## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

05-1407 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. and HONEYWELL INTELLECTUA L PROPERTIES, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. ITT INDUSTRIES, INC. and ITT AUTOMOTIVE, INC., Defendants-Appellees, and TG NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION, TG FLUID SYSTEMS USA CORPORAT ION, and A. RAYMOND, INC., Defendants-Appellees.

Dan L. Bagatell , Perkins Coie Brown & Bain P.A ., of Phoenix, Arizona, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Of counsel on the brief were R. Terrance Rader and Glenn E. Forbis , Rader, Fishman & Grauer PLLC, of Bloom field Hills, Michigan. Of counsel was Kristin L. Murphy , Rader, Fishman & Grauer PLLC. Thomas N. Young , Young & Basile, P.C., of Troy, Michigan, argued for defendants-appellees, ITT Indus tries, Inc., et al. Stephen L. Sulzer , Connolly Bove Lodge & Hutz LLP , of Washington, DC, argued for defendants-appellees, TG North America Corporation, et al . With him on the brief was James P. Calve

. Appealed from: United States District Cour t for the Eastern District of Michigan Senior Judge Avern Cohn

## United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

05-1407 HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC. and HONEYWELL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. ITT INDUSTRIALS, INC. and ITT AUTOMOTIVE, INC., Defendants-Appellees, and TG NORTH AMERICA CORPORATION, TG FLUID SYSTEMS USA CORPORAT ION, and A. RAYMOND, INC., Defendants-Appellees.

_____________________ DECIDED: June 22, 2006

_____________________ Before MAYER, LOURIE, and DYK, Circuit Judges

. LOURIE, Circuit Judge

. Honeywell International, Inc. and Honey well Intellectual Properties, Inc. (collectively “Honeywell”) appeal from the final decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mi chigan granting summary judgment of noninfringement of U.S. Pat ent 5,164,879 in favor of ITT Industrials, Inc., ITT Automotive, Inc., TG North America Corporat ion, TG Fluid System s USA Corporation, and A. Raymond, Inc. (collectively “ITT/TG”). Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc. , Civ. No. 02-73948 (E.D. Mich. April 27, 2005). Because the district court correctlyconstrued the claim limitation “fuel system component” and determined that the accused products do not meet that lim itation, we affirm its grant of summary judgment of noninfringement. We further conclude that under our modified construction of the claim limitation “electrically conductive fibers, ” the accused products do not meet that limitation either, thereby pr oviding a separate ground for a ffirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement. BACKGROUND The ’879 patent, entitled “Electrostatically Dissipative Fuel System Component,” discloses a fuel filter that is specially made for use in motor vehicles that have electronic fuel injection (“EFI”) systems. Before motor vehicles began using EFI systems, the housing of a fuel filter was commonly made of metal or a pol ymer material. ’879 Patent, col.1 ll.10-12 (filed July 1, 1991). Once v ehicles began using EFI syst ems, as the ’879 patent’s written description recognizes, fuel filters with polymer housing began to break down and start leaking. Id. , col.1 ll.17-20. It was discover ed that the breakdowns were caused by the contact between t he fuel, which flows at a high velocity in EFI systems, and the fuel filter’s pol ymer housing. The resultant fric tion strips electrons from the hydrocarbon fuel and traps them in the non-conductive polymer housing, which leads to an electrostatic charge buildup within t he housing of the f uel filter. Id. , col.1 ll.26-30. The charge continues to build up until it finally discharges by “arcing” onto the vehicle’s metal frame and becomes grounded. “Arcing” forms microscopic holes in the fuel filter’s housing. Id. , col.2 l.59 to col.3 l.2. When enough microscopic holes are formed, the fuel begins to leak. Fuel filters wit h metal housing avoid the “arcing” phenomenon because they allow no charge buildup. The conductive nature of metal prevents the

