IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 14–0426

Filed September 5, 2014

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

RICHARD CLAY MENDEZ,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission recommends attorney be ordered to cease 

and desist practicing law in Iowa for sixty days. ATTORNEY ORDERED 

TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN IOWA FOR 

SIXTY DAYS. 

Charles L. Harrington and Nicholas Tré Critelli, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

Jeffrey David Norris of Law Office of Richard Mendez, Des Moines, 

and Valerie Lynn Hanna of Law Office of Valerie Lynn Hanna, Glendale, 

California, for respondent. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a 

complaint against Richard Clay Mendez, charging numerous violations of 

Iowa’s disciplinary rules. Mendez is not licensed to practice law in Iowa 

but acquired a Des Moines-based immigration practice and represented 

Iowa residents in federal immigration proceedings. A division of the 

Grievance Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa determined Mendez 

violated certain rules governing trust accounts, fees, referrals, conflicts of 

interest, and neglect. The commission, with one member not 

participating in its deliberations, recommended we order Mendez to cease 

and desist from the practice of law in Iowa for a period of not less than 

sixty days, the period recommended by the Board. On our de novo

review, we find Mendez violated our rules and order him to cease and 

desist from practicing law in Iowa for sixty days. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Mendez has been licensed to practice law in California since 1998, 

but is not admitted to the Iowa bar. He practices chiefly in California, 

most recently from an office in Burbank. His practice is primarily 

immigration law, with some criminal defense work. Mendez began 

practicing in Iowa in July 2011, when he took over two branches of an 

immigration practice, ASESAL Immigration Services. One branch of 

ASESAL was located in Des Moines and the other in Grand Island, 

Nebraska. Mendez assumed representation of ASESAL’s clients and 

retained the majority of ASESAL’s staff. He renamed both branches “Law 

Office of Richard Mendez.”

Mendez stated that his Iowa practice is limited to providing legal 

services to Iowa residents on federal immigration matters, which is 

permitted by the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. See Iowa R. Prof’l 
3

Conduct 32:5.5(d)(2) (“A lawyer admitted in another United States 

jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any 

jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that . . . are 

services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other 

law of this jurisdiction.”). Federal law allows a member in good standing 

of any state’s bar to practice before the federal immigration court. See 8 

C.F.R. §§ 1001.1(f), 1292.1(a)(1) (2011). 

Mendez’s handling of his Iowa immigration practice resulted in 

ethics complaints by clients, successor counsel, and ultimately the 

Board, arising out of the following matters.

A. Trust Account Practices. Shortly after purchasing the 

ASESAL offices, Mendez opened a client trust account, as required by the 

Iowa Court Rules and the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. See Iowa 

Ct. R. 45.10(2) (“Funds a lawyer receives from clients or third persons for 

matters arising out of the practice of law in Iowa shall be deposited in 

one or more identifiable interest-bearing trust accounts located in 

Iowa.”); see also, e.g., Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.15(c). On August 31, 

Mendez and his Iowa counsel met with the director of the Office of 

Professional Regulation, the assistant director for boards and 

commissions for the Office of Professional Regulation, and the client 

security auditor. One of the purposes of the meeting was to discuss the 

need for Mendez to comply with Iowa’s rules governing client trust 

accounts. Mendez was provided with a copy of the trust account rules.

Those rules included requirements that an attorney provide notice and 

an accounting to clients upon withdrawing funds. Mendez concedes he 

failed to provide notices and accountings to forty-three clients upon 

withdrawal of funds. 
4

B. Nonrefundable Fees. Mendez’s written contracts with two 

clients, Rigoberto Flores and Miguel Angel Arechiga Cuellar, provided 

that Mendez could charge a $300 minimum fee merely for opening the 

file, regardless of whether any legal services were provided. The 

contracts stated: “ATTORNEY reserves the right to charge the minimum 

fee of $300 by opening the file, if that customer decides to end the 

contract before accumulating legal fees.” 

C. Rigoberto Flores Representation. In September 2011, 

Rigoberto Flores was charged with fraudulent practices in the third

degree, in violation of Iowa Code section 714.11, and identity theft, in 

violation of Iowa Code section 715A.8. These offenses are aggravated 

misdemeanors. On September 16, Flores engaged Mendez to represent 

him and paid Mendez $1000 of their agreed $1500 flat fee for the 

criminal representation. 

Mendez engaged an Iowa-licensed criminal attorney, John D. 

Hedgecoth, to enter an appearance on Flores’s behalf. Mendez stated, 

“[I]t would have been easier to just refer him, but I facilitated the 

agreement for Mr. Hedgecoth to represent Mr. Flores in the criminal 

matter.” Mendez and Hedgecoth orally agreed that Hedgecoth would be 

paid an hourly rate for his services from the $1000 Flores advanced to 

Mendez. When asked if he could give legal advice on criminal matters, 

Mendez responded, “Not on criminal matters as pertains to Iowa, but if it 

was criminal matters relating to immigration consequences, then yes, I 

believe so.” Mendez testified he never told Flores that he was an Iowalicensed attorney. 

Mendez admits that he did not seek or receive Flores’s written 

approval of the fee-splitting arrangement with Hedgecoth. He likewise 

failed to give Flores written notice of the withdrawal of any fees paid to 
5

his firm or to Hedgecoth’s firm. Hedgecoth’s billing records show that he 

ultimately provided Flores with $558 of legal services, but Mendez’s 

records reflect that he paid Hedgecoth $808 out of Flores’s account. On 

top of the $558 paid to Hedgecoth, Mendez billed Flores $1370 for 

“administrative support.” Flores paid Mendez a total of $1250, making 

Mendez’s net on the case $442 after payments to Hedgecoth. 

Flores ultimately entered guilty pleas on both charges. The Board 

asserts Mendez never personally spoke with Flores or Hedgecoth about 

the immigration implications of Flores’s criminal case, and that Mendez 

did not advise Flores of the immigration consequences of entering a 

guilty plea to the charged offenses. Mendez asserts the disposition of 

Flores’s case was unavoidable and denies the allegations that he never 

personally spoke with Flores and Hedgecoth about the immigration 

consequences of Flores’s guilty pleas. A postconviction court later 

granted Flores relief, finding that his guilty pleas were not intelligent, 

knowing, and voluntary because Flores was not informed in Spanish of 

each guilty plea’s potential impact on his immigration status. 

