I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2829 

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United 

Nations system, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AUGUST 30, 2011 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS, Mr. PENCE, Mr. 

MCCOTTER, Mr. KING of New York, Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. GALLEGLY, Mr. MANZULLO, Mr. 

CHABOT, Mr. BARTLETT, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. BROUN of Georgia, Ms. 

BUERKLE, Mr. BURGESS, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. CHAFFETZ, Mr. COFFMAN

of Colorado, Mr. DOLD, Mrs. ELLMERS, Mr. FLEMING, Mr. FORBES, Mr. 

FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. GARRETT, Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas, Mr. 

GRIMM, Mr. HUELSKAMP, Mr. HULTGREN, Mr. HURT, Mr. JOHNSON of 

Ohio, Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. KLINE, Mr. LAMBORN, Mr. 

LANCE, Mr. LATTA, Mr. LONG, Mr. MARINO, Mr. MCCAUL, Mr. 

MCHENRY, Mr. MCKINLEY, Mrs. MILLER of Michigan, Mr. NUNNELEE, 

Mr. OLSON, Mr. PALAZZO, Mr. POMPEO, Mr. POSEY, Mr. RENACCI, Mr. 

RIVERA, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, Mr. ROSS of Florida, Mrs. SCHMIDT, 

Mr. AUSTIN SCOTT of Georgia, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. TURNER, Mr. WALSH of Illinois, Mr. WEST, and Mr. WESTMORELAND) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within 

the United Nations system, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

3 ‘‘United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Re4 form Act of 2011’’. 

5 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents is 

6 as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 101. Findings. 

Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a voluntary 

basis. 

Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the regular 

budget of the United Nations. 

Sec. 104. Report on United Nations reform. 

TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED 

STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 201. Findings. 

Sec. 202. Definitions. 

Sec. 203. Independent and objective conduct of audits and investigations relating to United States contributions to the United Nations system. 

Sec. 204. Transparency for United States contributions. 

Sec. 205. Integrity for United States contributions. 

Sec. 206. Refund of monies owed by the United Nations to the United States. 

Sec. 207. Annual reports on United States contributions to the United Nations. 

TITLE III—UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 301. Annual publication. 

Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure. 

Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the security council. 

Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits. 

Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity. 

Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations. 

Sec. 307. Report on United Nations personnel. 

Sec. 308. United Nations treaty bodies. 

Sec. 309. Equality at the United Nations. 

Sec. 310. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations. 

Sec. 311. Regional group inclusion of Israel. 

TITLE IV—STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED 

NATIONS 

Sec. 401. Findings. 

Sec. 402. Statement of policy. 


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Sec. 403. Implementation. 

TITLE V—UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 

Sec. 501. Findings. 

Sec. 502. Human rights council membership and funding. 

TITLE VI—GOLDSTONE REPORT 

Sec. 601. Findings. 

Sec. 602. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 603. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer dollars. 

TITLE VII—DURBAN PROCESS 

Sec. 701. Findings. 

Sec. 702. Sense of congress; statement of policy. 

Sec. 703. Non-participation in the Durban process. 

Sec. 704. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer dollars. 

TITLE VIII—UNRWA 

Sec. 801. Findings. 

Sec. 802. United States contributions to UNRWA. 

Sec. 803. Sense of Congress. 

TITLE IX—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

Sec. 901. Technical cooperation program. 

Sec. 902. United States policy at the IAEA. 

Sec. 903. Sense of Congress regarding the nuclear security action plan of the 

IAEA. 

TITLE X—PEACEKEEPING 

Sec. 1001. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Sec. 1002. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Sec. 1003. Certification. 

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘‘employee’’ means 

4 an individual who is employed in the general serv5 ices, professional staff, or senior management of the 

6 United Nations, including consultants, contractors, 

7 and subcontractors. 


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1 (2) GENERAL ASSEMBLY.—The term ‘‘General 

2 Assembly’’ means the General Assembly of the 

3 United Nations. 

4 (3) MEMBER STATE.—The term ‘‘Member 

5 State’’ means a Member State of the United Na6 tions. Such term is synonymous with the term 

7 ‘‘country’’. 

8 (4) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

9 the Secretary of State. 

10 (5) SECRETARY GENERAL.—The term ‘‘Sec11 retary General’’ means the Secretary General of the 

12 United Nations. 

13 (6) SECURITY COUNCIL.—The term ‘‘Security 

14 Council’’ means the Security Council of the United 

15 Nations. 

16 (7) UN.—The term ‘‘UN’’ means the United 

17 Nations. 

18 (8) UNITED NATIONS ENTITY.—The term 

19 ‘‘United Nations Entity’’ means any United Nations 

20 agency, commission, conference, council, court, de21 partment, forum, fund, institute, office, organiza22 tion, partnership, program, subsidiary body, tri23 bunal, trust, university or academic body, related or24 ganization or subsidiary body, wherever located, that 

25 flies the United Nations flag or is authorized to use 


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1 the United Nations logo, including but not limited to 

2 those United Nations affiliated agencies and bodies 

3 identified as recipients of United States contribu4 tions under section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John War5 ner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

6 Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364). 

7 (9) UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.—The term 

8 ‘‘United Nations System’’ means the aggregation of 

9 all United Nations Entities, as defined in paragraph 

10 (1). 

11 (10) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION.—The 

12 term ‘‘United States Contribution’’ means an as13 sessed or voluntary contribution, whether financial, 

14 in-kind, or otherwise, from the United States Fed15 eral Government to a United Nations Entity, includ16 ing contributions passed through other entities for 

17 ultimate use by a United Nations Entity. United 

18 States Contributions include, but are not limited to, 

19 those contributions identified pursuant to section 

20 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense 

21 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 

22 109–364). 

23 (11) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT24 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com25 mittees’’ means— 


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1 (A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, 

2 Appropriations, and Oversight and Government 

3 Reform of the House; and 

4 (B) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 

5 Appropriations, and Homeland Security and 

6 Governmental Affairs of the Senate. 

7 TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE 

8 UNITED NATIONS 

9 SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 

10 The Congress makes the following findings: 

11 (1) The United States pays billions of dollars 

12 into the United Nations system every year (almost 

13 $7.7 billion in 2010, according to the White House 

14 Office of Management and Budget), significantly 

15 more than any other nation. 

16 (2) Under current rules and contribution levels, 

17 it is possible to assemble the two-thirds majority 

18 needed for important United Nations budget votes 

19 with a group of countries that, taken together, pay 

20 less than 1 percent of the total United Nations reg21 ular budget. 

22 (3) The disconnect between contribution levels 

23 and management control creates significant perverse 

24 incentives in terms of United Nations spending, 

25 transparency, and accountability. 


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1 (4) The United Nations system suffers from 

2 unacceptably high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, 

3 which seriously impair its ability to fulfill the lofty 

4 ideals of its founding. 

5 (5) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, 

6 and sexual abuse scandals of the past several years, 

7 American public disapproval of United Nations has 

8 reached all-time highs. A 2011 Gallup poll revealed 

9 that 62 percent of Americans believe that the United 

10 Nations is doing a poor job, a negative assessment 

11 shared by a majority of respondents from both polit12 ical parties. Research polling by another firm in late 

13 2006 found that 71 percent of Americans think that 

14 the United Nations is ‘‘no longer effective’’ and 

15 needs to be significantly reformed, while 75 percent 

16 think that the United Nations ‘‘needs to be held 

17 more accountable’’. 

18 (6) Significant improvements in United Nations 

19 transparency and accountability are necessary for 

20 improving public perceptions of and American sup21 port for United Nations operations. 

22 (7) Because of their need to justify future con23 tributions from donors, voluntarily funded organiza24 tions have more incentive to be responsive and effi25 cient in their operations than organizations funded 


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1 by compulsory contributions that are not tied to per2 formance. 

3 (8) Catherine Bertini, the former UN Under4 Secretary General for Management and director of 

5 the World Food Program (WFP), has stated that 

6 ‘‘Voluntary funding creates an entirely different at7 mosphere at WFP than at the UN. At WFP, every 

8 staff member knows that we have to be as efficient, 

9 accountable, transparent, and results-oriented as 

10 possible. If we are not, donor governments can take 

11 their funding elsewhere in a very competitive world 

12 among UN agencies, NGOs, and bilateral govern13 ments.’’. 

14 (9) Article XVII of the Charter of the United 

15 Nations, which states that ‘‘[t]he expenses of the 

16 Organization shall be borne by the Members as ap17 portioned by the General Assembly’’, leaves to the 

18 discretion of the General Assembly the basis of ap19 portionment, which could be done on the basis of 

20 voluntary pledges by Member States. 

21 (10) Unlike United States assessed contribu22 tions to the United Nations regular budget, which 

23 are statutorily capped at 22 percent of the total, 

24 there is no cap on voluntary contributions. 


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1 (11) The United States, which contributes gen2 erously to international organizations whose activi3 ties it recognizes as credible, worthwhile, and effi4 cient, contributes more than 22 percent of the budg5 et of certain voluntarily funded United Nations Spe6 cialized Agencies. 

7 SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REG8 ULAR BUDGET ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS. 

9 (a) UNITED STATES POLICY.—(1) It is the policy of 

10 the United States to seek to shift the funding mechanism 

11 for the regular budget of the United Nations from an as12 sessed to a voluntary basis. 

13 (2) The President shall direct the United States Per14 manent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

15 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

16 United Nations to shift the funding mechanism for the 

17 regular budget of the United Nations to a voluntary basis, 

18 and to make it a priority to build support for such a trans19 formational change among Member States, particularly 

20 key United Nations donors. 

21 (b) CERTIFICATION OF PREDOMINANTLY VOL22 UNTARY UN REGULAR BUDGET FINDING.—A certifi23 cation described in this section is a certification by the 

24 Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Com25 mittees that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget 


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1 (not including extra-budgetary contributions) of the 

2 United Nations is apportioned on a voluntary basis. Each 

3 such certification shall be shall be effective for a period 

4 of no more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked 

5 by the Secretary, with notice to the Appropriate Congres6 sional Committees, if the underlying circumstances change 

7 so as not to warrant such certification. 

8 (c) WITHHOLDING OF NONVOLUNTARY CONTRIBU9 TIONS.—(1) Beginning 2 years after the effective date of 

10 this Act and notwithstanding any other provision of law, 

11 no funds may be obligated or expended for a United States 

12 assessed contribution to the regular budget of the United 

13 Nations in an amount greater than 50 percent of the 

14 United States share of assessed contributions for the reg15 ular budget of the United Nations unless there is in effect 

16 a certification by the Secretary, as described in subsection 

17 (b). 

18 (2) For a period of 1 year after appropriation, funds 

19 appropriated for use as a United States contribution to 

20 the regular budget of the United Nations but withheld 

21 from obligation and expenditure pursuant to paragraph 

22 (1) may be obligated and expended for that purpose upon 

23 the certification described in subsection (b). After 1 year, 

24 in the absence of such certification, those funds shall re25 vert to the United States Treasury. 


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1 SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES 

2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REGULAR BUDGET 

3 OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 

4 (a) DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The annual congres5 sional budget justification shall include a detailed itemized 

6 request in support of the contribution of the United States 

7 to the regular budget of the United Nations. 

8 (b) CONTENTS OF DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The 

9 detailed itemization required under subsection (a) shall— 

10 (1) contain information relating to the amounts 

11 requested in support of each of the various sections 

12 and titles of the regular budget of the United Na13 tions; and 

14 (2) compare the amounts requested for the cur15 rent year with the actual or estimated amounts con16 tributed by the United States in previous fiscal years 

17 for the same sections and titles. 

18 (c) ADJUSTMENTS AND NOTIFICATION.—If the 

19 United Nations proposes an adjustment to its regular as20 sessed budget, the Secretary of State shall, at the time 

21 such adjustment is presented to the Advisory Committee 

22 on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), 

23 notify and consult with the appropriate congressional com24 mittees. 


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1 SEC. 104. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

3 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 

4 the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congres5 sional committees a report on United Nations reform. 

6 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required under sub7 section (a) shall describe— 

8 (1) progress toward the goal of shifting the 

9 funding for the United Nations Regular Budget to 

10 a voluntary basis as identified in section 102, and a 

11 detailed description of efforts and activities by 

12 United States diplomats and officials toward that 

13 end; 

14 (2) progress toward each of the policy goals 

15 identified in the prior sections of this title, and a de16 tailed, goal-specific description of efforts and activi17 ties by United States diplomats and officials toward 

18 those ends; 

19 (3) the status of the implementation of manage20 ment reforms within the United Nations and its spe21 cialized agencies; 

22 (4) the number of outputs, reports, or other 

23 mandates generated by General Assembly resolutions 

24 that have been eliminated; 

25 (5) the progress of the General Assembly to 

26 modernize and streamline the committee structure 


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1 and its specific recommendations on oversight and 

2 committee outputs, consistent with the March 2005 

3 report of the Secretary General entitled ‘‘In larger 

4 freedom: towards development, security and human 

5 rights for all’’; 

6 (6) the status of the review by the General As7 sembly of all mandates older than 5 years and how 

8 resources have been redirected to new challenges, 

9 consistent with such March 2005 report of the Sec10 retary General; 

11 (7) the continued utility and relevance of the 

12 Economic and Financial Committee and the Social, 

13 Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, in light of 

14 the duplicative agendas of those committees and the 

15 Economic and Social Council; and 

16 (8) whether the United Nations or any of its 

17 specialized agencies has contracted with any party 

18 included on the Lists of Parties Excluded from Fed19 eral Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs. 


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1 TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND 

2 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 

3 UNITED STATES CONTRIBU4 TIONS TO THE UNITED NA5 TIONS 

6 SEC. 201. FINDINGS. 

7 The Congress makes the following findings: 

8 (1) As underscored by continuing revelations of 

9 waste, fraud, and abuse, oversight and account10 ability mechanisms within the United Nations sys11 tem remain significantly deficient, despite decades of 

12 reform attempts, including those initiated by Secre13 taries General of the United Nations. 

14 (2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of 

15 any Secretary General of the United Nations to pro16 mote institutional transparency and accountability 

17 within the United Nations System, the Secretary 

18 General lacks the power to impose far reaching man19 agement reforms without the concurrence of the 

20 General Assembly. 

21 (3) Groupings of Member States whose voting 

22 power in the General Assembly significantly out23 paces their proportional contributions to the United 

24 Nations system have repeatedly and successfully de25 feated, delayed, and diluted various reform proposals 


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1 that would have enabled more detailed oversight and 

2 scrutiny of United Nations system operations and 

3 expenditures. 

4 (4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor 

5 states, including the United States, lack access to 

6 reasonably detailed, reliable information that would 

7 allow them to determine how their contributions 

8 have been spent by various United Nations system 

9 entities, further contributing to the lack of account10 ability within the United Nations system. 

11 SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS. 

12 In this title: 

13 (1) TRANSPARENCY CERTIFICATION.—The term 

14 ‘‘Transparency Certification’’ means an annual, 

15 written affirmation by the head or authorized des16 ignee of a United Nations Entity to the Comptroller 

17 General of the United States that the Entity will co18 operate with the Comptroller General and the Con19 gress, including by providing the Comptroller Gen20 eral, the Government Accountability Office, and the 

21 Congress, upon request, with full, complete, and un22 fettered access to Oversight Information as defined 

23 in this title. 

24 (2) OVERSIGHT INFORMATION.—The term 

25 ‘‘Oversight Information’’ includes— 


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1 (A) internally and externally commissioned 

2 audits, investigatory reports, program reviews, 

3 performance reports, and evaluations; 

4 (B) financial statements, records, and bill5 ing systems; 

6 (C) program budgets and program budget 

7 implications, including revised estimates and re8 ports produced by or provided to the Secretary 

9 General and the Secretary General’s agents on 

10 budget related matters; 

11 (D) operational plans, budgets, and budg12 etary analyses for peacekeeping operations; 

13 (E) analyses and reports regarding the 

14 scale of assessments; 

15 (F) databases and other data systems con16 taining financial or programmatic information; 

17 (G) documents or other records alleging or 

18 involving improper use of resources, mis19 conduct, mismanagement, or other violations of 

20 rules and regulations applicable to the United 

21 Nations Entity; and 

22 (H) other documentation relevant to the 

23 audit and investigative work of the Comptroller 

24 General of the United States with respect to 


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1 United States contributions to the United Na2 tions system. 

3 (3) ACCOUNTABILITY CERTIFICATION.—The 

4 term ‘‘Accountability Certification’’ means an an5 nual, written affirmation by the head or authorized 

6 designee of a United Nations Entity to the Comp7 troller General of the United States that the Enti8 ty— 

9 (A) provides the public with full, complete, 

10 and unfettered access to all relevant docu11 mentation relating to operations and activities, 

12 including budget and procurement activities; 

13 (B) implements and upholds policies and 

14 procedures to protect whistleblowers; 

15 (C) implements and upholds policies and 

16 procedures to require the filing of individual an17 nual financial disclosure forms by each of its 

18 employees at the P–5 level and above and to re19 quire that such forms be made available to the 

20 Office of Internal Oversight Services, to Mem21 ber States, and to the public; 

22 (D) has established an effective ethics of23 fice; 


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1 (E) has established a fully independent, 

2 autonomous, and effective internal oversight 

3 body; 

4 (F) has adopted and implemented, and is 

5 in full compliance with, International Public 

6 Sector Accounting Standards; and 

7 (G) has established a cap on its adminis8 trative overhead costs. 

9 SEC. 203. INDEPENDENT AND OBJECTIVE CONDUCT OF AU10 DITS AND INVESTIGATIONS RELATING TO 

11 UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 

12 UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. 

13 (a) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to 

14 make possible the independent and objective conduct of 

15 audits and investigations relating to United States Con16 tributions to the United Nations System and the use of 

17 those contributions by United Nations Entities, in an ef18 fort to eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the 

19 use of those contributions, and thereby to contribute to 

20 the development of greater transparency, accountability, 

21 and internal controls throughout the United Nations Sys22 tem. 

23 (b) THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL.— 


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1 (1) DUTIES.—(A) The Comptroller General of 

2 the United States shall conduct, supervise, and co3 ordinate audits and investigations of— 

4 (i) the treatment, handling, expenditure, 

5 and use of United States Contributions by and 

6 to United Nations Entities; and 

7 (ii) the adequacy of accounting, oversight, 

8 and internal control mechanisms at United Na9 tions Entities that receive United States Con10 tributions. 

11 (B) The Comptroller General shall collect and 

12 maintain current records regarding Transparency 

13 Certifications and Accountability Certifications by 

14 all United Nations Entities that receive United 

15 States Contributions. 

16 (C) The Comptroller General shall keep the Ap17 propriate Congressional Committees fully and 

18 promptly informed of how United Nations Entities 

19 are spending United States Contributions by means 

20 of reports, testimony, and briefings. 

