IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2021 ND 32

Kristofor John Paulson, Plaintiff and Appellee

v.

Shannon Marie Paulson, n/k/a

Shannon Marie Belgarde, Defendant and Appellant

No. 20200163

Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central

Judicial District, the Honorable M. Jason McCarthy, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice, in which Justice VandeWalle and 

Justice Tufte joined, and Chief Justice Jensen and Justice Crothers concurred 

in the result.

Jessie L. VanCamp, Grand Forks, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Jacey L. Johnston (argued), and Olivia A. Jureidini (appeared), Grand Forks, 

ND, for defendant and appellant.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

FEBRUARY 18, 2021 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Paulson v. Paulson

No. 20200163

McEvers, Justice.

[¶1] Shannon Marie Belgarde appeals from an order denying her motion to 

vacate a divorce judgment, which was entered pursuant to a stipulation. We 

affirm.

I

[¶2] Shannon Belgarde (formerly Shannon Paulson) and Kristofor Paulson 

began dating in 2003, and married in 2013. They divorced on December 4, 2019 

based on a stipulated settlement agreement signed by both parties and filed 

with the district court on November 12, 2019. Neither party was represented 

by counsel during the drafting or execution of the settlement agreement. 

According to the settlement agreement, at the time of the divorce, the parties 

jointly owned two vehicles, a home, and multiple financial accounts. Their 

debts included an automobile loan of approximately $8,500, a mortgage 

balance on the marital home of $130,000, and student loan debt of $150,000.

[¶3] Following the terms of the stipulation, the district court awarded 

Paulson the marital home, subject to the mortgage, both vehicles, subject to 

the loan, household goods of $35,000, his retirement and investments accounts, 

and a substantial amount of funds in checking and savings accounts. Belgarde 

was awarded $10,000 in household goods, her retirement account, some funds 

in checking and savings accounts, and was responsible for $150,000 in student 

loan debt. The property and debt division resulted in a net award to Paulson 

of $314,510 and a net debt to Belgarde of $105,100.

[¶4] On January 27, 2020, Belgarde moved to vacate the divorce judgment 

under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). She argued the judgment should be vacated on the 

grounds of duress, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, 

misconduct, and because the divorce stipulation was so one-sided as to be 

unconscionable. Belgarde argued she relied on Paulson’s statements regarding 

future reconciliation when she signed the settlement agreement. She stated 

she did not realize these statements were false until she discovered evidence 
2

of an alleged affair. Belgarde also argued the divorce stipulation was so onesided as to be unconscionable. Belgarde submitted affidavits and several 

exhibits in support of her motion.

[¶5] Paulson resisted the motion, arguing Belgarde failed to assert grounds 

justifying relief under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) and the settlement agreement was 

not unconscionable. In his affidavit, Paulson denied having an affair, and 

asserted he entered the marriage with property and no debt, while Belgarde 

entered the marriage with little property and substantial debt. Neither party 

requested a hearing on the motion.

[¶6] Despite no request for a hearing from the parties, the district court held 

a hearing on the motion. No testimony was offered at the hearing, neither party 

objected to admission of the parties’ affidavits as evidence, and the court took 

the matter under advisement. Based on the affidavits and exhibits submitted 

in record, the court found Belgarde was a highly educated person, with capacity 

to contract, who was free to seek independent legal advice before agreeing to 

the terms of the divorce stipulation. Further, the court considered Belgarde’s 

arguments and concluded that the facts and circumstances of the case did not 

rise to the level of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct. Finally, the court 

determined there was insufficient evidence of unconscionability. The court 

denied the motion to vacate the divorce judgment on April 14, 2020, and 

Belgarde appealed.

II

[¶7] On appeal, Belgarde argues the district court abused its discretion by 

denying her motion to vacate the divorce judgment because the agreement was 

the result of mistake, duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence. More 

specifically, she argues the court did not apply the correct analysis under 

N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) or (6), or for unconscionability. Belgarde also complains

the court abused its discretion by not specifically referring to the contents of 

her exhibits.
3

[¶8] “This Court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion to vacate a 

judgment for an abuse of discretion.” Vann v. Vann, 2009 ND 118, ¶ 10, 767 

N.W.2d 855. In reviewing the district court’s denial of a N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) 

motion to set aside a judgment, this Court does not determine whether the 

court was substantively correct in entering the judgment from which relief is 

sought. Terry v. Terry, 2002 ND 2, ¶ 4, 638 N.W.2d 11. Instead, this Court 

determines only if the court abused its discretion in ruling that sufficient 

grounds for disturbing the finality of the judgment were not established. Id.

