[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10272

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

GRETCHEN BUSELLI, 

a.k.a. Gretchen Yarbrough,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00045-MW-MAF-1

____________________

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23-10272 Opinion of the Court 2

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

After a jury trial, Gretchen Buselli appeals her convictions 

for a murder-for-hire plot targeting her husband and for making 

false statements to a federal agent. Buselli challenges the jury 

instructions given on both convictions and the constitutionality of 

her false-statements conviction. After careful review of the record 

and the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral argument, we 

affirm Buselli’s convictions. 

I. TRIAL EVIDENCE

As recounted below, the trial evidence included, inter alia,

recorded phone calls of Buselli hiring “Paul” to murder her 

estranged husband and pictures capturing Buselli leaving $5,000 in 

cash in a lunch box in a designated area for “Paul.” Here’s the 

sequence of events.

A. Buselli’s Daughter

In 2020, Buselli reported to authorities several times that her 

estranged husband, Bradley Buselli, was physically and sexually 

abusing their daughter.1 Buselli and Bradley lived in Florida, were 

separated, and shared custody of their daughter.

Buselli’s abuse allegations were investigated by the 

Tallahassee Police Department, the Children’s Home Society of 

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to Gretchen Buselli as “Buselli” and 

Bradley Buselli as “Bradley.” 

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Florida, the Florida Department of Children and Families2, and the 

guardian ad litem appointed in Buselli and Bradley’s divorce 

proceedings to represent the interests of their daughter. Each 

concluded that no evidence supported Buselli’s abuse allegations. 

Notably, the guardian ad litem recommended that Bradley be 

granted majority custody of his daughter because the guardian 

believed Buselli was attempting to take her daughter and move to 

Oregon.

B. The Murder-For-Hire Plot

In June 2021, Christopher Colon, who lived in Montana,

reported to the Hillsborough County, Florida Sheriff’s Department 

that Buselli asked him to murder Bradley. Buselli was Colon’s 

former high school girlfriend. Because Colon lived in Montana, 

Florida authorities contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(“FBI”) for assistance. An FBI agent contacted Colon in Montana

and gave Colon a recorder to capture his calls with Buselli.

On July 9, 2021, Colon recorded a call with Buselli. Buselli 

expressed her frustration with the failure of Child Protective 

Services and a state court judge to act on her reports that Bradley 

had sexually and physically abused their daughter.

2 The Department of Children and Families conducted three investigations 

into separate allegations of Bradley’s abuse, but each investigation—as well as 

a final quality review of those investigations—uncovered no evidence of 

abuse.

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Discussing Bradley’s murder, Buselli stated on the recorded 

call: “I have been thinking about this for a year, and um I have 

checked in with myself multiple, multiple, multiple times. I have 

paused in the anger. I have rejected the idea. I have thought about 

karma, . . . I have thought about [my daughter] growing up not 

knowing her father.” Buselli said that she would receive full 

custody of her daughter after Bradley was missing for 60 days and 

“at that point, I’ll put the house up for sale, bam, gone.”

As to how Bradley would be killed, Buselli stated: “The 

easiest thing would be for you [to] just pop him and get the fuck 

out of there fast, but again that’s going to instantly trigger a 

homicide investigation.” Colon suggested that he could throw 

Bradley into the ocean, to which Buselli responded, “it’s not going 

to trigger a homicide investigation immediately” and “that gives 

me time to be like ‘oh my god what the fuck, her dad just 

disappeared, I don’t know what happened.’” Buselli added that 

dumping Bradley into the ocean would be more complicated for 

Colon, but would leave “no trace, fish food, no trace.” Colon 

stated, “Alright so basically you want me to snatch him up, put him 

on a boat, get rid of his ass, real easy.” Buselli responded, “I think 

as far as the investigation aspect and the legal ramifications, that is 

the best.”

Buselli also confirmed that she had not talked to anyone else 

about killing Bradley. Buselli discussed mailing “ghost credit cards” 

to Colon to pay for him to travel to Florida.

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A few weeks after the July 9 phone call, Buselli mailed Colon 

two $500 pre-paid debit cards. Authorities intercepted envelopes 

from Buselli to Colon containing (1) the debit cards with user 

agreements, and (2) photographs of Bradley, his home and work 

addresses, and his vehicle information.

C. “Paul” — The Undercover Agent

Ultimately, the FBI planned to have Colon pass off Buselli to 

“Paul,” purportedly Colon’s friend, but actually an undercover 

agent. On August 20, 2021, Colon recorded a call with Buselli in 

which he told her that he was concerned authorities would connect

him to Bradley’s murder, and Colon would not have an alibi for the 

time it would take to drive to Florida, murder Bradley, and return 

to Montana. Colon told Buselli that he had a friend, “Paul,” who 

lived in Florida, owned a boat, and could carry out the plan to 

murder Bradley.

On August 23, 2021, Colon texted Buselli that he “talked to 

Paul and he’s 100% on board and wants to get involved[.]” Buselli 

responded, “Thank you so much! Yes please give him this 

number.”

