Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 186 / Wednesday, September 27, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 44945 

Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601 et 

seq.), do not apply. 

This action directly regulates growers, 

food processors, food handlers, and food 

retailers, not States or tribes, nor does 

this action alter the relationships or 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities established by Congress 

in the preemption provisions of FFDCA 

section 408(n)(4). As such, the Agency 

has determined that this action will not 

have a substantial direct effect on States 

or tribal governments, on the 

relationship between the national 

government and the States or tribal 

governments, or on the distribution of 

power and responsibilities among the 

various levels of government or between 

the Federal Government and Indian 

tribes. Thus, the Agency has determined 

that Executive Order 13132, entitled 

‘‘Federalism’’ (64 FR 43255, August 10, 

1999) and Executive Order 13175, 

entitled ‘‘Consultation and Coordination 

with Indian Tribal Governments’’ (65 FR 

67249, November 9, 2000) do not apply 

to this action. In addition, this action 

does not impose any enforceable duty or 

contain any unfunded mandate as 

described under Title II of the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 

1501 et seq.). 

This action does not involve any 

technical standards that would require 

Agency consideration of voluntary 

consensus standards pursuant to section 

12(d) of the National Technology 

Transfer and Advancement Act 

(NTTAA) (15 U.S.C. 272 note). 

VII. Congressional Review Act 

Pursuant to the Congressional Review 

Act (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), EPA will 

submit a report containing this rule and 

other required information to the U.S. 

Senate, the U.S. House of 

Representatives, and the Comptroller 

General of the United States prior to 

publication of the rule in the Federal 

Register. This action is not a ‘‘major 

rule’’ as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2). 

List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 180 

Environmental protection, 

Administrative practice and procedure, 

Agricultural commodities, Pesticides 

and pests, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

Dated: August 29, 2017. 

Michael L. Goodis, 

Director, Registration Division, Office of 

Pesticide Programs. 

Therefore, 40 CFR chapter I is 

amended as follows: 

PART 180—[AMENDED] 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 180 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 21 U.S.C. 321(q), 346a and 371. 

■ 2. In § 180.685, redesignate paragraph 

(a)(1) as paragraph (a) and add 

alphabetically the following commodity 

‘‘Cacao bean, dried bean’’ to the table in 

paragraph (a) in alphabetical order to 

read as follows: 

§ 180.685 Oxathiapiprolin; tolerances for 

residues. 

(a) * * * 

Commodity Parts per 

million 

* * * * * 

Cacao bean, dried bean ............. 0.15 

* * * * * 

* * * * * 

[FR Doc. 2017–20747 Filed 9–26–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6560–50–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration 

49 CFR Part 571 

[Docket No. NHTSA–2017–0085] 

RIN 2127–AL68 

Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standards; Electric-Powered Vehicles: 

Electrolyte Spillage and Electrical 

Shock Protection 

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic 

Safety Administration (NHTSA), 

Department of Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: NHTSA is issuing this final 

rule to amend Federal Motor Vehicle 

Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 305, 

‘‘Electric-powered vehicles: Electrolyte 

spillage and electrical shock 

protection,’’ to adopt various electrical 

safety requirements found in Global 

Technical Regulation (GTR) No. 13, 

‘‘Hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles,’’ and 

other sources. This final rule updates 

FMVSS No. 305 using modern and 

harmonized safety requirements and 

facilitates the introduction of new 

technologies, including hydrogen fuel 

cell vehicles (HFCVs) and 48-volt mild 

hybrid technologies. This final rule is a 

deregulatory action. It imposes no costs 

and adjusts FMVSS No. 305 to give 

more flexibility to manufacturers not 

only to use modern electrical safety 

designs to produce electric vehicles, but 

also to introduce new technologies to 

the U.S. market. To expand FMVSS No. 

305’s performance requirements beyond 

post-crash conditions, NHTSA adopts 

electrical safety requirements to protect 

against direct and indirect contact of 

high voltage sources during everyday 

operation of electric-powered vehicles. 

Also, NHTSA adopts an optional 

method of meeting post-crash electrical 

safety requirements, consistent with that 

in GTR No. 13, involving use of physical 

barriers to prevent direct or indirect 

contact (by occupants, emergency 

services personnel and others) with high 

voltage sources. 

DATES:

Effective date: This final rule is 

effective September 27, 2017. 

Compliance date: The compliance 

date for the amendments in this final 

rule is September 27, 2018. Optional 

early compliance is permitted. 

Petitions for reconsideration: Petitions 

for reconsideration of this final rule 

must be received not later than 

November 13, 2017. 

ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration 

of this final rule must refer to the docket 

and notice number set forth above and 

be submitted to the Administrator, 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

Note that all petitions received will be 

posted without change to http://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information provided. 

Privacy Act: Please see the Privacy 

Act heading under Rulemaking 

Analyses and Notices. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

technical issues, you may call William 

J. Sa ́nchez, Office of Crashworthiness 

Standards (telephone: 202–493–0248) 

(fax: 202–493–2990). For legal issues, 

you may call Deirdre Fujita, Office of 

Chief Counsel (telephone: 202–366– 

2992) (fax: 202–366–3820). Address: 

National Highway Traffic Safety 

Administration, U.S. Department of 

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., West Building, 

Washington, DC 20590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary 

a. Overview 

b. Summary of the Final Rule and 

Highlighted Differences With the NPRM 

1. Every Day (Normal) Vehicle Operations 

i. Direct Contact Protection From High 

Voltage Sources 

ii. Indirect Contact Protection From High 

Voltage Sources 

iii. Electrical Isolation of High Voltage 

Sources 

iv. Monitoring Systems 

v. Electrical Safety During Charging 

vi. Mitigating Driver Error 

2. Post-Crash Safety 


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1Since the physiological impacts of direct current 

(DC) are less than those of alternating current (AC), 

the standard specifies lower minimum electrical 

isolation requirements for DC high voltage sources 

with electrical isolation monitoring systems (100 

ohms/volt) than for AC components (500 ohms/ 

volt). 

2Under this low voltage option, electrical 

components are low voltage if their voltage is less 

than or equal to 60 VDC or 30 VAC. VDC is the 

voltage for direct current sources and VAC is 

voltage for alternating current sources. These low 

voltage levels will not cause electric shock. 

3Contact of a conductive part that is energized 

due to loss of electrical isolation of a high voltage 

source is an indirect contact of a high voltage 

source. 

4Petitioner Toyota requested the physical barrier 

option to allow HFCVs to be offered for sale in the 

U.S. After its submission of the petition for 

rulemaking, Toyota pursued and was granted a 

temporary exemption from FMVSS No. 305 for an 

HFCV (see grant of petition, January 2, 2015 (80 FR 

101)). Toyota incorporates electrical protection 

barriers (conductively connected to the electric 

chassis with low resistance) and maintains at least 

a 100 ohms/volt electrical isolation into its design. 

NHTSA granted the petition for exemption on the 

basis that the exemption would make the 

development or field evaluation of a low emission 

(zero emission) vehicle easier and would not 

unreasonably reduce the safety of the vehicle. 

5Petitioner Alliance requested the physical 

barrier option to facilitate the production of 48volt 

mild hybrid technologies as well as HFCVs. 

6The U.S. was one of several contracting parties 

to the 1998 Agreement that proposed the 

development and establishment of GTR No. 13. 

7Each Contracting Party that voted for a new GTR 

that has been established under the 1998 Agreement 

is obligated by that Agreement to initiate its process 

for adopting the GTR into national law. However, 

the Agreement does not obligate such a Contracting 

Party to adopt the GTR. The Contracting Party 

retains full discretion under the Agreement to 

decide for itself whether to adopt the GTR. 

8NHTSA is considering initiating rulemaking in 

the future on other aspects of GTR No. 13 directly 

pertaining to the fuel system integrity of HFCVs. 

9Contact of a conductive part that is energized 

due to loss of electrical isolation of a high voltage 

source is an indirect contact of a high voltage 

source. 

10NHTSA contracted with the Battelle Memorial 

Research Institute to research failure modes 

associated with physical barriers that could result 

in electric shock. Battelle identified different 

scenarios involving failure of electrical isolation, 

direct contact protection, or indirect contact 

protection and a combination of failure of two or 

more these protection measures. Battelle then 

evaluated the possibility of electric shock in each 

i. Direct and Indirect Contact Protection 

From High Voltage Sources 

ii. Electrical Isolation 

3. Definitions, Figures, and Test 

Procedures 

4. Compliance Date 

II. Background 

a. Overview of the GTR Process 

b. Overview of GTR No. 13 

c. Physical Barrier Option 

d. Petitions for Rulemaking 

III. Overview of the Comments 

IV. Response to the Comments 

a. Definitions and Terminology (General) 

b. Clarification of Application of 

Requirements 

c. Electrical Safety for Connectors and the 

Vehicle Charge Inlet 

d. Markings 

e. Indirect Contact Protection 

f. Electrical Isolation Requirements 

g. Electrical Safety During Charging 

h. Mitigating Driver Error 

i. Test Procedures and Figures in FMVSS 

No. 305 

j. Compliance Date 

V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices 

I. Executive Summary 

a. Overview 

NHTSA is issuing this final rule to 

update FMVSS No. 305, ‘‘Electricpowered vehicles: Electrolyte spillage 

and electrical shock protection.’’ As 

indicated in its title, one purpose of 

FMVSS No. 305 is to reduce deaths and 

injuries from electrical shock. Currently, 

the standard focuses on post-crash 

safety, requiring vehicles with high 

voltage sources to protect vehicle 

occupants, rescue workers and others 

who may contact the vehicle after a 

crash. To protect against electric shock, 

FMVSS No. 305 currently requires that, 

during and after the crash tests specified 

in the standard, high voltage sources in 

the vehicle must be either (a) 

electrically isolated from the vehicle’s 

chassis 1 or (b) their voltage must be at 

levels considered safe from harmful 

electric shock.2 This final rule amends 

the standard to adopt a physical barrier 

compliance option that prevents direct 

and indirect contact 3 of high voltage 

sources post-crash by way of ‘‘electrical 

protection barriers.’’ An electrical 

protection barrier is a physical barrier 

that encloses a high voltage source to 

prevent direct contact (by occupants, 

emergency services personnel and 

others) of the high voltage source from 

any direction of access. 

This final rule is a deregulatory action 

as it imposes no costs and adjusts 

FMVSS No. 305 to give more flexibility 

to manufacturers not only for current 

electric vehicle designs, but also for 

introducing new technologies to the 

U.S. market, including hydrogen fuel 

cell vehicles (HFCVs) and 48-volt mild 

hybrid technologies. In adopting the 

physical barrier option, this final rule 

adjusts the standard to remove an 

obstruction that prevented HFCVs from 

being offered for sale in the U.S. 

Adopting the physical barrier option 

also enables manufacturers to produce 

48-volt mild hybrid systems without 

having to use electrical isolation safety 

measures that involve more complexity, 

higher consumer costs, and higher mass, 

without an incremental safety benefit. 

This rule responds to petitions for 

rulemaking from Toyota Motor North 

America Inc. (Toyota) 4 and the Auto 

Alliance (Alliance).5

NHTSA is also issuing this final rule 

as part of the agency’s ongoing effort to 

avoid unnecessary differences in the 

vehicle safety standards of different 

countries through a harmonization 

process under the United Nation 

Economic Commission for Europe 

(UNECE) 1998 Global Agreement (‘‘1998 

Agreement’’). The efforts of the U.S.6

and other contracting parties to the 1998 

Agreement culminated in the 

establishment of GTR No. 13, 

‘‘Hydrogen and fuel cell vehicles.’’ 

NHTSA voted in June 2013 in favor of 

establishing GTR No. 13.7 This final rule 

adopts requirements based on the 

electrical safety requirements of GTR 

No. 13.8

Similar to FMVSS No. 305, GTR No. 

13 has requirements intended to reduce 

deaths and injuries from electrical 

shock, but addresses both normal 

vehicle operation and post-crash safety. 

Also, while the various post-crash 

compliance options in GTR No. 13 are 

like those in FMVSS No. 305, GTR No. 

13 includes the physical barrier option 

to prevent direct and indirect contact 9

of high voltage sources. 

On March 10, 2016, NHTSA issued 

the notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM) on which this final rule is 

based (81 FR 12647). The NPRM 

proposed adopting GTR No. 13’s normal 

vehicle operation requirements, and 

proposed adopting a post-crash physical 

barrier compliance option like that in 

GTR No. 13. 

Comments on the NPRM were 

generally supportive of the proposed 

changes. Some commenters requested 

modifying the proposed regulatory text 

to clarify the wording of requirements 

and test procedures or to align the text 

with GTR No. 13 and ECE R.100, 

‘‘Uniform provisions concerning the 

approval of vehicles with regard to 

specific requirements for the electric 

power train,’’ and some suggested 

NHTSA should not adopt some 

requirements for lack of safety need. 

This final rule adopts most aspects of 

the proposal, with some parts changed 

in response to commenters. The final 

rule improves motor vehicle safety by 

expanding FMVSS No. 305’s protections 

to normal vehicle operations. The 

updated post-crash performance 

requirements ensure that new power 

train configurations provide a 

comparable level of post-crash safety as 

that of existing electric vehicles. 

This final rule reflects the state-of-the 

art in vehicle electrical safety. It draws 

from the findings from the agency’s 

research on the physical barrier 

compliance option in GTR No. 13 

(Battelle study),10 ECE R.100, and the 


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of these scenarios. Battelle’s evaluation noted that 

multiple failures in protection measures were 

needed for a person to experience electric shock. 

The final report is available at https://

www.regulations.gov/document?D=NHTSA-2016- 

0029-0003. 

11SAE J1766, ‘‘Recommended practice for 

electric, fuel cell, and hybrid electric vehicle crash 

integrity testing,’’ January 2014, SAE International, 

http://www.sae.org. 

12 In November 2011, the Executive Committee of 

the 1998 Agreement established a working group to 

develop a GTR for electric vehicle safety. The 

United States is a co-chair of this working group, 

along with the European Union, Japan, and China. 

See, draft Global Technical Regulation on Electric 

Vehicle Safety, September 2016. https://

www2.unece.org/wiki/display/trans/ 

EVS+12th+session. 

13 IPXXB and IPXXD ‘‘protection degrees’’ refer to 

the ability of the physical barriers to prevent 

entrance of a probe into the barrier, to ensure no 

direct contact with high voltage sources. ‘‘IPXXB’’ 

is a probe representing a small human finger. 

‘‘IPXXD’’ is a slender wire probe. Protection degrees 

IPXXB and IPXXD are International 

Electrotechnical Commission specifications for 

protection from direct contact of high voltage 

sources. 

14A service disconnect is a device for 

deactivation of an electrical circuit when 

conducting checks and services of the electric 

battery, fuel cell stack, or other high voltage source. 

15The vehicle charge inlet is the device on the 

electric vehicle into which the charge connector is 

inserted for the purpose of transferring energy and 

exchanging information from an external electric 

power supply. 

