Filed 6/30/21 P. v. Jackson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRONSHI MAURICE JACKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

F079700

(Super. Ct. No. CRF52955)

OPINION

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. James A.

Boscoe, Judge.

Matthew J. Watts, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Daniel 

B. Bernstein, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P.J., Franson, J. and DeSantos, J.
2.

Defendant Bronshi Maurice Jackson was convicted by jury trial of battery by a 

prisoner of a nonconfined person after he spit on a correctional officer. On appeal, he 

contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On March 30, 2017, the Tuolumne County District Attorney filed an information 

charging defendant with battery by a prisoner of a nonconfined person (Pen. Code, 

§ 4501.5;1 count 1). The complaint further alleged defendant had suffered a prior strike 

conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 

1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)). Defendant pled not guilty and denied the prior strike allegation. 

On February 7, 2019, a jury found defendant guilty of count 1. In a bifurcated 

proceeding, defendant admitted the prior strike allegation. 

The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in state prison as follows: 

three years, doubled to six years pursuant to the Three Strikes law, plus 

two consecutive years imposed in another case. 

On July 25, 2019, defendant filed a notice of appeal. 

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On February 17, 2017, Correctional Officer Ralph Hansen was working at Sierra 

Conservation Center as a health care escort officer, escorting inmates to health 

appointments. That morning, Hansen attempted to escort defendant to a doctor’s 

appointment. After Hansen handcuffed defendant and removed him from his cell, 

defendant refused to see the doctor. Hansen put defendant back in his cell, but defendant 

refused to let him remove the handcuffs. He told Hansen that he was not going to return 

them and began yelling profanities. Hansen then notified a sergeant. When the sergeant 

approached defendant’s cell, defendant began kicking at the door. He stated that he had 

been there too long and wanted to kill himself. 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3.

As a result of defendant’s statement, Hansen transferred him to a holding cell for 

observation. The holding cell was approximately three feet by three feet, six or 

seven feet tall, and covered in diamond mesh screen. According to Hansen, as he secured 

the holding cell door, defendant became aggressive and began kicking. He yelled at 

Hansen, “ ‘Fuck you, old man,’ ” and then spit through the wire mesh, striking him in the 

face and chest. Defendant and Hansen were standing face-to-face, approximately one 

foot away from each other when defendant spit on Hansen. Afterwards, Hansen wiped 

his right check with the right sleeve of his uniform shirt. He immediately reported the 

incident to the sergeant. He then wiped some of the spit off with a paper towel and took 

off his uniform shirt. An officer took photos of Hansen’s uniform. After being 

photographed, Hansen went to the bathroom and washed his face. An officer then 

transported him to the hospital. 

Correctional Officer Byron Gardner was nearby when the incident occurred. He 

testified that he heard Hansen say, “ ‘He spit on me.’ ” Gardner was a couple of steps 

away from Hansen, but did not actually see or hear defendant spit on him. Gardner then 

retrieved a camera and took pictures of the spit. Additionally, he attempted to soak up 

some of the spit with a paper towel, which was eventually booked into evidence. 

Correctional Officer Dustin Duke was also working on the day of the incident. He 

was notified that Hansen had been spit on by an inmate and was instructed to collect and 

process the evidence. He said he saw spit marks on the left shoulder and right sleeve of 

Hansen’s uniform shirt. The spit appeared fresh and had a “whitish appearance” and had 

begun to absorb into the material. He made circles around the spit marks with a black 

marker and took three photos. 

John Styer, a criminalist for the Department of Justice, tested Hansen’s uniform 

shirt and a brown paper towel for saliva. Both results came back inconclusive for saliva, 

but positive for alpha-amylase, a substance found in saliva and other bodily fluids. He 

also found the presence of nucleated epithelial cells, which are generally found inside of 
4.

the mouth or other bodily orifices. Styer testified that the presence of alpha-amylase in 

high amounts and nucleated epithelial cells indicated there was an “extremely high 

probability” that the substance found on both items was saliva. 

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied spitting on Hansen. He said, 

“That’s total disrespect and that’s like an assault charge on a [correctional officer], I 

know that much.” He noted that he was 30 days away from being paroled and would not 

have risked his release date to spit on an officer. 

DISCUSSION

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction

because the only evidence available was Hansen’s “bald assertion” that defendant spit on

him. We conclude the evidence was sufficient.

