alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CIRCUIT COURT OF ALLEGHANY COUNTY

#### Ann Marie Keith v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield

April 16, 1982

Case No. (Law) 1965

By JUDGE DUNCAN M. BYRD, JR.

The plaintiff seeks to remand the above styled matter to the Alleghany County General District Court upon the grounds that it was improperly removed pursuant to § 16.1-92, Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended, which provides in part that the "[General District] judge shall, at any time on or before the return day of the process, or within ten days after such return day, if trial has not commenced . . ., remove the action." The return day of the process in this case was March 16, 1981. The removal Order was February 8, 1982, clearly more than ten days after the *"return date",*as distinguished from *"trial date."*

However, there was no appeal of the General District Court’s Order pursuant to Code of Virginia § 16.1-106, therefore the Order became final after the lapse of ten days (§ 16.1-106) with the possible exception [of the] rehearing jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Virginia § 16.1-97, which expired after the lapse of thirty days. Being of the opinion the time limitations of Code of Virginia § 16.1-92 are procedural and not jurisdictional, this Court has no jurisdiction to remand this matter to the General District Court.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 11.0

Computation of Earnings per Share

The following represents the computation of earnings per share reflecting the
assumption that the granted shares under the option and warrants plan which
would be dilutive will be exercised.

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                 Three Months Ended           Six Months Ended
                                                                      June 30,                    June 30,
                                                              -------------------------   -------------------------
                                                                 2005          2004          2005          2004
                                                              -----------   -----------   -----------   -----------
<S>                                                           <C>           <C>           <C>           <C>
Net earnings applicable to common shareholders - basic        $   498,183   $   470,754   $ 1,126,117   $   807,461
Add:  Dividend to preferred shareholders                           21,600        28,200        43,200        43,200
                                                              -----------   -----------   -----------   -----------

Net earnings - diluted                                        $   519,783   $   498,954   $ 1,169,317   $   850,661
                                                              ===========   ===========   ===========   ===========

Weighted average common shares outstanding - basic             12,652,370    12,483,979    12,636,465    12,447,374

Common share equivalents relating to stock options,
warrants and preferred stock
                                                                3,966,627     3,582,024     3,981,388     3,606,673
                                                              -----------   -----------   -----------   -----------
Adjusted common and common equivalent shares for diluted
computation                                                    16,618,997    16,066,003    16,617,853    16,054,047
                                                              ===========   ===========   ===========   ===========

Net earnings per share:
         Basic                                                $      0.04   $      0.04   $      0.09   $      0.06
         Diluted                                              $      0.03   $      0.03   $      0.07   $      0.05

Anti-dilutive options not included in the earnings per
share computations                                                450,000       365,100       375,000       365,100
</TABLE>

See notes to consolidated financial statements
exv10w2






Exhibit 10.2




	 	 	 

	 

	 	Alexza Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
	 

	 	ID: 77-0567768
	Notice of Grant of Stock Options

	 	2091 Stierlin Court
	and Option Agreement

	 	Mountain View, CA 94043






	 	 	 	 	 	 	 

	[Name]

	 	Option Number:
	 	[Number]

	[Address]

	 	Plan:
	 	2005	 





Effective [Date], you have been granted a(n) [Incentive Stock Option]/[Nonstatutory Stock Option]
to buy [Number of Shares] shares of Alexza Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (the Company) stock at $[Exercise
Price] per share.



The total option price of the shares granted is $[Total Exercise Price].



Shares in each period will become fully vested on the date shown.




	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 
	Shares	 	Vest Type	 	Full Vest	 	Expiration




By your signature and the Company’s signature below, you and the Company agree that these options
are granted under and governed by the terms and conditions of the Company’s Stock Option Plan as
amended and the Option Agreement, all of which are attached and made a part of this document.




	 	 	 

	 

	 	 
	Alexza Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

	 	Date
	 
	 	 
	 

	 	 
	[Name]

	 	Date






	 	 	 	 	 

	 

	 	Date:
	 	[Date]
	 

	 	Time:
	 	[Time]
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-1944

YARED ASHAGRE GEBREGEORGIS,

Petitioner,

versus

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration

Appeals. (A97-189-879)

Submitted: March 24, 2006 Decided: April 10, 2006

Before WILLIAMS, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Aragaw Mehari, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Paul J. McNulty,

United States Attorney, Ralph Andrew Price, Jr., Assistant United

States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Yared Ashagre Gebregeorgis, a native and citizen of

Ethiopia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals adopting and affirming the immigration judge’s

denial of his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture. We deny the

petition.

In his petition for review, Gebregeorgis challenges the

determination that he failed to establish his eligibility for

asylum. To obtain reversal of a determination denying eligibility

for relief, an alien “must show that the evidence he presented was

so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the

requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

478, 483-84 (1992). We have reviewed the evidence of record and

conclude that Gebregeorgis fails to show that the evidence compels

a contrary result. Accordingly, we cannot grant the relief that he

seeks.

