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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

January 19, 2017 

v No. 329471 

Kalamazoo Circuit Court 

ADAM DAVID SHIGWADJA, LC No. 2014-001371-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and METER and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his bench-trial convictions of assault with intent to cause 

great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), 

and second-degree arson, MCL 750.73(1). The trial court sentenced him as a second-offense 

habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 83 months to 15 years’ imprisonment for the assault 

conviction and 175 months to 30 years’ imprisonment for the arson and home invasion 

convictions. The assault and arson sentences are to be served concurrently, but consecutive to 

defendant’s sentence for home invasion. We affirm. 

 The female victim and defendant began dating as teenagers and had a tumultuous and 

volatile relationship for three years, marked by physical, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as 

manipulative conduct, by defendant, which at times terrorized the victim and culminated on 

September 15, 2014, with the conduct giving rise to the convictions. On that date, the victim, 

who lived in a residence separate from defendant, arrived at her house in the evening, and her 

mother and brother were present. Subsequently, the victim went upstairs to her bedroom while 

speaking on a cell phone to a friend. Once in her bedroom, the victim closed her door, at which 

point defendant popped up from underneath a comforter that was lying next to the door. 

Defendant had a knife and gasoline, and he took the victim’s phone. The victim began crying, 

which her mother and brother heard, and the victim’s mother went upstairs to check on her. The 

victim’s mother could not open the door, as defendant used his body to keep it pushed shut. The 

mother inquired of her daughter whether everything was okay, and the victim, who feared that 

defendant would kill her if she informed her mother of his presence, indicated that she was fine 

and was crying because of a mean text that she had received. The victim’s mother insisted on 

coming in, but did not enter and then headed back downstairs after the victim assured her that 

she would be out soon. 
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 Defendant then approached the victim and cut her chest with the knife, indicating that he 

was going to kill her. The victim collapsed, crouched down, and began sobbing. Her mother 

heard a thud, her daughter cry out, and what sounded like wrestling, and the victim’s mother 

raced back to the bedroom, slamming the door open after some initial unsuccessful efforts at 

opening the door. According to the victim, defendant had poured the gasoline in front of the 

bedroom door and to the side and then lit it on fire as the mother was entering the room. Flames 

erupted from the floor to the ceiling, and the victim called out for her brother to come help. The 

victim testified that defendant wrapped his arms around her and began moving the two of them 

toward the fire; she then closed her eyes, believing that she was going to die. Her brother, 

wielding a baseball bat, reached the bedroom and pushed through the flames. The victim’s 

brother thought that he saw defendant holding a knife up to the victim’s neck and chest area. 

The brother began hitting defendant with the bat, driving him back toward the bedroom’s 

window. At some point, defendant released the victim, and he then jumped through the window, 

landed on the ground, and raced from the scene. In the process of swinging the bat at defendant 

in the chaotic, fiery scene, the victim’s brother had accidently struck his sister in the head, and 

she was rushed to the hospital for treatment of a severe head injury. The victim’s hair was 

singed on one side from the fire. An officer later arrested defendant as he limped down a street; 

defendant had injuries to his knuckles and burns on his leg.1

 In the bench trial, the court found defendant guilty of the arson and home invasion 

charges, but rejected a charge of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83, finding 

defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm 

less than murder. Defendant now appeals as of right. 

 On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the victim to 

testify about prior acts of domestic violence committed by defendant against the victim that were 

not included in the prosecution’s pretrial notice of intent. The evidence, he maintains, was not 

admissible under MRE 404(b) and, to the extent that it was relevant and admissible under MCL 

768.27b, the prosecution’s failure to give notice prevented defendant from “adducing evidence to 

refute the allegations, which he denies.” Defendant asserts that the testimony was highly 

prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial, where it was inconsistent with his testimony that his 

intent was only to self-immolate and not to burn the residence. According to defendant, 

especially prejudicial was evidence showing that defendant had allegedly stated in July 2014 that 

he intended to drive his car into the victim’s home with gasoline in order to cause an explosion. 

