IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 47688-6-II

Respondent,

v.

DAVID A. NOVICK, PUBLISHED OPINION

Appellant.

WORSWICK, J. — David Novick appeals his convictions for eight counts of first degree 

computer trespass and eight counts of recording private communications after he installed a 

spying application on his girlfriend’s mobile phone. Novick argues that the State failed to 

provide sufficient evidence that he intentionally recorded a private communication. Novick also 

argues that entry of eight convictions of each crime violated his right against double jeopardy

because the correct unit of prosecution covers the entire course of conduct. We disagree and 

affirm Novick’s convictions.

FACTS

David Novick and Lisa Maunu began dating in December 2013. At the beginning of 

their relationship, Maunu used an old mobile phone. When Maunu’s phone started to 

malfunction, Novick bought her a new mobile phone on March 11, 2014, and set it up for her.

Unbeknownst to Maunu, Novick had installed an application called Mobile Spy on 

Maunu’s new phone. The application allowed a person to log onto the Mobile Spy website and 

monitor the phone on which the application was installed. From the Mobile Spy website, a user 

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

October 25, 2016
No. 47688-6-II

2

could access all the information stored on the monitored phone, including text messages, call 

logs, and e-mails. The versions of Mobile Spy used on Maunu’s phone, versions 6.5 and 6.6,

also permitted a user to send commands to the phone from a “live control panel” on the website. 

Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 416. One such command allowed a user to activate 

the phone’s microphone and recording feature and record audio into a file that could then be 

downloaded from the website.

In July, the relationship between Novick and Maunu soured, and Maunu noticed that her 

new phone was acting strangely. The phone would light up periodically, send text messages and 

emails without her knowledge, and frequently “lock up.” VRP at 212. About the same time, 

Maunu became concerned because Novick expressed specific knowledge about Maunu’s health 

conditions, medications, doctors’ appointments, and private conversations. Maunu then 

contacted Kaiser Permanente, where she received her health care and also where Novick worked, 

because she was concerned Novick was accessing her medical records at his work.

A compliance investigator for Kaiser ordered a forensic review of Novick’s work 

computer use. The forensic review was conducted by Robert Monsour. During his 

investigation, Monsour reviewed the records associated with Novick’s password-protected user 

account. Kaiser computers keep records of every URL1visited on an employee’s work computer 

and the date and time of each visit. Monsour found a pattern of Novick accessing websites 

associated with Mobile Spy from Novick’s computer account at Kaiser. In addition to the 

 

1

“Uniform resource locator” (URL) is a protocol for specifying the “addresses of the webpage.”

VRP at 366.
No. 47688-6-II

3

Mobile Spy websites, Monsour found evidence that Novick had downloaded over 500 audio files 

from Mobile Spy, searched for GPS (global positioning system) locations, and searched for 

particular telephone numbers.

The State charged Novick with eight counts of first degree computer trespass2and eight 

counts of recording private communications3based on Novick’s use of Mobile Spy to record 

Maunu’s conversations on March 30, April 4, June 5, and June 6.

4

During trial, Monsour testified about his investigation into Novick’s computer records. 

To understand how Mobile Spy operated, Monsour read all of the available documentation, 

focusing on versions 6.5 and 6.6—the versions of Mobile Spy available on the dates in question.

5

 

Monsour also explored an available demo feature of version 7.01 of the program. Version 7.01

of Mobile Spy removed the surround recording feature, among other slight variations.

According to the user guides Monsour read, in order to begin a recording through Mobile 

Spy, a user had to go to a “live control panel” on their website and affirmatively send a 

command through the control panel to the monitored phone. Monsour described the process as 

similar to “pushing a record button on a tape recorder but you’re able to do it from anywhere 

 

2 Former RCW 9A.52.110 (1984), repealed by LAWS OF 2016 ch. 164, § 14.

3 RCW 9.73.030.

4 On those 4 days, Novick downloaded 19 separate audio recordings from Maunu’s phone, 

capturing various conversations between Maunu and her neighbor, a friend, her mother, and 

Novick himself.

