Filed 4/17/17 (unmodified opn. attached) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL O F THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLYDELL BRYANT

,
Defendant and Appellant. B271300

(Los Angele s County Super. Ct. No. GA094777 )

ORDER MODIFYING THE OPINION (NO CHANGE IN THE JUDGMENT)

THE COURT:
On the court‟s own motion, the opinion filed in the
above

- entitled matter on April 3, 2017 , shall be mod ified in the following manner : On page 8, the text of footnote 5 is deleted and replaced with the following paragraph :
Our Supreme Court has granted review in In re Ricardo P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923. That case presents the following issue: Did the trial court err by imposing an electronics search condition on the juvenile as a condition of his probation when that condition had

no relationship to the crimes he committed but was justified on appeal as reasonably related to future crimi nality under Olguin

,2

supra , 45 Cal.4th 375 because it would facilitate the juvenile‟s supervision?

This modification does not constitute a change in the judgment.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLI CATION

.

________________________________________ ____________________ ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY , J. JOHNSON , J.Filed 4/3/17 (unmodified version) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL O F THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLYDELL BRYANT,

Defendant and Appellant. B271300

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. GA094777 )

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Villalobos , Judge. Affirmed with
directions. David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant

. Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorney s General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E.
Winte rs, Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, and Andrew S. Pruitt, Deputy Attorney s General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______ ________2 A jury convicted Clydell Bryant of possessing a concealed, loaded, unregistered firearm in a vehicle. The court imposed

a two

- year sentence, a portion of which was to be served
under mandatory supervision. During the period of mandatory supervi sion, the court required Bryant to submit to searches
of text messages, emails, and photographs on any cellular phone

or other electronic device in his possession or residence . He contends that the requirement is invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal .3d 481, 486 ( Lent ) and is unconstitutionally
overbroad

. We agree that the condition is invalid under Lent and, accordingly, strike the condition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On a night in August 2014, Pasadena police officers responded to a call for service outside a housing complex where a group of individuals were drinking and refusing to leave the area. Bryant and his girlfriend, Lamaine Jones , were smoking marijuana in a parked car in the area. Jones sat in the driver‟s seat and Bryant in the p assenger seat. The car belonged to Jones‟s mother. A Pasadena police officer approached the driver‟s side of the car and smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the car. The officer asked Jones and Bryant to step out of the car so he could
check for marijuana. Jones and Bryant complied. The police officer searched the car and found a
semi

- automatic .45 caliber Hi

- Point handgun under the front passenger seat. According to the officer, the gun was accessible to a person in the passenger seat, but not the driver‟s seat. There were nine bullets in the gun‟ s magazine. The police later determined that the gun was not registered. Bryant‟s DNA matched DNA found on the gun‟s magazine. DNA from several persons found

on the gun‟s handle could not be ma tched to any specific person.3 A jury convicted Bryant of ca rrying a concealed firearm
in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(1)), 1 and found that
the firearm was loaded and not registered to him

. (§ 25400
, subds. (a) & (c)(6).)
The court sentenced Bryant to two year s in county jail pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h), and suspended the
last 364 days of the term. During the time the sentence was suspended, Bryant would be subject to ma ndatory supervision by the county probation department purs uant to section 1170, subdivision (h)(5)(B). Over Bryant‟s objection, the court required that, during the term of his mandatory supervision, Bryant submit to search es of text messages and emails on any cellular phone or other electronic device in his poss ession or residence. In response to defendant‟s objection to the requirement, the court explained: “ Well, it seems to me that while he‟s on either probation or supervision, the probation
office r could go in and search his residence and his person and he could look in the residence for any indicia of any violations either

weap ons or contraband, or he or she c ould look for evidence that
the defendant is participating or associating with any gangs. [¶]
It seems to me that a part of that search should inclu de, while he‟s on supervision or probation, access to a ny computer that he uses
in the home or h is cell [] phone; however, I don‟t think it‟s unlimited access, and I would limit it to maybe his text messages and e

- mails and nothing else.” At the prosecutor‟s request and over defendant‟s further objection, the court added photographs to the items subject to search on Bryant‟s electronic devices, explaining that this was

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.4

“ reasonable because I think prior experiences have shown there may be evidence with the pho tographs. ” 2

DISCUSSION
The court sentenced Bryant pursuant to subdivision (h)
of s ection 1170 . Under that statute

, the court has discretion “to impose a hybrid or split sentence consisting of county jail followed by a period of mandatory supervision.” ( P eople v. Catalan (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 173, 178, citing § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).) During the period of mandatory supervision, “the defendant shall be supervised by the county probation officer in accordance with
the terms, conditions, and procedures gene rally applicable to

persons placed on probation .” (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).) Although mandatory supervision is comparable in some ways to probation,
it is not identical. (See People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
759 , 762

- 763.) A defendant who is o ffered probation, for example, may refuse probation if he “ „finds the conditions of probation more
onerous than the sentence he would otherwise face.‟ ” ( People v.
Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403 ). In contrast to a defendant
who is given probation, howe ver, a defendant may not refuse mandatory supervision. ( People v. Rahbari (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 185, 194

- 195 .) Accordingly, the court did not ask Bryant whether he would accept the court‟s terms of his mandatory supervision.