16This ensures that in the event of loss in 

electrical isolation, no dangerous voltage potentials 

are produced between exposed conductive parts of 

electrical protection barriers and the electrical 

chassis, and therefore very low levels of current 

would flow through a human body contacting 

different parts of the vehicle. Since current flows 

through the path of least resistance, most of the 

current flow will be through the chassis than 

through the human body which has a significantly 

higher resistance. 

electrical safety requirements in a 

January 2014 version of SAE J1766.11

The rule not only gives more 

flexibility to manufacturers to use 

modern electrical safety designs to 

produce electric vehicles and introduce 

new vehicle technologies, but also paves 

the way globally for future innovations 

on vehicle electrical safety. A new GTR 

is under development 12 for electric 

vehicle safety (EVS–GTR) which 

includes specifications for high voltage 

electrical components and rechargeable 

electric energy storage systems. In 

November 2016, NHTSA and other 

parties developing the new draft GTR 

completed the document’s high voltage 

electrical safety provisions. The parties 

designed the draft GTR to reflect the 

provisions of GTR No. 13, ECE R.100, 

and the requirements proposed in the 

March 2016 NPRM and adopted by this 

final rule. 

We estimate that the final rule will 

result in essentially no cost to 

consumers in the U.S. This rule adopts 

requirements that closely mirror the 

electrical safety provisions of GTR No. 

13, which have already been 

implemented by manufacturers in this 

country. 

b. Summary of the Final Rule and 

Highlighted Differences With the NPRM 

This section summarizes the 

requirements adopted by this final rule. 

For the convenience of the reader, we 

also note the few notable differences 

between this rule and the NPRM. The 

reasons underlying our decisions are 

explained in the body of this preamble 

and in the NPRM. 

1. Every Day (Normal) Vehicle 

Operations 

This final rule adds electrical safety 

requirements for vehicle performance 

during every day (normal) vehicle 

operations to mitigate the risk of electric 

shock due to direct or indirect contact 

of high voltage sources or loss in 

electrical isolation. We also adopt 

requirements to assure electrical safety 

during refueling and to mitigate driver 

error in vehicle operation. 

i. Direct Contact Protection From High 

Voltage Sources 

The rule specifies: 

A. IPXXD protection degree for high 

voltage sources inside passenger and 

luggage compartments, and IPXXB 

protection degree for high voltage 

sources outside passenger and luggage 

compartments.13

B. IPXXB protection degree for service 

disconnects that can be opened or 

removed without tools.14

C. Markings on certain electrical 

protection barriers of high voltage 

sources (i.e., barriers that can be 

physically accessed, opened, or 

removed without the use of tools) and 

on or near electric energy storage 

devices. As to the latter, the NPRM also 

proposed to require markings on or near 

electric energy conversion devices (fuel 

cells), but the agency concludes 

conversion devices are benign in and of 

themselves in that they are not high 

density energy sources. Thus, 

conversion devices do not need to be 

marked. (Note that the electric 

protection barrier around a fuel cell is 

required to be marked.) In another 

change from the NPRM, markings are 

not required on electrical connectors 

and on the vehicle charge inlet 15

because of a lack of a need for the 

markings. 

D. In a change from the NPRM, this 

rule has distinct direct contact 

protection requirements for connectors 

and the vehicle charge inlet. First, it 

requires that the IPXXB/IPXXD 

protection levels be met by each 

connector when connected to its mating 

component. IPXXD protection degree is 

required for connectors located inside 

the passenger and luggage 

compartments. IPXXB protection degree 

is required for connectors and vehicle 

charge inlets located outside these 

compartments. Second, connectors must 

meet at least one of the following three 

requirements: (1) If a connector or 

vehicle charge inlet can be separated 

from its mating component without the 

use of tools, the IPXXB/IPXXD 

protection level must be provided when 

the connector is uncoupled from its 

mating component; (2) if a connector or 

vehicle charge inlet can be separated 

from its mating component without the 

use of tools, the voltage of live parts of 

the connector or vehicle charge inlet 

becomes less than or equal to 60 VDC 

or 30 VAC within one second of 

separating from its mating component; 

or, (3) the connector has a locking 

mechanism (at least two distinct actions 

are needed to separate the connector 

from its mating component), and there 

are other components that must be 

removed to separate the connector from 

its mating component and these cannot 

be removed without the use of tools. 

E. This rule requires orange color 

outer coverings for cables of high 

voltage sources that are located outside 

electrical protection barriers. 

ii. Indirect Contact Protection From 

High Voltage Sources 

This rule requires exposed conductive 

parts of electrical protection barriers to 

be conductively connected to the 

chassis with a resistance less than 0.1 

ohms, and the resistance between two 

simultaneously reachable exposed 

conductive parts of electrical protection 

barriers that are within 2.5 meters of 

each other must be less than 0.2 ohms.16

iii. Electrical Isolation of High Voltage 

Sources 

A. This rule requires 500 ohms/volt or 

higher electrical isolation for AC high 

voltage sources and 100 ohms/volt or 

higher for DC high voltage sources. 

B. Where AC and DC buses are 

connected, this rule permits AC high 

voltage sources to have electrical 

isolation of 100 ohms/volt or higher, 

provided they also have the direct and 

indirect contact protection described in 

i and ii, above. 

iv. Monitoring Systems 

This rule requires an electrical 

isolation monitoring system for DC high 

voltage sources on fuel cell vehicles. 


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17Current will flow through the path of least 

resistance and therefore most of the current 

resulting from a loss of electrical isolation would 

flow through the ground connection rather than 

through the human body. 

18 Vehicles with an internal combustion engine 

that directly or indirectly provides the vehicle’s 

propulsion power on start up are excluded from 

this requirement. 

19 I.e., the vehicle mode when application of 

pressure to the accelerator pedal or release of the 

brake system causes the electric power train to 

move the vehicle. 

20 I.e., they provide IPXXB protection degree and 

indirect contact protection of resistance between 

exposed conductive parts of the electrical 

protection barrier and electric chassis of 0.1 ohms 

and between two simultaneously reachable exposed 

conductive parts within 2.5 meters of each other of 

0.2 ohms. 

21As noted above, under the terms of the 1998 

Agreement, NHTSA is not obligated to adopt the 

GTR after initiating this process. In deciding 

whether to adopt a GTR as an FMVSS, we follow 

the requirements for NHTSA rulemaking, including 

the Administrative Procedure Act, the National 

Highway and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (Vehicle 

Safety Act) (49 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.) Presidential 

Executive Orders, and DOT and NHTSA policies, 

procedures and regulations. Among other things, 

FMVSSs issued under the Vehicle Safety Act ‘‘shall 

be practicable, meet the need for motor vehicle 

safety, and be stated in objective terms.’’ 49 U.S.C. 

30111. 

v. Electrical Safety During Charging 

This final rule requires: 

A. Electrical isolation greater than or 

equal to 500 ohms/volt between the 

electrical chassis and other high voltage 

sources connected to the vehicle charge 

inlet (for connecting to the AC external 

power supply). Note that this is a 

change from the 1 million ohms 

isolation resistance requirement 

proposed in the NPRM. 

B. IPXXB/IPXXD protection level for 

the vehicle charge inlet when connected 

to the charge connector and IPXXB/ 

IPXXD protection level or low voltage 

when separated from the charge 

connector. 

C. Conductive connection of the 

electric chassis to earth ground before 

and during the application of exterior 

voltage to the vehicle.17

vi. Mitigating Driver Error 

This final rule includes requirements 

for— 

A. Providing at least a momentary 

indication to the driver when the 

vehicle is first placed in ‘‘possible active 

driving mode’’ after manual activation 

of the propulsion system.18 This is a 

change from the NPRM to clarify when 

the momentary indication must be 

provided. 

B. Informing the driver if the vehicle 

is still in a possible active driving 

mode,19 by an audible or visual signal 

when he or she leaves the vehicle; and, 

C. Preventing vehicle movement of 

more than 150 millimeters (mm) by its 

own propulsion system when the 

vehicle charging system is connected to 

the external electric power supply in 

such a way that charging is possible. 

(The 150 mm limit is a change from the 

NPRM, which did not specify a 

distance.) 

2. Post-Crash Safety 

This final rule also amends FMVSS 

No. 305’s post-crash electrical safety 

requirements. 

i. Direct and Indirect Contact Protection 

From High Voltage Sources 

The rule adds an optional method of 

meeting post-crash electrical safety 

requirements through physical barrier 

protection of high voltage sources. The 

specifications of this optional method of 

electric safety include requirements 

ensuring that: 

A. High voltage sources are enclosed 

in barriers that prevent direct human 

contact with high voltage sources 

(IPXXB protection level), 

B. Exposed conductive parts of 

electrical protection barriers are 

conductively connected to the chassis 

with a resistance less than 0.1 ohms. 

The resistance between any two 

simultaneously reachable exposed 

conductive parts of electrical protection 

barriers that are less than 2.5 meters 

from each other must be less than 0.2 

ohms. 

C. Voltage between exposed 

conductive parts of an electrical 

protection barrier and the electrical 

chassis, and between two 

simultaneously reachable exposed 

conductive parts of the electrical 

protection barrier that are less than 2.5 

meters from each other, must be less 

than or equal to 60 VDC or 30 VAC (low 

voltage). (The NPRM was worded to 

apply this requirement to voltage 

between any exposed conductive parts 

of the vehicle.) 

ii. Electrical Isolation 

An AC high voltage source that is 

conductively connected to a DC high 

voltage source may meet an electrical 

isolation requirement of 100 ohms/volt 

or greater, provided the AC high voltage 

source also has physical barrier 

protection specified in i(A) and i(B), 

above.20 (The NPRM had proposed 

requiring all three elements i(A), i(B), 

and i(C) of physical barrier protection 

for such AC high voltage sources.) 

3. Definitions, Figures, and Test 

Procedures 

We make minor changes to a number 

of proposed definitions to clarify the 

standard and to achieve consistency 

with other definitions. We adopt terms 

such as ‘‘high voltage live parts,’’ 

‘‘exposed conductive parts of electrical 

protection barriers,’’ and ‘‘possible 

active driving mode’’ in place of 

proposed terms that were less clear. 

We make a minor correction to Figure 

7b and clarify Figure 8. 

We clarify several test procedures, 

including how we will use the IPXXB 

and IPXXD protection degree probes 

and how we determine the voltage 

between various conductive parts. We 

provide manufacturers the option of 

choosing between two methods for 

measuring resistance, and, in a change 

from the NPRM, provide that resistance 

between two exposed conductive parts 

of the electrical protection barrier may 

be computed from measured resistances. 

4. Compliance Date 

The compliance date for this final rule 

is one year from the date of publication 

of the final rule in the Federal Register. 

Optional early compliance is permitted. 

(The NPRM proposed a compliance date 

of 180 days after the publication of the 

final rule in the Federal Register.) 

II. Background 

a. Overview of the GTR Process 

The United States is a contracting 

party to the 1998 Agreement, which was 

entered into force in 2000 and is 

administered by the UN ECE’s Working 

Party (WP).29. The purpose of this 

agreement is to establish GTRs. 

GTR No. 13 addresses hydrogen fuel 

cell vehicle technology. NHTSA closely 

collaborated with experts from 

contracting parties to the 1998 

Agreement, particularly Germany and 

Japan, to develop a GTR for hydrogen 

fueled vehicles that establishes levels of 

safety that are equivalent to or exceeds 

those for conventional gasoline fueled 

vehicles. The collaborative effort in this 

process led to the establishment of GTR 

No. 13 in June 2013. 

The U.S. voted on June 27, 2013 in 

favor of establishing GTR No. 13. In 

voting yes to establishing the GTR, 

NHTSA is obligated to submit the 

technical regulation to the process used 

in the U.S. to adopt the requirement into 

our law or regulation.21 By issuance of 

the March 10, 2016 NPRM preceding 

this final rule, NHTSA initiated the 

process for considering adoption of GTR 

No. 13. 

This final rule addresses the electrical 

safety requirements in GTR No. 13 (i.e., 

the electrical isolation requirements, 

physical barrier requirements, etc.) and 

not GTR No. 13’s hydrogen fuel system 

and fuel container integrity 

requirements. NHTSA will commence a 


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22A detailed description of GTR No. 13 can be 

found in the NPRM. See 81 FR at 12651–12654. 

23See final rule, 75 FR 33515, June 14, 2010; 

response to petitions for reconsideration, 76 FR 

45436, July 29, 2011. 

24 Id. 

25SAE J1766, ‘‘Recommended practice for 

electric, fuel cell, and hybrid electric vehicle crash 

integrity testing,’’ January 2014, SAE International, 

http://www.sae.org. 

separate proceeding on incorporating 

the latter portions of GTR No. 13 into 

the relevant FMVSSs. 

b. Overview of GTR No. 13 

HFCVs have an electric drive-train 

powered by a fuel cell that generates 

electric power electrochemically using 

hydrogen. The hydrogen is 

electrochemically combined with 

oxygen (from air) within the fuel cell 

system to produce high-voltage electric 

power. The electric power is supplied to 

the electric drive motors and/or used to 

charge batteries and capacitors. HFCVs 

may also be equipped with batteries to 

supplement the output of fuel cells and 

may also recapture energy during 

stopping through regenerative braking, 

which recharges batteries and thereby 

improves efficiency. 

The fuel cell provides DC power 

while the drive motors typically operate 

on AC. Therefore, the power train has: 

(a) Inverters to convert DC power to AC 

to run the motors and (b) converters to 

convert AC power generated in the drive 

motor during regenerative braking to DC 

to store energy in the batteries. In many 

respects, the electric power train of an 

HFCV is like that of electric and hybrid 

electric vehicles. 

GTR No. 13 specifies electrical safety 

requirements during normal vehicle 

operation and after a crash test, to 

protect against electric shock in the 

event of a failure in the high voltage 

propulsion system. GTR No. 13 includes 

a compliance option for electrical 

vehicle safety that prevents direct and 

indirect contact of high voltage sources 

by way of ‘‘physical barriers.’’ 22

c. Physical Barrier Option 

The industry has long requested 

NHTSA to adopt a physical barrier 

option into FMVSS No. 305. In 2010, 

NHTSA decided against adoption of a 

physical barrier option because the 

agency believed not enough was known 

about the option.23 Commenters to an 

NPRM to upgrade FMVSS No. 305’s 

electrical shock protection requirements 

had asked NHTSA to adopt the option 

in the final rule. NHTSA declined the 

request,24 explaining that (a) sufficient 

notice might not have been provided for 

the provision, (b) the agency was 

uncertain whether the option would 

sufficiently account for indirect contact 

failure modes, and (c) the agency 

wished to pursue research on this safety 

approach. NHTSA undertook a research 

program (later known as the Battelle 

study, discussed in detail in the NPRM, 

81 FR at 12656–12659) to better 

understand the issues related to a 

physical barrier option for electrical 

safety. 

Since that decision in 2010, several 

milestones ensued. GTR No. 13 was 

established, a product of shared data 

and knowledge from governing bodies 

and international experts around the 

world. The Battelle study was 

completed and the physical barrier 

countermeasure design was made more 

robust in response to its findings, with 

SAE International revising SAE J1766 in 

January 2014 to set forth more 

protective safety practices than it had 

before. Importantly, there have now 

been years of worldwide recognition of 

the physical barrier option as an 

acceptable means of providing electrical 

safety in electric powered vehicles, with 

years of experience in design labs and 

in the field showing no evidence of 

associated safety problems. 

d. Petitions for Rulemaking 

This final rule responds not only to 

GTR No. 13 but also to petitions for 

rulemaking from Toyota and the 

Alliance. The petitions are discussed in 

detail in the March 10, 2016 NPRM. See 

81 FR at 12659–12663. 

Petitioner Toyota believes that an 

additional compliance option that 

includes elements of the physical 

barrier option in GTR No. 13 is needed 

to allow HFCVs to be offered for sale in 

the U.S. 