5 The phone Novick installed Mobile Spy on was unavailable for investigation because Maunu 

exchanged her malfunctioning mobile phone before discovering the spying application.
No. 47688-6-II

4

where you can get on the internet.” VRP at 416. In an attempt to confirm this process for 

beginning a recording, Monsour contacted Mobile Spy’s technical support. Monsour asked the 

technical support staff whether a recording had to be started manually or if there was some way 

to automate it so the phone would keep recording repeatedly. The technical support staff 

confirmed that a user had to manually start a recording every time.

Novick testified on his own behalf. Novick acknowledged his extensive use of Mobile 

Spy, but he contended that everything on Mobile Spy—including the surround recording 

feature—occurred automatically at random times.

The jury trial found Novick guilty of all counts as charged. Novick appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Novick argues that the evidence was insufficient to support any of his convictions. He 

contends that because the application automatically recorded conversations, the State failed to 

provide sufficient evidence that Novick intentionally recorded private communications. Viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that sufficient evidence exists to 

support Novick’s convictions. State v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d 1, 8, 133 P.3d 936 (2006).

Sufficient evidence supports a conviction if, when viewed in the light most favorable to 

the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged crime 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d at 8. We draw all reasonable inferences 

from the evidence in favor of the State and interpret them most strongly against the defendant. 

Hosier, 157 Wn.2d at 8. When reviewing evidence for sufficiency, circumstantial evidence and
No. 47688-6-II

5

direct evidence carry equal weight. State v. Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774, 781, 83 P.3d 410 (2004). 

We defer to the fact finder on issues of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and 

persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

First degree computer trespass occurs when a person intentionally gains access without 

authorization to a computer system or electronic database of another and the access is made with 

the intent to commit another crime. Former RCW 9A.52.110 (2011), repealed by LAWS OF 2016 

ch. 164, § 14. Here, the underlying crime was recording private communications. A person 

commits the crime of recording private communications when he intercepts or records private 

communications transmitted by any device designed to record and/or transmit said 

communications. RCW 9.73.030.

Novick contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove he issued a command to begin 

audio recording from the live control panel because the computer records did not explicitly show 

Novick issued a command. To support his claim, Novick relies on his own refuted testimony

that Mobile Spy automatically recorded the communications without a command to do so. 

Assuming without deciding that proof of manual commands is required to establish sufficient 

evidence, such proof existed. Monsour accounted for the absence of specific computer records

showing a manual command was given by explaining that the records show only the activity that 

resulted in a new URL, and that commands could be sent within an internet program without 

creating a new URL.

The forensic review of Novick’s computer activity revealed substantial circumstantial 

evidence that Novick sent the commands. Monsour testified that “every bit of information” 
No. 47688-6-II

6

confirmed that in order to activate the surround recording feature of the Mobile Spy program, a 

user must visit the Mobile Spy website and send a command through the program’s live control 

panel. VRP 398. And the computer records showed that Novick visited the live control panel on 

Mobile Spy’s website and subsequently downloaded audio files.

Novick characterizes the State’s evidence that Novick issued commands to record from 

the live control panel as “flimsy” and “weak.” Br. of Appellant 10, 12. But we defer to the trier 

of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the 

evidence. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 874-75. The conflicting testimony from Novick and Monsour 

created a credibility determination, which we leave to the trier of fact. State v. Miller, 179 Wn. 

App. 91, 105, 316 P.3d 1143 (2014).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence supports a finding that 

Novick sent commands from the live control panel to intentionally record Maunu’s private 

communications. Accordingly, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence for a rational 

jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Novick committed the crime of recording 

private communications, and thus committed computer trespass.

