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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FOR PUBLICATION 

April 25, 2017 

9:05 a.m. 

v No. 330898 

Kalamazoo Circuit Court 

SABRINA RACINE PARKER, LC No. 2013-001721-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and MARKEY and SHAPIRO, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant, Sabrina Racine Parker, appeals by leave granted her guilty plea to identity 

theft, MCL 445.65, and conspiracy to steal and retain a financial transaction device without 

consent, MCL 750.157n(1). The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual 

offender, MCL 769.12, to 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment for each offense. The trial court ordered 

these sentences to run concurrently to one another, but consecutively to sentences imposed upon 

defendant in 2010 that she failed to complete because the Department of Corrections (DOC) 

erroneously released her into the community in 2011. Given the absence of statutory authority to 

support the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences in this case, we remand to the trial 

court to correct defendant’s judgment of sentence by striking the provision that her current 

sentences run consecutively to her sentences from 2010. 

I. PERTINENT FACTS 

 In October 2010, defendant was convicted and sentenced in Kent County to serve 21 to 

72 months’ imprisonment for possession of a stolen financial transaction device. In November 

2010, while serving her Kent County sentence, defendant was also convicted of possession of a 

stolen financial transaction device in Monroe County and sentenced to 32 to 48 months’ 

imprisonment. On June 6, 2011, the DOC erroneously released defendant back into the 

community before she finished serving either of her sentences. 

 The charges in the current case arose from conduct initiated on January 9, 2013, when 

defendant stole five credit cards from a victim while the victim was participating in a yoga class. 

Defendant was arrested on December 17, 2013, and subsequently entered guilty pleas to identity 

theft under MCL 445.65 and conspiracy to steal and retain a financial transaction device without 

consent under MCL 750.157n(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent sentences of 

4 to 15 years’ imprisonment for each offense. Because defendant’s release from prison in 2011, 
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before completing her sentences from 2010, came about through clerical error, her presentence 

investigation report indicated that she was “in prison.” Accordingly, the trial court ordered that 

defendant’s sentences in this case run consecutively to the completion of her sentences from 

2010 pursuant to MCL 768.7a.1

II. ANALYSIS 

 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering that her current 

sentences run consecutively to her sentences from 2010 because the consecutive sentencing 

provisions of MCL 768.7a do not apply to her. We agree. 

 Whether a consecutive sentence may be imposed is a question of law that we review de 

novo. People v Gonzalez, 256 Mich App 212, 229; 663 NW2d 499 (2003). Resolution of this 

issue requires us to interpret MCL 768.7a and related statutes. “The purpose of statutory 

interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. If a statute is clear, we enforce it 

as plainly written. However, if a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we must 

engage in judicial construction and interpret the statute.” People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 699; 

564 NW2d 13 (1997) (citations omitted). The purpose of a consecutive sentencing statute is “to 

deter persons convicted of one crime from committing other crimes by removing the security of 

concurrent sentencing.” People v Phillips, 217 Mich App 489, 499; 552 NW2d 487 (1996). 

Accordingly, “ ‘consecutive sentencing statute[s] should be construed liberally in order to 

achieve the deterrent effect intended by the Legislature.’ ” Id., quoting People v Kirkland, 172 

Mich App 735, 737; 432 NW2d 422 (1988). 

 A trial court may only impose a consecutive sentence if specifically authorized by statute. 

People v Lee, 233 Mich App 403, 405; 592 NW2d 779 (1999). Neither of the statutes under 

which the court sentenced defendant in this case specifically authorizes consecutive sentencing. 

See MCL 445.65; MCL 750.157n(1). As authority for the imposition of consecutive sentences, 

the trial court relied upon MCL 768.7a, which states in pertinent part: 

(1) A person who is incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution in this state, 

or who escapes from such an institution, and who commits a crime during that 

incarceration or escape which is punishable by imprisonment in a penal or 

reformatory institution in this state shall, upon conviction of that crime, be 

sentenced as provided by law. The term of imprisonment imposed for the crime 

shall begin to run at the expiration of the term or terms of imprisonment which the 

person is serving or has become liable to serve in a penal or reformatory 

institution in this state. 

(2) If a person is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a felony 

committed while the person was on parole from a sentence for a previous offense, 

 

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 Notably, the record contains a letter from the DOC to the trial court regarding defendant’s 

sentences, indicating that it did not believe that defendant’s current sentence should run 

consecutively to her 2010 sentences. 
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the term of imprisonment imposed for the later offense shall begin to run at the 

expiration of the remaining portion of the term of imprisonment imposed for the 

previous offense. 

