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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. GEORGE

MICHAEL LENIART

(AC 36358)

Prescott, Devlin and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who was convicted of capital felony and murder following

the disappearance of the fifteen year old victim, appealed from the

judgment of conviction, claiming, inter alia, that certain evidentiary

rulings violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and to present

a defense. At trial, the state presented testimony from A, who was

serving a ten year sentence for an unrelated crime, that he and the

defendant had sexually assaulted the victim, and, that when he met the

defendant the following day, the defendant had confessed to killing the

victim. In order to impeach A’s credibility, the defendant sought to

admit a videotape depicting a police officer interviewing A prior to the

administration of a polygraph examination. The defendant claimed that

the videotape was relevant because it showed that A had been promised

favorable treatment in exchange for his cooperation. The trial court,

however, excluded the videotape on the ground that it constituted inadmissible polygraph evidence under State v. Porter (241 Conn. 57). A

thereafter testified, inter alia, that he hoped to receive some consideration from the state in exchange for his testimony. On the defendant’s

direct appeal, this court agreed with the defendant’s evidentiary claim

that the trial court had improperly excluded the videotape and found

that its exclusion was harmful and, accordingly, reversed the trial court’s

judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. Both the state and the

defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to our Supreme

Court, which affirmed this court’s conclusion that the trial court improperly excluded the videotape but concluded that any error was harmless

and, thus, reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the case

for a determination of whether the exclusion of the videotape violated

the defendant’s constitutional rights. Held that the trial court’s exclusion

of the videotape did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights:

although evidence tending to impeach A’s trial testimony was central

and critical to the defense and the videotape provided support for the

defendant’s claim that A’s testimony was motivated by his own selfinterest, the defendant was able to present ample evidence from which

the jury could appropriately draw inferences relating to A’s motives in

testifying, his credibility and his bias, and the defendant was able to

impeach A’s testimony through other means, specifically through his

cross-examination of A; moreover, defense counsel devoted a considerable portion of his closing argument to A’s motives in testifying and his

lack of credibility, including highlighting inconsistencies in A’s testimony

and his statement to the police and A’s motives in testifying against

the defendant.

(One judge concurring separately)

Argued February 6—officially released June 30, 2020

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

three counts of the crime of capital felony and one

count of the crime of murder, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New London and tried

to the jury before Jongbloed, J.; thereafter, the court

granted the state’s motion to preclude certain evidence;

verdict and judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed; subsequently, this court, Sheldon and

Prescott, Js., with Flynn, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part, reversed the judgment of the trial

court and remanded the case for a new trial, and the
state and the defendant, on the granting of certification,

filed separate appeals with our Supreme Court, which

reversed in part the judgment of this court and

remanded the case to this court with direction to consider the defendant’s remaining claims on appeal.

Affirmed.

Lauren M. Weisfeld, chief of legal services, for the

appellant (defendant).

Stephen M. Carney, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, was Michael L. Regan, state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

DEVLIN, J. This case returns to this court on remand

from our Supreme Court following its reversal of our

judgment reversing the judgment of conviction of the

defendant, George Michael Leniart, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), and three counts

of capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev.

to 1995) § 53a-54b (5), (7) and (9), as amended by Public

Acts 1995, No. 95-16, § 4.1 The sole remaining claim

before us is whether the trial court’s improper exclusion

of certain evidence at trial violated the defendant’s

rights under the United States constitution. We conclude that the defendant’s constitutional rights were

not violated, and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of

conviction.

‘‘The following facts, which the jury reasonably could

have found, and procedural history are relevant to the

claims before us. On May 29, 1996, the victim,2 who

was then fifteen years old, snuck out of her parents’

home to meet Patrick J. Allain, a teenage friend also

known as P.J., so that they could smoke marijuana,

drink alcohol, and have sex. The two teenagers were

picked up by the defendant, who at the time was thirtythree years old. They then drove to a secluded, wooded

location near the Mohegan-Pequot Bridge in the defendant’s truck.

‘‘While parked, the victim and Allain kissed, drank

beer, and smoked marijuana. At some point, the defendant, who had told Allain that he was in a cult, called

Allain aside and told him that he wanted ‘to do’ the

victim and that he ‘wanted a body for the altar.’

‘‘Allain, who feared the defendant, returned to the

truck and informed the victim that he and the defendant

were going to rape her. Allain then removed her clothes

and had sex with her in the truck while the defendant

watched through the windshield. After Allain and the

victim finished having sex, the defendant climbed into

the truck and sexually assaulted the victim while Allain

held her breast. After the assault, the victim pretended

not to be upset so that the defendant would not harm

her further.

‘‘The defendant then drove the teenagers back to

Allain’s neighborhood. The defendant dropped off

Allain near his home, and the victim remained in the

truck. The victim never returned home that night and

was never seen again, despite a protracted nationwide

search by law enforcement. The search also did not

recover her body.