21 (2) REFERRALS.—(A) The Comptroller General 

22 shall promptly report to the United States Attorney 

23 General and to the Appropriate Congressional Com24 mittees when the Comptroller General has reason25 able grounds to believe a United States Federal 


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1 criminal law has been violated by a United Nations 

2 Entity or one of its employees, contractors, or rep3 resentatives. 

4 (B) The Comptroller General shall promptly re5 port, when appropriate, to the Appropriate Congres6 sional Committees, and to the Secretary General or 

7 to the head of the appropriate United Nations Enti8 ty, cases where the Comptroller General reasonably 

9 believes that mismanagement, misfeasance, or mal10 feasance is likely to have taken place within a 

11 United Nations Entity and disciplinary proceedings 

12 are likely justified. 

13 (3) COOPERATION BY UNITED STATES GOVERN14 MENT ENTITIES.—(A) In carrying out the duties, re15 sponsibilities, and authorities of the Comptroller 

16 General under this section, the Comptroller shall re17 ceive the cooperation of other Federal Government 

18 agencies. 

19 (B) Upon request of the Comptroller General 

20 for information or assistance from any department, 

21 agency, or other entity of the Federal Government, 

22 the head of such entity shall, insofar as is prac23 ticable and not in contravention of any existing law, 

24 furnish such information or assistance to the Comp25 troller General, or an authorized designee. 


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1 (C) Whenever information or assistance re2 quested by the Comptroller General is, in the judg3 ment of the Comptroller General, unreasonably re4 fused or not provided, the Comptroller General shall 

5 report the circumstances to the Appropriate Con6 gressional Committees without delay. 

7 (4) CONFIRMATION OF TRANSPARENCY BY

8 UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES.— 

9 (A) PROMPT NOTICE BY COMPTROLLER

10 GENERAL.—Whenever information or assistance 

11 requested from a United Nations Entity by the 

12 Comptroller General pursuant to a Trans13 parency Certification is, in the opinion of the 

14 Comptroller General, unreasonably refused or 

15 not provided in a timely manner, the Comp16 troller General shall notify the Appropriate 

17 Congressional Committees, the head of that 

18 particular United Nations Entity, and the Sec19 retary General of the circumstances in writing, 

20 without delay. 

21 (B) NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE.—If and 

22 when the information or assistance being 

23 sought by the Comptroller General in connec24 tion with a notification pursuant to subpara25 graph (A) is provided to the satisfaction of the 


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1 Comptroller General, the Comptroller General 

2 shall so notify in writing to the Appropriate 

3 Congressional Committees and the head of that 

4 particular United Nations Entity. 

5 (C) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the information 

6 or assistance being sought by the Comptroller 

7 General in connection with a notification pursu8 ant to subparagraph (A) is not provided to the 

9 satisfaction of the Comptroller General within 

10 90 days of that notification, then the United 

11 Nations Entity that is the subject of the notifi12 cation is deemed to be noncompliant with its 

13 Transparency Certification, and 

14 (D) RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.— 

15 After the situation has been resolved to the sat16 isfaction of the Comptroller General, the Comp17 troller General shall promptly provide prompt, 

18 written notification of that fact and of the res19 toration of compliance, along with a description 

20 of the basis for the Comptroller General’s deci21 sion, to the Appropriate Congressional Commit22 tees, the head of that United Nations Entity, 

23 the Secretary General, and any office or agency 

24 of the Federal Government that has provided 


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1 that United Nations Entity with any United 

2 States Contribution during the prior 2 years. 

3 (5) CONFIRMATION OF ACCOUNTABILITY BY

4 UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES.— 

5 (A) PROMPT NOTICE BY COMPTROLLER

6 GENERAL.—Whenever a United Nations Entity 

7 that has provided an Accountability Certifi8 cation is, in the opinion of the Comptroller Gen9 eral, not in full compliance with any or all of 

10 the provisions of that certification, the Comp11 troller General shall notify the Appropriate 

12 Congressional Committees, the head of that 

13 particular United Nations Entity, and the Sec14 retary General of the circumstances in writing, 

15 without delay. 

16 (B) NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE.—If and 

17 when the United Nations Entity resumes full 

18 compliance with its Accountability Certification 

19 following the provision of the notification pursu20 ant to subparagraph (A), the Comptroller Gen21 eral shall so notify in writing the Appropriate 

22 Congressional Committees and the head of that 

23 United Nations Entity. 

24 (C) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the United Na25 tions Entity named in the notification in subVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:19 Aug 31, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2829.IH H2829

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1 paragraph (A) does not resume full compliance 

2 with its Accountability Certification to the sat3 isfaction of the Comptroller General within 90 

4 days of that notification, then the United Na5 tions Entity that is the subject of the notifica6 tion is deemed to be noncompliant with its Ac7 countability Certification, and the Comptroller 

8 General shall provide prompt, written notifica9 tion of that fact to the Appropriate Congres10 sional Committees, the head of that United Na11 tions Entity, the Secretary General, and any of12 fice or agency of the Federal Government that 

13 has provided that United Nations Entity with 

14 any United States Contribution during the 

15 prior 2 years. 

16 (D) RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.— 

17 After the situation has been resolved to the sat18 isfaction of the Comptroller General, the Comp19 troller General shall promptly provide prompt, 

20 written notification of that fact and of the res21 toration of compliance, along with a description 

22 of the basis for the Comptroller General’s deci23 sion, to the Appropriate Congressional Commit24 tees, the head of that United Nations Entity, 

25 the Secretary General, and any office or agency 


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1 of the Federal Government that has provided 

2 that United Nations Entity with any United 

3 States Contribution during the prior 2 years. 

4 (6) REPORTS.— 

5 (A) AUDIT AND INVESTIGATION RE6 PORTS.—Promptly upon completion, the Comp7 troller General shall provide copies of each 

8 audit and investigation report completed pursu9 ant to paragraph (1) to the Appropriate Con10 gressional Committees, and, to the extent per11 missible under United States law, the head of 

12 each United Nations Entity that is the subject 

13 of that particular report. 

14 (B) SEMIANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later 

15 than May 30, 2010, and semiannually there16 after, the Comptroller General shall submit to 

17 the Appropriate Congressional Committees a re18 port that, among other things, includes a list of 

19 and detailed description of the circumstances 

20 surrounding any notification of noncompliance 

21 issued pursuant to paragraph (4)(C) or para22 graph (5)(C) during the covered timeframe, and 

23 whether and when the Comptroller General has 

24 reversed such finding of noncompliance. 


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1 (C) PROHIBITED DISCLOSURES.—Nothing 

2 in this subsection shall be construed to author3 ize the public disclosure of information that 

4 is— 

5 (i) specifically prohibited from disclo6 sure by any other provision of law; 

7 (ii) specifically required by Executive 

8 Order to be protected from disclosure in 

9 the interest of national defense or national 

10 security or in the conduct of foreign af11 fairs; or 

12 (iii) a part of an ongoing criminal in13 vestigation. 

14 (D) PRIVACY PROTECTIONS.—The Comp15 troller General shall exempt from public disclo16 sure information received from a United Na17 tions Entity or developed during an audit or in18 vestigation that the Comptroller General be19 lieves— 

20 (i) constitutes a trade secret or privi21 leged and confidential personal financial 

22 information; 

23 (ii) accuses a particular person of a 

24 crime; 


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1 (iii) would, if publicly disclosed, con2 stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 

3 personal privacy; and 

4 (iv) would compromise an ongoing law 

5 enforcement investigation or judicial trial 

6 in the United States. 

7 (E) PUBLICATION.—Subject only to the 

8 exceptions detailed in subparagraphs (C) and 

9 (D), the Comptroller General shall promptly 

10 publish each report under this subsection on the 

11 Web site of the Government Accountability Of12 fice. 

13 SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBU14 TIONS. 

15 (a) FUNDING PREREQUISITES.—Notwithstanding 

16 any other provision of law, no funds made available for 

17 use as a United States Contribution to any United Na18 tions Entity may be obligated or expended if— 

19 (1) the intended United Nations Entity recipi20 ent has not provided to the Comptroller General 

21 within the preceding year a Transparency Certifi22 cation as defined in section 202(1); 

23 (2) the intended United Nations Entity recipi24 ent is noncompliant with its Transparency Certifi25 cation as described in section 203(b)(4)(C); 


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1 (3) the intended United Nations Entity recipi2 ent has not provided to the Comptroller General 

3 within the preceding year an Accountability Certifi4 cation as defined in section 202(3); or 

5 (4) the intended United Nations Entity is non6 compliant with its Accountability Certification as de7 scribed in section 203(b)(5)(C). 

8 (b) TREATMENT OF FUNDS WITHHELD FOR NON9 COMPLIANCE.—At the conclusion of each fiscal year, any 

10 funds that had been appropriated for use as a United 

11 States Contribution to a United Nations Entity during 

12 that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended 

13 because of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be re14 turned to the United States Treasury, and are not subject 

15 to reprogramming for any other use. Any such funds re16 turned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to 

17 be repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

18 (c) PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.—The President may 

19 waive the limitations of this subsection with respect to a 

20 particular United States Contribution to a particular 

21 United Nations Entity within a single fiscal year if the 

22 President determines that failure to do so would pose an 

23 extraordinary threat to the national security of the United 

24 States and provides notification and explanation of that 


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1 determination to the Appropriate Congressional Commit2 tees. 

3 SEC. 205. INTEGRITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBU4 TIONS. 

5 (a) LIMITATION.—(1) No funds made available for 

6 use under the heading ‘‘Contributions to International Or7 ganizations’’ may be used for any purpose other than an 

8 assessed United States contribution to a United Nations 

9 Entity or other international organization. 

10 (2) No funds made available for use under the head11 ing ‘‘International Organizations and Programs’’ may be 

12 used for any purpose other than a voluntary United States 

13 contribution to a United Nations Entity or other inter14 national organization. 

15 (3) No funds made available for use under the head16 ing ‘‘Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activi17 ties’’ may be used for any purpose other than a United 

18 States contribution to United Nations peacekeeping activi19 ties, to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 

20 Yugoslavia, or to the International Criminal Tribunal for 

21 Rwanda. 

22 (b) TREATMENT OF FUNDS WITHHELD FOR NON23 COMPLIANCE.—At the conclusion of each fiscal year, any 

24 funds that had been appropriated for use as a United 

25 States Contribution to a United Nations Entity during 


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1 that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended 

2 because of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be re3 turned to the United States Treasury, and are not subject 

4 to reprogramming for any other use. Any such funds re5 turned to the Treasury shall not be considered arrears to 

6 be repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

7 SEC. 206. REFUND OF MONIES OWED BY THE UNITED NA8 TIONS TO THE UNITED STATES. 

9 (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following 

10 findings: 

11 (1) United States taxpayer funds overpaid to 

12 United Nations Entities and payable back to the 

13 United States sometimes remain in the hands of the 

14 United Nations because the United States has not 

15 requested the return of those funds. 

16 (2) Such funds have been paid into, among 

17 other United Nations Entities, the United Nations 

18 Tax Equalization Fund (TEF), which was estab19 lished under the provisions of United Nations Gen20 eral Assembly Resolution 973 (1955), and which is 

21 used to reimburse United Nations staff members 

22 subject to United States income taxes for the cost 

23 of those taxes. 

24 (3) In recent years, the TEF has taken in con25 siderably more money than it has paid out, with the 


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1 United States apparently overpaying into the TEF 

2 by $52.2 million in the 2008–2009 timeframe alone. 

3 (4) According to the United Nations Financial 

4 Report and Audited Financial Statements released 

5 on July 29, 2010, ‘‘As of 31 December 2009, an 

6 amount of $179.0 million was payable to the United 

7 States of America pending instructions as to its dis8 position.’’. 

9 (5) That balance was allowed to accrue notwith10 standing United Nations Financial Regulation 4.12, 

11 which states that any such surpluses ‘‘shall be cred12 ited against the assessed contributions due from that 

13 Member State the following year.’’. 

14 (6) Allowing the United Nations to regularly 

15 overcharge the United States and to retain those 

16 overpayments, or to spend them on wholly unrelated 

17 activities, is a disservice to American taxpayers and 

18 a subversion of the Congressional budget process. 

19 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

20 United States— 

21 (1) to annually instruct the United Nations to 

22 return to the United States any surplus assessed 

23 contributions or other overpayments by the United 

24 States to any United Nations Entity; and 


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1 (2) to use the voice and vote of the United 

2 States to press the United Nations to reform its 

3 TEF assessment procedures to reduce the repeated 

4 discrepancies between TEF income and expendi5 tures. 

6 (c) CERTIFICATION AND WITHHOLDING.—For each 

7 and every fiscal year subsequent to the effective date of 

8 this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to the appro9 priate congressional committees a certification that the 

10 United Nations has returned to the United States any sur11 plus assessed contributions or other overpayments by the 

12 United States to any United Nations Entity, the Secretary 

13 of State shall withhold from the regular budget of the 

14 United Nations an amount equal to the amount of the 

15 funds that the United Nations has yet to return to the 

16 United States. 

17 SEC. 207. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CON18 TRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS. 

19 (a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after 

20 the date of the enactment of this Act and annually there21 after, the Director of the Office of Management and Budg22 et shall submit to Congress a report listing all assessed 

23 and voluntary contributions of the United States Govern24 ment for the preceding fiscal year to the United Nations 

25 and United Nations affiliated agencies and related bodies. 


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1 (b) CONTENTS.—Each report required under sub2 section (a) shall set forth, for the fiscal year covered by 

3 such report, the following: 

4 (1) The total amount of all assessed and vol5 untary contributions of the United States Govern6 ment to the United Nations and United Nations af7 filiated agencies and related bodies. 

8 (2) The approximate percentage of United 

9 States Government contributions to each United Na10 tions affiliated agency or body in such fiscal year 

11 when compared with all contributions to such agency 

12 or body from any source in such fiscal year. 

13 (3) For each such contribution— 

14 (A) the amount of such contribution; 

15 (B) a description of such contribution (in16 cluding whether assessed or voluntary); 

17 (C) the department or agency of the 

18 United States Government responsible for such 

19 contribution; 

20 (D) the purpose of such contribution; and 

21 (E) the United Nations or United Nations 

22 affiliated agency or related body receiving such 

23 contribution. 


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1 TITLE III—UNITED STATES POL2 ICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS 

3 SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION. 

4 The President shall direct the United States Perma5 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

6 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

7 United Nations to ensure the United Nations publishes 

8 annually, including on a publicly searchable internet Web 

9 site, a list of all United Nations subsidiary bodies and 

10 their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both vol11 untary and assessed, sorted by donor. 

12 SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE. 

13 The President shall direct the United States Perma14 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

15 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

16 United Nations to implement a system for the required 

17 filing of individual annual financial disclosure forms by 

18 each employee of the United Nations and its specialized 

19 agencies, programs, and funds at the P–5 level and above, 

20 which shall be made available to the Office of Internal 

21 Oversight Services, to Member States, and to the public. 

22 SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE 

23 SECURITY COUNCIL. 

24 It is the policy of the United States to use the voice, 

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1 tions to oppose any proposals on expansion of the Security 

2 Council if such expansion would— 

3 (1) diminish the influence of the United States 

4 on the Security Council; or 

5 (2) include veto rights for any new members of 

6 the Security Council. 

7 SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS. 

8 The President shall direct the United States Perma9 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

10 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

11 United Nations to ensure that Member States may, upon 

12 request, have access to all reports and audits completed 

13 by the Board of External Auditors. 

14 SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY. 

15 The President shall direct the United States Perma16 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

17 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

18 United Nations to ensure that the Secretary General exer19 cises the right and duty of the Secretary General under 

20 section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immu21 nities of the United Nations to waive the immunity of any 

22 United Nations official in any case in which such immu23 nity would impede the course of justice. In exercising such 

24 waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret the in25 terests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation 


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1 or prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly 

2 under investigation for having committed a serious crimi3 nal offense or who is credibly charged with a serious crimi4 nal offense. 

5 SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS. 

6 The President shall direct the United States Perma7 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

8 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

9 United Nations to work toward adoption by the General 

10 Assembly of— 

11 (1) a definition of terrorism that— 

12 (A) builds upon the recommendations of 

13 the December 2004 report of the High-Level 

14 Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change; 

15 (B) includes as an essential component of 

16 such definition any action that is intended to 

17 cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians 

18 with the purpose of intimidating a population 

19 or compelling a government or an international 

20 organization to do, or abstain from doing, any 

21 act; and 

22 (C) does not propose a legal or moral 

23 equivalence between an action described in 

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1 fense against an action described in paragraph 

2 (1)(B); and 

3 (2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism 

4 that includes the definition described in paragraph 

5 (1). 

6 SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the 

8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

9 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 

10 a report— 

11 (1) concerning the progress of the General As12 sembly to modernize human resource practices, con13 sistent with the March 2005 report of the Secretary 

14 General entitled ‘‘In larger freedom: towards devel15 opment, security and human rights for all’’; and 

16 (2) containing the information described in sub17 section (b). 

18 (b) CONTENTS.—The report shall include— 

19 (1) a comprehensive evaluation of human re20 sources reforms at the United Nations, including an 

21 evaluation of— 

22 (A) tenure; 

23 (B) performance reviews; 

24 (C) the promotion system; 


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1 (D) a merit-based hiring system and en2 hanced regulations concerning termination of 

3 employment of employees; and 

4 (E) the implementation of a code of con5 duct and ethics training; 

6 (2) the implementation of a system of proce7 dures for filing complaints and protective measures 

8 for work-place harassment, including sexual harass9 ment; 

10 (3) policy recommendations relating to the es11 tablishment of a rotation requirement for non12 administrative positions; 

13 (4) policy recommendations relating to the es14 tablishment of a prohibition preventing personnel 

15 and officials assigned to the mission of a member 

16 state to the United Nations from transferring to a 

17 position within the United Nations Secretariat that 

18 is compensated at the P–5 level and above; 

19 (5) policy recommendations relating to a reduc20 tion in travel allowances and attendant oversight 

21 with respect to accommodations and airline flights; 

22 and 

23 (6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the 

24 Secretary General relating to greater flexibility for 


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1 the Secretary General in staffing decisions to accom2 modate changing priorities. 

3 SEC. 308. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES. 

4 The United States shall withhold from United States 

5 contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United 

6 Nations for a biennial period amounts that are propor7 tional to the percentage of such budget that are expended 

8 with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty 

9 monitoring body or committee that was established by— 

10 (1) a convention (without any protocols) or an 

11 international covenant (without any protocols) to 

12 which the United States is not party; or 

13 (2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if 

14 the United States is a party to neither. 

15 SEC. 309. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS. 

16 (a) DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AND RE17 PORT.— 

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—To avoid duplicative efforts 

19 and funding with respect to Palestinian interests 

20 and to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Pal21 estinian issues, the Secretary shall, not later than 

22 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 

23 Act— 

24 (A) complete an audit of the functions of 

25 the entities listed in paragraph (2); and 


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1 (B) submit to the appropriate congres2 sional committees a report containing audit 

3 findings and conclusions, and recommendations 

4 for the elimination of such duplicative entities 

5 and efforts. 