II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND UNIT OF PROSECUTION

Novick argues in the alternative that his multiple convictions for computer trespass and

recording private communications violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because the 

correct unit of prosecution for each crime covers the entire course of Novick’s conduct. We

disagree.
No. 47688-6-II

7

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no “person be 

subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Similarly, article I, 

section 9 of the Washington Constitution provides, “No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy 

for the same offense.” These double jeopardy provisions prohibit, among other things, multiple 

convictions for the same offense. State v. Hall, 168 Wn.2d 726, 729-30, 230 P.3d 1048 (2010). 

We review double jeopardy claims de novo. State v. Villanueva-Gonzalez, 180 Wn.2d 975, 979-

80, 329 P.3d 78 (2014).

“When a defendant is convicted for violating one statute multiple times, the proper 

inquiry is ‘what unit of prosecution has the Legislature intended as the punishable act under the 

specific criminal statute.’” State v. Reeder, 184 Wn.2d 805, 825, 365 P.3d 1243 (2015) (internal 

quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 634, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998)). In such 

a case, we determine whether there is a double jeopardy violation by asking, “‘What act or 

course of conduct has the Legislature defined as the punishable act?’” State v. Boswell, 185 Wn. 

App. 321, 327, 340 P.3d 971 (2014), review denied, 183 Wn.2d 1005 (2015) (quoting 

Villanueva-Gonzalez, 180 Wn.2d at 980). The scope of the criminal act as defined by the 

legislature is considered the unit of prosecution. Reeder, 184 Wn.2d at 825. “The issue is one of 

statutory interpretation and legislative intent.” Reeder, 184 Wn.2d at 825.

The first step is to analyze the statute in question. State v. Jensen, 164 Wn.2d 943, 949, 

195 P.3d 512 (2008). If the statute does not plainly define the unit of prosecution, we next 

examine the legislative history to discern legislative intent. Jensen, 164 Wn.2d at 949. Finally, 

we perform a factual analysis to determine if, under the facts of the specific case, more than one 
No. 47688-6-II

8

unit of prosecution is present. Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 735. If the legislature fails to define the unit 

of prosecution or its intent is unclear, any ambiguity must be resolved against allowing a single 

incident to support multiple convictions. State v. Tvedt, 153 Wn.2d 705, 711, 107 P.3d 728 

(2005).

A. The Plain Language of the Statutes

When interpreting a statute, our fundamental objective is to determine and give effect to 

the legislature’s intent. State v. Larson, 184 Wn.2d 843, 848, 365 P.3d 740 (2015). We look first 

to the statute’s plain language to determine this intent. Larson, 184 Wn.2d at 848. We discern the 

plain meaning of a statutory provision from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, as well 

as from the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the 

statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Polk, 187 Wn. App. 380, 389, 348 P.3d 1255 (2015). We 

avoid a reading that produces absurd results because we presume that the legislature does not 

intend absurd results. State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 733, 63 P.3d 792 (2003).

In applying the unit of prosecution analysis, courts look to discern “the evil the legislature 

has criminalized.” Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 731. The focus of this court’s inquiry is on the actual act

necessary to commit the crime. Boswell, 185 Wn. App. at 329.

“A person is guilty of computer trespass in the first degree if the person, without 

authorization, intentionally gains access to a computer system or electronic database of another; 

and (a) the access is made with the intent to commit another crime.” Former RCW 9A.52.110. 

“Access” as charged here means to “approach, instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve 
No. 47688-6-II

9

data from, or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, directly or by electronic 

means.” RCW 9A.52.010(1) (2011). 

A person is guilty of recording private communication when he “intercept[s], or record[s] 

any”:

(a) Private communication transmitted by telephone . . . or other device 

between two or more individuals between points within or without the state by any 

device electronic or otherwise designed to record and/or transmit said 

communication regardless how such device is powered or actuated, without first 

obtaining the consent of all the participants in the communication;

(b) Private conversation, by any device electronic or otherwise designed to 

record or transmit such conversation regardless how the device is powered or 

actuated without first obtaining the consent of all the persons engaged in the 

conversation.