 Given that the prior acts and the assault charge clearly constituted “domestic violence,” 

where defendant and the victim had a dating relationship and the conduct entailed assaultive 

behavior or the causing of physical or mental harm, MCL 768.27b governed the admission of the 

 

1

 Defendant testified that he had accidently bumped the victim’s chest with the knife, that he 

poured the gasoline on the left side of his body and lit himself on fire, while admitting on crossexamination that he only had burns near his ankle and on the bottom of his pants, and that, after 

briefly blacking out in the bedroom, he grabbed the victim in an effort to keep her away from the 

flames. 
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prior acts, superseding MRE 404(b), so to the extent that defendant’s argument is based on MRE 

404(b), it is rejected. See People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450, 476-477; 818 NW2d 296 (2012). On 

a substantive level, defendant makes no argument that the evidence was inadmissible under MCL 

768.27b, and this statutory provision allows for the admission of “domestic violence” evidence 

for any relevant purpose, including propensity or the character of the accused, subject to MRE 

403. MCL 768.27b(1); People v Daniels, 311 Mich App 257, 272-273; 874 NW2d 732 (2015).2 

 Defendant’s argument, as relevant under MCL 768.27b, is ultimately premised solely on 

a lack of notice. Under MCL 768.27b(2), “[i]f the prosecuting attorney intends to offer evidence 

under this section, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose the evidence, including the statements 

of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, to the 

defendant not less than 15 days before the scheduled date of trial . . . .” Because the issue was 

not preserved by defendant, our review is for plain error affecting substantial rights, requiring a 

showing of prejudice, as well as a showing of actual innocence or, independent of innocence, of 

an error that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial 

proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Defendant’s 

cursory and vague assertion that the lack of notice “prevented him from adducing evidence to 

refute the” challenged evidence is inadequate to establish the requisite prejudice; we note that 

defendant does not explain how he would have proceeded differently with notice, nor does he 

specifically explain why the lack of notice prevented him from refuting the prior acts. See 

People v Jackson, 498 Mich 246, 278-279; 869 NW2d 253 (2015) (no prejudice established from 

the lack of notice, where the defendant did not show how he would have approached the trial or 

presented his defense differently had the required notice been given, and where he did not 

identify or present offers of proof from any witnesses that he might have called with notice). 

And with respect to defendant’s threat to use his vehicle and gasoline to blow up the victim’s 

home, this was a statement in a text message, not an other act. See People v Rushlow, 179 Mich 

App 172, 176; 445 NW2d 222 (1989) (“As the Supreme Court recently noted, a prior statement 

does not constitute a prior bad act because it is just that, a prior statement and not a prior bad 

act.”) Accordingly, no notice under MCL 768.27b was even necessary to introduce that 

particular testimony. In sum, reversal is unwarranted under the plain-error test. 

 Defendant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his arson 

conviction, where a rational factfinder could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

defendant intended to burn the dwelling or intentionally committed an act that created a very 

high risk of burning the dwelling, with defendant being aware of the risk and disregarding it. 

Defendant contends that the evidence instead showed that he was attempting suicide by pouring 

gas on his left pant leg and then igniting it. For purposes of second-degree arson, the prosecution 

had to prove that defendant “willfully or maliciously” burned, damaged, or destroyed by fire or 

 

2

 Had defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence under MCL 768.27b, aside from the 

purported notice failure, we would have rejected the argument, considering that the prior acts 

revealed his abusive history and character, strongly bearing on his credibility, motivation, and 

intent relative to the charged offenses. And the probative value of the evidence was not 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, MRE 403. 
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explosive “a dwelling . . . or its contents . . . .” MCL 750.73(1). At trial, it was undisputed that 

the victim’s home constituted a dwelling and that defendant started a fire that damaged the 

dwelling and its contents. The only issue in dispute was whether he “willfully or maliciously” 

burned the dwelling or its contents.3

 The phrase “willfully or maliciously” means to commit an act “while knowing it to be 

wrong and without any just cause or excuse” and to do so “intentionally or with a conscious 

disregard of known risk to the property of another.” People v Richardson, 118 Mich App 492, 

496; 325 NW2d 419 (1982) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The evidence showed that 

defendant brought gasoline to the victim’s home, poured it out, and ignited it with a lighter. 

Although he claimed that he only intended to pour the gasoline on himself, there was evidence 

and testimony that directly contradicted his version of events. The victim testified that defendant 

poured the gasoline across the doorway just as her mother was attempting to force her way into 

the bedroom. And the victim’s mother similarly testified that the spill appeared to be in a line 

before the door and that when she tried to enter the bedroom she was blocked by a wall of 

flames. The prosecution also presented photos of the damaged doorway that suggested that the 

gasoline was deliberately poured across the doorway, and it presented photos of defendant’s 

injuries that suggested that he did not directly pour the gas on himself. 

 Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, taking into 

consideration the circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence 

generally, resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecution, deferring to the trial 

court’s assessment of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, People v 

Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 618-619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008), and appreciating that minimal 

circumstantial evidence suffices to establish intent, which can be inferred from any facts in 

evidence, People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 223; 749 NW2d 272 (2008), we hold that the 

evidence was sufficient to find that defendant intended to burn the house or that he intentionally 

committed an act that created a very high risk of burning the dwelling, with defendant being 

fully aware of the risk and disregarding it. Indeed, it would defy logic to conclude that defendant 

 

3

 As reflected in People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 618-619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008), in the 

context of a sufficiency argument, the principles governing our review of a jury’s verdict apply 

equally when reviewing a verdict rendered in a bench trial: 

 We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo. When ascertaining 

whether sufficient evidence was presented in a bench trial to support a conviction, 

this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and 

determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of 

the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court will not interfere 

with the trier of fact's role of determining the weight of the evidence or the 

credibility of witnesses. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences that 

arise from such evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the 

crime. All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. 

[Citations omitted.] 
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was unaware of the fire hazard or risk of fire damage to the dwelling caused by dousing an area 

with gasoline, if even just his pant leg, and then igniting the gasoline. Reversal of the arson 

conviction is unwarranted. 

 Defendant next maintains that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction of 

assault with intent to cause great bodily harm less than murder, where there “was no evidence 

that [he] intended to cause great bodily harm.” A person commits the offense when he or she 

attempts or threatens to do corporal harm to another with force or violence and does so with the 

intent to cause great bodily harm less than murder. See People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 

147; 703 NW2d 230 (2005). The requisite intent is the intent to do serious injury of an 

aggravated nature. People v Stevens, 306 Mich App 620, 628; 858 NW2d 98 (2014). And only 

minimal circumstantial evidence is necessary to show the required intent. Id. at 629. 

 Here, defendant cut the victim with a knife, began physically forcing the victim toward 

the fire started by defendant, such that she thought that she was about to die before her brother 

entered the room and saved her, and defendant expressly indicated that he intended to kill the 

victim. The victim’s hair was singed by the fire. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable 

to the prosecution, taking into consideration the circumstantial evidence and all reasonable 

inferences arising from the evidence generally, resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of 

the prosecution, deferring to the trial court’s assessment of the weight of the evidence and the 

credibility of the witnesses, Kanaan, 278 Mich App at 618-619, and appreciating that minimal 

circumstantial evidence suffices to establish intent, which can be inferred from any facts in 

evidence, Unger, 278 Mich App at 223, we hold that the evidence was more than sufficient to 

show that defendant intended to cause serious injury of an aggravated nature, i.e., great bodily 

harm, to the victim. 

 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in its handling of his objection to 

statements that were contained in his presentence investigation report (PSIR). The PSIR 

indicated that the victim’s mother had been informed by the victim of a previous incident in 

which defendant abducted her at knife point, drove her to his grandparents’ residence in Paw 

Paw, and held her captive for 14 hours. This incident was not addressed in the evidence 

presented at trial, and defense counsel at sentencing stated that defendant disputed the claim and 

objected to its inclusion in the PSIR. The prosecution responded, stating that the incident had 

been reported. The trial court indicated that “given the extensive information attached in support 

of everyone’s brief here too or sentencing memorandums – it certainly is addressed.” The court 

decided to leave the information in the PSIR, implicitly finding it to be accurate, but the court 

also added to the PSIR that defendant disputed the claim and that there was no evidence at trial 

concerning the incident. The court noted, “I think I can consider it in totality for sentencing.” 

On appeal, defendant claims that the sentence was based upon inaccurate information, i.e., the 

kidnapping incident, and requests resentencing or an evidentiary hearing. 

 “If any information in the presentence report is challenged, the court must allow the 

parties to be heard regarding the challenge, and make a finding with respect to the challenge or 

determine that a finding is unnecessary because it will not take the challenged information into 

account in sentencing.” MCR 6.425(E)(2). A PSIR may include “any . . . information that may 

aid the court in sentencing.” MCR 6.425(A)(1)(l). The scope of a PSIR is necessarily broad; 

therefore, “[a] judge preparing to sentence a defendant may consider comments made by the 
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defendant to the probation officer during the presentence interview in addition to evidence 

adduced at trial, public records, hearsay relevant to the defendant's life and character, and other 

criminal conduct for which the defendant has not been charged or convicted.” Morales v Parole 

Bd, 260 Mich App 29, 46; 676 NW2d 221 (2003) (citation omitted). 

