FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT SEPT 30, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK

Honora ble Arthur L . Al ar có n , Un i t ed States Circuit J udg e for the Ninth Circuit, sitt ing by * desig nation. [PUBLIS H]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ N o. 07- 1119 6

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 05-00971 CV -O RL -22-KR S ANTHONYG. MARTIN, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us BRE VA RD COU

NT Y P UBL IC S CHO OL S, an entity of the State of Florida, De fendant-Appellee.

___ ____ _ ____ _ ____ _ ____ __ ____ _ ____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court for the Middle District of Florida

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 30, 200 8) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, KRA V IT CH a nd A L A RC Ó N , Ci rc uit * Judg es .2

PE R CU RIA M: Anthony G. Martin (“ Martin”) a

ppeals the dist rict court’ s grant of summ ary j u d g me n tt o B r e v a r dC o u n t y P ub l i c S c h o o l s ( t h e “S c h o o l D i s t r i c t ” ) o n h i s c l a i ms fo r int er fe re nc e an d r et al ia tio n un de r the F am ily a nd M ed ic al L eave A ct

of 199 3, 29 U . S. C. §§ 2 601- 2654 ( “ FM L A ”) . W e va cate the j udgm en t and r em an d th e ca se fo r fu rth er p ro ceed in gs . BACKGROUND

In Jan ua ry

20 00 , th e Sch oo l Di st ric t h ire d M art in as a pa yro ll su pe rv is or . Martin w orked for the Sc hool District on a c ontractual basis sub j ect to annual re ne w al by

the sc hool board . B y

it s te rm s, Mart in’ s la st c ontra ct w iththe S ch ool Dis tri ctex pi redon 30 Ju ne 20 04 . D ur ing his ti m e w iththe S ch ool D istri ct , Mart in l ive d w ithhis w if e an d daught er s. I n late 200 3, Mart in’ s da ught er , Br itt an y , astu de nt and m em be r of the Ar m y Reser ve, gave birth to H annah: Martin’ s granddaugh ter. Martin provi ded Brittany and Hannah substantial financial sup port, furnishing th em with a hom e, ut il it ie s, t ran sp or ta ti on , foo d, m on ey forex pe ns es , and he al th in su ran ce.3

H an nah’ s bi olo gic al f

athe r did not li ve in Mart in’ s ho m e; Br itt an y w as asin gle m ot he r. Mi ch ae l D eg uti s, A ssi stant S upe ri nte nde nt o f Fi nanc e fo r the S ch ool D istri ct , w as Mart in’ s im m ed ia te sup er

vis or a nd r es pons ibl e fo r ev al ua tin g Mart in’ s pe rf

orm an ce . O n M ar

tin ’ s 20 01 and 2 002 pe rf

orm an ce r ev ie w s, he re ce ive d a“pr of

es sio na l l ev el ” ratin g—the hig he st r at ing pos sib le —i n th e

“ Over all Evaluation” cate gory . The f ollowing y ear, on his 2 003 p erfor m ance review , Martin rece ived a “ professional level” rating in all ten perform ance cate gor ie s, inc lud ing the “ O ve ra ll E va luatio n” c at eg or y . A cc or din g to the S ch ool District, however, Martin’ s later per form ance did not rem ain at this exem plary le ve l. On 19 April 2004, D egutis gave Martin an interim perform ance r eview. In th atev al ua ti on , Mart in rece iv eda “ pr of es si on al lev el ” rat in g i n t hr ee ca te go rie s, a