When asked if he could explain his fee for administrative support, 

Mendez stated, “Mr. Flores came to the . . . office on, almost on a daily 

basis asking about his case . . . . I think we even sent interpreters to 

interpret for him . . . . And there was a lot of assistance there.” These 

services were not itemized or noted in Flores’s file. However, the 

postconviction relief ruling found that a legal assistant from Mendez’s 

office attended Flores’s initial meeting with Hedgecoth at the jail to act as 

a translator. 

D. Sergio Guaillas Representation. Sergio Guaillas is a nonUnited States citizen who was initially represented by another attorney

on a visa petition. Guaillas’s petition was denied on September 8, 2011.
6

His letter of denial informed him that he had thirty-three days from the 

date of the letter, or until October 8, to file his notice of appeal. 

On September 21, after terminating his first attorney’s services, 

Guaillas spoke with a member of Mendez’s staff and engaged Mendez to 

handle his appeal. That same day, someone in Mendez’s office 

researched Guaillas’s appeal. 

Mendez failed to file the requisite notice of appeal by the October 8 

deadline. Mendez testified he was unable to file the appeal because his 

office could not get the proper documents from Guaillas’s previous 

attorney. Mendez further testified he orally informed Guaillas of his 

failure to file the notice of appeal and that this failure could constitute 

grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel and support a basis to 

reopen the matter. Nevertheless, Mendez could provide no 

documentation substantiating this assertion. 

On February 16, 2012, Guaillas retained the services of yet 

another immigration attorney, James Benzoni. The same day, Benzoni 

provided Mendez with a formal request to transfer Guaillas’s file. Mendez 

testified that he immediately mailed the file, but has no documentation of 

doing so. Benzoni did not receive the file. In late March, Benzoni again 

contacted Mendez asking for Guaillas’s file. On April 24, Benzoni filed a 

disciplinary complaint against Mendez. On June 14, Mendez provided 

Benzoni with Guaillas’s immigration file. 

Guaillas filed his own disciplinary complaint against Mendez. In 

his response to this complaint, Mendez stated that he had met with 

Guaillas on September 21, 2011, and that “[a]fter consultation, 

Mr. Guaillas agreed to retain [him] as his attorney.” Mendez’s paralegal 

also submitted a declaration stating Guaillas signed a retainer agreement 
7

with Mendez on September 21. Mendez testified at the hearing before 

the commission that he had met with Guaillas before November. 

But, Mendez’s internal billing and time records contradict his 

testimony. His records show the first time he personally met with 

Guaillas was well after the October 8 appeal deadline. The September 21 

notation in the file states that Guaillas “spoke with RF,” a staff member 

in the office. The first file notation indicating Mendez met with Guaillas 

is dated November 18, and Mendez’s invoice to Guaillas includes a 

November 18 entry stating, “Attorney Richard Mendez met with 

Mr. Guaillas.” 

E. Miguel Angel Arechiga Cuellar Representation. On 

August 30, 2011, Immigration and Customs Enforcement apprehended 

Miguel Angel Arechiga Cuellar and detained him in the Polk County jail. 

On September 1, Arechiga’s fiancée, Sandra Melendez, hired Mendez to 

represent Arechiga in a bond reduction hearing. According to the terms 

of the engagement agreement, Mendez charged a flat fee of $1500 for the 

bond reduction hearing.

That day, Mendez paid the $1500 flat fee on Arechiga’s behalf. 

Mendez did not deposit the advance payment into his client trust 

account. In his written response to the Board’s request for his trust 

account ledger for Arechiga and in his hearing testimony, Mendez 

attempted to justify his failure to do so by explaining that he did not 

think he needed to deposit the fee into his trust account “because part of 

the services w[ere] performed before and on the next two days after [he] 

was retained.” Mendez also failed to notify Arechiga for any withdrawal

of fees. 

Arechiga was incarcerated at the time of Mendez’s retention and 

wanted a bond reduction hearing as soon as possible so that he could be 
8

released from custody. One of Mendez’s staff visited Arechiga at the Polk 

County jail on September 1, and a paralegal and attorney followed up 

with Arechiga to complete some paperwork. A paralegal twice contacted 

the deportation office, apparently to no avail. Mendez’s billing records for 

September 11 refer to a call regarding paperwork for Arechiga. But,

Mendez did not file any documents requesting the bond reduction 

hearing. Mendez testified, “[I]f immigration doesn’t process the person, 

then there’s nothing I can—I can do, it’s out of my control. I can only 

respond once they are in the system.” 

A month later, on September 30, Arechiga was released from 

custody after posting the full amount of his original bail. On October 1, 

Arechiga and Melendez went to Mendez seeking a refund. Not until 

May 19, 2012—after Arechiga filed a disciplinary complaint—did Mendez 

issue any refund. During the interim, Mendez did not retain the funds in 

his client trust account. Mendez ultimately returned $1200 of the $1500

Melendez had paid.

F. Roberto Macedo-Davila Representation. In April of 2011, 

Roberto Macedo-Davila engaged the services of ASESAL to represent him 

in immigration matters. The contract provided that Macedo-Davila was 

to pay a total of $4000, with $1000 paid in advance on April 21 and the 

remaining money to be paid in increments of $150 monthly commencing 

May 30. In July, Mendez “took over” ASESAL and incorporated it into his 

own law firm. Macedo-Davila continued to make monthly cash payments 

of $150 after this transition, and Mendez accepted these payments.

Mendez did not, however, deposit these payments into his client trust 

account. 

An itemization of services provided by Mendez to Macedo–Davila

indicates that, during the months of July through December, Mendez 
9

“reviewed [the] case, updated files and made calls” for one and one-half

hours each month. Mendez charged $150 for each of these instances—

the exact amount paid by Macedo-Davila each month. Mendez admitted 

that he did not know exactly what services had been provided for these 

funds. 

