14

- 2731 Kaur v. Sessions BIA Videla , IJ A078 662 469 A079 596 140 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT**



# SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER**  **FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE**  **PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT** = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED W**  **ITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION**  **“ SUMMARY ORDER**  **” ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY**  **OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.**

**At a stated term of the Unite d States Court of Appeals for**  1 **the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States**  2 **Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in**  **the City of New York, on the** 3 **23 rd**  **da y of**  **October ,**  **two thousand s**  **even tee**  **n.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **GUIDO CALABRESI,** 7 **DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,** 8 **SUSAN L. CARNEY,**  9 **Circuit Judges.** 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **RUPINDER KAUR, AKA S AROJ BALA,**  13 **GURMINDER SINGH,** 14 **Petitioner s**  **,** 15 16

**v. 14** 
**- 2731**  17 **NAC** 18 **JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III,** 19 **UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL**  **,** 20 **Respondent .**  21

**_____________________________________** 22 23 **FOR PETITIONER S**  **:** Amy Nussbaum Gell , Gell & Gell, New 24 York, NY

. 25 26 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 27 Assistant Attorney General; Paul 28 Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel; 29 Judith R. O’Sullivan, Trial 30 Attorney , Office of Immigration 31 Litigation , United States 32 Department of Justice, Washington, 33 DC. 342 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 1
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 2

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DE CREED that the petitio n for review is 3

DENIED. 4

Petitioner s Rupinder Kaur and Gurminder Singh , native s and 5

citizen s of India, seek review of a July 14, 2014, decision of 6
the BIA affirming a n April 18, 2013 , decision of an Immigration 7
Judge (“IJ”) denying Ka ur ’s and Singh ’s application s for 8
asylum, withholding of removal , and relief under the Convention 9
Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Rupinder Kauer, Gurminder 10
Singh , No s . A 078 662 469 / 079 596 140 (B.I.A. July 14, 2014 ), 11

aff’g No s
. A 078 662 469 / 079 596 140 ( Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 12

18, 2013 ). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 13
underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 14

We have consider ed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for 15

the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland 16

Sec. , 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable 17

standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 18

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder , 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d 19

Cir. 2009). 20
Under the REAL ID Act of 2005, the agency may, in light of 21
“the totality of the circumstances,” base an adverse 22
credibility determination on asylum applicants’ “demeanor, 233 candor, or responsiveness” and inconsistencies in their 1
statements, “without regard t o whether” those inconsistencies 2
go “to the heart” of the applicants’ claim. 8 U.S.C. 3

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 162, 165 4
(2d Cir. 2008). In conducting “substantial evidence” review, 5

“ we defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility dete rmination unless, 6
from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 7

reasonable fact

- finder could make such an adverse credibility 8
ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 167. 9

The agency’s adverse credibility determination here is 10

supported by substan tial evidence

. T he record reflects 11
numerous inconsistencies between Kaur’s original asylum 12
application, Kaur and Singh’s statements to Government 13
investigators after their son’s arrest, Singh and Kaur’s second 14
asylum application, and the couple’s testimon y at the hearing. 15
We highlight several examples that amount to substantial 16

evidence. See id

. 17

First, c ontrary to the argument in Kaur’s and Singh’s 18
brief, the agency did not overstate the significance of the 19

inconsistencies between the first and second asylum 20
applications. In the first application , Kaur alleged that 21
Singh had been arrested and possibly killed for his political 22
activities. As became clear in the second application, 234 however, Singh was actually in the United States with Kaur when 1
Kaur affirmed that he was under arrest, and possibly dead. That 2

stark inconsistency alone is sufficient to support the adverse 3
credibility determination. S ee Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of 4

Homeland Sec. , 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) ( holding that 5
a single inconsistency “concerning the nature of [the 6
applicant’s] mistreatment

. . . afforded substantial evidence 7
to support the adverse credibility finding”). 8
The adverse credibility determination is further supported 9
by additional inconsis tencies and demeanor problems. The 10
couple reported various dates of entry into the United States. 11

Kaur’s first asylum application listed a 2000 arrival date and 12
affirmed that Singh had been arrested in India ; she subsequently 13

told Government investigators that she arrived in 2000, after 14
Singh; then, in their second asylum application, the couple said 15
that they arrived together in 1999. The y admitted Kaur 16

initial ly listed a false date of entry to meet the one

- year 17
deadline for asylum. Singh a dmitted that he knew about the 18

false date . He also admitted that he lied to an immigration 19

official at the U.S. consulate in 1999 to obtain a travel visa 20

to the United States

. 21
Kaur and Singh also failed to disclose that Singh had been 22

arrested in 2008 f or assault. When cross

- examined about this 235 omission from their applications , Singh explained that his 1
attorney asked him all the questions on the application except 2
the one about prior arrests. The IJ reasonably found this 3
explanation implausible. Majid i v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 77, 80 4
(2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that the agency is not required to 5
credit an explanation that is merely plausible or possible). 6

The IJ also expressed doubts about the couple’s demeanor 7
during the merits hearing, noting on the reco rd that Singh 8
appeared to be coaching Kaur while she testified. “[T]he IJ 9
has the unique advantage among all officials involved in the 10
process of having heard directly from the applicant,” and so 11
that finding deserves deference. See Zhou Yun Zhang v. U.S

. 12

INS , 386 F.3d 66, 73

- 74 (2d Cir. 2004), overruled on other 13
grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 494 F.3d 296 14

(2d Cir. 2007). 15
Given Kaur and Singh’s numerous false statements to 16
immigration officials, inconsistent testimony, and demeanor 17

p roblems, the totality of the circumstances supports the 18
agency’s adverse credibility determination. 8 U.S.C. 19

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 165. This 20
determination infects the entirety of their claim to relief, 21
calling into question both the allegations of past harm and 22
their political activity. Siewe v. Gonzales , 480 F.3d 160, 170 236 (2d Cir. 2007) (“So a single false document or a single instance 1
of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner) 2

infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or 3

unauthenticated evidence.”). Because t heir asylum, 4
withholding of removal, and CAT claims were all based on the 5
same factual predicate, the credibility determination is 6
dispositive. See Paul v. Gonzales , 444 F.3d 148, 156

- 57 (2d 7

Cir. 20 06). For this reason, we do not reach the agency’s 8

time

- bar denial of asylum. See INS v. Bagamasbad , 429 U.S. 24, 9
25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not 10
required to make findings on issues the decision of which is 11

unnecessary to the re sults they reach.”). 12
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 13
DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 14
that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 15
and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 16
is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 17
in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 18
Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 19

34.1(b). 20

FOR THE COURT: 21 Catherine O ’ Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 22