[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT 

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellant 

 v. 

TERRANCE WILLIAMS, 

 Appellee 

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No. 668 CAP 

Appeal from the Order entered on 

09/28/2012 in the Court of Common Pleas, 

Criminal Division of Philadelphia County at 

No. CP-51-CR-0823621-1984, granting a 

Stay of Execution 

SUBMITTED: September 18, 2013 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellant 

 v. 

TERRANCE L. WILLIAMS, 

 Appellee 

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No. 669 CAP 

Appeal from the Order entered on 

09/28/2012 in the Court of Common Pleas, 

Criminal Division of Philadelphia County at 

No. CP-51-CR-0823621-1984 

SUBMITTED: September 18, 2013 

OPINION 

MR. JUSTICE EAKIN DECIDED: December 15, 2014

The Commonwealth appeals from the order granting a stay of execution, vacating 

appellee’s death sentence, and awarding a new penalty hearing under the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We vacate the stay of 

execution and the grant of a new penalty phase, and reinstate the sentence of death. 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 2 

Appellee was sentenced to death after being convicted of the robbery and murder 

of Amos Norwood February 3, 1986, his second murder conviction. A detailed account 

of the crime is set forth in our opinion on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 

570 A.2d 75, 77-79 (Pa. 1990). Suffice it to say, appellee and his co-conspirator, Marc 

Draper, took Norwood to a graveyard, tied him with his own clothes, and beat him to death 

with a tire iron — appellee returned the next day and set fire to the corpse. At trial, 

appellee testified that Draper and another individual committed the crime; he claimed he 

was elsewhere at the time and uninvolved. He testified he did not know the victim, had 

never seen him before, and had no reason to be angry with him or wish to harm him. 

This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence February 8, 1990, id., at 84, and appellee 

did not seek certiorari. He filed a timely PCRA petition March 24, 1995. 

At the 1998 PCRA hearing, now represented by the Federal Community 

Defenders Office (FCDO), appellee abandoned his trial testimony and argued Norwood 

engaged in homosexual acts with him, and as set forth below, presented evidence 

supporting this claim. The PCRA court denied relief, and this Court affirmed. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 863 A.2d 505, 523 (Pa. 2004). Appellee filed a second 

PCRA petition February 18, 2005, which was dismissed as untimely. This Court 

affirmed. Commonwealth v. Williams, 909 A.2d 297 (Pa. 2006) (per curiam). Appellee 

filed a third PCRA petition June 1, 2005, which was dismissed as untimely, and we 

affirmed. Commonwealth v. Williams, 962 A.2d 609 (Pa. 2009) (per curiam). 

 While that PCRA appeal was pending before this Court, appellee filed a federal 

habeas corpus petition December 19, 2005, which was denied. The Third Circuit 

affirmed. Williams v. Beard, 637 F.3d 195, 238 (3d Cir. 2011). In his federal appeal, 

appellee contended trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence he was 

psychologically damaged by years of sexual abuse, which infused him with rage toward 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 3 

men who made sexual advances toward him; appellee argued Norwood was one of these 

men and had been sexually abusing him since the age of 13. Appellee petitioned the 

United States Supreme Court for certiorari, which was denied. Williams v. Wetzel, 133 

S. Ct 65 (2012) (per curiam). 

On January 9, 2012, the FCDO visited Draper, who was serving a life sentence at 

SCI-Frackville. That same day, Draper signed an affidavit declaring he told detectives 

and the prosecution prior to trial that Norwood was a homosexual and was in a 

relationship with appellee. The affidavit also claimed the prosecution “wanted the motive 

to be a robbery and kept coming back to that. That’s how they wanted me to testify, that 

it was a robbery.” Draper’s Affidavit, 1/9/12, at 4. The FCDO revisited Draper March 1, 

2012, obtaining another affidavit with similar declarations. 

Appellee then filed this facially untimely PCRA petition March 9, 2012, his fourth 

state petition for collateral review. On July 27, 2012, he filed a “Supplemental Petition for 

Post Conviction Relief and Notice of Filing Additional Evidence in Support of Stay of 

Execution,” although no execution warrant had been signed. An execution warrant was 

subsequently issued August 8, 2012, setting the execution for October 3, 2012. 