6 (2) ENTITIES.—The entities referred to in 

7 paragraph (1)(A) are the following: 

8 (A) The United Nations Division for Pales9 tinian Rights. 

10 (B) The Committee on the Exercise of the 

11 Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. 

12 (C) The United Nations Special Coordi13 nator for the Middle East Peace Process and 

14 Personal Representative to the Palestine Lib15 eration Organization and the Palestinian Au16 thority. 

17 (D) The NGO Network on the Question of 

18 Palestine. 

19 (E) The Special Committee to Investigate 

20 Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 

21 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the 

22 Occupied Territories. 

23 (F) Any other entity the Secretary deter24 mines results in duplicative efforts or funding 


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1 or fails to ensure balance in the approach to 

2 Israeli-Palestinian issues. 

3 (b) IMPLEMENTATION BY PERMANENT REPRESENTA4 TIVE.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct 

6 the United States Permanent Representative to the 

7 United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence 

8 of the United States at the United Nations to seek 

9 the implementation of the recommendations con10 tained in the report required under subsection 

11 (a)(1)(B). 

12 (2) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—Until such rec13 ommendations have been implemented, the United 

14 States shall withhold from United States contribu15 tions to the regular assessed budget of the United 

16 Nations for a biennial period amounts that are pro17 portional to the percentage of such budget that are 

18 expended for such entities. 

19 (c) GAO AUDIT.—The Comptroller General of the 

20 United States of the Government Accountability Office 

21 shall conduct an audit of— 

22 (1) the status of the implementation of the rec23 ommendations contained in the report required 

24 under subsection (a)(1)(B); and 


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1 (2) United States actions and achievements 

2 under subsection (b). 

3 SEC. 310. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS. 

4 The President shall direct the United States perma5 nent representative to the United Nations to use the voice, 

6 vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na7 tions to make every effort to— 

8 (1) ensure the issuance and implementation of 

9 a directive by the Secretary General or the Secre10 tariat, as appropriate, that— 

11 (A) requires all employees of the United 

12 Nations and its specialized agencies to officially 

13 and publicly condemn anti-Semitic statements 

14 made at any session of the United Nations or 

15 its specialized agencies, or at any other session 

16 sponsored by the United Nations; 

17 (B) requires employees of the United Na18 tions and its specialized agencies, programs, 

19 and funds to be subject to punitive action, in20 cluding immediate dismissal, for making anti21 Semitic statements or references; 

22 (C) proposes specific recommendations to 

23 the General Assembly for the establishment of 

24 mechanisms to hold accountable employees and 

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1 ized agencies, programs, and funds, or Member 

2 States, that make such anti-Semitic statements 

3 or references in any forum of the United Na4 tions or of its specialized agencies; 

5 (D) continues to develop and implements 

6 education awareness programs about the Holo7 caust and anti-Semitism throughout the world, 

8 as part of an effort to combat intolerance and 

9 hatred; and 

10 (E) requires the Office of the United Na11 tions High Commissioner for Human Rights 

12 (OHCHR) to develop programming and other 

13 measures that address anti-Semitism; 

14 (2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the 

15 General Assembly that establishes the mechanisms 

16 described in paragraph (1)(C); and 

17 (3) continue working toward further reduction 

18 of anti-Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions 

19 in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, 

20 programs, and funds. 

21 SEC. 311. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL. 

22 The President shall direct the United States Perma23 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

24 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 

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1 ers Group (WEOG) in the United Nations in Geneva to 

2 include Israel as a permanent member with full rights and 

3 privileges. 

4 TITLE IV—STATUS OF PALES5 TINIAN ENTITIES AT THE 

6 UNITED NATIONS 

7 SEC. 401. FINDINGS. 

8 The Congress makes the following findings: 

9 (1) In 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organiza10 tion (PLO) launched an effort to evade direct nego11 tiations for peace with the State of Israel by instead 

12 pursuing Palestinian membership in international 

13 organizations, which could imply de facto recognition 

14 of a Palestinian state by the United Nations. 

15 (2) The Executive Branch, with significant sup16 port from Members of Congress, successfully 

17 stopped the PLO’s effort by credibly threatening, as 

18 noted in a May 1, 1989 statement by then-Secretary 

19 of State James A. Baker, ‘‘that the United States 

20 [would] make no further contributions, voluntary or 

21 assessed, to any international organization which 

22 makes any change in the P.L.O.’s present status as 

23 an observer organization.’’. 

24 (3) The United States success in this case dem25 onstrates that withholding contributions and placing 


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1 conditions on their payment can result in real re2 forms, stop counter-productive developments, and 

3 advance United States interests at the United Na4 tions. 

5 (4) The Palestinian leadership has recently re6 sumed its effort to evade direct negotiations for 

7 peace with the State of Israel by seeking recognition 

8 of a Palestinian state from foreign governments and 

9 in international forums. 

10 (5) Efforts to bypass negotiations and to unilat11 erally declare a Palestinian state, or to appeal to the 

12 United Nations or other international forums or to 

13 foreign governments for recognition of a Palestinian 

14 state or membership or other upgraded status for 

15 the Palestinian observer mission at those forums, 

16 would violate the underlying principles of the Oslo 

17 Accords, the Road Map, and other relevant Middle 

18 East peace process efforts. 

19 (6) On December 15, 2010, the House of Rep20 resentatives passed House Resolution 1765, in 

21 which, inter alia, the House of Representatives: 

22 (A) ‘‘reaffirms its strong opposition to any 

23 attempt to establish or seek recognition of a 

24 Palestinian state outside of an agreement nego25 tiated between Israel and the Palestinians’’; 


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1 (B) ‘‘supports the Administration’s opposi2 tion to a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian 

3 state’’; and 

4 (C) ‘‘calls upon the Administration to . . . 

5 lead a diplomatic effort to persuade other na6 tions to oppose a unilateral declaration of a 

7 Palestinian state and to oppose recognition of a 

8 Palestinian state by other nations, within the 

9 United Nations, and in other international fo10 rums prior to achievement of a final agreement 

11 between Israel and the Palestinians.’’. 

12 (7) Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, United 

13 States Deputy Permanent Representative to the 

14 United Nations, stated on July 26, 2011, ‘‘Let there 

15 be no doubt: symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the 

16 United Nations in September will not create an 

17 independent Palestinian state . . . The United 

18 States will not support unilateral campaigns at the 

19 United Nations in September or any other time.’’. 

20 SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

21 It is the policy of the United States to oppose the 

22 recognition of a Palestinian state by any United Nations 

23 Entity, or any upgrade, including but not limited to full 

24 membership or non-member-state observer status, in the 

25 status of the Palestinian observer mission at the United 


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1 Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Pales2 tinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative 

3 organization or governing entity, at any United Nations 

4 Entity, prior to the achievement of a final peace agree5 ment negotiated between and agreed to by Israel and the 

6 Palestinians. 

7 SEC. 403. IMPLEMENTATION. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 

9 United States Permanent Representative to the United 

10 Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

11 States at the United Nations to advance the policy stated 

12 in section 402. 

13 (b) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of 

14 State shall withhold United States contributions from any 

15 United Nations Entity that recognizes a Palestinian state 

16 or upgrades in any way, including but not limited to full 

17 membership or non-member-state observer status, the sta18 tus of the Palestinian observer mission at the United Na19 tions, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Pales20 tinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative 

21 organization or governing entity, at that United Nations 

22 Entity, prior to the achievement of complete and final 

23 peace agreement negotiated between and agreed to by 

24 Israel and the Palestinians. Funds appropriated for use 

25 as a United States contribution to the United Nations but 


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1 withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to this 

2 section shall immediately revert to the United States 

3 Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid 

4 to any United Nations Entity. 

5 TITLE V—UNITED NATIONS 

6 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 

7 SEC. 501. FINDINGS. 

8 The Congress makes the following findings: 

9 (1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United 

10 Nations Human Rights Council has failed to mean11 ingfully promote the protection of internationally 

12 recognized human rights, and has proven to be even 

13 more problematic than the United Nations Human 

14 Rights Commission that it was created to replace. 

15 (2) The United Nations Human Rights Council 

16 suffers from fundamental and severe structural 

17 flaws present since its establishment by the United 

18 Nations General Assembly, such as the fact that it 

19 draws its members from the General Assembly with20 out any substantive membership criteria, with the 

21 perverse result that a number of the world’s worst 

22 human rights abusers are members of the council. 

23 (3) For example, the majority of members of 

24 the United Nations Human Rights Council are rated 

25 ‘‘Not Free’’ or only ‘‘Partly Free’’ by Freedom 


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1 House. Only a minority of members were rated 

2 ‘‘Free’’. 

3 (4) The structure and composition of the 

4 United Nations Human Rights Council have made it 

5 subject to gross political manipulation, with the re6 sult that, during its almost five years of operation, 

7 the Council has passed over 40 resolutions censuring 

8 the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, as compared 

9 to only a handful censuring the dictatorships in 

10 Burma and North Korea, just one addressing the se11 vere, ongoing human rights abuses in Libya, Iran, 

12 Syria, and Belarus, and none addressing the severe, 

13 ongoing human rights abuses in China, Cuba, Rus14 sia, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and elsewhere. 

15 (5) The United Nations Human Rights Coun16 cil’s agenda contains a permanent item for criticism 

17 of the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, but no 

18 permanent items criticizing any other state. 

19 (6) The United Nations Human Rights Council 

20 has established, or preserved the existence of, a 

21 number of ‘‘Special Procedures’’ mechanisms to ad22 dress country-specific situations or thematic issues. 

23 These mechanisms include a number of ‘‘special 

24 rapporteurs’’ whose expenses and staff support are 

25 paid for by contributions to the United Nations. 


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1 (7) The United Nations Human Rights Council 

2 has also established an ‘‘Advisory Committee’’ whose 

3 expenses and staff support are paid for by contribu4 tions to the United Nations. 

5 (8) Some of these special rapporteurs and mem6 bers of the Advisory Committee have displayed con7 sistent bias against the United States, Israel, and 

8 the Jewish people, while providing support to human 

9 rights abusers. 

10 (9) Richard Falk, the United Nations ‘‘Special 

11 Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Pal12 estinian territories occupied since 1967’’, has com13 pared Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians to the 

14 Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the events of 

15 September 11, 2001, and posted a cartoon on his 

16 blog depicting Americans and Jews as bloodthirsty 

17 dogs. 

18 (10) Jean Ziegler, a member of the United Na19 tions Human Rights Council Advisory Committee 

20 and former United Nations ‘‘Special Rapporteur on 

21 the Right to Food’’, has accused former President 

22 George W. Bush and former Israeli Prime Minister 

23 Ariel Sharon of committing ‘‘state terrorism’’, has 

24 called for an investigation of Israel by the Inter25 national Criminal Court for ‘‘war crimes’’ following 


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1 Israel’s war against Hezbollah in 2006, has visited 

2 Cuba and praised the Cuban regime’s provision of 

3 food to the Cuban people, and has stated that 

4 Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe ‘‘has history 

5 and morality with him’’. Ziegler was also involved in 

6 the establishment of the ‘‘Al-Gaddafi International 

7 Prize for Human Rights’’, a prize established by, 

8 funded by, and named after Libyan dictator Muam9 mar al-Gaddafi, and awarded in the past to Fidel 

10 Castro, Hugo Chavez, Louis Farrakhan, and Roger 

11 Garaudy, who has denied the Holocaust, questioned 

12 the veracity of the events of September 11, 2001, 

13 and supported Iranian leader Mahmoud 

14 Ahmadinejad’s call for Israel to be ‘‘wiped off the 

15 map’’. 

16 (11) Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann, a member of 

17 the United Nations Human Rights Council Advisory 

18 Committee who has previously served as President of 

19 the United Nations General Assembly and as foreign 

20 minister for the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, has 

21 implicitly accused the United States of ‘‘terrorism’’, 

22 has called former President Ronald Reagan a 

23 ‘‘butcher’’, has called for a international boycott of 

24 Israel, has stated that the Palestinians were being 

25 ‘‘crucified’’ by Israel, has called Israel’s defensive 


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1 Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip a ‘‘mon2 strosity’’ and ‘‘genocide’’, has urged the United Na3 tions to use the term ‘‘apartheid’’ in discussing 

4 Israeli treatment of Palestinians, has embraced Ira5 nian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after 

6 Ahmadinejad delivered an anti-American, anti-Israel 

7 address to the United Nations General Assembly, 

8 has stated that charges of genocide against Suda9 nese dictator Omar Hassan al Bashir are ‘‘racist’’, 

10 and has declared Fidel Castro ‘‘World Hero of Soli11 darity’’, stating that Castro ‘‘embod[ied] virtues and 

12 values worth emulation by all of us’’. 

13 (12) Halima Warzazi, a member of the United 

14 Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, 

15 has compared Israel to Nazi Germany, and used her 

16 previous membership in a United Nations apparatus 

17 to shield Saddam Hussein from censure for gassing 

18 Iraqi Kurds in Halabja. 

19 (13) The ongoing five-year review of the United 

20 Nations Human Rights Council concluded on June 

21 17, 2011, and failed make any significant reforms to 

22 its fundamental and severe structural flaws, includ23 ing its absence of substantive membership criteria, 

24 or to remove the permanent agenda item on Israel. 


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1 (14) On June 17, 2011, John F, Sammis, 

2 United States Deputy Representative to the Eco3 nomic and Social Council, stated that ‘‘The Geneva 

4 process [of the five-year review] failed to yield even 

5 minimally positive results, forcing us to dissociate 

6 from the outcome . . . the final resolution [for the 

7 five-year review] also fails to address the core prob8 lems that still plague the Human Rights Council 

9 . . . The United States has therefore voted ‘no’ on 

10 the resolution . . . the Council’s effectiveness and 

11 legitimacy will always be compromised so long as 

12 one country in all the world is unfairly and uniquely 

13 singled out while others, including chronic human 

14 rights abusers, escape scrutiny . . . The resolution 

15 before us today does nothing to address the Coun16 cil’s failures nor move it any closer to the founding 

17 values of the UN Charter and the Universal Dec18 laration of Human Rights.’’. 

19 (15) U.S. membership in the Human Rights 

20 Council has not led to reform of its fundamental 

21 flaws diminished the Council’s virulently anti-Israel 

22 behavior. The Council has passed fourteen resolu23 tions criticizing Israel since the U.S. joined in 2009. 


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1 SEC. 502. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND 

2 FUNDING. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—For each and every fiscal year 

4 subsequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Sec5 retary of State submits to Congress a certification that 

6 the requirements described in subsection (b) have been 

7 satisfied— 

8 (1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from 

9 a United States contribution each fiscal year to a 

10 regular budget of the United Nations an amount 

11 that is equal to the percentage of such contribution 

12 that the Secretary determines would be allocated by 

13 the United Nations to support the United Nations 

14 Human Rights Council; 

15 (2) the Secretary of State shall not make a vol16 untary contribution to the United Nations Human 

17 Rights Council; and 

18 (3) the United States shall not run for a seat 

19 on the United Nations Human Rights Council. 

20 (b) CERTIFICATION.—The annual certification re21 ferred to in subsection (a) is a certification made by the 

22 Secretary to Congress that— 

23 (1) the United Nations Human Rights Coun24 cil’s mandate from the United Nations General As25 sembly explicitly and effectively prohibits candidacy 


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1 for Human Rights Council membership of a United 

2 Nations Member State— 

3 (A) subject to sanctions by the Security 

4 Council; and 

5 (B) under a Security Council-mandated in6 vestigation for human rights abuses; 

7 (2) the United Nations Human Rights Council 

8 does not include a United Nations Member State— 

9 (A) subject to sanctions by the Security 

10 Council; 

11 (B) under a Security Council-mandated in12 vestigation for human rights abuses; 

13 (C) which the Secretary of State has deter14 mined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Ex15 port Administration Act of 1979 (as continued 

16 in effect pursuant to the International Emer17 gency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the 

18 Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the 

19 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other provi20 sion of law, is a government that has repeatedly 

21 provided support for acts of international ter22 rorism; or 

23 (D) which the President has designated as 

24 a country of particular concern for religious 


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1 freedom under section 402(b) of the Inter2 national Religious Freedom Act of 1998; and 

3 (3) the United Nations Human Rights Coun4 cil’s agenda or programme of work does not include 

5 a permanent item with regard to the State of Israel. 

6 (c) SPECIAL PROCEDURES.—The Secretary of State 

7 shall withhold from a United States contribution each year 

8 to a regular budget of the United Nations an amount that 

9 is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the 

10 Secretary determines would be allocated by the United 

11 Nations to support the United Nations ‘‘Special 

12 Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Pales13 tinian territories occupied since 1967’’, and any other 

14 United Nations Human Rights Council ‘‘Special Proce15 dures’’ used to display bias against the United States or 

16 the State of Israel or to provide support for the govern17 ment of any United Nations Member State— 

18 (1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; 

19 (2) under a Security Council-mandated inves20 tigation for human rights abuses; 

21 (3) which the Secretary of State has deter22 mined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Ad23 ministration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pur24 suant to the International Emergency Economic 

25 Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control 


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1 Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

2 1961, or other provision of law, is a government that 

3 has repeatedly provided support for acts of inter4 national terrorism; or 

5 (4) which the President has designated as a 

6 country of particular concern for religious freedom 

7 under section 402(b) of the International Religious 

8 Freedom Act of 1998. 

9 (d) REVERSION OF FUNDS.—Funds appropriated for 

10 use as a United States contribution to the United Nations 

11 but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 

12 this section shall immediately revert to the United States 

13 Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid 

14 to any United Nations Entity. 

15 TITLE VI—GOLDSTONE REPORT 

16 SEC. 601. FINDINGS. 

17 Congress finds the following: 

18 (1) On January 12, 2009, the United Nations 

19 Human Rights Council passed Resolution A/HRC/S– 

20 9/L.1, which authorized a ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ re21 garding Israel’s conduct of Operation Cast Lead 

22 against violent militants in the Gaza Strip between 

23 December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009. 

24 (2) The resolution pre-judged the outcome of its 

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1 finding mission’’ to ‘‘investigate all violations of 

2 international human rights law and International 

3 Humanitarian Law by . . . Israel, against the Pal4 estinian people . . . particularly in the occupied 

5 Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression’’. 

6 (3) The mandate of the ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ 

7 makes no mention of the relentless rocket and mor8 tar attacks, which numbered in the thousands and 

9 spanned a period of eight years, by Hamas and 

10 other violent militant groups in Gaza against civilian 

11 targets in Israel, that necessitated Israel’s defensive 

12 measures. 

13 (4) The ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ included a mem14 ber who, before joining the mission, had already de15 clared Israel guilty of committing atrocities in Oper16 ation Cast Lead by signing a public letter on Janu17 ary 11, 2009, published in the Sunday Times, that 

18 called Israel’s actions ‘‘war crimes’’. 