HFCVs and other electric powered 

vehicles operate with their DC high 

voltage sources (e.g. high voltage 

battery) connected to the AC high 

voltage sources (e.g. electric motor). In 

a moderate to severe crash (e.g., crash 

speeds at which an air bag would 

deploy), electric powered vehicles are 

generally designed with an automatic 

disconnect mechanism that activates 

and breaks the conductive link between 

the electrical energy storage system and 

the rest of the power train. Under these 

crash conditions in which an automatic 

disconnect mechanism activates, Toyota 

states that its HFCVs would be able to 

meet the current electrical safety 

requirements of FMVSS No. 305. 

However, in low speed crashes where 

the automatic disconnect mechanism is 

not designed to activate—so that the 

vehicle can be driven away after a minor 

crash (fender-bender)—Toyota states 

that its HFCVs would not be able to 

meet the electrical safety requirements 

in FMVSS No. 305. The electrical 

isolation for fuel cell stacks would need 

to be 500 ohms/volt or greater to comply 

with FMVSS No. 305, which may not be 

technically feasible. The petitioner 

believes that the additional compliance 

option requested in its petition would 

solve this problem and would not cause 

any reduction in the level of electrical 

safety now required by FMVSS No. 305. 

Petitioner Alliance requests a physical 

barrier compliance option to facilitate 

the production of 48-volt mild hybrid 

technologies as well as hydrogen fuel 

cell vehicles. The petitioner asks 

NHTSA to amend FMVSS No. 305 to 

adopt a physical barrier option 

incorporated in the SAE J1766 January 

2014,25 section 5.3.4, for 48-volt mild 

hybrid systems. The Alliance believes 

that the provisions for physical barriers 

in section 5.3.4 incorporate the 

requirements of GTR No. 13 and provide 

for physical barriers that ensure equal 

levels of safety as that afforded by the 

current FMVSS No. 305 electrical safety 

requirements. 

The Alliance states that while 

vehicles with 48-volt mild hybrid 

systems use mostly low-voltage 

components that do not present any 

danger of harmful electric shock, AC 

voltage sources contained within the 

system can exceed the 30 volt threshold 

in FMVSS No. 305 for consideration as 

a high voltage source. Since these 

systems are grounded to the vehicle 

chassis, they cannot meet FMVSS No. 

305’s existing electrical isolation option. 

The petitioner states that, while it is 

feasible to design a 48-volt mild hybrid 

system that is isolated from the chassis 

and meets FMVSS No. 305’s electrical 

isolation requirements, such designs 

involve more complexity, higher 

consumer costs, and higher mass 

resulting in reduced fuel economy and 

increased emissions. The petitioner 

believes that these consequences are 

inappropriate when there would be no 

incremental safety benefit gained 

beyond that associated with SAE J1766’s 

physical barrier option. 

III. Overview of the Comments 

NHTSA received six comments on the 

NPRM. Comments were received from 

two motor vehicle manufacturer 

associations (the Alliance and the 

Association of Global Automakers 

(Global)), three vehicle manufacturers 

(Mercedes-Benz USA LLC (MercedesBenz), Tesla Motors Inc. (Tesla), and 

Fuji Heavy Industries on behalf of 

Subaru of America Inc. (Subaru)), and 

one individual. 

The commenters strongly support that 

FMVSS No. 305 should include 


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26 In FMVSS No. 305, an electric component that 

is contained in the electric power train or is 

conductively connected to it is considered to be a 

high voltage source if its working voltage is greater 

than 30 VAC or 60 VDC. Working voltage is defined 

in FMVSS No. 305 as the highest root mean square 

voltage of the voltage source, which may occur 

across its terminals or between its terminals and 

any conductive parts in open circuit conditions or 

under normal operating conditions. Therefore, the 

reference to working voltage in the definition of 

‘‘high voltage source’’ in FMVSS No. 305 is that for 

the electrical component and not the power train. 

27The term, ‘‘electric component,’’ is currently 

used in the definition of a ‘‘high voltage source’’ in 

FMVSS No. 305. 

28The NPRM proposed to define live part to mean 

a conductive part of the vehicle that is electrically 

energized under normal vehicle operation (S4). 

requirements for normal vehicle 

operation and incorporate a physical 

barrier option for electrical safety. They 

request changes to the proposed 

regulatory text to improve clarity of or 

correct wording and to align the 

regulatory language, including 

definitions, to that in GTR No. 13 and 

ECE R.100. Some commenters suggest 

NHTSA not adopt or reduce the 

stringency of particular requirements for 

lack of safety need, such as the marking 

of connectors and the vehicle charge 

inlet, and a ‘‘one million ohms’’ 

isolation requirement for charging 

electrical energy storage devices. 

Several commenters suggest NHTSA 

adopt separate performance 

requirements for connectors and for the 

vehicle inlet, that include direct contact 

protection when connected and 

separated from its mating component. 

Some commenters request NHTSA 

change how the agency will conduct 

compliance tests, such as by limiting the 

number of resistance and voltage 

measurements between exposed 

conductive parts. Several commenters 

request the compliance date for the 

amendments be longer than 180 days. 

IV. Response to the Comments 

a. Definitions and Terminology 

(General) 

Commenters request modifications to 

certain definitions and terms generally 

used in the regulatory text. The Alliance 

believes that the definition of ‘‘exposed 

conductive part’’ should be revised to 

clarify that the part is not normally 

energized (that energization can occur 

under a fault condition). The Alliance 

also requests replacing the term, 

‘‘exposed conductive parts’’ in the 

regulatory text with ‘‘exposed 

conductive parts of electrical protection 

barriers,’’ so as to exclude conductive 

parts that are not part of the electrical 

protection barriers and the electric 

power train, such as hose clamps. 

Similarly, Global suggests the term be 

replaced with ‘‘exposed conductive part 

of the electrical protection barrier 

enclosing the high voltage source,’’ 

throughout the regulatory text. 

Commenters suggest ‘‘electrical 

barriers,’’ should be replaced with 

‘‘electrical protection barriers,’’ in the 

regulatory text for consistency and to 

reduce ambiguity. The Alliance requests 

a broadened definition for ‘‘external 

electric power supply,’’ to refer to 

‘‘electric energy storage device,’’ in part 

because the proposed definition uses 

the term ‘‘propulsion battery,’’ which is 

not defined. The Alliance requests 

replacing the term, ‘‘live parts’’ with 

‘‘high voltage live parts’’ in the 

regulatory text since electrical safety 

requirements apply to high voltage 

sources. 

NHTSA reviewed these comments 

and generally agrees with revising the 

definitions and terms at issue, to clarify 

the text of FMVSS No. 305. We 

summarized our decisions in Table 1 

and have incorporated appropriate 

changes into the regulatory text. 

The Alliance asks that we amend the 

definition of ‘‘high voltage source’’ to 

make clear that a component is a high 

voltage source based on its working 

voltage. The current definition states: 

‘‘High voltage source means any electric 

component contained in the electric 

power train or conductively connected 

to the electric power train that has a 

working voltage greater than 30 VAC or 

60 VDC.’’ The commenter states that the 

definition can be read in two different 

ways because ‘‘it is not clear if the 

component or the electric power train is 

being modified by the given voltage 

limits.’’ (Emphasis in text.) NHTSA’s 

intent was to modify the 

‘‘component.’’ 26 We have clarified the 

definition in the regulatory text. 

The Alliance and Global point out 

that the definition of luggage 

compartment mistakenly refers to 

‘‘protecting the power train’’ instead of 

‘‘protecting the occupant.’’ We note that 

the definition’s reference to ‘‘hood’’ 

should also refer to ‘‘trunk lid,’’ as in 

the U.S. luggage compartments are 

usually thought of as trunks, which are 

thought to have ‘‘trunk lids.’’ We have 

made the corrections in the text. 

The Alliance requests adding a 

definition for the term ‘‘connector,’’ 

assuming NHTSA will adopt separate 

electrical safety requirements for 

connectors (this issue is discussed in a 

section below). The Alliance states that 

a connector is a device that provides 

mechanical connection and 

disconnection of high voltage electrical 

conductors to a suitable mating 

component, including its housing. Since 

this final rule adopts such separate 

requirements for connectors, the agency 

agrees to add a definition for 

‘‘connector’’ to the regulatory text. 

The Alliance states that ‘‘electric 

energy storage device’’ in proposed 

S5.4.3.2 is too specific and thereby 

restrictive, and that ‘‘electric circuit’’ 

should be used instead. We concur the 

proposed term is overly specific, but 

since ‘‘electric circuit’’ is not used or 

defined in FMVSS No. 305, we will use 

‘‘electric component’’ in place of the 

term at issue.27

Subaru requests clarification of the 

meaning of the term ‘‘normal vehicle 

operation.’’ Subaru asks whether the 

term refers to anytime the vehicle is 

being driven under its own power or to 

any vehicle operation when no system 

faults or abnormalities are present. 

Subaru asks whether the reference to 

normal vehicle operation in the 

definition of the term, ‘‘live parts,’’ 28

includes the vehicle’s driving under its 

own electric power and static charging 

modes. 

NHTSA believes that ‘‘normal vehicle 

operation’’ includes operating modes 

and conditions that can reasonably be 

encountered during typical operation of 

the vehicle, such as driving, parking and 

standing in traffic, as well as, charging 

using chargers that are compatible with 

the specific charging ports installed on 

the vehicle. It does not include 

conditions where the vehicle is 

damaged, either by a crash or road 

debris, subjected to fire or water 

submersion, or in a state where service 

and or maintenance is needed or being 

performed. 

The Alliance, Global and Subaru ask 

about adding a definition for an 

‘‘enclosure,’’ since in the NPRM the 

agency used the term ‘‘enclosure’’ as 

though an enclosure was distinct from 

an electrical protection barrier. We 

meant the terms to be synonymous. 

However, rather than add the definition, 

for simplicity we have removed the term 

‘‘enclosure’’ from the standard and only 

use the term ‘‘electrical protection 

barrier.’’ 

For the convenience of the reader, 

Table 1 below shows the notable added 

and revised terms. 


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29The Alliance suggests ‘‘a connector is a device 

that provides mechanical connection and 

disconnection of high voltage electrical conductors 

to a suitable mating component, including its 

housing.’’ This definition was suggested by the 

Alliance and added in the draft EVS–GTR available 

at https://www2.unece.org/wiki/display/trans/ 

EVS+13th+session. 

30Similar to the Alliance’s request, Global 

requests replacing ‘‘exposed conductive part’’ with 

‘‘exposed conductive part of the electrical 

protection barrier enclosing the high voltage 

source’’ in the regulatory text. Due to the similarity 

with the Alliance’s request and because there is no 

need to specify that electrical protection barriers 

enclose high voltage sources, Global’s request was 

not adopted in the final rule. 

31Working voltage is defined in FMVSS No. 305 

as the highest root mean square voltage of the 

voltage source which may occur across its terminals 

or between its terminals and any conductive part 

in open circuit conditions or under normal 

operating systems. 

32 In contrast, the draft EVS–GTR applies to high 

voltage buses and electric circuits. In a 48-volt mild 

hybrid system, the DC electrical sources are low 

voltage (working voltage is less than or equal to 60 

Continued 

TABLE 1—NOTABLE TERMS AND DEFINITIONS THE COMMENTERS ASK TO BE ADDED OR AMENDED; NHTSA RESPONSE

Term at issue Requested change Reason for request Does NHTSA 

agree NHTSA response 

Connector .............. NHTSA should define the term 29 ........ Clarity; enables distinct requirements 

for ‘‘connectors’’.

Yes ........................ Defining the term will clarify the standard. 

Electrical barriers ... Use ‘‘electrical protection barriers’’ ...... Consistency and reduces ambiguity .... Yes ........................ NHTSA agrees the same term should 

be used throughout the standard. 

Electrical protection 

barrier.

Change the NPRM’s definition to make 

clear the term includes ‘‘enclosures’’.

Clarity ................................................... No ......................... See ‘‘enclosure’’ (below). The change 

is unnecessary. 

Enclosure ............... NHTSA should define the term ............ This term should be defined since it is 

used several times.

No, the change is 

unnecessary.

Revised the text to remove references 

to ‘‘enclosure’’ and use electrical 

protection barrier instead. 

Exposed conductive 

part.

Add to the NPRM’s definition to clarify 

that the part is not normally energized; Use ‘‘exposed conductive part 

of the electrical protection barrier’’ 30.

Clarify that the part is not normally energized; energization can occur 

under fault condition. This also excludes conductive parts that are not 

part of the electric power train, such 

as hose clamps.

Yes ........................ NHTSA concurs, to clarify the standard. Also, we clarify the term 

‘‘cover’’ in the definition. NHTSA 

agrees to replace ‘‘exposed conductive part,’’ with ‘‘exposed conductive 

part of the electrical protection barrier,’’ in the standard. 

External electric 

power supply.

Revise definition to refer to ‘‘electric 

energy storage device’’ rather than 

to ‘‘propulsion battery’’.

To improve accuracy of the definition Yes ........................ The change clarifies the standard. 

High voltage source Revise definition as ‘‘means any electric component which is contained in 

the electric power train or 

conductively connected to the electric power train and has a working 

voltage greater than 30 VAC or 60 

VDC’’.

Should make clearer what is being 

modified.

Yes ........................ We agree the change clarifies the 

standard. 

Live parts ............... Use ‘‘High voltage live parts’’ .............. To clarify the applicability of the term .. Yes ........................ Clarifies the standard. 

Luggage compartment.Correct the reference to ‘‘power train’’ Correction ............................................. Yes ........................ We correct the error, and add ‘‘trunk 

lid.’’ 

Normal vehicle operation.NHTSA should clarify the term ............ To clarify if it includes driving and 

charging modes.

Yes ........................ We clarify the term in the preamble. 

Electric energy storage device (specific to.

S5.4.3.2) ................

Use ‘‘electric circuit’’ ............................ Term is too specific and restrictive ...... Yes, but use 

‘‘electric component’’.

‘‘Electric circuit’’ is not defined. 

b. Clarification of Application of 

Requirements 

The Alliance requests we add 

paragraphs to the regulatory text 

explicitly stating that the electrical 

safety requirements (S5.3) and the 

monitoring system requirement (S5.4) of 

FMVSS No. 305 do not apply to the DC 

part of a 48-volt mild hybrid system. 

(This pertains to the DC part that is 

conductively connected to the electrical 

chassis and that has a working voltage 

less than or equal to 60 VDC, and the 

maximum voltage between the DC live 

part and any other live part is less than 

or equal to 30 VAC or 60 VDC.) The 

commenter states that the draft EVS– 

GTR includes such a statement. 

We do not believe there is a need for 

such a provision in FMVSS No. 305, for 

several reasons. 

First, as discussed in a previous 

section, we are amending the definition 

of ‘‘high voltage source,’’ as the Alliance 

requests, to make clear that a 

component is a high voltage source 

based on its working voltage. That 

change provides the clarification the 

commenter seeks. 

Second, the Alliance asks that 

NHTSA provide in the preamble the 

following statement for further 

clarification. The commenter’s 

statement is: ‘‘Where electrical circuits, 

that are galvanically connected to each 

other, and fulfilling the condition, that 

the maximum voltage between a DC live 

part and any other live part (DC or AC) 

is less [than] or equal [to] 30 VAC and 

60 VDC, only the components or parts 

of the electric circuit that operate on 

high voltage are classified as high 

voltage sources.’’ We concur that the 

statement is consistent with NHTSA’s 

intent. 

