This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-1899

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Nathaniel Donald Beulah, 

Appellant.

Filed August 1, 2016

Affirmed

Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-13-39779

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Daniel Guerrero, Meshbesher & Spence, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Johnson, 

Judge.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JOHNSON, Judge

A Hennepin County jury found Nathaniel Donnie Beulah1 guilty of first-degree 

criminal sexual conduct based on evidence that he sexually abused a stepgranddaughter. 

Beulah argues that the district court erred by admitting Spreigl evidence at trial and by 

denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure at sentencing. We affirm.

FACTS

Between 1999 and 2003, Beulah and C.T. lived together in a home in Minneapolis. 

Several of Beulah’s children, C.T.’s children, and their joint children lived in the home

during that period of time. Other relatives and friends were frequent visitors and overnight

guests. 

In 2013, Beulah was accused of sexually abusing two girls who lived in his home 

years earlier. One of those girls is J.T., who was a stepdaughter of a son of C.T. J.T. 

moved into Beulah’s home with her mother, stepfather, and younger brother in 1999, when 

she was five years old. J.T. and her three family members moved out in 2000 into a home 

that was a short distance away. Beulah and C.T. continued to care for J.T. before and after 

school, on some weekends, and during the summertime, until J.T. was nine or ten years 

old. J.T. viewed Beulah as a grandfather and often stayed overnight in Beulah’s home. 

 

1The record indicates that appellant’s middle name actually is Donnie, even though 

the caption of the complaint says Donald. Before trial, the state moved to amend the 

complaint to identify Beulah as Nathaniel Donnie Beulah, and the district court granted the 

motion. But the district court continued to use the original caption in its subsequent orders, 

and this court’s caption follows the district court caption.
3

J.T. testified at trial that Beulah began sexually abusing her in 2000 when she was 

approximately five years old. The first incident of sexual abuse that she remembers 

occurred when she stayed at Beulah’s home for an overnight visit while her mother was 

away. She was lying on a mattress on the main level of the home when Beulah entered the 

room, sat next to her, and touched her vagina with his hand. The last incident of sexual 

abuse that J.T. remembers occurred in approximately 2003, when she was eight or nine 

years old. Beulah brought J.T. downstairs to his basement bathroom, which was connected 

to his bedroom. Beulah removed her clothes and rubbed his penis on her vagina. J.T. 

believes that Beulah tried to insert his penis into her vagina but was interrupted by a knock 

on the bedroom door. Beulah sexually abused J.T. frequently in between the first and last 

incidents by touching her chest and vagina, both over and under her clothes. Although 

Beulah’s basement bedroom generally was off limits to all others, Beulah often lured J.T. 

to the basement by offering her money, candy, or a treat. The abuse often occurred when 

Beulah was the only adult at home. If other persons were present in the home, they were 

upstairs on the main level or the upper level. J.T. did not tell anyone about the abuse 

because she was afraid that Beulah would hurt her or her family. 

Beulah also was accused of sexually abusing J.B., who is C.T.’s daughter. J.B. 

moved into Beulah’s home as an infant and lived there throughout her childhood. During 

the period when she was sexually abused, J.B. lived with her mother, Beulah, four siblings, 

and several other persons. J.B. moved out in 2003 or 2004, when she was 18 or 19 years 

old, after she told Beulah that she would move out of the home if he did not move out. 
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J.B. testified at trial that, at the time Beulah sexually abused her, she believed that 

he was her biological father. When J.B. was 13, Beulah told her that he wanted to teach 

her about sex. Beulah typically sexually abused her in the afternoon, when her mother was 

at work. The abuse often occurred while she and Beulah were watching television in 

Beulah’s bedroom. Beulah often would remove her clothing and touch her vagina with his 

hands. The abuse intensified until Beulah touched her vagina with his penis. The sexual 

abuse ended when J.B. refused to go into Beulah’s bedroom with him. J.B. told no one 

about the abuse because Beulah “asked [her] not to.” J.B. also testified that she once 

entered Beulah’s bedroom and saw Beulah on top of J.T. 

In April 2013, an event triggered J.T.’s memory of her sexual abuse. After 

discussing the issue with her mother, J.T. reported the abuse to the police. Shortly 

thereafter, J.T.’s mother spoke with J.B. about J.T.’s report. As a result of that 

conversation, J.B. reported to the police that Beulah also had sexually abused her on 

multiple occasions in 1998 and 1999, when she was approximately 13 and 14 years old. 

