alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.2



CERTIFICATION

I, Edward A. White, certify that:



I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Braintech, Inc.;



Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:



a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c)	Disclosed in this report any changes in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting;



The small business issuer's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting.





/s/ Edward A. White			Edward A. White
Principal Financial Officer

Dated: November 10, 2004
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Postal Service

# AGENCY:

                        Postal ServiceTM.                    

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

# DATES:

*Date of notice required under 39 U.S.C. 3642(d)(1):*                         September 19, 2017.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Elizabeth A. Reed, 202-268-3179.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The United States Postal Service® hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on September 13, 2017, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a                     *Request of the United States Postal Service to Add Priority Mail Express & Priority Mail Contract 51 to Competitive Product List.*                     Documents are available at                     *www.prc.gov,*                     Docket Nos. MC2017-202, CP2017-305.                

Elizabeth A. Reed,

Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law.

[FR Doc. 2017-19851 Filed 9-18-17; 8:45 am]

 BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In the Interest of S.H., a Child

Appellate case number: 01-22-00255-CV

Trial court case number: 2020-02030J

Trial court: 313th Judicial District Court of Harris County

This case was abated and remanded to the trial court on August 25, 2022. In the abatement 

order,1 we directed the trial court to appoint new counsel to represent appellant, father, on appeal 

and to have a supplemental clerk’s record containing that appointment filed in this Court. On 

September 2, 2022, the trial court clerk filed a supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial 

court’s order appointing Stephen E. Newhouse to represent appellant on appeal. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 6.1. Accordingly, we REINSTATE this case on the Court’s active docket.

Appellant’s brief is due on September 19, 2022—20 days from the date appellant’s 

counsel was appointed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.1(a), 28.4, 38.6(a). Because this is a termination 

case, this Court is required to bring this appeal to final disposition within 180 days of April 4, 

2022, the date the notice of appeal was filed in this proceeding, so far as reasonably possible. See

TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T. CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. F app. Accordingly,

no extensions of time will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.6(d). 

It is so ORDERED.

1 The Court’s abatement order stated:

[W]e have reviewed the appellate record and [previously] appointed counsel’s 

Anders brief and conclude that the appeal warrants further development by new 

appellate counsel on the following arguable grounds for appeal: whether the 

evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that 

termination of appellant’s parental rights was in the best interest of S.H. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2).

We noted that newly appointed appellate counsel is not prevented from briefing any other arguable 

grounds of appeal.
2

Judge’s signature: _____/s/ Julie Countiss________

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: ___September 2, 2022____
51

THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA

WITH ANNOTATIONS

53

1 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).

2 E.g., the Court has read the preamble as bearing witness to the fact that the

Constitution emanated from the people and was not the act of sovereign and independent States, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316, 403 (1819) Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (2 U.S.) 419, 471 (1793); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1

Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304, 324 (1816), and that it was made for, and is binding only in,

the United States of America. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251 (1901); In re

Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).

3 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(Boston: 1833), 462. For a lengthy exegesis of the preamble phrase by phrase, see

M. ADLER & W. GORMAN, THE AMERICAN TESTAMENT (New York: 1975), 63–118.

THE PREAMBLE

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a

more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general

Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and

our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the

United States of America.

PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE PREAMBLE

Although the preamble is not a source of power for any department of the Federal Government, 1 the Supreme Court has often referred to it as evidence of the origin, scope, and purpose of the Constitution. 2 ‘‘Its true office,’’ wrote Joseph Story in his COMMENTARIES, ‘‘is to expound the nature and extent and application

of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantively to create them. For example, the preamble declares one

object to be, ‘to provide for the common defense.’ No one can doubt

that this does not enlarge the powers of Congress to pass any

measures which they deem useful for the common defence. But

suppose the terms of a given power admit of two constructions, the

one more restrictive, the other more liberal, and each of them is

consistent with the words, but is, and ought to be, governed by the

intent of the power; if one could promote and the other defeat the

common defence, ought not the former, upon the soundest principles of interpretation, to be adopted?’’ 3
Exhibit
32







CERTIFICATION




By
signing below, each of the undersigned officers hereby certifies pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to his or her knowledge, (i) this report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and (ii) the information contained in this report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of River
Valley Bancorp.






Signed
this 14th day of November, 2008.







/s/
      Matthew
      P. Forrester
            
            /s/
      Vickie
      L. GrimesMatthew
      P. Forrester
            
            Vickie
      L. GrimesPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer
            
            Vice
      President of Finance
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PARDEEP SINGH, 

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 16-71107

Agency No. A200-989-088

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted November 13, 2018

San Francisco, California

Before: FISHER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and BUCKLO, District Judge.

** 

Pardeep Singh petitions for review of a decision by the Board of

Immigration Appeals denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal,

humanitarian asylum and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 

FILED

NOV 28 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant in part and deny in part

Singh’s petition.

1. We lack jurisdiction to review the denial of Singh’s claims for asylum

and withholding of removal because Singh has not “exhausted all administrative

remedies available.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Singh argues the Board erred by

failing to analyze whether he could safely and reasonably relocate within India,

given his intention to engage in political activity. Because he did not present this

argument in the administrative proceedings, we cannot consider it. See Figueroa v.

Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2008).

2. The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Singh humanitarian

asylum because he failed to demonstrate sufficiently severe past persecution. See

Vongsakdy v. INS, 171 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 1999). Nor did the Board abuse

its discretion in providing a brief explanation for denying relief. The Board’s

decision enables us to determine that it heard, considered and decided the

humanitarian asylum claim. See Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1082-83 (9th Cir.

