alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### The HONORABLE WARREN K. URBOM, United States District Judge 1 

### for the District of Nebraska. ___________ No. 95-2699

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Nebraska. Pedro Serpa, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 5, 1996 Filed: April 9, 1996

___________ Before BEAM, LOKEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.

Ped ro Serpa, who previously pleaded guilty to a drug-conspirac y offense and received a fifteen-year sentence, br ought this motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, claiming that he had receive d ineffe ctive assistance of counsel. After appointing counsel and givin g Serpa time to produce information supporting his claims, the distric t court denied the motion. Serpa appeals, and we affirm.

1
We review de novo the district court's denial of Serpa's sectio n 2255 mot ion. See Holloway v. United States , 960 F.2d 1348, 1351 (8th Cir
. 1992). Serpa claimed that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him about the possibility of cooperating with

### The district court held unconstitutional part of th e 2 

### Sentencing Reform Act, and severed that portion from the Act. On direct appeal, we reversed the court's determination as to th e Act's unconstitutionality, but affirmed Serpa's sentence. United States v. Serpa , No. 88-2427, slip op. at 1-2 (8th Cir. Mar. 1 , 1989) (unpublished per curiam). We also affirmed the denial o f Ser pa's first section 2255 motion, in which he challenged hi s se ntence. United States v. Serpa , 930 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir
. 1991) (per curiam). -2- the government, and for failing to consider the potential outcome o f counsel's motion to hold the Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional. In 2 his brief on appeal, Serpa does not discuss these claims or point to any
error in the court's order denying them. Accordingly, we deem these claim s abandoned. See Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp. , 765 F.2d 736, 74 0 (8th Cir. 1985)
Rather, S erpa argues on appeal that counsel was ineffective because he failed to assess the evidence adequately and negotiate a proper ple a agreement, and also failed to argue at sentencing for departures unde r U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.2 and 5K2.0. These ineffective-assistance claims, which
were rais ed generally in Serpa's pro se brief in support of his sectio n 2255 m otion, fail because they are merely general and conclusor y allegations. See Hil l v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985); Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668, 690, 694 (1984); Estes v. United States , 883 F.2d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1989) (conclusory allegation was insufficient to rebut strong presumption of counsel's competence).
Accordingly, we affirm.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
exv10w17






Exhibit 10.17




TERMS OF RETENTION BONUS GRANTED TO JEFFERY D. ANSELL



A cash bonus to Mr. Ansell in connection with his relocation from New Britain, Connecticut to
Towson, Maryland totaling $550,000 of which $160,000 was immediately vested, $130,000 vested on
December 31, 2010, and the balance will vest in two equal installments of $130,000 each on December
31, 2011 and December 31, 2012. This award was granted in July, 2010.
#### Illingworth *v.*Spaulding, Jennings & Co.

*(Circuit Court, D. New Jersey.*

July 23, 1881.)

1. .Letters Patent — Preliminary Injunction.

A preliminary injunction 'will not be granted where the defendant’s affidavits make out a case of reasonable doubt as to the novelty of the complainant’s patent.

2. Sake — Same.

*Semble*that the same rule applies as to its .validity.

In Equity.

Nixon, D. J.

This is an application for a preliminary injunction. None should ever be granted where the answering affidavits of the defendants show a reasonable doubt about the novelty or validity of the complainant’s patent. This was done at the hearing by exhibiting a certified copy of English letters patent No. 3,801, for improvements in the manufacture of plated and gilded ingots of iron and steel, and in the moulds used for that purpose, ceded to William Morse on the nineteenth of May, 1874. After an inspection and examination of the provisional and complete specifications and drawings of the said Morse patent on the argument, I intimated that they suggested a sufficient uncertainty in regard to the novelty of the complainant’s patent to warrant the court in refusing the application. The counsel for the complainant afterwards submitted to me several affidavits, taken without notice, and purporting to be verified *155before a master in the court of chancery of New Jersey, tending to show that, although the patent to Morse antedated the Illingworth patent op which the suit was brought, the invention of the latter was in fact perfected several weeks before the actual sealing of the complete specifications of Morse, and claimed that, under the rule, he was entitled to use such affidavits in reply to the affidavits of the defendants on the complainant’s motion. But this is not allowable. Such a practice would often result in determining what seems to he the vital question of a cause upon *ex parte*affidavits.

