### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON FE BR U A RY 16, 200 5 S es sio n
IN R E: A D OP TI ON OF A M H, A M in or
JE RRY L. BAKER a nd w ife , LOUI SE K. BAK ER v. SHAO -QI ANG (J ACK) HE an d w ife , QIN (CASE Y) LUO

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-01-1302- III Robert L. Childers, Chancellor By Designation

No. W2004-01225-C OA-R3-P T - F iled Novem ber 23, 2005

I n th is a pp e a l, w e are c a lle d up on to e va luate the tria l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to t e rm inate thepa re nta l r ig hts of the biol og ical parents t o a mi nor child. The biolog ical par ents are Chinese immigrants who are prese ntly in this country

illega lly and ar e subj ect to deportation proce eding s. Shortlyafte r coming to the Un ite d St a te s, the bio log ic a l pa re nts ha d a

daug hte r. F a c ing fi na nc ia l di ff ic ult ie s at th e tim e of their daug hter’s birth, the pare nts de cided to pla ce their daug hter in the car e of an adoption ag ency until their financial situation improved. The ag ency place d the child wit h foster pa rents who a g ree d to car e for

the child over

an initial three month period. At the conclusion of the thr ee month foster
car e period, the biologica l pare nts ag ree d to the entry of a c onsent order

by the juvenile court tr a ns fe rring c us tod y of

the c hil d to the fo ste r p are nts . T he bio log ic a l pa re nts c on tin ue d to vis it w ith their daug hter at the hom e of the custodial non-par ents approximately once e ach w eek f

or one hour
e a c h v isi t. H ow e ve r, the y pa id n o c hil d s up po rt

to the c us tod ia l non- pa

re nts . T he bio log ic a l pa

re nts subsequently

filed a pe tition t o modify the juvenile court’s custody order seeking to reg ain custody of the ir daug hte r, wh ic h th e c ou rt de nie d. Th e re a ft e r, the bio log ic a l par e nts c on tin ue d to vi sit the ir daug hter with the same fre quency as before. On one day in particula r, t he biol og ical par ents asked to take their daug hter for a family portrait, and the custodial non-par ents ref used their reque st. W hen the biologic al par ents ref

used t o leave the custodi al non-pa rents’ home , the police we re c alled. Af ter sp e akin g wi th the po lic e , th e bio log ic a l pa re nts le ft theho me a ndne ve r r e turne d to vis it the ir daug hter c iting their fe ar of arr est. A short time afte r this incident, the biologic al par ents filed a
se c on d p e tit ionto m od if

y the juv e nil e c ou rt ’s c us tod y or de r. I n r e sp on se , th e c us tod ia l no n- pa re nts filed a pe tition t o adopt the child and to terminate the biolog ical par en t s ’ p ar en t al rig hts in the
c ha nc e ry c ou rt , p ri mari ly

re ly ing on theg ro un d o f a ba nd on me nt. As a re su lt, thebio log ic a l pa re nts ’ petition to modi fy

the custody

order was transfer

red to the c hance ry court. Following a leng thy and tortur e d p ro c e du ra l hi sto ry , th e c ha nc e ry c ou rt he ld a ben ch tria l in thematte r andsu bs e qu e ntl y enter ed an or der te rminating the biologic al par ents’ par ental rig hts. The biologica l pa rents filed a timely appea l to this Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decisions of the c hance ry court in this case. Howe ver, in lig ht of our dec isions on certain issues pre sented in this case , we ne ed not
re ma ndthi s c a se to the c ha nc e ry c ou rt fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s.-2-

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in Par t; Reve rsed in Par t

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined, and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., dissented.
David A. Sieg el, Memphis, TN, for Appellant, Shao-Q iang (Jack) He

Richard A. G ordon, Memphis, TN, for Appellant, Qin (Case y ) L uo

L arry E. Parrish, Memphis, TN, for Appellee s Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter , Dou g la s E a rl D im o n d , Senior Counsel, Nashville, TN, I n Def

ense of Challeng ed Te nnessee Statutes

Christina A. Z awisza, Memphis, TN, for Amicus Curiae: Childlaw Center, V ander bilt L eg al Clinic, Child Advocacy

Clini c, Te nnessee Alliance f or L eg al Service s
Scott A. Krame r, Memphis, T N, for Amicus Curia e: Gre ater Seattle Chapter of

the Org anization of Chinese Americans, Inc.

L inda L . Holmes, Memphis, TN, for G uardia n Ad Litem, Kimbroug h Mullins

OP IN ION

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

A

. The Hes Enter th e United States

Shao-Qiang (Jack) He (“F ather ”) w as born on July 18, 1964 in the Peoples Republic of China (“China” ). From 1979 to 1985, Father pursued his bache lor’s degr ee at a university in China. Upon
c omp le tin g his ba c he lor ’s de g re e , F a the r t aug ht at a hi gh sch oo l in Hu na n, Chi na . Fro m 19 86 to 1998, Father wor

k ed t o wa rd obtaining his master ’s deg ree from Huna n University in teaching Eng lish as a s ec o n d lang uag e. Af ter he rec eived his master ’s deg ree , the Chinese g overnme nt assig ned F ather

to teach E ng lish courses at the University of Nanjing, where he continued to tea ch
a s a te nu re d p ro fe sso r f

ro m 19 90 un til 19 95 . In M arc h o f 1 99 5, F a the r c a me to the Un ite d St a te s to p u r s u e a m a s t e r ’ s d e g r e e i n t e a c h i n g E n g l i s h a s a s e c o n d l a n g u a g e a tA r i z o n a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y.F a the r m a rr ie d his first w ife in 1 9 9 0 , an d the y d ivo rc e d a t t h e e n d o f 1 9 9 5 o r in 1 9 9 6

. 1

-3- Father e ntere d the United States on a student vi s a, and he r ece ived a f ull scholarship to attend Arizona State University . Father attended Arizona St ate Unive rsity from 1995 until 1997, and he returne d to the university in 2000 to de fend his ma ster’s thesis. I n Aug ust of 1997, Father e nrolled
a t th e Un ive rs ity

of Me mph is t o p urs ue a

do c tor a te de g re e in e c on omi c s. F a the r r e c e ive d a fu ll scholarship to attend the University of Memphis, which inc l u ded a stipend in the amount of $1,050.00 eac h month for working as a te aching/resea rch a ssistant for approximat elytwenty (20) hours ea ch we ek. F ather subsequently

abandone d hi s d o ct oral de g ree and chang ed his course of study to pursue a ma ster’s de g ree in manag ement information sy stems.

After coming to the United States, Father re turned to China in May of 1998 to visit for approximately

one month. Qin (C asey ) L uo (“Mother ” or, c ollectively with Fathe r, “the Hes” or “Appe llants”) wa s born i n China on Marc h 21, 1968. Mother and F ather never met in person prior to F a the r’ s r e turn trip t o Ch ina , b ut the y did c ommun ic a te thr ou g h te le ph on e c a lls a nde ma il f or six to seven months prior to their fir st meeting

. During his r eturn trip to China in May of 1998, Mr. He met Mother in per son. Acc ording to Mothe r, F ather mailed her

some materia l in 1998 inst ructing he r t o g o to the Un ite d State s Emba ssy in Chi na to se c ur e a vis a , a nd he re turne d to Chi na to a ssi st her w ith securing the visa. I n order to assist Mother in coming to this country , Father submitted a form to the Univer sityof Memphis indicating that he and Mother wer e marrie d. Mother and F ather 1 ind ic a te d o n th e ir

imm ig ratio n d oc ume nts that th e y we re le g a lly marrie d in China

. Mo the r w a s a ble to s e c ur e a

vis a a s th e wi fe of

a stu de nt, a ndsh e e nte re d the Un ite d Stat e s in J un e of 19 98 . In f

a c t, the Hes w ere not leg ally marr i ed in C hina bef

ore Mother

came to the United States, there fore , Mother has be en an illeg al alien since she ente red theUnited States. I n a subseque nt deposition, Father testified that his int ent was to g et Mother into the country without ever ha ving ma

rried he r in China.

B.

The Bir th o f A .M .H. and th e Hes’ Financial Difficulties

When she enter ed the United States, Mother could s p ea k v ery

littl e Eng lish. S he beg an working as a w aitress in a Chinese restaur ant shortly afte r ar riving in thi s co u n t ry earning
app ro xima te ly

$2 00 to $3 00 pe r mon th. I n July of 19 98 , F a the r l e arn e d th a t Mo the r w a s p re g na nt. Be tween the time Mother enter ed the United States and October of 1998, the Hes’ financ es re mained stable. On Oc tober 11, 1998, F ather worke d as a c omputer lab as s i s t an t at the Univer sityof Memphis. A ccor ding to F ather , another Chinese student approa ched him and a sked for assistance with he r s tu d ie s

. F a th e r r e c o u n te d th a t th e s tu d e n t a s k e d to b o rr o w mo n e y , a n d h e r e f u s ed her reque st. On October

19, 1998, the student filed a complaint ag ainst Father with the c ampus police department alleg ing that Fathe r sexually assaulted he r. As a r esult of the compliant being fi led, Kathry n Sto ry (“ Ms. Sto ry ” ), the As so c ia te De a n o f Jud ic ia l a ndEthic a l Pr og rams f or the Un ive rs ity of Me mph is at th e tim e , la

un c he d a n in ve sti g a tio n. Du ri ng the pe nd e nc y of theinv e sti g a tio n, Ms.-4-

Story reported t hat Mother c ame to her office toward the end of 1998 and beg an y elling, c alling he r a “r acist devil.” Ms. Story called the campus police, and an ambulance was summoned for Mother. Sub se qu e nt t o th e se xua l a ssa ult c omp la int

be ing fi le d, the Un iv ers it y of Me mph is d e c ide d to te rm inate F a the r’ s g ra du a te a ssi stants hip po sit ion , r e su lti ng in the los s o f h is $1 ,0 50 .0 0 mo nth ly stipend.

Aft er Fa t her lost his stipend, the Hes be g an to experienc e fina ncial diffic ulty . Around Thanksg iving of

1998, the Hes w ere shopping at a Chinese g roce ry store in Memphis when they
e nc ou nteredF a the r’ s a c c us e r a c c omp a nie d b y tw o o the r m e n. An a lte rc a tio n e ru pte d, a nd , a s a result, Mother lost he r balanc e and fell into a shopping cart. Mothe r, appr ox imately seven months preg nant at the time, experienc ed vag inal bleeding and wa s taken to t he hospi tal. The He s sought leg al counse l to file a lawsuit for the incident in the g roce ry store, b u t t h ey n ever

pursued the litigation to a conc lusion. As the birth of their child g rew near er, the Hes c onsidered pla cing the child for a doption. I n November or De cembe r of 1998, the H es appr oach ed M id-South Christ ian Serv i ce s (“ Mid-South”), a lice nsed child plac ement ag ency providing adoption and foster car e servic es , s ee k i n g assistance . The He s met with Dianne Chunn (“ Ms. Chunn”), a birth-pa rent counselor w ith Mid-Sout h.

As a birth- pa re nt c ou ns e lor , Ms. Chu nn c ou ns e le d the He s on the ir de c isi on to pa re nt the ir child or plac e the c hild for adoption. Ms. Chunn ope ned a birth-par ent file on the Hes on De cembe r 1, 19 98 , wh ic h inc lud e d he r no te s fr om c on ve rs a tio ns wi th the He s. I n he r dis c us sio ns wi th the He s, t h eyre p re s en t ed t h em s el v es as a m arri ed co u p l e, b u t M s

. C h u n n d i d n o t re q u es tt o s ee t h ei r m arri age license. In fac t, the Hes completed a “Preg nancy Counseling Status Shee t” re prese nting that they
wer e mar ried e ven thoug h they

wer e not leg ally

marrie d at t he ti me. M s. Chunn stated that, in one of their c onversations, Father expressed conc erns a

bout whether

he wa s the biologic al father of the
un bo rnc hil d. Fath e r s ub se qu e ntl y de nie d ma

kin g a ny state me nts to M s. Chu nn qu e sti on ing his paternity of the c hild.

Ac c or din g to M s. Chu nn , th e He s in iti a lly e xpre sse d the ir de sir e to pla c e the ir un bo rnc hil d for a doption. W hen subseque ntly rec ounting he r discussions with the Hes, Ms. Chunn stated that they expressed their desire to f ind a family that was financ ially stable. To that en d , M s

. Chunn
sc he du le d a

me e tin g be tw e e n th e He s a nda pr os pe c tiv e a do pti ve famil y on De c e mbe r 1, 19 98 . M s. Chunn’s notes from J anuary 1, 1999, ref lected that Mother felt “che ated” beca use the prospe ctive family “wa s not wealthy , as wa s their re quest.” He r notes also indicated that Father stated that they felt that the adoptive family should be “taking car e of them; visiti ng , bring ing nutritious food, etc.” Acc ording to Fathe r, he and Mot h er n ev er wanted to plac e their unborn child for a doption. He
asserted that they

simplylistened to Ms. Chunn’s advice and conside red it, but Ms. Chunn pushed for a doption to fill a quota a nd make money for he r ag ency

. On J anuary

28, 1999, Mother g ave b i rth to a daug hter, A.M.H. A .M.H. remained in the hospital for seve ral day s while Mot h er re t u rn ed home. The hospital “OB Admission Assessment Re c or d” date d Jan ua

ry 28 , 1 99 9 ind ic a te d that A. M. H. wa s n ot t o b e pla c e d f or a do pti on . Sh ortly afte r Mother g ave birth to A.M.H ., she convey ed to Ms. Chunn that she did not want to place A .M.H.-5-

fo r a do pti on . M s. Chu nn me t w ithMo the r andF a the r at th e ir ho me to di scuss d if fe re nt o pti on s. Ac c or din g to M s. Chu nn , F a the r s til l be lie ve d th a t a do pti on wa s th e bes t cours e of a c tio n, wh ile Mo the r d isag re e d. On F e br ua ry 22 , 1 99 9, F a the r c a lle d M s. Chu nn to r e po rt that th e y we re sti ll considering adoption. The following day , Ms. Chunn met with t he He s at their apa rtment. During their conver sation, Father stated that adoption was the best plan for A.M.H., but the i r a l t er n ati ve c ou rse of act ionwa s lo ng -t e rm fo ste r c are . F athe r e sti ma te d th a t th e y wo uldne e d b e tw e e n s ix months to one y ear

of long -ter m fo s t er carefor A.M.H . to allow them to ree stablish themselves fi n an ci al l y

. Fa t h ert o l d M s

. C h u n n t h at t h ey wo u l d go t o t h e ju v en i l e c o u rt t o i n q u i re ab o u tl o n gterm ca re.
On F e br ua ry 24 , 19 99 , the He s we nt to juv e nil e c ou rt a nd sp ok e to Sarah C lo ud (“M s. Cloud”), a probation counselor at the time, to expl ain their inability to car e fina ncially

for A.M.H

. Ms. Clo udc a lle d M s. Chu nn that same day to inq uir e abo ut the situatio n. Ms. Chu nn inf orme d M s. Cloud that the Hes initiallywanted to plac e A.M.H. f or adoption, but they s u b sequently chang ed the ir mi nd s and wan ted t o p la c e he r i n f os te r c are . A s a

re su lt o f this c a ll, Ms. Chu nn a g re e d to pr ov ide the He s w iththr e e mon ths of fo ste r c arefo r A .M .H . th ro ug h M id- Sou th. Whil e Mid -S ou th normally did not pr ovide foster car e bey ond one month, Ms. Chunn ag ree d to provide threemonths of f o s t er ca re fo r A.M.H. to allow the H es to improve their f inancial situation. On F ebrua ry 24, 1999, the Hes enter ed into a n “Interim Care Ag ree ment and Consent Form” with Mid-South which pr ov ide d, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:

FINANCIAL

ARRANGEMENTS I understand that 90 day s of interim ca re w ill be provided my

child at
n o c h ar g e to me

. I f, a f

te r 9 0 d a y s , I h a v e n o t r e a c h e d a dec ision of adoption for my

child, I ag ree t o pay

MI D-SOUTH $________ pe r day for this ca

re, be g innin g (r eview needs at that time), plus any medical e x penses incur

re d o n my

child’s beha lf. I nterim ca re c an continue at the disc retion of MI D-SOUTH when there i s a ca se plan wh ic h ju sti fi e s it

.

. . . . CUSTODY I understand that this Agre ement does not terminate my pare ntal ri g hts , p ri vil e g e s an d ob lig a tio ns to m y c hil d. B y

sig nin g thi s Ag ree ment, I

desig nate MID-SOUTH, its agen t s and off icer s, such rig hts, privilege s and oblig ations which are nece ssary for my child’s well-be ing f

rom the date of admission until Isign a rele ase r equesting termination of ca

re by MI D-SOUTH and rec eive my child from MIDSOUTH, or until such t ime as I sign a leg al surre nder of my pare ntal rig hts, privilege s and oblig ations befor e a Cha ncery Court J udg e, there by placing said child with MI D-SOUTH for perma nent adoptive p l an n i n g.-6- My pa re nta l r ig hts to this c hil d c a n o nly be te rm inate d by du e pr oc e ss of law a ppropriate ly

presc ribed by

the State of Te nnessee

.
W hen Mid -S ou th a g re e d to pe rf orm f os te r- c are , th e y

turne d to the ne xt fo ste r f a mil y on the ir lis t wh ic h h a pp e ne d to be Jer

ry B ake r ( “ Mr . B ake r” ) andL ou ise B ake r ( “ Mr s. B ake r” or , c oll e c tiv e ly with Mr. Ba

ker, “ the B aker s” or “ Appellee s”).

C.

The He s’ Re lat

ion ship with the Bak e rs

I n 1989, Mrs. Ba

ker unde rwe nt a tubal ligation while preg nant with the B aker s’ third child. I n approx i mately

1998, the B aker s decide d that they wanted another c hild, and Mrs. Ba ker underw ent a tubal reve rsal. The Ba kers considere d adopting a child, but the y wanted to try to have
a child of their own first. The B aker s previously submitt ed a “ Foster

Home Application” to MidSouth in 1997. I n response to the question “Why are y ou interested in pr oviding a foster home? ” on the app lic a tio n, the B ake rs re sp on de d b y statin g , in re le va nt part , tha t the y “ we refi rs t in te re ste d in adoption of a ne wborn, but thoug ht we would try foster c are of new borns for a couple of

y ears.” Acc ording to Mrs. Ba

ker, the y wer e conside ring adoption, and serving a s f o s ter pare nts allowed them to decide if

adoption was something they wanted to pursue. Af ter submitting their a

pplication, the Ba kers began s erving as foster pare nts for Mid-South. The B aker s serve d as foster pare nts for approximately

ten diffe rent c hildren, and the y never considere d adopting any

of the c hildren plac ed with them by

Mid-South. The ext ent of their f oster ca re w as usually

limit ed to ten da y s , wi t h the longe st period being six wee ks, in order to a llow Mid-South t o finalize the adoption pape rwork.

At Mid-South’ s reque st, the Ba kers be g an providing foster c are for A.M.H . (who wa s app ro xima te ly

thr e e we e ks olda t th e tim e ) o n F e br ua ry 24 , 1 99 9, fo r the a g re e d up on thr e e mon th period while the Hes de cided whe ther they wanted to pur sue adoption. Ac cording to M rs. Baker , she wa s still attempting to g et preg nant, and they did not expect to ke ep A.M.H. be y ond the ag ree d up on thr e e m o n t h f

o s t e r c ar e p e r i o d

. T h e B ak e r s s t a t e d t h a t t h e y f u l l y i n t e n d e d t o e n d the ir involvement at the end of

the three month period; either A.M.H

. would be returned to the Hes or the Hes would plac e her

with an adoptive f

amily of their c hoosing.

Ac c or din g to Ms. Chu nn , Mid- Sou th cu sto mari ly a llo we d the birth pare nts to vis it the ir c hil d
once a wee k while the child wa s in foster c are , howeve r, she did not participate in any visitation ag ree ment betwee n t h e He s and the B aker s. The B aker s and the He s appar ently rea ched an oral ag ree ment wher eby

the Hes c ould visitA.M.H. once a we ek during the three month foster ca re period. Pursuant to this ag ree ment, the Hes c ame to the Ba kers’ home approx imately once a wee k to visit A.M.H., and the y

stay ed for

about an hour

eac h time they

visited. Ms. Chunn documented the Ma rc h 1 99 8 v isi ts b y

the He s in he r n ote s. On Ma rc h 8 , 1 99 9, Ms. Chu nn we nt w iththe He s to vis it A .M .H . at th e B ake rs ’ h ome , a ndsh e no te d that Mo the r w a s e xcit e d to se e A. M. H. F a the r t old Ms. Chu nn that Mo the r wa s “ mov ing mor e tow arda do pti on ,” a ndMo the r w ou ld “ re a dil y a g re e ” toFat her was ne ver conv i ct ed of t he cr i mi nal cha r ges l eve l ed aga i ns t hi m. T he r ecor d i s not en t i r el y cl ear as 2

t o wh ethe r t he c ha rge s w ere d i sm i ssed o r w he t he r F athe r w as ac q uit t ed fo l l o w i ng a jury t rial

. S t ep ha nie J o hn so n (“M s. Jo hn so n” ), t he a ssi st an t d i st rict att o rne y gen era l i nv o l ve d i n the c rimina l ca se, sub seq ue ntl y s t ated t ha t t he F athe r’ s ca se
was s et for t r i al on or ar ound D ece mb er of 200 1. At a h ear i ng dur i ng t hat per i od , M s

. John s on l ear ned t hat M ot her ha d t hr eat ene d t he vi ct i m i n t he cas e, and s he broug ht t hi s t o t he at t ent i on of t he t r i al j udge. T he t r i al jud ge ad mo ni s hed M o the r a b o u t co m m u n ic a ting w ith the vic tim in the c a se

.

I n Febr uar y of

2 0 0 3 , M s. John s on at t ended a mo t i ons he ar i ng i n pr epar at i on for Fat her ’ s t r i al

. D ur i ng t hat hea r i ng , M s

. John so n l ea rne d t hat M ot her ha d i mp r op er l y comm un i cat ed wi t h t he j ur y out s i de t he cour t r oo m. O nce ag ai n , t h e t r i al j u dg e admon i s h ed h er a bou t t h i s c on du ct a s w el l

. M s

. J oh n s on s u bs equ en t l y l ea r n ed t h at a t ape of F athe r’ s p reli m i na ry hea ring wa s unintell i gib l e. A s a resu l t , t he i nd i ctm en t s aga i nst Fa t he r we re d i sm i ssed , an d t he ca se
wa s r et u r n ed t o t h e l owe r c ou r t for a n ew pre l i mi n ar y he ar i n g

. I n t h e l owe r c ou r t , Fa t h er pr odu ce d a c opy of t h e t ape f ro m t he o rigi na l p reli m i na r y h e a r in g , b u t it w as d ec i d ed t o co nti nu e w i t h a ne w p reli m i na ry hea ring. A s t he ca se progr es s ed t o t r i al for t he s econd t i me, M r

. H e di d not s how u p f or an af t er noon hea r i ng af

t er t he t r i al j udge i ns t r uct ed hi m t o do s o. T he t r i al j udge s ubs equen t l y i s s ued a w arra nt for M r

. H e’ s ar r es t

. I n a ny ev ent , M r

. H e wa s ne ver (c o n tinu e d ...)
-7- an adoption if the a doptive family would allow them wee kly visits unt il M o t h er b ecame pre g nant
a g ain

. Fath e r i nf

orme d M s. Chu nn of

a Chi ne se su pe rs tit ionwh ic h c ha ra c te ri zedA. M. H. a s le ss than an idea l child due to her diff icult birth. During a visit on Marc h 15, 1999, Ms. Chunn noted that the Hes w ere excited to see A.M.H., but Mother c ontinued to be hesitant about a doption. On Marc h 30 , 1 99 9, Ms. Chu nn do c ume nte d a ph on e c on ve rs a tio n w ithF a the r w he re in h e state d th a t, w hil e Mother see med comfortable with adoption, she “ wants to maintain g uardia nship of the child so she
can c ontinue in the U.S.”

Acc ording to M o t her, the initial three month foster c are period we nt well, and Mrs. B aker took good c are of A.M.H. a nd taug ht Mother how to ca re f or her as well. At some point during the three month foster ca

re pe riod, the He s attempted to pay the Ba kers $300, presumably

for c aring for A.M.H. Ac cording to Mrs. Ba ker, the y ref used to acc ept the money beca use they wer e paid $6 pe r day throug h Mid-South, and their ag ree ment with Mid-South preve nted t hem from acce pting money from the f oster par ents. Mid-South did nothave a specific set of rule s preve nting f oster par ents from
a c c e pti ng mon e y

fr om the bio log ic a l par e nts , an d Mid- Sou th did no t in str uc t th e bio log ic a l pa

re nts to pay the foster pare nts. Howeve r, it was Mid-South’s practice to reimburse the foster pa rents for
caring f or a c hild.

I n mid-April of 1999, the He s decide d that they wanted to apply for a passport for A.M.H. so they could send he r to China at the end of the three month foster ca

re period. Fa

ther informed the Ba kers of their intentions, and he r equeste d their assistance in having A.M.H.’s pa ssp o r t photo take n. Mr s. B ake r c omp lie d a ndtoo k A .M .H . to ha ve a pa ssp ort ph oto take n, a ndA. M. H. su bs e qu e ntl y rec eived he r passport. The Hes attempted to loc ate someone they could trust to take A.M.H. ba ck to China at the end of three month foster care period, but they wer e unable to find a sui table per son. Father stated that they

could not le ave to g o to China beca use, without a g ree n car d, they would be
un able to r e turn. Ac c or din g to the He s, the B ake rs a tte mpt e d to pe rs ua de the m to ke e p A .M .H . in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b y s t a t i n g t h a tt h e y c o u l d v i s i th e r m o r e f r e q u e n t l y i f s h e r e m a i n e d i n t h i s c o u n tr y. Towar d the end of

April of 1999, F ather was arre sted and c harg ed with sexual assault for the inc ident
a t the Un ive rs ity of Me mph is in Oc tob e r of 19 98

. At the tim e of his arr e st, F a the r w or ke d p art

2(

. . . con t i n u ed) 2

c o n v ic te d o f t h e c rim ina l ch a rg e s b ro u g h t ag a ins t him ste m m ing fro m the O c to b e r 1 9 9 8 inc id e n t.
-8- time at the Univer sityof Memphis in a dormitory earning a

pproxi mately

$200 per month, and Mother continued to work part-time as a w aitress. Af ter his ar rest, the univer sityfired F ather from his job at the dormitory

. On May 8, 1999, the Hes se nt Mrs. Ba ker a Mother’s Day

car d inside which t hey

wrote the fo l l o wi n g:

Dea

r L ouise:

H ap p y M o t h e r s D a y! You have offe red e nd l ess love to many children. Y ou are the re al Mom of [A.M.H.] . Our thanks to y ou is bey ond expression.

/s/ J ack & Casey 5/8/99

Whil e she a cknowledg ed that they sent the car d, Mother asse rted that she did not intend for the ca rd to mean that she w anted to g ive up her daug hter.
Their inability

to secure a suitable pe rson to take A.M.H. back to China at the end of the three
mon th f os te r c are pe ri odpr omp te d th e He s to de c ide to a llo w A .M .H . to re ma in w ith th e B ake rs

. I n a dd iti on , th e He s w e re sti ll not able to fi na nc ia lly c arefo r A .M .H . at th e e ndof thethr e e mon th fo ste r c are pe ri od

. Ac c or din g to Mr s. B ake r, F a the r c a me to the m to wa rdthe e ndof

the thr e e mon th foster c are period a nd asked the m to adopt A.M.H., but Mother opposed an adoption. On May 19, 1999, Ms. Chunn met with F ather to disc uss the Hes’ future plans for A .M.H. Father stated that they would like to maintain their pare ntal rig hts, but they wanted to c ontinue t h e custodyarr ang ement with the Ba

kers. Ms. Chunn felt that such a n ar ra n gem ent was unr ealistic, and she discussed the possible adver se effec ts long-te rm foster c are could have on A.M.H. af ter she bonde d with the Ba kers. The rea fter, F ather

returne d to t h e Ba k er s ’ home to discuss a c ustody arr ang ement. The B ake rs inf

orme d Father that

the y wo uldno t bewi lli ng to r e ta in c us tod y of A. M. H. on the ba sis sug g ested by

Father. Ac cording to the Bak ers, they enter ed into an ora l ag ree ment with Fathe r wher eby the parties ag ree d that the Baker s would raise A .M.H. until she turned eig hteen, and the Hes would reta in their pare ntal rig hts so they could re main in the United States.
On May 24, 1999, Father a nd Mrs. Ba ker ca l l ed M s . Chunn to inform her that the B aker s wer e willing to a cce pt temporary custody of A.M.H. Ms. Chunn understood that the parties we re in a g ree ment that the Ba

kers would car e for A.M.H. until she rea ched eig hteen y ear s of ag e. Af ter speaking with Fathe r and Mr s. Ba ker, Ms. Chunn c ontacted attorney Kevin Weave r (“ Mr. Weaver ”). Mr. Weaver

previously

advised Mid-South on adoption and par ental terminatio n m atters, a nd he commonly

met with families at the re quest of Mid-South. Ms. Chunn asked M r. W ea v er to mee t-9-

wi th the B ake rs a ndthe He s to disc us s the le g a l impli c a tio ns of the c us tod y arr a ng e me nt andso me of the risks involved.

On June 2, 19 99 , F a the r, the B ake rs , an d Ms. Chu nn me t Mr. Wea ve r at his of fi c e to d isc us s the custody

arr ang ement. F ather

informed Mother

of the mee ting, but Mother d i d not attend the meeting beca

use she ha d to work. Ac cording t o Mr. Weaver , Ms. Chunn, and the Ba kers, F ather called Mothe r fr om the meeting to inquire if they should procee d in h er ab s ence . Father
su bs e qu e ntl y

de nie d th a t he c a lle d M oth e r f ro m th e me e tin g to make thi s in qu iry . M r. Wea ve r, Ms. Chunn, and the B a

k e r s alls tated that, af

ter F ather conclude d his telephone c onversation with Mot her, he stated that he and Mother wer e re ady

to proce ed with the ag ree ment, and the y s h o u ld continue with the meeting

.
Mr. Weaver

did not consider himself to be r epre senting either pa rty at t he meeting, a nd he
e x p l a i n e d t o t h e p a

r t i e s a t t h e o u t s e t o f t h e m e e t i n g t h a t h e w a s n o t t h e r e t o r e p r e s e n te i t h e r p ar t y. Mr. Weaver

explained how the parties could obtain a consent order for temporary custody , and he tol d F a the r that he a ndMo the r wo uld ne e d to ob ta in a c ou rt or de r t o r e g a in c us tod y

in the fu tur e if
every one wa s not in ag ree ment to a chang e of c ustody . Father subseque ntly confirme d that Mr. Weaver did i n d ee d tell him that, once they signe d a conse nt order g iving the B aker s custody of A.M.H., they

would have to g o befor e a c ourt to obtain a chang e in custody

. Mr. Weaver rec alled Father asking questions during the meeting , but he did not rec all any specific questions. Mr. Weaver did not a dvise Father that he and Mother c ould lose their par ental rig hts if they failed to visit A.M.H.
or faile d to pay

c hil d s up po rt

fo r A. M. H. fo r fo ur c on se c uti ve mon ths , an d no one a dv ise d F a the r t o have an att o rn ey

prese nt at this meeting. A t the conclusion of the me eting , Mr. Weaver felt that
every one under stood the proce ss and was satisfied with their dec ision. A cc o rd i n g t o Mrs. Ba ker, Father stated that he would inform Mother of what tra nspired at the me eting and would l et t hem know of their decision. Father subseque ntly stated that he did not under stand the conc epts of adoption and custody , and he unde rstood that they wer e ente ring the tempora ry ag ree ment so A.M.H. could be c overe d under the Ba kers’ health insuranc e. F ather stated that he spoke to Mother afte r the ag ree ment and informe d her that they would need to sig n something to a llow A .M.H. to be place d on the B aker s’ hea lth insurance.

Mr. Weaver

subsequently sent a bill to Mid-South in the amount of $100.00 for his servic es at the mee ting. Ms. Chunn’s rec ords indicate that Mid-South forwarde d the bill to the Bake rs for pay me nt. Ms. Chu nn a sk e d th e B ake rs to r e imb ur se Mid -S ou th f or the c os t of

the me e tin g be c aus e she fe lt the Hes we re not fina ncially able to do so. The B aker s appar en t l y paid the bill for Mr. Weaver ’s servic es at the June 2, 1999 meeting

. On June 3, 19 99 , Ms. Chu nn a sk e d Pa sto r K e nn y Yau ( “ Pa sto r Y au” ) t o a c c omp a ny he r t o the Hes’ apartment to speak wit h Mother. Father was not prese nt at t his meeting

. On t he way to the Hes’ a partment, Ms. Chunn indicated that she felt Mother did not completely understand the ag ree d upon custody

arr ang ement the pa

rties wer e about to ente r into. Ms. Chunn told Pastor Yau that she wanted to e nsure that Mother under stood the proce ss and was not be ing f orce d into any thing. She asked Pastor Y au to attend the me eting and translate so Mother could better

understand theM s. C l o ud t y p ed the l anguage “and guardians hi p o f the p ers o n of sai d chi l d ” i nt o t he d o cum ent whi ch ap p ears 3

t o be a s t an dar di ze d for m u s ed by t h e j u v en i l e cou r t

. Acc or di n g t o M s

. Cl ou d, t h e B ak er s di d n ot r equ es t t h e i n cl u s i on
o f t h e gu a rd ia n sh ip lan g u a g e , b u t she inse rte d the lan g u a g e b a se d up o n w h a t she ha d b e e n to ld b y the p a rtie s.
-10- ag ree ment. Pastor Yau state d that, at the conc lusion of the m ee t ing, Mothe r indicate d that she
un de rs too d th e pr oc e ss. L a te r that day , F a the r c a lle d the B ake rs to inf orm the m that th e y

wante d to g o ahea d with the consent orde r transf erring c ustody

of A.M.H. to the B aker s.

D. The Juv e nile Cour

t Ord e r T ra nsf e rring Cu sto dy of

A.M .H. to t he Bak e rs

On J une 4, 1999, the He s, the Ba kers, and Ms. Chunn met at Mid-South’s of fice

. Fr om there, they proce eded to the Shelby CountyJ uveni l e C o u rt in the Ba kers’ van. Mr. Weave r did not
a c c omp a ny

the pa rt ie s to juv e nil e c ou rt , a ndne ith e r p arty ha d a n atto rn e y

pr e se nt a t the me e tin g in juvenile court. Accor ding to F ather , Ms. Chunn tol d the Hes to g o to juvenile court, but he did not know why . Since Mother wa s not prese nt at t he mee ting with Mr. Weave r, the B aker s reque sted that Pastor Yau attend the meeting to i n t er p re t s o that they could ensure that Mother fully understood what wa s transpiring

. Ms. Cloud m et with the parties at juvenile court, and she noted that M o t her w as “ve ry conce r n e d ” th a t th e arr a n g e me n t w o u ld b e te mp o r ar y a n d n o t p e r man e n t. M s

. Cl o u d d r a fted a “Petition for C ustody ” which provided that the Hes wer e unable financ ially to car e for A.M.H. at the time, and the He s were reque sting that c ustody of A.M.H. be transferr ed to t he B aker s. Ms. Cloud
a lso dr a ft e d a

“ Con se nt O rd e r A wa

rd ing Cus tod y ” wh ic h p ro vid e d, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
This c ause was befor e the Court on a sworn petition, an d i t being evident to the Court by the signatures of the parties that they do place the mse lve s b e fo re thi s H on orable Cou rt a nda c kn ow le dg e its j u ri s d i ct i o n an d ad m i tt h e f o l l o wi n g:
1. Th a t [th e He s] ha ve be e n f ull y a dv is ed of thei r l e g a l r ig hts
a ndthat a

he ari ng be fo rethe Cou rt is h e re by

e xpre ssl y waived. 2. That all parties ag ree that it is i n the best intere st of the
c hil d( re n) fo r c us tod y

a ndg ua rd ia ns hip of

the pe rs on of

sa id
c hil d to b e a wa

rd e d to Jer

ry a nd L ou ise B ake r, no n r e la tiv e s. 3 3. That [the Hes] are a ware that on this ag ree ment is based the O r d e r o f th is Co u r t, a n d th a t f

a il u r e to c o mp ly

h e rew ith, without j u s t c au s e , p la c e s th e m i n c o n te mp t o f Co u r t and
su bje c ts the m to su c h a c tio n a s th e Cou rt de e ms p ro pe r w ith in its jurisdi ction.M s. C lo u d typ e d the lan g u a g e “a n d gu a rd ia n sh ip o f t h e p e rs o n ” into the d o c u m e n t at this p o int a s w e ll. 4

-11- Ha vin g c on sid e re d th e a dmi ssi on s anda g re e me nt o f the pa rt ie s, it i s the j u d g m e n to f

t h e C o u r tt h a ta

c h a n g e o f

c u s t o d y i s i n t h e b e st interest of the said child(re n).

I T I S THEREFORE ORDERE D, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that custody and guar dianship of t he person of said child(re n) be and 4 is h e re by a wa rd e d to Jer

ry a ndL ou ise B ake r, no n- re la tiv e s w ith authority to make appr opriate pla ns for th e ca re and supervision of said child(re n).

B e fo re the He s si g ne d th e or de r, Ms. Clo ud , Ms. Chu nn , a ndPa sto r Y au to ok Mo the r i nto a

se pa rate room to talk privately

about the conse nt order.

Ac c or di n g t o M s

. C l o u d , M o t h e r a s k e d i f t h e arr a n g e m e n t s h e w a s a g r e e i n g t o w a s a temporary

arr ang ement. Pastor Yau stated that he was shown the consent orde r, but he did not rea d it t o M oth e r w or d f

or wo rd

. I ns te a d, he re a d th e do c ume nt h ims e lf the n tr a ns la te d it s c on te nts to Mother. He convey ed to Mother that, since they wer e fina ncially

unable to car e for A.M.H., anothe r family woul d ca re f

or her . Furthermore , since they neede d health insuranc e for A.M.H., Mother neede d to sig n the document to g ive the B aker s leg al authority . Acc ording to Mother, Pastor Yau tol d h e r that th e c us tod y

arr a ng e me nt w a s o nly

te mpo ra ry , a ndsh e c ou ld ha ve A. M. H. re turne d to her at any

time. Pastor Yau fe lt that he adequately convey ed the or der’ s import to Mot her, and Mother neve r indicate d that she did not understand the d o cu ment and neve r aske d him to repeat
an y t h i n g. M s

. C l o u d an d M s

. C h u n n b o t h d es cr i b ed M o t h eras em o t i o n al d u r i n g t h ei r m ee t i n g, statin g that sh e wa s te arf

ul w he n s he sig ne d th e or de r. Ho we ve r, Ms. Chu nn a ndMs. Clo udbo th f e lt th a t M o th e r

u n d e r s to o d th e o r d e r , w h ic h th e y d e s c r ib e d a s a

d o c u me n t p r o v id in g th a t th e H es would reta in their pare ntal ri gh t s , but they would be tra nsfer

ring leg al custody

of A.M.H. to the Ba kers. Ms. Cloud expl ained that she did not schedule a hea ring befor e the juvenile c ourt judg e that day beca use eve ry one was in ag ree ment. She stated t hat it was her standard pr actice to ensure that the biologic al par ents understood that they would have to g o befor e the juvenile court judge if they didno t a g re e to the or de r. Ac c or din g to Ms. Clo ud , ha d sh e tho ug ht that the He s w e reno t si nc e re ly consenting to the order , she would have set the case for a hearing befor e the juvenile court. On the day that the Hes signe d the conse nt order g iving the B aker s custody of A.M.H., the H es also sig ned
a form provided by

Mid-South which effe ctively remove d A.M.H. fr om Mid-South’s care and ende d Mid-South’s involvement up to that point

. Ms. Cloud stated that no one asked about visitation during the meeting , and the or der did not contain any

provisions for visitation. The order also did not make provisions for any child support to be paid by

the Hes. Pastor Y au stated that he did not rec all any discus s i o n d u ri n g the meeting reg arding the law of

abandonme nt, specifica ll y ch i l d support or visitation. Ms. C loud stated, howeve r, t hat t he Bake rs t old the Hes that they could vi sit A.M.H. Acc ording to Fathe r, the B aker s a ssu re d th e m that the y c ou ld c on tin ue to vis it A. M. H. on c e e ve ry we e k. Re g ard ing c hil d s up po rt ,A c c o rd ing t o M s

. S to r y , F a the r c o m p le te d his d e g re e re q u ire m e n ts a t t h e un ive rs ity, b u t he w a s u n a b le to 5

o b ta in h is d e g re e d u e to the su sp e n sio n . A p p a re n tly, the un ive rs ity su b se q u e n tly a w a rd e d F a the r h is d e g re e

. -12- the B ake rs ne ve r t oldthe He s n ot t o p a y c hil d sup po rt , but the y did no t e xpe c t th e He s to pay c hil d
s u p p o r ts i n c e t h e p ar t i e s a g r e e d t h a t t h e B ak e r s w e r e t o r a i s e A

. M

. H

. u n t i l s h e t u r n e d e i g h t e e n

. In f a c t , t h e p ar t i e s a g r e e d t h a tA

. M

. H

. s h o u l d b e g i n t o r e f e r t o t h e B ak e r s a s “ m o m m y” a n d “ d a d d y”
a ndre fe r t o th e He s as “Ja c k” a nd “ Ca se y .” Du ri ng su bs e qu e nt vis its , Fathe r wo uld re fe r to h ims e lf as “U ncle Jack.”

After J un e 4, 19 99 , th e He s c on tin ue d to vis it A .M .H . at th e B ake r’ s h ome app ro xima te ly once a week for one hour eac h visit. On J une 5, 1999, the day afte r the pa

rties sig ned the c onsent order , Mrs. Ba

ker be g an kee ping a

journal of the Hes’ visits t o their home. Ac cording to Mrs. Ba ker, the pu rp os e of

the jou rn a l w a s to do c ume nt “ e ve rythi ng” that oc c ur re d w he n th e He s v isi te d th e ir home. The H es we re not a war e that Mrs. B aker was ke eping a journa l of their visits, however , Father subseque nt l y ac k n o wl edged that he did not dispute the journal’s ac cura cy . The B aker s encour ag ed the He s to interact with A.M.H. during the ir visits, and Mrs. Baker w ould show Mother how to fee d, chang e diape rs, and g ener ally car e for A.M.H. About two wee ks afte r the pa rties sig ned the conse nt order, the Ba

kers lea rned t hat Mrs. B aker

was pre g nant with the B aker s’ fourth c hild.

B e t w e e n J u n e 4 , 1 9 9 9 , an d Oc t o b ero f 1 9 9 9 , th e H e’ s v i s i t s wi t h A. M

. H. co n t i n u ed t o go well as e vidence d by

Mrs. Ba ker’ s journal. During their June visi ts, the Hes broug ht A.M.H. jars of baby food, formula, juice, diape rs and two books. I n Aug ust of 1999, the Baker s told the Hes that they wer e expecting another child. During a visit on Aug ust 28, 1999, Mother kept g iving A.M.H

. a g old c ha in a nd g la ss c him e to play wi th. Mr s. B ake r wa rn e d Mo the r that A. M. H. c ou ld c ut h e rs e lf or g et choke d, and Mrs. B aker wrote in her j ournal that the Hes “ha ve no conc ept on what ba bies ca n do or not do.” During a vis it on September 11, 1999, the Hes expressed excitement over the fac t that A.M.H. would have a sibling to g row up with. Mrs. B aker noted in her journa l that Mother g ave A.M.H. one of

her rings to play

with, and Mrs. Ba

ker reiterated her conce rn about A.M.H. putting things in her

mouth. On September 30, 1999, Mother broug ht A. M .H. porridg e, and the Ba kers allowed A.M.H . to have a few bites.

On September 15, 1999, the Univer sityof Memphis Social Discipline Commit tee c onducted a hea ring on the sexual assault complaint filed ag ainst Father. At the c onclusion of the hea ring , the committee unanimously

found F ather

g uiltyof violating certain provisions of t he C ode of Student Conduct. On September 20, 1999, the committee notified F ather by l et t er that he was suspe nded from the univer sityfor the r emainder of the 1999 to 2000 term until the Summer of 2000 term, that he would be pla ced on tr espass status, that he must complete se x ual abuse counseling , and that he could not rec eive his deg ree during the term of his suspension. As a result of his suspension, Father 5 became an illeg al alien subjec t to deportation proce eding s.
On Octo b er 3, 1999, Mr s. Ba ker ma de an e ntry

in her journa l expressing c oncern over the He s ’ r eq u es tt o t ak e A

. M

. H. o u to f t h e B ak er s ’ h o m e d u ri n g a v i s i t , s t at i n g:-13- Jac k a ndCa se y cam e a t 3: 00 . [A .M .H .] pl a y e d f or a min ute wi th the m a ndthe n wa nte d us. Th e vis it wa s very dis c ou ra g ing to u s. They wanted to se e if they

could come and g et [ A.M.H.] and kee p her for the day

next S unday

. I told them No. She is too li ttle to be away from us. Casey

was ve ry distraug ht, crying ve ry

loud. They

left soon afte r. J ack kept telling us that they had fr iends that kept asking about her and a doctor at church wanted to see he r. We told them she didn’t
ne e d to se e a

do c tor a nd if a ny on e wante d to se e he r the y c ou ld c ome to our home. We stood strong with this. I think J ack w as just try ing to p le a se Ca se y . N o w or ds we ree xch a ng e d. We f e e l li ke Jac k w ill try something now . We would like to g et visits to every other we ek. We f eel like they would wea n away , but the last 2 visits we c ould see Casey is wanting to come more

. I f Ja c k c on fr on ts u s w iththe vis it w e are g oin g to t e ll h im this is the way its going to be and se t rules for him. Heis very pushy and overbe aring . They ar e s u ppose [sic] to com [si c] Thurs, 8:45 AM beca use Jerry is going to be out of town. J ac k wi ll not come to our home without J erry

being here

.
Mr s. B ake r s ub se qu e ntl y

state d th a t th e y

we reno t g oin g to a llo w the He s to take A. M. H. ou t of the ir home, and, a fter the October 3, 1999, visit, t hey

decide d to move v i s i t at i on to every other we ek. Ac co rd i n g t o M o th er , s h e wa n t ed t o s ee A. M

. H. m o re o ft en , b u t t h e Bak er s b ega n t o c h an ge visitation t imes or m ake their visits m ore diff icult. Howeve r, Mrs. B aker ’s journal indicated that the He s o c c a sio na lly

mis se d v isi ts, re sc he du le d vis its , or the B ake rs wo uldmis s c hu rc h to a c c omm od a te t h e H es ’ v i s i t s o n S u n d ay s

. Fa t h ers u b s eq u en t l y s t at ed t h at th ei r v i s i t s wi t h A. M

. H. co n t i n u ed t o go well, and they

experience d no problems with visitation during this period.

On November 14, 1999, Father c alled the B aker s to tell them he was bring ing a friend f rom churc h, Eliz abeth Ma

rshall (“ Ms. Marshall”) , to visit A.M.H. Ms. Marsha ll pr eviously adopted two Chi ne se c hil dr e n, a nd sh e hir e d Mo the r wh e n sh e wa s pr e g na nt wi th A. M. H. to ba by sit fo r he r. Ms. Marsha ll was awa

re that the Ba

kers we re caring for A.M.H., but the Hes did not tell her the spe cifics of their a rra ng ement with the Bake rs. Father asked the B aker s to pretend that they wer e A.M.H.’ s foster pa rents, not her cu s t odial pare nts. I n fac t, Fathe r told Ms. Marshall that the B aker s were A.M.H. ’s t em p orary

foster pa rents. During the visit, Ms . Marsha ll inquired as to how the B aker s c ou ld g ive up A. M. H. a ft e r c ari ng fo r he r fo r so lon g , an d she re fe rr e d to A .M .H . a s A .M . M ars ha ll. Mr s. B ake r g ot the imp re ssi on that the He s h a d s po ke n to Ms. Ma rs ha ll a bo ut a do pti ng A. M. H. Ms. Marsha ll subsequently

stated that she ha d no intention of adopting A.M.H.

At so me po int in N ov e mbe r o f 1 99 9, Mo the r a sk e d F a the r t o a pp ro a c h th e B ake rs a ndre qu e st that they return c ustody

of A.M.H. to them. Pursuant to Mother’ s reque st, Fathe r appr oache d Mr. B ake r a bo ut the ir re g a ini ng c us tod y

of A. M. H. Ac c or din g to F a the r, Mr . Ba ke r state d tha t th e y

did
no t w a nt t o r e turn A .M .H . to the He s, a ndMr . B ake r a sk e d h im n ot t o me nti on it a g a in be c aus e Mr s. Ba ker w as pre g nant, and he did not want to ca u s e a miscarria g e. Af ter this conver sation, the Hes-14-

state d t hat the y

no lon g e r f

e lt c omf orta ble wi th the B ake rs , a ndthe ir re la tio ns hip be g a n to deteriorate. The Ba

kers invited the He s to come t o their hom e on De cembe r 22, 1999 to see w hat A.M.H. re ceive d for Christmas. The H es brou gh t gi ft s for e very one but A.M.H. On January 28, 2000, the B aker s invited the Hes to t h ei r h o m e t o cele brate A.M.H.’s birthday . The He s broug ht fo odfo r e ve ry on e a ndthe y ha d b irthd a y

c ake . T he He s b ro ug ht A .M .H . a Se sam e Str e e t su itc a se a s a g if t. On F e br

ua ry 15 , 2 00 0, the He s v isi te d A .M .H . a ndbr ou g ht s ome fi sh wh ic h h a d b on e s in it. Mrs. Ba

ker decide d not to fee d it to A.M.H. On F ebrua ry 21, 2000, Mrs. Ba

ker g ave birth to a daug hter, Aimee . During a visit on Febr uary 28, 2000, the Hes state d that they wer e pleased that A.M.H. had a

new sister. Around t his time, Mother became pr eg nant with the Hes’ second c hild.

