OTHER CONVEYANCES, AND IN4 STRUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC 

5 SUBJECT TO SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE FOR 

6 SMUGGLING. 

7 Section 3 of the Anti-Smuggling Act (19 U.S.C. 

8 1703; Public Law 74–238) is amended— 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 3033 IH

1 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ‘‘, vehicle, 

2 other conveyance, or instrument of international 

3 traffic’’ after ‘‘vessel’’ each place it appears; 

4 (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ‘‘, vehicle, 

5 other conveyance, or instrument of international 

6 traffic’’ after ‘‘vessel’’ each place it appears; and 

7 (3) by amending subsection (c) to read as fol8 lows: 

9 ‘‘(c) For the purposes of this section, prima facie evi10 dence that a vessel, vehicle, other conveyance, or instru11 ment of international traffic is being, or has been, or is 

12 attempted to be employed in smuggling or to defraud the 

13 revenue of the United States shall be— 

14 ‘‘(1) in the case of a vessel, the fact that such 

15 vessel has become subject to pursuit as provided in 

16 section 581 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 

17 1581), or is a hovering vessel, or that such vessel 

18 fails, at any place within the customs waters of the 

19 United States or within a customs-enforcement area, 

20 to display light as required by law; and 

21 ‘‘(2) in the case of a vehicle, other conveyance, 

22 or instrument of international traffic, the fact that 

23 such vehicle, other conveyance, or instrument of 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 3033 IH

1 international traffic has any compartment or equip2 ment that is built or fitted out for smuggling.’’. 

Æ 


tjames on DSK6SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA

#### C. M. Productions v. Milne C. M. Productions v. Fitzgerald

June 23, 1980

Cases No. (Law) 5975, 5976

By JUDGE ALBERT H. GRENADIER

These cases were appealed from the General District Court for the City of Alexandria, which denied the right of the plaintiff to proceed by interrogatories to determine the nature, extent and location of the defendants’ assets. The plaintiff claims in each case that it has a valid judgment and thus has the right as a matter of law to propound such interrogatories. The defendant avers that the original judgments taken in the General District Court will not support these interrogatories because when the judgments were taken the plaintiff was not a viable legal entity.

The Virginia cases clearly point out that noncompliance with the Virginia Fictitious Names Statute (Sec. 59.1-69 Va. Code) does not constitute a bar to the action if there is compliance with the statute at *5some time before the entry of the final judgment. *City of Norfolk*v. *Stephenson,*185 Va. 305, 315 (1946); *Phlegar*v. *Virginia Foods, Inc.,*188 Va. 747, 751 (1949). These cases are consistent with the language of § 59.1-76 of the Virginia Code which provides that ". . . no action shall be maintained in any of the courts in this State. . . unless and until the certificate. . . has been filed.”

It does not appear that the failure of the defendant to raise non-compliance with the statute can constitute a waiver of this Code requirement. The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia in *Moore*v. *Northern Homes of Pennsylvania, Inc.,*80 F.R.D. 278 (W.D.Va. 1978), noted that the prohibition against a corporation which fails to comply with the statute from maintaining a suit in the Virginia courts is not so much a defense available to that corporation’s adversary, which may plainly be waived, but is rather an absolute bar to the offender’s use of the courts until compliance with the statute is effected.

In this case, if the plaintiff had complied with the provisions of the statute prior to the entry of the judgment, the judgment would have clearly been valid. The plaintiff’s compliance with the statute after the rendition of the judgment does not and cannot validate the judgment.

In the case of *Leckie*v. *Seal,*161 Va. 215 (1933), the Court held that a judgment taken against a nonexistent corporation was void. The Court said:

> In our opinion, it is no longer an open question in Virginia that it is essential in order to obtain a valid judgment against the real owner, when trading under an assumed name, that the pleading should aver the name of the real owner; that the proof should sustain the allegation, if controverted; and that judgment should be entered against the defendant in his or its true name ... it seems to be recognized that suit brought by or against a corporation should be in the true name of the corporation.

*6It is the Court’s opinion that the judgments entered in these two cases are fatally defective and void. For this reason the plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment are denied and the interrogatories filed herein quashed.
#### Manuel TURCHAN and Curtis Walker, Plaintiffs, v. BAILEY METER COMPANY, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 1703.

United States District Court D. Delaware.

Nov. 14, 1957.

See also 19 F.R.D. 201.

Hugh M. Morris and Andrew B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. (of Morris, Steel, Nichols & Arsht), Wilmington, Del., for plain*233tiffs. Thomas S. Donnelly, Detroit, Mich., of counsel.

C. Waggaman Berl, Jr. (of Berl, Potter & Anderson), Wilmington, Del., for defendant.

LAYTON, District Judge.

