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w . v i l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2004/134NOT PRE CEDENT IAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 03-1144

ANA CARRI LLO, Petitioner

v. JOHN ASHC ROFT , Attorney Generalof the

United States, Respondent

On P etition for Rev iew of a Final O rder of the Bo ard o f Imm igration Ap peals (No. A76-141-769)

Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

October 28, 2004 Be for e: N YG AA RD , AM BR O, a nd G AR TH , Circuit Judges (Opinion fi led: November 16, 2004)

OPI NION

AM BR O, Circuit

Judge Ana Carrill o, a native and ci tize n of Peru, entered the United States in December 198 4, at th e ag e of nin etee n, by c ross ing the M exic an b ord er w itho ut in spe ction

.1 Under § 240A(b) of the I NA, “the Attorne y Generalmay cancelremoval of, and

adjus t to the sta tus of an alie n law fully adm itted fo r perm anen t residen ce, an alien w ho is inadmiss ible or

deportabl e from the Unit ed State s if t he ali en – (A) has been phy sical ly present in the United State s for a continuous period of not le ss than 10 y ears i mmediatel y pr eceding the date of s uch applic ation; (B) h as be en a p erson of g ood mo ral cha racter d uring such period ; (C) has n ot been co nvicted of an offe nse und er section 212 (a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 23 7(a)(3 ) [8 U .S.C. § § 11 82(a )(2), 12 27(a )(2), or 1 227 (a)(3)] (e xcep t in a case desc ribed i n secti on 237(a)( 7) [8 U.S.C. § 1227( a)(7) ] where the AttorneyGeneral exer cises discr etion to grant a wai ver); and (D) e stablish es that re mo val w ould result in e xcep tional a nd ex treme ly unusual har dship t o the al ien’s spouse, parent, or chil d, who is a ci tize n of the U nited Sta tes o r an alien law fully a dm itted for per ma nen t resid enc e. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Only the last requirement was at issue before the IJ. 2 Subsequentl y, while remai ning in t he United States, Carril lo marri ed Jose Marti n Carril lo, an undocumented native of Peru. The couple’s two daughters , Genesis and Katiuska,

we re b orn in th e U nited Sta tes in 199 4 an d 19 99, r esp ectiv ely. In June 1999, Carril lo was charged a s removable unde r § 212(a) (6)(A)( i) of t he Immigration and Nati onalit y Act ( “INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)( 6)(A)(i ), as an ali en present in the United State s without having been admit

ted le gally . Before t

he Immigration Judge (“IJ” ), Carrill o conceded removabi lit y, but sought

cancell ation of

removal purs uant to § 240 A( b) o f the IN A, 8 U.S .C. § 122 9A (b), o r alte rna tivel y volu ntar y dep artu re. With resp ect to Carrillo’s reque st for cancellation o f remo val, the only issue before the IJ was whether she had es tabli shed that her U.S. ci tize n daughters would suffer “excepti onal and ext

remelyunusual har dship” as a resul t of her de portation. 1 Concluding that Car ril lo fai led to s atis fy t

his st atutor

y r equirement , the IJ deni ed her appl ication for2 To the extent necessary, we also consi der the I J’s opi nion for i ndicia of procedural due pro ces s in P art III , infra

. 3 Pub. L . No. 104 -208, 110 Stat. 3009 (19 96). 3 cancell ation of

removal i n a written opinion i ssued on April20, 2000. The I J grant ed Carril lo volunt ary departure in the same opinion. Carril lo appeal ed the deni al of cancell ation of

removal t o the Board of I mmigrati on Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed t he I J’ s d ec i si on on De ce mb er 19 , 20 02 , an d i ss ue d a n a l t erna t e o r de r of r em ov al

