alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 06-4169

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. Daniel Tovar-Arguello, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 4, 2007 Filed: October 9, 2007

___________ Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Daniel Tovar-Arguello, a citizen of Me xico, pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States after having b een deported following his conviction for an aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) and 6 U.S.C. §§ 202(3), (4), and 557. His advisory Guidelines imprisonment range was 30-37 months, and he was sentenced to 30 months in prison by the district court. 1 On appeal, TovarArguello argues that his sentence is unreas onable because the district court (1) undervalued the mitigating facts and unique ci rcumstances of his case, such as his-2- benign reasons for illegal re-entry, and (2) ove rvalued the deterrent effect of a prison sentence. His argument relies on the fact ors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the “parsimony” doctrine, which provides that the sentence imposed should be the least severe sanction necessary to ach ieve the purpose of sentencing.
Upon careful review, we conclude thatthe district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing T ovar-Arguello at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. See Rita v. United States , 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007) (presumption of reasonableness applies to sentence imposedwithin advisory Guidelines range); United States v. Garlewicz , 493 F.3d 933, 938 (8th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Long Soldier , 431 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 2005) (reas onableness of sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion, which occurs if c ourt fails to consider relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only appr opriate factors but co mmits clear error of judgment); cf. United States v. Turbides-Leonardo , 468 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2006) (“It will be the rare case in which a within-the-range sentence can be found to transgress the parsimony principle.”), cert. denied , 127 S. Ct. 3064 (2007); United States v. Dyck , 334 F.3d 736, 742 (8th Cir. 2003) (“harm sought to be prevented is illegal reentry itself, for whatever purpose”).
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

______________________________
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EXHIBIT 23.1








CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM








We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Form S-3 (No. 333-168297) and Form S-8 (No. 333-163958) of China Green Agriculture, Inc. (the “Company”) of our report dated September 12, 2011, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of the Company and its subsidiaries as of June 30, 2011 and the related consolidated statements of operations and comprehensive income, stockholders’ equity and cash flows for the year ended June 30, 2011, and the related financial statement schedule, and the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting, which appear in this Form 10-K.





/s/ Kabani & Company, Inc.


Los Angeles, California


September 12, 2011
**Exhibit 2(b)(i)**

 

----

 

The total amount of long-term debt  securities of the Group authorized under any individual agreement, other than  the “Amended and Restated Trust Deed” dated September 21, 2000 relating  to the Company’s euro 2,000 million Debt Issuance Program originally constituted  on October 9, 1998 (incorporated by reference to Exhibit 2 to Six Continents  PLC’s Annual Report on Form 20-F (File No. 1-10409), dated December 20,  2001), does not exceed 10% of the total assets of the Group on a consolidated  basis. The Company agrees to furnish copies of any or all such instruments to  the Securities and Exchange Commission upon request.

----
**EXHIBIT 32.2**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Braintech, Inc. (the "Company ") on Form 10-QSB for the three months ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Edward A. White, the Principal Financial and Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge: 

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 

 
| /s/ Edward A. White |
|---------------------|

Edward A. White

Principal Financial Officer and Accounting Officer 

May 13, 2005
#### UNITED STATES of America v. Vaughn COTTMAN, Appellant.

No. 07-2221.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) on March 25, 2008.

Filed: June 2, 2008.

George S. Leone, Sabrina G. Comizzoli, Office of United States Attorney, Newark, NJ, for United States of America.

John F. Renner, Marlton, NJ, for Appellant.

Before: McKEE, RENDELL, and TASHIMA,* Circuit Judges.

*

 Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

OPINION OF THE COURT

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Vaughn Cottman appeals his sentence, urging that the District Court erred in applying the career offender provision. Although the parties have argued only those issues taken into account by the District Court, namely relevant conduct *161and the relatedness of the prior felony-convictions, we have concluded, and the parties appear to agree, that the two state court convictions that preceded Cottman’s sentencing in this case and formed the basis for the career offender application do not fit within the definition of “two prior felony convictions” under section 4B1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines.1

While we recognize that the defendant did not raise this issue either in the District Court or on appeal, we acknowledge and applaud the willingness of the government, through Assistant United States Attorney Sabrina G. Comizzoli, to remand this matter for resentencing as a matter of fairness, as well as its indication that “at resentencing, the government would continue to stand by its plea agreement and, thus, would not argue for imposition of the career offender enhancement.”

In light of the foregoing, we will VACATE the Judgment and Commitment Order of the District Court and REMAND for resentencing.