Appellee filed a “Renewed Motion for Stay of Execution” August 28, 2012, and the 

Commonwealth filed a response September 7, 2012. On September 6, 2012, appellee 

filed a motion for discovery, requesting the production of exculpatory information from the 

Commonwealth “as well as any reports or notes made concerning Norwood’s sexual 

relationship or sexual abuse of [appellee] or any other child under the age of 18.” 

Appellee’s Motion for Discovery, 9/6/12, at 5-6. 

On September 10, 2012, the PCRA court heard argument on the pleadings to 

determine whether the petition warranted an evidentiary hearing. The court gave 

appellee time to obtain and submit additional information from Draper, which led to his 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 4 

third affidavit, dated September 11, 2012. On September 14, the court heard additional 

argument and ordered an evidentiary hearing, which began September 20; only Draper 

and the trial prosecutor testified. On Saturday, September 22, the court ordered the 

Commonwealth to produce trial files and Philadelphia Police Department files and 

allowed both parties to review those files.1 On September 24, documents from these 

files were offered and admitted into evidence, and the PCRA court entered 11 exhibits 

sua sponte. See Exhibit List, 9/20/12. The court then directed appellee to amend his 

PCRA petition; on September 28, appellee filed an “Amendment and Supplement to 

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,” requesting relief because the Commonwealth had 

given “sanitized” witness statements to the defense. The same afternoon, the court 

ruled there was a Brady 2 violation because that which was missing from original 

discovery suggested Norwood may have been a “homosexual ephebophiliac.” PCRA 

Court Opinion, 11/27/12, at 12-13 (citations omitted).

3

 The PCRA court also concluded appellee’s fourth PCRA petition met the 

“governmental interference” exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement, 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(1)(i),4 though it did not meet the “newly-discovered evidence” exception, id., § 

 

1

 The court’s order included files for both the Norwood murder and the murder of Herbert 

Hamilton. Both murders had the same trial prosecutor, the same defendant (appellee), 

and the same key witness (Draper). In the Hamilton murder, appellee was receiving 

money from Hamilton in exchange for sex; appellee murdered Hamilton when he 

threatened to expose this relationship. Although the charge was first degree murder, the 

jury convicted appellee of third degree murder, about one year before the Norwood trial. 

2

 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

3

 The PCRA court defined “homosexual ephebophilia” as a psychological term for the 

attraction to “young men,” both adults and adolescents. See id., at 13 n.32. 

4

 Subsection (b)(1)(i) provides an untimely PCRA petition falls within an exception if the 

petitioner proves: “the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by 

(continuedJ) 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 5 

9545(b)(1)(ii).5 The court ordered a stay of execution pursuant to § 9545(c)(2),6 finding 

appellee exceeded the “strong likelihood” threshold and demonstrated actual success on 

the merits of his claim regarding the penalty phase. The court held the Commonwealth 

violated Brady and found appellee identified a specific claim, Norwood’s homosexual 

ephebophilia, which he was unable to discover or develop due to interference by the 

Commonwealth. The interference consisted of withholding or “sanitizing” three specific 

pieces of evidence: a statement by Norwood’s wife, a statement by the pastor of 

appellee’s church, and notes made by the prosecutor. 

 The first statement involved a story Norwood’s wife told police, which was omitted 

from the 1984 police activity sheet. She said Norwood once woke her at 2 a.m. and 

asked her for money while a young male stood in the hall outside their bedroom. She 

saw Norwood load stereo equipment into his car and drive away with the young male. 

She told police she believed this to be a kidnapping; when Norwood returned home 

around 9 a.m., he said he was abducted but escaped by using psychology on his captors. 

When his wife tried to call the police, Norwood asked her to avoid their involvement. 

 The second statement was from appellee’s pastor, who was also a friend of 

Norwood. The pastor told police Norwood worked with and counseled young males in 

 

(Jcontinued) 

government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or 

laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States[.]” Id. 

5

 Subsection (b)(1)(ii) provides an exception for an untimely PCRA petition if the 

petitioner proves: “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the 

petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]” Id. 

6

 Subsection (c)(2) states no stay may be issued unless a PCRA petition meeting all 

requirements of this subchapter of the PCRA has been filed and is pending, and the 

petitioner makes “a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits.” Id., § 

9545(c)(2). 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 6 

the church for many years. Omitted from the 1984 activity sheet was the pastor’s 

suspicion that Norwood may have been a homosexual, and that five years earlier, the 

pastor received a complaint from a mother alleging Norwood propositioned her 

17-year-old son for sex. The pastor also repeated for police the “kidnapping” story told 

by Norwood’s wife — this was included with the pastor’s statements in the 1984 police 

activity sheet, which had been disclosed to the defense. 