Third, the agency does not believe the 

above-quoted text is needed in FMVSS 

No. 305 because of a fundamental 

difference between the standard and the 

draft EVS–GTR. (This difference also 

exists between FMVSS No. 305 and GTR 

No. 13 and ECE R.100.) The electrical 

safety requirements in FMVSS No. 305 

apply to each high voltage source in the 

power train, while the electrical safety 

requirements in the draft EVS–GTR 

would apply to high voltage buses and 

electric circuits. This means that 

NHTSA determines whether the 

electrical safety requirements of FMVSS 

No. 305 apply to electric components 

that are connected to or part of the 

electric power train by individually 

assessing each component separately, 

analyzing its working voltage.31 To 

illustrate, in a 48-volt mild hybrid 

system, NHTSA will assess the working 

voltage of each DC component. If the 

working voltage of the component is not 

greater than 60 VDC, NHTSA does not 

subject it to the electrical safety 

requirements in FMVSS No. 305, 

regardless of whether it is galvanically 

connected to other electrical 

components that would be considered 

high voltage sources.32 Accordingly, the 


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VDC). The DC high voltage sources are conductively 

connected to AC electrical components such as the 

motor than can be a high voltage source (working 

voltage is greater than 30 VAC). Since the EVS draft 

GTR applies to high voltage buses and circuits, the 

electrical safety requirements for the high voltage 

source in a 48-volt system would also apply to the 

DC source though it is considered low voltage. For 

this reason, specific statements are needed in the 

EVS GTR to exclude these low voltage sources from 

electrical safety requirements that are intended for 

high voltage sources. 

33This definition was added in the draft EVS– 

GTR available at https://www2.unece.org/wiki/ 

display/trans/EVS+13th+session. 

34Tesla indicates that the high voltage source in 

its vehicles is located underneath the vehicle’s 

floor, in the form of a battery. The commenter states 

this is unlike hybrid-electric vehicles, in which the 

high voltage source is located in or near the vehicle 

trunk. 

35While the commenter suggested incorporating 

Table 4 of ISO 6439–3, it later corrected that it 

meant to refer to the 2001 version of ISO 6469–3. 

36Locking mechanisms on connectors are 

intended to prevent inadvertent disconnection of 

the connector from its mating component. Locking 

mechanism designs include locking levers and 

screw locking. In these types of locking 

mechanisms, two distinct actions are needed to 

uncouple the connector. For a locking lever, the 

lever would need to be pressed down and then the 

connector pulled out. For screw locking, the 

connector would need to be unscrewed and then 

pulled out. 

37The requirements for connectors in GTR No. 

13, ECE R.100, and the draft EVS–GTR are also 

consistent with the 2011 revision of ISO 6469–3. 

38 In the NPRM, NHTSA noted that electrical 

protection barriers and connectors located under 

the vehicle floor should not be excluded from 

IPXXB direct contact protection and marking 

requirements because it is possible that the high 

voltage sources enclosed by these barriers and 

connectors may be accessed following a rollover 

crash or during vehicle maintenance. 81 FR at 

12654–12655. The agency stated in the NPRM that 

if connectors and electrical protection barriers 

located under the vehicle floor can be accessed, 

opened, or removed without the use of tools they 

should be required to meet the same requirements 

for high voltage markings and direct contact 

protection as electric protection barriers and 

connectors not located under the vehicle floor. Id. 

additional text for excluding the DC part 

of 48-volt mild hybrid systems from 

electrical safety requirements requested 

by the Alliance is not necessary in 

FMVSS No. 305. 

c. Electrical Safety for Connectors and 

the Vehicle Charge Inlet 

GTR No. 13 specifies direct contact 

protection requirements for high voltage 

connectors separately. Per GTR No. 13, 

connectors do not need to meet IPXXB 

protection if they are located 

underneath the vehicle floor and are 

provided with a locking mechanism, or 

require the use of tools to separate the 

connector, or the voltage reduces to 

below 30 VAC or 60 VDC within one 

second after the connector is separated. 

In the NPRM, NHTSA expressed 

disagreement with the GTR’s exclusion 

of connectors under the floor. (See 81 

FR at 12654–12655; id. at 12664.) 

NHTSA believed that if connectors are 

high voltage sources and if they can be 

accessed, opened, or removed without 

the use of tools, regardless of whether 

they are located under the floor, they 

should be required to meet the same 

requirements for direct contact 

protection as other high voltage sources, 

including barriers providing protection 

degree IPXXD or IPXXB, based on 

whether they are located inside or 

outside the passenger or luggage 

compartment areas, respectively. 

Additionally, the agency noted that 

‘‘vehicle floor’’ and ‘‘connector’’ are not 

defined in GTR No. 13. 

Comments Received 

The agency received several 

comments on this issue. The Alliance 

and Global request the regulatory text 

include a separate section setting forth 

direct contact protection requirements 

that connectors and the vehicle charge 

inlet must meet. The Alliance suggests 

the following definition for 

‘‘connector’’: ‘‘A connector is a device 

that provides mechanical connection 

and disconnection of high voltage 

electrical conductors to a suitable 

mating component, including its 

housing.’’ 33

The Alliance and Global suggest that 

the separate section specify that 

connectors and the vehicle charge inlet 

must provide protection degree IPXXD 

or IPXXB, as appropriate, when 

connected to its mating component. 

Further, each connector or vehicle 

charge inlet must also meet one of the 

following: (1) It must provide, in an 

uncoupled state, protection degree 

IPXXD or IPXXB, as appropriate, if the 

connector or vehicle charge inlet can be 

uncoupled from its mating component 

without a tool; (2) the voltage of the live 

parts become equal to or less than 60 

VDC or 30 VAC within 1 second after 

separating from its mating component; 

or (3) it has a locking mechanism that 

prevents the connector or vehicle charge 

inlet from being uncoupled from its 

mating component without a tool. 

In its comment, Tesla asks NHTSA to 

confirm whether various scenarios 

involving its connectors underneath the 

floor of its vehicles would meet the 

proposed requirements.34 Tesla requests 

that NHTSA clarify what we consider 

‘‘acceptable’’ for connectors underneath 

the floor.35

Agency Response 

NHTSA has reviewed the comments 

and agrees with the recommendations to 

include separate requirements for direct 

contact protection of connectors and 

vehicle charge inlets. In drafting the 

NPRM, we determined that connectors 

were high voltage sources and that they 

should meet all the requirements for 

high voltage sources. However, the 

commenters provide more information 

about connectors, pointing out that they 

connect high voltage cables to high 

voltage sources through a mating 

component. Like high voltage 

conductors (cables), connectors need to 

have direct contact protection. But, 

commenters point out, connectors are 

unique in that they are designed to be 

disconnected from their mating 

component. Therefore, additional safety 

provisions are required to ensure the 

safety of this coupling and re-coupling 

design mechanism. For this reason, we 

have decided there is a need to specify 

unique safety provisions for connectors 

and vehicle charge inlets. 

We have based our final rule on the 

requirements suggested by the Alliance 

and Global. The requirements are 

harmonized with GTR No. 13, ECE 

R.100, and the draft EVS–GTR for 

electric vehicles. When a connector is 

connected to its mating component, it 

should have direct contact protection 

IPXXD or IPXXB based on whether the 

connector is inside or outside the 

passenger or luggage compartment, 

respectively. Additionally, connectors 

are required to meet at least one of the 

three following requirements: (1) It must 

provide protection degree IPXXD or 

IPXXB, as appropriate, in the uncoupled 

state, if the connector or vehicle charge 

inlet can be uncoupled from its mating 

component without a tool; (2) the 

voltage of the high voltage live parts 

become equal to or less than 60 VDC or 

30 VAC within 1 second after separating 

from its mating component; or (3) it has 

a locking mechanism (at least two 

distinct actions are needed to separate 

the connector from its mating 

component) 36 and there are other 

components that must be removed in 

order to separate the connector from its 

mating component and these cannot be 

removed without the use of tools. 

Regarding Tesla’s recommendation 

that we incorporate Table 4 of ISO 

6469–3 for connectors, we believe there 

is no need for such an amendment. ISO 

6469–3 was revised in 2011 and its 

requirements for connectors are similar 

to those in this final rule.37

Regarding Tesla’s inquiry about 

connectors underneath the floor, 

connectors and electrical protection 

barriers located under the vehicle’s floor 

are treated the same as other connectors 

and electrical protection barriers located 

outside of the passenger and luggage 

compartments.38 A connector located 


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39The test method to evaluate protection from 

direct contact with high voltage sources (S9.1) 

specifies that before assessing IPXXB or IPXXD 

protection degree for high voltage components, 

parts surrounding the high voltage source are 

opened, disassembled, or removed without the use 

of tools. 

40We do not agree with the idea of excluding a 

device from the marking requirements simply 

because the device is not in plain view of the 

occupants. However, as discussed further below, we 

are omitting the marking requirement generally for 

electric energy conversion devices. The rest of this 

response to Subaru pertains to marking electric 

energy storage devices. 

under the floor that has IPXXB 

protection level and that cannot be 

separated from its mating component 

without tools would comply with the 

above direct contact protection 

requirements for connectors. (If it can be 

separated from its mating component 

without tools, it must provide 

protection degree IPXXB in the 

uncoupled state or the live parts must 

be equal to or less than 60 VDC or 30 

VAC within 1 second from separating 

from its mating component). Regarding 

a connector located under the vehicle’s 

floor where the access point to the 

connector is smaller than a finger could 

fit through, the connector would need to 

meet IPXXB protection degree if parts 

surrounding the connector (that limit 

access to the connector) can be opened, 

disassembled or removed without the 

use of tools.39

d. Markings 

NHTSA proposed marking 

requirements (yellow high voltage 

symbol) on or near electric energy 

storage/conversion devices, and on 

electrical protection barriers in general. 

We proposed that the markings would 

not be required for electrical protection 

barriers that cannot be physically 

accessed, opened, or removed without 

the use of tools. The proposed 

provisions were based on GTR No. 13 

requirements, but unlike GTR No. 13, 

the NPRM did not exclude from the 

marking requirement (1) electrical 

protection barriers or high voltage 

sources located under the vehicle floor; 

(2) connectors generally; or (3) the 

vehicle charge inlet. NHTSA also 

proposed that cables for high voltage 

sources that are not located within 

electrical protection barriers must be 

identified by an orange colored outer 

covering. 

Comments Received 

The agency received multiple 

comments on this issue. 

The Alliance, Global and Subaru 

request that connectors be excluded 

from the marking requirement. The 

Alliance and Global state that some 

connectors can be so small that the 

markings on these connectors would be 

not easily read and that high voltage 

cables going into the connectors are 

required to have orange outer covers, 

which should signal that the cables and 

their connectors are high voltage. The 

Alliance also notes that high voltage 

connectors do not necessarily carry high 

current. The Alliance states that the 

inclusion of a marking requirement for 

connecters would necessitate product 

development efforts, increased 

economic cost and compliance burden, 

without a commensurate increase in 

safety. 

Subaru believes that markings should 

not be necessary on or near electric 

storage/conversion devices which are 

not in plain view of vehicle occupants 

during normal vehicle operation. 

Subaru states that a device that is 

mounted under a seat, and that is not 

visible without first removing the seat, 

should not have to be marked. 

Tesla believes that high voltage 

sources underneath the vehicle are 

subject to a harsh physical environment, 

and that the markings on them are not 

likely to survive the vehicle’s life. Tesla 

asks NHTSA to allow for alternative 

placement of high voltage markings 

when a vehicle’s high voltage source is 

located under the vehicle’s floor. 

Agency Response 

The agency agrees with the Alliance 

and Global request to exclude 

connectors from requiring markings. 

The agency is persuaded by the 

commenters that connectors do not 

necessarily carry high current and that 

the increased economic cost and 

compliance burden resulting from a 

marking requirement are not warranted. 

The connectors are small, so markings 

on them would not be easily read. 

Further, we agree that since high voltage 

cables going into the connectors are 

required to have orange outer covers, 

those covers will sufficiently indicate 

that the cables and their connectors are 

high voltage. Importantly, the markings 

are also not needed because, in a change 

from the NPRM, we have decided to 

require connectors to have direct 

contact protection when connected and 

disconnected from their mating 

component. (As discussed above, the 

direct contact protection consists of 

IPXXD or IPXXB protection when 

connected to the mating component, 

and at least one of the following: (1) 

IPXXD or IPXXB protection when 

separated from its mating component if 

the connector can be uncoupled without 

a tool; (2) a low voltage requirement 

within 1 second after separation from its 

mating component; or (3) it cannot be 

uncoupled from its mating component 

without the use of tools. Thus, we 

conclude that connectors will 

sufficiently protect against the risk of 

electrical shock without the markings. 

Similarly, the agency also agrees with 

the Alliance and Global request to 

exclude the vehicle charge inlet from 

requiring markings. The markings are 

not necessary because this final rule 

requires vehicle charge inlets to have 

direct contact protection when 

connected and disconnected from their 

mating component, like connectors. 

The agency does not agree with 

Subaru’s request to omit the high 

voltage marking on electric energy 

storage/conversion 40 devices that are 

not in plain view of vehicle occupants 

during normal vehicle operation. GTR 

No. 13, ECE R.100, and the draft EVS– 

GTR require the high voltage symbol on 

or near electric energy storage devices. 

Since an electric energy storage device 

is a high density energy source, we 

believe there is a safety need for the 

marking, as persons (such as 

maintenance, repair and rescue 

personnel and consumers working on 

their vehicles) encountering the electric 

energy storage device should be warned 

of the electrical shock risks. However, 

we are revising the proposed regulatory 

text to indicate that the marking on 

electric energy storage devices ‘‘shall be 

present’’ rather than ‘‘shall be visible.’’ 

This terminology is consistent with the 

draft EVS–GTR. The final rule’s wording 

(‘‘shall be present’’) acknowledges that 

the marking is not, and does not have 

to be, ‘‘visible’’ on an electric energy 

storage device when the device is 

located under the floor away from view. 

Thus, under this final rule, the 

electric energy storage device must be 

marked, and the electrical protection 

barrier for the device must also be 

marked with a visible high voltage 

symbol if it can be accessed, opened, 

and removed without the use of tools. 

To illustrate, if an electric energy 

storage device is accessible when the 

floor mat is pulled out and a floor panel 

is opened (without the use of tools), the 

floor panel has to have a high voltage 

symbol that is visible to the person 

when he/she pulls out the floor mat. 

NHTSA has decided not to require 

electric energy conversion devices to be 

marked with the high voltage symbol. 

Electric energy conversion devices 

include fuel cells which convert 

chemical energy to electric energy. A 

fuel cell only becomes a high voltage 

source when hydrogen is supplied to it. 

Since conversion devices (e.g., fuel 

cells) are not high density energy 

sources, we are not requiring them to be 


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44954 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 186 / Wednesday, September 27, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 

41Markings are not required on electrical 

protection barriers that cannot be physically 

accessed, opened, or removed without the use of 

tools. The persons who will access the powertrain 

with tools will be maintenance personnel 

technically aware of the vehicle’s electrical system, 

and not first responders. We believe that 

maintenance personnel will have basic knowledge 

of the workings of the electrical system, so the 

electrical shock warning symbol is not necessary. 

42 Indirect contact refers to the contact of persons 

with exposed conductive parts. 

43Shunting is when a low-resistance connection 

between two points in an electric circuit forms an 

alternative path for a portion of the current. If a 

human body contacts an electrical protection 

barrier that is energized due to loss in electrical 

isolation of a high voltage source enclosed in the 

barrier, most of the current would flow through the 

chassis rather than through the human body 

because the current path through the chassis has 

significantly lower resistance (less than 0.1 ohm) 

than the resistance of the human body (greater or 

equal to 500 ohm). 