‘‘Allain subsequently implicated the defendant in the

victim’s death. As a result, in 2008, the state charged

the defendant with murder in violation of § 53a-54a,

capital felony in violation of § 53a-54b (5) for murder

in the course of a kidnapping, capital felony in violation

of § 53a-54b (7) for murder in the course of a sexual
assault, and capital felony in violation of § 53a-54b (9)

for murder of a person under the age of sixteen. The

case was tried to a jury.

‘‘The state’s case against the defendant included the

testimony of four witnesses, who each testified that, at

different times, the defendant had admitted, directly or

indirectly, to killing the victim. Allain, the state’s key

witness, was serving a ten year sentence for an unrelated sexual assault at the time of trial. He testified that,

on the afternoon following the previously described

events, the defendant had asked to meet with him on

a path behind the Mohegan School in Montville. At that

meeting, the defendant admitted that ‘he had to do [the

victim]—to get rid of her.’ The defendant described to

Allain how, after dropping Allain off the night before,

he had pretended to run out of gas near the path.3 He

then ripped the license plates off his truck, dragged the

frantic victim into the woods, and choked her. Later

that evening, at a second meeting, the defendant further

confessed to Allain that he had killed the victim and

had ‘erased’ her by placing her remains in a lobster trap

and dropping them into the mud at the bottom of the

Thames River. The defendant was a lobster fisherman

at the time.’’ (Footnotes in original.) State v. Leniart,

333 Conn. 88, 93–95, 215 A.3d 1104 (2019).

‘‘Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude all testimony or evidence pertaining to

the polygraph examination of any witnesses. Defense

counsel opposed the motion, arguing that he intended

to offer, among other things, a ninety minute videotape

showing the standard pretest interview that the polygrapher, state police Trooper Tim Madden, had conducted

with Allain prior to performing Allain’s polygraph test

in 2004. Defense counsel stated that he would seek to

offer the videotape on the ground that it showed Madden giving Allain numerous assurances that Allain

would receive favorable treatment if he cooperated with

the police, which, defense counsel argued, ‘raises questions . . . about whether this young man is coming

into this courtroom with the intention to do anything

other than save himself.’

‘‘The trial court ruled that the videotape was inadmissible. The court’s oral ruling appeared to adopt the

state’s argument that a recording of a pretest interview

or, indeed, any reference to the fact that a polygraph

examination has been conducted, constitutes polygraph

evidence and is, therefore, per se inadmissible. The

court did, however, indicate that it would permit

defense counsel to cross-examine Allain regarding ‘any

promises or benefits that were made to him during the

course of that interview.’ ’’ Id., 124–25.

‘‘The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts.

The court merged the verdicts into a single conviction

of capital felony and sentenced the defendant to a term

of life imprisonment without the possibility of release.
On appeal to [this court], the defendant raised various

challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and

also claimed, relying in part on the common-law corpus

delicti rule, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain

his conviction. State v. Leniart, [166 Conn. App. 142,

146–49, 140 A.3d 1026 (2016)]. [This court] rejected the

defendant’s sufficiency claim but concluded that the

trial court incorrectly had excluded the polygraph pretest interview videotape, as well as expert testimony

relating to the credibility of jailhouse informants. [This

court] then concluded that those evidentiary rulings

substantially affected the verdict and, accordingly,

remanded the case for a new trial.

‘‘[Our Supreme Court] granted the state’s petition

for certification to appeal, limited to the questions of

whether [this court] correctly concluded that the trial

court had erroneously excluded the polygraph pretest

interview videotape and expert testimony regarding jailhouse informant testimony and that those rulings substantially affected the verdict. State v. Leniart, 323

Conn. 918, 150 A.3d 1149 (2016). [The Supreme Court]

also granted the defendant’s petition for certification

to appeal, limited to the question of whether [this court]

properly applied the corpus delicti rule in concluding

that there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of murder and capital felony. State v. Leniart, 323

Conn. 918, 918–19, 149 A.3d 499 (2016).’’ (Footnote

omitted.) State v. Leniart, supra, 333 Conn. 96.

Our Supreme Court affirmed this court’s rejection

of the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence. Id., 93. The Supreme Court also affirmed this

court’s conclusion that the trial court improperly

excluded the polygraph pretest interview videotape. Id.

The Supreme Court concluded, however, that ‘‘any error

in the exclusion of the video was harmless’’; id., 124;

and, thus, reversed the judgment of this court,4 and

remanded this case for determination of the final issue

of whether the exclusion of the videotape violated the

defendant’s constitutional rights. Id., 152 and n.35.

