Filed 4/17/17 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLYDELL BRYANT,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B271300

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. GA094777)

 ORDER MODIFYING THE

 OPINION (NO CHANGE IN 

 THE JUDGMENT)

THE COURT:

On the court‟s own motion, the opinion filed in the 

above-entitled matter on April 3, 2017, shall be modified in the 

following manner:

On page 8, the text of footnote 5 is deleted and replaced with 

the following paragraph:

Our Supreme Court has granted review in In re Ricardo P.

(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, 

S230923. That case presents the following issue: Did the trial 

court err by imposing an electronics search condition on the 

juvenile as a condition of his probation when that condition had 

no relationship to the crimes he committed but was justified on 

appeal as reasonably related to future criminality under Olguin,
2

supra, 45 Cal.4th 375 because it would facilitate the juvenile‟s 

supervision?

This modification does not constitute a change in the 

judgment.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

____________________________________________________________

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. JOHNSON, J.
Filed 4/3/17 (unmodified version)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLYDELL BRYANT,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B271300

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. GA094777)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Michael Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed with 

directions.

David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, 

Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. 

Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, and Andrew S. 

Pruitt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________
2

A jury convicted Clydell Bryant of possessing a concealed, 

loaded, unregistered firearm in a vehicle. The court imposed 

a two-year sentence, a portion of which was to be served 

under mandatory supervision. During the period of mandatory 

supervision, the court required Bryant to submit to searches 

of text messages, emails, and photographs on any cellular phone 

or other electronic device in his possession or residence. He 

contends that the requirement is invalid under People v. Lent

(1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent) and is unconstitutionally 

overbroad. We agree that the condition is invalid under Lent

and, accordingly, strike the condition. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On a night in August 2014, Pasadena police officers 

responded to a call for service outside a housing complex where a 

group of individuals were drinking and refusing to leave the area. 

Bryant and his girlfriend, Lamaine Jones, were smoking marijuana 

in a parked car in the area. Jones sat in the driver‟s seat and 

Bryant in the passenger seat. The car belonged to Jones‟s mother.

A Pasadena police officer approached the driver‟s side of the 

car and smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the car. 

The officer asked Jones and Bryant to step out of the car so he could 

check for marijuana. Jones and Bryant complied.

The police officer searched the car and found a 

semi-automatic .45 caliber Hi-Point handgun under the front 

passenger seat. According to the officer, the gun was accessible to a 

person in the passenger seat, but not the driver‟s seat. There were 

nine bullets in the gun‟s magazine. The police later determined 

that the gun was not registered. Bryant‟s DNA matched DNA 

found on the gun‟s magazine. DNA from several persons found 

on the gun‟s handle could not be matched to any specific person. 
3

A jury convicted Bryant of carrying a concealed firearm 

in a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25400, subd. (a)(1)),1 and found that 

the firearm was loaded and not registered to him. (§ 25400, 

subds. (a) & (c)(6).)

The court sentenced Bryant to two years in county jail 

pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (h), and suspended the 

last 364 days of the term. During the time the sentence was 

suspended, Bryant would be subject to mandatory supervision 

by the county probation department pursuant to section 1170, 

subdivision (h)(5)(B). 

Over Bryant‟s objection, the court required that, during the 

term of his mandatory supervision, Bryant submit to searches of 

text messages and emails on any cellular phone or other electronic 

device in his possession or residence. In response to defendant‟s 

objection to the requirement, the court explained: “Well, it seems to 

me that while he‟s on either probation or supervision, the probation 

officer could go in and search his residence and his person and he 

could look in the residence for any indicia of any violations either 

weapons or contraband, or he or she could look for evidence that 

the defendant is participating or associating with any gangs. [¶] 

It seems to me that a part of that search should include, while he‟s 

on supervision or probation, access to any computer that he uses 

in the home or his cell[]phone; however, I don‟t think it‟s unlimited 

access, and I would limit it to maybe his text messages and e-mails 

and nothing else.”

At the prosecutor‟s request and over defendant‟s further 

objection, the court added photographs to the items subject to 

search on Bryant‟s electronic devices, explaining that this was 

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory references 

are to the Penal Code.
4

“reasonable because I think prior experiences have shown there 

may be evidence with the photographs.”