The district court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, 

unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, when it misinterprets or misapplies 

the law, or when its decision is not the product of a rational mental process 

leading to a reasoned determination. Knutson v. Knutson, 2002 ND 29, ¶ 7, 639 

N.W.2d 495. An abuse of discretion is never assumed and must be affirmatively 

established. Dvorak v. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d 868, 870 (N.D. 1983). We will not 

overturn a district court’s decision merely because it is not the one we may 

have made. Interest of D.J.H., 401 N.W.2d 694, 700 (N.D. 1987). The district 

court’s findings are not disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. 

Terry, at ¶ 5; N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

[¶9] The district court may set aside a judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) 

for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party. The court 

may also set aside a judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief” under 

N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). “Just as courts will not enforce an agreement that is

illegal, so too courts should vacate judgments that are unconscionable. Rule 

60(b)(vi), N.D.R.Civ.P., is available for just such a rare occasion and 

exceptional circumstance.” Varty v. Varty, 2020 ND 165, ¶ 10, 946 N.W.2d 713 

(quoting Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833, 836 (N.D. 1994)). Accordingly, 

we will consider Belgarde’s unconscionability and her other arguments under

N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) together.

[¶10] The divorce judgment in this case was entered based on a stipulation. 

“This Court encourages peaceful settlements of disputes in divorce matters, 

and the strong public policy favoring prompt and peaceful resolution of divorce 
4

disputes generates judicial favor of the adoption of a stipulated agreement of 

the parties.” Knutson, 2002 ND 29, ¶ 8. A district court ordinarily should not 

decree a distribution of property that is inconsistent with a voluntary 

stipulation agreed to by the parties. Eberle v. Eberle, 2009 ND 107, ¶ 15, 766 

N.W.2d 477. However, a court has a duty to equitably distribute the marital 

estate, which includes the duty to decide whether an agreement as executed is 

a result of mistake, duress, fraud, menace, or undue influence. Id.

A. Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Misconduct

[¶11] Belgarde argues the divorce judgment should be vacated under 

N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) because Paulson deliberately misrepresented his reasons

for the divorce to fraudulently induce her to sign a one-sided agreement 

favoring his interests. The party seeking relief from a judgment based on fraud 

has the burden of proof and must establish fraud by clear and convincing 

evidence. Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d 868, 872 (citations omitted). When the judgment 

sought to be set aside was entered pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the 

party challenging the judgment has the additional burden of showing a 

justification under the law of contracts. Terry, 2002 ND 2, ¶ 4. Relief under 

N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3) for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct is

extraordinary relief that should only be granted in exceptional circumstances. 

Id. “Rule 60(b), N.D.R.Civ.P., is not to be used to relieve a party ‘from free, 

calculated, and deliberate choices he or she has made.’” Id. at ¶ 7 (quoting Fleck 

v. Fleck, 337 N.W.2d 786, 791 (N.D. 1983)). A stipulation will not be rescinded

on the grounds of mistake or fraud if a party had the opportunity to read the 

agreement without being misled as to its contents. Eberle, 2009 ND 107, ¶ 26.

[¶12] Belgarde argues Paulson promised that there would be reconciliation, 

that her name would be restored to the home title, and that he would help her 

when she needed it. Belgarde alleged Paulson repeatedly denied having an 

affair prior to divorce, but she discovered text messages and call logs between 

Paulson and another woman after she signed the agreement. Belgarde argues 

this is evidence of an affair demonstrating that Paulson misrepresented his 

intentions regarding a future reconciliation with her and his reasons for 
5

wanting a divorce. Paulson argues Belgarde misconstrued his statements as 

promises, and maintains he did not have an extramarital affair.

[¶13] The district court considered the submissions and arguments of the 

parties and noted both parties are well-educated adults with advanced degrees, 

with the full ability and capacity to enter contracts freely. The court noted 

Belgarde submitted no evidence to suggest she did not understand the finality 

of a divorce decree. The court concluded there was nothing enforceable about a 

discussion, or even an agreement, to reconcile in the future. The court stated 

the risk of relying on such an agreement was apparent and foreseeable at the 

time she agreed to the stipulation. The court also found Belgarde had time to 

read and understand the stipulation. Regarding the alleged extramarital 

affair, the court noted Belgarde suspected Paulson was having an affair prior 

to signing the settlement agreement, while Paulson has continuously denied 

the allegation. The court found Belgarde had sufficient suspicion of the conduct 

for her to factor it as a possibility when reaching a settlement agreement. 