In assessing the evidentiary issue raised by the exclusion of the videotape and its subsequent determination

that the exclusion was harmless, the Supreme Court

set forth the following relevant description and analysis

of its content, and of Allain’s testimony at trial. ‘‘Madden’s pretest interview of Allain lasted for approximately ninety minutes. For the first thirteen minutes

or so, Madden and Allain discussed Allain’s reasons for

submitting to the polygraph. Specifically, a question

arose as to whether Allain was taking the test voluntarily, because he believed that assisting the state was

the right thing to do or, rather, because he was facing

a potential five year sentence for having violated his

probation through a failed drug test and had been led

to believe that the state might not pursue a conviction

if he cooperated in this matter. Allain initially indicated
that he had consented to the polygraph primarily to

avoid the conviction for violating his probation. Madden

promptly explained, in no uncertain terms, that he could

not perform the polygraph on those terms. Thus, before

proceeding, Madden obtained from Allain a statement

that he was participating freely.

‘‘The remainder of the pretest interview consisted of

Madden’s asking Allain a series of background questions, reviewing the statements that Allain had given to

the police and Allain’s accounts of the events surrounding the victim’s disappearance, and explaining the

questions that Allain would be asked during the polygraph. During that time, Madden repeatedly emphasized

how ‘unbelievably important’ it was for Allain to give

completely truthful answers during the examination.

‘‘Moreover, Madden consistently equated truthfulness with successfully passing the test, doing ‘the right

thing,’ and being a reliable witness. He emphasized in

this respect that the state would consider Allain to be

a useful witness, and Allain would qualify for potentially

favorable treatment, only if the polygraph results demonstrated that Allain was being completely truthful and

forthcoming. Madden referred several times during the

interview to the investigation of the 1997 gang rape and

murder of Maryann Measles. He informed Allain that

suspected participants in that crime who truthfully confessed their roles and then passed polygraph examinations were let off with ‘a slap on the wrist,’ whereas

suspected participants who failed polygraph tests were

aggressively prosecuted.

‘‘At several points during the interview, Madden made

comments indicating that the police were interested in

obtaining Allain’s cooperation. In particular, Madden

explained that the police were interested in having

Allain on their ‘team’ rather than on the defendant’s

team, and in procuring Allain’s assistance in ‘getting’

the defendant, whom Madden described as the ‘bigger

fish.’ In each instance, however, he made clear that

Allain could provide such assistance only by giving completely truthful testimony and passing the polygraph

test. Madden indicated, for example, that, if Allain failed

the polygraph, then he would be on the ‘other team,’

aligned with the defendant, rather than ‘on our team.’

In other words, Madden made clear that only truthful

statements would help Allain.

‘‘Throughout the interview, Madden made comments

that gave the impression that he believed that Allain

had not been completely forthcoming in his prior statements to the police and that Allain still had something

to ‘get off [his] chest.’ In a few instances, Madden speculated that Allain felt intimidated or frightened by the

defendant. In most instances, however, Madden

appeared to believe that what Allain was withholding

was the extent of his own involvement in the crime.

Madden even suggested that this might be a cause of
Allain’s diagnosed clinical depression and speculated

that Allain, by telling the complete truth, might find

some relief. . . .

‘‘After the trial court ruled the videotape inadmissible, the state called Allain to testify. The prosecutor

began his direct examination by eliciting that Allain

was then serving a ten year sentence for felony sexual

assault involving a different victim, and that Allain was

hoping for ‘leniency’ in connection with that sentence

in exchange for his cooperation with the state and testimony against the defendant in the present matter. Allain

acknowledged that ‘it would be nice’ to receive some

consideration in exchange for his testimony.

‘‘On cross-examination, defense counsel effectively

developed all of the basic facts and themes that the

defendant sought to establish through use of the pretest

interview videotape. Defense counsel was able to demonstrate that Allain was generally unreliable as a witness. For example, defense counsel repeatedly returned

to the theme that Allain had two powerful incentives

to cooperate with the state in convicting the defendant,

namely, to divert attention from himself as a suspect

in the victim’s murder and to obtain a reduction of the

sentence that he was then serving for sexual assault.

With respect to the former, Allain admitted to having

raped the victim on the night she disappeared and to

having concealed that information from the police until

after the statute of limitations for rape had expired. He

also understood, however, that the statute of limitations

for a felony murder never runs.

‘‘Allain also acknowledged that he had found and

concealed the victim’s shoe the day after she disappeared, and that this could make him an accessory to

her murder. He also admitted to telling the police that

he had previously indicated to the defendant that he

was willing to kill the victim, and that he later told his

father that he was involved in the victim’s murder and

that he needed help moving her body. . . . Allain

admitted that he was concerned because, if the police

believed that he had anything to do with the victim’s

death, he still could be charged with capital felony, and

he believed that he would face a likely death sentence

if convicted. At the same time, Allain, without expressly

mentioning the pretest interview, testified that Madden

had repeatedly told him that even someone who had

been involved in rape and murder ‘could walk away

. . . with a slap on the hand’ if they cooperated with

the police. . . . Accordingly, the jury was aware that

Allain was a potential suspect in the victim’s murder,

that he had implicated himself in the murder, and that

he understood that he could be charged with the crime

if the defendant were exonerated.