 The court also found the Commonwealth failed to disclose handwritten notes by 

the trial prosecutor, purportedly recounting an instance of Norwood’s behavior toward a 

teenage male, which would establish the prosecution’s awareness of Norwood’s 

homosexual proclivities. The court stated, had such evidence been disclosed to the 

defense, trial counsel would have been able to challenge the Commonwealth’s 

sympathetic portrayal of Norwood. The court concluded the inability to portray an 

unsympathetic victim was enough to undermine one’s confidence the jury would have 

returned the same verdict of death.7 

 Finding appellee exercised due diligence, the court concluded he did not know this 

evidence existed until his co-conspirator executed an affidavit in January, 2012, declaring 

a possible motive for the crime, i.e., rage over being sexually abused by Norwood. 

Appellee timely filed his PCRA petition within 60 days of learning the substance of 

Draper’s affidavit. Furthermore, the court noted appellee could not have known the 

 

7

 The court also stated the Commonwealth interfered with appellee’s Brady claim by 

“disput[ing] the existence of information in [its] files about [] Norwood’s homosexual 

ephebophilia” when the Commonwealth represented to the 1998 PCRA court that the 

only evidence involved in the case was appellee’s knowledge that Norwood was a 

homosexual and his plan to extort money from Norwood but mentioned nothing about the 

additional “homosexual ephebophilia” evidence. PCRA Court Opinion, 11/27/12, at 

15-17. The court added a supplemental opinion to its PCRA opinion, describing 

additional instances that led it to conclude the prosecution exhibited “gamesmanship.” 

See id. app., at 1-15. 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 7 

Commonwealth interfered with his ability to present evidence of Norwood’s homosexual 

ephebophilia until the underlying evidence was uncovered during the hearing held as a 

result of Draper’s affidavit; therefore, appellee timely filed the amendment and 

supplement to his PCRA petition in order to particularize his Brady claim just three days 

after government files were opened. Accordingly, the court concluded appellee met his 

burden under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), and subsection (b)(2), so it had jurisdiction to 

grant relief. Finding appellee established his Brady claim, the court held he was entitled 

to a new penalty hearing. The court denied relief regarding the guilt phase. The 

Commonwealth filed this appeal, raising two issues for our review regarding the 

timeliness of appellee’s fourth PCRA petition and the merits of his Brady claim.8

 Our standard of review of the PCRA court’s grant of relief is clear: we examine 

whether the court’s findings are supported by the record and whether its conclusions of 

law are free from legal error. Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010). 

All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one 

year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an exception to timeliness applies. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). “The PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. 

Thus, [i]f a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has 

jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal 

 

8

 The Commonwealth’s issues, set forth verbatim, are: 

I. Was [appellee]’s fourth PCRA petition, in which he alleged a violation of 

Brady[] based on the non-disclosure of information he had known since 

before trial, untimely? 

II. In any event, was [appellee]’s Brady claim meritless where the 

information in question would not have been reasonably likely to change the 

outcome, had no apparent exculpatory value, and had been known all along 

by [him]? 

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 3. 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 8 

authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 

522 (Pa. 2006) (first alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

As timeliness is distinct from the merits of the underlying claims, we must first determine 

whether appellee’s PCRA petition was timely filed in order to decide whether this Court 

has legal authority to address its substantive claims. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 

A.2d 306, 310 (Pa. 2008) (consideration of Brady claim separate from consideration of its 

timeliness). 

 This, appellee’s fourth PCRA petition, was untimely on its face, as it was filed over 

20 years after his judgment of sentence became final. The PCRA petitioner has the 

burden of proving an untimely petition falls within an exception outlined in § 9545(b)(1). 

See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 2008) (“[I]t is the [petitioner]’s 

burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.” (citation 

omitted)). Furthermore, any PCRA petition filed under a timeliness exception must be 

filed within 60 days of when the petition could have first been presented. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(2). “‘[T]he 60-day rule requires a petitioner to plead and prove that the 

information on which he relies could not have been obtained earlier, despite the exercise 

of due diligence.’” Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (quoting 

Stokes, at 310). 