G. Orlando Ramirez Barragan Representation. In April 2011, 

Orlando Ramirez Barragan retained ASESAL to represent him in 

immigration matters. Barragan was to pay a total of $4000, with $1000 

paid in advance on April 9 and the remaining money paid in monthly 

increments of $200 commencing May 15. Barragan continued to make 

monthly payments of $200 after July, when Mendez took over ASESAL. 

Mendez failed to deposit these payments into his client trust account. 

On August 31, Barragan was scheduled for a 9 a.m. immigration 

hearing in Omaha, Nebraska. Mendez was in California that day. 

Natalia Lazareva, an attorney in Mendez’s office, prepared for the hearing 

and met Barragan in Omaha. Upon arriving at the location of the 

hearing, Lazareva was informed that the scheduled judge was absent due 

to illness and Barragan’s hearing was rescheduled to 1 p.m. that 

afternoon. Lazareva informed Barragan of this change, and Barragan left

the building. Upon returning shortly before 1 p.m., Barragan discovered 

that the hearing had not been rescheduled, but had been held that 

morning without Barragan or Lazareva present, and the judge had 

ordered Barragan removed in absentia. Barragan was in fact removed. 

Mendez billed Barragan $625 for Lazareva’s legal services that day. 

One remedy for an order of removal in absentia is the filing of a 

motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See Matter 

of Lozada, 19 I.&N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988). One of the prerequisites 

for obtaining relief on that basis is that the motion to reopen states 
10

whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate disciplinary 

authorities with respect to an ethical or legal violation, and if not, why 

not. Id. Mendez failed to advise Barragan to seek alternate counsel to 

file such a disciplinary complaint. 

Instead, Lazareva, with Mendez’s approval, continued to represent 

Barragan and filed a motion to reopen. Mendez testified that filing a 

complaint and pursuing relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel 

was “just one of several options.” Lazareva’s motion to reopen asked for 

relief because of “rescheduling confusion.” On October 27, the 

immigration court denied Lazareva’s motion, finding “the respondent has 

not advanced either credible or persuasive evidence to support his 

assertion that his failure to appear at his removal hearing was due to 

exceptional circumstances beyond his control.”

Without Barragan’s knowledge or consent, Mendez then hired a 

California immigration attorney, Tina Malek, to prepare a second motion 

to reopen. Malek did not file a complaint against Mendez before filing 

this second motion to reopen. The court, in ruling on Malek’s motion,

noted that it was based upon the alleged ineffective assistance of former 

counsel,1 which requires:

(1) that the motion be supported by an affidavit of the 

allegedly aggrieved respondent setting forth in detail the 

agreement that was entered into with counsel with respect to 

the actions to be taken and what representations counsel did 

or did not make to the respondent in this regard, (2) that 

counsel whose integrity or competence is being impugned be 

informed of the allegations leveled against him and be given 

an opportunity to respond, and (3) that the motion reflect 

whether a complaint has been filed with appropriate 

disciplinary authorities with respect to any violation of 

counsel’s ethical or legal responsibilities, and if not, why not. 

 1A copy of Malek’s motion to reopen is not in the record. 
11

Because Malek had not filed a complaint against Mendez, the 

immigration court denied the second motion to reopen on January 9, 

2012. 

Mendez then had Malek file an appeal of the denial with the Board 

of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA denied Barragan’s appeal on 

September 19, again due to lack of a disciplinary complaint and other 

necessary evidence. Mendez paid Malek $910 from Barragan’s funds for 

filing the second motion to reopen and appealing the denial of that 

motion. Mendez billed Barragan an additional $700 for services relating 

to the motions to reopen. 

On September 23, 2013, the Board filed a six-count complaint 

against Mendez, alleging violations of our disciplinary rules in the 

foregoing matters. A five-member division of the commission conducted 

a two-day evidentiary hearing on January 6–7, 2014. Mendez testified,

and documentary evidence was submitted by the Board. Posthearing 

briefs were then submitted. On March 14, the commission filed its 

“Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Sanction Recommendation.” 

The commission, by a four-to-zero vote, found multiple violations by 

Mendez and recommended that he be barred from practicing law in Iowa 

for sixty days. A footnote stated, “One panel member was unable to 

participate in the deliberations concerning the recommendation in this 

matter.” No further information is provided to explain why one panelist 

did not participate in the recommendation. 

II. Scope of Review.

We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. See Iowa Ct. 

R. 35.12(4). “We give deference to the commission’s credibility findings 

because the commission hears live testimony and observes the demeanor 

of witnesses.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ouderkirk, 845 
12

N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 2014). The Board has the burden to prove attorney 

misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Thomas, 844 N.W.2d 111, 113 (Iowa 

2014). “This standard is more demanding than proof by preponderance 

of the evidence, but less demanding than proof beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d at 33. 

If we conclude there has been a rule violation, 

our determination of the appropriate sanction “is guided by 

the nature of the alleged violations, the need for deterrence, 

protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of the 

bar as a whole, and [the attorney’s] fitness to continue in the 

practice of law.” 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Laing, 832 N.W.2d 366, 367–68 

(Iowa 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & 

Conduct v. Kaufman, 515 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa 1994)). “We respectfully 

consider the commission’s findings of fact and recommended sanction, 

but we are not bound by them.” Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d at 33. 

III. Ethical Violations. 

The commission found the Board proved over sixty violations, but 

did not meet its burden to prove five other alleged violations. In his 

challenge to the commission’s recommendation, Mendez makes three

general arguments: (1) “there has been no legal criteria advanced to 

define who or what constitutes an Iowa client when there is obvious 

cross jurisdictional practice going on with Nebraska”; (2) “Nebraska holds 

a different position than Iowa on how flat fees for Nebraska immigration 

clients should be handled and it is permissible to deposit them into the 

attorney’s general account upon receipt”; and (3) he has “been deprived 

of a properly constituted panel wherein the original 5 selected to consider 

all evidence and testimony, was without warning or consultation, 
13

diminished to 4 in deliberations depriving [him] of yet another voice in 

final deliberations.”