1

. This section of the Sentencing Guidelines states:

> The term "two prior felony convictions” means (1) the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense ...

U.S.S.G. § 4B 1.2(c). While Cottman was arrested for possession of cocaine in March 2004, he was not convicted in state court until he pled guilty on June 15, 2005; he was then sentenced in August 2005. *See*Presentence Report ¶¶ 154-55. The instant offenses for which he was sentenced occurred in February 2004 and July 2004. *See*Plea Tr. 25-26. Thus, the instant offense was committed almost a year before, not "subsequent to,” the state conviction in August 2005. Thus, the state conviction is not a "prior felony conviction" as required by section 4B 1.2(c).
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 23.1

                    CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the inclusion of our
report dated January 24, 2002 included in Transcend Services, Inc.'s Annual
Report on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2001 as well as the
incorporation by reference of such report into the Company's previously filed
Registration Statements File Nos. 033-57072, 033-41361, 033-37685, 033-59115,
333-32587, 333-16213 and 333-78777.

/s/ Miller Ray & Houser LLP

Atlanta, Georgia
February 28, 2002
<PAGE>

WorldPort Communications, Inc.                                      EXHIBIT 12.1


       Statement Re:  Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                                 (In millions)
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                    For the Year Ended
                                                                       December 31,
                                                      -----------------------------------------------

                                                       1996         1997          1998           1999
                                                       ----         ----          ----           ----
<S>                                                   <C>        <C>          <C>           <C>
Fixed charges:

   Interest expense (including amortization of
   debt issuance costs)                                (24)        (193)      (24,570)       (52,075)
   Interest element of rent expense (1/3 rent)           -          (30)         (420)          (765)
                                                      -----      -------      --------      ---------
                                                       (24)        (223)      (24,990)       (52,840)
                                                      =====      =======      ========      =========
Earnings:
   Consolidated net loss                              (260)      (3,493)      (76,772)      (121,020)
      Add back:
      Minority interest                                  -            -          (903)        (1,845)
      Fixed charges excluding cap interest             (24)        (223)      (24,990)       (52,840)
                                                      -----      -------      --------      ---------
                                                      (236)      (3,270)      (52,685)       (70,025)
                                                      =====      =======      ========      =========

Coverage (Deficiency)                                 (260)      (3,493)      (77,675)      (122,865)
                                                      =====      =======      ========      =========
</TABLE>
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Homeland Security

###### Federal Emergency Management Agency

          - [Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4335-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2017-0001]

# AGENCY:

Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

This notice amends the notice of a major disaster for the territory of the U.S. Virgin Islands (FEMA-4335-DR), dated September 7, 2017, and related determinations.

# DATES:

The amendment was issued September 15, 2017.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Dean Webster, Office of Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2833.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Notice is hereby given that the incident period for this declared disaster is now September 5, 2017, and continuing.

The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and Households In Presidentially Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and Households; 97.050, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals and Households—Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants—Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, Hazard Mitigation Grant.

Brock Long,

Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

[FR Doc. 2017-20458 Filed 9-22-17; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA

#### Schnedl v. O’Donnell

August 12, 1983

Case No. (Law) 7545

By JUDGE ALBERT H. GRENADIER

The Court having reviewed the requests for admissions and the responses made thereto by the defendant is of the opinion that the defendant has adequately responded to said requests.

Although Rule 4:11 of the Rules of Court requires a party to secure readily obtainable information, the Court is not persuaded that the rule contemplates the use of the kind of requests made by the plaintiff in this case.

The first four admissions sought are unnecessary and of dubious relevance. The matters raised in these requests will undoubtedly be the subject of testimony at the trial and an admission of these matters will result in no trial economy.

The remaining requests are improper. Although the defendant may be called upon to admit the genuineness of hospital and medical records, it is not reasonable to require the defendant to admit to the veracity of the many diagnoses, reports and statements contained in those records. The mere existence of those records *114does not require a litigant to admit the absolute truth of their content.

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s motion to determine the sufficiency of the defendant’s responses and to require the defendant to admit the requests for admissions is denied.

By JUDGE WILEY R. WRIGHT, JR.

November 22, 1983

The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s claim for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident which occurred on August 29, 1978, is barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Code Section 8.01-243(A). This suit was not filed until June 28, 1982; however, the plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations was tolled by Code Section 8.01-229 because he was of unsound mind until sometime after June 28, 1980.

