J-A28039-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

DOMINIQUE MARSHON LEE,

Appellant No. 1299 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 17, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-15-CR-0001738-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2016

Appellant, Dominique Marshon Lee, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence imposed after his jury conviction of murder of the second degree, 

robbery, burglary, and criminal conspiracy.1 We affirm.

In its May 3, 2016 opinion, the trial court aptly set forth the relevant 

facts, as follows:

Shortly after midnight on June 29, 2012, three armed men 

burst into the living room of the apartment shared by Dominick 

Williams and Aaron Crawford. Mr. Crawford was asleep in his 

bedroom. Mr. Williams was awake and playing video games in 

the living room. All three intruders wore t-shirts wrapped 

around their faces to disguise their identity. One of the intruders 

immediately shot Mr. Williams in the groin. Another of the 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a), 3502(a), 903, respectively.
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intruders went to Mr. Crawford’s bedroom and grabbed a clear, 

plastic jar that contained marijuana, money and a pack of 

cigarettes. All three intruders then ran from the apartment. 

Dominick Williams remained on his living room floor bleeding to 

death. Later, at the hospital, he died.

Shortly after the robbery[,] the police located the plastic 

jar about two blocks away from the victim’s apartment. Located 

nearby was a black t-shirt. Subsequent testing revealed the 

presence of [Appellant’s] thumbprint on the jar, and codefendant Marquis Rayner’s[2

] DNA on the t-shirt. Marquis 

Rayner and [Appellant], who are half-brothers, were 

subsequently arrested for the murder of Dominick Williams.

On November 20, 2014, after a four-day trial, a jury found 

Appellant guilty of second degree murder, robbery, burglary, and 

criminal conspiracy. He was sentenced to life in prison on April 

17, 2015. [The trial court] denied his optional post-sentence 

motion by order dated April 23, 2015. This appeal followed. 

(Trial Court Opinion, 5/03/16, at 1-2).

Appellant raises four questions for this Court’s review:

1. Were the convictions for murder of the second degree, 

robbery, burglary and conspiracy to commit robbery and 

burglary against the weight of the evidence? Were the verdicts 

against the weight of the evidence when the only evidence was 

[Appellant’s] fingerprint on the glass jar with other persons’ DNA 

found [one and one-half] blocks from the crime and [fifteen] feet 

from another persons’ DNA on a black tee shirt?

2. Were the convictions for murder of the second degree, 

robbery, burglary and conspiracy to commit robbery and 

burglary not supported by sufficient evidence?

3. Did the Assistant District Attorney err in his opening 

statement and err again when presenting Detective Dutter by 

stating his office received an anonymous tip linking [Appellant] 

(half-brother of Mr. Rayner) as a participant in the crime? Did 

____________________________________________

2 Marquis Rayner filed an appeal at docket number 1263 EDA 2015. 
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[the trial court] err in denying the defense request for a mistrial? 

Did this intentional error violate [Appellant’s] right to confront a 

critical witness in violation of the Sixth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution and further, was this improper hearsay, particularly 

since Mr. Rayner [sic] was charged with conspiracy?

4. Did [the trial court] err by interfering improperly with Mr. 

Stretton’s[3] cross-examination of a key prosecution witness on 

his critical testimony on the tee shirt, and did [the trial court] err 

in criticizing Mr. Stretton before the jury? Did [the trial court] 

further err in repeatedly and incorrectly criticizing Mr. Stretton 

during his closing argument on the issue of burden of proof? Did 

[the trial court] wrongly criticize Mr. Stretton in front of the jury? 

Did [the trial court] err in not granting a mistrial? Did [the trial 

court’s] improper interference and criticism of Mr. Stretton 

prejudice [Appellant], deny him a fair trial, and impact on 

[Appellant’s] [Sixth] Amendment right to effective counsel?

(Appellant’s Brief, at 6-8).4

Appellant’s first two issues challenge the sufficiency and weight of the 

evidence to support his convictions. (See id. at 40-52).5 For ease of 

____________________________________________

3 Attorney Samuel Stretton was trial counsel for Appellant’s co-defendant, 

Marquis Rayner.

4

In the argument section of his brief, Appellant includes a claim that the 

prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument. (See 

Appellant’s Brief, at 58-65). However, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 2116(a), “[n]o question will be considered unless it is 

stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested thereby.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). Therefore, the allegation is waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Hodge, 144 A.3d 170, 172 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(waiving claim raised in argument section of brief that was not raised in 

statement of questions involved). 