None of these arguments excuses Mendez’s violations of our state’s 

disciplinary rules. We will address each argument in turn. First, the 

clients at issue were living in Iowa and retained Mendez through his 

Des Moines office. A commissioner stated at the hearing: 

I think we have the right to assume, not seeing any notations 

to the contrary in your itemizations of services, that the work 

that you performed for the various named clients did occur 

here in Iowa. I don’t see why somebody who is domiciled in 

Des Moines would hire someone that would require them to 

travel to Nebraska to get an answer on a particular legal 

question. 

Mendez agreed with this statement. We find that Mendez has provided 

legal services in Iowa on the matters at issue. We hold that jurisdiction

therefore exists pursuant to Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:8.5(a). 

That rule states:

Disciplinary Authority. . . . A lawyer not admitted in Iowa is 

. . . subject to the disciplinary authority of Iowa if the lawyer 

provides or offers to provide any legal services in Iowa. A 

lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both 

Iowa and another jurisdiction for the same conduct. 

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.5(a) (emphasis added). “Our jurisdiction to 

discipline attorneys practicing in Iowa under rule 32:5.5(d)(2) rests on 

our responsibility to protect the citizens of our state from unethical 

conduct of attorneys who provide services in Iowa.” Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Iowa 2010)

(emphasis added); see also Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Olson, 807 N.W.2d 268, 270, 276 n.7 (Iowa 2011) (finding jurisdiction 

over Minnesota counsel based on the conduct of communicating with an 

Iowa resident located in Iowa).
14

Second, the fact that Nebraska’s ethical rules differ from Iowa’s 

does not excuse a violation of Iowa’s ethical rules for legal services 

provided in Iowa. Mendez operated an office in Iowa, and it was 

incumbent on him to learn and follow Iowa’s rules when assisting clients 

here. 

Mendez’s third argument about the loss of a panel member also 

lacks merit. The Iowa Court Rules generally require the grievance 

commission panel to consist of at least five members. See Iowa Ct. R. 

35.1(1) (“The grievance commission shall also consist of no fewer than 5 

nor more than 35 laypersons appointed by the court.”); id. r. 36.2 (“The 

commissioners may act as a body or in such divisions as the chair may 

direct. Each division shall consist of five members.”). Iowa Court Rule 

36.17, however, states that “[a]n omission, irregularity, or other defect in 

procedure shall not render void or ineffective any act of the commission 

or a division or any member thereof unless substantial prejudice is 

shown to have resulted.” 

We find Mendez was not prejudiced by the fact one panel member 

did not deliberate. Rule 35.10 provides that “[a]ny determination or 

report of the commission need only be concurred in by a majority of the 

commissioners sitting.” Id. r. 35.10; see also In re Paulson, 216 P.3d 

859, 876 (Or. 2009) (noting a third disciplinary panel member’s failure to 

sign a disciplinary opinion did not prejudice attorney because the 

decision only required two concurring members), opinion adhered to as 

modified on reconsideration, 225 P.3d 41, 42 (Or. 2010). Even if the fifth 

panel member had participated in deliberations and dissented, the 

commission’s four other voting members constituted the requisite 

majority. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.10 (noting also that “[a]ny commissioner 

has the right to file with the supreme court a dissent from the majority 
15

determination or report”); cf. Paulson, 216 P.3d at 876 (concluding 

missing panel member was “effectively . . . in the position of an 

abstaining panel member” that “did not join in the opinion and . . . did 

[not] dissent”). 

Mendez’s argument that he was “depriv[ed] of yet another voice in 

final deliberations” does not require a new hearing. See Comm. on Prof'l 

Ethics & Conduct v. Michelson, 345 N.W.2d 112, 117 (Iowa 1984) (“He 

was afforded a full-blown hearing and there is no indication that the 

outcome of the hearing was affected.”); Paulson, 216 P.3d at 876 (“We 

might reach a different conclusion if the irregularity were shown to have 

prejudiced the accused. But here, there is no prejudice.”). Mendez has 

not shown participation of the fifth panelist likely would have changed 

the recommendation. In any event, our court has examined the record 

de novo and we are not bound by the commission’s recommendations.

Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d at 33. Accordingly, Mendez is not entitled to 

relief on this ground. 

A. Trust Account Violations Involving Forty-Three Clients.

The Board charged Mendez with violating Iowa Court Rule 45.7(4) with 

regard to forty-three clients. Rule 45.7(4) provides:

A lawyer accepting advance fee or expense payments must 

notify the client in writing of the time, amount, and purpose 

of any withdrawal of the fee or expense, together with a 

complete accounting. The attorney must transmit such 

notice no later than the date of the withdrawal. 

Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(4). Mendez admitted he did not comply with rule 

45.7(4), and the commission found he violated that rule as to those fortythree clients. We agree with the commission and find Mendez violated 

rule 45.7(4) with regard to those forty-three clients. 
16

The Board also charged Mendez with several trust-account-related 

violations involving the clients specifically discussed above. Iowa Rule of 

Professional Conduct 32:1.15(c) provides: “A lawyer shall deposit into a 

client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in 

advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or 

expenses incurred.” Iowa Court Rule 45.10(2) provides: “If the client 

makes an advance payment of a flat fee prior to performance of the 

services, the lawyer must deposit the fee into the trust account.” Those 

allegations are summarized as follows: 

(1) Mendez violated rules 32:1.15(c) and 45.10(2) by 

failing to deposit Flores’s $1000 payment into his trust 

account and rule 45.7(4) by failing to provide the requisite 

notices to Flores when he withdrew fees; 

(2) Mendez violated rules 32:1.15(c) and 45.10(2) by 

failing to deposit Arechiga’s $1500 payment into his trust 

account and rule 45.7(4) by failing to provide the requisite 

notices to Arechiga when he withdrew fees; 

(3) Mendez violated rules 32:1.15(c) and 45.10(2) by 

failing to deposit Macedo-Davila’s monthly payments into his 

trust account; 

(4) Mendez violated rules 32:1.15(c) and 45.10(2) by 

failing to deposit Barragan’s monthly payments into his trust 

account. 

