FIRST DI VISI ON May 27, 2008

No. 1-06-1825 JAMIE MERCADO, Indiv. and a s Personal Representative of the Estate of Baby

Mercado Peterson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MOUNT SINAI

HOSPITAL

MEDICAL

CENTER OF CHICAGO, a Corporation; PAUL A L. CAVENS; AYER ORHAN; and ACCESS COMMUNITY HEALTH NETWORK, a Corporation, Defend ants-App ellants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook Cou

nty

No. 04 L 3959

Honorab le John A. Ward, Judge Presi ding.

PRESID ING

JUSTICE

CAHI LL deliver ed the opi nion of the

court: Defendants Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center of Chicago, Dr. Paula L. Cavens, Dr. Ay er Orha

n and Acc ess Communi

ty H ealth Ne

twork bri ng this in terlocu tory appeal u nder Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). I n 2005, plaintiff Jamie Mercado filed a wrongful death action against defendants on beha lf of her fetus Baby

Mercado Peterson. Plaintiff alleged Dr. Cave ns erre d in diag

nosing h er preg

nancy as an unviable an

d potentia lly d anger ous ectop ic pregnancy

outside her uterus. Plaintiff agreed to terminate the e ctopic pregnancy by taking the drug me thotrexate . Plaintiff

later le arned the preg

nancy was not e ctopic bu

t uterine , where

it could have been viable.1-06-1825

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Rule 308( a) perm

its appell ate review of an otherwis e unappe alable order if t here is a question of law with substantial grounds for difference s of opinion and if immediate resolution of the quest ion would ma

terially advanc e the litig ation. 155 Ill. 2 d R. 308(a ). The tr ial cour t must identify and ce

rtify the question of law to be answered. 155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a) . Our standard of review i s de novo. Terrill v . Oakbro ok Hilton Su ites & Ga rden I nn, L. L.C. , 338 Ill. App. 3d 631, 634, 788 N.E.2d 789 (2003). The question certified for review is: "Whether a plaintiff's agreement to terminate a pregnancy

constitutes 'requisite consent' under [s]ection 2.2 of the Wrongful De ath Act (Act), 740 IL CS 180/2.2 [(West 2004)], and bars a wrongful death claim where defenda nts are alleged to have misdiagnosed her pregna ncy as ec topic rather than uterine." We answer in the ne gative. Plaintiff 's ag reemen t to terminate an e ctopic pr egnancy was not requisite consent to terminate a uterine pregnancy . Her wrongful death claim ag ainst defendants on behalf of her fetus is not barred under section 2.2 of the Act (740 I LCS 180/2.2 (West 2004)). The primary r

ule of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Magg ette , 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348, 747 N.E.2d 339 (2001). An inquiry into legislative intent begins with the languag e of the statute. Magg ette , 195 Ill. 2d at 348. Courts must give statutory lang uage its plain and ordinary meaning. Advincula v. United Blood Services , 176 Ill. 2d 1, 16, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1996). A statute should be construed so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaningle ss. Magg ette , 195 Ill. 2d at 350. Where the statutory language is clear, it should be given effect without resort to other interpretative aids. Magg ette , 195 Ill. 2d at 348.1-06-1825

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The statute at issue provides: "There shall be no cause of action against a physician or a medical institution for the wrongful death of a fetus ca used by an abor

tion where the abortion was permitted by law

and the requisite consent was lawfully g

iven." (Emphasis added.) 740 IL CS 180/2.2 (West 2004). The certified question requires us to construe "r equisite consent" as used in this statute. The parties have not identified nor have we found a nother Illinois statute that uses the term "requi site cons ent." N or have we found in state or f ederal decision s a defin

ition of " requisite consent" as it is used here. L ooking at the wrongful death statute as a whole, we find no other reference to consent. See 740 I LCS 180/1 et seq . (2004). The terms "requisite" and "c onsent" have plain and ordinary meanings. "I

n determining th e p la in me an in g o f a st at ut or y te rm , i t i s e nt ir el y appropriate to look to the dictionary for a definitio n." People v. Perry , 224 I ll. 2d 312, 3 30, 864 N. E.2d 196, 2 08 (2007) . "Requi site" is defined as "requ ired by the nature of t hings or by circumsta nces or by the end in vi ew." Webster's Third New I

nternational Dictionary

1929 (1993). The definition of consent has been scrutinized by Illinois courts. In People ex r el. Vestuto v. O'Connor , 351 Ill. App. 539, 543-44, 115 N.E.2d 810 (1953), this court wrote:

"The te rm conse nt implies a

n intellec tual act g iving as sent ( People ex r

el. Walker v. O'Connor , [351 Ill. App. 545, 548-49, 115 N.E.2d 808 (1953)] ***). Consent implies a knowledge of the facts. We think that the knowledge needed for cons ent is that

which the

ordinar y pr udent person would require before giving assent to [ a serious] matter."1-06-1825

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"[T]he term ‘consent’ ** * implies an understan ding of the th ing consented to." Walker , 351 I ll. App. at 548. Based on the plain languag e of the statute, we conclude that plaintiff could not have given the "requisite consent" for the termination of he r uterine pregnancy . Plaintiff's consent was not "requisite" because she did not have the information necessary to understand "the nature of things." Plaintiff's agree

ment to terminate the pregnancy was not "consent" because she did not know her pregnancy

was in her uterus. She agreed to the ter mination of an ectopic pregnancy

. She received the termination of a uterine preg nancy. Without the requiste consent r equired by the statute, her wrongful death action on beha lf of her fetus is not barred. Defendants cite Light v. Proctor Community Hospital , 182 Ill. App. 3d 563, 538 N.E.2d 828 (1989), to argue that "requisite conse nt" connotes only a

voluntary decision. The c ourt there was not called on to construe "requisite consent." The question of whether plaintiff's decision here was voluntary

is immaterial given our conclusion that she lacked the information nec essary to establish "requisite consent." We answer the certified question in the negative. Plaintiff' s agreement to terminate an ectopic pregnancy

was not requisite consent t o termina te a uter ine preg nancy . Under t

hese circumstances, plaintiff's wrongf ul death claim against defendants on behalf of her fetus is not barred under section 2.2 of the Act (740 I LCS 180/2.2 (West 2004)). Certified question answered; cause remande d. WOLFSON and R.E. GORDON, JJ., concur.