F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

D A L I A R A S H D A

N (M O H A

M E D ), Plaintiff-Appellant
,

v

.

M A R C G E I S S B E R

G E R ; E U G E

N E L A B A R R E ; A I B

. S T R

E A C K E R ; F O R O U D H A K

I M ; N A D E R A

. N A D E R S H A H I ; P A T R

I C K J

. F E R

R I L L O , J R .; L E I G H A

N D E R S O N ; J E F F M I L E S ; D A N I E L J

. B E

N D E R ; L O L

A G I U S T I ; C R A I G Y A R

B O R O U G H ; D O E S 1 –50; U N I V E R S I T Y O F T H E P A C I F I C ,

Defendants-Appellees

. N o. 12-16305

D.C. No. 4:10-cv-00634- SB A

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Saundra B . Armstrong
, District J udg e, Presiding

Submitted Aug ust 15, 2014 * San F rancisco, California

F iled Aug ust 26, 2014

* T h e p an el u n a n i m o u sl y co n clu d es th is case is su itab le f o r d ecisio n

w ith o u t o ral arg u

m en t. S ee Fed . R. A pp . P . 3 4 (a)(2 ).RA S H D A N V

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B efore: M. Marg aret McKeown and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit J udg es, and David Alan Ez ra, District J udg e. * *

Opinion by

J udg e McKeown

SUMMARY * * *

Em ploym ent Discrim ination

The panel affirmed the d istrict court’s summary judg ment

on a claim of national orig in d i s c ri m i n ation in violation o f Title VIof the Civil Rig hts Act of 1964.

J oining other circuits, the panel held that the McDonnell Douglas fram e w o r

k f o r d i sparate treatment c laims under Title VI I app l i e d t o t he Title VI c laim. Under this analy sis, the plaintiff did not establish a p rima facie case of national orig in discrimination.

** T h e H o n o r a b l e Dav id A

. Ezra, District J u d g e f or th e U.S. District Co u rt f o r th e District o f

Haw aii, sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.

*** T h is su

m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f

th e o p in io n

o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.RA S H D A N V

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COUNSEL

J ay T. J ambeck and Mandy G

. L eig h
, L eig h L aw Group, San F rancisco, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael J

. Vartain and K athry n J

. B urke, Vartain L aw Group, San F rancisco, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OP INION

McKEOW

N, Circuit J udg e:

Dalia Rashdan (M o hamed) was enrolled in a dentistry prog r am for international students at the University of the Pacific. She appeals from the distri c t c ourt’s g rant o f summary judg ment in favor of the Univer s i t y and several instructors and administrators o n her claim of national orig in discrimination in violation of T itle VI of the Civil Rig hts A ct

o f 1 9 6 4
, 4 2 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq

. W e join our siste r circuits in holding that the M cDonnell D ouglas frame w ork for disparate treatment claims under T itle VI I a p p l i es to Rashdan’s Title VI claim. Under this analy sis, R a s hdan’s claim fails because she did not establish a prima facie case o f national orig in discrimination.

B A C K G R O U N D A N D P R O C E D U R AL H I S T O R

Y

Rashdan, an E g y

ptian d entist, w as enrolled in a two-y e ar I nternational Dental Studies Prog ra m to credential her for practice in the U nited States. T hree months before g raduation, Rashdan followed her clin ical supervisor’s instruct i o ns to seat a crown, but the procedure was unsuccessful. After the h ead o f t he restorative dentistryRA S H D A N V

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prog r am, Dr. Geissberg er, heard from a colleag u e about the failed crown seating
, he told Rashdan—within earshot o f other f aculty
, students, and patients—that her “clinical work on the patient . . . was ‘Third W orld Dentistry

. ’”

Offended by the remark, Rashdan c onfronted Geissberg er in h is office, ex plaining that the crown-seating procedure was her clinical supervisor’ s idea and that she was simply carry ing it out as his studen t

. Geissberg er told her that the procedure was “nowhere in the sy llabus.” Rashdan aga i n

ex p lained that her clinical supervisor had proposed the procedure and that she “did n ot feel that it w as [ her] place to quest i o n the direction of a respected faculty member.” Geissberg er responded: “I t’s still Third W o r l d D entistry

. ” Rashdan replied: “ I am offended by that remark.” Geissberg er then asked her where she was from and, when she said Eg y

pt, he stated that Eg y

p t was “not a Third W orld country .” Rashdan retorted: “Yes it is.” Geissberg er insisted: “No it’s not and it’s still Third W o rld Dentist r y

. ” Rashdan ended the conversation by say ing : “Yes it is. And in a ny case I learned this Third W orld Dentistry in y o ur F irst W orld clinic.”