Therefore, it was not new information unknown to her at the time the parties 

negotiated their stipulation. The court concluded that Belgarde’s “belief that 

[Paulson] engaged in an extramarital affair does not constitute and would not 

constitute false pretenses, fraud, newly discovered evidence, duress, 

misrepresentation, or misconduct by [Paulson], even if [her] allegations were 

true.”

[¶14] We are concerned with the district court’s last conclusion. If Paulson 

made false statements about the alleged affair prior to execution of the 

settlement agreement, “the suppression of the truth with intent to induce 

another to enter into a contract is fraud.” Dvorak, 329 N.W.2d 868, 872 

(citation omitted). However, the court here did not find an extramarital affair 

occurred, likely because the evidence in the record was conflicting and 

inconclusive. The court concluded that Belgarde’s “belief” that Paulson

engaged in an extramarital affair did not constitute false pretenses, fraud, 

newly discovered evidence, misrepresentation, or misconduct. “Generally, no 

abuse of discretion will be presumed or inferred where there are conflicting 

affidavits.” Haugo v. Haaland, 349 N.W.2d 25, 27 (N.D. 1984). The conflicting 

affidavits in the record here do not provide clear and convincing evidence that 
6

an affair occurred; therefore, Belgarde has not met her burden. On this record, 

we cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate 

based on fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct for the alleged affair or any 

other alleged misrepresentation.

B. Duress

[¶15] The district court discussed the arguments made by Belgarde that 

Paulson took advantage of her mental condition, constituting duress. Belgarde

submitted affidavits regarding her mental health issues before and after the 

divorce. The court noted that Belgarde admitted she did not historically have 

mental health issues, other than anxiety, prior to the divorce. The court noted 

the evidence submitted that Belgarde made an attempt on her life after 

reading the suggestive conversations between Paulson and another woman, 

demonstrated that she was distressed upon forming a firm belief that Paulson

had an affair. However, the court found Belgarde formed this firm belief after 

signing the stipulation, so it was not evidence of her mental state at the time 

that she considered and signed it. The court concluded there was no evidence 

that Belgarde’s mental health prevented her from making a free, voluntary,

and reasoned decision when she entered into the stipulation. We conclude that 

the court’s findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. 

On this record, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying the 

motion to vacate based on the allegations of duress.

C. Unconscionability

[¶16] Belgarde argues the stipulation agreement should be vacated for 

unconscionability. “An agreement is unconscionable if it is one no rational, 

undeluded person would make, and no honest and fair person would accept, or 

is blatantly one-sided and rankly unfair.” Eberle, 2009 ND 107, ¶ 18 (citations 

omitted). While the question of unconscionability is a question of law, the 

factual findings made by the district court to support the determination are 

reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Terry, 2002 ND 2, ¶ 14. A finding 

of fact is clearly erroneous if it has no support in the record, or even if there is 

some supporting evidence, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm 
7

conviction a mistake has been made, or the decision was induced by an 

erroneous view of the law. Id.

[¶17] To vacate a divorce judgment as unconscionable, “there must be some

showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability and courts must 

balance the various factors, viewed in totality, to make its determination.”

Eberle, 2009 ND 107, ¶ 18 (citation omitted). Procedural unconscionability 

focuses on the formation of the agreement and the fairness of the bargaining 

process:

An agreement may be free from mistake, duress, menace, 

fraud, or undue influence and still be procedurally unconscionable.

While there may not be mistake, duress, menace, fraud, or undue 

influence, one party may be guilty of such oppressive conduct to 

secure the agreement that the agreement should not be enforced. 

See Derby v. Derby, 8 Va. App. 19, 378 S.E.2d 74, 79 (1989). 

Settlement agreements in divorce cases are more susceptible to 

overreaching and oppressive conduct because of the relationship 

between the husband and wife, particularly when the negotiations 

are between the parties rather than through their lawyers. Id. 

