# J!n tbe Wniteb $>tates QCourt of jf 

# eberal QClaims No. 17-1598 C Filed: April 6, 2018 

### **************************************** 

## * DIANE DANIELS, 

### * * Plaintiff,prose, 

### * * v. 

### * * THE UNITED STATES, 

### * * Defendant. 

### * * **************************************** DianeDaniels, San Diego, California,prose. 

# FILED APR - 

## 62018 U

.S

. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS



### EricE. Laufgraben, United States Department ofJustice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., Counsel for the Government. MEMORANDUM OPINIONAND FINAL ORDERGRANTING THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTIONTO DISMISS BRADEN, Chief Judge. I. RELEVANTFACTUALBACKGROUND.1 On June 30, 1999, Dianne Daniels and Ellington Daniels executed a security instrument identified as a Deed ofTrust to purchase real property, located at 6391 Media Street, San Diego, California (the "Property"). Compl.**~** 16; Compl. Ex. A at 1-7. The Deed ofTrust stated that ComUnity Lending, Inc. agreed to lend $175,440 to Mr. and Mrs. Daniels, in exchange for a security interest in the Property. Compl. Ex. A at 2. On July 2, 1999, the San Diego County Recorder's Office recorded the June 30, 1999 Deed ofTrust. Compl. Ex. A at 1

- 2.

1 The relevant facts were derived from the October 23, 2017 Complaint ("Compl.") and attached Exhibits ("Compl. Ex. A

- I").



### 7016 3010 DODD 4308 4577OnFebruary23, 2015, Mr. Daniels executedaHomesteadDeclaration,2 withthe SanDiego County Recorder's Office, that represented that the Property was owned injoint tenancy by Mr. and Mrs. Daniels. Comp!. Ex. D at 1. On June 2, 2016, Mrs. Daniels filed a Substitution OfTrustee And Full Reconveyance in the Superior Court ofLamar County, Georgia. Comp!. Ex.Bat 2. The June 2, 2016 Substitution OfTrustee And Full Reconveyance stated that Mrs. Daniels "desires to substitute a new Trustee under [the] Deed ofTrust

... instead ofComUnity Lending, Incorporated."3 Comp!. Ex.Bat 2. On July 6, 2016, Mr. and Mrs. Daniels filed an "Assignees Declaration Of Land Patent Update" in the Superior Court ofLamar County, Georgia. Comp!. Ex. A-1at1. The July 6, 2016 Declaration stated that Mr. and Mrs. Daniels held a land patent, issued on July 12, 1876 by President Ulysses S. Grant. Comp!. Ex. A-1 at 1. On July 7, 2016, the San Diego County Recorder's Office recorded the Substitution Of Trustee And Full Reconveyance. Comp!. Ex. B at2. On June 2, 2017, Sheriffs from the San Diego County Sheriffs Department allegedly kidnapped Mrs. Daniels from the Property, that caused Mrs. Daniels physical and mental injury. Comp!. 

### if 23. One Sheriffalso allegedly "stomped on [Mrs. Daniels'] neck" and caused injuries to Mrs. Daniels' "body, face, neck, arms, back [,]

... and wrist." Comp!. 

### if 25. Thereafter, Mrs. Daniels was "imprisoned at Los Colinas [Detention Facility

### Jfor over 14 hours, until [she paid] $2,000

... on a $20,000 bond."4 Comp!. 

### if 25. On an unspecified date thereafter, an agent ofthe Bank ofNew York, Inc. (the "Bank of New York") allegedlyremoved $100,000,jewelryvalued at $175,000, and otherpersonal property from the Property, and vandalized the security system onthe Property. Comp!. 

### if 25.

2 The California Code ofCivil Procedure provides that [a] dwelling inwhich an owner or spouse ofan ownerresides may be selected as a declared homesteadpursuantto this article byrecording a homestead declaration in the office ofthe county recorder ofthe county where the dwelling is located. From and after the time of recording, the dwelling is a declared homestead for the purposes ofthis article. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE§ 704.920 (West 2017).