RCW 9.73.030(1).

Novick contends that the language used in the statutes “suggests that there is a unit of 

prosecution for each computer trespassed upon and perhaps for each person to whom the 

computer belonged.”6 Br. of Appellant 15. The State responds that the plain language of the 

statutes define the proper unit of prosecution as each time a person gains unauthorized access to 

a computer and each conversation recorded without consent. We agree with the State. 

The operative criminal act prohibited by former RCW 9A.52.110 is the unauthorized 

access to another’s computer. Stated another way, the “evil the legislature has criminalized” is 

the access. See Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 731; RCW 9A.52.110. The violation of the statute is 

 

6 Novick does not state what he believes to be the proper unit of prosecution for recording 

private communication, rather he simply rejects the State’s interpretation that the unit of 

prosecution is each recorded conversation.
No. 47688-6-II

10

complete as soon as the defendant accesses another’s computer system with the intent to commit 

a crime. Likewise, RCW 9.73.030 prohibits recording private conversation without the consent 

of each participant in that conversation.

Novick contends that had the legislature intended each trespass, as opposed to each 

computer system, to be a separate crime it could have used such language as “a person commits 

a computer trespass in the first degree if . . . .” Br. of Appellant 15. Likewise he contends that 

had the legislature intended the unit of prosecution for recording private communication to be 

each conversation, it could have used the language “by recording . . . a private conversation.”

To support his argument, Novick relies on State v. Ose, 156 Wn.2d 140, 124 P.3d 635 

(2005). There, our Supreme Court held that by using the indefinite article “a” in the clause 

“possesses a stolen access device” the legislature unambiguously defined the unit of prosecution 

for possessing stolen property, as defined by RCW 9A.56.160(1)(c),

7

as one count per stolen 

access device. Ose, 156 Wn.2d at 146. Novick attempts to analogize the court’s interpretation in 

Ose to the first degree computer trespass statute by focusing on the statute’s use of “a computer 

system or electronic database.” Br. of Appellant at 15. However, Novick’s analogy is not 

persuasive.

Novick is correct that the legislature’s use of the word “a” in a criminal statute may

authorize punishment for each individual instance of criminal conduct even when the conduct 

occurs simultaneously. Ose, 156 Wn.2d at 147. However, Ose does not stand for the converse 

 

7 RCW 9A.56.160(1)(c) provides: “A person is guilty of possessing stolen property in the second 

degree if . . . [h]e or she possesses a stolen access device.”
No. 47688-6-II

11

proposition that the article “a” anywhere in a statute is required to define one unit of prosecution. 

Rather, we look at the statute as a whole to discern the criminal act the legislature intended to 

prohibit. We are not persuaded by Novick’s argument that if the legislature intended a single 

unit of prosecution based on a course of conduct, it could have said so plainly. What matters is 

not what the legislature did not say, but what it did say. State v. Vidales Morales, 174 Wn. App. 

370, 387, 298 P.3d 791 (2013).

The better analogy is to State v. Brooks, 113 Wn. App. 397, 400, 53 P.3d 1048 (2002), 

where Division One of our court determined the unit of prosecution for the crime of burglary by 

focusing on the action prohibited by the statute—unlawfully entering or remaining in a 

building—rather than the number of victims. Similarly, in State v. Allen, 150 Wn. App. 300, 

314, 207 P.3d 483 (2009), we focused on the action prohibited by the violation of a no-contact 

order statute when we held that the defendant could properly be charged with two violations of a 

no-contact order for sending two e-mails on different days that the victim viewed at the same 

time.