On Ap ri l 2 6 , 2 0 0 0 , t h e H es v i s i t ed t h e Bak er s ’ ho m e, an d Fa t h eras k ed i f h e c o u l d b ri n g a friend f rom Ohio to visit A.M.H. According to Mr s. Ba ker’ s journal entry

for that date, Mr. B aker asked F ather

if he told his friend the tr uth about A.M.H., and F ather said he did not be cause he wa s worrie d about being criticiz ed for telling the truth. Fathe r wonde red a loud if he should tell his friend th at A. M

. H. was “temporary ,” or if he should tell his friend the whole truth a bout A.M.H. being “permanent.” T hey

encour ag ed F ather to tell his friend the truth about the situation, and the B aker s invited the Hes’ f

riend to dinner.

E. The Hes’ De cision to Petiti on th e Juvenile Court for a Ch ange in C ustody

Acc ording t o Ms. Cloud, t he He s came to juvenile court or c alled her on the telephone
se ve ra l tim e s a ft e r the orig ina l a g re e d up on c us tod y or de r wa s e nte re d to c omp la in abo ut th eir visitation with A.M.H. and to express their desire to reg ain custody of A.M.H. How ever , Ms. Cloud could not reme mber the e x act dates o f these c onversations. On May 3, 2000, the Hes sig ned a petition seeking to modify the J une 4, 1999 conse nt order a war ding c ustody of A.M.H. to the Ba

kers
a lle g i n g t h a ta

c h a n g e i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s w arr a n t e d a c h a n g e i n c u s t o d y

. F a t h e r s u b s e q ue ntl y acknow ledg ed that he ha d been c ontacted by immigration officials p ri o r t o filing the May 2000 petition. Accor ding to the Hes, as of the date they filed the pe tition t hey

wer e fina ncially

able to ca re for A.M.H . Mrs. Ba

ker’ s journal entry

for May 3, 2000, indicates that the H es did not apprise the Ba kers of their intentions during the visit, and, in fact, the H es and the Ba kers discusse d the kinds of le sso ns the y wante d A. M. H. to le arn g ro wi ng up . M s. Clo udsu bs e qu e ntl y c a lle d M s. Chu nn to inform her

that the Hes ha d filed a pe tition i n the juvenile court to reg ain custody of A.M.H. In turn, Ms. Chunn called Mrs. Ba ker on May 4, 2000, to a lert her of the fac t that a petition had been f iled.

Mrs. Ba ker c alled Mr. B aker

to inform him of the news. Ac cording to he r journal entry for Ma y 4, 20 00 , th e B ake rs we re “ fl oo re d” by thi s n e ws . M r. B ake r c a lle d F a ther th a t a ft e rn oo n to
arr ang e a meeting to discuss the Hes’ decision to file the pe tition, and Mr. Baker me t Fathe r at the clubhouse of the Hes’ a

partment c omplex

. During their m eeting , Mr. B aker asked F ather

why they fi le d th e pe tit ion . F a the r r e sp on de d b y statin g that Mo the r i ns ist e d o n f ili ng the pe tit ionto r e g a in custody of A.M.H., but he wanted A.M.H. to remain with the Bakers. F ather told Mr. Baker that the-15-

Hes planne d to “ship” A.M.H. back to China. Father acknow ledg ed the parties’ prior oral a g ree ment (that th e B ake rs wo uld

raise A. M. H. un til sh e turne d e ight een) , b ut h e state d th a t th e y ne e de d to discuss chang es to the ag ree ment. As Father beg an talking about the proposed c hang es, Mr. B aker started writing down what Father proposed. When Mr. Baker indicated that the Baker s would not agr ee t o ch an gi n g t h ei r p ri o r a gre em en t , Fa t h ergra b b ed t h e p ap erfr o mM r. Ba k eran d b ega n wr i t i n g. The discussion betwe en the t wo men re sulted in the following thr ee options being prese nted by Father:

The be low options were disc ussed by J erry Ba ker and J ack H e. /s/ J erry Ba ker /s/ J ack H e 5/4/00

OPTI ON # 1 That the Ba k er s and the He ’s [sic] ag ree to give [A.M.H.] back to the H es without disputing custody in court

. The He s ag ree that in the event the Hes must leave the Unit ed S tates for China they will let the Bakers a dopt [ A.M.H.] foreve r. * The B aker s must agr ee not to ca use the He s to leave the Un ite d St a te s b y

re po rt ing to the U. S. G ov e rn me nt.

OPTI ON # 2 Th e Hes a g re e to s ta y

in M e mph is a s lo ng a s th e y stay in Uni t ed S t ates. The Hes will allow the B aker s to have [A.M.H.] for a visit no less than two day s per we ek. * Option 1 and 2 g o toge ther.

OPTI ON # 3 Th e B ak e r s a n d th e H e s a g r e e to c o n ti n u e th e ir c urre nt ag ree ment with one supplement: the Hes may take [A.M.H.] back home one day

every other we ek. Such ag ree ment will continue for 18 y ear s. The He s ag ree to leave [ A.M.H.’s] passport t o the care of the B ake rs

.
Mr. B aker

wrote the first two options as Father spoke, and Father wrote the third option. Father a nd Mr. B aker

wer e unable to rea ch any ag ree ment that day , and the matter rema ined unre solved.

Af te r the He s file d the ir pe tit ion to mod if y the orig ina l c us tod y

or de r, the He s c on tin ue d to visit A.M.H. at the Ba

kers’ home with the same r eg ularity

. On May 7, 2000, the Hes c ame to the Ba kers’ home with their friends from Ohio. When M rs

. Ba k er was alone in the kitche n, Father approa ched her and stated that “it was g oing to be alrig ht, that he was g oing to pe rsuade Casey not to do this.” At some point in M ay of 2000, the B aker s contac ted Mr. Weave r.T h e re c o rd o n a p p e a l d o e s n o t i n c lud e a tra n sc rip t o f t h e J u n e 2 8 , 2 0 0 0 he a rin g in the ju v e n ile c o u rt. 6

-16- The He s’ May

2000 petition to modi fy

custody was filed in the ju v en i l e court on June 19, 2000. On J une 28, 2000, the juvenile court ref ere e held a hearing on the Hes’ petition. Mr. Weaver 6 attended the hearing on be half of the Ba kers. The Hes did not hire a lawy er to re prese nt them at the hearing, and no translator w as pre sent. Prior to the hea ring , th e juvenile court appointed a Court Appointed Special Advoc ate ( “CASA”) to investig ate the H es ’ p et ition to m odify custody and de te rm ine if

the y we re pr e se ntl y

able to pr ov ide fo r A. M. H. Th e CA SA p ro vid e d th e re fe re e wi th
a c op y of his re po rt

on the date of

the he ari ng , w hic h p ro vid e d, in r e le va nt p art a s f oll ow s:
CONCERNS AND EVALUATI ONS

Mrs. Luo does not speak E ng lish. Theref o re , Mr. He tr anslated f

or her during this CASA’s visit. P rese ntly , both pare nts stated they want [A. M. H. ] ba c k h ome wi th the m, a s th e y areno w a

ble to f inanc ially
c are a ndpr ovid e for he r. Th is C ASAbe lie ve s th a t [A. M. H. ’s ] pare nts love her very much. Howeve r, Mr. He and Mrs. Luo do not
se e m t o u n d e r s tan d th e s e r io u s n a tu r e o f th is matt e r

. F o r

insta nce, ne ith e r pare nt ap pe ars to u nd e rs ta ndwh y the y ha ve to g o to c ou rt

to reg ain custody

of [A.M.H.]. They do not understand why they have to prove a ny thing. This C ASA believes the fac t that the mother and th e f a th e r ar e n o t ab le to s p e ak E n g li s h is r e lati v e to th e ir la c k of issues surrounding custody of their c hild.

. . . . Qi n ( Ca se y ) L

uo is fo ur mon ths pr e g na nt with he r se c on d ch ild . T his CASA is concerned about the a dded re sponsibil i ty that a new baby
wo uldbring to M r. He a ndMr s. Luo

. Pr e se ntl y , th e c ou ple liv e s in a two-bedroom apa

rtment with an adult fe male roommate named Ping. Ping w as not prese nt durin g t h i s C AS A’s home visit. The
c ou ple plans fo r b oth[A. M. H. ] an d th e ne w b aby to sh are the ir
e xistin g be dr oo m w iththe m.
This CASA is conce rned that Mr. He and Mrs. L uo want custody

of [A.M.H.] reinstated f

or t he purpose of citi zenship. The B aker s stated that they wer e very

shocked w hen [A.M.H.’s] parents fi led for custody without first d i s cu s s i n g it with them. They stated that they be lie ve Mr . H e a nd Mr s. Luo want c us tod y of [A. M. H. ] re ins ta te d in order to become c itiz ens and stay in the United States. M r. B aker
s t a t e d t h a tM r

. H e w o u l d d o a n yt h i n g t o r e m a i n i n t h i s c o u n tr y.-17- Th is C ASAis co nc e rn e d ab ou t th e po ssi bil ity that Mr . H e a ndMr s. Luo might send [A.M.H.] back to China if custody is reinstated. Mr. He informed Mr. B aker

that they might send [A.M.H.] back to China to li v e with relatives if Mr . He a nd Mrs. Luo reg ain custody . The Ba kers be li ev e that this would be traumatic to the c hild since [A. M. H. ] thi nk s o f the B ake rs a s h e r p are nts

. The CASA re commended that the Ba kers reta in c ustody of A.M.H. and that the juvenile court gr ant the Hes supe rvised visitation with A.M.H. twice a w eek f or four hours ea ch day

.
Acc ording to the parties, the juve nile court re fer ee primarily spoke to Fa t h er during the he ari ng abo ut the He s’ plans fo r A .M .H . T he re fe re e a sk ed Fa the r a bo ut the He s’ fi na nc e s, his pending criminal matter, and t heir plans for A.M.H . if they reg ained c ustody . Father told the re fer ee that they wer e pre sently

financ ially able to car e for A.M.H., and, if they wer e aw arde d custody , they planned to send A.M.H. t o China and send $25 to $35 a month to support her. At the conc lusion of the he ari ng , th e re fe re e e nte re d “ F ind ing s a ndRe c omm e nd a tio ns of Re fe re e ” de nying the He s’ pe tit ionto m od if

y the pr e vio us June 4, 19 99 c us tod y or de r, a nd the juv e nil e c ou rt c on fi rm e d th os e finding s that same day . The He s did not appeal this ruling , and they continued to visit A.M.H. at the Ba kers’ home once a we ek occ asionally bring ing f

ood and other

items for A.M.H.
Shortlyafte r the he aring , Father we nt to M ac o n , Geor g ia to work for approximately

two
mon ths , a nd Mo the r re ma ine d in Me mph is. Du ri ng thi s p e ri odof tim e , M oth e r c on tin ue d to vis it A. M. H. a t th e B ake rs ’ h ome . Of pa rt ic ula r sig nif ic a nc e is a visi t Moth e r ma de to the B ake rs ’ h ome on Au g us t 1, 20 00 to v isi t A .M .H . T he B ake rs ha d p re vio us ly sp ok e n to Moth e r an d a sk e d h e r t o come at 10:00 a.m. be cause Mrs. Ba ker had to le ave at 11:00 to meet Mr. B aker for lunch. Mothe r arrived at 10:45 a.m, and at 12: 15 p.m. Mrs. Ba ker informed Mot her she neede d to leave to mee t Mr. Ba ker. Mother

picked A.M.H. up and refused to leave , stating that Mrs. Ba ker should ca ll the police. Mother beg an y elling and scre aming at Mrs. B aker , ref erring to the B aker s as “ba d people, de mons.” Mrs. Ba ker c alled Mr. B aker

and informe d him of the situation, and she aske d him to return home. Mr. B aker

called F ather

in Macon, Ge org ia and informed him of t he situation, and F ather advised Mr. B aker

to call the police. A ccor d i n g t o t h e Ba kers, F ather

apolog ized for Mother’ s behavior. After the police a

rrived, Mothe r ag ree d to leave. The B aker s informed F ather that Mother would not be a llo we d b a c k in the ir ho me un le ss he a c c omp a nie d he r. As a re su lt o f the inc ide nt, F a the r q uit his job in Macon, Geor g ia and r eturne d to Memphis.

The He s continued to visit A.M.H. approximately once eac h wee k in Septe mber and Oc tober of 2000

. O n O c to b e r

2 3 , 2 0 0 0 , th e H e s v is it e d A

. M

. H

. a n d b r o u g h t h e r p e ar s , c h ip s , w a te r me lon seeds, a nd some Chinese books. Acc ording to Mrs. Ba k er ’s j o u rnal, the H es spoke Chinese the whole time, and they

wer e “determined to g et [ A.M.H.] to call them Mama & P apa.” On Octobe r 28, 200 0 , Mother g ave birth to a son, Andy . One of Andy ’s ea

rs was only

partially develope d at birth. After

Mother g ave birth to Andy , Father called Mrs. Bake r to ask if she w ould pick up Mother
a ndAn dy fr om the ho sp ita l, w hic h M rs . B ake r a g re e d to do . A t F a the r’ s re qu e st, Mr s. B ake r a lso de liv e re d a do c ume nt fo r the He s to a so c ia l se rv ic e s of fi c e

. Mr s. B ake r visi ted th e Hes ’ hom e-18-

throug hout the month of November 20 0 0 t o bring them food, items for Andy , and helpe d teac h Mother how to ca

re f or the ne wborn. She a lso took Mother shopp i n g for Andy , and she dr ove Mother to s e e A n d y ’ s p e d iatric ian

. T h e H e s a ls o c a ll e d M r s

. B ak e r o c c a s io n a ll y to in q u ir e about ho w t o c are fo r th e ba

by . T ow ardthe e ndof

No ve mbe r, the B ake rs he lpe d th e He s w he n th e ir
auto mob ile ne e de d r e pa ir s, a ndthe y dr ov e Mo the r o n h e r e rr a nd s. Ac c or din g to the He s, the ir fi na nc ia l si tuatio n b e g a n to imp ro ve a ft e r A nd y wa s b orn, a nd th ey were abl e to h ir e a fu ll- tim e Chinese baby sitter to car e for Andy

. On De c e mbe r 4 , 2 00 0, Mr s. B ake r dro ve F a the r t o w or k, a ndsh e too k M oth e r and An dy to see A ndy ’s ea

r spec ialist. On Dece mber 15, 2000, Mrs. B aker took Mother and Andy

to another do c tor ’s app oin tme nt, a ndsh e too k A nd y to h a ve his pa ssp ort phot o mad e

. Mr s. B ake r s ub se qu e ntl y took Andy

to a doctor’ s appointment without Mother at the request of t he Hes. On Dec ember 22, 2000, the B aker s invited the Hes to their ho m e fo r C h ri s tmas, and the He s visited A.M.H. the following day . The He s did not bring A.M.H

. any g ifts, stating they did not have time to shop. The Ba kers g ave the Hes a

vacuum c leane r and g ave A ndy clothes.

I n J anuary

of 2001, the Hes visited A .M.H. at the Ba kers’ home four times. On J anuary 1, 2001, friends of the Hes drove them and Andy to visit A.M.H. Shortly

afte r ar riving , Father said he ha d to le a ve , a ndhe a sk e d th e B ake rs to dri ve Mo the r andAn dy ba c k h ome , w hic h th e y

a g re e d to do . O n Jan ua

ry 13 , 2 00 1, the He s v isi te d A. M. H. a nd br ou g ht he r thr e e pe ars a nd so me Chi ne se je llO. On J anuary 20, 2001, Father called the Ba kers and wanted to c ome visit, but t he B aker s informed him that it was an inconvenie nt t i m e b ec ause Mr s. Ba ker w as having a baby

shower. T hey
resc heduled the visit for J anuary 22, 2001. On their way

to the Ba kers’ home on J anuary

22, 2001, Father c alled to ask if Mother could visit A.M.H. on her birthday , J anuary 28, 2001, and the B aker s ag ree d. When the Hes a

rrived at the Ba

kers’ home, they

introduced a

fema le ac companying the m a s Mo the r’ s si ste r. Whe n M rs . B ake r i nq uir e d f urthe r b e c aus e of

he r u nd e rs ta nd ing that Mo the r o nly had a br other, Father stated t hat t he female was actua lly Mother’s c ousin. Mrs. Baker note d in her journal that Mother a

ppear ed to be upse t. She also noted i n her journal that A.M.H. was sick, and she made an appointment for her to see the doctor.

On J anuary

28, 2001, the Hes arrived at the Baker s’ hom e to visit A.M.H. for what turned
ou t to be the ir

fi na l vi sit . A c c or din g to the He s, the y c a lle d the B ake rs abo ut a we e k p ri or to the vis it to inform the B aker s that they wanted to take A.M.H. to have a fa milyportrait made , and the B aker s a g re ed to th eir

re qu e st. Ac c or din g to M rs . B ake r’ s jo urna l, the y ha d n o p ri or

kn ow le dg e of

thi s re qu e st. Whe n th e He s st a te d th e ir int e nti on s, the B ake rs tol d th e m th a t A .M .H . w a s si c k a ndc ou ld not leave the house. Recor ds subsequently introduced in this matter indicate that the B aker s were in contact with A.M.H.’s doctor during this period reg arding A.M.H.’s hig h feve r, coug h, and
c on g e sti on . T he He s bec a me mor e ins ist e nt an d de ma nd e d to tak e the ir daug hte r t o h a ve a famil y portrait made

. When the Ba kers ref used, Father instructed them to c all the police, which the B aker s did . T wo sh e ri ff ’s de pu tie s a rrive d at th e B ake rs ’ r e sid e nc e a ndsp ok e to the He s a ndthe B ake rs

. Deputy J ohn Astor (“ Deputy

Astor”) subsequently stated t hat he found t he Hes to be “irate,” and they
wer e outside the B aker s’ home y elling and scre aming

. Deputy Astor spoke to Fathe r and a dvised him to speak to an attorne y . Acc ording to Deput y Astor, he instructe d the Hes to re fra in fromD uri ng a subseq uent d ep o si t i o n, Fa t her t est i f i ed t hat he t o o cal l ed and l ef t a m ess age wi t h t he B akers aski ng 7
about vi s i t at i on. H e a l s o s t at ed t hat he mai l ed A

. M

. H

. a car d a f t er Jan uar y 28 , 20 01 , but he di d not r ece i ve a r es po ns e. F a the r o ff

e re d no su c h tes tim o n y a t tria l, a n d th e tr ia l c o u rt m a d e n o m e n tio n o f th is fa c t i n it s o rd e r a p p a re n tly d u e to the trial c o u rt’s fi n d ing s re g a rd ing F a the r’s c re d ib ili ty.
-19- returning to the Ba

ker s ’ h o m e t h at day . Mother subseque ntly stated that, base d on Father’s translation, she unde rstood Deputy Astor’s stateme nt to mean that they co u l d never return to the Ba kers’ home or they

would be ar

rested. Mr . Ba

ker state d t h at he memorialized the events of J anuary 28, 2001 in Mr s. Ba ker’ s journal shortly afte r the incident bec ause Mr s. Ba ker w as too upset to write.

Af te r the Janu ary

28 , 2 00 1 in c ide nt, theHe s n e ve r r e turne d to the Bakers ’ ho me to v isi t A.M.H. Ac cording to Fathe r, they did not return or c all beca use they wer e afr aid of be ing a rre sted,
a ndthe y we re a lso c on c e rn e d a

bo ut p os sib le de po rt a tion and hi s pen din g c ri min a l c ha rg e s. Mr s. B ake r s ta te d th a t, a ft e r the inc ide nt, sh e c a lle d the Exc ha ng e Clu b to arr a ng e fo r any fu tur e vis its to be c on du c te d th e re . H ow e ve r, the B ake rs did no t c a ll a nd inf orm the He s that fu tur e vis its wo uld be conduc ted throug h the Exchang e Club. I n fac t, Mrs. Ba ker subse quently

admitted that the B aker s did nothing af

ter the January

28, 2001 incident to promote a r elationship betwee n A.M.H. and the Hes. The Ba

kers did not hea

r fr om the Hes ag ain unt il April 2, 2001. On t hat day , Mother ca lled
a ndle ft a me ssa g e on the B ake rs ’ a ns we ri ng ma c hin e ins truc tin g the B ake rs to c ome to the ir ho me and “g et [their] baby

bed, we are moving, thank y ou, by e by e.” Mother subseque ntly stated that 7 they also sent postcar ds to A.M.H. in April or May of 2001, but they

wer e re turned.

I n Fe bruary

of 2001, the Hes c ontacted the juvenile court asking for a ssistance in re g aining custody of A.M.H. from the Ba kers. On Fe bruary

15, 2001, Father fax ed a le tter date d Fe bruary 1, 2001, to the juvenile court setting forth a brief history of the c ase, the incident on J anuary 28, 2001, and the He s’ desire to “ take our child back and g o back to China.” Father a lso sent a copy of the letter to t he media. On April 9, 2001, the Hes went to juvenile court where they met with Candice Br own (“ Ms. Brow n”), a

probation counselor. Ms. Brow n described Mother’ s behavior that day as

“ hy ste ri c a l,” a nd sh e app e are d to be g e nu ine ly up se t abo ut re g a ini ng c us tod y of he r d aug hte r. Ms. Br own re counted that the Hes told her that they did not understand the Ame rica n sy stem, and they did not understand what they wer e doing w h en they

signe d the orig inal consent orde r g iving the B ake rs c us tod y

of A. M. H. Ms. B ro wn e xpla ine d to the He s th a t, s inc e the B ake rs we re no t th e re to ag ree to a cha ng e of c ustody , they would need t o fi l e a p et i t i o n and g o befor e a judg e to ask for a mod if ic a tio n o f the c us tod y

arr a ng e me nt. Ms. B ro wn pr e pa re d a pe tit ionon Ap ri l 9, 20 01 , w he re in the He s st a te d th a t th e y

we re pr e se ntl y able to c arefo r A .M .H . O nly Mo the r s ig ne d th e pe tit ion . M s. B ro wn su bs e qu e ntl y

state d th a t F a the r wa s p re se nt that day , b ut s he wa s n e w t o th e po sit iona ndon ly had Mother sig n the petition. The Hes’ petition to modify the custody arr ang ement wa s filed in the juvenile court on May

29, 2001, and the pe tition was set fo r a h ea ri n g i n J une of 2001. F ather subsequently

admitted that, as with the pre vious petition t hey filed i n May

of 2000, the He s were c on ta c te d by imm ig ratio n of fi c ia ls aro un d the tim e the y fi le d the May 20 01 pe tit ion , bu t he could not remembe r the e x act dates of those c alls. Father stat ed t h at t h ey rec eived the c alls from immigration officials betwe en Mar ch and May of 2001.-20-

At some point in May

of 2001, the He s sent their son Andy , who was seven months old at the tim e , to Chi na

to liv e wi th Mo the r’ s re la tiv e s. Th e y pa id the ir ba by sitte r, a Chi ne se imm ig rant, to t akeAn dy

to C hin a . A c c or din g to the He s, the y se nt A nd y

to C hin a be c aus e the y

fe are d h e c ou ld be take n f ro m th e m if Fathe r wa s ultim a te ly c on vic te d of the c ri min a l cha rg e s pen din g a g a ins t hi m. Th e y a lso ho pe d tha t Moth e r’ s fa the r, a “ tr a dit ion a l med ic ine do c tor ,” c ou ld tr e a t A nd y ’s e ar. Whil e Andy was in China, the He s sent approximately $1,000.00 eac h month to her family

.

F. The Bak e rs’ Pe tit

ion to T e rminat e the He s’ Pa re nta l Rights

After the Hes filed their petition to modify the orig inal custody order in juvenile court in May of 2001, the B aker s once ag ain met with Mr . Weaver . Mr. Weaver rec ommended that the B aker s fi le a pe tit ion to te rm inate the He s’ pa re nta l rig hts to A. M. H. to sto p the juv e nil e c ou rt pr oc e e din g s. When the Hes a

ppear ed in juvenile court on J une 6, 200 1 fo r t h e hearing on their petition, the juvenile court resche duled the hea ring until J une 22, 2001 bec ause Mr. Weaver was unable to attend. Two day s befor e the schedule d J une 22, 2001 hearing, the B aker s filed a “ Petition for Adoption and Termination of Par ental Rig hts” i n t h e C hance ry Court of Shelby

County . The B aker s’ petition, which Mr. Weave r filed on their behalf , stated that the He s abandone d A.M.H. by willfullyfailing to visit her and willfullyfailing to support her. The Hes wer e subseque ntly informed of

the petition and the nece ssityto transfe r the c ase to the c hance ry court. Soon there afte r, the He s secur ed the
se rv ic e s o f atto rn e y

De nn is J. So ssama n ( “ Mr . So ssama n” ) t o r e pr e se nt the m in the ma tte r. Th e c a se wa s in iti a lly

a ssi g ne d to Chanc e llo r D .J. A lis sa nd ratos

. On J une 27, 2001, the c hance ry court a ppointed Mid-South as nex t friend to co n duct an investigation into t he merits of the Ba kers’ ado p t i o n petition. Ms. C hunn conducte d the inv e sti g a tio n o n b e ha lf

of Mid -S ou th andop e ne d a n “ a do pti ve famil y f i l e .” Ms. Chu nn su bs e qu e ntl y filed her report outlini ng the history betwee n the Hes and the B aker s, and she c oncluded that A.M.H

. “is continuing to thrive in the Ba ker home .” On July24, 2001, the chancery court, pursuant to the
a g re e me nt o f the pa

rt ie s, ent ered a n o rd e r a pp oin tin g a tto rn e y

Ki mbr ou g h B . M ull ins (“ Ms. Mullins”) to serve a s the g uardia n ad litem for A.M.H . The orde r also provide d that the parties ag ree d to waive a ny

hear say objections to any statements contained in Ms. Mulli ns’ re ports, and they stipulated that Ms. Mulli ns would be deeme d an expert reg arding any subsequent opinions she may form in t he ca se. On Septembe r 24, 2001, the B aker s filed a notice with the chanc ery court that they
wer e substituting attorne y L arry E. Parrish (“ Mr. Parrish” ) as c ounsel to replac e Mr. Weave r.
O n O c t o b e r

1 0 , 2 0 0 1 , M s

. M u l l i n s f

i l e d h e r f i r s t i n t e r i m r e p o r t w i t h t h e c h a n c e r y c o u r t

. In prepa ring her r eport, Ms. Mullins conducted int ervie ws with the Hes, a ssisted by Pastor Yau tr a ns la tin g ; th e B ake rs ; Ms . Ch un n; an d M s. Clo ud . M s. Mu lli ns ind ic a te d inhe r r e po rt that Ms

. Chu n n in f

o r me d h e r

th a t, p rio r

to th e b irtho f

A

. M

. H

. , F a th e r

q u e s ti o n e d h is p a te r n ity

o f A

. M .H.,
a ndMs. Mu lli ns ’ report not e d th a t F a the r c on fi rm e d th is a sse rt ion . B a se d o n h e r i nte rv ie ws wi th F a the r, Ms. Mu lli ns no te d that F a the r wa s in fa vo r of he r s ug g e sti on that heun de rg o a DN A t e st t oI n a s ubs equen t r eport f i l ed i n Sept emb er of 20 03 , M s

. M ul l i ns i ndi cat ed t hat t he cha nce r y cour t di d i n fact 8
appo i nt D r

. G ol dst ei n t o perf orm a ps y chol ogi cal ev al uat i on of A. M

. H

. T he rec o rd d oes not cont ai n a n or der t o t hat ef fect , an d we f

i nd no t r ans cr i pt o f

any hear i ng d i s cus s i ng su ch an order i n t he r ecor d on appeal

. I n a ny ev ent , t he part i es d o not d i sput e t hat t he t ri al co urt ap p o i nt ed t o D r. G o l d st ei n t o co nd uct t he eval uat i o n.

D r. G o l d st ein ne ve r ev alua t ed t he H es o r t he B ak ers in t his case

. W he n he wa s i nit i all y co nta c te d b y M s. 9
M ul l i ns , D r

. G ol dst ei n w oul d not ag r ee t o conduct an ev al uat i on of t he adul t s becau s e h e f el t t hat , due t o t he cul t ur al i s s ues i nv ol ved a nd t he cos t s as s oci at ed wi t h perf ormi ng s uch a com pl ex eva l uat i on, he wan t ed t o gat her a n eut r al t eam
o f p ro fessio na l s t o co nd uc t t he ev alua t i o n. A cc o rd i ng to M s. M ull i ns, co un sel f o r b o t h p arti es o b je cted t o he r req ue st t o e val uat e t he B ake r s and t he H es ci t i ng t he cos t s as s oci at ed wi t h s uch an ev al uat i on, t her efore, t he cha nce l l or deci ded to d e fer a d e c isio n o n a n e v a lua tio n o f t h e p a rtie s.
-21- es t ab l i s h p at er n i t y

. Ac co rd i n gl y , s h e i n cl u d ed i n h er re p o rt a re co m m en d at i o n t h atFa t h eru n d er go a DNA test to e stablish whether he was the biolog ical father of A .M.H. Father subseque ntly denied telling Ms. Chunn he questioned paternity of A.M.H., a nd he denie d telling Ms. Mullins he wanted a DNAtest. Ms. Mulli ns also rec ommended that the p ar t i es underg o psy cholog ical testing . She
rec ommended that the c ourt appoint a child psy cholog ist to evaluate A.M.H. for the psy cholog ical impact removing her from the Baker s would have and t he effec t of losing he r cultura l heritag e if the He s’ pa re nta l ri g hts we re ult imate ly te rm inate d. Ms. Mu lli ns re c omm e nd e d D r. Da vidGo lds te in (“ Dr . G old ste in” ), a lic e ns e d cli nic a l psy c ho log ist , to pe rf orm th is r ole . A c c or din g to M s. Mu lli ns , the c ha nc e ry

c ou rt e nte re d a c on se nt or de r i n O c tob e r o f 2 00 1 a pp oin tin g Dr . G old ste in t o e va luate A.M.H. Dr. Goldstein foc used his evaluation on three issues: (1) the psy cholog ical status of

8 A.M.H., (2) the ef

fec t removing A.M.H. from the Baker s would have on thechild, and (3) the ef fec t
severing A .M.H.’s re lationship with t he He s would have on the child. 9

I n October

of 2001, F ather

filled out a cr edit application to pur chase a new Ma zda vehicle. I n the sec tion of the application reque sting the name and addre ss of a close st livi ng relative, Father inserted the names “J ac k J o h nson” and “ J eff He” indicating they

wer e his cousins. Father subsequently

adm itted that these we re f ictitious names he occ asionally used to ref

er to himself. Ac c or din g to F a the r, the sa le sp e rs on pr e ssu re d him into bu y ing the ve hic le a nde nc ou ra g e d h im t o use the fic titious names. The application re flec ts that the Hes made a $1,500.00 down payment on the ve hic le wh ic h co st ap pr oximate ly $1 8, 00 0. 00 , an d the y fi na nc e d the re st by makin g pay me nts of appr ox imately

$300.00 per month beg inning in Nove mber of 2001.

On J anuary

7, 2002, the Hes wer e leg ally marrie d in Memphis, ShelbyCounty , Tenne ssee. Around that time, F ather

took a DNA te st which esta blished that he wa s indeed the biolog ical father of A. M. H. Sho rt ly

the re a ft e r, he fi le d a “ Vo lun tary Ac kn ow le dg me nt of Pa te rn ity .” Mo the r b e c a me pr e g na nt w iththe He s th ir d c hil d a ro un d th is t ime a s w e ll.

On J anuary

23, 2002, the B aker s filed a motion reque sting that the chanc ery court orde r the He s to pay

Ms. Mu lli ns ’ f

e e s, de po sit

a sum wi th the c ou rt

su ff ic ie nt t o p a y

fo r f utu rec os ts
a sso c ia te d w ithps y c ho log ic a l e va luatio ns , e xpe rt te sti mon y , a nd DN A te sti ng

. I n s up po rt of the ir motion, the Bake rs re lied on the following testimonyfrom F ather ’s deposition, where in he stated:-22- Q. I s y ou [si c] y our under standing t h at y ou have the
re sp on sib ili ty

to pay a t le a st i nit ia lly

ha lf of the c os t f or Ms. Mu lli ns se rv ic e a s g ua

rd ia n a d li te m? A. I do no t un de rs ta ndit. Q. Okay . Are y ou prepa re [sic] to pay

half of he r fe es whe n they
are due? A

. L et me p u t it th is w a y , mo n e y is n o th in g c o mp ar e d with the h u m an b ei n g. Q

. O k a y. A. Compared with having our daug hter ba ck. Money is nothing if in the money

is justi fied, if the e x pense. Q. Well, if the Court order ed y ou to pay stay [si c] $3,000 toward the g uardia n ad litem’s f

ee, are y ou able and willing to make that pay me nt? A. I ’m ab l e, b u tI ’m n o tn ec es s ar i l y wi l l i n g. Q. So i t may

be that y ou wo uld ha ve the mon e y , b ut j us t be c aus e the Cou rt tol d y ou to p a y

it, y ou wo uld n’ t ne c e ssa

ri ly pay it, ri g ht? A. I wi ll wait a nd se e

. I c a nn ot m ake de c isi on s rig ht n ow . I wi ll wait and se e. Q. But y ou d o re s erve to y ourself the rig ht to make a judg ment about whethe r y ou will or will not follow the order? A. I will consult a few othe r people befor e I make my decision.

. . . . Q. Okay . Now, wh en y ou say that y ou are able, do y ou mean y ou have the money

in the bank? A. I ha ve pa rt of the mon e y

in the ba nk , b ut, y ou kn ow , a s a Chine s e , Ch in e s e tr a d it io n is d if f e r e n t f r o m A me r ic an tr a dit ion . I can bo rr ow mon e y ve ry e a sil y fr om m y frie nd s, my re la tiv e s. Q. Al l r ig ht? A. Ye s. Q. How much money do y ou have in the bank? A. Right now I have $2,500 and 60-something most re cent information.

. . . . Q. Now, y ou say

y o u ca n borrow mone y from friends and
re la tiv e s; i s th a t c or

re c t? A. Ye s.-23- Q. Ok a y . G ive me the na me s of the frie nd s for wh om y ou wo uld b o rr o w m o n e y i f

yo u n e e d e d t o b o rr o w m o n e y? A. Most of them in China. I can g ive it to y ou. Q. Please. A. My

relatives such as my

wife’ s brother . . . . Q

. O k a y. A. Her

brother is a very succe ssful y oung man. Young er br other.

. . . . Q. An d h ow muc h c apa c ity wo uld he ha ve to l e ndy ou mon e y , if y ou ne e de d mo ne y

fr om h im? A. I think he can e asily

loan us one million. Q. One million? A. Yes. One milli on. Q. Ok a y . A ll rig ht. Yo u a reta lki ng abo ut d oll ars ? A. Ye s. Q. Okay . And who else ? A. And then that’s f

or my wife’ s brother, y oung er brother. And then for f rom my relatives, my

sister just now mentioned, she is an atto rn e y . Sh e c a n lo a n me abo ut $ 10 ,0 00 . U .S. Do lla rs

. Q. Okay . And who else ? A. And some of my previous co- workers t h e Chong Qing University

. . . . Q. Okay . And he’ s at — A. He is an a

rc hit e c t. Q. Ar c hit e c t? A. Ye s. Q. An d h ow muc h d o y ou thi nk y ou c ou ld b or

ro w f ro m hi m if y ou neede d? A. $10,000. Q. Okay . Any

body else? A. I think that’s sufficient to see throug h this case. Q. And y ou think y ou would need to do a ny thing to borr ow the
mone y f r o m th e o th e r th a n ju s t a s k th e m a n d te ll the m how much y ou need? A. I would tell them and if — I know — I know they

will. They will be v er y h ap p y to do so. I know that. B eca

use we are fig hting f or our daug hter ba ck.

F a the r a lso me nti on e d th a t he c ou ld s e c ur e the fu nd s w ith in a mon th and that he c ou ld r e c e ive the se loans interest fr ee. Mothe r subs eq u en t ly testified that Mr. Sossaman, their attorney at the time of Father’s de position, i nstructed F ather to testify at hi s deposition that they had more money

than theyO n Feb ruary 12 , 20 0 2 , t he chancell o r ent ered an ord er nu nc pro t un c t o Februa r y 7, 200 2 add r es s i ng t he oral 10

o rd e rs e n te re d a t th e F e b ru a ry 7 , 2 0 0 2 , h e a rin g

. T h e c o u rt e n te re d a n o rd e r o n A p ril 2 , 2 0 0 4 , nu nc pro t un c t o Feb ruary 2 , 2 0 0 2 , ap p o intin g a tto rn e y L ind a L . H o lm e s a s the a tto rn e y a d li te m fo r M s. M u lli n s.
-24- a c tua lly did . H ow e ve r, F a the r s ub seq uen tl y tes tif ie d th a t Mr . So ssama n d id n ot a sk him to misrepre sent their income. Although headmitted to ly ing a bout their income during his deposition, Father a sserted that Mr. Parrish trappe d him into s aying how much money they could ac quire.

On Fe bruary

7, 2002, the cha ncellor c onducted a h ea ri ng on the B aker s’ motion. At the hearing, Ms. Mullins reque sted that the chancery court take custody of A.M.H.’ s passport. The H es informed the c hance llor that the passport wa s at their apartment, and the chancellor or dere d the Hes to surrende r the pa ssport to th e court by 4:00 p.m. that day . The c hance llor also appointed an attorney ad litem to repre sent Ms. Mullins. Reg arding the Baker s’ m otion, the chancellor or dere d 10 the Hes to de posit $10,000 with t he chancery court to cove r future g uardia n ad li tem fee s, to pay for the DN A t e st, a ndto d e po sit $5 ,0 00 to c ov e r the pr oje c te d c os ts a sso c ia te d w ithps y c ho log ic a lly evaluating the pa

rties and A.M.H

. The Hes did not comply with the chanc ellor’s ruling by tendering A .M.H.’s passport to the court on F ebrua

ry 7, 2002. When subse quently questioned about his communication with a r eporte r a f t e r t h e h e ar i n g , F a t h e r

p r o v i d e d t h e f

o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y: Q. And do y ou rec all [t he re porter] asking y ou whether y ou wer e g oin g to p ro du c e the pa ssp ort or no t pr od uc e the pa ssp ort? A. Ab ou t th e pa ssp ort, I thi nk I tol d h e r that w e didno t w a nt t o g ive the passport. That’s what I said. Q. Ok a y , are y ou de nying that y ou sa id t o h e r, “ Whic h w ou ld make a better story

for y ou”? A. I could not r emember exactly what I said, but the point is that I didno t w a nt t o g ive the pa ssp ort. T hat’ s my po int

. Q. Did y ou s ayto her wor ds that, “I may do either one . Which
o n e w i l l m ak e t h e b e s ts t o r y f o r y o u ?”

. . . . Q. Ar e y ou de nying that y ou sa id that? A. I do no t de ny

it. I c ou ld n ot r eme mb er that . T hat’ s w hat I said.

F a the r w e nt o n to te sti fy

that th e re wa s a

sixty pe rc e nt c ha nc e he ma de the state me nt ve rs us a fo rty perc ent cha nce that he did not make the statement. According to Fathe r, he “ was trying to g et the media’s attention in order to help me to g et my daug hter back.” On Februa ry 8, 2002, the chancellor enter ed an “ Orde r to Show Cause” r efle cting that the cour t re ceive d a ca ll from the g uardia n adT h e ch an ce l l or h ad pr ev i ou s l y i n s t r u ct ed t h e H es t o produ ce proof of t h ei r m ar r i ag e i n Chi n a an d pr oof of 11
the ir T e n n e sse e m a rr ia g e . A t t h e he a rin g o n F e b ru a ry 1 4 , 2 0 0 2 , th e c h a n c e llo r fo u n d tha t t h e H e s n e v e r m a rr ie d in C hi na. O n Febr uar y 15, 2 00 2, t he ch anc el l or order ed t he H es t o produce a cop y o f t hei r T enn es s ee marr i age l i cen s e. T h is o rd e r w a s the su b je c t o f a se p a ra te c o n te m p t p ro c e e d ing

. T he cour t al s o ent er ed a s ubs equen t s how ca us e or der r equi r i ng t he H es t o app ear an d expl ai n w hy t hey f ai l ed t o pay t he $1 5, 00 0. 00 t he cour t pre vi ous l y order ed t hem t o pay

. T he H es s ubs equen t l y com pl i ed wi t h t he cour t ’ s order

a n d e n te re d a no tice o f t h e ir p a ym e n t o f $ 1 5 ,0 0 0 .0 0 to the c o u rt.
-25- litem, c ounsel for the Hes, and counsel for the Ba kers on Fe bruary 7, 2002, at appr ox imately 4:00 p.m. informing the court that the H es did not intend to comply with the chanc ellor’s orde r.
The c hance llor entere d another order on Fe bruary 8, 2002, appointing the Ba kers g uardia ns of A.M.H., a nd the cha ncellor or dere d that the Hes ha ve no conta ct with A.M

. H. unt il the court enter ed an or der dire cting otherwise. T he orde r indicate d that the chanc ellor based his decision on the entire rec ord, including the re commendation of the g uardia n ad litem. The Certificate of Servic e on the or de r ind ic a te d tha t it wa s pre se nte d to Mr. Sos sa ma n, c ou ns e l for the He s, a ndMs. Mu lli ns , the g uar dian a d li te m f

or re vie w. Ho we ve r, Mr . Pa rrish , c ou ns e l f

or theB ake rs , w a s th e on ly attorney who s igne d the orde r indicating his approval. The Ba kers ne ver r equeste d such an or der, and the r ecor d on appea l contains no transc ript of any hearing a ddressing the nee d for suc h an orde r. I n fac t, Mr

. Parrish subsequently testified at trial that, as every one was pre paring to leave the hearing on Fe bruary

7, 2002, the cha ncellor instructed him to draft the orde r. Ac cording to Mr. Parrish, the chanc ellor instructed him to forg o having the ot her attorney s sign the order

. Mr. Parrish stated that Mr. Sossaman was no longe r the Hes’ attorney at the time, and he admitted that he did not show the order to Mr. Sossaman prior to pr esenting it to the chance llor for his appr oval. Mr. Parrish was the only lawy er pr esent in the c ourtroom when the chanc ellor re ad the or der and signe d it.

I t w a s not unt il Fe br

ua ry 14 , 200 2 tha t Mr. Sos sa ma n fil e d his “M oti on to Wi thdra w” wi th the chanc ery court citing a conf lict of interest. That same day , the cha ncellor c onducted a hearing on the pre vious “Show C ause Order ” and Mr. S ossaman’s “Motion to W ithdraw” as counse l for the Hes. Mr. S ossaman informed the court that a conflict had developed between the H es re g arding the
manner in which the ca se should proce ed af ter the F ebrua

ry 7, 2002 hea ri n g. The c hance llor
re qu ir e d Mr. S os sam a n to re ma in a s c ou ns e l f or F a the r d uringthehe ari ng , a ndMo the r c ho se to
re pr e se nt h e rs e lf . D uring the he ari ng , Mo the r inf orme d the c ha nc e llo r that sh e wo uldno t c omp ly wit h the court’s previous orde r to surre nder the passport. F ather testified that, af

ter the pr evious hearing, he tried to g et the passport from Mother, who ha d control of the doc ument, but she ref used to tell him where she put it. At the conc lusion of the hearing, the chanc ellor determined that Father was not a c redible w itness, that both Mother and Father had control of the passport, a nd that Father was “a wil lful, knowing , perjure r on these point s.” The c hance llor order ed the He s to surrende r the passport by 9:00 a .m. the following morning or fa ce inc arc eration. That same day , the cha ncery 11

c ou rt e nte re d a n o rd e r p e rm itt ing Mr . So ssama n to wi thdra w f ro m r e pr e se nti ng th e He s in thi s matter. O n F e b ru ar y 1 5 , 2 0 0 2 , a tt o r n e y D a v id A

. Si e g e l ( “ M r

. Si e g e l” ) f il e d a n o ti c e w ith the chanc ery court indicating that he would be taking over r epre sentation of the He s in the matter.-26-

On F e br ua ry 20 , 2 00 2, the He s f

ile d a mot ionre qu e sti ng that th e c ha nc e llo r o rd e r i mme diate vis itatio n w ith A. M. H. a nd va c a te its pr e vio us or de r dir e c tin g the m to re fr a in fr om c on ta c tin g the ir daug hter. On F ebrua

ry 22, 2002, the chancellor e ntere d an orde r nunc pro tunc to Febr uary 14, 2002, finding the Hes in civil contempt for ref using to surre nder A.M.H.’s passport, and the court order ed them incar cer ated un t i l s uch time as they purg ed themselve s of the conte mpt by producing the pa ssp ort. T he He s su bs e qu e ntl y c omp lie d b y

de liv e ri ng the pa ssp ort to the c ou rt

. On Marc h 7, 2002, the ch ance llor conducte d a hea ring on the Hes’ petition requesting visitation. R eg arding the chancellor’ s prior order directing no contac t betwee n the Hes and A.M.H., the following exchang e occ urre d:

THE COURT: Whydid I issue a no conta ct orde r? MR. PAR RI SH: The g uardia n ad litem asked y ou to.

Th e He s w e rehe rewi th c ou ns el at the tim e a nddid n’ t ob

je c t. THE COURT: L et me say this, Ineed to ha ve an evidentiary

hearing so I can see whether or not I ne e d to re ve rs e my se lf, s ti c k w ithwh a t I have done, whate ver it is, beca use I don’t
reme mber why

I did it

. I t sounds more log ic a l, w hic h is — b e c aus e it’ s not l ike me to sit and go , I ’m looking at an over cast day , I think I will deny , think I

will d enyy ou visitation. Iusually

do things for

a re ason. People might disag ree , but I am a pe rson who
re a so ns thr ou g h th ing s. MR. SIEG EL : I re a lize that. THE COURT: Obviously what happe ned wa s the g uardia n ad litem made a rec ommendation the other side rema ined silent on and didn’t off er proof, and I went on ahea d, and I we n t o n, said my job is to be decisive, not just ride the fenc e being indecisive. So, I made a decision, one side said, I would like fo r y ou to decide this way , which is t o d e n y v is it a ti o n , a n d th e o th e r s ide was heard for w hateve r short time it was or long time it was or wha t ever , then I made a decision. Now , h aving done that, I ’m more than h app y

to r e visit i t, b ut i f I ’m

g oin g to revisit it now, I ’m g oing to need to hear from the g uardia n ad litem, and witnesses, any body-27- they wan t t o call, bec ause the law is not
abs olu te on thi s.
As pr e vio us ly

me nti on e d, the re c or d o n a pp e a l do e s n ot con tain a ny mot ionby

the B ake rs or

Ms. Mul l i n s as k i n g fo r a ruling on visitation or a no c ontact orde r, and the rec ord does not conta in a transcript of any

evidentiary

hearing addre ssing the entry of t he orde r. Ac cording to Mr. Parrish’s
su bs e qu ent tes timon y

a t tria l, n o p ri or

he ari ng wa s e ve r c on du c te d o n th is i ssu e . In f a c t, M s. Mullins’ int erim re port filed on Oc tober 10, 2001 on l y co n t ained a rec ommendation that any visitation between the Hes and A.M.H. be supervised. Ms. Mullins subsequently stated that there was no pe nding motion on this issue, but she believed the chanc ery court ha d enoug h evidenc e befor e it to justi fy

the orde r. I n any

event, the trial court de clined to consider the Hes’ motion on the day of the he aring

. On Marc h 8, 2002, the B aker s filed a motion to amend their petition to allege that Father wa s not the leg al par ent of A.M.H. but only her biologica l fathe r wit h no basis to alleg e he ha d pare ntal ri g hts to A .M .H . T he c ha nc e ry c ou rt su bs e qu e ntl y

g rante d th e Bakers ’ mot ionto ame ndthe ir petition. Therea fter, the parties filed numerous motions with the trial court. On April 22, 2002, the Ba kers f iled a motion for default judgme nt. On April 25, 2002, the He s filed a motion for summary judgme nt arg uing that the rec ord, as a matter of la w, fa ile d t o es t ablish that the Hes a bandoned A.M.H. On May 1, 2002, the Ba kers filed a motion for partial summary judgme nt alleg ing F ather had no par ental rig hts to A.M.H., but they subsequently

withdrew the motion.

I n July of 20 02 , D r. Go lds te in f

ile d h is r e po rt

wi th the c ha nc ery cou rt

. Dr. Go lds te in conclude d that A.M.H. wa s thriving with the B aker s, and she vi ewed the B aker s as her “psy cholog ical par ents.” Af ter a cknowledg ing that he could not predict how a spe cific individual would respond to an inter

ruption in attachment, he c oncluded that, ba sed on his rese arc h, a child who experience s loss in early

childhood is at a g reater risk of deve loping se rious psy cholog ical disorder s in the future. H e opined that, if A .M.H. wer e re moved from the Bak ers, she would experience separ ation anxietyand possibly develop a

depre ss i v e d isorder. While he found the rese arc h inv olv ing tr a ns c ultur a l a do pti on s to be sp ars e , h e c on c lud e d t hat su c h a do pti on s d o n ot a pp e ar t o ha ve a ny sig nif ic a nt d if fe re nc e s f ro m no rm a l a do pti on s. Dr . Gol ds te in sub se qu e ntl y a dmi tte d th a t, as of t h e d at e h e fi l ed his report, he had not investig ated the attachment betwe en A.M.H. and the He s. Ho we v e r , h e o p i n e d t h a t A

. M

. H

. w o u l d h a v e v e r y l i t t l e a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e H e s b a s e d on his observation of her i n tera ctions with the Ba kers and the fa ct that the He s had only visited her approximately

eig hty times for one hour

eac h time. On Aug ust 30, 2002, the chanc ellor ente red a
c on se nt o rd e r r e l e a sin g Dr . G old ste in’ s p re lim ina ry re po rt to the a tto rn e y s, a ndthe c ou rt lim ite d th e ir dis c los ur e of the re po rt to the a tto rn e y s, the pa rt ie s, a ny oth e r e xpe rt s to be uti lize d b y the pa rt ie s. On September

9, 2 0 0 2 , M o t h er gave birth to the Hes third child, Avita. On Nove mber 8, 2002, the Hes f

iled a notice w ith the Tennesse e Attorne y Gene ral of the ir int en t t o challeng e the constitutionalit y

of ce rtain Tenne ssee statutes, spe cific al ly certain provisions contained in sec tion 36-1-102 a nd section 36-1- 113 of the Te nnessee Code. Ther eaft er , Assistant Attorney Gene ral Doug las E. Dimond (“Mr . Dimond”) e ntere d an ap p ea ra nce in the c hance ry court to def

end the-28-

constitutionalit y

of the statutes. On June 23, 2003, the Hes filed a motion reque sting a jury trial, and a motion to bifurca t e the procee dings into a se parate determination of the g rounds justify ing termination and a

decision on the be st interest ana ly sis.