 Defendant never requested an evidentiary hearing below; defense counsel quickly 

accepted the trial court’s resolution and moved on. A PSIR is presumed to be accurate and may 

be relied on by a sentencing court “unless effectively challenged by the defendant.” People v 

Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 334; 662 NW2d 501 (2003) (emphasis added), citing People v 

Grant, 455 Mich 221, 233-234; 565 NW2d 389 (1997). The simple and cursory assertion by 

counsel below that defendant “disputes” the incident absent any elaboration and without having 

defendant himself step forward at the sentencing hearing and deny the incident or offer an 

affidavit was not an “effective” challenge, such that an evidentiary hearing was required with the 

burden shifting to the prosecution to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the incident 

occurred. See Callon, 256 Mich App at 333-334 (noting that “it is incumbent on a defendant to 

first mount an effective challenge to invoke his right to a hearing on a contested fact at 

sentencing and, thus, the need for an evidentiary hearing with a finding by the trial court based 

upon the preponderance of evidence” and that “a flat denial of an adverse factual assertion” may 

not suffice, as opposed to “an affirmative factual assertion,” depending on the nature of the 

disputed matter) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Again, defendant did not even request 

an evidentiary hearing below. And on appeal, defendant fails to even frame an argument 

employing the pertinent caselaw and analysis that contemplates whether there was an “effective” 

challenge necessitating a hearing. We conclude that the trial court complied with MCR 

6.425(E)(2) by allowing defendant to present the challenge and then by resolving the challenge, 

and any argument about an evidentiary hearing is rejected and has not been properly presented to 

us. 

 Finally, defendant argues that, given the evidence in the record, the trial court should 

have assessed: offense variable (OV) 3 (physical injury to victim), MCL 777.33, at 10 points 

instead of 25 points; OV 4 (psychological injury to victim), MCL 777.34, at zero points instead 

of 10 points; OV 7 (aggravated physical abuse), MCL 777.37, at zero points instead of 50 points; 

OV 10 (exploitation of vulnerable victim; predatory conduct), MCL 777.40, at zero points 

instead of 15 points; OV 13 (continuing pattern of criminal behavior), MCL 777.43, at zero 

points instead of 25 points; and OV 16 (property damaged or destroyed), MCL 777.46, at zero 

points instead of 10 points. We first note that, to the extent that defendant is making a claim 

under People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358; 870 NW2d 502 (2015), that the trial court engaged in 

constitutionally-impermissible fact-finding when scoring the challenged OVs, the argument is 

rejected, given that defendant was sentenced after Lockridge was issued and pursuant to advisory 

guidelines. See People v Biddles, __ Mich App __; __ NW2d __ (2016); slip op at 5-6 (“The 

constitutional evil addressed by the Lockridge Court was not judicial fact-finding in and of itself, 

it was judicial fact-finding in conjunction with required application of those found facts for 

purposes of increasing a mandatory minimum sentence range, which constitutional violation was 

remedied in Lockridge by making the guidelines advisory, not by eliminating judicial factfinding.”). 

 Next, the unchallenged total OV points for defendant is 60; he had been assessed 185 

total OV points. With respect to the applicable guidelines grid concerning class B offenses, the 
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top OV level is level VI, which requires a score of 75 or more points. MCL 777.63. 

Accordingly, if, in regard to the challenged scores, the trial court did not err in assessing 15 of 

those points, there would be no basis for reversal, as only when the guidelines range is altered is 

it necessary to remand for resentencing. People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89; 711 NW2d 44 

(2006). In People v Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013), our Supreme Court 

observed: 

 Under the sentencing guidelines, the circuit court's factual determinations 

are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence. Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring 

conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a 

question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo. 

[Citations omitted.] 

 With respect to OV 3, a trial court must assess 25 points if it finds that a “[l]ife 

threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim.” MCL 777.33(1)(c). 

