alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[CFR Index and Finding Aids, 2020]
[List of Agency-prepared Indexes Appearing in Individual CFR Volumes]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]

                       LIST OF AGENCY-PREPARED INDEXES
                     APPEARING IN INDIVIDUAL CFR VOLUMES

   Code of Federal Regulations
    Title and chapter or part                         Agency
------------------------------------------------------------------------

3 CFR                                       The President
11 CFR Parts 1-8, 100-116, 200-201, 9001    Federal Election Commission
9001-9007 and 9012, 9008, 9031 -9039

19 CFR Chapter I                            Bureau of Customs and Border 
                                              Protection, Department of 
                                              Homeland Security; Department 
                                              of Treasury
20 CFR Chapter III                          Social Security Administration
37 CFR Chapters I and II (4 indexes)        Patent and Trademark Office and 
                                              Copyright Office
40 CFR Parts 1500-1508                      Council on Environmental Quality
43 CFR Chapter II                           Bureau of Land Management
                                            Interior Department
```
DENIED and Opinion Filed August 20, 2024 

# S

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-00801-CV IN RE SANTIAGO MARTINEZ, Relator Original Proceeding from the 301st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-17-18712 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Miskel Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness In his July 3, 2024 petition for writ of mandamus, relator seeks relief from the trial court’s denial of his motio n to modify temporary orders. Entitlement to mandamus relief requires a relator to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and that the re lator lacks an adequa te appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). After reviewing relator’s petiti on and the record before us, we conclude that relator has failed to demonstrate entitlement to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.8(a). Additionally, based on our revi ew, relator’s petition and its attached–2– appendix contain unredacted sensitive da ta—such as a minor’s full name—in violation of the Texas Rule s of Appellate Procedure. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 9.9. Accordingly, we strike relator’s petition and its attached appendix.

240801F.P05 / Robbie Partida-Kipness / ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS JUSTICE
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2923 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2923

  To direct the Secretary of Defense to establish a Quality Assurance 
Surveillance Plan for security contractors operating in Afghanistan and 
              in support of other contingency operations.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 14, 2011

   Mr. Donnelly of Indiana introduced the following bill; which was 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To direct the Secretary of Defense to establish a Quality Assurance 
Surveillance Plan for security contractors operating in Afghanistan and 
              in support of other contingency operations.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Josh Birchfield Security Contractor 
Oversight Improvement Act''.

SEC. 2. QUALITY ASSURANCE SURVEILLANCE PLAN FOR SECURITY CONTRACTORS 
              OPERATING IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN SUPPORT OF OTHER 
              CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of Defense shall establish a plan to 
be known as a ``Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan'' setting standards 
that must be incorporated in Department of Defense oversight plans 
governing all security contractors operating in Afghanistan, and other 
future contingency operations, under a contract or subcontract funded 
by the Department of Defense. The Secretary shall designate a single 
appropriate official stationed in the country of operations to review 
each security contract or subcontract involving security contractors 
funded by the Department of Defense for compliance with the Quality 
Assurance Surveillance Plan. Such official shall certify that the 
official has reviewed the oversight plan for that contract, that the 
oversight plan is appropriate for that contract, that there is an 
appropriate number of appropriately trained personnel available to 
oversee that contract, and confirm that any and all licenses and 
permits required by the security contractor and its employees have been 
reviewed and verified as current and authentic.
    (b) Deadline for Implementation.--These requirements under 
subsection (a) shall be implemented by not later than six months after 
the date of enactment of this Act.
    (c) Comptroller General Assessment.--The Comptroller General of the 
United States shall conduct an assessment the Department of Defense's 
compliance with this section and, not later than 6 months after the 
requirements of this section are implemented pursuant to subsection 
(b), shall submit to Congress a report on such assessment.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit
32








CERTIFICATION




By
signing below, each of the undersigned officers hereby certifies pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that, to his or her knowledge, (i) this report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and (ii) the information contained in this report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of River
Valley Bancorp.




Signed
this 15th day of May 2008.







/s/
      Matthew P. Forrester
            
            /s/
      Vickie L. GrimesMatthew
      P. Forrester
            
            Vickie
      L. GrimesPresident
      and Chief Executive Officer
            
            Vice
      President of Finance
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-31078

Summary Calendar

 

CLEVELAND DUCOTE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 95-CV-859

- - - - - - - - - -

August 13, 1998

Before WISDOM, DUHE’, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Cleveland Ducote appeals the district court’s dismissal of

his action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of the

denial of his application for a period of disability, disability

insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. Ducote

argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in failing

to find that his spinal compression fracture met one of the

impairments listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations, specifically

the impairment listed in § 1.05(b)(1). Ducote has not 
No. 97-31078

-2-

demonstrated that his impairment meets the requirements of that

section. See 20 C.F.R., Subpart P, Appendix 1, Part A 

§ 1.05; see also Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990).