On August 26, 2021, Buselli and “Paul” spoke on the phone

in a recorded call. Buselli explained that Bradley was molesting 

their daughter, Child Protective Services was not helpful, and she 

wanted to move back to Oregon, but Bradley was getting in the 

way. Buselli told “Paul” she was “thinking about it” for over a year

and was 100% sure she wanted Bradley gone forever. Buselli gave 

“Paul” information about Bradley, including his age, height, 

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weight, and his work and home addresses. Buselli agreed to pay 

“Paul” $5,000 up front and $20,000 after the murder. Buselli said 

she wanted “Paul” to use his boat to “just take [Bradley] out, and, 

disappear him” so there would be “no trace . . . missing person 

forever.” Buselli agreed to leave $5,000 for “Paul” to pick up in a 

public place, like a Walmart or a Greyhound bus station.

Buselli and “Paul” spoke again on September 8, 2021, in a 

recorded call. Buselli provided “Paul” with Bradley’s new home 

address. Buselli proposed to leave the $5,000 at a large outdoor 

amphitheater because it was a public place without any cameras. 

Buselli confirmed that the agreement with “Paul” was for “five 

upfront, and 20 after, to make it never found.” Buselli said she had 

$7,000-$8,000 in African Krugerrand gold coins and could pay 

“Paul” the remaining amount after she sold her home.3 In response 

to this phone call, investigators installed a camera facing the 

amphitheater and captured Buselli as she left $5,000 in cash in a 

lunch box in the seating area of the amphitheater.

With the murder-for-hire plot in motion, investigators 

wanted to make it seem that Bradley had actually disappeared. So 

investigators contacted Bradley, explained the murder-for-hire plot, 

put him in a hotel, and asked him not to make any phone calls or 

3 Investigators later found six Krugerrand coins in Buselli’s residence. For 

reference, in September 2021, one 1-ounce Krugerrand was worth between 

$1,749.80 and $1,864.05. Historical Prices for Krugerrand 1 oz, BUSINESS INSIDER,

https://perma.cc/Z64V-39E6.

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use the internet. Investigators also had Bradley miss a scheduled 

FaceTime call with his daughter while she was with Buselli on the 

night of September 15, and investigators had Bradley miss work on 

September 16.

On September 16, 2021, “Paul” and Buselli spoke on the 

phone. “Paul” told Buselli “[i]t’s done” and “it was quick and clean, 

and he had no idea what it was about,” to which Buselli said 

“[t]hank you” and that she felt “relieved.” The two agreed to speak 

again on October 16 to discuss Buselli’s remaining payment to 

“Paul.”

D. Buselli’s Statements to the FBI

Also on September 16, 2021, investigators, including an FBI 

agent, contacted Buselli at her home. Under the guise that Bradley 

had disappeared, investigators asked her to come to the police 

station for questioning, which she voluntarily did. Once at the 

police station, investigators read Buselli her Miranda4 rights, and 

Buselli signed a form stating she understood and waived her rights.

Buselli detailed her troubled relationship with Bradley. 

Buselli explained that the couple separated and Bradley moved out 

of their home after a fight in which Buselli struck Bradley, which 

led to the police being called. Buselli clarified that Bradley had 

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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never hit her. Soon after this fight, Buselli began reporting Bradley 

to authorities for physically and sexually abusing their daughter.

Investigators then told Buselli it was a crime to lie to a 

federal agent and asked her if she knew anybody “that would do 

anything like this?”—referring to Bradley’s apparent 

disappearance. Buselli replied, “No. I would never ask anyone to 

do something like this.” Investigators then asked, “how would you 

feel if something happened to him?” Buselli replied, “I don’t know. 

I don’t want something to happen to him.”

Eventually, investigators revealed that they had been 

surveilling Buselli, that “Paul” was an undercover agent, and that 

they knew about the murder-for-hire plot. Investigators asked why 

Buselli wanted Bradley dead, to which she responded, “He’s 

molesting my daughter.” Investigators noted that several 

investigations into Bradley’s purported abuse of their daughter 

concluded that no abuse occurred. Investigators then arrested 

Buselli.5

5 Upon Buselli’s arrest, authorities released her daughter into Bradley’s 

custody. Authorities concluded that Bradley did not pose a danger to his 

daughter based on the conclusions of the investigations into the purported 

abuse, as well as a separate interview conducted by an FBI victim witness 

specialist.

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Indictment

Buselli was indicted on two counts: (1) use of interstate 

commerce “with intent that the murder of [Bradley] be committed 

in violation of the laws of the State of Florida” as consideration for 

payment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1958(a), 2; and (2) knowingly 

and willfully making materially false statements, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). The false-statements charge was based on 

these two statements Buselli made to investigators: “I would never 

ask anyone to do something like this” and “I don’t want something 

to happen to him.”

B. Jury Instructions: False Statements

For the mens rea element of the false-statements charge, the 

government proposed this jury instruction: “the Defendant acted 

willfully, knowing that the statement was false.” The government’s 

instructions included a definition of the terms “knowingly” and 

“willfully.” Buselli did not object to the government’s mens rea

instruction.

C. Jury Instructions: Murder-For-Hire

Buselli did contest the government’s instructions for the 

murder-for-hire charge. After both parties submitted proposed 

instructions, the district court held two hearings and requested 

briefing on the issue. We set forth their positions.