2

DISCUSSION

The court sentenced Bryant pursuant to subdivision (h) 

of section 1170. Under that statute, the court has discretion “to 

impose a hybrid or split sentence consisting of county jail followed 

by a period of mandatory supervision.” (People v. Catalan (2014) 

228 Cal.App.4th 173, 178, citing § 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).) During 

the period of mandatory supervision, “the defendant shall be 

supervised by the county probation officer in accordance with 

the terms, conditions, and procedures generally applicable to 

persons placed on probation.” (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).) Although 

mandatory supervision is comparable in some ways to probation, 

it is not identical. (See People v. Martinez (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 

759, 762-763.) A defendant who is offered probation, for example, 

may refuse probation if he “ „finds the conditions of probation more 

onerous than the sentence he would otherwise face.‟ ” (People v. 

Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403). In contrast to a defendant 

who is given probation, however, a defendant may not refuse 

mandatory supervision. (People v. Rahbari (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 

185, 194-195.) Accordingly, the court did not ask Bryant whether 

he would accept the court‟s terms of his mandatory supervision.

 

2 The court expressed the electronic search condition in a 

minute order as follows: “Defendant is to submit to search of any 

electronic device either in his possession including cell phone and/or 

any device in his place of residence. Any search by probation is 

limited to defendant[‟]s text messages, emails, and photos on such 

devices.” (Capitalization omitted.)
5

Courts generally have “broad discretion in fashioning terms 

of supervised release, in order to foster the reformation and 

rehabilitation of the offender, while protecting public safety.”

(People v. Martinez, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 764.) Under a 

test announced in Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481, however, a court 

abuses its discretion when it imposes a term or condition that 

“ „(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was 

convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, 

and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably 

related to future criminality . . . .‟ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 486; 

see People v. Martinez, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 764 [applying 

Lent test to mandatory supervision terms]; People v. Relkin (2016) 

6 Cal.App.5th 1188, 1194 [same].) “This test is conjunctive—all 

three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will 

invalidate a . . . term.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

(Olguin); In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754.)3

 

3 The Attorney General contends that Bryant waived his 

Lent claim by failing to object in the trial court. We disagree. 

Bryant‟s counsel objected to the condition, stating that the facts 

“do not suggest that any criminal conduct involving a cell[ ]phone 

or electr[on]ic device has been committed,” and that there has 

not been “a proper showing of the need to impose this term of 

probation.” This was sufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.
6

The Attorney General does not dispute that the electronic 

search condition fails the first two Lent prongs—the condition has 

no relationship to Bryant‟s crime and the use of electronic devices 

“is not itself criminal.” (See In re Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 

907, 913; In re J.B., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 754-755.) The 

issue, therefore, is whether the electronic search condition is 

reasonably related to preventing future criminality. 

Our Supreme Court discussed the future criminality prong 

in Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th 375, a case the Attorney General 

contends is “dispositive” here. In Olguin, our Supreme Court held 

that a probation condition that required the defendant to notify 

his probation officer of the presence of any pets at the defendant‟s 

residence was “reasonably related to future criminality because 

it serve[d] to inform and protect a probation officer charged with 

supervising a probationer‟s compliance with specific conditions 

of probation.” (Id. at p. 381.) “Animals,” the Court explained, 

“can be unpredictable and potentially dangerous when faced 

with a stranger in their territory, and some pose a great or even 

life-threatening hazard to persons in these circumstances. Being 

informed at all times of the pets that are present at a probationer‟s 

residence thus reduces the possible threat to the probation officer‟s 

safety by enabling the officer to be aware of, and prepared for, 

situations that may arise should the officer choose to conduct an 

unscheduled „compliance visit‟ to the probationer at his or her 

residence.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) “Probation officer safety during 

these visits and searches is essential to the effective supervision of 

the probationer and thus assists in preventing future criminality.” 

(Ibid.) The Court further explained that the defendant failed 

to demonstrate that the condition infringed or impaired any 

constitutional right, and reasoned that reporting the presence of 
7

pets “is a simple task” and “imposes no undue hardship or burden” 

on the probationer. (Id. at pp. 382, 384-387.)

The Attorney General contends that Bryant‟s electronic 

search condition, like the pet notification condition in Olguin, 

facilitates the probation officer‟s ability to supervise the 

defendant and determine whether the defendant is complying 

with other terms of probation.4 (See Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th 

at pp. 380-381.) Unlike the pet notification condition in Olguin, 

however, a search of a defendant‟s cellular phone and other 

electronic devices implicates a defendant‟s constitutional rights. 

