### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 6, 200 9
JON LE E F IELD S v. STA TE OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal from t he Circuit Court for Tipton Coun ty No. 5445 Joe H. Walker, III, Judge

No. W2008-00821-C CA-R 3-PC - Filed April 15, 2009

On M arc h 28, 2007, the petit ioner pled g uilty in the Ti pton County Circuit Court to ini tiation of the
manu fa c tur e of

me tha mph e tamin e and

wa s se nte nc e d to tw e lve y e ars to be se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y wi th a sente nce imposed in L auder dale County . On J uly 9, 2007, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief , claiming that he had not be en af forde d a hea

ring on his reque st for alternative se ntencing , as he wa s told he would have. F ollowing a n evidentiar

y hear ing, the post-conviction cour t found that the petition was without merit. After our re view, we aff

irm the dismissal of the petition. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court Af firme d

A LA N E. G LE NN , J. , d e liv e re d th e op ini on of the c ou rt , in wh ic h J .C. M C L IN and C AM I LLE R. M C M ULLEN , JJ., joined.

Fr a nk De slaur ie rs , Co vin gto n, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Jo n L e e Fie lds

. Robert E. Cooper, Jr ., Attorney Genera l and R eporte r; Matthew Brya nt Haskell, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; D. Micha el Dunava nt, D istrict A ttorney Gene ral; and Ja mes Wa lter Free land, Jr., Assistant District Attorney Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

FA CT S The pe ti ti o n f

o r p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n r e li e f

s o u g h t, a s s p e c if

ic r e li e f, th a t “ th e Pe ti tione r’s conviction in [the Tipton County case] be set a side and the sentenc e vacated and t he P etitioner be
a ff or de d th e op po rtun ity to h a ve thi s mat te r tr ie d” a nd that the “ [v iol a tio n of pr ob a tio n] he ari ng [i n Laude rdale County] be postponed until af ter the Petitioner’s Post-Conviction procee dings in Tipton County Case No. 5445 are conclude d.” Howe ver, at the evidentiar y hearing, the petitioner testified that he did n o t wa n t t o withdraw his plea of guilty but, inst ead, be aff orded a hearing at which he could see k alternative sentenc ing.-2-

At the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the pe titioner testified that the guilty plea off er f rom the State was a

twelve- year

sentenc e on the c ase w h i ch is the basis for this appea l, to be serve d
concur rently with an e ight-year

sentenc e imposed in Laude rdale County:
[Tria l counsel] ha d come and spoke with me ear lier that day in the ba ck and told me that the S tate was willing to offe r me a twelve- year

sentenc e on this char ge with the eight that I had in Lauderda le County ran conc urre nt with it, ran into it, and that th e Sta te wo uldno t ob je c t to me po sin g f

or a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing to a lon g- te rm , eighteen- month rehab at Serenity House in Memphis. The pe titioner then explaine d what he w as told would happen f ollowing his pl ea of

guilty:

I had c ome in here and signed the pa perw ork and . . . ple d guilty in the court. And [the tr ia l ju dg e ] h a d t[a

ke n] the ple a a nd se t me an oth e r co urt date fo r A pr il 2 7 f or my sentenc ing. And when [ trial counsel] told me that I’d come up in front of the judge for my alternative sente ncing, and . . . somebody from his office had – we had contac ted Sere nity House and had an intervie w over the phone, Ser enity House wa s willing to accept me, [trial counsel] told me t hat I’d come into court on April 27 and file – go for

my alterna tive sentenc ing hearing. If it we nt through, then I’d . . . le ave and go to Sere nity House. The pe titioner testified that he was not see king to set aside his plea of guilty but, rathe r, that he be give n a hea

ring on his reque st for alternative sente ncing. Ap pa re ntl y, be fo re a

he ari ng in T ipt on Cou nty on his re qu e st fo r a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ing c ou ld be conduc te d , th e p e ti ti o n e r w a s f o u n d to h a v e v io late d h is p r o b a ti o n o n h is e ig h t- y e ar s e n te n ce, which he w as orde red to ser ve:

I we nt to court in February in Laude rdale [County]. . . . [I] t was put off. Next thing I kno w, M ar ch 28, [tria l counsel] c omes at me with the a gree ment of twelve years, the eight’s going to run into it, I’m going to go t o the long-term r ehab.

I c ome ba ck th e 27 th t o f indou t th a t so me ho w [ c ou ns e l] ha d w e nt .

. . to court a nd done all that without me being prese nt, and I was viol ated. And now [trial counsel] is telling me t hat t he rehab that he promised me i s no longer eligibl e for me.