05-1407 2electrons from being trapped inside the fuel filt er and allows them to pass through to the vehicle’s frame. Fuel filt ers with housing made of polymer material, however, are more desirable than their metal housing counterparts because of their lower cost and weight. Id. , col.1 ll.13-14. The patented invention addresses the “arcing” problem in fuel filters with polymer housing by providing an electrically conducti ve pathway between the fuel filter and the vehicle’s metal frame. Id. , col.3 ll.41-43. The electrica lly conductive pathway prevents the electrostatic charge from building up wit hin the housing of the fuel filter. Id. , col.3 ll.3-6. According to the wr itten description, the electrically conductive pathway is created by incorporating small amounts of a “conductive filler material” into the polymer housing. Id. , col.3 ll.47-51. The written description further discloses that stainless steel is an ideal “conductive filler material” because it has high conductivity, allowing it to be used in fibers with a high aspect ratio. Id. , col.3 l.53 to col.4 l.13. The written description also notes that stai nless steel fibers are ductile, which allows them to better maintain their integrity during melt-processing. Id. The benefits of stainless steel fibers are contrasted in the written description to el ectrically conductive carbon fibers, which are said to have less desirable characteristics, e.g. , they must be used in fibers with smaller aspect ratios, are more rigid, and act as stress concentrators. Id. , col.3 ll.56-60; col.4 ll.1-5. Turning to the prosecution history of t he patent in suit, the ’879 patent issued from a divisional application of U.S. Patent Application 575,260, which issued as U.S. Patent 5,076,920 and was entit led “Electrostatically Dissipative Fuel Filter.” Also issuing from a divisional application of the ’260 app lication was U.S. Pa tent 5,164,084, also

05-1407 3entitled “Electrostatically Dissipative Fuel Filter.” The drawing and written description sections for the ’879, ’920, and ’ 084 patents appear to be identical. See Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc. , 330 F. Supp. 2d 865, 871 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The patent examiner for the ’260 applicat ion issued a restriction requi rement in that application because it claimed three distinct inventions : (1) a method for preventing breakdown of a fuel filter, (2) the fuel filter itself, and (3) a moldable polymeric material. Id. F a c e d with this restriction requirement, the patent ee chose the first invention for immediate prosecution, a method for preventing breakdow n of a fuel filter , and that became the claimed subject matter of what issued as the ’920 patent. The patentee filed divisional applications for the remaining inventions re sulting in two other patents, the ’084 patent (for a fuel filter) and the ’ 879 patent (for a moldable polymer ic material), the patent at issue in this case. The ’879 application, as initially filed, was entitled “Electrostatically Dissipative Fuel Filter” and contained one independent claim directed to a “mol dable material for fuel system components.” 1 The patent examiner reject ed the claim on the ground of, inter alia , indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. According to the examiner, it was “not clear what fuel system components [w ere] intended to be co nstructed of the

1 The ’879 application’s independent claim, as originally filed, read as follows: Moldable material for f uel system components for communicating fuel to the engine of a motor vehicle, said motor vehicle having a common el ectrical plane maintained at a common electrical potential, said material comprising a polymer material having electrically conductive fibers distributed randomly throughout t he material to provide an electrically conductive path through said components between the fuel communica ted through said components and said common electrical plane.

05-1407 4electrically conductive moldable material.” In addressing the indefiniteness rejection, the patentee deleted the “moldable material for” language so that the claims were directed to a “fuel system component.” The patentee also argued that the independent claim was not indefinite because, although the specification onl y referred to fuel filters and fuel lines, “it is Applicant ’s position that he is entitled to a claim broad enough to cover all fuel system components manufactured of the moldable material disclosed and claimed in the specification. ” While the application was pending, the title of the ’879 application was changed to “Electrostatically Dissipative Fuel System Component,” because, the patentee contended, it “more a ccurately reflect[ed] the scope of the claims.” After an interview between the patentee and examiner, which resulted in the “arcing” limitation being added, the claims were allowed and the patent issued. Following a reexamination proceeding, t he sole independent claim was further amended to recite “fuel injection system component ” instead of “fuel system component” as the subject matter of the claims. On October 2, 2002, Honeywell filed suit against ITT/TG for infringement of the ’879 patent. Claim 1 of the ’879 patent, t he patent’s only independent claim, provides as follows: Fuel injection system component for communicating fuel to the engine of a motor vehicle, said motor vehicle having an electrical plane maintained at a predetermined electrical potential, said fuel system component being made of a composite material comprising a polymer having electrically conductive fibers distribut ed randomly throughout the material to provide an electr ically conductive path through said component between the f uel communicated through said component and said electrical plane, so that at least a portion of the electrically conductive path extends through the component to thereby prevent build-up of electrostatic charge in the fuel and the resu ltant arcing which causes the