5 Although Appellant recognizes that each of these issues has its own 

standard, (see Appellant’s Brief, at 47), he appears to confuse the legal 

concepts. (See id. at 40-52). For example, “[a] motion for new trial on the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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disposition, we will address Appellant’s sufficiency challenge first, and then 

his weight of the evidence claim. Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence lacks merit.

Our standard of review of this matter is well-settled:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial [ ] 

in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying 

the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note the facts 

and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, 

part or none of the evidence.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes

that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.” Commonwealth v. 

Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted). However, in 

support of his weight of the evidence challenge, Appellant repeatedly states 

that the Commonwealth failed to prove the elements necessary to support 

his convictions. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 43-45). Also, in his sufficiency 

challenge, Appellant maintains that “[t]he speculative and conflicting nature 

of the testimony would warrant a reversal on the basis of sufficiency of 

evidence.” (Appellant’s Brief, at 50). However, this allegation goes to the 

weight of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Doleno, 633 A.2d 203, 

206 (Pa. Super. 1993) (“claim goes to the weight of the evidence because it 

depends upon a resolution of the conflicting testimony of competing 

witnesses.”).
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Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 981 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted). In other words, “[a] mere conflict in the testimony of the 

witnesses does not render the evidence insufficient because it is within the 

province of the factfinder to determine the weight to be given to the 

testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Rabold, 920 A.2d 857, 858 (Pa. Super. 2007), 

affirmed, 951 A.2d 329 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).

In this case, Appellant was convicted of murder of the second degree, 

robbery, burglary, and conspiracy.

Pursuant to section 2502 of the Crimes Code, “[a] criminal homicide 

constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while 

defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of 

a felony.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b). The Crimes Code also provides, in 

pertinent part, that “[a] person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of 

committing a theft, he . . . inflicts serious bodily injury upon another [or] 

threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious 

bodily injury[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(i), (ii). It further provides, “[a] 

person commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime 

therein, the person . . . enters a building or occupied structure, or separately 

secured or occupied portion thereof that is adapted for overnight 

accommodations in which at the time of the offense any person is 

present[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a). Finally:
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A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons 

to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating 

its commission he . . . agrees with such other person or persons 

that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which 

constitutes such crime . . . or . . . agrees to aid such other 

person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime . 

. . .

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a).

Here, the evidence at trial established that three men burst into 

Dominick Williams’ apartment with the intent of robbing him. (See N.T. 

Trial, 11/17/14, at 67, 69, 150). The men were armed with guns and wore 

t-shirts across their faces. (See id. at 66-68, 77, 118-19, 132). After 

shooting Mr. Williams, and pistol whipping his roommate, Aaron Crawford, 

one of the men stole a plastic-lidded jar that contained marijuana and other 

items. (See id. at 155-57). The individual was not wearing gloves. (See 

id. at 150).

As further described by the trial court:

Approximately [ninety] minutes after Dominick Williams 

had been shot, police officer Stephen Galletta of the Coatesville 

City Police Department located the clear plastic jar tossed in a 

hedge row approximately a block and a half from the crime 

scene. (See id. at 244). The jar contained a pack of Newport 

cigarettes. (See id. at 163). Located several feet away was a 

black t-shirt. (See id. at 244, 248). Witness Aaron Crawford 

was brought to the discovery scene and identified the jar as the 

one taken from his bedroom earlier that morning, and the t-shirt 

as the type of shirt that one of the robbers had been wearing 

across his face. (See id. at 161-64).

Chester County Detective Kenneth Beam testified as an 

expert in the field of fingerprint analysis. Detective Beam 

received as evidence the plastic jar and t-shirt found close to the 

scene of the robbery. (See N.T. Trial, 11/18/14, at 49). 
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Detective Bean testified that the print with the sharpest and 

clearest detail found on the plastic jar belonged to Appellant. 

(See id. at 65, 69, 73). . . .

(Trial Ct. Op., at 4-5) (some record citation formatting provided).

Considering the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we conclude that the trial court properly found that it was 

sufficient to support each of Appellant’s convictions. See Stiles, supra at 

981. In fact, Appellant’s argument, that the testimony was insufficient 

because it conflicted, fails where it was within the province of the jury, as 

fact finder, “to determine the weight to be given to the testimony and to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence.” Rabold, supra at 858. 

Appellant’s challenge the sufficiency of the evidence does not merit relief.

Next, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence on the basis that 

“[t]he only evidence placing [him] at the crime is particularly flimsy in that 

[his] fingerprints were found on the jar that was taken and was sitting in a 

bush [fifteen] feet [away].” (Appellant’s Brief, at 43; see id. at 40-47). 

Appellant’s claim does not merit relief.

