[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-11928

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cv-02461-CEH-AEP

WENDY L. MEADE, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

 versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant–Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(March 23, 2020)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Wendy Meade appeals the district court’s affirmance of the Social Security 

Administration Commissioner’s decision denying her application for disability 

insurance benefits (DIB). Meade asserts Arline Colon, the administrative law 

judge (ALJ) who presided over her proceedings, erred in failing to recuse herself

on remand from the Appeals Council, despite evidence stemming from Meade’s

administrative proceedings that indicated ALJ Colon was biased or prejudiced 

against her. Meade also contends ALJ Colon committed reversible error because 

ALJ Colon’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, insofar as she: 

failed to consider the episodic nature of Meade’s panic disorder; improperly 

required eyewitness accounts of Meade’s panic attacks by medical professionals; 

improperly required corroborating testimony from Meade’s former coworkers and 

employers regarding her panic disorder’s effect on her ability to work; and 

discounted the medical opinions of three physicians who treated or evaluated 

Meade without good cause for doing so. After review, we affirm in part, and 

reverse and remand in part. 

I. DISCUSSION

A. Bias of ALJ Colon

A presumption exists that judicial and quasi-judicial officers such as ALJs 

are unbiased. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982). That presumption 

can be rebutted by showing a conflict of interest or some other specific reason 

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warranting the ALJ’s disqualification. Id. The party asserting a disqualifying 

interest bears the burden of establishing its existence. Id. at 196. Bias is shown 

where an objective, fully-informed lay person would have significant doubt about a 

judge’s impartiality. In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 2008). 

Generally, bias sufficient to disqualify a judge must stem from an extrajudicial 

source, except where a judge’s remarks in a judicial context show such pervasive 

bias and prejudice that it constitutes bias against a party. Id. at 1310–11. Judicial 

rulings, routine administrative efforts, and ordinary admonishments (whether or 

not legally supportable) to counsel and witnesses that occur during the course of 

judicial proceedings that neither rely upon knowledge acquired outside of such 

proceedings nor display a deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism rendering fair 

judgment impossible are inadequate grounds for recusal. Liteky v. United States, 

510 U.S. 540, 556 (1994). 

The record does not support Meade’s claim that ALJ Colon was biased or 

prejudiced against her. Although Meade argues ALJ Colon’s bias was shown by 

her refusal to provide an evidentiary hearing in 2014, as ordered by the Appeals 

Council on remand, Meade offers no evidence in support of her claim that ALJ 

Colon willfully misread § I-3-7-40(E) of the Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation and 

Law Manual. To the extent Meade asserts ALJ Colon’s 2017 decision is indicative 

of bias based on her discussion and interpretation of the evidence, an unfavorable 

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judicial decision is not indicative of bias without other evidence of bias. Liteky, 

510 U.S. at 556. Similarly, Meade’s SSA Office of Disability Adjudication and 

Review’s Division of Quality Service complaint about ALJ Colon, which arose out 

of Meade’s administrative proceedings, was an inadequate basis for recusal absent 

extrajudicial sources of bias or other evidence of antagonism. Id.; In re Walker, 

532 F.3d at 1310. Meade has not cited any overt, pervasive statements by ALJ 

Colon indicating she was biased against Meade, nor has Meade offered an 

extrajudicial reason for ALJ Colon’s alleged bias or prejudice against her. 

Accordingly, because Meade cannot show an objective, fully-informed lay person 

would have significant doubt about ALJ Colon’s impartiality in the absence of 

such evidence, we affirm the district court’s denial of Meade’s bias claim. 

B. Substantial Evidence 

We review the Commissioner’s conclusions of law and the district court’s 

judgment de novo. Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th 

Cir. 2018). The Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive if they are 

supported by substantial evidence, which is relevant evidence that a reasonable 

person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. Even where the 

evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s factual findings, we must 

affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Parks ex rel. D.P. v. 

Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 783 F.3d 847, 850 (11th Cir. 2015). Under this 

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standard of review, we will not decide the facts anew, make credibility 

determinations, or re-weigh the evidence. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 

F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). However, we will not “merely rubber-stamp a 

decision . . . [but] must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision 

reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Schink v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). 

