T he H onorabl e T homas W

. P hi l l i ps, U ni t ed St at es D i s t r i ct Ju dge f or t he E as t er n D i s t r i ct of T enn es s ee, * si t t i ng by desi gnat i o n.

NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0917n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 20, 2006 Case No. 05- 4543 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT TIM GR AY, P etitioner , v. UNITED STAT ES DEPARTMENT OF AG RI CU LTU RE , Respondent.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UN ITED STA TES DE P AR TM EN T OF AG RICULTURE

BEFORE: BATCHELDER and GRIF F IN, Circ uit Jud ges; P HILL IP S , District Judge. * ALICE M. B AT CH E L DE R, Circ uit Jud ge. Petitioner Tim Gray (“G ray”) a

ppeals the Un ite d St a te s D e pa

rtme nt o f A g ri c ult

ur e ’s (“ USD A” ) de c isi on fi nd ing him in v iol a tio n o f t

he Ho rs e Protection Act (“ HPA”), 15 U .S.C. § 1821 et seq . On appe al Gra y argues that the Administrative L aw J udg e (“AL J ”) c ommitt ed proc edura l error s rende ring the USDA’s judg ment “null and void.” Be cause Gra

y ’s ar g uments are without merit, we af firm the dec ision of the USDA. I. Bac kgr ound In 2001, the Administrator (“ Administrator”) of the Animal and P l an t He alth Inspection Service (“A PHI S”), an a g ency of the USDA, filed a complaint ag ainst Gra y , Sand Creek F arm, Inc.2

(“Sand Cre ek”) , Wil liam B. J ohnson, and S andra J ohnson, alleg ing that they violated the HPA, 15 U. S.C. § 1 82 4( 2) , b y

e nte ri nga ho rs e in a sho w or e xhibi tio n w hil e that ho rs e wa s “ so re .” Th e c a se
was a ssigne d to AL J J ill S . Clifton, and a hea ring was set for Ma

rch 2004. O ne we ek bef

ore the hear ing, the responde nts move d for a continuance beca use Gra y had suff ere d injuries that preve nted him from attendingthe hea ring . The Administrator opposed the continuance, or in the alternative,

m o v edt o s ev er

Gr ay fr o mt h e p ro ce ed i n gs . T h e ALJ d ec i d edt o s ev er Gr ay s o th at th e p ro ce ed i n gs could continue a g ainst the J ohnsons. Moreover , beca use Sand Cree k could not obtain a fa ir hea ring without Gray ’s par

ticipation, the ALJ also severed Sand Cre ek fr om the orig inal action, and

co n s o l i d at edS an d

C re ekan d

Gr ay i na s ep ar at e p ro ce ed i n g. The he aringag ainst Gray

and Sand C ree k was set for Monday , Marc h 7, 2005. Howeve r on Thursday , Marc h 3, the Administrator filed a motion to s ummarily

resolve the matter a g ainst Sand Creek. A fter a series of teleconf ere nces on Fr iday , Marc h 4, the AL J excused Sand Creek f rom the Marc h 7 hear ing in or der to provide Sand Creek w i t h ad ditional tim e to re spond to the Administrator’s Mar ch 3 motion. Never theless, in an ef

fort to continue in an “ order ly ” and

“ e ff ic ie nt” fa sh ion , the AL J ann ounc e d that sh e wo uld pr oc e e d wi th the Ma rc h 7 he ari ngagain st Gra y . The AL J enter ed an order sever ing the parties and assig ning se parate docke t numbers to the

re c e ntl y div ide d p ro c e e din g s. Up t o th i s p o i n t , Gr ay

h adb ee np ro ce ed i n g pr o s e and candidly admitted that he wa s “riding th e c o at t ai l s ” o f, an d u t t er l y d ep en d i n g o n , S an d C re ekfo r l ega l as s i s t an ce . Be cau s e t h e p ro ce ed i n gs
wer e sever ed on Fr iday and the hea ringwas set f

or Monday , Gra

y was una ble to find counsel on suc h

s h o rtn o t i c e . A tth e b e g i n n i n g o f th e h e ar i n g , h o w e v e r , th e A L J n o t e d th a t s h e “ w o u l d h e ar

[ G r ay] out” if he r equeste d a continuanc e to obtain counse l. Despite Gray ’s complaints that he did not know3

what to do or how to a ct at the he aring , he did not reque st a continuanc e. At the close of evidenc e, the AL J issued an oral de cision, concludingthat Gra y had violated the HPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)( b), by enter ing a horse in a showor exhibit ion while that horse wa s
s o re . T h e AL J then orde red G ray to pay a civil pena lty

of $2,200 and disqualifie d him from pa rt ic ipatin g in a

ny ho rs e sh ow s o r e xhibi tio ns fo r a tw o- y e ar p e ri od . F ina lly , th e AL J scr up ulo us ly outlined Gray ’s rig hts of appea l to the J udicial Officer (“JO”) a nd provided him with a copy of the

