2049

FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 

RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 

CONTENTS

Page

Abolition of Suffrage Qualifications on Basis of Race ............................................................ 2051 

Adoption and Judicial Enforcement .................................................................................. 2051 

Adoption ....................................................................................................................... 2051 

The Judicial View of the Amendment ....................................................................... 2052 

Grandfather Clauses ................................................................................................... 2053 

The White Primary ..................................................................................................... 2054 

Literacy Tests .............................................................................................................. 2054

Racial Gerrymandering ............................................................................................... 2055 

Congressional Enforcement ............................................................................................... 2056 

State Action ................................................................................................................. 2056

Federal Remedial Legislation ..................................................................................... 2058 

2051

1See discussion under ‘‘Apportionment of Representation,’’ supra. Of course, the 

equal protection clause has been extensively utilized by the Court to protect the 

right to vote. See ‘‘Fundamental Interests: The Political Process,’’ supra. 2W. GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 25–28 (1965). 3 Id. at 29–31; ch. 6, 14 Stat. 375 (1866) (District of Columbia); ch. 15, 14 Stat. 

379 (1867) (territories); ch. 36, 14 Stat. 391 (1867) (admission of Nebraska to statehood upon condition of guaranteeing against racial qualifications in voting); ch. 153, 

14 Stat. 428 (1867) (First Reconstruction Act). 

RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 

FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 

SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to 

vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 

any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this 

article by appropriate legislation. 

ABOLITION OF SUFFRAGE QUALIFICATIONS ON BASIS 

OF RACE 

Adoption and Judicial Enforcement 

Adoption.—The final decision of Congress not to include anything relating to the right to vote in the Fourteenth Amendment, 

aside from the provisions of § 2, 1 left the issue of Negro suffrage 

solely with the States, and Northern States were generally as loath 

as Southern to grant the ballot to African Americans, both the 

newly-freed and those who had never been slaves. 2 But in the second session of the 39th Congress, the right to vote was extended 

to African Americans by statute in the District of Columbia and the 

territories, and the seceded States as a condition of readmission 

had to guarantee Negro suffrage. 3 Following the election of President Grant, the ‘‘lame duck’’ third session of the Fortieth Congress 

sent the proposed Fifteenth Amendment to the States for ratification. The struggle was intense because Congress was divided into 

roughly three factions: those who opposed any federal constitutional guarantee of Negro suffrage, those who wanted to go beyond 

a limited guarantee and enact universal male suffrage, including 

abolition of all educational and property-holding tests, and those 

who wanted or who were willing to settle for an amendment merely 

2052 AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 

4Gillette, supra, at 46–78. The congressional debate is conveniently collected in 

1 B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES—CIVIL RIGHTS 372

(1971). 5 United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1876); United States v. 

Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 566 (1876). 6 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884); Guinn v. United States, 238 

U.S. 347, 363 (1915). A state constitutional provision limiting the right of suffrage 

to whites was automatically nullified by ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. 

Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881). 7 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000). 

8Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating Oklahoma exception 

to literacy requirement for any ‘‘lineal descendants’’ of persons entitled to vote in 

1866).

proscribing racial qualifications in determining who could vote 

under any other standards the States wished to have. 4 The latter 

group ultimately prevailed. 

The Judicial View of the Amendment.—In its initial appraisals of this Amendment, the Supreme Court appeared disposed 

to emphasize only its purely negative aspects. ‘‘The Fifteenth 

Amendment,’’ it announced, did ‘‘not confer the right . . . [to vote] 

upon any one,’’ but merely ‘‘invested the citizens of the United 

States with a new constitutional right which is . . . exemption from 

discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account 

of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’’ 5 But in subsequent cases, the Court, conceding ‘‘that this article’’ has originally 

been construed as giving ‘‘no affirmative right to the colored man 

to vote’’ and as having been ‘‘designed primarily to prevent discrimination against him,’’ professed to be able ‘‘to see that under 

some circumstances it may operate as the immediate source of a 

right to vote. In all cases where the former slave-holding States 

had not removed from their Constitutions the words ‘white man’ as 

a qualification for voting, this provision did, in effect, confer on him 

the right to vote, because . . . it annulled the discriminating word 

white, and this left him in the enjoyment of the same right as 

white persons. And such would be the effect of any future constitutional provision of a State which would give the right of voting exclusively to white people. . . .’’ 6

Although ‘‘the immediate concern of the Amendment was to 

guarantee to the emancipated slaves the right to vote,’’ the Amendment ‘‘is cast in fundamental terms’’ that transcend that immediate 

objective, and ‘‘grants protection to all persons, not just members 

of a particular race.’’ 7 Moreover, the Court has construed ‘‘race’’ 

broadly to comprehend classifications based on ancestry as well as 

those based on race. 8 ‘‘Ancestry can be a proxy for race,’’ the Court 

explained recently, finding such a proxy in Hawaii’s limitation of 

the right to vote in a statewide election for an office responsible for 

AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 2053

9 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000). 

10Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 

11Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939). 

administering a trust for the benefit of persons who can trace their 

ancestry to Hawaiian inhabitants of 1778. 9

Grandfather Clauses.—Until quite recently, the history of 

the Fifteenth Amendment has been largely a record of belated judicial condemnation of various state efforts to disenfranchise African 

Americans either overtly through statutory enactment or covertly 

through inequitable administration of electoral laws and toleration 

of discriminatory membership practices of political parties. Of several devices which have been voided, one of the first to be held unconstitutional was the ‘‘grandfather clause.’’ Beginning in 1895, 

several States enacted temporary laws whereby persons who had 

been voters, or descendants of those who had been voters, on January 1, 1867, could be registered notwithstanding their inability to 

meet any literacy requirement. Unable because of the date to avail 

themselves of the exemption, African Americans were disabled to 

vote on grounds of illiteracy or through discriminatory administration of literacy tests, while illiterate whites were permited to register without taking any tests. With the achievement of the intended result, most States permitted their laws to lapse, but Oklahoma’s grandfather clause had been enacted as a permanent 

amendment to the state constitution. A unanimous Court condemned the device as recreating and perpetuating ‘‘the very conditions which the [Fifteenth] Amendment was intended to destroy.’’ 10

The Court did not experience any difficulty in voiding a subsequent Oklahoma statute of 1916 which provided that all persons, 

except those who voted in 1914, who were qualified to vote in 1916 

but who failed to register between April 30 and May 11, 1916, with 

some exceptions for sick and absent persons who were given an additional brief period to register, should be perpetually 

disenfranchised. The Fifteenth Amendment, Justice Frankfurter 

declared for the Court, nullified ‘‘sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the 

colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race.’’ 11 The impermissible effect of the statute, said 

the Court, was automatically to continue as permanent voters, 

without their being obliged to register again, all white persons who 

were on registration lists in 1914 by virtue of the previously invalidated grandfather clause, whereas African Americans, prevented 

2054 AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 

12 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 

649 (1944). 13 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 14 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 15Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). 16Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 17 Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 

(1948); see also Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1949). 18Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). For analysis of the opinions, see ‘‘State

Action,’’ supra. 

from registering by that clause, had been afforded only a 20-day 

registration opportunity to avoid permanent disenfranchisement. 

The White Primary.—Indecision was displayed by the Court, 

however, when it was called upon to deal with the exclusion of African Americans from participation in primary elections. Prior to 

its becoming convinced that primary contests were in fact elections 

to which federal constitutional guarantees applied, 12 the Court had 

relied upon the equal protection clause to strike down the Texas 

White Primary Law 13 and a subsequent Texas statute which contributed to a like exclusion by limiting voting in primary elections 

to members of state political parties as determined by the central 

committees thereof. 14 When exclusion of African Americans was 

thereafter perpetuated by political parties not acting in obedience 

to any statutory command, this discrimination was for a time 

viewed as not constituting state action and therefore as not prohibited by either the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendments. 15 This

holding was reversed nine years later when the Court declared that 

where the selection of candidates for public office is entrusted by 

statute to political parties, a political party in making its selection 

at a primary election is a state agency, and hence it may not under 

the Fifteenth Amendment exclude African Americans from such 

elections. 16 An effort by South Carolina to escape the effects of this 

ruling by repealing all statutory provisions regulating primary elections and political organizations conducting them was nullified by 

a lower federal court with no doctrinal difficulty, 17 but the Supreme Court, although nearly unanimous on the result, was unable 

to come to a majority agreement with regard to the exclusion of African Americans by the Jaybird Association, a county-wide organization which, independently of state laws and the use of state election machinery or funds, nearly monopolized access to Democratic 

nomination for local offices. The exclusionary policy was held unconstitutional but there was no opinion of the Court. 18