Remand is appropriate for further factual development before the ALJ where the 

record reveals evidentiary gaps that result in unfairness or clear prejudice. 

Washington, 906 F.3d at 1358. 

“An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that 

she is disabled.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). The 

ALJ uses a five-step, sequential evaluation process to determine whether a 

claimant is disabled. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178. This process includes an 

analysis of whether the claimant: (1) is unable to engage in substantial gainful 

activity; (2) has a severe and medically-determinable impairment; (3) has an 

impairment, or combination thereof, that meets or equals a Listing, and meets the 

duration requirement; (4) can perform past relevant work, in light of her RFC; and 

(5) can make an adjustment to other work, in light of her RFC, age, education, and 

work experience. See id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). 

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An ALJ considers many factors when weighing medical opinion evidence, 

including the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, whether an 

opinion is well-supported, and whether an opinion is consistent with the record. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The ALJ may discount any medical opinion when the 

opinion is conclusory or inconsistent with the record, or when the evidence 

supports a contrary finding. Id. Physicians’ opinions about a claimant’s abilities 

and restrictions constitute relevant evidence but are not determinative, because the 

ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s RFC. Id. § 404.1527(d). An 

ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion “substantial or considerable weight” 

unless there is “good cause” not to do so. Schink, 935 F.3d at 1259. “Good cause 

exists when (1) the treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence, 

(2) the evidence supported a contrary finding, or (3) the treating physician’s 

opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with his or her own medical records.” Id. 

The ALJ must clearly articulate her reasons for giving less weight to a treating 

physician's opinion. Id.

In Schink, we vacated the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits, holding, in 

relevant part, that the ALJ failed to give good cause for discounting the opinion of 

the claimant’s two treating physicians while giving substantial weight to the

opinion of two evaluative physicians who had never treated the claimant. Id.

at 1256, 1260. As part of the ALJ’s finding the treating physicians’ opinions were 

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due little weight, the ALJ found their treatment notes indicated only mild 

limitations during the claimant’s mental-status examinations. Id. at 1262. We

noted the ALJ did not clearly articulate the basis for that conclusion but stated it 

was unclear how the record could support such a conclusion. Id. We stated some 

of the claimant’s mental-status examinations were better than others with respect to 

various metrics, but nevertheless held the alleged inconsistencies within those 

medical records were insufficient to discount the treating physicians’ opinions 

because “[i]t is not enough merely to point to positive or neutral observations that 

create, at most, a trivial and indirect tension with the treating physician’s opinion 

by proving no more than that the claimant’s impairments are not 

all-encompassing.” Id. at 1262–63. We also noted the fact the claimant could 

remain on topic during a conversation on examination was not inconsistent with a 

finding the claimant suffered from a highly disruptive mood disorder that rendered 

him incapable of working. Id. at 1263. Finally, we stated the ALJ’s reliance on 

the claimant’s ability to engage in solitary activities, such as watching television or 

walking the dog, was not a basis to discount the treating physicians’ opinions, 

particularly with regard to their opinions regarding the claimant’s ability to interact 

with others. Id. at 1264. 

ALJ Colon’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because her 

denial of Meade’s DIB claim relied primarily on alleged inconsistencies or 

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interpretations of the medical opinions of physicians who treated or evaluated 

Meade that are not adequately supported by the record. See id. at 1257. In 

evaluating Meade’s claim, ALJ Colon stated that, although Meade’s pattern of 

work from the late 1990s onward might have tended to support her disability 

claim, that evidence was equivocal because it was not supported by corroborating 

evidence from Meade’s former coworkers or employers, or medical evidence. 

However, Meade’s ex-husband, Steven South, stated Meade began experiencing 

difficulty at work due to her excessive worrying and fears about leaving the house, 

for which she began taking excessive amounts of medication, which supports that 

Meade’s troubled work history was caused by her anxiety disorder. Further, 

Meade testified that, as of 2006, she was taking Xanax in quantities far exceeding 

her prescribed dose in an unsuccessful attempt to manage her panic disorder so she 

could continue to work. At her 2009 disability hearing, Meade also stated she had 

previously filed for disability in 2001 and 2005 due to her panic attacks, which 

indicates her condition had worsened to some degree as early as 2001. Thus, while 

ALJ Colon cited the lack of certain corroborating evidence in concluding Meade’s 

work history was not supportive of her disability claim, Meade nevertheless 

provided her own supportive testimony and South’s corroborating evidence, and 

there was no contrary evidence in the record that supported ALJ Colon’s finding 

that Meade’s work history was not tied to her panic disorder. See id. at 1257.