“ ne ed s im pr ove m en t” r at ing in fi ve c at eg or ie s, a nd an “ unsatis fa ct or y le ve l” r at ing in tw o c at eg or ie s. D eg uti s a lso pr es en te d M ar tinw itha n im

pr ove m en t pl an , w hic h a ff or de d M ar

tinthr ough1 June 200 4 “ to d em onstrate sig nif ic an t pr ogr es s as outlin ed . . . in the im

provem ent plan.” A ro und the sam e tim e, the A rm y Re se rv e inf

orm ed Br itt an y that he r uni t w as c al le d to a ct ive duty

a nd w oul d so on b e de plo y ed ove rs ea s. O n 29 Apr il4

2004 , Mart in s ubm itt ed

to the S ch ool D istri ct

aw ri tte n r eque st f

or tw el ve w ee ks of FML A le ave to car e for H annah beginn ing on 7 May 2004 . Martin presented thi s e xpl an at ion : “ D ue to unf or es ee ab le e ve nts , I have day -t o- day r es pons ibi lity fo r cari ng f

or m y gr an ddaught er

a nd s tand ‘ in loc o pa re nti s . ’ T he se responsib ilities inclu de car ing for and financially suppo rting her. She is less than 12-m onth s old . . . . ” D eg uti s a ppr ove d M ar

tin ’ s r eque st f

or F ML A le av e fr om

7 M ay thr ough30 June but not be y ond the e xpi ratio n of Mart in’ s c ontra ct . Mart in’ s F ML A le av e ove rl ap pe d w iththe pe ri od s et out in Mart in’ s im

pr ove m en t pl an . A cc or din g to Mart in, he r el ie d onD eg uti s’ s a ppr ova l “ as pr oof

that [ he ] w as F ML A [- ] el igi ble an d th at [ his ] r ea sons w er e FM L A -qua lif y ing . ” H e w oul d no t have take n le av e ha d i t n ot be en ap pr ov edas F MLA-q ua li fy in g. A ft er gr an tin g M ar

tinF ML A le av e, D eg uti s c onsu lte d w ithse ve ra l se nio r Sc hool D istri ct

e m plo y ee s, inc lud ing the D ir ec tor of H um anRe sour ce s, the D ir ec tor of Co m pe nsa tio n/B en ef

its , a nd the D ep uty

S upe ri nte nde nt. T hose pe opl e inf orm ed D eg uti s th at

Mart in’ s c ontra ct

w iththe S ch ool D istri ct , w hic h e xpi re d on 30 June 200 4, w oul d no t be r en ew ed if F ML A le av e pr ohi bit ed

Mart in f ro m fu lf ill ing his im

pr ove m en t pl an . D eg uti s in fo rm ed Mart in o f thi s po sit ionon 35

May 200 4 and a ske d th at

Mart in s ignastate m en t t o th at e ff ec t. Mart in r ef

use d to si gn . On 7 May

2004 , Martin tookFML A le ave as scheduled. B ut Brittany wa s never deploy ed. Instead, she c ontin ued to attend scho ol and to satis fy her oc ca sio na l A rm

y Re se rv e obl igatio ns, j ust a s sh e ha d do ne be fo re Mart in re que ste d F ML A le av e. Whe n B ri ttany w as a t ho m e, Mart in a ssi ste d he r in feeding and bathin g Hannah and changing Hannah’ s diaper. When Brittany wa s at sc hool , w hic h oc curr ed

about f our day s aw ee k f

or thr ee or f our hours aday

a nd som e ev en ing s, or

w as pe ri odi ca lly

a w ay f or w ee ke nd A rm

y Re se rv e dr ill s, Mart in w as sol el y

r es pons ibl e fo r cari ng f

or H an nah. Mart in c ont inu ed to pr ovi de Bri tt an y an d Han na h fi na nc ia l s up po rt d ur in g t hi s p eri od . While Martin wa s on FMLAleave, De gutis rec omm ended to the hu m an resources departm ent that Martin’ s contract not be renew ed. The S chool District fo llo w ed that r ec om

m en da tio n. O n 21 Jun e 2004 , Mart in r ec ei ve d ale tte r fr om D eg uti s st at ing that the S ch ool D istri ct did not r en ewMart in’ s c ontra ct

be ca use Martin failed to com

plete his im

provem ent plan. T he School District concedes t h at th i s n o t i fi ca t i o n wa s i n ef fe ct a t er m i n at i o n o f M ar t i n ’s empl o ym en t . M ar t i n ’s la st da y wit h t he Sch oo l Di st ric t was 30 Ju ne 20 04 .6