3 The October 23, 2017 Complaint does not state whether a new trustee was actually substituted inthe Deed ofTrust.

4 The October 23, 2017 Complaint does not provide a reason for Mrs. Daniels' alleged arrest and subsequent imprisonment.

2On June 9, 2017, Mrs. Daniels was "physically prevented from entering [the Property] as personal property was removed from her home, without consent,

... [and was] threatened [that] if she returned to [the Property] she would be rearrested."5 Comp!. 

## ii 25. On June 28, 2017, Mrs. Daniels posted a Notice OfRight AndDemand For Possession Of Property Located In San Diego County, notifying the "Bank ofNew York, and All Unknown Occupants" that they were required to "[r]elinquish [the Property]" to Mrs. Daniels. Comp!. 

### Ex.E. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY. On October 23, 2017, Mrs. Daniels ("Plaintiff') filed a Complaint in the United States Court ofFederal Claims against "[United States] Government employees," the BankofNewYork, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the Superior Court of California, a number of private individuals, and "fictitiously named defendant[s]," alleging: (1) fraud; (2) misrepresentation; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) kidnapping; (5) false imprisonment; (6) grand theft; (7) burglary; (8) conspiracy; (9) a violation ofthe Truth inLending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.; (10) violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Amendments ofthe United States Constitution; (11) violation ofthe ShermanAct, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.; (12) violation ofthe Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27; (13) violation ofthe 1848 Treaty ofGuadalupe Hidalgo; (14) violation ofa land patent; and (15) breach ofcontract. Comp!. 

## iii! 1- 62. Onthat same day, Plaintiffalso filed a MotionForLeave To ProceedIn Forma Pauperis, that the court granted onNovember 7, 2017. On December 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Notice And Affidavit Of Obligation Of Commercial Lienthat re-alleges several claims ofthe October 23, 2017 Complaint and states that Plaintiffseeks $7,000,034,818,577.23 in relief. On December 22, 2017, the Government filed a Motion To Dismiss ("Gov't Mot."), pursuant to Rules ofthe United States Court ofFederal Claims ("RCFC") 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6). On January 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed a letter addressed to the undersignedjudge. On that same day, Plaintiff filed a Notice And Declaration, requesting a default judgment against the Government. OnJanuary 9, 2018, Plaintifffiled, under seal, anAffidavit OfCorporate Denial and an Affidavit Of Denial Of Contract And License Third Party Attorney. The January 9, 2018 Affidavit stated that, as a "sovereign," Plaintiffdid not consent to federal government taxation, including social security and income taxation. On that same day, Plaintiff filed a Notice And Declaration, statingthatthe Government failed to respondto Plaintiffs December 12, 2017Notice And Affidavit OfObligation OfCommercial Lien ("Pl. Notice").

5 The October 23, 2017 Complaint does not state who threatened and prevented Mrs. Daniels from entering the Prope1ty on June 9, 2017.

3III. DISCUSSION. A. Jurisdiction. The United States Court ofFederal Claims hasjurisdictionundertheTucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, to adjudicate "any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l). The Tucker Act, however, is "ajurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages

. . . . [T]he Act merely confers jurisdiction upon [the United States Court of Federal Claims] wheneverthe substantive right exists." 

### UnitedStates v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). To pursue a substantive right under the Tucker Act, a plaintiffmust identify and plead an independent contractual relationship, constitutional provision, federal statute, and/or executive agencyregulationthat provides a substantive right to money damages. 

### See Toddv. UnitedStates, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[J]urisdictionunder the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act[.]"). Specifically, a plaintiffmust demonstrate that the source ofsubstantive law upon which she relies "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Govermnent." 

### United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216 (1983) (quoting 

### Testan, 424 U.S. at 400). Plaintiff must also make "a non-frivolous allegation that [the plaintiff] is within the class of plaintiffs entitled to recover under the money-mandating source." 

### Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. FA.A., 525 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008). B. Relevant Legal Standard. 1. Standard Of Review For A Motion To Dismiss Under RCFC 

### 12(b)(l). A challenge to the United States Court ofFederal Claims' "general power to adjudicate in specific areas ofsubstantive law

... is properly raised by a [Rule] 12(b)(1) motion[.]" 

