-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

ALI AHMAD BAKRI, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

June 21, 2016 

v No. 326109 

Wayne Circuit Court 

SENTINEL INSURANCE COMPANY, also 

known as HARTFORD CASUALTY 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

LC No. 13-006364-NI 

 Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

YOUSSEF FTOUNI, 

 Defendant. 

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and SAAD and BORRELLO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant Sentinel Insurance Company (Sentinel) appeals the trial court’s order that 

denied its motion for summary disposition in this insurance coverage dispute. We reverse and 

remand for entry of summary disposition in favor of Sentinel. 

 This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on March 8, 2012, between 

plaintiff and defendant Youssef Ftouni, in which plaintiff suffered injuries. Plaintiff filed a 

complaint against Ftouni and claimed that Ftouni’s negligence was the direct and proximate 

cause of the serious impairment of bodily function he sustained in the accident. He also named 

Sentinel as a defendant because it issued him an underinsured motorist (UIM) policy, under 

which it was obligated to pay the damages that exceed Ftouni’s own insurance policy limits.1

 

The case was submitted to the Mediation Tribunal for case evaluation, and the panel 

 

1

 The UIM policy identifies Caffina Coffee, Inc., as the named insured. The policy also provides 

that if the named insured is a corporation, then the term “insureds” includes anyone occupying a 

covered automobile. It is undisputed that plaintiff is an insured under the policy. 
-2- 

recommended two awards in favor of plaintiff: $100,000 (Ftouni’s policy limit) against Ftouni, 

and $100,000 against Sentinel. On September 17, 2014, the Mediation Tribunal mailed a 

notification of case evaluation results, which indicated that plaintiff and Ftouni both accepted the 

award regarding plaintiff’s negligence claim. The notice also indicated that plaintiff and Sentinel 

rejected the award regarding plaintiff’s UIM claim. 

 After the notice of the evaluation results was issued, Sentinel advised plaintiff that his 

UIM claim was barred under a policy exclusion that precluded coverage for any claim settled 

without Sentinel’s consent. According to Sentinel, the exclusion was triggered when plaintiff 

accepted the case evaluation award against Ftouni without requesting or obtaining Sentinel’s 

consent. Plaintiff filed a motion for declaratory relief and sought an order that indicated that his 

case evaluation acceptance did not impact his UIM claim. Alternatively, plaintiff requested that 

his case evaluation acceptance be set aside. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion and, 

pursuant to MCR 2.403(M), entered judgment against Ftouni in accordance with the case 

evaluation award. 

 Sentinel then moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and argued 

that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff’s claim was barred by the 

plain language of the UIM policy. In his response, plaintiff argued that the exclusion that 

Sentinel relied upon contained an exception, which provided that a claim is not excluded if the 

insured gives prompt written notice of a tentative settlement to Sentinel. Plaintiff alleged that 

summary disposition was inappropriate because his case evaluation acceptance should be 

construed as a tentative settlement and the exception was satisfied by the written notification of 

results provided by the Mediation Tribunal, as well as a letter his counsel mailed to Sentinel on 

October 6, 2014. The trial court denied Sentinel’s motion and reasoned that any ambiguity in the 

policy’s language should be construed against its drafter, Sentinel. 

 On appeal, Sentinel argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the exclusion 

in its policy did not preclude plaintiff’s claim. We agree. 

 This Court reviews rulings on summary disposition motions de novo. Dancey v 

Travelers Prop Cas Co, 288 Mich App 1, 7; 792 NW2d 372 (2010). Under this subrule, a court 

considers “the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant record evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. The trial court may grant the motion for summary 

disposition only if “there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the 

record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon 

which reasonable minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 

468 (2003). Further, “[t]he construction and interpretation of an insurance policy and whether 

the policy language is ambiguous are questions of law, which we also review de novo on 

appeal.” Dancey, 288 Mich App at 7. 