Literacy Tests.—At an early date the Court held that literacy 

tests which are drafted so as to apply alike to all applicants for the 

voting franchise would be deemed to be fair on their face and in 

the absence of proof of discriminatory enforcement could not be 

AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 2055

19Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Cf. Lassiter v. Northampton 

County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1960). 20Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (M.D. Ala. 1949), aff’d 336 U.S. 933 (1949). 21See ‘‘Apportionment and Districting,’’ supra. 22 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964). 23 E.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 

755 (1973). 24 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 25On the issue of motivation versus impact under the equal protection clause, 

see discussion of ‘‘Testing Facially Neutral Classifications Which Impact on Minorities’’ in the Fourteenth Amendment, supra. On the plurality’s view, see 446 U.S. at 

61-65. Justice White appears clearly to agree that purposeful discrimination is a 

necessary component of equal protection clause violation, and may have agreed as 

well that the same requirement applies under the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 94– 

103. Only Justice Marshall unambiguously adhered to the view that discriminatory 

effect is sufficient. Id. at 125. See also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 146– 

49 & nn.3–5 (1976) (dissenting). 26 446 U.S. at 65. At least three Justices disagreed with this view and would 

apply the Fifteenth Amendment to vote dilution claims. Id. at 84 n.3 (Justice Stevens concurring), 102 (Justice White dissenting), 125–35 (Justice Marshall dissenting). The issue was reserved in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 619 n.6 (1982). 27See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97–205, 96 Stat. 131, 

amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The Supreme Court interpreted the 1982 amendments 

to section 2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), determining that Congress 

said to deny equal protection. 19 But an Alabama constitutional 

amendment the legislative history of which disclosed that both its 

object and its intended administration were to disenfranchise African Americans was condemned as violative of the Fifteenth Amendment. 20

Racial Gerrymandering.—The Court’s series of decisions interpreting the equal protection clause as requiring the apportionment and districting of state legislatures solely on a population 

basis 21 had its beginning in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 22 in which the 

Court found a Fifteenth Amendment violation in the redrawing of 

a municipal boundary line into a 28-sided figure which excluded 

from the city all but four or five of 400 African Americans but no 

whites, and which thereby continued white domination of municipal elections. Subsequent decisions, particularly concerning the validity of multi-member districting and alleged dilution of minority 

voting power, were decided under the equal protection clause, 23

and in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 24 in the course of a considerably 

divided decision with respect to the requirement of discriminatory 

motivation in Fifteenth Amendment cases, 25 a plurality of the 

Court sought to restrict the Fifteenth Amendment to cases in 

which there is official denial or abridgment of the right to register 

and vote, and to exclude indirect dilution claims. 26 Congressional

amendment of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act may obviate the further 

development of constitutional jurisprudence in this area, however. 27

2056 AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 

had effectively overruled the City of Mobile intent standard in returning to a ‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ results test. 

28Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 362–63 (1915). 

29 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884). 

30 16 Stat. 140. Debate on the Act is collected in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES—CIVIL RIGHTS 454 (1971). See also The Enforcement Act of 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433. 

31 Ch. 25, 28 Stat 36 (1894); ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1153 (1909). See R. CARR, FEDERAL

PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 35–55 (1947), for a brief history 

of the enactment and repeal of the statutes. The surviving statutes of this period 

are 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–42, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(a), 1983, and 1985(3). 

32See ‘‘State Action,’’ under the Fourteenth Amendment, supra. ‘‘The State . . . 

must mean not private citizens but those clothed with the authority and influence 

which official position affords. The application of the prohibition of the Fifteenth 

Amendment to ‘any State’ is translated by legal jargon to read ‘State Action.’ This 

phrase gives rise to a false direction in that it implies some impressive machinery 

or deliberative conduct normally associated with what orators call a sovereign state. 

The vital requirement is State responsibility—that somewhere, somehow, to some 

extent, there be an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with State power, into 

any scheme by which colored citizens are denied voting rights merely because they 

are colored.’’ Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (Justice Frankfurter concurring).