44 In the NPRM, S5.3(c)(3) was worded such that 

the voltage measurements were between the 

electrical protection barrier and ‘‘other exposed 

conductive parts,’’ which includes the electrical 

chassis. Since in this final rule we have modified 

the proposed wording of S5.3(c)(3) to make the 

voltage measurements between exposed conductive 

parts of electrical protection barriers (in response to 

Global’s comment), the agency has separately added 

a requirement to S5.3(c)(3) to account for the 

voltage measurement between exposed conductive 

parts of the electrical protection barrier and the 

electrical chassis. This change in the language of 

S5.3(c)(3) makes it more consistent with the 

language of S5.3(c)(2) and is not a substantive 

change from the NPRM. 

marked. However, the electric 

protection barrier around a conversion 

device (e.g., fuel cell) will have to be 

marked, and the mark is required to be 

visible. 

NHTSA does not agree with Tesla’s 

request to allow alternative positions for 

the high voltage symbol mark on high 

voltage sources that are located 

underneath the vehicle’s floor. We do 

not believe there is a need for the 

change as the regulatory text requires 

that the mark be ‘‘on or near’’ electric 

energy storage devices without 

providing specifics for the location of 

the high voltage marking. We note also 

that this final rule provides that 

electrical protection barriers that cannot 

be physically accessed, opened, or 

removed without the use of tools are 

excluded from the marking 

requirement,41 which may bear on 

Tesla’s labeling of its devices. 

e. Indirect Contact Protection 

Exposed conductive parts of electrical 

protection barriers must be protected 

against indirect contact 42 during normal 

vehicle operation and post-crash. The 

NPRM proposed that the resistance 

between exposed conductive parts of 

electrical protection barriers and the 

electrical chassis must be less than 0.1 

ohms and that the resistance between 

any two simultaneously reachable 

exposed conductive parts of electrical 

protection barriers that are within 2.5 

meters of each other be less than 0.2 

ohms (proposed S5.3(c)(2)). The NPRM 

also proposed (S5.3(c)(3)) that the 

voltages between an electrical 

protection barrier and other exposed 

conductive parts must be less than or 

equal to 30 VAC or 60 VDC (‘‘low 

voltage requirement’’). These proposed 

requirements would protect against 

electric shock if any electrically charged 

components lose isolation within the 

protective barrier and two exposed 

conductive parts of the electrical 

protection barrier are contacted 

simultaneously, by shunting 43 any 

harmful electrical current to the vehicle 

chassis. 

Comments Received 

Global comments that the reference to 

‘‘any two simultaneously reachable 

exposed conductive parts’’ in proposed 

S5.3(c)(2) ‘‘would result in excessive 

testing requirements, due to the number 

of potential combinations of two 

simultaneously reachable exposed 

parts.’’ The commenter recommends 

that manufacturers be authorized to 

identify a ‘‘worst case’’ pair of 

conductive parts for testing under the 

provision to reduce the potential 

number of combinations. Global also 

recommends that greater specification 

for the phrase ‘‘any two simultaneously 

reachable,’’ be provided, such as a 

measured distance. 

Agency Response 

NHTSA believes that the regulatory 

text already provides the specification 

that the simultaneously reachable 

exposed conductive parts of electrical 

protection barriers must be located 

within 2.5 meters of each other. Thus, 

we do not believe the requirement 

results in an excessive number of 

resistance measurements. However, 

NHTSA is correcting the reference to 

‘‘exposed conductive parts of the 

electrical protection barriers’’ in 

S5.3(c)(2) to qualify that they are 

exposed conductive parts of the 

electrical protection barrier of the high 

voltage source under consideration in 

S5.3. 

Comments Received 

Global comments that the low voltage 

requirement (S5.3(c)(3)) is too broad in 

scope and recommends limiting this 

testing requirement to exposed 

conductive parts of the electrical 

protection barriers. Global states that in 

the event of a barrier failure, a voltage 

differential could exist with regard to all 

exposed conductive parts of the chassis 

and all metal parts connected to the 

chassis. The Alliance comments that the 

requirements in S5.3(c)(3) should be 

consistent with the requirement in 

S5.3(c)(2). I.e., the Alliance believes that 

the voltage measurements for S5.3(c)(3) 

between exposed conductive parts 

should be made on the same exposed 

conductive parts of electrical protection 

barriers for which resistance 

measurements are made for S5.3(c)(2). 

Agency Response 

The agency agrees with the comments 

of Global and the Alliance and has 

worded S5.3(c)(3) to reflect the 

recommended changes. As adopted, 

S5.3(c)(3) specifies that the voltage 

between exposed conductive parts of 

the electrical protection barrier and the 

electrical chassis must be less than or 

equal to 30 VAC or 60 VDC.44 In 

addition, the voltage between an 

exposed conductive part of the electrical 

protection barrier and any other 

simultaneously reachable exposed 

conductive parts of electrical protection 

barriers within 2.5 meters of it must be 

less than or equal to 30 VAC or 60 VDC. 

f. Electrical Isolation Requirements 

Under FMVSS No. 305’s current postcrash safety requirements, vehicles must 

meet either electrical isolation 

requirements or low voltage 

requirements. The current requirements 

for electrical isolation are that the 

electrical isolation of the high voltage 

source must be greater than or equal to: 

500 ohms/volt for an AC high voltage 

source; 500 ohms/volt for a DC high 

voltage source without electrical 

isolation monitoring during vehicle 

operation; or 100 ohms/volt for a DC 

high voltage source with an electrical 

isolation monitoring system during 

vehicle operation. 

The NPRM proposed to change these 

requirements (S5.3(a)) and add 

specifications that high voltage sources 

must have electrical isolation during 

normal vehicle operation (S5.4.3.1). 

Briefly, the proposed electrical isolation 

requirements are: AC high voltage 

sources have 500 ohms/volt or higher 

electrical isolation from the electric 

chassis; DC high voltage sources have 

100 ohms/volt or higher electric 

isolation from the electric chassis; or, 

AC high voltage sources that are 

conductively connected to the DC high 

voltage sources may have 100 ohms/volt 

or higher electrical isolation from the 

electric chassis provided they also 

provide physical barrier protection. 


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45These are proposed as: (1) IPXXB protection 

level (S5.3(c)(1)), (2) resistance between exposed 

conductive parts of the electrical protection barrier 

and chassis of less than 0.1 ohms and between any 

two simultaneously reachable exposed conductive 

parts of barriers less than 2.5 m apart of less than 

0.2 ohms (S5.3(c)(2)), and (3) the voltage between 

electrical protection barrier enclosing the high 

voltage source and other exposed conductive parts 

of less than or equal to 30 VAC or 60 VDC (‘‘low 

voltage requirement’’) (S5.3(c)(3)). 

46Supra. The NPRM discusses the Battelle study 

in detail, see 81 FR at 12656. 

47We have docketed a memorandum showing our 

analysis. See the docket for this final rule. 

48 IEC 61851–1:2010, ‘‘Electric vehicle conductive 

charging system—Part I: General Requirements,’’ 

https://webstore.iec.ch/publication/6029. 49Miki, T., ‘‘Personal Protection during 

Charging.’’ Submitted at the 12th EVS GTR meeting 

in Paris on September 15, 2016, EVSTF09–32–TF2– 

04.docx. https://www2.unece.org/wiki/display/ 

trans/9th+Task+Force+meetings+in+Paris. 

50OICA is an international organization of motor 

vehicle manufacturers whose members include 39 

national trade associations around the world. 

Comments Received and Agency 

Response 

The Alliance first requests that the 

regulatory text of the electrical isolation 

option under post-crash conditions 

(S5.3(a)) and during normal vehicle 

operating conditions (S5.4.3.1) be 

replaced by the language in GTR No. 13. 

The agency declines this request. The 

requirements of the electrical isolation 

option in FMVSS No. 305 and GTR No. 

13 are identical, while the text in 

FMVSS No. 305 is more concise. 

Second, the Alliance requests changes 

to the proposed physical barrier 

protection requirements for AC high 

voltage sources that are conductively 

connected to DC high voltage sources 

and that comply with the lower 

electrical isolation limit of 100 ohms/ 

volt under post-crash conditions 

(S5.3(a)(2)). The proposed text in the 

NPRM permits an AC high voltage 

source to have an isolation resistance of 

only 100 ohms/volt if three physical 

protection requirements are met.45 The 

Alliance suggests that the low voltage 

requirement is ‘‘not logically needed.’’ It 

states that the electric shock scenario 

identified in NHTSA’s Battelle study 46

of physical barriers will never happen if 

it maintains a minimum electrical 

isolation of more than 100 ohms/volt, 

protection against direct contact 

(IPXXB), and protection against indirect 

contact (resistance between exposed 

conductive parts and the electrical 

chassis and between two exposed 

conductive parts of less than 0.1 ohms 

and 0.2 ohms, respectively). 

NHTSA has carefully analyzed 

electrical safety implications under the 

conditions of a minimum electrical 

isolation of 100 ohms/volt, resistance 

between exposed conductive parts of 

electrical protection barriers and the 

chassis of 0.1 ohms, and electrical 

isolation between two exposed 

conductive parts of 0.2 ohms. The 

results of the analysis 47 showed that 

under these conditions, the electric 

current through the body would be 

significantly lower than 10 milliamps 

(mA) DC and 2 mA AC, which are 

considered safe levels of current for 

protection from electric shock. 

Therefore, the agency agrees to this 

change in the regulatory text requested 

by the Alliance. Accordingly, S5.3(a)(2) 

is modified so that AC high voltage 

sources that are conductively connected 

to DC high voltage sources may comply 

with the lower electrical isolation limit 

of 100 ohms/volt provided they meet 

the physical protection requirements of 

S5.3(c)(1) and S5.3(c)(2). 

g. Electrical Safety During Charging 

Like GTR No. 13, the NPRM proposed 

(S5.4.5) to require electric vehicles 

whose rechargeable energy storage 

system are charged by conductively 

connecting to a grounded external 

power supply to have a device to enable 

conductive connection of the electrical 

chassis to the earth ground during 

charging. This proposal was to ensure 

that in the event of electrical isolation 

loss during charging, a person 

contacting the vehicle does not form a 

ground loop with the chassis and 

sustain significant electric shock. 

Additionally, like GTR No. 13, the 

NPRM proposed (S5.4.3.3) to require the 

isolation resistance between the high 

voltage source and the electrical chassis 

to be at least 1 million ohms when the 

charge coupler is disconnected. This 

proposal was to ensure that the 

magnitude of current through a human 

body when a person contacts a vehicle 

undergoing charging is low and in the 

safe zone. 

Comments Received 

The agency received many comments 

regarding the requirement for isolation 

resistance of 1 million ohms during 

charging. 

The Alliance states that the 

requirement should only be applicable 

to conductive charging with an AC 

external electric power supply, noting 

that the isolation resistance of one 

million ohms should be required for the 

high voltage source (high voltage buses) 

that are conductively connected to the 

contacts of the vehicle charge inlet, and 

not to the vehicle charge inlet itself. 

Mercedes-Benz states that the 1 

million ohms isolation resistance 

specification— 

is intended as a system reliability 

requirement, not a safety requirement. The 

safety relevant requirements on an isolation 

resistance are already specified in S5.4.3.1. 

. . . [T]he regulatory text [should] explicitly 

remove the ‘one million ohm’ specification 

and instead state that the isolation resistance, 

measured at the vehicle charge inlet, must 

comply with the requirements stated in 

S5.4.3.1. 

Tesla states that it does not believe 

the insulation resistance requirement for 

the vehicle’s inlet is aligned with the 

associated high voltage hazards that the 

NPRM proposes to mitigate. Tesla 

believes that the intent of the insulation 

resistance requirement is to prevent 

high voltage current from flowing 

through the human body. Tesla believes 

that Section 11.7 of the IEC 61851– 

1:2010 48 more accurately captures this 

prevention for AC equipment because it 

specifically applies to cord and plugconnected equipment. Tesla also 

recommends that NHTSA ‘‘provide 

clear requirements for off-board 

(including charging) equipment(s)’’ 

since any fault current that is generated 

while charging would be a function of 

both the vehicle as well as the electric 

vehicle supply equipment. 

Agency Response 

To evaluate these comments, NHTSA 

requested information from technical 

experts in the working group for the 

draft EVS–GTR on electric vehicle 

safety, in which NHTSA participates. 

Technical information was provided by 

Mr. Takahiko Miki 49 from the 

Organisation Internationale des 

Constructeurs d’Automobiles (OICA).50

Mr. Miki noted that the one million 

ohms electrical isolation requirement is 

from IEC 61851–1. Mr. Miki also noted 

that the requirements in IEC 61851–1 

apply to conductive charging of electric 

vehicles with an AC external electric 

power supply. 

Mr. Miki provided the following 

detailed explanation of protective 

measures in vehicles during charging to 

prevent electric shock. Mr. Miki noted 

that protection against electric shock 

during charging by connecting to an AC 

external electric power supply is 

provided by the vehicle and the offboard electric vehicle supply equipment 

(i.e. charge connector) and provided a 

description of these protection systems. 

Protection systems in the vehicle 

include: (1) Protection against direct 

contact with high voltage live parts and 

(2) indirect contact protection from high 

voltage sources (equipotential 

bonding—earthing/grounding). 

Protection systems in the electric 

vehicle supply equipment (charge 

connector) include: (1) Earthing/ 

grounding conductor between the 

electrical chassis of a vehicle and the 


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51RCD is a mechanical switching device designed 

to make, carry and break currents under normal 

service conditions and to cause the opening of the 

contacts when the residual current attains a given 

value under specified conditions. A residual 

current device can be a combination of various 

separate elements designed to detect and evaluate 

the residual current and to make and break current. 

[Source: IEC 61851–1, IEV 442–05–02] 

52CCID is a device that continuously monitors the 

differential current among all of the currentcarrying line conductors in a grounded system and 

rapidly interrupts the circuit under conditions 

where the differential current exceeds the rated 

Measurement Indication Unit (MIU) value of a 

charging circuit interrupting device. The device is 

identified by the letters CCID followed by the 

differential trip current rating of either 5 or 20 

indicating the tripping rating in MIU. [Source: UL 

2231–1] 

53Leakage current is the current flowing through 

ground due to a fault condition. The magnitude of 

leakage current is determined as the difference in 

the current flowing through the positive terminal 

and that returning on the negative terminal. 

Therefore, it is also referred to as residual current. 

54For DC charging, the power input to the vehicle 

is isolated from the ground by the isolation 

transformer. Therefore, electric shock protection is 

maintained even if isolation resistance is reduced 

(fault condition), because the current loop to the 

ground is not established. Additionally, DC 

charging stations monitor the combined isolation 

resistance of the vehicle and the electric vehicle 

supply equipment. If the DC charging station 

detects that the combined isolation resistance is 

lower than the specified value (for electric shock 

protection), the DC output cable is not energized 

(power supply is terminated). 

55 ‘‘Possible active driving mode’’ is the vehicle 

mode when the application of pressure to the 

accelerator pedal or release of the brake system 

causes the electric power train to move the vehicle. 

earth/ground, (2) earthing/grounding 

continuity monitor, and (3) automatic 

disconnection of supply (residual 

current device (RCD),51 charging circuit 

interrupting device (CCID) 52 located in 

the charge electric vehicle supply 

equipment or in the fixed electrical 

installation, or both) operated by the 

fault current that disconnects one or 

more of the line conductors. 

The AC external electric power 

supply is grounded to earth ground. 