On S eptember 4, 2003, the cha ncery court c onducted a

hearing on the Hes’ motion contesting the constitutionalityof ce rtain Tenne ssee statutes. On Septe m b er 1 0 , 2003, attorney Richard A. G o r d o n ( “ M r

. G o r d o n ” ) e n t e r e d a n o t i c e o f ap p e ar a n c e a s c o

- c o u n s e l f o r t h e H e s

. T h a ts a m e d a y, the Hes f iled a motion asking the cha ncellor to set a side its p rior orde r appointing Mid-South and Ms. Chunn as next friend to investig ate the Bakers’ adoption petition. On S eptember 12, 2003, the B ake rs fi led a motio n inlim ine re qu e sti ng a ru lin g that a ny

pa re nta l rig hts F a the r m a y

ha ve a s to A.M.H. ar e subjec t to termination pursuant to section 36-1-113( g )(9) of the Te nnessee Code. The B ake rs a lso fi le d a

mot iona sking the c ha nc e ry c ou rt to c on so lid a te the B ake rs ’ pe tit ionto t e rm inate the Hes’ pare ntal rig hts with Mother’s petition f iled in the juvenile court on May 29, 2001, asking the j uvenile court to modify the J une 4, 1999 custody order

. That same day , the Hes filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Civil Procedur e, asking the chanc ery court to set aside the c onsent order

issued in juve nile court on J une 4, 1999. On September 15, 2003, the Hes fi le d a mot ionfo r d e fa

ult jud g me nt a g a ins t th e B ake rs on Mo the r’ s May 19 , 2 00 1 p e tit ion fi le d in juvenile court reque sting a modification of the c ustody order

. On Se pte mbe r 2 3, 20 03 , D r. Go lds te in c on du c te d a vid e ota pe d “ a tta c hme nt s e ssi on ” wi th A.M.H., the Hes, a nd the B aker s. The video r ecor ding of the incident is included in the re cord on appea l. Dr. Goldstein met with the parties prior to the meeting to expl ain the purpose of the mee ting and the pa

rame ters of pe rmissible c onduct at the meeting , which included keeping the contents of the meeting confiden t i al

. Acc ording to Dr. Goldstein, the video de monstrated the hig h level of attachme nt A.M.H. has to the B aker s. The He s broug ht food items and g ifts to the me eting which,
a c c or din g to D r. Go lds te in, the y us e d to e nc ou ra g e A. M. H. to int e ra c t wi th the m. D r. Go lds te in d id not attribute A.M.H.’s willing ness to approa ch the H es to retrieve an item to mean she still had a level of attachment to the He s. Dr. Goldstein stated that, the day afte r the sess i o n , h e o b s erve d a news intervie w with the Hes w here in the Hes stated that A.M.H. thoug ht they abandone d her.
On September

24, 2003, Ms. Mulli ns filed another report where in she opined that the He s abandone d A.M.H. by

failing to visit and failing to s upport her. Ms. Mullins cited A.M.H.’s le vel of attac hmen t t o t h e Ba k ers a nd conclude d that she should rema in in the Bakers’ custody . On Se p t em b er 2 5 , 2 003, the Hes f iled an ame nded motion to set aside the conse nt order a war ding custody of A.M.H. to the B aker s entere d in J une of 1999. That same day , the Hes fi l ed a mot ion asking the cha ncery

court to set aside its previo u s order appointing the Ba

kers the g uardia ns of A.M.H. On Septembe r 26, 2003, the c hance ry court e nt er ed an orde r denying theHes’ motion challeng ing the constitutionalit y of ce rtain provisi ons in section 36-1-102 and sec tion 36-1-113 of the Tenne ssee Code. On September 29, 2003, the Hes filed a motion re questing immediate visitation with A.M.H.

On Octobe r 2, 2003, the He s filed a motion pursuant to section 36-1-119(d) of the Tenne ssee Code reque sting that the tria l court dismiss the Ba kers’ petition f

or adoption beca

use the a doption-29-

pr oc e e di ng had been pe nd ing be y on d th e statut orily a llo we d p e ri od . O n O c tob e r 2 3, 20 03 , M s. Mullins fil ed an a ddendum to her pr evious report filed on September 24, 2003.

On Novembe r 5, 2003, the Baker s filed a motion in limine reque sting that the chancery court issue a ruling on the m eaning of the wor d “willfully ” as use d in section 36-1-102( 1)(A) (i) of the Tenne ssee Code. O n November 6, 2003, Chance llor Alissandratos rece ived a letter from attorney C h ad A. M assey

notify ing him that the He s filed a c omplaint with the Tennessee Court of the J udiciary alleg ing judicia l misconduct. On Novembe r 7, 2003, the He s filed a r enew ed motion for
e me rg e nc y

vis itatio n w iththe tr ia l c ou rt . O n No ve mbe r 14 , 20 03 , Mr

. Go rd on fi le d a no tic e wi th the cha ncery

court of his intentio nto w it h draw from re prese nting F ather and solely

repr esent Mother

. That same day , Mr. Sieg el notified the c hance ry court of his int ention to withdraw from repr esenting Mother and sole ly

repr esent F ather . Also on November 14, 2003, Chance llor Alissandratos
convene d a hea

ring wher ein he informed the parties that, due to an ethica l complaint filed by the Hes
a nd“ to a vo id e ve n th e app e aranc e of imp ro prie ty ,” he wo uld re c us e him se lf fr om the c a se . Sh ortly t h e r e a f t e r , t h e C h i e f

J u s t i c e o f

t h e T e n n e s s e e S u p r e m e C o u r t e n t e r e d a n o r d e r a s s i g n i n g R o b e r tL. Childers of the Shelby

CountyCircuit Court to hear the c ase by interchang e.
On Dec ember

1, 2003, the Hes’ second c hild, Andy , returne d to the United States. After picking up Andy

at the air port, the Hes proce eded to Wal-Mart where they encounte red H ope B aker , the B ake rs ’ o lde r d aug hte r, A. M. H. , A ime e , a nda no the r c hild Mrs . B ake r w a s b aby sittin g . M rs

. Ba ker w as in another

part of the store shoppi n g , and Hope was watching over the other c hildren. Up on se e ing A. M. H. , Moth e r ap pr oa c he d A.M .H ., tou c he d the c hil d, a nd sa id lou dly , “T hat’ s my daug hte r. Gi ve me my

daug hte r. ” Ho pe g ra

bb e d A .M .H . a ndbe g a n s c re ami ng for he lp. A Wa lMart mana g er he ard the scre am for help and a pproac hed the g roup. F ather subsequently

approa ched the g roup and told another manag er w ho arrived at the sc ene that the Hes wanted to take A.M.H . and leave . One of

the Wal-Mart mana g ers c alled the police to deal with the situation.

On Janu ary

22 , 2 00 4, Judg e Chi lde rs c on ve ne d a hea ri ng to as c e rt a in the status of the c a se a nd a ny pe nd ing mot ion s, a nd he inq uir e d abo ut mov ing the c a se to t ri a l a s so on a s p os sib le . A t a hearing on January

27, 2004, the Hes ma de an or al motion requesting a visit wi th A.M.H. the following day , her birthday . At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court or ally order ed that the Hes we re to ha ve no conta ct with A.M.H. until after a trial in the matter . On J anuary 28, 2004, the tr ia l c ou rt e nte re d s e pa

rate or de rs , a ll nunc pro tunc to September 4, 2003, de ny ing the Hes’ motion for summary judgme nt, de ny ing their motion to bifurcate the proce eding s, and denying the ir motion for a jury trial.

On F e br ua ry 6, 20 04 , th e tr ia l c ou rt

e nte re d a n o rd e r add re ssi ng the He s’ pr e vio us re qu e st fo r v isi ta tio n o n A .M .H .’ s b irthd a y a nd de nie d a ny fu tur e c on ta c t be tw e e n the He s a ndA. M. H. un til the completion of the tria l in this matter, effe ctively denying the Hes’ pr evious motions requesting visitation. On Februa

ry 23, 2004, the t ri al co urt enter ed a “ J oint Pretrial Orde r” se tting forth the disputed and undisputed fa cts in the case

. On Fe bruary 27, 2004, the trial court, rec og nizi ng that no order had bee n enter ed allowing Mr. Weaver to w ithdraw as counsel for the Ba kers, e ntere d an order nunc pro tunc to September 30, 2001 pe rmitting Mr. Weave r to withdraw f rom the ca se.-30- G. The Trial

Th e tr ia l onthe B ake rs ’ pe tit ion fo r a do pti on a ndte rm inatio n o f the He s’ pa re nta l r ig hts to A.M.H. and the Hes’ petition to modify the J une 4, 1999 custody order g ot underway

on Fe bruary 23, 2004 and continued until Marc h 2, 2004. During that time, the trial court f reque ntly held court well i nto the ni g ht and heard testim ony from twenty -eig ht (28) witnesse s and admitted seve nty -nine (79) tria l exhi bits int o evidenc e.

I n addition t o the af

oreme ntioned fac ts, the Hes testified that they never intended to place A.M.H. for adoption or perma nently relinquish custody of A.M.H. to the Ba kers. The Hes took the po sit ionthat th e B ake rs int e nd e d to a do pt A .M .H . f ro m th e ve ry begin ni ng of the pa rt ie s’
re l at i o n s hip. Fathe r testified that Chanc ellor Alissandratos, Ms. Mull ins, Dr. Goldstein, and Mr. Parrish eng ag ed in a c onspiracy ag ainst the Hes.

The He s prese nted t h eir own e x perts at tria l to refute the testimonyof Dr. G oldstein. Dr. J ohn F. Cooper

(“D r. Cooper” ), a pr ofessor of internat i o n al studies at Rhodes College , testified reg arding the manner

in which Chinese citizens view childre n and the family . He testified that the
e xten de d f

a mil y play s a piv ota l r ole in C hin e se c ultur e , an d it is n ot u nc omm on fo r s tud e nts to a sk family members to c are for their children w hile they pursue a highe r educ ation. Acc ording to Dr. Cooper, the c hild is returned to the biolog ical par ents at their r equest. He testified that China does not have a

lega l co n ce p t compar able to the Te nnessee statutes g overning termination of par ental rig hts. Dr. Cooper a cknowledg ed his familiarity with the “one-child” rule in China, and noted that the Chinese g overnme nt will ty pically requirethe mother to get an abortion upon bec oming pr eg nant
a second time. He also stated that the Chinese g overnme nt may impose fines on t h e b i o l o gical pare nts who have e x tra children, but the se fines a re only imposed on children born in China. Under
cross-e x amination, Dr. Cooper admitted that it is poss ible that fines could be imposed on a par ent who had children in another c ountry and re turned to China with more than one child, but he stated that do ing so is n ot the g e ne ra l po lic y

. Cou ns e l f or the B ake rs a lso qu e sti on e d D r. Coo pe r o n c ro ssexamination concerning an opinion i ssued by a fe dera l bankruptcy

court finding him to be an untruthful witness and imposing sa nctions ag ainst him and the attorney repr esenting h i m i n the matter.

Dr . Joh n Hu ts on (“Dr. Hut so n”), a ps y cho lo gist , rev iew ed D r. G ol ds tei n’s repo rtand re c ords , and he te stified that Dr. Goldstein did not perf o rm his duties appropriate ly in this m atter. U pon revie wing the vi deo of the “attachment session” conducte d by Dr. Goldstein on September 23, 2003, Dr. Hutson conc luded that the video r evea led that Mrs. B aker was “ controlling” A.M.H. a nd “holding onto her.” Acc ording to D r. Hutson, there was “ a g reat deal of c omfort” be tween A .M.H. and the He s. Howeve r, Dr. H utson subsequently admitted t h at , afte r re viewing the video in court
once mor e, he did not see Mrs. Ba ker “cla sping” the child during the meeting . He a lso admitted that-31-

he could not form an opinion a s to A .M.H.’s attachme nt to either the Hes or the Ba kers ba sed on the video.

Dr. John V. Ciocca ( “Dr . Ciocca” ), anothe r psy cholog ist, reviewe d the video of the “a t t ac h m en t session” and c oncluded that A.M.H . responde d “very favor ably ” to the He s, and the “conne ction betwee n the biologic al par ents and this c hild ha d survived.” H e opined that A.M.H

. ha d a po sit ive re a c tio n to the He s w hic h s ig nif ie d th a t a prior co nn ect ion su rv ive d d e sp ite the ir prolong ed abse nce f

rom her life . Dr. Yih-Jia Chang (“D r. Chang ”), a clinical psy cholog ist practicing in C a lif ornia , p e rf

orme d p sy c ho log ic a l e va luatio ns on the He s in Se pte mbe r of 20 03 . Ac c or din g to her te st results, the Hes did not prese nt any abnorma l psy cholog ical tra its. Re gar d i n g t h e testing pr oc e du re s u se d to e va luate th e He s, Dr . Ch a ng state d th a t th e He s w e rero ta te d d uring the te st t o c on du c t pe rs on a l in te rv ie ws . Wh ile a dmi tti ng that th is i s n ot the be st w a y to a dmi nis te r the te sts , Dr. Chang stated that it was the be st method give n the circ umstances.

Dr. Goldstein testified that F ather filed a c omplaint with the ethi cs committee during the pe nd e nc y of the se pr oc e e din g s to c omp la in o f the ma nn e r i n w hic h h e fu lf ill e d h is d uti e s to the c ou rt

. Prior to giving his testimonyin the case , Dr. Goldstein stated that Fathe r appr o ac h ed h i m in the h a l l w a y o f t h e c o u r t h o u s e a n d i n f o r m e d h i mt h a th e d i d n o ti n t e n d t o p u r s u e t h e c o m p l a i n t

. In response to the Hes’ e x perts, Dr . Goldstein testifie d t h at what Dr . Hutson char acte rized as “contr olling behavior ” he viewed as “hea lthy attachme nt be havior” betwee n a mother and her c hild. Hi s v ie w of the “ a tta c hme nt se ssi on ” wa s tha t the He s use d foo d an d g if ts to en c ou ra g e A. M. H. to interac t with them, but he did not view A.M.H.’s willingne ss to appro ach the m as evidenc e of an attachme nt to the H es. He noted that, during the session, the B aker s encour ag ed A.M.H. to intera ct with the Hes, but he opine d that A.M.H. did not ha ve the attachment to the He s that she did to the Ba kers. Ac cording to Ms. Mull ins, A.M.H. viewed the Hes a s “spec ial friends.”

I n Marc h of 2004, af

ter the e vidence had bee n prese nted to the trial court, the parties be g an to file various motions asking the court to ex clude or strike the testi m o ny

of various ex perts and
w i t n e s s e s

. O n M ar c h 2 2 , 2 0 0 4 , M s

. M u l l i n s f i l e d a m o t i o n a s k i n g t h e tr i a l c o u r t t o a l low he r t o reope n the proof and prese nt evidence reg arding the issuance o f the g uardia nship and no-conta ct order . I n her aff

idavit attached to the motion, Ms. Mullins stated that, afte r revie wing Mr. Parrish’s tes t i m o ny at trial re g arding the issuance of the no-c ontact orde r and his notes fr om the event, she de te rm ine d th a t Mr . Pa

rrish ’s re c oll e c tio n o f the e ve nts a s te sti fi e d to a t trial wa s in c or re c t. Acc ording to Ms. Mull ins, when she learned from the Hes’ attorney at the time that they

wer e not g oin g to d e liv e r A .M .H .’ s p a ssp ort to the c ou rt a s o rd e re d, sh e a sk e d Ch anc e llo r A lis sa nd ratos to issue the orde r to protec t the child from being remove d t o China during the pende ncy of the pr oc e e din g s. Mr . Pa

rrishsu bs e qu e ntl y

fi le d a re sp on se to M s. Mu lli ns ’ m oti on statin g that hi s re c oll e c tio n o f the e ve nts su rr ou nd ing theiss ua nc e of theor de r n ow c on fo rm e d to t hat o f M s. Mullins.

On Ma rc h 2 9, 20 04 , th e tr ia l cou rt e nte re d a n o rd e r g ranti ng the B ake rs ’ m oti on to consolidate their pe tition t o terminate the pare ntal rig hts of the Hes with Mother’s pe tition t o modify the J une 4, 1999 custody order enter ed by the juvenile court. That same day , the trial court e ntere d-32-

a c on se nt o rd e r a dmi tti ng Ms. Mu lli ns ’ af fi da vit a ndMr . Pa

rrish ’s no te s f

ro m th e c on fe re nc e c a ll with Chancellor Alissandr atos into evidence

. On April 5, 2004, Mr. Dimond f iled, on behalf of the Attorney Gene ral, a

motion to i nterve ne in the proce eding s to defend the constitutionalit y of any statutes which may

be plac ed at issue. On April 6, 2004, the t rial court enter ed several orders addressing the parties’ pending motions: the court denied the pa

rties’ mot ions to exclude certain testimony from the r ecor d; the trial court e ntere d an order denying the Hes’ motion filed on Septembe r 10, 2003, to se t aside the orde r appointing MidSouth nex t friend to conduc t an investi gat i o n i nto the adoption petition; the trial court enter ed an order denying the Hes’ motion for de fault judg ment on their petition to modif y t h e J u n e 4, 1999 order enter ed by

the juvenile court; the trial court denie d the Hes’ motion t o s et as i d e the J une 4, 1 9 9 9 consent order; the trial c ourt denied the Hes’ motion to set aside the or der a ppointing the B ake rs g ua

rd ians of A.M .H .; andthe tr ia l c ou rt de nie d th e He s’ mot ionto d ism iss the B ake rs ’ adoption petition filed on October 2, 2003. These or ders e ffe ctively dealt with all of the pe nding motions filed by

the parties in this case.

H.

The Tr ial Cour t’s J udgment

On May 12, 2004, the trial co u rt enter ed its seventy -two (72) pag e memorandum opinion g ranting the B aker s’ petition to terminate the Hes’ pa renta l rig hts to A.M.H. and denying Mothe r’s pe tit ionto m od if

y the c us tod y

or de r e nte re d o n Jun e 4, 19 99 by the juv e nil e c ou rt , s ta tin g : Specifica lly , t h i s Court finds that (1) the He s willfullyabandone d AMH for a period exceeding four ( 4) months, (2) the He s provided
no su pp ort f

or a pe ri ode xce e din g fo ur

(4 ) mon ths , ( 3) the He s o nly
so ug ht c us tod y of AM H to pr e ve nt the He s’ de po rt a tio n, and (4) it
wo uldbe in A MH ’s be st i nte re st t o te rm inate the He s’ pa re nta l rig hts
a ndto r ema in wi th the B ake rs . T he Cou rt wi ll h oldtheB ake rs ’ Petition For Adoption in abey ance until the Court’s d ec i sion on the Petition t o Terminate Parenta l R i gh t s and the Petition to Modify Cus tod y is f ina l.
Throug hout the order , the trial court set forth it s ext ensive finding s of fa ct, conc lusions of law, and
c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns

.
Re g ard ing the c re dib ili ty of the B ake rs a ndtheHe s, thetr ia l c ou rt ’s or der p rov ides , in
re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:
I. G EN ER AL LY SIG NI F IC AN T F AC TS-33- . . . . 20. Mr. He que stioned whether he wa s the biologic al father of AMH and reque sted that the g uardia n ad litem arr ang e blood te sti ng fo r M r. He , M rs . H e , a nd AM H to de te rm ine pate rn ity of AMH. 21. Mr. He f

iled an ac knowledg m en t o f paternity on Marc h 15, 2002.

. . . . 29. All parties, i ncluding Mr. and Mrs. H e, knowing ly and voluntarily

signe d the J une 4, 1999, Consent Order Awar ding Custody , without being induc ed by any fraud or undue influence

.

. . . .
II. LITI G AN T C RE DI BILI TY The Court has car efully scrutinized the testimony of the He s and the B aker s. Be cause they have an intere st in the outcome of the
c a se , th e re lia

bil ity of the ir te sti mon y

ha s b e e n v ie we d inre la tio n to other e v i d ence and the e ntire re cord in this cause , for c orrobor ation and/or inconsistenc y an d the Court has we ighe d their testimony
a c c o r d i n g l y. The Court observed Mr. B aker testify for a pproxi mately

three (3) hour s of live testimony at trial. Mrs. B aker testified for approximate l y fi v e (5) hours of live testimony at trial. Mrs. He te sti fi e d f or app rox im a te ly

te n ( 10 ) h ou rs of

liv e te sti mon y

a t tria l. Mr. He te stified for approxi mately seven (7) hours of live te stimony
a t tria l. T he Cou rt

a lso ob se rv e d M r. He te sti fy fo r a pp ro xima te ly

six (6) hour s, by

a video- tape de position t hat was a d m i t t ed as Trial Ex hibit 20. The Court wa s phy sically

prese nt with the Ba

kers and the Hes i n t h e c o u r t r o o m f

o r o v e r n i n e t y- o n e ( 9 1 ) h o u r s o f tr i a l t e s t i m o n y, over f ifteen ( 15) hours of arg uments on motions after the c onclusion of proof , and six (6) hours of closing arg uments. The Court obser ved
ea ch o f t h em t h ro u gh o u tt h e t ri al p ro ce ed i n gs an d i n t er ac t ed , t h ro u gh counsel, with t hem as the tria l proce eded to c onclusion. The Court mak e s th e f

o ll o w in g f

in d in g s o f f

a c t r e g ar d in g c r e d ib il ity o f the wi tne sse s: 32. Mr. Ba

ker impressed the Court as a ma n who has a g reat deal of love, car e, and conce rn for children in g ener al, but who has-34- an enormous amount of love, ca re , an d conce rn for his own
natur a l bo rn c hil dr e n a ndfo r A MH . H e te sti fi e d ina n h on e st, straig htforwa

rd, sincer e manne r. Mr. Ba k er impressed the Court with his si ncerity

and the c oncern he expressed f or AMH’s we lfare and safe ty . Mr. B aker has demonstrated
conce rn for and a willingness to he lp others who ar e in nee d, including the Hes. As one example, Mr. Ba ker helped Mr. He wh e n M r. He ’s ve hic le wa s inthe sh op fo r r e pa ir s. 33

. Mr s. B ake r i mpr e sse d the Cou rt a s a sin c e re , h on e st, c re dib le witness. She too has demonstrated that she ha s a g reat deal of lov e , c are , a ndc on cern fo r c hil dr e n ing e ne ra l, b ut s he a lso has an e normous am o u n t of love, c are , and conc ern f or her
ow n n a tur a l bo rnc hil dr e n a ndfo r A MH

. Mrs . Ba ke r a lso impressed the Court w ith he r car e and conce rn fo r AMH’s welfa re and safe ty

. Mrs. Ba

ker ha s demonstrated c oncern for and a w illin gness to help others who a re in ne ed, including the Hes. F or example, she took Mrs. He to obtain s o ci al service s and to apply

for Te nnCare insurance cover ag e for the Hes’ second child, Andy , who was born in Octobe r 2000. She took Mrs. He a nd Andy

home from the hospital after Andy ’s birth. She loane d th e He s a ba by be d f or An dy . Sh e we nt t o the Hes’ apartment to show Mrs. He how to fee d, burp, bathe , and ch an ge Andy ’s diaper s. She took Andy to the doctor’s of fi c e be c aus e Mr . H e wa s to o b us y , and she too k A nd y to
o t h e r ap p o i n t m e n t s b e c au s e M r

. H e w a s t o o b u s y. 34. Both of the Ba

kers demonstrated their conce rn and ca re, and la c k o f a n y a n i m o s i t y

t o w ar d t h e H e s , b y

f o r e g o i n g t h e ir
c hu rc h an d othe r re g ula

r ac tiv iti e s to a c c omm od a te theHe s’ visits wit h AMH. The B aker s also serve d the Hes dinner on several of their visits, and allowed the Hes to bring friends with them to the Bakers’ home for visits, serving the frie nds dinner a s well . . . . 35. Mr. He is hig hly

educated, both in the Peoples R ep ublic of China and in the United States , and exhibits a hig h level of i n t e l l i gen ce

. He h as d em o n s tra t ed t h ath e a l s o h as a h i gh level of know ledg e of the culture in the United S tates, t hat he i s f a m i l i ar w i t h t h e j u s t i c e s y s t e m i n S h e l b y C o u n t y, Te nn e sse e , a nd that he is p ro fi c ie nt i n h is kno wl e dg e a ndus e of the En g lis h la ng ua g e

. . . . He ha s a n a g g re ssi ve pe rs on a lit y a ndsh ow s n o p ro pe ns ity

to b e de te rr e d o r i nti mid a te d. He is
a tho ug htf ul and de lib e rate pe rs on wh o e xhibi ts a pr oc liv ity to calculate, plan, and care fully prede termine his ac tion and behavior s. At al l t i mes rele vant to this case, Mr. H e has-35- de mon str a te d th e abil ity to a c c e ss kno wl e dg e able a dv iso rs in any are a in which he nee ds assistance, to sc rutiniz e the a dvice g iven, and, if d i s s atisfied with the advic e, re ject the a dvice
a ndse e k o ut o the r a dv iso rs

. 36. Since 1998, Mr. He has re peated l y eng ag ed in a pattern of conduct mar

ked by dece itfulness and d ishonesty , without
remorse , repe ntance , or consc ience , and has show n a propensity

to justi fyall means, including perjury , for what Mr . H e de e ms t o b e jus tif ia blee nd s. 37

. Mr . H e a dmi tte d th a t he lie d a bo ut his inc ome , u nd e r o a th, in his Dece mber 21, 2001, de position and that he said things he knew we re not the truth . . . . The Court has previously found that Mr. He c ommitt ed per jury while u n d er oath in Court hearings and pleading s filed in this cause. 38. The Court rea ffirms and inc orporates here in by ref ere nce the finding s made by

the Court relative to the perjury of Mr. He in testimonyg iven befor e the Court on F ebrua ry 14, 2002, as memorialized in the Fe bruary 22, 2002, order

entitled

“ Judg me nt On Or de r To Sho w Cau se Pe rt a ini ng To Pa ssp ort”
a ndthe or de r e nti tle d “ Judg me nt O n Orde r T o Sh ow Caus e Pe rt a ini ng To Do c ume ntatio n O f M arria g e I n T he Re pu bli c Of China.”

. . . . 40. Mr. He made material false statements on a loan a pplication, date d O c tob e r 1 8, 20 01 , r e la tiv e to h is empl oyme nt, his income, his status as a student, and his pe rsonal re fer ence s for the purpose of securing a loan for the purcha se of a new vehicle.

. . . . 42. Mrs. He is an impetuous pers o n not subject to being intimi dated or deter

red in achie ving whateve r she se ts as her g oa l. T h e e v i d e n c e s h o w s t h a ts h e i s c a l c u l a t i n g , a l m os t theatric al, in her actions. The e vidence further shows that she is d ish on e st andma nip ulativ e , a nd has a h ist ory of a c tin g in an unstable ma nner w hen it serve s her own se lf-intere st. For
e xamp le , du ri ng c ro ss- e xami natio n, Mr s. He wo uld b eg in sobbing w hen aske d difficult questions. Howeve r, Mrs. He would immediately

reg ain her composure w hen aske d subsequent questions. It appea rs to the Court that Mrs. He’ s-36- courtroom hy sterics we re c alculate d by Mrs. He in a n eff

ort to a vo id ans we ri ng the dif fi c ult c ro ss- e xami natio n q ue sti on s. 43. Tho ug h Mrs. He spe aks suffic ient Eng lish to carry on her daily aff airs in the United St ates, she is not as pr oficient a s Mr. He in knowle dg e or use o f t h e E ng lish langua g e and,
un lik e Mr

. He , so me tim e s ne e ds a ssi stanc e wi th t rans la tio n in technica l and extraordinary use of the Eng lish lang uag e. She has conf idenc e in M r. He , pref

ers Mr. H e as he r translator, has no desire to part company with Mr. He f or any rea son and int e nd s to c oo pe rate fu lly

wi th M r. He to r e ma in t og e the r w ith him as a family

and believe s Mr. He ha s never failed to ke ep her f ully and honestly

inform ed about the le g al matters involving AMH. 44. Al t houg h Mrs. He doe s not speak the Eng lish langua ge fluentl y , she appe ars to spea k and under stand Eng lish better than s he prof

e sse s. F or

e xamp le , M rs . H e sp ok e En g lis h du ri ng so me of

the He s’ vis its wi th A MH a t th e B ake rs ’ h ome and whe n Mrs. He took the H es’ other chil d re n for medic al treatment . . .

. During the trial, in r esponse to a question from attorney L inda Holm es, Mrs. He responded to the questi on by speaki n g Eng lish, before the interpre ter ha d beg un interpre ting Ms. Holmes’ question to Mr s. He. Mrs. H e said, “Mr. Par rish fi led leg al motion,” then she stopped spe aking Eng lish and beg an re sponding to the que stion in C hinese.

. . . . 48. Mrs. He o n l y

seems to be inter ested in re g aining custody of A M H w h e n d e p o r t a t i o n s e e m s i m m i n e n t

. T h i s f a c tis evidenc ed by M rs. He filing the two ( 2) petitions to modify custody in c lose proxim ity

to rec eiving calls fr om the United States I mmigration & Naturali z ati on Service (“INS”),
re g ard ing Mr . a ndMr s. He s’ imm ig ratio n s ta tus

. 49. Fr om the totalityof th e credible proof at trial, both Mr. and Mrs. H e h a v e s h o w n th e ms e lv e s to b e p e r s o n s w h o d o not consider themselves to be bound by the rule of law. Mr. and Mrs. He ha ve demonstrated that they will do and say

anything in o rd e r t o a c hie ve the ir

de sir e d g oa ls.

The trial court also made credibility determinations reg arding the other w itnesses at trial. As for the e x pert witnesse s, the trial court determined that Dr. Cooper’s testimony was “ totally

lacking in c re dib ili ty ,” c iti ng the c ou rt ’s a g re e me nt w iththe ba nk ru ptc y c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s r ega

rd ing his
c re dib ili ty

in that matte r. Mo re ov e r, the tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t “ Dr . Co op e r i s n ot an e xpe rt in-37-

Chinese adoption law, nor is he an e x pert on termination of pare ntal rig h t s

. ” T h e t ri al court determined that the under ly ing f acts or data

relied upon by

Dr. Chang in forming her opinions wer e untrustworthy as to Mothe r, and the court g ave no weig ht to her finding s as to F ather beca use of her
re lia nc e on his a ns we rs to he r qu e sti on s. As fo r Dr . H uts on , th e tria l c ou rt fo un d h is t e sti mon y

to b e of little assistance be cause he did not persona lly evaluate A.M.H., a nd he only viewed the videotape of

the “a ssessm en t session” in rea ching his opinions. The court found Dr . Ciocca’ s testimonyto be of little value g iven his testimonythat he could not off er an opinion as to A.M.H.’s level of attachment to the B aker s or the He s af t er viewing the videotape . Finally , the trial court determined that Dr. Goldstein wa s “a very k n o wl edg eable , honest and forthrig ht witness.” Re g ard ing the oth e r w itn e sse s at tr ial , the tria l c ou rt de te rm ine d e a c h to be a c re dib le wi tne ss. Specifica lly , the trial court found Mr. W eave r, Ms

. Mullins, Ms. Chunn, Ms. Cloud, and P astor Yau to be cr edible witnesses.

I n lig ht of the se c re dib ili ty

de te rm inatio ns , th e tria l c ou rt a dd re sse d th e me ri ts o f the pa rt ie s’ petitions. Beg inning with the due p ro cess c laims, the trial court made the following rele vant fi nd ing s:
63. Both befor e and afte r J une 4, 1999, the Hes eng ag ed t he

se rv ic e s o f at le a st t wo atto rn e y s in Me mph is .

. . to a dv ise and re prese nt the Hes in civil litigation arising from phy sical injuries Mrs. He alleg edly sustained in N ovember of 1998. The He s al so spoke to another attorney that Ms. Chunn ref err ed them to . . . about civil litigation. Neither of the He s ever mention ed to any

of these thr ee attorney s the nee d for repr esentation or advi ce reg arding placing or re taining custody of AMH. 6 4

. Both b e f

o r e a n d a f

te r Ju n e 4 , 1 9 9 9 , M r

. H e e n g a g ed the service s of at least three attorney s to a dvise him and repr esent him in defense of

the criminal charg es brought by the State .

. . N e i t h e r o f t h e H e s e v e r

m e n t i o n e d t o a n y o f

t h e s e a t t o r n e ys the nee d for r epre sentation or advic e re lative to AMH’s
c u s t o d y. In f

a c t , t h e H e s n e v e r

t o l d t h e s e t h r e e a t t o r n e ys about the existence of A MH.

. . . .
67. On J une 2, 1999, attorne y Kevin Weave r met wi th Mr. He and the B aker s and fully

advised Mr. H e and the Ba kers of the leg al ra mifi cations of filing a pe tition for custody and of signing a conse nt order a war ding custody of AMH. Mrs. H e, afte r being fully

advised of the meeting and of the purpose of the meeting b y Mr. He, w aived he r rig ht to be prese nt at the meeting and told Mr. He to tell the others at t he mee ting that-38- she wa s rea dy

to proce ed. Mr. W eaver a nswere d all of Mr. He ’ s a n d th e B ak e r s ’ q u e s ti o n s d u r in g th e me e ti n g

. Mr. He later a dvised Mrs. He of t h e i nformation that Mr. Weave r i m p ar t ed att h e m ee t i n g. 68. On J une 3, 1999, M s . Chunn and Mr. Ke nny Yao, a n experience d interpre ter i nE n g li s han d M andarin Chinese, me t wit h M rs

. He , alone, in the He s’ apa rtment . . . . Mrs. He indicated that she understood everything that Ms. Chunn had told her throug h Mr. Yao. 69. On J u n e 4 , 1999, Ms. Sar ah Cloud, with the assistance of a qualified interpr eter , privately met with Mrs. He, without Mr. He, a nd fully

explained the leg al ra mifications of both the Petition for Custody and the Consent O rder Awarding Custody , both of which Mrs. He later voluntarily signe d. 70.

. . . . Al t h oug h the Hes ha d consulted with attorney s in the p as t reg arding other leg al matters, the H es neve r inquired at J uvenile Cou rt about g etting an attorney to provide the He s leg al advice c o n ce rning the orig inal transfe r of c ustody of AMH. 71. A fe w months after the Hes sig ned the June 4, 1999, Consent Orde r Awar ding Custody , the Hes w ent to J uvenile Court and spoke w ith M s

. Cl o u d ab o u t g e tt in g a s s is tan c e to f il e a petition to re gain custodyof AMH . . . . Ms. Cloud advised the Hes that the y should hire an attorney for leg al advice and repr esentation, and Ms. C loud rec ommended the se rvice s of the Memphis Are a L eg al Service s, if the He s could not aff ord t o h i r e a n a t t o r n e y.
Acc ording ly , the t rial court conclude d that there was no c onspiracy to deprive the Hes of the ir rig ht to d ue pr oc e ss r e g ard ing the c us tod y of A. M. H. , andthe He s did no t su ff e r a de privatio n o f the ir
c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts du ri ng the c ou rs e of tr a ns fe rr ing c us tod y

of A. M. H. to the B ake rs

.
Ne xt, th e tr ia l c ou rt

ma de fi nd ing s r e g ard ing the B ake rs’ pet it io n to te rm inate the He s’ pare ntal rig hts. The Baker s filed t heir petiti on on J une 20, 2001, four ( 4) months and twenty (20) day s a ft e r the inc ide nt at th e B ake rs ’ h ome on Janu ary 28 , 20 01 wh ic h, c on se qu e nti a lly , w a s th e la st time the Hes visited with AMH prior to the pe tition being filed. Reg arding the B aker s’ alleg ation that the Hes a

bandoned A MH by

failing to support her, the t ri al court concluded that, betwee n J anuary 28, 2001 and J une 20, 2001, the Hes had the ability to pay child support for AMH . The trial
c ou rt fo un d th e ir

abi li ty to pr ov ide c hil d s up po rt to b e e vid e nc e d b y

the ir May 20 01 pe tit ionto modify custody wher ein they

stated as much; the f

act that they

sent $ 1 , 0 0 0 t o C h ina to provide
su pp ort f or the ir so n A nd y ; th e He s p ur c ha se d a ne w c omp ute r s ho rt ly

a ft e r s e nd ing the ir

so n to China; the Hes took vacations to various Americ an cities be tween June 4, 1999 and June 20, 2001; and their a

bilityto pay

$625 monthlyrent during the re levant time period. Although the re w as no-39-

court orde r re quiring the Hes to pay child support, the trial court concluded that the Hes kne w they had an o bligation to support AMH. The court found that the B aker s’ re fusal to ac cept moneta ry compensation from the Hes did not re lieve the He s of their obligation to support AMH because the Ba kers c ould not acce pt money pursuant to their agr eeme nt with Mid-South, and they did not ex pect the Hes to provide support beca use they ag ree d to raise AMH until she turned eig hteen. As f or the items the Hes broug ht to AMH during their visits, the trial co u rt determined the items to be “of insubstantial e conomic value and amounted to token support.” The tria l court dee med such token support to be “c onsistent with the Hes’ intent to absolve themselves of all par ental re sponsibili ties to AMH.”
Next, the trial court examined the Baker s’ allegation that the Hes abandone d AMH by failing to visit her during the four months prec eding the petition to terminate the Hes’ pare ntal rig hts. The court noted the following rele vant fa cts: the Hes did not visit AMH betwee n J anuary 28, 2001 and J une 20, 2001; t he trial c ourt found the He s’ re asons for not r eturning to the Ba kers’ home af

ter J anuary 28, 2001 to visit AMH to be lac king in c redibility ; while the B aker s were willing to allow the Hes to visit, the Hes never called and reque sted any visitation wit h AMH af

ter January

28, 2001; althoug h Mother ca lled the B aker s’ home on April 2, 200 1 , h er t el ep h o ne ca ll did not ask for visitation; and immigr ation officia ls contac ted Father in Marc h, April, or May of 2001, ar ound the time the Hes filed the April 2001 petition to modi fy the custody

order

.
B a se d o n the a fo re me nti on e d fa c ts, the tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud e d th a t th e He s a ba nd on e d A MH byw il lf u ll y f a il in g to v is it

a n d w il lf u ll y f a il in g to s u p p o r t h e r

d u r in g th e f

o u r mo n th s p r io r

to the Ba kers’ filing the ir petition to terminate the Hes’ pare ntal rig hts. The trial court then eng ag ed in a le ng thy a na ly sis of

the be st int e re st fa c tor s a nd c on c lud e d th a t te rm inatin g theHe s’ pa re nta l r ig hts was in the be st inter est of A.M.H. There afte r, the Hes filed a timely notice of a

ppeal to this Court seeking appellate revie w of the tria l court’s ruling s in this case.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED

The Appe llants have pre sented sixt een issues to this Court setting forth numerous alleg ed
err ors by the trial court. The Appe llees have joined the Appellants by raising numerous issues of their own whic h, upon revie w, mere ly constitute counter- arg uments to the issues put forth by the Ap pe lla nts . We ha ve c ho se n to re state the iss ue s r a ise d b y the Ap pe llants on app e a l a s f oll ow s:
1. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d inde nying se ve ra l pr e -t ri a l mo tio ns fi le d b y

the Ap pe lla nts , s p e c i f i c a l l y:-40-

(A) Did the trial court err in de ny ing the Appellants’ motion, pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Te nnessee Rules of Civil P roce dure, to set a side the June 4, 1999 consent
c us tod y or de r e nte re d b y

the juv e nil e c ou rt ; (B ) Di d th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr in d e nying the Ap pe llants ’ m oti on to d ism iss the Ap pe lle e s’ petition for adoption; (C) Did the trial court err in de ny ing the Appellants’ motion to bifurcate the proce eding s below; 2. Whether sec tions 36-1-102 and 36-1- 113 of the Te nnessee Code violate the F ifth and Fourteenth Amendme nts to the United States Consti tution because they fail to requir e that natura l pare nts rece ive prior a ctual notice of certain information re lated to the termination of pa re nta l r ig hts in the c on te xt of a private c us tod y

a g re e me nt; 3. Should the afore mentioned statutes be de emed c onstitut ional, whether the trial court erre d in failing to apply

the notice pr ovisions found in section 37-2-403 of the Tenne ssee Code
w h e n t h e c h i l d a ti s s u e w a s p l a c e d i n t h e f o s t e r c ar e o f a n a g e n c y; 4. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d infaili ng to a

pp ly the “ su pe ri or

pa re nta l r ig hts do c tr ine ” to Mother’s pe tition t o modify the custody

J une 4, 1999 custody

order enter ed by

the juv e nil e c ou rt , th e re by

re nd e ri ng a

de c isi on on the te rm inatio n o f M oth e r’ s p are nta l r ig hts
moo t; 5. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in applying the statutory g rounds for te rminating a biolog ical pa re nt’ s p are nta l r ig hts a ndin f ind ing the e xiste nc e of

c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e to
s u p p o r ts u c h g r o u n d s , s p e c i f i c a l l y: (A) Did the trial court err in its application and interpre tation of Tenne ssee law g overning the “se ttled purpose doctrine”; (B ) Di d th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr by fi nd ing that th e Ap pe llants ’ w ill fu lly aba nd on e d th e ir daug hter by

willfullyfailing to visit and willfully failing to support her for the requisite statutory

period; and (C ) Di d th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr in f ind ing that F a the r w a s n ot the “ le g a l pa re nt” of the c hil d wh e n th e Ap pe lle e s’ fi le d th e ir pe titionto t e rm inate his pa re nta l rig hts ; 6. Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d infi nd ing that te rm inatio n o f the Ap pe llants ’ p are nta l rig hts is in the best interest of the c hild in thi s case

. The Appe llees have raised, a s we pe rce ive them, two independe nt issues for our r eview:

7. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in consolidating Mother’s pe tition t o modify the J une 4, 19 99 c on se nt c us tod y

or de r w iththe Ap pe lle e s’ pe tit ionto a do pt the c hil d a ndto terminate the Appellants’ pa renta l rig hts; and 8. Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding that the “pe rsistent conditions” g round for termination did not apply in the instant case be cause the g round re quires the r emoval of the child by

a state a g ency

.
I n addition t o t h e argume nts raised by the parties on appea l, we ar e pre sented with the
a dd iti on a l arg um ent s of a mic i c uria e arg uin g va ri ou s is su e s infa vo r o f the He s o n a pp e a l. Sp e c i f i c a l l y , t h e C h i l d l a w C e n t e r o f t h e L o y o l a

U n i v e r s i t y

C h i c a g o S c h o o l o f

L a w , V a n d e r

bil t-41-

School of L aw L eg al Clinic, The University of Memphis School of L aw Child Advoc acy Clini c, and the Tenne ssee Allianc e for L eg al Service s (her einaf ter c ollectively

re fer red to a s “Amici”) have submitt ed a c ombined brief and wer e permitted to present ora l arg ument to this Court. Their brief primarily addre sses the bifurc ation issue, the per sistent conditions i ssue, and th e s t an d ar d to be applied to a de termination of abandonment. We have a lso been presented with a brief fil ed by the Gre ater Seattle Chapter of

the Org anization of Chinese Americ ans, Inc., (he reina fter r efe rre d to as

“ Gr e a te r Se a ttl e ” ) a dd re ssi ng so c ia l sc ie nc e inf orma tio n s pe c if

ic to the c ultur a l is su e s p re se nt i n th is
app e a l. T he Emba ssy

of the Pe op le’ s Repu bli c of Chi na (h e re ina ft e r r e fe rr e d to a s th e “ Chi ne se Emba ssy ” ) h a s a lso su bmi tte d a le tte r t o th is C ou rt

e xpre ssi ng its po sit ionre g ard ing the “ on e -c hil d policy ” in ef

fec t in Chi na.

I n rea ching a decision on the various issues prese nted in this case, we have r eviewe d all of the brief s and materials filed i n this Court, the voluminous record c reated by the trial in this matter, and the argu m ents of counse l presente d at ora l arg ument. Upon doing so, we a ffirm in part and
reve rse in part the trial court’ s decisions in this case.

III
. S TA N D A R D O F R EVIEW

“A biolog ical par ent’s intere st in the care , custody , and control of hi s or her child is among the ol dest of t he judi cially rec og nized fundamental liberty interests.” Ray v. Ray , 83 S.W .3d 726, 7 3 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Tr ox e l v . G ra nv ill e , 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). This fundamental rig ht is protected not only by the Due Proc ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendme nt, Sa n to s k y v. Kram er , 4 55 U. S. 7 45 , 7 53 (1 98 2) ; Sta nle y v . I llinoi s , 4 05 U. S. 645 , 6 51 (1 97 2) , b ut a lso by Artic le I , section 8 of the T ennesse e Constituti on as we ll, Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137, 141 (Tenn. 20 02 ); Haw k v . Ha wk , 8 5 5 S

. W

. 2 d 5 7 3 , 5 7 9 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 3 )

. H o w e v e r , t h e r i g h t t o t h e c ar e , c u s t o d y, and contr ol of one’s c hildren is not absolute, and “[i]t continues without interruption only as long as a pa rent ha s n o t relinquished it, abandone d it, or eng ag ed in conduc t requiring its li mitation or termination.” In re S.M

. , 14 9 S.W. 3d 63 2, 63 8– 39 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 04 ) ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see als o I n re C.W .W

. , 37 S.W .3d 467, 473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

“The g rounds for te rminating pare ntal rig hts in Tennessee are define d by statute.” Jones v. Ga rre tt , 92 S.W. 3d 83 5, 83 8 (T enn . 2 002) ; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g ) (2003)

. “Te rmination of a pe rson’s rig hts as a par ent is a g rave and fina l decision, irre vocably altering the lives of the par ent and c hild involved and ‘seve ring fore ver a ll lega l rig hts and obligations’ of the pare nt.” Means v. Ashby , 130 S.W .3d 48, 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1- 113( l )( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 3 ))

. Be ca u s e o f t h e gr av i t y o f t h e c o n s eq u en ce s as s o ci at ed w i t h t e r m i n at i n g a b io lo g ic a l p ar e n t’ s p ar e n ta l r ig h ts to a c h il d , th e in d iv id u a ls o r e n ti ti e s s e e k in g to te r mi n a te the pare ntal rig hts of the biologic al p ar ents must prove the existence of the statutory g rounds for termination by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. In re Drinn on , 776 S.W .2d 96, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 9 8 8 ) ( ci t i n g Santosky , 4 55 U. S. at 76 9– 70 ); see also Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c )( 1) (2 00 3) ; In-42-

re V ale ntine , 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002) (noting that clea r and convincing evidenc e as to any one of the statutorily

enumer ated g rounds will justi fy the te rmi n ati on of a biolog ical par ent’s par ental ri g hts to a min or c hil d) ; In re M. J. B. , 1 40 S.W. 3d64 3, 65 3 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 04 ). Th e statut e a lso require s that parties see king to terminate a biologica l pare nt’s pare ntal rig hts demonstrate that doing
so is in the best interest of the child. See Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c )( 2) (2 00 3) ; In re S.M

. , 149 S.W .3d at 639.

Th e he ig hte ne d c le ar andc on vin c ing stand ardof pr oo f a pp lic able to the se case s ser ve s to preve nt the unwar

rante d termination of the biolog ical par ents’ par ental rig hts in their minor children. In re M. W. A. , 980 S.W .2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). “The ‘cle ar and convincing evidenc e’ standard de fies pre cise de finition.” Me ans , 130 S.W .3d at 5 4

. T his Court has formulated the following explanation of the standar d when r eviewing case s of this nature:

This court re cently at tempted to describe the cle ar and
c on vin c ing e vid e nc e stand ard , e xpla ini ng that[:]
[A] lthough it does not re quire a s much certainty as the “bey ond a rea sonable doubt” standard, the “cle ar and convincing evidenc e” sta ndard is more exacting tha n the “pr eponder ance of the ev idence ” standa rd. O' Daniel v. M

essier , 9 0 5 S. W. 2 d 1 8 2 , 1 8 8 ( Tenn. Ap p. 19 95 ); Brandon v. W right , 838 S.W .2d 532, 536 (T e n n

. A p p

. 1 9 9 2 )

. I n o r d e r to b e c le ar a nd convincing , evidenc e must eliminate any serious or substantial d o u bt about the cor rec tness of the conclusions to be dra wn from the e vidence

. Hodges
v
. S

. C. To o

f & Co. , 833 S.W .2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 19 92 ); O'Daniel v. Me ssier , 905 S.W .2d at 188. S uch evidenc e should producein the fac t- finder ’s mind a fi rm b elief or

conviction as to the truth of the
a ll e g a ti o n s s o u g h t to b e e s ta b li s h ed. O'Daniel v. Messier , 9 05 S.W. 2da t 18 8; W iltcher v. Bradley , 708 S.W. 2d40 7, 41 1 ( Te nn. App . 1 98 5) . In c on tr a st t o the pre ponderance of

the evidenc e standa

rd, cle ar and
c on vin c i ng e vid e nc e sh ou ld d e mon str a te that th e truth of the fa cts assert ed i s “hig hly probable ” as oppose d to m erely

“more probable ” than not. Lettner v. Plummer , 559 S.W .2d 785, 787 (Tenn. 1977) ; Go lds mith v . R ob e rts , 622 S.W .2d 438, 441 (Tenn. Ap p. 19 81 ); Brandon v. W right , 838 S.W .2d at 536.W e a re c o g n iz a n t o f the fo llo w ing sta tuto ry d u ty p la c e d u p o n this C o u rt b y the le g islatu re re g a rd ing a p p e llate 12

rev i ew o f

p are ntal t erm i na t i o n c ase s:

In al l cases whi ch are ap p eal ed fr o m the d eci si o n o f a t ri al co urt , t he ap p el l at e co urt sh a ll, c o n siste n t w ith its ru le s, e x p e d ite th e c o n te ste d ter m ina tio n o f p a re n ta l righ ts
or a do pt i on cas e by ent er i ng s uch s che dul i ng order s as ar e n ece s s ar y t o ens ur e t hat the case i s no t d el ayed, and such case shal l b e gi ven p ri o ri t y o ver al l o t h e r c ivil lit iga tio n in re a c h ing a d e te rm ina tio n o n the sta tus o f t h e a d o p tio n , o the r th a n c h ild pr ot ec t i v e s er v i ce s c as es a r i s i n g u n der t i t l e 37, c h apt er 1, pa r t s 1, 4 a n d 6.

