alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Tyrone O. YOUNG, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-4015.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted April 2, 2008.

Decided April 15, 2008.

*718Tyrone O. Young (submitted), Oxford, WI, pro se.

Michelle L. Jacobs, Office of the United States Attorney, Milwaukee, WI, for Re-spondenb-Appellee.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and POSNER and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner has appealed from the denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence. The district court issued a certificate of appeala-bility “regarding the timeliness of his motion.” The court offered no other explanation for its action.

In acting as it did, the court appears to have overlooked our opinion in *Davis v. Borgen,*349 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir.2003), another case from the Eastern District of Wisconsin. There we stated:

> (1) A certificate of appealability may be issued only if the prisoner has at least one substantial constitutional question for appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). (2) The certificate must identify each substantial constitutional question. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); *Beyer v. Litseher,*306 F.3d 504 (7th Cir.2002).(3) If there is a substantial constitutional issue, *and,*an antecedent non-constitutional issue independently is substantial, then the certificate may include that issue as well. See *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Owens v. Boyd,*235 F.3d 356 (7th Cir.2000).(4) Any substantial non-constitutional issue must be identified specifically in the certificate. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). (5) If success on a non-constitutional issue is essential (compliance with the statute of limitations is a good example), and there is no substantial argument that the district judge erred in resolving the non-constitutional question, then no certificate of appeala-bility should issue even if the constitutional question standing alone would have justified an appeal. See *Anderson v. Litseher,*281 F.3d 672 (7th Cir.2002).

*Id.*at 1029. We then pointed out that the certificate issued by the district court did not satisfy these requirements.

It is the same here. The prisoner has no constitutional question for appeal, substantial or otherwise; the only question he presents is whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that his section 2255 motion was untimely. The certificate of appealability does not identify a substantial, or any, constitutional question.

That moots the other three requirements.

The certificate of appealability is vacated and the appeal dismissed.
13‐920‐cv

Hallford v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.  CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER

JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S

LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER

THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).    A PARTY CITING A

SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley

Square, in the City of New York, on the 28th day of February, two thousand

fourteen.

      

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

     Circuit Judges.

____________________________________________  

EVERETTE HALLFORD,

                     Plaintiff ‐ Appellant,

‐v.‐            No. 13‐920‐cv

FOX ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC., Peter F. CHERNIN, CHERNIN

ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, Richard Timothy KRING, AKA Tim KRING, Kiefer

SUTHERLAND,

                     Defendants ‐ Appellees,
2

TAILWIND PRODUCTIONS,

                     Defendant.  

____________________________________________  

FOR APPELLANT:   JOSEPH D. NOHAVICKA, Pardalis & Nohavicka, LLP,

New York, NY.

  FOR APPELLEES:   JONATHAN NEIL STRAUSS (Jonathan Zavin, on the

brief), Loeb & Loeb LLP, New York, NY.

____________________________________________  

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York (William H. Pauley III, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the order of the district court be and hereby

is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff‐Appellant Everette Hallford brought this action against Fox

Entertainment Group, Inc., and others in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York. Hallford alleges that Defendants’ television show

infringed the copyright in his screenplay. The district court dismissed Hallford’s

complaint by memorandum order and opinion dated February 13, 2013. Hallford

now appeals.  
3

We AFFIRM for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court

in its opinion.  

     

       FOR THE COURT:

       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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. 11/29/2016 November 29, 2016
Exhibit 32



Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



The undersigned hereby certifies that, to his knowledge, (i) the Form 10-QSB of South Street Financial Corp. (the
Company) for the quarter ended March 31, 2005 (the Report), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company on the dates and for the periods presented therein.



|                   |  |                              |  |                                      
|------------------ |  | ---------------------------- |  | -------------------------------------
|                   |  | SOUTH STREET FINANCIAL CORP.
|                   |  |                             
|Date: May 12, 2005 |  | By:                          |  | /s/ R. Ronald Swanner                
|                   |  |                              |  | R. Ronald Swanner                    
|                   |  |                              |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
|                   |  |                             
|Date: May 12, 2005 |  | By:                          |  | /s/ Christopher F. Cranford          
|                   |  |                              |  | Christopher F. Cranford              
|                   |  |                              |  | Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.1





CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Jacobs Financial Group,
Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the year ended May 31, 2014 (the "Report") filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, I, John M. Jacobs, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) The Company's Report fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|Date:   June 30, 2017 |                                        
|--------------------- | ---------------------------------------
|                      |                                        
|By:                   | /s/John M. Jacobs                      
|                      |                                        
|                      | John M. Jacobs, Chief Executive Officer
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2928 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2928

To provide relief to the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada for settlement of 
               certain claims against the United States.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 14, 2011

  Mr. Kildee introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To provide relief to the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada for settlement of 
               certain claims against the United States.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SETTLEMENT OF CERTAIN CLAIMS.