05-1407 5breakdown of the polymer mate rial comprising the fuel injection system component. The products accused of infringement are “quick connects” manufactured and sold by ITT/TG. Quick connects are nut-like structur es that join the various components of a fuel injection system together, such as a fuel line to a fuel filter . The accused quick connects have polymer housing that is interl aced with carbon fiber. ITT/TG denied the charge of infringement, and the distri ct court subsequently held a Markman hearing to construe various limitations of the ’879 patent, includi ng “fuel injection system component” and “electrically conductive fiber.” The district court construed the “fuel in jection system component” limitation to mean “a fuel filter.” In arriving at its cons truction, the court rec ognized that the ordinary meaning of the term “refers to any constituent part of the fuel injection system of a motor vehicle including, for example, fuel f ilters, fuel lines, and connectors.” Honeywell , 330 F. Supp. 2d at 878. The court also re cognized that the pat entee made statements during the prosecution of the ’879 and ’084 app lications that could be interpreted to mean that the scope of the “fuel injection system com ponent” limitation was broader than only fuel filters, at l east in the patentee’s view. Notwithstanding the ordinar y meaning or the prosecut ion history, the court determined that the written description clear ly limited the “fuel injection system component” to a fuel filter, and that the statements in the prosecution history could not be used to enlarge the content of the written description. Id. at 882-83. According to the court, on several occasions in the writt en description, the “invention” was identified to be only a fuel filter. Id. at 879. Moreover, the co urt ex plained, “[t]he entire specification of the ’879 patent, as well as the sole drawing, describe the elements and

05-1407 6operation of a fuel f ilter with electrically conductive fibers. No other parts are described.” Id. Given the written description, the court concluded that “the patentee characterized a fuel filter as the only em bodiment of his invent ion, not merely a ‘preferred’ version of all possible embodiments.” Id. at 880. The district court also construed the claim term “electrically conductive fibers” to mean “fibers of a material that conducts elec tricity, including, wit hout limitation, metal and carbon.” Id. at 888. According to the court, that was the ordinary meaning of “electrically conductive fibers.” The court gave the term its ordinary meaning despite a detailed disclosure in the wri tten description why metal fibers were preferable to carbon fibers. Id. at 884. In the court’s view, the disclos ure was “not like the clear specification language defining the ‘invention’ as a fuel filter.” Id. The court determined that the disclosure distinguishing metal and non-metal conductive fibers merely reflected the patentee’s preferred embodiment. Id. at 884-85. The court further noted that the written description never stat ed that carbon fibers could not be used as electrically conductive fibers. Id. After the court issued its claim construc tion, ITT/TG filed a motion for summary judgment of noninfringement, whic h the court granted. In concluding that the accused products did not infringe the ’879 patent, t he court determined that quick connects are not fuel filters, and thus they do not literally infringe. Honeywe ll Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc. , Civ. No. 02-73948, slip op. at 9 (E.D. Mi ch. May 17, 2005). Moreover, the court found that quick connects do not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents because they are not interchangeable with a fuel filter, and they do not compete commercially with fuel filters. Id. The also court determined that H oneywell could not invoke the doctrine

05-1407 7of equivalents to encompass the accused quick connects in view of the written description’s identification of a fuel filter as “the present invention.” According to the court, the patentee knew of f uel system components other than fuel filters, and that because he limited the claims to a fuel filter, all other fuel system components were dedicated to the public, and thus outside the reach of the doctr ine of equivalents. Id. , slip op. at 13-14. The district court entered final judgment on April 27, 2005. Honeywell timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction purs uant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). DISCUSSION We review a district court’ s grant of summary judgment de novo , reapplying the same standard used by the district court. Ethi con Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. , 149 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Stratienko v. Cordis Corp. , 429 F.3d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 2005). Summary j udgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitl ed to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “The evidence of the non-mov ant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his fa vor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Claim construction is an issue of law, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. , 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), that we also review de novo , Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc. , 138 F.3d 1448, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
I. On appeal, Honeywell argues that the distri ct court erred by limiting the “fuel injection system component” limitation to a f uel filter and includi ng no other component of a fuel injection system. In doing so, Honeywell contends that the court imported a