In December 2013, the state charged Beulah in a single complaint with criminal 

conduct toward both J.T. and J.B. The complaint alleged three offenses: (1) first-degree 

criminal sexual conduct toward J.B., in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) 

(1998); (2) first-degree criminal sexual conduct toward J.T., in violation of Minn. Stat. 

§ 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2002); and (3) second-degree criminal sexual conduct toward J.B.,

in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(b) (1998). 
5

In July 2014, Beulah moved to sever counts 1 and 3 from count 2. The district court 

granted the motion. This appeal is concerned solely with subsequent proceedings on count 

2, which alleged criminal sexual conduct toward J.T.

Before trial, the state moved to admit Spreigl evidence of Beulah’s alleged sexual 

abuse of J.B. to show Beulah’s intent, absence of mistake, and common scheme or plan

with respect to J.T. Beulah opposed the state’s motion. At the outset of trial, the district 

court granted the state’s motion, thereby allowing J.B. to testify that Beulah had sexually 

abused her. 

The case was tried to a jury on seven days in July 2015. The state called five 

witnesses: J.T., J.B., J.T.’s mother, C.T., and a police sergeant. Beulah testified at trial and 

denied sexually abusing either J.T. or J.B. Beulah also called six other witnesses: four of 

his children, a former girlfriend of one of his children, and a crime-scene investigator. The 

jury found Beulah guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct toward J.T. 

Before sentencing, Beulah moved for a downward dispositional departure from the 

presumptive guidelines sentencing range. The district court denied the motion and imposed 

a presumptive sentence of 48 months of imprisonment. Beulah appeals. 

D E C I S I O N

I. Spreigl Evidence

Beulah argues that the district court erred by admitting J.B.’s testimony that Beulah 

sexually abused her when she was a child.

Beulah’s argument is governed by a rule of evidence that states, in relevant part:
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Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 

action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible 

for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 

or accident. In a criminal prosecution, such evidence shall not 

be admitted unless . . . the other crime, wrong, or act and the 

participation in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and 

convincing evidence . . . .

Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Evidence of other crimes or bad acts may be admissible to prove a 

common scheme or plan. State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998). Evidence 

of other crimes or bad acts is known in Minnesota as “Spreigl evidence.” Id. (citing State 

v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965)). A district court must apply a fivepart test to determine whether Spreigl evidence is admissible. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Such 

evidence is admissible if:

1) the prosecutor gives notice of its intent to admit the evidence 

consistent with the rules of criminal procedure; 2) the 

prosecutor clearly indicates what the evidence will be offered 

to prove; 3) the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation 

in it by a relevant person are proven by clear and convincing 

evidence; 4) the evidence is relevant to the prosecutor’s case; 

and 5) the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed 

by its potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant.

Minn. R. Evid. 404(b); see also State v. Ness, 707 N.W.2d 676, 685-86 (Minn. 2006). This 

court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s admission of 

Spreigl evidence. State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 345 (Minn. 2007). 

In this case, there is no dispute that the state has satisfied the first, second, and third 

requirements of the five-part test. Beulah challenges the admission of the state’s Spreigl 

evidence under the fourth and fifth requirements. 
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A. Relevance

Beulah contends that the district court erred by finding that the state’s Spreigl 

evidence is relevant to the state’s case. 

When offering its Spreigl evidence, the state asserted that the evidence is relevant 

to prove Beulah’s intent, the absence of mistake, and a common scheme or plan. The 

district court found the state’s Spreigl evidence relevant for the asserted purposes. The 

district court specifically found the Spreigl evidence relevant due to similarities between 

the abuse of J.B. and J.T. in terms of the ages of the victims, the lack of a nearby parent, 

the escalation from “non-criminal” touching to genital touching, the time frame of the 

abuse, Beulah’s means of coercing compliance, and Beulah’s efforts to keep the conduct 

secret.

We begin by addressing the relevance of the state’s Spreigl evidence to the common 

scheme or plan exception. To be relevant under this exception, Spreigl evidence must have 

a “marked similarity in modus operandi to the charged offense.” Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 687-

88. “[I]f the prior crime is simply of the same generic type as the charged offense, it 

ordinarily should be excluded.” Clark, 738 N.W.2d at 346 (alteration in original) 

(quotation omitted). It is well established that, in prosecutions for sexual abuse, Spreigl 

evidence may be admitted under the common scheme or plan exception to establish that a 

sexual act occurred. Id.; State v. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Minn. 1993). 

