This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellant, 3

v. NO. 33,105 4 BRANDO HOWARD, 5 Defendant-Appellee. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 Karen L. Townsend, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Corinna Laszlo-Henry, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellant 12 Emeterio L. Rudolfo 13 Farmington, NM 14 for Appellee 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 VIGIL, Judge. 172 {1} The State appeals the district court’s order suppressing evidence obtained 1 following a traffic stop. This Court issued a notice of proposed summary disposition, 2 proposing to affirm. The State has filed a memorandum in opposition, which we have 3 duly considered. As we are unpersuaded by the State’s arguments, we affirm the 4 district court’s order suppressing evidence arising from the traffic stop. 5
{2} The sole issue in this appeal is whether the traffic stop at issue was based upon 6 a reasonable suspicion that Defendant violat ed one of three statutes relied upon by the 7 State below. The State’s sole witness at the suppression hearing was the arresting 8 officer. As noted in our proposed summary disposition, [CN 6] that witness’s 9 testimony, along with the State’s theories supporting reasonable suspicion, was 10 internally inconsistent. According to the testimony received at the hearing, Defendant 11 was driving on the inside lane of a four-l ane highway, he illegally changed lanes from 12 the inside lane to the outside lane, and he then made an illegal right-hand turn from 13 the inside lane. [DS unnumbered pages 2-3; RP 68 (describing both an illegal turn 14 from the inside lane and failure to use cau tion before entering the outside lane)] That 15 testimony is consistent with the fact that the witness issued Defendant citations for 16 both an illegal lane change and an illegal right turn. [RP 29-30] 17
{3} Of course, if Defendant changed lane s from the inside lane (illegally or 18 otherwise), he was already in the outside lane before making the right-hand turn for 193 which he was cited. On appeal, the State continues to argue both that Defendant made 1 an illegal lane change [See DS unnumbered page 2 (citing NMSA 1978, § 66-7-317 2 (1978))] and that Defendant made an illegal right-hand turn [See DS unnumbered 3 page 3 (citing NMSA 1978, § 66-7-322 (1978))]. Thus, in attempting to establish the 4 existence of a reasonable susp icion that would support the traffic stop at issue, the 5 State argued—and continues to argue—two alternative sets of facts. In its 6 memorandum in opposition, the State now sugge sts that the district court must have 7 disregarded the officer’s testimony regarding an illegal turn when it found that 8 Defendant changed lanes beforemaking a right-hand turn. [MIO 4] On that basis, the 9 State argues that this Court should conduct a full review of th e evidence presented 10 below, making summary disposition inappropriate. [MIO 3] 11
{4} The district court’s finding regardin g a lane change, however, was amply 12 supported by the officer’s own (contradict ory) testimony that Defendant changed 13 lanes. [RP 68; see also MIO 10 (continuing to assert that Defendant “changed lanes 14 into the path of a rapidly approaching vehicle”)] That finding is also supported by the 15 fact that the record contains a citation issued by that officer to Defendant for an 16 improper lane change. [RP 29] Thus, the reco rd currently before this Court provides 17 all the support necessary to review the issue asserted by the State. Further, in deciding 18 that issue, we need not reso lve the internal conflicts in the State’s theory of the case 194 or scrutinize evidence that would have supported a contrary result, since the question 1 before this Court is simply whether th e district court’s “decision is supported by 2 substantial evidence, not whether the trial court could have reached a different 3 conclusion.” In re Ernesto M., Jr., 1996-NMCA-039, ¶ 15, 121 N.M. 562, 915 P.2d 4 318. In the present case, the record demons trates that there wa s substantial evidence 5 to support the district court’s findi ng that Defendant changed lanes. 6
{5} The State also complains of various other factual findings made by the district 7 court, including where the Bisti Highway expands to four lanes af ter an intersection, 8 whether a truck making a right turn was “merging” onto that roadway, and the way 9 that the district court described the driver of that truck’s failure to yield and 10 subsequent braking to avoid a collision. [M IO 4-5] The State’s complaints appear to 11 be semantic, in that they are principally directed at the district court’s choice of words 12 rather than the substance of the suppression order. And, in any event, the State does 13 not explain how any of these purported factual disputes are material to the district 14 court’s decision to suppress the evidence at issue in this appeal. Because it is not the 15 purpose of this Court to correct errors thathave no effect on the outcome of a case, In 16 re Estate of Heeter, 1992-NMCA-032, ¶ 23, 113 N.M. 691, 831 P.2d 990, assignment 17 to the general calendar in order to revi ew these purported disputes would serve no 18
purpose. 195 {6} The State’s memorandum in opposition also c ontinues to assert that it was error 1 for the district court to apply the doctrine of comparative fault to Defendant’s conduct. 2 [MIO 6-7] However, for the reasons expl ained in our notice of summary disposition 3 [CN 4-5] (but not addressed in the State’s memorandum in opposition thereto), we 4 find that the district court did not apply that doctrine to any issue in this case. See 5 State v. Mondragon , 1988-NMCA-027, ¶ 10, 107 N.M . 421, 759 P.2d 1003 (stating 6 that a party responding to a summary cal endar notice must come forward and 7 specifically point out errors of law and fact, and the repetition of earlier arguments 8 does not fulfill this requirement), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 9 State v. Harris , 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 3, 297 P.3d 374. 10
{7} Similarly, the State also continues to assert its general ar gument that it was 11 reasonable to stop Defendant because “he ch anged lanes into the path of a rapidly 12 approaching vehicle.” [MIO 10] As explai ned in our notice of summary disposition, 13 however, the district court could properly have determined thatDefendant’s change 14 of lanes was not unsafe, since Defendant—and not the “rapidly approaching 15 vehicle”—had the right-of-way. [CN 4-6] The State’s repetition of its argument that 16 the Defendant must have faile d to ascertain that it was safe to change lanes does not 17 satisfy its burden of demonstrating that the proposed disposition would be error. 18 Mondragon , 1988-NMCA-027, ¶ 10

. 196 {8} The State’s memorandum in oppositi on does not provide new facts or 1 authorities that persuade us that our propos ed summary disposition was in error. “Our 2 courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party 3 opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.” Hennessy 4 v. Duryea , 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683. The State has failed 5 to do so. Thus, for the reasons stated here and in our notice of proposed summary 6 disposition, we affirm the district court’s suppression order. 7
{9} IT IS SO ORDERED. 8

__________________________________ 9 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 10 WE CONCUR: 11

___________________________________ 12 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 13

___________________________________ 14 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 15