United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 25, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

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m 05-30621

Summary Calendar

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IN THE MATTER OF:

JERRY JACKSON STAMPS AND THERESA LYNN WITT-STAMPS,

Appellants,

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

m 2:04-MC-1831

______________________________

Before SMITH, GARZA and PRADO, 

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Jerry Stamps and Theresa Witt-Stamps, a

married couple, challenge the district court’s

order disbarring them from the practice of law

in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Finding

no error, we affirm. 

I.

The order arisesfromthe Stampses’ disbarment by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The

principal basis for the state disbarment decision is that court’s finding that the Stampses

purposefully excluded, from their Louisiana

bar applications, information regarding past

legal employment. The court also found that

the legal employment the Stampses sought to

conceal constituted the unauthorized practice

oflaw and that disbarment wasthe only appropriate sanction. 

After being notified of the state disbarment

order, the federal district court directed the

Stampsesto show cause why an identicalsanc-

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
2

tion should not be imposed on them in the

Eastern District ofLouisiana. After holding an

oral hearing and considering the Stampses’

objectionsto the state disbarment proceeding,

the district court ordered them disbarred. 

II.

The Stampses correctly point out that discipline imposed by federal courts does not automatically flow from discipline in state courts.

Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282

(1957). A federal court, however, should recognize, and give effect to, the “condition created by the judgment of the state court unless,

from an intrinsic consideration of the state record,” it appears that

(1) the state proceeding was wanting

in due process;

(2) the proof of facts relied on by the

state court to establish want of fair character was so infirm as to give rise to a

clear conviction on the federal court’s part

that it could not, consistent with its duty,

accept the state court’s conclusion as final; or

(3) that to do so would, for some other

grave and sufficient reason, conflict with

the court’s duty not to disbar except upon

the conviction that, under the principles

or right and justice, it is constrained to do

so.

Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917).

The Selling factors continue to be the standard

by which federal courts determine whether

they will impose reciprocal discipline based on

a state court proceeding and have been expressly employed by this circuit.1

III.

The Stampses’mainobjectionto the district

court’s order isthat, they claim, the state court

proceedings on which it was based denied

them due process. They argue that the evidentiary standards used by the Louisiana Supreme Court were unconstitutionally lax, and

they urge this court to require that state disbarment proceedings employ evidentiary

standards akin to criminal prosecutions if they

are to be afforded deference by the federal

courts. The Stampses also argue, without any

elaboration, that the state decision was based

on insufficient proof of misconduct. 

A.

On the due process claim, the Stampses

contend that the Louisiana Supreme Court

should have strictly employed the state’s rules

ofevidence throughout the disbarment proceedings. They object to the introduction of a

variety of hearsay evidence that would probably not have been admitted in a criminal trial;

they contend that their rights under the United

StatesConstitution to confrontation and crossexamination were repeatedly violated by the

Louisiana Supreme Court’s procedures. They

also attack the disbarment procedures used in

their case as inconsistent with that court’s

rules. 

This latter contention isirrelevant. Whether the procedures were adequate under Louisiana law is not a proper question for this court.

The Stampses concede as much in their brief

when they note that we have no authority, at

1

In re Wilkes, 494 F.2d 472, 476-77 (5th Cir.

1974); In re Dawson, 609 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th

Cir.1980); see In re Watson, 2000 WL 34507666,

at *2 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished).
3

this stage, to review directly the propriety of

a state court disbarment order. See Selling,

243 U.S. at 50. The question properly posed

by this appeal is whether we should decline to

give reciprocal force to the state court’s disbarment order because it allegedly is based on

procedures that fall short of the due process

guarantees of the United States Constitution.

Attorneys facing disciplinary proceedings

are not entitled to receive all the guarantees afforded the accused in a criminal case. Sealed

Appellant 1 v. Sealed Appellee 1, 211 F.3d

252, 254 (5th Cir. 2000). Although due process doesinclude notice and an opportunity to

be heard in these cases, only rarely will more

be required. Crowe v. Smith, 151 F.3d 217,

229 (5th Cir.1998). “That attorney discipline

proceedings require proof only by clear and

convincing evidence, as opposed to ‘beyond a

reasonable doubt,’ is indicative of the mere

quasi-criminal nature of such proceedings,

which nature would not implicate all ofthe due

process requirements attendant purely criminal

proceedings.” Sealed Appellant 1, 211 F.2d at

254. 

In its opinion disbarring the Stampses, the

Louisiana Supreme Court correctly noted the

principal justification for allowing relaxed evidentiary rules in disbarment proceedings:

“Unlike a lay jury, this court, in itsrole as trier

of fact in disciplinary cases, has the ability to

consider the entire record and evaluate and

weigh the probative value of evidence based

on the totality of the circumstances.” In re

Stamps, 874 So. 2d 113, 123 (La. 2004).

By adopting the rule urged by the Stampses, requiring strict application of the rules of

evidence, we essentially would be telling the

members of the Louisiana Supreme Court that

they are not able objectively to weigh the evidence before themand should be shielded from

certain evidence because of its potential to

influence their decision improperly. We decline to do so; that court is eminently qualified

to consider any and all evidence before it in a

disbarment proceeding and to ascribe the appropriate weight to that evidence. There is no

reason, in the record before us, to doubt that

the court did exactly that in the Stampses’

proceeding.

Regarding theirrightsto cross-examination

and confrontation of witnesses, the Stampses

ask this court to announce a new rule of law

granting such rights to attorneys facing disciplinary action. As stated above, we have never required more than notice and an opportunity to be heard in these cases. It is undisputed that the Stampses received notice and a

hearing at the state court and federal district

court levels. 

There is no justification to depart from our

precedent. The Stampses were afforded all the

process that is due to attorneys facing disbarment.

B.

The Stampses contend, without serious explanation or elaboration, that their disbarment

was based on insufficient proof ofmisconduct.

Our standard of review on this claim is heightened by Supreme Court law. Under Selling,

such a challenge will succeed only if the evidence relied on by the state court was “so

infirm as to give rise to a clear conviction on

the federal court’s part that it could not . . .

accept the state court’s decision . . . .” Selling, 243 U.S. at 51. 

The summary of the evidence against the

Stampses provided in the Louisiana Supreme

Court’s opinion accurately reflects the contents of the state court record. Our review of

that record does not reveal evidence so scant
4

as to give rise to a clear conviction that the

state court decision was faulty. The evidence

accumulated against the Stampsesis sufficient

under Selling to allow us to accept the state

court’s finding that the Stampses lied on their

bar exam applicationsto hide the fact that they

had engaged in the unauthorized practice of

law.

C.

The third Selling factor requires this court

not to defer to the state disbarment order if “to

do so would, for some other grave and sufficient reason, conflict with the court’s duty not

to disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles or right and justice, it is constrained to do so.” Id. Other than the alleged

due process violations and insufficient evidence claim, the Stampses provide no rationale

why we should doubt the state court’s reasoning. Finding no “grave and sufficient” reasons ourselves, we are constrained by law to

defer to the decision ofthe Louisiana Supreme

Court.

AFFIRMED.