The commission found Mendez committed each of these rule violations. 

On our de novo review, we agree that Mendez violated each of these rules 

as charged by the Board. 

B. Nonrefundable Fees in Flores and Arechiga 

Representations. The Board alleged, and the commission found,

Mendez violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(c) and Iowa 

Court Rule 45.7(5) by representing in his fee agreement with Flores and 

Arechiga that he was entitled to a nonrefundable fee of $300 for “opening 

the file,” even if he did not provide any legal services. Rule 45.7(5) states, 

“Notwithstanding any contrary agreement between the lawyer and client, 
17

advance fee and expense payments are refundable to the client if the fee 

is not earned or the expense is not incurred.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.7(5).

Mendez admitted that his contracts with Flores and Arechiga contained 

impermissible, nonrefundable fees. 

We find Mendez violated rules 32:1.15(c) and 45.7(5). See Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d 470, 

475 (Iowa 2003) (“[C]ontracts providing for nonrefundable special 

retainers and nonrefundable ‘flat’ fees are void as well as unethical.”). As 

we have long recognized, nonrefundable fees undermine the client’s right 

to discharge an attorney. Id. at 476. “[C]lients would be reluctant to 

exercise the right if an advance fee was nonrefundable” and

nonrefundable fees “also undermine the fiduciary nature of an attorney–

client relationship.” Id. 

C. Rigoberto Flores Representation.

1. Unauthorized practice of law. While Mendez is allowed to 

practice immigration law in Iowa, he is not authorized to defend criminal 

charges in our state courts. The Board alleged that Mendez engaged in 

the unauthorized practice of law by representing Flores in his state

criminal case. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:5.5(a) states, “A 

lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the 

regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction . . . .” The 

commission highlighted that “the amount of fees in question is 

de minimus” and concluded that, “given the way the criminal case played 

out,” the Board did not meet its burden to prove Mendez violated rule 

32:5.5(a). 

Mendez contends his representation of Flores was proper because 

he only “facilitated” an Iowa-licensed attorney’s representation and 

because the fees he charged were for “administrative support.” The 
18

record reflects that Mendez provided translation services for Flores on at 

least one occasion, and Mendez is authorized to advise clients as to the 

immigration consequences of criminal proceedings. We agree with the 

commission that the Board failed to prove by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence that Mendez violated rule 32:5.5(a) 

through his involvement with the Flores case. 

2. Unreasonable fee. The Board next asserts Mendez collected an 

unreasonable fee in violation of rule 32:1.5. Iowa Rule of Professional 

Conduct 32:1.5(a) prohibits a lawyer from “mak[ing] an agreement for, 

charg[ing], or collect[ing] an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable 

amount for expenses.” The Board presents two rationales for finding

Mendez violated this rule. First, based on its belief that Mendez’s 

representation of Flores was outside the scope of his permissible 

practice, the Board charged Mendez with collecting an unreasonable fee. 

Because we find the Board failed to prove Mendez engaged in the 

unauthorized practice of law, we find his fee was not unreasonable on 

this basis. 

However, we agree with the Board’s second argument. The Board 

asserts that Mendez collected an unreasonable fee by paying Hedgecoth 

$808 from Flores for his services while Hedgecoth’s billing records show 

that he provided Flores with only $558 of legal services. The commission 

found Mendez violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a) and 

(e) by using Flores’s money to pay Hedgecoth more than was earned. 

Rule 32:1.5(e)(3) provides “[a] division of a fee between lawyers who are 

not in the same firm may be made only if . . . the total fee is reasonable.” 

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.5(e)(3). Because Mendez collected from 

Flores and paid Hedgecoth more than he had earned, we agree Mendez 

violated rule 32:1.5(a) and (e)(3). 
19

3. Improper division of fees. The Board charged Mendez with the 

improper division of fees based on his arrangement with Hedgecoth. 

Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.5(e)(2) states that a lawyer may 

divide fees with a lawyer in a different firm only upon receiving the 

client’s written agreement to the fee division. Mendez did not receive 

written approval from Flores for the fee-splitting agreement. The 

commission found Mendez violated this rule, and we agree. 

4. Failure to communicate. Finally, the Board alleged Mendez 

violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.4 by failing to properly 

advise Flores of the immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea. 

Rule 32:1.4 requires a lawyer to “explain a matter to the extent 

reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 

regarding the representation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(b). The 

commission found the Board failed to prove this allegation by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence. We agree with the 

commission. We are not persuaded on this record that Mendez failed to 

discuss with Flores the immigration consequences of his pleas. The 

postconviction court ruling that granted Flores relief from his guilty plea 

only mentioned Mendez in passing. The ruling focused on the guilty plea 

proceedings handled by Hedgecoth and the fact that the plea colloquy 

was not translated into Spanish to ensure Flores understood the 

consequences. Mendez testified that he did indeed discuss the 

immigration consequences with Flores, and the Board has failed to rebut 

Mendez’s testimony on that point. 

D. Sergio Guaillas Representation. 

1. False statement of material fact. The Board charged Mendez 

with making a false statement of material fact in connection with a 

disciplinary matter, in violation of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 
20

32:8.1(a). Rule 32:8.1 provides, “[A] lawyer . . . [,] in connection with a 

disciplinary matter, shall not . . . knowingly make a false statement of 

material fact[.]” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.1(a). Mendez asserts that he 

met with Guaillas on September 21, but the Board contends this is 

untrue and Mendez did not meet with Guaillas until November 18. The 

commission found a violation of this rule. As the commission 

summarized,

Mendez’s written and oral recollections are the only 

evidence presented in support of his position on this point. 

His time and billing records tell a different story. In fact, 

Mendez’s own billing records show that Mendez did not meet 

with [Guaillas] until November 18, 2011 . . . . 

The commission found Mendez’s version of events not credible. “We give 

deference to the commission’s credibility determination because the 

commission heard [Mendez]’s live testimony and observed his demeanor.”