The Court’s standard of review of a weight of the evidence claim is a 

stringent one:

The finder of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of 

the evidence as the fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence presented and determines the credibility of the 

witnesses.

As an appellate court, we cannot substitute our judgment 

for that of the finder of fact. Therefore, we will reverse a jury’s 

verdict and grant a new trial only where the verdict is so 
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contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. A 

verdict is said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks 

one’s sense of justice when the figure of Justice totters on her 

pedestal, or when the jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, 

causes the trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes 

him to almost fall from the bench, then it is truly shocking to the 

judicial conscience.

Furthermore, where the trial court has ruled on the weight 

claim below, an appellate court’s role is not to consider the 

underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight 

of the evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether 

the trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the 

weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 A.3d 1269, 1274-75 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). 

In this case, the trial court “presided over Appellant’s trial. . . . [It 

did] not find the jury’s verdict so contrary to the evidence as to shock the 

[c]ourt’s sense of justice. Thus, [it] specifically [found] that the verdict 

entered in this matter was not against the weight of the evidence.” (Trial 

Ct. Op., at 6). We decline Appellant’s invitation to re-weigh the evidence in 

this matter, and conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying his weight of the evidence challenge. See Boyd, supra at 1274-

75. Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim does not merit relief.

In Appellant’s third issue, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his 

co-defendant’s motions for a mistrial after the Commonwealth’s attorney 

referenced an anonymous tip during his opening statement and his 

examination of Detective Dutter. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 52-58). This 

issue is waived.
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It is well settled that a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is waived on 

appeal if the defendant did not lodge a contemporaneous objection to the 

alleged impropriety at trial. See Commonwealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750, 

758 (Pa. 2005); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Commonwealth v. Cannady, 

590 A.2d 356, 362 (Pa. Super. 1991), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 950 (Pa. 

1991) (concluding where defendant did not object or join in co-defendant’s

objection, issue was waived as to defendant for purposes of appeal); 

Commonwealth v. Woods, 418 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Pa. Super. 1980) (issue 

waived where appellant failed to join objection of co-defendant). 

In this case, although Rayner’s counsel objected to the prosecutor’s 

remarks and moved for mistrials, Appellant neither lodged his own objection 

nor joined in his co-defendant’s objections and motions. (See N.T. Trial, 

11/17/14, at 18; N.T. Trial, 11/18/14, at 183-84). Therefore, because the 

objection by co-defendant did not preserve the issue for Appellant’s appeal, 

this issue is waived.6 See Cannady, supra at 362; Woods, supra at 

1352; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); May, supra at 758. Moreover, it would 

not merit relief.

____________________________________________

6 Appellant’s issue also is waived for his failure to identify where he 

preserved this issue, in contravention of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) (appellant’s statement of the case must 

state where in record issue raised and preserved for appeal); Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(e) (argument section of brief must state where issue raised and 

preserved for appeal); Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 333 (Pa. 

Super. 2010), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2011) (finding claim waived 

for appellant’s failure to identify where issue preserved).
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It is well-settled that the review of a trial court’s denial of 

a motion for a mistrial is limited to determining whether the trial 

court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely 

an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will . . . discretion is abused. A trial court may grant a 

mistrial only where the incident upon which the motion is based 

is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing 

and rendering a true verdict. A mistrial is not necessary where 

cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 422 (Pa. 2011), cert. 

denied, 132 S. Ct. 2377 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted); 

see also Commonwealth v. Jemison, 98 A.3d 1254, 1263 (Pa. 2014)

(observing that “the jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions.”) 

(citation omitted).

In the case sub judice, Appellant first argues that the trial court erred 

in denying the motion for a mistrial where the Commonwealth’s counsel 

referred to prejudicial hearsay during his opening statement. (See 

Appellant’s Brief, at 53). This argument lacks merit.

It has long been the law of this Commonwealth that:

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the 

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. [See] 

Pa.R.E. 801(c). Thus, any out of court statement offered not for 

its truth but to explain the witness’s course of conduct is not 

hearsay.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1035 (Pa. 2012), cert. denied, 

133 S. Ct. 1795 (2013) (case citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Here, during the Commonwealth’s opening statement, the prosecutor 

explained the process by which the fingerprint on the jar was identified. 

Specifically, after stating that investigators had been unable to identify the 

fingerprints for approximately six months, the prosecutor stated:

Now it’s time for me to talk about that second lucky break 

that happened in January of 2013 when Detective Harold Dutter 

received an anonymous tip from someone who identified 

[Appellant] as one of the men who [was] involved in the home 

invasion robbery.

