20

- 2643 Peddy v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.



## UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT


# SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT = S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION A SUMMARY ORDER @ ). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT O N ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 2 New York, on the 2 0 t h da y of M a y , two thous and twenty

- one . 3 4 PRESENT: 5 J OHN M. WALKER, JR. , 6 MICHAEL H. PARK , 7 WILLIAM J. NARDINI , 8 Circuit Judges. 9

_____________________________________ 10 11 Christine Peddy , 12 13 Plaintiff

- Appellant , 14 15

v. 20

- 2643

- cv 16 17 L’Oreal USA, Inc. , 18 19 Defendant

- Appellee. 20

_____________________________________ 21 22 F OR PLAINTIFF

- APPELLANT: S TEPHEN B ERGSTEIN , Bergstein & Ullrich, 23 LLP, New Paltz, NY

. 24 25 F OR DEFENDANT

- APPELLEE: E RIC A. S AVAGE ( Emma J. Diamond
, on the 26 brief ), Littler Mendelson P.C., New York, 27 NY

. 28 292 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 1
New York ( Abrams
, J

. ). 2

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 3

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED

. 4
Christine Peddy, a former Assistant Vice President of Marketing at two L’Oréal USA 5
brands, alleges that her former employer discriminated against her in violation of the Age 6

Discrimination in Employmen t Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”), and state and local 7

law. Specifically, she alleges that L’Or é al failed to find her a new role within the company when, 8
at the age of 47, she was terminated as part of an organizational restructuring. After discovery, 9
the district court granted summary judgment for L’Oréal on Peddy’s ADEA claim and declined to 10
assert supplemental jurisdiction over her remaining state and local claims. We assume the parties’ 11
familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal. 12

“We review de novo a di strict c ourt’s grant of summary judgm ent. ” Delaney v. Bank of 13

Am. Corp. , 766 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2014). Su mmary judgment must be granted if “the movant 14
shows that there is no genuine dis pute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 15
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 16

“It is well established that the burden

- shifting framework set forth by the Supreme Court 17

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 ( 1973)
, applies to claims brought under the 18

ADEA.” Delaney , 766 F.3d at 167. Under this framework, “ t he plaintiff bears the initial burden 19
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff does so, the burden shifts to 20

the defendant to articulate ‘some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its action. Once such 21
a reason is provided, the plaintiff can no longer rely on the prima facie case, but may still prevail 22
if she can show that the employer ’s determination was in fact the res ult of discrimination.” 233 Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp. , 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) ( citations omitted ) (quoting 1
McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802) . Thus, the plaintiff can survive the defendant’s summary 2
judgment motion if “the facts, taken in [her] favor, suffice to meet her burden of showing a triable 3

issue as to whether her age was a ‘but for’ cause ” of an adverse employment action

. Id

. In Peddy’s 4
claim, the purported adverse action is L’Oréal’s failure to find her a new position. She does not 5
challenge her termination. 6
Assuming without deciding that Peddy stated a prima facie case of age discrimination, we 7
conclude that L’Oréal provided legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its failure to redeploy 8

her . After Peddy was notified that her job in the L’Oréal Professional brand was being eliminated, 9
she applied to at least thirteen other positions within the organization. As the district court 10
thoroughly explained
, for each of those positions
, L’Oréal proffered a legitimate
, 11

nondisc riminatory reason for choosing the person they ultimately hired, whether based on 12
interview performance, relevant skill set, or compatible level of seniority

. 13

We thus turn to causation and conclude that, even taking the facts in the light most 14

favorable to Peddy, she failed to meet her burden to create a triable issue of fact

. Peddy asserts 15
that a reasonable juror could infer causation from L’Oréal’s alleged deviation from its 16

“ Responsible Restructuring ” p olicy statement

. While “[d]epartures from procedur al regularity

. . . 17
can raise a question as to the good faith of the process,” Tolbert v. Smith , 790 F.3d 427, 438 (2d 18
Cir. 2015) (quoting Zahorik v. Cornell Univ. , 729 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1984)), the Responsible 19
Restructuring statement sets forth no specific procedures
, and Peddy fails to raise a genuine 20
question as to the existence of any such procedures. Rather, the Responsible Restructuring 21
statement provides that “values of respect and integrity ” guide restructuring and that, “[w]h en 22
redundancies prove unavoidable, we aim to maintain employment by supporting employees in 234 their professional reorientation , in particular through internal redeployment or solutions adapted 1

to each individual situation s [sic] .” App’x at 913. The simple failure to achieve an “aim” in a 2
given instance does not , on its own, raise a question as to L’Oréal’s good faith

. 3
Peddy also argues that a reasonable juror could infer causation from the hiring of less

4
qualified individuals for the jobs to which she appli ed. But a plaintiff who raises her supposedly 5
superior qualifications for the job as circumstantial evidence of causation must present evidence 6

that her credentials we re “so superior to the credentials of the person selected for the job that no 7

reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected 8
over the plaintiff for the job in question.” Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell

, Bd. of Educ.
, 243 F.3d 93, 9
103 (2d Cir. 2001) ( internal quotation marks omitted)
, superseded in part on other grounds by 10
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e). Here, L’Oréal made reasonable hiring decisions. For the positions Peddy 11
highlights, the selected candidates each had experience that roughly matched the job posting s

. 12
Thus, Peddy’s credential s were not “so superior” t hat they would support an inference of 13

discrimination. Moreover, L’Oréal reasonably explained that the jobs to which Peddy applied 14

would have been demotions , which the company disfavors . “[T]he court must respect the 15
employer’s unfettered discretion to choose among qualified candidates.” Id. (quoting Fischbach 16
v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr. , 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). 17

We have considered the remainder of Peddy’s arguments and find them to be without merit. 18
For the foregoing r easons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court

. 19

FOR THE COURT: 20 Catherine O ’ Hagan Wolfe, Cler k of Court 21