2023 IL App (4th) 221028-U 

NO. 4-22-1028 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re I.G., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois), 

Petitioner-Appellee,

v. 

Ira G., 

Respondent-Appellant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Knox County 

No. 18JA26 

Honorable 

Curtis S. Lane, 

Judge Presiding.

 

JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Harris and Doherty concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed 

the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights, concluding no 

meritorious issues could be raised on appeal.

¶ 2 On November 1, 2022, the trial court entered an order terminating the parental 

rights of respondent, Ira G., to his minor child, I.G. Respondent appealed, and counsel was 

appointed to represent him. Appellate counsel now moves to withdraw, citing Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), on the basis that she cannot raise any potentially meritorious 

argument on appeal. The record indicates counsel sent a copy of her motion and accompanying 

memorandum of law to respondent by mail. Respondent has not filed a response. After reviewing 

the record and counsel’s memorandum, we grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the court’s 

judgment. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

April 19, 2023

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
- 2 - 

¶ 4 A. Case Opening

¶ 5 On May 18, 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship and a 

motion to have I.G. placed in temporary custody. The petition alleged I.G.’s environment was 

injurious to his welfare in that I.G. was born with cocaine in his system. Despite having notice, 

neither respondent nor I.G.’s mother, Amber W., appeared at the shelter care hearing. Following 

that hearing, the trial court found that there was probable cause to believe that I.G. was 

neglected, and it ordered temporary guardianship and custody of the minor to be placed with the 

Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

¶ 6 On July 10, 2018, the trial court adjudicated I.G. neglected pursuant to 

respondent’s stipulation and section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court 

Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)).

¶ 7 Following a September 11, 2018, dispositional hearing, the trial court made I.G. a 

ward of the court and granted continued guardianship and custody with DCFS. 

¶ 8 On February 9, 2021, the trial court changed the permanency goal to substitute 

care pending termination of respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 9 On February 28, 2022, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental 

rights. The petition alleged that respondent was an unfit parent in that he failed to (1) make 

reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that caused I.G. to be removed during a nine-month 

period after I.G. was adjudicated neglected, namely, the period of April 25, 2021, to January 25, 

2022 (the relevant nine-month period) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2020)); (2) make 

reasonable progress toward the return of I.G. to his care during a nine-month period after I.G. 

was adjudicated neglected, i.e., the relevant nine-month period (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 

2020)); (3) protect I.G. from conditions within the environment injurious to his welfare (750 
- 3 - 

ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 2020)); and (4) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or 

responsibility as to I.G.’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)). The State also included 

Amber W. in the petition to terminate parental rights; however, Amber W. surrendered her 

parental rights on May 24, 2022, and is not a party to this appeal.

¶ 10 B. Fitness Hearing

¶ 11 The trial court commenced the fitness hearing on October 4, 2022. Respondent 

failed to appear. At the hearing, the State first presented the testimony of Diana Bledsoe, I.G.’s 

caseworker since May 2021. According to Bledsoe, I.G. had been in care since 2018. Bledsoe 

testified respondent’s service plan required that he obtain substance abuse, mental health, and 

domestic violence assessments and follow recommendations and complete weekly drug screens. 

Respondent was further required to maintain appropriate housing and legal employment and

participate in parenting classes. According to Bledsoe, between April 25, 2021, and January 25, 

2022, respondent failed to: complete a substance abuse assessment; participate in drug drops,

parenting education and domestic violence classes, and individual counseling; maintain legal 

employment; and complete a mental health assessment. Regarding the requirement that 

respondent obtain safe and stable housing, Bledsoe stated, “To my knowledge, [respondent] has 

a house but nobody’s been able to get in the house to see if it’s safe or not.” Bledsoe indicated 

she called respondent and sent multiple letters in an attempt to inspect the house, however, 

Bledsoe “had no communication [with respondent] during that time frame.” According to 

Bledsoe, respondent’s last visit with I.G. was in “February or March of 2020.” 

¶ 12 On cross-examination, Bledsoe agreed respondent lived at the same residence 

throughout the course of the proceedings. Additionally, Bledsoe agreed that, prior to the relevant 

nine-month period, respondent had started some of the recommended services. However, 
- 4 - 

Bledsoe clarified, “I think he started some parenting. He’d done some substance abuse treatment, 

but then he tested positive so he was supposed to go back and do it again.” When asked about her 

inability to inspect respondent’s house, Bledsoe indicated she was unable to make contact with 

respondent until “April of last year when he came to court.” Bledsoe testified she made three 

appointments with respondent “in court,” but when she arrived at his house to inspect it, 

respondent was “never there.” 