‘‘The jury also heard testimony suggesting that there

was an implicit agreement between Allain and the state

that he would receive leniency on his sexual assault
sentence if he fully cooperated with the state in this

matter and if his cooperation proved sufficiently helpful. Allain twice acknowledged that, at the time he was

sentenced on that conviction, the state’s attorney had

indicated that the state would not oppose a motion for

sentence modification at a later date if Allain met certain unstated requirements. Allain testified that he

understood that to mean that he might be allowed to

serve less time if he ‘played ball’ and cooperated in the

defendant’s case.

‘‘At several points, Allain expressed hope that the

state would believe that he had provided substantial

assistance in the case against the defendant and that,

if his cooperation was sufficiently valuable, he would

be released from prison early. Indeed, Allain complained that he had been ‘blackmailed’ by the state and

that an especially long sentence had been imposed for

the sexual assault conviction specifically to ensure that

he assisted the state in the defendant’s case.

‘‘Accordingly, the jury learned through cross-examination that Allain felt pressured to cooperate and that

he hoped that the state would deem his help sufficiently

valuable that he would obtain a sentence modification.’’

(Citation omitted; emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.) Id., 128–32. The Supreme Court thus concluded

that ‘‘all of the basic facts and themes that the defendant

sought to show to the jury through the pretest interview

videotape were effectively elicited during Allain’s crossexamination . . . .’’ Id., 132. The defendant disagrees

and contends that his constitutional rights to confrontation and to present a defense were violated by the

exclusion of the videotape. We are not persuaded.

‘‘It is fundamental that the defendant’s rights to confront the witnesses against him and to present a defense

are guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United

States constitution. The sixth amendment provides in

relevant part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the

witnesses against him; [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . . A

defendant’s right to present a defense is rooted in the

compulsory process and confrontation clauses of the

sixth amendment . . . . Furthermore, the sixth

amendment rights to confrontation and to compulsory

process are made applicable to state prosecutions

through the due process clause of the fourteenth

amendment. . . .

‘‘In plain terms, the defendant’s right to present a

defense is the right to present the defendant’s version

of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so

that it may decide where the truth lies. . . . It guarantees the right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and

to compel their attendance, if necessary . . . . Therefore, exclusion of evidence offered by the defense may

result in the denial of the defendant’s right to present
a defense. . . .

‘‘The right of confrontation is the right of an accused

in a criminal prosecution to confront the witnesses

against him. . . . The primary interest secured by confrontation is the right to cross-examination . . . and

an important function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying. . . . Crossexamination to elicit facts tending to show motive,

interest, bias and prejudice is a matter of right and may

not be unduly restricted. . . .

‘‘Impeachment of a witness for motive, bias and interest may also be accomplished by the introduction of

extrinsic evidence. . . . The same rule that applies to

the right to cross-examine applies with respect to

extrinsic evidence to show motive, bias and interest;

proof of the main facts is a matter of right, but the extent

of the proof of details lies in the court’s discretion. . . .

The right of confrontation is preserved if defense counsel is permitted to expose to the jury the facts from

which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility,

could appropriately draw inferences relating to the

reliability of the witness. . . .

‘‘Although it is within the trial court’s discretion to

determine the extent of cross-examination and the

admissibility of evidence, the preclusion of sufficient

inquiry into a particular matter tending to show motive,

bias and interest may result in a violation of the constitutional requirements [of the confrontation clause] of the

sixth amendment. . . .

‘‘These sixth amendment rights, although substantial,

do not suspend the rules of evidence . . . . A court

is not required to admit all evidence presented by a

defendant; nor is a court required to allow a defendant

to engage in unrestricted cross-examination. . . .

Instead, [a] defendant is . . . bound by the rules of

evidence in presenting a defense. . . . Nevertheless,

exclusionary rules of evidence cannot be applied mechanistically to deprive a defendant of his rights . . . .

Thus, [i]f the proffered evidence is not relevant [or

constitutes inadmissible hearsay], the defendant’s

right[s] to confrontation [and to present a defense are]

not affected, and the evidence was properly excluded.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Wright, 320 Conn. 781, 816–19, 135 A.3d 1 (2016).

‘‘[W]hether a trial court’s [exclusion of evidence

offered by a criminal defendant] deprives [him] of his

[constitutional] right to present a defense is a question

that must be resolved on a case by case basis. . . .

The primary consideration in determining whether a

trial court’s ruling violated a defendant’s right to present

a defense is the centrality of the excluded evidence to

the claim or claims raised by the defendant at trial.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Andrews,

313 Conn. 266, 276, 96 A.3d 1199 (2014). Moreover, ‘‘[a]
defendant may not successfully prevail on a claim of a

violation of his right to present a defense if he has failed

to take steps to exercise the right or if he adequately

has been permitted to present the defense by different

means.’’ State v. Santana, 313 Conn. 461, 470, 97 A.3d

963 (2014).