### Palmer v. UnitedStates, 168 F.3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 

### see also RCFC 12(b)(l) ("Every defense to a claim for reliefin any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading[.] But a party may assert

... [,] by motion[,] lack of subject-matterjurisdiction[.]"). When considering whether to dismiss an actionfor lack ofsubject matterjurisdiction, "acourtmust accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiffs complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." 

### TrustedIntegration, Inc. v. UnitedStates, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 2. Standard Of Review For A Motion To Dismiss Under RCFC 

### 12(b)(6). A claim is subject to dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6), ifit does not provide a basis for the court to grant relief. 

### See BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) ("[A wellpleaded complaint] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation ofthe elements ofa cause ofaction will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right of reliefabove the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are

4true (evenifdoubtful infact)." (internal citations omitted)); 

### see also Lindsay v. UnitedStates, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Amotionto dismiss

... for failure to state a claim uponwhich reliefcan be granted is appropriate when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy."). A complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to reliefthatis plausible on its face.'" 

### Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

### Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiffpleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 

### Id. The allegations in a complaint also must establish that there is "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." 

### Id. "Threadbare recitals ofthe elements ofa cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." 

### Id.; see also Sioux Honey Ass'n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 1041, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that a complaint "require[s] more than labels and conclusions"). To determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief, the court must engage in a context-specific analysis and "draw on itsjudicial experience and common sense." 

### Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Therefore, the court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." 

### Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

### 3. Standard OfReview ForPro Se 

### Litigants. Pro se plaintiffs' pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those of litigants represented by counsel. 

### See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding that

### prose complaints, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers"). The United States Court ofFederal Claims traditionally examines the record "to see if [a

### pro se] plaintiffhas a cause ofaction somewhere displayed." 

### Ruderer v. United States, 412 F.2d 1285, 1292 (Ct. CL 1969). Nevertheless, while the court may excuse ambiguities in a

### prose plaintiff's complaint, the court "does not excuse [a complaint's] failures." 

### Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The fact that [the plaintiff] acted

### pro se in the drafting of[the] complaintmay explain its ambiguities, but it does not excuse its failures, ifsuch there be."). A

### pro se plaintiff, however, is not excused from his burden ofproving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court possesses jurisdiction. 

### See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) ("[The plaintiff] must allege in [the complaint] the facts essential to showjurisdiction."); 

### see also Reynolds v. Army & 

### Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("[The

### proseplaintiff] bears the burden ofestablishing subjectmatterjurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence."). The

### pro se plaintiff cannot rely solely on conclusory allegations inthe complaint, but must allege "competentproof' to establishjurisdiction. 

### McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189; 

### see also Reynolds, 846 F.2d at748 ("[I]twas incumbentupon [the

### proseplaintiff] to come forward with evidence establishing the court'sjurisdiction."); 

### Zulueta v. United States, 553 F. App'x 983, 985 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[T]he leniency affordedto a 

### [prose] litigantwithrespect to mere formalities does not relieve the burden to meetjurisdictional requirements." (quotation marks omitted)).

5

### C. The Government's December 22, 2017 Motion To Dismiss. 

### 1. The Government's Argument. The Government argues that the United States Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims alleged in the October 23, 2017 Complaint, because the October 23, 2017 Complaint does not allege a claim arising under a money-mandating source of law and does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a breach ofcontract with the United States. Gov't Mot. at 4-9. Specifically, the United States Court ofFederal Claims does not have subject matterjurisdiction to adjudicate the claims alleged in the October 23, 2017 Complaint arising under: (1) tort law; (2) criminal law; (3) the Truth in Lending Act; (4) the Sherman Act; (5) the Clayton Act; (6) the Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Amendments ofthe United States Constitution; (7) the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo; (8) violation of a land patent; and (9) breach of contract between private parties. Gov't Mot. at 4-8. In addition, to the extent the October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges a breach ofcontract bythe United States, this allegation does not state a claim on which reliefcan be granted, because it fails to plead the necessary elements of a breach ofcontract claim. Gov't Mot. at 8-9. 