The government’s instructions explained that the elements 

of the murder-for-hire charge under § 1958 were (1) “the Defendant 

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used or caused another person to use the mail or a facility of 

interstate commerce,” (2) “with the intent that a murder be 

committed in violation of the laws of the State of Florida,” and (3) “as 

consideration for the receipt of, or promise, or agreement to pay 

anything of pecuniary value.” (Emphasis added.) The 

government’s instructions defined murder as “the unlawful, 

premeditated killing of a human being with malice aforethought. 

A ‘premeditated killing’ is a killing after consciously deciding to do 

so.” This definition is consistent with Florida law’s definition of 

murder as “[t]he unlawful killing of a human being . . . [w]hen 

perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the 

person killed or any human being.” See Fla. Stat. § 782.04(1)(a)(1). 

Buselli argued that the government’s instructions

inadequately explained what constitutes murder in violation of 

Florida law. Buselli argued the district court must also instruct the 

jury on the Florida defenses to murder, which are excusable 

homicide, justifiable homicide, and a killing by the justifiable use 

of deadly force. See Fla. Stat. §§ 782.02, 782.03, 776.012. Buselli 

argued that Florida’s defenses to murder were necessary for the 

jury to determine whether she intended the murder-for-hire plot to 

result in a lawful or an unlawful killing. However, Buselli

acknowledged that she did not anticipate “any affirmative 

testimony saying this was a justifiable homicide -- or justifiable use 

of deadly force.”

The government responded that no instructions on Florida’s 

defenses to murder should be given because no evidence supported 

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them, and, in any event, Buselli’s crime was solicitation of a murder 

under federal law, not commission of a murder under Florida law.

The district court issued a preliminary order on the 

murder-for-hire instructions. First, the district court determined 

that an instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force was 

required under Florida law only when supported by evidence and 

where the defense theory was valid. The district court stated that 

it would not give this instruction unless Buselli (1) cited caselaw 

showing that the justifiable use of deadly force was a defense to a 

Florida solicitation-for-murder charge, and (2) proffered evidence 

demonstrating that Buselli’s intended use of force against Bradley

was justifiable under Florida law.

Second, the district court acknowledged that Florida law 

usually requires instructions on excusable and justifiable homicide 

in all murder cases. However, the district court determined that it 

would not give these instructions because (1) Buselli stated she 

would not present evidence that the murder-for-hire plot 

constituted excusable or justifiable homicide; (2) if there was no 

evidence supporting either defense, the district court would have 

to instruct the jury that neither was a defense to her 

murder-for-hire charge, which would confuse the jury; and (3) the 

district court had an obligation to not confuse the jury. 

Accordingly, absent evidence at trial showing that excusable or 

justifiable homicide applied to Buselli’s conduct, the district court 

concluded that it would not instruct the jury on these defenses.

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D. Buselli’s Trial Testimony

At trial, Buselli testified and her defense theory was that 

during her conversations with Colon and “Paul,” she never actually 

intended for Bradley to be murdered. Prior to any of the recorded 

conversations, Colon offered to kill Bradley because Buselli told 

him about Bradley’s abuse of her daughter. Buselli stated she did 

not take Colon seriously and “just blew it off as a derogatory 

remark.” Colon suggested to Buselli that he could come to Florida 

and beat up Bradley or shoot Bradley through the door, but Buselli 

told Colon not to do that.

As to the recorded July 9, 2021, call between Buselli and 

Colon, Buselli explained she had drunk “quite a bit of red wine.” 

Buselli was concerned about Bradley’s abuse of their daughter and 

that the Department of Children and Families was not taking her 

concerns seriously. Buselli admitted she spoke with Colon on the 

July 9 call about killing Bradley, but she clarified that she was just 

mad and “vented.” Buselli further asserted that if Colon had come

to Florida, she “was willing to let him confront Bradley,” and she 

mailed Colon Bradley’s address and $1,000 in prepaid debit cards 

for gas money for Colon’s trip to Florida.

Turning to the recorded August 20, 2021, call with Colon, 

Buselli testified that Colon told her he was not coming down to 

Florida, and she believed Colon had stolen the $1,000 she mailed to 

him. Buselli also testified that when Colon said he spoke to “Paul,”

Buselli suspected that “Paul” was going to ask for money from her 

too.

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As to the recorded August 26, 2021, call between Buselli and 

“Paul,” Buselli testified that she was terrified because “Paul” was 

asking her for $20,000. On the call, Buselli discussed “Paul” killing 

Bradley, but Buselli did not intend for Bradley to be killed and she 

believed “Paul” was scamming her. Buselli went forward with 

paying “Paul” because she was scared of him, and she “was 

absolutely confident at that point that Bradley was in no danger.”

Buselli was shocked when, on September 16, 2021, “Paul”

called her to tell her he had killed Bradley. Buselli told “Paul”

“‘thank you,’ but that wasn’t genuine for sure.” Buselli did not 

“have a logical answer” for why she did not tell investigators during 

her questioning about what had happened with “Paul” and Colon.

On cross-examination, Buselli admitted that she talked with 

Colon and “Paul” about murdering Bradley and that it was against 

the law in Florida to commit murder. But Buselli explained that 

she was just “venting” in her calls with Colon and “Paul,” and she 

“didn’t believe these men.” Buselli testified that she “did not want 

[Bradley] murdered,” she “wanted a healing path for our family.” 