Congressional Enforcement 

Although the Fifteenth Amendment is ‘‘self-executing,’’ 28 the

Court early emphasized that the right granted to be free from racial discrimination ‘‘should be kept free and pure by congressional 

enactment whenever that is necessary.’’ 29 Following ratification of 

the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, Congress passed the Enforcement Act of 1870, 30 which had started out as a bill to prohibit state 

officers from restricting suffrage on racial grounds and providing 

criminal penalties and ended up as a comprehensive measure 

aimed as well at private action designed to interfere with the 

rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Insofar as this legislation reached private action, it was 

largely nullified by the Supreme Court and the provisions aimed at 

official action proved ineffectual and much of it was later repealed. 31 More recent legislation has been much more far-reaching 

in this respect and has been sustained. 

State Action.—Like § 1 of the Fourteenth, § 1 of the Fifteenth 

Amendment prohibits official denial of the rights therein guaranteed, giving rise to the ‘‘state action’’ doctrine. 32 Nevertheless, the 

Supreme Court in two early cases seemed to be of the opinion that 

Congress could protect the rights against private deprivation, on 

the theory that Congress impliedly had power to protect the enjoyment of every right conferred by the Constitution against deprivaVerDate Apr<15>2004 10:51 Jun 28, 2004 Jkt 077500 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 C:\CONAN\CON048.SGM PRFM99 PsN: CON048
AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 2057

33The idea was fully spelled out in Justice Bradley’s opinion on circuit in United 

States v. Cruikshank, 25 Fed. Cas. 707, 712, 713 (No. 14,897) (C.C.D. La. 1874). The 

Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555–56 

(1876), and United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1876), may be read to support the contention. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), involved a federal 

election and the assertion of congressional power to reach private interference with 

the right to vote in federal elections, but the Court went further to broadly state 

the power of Congress to protect the citizen in the exercise of rights conferred by 

the Constitution, among which was the right to be free from discrimination in voting protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 665–66. 34 190 U.S. 127 (1903), holding unconstitutional Rev. Stat. § 5507, which was 

§ 5 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. 35 E.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 77 (1951). 36See ‘‘Congressional Definition of Fourteenth Amendment Rights,’’ supra. 37 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 38 ‘‘The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its organic law grants to 

all citizens a right to participate in the choice of elected officials without restrictions 

by any State because of race. This grant to the people of the opportunity for choice 

is not to be nullified by a State through casting its electoral process in a form which 

permits a private organization to practice racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied.’’ 

321 U.S. at 664. 39 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 

tion from any source. 33 But in James v. Bowman 34 the Court held 

that legislation based on the Fifteenth Amendment which attempted to prohibit private as well as official interference with the 

right to vote on racial grounds was unconstitutional, and that interpretation was not questioned until 1941. 35 But the Court’s interpretation of the ‘‘state action’’ requirement in cases brought under 

§ 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment narrowed the requirement there 

and opened the possibility, when these decisions are considered 

with cases decided under the Fourteenth Amendment, that Congress is not limited to legislation directed to official discrimination. 36

Thus, in Smith v. Allwright, 37 the exclusion of African Americans from political parties without the compulsion or sanction of 

state law was nonetheless held to violate the Fifteenth Amendment 

because political parties were so regulated otherwise as to be in effect agents of the State and thus subject to the Fifteenth Amendment; additionally, in one passage the Court suggested that the 

failure of the State to prevent the racial exclusion might be the act 

implicating the Amendment. 38 Then, in Terry v. Adams, 39 the political organization was not regulated by the State at all and selected its candidates for the Democratic primary election by its own 

processes; all eligible white voters in the jurisdiction were members 

of the organization but African Americans were excluded. Nevertheless, the Court held that this exclusion violated the Fifteenth 

Amendment, although no rationale was agreed upon by a majority 

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2058 AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 

40 345 U.S. at 477 (Justices Clark, Reed, and Jackson, and Chief Justice Vinson).41 345 U.S. at 470. 42 345 U.S. at 462, 468–69, 470 (Justices Black, Douglas, and Burton). 43 345 U.S. at 466-68. Justice Minton understood Justice Black’s opinion to do 

away with the state action requirement. Id. at 485 (dissenting). 44 71 Stat. 637, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(b), 1971(c). In a suit to enjoin state officials 

from violating 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a), derived from Rev. Stat. 2004, applying to all 

elections, the defendants challenged the constitutionality of the law because it applied to private action as well as state. The Court held that inasmuch as the statute 

could constitutionally be applied to the defendants it would not hear their contention that as applied to others it would be void. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 

17 (1960), disapproving the approach of United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876). 45Pub. L. No. 89–110, §§ 11–12, 79 Stat. 443, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973i, 1973j. 46The 1871 Act, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433, provided for a detailed federal supervision 

of the electoral process, from registration to the certification of returns. It was repealed in 1894. ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36. In Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), the 

Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, refused to order the registration of 6,000 

African Americans who alleged that they were being wrongly denied the franchise, 

the Court observing that no judicial order would do them any good in the absence 

of judicial supervision of the actual voting, which it was not prepared to do, and 

suggesting that the petitioners apply to Congress or the President for relief. 47Pub. L. No. 85–315, 71 Stat. 634. See United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 

(1960); United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961), aff’d, 304 F.2d 

583 (5th Cir.), aff’d, 371 U.S. 37 (1962). 48Pub. L. No. 86–449, 74 Stat. 86. 

able from Smith v. Allwright and thus did not deal with the central 

issue. 40 Justice Frankfurter thought the participation of local elected officials in the processes of the organization was sufficient to implicate state action. 41 Three Justices thought that when a purportedly private organization is permitted by the State to assume the 

functions normally performed by an agency of the State, then that 

association is subject to federal constitutional restrictions, 42 but

this opinion also, in citing selected passages of Yarbrough and

Reese and Justice Bradley’s circuit opinion in Cruikshank, appeared to be suggesting that the state action requirement is not indispensable. 43 The 1957 Civil Rights Act 44 included a provision 

prohibiting private action with intent to intimidate or coerce persons in respect of voting in federal elections and authorized the Attorney General to seek injunctive relief against such private actions 

regardless of the character of the election. The 1965 Voting Rights 

Act 45 went further and prohibited and penalized private actions to 

intimidate voters in federal, state, or local elections. The Supreme 

Court has yet to consider the constitutionality of these sections. 

Federal Remedial Legislation.—The history of federal remedial legislation is of modern vintage. 46 The 1957 Civil Rights Act 47

authorized the Attorney General of the United States to seek injunctive relief to prevent interference with the voting rights of citizens. The 1960 Civil Rights Act 48 expanded on this authorization 

by permitting the Attorney General to seek a court finding of ‘‘patVerDate Apr<15>2004 10:51 Jun 28, 2004 Jkt 077500 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 8222 Sfmt 8222 C:\CONAN\CON048.SGM PRFM99 PsN: CON048
AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 2059

49Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241. 50Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. 51The phrase ‘‘test or device’’ was defined as any requirement for (1) demonstrating the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrating any educational achievement or knowledge, (3) demonstrating good moral 

character, (4) proving qualifications by vouching of registered voters. Aimed primarily at literacy tests, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333–34 (1966), 

the Act was considerably broadened through the Court’s interpretation of § 5, 42 

U.S.C. § 1973c, which require the approval either of the Attorney General or a 

three-judge court in the District of Columbia before a State could put into effect any 

new voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 

with respect to voting, to include such changes as apportionment and districting, 

adoption of at-large instead of district elections, candidate qualification regulations, 

provisions for assistance of illiterate voters, movement of polling places, adoption of 

appointive instead of elective positions, annexations, and public employer restrictions upon employees running for elective office. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 

U.S. 544 (1969); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971); Georgia v. United 

States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 

(1978). See also United States v. Board of Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110 (1978) 

(pre-coverage provisions apply to all entities having power over any aspect of voting, 

not just ‘‘political subdivisions’’ as defined in Act). 52 380 U.S. 128 (1965). 

tern or practice’’ of discrimination in any particular jurisdiction and 

authorizing upon the entering of such a finding the registration of 

all qualified persons in the jurisdiction of the race discriminated 

against by court-appointed referees. This authorization moved the 

vindication of voting rights beyond a case-by-case process. Further 

amendments were added in 1964. 49 Finally, in the Voting Rights 

Act of 1965 50 Congress went substantially beyond what it had done 

before. It provided that if the Attorney General determined that 

any State or political subdivision maintained on November 1, 1964, 

any ‘‘test or device’’ 51 and that less than 50 per cent of the voting 

age population in that jurisdiction was registered on November 1, 

1964, or voted in the 1964 presidential election, such tests or devices were to be suspended for five years and no person should be 

denied the right to vote on the basis of such a test or device. A 

State could reinstitute such a test or device within the prescribed 

period only by establishing in a three-judge court in the District of 

Columbia that the test or device did not have a discriminatory intent or effect and the covered jurisdiction could only change its 

election laws in that period by obtaining the approval of the Attorney General or a three-judge court in the District of Columbia. The 

Act also provided for the appointment of federal examiners who 

could register persons meeting nondiscriminatory state qualifications who then must be permitted to vote. 