### 2. Plaintiff's Response. On January 9, 2018, Plaintifffiled a Notice And Declaration, that stated [a]nypapers received after my Affidavit ofObligation Commercial Lien submitted into the Court record, must be sent backrefused for failure in REBUTTAL ofmy Affidavit. Any[]one that respon[ds] to the Affidavit must respond by Affidavit, rebutted point for point, with unlimited liability, and signed under penalty [of] perjury; that has never been done by any ofthe named defendants, and [Counsel for the Government] not a party to this case, commits FRAUD [by trying] to become a party to this case without consent, no contract. My Affidavit to date remains unrebutted. Denial ofContract and License Third party Attorney on file with the Court. PL Notice at 7. Plaintiffs January 9, 2018 Notice also includes a copy ofthe Government's December 22, 2017 Motion To Dismiss with the following hand-written message on the first page: "VOID no contract[.] Returned for cause, without commercial dishonor and no recourse[.] Affidavit remains unrebutted[.] Where is the Consent?" Pl. Notice at 9. 

### IV. THE COURT'S RESOLUTION. The United States Court ofFederal Claims does not havejurisdiction to adjudicate claims brought against private parties. See 28 U.S.C. 

### § 149l(l)(a) ("The United States Court ofFederal Claims shall havejurisdiction to renderjudgment upon any claim against the United States[.]"); see also United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 789 (1941) (holding that thejurisdiction ofthe

6United States Court ofFederal Claims is "narrowly restricted to the adjudication ofsuits brought againstthe Government alone"); 

### Brown v. UnitedStates, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997)("The Tucker Act grants the [United States] Court ofFederal Claimsjurisdiction over suits against the United States, not against individual federal officials."). Inthis case,the October23, 2017 Complaintidentifies the United Statesinthe case caption, but does not explicitly allege any claims against the United States. Comp!. 

## iii! 1-62. Instead, the October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges only claims against the Bank ofNew York, certain Sheriffs of the San Diego County Sheriffs Department, and "other named defendants." 6 Comp!. 

## irir 54-62. Forthese reasons, to the extentthatthe October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges claims against private paiiies and not the United States, those claims are dismissed, pursuant to RCFC 

### l2(b

### )(1). To the extent that the October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges claims against the United States, the court addresses these claims below. 

### A. TheUnited States Court OfFederal Claims Does NotHaveJurisdiction To Adjudicate The Tort Claims Alleged In The October 23, 2017 Complaint. The Tucker Act provides that the United States Court ofFederal Claims does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims "sounding in tort." 

### See 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l); 

### see also Keene Corp. v. UnitedStates, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993) ("The [United States] ComiofFederal Claims is a court oflimitedjurisdiction. It lacksjurisdiction over tort actions against the United States."). Rather, the Federal Torts Claims Act grants jurisdiction to hear tort claims brought against the United States exclusively to United States district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b )(1). In this case, the October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges claims sounding in tort, including fraud, misrepresentation, breach offiduciary duty, kidnapping, and false imprisonment. Comp!. 

## iii! 2, 10, 14, 16, 21-27, 29-30, 37, 53-61. But, the court does not havejurisdictionto adjudicate claims "sounding intort." 

### See 28 U.S.C. 

### § 149l(a)(l). For these reasons, the tort claims alleged in Paragraphs 2, 10, 14, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 37, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, and 61 ofthe October 23, 2017 Complaint are dismissed, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1).

6 The October 23, 2017 Complaint also identifies the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the Superior Court of California, the County of San Diego, "RichardRealty Groups#Ol705437," "SLS," and "America's Wholesale Lender," but the October 23, 2017 Complaint does not allege claims against these entities. Comp!. 

