alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
In the Missouri Court of Appeals 

Eastern District 

DIVISION THREE 

JEFFERY PINNELL, ) No. ED106881 

 ) 

Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of 

 ) Franklin County 

vs. ) 15AB-CC00291 

 ) 

CITY OF UNION, MISSOURI, ) Honorable Gael D. Wood 

 ) 

 Respondent. ) Filed: May 14, 2019 

OPINION 

 Jeffery Pinnell appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Franklin County that granted 

the City of Union, Missouri’s motion for a directed verdict in this personal injury lawsuit on the 

grounds that Pinnell failed to make a submissible case for waiver of the City’s sovereign immunity 

under § 537.600.11

. Because we find Pinnell adduced substantial evidence that at the time of his 

fall from the South Oak Street bridge in Union, the City’s property was in a dangerous condition 

precluding the entry of a directed verdict, we reverse and remand. 

 

1

 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016. 
2 

Background 

 This action arose from the injuries Pinnell sustained on September 9, 2015 when he lost 

his balance while sitting on the headwall of a short bridge or culvert2

 on South Oak Street, a public 

roadway in Union, and fell 13 feet down into the creek below. The features of the bridge relevant 

to this case included north-south traffic lanes, a pedestrian sidewalk separated from the traffic lanes 

by a curb, and a headwall from which Pinnell fell, located immediately adjacent to the sidewalk. 

The term “headwall” refers to a curb-like structure approximately 18 to 20 inches high and 18 to 

20 inches wide, running parallel to the road surface along the westernmost edge of the bridge. 

 Pinnell filed a one-count negligence lawsuit against the City alleging that it maintained the 

bridge with its sidewalk and headwall in a dangerous condition that caused his fall and injuries. 

Specifically, he averred that where Oak Street passed over the creek, at a height of 13 feet from 

the creek bed to the bridge surface, the City “maintained a sidewalk for pedestrian use” on the 

western side of the roadway, “thereby encouraging pedestrian traffic thereupon,” even though 

between the sidewalk and the precipitous drop down to the creek there was only a curb-like 

structure approximately 18 to 20 inches high—the headwall—which was substantially shorter than 

the average person’s center of gravity. He further alleged that the City, by maintaining such a low 

headwall, “encourage[d], entice[d], or otherwise invite[d] the public to sit upon” it. As a result, 

Pinnell claimed, the City failed to “adequately protect” the public from the foreseeable risk of 

falling over the headwall and into the creek below, and therefore the City’s premises were in a 

dangerous condition. 

 

2

 The structure in question was referred to during the lawsuit as a “culvert” and as a “bridge.” For 

ease of understanding, we will use the term “bridge” in this opinion and note that the difference is 

immaterial for purposes of this appeal.
#### Hernan Ismael DELGADO, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 03-74442.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Sept. 2, 2010.

Hernán Ismael Delgado, Brett Dignam, Esquire, Sylmar, CA, pro se.

Niels W. Frenzen, Esquire, University of Southern CA Law School, Los Angeles, CA, Scott L. Shuchart, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, for Petitioner.

CAS-Distriet Counsel, Esquire, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Diego, CA, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Norah Ascoli Schwarz, Senior Litigation Counsel, Linda S. Wendtland, Esquire, Erica Miles, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

ORDER

KOZINSKI, Chief Judge:

Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused active judges, it is ordered that this case be reheard en banc pursuant to Circuit Rule 35-3. The three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00106-CR

TERRY LEE BAUDER, JR. APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

----------

FROM THE 367TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. F-2002-0042-E

----------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

----------

Appellant Terry Lee Bauder Jr. attempts to appeal from the trial court’s 

March 2015 denial of his March 2015 postconviction motion to modify or reduce 

his 2002 sentence. On August 12, 2015, we notified Appellant of our concern 

that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, indicating that the trial court’s order is 

not an appealable order or final judgment and that only the Texas Court of 

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

Criminal Appeals has jurisdiction over postconviction habeas matters, and we 

stated that this appeal was subject to dismissal unless Appellant or any party 

desiring to continue the appeal filed a response showing grounds for continuing 

the appeal. Appellant’s response does not show grounds for continuing the 

appeal.