Buselli mailed Colon $1,000 because she “was willing to let him 

intervene, not murder Bradley.” Buselli testified, “I really truly 

thought this was a fraud/extortion scam,” but she acknowledged 

that she never asked Colon to return the money she mailed him 

and never contacted the police. Buselli also acknowledged she had 

specific conversations about how “Paul” would kill Bradley, but she 

did not believe “Paul” would actually kill Bradley.

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E. Jury Instructions Ruling at Trial 

After both sides presented their cases at trial, Buselli 

renewed her objections to the jury instructions. Buselli and the 

government relied on their prior arguments. The district court 

declined to give the instructions for excusable or justifiable 

homicide because there was no caselaw or evidence at trial 

supporting that either applied to Buselli’s conduct. 

Buselli’s counsel acknowledged that Buselli’s own testimony 

did not support giving the instruction on the justifiable use of 

deadly force. But Buselli’s counsel argued that some other evidence 

supported this instruction because the government presented tapes 

of the FBI’s interrogation of Buselli, in which Busellireferenced the 

abuse of her daughter. The district court observed that the 

justifiable use of deadly force could be used to protect another, 

such as Buselli’s daughter, against an imminent harm. The district 

court found, however, that there was no evidence of an imminent 

harm to Buselli’s daughter. The district court noted that applying 

the defense of justifiable use of deadly force to the facts of this case 

“would be an invitation to absolute lawlessness to say you could 

murder a child molester because the government wasn’t taking 

adequate steps to investigate and/or arrest the perpetrator.”

F. District Court’s Instructions to the Jury

The district court then instructed the jury. As to the 

murder-for-hire charge, the district court instructed that Buselli 

could be found guilty only if the government proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt, among other things, that she acted “[w]ith the 

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intent that the murder be committed in violation of the laws of the 

State of Florida.”6 The district court instructed that “[m]urder is 

the unlawful, premeditated killing of a human being with malice 

aforethought and is a violation of the laws of the State of Florida.” 

The district court did not instruct the jury on excusable or 

justifiable homicide, or the justifiable use of deadly force.

As to the false-statements charge, the district court 

instructed the jury that it was “a federal crime to willfully make a 

false or fraudulent statement to a department or agency of the 

United States.” The district court explained that, to find Buselli 

guilty, the jury had to find that, among other things, she “acted 

willfully, knowing that the statement was false.” The district court 

defined the terms “knowingly” and “willfully” as follows:

The word “knowingly” means that an act was 

done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of 

a mistake or by accident.

The word “willfully” means that the act was 

committed voluntarily and purposely with the intent 

to do something the law forbids, that is, with a bad 

purpose to disobey or disregard the law. While a 

person must have acted with the intent to do 

6 The district court also instructed that “[a] premeditated killing is killing after 

consciously deciding to do so. The decision must be present in the mind at 

the time of the killing. The law does not fix the exact period of time that must 

pass between the formulation of the premeditated intent to kill and the killing. 

The period of time must be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant. 

The premeditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing.”

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something the law forbids before you can find the 

person acted willfully, the person need not be aware 

of the specific law or rule that his or her conduct may 

be violating.

G. Verdict

The jury found Buselli guilty on both counts. The district 

court sentenced Buselli to 180 months’ imprisonment.7 Buselli 

timely appealed.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo the legal correctness of a jury instruction, 

but we review for an abuse of discretion the phrasing of an 

instruction or a district court’s refusal to give a requested 

instruction. United States v. Mayweather, 991 F.3d 1163, 1174 (11th 

Cir. 2021). 

Further, a challenge to jury instructions is subject to 

harmless-error review. United States v. Heaton, 59 F.4th 1226, 1241 

(11th Cir. 2023). Under harmless-error review, we ask “whether it 

appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 

did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” i.e., whether there is a 

“reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result 

with or without that instruction.” United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 

1303, 1314 (11th Cir. 2005).

7 On appeal, Buselli does not challenge her sentence.

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We review for plain error where a party challenges for the 

first time on appeal a jury instruction or the constitutionality of a 

statute. United States v. Hughes, 840 F.3d 1368, 1384 (11th Cir. 2016). 

To establish plain error, a defendant must show there is (1) an error, 

(2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If the 

defendant makes this showing, we have discretion to correct the 

error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. “When the explicit language 

of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can 

be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme 

Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United States v. Duldulao, 

87 F.4th 1239, 1252 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted).

IV. MURDER-FOR-HIRE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The first issue involves the jury instructions on the 

murder-for-hire crime in 18 U.S.C. § 1958.

A. 18 U.S.C. 1958(a) — Murder-For-Hire

Section 1958(a) prohibits a person (1) from traveling in or 

causing another to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or 

using or causing another to use any facility of interstate or foreign 

commerce, (2) “with intent that a murder be committed in violation of 

the laws of any State or the United States,” (3) in return for a promise 

or agreement to pay anything of pecuniary value. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1958(a) (emphasis added); United States v. Preacher, 631 F.3d 1201, 

1203 (11th Cir. 2011). 