Code Section 8.01-229(A)(2)(b) defines unsound mind as follows:

> For the purposes of items 1 and 2 of this subsection, a person shall be deemed of unsound mind if he is adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction to be mentally incapable of rationally conducting his own affairs, or if it shall otherwise appear to the court or jury determining the issue that such person is or was so mentally incapable of rationally conducting his own affairs within the prescribed limitation period.

The plaintiff has not been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the issue is whether he "was so mentally incapable of rationally conducting his own affairs within the prescribed limitation period."

The evidence establishes that the plaintiff sustained a severe head injury and that he was of unsound mind within the meaning of the statute for a considerable period of time following the accident. The Court is not satisfied, however, that the plain*115tiff’s disability continued until June 28, 1980. Accordingly, the plea of the statute of limitations will be sustained and the motion for judgment will be dismissed.
#### DODGE et al. v. UNITED STATES.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York.

December 9, 1896.)

No. 2,325.

Customs Duties — Classification—Liquid Camphor Refuse.

Liquid camphor refuse, tbe substance obtained, by drainage, from crude camphor, and used for the manufacture of camphor oil, is dutiable, under paragraph 60 of the tariff act of 1894, as an oil, and is not entitled to free entry, under paragraph 429, as “camphor, crude.”

This was an appeal by Dodge & Olcott from a decision of the board of general appraisers, sustaining the classification, by the collector of the port of New York, of certain merchandise imported by them. The merchandise was invoiced as “camphor refuse,” and appeared to be known as such, or as “liquid camphor refuse,” being a liquid which drips from the crude camphor, and from which an essential oil, known as “camphor oil,” is made, but from which no refined camphor is obtained. The collector classified it under paragraph 60 of the tariff act of 1894, as an oil. The importers claimed that it should be free, under paragraph 429 or under paragraph 470, as a drug, gum, gum resin, or otherwise, or under paragraph 558, as a vegetable substance, or, if dutiable at all, dutiable only under paragraph 10| or paragraph 16-£.

Comstock & Brown, for plaintiffs.

Henry D. Sedgwick, Asst. U. S. Atty.

WHEELER, District Judge.

The act of 1894 provides for a duty on: “60. Products or preparations known as alkalies, alkaloids, distilled oils, essential oils, expressed oils, rendered oils, and *603all combinations of the foregoing;” and puts on the free list: “429. Camphor, crude.” The importation appears to be an essential oil. It comes with crude camphor from the tree, and is separated from the camphor crystals by drainage. It is expressed from them by gravitation, and is in some sense an expressed oil. It has been classified under paragraph 60, as an oil, against a protest that it belongs under 429, as camphor, crude. Camphor, crude, implies what may become camphor, refined. This oil, although it may be called “camphor oil” because of its origin, contains no camphor, and can never become camphor. It is not in fact, nor is it called, camphor, crude. Decision of general appraisers affirmed.
**Exhibit****31.2**
 
 Certification
Pursuant to Exchange Act Rules 13a-14(a) and 15d-14(a)
 As
Adopted Pursuant to Section 302 of the
 Sarbanes
- Oxley Act of 2002
 
 I,
Richard K Brock, certify that:
 
 1.  I have
reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of PLM Equipment Growth Fund
V.
 
 2.  Based on
my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report.
 
 3.  Based on
my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this annual report.
 
 4.  The
Registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:
 
 a)  designed
such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under supervision, to ensure that material information
relating to the Registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made
known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;
 
 b)  evaluated
the effectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and
 
 c)  disclosed
in this annual report any change in the Registrant’s internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant’s most recent fiscal
quarter that has materially affected or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the Registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
 
 5.  The
Registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal controls over financial reporting, to the
Registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of Registrant’s board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 
 a)  all
significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of
internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the Registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and
report financial information; and
 
 b)  any
fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who
have a significant role in the Registrant’s internal controls over financial
reporting.
 
 
 
 
 
 Date:
March 29, 2005  By:  /s/
Richard K Brock
 Richard K
Brock
 Chief
Financial Officer
 (Principal
Financial Officer)
<PAGE>


                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of AVANIR Pharmaceuticals (the "Company")
on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gerald
J. Yakatan, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

         (1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section
                  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2)      The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
                  all material respects, the financial condition and result of
                  operations of the Company.

                       /s/ Gerald J. Yakatan, Ph.D.
                       --------------------------------
                       Gerald J. Yakatan, Ph.D.
                       Chief Executive Officer

December 22, 2003