We surmise that the petitioner enter ed his ple a of guilty in Tipton Count y to a twelve- year sentenc e and w as ac cepte d into a drug re habilitation program, depe ndent upon the outcome of the Laude rdale County viol ation of probation hearing. The petitioner testified:
All I know is that [trial counse l] told me that I was e ligible for the al t er n at ive sent e n c in g

. I e n te r e d th e g u il ty p le a

. T h e n I e n te r e d th e g u il ty p le a Marc h 28. Around April 1st . . . a member of his law f irm, whateve r, come , and we c alled and had the interview over the phone with Ser enity House. They acc ept ed m e. T h eyI n m aki ng r efer enc e t o t hes e convi ct i ons , w e rel y u p o n thei r c har ac t er i za t i on by t he St at e dur i ng t he 1

e v id e n tiar y h e a rin g

. -3- [we re] willing to accept me pe nding what went on [on] April 27. So all I can look at it is, is [trial counsel] off ere d it to me. Then we ha d the interview [.]

On cr oss-exa mination, the petitioner ac knowledged that he had prior convictions for fac ilitation of arson, attempted manuf actur e o f me thamphetamine, possession of me thamphetamine, fe lon y f a ilu re to a pp e ar, a gg ra va te d b ur gla

ry , th e ft ov e r $ 50 0, bu rg lary , a ndtw o a dd iti on a l th e ft s over $1000. 1

Th e pe tit ion e r’ s tria l c ou ns e l in the Ti pto n Co un ty c a se te sti fi e d a s to his ne go tiatio n w ith the State: [The pe titioner] wa s actually charge d with . . . the deal wa s – the situation was kind of tric ky. He was char ged with a C lass B felony a nd a couple of C’s and D’s. But h e wa s a ca re er o ffe nder f or the C’s and the D offe nses. If I reme mber
corr ectly he w as not a car eer offe nder f or the B. So that’s why we ultimately ente red the plea on the B because he w as ac tually fac ing a lesser amount of time than he
wo uldha ve be e n f

a c ing on the le sse r c ha

rg e s.
After some negotiation and talking w ith [ the prosec utor] re garding those, we ultimately came to an agre ement that he would enter a plea to the Class B felony for the tw e lve ye ars

. Q. Al l r igh t. D id you ha ve a ny dis c us sio n with [the pr os e c uto r] abo ut the po ssi bil ity of alternative sente ncing?

A. Ye s. Q. An d w ha t is yo ur

me mory o f tho se dis c us sio ns ?

A. I thin k in iti a lly [the pr os e c uto r] ha d re se rv a tio ns abo ut .

. . him be ing e nti tle d to that. But I think ult imately he dec ided that he would just submit it to the Court.

The order of the post-conviction court dismi ssing the petition set out t he chr onology of the matter:

Pe tit ion e r w a s in dic te d in No ve mbe r 2 00 6 f or the C f e lon y o f A ttempt t o Ma nu fa c tur e Me th, the D f e lon y o f p ro mot e me th, th e E felon y o f r e c kle ss endange rment with a de adly wea pon, and the B fe lony of initiate the manufa cture of meth. These of

fense s occur

red in August 2006. At that time the petitioner wa s on alternat[ive] se ntencing in Laude rdale County, RD 7704.-4- The [S]ta te filed notice that the petitioner is a r ange I II, c are er of fende r. The public de fende r wa s appointed to r epre sent the petitioner, and ne gotiated a plea agre ement to enter

a plea of guilty in count 4 fo r an agreed sente nce of 12 year s as a multiple offe nder, a nd dismiss all other c o u n t s

. F u rt her the 12 year sentenc e would be c oncurr ent to Laude rdale RD 7704.

On M arc h 28, 2007, the [petiti oner] enter ed a ple a of guilty per the agre ement and wa s sentence d to 12 ye ars. The [pe titioner] had be en re voked fr om alterna t[ive] sentenc ing in Lauderda le County RD 7704 afte r a hearing in February 2007, and wa s serving that sente nce.
In dis mis sin g th e pe tit ion , th e c ou rt ma de de ta ile d f

ind ing s: The [pe titioner] is a ca

ree r off ender , and has be en tri ed m u l t i ple times on rele ase status. He has bee n place d on p ro b at i on in 1998, revoke d in 1999. Placed on alternat[ive] se ntencing in 2000, a n d re v oked in 2001. Paroled in 2003, a nd revoke d in 2004. Released upon e xpirati o n and convic ted aga in. He wa s place d again with alternat[ive] sentenc ing in 2006, and revoke d in 2007. He ente red the plea in Tipton RD 5445 shortly after the r evocation. . . .