T en n. C o d e A nn

. § 3 6

- 1

- 1 2 4 (b ) (2 0 0 3 ). O n M ay 1 2 , 2 0 0 5 , M r. P arrish, co un sel f o r the B ak ers, fi l ed t he “A p p ell ee s’ M ot i on t o D i s mi s s Appea l ” wi t h t h i s Cour t a r g u i n g t h at t h e H es ’ a ppea l s h ou l d be di s mi s s ed pu r s u an t t o t h e s t at u t e of

r epose codi f

i ed at s ect i on 36

- 1- 11 3(q) of t he T enn es s ee C od e. M r

. P ar r i s h as s er t ed t hat , s i nce one y ear ha d el aps ed s i nce t he t ri al cou r t i s s u ed i t s or der i n t h i s ca s e, t h i s Cour t n o l on g er pos s es s ed s u bj ec t mat t er j u r i s di ct i on t o en t er t ai n t he ap p eal

. O n M ay 1 7 , 20 0 5 , t hi s C o urt i ss ued an O rder d enyi ng t he B akers’ m o t i o n. W e co ncl ud ed t hat t he l egi sl at ure d id no t i n te n d fo r se c tio n 3 6 -1 -1 1 3 (q ) to d ive st the a p p e llate c o u rts o f this state o f sub je c t m a tter ju risd ic tio n to e v a lua te
a p a re n ta l t e rm ina tio n o rd e r th a t wa s tim e ly f iled in the a p p e llate c o u rt.

-43- In re C.W

.W

. , 3 7 S

. W

. 3 d 4 6 7 , 4 7 3

– 7 4 ( T e n n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( q u o t i n g In re M.C.G. , No. 01A01-9809-JV-00461, 1 9 9 9 Tenn. App. L EXI S 327, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 26, 1999) (no pe rm . a pp . f ile d) ); se e als o M

e ans , 130 S.W .3d at 54–55.

“ B e c aus e of

the g ra vity

of the ir c on se qu e nc e s, pr oc e e din g s to te rm inate pa re nta l r ig hts require individualiz ed dec ision making.” In re M. J. B. , 140 S.W .3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (c i t i n g In re Sw anson , 2 S.W. 3d18 0, 18 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ). To that e nd , th e tria l c ou rt is r e qu ir e d to

“ e n t e r a n o r d e r w h i c h m ak e s s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s o f f

a c ta n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f

l a w w i t h i n t h i r t y ( 3 0 ) d a ys of the c on c lus ionof the he ari ng .” Te nn . Code An n. § 36- 1- 11 3( k) (2 00 3)

. Th e se fi nd ing s f a c ili ta te
app e llate re vie w of pa

re nta l te rm inatio n c a se s, a ndin the abs e nc e of su c h f ind ing s, we mus t va c a te 12 the judg ment and re mand t he case to the t rial court for the e ntry of finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law in compliance with the statute. See White v. Moody , No. M2004-01295-COA- R3-PT, 2004 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 890, at *11–14 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 30, 2004) ( perm. a pp. denied, 2005 Te nn. LEX I S 26 5 ( Mar. 21 , 200 5) ); In re M. J. B. , 1 40 S.W. 3da t 65 4; In re Ado ption o f M uir , No. M2002-02963-COA- R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 831, at *8–10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003) (no perm. app. filed).

Ba sed on the a fore mentioned principles of law, this Court has formulated the following stand ardof

re vie w t o g ov e rnapp e llate re vie w o f p are nta l te rm inatio n c a se s:

Be cause of the he ighte ned burden of proof require d by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( c)( 1), we must adapt Tenn. R. App. P . 13(d)’ s c usto mar y st and ardof

re vie w f or c a se s o f this so rt . F ir st, we mus t
re vie w the tr ia l c ou rt ’s sp e c if ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t de novo in acc ordanc e wi th T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) . T hu s, e a c h of the tr ia l c ou rt ’s sp e c if ic fac tual finding s will be presumed to be corr ect unless the e vidence preponde rate s otherwise. Sec ond, we must determine whether the-44- fac ts, either as f

ound by the trial cour t or as supporte d by the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, cle arly and convinc ingly

establish the
e le me nts re qu ir e d to te rm inate a bio log ic a l pa re nt’ s pa re nta l r ights

. J on e s v . G ar re tt , 9 2 S. W.3 d at 83 8; In re V a l en tine , 79 S.W .3d at 54 8- 49 ; In re Ad

op tio n of M

uir , 2003 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 831, 2003 WL 22 79 45 24 , at *2 ; In re Z.J.S. , 2003 Tenn. App. LEXI S 415, No. M2 00 2- 02 23 5- CO A- R3- JV, 2 00 3 WL 21 26 68 54 , a t *1 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. June 3, 2003 ) ( No Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 1 a pp lic a tio n f

ile d) ; Ray v. Ray , 83 S.W .3d at 733; I n r e L

. S

. W. , 2001 Tenn. App. LEXI S 659, No . M 20 00 -0 19 35 -C OA -R 3- JV, 2 00 1 WL 10 13 07 9, a t *5 (T e nn . Ct

. App. Sept. 6, 2001), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. D ec. 27, 2001)

.
In re M. J. B. , 140 S.W .3d at 654. Moreove r, we are mindful that case s of this nature of ten hing e on the te sti mon y

of the wi tne sse s at tria l a nd , inturn, the tria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s r e g ard ing the c re dib ili ty of those witnesses. A ccor dingly , we a re bound by

the following additional principle of la w: Unlike appe llate courts, trial courts are a ble to observe witnesses as they testify and to assess their demea nor, which be st situates trial judge s to evaluate witness cre dibilit y

. Se e Sta te v . Pru ett , 788 S.W. 2d 55 9, 56 1 (T enn . 1 99 0) ; Bowman v. Bowman , 836 S.W .2d 56 3, 56 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 1) . Thu s, tr ia l c ou rt s a rein the mos t fa vo ra ble po sit ionto r e so lve fa c tua l di sp ute s h ing ing on c re dib ili ty determinations. See Tenn-Tex Prope rties v. Brownell-Elec tro, Inc. , 77 8 S. W.2 d 42 3, 42 5- 26 (T e nn . 1 98 9) ; Mi tc he ll v . A rc hib ald , 971 S.W. 2d25 , 2 9 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 199 8) . A c c or din g ly , a pp e llate c ou rt s wi ll n ot r e -e valua te a

tria l ju dg e ’s a sse ssm e nt o f w itn e ss c re dib ili ty
ab s e n tc l e ar

a n d c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e t o t h e c o n tr ar y. See H umphrey v. Dav id W

itherspoon, Inc. , 734 S.W .2d 315, 315-16 (Te nn. 1987); Bingham v. Dy ersburg Fabrics. Co. , I nc., 567 S.W .2d 169, 170 (Tenn. 1978)

. We lls v . T

e nn. B d. of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W. 3d77 9, 78 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; s e e a l s o J o n e s v . G ar re tt , 92 S.W. 3d83 5, 83 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 2) ; In re C.T .S. , 156 S.W .3d 18, 22 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

IV. D I S CUS S I ON

The c rux of t his appea l is whether the t rial court err ed in finding that the B aker s proved, by clea r and c onvincing evi d ence, that the He s abandone d A.M.H. by willfullyfailing to visit and wi llf ull y faili ng to sup po rt he r fo r the fo ur mon ths imm e diate ly pr e c e din g thefi lin g of theB ake rs ’-45-

petition to terminate the Hes’ pare ntal rig hts. H oweve r, bef ore w e ar e able to rea ch the issues re lated to the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s in that r e g ard , w e mus t a dd re ss o the r i ssu e s p re se nte d b y the pa rt ie s.

A. Order Consolidat ing th e Bakers’ Pe tition with Mothers’ Petition to Modify Custody

On May 29, 2001, Mother filed her petition in the juvenile court reque sting a modification of the Ju n e 4 , 1 9 9 9 c o n s e n t c u s to d y o r d e r

. O n Ju n e 2 0 , 2 0 0 1 , th e B ak e r s f il e d th e ir “ Pe ti ti o n for Adoption and Termination of Parental Rig hts” in the cha ncery court. T h i s ef

fe cti vely vested the chanc ery cou rt wi th “exclusive jurisdiction of all matters pertaining to the c hild . . . ex cept f or alleg ations of delinquenc y , unruliness or trua ncy of the child pursuant to title 37.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6-1-116 (f

) ( 20 03 ); se e als o St

ate v . R. S. , No. M2002-00919-COA- R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LE XIS 6 5 7 , at *65 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2003) ( no perm. a pp. filed). ( “The exclusive jurisdiction of juvenile court is super seded w hen a pe tition for termination of par ental rig hts is filed in another court wit h concur rent jurisdi ction to make that determination.”). On S eptember 13, 2003, the B ake rs fi le d a

mot iona skin g the c ha nc e ry c ou rt to c on so lid a te , f

or joi nt t ri a l, the ir pe tit ionto terminate the Hes’ pa

renta l rig hts with Mother ’s petition to modify the J une 4, 1999 conse nt order
e nte re d b y

the juv e nil e c ou rt . O n M arc h 2 9, 20 04 , a ft e r the pa rt ie s f ini sh e d p re se nti ng e vid e nc e in this case, the c hance ry

court e ntere d an orde r g ranting the B aker s’ motion to consolidate.
Strang ely enoug h, the B aker s now ask this Court to determine whe ther the tria l court er red in gr anting their motion at trial. Rule 6 (a) (1) and (a) (3) of the Rules of the Court of Appe als of Tenne ssee pr ovides that written ar g ument by a party shall contain a stat em en t i n d i cating the
err oneous ac tion by

the trial court and how the party was prejudice d by such er ror. The section of the Appellee s’ brief

addre ssing this issue fails t o assert any basis for finding error on the part of the tr ia l c ou rt in g ranti ng the ir

mot ion . Ins te a d, the Ap pe lle e s dev ote the ir e nti rearg ume nt i n th is
s e c t i o n o f t h e b r i e f t o i s s u e s u n r e l a t e d t o t h e q u e s t i o n t h e y a s k t h i s C o u rt t o d e c i d e

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we fi ndthi s is su e to b e wh oll y wi tho ut m e ri t.

B. Propriety of the Chancery Court’s Ru lings on Certain Pre-Trial Motions F iled by the Hes

On appe al, the He s take issue with the c hance ry court’s r ulings on va

rious matters prior to the tr ia l in thi s matte r. I n tu rn , w e wi ll a dd re ss the me ri ts o f the se iss ue s c oll e c tiv e ly in this section of the O pinion.

1. Motions to Set Aside the June 4, 1999 Consent Custody Order P ursuan t to Rule 60.02T he H es r el i ed on t he fo l l o wi ng pro vi si o ns o f t he rul e i n s up p o rt of t hei r mo t i o n: 13

O n m o t i o n and upo n s uch t erm s as ar e jus t , t he co urt m a y rel i eve a p art y or t he p ar t y ’ s l eg al r epr es en t at i v e f r om a f i n al j u dg men t , or der or pr oce edi n g fo r t he fol l owi n g reas o ns:

. . . ( 3) t h e j u dg men t i s v oi d;

. . . or ( 5) a n y ot h er r ea s on j u s t i f y i n g r el i ef

f r om t h e oper at i on of

t h e j u dg men t

. T h e mot i on s h al l be ma de

w ithin a re a so n a b le ti m e

. . . .
T e n n . R . C iv. P . 6 0 .0 2 (2 0 0 4 ).
-46- On appe al, the He s arg ue that the chancery court erre d in denying their motions to set aside the juvenile court ’s J une 4, 1999 conse nt order a war ding c ustody of A.M.H. to the B aker s. On September 12, 2003, the Hes filed a motion with the trial court asking the chanc ery court to se t aside, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, the J une 4, 19 9 9 co n s en t o rder . I n this mot ion, the Hes 13

conce ded that the June 4, 1999 order provides that the He s “have been f ully advised of the ir leg al ri g hts a ndthat a hea

ri ng be fo re the Cou rt is he re by e xpre ssl y waive d. ” Ho we ve r, the y arg ue d th a t, in r e a lit y , th e y

we reno t f

ull y a dv ise d o f the ir le g a l ri g hts prior to s ig nin g the or de r. Th e y po int to the following fac ts to support thi s assertion: Mother did not re ceive leg al advice prior to sig ning the order ; Mr. Weaver

met with Fathe r on June 2, 1999, but h e d i d not meet with Mother prior to the date the y sig ne d the or de r; on the day the y we nt t o ju ve nil e c ou rt

to s ig n th e or de r, Ms. Chu nn , M s. Cloud, and Pastor Yau, a ll unlicensed attorne y s, attempted t o ad v ise Mother of the document’s meaning , but they

did not read it to her; and the juvenile c ourt did not conduct a he aring to ensure that the Hes unde rstood what they had bee n told up to that point or to explain the purpose and e ffe ct of the or de r. Ac c or din g to the Hes , th ese fac ts e sta bli sh that th e y

we reno t f

ull y a dv ise d o f the ir rig hts and did not expressly waive the ir rig ht to a hearing a s the order states, there fore , the conse nt order should be dee med void ab ini tio . On September 25, 2003, the Hes f

iled an ame nded motion wher ein they

arg ued that, in addition to the arg uments contained in the afor ementioned motion, the consent orde r should be vac ated be cause the juvenile court failed to comply with se ctions 34-2-101, 34-2-103, 34- 2-104, and 32- 2-105 of the T ennesse e Code. The se argu m ents wer e aimed at addre ssing the “ g uardia nship of the person” l ang uag e which Ms. Cloud t estified she inserted into the
or de r b a se d o n h e r u nd e rs ta nd ing of the fa c ts.

On A p r il 7 , 2 0 0 4 , th e c h a n c e r y c o u r t e n te r e d a n o r d e r d e n y in g th e H e s ’ f irst motion
c on c lud ing , inre le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
Th e Con se nt Or de r Aw ard ing Cus tod y , sig ne d bybo th Respo n d en ts, entere d in J uvenile Court on J une 4, 1999, states that the parties were fully

advised of the ir l ega l ri gh ts. The Court finds that Mr. He was fully advised of his leg al rig hts by Attorney Weaver

. Th e Cou rt

a lso fi nd s th a t Mr s. He vo lun tari ly waive d he r rig ht t o rec eive lega l advice by not attending the meeting , by telling Mr. H e that sh e wa s r e a dy

to p ro c e e d, a ndby

re lyin g o n M r. He to
c ommun ic a te Attorne y

Wea ve r’ s e xpla natio n o f the pa rt ie s’ ri g hts to her. Thus, the Consent O rder Awar ding Custody enter ed on June 4,-47- 19 99 , is no t f

a c ia lly de fe c tiv e , no r is it vo id a b in iti o o r v oid able pu r s u a n tt o R u l e 6 0

. 0 2 ( 3 ) a n d ( 5 ) o f t h e T e n n e s s e e R u l e s o f

C i vil Procedur e.

. . . . The Cons ent Orde r Awa rding Custodywas e ntere d by the J uvenile Court on J une 4, 1999. There was no motion file d t o s et
a sid e the Con se nt Or de r. Th e Re sp on de nts fi le d th e ir fi rs t Pe tit ionto Modify the custody

order in J uvenile Court o n May 3, 2000, and Respondents made no request in that Petition t o set aside the Consent CustodyOrde r. The J uvenile Court de nied the May 3, 2000, Petition to M od if y on June 28 , 200 0. No app e a l w a s ta ke n b y Re sp on de nts to the Orde r Denying the Petition to Modify

. The Responde nts filed a
se c on d Pe tit ionto Mo di fy the Con se nt C us tod y

Or de r i n Juv e nil e Cou rt on Ap ri l 9, 2001 . A g a in, theRe sp on de nts ma de no re qu e st t o set aside the C o n s ent C ustody Orde r. The Petitioners he rein, the Bakers, the n filed their Petition for Adoption and Te rmination of Pa re nta l R i g h t s o n Ju n e 2 0 , 2 0 0 1 , a n d t h e m a t t e r w a s tr a n s f

e rr e d to thi s c ou rt . Re sp on de nts fi le d a n a ns we r anda n a me nd e d a ns we r t o the Petition for Adoption and Te rm ination of Parenta l Rights and neither the answe r nor the amended answe r conta ined a r equest to set
a sid e the June 4, 19 99 , Co ns ent Custo dy Or de r p ur su a nt t o Ru le 60.02. Then the Responde nts filed the instant motion on September 12, 2003, approximately

four y ear s and three months after the entry of the June 4, 19 99 Con se nt Or de r A wa rd ing Cus tod y . T .R. C.P. 60 .0 2 re qu ir e s th a t th is t ype of mot ionbe ma de wi thi n a re a so na ble time

. T h e Co u r t f

in d s th a t th is mo ti o n w a s n o t f il e d w ith in a
re a so na ble tim e . F urthe rm or e , th e Cou rt fi nd s th a t Re sp on de nts ’ Motion Pursuant to Rule 60.02 to Set Aside Consent Order Awar ding Custody E n t er ed J une 4, 1999, is barr ed by res judicata, collater al
e sto pp e l a ndthe do c tr ine of la c he s. On May 12, 2004, the cha ncery

court e ntere d another

order addre ssing the H es’ amended pe tition, wher ein the chanc ery court denied the Hes’ amende d motion and conclude d that the juvenile court complied with the applica ble statutes when e ntering the orde r. Rule 60.02 is “desig ned to strike a pr oper ba lance betwee n the competing p ri nciples of finality and jus tice.” Jerkins v. McKinn ey , 533 S.W .2d 275, 280 (Tenn. 1976) . “The relief provided under Rule 60.02 is an e x ceptional r emedy ,” Nails v. Aetna In s. Co. , 834 S.W .2d 289, 294 (Tenn. 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g Toney v. M

ueller Co. , 8 10 S.W. 2d14 5, 14 6 ( Te nn . 199 1) ), “ the pu rp os e of wh ic h ‘ is to alleviate the e ffe ct of an oppressive or onerous f inal judgme nt,’” Black v. Black , 166 S.W .3d 699, 7 0 3 (T en n

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( q u o t i n g Kill ion v. Dep’t of Hum an Services , 845 S.W .2d 212, 213 (Tenn. 1992) ).-48-

“Rule 60.02 ac ts as an esc ape va lve from possible inequity that might othe rw i s e ar i s e fr om the unrele nting imposition of the principle of f inality embedde d in our proce dural rule s.” Thom pson v. Firem en’s Fun d Ins. C o. , 798 S.W .2d 235, 238 (Tenn. 1990)

. Howeve r, due to the importanc e of finality in case s, “the ‘e scape valve’ should not be easily opened.” Banks v. Dem ent Const r. Co., Inc. , 8 1 7 S

. W

. 2 d 1 6 , 1 8 (T en n

. 1 9 9 1 )( q u o t i n g T o ne y v . M ueller , 810 S.W .2d 145, 146 (Tenn. 1991)).

“ To se t a sid e a

jud g me nt u nd e r r

ule 60 .0 2 th e bu rd e n is up on the mov a nt to p ro ve that he is entitled to relief, and there must be proof of the basis on which re lief is soug ht.” Id ; se e als o He nry v . Goin s , 104 S.W .3d 475, 482 (Tenn. 2003) . When revi ew i ng a trial c ourt’s dec ision to gra nt or deny relief pursuant to Rule 60.02, we e mploy the following standard of revie w:
[W ]e g ive g reat defe renc e to the trial c ourt. See Underwood v. Zurich Ins. Co. , 854 S.W .2d 94, 97 (Tenn. 1993)

. Consequently , we will not
se t a sid e the tr ia l cou rt ’s ru lin g un le ss the tria l c ou rt ha s a bu se d it s discretion. Se e id

. An abuse of di scre tion is found only when a trial court ha s “‘a

pplied an incorre ct leg al standar d, or re ache d a dec ision which is ag ains t l o gi c o r re asoning that cause d an injustice to the party complaining .’” State v. Stev ens , 78 S.W .3d 817, 8 3 2 (Tenn. 2 0 0 2 ) ( q u o t i n g State v. Shuck , 953 S.W .2d 6 6 2 , 6 69 (Tenn. 1997) ). The a buse of discr etion standard do es not permit an a ppellate c ourt to merely substitut e its judgme nt for that of the trial court. See Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001)

.
He nry , 1 04 S.W. 3da t 47 9; see also Banks , 817 S.W .2d at 18.

The He s g o to gr eat e fforts to ex plain their l ack of notice a nd lack of adequate counse l prior to signing the orde r at issue. How ever , we are cog nizant of t he fact t hat t hese issues we re a matter of conte ntion at trial. Both parties pre s en t ed testimonyaddre ssing the issue of whether the Hes
un de rs too d th e pu rp os e a nde ff e c t of theJune 4, 19 99 c on se nt or de r aw ard ing c us tod y of A. M. H. to the B aker s. Ba sed on the testimony offe red at trial, the cha ncery court he ld that th e He s were adequately

informed of the order ’s purpose and eff ect, a nd the Hes e ither had a dequate counsel or had an opportunityto seek c ounsel reg arding this iss ue. We g ive these cre d i b i litydeterminations g reat w eig ht on appea l, and we find no clea r and convincing evidenc e in the re co rd t o j ustify
rea ching a diffe rent c onclusion reg arding such testimony

. S e e W e l l s v . T e n n . B d

. of Re ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999)

. Of the most sig nificanc e to our a naly sis of this is sue i s t h e rea liz ation that Rule 60.02 require s that the motion “shall be m ade within a reasonable time.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 (2004). What constitut es a r easona ble time is a question of fact, and not a question of law. See Thom pson , 79 8 S. W.2 d at 23 8; Rog e rs v . Es tat e of Russ e ll , 50 S.W .3d 441, 4 4 5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). O n app e a l, the He s f

a il t o o ff e r any jus tif ic a tio n for wh y the y waite d in exce ss of fo ur y e ars to f ile the ir Rule 60.02 motion. Anyarg ument that they did not understand the need to file t he mot ion or di d not-49-

have a dequate repr esentation to advise them to file such a motion must fail. As the t rial court noted i n i t s o r d e r , t h e H e s h a d a c c e s s t o l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( a s e v i d e n c e d b y t h e v ar i o u s a t t o r n e ys repr esenting them in their civil and criminal matters) both befor e and afte r the J une 4, 1999 custody order was e ntere d. Even a fter the J une 4, 1999 orde r had been enter ed, Ms. Cloud i nstructed the H es du ri ng a su bs e qu e nt v isi t to juv e nil e c ou rt to h ir e a la wy e r o r s e e k c ou ns e l th ro ug h le g a l se rv ic e s, wh ic h th e y

c ho se no t to do . M or e ov e r, a ft e r the B ake rs fi le d th e ir pe tit ionto t e rm inate the He s’ pa re nta l r ig hts on June 20 , 20 01 , the He s’ a tto rn e y , M r. Sos sa ma n, fi le d a n a ns we r o n th e ir be ha lf sh ortly the re a ft e r. De sp ite ha vin g a la wy e r d e dic ate d s ole ly

to a dd re ssi ng the B ake rs ’ p e tit iona t th is stag e in the litigation, the Hes wa ited until S eptember 12, 2003, over one y ear afte r the B aker s filed their petition, to file their Rule 60.02 motion in thi s case . Acc ording ly , we f ind that the Hes did not file their Rule 60.02 motion within a rea sonable time as require d by the rule, and we a ffirm the tria l court’s r uling on this issue.

2. Order De nyin g Hes’ Motion to Dism iss Bak ers’ P etition for Adoption

The He s filed a motion with the trial court on Oc tober 2, 2003, a sking the court to enter an order dismiss ing the Ba

kers’ adoption petition. I n support of their pe tition, t he He s relied on se ction 36 -1 -1 19 (d ) o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e , w hic h p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s:

I f n o appea l has bee n taken f rom any order of the c ourt, the court
mu st complete or

dismiss the adoption proceeding by entering a final order withi n two (2) years of the fi l i n g of the petition , unless the petitione r shows g ood cause why such final or der should not be enter ed.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-119(d) (2003) ( emphasis adde d). The B aker s filed their pe tition t o adopt A.M.H. and terminate the Hes’ pare ntal rig hts to A.M.H. on J une 20, 2001. As of June 20, 2003, their petition had bee n pending fo r t wo y ear s. The He s arg ue that the B aker s failed to re quest an
e xten sio n o f t ime un de r R ule 6. 02 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f C ivi l Pr oc e du re , w hic h p ro vid e s:
When by statute . . . an ac t is required or allowed to be doneat or wi thi n a sp e c if ie d ti me , th e c ou rt for cause shown ma y , at a ny tim e in its discretion, (1) wit h o r wi thout moti on or notice or der the period enlar g ed if reque st there of i s made be fore the expiration of the period orig inally presc ribed or a s ext ended by a pre vious order, or

(2) upon motion made afte r the ex piration of t he specified period permit the ac t to be done, whe re the fai lure to act wa s th e re su lt o f e x c us ab le

ne gle c t

. . . .-50-

Te nn . R. Civ . P. 6. 02 (2 00 4) (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e He s ar g ue d at tri a l, an d ag a in on a pp e a l, that, since the B aker s did not file a re quest for an extension of t ime under Rule 6.02, they cannot show

“ g oo d c aus e ” fo r e xten din g the tw o y e ar p e ri oda ndthat th e y c a nn ot e sta

bli sh that th e ir

failu reto f

ile such re quest constitutes “ excusable neg lect.” Acc ording ly , the Hes urg ed the trial court, and now this Court, t o find that the B aker s’ adoption petition must be dismi ssed pursuant to the statute. On April 6, 2004, the trial court entere d an o rd er denying the Hes’ motion noting that the court ha d be fo re it a

pe tit ionfo r a do pti on c ou ple d w itha pe tit ionto t e rm inate the He s’ pa re nta l rig hts

.
Pr os pe c tiv e a do pti ve pa

re nts ha ve stand ing to p e tit iona c ou rt to t e rm inate thepa

re nta l r ig hts of the biolog ical par ents, and t h ey m ayinclude in their pe tition for adoption a re quest that the pare ntal rig hts of the biologica l pa rents be te rminated. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( b) (2003)

. Th us , th e c ha nc e ry

c ou rt pr op e rl y ha d b e fo reit an a do pti on pe tit ion c on ta ini ng a re qu e st t o te rm inate the He s’ pa

re nta l r ig hts

. Section 36-1-113 of the Tenne ssee Code, g overning termination of par ental rig hts, recog nizes that a petition for adoption and pe tition for termination of par ental rig hts are two distinct lega l proce sses. See T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 ( b ) , - 1 1 3 ( d ) ( 4 ) , - 113( l )(1), -113( l )(2) , - 113(m), -113( p) (2003) . “The conclusion is that the state and fede ral constitutions re quire that the natura l [ pare nt’s] parental rig hts be determined b ef ore the court may

proce ed with the issue of adoption.” Nale v. Robe rtson , 871 S.W .2d 674, 680 (Tenn. 1994) (f inding invalid a statute which
a llo we d a c ou rt to e nte r a

de c re e of

a do pti on ba se d on th e be st i nte re st o f the c hil d w ith ou t f ir st de te rm ini ng if

the biolo gical pa

re nt’ s p are nta l rig hts sh ou ld b e te rm inate d) ; see also Jones v. Ga rre tt , 92 S.W .3d 835, 840 (Tenn. 2002) (re aff irming the Court’s prior stateme nt in Nal e ). Section 3 6 -1 -1 1 9 o f the Tenne ssee Code r equire s the trial court to “complete or dismiss the adoption proce eding

. . . within two (2) y ear s of the filing of the petition.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-119(d) (2003) ( emphasis adde d).

The He s have cited to a dec ision byour supre me court in Clem ents v. Morgan , 296 S.W .2d 8 7 4 (T enn. 1956), in support of the ir position on appeal. In Cle me nts , th e s u p r e me c o u rt, when dealing with the precursor to the present statute, held t hat t he statute re quired a n adoption petition to be completed or dismiss ed within two y ear s, and the statute “must be strictly compli ed wi t h.” Cle ments , 296 S.W

. 2 d at 9 6–97. Howeve r, the de cision in Cle me nts is easily distinguished fr om the fa cts in the prese nt case . I n Cle me nts , the only petition f iled in the trial co u rt wa s o n e f or adoption. Id . at 95. Ther e wa s no need to a djudicate the issue of terminating the biologic al par ent’s pare ntal rig hts because the biologica l pa rents filed a written consent ag ree ing to a llow the petitioners to adopt t he child. Id

. I t w as only when the Tenne ssee De partment of Children’ s Services soug ht to intervene in the case that the adoption petition was delay ed bey ond the two y ear statutory period. Id . at 96 . In the pr e se nt c a se , the tr ia l c ou rt wa s fa c e d wi th a pe tit ionto t e rm inate the pa re nta l r ig hts of the He s along with a petiti on to adopt A.M.H. As our supreme court instructe d in Nal e , the trial court must nece ssarily

determine if a termination of pare ntal rig hts is warra nted bef ore it may pr oc e e d to the a do pti on pe tit ion

. Ac c or din g ly , we a ff ir m th e tria l c ou rt ’s de c isi on to d e ny the He s’ motion.

3.-51- Motion to Bifu rcat e the P roce edings

On J u n e 23 , 2 0 0 3 , t h e He s fi l ed a mo t i o n as k i n g t h e tr i al co u rt t o b i fu rc at e t h e p ro ce ed i n gs in this m atter. Specifica lly , the Hes asserted that, pursuant to the statutory and ca se law g overning termination of par ental ri g hts, the trial court wa s require d first to determine w hether the B aker s proved that the Hes’ w illfullyabandone d A.M.H. by clea r and c onvin ci n g evidenc e. Af ter
c on c lud ing a pr oc e e din g on the g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatio n, on ly the n c ou ld the c ou rt

c on du c t a se pa rate proce eding to addre ss the best interest a naly sis. After c onducting a hearing on the Hes’ motion, the chanc ery court entered an order on J anuary 28, 2004, nunc pro tunc to September 4, 2003, de ny ing the Hes’ motion.

Se c tio n 3 6- 1- 11 3( c ) o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: (c) Termination of pa

renta l or g uardia nship rights must be base d upon: (1) A fi n d i n g b y

the court by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that th e g ro un ds for

te rm inatio n o r p a

re nta l or g ua rd ia ns hip ri g hts have be en esta

blished; and (2 ) T hat te rm inatio n o f the pa re nt’ s o r g ua

rd ia n’ s rig hts is i n the best intere sts of the child.

Tenn. Co d e A n n

. § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 ( c ) ( 2 0 0 3 )

. O n ap p e a l, th e H e s ar g u e th a t s e c ti o n 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 ( c ) o f the Tenne ssee Code implies that a c ourt must conduct a se parate ev i d en t i ary hearing to a ddress the g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatio n a ndthe be st i nte re st o f the c hil d b e fo reit may ter mi nate pa re nta l r ig hts

. They also cite to a de cision by

this Court, wherein we stated that “[b]efore the court may inquire as to w he the r t e rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts is i n th e be st i nte rest of th e child, the c ou rt fi rs t mu st determine that the g rounds for te rmination have been established by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e.” K.S. O. H. v . J

.W .B. , J r. , No. E2001-00055- C OA -R 3 -C V, 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 740, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oc t. 4, 2001) (no perm. a pp. filed). The He s contend that a bifurcated proc eeding would ensure that the trial court could dec ide the existence of g rounds for te rmination without being influence d by

evidenc e tending to prove that termination is i n the best intere st of the child.

The He s’ ar g ument is e choed by the Amici in the ir brief. I n addition, the Amici arg ue that fede ral pre cede nt require s bifurcation, dire cting our attention to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Santosky v. Kram er , 455 U.S. 745 (1982). In Santosky , the Court made the f ollowing observation:

Th e S t a t e b i f u r c a t e s i t s p e r m a n e n tn e g l e c tp r o c e e d i n g i n to “fa ctfinding ” and “ dispositi onal” he aring s. Fam. Ct. Act §§ 622, 623. At the fa ctfinding stag e, the State must prove that the child has bee n “permanently neg lected,” as define d by Fam. Ct. Ac t §§ 614.1.(a)- (d) and Soc. Serv. L aw § 384- b.7.(a)

. See Fam. Ct. Ac t § 622. The-52- Fa milyCourt judge then determines at a subsequent disposit ional hearing w hat place ment would serve t h e child’s be st interests. §§ 623, 631.

Santosky , 455 U.S. at 748. I t is clear, how ever , that the Court in Santosky wa s su mma ri zing a state statute requiring bifurcation. Section 36-1-113(c ) of the T ennesse e Code does not contain a simil ar re qu ir e me nt.

The Amici a lso as s er t that “national pr ece dent” f avors bifur cation, and the y contend that “[o] ne of the most in-depth rationales f or bifurc ation” can b e found i n Champa gne v . W e lf are Division of the Nevada State Departmentof Hum an Resources , 6 9 1 P

. 2 d 8 4 9 ( N e v

. 1 9 8 4 )

. In Champagne , th e Ne va da

Sup re me Cou rt

ma de the fo llo wi ng state me nt:

We borrow f

rom Ketch am and Babc ock to state the g ener al proposition in these terms: “The jurisdictional question is whether the biologica l pare nt, by

beha v i o r, has forfeited a ll rights in the child. Th e dis po sit io nal que sti on is w he the r t e rm inatin g pa re nta l rig hts would be in the best interest of the child. The fir st question focuses on the ac tion, or i n ac tion, of the natura l pare nt. The sec ond focuse s on the pl acem ent wh ic h w ill be mos t be ne fi c ia l to the c hil d. I f i t is fi r s t d e c id e d th a t th e p ar e n t h a s f o r f e it e d h is r ig h ts inth e c h ildr en, then the court moves on to the s econd question. On the other hand, if it i s dec ide d tha t the bio log ic a l par e nt’ s beh a vio r doe s n ot v iol a te
m i n i m u m standards of

pare ntal conduct so a s to render the par ent unfit, then the analy sis ends and termination is denied. I n these latter instances, the court never reac hes the que stion of whether the child’s fut u re w ell-being would be better serve d by

place ment with the substitut e or psy cholog ical par ent.” Champa gne , 691 P.2d at 647. Howeve r, our indepe ndent re sear ch has r evea led t hat the Ne vada Supreme Court over

ruled its decision in Champagne in 2 00 0, ho ldi ng a s f oll ow s:
[T] his court in Champagne interpre ted the statute a nd announce d a tw o- ste p a na ly sis to b e app lie d w he n d e c idi ng wheth e r t o te rm inate pare ntal rig hts. Accor ding to Champagne , the fir s t s t ep in the analy sis requires that there be what the co u rt cha rac terized as “jurisdictional” g rounds for te rmination. Id . at 640, 691 P.2d at 849

. . . . I f j urisdictional g rounds for termination are not established, the in q u iry ends. Id . at 647, 691 P.2d at 854. I f jurisdictional g rounds
are established, the a naly sis turns t o wh ether dispositi onal g rounds exis t for termination.

. . . .-53- I n 1 98 7, the le g isl a tur e re sp on de d to our decis ionin Champagne , and ag ain amende d the termination statute . . . . The leg islative history

indicates that the leg islature was conce rned that the Champagne de c isi on bif

ur c a te d th e iss ue s r e g ard ing c hil dr e n’ s rig hts and par ent’s rig hts in termination procee dings. See Heari ng on A.B. 3 0 8 Be fo re t h e Ne v ad a A s s em b l y C o m m i t t ee o n J u d i ci ar y , 6 4 t h L eg. (Ne v., Marc h 20, 1987).

. . . . Our a dhere nce to the Champagne standard ha s resulted in the imp ro pe r a

pp lic a tio n o f the te rm inatio n sta tut e . The a me nd me nts to NR S 12 8.10 5 d e mon str a te thele g isl a tur e ’s fr us tr a tio n w ith Champagne and its prog eny , which plac e too m uch emphasis on the conduct of

the par ents inste ad o f on the best intere sts of the child. Clearly , the leg islative amendments of N RS 128.105 i llustrate the leg islature’s c oncern with protecting the best intere sts of the child.

. . . .
Acc ording ly , we now a

bandon Champagne’s strict adher ence to a finding of par ental fault to t er minate par ental rig hts before the district c ourt consider s the best intere sts of the child. Application of the Champagne standard may have r esulted in an a rt i fi cial de te rm inatio n b y the dis tr ic t cou rt c on c e rn ing pa re nta l f ault , b e c aus e such a de termination cannot be made without consider ations of how the par ents’ conduc t has impacted the child. The impac t of pare ntal conduct on the c hild is, i n turn, one c onsideration in determining the be st i nte re sts of th e c hil d. We w ill no lon g e r r e qu ir e dis tr ic t c ou rt s, in the name of

determining par ental fa u l t , to consider rigidly and formula i ca l ly

the conduc t of the par ents in a vac uum, without considering the best intere sts of the child. I nstead, in conf ormanc e with NRS 128.105, we adopt a best int ere sts/parental fa ult standard for termination c ases. Acc ording ly , the district court in dete rmining wh e the r t o te rm inate par e nta l r ig hts mus t c on sid e r b oththe be st int e re sts of

the c hil d a ndpa

re nta l f ault

.
In re Term inati on of Parental Ri ghts as to N.J. , 8 P.3d 126, 130–32 (Nev. 2000).

We are unawa

re of any case law, and ne ither the Appellants or t he Amici cite to this Court any authority , holding that the f eder al or state c onstitut ions re quire that pa renta l termination pr oc e e din g s in thi s st a te mus t be bif ur c a te d. At pr e se nt, the le g isl a tur e of thi s st a te ha s d e e me d it the policy of this state that pare ntal termination proce eding s not be bifurc ated. See Tenn. Code Ann.-54-

§ 3 6- 1- 11 3( c ) ( 20 03 ) (n ot in g t he a bs e nc e of a ny dir e c tiv e to the c ou rt s o f this state to b if ur c a te termination proce eding s). “The L eg islature is more or less the body who forms our public policy .” M cK es s o n & R obinson , Inc. v. Gov ’t Em ployee s Dep’t Store, Inc. , 365 S.W .2d 890, 894 (Tenn. 1963). As such, w e find the foll owing statement by our supreme court to control our resolution of this iss ue:
There is nothing in our Constituti on fr o m which it can be

inferr ed that a policy

differ ent from that state d should never be adopted by

the l eg islature. That being so, the leg islative department of the State gove rnment has exclusive and ample pow er to de termine the State ’s po lic y . Wh e n th e le g isl a tur e , a c tin g wi thi n it s c on sti tut ion a l po we rs , ha s sp ok e n up on a pa rt ic ula r su bject, its utteranc e is the publ i c p o l i cy of the State upon that subjec t, and the courts ar e without power

to rea d into the Consti t u t i o n a re straint of the leg islatu re wi t h respe ct there to. The prohibition must be
e xp r e s s e d o r

n e c e s s ar il y impl ie d f

r o m th a t w h ic h is e xp r e s s e d

. We fail to find any

such re straint in our Constit ution.

. . . [“] All que stions of policy are for the de termination of the leg islature, and not f

or the c ourts, and ther e is no public policy which prohibits the leg islature from doing anything which the Constitution does not prohibit. Hence the courts are not at liberty to decla re a law
vo id a s in vio la tio n o f p ub lic poli cy

. . . . Wher e c ou rt s in trud e int o their dec ree s their opinion on que stions of public policy , they in effe ct constitute the judicial tribunals as lawmaking bodie s in usurpation of the power s of the leg islature.” 6 R. C. L ., section 108, pp. 108, 109.

Cav e nde r v . He witt , 2 39 S.W. 76 7, 76 8 ( Te nn . 1 92 1) ; see also Crawford v. Buckner , 839 S.W .2d 75 4, 75 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) ; Smith v . Gore , 728 S.W .2d 738, 746 (Tenn. 1987). As the leg islature of Neva da chose to act in light of the Neva da Supreme Court’s decision in Champagne , so too may the Tenne ssee leg islature ac t, if it chooses, to require the courts of this s t at e t o conduct a bifurcated proce eding in pare ntal termination ca ses. I n the absenc e of such direc tion, however , we a ffirm the trial court’ s decision to deny the Hes’ motion to bi furc ate the pr ocee dings at trial.

C. Const itut ionali ty of sec tion 36-1-102 and section 36-1-113 of the Tennessee Code

The Hes arg ue that the trial court err ed by failing to find that section 36-1-102 and section 36-1-113 of

the Tenne ssee Code violate the protec tions afforde d them by the United States Constit ution by failing to r equire that biologica l pa rents rec eive actua l notice of the following : the statut ory de fi nit ion of aba nd on me nt; the c ri te ri a a ndpr oc e du re s u se d f

or te rm inatin g pa

re nta l r ig hts ; information conc erning the law of abandonme nt; information reg arding the nec essity for the-55-

assistance of counse l; and a wa rning that failure to visit or failure to support the child for the statutory period may

constitute g rounds for te rminating their par ental rig hts. Specifically , the Hes
assert that the lack of notice in this case violated their constitutional rig hts pr otected by the Fif th and Fourteenth Amendme nts to the United States Consti tution.

The He s make re fer ence to the notice provisions found in Title 37, Chapter 2, Part 4 of the Tenne ssee Code which g overn the place ment of juveniles. Specifica lly , the Hes direc t our attention to s e c tio n 3 7- 2- 40 3( a )( 2) of the Te nn e sse e Cod e , w hic h p ro vid e s, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s: (2) ( A) The permanenc y plan for any child in foster c are shall include a stateme nt of respons ib iliti es betwe en the pa rents, the agenc

y and the
case worke r of suc h a gency
. Such statements shall include the
re sp on sib ili tie s of e a c h pa rty in sp e c if

ic te rm s a nd sh a ll be re a so na bly related t o the achievement of the goal specified in s ubdivision (a)(1)

. Th e state me nt shall include t h e definitions of “ abandonment” and “ab an do nm e nt o

f an inf an t” con tai ne d in § 3 6- 1- 10 2 a nd the c rit e ria
an d p ro c e du re s fo r ter

mi na tio n o

f pa re nta l ri gh ts . E a c h p arty sh a ll sign the statement and be g iven a c opy of it. The court must review the proposed pla n, make any nece ssary

modifications and ra tify or approve the pl an withi n six ty (60) day s of t he foster car e plac ement

. . . . (B ) (i) The pare nts or leg al g uardia ns of the child shall rec eive notice to appea r at the c ourt revie w of the pe rmane ncy plan o r the plan of
car e and the c ou rt s ha ll e x pla in o n th e reco rd th e law re lat ing to abandonment contained in § 36- 1-102, and shall explain th a t the conseque nces of failure to visit or support t he child will be termination of the parents’ or guardians’ rights t o the child, and the court will f

urther explain that the par ents or guardians may see k an attorney to represe nt the parents or guardians in any termination procee ding

. I f the pa

re nts or le g a l g ua rd ia ns areno t a t th e he ari ng to
re vie w the pe rm a ne nc y plan or plan of ca re , the c ou rt

sh a ll e xpla in t o the pa re nts or g ua

rd ia ns a t a ny su bs e qu e nt he ari ng re g ard ing the c hil d held there afte r, that the conseque nces of failure to visit or support the child will be termination of the pa rents’ o r guar dians’ rig hts to the child and that they

may seek an attorney to repre sent the par ents or gu ar d i an s i n a t er m i n at i o n p ro ce ed i n g.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-403( a)( 2) (2003) (empha sis added). A n examination of section 36-1-102 and 36-1- 113 of the Tenne ssee Code, which g overn a doptions, revea ls the absenc e of similar notice pr ov isi on s in tho se statut e s.-56-

I n assessing the Hes’ arg uments relate d to the constitutionalit y of the two a doption statutes ati s s u e, we ar e m i n d fu l o f t h e f o l l o wi n g:
When fac ed with s uch a constituti onal assault on a statute, this court must indul g e eve ry

presumption and re solve eve ry doubt in favor of the constitutionalityof the leg islati v eenac tment. See R iggs v. Burson , 941 S.W .2d 44, 51 (Tenn.) , cert. de nied , 522 U.S. 982, 139 L . Ed. 2d 38 0, 11 8 S. Ct. 44 4 ( 19 97 ); Vogel v. W ells Fargo Guard Servs ., 937 S.W .2d 856, 858 (Tenn. 1996) . The p arty challeng ing the constitutionalit y

of a statute “ bear s a hea vy b u r d e n of over coming that presumption.” He lm s v . Te nn e sse e De p't of Safe ty , 987 S.W .2d 545, 550 (Tenn. 1999)

. In re Ado ption o f M .J .S. , 44 S.W. 3d 41 , 61 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 00 ); see also Gallaher v. Elam , 104 S.W. 3d45 5, 45 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; In re Ado ption of Fe m ale C

hild , 42 S.W .3d 26, 31–32 (Tenn. 2001).

The He s assert that, since they have a fundame ntal rig ht to the c are , custody , and contr ol of their daug hter, se e Tr

ox e l v . G ra nv ill e , 5 30 U. S. 5 7, 65 (2 00 0) ; Santosky v. Kram er , 455 U.S. 745, 7 5 3 ( 1 9 8 2) ; Ha wk v. Hawk , 8 55 S.W. 2d57 3, 57 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) , th e F if th andF ou rt e e nth Amendments to the United States Constituti on require that the notice pr ovisions applicable to ca ses involving the Te nnessee Depa rtment of Children’s Servic es apply with equal for ce to non- ag ency custody arr ang ements betwe en private individuals as well. The pa rties do not dispute that the Hes
never rec eived a ny of the forms of notice re quired by section 37-2- 403(a) (2) of the Tenne ssee Code at any time before or af

ter the juve nile court e ntere d the conse nt order on J une 4, 1999 transfe rring custody of A.M.H. to t h e Bakers. TheHes c ontend that, had they rec eived this information, they
wo uldha ve take n a dd iti on a l st e ps to p re ve nt the te rm inatio n o f the ir pa re nta l r ig hts

.
I n support of their position on appea l, the Hes cite to the following statement by the United States Supreme Court in Santosky v . Kramer :

The fundamental liberty interest of natural par ent s i n the ca re, c us tod y , a ndma na g e me nt o f the ir c hil d doe s n ot e va

po rate simply beca use they have not be en model par ents or havelost te mporary custody of t heir c hild to t

he Sta te

. Even when blood relationships are str a ine d, pa

re nts re ta in a vit a l in te re st i n p re ve nti ng their re tr ie va ble destruction of the ir family life. I f anything, pe rsons fac ed with forc ed dissoluti on of their pare ntal rig hts ha ve a more critica l n ee d for p ro ce d u ra l p ro t ec t i o n s t h an d o t h o s e r es i s t i n g state intervention int o ong oing f amily aff airs. When the State moves to destroy wea kened famil ia l bo nd s, it m us t pr ov ide the pa re nts wi th fu nd ame nta lly fair pr oc e du re s.W e al s o n ot e t h at t h e H es h av e as s er t ed a v i ol at i on of t h e Fi f t h Amen dmen t t o t h e U n i t ed St at es Cons t i t u t i on 14

a s w e ll. T h e F ift h A m e n d m e n t ha s b e e n re p e a te d ly he ld to a p p ly t o a c tio n s b y the fed e ra l go v e rn m e n t, n o t t h e sta te g o v e rn m e n t. Se e Cam den F i r e I ns . A s s ’ n v . H as t on , 2 8 4 S .W . 9 0 5 , 9 0 8 (T e n n . 1 9 2 5 ); S ta te v . N o rv e ll , 191 S. W

. 536, 539 ( T en n

. 1916)

. T h e H es f ai l t o demon s t r at e an y ac t i on on t h e par t of t h e fede r al g ov er n men t r eg ar di n g t h ei r l ac k of

n o tice in this c a se . A c c o rd ing ly, this c o m p o n e n t o f t h e ir a rg u m e n t i s w itho u t m e rit.
-57- Santosky , 4 55 U. S. a t 75 3– 54 (e mph a sis a dd e d)

. Th e He s a lso se e k to pe rs ua de thi s Co urt to app ly
a no tic e re qu ir e me nt sim ila r to that f ou ndin s e c tio n 3 7- 2- 40 3( a )( 2) of the Te nn e sse e Cod e to p ri vate
c us tod y a g re e me nts by

c iti ng to the de c isi on s o f thi s Court app lying that st a tut e a ndho ldi ng that a pare nt’s failure to rec eive the r equire d statutory notice wa

rra nt ed a reversa l of the trial court’s finding of abandonment. Se e In re S.M

. , 1 49 S.W. 3d63 2, 63 7– 38 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 4) ; State v. De marr , No. M2002-02603-COA- R3-J V, 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 569, at *29–32 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 13, 2003) (no pe rm. app. filed) ; In re J. J. C. , 148 S.W .3d 919, 926–27 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); In re C .L.H. , No . M 20 00 -0 27 99 -C OA -R 3- JV, 2 00 1 T e nn . A pp . L EX I S 42 4, a t *1 3– 15 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. June 5, 20 01 ) ( no pe rm . a pp . f ile d) ; Pi e rc e v . Be c hto ld , 44 8 S.W. 2d 42 5, 42 9– 30 (T e nn . Ct

. App. 1969).

Th e F ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: “ no r s ha ll any State deprive any

person of life, liberty , or prope rty without due proce ss of law; nor de ny to any p e r s o n w i t h i n i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e l a w s

. ” U

. S

. C o n s t

. a m e n d

. X IV , § 1

. In 14 addre ssing claims premised upon the Fourteenth Amendme nt, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court has noted:

I t is well established that the due proce ss pr otections o f t he

F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n td o n o tc o m e i n t o p l a y unless t h er e i s some
ac tio n o n th e pa rt o

f th e Sta te

. See She lley v. Kraem er , 334 U.S. 1, 13 , 92 L

. Ed

. 11 61 , 68 S. Ct. 83 6 (1 94 8) ; State ex re l. Hawkins v. Lut tre ll , 22 1 Te nn

. 32 , 42 4 S.W. 2d18 9, 19 0 ( Te nn . 1 96 8) ; State ex

r e l. J o h n s o n v
. H

eer , 219 Tenn. 604, 412 S.W.2d 218, 219 (Tenn. 19 66 ). Th e re fo re , inor de r t o s ta te a c aus e of a c tio n f or a du e pr oc e ss violation under the Fourteenth Amendme nt, state action must be alleged

. City of Cookeville v. Hum phrey , 126 S.W .3d 897, 906 (Tenn. 2004) (empha sis added); se e als o State ex rel. Johnson v. Hee r , 412 S.W .2d 218, 219 (Tenn. 1966) (“[I ]n order for the def endant’ s rig hts under the F ourtee nth Amendment to come into play , there must be some action on the pa rt of the State that deprives him of due proc ess of law and/or e qual protec tion of the law.” ).