 Although a Brady violation might fall within the “governmental interference” 

exception, § 9545(b)(1)(i) nonetheless requires a petitioner to plead and prove: (1) the 

failure to previously raise the claim was the result of interference by government officials 

and (2) the information on which he relies could not have been obtained earlier with the 

exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 

2008) (citation omitted). The merits of a Brady claim need not be addressed until it is 

established that the instant petition was timely filed. Stokes, at 310. Thus, the proper 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 9 

questions for our review are whether the Commonwealth interfered with appellee’s ability 

to present a claim that Norwood was a homosexual with a sexual attraction to teenage 

males, and whether appellee was duly diligent in obtaining such information. 

 The PCRA court held it had jurisdiction under the “governmental interference” 

exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, concluding the alleged Brady violations posited by 

appellee met the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i). The Commonwealth 

contends appellee’s PCRA petition failed to establish this exception, as appellee would 

have known well before trial of any sexual relationship or abuse between Norwood and 

himself. In fact, the Commonwealth argues, if anyone knew about Norwood’s 

homosexual proclivities toward teenage males, it was appellee himself. The 

Commonwealth points to the evidence of appellee’s statements during the murder, 

taunting Norwood for “liking boys,” and appellee’s plan to extort Norwood by threatening 

to expose his homosexual activity. 

 Further, the Commonwealth contends appellee not only could have presented 

evidence of ephebophilia much sooner, but points out appellee did present just such a 

claim during his first PCRA proceedings in 1998, where he offered testimony from several 

witnesses alleging Norwood sexually abused him. The Commonwealth also posits that 

appellee’s instant PCRA petition admitted he knew about Norwood’s homosexual 

tendencies years before the murder. Since appellee already knew about this alleged 

material evidence, the Commonwealth contends any “sanitization” of evidence by the 

prosecution does not amount to a Brady violation. Accordingly, the Commonwealth 

asserts, appellee did not prove the timeliness exception applies, and the PCRA court was 

without jurisdiction to rule on appellee’s petition, much less grant a stay of execution and 

a new penalty phase. 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 10 

 The Commonwealth also suggests the PCRA court attempted to circumvent a 

valid death sentence and undermine the integrity of this Court’s ruling in appellee’s first 

PCRA appeal. The Commonwealth refers to the ordering of what amounted to additional 

discovery to supplement appellee’s inadequate petition, the court’s lengthy examination 

of the trial prosecutor after PCRA counsel finished his examination, and the admission of 

“court exhibits” sua sponte, later basing its “governmental interference” decision on one 

of its own exhibits. In sum, the Commonwealth contends the PCRA court “went to great 

lengths to expand the record, to reshape [appellee]’s claim, and to limit the 

Commonwealth.” Commonwealth’s Reply to Defendant’s Response to Emergency 

Application to Lift Illegal Stay of Execution, 10/2/12, at 12. The Commonwealth, 

therefore, requests we vacate the stay of execution and the grant of a new penalty phase. 

 Appellee argues the PCRA court’s timeliness findings were supported by the 

record and devoid of legal error. While appellee admits he had prior knowledge of 

Norwood’s sexual orientation, he contends such prior knowledge is critically different from 

evidence of homosexual ephebophilia and sexual abuse of other teenage males. He 

distinguishes the failure to present the defense of rage at trial, his 1998 ineffectiveness 

claim, from the inability to present Norwood as unsympathetic, and repeats that 

knowledge of homosexuality is not the same as knowledge of homosexual ephebophilia, 

insofar as it relates to the ability to paint an unsympathetic picture of Norwood. 

 Appellee argues he met § 9545(b)(1)(i)’s exception because the Commonwealth 

interfered with his ability to proffer this particular Brady claim, and that he exercised due 

diligence by presenting the claim within 60 days of obtaining the facts on which the claim 

was based. Further, appellee asserts a PCRA petitioner’s previous knowledge of a fact 

applies only to § 9545(b)(1)(ii)’s newly-discovered evidence exception, not § 

9545(b)(1)(i), alleging the Commonwealth is required to disclose evidence in its 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 11 

possession even if the defense has previous knowledge or other information about that 

fact, and the failure to disclose such evidence violates Brady, constituting governmental 

interference with the ability to present a Brady claim. 