‘‘If . . . we conclude that the trial court improperly

excluded certain evidence, we will proceed to analyze

[w]hether [the] limitations on impeachment, including

cross-examination, [were] so severe as to violate [the

defendant’s rights under] the confrontation clause of

the sixth amendment . . . . In evaluating the severity

of the limitations, if any, improperly imposed on the

defendant’s right to confront, and thus impeach, a witness, [w]e consider the nature of the excluded inquiry,

whether the field of inquiry was adequately covered

by other questions that were allowed, and the overall

quality of the cross-examination viewed in relation to

the issues actually litigated at trial. . . . We consider

de novo whether a constitutional violation occurred.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Halili, 175 Conn. App. 838, 852–53, 168 A.3d

565, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 961, 172 A.3d 1261 (2017).

In this case, the defendant sought to introduce the

videotape of the pretest interview into evidence at trial

on the ground that it showed Madden giving Allain

numerous assurances that Allain would receive favorable treatment if he cooperated with the police, which,

defense counsel argued, ‘‘raises questions . . . about

whether this young man is coming into this courtroom

with the intention to do anything other than save himself.’’ On appeal, he claims that his right to confrontation

was violated when the trial court excluded the videotape from evidence because, through the videotape, he

‘‘sought to elicit the psychological context of [Allain’s]

polygraph, and especially the pretest where . . . Madden can be seen frightening and inducing him to cooperate, to show motive and bias.’’ The defendant claims

that the videotape demonstrated Allain’s ‘‘vulnerable

status . . . as well as [his] possible concern that he

might be a suspect in the investigation.’’ (Emphasis

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) He argues

that by excluding the videotape, ‘‘[t]he court prohibited

relevant inquiry reasonably aimed at eliciting facts from

which the jury might decide to disbelieve [Allain].’’ As

to his claim that the exclusion of the videotape violated

his right to present a defense, he claims that he was

prevented from presenting his theory at trial that Allain

was ‘‘the culprit’’ and that the exclusion of the videotape

‘‘violated his right to show that [Allain] was motivated

by a desire to avoid being charged.’’ The defendant also

contends, more generally, that he was denied the right

to ‘‘show whatever interest or motive [Allain] had.’’ The

defendant further argues that the cross-examination of

Allain was no substitute for the videotape because the

videotape showed ‘‘Madden’s use of fear and promises’’
in questioning Allain, and that Madden ‘‘manipulated

[Allain] by discouraging him from getting a lawyer, and

by representing that the [polygraph] test would be

‘medicinal.’ ’’

In assessing the defendant’s claim that his sixth

amendment rights to confrontation and to present a

defense have been violated, we first assess the centrality

of the excluded evidence, the videotape, to the case, or,

more specifically, to the defendant’s claim that Allain’s

testimony was not credible because it was motivated

by Allain’s desire not to be implicated in the murder of

the victim in this case and to serve a lesser sentence

on the unrelated sexual assault for which he was incarcerated at the time of trial. It cannot reasonably be

disputed that Allain’s testimony was central to the

state’s case, and the jury’s ability to assess and the

defendant’s ability to impeach the credibility of that

testimony were critical. The more focused question,

however, is whether the excluded videotape was central

and critical to the defendant’s case because it highlighted Allain’s motives to testify as he did at trial. Again,

we do not believe that it reasonably can be disputed

that evidence tending to impeach Allain’s trial testimony

was central and critical to the defense, and the videotape certainly provided support for the defendant’s

claim that Allain’s testimony was motivated by his own

self-interest.

Our constitutional inquiry, however, does not end

here. We must next determine whether the defendant

was able to present his theory of the case, or to present

evidence to prove Allain’s motives in testifying and to

impeach his testimony, through other means, specifically through the cross-examination of Allain. ‘‘Both

this court and our Supreme Court have stated that,

when a defendant is afforded wide latitude in crossexamining a state’s witness as to credibility, claims of

sixth amendment violations for restrictions on crossexamination are indicia of the defendant [putting] a

constitutional tag on a nonconstitutional claim.’’5

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bermudez, 195

Conn. App. 780, 807, A.3d , cert. granted, 335

Conn. 908, A.3d (2020); see id., 808 (defendant

given ample opportunity to impeach credibility of witnesses); see also State v. Jordan, 329 Conn. 272, 287–88

n.14, 186 A.3d 1 (2018) (claim of improper exclusion

of evidence of victim’s convictions not constitutional

in nature when jury heard testimony that, if credited,

would support theory of self-defense); State v. Leconte,

320 Conn. 500, 511, 131 A.3d 1132 (2016) (no constitutional violation where defendant was given ample

opportunity to ‘‘expose to the jury the facts from which

[the] jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility,

could appropriately draw inferences relating to the

reliability of the witness’’); State v. Romanko, 313 Conn.