Novick further argues that the State’s interpretation of the units of prosecution would 

lead to absurd results. He contends that by defining the unit of prosecution for computer trespass 

as every access, the State could charge an unlimited number of counts based on the automated 

access of a program into a computer system. But the charges at issue here are specifically 

limited to Novick’s use of the live control panel to record and download Maunu’s private 

conversations. Whether Novick’s specific actions in this case constitute separate and distinct 
No. 47688-6-II

12

acts of computer trespass is a factual question we decide separately from determining the unit of 

prosecution intended by the legislature.

The plain language of the statutes support the conclusion that the units of prosecution for 

first degree computer trespass and recording private communication are each separate 

unauthorized access and each recording of a conversation without consent.

B. Novick’s Actions Constituted More Than One Unit of Prosecution

Once the unit of prosecution is determined, we next conduct a factual analysis to decide if 

more than one unit of prosecution exists. Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 735. The essential question is 

whether Novick committed separate crimes with each access and each recording. Factors that 

can be considered in addressing whether each act is a separate or distinct violation include the 

method used to commit the crime; the amount of time between the acts; and whether the initial 

conduct was interrupted, failed, or abandoned. See Boswell, 185 Wn. App. at 332.

Novick argues that his actions constituted “a single course of conduct with the single 

objective to spy on a single person’s cell phone,” and therefore, he should have been charged 

with only one count of each crime. Br. of Appellant at 16. We disagree. 

Both Novick and the State cite Hall, 168 Wn.2d 726, to support their argument. In Hall, 

the defendant was convicted of 3 counts of witness tampering after attempting to call one witness 

over 1,200 times within 3 days to convince her not to testify against him. Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 

729. Our Supreme Court explained that “‘[t]he obstruction of justice is the evil which the statute 

was designed to forestall,’” and therefore, the number of attempts was secondary to that purpose.

Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 735 (quoting State v. Stroh, 91 Wn.2d 580, 582, 588 P.2d 1182 (1979)). The 
No. 47688-6-II

13

court held that because the defendant’s conduct in that case was continuous, aimed at a single 

person, and meant to tamper with her testimony in a single proceeding, there was only one 

violation of the statute. Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 736. The Supreme Court noted that their 

determination may have been different had the defendant changed his strategy, or if he had 

briefly stopped his witness tampering before resuming it again at a later time. Hall, 168 Wn.2d 

at 737.

State v. Kinneman, 120 Wn. App. 327, 84 P.3d 882 (2003), addressed a similar issue. 

There, Kinneman made 67 unauthorized withdrawals from an individual’s trust account. 

Kinneman, 120 Wn. App. at 327. The State charged Kinneman separately for each withdrawal 

resulting in 28 counts of first degree theft and 39 counts of second degree theft. Kinneman 

argued that his numerous withdrawals constituted only a single count of first degree theft 

because all the takings were from the same place and the same victim. Kinneman, 120 Wn. App. 

at 334. Division One of this court rejected Kinneman’s argument, holding that each separate 

withdrawal occurring at different times could be viewed as a distinct theft. Kinneman, 120 Wn. 

App. at 338.

The facts of this case are similar to Kinneman. While Novick’s actions were somewhat 

repetitious, they were not continuous. On at least eight separate and distinct times, Novick 

logged onto Mobile Spy’s website, accessed Maunu’s phone by issuing a command through the 

live control panel, and downloaded at least eight different recordings of conversations between 

Maunu and various other people. Each access was separated by time and reflected a separate 

intent to record a separate conversation.
No. 47688-6-II

14

We hold that Novick’s eight convictions for first degree computer trespass and eight 

convictions for recording private conversations do not violate double jeopardy principles because

he was not charged multiple times for the same offense. Each count was based on evidence of 

eight distinct times that Novick’s conduct violated each statute.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the State provided sufficient evidence that Novick intentionally recorded 

eight private communications. Additionally, Novick’s actions constituted multiple units of 

prosecution, and therefore, his multiple convictions did not violate double jeopardy principles. 

Thus, we affirm Novick’s convictions.

Worswick, J.

We concur:

Maxa, A.C.J.

Melnick, J.