    (a) Authorization for Payment.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, subject to subsection (b), the Secretary of the Treasury shall 
pay to the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada $1,830,000 from amounts 
appropriated under section 1304 of title 31, United States Code.
    (b) Payment in Accordance With Stipulation for Recommendation of 
Settlement.--The payment under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) be made in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
        the Stipulation for Recommendation of Settlement dated May 22, 
        2000, entered into between the Pottawatomi Nation in Canada and 
        the United States (referred to in this section as the 
        ``Stipulation for Recommendation of Settlement''); and
            (2) be included in the report of the Chief Judge of the 
        United States Court of Federal Claims regarding Congressional 
        Reference No. 94-1037X, submitted to the Senate on January 4, 
        2001, in accordance with sections 1492 and 2509 of title 28, 
        United States Code.
    (c) Full Satisfaction of Claims.--The payment under subsection (a) 
shall be in full satisfaction of all claims of the Pottawatomi Nation 
in Canada against the United States that are referred to or described 
in the Stipulation for Recommendation of Settlement.
    (d) Nonapplicability.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
the Indian Tribal Judgment Funds Use or Distribution Act (25 U.S.C. 
1401 et seq.) does not apply to the payment under subsection (a).
                                 <all>
```
#### PAMELA AMUSEMENT CO., Inc., v. SCOTT JEWELRY COMPANY and Matthew J. Brown.

Civ. A. No. 58-442.

United States District Court D. Massachusetts.

June 16, 1958.

*256Clarence P. Kudisch, Alfred Sigel, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

Lawrence R. Cohen, Boston, Mass., for defendants.

FRANCIS J. W. FORD, District Judge.

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or alternatively for a more definite statement.

Rule 8(a) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” From the facts set forth here in a single count it is not clear just what claims plaintiff is asserting. It appears from plaintiff’s argument that its principal claim is one for deceit based on misrepresentations by defendant Brown. However, there is no allegation that plaintiff believed these representations or relied on them. ' Nor is it clear whether such a claim is asserted solely against the individual defendant Brown, or also against the corporate defendant.

Plaintiff also contends that a claim is set forth for breach of the covenants of the lease against defendant corporation as a guarantor. However, the terms of the lease or of the guaranty are not set forth. Moreover, while it is alleged that Brown executed the lease, purporting to act as Treasurer of defendant corporation, it is not alleged he was Treasurer or otherwise authorized to act on behalf of defendant corporation.

The complaint should be amended to set forth a clear statement, in separate counts, of the claim or claims asserted against each defendant. If this is done, defendants will be able to answer the complaint without need of a more definite statement.

The motion for a more definite statement is denied. The motion to dismiss is allowed unless within twenty days plaintiff amends its complaint to set forth a clear statement of its claim or claims against'each defendant.
**Exhibit 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, John H. Karnes, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of The HoustonExploration Company; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofthe registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision,to ensure that material information relating to the registrant,including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which thisreport is being prepared; b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’smost recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter inthe case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’sboard of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability torecord, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.
Date: November 4, 2004    /s/ John H. Karnes  John H. Karnes Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
34
ZAVON DESHAWN TAYLOR,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO 

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND 

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D14-3435

_____________________________/

Opinion filed February 26, 2016.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

James H. Daniel, Judge.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Wendy S. Loquasto, Special Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Matthew Pavese, Assistant Attorney 

General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Zavon DeShawn Taylor appeals from his judgment and sentence for 

unarmed carjacking. Although the circuit court attempted to strike certain costs 

pursuant to Taylor’s request in a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 

3.800(b)(2), the circuit court did so after its jurisdiction under that rule expired.
2

Therefore, we must declare the corrected judgment and sentence a nullity and 

remand for re-entry of that order. See Calidonio v. State, 951 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2007) (explaining that an order entered after the expiration of the time for 

ruling on a motion under Rule 3.800(b)(2) is a nullity); Sessions v. State, 907 So. 

2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). We also reverse as to an error in the separate 

order of probation. The circuit court improperly imposed a condition requiring 

Taylor to “obtain” a GED or high school diploma. See Rodriguez v. State, 768 So. 

2d 1234, 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), overruled on other grounds as stated in Mier 

v. State, 58 So. 3d 319, 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). We remand for the court to 

modify this condition to conform to the requirements of section 948.037(1), 

Florida Statutes (2012), which would require Taylor to make a “good faith effort” 

to achieve such skills or diploma. We affirm as to Taylor’s remaining arguments. 

As the acts required by this opinion are ministerial in nature, Taylor need not be 

present for the court to undertake them. 

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

WETHERELL, RAY, and KELSEY, JJ., CONCUR.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-40916 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JUAN ANTONIO BARRON-REVILLA, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. L-97-CR-62-1

- - - - - - - - - - April 10, 1998 Before JOLLY, JONES, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Juan Antonio Barron-Revilla appeals his sentence following a guilty plea for reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Barron-Revilla argues that he was charged with and pleaded guilty to simple reentry following deportation under § 1326(a) and that he could not be sentenced under § 1326(b) because the indictment did not allege that he had a prior aggravated-felony conviction. His argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States , ___ U.S. ___, 1998 WL 126904, at *3, *8 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1998).No. 97-40916 -2- AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 13.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Luxottica Group S.p.A. (the Company) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2015 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Leonardo Del Vecchio, Executive Chairman of the Company, certify to my knowledge, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that:  1.             The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2.             The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  By:
/s/ LEONARDO DEL   VECCHIOLeonardo Del VecchioExecutive Chairman   Dated: April 21, 2016  This written statement accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.