. We review the BIA’s order here. 2 W e ha ve ju risdi ction to re view fina l ord ers o f rem ova l pu rsua nt to 8 U .S.C . § 125 2(a), as ame nded by the Illeg al Imm igration Ref orm and I mm igrant R espo nsibility Act (“IIR IRA ”). 3 This jurisdiction is qua lified, howe ver, by several explicit, statutory juris dicti ona l bar s. A mo ng t hes e jur isdic tion al ba rs is § 242 (a)(2 )(B ) ofthe I NA , 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a )(2)( B), which prec ludes us f rom reviewing de nials of appli cati ons for discr etionary reli ef. 8 U.S. C. § 1252(a)( 2)(B) (pr oviding t hat “no court shal l have jurisdictio n to rev iew . . . an y . . . decision o r action of the Atto rney G enera l the au thority for which is specifi ed under thi s subchapt er to be i n the dis creti on of the Att orney Gen eral . . .”). This jurisdictio nal ba r app lies to the determ ination that an applic ant ha s failed to establ ish that removalwould resul t in t he excepti onal and ext

remelyunusual har dship of a relat ive. M ende z-M oran chel v . Ashc roft , 338 F.3d 176, 176 (3d Cir. 2003) (hol ding that “the issue of w hether [a p etitioner] meets the ha rdship requ irement is a discretiona ry4 Rec ogn izing th at as a g enera l rule w e do n ot cite n on-p reced ential o pinion s, we note

here a s an h istorical f act tha t the qu estion w hethe r we have jurisdictio n to en tertain Carril lo’s argument was squar elyaddresse d in Go me z San chez v. Ash croft , No. 03-1784, 2004 WL 751498 (3d Cir. Apr. 6, 2004). I n Sanchez , we held , inter alia , that we lack juri sdiction to entertai n a “clai m that the IJ used t he wrong legal standar d in asse ssing [a discr etionary ] appli cati on.” Id. at **2 . (Judg e G arth do es no t join in th is foo tnote bec aus e this Co urt h as a dop ted a pol icy of not citin g no n-p rece den tial o pin ion s.) 4 decisi on by the Board of Immigration Appeals, [and] we lack j urisdi ction to review [such a] d ecis ion ”). P ut sim ply, Mendez-Moranchel stymies a look by us at the discretion ary decisi on of the BIA in this cas e. Carril lo nonethe less mai ntains that we have j urisdi ction to consider the three arguments s he present s in her petit ion for r eview. Her fi rst argument is that t he IJ appl ied the wrong lega l st andard in he r analy sis and t hat the BIA summarily adopted this fl awed analysis. Second, C arrillo contends that the B IA erron eously applied the reg ulatory criteria f or summary affirmance by a singl e BIA member. Third, Carril lo claims she has suffered a de privation of her c onsti tuti onal ri ght to due process of l aw. For the reasons given below , we c onclu de tha t we la ck juris diction to con sider h er first arg um ent, 4 the second argument

proceeds on t

he wrong basis–t

hat the BIA through a si ngle member

su mmaril y af

fi rme d the IJ ’s de ci si on w he n i n f ac t t he fu llBIA pa ne l a ff

irmed , and w e reject as unp ersua sive h er third a rgum ent. I. Carrillo first argues that he r remov al proceed ings we re deficient bec ause the IJ applie d an erroneous standar d and the BIA summaril y affirmed the IJ ’s deci sion on the5 In pe rtinent p art, the B IA w rote: “[ n]otw ithstand ing...[C arrillo’s] a ppella te

co nt en ti ons , w e a gr ee wit h the [I J] th at .. .[ Car

ri ll o] ha s n otde mon st

ra te d tha t h ertwo [U.S.] ci tize n children would suffer exc eptiona l and extremelyunusual har dship as t hat term has bee n defined. ” 

### A.R. at 2. 5 basis of that s tandard. She contends t hat the IJ impl icitly construed the “exce ptionaland extremel y unusua l hards hip” st andard as r equiri ng an unconscionable hards hip to t he petit ioner’ s rel ative . While s he might have fa iled to meet thi s more demanding st andard, Carr illo ma intains th at she u nequ ivoca lly demo nstrated the lev el of h ardsh ip actu ally requir ed by t

he stat ute. As we know of no prescribed t emplate cabining t he Attorney General’s exerci se of dis creti on in dete rmining “e xcepti onal and ext remelyunusual hardshi p” in cancel lati on of removal cas es (abse nt, of c ourse, the prerequisi tes of § 240A(b) of the I NA), the bottom line i s that all roads lead to discr etion and we are bereft of th e au tho rity to re view its ex ercis e. Cf. Ca rriche v. Ash croft , 350 F.3 d 84 5, 85 4 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003 ). II. Carril lo’s argument that the BIA erred in dis posing of her appeal through a summary aff

