alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-6845

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

WENDELL WOOD, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District 

Judge. (2:93-cr-00090-3) 

Submitted: August 28, 2009 Decided: September 10, 2009 

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Wendell Wood, Appellant Pro Se. Howard Jacob Zlotnick, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Wendell Wood appeals the district court’s orders 

summarily denying his motion to reopen the appeal period and 

motion for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and 

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the orders of 

the district court. See United States v. Wood, No. 2:93-cr00090-3 (E.D. Va. filed Mar. 13, 2009 & entered Mar. 16, 2009; 

filed Apr. 16, 2009 & entered Apr. 17, 2009). We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before the court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF CLARK-SCHWEBEL HOLDINGS INC. FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED
JULY 4, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS<F1>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JAN-02-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-04-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUL-04-1998
<CASH>                                          14,175
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   22,153
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                     35,799
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                72,742
<PP&E>                                          74,565
<DEPRECIATION>                                  16,623
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 243,993
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           40,625
<BONDS>                                        155,994
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         9,000
<OTHER-SE>                                      14,657
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   243,993
<SALES>                                        111,664
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               111,664
<CGS>                                           84,546
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   84,546
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 8,018
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,885
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 10,215
<INCOME-TAX>                                     4,090
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              8,646
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     8,646
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<FN>
<F1>The results of operations for the six months ended July 4, 1998 represent
the results of Clark-Schwebel Holdings, Inc. ("Company") for the period of
January 4, 1998 through July 4, 1998 (successor company). A change in ownership
resulted from a leveraged buyout on April 17, 1996, and the transaction resulted
in a new basis of accounting for the Company. Therefore, the results of
operations for the six months ended July 4, 1998 are not fully comparable to
preceding reporting periods. This schedule contains summary financial
information from the Company's financial statements and is qualified in its
entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE HOUSTON EXPLORATION COMPANY SET FORTH IN THE
COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 AND IS
QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                           2,373
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   75,412
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      1,462
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                80,795
<PP&E>                                       1,252,345
<DEPRECIATION>                                 582,244
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 753,685
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           64,582
<BONDS>                                        274,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           293
<OTHER-SE>                                     347,377
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   753,685
<SALES>                                        168,930
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               170,181
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   91,982
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,752
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,115
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 67,332
<INCOME-TAX>                                    22,889
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             44,443
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    44,443
<EPS-BASIC>                                       1.62
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.60


</TABLE>
CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY

#### Hugh V. Clark v. Donald Long

August 25, 1971

Case No. (Law) 10305

By JUDGE WALTER T. MCCARTHY

This case is before the Court on a motion of the defendant to dismiss because process was served more than one year after the commencement of the action and a motion to strike the motion to dismiss.

The action was begun in January, 1965. Process was served in November, 1966, more than one year after the commencement of the action.

The defendant’s motion to dismiss is based upon the one-year prohibition contained in the last paragraph of Rule 3:3 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals which reads as follows:

> No judgment shall be entered against a defendant who was served with process more than one year after the commencement of the action against him unless the court finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due diligence to have timely service on him.

Undisputed service was effectuated upon the defendant on January 22, 1971. The defendant’s motion to dismiss was filed March 2, 1971, admittedly 21 days after that service.

*423The plaintiff has moved to strike the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The claim is that the motion to dismiss is in effect a plea in abatement, required to be filed within 21 days of service without exception; or that at least it is a pleading in response to the plaintiff’s notice of motion and therefore had to be filed within 21 days, Rule 3:5, or after good cause shown and extension granted. (Rule 3:13)

The Court disagrees with the contention of the plaintiff made upon his motion to strike. The motion of the defendant is not a plea in abatement. Its object is not to require the plaintiff to correct a writ or anything else. It is a plea to the jurisdiction or power of the Court to enter a judgment. It is very similar to the statute applicable to practice under the old rules Section 6079 of the Code of 1919 requiring the Clerk to dismiss if a Bill or Declaration was not filed within one month after service. The effect was automatic and could only be avoided by a showing of good cause. The burden was upon the plaintiff to show good cause.

The effect of Rule 3:3 is automatic. No motion by the defendant is necessary. The burden of initiative is upon the plaintiff, he must not only show diligence he must seek the opportunity to show. If he does not the Court may act sua sponte or ex mero motu. The motion to strike the defendant’s motion is denied.

The plaintiff has here been given the opportunity to show diligence and in the opinion of the Court he has failed. He had the opportunity before he sought service upon the Commissioner in November 1966, to proceed by filing the affidavit referred to in the last paragraph of Section 8-67.2 to obtain service. He did not take advantage of this provision of the Code.

The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiff has not brought himself within the exception provided. The motion to dismiss will be granted.
Amendment No. 1 to the Change in Control Agreement for Thomas H. Caudle, Jr.