In particular, if a defendant contends that a charge of criminal sexual conduct is a 

fabrication, Spreigl evidence is admissible to rebut that contention so long as the evidence 

is “sufficiently relevant to the charged crime.” Clark, 738 N.W.2d at 346.
8

Our comparison of the testimony of J.T. and the testimony of J.B. reveals that the 

two witnesses described sexual abuse that was very similar. Each girl was a family member

or relative of Beulah. Each girl was abused in Beulah’s home when he typically was the 

only adult present or when other persons were in other areas of the home. Each girl was 

abused in Beulah’s basement bedroom, a room where others were specifically excluded. 

Each girl’s abuse escalated to Beulah’s placing or rubbing his penis on the girl’s vagina. 

Beulah used his familial authority over each girl to influence or threaten her into keeping 

the abuse a secret. In these ways, the sexual abuse of J.T. and J.B. share marked similarities 

in modus operandi. The facts of this case are comparable to Kennedy, in which the supreme 

court affirmed the admission of Spreigl evidence in a sexual-assault case to show common 

scheme or plan because the conduct in each situation was “nearly identical” and occurred 

in the same bedroom. 585 N.W.2d at 391.

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that J.B.’s 

testimony is relevant to show that Beulah committed criminal sexual conduct against J.T. 

and J.B. according to a common scheme or plan. Because we conclude that the Spreigl 

evidence is relevant for that purpose, we need not consider whether the evidence is relevant 

for the other reasons asserted by the state.

B. Probative Value and Unfair Prejudice

Beulah also contends that the district court erred by finding that the probative value 

of the state’s Spreigl evidence substantially outweighs the potential for unfair prejudice. 

Specifically, he contends that the probative value of the Spreigl evidence was low and that 
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the state’s Spreigl evidence was unfairly prejudicial because it “invit[ed] the jury to punish 

[him] for acts other than the offense charged.”

In determining whether the probative value of Spreigl evidence outweighs its 

prejudicial impact, we balance the relevance of the evidence and “the State’s need to 

strengthen weak or inadequate proof” against the risk that the evidence will be used as 

propensity evidence. State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 319 (Minn. 2009). In this case, 

the probative value was relatively high. As discussed above, the state’s Spreigl evidence 

tended to show that Beulah committed criminal sexual conduct against both J.T. and J.B. 

according to a common scheme or plan. See supra part I.A. Beulah suggests that the state 

did not need to corroborate J.T.’s testimony with J.B.’s testimony because J.T.’s testimony 

alone was sufficient to prove the state’s case. But Beulah acknowledges that there was no 

physical evidence of the alleged sexual abuse and that J.T. reported it years afterward. In 

addition, Beulah denied having any sexual contact with J.T., thereby implying that J.T. 

fabricated the accusation. For these reasons, the state’s Spreigl evidence had significant 

probative value in light of the state’s need to prove its case. See Clark, 738 N.W.2d at 346; 

Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 391-92; Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d at 242; State v. Rucker, 

752 N.W.2d 538, 550-51 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008). 

Beulah relies on Ness, in which the supreme court concluded that the state’s Spreigl 

evidence that the defendant had sexually abused a child in the past was unfairly prejudicial. 

Ness, 707 N.W.2d at 689-91. But in Ness, the state’s case was particularly strong, in part 

because the state had a credible eyewitness to the alleged abuse. Id. at 690-91. This case 

is distinguishable from Ness because the state had no such evidence. Rather, the 
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circumstances indicate that the state’s need for J.B.’s testimony was not insubstantial. 

Furthermore, the possibility of unfair prejudice was lessened because the district court gave 

the jury two cautionary instructions about the permissible uses of the Spreigl evidence, 

immediately before the state presented the Spreigl evidence and again before the jury began 

deliberating. See State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009) (stating that courts 

“presume a jury follows a court’s cautionary instruction”); Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 392 

(reasoning that cautionary instructions concerning Spreigl evidence lessened probability of 

undue prejudice).

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the 

probative value of J.B.’s testimony evidence substantially outweighs the potential for 

unfair prejudice. Therefore, the district court did not err by granting the state’s motion to 

admit its Spreigl evidence.

II. Downward Dispositional Departure

Beulah also argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a 

downward dispositional departure. 

The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide for a presumptive sentence for a 

felony offense. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.C (2003). The presumptive sentence is 

“presumed to be appropriate for all typical cases sharing criminal history and offense 

severity characteristics.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines app. (2003). Accordingly, a district court 

“shall utilize the presumptive sentence . . . unless the individual case involves substantial 

and compelling circumstances.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D. (2003); see also State v. 

Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). If the district court departs from the presumptive 
11

guidelines range, the district court is required to state the reason or reasons for the 

departure. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D. But if the district court does not depart, the district 

court is not required to state reasons for imposing a guidelines sentence. State v. Johnson, 

831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013); State v. 

Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985).

A district court may grant a downward dispositional departure from the presumptive 

guidelines range if a defendant has a “particular amenability to individualized treatment in 

a probationary setting.” State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982). In considering 

whether a defendant is particularly amenable to probation so as to justify a downward 

dispositional departure, a district court may consider, among other things, “the defendant’s 

age, his prior record, his remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the 

support of friends and/or family.” Id. If the defendant requests a downward dispositional 

departure, the district court must “deliberately consider[]” the factors that are urged by a 

defendant in support of the motion. State v. Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn. App. 

2002), review denied (Minn. Apr. 16, 2002). This court applies a very deferential standard 

of review to a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for a downward dispositional 

departure. See State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006). This court will reverse 

such a decision only if the district court abused its discretion. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 

251, 253 (Minn. App. 2011).

In this case, Beulah argued that a downward dispositional departure is appropriate 

because he has been law abiding since offending, was cooperative with the district court, 

has the support of family and friends, and has no conditional-release violations. Beulah 
12

also argued that incarceration would not be suitable for him because he was 65 years old, 

in poor health, and suffering from cognitive deficits. The state opposed Beulah’s motion 

and urged the district court to impose an executed sentence of 48 months of imprisonment, 

which was the presumptive guidelines sentence at the time of the offense. See Minn. Sent. 

Guidelines IV & V (2003). The state argued that Beulah is not amenable to probation 

because he has not accepted responsibility for the crime or apologized to J.T. and, thus, is 

unlikely to be rehabilitated in a probationary program. 

At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it had 

reviewed everything that had been submitted, which included a pre-sentence investigation 

report, a psychosexual-evaluation report, Beulah’s memorandum of law, and numerous 

letters from relatives. During the sentencing hearing, the district court received victimimpact statements from J.T., J.T.’s mother, and J.B. The district court received an oral 

statement from C.T. in support of Beulah and allowed Beulah to make a personal statement.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it was 

“deeply impressed by both the testimony of [J.T.] and [J.B.]” and that “[i]t was clear . . . 

that the impact of that offense is deep and long-lasting.” Addressing Beulah directly, the 

district court stated: “Despite all of the good that you have done in your life, I cannot find 

substantial and compelling reasons to depart. To do so would undervalue the criminality 

of the offense of which you have been convicted.” These and other aspects of the record 

indicate that the district court “deliberately considered” the relevant factors and exercised 

its discretion when it denied Beulah’s motion. See Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d at 483. No more 
13

was required of the district court. See Johnson, 831 N.W.2d at 925; Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 

at 80.

Beulah contends that the district court erred because it ignored the opinions stated 

in a psychosexual-evaluation report. In that report, a psychologist recommended that 

Beulah participate in outpatient sex offender treatment. Beulah’s contention is inconsistent 

with the caselaw, which recognizes that a district court is not obligated to depart merely 

because a mitigating factor is present. See Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d at 668; Kindem, 313 

N.W.2d at 7-8; Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 253-54. This court recently reiterated that “the 

presence of factors supporting departure does not require departure.” State v. Abrahamson, 

758 N.W.2d 332, 337 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). This case 

is similar to Abrahamson, in which the district court denied a motion for a downward 

dispositional departure despite a doctor’s opinion that the defendant, who was convicted 

of criminal sexual conduct against a child, had a low risk of reoffending. Id. at 335-36. 

The district court acknowledged that there was “some hope” for treatment of the defendant 

and that his lack of a criminal history supported a dispositional departure. Id. at 336. 

Nonetheless, the district court emphasized the serious nature of the defendant’s crime and 

the need for punishment by way of incarceration. Id. This court affirmed the denial of the 

motion for a downward dispositional departure. Id. at 337. Likewise, in this case, despite 

the presence of factors that might support a downward dispositional departure, the district 

court deliberately considered Beulah’s arguments and exercised its discretion by 

concluding that a downward dispositional departure is inappropriate. The only question 
14

for this court is whether the district court abused its discretion, and we conclude that it did 

not do so.

Thus, the district court did not err by denying Beulah’s motion for a downward 

dispositional departure.

Affirmed.