2 T he court expressed the electronic search condition in a minute order as follows: “Defendant is to submit to search of any electronic device either in his possession including cell phone and/or any device in his place of residence. Any search by probation is limited to defendant[‟]s text messages, emails, and photos on su ch devices.” (Capitalization omitted.)5 Courts generally have “ broad di scretion in fashioning terms
of supervised release, in order to foster the reformation and rehabilitation of the offender, while protecting public safety. ” ( People v. Martinez

, supra , 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 764 .) Under a

test announced in Lent

, supra , 15 Cal.3d 481 , however, a court abuses its discretion when it imposes a term or condition that

“ „(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal,
and (3) requires or forbids co nduct which is not reasonably
related to future criminality . . . .‟ [Citation.] ” ( Id . at p. 486;

see People v. Martinez

, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 764 [applying
Lent test to mandatory supervision terms] ; People v. Relkin (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 1188, 11 94 [same].) “This test is conjunctive

— all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will
invalidate a

. . . term.” ( People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 ( Olguin ); In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754 .) 3

3 The Attorney General contends that Bryant waived his Lent claim by failing to object in the trial court. We disagree. Bryant‟s counsel objected to the condit ion, stating that the facts “do not suggest that any c riminal c onduct involving a cell [ ] phone

or electr [on]ic device has been com mitted,” and that there has
not been “a proper showing of the need to impose this term of probation.” T his was s ufficient to preserve the issue on appeal

.6 The Attorney General doe s not dispute that the electronic
search condition fails the first two Lent prongs

— the condition has no relationship to Bryant‟s crime and the use of electronic devices “is not itself criminal.” (See In re Erica R

. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 913; In re J

.B.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 754

- 755 .) The issue, therefore, is whether the electronic search condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality. Our Supreme Court discussed the future criminality prong
in Olguin

, supra , 45 Cal.4th 37 5 , a case the Attorney General contends is “dispositive” here. In Olguin , our Supreme Court held that a probation condition that required the defendant to notify
his probation officer of the presence of any pets at the defendant‟s
residence was “reasonabl y related t o future criminality because
it serve [d] to inform and protect a probation officer charged with supervising a probationer‟s complia nce with specific conditions
of probation. ” ( Id. at p. 381.) “Animals,” the Court explained,
“can be unpredictab le and potentia lly dangerous when faced
with a stranger in their territory, and some pose a great or even
life

- threatening hazard to persons in these circumstances. Being informed at all times of the pets that are present at a probationer‟s
residence thus reduces the possible threat to the probation officer‟s safety by enabling the officer to be aware of, and prepared for, situations that may ari se should the officer choose to conduct an
unscheduled „ compliance visit ‟ to the probationer at his or her
resid ence. ” ( Ibid. , fn. omitted. ) “Probation officer safety during these visits and searches is essential to the effective supervision of the probationer and th us assists in preventing future criminality. ” ( Ibid. ) The Court further explained that the defend ant failed

to demonstrate that the condition infringed or impaired any constitutional right, and reasoned that reporting the presence of7

pets “is a simple task” and “imposes no undue hardship or burden” on the probationer. ( Id. at pp. 382, 384

- 387.)
The A ttorney General contends that Bryant‟s electronic search condition, like the pet notification condition in Olguin

, facilitates the probation officer‟s ability to supervise the
defendant and determine whether the defendant is complying
with other terms of p robation. 4 (See Olguin

, supra , 45 Cal.4th

at pp. 380

- 381.) Unlike the pet notification condition in Olguin

, however, a search of a defendant‟s cellular phone and other electronic devices implicates a defendant‟s constitutional rights. (See People v. App leton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 ( Appleton );
see also Riley v. California (2014)

___ U.S. ___, ___ [134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489] [Fourth Amendment applies to search of information

on cellular phone]; People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827, 832 [a “ probatio ner has the right to enjoy a significant degree of privacy, or liberty, under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the federal Constitution ”], disapproved on other grounds in People
v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237 .) In contrast to information about a defendant‟s pets, a cellular phone search could potentially reveal “ a digital record of nearly ev ery aspect of [its owner‟s life]