These laws the Supreme Court upheld and expansively applied. In United States v. Mississippi, 52 the Court held that the Attorney General was properly authorized to sue for preventive relief 

to protect the right of citizens to vote, that the State could be sued, 

2060 AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 

53 380 U.S. 145 (1965). See also United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960); 

United States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960); Alabama v. United States, 371 U.S. 

37 (1962). 54South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 

and that various election officers were defendants and the suit 

could not be defeated by the resignation of various officers. A lower 

federal court’s judgment voiding an ‘‘interpretation test,’’ which required an applicant to interpret a section of the state or federal 

constitution to the satisfaction of the voting registrar was approved 

in Louisiana v. United States. 53 The test was bad because it vested 

vast discretion in the registrars to determine qualifications while 

imposing no definite and objective standards for administration of 

the tests, a system which the evidence showed had been administered so as to disqualify African Americans and qualify whites. The 

Court also affirmed the lower court’s decree invalidating imposition 

of a new objective test for new voters unless the State required all 

present voters to reregister so that all voters were tested by the 

same standards. 

But it was in upholding the constitutionality of the 1965 Act 

that the Court sketched in the outlines of a broad power in Congress to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 54 While § 1 authorized 

the courts to strike down state statutes and procedures which denied the vote on the basis of race, the Court held, § 2 authorized 

Congress to go beyond proscribing certain discriminatory statutes 

and practices to ‘‘enforcing’’ the guarantee by any rational means 

at its disposal. The standard was the same as that employed under 

the ‘‘necessary and proper’’ clause supporting other congressional 

legislation. Congress was therefore justified in deciding that certain 

areas of the Nation were the primary locations of voting discrimination and in directing its remedial legislation to those areas. Congress chose a rational formula based on the existence of voting 

tests which could be used to discriminate and based on low registration or voting rates demonstrating the likelihood that the tests 

had been so used; it could properly suspend for a period all literacy 

tests in the affected areas upon findings that they had been administered discriminatorily and that illiterate whites had been registered while both literate and illiterate African Americans had not 

been; it could require the States to seek federal permission to reinstitute old tests or to institute new ones; and it could provide for 

federal examiners to register qualified voters. The nearly unanimous decision affords Congress a vast amount of discretion to enact 

measures designed to enforce the Amendment through broad affirmative prescriptions rather than through proscriptions of specific 

AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 2061

55 Justice Black dissented from that portion of the decision which upheld the requirement that before a State could change its voting laws it must seek approval 

of the Attorney General or a federal court. 383 U.S. at 355. 56Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). 57 84 Stat. 315, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa. 58Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131–34, 144–47, 216–17, 231–36, 282–84 

(1970). 59 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 60 Cf. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 

practices. 55 Subsequent decisions confirm the reach of this power. 

In one case, the Court held that evidence of discrimination in the 

educational opportunities available to black children in the county 

as compared to that available to white children during the period 

in which most of the adults who were now potential voters were in 

school precluded a North Carolina county from reinstituting a literacy test because of the past educational discrimination. 56 And

when Congress in 1970 57 suspended for a five-year period literacy 

tests throughout the Nation, the Court unanimously sustained the 

action as a valid measure to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. 58

Moreover, in City of Rome v. United States, 59 the Court read 

even more broadly the scope of Congress’ remedial powers under § 

2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, paralleling the similar reasoning 

under § 5 of the Fourteenth. The jurisdiction sought to escape from 

coverage of the Voting Rights Act by showing that it had not utilized any discriminatory practices within the prescribed period. The 

lower court had found that the City had engaged in practices without any discriminatory motive, but that its practices had had a discriminatory impact. The City thus argued that, inasmuch as the 