When an electric vehicle is connected to 

the AC external electric power supply 

by the charge connector, the vehicle 

electrical chassis is connected to the 

earth/ground through the earthing/ 

grounding conductor. If electrical 

isolation/insulation is lost during 

charging, the leakage current (residual 

current) 53 would flow to the earth/ 

ground through the earthing/grounding 

conductor. Under such conditions, a 

human body contacting high voltageexposed conductive parts of the vehicle 

would not experience electric shock if 

the leakage current is less than or equal 

to maximum current levels considered 

to be safe. If the leakage current reaches 

or exceeds specified safety threshold 

levels, the RCD/CCID would open the 

circuit to interrupt the supply of electric 

energy. A similar form of this type of 

electric shock protection measure is 

provided in homes for use of common 

household electric equipment. 

The electrical isolation of high voltage 

sources that are connected to the vehicle 

charge inlet during charging by 

connecting the AC external electric 

power supply is determined based on 

the characteristics of the RCD/CCID to 

ensure that leakage current would be 

significantly lower than the leakage 

current level that would trip the RCD/ 

CCID to open the circuit. This electrical 

isolation requirement is not for electric 

shock protection but to ensure that 

charging is not interrupted under 

normal charging conditions. Mr. Miki 

recommends that the electrical isolation 

between the electrical chassis and high 

voltage sources that are conductively 

connected to the vehicle charge inlet 

during AC charging be greater than or 

equal to 500 ohms/volt because with 

this level of electrical isolation, the 

leakage current would be sufficiently 

lower than the leakage (residual) current 

level that would trip the RCD/CCID to 

open the circuit and interrupt the 

electric energy supply.54

In light of the new information 

provided by Mr. Miki and the 

commenters, the agency is modifying 

the proposed isolation resistance 

requirement for high voltage sources for 

charging the electric energy storage 

device (S5.4.3.3). High voltage sources 

conductively connected to the vehicle 

charge inlet during charging (through 

conductive connection to the AC 

external electric supply) are required to 

have electrical isolation from the 

electric chassis of 500 ohms/volt when 

the charge connector is disconnected. 

We believe the modified language 

responds to the comments from the 

Alliance, Mercedes-Benz, and Tesla. 

Additionally, the modified requirement 

is consistent with that developed in the 

draft EVS–GTR for electric vehicles. 

Regarding Tesla’s recommendation for 

NHTSA to provide clear requirements 

for off-board (including charging) 

equipment, the agency is looking into 

this matter. The safety measures in the 

electric vehicle supply equipment, such 

as the RCD/CCID in the charge 

connector, are specified in the National 

Electric Code (NEC)—Article 625: 

Electric Vehicle Charging System and in 

the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) 2954, 

‘‘Electric vehicle supply equipment.’’ 

Adding requirements for off-board 

equipment is not in scope of this final 

rule since the agency did not include 

any such requirements in the NPRM. 

The agency may consider the need for 

and the feasibility of requirements for 

off-board electric vehicle equipment in 

the future. 

h. Mitigating Driver Error 

NHTSA proposed three provisions for 

mitigating the likelihood of driver error 

in operating electric vehicles (S5.4.6). 

First, the heading and text of proposed 

S5.4.6.1 proposed that at least a 

momentary indication shall be given at 

‘‘start up’’ when the vehicle is in a 

possible active driving mode.55 (‘‘Start 

up’’ is also used in GTR No. 13.) 

Second, the NPRM proposed that 

drivers be provided an audible or visual 

signal if the vehicle is still in the 

possible active driving mode when the 

driver leaves the vehicle. Third, for 

vehicles that have on-board electric 

energy storage devices that can be 

charged externally, the NPRM proposed 

to prohibit vehicle movement by the 

vehicle’s own propulsion system when 

the external electric power supply is 

physically connected to the vehicle 

charge inlet. 

Comments Received and Agency 

Response 

The agency received comments from 

Global, the Alliance and Tesla on the 

proposal. Global requests a clarification 

of the meaning of ‘‘start up’’ used in the 

first provision. Global asks if ‘‘start up’’ 

refers to the time of engine start or some 

other meaning. 

NHTSA meant ‘‘start up’’ to refer to 

the time when the vehicle is first placed 

in a possible active driving mode (e.g., 

reverse, drive, or other driving gears) 

after manual activation of the 

propulsion system. The provision at 

issue is intended to reduce operational 

errors that could have safety 

implications. For example, a driver 

might not realize the vehicle is in an 

active driving mode when he or she 

pressed on the accelerator pedal, which 

could result in a potential crash 

condition. However, to reduce 

ambiguity, we have modified the final 

rule regulatory text by replacing the 

phrase, ‘‘upon start up,’’ with the 

phrase, ‘‘when the vehicle is first placed 

in possible active driving mode after 

manual activation of the propulsion 

system.’’ Once driving is initiated, 

notification is not needed when the 

vehicle is put in neutral to change gears 

(for manual-drive vehicles). 

The Alliance believes the heading of 

the third provision for mitigating driver 

error should be revised from ‘‘Prevent 

drive-away during charging’’ to 

‘‘Prevent drive-away’’ to reflect that the 

concern is that the driver may drive the 

vehicle away after charging is 


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56 If the charge connector is not connected 

correctly to the vehicle charge inlet, then charging 

may not even initiate and driving away with the 

charge connector physically connected would not 

result in an electric safety hazard. 

57 Vehicle movement of 150 mm is deemed 

sufficiently low such that the charge connector 

would not disengage from the vehicle inlet or 

damage the charging equipment. 

completed without disconnecting the 

charge connector. The Alliance also 

notes that a simple physical connection 

without any conductive connection may 

not be detected by vehicle systems. The 

commenter recommends changing the 

phrase, ‘‘physically connected to the 

vehicle charge inlet,’’ to ‘‘physically 

connected to the vehicle charge inlet in 

such a way that charging is possible.’’ 

The agency agrees generally with the 

Alliance’s recommended changes and 

has changed the proposed regulatory 

text. We believe the changes improve 

clarity and removes ambiguity about 

when and under what conditions the 

requirement to prevent vehicle 

movement applies.56

Tesla states that the phrase, 

‘‘preventing physical vehicle movement 

by its own power,’’ is vague and needs 

clarification. Tesla requests that the 

agency draw a clear distinction between 

when a vehicle is considered stationary 

and when it is in ‘‘movement under its 

own power.’’ The commenter suggests 

using a provision in FMVSS No. 114, 

‘‘Theft protection and rollaway 

prevention.’’ S5.2.5 of FMVSS No. 114 

specifies that a vehicle must not move 

more than 150 mm on a 10 percent 

grade when the gear selection control is 

locked in ‘‘park.’’ 

The agency sees merit in Tesla’s 

suggestion to improve objectivity of the 

requirement for preventing vehicle 

movement when the charge connector is 

connected to the vehicle charge inlet. 

S5.2 in FMVSS No. 114 specifies 

provisions to prevent rollaway in 

vehicles equipped with a transmission 

with a ‘‘park’’ position. One provision is 

that when the vehicle is resting on a 10 

percent grade and the vehicle’s gear 

selection control is locked in ‘‘park,’’ 

the vehicle must not move more than 

150 mm when the brakes are released. 

To distinguish minor vibrations of the 

vehicle when it is idling from vehicle 

movement ‘‘under its own power,’’ the 

agency is modifying the proposed 

regulatory text to state that the vehicle 

must not move more than 150 mm 57 by 

its own propulsion system when the 

charge connector is physically 

connected to the vehicle charge inlet in 

such a way that charging is possible. 

i. Test Procedures and Figures in 

FMVSS No. 305 

The NPRM proposed test procedures 

for evaluating IPXXB and IPXXD direct 

contact protection (S9.1), measuring 

resistance between exposed conductive 

parts and between an exposed 

conductive part and the electrical 

chassis to evaluate indirect contact 

protection (S9.2), and measuring voltage 

between exposed conductive part of an 

electrical protection barrier and the 

electrical chassis or any other exposed 

conductive part of the vehicle for 

indirect contact protection (S9.3). 

For evaluating direct contact 

protection, the proposed test procedure 

in S9.1 detailed how the IPXXB and 

IPXXD probes are used and manipulated 

to determine if high voltage live parts 

are contacted. Subaru comments that 

the description of manipulating the 

IPXXB finger probe does not specifically 

note that it is only applicable to the 

IPXXB probe and not the IPXXD probe. 

NHTSA agrees and has corrected this 

omission to indicate that the described 

manipulation of the finger probe only 

applies to the IPXXB probe. 

In proposed S9.1 the NPRM did not 

explicitly provide criteria for assessing 

whether high voltage live parts were 

contacted, though such information is 

provided in GTR No. 13. To make S9.1 

clearer, and to better harmonize the test 

procedure in FMVSS No. 305 with that 

in GTR No. 13, the criteria for 

verification of IPXXD and IPXXB 

protection degree in GTR No. 13 are 

included in the regulatory text. 

For measuring resistance between two 

exposed conductive parts, the NPRM at 

S9.2 provided two methods that could 

be used. Global states that the two 

methods were provided in GTR No. 13 

as compliance options for 

manufacturers to select for evaluating 

indirect contact protection. The 

commenter recommends we include 

regulatory text to make clear that it is at 

the manufacturer’s option to choose 

either test method to certify compliance. 

The agency agrees that the two methods 

were provided as compliance test 

options for manufacturers and has 

included the recommended regulatory 

text in S9.2 of FMVSS No.305. 

Global expresses concern that 

provisions for indirect contact 

protection in S9.2 create an inordinate 

certification burden on manufacturers 

due to the phrase, ‘‘any two exposed 

conductive parts.’’ The commenter 

requests that instead of measuring the 

resistance between two exposed 

conductive parts, resistance may be 

calculated using the separately 

measured resistances of the parts of the 

electrical chassis. 

NHTSA agrees with this requested 

change from Global. The agency notes 

that GTR No. 13, ECE R.100, and the 

draft EVS–GTR permit resistances to be 

calculated using the separately 

measured resistances of the relevant 

parts in the electric path. NHTSA 

believes that a calculation option is 

acceptable for the requirement at issue 

because resistances can be computed 

from other measured resistances on an 

actual vehicle in a straightforward 

manner, and do not involve potentially 

subjective judgment calls on the part of 

evaluators as to whether assumptions 

underlying a calculation are merited. 

For measuring voltage between 

exposed conductive parts of electrical 

protection barriers, the NPRM specified 

a method in which the DC power 

supply, voltmeter, and ammeter are 

connected between measuring points. 

The Alliance and Global point out that 

the DC power supply should not be 

connected in this test (S9.3a). The 

agency agrees and has corrected the 

regulatory text. Additionally, NHTSA 

believes that calculating the voltage 

between two exposed conductive parts 

from the measured voltages between the 

exposed conductive parts and the 

electrical chassis is straightforward and 

unambiguous and so is permitting a 

calculation option for determining 

voltage between exposed conductive 

parts. 

The proposal provided specifications 

of the IPXXB probe in Figure 7b of the 

regulatory text. The Alliance and Global 

note errors in the specification for R2 

and R4. The agency has corrected the 

errors in Figure 7b. 

The Alliance and Global provide an 

improved Figure 8 in which the text is 

clearer than the NPRM’s Figure 8. The 

agency has included the new figure in 

FMVSS No. 305. 

j. Compliance Date 

The NPRM proposed a compliance 

date of 180 days after the date of 

publication of the final rule in the 

Federal Register, with optional early 

compliance permitted. 

The Alliance states that, although the 

proposed amendments to FMVSS No. 

305 are vital to enable the production of 

advanced fuel cell and 48-volt mild 

hybrid vehicles, the ‘‘in use’’ 

requirements may require some 

modification of currently-certified 

electric vehicles. The commenter asks 

that the compliance date be modified to 

align it with the first September 1st that 

is at least 180 days after the publication 

of the final rule in the Federal Register, 

with optional early compliance 


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permitted. An individual, Mr. Albert 

Torres, also believes that a longer 

compliance date should be provided. 

Agency Response 

The agency believes that most, if not 

all, electric-powered vehicles currently 

sold in the United States would be able 

to comply with the updated 

requirements in FMVSS No. 305 by the 

proposed compliance date. However, as 

noted by the Alliance, some vehicles 

may need some minor modifications to 

comply with some of the modifications 

in FMVSS No. 305, such as the marking 

requirements. Therefore, the agency 

finds good cause to provide more time 

to comply with this final rule. The 

agency believes one year from the date 

of publication of the final rule is 

sufficient time for vehicle 

manufacturers to comply with the 

updated FMVSS No. 305 requirements. 

Therefore, the compliance date for the 

amendments in FMVSS No 305 is one 

year after publication of the final rule. 

We permit optional early compliance 

with this final rule. 

We note that in the ‘‘DATES’’ section 

at this beginning of this document 

NHTSA indicates that the ‘‘effective 

date’’ of this final rule is the date of 

publication of the rule. The ‘‘effective 

date’’ in the DATES section is the date the 

amendments should be incorporated 

into the CFR. That date is different from 

the ‘‘compliance date’’ discussed above. 

As stated above, NHTSA is permitting 

optional early compliance with this 

final rule. Because of this, we are 

amending 49 CFR 571.305 (FMVSS No. 

305) on the date of publication of this 

final rule so that interested 

manufacturers can begin certifying the 

compliance of their vehicles with the 

amended standard from that date. 

V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices 

Executive Order 12866 and DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

This rulemaking document was not 

reviewed by the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) under Executive 

Order (E.O.) 12866. It is not considered 

to be significant under E.O. 12866 or the 

Department’s Regulatory Policies and 

Procedures. The amendments made by 

this final rule will have no significant 

effect on the national economy, as most 

of the requirements are already in 

voluntary industry standards and 

international standards that current 

electric powered vehicles presently 

meet. 

This final rule updates FMVSS No. 

305 to incorporate the electrical safety 

requirements in GTR No. 13. This final 

rule also responds to petitions for 

rulemaking from Toyota and the 

Alliance to facilitate the introduction of 

fuel cell vehicles and 48-volt mild 

hybrid technologies into the vehicle 

fleet. The final rule adds electrical 

safety requirements in GTR No. 13 that 

involve electrical isolation and direct 

and indirect contact protection of high 

voltage sources to prevent electric shock 

during normal operation of electric 

powered vehicles. Today’s final rule 

also provides an additional optional 

method of meeting post-crash electrical 

safety requirements that involve 

physical barriers of high voltage sources 

to prevent electric shock due to direct 

and indirect contact with live parts. 

Since there is widespread conformance 

with the requirements that would apply 

to existing vehicles, we anticipate no 

costs or benefits associated with this 

rulemaking. 

Executive Order 13771 

Executive Order 13771 titled 

‘‘Reducing Regulation and Controlling 

Regulatory Costs,’’ directs that, unless 

prohibited by law, whenever an 

executive department or agency 

publicly proposes for notice and 

comment or otherwise promulgates a 

new regulation, it shall identify at least 

two existing regulations to be repealed. 

In addition, any new incremental costs 

associated with new regulations shall, to 

the extent permitted by law, be offset by 

the elimination of existing costs. Only 

those rules deemed significant under 

section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, 

‘‘Regulatory Planning and Review,’’ are 

subject to these requirements. As 

discussed above, this rule is not a 

significant rule under Executive Order 

12866 and, accordingly, is not subject to 

the offset requirements of 13771. 