I. Applicable Law

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Standards

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘we review the whole record in the 

light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial 

evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a 

reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” 

(People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) “We must presume in support of the 

judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from 

the evidence.” (People v. Medina (2009), 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) “The conviction shall 

stand ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial 

evidence to support [the conviction].” ’ ” (Cravens, at p. 508.) The reviewing court 

“neither reweigh[s] the evidence nor reevaluate[s] the credibility of the witnesses.” 

(People v. Mohamed (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 515, 521.) “[C]ircumstantial evidence is as 

sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction. (People v. Park (2003) 112 

Cal.App.4th 61, 68.) The standard of review is the same in cases in which a conviction is 

based primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 
5.

625.) Moreover, “ ‘[t]he uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to 

sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently 

improbable.’ ” (People v. Duncan (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1018.)

B. Battery by a Prisoner of a Nonconfined Person

Pursuant to section 4501.5, “[e]very person confined in a state prison of this state 

who commits a battery upon the person of any individual who is not himself a person 

confined therein shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for 

two, three, or four years, to be served consecutively.” To prove that the defendant is 

guilty of this crime, the prosecution must therefore prove that (1) the defendant willfully 

touched the victim in a harmful or offensive manner, (2) the defendant was confined in a 

state prison, and (3) the victim was not confined in a state prison. (People v. Flores 

(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 924, 930–931; CALCRIM No. 2723.)

In regard to the first element, “the touching can be done indirectly by causing an 

object to touch the other person, and ... the slightest touching can constitute a battery.” 

(People v. Flores, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.) “The act of placing or throwing 

human bodily fluids or excrement, or a substance containing either bodily fluids or 

excrement, thereby causing such substance to contact the skin or membrane of the 

employee, also is harmful or offensive touching.” (Ibid.) Additionally, the touching

must have been willful. (Ibid.) Willful means “a purpose or willingness to commit the 

act, or make the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to 

injure another, or to acquire any advantage.” (§ 7, subd. (1).)

II. Analysis

Defendant’s argument that the only evidence that he spit on Hansen was Hansen’s 

“unsupported assertion” is contradicted by the testimony of multiple officers and the 

criminologist, which provided ample support and corroboration for Hansen’s assertion. 

Furthermore, the testimony of Hansen alone would have constituted sufficient evidence, 

unless it was physically impossible or inherently improbable. (See People v. Duncan, 
6.

supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1018.) “To reject the statements given by a witness whom

the trial court has found credible, either they must be physically impossible or their 

falsity must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.” (Ibid.)

Here, there was nothing impossible or improbable about any of the witnesses’ 

testimony. Hansen testified that when defendant was in a mesh-screened holding cell, 

defendant spit on him through the screen, striking him on the face and chest. They were 

standing face-to-face, approximately one foot away from each other when it occurred. 

Gardner, who was standing nearby, heard Hansen say, “He spit on me.” Although 

Gardner did not see defendant spit on Hansen, he did see the spit on Hansen’s shirt 

afterwards, took photos of the spit approximately a minute later, and even attempted to 

soak some of it up with a paper towel. Duke also saw spit marks on the left shoulder and 

right sleeve of Hansen’s shirt. He said the spit appeared fresh and he took three photos of 

it. 

Additionally, the conviction was supported by forensic evidence. Styer tested 

Hansen’s shirt and the brown paper towel used to wipe the spit off. Although the results 

came back inconclusive for saliva, both items tested positive for alpha-amylase and 

nucleated epithelial cells, which indicated an “extremely high probability” that the 

substance found on Hansen’s shirt and the paper towel was saliva. 

Defendant argues that this forensic evidence created only a “mere possibility” the 

substance on the shirt and paper towel was saliva because alpha-amylase is also found in 

sweat and other bodily fluids. However, as noted, Styer testified there was an “extremely 

high probability” that the substance was indeed saliva because he found high levels of 

alpha-amylase and “the presence of alpha-amylase in saliva is approximately a thousand 

times higher than amylase in any other of the bodily fluids.” This was sufficient to 

support an inference the substance on Hansen’s shirt was saliva. (See People v. Park, 

supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 68 [“ ‘circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct 

evidence to support a conviction’ ”]; People v. Bellamy (1986) 109 Cal. 610, 611 
7.

[circumstantial evidence need not provide “an absolute and mathematical demonstration 

of guilt”].)

In any event, even without this corroborating circumstantial evidence, Hansen was 

an eyewitness to the fact that defendant spit on his face and shirt, and his testimony alone 

constituted substantial evidence. In sum, the evidence supporting the conviction was 

overwhelming.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.