(N.T. Trial, 11/17/14, at 18). This statement about the tipster was made to 

explain the course of conduct pursued by the police, not for the truth of the 

matter asserted. Therefore, it was not hearsay. See Johnson, supra at 

1035. Additionally, even if the remark were hearsay, after the 

Commonwealth’s counsel completed his opening statement, the court 

instructed the jury:

Ladies and gentlemen, before we get to the defense 

opening, I need to give you an instruction. You recall that 

during the course of [the prosecutor’s] opening[,] he made 

mention of what a tipster said and certain tipster information 

was provided to the police and there was an objection by 

defense. I need to give you an instruction with respect to that. 

When an anonymous tip comes to the police[,] the police 

are allowed to act on an anonymous tip. In other words, they 

are allowed to check fingerprints and identities and these types 

of things. But what the tipster said, his actual words[,] is not 

evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt and you may not consider what 

the tipster said as being evidence of any defendant’s guilt. 

However, the prints that were checked as a result of the 

tip is evidence that you may consider in this particular case. . . .

(N.T. Trial, 11/17/14, at 30-31).
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Therefore, based on the foregoing, any prejudice allegedly suffered by 

Appellant was cured by the court’s cautionary instruction, which the jury is 

presumed to have followed. See Jemison, supra at 1263; Chamberlain, 

supra at 422. Hence, Appellant’s argument would lack merit.

Similarly, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it denied co-defendant’s motion for a mistrial on the basis of the 

prosecutor’s questioning of Detective Dutter about the anonymous tip. (See 

Appellant’s Brief, at 54-56). Appellant maintains that, because the 

anonymous tip led to the identification of his fingerprint, the tip was “very 

damning evidence” that denied him the right of confrontation. (Id. at 55). 

However, this argument also would fail.

A review of the testimony reveals that the Commonwealth’s attorney 

asked Detective Dutter at what point during the investigation Appellant’s 

name came up, to which the detective responded that it was through an 

anonymous tip. (N.T. Trial, 11/18/14, at 183). Co-defendant objected and 

moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied after cautioning the jury 

that: “[J]ust because somebody’s name comes up in an anonymous tip, it is 

not to be construed in any way by you as evidence against that individual. 

It[ is] simply being used in this context to show that the police took [a] step 

and went forward. . . .” (Id. at 183-84).

As previously observed, the statement by the anonymous tipster was 

not hearsay because it was offered to show why the police took the 
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investigation in the direction that they did, not for the truth of the matter 

asserted; and, in any event, the cautionary instruction provided by the trial 

court was sufficient to overcome any potential prejudice. See Johnson, 

supra at 1035; Chamberlain, supra at 422; see also Jemison, supra at 

1263. Therefore, this argument would fail, and Appellant’s third issue would 

lack merit.

In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly 

interfered with trial. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 65-79). Specifically, he 

maintains:

[The trial court] improperly interfered with Mr. Stretton’s crossexamination of a key prosecution witness and commented on the 

evidence. Further, [the trial court] criticized Mr. Stretton 

repeatedly in front of the jury and incorrectly and repeatedly 

interrupted his closing speech and criticized Mr. Stretton for the 

closing speech in front of the jury, even though Mr. Stretton 

gave an appropriate closing speech. [The trial court] refused a 

mistrial request. [The trial court’s] interference, commenting on 

evidence, improper criticism and interruption of Mr. Stretton’s 

closing speeches denied Mr. Rayner, his right to due process and 

a fair trial and impacted on Mr. Rayner’s Sixth Amendment right 

to effective counsel.

(Id. at 65) (underlining omitted). Appellant’s issue is waived, and would not 

merit relief.

Mr. Stretton was Mr. Rayner’s trial counsel. (See, e.g., N.T. Trial, 

11/17/14, at 1). Appellant had his own legal representation at trial. (See 

id.). Appellant’s counsel failed to object to any of the trial court’s 

interactions with co-defendant’s counsel. (See N.T. Trial, 11/17/14, at 

186-87, 190-91, 198-99; N.T. Trial, 11/19/14, at 160-61). Therefore, 
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Appellant’s claim is waived. See Cannady, supra at 362; Woods, supra

at 1352; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); May, supra at 758. 

Moreover, not only does Appellant fail to provide any argument about 

how the court’s interactions with Mr. Stretton prejudiced him, (see 

Appellant’s Brief, at 65-79), after our independent, exhaustive review of the 

entire record in this matter, we are unable to discern how any of the trial 

court’s exchanges with Mr. Stretton “so prejudice[d] the jurors against 

[Appellant] that it may reasonably be said [that the remarks] deprived [him] 

of a fair and impartial trial.” Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 39 

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). 

Appellant’s fourth issue would not merit relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/29/2016