The He s focus their a

rg uments on appea l to a lack of not i ce re gar d i n g the abandonment g round for terminating pare ntal rig hts, how ever , they do not specifica lly state which individuals or entities were constitutionally require d to pr ovide them notice. Section 36-1-102( 1) of the Te nnessee Code, which d ef

ines “a bandonment,” r equire s the courts of this state to foc us on the biologic al pa re nts ’ c on du c t w ith in the fo ur (4) mon ths imm e diate ly pr e c e din g the fi lin g of

the pe tit ionto terminate the ir paren t al rig hts. See Te nn . Co deAn n. § 3 6- 1- 10 2( 1) (A ) – (E ) ( 20 01 ). Th us ,-58-

assuming f

or purpose s of our discussion he re that a party did have a

duty to provide notice to the H es during this period of time, we must nec essarily focus our attention on those individuals or entities which had the ability

to influence the beha vior of the pa rents d u ring this statutoryperiod. When Mid-South cease d its invol vement in this case on June 4, 1999 (the date of the juve nile court’s consent c ustody

order ), the B aker s took over r esponsibilityfor A.M.H . Thus, it is apparent that the He s a re a sse rt ing that th e B ake rs , p ri vate ind ivi du a ls, vio la te d th e ir du e pr oc e ss ri g hts by faili ng to provide them with notice compar able to that re quired by section 37-2- 403 of the Te nnessee Code.

Re g ard ing the B ake rs , th e He s ar e un able to es ta bli sh the re qu isi te state a c tio n n e c e ssa ry to pursue their due proce ss c laims in this c ase. Mor eover , their re liance on the afor ementioned c ases actua lly undermines their

position on appeal. In In re J.J. C. , De ma rr , and In re C.L.H. , the Tenne ssee De partment of Chil dren’ s Services, a state agency , had custody of the c hildren and f

iled the petit ion to terminate the pare nts’ pare ntal rig hts, and thi s Court addre ssed the state’s failu re to provide the r equire d statutory notice to the par ents in eac h of those ca ses. In re J. J. C. , 148 S.W .3d
a t 92 1; De marr , 2 00 3 T e nn . A pp

. LEX I S 56 9, a t *3 –4 ; In re C.L.H. , 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 424, at *4–5. Thus, in those case s we wer e dealing specific ally with a ction on the part of the state which aff ecte d the parental rights of a pa rent to their minor c hild. I n Santosky , th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court expresslystated that, “[w]hen t h e S t ate moves to destroy wea kened f amilial bonds, it

mus t provide the pa

rents with funda mentally

fair pr ocedur es.” Santosky , 4 55 U. S. at 75 3– 54 (e mph a sis
a d d e d )

. In In re S.M. , a license d child-plac ement ag ency filed the pe tition t o terminate the pare ntal rig hts of the biologica l pa rents, but this Court did not a ddress any failure on the part of the ag ency to provide notice w hen ruling that the par ent did not w illfullyabandon the child. In re S.M

. , 149 S.W .3d at 643–44 (finding that the ag ency failed to present c lear and convinc ing e vidence that the biologica l pare nt willfully abandone d the child). Our decision in Pierce is no t pe rs ua siv e be c aus e ou r d e c isi on in that c a se c on sti tut e s a c omm on la w r

uli ng wh ic h, a s th e He s a c kn ow le dg e in the ir brief, w as hande d down prior to the codification of the notice provisions in section 37-2-403 of the Tenne ssee Code. See Pierc e , 448 S.W .2d at 429–30.

I n addre ssing the F ourtee nth Amendment to the United States Constitut ion, the United States Sup re me Cou rt

ha s st a te d a s f

oll ow s:

I t is S tate ac tion of a particular c hara cter that i s prohibited. Individual in va s i o n of individual ri ghts is not t he subjec t-matter of th e a m e n dment

. I t has a de eper and broa der sc ope. It nullifies and makes void all State leg islation, and State action of every kind, which imp a ir s th e privi le g e s a ndimm un iti e s o f c iti zen s o f the Un ite d St a te s, or wh ic h in jur e s th e m in lif

e , lib e rty or pr op e rty wi tho ut d ue pr oc e ss of law, or which denie s to any

of them the e qual protec tion of the la ws

.W e ad d res s t he H es’ l ack o f noti ce m o re f

ul l y when ad d res si ng t he ground s fo r t erm i nat i o n i n f ra
. H o wever, 15
we pau s e h er e t o not e t hat our i ndependen t r es ear ch has r eve al ed one deci s i on ren dere d by t hi s C our t af t er t he appeal i n t he i ns t ant ca s e wa s f i l ed whe r ei n w e a dd r es s ed a p riv a te cust o d y agreem ent and a pa rent ’ s l ack o f noti ce regarding ab and o nm ent , s t at i ng:

W hen t he D ep art m ent of C hi l d ren’ s Se rvi ces or other chi l d

- p l aci ng agency o b t ai ns cust o d y of chi l d ren r em o ved f rom t he p arent s’ hom e, it i s requir ed t o noti f y t he pare nt s of t he s t at ut ory def i ni t i ons of abandonment and t he cr i t er i a and pr ocedur es for t er mi nat i on of

p ar ent al ri gh t s

. T enn

. Co de Ann. § 37

- 2- 40 3(a) ( 2)( A )

. I n s uch si t uat i o ns, a co urt canno t t erm i nat e a p arent ’ s ri ght s o n t he ground of ab and o nm ent
u n l es s s u ch n ot i ce , i n cl u di n g t h e c on s equ en ce of aba n don men t , ha s bee n g i v en by the a g e n c y p e tit io n ing fo r te rm ina tio n o r th e c o u rt itself. T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 7 -2 -4 0 3 (a )( 2 )( B ). In t h e c a s e b e f o r e u s , n e i t h e r DCS n o r a n o t h e r a g e n c y was in v o lv e d , so th e sta tu te d o e s n o t ap p ly

. N o n e the le ss, M o the r’s k n o w le d g e o f a d u ty
o r ex p ec t ati o n that she p ro vid e sup p o rt an d v i si t i s a f act or i n de t er m i ni ng
w i l l f u l n ess
. W e f

i nd not hi ng i n t he r ecor d t o i ndi cat e she was ev er t ol d s he was
ex p ec t ed t o p ro vid e sup p o rt o r f ac e term i na t i o n o f he r p are ntal ri gh t s.

In re W .B ., IV , N o. M 2004- 00999- CO A- R3- PT , 2005 T en n

. App. LEX I S 262, a t * 38 ( T en n

. Ct

. App. Apr

. 29, 2005) (no p erm

. ap p

. f

i l ed ) ( em p hasi s ad d ed ). W hi l e a p arent ’ s kno wl ed ge o f a duty t o vi si t or supp o rt m ay have a b eari ng whe n det er mi ni ng wi l l f ul nes s , we can not say t hat t he Fourt een t h A mendm ent t o t he U ni t ed St at es Co ns t i t ut i on mandat es tha t a p riv a te ind ivid u a l p ro v id e the no tif ic a tio n s u rg e d up o n the C o u rt b y the A p p e llan ts in this c a se

.

-59- T h e Civil Righ ts Cases , 1 0 9 U

. S. 3 , 1 1 ( 1 8 8 3 ) ( e mp h a s is a d d e d )

. A c c o r d in g ly , th e H e s have no ba sis to a sse rt

that th e B ake rs , p ri vate ind ivi du a ls, vio la te d th e ir Fou rt eenth Am e nd me nt rig hts reg arding A.M.H. by

failing to give them the notice whic h they claim they

wer e entitled to. 15

With ou t e xplic itl y

statin g a s mu c h, the He s impli e dly arg ue in the ir

brie f that th e juv e nil e court a lso violated their constitutional rights unde r the F ourtee nth Amendment by failing to ensure that they rec eived some fo rm o f not ice c ompara ble to that found in section 37-2- 403 of the Te nn e sse e Cod e wh e n it

e nte re d th e June 4, 19 99 c on se nt o rd e r t rans fe rring c us tod y

of A. M. H. to the B aker s. The United St ates S upreme Court has recog nized that state ac tion may take the f orm of j u d i ci al en fo rc em en to f p ri v at e a gre em en t s , s t at i n g:

That the a ction of state c ourts and jud ic ial off ic e rs in their offic i al capa cities is to be reg arde d as ac tion of t he S tate withi n the meaning of the F ourtee nth Amendment, i s a propositi on which has long be en e stabli s h e d b y d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s C o u r t

. . . . “ A s t a t e a c t s b yits le g isl a tiv e , it s e xec uti ve , o r i ts ju d icialauthorities. It can a ct in no oth e r w a y .” I n the Civ il Rig hts Ca se s, 10 9 U .S. 3, 11 , 1 7 ( 18 83 ), thi s Cou r t p o in te d o u t th a t th e A me n d me n t ma k e s v o id “ St a te a c ti o n of
e ve ry kin d” wh ic h is inc on sis te nt wi th the g ua ranti e s the rei n contained, and extends to m anife stations of “State authorit y in the shape of laws, customs, or judicialor executive proc eeding s.” Shelley v. Kraemer , 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) (e mphasis added)

.O ur s up rem e co urt has st at ed t hat a cust o d y ord er m ay no t c o nst i t ut e a f i nal judgm ent wi t h t he acco m p anyi ng 16

re s ju d ic a ta e ff

e c t w h e n the ju v e n ile c o u rt inte n d s the o rd e r to b e o f t e m p o ra ry e ff e c t. See I n r e Askew , 993 S. W

. 2d 1, 4 ( T enn

. 1 99 9). W e d i s cus s t he ot her rel at ed i s s ues rai s ed by t he H es i n an at t emp t t o i nv al i dat e t he Jun e 4, 199 9 order i n f ra
.
“Fo st er c are ”, fo r p urp o ses o f sec t i o n 3 7

- 2

- 4 0 3 o f

t he T en ne ssee C o d e, i s d efi ne d as fo l l o w s: 17

“Fo st er care” me ans t he t em p o rary placem ent of a chi l d in th e c ust o d y of t he d e p art m ent of chi l d ren’ s ser vi ces or an y agency , i n stitutio n o r h o m e , whe t her p u b lic o r p riv a te , for c are out s i de t h e h ome of a pa r en t or r el at i v e ( by bl ood or

m arri age) of t he chi l d , whet her s uch p l acem ent i s b y c o urt ord er, volunt ary p la c e m e n t ag re e m e n t, su rr e n d e r o f p a re n ta l rig h ts o r o the rw ise . F o ste r c a re sh a ll

cease at such t i me as t h e ch i l d i s pl ac ed wi t h a n i n di v i du al or i n di v i du al s for t he pur po s e of

t he chi l d’ s adop t i on b y t he i ndi vi dual or i ndi vi dual s or at s uch t i me as
a p e tit io n to a d o p t i s fil e d , w h ic h e v e r o c c u r s f ir s t, o r a t suc h ti m e a s the c h ild is

re tur n e d to o r p la c e d in the c a re o f a p a re n t o r re la tive

. . . .
T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 7

- 2

- 4 0 2 (5) (20 0 3 ) ( em p hasi s ad d ed ).
-60- I n a ny e ve nt, we c a nn ot e nte rt a in any arg ume nts , e ve n if e xpre ssl y state d, wh ic h atte mpt

to
satis fy the st a te a c tio n r e qu ir e me nt b y po int ing to the juv e nil e c ou rt ’s e nf or c e me nt o f the pa

rt ie s’ private c ustody

ag ree ment by

entering an order solidify ing that ag ree ment. Although the order was the result of a consent ag ree ment reg arding custody of A.M.H., the H es re tained their right to appe al the June 4, 19 99 or de r t o th is C ou rt , a s w e ll a s the subse qu e nt o rd e r d e nying the ir fi rs t pe tit ionto modify that order , and pre sent any alleg ed constitutional infirmities for re solution. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159( g ) (2003) (“A ppeals in all other civil matters he ard by the juvenile court shall be g ov e rn e d b y

the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re .” ). Th e He s failu reto f ile a n a pp e a l di ve sts this Court of the abilityto review the constitutional validityof the June 4, 1999 o rder . Once a c us tod y or de r is fin a l, it b e c ome s re s ju dic ata and can only be modified in a subse quent proc eeding upon a showing that there had been a materia l chang e in circumstances making a chang e of c ustody in the child’s best intere st. See I n re E

. J .M

. , No

. W 2 0 03-02603-COA- R3-J V, 2005 Tenn. A pp. LEX I S 14 6, a t *4 6 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . M ar. 10 , 2 00 5) (n o p e rm . a pp . f ile d) ; Rushing v . Rus hing , No. W2003-01413-COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 708, at *14 ( Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2004) (n o p e rm . a

pp . f ile d)

. Ac c or din g ly , w e fi ndtheHe s a rg ume nt i n th is r e g ardto b e wi tho ut m e ri t. 16

D. Application of the Notice Prov ision s in S ection 37-2-403 of the Tennessee Code

The He s make the a lternative a rg ument that, even if the aforementioned statutes are deeme d constitutional, the trial court er red by failing to f

ind that the notice provisions found in sec tion 37-2- 403 of the Te nnessee Code should a pply in this ca se bec ause A .M.H. was in the “ foster c are ” of 17I t i s un di s pu t ed t h at M i d- Sou t h i s a l i ce n s ed c h i l d pl ac eme n t ag en cy

. T h e l eg i s l at u r e def i n es “ ag en cy ” for 18
pu r pos es of

T i t l e 37, Cha pt er 2, Par t 4 a s “ a ch i l d c ar e ag en cy , a s de f i n ed i n t i t l e 71, c h apt er 3 , p ar t 5, or i n t i t l e 37,

c h a p te r 5 , p a rt 5 , re g a rd le ss o f w h e the r su c h a g e n c y is l ic e n se d o r a p p ro v e d , an d inc lud e s the d e p a rtm e n t o f ch ild re n ’s

serv i ce s. ” T en n. C o d e A nn

. § 3 7

- 2

- 4 0 2 (1 ) (2 0 0 3 ). S ec t i o n 3 7

- 5

- 5 0 1 o f t he T en ne ssee C o d e states:

A s u se d in this p a rt, un le ss th e c o n te x t o the rw ise re q u ire s: “c h ild c a re a g e n c y” inc lud e s: “c h ild a b u se a g e n c y,” “c h ild c a rin g institutio n ,” “c h ild p la c ing a g e n c y,” “d e te n tio n c e n te r,” “fam ily b o a rd ing ho m e o r fo ste r h o m e ,” “g ro u p c a re ho m e ,” “mater ni t y hom e, ” o r “ t em p o rary holdi ng res o urce” as d ef i ned i n s ub sect i o n (b).

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 7 -5 -5 0 1 (a ) (2 0 0 3 ).

-61- a n “ a g e nc y ” prior

to the date the B ake rs fi le d th e ir pe tit ion to te rm inate the He s’ pa re nta l r ig hts

. 18 The He s assert that, while “AMH was not ‘technically ’ in the foster car e of an ag ency

following the end of the 90-day

foster c are period through Mid-Sout h Christian Service s,” she wa s in the type of foster c are contemplated by section 37-2-403(a) (2) of the Tennessee Code betwee n J une 4, 1999 and the date the Baker s filed t heir petiti on in this case bec ause the transfe r of r esponsibilityfor A.M.H

. betwee n Mid-South and the Ba kers wa s “seamless.” Furthermore , in an ef fort to demonstrate that Mid -S ou th r e ma ine d in vo lve d a ft e r the c on c lus ionof the thr e e mon th f

os te r c arepe ri od , th e He s c ite to the fa c t th a t Mr . We a ve r, Mid -S ou th’ s la wy e r, su bs e qu e ntl y re pr e se nte d the B ake rs in the ir
a tte mpt s to c on te st the He s’ pe tit ion s to modif y the c us tod y or de r an d fil e d the pe tit ionto t e rm inate the Hes’ pare ntal rig hts. There fore , they contend that Mid-South rema ined “inter ested” in the
ou tc ome of the pr oc e e din g s e ve n tho ug h the He s sig ne d a fo rm a c kn ow le dg in g that Mid -S ou th would no longe r be involved in the c ase.

J ust prior to the end of the initial thre e month foster ca re pe riod, Ms. Chunn met with Father to d isc us s th e He s’ fu tur e plans fo r A .M .H . Wh e n F a the r i nd ic a ted that th e y wante d A .M .H . to
re ma in w ith the B ake rs , Ms. C hu nn a dv ise d F a the r o f t he a dv e rs e e ff

e c ts s uc h a n a

rr a ng e me nt c ou ld have on A .M.H. and counsele d ag ainst it. At this point, Father met with the Ba kers a nd discussed
a pr iv ate arrang ement without any involvement of Mid-South. There afte r, F ather and the B aker s called Ms. Chunn to inf

orm her of the parties’ decision. Admittedly , Ms. Chunn did facilitate the meeting with Mr . Weaver to discuss the proce ss of transfe rring custody . Howeve r, on June 4, 1999, th e d a y th e p ar ti e s s ig n e d th e c o n s e n t o r d e r tr a n s f e rr in g c u s to d y , th e H e s s ig n e d a for m which pr ov ide d a s f

oll ow s: Up on sig nin g thi s form and re c e ivi ng sa id ch ild (r e n) , I(w e ) a ssu me full res po ns ibi lit y

fo r the c hil d( re n) , a nddis c ha rg e Mid -S ou th Christ ia n Se rv ic e s f

ro m a ny fu rthe r c areof

the c hil d( re n) be y on d th is date.

After this date, Mid-Sout h’s responsibil ity for A.M.H. cea sed. Whil e the r ecor d demonstrates that Ms. Chunn did communi cate with the Ba kers a fter that date, we cannot f ind th at t h is conduct
a mou nts to a

c on tin uin g e ff

ort to pro vid e “ fo ste r c are .” Like wi se , w e c a nn ot s a y that th e B ake rs ’ independe nt d ec i s ion to have Mr. Weave r re prese nt them at a later date e quates to a “ continuingI n a s i mi l ar v ei n , an y at t empt by t h e H es t o as s er t a vi ol at i on of t h e Fou r t ee n t h Amen dmen t on t h e par t of 19
M i d

- So ut h w o ul d no t b e m eri t o ri o us. A s o f J une 4 , 1 9 9 9 , M i d

- So ut h no l o nger had any i nvo l vem ent i n t hi s case, and t hey have no t be en m ad e a p art y t o t he i nst ant co nt roversy

. M o reove r, t he H es d i d not ap p eal t he juveni l e co urt ’ s June 4, 1999 or der or t h e s u bs equ en t de n i al of t h ei r or i g i n al pe t i t i on t o modi f y t h at or der , w h i ch w ou l d n ec es s ar i l y i n cl u de

a n e v a lua tio n o f M id -S o u th’s c o n d u c t up to tha t p o int in tim e

.

As pr ev i ou s l y n ot ed, M s

. Cl ou d t y ped t h e i t al i ci ze d l an g u ag e i n t o t h e or der a bov e t h e ph r as e “ cu s t ody t o be 20

awar ded” and “ cus t od y of s ai d chi l d(r en)

. ”
-62- interest” in the c ase on the part of Mid-South. There is simply no evidenc e in the re cord sug g esting that Mid-South directed Mr. Weaver to r epre sent the Ba kers or encour ag ed the B aker s to select Mr. Weaver to repre sent them. Thus, A.M.H. did not rema in in “foster car e” w ith an “ag ency ” bey ond June 4, 19 99

. Ac c or din g ly , we fi nd the He s ar g ume nts in this re g ardto b e wi tho ut m e ri t a s w e ll.

19

E.

Supe rio r P

are nta l Rights D oc trine

At the conc lusion of the initial thre e month f oster car e period, the Hes sig ned a “ Petition for Custody ,” whe rein they

asked that “[c] ustody

of [A.M.H.] be awar ded to J erry & L ouise Ba

ker, nonrelative[.] ” On June 4, 1999 the juvenile court entere d a “Consent Order A war ding Custody ,” wh er ei n t h e j u v en i l e c o u rt n o t ed t h att h e H es ad m i t t ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:
1. That they have been fullyadvised of the ir leg al rig hts and that a hea ring befor e the Court is here by expressly waived.

2. That all parties ag ree that it is i n the best intere st of the
c h i l d ( r e n ) f

o r c u s t o d y an d gu ar

dia ns hip of the pe rso n o

f sa id child to be a wa

rd e d to Jer

ry a ndL ou ise B ake r, no n- re la tiv e s.

. . . .
I T I S THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJ UDGED , AND DE CREED that custody

and guardianship of t he person of said child(re n) be and is h e re by a wa rd e d to Jer

ry a ndL ou ise B ake r, no n- re la tiv e s w ith authority to make appr opriate pla ns for the c are and supervision of said child(re n).
(empha sis added). On Ma y 29 , 2 00 1, Mo the r f

ile d a “ Pe tit ionto M od if

y Or der” in the juv e nil e 20

c ou rt a lle g ing that a

c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s w arr a nte d a c ha ng e in the c us tod y

arr a ng e me nt s e t f

orthM s

. Cl o ud testi fi ed t hat , wh i l e Fat her was pre s ent at j uv eni l e c our t wh en t he M ay 29, 200 1 pet i t i on was 21
d raf t ed , only M o t her s i gned t he p et i t i o n s eeki ng a m o d i f i cat i o n of t he juveni l e co urt ’ s earl i er ord er.

T he B akers at t em p t t o dis t i ngui sh B la ir b y p o i nt i ng to t he fact that the no n- p arent i n B la ir was ne ver awa r ded 22
g u ar di an s h i p of

t he m i nor c h i l d a s w as don e i n t h i s c as e. T h ey a r g u e t h at t h ey h av e bee n a dj u di ca t ed g u ar di an s of A .M .H ., t he refo re, t he fo l l o w i ng st atute ap p l i es:

A cu s t od i an t o whom l ega l cu s t od y ha s been gi ven by t he cour t un der t hi s par t ha s t he ri ght t o t he p hy si cal cust o d y of t he chi l d , t he ri ght t o de t erm i ne t he nat ure of t he care and tr eat m ent o f

the chil d , incl ud i ng o rdinar y m ed i cal c are and t he ri ght and d u ty t o p ro v id e fo r th e c a re , p ro te c tio n , t ra inin g a n d e d u c a tio n , an d the p h ysic a l,

m e n ta l an d m o ra l we lfar e o f t h e c h ild , s ubj ec t t o t he condi t i ons and l i m i t at i ons of t he or der and t o t he r emai ni ng r i ght s and dut i es of t he chi l d’ s par ent s or guar di an
. A c u sto d ia n is also re sp o n sib le fo r p ro v id ing n o tice s a s re q u ire d in § 4 9 -6 -3 0 5 1 , t o t h e pr i n ci pal of

t h e s ch ool i n w h i ch t h e ch i l d i s e n r ol l ed.

T enn

. C od e A nn

. § 3 7- 1- 14 0(a) (200 3). T he B ake r s ass er t t hat , unl i ke a “ cus t od y ” d et er mi nat i on whi ch i s mo di f i abl e,
an o rder ap p o i nt i ng a “guar d i an” fo r a m i no r chi l d b eco m es f i nal and unap p eal ab l e. A s a res ul t , t hey co nt end t hat t he H es w er e r equ i r ed t o f

i l e a pet i t i on t o t er mi n at e t h e B ak er s ’ g u ar di an s h i p r i g h t s , an d t h ey w er e r equ i r ed t o pr ov e g r ou n ds fo r te rm ina tio n b y c le a r a n d c o n v inc ing e v id e n c e

. See T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 (a),

- 1 1 3 (d) (20 0 3 ) (s et t i ng fo rt h t he juri sdi ct i o n and venue o f t he co urt s i n t erm i nat i ng pa rent al or g u a rd ia n sh ip rig h ts to a c h ild ). T he B akers ci t e t o no T enness ee case l aw, and our i nd ep end e n t r e se a rc h h a s l i kewis e f ai l ed t o l o cat e any aut hor i t y , wh i ch r equi r es t he r es ul t t hey ur ge t hi s Co ur t t o ad o p t in t he pres ent ca s e. M oreove r , r equi r i ng bi ol ogi cal pare nt s t o s eek t o t er mi nat e t he gu ar di ans hi p ri gh t s of a no n-par ent , as t he B ake r s s ug ges t , woul d s t and i n di r ect
c o n tra v e n tio n o f a b io lo g ic a l p a re n t’s f u n d a m e n ta l righ t t o the c a re , cu sto d y, an d c o n tro l o f the ir c h ild re n

. Se e Sant os ky

v. Kram er , 4 5 5 U .S . 7 4 5 , 7 5 3 (1 9 8 2 ); H awk v . H awk , 8 55 S

. W

. 2d 5 73 , 5 79 (T enn

. 1 99 3). T o adop t su ch an approach

wo ul d b e, i n ess ence, t o s anct i o n de f act o a d o p tio n s w itho u t th e n e e d o f p ro te c ting the b io lo g ic a l p a re n ts’ co n stitutio n a lly pr ot ec t ed r i g h t t o t h ei r mi n or c h i l d. T h i s w e dec l i n e t o do.

-63- in the J une 4, 1999 order

. As previously noted, after the Ba kers filed their petit ion to terminate the 21 He s’ pa re nta l r ig hts to A .M .H . inthe c ha nc e ry c ou rt , th e c ou rt c on so lid a te d Moth e r’ s p e tit ionwi th the B ake rs ’ p e tit iona t th e re qu e st o f the B ake rs

. On appe al, Mother a

rg ues that the trial c ourt err ed by no t ap p l y ing the “superior pare ntal rig hts doctrine” wh en ana ly zing Mother’ s May 29, 2001 petition which, if done, would ha ve rende red the B aker s’ petition to terminate Mother’ s pare ntal rig hts moot. S pecif ically , Mother
asserts that, pursuant to certain enumer ated e x ceptions in our supre me court’s decision in Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137 (Tenn. 2002) , the “supe rior par ental rig hts doctrine” must be applied to her petiti on to modify the custody

order at issue. Converse ly , the B aker s contend that the “superior pare ntal rig hts doctrine” doe s not apply to the fac ts in the instant case. 22

Due to the constitut ionally protec ted rig ht of biologic al par ents to the ca re, c ustody

and control of their childre n, our supre me court has instructed that, in an initial custody determination betwee n a par ent and a

non-par ent, the following standard must be applied to pr otect the biolog ical pa re nts ’ f un da me nta l c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts :-64- [I ]n a contest betwee n a par ent and a non-par ent, a pa

rent cannot be d ep ri v ed o f t h e c u s t o d y

o f ach i l d u n l es s t h er e h as b ee n a f i n d i n g, afte r notice r equire d by due process, of substantial harm to the child. Only then m ay a court eng ag e in a gene ral “best interest of the child”
e v a l u a t i o n i n m ak i n g a

d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f

c u s t o d y.
In re Ado ption o f Fe male Chil

d , 896 S.W .2d 546, 548 (Tenn. 1995). The supr eme c ourt rea ffirme d this principle in Blair v. Badenhope , s t at i n g:

The law i s now well-se ttled that the Tenne ssee Constitution protec ts the fundamenta l rig ht of natura l pa rents to have the ca

re and
c u s to d y o f th e ir c h il d r e n. S ee Nale v. Robertson , 871 S.W .2d 674, 68 0 (Ten n. 19 94 ); Ha wk v . H awk , 855 S.W .2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993). Throug h Article I , sec t i on 8 and its impli cit rec og nition of pare ntal privac y

rig hts, our Constit ution requires that courts dec iding initial cust ody

disputes give natura l pare nts a presumption of “superior pare ntal rig hts” reg arding the custody of their c hildren. See In re Askew , 9 9 3 S

. W

. 2 d 1 , 4 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 9 )

. S i m p l y s t a t e d , th is pr e su mpt ion re c og nize s tha t “pa re nta l rig hts aresu pe ri or

to the ri g hts of others and continue without interruption unless a biolog ical par ent
c on se nts to r e lin qu ishthe m, ab a nd on s his or he r ch ild , o r f or fe its his or her pare ntal ri gh t s b y some conduc t that substantiallyharms the child.” See O'

Dani el v. M

essier , 9 05 S.W. 2d18 2, 18 6 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1995).

Bla ir , 77 S.W .3d at 141.

I n Bl air , our supreme court was asked to a ddress the standa rd to be a pplied to a biologic al pare nt’s petition to mo dif y a pr e vio us c us tod y

or de r a wa

rd ing c us tod y of the c hil d to a no n- pa re nt. Bla ir , 7 7 S. W. 3 da t 1 3 9

. T h e mo th e r o f th e c h il d s u c c u mb e d to canc er in 1990. Id . Prior to her death, the mother

and the child wer e care d for by the child’s g randmother

. Id . After the mother’s deat h , t h e ch i ld continued to live with the g randmother

. Id . T he g rand mothe r s ub se qu e ntl y petitioned for c ustody

of the c hild, and the trial court awar ded tempora ry custody of the c hild to the g randmother

. Id . After the biologica l f ather established his paternity to the child, he conte sted the trial court’s awar d of custody to the g randmother

. Id

. Howeve r, befor e the trial court could re ach
a de c isi on in the ma tte r, the fathe r an d the g rand mothe r ag re e d to allo w the g rand mothe r t o r e ta in custody of the c hild. Id . The trial c ourt enter ed a c onsent order to solidi fy

the ag ree ment. Id

. There afte r, in 1995, the father petiti oned the trial court to modify the custody

order , howeve r, the court found t hat a materia l chang e in circ umstances did not war rant a chang e in custody

. Id

. In 1997, the father onc e ag ain petitioned the trial c ourt for a modification of its previous custody order alleg ing that a material chang e in circ umstances wa rra nted s u ch a ch an g e. Id . at 140. The f ather also asserted that he e njoy ed a pr esumption that his parental rig hts were sup er i o r t o those of the-65-

g randmother , a non-pa

rent, ther efor e, the tria l co u rt could not deny him custody

of his daug hter unless he wa s shown to be an unfit pare nt. Id . The trial c ourt, while ac knowledg ing that the fathe r wa s a fi t p ar en t , co n cl u d ed t h at a ma t er i al ch an ge in ci rc u m s t an ce s d i dn o tex i s tt o wa rr an ta c h an ge in custody

. Id . This Court affirme d, and the supre me court reve rsed. Id . at 141.
At the outset, the supre me court examined the p rio r Tenne ssee c ases a ddressing pare nt versus non-par ent custody

disputes and made the following observation:

Exam ini ng the pr inc ipl e s app lie d in e ac h o f th e se c as e s wi th respe ct t o custody

modification issues, a natur al par ent enjoy s the presumption of superior rig hts under four circ umstances: (1) when no order exis ts that transfe rs custody from the natural par ent; (2) whe n the orde r transf

erring c ustody

from the natura l pare nt is accomplished by fraud o r wit hout notice to the par ent; (3) whe n the orde r transfe rring custody

from the natural par ent is invalid on its face; a nd (4) wh en t he natur al par ent ce des only temporary

and informa l cust o dy to the non-par ents. Con se qu e ntl y , wh e n a ny of t

he se circumstance s are present in a given case, the n protection of the right of natural parents t o have the care and c ustody of their children demands that they be accorde d a presumption of superior parental rig hts ag ain st c lai ms of c us tod y by no n- pa re nts

. Id . at 143 (e mphasis added) . I n Bl air , the s upreme court noted that it was a lso being asked to de cide whether a “f ifth circumstanc e” w arr anted the same result; “whe n the orde r transf erring c ustody

from the natur a l pa

re nt i s v a lidin all r e sp e c ts, e ve n th ou g h it re su lts fr om the natur a l par e nt v olu nta ri ly
surre ndering full and [sic] custody of the c hild to the non-pare nt.” Id

.
I n concluding that this “fifth circ umstance” did not warrant an application of the “supe rior pare ntal rig hts doctrine” to the f ather ’s petition in Bl air , our supre me court stated:
Thoug h we ha ve broa dly

rec og nized that the right of par ental privac y in this st ate is fundamental, see , e .g. , Ha wk , 855 S.W .2d at 579, nothing in the lang uag e of our Constit ution, nor in the volumes of ou r c a se la w, su g g e sts that the su pe ri or ri g hts do c tr ine sh ou ld a ssi st
a pa re nt t o o btain c us tod y

of a c hil d w he n a

va lidc ou rt

or de r p ro pe rl y transfe rre d custody from that pare nt in the first instance . Nor is there
a ny su g g e sti on fr om the se so ur c e s that ou r ri g ht t o p ri va c y e xten ds so far as to w arr ant application of the superior rig hts doctrine eve n when that valid order

results from the natural pare nt voluntarily consenting to give custody

of t he child to a non-parent. Bec ause a ll of our prior
c a se s d isc us sin g a wa

rd s o f cus tody

to a natur a l pa

re nt f ro m a non-par ent have been those in whi ch t h e initial transfer of custody from the natural par ent was not a ccomplished with a valid court order-66- or wa s not consensual, these case s cannot be pro p er l yused to “say what the law is” on this issue in Tennessee

. Id . A ft e r e xami nin g sim ila r c a se s f ro m si ste r s ta te s, the su pr e me c ou rt c on c lud e d a s f

oll ow s:
As these case s demonstrate, pare nts in the initia l custody proce eding s enjoy

a s t ro n g presumption that they are entitled to the phy sical custody

of their childre n. Howeve r, having once pr otected the rig hts of natura l pare nts to the ca re and custody

of their c hildren, no constitutional principle demands that natural par ents ag ain be aff orded a presumption of superior rig hts in a subsequent modification proce eding . Of c ourse, whe re an initial order does not
e xist, or is oth e rw ise inv a lid , the n the Con sti tut ion re qu ir e s a cou rt to
app ly th e su perior

ri g hts do c tr ine . H ow e ve r, be c aus e the se circ umsta n ce s d o not exi st in thi s case , we disag ree that the Tenne ssee Constitution compels appl i ca tion of that doctrine in the fa c e of a la wf ul andva lidc ou rt

or de r v e sti ng c us tod y

of [the c hil d] in her g randmother

. Id . at 146.

Th e su pr e me c ou rt

the n tu rn e d it s atte nti on to th e ef fe c t th e fathe r’ s v olu nta

ry c on se nt t o relinquish custody

of his daug hter to the g randmother had on his ability

to assert his superior

pare ntal rig hts in a proce eding to modify the previous custody order

. Id

. The supre me court found that the fathe r’s voluntary

relinquishment o f cu stody “undermine[d] his arg ument that the Constitut ion commands application of the superior rights doc trine in this custody modification proce eding .” Id

. I n fa ct , t he court concluded that a “pa rent’s voluntary

transfe r of c ustody

to a non-pa

rent, w ith knowledge of the c onsequenc es of that transfer , eff ectively operates as a w aiver

of these f undamental pare ntal rig hts.” Id . at 147 (empha sis added)

. I n response to the arg uments put forth by the dissent in Bl air , the majority

made the f

ollowing obse rvation:

I mportantly , the dissent ma intains that “ pare nts in many case s may make custodial decisions without f ully understanding the l eg al ramifications of their choices.” Characte rizing the voluntary waiver of pare ntal rig hts a s a “tra p for the unwary ,” the dissent ex p resses conce rn that par ents m aynot fully understand the eff

ect of such a waiver

. We fu ll y

a g r e e w ith th e d is s e n t i n th is r e g ar d , a n d we emphasize he re, as above , that a parent' s vo l untary relinquishment of custody must be made with knowledge of the c onsequenc es of that decision . Wher e a n atural parent voluntarily relinquishes custody without knowledg e of the eff ect of that act, then it cannot be said that these rig hts were acc orded the protec tion demanded by the-67- Con sti tut ion . A s su c h, app lic a tio n of the su pe ri or ri g hts do c tr ine in a subsequent modification proce eding would be justified. Howe ver, no such alleg ation has bee n made by [t he father] in this case

. Id . at 147–48 n.3.

Mother relies on three of the “ circ umstances” enumer ated by our supre me court in Bl air in
su pp ort of

he r a rg ume nt that th e “ su pe ri or pa re nta l rig hts do c tr ine ” sh ou ld a pp ly to h e r p e tit ionto modify the custody

order . First, she alleg es that the J une 4, 1999 order enter ed by the juvenile court
wa s ac co m p l i s h ed b y fr au d o r wi t h o u t p ro v i d i n g n o t i ce t o h er

. S ec o n d , M o t h eras s er t s t h at , t h ro u gh the J une 4, 1999 orde r, she only cede d temporary

and informa l custody to the Ba kers. F inally , she
a sse rt s th a t th e June 4, 19 99 or de r i s in va lid on its fa c e

. We wil l addre ss ea c h of the se arg ume nts in turn.

1. Alleged F raud and Lack of Notice

The chanc ery court c oncluded that “ [a] ll parties, including Mr. and Mrs. H e, knowing ly and voluntarily

signe d the J une 4 , 1 9 99, Consent Order Awar ding Custody , without being induc ed by
a ny fr audor un du e inf

lue nc e .” Al l of

thearg ume nts pu t f

orth b y Mo the r o n a

pp e a l a dd re ssi ng thi s issue fail to demonstrate how the trial c ourt err ed in finding a lac k of fr aud in the inducement of the order . Moreove r, Mot her offer s no arg ument reg arding a lack of not ice of the hea ring on the orde r, and she w ould be hard presse d to make such an arg ument g iven the fa ct that she a g ree d to an orde r transfe rring custody

and appe are d at juvenile court on J une 4, 1999.

I ns te a d, Mo the r c on te nd s th a t sh e didno t r e c e ive pr op e r l e g a l adv ic e a nddidno t e nte r i nto the a g re e d o rd e r “ wi th kno wl e dg e of the c on se qu e nc e s o f that tr a ns fe r. ” Mo the r p ri mari ly po int s to the fa ct that, while Father attended the mee ting with Mr. Weave r prior to the or der be ing e ntere d, she wa s not present at that meeting . On the day the parties met at juvenile court to sign the order , Mother, Ms. Cloud, Ms. C hunn, and Pastor Yau met in a sepa rate room to discuss the order . Mother
a sse rt s th a t th is m e e tin g re su lte d inhe r r e c e ivi ng le g a l a dv ic e fr om n on-l awy ers

. B a se d o n th e se fac ts, Mother arg ues that she wa s not fully advised of he r l ega l ri gh t s , and ther efor e, did not “c o n s en t ” t o t h e t ra n s fe r o f c u s t o d y o r “ ex p re s s l y

wa i v e” h erri gh tt o a h ea ri n g.
The trial c ourt conc luded t hat, base d on the evidenc e at tria l, Ms. Chunn, Ms . Cloud, and Pastor Yau “ fully

explained the l eg al ra mifications of both the Petition for Custodyand the Consent Orde r Awarding Custody , both of which Mrs. He later vol untarily signe d.” The re w as conf licting t e s t i m o n y o f

f e r e d a ttr i a l o n t h e l e v e l o f M o t h e r ’ s u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e g ar d i n g t h e tr a n s f e r o f c u s t o d y. Mo the r t e sti fi e d th a t she did no t unde rs ta nd the ramif ic a tio ns of the or de r. Th e tria l c ou rt no te d th a t, bo th p ri or

to andbe fo re June 4, 19 99 , th e He s e ng a g e d th e se rv ic e s o f at le a st thr e e a tto rn e y s to advise them in Mother’ s civil case f or the a lleg ed assault in Nove mber of 1998 and F ather ’s criminal-68-

tr ia l. H ow e ve r, the He s n e ve r s ou g ht a dv ic e fr om the se a tto rn e y s a bo ut the c us tod y iss ue , a nd , in fa c t, n e ve r m e nti on e d th e e xiste nc e of A. M. H. to a ny of the se a tto rn e y s. Re g ard ing theme e tin g wi th Mr. Weaver , Father denied ever calling Mother from the meeting to inquire if they should procee d i n h e r ab s e n c e

. In l i g h to f t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e B ak e r s , M r

. W e a v e r , a n d M s

. C h u n n t o t h e c o n tr ar y, the trial court c oncluded that the call did, in fac t, take plac e, and Mothe r wa ived her rig ht to attend. Since Mother did not attend this meeting , Ms. Chunn took Pastor Yau with her to meet with Mother at the He s’ apa

rtment prior to the m eeting in juvenile court to sign the order . Pastor Yau testified that Ms. Chunn wanted to ensure that Mother under st o o d t h e cust ody arr ang ement, and Mothe r indicated that she understood the or der and the proc ess. Reg arding the m eeting in juvenile court on J une 4, 1999, both Pastor Yau and Ms. Chunn testified that Mother indicated t h at s h e understood the orde r and the proce ss.
The trial c ourt’s finding s in relation to this i ssue ar e base d solely upon the cr edibilityof the wi t n es s es

. T h e r ec o rd d o es n o tco n t ai n cl ea r a n dco n v i n ci n g ev i d en ce t h atM o t h erl acked knowl ed ge as to the conseque nces of the transf er of custody

. Se e We lls v . T

e nn. B d. of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999)

. Acc ording ly , we must conc lude that Mother’ s attempts to arg ue that the “ superior pa re nta l r ig hts do c tr ine ” sh ou ld a pp ly fo r the abo ve state d r e a so ns mus t f a il.

2. Te m por ar y C ust ody

Whil e Mother ha d “knowledg e of the conseque nces” of the transfe r of custody , she conte nds that her “ knowledg e” c onsisted of t he under standing that the ag ree d order only transfe rre d temporary c us tod y of A. M. H. to the B ake rs

. Mo the r ar g ue s that, pur su a nt to the June 4, 19 99 or de r, sh e on ly intended to ce de tempora

ry custody of A.M.H. to the Baker s, there fore , she is entitled to assert he r superior pare ntal rig hts in her petition to modifycustody . I n support of this positi on, Mother re lies on this Court’s decision in Means v. Ashby , 130 S.W .3d 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). In Means , the biologica l mo t h er m et h er brother and sister-in-law at their attorney ’s offic e to sig n a custody ag ree ment transfe rring custody of the mother’s child to the brother and sister-in-law

. Me ans , 130 S.W .3d at 52–53. Mother subsequently soug ht a return of custody , and the br other a nd sister-in-law filed a pe tition for adoption and to terminate the mother’s pa renta l rig hts. Id . at 53. The trial c ourt conclude d that the mother did not aba ndon the child by willfullyfailing to visit or willfully failing to support he r. Id

. Howeve r, the trial c ourt ruled that the c hild should remain in the custody of the brother and sister-in-law

. Id . at 53 –5 4. Re g ard ing the tria l c ou rt ’s c us tod y de te rm inatio n, thi s Co urt, ad d re s sing the Bl air

e xc e p ti o n r e li e d u p o n b y M o th e r inth e in s tan t c a s e , v a c a te d th e tria l c o u r t’ s custody determination and rema nded the c ase to the trial court f or further c onsideration in light of the s upreme court’s de cision in Bl air

. Id

. at 58. I n support of our decision, we noted the testimony of the attorney

who dra fted the or der t o t h e ef fect that “the primary

purpose [of the custody ag ree ment] was to allow the minor child to be cove red by insurance .” Id

.-69-

I n s up po rt of he r arg ume nt that sh e on ly int e nd e d to c e de te mpo ra ry c us tod y of A. M. H. to the Bakers, Mother

relies on the f

ollowing testimony

by Ms. Cloud who drafted the J une 4, 1999 order : Q. All righ t, and did either Mr . or Mrs. He tell y ou that they

wanted the Ba

kers to take car e of the ir child on a pe rmane nt ba sis ? A. No. Q. Did the Hes ever say anything to y ou that indicated to y ou that they wer e int er es ted in either a temporary

or permanent
arr a ng e me nt? A

. T e m p o r ar y. Q. Ca n y ou te ll u s w hat y ou re c a ll? A. I rec all mainly

talking to Case y , that she was very conce rned that it wa s n ot a

pe rm a ne nt s itu a tio n. She didno t w a nt i t to be a pe rmane nt situation. Q. She made that ve ry clea r to y ou? A. Yes, sir.

. . . . Q. When Mr. and Mrs. B aker and Mr. and Mrs. H e we re be fore y ou on June 4 of 19 99 , did the y app e ar to be in a g re e me nt?

th A. Ye s. Q. I t di d n ot a

pp e ar t o b e a

c on te ste d matte r. I s th a t c or re c t? A. No. Q. You under stood Ms. He, throug h th e interpre ter, to wa nting t h i s m at t ert o b e t em p o ra ryo n l y

. I s t h aty o u r u n d er s t an d i n g? A. Ye s. Q. Was there a ny

equivocation about that, any lang uag e proble m abo ut that? A. No t — Q. I mean, y ou understood throug h the interpre ter what she wanted? A. I believe I did. Q. And is that what y ou understood that Mr. and Mrs. B aker wanted? A. Ye s. Q. I f y o u u n d er s t o o d t h atM r. an d M rs

. Ba k erwa n t ed l an gu age in the c on se nt o rd e r that said that, “ W e wi ll be abl e to r a ise this child unti l she’s 18 y ear s of ag e,” would y ou consider that t o b e c o n s i s t e n tw i t h w h a tM s

. H e u n d e r s t o o d o n t h a td a y? A. No.-70- . . . . Q. Ms. Cloud, what was the ag ree ment that y ou wer e so sure that
a ll p art ie s h a d co ns e nte d to? Was it tempo ra ry or pe rm a ne nt? A

. T e m p o r ar y.

. . . . Q. Te mpo ra

ry be c aus e it c ou ld b e c ha ng e d; rig ht? A. That would be one of the rea sons, but I believe Ca s ey was fairly adama nt that at some point she wanted he r child bac k.
Reg arding the meeting with Mother at juvenile c ourt on J une 4, 1999, Past o r Ya u offe red the f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y:

Q. Did y ou hear

any discussion about insurance ? A. Ye s. Q. And what wa s said about insuranc e? A. No detail wa s mentioned, but because of the ne ed of medica l
c are fo r the ba

by , th e g ua

rd ia ns or the c us tod ia ns ne e ds to h a v e m e d i c a l i n s u r a n c e f

o r t h e b ab y. Q. And wer e y ou asked to e x plain that to Ms. He? A. Ye s. Q. And did y ou? A. Ye s. Q. Di d y ou e xpla in a nythi ng abo ut the wo rd“ te mpo ra ry ” to M s. He? A. Yes, I

did. Q. An d w hat di d y ou te ll h e r a bo ut that? A. I told her that tempora

ry custody means that someone was willing to look afte r or take care of t he well-being of the ba by for a period of time. Q. Fo r h o w l o n g? A. No spec ific time was mentioned.

. . . . Q. An d w hat sp e c if

ic a lly — b a se d o n that, wh a t sp e c if ic a lly did y ou explain to M s. He? A. I n summ ar y — y ou know, I can’ t rec all the word f

or word qu e sti on — s a id that be c aus e th e Hes we reun able to financ ially

support the baby at that time, that some family was wi lli ng to take c areof

the ir ba by on the ir be ha lf, b ut b e c aus e-71- of the le g a l pr oc e du rethat nec e ssi ta te to buy ins ur a nc e or to administer medication or wh atever to the baby by the custodian, Ms. H e needs to g ive the authority to the custodian by sig nin g a do c ume nt. Q. Di d y o u h ea r t h e w o rd “t em p o ra ry ” i n t h atm ee t i n g? A. Ye s. Q

. A n d w e r e yo u a s k e d t o e x p l a i n w h a tt h e w o r d “ t e m p o r ar y” meant for the bene fit of Ms. He? A. “ Te mpo ra

ry ” me a ns a

pe ri odof tim e a g a ins t pe rm a ne nt?

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d b othMs. Clo uda ndPa sto r Y au to be c re dib le wi tne sse s.
Whil e it is t rue that our supreme court stated in Bl air that th e “ su pe ri or

pa re nta l r ig hts doctrine” will apply

“whe n the natura l pare nt cede s only temporar y and i n fo rmal custody ,” we believe Mothe r has misconstrue d this ex ception. The four “ circ u m s t an ces” enunc iated in Bl air which the supre me court held would war rant a pplication of the “superior pa renta l rig hts doctrine” to a modification proc eeding wer e the r esult of the court’s analy sis of previous cases addre ssing pare nt versus non-pa

rent custody

disputes. Bla ir , 7 7 S. W.3 d at 14 3. I t is app are nt that th e su pr e me court derive d the “tempora ry and informal custody ” exception f rom its prior decision in In re Askew , 993 S.W .2d 1 (Tenn. 1999)

. I n t h at ca se, the biolog ical mother w as experienc ing f inancial difficulties at the time of

g iving birth to her

daug hter. In re Askew , 9 93 S.W. 2da t 1. As a re su lt, the mother a nd the child beg an to re side with one of the mother ’s fema le frie nds. Id . I n 1994, the non-par ent fe male petitioned the juvenile c ourt for custody of the child, simply stating in her pe tition that the c h i l d h ad lived with her since 1991. Id . at 2. Ther eaf ter, the juve nile court g rante d the petition and awa

rded c ustody

to the non-par ent fe male in a pe rfunc tory order whi ch made no finding s reg arding the mother’s unf itness as a pa

rent. Id . The mother subsequently filed for a return of custody

citing a chang e in circ umstances a nd aske d that the juvenile court’s order be set a side beca use she did not rec eive notice of the prior hearing. Id

. The juvenile court determined that the 1994 order sh o u ldb e s e t a s id e b e c au s e th e mo th e r w a s n o t g iv e n p r o p e r

n o ti c e , b u t th e c o u rt
awa rded “ temporary

custody ” to the non-pa

rent fe male. Id . I t i t s o rd er , t h e juvenile court stated that, while the mother’ s interest in her child was superior to that of the non-par ent fema le, the mother had to demonstrate that she wa s prese ntly able to ca

re fo r t h e ch i ld beforethe court would return custody to her. Id

. The mother subsequently filed a renew ed petition to reg ain custody which the juvenile court denied. Id

. The mother filed an appea l to the circ uit court, but the circ uit court conc luded that the mother failed to c arry her burden of proving a chang e in circumstanc es wa rra nting a chang e in custody

. Id

. at 3. On appe al, this Court noted that, since the mother did not appe al the 1994 orde r, the res judicata eff

ect of the orde r made it final. Id

. T h e s u p re m e c o u rt d i s agr ee d , s t at i n g:

I n addition, we are also troubled by the Court of Appea ls’ analy sis of the res judicata e f

f e c to f t h i s A u g u s t1 9 9 4 o r d e r

. T h e o r d e r c o n v e ys
no suggestion of final ity but, instea d, char acte rizes the custody awa rdO r di nar i l y , “ [ c] us t od y order s ar e r es j udi cat a and canno t b e m o d i f i ed unl ess t here has been a m at eri al change 23
i n c i r cums t anc es t hat makes a c han ge of cu s t od y i n t he chi l d’ s bes t i nt er es t

. ” I n r e E

. J

. M. , N o. W 2003- 02603- CO A- R3- JV , 20 0 5 T enn. A p p

. LE X IS 1 4 6 , at * 4 6 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. M ar. 10 , 20 0 5 ) ( no pe rm. app

. f i l ed ) ( ci t i ng K endri ck v. Shoe m ake , 9 0 S .W .3 d 5 6 6 , 5 7 0 (T e n n . 2 0 0 2 ); B la ir , 7 7 S .W .3 d a t 1 4 8 )) ; s ee al s o Rus hi ng v . Rus hi ng , N o. W 2003- 0 1 4 1 3

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 20 0 4 T enn. A p p

. LE X IS 7 0 8 , at * 1 4 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. O ct

. 27 , 20 0 4 ) ( no pe rm. app

. f i l ed ).