Fifteenth Amendment reached only purposeful discrimination, the 

Act’s proscription of effect as well as purpose went beyond Congress’ power. The Court held, however, that even if discriminatory 

intent was a prerequisite to finding a violation of § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment by the courts, 60 Congress had the authority to 

go beyond that and proscribe electoral devices that had the effect 

of discriminating. The section, like § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, was in effect a ‘‘necessary and proper clause’’ enabling Congress to enact enforcement legislation which was rationally related 

to the end sought and which was not prohibited by it but was consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, even though 

the actual practice outlawed or restricted would not be judicially 

found to violate the Fifteenth Amendment. In so acting, Congress 

could prohibit state action that perpetuated the effect of past discrimination, or that, because of the existence of past purposeful discrimination, raised a risk of purposeful discrimination that might 

not lend itself to judicial invalidation. ‘‘It is clear, then, that under 

§ 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may prohibit practices 

2062 AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 

61 City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980). Justices Powell, 

Rehnquist, and Stewart dissented. Id. at 193, 206. In Lopez v. Monterey County, 

525 U.S. 266 (1999), the Court reiterated its prior holdings that Congress may exercise its enforcement power based on discriminatory effects, and without any finding 

of discriminatory intent. 62The 1975 amendments, Pub. L. 94–73, 89 Stat. 400, extended the Act for 

seven years, expanded it to include those areas having minorities distinguished by 

their language, i.e., ‘‘persons who are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan 

Natives or of Spanish heritage,’’ § 207, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 1(c)(3), in which certain 

statistical tests are met and requiring election materials be provided in the language(s) of the group(s), and enlarged to require bilingual elections if more than five 

percent of the voting age citizens of a political subdivision are members of a single 

language minority group whose illiteracy rate is higher than the national rate. The 

1982 amendments, Pub. L. 97–205, 96 Stat. 131, in addition to the § 2 revision, 

alter after August 5, 1984, the provisions by which a covered jurisdiction may take 

itself from under the Act by proving to the special court in the District of Columbia 

that it has complied with the Act for the previous ten years and that it has taken 

positive steps both to encourage minority political participation and to remove structural barriers to minority electoral influence. Moreover, the amendments change the 

result in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976), in which the Court had held 

that a covered jurisdiction was precluded from altering a voting practice only if the 

change would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities; even if the 

change was only a little ameliorative of existing discrimination, the jurisdiction 

could implement it. The 1982 amendments provide that the change may not be approved if it would ‘‘perpetuate voting discrimination,’’ in effect applying the new § 

2 results test to preclearance procedures. S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Congress, 2d Sess. 

12 (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 227, 97th Congress, 1st Sess. 28 (1981). 63Private parties may bring suit to challenge electoral practices under § 2. It 

provided, before the 1982 amendments, that ‘‘[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied 

by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of 

the United States to vote on account of race or color.’’ 64 446 U.S. 55 (1980). See id. at 60–61 (Justices Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, and 

Chief Justice Burger), and id. at 105 n.2 (Justice Marshall dissenting). 

that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the Amendment, so 

long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting 

are ‘appropriate,’ as that term is defined in McCulloch v. Maryland and Ex parte Virginia . . . . Congress could rationally have 

concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a 

demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting 

create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.’’ 61

City of Rome is highly significant for the validity of congressional additions to the Voting Rights Act. In 1975 and 1982, the 

Act was extended and revised to increase its effectiveness, 62 and

the 1982 Amendments were addressed to revitalizing § 2 of the Act, 

which, unlike §§ 4 and 5, which remain limited to a number of jurisdictions, applies nationwide. 63 As enacted in 1965, § 2 largely 

tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment itself. In City of 

Mobile v. Bolden, 64 a majority of the Court agreed that the Fifteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Act were coextensive, but the 

Justices did not agree on the meaning thus to be ascribed to the 

AMENDMENT 15—RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO VOTE 2063

65 In § 3 of the 1982 amendments, § 2 of the Act was amended by the insertion 

of the quoted phrase and the addition of a section setting out a nonexclusive list 

of factors making up a totality of circumstances test by which a violation of § 2 

would be determined. 96 Stat. 134, amending 42 U.S. § 1973. Without any discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 

(1986), interpreted and applied the ‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ test in the context 

of multimember districting. 66See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 

statute. A plurality did believe that because the constitutional provision reached only purposeful discrimination, § 2 was similarly 

limited. It was one major purpose of Congress in 1982 to set aside 

this possible interpretation and provide that any electoral practice 

‘‘which results in a denial or abridgement’’ of the right to vote on 

account of race or color will violate the Act. 65 The subsequent 

Court adoption, or re-adoption, of the standards by which it can be 

determined when a practice denies or abridges the right to vote, 

though couched in terms of proving intent or motivation, may well 

bring the constitutional and statutory standards into such close 

agreement that the constitutional question will not arise. 66