Shortly after h er ex chang e with G eissberg er, another supervisor, Dr. Hakim, g reeted Rashdan by sa y ing
, “W hat’s
up, TW ? ” Rashdan looked puz z led, so Hakim clarified: “Oh

come on! Don’t y ou g et it?

. . . T h i r d W orld? ” A few

mo n t h s later, Rashdan sent Hakim an effusive thank y ou e-mail for a s s i s t ing her with a procedure, which she sig n ed “Dalia Rashdan Mohamed a.k.a. T.W

. ”

F our day s b efore g raduation, Rashdan was informed that despite her more than adequate p erformance in course work, she was n ot r ecommended for g raduation and that she wouldRA S H D A N V

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have to remediate in restorative dentistr y and r emovable prosthodontics. Rash d a n entered an additional quarter o f clinical w ork a t no ex tra cost during which her performance did n ot improve; evaluators stated that she was ac t i v ely harming p atie nts and her performance was “clinically unacceptable.” Geissberg er and o t h e r faculty ex chang ed emails discussing her poor performance, attempting to come up with a “strateg y ” to ensure that Rashdan would not pr a c t i c e d entistry in the United States until she could do so safely

.

The faculty settled on a recommendatio n t h a t Rashdan
pursue a n additional q u arter of remedial work on models, after w hich she could return to clinical wor k o n p a tients. Geissberg er informe d Rashdan of the recommendation a nd called a meeting to discuss it w ith her, but the day before the meeting
, Rashdan submitted a requ e s t for absence. The meeting w ent on without Rashdan, and the faculty sent h e r a p r o p o s e d r e m e d i a t i o n p l a n , e c h o i n g t h e e a r l i e r recommendation and communicating the faculty ’s hope that Rashdan would “consider r eturning to school at [ her] earliest convenience to f

ulfill the requirements of the [ remediation] plan and earn [ her] d eg r ee.” When Rashdan did not respond,

a c o m m i ttee accepted the plan o n her behalf, and she w a s notified o f a r ig ht of appeal. Rather than appeal the plan o r beg in the recommended r emediation, Rashdan took a leave o f absence, did not return to school, and filed this lawsuit.

A N AL Y S I S

I. Title VI F ram ew ork

Title VI provides that “[ n ] o person in the United States

s h a l l, on the g round of race, color, or national orig in, b eRA S H D A N V

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e x cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, o r be subjected to discrimination under any prog ram or activity receivi n g F ederal financial a ssistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. S i m i l ar l y , T i t l e V I I p r o h i b i t s a n e m p l o y e r f r o m “discriminat[ ing ] ag a inst any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, colo r , relig ion, sex , or national orig in.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). I n McDonnell Douglas Corp. v

. Green
, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court “set forth the basic allocation of burdens and o r der of presentation of proof i n a Title V I I c ase alleg ing discriminatory treatment.” T e x. De p ’ t o f Cmty. Affairs v. B urdine
, 4 50 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981).

Fi r s t, the plaintiff has the burden of provi n g by the preponderance of the evidence a prima fa c i e case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in provi n g the prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the d e fendant to articulate some leg itimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the employ e e ’s rejection. Third, should the defendant carry this b u rden, the plaintiff must then have an o p portunity to prove by a preponderance of the e vidence that the leg itimate rea s o n s offered by the de fendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretex t for discrimination.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Al t h o u g h we have y et to consider whether McDonnell Douglas a

pplies to Title VI d i s parate treatment claims, we have “look[ ed] to” Title VI I doctrines to analy z e o ther Title VI claims. See, e.g. , D arensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n
, 6 3 6 F .3d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 2011) (disparate impact). W eRA S H D A N V

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now join the other c ircuits in concluding t hat McDonnell Douglas a lso applies to Title VI disparate treatment claims. See, e. g

. , Gazarov ex rel. Gazarov v. Diocese of Erie
, 80 F

. App’x 202, 203–05 (3d Cir. 2003) (opinion); Bryant v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-38 o

f G a rvin Cnty., Okla.
, 334 F .3d 928, 929–30 (10th Cir. 2003); F u ller v. R a

yburn
, 161 F .3d 516, 518 ( 8 th Cir. 1998); Ga. State Conference o f Branches of NAACP v. S

tate of Ga.
, 775 F .2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985), abrogated o n o t h e r g

rounds by Lee v

. E towah Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 963 F .2d 1416, 1419 n.3 (11th Cir. 1992).