The government argues that the text in § 1958(a)—“with 

intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of any 

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State”—has a definitional role and serves only to identify the 

generic kind of conduct tied to interstate activity for which the 

federal statutes makes it illegal to pay. The district court thus only 

had to charge the jury, as it did, that “[m]urder is the unlawful, 

premeditated killing of a human being with malice aforethought 

and is a violation of the laws of the State of Florida.” This

instruction contains the generic definition of murder that Florida 

law proscribes and is all that was required.

Buselli contends that the district court was required to go 

further because Florida law distinguishes between lawful and 

unlawful killings. Buselli argues the jury had to be instructed on

Florida’s defenses of justifiable and excusable homicide and the 

justifiable use of deadly force because these defenses result in a 

lawful killing. Buselli contends that the jury needed to know these 

defenses to decide whether Buselli intended her murder-for-hire 

plot to result in an unlawful or a lawful killing under Florida law.

The parties do not cite any circuit precedent as to this § 1958 

text—“with intent that a murder be committed in violation of the 

laws of any State.” A few of our sister circuits, however, have dealt 

with somewhat similar arguments regarding § 1958 prosecutions 

for violations of state law. These decisions bolster our 

determination that the district court did not err in refusing to give 

Buselli’s requested jury instructions for justifiable homicide, 

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excusable homicide, or the justifiable use of deadly force under 

Florida law. 

For example, in United States v. Lisyanski, 806 F.3d 706, 712 

(2d Cir. 2015), the Second Circuit upheld a § 1958 conviction despite 

the defendant’s contention “that the district court constructively 

amended the indictment by failing to instruct the jury on the 

definition of murder found in N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25, the state law 

underlying the murder-for-hire charges in the indictment.” The

Second Circuit held that the defendant “failed to show that the 

district court’s instruction altered the ‘core of criminality’ of the 

charged offenses,” and that “[t]he instruction given was in 

accordance with a standard modern jury instruction to which 

Lisyansky not only failed to object but agreed should be given.” Id. 

(citing Leonard B. Sand, et al., 3 Modern Federal Jury InstructionsCriminal ¶ 60.02, Instruction 60-16 cmt. (2023) (noting that with 

respect to the intent element of a murder-for-hire charge, “[t]he 

jury should not be charged on the elements of murder. Whether 

the murder would violate state or federal law is a question of law 

for the court.”)).

Similarly, in United States v. Wynn, 987 F.2d 354, 357–58 (6th 

Cir. 1993), the Sixth Circuit held that the government was not 

required to prove that murder was a crime under Tennessee law 

and that it was enough for the district court to have instructed the 

jury generally “that murder violates Tennessee law.” And in United 

States v. Robertson, 473 F.3d 1289, 1294 (10th Cir. 2007), the Tenth 

Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury in a § 1958 

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case should have been instructed that murder is the killing of 

another human being with malice aforethought pursuant to 

Oklahoma’s statutory definition. See also United States v. Angleton, 

221 F. Supp. 2d 696, 726 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (ruling on a motion to 

dismiss the indictment: “[§ 1958] does not incorporate Texas Penal 

Code § 19.03 [the Texas capital murder statute] such that an 

acquittal under [§] 19.03 could bar a prosecution under [§] 1958”).

Finally, in United States v. Morin, 80 F.3d 124, 126–27 & n.3 

(4th Cir. 1996), the Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant’s 

arguments that he could not have been found guilty under Virginia 

law (or the laws of the United States) because the murder was to 

occur outside of the United States and because, as a matter of 

Virginia law, he could not have been convicted for conspiracy to 

commit murder where the conspiracy was with an undercover FBI 

agent. The Fourth Circuit noted that, state law nuances aside, the 

relevant question was whether the defendant had the “intent” to 

conspire with a hit man to commit murder, and that under the plain 

terms of the statute, this was sufficient. Id. at 127 n.3. As set forth 

by the Fourth Circuit, “[q]uestions of ultimate prosecution and 

jurisdiction . . . simply exceed the plain meaning of § 1958. The 

‘violation’ element of murder-for-hire is a low hurdle, nothing 

more than an abstract comparison of a crime’s elements with what 

the defendant intended to accomplish.” Id. at 127 n.2. “Any further 

inquiry would lead courts down the path of speculation and 

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distract both courts and juries from the central issues at stake in a 

§ 1958 prosecution[.]” Id.

Likewise, virtually the same text is employed in another 

federal criminal statute, the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, which 

courts have interpreted. Specifically, the Travel Act prohibits

interstate activity with intent to further certain crimes, including 

extortion and arson, “in violation of the laws of the State in which 

committed” or of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a), (b)

(emphasis added). In fact, when § 1958 was originally enacted in 

1984, it was located at 18 U.S.C. § 1952A, alongside the Travel Act. 

See Drury, 396 F.3d at 1309 n.1. Both the Supreme Court and our 

predecessor Court have interpreted this same statutory text in 

§ 1952, and thus, those cases, discussed below, are also instructive.

B. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 — Travel Act 

In United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 287-88 (1969), the 

defendants were indicted under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, for 

traveling in interstate commerce to promote extortion in violation 

of the laws of Pennsylvania. At that time, § 1952(a), provided, inter 

alia, “[w]hoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses 

any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, 

with intent to . . . promote . . . any unlawful activity,” is punishable 

as provided in the statute. Id. at 287 n.1 (emphasis added). In turn, 

§ 1952(b) defined “unlawful activity” as “extortion, bribery, or 

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arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of the 

United States.” Id. (emphasis added).8

In Nardello, a distinction in Pennsylvania law was made 

between extortion and blackmail, with extortion applying to only 

public officials. Id. at 288. Because the defendants were not public 

officials, the district court dismissed the indictment, reasoning the 

phrase, “in violation of the laws of the State,” meant “extortion” 

was to track closely the state law. Id. When the government 

appealed, the defendants argued “that Congress’ decision not to 

define extortion combined with its decision to prohibit only 

extortion in violation of state law compels the conclusion that 

peculiar versions of state terminology are controlling.” Id. at 

288-89, 293.

Reversing the dismissal of the indictment, the Supreme 

Court held that Congress’s intent in defining extortion by reference

to state law was meant to aid local law enforcement officials in 

general, “not to eradicate only those extortionate activities which 

any given State denominated extortion.” Id. at 293-94. The 

Supreme Court “decline[d] to give the term ‘extortion’ an 

unnaturally narrow reading,” and concluded that “the generic term 

extortion” should be used to judge whether the Travel Act covered

the defendants’ conduct. Id. at 296. The Supreme Court reasoned 

that relying on how states chose to classify extortionate conduct 

under their criminal laws would lead to uneven application of the 

8 With minor word changes irrelevant in Nardello and in this appeal, § 1952 

reads the same today. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952.

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Travel Act, and it could “discern no reason why Congress would 

wish to have [the Travel Act] aid local law enforcement efforts in 

Utah but to deny that aid to Pennsylvania when both States have 

statutes covering the same offense.” Id. at 294-95.

After Nardello, our predecessor Court likewise held that 

§ 1952’s reference to “state law merely serves a definitional 

purpose.” United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 

1975) (discussing Nardello, 393 U.S. at 295).9 The defendant Conway 

was convicted under § 1952 for “traveling in interstate commerce 

with intent to promote the unlawful activity of arson in violation 

of Maryland laws.” Id. at 1048. When instructing the jury, the 

district court did not define arson under Maryland law. Id. at 1051.

Our predecessor Court concluded arson “is a commonly 

used and understood word,” and the Travel Act did not otherwise 

require jury instructions on Maryland’s definition of arson. Id. at 

1051-52. The Court explained that “proof of the violation of the 

[underlying state law] to which reference is made for purposes of 

prosecution under [the Travel Act] is not an essential element to be 

proved in such a federal prosecution.” Id. at 1051. 

In yet another § 1952 case, our predecessor Court repeated 

that “state law merely serves a definitional purpose,” and “[t]here 

9 Our predecessor Court also described Nardello as stressing that “Congress did 

not intend to restrict the coverage of the ‘Travel Act’ by defining extortion 

according to state labels” and “it was sufficient that the acts for which the 

[defendant] was indicted fall within the ‘generic term’ of extortion.” Conway, 

507 F.2d at 1051 (quoting Nardello, 393 U.S. at 295).

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is no need to prove a violation of the state law as an essential 

element of the federal [§ 1952] crime.” United States v. Prince, 

515 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1975) (quotation marks omitted). The 

Prince defendants were convicted of conspiracy to engage in 

interstate prostitution activities. Id. at 565. But the West Virginia 

statute that prohibited prostitution did not define prostitution. Id.

at 566. Affirming the convictions, our predecessor Court held 

“[w]e need not concern ourselves, then, with the lack of a 

definition of ‘prostitution’ within the West Virginia statute” 

underlying the Travel Act convictions. Id. This was because 

prostitution is “a generic term” and “the definition of the trial court 

‘sexual intercourse for hire’ sufficiently described the offense.” Id.; 

see also United States v. Jones, 642 F.2d 909, 913 n.5 (5th Cir. Apr. 1981) 

(“A prosecution under [§] 1952 is not restricted to state law 

definitions of the unlawful activity. It can prevail upon showing 

that the acts fall within the generic term charged.”).

Citing Conway, discussed above, the Tenth Circuit recently 

interpreted the statutory language “murders . . . in violation of the 

laws of any State” in 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), another federal criminal 

statute known as VICAR (“Violent crimes in aid of racketeering 

activity”). See United States v. Garcia, 74 F.4th 1073, 1083, 1124 (10th 

Cir. 2023). The Tenth Circuit ruled that this statutory text “does 

not require that a person could be charged or convicted of murder 

under state law.” Id. at 1124. The Tenth Circuit pointed out how 

other courts have concluded “that a violation of state law is not an 

element of the Travel Act, but rather serves a definitional purpose 

in characterizing the proscribed conduct.” Id. (quotation marks 

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omitted) (collecting cases including Conway, 507 F.2d at 1051). As 

aptly put in Garcia, “the government need not be able to convict a 

defendant of a state law violation. Instead, state law simply defines 

the prohibited conduct.” Id.

With this background, we return to Buselli’s appeal.

C. No Jury-Instruction Error

While we have yet to address the meaning of “with intent 

that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of any State” 

in federal § 1958 prosecutions, we do not write on a blank slate. 