1998).

3. Finally, the government argues Singh did not exhaust his CAT claim

because it was insufficiently presented to the Board. But Singh raised the claim in

the title page, introduction and conclusion of his appellate brief and presented

2
argument in the brief that supported the claim. This was sufficient for exhaustion. 

See Figueroa, 543 F.3d at 492. Because the Board concluded Singh had not

appealed the CAT claim, it did not consider whether Singh had established it was

more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to India. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(2). We remand to the Board to make this determination in the first

instance. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002).

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

PETITION DENIED in part; GRANTED in part; REMANDED.

3
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                                             891
<SECURITIES>                                     1,672
<RECEIVABLES>                                    1,977
<ALLOWANCES>                                       376
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 5,626
<PP&E>                                           4,276
<DEPRECIATION>                                   1,054
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  10,639
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            2,046
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            57
<OTHER-SE>                                       6,659
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    10,639
<SALES>                                          4,418
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 4,418
<CGS>                                              527
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                      527
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  (21)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    30
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  39
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (458)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (144)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (314)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (314)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.05)


</TABLE>
#### Milliken v. Ross.

*(Circuit Court, E. D. Louisiana.*

June, 1881.)

New Trial.

After two concurring verdicts the court will not grant another new trial, unless the jury have manifestly disregarded the law as given them by the court.

On Rule for New Trial.

*J. P. Hornor*and *F. Baker,*for plaintiff.

*Kennard, Howe é Prentiss,*for defendant.

Billings, D. J.

This case is submitted on an application for a new and third trial, and to set aside the second of two concurring verdicts. In the matter of granting new trials and setting aside verdicts, the circuit courts are governed by the statutes of congress, (1 St. 83, § 17,) and “where there has been a trial by jury” are restricted to “reasons for which new trials have usually been granted in the courts of law.” The question, therefore, is one of usage in the common-law courts. One verdict has already been set aside as being against the weight of testimony. The question now is whether a second verdict, upon substantially the same testimony shall be set aside. There is, I think, a well-settled rule that in such a case the *court*will defer to a second verdict.

In *Winnerton*v. *Marquis of Stafford, 3*Taunt. *233,*Lord Mansfield held that, although the judge who last tried the cause thought the evidence against the verdict preponderated, nevertheless, when the evidence was conflicting, the court ought to refuse to grant a second new trial; Lord Mansfield remarking that "it could never be right to make no weight of two verdicts in order to take a chance of a third.” See, also, to the same effect, *Fowler v. Ætna Fire Ins. Co.*7 Wend. 270.

There undoubtedly are cases when it would be the duty of the court to set aside any number of verdicts. But those are eases in which juries manifestly disregard the rules of law as given to them by the court. But this is not such a case. The question here is one of fact, viz., the good faith or reality of a claimed transfer of a promissory note. When two successive verdicts are contradictory, and the last is unsatisfactory to the court, a new trial may be ordered. *Parker*v. *Ansel, 2*W. Bl. 963. It may also be done after two concurring verdicts. *Goodwin*v. *Gibbons,*4 Burr. 2108. But this is seldom done. *Clerk*v. *Udall, 2*Salk. 649; *Chambers*v. *Robinson, 2*Strange, 692.

The new trial is refused.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE THREE MONTH PERIOD ENDED MARCH 31,
1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                             621
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   25,190
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               330,085
<PP&E>                                         125,957
<DEPRECIATION>                                  39,642
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 426,530
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          507,693
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        34,771
<OTHER-SE>                                   (721,934)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   426,530
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               356,925
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (356,925)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (356,925)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (356,925)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IN RE DOMESTIC AIRLINE TRAVEL

ANTITRUST LITIGATION

_____________________________________

This Document Relates to

ALL CASES MDL Docket No. 2656

Misc. No. 15

- 1404 (CKK)

R EPORT AND RECOMMENDATION NO. 9 ON REMAND

REGARDING WHETHER DELTA ’ S HURDLE RATE DATA IS RESPONSIVE TO

P LAINTIFFS’ RFP NO. 10

( Feb ruary 1 1

, 20 20 )

The Court having considered the Special Master ’s Report and Recommendation No. 9 on

Remand and having been informed that there is no objection from any party, adopts R epor t and

Recommendation No. 9 on Remand.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

____________ /s/

__________________ COLLEEN KOLLAR

- KOTELLY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
<PAGE>

                         Service Systems International, Ltd.
                           Computation of Per-Share Income
                                Treasury Stock Method
                               As Modified for 20% Test


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                  Period Ended May. 31, 1998
                                                  --------------------------
                                                          Nine Months
                                                          -----------


<S>                                                <C>
Weighted average number of shares outstanding                7,992,401
                                                          ------------

Total common and common equivalent shares                   12,662,988
                                                          ------------
                                                          ------------

Net income (loss) for the period                          $ (1,399,424)
                                                          ------------
                                                          ------------



Total common and common equivalent shares                   12,662,988
                                                          ------------
                                                          ------------


Loss per common and common equivalent shares              $      (0.18)
                                                          ------------
                                                          ------------

</TABLE>


Earnings per share:

The earnings per share is computed by dividing the net income (loss) for the
period by the weighted average number of common shares outstanding for the
period. Common stock equivalents are excluded from the computation if their
effect would be anti-dilutive.