Behavior that may not constitute fraud, duress, mistake, menace, 

or undue influence in an arms length context may be sufficient to 

make an agreement unconscionable when the relationship is used 

to take advantage of a situation and achieve an oppressive result. 

Id.

Eberle, at ¶ 20. Substantive unconscionability focuses on the one-sidedness of 

the agreement. Id. at 18.

[¶18] Belgarde argues the stipulation was procedurally unconscionable 

because it was the result of an unfair bargaining process. Specifically, she

argues Paulson’s assurances of a future reconciliation rendered the bargaining 

process unfair. Belgarde also asserts the rushed timeframe between Paulson

requesting a divorce near the end of October 2019, Paulson drafting the 

documents on November 9, 2019, and filing the documents on November 12, 

2019 evidences procedural unconscionability. She argues that Paulson assured 

her that attorneys were not necessary and she should not discuss the divorce 

with anyone until it was over.
8

[¶19] Paulson argues Belgarde’s claims do not show procedural 

unconscionability. He disputed her factual allegations in his affidavit about the 

preparation of the divorce documents, asserting that the documents were 

prepared by both parties, and that it was Belgarde who located the notary 

public to notarize their signatures. He further argues Belgarde had time to 

seek an attorney and he did not discourage her from seeking counsel.

[¶20] This Court has cautioned, as a matter of public policy, a stipulation in a 

divorce proceeding should be viewed with great skepticism when it occurs 

rapidly, with the use of one attorney, and under serious threats of harm to one 

party. Eberle, 2009 ND 107, ¶ 27 (relying on Peterson v. Peterson, 555 N.W.2d 

359, 362 (N.D. 1996)). In Eberle, despite concluding that the district court did 

not err in finding a marital agreement was free from mistake, duress, fraud or 

undue influence, this Court reversed a denial of a motion to vacate a divorce 

judgment, holding the facts of the case showed the marital agreement was 

procedurally unconscionable. Id. at ¶ 32 (holding an agreement procedurally 

unconscionable where one party was not represented by counsel, the 

agreement was rushed, and there was very little discussion between the 

parties about the terms of the agreement). In Eberle, one party hired an 

attorney who drafted the settlement agreement. Id. at ¶ 4. The agreement was 

signed only a few days later by the other party, who was not represented by 

counsel. Id. The parties in Eberle filed affidavits and testified about the process 

the parties followed in reaching the terms of the settlement agreement. Id. at 

¶¶ 22-25.

[¶21] Here, the parties did not testify or request an opportunity to testify or 

cross-examine, so the district court had little or no opportunity to weigh the 

credibility of the parties. Rather, the parties filed conflicting affidavits 

regarding the procedural steps the parties took prior to the divorce. Unlike 

Eberle, it is undisputed that neither of the parties here were represented by 

counsel. The court found that Belgarde had time to seek counsel and 

understand the permanence of a divorce prior to executing the stipulation.

While the short time frames here are concerning, we cannot say as a matter of 

law that the court’s finding is clearly erroneous. The court found that because 

neither party was represented by counsel, neither party had a clear advantage 
9

over the other in the crafting of the stipulation. The court found both parties 

were highly educated and capable of understanding the agreement they were 

entering into. The court also noted Belgarde moved to vacate the judgment 

only upon discovering evidence of an alleged affair, finding the timing 

indicated she was motivated by a desire for retribution, rather than a

realization the agreement was inequitable. These findings are not clearly 

erroneous, and are supported by the record. The court did not abuse its 

discretion by concluding Belgarde failed to establish procedural 

unconscionability. Although we affirm the court, there was some showing of 

possible procedural unconscionability in regard to the short time frame 

involved in drafting the settlement agreement. We therefore will review for 

substantive unconscionability, considering the totality of the circumstances.

[¶22] Belgarde also argues the stipulation is substantively unconscionable. 

She argues the property division, on its face, shows the judgment was 

unconscionable. She further argues there was not sufficient evidence for the 

court to make a conclusory decision concerning the marital equity.

[¶23] The terms of the settlement agreement here appear disparate, which is 

a significant factor to consider in determining whether the agreement is 

unconscionable. See Eberle, 2009 ND 107, ¶ 33. However, whether the 

disparity is equitable must be considered under the facts of the case. The RuffFischer guidelines are not the standard used to determine unconscionability of 

a property settlement in a divorce, but they may be considered. Vann, 2009 ND 

118, ¶ 25. Under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines the court considers:

[T]he respective ages of the parties, their earning ability, the

duration of the marriage and conduct of the parties during the

marriage, their station in life, the circumstances and necessities of

each, their health and physical condition, their financial

circumstances as shown by the property owned at the time, its

value at the time, its income-producing capacity, if any, whether

accumulated before or after the marriage, and such other matters

as may be material.