19 (5) The mission’s flawed and biased mandate 

20 gave serious concern to many United Nations 

21 Human Rights Council Member States which re22 fused to support it, including Bosnia and 

23 Herzegovina, Cameroon, Canada, France, Germany, 

24 Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Republic of 

25 Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, and 


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1 the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 

2 Ireland. 

3 (6) The mission’s flawed and biased mandate 

4 was never broadened or revised by any plenary meet5 ing of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 

6 and troubled many distinguished individuals who re7 fused invitations to head the mission. 

8 (7) On September 15, 2009, the ‘‘United Na9 tions Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’’ 

10 released its report, which is commonly referred to as 

11 the ‘‘Goldstone Report’’. 

12 (8) The Goldstone Report repeatedly made 

13 sweeping and unsubstantiated determinations that 

14 the Israeli military had deliberately attacked civil15 ians during Operation Cast Lead. 

16 (9) The authors of the Goldstone Report admit 

17 that we did not deal with the issues . . . ‘‘regarding 

18 the problems of conducting military operations in ci19 vilian areas and second-guessing decisions made by 

20 soldiers and their commanding officers in the fog of 

21 war’’. 

22 (10) In the October 16, 2009 edition of the 

23 Jewish Daily Forward, Richard Goldstone, the head 

24 of the ‘‘United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the 

25 Gaza Conflict’’, is quoted as saying, with respect to 


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1 the mission’s evidence-collection methods, ‘‘If this 

2 was a court of law, there would have been nothing 

3 proven’’. 

4 (11) The Goldstone Report, in effect, denied the 

5 State of Israel the right to self-defense, and never 

6 noted the fact that Israel had the right to defend its 

7 citizens from the repeated violent attacks committed 

8 against civilian targets in southern Israel by Hamas 

9 and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations operating 

10 from Gaza. 

11 (12) The Goldstone Report largely ignored the 

12 culpability of the Government of Iran and the Gov13 ernment of Syria, both of whom sponsor Hamas and 

14 other Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 

15 (13) The Goldstone Report usually considered 

16 public statements made by Israeli officials not to be 

17 credible, while frequently giving uncritical credence 

18 to statements taken from what it called the ‘‘Gaza 

19 authorities’’, i.e., the Gaza leadership of Hamas. 

20 (14) Notwithstanding a great body of evidence 

21 that Hamas and other violent Islamist groups com22 mitted war crimes by using civilians and civilian in23 stitutions, such as mosques, schools, and hospitals, 

24 as shields, the Goldstone Report repeatedly 

25 downplayed or cast doubt upon that claim. 


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1 (15) In one notable instance, the Goldstone Re2 port stated that it did not consider the admission of 

3 a Hamas official that Hamas often ‘‘created a 

4 human shield of women, children, the elderly and the 

5 mujahideen, against [the Israeli military]’’ specifi6 cally to ‘‘constitute evidence that Hamas forced Pal7 estinian civilians to shield military objectives against 

8 attack’’. 

9 (16) Hamas was able to significantly shape the 

10 findings of the investigation mission’s Goldstone Re11 port by selecting and prescreening some of the wit12 nesses and intimidating others, as the Goldstone Re13 port acknowledges when it notes that ‘‘those inter14 viewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about 

15 the presence of or conduct of hostilities by the Pales16 tinian armed groups . . . from a fear of reprisals’’. 

17 (17) Even though Israel is a vibrant democracy 

18 with a vigorous and free press, the Goldstone Report 

19 erroneously asserts that ‘‘actions of the Israeli gov20 ernment . . . have contributed significantly to a po21 litical climate in which dissent with the government 

22 and its actions . . . is not tolerated’’. 

23 (18) The Goldstone Report recommended that 

24 the United Nations Human Rights Council endorse 

25 its recommendations, implement them, review their 


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1 implementation, and refer the report to the United 

2 Nations Security Council, the Prosecutor of the 

3 International Criminal Court, and the United Na4 tions General Assembly for further action. 

5 (19) The Goldstone Report recommended that 

6 the United Nations Security Council— 

7 (A) require the Government of Israel to 

8 launch further investigations of its conduct dur9 ing Operation Cast Lead and report back to the 

10 Security Council within six months; 

11 (B) simultaneously appoint an ‘‘inde12 pendent committee of experts’’ to monitor and 

13 report on any domestic legal or other pro14 ceedings undertaken by the Government of 

15 Israel within that 6-month period; and 

16 (C) refer the case to the Prosecutor of the 

17 International Criminal Court after that 6- 

18 month period. 

19 (20) The Goldstone Report recommended that 

20 the United Nations General Assembly consider fur21 ther action on the report and establish an escrow 

22 fund, to be funded entirely by the State of Israel, to 

23 ‘‘pay adequate compensation to Palestinians who 

24 have suffered loss and damage’’ during Operation 

25 Cast Lead. 


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1 (21) The Goldstone Report ignored the issue of 

2 compensation to Israelis who have been killed or 

3 wounded, or suffered other loss and damage, as a re4 sult of years of past and continuing rocket and mor5 tar attacks by Hamas and other violent militant 

6 groups in Gaza against civilian targets in southern 

7 Israel. 

8 (22) The Goldstone Report recommended ‘‘that 

9 States Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 

10 start criminal investigations [of Operation Cast 

11 Lead] in national courts, using universal jurisdic12 tion’’ and that ‘‘following investigation, alleged per13 petrators should be arrested and prosecuted’’. 

14 (23) The concept of ‘‘universal jurisdiction’’ has 

15 frequently been used in attempts to detain, charge, 

16 and prosecute Israeli and United States officials and 

17 former officials in connection with unfounded allega18 tions of war crimes and has often unfairly impeded 

19 the travel of those individuals. 

20 (24) On September 20, 2009, United Nations 

21 High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem 

22 Pillay wrote, ‘‘I lend my full support to Justice 

23 Goldstone’s report and its recommendations’’. 

24 (25) The State of Israel, like many other free 

25 democracies, has an independent judicial system 


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1 with a robust investigatory capacity and has already 

2 launched numerous investigations, many of which re3 main ongoing, of Operation Cast Lead and indi4 vidual incidents therein. 

5 (26) Several nations have indicated that they 

6 intend to further pursue consideration of the 

7 Goldstone Report and implementation of its rec8 ommendations by the United Nations Security Coun9 cil, the United Nations General Assembly, the 

10 United Nations Human Rights Council, and other 

11 multilateral fora. 

12 (27) On September 30, 2009, Secretary of 

13 State Hillary Clinton described the underlying man14 date for the Goldstone Report as ‘‘one-sided’’. 

15 (28) On September 17, 2009, Ambassador 

16 Susan Rice, United States Permanent Representa17 tive to the United Nations, expressed the United 

18 States’ ‘‘very serious concern with the mandate’’ un19 derlying the Goldstone Report and noted that the 

20 United States views the mandate ‘‘as unbalanced, 

21 one-sided and basically unacceptable’’. 

22 (29) Israeli President Shimon Peres has called 

23 the Goldstone Report a ‘‘blood libel’’. 


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1 (30) The Goldstone Report reflects the long2 standing, historic bias at the United Nations against 

3 the democratic, Jewish State of Israel. 

4 (31) The Goldstone Report is being exploited by 

5 Israel’s enemies to excuse the actions of violent mili6 tant groups and their state sponsors, and to justify 

7 isolation of and punitive measures against the demo8 cratic, Jewish State of Israel. 

9 (32) On November 3, 2009, the House of Rep10 resentatives overwhelmingly adopted House Resolu11 tion 867, which stated that the House of Represent12 atives: 

13 (A) ‘‘considers the [Goldstone Report] to 

14 be irredeemably biased and unworthy of further 

15 consideration or legitimacy’’; 

16 (B) ‘‘supports the Administration’s efforts 

17 to combat anti-Israel bias at the United Na18 tions, its characterization of the [Goldstone Re19 port] as ‘unbalanced, one-sided and basically 

20 unacceptable’, and its opposition to the resolu21 tion on the report’’; 

22 (C) ‘‘calls on the President and the Sec23 retary of State to continue to strongly and un24 equivocally oppose any endorsement of the 

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1 ing through leading opposition to any United 

2 Nations General Assembly resolution and 

3 through vetoing, if necessary, any United Na4 tions Security Council resolution that endorses 

5 the contents of this report, seeks to act upon 

6 the recommendations contained in this report, 

7 or calls on any other international body to take 

8 further action regarding this report’’; 

9 (D) ‘‘calls on the President and the Sec10 retary of State to strongly and unequivocally 

11 oppose any further consideration of the ‘Report 

12 of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on 

13 the Gaza Conflict’ and any other measures 

14 stemming from this report in multilateral fora’’; 

15 and 

16 (E) ‘‘reaffirms its support for the demo17 cratic, Jewish State of Israel, for Israel’s secu18 rity and right to self-defense, and, specifically, 

19 for Israel’s right to defend its citizens from vio20 lent militant groups and their state sponsors’’. 

21 (33) On October 16, 2009, the United Nations 

22 Human Rights Council voted 25–6 (with 11 Member 

23 States abstaining and 5 not voting, and with the 

24 United States voting against) to adopt resolution A– 

25 HRC–S–12–1, which endorsed the Goldstone Report 


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1 and condemned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, 

2 other such violent militant groups, or their state 

3 sponsors. The United States voted against the reso4 lution. 

5 (34) On November 5, 2009, the United Nations 

6 General Assembly voted 114–18 (with 44 Member 

7 States abstaining, and with the United States voting 

8 against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/10, which, 

9 among other things: 

10 (A) endorsed the United Nations Human 

11 Rights Council’s resolution A–HRC–S–12–1, 

12 which endorsed the Goldstone Report and con13 demned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, 

14 other such violent militant groups, or their 

15 state sponsors; 

16 (B) requested that the Secretary General 

17 of the United Nations transmit the Goldstone 

18 Report to the United Nations Security Council; 

19 (C) expressed its ‘‘appreciation’’ to the 

20 ‘‘United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the 

21 Gaza Conflict’’ for its ‘‘comprehensive report’’; 

22 (D) expressed grave concern regarding ‘‘re23 ports regarding serious human rights viola24 tions’’ during Operation Cast Lead, including 

25 the findings in the Goldstone Report; and 


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1 (E) recommended ‘‘that the Government of 

2 Switzerland, in its capacity as depositary of the 

3 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 

4 Civilian Persons in Time of War, undertake as 

5 soon as possible the steps necessary to recon6 vene a Conference of High Contracting Parties 

7 to the Fourth Geneva Convention on measures 

8 to enforce the Convention’’ in the West Bank, 

9 the Gaza Strip, and ‘‘East Jerusalem’’. 

10 (35) On February 26, 2010, the United Na11 tions General Assembly voted 98–7 (with 31 Mem12 ber States abstaining, and with the United States 

13 voting against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/254, 

14 which built on the determinations of A/RES/64/10. 

15 (36) On March 24, 2010, the United Nations 

16 Human Rights Council voted 29–6 (with 11 Member 

17 States abstaining and one not voting, and with the 

18 United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/ 

19 HRC/13/L.30, which, among other things— 

20 (A) called upon ‘‘all concerned parties, in21 cluding United Nations bodies, to ensure their 

22 implementation of the recommendations con23 tained in the [Goldstone Report]’’; 

24 (B) requested that the United Nations 

25 High Commissioner for Human Rights submit 


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1 a ‘‘progress report on the implementation of the 

2 present resolution to the [Human Rights] 

3 Council at its fourteenth session’’ in May and 

4 June 2010; and 

5 (C) decided to ‘‘follow up on the implemen6 tation of the present resolution at [the] fif7 teenth session’’ of the Human Rights Council in 

8 September 2010. 

9 (37) On March 25, 2011, the United Nations 

10 Human Rights Council voted 27–3 (with 16 Member 

11 States abstaining, and with the United States voting 

12 against) to adopt resolution A/HRC/16/L.31, which, 

13 among other things— 

14 (A) called upon ‘‘all concerned parties, in15 cluding United Nations bodies, to ensure the 

16 full and immediate implementation of the rec17 ommendations contained in the [Goldstone Re18 port]’’; 

19 (B) recommended that the United Nations 

20 General Assembly again consider the Goldstone 

21 Report at its sixty-sixth session, and urged the 

22 General Assembly to submit the report to the 

23 United Nations Security Council ‘‘for its con24 sideration and appropriate action,’’ including 


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1 referral to the prosecutor of the International 

2 Criminal Court; 

3 (C) requested that the United Nations 

4 High Commissioner for Human Rights submit 

5 a ‘‘progress report on the implementation of the 

6 present resolution to the Human Rights Council 

7 at its eighteenth session of September 2011’’; 

8 and 

9 (D) decided to ‘‘follow up on the imple10 mentation of the present resolution at [the] 

11 nineteenth session [of the Human Rights Coun12 cil] of March 2012’’. 

13 (38) On April 1, 2011, Richard Goldstone, the 

14 head of the ‘‘United Nations Fact Finding Mission 

15 on the Gaza Conflict’’ that authored the Goldstone 

16 Report, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post that 

17 renounced the Goldstone Report’s claim that the 

18 Israeli military deliberately attacked civilians during 

19 Operation Cast Lead. Goldstone wrote that the 

20 Israeli military’s investigations with respect to inci21 dents in Operation Cast Lead ‘‘indicate that civilians 

22 were not intentionally targeted as a matter of pol23 icy’’. 

24 (39) Efforts to delegitimize the democratic 

25 State of Israel and deny it the right to defend its 


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1 citizens and its existence can be used to delegitimize 

2 other democracies and deny them the same right. 

3 SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

4 It is the policy of the United States to— 

5 (1) consider the Goldstone Report irredeemably 

6 biased and unworthy of further consideration or le7 gitimacy; 

8 (2) strongly and unequivocally oppose any con9 sideration, legitimization, or endorsement of the 

10 Goldstone Report, or any other measures stemming 

11 from this report, in multilateral fora; 

12 (3) lead a high-level diplomatic campaign in 

13 support of the revocation and repudiation, by the 

14 United Nations General Assembly, of the Goldstone 

15 Report and any United Nations resolutions stem16 ming from the report, including: 

17 (A) United Nations General Assembly res18 olutions A/RES/64/10 and A/RES/64/254; and 

19 (B) United Nations Human Rights Council 

20 resolutions A–HRC–S–12–1, A/HRC/13/L.30, 

21 and A/HRC/16/L.31; and 

22 (4) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encour23 age other responsible countries not to endorse, sup24 port, or legitimize the Goldstone Report or any other 

25 measures stemming from the report. 


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1 SEC. 603. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED 

2 STATES TAXPAYER DOLLARS. 

3 (a) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of 

4 State shall withhold from the United States contribution 

5 to the regular budget of the United Nations an amount 

6 that is equal to the percentage of such contribution that 

7 the Secretary determines would be or has been expended 

8 by the United Nations for any part of the Goldstone Re9 port or its preparatory or follow-on activities. 

10 (b) REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER DOL11 LARS.—Funds appropriated for use as a United States 

12 contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations 

13 but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 

14 subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United 

15 States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be 

16 repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

17 TITLE VII—DURBAN PROCESS 

18 SEC. 701. FINDINGS. 

19 The Congress makes the following findings: 

20 (1) The United States is opposed to racism, ra21 cial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intoler22 ance, and has long been a party to the Convention 

23 on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 

24 (2) Expensive and politically skewed inter25 national conferences can disserve and undermine the 


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1 worthy goals that they are ostensibly convened to 

2 support. 

3 (3) The goals of the 2001 United Nations 

4 World Conference Against Racism—held in Durban, 

5 South Africa, and commonly referred to as ‘‘Durban 

6 I’’—were undermined by hateful, anti-Jewish rhet7 oric, and anti-Israel political agendas, prompting 

8 both Israel and the United States to withdraw their 

9 delegations from the Conference. 

10 (4) The official government declaration adopted 

11 by Durban I, the ‘‘Durban Declaration and Program 

12 of Action’’, focused on the ‘‘plight of the Palestinian 

13 people under foreign occupation’’, and thereby sin14 gled out one regional conflict for discussion and im15 plicitly launched a false accusation against Israel of 

16 intolerance towards the Palestinians. 

17 (5) On September 3, 2001, Secretary of State 

18 Colin Powell explained the withdrawal of the United 

19 States delegation from Durban I by stating that 

20 ‘‘you do not combat racism by conferences that 

21 produce declarations containing hateful language, 

22 some of which is a throwback to the ‘days of Zion23 ism’ equals racism; or supports the idea that we 

24 have made too much of the Holocaust; or suggests 

25 that apartheid exists in Israel; or that singles out 


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1 only one country in the world—Israel—for censure 

2 and abuse’’. 

3 (6) The late United States Representative Tom 

4 Lantos, who participated as a member of the United 

5 States delegation to the Durban Conference, sup6 ported that delegation’s withdrawal and wrote in 

7 2002 that the conference ‘‘provided the world with 

8 a glimpse into the abyss of international hate, dis9 crimination and, indeed, racism’’. 

10 (7) On December 19, 2006, the United Nations 

11 General Assembly approved a resolution initiating 

12 preparations for a Durban Review Conference (com13 monly referred to as ‘‘Durban II’’), which was held 

14 between April 20 and 24, 2009, in Geneva, Switzer15 land. 

16 (8) The chair of the preparatory committee for 

17 Durban II was Libya, and the co-chairs included 

18 Iran and Cuba. 

19 (9) Throughout the preparatory process for 

20 Durban II, member states of the Organization of the 

21 Islamic Conference urged that the conference again 

22 focus criticism on Israel and single out the Israeli23 Palestinian conflict for discussion, and also urged 

24 that the conference advocate global speech codes 

25 that would impose restrictions contrary to fundaVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:19 Aug 31, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2829.IH H2829

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1 mental freedoms recognized in the provisions of the 

2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

3 (10) In testimony before the House of Rep4 resentatives on April 2, 2008, then-Assistant Sec5 retary of State for International Organizations 

6 Kristen Silverberg stated that the United States had 

7 decided against participating in preparatory activi8 ties for Durban II because ‘‘[there is] absolutely no 

9 case to be made for participating in something that 

10 is going to be a repeat of Durban I. We don’t have 

11 any confidence that this will be any better than Dur12 ban I’’. 

13 (11) On September 23, 2008, the House of 

14 Representatives passed House Resolution 1361, 

15 which, among other things, called on the President 

16 to ‘‘urge other heads of state to condition participa17 tion in the 2009 [Durban II] Conference on concrete 

18 action by the United Nations and United Nations 

19 Member States to ensure that it is not a forum to 

20 demonize any group, or incite anti-Semitism, hatred, 

21 or violence against members of any group or to call 

22 into question the existence of any state’’ and urged 

23 all United Nations Member States ‘‘not to support 

24 a 2009 Durban Review Conference process that fails 

25 to adhere to established human rights standards and 


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1 to reject an agenda that incites hatred against any 

2 group in the guise of criticism of a particular gov3 ernment or that seeks to forge a global blasphemy 

4 code’’. 