NHTSA has determined that this 

rulemaking is a deregulatory action 

under E.O. 13771, as it imposes no costs 

and, instead, amends FMVSS No. 305 to 

give more flexibility to manufacturers 

not only to use modern electrical safety 

designs to produce electric vehicles, but 

also to introduce new technologies to 

the U.S. market, including hydrogen 

fuel cell vehicles and 48-volt mild 

hybrid technologies. Although NHTSA 

was not able to quantify any cost 

savings for this rule, in adopting an 

optional method of meeting post-crash 

electrical safety requirements involving 

use of physical barriers to prevent direct 

or indirect contact (by occupants, 

emergency services personnel and 

others) with high voltage sources, this 

final rule adjusts the standard to remove 

an obstruction that prevented HFCVs to 

be offered for sale in the U.S. Use of the 

physical barrier option will also enable 

manufacturers to produce 48-volt mild 

hybrid systems without having to use 

electrical isolation safety measures that 

involve more complexity, higher 

consumer costs, and higher mass, 

without an incremental safety benefit. 

Regulatory Flexibility Act 

NHTSA has considered the effects of 

this final rule under the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as 

amended by the Small Business 

Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act 

(SBREFA) of 1996). I certify that this 

final rule will not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. Any small 

manufacturers that might be affected by 

this final rule are already subject to the 

requirements of FMVSS No. 305. 

Further, the agency believes the testing 

associated with the requirements added 

by this final rule are not substantial and 

to some extent are already being 

voluntarily borne by the manufacturers 

pursuant to SAE J1766. Therefore, to the 

extent there is an economic impact on 

the manufacturers, it will only be minor. 

National Environmental Policy Act 

NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking 

action for the purposes of the National 

Environmental Policy Act. The agency 

has determined that implementation of 

this action will not have any significant 

impact on the quality of the human 

environment. 

Executive Order 13132 (Federalism) 

NHTSA has examined today’s final 

rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 

(64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and 

concluded that no additional 

consultation with States, local 

governments, or their representatives is 

mandated beyond the rulemaking 

process. The agency has concluded that 

the final rule does not have sufficient 

federalism implications to warrant 

consultation with State and local 

officials or the preparation of a 

federalism summary impact statement. 

The final rule does not have 

‘‘substantial direct effects on the States, 

on the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government.’’ 

NHTSA rules can have preemptive 

effect in two ways. First, the National 

Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 

contains an express preemption 

provision: 

When a motor vehicle safety standard 

is in effect under this chapter, a State or 

a political subdivision of a State may 

prescribe or continue in effect a 

standard applicable to the same aspect 

of performance of a motor vehicle or 


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58The issue of potential preemption of state tort 

law is addressed in the immediately following 

paragraph discussing implied preemption. 

59The conflict was discerned based upon the 

nature (e.g., the language and structure of the 

regulatory text) and the safety-related objectives of 

FMVSS requirements in question and the impact of 

the State requirements on those objectives. 

motor vehicle equipment only if the 

standard is identical to the standard 

prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 

30103(b)(1). 

It is this statutory command that 

preempts any non-identical State 

legislative and administrative law 58

addressing the same aspect of 

performance, not today’s rulemaking, so 

consultation would be inappropriate. 

Second, the Supreme Court has 

recognized the possibility, in some 

instances, of implied preemption of 

State requirements imposed on motor 

vehicle manufacturers, including 

sanctions imposed by State tort law. 

That possibility is dependent upon 

there being an actual conflict between a 

FMVSS and the State requirement. If 

and when such a conflict exists, the 

Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 

makes the State requirements 

unenforceable. See Geier v. American 

Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), 

finding implied preemption of state tort 

law on the basis of a conflict discerned 

by the court,59 not on the basis of an 

intent to preempt asserted by the agency 

itself. 

NHTSA has considered the nature 

(e.g., the language and structure of the 

regulatory text) and objectives of today’s 

final rule and does not discern any 

existing State requirements that conflict 

with the rule or the potential for any 

future State requirements that might 

conflict with it. Without any conflict, 

there could not be any implied 

preemption of state law, including state 

tort law. 

Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice 

Reform) 

With respect to the review of the 

promulgation of a new regulation, 

section 3(b) of Executive Order 12988, 

‘‘Civil Justice Reform’’ (61 FR 4729; Feb. 

7, 1996), requires that Executive 

agencies make every reasonable effort to 

ensure that the regulation: (1) Clearly 

specifies the preemptive effect; (2) 

clearly specifies the effect on existing 

Federal law or regulation; (3) provides 

a clear legal standard for affected 

conduct, while promoting simplification 

and burden reduction; (4) clearly 

specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) 

specifies whether administrative 

proceedings are to be required before 

parties file suit in court; (6) adequately 

defines key terms; and (7) addresses 

other important issues affecting clarity 

and general draftsmanship under any 

guidelines issued by the Attorney 

General. This document is consistent 

with that requirement. 

Pursuant to this Order, NHTSA notes 

as follows. The issue of preemption is 

discussed above. NHTSA notes further 

that there is no requirement that 

individuals submit a petition for 

reconsideration or pursue other 

administrative proceedings before they 

may file suit in court. 

Privacy Act 

Please note that anyone can search the 

electronic form of all comments 

received into any of our dockets by the 

name of the individual submitting the 

comment (or signing the comment, if 

submitted on behalf of an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). You may 

review DOT’s complete Privacy Act 

Statement in the Federal Register 

published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 

19477–78), or online at http://

www.dot.gov/privacy.html. 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act 

of 1995 (PRA), a person is not required 

to respond to a collection of information 

by a Federal agency unless the 

collection displays a valid OMB control 

number. There are no information 

collection requirements associated with 

this NPRM. 

National Technology Transfer and 

Advancement Act 

Section 12(d) of the National 

Technology Transfer and Advancement 

Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Public Law 104– 

113, as amended by Public Law 107–107 

(15 U.S.C. 272), directs the agency to 

evaluate and use voluntary consensus 

standards in its regulatory activities 

unless doing so would be inconsistent 

with applicable law or is otherwise 

impractical. Voluntary consensus 

standards are technical standards (e.g., 

materials specifications, test methods, 

sampling procedures, and business 

practices) that are developed or adopted 

by voluntary consensus standards 

bodies, such as the Society of 

Automotive Engineers (SAE). The 

NTTAA directs us to provide Congress 

(through OMB) with explanations when 

the agency decides not to use available 

and applicable voluntary consensus 

standards. The NTTAA does not apply 

to symbols. 

FMVSS No. 305 has historically 

drawn largely from SAE J1766, and does 

so again for this current rulemaking, 

which updates FMVSS No. 305 to 

facilitate the development of fuel cell 

and 48-volt mild hybrid technologies. It 

is based on GTR No. 13 and the latest 

version of SAE J1766 January 2014. 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

Section 202 of the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), 

Pub. L. 104–4, requires Federal agencies 

to prepare a written assessment of the 

costs, benefits, and other effects of 

proposed or final rules that include a 

Federal mandate likely to result in the 

expenditure by State, local, or tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or by the 

private sector, of more than $100 

million annually (adjusted for inflation 

with base year of 1995). Adjusting this 

amount by the implicit gross domestic 

product price deflator for the year 2013 

results in $142 million (106.733/75.324 

= 1.42). This final rule will not result in 

a cost of $142 million or more to either 

State, local, or tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or the private sector. Thus, 

this final rule is not subject to the 

requirements of sections 202 of the 

UMRA. 

Executive Order 13609 (Promoting 

Regulatory Cooperation) 

The policy statement in section 1 of 

Executive Order 13609 provides, in part: 

the regulatory approaches taken by 

foreign governments may differ from 

those taken by U.S. regulatory agencies 

to address similar issues. In some cases, 

the differences between the regulatory 

approaches of U.S. agencies and those of 

their foreign counterparts might not be 

necessary and might impair the ability 

of American businesses to export and 

compete internationally. In meeting 

shared challenges involving health, 

safety, labor, security, environmental, 

and other issues, international 

regulatory cooperation can identify 

approaches that are at least as protective 

as those that are or would be adopted in 

the absence of such cooperation. 

International regulatory cooperation can 

also reduce, eliminate, or prevent 

unnecessary differences in regulatory 

requirements. 

The agency participated in the 

development of GTR No. 13 to 

harmonize the standards of fuel cell 

vehicles. As a signatory member, 

NHTSA is obligated to initiate 

rulemaking to incorporate electrical 

safety requirements and options 

specified in GTR No. 13 into FMVSS 

No. 305. The agency has initiated 

rulemaking by way of the March 10, 

2016 NPRM and completes it with this 

final rule. 

Regulation Identifier Number 

The Department of Transportation 

assigns a regulation identifier number 

(RIN) to each regulatory action listed in 


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44960 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 186 / Wednesday, September 27, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 

the Unified Agenda of Federal 

Regulations. The Regulatory Information 

Service Center publishes the Unified 

Agenda in April and October of each 

year. You may use the RIN contained in 

the heading at the beginning of this 

document to find this action in the 

Unified Agenda. 

Plain Language 

Executive Order 12866 requires each 

agency to write all rules in plain 

language. Application of the principles 

of plain language includes consideration 

of the following questions: 

• Have we organized the material to 

suit the public’s needs? 

• Are the requirements in the rule 

clearly stated? 

• Does the rule contain technical 

language or jargon that isn’t clear? 

• Would a different format (grouping 

and order of sections, use of headings, 

paragraphing) make the rule easier to 

understand? 

• Would more (but shorter) sections 

be better? 

• Could we improve clarity by adding 

tables, lists, or diagrams? 

• What else could we do to make the 

rule easier to understand? 

If you have any responses to these 

questions, please write to us with your 

views. 

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571 

Imports, Motor vehicles, Motor 

vehicle safety. 

In consideration of the foregoing, 

NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as 

follows: 

PART 571—FEDERAL MOTOR 

VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 571 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 

30117, and 30166; delegation of authority at 

49 CFR 1.95. 

■ 2. In § 571.305: 

■ a. Revise S1 and S2; 

■ b. Under S4: 

■ i. Add in alphabetical order 

definitions for ‘‘Charge connector,’’ 

‘‘Connector,’’ ‘‘Direct contact,’’ 

‘‘Electrical protection barrier,’’ 

‘‘Exposed conductive part,’’ ‘‘External 

electric power supply,’’ and ‘‘Fuel cell 

system’’; 

■ ii. Revise the definitions of ‘‘High 

voltage source’’; 

■ iii. Add in alphabetical order 

definitions for ‘‘Indirect contact,’’ ‘‘Live 

part,’’ ‘‘Luggage compartment,’’ 

‘‘Passenger compartment,’’ and 

‘‘Possible active driving mode’’; 

■ iv. Revise the definition of 

‘‘Propulsion system’’; and 

■ v. Add in alphabetical order 

definitions for ‘‘Protection degree 

IPXXB,’’ ‘‘Protection degree IPXXD,’’ 

‘‘Service disconnect,’’ and ‘‘Vehicle 

charge inlet’’; 

■ c. Revise S5.3 and S5.4; and 

■ d. Add S5.4.1, S5.4.1.1, S5.4.1.1.1, 

S5.4.1.2, S5.4.1.3, S5.4.1.4, S5.4.1.5, 

S5.4.1.6, S5.4.2, S5.4.2.1, S5.4.2.2, 

S5.4.3, S5.4.3.1, S5.4.3.2, S5.4.3.3, 

S5.4.4, S5.4.5, S5.4.6, S5.4.6.1, S5.4.6.2, 

S5.4.6.3, S9, S9.1, S9.2, S9.3, and 

figures 6, 7a, 7b, and 8. 

The revisions and additions read as 

follows: 

§ 571.305 Standard No. 305; Electricpowered vehicles: electrolyte spillage and 

electrical shock protection. 

S1. Scope. This standard specifies 

requirements for limitation of 

electrolyte spillage and retention of 

electric energy storage/conversion 

devices during and after a crash, and 

protection from harmful electric shock 

during and after a crash and during 

normal vehicle operation. 

S2. Purpose. The purpose of this 

standard is to reduce deaths and injuries 

during and after a crash that occur 

because of electrolyte spillage from 

electric energy storage devices, 

intrusion of electric energy storage/ 

conversion devices into the occupant 

compartment, and electrical shock, and 

to reduce deaths and injuries during 

normal vehicle operation that occur 

because of electric shock or driver error. 

* * * * * 

S4. * * * 

Charge connector is a conductive 

device that, by insertion into a vehicle 

charge inlet, establishes an electrical 

connection of the vehicle to the external 

electric power supply for the purpose of 

transferring energy and exchanging 

information. 

Connector means a device providing 

mechanical connection and 

disconnection of high voltage electrical 

conductors to a suitable mating 

component, including its housing. 

Direct contact is the contact of 

persons with high voltage live parts. 

* * * * * 

Electrical protection barrier is the part 

providing protection against direct 

contact with high voltage live parts from 

any direction of access. 

Exposed conductive part is the 

conductive part that can be touched 

under the provisions of the IPXXB 

protection degree and that is not 

normally energized, but that can become 

electrically energized under isolation 

fault conditions. This includes parts 

under a cover, if the cover can be 

removed without using tools. 

External electric power supply is a 

power supply external to the vehicle 

that provides electric power to charge 

the electric energy storage device in the 

vehicle through the charge connector. 

Fuel cell system is a system 

containing the fuel cell stack(s), air 

processing system, fuel flow control 

system, exhaust system, thermal 

management system, and water 

management system. 

High voltage source means any 

electric component which is contained 

in the electric power train or 

conductively connected to the electric 

power train and has a working voltage 

greater than 30 VAC or 60 VDC. 

Indirect contact is the contact of 

persons with exposed conductive parts. 

Live part is a conductive part of the 

vehicle that is electrically energized 

under normal vehicle operation. 

Luggage compartment is the space in 

the vehicle for luggage accommodation, 

separated from the passenger 

compartment by the front or rear 

bulkhead and bounded by a roof, hood 

or trunk lid, floor, and side walls, as 

well as by electrical protection barriers 

provided for protecting the occupants 

from direct contact with high voltage 

live parts. 

Passenger compartment is the space 

for occupant accommodation that is 

bounded by the roof, floor, side walls, 

doors, outside glazing, front bulkhead 

and rear bulkhead or rear gate, as well 

as electrical protection barriers provided 

for protecting the occupants from direct 

contact with high voltage live parts. 

Possible active driving mode is the 

vehicle mode when application of 

pressure to the accelerator pedal (or 

activation of an equivalent control) or 

release of the brake system causes the 

electric power train to move the vehicle. 

Propulsion system means an assembly 

of electric or electro-mechanical 

components or circuits that propel the 

vehicle using the energy that is supplied 

by a high voltage source. This includes, 

but is not limited to, electric motors, 

inverters/converters, and electronic 

controllers. 

Protection degree IPXXB is protection 

from contact with high voltage live 

parts. It is tested by probing electrical 

protection barriers with the jointed test 

finger probe, IPXXB, in Figure 7b. 

Protection degree IPXXD is protection 

from contact with high voltage live 

parts. It is tested by probing electrical 

protection barriers with the test wire 

probe, IPXXD, in Figure 7a. 

Service disconnect is the device for 

deactivation of an electrical circuit 

when conducting checks and services of 

the vehicle electrical propulsion system. 

* * * * * 


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Vehicle charge inlet is the device on 

the electric vehicle into which the 

charge connector is inserted for the 

purpose of transferring energy and 

exchanging information from an 

external electric power supply. 

* * * * * 

S5.3 Electrical safety. After each test 

specified in S6 of this standard, each 

high voltage source in a vehicle must 

meet one of the following requirements: 

electrical isolation requirements of 

subparagraph (a), the voltage level 

requirements of subparagraph (b), or the 

physical barrier protection requirements 

of subparagraph (c). 