 Our examination of the three omissions alleged leads to the inescapable 

conclusion that appellee is not entitled to relief. The missing reports were found to be 

relevant to Norwood’s character, but the failure to explore or exploit that character was 

not a result of governmental interference — there is abundant evidence appellee knew of 

Norwood’s homosexuality and conduct with teenage boys well before trial, sufficient to 

present him as unsympathetic before the jury. Appellee himself was a teenage male 

admittedly engaged in homosexual acts with Norwood. Although he denied any 

involvement in the crime at trial, evidence included his plan to extort Norwood by threating 

to expose him for being a homosexual, and statements in which Draper and appellee 

taunted Norwood for “liking boys” while they were beating him. N.T. Trial, 1/22/86, at 

667-68; N.T. Trial, 1/23/86, at 813-14; see also N.T. PCRA Hearing, 9/20/12, at 219; N.T. 

PCRA Hearing Vol. 2, 9/24/12, at 13. Draper testified at trial that appellee told him 

Norwood was a homosexual. N.T. Trial, 1/23/86, at 814. We agree with the courts that 

have previously considered appellee’s claims based on sexual orientation — there is no 

reasonable conclusion that the result of a trial for this horrific crime would have been 

different had the missing information been provided as appellee would have liked. 

 Further, evidence offered at appellee’s first PCRA hearing in 1998 demonstrated 

the extent of available knowledge of Norwood’s sexual appetites. At that proceeding, 

counsel offered three expert witnesses, all of whom testified appellee and Norwood were 

in a homosexual relationship in which appellee was abused by Norwood; they suggested 

the murder was an “enraged killing” in response to the sexual abuse. See N.T. PCRA 

Hearing, 4/8/98, at 106, 115, 156-59, 186; N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/9/98, at 360-61, 375-76; 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 12 

N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/13/98, at 540, 542-44, 551-54, 569-70. Additionally, appellee’s 

high school teacher, who was also a private psychotherapist, testified Norwood molested 

young boys, including appellee, and he learned this information from several people in 

early 1997. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/8/98, at 226-33. Appellee’s friend, Donald Fisher, 

who was also in a homosexual relationship with appellee for approximately five years, 

testified appellee and Norwood began a homosexual relationship when appellee was 

approximately 15 years old, which lasted a few years, and Norwood was abusive, liked to 

inflict pain, and enjoyed having sex with teenage males. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/13/98, at 

597, 602-05, 617. Fisher also testified appellee would engage in homosexual acts with 

Norwood for money, alcohol, and other gifts. Id., at 617-18. Fisher learned this 

information not only from observing the relationship between appellee and Norwood but 

also because appellee told Fisher. Id. Additionally, the defense stated throughout the 

hearings that its mitigation witnesses were offered to show Norwood molested young 

males and to demonstrate trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in investigating the homosexual 

relationship between appellee and Norwood and the abuse involved in that relationship. 

See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/8/98, at 235-37; N.T. PCRA Hearing, 4/13/98, at 603. 

 Appellee’s prior knowledge was also evident at his federal habeas corpus 

proceeding, during which he alleged Norwood was a closeted homosexual from whom he 

could extort cash by threatening to expose Norwood’s secret to his wife. Williams, 637 

F.3d at 200. Analyzing the record from appellee’s first PCRA proceeding, the Third 

Circuit noted appellee and Norwood began their homosexual relationship when appellee 

was approximately 13 years old. Id., at 229. The court stated Norwood was physically 

abusive toward appellee, once allegedly beating him with a belt. Id., at 229-30. The 

federal district court also elicited testimony from appellee’s first PCRA proceeding 

showing Norwood was a homosexual with whom appellee had sex in exchange for 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 13 

money, drugs, and gifts. See Williams v. Beard, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41310, at *106 

n.32 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2007). 

 The PCRA court itself acknowledged appellee’s arguments from the 1998 PCRA 

hearing supported his prior knowledge, stating appellee “elicited evidence from [] Fisher 

that [] Norwood was very degrading and he liked to have sex with kids. However, the 

current claim does not rest solely upon that evidence.” See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 

9/28/12, at 21. The court also noted the defense, at the time of trial, indeed had 

information suggesting Norwood was a homosexual — a statement from a witness 

disclosing appellee told him Norwood “‘was a homosexual and was the type to pay 

people.’” Id., at 27-28. Appellee’s PCRA counsel also referenced his prior knowledge 

at the hearings. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 9/10/12, at 24 (“[W]e tried to present in prior 

proceedings evidence about the sexual abuse by [] Norwood of [appellee.]”). 