-72- as “te mporary ,” stating that “the Court is only delaying restoring custody to the natura l pare nts,” and emphasiz ing that the rights of the
n a tu r a l p ar e n ts ar e s u p e r io r to th e in te r e s t o f [th e n o n

- p ar e n t f e ma le ]. We w ou ld c ha

ra c te ri ze this or de r a s a con ti nu anc e of the c a se un til the c ou rt he ardmor e pr oo f f

ro m [th e mothe r]. Und er the se c i r c u m s t a n c e s , [ t h e m o t h e r ] h a d v i r t u a l l y no inc e nti v e to a pp e al what was not a f

inal order , since the juve nile court e x plicitlyindicated that [t he child] would soon be returned t o t h e custody of her natura l pa re nts

. Id . at 4. Thus, when disc ussing the “ temporary ” natur e of the order in In r e Aske w , o ur

su pr e me c o u r tw a s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e o r d e r ’ s l a c k o f f i n a l i t y. 23

I n the instant c ase, Mother seeks to a rg ue that the supreme court’s r efe renc e to “tempor ary and informa l custody ” in Bl air is addresse d to the le ng th of the custody arr ang ement set forth in the order

. Howeve r, t his lang uag e si mply ref lected the supreme court’s interpr etation of then e x isting pr e c e de nt. I t is c le ar f

ro m th e su pr e me c ou rt ’s dis c us sio n inIn re As k e w that the c ou rt ’s int e re st i s in the eff ect of the order i tself ( i.e. , it s f ina lit y ) a s o pp os e d to the le ng th o f t he c us tod y

arr a ng e me nt. There is nothing i n the j uvenile court’s J une 4, 1999 order which si g nifies a lack of finality . Stated dif fe re ntl y , the re is no ind ic a tio n in the or de r that th e juv e nil e c ou rt int e nd e d to ho ld the c ha ng e in
c us tod y in a be y a nc e un til Mo the r m e t c e rt a in r e qu ir e me nts

. Or de rs tr a ns fe rring c us tod y of a min or c hil d to ano the r pa re nt or a no n- pa re nt a re , b y the ir very nature , “tempora

ry ” ( i.e. , as def

ined by Mother to mean subject to being chang ed at a later date). The pa rent re linquishi ng custody is alway s fr ee t o petition the court to cha ng e a prior custody
arr ang ement whe n circ umstances wa rra nt. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101( a)( 1) (2003) (“Such decr ee sha ll remain within the control of the court and be subjec t to such chang es or modification
a s the e xig e nc ie s of the c a se ma y re qu ir e .” ); see also Kendrick v. Shoem ake , 90 S.W .3d 566, 570 (Tenn. 2002) (discussing the standar d to apply to a petition to modify a valid orde r of c ustody ). To hold, as Mother sug g ests, that the supreme court intende d the word “ temporary ” in Bl air to r e fe r t o

“ the le ng th o f the c us tod y arr a ng e me nt” wo uldre le g a te thec ou rt s o f this state int o a pe rp e tua l st a te of def ining the me aning of “te mporary ” as it pertains to custody decisions. I n fac t, the Hes acknow ledg e the a

bsurdity of such a result i n their brief filed on appea l. I n their brief, the He s assert that “ther e is no evidenc e that the parties understood the t echnic al definiti on of ‘temporary ,’ in the
same manne r that a la wy er w ould understand that term.” The Hes g o on to conclude that the conce pt of “ pe rm a ne nt” c us tod y

or de rs is, in re a lit y , a

mis no me r s inc e pe rm a ne nt o rd e rs of c us tod y a c tua lly take the form of adoption proce eding s. Thus, if we were to adopt M other’s logic, we would nee d-73-

to eng ag e in an e valuation of the biolog ical par en t ’s s u b j ective understanding of the c oncept of “tempora ry ” custody

eac h and eve ry t i m e we were aske d to evaluate whether the natura l pare nt intended to cede “only

temporary

and informa l custody ” to the non-pa rent. Se e Bla ir , 77 S.W .3d at 143.

I t is app are nt that th e su pr e me c ou rt ’s dis c us sio n of the “ te mpo ra ry ” natur e of

the or de r i n In re As k e w wa s a ime d at a dd re ssi ng the mothe r’ s failu re to app e a l that or de r, a ndno t th e “ le ng th of t he custody ” orde red. See In re Askew , 993 S.W .2d at 4–5. The primary import of the court’s analy sis in In re Aske w focuse d on the j uvenile court’s failure to rec og nize the biologica l pare nt’s superior rights to her

minor child when de ciding the initial custody issue. See id. a t 5

. A c c o r d i n g l y, we interpre t our supreme court’s de cisions in Bl air and In re As k e w to mean that, whe n a trial c ourt
e n t e r s a n o r d e r

w h i c h i s t e m p o r ar y ( i.e. , the court has not enter ed a de finitive and unalter able r uling on the custody

of the c hild), and the court has not pr eviously permitted the biologica l pa rent to asse rt her superior pare ntal rig hts, the superior pa renta l rig hts doctrine may be asse rted by

the biologic al p ar en ti n a s u b s eq u en tm o d i fi ca t i o n p ro ce ed i n g.

We are cog nizant of Mother’s re liance on our decision in Me an s in support of her position
on appea l. Howeve r, Means was decide d afte r the de cision in In re As k e w but before the dec ision in Bl air

. Me ans , 130 S.W .3d at 57. Moreove r, while we noted the lawy er’ s testimonyreg arding the “primary purpose” for the c ustody

order at issue in Means , w e didno t r e a c h a de c isi on on the me ri ts as to the cor

rec tness of the trial court’s c ustody decision. Id . at 58 . Ins te a d, we re ma nd e d th e c a se t o the trial court for further c onsideration in light of the supreme court’s de cisions in Bl air and In re Aske w
. Id

. Acc ording ly , we a re of the conc lusion that thi s Court’s holding in Means does not support the proposition urg ed upon this Court by Mother.
Reg ardle ss of whethe r Mother believed the J une 4, 1999 orde r wa s “tempora ry ” ( i.e. , custody of short duration), it is clea r fr om the fac e of the order and the surr ounding f

acts that a ll of the parties int e nd e d f or the or de r t o tr a ns fe r c us tod y of A. M. H. fr om the He s to the B ake rs , an d it wa s to re ma in eff ective until such time as the Hes sought t o file a pe tition t o reg ain custody . Mr. Weaver testified that he informe d Father at their meeting on J une 2, 1999 that the He s would need to file a petition to modify the custody order if they wanted a return of custody in the future. Ms. Cloud t estified that sh e a dv ise d th e He s th a t, if the y de sir e d to c ha ng e the c us tod y arr a ng e me nt i n th e fu tur e , th e y wo uld need to pe tition t he court to modify the custody

order . Ba sed on this testimony , the trial court conclude d that Mother under stood the need to file a petitio n t o m o d i fy t h e custody order in the future, and we find nothing in the rec ord to warr ant a diff ere nt conclusion. Acc ording ly , we f ind that Mo the r’ s a

rg ume nt i n th is r e g ardis w ith ou t me ri t.

3. Validity of

the June 4, 1999 Custody Order-74-

On appe al, Mother asserts that she was e ntitled to assert her supe rior par ental rig hts in the trial court be cause the J une 4, 1999 custody order is invalid on its face

. Se e Bla ir , 77 S.W .3d at 143. Spe c if ic a lly , M oth e r a sse rt s th a t th e juv e nil e c ou rt ’s c us tod y or de r f a ils to co mpl y

wi th c e rt a in provisions found in Title 34, Chapter 1, Part 1 of t he Te nnessee Code. First, Mother arg ues that the trial court did not conduc t an open- cour t h ea ri ng to consider any additional person who w ould be better suited to ac t as g uardia ns of A.M.H. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-2-103 ( 2003). Ne x t, Mother
asserts that the juvenile court’ s order fails to comply

with the following statutory provision:

The petition f

or the appointment of a g uardia n, which shall be sworn, s h o u l d co n t ai n t h e f

o l l o wi n g:

. . . . (3) The name, a g e, maili ng addre ss and relationship of the propose d g uardia n and, if the proposed gua rdian is other tha n the petitioner, a state me nt s ig ne d by the pr op os e d g ua rd ia n a c kn ow le dg ing a wa re ne ss of the pe tition and willi ng ness to serve ;

. . . . (5) An e x planation of the r eason f or see king app ointment of a g uardia n[.]
Tenn. Code Ann. § 34- 2-104 (2003) . Mother notes that, while the Hes orig inal petition for custody
m e n t i o n s t h e B ak e r s a n d l i s t s t h e i r a d d r e s s , i t o n l y m e n t i o n s t h e m i n r e g ar d s t o a tr a n s f e r o f c u s t o d y, not gua rdianship. Furthermore , the petition does not expl ain the re ason for seeking the appointment of a g uardia n. Finally , Mother ar g ues that, “[i] f the c ourt determines a g uardia n is neede d, the court shall enter an order

which shall . .

. [s] tate any other authority or direc tion a s the court determines is appropriate to properly car e for the per son and property of the minor.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-2- 105(3) ( 2003).
At trial, Ms. Cloud, the indivi dual who dra fted the pe titi o n and re sulting custody order , testified that she made the dec ision to i nclude the g uardia nship lang uag e in the J une 4, 1999 custody order based upon he r conve rsations with the parties. It is appare nt to this Court that, in arg uing he r position on appea l reg arding this issue, Mother has place d form over substance . We need not dec ide whether the juvenile court entere d the orig inal cu s t o d y o rd er in c ompliance with the a bove cited statut e s r e lie d u po n b y

Mo the r o n a

pp e a l.

As we noted previously , the enunc iation of this “circ umstance” in Bl air r e s u lt e d f rom the supreme c ourt’s eva luation of its prior decisions addr essing custody disputes b et we en the natural pare nts and non-par ent individuals. Bla ir , 77 S.W.3 d at 143

. On c e a g a in, we turn to thesu pr e me court’s de cision in In re As k e w as the source of this “circumstanc e” w arr anting the application of theFurt herm o re, M o t her’ s at t em p t s t o at t ack t he val i d i t y of t he June 4 , 19 9 9 cust o d y ord er i n t hi s regard am o unt 24

to a n a ttem p t t o a v o id the c o n se q u e n c e s o f he r fa ilure to a p p e a l t h a t o rd e r to this C o u rt.
-75- “superior pare ntal rig hts doctrine” t o a petition to modify a prior c ustody

order . Reg arding the inv a lid ity of the ini tia l c us tod y

or de r, the su pr e me c ou rt he ld a s f oll ow s:

I t app e ars that no valid initial determination was eve r made that [the mother’s] cust

ody of [the child] would result i n “substant ial ha rm ” to the c hil d . Absent such a finding , we c onclud e t hat the deprivation of the custody of her child has re sulted in an abridg ment of [ the m other’s] fundame ntal rig ht to privacy

. Bond , 896 S.W .2d at 54 8; Nal e , 8 71 S.W. 2da t 68 0; Ha wk , 855 S.W .2d at 577. In light of the un ique c irc um sta nc e s o f th is c as e , we be lieve that the Court of Appea ls has misapplied modification of custody principles whe n no valid initial order depriving the natural mother of custody exis ted. In the absenc e of such a v alid initial order, w e believ e that it woul d be unconstitutional for the nat ural mother t o bear t he burden of proving the ab se nc e of s ub sta nti al h ar m
. Be cause the re cord doe s not show that a finding of substantial harm wa s made in this case , constitutional principles compel u s t o reve rse the de cisions of the low e r c ou rt s.
In re Askew , 993 S.W .2d at 5. Thus, in In re Ask ew , the supreme court, whe n speaking of the orig inal custody order ’s “invalidity ,” wa s conce rned w ith whether the natura l pare nt’s constitutional ri gh t s we re p ro t ec t ed i n t h e i n i t i al cu s t o d y h ea ri n g ( i.e. , th e la c k o f a fi nd ing of su bs ta nti a l ha

rm to the child). We dec line to ext end thi s “c i rc u mstance” bey ond the import of the supre me court’s discussion r eg arding the invalidity of the initia l o rd er in In re As k e w to include the fa cts in the prese nt case

. 24

The trial c ourt determined that, based upon the testimony

of the witnesse s at trial, that Mother was fully advised of the m eaning of t he J une 4, 1999 consent order. As previously noted, we f ind no justification for disturbing this credibility determination on appeal. The rec ord demonstrates that the parties, including Mother , understood this order to transfe r tempora

ry custody of A.M.H. fr om the Hes to the B aker s. Furthe rmore, the re co rd d em o n strates that Mother was informed that she
wo uldne e d to file a pe tit ion wi th the c ou rt to re g a in cu sto dy of A. M. H. a t a

fu tur e date . A rm e d w ith this knowledg e, Mother voluntarily consente d to the entry

of the orde r and w aived a hearing on the custody issue. The custody order does not ha ve the indicia of a lack of finality as discussed by

our supreme c ourt in In re Askew . Ac c or din g ly , non e of the “ c ir c ums ta nc e s” se t f orth b y ou r s up re me court in Bl air

war rant the application of the “ superior pa renta l rig hts doctrine” to Mother ’s petition to m od if y c us tod y in this c a se , th e re fo re , we are bo un d by thefo llo wi ng state me nt b y ou r s up re me court in Bl air :-76- [P ]arent s in the initial custodyproce eding s enjoy a strong pr esu mp tion that th e y

aree nti tle d to the ph y sic a l c us tod y of the ir children. Howeve r, having once protec ted the rig hts o f natural pare n t s to the car e and c ustody of their c hildren, no constitutional principle de mands that natura l pare nts ag ain be affor ded a presumpt i on of superior rig hts in a subsequent modification pr oc e e din g . O f c ourse , w he rea n in iti a l or de r d oe s n ot e xist, or is otherwise inva lid, then the Constit ution requires a court to apply

the
s u p erior rights doc trine. Howe ver, be cause these c ircumstance s do not exi st i n this case, wedisag ree that the Tenne ssee Constitution
c omp e ls a pp lic a tio n o f that do c tr ine in the fa c e of a la wf ul andva lid court orde r vesting custody of [the child] in her g randmother

.

. . . .
B a se d o n ou r prior c a se la w i nte rp re tin g Artic le I , s e c tio n 8 in t h i s co ntext , and g iven the over whelming authority from other jurisdictions on this issue, we c onclude that our Constit ution does not
acc ord natura l pare nts a presumption of superior rig hts to modify an exis ting and valid order of custody , even w hen that orde r re sults from the pa re nt v olu nta

ri ly a g re e ing to g ive c us tod y to the no n- pa

re nt. Thoug h strong in many respe cts, no aspec t of t he fundamental rig ht of par ental priva cy

is abso l u t e, and a pa

rent who is g iven the opportunity to r ely upon the presumption of superior rig hts i n an ini tia l c us tod y

de te rm inatio n may

no t ag a in i nv ok e that do c tr ine to modify a valid custody

order

. Absent proof

of the c ustody

order ’s invalidityor proof

that the par ental rig hts were not protecte d in the initial custodyproce eding , the child' s i n t er est in a stable and secur e environment is at lea st as i mportant, and proba bly more so, than the pare nt’s interest in having custody of the c hild returned.

Bla ir , 77 S.W .3d at 146–48. We conclude that the tri al co u rt did not err by ref using to a pply the “superior pare ntal rig hts doctrine” to Mother ’s petition to modifythe J une 4, 1999 custody order

.

F. Grounds for Term inati on

1. Appli cation of the “Settled P urpose Doctr ine”-77-

At the ou tse t, w e no te that th e B ake rs fi le d th e ir pe tit ion to te rm inate the He s’ pa re nta l r ig hts on J une 20, 2001. The applicable statute in eff ect on the date the B aker s filed their pe tition provided that “[a]bandonment by the parent or guar dian, as define d in § 36-1-102,” qualifies as a g round for terminating the biologic al par ent’s par ental rig hts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(1) (2001). At iss u e i n this case is the de finition of abandonment se t forth in section 36-1- 102 of the Te nnessee Code. Since t he petiti on at i ssue was filed i n 2001, we must evaluate this case unde r the a doption statutes in effe ct at that time. See In re Swan son , 2 S.W .3d 180, 185 (Tenn. 1999)

.
I n its memorandum opinion, the trial court, per haps out of an a

bundance of caution,
c on c lud e d a s f

oll ow s:
Al tho ug h the “ se ttl e d pu rp os e do c tr ine ” wa s re pe a le d le g isl a tiv e ly in 1996 an d n o lo n g e r h a s a n y f o r c e o r e f f e c t a s la w in T e n n e s s ee, a revie w of the e vidence in this cause establishes t hat the ac tions of the Hes e vince a s et t led purpose to f oreg o all pare ntal rig hts and
re sp on sib ili tie s.

P ri o r to 1995, the courts of this state utili zed a judicially cre ated standa

rd to eva luate whe ther a b io lo g ic a l p ar e n t ab a n d o n e d h is o r h e r c h il d in a d o p ti o n c ases. I n re Swans on , 2 S.W .3d at 184; O’Da niel v. Messier , 905 S.W .2d 182, 186 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). T his Court set forth the j u d i ci al l y cr ea t ed s t an d ar d t o b e a p p l i ed i n ad o p t i o n ca s es b y s t at i n g: So, the issue of abandonme nt should be resolved by the Circuit Court under the following statement of the la w:
“Aba ndonment imports any conduct on the part of the pa re nt wh ich ev ince s a s e ttl e d p ur po se to f ore go all pa re nta l du tie s a nd

re lin qu ish all

pa re nta l c lai ms to the c hil d . I t does not follow that the purpose may not be re pe nte d of

, a nd , in pr op e r c a se s a ll pa re nta l rig hts ag ain ac quired. * * * but w hen abandonment is shown to have e x isted, it becom es a judicial question whether it really has bee n terminated, or can be, consistently

with the welfa

re of the child.” 1 Am. Jur. Adoption of Children, Section 42. Ex parte Wolfenden , 3 49 S.W. 2d71 3, 71 4 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 19 59 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; se e als o I n re Ado ption o f S e lf , 836 S.W. 2d 58 1, 58 2– 83 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; Fanc he r v . M ann , 432 S.W .2d 63, 65–66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1968). I n 1982, the Tenne ssee Supreme Court, re ly ing on our decision in Ex Parte W

olfenden , rea ffirme d that the “se ttled purpose doctrine” r ema ined the standa rd applicable to a determination of abandonme nt in a doption cases. In re Ado ption o f B owl ing , 631 S.W .2d 386, 389 (Tenn. 1982)

.-78-

I n 1995, this Court not ed in O’Danie l that Tenne ssee lac ked a uniform standard f or asce rtaining whether a biolog ical par ent had a bandoned his or he r child. O’Daniel , 905 S.W .2d at 186. At the time we de cided O’Danie l , th e cou rt s of th is s ta te app lie d o ne of thr e e po ssi ble standards to de termine a

bandonment ac cording to the ty pe of pr ocee ding involved. Id

. at 186 n.3. At t h e s am e t i m e w e w er e d ec i d i n g O’Danie l , the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assembly was unde rtaking an eff ort to rewrite the then existi ng adoption laws. See 19 95 Te nn . Pu b. Ac ts c h. 53 2; O’Daniel , 905 S.W .2d at 187 n.5. Howe ver, since t he proposed leg islation was pending at the time of our de cision in O’Danie l , we we re f

orce d to evaluate whether the m o t h er i n that case abandone d her daug hter
u n d e r th e e xis ti n g le g a l f r a me work ( i .e. , the “se ttled purpose doctrine”) applicable to adoption proce eding s. O’Daniel , 9 0 5 S

. W

. 2 d at1 8 7 (c i t i n g In re Ado ption o f B owl ing , 631 S.W .2d at 389). I n evaluating the line of

case s establishing the “settled purpose doctrine” in this st ate up to that point in time, we made the following observation:

Thes e d e c is io n s d e mo n s tr a te th a t th e c o u r ts c o n s id e r th e f o ll o wing matters when determining whe ther a n abandonme nt has occ urre d: (1) the par ent’s ability

to support the child; ( 2) the amount of support the pare nt has provided to t h e ch i ld; (3) the extent and nature of the contac t be tween the pare nt and the child; (4) the f reque ncy of g ifts on specia l occa sions; (5) whether the par ent voluntarily

relinq u ished custody of the c hild; (6) the leng th of ti m e the child has be en separ ated f

rom the parent; and (7) the home envir onment and conduc t of the pa rent prior t o the re moval of the c hild. See I n re Rigsby , s up ra , slip op . at 10 ; Koi v u v . I rwi n , 7 21 S.W. 2da t 80 7. No sin g le fa c tor is c on tr oll ing . A ba nd on me nt i nq uirie s a re h e a vil y fa c t- orie nte d, so the c ou rt s may c on sid e r any

fa c t th a t a ssi sts in deciding whether

the par ent’s conduct d emonstrates a conscious or willful disreg ard of

all of his or her

pare ntal duties. I

n r e Rigsby , su pr a , slip op. at 10.

Id

. a t 18 7. I t is thi s ju dic ia lly c re a te d le g a l f

rame wo rk

wh ic h A pp e llants ur g e thi s Co urt to app ly to the pre sent ca se.
The Te nnessee Gene ral Asse mbly ’s ef forts in 1995 to amend the a doption statutes resulted in the cre ation of a statutory definition of abandonme nt a pplicable to a doption c ases. See 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 532, § 1. This definition, which remained in eff ect when t he B aker s filed their pe tition in the ins ta nt c a se , p ro vid e d, in r e le va nt p art , a s f oll ow s: (1) ( A) “ Abandonment” means, for purposes of te rminating the pa re nta l or g ua rd ia n rig hts of par e nt( s) or g ua rd ia n( s) of

a c hil d to that c hil d inor de r t o ma

ke that c hil d a va ila

ble fo r a do pti on , th a t:
(i ) F or a pe ri odof fo ur (4 ) c on se c uti ve mon ths imm e diate ly prec eding the filing of a p ro ce ed ing or pleading to terminate the-79- pare ntal rig hts of the par ent(s) or g uardia n(s) of the child who is the subject of the pe tition for termination of par ental rig hts or adoption, that the par ent(s) or

g uardia n(s) e ither have willfullyfailed to visit or have w illfullyfailed to support or make reasona ble payments toward the support of the c hild;

. . . . (B ) For purposes of this subdivision (1), “token support” means that the s u p p o r t , u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l c a s e , is ins ig nif ic a nt g ive n th e pa

re nt’ s me a ns ; (C) F or purpose s of this su b d i v ision (1), “token visitation” means that the visitation, under th e circ umstances of the individual case , constitutes nothing more than per functory visitation or visi tation of
su c h a n in fr e qu e nt nat ure or of su c h s ho rt

du ratio n a s to me re ly establish minimal or insubst antial contac t with the child;
(D ) F or pu rp os e s o f this su bd ivi sio n (1) , “w ill fu lly faile d to su pp ort” or “w illfullyfailed to make rea sonable pay ments toward suc h child’s support” means that, for a period of four (4) consec utive months, no

mo ne tar y su pp or t wa s p aid or tha t th e am ou nt o f su pp or t pa id i s toke n s up po rt ; (E ) F or pu rp os e s o f this su bd ivi sio n ( 1) , “ wi llf ull y faile d to vis it”
me a ns the wi llf

ul fa ilu re , for

a pe ri odof fo ur (4 ) c on se c uti ve mon ths , to visit or eng ag e in more tha n token visitation;
(F ) Aba ndonment may

not be re pented of by resuming visitation or
su pp ort su bs e qu e nt t o th e fi lin g of a ny pe tit ionse e kin g to t e rm inate pare ntal or g uardia nship rights or se eking the adoption of a child; and
(G) “ Abandonment” and “ abandonme nt of an infant” do not have any other definition exce

pt that w hich is se t forth i n this section, it being th e in te n t o

f th e g e n e r

a l a s s e m b ly to e s ta b li s h th e o n ly g rounds for abandonment by statu t o r y definition

. Specifically, it shall not be

re qu ire d th at a pa re nt b e sh own to hav e e v inc e d a se ttl e d p ur po se to fore go all

pa re nta l ri gh ts a nd

re sp on sib ili tie s in or

de r fo r a determination of abandonment to be made

. De c isi on s o f an y c ou rt to the contrary are herebylegislatively ove rruled [.]
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102(1) (2001) ( emphasis adde d).-80-

Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Cou rt wa s ultim a te ly c a lle d upo n to e va luate thec on sti tut ion a lit y of this definition, specifica lly subsection (D) defining “willfullyfailed to support.” I n In re Swan son , 2 S.W. 3d18 0, 18 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) , the b io log ic a l f a the r o f a min or c hil d a pp e a le d th is Court’s determination that he abandone d his chi l d p ursuant to the statutory definition of abandonme nt. At the outset, the supreme court set forth the a fore mentioned leg al framework w hich
e sta bli sh e d th e “ se ttl e d p ur

po se do c tr ine ” a ndle d th e le g isl a tur e to a me nd the a do pti on statut e s in 1995. Id

. at 184–85. On appea l, the fathe r arg ued that the statutory definition of “willfully

failed to support” was unc onstitut ional beca use i t d i d n o t co ntain a provision re quiring that the par ent’s failure to pay support to be int entional. Id . at 185–86. He a sserted that, since the statutory definition
cre ated a conclusive pr esumpt i o n that failure to provide support would re sult in a termination of pare ntal rig hts, the statute failed to c omport with h i s fu n d amental constitut ional rig ht to the car e, custody , and contr ol of his child. Id . at 186. The supr eme c ourt ag ree d.

I n determining that the de finition of “willful failure to support” was u n constitutional, the supreme c ourt noted that the pre vious definition of abandonme nt pert ai n i n g t o failure to support “alway s contained an element of intent or purposef ulness.” Id . at 18 7. I t w a s c le ar t o th e su pr e me court that, by

enac ting the statutory

definition of abandonment, the leg islature “intende d to limi t the discretion of tria l judge s when making a determination as t o whether abandonme nt has occ urre d.” Id . at 18 6. Th us , th e su pr e me c ou rt he ld a s f oll ow s:
Sin c e the statut ory

de fi nit ion s of “w ill fu lly faile d to su pp ort” and “w illfully failed to make reasona ble pay ment toward suc h child’s support” in ef

fec t cre ate an irrebuttable presumption that the fa ilure to provide monetary

support for the fo u r m onths prece ding the pe tit ionto t e rm in a te pa re nta l rig hts c on sti tut e s a ba nd on me nt, ir re sp e c tiv e of

wh e the r that f

a ilu re wa s int e nti on a l, w e ho ld that th os e definitions are unconstitutional. The statutory definitions simpl y

do
no t a llo w fo r the ty

pe of ind ivi du a lize d de c isi on - m akin g wh ic h mu st take plac e whe n a fundamental cons t i tutional right is at stake

. There fore , they

impermis s i b l yinfring e upon a pa rent’s right to the
car e and c ustody

of his or her

children. The fede ral and state constitutions re quire the opportunity for
a n in div idu a li z e d d e te rm inatio n th a t a pa re nt i s e ith e r u nf

it o r w ill
cause substantial harm to his or her child befor e the f

undamental r

ight to the car e and custody of the c hild can be ta ken aw ay

. Stanley , 405 U. S. at 65 8- 59 ; Bond , 896 S.W .2d at 548.

Id

. at 188. The c ourt went on to hold that “we are able to elide the unconstitutional portion of the statute, and the remaining provisions of t he Ac t may be enf orce d.” Id . A c c or din g ly , th e su pr e me court instructe d that “the definition in eff ect under prior law shall be applied” until the legislatureT he l egi s l at ur e di d not ch oo s e t o act t o amend t he s t at ut e u nt i l 200 3. E f fect i ve Jun e 2, 200 3, t he s t at ut e wa s 25
amended t o i ncl ude t he fol l owi ng l ang uag e:

(D ) F o r p u rp o se s o f t h is su b d ivisio n ( 1 ), “w ill fully fa iled to su p p o rt” o r “w ill fully f ai l ed t o m ake r eas onabl e pay ment s t owar d s uch chi l d’ s s uppo r t ” mean s t he wi l l f ul f ai l u r e, for a per i od of

f ou r (4) con s ec u t i v e mon t h s , t o prov i de mon et ar y s u ppor t or t he wi l l f ul f ai l ure t o pro vi d e m o re t han t o ken p ayments t o ward t he supp o rt of t he

c h ild [.]

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -1 -1 0 2 (1 )( D ) (S u p p . 2 0 0 4 ) ( e m p h a s is a d d e d ); 2 0 0 3 T e n n . P u b . A c ts c h . 2 3 1 , § 3 . S inc e this

a m e n d m e n t w a s n o t in effe c t a t the tim e the B a k e rs fil e d the ir p e tit io n to te rm ina te the H e s’ p a re n ta l rig h ts, it is ina p p lica b le to the p re se n t ap p e a l. Se e I n r e Swans on , 2 S .W .3 d a t 1 8 5 ; O ’ D ani el v. M es s i er , 905 S. W

. 2d 182, 187

n .5 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 1 9 9 5 ).

U nd er the d efi nit i o n in eff ec t p rior to 1 9 9 5 , an “ab an d o ne d ch i l d ” w as d efi ne d as: 26

( i ) A chi l d whos e par ent s ha ve w ill fu lly f ai l ed to vi s i t or hav e w ill fu lly faile d to
s u ppor t or ma k e r ea s on abl e pay men t s t o wa r ds s u ch c h i l d’ s s u ppor t for fou r ( 4)

co nsecut i ve m o nt hs i m m ed i at el y prece d i ng i nst i t ut i o n o f an acti o n or p roce ed i ng to d e c la re the c h ild to b e a n a b a n d o n e d c h ild

. . . .
T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6 -1 -1 0 2 (1 )( A ) (1 9 9 4 ) (e m p h a sis a d d e d ); s ee al s o 1978 T en n

. Pub. Act s c h

. 704, § 1.

T h e H e s’ p o sitio n o n a p p e a l re g a rd ing this issu e is, in e sse n c e , th e s a m e a rg u m e n t es p o u se d b y A m ic i i n the ir 27
b rie f.
-81- ch o o s es t o am en d t h e s t at u t e, s t at i n g: 25

We wish to make it clea

r t hat the def

inition previouslyin effe ct was the def inition as it exis ted in 1994. Un d er t h e prior statute, the de fi nit ionof

“ aba nd on e d c hil d” c on ta ine d an e le me nt of int e nt b oth in f a ilu re s to vis it a ndfailu re s to su pp ort. 26

Id . at 189 n.14.
Despite the supr eme court’s hol ding in In re Swanson , the Hes a rg ue on appe al that the trial court e rre d by

holding that the “ settle purpose doc trine” no longe r has the forc e of law in Tenne ssee. Acc ording to the Hes , t he “se ttled purpose doctrine” r emains a via ble leg al doctrine , and the tria l court should have utili zed the doctrine to asce rtain whether the He s abandone d A.M.H. More over, the He s a sse rt

that, s inc e the “ se ttl e d pur po se do c tr ine ” app lie s in this c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in finding that the Hes’ actions evinc ed a “ settled purpose to for eg o al l p ar ental rights and responsibilities.” Conversely , the B aker s assert that the trial court c orre ctly observe d that the 27

“ se ttl e d p ur

po se do c tr ine ” ha s b e e n le g isl a tiv e ly re pe ale d and ha s n o c on tin ue d v ia bil ity in Tenne ssee law . I n the alternative, the B aker s assert that, if the doctrine is held to apply to this case, t h e f ac t s i n t h e r ec o rd s u p p o rt t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n g t h at t h e He s h ad a se t t l ed p u rp o s e t o fo re go all of their pa

renta l rig hts and responsibilities reg arding A.M.H. We cannot a g ree with the position
ur g e d u po n th is C ou rt

by the Ap pe lla nts

.T he H es and t he A m i ci d i rect o ur at t ent i o n t o cases d eci d ed b y t hi s C o urt af t er t he suprem e co urt ’ s rul i ng 28
i n In r e Swans on and a dd r es s i ng pet i t i ons fi l ed pri or t o t he 20 03 am endment s t o t he s t at ut e at i s s ue, wh er ei n r ef er enc e is m a d e to the a p p lica b ili ty o f the “se ttl e d p u rp o se d o c trine ” in d e c id ing issu e s re la te d to a b a n d o n m e n t. Se e Stat e v. R. S. , N o . M 2 0 0 2 -0 0 9 1 9 -C O A -R 3 -C V , 2 0 0 3 T e n n . A p p . L E X IS 6 5 7 , at *2 5 (T e n n . C t. A p p . S e p t. 1 1 , 2 0 0 3 ); D ep’ t of Ch i l d r e n ’ s S e r v i c e s v . C. L. , N o. M 2001- 02729- CO A- R3- JV, 2003 T en n

. App. LEX I S 606, at * 50–51 ( T en n

. Ct

. App. A u g

. 2 9 , 2 0 0 3 ) (no p e rm . ap p . f iled ); S ta t e v . D em a rr , N o. M 2002- 02603- CO A- R3- JV, 2003 T en n

. App. LEX I S 569,

a t *2 7 (T e n n . C t. A p p . A u g . 1 3 , 2 0 0 3 ) (n o p e rm . ap p . f iled ); S p e n c e r v . A y d lo tte , N o. W 2001- 00995- CO A- R3- CV , 2001 T e n n . A p p . L E X IS 9 5 7 , at *9 (T e n n . C t. A p p . D e c . 2 8 , 2 0 0 1 ) (n o p e rm . ap p . f iled ); M a rt in v . M a rtin , N o. M 1999- 0 0 2 1 0

- C O A -R 3 -C V , 20 0 0 T enn. A p p

. LE X IS 1 7 8 , at * 2

– 3 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. M ar. 23 , 20 0 0 ) ( no pe rm. app

. f i l ed ). H o wever, i n o t her cases d eal i ng wi t h pe t i t i o ns f i l ed af t er In r e Swans on b u t b e fo re the 2 0 0 3 a m e n d m e n ts to the sta tute
a t issu e , th is C o u rt d id n o t r e fer to th e “ se ttl e d p u rp o se d o c trine ” b u t sim p ly d e te rm ine d w h e the r th e b io lo g ic a l p a re n t’s

c o n d u c t wa s w ill ful. Se e I n r e Ado pt i on of S

. M

. F. , N o. M 20 04

- 00 87 6- C O A

- R 9- P T , 200 4 T enn

. Ap p. LE X I S 82 6, at *2 4 ( T e n n . C t. A p p . D e c . 6 , 2 0 0 4 ) (n o p e rm . ap p . f iled ); I n r e S

. M. , 1 4 9 S.W

. 3 d 6 3 2 , 6 4 1

– 4 2 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 20 0 4 ); In re A d op tio n o

f M u ir , N o

. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 2 9 6 3

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 20 0 3 T enn. A p p

. LE X IS 8 3 1 , at * 1 3

– 1 4 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. N o v. 2 5 , 2 0 0 3 ) (n o p e rm . ap p . f iled ); I n r e L. J. C. , 1 2 4 S .W .3 d 6 0 9 , 6 2 0

– 2 1 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 3 ); I n r e Adopt i on of Copel and , 4 3 S .W .3d 4 8 3 , 4 8 8 (T en n. C t . A p p . 2 0 0 0 ). R eg ard l ess o f a ny c o nfusi o n w hich m ay ha ve result ed f ro m t he se (c o n tinu e d ...)
-82- I n In re Swanson , the supreme court, while noting the hi story leading to the creation of the judicially cre ated “ settled purpose doc trine,” did not direc t the court’s of this state t o u t i l i z e the do c tr ine in l ie u of th e un consti tut ion a l pr ov isi on in the 19 95 statut e . Ins te a d, the c ou rt e xpre ssl y direc ted that the statutory definition of “a

bandoned c hild” would remain in effe ct until the leg islature ac ted to am en d t h e constit utionally defe ctive statute. Id . at 189 n.14. Second, our
su pr e me c ou rt wa s c are fu l to n ote that on ly the definiti on of “willful failure to support” in the 1995 statutory amendment was unconstitutional, leaving the remainder of the statute in forc e. Id . at 188. Of pa rticular sig nificanc e is t h e fa ct t hat the following lang uag e fr om section 36-1-102 of the Tenne ssee Code, w hich was in e ffe ct when he Ba kers f iled their petition in th i s case , rema ined applicable to proce eding s of this nature a fter the supreme c ourt’s dec ision in In re Swanson :

(G) “ Abandonment” and “a bandonment of an infant” do not ha ve any other de finition ex cept that which is set forth in this section, it being the intent of the g ener al asse m bly to establish the only

g rounds for ab andonment bystatutory definition. S

p e c if ic a ll y , it s h a ll n ot be

re qu ire d th at a pa re nt b e sh own to ha v e e v inc e d a se ttl e d p ur po se to fore go all

pa re nta l ri gh ts a nd

re sp on sib ili tie s in or

de r fo r a de te rm ina tio n o

f ab an do nm e nt to b e ma de . De c isi on s o f an y c ou rt to the contrary are herebylegislatively ove rruled [.]

Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 10 2( 1) (G ) ( 20 01 ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also In re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d at 188–89. Acc ording ly , we must conc lude that re fer ence to the “settled purpose doctrine” is no longe r appropriate g iven the 1 9 9 5 amendments to sec tion 36-1-102(1) of the Tenne ssee Code and our supreme c ourt’s dec ision in In re Swanson

. To some extent, of course , the meaning of a “ settled purpose” overla ps with and is subsumed wi thi n th e statut ory

de fi nit ionof

wi llf ulness in e ff

e c t w he n th e B ake rs fi le d th e ir pe tit ionto terminate the Hes’ p ar ental rights. Howeve r, to the extent that the “settled purpose doctrine” 28(

. . . con t i n u ed) 28
earl i er cases , our suprem e co urt ’ s o p i ni o n i n In r e Swans on m ak es cl ea r t ha t t he l eg i sl ature ab ro ga t ed t he “sett l ed p urp o se do ct r i ne, ” a nd t he s upr eme cour t i ns t r uct ed t hat par t i es s eek i ng t o t er mi nat e a bi ol ogi cal pa r e n t ’ s par ent al r i gh t s t her eaf t er
m u st p ro v e tha t t h e p a re n t “ w ill fu lly ” f ai l ed t o s u ppor t t h e ch i l d.

-83- extends bey ond the def

inition of a

bandonment set forth in the statute at issue, the statutory definition must be the standar d applied by this Court to the prese nt c ase. Consequently , we must conclude that ref ere nce to t he “se ttled purpose doctrine” is no long er a ppropriate g iven the 1995 leg islative amendments to the statutes g overning termination of par ental rig hts. Thus, the p roper inquiry for this Court i s whether the Hes’ c onduct, by failing to visit or failing to support A.M.H. during the four month s i m m ediately

prec eding the B aker s’ petition, was “w illful.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1- 102(1)( E) (2001) (def

ining willful fa ilure to visit as “the will ful failure , for a p er i o d o f f o u r (4)
c on se c uti ve mon ths , to vis it o r en g a g e in mor e than to ke n v isi ta tio n” ); In re Sw anson , 2 S.W .3d at 189 n.14 (noting that the prior definition of “abandone d child” required that the biologic al par ent’s conduct in failing to support the child be will ful ).

I n determini n g wh et h er a par ent’s conduc t was “w illful,” the leg islature has c onfined the courts of this state to a pa rticul ar period of time. The statute in eff ect on the date that the B aker s filed their pe tition t o termi n at e t h e He s ’ par ental rig hts defined a bandonment, in re levant part, as fo llo ws :

F o r a p e r io d of f o ur (4) consec utive months imme diately prec eding the fil ing of a proc e e din g o r p le ad ing to te rm ina te the pa re nta l ri gh ts
o f th e p a r en t (s) . . . of the c hild who is the subject of the pe tition for termination of par ental rights or adoption, that the parent(s) . . . e ither have w illfullyfailed to visit or havewillful l y fa iled to support or make r easona

ble payments toward the support of the child[.]
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-1-102( 1)(A) (i) (2001) (empha sis a dded). This Court has previously noted t h e s i gn i fi ca n ce o f t h i s l egi s l at i v el y cr ea t ed t i m e p er i o d , s t at i n g:

F ina lly , w e no te that th e tria l c ou rt , inde c idi ng wh e the r J.M .S.
aba nd on e d S. M. F ., didno t con fi ne its e lf to c on sid e ratio n o f h is conduct during the four- month peri o d s immediately prec eding the filing of the petition for adoption and termination and S.M.F.’s birth. I n doing so, the trial court de viated fr om th e s t at u t ory definition of

“ aba nd on me nt” c on ta ine d inTe nn . Code Ann . § 36 -1 -1 02 (1 )( A) (i ) and (iii). In Tenne ssee, the g rounds for terminating pare ntal rig hts are g overne d solely

by statute, an d T en n. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)( G) specific ally

provides that “a

bandonment” doe s “not have an y other definition except that which is set forth in this section, it b ei n g the inte n t o f th e g e n e r a l a s s e mb ly

to e s ta b li s h th e o n ly

g r o u n d s f

or aba nd on me nt b y

statut ory de fi nit ion .” Th us , th e trial c ou rt e rr e d to-84- the extent that it based its decisi o n reg arding abandonme nt on J .M.S.’s conduct occ urring aft er t he conc lusion of the statutory fo ur -m on th p e ri od s.

In re Ado ption o f S .M .F. , No. M2004-00876-COA- R9-PT, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXI S 826, at *30–31 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. De c . 6 , 2 00 4) (n o p e rm . a pp . f ile d) ; se e als o In re Muir , No. M2002-02963-COAR3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 831, at *19 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003) (no pe rm. app. filed) (noting that the “pivotal question” w hen eva luating thewillful fa i l u re to visit or support is the
c on du c t of

the bio log ic a l pa

re nt w ith in the fo ur

mon ths pr e c e din g the fi lin g of the pe tit ionto terminate) . The B aker s filed their pe tition t o terminate the Hes’ pa renta l rig hts on J une 20, 2001, there fore , we must nec essarily direc t our attention to the conduct of the He s within the four months immediately

prec eding that date. Se e In re D. L. B. , 1 18 S.W. 3d36 0, 36 6 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) (“ [W]e h old that only a par ent’s conduc t in the four months immediately prec eding the filing of a pe tition t hen befor e the c ourt may

be used a s g rounds to terminate pa renta l rig hts u n d er T en n essee Code Annotated se ction 36-1-102( 1)(A) (i).”)

. This Court has previously addre ssed th e co n ce p t of “w illfulness” as it relates to the ab an d o n m en tgro u n d fo r t er m i n at i n g a b i o l o gi ca l p ar en t ’s p ar en t al ri gh t s , s t at i n g:

The c oncept of

“willfulness” is at the c ore of the statut ory definition of aba ndonment. For t h e p u rp ose of Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102( 1)(A) (i), a pa

rent c annot be f

ound to have a

bandoned a child unless the par ent either has “w illfully ” failed to eng ag e in more than token visitation or has “w illfully ” failed to provide more than tok e n mon e tary su pp ort to the c hil d fo r fo ur c on se c uti ve m on ths. “Willfull y ” is a wor d of m any meaning s, and so each use of the word must be i n te rp r e te d w ith r e f e r e n c e to th e s tatu to r y

c o n te xt i n w h ic h i t appea rs. United States v. Sanc hez-Corcino , 8 5 F

. 3 d 5 4 9 , 5 5 2

- 53 (11th Cir. 1996 ); GE OR GE W. PATON, A TEXTB OOK ON J URI SPR UDENCE 313 n.2 (4th e d. 1972) (sugg esting that use of the word should be a voided bec ause of its ambiguities). “Willfulness” does not r equire the same stand ar d of culpability

require d by

the p en al code. G. T. v . A do pti on of A .E

.T. , 725 So. 2 d 404, 409 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Nor does it re quire malevolenc e or ill will. In re Adoption of a Minor , 343 Mass. 292, 17 8 N .E .2 d 2 64 , 2 67 (M a ss. 19 61 ). Willf ul c on du c t c on sis ts o f a c ts or failur e s to a c t th a t a r e in te n ti o n a l o r

v o lu n ta ry r a th e r th an acc idental or inadve rtent. In re M azzeo , 131 F.3d 295, 299 (2d Cir. 19 97 ); United States v. Phillips , 19 F.3d 1565, 1576 (11th Cir. 1994); In re Ad op tio n o f E ar ha rt , 117 Ohi o App. 73, 190 N.E.2d 468, 470 (O hio Ct. Ap p. 19 61 ); Mey er v. Sk yline Mobile H

omes , 99 I daho 754, 589 P.2d 89, 96 (I daho 1979). Conduct is “willful” if it is the product of fr ee w ill rather than c oerc ion. Thus, a per son acts “w illfully ” if he-85- or sh e is a fr e e a g e nt, kn ow s what he or sh e is doi ng , an d in te nd s to d o wh ath e o r s h e i s d o i n g.

. . . . The w il lf u ln e s s o f p a rticular c onduct depe nds upon the ac tor’s intent. I ntent is seldom capa ble of direct proof, and triers-of -fa ct lack the ability

to peer into a person’ s mind to assess intentions or motivations. American C a b l e C orp. v. ACI Mgt., Inc

. , 2000 Tenn. A p p

. LE X I S 6 1 5 , N o

. M 1 9 9 7

- 0 0 2 8 0

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 0 WL 12 91 26 5, a t *4 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . Se pt. 14 , 20 00 ) (N o T e nn . R. Ap p. P. 11 application filed). Acc ording ly , triers-of -fa ct must infer intent from the c ircumstantial evidenc e, including a per son’s ac tion s or conduct. Se e J

oh ns on Cityv . W

olf e , 103 T e n n

. 2 7 7 , 2 8 2 , 5 2 S. W. 99 1, 99 2 ( 18 99 ); A b s a r

v
. Jones , 83 3 S.W.2 d 8 6, 89 -9 0 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 92 ); State v. W

ashington , 6 58 S.W. 2d14 4, 14 6 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 83 ); se e als o I

n re K.L. C. , 9 S.W .3d 768, 773 (Mo. C t. App. 2000). A person’ s demeanor and c redibility as a w itness also play

an important role in determining intent. Acc ording ly , trial courts a re best suited for making willfulness determinations. In re D.L.B. , 118 S.W .3d at 367, 2003 Tenn. L EXI S 983, 2003 W L

22383609, at *6.

In re Muir , 2003 Tenn. App. LEXI S 831, at *13–17. Determining whether a biolog ical par ent has wi llf ull y faile d to v is it or

su pp ort hi s o r h e r c hil d is a fa c t in te ns ive inq uiry , a ndthe c ou rt s o f this state ar e re quired to eng ag e in an “ individualiz ed dete rmination” of whe ther the standard has bee n met in a g iven ca se. See In re Swan son , 2 S.W .3d 180, 188 (Tenn. 1999)

.

2. Willf ul Failure to Support
Reg arding the willful failure to support component of a bandonment, the tria l court made the fo llo wi ng re le va nt f

a c tua l f ind ing s:
157. The He s had the a bilityto pay

child s u p p ort payments for AMH fr om J anuary

28, 2001, to J une 20, 2001. 158. The He s swore, under oath, in the Petition to M odify custody they signe d on May

3, 2000, that “cir cumstance s had
c ha ng e d” a ndthat th e He s w e re“ fu lly wi lli ng a ndable to properly car e and provide for AMH,” y et they willfullyfailed to provide support for

AMH af ter May 3, 2000. 15 9. Mr s. He sw or e un de r oath o n A pril 9 , 2 00 1, in the Pe tit ionto Modify custody , that the Hes w ere “able t o p rovi de ca re,-86- support and prope r super vision for AMH,” y et, ag ain, they willfullyfailed to provide support for AMH befor e and after April 9, 2001. 160. Even thoug h there was no c hild support order i n p l ac e, the Hes kne w they

had an oblig ation to pr ovide child support for AMH fr om J anuary

28, 2001, to June 20, 2001, as evide nced by statements made to [the juvenile court refe ree ] and the fac t t h a tt h e y p r o v i d e d s u p p o r tf o r t h e i r s o n , A n d y. 16 1. Th e He s pa id no su pp ort f or AM H f ro m Jan ua

ry 28 , 2 00 1, to J une 20, 2001. 162. During the J une 28, 2000, hea ring befor e [ the juvenile court ref ere e], Mr

. He told [the refe ree ] t hat the He s would send $25.00 per month to China for AMH ’s s upport, if the He s reg ained c ustody

of AMH. 16 3. Th e He s p a id s ome one to take the ir y ou ng e r s on , A nd y , to [C hina] during the month of May 2001. The He s beg an sending $1,000.00 per mo n t h to China to support their son, Andy , sometime during May 2001. 164. Some t i m e af

ter sending her son, Andy , to China, Mrs. He purcha sed a ne w computer

. 165. The Hes took va cation trips to New Orleans, At lanta, Arizona, Ohio, and California , betwee n J une 4, 1999 and June 20 , 2 00 1. Th e He s a lso too k trips for othe r p ur po se s to Atlanta and Washington, D.C., during the same time pe riod. 166. The He s li v ed in an apa rtment and pa id monthlyrenta l payments of $625

. 0 0 during the period from J anuary 28, 2001, to J une 20, 2001. 167. The He s used their e co n o mic resour ces to a ccumulate and pu r c h a s e n o n

- n e c e s s ar y

p o s s e s s i o n s a n d t o t ak e m u l t i p le
va c a tio ns fo r p le a su rea ndse ve ra l trips fo r o the r p ur po se s, a ll consistent wi t h t h e He s’ ag ree ment with the Ba kers that the Ba kers would r aise AMH until ag e eig hteen, a nd evincing the Hes’ intention to fore g o all pare nt al o b ligations and responsibilities for AMH.