Our precedent holds that virtually the same statutory language in

§ 1952 of the Travel Act—“in violation of the laws of the State in 

which they are committed”—merely serves a definitional purpose

in describing the generic conduct prohibited.10 See Conway, 

507 F.2d at 1048, 1051; Prince, 515 F.2d at 566; Jones, 642 F.2d at 913 

n.5. And under our precedent, there is no need to prove an actual

state law crime as an essential element of the federal § 1952 crime.

See Conway, 507 F.2d at 1051; Prince, 515 F.2d at 566. 

Similarly, the statutory text of § 1958(a) does not require that 

a person be charged and convicted of murder under state law or 

even that a murder actually happened. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). 

Rather, the federal statute requires only that the person intend that 

a murder be committed. See United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 

10 Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 

1981, are binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 

1207 (11th Cir. 1981).

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1149 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[Section 1958] does not prohibit murder or 

attempted murder. Instead, it outlaws using interstate-commerce 

facilities with the intent that murder-for-hire be committed.”).

Further, the § 1958(a) reference “with intent that a murder be 

committed in violation of the laws of any State” identifies the kind 

of conduct tied to interstate activity for which the federal statute 

makes it illegal to pay. The gravamen of a federal murder-for-hire 

prosecution under § 1958(a) is the violation of federal law, not state 

law. 

Additionally, the text of § 1958(a) does not require varying 

state-law defenses to murder to apply in federal murder-for-hire 

prosecutions. “[I]n the absence of a plain indication of an intent to 

incorporate diverse state laws into a federal criminal statute, the 

meaning of the federal statute should not be dependent on state 

law.” United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957). The 

longstanding interpretation of materially similar statutory text in 

§ 1952, as set forth by Nardello and our predecessor Court, has been 

that Congress did not intend that text to incorporate diverse state 

laws. See Nardello, 393 U.S. at 294-95; Conway, 507 F.2d at 1051-52; 

Prince, 515 F.2d at 566. 

Here, the district court instructed the jury that “[m]urder is 

the unlawful, premeditated killing of a human being with malice 

aforethought and is a violation of the laws of the State of Florida.” 

This instruction was an accurate description of the term murder, 

“a commonly used and understood word,” see Conway, 507 F.2d at 

1051, which Florida law proscribes, see Fla. Stat. § 782.04(1)(a)(1)

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(stating first-degree murder is “[t]he unlawful killing of a human 

being . . . [w]hen perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect 

the death of the person killed”). The district court was not 

required to go further and instruct the jury on Florida’s defenses to 

murder. 

We recognize that Florida law generally requires a jury be 

instructed on these defenses in all murder trials. See Pena v. State, 

901 So. 2d 781, 786-88 (Fla. 2005). That is because under Florida 

law (1) manslaughter is a required lesser included offense of 

first-degree murder, meaning it must appear on the jury verdict 

form, see Daugherty v. State, 211 So. 3d 29, 37 (Fla. 2017);

(2) manslaughter is defined as “[t]he killing of a human being . . . 

without lawful justification . . . and in cases in which such killing 

shall not be excusable homicide or murder,” see Fla. Stat. 

§ 782.07(1); and (3) manslaughter, thus, can be defined fully only by 

the exclusion of justifiable and excusable homicide and the 

justifiable use of deadly force, see Pena, 901 So. 2d at 786-87; Howard 

v. Moore, 730 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). But, again, 

there is no text in § 1958 requiring that a person be charged and 

convicted under state law, so it follows that Florida’s general rule 

requiring these instructions in a Florida murder trial does not apply 

to a federal prosecution under § 1958.

D. Harmless Error

As an independent, alternative holding, we conclude that 

any error in failing to instruct on Florida’s defenses to murder was

harmless in this case. Given the trial evidence, no reasonable jury 

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could have concluded Buselli’s conduct constituted justifiable or 

excusable homicide or the justifiable use of deadly force under 

Florida law. 

We can quickly dispense with justifiable and excusable 

homicide. For justifiable homicide to apply, the defendant must kill 

another while resisting an attempted murder or a forcible felony

against the defendant. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim) 7.1; Fla. Stat 

§ 782.02. By contrast, excusable homicide applies only to 

accidental killings or killings by misfortune. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. 

(Crim) 7.1; Fla. Stat. § 782.03. 

There was no evidence presented at trial that Buselli sought 

Colon or “Paul” to kill Bradley in an effort to defend Buselli herself 

from an attempted murder or from a forcible felony by Bradley, or 

to have Bradley killed by accident or misfortune. 

As to the justifiable use of deadly force, we recognize Buselli 

argues that this defense extends to the protection of others, such as 

Bradley’s purported abuse of her daughter, and that the FBI 

interrogation tape presented at trial referenced this purported 

abuse.

But the use of deadly force in defense of another is justifiable

under Florida law only when protecting another from “the 

imminent commission of a forcible felony.” See Fla. Stat.

§ 776.012(2) (emphasis added); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim) 3.6(f ). An 

“imminent” forcible felony is one that is “ready to take place: 

happening soon” and “requires no further measures to manifest.” 

See State v. Woodson, 349 So. 3d 510, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022). 