 And quite tellingly, Draper’s affidavits established he knew appellee and Norwood 

were in a homosexual relationship — “[appellee] had also told me that Norwood was gay” 

and during the murder, “[appellee] was yelling ‘so you like boys, so you like boys’ as he hit 

Norwood” — and appellee told Draper the murder was about the homosexual 

relationship. Draper’s Affidavit, 9/11/12, at 2-4. Draper confirmed appellee’s prior 

knowledge of Norwood’s homosexual proclivities repeatedly in his PCRA testimony. 

See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 9/20/12, at 219; N.T. PCRA Hearing Vol. 1, 9/24/12, at 88, 93, 

96; N.T. PCRA Hearing Vol. 2, 9/24/12, at 12-13. 

 The evidence alleged to comprise the Brady violation does not include information 

unknown to appellee, or information he would have been unable to find on his own. The 

“kidnapping” story told by Norwood’s wife indicates that a probably untruthful story was 

told to her, but nothing more. The PCRA court apparently read between the lines and 

presumed the story was a lie to hide Norwood’s homosexuality from his wife. And 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 14 

although this story was omitted from the wife’s statements in the 1984 police activity 

sheet, it was disclosed with the pastor’s statements in the same sheet. That is, appellee 

was already aware of this story, whatever its value, through other means. See 

Reverend’s Disclosed Statement, Exhibit C-2, PCRA Hearing, 9/20/12, at 5. Since 

appellee had it, the government did not interfere with his ability to obtain it. 

 The pastor’s suggestion that he suspected Norwood may have been a 

homosexual would hardly have surprised appellee, who knew that for years. The 

government did not keep appellee from ferreting out the reverend, even if his opinion 

might have been admissible. The pastor’s report that he once received a complaint 

alleging Norwood propositioned a teenage male would have been equally unsurprising. 

These allegations confirmed what appellee already knew — Norwood was a homosexual 

with attraction toward teenage males, like himself.9 There simply is no surprise in this 

revelation, no new information or insinuation that only now suggests Norwood might be 

made to look “unsympathetic.” 

 The third “interference” involves nondisclosure of handwritten notes of the trial 

prosecutor; the PCRA court concluded they recounted a specific instance of homosexual 

ephebophilia. In toto, the notes read, “[N]ot true — Mrs. House — son in play — Ronald 

— 16 yrs.[sic] — touched on privates — I don’t do that — nobody wd [sic] have to know — 

brought boy home [and] asked him not to say anything @ [sic] the — he stopped coming 

to church — disappeared — never verified it — 29 yrs. [sic] — 1st X [sic] — never heard 

from others @ [sic] possible incidents.” See Exhibit Court-2, PCRA Hearing, 9/20/12, at 

 

9

 The reverend refused to make these statements in writing but related them to police in 

confidence. He stated, “[H]e himself handled the matter internally and the complaint 

never went any further than that.” See Police Activity Sheet, Exhibit P-24, PCRA 

Hearing, 9/20/12. 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 15 

2. The court sua sponte admitted these cryptic notes into evidence and used them to 

question the trial prosecutor.10 

 These murky notes, if decipherable with any degree of confidence, do not indicate 

the origin or veracity of their content; they do not indicate whether the notes were written 

during a witness interview, much less who was being interviewed. Indeed, they start with 

the notation “not true.” They do not mention Norwood, whose connection to the notes we 

are asked to insinuate. One could infer they involve the incident omitted from the 

pastor’s statements in the 1984 police activity sheet, where a mother told of Norwood’s 

propositioning her teenage son. However, next to appellee’s own evidence at the 1998 

hearing, it adds little or nothing whatsoever to the information available and already 

presented. The ability to pursue the mitigating tactic of making Norwood appear 

unsympathetic was not created by these notes. 

 Lastly, we note a measure of bootstrapping in appellee’s argument. It is difficult to 

conclude appellee learned something new from Draper’s latest affidavit, as Draper’s 

information was derived from appellee’s own statements to Draper prior to and at the time 

of the murder. Further, Draper’s suggestion that appellee was enraged at the time of the 

murder depends on Norwood’s prior abuse of appellee, which necessarily establishes 

appellee’s knowledge of Norwood’s proclivities before trial. Thus, any failure to 

previously raise this claim was not the result of governmental interference. See 

Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. 2002) (“[N]o Brady violation occurs 

where parties had equal access to the information or if the defendant knew or could have 

 

10 Although the Commonwealth contends the PCRA court violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 

902(E)(1) in the “Statement of the Case” section of its brief, see Commonwealth’s Brief, at 

19, the Commonwealth does not raise a discovery issue on appeal; thus, we will not 

address discovery matters. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 16 

uncovered such evidence with reasonable diligence.” (citation omitted)); see also 

Commonwealth v. Morris, 822 A.2d 684, 696-97 (Pa. 2003). 