Th e [p ]e ti ti one r h a s a

le ng thy his tory o f a lc oh ol a nddr ug abu se pr ob le ms. He ha s b e e n th ro ug h r e ha b tr e a tme nt s e ve ra l ti me s. The pe titioner has shown no pre judice by not receiving [a n] alternat[ive] sentenc ing hearing. This offense occur red w hile he wa s on alternat[ive] se ntencing. He ha d just been re voked off alternat[ive] se ntencing in Febr uary 2007, and had be en t ri ed b ef ore on both proba

tion and alternat[ive] se ntencing seve ral times without
succe ss. H[is] cha nce to be returne d to alternat[ive] sentencing was nil. The attorney was not ineff

ective by not sc heduling an alternat[ive] sentenc ing hearing.

The Court finds that petitioner has failed to establish the factua l allegations contained in his petition by clea r and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-210. The pe titioner has not shown that (a) the s ervic es rendere d by trial counsel
wer e def icient and (b) the defic ient perf ormanc e was prejudicial. The petitioner has not shown t h at t h e service s rende red or the advice given was be low the ra nge of competenc e dema nded of attorneys i n criminal cases. The petiti oner ha s not shown that there is a rea sonable proba bility t hat, but for c ounsel’s def icient per formanc e, the result of the pr ocee ding would have be en diffe rent.
As we state d, the re c or d on a pp e a l do e s n ot i nc lud e c op ie s o f e ith e r the Ti pto n o r L a ud e rd a le County judgm ents or of the submissi on hearing. The State a rgues that this fac t preve nts our being able to ade quately re view this matter.
AN AL YSI S-5-

In orde r to determine the compete nce of counsel, Te nnessee courts have applied standa rds develope d in fede ral case law. See S tate v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (n oti ng that th e sa me sta nd ardfo r d e terminin g in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of

c ou ns e l th a t is app lie d in fede ral case s also applies in T ennesse e). The United States Supreme Court articulated the standa rd in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), which is widely ac cepte d as the appropriate standa

rd for all claims of a c onvicted petiti oner that counsel’s assistanc e wa s defe ctive. Th e sta nd ardis f

ir mly gr ou nd e d in the be lie f that c ou ns e l pl a ys a ro le that is “ c ri tic a l to the abil ity of the a dversa

rial sy s t em t o p ro d u ce just re sults.” Id. at 685, 104 S. Ct. at 2063. The Strickland sta nd ardis a

tw o- pr on g te st:
Fir st, the de fe nd a nt m us t s ho w tha t c ou ns e l’ s p e rf or ma nc e wa s d e fi c ie nt. Th is require s showing that counsel made err ors so serious that counse l was not fu nc tio nin g a s th e “ c ou ns e l” gu ara nte e d th e de fendan t by th e Six th A me nd me nt. Second, th e defenda nt must show that the deficient pe rformance prejudice d the defe nse. This requir es showing that counse l’s erro rs we re s o serious as to deprive the def endant of a fa ir trial, a tria l whose re sult is reliable.
Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The Strickland C o u rt fu rther e xplained the mea ning of “de ficient perf ormanc e” in the f

irst prong of the test in the following wa y: In any c ase pr esenting an ine ffe ctiveness c laim, the perf ormanc e inquiry m u s t be whether counsel’s a ssistance wa s rea sonable considering all the circ umstances.

. . . No particular set of

detailed r

ules for c ounsel’s conduc t can sa tisfactorily t ake
acc ount of t h e v ar ie ty o f c ir c u ms ta n c e s f

a c e d b y d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l o r

th e r a n g e of le git imate de c isi on s r e ga

rd ing ho w b e st t o r e pr e se nt a c ri min a l de fe nd a nt.
Id . a t 68 8- 89 , 1 04 S. Ct . a t 20 65

. Th e pe tit ion e r mus t e sta bli sh “ that c ou ns e l’ s r e pr e se ntatio n f e ll below an obje ct i v e s t an d ar d o f r ea s o n ab l en es s u n d erp re v ai l i n g p ro fe s s i o n al n o rm s

. ” H o u s e v

. S t at e, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 ( Tenn. 1996))

. As fo r the pr e

jud ic e pr on g o f the te st, the Str ic kla ndCou rt stat ed: “T he de fe nd a nt m us t show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional err ors, t he re sult of the pr oc e e din g w ou ld h a ve be e n d if fe re nt. A r e a so na

ble pr ob abil ity is a

pro bab ility s uf

fi c ie nt t o undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome.” 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S. Ct . at 2068; see a lso Overton v. Sta te , 8 74 S.W .2 d 6, 1 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 4) (c on c lud ing that pe tit ion e r f a ile d to e sta

bli sh that “ the re is a
rea sonable proba

bility t hat, but for c ounsel’s er rors, the outc ome o f

th e p r ocee dings would have be en differ ent”)

. Cou rt s n e e d n ot a

pp ro a c h th e Str ic kla ndte st i n a sp e c if ic or de r o r e ve n “ a dd re ss b oth components of the inquiry if the defe ndant makes an insufficient showing on one.” 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069; se e also Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (stating that “fa ilure to prove e ither def iciency or pre judice provide s a suffic ient basis to deny re lief on the inef fec tive assistance claim”)

. By statute in Tennessee , the petit ioner a t a post-conviction re lief hea ring has the bur den of proving the allegations of fac t by clear and convinc ing evidence. S ee T en n . Code Ann. § 40-30- 110(f) (2006). A pe tition based on ineffe ctive assist an ce o f counsel is a singl e ground f or re lief,-6-

there fore all fac tual allegations must be pre sented in one c l aim. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-30- 206(d).