Mar ti n s ue d t he Sch oo l Di st ric t fo r in te rfer in g wi th cert ai n o f hi s FM LA rights and for retaliating against him for taking FML A le ave. The School District m ov edforsu m

m ary jud gm en t o n M art in ’s cla im s, wh ic h t he di st ric t co ur t g ran te d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c onc lud ed that M ar tinw as not

e nti tle d to F ML A le av e, a s “ no reas on ab le jury co ul d fi nd th at[Mar ti n] st oo d i n l oc o p aren ti s i n t hi s s it ua ti on ,” and that the School District wa s not esto pped from challenging Martin’s in loco pare nti s st at

us. T he dis tr ic t c ourt, in anabund an ce of c au tio n, a lso a na ly ze d th e subs tanc e of

Mart in’ s c la im s and c onc lud ed that the y w er e w ith out

m er it. Mart in ap pe al s. STANDARD OF REVIEW

W e re view de novo an order granting summ ary j udgm ent. D rago v. Jenne, 453 F. 3d 1 301, 130 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) . I n do ing so, w e vie w“ the e vid en ce a nd a ll re as ona ble inf er en ce s dr awn f

ro m it in the li ght

m ost f av or ab le to the non m ovi ng party . ” Battl e v. Bd . of

Re ge nts , 468 F . 3d 7 55, 759 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) . W e w ill af fi rm sum m ar y j udgm en t on ly

if no g enuin e iss ue of

m at er ia l f

ac t e xis ts and the m ov in g p art y

is en ti tl edto jud gm en t as a m at te r of law. Fed . R. Civ . P. 56 (c).7 DISCUSS ION

Mart in r ai se s se ve ra l i ssu es on a ppe al . A s an in iti al m atte r, Mart in c ont en ds that he sto od i n lo co pare nti s to H an nah and w as the re fo re e nti tle d to F ML A le av e to c ar e fo r he r. B ut e ve n if his le av e w er e not

F ML A -qua lif

y ing , Mart in a lso cl ai m s th at

the S ch ool D istri ct

w as e sto ppe d f

ro m c ha lle ngi ng h is e nti tle m en t t o that leave because the S chool District originallyapproved his leave request. I n ad d i t i o n , M ar t i n p o i n t s t o v ar i o u s s up p o s ed erro rs i n th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s subs tanti ve a na ly sis of

his F ML A c la im s. W e ad dr es s e ac h is sue in tur n. A . Mart in’ s E nti tle m en t t o F ML A L eave

T he F ML A a ff

or ds an e lig ibl e em

plo y ee tw el ve w ee ks o f unpa id l eave in any one-y ear period “ [b] ecause of the birth of a son or daugh ter of the e m ploy ee an d inor de r to c ar e fo r suc h so n or daught er . ” 29 U . S. C. § 26 12( a) . Asonor daught er “ m eans a bio log ic al , a dopt ed , or

f ost er c hil d, aste pc hil d, ale ga l w ar d, orThe pa rties do not dispute that the School District is a cover ed employer a

nd that Martin is an 1 elig ible employ ee unde r the F ML A. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2)(A) , (4). 8 a ch ild of ape rs on s tandi ng i n lo co pare nti s. ” I d. § 26 11( 12) . Mart in s ough t FM L A le av e to c ar e fo r H an nah onthe ba sis of in loc o pare nti s st at

us. 1 The phrase in loco parentis literally m eans “ in the place of a par ent.” Black’ s Law D ictionary