## iii! 5-7, 18-19, 23, 32, 37, 54-62.

7B. TheUnited States Court OfFederal Claims Does NotHaveJurisdiction To Adjudicate The Criminal Claims Alleged In The October 23, 2017 Complaint. The United States Supreme Courthas held that the United States Court ofFederal Claims does not havejurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising under a state criminal code. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 215-18 ("Claims founded on state law are . . . outside the scope of the limited jurisdiction ofthe [United States] Court ofFederal Claims."). And, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that the United States Court ofFederal Claims does not havejurisdictionto adjudicate claims arisingunderthe federal criminal code. SeeJoshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 379 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that the United States Court ofFederal Claims "has nojurisdictionto adjudicate any claims whatsoever under the federal criminal code"). Inthis case, the October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges claims arising under federal and state criminal codes, including grand theft, burglary, and conspiracy. Comp!. 

## ifif 7, 14, 16, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32, 36-37, 55, 57-59, 61-62. But, the court does not havejurisdictionto adjudicate criminal claims. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 215-18; Joshua, 17 F.3d at 379. For these reasons, the criminal claims alleged in Paragraphs 7, 14, 16, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32, 36, 37, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, and 62 ofthe October 23, 2017 Complaint are dismissed, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l). C. TheUnited States Court OfFederal Claims Does NotHaveJurisdiction To Adjudicate The Truth In Lending Act Claim Alleged In The October 23, 2017 Complaint. The United States Supreme Courthasheldthatthe TuckerAct doesnotcreate a substantive cause ofaction. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216 (holding that "the Tucker Act does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages" (internal quotation marks omitted)). In order to come within the jurisdictional reach of the wavier of sovereign immunity in the Tucker Act, the plaintiffmust identify a separate source ofsubstantive law that creates the right to money damages. See id. ("A substantive right must be found in some other source oflaw, such as 'the Constitution, or any Act ofCongress, or any regulation ofan executive department."' (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l))). In this case, the October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges a violation ofthe Truth in Lending Act. Comp. 

## ifif 10, 30. But, the Truth in Lending Act "create[s] no private right of action enforceable against the federal government for money damages." See Wilson v. United States, 404 F. App'x 499, 501 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that the Truth in Lending Act is not moneymandating within the meaning ofthe Tucker Act). Forthese reasons, the claimbrought under the Truthin Lending Act alleged inParagraphs 10 and 30 ofthe October 23, 2017 Complaint is dismissed, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l).

8D. TheUnited StatesCourtOfFederalClaimsDoes NotHaveJurisdiction ToAdjudicate The Claims Alleged In The October23, 2017 Complaint Arising Under the Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Amendments OfThe United States Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has held that, "[b]ecause monetary damages are not available for a Fourth Amendment violation, the [United States] Court ofFederal Claims does not havejurisdictionover such a violation." See Brown, 105 F.3d at 623- 24. The United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuithas also held that "theDueProcess [C]lauses ofboth the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments do not mandate the payment ofmoney and thus do not provide a cause ofaction under the Tucker Act." See Smith v. UnitedStates, 709 F.3d 1114, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2013); see also Spain v. United States, 277 F. App'x 988, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("the Due Process Clauses ofthe Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments [and] the Equal Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment" are not money-mandating). And, this court has previously determined thatthe United States Court ofFederal Claims does not havejurisdictionto adjudicate claims arising under the Sixteenth Amendment. See Russell v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 281, 288 (Fed. Cl. 2007) ("The court does not perceive how the [Sixteenth A]mendment[,] authorizing the government to collect taxes[,] could possibly constitute a source mandating the payment ofmoney to [the] plaintiff."). Inthis case, the October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges violations ofthe Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clauses ofthe Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Sixteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Comp!. 

## irir 3, 22-23, 53-54, 56-57, 61. Forthese reasons, the constitutional claims alleged in Paragraphs 3, 22, 23, 53, 54, 56, 57, and 61 ofthe October 23, 2017 Complaint are dismissed, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l). E. TheUnited StatesCourtOfFederalClaimsDoes NotHaveJurisdiction To Adjudicate The Antitrust Claims Alleged In The October 23, 2017 Complaint. To establish jurisdiction in the United States Court of Federal Claims, a plaintiff must identify a money-mandating source of law, because "the Tucker Act does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages." See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, the Sherman Act is not a money-mandating statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 etseq.; see also Akinro v. UnitedStates, 91 Fed. Cl. 650, 655 (Fed. Cl. 2010)("Neitherthe Sherman[] Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 etseq., nor specifically 15 U.S.C. § 17

... , are money-mandating statutes."). And, claims underthe Clayton Act are similarly outside the court's jurisdiction, because they are within the exclusivejurisdictionofUnited States district courts. See Hufford v. UnitedStates, 87 Fed. Cl. 696, 703 (Fed. Cl. 2009). In this case, the October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges a violation ofthe Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. Comp!. 