5 (12) The present United Nations High Com6 missioner for Human Rights, Dr. Navanethem 

7 Pillay, who served as Secretary General of Durban 

8 II, has repeatedly sought to downplay the level of 

9 hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political 

10 agendas present at Durban I, describing it as merely 

11 ‘‘the virulent anti-Semitic behavior of a few non-gov12 ernmental organizations on the sidelines’’ and prais13 ing the biased 2001 Durban Declaration and Pro14 gramme of Action as ‘‘[t]he legacy of this Con15 ference’’, has repeatedly sought to downplay the level 

16 of hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel polit17 ical agendas present at Durban II and its pre18 paratory activities, and has repeatedly praised and 

19 urged the full implementation of the Durban Dec20 laration and Programme of Action. 

21 (13) High Commissioner Pillay has repeatedly 

22 and publicly criticized nations, including the United 

23 States, which announced that they would not partici24 pate in Durban II, but has almost never publicly 

25 criticized governments who succeeded in using the 


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1 conference and its preparatory activities to single 

2 out Israel for criticism and to attempt to restrict 

3 fundamental freedoms. 

4 (14) A United Nations press release on Sep5 tember 8, 2008, regarding an address by High Com6 missioner Pillay, disturbingly dismissed objections 

7 raised by non-governmental organizations to Durban 

8 II as ‘‘ferocious, and often distorted, criticism by 

9 certain lobby groups focused on single issues’’. 

10 (15) During February of 2009, the United 

11 States actively participated in intergovernmental 

12 consultations on Durban II’s ‘‘draft outcome docu13 ment’’ and engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts 

14 to dramatically reverse the path of Durban II by di15 recting it towards meaningful efforts to combat in16 tolerance and bigotry and directing it away from ef17 forts to undermine the cause of fighting discrimina18 tion through singling out Israel for implicit criticism 

19 and calling for restrictions on fundamental free20 doms. 

21 (16) On February 27, 2009, a State Depart22 ment spokesman stated that, despite United States 

23 efforts to redirect the path of Durban II, ‘‘the docu24 ment being negotiated has gone from bad to worse, 

25 and the current text of the draft outcome document 


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1 is not salvageable . . . A conference based on this 

2 text would be a missed opportunity to speak clearly 

3 about the persistent problem of racism’’ and there4 fore, the United States would not participate in fur5 ther consultations and negotiations regarding the 

6 ‘‘draft outcome document,’’ and would not partici7 pate in Durban II itself unless the ‘‘draft outcome 

8 document’’ was radically shortened and revised to 

9 eliminate objectionable material. 

10 (17) On April 17, 2009, the third and final ses11 sion of the preparatory committee for Durban II 

12 proposed a final ‘‘draft outcome document’’ that 

13 contained a number of provisions advocating restric14 tions on freedom of expression, and that also implic15 itly singled out and criticized Israel for racism by re16 affirming, in its very first paragraph, the 2001 Dur17 ban Declaration and Programme of Action. 

18 (18) On April 18, 2009, a State Department 

19 spokesman announced that ‘‘the United States will 

20 not join the [Durban II] conference’’, noting that 

21 ‘‘The current document . . . still contains language 

22 that reaffirms in toto the Durban Declaration and 

23 Programme of Action (DDPA) from 2001, which the 

24 United States has long said it is unable to support 

25 . . . The United States also has serious concerns 


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1 with relatively new additions to the text regarding 

2 ‘incitement’, that run counter to the U.S. commit3 ment to unfettered free speech.’’. 

4 (19) On April 19, 2009, the President stated at 

5 a press conference that ‘‘I would love to be involved 

6 in a useful conference that addressed continuing 

7 issues of racism and discrimination around the globe 

8 . . . we expressed in the run-up to this conference 

9 our concerns that if you incorporated—if you adopt10 ed all the language from 2001, that’s just not some11 thing we could sign up for . . . our participation 

12 would have involved putting our imprimatur on 

13 something that we just don’t believe . . . Hopefully 

14 . . . we can partner with other countries on to actu15 ally reduce discrimination around the globe. But this 

16 wasn’t an opportunity to do it.’’. 

17 (20) Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Neth18 erlands, Poland, Australia, and New Zealand also 

19 did not participate in Durban II, and the Czech Re20 public walked out of the Conference during its pro21 ceedings, never to return. 

22 (21) Libya was the chair of the Main Com23 mittee of Durban II, and vice presidents of Durban 

24 II included Libya, Iran, and Cuba. 


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1 (22) Speaking at Durban II on April 20, 2009, 

2 Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the 

3 democratic State of Israel ‘‘totally racist’’ and ‘‘the 

4 most cruel and repressive racist regime’’, and called 

5 for Israel’s destruction, stating that ‘‘Efforts must 

6 be made to put an end to the abuse by Zionists . . . 

7 Governments must be encouraged and supported in 

8 their fights aimed at eradicating this barbaric rac9 ism’’. 

10 (23) In his speech at Durban II, Ahmadinejad 

11 also propagated anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, 

12 saying that ‘‘Those who control huge economic re13 sources and interests in the world . . . mobilize all 

14 the resources, including their economic and political 

15 influence and world media, to render support in vain 

16 to the Zionist regime’’. 

17 (24) Disgusted by Ahmadinejad’s biased and 

18 incendiary statements, delegates from about two 

19 dozen nations walked out of the assembly hall in 

20 protest, but most delegations remained, and a large 

21 number of delegations and observers repeatedly ap22 plauded Ahmadinejad’s remarks. 

23 (25) On April 21, 2009, governments partici24 pating in Durban II adopted by consensus an ‘‘out25 come document’’ that contained a number of proviVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:19 Aug 31, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2829.IH H2829

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1 sions advocating restrictions on freedom of expres2 sion, and that also implicitly singled out and criti3 cized Israel for racism by reaffirming, in its very 

4 first paragraph, the 2001 Durban Declaration and 

5 Program of Action. 

6 (26) Throughout Durban II, many speakers 

7 singled out Israel for criticism or called for restric8 tions on fundamental freedoms, including represent9 atives of Iran, Libya, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Ven10 ezuela, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, 

11 Qatar, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 

12 Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia, Ban13 gladesh, Switzerland, the Organization of the Islamic 

14 Conference, the Arab League, the Palestine Libera15 tion Organization, and a number of other organiza16 tions and countries. 

17 (27) During Durban II, several speakers who 

18 sought to draw attention to genuine instances of rac19 ism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, related intol20 erance, and human rights violations by the govern21 ments of Iran, Libya, and China were repeatedly in22 terrupted by the delegations from those governments 

23 and instructed by the conference’s chair to not refer 

24 specifically to those governments. 


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1 (28) On December 18, 2009, the United Na2 tions General Assembly approved Resolution A/RES/ 

3 64/148, which urged the ‘‘full and effective imple4 mentation of the Durban Declaration and Pro5 gramme of Action’’ and called for a ‘‘one-day ple6 nary event to commemorate the ten-year anniversary 

7 [of Durban I] during the high-level segment of the 

8 General Assembly to be devoted to racism, racial dis9 crimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance dur10 ing its sixty-fifth session, in 2011’’. The United 

11 States, joined by 12 other nations, voted against this 

12 resolution. 

13 (29) On December 24, 2010, the United Na14 tions General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/ 

15 65/240, authorizing the holding of a ‘‘one-day high16 level meeting of the General Assembly to commemo17 rate the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the 

18 Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, at 

19 the level of Heads of State and Government, on the 

20 second day of the general debate of the sixty-sixth 

21 session’’ in September of 2011. The resolution also 

22 states that the meeting (commonly referred to as 

23 ‘‘Durban III’’) will adopt a ‘‘political declaration 

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1 tive implementation of the Durban Declaration and 

2 Programme of Action and its follow-up processes.’’. 

3 The resolution also requests that the United Nations 

4 Secretary General ‘‘establish a programme of out5 reach, with the involvement of Member States and 

6 United Nations funds and programmes as well as 

7 civil society, including non-governmental organiza8 tions, to appropriately commemorate the tenth anni9 versary of the adoption of the Durban Declaration 

10 and Programme of Action.’’ The resolution also re11 quests that ‘‘the Office of the United Nations High 

12 Commissioner for Human Rights and the Depart13 ment of Public Information of the Secretariat . . . 

14 launch a public information campaign for the com15 memoration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption 

16 of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Ac17 tion’’. The United States, joined by 21 other na18 tions, voted against this resolution. 

19 (30) The Government of Canada has announced 

20 that it will not participate in the Durban III meet21 ing. Canadian Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, 

22 and Multiculturalism Jason Kenney stated that 

23 ‘‘Our government has lost faith in the entire tainted 

24 Durban process. Canada will not participate in this 

25 charade any longer. We will not lend our country’s 


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1 good name to a commemoration of what has widely 

2 been characterized as a hatefest . . . Canada is 

3 clearly committed to the fight against racism, but 

4 the Durban process commemorates an agenda that 

5 actually promotes racism rather than combats it.’’. 

6 (31) The Government of Israel has announced 

7 that it will not participate in the Durban III meet8 ing, stating that ‘‘Israel is part of the international 

9 struggle against racism. The Jewish people was 

10 itself a victim of racism throughout history. Israel 

11 regrets that a resolution on an important subject— 

12 elimination of racism—has been diverted and politi13 cized by the automatic majority at the UN, by link14 ing it to the Durban Declaration and Programme of 

15 Action (2001) that many states would prefer to for16 get. The Durban Conference of 2001, with its 

17 antisemitic undertones and displays of hatred for 

18 Israel and the Jewish World, left us with scars that 

19 will not heal quickly . . . Under the present cir20 cumstances, as long as the [Durban III] meeting is 

21 defined as part of the infamous ‘Durban process’, 

22 Israel will not participate . . .’’. 

23 (32) On June 2, 2011, the United States pub24 licly announced that it would not participate in the 

25 Durban III meeting. U.S. State Department deputy 


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1 spokesman stated that the ‘‘Durban process includes 

2 displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism, and we 

3 don’t want to see that commemorated. In our con4 versations about this commemoration, we’ve not seen 

5 the kind of progress that we think is indicative. We 

6 remain unconvinced that the conference is moving in 

7 a new direction.’’. 

8 (33) The Governments of the Czech Republic, 

9 the Netherlands, and Italy have announced that they 

10 will not participate in the Durban III meeting. 

11 (34) The Durban I and Durban II Conferences, 

12 and the preparatory and follow-on activities for both, 

13 have made little or no demonstrable contribution to 

14 combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, 

15 and related intolerance. 

16 (35) To date, several million dollars from the 

17 United Nations regular budget has been expended 

18 on Durban I, Durban II, and their preparatory and 

19 follow-on activities. 

20 (36) The United States is the largest contrib21 utor to the United Nations system, and is assessed 

22 for a full 22 percent of the United Nations regular 

23 budget, which is funded by assessed contributions 

24 from Member States. 


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1 (37) Funding for Durban I, Durban II, and 

2 their preparatory and follow-on activities through 

3 the United Nations regular budget has resulted in 

4 United States taxpayer dollars being used for those 

5 purposes. 

6 (38) The United States Congress, through its 

7 adoption of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

8 2008 (Public Law 110–161) withheld from the 

9 United States assessed contribution for fiscal year 

10 2008 to the United Nations regular budget an 

11 amount equivalent to the United States share of the 

12 United Nations Human Rights Council budget, in13 cluding its share of the Council-administered pre14 paratory process for Durban II. 

15 SEC. 702. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

16 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con17 gress that— 

18 (1) the Durban I and Durban II conferences, 

19 and their preparatory and follow-on activities, were 

20 subverted by members of the Organization of the Is21 lamic Conference and irredeemably distorted into a 

22 forum for anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and anti-freedom 

23 activity; 

24 (2) by walking out of the Durban I conference, 

25 not participating in the Durban II conference, and 


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1 announcing that it would not participate in the Dur2 ban III meeting, the United States Government 

3 upheld and reaffirmed the fundamental commitment 

4 of the United States to combating racism, racial dis5 crimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance; 

6 (3) the Governments of Canada, Israel, Italy, 

7 Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Australia, New 

8 Zealand, and the Czech Republic should be com9 mended for their decision to not participate or cease 

10 participation in the Durban II conference. 

11 (4) the Governments of Canada, Israel, the 

12 Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Italy, and any 

13 other government that decides not to participate in 

14 the Durban III meeting, should be commended for 

15 that decision; and 

16 (5) the Administration should expeditiously and 

17 unequivocally announce that it will not participate 

18 in, support, or legitimize any part of the Durban 

19 process. 

20 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 

21 of the United States to— 

22 (1) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encour23 age other responsible countries— 

24 (A) not to participate in, support, legiti25 mize, or fund any portion of the Durban III 


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1 meeting, its preparatory or follow-on activities, 

2 or any other part of the Durban process, and 

3 (B) to withhold from their respective con4 tributions to the regularly assessed biennial 

5 budget of the United Nations an amount that 

6 is equal to the percentage of such respective 

7 contributions that they determine would be or 

8 has been allocated by the United Nations for 

9 any part of the Durban III meeting or its pre10 paratory or follow-on activities, or for any other 

11 part of the Durban process; 

12 (2) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to explore 

13 credible, alternative forums for combating racism, 

14 racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intol15 erance. 

16 SEC. 703. NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE DURBAN PROCESS. 

17 None of the funds made available in any provision 

18 of law may be used for United States participation in the 

19 Durban III meeting, its preparatory or follow-on activities, 

20 or any further part of the Durban process. 

21 SEC. 704. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED 

22 STATES TAXPAYER DOLLARS. 

23 (a) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS FOR THE DURBAN

24 PROCESS.—The Secretary of State shall withhold from the 

25 United States contribution to the regular budget of the 


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1 United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage 

2 of such contribution that the Secretary determines would 

3 be or has been expended by the United Nations for any 

4 part of the Durban I or Durban II conferences, the Dur5 ban III meeting, their preparatory or follow-on activities, 

6 or any other part of the Durban process, including— 

7 (1) the ‘‘public information campaign for the 

8 commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the 

9 adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme 

10 of Action’’ requested by United Nations General As11 sembly Resolution A.RES/65/240; 

12 (2) the Intergovernmental Working Group on 

13 the Effective Implementation of the Durban Dec14 laration and Programme of Action; 

15 (3) the ‘‘group of independent eminent experts 

16 on the implementation of the Durban Declaration 

17 and Programme of Action’’; and 

18 (4) the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration 

19 of Complementary Standards. 

20 (b) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS FOR OTHER BIASED

21 AND COMPROMISED ACTIVITIES.—Until the Secretary of 

22 State submits to the appropriate congressional committees 

23 a certification, on a case-by-case basis, that the require24 ments described in subsection (d) have been satisfied, the 

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1 tribution to the regular budget of the United Nations an 

2 amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribu3 tion that the Secretary determines has been allocated by 

4 the United Nations for any conference, meeting, or other 

5 multilateral forum, or the preparatory or follow-on activi6 ties of any conference, meeting, or other multilateral 

7 forum, that is organized under the aegis or jurisdiction 

8 of the United Nations or of any United Nations Entity. 

9 (c) REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER DOL10 LARS.—(1) Funds appropriated for use as a United States 

11 contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations 

12 but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 

13 subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United 

14 States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be 

15 repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

16 (2) Funds appropriated for use as a United States 

17 contribution to the regularly assessed biennial budget of 

18 the United Nations but withheld from obligation and ex19 penditure pursuant to subsection (b) may be obligated and 

20 expended for that purpose upon the certification described 

21 in subsection (d). Such funds shall revert to the United 

22 States Treasury if no such certification is made by the 

23 date that is one year after such appropriation, and shall 

24 not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Na25 tions Entity. 


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1 (d) CERTIFICATION.—The certification referred to in 

2 subsection (b) is a certification made by the Secretary of 

3 State to the appropriate congressional committees con4 cerning the following: 

5 (1) The specified conference, meeting, or other 

6 multilateral forum did not reaffirm, call for the im7 plementation of, or otherwise support the Durban 

8 Declaration and Programme of Action (2001) or the 

9 outcome document of the Durban II conference 

10 (2009) or the Durban III meeting (2011). 

11 (2) The specified conference or forum was not 

12 used to single out the United States or the State of 

13 Israel for unfair or unbalanced criticism. 

14 (3) The specified conference or forum was not 

15 used to propagate racism, racial discrimination, anti16 Semitism, denial of the Holocaust, incitement to vio17 lence or genocide, xenophobia, or related intolerance. 

18 (4) The specified conference or forum was not 

19 used to advocate for restrictions on the freedoms of 

20 speech, expression, religion, the press, assembly, or 

21 petition, or for restrictions on other fundamental 

22 human rights and freedoms. 

23 (5) The leadership of the specified conference 

24 or forum does not include a Member State, or a rep25 resentative from a Member State— 


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1 (A) subject to sanctions by the Security 

2 Council; 

3 (B) under a Security Council-mandated in4 vestigation for human rights abuses; or 

5 (C) the government of which the Secretary 

6 of State has determined, for purposes of section 

7 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 

8 (as continued in effect pursuant to the Inter9 national Emergency Economic Powers Act), 

10 section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, sec11 tion 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

12 1961, or other provision of law, is a government 

13 that has repeatedly provided support for acts of 

14 international terrorism. 

15 TITLE VIII—UNRWA 

16 SEC. 801. FINDINGS. 

17 The Congress makes the following findings: 

18 (1) United Nations General Assembly Resolu19 tion 302 (1949) created the United Nations Relief 

20 and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 

21 Near East (UNRWA) with the temporary, strictly 

22 humanitarian mandate to ‘‘carry out . . . direct re23 lief and works programmes’’ for Palestinian refu24 gees. 


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1 (2) UNRWA has acknowledged that it is the 

2 ‘‘only UN agency that reports directly to the UN 

3 General Assembly, and whose beneficiary population 

4 stems from one nation-group’’, and is responsible 

5 solely for Palestinian refugees, while the United Na6 tions High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is 

7 responsible for other refugees across the world. 

8 (3) UNHCR’s definition of a refugee is, in ac9 cordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the 

10 Status of Refugees, any person who ‘‘owing to a 

11 well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 

12 race, religion, nationality, membership of a par13 ticular social group, or political opinion, is outside 

14 the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, 

15 owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of 

16 the protection of that country . . .’’. 

17 (4) UNRWA’s much broader definition of a 

18 ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ is any person, and his descend19 ants, whose ‘‘normal place of residence was [the 

20 former British Mandate of] Palestine during the pe21 riod 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both 

22 home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 

23 conflict.’’. 

24 (5) UNRWA’s overly inclusive definition of a 

25 ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ has resulted in an increase in 


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1 UNRWA’s reported number of ‘‘Palestine refugees’’ 

2 from under one million in 1950 to over 4.5 million 

3 today, encompassing multiple generations of de4 scendants of the original Palestinian refugees. 