140, 151–52, 96 A.3d 518 (2014) (no constitutional violation where defendant was permitted to present his the-
ory of case ‘‘by means other than the proposed demonstration’’); State v. Mark R., 300 Conn. 590, 612, 17 A.3d

1 (2011) (‘‘over the course of a cross-examination of

the victim that filled more than thirty transcript pages,

the trial court did permit defense counsel to inquire

into numerous elements of the defendant’s fabrication

theory’’); State v. Osimanti, 299 Conn. 1, 10–13, 6 A.3d

790 (2010) (no violation of right to confrontation where

defendant was permitted to present alternative evidence by way of cross-examination in support of his

claim of self-defense and was able to refer to and

emphasize that evidence in closing argument to jury);

State v. William C., 267 Conn. 686, 707–708, 841 A.2d

1144 (2004) (improper exclusion of records of Department of Children and Families indicating problems with

victim’s veracity in sexual assault case was, although

harmful evidentiary error, not of constitutional magnitude, because defendant had opportunity to elicit issues

concerning victim’s veracity through extensive crossexamination); State v. Sandoval, 263 Conn. 524, 549, 821

A.2d 247 (2003) (‘‘defense counsel aggressively crossexamined the victim in an attempt to convey to the jury

that any participation by the defendant in the attempted

abortion was consensual and that the victim falsely had

accused the defendant of seeking to abort the pregnancy against her will’’); State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23,

76, 770 A.2d 908 (2001) (no violation of constitutional

right to present defense where subject matter of precluded testimony was presented through other witnesses); State v. Shabazz, 246 Conn. 746, 758 n.7, 719

A.2d 440 (1998) (no deprivation of constitutional right

to present defense when ‘‘defendant was adequately

permitted to present his claim of self-defense by way

of his own testimony, by cross-examining the state’s

witnesses, and by the opportunity to present any other

relevant and admissible evidence bearing on that question’’), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1179, 119 S. Ct. 1116, 143

L. Ed. 2d 111 (1999); State v. Barletta, 238 Conn. 313,

322–23, 680 A.2d 1284 (1996) (improper restriction on

expert’s testimony about likely effects of cocaine ingestion on eyewitness was not of constitutional magnitude

because defendant permitted to cross-examine that eyewitness about her cocaine use, criminal record including narcotics convictions, and inducement from state

to testify); State v. Jones, 205 Conn. 723, 730–32, 535

A.2d 808 (1988) (improper restriction on testimony of

defendant’s sister concerning reasons for defendant’s

flight, namely, his fear of victim’s family, was not of

constitutional magnitude because defendant had

explained flight in his own testimony); State v. Vitale,

197 Conn. 396, 403, 497 A.2d 956 (1985) (wide latitude

of cross-examination by defendant suggestive that

claimed evidentiary errors were nonconstitutional in

nature); State v. Porfil, 191 Conn. App. 494, 523–24,

215 A.3d 161 (2019) (no constitutional violation where

defendant was able to adequately present his defenses

of misidentification and lack of possession by other
means and had additional, alternative avenues available

to him to further bolster his defenses), cert. granted on

other grounds, 333 Conn. 923, 218 A.3d 67 (2019); State

v. Durdek, 184 Conn. App. 492, 511 n.10, 195 A.3d 388

(noting that ‘‘multiple avenues of impeachment’’

afforded to defendant in cross-examining ‘‘important

state witness’’ supported conclusion that claimed errors

were evidentiary, not constitutional, and defendant

therefore had burden of establishing harm), cert.

denied, 330 Conn. 934, 194 A.3d 1197 (2018); State v.

Papineau, 182 Conn. App. 756, 780–82, 190 A.3d 913

(no violation where defendant was permitted to present

evidence by means other than narrow inquiry that was

excluded by trial court), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 916,

193 A.3d 1212 (2018); State v. Manousos, 179 Conn.

App. 310, 333, 178 A.3d 1087 (no constitutional violation

where defendant was able to present his defense in full

through other, unlimited testimony), cert. denied, 328

Conn. 919, 181 A.3d 93 (2018); State v. Thomas, 110

Conn. App. 708, 718, 955 A.2d 1222 (‘‘[b]ecause the

theory in question provided at most merely one more

motivation to attack, its exclusion did not foreclose an

entire defense theory and, therefore, did not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation’’), cert. denied, 289

Conn. 952, 961 A.2d 418 (2008).