791 (7th ed. 1999 ). A ccording to its generally acce pted co m m on l awm eanin g, in loc o pare nti s “ re fe rs to a pe rs on who h as put him se lf in the situatio n of a law ful parent by assum ing th e obligatio ns incident to the parental re la tio n w ith out

goi ng thr oughthe f

orm al iti es ne ce ssary

to le ga l a dopt ion . ” D ill on v. M arylan d- Nat’l Capi ta l Pa rk& Pl an ni ng Co m m ’n, 38 2 F . Sup p. 2 d 7 77 , 78 6 (D. Md. 2005) (internal quotation m arks om itted). T he De partm ent of L abor has f u rt h e r d e f i n e di n l o c o p a r e n t i s u n d e r th e F M LA t o i n c l u d e p e r s o n s wi t h th e “ d a yto-day responsibi lity

to care for and financially suppo rt a c hild . . . . Abiolo gical orleg al rel at io ns hi p i s n ot ne ces sa ry .” 29 C.F.R. § 82 5.1 13 (c)( 3) . W e cannot

a gr ee w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt tha t no r ea sona ble j ur y c oul d f ind th atMart in st oo d i n l oc o p aren ti s t o Han na h wh il e h e was on FMLA le av e. During that period, Mar

tin provi ded Brittany

and Hannah substantial financial supp ort, inc lud ing ahom e, f ood, a nd h ea lthins ur an ce . Ma rt in a lso play ed

a signi ficant role in caring for H annah even thou gh Brittany wa s never deploy edTo invoke estoppel, a party must prove that: “ (1) the party to b e e s t o p p ed m i s repr esente d 2 materia l fac ts; (2) the par ty to be estopped w as aw are of the true fac ts; (3) the party to be estopped intended that the misrepr esentation be acte d on or had re as on to believe the pa rty asser ting the estoppel would re ly

on it; (4) the par

ty asser ting the e stoppel did not kno w, n o r shoul d it have known, the true fac ts; a

nd (5) the party asser

ting the estoppel rea sonably and detrimentally relied on the misrepre sentation.” B usby v. J RHBW Realty , Inc., 513 F .3d 1314, 1326 (11th Cir. 2008).

9 overseas: he helped with H annah when Brittany wa s at hom e; and he assum ed sol e re spon sib ili ty

f or H an nah w he n B ri ttany

w as a t sc hool or

A rm y Re se rv e dr ill s. W e cannot

say a s am atte r of

lawthat M ar

tinsto od i n lo co pare nti s to Hannah; no r can we say

that he did no t. Martin has presented sufficient evidence to c re at e a ge nui ne iss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t, a nd the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr ed in co nc lud ing ot he rwis e. Mart in arg ue s th at

the S ch ool D istri ct

sho uld be e sto ppe d f

ro m c ha lle ngi ng hi s en ti tl em en t t o F MLA le av e b ecau se itori gi na ll y ap pr ov edhi s l eav e req ue st . Mart in r ec ogni ze s th at

thi s C ourt ha s no t y et

a dopt ed the e sto ppe l do ctri ne in the FML A c ontext, but nevertheless asks us to follo w the le ad of other courts that have done so. W e need not acce pt Martin’ s invit ation, however ; the estoppel do ct rin e, as a m at te r of

law, wo ul d n ot ap pl y

he re i n a ny even t. T he e qui ta

ble doc tr ine of

e sto ppe l i s in voke d “ to avoi d in j ust ic e in part ic ular ca se s. ” H ec kle r v. Cm ty . H ea lthS er

vs. of Cr aw fo rd

Co unty , I nc . , 104 S. Ct. 2218 , 2221 (1984). Aparty claim ing estop pel m

ust sh ow, am ong o ther thi ngs, that the party

to be e sto ppe d m isr ep re se nte d m at er ia l f ac ts d es pit e be ing 2Mart in c onte nd s th at th e Sc ho ol D istri c t sh ou ld be c ha rg e d wi th c on str

uc tiv e kn ow le dg e of

a ll 3 fac ts releva

nt to whether his lea

ve qualifie d under the FMLA. B ut Martin i d en t i fi es no statute, regulation, or ca se sug g estingthat constructive know ledg e is appropr iate under the fac ts in thi s case ; and we are awa