(See People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 724 (Appleton); 

see also Riley v. California (2014) ___U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 

2473, 2489] [Fourth Amendment applies to search of information 

on cellular phone]; People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827, 832

[a “probationer has the right to enjoy a significant degree of privacy, 

or liberty, under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the federal Constitution”], disapproved on other grounds in People 

v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.) In contrast to information

about a defendant‟s pets, a cellular phone search could potentially 

reveal “a digital record of nearly every aspect of [its owner‟s life]—

from the mundane to the intimate” (Riley v. California, supra, 

134 S.Ct. at p. 2490), including “vast amounts of personal 

information unrelated to defendant‟s criminal conduct or his 

potential for future criminality” (Appleton, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th 

 

4 In addition to the electronic search condition and other 

terms, the court ordered Bryant not to associate with persons 

known by him to be drug users or criminal street gang members or 

associates, and to stay away from the place of his arrest and places 

where he knows drug users or gang members and associates 

congregate.
8

at p. 727). Olguin, therefore, does not resolve the question 

presented here, and the “fact that a search condition would 

facilitate general oversight of the individual‟s activities is 

insufficient to justify an open-ended search condition permitting 

review of all information contained or accessible on the 

[individual‟s] smart phone or other electronic devices.” (In re J.B.,

supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 758; but see In re P.O. (2016) 

246 Cal.App.4th 288, 295-296 [electronic search condition was 

permissible under Olguin].)5

Whether an electronic search condition is reasonably related 

to preventing future criminality depends upon on the facts and 

circumstances in each case. (See In re J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 

795, 802 (J.E.), review granted Oct. 22, 2016, S236628; People v. 

Burton (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 382, 391; In re Martinez (1978) 

86 Cal.App.3d 577, 584.) Most published decisions addressing 

such conditions in California involve juvenile probation conditions. 

(See, e.g., In re J.E., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th 795; In re P.O., supra,

246 Cal.App.4th 288; In re J.B., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 749; 

In re Erica R., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 907; People v. Ebertowski

(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170 (Ebertowski). Although these cases 

are instructive, consideration of them must take into account the 

fact that “ „ “the power of the state to control the conduct of children 

reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.” ‟ [Citation.] 

 

5 Our Supreme Court has granted review in In re Ricardo P.

(2016) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923, 

to consider the following issue: “Did the trial court err by imposing 

an „electronics search condition‟ on the juvenile as a condition of his 

probation when that condition had no relationship to the crimes

he committed but was justified on appeal as reasonably related to 

future criminality under [Olguin, supra,] 45 Cal.4th 375 because 

it would facilitate the juvenile‟s supervision?”
9

This is because juveniles are deemed to be „more in need of guidance 

and supervision than adults, and because a minor‟s constitutional 

rights are more circumscribed.‟ [Citation.]” (In re Victor L.

(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910; see also In re Antonio R. (2000) 

78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941; In re P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 296.) Thus, a probation condition that would be reasonable 

and permissible for a minor under juvenile court supervision 

may “ „be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult 

probationer.‟ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889; accord 

In re Malik (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901.)6

In In re Erica R., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 907, the juvenile 

court declared a minor a ward of the court based on her unlawful 

possession of the drug Ecstacy. (Id. at p. 910.) The court placed 

her on probation with a condition that she submit to “ „a search of 

any containers [she] may have or own, [her] vehicle, residence, or 

electronics day or night at the request of a Probation Officer or 

peace officer.‟ ” (Ibid.) The court also required the minor turn over 

her passwords to her probation officer. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal 

 

6 Two cases involving electronic search conditions imposed

on adult probationers are inapposite. In Appleton, supra, 

245 Cal.App.4th 717, the court found that the electronic search 

condition satisfied the first prong of Lent—that the condition was 

related to the defendant‟s crime—because the defendant had met 

his sexual assault victim through “a social medial application for 

smartphones.” (Id. at pp. 719, 724.) The court did not consider, 

therefore, the third prong that concerns us here. 

In People v. Smith (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 977 [2017 D.A.R. 

1519], the defendant used a cellular phone to arrange the 

illegal drug transaction for which he was convicted. It was thus 

“imperative that his cell phone use be monitored by the probation 

officer to ensure that he was not violating his probation by engaging 

in drug trafficking.” (Id. at p. 1522.)
10

held that the probation condition was invalid under Lent, 

stating: “There is nothing in this record regarding either the 

current offense or [the minor‟s] social history that connects her 

use of electronic devices or social media to illegal drugs. In fact, 

the record is wholly silent about [the minor‟s] usage of electronic 

devices or social media. Accordingly, „[b]ecause there is nothing 

in [the minor‟s] past or current offenses or [her] personal history 

that demonstrates a predisposition‟ to utilize electronic devices 

or social media in connection with criminal activity, „there is no 

reason to believe the current restriction will serve the rehabilitative 

function of precluding [the minor] from any future criminal acts.‟ ” 

(Id. at p. 913.) 