05-1407 8limitation from the specificat ion into the claims and thereby improperly limited the scope of the claims to the specif ication’s preferred embodiment. According to Honeywell, nothing in the specification exp licitly limits the claim term to a “fuel filter.” Honeywell relies on a statement contained in the specification referri ng to “the metallic components used in prior art systems,” ’879 Patent, col.1 ll.32-33, to argue that the term “component” was meant to be broad. It al so cites the patent’s abstract, which summarized the invention using the term “c omponent,” and the title of the patent as amended, to further argue that t he specification did not limit the “fuel injection system component” to a fuel filter. In addition, Honeywell points to the prosec ution history in assigning error to the district court’s construction of the “fuel injection system co mponent” limitation. According to Honeywell, the patentee stated during prosecution t hat the intended scope of the claims was to include “all fuel components manufactured of the moldable material disclosed and claimed in the specification.” Honeywell also notes that the patent examiner issued a restricti on requirement during prosecut ion of the ’084 application (which also included claims to “fuel f ilters”) because “the fuel system component [claims] do[ ] not specifically require that the component be a fuel filter.” Mainly reiterating the point s made by the district cour t in its claim construction decision, ITT/TG responds that the claim term “fuel injection system component” was correctly limited to a fuel filt er. ITT/TG also argues, however , that the court erred in its construction of the “electrically conductive fi bers” limitation. ITT/ TG contends that the court should have construed that term to in clude only metal fibers with a high aspect ratio, not carbon fibers. According to I TT/TG, the written description compared the

05-1407 9properties of metal and car bon fibers, and “disparaged” the use of the latter as an electrically conductive fiber. ITT/TG cont ends that there was a clear disavowal of carbon fibers from the scope of the claims. Moreover, because the accused quick connects are indisputably made with carbon fibers, ITT/TG a sserts that there can be no infringement either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. We agree with the district court that the claim term “fuel injection system component” is limited to a fuel f ilter. In Phillips v. AWH Corp. , 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), this court recognized that “claims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.’” We further stat ed that “the specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meani ng of a disputed term.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). Here, the written description uses language that leads us to the conclusion that a fuel filter is the only “fuel injection system com ponent” that the claims co ver, and that a fuel filter was not merely discussed as a preferr ed embodiment. On at l east four occasions, the written description refers to the fuel f ilter as “this invention” or “the present invention”: This invention relates to a fuel filter for use in the fuel line that delivers fuel to a motor vehicle engine. ’879 Patent, col.1 ll.8-9. According to the present inventi on, a fuel filter for a motor vehicle is made from a mol dable material which may be safely used in vehicles equipped with electronic fuel injection system. Id. , col.1 ll.40-43. This and other advantages of the present invention will become apparent from the fo llowing descriptions, with reference to the accompanying drawing, the sole Figure of which is a cross-sectional view of a fuel filt er made pursuant

05-1407 10to the teachings of the present invention. . . . Id. , col.1 ll.43- 49. According to the present invent ion, an electrically conductive path is provided between the fuel within the inlet cavity 42 [of the fuel filter] and the [vehicle] body 38 . Id. , col.3 ll.41-43. The public is entitled to take the patentee at his word and the word was that the invention is a fuel filter. Moreover, the written descripti on does not indicate that a fuel filter is merely a preferred embodiment of the clai med invention. The fuel f ilter was the only component of an EFI system that the written descripti on disclosed as having a polymer housing with electrically conductive fibers interlaced t herein. The only other fuel component specifically mentioned in the written description, the fuel line, was not required by the patentee to be made of an electr ically conductive polymer material, as the claims require. See id. , col.1 ll.59-60 (stating that the “f uel line may also be made of a nonconductive material”). The written descrip tion’s detailed discussion of the prior art problem addressed by the patented invention, viz. , leakage of non-metal fuel filters in EFI systems, further supports the conclusion t hat the fuel filter is not a preferred embodiment, but an only embodiment. Id. , col.1 ll.10-25. Given the written description’s disclosure, we conclude that the patentee has limited the scope of the ’879 patent claims to a fuel filter. Nor are we persuaded by Honeywell’s ar gument that the patentee confirmed a broader scope of his claims during prosecut ion. Honeywell relies mainly on the patentee’s response to the exam iner’s indefiniteness rejecti on in which he stated that the claims cover “all fuel components manufactured of the moldable material disclosed and claimed in the specification.” Honeywell places too much wei ght on that statement,