re of none. 10 aw ar e of the tr ue f ac ts. B usby , 513 F . 3d at 13 26. T ha t i s no t the c as e he re . T he Sc h o o l Di s t ri ct ap p ro v ed Ma rt i n ’s re qu es tfo r F M LA l ea v e b as ed o n Br i t t an y’ s an tic ipate d de plo ym en t ov er se as . Whe n do ing so, the S ch ool D istri ct did not ( an d co uld not ) knowthat this c ir cu m stanc e w oul d ne ve r m at er ia liz e an d th er eb y c al l in to qu es ti on Mart in ’s ent it le m en t t o F MLA le av e. Acco rd in gl y , eve n i f we 3 adopted th e estoppel doctrine in th e FML A c ontext—an is sue on which we say noth ing—Martin could not inv oke it in th is case.

B . M a rt i n ’s F M L A C l a i ms W e nowtur

n to the sub stanc e of

Mart in’ s in te rf

er en ce a nd r et al ia tio n cl ai m s. I n do ing so, w e as sum e fo r the sake of dis cu ssi on tha t M ar

tinsto od i n loco parentis to Hannah and was there fore e ntitled to FML A le ave to car e for her .11 1. In te rf

er en ce Cl ai m To prove FML A interf

erence , an em

ploy ee m ust dem onstrate that he was de ni eda be ne fit to whi ch he was e nt it le d u nd er t he FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a )( 1) ; S tr ic kland v . W at er W orks and S ew er

Bd . of Bi rm ing ha m , 239 F . 3d 1199 , 1206-07 (11th Cir. 2001 ). A n em ploy ee need not “ allege that his em ploy er int en de d to de ny

the r igh t; the e m

plo y er ’ s m oti ve s are ir

re le vant. ” S tr ic kland, 239 F. 3d at 12 08. A lth oughMart in c la im s th at the S ch ool D istri ct

int er fe re d w ith several of his substanti ve FML A r ights , w e see only one that can survive summ ary j udgm en t. A n e m plo y ee ha s th e ri ght

f oll ow ing F ML A le av e “ to b e re sto re d by the em plo y er to the pos iti on o f em

plo ym en t he ld b y

the e m plo y ee w he n th e le av e co m m en ce d” or

to ane qui va le nt p osi tio n. 29 U . S. C. § 26 14( a) (1 )( A ); se e al so 2 9 C. F. R. § 82 5. 214( a) . B ut this r igh t i s no t a bsol ute ; an e m

plo y er c an de ny reinstatem ent “ if it can dem onstrate that it would have dis charged the em ploy ee ha d he not

be enon F ML A le av e. ” S tr ic kland, 239 F . 3d at 12 08; se e al so 2 9 U.S.C. § 2 61 4( a)(3 ); 2 9 C .F.R. § 8 25 .21 6( a); Parri s v . Mia m i Her al d P ub l’g Co ., 216 F. 3d 1 298, 130 1 n. 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) ( em plo y er that i nte rf

er es w ith em ploy ee’ s right to reinstatem ent “ bears the burden of proving th at the em ploy eeMart in c ann ot u se the F MLA t o c ir c umv e nt h is i mpr ov e me nt p lan; i f r e ins tate d, he jus t w ou ld 4 have thr e e -p lus we e ks of

e mpl oy me nt e ith e r t o f

ulf ill tha t pl an o r t o f

a c e te rm inatio n. Se e 29 U. S.C. § 2614(a) (3)( B) (employ ee not e ntitled to “a ny rig ht, benef

it, or position of employ

ment other than [t hat] to which the employ ee would have been e ntitled had the employ ee not take n the leave ”); 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a) (“An employ ee ha s no g reater right . . . t o o ther be nefits and c onditions of employ ment than if the e mploy ee ha d been c o nti n u o u s ly e mp lo yed duringthe FMLA leave period.” ). The School District do es not argue that Mar tin’s rig ht to reinstatement is prec luded under 29 5 C.F.R. § 825.216(b), whic h denies a n employ ee hir ed “f