## i!il 28, 35, 36. But, the United States Court ofFederal Claims "does not have jurisdiction to hear claims under the Sherman Act," because that Act is not a money9mandating source of law. 

### See Akinro, 91 Fed. CL at 655. And, "[c]laims for violations ofthe antitrust laws are not within the scope ofthe Tucker Act." 

### See Smith v. UnitedStates, 34 Fed. CL 313, 321 (Fed. Cl. 1995). Forthese reasons, the antitrust claims alleged inParagraphs 28, 35, and 36 ofthe October 23, 2017 Complaint are dismissed, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l). F. TheUnited States Court OfFederal Claims Does NotHaveJurisdiction To Adjudicate The Claims Alleged In The October 23, 2017 Complaint Arising Under The 1848 Treaty OfGuadalupe Hidalgo. In 1851, Congress passed legislation that established a board ofcommissioners to resolve claims under the 1848 Treaty ofGuadalupe Hidalgo. 7 

### See Act to Settle Private Land Claims in California §§ 9, 13, 9 Stat. 631 (1851); 

### see also Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. 478, 478 (1865) ("Congress, by act of 3d March, 1851, 'to ascertain and settle the private land claims' in that State[,] constituted a board ofcommissioners, inthe nature ofajudicialbody, before which, claims to land there were to be investigated."). The Actrequired that plaintiffs alleging claims under the Treaty must do so within two years from enactment, and provided that review ofthe board of commissioners' decisions was withinthe exclusivejurisdictionofthe United States district courts. 

### See Act to Settle Private Land Claims in California§§ 9, 13, 9 Stat. 631 (1851); 

### see also Beard, 70 U.S. at 478 ("[The Act] declares moreover 'that all lands, the claims to which shall not have been presented to the said commissioners within 

### two years after the date ofthe act, shall be deemed, held, and considered as part of the public domain of the United States."' (emphasis added)). In this case, the October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges a violation of the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, butfails to explain whythe court hasjurisdiction, when Congress established a separate administrative scheme for claims brought under the Treaty, and when such claims were required to be brought over 160 years ago. Comp!. 

## ifif 2, 53, 61. Forthese reasons, the claim alleging a violation ofthe 1848 Treaty ofGuadalupe Hidalgo in Paragraphs 2, 53, and 61 ofthe October 23, 2017 Complaint is dismissed, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l). G. The United States Court OfFederal Claims Does NotHaveJurisdiction To Adjudicate TheLandPatent Claim Alleged In TheOctober23,2017 Complaint. A landpatentpasses all rights and control ofpublic landfrom the United States to aprivate owner. 

### See United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 395-96 ("Congress

... enacted a system of lawsby whichrightsto [public] landsmaybe acquired, and thetitle ofthe [ G]overnemnt conveyed

7 The 1848 Treaty ofGuadalupe Hidalgo establishedpeace betweenthe United States and Mexico. 

### See Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement (Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo), United States-Mexico, arts. XII, XVI, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 222. Underthe Treaty, Mexico ceded all lands now included inthe State ofCaliforniato the United States for paymentto Mexico of$15 million. 

### See id.

10to the citizen."). The court has previously determined that the United States Court of Federal Claims does not havejurisdiction to adjudicate a claim by a "sovereign citizen" alleging rights under a purported land patent. 

### See Startup v. United States, No. 15-262L, 2015 WL 6386533, at *2 (Fed. CL Oct. 21, 2015) ("This [land patent] claim is

... outside the [c]ourt'sjurisdiction, because [the plaintiff] does not identify any statute that would give this [ c]ourt jurisdiction to review actions taken by the [federal agency] and because the [c]ourt lacksjurisdiction under the Tucker Act to grant equitable relief except as incidental to a grant ofmoney damages." (citing 

### Nat'lAir Traffic ControllersAssoc. v. UnitedStates, 160 F.3d 714, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998))). The October 23, 2017 Complaint alleges a violation ofa land patent. Comp!. 