05-1407 11as we find it to be ambiguous and possibly in consistent with the written description. After all, the only fuel component disclosed and claimed in the patent was a fuel filter. In any event, such a broad and vague statement cannot contradi ct the clear statements in the specification describing the invention more narrowly. We also do not assign much weight to the patent examiner’s restriction requirement with respect to claims for a “fuel filter” and a “fuel system component” during prosecution of the ’084 application. In making the restriction requirement, the examiner did not construe the claim term “fuel system component” or determine its meaning in light of the written description. He merely requi red that the applicant elect one aspect of his invention for prosecution without applying it to the specification. Nevertheless, even if we were to agree with Honeywell that t he patentee clearly expressed his intention during prosecut ion to have the “fuel injection system component” limitation include components in additi on to a fuel filter, it would not change the result in this case. As we determined above, the written description provides only a fuel filter that is made with polymer housing and electrically conductive fibers interlaced therein. No other fuel injection system component with the clai med limitations is disclosed or suggested. Where, as here, the written descrip tion clearly identifies what his invention is, an expression by a patentee during prosecution that he intends his claims to cover more than what his specificat ion discloses is entitled to little weight. See Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Labs. , 318 F.3d 1132, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that “[r]epresentations during prosec ution cannot enlarge the content of the specification”). We disagree, however, with the district court’s construction of the claim term “electrically conductive fibers” to the extent that it encompasses carbon fibers. This

05-1407 12court has recognized that “[w] here the specification makes cl ear that the invention does not include a particular featur e, that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.” Scimed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. , 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). It is true, as the district court noted, that t he ’879 patent’s written description did not expressly define “electrica lly conductive fibers,” as it did for “fuel injection system component.” Nevertheless, based on the disclosure in the written description, which demeaned the pr operties of carbon fibers, we conclude that the patentee thereby disavowed carbon fibers from the scope of the ’879 patent’s claims. The written description contai ns the following disclosure: Stainless steel also has t he advantage of requiring smaller quantities for providing the r equired conductivity than other conductive fillers, such as carbon black . ’879 Patent, col.3 ll.56-60 (emphasis added). Other electrically conductive fillers, such as the aforementioned carbon , act as stress concentrators and, at the relatively high filler loadings required to achieve conductivity, restrict the ability of the resin matrix to yield under stress. Id. , col.4 ll.1-5 (emphasis added). Also, stainless steel fibers ar e ductile and non-rigid unlike straight or metallized carbon fibers . . . . This a llows stainless steel fibers to maintain thei r integrity better during meltprocessing. Id. , col.4 ll.5-10 (emphasis added). Unlike the non-metallic fibers , stainless steel fibers also do not increase mechanical strength or stiffness of the base resin significantly. Other meta l fibers with high aspect ratios can be satisfactorily substitu ted for stainless steel. Id. , col.4 ll.10-14 (emphasis added).

05-1407 13In making the above statement s, the patentee informed its readers specifically why carbon fibers would not be suitable as “elect rically conductive fibers” in the claimed invention. If the written descr iption could talk, it would say, “Do not use carbon fibers.” There is no other way to interp ret the written description’s listing of all the reasons that metal fibers fare better than carbon fibers for use in the claimed invention, even though both materials are electrically conductive, viz. , that metal fibers require smaller quantities to achieve the desired conductivity than carbon fibers, create less stress concentration, are more ductile, are less rigi d, and increase the mech anical strength of the polymer housing. Contra ry to the district court’s understanding, the written description has gone beyond expressing the patent ee’s preference for one material over another. Its repeated derogatory statements concerning one type of material are the equivalent of disavowal of that subject ma tter from the scope of the patent’s claims. In reaching this decision, we reject Honeywell’s argument in support of the district court’s construction of “electrically conductive fibers.” Ho neywell argues that the written description did identify carbon fibers as electrically conductive fibers, and that stainless steel fibers were merely pref erred embodiments. Honeywell’s argument misses the point. It is precisely because t he written description has identified carbon fibers as electrically conductive, and yet it denigrated carbon fibers’ applicability to the claimed invention, that we find a disavowal of that subject matter. Moreover, it is irrelevant whether stainless steel fibers are a preferred embodim ent of the claimed invention. We are not here m odifying the district court’s cl aim construction to limit its scope to stainless steel fibers. We only modify it to exclude carbon fibers from the scope of the ’879 patent claims.

05-1407 14II. Because Honeywell does not appeal the district court’s j udgment of lack of literal infringement, we turn to the question whether the accused quick connects infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. Even if the district court correctly construed the “fuel injection system component” limit ation, Honeywell argues that the court erred in finding that the accused quick connects do not infr inge under the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of law. According to Honeywell, al though quick connects do not filter fuel like a fuel filter, the ’879 claims do not require that the “fuel injection system component” perform that function. Honeywe ll contends that the claims only require that the “fuel injection system component” per form the functions of “communicat[ing] fuel to the engine of a motor vehicle,” and “provid[ing] an electrically conductive path through said component and [the] electrical plane.” Honeywe ll also asserts that the claims require that the only result needed to be achieved is to “prevent the build-up of electrostatic charge in the fuel and the re sultant arcing which causes the breakdown of the polymer material comprising the fuel injection syst em component.” Because, Honeywell argues, the accused quick connects perform these functions in the same way as the fuel filter to achieve the same result, there is infringement. We agree with the district court that t he fuel filter and qui ck connects are not equivalent devices. They are substantially different. The accused quick connects do not filter fuel. Once we agree with the district cour t to construe a fuel system component to be a fuel f ilter, the fuel filter is not mere ly a limitation of the ’879 patent claims. It is central to the patented in vention. If one utilizes the conventional function/way/result analysis, it is beyond ques tion that the accused quick connects do

05-1407 15not perform the function of the fuel filter. Any equivalent of a fuel filter must necessarily perform the function of fuel filter—filtering f uel—in order to be an equivalent. As Honeywell recognizes in its own brief, “a fuel f ilter inherently filters fuel.” Honeywell Op. Br., at 49. Having established that any structure equivalent to a fuel filter must substantially perform the function of filtering fuel, we affirm the district court’s judgment of noninfringement. Honeywell concedes in its br ief, as it must, that the accused quick connects do not perform the fuel filtering functi on. Honeywell Op. Br., at 47. Thus, no reasonable trier of fact could find that these two structures are equivalent. Given that quick connects do not perform substantially the sa me function as a fuel filter, there is no need for us to conduct a further analysis of the way that the accused products perform and the result of that performance. We also conclude that the accused quick c onnects do not meet, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, the “electrically conductive fibers” limitation as we have construed it. There is of course no lit eral infringement because, as we have held and Honeywell has admitted, a quick connect is not a fuel filter. There can also be no infringement under the doctrine of equivalent s because the accused quick connects use carbon fibers, and such fibers were disavo wed from the scope of the “electrically conductive fibers” limitation, as we have discussed above. See J&M Corp. v. Harley– Davidson, Inc. , 269 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The scope of equivalents may [ ] be limited by statements in the specification that disclaim coverage of certain subject matter.” Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky Farms, Inc. , 140 F.3d 1009, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

05-1407 16CONCLUSION Because the accused quick connects do not meet, literally or equivalently, the “fuel injection system component” or “electrically conductive fibers” claim limitations, the district court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement of the ’879 patent in favor of ITT/TG is affirmed.
AFFIRMED

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