 Like appellee’s failed effort to establish a timeliness exception, his Brady claim 

provides no grounds for PCRA relief because the claim is inapposite to the necessary 

materiality inquiry. The United States Supreme Court has never held Brady materiality is 

measured in terms of “effects on the defense strategy.” See Commonwealth v. Weiss, 

81 A.3d 767, 810-11 (Pa. 2013) (Castille, C.J., concurring, joined by Eakin, J.). Further, 

Brady does not permit a defendant to shield himself from his prior perjury at trial. See id., 

at 811-13. 

 Appellee’s Brady theory suggested that had he received additional information 

about Norwood’s homosexual proclivities, his defense would have learned his actual 

motive for the murder, i.e., rage over being sexually abused by Norwood, which, in turn, 

would possibly lead to a new strategy where appellee does not perjure himself and 

Norwood is portrayed unsympathetically. Yet, at the time of trial, appellee was aware of 

potential witnesses and information that would establish Norwood’s homosexual 

attraction to teenage males. Appellee could have used his prior knowledge and his 

counsel’s due diligence to obtain additional information and witnesses to support a 

different trial theory than that presented. He could have argued Norwood’s homosexual 

proclivities developed into sexual abuse, leading to rage and ultimate murder of Norwood. 

He could also have created a portrait of Norwood consistent with that now proffered. 

However, appellee chose not to do so. 

 Instead, appellee perjured himself at trial, testifying he did not know the victim, had 

never seen him before, took no part in the murder, and had no reason to be angry with 

him or wish to harm him. The defense he chose to present disclaimed knowledge of 

Norwood, which is antithetical to what he knew and could have presented — evidence 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 17 

that showed Norwood as a molester, which may have led to establishing a motive of rage, 

or evidence allowing him to depict Norwood as an unsavory character and sexual 

predator. Given the choice of defense, such strategies were not relevant.11 Given the 

details of appellee’s crime, showing the jury the victim was “unsympathetic” was not a 

plan that was likely to cause reciprocal sympathy for the man who bludgeoned him and 

incinerated his body. Regardless, this alleged “sanitized information” claim, coupled 

with the possible effect on appellee’s defense strategy, lacks any basis under Brady, as it 

is neither exculpatory nor material. See Weiss, at 810-13 (Castille, C.J., concurring, 

joined by Eakin, J.). In sum, the Commonwealth did not obstruct appellee’s ability to 

present Norwood as unsympathetic. Appellee had prior knowledge of the information on 

which he based his Brady claim, and could have presented the claim much sooner — 

prior to trial or at any time over the last 20 years. Because appellee’s theory was built on 

perjury, and the information on which he relied was not exculpatory, the PCRA court erred 

in finding his claim material under Brady. Accordingly, the record does not support the 

PCRA court’s finding appellee established his burden of proof regarding the 

“governmental interference” exception. See Abu-Jamal, at 1268 (citation omitted). 

Because the PCRA court was thus without jurisdiction to consider the merits of this 

petition, see Hawkins, at 1252 (citations omitted), we vacate the court’s order, dismiss 

this petition as time-barred, and reinstate the judgment of sentence of death. The 

Prothonotary is directed to transmit the complete record in this case to the Governor 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(i). 

 Order vacated; petition dismissed; judgment of sentence reinstated. 

 

11 Trial counsel indicated at a hearing on appellee’s post-sentence motions that he was 

left with using appellee’s youth as a potential mitigating factor — since appellee provided 

him little, if any, assistance, he was frustrated in efforts to present a compelling group of 

character witnesses on his behalf. See N.T. Post-Sentence Motions, 4/24/87, at 21-27. 
[J-82A-2013 and J-82B-2013] - 18 

 Jurisdiction relinquished. 

 Mr. Chief Justice Castille and Messrs. Justice Baer and Stevens join the opinion. 

 Mr. Chief Justice Castille files a concurring opinion. 

 Mr. Justice Saylor and Madame Justice Todd concur in the result.