We note that when post-c onviction proce edings have included a full evidentiary he aring, a s was true in this case, the trial judge’s findings of fac t and conc lusions of law are given the ef fec t and weight o f a jury ve rdict, and this court is “bound by the trial judge’s f indings of fac t unless we conclude that the evidenc e conta ined in the re cord pr eponder ates a gainst the judgment enter ed in the
c a us e .” Bla c k v . St a te , 7 94 S.W .2 d 7 52 , 75 5 (T e nn

. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ). Th e re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t ind ulg e a str on g p re su mpt ion that th e c on du c t of c ou ns e l f

a lls wi thi n th e rang e of

re a so na ble profe ssional assistance, se e Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, and may not sec ondguess the tactical and strategic choices made by t rial counse l unless those choice s were uninformed beca use of inade quate pr epar ation. S ee He llard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Te nn. 1982). The f act that a strate gy or tac tic failed or hurt the def

ense doe s not alone support t he cla im of ineffe ctive assistance of counse l. See Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 1 5 6 , 1 6 5 (T enn. C rim. App. 1997). Finall y , a p e r s o n c h ar g e d w ith a c r im in a l o f f e n s e is n o t e n ti tl e d to p e r f e c t r e p r e s e n tati o n. See Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1996). As explaine d in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 462 (Tenn. 1999) , “[c ]onduct that is unre asonable under the fac ts of one ca se may be perf ectly re asonable under the fac ts of another .”

As we unde rstand the fa cts, the petitioner pled guilty in March 2007 in Tipton County and
was sentenc ed to twe lve y ear s to be serve d concur rently with the L auder dale County sentenc e. As we have said, the r ecor d on ap p ea l i n cl u d es neither copies of the judgme nts from Tipton or L auder dale County

nor a tra nscript of t h e Tipton County submissi on hear ing. H e filed in Tipton County a petition for post-c onviction relief, a sking that his plea of guilt y b e s et asi de and the sentenc e vac ated a

nd that the violation of probation proc eedingin L aude rdale County be “postponed” until the Tipton County proce eding s wer e “concluded.” Howeve r, at the evidentiar y hear ing, t h e p etitioner aba ndoned his reque st to withdraw his plea of guilty and, instead, sa id that he soug ht “spec ific per formanc e” of his Tipton C ounty

plea a g r e ement, mea

ning he wanted a

hear ing at which he could see k alternative sentenc ing a s to that sentence . He no long er w ished to withdraw h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y.
Th e po st- c onvic tio n c ourt de ta ile d th e peti tio ne r’ s e xten siv e c ri min a l r e c or d a nd mul tip le fa ilure s to a

bid e by c on dit ion s o f r e le a se . T he c ourt no te d th a t th e pe tit ion e r w a s c la ssi fi e d a s a c are e r o ff e nd e r, that hi s a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e s h a d b e e n r e vo ke d in 19 99 , 2 00 1, and 20 07 and that hi s 2003 parole was re voked in 2004. At the time he wa s seekingalternative sentenc ing for his twelvey ear Tipton County

sentenc e, his alternative sentenc e had just bee n rev oked on his eig ht-y ear L auder dale County

sentenc e. Thus, in the view of the post-conviction cour t, his chance s for y et anoth e r a lt e r

n a ti v e s e n te n c e w e r e “ n il , ” an d , a c c o r d in g ly , h e h a d f a il e d to s h o w th a t he wa s pr e jud ic e d b y

the a lle g e d in e ff

e c tiv e ne ss of c ouns e l. T he re c or d a bund antl y su pp or ts this ana ly sis

. Additionally , we a dd that the petitioner fa iled t o explain how he might have benef itted from
re c e ivi nga lte rn a tiv e se nte nc ingfo r t he Ti pto n County se nte nc e wh e n, a t th e same tim e , h e wo uld have r emained inc arc erated for the L auder dale County sentenc e.
CO NC LU SION-7-

Based upon the foregoing authorities and rea soning, we af firm the post-convic tion court’s dismiss al of the pe tition.

___________________________________ ALAN E. G LENN, JUD GE