or a spe cific te rm” the r ight to re instatement “ if the e mpl oy

me nt t e rm

. . . is ov er . . . a

nd the e mpl oye r w ou ld n ot o the rw ise have c ontin ue d to e mpl oy the e mp loye e .” B ut e ve n if it d id, that r e gulatio n w ou ld n ot s up po rt summa ry jud g me nt. Th e Sc ho ol D istri c t f

a ils to s ho w bey on d di sp ute that it wo uld have se ve re d it s r e latio ns hip wi th Martin had he not taken F ML A leave . 12 w oul d have be enla id o ff dur ing the F ML A pe ri od f or r ea sons unr el at ed

to the [FML A le ave] , and therefore is not entitled to restoration”). Mart in c ont en ds tha t the S ch ool D istri ct int er fe re d w ithhis r igh t t o reinstatem ent by

not renewing his contract. In re spon se, the S chool District 4 ar gue s th at

it te rm inate d M ar

tinf or ar ea son w hol ly

unr el at ed

to his F ML A le av e: fa ilure to fu lf

ill his im pr ove m en t pl an . E ve n if

that r ea son is tru e, how ev er , the re co rd doe s no t e sta

bli sh b ey ond dis put e that the S ch ool D istri ct w oul d have dis ch ar ge d M ar

tinha d he not

take n F ML A le av e. I n f ac t, the r ec or d is unc le ar : whether Martin w ouldhave been reta ined and his contract re newed if he had been ab le to co m

ple te the f

ina l thr ee -p lus w ee ks o f his im pr ove m en t pl anis a m atte r of speculation . Martin was unable to com plete the plan as a re sult of his being—at 5 le as t arg uably

—onpr ope r FM L A le av e. Age nui ne iss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t r em ai nsMartin ar gues that the S ch o o l District’s 21 J une 2004 re prese ntation to him t hat it was 6 terminatinghis empl o y

m ent because he did not fulfill his improvement plan on a ccount of taking FMLA leave is dire ct evidenc e of reta liatory intent. Be cause Martin has presen t ed s u fficient circ umstantial e vidence of reta liatory intent to survive summary judgme nt, w e decline to r eac h the question of whethe r direc t evidence is in thi s case . 13 co nc er nin g M ar tin ’ s c la im

that the S ch ool D istri ct

int er fe re d w ithhis r igh t t o reinstatem ent. S umm ary j udgm ent was not proper.

2. Re ta liatio n C la im To prove FML A r etaliation, an em ploy ee m ust sh ow that his em

ploy er int en tio na lly

dis cr im inate d a ga ins t hi m f or e xe rc isi ng an F ML A r igh t. S ee 29 U. S. C. § 261 5(a)( 2); 29 C.F. R. § 825 .220(c). U nlike an interference claim , an em ploy ee “bringin g a reta liation claim fac es the increased burden of showing that his e m plo y er ’ s a ct ion s w er e m oti va te d by a n im pe rm iss ibl e re ta liator

y or dis cr im inator

y a nim us. ” S tr ic kland, 239 F . 3d at 12 07 ( int er na l qu otatio n m ar

ks om itt ed ). Mart in a lle ge s th at the S ch ool D istri ct

r et al ia te d a ga ins t hi m

f or takin g FM L A le av e by

te rm inatin g hi s e m

plo ym en t. Abse nt d ir ec t e vid en ce of r et al ia tor y int en t, w e ap ply

the bur de n- shi ft ing 6 fr am ew ork e sta

bli she d inMc D onne ll D ougl as Co rp . v. G re en , 93 S . Ct . 181 7 (1973). Br

ungart v. BellSouth Te lecom m s., Inc. , 231 F. 3d 79 1, 798 (11th Cir.14

2000 ). U nde r that a

ppr oa ch , a n e m

plo y ee c la im ing F ML A r et al ia tio n m ust sho w that ( 1) he e nga ge d instatut or ily pr ote ct ed

a ct ivi ty , ( 2) he suf

fe re d an a dve rs e em ploym ent decision, and (3) the decision was ca usally relate d to the protected ac tiv ity . I d. Once the em

ploy ee establishes a prim a fa cie ca se of re taliation, the burden shifts to th e em

