COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

ANITA SEIDL 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0711-97-2 PER CURIAM 

 NOVEMBER 10, 1997 

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 OF HENRICO COUNTY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

L. A. Harris, Jr., Judge 

 (John M. Wright, Jr.; Downs and Wright, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 (George T. Elmore, III, Assistant County 

Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

 (Deborah S. Tinsley, guardian ad litem for 

infant child.) 

 Anita Seidl appeals the decision of the circuit court 

terminating her residual parental rights to her child. Seidl 

contends that trial court erred in finding that the Henrico 

County Department of Social Services (DSS) established by clear 

and convincing evidence the criteria set out in Code § 16.1-283. 

 Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude 

that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily 

affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 "The termination of parental rights is a grave, drastic, 

and irreversible action." Lowe v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 

231 Va. 277, 280-81, 343 S.E.2d 70, 72 (1986). "'[S]tatutes 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

terminating the legal relationship between parent and child 

should be interpreted consistently with the governmental 

objective of preserving, when possible, the parent-child 

relationship.'" Id. (Citation omitted). But, 

 [w]hen addressing matters concerning a child, 

including the termination of a parent's 

residual parental rights, the paramount 

consideration of a trial court is the child's 

best interests. On review, "[a] trial court 

is presumed to have thoroughly weighed all 

the evidence, considered the statutory 

requirements, and made its determination 

based on the child's best interests." 

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 

128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) (citation omitted). "The trial 

court's judgment, 'when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will 

not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it'" Id. (Citation omitted). 

 Although Seidl alleges that DSS sought to terminate her 

parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), the record 

demonstrates that it relied upon Code § 16.1-283(C). That 

provision provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

 The residual parental rights of a parent or 

parents of a child placed in foster care as a 

result of court commitment, an entrustment 

agreement entered into by the parent or 

parents or other voluntary relinquishment by 

the parent or parents may be terminated if 

the court finds, based upon clear and 

convincing evidence, that it is in the best 

interests of the child and that: 

 

* * * * * * * 

 2. The parent or parents, without good cause, 

have been unwilling or unable within a 

reasonable period not to exceed twelve months 
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to remedy substantially the conditions which 

led to the child's foster care placement, 

notwithstanding the reasonable and 

appropriate efforts of social, medical, 

mental health or other rehabilitative 

agencies to such end. 

 Evidence that the parent failed, without good cause, "to 

make reasonable progress towards the elimination of the 

conditions which led to the child's foster care placement in 

accordance with . . . a [jointly designed and agreed upon] 

foster care plan" is prima facie evidence that the parent was 

unwilling or unable to substantially remedy the underlying 

conditions. Code § 16.1-283(C)(3)(b). 

 DSS became involved with appellant in December 1993 when it 

received a complaint that the child appeared at day care with a 

black eye. Seidl allegedly caused the injury. The agency had 

difficulty locating Seidl and the child, but did not believe the 

case warranted an emergency removal. However, in the summer of 

1994, DSS initiated an emergency removal when the child could not 

be located and Seidl refused to disclose his whereabouts. 

 The evidence presented by DSS indicated that, from the 

initial contact with DSS, Seidl was uncooperative, angry, and 

distrustful. She was verbally abusive towards DSS employees and 

others, and made derogatory comments even in front of the child. 

 The extent of Seidl's distrust and anger was apparent in her 

trial testimony, where she indicated that she believed numerous 

witnesses for DSS lied. 

 Seidl refused to assist in the development of the foster 
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care plan. Under the plan developed by DSS and approved by the 

court, Seidl was to take a parenting class and receive 

psychological testing. DSS also sought to evaluate her in-home 

parenting skills. Seidl completed a STEP parenting class and 

submitted to psychological testing. She also entered into 

individual counseling. Despite repeated counseling sessions in 

both individual and group settings, Seidl did not acknowledge any 

problems with herself or take any responsibility for her child's 

removal. She continued to blame others for her problems. 

 While Seidl was willing to work with certain training and 

mental health professionals, she remained unwilling to cooperate 

with DSS personnel in any way. In an effort to overcome this 

problem, DSS arranged for an outside agency to provide in-home 

parenting services to Seidl. However, Seidl did not cooperate 

with the new service provider, and the funding for this service 

was canceled. One year later, in December 1995, Seidl wrote to 

the service provider and expressed a willingness to cooperate. 

 DSS believed it was necessary to observe Seidl at home with 

the child to ensure that the child could be returned to her 

safely. Neither DSS nor the alternative service provider was 

ever able to observe Seidl's in-home parenting skills because of 

her resistance. Seidl's lack of cooperation led DSS to seek to 

terminate her parental rights. 

 The evidence demonstrated that a return to Seidl's care was 

not in the child's best interests. The child came into foster 
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care with emotional and psychological problems. Evidence of 

those problems belied Seidl's testimony that the child's only 

problem was that he was anxious after being taken from her 

abruptly and placed elsewhere without familiar toys or clothes. 

When the child came into foster care, he was angry, 

hypervigilant, and insecure. When stressed, the child acted out. 

 His therapist testified that the child did not feel that he 

could trust Seidl and did not feel safe with her. The therapist 

indicated that "[t]here was clearly a pattern, chaotic, 

unpredictable way of living, or caretaking for him that affected 

him, that continued to affect him today." 

 At the time of trial, the child had improved. He was 

calmer, was able to talk about his feelings, and was able to turn 

to his caretakers to seek relief when stressed. His therapist 

testified, however, that he "still has emotional behavior 

problems, that he's going to be troubled with it quite a while 

into the future," and that he needed a stable home with strong 

parents. The child expressed clearly that he did not feel safe 

with Seidl and was frightened by the idea of contact with her. 

According to the therapist, the continuing uncertainty of where 

the child would live placed the child at risk for "more anxiety, 

more difficulty in trusting, more defenses . . . ." 

 Despite the many services offered to Seidl by DSS, the 

trial court found that DSS had established, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that Seidl "failed without good cause to 
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remedy substantially the conditions which led to the child's 

foster care placement within a reasonable period." The court 

also found that the best interests of the child required 

termination of Seidl's parental rights. This finding is not 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. 

 The statute clearly contemplates that 

efforts to resolve the "conditions" relevant 

to termination are constrained by time. Code 

§ 16.1-283(C)(2). Absent "good cause," a 

parent or parents receiving the "reasonable 

and appropriate" services of "rehabilitative 

agencies" must "remedy substantially" the 

"conditions which led to . . . foster care" 

of the child in a "reasonable period not to 

exceed twelve months." Id. This provision 

protects the family unit and attendant rights 

of both parents and child, while assuring 

resolution of the parent/child relationship 

without interminable delay. "It is clearly 

not in the best interests of a child to spend 

a lengthy period of time waiting to find out 

when, or even if, a parent will be capable of 

resuming . . . responsibilities." 

Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 312, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) 

(other citations omitted). 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.