In this case, we agree with the state that the defendant

was able to elicit testimony regarding Allain’s motives

in testifying and to adequately impeach that testimony

through cross-examination and, thus, was not prevented from presenting his defense to the jury. By way

of the unbounded and rigorous cross-examination of

Allain, the transcript of which spans approximately 140

pages, defense counsel effectively challenged Allain’s

credibility. During cross-examination, defense counsel

focused on Allain’s motivations in testifying—to avoid

implication in the murder of the victim and to obtain

a lesser sentence on the sexual assault charge for which

he was then incarcerated. Allain openly acknowledged

that he had strong incentives to testify in this case. He

admitted, after several years of denying, that he had

raped the victim in this case on the night in question,

but he knew that the statute of limitations on that charge

had expired and, thus, that he could not be charged

with that rape. He understood, however, that he could

still be charged with murder because there was no

statute of limitations on that charge. Although Allain

denied defense counsel’s suggestion that he was motivated to inculpate the defendant in the hope of exculpating himself, stating that his testimony was truthful, he

admitted that, despite speaking to members of the

major crime squad approximately twenty-five times, he

had never been entirely truthful with the police throughout the course of the investigation. Allain testified at

trial to several facts that he admittedly had never told

any of the law enforcement officers with whom he had

spoken over the course of the ten year investigation.6
Allain even admitted during cross-examination that he

was ‘‘making up things about what [he] thought was in

[the defendant’s] mind’’ pertaining to the victim, and

that he had told the defendant that he would kill the

victim himself.

During direct examination by the state, Allain

acknowledged that he was then serving a ten year sentence for a felony sexual assault charge and that he

was hoping for leniency in exchange for his testimony

against the defendant in this case. Allain testified that

he thought that the sentence that he received on that

sexual assault charge was excessive, and that it was

designed to compel him to testify in this case. On the

basis of his perception of the sentence in that case as

excessive, Allain testified that he felt as though he had

been ‘‘blackmailed’’ to testify in this case so that he

might receive a downward sentence modification later.

As noted, Allain admitted that he hoped ‘‘that the state

believes that [he] provided substantial assistance in [its]

case against [the defendant] . . . .’’ He expressed his

hope that the state believed that his ‘‘cooperation in

this case was valuable enough’’ to obtain a sentence

modification on his sexual assault charge.

In sum, the court allowed defense counsel to inquire

repeatedly into Allain’s motivations to testify—his

desire to avoid his own implication in the murder of

the victim in this case and his quest for a lesser sentence

on the sexual assault charge for which he was incarcerated at the time of trial. Not only did the court not

restrict defense counsel’s inquiry, but that inquiry was

effective and impactful. The jury was not only provided

with an adequate opportunity to judge the credibility

and bias of Allain, but a fair reading of the cross-examination leads to an inexorable conclusion that Allain’s

testimony was motivated by his own interests and his

overall credibility had been damaged.

Moreover, defense counsel devoted a considerable

portion of his closing argument to Allain’s motives in

testifying for the state and his lack of credibility.

Defense counsel told the jury that it was ‘‘entitled to

consider a witness’ interest in the outcome of this case

when rendering [its] verdict,’’ and posited: ‘‘Who more

than . . . Allain has an interest in—besides [the defendant]—in the [outcome] of this case?’’ Defense counsel

underscored the incredibility of Allain’s testimony by

tracking each of Allain’s statements to the police, all

the way to his testimony at trial, and highlighting inconsistencies between his testimony on direct examination

and cross examination.7 As with cross-examination,

defense counsel effectively demonstrated to the jury

the flaws in Allain’s testimony in support of counsel’s

claim that Allain was not a credible witness. Defense

counsel told the jury: ‘‘Allain has never told the same

story twice’’ and that Allain was ‘‘a practiced liar’’ and

‘‘a stranger to the truth.’’ Finally, defense counsel
emphasized Allain’s motives in testifying against the

defendant when he argued to the jury that ‘‘the State

of Connecticut has charged the wrong man; that the

State of Connecticut cut a deal with the man who knew

where the body is and is still afraid to tell it because

they may kill him; that . . . Allain has everything to

gain by the conviction of [the defendant] . . . .’’

Because the defendant was permitted to present

ample evidence from which the jury could appropriately

draw inferences relating to Allain’s motives and credibility, his rights to confrontation and to present a

defense were preserved. Accordingly, the defendant’s

arguments that his constitutional rights were violated

because the exclusion of the videotape ‘‘prohibited relevant inquiry reasonably aimed at eliciting facts from

which the jury might decide to disbelieve [Allain]’’ and

that he was prevented from demonstrating Allain’s

motives and biases are unavailing.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion, Sheldon, J., concurred.

1 For the sake of simplicity, we note that all references in this opinion to

§ 53a-54b are to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 53a-54b, as amended by

Public Acts 1995, No. 95-16, § 4.

2

In accordance with our policy of protecting the interests of the victims

of sexual abuse, we decline to identify the victim or others through whom

the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

3

‘‘Although Allain’s testimony was unclear on this point, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the path on which Allain and the defendant

spoke is the same path to which the defendant confessed having taken the

victim.’’ State v. Leniart, 333 Conn. 88, 95 n.3, 215 A.3d 1104 (2019).