Defendant suggests that the trial court could only consider the nature and extent of the physical 

injury that he actually inflicted on the victim, which would not include the injury to the victim’s 

head that was inflicted by her brother while swinging the baseball bat. However, the statute did 

not limit the trial court to consideration of only those injuries directly inflicted by defendant 

himself. Rather, the Legislature simply required the scoring of points for an injury that 

“occurred to a victim” during the offense. MCL 777.33(1)(c). Thus, the trial court could 

properly consider the injury that the victim suffered when her brother accidentally struck her 

with the baseball bat, given that she would not have suffered the head injury but for defendant’s 

home invasion and assault. See, e.g., People v Laidler, 491 Mich 339, 345-346; 817 NW2d 517 

(2012) (holding that the trial court could properly score OV 3 on the basis of an injury inflicted 

by a homeowner who exercised his right to use force in self-defense during a home invasion 

because the injury to a coperpetrator would not have occurred but for the defendant perpetrator’s 

commission of the home invasion). 

 Defendant further contends that there was no evidence that the victim’s head injury was 

life threatening or permanently incapacitating. During her trial testimony, the victim agreed that 

she needed surgery to treat the head injury. And the PSIR stated that the victim suffered “a 

severe head injury.” Also, it was indicated at sentencing that the victim underwent “brain 

surgery” and “needed 24-hour care for 6-weeks” as a result of the injury.4

 It is within the realm 

of common understanding that a strike to the head with a baseball bat can cause a life-threatening 

 

4

 “When calculating the sentencing guidelines, a court may consider all record evidence, 

including the contents of a PSIR, plea admissions, and testimony presented at a preliminary 

examination.” People v McChester, 310 Mich App 354, 358; 873 NW2d 646 (2015). It may 

also consider a victim impact statement in a PSIR or statements or letters submitted to the court 

for consideration on sentencing. See, e.g., People v Earl, 297 Mich App 104, 109-110; 822 

NW2d 271 (2012). Further, the trial court may properly rely on inferences that arise from the 

record evidence when making the findings underlying its scoring of offense variables. Id. at 109. 
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injury, and the trial court could reasonably infer from the testimony and statements at sentencing 

that the victim’s head injury was such an injury. We find no error in the trial court’s ruling. 

 Adding 25 points for OV 3 to the unchallenged 60 points places defendant at OV level 

VI, the top level (75+), MCL 777.63, and therefore there is no basis to remand for resentencing, 

Francisco, 474 Mich at 89. Accordingly, there is no need for us to go further. That said, we find 

that the evidence also adequately supported the scores for OVs 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16. There was 

overwhelming evidence that the victim suffered “[s]erious psychological injury requiring 

professional treatment,” including post-traumatic stress disorder, thereby supporting the 

assessment of ten points for OV 4, MCL 777.34(1)(a). Next, there was sufficient evidence that 

the “victim was treated with . . . egregious conduct designed to substantially increase the fear and 

anxiety . . . [she] suffered during the offense,” including defendant popping out from underneath 

the comforter after hiding in the victim’s bedroom, holding her at knifepoint, telling her that he 

was going to kill her, and then attempting to burn her alive, thereby supporting the assessment of 

50 points for OV 7, MCL 777.37(1)(a). Next, there was overwhelming evidence that defendant 

engaged in “preoffense conduct directed at [the] victim . . . for the primary purpose of 

victimization[,]” i.e., predatory conduct, including preoffense ominous and threatening text 

messages sent by defendant to the victim, thereby supporting the assessment of 15 points for OV 

10, MCL 777.40(1)(a) and (3)(a). Next, there was sufficient evidence that the home invasion 

offense “was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving 3 or more crimes against a 

person,” including a 2013 felonious assault conviction and the three offenses for which 

defendant was convicted in this case, thereby supporting the assessment of 25 points for OV 13, 

MCL 777.43(1)(c). As indicated in MCL 777.43(2)(a) for purposes of OV 13, all crimes 

committed by defendant “within a 5-year period, including the sentencing offense,” had to be 

counted, and without regard to “whether the offense resulted in a conviction.” Moreover, 

contrary to defendant’s argument, multiple concurrent offenses arising from the same incident or 

from a single criminal episode are to be counted in scoring OV 13. People v Gibbs, 299 Mich 

App 473, 487; 830 NW2d 821 (2013); People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 532; 640 NW2d 

314 (2001). We note that the assault, arson, and home invasion crimes were three separate and 

distinct offenses. Finally, there was sufficient evidence that the fire-damaged portion of the 

home had a value of more than $20,000, including the information in the PSIR that the insurance 

carrier paid more than $24,000 to cover the damages, thereby supporting the assessment of ten 

points for OV 16, MCL 777.46(1)(b). In sum, the trial court did not commit clear error in 

scoring OVs 3, 4, 7, 10, 13, and 16. Resentencing is unwarranted. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause