Opinion filed January 12, 2012

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-11-00254-CR

__________

TERRY LANE LEE, Appellant

V.

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 238th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CR36839

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Terry Lane Lee pleaded guilty to two first-degree 

felony counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child. In accordance with the plea bargain, the 

trial court accepted his plea and sentenced him to confinement for a term of twenty-nine years in 

the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice on each count with the 

sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, appellant attempts to set aside his conviction on the 

grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his plea was involuntary. According to the 

record, however, appellant waived his right to appeal, and the trial court did not grant him a right 

to appeal. Specifically, the trial court’s certifications of appellant’s right of appeal indicated that 

it was a plea-bargain case and appellant has no right of appeal and that appellant waived the right 

of appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.
2

On December 1, 2011, the clerk’s office notified appellant in writing of the trial court’s 

certifications and their consequences to his appeal. Appellant was requested to provide a written 

response by December 16, 2011, to continue the appeal. Appellant has filed numerous motions 

and responses since then claiming that his appeal should be continued because it is meritorious. 

In connection with his guilty plea, appellant acknowledged in writing that he was waiving 

his right to appeal the conviction under the terms of the plea bargain. He executed a “Waiver of 

Right to Appeal” in each count wherein he was admonished in writing of his right to appeal the 

conviction and the right to court-appointed counsel on appeal if he is indigent. He agreed to 

“voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently WAIVE AND GIVE UP [HIS] RIGHT TO 

APPEAL.” Furthermore, appellant acknowledged in writing that he was admonished by the trial 

court:

[I]f the punishment assessed by the Court does not exceed the punishment 

recommended by the State and agreed to by me, the Court must give its 

permission to me before I may prosecute an appeal on any matter in the case 

except for those matters raised by written motion filed prior to trial which were 

ruled on by the Court.

The record shows that appellant received the necessary admonishments about the 

consequences of his plea, including the waiver of his right to appeal. Both he and his trial 

counsel signed the written admonishments and waivers of the right to appeal, and the trial court 

accepted them. When a defendant waives this limited right to appeal, he may appeal only if the 

trial court later gives its express permission. See Willis v. State, 121 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003); Monreal v. State, 99 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Here, appellant 

expressly waived his right to appeal under the terms of his plea agreement. The trial court’s

certifications do not indicate that he was given permission to appeal, nor does the record. As a 

result, we dismiss his appeal. 

Furthermore, TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2) provides as follows:

In a plea bargain case–that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was guilty . . . 

and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the 

prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant–a defendant may appeal only:

 (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and 

ruled on before trial, or

 (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal.
3

The trial court’s certifications indicate that appellant does not have a right of appeal because he 

was sentenced pursuant to the agreed terms of a plea bargain and did not satisfy either of the 

exceptions listed under Rule 25.2(a)(2). We must dismiss the appeal “without further action,

regardless of the basis for the appeal” if the trial court’s certifications show there is no right to 

appeal. Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In such circumstances, 

no inquiry into even possibly meritorious claims may be made. Id.

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

January 12, 2012

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Hill, J.1

 

1

John G. Hill, Former Justice, Court of Appeals, 2nd District of Texas at Fort Worth, sitting by assignment.