## iii! 2, 11-12, 14, 16, 23, 29, 39--42. In addition, Exhibit A-1 of the October 23, 2017 Complaint, entitled "Assignees Declaration OfLand Patent Update," alleges that Plaintiffand Mr. Daniels hold a land patent issued on July 12, 1876 by President Ulysses S. Grant. Comp!. Ex. A-1 at I. Holding a land patent, like any ownership interest in property, however, is not sufficient on its ownto give rise to a cause of action. A claim related to a land patent requires the complaint to identify a substantive source of law that has been violated. 

### See Startup, 2015 WL 6386533, at *2. For example, a land patent holder may allege that his or her property was taken by the United States, in violation ofthe Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. But, neither the October 23, 2017 Complaint nor Exhibit A-1 of the October 23, 2017 Complaint allege any source of substantive law that has been violated in relation to Plaintiffs land patent. Comp!. 

## iii! 2, 11-12, 14, 16,23,29,39--42. For these reasons, the land patent claim alleged in Paragraphs 2, 11, 12, 14, 16, 23, 29, 39, 40, 41, and 42 in the October 23, 2017 Complaint is dismissed, pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(l). 

### H. The October 23, 2017 Complaint Does Not Allege Sufficient Facts To State A Contract Claim On Which ReliefCan Be Granted. To state a contract claim onwhich reliefcan be granted, the complaint "must allege either an express or an implied-in-fact contract, and the breach of that contract." 

### See Trauma Serv. Grp. v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997). "The general requirements for a binding contract with the United States are identical for both express and implied[-in-fact] contracts." Id. As a matter oflaw, an implied-in-fact contract is "inferred

... from [the] conduct ofthe parties showing, in the light ofthe surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding." 

### See Balt. & 

### Ohio R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923). An implied-in-fact contract requires the court to find that "surrounding circumstances" show: (1) mutuality of intent to contract; (2) consideration; (3) lack ofambiguity in offer and acceptance; and (4) actual authority on the part ofthe Government representative to bind the Government in contract. 

### See City of El Centro v. UnitedStates, 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In otherwords, "therequirements for an implied-in-fact contract are the same as for anexpress contract; only the nature ofthe evidence differs." 

### See Hanlin v. UnitedStates, 316 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In this case, the October 23, 2017 Complaint does not allege that an express contract was formed between Plaintiff and the United States. Comp!. 

## ifif 1-62. The October 23, 2017 Complaint, however, alleges a breach ofa contract with the Bank ofNew Yark and "other named defendants," but fails to allege any ofthe required elements to establish contract formation, 

### i.e., mutuality ofintentto contract, consideration, lackofambiguity in offer and acceptance, and actual

11

### authority ofthe Government representative to bind the Government in contract. Compl. 

### ifif 54

- 55, 61 ; see also City of El Centro, 

### 922 F.2d at 820. Therefore, Paragraphs 11, 22, 23, 28, 31, 37, 43 , 53 , 54, 55, and 61 ofthe October 23, 2017 Complaint do not allege sufficient facts to state a contract claim on whichreliefcan be granted. For these reasons, the court has determined that, even ifthe October 23, 2017 Complaint establishedjurisdiction as to the contract claim alleged in Paragraphs 11, 22, 23, 28, 31 , 37, 43, 53, 54, 55, and 61 ofthe October 23, 2107 Complaint, those allegations fail to state a claim on which reliefcan be granted andmust be dismissed under RCFC 12(b)(6). V. CONCLUSION. For these reasons, the court grants the Government's December 22, 2017 Motion To Dismiss. See 

### RCFC 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the Clerk ofthe United States Court of Federal Claims is directed to enterjudgment on behalfofthe Government. IT IS SO ORDERED.

SUSAN G. BRADEN ChiefJudge



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