NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JORGE ALVARENGA-RIVERA, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 18-71895

Agency No. 200-958-972

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an 

Immigration Judge’s Decision, 

Agency No. 200-958-972

Submitted March 3, 2020**

Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,***

District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Dana L. Christensen, United States Chief District 

Judge for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

FILED

MAR 9 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Jorge Alvarenga-Rivera challenges the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) negative 

reasonable fear determination after reinstatement of his 2016 order of removal. 8 

U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), (b)(3); 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.8(e), 1241.8(e). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (5). See Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 1017–18

(9th Cir. 2017). We deny his petition.

1. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination that AlvarengaRivera is not eligible for withholding of removal because he did not demonstrate 

that he fears harm upon return to Honduras based on a protected ground. 

Alvarenga-Rivera’s testimony that he was targeted by MS-13 for resisting their 

recruitment efforts is not an imputed political opinion. See, e.g., Ramos-Lopez v. 

Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds 

by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013). Alvarenga-Rivera’s 

testimony that gang members watched him walk to church and attacked two of his 

cousins does not compel us to conclude that the IJ erred in finding no evidence that 

MS-13 targeted Alvarenga-Rivera because of his religious beliefs or family/kinship 

ties. 

2. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s decision that Alvarenga-Rivera is 

not eligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture because he failed to 

show the government’s acquiescence to gang violence in the region. AlvarengaRivera’s testimony that local police are reluctant to investigate gang-related crimes 
3 

out of fear for their safety does not indicate police corruption; it shows the police 

are “aware of torture but powerless to stop it.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 

1026, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 413 

(8th Cir. 2007)). We also reject Alvarenga-Rivera’s argument that the IJ should 

have taken judicial notice of the U.S. Department of State’s Country Report for 

Honduras, as he never referenced or submitted that report to the IJ. Cf. AguilarRamos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the BIA’s failure 

to consider country-condition evidence that was “included in the record without 

objection” is reversible error).

3. Reviewing de novo, Perez-Lastor v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d 773, 777 (9th Cir. 

2000), Alvarenga-Rivera’s due process claim fails. Even assuming that the 

framework set forth in Matter of M-A-M, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (BIA 2011) applies 

in reasonable-fear review proceedings, the record does not present indicia of 

mental incompetence. During his interview, at which he was represented by 

counsel, Alvarenga-Rivera experienced “health-related complaints . . . and poor 

memory[,]” neither of which impeded his “rational and factual understanding of 

the nature and object of the proceedings,” id. at 477–79, or otherwise violated his 

right to due process.

Alvarenga-Rivera’s petition is therefore DENIED.