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Clarity, 838 N.W.2d 648, 659 

(Iowa 2013). Nevertheless, we give less weight to the documentary 

evidence in this context. Mendez had a high volume immigration 

practice. It is not uncommon for attorneys to meet a new client in 

person and hand him off to a paralegal to conduct the initial interview, 

with the attorney not billing for an attorney–client conference on the day 

of the client’s initial office visit. We find the Board failed to prove by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence that Mendez violated rule 

32:8.1(a) by misrepresenting the date that he first met with Guaillas. 

2. Neglect. The Board charged Mendez with a violation of Iowa 

Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.3 for failing to file Guaillas’s notice of 

appeal by the deadline, and the commission found Mendez violated that 

rule. Rule 32:1.3 states, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence 
21

and promptness in representing a client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.3. 

A comment to rule 32:1.3 emphasizes the importance of diligence:

Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented 

than procrastination. A client’s interests often can be 

adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of 

conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks 

a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be 

destroyed. 

Id. r. 32:1.3 cmt. 3. The commission did not credit Mendez’s excuse that 

he was unable to file the appeal because he could not get some necessary 

documents from Guaillas’s former counsel. Giving deference to the 

commission’s credibility determination, we likewise find his excuse 

unconvincing. We find Mendez violated rule 32:1.3 by neglecting 

Guaillas’s appeal. 

3. Failure to communicate. The Board alleged that Mendez 

neglected to tell Guaillas that he had failed to file the notice of appeal 

and that this failure could serve as grounds for ineffective assistance of 

counsel and support a basis to reopen the matter. The Board charged 

Mendez with violating Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.4, which 

requires attorneys to “keep the client reasonably informed about the 

status of the matter” and to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably 

necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 

representation.” Id. r. 32:1.4(a)(3), (b). The commission found Mendez 

violated rule 32:1.4. Again, giving deference to the commission’s 

determination, we agree Mendez violated this rule. 

4. Failure to turn over file. The Board charged Mendez with 

violating Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(d) and 32:1.16(d) 

for failing to promptly turn over Guaillas’s file to Benzoni, and the 

commission found a violation of these rules. Rule 32:1.15(d) states “a 

lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or 
22

other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive.” Id. r. 

32:1.15(d). Rule 32:1.16(d) states that, “[u]pon termination of 

representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably 

practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as . . . surrendering 

papers and property to which the client is entitled.” Id. r. 32:1.16(d). 

Benzoni received Guaillas’s file only after he filed a disciplinary complaint 

against Mendez—four months after the initial request. Mendez testified 

that he immediately sent the file but could provide no documentation 

supporting his testimony. The commission found Mendez’s testimony 

not credible on this point. So do we. We find Mendez violated rules

32:1.15(d) and 32:1.16(d) by failing to promptly deliver Guaillas’s file. 

E. Miguel Angel Arechiga Cuellar Representation. 

1. Neglect. The Board alleges, and the commission found, Mendez 

violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.3 by failing to file any 

documents requesting a bond reduction hearing for Arechiga. As 

discussed above, rule 32:1.3 requires reasonable diligence and 

promptness. See id. r. 32:1.3. 

A member of Mendez’s staff visited Arechiga at the jail on the day 

the firm was retained, an attorney and paralegal followed up with 

Arechiga to complete paperwork, a paralegal twice contacted “the 

Deportation Office,” and someone in the firm took a call regarding 

Arechiga’s paperwork. Mendez testified he could not request a bond 

reduction hearing because Arechiga had not been processed by the 

immigration court. The Board did not present any expert testimony or 

other evidence to rebut Mendez’s assertion. We conclude the Board has 

failed to prove by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that

Mendez’s representation of Arechiga violated rule 32:1.3.
23

2. Failure to refund fees and retain disputed fees in trust. The 

Board charged Mendez with a violation of rule 32:1.15(d) for failing to 

promptly return Arechiga’s funds along with an accounting of services 

rendered and with a violation of rule 32:1.15(e) for failing to retain 

disputed funds in trust. The commission found Mendez violated both of 

these rules. We agree. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(d) 

requires an attorney to 

promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or 

other property that the client or third person is entitled to 

receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall 

promptly render a full accounting regarding such property. 

Rule 32:1.15(e) states: 

When in the course of representation a lawyer is in 

possession of property in which two or more persons (one of 

whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall 

be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. 

The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the 

property as to which the interests are not in dispute. 

Id. r. 32:1.15(e). Mendez did not refund Arechiga’s payment until seven

months after Arechiga first requested the refund. During this time, 

Mendez did not retain Arechiga’s payment in his client trust account. 

F. Roberto Macedo-Davila Representation. The Board alleges 

Mendez violated rules 45.7 and 45.10(3) by taking an unearned fee from 

Macedo-Davila. Rule 45.10(3) states, “In no event may the lawyer 

withdraw unearned fees.” Iowa Ct. R. 45.10(3). The commission 

concluded “[w]hile certain inferences adverse to Mendez could be drawn 

from the evidence presented, the preponderance standard does not 

permit such an inquiry.” Accordingly, the commission found the Board 

did not prove Mendez violated rules 45.7 and 45.10(3). We agree. The 

Board did not present any evidence to rebut Mendez’s billing records, 
24

which indicate someone in Mendez’s office “reviewed [Macedo-Davila’s] 

case, updated files and made calls” each month. 

G. Orlando Ramirez Barragan Representation.

1. Unreasonable fee. The Board charged Mendez with collecting 

an unreasonable fee from Barragan, in violation of Iowa Rule of 

Professional Conduct 32:1.5(a). The Board takes issue with the fact that 

Mendez billed Barragan $625 for the Omaha hearing, despite the fact 

that Lazareva missed the hearing. The commission found the Board did 

not carry its burden to prove Mendez violated rule 32:1.5(a). The 

commission stated:

While it is true that Ms. [Lazareva] missed the hearing, she 

prepared for it and traveled to and from Omaha to attend it. 

We think Mendez’s firm is reasonably entitled to 

compensation for her efforts even though she missed the 

hearing.

