NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of the Guardianship of: 

B.C.,1 a Minor.

_________________________________ 

COURTNEY ELIZABETH COTA, Petitioner/Appellant, 

v.

ELIZABETH KEENE, Respondent/Appellee. 

No. 1 CA-CV 20-0301 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400GC201600080 

The Honorable Lawrence C. Kenworthy, Judge

DISMISSED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART

COUNSEL

Fennemore Craig, P.C., Phoenix

By Timothy J. Berg, Bradley J. Pew

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant 

1 This caption is amended as reflected. The amended caption shall be used 

on all further documents filed in this appeal. 

FILED 9-30-2021
2

Perkins Coie, LLP, Phoenix

By Karl J. Worsham, Joel Nomkin

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding 

Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Courtney Elizabeth Cota challenges the superior 

court’s 2016 order suspending her parental rights to her child, B.C., and

appointing Appellee Elizabeth Keene, B.C.’s paternal grandmother, as 

B.C.’s guardian under Title 14. Cota also challenges the court’s 2020 order 

continuing the parental rights suspension and the guardianship. Because 

Cota cannot challenge the 2016 order, we dismiss that portion of her appeal.

But we reverse the 2020 order denying Cota’s guardianship termination 

petition and remand to the superior court to terminate the guardianship.

This case was placed in this court’s Pro Bono Representation Program, and 

pro bono counsel was appointed to represent the parties in the appeal.2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2016, Keene petitioned to be appointed as B.C.’s temporary 

guardian, alleging B.C. suffered “neglect and abuse” in Cota’s care. Keene’s 

filings consisted of preprinted forms for guardianship proceedings under 

Title 14, which allows appointment of a guardian for an unmarried minor 

if “all parental rights of custody have been terminated or suspended by 

circumstances or prior court order.” A.R.S. § 14-5204.A.

¶3 The superior court scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Cota 

did not appear at the time set, but B.C.’s father did. After a short delay, the 

hearing proceeded in Cota’s absence. After a brief hearing, the superior 

court suspended Cota’s parental rights “upon further order of the Court.”

The superior court appointed Keene as B.C.’s permanent guardian until 

“[B.C.] turns 18 or until the guardian is discharged from these duties by 

2 The court expresses its appreciation to pro bono counsel for contributing 

their time, energy, and other resources in pursuing this appeal. The court 

commends counsel for the excellent briefing and argument.
COTA v. KEENE

Decision of the Court

3

order of this Court.” And the superior court directed Keene to file annual 

reports regarding “the status of the Minor and the need to continue the 

guardianship.”

¶4 In 2018, Cota petitioned to terminate B.C.’s guardianship,

alleging she was “stable and capable of caring for [B.C.].” Keene opposed 

termination. By that time, B.C.’s father had died.

¶5 In 2020, the superior court held a trial on Cota’s petition to 

terminate B.C.’s guardianship. Following the bench trial, the superior court 

denied Cota’s petition, saying Cota bore the burden of establishing (1) 

changed circumstances since it appointed Keene as B.C.’s guardian, (2) B.C. 

faced no danger with Cota, and (3) Cota could care for B.C. The superior 

court ruled Cota did not meet her burden and dismissed the petition.

¶6 Cota moved for reconsideration, which the superior court 

denied. Cota appealed both the 2016 and the 2020 order.

DISCUSSION

I. Cota Cannot Challenge the 2016 Order in This Appeal.

¶7 Cota challenges both the 2016 and 2020 orders in this appeal.

Keene contends we lack jurisdiction to consider Cota’s challenge to the 2016 

order because Cota did not timely appeal from it. See In re Guardianship of 

Sommer, 241 Ariz. 308, 311, ¶ 10 (App. 2016) (“[T]he legislature did not 

intend to disallow an immediate appeal from an order establishing a 

conservatorship or guardianship and appointing a guardian or 

conservator.”). This court has an independent obligation to determine 

whether it has jurisdiction over an appeal. Dabrowski v. Bartlett, 246 Ariz. 

504, 511, ¶ 13 (App. 2019). This court must dismiss those portions of an 

appeal over which it lacks jurisdiction. Natale v. Natale, 234 Ariz. 507, 509, 

¶ 8 (App. 2014).