re le va nt a pp e llate ru le s. Followingthe AL J ’s dec ision, Gray obtained numer ous continuance s of his administrative

a pp e a l de a dli ne . D e sp ite the se c on tin ua nc e s, ho we ve r , G ra

y fi le d h is a pp e a l be y on d th e a llo tte d ti me period. As a

result of this untimely

filing, the J O d en i ed h i s cl aim. The JO also rejec ted Gra y ’s argument that his pr ocee ding was not final bec ause the AL J had no author ity to sever it. Gr ay

filed a petition for r econside ration with the JO, which was denie d, and he t h en fi l ed a t i mely notice of

a pp e a l w iththi s Co ur

t. II. Ana lys is On a pp e a l G ra y argue s tha t the AL J did n ot h ave “ po we r” to i ssu e a de c isi on a g a ins t hi m. More spe cifica lly , he conte nds that the AL J ’s dec ision was “null and void” be cause she lac ked authority to sever pr ocee dings unde r the Rules of Pra cti ce Gover ning F ormal Adjudicatory Procee dings I nstitut ed by

the Secr etar

y under V arious Statutes (“Rules of Practice ”). We re

ject the pr e mis e of G r ay ’ s ar g u m e n t - - th a t an A L J l a c k s a u th o r i ty t o s e v e r p r o c e e d i n g s - - an d f i n d his position unpersuasive. Whil e the Rul es of Practice do not expli citly authorize sever ance of proc eeding s, we find that the seve ranc e orde rs i n Gra y ’s proc eeding s were supported by other provisions in the Rules ofG ra y d o e s n o t alle g e -- a n d ind e e d the re c o rd d o e s n o t i n d ic a te -- tha t he o b je c te d to the A L J ’s d e c isio n to 1 sev er the p ro ce ed i ng s. 4 Practice . The Rules of Pra ctice ex p re s s ly authorize an AL J to hold confer ence s to “expedite” the p ro cee dings, see 7 C. F

. R. § 1

. 1 4 0 ( a ) ( 1 ) , an d to c o n s id e r “ matt e r s a s ma y e xp e d it e an d a id in the dispositi on of the proc eeding ,” see7 C. F .R. § 1.1 40 (a )( 3) (i x). In our c a se , the AL J g ra nte d th e fi rs t

sever ance reque st beca

use Gra y was injured and unable to attend the hear ing. T he AL J there afte r order ed the se cond seve ranc e to provide Sand Cre ek with additional time to respond to a motion, and the AL J , in an ef

fort to proc eed in a

n “orde rly ” and “ eff

icient” f ashion, s aw no r eason to de lay Gra y ’s hea ring . In bot h instances, the A L J was a cting to expedite the timely dispositi on of the proce eding s, as she was authorized to do under the Rules of Practice

. We theref ore c onclude that 1 even thoug h the Rules of Prac tice do not expressly authorize an AJLto sever pr ocee dings, the

sever ance order s in Gray ’s ca se we re implicitly permitted un d er o t her pr ovisions of the Rules of Pr a c tic e . M or e ov e r, it i s w e ll- se ttl e d th a t “ [a]dmin ist rativ e a g e nc ie s e njo y

‘b ro a d d isc retion’ to manag e their own dockets,” see Florida M un. Power Agenc

y v. Fed. Energy R egulatory Comm’n , 315 F.3d 362, 366 (D.C. Cir. 2003) , and as expressed above, the AL J did not abus e h er “b road discretion” in issuing the seve ranc e orde rs in this case. Gra y ’s a rgu m ents imply

that the AL J ’s sec ond sever ance prejudice d him by aff ording ina de qu a te tim e to o bta in c ouns e l. We fi nd that any pr e jud ic e Gr ay

e xpe ri e nc e d w a s c a

us e d b y his admitted choice to depend on Sand Cre ek for leg al assistance . Moreove r, at the b egi nning of the hear ing, the AL J indicated that she would seriously enter tain a re quest for a

continuance ; however , Gra y did not request one. I

n light of the se fa cts, we determine that Gra y was not unfairly

prejudice d by the AL J’s d e c isi on

to s e ve r h is p ro c e e din g s.5

Finally , Gra

y contends -- without c iting any leg al authority -- that even if the AL J did not err in se ve ri ng his pr oc e e din g s, sh e la c ke d a uth or ity to iss ue he r de c isi on be c a us e sh e wa s no t f

or ma lly “appointed as judge ” over the newly sever ed proc eeding s. I t is clear that AL J Clifton was assig ned to the orig inal proce eding s involving Gra y , and we there fore find that she ac ted within her discr etion in c on tin uin g to p re sid e ov e r G ra

y ’s po st- se ve ra

nc e pr oc e e din g s. III. Conclusi on For t h e fore g oing r easons, we conclude that the AL J did not err in seve ring Gra y ’s proce eding s, nor did she er r in presidingover the post-sever ance p ro ce eding s. Consequently , we deny Gra y ’s appe al and a ffirm the U SDA’s dec ision finding Gr ay in violation of the HPA.