ploy er “ to articulate a le gitim ate re ason for the adverse ac tion.” Hurlbert v. St. Mary ’ s Hea lth Care S y s., Inc. , 439 F. 3d 12 86, 1297 (11t h Cir. 2 0 0 6 ). If th e e m p l o yer d o es s o , t h e e m

p l o yee mus tth en s h o w t h at th e e m p l o yer’s pr of fe re d r ea son w as pr et ex tua l by pr es en tin g e vid en ce “ suf fi ci en t t o pe rm it a re as ona ble f ac tf ind er to co nc lud e that the r ea sons giv enby the e m plo y er w er e not the real r easons for the adverse em ploym ent decision.” Id. at 1298 (internal quot at ionm ar

ks o m itt ed ). T he e m

plo y ee m ay

r el y on e vid en ce that he a lr ea dy pr oduc ed to es ta bli sh h is p ri m a fa ci e ca se . C om bs v . P lantatio n P atte rn s, 106 F . 3d 1519 , 152 8 ( 11th C ir . 199 7) ; H ai rs tonv. G ai ne svi lle S un P ubl ’ g C o. , 9 F . 3d 9 13, 92 1 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 3) . Mart in e as ily

de m onstrate s apr im a fa ci e ca se of r et al ia tio n. I n f

ac t, the Sc hool D istri ct

c ha lle nge s on ly

the c au sa l r el at ionbe tw ee n M ar tin ’ s F ML A le av e and term ination . But the close tem poral proxim ity

betwee n the two—Martin w as te rm inate d w hil e on F ML A le av e— is m or e than su ff ic ie nt t o c re at e a ge nui ne15

iss ue of m at er ia l f

ac t of c au sa l c onne ct ion . H ur lbe rt , 439 F . 3d at 12 98. T o pr ev ai l on summ ary

j udgm ent, there fore, the School District m ust present a legitim ate, non-retaliatory

rea son for term inating Martin: a r eason that no reasonable jury co uld c onc lud e w as pr et ex tua l. T he S ch ool D istri ct ha s no t m et

thi s hi gh s tandard . The S chool District contends th at Martin w as term inated because he failed to f ulf ill his im pr ove m en t pl an , not

be ca use he too k F ML A le av e. T he S ch ool District say s, in ef

fect, that it was not hostile to FMLA -leave taking but rather in di ffer en t t o i t: a su bt le di st in ct io n, yet a le gi ti m at e, no n- ret al ia to ry ex pl an at io n. In te nt i s a t i ssu e. A nd the r ec or d c ont ai ns e vid en ce on whic h r ea sona ble m ind s co uld f ind pr et ex t, inc lud ing the S ch ool D istri ct ’ s w ar nin g to Mart in a

bout the ram ifications of his takin g FML A le ave and the close tem poral proxim ity

betwee n M ar t i n ’s FM LA l ea v e a n dt er m i n at i o n . Al t h o u g h th e S ch o o l Di s t ri ct ’s explanation m ay

ultim ately

prove true, a genuine disp ute of m aterial f act noneth eless rem ains. Sum m ary j udgm ent was not appropriate.

CONCLUSION W e V A CA T E the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j udgm en t and RE MA N D the c as e fo r furthe r pr oc ee din gs. VACATED andREMANDED.16

KRA V IT CH , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , spe ci al ly

c onc ur ri ng: I ag re e w iththe m aj or ity ’ s op ini on v ac at ing the sum m ar y j udgm en t and re m an din g to the dis tr ic t c ourt. I w ri te thi s sp ec ia l c onc ur re nc e to a ddr es s Mart in’ s in te rf

er en ce c la im . A lth oughI r ea chthe sam e co nc lus iona s th e m aj or ity that sum m ar y j udgm en t onMart in’ s in te rf er en ce c la im

w as im pr ope r, I do s o f

or di ffer en t re as on s. It is undi sput ed

that M ar tinw as una

ble to fu lf

ill his im pr ove m en t pl anon ac co unt of his le av e an d th at

the m ai n r ea son he w as not r eh ir ed w as be ca use he wa s unable to com

plete the plan. T he question , ther efore, is whether an em ploy er m ust giv e ane m