irmance wit

hout opini on has a fundamentalflaw. At root level , the re was an opinion o f the full BIA , not merely a single m embe r. While w e conce de that the B IA’s opinion on t

he merit s of Carri llo’ s cancel lati on of removal ent reaty was as bare bones as it gets, 5 it was non etheless an op inion. Thu s Carrillo’s assertion that a sum mary aff irma nce wa s en tered imp rop erly is a non -star ter.6 III. Carril lo argues final ly that t he IJ and BIA viol ated her right to due proce ss by denying her an “individualized legal analysis of her case using established BIA precedent .” Pet ’r Br. at 20. She maintai ns that the IJ employe d “boile rplate” language with out co nside ring the facts o f her c ase an d that th e BIA ’s sum mary af firma nce re flects no indication “t

hat the record was r eviewed.” Id. at 22. On the basis of these a llegations that she wa s den ied an individ ualize d rev iew o f her c ase at b oth the IJ and BIA level, Car ri ll o a rg ue s tha t s he was not ac co rd ed due pr oc es s o f l aw. Ag ain, w e mu st con sider w hethe r we have the jurisd iction re quired to ente rtain Carril lo’s c laim. In thi s consti tuti onal cont ext, however, the inquiry i s not as straightforward as it

was in our earlier

analy sis. The Government concedes that we “may have jurisdictio n to rev iew c ertain su bstan tial con stitutiona l issues im plicated ” by den ials of appli cati ons for di scretionaryreli ef. Resp. Br. at 10 (quotation omitted) ( citi ng Alva rez-D elmu ro v. A shcro ft , 360 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir . 2004) ( leavi ng open the ques tion “w hethe r con stitutiona l conc erns m ight req uire us to con strue § 125 2(a)(2 )(B)(i) to perm it review in som e circu mstan ces”); Flo re s- Garz a v. INS , 328 F.3 d 79 7, 80 3 n.5 (5th C ir. 2003 ) (leavin g op en the ques tion w hethe r cou rt’s jurisdic tion w ould exten d to “separate and disti nct” constitutional claims in cases where juri sdiction is otherwise barred by § 12 52(a )(2)(C )); Singh v. Reno , 182 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir . 1999) ( explai ning that “ review may be impli ed where it s absence would r aise s erious consti tuti onal7

concerns”) ). I n order t o determi ne whether Carrill o’s case present s a constitutional challenge that ri ses to a level suffici ent to warrant our exercise of juri sdiction, we mu st

con side r the natu re an d m erit o f he r co nstitu tion al arg um ent. Cf. Calcano-Martine z v. Ash croft , 533 U .S. 348 , 350 n .2 (20 01) (c onsid ering w hethe r “cou rts of a ppea ls retain ju ri sdi ct io n t o r evi ew ‘ sub st antia l c ons ti tu ti ona l c hal le nge s’ ra is ed b y al ie ns wh o co me within t he strictures of § 1252(a) (2)(C)” and concludi ng that “ background pri nciple s of stat utoryconstruction and consti tuti onal concerns must be consi dered in de termini ng the scope of II RIRA's juri sdiction-st rippi ng provisi ons”). This creates a t heoreti cal chi ckenand-egg probl em; we must reach t he substance of her ar gument in orde r to determine wh ethe r w e ha ve ju risdi ction to re ach the s ubs tanc e of her arg um ent. Id. Analyzi ng Carril lo’s due process c laim i n this context , we conclude t hat her argument i s unpersuas ive. On its face , the IJ’s decisi on controver ts Carrill o’s ass erti on that the IJ employ ed boilerplate l anguage in her decision. As the Governm ent explains, the IJ’s o pinion “inclu ded a three-p age d escrip tion of Carr illo’s evid ence on th e hard ship issue . . . f

ollowed bya one-and-a -half pa ge[] anal ysi s as to whether thi s evidence met the standar d.” Resp. Br. at

17. The IJ carefull y cat alogued the asserted hards hips and reasoned t

hat the y di d not ri se to t he stat utorylevel requir ed to support an appl ication for cancell ation of

deportat ion. Her opi nion cle arlyembodies an i ndividual ized re view of Carril lo’s c ase.8 IV. For the reaso ns set forth, Ca rrillo’s petition for review is he reby dismissed in pa rt and d enied in part.