 “Insurance policies are contracts and, in the absence of an applicable statute, are subject 

to the same contract construction principles that apply to any other species of contract.” Titan 

Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547, 554; 817 NW2d 562 (2012) (citation and quotation marks 

omitted). Unlike personal protection insurance, UIM insurance is not required by statute in 

Michigan. Dawson v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 293 Mich App 563, 568; 810 NW2d 
-3- 

106 (2011). Accordingly, the terms of the UIM policy itself “generally determine the 

circumstances under which benefits will be awarded.” Klida v Braman, 278 Mich App 60, 62; 

748 NW2d 244 (2008). Under traditional principles of contract interpretation, “unless a contract 

provision violates law or one of the traditional defenses to the enforceability of a contract 

applies, a court must construe and apply unambiguous contract provisions as written.” Rory v 

Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 461; 703 NW2d 23 (2005). Although exclusionary clauses 

should be construed in the insured’s favor, an exclusion that is specific and clear must be 

enforced. Hunt v Drielick, 496 Mich 366, 373; 852 NW2d 562 (2014). 

 The relevant portions of the UIM policy at issue in this matter provide the following: 

A. Coverage 

1. We will pay all sums the “insured” is legally entitled to recover as 

compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an “uninsured[2] motor 

vehicle.” The damages must result from “bodily injury” sustained by the 

“insured” caused by an “accident.” The owner’s or driver’s liability for these 

damages must result from the ownership, maintenance or use of the “uninsured 

motor vehicle.” 

2. With respect to damages resulting from an “accident” with . . . [an] 

“uninsured motor vehicle,” we will pay under this coverage only if Paragraph a.

or b. below applies: 

* * * 

b. A tentative settlement has been made between an “insured” and 

the insurer of . . . [an] “uninsured motor vehicle” and we: 

(1) Have been given prompt written notice of such tentative 

settlement; and 

(2) Advance payment to the “insured” in an amount equal 

to the tentative settlement within 30 days after receipt of 

notification. 

* * * 

C. Exclusions 

This insurance does not apply to any of the following: 

 

2

 The policy refers to “uninsured” motor vehicles but includes “underinsured” motor vehicles 

within the definition of an “uninsured motor vehicle.” 
-4- 

1. Any claim settled without our consent. However, this exclusion does 

not apply to a settlement made with the insurer of . . . [an] “uninsured motor 

vehicle,” in accordance with the procedures described in Paragraph A.2.b.

 Regardless of how the settlement was reached in this matter, there is little question that 

plaintiff has, in fact, settled his claim with Ftouni, the underinsured driver. Plaintiff and Ftouni 

both accepted case evaluation, and the trial court entered judgment against Ftouni in accordance 

with the case evaluation award. Paragraph C.1 of the UIM policy states that Sentinel’s coverage 

does not extend to any claim settled without its consent, unless the settlement is entered in 

compliance with the procedures outlined in ¶ A.2.b. The parties do not dispute that plaintiff 

settled his claim with Ftouni without Sentinel’s consent. Therefore, under the clear language of 

¶ C.1, plaintiff’s claim is excluded unless he satisfied the procedures in ¶ A.2.b. 

 Sentinel contends that plaintiff cannot rely on the ¶ A.2.b exception because compliance 

with that section is only possible where the insured has entered a “tentative settlement,” and 

plaintiff’s case evaluation acceptance was not a “tentative settlement.” Plaintiff, on the other 

hand, argues that the phrase “tentative settlement” is ambiguous, and should therefore be 

construed in his favor to include case evaluation acceptance. “In ascertaining the meaning of a 

contract, we give the words used in the contract their plain and ordinary meaning that would be 

apparent to a reader of the instrument.” Rory, 473 Mich at 464. Additionally, a contract term is 

not ambiguous merely because it is not defined within the contract. Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen 

Ins Co of Mich, 284 Mich App 513, 515; 773 NW2d 758 (2009). “While we construe the 

contract in favor of the insured if an ambiguity is found, this does not mean that the plain 

meaning of a word or phrase should be perverted, or that a word or phrase, the meaning of which 

is specific and well recognized, should be given some alien construction merely for the purpose 

of benefitting an insured.” Henderson v State Farm Fire & Cas Co, 460 Mich 348, 354; 596 

NW2d 190 (1999) (citation omitted). 