— from the mundane to the intimate” ( Riley v. California

, supra , 134 S.Ct. at p. 2490) , including “vast amounts of pers onal
information unrelated to defendant‟s criminal conduct or his potential for future criminality” ( Appleton

, supra , 245 Cal.App.4th

4 In addition to the e lectronic search condition and other terms, the court ordered Bryant not to associate with persons known by him to be drug users or criminal street gang members or associates, and to stay away from the place of his arrest and places where he knows drug use rs or gang members and associates congregate.8

at p

. 727). Olguin , therefore, does not resolve the question presented here, and the “ fact that a search condition would facilitate general oversight of the individual‟s activities is insufficient to justify an open

- ended search condition permitting
review of all information contained or accessible on the [individual‟s] smart phone or other electronic devices. ” ( In re J.B.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 758; but see In re P.O. (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 288, 295

- 296 [electronic search condition was permissible under Olguin ].) 5 Whether an electronic search condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality depends up on on the facts and circumstances in each case. (See In re J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 795, 802 ( J.E. ), review granted Oct. 22, 2016, S236628 ; People v.
Burton (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 382, 391 ; In re Martinez (1978)
86 Cal.App.3d 577, 584.) Most published de cisions addressing
such conditions in California involve juvenile probation conditions. (See, e.g., In re J.E.

, supra , 1 Cal.App.5th 795 ; In re P.O.

, supra , 246 Cal.App.4th 288; In re J.B.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th 749 ; In re Erica R.

, supra , 240 Cal.App.4t h 907; People v. Ebertowski (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170 ( Ebertowski ). Although these cases are instructive, consideration of them must take into account the
fact that “ „ “ the power of the state to control the con duct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults. ” ‟ [Citation.]

5 Our Supreme Court has granted review in In re Ricardo P. (2016) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923

, to consider the following issue: “ Did t he trial court err by imposing

an „ electro nics search condition ‟ on the juvenile as a condition of his probation when that condition had no relationship to the crimes he committed but was justified on appeal as reasonably related to future criminality under [ Olguin

, supra ,] 45 Cal.4th 375 because it would facilitate the juvenile‟s supervision? ”9

This is because juveniles are deemed to be „ more in need of guidance and supervision t han adults, and because a minor‟s constitutional rights are more circumscribed. ‟ [Citation.] ” ( In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910 ; see also In re Antonio R. (2000)
78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 ; In re P.O.

, supra , 246 Cal.App.4th

at p. 296 .) Thus, a probation condition that would be reasonable and permissible for a minor under juvenile court supervision

may “ „ be un constitution al or otherwise improper for an adult probationer .‟ ” ( In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889 ; accord
In re Malik (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901.) 6
In In re Erica R

. , supra , 240 Cal.App.4th 907, the juvenile
court declared a minor a ward of the court based on her unlawful possession of the drug Ecstacy. ( Id. at p. 910.) The court placed
her on probation with a condition that she submit to “ „a search of

any containers [she] may have or own, [her] vehicle, residence, or electronics day or night at the request of a Probation Officer or peace officer.‟ ” ( I

bi d .) The court also required the minor turn over her passwords to her probation officer. ( Ibid .) The Court of Appeal

6 Two cases involving electronic search conditions imposed

on adult probationers are inapposite . In Appleton

, supra , 245 Cal.App.4th 717, the court found that the electronic search condition satisfied the first prong of Lent

— that the condition was related to the defendant‟s crime

— because the defendant had met his sexual assault victim through “a social medial application for smartphones.” ( Id. at p p

. 719, 724.) The court did not consider, therefore, the t hird prong that concerns us here. In People v. Smith ( 2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 977 [2017 D.A.R. 1519]

, the defendant used a cell ular phone to arrange the illegal drug transaction for which he was convicted . It was thus

“ imperative that his cell phone use be monitored by the probation of ficer to ensure that he was not violating his probation by engaging in drug trafficking. ” ( Id. at p. 1522. )10

held that the probation condition was invalid under Lent

, stating: “ There is nothing in this record regarding either the
current offense or [the minor‟s] socia l history that connects her

use of electronic devices or social media to illegal drugs. In fact,
the record is wholly silent about [the minor‟s] usage of electro nic
devices or social media. Accordingly, „ [b]ecause ther e is nothing
in [ the minor‟s ] past or current offenses or [her] personal history
that demonstrates a predisposition ‟ to utilize electronic devices

or social media in connection with criminal activit y, „ th ere is no

reason to believe the current restriction will serve the rehabilitative function of precluding [ the minor ] from any future criminal acts. ‟ ” ( Id. at p. 913. )
In re Erica R. was followed in In re J.B.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th 749. In In re J.B. , the minor committed petty
theft. ( Id. at p. 752.) The court imposed a condition of probation requiring the minor “to submit to a search of „[his] electronics including [his] passwords.‟ ” ( Ibid. ) In rejecting the minor‟s motion
to delete the con dition, the trial court explained that the minor admitted to using marijuana for more than two years, and that