Ducote next argues that the ALJ erred in failing to find he

was disabled by chronic back pain. The ALJ determined that

Ducote’s subjective complaints of pain were not borne out by the

medical evidence in the record. See Harper v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d

92, 96 (5th Cir. 1989). The ALJ’s assessment of Ducote’s

subjective complaints of pain is therefore supported by

substantial evidence. See Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292

(5th Cir. 1992). Moreover, the ALJ did not err in relying on

Ducote’s demeanor in assessing the credibility of his complaints

of pain. Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1990). 

The ALJ likewise did not err in relying exclusively on the

medical-vocational guidelines contained in § 201.24 of Appendix

2, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4 in reaching his decision that

Ducote was not disabled. See Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614,

618 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, because the ALJ’s conclusion is

supported by the substantial evidence and resulted from the

application of proper legal standards, the district court’s

decision to deny review and to dismiss Ducote’s complaint is

affirmed. See Bowling v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir.

1994).

AFFIRMED.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDG MENT

Nos. 04

- 13

- 00434

- CR & 04

- 13

- 00435

- CR

Troy Eugene DOVE

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 144th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 2013CR3631 & 2013CR3632

The Honorable Angus McGinty, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE STONE

, JUSTICE ANGELINI , AND JUSTICE MARION

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, these appeals are DISMISSED.

SIGNED September 18, 2013.

_________________________________ Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
EXHIBIT 23.1



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

We have issued our report dated February 27, 1998, accompanying the financial
statements included in the Annual Report of Dakotah, Incorporated on Form 10-K
for the year ended December 31, 1997. We hereby consent to the incorporation by
reference of said report in the Registration Statements of Dakotah, Incorporated
on Form S-8 (File No. 33-86868, effective November 24, 1994; File No. 33-334185,
effective August 22, 1997; File No. 33-334186, effective August 22, 1997 and
File No. 33-334187, effective August 22, 1997).


                                            GRANT THORNTON LLP

Minneapolis, Minnesota
February 27, 1998
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                        Consent of Independent Auditors

We consent to the incorporation be reference in the Registration Statements
(Form S-8 No. 33-42634) pertaining to the Employee Nonqualified Stock Option
Plan, (Form S-8 No.333-32961) pertaining to the Employee Nonqualified Stock
Option Plan,(Form S-8 No. 33-72614) pertaining to the Employee Stock Purchase
Plan, (Form S-8 No. 33-99164) pertaining to the SIG Holdings, Inc. 1992 Long
Term Incentive, (Form S-3 No. 33-77028) and in the related Prospectus pertaining
to the Shelf Registration of securities of Delphi Financial Group, Inc. of our
report dated February 9, 1998, with respect to the consolidated financial
statements and schedules of Delphi Financial Group, Inc. included in the Annual
Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 1997.

                                                            /s/ERNST & YOUNG LLP

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
March 12, 1998
<PAGE>

                                                                     Exhibit 24


                           POWER OF ATTORNEY

        Annual Report on Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended
                           December 31, 2001


The  undersigned  directors of the following  companies (each  respectively  the
"Company")

       Company                                      State of Incorporation

AEP Generating Company                                      Ohio
Appalachian Power Company                                 Virginia
Central Power and Light Company                            Texas
Columbus Southern Power Company                             Ohio
Kentucky Power Company                                    Kentucky
Ohio Power Company                                          Ohio
Public Service Company of Oklahoma                        Oklahoma
Southwestern Electric Power Company                       Delaware
West Texas Utilities Company                               Texas

do hereby constitute and appoint E. LINN DRAPER,  JR., ARMANDO A. PENA and SUSAN
TOMASKY,  and each of them, their  attorneys-in-fact  and agents, to execute for
them,  and in their names,  and in any and all of their  capacities,  the Annual
Report of the  Company on Form 10-K,  pursuant  to Section 13 of the  Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,  for the fiscal year ended  December 31, 2001, and any and
all  amendments  thereto,  and to file the same,  with all exhibits  thereto and
other  documents  in  connection  therewith,  with the  Securities  and Exchange
Commission,  granting unto said  attorneys-in-fact and agents, and each of them,
full power and  authority  to do and  perform  every act and thing  required  or
necessary to be done,  as fully to all intents and  purposes as the  undersigned
might or could do in  person,  hereby  ratifying  and  confirming  all that said
attorneys-in-fact  and agents,  or any of them,  may  lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue hereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,  the undersigned have signed these presents this 21st day of
February, 2002.

   /s/ E. Linn Draper, Jr.                     /s/ Thomas V. Shockley, III

   /s/ Henry W. Fayne                          /s/ Susan Tomasky

   /s/ Armando A. Pena                         /s/ J. H. Vipperman

   /s/ Robert P. Powers
exv10w11






EXHIBIT 10.11




AMENDMENT NO. 1

TO THE

SUPERIOR ENERGY

NONQUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN




     WHEREAS, Superior Energy Services, Inc. (the “Company”) adopted the Superior Energy
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plan (the “Plan”) effective September 1, 2004;



     WHEREAS, IRS Notice 2010-6 requires that the Plan be amended in 2010 to revise the delay of
payment provisions; and



     WHEREAS, Section 9.01 of the Plan states that the Company may amend the Plan;



     NOW THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended effective January 1, 2009, as follows:



I.