¶8 Cota contends she may challenge the 2016 order because the 

court never considered its guardianship order to be final, indicating “it 

would monitor this case to see if circumstances change.” Though the 

superior court ordered Keene to file annual reports and conducted multiple 

status conferences to monitor the guardianship, it also included a Rule 54(c) 

certification in its order establishing the guardianship.

¶9 Cota also contends the 2016 order can be challenged at any 

time because it is void. See State v. Bryant, 219 Ariz. 514, 517–18, ¶¶ 13–14 

(App. 2008). An “order is void if the court lacked jurisdiction over the 
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Decision of the Court

4

subject matter, over the person, or over the particular judgment or order

entered.” Master Fin., Inc. v. Woodburn, 208 Ariz. 70, 74, ¶ 19 (App. 2004).

An order is voidable if the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction but 

erred in issuing the order. In re Marriage of Dougall, 234 Ariz. 2, 6, ¶ 12 (App. 

2013). A voidable judgment or order has “all the ordinary attributes of a 

valid judgment [or order] until it is reversed or vacated.” Id. (citation 

omitted). This court reviews de novo challenges to the superior court’s

jurisdiction. Samaritan Health Sys. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. 

Admin., 198 Ariz. 533, 536, ¶ 13 (App. 2000).

¶10 Cota contends the 2016 order is void, arguing the probate 

court lacked jurisdiction because the juvenile court “retains exclusive 

jurisdiction to terminate the parent-child relationship.” But the superior 

court is a single trial court of general jurisdiction, and distinctions between 

juvenile court and probate court generally do not affect jurisdiction. See 

Marvin Johnson, P.C. v. Myers, 184 Ariz. 98, 100 (1995); State v. Rodriguez, 205 

Ariz. 392, 395, ¶ 9 n.2 (App. 2003). Though Arizona’s constitution grants the 

superior court original jurisdiction over probate matters, it also says “[t]he 

jurisdiction and authority of the courts of this state in all proceedings and 

matters affecting juveniles shall be as provided by the legislature or the 

people by initiative or referendum.” See Ariz. Const. art. VI, §§ 14.8, 15. To 

that end, the legislature granted the juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction to 

hear petitions to terminate a parent-child relationship. See A.R.S. §§ 8-

531(9), -532.A.

¶11 Keene, however, did not seek to terminate Cota and B.C.’s 

parent-child relationship. And though establishing a Title 14 guardian 

appointment when Cota’s parental rights had not been terminated or 

suspended “may have been error, . . . the court still had jurisdiction to 

appoint a guardian.” See In re Guardianship of Mikrut, 175 Ariz. 544, 546 

(App. 1993). Cota, therefore, may not attack the 2016 order because she did

not timely appeal it. See id. Assuming without deciding the superior court 

should have heard Keene’s petition in a juvenile proceeding, that legal error

would not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction. See infra ¶ 23; A.R.S. 

§ 14-5204; Mikrut, 175 Ariz. at 546.

¶12 Cota also argues a parent who is “denied and redenied 

control over his or her children must have the right to appeal the initial and 

subsequent denials.” See Yavapai Cnty. Juv. Action No. J-8545, 140 Ariz. 10, 

14 (App. 1984). In J-8545, this court held “each periodic review of a 

dependency determination is a new determination of whether or not a child 

is dependent” and constitutes a final and appealable order. Id. Cota would 

not have been precluded from appealing the 2020 order even if she had 
COTA v. KEENE

Decision of the Court

5

timely appealed from the 2016 order. See id. But J-8545 does not authorize a

retroactive challenge to the 2016 order. See id.

II. The Superior Court Had No Authority to Continue the Title 14 

Guardianship Over Cota’s Objection.

