NO. 12-09-00189-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

LARRY T. LONG, L. ALLAN LONG, § APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH

AND B. VIRGINIA LONG, IN THEIR

CAPACITY AS TRUSTEES OF THE

LAWRENCE ALLAN LONG TRUST,

THE CHARLES EDWARD LONG TRUST,

THE LARRY THOMAS LONG TRUST

AND THE JOHN STEPHEN LONG

TRUST D/B/A THE LONG TRUSTS, § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 

APPELLANTS

V.

CASTLE TEXAS PRODUCTION

LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

APPELLEE § RUSK COUNTY, TEXAS

OPINION

Larry T. Long, L. Allan Long, and B. Virginia Long, in their capacity as trustees of the 

Lawrence Allan Long Trust, the Charles Edward Long Trust, the Larry Thomas Long Trust, and 

the John Stephen Long Trust d/b/a the Long Trusts (collectively the Long Trusts) appeal from 

the judgment of the trial court. In their sole issue, the Long Trusts challenge the trial court’s 

determination of the accrual date for postjudgment interest. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Long Trusts sued Castle Texas Production Limited Partnership (Castle) in 1996.1

Castle thereafter filed a counterclaim against the Long Trusts. After a jury trial, the trial court 

signed its final judgment on September 5, 2001 (the 2001 judgment). The Long Trusts prevailed 

and Castle prevailed on its counterclaim. Castle appealed to this court, and the Long Trusts 

cross-appealed. See Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. 

 

1 The underlying factual scenario is complicated and need not be repeated here. Moreover, the underlying 

factual basis for the claims by the parties is not relevant to this appeal, and the facts will be discussed only as 

necessary to the disposition of this appeal. For a detailed recitation of the facts and the procedural history, see 

Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, pet. denied), clarification 

denied, 161 S.W.3d 673 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.); In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 157 S.W.3d 524 

(Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no pet.).
2

App.—Tyler 2003, pet. denied). We reversed and remanded the trial court’s judgment on the 

Long Trusts’ claims. As to Castle’s counterclaim, the claim that we are concerned with in this 

appeal, we suggested a remittitur on attorney’s fees and damages. Castle complied. We then 

reformed the trial court’s judgment, and affirmed the judgment as reformed. Additionally, we 

instructed the trial court to sever Castle’s counterclaim, and by limited remand, ordered the trial 

court to properly calculate prejudgment interest. After the severance on remand, and after the 

denial of Castle’s petition for writ of mandamus in this court,2 Castle affirmatively waived any 

claim for prejudgment interest at a hearing on March 25, 2009. During that hearing, the trial 

court rendered another judgment, signing it on the same day (the 2009 judgment). This

judgment ordered that Castle recover postjudgment interest from September 5, 2001, the date of 

the original judgment. The Long Trusts appealed.

POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST

In their sole issue, the Long Trusts contend that postjudgment interest began to accrue on 

March 25, 2009, the date of the most recent judgment,3instead of September 5, 2001, the date of 

the original judgment, as found by the trial court.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Postjudgment interest is regulated by statute, and as such, its application is a question of 

law that we review de novo. See Advanced Messaging Wireless, Inc. v. Campus Design, Inc.,

190 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (citing Columbia Medical Center v. 

Bush ex rel. Bush, 122 S.W.3d 835, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied)).

Postjudgment interest is recoverable on any money judgment in this state as long as the 

judgment specifies the postjudgment interest rate. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 304.001 (Vernon 

2006). Postjudgment interest is compensation allowed by law for the use or detention of money, 

computed from the date of rendition of judgment until the date of satisfaction. Sisters of Charity 

of the Incarnate Word v. Dunsmoor, 832 S.W.2d 112, 119 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ 

denied); see also TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 304.005(a) (Vernon 2006). Generally, a judgment is 

“rendered” when the decision is officially announced orally in open court, by memorandum filed 

 

2

See In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 189 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, no pet.).

3 The trial court issued its “Final Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc” on October 1, 2009. However, none of the 

parties contend that postjudgment interest began to accrue on the date of that judgment.
3

with the clerk, or otherwise announced publicly. Garza v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 89 

S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2002). 

Discussion

The Long Trusts argue that when we ordered the trial court to sever Castle’s counterclaim 

and determine the prejudgment interest issue, the September 5, 2001 judgment became 

interlocutory. In other words, they urge that the September 5, 2001 judgment lost its status as a 

final judgment and the monetary award became uncertain. Because of this procedural posture, 

the Long Trusts contend, postjudgment interest did not begin to accrue until the trial court 

rendered its second judgment on March 25, 2009—the day that Castle affirmatively waived its 

entitlement to prejudgment interest in open court.4

Castle argues that our opinion in Lewis v. Hill controls the disposition of this case. Lewis 

v. Hill, 429 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1968, no writ). In that case, Hill brought suit 

against Lewis for dissolution of their partnership. Id. at 573. Hill prevailed and obtained a 

judgment in the amount of $44,551.82. Id. Lewis appealed contending that $16,187.50 of the 

award to compensate Hill for salary payments was erroneous. The Amarillo court of appeals 

agreed, reduced the total award to $25,364.32, and affirmed the judgment as reformed. Id. at 

574. Thereafter, Lewis paid Hill the judgment amount, but calculated postjudgment interest 

from the date of the appellate court’s judgment, not the date of the trial court’s original 

judgment. Id. Consequently, Hill refused to release the judgment on the ground that Lewis 

failed to pay the total amount due for postjudgment interest. Id. A second suit was filed, this 

time by Lewis. Id. The trial court held that postjudgment interest ran from the date of the trial 

court’s original judgment in the first suit, not from the date of the Amarillo court of appeals’ 

opinion. Id. On appeal, this court agreed,5concluding as follows: 

The general rule is that a judgment creditor is entitled to 

[postjudgment] interest on the amount of the decree as reduced from the same 

date that interest would have run on the original judgment if it had not been 

reduced, that is, normally from the date of the original judgment. [Citations 

omitted.] Therefore, we believe that Hill is entitled to [postjudgment] 

 

4

In its reply brief, the Long Trusts made the related argument that (1) postjudgment interest can be 

awarded only on a “money judgment,” (2) a judgment is not a “money judgment” until prejudgment interest is 

properly calculated, and (3) since we remanded Castle’s counterclaim for the calculation of prejudgment interest, an 

issue for which we later determined factual issues remained, the judgment did not become a money judgment until 

prejudgment interest was waived during the March 25, 2009 hearing. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 304.005 (Vernon 

2006); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 304.002(a)(1), (7)-(8), (12). Since these arguments are closely related, we address 

them together. 

5 Lewis’s appeal in the second lawsuit was transferred and assigned to this court “upon an equalization of 

the dockets from the Seventh Supreme Judicial District at Amarillo.” Lewis, 429 S.W.2d at 576.
4

interest . . . commencing on the date of the previous judgment in the District 

Court, as reformed, until the same is finally paid and satisfied. 

Id. at 575. Likewise, other courts have held that if an appellate court reverses a judgment for one 

party and enters judgment for the other party, the prevailing party on appeal is entitled to interest 

on the judgment from the date of the erroneous judgment in the trial court. See, e.g., Thornal v. 

Cargill, Inc., 587 S.W.2d 384, 384-85 (Tex. 1979).

The Long Trusts argue that Lewis does not control because in Lewis, the judgment was, 

in effect, affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part. Consequently, no issues remained 

after appeal. The Long Trusts point out that, in contrast to Lewis, the instant case was affirmed 

in part and reversed and remanded in part. It is the limited remand for calculation of 

prejudgment interest that the Long Trusts argue is a key procedural difference. They assert that 

this remand essentially rendered the 2001 judgment “un-final” or interlocutory, and thus 

prohibited Castle’s recovery of postjudgment interest from the date of that judgment. However, 

we have previously addressed this issue and held contrary to the Long Trusts’ position. See 

State Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. City of Timpson, 795 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.—Tyler 

1990, writ denied). 

In Timpson, the plaintiff (Pruitt) was injured after striking a pothole on his motorcycle. 

He sued the City of Timpson and the State for the defect. Id. at 25. The State filed a cross 

action for contribution against Timpson. Id. At the close of the State’s case, the trial court 

directed a verdict for Timpson on the cross action. Id. Timpson settled with Pruitt. Id. The jury 

awarded damages and apportioned negligence 100% to the State. Id. The State appealed, and 

we affirmed as to the State’s liability and the amount of damages. Id. However, we remanded 

the case “for trial only of the issues of the comparative negligence of the State and the City.” Id. 

In other words, we affirmed the trial court’s judgment, but remanded for the limited purpose of 

determining the apportionment of damages, a factual issue requiring a limited trial. On remand, 

after conducting the retrial of comparative negligence, the trial court awarded postjudgment 

interest from the date of its new judgment. Id. Pruitt appealed, arguing that postjudgment 

interest accrued from the original judgment. Id. at 27. We held as follows:

The case was remanded with instructions to the trial court to determine the 

single issue of the comparative negligence of the State and City, and to reduce 

the amount of damages awarded to Pruitt in the first proceeding by the 

percentage of the City’s negligence. Interest on the revised judgment should run 

from the date of the original or erroneous judgment.
5

Id. 

Simply stated, the general rule is that after examining the entire procedural history of a 

dispute, a party that ultimately prevails is entitled to postjudgment interest from the date the 

original judgment was rendered, irrespective of whether the original judgment was erroneous, 

because that is the date upon which the trial court should have rendered a correct judgment. See 

id. In the instant case, the original judgment was issued on September 5, 2001. We affirmed that 

judgment in Castle’s favor on July 31, 2003,6but remanded for the limited purpose of 

determining the correct amount of prejudgment interest. Whether the remand on prejudgment 

interest created a fact issue or required a limited retrial was immaterial to the accrual of 

postjudgment interest. See id. 

Castle has been deprived of the use of the amounts awarded in the judgment favoring it 

since 2001, a judgment we affirmed on appeal. Applying the reasoning in Timpson, we hold that 

Castle is entitled to postjudgment interest from the date of the original judgment, because that is 

consistent with the purpose of postjudgment interest—to compensate for the use or detention of 

money from the date of the judgment. See id. The Long Trusts’ sole issue is overruled.

DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

BRIAN T. HOYLE

 Justice

Opinion delivered December 30, 2010.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(PUBLISH)

 

6 We issued our judgment following remittitur on August 20, 2003, but the operative date of our judgment 

is not at issue in this appeal.