The Board did not assert that Lazareva or Mendez was to blame for 

missing the hearing. On this record, we agree with the commission and 

find the Board failed to prove by a convincing preponderance of the 

evidence that Mendez violated rule 32:1.5(a) by charging Barragan for the 

time Lazareva spent in Omaha. 

2. Failure to communicate and conflict of interest. The Board 

alleges Mendez violated Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.4(b) and 

32:1.7(a)(2) by failing to inform Barragan that he should retain alternate 

counsel and file a disciplinary complaint against Mendez’s firm in order 

to reopen his immigration matter. Again, rule 32:1.4 governs 

communication and requires an attorney to “explain a matter to the 

extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed 

decisions regarding the representation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4(b). 

Rule 32:1.7(a)(2) instructs a lawyer to withdraw from representation if 
25

“there is a significant risk that the representation of [the client] will be 

materially limited by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer.” Id. 

r. 32:1.7(a)(2). The commission found Mendez violated both of these 

rules. 

We too find Mendez violated rules 32:1.4(b) and 32:1.7(a)(2) by 

failing to withdraw from representation and inform Barragan that he 

should file a disciplinary complaint. When faced with nearly identical 

facts in Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Yang, we 

found a violation of rule 32:1.4(b) because “Yang owed his client an 

explanation of the alternative course of action because it was reasonably 

necessary to permit [the client] to make an informed decision on the 

matter.” 821 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Iowa 2012). We also found the failure to 

withdraw under these circumstances violates rule 32:1.7(a)(2) because, 

“[i]n continuing the representation . . . without disclosure of the apparent 

conflict of interest, Yang ignored a significant risk that the representation 

would be materially limited by Yang’s personal interest in avoiding a 

potential ethical complaint.” Id. 

Lazareva did not file a disciplinary complaint against herself or 

arrange for anyone else to file such a complaint against her on 

Barragan’s behalf before she filed the first motion to reopen Barragan’s 

case. Accordingly, the court denied Lazareva’s motion to reopen. The 

outside counsel retained by Mendez similarly failed to file a disciplinary 

complaint, as made clear in the rulings denying both the second motion 

to reopen and the appeal of that motion. Had Mendez informed Barragan 

of the need to retain independent counsel, rather than pursuing these

ineffective appeals, Barragan may have successfully reopened his case 

and avoided removal. “Although this may be speculative, the fact 

remains that [the attorney’s conflict of interest] denied [the client] the 
26

opportunity to make an informed choice.” See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of 

Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Wagner, 599 N.W.2d 721, 730 (Iowa 1999). 

3. Improper referral, improper division of fees, and unreasonable 

fee. Also in connection with the futile motions to reopen, the Board 

charged Mendez with (1) billing an unreasonable fee, in violation of rule 

32:1.5(a); (2) improperly dividing fees with outside counsel, in violation of 

rule 32:1.5(e); and (3) improperly referring Barragan to outside counsel, 

in violation of rule 32:1.6. The commission found Mendez violated each 

of these rules. Mendez did not receive Barragan’s written agreement to 

the fee division between Mendez and outside counsel. See id. r. 

32:1.5(e)(2). Nor did he not obtain Barragan’s consent to retain outside 

counsel to pursue Barragan’s motion to reopen. See Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:1.6(a) (setting forth general rule that a lawyer “shall not 

reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the 

client gives informed consent”). Mendez conceded as much, testifying, “I 

guess I was in such a rush to try to get this reopened, I may have cut 

some corners there. . . . I should have had that all in writing.” In total, 

Mendez billed Barragan $1610 for unproductive attempts to reopen his 

case. We find Mendez violated rules 32:1.5(a), 32:1.5(e)(2), and 32:1.6(a). 

IV. Sanction. 

Although we consider prior cases when imposing a sanction, 

“[t]here is no standard sanction for particular types of misconduct.” 

Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 660. We consider the unique circumstances of 

each case, weighing several factors, such as 

“the nature of the violations, the attorney’s fitness to 

continue in the practice of law, the protection of society from 

those unfit to practice law, the need to uphold public 

confidence in the justice system, deterrence, maintenance of 

the reputation of the bar as a whole, and any aggravating or 

mitigating circumstances.” 
27

Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Rhinehart, 827 

N.W.2d 169, 182 (Iowa 2013)). 

The commission recommended we order Mendez to cease and 

desist from the practice of law in Iowa for a period no shorter than sixty 

days.2 We give respectful consideration to this recommendation. See 

Ouderkirk, 845 N.W.2d at 33. The Board urged the same sixty-day 

sanction in its posthearing brief. Mendez argues a public reprimand is 

an appropriate sanction. He argues, “I have spent my entire career 

serving the disenfranchised seeking asylum and immigration status in 

this country and it is my desire to continue to follow this path.” 

We conclude the numerous violations committed by Mendez 

require more than a public reprimand. His violations span a wide variety 

of rules. He disregarded our trust account rules, impermissibly 

contracted for nonrefundable fees, charged an unreasonable fee,

improperly divided fees, neglected a client’s appeal, failed to promptly 

turn over a client’s file, failed to return funds promptly, failed to keep 

disputed funds in trust, failed to communicate with a client, and failed to 

disclose a conflict of interest. 

The commission accurately recited the mitigating circumstances in 

this case: “Cooperating with the Board is generally considered a 

mitigating factor, and Mendez did. Mendez also serves a vulnerable 

 2[W]hen a non-Iowa licensed attorney commits misconduct that typically 

warrants a sanction directly affecting licensure, such as suspension or 

revocation, such sanctions are not feasible because there is no Iowa law 

license to suspend or revoke. Nevertheless, like our sister courts, we 

conclude our authority to discipline non-Iowa licensed attorneys includes 

the ability to fashion practice limitations through our injunctive and 

equitable powers that are equivalent to license suspension, disbarment, 

or other sanctions related to an attorney’s license. 

Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d at 269–70. 
28

population, many of whom do not speak English and are unfamiliar with 

the American legal system.” We agree these are mitigating factors here.