Id. (citations omitted).
10

[¶24] The length of a marriage is a factor a district court must consider in 

determining the equitable division of the marital estate under the Ruff-Fischer

guidelines. Lill v. Lill, 520 N.W.2d 855, 857 (N.D. 1994). There is no brightline rule to distinguish between short and long-term marriages. Hitz v. Hitz, 

2008 ND 58, ¶ 16, 746 N.W.2d 732. Generally, a long-term marriage supports 

an equal division of marital assets, but the division need not be equal to be 

equitable. Bladow v. Bladow, 2003 ND 123, ¶ 8, 665 N.W.2d 724. In a shortterm marriage, the district court may distribute property based on what each

party brought into the marriage. Lill, at 857.

[¶25] The district court found that the Paulsons had a short-term marriage. 

Belgarde and Paulson were married for six years, and cohabited for a decade 

prior to marriage. A court may, but is not required to, consider a period of 

cohabitation when calculating the length of a marriage. Schultz v. Schultz, 

2018 ND 259, ¶ 13, 920 N.W.2d 483. Belgarde provided no evidence to the court 

of the parties’ financial practices during the period of cohabitation, which may 

have supported a finding cohabitation should be considered in calculating the 

length of the marriage. The determination that the Paulsons had a short-term 

marriage is not clearly erroneous.

[¶26] The source of the property is also a factor a district court should consider 

in determining the equitable distribution of a marital estate under the RuffFischer guidelines. Lill, 520 N.W.2d 855, 857. The court considered this factor, 

finding Belgarde entered the marriage with substantial student loan debt and 

little to no assets. In contrast, the court found much of the marital estate was 

either brought into the marriage by Paulson or contributed by his parents. The 

court considered numerous factors and found in part:

Their positions when entering the marriage were vastly different,

[Paulson] having no debt and having already accumulated assets. 

[Belgarde] had substantial student loan debt, and little to no 

assets. This was a short term marriage. Both parties are young 

and able bodied. Both have advanced degrees, and the same 

advanced degrees at that, giving them similar to identical earning 

capacities. While [Paulson] earns more annually at this time, he 

also works two jobs, and [Belgarde] holds a position considered to 
11

be a “public interest” position, qualifying her for forgiveness of her 

student loans in a year and a half. This is in kind income of great 

value. Much of the parties’ marital estate was either brought into 

the marriage by [Paulson] or contributed by [his] parents.

[¶27] The district court found the stipulation appeared to be guided by the 

parties’ mutual belief that they each owned certain assets and were responsible 

for certain debts, and concluded the stipulation was not substantively 

unconscionable in a short-term marriage. The court’s findings are based on the 

affidavits submitted by the parties. Based on the record, the court’s findings 

are not clearly erroneous. While on its face the divorce judgment appears 

disparate, it is not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable to award a party 

the debt that they incurred. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Belgarde’s motion to vacate the judgment based on

unconscionability.

[¶28] “Rule 60(b) attempts to strike a proper balance between the conflicting 

principles that litigation must be brought to an end and that justice should be 

done, and, accordingly, the rule should be invoked only when extraordinary 

circumstances are present.” Knutson, 2002 ND 29, ¶ 7 (relying on Kopp v. 

Kopp, 2001 ND 41, ¶ 9, 622 N.W.2d 726). See also Hildebrand v. Stolz, 2016 

ND 225, ¶ 16, 888 N.W.2d 197; Watne v. Watne, 391 N.W.2d 636, 639 (N.D.

1986). Despite Belgarde’s N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) arguments, she has not argued or 

demonstrated why the facts of this case present extraordinary circumstances 

justifying relief. We conclude there are no extraordinary circumstances present 

justifying relief from the judgment.

III

[¶29] We have considered the remainder of Belgarde’s arguments and conclude 

they are either unnecessary to our decision or are without merit.

[¶30] We affirm the district court’s order denying Belgarde’s motion to vacate 

the divorce judgment.
12

[¶31] Gerald W. VandeWalle

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte

I concur in the result.

Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Daniel J. Crothers