 Exhibit 10.3 
 AMENDMENT NO. 1 
 TO THE 

CHANGE IN CONTROL AGREEMENT FOR THOMAS H. CAUDLE, JR. 

This Amendment No. 1, effective the 31st day of December, 2011, to the Change in Control Agreement for THOMAS H. CAULDE, JR., dated August 14, 2009 (the
“Agreement”) between Unifi, Inc. (the “Company”) and THOMAS H. CAULDE, JR. (the “Executive”). 

WHEREAS, the Agreement provides certain severance benefits in the event the Executive’s employment is terminated without
“Cause” or the Executive resigns for “Good Reason” following a “Change in Control” of the Company (as such terms are defined in the Agreement); 
 WHEREAS, in accordance with Section 14(a) of the Agreement, the Company may amend the Agreement at any time; and 
 WHEREAS, the Company now desires to amend the Agreement to extend the term of the Agreement for an additional three years and to make certain other clarifications. 

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED THAT, the Agreement is hereby amended as follows, effective December 31, 2011: 

1. Section 1(a) of the Agreement is hereby amended by striking the phrase “December 31, 2011” and replacing it with
“December 31, 2014”. 
 2. Section 3(e) of the Agreement is amended by replacing the first sentence as follows: 

“Following a Change in Control and during the term of this Agreement, the Executive may terminate the Executive’s employment for
Good Reason.” 
 3. Section 4(b) of the Agreement is amended by replacing the last sentence as follows: 

“The determination of any reduction in the severance payments under this Section 4 pursuant to the foregoing proviso shall be
made by the Company’s Independent Certified Public Accountants, and their decision shall be conclusive and binding on the Company and the Executive.” 
 4. In all other respects not amended, the Agreement is hereby ratified and confirmed. 
 * * * Signature Page to Follow * * * 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment No. 1 to
be executed on this the 3rd day of January, 2012.

  

			
	UNIFI, INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ CHARLES F. MCCOY

		 	CHARLES F. MCCOY
		 	Vice President
	
	EXECUTIVE
	
	 /s/ THOMAS H. CAUDLE, JR.

	THOMAS H. CAULDE, JR.
**EXHIBIT 23.1****CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**     We have issued our report dated April 6, 2006 (except for Note 9, as to which the date isMarch 29, 2007), accompanying the consolidated financial statements of JMAR Technologies, Inc. onForm 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2005. We hereby consent to the incorporation by referenceof said report in the Registration Statements of JMAR Technologies,Inc. on Forms S-3 (File Nos.33-96848 effective August 14, 1996, 333-104640 effective May 23, 2003, 333-110258 effectiveDecember 18, 2003, 333-111993 effective January 29, 2004, 333-112639 effective February 17, 2004,333-122645 effective June 1, 2005 and 333-131354 effective February 14, 2006) and on Forms S-8(File Nos. 333-33902 effective April 3, 2000, 333-33904 effective April 3, 2000, 333-111994effective January 16, 2004, 333-112059 effective January 21, 2004, and 333-112060 effective January21, 2004 333-118189 effective August 13, 2004)./s/ GRANT THORNTON LLPIrvine, California
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-7478

RASHEED OLDS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James E. Gates, 

Magistrate Judge. (5:08-ct-03120-JG)

Submitted: January 15, 2015 Decided: January 21, 2015

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Rasheed Olds, Appellant Pro Se. Tobin Webb Lathan, Joshua Bryan 

Royster, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Rasheed Olds appeals the magistrate judge’s order 

denying relief on his action filed under the Federal Tort Claims 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012). On appeal, we confine our 

review to the issues raised in the Appellant’s brief. See 4th 

Cir. R. 34(b). Because Olds’ informal brief does not 

sufficiently challenge the order’s ruling as to proximate 

causation, an independent basis for the magistrate judge’s 

disposition, Olds has forfeited appellate review of the 

magistrate judge’s order. Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate 

judge’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
### SCWC-18-0000097 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI # I

STATE OF HAWAI # I, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs. FRED E. HOFER, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-18-0000097; CIV. NO. 3DTC-17-013008) ORDER DISMISSING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ( B y : R e c k t e n w a l d , C . J . , N a k a y a m a , M c K e n n a , P o l l a c k , a n d W i l s o n , J J . )



### Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Fred E. Hofer’s application for writ of certiorari is hereby dismissed as untimely. See Hawai # i Revised Statutes § 602-59(c) (Supp. 2017); Hawai # i Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 40.1(a) (2017).