¶13 Neither Cota nor Keene disputes this court’s jurisdiction over 

Cota’s challenge to the 2020 order. We agree. Keene petitioned to be 

appointed B.C.’s guardian under Title 14. And Cota’s petition to terminate 

the guardianship also is grounded in Title 14. See A.R.S. § 14-5212.A (“Any 

person interested in the welfare of a ward . . . may petition for removal of a 

guardian on the ground that removal would be in the best interests of the 

ward.”). Because the order denying Cota’s motion to terminate the 

guardianship fully resolved the matter and had the effect of continuing 

Keene’s Title 14 guardianship indefinitely, it is a final, appealable order

under § 12-2101.A.9. This court, therefore, has jurisdiction under article VI, 

section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and §§ 12-120.21.A.1 and 12-2101.A.9.

¶14 This court reviews rulings on petitions to terminate a 

guardianship under § 14-5212 for an abuse of discretion. In re Guardianship 

of Kelly, 184 Ariz. 514, 518 (App. 1996). The superior court abuses its 

discretion when it commits legal error or the record lacks competent 

evidence to support its decision. Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 531, ¶ 5 

(App. 2019); see also In re Cosden’s Est., 12 Ariz. App. 88, 89 (1970) (“The 

court’s discretion to remove a guardian is not to be exercised arbitrarily or 

capriciously but is a legal discretion to be exercised with due regard to legal 

rights of all concerned.”).

¶15 Cota contends the superior court erred by requiring her to 

show “circumstances ha[d] changed since [Keene] was appointed and there 

[was] no longer a danger to [B.C.] and/or she was able to care for [B.C.].”

¶16 In Mikrut, this court recognized “the probate court lacks 

jurisdiction to effect a de facto termination of the parent-child relationship. 

Although guardianship proceedings in Arizona are heard in probate court, 

the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over petitions to terminate the 

parent-child relationship.” 175 Ariz. at 547. Section 14-5212.A says a 

petition to remove a guardian must be “on the ground that removal would 

be in the best interests of the ward.” See also Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 555 (App. 1997). But courts also must consider the 

guardianship’s continuing effect on Cota’s parental rights, which have not

been terminated. See Mikrut, 175 Ariz. at 547 (“[A] decision to continue a 

guardianship that effectively terminates parental rights cannot be made 
COTA v. KEENE

Decision of the Court

6

solely on the basis of the best interests of the child.”); see also In re Marriage 

of Friedman and Roels, 244 Ariz. 111, 119, ¶ 31 (2018) (“[A] parent’s rights 

‘do[] not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or 

have lost temporary custody of their child.’”) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 

455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)); Charboneau v. Super. Ct., 101 Ariz. 586, 588 (1967) 

(“The parent is the natural guardian of its child.”).

¶17 Keene relies on Mikrut to contend a presumption arises in 

favor of continuing the guardianship when the child becomes established 

in a home, neighborhood, and school. See 175 Ariz. at 548. This court, 

however, did not adopt or recognize such a presumption in Mikrut. Indeed, 

in Mikrut, this court only commented, in dicta, a presumption may be 

appropriate “when the parent-child relationship has been terminated or 

suspended after appropriate court proceedings.” Id. Even if we assume the 

2016 hearing, which proceeded without Cota, constituted “appropriate 

court proceedings”—an issue this court did not reach in Mikrut—the 

guardianship may not continue over Cota’s objection. See id.

¶18 To begin, the superior court did not rely on any Mikrut

presumption. Instead, the superior court continued the guardianship

because (1) Keene objected to it; and (2) Cota’s “living arrangements . . . 

emotional state, and parenting abilities are different as to caring for one, 

versus two children.” The reference to two children is a result of the 

superior court—more than a year earlier—reinstating Cota’s parental rights 

to another child—K.C.—which would make B.C. the second child in Cota’s 

home. Indeed, the guardian ad litem who recommended guardianship in 

2016 changed her position at the 2020 hearing and said she believed Cota 

was “mentally adequate and able to parent her children.” 

¶19 Keene cites no authority, and we are not aware of any, 

suggesting these are proper grounds to continue a guardianship over a 

natural parent’s objection. See Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 

1982) (“The parental presumption . . . cannot be rebutted merely by 

demonstrating that the opposing party possesses superior qualifications, 

has established a deeper bond with the child, or is able to provide more 

desirable circumstances.”) (internal citation omitted). 