Additionally, we uphold the denial of Gebregeorgis’

request for withholding of removal. “Because the burden of proof

for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum--even though

the facts that must be proved are the same--an applicant who is

ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of

removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).” Camara v. Ashcroft, 378

F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir. 2004). Because Gebregeorgis fails to show
- 3 -

that he is eligible for asylum, he cannot meet the higher standard

for withholding of removal.

We also find that substantial evidence supports the

finding that Gebregeorgis fails to meet the standard for relief

under the Convention Against Torture. To obtain such relief, an

applicant must establish that “it is more likely than not that he

or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of

removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2005). We find that

Gebregeorgis failed to make the requisite showing before the

immigration court.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

PETITION DENIED
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2355 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2355

To amend title 38, United States Code, to exclude individuals who have 
   been convicted of committing certain sex offenses from receiving 
certain burial-related benefits and funeral honors which are otherwise 
available to certain veterans, members of the Armed Forces, and related 
                  individuals, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 24, 2011

  Mrs. Hartzler (for herself, Mr. Luetkemeyer, Mr. Ryan of Ohio, Mr. 
Kissell, Mr. Latta, Mr. Bachus, Mr. Forbes, Mrs. McMorris Rodgers, Mr. 
 Burton of Indiana, Mr. Denham, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Boustany, Mr. Davis 
of Kentucky, Mr. Stutzman, Mr. Gowdy, Mr. Pitts, Mr. Rogers of Alabama, 
 Mr. Brooks, Mr. Hanna, Mr. Terry, Mr. Bilbray, Mr. Flake, Mr. Poe of 
  Texas, Mr. Pompeo, Mr. Flores, Mr. Hensarling, Mr. Neugebauer, Mr. 
 Carter, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McCaul, Mr. Farenthold, Mrs. Ellmers, Mr. 
   Nunnelee, Ms. Granger, Mr. Mack, Mr. Manzullo, Mr. Kingston, Mr. 
Jordan, and Mr. Akin) introduced the following bill; which was referred 
to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, and in addition to the Committee 
 on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 38, United States Code, to exclude individuals who have 
   been convicted of committing certain sex offenses from receiving 
certain burial-related benefits and funeral honors which are otherwise 
available to certain veterans, members of the Armed Forces, and related 
                  individuals, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Hallowed Grounds Act''.

SEC. 2. EXCLUSION OF PERSONS CONVICTED OF COMMITTING CERTAIN SEX 
              OFFENSES FROM INTERMENT OR MEMORIALIZATION IN NATIONAL 
              CEMETERIES, ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY, AND CERTAIN 
              STATE VETERANS' CEMETERIES AND FROM RECEIVING CERTAIN 
              FUNERAL HONORS.

    (a) Prohibition Against.--Section 2411(b) of title 38, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph:
            ``(4) A person who is a tier III sex offender for purposes 
        of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply with respect to interments and memorializations that occur on or 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
2115

1 Indeed, in Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921), the Court, albeit in dictum, observed that, unless the inference was drawn that ratification must occur 

within some reasonable time of proposal, ‘‘four amendments proposed long ago—two 

in 1789, one in 1810 and one in 1861—are still pending and in a situation where 

their ratification in some of the States many years since by representatives of generations now largely forgotten may be effectively supplemented in enough more 

States to make three-fourths by representatives of the present or some future generation. To that view few would be able to subscribe, and in our opinion it is quite 

untenable.’’ (Emphasis supplied). 2 A comprehensive, scholarly treatment of the background, development, failure, 

and subsequent success of this mendment is Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORD. L. REV. 497 (1992). 

A briefer account is The Congressional Pay Amendment, 16 Ops. of the Office of 

Legal Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice 102, App. at 127-136 (1992) (prelim. pr.). 3The ratification issues are considered supra in the discussion of Article V. 

4 In the only case to date brought under the Amendment, the parties did not 

raise the question of the validity of its ratification; the court refused to consider the 

issue raised by an amicus. Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F.Supp. 138, 139 (D.D.C. 

1992). It is not at all clear the issue is justiciable. 

CONGRESSIONAL PAY LIMITATION 

TWENTY-SEVENTH AMENDMENT 

No law, varying the compensation for the services of the 

Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened. 

REGULATING CONGRESSIONAL PAY 

Referred to the state legislatures at the same time as those 

proposals that eventually became the Bill of Rights, the congressional pay amendment had long been assumed to be dead. 1 This

provision had its genesis, as did several others of the first amendments, in the petitions of the States ratifying the constitution. 2 It,

however, was ratified by only six States (out of the eleven needed), 

and it was rejected by five States. Aside from the idiosyncratic action of the Ohio legislature in 1873, which ratified the proposal in 

protest of a controversial pay increase adopted by Congress, the 

pay limitation provision lay dormant until the 1980s. Then, an aide 

to a Texas legislator discovered the proposal and began a crusade 

that culminated some ten years later in its proclaimed ratification. 3

Now that the provision is apparently a part of the Constitution, 4 it will likely play a minor role. What it commands was already statutorily prescribed, and, at most, it may have implications 

2116 AMENDMENT 27—CONGRESSIONAL PAY LIMITATION 

5See discussion of ‘‘Congressional Pay,’’ supra. 

for automatic cost-of-living increases in pay for Members of Congress. 5
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

DA 22-0424

_________________

SHAWN FOWLER,

 Plaintiff and Appellee,

 v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MONTANA 

HIGHWAY PATROL,

 Defendant and Appellant.