. . . . 168. During the foster car e period, Fe bruary 24, 1999, to May

23, 1999, the Hes put a sum of m oney , approximately $300.00, on the B aker s’ couc h during a visit. Mrs. He told the Bakers that the Hes w ould gi v e the Bake rs more mone y for AMH ’s
su pp ort a s soon a s th e y

we refi na nc ia lly

able . M rs . B ake r t old the Hes that the Baker s could not take the money

. The B aker s-87- we re no t a llo we d to a c c e pt m on e y fo r f os te r c hil dr e n inthe ir
car e, except for

the $6.00 per

day that Mid-South paid the Ba kers unde r the foste r ca

re a g ree ment with Mid-South. 1 6 9

. On Ju n e 4 , 1 9 9 9 , w h e n th e H e s s ig n e d th e Ju v e n il e Court Consent Order

Awar ding Custo d y , there was no mention of
c hil d s up po rt

. 170. Be cause of the ag ree ment with the Hes that the Ba kers we re to rea r AMH to ag e eig hteen, the B aker s did not ex pect the Hes to make payments to support AMH, and the Bake rs neve r asked the Hes to pay

child support for AMH , afte r the June 4, 1999, Consent Order

Awar ding Custody

was e ntere d.

. . . . 172. During the Hes’ approximate eig hty (80) visits with AMH, be tw e e n Jun e 4, 19 99 , to Jan ua ry 28 , 2 00 1, the y

oc c a sio na lly brou g h t it e ms f

o r A M H

. . . . A ll o f th e s e it e ms w ere of ins ub stanti a l e c on omi c va lue a nd a mou nte d to tok e n s up po rt

.
Ba sed on these f

acts, the tria l court conc luded that the He s abandone d A.M.H. by willfullyfailing to support her for

the four c onsecutive months prior to June 20, 2001.

After revie wing the re cord, w e must conclude that the evidenc e in t h e re co rd does not preponde rate ag ainst the trial court’s finding s of fa ct in this case. Se e In re M. J. B. , 140 S.W .3d 643, 65 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 4)

. Ou r inq uiry a t thi s po int mus t sh if t to a de te rm inatio n o f w he the r the se fa c ts c le arl y a nd c on vin c ing ly e sta bli sh a wi llf ul f a ilu reto s up po rt

A. M. H. on the pa

rt of the He s. Se e id

. This Court has previously addre ssed t he “willfulness” aspec t of a parent’ s failure to support
a c h i l d , s t at i n g:

F a ilu re to s up po rt

a c hil d is “ will ful ” wh e n a pe rs on is a wa

reof his or her duty to support, has the ca

pacity to provide support, make s no attem p t t o p rovide support, a nd has no justifiable excuse for not pr ov idi ng the su pp ort.

In re Muir , 20 03 Te nn

. Ap p. LEX I S 83 1, a t *1 5; se e als o I n re M. J. B. , 140 S.W .3d at 654. Upon revie wing the trial court’s finding s of fa ct re levant to this issue, we note that many of the fa cts relied upon by the trial court in de ciding that the Hes willfully failed to support A .M.H. constitute actions by the He s w e ll b e y on d th e fo ur mon th pe ri odimm e diate ly pr e c e din g the date the B ake rs fi le d th e ir pe tit ionin this c a se . In d e te rm ini ng wh e the r a bio log ic a l pa

re nt’ s c on du c t in faili ng to s up po rt a child amounts to “willfulness,” it may become nece ssary in a given case to evaluate e vents occ urringW e are cognizant of o ur pri o r s t at em ent i n In r e S

. M

. F. , 200 4 T enn

. Ap p. LE X I S 82 6, at * 30 –3 1, an d we 29

a g re e tha t an inq u iry into w h e the r a p a re n t’s co n d u c t is “w ill ful” s h o u ld ge n e ra lly fo c u s o n the fo u r m o n ths im m e d ia te ly p re c e d ing the fi ling o f a p e tit io n to ter m ina te the p a re n ta l righ ts o f t h e p a re n t. Se e I n r e D. L. B. , 118 S. W

. 3d 360, 366 (T enn. 20 0 3 ). W e no t e, ho wever, that i n In r e S

. M

. F. , t he t ri al co urt “ b ased i t s d eci si o n regardi ng ab and o nm ent on [t he p arent ’ s] c o nd uct oc curri ng af t ert he conc l us i on of

t he s t at ut or

y f our
- m ont h pe r i od

. ” I n r e S

. M

. F. , 2004 T en n

. App. L E X IS 8 2 6 , at *3 1 (e m p h a sis a d d e d ). C o n d u c t af t er the ter m ina tio n p e tit io n is f iled is o b v io u sly o f no va lue in d e te rm inin g w h e the r a p a re n t’s co n d u c t pr i or t o t he f i l i ng of t he pet i t i on was wi l l f

ul

. I n s om e i ns t anc es , s uch as t hi s ca s e, a p arent m ay have d o ne no t hi ng ( i

. e. , pro vi d ed no supp o rt or d i d not vi si t ) wi t hi n t he fo ur mo nt h p eri o d

. I f we were
c o n stra ine d to c o n sid e rin g o n ly this “co n d u c t,” i t w o u ld p re c lud e the c o u rts o f this state fro m c o n sid e rin g e v e n ts
o c c u rr ing p rio r to the fo u r m o n th p e rio d w h ic h b e a r o n th e “ w ill fuln e ss” o f th e p a re n t’s co n d u c t d u rin g the fo u r m o n th p e rio d

. Se e I n r e Swans on , 2 S

. W

. 3 d 18 0 , 18 8 (T enn. 19 9 9 ) (noti ng that the f ed eral and s t at e co nst i t ut i o ns “r eq ui re t he oppor t u n i t y for a n i n di v i du al i ze d de t er mi n at i on ” bef or e a par en t ’ s f

u n dame n t al ri g h t t o t h e c ar e, cu s t ody , a n d c on t r ol

o f t he chi l d m ay b e severed). T h e sta tuto ry fo u r-m o n th p e rio d , b e sid e s b e ing leg islativ e ly m a n d a te d , ne c e ssa rily lim its th e inc lus io n o f t o ta lly

u n n ec es s ar y a n d i r r el ev an t f ac t s i n t o t h e t r i al c ou r t ’ s e v al u at i on of w i l l f u l n es s

. W e wi s h t o e mp has i ze t h at w e do n ot
m ean t o i m p l y t hat a t ri al co urt has cart e b l anche t o eval uat e f act s o ut si d e t he fo ur- m o nt h s t at ut o ry pe ri o d whi ch have

n o b e a rin g o n the d e te rm ina tio n o f a p a re n t’s “willfuln e ss.”
-88- prior to the start of the four month period. See In re Adoption of Kleshin ski , No. M2004-00986- 29 CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 5 T e nn

. Ap p. LEX I S 27 5, a t *6 5 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . M a y 4, 20 05 ) ( “ I n th e ov e ra ll circ umstances, F ather ’s phy sical abuse of Moth er d u ri n g t h eir mar riag e is rele vant, since it is the backdr op for the trial court’s c onsideration of Mother ’s claim of f ear of phy sical abuse .”).
The leg islature has c harg ed the pare nts of a minor child with the duty to support the child. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 4- 1- 10 2( a ), (b ) ( 20 03 ); se e als o Smith v . Gore , 728 S.W .2d 738, 750 (Tenn. 19 87 ); In re M. J. B. , 140 S.W .3d at 655. The Hes do not deny an aw are ness of the pa

rents’ g ener al
re sp on sib ili ty

to p ro vid e fi na nc ia l su pp ort f or the ir c hil d. Th e He s’ a wa

re ne ss i s e vid e nc e d b y

the ir payment of $1,000.00 per month f or their son’s support while in China, their stated intention to pay $2 5. 00 pe r mon th fo r A. M. H. ’s c are if the y re g a ine d c us tod y a nd se nt he r to Chi na , and t heir payment of $300.00 to the B aker s during the foster car e period. The fa cts also demonstrate that the Hes we re f

inancially able to support A.M.H. during the rele vant four month pe riod. The He s stated under oath in their petitions to m odify the custodyorder that they wer e once ag ain able to pr ovide financ ially

for A.M.H ., they

purchas ed a n ew ca r in Octobe r of 2001, Mother purcha sed a ne w c omp ute r, a ndthe He s to ok tr ips to s e ve ra l A me ri c a n c iti e s.
The Hes arg ue, howeve r, that they cannot be found to ha ve willfullyfailed to support A.M.H. be c aus e the y we re ne ve r inf orme d the y ha d a du ty to su pp ort he r w hil e sh e re ma ine d inthe B ake rs ’ custody . I n support of this position, the Hes c ite to case s in which this Court found that the pare nt did not wi l l fu l l y

fail to support the child whe n the Tenne ssee De partment of Children’ s Services failed to inform the pare nt of a duty to support. Se e In re J. J. C. , 1 48 S.W. 3d91 9, 92 7 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 04 ); Sta te v . D e Ma rr , No. M2002-02603-COA- R3-J V, 2003 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 569, at *38 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 13, 2003) (no pe rm. app. filed) . They also note that the June 4, 1999 custody order did not mention a duty to support A.M.H., citi ng to case s in which this Court noted the lack of a c ou rt or de r d ir e c tin g the pa

re nt t o p a y

su pp ort w he n fin din g that a par e nt d id n ot w ill fu lly fail to support the child. Se e DeMa rr , 200 3 Te nn . App . L EX I S 56 9, a t *3 8; Hickm an v. Hickm an , No. E2000-00927-COA- R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. L EXI S 653, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2000) (no-89-

pe rm . a pp . f ile d) ; Ma rtin v . M

ar tin , No. M1999-00210-COA- R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. L EXI S 178, at *4 (Te nn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2000) (no perm. app. f iled). Ac cording to the Hes, these case s stand fo r the pr op os iti onthat “ wi tho ut n oti c e , th e ir c a n b e no wi ll ful nes s. ” Th e He s a rg ume nt i n th is reg ard is close ly

akin to their pre vious arg ument reg arding the constitutionality of the a doption statutes. We have pr eviously dealt with the He s’ consti tutional arg uments, and we need not r eturn to those arg uments in this s ection of the Opinion.

For purposes of our

discussion he re , h o weve r, we note that both In re J .J.C. and DeMa rr i n v o l v e d t h e f

a i l u r e o n t h e p ar to f

t h e T e n n e s s e e D e p ar t m e n to f C h i l d r e n ’ s S e r v i c e s , a

s t a t e a g e n c y, to pr o v i d e t h e parent with notice of a duty to support in cases whe re the child was take n from the pare nt’s custody

by the depa rtment. See Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 37 -2 -4 03 (2 00 3) (g ov e rn ing the du ty of an “ ag ency ” to pr ovide pare ntal notification of the law g overning abandonme nt). The a doption statutes contain no rec iproca l r equire ment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-101 et seq . (2003). At the time the Hes a

ppeale d the pre sent controve rsy to this C ourt, no Tenne ssee c ase ha d addre ssed the eff ect of a parent’s lack of not ice reg arding a duty to support in the context of a private a g ree ment transfe rring custody

of a c hild to a non-par ent. Since that time, how ever , this Court has had occa sion t o ad d re s s t h e i s s u e, s t at i n g:

When the Depa

rtment of Children’s Ser vices or othe r chi l d-plac ing ag ency obtains custody

of children remove d from the pa rents’ home , it is required to notify

the par ents of t h e s tatutory definitions of abandonme nt and the criteria a nd p ro cedures for termination of pare ntal rig hts. Tenn. Code An n

. § 37-2-403( a)( 2)(A) . I n such situations, a court cannot terminate a pare nt’s rig hts on the g round of abandonme nt unless such notice, including the co n s equence of ab an donment, has bee n g iven by the ag ency

petitioning for termination or the court itself. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 2-403(a )(2) (B ). I n the ca se bef

ore us, ne ither DCS nor another age ncy was involved, so the statute does not apply . Nonethele ss, Mother’ s knowledg e of
a du ty or e xpe c ta tio n th a t sh e pr ov ide su pp ort a ndvis it i s a fac tor in de te rm ini ng will

fulne ss
. We f

ind nothing in the rec ord to indicate she
was e ver told she was expected to provide support or fac e termination of he r p are nta l r ig hts

.
In re W. B., IV

, N o. M2 00 4- 00 99 9- CO A- R3- PT, 20 05 Te nn . A pp . L EX I S 26 2, a t *3 8 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. Ap r. 29 , 2 00 5) (n o p e rm . app. fi le d) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . A c c or din g ly , w e de c lin e the He s’ invitation to fo rm u l ate a pe r se rule to def eat a finding of willfulness when a biologica l pare nt voluntarily

relinquishes custody

of a c hild to a non-pare nt pursuant to a private ag ree ment. Such a rule would thwa

rt t h e i n dividualiz ed dec ision making re quired in ca ses of this nature , se e In re Swan son , 2 S.W. 3d a t 18 8, e sp e c ia lly wh e n th e fa c ts e sta

bli sh that th e bio log ic a l pa re nts arec le arl y awa re of their duty

to support their child despite the lac k of formal notice.-90-

I ns te a d, the bio log ic a l pa

re nts ’ l a c k o f n oti c e re g ard ing the du ty to s up po rt

the ir min or c hil d is merely a factor to consi d er when determining if that failure was “ willful.” Se e In re W. B., IV , 20 05 Te nn . A pp . L

EX I S 26 2, a t *3 8; In re A doption of Kleshin ski , 2005 Tenn. App. L EXI S 275,
a t *5 3– 57

. Th us , a det e rm inatio n of wh e the r the a fo re me nti on e d ev ide nc e c le arl y a ndc on vin c ing ly
e sta bli sh e s th a t th e He s “ wi llf ull y ” faile d to supp ort A.M .H . hing e s upo n whe the r the y “ vo lun tari ly and intention ally

[chose] not to provide financ ial support without a justifiable excuse.” In re M. J. B. , 1 4 0 S

. W

. 3 d at6 5 4 (c i t i n g In re Muir , 2003 Tenn. App. L EXI S 831, at *15). The de terminative fa ct in this case is the B aker s’ refusal t o acc ept any money offe red by the Hes f or the support of A .M.H. Du ri ng the ini tia l th re e mon th f os te r c arepe ri od , the B ake rs re fu se d the $3 00 .0 0 off e re d by the He s. At trial, the B aker s testified that they did not ex pect the H es to pay child support beca

use they believ ed t h eywould be re sponsible for raising A.M.H. until she be came an adult. We cannot say that a pa re nt’ s f a il ure to pay c hil d s up po rt is “ wi llf ul” wh e n a ny

a tte mpt to o ff e r s uc h s up po rt

is rebuf fed. We find that the e vidence i n the re cord doe s not clearly and convinc ingly

establish that the Hes “willfully ” failed to support A .M.H. during the four month period immediately prec eding the B aker s’ petition to terminate the He s’ pare ntal rig hts. A ccor dingly , we r ever se the trial c ourt’s decision on this issue.

3. Wil lful F ail ur e to Vi sit

Reg arding the willful failure to visit component of the abandonme nt g round, the trial court made the f

ollowing f

indings of f

act a nd conclusions of law :
15 0. On Janu ary

28 , 20 01 , AM H’ s se c on d b irthd a y , th e He s c a me to the Ba kers’ h o m e to vi sit AMH and re quested of the B ake rs that th e He s b e a llo we d to take AM H w ith the m to ha ve a famil y po rt rait m a de. Th e B ake rs re fu se d th e He s’
re qu e st be c aus e AM H ha d be e n ill fo r se ve ra l day s p ri or to J a n u ar y 2 8 , 2 0 0 1

. T h e H e s t h e n b e c a m e u p s e ta n d a n g r y, started r aising their voice s, and Mrs. He started sc reaming and crying. A MH then bec ame upse t an d the B aker s asked the Hes to lea ve the B aker s’ home. The Hes re fused to leave. Mr. H e b e c a me v e r y p u s h y a n d to ld M r

. B ak e r to call the police. Mr. He told the Bakers, “ I won’t lea ve her e.” T he Ba kers then ca lled the police to have the Hes r emoved f rom the B aker s’ home. 151. Shelby

CountySheriff’ s [Deputy Astor ] . . . came to the Ba kers’ home in response to the J anuary 28, 2001, dis tur ba nc e cal l. Whe n th e De pu t[y ] ar ri ve d at th e B ake rs ’ home, Mr. and M rs

. Ba

ker w ere calm and Mr . and Mrs. He
wer e very irate and ag itated. The Hes continued to be upset-91- and ag itated whil e the deput[ y ] conducted [his] investigation of the incide nt. During the investig ation, the Hes w ere o u t s i d e t h e B ak er s ’ h o m e y el l i n g, s cr ea m i n g, an d ca u s i n g a disturbance

. 152. . . . After

spending approximately

forty -five min utes to one hour at the B aker s’ hom e on January 28, 2001, Deputy

Astor told the Hes t o leave the Baker s’ hom e and not to come bac k that day . T he re a so n D e pu ty As tor tol d th e He s n ot t o c ome ba c k to the B ake rs ’ ho me that day wa s b e c aus e he wante d to neutra liz e the situation and because he did not want Mrs. He to b e arr e ste d. De pu ty

As tor a dv ise d th e He s th a t th e ir disag ree ment with the Ba kers was a

civil matter, and he advised the H es t o seek le g al advice from an attorney about the matter. 153. Both Mr. and Mrs. He testified that they did not return to the Ba kers’ home to visit AMH after the J anuary 28, 2001, incident bec ause the y

wer e afraid that they

would be ar

rested b y t h e police. Howe ver, this Court finds this testim ony la c k in g inc r e d ib il ity , s in c e th e r e h a v e b e e n n u mer o us instances when the policewer e ca lled due to Mrs. He ’s inappropriate beha vior. . . .

. . . . 174. The He s did not attempt to ot herw ise ca ll, write, or make any oth e r atte mpt

to c on ta c t th e B ake rs abo ut v isi tin g AM H, or to in q u i r e ab o u tA M H ’ s w e l l

- b e i n g f r o mJa n u ar y

2 9 , 2 0 0 1 , to J une 20, 2001. 175. The He s willfullyfailed to visit AMH from J anuary 29, 2001, to J une 20, 2001. 176. The He s t es t i fied that they did not visi t AMH afte r January 28, 2001, beca

use they fea

red for their per sonal safe ty if they returne d to the Ba

kers’ home for a visit. The Court f inds the H e s ’ t e s t i m o n y t o b e l a c k i n g i n c r e d i b i l i t y. 177. After

J an u ar y 28, 2001, the Hes w illfullymade the de cision not to visi t AMH. 178. Be tween January

28, 2001, and June 20, 2001, the Hes neve r vis ite d A MH a ndne ve r m a de a re qu e st to the B ake rs to v isi t AMH. 179. The He s rig ht to visi t AMH was never restric ted by any court until Februa

ry 8, 2002, when t h is Court entered an order pr oh ibi tin g the He s f

rom attemp tin g “ to h a ve a ny c on ta c t, dir e c t or ind ir e c t, in pe rs on , o r o the rw ise , w ithAM H, ” un til-92- further order of the Court. The Court entere d the Fe bruary 8, 2002, “no-c ontact” order beca use, on Fe bruary 7, 20 0 2 , t he Court had ordered the Hes to deliver AMH’s pa ssport to the Clerk & Mast er b y 4 :00 P.M. t hat day . At 4:00 P.M. on Fe bruary 7, 2002, the Hes’ counsel tele phoned the Court and advised the Court that the Hes had no intention of c omply ing with the Cou rt ’s o rder , and the Court then e ntere d the “noc o n t a c t ” o r d e r

t h e n e x td a y. 18 0. Th e B ake rs we re wi lli ng to a llo w the He s to ha ve vis its wi th AM H a ft e r the Janu ary

28 , 2 00 1, dis tur

ba nc e in the B ake rs ’ home, but the Hes never contacte d the Baker s and re quested any visitation wit h AMH. 181. I mmediat ely

afte r the January

28, 2001, disturbance , the B ake rs de c ide d th a t a ll f

utu revis its by the He s wou ld ha ve to be arr a ng e d at a loc a tio n othe r tha n th e B ake rs ’ h ome be c aus e of the Au g us t 1, 20 00 , a ndJanu ary 28 , 2 00 1, dis tur

ba nc e s. 182. I mmediately

afte r January

28, 2 0 0 1 , in futhera nce of the
nece ssity to arr ang e future vi sitations at a site other than the Ba kers’ home, Mrs. B aker

telephoned the Ex chang e Club Fa milyCenter to inquire about its ability to provide visitation service s and fa cilities for any future visit s with AMH by the He s. 18 3. Th e B ake rs we re wi lli ng to a llo w the He s to ha ve vis its wi th AM H, thr ou g h the fac ili tie s o f the Exc ha ng e Clu b F a mil y Ce nte r, e ve n a ft e r M rs . H e sig ne d h e r s e c ond P etiti onto M o d i f y c u s t o d y. 184. The only

contac t the Hes made with the Ba kers afte r January 28, 2001, occ urre d on April 2, 2001. On that date , Mrs. He called the Ba

kers’ home and lef

t the foll owing messag e on the B a k e r s ’ t e l e p h o n e a n s w e r i n g m a c h i n e : “ C o m e t o m y h o me and g et y our baby

bed, we are moving, thank y ou, by e by e.” 185. The B aker s did not respond to Mrs. He’ s April 2 , 2001, telephone c all beca

use Mrs. He did not say

anything a

bout AM H o r a b o u twa n t i n g t o v i s i t AM H. T h e Bak er s d i d n o tgo to the Hes’ a

partment a fter Mr s. He’s April 2, 2001, telephone
c a ll. 186. The INS contacte d Mr. He about the Hes’ immigration status in March, A pril, or May , 2001. 187. Mrs. He signe d a sec ond Petition t o Modify the Consent Orde r Awa

rding Custodyon April 9, 2 0 01, that was subsequently fi led in J uvenile Court on May 29, 2001. The Cou rt no te s tha t Mr s. He didno t r e qu e st v isi ta tio n w ithAM H wh e n s he fi led the p e tit ionto m od if y c us tod y . It is we ll-O n a pp e a l , t h e H e s r a i s e , a s a s e pa r a t e i s s u e , w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l c ou r t e r r e d by r e c og n i zi ng a pur po r t ed 30
agr eement wh i ch cont r ave nes t he publ i c po l i cy of T enn es s ee. T he H es cont i nu e t o di s put e t hat t hey en t er ed i nt o an or al agr eement w i t h t he B ake r s wh er eby t he B ake r s woul d ra i s e A. M

. H

. un t i l s he t ur ned e i gh t een

. T he t r i al cour t , af t er heari ng t he co nf

l i ct i ng t est i m o ny , fo und t hat t he p art i es d i d ent er i nt o t he o ral agreem ent

. W e f i nd no c le a r a nd

c o n v inc ing e v id e n c e in the re c o rd to d isru p t t h is fi n d ing b y the trial c o u rt. S e e W e lls v . T e n n . B d

. o f R e g e n ts , 9 S. W

. 3d 7 7 9 , 78 3 (T enn. 1 9 9 9 ). T he H es ass ert t hat , b y t erm i nat i ng t hei r p arent al ri ght s fo r wi l l f ul l y ab and o ni ng A

. M

. H

. , t he t r i al cour t , i n e s s enc e, en force d an i l l ega l cont r act vi ol at i ng t he publ i c pol i cy of t hi s s t at e. T h e tria l c o u rt’s o rd e r, w h e n d isc u ssin g the H e s’ w ill ful failu re to visit a n d w ill ful failu re to su p p o rt, m e re ly l i st s t hi s agreem ent as o ne o f t he f act s i n s up p o rt of t he t ri al co urt ’ s f i nd i ng of wi l l f

ul ness on t he p art o f t he H es. T o t he ext ent t he t ri al co urt co nsi d ered t he agreem ent as a f act o r i n de ci d i ng wi l l f ul ness , we f

i nd no error. H o wever, t he reco rd b e fo re this C o u rt d o e s n o t sup p o rt the H e s’ as se rtio n tha t t h e tr ia l co u rt so u g h t t o e n fo rc e the p a rtie s’ “c o n tra c t.” A c c o rd ing ly, w e fi n d this issu e to b e w itho u t m e rit.
-93-

settled that a pa

rent may alway s pet ition to have visitation
re ins ta te d u po n a

sh ow ing of

c ha ng e d c ir c ums tanc e s. Mr s. Hes’ [sic] wi llful failure to see k reinstateme nt of visitation wi th AM H de mon str a te s tha t her g oa l in fi lin g the Pe tit ionto Modify to reg ain custody

was for the sole purpose of
rema ining in the United States and avoidi n g deportation. Mr s. He s’ failu re to a sk

theCou rt to r e ins ta te vis itatio n w ith AM H, wh e n sh e c ou ld ha ve e a sil y do ne so , e vin c e s Mr s. He s’ [si c] willful abandonment of AMH.
(citat i o n s o mitted). After revie wing the re cord, w e cannot say that the evidenc e in the re cord preponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’s finding s of fa ct, se e In re M. J. B. , 140 S.W .3d at 654, many of which r esulted fr om the trial court’ s conclusions reg arding the credibilityof the witnesse s. See We lls v . T e nn. B d. of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W. 3d 77 9, 78 3 (T e nn

. 19 99 ) (n oti ng that we wi ll n ot r e -e va luate the trial court’s finding s reg arding the cr edibility of a witness absent clea r and convincing evidenc e wa rr a nti ng a dif fe re nt r e su lt) . T hu s, a s w e didwh e n e va luatin g the He s’ a lle g e d w ill fu l f a ilu re to support A.M.H., we must now determine whe ther these fac ts constitute cl ea r an d convincing evidenc e of the Hes’ w illful failure to visit A.M.H. Se e In re M. J. B. , 140 S.W .3d at 654.

The afor ementioned fac ts do not c onstitut e all of the finding s of fa ct made by the trial court
re gar d i n g t h i s i s s u e. I n a s ep ar at e s ec t i o n o f i t s o p i n i o n , t h e t ri al co u rt i n cl u d ed n u m er o u s fi n d i n gs related to the Hes’ visitation wit h A.M.H. betwe en June 4, 1999 (the date of the juvenil e court’s consent orde r aw arding custody of A.M.H. to the Baker s) and J anuary 28, 2001 (the last ti me the He s visited A.M.H.). As we pr eviously noted, we must constrain our focus to whe ther the H es’ f ailure 30 to v isi t w it hinthe fo ur

mon ths imm e diate ly

pr e c e din g thedate theB ake rs ’ f ile d th e ir pe tit ionto terminate the Hes’ pare ntal rig hts was will ful. Se e In r e S.M .F. , No. M2004-00876-COA- R9-PT, 20 0 4 T en n

. App. LEXI S 826, at *30–31 (Tenn. Ct. App. De c. 6, 2004) ( no perm. a pp. filed). Ho we ve r, to p ro pe rl y

e xami ne the wi llf

uln e ss, or la c k the re of

, of a b iol og ic a l pa

re nt’ s f a ilu reto v isi t within the four month pe riod, it may become nece ssary in a g iven case to look to f acts oc cu rr i ng outside the four month period. See In re A doption of Kleshin ski , No. M2004-00986-COA- R3-CV, 2 0 0 5 T e n n

. A p p

. LE X IS 2 7 5 , a t * 6 5 ( T e n n

. C t

. A p p

. M a y 4 , 2 0 0 5 ) ( n o p e r m

. ap p

. f i l e d )

. In discussing the Hes’ visitation during the period betwee n J une 4, 1999 and January 28, 2001, the trial-94-

court made finding s relate d to the substance, leng th, and token nature of those visits. Since many of these f indings ha ve no bearing on the Hes’ “willfulness” during the four month period at issue, they do not warr ant mention. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102(1)(E) ( 2001) (de fining “willful failure to support” as “ the willf u l failure, f

or a pe riod of four

(4) c onsecutive months, to visit or
e ng a g e in m or e than to ke n v isi ta tio n” ); s e e a l s o I n re D .L .B. , 118 S.W .3d 360, 366 (Tenn. 2003) (“ [W]e h oldthat on ly

a pa re nt’ s conduct

i n the four months immediately prec eding the filing of a petition then before the court may be used as g rounds to terminate pa renta l rig hts under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 36-1-102( 1)(A) (i).”)

. On appeal, the He s assert that ther e ar e additional fa cts containe d in the rec ord which w arr ant consideration when eva luating this issue. The H es cite to our decision in In re Z.C.G. , No. M2000- 02 93 9- CO A- R3- CV , 2 00 1 T e nn . A pp . L EX I S 78 3, a t *1 9 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . O c t. 22, 20 01 ) ( no pe rm

. app. filed) , wher ein we a cknowledg ed the va lidity of the trial court’s cre dibilit y determinations, but
we re ve rs e d th e fi nd ing that th e fathe r h a d w ill fu lly faile d to vis it h is c hil d b y makin g re fe re nc e to
sever al u n co n troverte d fac ts overlooked by the trial court. Howeve r, our de cision in In re Z.C.G. is disti ng uishable fr om the prese nt case beca use t hat case i nvolved the biolog ical mother’ s attempt to overtly impede the f

ather ’s visitation, and we noted that the fathe r ca lled the m other to inquire about his visit ation. Se e id . at *1 9– 20 . In th e pr e se nt c a se , it is u nd isp ute d th a t th e He s d id n ot c a ll the B aker s to inquire about visitation during the four month period at issue. Moreover , any evidenc e tending to show that the Ba kers attempted to impede the Hes’ visitation at cer tain times prior to the four mon t h p eriod at issue fails to demonstrate why the Hes did not visit A.M.H. during the four month period.

“The question of intent or willfulness is fac t sp ec i fi c an d d epends on the totalityof the circ umstances.” In re W. B., IV , No. M2004-00999-COA- R3-PT, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXI S 262, at *28 (Tenn. Ct. App. Ap r. 2 9 , 2 0 0 5). As with the willful failure to support component of abandonme nt, the Hes a g ain ar g ue that they did not rece ive notice that their fa ilure to visit A.M.H. could result in a termination of their pare ntal rig hts, theref

ore, the ir failure to visit cannot be deeme d willful. The parties do not dispute that t h e He s n ev er rec eived suc h notice. Howe ver, a s we previously

noted, the He s lack of knowledg e reg arding the need to visit A.M.H. is mere ly “a f actor in determining willfulness.” Id

. at *38. Thus, we must look to the other fa ctual finding s of the trial
c ou rt to d e te rm ine if the y c on sti tut e c le ar an d co nv inc ing e vid e nc e of theHe s’ wi llf

ul f a ilu reto v isi t A.M.H.

T h e trial c ourt determined that, upon responding to the incident at the B aker s’ home on J anuary 28, 2001, Deputy Astor instructed the H es to ref rain fr om returning to the Ba kers home that day

. At trial, the He s testified that they understood De puty

Astor’s instructions to mean do not eve r re turn. Th e He s a lso state d th a t th e y fe are d ar re st or ph y sic a l harm if the y re turne d to the B ake rs ’ residenc e af

ter that date. Stated diffe rently , the Hes seek to assert that they wer e comply ing w ith the instructions of an authority fig ure and fe l t intimi dated. How ever , the Hes ha ve demonstrated on
sever al occ asions that they are not i n t i m i dated by

the authority

of others. The Ba

kers c alled the police on Aug ust 1, 2000 when Mother r efuse d to leave the ir home af ter c ausing a disturba nce. After the pol ice arrived and i nstructed her t o leave , Mother left the Ba kers’ residenc e. Howe ver, she-95-

subsequently

returne d and continued he r we ekly visits with A.M.H. On a nother oc casion Mother picketed the Ba

kers’ home and a

n ei gh b or aske d Mother to move her car . When Mother re fused, the neig hbo r ca l l ed the police . After the police instructe d Mother to move the ve hicle, Mother
c omp lie d a nd re turne d to pic ke tin g the B ake rs ’ ho me . O n A pril 2 , 2 00 1, Mo the r c a lle d th e B ake rs ’ home to instruct them to come re trieve a baby bed that Mrs. B aker

had loane d the Hes. H oweve r, Mo the r d id n ot l e a ve a

me ssa g e re qu e sti ng to vi si t A.M.H. , f urthe r e vid e nc ing he r l a c k o f f e ar i n contac ting the B aker s. Finally , when or dere d by Chance llor Alissandratos to surre nder A .M.H.’s pa ssp ort to the c ou rt , th e He s r e fu se d to c omp ly . T he se inc ide nc e s d e mon strat e that th e He s’ justification for not re turning to the Ba kers’ home af

ter January

28, 2001 is not well founded.

Th e He s e ng a g e d inse ve ra l c ou rs e s o f c on du c t du ri ng the fo ur mon th peri od imm e diate ly prec eding the date the Ba kers f iled their peti t i o n to terminate the H es’ pa renta l rig hts which are rele vant to resolving this iss ue. I n Fe bruary of 2001, Father fax ed a le tter to the juvenile c ourt and the media e x pressing a desire to reg ain custod y o f A. M

. H. I n April of 2001, the He s went to the juv e nil e cou rt

a ndsp ok e wi th M s. B ro wn . M s. B ro wn state d th a t Mo the r a pp e are d g e nu ine ly interested in r eg aining custody of A.M.H., and Ms. B rown prepa red a petition f

or Mother a sking the juvenile court to modifythe J une 4, 1999 custody order . This petition, which was filed in May of 2001, asked f

or a modification of custody , but it did not ask for visitation. During Marc h, April, or May of 2001, i mmigration officia ls contac ted Father about the Hes’ immigration status. The trial court conclude d that the Hes’ attempts to r eg ain custody of A.M.H. during this pe riod wer e for the sole purpose of

avoiding deportation.

The He s assert that the rec ord does not support the trial court’ s conclusion since the re is no
e vid e nc e sh ow ing a

c on ne c tio n b e tw e e n the c a lls fr om imm ig ratio n o ff ic ia ls andthe He s’ de sir e to have A .M.H. returned to them. We cannot conclude that the record does not support this conclusion. The trial c ourt determined that, at t he end of t he ini tial three month foster care period, the H es met wi th the B ake rs a nda sk e d th e m to raise A. M. H. un til sh e turne d e ig hte e n, bu t th e y wante d to re ta in the ir pa re nta l r ig hts in o rd e r t o r e ma in i n th is c ou ntry . In M a y of 20 00 , th e Hes fi led th eir fi rs t petition seeking to modify the J une 4, 1999 cu s t o d yorder . Father testified that he had be en contac ted by

immigration officials bef ore the Hes filed this p etition. After f iling the May

2000 petition, Father

met with Mr. Ba

ker at the Hes’ a

partment to discuss the petition. One of the options prese nted by

Father included the Ba

kers promising to r efr ain from any action which w ould cause the Hes to be de ported. The CASA assigne d to investigate the He s’ May 2000 petition filed a re port wi th the juv e nil e c ou rt

e xpre ssi ng c on c e rnthat th e He s w e re seek ing to r e g a in c us tod y to a vo id deportation. Thus, the Hes’ desire to avoid deportation has been a consistent theme thr oug hout the tortured history

of this case

.
We once a g ain re sort to a prior decision of this Court addre ssing the conc ept of “ willfulness,” wher ein we stated:

Th e wi llf uln e ss of pa

rt ic ula r co nd uc t dep e nd s upo n the a c tor ’s int e nt. I ntent is seldom capable of direc t proof, and trier s-of-f act lac k the ability to p ee r into a per son’s mind to assess intentions or-96- motivations. American Cable Corp. v. AC I Mg t., Inc. , 2000 Tenn. A p p

. LE X I S 6 1 5 , N o

. M 1 9 9 7

- 0 0 2 8 0

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 0 WL 12 91 26 5, a t *4 (Te nn . Ct. App . Sep t. 14, 20 00 ) (N o Te nn . R. A pp . P. 11 application filed) . Acc ording ly , triers-of-fa ct must infer intent from the c ircumstantial evid ence , including a person’ s actions or conduct. Se e J

oh ns on Cityv . W

olf e , 1 0 3 T e n n

. 2 7 7 , 282, 5 2 S. W. 99 1, 99 2 ( 18 99 ); Absar v. Jone s , 8 33 S.W. 2d 86 , 89 -90 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 92 ); State v. W

ashington , 65 8 S.W. 2d 14 4, 14 6 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 83 ); se e als o In re K.L. C. , 9 S.W .3d 768, 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). A pe rson’s deme anor and cre dibilit y as a witness also play an important role in determining intent. Acc ording ly , trial courts a re best suited for making willfulness determinations. In re D.L.B. , 118 S.W .3d at 367, 2003 Tenn. L EXI S 983, 2003 W L

22383609, at *6.

In re Muir , No. M2002-02963-COA- R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXI S 831, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. No v. 25 , 2 00 3) (n o p e rm . a pp . f ile d) ; se e als o In re S.M

.F. , No. M2004-00876-COA- R9-PT, 2004 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 826, at *24–26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec

. 6, 2004) (no perm. app. filed) . Ba sed on the rec ord prese ntly befor e this Court, we conclude that the B aker s proved, by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, that the Hes willfully failed to visitA.M.H. during the four months immediately prec eding the filing of the B aker s’ petition to terminate the He s’ par ental rig hts. Accor dingly , we a ffirm the trial court’ s finding that the Hes ha ve abandoned A.M.H.

4. F at he r ’s St at us a s a Le ga l P ar e nt

When the Ba

kers f iled their petition to terminate the He s’ par enta l rig hts in thi s case , the fo llo wi ng ve rs ionof

se c tio n 3 6- 1- 11 3 w a s in e ff e c t: The pa renta l rig hts of any

person who is not the leg al par ent or g uardia n of a child . . . may also be terminated base d upon any one (1)
or mor e of the fo llo wi ng a dd iti on a l g ro un ds :

. . . . (i i) Th e pe rs on ha s f

a il ed, wi tho ut g oo d c aus e or e xcu se , to
make re a so na

ble a nd c on sis te nt pay me nts fo r the su pp ort of the c hil d in acc ordanc e with the child support g uidel i n es p rom ulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-101;

. . . .-97- (iv) The person ha s failed to manife st a n abil ity and willingness to assume le g al and phy sical custody of the c hild; (v) Placing custody

of the c hild in the pers o n ’s leg al and phy sical custody

would pose a risk of substantial harm to the phy sical or psy cholog ical we lfare of the c hild; or (v i) Th e pe rs on ha s faile d to fi le a pe tit ion to estab lis h paternity of t he child within thirty (30) day s after

notice of a lleg ed paternity by the child’s mother . . . .

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(9) (A) ( 2001). In its memorandum opinion, the trial court made the following ruling reg arding Father’s pa renta l rig hts to AMH:

Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113( g )(9) (ii), (iv), ( v), and ( vi): T h e Court concludes, by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that, a t the tim e of t he fil ing of the Pe tit ion to T e rm ina te Pa re nta l R igh ts , ShaioQiang (Jack) He , was not the leg al par ent or g uardia n of AMH. The Cou rt further

conclude s, by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, that S haio-Qia ng (Jack) He ’s par ental rig hts should be terminated beca use: (1) Mr. H e h a s f

a il e d , w ith o u t g o o d c au s e o r e xc u s e , to make
re a so na ble a nd c on sis te nt pay me nts fo r the su pp ort of AM H in
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h h i s ab i l i t y t o p a y; (2 ) M r. He ha s e ng a g e d inon ly tok e n v isi ta tio n w ithAM H; (3 ) Mr

. He ha s faile d to ma nif e st a n a bil ity a ndwi lli ng ne ss t o a ssu me leg al and phy sical custody of AMH; and (4) Placing custody

of AMH in Mr . He’ s leg al and phy sical custody would pose a risk of substantial ha rm to the phy sical or psy cholog ical welfa re of the child.
(empha sis added).

On app e a l, F a the r a

rg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d inre lying on theabo ve cit ed st a tut e to terminate his pa

renta l rights. He cites to the voluntary acknow ledg ment of pate rnity he executed on Marc h 15, 2002 and conte nds t h at t h is acknowle dg ment, consistent with our supreme court’s decision in Jo ne s v . G

ar re tt , 9 2 S. W.3 d 8 35 (T e nn . 2 00 2) , ma ke s th e a fo re me nti on e d s ta tut e in ap p li c ab le to th e p r e s e n t c a s e

. Co n v e r s e ly , th e B ak e r s ar g u e th a t, s in c e F a th e r d idn o t file a petition to establish paternity as re quired by

section 36-1-113( g )(9) (A)( vi) of the Tenne ssee Code within thirty(30) day s after he re ceive d notice he w as t h e b i o l o g ical father of A MH, the afor ementioned statute does apply in this case. The Ba

kers a lso assert that no Te nnessee court ha s e ve r r ule d th a t a

vo lun tary

a c kn ow le dg me nt of pat ernity is o n e qu a l f

oo tin g wi th the statut orily require d “petition to establish paternity ,” ther efor e, the statute a pplies since ther e has ne ver be en an a d ju d ic a ti o n o f a n y s u c h p e ti ti o n in th is c a s e

. M o r e o v e r , th e B ak e r s ar g u e th a t th e leg islatureT h e B a k e rs fi le d the ir p e tit io n o n J u n e 2 0 , 2 0 0 1 . F a the r d id no t f ile th e a c k n o w le d g m e n t o f p a te rn ity in th is 31

c a se u n til M a rc h 1 5 , 2 0 0 2 , the re fo re , the c u rr e n t v e rs io n o f the sta tute w o u ld n e g a te h is a ttem p ts to e sta b lish p a te rn ity

a fter the fi ling o f t h e ter m ina tio n p e tit io n

. -98- rec ently amende d the af

oreme ntione d statute, and they urg e this Court to apply

the policy

for the amendment, a s they

perc eive it, to the pre sent ca se.
At the outset, we must de termine which version of the statute at issue applies to the pre sent
case . The B aker s filed their pe tition t o terminate the Hes’ pa renta l rig hts to A.M.H. on J une 20, 2001. T h e l egislature amended se ction 36-1-113( g )(9) of the Te nnessee Code in 2003 to provide
a s f oll ow s: The pa

renta l ri g hts of any

person who, at t

he tim e of t

he fil ing of a petition to terminate the parental rights of such person or, if no such pe tit ion is f

ile d, at t he tim e of the fil ing of a pet iti on to ado pt a c hild , is not the leg al par ent or g uardia n of such c h i l d . . . may also be termi n at ed base d upon any one (1) or more of

the following additional g rounds[.]

Te nn

. Cod e An n. § 36 -1 -1 13 (g )( 9) (A ) (2 00 3) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; see also 2003 Tenn. P ub. Acts ch. 231, § 10. I n light of this amendme nt, our supreme court ha s noted that “ther e now e x ists st atutory authority to apply the additional g rounds for te rmination enumerated in section 36-1- 113(g )(9) (A) to persons who ha ve esta

blished leg al par entag e, but did so subsequently to the filing of a pe tition seeking termination of their pa renta l rig hts.” In re D. A.H

. , 142 S.W .3d 267, 272–73 (Tenn. 2004)

. 31 I n In re D.A .H. , th e pe tit ion e r ar g ue d tha t the ne w s ta tut ory la ng ua g e sh ou ld b e app lie d r e tr oa c tiv e ly to enable the trial court to apply the statute to the biolog ical fat h er i n t h at case. Id . at 273. Our supr e me c o u r t d is a g r e e d , h o ld in g th a t th e a me n d e d s tatu te d o e s n o t a p p ly r e tr o a c ti v e ly

to cover events alleg ed in a termination petition filed prior to the amendment of t he st atute. Id . at 274–75. Acc ording ly , we must apply the pre-2003 version of t he st atute in eff ect at the time the Ba

kers f iled their petition in the instant case.
Our supre me court addre ssed the pre -2003 lang uag e in sec tion 3 6 -1 -113(g )(9) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code in Jo ne s v . G ar re tt , 92 S.W .3d 835 (Tenn. 2002) . I n Jones , the biologic al mother and fathe r of the child never marrie d. Jones , 92 S.W .3d at 836. The mother voluntarily

surre ndere d her pa renta l rig hts to the child, and a non-re lative couple subsequently filed a petition to adopt the child on April 9, 1998. Id

. I n their petit ion, the adoptive pare nts soug ht to terminate the pa renta l rig hts of t he biol og ical father a lleg ing a bandonment of the child. Id

. There afte r, on May 26, 1998, the father filed a petition to establish his pa renta g e of the child. Id . at 837. On F ebrua ry 5, 1999, the trial court e ntere d an “Ag ree d Orde r” decla ring the father to be the biologica l father of the c hild. Id . At the conclusion of t he hea ring on the adoptive pa

rents’ pe tition, t he trial c ourt found that the fathe r “failed to file a petition to establish paternity within thirtyday s after

rec eiving notice fr om the child’s mother that he was be lieved to be the f ather o f t h e ch i l d

. ” Id . As a re sult, the trial court-99-

terminated the fathe r’s pa

renta l rig hts pursuant to section 36-1-113( g )(9) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code. Id

. Ou r s u p re m e c o u rt d i s agr ee d , h o l d i n g:

The leg is l at u re’s use of the pr esent tense (“is not the leg al par ent”) in d ic a te s th a t th e g r o u n d s f o r te r mi n a ti n g p ar e n ta l rig h ts u n d er Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d sec tio n [36- 1- 11 3( g )( 9) (A )] do not app ly t o p er s o n s wh o ar e l e g a l p ar en t s att h e t i m e o f t h e p ro ce ed i n g. Clearly , [t he fathe r] mee ts the definition of “leg al par ent” be cause he
wa s ad jud ic ate d to be the fat

he r of [the mother’s] child prior to the proc e e din g whi c h re su lte d in the te rm ina tio n o f hi s p are nta l ri gh ts

. Thus, we find that the plain lang uag e of Te nnessee Code Annotated section [36-1-119(g) (9 )( A) ] s u p p o rt s [ t h e f at h er ’s ] co n t en t i o n t h atthe statut e is i na

pp lic able to h im.

. . . . A father who e stablis h es pate rnity prior to a termination pro c e e d in g s h o u ldb e p e r mi tt e d to e n jo y th e b e n e f

it o f h a ving established pate rnity . One suc h benef it is t o be exem p t fr o m the additional g rounds for te rminating pare ntal ri ghts under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction [36-1-113(g )(9) (A)]. After a father ha s been g rante d an ad

jud ic ati on of p ate rn ity , it

is i nc on g ru ou s to te rm inate his pa re nta l r ig hts be c aus e he faile d to tim e ly fi le a pe tit ionto e sta

bli sh p a t e r n i t y.
Id . at 839 (e mphasis added)

. The B aker s arg ue that there has never been an “adjudication of pate rnity ” in the pre sent ca se. The B aker s cite to the introductory para g raph of

our supreme court’s holding in Jones , wher ein the court stated a s follows: “We hold that Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion [ 36-1-113( g )(9) (A)( vi)] applies only

to case s in which no leg al re lationship between the p ar en t and child has been established.” Id

. at 836. The Ba kers note that the supreme court did not ela b o ra t e o n what constitutes a “lega l relationship betwee n the parent and the child.” I n light of the supreme court’s decisi o n in Jones , th e B ake rs se e min g ly c on c e de that a n “ Ag re e d O rd e r” e sta bli sh ing pate rn ity

is sufficie nt, however , a voluntary acknow ledgm ent of paternity is not sufficient as it is not an “adjudication.” Conversely , the Hes a ssert that the B aker s’ position on appeal ove rlooks section 24- 7- 11 3 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e wh ic h the y c on te nd pla c e s a vo lun tary a c kn ow le dg me nt o f p a te rn ity
o n e q u a l f o o t i n g w i t h a n a d

j u d i c a t i o n o f

a p e t i t i o n t o e s t ab l i s h p a t e r n i t y.
We find the B aker s’ position on appeal to amount to an attempt to li mit im permissibly the supreme c ourt’s holding in J o nes
. S ection 24-7- 113 of the Te nnessee Code provides, in re levant pa rt , a s f oll ow s:-100- (a) A voluntary

acknow ledg ment of pate rnity

. . . shall constitut e a legal finding of pat ernity on the i ndividual named as the father of the child in the acknowledgm ent , s ub je c t to re sc iss iona s p ro vid e d in
su bs e c tio n ( c ). Th e a c kn ow le dg me nt, unles s r e sc ind e d p ur su a nt t o subsection (c ), shall be conclusive of that father’s paternity without furthe r o rd

e r o f th e c ou rt

.

. . . . [(b)](3) No judicial or administrative procee dings are required , nor shall any such proc eeding s be permitted, to ratify an uncha lleng ed acknow ledg ment of paternity in order to cre ate the c onclusive status
o f t h e a c k n o w l e d g m e n to f

p a t e r n i t y.

. . . . (e) (1 ) I f the voluntary

acknow ledg ment has not bee n resc inded pu rs ua nt t o s ubsect ion ( c ), the a c kn ow le dg me nt may only be challenged on the basis of fraud, whether extrinsi c or i n t ri nsic, du re ss, or ma te ri a l mi sta

ke of fa c t.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 24-7-113 (2003) (emphasis added). “ [S ection 24-7- 113 of the Te nnessee Code]
e s t ab l i s h e s a s i m p l i f

i e d p r o c e d u r e f

o r u n m arr i e d f

a th e r s t o l e g a l l y e s t ab l i s h t h e i r p a t e r n i t y without the inte rv e nti on of the c ou rt , by simplyexecuting a

voluntary

acknow ledg ment of pate rnity .” In re C.A .F. , 114 S.W .3d 524, 528 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ( emphasis adde d).