In re Erica R. was followed in In re J.B., supra, 

242 Cal.App.4th 749. In In re J.B., the minor committed petty 

theft. (Id. at p. 752.) The court imposed a condition of probation 

requiring the minor “to submit to a search of „[his] electronics 

including [his] passwords.‟ ” (Ibid.) In rejecting the minor‟s motion 

to delete the condition, the trial court explained that the minor 

admitted to using marijuana for more than two years, and that 

“ „minors do use the Internet to buy and sell . . . drugs,‟ ” and to 

“ „brag about their drug use, showing themselves puffing marijuana, 

showing themselves with drug paraphernalia and, of course, with 

weapons and those other types of improper probation activities.‟ ” 

(Id. at p. 753.) The search condition would not only deter the minor 

from committing crimes, but also allow the probation officer “to 

monitor [the minor] as part of the probation terms and conditions.” 

(Ibid.) The court further noted that the minor had played with his 

cellular phone during an interview with his mother and a probation 

officer, and refused his mother‟s request to put it away. (Ibid.) 

“ „Clearly,‟ ” the court stated, the minor is “ „very closely connected 
11

with the use of his cell phone, which is disrespectful, not paying 

attention, and this connection makes it even more important that 

the probation officer be able to monitor what he was doing on 

his cell phone, what‟s he doing on his cell phone in an interview, 

what‟s he doing on the cell phone in social media when he‟s not 

going to school, what‟s he doing with regard to the offenses he may 

be committing, what‟s he doing with . . . regards to the drugs he 

may[] be trying to purchase, sell or use.‟ ” (Ibid.)

In In re J.B., the Attorney General made an argument 

similar to the argument asserted here—that the electronic search 

condition was reasonably related to future criminality because 

“it was „designed to help probation officers monitor other probation 

conditions prohibiting drinking alcohol or taking drugs and 

requiring [minor] to stay away from the coparticipant with whom 

he committed the theft, avoid those under the influence of an illegal 

or intoxicating substance, attend school, and obey parents.‟ ” 

(In re J.B., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 755.) The condition, the 

Attorney General argued, was thus “no different from any other 

search condition to which the minor is subject.” (Ibid.) The Court 

of Appeal, relying on In re Erica R., rejected the Attorney General‟s 

argument, and held that the search condition was invalid under 

Lent because there was “no showing of any connection between the 

minor‟s use of electronic devices and his past or potential future 

criminal activity.” (In re J.B., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 756.) 
12

Like the minors in In re Erica R. and In re J.B., there is no 

showing of any connection between Bryant‟s use of a cellular phone 

and criminality, past or future. Bryant was convicted of possessing 

a concealed weapon in a vehicle. No cellular phone or electronic 

device was involved in the crime and there is no evidence that 

Bryant would use such devices to engage in future criminal 

activity. (See In re Erica R., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.) 

Nor was there any showing as to how the search condition 

would reasonably prevent any future crime or aid in Bryant‟s 

rehabilitation. Although it is conceivable that future searches of 

Bryant‟s cellular phone might yield information concerning criminal 

activity, “[n]ot every probation condition bearing a remote, 

attenuated, tangential, or diaphanous connection to future criminal 

conduct can be considered reasonable.” (People v. Brandão (2012) 

210 Cal.App.4th 568, 574.) The fact that a search of Bryant‟s 

cellular phone records might aid a probation officer in ascertaining 

Bryant‟s compliance with other conditions of supervision is, without 

more, an insufficient rationale to justify the impairment of Bryant‟s 

constitutionally protected interest in privacy. (See In re J.B., supra, 

242 Cal.App.4th at p. 758.) As in In re Erica R. and In re J.B., in 

the absence of facts demonstrating “ „ “a predisposition” to utilize 

electronic devices . . . in connection with criminal activity, 

“there is no reason to believe the current restriction will serve 

the rehabilitative function of precluding [the defendant] from 

any future criminal acts.” ‟ ” (In re J.B., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 755, quoting In re Erica R., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.)
13

The Attorney General, however, relies on Ebertowski, supra, 

228 Cal.App.4th 1170, and In re J.E., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th 795. 

In Ebertowski, the minor was a gang member who brandished a 

weapon, told an arresting “officer that he was „ “[f]ucking with 

the wrong gangster,” ‟ ” and repeatedly threatened the officer 

and the officer‟s family. (Ebertowski, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1172-1173.) The minor pleaded no contest to making 

criminal threats and resisting or deterring an officer, and admitted 

a gang allegation. The prosecution requested that the court impose 

probation conditions requiring the defendant submit to a search 

of electronic devices within his custody or control and provide 

his passwords to the devices and any social media websites. 