5 (6) Hundreds of thousands of ‘‘Palestine refu6 gees’’ are citizens of recognized states, including 

7 Jordan. 

8 (7) UNRWA, unlike UNHCR, does not offer 

9 refugees the option of resettlement and reintegration 

10 into their country of refuge or a third country. Ef11 forts by UN officials in the 1950s to offer resettle12 ment and reintegration as an option for Palestinian 

13 refugees were dropped under fierce opposition from 

14 Arab governments, and have not been taken up 

15 since. 

16 (8) Through its overly inclusive definition of a 

17 ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ and its refusal to offer refugees 

18 the option of resettlement and reintegration, 

19 UNRWA contributes to the perpetuation of the suf20 fering of Palestinian refugees, who have been ex21 ploited by Arab governments and Palestinian mili22 tant groups for over six decades as a political tool 

23 with which to assail Israel. 


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1 (9) Almost all of UNRWA’s almost 30,000 staff 

2 are Palestinian refugees themselves, presenting a 

3 clear conflict of interest. 

4 (10) UNRWA’s total annual budget, including 

5 its core programs, emergency activities and special 

6 projects, exceeds $1 billion. 

7 (11) The United States has long been the larg8 est single contributing country to UNRWA. 

9 (12) From 1950 to 2010, the United States has 

10 contributed almost $3.9 billion to UNRWA, includ11 ing an average of over $210 million per year be12 tween fiscal years 2007 and 2010. 

13 (13) Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance 

14 Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S. Code 2221(c)) 

15 states that ‘‘No contributions by the United States 

16 shall be made to the United Nations Relief and 

17 Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 

18 East except on the condition that the United Na19 tions Relief and Works Agency take all possible 

20 measures to assure that no part of the United States 

21 contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to 

22 any refugee who is receiving military training as a 

23 member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army 

24 or any other guerrilla type organization or who has 

25 engaged in any act of terrorism.’’. 


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1 (14) Then-Deputy Secretary of State Jacob J. 

2 Lew testified before the House Committee on For3 eign Affairs on May 13, 2009 that ‘‘We have the 

4 highest level of scrutiny in terms of UNRWA’’. 

5 (15) However, in contravention of United 

6 States law, UNRWA does not ask its personnel or 

7 aid recipients if they are members of Foreign Ter8 rorist Organizations. 

9 (16) Even though the United States remains 

10 the largest single contributing country to UNRWA, 

11 UNRWA does not screen its prospective or present 

12 staff and aid recipients through United States watch 

13 lists, including that of the Department of the Treas14 ury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, and refused 

15 a United States request to do so in 2005. 

16 (17) UNRWA claims that it has fulfilled its ob17 ligations under section 301(c) of the Foreign Assist18 ance Act of 1961 by screening personnel through the 

19 United Nations Consolidated List pursuant to 

20 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, 

21 but the names on that list are largely members of 

22 Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, not of Palestinian For23 eign Terrorist Organizations such as Hamas, 

24 Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, or Palestinian 

25 Islamic Jihad. 


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1 (18) Former UNRWA commissioner-general 

2 Peter Hansen, stated in 2004 that ‘‘I am sure that 

3 there are Hamas members on the UNRWA payroll 

4 and I don’t see that as a crime.’’. 

5 (19) A number of UNRWA personnel have been 

6 discovered to be affiliated with Foreign Terrorist Or7 ganizations, including, inter alia: 

8 (A) Issa Batran (now deceased), a com9 mander of Hamas’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades 

10 and senior rocket-maker who taught at an 

11 UNRWA school in Gaza; 

12 (B) Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi 

13 (now deceased), who reportedly carried out a 

14 homicide bombing that killed seven Americans 

15 and one Jordanian at Forward Operating Base 

16 Chapman in Afghanistan on December 30, 

17 2009, reportedly worked as a physician at an 

18 UNRWA clinic in Amman, Jordan, and had 

19 longstanding ties to violent Islamist extremism; 

20 (C) Said Siam (now deceased), a longtime 

21 Hamas official who eventually served as 

22 Hamas’s Interior Minister in Gaza, and who 

23 taught at an UNRWA school in Gaza; 

24 (D) Awad al-Qiq (now deceased), a rocket25 builder for Palestinian Islamic Jihad who 


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1 served as headmaster of an UNRWA school in 

2 Gaza; 

3 (E) Nahd Atallah, an UNRWA staff mem4 ber in Gaza, who was arrested, convicted, and 

5 sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment by an 

6 Israeli military court of using his UN travel 

7 document to bypass Israeli checkpoints in Gaza 

8 in order to transport armed Palestinian mili9 tants; and 

10 (F) an UNRWA teacher who reportedly 

11 praised homicide bombers and permitted 

12 Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin (now deceased) to 

13 speak to an assembly of students at an 

14 UNRWA school. UNRWA did not terminate 

15 the teacher’s employment, instead only giving 

16 him a letter of censure. 

17 (20) UNRWA staff unions, including the teach18 ers’ union, are frequently controlled by members af19 filiated with Hamas. 

20 (21) UNRWA refugee camps in Lebanon have 

21 frequently been controlled by Foreign Terrorist Or22 ganizations and used for numerous unacceptable ac23 tivities. 

24 (22) Former UNRWA general counsel James 

25 Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that— 


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1 (A) ‘‘UNRWA . . . obviously does not take 

2 ‘all possible measures’ in practice’’ to assure 

3 that United States contributions do not provide 

4 assistance to any refugee with ties to Foreign 

5 Terrorist Organizations, in accordance with sec6 tion 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

7 1961; 

8 (B) ‘‘UNRWA makes no attempt to weed 

9 out individuals who support extremist positions 

10 . . . UNRWA has taken very few steps to de11 tect and eliminate terrorists from the ranks of 

12 its staff or its beneficiaries, and no steps at all 

13 to prevent members of terrorist organizations, 

14 such as Hamas, from joining its staff.’’; 

15 (C) ‘‘[I]t is rare for an area staff member 

16 . . . to report or confirm that another staff 

17 member has violated rules against political 

18 speech, let alone exhibited ties to terrorism. Not 

19 surprisingly, external allegations of improper 

20 speech or improper use of UNRWA facilities 

21 are difficult to prove, as virtually no one is will22 ing to be a witness against gang members.’’; 

23 and 

24 (D) ‘‘[T]here are no formal procedures for 

25 deregistering or denying services to a properly 


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1 registered refugee, no matter what he or she 

2 does.’’. 

3 (23) The late United States Representative 

4 Tom Lantos, in a May 13, 2002 letter, expressed his 

5 concern that— 

6 (A) ‘‘UNRWA is perpetuating, rather than 

7 ameliorating, the situation of Palestinian refu8 gees’’; 

9 (B) ‘‘UNRWA officials have . . . failed to 

10 prevent their camps from becoming centers of 

11 terrorist activity’’; and 

12 (C) ‘‘for too long, UNRWA has been part 

13 of the problem, rather than the solution, in the 

14 Middle East . . . UNRWA camps have fostered 

15 a culture of anger and dependency that under16 mines both regional peace and the well-being of 

17 the camps’ inhabitants.’’. 

18 (24) UNRWA continues to hold accounts at the 

19 Arab Bank and the Commercial Bank of Syria 

20 (CBS), financial institutions that the United States 

21 deems or believes to be complicit in money laun22 dering and terror financing. 

23 (25) The Arab Bank is reportedly at the center 

24 of United States investigations into how tens of mil25 lions of dollars have flowed to Palestinian groups 


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1 that allegedly used some of those funds to pay off 

2 suicide bombers and their relatives, and is also re3 portedly being sued in Federal court by American 

4 victims of attacks in Israel, with attorneys for the 

5 victims accusing the bank of facilitating Acts of 

6 International Terrorism. 

7 (26) On May 11, 2004, the Department of the 

8 Treasury designated CBS as a financial institution 

9 of ‘‘primary money laundering concern’’ pursuant to 

10 section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, stating that 

11 ‘‘CBS had been used by terrorists and their sympa12 thizers and acted as a conduit for the laundering of 

13 proceeds generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil’’ 

14 and that ‘‘numerous transactions that may be indic15 ative of terrorist financing and money laundering 

16 have been transferred through CBS, including two 

17 accounts at CBS that reference a reputed financier 

18 for Usama bin Laden.’’. 

19 (27) CBS is controlled by the Government of 

20 Syria, a State Sponsor of Terrorism. 

21 (28) The curriculum of UNRWA schools, which 

22 use the textbooks of their respective host govern23 ments or authorities, has long contained materials 

24 that are anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and supportive of 

25 violent extremism. 


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1 (29) As far back as over forty years ago, former 

2 UNRWA commissioner-general Laurence 

3 Michelmore admitted that UNRWA schools were 

4 supporting a ‘‘bitterly hostile attitude to Israel.’’. 

5 (30) Former UNRWA general counsel James 

6 Lindsay noted in a January 2009 report that 

7 ‘‘[T]eachers in UNRWA schools were often afraid to 

8 remove posters glorifying ‘martyrs’ (including sui9 cide bombers) for fear of retribution from armed 

10 supporters of the ‘martyrs.’ ’’. 

11 (31) UNRWA officials have compromised 

12 UNRWA’s strictly humanitarian mandate by engag13 ing in political agitation, propaganda, and advocacy 

14 agitation against Israel and in favor of Hamas, as 

15 reflected by the following, inter alia: 

16 (A) UNRWA officials have repeatedly 

17 called for the United States and other nations 

18 to deal directly with Hamas and have repeat19 edly called for political ‘‘reconciliation’’ between 

20 Hamas and Fatah. 

21 (B) UNRWA officials have repeatedly cas22 tigated Israel for her actions to defend innocent 

23 civilians from rocket and mortar attacks from 

24 violent extremist groups in Gaza and from 

25 other Acts of International Terrorism, and has 


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1 repeatedly blamed Israel, not Hamas and other 

2 violent extremist groups, for present restrictions 

3 on access to Gaza. 

4 (C) Former UNRWA general counsel 

5 James Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that: 

6 ‘‘Although it occasionally issued mild, pro 

7 forma criticisms of Palestinian attacks (most of 

8 which were clearly war crimes), [UNRWA] put 

9 more effort into criticizing Israeli counterter10 rorism efforts (which were condemned using 

11 language associated with war crimes, though 

12 any such crimes were far from proved) . . . 

13 UNRWA never seems to acknowledge that 

14 Israel, since its 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, 

15 has launched strikes on the territory largely in 

16 order to halt rocket attacks and other as17 saults.’’. 

18 (D) Lindsay also noted that ‘‘UNRWA— 

19 through its leaders and press spokespersons—is 

20 constantly involved in political speech . . . 

21 These one-sided speeches on political matters 

22 do not further the goals of a humanitarian and 

23 supposedly nonpolitical agency.’’. 

24 (E) UNRWA Commissioner-General 

25 Filippo Grandi described as a ‘‘massacre’’ 


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1 Israel’s May 31, 2010 naval operation, and use 

2 of self-defense measures, to seize the Mavi 

3 Marmara ship in order to enforce its naval 

4 blockade of the Gaza Strip. 

5 (F) Former UNRWA commissioner-gen6 eral Karen AbuZayd stated in a 2009 meeting 

7 with Congressional staff that ‘‘We [UNRWA] 

8 are not just humanitarian.’’. 

9 (G) In January of 2009, UNRWA spokes10 man Christopher Gunness called for an inves11 tigation as to whether Israel had committed ‘‘a 

12 war crime.’’. 

13 (H) On December 30, 2008, former 

14 UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd 

15 stated that only Israel was responsible for the 

16 start of the most recent conflict in Gaza. 

17 (I) On May 25, 2008, in an interview with 

18 Press TV, which is controlled by the Govern19 ment of Iran, former UNRWA commissioner20 general Karen AbuZayd reportedly claimed that 

21 Hamas was free from corruption and ‘‘more 

22 popular than ever’’. 

23 (J) On October 5, 2007, former UNRWA 

24 commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd blamed 

25 Israel for violent extremist groups in Gaza 


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1 launching rockets and mortars against Israeli 

2 civilian targets, stating that residents of Gaza 

3 ‘‘have absorbed—and continue to experience— 

4 military incursions in which civilian lives, liveli5 hoods, and property have been destroyed, and 

6 to which they have responded with the contin7 uous firing of Qassam rockets into Israel.’’. 

8 (K) On March 8, 2007, former UNRWA 

9 commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd, com10 paring the 1948 Arab-Israeli War with more re11 cent conflicts between Israel and Palestinian 

12 militant groups, stated that ‘‘[T]here is a strik13 ing historical continuity in the systematic ap14 proach to use overwhelming and dispropor15 tionate force in the name of security; to sepa16 rate and exclude Palestinians from the main17 stream; to eject them from their land; and to 

18 occupy Palestinian land.’’. 

19 (L) On January 19, 2005, former 

20 UNRWA commissioner-general Peter Hansen 

21 stated that ‘‘My job [is] to represent the refu22 gees.’’. 

23 (M) In 2002, former UNRWA commis24 sioner-general Peter Hansen falsely accused 

25 Israel of carrying out a ‘‘massacre’’ in 


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1 UNRWA’s Jenin refugee camp after Israeli 

2 forces entered the camp, a base of operations 

3 for Palestinian militant groups, to carry out de4 fensive operations to halt repeated homicide 

5 bombings in Israel. 

6 (N) In 1964, UNRWA allowed its staff to 

7 attend the conference in Jerusalem where the 

8 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was 

9 established. 

10 (32) Despite UNRWA’s contravention of U.S. 

11 law and activities that compromise its strictly hu12 manitarian mandate, UNRWA continues to receive 

13 United States contributions, including $237.8 mil14 lion in fiscal year 2010. 

15 (33) The bilateral ‘‘Framework for Coopera16 tion’’ that the United States concluded with 

17 UNRWA for 2010 actually ‘‘commends’’ UNRWA 

18 and does not commit UNRWA to vetting its per19 sonnel and aid recipients through United States 

20 watch lists. 

21 (34) Assistance from the United States and 

22 other responsible nations allows UNRWA to claim 

23 that criticisms of the agency’s behavior are un24 founded. UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness 

25 has dismissed concerns by stating that ‘‘If these 


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1 baseless allegations were even halfway true, do you 

2 really think the U.S. and [European Commission] 

3 would give us hundreds of millions of dollars per 

4 year?’’ 

5 (35) Former UNRWA general counsel James 

6 Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that: 

7 (A) ‘‘The United States, despite funding 

8 nearly 75 percent of UNRWA’s national budget 

9 and remaining its largest single country donor, 

10 has mostly failed to make UNRWA reflect U.S. 

11 foreign policy objectives . . . Recent U.S. ef12 forts to shape UNRWA appear to have been in13 effective . . .’’; 

14 (B) ‘‘[T]he United States is not obligated 

15 to fund agencies that refuse to check its rolls 

16 for individuals their donors do not wish to sup17 port.’’; 

18 (C) ‘‘A number of changes in UNRWA 

19 could benefit the refugees, the Middle East, and 

20 the United States, but those changes will not 

21 occur unless the United States, ideally with 

22 support from UNRWA’s other main financial 

23 supporter, the European Union, compels the 

24 agency to enact reforms.’’; and 


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1 (D) ‘‘If the [UNRWA commissioner-gen2 eral’s] power is used in ways that are conflict 

3 with the donors’ political objectives, it is up to 

4 the donors to take the necessary actions to en5 sure that their interests are respected. When 

6 they have done so, UNRWA—given the tight fi7 nancial leash it has been on for most of its ex8 istence—has tended to follow their dictates, 

9 even if sometimes slowly.’’. 

10 (36) The Government of Canada has recently 

11 placed restrictions on its contributions to UNRWA, 

12 demonstrating consequences for UNRWA’s malfea13 sance and setting an example for the United States 

14 and other donor governments. 

15 SEC. 802. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA. 

16 Section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

17 is amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the 

18 following new subsection: 

19 ‘‘(c)(1) WITHHOLDING.—Contributions by the 

20 United States to the United Nations Relief and Works 

21 Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 

22 (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to the 

23 regular budget of the United Nations for the support of 

24 UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff positions 

25 provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), 


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1 may be provided only during a period for which a certifi2 cation described in paragraph (2) is in effect. 

3 ‘‘(2) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in 

4 this paragraph is a written determination by the Secretary 

5 of State, based on all information available after diligent 

6 inquiry, and transmitted to the appropriate congressional 

7 committees along with a detailed description of the factual 

8 basis therefor, that— 

9 ‘‘(A) no official, employee, consultant, con10 tractor, subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of 

11 UNRWA— 

12 ‘‘(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist 

13 Organization; 

14 ‘‘(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or in15 cited anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic 

16 rhetoric or propaganda; or 

17 ‘‘(iii) has used any UNRWA resources, in18 cluding publications or Web sites, to propagate 

19 or disseminate political materials, including po20 litical rhetoric regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 

21 conflict; 

22 ‘‘(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other 

23 facility, or other infrastructure or resource is being 

24 used by a Foreign Terrorist Organization for oper25 ations, planning, training, recruitment, fundraising, 


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1 indoctrination, communications, sanctuary, storage 

2 of weapons or other materials, or any other pur3 poses; 

4 ‘‘(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive fi5 nancial audits by an internationally recognized third 

6 party independent auditing firm and has imple7 mented an effective system of vetting and oversight 

8 to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any 

9 UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organiza10 tion or members thereof; 

11 ‘‘(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational 

12 institution uses textbooks or other educational mate13 rials that propagate or disseminate anti-American, 

14 anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric, propaganda or 

15 incitement; 

16 ‘‘(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is 

17 a member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization; and 

18 ‘‘(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affili19 ations with financial institutions that the United 

20 States deems or believes to be complicit in money 

21 laundering and terror financing. 

22 ‘‘(3) DEFINITION.—In this section: 

23 ‘‘(A) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.— 

24 The term ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’ means an 

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1 ganization by the Secretary of State in accordance 

2 with section 219(a) of the Immigration and Nation3 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)). 

4 ‘‘(B) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT5 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional com6 mittees’ means— 

7 ‘‘(i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, 

8 Appropriations, and Oversight and Government 

9 Reform of the House; and 

10 ‘‘(ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 

11 Appropriations, and Homeland Security and 

12 Governmental Affairs of the Senate. 

13 ‘‘(4) EFFECTIVE DURATION OF CERTIFICATION.— 

14 The certification described in paragraph (2) shall be effec15 tive for a period of 180 days from the date of transmission 

16 to the appropriate congressional committees, or until the 

17 Secretary receives information rendering that certification 

18 factually inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the event 

19 that a certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall 

20 promptly transmit to the appropriate congressional com21 mittees a description of any information that precludes the 

22 renewal or continuation of the certification. 

23 ‘‘(5) LIMITATION.—During a period for which a cer24 tification described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the 

25 United States may not contribute to the United Nations 


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1 Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 

2 Near East (UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual 

3 amount— 

4 ‘‘(A) greater than the highest annual contribu5 tion to UNRWA made by a member country of the 

6 League of Arab States; 

7 ‘‘(B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA 

8 budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget 

9 for the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref10 ugees (UNHCR) paid by the United States; or 

11 ‘‘(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget 

12 of UNRWA.’’. 

