This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 4 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15
- 0331 State of Minnesota, Respondent,

vs. Michael Donovan Krauss, Appellant. Filed February 1 , 2016 Affirmed Kirk , Judge
Mower County District Court File No. 5 0

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- 3 60 Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Karen B. Andrews, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Kristen Nelsen, Mower County Attorney, Austin, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Considered and decided by Kirk , Presiding Judge; Stauber , Judge; and Kalitowski , Judge

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 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.2 U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
KIRK , Judge Appellant challenges his convictions of ineligible person in possession of a firearm and fifth

- degree possession of a controlled substance, arguing that the district court erred by declining to suppress evidence because his arrest was unlawful. We affirm. FACTS On February 15, 2013, a Mower County deputy stopped a Cadillac driving south on Highway 218 near Austin for speeding . Appellant Michael Donovan Krauss was driving and B.S. was in the front passenger seat

. T he deputy ran the Cadillac ’s license plate and learned that it was registered to C.B.
He then approached the Cadillac , where appellant identified hi mself by name and date of birth, but was unable to produce his driver’s license or proof of insurance. Appellant explained to the deputy that he recently purchased the Cadillac from C.B. and that he thought that the vehicle was insured

. Although appellant told th e deputy that he had a handwritten receipt confirming the purchase of the Cadillac , he was unable to locate it

. Appellant also told the deputy t hat once they were free to leave, B.S. would drive. When the deputy asked where he was from, a ppellant stated that he was originally from California but that he currently resides in Michigan. He did not provide an explanation for being in the Austin area . The deputy testified at the omnibus hearing that the Cadillac contained “a lot of stuff,” including multiple suitcases, garment bags, and personal electronics.3

The deputy ran the names of both appellant and B.S. and learned that neither of them ha d a Minnesota driver’s license and that B.S.’s California license was revoked

. The deputy then placed appellant under arrest for driving without a license, no proof of insurance, and speeding , and placed him in the back of his squad vehicle . The deputy

t estified that he placed appellant under arrest because “[t]he [Cadillac] was packed like they were moving,” “[t]hey were heading south away from Austin,” and that he wanted to “hold him for bail to ensure a court appearance.”
T he deputy returned to the C adillac to advise B.S. that she would not be allowed to drive the vehicle. T he deputy testified that when she rolled down her window he observe d “a moderate odor of marijuana

. ” The deputy asked B.S. if she knew of any marijuana in the vehicle and she res ponded that there were “ some marijuana cigarette roaches in the ashtray. ” The deputy did not see any roaches from where he was standing, but he di d see “a green, leafy substance, ” that he recognized as marijuana located in the carpet and o n the

center con sole

. The deputy placed B.S. in the back of a squad vehicle and began to search the Cadillac

. He found a gallon

- size bag containing a considerable amount of marijuana in the glove box

. T he deputy had the vehicle towed back to the law enforcement center because of the cold weather

. During an inventory search, he also discovered a pistol in the trunk. Appellant was charged with ineligible person in possession of a firearm and fifth

degree possession of a contro lled substance. Appellant filed three separate motions to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle and all three were denied by the district court

. A jury trial was held. At trial, the deputy testified about the discover y of the pistol and the4

marijua na , and B.S. testified that the pistol and marijuana belonged to appellant . The jury found appellant guilty of both counts . This appeal follows. D E C I S I O N
In reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we review t he court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and its legal determinations de novo

. Stat e v. Ortega , 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). “We may independently review facts that are not in dispute and determine, as a matter of law, whether the evidence need be suppressed.” Id. (citation omitted )

. Appellant’s argument for suppression hinges on his contention that his arrest was impermissible under M inn. R. Crim. P. 6.01, which provides:

Subd. 1. Mandatory Citation Issuance in Misdemeanor Cases. (a) By Arresting Officer