(Id. at p. 1172.) The prosecutor explained that these conditions 

should be imposed because “ „the defendant has used social media 

sites historically to promote the Seven Trees Norteno criminal 

street gang.‟ ” (Id. at p. 1173.) The conditions were also a “ „means 

to effectuate the already existing warrantless search condition.‟ ” 

(Ibid.) 

The Court of Appeal upheld the probation conditions, 

explaining that the “conditions were related to [the defendant‟s] 

crimes, which were plainly gang related because they were 

designed to allow the probation officer to monitor defendant‟s gang 

associations and activities. Defendant‟s association with his 

gang was also necessarily related to his future criminality. His 

association with his gang gave him the bravado to threaten and 

resist armed police officers. The only way that defendant could be 

allowed to remain in the community on probation without posing 

an extreme risk to public safety was to closely monitor his gang 

associations and activities. The password conditions permitted the 
14

probation officer to do so.” (Ebertowski, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1176-1177.) 

In In re J.E., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th 795,7 the Court of Appeal 

relied on Ebertowski in upholding an electronic search condition, 

and distinguished In re Erica R. and In re J.B., stating that the 

minor in the case before it had “deep-seated issues with drugs,” 

“struggle[d] with school attendance and grades,” had been 

suspended and reprimanded for behavioral issues, brought a 

weapon to school, had gang graffiti in his locker and a prior 

association with Norteños gang members, and an “unstable home 

life.” (Id. at p. 802.) These facts, the court explained, “support 

the juvenile court‟s conclusion that the electronic search condition 

would „ “serve the rehabilitative function of precluding [Minor] from 

any future criminal acts.” ‟ ” (Ibid., quoting In re Erica R., supra, 

240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.)

Ebertowski and In re J.E. are distinguishable. There is no 

evidence that Bryant, unlike the minor in Ebertowski, used any 

electronic device to promote gang activity. And In re J.E. involved 

a minor who “had a constellation of issues requiring intensive 

supervision,” including a “ „pretty deep drug issue.‟ ” (In re J.E., 

supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 801.) The electronic search condition was 

considered “ „critical ‟ for Minor‟s rehabilitation” by allowing the 

probation officer to “ „monitor the purchase, or sales, [or] usage‟ of 

drugs.” (Ibid.) Here, although Bryant had been smoking marijuana 

in a car, there is nothing to suggest that his phone must be 

monitored for drug sales, as in In re J.E. Moreover, because 

 

7 The Supreme Court granted review of In re J.E. and 

deferred briefing pending its review of In re Ricardo P., supra, 

241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923. 

(See fn. 5, ante.)
15

Bryant is an adult, the justification for state supervision of his 

personal drug use is weaker than in the case of minors, and his 

constitutionally protected interest in his privacy is greater. 

(See, e.g., In re Antonio R., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.) 

For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the electronic 

search is invalid under Lent. Bryant also contends that the 

electronic search condition is unconstitutionally overbroad. 

Because we hold that the condition is invalid under Lent, we do not 

reach these issues.

8

 

8 Under an overbreadth challenge, if a probation condition 

limits the defendant‟s constitutional rights, it must be closely 

tailored to the purpose of the condition—i.e., the defendant‟s 

reformation and rehabilitation—to avoid being invalidated as 

unconstitutionally overbroad. (See Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th 

at p. 384; In re J.E., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 803.) In In re P.O., 

supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 288, for example, an electronic search 

condition that survived a Lent challenge was unconstitutionally 

overbroad because “it permit[ted] review of all sorts of private 

information that is highly unlikely to shed any light on whether 

[the minor was] complying with the other conditions of his 

probation.” (Id. at p. 298.) 

Courts that determine that a condition is overbroad 

will generally modify the condition to tailor it more closely 

to the purpose of the condition (see, e.g., In re P.O., supra, 

246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 299-300; In re Malik, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 906), or strike the condition and direct the trial court to 

fashion a new condition consistent with the Court of Appeal‟s views 

(see, e.g., Appleton, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 728-729).
16

DISPOSITION

The terms of Bryant‟s mandatory supervision that he submit 

to searches of his cellular phone or other electronic devices is 

stricken. The trial court is ordered to file a minute order reflecting 

the striking of this term and forward a copy of the order to the 

Los Angeles County Probation Department. The judgment is 

otherwise affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

JOHNSON, J.