The complainant must wait for his injunction until the final hearing, when the court will he better able upon the proofs to ascertain the facts. The injunction is refused.
EXHIBIT 99.2

 

 

Certification of Chief Financial Officer

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as created by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,the undersigned officer of CNET Networks, Inc. (CNET) hereby certifies that:

- the accompanying Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of CNET for the quarterly period ended June 30,2002 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), asapplicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of CNET.        Dated:  August 13, 2002           
/s/ Douglas N. Woodrum	 
 Douglas N. Woodrum
Executive Vice President
Chief Financial Officer

 

 

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18U.S.C. Section 1350, and is not being filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities ExchangeAct of 1934, as amended, and is not to be incorporated by reference to any filing of CNET, whethermade before or after the date hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in suchfiling.
CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

#### Commonwealth of Virginia v. Breeden

November 7, 1985

Case No. (Criminal) 46116

By JUDGE F. BRUCE BACH

This matter came before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress evidence obtained from a search of 8501 Robin Ridge Road, Fairfax, Virginia, pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant maintains that the affiants knowingly or recklessly included or omitted false and misleading statements in the search warrant in contravention of *Franks*v. *Delaware,*438 U.S. 154 (1978). After reviewing documents submitted by counsel and other authorities, it is still the opinion of the Court that the Motion to Suppress be denied, and that no hearing is required under *Franks.*

The Supreme Court held in *Franks*that there is a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting a search warrant. *Franks, supra*at 171. To overcome the presumption to the extent that an evidentiary hearing is called for, a challenger must first allege and submit evidence tending to prove that certain portions of the affidavit state *deliberate or recklessly made falsehoods. Id.*Even if this first hurdle is overcome, no evidentiary hearing will be ordered if the affidavit, excised of the alleged falsehoods, would still support a finding of probable cause. *Id.*

Defendants allege that the affiants knew of and deliberately withheld from the magistrate the confidential informant’s supposed retaliatory motive and self interest, *251the alleged fact that the informant was intoxicated, and the alleged fact that the informant was a convicted felon. These and other similar allegations are not the deliberate, affirmative falsehoods that fall within the purview of *Franks.*To the contrary, they are merely "facts" relating to the credibility of the informant which were *omitted*from the warrant. Every warrant lacks some fact; such omissions are not grounds for suppression of a search.

Assuming without deciding that the omission of facts from a warrant is the type of evil *Franks*sought to prevent, the inclusion of the alleged omissions would not alter the validity of the warrant. There would still be probable cause to support a search. Each of the alleged omissions relates to the credibility of the confidential informant. However, the affidavit sets forth supervening facts that tend to establish the informant’s credibility, including his dealings with the police regarding stolen property, past information supplied, and corroboration of the truth of informant’s statements by later observation and another witness. Because the affidavit would still support a finding of probable cause even if the alleged omissions were included, the second prong of *Franks*is not met and no hearing is required. *See, Franks, supra*at 171.

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is denied.
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">The People of the State of New York, Respondent,<br><br>against<br><br>Donny Kelly, Appellant.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Appellate Advocates (Rebecca J. Gannon of counsel), for appellant.Queens County District Attorney (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and William H. Branigan of counsel), for respondent.</p><p>Appeal from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Michelle A. Armstrong, J.), rendered January 21, 2016. The judgment convicted defendant, after a nonjury trial, of attempted petit larceny and attempted criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, and imposed sentence.</p><p>ORDERED that the judgment of conviction is affirmed.</p><p>After a nonjury trial, defendant was found guilty of attempted petit larceny (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 155.25) and attempted criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 165.40). Defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review since he made only a general motion to dismiss and did not specify any of the specific grounds raised on appeal (<i>see</i> CPL 470.05 [2]; <a href="../2005/2005_05099.htm" target="_blank"><i>People v Leon</i>, 19 AD3d 509</a> [2005], <i>affd</i> 7 NY3d 109 [2006]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (<i>see People v Contes</i>, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish defendant's guilt of attempted petit larceny and attempted criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence demonstrated that defendant had engaged in conduct which tended to effect the commission of the offense of petit larceny (<i>see </i>Penal Law §§ 110.00, 155.25) by intentionally taking the complainant's faucet in order to deprive it of that item. In addition, the People established that defendant engaged in conduct which tended to effect the commission of the offense of attempted criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 165.40) by intentionally impeding the complainant's recovery of the faucet in order to benefit himself. Furthermore, upon the exercise of our factual review power (<i>see </i>CPL 470.15 [5]), we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (<a href="../2006/2006_08640.htm" target="_blank"><i>see People v Romero</i>, 7 NY3d 633</a> [2006]).</p><p>Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.</p><p>PESCE, P.J., ELLIOT and SIEGAL, JJ., concur.</p><br>ENTER:<br>Paul Kenny<br>Chief Clerk<br>Decision Date: February 22, 2019<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_2_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16