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“In other words, very little time or preparation may stand between 

the present moment and an ‘imminent’ event.” Id. at 512; see also 

State v. Wagner, 353 So. 3d 94, 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022) (holding 

the defendant’s use of deadly force was not justified where she left 

her house, walked to a neighbor’s house, and returned a short 

while later to shoot her husband). 

The steps Buselli took to arrange for Bradley’s killing, 

including her months-long coordination with Colon and “Paul,” 

belie any suggestion that she intended to prevent an “imminent” 

forcible felony against her daughter. Notably too, the crime of 

murder-for-hire under § 1958(a) is completed “once the defendant 

uses an instrument of interstate commerce with the intent that a 

murder-for-hire be committed.” Preacher, 631 F.3d at 1203-04 (“The 

first time that Preacher used his cell phone to communicate his 

desire that the victim be killed for money, he violated § 1958.”).

Buselli completed the crime of murder-for-hire on at least the dates 

of July 9, 2021, and August 26, 2021, when she called Colon and 

“Paul” and offered to pay them to kill Bradley. See id. There is no 

evidence that Bradley’s purported abuse of his daughter was 

“imminent” on those dates. 

We also recognize that Buselli relies on the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Ruan v. United States, 597 U.S. 450 (2022), and argues that 

the Florida defenses to murder were required for the jury to 

separate wrongful from innocent acts. Ruan, however, recognized 

that harmless error review would apply to the incorrect jury 

instructions in that case, and the Supreme Court declined to 

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determine in the first instance whether the incorrect instructions 

were harmless. Id. at 467. By contrast, for the reasons outlined 

above, we conclude readily that any error in the omission of 

instructions on Florida’s defenses to murder was harmless because 

no reasonable jury would have found Buselli’s conduct constituted 

justifiable or excusable homicide or the justifiable use of deadly 

force.

Even assuming the district court erred by failing to give the 

defense instructions, we have no “reasonable doubt that the jury 

would have reached the same result with or without” instructions 

on these defenses. See Drury, 396 F.3d at 1314. We therefore affirm 

Buselli’s murder-for-hire conviction.

V. FALSE-STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONALITY AND 

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Buselli was also charged and convicted of making false 

statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Section 1001(a)(2) 

provides that an individual who, “in any matter within the 

jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the 

Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully . . . 

makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 

representation . . . shall be fined under this title [and] imprisoned 

not more than 5 years . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Other 

subsections of § 1001 limit the statute’s application to certain 

matters within the jurisdiction of the judicial and legislative 

branches. See id. § 1001(b), (c). The statute does not limit its 

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application to matters within the jurisdiction of the executive 

branch, such as interrogations by federal agents. See id. § 1001.

On appeal, Buselli challenges the constitutionality of her 

false-statements conviction and the district court’s instructions on 

her false-statements charge. Because Buselli did not raise these 

challenges below, our review is for plain error. See Hughes, 840 F.3d 

at 1384. 

First, Buselli argues that her false-statements conviction is 

unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment because her 

statements were an assertion of her rights to plead not guilty and 

to demand a jury trial. Again, the statements underlying Buselli’s 

conviction were “I would never ask anyone to do something like 

this” and “I don’t want something to happen to him,” referring to 

the murder-for-hire plot.

Buselli made these statements to an FBI agent after she was 

advised of her Miranda rights, including the right to remain silent, 

and warned further that it was a crime to lie to a federal agent.

We doubt whether Buselli’s statements—after she was 

Mirandized and told lying to a federal agent was a crime—were 

akin to pleading not guilty or demanding a jury trial under the Sixth 

Amendment. Regardless, (1) the explicit text of § 1001 does not 

touch or address this issue, and (2) the parties have cited no decision 

from the Supreme Court or our Court directly resolving this issue, 

and we have found none. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001; Duldulao, 87 F.4th at 

1252. As a result, we discern no plain error.

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Second, Buselli challenges the instruction that an element of 

her false-statements charge was that she acted “willfully, knowing 

the statement was false.” Buselli argues that § 1001(a) required the 

government to prove that she both “knowingly” and “willfully” 

made a materially false statement. Buselli argues the instruction 

quoted above improperly conflated the terms “willfully” and

“knowingly,” thereby relieving the government of proving an 

element of her § 1001(a) charge.

Here, there was no error, let alone plain error, in the district 

court’s instruction on the elements of Buselli’s false-statements 

charge. As Buselli concedes, the district court properly gave a 

definition of “willfully” and then a separate definition of

“knowingly,” all before setting out the elements of her 

false-statements charge. There is a strong, “almost invariable,” 

presumption that juries follow instructions given by the district 

court. United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 938 (11th Cir. 1993) 

(quotation marks omitted); United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1, 14 

(11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2594 (2023). We therefore 

presume the jury followed the district court’s instruction on the 

meaning of “willfully”—as a term distinct from “knowingly”—and 

correctly understood those separate meanings in analyzing 

whether she willfully and knowingly made false statements to a 

federal agent. 

Accordingly, the district court did not err, plainly or 

otherwise, in instructing the jury on Buselli’s false-statements 

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conviction. We therefore affirm Buselli’s false-statements 

conviction. 

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we affirm Buselli’s murder-for-hire 

and false-statements convictions.

AFFIRMED.

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