II. Applying McDonnell Douglas to R ash d a n ’s Title V I Claim

Althoug h “[ t] he req u i s ite deg ree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case for [ a] Title V I I

. . . claim[ ] on summary judg ment is minimal and does not e ven need to r ise
to the level of a preponderance o f the eviden c e , ” Rashdan’s claim fails. W

allis v. J.R. Simplot Co.
, 26 F .3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). On de novo r eview, the undisputed facts viewed in the lig ht most favorable to Rashdan d o n o t “ g ive[ ] rise to

an inference of unlawful discrimination.” See G o d w i n v

. Hunt W esson, Inc.
, 150 F .3d 1217, 1219–20 (9th Cir. 1 998) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

Evidence of discriminatory motive can b e d i r e ct o r indirect. Burdine
, 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnell Douglas
, 411 U.S. at 804–05). “Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [ of discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption.” V a squez v. Cnty. of

L.A.
, 349 F

. 3 d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) ( alteration in orig inal) (internal qu otation marks o mitted). Rashdan’s direct evidence of discriminatory intent—Geissberg er’s comment that her w or k w a s “Third W orld dentistry ,” Hakim’sRA S H D A N V

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reference to her as “ T W ,” and the discussion of a “strateg y ” about how to deal with her subpar clinical performance—do
not support a c laim of discriminatory animus. To b e sure, the

“ T hird W orld” reference was an offensive, insensitive, a n d politically incorrect jab ; i t was directed, however, at the procedure, not Rashdan’s national orig in. See Stall cop v

. Kaiser Found. Hosps.
, 820 F.2d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 1 987) (“[ D] e rog atory ethnic st a tements, u nless ex cessive a nd
op p r o brious, a

re insufficient to establish a case of n ational orig in discrimination.”). I n contex t, construing all inferences in favor of Rashdan, Geissberge r ’ s statement about “Third W o rld Dentistry ,” r eferred to the procedure th a t Rashdan’s

s u pervisor ordered. Rashdan acknowledg es that n o o ne affiliated w ith the University made any disparag ing comment about Eg y

pt or its people, customs, culture, relig ious practices, or traditions, and she referred to herself as “TW ” in

an e-mail to Hakim. Rashdan a lso offers n o link b etween statements a

bout a “strateg y ” to address her performance a nd any comments about the “Third W orld.”

Rashdan’s indirec t evidence of alleg edly similarly situated students who were permitted to g raduate also f a ils to establish a p rima fac i e c ase of discriminatory animus. Rashdan offe r s g rades, clinical competency r ating s, a nd fa c u l t y comments for c ertain students whom she c laims performed as well or worse than she did, but Rashdan offers

no c ontex t to eval uate this data. A laundry list of scores proves nothing in the absence of contex t or ex planation. See Dandy v. U

nited Parcel Serv., In c

. , 388 F .3d 263, 274 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[ T he plaintiff] has g iven t h i s c ourt no concrete way to measure the c andidates she alleg es w ere u nl a w f ully promoted over h er a

nd i n s t e ad has taken a ‘kitchen sink’ approach to her appeal by listing every white male employ ee p romoted to a rank hig her than f ull-time supervisor with o u tRA S H D A N V

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identif y ing a ny coherent method o f analy sis.”). Simply offering up clinical s c o r e s of students who g raduated a nd students sent for their own tailor-made remediation prog rams is insufficient to meet a minimum threshold of identif y ing
stu d e n t s who are similarly situated to Rashdan. These comparators miss the mark of establishing any thing
, let alone a categ ory

of similarly situated individuals.

Rashdan’s direct and indirect evidence of discriminatory motive falls short of establishing a prima facie case. 1

AF F IRMED.

1 W e also n o t e th at ev en

if Rash d an h ad estab lish ed a p rim a f acie case

o f d iscrim in atio n , h er claim n o n eth eless f ails b ecau se sh e d id n o t reb u t th e leg i tim ate, n o n

- d iscrim in ato ry j u stif icatio n f o r th e ad d itio n al rem ed iatio n , n am ely th at sh e w as p erf o rm in g v ery p o o r l y i n clin ical resto rativ e d en tistry

. S

ee Va sq u ez , 3 4 9 F.3 d at 6 4 1

– 4 2.