13 SEC. 803. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

14 It is the sense of Congress that— 

15 (1) the President and the Secretary of State 

16 should lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encour17 age other responsible nations to withhold contribu18 tions to UNRWA, to any successor or related entity, 

19 or to the regular budget of the United Nations for 

20 the support of UNRWA or a successor entity 

21 (through staff positions provided by the United Na22 tions Secretariat, or otherwise) until UNRWA has 

23 met the conditions listed in subparagraphs (A) 

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1 sistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 2 of this 

2 Act); 

3 (2) citizens of recognized states should be re4 moved from UNRWA’s jurisdiction; 

5 (3) UNRWA’s definition of a ‘‘Palestine ref6 ugee’’ should be changed to that used for a refugee 

7 by the Office of the United Nations High Commis8 sioner for Refugees; and 

9 (4) in order to alleviate the suffering of Pales10 tinian refugees, responsibility for those refugees 

11 should be fully transferred to the Office of the 

12 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 

13 TITLE IX—INTERNATIONAL 

14 ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

15 SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM. 

16 (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress makes the following 

17 findings: 

18 (1) The International Atomic Energy Agency 

19 (IAEA) was established in 1957 with the objectives 

20 of seeking to ‘‘accelerate and enlarge the contribu21 tion of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity 

22 throughout the world’’ and to ‘‘ensure . . . that as23 sistance provided by it or at its request or under its 

24 supervision or control is not used in such a way as 

25 to further any military purpose.’’. 


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1 (2) The United States, via assessed contribu2 tions, is the largest financial contributor to the reg3 ular budget of the IAEA. 

4 (3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now 

5 called the Technical Cooperation Program, financed 

6 primarily through voluntary contributions by mem7 ber states to the Technical Cooperation Fund, to 

8 provide nuclear technical cooperation (TC) for 

9 peaceful purposes to countries worldwide. 

10 (4) The United States is the largest financial 

11 contributor to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation 

12 Fund. 

13 (5) A March 2009 report by the Government 

14 Accountability Office (GAO) found that ‘‘neither 

15 [the Department of State] nor IAEA seeks to sys16 tematically limit TC assistance to countries the 

17 United States has designated as state sponsors of 

18 terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even 

19 though under U.S. law these countries are subject to 

20 sanctions.’’. 

21 (6) The GAO report also found that ‘‘Together, 

22 [Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria] received more than 

23 $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 

24 2007.’’. These four countries have received contin25 ued assistance since 2007. 


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1 (7) The GAO report also found that ‘‘prolifera2 tion concerns about the [Technical Cooperation Pro3 gram] have persisted because of the assistance it has 

4 provided to certain countries and because nuclear 

5 equipment, technology, and expertise can be dual6 use—capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but 

7 also useful in contributing to nuclear weapons devel8 opment.’’. 

9 (8) The GAO report also found that ‘‘[The 

10 State Department] reported in 2007 that three TC 

11 projects in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian 

12 nuclear power plant at Bushehr.’’. 

13 (9) The GAO report also found that ‘‘The pro14 liferation concerns associated with the [Technical 

15 Cooperation Program] are difficult for the United 

16 States to fully identify, assess, and resolve . . . [be17 cause] there is no formal mechanism for obtaining 

18 TC project information during the proposal develop19 ment phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State doc20 umentation on how proliferation concerns of TC pro21 posals were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. 

22 policies and IAEA procedures [including monitoring 

23 proliferation risks] related to TC program fellow24 ships.’’. 


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1 (10) The GAO report noted that ‘‘IAEA offi2 cials told us that the [Technical Cooperation Pro3 gram] does not attempt to exclude countries on the 

4 basis of their status as U.S.-designated state spon5 sors of terrorism or other political considerations’’ 

6 and that, according to the Deputy Director General 

7 for the Technical Cooperation Program, ‘‘there are 

8 no good countries and there are no bad countries’’ 

9 with respect to provision of technical cooperation by 

10 the IAEA. 

11 (11) The GAO report also found that ‘‘given 

12 the limited information available on TC projects and 

13 the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and 

14 expertise, we do not believe [the State Department] 

15 can assert with complete confidence that TC assist16 ance has not advanced [weapons of mass destruc17 tion] programs in U.S.-designated state sponsors of 

18 terrorism’’. 

19 (12) The GAO report also found that ‘‘we do 

20 not share [the State Department’s confidence in 

21 IAEA’s internal safeguards to prevent TC projects 

22 from contributing to weapons development . . .]’’. 

23 (13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

24 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibited any of the funds au25 thorized to be appropriated for ‘‘International OrgaVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:19 Aug 31, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00116 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2829.IH H2829

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1 nizations and Programs’’ from being made available 

2 for the United States proportionate share for pro3 grams for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Lib4 eration Organization, inter alia. 

5 (14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financ6 ing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 

7 1998 (Public Law 105–118) prohibited any of the 

8 funds made available by such Act for the IAEA from 

9 being made available for programs and projects of 

10 the IAEA in Cuba. 

11 (15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc12 turing Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277) required 

13 the United States to withhold a proportionate share 

14 of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba regard15 ing the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro 

16 Pi Nuclear Research Center. 

17 (16) The GAO report asked Congress ‘‘to con18 sider directing [the State Department] to withhold a 

19 share of future annual contributions to the [Tech20 nical Cooperation Fund] that is proportionate to the 

21 amount of funding provided from the fund for U.S.- 

22 designated state sponsors of terrorism and other 

23 countries of concern, noting that such a withholding 

24 is a matter of fundamental principle and intended to 


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1 foster a more consistent U.S. policy toward such na2 tions’’. 

3 (17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that 

4 the Government of Iran continues its work on heavy 

5 water-related projects and its enrichment of ura6 nium, in violation of United Nations Security Coun7 cil Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 

8 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 

9 (2010). 

10 (18) United Nations Security Council Resolu11 tion 1737 (2006) decided ‘‘that technical cooperation 

12 provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices 

13 shall only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or 

14 other humanitarian purposes [inter alia] . . . but 

15 that no such technical cooperation shall be provided 

16 that relates to . . . proliferation sensitive nuclear ac17 tivities . . .’’. 

18 (19) The IAEA Director General reported to 

19 the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 2011 

20 that the Government of Iran now has approximately 

21 7,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium, is running 

22 almost 5,000 of them, and has increased its stock23 pile of low-enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilo24 grams, considered sufficient for further enrichment 

25 into enough high-enriched uranium for more than 


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1 one atomic bomb. The Government of Iran has also 

2 reportedly produced a stockpile of over 40 kilograms 

3 of uranium enriched up to 20 percent U–235. 

4 (20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

5 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

6 in his report of February 25, 2011, about the ‘‘out7 standing issues related to possible military dimen8 sions to Iran’s nuclear programme’’. 

9 (21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

10 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

11 in his report of February 25, 2011, that ‘‘the 

12 [IAEA] remains concerned about the possible exist13 ence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear 

14 related activities involving military-related organiza15 tions, including activities related to the development 

16 of a nuclear payload for a missile.’’. 

17 (22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

18 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

19 in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘Iran has 

20 not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a 

21 prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide credible as22 surance about the absence of undeclared nuclear ma23 terial and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the 

24 IAEA’s] request that Iran provide, as a trans25 parency measure, access to additional locations reVerDate Mar 15 2010 02:19 Aug 31, 2011 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H2829.IH H2829

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1 lated, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, 

2 research and development on uranium enrichment, 

3 and uranium mining and milling, as also required by 

4 the Security Council.’’. 

5 (23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

6 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

7 in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘as a result 

8 of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in con9 nection with . . . issues which give rise to concerns 

10 about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 

11 programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive 

12 progress on these issues.’’. 

13 (24) Iran has refused to comply with resolu14 tions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 

15 September 12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 

16 2004, June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 

17 11, 2005, September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, 

18 and July 31, 2006, regarding ‘‘Iran’s many failures 

19 and breaches of its obligations to comply with its 

20 NPT Safeguards Agreement’’ and continues to block 

21 IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities, in violation 

22 of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. 

23 (25) According to multiple news reports, Iran 

24 recently denied access to its enrichment site at 

25 Natanz to IAEA inspectors, and has also denied a 


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1 request by the IAEA to place one or more additional 

2 surveillance cameras at the enrichment site at 

3 Natanz. 

4 (26) In April of 2008, United States Govern5 ment officials publicly revealed that Syria was build6 ing at the Dair Alzour site, with North Korea’s as7 sistance, a secret nuclear reactor that was based on 

8 a North Korean model capable of producing pluto9 nium for nuclear weapons and that was weeks away 

10 from becoming operational before an Israeli air 

11 strike reportedly destroyed the reactor in September 

12 2007. 

13 (27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hay14 den, the former Director of the Central Intelligence 

15 Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair 

16 Alzour could have produced enough plutonium for 1 

17 or 2 bombs within a year of becoming operational. 

18 (28) The IAEA Director General reported to 

19 the IAEA Board of Governors on November 19, 

20 2008 that the Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore 

21 features that resembled those of an undeclared nu22 clear reactor, adding that ‘‘Syria has not yet pro23 vided the requested documentation in support of its 

24 declarations concerning the nature or function of the 

25 destroyed building, nor agreed to a visit to the three 


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1 other locations which the IAEA has requested to 

2 visit.’’. 

3 (29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated 

4 to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, 

5 that ‘‘the limited information and access provided by 

6 Syria to date have not enabled the Agency to deter7 mine the nature of the destroyed facility’’ at Dair 

8 Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found 

9 in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 

10 Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and 

11 that the particles found at both sites ‘‘are of a type 

12 not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear 

13 material.’’. 

14 (30) Commercial satellite photos published on 

15 February 23, 2011 indicate efforts by the Govern16 ment of Syria to conceal its activities at an addi17 tional site, Marj as Sultan, which may be connected 

18 to the Dair Alzour facility. 

19 (31) The IAEA Director General reported to 

20 the IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 2011 

21 that ‘‘Syria has not cooperated with the [IAEA] 

22 since June 2008 in connection with the unresolved 

23 issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the other 

24 three locations allegedly functionally related to it. As 

25 a consequences, the [IAEA] has not been able to 


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1 make progress towards resolving the outstanding 

2 issues related to those sites.’’ 

3 (b) IN GENERAL.—No funds from any United States 

4 assessed or voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be 

5 used to support any assistance provided by the IAEA 

6 through its Technical Cooperation program to any coun7 try, including North Korea that— 

8 (1) is a country the government of which has 

9 been determined by the Secretary of State, for pur10 poses of section 6(j) of the Export Administration 

11 Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 

12 Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control 

13 Act, or other provision of law, is a government that 

14 has repeatedly provided support for acts of inter15 national terrorism; 

16 (2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its 

17 obligations regarding— 

18 (A) its safeguards agreement with the 

19 IAEA; 

20 (B) the Additional Protocol; 

21 (C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 

22 (D) any relevant United Nations Security 

23 Council Resolution; or 

24 (E) the Charter of the United Nations; or 


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1 (3) is under investigation for a breach of or 

2 noncompliance with the obligations specified in para3 graph (2). 

4 (c) WITHHOLDING OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBU5 TIONS.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the en6 actment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall withhold 

7 from the United States voluntary contribution to the 

8 IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA 

9 in the period from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through 

10 its Technical Cooperation Program to countries described 

11 in subsection (b). 

12 (d) WITHHOLDING OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

13 If, not later than 30 days of the date of the enactment 

14 of this Act, the amount specified in subsection (c) has not 

15 been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all assist16 ance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program 

17 to the countries described in subsection (b), an amount 

18 equal to that specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld 

19 from the United States assessed contribution to the IAEA. 

20 (e) WAIVER.—The provisions in subsections (c) and 

21 (d) may be waived if— 

22 (1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance pro23 vided through its Technical Cooperation Program to 

24 the countries described in subsection (b); or 


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1 (2) the President certifies that the countries de2 scribed in subsection (b) no longer pose a threat to 

3 the national security, interests, and allies of the 

4 United States. 

5 (f) UNITED STATES ACTIONS AT IAEA.—The Presi6 dent shall direct the United States Permanent Represent7 ative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 

8 of the United States at the IAEA to block the allocation 

9 of funds for any assistance provided by the IAEA through 

10 its Technical Cooperation Program to any country de11 scribed in subsection (b). 

12 (g) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the 

13 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 

14 transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a re15 port on the implementation of this section. 

16 SEC. 902. UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE IAEA. 

17 (a) ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE.— 

18 (1) OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE.— 

19 (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President 

20 shall direct the United States Permanent Rep21 resentative to International Atomic Energy 

22 Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and influ23 ence of the United States at the IAEA to estab24 lish an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat 

25 of the IAEA. 


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1 (B) OPERATION.—The Office of Compli2 ance shall— 

3 (i) function as an independent body 

4 composed of technical experts who shall 

5 work in consultation with IAEA inspectors 

6 to assess compliance by IAEA Member 

7 States and provide recommendations to the 

8 IAEA Board of Governors concerning pen9 alties to be imposed on IAEA Member 

10 States that fail to fulfill their obligations 

11 under IAEA Board resolutions; 

12 (ii) base its assessments and rec13 ommendations on IAEA inspection reports; 

14 and 

15 (iii) take into consideration informa16 tion provided by IAEA Board Members 

17 that are 1 of the 5 nuclear weapons states 

18 as recognized by the Treaty on the Non19 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 

20 483) (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nu21 clear Nonproliferation Treaty’’ or the 

22 ‘‘NPT’’). 

23 (C) STAFFING.—The Office of Compliance 

24 shall be staffed from existing personnel in the 

25 Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the 


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1 Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of 

2 the IAEA. 

3 (2) COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND

4 VERIFICATION.—The President shall direct the 

5 United States Permanent Representative to the 

6 IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

7 United States at the IAEA to ensure that the Com8 mittee on Safeguards and Verification established in 

9 2005 shall develop and seek to put into force a 

10 workplan of concrete measures that will— 

11 (A) improve the ability of the IAEA to 

12 monitor and enforce compliance by Member 

13 States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Non14 proliferation Treaty and the Statute of the 

15 International Atomic Energy Agency; and 

16 (B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, be17 yond the verification mechanisms and authori18 ties contained in the Additional Protocol to the 

19 Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and 

20 Member States of the IAEA, to detect with a 

21 high degree of confidence undeclared nuclear 

22 activities by a Member State. 

23 (3) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE IAEA.— 

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1 tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and in2 fluence of the United States at the IAEA to en3 sure that a Member State of the IAEA that is 

4 under investigation for a breach of or non5 compliance with its IAEA obligations or the 

6 purposes and principles of the Charter of the 

7 United Nations has its privileges suspended, in8 cluding— 

9 (i) limiting its ability to vote on its 

10 case; 

11 (ii) being prevented from receiving 

12 any technical assistance; and 

13 (iii) being prevented from hosting 

14 meetings. 

15 (B) TERMINATION OF PENALTIES.—The 

16 penalties specified under subparagraph (A) 

17 shall be terminated when such investigation is 

18 concluded and such Member State is no longer 

19 in such breach or noncompliance. 

20 (4) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NU21 CLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.—The Presi22 dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep23 resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 

24 influence of the United States at the IAEA to en25 sure that a Member State of the IAEA that is found 


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1 to be in breach of, in noncompliance with, or has 

2 withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 

3 shall return to the IAEA all nuclear materials and 

4 technology received from the IAEA, any Member 

5 State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nu6 clear Nonproliferation Treaty. 

7 (b) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

8 (1) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.—Voluntary 

9 contributions of the United States to the IAEA 

10 should primarily be used to fund activities relating 

11 to Nuclear Safety and Security or activities relating 

12 to Nuclear Verification. 

13 (2) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The 

14 President shall direct the United States Permanent 

15 Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, 

16 and influence of the United States at the IAEA to— 

17 (A) ensure that funds for safeguards in18 spections are prioritized for countries that have 

19 newly established nuclear programs or are initi20 ating nuclear programs; and 

21 (B) block the allocation of funds for any 

22 other IAEA development, environmental, or nu23 clear science assistance or activity to a coun24 try— 


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1 (i) the government of which the Sec2 retary of State has determined, for pur3 poses of section 6(j) of the Export Admin4 istration Act of 1979, section 620A of the 

5 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 

6 of the Arms Export Control Act, or other 

7 provision of law, is a government that has 

8 repeatedly provided support for acts of 

9 international terrorism and the government 

10 of which the Secretary has determined has 

11 not dismantled and surrendered its weap12 ons of mass destruction programs under 

13 international verification; 

14 (ii) that is under investigation for a 

15 breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 

16 obligations or the purposes and principles 

17 of the Charter of the United Nations; or 

18 (iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 

19 obligations or the purposes and principles 

20 of the Charter of the United Nations. 

21 (3) DETAIL OF EXPENDITURES.—The Presi22 dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep23 resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 

24 influence of the United States at the IAEA to se25 cure, as part of the regular budget presentation of 


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1 the IAEA to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed 

2 breakdown by country of expenditures of the IAEA 

3 for safeguards inspections and nuclear security ac4 tivities. 

5 (c) MEMBERSHIP.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct 

7 the United States Permanent Representative to the 

8 IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

9 United States at the IAEA to block the membership 

10 on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Mem11 ber State of the IAEA that has not signed and rati12 fied the Additional Protocol and— 

13 (A) is under investigation for a breach of 

14 or noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or 

15 the purposes and principles of the Charter of 

16 the United Nations; or 

17 (B) that is in violation of its IAEA obliga18 tions or the purposes and principles of the 

19 Charter of the United Nations. 

20 (2) CRITERIA.—The United States Permanent 

21 Representative to the IAEA shall make every effort 

22 to modify the criteria for Board membership to re23 flect the principles described in paragraph (1). 

24 (d) SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.—The President 

25 shall direct the United States Permanent Representative 


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1 to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

2 United States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure 

3 that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small 

4 Quantities Protocol in order to— 

5 (1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities 

6 Protocol; 

7 (2) require that any IAEA Member State that 

8 has previously signed a Small Quantities Protocol to 

9 sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol, 

10 provide immediate access for IAEA inspectors to its 

11 nuclear-related facilities, and agree to the strongest 

12 inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and 

13 (3) require that any IAEA Member State that 

14 does not comply with paragraph (2) to be ineligible 

15 to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, 

16 or assistance from any IAEA Member State and 

17 subject to the penalties described in subsection 

18 (a)(3). 

19 (e) NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN.— 

20 (1) UNITED STATES ACTION.—The President 

21 shall direct the United States Permanent Represent22 ative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influ23 ence of the United States at the IAEA to make 

24 every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by 

25 the IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to 


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1 the restrictions already imposed, makes Iran ineli2 gible to receive any nuclear material, technology, 

3 equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member 

4 State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not re5 lated to safeguards inspections or nuclear security 

6 until the IAEA Board of Governors determines that 

7 Iran— 

8 (A) is providing full access to IAEA in9 spectors to its nuclear-related facilities; 

10 (B) has fully implemented and is in com11 pliance with the Additional Protocol; and 

12 (C) has permanently ceased and disman13 tled all activities and programs related to nu14 clear-enrichment and reprocessing. 

