NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARLOS DAGOBERTO RIVAS,

Petitioner

- Appellant,

v. SHERMAN SPEARMAN, Warden,

Respondent

- Appellee. No. 17

- 55182
D.C. No. 8:16

- cv - 00307

- JVS

- JPR

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted August 6, 2018 Pasadena, California Before: CLIFTON and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges, and HOYT, ** District Judge. Officer Daniel Carrillo (Carrillo) interviewed Carlos Dagoberto Rivas (Rivas) a t his home, arrested him, and then interviewed him again at the jail. Rivas
confess ed to the allegations the victim had leveled against him. An Orange Coun ty Superior Court (Superior Court) jury convicted Rivas of three counts of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Kenneth M. Hoyt, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

AUG 30 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

committing lewd acts on a child under age 14, one of those counts involv ing force.

T he California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District ( Court of Appeal ),
affirm ed his convict ion. After his direct appeals failed, Rivas petitioned the district court for habeas corpus relief claiming, among other things , a violation of
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self

- incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

. Evalua ting Rivas’ Miranda claim under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d) , t he
district court denied hi s petition

. We affirm. 1

AEDPA provides that a federal court may not grant a petitioner’s habeas

corpus application “with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Sup reme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding

. ” 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)

. T he Miranda warn ings must reasonably conve y to a suspect his rights , including the right to remain silent and the consequences of relinquishing it

. Duckworth v. Eagan , 492 U.S. 195, 20 3 (1989)

. They must also be “sufficiently

1 As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, we restate t hem only as necessary to explain our decision.3

comprehensive and comprehensible when given a commonsense reading.” Florida
v. Powell , 559 U.S. 50, 6 3 (2010)

. “ If the State establishes that [the] Miranda warning[s] [were] given ” and were “ understood by the accused, ” then the

“ accused ’ s uncoerced statement, ” so long as it was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, “ establishes an implied waiver. ” Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010). To obtain relief, Rivas must show that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary , and intelligent

. He contends that Carrillo’s warnings were incomprehensible to him and that the Court of Appeal’s contrary determination
was unreasonable

. W e , however, find sufficient evidence in the record supporting the Court of Appeal’s decision because : (1) Rivas did not have substantial difficulty understanding Carrillo ; (2 ) Carrillo’s informing Rivas of “the right not to say anything” was the equivalent of informing him of his right to remain silent ; (3)
Carrillo had also instructed Rivas that he should seek a clarification if he was confused about any aspect of the warning s ; ( 4 ) Rivas has failed to establish that Carrillo’s Spanish was incomprehensible to him ; and ( 5 ) Rivas suffered from no apparent impediment that would have put a reasonable officer on notice that Rivas
did not understand the Miranda warnings. In sum, Car rillo informed Rivas of his
Miranda rights, and Rivas free ly and deliberate ly cho se to speak to Carrillo. Rivas4

knew that in speaking, he was relinquishing certain rights , with important

consequen ces
. Viewed through AEDPA’s deferential prism, see Cullen v. Pinholster , 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) , the Court of Appeal ’s decision was consistent with, and not unreasonable as to its application of, United States Supreme Court precedent

. Similarly, t he Court of Appeal ’s factual findings were reasonable. A ccordingly,

t he district court’s judgment denying habeas relief to Rivas is AFFIRMED

.