O R D E R

_________________

Pursuant to the Internal Operating Rules of this Court, this cause is classified for 

submission on briefs to a five-justice panel of this Court. 

The Clerk is directed to provide a copy hereof to all counsel of record and to the 

Honorable Brenda R. Gilbert, District Judge.

For the Court,

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

October 4 2023

10/04/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0424
Exhibit
32.1








CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


(18
U.S.C.  SECTION 1350)








In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Aware, Inc. (the “Company”)
for the quarter ended March 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), each of the undersigned Chief
Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies, to the
best knowledge and belief of the signatory, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1)
              The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
              The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.











/s/   Michael A.
      Tzannes
              
              /s/   Richard P.
      MobergChief
      Executive Officer
              
              Chief
      Financial OfficerDate:  May
      6, 2009
              
              Date:
      May 6, 2009








The certification set forth above is
being furnished as an exhibit solely pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and is not being filed as part of the Form 10-Q or as
a separate disclosure document of the Company or the certifying
officers.
Opinion issued August 22, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-19-00108-CV

———————————

CEDRICK JEROME BASS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 113th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2014-47611

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P.

42.1(a)(1). No other party has filed a notice of appeal and no opinion has issued. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(c). Further, although appellant failed to include a certificate 

of conference in his motion, appellant’s motion includes a certificate of service, 
2

more than 10 days have passed since the motion was filed, and no party has 

responded to the motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.1(a)(5), 10.3(a).

Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 42.1(a)(1). We dismiss all other pending motions as moot. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Higley.
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed May 31, 2023. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D23-0427 Lower Tribunal No. F16-1923

________________ 

### Jimmy Howard, Appellant, vs. 

### The State of Florida, Appellee. An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ramiro C. Areces, Judge. Jimmy Howard, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee. Before LOGUE, LINDSEY and LOBREE, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed.
**Exhibit 32**

 

**CertificationPursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

Pursuant to 18U.S.C. §1350, we, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief FinancialOfficer, respectively, of Community First Bankshares, Inc. (the “Company”), herebycertify:

 

1)     That the Annual Report onForm 10-K of the Company for the year ended December 31, 2003 (the “Report”)fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

2)     That information containedin the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financialcondition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Date:  March 11, 2004 |   | /s/ Mark A.  Anderson                 |   |
|----------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|--------|
|                       |   | Mark A. Anderson                      |   |
|                       |   | President and Chief Executive Officer |   |
|                       |   |
|                       |   |

 

 
| Date:  March 11, 2004 |   | /s/ Craig A.  Weiss                                   |   |
|----------------------------|--------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                       |   | Craig A. Weiss                                        |   |
|                       |   | Executive Vice President and Chief  Financial Officer |   |
|                       |   |
|                       |   |

 

----
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-19-00803-CR

Pedro JIMENEZ,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CR13315

Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 4, 2020

APPEAL DISMISSED

Appellant Pedro Jimenez entered into a plea bargain with the State pursuant to which he 

pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a firearm as a repeat offender. The trial court imposed 

sentence in accordance with the agreement and signed a certificate stating this “is a plea-bargain 

case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Appellant timely 

filed a notice of appeal, and the district clerk filed a copy of the clerk’s record, which includes the 

trial court’s Rule 25.2(a)(2) certification and a written plea bargain agreement. See id. R. 25.2(d). 
“In a plea bargain case . . . a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised 

by written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to 

appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” Id. R. 25.2(a). We 

must dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has not 

been made part of the record.” Id. R. 25.2(d). 

Here, the clerk’s record establishes the punishment assessed by the trial court does not 

exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant. See id. R.

25.2(a)(2). The record also supports the trial court’s certification that appellant does not have a 

right to appeal. See Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that 

court of appeals should review clerk’s record to determine whether trial court’s certification is 

accurate). 

On January 7, 2020, we gave appellant notice that this appeal would be dismissed pursuant 

to Rule 25.2(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure unless an amended certification showing 

that appellant has the right to appeal was made part of the appellate record by February 6, 2020. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d), 37.1; Daniels v. State, 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2003, order), disp. on merits, No. 04-03-00176-CR, 2003 WL 21508347 (July 2, 2003, pet. ref’d) 

(not designated for publication). Neither an amended certification nor other response has been 

filed. We therefore dismiss this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). 

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
EXHIBIT 12.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302  OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I,
Enrico Cavatorta, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Luxottica Group S.p.A.;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
company's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have:



5.     The
company's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company's
auditors and the audit committee of the company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



| |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ENRICO CAVATORTAEnrico Cavatorta,
Chief Financial Officer
| |  |  |  | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------

Dated:  June 29,
2004

---



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