Adm ittedly , all of the c ases whic h have a ddresse d the application of the statute at issue involved a biolog ical father filing a petition to establish paternity

. Se e In re D. A.H

. , 142 S.W .3d
a t 27 1; Jones , 9 2 S. W.3 d at 83 7; I n re S

. M. , 14 9 S .W.3d63 2, 64 1 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 4) ; In re H.E.J. , 124 S.W .3d 110, 113 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Howeve r, we believe that a biologic al father who executes a

voluntary acknow le d g me n t o f

p aternity prior to the termination procee ding is e x empt fr om theapp lic a tio n o f the ve rs ionof se c tio n 3 6- 1- 11 3( g )( 9) (A ) o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e app lic able to this ca se. See Jones , 92 S.W .3d at 840 (“A fathe r who establishes paternity prior to a termination proce eding should be permitted to enjoy the benefit of having established pate rnity .”). The Ba kers also overlook the de finition of “leg al par ent” f ound in the adoption code:
(2 8) “ L e g a l pa

re nt” me a ns :

. . . . (D) Aman who has be en a d j u d i ca t ed to be the leg al father of the child by any court or a dminist rative body of this state . . . or who has sig ne d, pu rs uant to § 24 -7-1 13

. . . a n u nre v oke d a nd swo rn-101- acknowledgm ent of paternity under the provisions of Tenne ssee law

. . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102(28) (2001) (emphasis added)

. The legislature expressly qualified the appl i cation of section 36-1-113( g )(9) (A) by stating that its provisi ons apply when “ [t ]he parenta l rig hts of any

person who is not the le ga l pa re nt or g uardia n of such child” have not be en esta blished. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g )(9) (A) (2001) (empha sis a dded). Pursuant to the statutory definition of “le g al pare nt,” a voluntary acknow ledg ment of paternity enter ed pursuant to se ction 24-7-113 of the Tenne s s ee C o de and pr ior to the trial court’s ruling on the termination petition preve nts the operation of section 36-1-113( g )(9) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code.

S i n ce Fa t h erex ec u t ed an ac k n o wl ed gm en t o f p at er n i t y p ri o r t o t h e t er m i n at i o n p ro ce ed i n gs in the instant case, w e conc lude that, consistent with the supreme court’s holding in J on e s and the definition of “leg al par ent” in the ve rsion of sec tion 36-1-102(28)( D) o f the Te nnessee Code applicable to this case, F ather established a “ le g al re lationship” betwee n himself and A.M.H. making section 36-1-119(g )(9) (A) of the Tennessee Code inapplicable to the present case . Acc ording ly , we reve rse the trial court’s de cision reg arding this iss ue.

5. P ersiste nt Condi tions Ground f or Ter m ination

Section 36-1-113( g )(3) (A) of the Tenne ssee, c ommonlyref err ed to as the “ persistent
c on dit ion s g ro un d” fo r t e rm inatio n, pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: (3) ( A) The child has bee n remov ed from the home of the par ent or g uardia n by or

de r o f a c ou rt for a

period of six (6) months and: (i) The conditions w hich led to the child’s re moval or other
c on dit ion s w hic h ina ll r e a so na ble pr ob abil ity

wo uld c aus e the c hil d to be subjecte d to further abuse or neg l ec t an d which, ther efor e, preve nt t h e ch i l d’s safereturn to the c are of the pa rent(s) or g ua rd ia n( s) , s til l pe rs ist ; (ii) Ther e is littl e li k el i h ood that these c onditions wil l be
re me die d at a n e arl y

date so that th e c hild can be safe ly re turne d to the par ent(s) or

g uardia n(s) in the ne ar f

uture; and (i ii) Th e con tin uatio n o f the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n a ndc hil d rela tionship gre atl y

d i m i n i s h es t h e c h i l d ’s ch an ce s o f e ar l y i n t egr ati on into a safe , stable and pe rmane nt home.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(3) (A) ( 2001) (e mphasis added)

. I n its memorandum opinion, the tr ia l c ou rt c on c lud e d, a s a

ma tte r o f l a w, that “th is se c tio n of the statut e [is] in app lic able to this c aus e-102-

be c aus e AM H w a s n ot r e mov e d fr om [the He s’ ] c us tod y by State a c tio n, rathe r [the He s] vo lun tari ly relinquished custody

and g uardia nship of AMH throug h a conse nt order a war ding c ustody .”
On appe al, the B aker s arg ue that this g round for termination does not re quire re moval of a
c hil d b y the state be fo re it m a y

app ly in a g ive n case . F urthe r, the B ake rs c on te ndthat th e statut e do e s n ot r e qu ir e that th e c hil d at is su e be “ fo rc ibl y re mov e d” fr om the pa

re nt’ s cus tod y , b ut i t me re ly require s that a child is “no longe r an occupant of the pare nt’s home.” The y assert that “re moval” can e v e n b e a c c o m p l i s h e d b y a b i o l o g i c a l p ar e n t ’ s v o l u n t ar y r e l i n q u i s h m e n to f c u s t o d y t o a n o t h e r

p ar t y. Conversely , the Hes a

rg ue that the statute r equire s some form of state action in ac complishing the
remova l before it may

apply in a g iven ca se.
When we ar e ca lled upon to construe the lang uag e ins erte d into a st atute by the leg islature,
we e mpl oy

the fo llo wi ng princ ipl e s: Construction of statutes and application of law to fac ts are que stions
o f l a w , w h i c h w e r e v i e w u n d e r a p u r e l y de novo standard, a ccor ding no defe renc e to the conc lusions of law made by the lower courts. See Gan ze v oo rt v . R us se ll , 9 4 9 S

. W

. 2 d 2 9 3 , 2 9 6 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 7 )

. In construing statutes, this Court’s role is “‘to ascertain and g ive ef fec t t o t h e l egi s l at i v e i n t en twi t h o u tu n d u l y re s tri ct i n g o r e x p an d i n g a s t at u t e’ s co v er age b ey o n d i t s i n t en d ed scope.’ ” H ou gh ton v . A ra ma rk Educ. Re s., Inc. , 9 0 S

. W

. 3 d 6 7 6 , 6 7 8 (T en n

. 2 0 0 2 ) ( q u o t i n g Owens
v . S tate , 908 S .W. 2d92 3, 92 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; State v. Sliger , 846 S.W .2d 262, 263 (Tenn. 1993) ). L eg islative intent is d erive d from the plain and or dinary

meaning of the s t atutory lang uag e unless the statute is ambiguous. S e e Owens , 908 S.W .2d at 926. I f statutory lang uag e is ambig uous, then we must l o o k to the entire statutory
s chemeto determine le g islative intent. Id

. Component pa rts of a
s t a t u t e s h o u l d b e c o n s tru e d , i f p o s s i b l e , c o n s i s t e n t l y a n d r e a s o n ab l y. Se e Sta te v . A lfo rd , 970 S.W .2d 944, 946 (Tenn. 1998)

.
In re D. L. B. , 118 S.W .3d 360, 365 (Tenn. 2003). “I f a statute’s lang uag e is e x presse d in a manner devoid of a mbiguity , courts ar e not at liberty to depart from the statute’s w ords.” Freeman v. Marco Transp. Co. , 27 S.W .3d 909, 911 (Tenn. 2000)

. The de finition section of the adoption code does not define the term “ remove d.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 (2003). “When approaching statutory text , courts must also presume that the leg islature say s in a statute what it means and means in a statute w hat it s ay s there .” Be llSo uth Telec om m s., Inc. v. Gree r , 972 S.W .2d 663, 67 3 (T en n . Ct. App. 1997). As such, we turn to the ordinary d ictionary

definition of the term at issue. See Freeman , 2 7 S. W.3 d at 91 2; Gleave s v. Checker Cab Transit C

orp., Inc. , 15 S.W .3d 799, 803 (Tenn. 2000). “Removal” is define d as “[t] he transfe r or moving of a pe rson or thing from one loc ation, position, or r esidenc e to another.” Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary

1298 (7th ed. 1999). Conspicuously absent from this de finition is t he re quirement-103-

that remova l be acc omplished by a state e ntity . The He s and the Amici a rg ue that the r equire ment that the remova l be conducte d “by order of a c ourt” a dds cre dence to their assertion that the removal must be acc omplished by a state e ntityin order f or this gr ound for termination to apply . We decline to adopt such a r estrictive a pplication of the statute.

We a re c og nizant o f the fa c t tha t man y of ou r de c isi on s, too nu me ro us to ci te he re , d e a l w ith t h i s gro u nd for termination in the context of a c hild being r emoved f rom the par ents by

the Tenne ssee De partment of Children’ s Service s. Howeve r, our rese arc h has re veale d no Tenne ssee c a se int e rp re tin g the statut e a t is su e in the ma nn e r u rg e d u po n th is C ou rt by the He s a ndthe Am ic i. I n fac t, this C ourt has pre vious l y ad d re s s ed the application of the a fore mentioned g round for te rm inatio n intw o c a se s w he re the c hil d w a s r e mov e d f ro m th e pa

re nt a nd pla c e d wi th ano the r p arty without state involvement. Se e I n re R. D.T. , No. E2003-01835- COA-R3-PT, 2004 Tenn. App. LEXI S 516, at *37–39 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 12, 2004) (pe rm. app. de nied, 2004 Tenn. L EXI S 947 (N ov . 8 , 2 00 4) ); I

n re V .D. , No. M2003-00186-COA- R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 465, at *2 4– 28 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . July 26 , 2 00 4) (n o pe rm

. a

pp

. fi le d)

. I t is no t f

or thec ou rt s o f this state to alter or amend a statute. I nstead, we must sim ply interpre t and a p p l y t h e s t at ute as written by the leg islature. See Gleav es , 15 S.W .3d at 803. The statute at issue is pla in and unambig uous. Had the leg islature i n t en d ed for this g round for termination to apply

only in those instances whe n the Te nn e sse e De pa

rtme nt o f C hil dr e n’ s Se rv ic e s r e mov e d t he c hil d f ro m th e bio log ic a l pa

re nts , it c ou ld have c lear ly

stated as much. Acc ording ly , we find that the statute at issue may apply when a pare nt volunta rily

relinquishes custody

of a minor c hild to another party pursuant to a c onsent custody order . Thus, we r ever se the trial c ourt’s conc lusion of law on this issue.

Whil e the t ri al court’s le g al justification for holding that section 36-1- 113(g )(3) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code did not apply in this case constitutes er ro r, the statute re mains inapplicable f or another rea son. I n In re Audr e y S. , No. M2004-02758-COA- R3-PT, 2005 Tenn. App. L EXI S 539, at *76 (Te nn. Ct. App. Aug . 25, 2005), t his Court ref used t o interpre t section 36-1-113( g )(3) (A) of the Te nn e sse e Cod e , a s w e do in the pr e se nt ca se , to e xclu de or de rs e nte re d inc a se s in vo lvi ng c hil d custody disputes. Howeve r, in I

n r e A u drey S. , we held that the per sistent conditions ground f or termination applies only “whe re the prior court order removing the child from the pa rent’s home was based on a judicial finding of depende ncy , neg lect, or abuse .” Id. a t *8 2; se e als o In re K.C ., Jr

. , No. M2005-00633-COA- R3-PT, 2005 Tenn. App. L EXI S 636, at *34–37 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 20 05 ). Th us , w hil e it is poss ibl e that the pe rs ist e nt co nd iti on s g ro un d for te rm inatio n may app ly in
case s where the child is not r emoved by the state, the orde r direc ting the c hang e in custody must be prompted by

a finding of depe ndency , neg lect, or a buse. The J une 4, 1999 consent order transfe rring custody of A.M.H. to the B aker s was not ba sed on a finding of depe ndency , neg lect, or a buse. As
a re sult, section 36-1-113(g )(3) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code is inapplica ble to the pre sent case. Ac c or din g ly , w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on on thi s is su e , a lbe it f or dif fe re nt l e g a l r e a so ns

.

G. Be st I nte re st o f A .M .H.-104-

A find i n g that the re cord c ontains clea r and c onvincing evidenc e of one of the statutory g rounds for termination does not end our inquiry on appea l. We mustnow turn our attention to the trial court’ s conclusion that terminating the Hes’ pare ntal rig hts was in the best intere st of A.M.H. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c )( 2) (20 01). Whe n c on du c tin g thestatut orily re qu ir e d b e st i n t er es tan al y s i s , t h e t ri al co u rtm u s tco n s i d ern u m er o u s fa ct o rs wh i ch m ayi n cl u d e t h e f o l l o wi n g: (i ) In d e te rm ini ng wh e the r t e rm inatio n of pare nta l or g ua rd ia ns hip rig hts is in t he best int ere st of t he child pursuant to t his part, the court
s h al l co n s i d er , b u ti s n o tl i m i t ed t o , t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1) Wh ether the pare nt or g uardia n has made such an adjustment of circ umstance, conduct, or conditions a s to ma ke it safe and in the child’s be st inte re s t t o be in the home of the par ent or g uardia n; (2 ) Wh e ther

thepa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n h a s f

a ile d to e ff

e c t a lasting a djustment after r easona ble ef forts by available social s e rv ices ag encie s for such dur ation of t i m e t h at lasting a djustment does not
rea sonably

appea r possible; (3) Whether

the parent or g uardia n has maintained r eg ular visitation or other contac t with the child; (4) Whether

a meaningf

ul relationshi p h as ot herw ise bee n established betwe en the pa rent or g uardia n and the c hild; (5) T h e effec t a chang e of c are taker s and phy sical environment is likely to ha ve on the c hild’s emotional, psy cholog ical and medica l condition; (6) Whether

the par ent or g uardia n, or other pe rson re siding wi th t he pare nt o r g ua

rd ia n, ha s sh ow n b ru ta lit y , p hy sic a l, s e xua l, emotional o r p sy cholog ical abuse , or neg lect towar d the child, or another child or adult in the fa milyor household; (7) Wh e th e r th e p h y s ic a l e n v ir o n me n t o f th e p ar e n t’ s or g ua rd ia n’ s home is he a lth y a ndsa fe , w he the r the reis c ri min a l a c tiv ity in the ho m e, o r whe ther ther e is such use of alcohol or c ontrolled
su bs ta nc e s a s may

re nd e r the pa

re nt o r g ua

rd ia n c on sis te ntl y

un able to car e for

the child in a saf

e and sta ble manner ; (8) Whether

the par ent’s or g uardia n’s mental and/or emotional status would be detrimenta l to the ch i l d o r prevent the pare nt or g uardian from ef fec tively providing safe and stable c are and supervision for the child; or (9) Wh e th e r

th e p ar e n t o r

g u ar d ian h a s p a idc h il d s u p p o rt consisten t wi t h the child support g uidelines promulg ated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-101.-105-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) ( 2001). This list is not exhausti ve, and the statute does not re quire the court to find the exi stence of eve ry fac tor befor e c o ncluding that terminating the biologic al pare nt’s pare ntal rig hts is in the child’s best intere st. Sta te v . T .S. W. , No. M2001-01735-COA- R3- J V, 2002 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 340, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2002).

I n conducting the best intere st analy sis in t his case, the trial court made the following fi nd ing s:
277. The Court concludes, by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, that AMH is a min o r ch i l d of tende r y ear s, who has deve loped a str on g ps y c ho log ic a l and e mot ion a l atta c hme nt to the B ake rs , a ndthat r e mov a l of

AM H f ro m th e B ake rs wou ld caus e substantial harm to AMH. 278. The Court conc ludes, by clea r and convincing evidenc e, that the B aker s have pr ovided AMH a safe , stable, hea lthy , loving
e nv ir on me nt f

or su c h a le ng th o f t ime that r e mov a l of AM H from that envir onment wou ld c a u s es ubstantial harm to AMH. 279. The Court conc lud es by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, that
c on tin uatio n o f any

pa re nt- c hil d r e la tio ns hip betw e e n A MH and either Mr . or Mrs. He g reatly diminis hes AMH’ s chanc es of ea rly integ ration into a saf

e, stable, and perma nent home. 28 0. Th e Cou rt

c on c lud e s th at th e ri sk s in he re nt in re mov ing AM H fr o mAM H’ s p re s e n tci rc u m s t an ce s s u b s t an t i al l y o u t we i gh any risks posed by

transcultura l pla ceme nt and loss of contac t wi th A MH ’s bio log ic a l pa re nts , th e He s. 281. The Court conc ludes, by clea r and convincing evidenc e, that the re is pa

re nta l mis c on du c t or ina

bil ity to pa

re nt by the He s. 282. The Court conc ludes, by clea r and convincing evidenc e, that b o t h Mr. and Mrs. H e ar e unfit par ents, based on abandonme nt of AMH by both Mr. and Mrs. He

. 283. The Court c oncludes, by clea r and convinc ing e vidence , that it is i n AMH’s be st interest to terminate the pa renta l rig hts of both Mr. and Mrs. He

. 284. Apply ing the fac tors in Ten nessee Code Annotated § 36-1- 113(i)(1–9) for de termining whether termination of par ental rig hts is in t he best in t ere st of the minor child, the Court conclude s, by clea

r and convincing evidenc e, that termination of the Hes’ pare nta l rig hts is i n th e be st i nte re st o f A MH beca use: (1) the Hes ha ve failed to make such an adjustment of
c ir c ums ta nc e s, c on du c t, andc on dit ion s a s to make it-106- sa fe a n d i n A M H ’ s b e s t i n t e r e s t t o b e i n t h e He s’ home; (2) the Hes have failed to maintain r eg ular, m eaning ful visitation and contact with AMH; (3) the Hes ha ve failed to estab l i s h a meaningf ul relationship wi t h AM H due to the He s neg lect and inatte nti ve ne ss; (4) the ef

fec t of a c hang e of c are taker s and phy sical environment will have a neg ativ e and de trimental imp a c t on AM H’ s emo tio na l andps y c ho log ic a l w e llb ei n g; (5 ) the ph y sic a l e nv ir on me nt of th e He s’ ho me is unhealthy and unsaf

e; (6) Mrs. Hes’ [si c] emotional i nstabilitywould be detrimental to AMH; and (7) the Hes’ [si c] ha ve failed to pr ovide anythi n g m o re than to ke n s up po rt

fo r A MH , de sp ite the He s’ abil ity to p a y su c h s up po rt

. On app e a l, the He s arg ue that the re c or d do e s no t su pp ort the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s. Gr e a te r S e a ttl e has submitt ed a brief to this Court prese nting c erta in social scienc e information aimed at addr essing the nee d for the c ourts of this state to consider c ultural fac tors when de ciding case s of this nature.
Since voluntarily

relinquishing c ustody

of A.M.H. to t

h eB a k e r s , th eH e s h ave not maintaine d reg ular visi tation with A.M.H. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( i)(3) ( 2001). Reg arding the initial three month foster ca

re pe riod, the trial court made the f ollowin g fi n d i n g which the He s do not dispute:
During the ninety -day foster c are period, F ebrua ry 24, 1999, to May 23, 1999, the Hes visited the Ba kers’ home for approximately one (1) hour eac h wee k, a total of a pproxi mately

twelve ( 12) hours during the first thre e m o n t hs of AMH’s life . During this period, neither the Ba kers nor Mid-South placed any

restrict i o n s on the fre quency or d u r a ti o n o f th e H e s ’ v is it s in th e B ak e r s ’ h o me

. T h e H es neve r reque sted to visit AMH m ore freque ntly or for longe r periods during the ninety -day

foster c are period . . . .

As for the Hes’ visitation betwe en J u n e 4 , 1 9 9 9 (the date of the juve nile court’s c onsent custody order ) and January

28, 2001 (the last time the Hes visited A.M.H.), the trial court made the following finding which the He s do not dispute:

Be tween J une 4, 1999, and J anuary 28, 2001, either Mr . or Mrs. He , or both, visited AMH in the Ba kers’ home, approximately eig hty (80)A. M

. H

. ha s l i ved wi t h t he B ake r s s i nce s he was l es s t han one mont h ol d, and for al mo s t s eve n y ear s s he has 32
kn own n o ot her par ent s , no ot her home, no ot her env i r onment , no ot her s i bl i ng s , and no ot her l i fe. T he di s s ent conc edes t h a t t h e r e i s n o m e a n i n g f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p o f

p a r e n t a n d c h i l d b e t w e e n t h e He s a n d A

. M

. H.

-107- times. The Hes visited AMH, on a vera g e, appr ox imately once pe r wee k. There wer e som e occasions when the Hes would go two w eeks
or lon g e r b e tw e e n v isi ts w ithAM H. Th e a ve ra g e tim e of e a c h v isi t
was a pproxi mately

one (1) hour, with the shor test visit l asting appr o xim a te ly

th irty ( 3 0 ) mi n u te s a n d th e lo n g e s t v is it s la s ti ng approximately

t wo (2) hours. The appr ox imately eig hty (80) hour s of time that the Hes ha ve visited AMH, fr om J une 5, 1999, to J anuary 28, 2001, amount to a total of less than f our (4) day s of AMH’s life

. Th e He s d id n ot v isi t A MH a ft e r the Janu ary 28 , 2 00 1 in c id ent at th e B ake rs ’ h ome . T he on ly
c on ta c t a ft e r that date wa s a ph on e c a ll by Mo the r to the B ake rs ins truc tin g the m to c ome to the He s’
apa rt me nt t o r e tr ie ve a

ba by be d th e B ake rs pr e vio us ly g a ve the He s.
Th e re c or d a lso e sta

bli sh e s th a t th e He s hav e no t e sta bli sh e d a me a nin g fu l r e la tio ns hip wi th A.M.H. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( i)(4) (2001). Mother g ave birth to A.M.H. on J anuary 28, 1999, and the He s voluntarily place d A.M.H. in the ca re of the B aker s on Fe bruary

24, 1999, a few wee ks after

she was born. A.M.H. has rema ined in the continuous custody of the B aker s’ since that time, which amounted to the f irs t fi v e y ears of her

life by the time the trial in this matter was conducte d. On M ay 8, 1999, the Hes sent Mrs. Ba ker a Mother’s Day car d which st ated: “Y ou are 32 the rea l Mom of [A.M.H.].” After the juve nile court e ntere d the J une 4, 1999 conse nt custody order , the Hes wanted A.M.H. to c all the B aker s “mommy ” and “ daddy ” and r efe r to the He s as “Jack” and “Casey .” The very

bond that the Hes soug ht to foster between A.M.H. and the B aker s was, as the
re c or d d e mon str a te s, e sta bli sh e d inthi s c a se . D r. G ol ds te in, thec ou rt app oin te d p sy c ho log ist , testified t hat A.M.H. views t he B aker s as her “psy cholog ical par ents.” In conducting his evaluation of A.M.H., he noted that she ha s a high l evel of attachme nt to the Baker s, but she does not have a simil ar attachment to the He s. He c onducted an “attac hment s ession” in September of 2003 and
no te d th a t A .M .H .’ s b e ha vio r, a s d e mon str a te d b y thevid e ota

pe of these ssi on , s up po rt s th e se conclusions. Whil e he ag ree d that A.M.H. did a pproac h the Hes during the session, he opined that she did so based on the Hes’ use of food and g ifts to reinforc e her interac tion.

Th e re c or d a lso de mon str a te s th a t a c ha ng e in c are take rs a ndph y sic a l e nv ir on me nt at th is sta g e in A.M .H. ’s lif

e wi ll l ike ly

ha ve a n a dv e rs e a ff

e c t onhe r e mot ion a l a ndps y c ho log ic a l w e ll being

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(i)( 5) (2001) . After stating his opinion reg arding the strong
a tta c hme nt A .M .H . n ow ha s f or the B ake rs , D r. Go lds te in t e st ifie d th a t A .M .H . w ou ld l ike ly experience separ ation anxiety and could possibly develop a seve re de pressive disorde r if she w ere re mov e d fr om the B ake rs

. We are a lso min df ul of thestr on g a tta c hme nt A .M .H . h a s d e ve lop e d to the B ake rs ’ oth e r c hil dr e n. We are c og nizant of the fa c t th a t th e He s p re se nte d e xpe rt te sti mon y

to contra dict Dr. Goldstein’s a ssertions, howeve r, the trial c ourt found that t h e He s’ experts lacke d-108-

cre dibilit y . We find n o cl ea r and convinc ing e vidence in the rec ord to disturb this finding. See We lls v . T

e nn. B d. of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999)

.
As pr e vio us ly

dis c us se d, we do no t g ive thesa me we ig ht a s th e tria l c ou rt didto the He s’ failure to pay

child support for A.M.H . during the pende ncy of this case below due to the Ba ker’ s ref usal to a cce pt such support. See Te nn . Code An n. § 36- 1- 11 3( i) (9 ) (2 00 1) . A dmi tte dly , th e re is
n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d t o i n d i c a t e t h a tt h e H e s ar e p r e s e n t l y u n ab l e t o c ar e f o r A

. M

. H

. f i n a n c i a l l y. Howeve r, we are permitted, as did the tria l court, to c onsider the parties’ ability to support A.M.H. should they

rec eive c ustody

of the c hild. Mother testified that, if she we re to re g ain custody of A. M. H. , sh e plann e d to re turn to Chi na . Sh e state d th a t sh e ha s a n a on e -b e dr oo m apa

rt me nt i n China curr ently

occupie d by

her gr andpar ents, and she, Father, A.M.H., and their two othe r childre n wo uldre sid e in the apa

rt me nt. Mo the r ind ic a te d tha t he r f a mil y wo uldhe lp t o p ro vid e fo r the He s’ financ ial n e e d s u p o n r e tu r n in g to Ch in a u n ti l F a th e r f o u n d a jo b

. F a th e r n o te d a t tria l th at the Ba kers’ have inc urre d a si zeable amount of debt in prosecuting their petition to adopt A.M.H. and terminate the Hes’ pa

renta l rig hts. Howeve r, t he Bake rs, unl ike t he Hes who face deportation, do
no t pr e se ntl y

fa c e the po ssi bil ity

of los ing the ir

c ur re nt so urc e s o f i nc ome . M or e ov e r, the re is
no thi ng in the re c or d to de mon str a te that, in sp ite of the ir size able le g a l bil l, the B ake rs arepr e se ntl y unable to provide for A.M.H

. The Hes also prese nted the testimony of their expert, Dr. Cooper, to a ddress the issue of the “one- child” rule in China. On direc t e x amination, Dr. Cooper testified that the Chinese g overnme nt does not impose fines on pare nts who have more than one child outside of China then r eturn to that country . Howeve r, under cross-e x amination, Dr. Cooper conce ded that t h e C h i n ese g overnme nt could i mpose such fines. I n a letter addre ssed t o this Court, the C hinese Embassy seeks to def

end its “one-c hild” policy

by stating that “there are various cir cumstance s under whic h people c an have more than one or t wo childre n. These c ircumstance s apply to Chinese citizens who return to China fr om ab ro a d with mor e than one c hil d. ” F urthe r, thele tte r s e e ks to i nf orm th e Cou rt

that th e Chi ne se g overnme nt does n o t i mpose financ ial penalties or r emove g overnme nt service s and bene fits for
v i o l at i o n s o f t h i s p o l i cy

. I t i s en t i re l y wi t h i n t h e p u rv i ew o f t h e C h i n es e go v er n m en t , as a s o v er ei gn natio n, to f

ormul a te a nd e nf

or c e su c h a poli c y

wi thi n Ch ina . H ow e ve r, ou r f oc us in this c a se mus t be on the be st interest of A.M.H., an Americ an citizen, and the eff ect such a policy may have on the Hes’ a bilityto provide for

her w ell-being should they reg ain custody of A.M.H. and r eturn to China. Most noteworthy

is the fac t that the letter doe s not elaborate on what “ circ umstances” war rant a n exception to the “one- child” policy or if the Hes qualify for suc h an exception. Nor doe s the letter indicate what sanctions are imposed for violating the policy

. Thus, we must c onclude, a s did the trial court, that the possibilityrema ins that the Hes c o u l d b e adve rsely penalized in some manner for violating the “ one-c hild” policy which, in turn, could ha ve an a dverse aff ect on A.M.H

. Finally , the trial court noted the Hes’ questionable c hara cter as evide nced i n the re cord by the He s’ de fi a nc e to le g a l auth ority a nd un truth fu l state me nts ov e r the c ou rs e of e ve nts g ivi ng ri se to the c ur re nt a pp e a l. T he tr ia l c ourt det erm ine d th a t su c h c ha ra c te r f la ws c ou ld h a ve a n a dv e rs e eff ect on A.M.H . The re cord in this case supports this conclusion.-109-

The re cord, vie wed in its entirety , fully supports the trial court’s conclusion that terminating the Hes’ paren t al ri g hts is in t he best intere st of A.M.H. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the tria l court’s decision in this reg ard.

V. C ONCL US I ON

I n the dissenting opinion filed in this case , it is arg ued that we apply “a dif fer ent standar d than would have been a

pplied had the termination of pare ntal rig hts been soug ht by the Tenne ssee De partment of Children’ s Services ( “DCS”).” The dissent conte nds that our appr oach
on thi s is su e “ is w ro ng .” Th e dis se nti ng op ini on is r e ple te wi th r e fe re nc e s to ho w the re su lt i n thi s c a se wo uldbe dif

fe re nt i f o nly

DC S we reinv olv e d. Re sp e c tf ull y , th is C ou rt

c a n o nly
a dju dic a te the c a se be fo re it. We a re no t a t li be rty

to c re ate hy

po the tic a ls o r t o w ishthat th e fa c ts in a g iven ca se we re othe rwise.

We a re a sk e d s imp ly

to r e so lve wh e the r the He s’ c on du c t in the fo ur mon ths imm e diate ly prec eding the B aker s’ petition to terminate their pa renta l rig hts was willful. The dissent acknow ledg es that in In re W .B., IV we state d that, in case s involving private parties, a pare nt’s l a c k o f k n o w l e d g e r e g ar d i n g t h e ab a n d o n m e n tg r o u n d f o r t e r m i n a t i o n i s m e r e l y “ a factor in determining willfulness.” In re W. B., IV , No. M2004-00999-COA- R3-PT, 2005 Tenn. App. LEXI S 262, at *38 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005) (empha sis added). A“fa ctor” is defined a s “[o] ne of two or

more qua ntities that when multipl ied tog ether y ield a g iven produc t.” Webster’s I I New Colleg e Dictionary

401 (2001). A f

actor is, theref ore, but one element to be c onsidered, pe rh aps a mon g ma ny , inre a c hin g a c on c lus ion . T hu s, wh e the r o r n ot a private pa

rty wi th
c us tod y of the c hil d n oti fi e d th e bio log ic a l pa re nts of the po te nti a l g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatin g the ir pare ntal rig hts is but one factor to be considere d. Yet, the dissent would impose a pe r se ru le in
c a se s o f this natur e , s ta tin g : “ Ho w c a n th is d isp ari ty be jus tif ie d? Fa ir ne ss d ic ta te s th a t pa re nts
a ndpe tit ion e rs in a ll t e rm inatio n c a se s b e he ld t o th e sa me stand ard , r e g ard le ss o f w he the r D CS is involved . . . .”

The a nswer to the que stion posit ed by the dissent is quite simpl e. Our s is a limit ed role

. “The g rounds for te rminating pare ntal rig hts in Tennessee are define d by statute.” Jones v. Ga rre tt , 9 2 S. W.3 d 8 35 , 8 38 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; se e als o Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g ) (2003) . As the jud ic ia l br a nc h o f g ov e rn me nt, we areto a dd re ss the iss ue pr e se nte d b y the He s in thi s c a se and ase rce rtain whe ther the statutory scheme adopted by

the leg islature comports with the F ou rt e e nthAm e nd me nt o f the Un ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on . T he dis se nt o ve rl oo ks the c on str a int s, or the la c k th e re of

, impo se d b y

the Un ite d St a te s Co ns tituti on a ndpr oc e e ds to f ormul a te wh a t it be lie ve s to be so un d p oli c y in this are a

of the la w. We a

retol d r e pe a te dly

by the dis se nt that it

is not fair f or the leg islature to re quire DCS to provide par ents with notice of the a bandonment g round for

termination while not requiring the same notice when private individuals are involved. Com

pare Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 2-403(a )(2) (2003) with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102-110-

(2003) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(2003) . The re ason the leg islature is permitted to make this dist inction is well settled in the law. When DCS, a state agency , seeks to terminate a biologica l pare nt’s pare ntal rig hts, the notice re quirement imposed upon DCS by the leg islature seeks to ensur e that the biolog ical par ent’s fundamental rig hts as pare nts are pr otected f rom unwar rante d state infring ement. The United States Supreme Court has r ecog nized as much, stating: “ When the Sta te moves to destroy wea kened f amilial bonds, it

mus t pr ov ide the pa

re nts with fundamenta lly

fair pr ocedur es.” Santosky v. Kram er , 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (e mph a sis a dd e d. ) Wh y

do we dr a w a

dis tin c tio n w he n p ri vate pa rt ie s a reinv olv e d? Be c aus e it is onlystate ac tion, not the actions of private individuals, which the Fourteenth Amendme nt seeks to saf

eg uard a g ainst. The Civil Ri ghts C ases , 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The ref ore, the l egi s l at u re i s p er m i t t ed t o m ak e t h e d i s t i n ct i o n wh i ch t h e d i s s en tfi n d s m o s ttro u b l i n g.
Whil e the dissent may

find this dist inction unjust, i t comprises the leg al framework w hich
mus t g uid e ou r r e so lutionof thi s is su e . “ Th e po we rs of the g ov e rn me nt s ha ll b e div ide d in to three distinct departments: leg islative, executive, and judicial.” Tenn. Const. art. I I , § l. “No person or persons be longing to one of these departments shall ex erc ise any of the powe rs properly belong ing to e ither of the othe rs, except in the ca ses her ein direc ted or pe rmitted.” Te nn . Co ns t. a

rt . I I , § 2. “ I t is prima

ri ly fo r the L e g isl a tur e to d e te rm ine the pu bli c po lic y of thi s state . . . .” Car

y v . Ca ry , 937 S.W .2d 777, 781 (Tenn. 1996) . “When the leg islature, acting with in i ts c on sti tut ion al p owe rs , h a s sp ok e n u po n a pa rt ic ula r s ub je c t, i ts u tte ranc e is the pu bli c policy of the State upon that subjec t, and the courts are without power to read into t he Con sti tut ion a re str

ain t of the le gis lat ure with respec t thereto.” Cav e nde r v . He witt , 2 3 9 S. W. 76 7, 76 8 ( Te nn . 1 92 1) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . “ [I ]f a mod if ic a tio n o r c ha ng e in s uc h p oli c y is de sir e d, the la wm akin g de pa rt me nt mus t be app lie d to , a ndno t th e jud ic iary , w ho se fu nc tio n is to decla re the law but not to make it.” Fields v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. , 249 S.W . 798, 800 (Tenn. 1922). B y

extending an invitation to our supre me court and the state le g islature to ena ct cha ng es in the law, the dissent, af

ter trying to c onvince us that the la w supports a diff ere nt conclusion on this iss ue, conc edes that the law is not as the dissent attempts to portray it. Otherwise, no suc h i n v i t a t i o n w o u l d b e n e c e s s ar y.

We are troubled by

the dissent’s attempt to fit the fac ts of this case into our de cision in In re W .B., IV

. T h e d i s s en ts t at es : “T h e m aj o ri t y i n t h i s ca s e d i s m i s s es t h e H es ’ l ac k o f k n o wl ed ge a s ‘ me re ly ’ a

fa c tor to c on sid e r i n d e te rm ini ng wh e the r the ir failu reto v isi t A .M .H . w a s w ill fu l,
eve n though that same factor was found t o be dete rminative in In re W .B., IV .” (e mph a sis added) . Reg arding the mother’s f ailure to visit her c hildren in In re W .B., IV , th e Cou rt , in addition to noting the lac k of notice to the mother , also noted that the mother did not know the wher eabouts of he r childre n. In re W. B., IV , 2005 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 262, at *36. As the Court stated, “[i] t is difficult to understand how Mother could have visited the children while she was unawa re of their whe rea

bouts.” Id. I n the pre sent ca se, the He s knew the w here abouts of A.M.H. for

the entire four month period at issue. Our re ading of In re W .B., IV reve als that the Cou rt fo un d th a t th e mothe r’ s la c k o f n oti c e of the g ro un d o f a

ba nd on me nt coupled with the mother’s lac k of knowledg e re g arding the wher eabouts of he r childre n constituted evidenc e that the mother’s f

ailure to visit was not willful. Thus, it is difficult to understand how the dissentT h e d isse n t ch a rg e s tha t w e “sid e ste p the re a l p ro b le m ” b e c a u se the sta tuto ry d e finiti o n o f ab a n d o n m e n t i s 33

t h e s ame r eg ar dl es s of

w h et h er t h e pet i t i on er i s D CS or a pr i v at e i n di v i du al ; h owe v er , t h e di s s en t ’ s c ompl ai n t t o t he le g islatu re d o e s n o t re la te to the d e finiti o n o f a b a n d o n m e n t, b u t r a the r to th e q u e stio n o f no tice . T h e d isse n t atte m p ts t o app l y a bl ank et r ul e bot h t o s t at e a ct i on an d t he conduct of pri vat e par t i es , al t houg h t he s t at ut e by i t s t er ms a dd r es s es
o nl y s t at e act i o n.

C o nd uc t p rior to , o r o utsi d e o f , t he statutory fo ur-m o nth p erio d i s releva nt o nly t o t he q ue st i o n o f wil l f ulne ss, 34

o r su p p o rt, o r th e lac k the re o f, wi t hi n t he f our
- m ont h pe r i od prescri b ed i n t he st at ut e. T hi s p ri nci p l e d o es not op en t he f l o o d gat es s o as t o al l o w a b road s weep of al l egat i o ns and event s i n t he ho p e t hat one or m o re o f them m i ght s t i ck. T here

m u st b e a n e x u s e sta b lishe d b e tw e e n the e v e n ts a lleg e d a n d the c ru c ia l f o u r-m o n th p e rio d tha t we a re m a n d a te d to
ex ami n e. T h e di s s en t h as f ai l ed t o s h ow t h at f ac t s w h i ch occ u r r ed b efo re t h e s t at u t or y pe r i od a r e det er mi n at i v e of

w h e the r th e H e s’ f a ilure to visit w ith in the fo u r m o n ths w a s w ill ful.
-111- jus tif ie s it s c on c lus ionthat th e la c k o f n oti c e of the g ro un d o f a

ba nd on me nt alone produce d the result this Court reac hed in In re W .B., IV

. 33

The dissent devote s a sig nificant a mount of discussion to our failure to discuss the tria l court’s f inding that the visitation by the Hes prior to the four month period at issue constituted “token visitation.” The dissent r efe rs to the statutory definition of “token visitation,” see Tenn. Cod e An n. § 3 6- 1- 10 2( 1) (C ) ( 20 03 ), a ndc on c lud e s th a t “ vis itatio n is tok e n if it i s either perf unctory , or

of an infr equent nature, or both.” (empha sis in original). T he dissent contends that the Hes’ visitation wit h A.M.H. prior to the four month period at issue is cruc ial to a de te rm inatio n o f w he the r the ir failu re to v isi t w ith in the fo ur mon th p e ri odwa s w ill fu l. 34
Pursuant to the definition of “token support,” the courts of this state are only conce rned with whether

the visitation during the four month period at issue was toke n in nature. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)( E) (2003) (def ining “ willfullyfailed to visit” as “ the willful failure , for
a pe ri odof fo ur (4 ) c on se c uti ve mon ths , to vis it o r e ng a g e in m or e than to ke n v isi ta tio n” ). Th us , wh e n w e e xami ne the fo ur -m on th p e ri oda t is su e in this c a se , w e fi ndthat th e He s d id n ot v isi t their daug hter at all. The dissent notes that visitation can be toke n if it is “perfunc tory ” or “infre quent.” It is difficult to see how no v isi ts du ri ng the fo ur -m on th p e ri oda t is su e c a nn ot, there fore , be included in the de finition of “token visitation.” I nstead of f ocusing on the statutory four- month period at issue, the dissent conte nds that we should consider the pattern of visitation
e ng a g e d inby

the He s si nc e the be g inn ing of the ir re la tio ns hip wi th the B ake rs in o rd e r t o asce rtain if they

willfullyfailed to visit A.M.H. What else should the Court consider outside of the statut ory

fo ur -m on th p e ri od ? On e c ou ld c on sid e r the fa c t th a t th e He s w a nte d th e B ake rs to raise A .M.H. until she turned eig hteen so the H es could re main in the United States. Ther e is the fac t that the Hes wanted A.M.H. to ca ll the Bakers “ mommy ” and “ daddy ” and the Hes “ J ack”
a nd“ Ca se y ” wh ic h c ou ld b e re le va nt t o a de te rm inatio n o f the He s’ wi llf uln e ss. Th e se fa c ts
oc c ur re d, ho we ve r, we ll b e y on d th e fo ur mon th p e ri oda t is su e . We arec are fu l to no te that, under our statutory scheme , they

can ha ve no bearing on ou r d e te rm inatio n o f w he the r the He s’ conduct within the four -month period wa s willful. The dissent acknow ledg es the most cruc ial fac t to our determination: “Of course , all of the He s’ visits with A.M.H. took pl ace prior to the
commence ment of the statutory four- month period.”-112-

We approa ch our duty

in this case somewhat differ ently than the dissent by

confining our analy sis to the parame ters of the statute which must g uide our de cision. The leg islature has direc ted that we a

re to c onsider the pa

rents’ c onduct in the four months pre ceding the filing of the petition to terminate their pa renta l rig hts. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-102(1) (2003). In the prese nt case , it is undi sputed that the He s did not visi t A.M.H. during the four months prior to the Ba kers’ petition to terminate the He s’ par ental rig hts.

On c e the pa

rame te rs of

ou r ana ly sis arelim ite d to the statut ory fo ur -m on th p e ri od , it

is appar ent that the line of de marc ation betwee n the majority opinion and the dissent is not as distinct as it mi g ht first appea r. The dissent c oncede s the exist ence of many of the fa cts we deem de terminative of this issue. The dissent notes that “[i] t is undisput ed that the He s did not vis it A .M .H . a ft e r the a lte rc a tio n at th e B ake rs ’ h ome on Janu ary 28 , 2 00 1” ; “ Th e ma

jority ri g htl y c on c lud e s” that “ the He s’ failu reto v isi t w a s n ot b a se d o n th e He s’ fe ar that th e y wo uld be ar rested and phy sically

harme d, as the He s asserte d”; and, “ I n the petition Brow n prepa red, Mother soug ht custody

of A.M.H., but did not reque st visit ation.”

Wit h ref ere nce to the H es’ motivation to avoid deportation, the dissent focuses upon Father’s te stimonyreg arding the cor relation between the calls fr om immi g ration off icials and the filing of the petitions to reg ain custody of A.M.H., f

inding suc h testimonyto be inconclusive. The dissent ar g ues that “the re is no evide nce on the substance of the conve rsation betwe en F ather and the INS official, a ny

issues raised by

the offic ial, or how the f

iling of the petition for custody would have a ddresse d any INS conce rns.” The dissent seeks to impose a “ proof be y ond a
rea sonable doubt” standa rd in pare ntal termination ca ses. Howe ver, our case law does not
su pp ort th e dis se nt’ s c ha

ra c te ri zat ionof

the e vid e nc e . Wh e n e va luatin g a tr ia l c ou rt ’s de c isi on in pa re nta l te rm inatio n c a se s, we mus t f ir st e va luate a

tria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t de novo , presuming those finding s to be corr ect unless the preponderanc e of the ev idence is otherwise. In
re M. J. B. , 1 40 S.W. 3d64 3, 65 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 4) . ( e mph a sis a dd e d) . “ Se c on d, we mus t determine whether

the fa cts, either a s found by the trial court or as supported by the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, c le ar ly an d c on v inc ing ly e sta bli sh the e le me nts re qu ir e d to terminate a

biologica l pare nt’s pare ntal rig hts.” Id . (empha sis added). “ ‘Will fulness’ doe s not require the same standa

rd of c ulpabilityrequire d by the pena l code.” In re Muir , No. M2002- 02963-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Te nn. App. LEXI S 831, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2003) (c itatio n o mit te d) . “ I nte nt i s se ldo m c apa ble of dir e c t pr oo f, a ndtr ie rs -o f- fa c t la c k th e abil ity to pe e r i nto a

pe rs on ’s min d to a sse ss i nte nti on s o r m oti vatio ns . A c c or din g ly , trie rs -o f- fa c t mu st infer intent f

rom circ umstantial evidence , including a person’ s actions or c onduct.” Id . at *17 (citations omitted).

I t is appare nt that the dissent has lost sight of the manne r in which the trie r of f act evaluates evidenc e. F ather ’s testimony is but one component of the trial court’s f inding that the He s’ re a so ns fo r f

ili ng the pe tit ion s to re g a in c us tod y we redrive n b y

a de sir e to a vo id deportation. As we set forth here tofore, the rec ord is reple te with instances whe n the Hes expressed conc erns a

bout deportation as it re lates to custody of their daug hter. Pare ntal termination ca ses ar e fa ctually driven a nd require individualiz ed dec ision making. Se e In re-113-

Swan son , 2 S.W. 3d18 0, 18 8 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . T he trie r o f f a c t is pe rm itt e d to dr a w a ll r e a so na ble inf e re nc e s f ro m th e e vid e nc e pr e se nte d o n a n is su e . Wemus t a lso de fe r t o c re dib ili ty determinations made by

the trier of

fac t. Se e We lls v . T

e nn. B d. of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999) . Fr om the ag g reg ate of the af oreme ntioned fac ts, it was rea sonable for the trial court to infer

that the Hes’ actions in filing the petitions to reg ain custody of their daug hter we re desig ned to avoid deportation. On appea l, this C ourt is not permitted to rejec t the infere nces draw n by the trial court from the cir cumstantial evidenc e and substitute our own infe renc es instead. See State v. Thacke r , 1 6 4 S

. W

. 3 d 2 0 8 , 2 2 1 (T en n

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Sta te v . Ev ans , 108 S.W .3d 231, 236–37 (Tenn. 2003) ).

Th e B ake rs ha ve a sk e d th is C ou rt to r e ve rs e the tria l c ou rt ’s or de r c on so lid a tin g the ir petition to terminate the He s’ par ental rig hts with Mother’s petition to modi fy the J une 4, 1999 custody order , and we find this issue to be without merit. Rega rding the trial court’s ruling s on the He s’ pr e -t

ri a l mo tio ns , w e a ff

ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s or de r d e nyingthe He s’ mot ion , p ur su a nt t o Rule 60.02, to set aside the June 4, 1999 custody order ; we af

firm the trial c ourt’s orde r denying the Hes’ motion to di smiss t he B aker s’ adoption petition; and we a ffirm the tria l court’s orde r denying the Hes’ motion to bifurcate the proc eeding s. Reg arding the Hes’ constitutional arg uments, we find that se ction 36-1-102 a nd section 36-1- 113 of the Te nnessee Code are not
un c on sti tut ion a l in lig ht o f the fa c ts i n th is c a se . We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in
ru lin g that th e no tic e pr ov isi on s f ou ndin s e c tio n 3 7- 2- 40 3 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e didno t app ly in this case. We conc lude that the trial c ourt did not err by ruling that the “supe rior par ental rig hts doctrine” did not apply to Mother’s petition to modify the J une 4, 1999 conse nt custody order

. Reg arding the g rounds for te rmination, the trial court did not err in ruling that the “se ttled purpose doc trine” did not apply in this case. Turning to the abandonme nt gr ound for termination,
we re ve rs e the tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g that th e Ap pe llants wi llf ull y faile d to su pp ort A .M .H . inthi s c a s e a s th e r e c o r d d o e s n o t c o n tainc le ar a n d c o n v in c in g e v id e n c e to s u p p o r t s u c h a f in d in g

. We conclude that the trial court erre d in finding that Fathe r wa s not the leg al par ent of A.M.H. w hen the Ap pe lle e s f

ile d th e ir pe tit ionin this c a se , th e re fo re , te rm inatio n o f F a the r’ s p are nta l rig hts under se ction 36-1-113( g )(9) of the Te nnessee Code was not appr opriate in this case . The trial court e rre d in finding that the “per sistent conditions” gr ound for termination codified at sec tion 36-1-113( g )(3) (A) of

the Tenne ssee Code r equire s the remova l of a c hild by the state. F or other leg al re asons, howeve r, we aff irm the trial court’s ruling that section 36-1- 113(g )(3) (A) of the Tenne ssee Code doe s not apply to this case. We af

firm the trial c ourt’s ruling that the re cord
c on ta ins c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e to s up po rt a fi nd ing that th e Ap pe llants wi llf ull y faile d to visit A.M.H., therefor e, termination of their par ental rig hts was justified in this case. F inally , we a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s c on c lus ionthat te rm inatin g the Ap pe llants ’ p are nta l r ig hts is i n th e be st interest of the minor child at issue in this case.Spec i f i ca l l y , t h e H es as k t h i s C ou r t t o ev al u at e t h e fol l owi n g : wh et h er t h e t r i al cou r t e r r ed i n i s s u i n g a n o35

co nt act ord er pri o r t o a t ri al i n t hi s m at t er; whet her t he t ri a l c o u rt erred i n ent eri ng an ord er app o i nt i ng t he B akers g u ar di an s of

A. M

. H

. ; a nd w het h er t h e t r i al c ou r t e r r ed i n de n y i n g t h ei r mot i on t o s et a s i de t h e or der a ppoi n t i n g M i dSout h a s ne xt f

r i end t o i nv es t i gat e t he B ake r s ’ adop t i on pet i t i on. As prev i ous l y not ed, a maj ori t y of t he i s s ues pre s ent ed by t h e B ak er s ar e n ot i n depe n den t i s s u es wh i ch de s er v e ev al u at i on , bu t t h ey c on s t i t u t e r es pon s es t o t h e i s s u es r ai s ed by t he H es i n t hi s ca s e. Fr om t he B ake r s s t at ement of t he i s s ues , we hav e el i ded t wo i ndependen t i s s ues whi ch hav e been ad d res sed herei n.

-114- We are cog nizant of the fac t that the parties ha ve raised other issues in their briefs which
are no t a dd re sse d inthi s O pin ion

. I n li g ht o f o ur ho ldi ng s o n th e iss ue s w hic h a redis c us se d in 35 this Opinion, a discussion of the other issues raised by the parties would have no be aring on the outcome of the case on appea l, theref ore, the y are prete rmitted. Costs of thi s appea l are to be taxed to the Appellants, Shao-Qiang (Jack) He and Qin L uo (Casey ) He , and their sur ety , for
w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________

ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE