COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Annunziata and Agee 

WAYNE MAURICE SCOTT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1589-00-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 MAY 29, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 

Richard C. Pattisall, Judge 

 (Thomas E. Wray, on brief), for appellant. 

Appellant submitting on brief. 

 (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; 

Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee 

sumitting on brief. 

 Wayne Maurice Scott (appellant) was convicted in a jury trial 

of rape, in violation of Code § 18.2-61(A), and robbery, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-58. On appeal, he contends that the 

evidence was insufficient to convict him of either crime because 

the eyewitness testimony was inherently incredible and the other 

evidence was not sufficient to identify him as the perpetrator of 

the crimes.1 Because appellant failed to object to the 

introduction of the identification evidence and failed to move to 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

1

 Other than with respect to identification, appellant does 

not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 
strike the evidence or set aside the verdict on this ground, Rule 

5A:18 bars our consideration of his insufficient evidence claim. 

 Rule 5A:18 provides: 

No ruling of the trial court . . . will be 

considered as a basis for reversal unless 

the objection was stated together with the 

grounds therefor at the time of the ruling, 

except for good cause shown or to enable the 

Court of Appeals to attain the ends of 

justice. A mere statement that the judgment 

or award is contrary to the law and the 

evidence is not sufficient to constitute a 

question to be ruled upon on appeal. 

(Emphasis added). "'To be timely, an objection must be made 

when the occasion arises--at the time the evidence is offered or 

the statement made.'" Bowman v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 298, 

301, 516 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1999) (quoting Marlowe v. 

Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 619, 621, 347 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1986)). 

Objections to identification evidence must be made by "motion or 

objection either before or at the time the identification 

evidence was unfolded to the jury." Poole v. Commonwealth, 211 

Va. 258, 259, 176 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1970) (holding that an 

accused waives all objections to identification evidence when 

the accused waits until the Commonwealth has rested its case 

before challenging the admissibility of identification 

evidence). In the instant case, appellant made no objection 

when Jennifer Schuder (Schuder), the victim of the rape and 

robbery, identified him in court during the trial. Nor did 

appellant object when Schuder testified that she identified 

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appellant during a "live line-up" at the courthouse shortly 

after the rape and robbery. Appellant also did not object when 

Sue Rubeiz testified that Schuder identified appellant during 

the "live line-up." Thus, we hold that appellant failed to 

timely object to the identification evidence. 

 Appellant cannot rely upon his motions to strike the 

evidence or his motion to set aside the verdict. A motion to 

strike the evidence or to set aside the verdict must specify the 

grounds upon which the motion is based. See Marshall v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 627, 637, 496 S.E.2d 120, 124 (1998); 

Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 220, 487 S.E.2d 269, 

272 (1997). In the instant case, appellant failed to specify 

the grounds upon which his motions were based. At the end of 

the Commonwealth's evidence appellant "move[d] to strike the 

evidence for the Record." He provided no other basis and did 

not make an argument to the court explaining his motion. At the 

end of all the evidence appellant again "move[d] to strike the 

evidence for the Record." Again he did not provide a basis for 

the motion or offer any further argument or explanation to the 

court for his motion. After the jury returned a verdict, the 

following colloquy took place between the trial court and 

appellant's trial counsel: 

MR. MAYNARD: I have a motion to set aside 

the verdict, excuse me, a motion to set 

aside the judgment, notwithstanding the 

verdict. 

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THE COURT: All right, and what are your 

grounds for that, Mr. Maynard? 

MR. MAYNARD: For the Record, Your Honor. 

Appellant offered no further argument or explanation of the 

basis for his motion. Appellant's sole basis in all three 

motions was "for the Record." "For the record" is not a ground 

for a motion. Appellant's motion is identical to a "motion to 

strike the evidence" or a "motion to set aside the verdict" 

where counsel has not included the phrase "for the record." If 

the motion is made in court or by written motion then it is "on 

the record," adding the phrase "for the record" to the motion 

has no effect on whether the motion is a part of the record or 

on the validity of the motion. Appellant has made nothing more 

than a general "motion to strike" and a general "motion to set 

aside the verdict." Therefore, although appellant moved to 

strike the evidence at the end of the Commonwealth's evidence, 

renewed his motion at the end of all the evidence and made a 

motion to set aside the verdict, he failed to specifically 

assert that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was 

the person who committed the crimes or offer any other grounds 

of error, as required to preserve the issue for appeal. 

 Furthermore, we cannot excuse appellant's failure to 

properly object or make a sufficient motion to strike so as to 

invoke the "ends of justice" exception because the record does 

not show that appellant "was convicted for conduct that was not 

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a criminal offense or . . . that an element of the offense did 

not occur." Redman, 25 Va. App. at 222, 487 S.E.2d at 273. For 

the reasons set forth above, we hold that Rule 5A:18 bars our 

review of the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the 

identification of appellant as the person who committed the 

robbery and rape. Accordingly, we affirm both convictions. 

 Affirmed.

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