After a felony conviction becomes final, the procedure outlined in article 

11.07 of the code of criminal procedure is a prisoner’s exclusive remedy for relief; 

this court has no jurisdiction.2

 We therefore dismiss this appeal for want of 

jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: October 15, 2015

 2

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07, §§ 1, 3(a), 5 (West 2015); Ater v. 

Eighth Court of Appeals, 802 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (orig. 

proceeding) (holding court of appeals usurped exclusive authority of court of 

criminal appeals to grant postconviction relief by ordering trial court to vacate a 

final conviction on basis of allegedly invalid guilty plea); cf. Padieu v. Court of

Appeals of Tex., Fifth Dist., 392 S.W.3d 115, 117–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) 

(orig. proceeding) (contrasting court of appeals’s authority to rule on matters 

potentially related to forthcoming, but not pending, article 11.07 application with 

court of criminal appeals’s exclusive jurisdiction to grant postconviction relief).
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Braintech, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the six months ended June 30, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Edward A. White, the Principal Financial and Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



/s/ Edward A. White			Edward A. White
Principal Financial Officer and Accounting Officer

August 11, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
The  schedule  contains  summary  financial   information   extracted  from  the
consolidated  balance  sheets  and  consolidated  statements  of  income  and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

       
<S>                                         <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                12-MOS     
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                 DEC-31-1998 
<CASH>                                         3,198,407
<SECURITIES>                                           0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    163,529 
<ALLOWANCES>                                           0
<INVENTORY>                                            0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                       0 
<PP&E>                                         1,567,365 
<DEPRECIATION>                                         0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 4,929,301 
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                  0
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                               0
<OTHER-SE>                                     2,633,017 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   4,929,301
<SALES>                                        1,236,378
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               4,315,468
<CGS>                                                  0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  2,999,706
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  90,097
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 566,670
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               500,730
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                1,315,762
<INCOME-TAX>                                           0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            1,315,762 
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                   1,315,762
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       7.70
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       7.70
        


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3037 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3037

To allow for the harvest of gull eggs by the Huna Tlingit people within 
           Glacier Bay National Park in the State of Alaska.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 22, 2011

 Mr. Young of Alaska introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                 to the Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To allow for the harvest of gull eggs by the Huna Tlingit people within 
           Glacier Bay National Park in the State of Alaska.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Huna Tlingit Traditional Gull Egg 
Use Act of 2011''.