 According to the plain language of MCL 768.7a, to be subject to consecutive sentencing 

a person must either be “incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution,” an escapee, or a 

parolee. It is undisputed that defendant was neither an escapee nor a parolee when she 

committed the 2013 offenses. Therefore, the question before this Court is whether defendant 

was “incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution” at the time of the 2013 offenses, thus 

warranting imposition of a consecutive sentence pursuant to MCL 768.7a(1). 

 It is undisputed that defendant was not literally incarcerated at the time she committed the 

crimes charged in this case. Therefore, interpreting MCL 768.7a(1) according to its plain 

language leads to the conclusion that defendant was not subject to its provisions and the trial 

court improperly ordered her to serve the sentences imposed for her current crimes consecutively 

to those imposed for her 2010 convictions. However, “[f]or consecutive sentencing purposes the 

term ‘penal or reformatory institution’ is broadly construed to include any grounds under the 

control of any person authorized by the Department of Corrections to have a prison inmate under 

care, custody or supervision either in an institution or outside an institution.” People v Sanders, 

130 Mich App 246, 250-251; 343 NW2d 513 (1983) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Literal confinement, therefore, “is not a controlling factor if the person continues to be under the 

control of the Department of Corrections.” People v Larkin, 118 Mich App 471, 474; 325 NW2d 

460 (1982) (concluding that a person on “pre-parole” status remains subject to the consecutive 

sentencing statute); see also Kirkland, 172 Mich App at 737 (“incarcerated in a penal or 

reformatory institution” applies “to inmates who are participating in community corrections 

programs, assigned to halfway houses, or on extended furloughs.”). 

 However, given the particular facts of this case, even a liberal construction of the phrase 

“incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution” does not bring defendant within MCL 

768.7a(1) for sentencing purposes. After the DOC erroneously released defendant on June 6, 

2011, the DOC stopped asserting any type of control over defendant or her activities. There is 

no evidence that the DOC was aware of or attempted to contact defendant regarding her 

erroneous release. Defendant’s only connection with the DOC after her release in 2011 was that 

she had time left unserved on her sentences from 2010 that she could have been ordered to serve 

under the DOC’s jurisdiction. See Michigan ex rel Oakland Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of 

Corrections, 199 Mich App 681, 694; 503 NW2d 465 (1993) (indicating that a prisoner whose 

early release resulted from an incorrect method of calculating good-time and special good-time 

credits could have been required to complete his sentence). Nevertheless, as Michigan’s 

Supreme Court recently illustrated, this connection alone is not sufficient to find that defendant 

was “incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution” pursuant to MCL 768.7a(1). 

People v Veilleux, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 

29, 2012 (Docket No. 302335), involved a defendant who had previously been sentenced to 365 

days in jail and three years’ probation for a felony drug violation, plus seven 90-day sentences 

for contempt of court arising from defendant’s outbursts at the sentencing hearing. Veilleux, 

unpub op at 1-2. The trial court had ordered the seven sentences for contempt of court to be 
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served consecutively, and all of the contempt sentences were to be consecutive to the sentence 

for the underlying felony. Id. However, the DOC released the defendant in error after serving 

365 days in jail on the felony violation, without having served any of his sentences for contempt 

of court. Id. at 2. Three weeks after his erroneous release, police arrested the defendant for 

assault. Although the assault charged was dismissed, the defendant’s blood alcohol level at the 

time of his arrest had been .17%, and, therefore, the defendant was found in violation of the 

terms of his probation. Id. The trial court re-sentenced the defendant to 34 months to 15 years’ 

imprisonment, and ordered the sentence to be served consecutive to the seven sentences for 

contempt, relying in part on MCL 768.7a(1).2

 Id. This Court granted the defendant’s delayed 

application for leave to appeal, “limiting [its] inquiry to whether the trial court erred in ordering 

that defendant’s 34 month to 15-year prison term run consecutive to his sentences for contempt 

of court.” Id. Relying heavily on the Court’s decision in Williams, a two-member majority 

affirmed the trial court’s order of consecutive sentencing on the ground that the defendant had to 

complete the sentence “he remained liable to serve” at the time of his resentencing. Id. at 4. 

 Defendant sought leave to appeal this Court’s decision to Michigan’s Supreme Court. In 

lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this Court’s judgment and remanded 

the matter to the trial court “for it to correct the judgment of sentence by striking those 

provisions making the sentences for contempt consecutive to each other and consecutive to 

defendant’s sentence for the underlying felony.” People v Veilleux, 493 Mich 914; 828 NW2d 

328 (2012). Regarding the applicability of MCL 768.7a(1), the Supreme Court explained: 

Contrary to the lower courts’ holdings, MCL 768.7a(1) does not specifically 

authorize the consecutive sentences imposed here. MCL 768.7a(1) applies only 

to “[a] person who is incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution in this 

state, or who escapes from such an institution.” When defendant committed the 

contempts of court at issue here, he was not at the time incarcerated in a penal or 

reformatory institution and he was not an escapee. 

