J-S25041-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

MARTIN TISDALL 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 2954 EDA 2023 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 24, 2023 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0308871-1998 

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BECK, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED AUGUST 16, 2024

Martin Tisdall (“Tisdall”) appeals pro se from the order entered by the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his fifth petition 

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 Because Tisdall filed an 

untimely PCRA petition and failed to establish an exception to the statutory 

time-bar, we affirm. 

In 1997, Tisdall and a co-conspirator robbed four Philadelphia retail 

stores at gunpoint. On November 22, 1999, Tisdall entered an open guilty 

plea to multiple counts of robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possessing an 

instrument of crime. On March 1, 2000, the trial court sentenced Tisdall to 

thirty-two and one-half to sixty-five years in prison, to be followed by sixty 

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1

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 
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years of probation. Tisdall filed timely post-sentence motions. The trial court 

denied these motions on May 3, 2000. Tisdall did not file a direct appeal. 

Tisdall filed a timely first PCRA petition raising a single claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCRA court held a hearing, after which 

it denied the petition. This Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Tisdall, 

2997 EDA 2002 (Pa. Super. Aug. 20, 2003) (non-precedential decision). 

Thereafter, Tisdall filed three PCRA petitions, all of which were dismissed. This 

Court affirmed each dismissal. See Commonwealth v. Tisdall, 2071 EDA 

2022 (Pa. Super. May 22, 2023) (non-precedential decision); 

Commonwealth v. Tisdall, 2788 EDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Mar. 21, 2019) (nonprecedential decision), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 378 (Pa. 2019); 

Commonwealth v. Tisdall, 2898 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. Aug. 28, 2015) (nonprecedential decision), appeal denied, 131 A.3d 491 (Pa. 2016). 

On July 5, 2023, Tisdall filed the pro se PCRA petition underlying this 

appeal. The PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss the petition 

without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Tisdall filed a response to 

the notice. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. Tisdall filed a 

timely appeal, presenting the following issue for our review: “Whether the 

[PCRA] court erred in dismissing [Tisdall’s] post[-]conviction petition seeking 

relief in the interest of justice where insufficient reason exist to support 

differential treatment among individuals?” Tisdall’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary 

capitalization omitted). 
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“Crucial to the determination of any PCRA appeal is the timeliness of the 

underlying petition. Thus, we must first determine whether the instant PCRA 

petition was timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 499 

(Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The timeliness 

requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and 

the court may not ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition.” Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Commonwealth 

Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“the timeliness of a PCRA 

petition is jurisdictional and [] if the petition is untimely, courts lack 

jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief”). “As the timeliness of 

a PCRA petition is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and 

our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 

121 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). 

A petition for relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent 

petition, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence 

becomes final unless the petitioner pleads and proves that an exception to the 

time limitation is met. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). The exceptions to the oneyear time bar include: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or 
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 

Id. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). A PCRA petition invoking a statutory exception must 

be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 

Id. § 9545(b)(2). 

 Tisdall’s judgment of sentence became final on June 2, 2000, when the 

time for filing a direct appeal expired. See Commonwealth v. Claffey, 80 

A.3d 780, 783 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[W]hen post-sentence motions are filed, 

the judgment of sentence does not become final until those motions are 

decided.”). As such, the instant PCRA petition, filed on July 5, 2023, is facially 

untimely. See Tisdall’s Brief at 8 (recognizing the PCRA petition was untimely 

filed). 

Tisdall claims, however, that there was a breakdown in the PCRA court 

when it did not properly advise him of his appellant rights following the denial 

of his first PCRA petition. Tisdall’s Brief at 9-10. Tisdall argues that this case 

therefore presents extraordinary circumstances warranting relief. Id. To 

support his argument, Tisdall cites to Commonwealth v. Valentine, 287 

A.3d 872 (Pa. Super. Oct. 18, 2022) (non-precedential decision) (vacating 

dismissal of appellant’s second PCRA petition where the PCRA court 

erroneously advised appellant of his appellate rights after the denial of his first 
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PCRA petition, causing a breakdown of the judicial process). Tisdall’s Brief at 

9. 

Upon review, we conclude that Tisdall failed to invoke, let alone 

establish, any exceptions to the one-year time bar. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). 

His citation to Valentine does not provide an avenue for relief, as the law is 

clear he must establish an exception to the one-year time limit in order for 

this Court (or any court) to have jurisdiction to decide the merits. Valentine 

does not fall under any of the PCRA’s time-bar exceptions—it does not create 

a new constitutional right or apply retroactively, nor does Tisdall make any 

claim in support of such a finding. 

Moreover, the facts and circumstances at issue in Valentine—wherein 

the PCRA petitioner had been misinformed of his appellate rights, which 

directly impacted the timeliness of his first PCRA petition—are not present 

here. Tisdall does not dispute he filed a timely first PCRA petition, and a timely 

appeal following its denial, which this Court affirmed. 

The underlying PCRA petition was untimely, and Tisdall failed to plead 

and prove that any exceptions apply. Accordingly, neither the PCRA court nor 

this Court have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Tisdall’s claims. See 

Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(“Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address 

the substantive claims.”) (citation omitted). 

 Order affirmed. 
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Date: 8/16/2024