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR COLLECTION OF GULL EGGS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Secretary of the Interior may allow the collection of the eggs of 
glaucous-winged gulls (Larus glaucescens) not more frequently than 
twice each calendar year at up to 5 locations within Glacier Bay 
National Park in the State of Alaska by members of the Hoonah Indian 
Association.
    (b) Conditions.--The Secretary of the Interior shall establish 
harvest schedules and locations and any other terms and conditions the 
Secretary determines to be necessary, based on an annual harvest plan 
to be prepared jointly by the Secretary and the Hoonah Indian 
Association.
                                 <all>
```
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 12**  **- 8150** 

SYLVESTER E. HARDING, III , Plaintiff

– Appellant ,

v. ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary Department of Veteran Affairs [Agency]; JOHN C. WEAVER, Staff Attorney Department of Veteran Affairs; KAREN CLARKSON, Assistant Chief of Human Resources; ALLISON BROWN, Police Office Fayetteville Police Department; ROBERT HICKS, Assistant District Attorney , Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. ( 5:12

- ct

- 03095

- F )

Submitted : May 23, 2013 Decided: May 28, 2013

Before MOTZ and AGEE , Circuit Judges, and HAM ILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Sylvester E. Harding, III, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Sylvester E. Harding, III , appeals the district

court ’ s order s dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (200 6 ) complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (200 6 ) and denying his Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e) motion . We have reviewed the record and find no
reversible error . Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Harding v. Shinseki , No.
5:12

- ct

- 03095

- F (E.D.N.C. Oct. 30, 2012; Dec. 11, 2013)

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
th is cour t and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
1995

1 79 Stat. 437, as extended and amended by 84 Stat. 314, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et

seq.

2Title 3, 84 Stat. 318, 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb.

3Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

4S. Rep. No. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 37, 92d Cong., 1st

Sess. (1971).

REDUCTION OF VOTING AGE QUALIFICATION

TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENT

SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who

are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied

or abridged by the United States or by any State on account

of age.

SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this

article by appropriate legislation.

THE EIGHTEEN-YEAR-OLD VOTE

In extending the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in 1970 1 Congress

included a provision lowering the age qualification to vote in all

elections, federal, state, and local, to 18. 2 In a divided decision, the

Supreme Court held that Congress was empowered to lower the

age qualification in federal elections, but voided the application of

the provision in all other elections as beyond congressional power. 3

Confronted thus with the possibility that they might have to maintain two sets of registration books and go to the expense of running

separate election systems for federal elections and for all other

elections, the States were receptive to the proposing of an Amendment by Congress to establish a minimum age qualification at 18

for all elections, and ratified it promptly. 4
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-7933
LONNIE EVERETT, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus TROOPER WILKERSON; TROOPER BRANCH; I. GRAHAM PRUITT, Magistrate at Pitt County Detention Center; STACEY A. PHIPPS, Associate Attorney General, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, District Judge. (CA-04-569-5-4) Submitted: April 28, 2005 Decided: May 4, 2005 Before WILLIAMS, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lonnie Everett, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Lonnie Everett appeals the district court’s order dismissing as time-barred his complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (2000). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Everett v. Wilkerson , No. CA-04-569-5-4 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 20, 2004). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2683 

To require that members of the Armed Forces who were killed or wounded 

in the attack that occurred at a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 2009, are treated in the same manner as members 

who are killed or wounded in a combat zone. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 28, 2011 

Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas (for himself, Mr. CRAWFORD, Mr. WOMACK, and 

Mr. ROSS of Arkansas) introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To require that members of the Armed Forces who were 

killed or wounded in the attack that occurred at a recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 

2009, are treated in the same manner as members who 

are killed or wounded in a combat zone. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Honoring Ezeagwula 

5 and Long Act’’ or the ‘‘HEAL Act’’. 


pwalker on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2683 IH

1 SEC. 2. EQUITABLE TREATMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE 

2 ARMED FORCES KILLED OR WOUNDED IN 

3 LITTLE ROCK RECRUITING STATION ATTACK. 

4 For purposes of all applicable Federal laws, regula5 tions, and policies, the members of the Armed Forces who 

6 were killed or wounded in the attack that occurred at a 

7 recruiting station in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 1, 

8 2009, shall be deemed to have been killed or wounded in 

9 a combat zone as the result of an act of an enemy of the 

10 United States. 

Æ 


pwalker on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2919 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2919

To eliminate the reimbursement requirement for certain tornado shelters 
      constructed with Federal assistance, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 14, 2011

   Mr. Bachus (for himself, Mr. Aderholt, Mr. Bonner, Mr. Rogers of 
  Alabama, Mr. Brooks, and Ms. Sewell) introduced the following bill; 
       which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and 
                             Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To eliminate the reimbursement requirement for certain tornado shelters 
      constructed with Federal assistance, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Community Shelter Protection Act of 
2011''.

SEC. 2. NO REIMBURSEMENT REQUIRED FOR COVERED TORNADO SHELTER 
              FACILITIES.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) shall not require an 
educational institution Public Assistance applicant to reimburse FEMA 
for the market value of a covered temporary tornado shelter facility 
when the facility is no longer needed for its temporary purpose.
    (b) Definitions.--In this section the following definitions apply:
            (1) Covered temporary tornado shelter facility.--The term 
        ``covered temporary shelter facility'' means a structure--
                    (A) designed to provide children protection from a 
                tornado; and
                    (B) constructed or acquired with Federal financial 
                assistance.
            (2) Educational institution.--The term ``educational 
        institution'' means any elementary school or any secondary 
        school that is an eligible applicant for FEMA assistance 
        pursuant to section 403 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
        Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5170b).
                                 <all>
```
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

 

I, Joseph G. Bleser, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Transcend Services, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2004; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of amaterial fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is being prepared; 

 

b) [Paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986];

 

c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’sdisclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this annual report based on such evaluation; and 

 

d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrols over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materiallyaffect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s boardof directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

 

a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and 

 

b) any fraud, whether ornot material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: March 9, 2005
#### In the Matter of Kent W. Davenport, Respondent, v Jeffrey Stein, Appellant.

Submitted March 10, 2008;

decided March 20, 2008

Appeal dismissed, without costs, by the Court of Appeals, sua sponte, upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.