 

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 The trial court also relied on this Court’s decision in People v Kevin Williams, unpublished 

opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued May 12, 2005 (Docket No. 254628). At issue 

in Williams was whether a trial court could order that multiple contempt sentences run 

consecutively. People v Veilleux, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, 

issued March 29, 2012 (Docket No. 302335), p 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The 

Court determined in relevant part that “[t]he clear and unambiguous language of MCL 768.7a(1) 

requires that each of defendant’s sentences for contempt . . . be consecutive ‘to terms of 

imprisonment which the person . . . has become liable to serve.” Id. (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court concluded, “each contempt sentence is required to be 

served consecutively to those prior contempt sentences for which defendant had already become 

liable to serve.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Williams was not quite on point, as 

unlike the defendant in Veilleux, the defendant in Williams did not contest the trial court’s 

authority to impose the contempt sentences consecutive to the sentence for an underlying crime. 

Id. 
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 In Veilleux, our Supreme Court rejected the idea that merely being “liable to serve” a 

sentence is tantamount to being “incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution” for purposes 

of MCL 768.7a(1). The Veilleux Court’s decision underscores that the purpose of the portion of 

MCL 768.7a(1) at issue is to deter incarcerated persons from committing crimes while 

incarcerated by “removing the security of concurrent sentencing,” thereby ensuring that they will 

actually serve additional time for the crimes committed. See Phillips, 217 Mich App at 499. 

That defendant had time remaining on her sentences from 2010 is not, by itself, sufficient to find 

that defendant was “incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution” within the meaning of 

MCL 768.7a(1). Accordingly, the trial court erred by ordering that defendant’s current sentences 

run consecutive to the completion of her sentences from 2010 pursuant to MCL 768.7a(1). 

 The prosecution argues that defendant should be considered “incarcerated in a penal or 

reformatory institution” based on the interplay between MCL 768.6, MCL 768.7, and MCL 

768.7a(1). MCL 768.6 provides: 

Any person now or hereafter confined in any penal or reformatory institution in 

this state, and who during the term of such confinement shall commit any crime 

or offense punishable under the laws of this state by imprisonment in such 

institution, shall be subject to the same punishment as if the crime had been 

committed at any other place or by a person not so confined. 

And MCL 768.7 provides in relevant part as follows: 

The circuit court for the county in which the prison or institution named in the 

preceding section is, shall have jurisdiction over cases arising under the foregoing 

section[.] . . . The provisions of this and the preceding section shall apply to 

persons who are temporarily outside the limits of the institutions named in such 

sections, except those prisoners who have received a parole by due process of law 

and are at liberty under the terms of such parole. 

 MCL 768.6 applies when a person commits a crime while “confined in any penal or 

reformatory institution.” MCL 768.7 expands the applicability of MCL 768.6 to persons 

“temporarily outside the limits” of such institutions at the time the person commits a crime. 

Thus, a person who commits a crime while “temporarily outside the limits” of a penal or 

reformatory institution may be punished as though the person committed the crime while 

incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution. MCL 768.6; MCL 768.7. If a person commits 

a crime while “incarcerated in a penal or reformatory institution,” the person is subject to 

consecutive sentencing pursuant to MCL 768.7a(1). Based on this interplay between MCL 

768.6, MCL 768.7, and MCL 768.7a(1), the prosecution argues that defendant was subject to 

consecutive sentencing pursuant to MCL 768.7a(1) because she committed the crimes in this 

case while “temporarily outside the limits” of a penal or reformatory institution. 

 We find the prosecution’s argument unpersuasive. MCL 768.7 does not define 

“temporarily,” nor is a definition provided in the relevant section of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure, MCL 761.1. Where terms are undefined, a court may consult a dictionary regarding 

their plain and ordinary meaning. People v Ackah-Essien, 311 Mich App 13, 25; 874 NW2d 172 
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(2015). The dictionary defines the word “temporarily” as “during a limited time.” MerriamWebster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed), p 1286. Nothing in the record indicates that 

defendant’s erroneous release from prison was for a “limited time” only, after which she would 

be returning to incarceration. The DOC did not attempt to bring defendant back under its control 

or notify her that she was out by mistake, or even seem aware that an error had occurred. In 

other words, nothing in the record suggests that defendant’s time at liberty was other than 

unlimited. If there was no limit on defendant’s time at liberty, there is no possible interpretation 

of MCL 768.7 that would allow for defendant’s time outside of a penal or reformatory institution 

to be considered temporary. 

 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by ordering that defendant’s current 

sentences run consecutively to her previous sentences from 2010 pursuant to MCL 768.7a(1), 

and thus, we remand the case to the trial court to correct the judgment of sentence by striking the 

provisions making defendant’s sentences consecutive. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro