Attorneys for Appellant		Attorneys For Amicus Curiae		Attorneys for 	 											Appellees

Gil I. Berry, Jr.				John C. Trimble					Nicholas C. Pappas

Buck Berry Landau & Breunig		Dina M. Cox					Sandra Boyd Williams

Indianapolis, Indiana			Lewis & Wagner					Locke Reynolds Boyd & 

					Indianapolis, Indiana				Weisell

											Indianapolis, Indiana

					James D. Johnson

					Rudolf Fine Porter & Johnson LLP

					Evansville, Indiana

	IN THE

	INDIANA SUPREME COURT

JOYCE S. ROSS,

	Appellant (Plaintiff below),

	v.

RAMINDER CHEEMA and PILLOW

EXPRESS DELIVERY SERVICE, INC.,

	Appellees (Defendants below).

)

)	Supreme Court No.

)	49S04-9909-CV-500

)

)	Court of Appeals No.

)	49A04-9707-CV-00302

)

)

)

	APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT

	The Honorable Thomas L. Landwerlen, Judge Pro Tempore

	Cause No. 49D07-9607-CP-1021

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

September 27, 1999

SULLIVAN,  Justice.

	While sitting in her living room, Plaintiff Joyce Ross was frightened by loud knocking

at her door.  We find that Ross did not sustain the requisite direct impact necessary to

maintain an action in Indiana for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Background 

	On December 6, 1995, Ross was sitting in a chair in her living room when someone

rang the doorbell.   Before Ross could answer the door, the person pounded loudly on the

door.  Ross then heard the screen door pop open, followed by the twisting of the door knob,

and then more pounding on the door.  Ross rose from her chair, ran to the kitchen, looked

out the window and saw an unfamiliar car.  Frightened, she placed a steak knife in her pants

before going to answer the door.  Upon opening the door, Defendant Raminder Cheema,

making a delivery for his employer, Defendant Pillow Express Delivery Services, Inc.,

handed Ross a clipboard and stated “I have a letter for you.  Sign here.”  Ross signed for the

letter, but as she closed the door, she noticed that the screen door lock was broken and that

the door knob was very loose. 

	On August 3, 1996, Ross filed a complaint for damages against Cheema and Pillow

Express, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress.  At trial, Defendants successfully

moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Indiana impact rule barred Ross'’s recovery. 

The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that because Ross sustained a direct impact from Defendant'’s negligence, she was not precluded by the modified impact rule from maintaining

her action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Ross v. Cheema, 696 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  

Discussion

		Defendants contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s grant

of summary judgment.  Specifically, they argue that the Court of Appeals improperly

concluded that Ross sustained the “direct impact” necessary to maintain an action for

negligent infliction of emotional distress under Indiana’s modified impact rule.  We agree. 

	In Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991), this Court set forth the rule governing negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.  Shuamber modified prior Indiana law, which held that damages for emotional distress were recoverable only where the

emotional distress is accompanied by, and results from, a contemporaneous physical injury. 

See,e.g., New York, Chicago, & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Henderson, 237 Ind. 456, 477, 146 N.E.2d 531, 543 (1957).  In doing so, this Court did away with the physical injury

requirement, concluding instead that:

When . . . a plaintiff sustains a direct impact by the negligence of another and,

by virtue of that direct involvement sustains an emotional trauma which is

serious in nature and of a kind and extent normally expected to occur in a reasonable person, we hold that such a plaintiff is entitled to maintain an

action to recover for that emotional trauma without regard to whether the

emotional trauma arises out of or accompanies any physical injury to the

plaintiff.

Shuamber, 579 N.E.2d at 456.  Hence, the modified rule maintains the requirement of a direct impact, but that impact need not result in a physical injury, nor need the emotional

trauma result from a physical injury.  

	In the present case, Ross was sitting in her living room when Cheema began the

pounding on her door that is alleged to have caused her emotional distress.  This pounding,

Ross asserts, constitutes a “direct impact” within the meaning of Indiana’s modified impact

rule, and thereby entitles her to maintain her action for negligent infliction of emotional

distress.  It does not.  Prior to Shuamber, Indiana’s impact rule required a direct impact, which resulted in physical injury, which in turn resulted in the actionable emotional distress. 

Boston v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 428-29, 61 N.E.2d 326, 327 (1945).  In causing the requisite physical injuries, the direct impact is properly understood as being

“physical” in nature.  Though removing the physical injury element, Shuamber in no way altered the “impact” element of the rule.  For purposes of the modified rule, the direct impact

sustained by the plaintiff must necessarily be a “physical” one.  It is clear from the facts of

this case that Ross, in merely hearing a loud pounding at her door, did not sustain the direct

“physical” impact necessary to maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the modified impact rule.1  

Conclusion    

	For these reasons, we grant transfer, vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, and

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

SHEPARD, C.J., and SELBY, and BOEHM, JJ., concur. 

DICKSON, J., dissents without opinion.