(a) The electrical isolation of the high 

voltage source, determined in 

accordance with the procedure specified 

in S7.6, must be greater than or equal to 

one of the following: 

(1) 500 ohms/volt for an AC high 

voltage source; or 

(2) 100 ohms/volt for an AC high 

voltage source if it is conductively 

connected to a DC high voltage source, 

but only if the AC high voltage source 

meets the physical barrier protection 

requirements specified in S5.3(c)(1) and 

S5.3(c)(2); or 

(3) 100 ohms/volt for a DC high 

voltage source. 

(b) The voltages V1, V2, and Vb of the 

high voltage source, measured according 

to the procedure specified in S7.7, must 

be less than or equal to 30 VAC for AC 

components or 60 VDC for DC 

components. 

(c) Protection against electric shock by 

direct and indirect contact (physical 

barrier protection) shall be 

demonstrated by meeting the following 

three conditions: 

(1) The high voltage source (AC or 

DC) meets the protection degree IPXXB 

when tested according to the procedure 

specified in S9.1 using the IPXXB test 

probe shown in Figures 7a and 7b; 

(2) The resistance between exposed 

conductive parts of the electrical 

protection barrier of the high voltage 

source and the electrical chassis is less 

than 0.1 ohms when tested according to 

the procedures specified in S9.2. In 

addition, the resistance between an 

exposed conductive part of the electrical 

protection barrier of the high voltage 

source and any other simultaneously 

reachable exposed conductive parts of 

electrical protection barriers within 2.5 

meters of it must be less than 0.2 ohms 

when tested using the test procedures 

specified in S9.2; and 

(3) The voltage between exposed 

conductive parts of the electrical 

protection barrier of the high voltage 

source and the electrical chassis is less 

than or equal to 30 VAC or 60 VDC as 

measured in accordance with S9.3. In 

addition, the voltage between an 

exposed conductive part of the electrical 

protection barrier of the high voltage 

source and any other simultaneously 

reachable exposed conductive parts of 

electrical protection barriers within 2.5 

meters of it must be less than or equal 

to 30 VAC or 60 VDC as measured in 

accordance with S9.3. 

S5.4 Electrical safety during normal 

vehicle operation. 

S5.4.1 Protection against direct 

contact. 

S5.4.1.1 Marking. The symbol shown 

in Figure 6 shall be present on or near 

electric energy storage devices. The 

symbol in Figure 6 shall also be visible 

on electrical protection barriers which, 

when removed, expose live parts of high 

voltage sources. The symbol shall be 

yellow and the bordering and the arrow 

shall be black. 

S5.4.1.1.1 The marking is not required 

for electrical protection barriers that 

cannot be physically accessed, opened, 

or removed without the use of tools. 

Markings are not required for electrical 

connectors or the vehicle charge inlet. 

S5.4.1.2 High voltage cables. Cables 

for high voltage sources which are not 

located within electrical protection 

barriers shall be identified by having an 

outer covering with the color orange. 

S5.4.1.3 Service disconnect. For a 

service disconnect which can be 

opened, disassembled, or removed 

without tools, protection degree IPXXB 

shall be provided when tested under 

procedures specified in S9.1 using the 

IPXXB test probe shown in Figures 7a 

and 7b. 

S5.4.1.4 Protection degree of high 

voltage live parts. 

(a) Protection degree IPXXD shall be 

provided for high voltage live parts 

inside the passenger or luggage 

compartment when tested according to 

the procedures specified in S9.1 using 

the IPXXD test probe shown in Figure 

7a. 

(b) Protection degree IPXXB shall be 

provided for high voltage live parts in 

areas other than the passenger or 

luggage compartment when tested 

according to the procedures specified in 

S9.1 using the IPXXB test probe shown 

in Figures 7a and 7b. 

S5.4.1.5 Connectors. Direct contact 

protection for a connector shall be 

provided by meeting the requirements 

specified in S5.4.1.4 when the 

connector is connected to its 

corresponding mating component, and 

by meeting at least one of the 

requirements of subparagraphs (a), (b), 

or (c). 

(a) The connector meets the 

requirements of S5.4.1.4 when separated 

from its mating component, if the 

connector can be separated without the 

use of tools; 

(b) The voltage of the live parts 

becomes less than or equal to 60 VDC 

or 30 VAC within one second after the 

connector is separated from its mating 

component; or, 

(c) The connector is provided with a 

locking mechanism (at least two distinct 

actions are needed to separate the 

connector from its mating component) 

and there are other components that 

must be removed in order to separate 

the connector from its mating 

component and these cannot be 

removed without the use of tools. 

S5.4.1.6 Vehicle charge inlet. Direct 

contact protection for a vehicle charge 

inlet shall be provided by meeting the 

requirements specified in S5.4.1.4 when 

the charge connector is connected to the 

vehicle inlet and by meeting at least one 

of the requirements of subparagraphs (a) 

or (b). 

(a) The vehicle charge inlet meets the 

requirements of S5.4.1.4 when the 

charge connector is not connected to it; 

or 

(b) The voltage of the high voltage live 

parts becomes equal to or less than 60 

VDC or equal to or less than 30 VAC 

within 1 second after the charge 

connector is separated from the vehicle 

charge inlet. 

S5.4.2 Protection against indirect 

contact. 

S5.4.2.1 The resistance between all 

exposed conductive parts of electrical 

protection barriers and the electrical 

chassis shall be less than 0.1 ohms 

when tested according to the procedures 

specified in S9.2. 

S5.4.2.2 The resistance between any 

two simultaneously reachable exposed 

conductive parts of the electrical 

protection barriers that are less than 2.5 

meters from each other shall be less 

than 0.2 ohms when tested according to 

the procedures specified in S9.2. 

S5.4.3 Electrical isolation. 

S5.4.3.1 Electrical isolation of AC and 

DC high voltage sources. The electrical 

isolation of a high voltage source, 

determined in accordance with the 

procedure specified in S7.6 must be 

greater than or equal to one of the 

following: 

(a) 500 ohms/volt for an AC high 

voltage source; 

(b) 100 ohms/volt for an AC high 

voltage source if it is conductively 

connected to a DC high voltage source, 

but only if the AC high voltage source 

meets the requirements for protection 

against direct contact in S5.4.1.4 and the 

protection from indirect contact in 

S5.4.2; or 


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44962 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 186 / Wednesday, September 27, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 

(c) 100 ohms/volt for a DC high 

voltage source. 

S5.4.3.2 Exclusion of high voltage 

sources from electrical isolation 

requirements. A high voltage source that 

is conductively connected to an electric 

component which is conductively 

connected to the electrical chassis and 

has a working voltage less than or equal 

to 60 VDC, is not required to meet the 

electrical isolation requirements in 

S5.4.3.1 if the voltage between the high 

voltage source and the electrical chassis 

is less than or equal to 30 VAC or 60 

VDC. 

S5.4.3.3 Electrical isolation of high 

voltage sources for charging the electric 

energy storage device. For the vehicle 

charge inlet intended to be conductively 

connected to the AC external electric 

power supply, the electric isolation 

between the electrical chassis and the 

high voltage sources that are 

conductively connected to the vehicle 

charge inlet during charging of the 

electric energy storage device shall be 

greater than or equal to 500 ohms/volt 

when the charge connector is 

disconnected. The electrical isolation is 

measured at the high voltage live parts 

of the vehicle charge inlet and 

determined in accordance with the 

procedure specified in S7.6. During the 

measurement, the rechargeable electric 

energy storage system may be 

disconnected. 

S5.4.4 Electrical isolation monitoring. 

DC high voltage sources of vehicles with 

a fuel cell system shall be monitored by 

an electrical isolation monitoring 

system that displays a warning for loss 

of isolation when tested according to S8. 

The system must monitor its own 

readiness and the warning display must 

be visible to the driver seated in the 

driver’s designated seating position. 

S5.4.5 Electric shock protection 

during charging. For motor vehicles 

with an electric energy storage device 

that can be charged through a 

conductive connection with a grounded 

external electric power supply, a device 

to enable conductive connection of the 

electrical chassis to the earth ground 

shall be provided. This device shall 

enable connection to the earth ground 

before exterior voltage is applied to the 

vehicle and retain the connection until 

after the exterior voltage is removed 

from the vehicle. 

S5.4.6 Mitigating driver error. 

S5.4.6.1 Indicator of possible active 

driving mode. At least a momentary 

indication shall be given to the driver 

each time the vehicle is first placed in 

possible active driving mode after 

manual activation of the propulsion 

system. This requirement does not 

apply under conditions where an 

internal combustion engine provides 

directly or indirectly the vehicle’s 

propulsion power when the vehicle is 

first placed in a possible active driving 

mode after manual activation of the 

propulsion system. 

S5.4.6.2 Indicator of possible active 

driving mode when leaving the vehicle. 

When leaving the vehicle, the driver 

shall be informed by an audible or 

visual signal if the vehicle is still in the 

possible active driving mode. 

S5.4.6.3 Prevent drive-away. If the onboard electric energy storage device can 

be externally charged, vehicle 

movement of more than 150 mm by its 

own propulsion system shall not be 

possible as long as the charge connector 

of the external electric power supply is 

physically connected to the vehicle 

charge inlet in a manner that would 

permit charging of the electric energy 

storage device. 

* * * * * 

S9 Test methods for physical barrier 

protection from electric shock due to 

direct and indirect contact with high 

voltage sources. 

S9.1 Test method to evaluate 

protection from direct contact with high 

voltage sources. 

(a) Any parts surrounding the high 

voltage components are opened, 

disassembled, or removed without the 

use of tools. 

(b) The selected access probe is 

inserted into any gaps or openings of the 

electrical protection barrier with a test 

force of 10 N ± 1 N with the IPXXB 

probe or 1 to 2 N with the IPXXD probe. 

If the probe partly or fully penetrates 

into the electrical protection barrier, it 

is placed in every possible position to 

evaluate contact with high voltage live 

parts. If partial or full penetration into 

the electrical protection barrier occurs 

with the IPXXB probe, the IPXXB probe 

shall be placed as follows: starting from 

the straight position, both joints of the 

test finger are rotated progressively 

through an angle of up to 90 degrees 

with respect to the axis of the adjoining 

section of the test finger and are placed 

in every possible position. 

(c) A low voltage supply (of not less 

than 40 V and not more than 50 V) in 

series with a suitable lamp may be 

connected between the access probe and 

any high voltage live parts inside the 

electrical protection barrier to indicate 

whether high voltage live parts were 

contacted. 

(d) A mirror or fiberscope may be 

used to inspect whether the access 

probe touches high voltage live parts 

inside the electrical protection barrier. 

(e) Protection degree IPXXD or IPXXB 

is verified when the following 

conditions are met: 

(i) The access probe does not touch 

high voltage live parts. The IPXXB 

access probe may be manipulated as 

specified in S9.1(b) for evaluating 

contact with high voltage live parts. The 

methods specified in S9.1(c) or S9.1(d) 

may be used to aid the evaluation. If 

method S9.1(c) is used for verifying 

protection degree IPXXB or IPXXD, the 

lamp shall not light up. 

(ii) The stop face of the access probe 

does not fully penetrate into the 

electrical protection barrier. 

S9.2 Test method to evaluate 

protection against indirect contact with 

high voltage sources. At the option of 

the manufacturer, protection against 

indirect contact with high voltage 

sources shall be determined using the 

test method in subparagraph (a) or 

subparagraph (b). 

(a) Test method using a resistance 

tester. The resistance tester is connected 

to the measuring points (the electrical 

chassis and any exposed conductive 

part of electrical protection barriers or 

any two simultaneously reachable 

exposed conductive parts of electrical 

protection barriers that are less than 2.5 

meters from each other), and the 

resistance is measured using a 

resistance tester that can measure 

current levels of at least 0.2 Amperes 

with a resolution of 0.01 ohms or less. 

The resistance between two exposed 

conductive parts of electrical protection 

barriers that are less than 2.5 meters 

from each other may be calculated using 

the separately measured resistances of 

the relevant parts of the electric path. 

(b) Test method using a DC power 

supply, voltmeter and ammeter. 

(1) Connect the DC power supply, 

voltmeter and ammeter to the measuring 

points (the electrical chassis and any 

exposed conductive part or any two 

simultaneously reachable exposed 

conductive parts that are less than 2.5 

meters from each other) as shown in 

Figure 8. 

(2) Adjust the voltage of the DC power 

supply so that the current flow becomes 

more than 0.2 Amperes. 

(3) Measure the current I and the 

voltage V shown in Figure 8. 

(4) Calculate the resistance R 

according to the formula, R=V/I. 

(5) The resistance between two 

simultaneously reachable exposed 

conductive parts of electrical protection 

barriers that are less than 2.5 meters 

from each other may be calculated using 

the separately measured resistances of 

the relevant parts of the electric path. 

S9.3 Test method to determine 

voltage between exposed conductive 

parts of electrical protection barriers 

and the electrical chassis and between 


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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 186 / Wednesday, September 27, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 44963 

exposed conductive parts of electrical 

protection barriers. 

(a) Connect the voltmeter to the 

measuring points (exposed conductive 

part of an electrical protection barrier 

and the electrical chassis or any two 

simultaneously reachable exposed 

conductive parts of electrical protection 

barriers that are less than 2.5 meters 

from each other). 

(b) Measure the voltage. 

(c) The voltage between two 

simultaneously reachable exposed 

conductive parts of electrical protection 

barriers that are less than 2.5 meters 

from each other may be calculated using 

the separately measured voltages 

between the relevant electrical 

protection barriers and the electrical 

chassis. 

* * * * * 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–P 


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Figure 6. S5.4.1.1 Marking of high voltage equipment. 

IPXXB 

IPXXD 

See Fig-7b -

for full 

demenslons 

Access probe 

(Dimensions in mm) 

Jointed test finger 

Stop face 

1+--(0 50 X 20) 

N 

... 

Jointed test finger 

(Metal) 

Insulating material ~-----n------~ 

Test wire 1.0 mm diameter, 100 mm long 

Sphere 35±0.2 (01+0.05) 

Approx. 100 100±0.2 --1-----. 

= -t-------f 

0--~----------~J 

Handle 

(Insulating material) 

Stop face 

(Insulating material) 

Figure 7a. S4, S5.3, S5.4.1.3, and S5.4.1.4 Access probes for the tests of direct contact 

protection. Access probe IPXXB (top) and Access probe IPXXD (bottom). 
44964 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 186 / Wednesday, September 27, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 


asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with RULESER27SE17.008</GPH>

IPXXB 

Handle 

Guard 

Stop face 

Joints 

R2±0.05 

cylindrical I 

Access probe 

(Dimensions in mm) 

Jointed test finger 

Insulating 

material 

Chamber 

all edges 

R4±0.05 

spherical 

075 

-· I 

Section A-A r---+---.-+--r-~ 0 

+I 

~ J---+---+--1-_._~ . Section B-B 

Material: metal, except where otherwise specified 

Linear dimensions in millimeters 

050 

Tolerances on dimensions without specific tolerance: 

on angles, 0/10 degrees 

on linear dimensions: 

up to 25 mm: 0/-0.05 mm 

over 25 mm: ±0.2 mm 

Both joints shall permit movement in the same plane and the same direction through 

an angle of 90° with a 0° to + 10° tolerance. 

Figure 7b. S4, S5.3, S5.4.1.3, and S5.4.1.4 Jointed test finger IPXXB 
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 186 / Wednesday, September 27, 2017 / Rules and Regulations 44965 

Jack Danielson, 

Acting Deputy Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2017–20350 Filed 9–26–17; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–59–C 


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