“ „minors do use the Internet to buy and sell . . . drugs,‟ ” and to

“ „brag about their drug use, showing themselves puffing marijuana, showing themselves with drug paraphernalia and, of course, with

weapons and those other types of improper probation activities.‟ ” ( Id. at p. 753.) The search condition would not only deter the minor from committing crimes, but also allow the probation officer “ to monitor [the minor] as part of the probation terms and conditions.” ( Ibid. ) The court further noted that the minor had played with his cellular phone during an interview with his mother and a probation officer, and refused his mother‟s request to put it away. ( Ibid. )

“ „Clearly,‟ ” the court stated, the minor is “ „ very closely connected11

with the use of his cell phone, which is disrespectful, not paying attention, and this connection makes it even more important that the probation officer be able to monito r what he was doing on
his cell phone, what ‟ s he doing on his cell phone in an interview,
what ‟ s he doing on the cell phone in social media when he ‟s not going to school, what ‟ s he doing with regard to the offenses he may be committing, what ‟ s he doi ng with

. . . regards to the drugs he

may [] be trying to purchase, sell or use. ‟ ” ( Ibid. )
In In re J.B. , the Attorney General made an argument
similar to the argument asserted here

— that the electronic search
condition wa s reasonably related to future cri minality because
“it was „ designed to help probation officers monitor other probation conditions prohibiting drinking alcohol or taking drugs and requiring [minor] to stay away from the coparticipant with whom
he committed the theft, avoid those un der the influence of an illegal

or intoxicating substance, attend school, and obey parents. ‟ ” ( In re J.B.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 755.) The condition, the Attorney General argued, was thus “ no different from any other
search condition to which the minor i s subject. ” ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal, relying on In re Erica R. , rejected the Attorney General‟s argument, and held that the search condition was invalid under
Lent because there was “no showing of any connection between the
minor‟s use of electronic devices and his past or potential future criminal activity.” ( In re J.B.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 756.)12 Like the minors in In re Erica R. and In re J.B. , there is no showing of any connection between Bryant‟s use of a cellular phone and criminality , past or future. Bryant was convicted of possessing
a conceale d weapon in a vehicle. No cellular phone or electronic
device was involved in the crime and there is no evidence that Bryant would use such devices to engage in future criminal activity. (Se e In re Erica R.

, supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.)
Nor was there any showing as to how the search condition
would reasonably prevent any future crime or aid in Bryant‟s rehabilitation. Although it is conc eivable that future searches of Bryant‟s cell ula r phone might yield information concerning criminal activity, “[n]ot every probation condition bearing a remote, attenuated, tangential, or diaphanous connection to future criminal conduct can be considered reasonable.” ( People v. Brand ã o (2012)
210 Cal.A pp.4th 568, 574.) The fact that a search of Bryant‟s
cellular phone records might aid a probation officer in ascertaining Bryant‟s compliance with other conditions of supervision is, without more, an insufficient rationale to justify the impairment of Bry ant‟s constitutionally protected interest in privacy. (See In re J.B.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 758.) As in In re Erica R. and In re J.B. , in
the absenc e of facts demonstrating “ „ “a predisposition” to utilize
electronic devices

. . . in connection wi th criminal activity, “there is no reason to believe the cur rent restriction will serve
the rehabilitative function of precluding [ the defendant] from

any future criminal acts.” ‟ ” ( In re J.B.

, supra , 242 Cal.App.4th

at p. 755 , quoting In re Erica R.

, supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.)13 The Attorney General, however, relies on Ebertowski

, supra , 228 Cal.App.4th 1170
, and In re J. E

. , supra , 1 Cal.App.5th 795

. In Ebertowski , t he minor was a gang member who brandished a weapon, told an arresting “officer t hat he was „ “[f]ucking with
the wrong gangster,” ‟ ” and repeatedly threatened the officer
and the officer‟s family. ( Ebertowski

, supra , 228 Cal.App.4th

at pp. 1172

- 1173.) T he minor pleaded no contest to making criminal threats and resisting or deterrin g an officer, and admitted a gang allegation. The prosecution requested that the court impose probation conditions requiring the defendant submit to a search
of electronic devices within his cus tody or control and provide
his passwords to the devices and any social media websites. ( Id

. at p. 1172.) The prosecutor explained that these conditions should be imposed because “ „the defendant has used social media sites historically to promote the Seven Trees Norteno criminal street gang.‟ ” ( Id. at p. 1173.) The conditions were also a “ „means to effectuate the already existing warrantless search condition.‟ ” ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal upheld the probation conditions, explaining that the “conditions were related to [the defendant‟s] crimes, which were p lainly gang rel ated because they were designed to allow the probation officer to monitor defendant‟s gang
associations and activities. Defend ant‟s association with his

gang was also necessarily related to his future criminality. His
association with his gang gave him the bravado to threaten and resist armed police officers. The only way that defendant could be allowed to remain in the community on probation without posing

an extreme risk to public safety was to closely monitor his gang
associations and a ctivities. The password conditions permitted the14

probation officer to do so.” ( Ebertowski

, supra , 228 Cal.App.4th

at pp. 1176

- 1177.)
In In re J. E

. , supra , 1 Cal.App.5th 795, 7 the Court of Appeal
relied on Ebertowski in upholding an electronic search con dition, and distinguished In re Erica R. and In re J.B. , stating that the minor in the case before it had “deep

- seated issues with drugs,” “struggle[d] with school attendance and grades,” had been suspended and reprimanded for behavioral issues, brought a weapon to school, had gang graffiti in his locker and a prior
association with Norteños gang members , and an “unstable home
life.” ( I d . at p. 802

. ) These facts, the court explained, “support
the juvenile court‟s conclusion that the electronic search cond ition would „ “ serve the rehabilitative function of prec luding [Minor] from any future criminal acts. ” ‟ ” ( Ibid. , quoting In re Erica R.

, supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913. )
Ebert owski and In re J.E. are distinguishable. There is no evidence that Bryant, unlike the minor in Ebertowski , used any electronic device to promote gang activity. And In re J.E. involved

a minor who “had a constellation of issues requiring intensive supervision,” including a “ „pretty deep drug issue.‟ ” ( In re J.E.,

supra , 1 Cal .App.5th at p. 801.) The electronic search condition was
considered “ „ critical ‟ for Minor‟s rehabilitation” by allowing the probation officer to “ „monitor the purchase, or sales, [or] usage‟ of drugs.” ( Ibid. ) Here, although Bryant had been smoking m arijuana in a car, there is nothing to suggest that his phone must be monitored for drug sales, as in In re J.E. Moreover, because

7 The Supreme Court granted review of In re J.E. and deferred briefing pending its review of In re Ricardo P.

, supra , 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review grante d Feb. 17, 2016, S230923. (See fn. 5
, ante .)15

Bryant is an adult, the justification for state supervision of his personal drug use is weaker than in the case of minors, a nd his constitutionally protected interest in his privacy is greater

. (See, e.g., In re Antonio R.

, supra , 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 941 .) For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the electronic
search is invalid under Lent

. Bryant also contends that the
electronic search condition is unconstitutionally overbroad.
B ecause we hold that the condition is invalid under Lent , we do not
reach the se issue s

. 8

8 Under an overbreadth challenge, if a probation condition limits the defendant‟s constitutional rights, it must be closely tailored to the purpos e of the condition

— i.e., the defendant‟s reformation and rehabilitation

— to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. (See Olguin

, supra , 45 Cal.4th
at p. 384; In re J.E.

, supra , 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 803.) In In re P.O.

, supra , 246 C al.App.4t h 288, for example, an electronic search condition that survived a Lent challenge was unconstitutionally overbroad because “it permit[ted] review of all sorts of private information that is highly unlikely to shed any light on whether [the minor was] compl ying with the other conditions of his probation.” ( Id. at p. 298.) Courts that determine tha t a condition is overbroad will generally modify the condition t o tailor it more closely
to the purpose of the condition (see, e.g., In re P.O.

, supra , 246 Cal.A pp.4th at pp. 299

- 300; In re Malik

, supra , 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 906), or strike the condition and direct the trial court to fashion a new cond ition consistent with the Court of Appeal‟ s views (see, e.g., Appleton, supra

, 2 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 728

- 729 )

.16 DISPOSITION The terms of Bryant‟s mandatory supervision that he submit to searches of his cellular p hone or other electronic device s is
stricken. The trial court is ordered to file a minute order reflecting the striking of this term and forward a copy of the order to the
Los Angeles County Probation Department

. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

CERT IFIED FOR PUBLICATION

.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

CHANEY, J.

JOHNSON, J.