¶ 13 The trial court found the respondent unfit as to paragraphs 7(a), (b), and (d) of the 

State’s petition to terminate parental rights. Specifically, the court noted that “maybe there was 

completion of a parenting education course *** if you incorporated it in your lifestyle, [the 

objective] of a parenting course is to have contact with your child, which [respondent] clearly 

has not for over two years.” Further, the court found, “[n]othing has been completed, and even if 

it was, clearly [respondent] did not absorb it into his lifestyle.”

¶ 14 C. Best Interest Hearing

¶ 15 On November 1, 2022, the trial court conducted the best interest hearing, which 

respondent attended. The court-appointed special advocate’s report and the best interest report 

filed October 26, 2022, were admitted without objection. The authors of the best interest report 

noted I.G. had been in the care of his maternal grandmother, Cindy R., “since he was two weeks 

old.” I.G. did not “have any relationship with his parents.” According to the report, respondent 

was not currently participating in any services. Bledsoe testified Cindy R. provided I.G. with 

emotional support, physical safety, clothing, food, and shelter, and all of his medical needs were 

met. Cindy R. was willing to provide permanence through adoption. On cross-examination, 

Bledsoe indicated I.G. had been in Cindy R.’s care for four years. Moreover, respondent’s last 
- 5 - 

visit with I.G. occurred nearly two years ago on March 16, 2020, “which would be in excess of 

half of [I.G.’s] life.”

¶ 16 Respondent testified when I.G. was born he quit “partying,” participated in drug 

treatment, and had not used drugs since. Respondent stated when the COVID-19 pandemic 

started, Lutheran Social Services (LSS) told him to “quit coming out there.” When LSS wanted 

him to “start coming back out there,” respondent alleged LSS called Amber W.’s phone number, 

even though they had respondent’s contact information. Respondent admitted he had 19 “dirty 

drops” because failing to attend a drug test was considered a positive result. Respondent testified

he and I.G. were attached to one another, and initially, respondent “never missed a visit.” 

However, when LSS reduced his visitation to one hour a month due to positive drug drops, 

respondent stopped attending because he “[did not] see the point.” Respondent acknowledged 

Cindy R. was “taking good care of [I.G.] and I feel that he’s safe and all that, but I just want him 

to know who I am and that I care about him.”

¶ 17 Respondent’s sister, Catherine G., testified on respondent’s behalf. Catherine 

indicated, “This is the first time [respondent] has been sober *** for a long period of time.” 

Catherine attributed respondent’s sobriety to I.G.’s birth. According to Catherine, she observed a 

visit between respondent and I.G. during a Christmas gathering two years prior in which I.G. 

called respondent “dad,” played with respondent, and “didn’t ask much of anything from 

anybody but [respondent].”

¶ 18 Following arguments, the trial court found termination of respondent’s parental 

rights was in I.G.’s best interest. Specifically, the court emphasized, “Nothing has been done due 

to the lack of contact by [respondent]” for two years. Noting respondent’s lack of involvement in 

the case, the court stated, “[I]t got to the point where [respondent’s counsel] was allowed to 
- 6 - 

withdraw because [respondent], did not appear at the hearings.” The court concluded it was 

“[o]verwhelmingly” in I.G.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.

¶ 19 This appeal followed.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 21 On appeal, appellate counsel seeks to withdraw on the basis that she cannot raise 

any arguments of potential merit.

¶ 22 The procedure for appellate counsel to withdraw set forth in Anders applies to 

findings of parental unfitness and termination of parental rights. In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 

685 (2000). According to this procedure, counsel’s request to withdraw must “be accompanied 

by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Anders, 

386 U.S. at 744. Counsel must “(a) sketch the argument in support of the issues that could 

conceivably be raised on appeal, and then (b) explain why he believes the arguments are 

frivolous.” S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 685. Counsel must then conclude the case presents no viable 

grounds for appeal. S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 685. In doing so, counsel should review both the 

unfitness finding and the best interest determination and indicate in the brief that she has done 

so. S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 685-86. 

¶ 23 In the instant case, counsel asserts she has reviewed the record on appeal,

including the report of proceedings of the termination hearing, and has concluded there are no 

appealable issues of merit. Counsel states she has considered raising the argument that the trial 

court erred in finding respondent failed to make reasonable efforts during the relevant 

nine-month period. She also indicates she has considered raising the argument that the trial court 

erred in finding respondent failed to make reasonable progress during the relevant nine-month 

period. Counsel further states she has considered raising the argument the court erred in finding 
- 7 - 

respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to 

I.G.’s welfare. Moreover, counsel considered raising an argument challenging the court’s best 

interest finding. We address each argument in turn and ultimately agree with counsel’s 

conclusion there are no issues of arguable merit to be raised on review.

¶ 24 A. Unfitness Findings

¶ 25 We first address appellate counsel’s assertion no meritorious argument can be 

made the trial court erred in finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress during 

the relevant nine-month period. 

¶ 26 Termination of parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 

et seq. (West 2020)) is a two-step process. In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 1. 