. In misdemeanor cases, peace officers who decide to proceed with prosecution and who act without a warrant must issue a citation and release the defendant unless it reasonably appears: (1) the person must be detained to prevent bodily injury to that person or another; (2) further criminal conduct will occur; or (3) a substantial likelihood exists that the person will not respond to the citation. In denying appellant’s motion, the district court concluded that subparts 2 and 3 of the rule were satisfied because arresting appellant “ ensured he would respond to the citation and prevented further criminal conduct of unlawful traffic violat ions.” We agree. First, it was reasonable for the deputy to conclude that an arrest was n ecessary to prevent further criminal conduct. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.01, subd. 1(a)(2). The deputy testified that a ppellant was unable to produce a driver’s licens e or proof of insurance and5

that B.S.’s California license was revoked. He also testified that , despite telling B.S. that she could contact C.B. and having dispatch attempt to locate C.B.’s phone number, he was
unable to determine if the Cadillac was insu red. Therefore, had the deputy cited and released appellant , appellant or B.S. would likely have operated the Cadillac without a valid driver’s license and proof of insurance

. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169.791, subd. 2(a) (stating “[e]very driver shall have in possession at all times when operating a vehicle . . . proof of insurance . . . covering the vehicle being operated ” ), 171.08 (stating “[ e ] very l icensee shall have [ the ir driver’s] license in immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle ”), and 171.24, subd. 2 (2012) (stating it is a misdemeanor for an individual to operate a motor vehicle while the person’s license is revoked). Appellant argues that “while neither [appellant] nor [B.S.] had a driver’s license,
the record does not concl usively show that they could not have called someone to come meet them and drive the [Cadillac] .” But t his argument fails because even if someone with a valid driver’s license came to drive the Cadillac , th at individual would still be operating the vehicl e without proof of insurance. See Minn. Stat. § 169.791, subd. 2(a).
S econd, it was reasonable for the deputy to conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that appellant would not respond to the citation s . See Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.01, subd. 1(a)(3)

. The deputy testified that when he stopped appellant he was traveling south on Highway 218 , away from Austin , and that there were multiple suitcases, garment bags, and personal electronics in the vehicle. He also testified that appellant stated that he was from California and Michigan and did not provide an explanation for why he was in the Austin area

. Further, appellant was driving a Cadillac registered to another person, and he6

could not prove that the vehicle was lawfully in his posse ssion. The refore, it was reasonable for the deputy to arrest appellant to ensure he would respond to the citation s . Appellant argues that his case is unlike Carradine v. State because there “was no evidence where [appellant] was going generally, or whether he was actually leaving the state specifically.” 494 N.W.2 d 77, 83 (Minn. App. 1992) (concluding that a “reasonably competent law enforcement officer” could believe that there was a substantial likelihood that an individual would fail to respond to a citation w here the record demonstrated that the individual and his traveling companion were not Minnesota residents and that the individual was driving at a high rate of speed toward the airport), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds , 511 N.W.2d 733 (Minn. 1994 ) . This argument is not persuasive. The deputy did not need to know definitively where appellant was going or that he was leaving the state in order to make a valid arrest. Minn

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. 6.01 only requires that it “reasonably appear” that a subs tantial likelihood exists that the person will not respond to the citation. Further, the other cases appellant relies on are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case . In State v. Varn a do , the supreme court noted that “[t]he record is absent of facts supporting a belief that a custodial arrest was necessary to prevent Varnado from hurting someone or to ensure that she would respond to a citation.” 582 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1998). In In re Welfare of M.D.B. , the of ficer “did not testify that he had reason to believe that securing appellant was necessary to prevent injury or that there was a substantial likelihood that appellant would fail to respond to a citation.” 601 N.W.2d 214, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Jan. 18, 2000). Here, the record contain s7

ample facts supporting a belief that custodial arrest was necessary to ensure appellant would respond to the citation s , including the deputy’s testimony that he had a reason to believe that there was a substantial likelihood that appellant would fail to respond to the citation s . In sum, the district court did not err by concluding that appellant’s arrest was permissible under Minn

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. 6.01 and by denying his motion s to suppress. Affirmed.