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Next, in assigning little weight to Dr. Karl Jones’ opinion, ALJ Colon cited 

inconsistencies within his September 2006 testimony. Specifically, ALJ Colon 

stated Dr. Jones had “paradoxically” stated Meade had made some, albeit 

insignificant, progress under his care, even though he also stated her globalassessment-of-functioning (GAF) score had decreased from 60 to 50 over the same 

time period. But Dr. Jones’ opinion as Meade’s treating physician was due 

substantial or considerable weight absent good cause to discount it, and there is no 

inherent contradiction between the idea Meade had made some insignificant 

progress under Dr. Jones’ care while her overall ability to function simultaneously 

decreased due to the addition of the stress stemming from her divorce. See id. at 

1259. Further, Dr. Jones’ assessment of a GAF score of 50 was in line with the 

GAF scores of 55 and 65 Meade received from Drs. Lia Nardone and Gerald 

Hodan that same year, and thus, the other contemporaneous medical-opinion 

evidence in the record did not support a finding that Dr. Jones’ opinion was due 

little weight. There is also no inherent inconsistency between Meade’s GAF score 

of 75 from October 2006—which represented a 25-point increase from the month 

before—given the fluctuating nature of Meade’s anxiety. See id. at 1262-63. And, 

in any event, Dr. Jones subsequently explained Meade’s average GAF score was 

60, which he considered to be a large functional impairment, based on his longterm observations of her. Thus, even if ALJ Colon was correct to discount Dr. 

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Jones’ October 2006 opinion of Meade’s condition, she did not properly consider 

his opinion as Meade’s treating physician because that one treatment record did not 

make his overall opinion of Meade inconsistent with the record such that his 

opinion could be given little weight across the board. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); 

Schink, 935 F.3d at 1259, 1262-63.

ALJ Colon similarly erred in giving little weight to Dr. Hodan’s opinion that 

Meade would have issues with reliability. ALJ Colon stated that Dr. Hodan’s 

opinion was due little weight because: there was no evidence that Meade was late 

to, failed to show for, or cancelled any medical appointments due to her condition; 

it largely relied on Meade’s self-reported symptoms; Meade had been on a 

consistent prescription of Xanax for many years; Meade had never been 

hospitalized due to her panic disorder; Meade did not provide any evidence of 

reliability issues from her former coworkers or employers nor evidence of an 

actual deterioration of her condition while at work; and no medical professional 

had witnessed one of Meade’s attacks. However, as discussed above, Meade 

provided corroborating evidence indicating her extensive work history was due to 

her panic disorder, and it is unclear how her ability to consistently show up for 

medical appointments that occurred monthly or every few months was indicative 

of her ability to reliably report to work on a daily or near-daily basis. Relatedly, it 

is unclear why ALJ Colon required corroborating evidence that Meade had 

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experienced a panic attack while at work, as the record indicates Meade’s disorder 

affected her reliability by inhibiting her ability to regularly report to work, 

regardless of whether she also suffered from panic attacks while at work. See 

Schink, 935 F.3d at 1263-64. ALJ Colon’s reliance on Meade’s consistent Xanax 

prescription history was also misplaced, since Meade testified that, immediately 

before she filed for disability, she was taking dosages far exceeding her prescribed 

amount to manage her anxiety, and her September 2007 request for an early Xanax 

refill suggests she continued to need above-prescribed levels of medication to 

manage her condition. 

