2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-29-2013

Nguyen v. Franklin County Sheriffs Dept

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-2559

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"Nguyen v. Franklin County Sheriffs Dept" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 1315.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/1315
NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-2559

___________

TRI THANH NGUYEN, Appellant

v.

FRANKLIN COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT; 

DEPUTY STROBLE; DEPUTY CARTER; 

DEPUTY HALL; SHERIFF DUANE ANTHONY;

OTHER UNKNOWN COUNTY OFFICERS; FRANKLIN COUNTY

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-01866)

District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 2, 2013

Before: SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed January 29, 2013)

___________

OPINION

___________
2

PER CURIAM

Appellant, Tri Thanh Nguyen, appeals pro se from the judgment entered against 

him by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. For the 

following reasons, we will affirm. 

I.

Nguyen is a Pennsylvania inmate who was incarcerated at the Franklin County Jail

(“FCL”). In September 2010, he commenced a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

in the District Court against the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department and four of its 

employees—Sheriff Anthony, and Deputies Stroble, Carter, and Hall. In the complaint, 

Nguyen alleged that, in October 2008, while detained at the FCJ pending trial on sexual

assault charges, he was escorted by Franklin County deputies to the Franklin County 

Courthouse, placed in a group holding cell, and left unattended. While in the group cell, 

one of the other inmates slipped out of his handcuffs and assaulted Nguyen. Nguyen 

claimed that he was assaulted due to the “lax transportation practices of the Franklin 

County Sheriffs, which was known to and ratified by the defendants.” (Compl., Dist. Ct. 

Dkt. # 1, at ¶ 34.) Specifically, Nguyen alleged that the defendants had customs and 

policies in place that disregarded an excessive risk to inmates in protected classes, and 

that, despite being on notice of their deficient polices, the defendants failed to properly 

train and supervise deputies with respect to inmate safety. Nguyen claimed that the 
3

defendants’ conduct violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments.

The matter was referred to a Magistrate Judge who recommended that: (1) the 

District Court dismiss Nguyen’s claims under the Fifth Amendment because the 

defendants are not federal actors; (2) the District Court dismiss Nguyen’s claims under 

the Eighth Amendment because he had not yet been adjudicated guilty of a crime, see

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 & n.16 (1979); (3) the District Court dismiss 

without prejudice Nguyen’s claims against Deputies Stroble, Carter, and Hall because 

Nguyen did not claim that they were personally involved in the alleged misconduct, see

Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995); and (4) Franklin County 

be substituted as a defendant in place of the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department 

because the Sheriff’s Department is not a separate entity.

1

 The District Court adopted the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and ordered Nguyen to proceed solely 

on his Fourteenth Amendment claims against Franklin County and Sheriff Anthony. 

The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge 

recommended that their motion be granted on the grounds that: (1) Nguyen failed to 

establish liability against Franklin County and Sheriff Anthony in his official capacity

because he did not demonstrate that they maintained an unconstitutional custom or policy 

that caused the alleged injury, see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); 

 

1

The Magistrate Judge also recommended that the District Court dismiss without 
4

(2) Nguyen failed to establish liability under a “failure to train” theory because he did not 

submit any evidence concerning inadequate training, see Carter v. City of Phila., 181 

F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999); and (3) Nguyen failed to establish liability under the “statecreated danger” doctrine because he did not show that his injury was foreseeable or that 

the defendants acted with sufficient culpability, see Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 

F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006). The District Court agreed, and, by order entered April 20, 

2012, entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. This appeal followed. 

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise 

plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(b). See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). We likewise 

exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. See

Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006). 

On appeal, Nguyen argues that he produced sufficient evidence to withstand 

dismissal of his Eighth Amendment claims against Franklin County and Sheriff Anthony. 

As noted above, however, the District Court dismissed Nguyen’s Eighth Amendment 

claims on the ground that pre-trial detainees like Nguyen are protected by the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment. We see no 

error in the District Court’s conclusion. As the District Court correctly noted, the Eighth 

 

prejudice several John Doe defendants that Nguyen named in the complaint.
5

Amendment applies only after the state “has secured a formal adjudication of guilt” 

because, prior to that time, it has not acquired “the power to punish with which the Eighth 

Amendment is concerned.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977). To the 

extent that Nguyen’s arguments can be construed as challenging the District Court’s 

conclusion that he did not establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation because he did 

not demonstrate the existence of a state-created danger, we agree with the District Court 

that Nguyen failed to show that the defendants acted with sufficient culpability. See

Bright, 443 F.3d at 281.

We have reviewed the record and discern no error in the reasoning of either the 

Magistrate Judge or the District Court regarding Nguyen’s other claims.

III.

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.