     Subsection (a) of Section 6.07, Delay of Payment, is amended and restated to read in
its entirety as follows:




	 	(a)	 	Delay Due to Financial Considerations. Any payment required to
be made on a date set forth under the terms of this Plan may be delayed if
payment on the originally scheduled date would jeopardize the ability of the
Company to continue as a going concern (in such case, payment will be made
during the first taxable year after such payment no longer would have such
effect).





     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Amendment No. One to the Plan is executed on the 30th day
of December, 2010.



	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

	WITNESSES:	 	 	 	SUPERIOR ENERGY SERVICES, INC.	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	/s/ A. Patrick Bernard
 


	 	 
	 	By:
	 	/s/ Danny R. Young
 

	 	 
	 

	 	 	 	Name:
	 	Danny R. Young
 

	 	 
	/s/ Danna Allo
 


	 	 	 	Title:	 	Executive Vice President
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

TYRELL BRAGG, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D17-2035 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed February 16, 2018. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Michelle Sisco, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Pamela H. Izakowitz, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, BLACK, and BADALAMENTI, JJ., Concur.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**WILLIAM GEORGE RABATIN,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 48 MM 2015** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 1st day of May, 2015, the Petition for Leave t o File a Petition for** 

**Allowance of Appeal** Nunc Pro Tunc **is** DENIED

**.**
**Exhibit
      32.2**




**CFO
      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**


**18
      U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**




In
      connection with the Annual Report of Emclaire Financial Corp. (the
“Corporation”) on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2006 as filed
      with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here (the “Report”), I,
      William C. Marsh, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer of the Corporation,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to
§ 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




1.
            The
                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
                of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
                and




2.
            The
                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
                respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
                Corporation.




/s/William
      C. Marsh


William
      C.
      Marsh


Executive
      Vice President


Chief
      Financial Officer


Treasurer


March
      23,
      2007
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-40564 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus RAMON LUIS GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 4:94-CR-24-3

- - - - - - - - - - February 10, 1998 Before SMITH, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Ramon Luis Garcia appeals his sentence for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute crack cocaine. Garcia argues that the district court’s findings of fact and its reliance on the presentence report (PSR), which the court adopted, fail to comply with the requirements for attributing a drug quantity to a defendant in a drug conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a). He also argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that Garcia was a minor participant, not a minimalNo. 97-40564 -2- participant, pursuant to § 3B1.2. We have carefully reviewed the record and the appellate briefs. We conclude that the district court’s findings, concerning the drug quantity for which Garcia is held accountable, are adequate. See United States v. Castillo , 77 F.3d 1480, 1495 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 180 (1996). The court’s finding as to Garcia’s role in the offense was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Gaytan , 74 F.3d 545, 561 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 77 (1996).
AFFIRMED.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997             DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997             JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                      12,518,269              12,518,269
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                               10,799,468              10,779,468
<ALLOWANCES>                                   317,000                 317,000
<INVENTORY>                                    720,616                 720,616
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            35,392,692              35,392,692
<PP&E>                                      47,116,110              47,116,110
<DEPRECIATION>                              21,616,432              21,616,432
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             255,912,110             255,912,110
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       21,197,763              21,197,763
<BONDS>                                     81,784,650              81,784,650
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                      105,312,500             105,312,500
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                        98,407                  98,407
<OTHER-SE>                                  43,310,892              43,310,892
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               255,912,110             255,912,110
<SALES>                                     19,778,392              35,609,564
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            19,778,392              35,609,564
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               19,891,455              36,088,560
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                50,270             (4,902,908)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,869,286               6,023,752
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,032,619)             (1,599,840)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    50,000                  50,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,082,619)             (1,649,840)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,082,619)             (1,649,840)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.64)                  (0.71)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.64)                  (0.71)
        


</TABLE>
RATIFICATION

ARTICLE VII

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be

sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the

States so ratifying the Same.

IN GENERAL

In Owings v. Speed 1 the question at issue was whether the Constitution operated upon an act of Virginia passed in 1788. The Court

held it did not, stating in part:

“The Conventions of nine States having adopted the Constitution, Congress, in September or October, 1788, passed a resolution

in conformity with the opinions expressed by the Convention, and

appointed the first Wednesday in March of the ensuing year as the

day, and the then seat of Congress as the place, ‘for commencing

proceedings under the Constitution.’ ”

“Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same

time. The New Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is apparent that the government did not commence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth State; for these

ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who were requested

to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the

new Government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to

act as a Government until it dissolved on the 1st of November, by

the successive disappearance of its Members. It existed potentially

until the 2d of March, the day proceeding that on which the Members of the new Congress were directed to assemble.”

“The resolution of the Convention might originally have suggested a doubt, whether the government could be in operation for

every purpose before the choice of a President; but this doubt has

been long solved, and were it otherwise, its discussion would be useless, since it is apparent that its operation did not commence before the first Wednesday in March 1789 . . . .”

1 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420, 422–23 (1820).

1051