15 (2) PENALTIES.—If an IAEA Member State is 

16 determined to have violated the prohibition on as17 sistance to Iran described in paragraph (1) before 

18 the IAEA Board of Governors determines that Iran 

19 has satisfied the conditions described in subpara20 graphs (A) through (C) of such paragraph, such 

21 Member State shall be subject to the penalties de22 scribed in subsection (a)(3), shall be ineligible to re23 ceive nuclear material, technology, equipment, or as24 sistance from any IAEA Member State, and shall be 

25 ineligible to receive any IAEA assistance not related 


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1 to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until 

2 such time as the IAEA Board of Governors makes 

3 such determination with respect to Iran. 

4 (f) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date 

5 of the enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years 

6 thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate 

7 congressional committees a report on the implementation 

8 of this section. 

9 SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR 

10 SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE IAEA. 

11 It is the sense of Congress that the national security 

12 interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear 

13 Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Gov14 ernors should recommend, and the General Conference 

15 should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Secu16 rity Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA. 

17 TITLE X—PEACEKEEPING 

18 SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 

19 OPERATIONS. 

20 It is the sense of Congress that— 

21 (1) although United Nations peacekeeping oper22 ations have contributed greatly toward the pro23 motion of peace and stability for over 6 decades and 

24 the majority of peacekeeping personnel who have 

25 served under the United Nations flag have done so 


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1 with honor and courage, the record of United Na2 tions peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by 

3 operational failures and unconscionable acts of mis4 conduct; 

5 (2) in response to such failures, successive Sec6 retaries General of the United Nations have 

7 launched numerous reform efforts, including the 

8 high-level Panel on United Nations Peace Oper9 ations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria 

10 Lakhdar Brahimi, the 2005 report by the Special 

11 Advisor on the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation 

12 and Abuse, His Royal Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad 

13 Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, and the 2009 New Part14 nership Agenda, known as the ‘‘New Horizon’’ re15 ports; 

16 (3) despite the fact that the United Nations has 

17 had over a decade to implement many of these re18 forms, nearly four years to implement the reforms in 

19 the Zeid Report, and the fact that Secretary General 

20 Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and the 

21 Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations re22 peatedly have expressed their commitment ‘‘to imple23 menting fundamental, systematic changes as a mat24 ter of urgency,’’ a number of critical reforms con25 tinue to be blocked or delayed by Members States 


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1 who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status 

2 quo; 

3 (4) further, audits of procurement practices in 

4 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, con5 ducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 

6 and the now-defunct United Nations Procurement 

7 Task Force have uncovered ‘‘significant’’ corruption 

8 schemes and criminal acts by United Nations peace9 keeping personnel; and 

10 (5) if the reputation of and confidence in 

11 United Nations peacekeeping operations is to be re12 stored, fundamental and far-reaching reforms, par13 ticularly in the areas of planning, management, pro14 curement, training, conduct, and discipline, must be 

15 implemented without further delay. 

16 SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NA17 TIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. 

18 It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue 

19 reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the 

20 following areas: 

21 (1) PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT.— 

22 (A) GLOBAL AUDIT.—As the size, cost, 

23 and number of United Nations peacekeeping 

24 operations have increased substantially over the 

25 past decade, independent audits of each such 


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1 operation should be conducted annually, with a 

2 view toward ‘‘right-sizing’’ operations and en3 suring that all operations are efficient and cost 

4 effective. 

5 (B) PROCUREMENT AND TRANS6 PARENCY.—The logistics established within the 

7 United Nations Department of Field Support 

8 should be streamlined and strengthened to en9 sure that all peacekeeping missions are 

10 resourced appropriately, transparently, and in a 

11 timely fashion while individual accountability 

12 for waste, fraud and abuse within United Na13 tions peacekeeping missions is uniformly en14 forced. 

15 (C) REVIEW OF MANDATES AND CLOSING

16 OPERATIONS.—In conjunction with the audit 

17 described in subparagraph (A), the United Na18 tions Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

19 should conduct a comprehensive review of all 

20 United Nations peacekeeping operation man21 dates, with a view toward identifying objectives 

22 that are practical and achievable, and report its 

23 findings to the Security Council. In particular, 

24 the review should consider the following: 


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1 (i) Except in extraordinary cases, in2 cluding genocide, the United Nations De3 partment of Peacekeeping Operations 

4 should not be tasked with activities that 

5 are impractical or unachievable without the 

6 cooperation of the Member State(s) 

7 hosting a United Nations peacekeeping op8 eration, or which amount to de-facto 

9 Trusteeship outside of the procedures es10 tablished for such under Chapter XII of 

11 the United Nations Charter, thereby cre12 ating unrealistic expectations and obfus13 cating the primary responsibility of the 

14 Member States themselves in creating and 

15 maintaining conditions for peace. 

16 (ii) Long-standing operations that are 

17 static and cannot fulfill their mandate 

18 should be downsized or closed. 

19 (iii) Where there is legitimate concern 

20 that the withdrawal from a country of an 

21 otherwise static United Nations peace22 keeping operation would result in the re23 sumption of major conflict, a burden-shar24 ing arrangement that reduces the level of 

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1 rently supporting the United Nations 

2 Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be 

3 explored and instituted. 

4 (D) LEADERSHIP.—As peacekeeping oper5 ations become larger and increasingly complex, 

6 the Secretariat should adopt a minimum stand7 ard of qualifications for senior leaders and 

8 managers, with particular emphasis on specific 

9 skills and experience, and current senior leaders 

10 and managers who do not meet those standards 

11 should be removed. 

12 (E) PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING.—Pre-de13 ployment training on interpretation of the man14 date of the operation, specifically in the areas 

15 of use of force, civilian protection and field con16 ditions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and 

17 human rights should be mandatory, and all per18 sonnel, regardless of category or rank, should 

19 be required to sign an oath that each has re20 ceived and understands such training as a con21 dition of participation in the operation. 

22 (F) GRATIS MILITARY PERSONNEL.—The 

23 General Assembly should seek to strengthen the 

24 capacity the United Nations Department of 

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1 dinary burden currently placed upon the limited 

2 number of headquarters staff by lifting restric3 tions on the utilization of gratis military per4 sonnel by the Department so that the Depart5 ment may accept secondments from Member 

6 States of military personnel with expertise in 

7 mission planning, logistics, and other oper8 ational specialties. 

9 (2) CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.— 

10 (A) ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM CODE OF

11 CONDUCT.—A single, uniform Code of Conduct 

12 that has the status of a binding rule and ap13 plies equally to all personnel serving in United 

14 Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of 

15 category or rank, including military personnel, 

16 should be adopted and incorporated into legal 

17 documents governing participation in such an 

18 operation, including all contracts and Memoran19 dums of Understanding, promulgated and effec20 tively enforced. 

21 (B) UNDERSTANDING THE CODE OF CON22 DUCT.—All personnel, regardless of category or 

23 rank, should receive training on the Code of 

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1 keeping operation, in addition to periodic fol2 low-on training. In particular— 

3 (i) all personnel, regardless of cat4 egory or rank, should be provided with a 

5 personal copy of the Code of Conduct that 

6 has been translated into the national lan7 guage of such personnel, regardless of 

8 whether such language is an official lan9 guage of the United Nations; 

10 (ii) all personnel, regardless of cat11 egory or rank, should sign an oath that 

12 each has received a copy of the Code of 

13 Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the 

14 Code of Conduct, and that each under15 stands the consequences of violating the 

16 Code of Conduct, including immediate ter17 mination of participation in and permanent 

18 exclusion from all current and future 

19 peacekeeping operations, as well as the as20 sumption of personal liability and victims 

21 compensation, where appropriate, as a con22 dition of appointment to any such oper23 ation; and 

24 (iii) peacekeeping operations should 

25 continue and enhance educational outreach 


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1 programs to reach local communities where 

2 peacekeeping personnel of such operations 

3 are based, including explaining prohibited 

4 acts on the part of United Nations peace5 keeping personnel and identifying the indi6 vidual to whom the local population may 

7 direct complaints or file allegations of ex8 ploitation, abuse, or other acts of mis9 conduct. 

10 (C) MONITORING MECHANISMS.—Dedi11 cated monitoring mechanisms, such as the Con12 duct and Discipline Teams already deployed to 

13 support United Nations peacekeeping oper14 ations in Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, Leb15 anon, Timor Leste, Cote d’Ivoire, Western Sa16 hara, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, 

17 should be present in each operation to monitor 

18 compliance with the Code of Conduct, and 

19 should report simultaneously to the Head of 

20 Mission, the United Nations Department of 

21 Field Support, the United Nations Department 

22 of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Associate 

23 Director of the Office of Internal Oversight 

24 Services for Peacekeeping Operations (estab25 lished under section 1114(b)(9)). 


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1 (D) INVESTIGATIONS.—A permanent, pro2 fessional, and independent investigative body 

3 should be established and introduced into 

4 United Nations peacekeeping operations. In 

5 particular— 

6 (i) the investigative body should in7 clude professionals with experience in in8 vestigating sex crimes and the illegal ex9 ploitation of resources, as appropriate, as 

10 well as experts who can provide guidance 

11 on standards of proof and evidentiary re12 quirements necessary for any subsequent 

13 legal action; 

14 (ii) provisions should be included in 

15 all Memorandums of Understanding, in16 cluding a Model Memorandum of Under17 standing, that obligate Member States that 

18 contribute troops to a peacekeeping oper19 ation to designate a military prosecutor 

20 who will participate in any investigation 

21 into credible allegations of misconduct 

22 brought against an individual of such 

23 Member State, so that evidence is collected 

24 and preserved in a manner consistent with 

25 the military law of such Member State; 


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1 (iii) the investigative body should be 

2 regionally based to ensure rapid deploy3 ment and should be equipped with modern 

4 forensics equipment for the purpose of 

5 positively identifying perpetrators and, 

6 where necessary, for determining paternity; 

7 and 

8 (iv) the investigative body should re9 port directly to the Associate Director of 

10 the Office of Internal Oversight Services 

11 for Peacekeeping Operations, while pro12 viding copies of any reports to the Depart13 ment of Field Support, the Department of 

14 Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mis15 sion, and the Member State concerned. 

16 (E) FOLLOW-UP.—The Conduct and Dis17 cipline Unit in the headquarters of the United 

18 Nations Department of Field Support should be 

19 appropriately staffed, resourced, and tasked 

20 with— 

21 (i) promulgating measures to prevent 

22 misconduct; 

23 (ii) receiving reports by field per24 sonnel and coordinating the Department’s 

25 response to allegations of misconduct; 


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1 (iii) gathering follow-up information 

2 on completed investigations, particularly by 

3 focusing on disciplinary actions against the 

4 individual concerned taken by the United 

5 Nations or by the Member State that is 

6 contributing troops to which such indi7 vidual belongs, and sharing such informa8 tion with the Security Council, the Depart9 ment of Peacekeeping Operations, the 

10 Head of Mission, and the community 

11 hosting the peacekeeping operation; and 

12 (iv) contributing pertinent data on 

13 conduct and discipline to the database re14 quired pursuant to subparagraph (H). 

15 (F) FINANCIAL LIABILITY AND VICTIMS

16 ASSISTANCE.—Although peacekeeping oper17 ations should provide immediate medical assist18 ance to victims of sexual abuse or exploitation, 

19 the responsibility for providing longer-term 

20 treatment, care, or restitution lies solely with 

21 the individual found guilty of the misconduct. 

22 In particular: 

23 (i) The United Nations should not as24 sume responsibility for providing long-term 

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1 ual Exploitation and Abuse Victim Assist2 ance Mechanism by utilizing assessed con3 tributions to United Nations peacekeeping 

4 operations, thereby shielding individuals 

5 from personal liability and reinforcing an 

6 atmosphere of impunity. 

7 (ii) If an individual responsible for 

8 misconduct has been repatriated, reas9 signed, redeployed, or is otherwise unable 

10 to provide assistance, responsibility for 

11 providing assistance to a victim should be 

12 assigned to the Member State that contrib13 uted the contingent to which such indi14 vidual belonged or to the manager con15 cerned. 

16 (iii) In the case of misconduct by a 

17 member of a military contingent, appro18 priate funds shall be withheld from the 

19 troop contributing country concerned. 

20 (iv) In the case of misconduct by a ci21 vilian employee or contractor of the United 

22 Nations, appropriate wages shall be gar23 nished from such individual or fines shall 

24 be imposed against such individual, con25 sistent with existing United Nations Staff 


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1 Rules, and retirement funds shall not be 

2 shielded from liability. 

3 (G) MANAGERS AND COMMANDERS.—The 

4 manner in which managers and commanders 

5 handle cases of misconduct by those serving 

6 under them should be included in their indi7 vidual performance evaluations, so that man8 agers and commanders who take decisive action 

9 to deter and address misconduct are rewarded, 

10 while those who create a permissive environ11 ment or impede investigations are penalized or 

12 relieved of duty, as appropriate. 

13 (H) DATABASE.—A centralized database, 

14 including personnel photos, fingerprints, and bi15 ometric data, should be created and maintained 

16 within the United Nations Department of 

17 Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of 

18 Field Support, and other relevant United Na19 tions bodies without further delay to track cases 

20 of misconduct, including the outcome of inves21 tigations and subsequent prosecutions, to en22 sure that personnel who have engaged in mis23 conduct or other criminal activities, regardless 

24 of category or rank, are permanently barred 


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1 from participation in future peacekeeping oper2 ations. 

3 (I) COOPERATION OF MEMBER STATES.— 

4 If a Member State routinely refuses to cooper5 ate with the directives contained herein or acts 

6 to shield its nationals from personal liability, 

7 that Member State should be barred from con8 tributing troops or personnel to future peace9 keeping operations. 

10 (J) WELFARE.—Peacekeeping operations 

11 should continue to seek to maintain a minimum 

12 standard of welfare for mission personnel to 

13 ameliorate conditions of service, while adjust14 ments are made to the discretionary welfare 

15 payments currently provided to Member States 

16 that contribute troops to offset the cost of oper17 ation-provided recreational facilities, as nec18 essary and appropriate. 

19 SEC. 1003. CERTIFICATION. 

20 (a) NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OPER21 ATIONS CONTINGENT UPON PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFI22 CATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REFORMS.— 

23 (1) NO NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OP24 ERATIONS.— 


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1 (A) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided 

2 in subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of 

3 State certifies that the requirements described 

4 in paragraph (2) have been satisfied, the Presi5 dent shall direct the United States Permanent 

6 Representative to the United Nations to use the 

7 voice, vote, and influence of the United States 

8 at the United Nations to oppose the creation of 

9 new, or expansion of existing, United Nations 

10 peacekeeping operations. 

11 (B) EXCEPTION AND NOTIFICATION.—The 

12 requirements described under paragraph (2) 

13 may be waived with respect to a particular 

14 peacekeeping operation if the President deter15 mines that failure to deploy new or additional 

16 peacekeepers in such situation will significantly 

17 contribute to the widespread loss of human life, 

18 genocide, or the endangerment of a vital na19 tional security interest of the United States. If 

20 the President makes such a determination, the 

21 President shall, not later than 15 days before 

22 the exercise of such waiver, notify the appro23 priate congressional committees of such deter24 mination and resulting waiver. 


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1 (2) CERTIFICATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPER2 ATIONS REFORMS.—The certification referred to in 

3 paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Sec4 retary to the appropriate congressional committees 

5 that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of 

6 reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have 

7 been adopted by the United Nations Department of 

8 Peacekeeping Operations or the General Assembly, 

9 as appropriate: 

10 (A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct 

11 that has the status of a binding rule and ap12 plies equally to all personnel serving in United 

13 Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of 

14 category or rank, has been adopted by the Gen15 eral Assembly and duly incorporated into all 

16 contracts and a Model Memorandum of Under17 standing, and mechanisms have been estab18 lished for training such personnel concerning 

19 the requirements of the Code and enforcement 

20 of the Code. 

21 (B) All personnel, regardless of category or 

22 rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have 

23 been trained concerning the requirements of the 

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1 sonal copy of the Code, translated into the na2 tional language of such personnel. 

3 (C) All personnel, regardless of category or 

4 rank, are required to sign an oath that each has 

5 received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that 

6 each pledges to abide by the Code, and that 

7 each understands the consequences of violating 

8 the Code, including immediate termination of 

9 participation in and permanent exclusion from 

10 all current and future peacekeeping operations, 

11 as well as the assumption of personal liability 

12 for victims compensation as a condition of the 

13 appointment to such operation. 

14 (D) All peacekeeping operations have de15 signed and implemented educational outreach 

16 programs to reach local communities where 

17 peacekeeping personnel of such operations are 

18 based to explain prohibited acts on the part of 

19 United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to 

20 identify the individual to whom the local popu21 lation may direct complaints or file allegations 

22 of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of mis23 conduct. 

24 (E) The creation of a centralized database, 

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1 ometric data, has been completed and is being 

2 maintained in the United Nations Department 

3 of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of 

4 misconduct, including the outcomes of inves5 tigations and subsequent prosecutions, to en6 sure that personnel, regardless of category or 

7 rank, who have engaged in misconduct or other 

8 criminal activities are permanently barred from 

9 participation in future peacekeeping operations. 

10 (F) A Model Memorandum of Under11 standing between the United Nations and each 

12 Member State that contributes troops to a 

13 peacekeeping operation has been adopted by the 

14 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 

15 Operations that specifically obligates each such 

16 Member State to— 

17 (i) uphold the uniform Code of Con18 duct which shall apply equally to all per19 sonnel serving in United Nations peace20 keeping operations, regardless of category 

21 or rank; 

22 (ii) designate a competent legal au23 thority, preferably a prosecutor with exper24 tise in the area of sexual exploitation and 

25 abuse where appropriate, to participate in 


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1 any investigation into an allegation of mis2 conduct brought against an individual of 

3 such Member State; 

4 (iii) refer to its competent national or 

5 military authority for possible prosecution, 

6 if warranted, any investigation of a viola7 tion of the Code of Conduct or other crimi8 nal activity by an individual of such Mem9 ber State; 

10 (iv) report to the Department of Field 

11 Support and the Department of Peace12 keeping Operations on the outcome of any 

13 such investigation; 

14 (v) undertake to conduct on-site court 

15 martial proceedings, where practical and 

16 appropriate, relating to allegations of mis17 conduct alleged against an individual of 

18 such Member State; and 

19 (vi) assume responsibility for the pro20 vision of appropriate assistance to a victim 

21 of misconduct committed by an individual 

22 of such Member State. 

23 (G) A professional and independent inves24 tigative and audit function has been established 

25 within the United Nations Department of 


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1 Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of In2 ternal Oversight Services to monitor United 

3 Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Æ 


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