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai # i, August 29, 2019. /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald /s/ Paula A. Nakayama /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna /s/ Richard W. Pollack /s/ Michael D. Wilson Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-18-0000097 29-AUG-2019 09:43 AM
#### In the Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc., Respondent, v Planning Board of Town of Southeast et al., Appellants. In the Matter of Richard Feuerman et al., Respondents, v Planning Board of Town of Southeast et al., Appellants. In the Matter of Croton Watershed Clean Water Coalition, Inc., et al., Respondents, v Planning Board of Town of Southeast et al., Appellants.

Submitted January 22, 2008;

decided February 12, 2008

Motion for reargument denied *[see*9 NY3d 219 (2007)].
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                                                      5
<LEGEND>
(Replace this text with legend, if applicable)
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                                                 0000857615
<NAME>                                  Redwood Equipment Leasing Income Fund
<MULTIPLIER>                                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                          U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                                                <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                             12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                    DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                                        JAN-1-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                         DEC-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                                1
<CASH>                                                 2,772,471
<SECURITIES>                                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                             33,098
<ALLOWANCES>                                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                       2,805,569
<PP&E>                                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                         4,447,393
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                     71,693
<BONDS>                                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                          0
<PREFERRED>                                                    0
<COMMON>                                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                                     0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                           4,447,393
<SALES>                                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         352,538
<CGS>                                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         105,694
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                          246,844
<INCOME-TAX>                                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      246,844
<DISCONTINUED>                                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                                0
<CHANGES>                                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                             246,844
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                              0.000
<EPS-DILUTED>                                              0.000
        


</TABLE>
Exhibit 23.1


          CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-115433 and 333-50371) of our report dated January 20,
2006 on the consolidated balance sheet of Slade's Ferry Bancorp. and
Subsidiary as of December 31, 2005, and the related consolidated statements
of income, changes in stockholders' equity and cash flows for the year then
ended, appearing in this Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended
December 31, 2005 of Slade's Ferry Bancorp.


/s/ Wolf & Company, P.C.


Boston, Massachusetts
March 31, 2006


<PAGE>
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2622 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2622

 To amend title 49, United States Code, to establish a 10-year term of 
   office for any individual appointed as the Assistant Secretary of 
  Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), and for 
                            other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 21, 2011

   Mr. Wolf introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Homeland Security

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title 49, United States Code, to establish a 10-year term of 
   office for any individual appointed as the Assistant Secretary of 
  Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration), and for 
                            other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. APPOINTMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
              (TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION).

    (a) In General.--Section 114(b) of title 49, United States Code, is 
amended to read as follows:
    ``(b) Appointment; Term of Office.--
            ``(1) Appointment.--The head of the Administration shall be 
        the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security (Transportation 
        Security Administration). The Assistant Secretary shall be 
        appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent 
        of the Senate.
            ``(2) Qualifications.--The Assistant Secretary must--
                    ``(A) be a citizen of the United States; and
                    ``(B) have experience in a field directly related 
                to transportation or security.
            ``(3) Term of office.--The term of office of an individual 
        appointed as the Assistant Secretary shall be 10 years. An 
        Assistant Secretary may not serve more than one 10-year 
        term.''.
    (b) Technical Amendments.--Section 114 of such title is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a) by striking ``Department of 
        Transportation'' and inserting ``Department of Homeland 
        Security'';
            (2) in the heading for subsection (m)(1) by striking 
        ``under secretary'' and inserting ``assistant secretary''; and
            (3) by striking ``Under Secretary'' each place it appears 
        and inserting ``Assistant Secretary''.
    (c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to any individual appointed as the Assistant Secretary of 
Homeland Security (Transportation Security Administration) after the 
date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
LAW AND CHANCERY COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK

#### Gimbert v. Rowley

December 9, 1964

Case No. (Law) 9013

By JUDGE WALTER A. PAGE

I have considered the argument of counsel on the defendant’s motion to file a late answer in the above-styled case.

The question of the allowance of further time is in the sound discretion of the court. Where there is a showing of neglect and carelessness on the part of the party this does not constitute a reasonable or legal excuse. See *Cooper*v. *Davis,*199 Va. 472 (1957). This also has been held to be true where no motion was made for an extension of time and no excuse or reason offered for the delay. See *Levine*v. *Lacy,*204 Va. 297 (1963).

In the instant case the party has acted in good faith and communicated the notice served upon her to her insurance company. Consequently, it cannot be said that she was neglectful or careless. Under these circumstances the court is of the opinion that the action of the court in allowing the motion will not prejudice the plaintiff. See *Williams*v. *Service, Incorporated,*199 Va. 326 (1957); *May*v. *Martin,*205 Va. 397 (1964). A ruling to the contrary would clearly prejudice the defendant who has acted reasonably and in good faith.

An order allowing the filing of responsive pleadings and noting exception of counsel for the plaintiff will be entered upon presentation to the court.