As for the lack of any eyewitness accounts by medical personnel, Meade 

explained she scheduled outings in such a way that her Xanax would be at fullstrength when she needed to leave the house. Further, she provided corroborating 

statements regarding her frequent panic attacks from South, Richard Holland, 

Thomas Harfst, and Felicia Barr, and ALJ Colon did not explain why an 

observation by medical personnel would have been more illuminating, since the 

core problem with Meade’s panic disorder as it related to her ability to work was 

the fact it frequently prevented her from being able to leave her home. See Schink, 

935 F.3d at 1264. In addition, ALJ Colon failed to explain why Dr. Hodan’s 

opinion was due less weight because it was largely based on Meade’s selfreporting, as one would expect a psychiatric evaluation to largely rely on such 

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testimonial evidence, particularly during an initial evaluation, and Meade’s selfreports are corroborated by the record evidence. Therefore, because Dr. Hodan’s 

opinion was not contradicted by other record evidence and ALJ Colon’s stated 

reasons for discounting his opinion are unpersuasive, ALJ Colon erred in giving 

Dr. Hodan’s opinion little weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).

Next, ALJ Colon erred in assigning little weight to Dr. Nardone’s opinion 

from March 2007 that Meade would be unable to maintain employment due to her 

panic disorder because that finding is not supported by substantial evidence. In 

discounting Dr. Nardone’s opinion, ALJ Colon stated that opinion was inconsistent 

with Dr. Nardone’s treatment notes. First, ALJ Colon stated Dr. Nardone’s 

treatment notes from January and March 2008 indicated Meade was less anxious 

following the finalization of her divorce, and by January 2009, Meade’s 

agoraphobia was focused on her fear of bridges. However, there is nothing 

inconsistent with the idea that Meade was unable to maintain employment in 2007 

due to her panic disorder, and the idea her anxiety was reduced one year later 

following the finalization of her divorce, which was a significant source of stress. 

See Schink, 953 F.3d at 1262-63. Further, although Meade reported in January 

2009 that she was anxious about having to cross a bridge, nothing in Dr. Nardone’s 

treatment notes indicate Meade’s agoraphobia was solely focused on that fear. To 

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the contrary, Dr. Nardone’s January 2009 treatment notes state Meade’s fear of 

bridges was an element of Meade’s panic disorder, not the sole cause thereof.

ALJ Colon also cited the fact Dr. Nardone did not opine for how long Meade 

would be unable to maintain employment as a basis for giving that opinion little 

weight. But ALJ Colon did not state why the lack of a long-term prognosis 

justified discounting Dr. Nardone’s opinion. Further, there is nothing within Dr. 

Nardone’s March 2007 treatment notes that suggests her assessment of Meade’s 

ability to work during a time when Meade reported breakthrough panic attacks 

despite her Xanax prescription and the stress associated with her divorce was 

meant to be anything other than an evaluation of Meade’s then-current situation. 

And, even if Meade was able to better manage her symptoms after the finalization

of her divorce in 2007, Dr. Nardone’s December 2006 and March 2007 

assessments suggest Meade was unable to work while her divorce was pending in 

2006 and 2007. ALJ Colon’s reliance on Meade’s normal speech, euthymic affect, 

lack of psychosis, linear thought processes, and normal cognitive functions also do 

not support the assignment of little weight to Dr. Nardone’s opinion because ALJ 

Colon did not provide any reason why those evaluations were inconsistent with 

Meade’s inability to reliably leave her house or remain at work due to her panic 

disorder and agoraphobia, which intermittently but consistently incapacitated her. 

See Schink, 935 F.3d at 1264. Finally, for the reasons discussed above, Dr. 

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Nardone’s opinion is not inconsistent with the opinions of Drs. Jones and Hodan, 

who also concluded Meade’s panic disorder would inhibit her ability to maintain 

employment. Thus, because ALJ Colon’s finding that Dr. Nardone’s opinion was 

due little weight was not based on its conclusory nature or inconsistencies with Dr. 

Nardone’s treatment records or other record evidence, ALJ Colon did not have 

good cause to discount Dr. Nardone’s opinion. See id. at 1259.

Therefore, ALJ Colon’s findings that the opinions of Drs. Jones, Hodan, and 

Nardone were due little weight is not supported by substantial evidence, and the 

district court erred in affirming the denial of Meade’s DIB application. See 

Washington, 906 F.3d at 1358. 

II. CONCLUSION

We affirm as to Meade’s claim of bias, and reverse and remand to the 

district court with instructions to remand Meade’s claim to the Commissioner for 

proper consideration of the medical-opinion evidence. 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN 

PART.

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