4 The Supreme Court also held that this court incorrectly concluded that

the trial court had abused its discretion in precluding expert testimony

regarding jailhouse informant testimony. See State v. Leniart, supra, 333

Conn. 93.

5 By contrast, a constitutional violation arises when a defendant is wholly

prohibited from inquiring into an area pertaining to his or her defense at

trial, particularly when a witness’ credibility, motives or bias are at issue.

See, e.g., State v. Peeler, 271 Conn. 338, 383–85, 857 A.2d 808 (2004) (trial

court’s failure to admit mental health records of state’s witness precluded

relevant line of inquiry into witness’ ability to perceive events and was

therefore of constitutional magnitude), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 845, 126 S. Ct.

94, 163 L. Ed. 2d 110 (2005); see also State v. Slimskey, 257 Conn. 842, 859,

779 A.2d 723 (2001) (‘‘[h]aving determined that the evidence in issue was

especially probative and having concluded that there was no other available

means of inquiry into the victim’s propensity to lie, we necessarily have

concluded that the confrontation clause requires the disclosure’’).

6 For example, Allain testified for the first time in court that the defendant

told him that he was in a satanic cult, that he spoke to the defendant for

about three minutes about the defendant’s desire to kill the victim and that

the defendant was giggling about it. He testified that, after he and the

defendant raped the victim, he and the victim discussed the need to get ‘‘a

good night’s rest’’ in order ‘‘to prepare for school the next day’’ and that

the victim casually told them that she had ‘‘always wanted to have sex with

two guys.’’

7 Defense counsel argued to the jury: ‘‘There are more peaks and valleys

in [Allain’s] testimony than there is in the Rocky Mountains. . . . When

[Allain] first went to the police in October of 1997, he told them all about

being with that young woman that night. But he denied having any sexual

contact with her, he denied having any real misconduct at all. He made it

all sound out to be just like a night of partying. I may have misspoke—he

may have said he had sex with her; that I may have gotten wrong. But he

didn’t make out any crimes.

‘‘Then he spoke to the police on a second occasion. We’ve got these

here—not all of these are exhibits—but I spent a lot of time cross-examining
[Allain] and I want to tell you why. I listened very carefully and I’d ask you

to do this as you deliberate.

‘‘Go through what they said, each of them. Make the list. . . . What did

they say on direct and what did they say on cross.

‘‘In October of 1997, [Allain’s] with [the defendant]. They’re with this

young man; not much happens. We get then to another statement—and

again, I don’t mean to harp on this stuff and I’m not asking you to let [the

defendant] go because the police can’t keep track of dates—but maybe it

was in November of 2001, maybe it’s 2007; I don’t really know. The date

says one thing, the testimony’s another.

‘‘In 2004, [Allain] gives another statement. In this statement, he talks about

some—a little bit more. This time [the defendant] has killed her now or

[the defendant] says he was going to kill her. She jumps out of the van. But

you know, [Allain] has some voluntary consensual sexual activity with her.

‘‘In 2007, it’s now this whole business about we’re going to rape you. On

the stand when I questioned him, he finally came around to rape but he

pussyfooted around about that, too. I’d suggest to you that [Allain’s] pussyfooting around because [Allain] knows where that body is and if [Allain]

tells anybody, they’ll seek to kill him. It’s that simple.

‘‘Nobody is going to pity poor [Allain] if he acknowledges his role in the

rape and the murder of [the victim] and tells this jury—you, them, anybody

in this room—something he’s never told anybody but he wanted his father’s

help with. I need to move that body, it’s up there near the Mohegan reservation—not near any water. It’s up there near the Mohegan reservation.

‘‘[The defendant] didn’t dump it in the river. He didn’t dump it in the

Sound. He didn’t chop her up. He didn’t put her in the mud. He didn’t put

her in a well. It’s up there near the reservation and dad help me and his

father didn’t and his dad ratted him out as it were and then [Allain] had to

dance and he’s dancing still.’’

Defense counsel further argued: ‘‘Then we get really not much more in

the case. You know, [Allain’s] out there, he’s given a statement in [1997].

He gave one in maybe [2004], maybe [2007]. No warrant, no arrest. He’s

claiming the body’s up there near the casino. He testifies in the trial then

about a well. . . .

‘‘If you need to hear from [Allain] again, listen to the entire testimony

and what you will find out is that story he told on the stand, it doesn’t agree

with the story he told in 1997, it doesn’t agree with the story he told in

2004, it doesn’t agree with the story he told in 2007.

‘‘Some of the things he told you in this room, you heard for the very first

time—well, of course you did, but I mean, law enforcement heard for the

very first time. [Allain] is a stranger to the truth and that desperate men do

desperate things.’’