See Yang, 821 N.W.2d at 431 (noting as mitigating factors the attorney’s 

“substantial service to the immigrant community and his complete 

cooperation with the Board’s investigation”).

Several aggravating factors are also present. First, several officials 

from the Office of Professional Regulation met with Mendez when he was 

new to Iowa to explain our trust account requirements to him. 

Nevertheless, he proceeded to flout those requirements. The commission 

appropriately faulted Mendez for his “total lack of appreciation for the 

Iowa trust account rules and how they apply to his practice.” Indeed, 

when asked at the end of the hearing if he had read the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct, Mendez responded:

I haven’t actually sat down and read them. I’ve consulted 

with counsel. . . . It’s no excuse, but perhaps sometimes, 

you know, you get bogged down in day-to-day serv[ing] your 

clients, your cases, personal life, you know those things. So 

I haven’t sat down and really opened it up and read the 

different sections. 

We find it remarkable that even by the late date of his disciplinary 

hearing, Mendez still had not yet read the Iowa rules he was charged 

with violating.

Second, the harm Mendez caused several clients is an aggravating 

factor. See Clarity, 838 N.W.2d at 660 (finding it significant an attorney’s 

actions caused harm to clients, both in terms of cost and delay). The 

commission correctly discounted Mendez’s argument that no clients were 

harmed by his conduct:

First, [Guaillas] was harmed in some aspects because he was 

denied the opportunity for relief by Mendez’s failure to file 

his appeal. Second, Barragan suffered serious harm as a 

result of a member of Mendez’s firm missing his immigration 
29

hearing. Finally, we are also mindful that while Mendez’s 

other clients may not be aware that they were harmed by his 

billing tactics, this does not mean that they received all of 

the services he billed them for. 

We also note that Barragan suffered harm due to Mendez’s failure to 

inform him that he needed to file a complaint against the firm in order to 

proceed with his motion to reopen. 

Finally, at the hearing, Mendez blamed other attorneys for the 

client complaints against him. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics 

& Conduct v. Herrera, 560 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Iowa 1997) (“[W]e have a 

strong negative reaction to a lawyer’s attempt to blame professional 

shortcomings on [another].”); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Postma, 

430 N.W.2d 387, 389 (Iowa 1988) (noting that blaming others for failings 

is a “timeworn excuse” that is viewed with “unbounded skepticism, and 

never with admiration”). Mendez portrays himself as the victim of a 

confusing set of ethical rules imposed as a result of his voluntary 

purchase of a federal immigration practice located in Iowa and his 

service to clients residing in Iowa. We are unimpressed by his failure to 

take responsibility for his ethical breaches. As the commission 

accurately observed, “Mendez does not fully appreciate the seriousness of 

his transgressions or his obligations to follow the Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct when representing Iowa residents in any legal 

matter.” 

We also find Mendez’s violation of our conflict-of-interest rules in 

the Barragan matter significant in light of his other violations. In Yang, 

we merely imposed a public reprimand as recommended by the 

commission for the same conduct—failing to advise the client of the 

option to retain new counsel to file a complaint alleging ineffective 

assistance of counsel as a ground to reopen the immigration hearing. 
30

821 N.W.2d at 430–31. But, Yang involved an isolated violation, not the 

array of violations committed by Mendez involving numerous clients. See 

id. at 429. Suspensions in other cases for conflict-of-interest violations 

in combination with other ethical breaches typically fall in the two-tofour-month range. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Qualley, 828 N.W.2d 282, 293–94 (Iowa 2013) (sixty-day suspension for 

attorney who, among other things, violated conflict of interest rules);

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Zenor, 707 N.W.2d 176, 182, 

187 (Iowa 2005) (imposing a four-month suspension when attorney 

represented opposing entities, among other violations); Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 378, 382 (Iowa 2005) 

(same); Wagner, 599 N.W.2d at 723–24 (imposing a three-month 

suspension when attorney failed to inform the client of the attorney’s 

financial interest in a transaction); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics 

& Conduct v. Sikma, 533 N.W.2d 532, 537–38 (Iowa 1995) (imposing a 

three-month suspension on attorney who engaged in undisclosed 

business transactions with a client). But see Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 600–02, 607 (Iowa 2011)

(imposing a two-year suspension when attorney engaged in a conflict of 

interest with his client, among other violations). 

Mendez has also flouted our trust account rules, which in 

combination with his other ethical breaches warrants a suspension. See 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Kennedy, 684 N.W.2d 

256, 261 (Iowa 2004) (sixty-day suspension for neglect, trust account 

and accounting violations, and failure to cooperate, in light of mitigating 

factors); Frerichs, 671 N.W.2d at 477–78 (four-month suspension for

neglect, an illegal fee accompanied by a trust account violation, failure to 

provide an accounting, and failure to cooperate); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of 
31

Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Kallsen, 670 N.W.2d 161, 166–68 (Iowa 2003) 

(three-month suspension for neglect, failure to make accounting, and 

failure to cooperate); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics and Conduct v. 

Adams, 623 N.W.2d 815, 818–19 (Iowa 2001) (three-month suspension

for neglect, failure to deposit a fee into a trust account, failure to account 

for client property, and misrepresentation to the client in an effort to 

cover up the neglect). 

Considering all these factors, and giving weight to the 

commission’s recommendation, we determine that a sixty-day 

suspension is appropriate. 

V. Disposition. 

We order Mendez to cease and desist from all legal practice in Iowa 

indefinitely with no possibility that the order will be lifted for a period of 

sixty days. Mendez shall provide all notifications specified in Iowa Court 

Rule 35.23. In addition, costs are taxed to Mendez pursuant to Iowa 

Court Rule 35.27(1). 

For purposes of having the cease-and-desist order lifted, as well as 

for all other purposes, Mendez shall be treated as though he has been 

suspended. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.13. This sanction shall be conveyed to 

the California state disciplinary authority, the Executive Office for 

Immigration Review, and other disciplinary authorities as appropriate for 

their consideration. 

ATTORNEY ORDERED TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM THE 

PRACTICE OF LAW IN IOWA FOR SIXTY DAYS.