¶20 Next, best interests alone cannot support the continued 

guardianship. See Mikrut, 175 Ariz. at 547. Parental rights constitute a 

fundamental liberty interest. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 24 

(2005); see also A.R.S. § 1-601.A. Other states have recognized this interest in 

custody disputes between natural parents and non-parent guardians by 

requiring the guardian to show continuing the guardianship would serve 
COTA v. KEENE

Decision of the Court

7

the minor child’s best interests. In re Guardianship of J.R.G., 708 P.2d 263, 267 

(Mont. 1985) (citing cases); see also Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148, 152 

(Minn. 1989) (“there is a presumption in custody determinations that a 

natural parent is fit to raise his or her own child”).

¶21 Finally, as this court stated in Mikrut, when “a guardianship 

is based on parental consent and that consent is withdrawn due to the 

parent’s changed circumstances, the probate court’s refusal to terminate the 

guardianship may operate as a de facto termination of the parent’s parental 

rights.” 175 Ariz. at 547. Though Cota did not consent to B.C.’s 

guardianship, Cota’s situation is like the Mikrut guardianship in two legally 

significant ways. First, neither Cota nor the parent in Mikrut consented to 

the guardianship. See id. Instead, Cota and the parent in Mikrut simply did 

not appear at the hearing in which the guardianship was established. See id.

The only difference being in this case, Cota received notice and in Mikrut, 

the parent waived the notice. See id. Second, both here and in Mikrut, a 

natural parent sought to end the guardianship. See id. In short, the 

controlling facts in this case and in Mikrut are the same. See id.

¶22 Here, as in Mikrut, (1) the guardianship must terminate; and 

(2) “[i]f the guardian believes the parent to be an unfit parent, he or she can 

petition the court pursuant to A.R.S. section 8-533 to terminate or suspend 

the parent-child relationship.” See id. at 548. Keene did not file any Title 8 

petition. Keene also did not seek relief under § 25-409.A (providing third 

party rights for legal decision-making or placement).

¶23 Our resolution is consistent with the language of the statute, 

which allows the superior court to put a guardianship in place “if all 

parental rights of custody have been terminated or suspended by 

circumstances or prior court order.” A.R.S. § 14-5204. Keene argues the 

superior court suspended Cota’s rights during the 2016 hearing before the 

court went on to put the guardianship in place. That argument falls flat. In 

the absence of consent, a Title 14 guardianship is not appropriate unless the 

guardian establishes “all parental rights of custody” were terminated or 

suspended based on circumstances or a prior court order outside of the Title 

14 guardianship. Our conclusion is consistent with the forms the various 

courts provide to litigants who wish to pursue a Title 14 guardianship. See, 

e.g., Required Forms to File a Guardianship of a Minor, Ariz. Bar Found. 13, 

https://www.azcourthelp.org/finder/yuma-forms/2-probate-courtforms/6-guardianship-of-a-minor/1-appointment-4/937-1-preparing-thefirst-court-papers-4/file (“WARNING: A GUARDIANSHIP UNDER 

TITLE XIV CANNOT BE GRANTED OVER A PARENT’S OBJECTION 

(DISAGREEMENT).” (emphasis original)); To Petition for 
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Decision of the Court

8

Guardianship/Conservatorship for a Minor, Jud. Branch of Ariz., 

https://superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/llrc/prob_pbgcm1/ (last updated 

Mar. 19, 2020) (“The parents will either sign a Voluntary Consent, OR after 

receiving notice of the Petition to Appoint a Permanent GuardianConservator, will not file papers or come to court to object to the 

appointment.” (emphasis original)); Guardianship and Conservatorship for a 

Minor, Super Ct. of Ariz. in Maricopa Cnty., 

https://superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/media/3914/pbgcm1iz.pdf (last 

visited Sept. 14, 2021) (“If both parents are living and can be located, each 

parent may complete and sign a CONSENT to the appointment to be filed 

with the Court.” (emphasis original)). These forms are not controlling 

precedent, but they are consistent with our interpretation. As an aside, the 

court form Keene used did not include a warning or notice about the need 

for Keene to secure parental consent, but that fact does not change the 

outcome here.

CONCLUSION

¶24 We reverse the 2020 order continuing the indefinite 

suspension of Cota’s parental rights and the guardianship of B.C.