 Mutual case evaluation acceptance cannot reasonably be construed as a “tentative 

settlement.” In determining the common meaning of a word or phrase, this Court may refer to a 

dictionary definition. Vushaj, 284 Mich App at 515. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary

defines the term “tentative” as “not fully worked out or developed.” Merriam-Webster’s 

Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed). By contrast, this Court has indicated that the purpose of case 

evaluation is to “expedite and simplify the final settlement of cases.” Magdich & Assoc, PC v 

Novi Dev Assoc LLC, 305 Mich App 272, 276-277; 851 NW2d 585 (2014) (emphasis added; 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “An accepted [case] evaluation serves as a final 

adjudication . . . and is therefore binding on the parties similar to a consent judgment or 

settlement agreement.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, if case evaluation 

acceptance is akin to a consent judgment or settlement agreement and intended to facilitate final 

settlements, a settlement reached by way of case evaluation cannot reasonably be characterized 

as “not fully worked out or developed.” 

 Moreover, even if this Court accepted plaintiff’s argument that the settlement was 

“tentative” and that he was able to avail himself of the ¶ A.2.b exception to avoid exclusion of 

his claim, the procedures outlined in that section were not satisfied in this case. Paragraph A.2.b 
-5- 

provides that Sentinel will pay UIM benefits when its insured reaches a tentative settlement with 

the insurer of an underinsured motor vehicle, but only if two conditions are met: (1) Sentinel is 

given prompt written notice of the tentative settlement, and (2) Sentinel advances the amount of 

the tentative settlement to its insured within 30 days. The first requirement was fulfilled: 

Sentinel received written notice of the settlement by way of the Mediation Tribunal’s September 

17, 2014, notification of results, as well as plaintiff’s October 6, 2014, correspondence. 

However, the second requirement remains unsatisfied because there is no dispute that Sentinel 

never advanced payment of the case evaluation award to plaintiff.3

 In sum, because Sentinel did not consent to plaintiff’s settlement with Ftouni, the trial 

court erred when it concluded that Sentinel was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. An 

exclusion that is specific and clear must be enforced, Hunt, 496 Mich at 373, and the plain 

language of ¶ C.1 excludes plaintiff’s claim for UIM benefits. Additionally, giving the benefit of 

reasonable doubt to plaintiff regarding the “tentative” nature of mutual case evaluation 

acceptance, there is no question that ¶ A.2.b was not satisfied because Sentinel did not advance 

the settlement funds within 30 days of receiving notice of the settlement. 

 Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of Sentinel. We do not 

retain jurisdiction. Sentinel, as the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219. 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

 

3

 Plaintiff’s contention that the requirement in ¶ A.2.b(2) renders the contract illusory lacks 

merit. The items listed in ¶¶ A.2.b(1) and (2) are express conditions. The mere fact that express 

conditions might have been necessary to meet before Sentinel would be obligated to act on its 

promise to pay UIM benefits does not render the promise illusory or affect its validity as 

consideration. See Omni Group, Inc v Seattle-First Nat’l Bank, 32 Wash App 22, 25; 645 P2d 

727 (1982) (“But that a promise given for a promise is dependent upon a condition does not 

necessarily render it illusory or affect its validity as consideration.”). Moreover, plaintiff ignores 

the fact that he would not have needed to rely on the procedures in ¶ A.2.b if he had sought 

Sentinel’s consent to settle before accepting case evaluation. Had plaintiff received Sentinel’s 

consent, his claim would not have been excluded under ¶ C.1, and the claim’s continued viability 

would not depend on Sentinel’s refusal to advance the settlement funds.