Not having been present at the examination, I am in no position to say whether the witness replied “yes” or “no”. Nor does a careful reading of the transcript disclose to me that “yes” was the only sensible answer that the witness could have made under the circumstances. Thus, I have no alternative but to treat this application as one to change an answer on a material point. While the facts are different, the rule laid down by Judge Inch in De Seversky v. Republic Aviation Corporation, D.C.N.Y., 2 F.R.D. 113, 115, is controlling. There it was said in part:

> “Rule 30, Subdivision (e), contemplates a finished examination, an examination that is concededly finished except for certain errors and mistakes on immaterial matters. Such examination should not be considered finished if a witness seeks to recant his testimony or feels that to be ‘truthful’ he must directly contradict the answers already given by him on most material points. To do otherwise is not only to create delay but make complex procedure which the very purpose of the Rule is to avoid.”

See also Colin v. Thompson, D.C., 16 F.R.D. 194, and particularly Downing v. Gasser, 8 Terry 273, 47 Del. 273, 90 A.2d 651, *652*
      *2*
      **where it was said:

> “The De Seversky case points out that Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 30(e), 28 U.S.C.A., contemplates an examination which is finished, except for errors and mistakes on immaterial matters. When a witness desires to directly contradict his previous answers on material matters, the examination is not ‘finished’. The distinction is important because the cited rule includes no express right of further examination upon the basis of the changed answers, and, certainly, no such change as the one requested here ought to be permitted without opportunity for such further examination.

> *****

> “ * * * The' original answers must, of course, remain in the record. 4 Moore’s Federal Practice See. 30, 20. Moreover, defendant must have the opportunity to examine the plaintiff further in the light of the new answers. If any unforeseen difficulty should arise during the taking of the further testimony, the parties may come back to the Court under Rule 30 for any proper relief.”

The defendant’s motion to amend or to suppress will be denied leaving it to defendant by appropriate action under the discovery rules to reopen the deposition and correct or otherwise explain the controverted answer.

*.*Rule 30(e) of the Delaware Superior Court Rules Del.C.Ann., is identical with the Federal Rule.
[950 NYS2d 475]

#### U.S. Bank National Association, Petitioner, v Anna Eichenholtz et al., Respondents.

Justice Court of Town of Yorktown, Westchester County,

August 6, 2012

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Ira S. Clair*for respondents. *Richard E O’Brien*for petitioner.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Salvatore A. Lagonia, J.

The respondents having moved this court for an order dismissing the summary proceeding before the court, and the *537petitioner having opposed said motion, and the issues raised by said motion having been duly considered by this court, the court renders the following decision.

In the action before the court, the petitioner seeks an order of eviction citing an action for foreclosure, which was commenced and a final judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered by the Supreme Court on November 2, 2009. The respondents in that action allegedly remain in possession of the property, described as 2595 Evergreen Street, Yorktown Heights, New York which is within the jurisdiction of this court.

The respondents argue that pursuant to RPAPL article 7, specifically section 713 (5), strict compliance is required in order to sustain an order of eviction. That statute requires the petitioner to “personally exhibit” the referee’s deed to the respondents. Respondents cite *Home Loan Servs., Inc. v Moskowitz*(31 Misc 3d 37 [2011]) wherein the court held that since the RPAPL literally requires the deed to be “exhibited” to the respondents, attaching a certified copy of the referee’s deed to a 10-day notice to quit, which was then served by substituted service, was insufficient to meet the statutory requirement.

The petitioner argues that RPAPL 713 (5) is satisfied when the referee’s deed is exhibited through substituted service, as occurred in this matter. It points to the difference between substituted service in *Moskowitz,*of “nail and mail,” as opposed to the type of service used in this matter upon a “person of suitable age and discretion.”

This court is therefore left with the question as to whether the substituted service in *Moskowitz*is sufficiently different than the substituted service in this matter in order to come to a different result.

However, the court in *Moskowitz*did not make that distinction and instead implied that the term “exhibited” has to be taken literally. As in most issues with the RPAPL, strict compliance with the statute is required as a condition precedent to an eviction judgment.

The statute specifically requires that the deed be “exhibited” to the respondents. Indeed, the *Moskowitz*court came to this conclusion, even after the evidence showed that the petitioner made four failed attempts at personal service. The court found that, even with those efforts, the use of substituted service was insufficient to satisfy the requirement of “exhibition” of the deed pursuant to RPAPL 713. Therefore, we can come to no other conclusion, in that the court has already spoken on this matter and sufficient contact does not exist between the two.

*538It is therefore ordered that said motion to dismiss this summary proceeding be granted.
EXHIBIT 32.2

Certificate of Principal Financial Officer

pursuant to section 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as adopted pursuant to Section 906

of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the accompanying Quarterly Report of CNET Networks, Inc.
(CNET Networks) on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, George E. Mazzotta, Executive Vice President and Chief
Financial Officer of CNET Networks, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of CNET Networks.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: July 31, 2007



|                       
|-----------------------
|                       
|/s/ George E. Mazzotta 
|George E. Mazzotta     
|Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to CNET Networks and
will be retained by CNET Networks and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.