plo y ee a ddi tio na l t im e af te r re tur nin g f ro m le av e to i m

pr ove his pr ior poo r pe rf

orm an ce thr ougha n e sta

bli she d im

pr ove m en t pl anw he re the em pl oyee was o n a for m

of p ro ba ti on be fo re t ak in g l eav e. The F MLAregulations prov ide that “ [i] f an em ploy ee is no longer qualified for the position because of the e m ploy ee’ s inabilit y

to attend a necessary

course, re ne wali ce nse , f

ly am ini m um num be r of hours , e tc . , a s ar es ult

of the le av e, the em plo y ee sha ll be giv enar ea sona ble opp or tun ity to fu lf ill tho se c ondi tio ns u

pon re tur n to w ork. ” 29 C . F. R. § 82 5. 215( b) . T his r ai se s th e que sti on o f w he the r the co m ple tio n of apr ogr am

to de m onstrate im

pr ove m en t i s th e ty

pe of qua lif ic at ion pr ogr am that an e m

plo y ee is en tit le d to c om

ple te a ft er

le av e or w he the r it is aAdditionally , the district court e rre d in finding that Martin’s rig hts pursuant to FMLA wer e not 1 violated bec ause the y

wer e extinguished whe n h i s y ear -to-year employ ment contra ct ende d. The School D istrict’s counsel stipulated that “contr act non-re newa l” is the same thingas “te rmination” for the pur

poses of F ML A. 17 pr iv il eg e th atan em

pl oyer m ay

wit hd raw i f in co m

pa ti bl e wit h F MLA le av e. U nde r the c ir cu m stanc es of thi s c as e, I be lie ve that i t i s ana log ous to the qualification prog ram s discuss ed in the regulations . See id. Mar tin’s superior, D eg uti s, appr ove d M ar

tin ’ s le av e re que st, but

the n in fo rm ed

him that t ak ing the le av e w oul d pr ev en t hi m

f ro m c om ple tin g th e im

pr ove m en t pl ana nd d ir ec tly re sul t i n th e non- re ne w al of his c ontra ct . T hus, the F ML A le av e pr ev en te d M ar tin fr om c om ple tin g apr ogr am

r equir ed f or c ontra ct r en ew al . T he S ch ool D istri ct , the re fo re , int er fe re d w ithMart in’ s r igh ts unde r FM L A to take appr ove d le av e by not r e- hir ing him

on a cc ount

of his ina bil ity to co m ple te the im

pr ove m en t pl an . 1 The S chool District corre ctly point s out th at FML A provides no greater pr ote ct iona ga ins t t er

m inatio n un re la te d to F ML A le av e than th e em plo y ee w oul d ha ve ha d if

he ha d no t r eque ste d le av e. 29 C. F. R. § 82 5. 216( a) ; se e G unne ll v. U tah V al le y

S ta te Co lle ge , 152 F . 3d 1 253, 126 2 ( 10th C ir . 199 8) . T his r ule ap pli es , how ev er , w he re the r ea son is unrelat ed to the F ML A le av e. S ee e . g. O ’ Co nnor

v. P CAF am ily

H ea lthP lan, I nc . , 200 F . 3d 1 349, 135 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) (i nvol vin g te rm inatio n of a n e m plo y ee on F ML A be ca

use of le git im at e co m

pany dow n- siz ing ). H er e, Mart in’ s te rm inatio n w as not unr el at ed

to his le av e be ca

use18

the r ea son he w as una

ble to co m

ple te the r equir ed

im pr ove m en t pl anw as that he wa s on FMLAleave. Beca use I fe el that Martin established that the School District interfere d w ithhis r igh ts unde r FM L A , I a gr ee w iththe m aj or ity that the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s gr an t of summ ary

j udgm ent for the Sc hool District on the interfe rence claim wa s im proper.