Parental rights may not be terminated without the parent’s consent unless the trial court first 

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, the parent is unfit as defined in section 1(D) of the 

Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354 (2005). 

Pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)), a 

parent may be found unfit if he fails to “make reasonable progress toward the return of the child 

to the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected *** minor.” A 

“parent’s failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct 

the conditions that brought the child into care during any 9-month period following the 

adjudication” constitutes a failure to make reasonable progress for purposes of section 

1(D)(m)(ii). 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020). “As the grounds for unfitness are 

independent, the trial court’s judgment may be affirmed if the evidence supports the finding of 

unfitness on any one of the alleged statutory grounds.” In re H.D., 343 Ill. App. 3d 483, 493 

(2003). 
- 8 - 

¶ 27 We will not disturb a finding of unfitness unless it is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68. “A finding is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence only if the evidence clearly calls for the opposite finding [citation], such 

that no reasonable person could arrive at the circuit court’s finding on the basis of the evidence 

in the record [citation].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, 

¶ 68. “This court pays great deference to a trial court’s fitness finding because of [that court’s] 

superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) In re O.B., 2022 IL App (4th) 220419, ¶ 29. 

¶ 28 Here, the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to 

make reasonable progress toward the return of I.G. during the nine-month period of April 25, 

2021, to January 25, 2022, as alleged in paragraph 7(b) of the State’s petition to terminate. 

Pursuant to respondent’s integrated assessment, he was to engage in substance abuse services, 

complete parenting classes, secure steady employment, and attend visits with I.G. According to 

the service plan dated April 27, 2021, respondent failed to appear for any of his drug drops since 

May 2020 and was not participating in any of the recommended services. At the October 2021

fitness hearing, Bledsoe testified she “had no communication” with respondent during the 

relevant nine-month period. Additionally, Bledsoe indicated respondent’s last visit with I.G. was 

“February or March of 2020.” Although respondent did initially complete substance abuse 

treatment in March 2019, he tested positive for cocaine on August 5, 2019, and September 6, 

2019. As a result, respondent was recommended for additional substance abuse services, which 

he failed to complete.
- 9 - 

¶ 29 Based on this evidence, respondent did not “substantially fulfill his *** 

obligations under the service plan” and therefore did not make reasonable progress toward the 

return of I.G. to his care. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020).

¶ 30 Because the State proved one ground of unfitness by clear and convincing 

evidence, we agree with appellate counsel no meritorious argument can be made that the trial 

court’s finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See H.D., 343 Ill. 

App. 3d at 493. 

¶ 31 B. Best Interest Findings

¶ 32 Appellate counsel next asserts she can make no meritorious argument that the trial 

court’s best interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 33 When a trial court finds a parent to be unfit, “the court then determines whether it 

is in the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 

352 (2004). “[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child 

relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 

364. The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights 

is in the minor’s best interest. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366. In making the best interest determination, 

the court must consider the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 

ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020). These factors include: 

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the 

child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial, 

cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, 

security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive 

placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes; (6) the child’s community 
- 10 - 

ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence, including the need for stability 

and continuity of relationships with parental figures and siblings; (8) the 

uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute 

care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the 

child.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009) (citing 705 ILCS

405/1-3(4.05) (West 2008)).

“The court’s best interest determination need not contain an explicit reference to each of these 

factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in 

affirming its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. On review, “[w]e 

will not disturb a court’s finding that termination is in the child[ ]’s best interest unless it was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961 (2005).

¶ 34 Here, the trial court’s best interest finding was not against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. The best interest report showed I.G. was thriving in his relative foster placement.

I.G. was bonded with Cindy R. and referred to her as “mom.” The report indicated I.G.’s 

physical and emotional needs were being met by Cindy R. and that “this is the only home that 

[I.G.] has ever known.” Cindy R. agreed to provide permanency for I.G. through adoption. 

According to the authors of the best interest report, I.G. did not “have any relationship with his 

parents” and lived with Cindy R. “since he was two weeks old.” Respondent failed to complete

mental health treatment or domestic violence classes; additionally, respondent failed to complete

drug drops since May 2020. Respondent cut off contact with LSS and failed to exercise visitation 

with I.G. since March 16, 2020. The court noted it did not believe respondent was “objecting to 

the termination,” referencing respondent’s testimony that “[respondent] stated he wanted to let 

the child know that he cared for him, that he loved him but he acknowledged that the 
- 11 - 

grandmother was taking good care of the child.” The court found that it was “[o]verwhelmingly” 

in I.G.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.

¶ 35 Based on our review of the record on appeal, we agree with appellate counsel no 

meritorious argument can be made that the trial court’s best interest determination was against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and 

affirm the court’s judgment. 

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 For the reasons stated, consistent with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) (eff. 

Feb. 1, 2023), we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

¶ 38 Affirmed.