- 10136 Summary Calendar

GERY LEE SCOTT ,
Petitioner

- Appellant

v. LORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION , Respondent

- Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 4:16

- CV

- 20

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Gery Lee Scott, Texas prisoner # 1123905, seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to appeal the district court’s transfer of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application as successive and unauthorized

. Scott was convicted of inju ry to a child

- bodily injury and sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment. He
raised claims challenging his conviction and sentence on the basis of a n

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED November 10, 2016 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 16-10136 Document: 00513755887 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/10/2016No. 16

- 10136

2 allegedly unlawful sentence enhancement as well as the state and federal postconviction proceedings.
This a ppeal is frivolous and without merit because t he district court correctly determined that the § 2254 application was successive and unauthorized under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). See § 2254(a) ; Leal Garcia v. Quarterman , 573 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir. 2009); Moore v. Dretke , 369 F.3d 844, 846 (5th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Scott’s motions for IFP and appointment of counsel are DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED as frivolous. See 5 TH C IR

. R . 42.2; F ED

. R. A PP

. P . 24(a)(5); Carson v. Polley , 689 F.2d 562, 586 (5th Cir. 1982). This is Scott’s third unsuccessful attempt to challenge his conviction and sentence. He is WARNED that future frivolous or repetitive filings will result in the imposition of sanctions. Case: 16-10136 Document: 00513755887 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/10/2016
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 186 (Wednesday, September 27, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 44879]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-20609]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL CAPITAL PLANNING COMMISSION

1 CFR Part 603


Privacy Act Regulations; Correction

AGENCY: National Capital Planning Commission.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC or Commission) 
is correcting a final rule that appeared in the Federal Register on 
September 20, 2017. The document issued New Privacy Act Regulations.

DATES:  Effective October 20, 2017.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Anne R. Schuyler, General Counsel and 
Chief FOIA Officer, 202-482-7223, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c5a4ababa0ebb6a6adb0bca9a0b785aba6b5a6eba2aab3"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="ee8f80808bc09d8d869b97828b9cae808d9e8dc0898198">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In FR Doc. 2017-19996 appearing on page 
44044 in the Federal Register on Wednesday, September 20, 2017, the 
following corrections are made:


Sec.  603.3   [Corrected]

0
1. On page 44048, in the second column, the first of the two paragraphs 
designated (c)(3)(vii) is correctly redesignated as paragraph 
(c)(3)(vi).

    Dated: September 21, 2017.
Anne R. Schuyler,
General Counsel.
[FR Doc. 2017-20609 Filed 9-26-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7520-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
Exhibit 32.1



Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



The undersigned, as Chief Executive Officer of
Transcend Services, Inc., certifies that the Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003, which accompanies this certification fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the information contained in the annual report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Transcend Services, Inc. at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is
made solely for purposes of Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350 of the United States Code and is subject to the knowledge and willfulness qualifications contained in Title 18, Chapter 63, Section 1350(c).



|                                                                
|----------------------------------------------------------------
|                                                                
|/s/ Larry G. Gerdes                                             
|                                                                
|Larry G. Gerdes Chief Executive Officer  Date: February 12, 2004
SCWC-14-0001058 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI 

ANTHONY R. LEOFFLER, 

Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant, 

vs. 

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, 

Respondent/Respondent-Appellee. 

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS 

(CAAP-14-0001058; S.P.P. No. 13-1-002K (CR. NO. 03-1-0221K)) 

ORDER REJECTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, Pollack, McKenna, and Wilson, JJ.) 

 Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant Anthony R. Leoffler’s 

Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed on February 26, 2016, 

is hereby rejected. 

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, April 12, 2016. 

Jeffrey A. Hawk 

for petitioner 

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald 

/s/ Paula A. Nakayama 

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna 

/s/ Richard W. Pollack 

/s/ Michael D. Wilson 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-14-0001058

12-APR-2016

07:56 AM
Exhibit 23.1

              CONSENT OF PETERSON & CO., LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on
Forms S-2 (Nos. 333-108923, 333-105656, 333-37676, 333-63468, 333-73906,
333-84766), Forms S-3 (Nos. 333-19695, 333-62761, 333-45759, 333-07861) and
Forms S-8 (Nos. 333-105854, 033-61704, 033-61708, 033-63046, 333-24991,
333-26319, 333-60011) of our report dated February 28, 2005, except for Note 10,
as to which the date is May 13, 2005, included in the Annual Report on Form
10-KSB/A of Protein Polymer Technologies, Inc. for the year ended December 31,
2004, with respect to the financial statements, included in this Form 10-KSB/A.



                                            /s/ PETERSON & CO., LLP



San Diego, California
May 18, 2005
#### Arnold LEON, Plaintiff, v. HOTEL AND CLUB EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL 6, Defendant.

United States District Court S. D. New York.

Nov. 30, 1960.

Arnold Leon, Miami, Fla., plaintiff, pro se.

Boudin, Cohn & Glickstein, for defendants.

BICKS, District Judge.

Defendant moves for an order directing (1) plaintiff to serve an amended complaint containing separate counts and numbered paragraphs, and (2) setting forth a more definite statement of the grounds upon which this court has jurisdiction.

*159 Plaintiff appears pro se. In a neatly typed, two page complaint, properly captioned and signed, he alleges that he has been wrongfully expelled from defendant union and effectively denied employment as the result of agreements between the defendant and various employers. The complaint, although it flows from a congeries of events (alleged dismissal and blacklisting), states a single claim: separation into counts would be superfluous. Since the complaint contains only seven paragraphs and an *ad damnum*clause, plaintiff’s failure to number these cannot be said to prejudice defendant. In sum, the complaint is sufficient to give fair notice of the claim asserted; this is the hallmark of a complaint in Federal court. See, 2 Moore, Federal Practice, Par. 8.13, p. 1649, fn. 6; Dioguardi v. Durning, 2 Cir., 1944, 139 F.2d 774.

Defendant’s motion under Rule 12(e), F.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A., seeking a more definite statement of the basis of this court’s jurisdiction, misconceives the function of the motion for a more definite statement. Rule 12(e) permits such a motion when vagueness and/or ambiguity in the pleading attacked is such “that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading * * The fact that plaintiff has stated dual grounds to support this court’s jurisdiction does not create the vagueness or ambiguity upon which a Rule 12(e) motion must be based. Plaintiff’s complaint, fairly construed, is susceptible of answer in the usual manner. Information as to the basis of jurisdiction not contained in plaintiff’s complaint may be ascertained through the discovery mechanisms of the federal rules; and, of course, objections as to jurisdiction are never waived.

It may be that plaintiff’s motion under Rule 12(e) is preparatory to a motion to dismiss. Rule 12(e) is designed to enable a litigant to answer, not to move for dismissal. See, 2 Moore, Federal Practice, Par, 12.18 [4], p. 2307-2308, Harrington v. Yellin, D.C.E.D.Pa.1958, 158 F.Supp. 456, 459; U. S. Aluminum Siding Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1958, 163 F.Supp. 906.

Since plaintiff has alleged residence outside of the state of New York, defendant’s demand for security for costs in the amount of $250 will be granted.

So ordered.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

GREGG ANDREW TCHIRKOW,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 149 WM 2018

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 26th day of November, 2018, the “Application for Recusal and/or 

Disqualification,” treated as an Application for Extraordinary Relief, is DENIED.
Exhibit 10.16





Exhibit 10.16




AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO THE

NOBLE DRILLING CORPORATION

RETIREMENT RESTORATION PLAN




Pursuant to the provisions of Section 9 thereof, the Noble Drilling Corporation Retirement
Restoration Plan as amended by restatement in its entirety effective as of January 1, 2009 (the
“Plan”), is hereby amended in the following respect only:



Effective as of January 1, 2009, Section 1.1(h) of the Plan is hereby amended by restatement
in its entirety to read as follows:




(h) “Participant” means the Chief Executive Officer of Noble Corporation and any other
employee of an Employer who (i) is a participant in the Retirement Plan, and (ii) has been
designated by the Chief Executive Officer of Noble Corporation to be a Participant in this
Plan.



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment has been executed by Noble Drilling Corporation on behalf
of all Employers on this 10th day of July, 2009.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	NOBLE DRILLING CORPORATION

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Julie Robertson	 
	 	 	Title: Senior Vice President