J-A19042-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RAHMEER YOUNG 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2098 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered October 27, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003398-2019

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED JANUARY 28, 2022

This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division following a nonnegotiated guilty plea by Rahmeer Young (Appellant) to robbery (for 

threatening or intentionally putting the victim in fear of immediate serious 

bodily injury) and terroristic threats.1 Appellant asserts that the trial court 

abused its discretion by imposing an excessive aggregate 12 1⁄2 to 25 years’ 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii) and 2706 (a)(1). Appellant was also charged 

with simple assault, recklessly endangering another person (REAP), theftreceiving stolen property, and theft by unlawful taking; the Commonwealth 

nolle prossed these charges.
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sentence outside the sentencing guidelines2 and the Commonwealth’s 

sentencing recommendation.3 The Commonwealth has filed a brief, further 

asserting that Appellant’s sentence is illegal because the trial court imposed 

separate sentences for robbery and terroristic threats, and the two sentences 

should have merged for sentencing purposes. The Commonwealth also 

asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the statutory 

maximum sentence, far in excess of the sentencing guidelines. After careful 

consideration, we affirm the convictions for both robbery and terroristic 

threats, but vacate the judgment of sentence for terroristic threats, as it 

merges with robbery.

The factual history presented by the trial court in its 1925(a) opinion is 

as follows:

On March 13, 2019, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Appellant, 

Rahmeer Young, robbed [Victim], on the 3200 block of Pearl 

Street in Philadelphia, as she was walking home from the Drexel 

University library. According to [Victim], Appellant approached 

her and told her “give me everything you have or it’ll get really 

violent.” Appellant then put his hand on a bulge on his left side, 

which led [Victim] to assume he was armed. Appellant then took 

a $50 American Express gift card and [Victim]’s student ID. He 

then grabbed [Victim]’s arm and attempted to drag her to a 

secondary location. [Victim] was able to break free, and she fled 

to her home, where she contacted police. Philadelphia Police 

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2 Appellant’s offense gravity score was 10, and his prior record score was 1; 

the Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines for robbery provide a standard 

sentencing range of 2 1⁄2 to 3 1⁄2 years, with an aggravated range of plus 12 

months. N.T., 9/5/19 at 15.

3 The Commonwealth requested an aggregate sentence of 2 1⁄2 to 5 years’ 

incarceration. N.T., 9/5/19 at 16. 
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Officers apprehended Appellant based on [Victim]’s description. 

Appellant was in possession of [Victim]’s stolen belongings, and 

[Victim] positively identified Appellant as the man who robbed 

her.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 2/16/2021 at 1. 

Following a sentencing hearing on September 5, 2019, Appellant was 

sentenced to consecutive terms of ten to twenty years’ confinement for 

robbery and two and one-half to five years of confinement for terroristic 

threats. He filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was denied 

on October 27, 2020. This appeal followed.4

Although Appellant has not raised this issue, a claim that crimes should 

have merged for sentencing purposes raises a challenge to the legality of a 

sentence. Commonwealth v. Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 1030 (Pa. Super. 

2016). The issue of whether a sentence is illegal is not subject to waiver and 

may be raised by this Court, even if its illegality has not been raised by the 

appellant. Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 889 (Pa. 

Super. 2019); Commonwealth v. Tanner, 61 A.3d 1043, 1046 (Pa. Super. 

2013). “The legality of a criminal sentence is non-waivable, and this Court 

may ‘raise and review an illegal sentence sua sponte.’” Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 

211 A.3d at 889 (quoting Commonwealth v. Muhammed, 992 A.2d 897 

(Pa. Super. 2010)). In a challenge to the legality of a sentence, our standard 

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4 The trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of matters 

complained of on appeal on December 3, 2020, and Appellant filed a concise 

statement on December 10, 2020. The trial court issued its 1925(a) opinion 

on February 16, 2021. 
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of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Martinez, 153 A.3d 

at 1030 (Pa. Super. 2016).

The crime of terroristic threats is committed when an individual 

“communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to commit any crime of 

violence with intent to terrorize another.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1). The 

robbery charge to which Appellant pled guilty was section 3701(a)(2) of the 

Crimes Code, which provides that an individual is guilty of robbery if, in the 

course of committing a theft, he or she “threatens another with or intentionally 

puts [her] in fear of immediate serious bodily injury[;].” 18 Pa.C.S. § 

3701(a)(2).

“No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the 

crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the 

statutory elements of one offense are included in the 

statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes 

merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence 

the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

18 Pa.C.S. § 9765. The offense of robbery under section 3701(a)(2) includes 

all of the statutory elements of terroristic threats. Where a defendant’s 

convictions for terroristic threats and robbery both rely on the same 

threatening statement - “give me everything you have or it’ll get really violent” 

– the convictions merge and the sentence is illegal. See Martinez, 153 A.2d 

at 1032. 

Appellant’s claim of a manifestly excessive sentence implicates the 

discretionary aspects of his sentence, and such challenge does not guarantee 
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a petitioner’s right to our review. Instead, in order to invoke our Court’s 

jurisdiction, he must satisfy a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa. R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b),

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 337 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted.) Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and his brief included 

a statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal, as is required by 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). See Appellant’s Brief at 9. He also preserved the issue in 

a timely post-sentence motion to reconsider, filed on September 16, 2019. 

Therefore, we consider whether Appellant has raised a substantial question. 

“A substantial question exists only when the appellant advances a 

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) 

inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code; or () contrary to 

the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” 

Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal 

citations omitted). A claim that a sentence was based on an improper factor 

raises a substantial question, see Commonwealth v. Downing, 990 A.2d 

788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2010), and an allegation that a sentence was 

unreasonable because it was outside the sentencing guidelines similarly raises 
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a substantial question, see Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 960 A.2d 473, 

478 (Pa. Super. 2008). Appellant claims that the trial court focused solely on 

the harm caused to the victim and failed to take into account mitigating 

factors, and the imposition of the statutory maximum sentence was far in 

excess of the sentencing guidelines, which provide for a minimum sentence of 

two and one-half years. Here, we conclude that the challenges present a 

substantial question, and we proceed to the merits of the sentencing 

challenge.

Our Supreme Court has enunciated the proper standard of appellate 

review of a sentencing court’s imposition of a sentence:

Our Court has stated that the proper standard of review 

when considering whether to affirm the sentencing court’s 

determination is the abuse of discretion. Commonwealth 

v. Smith, 673 A.2d 893, 895 ((1996) (“Imposition of a 

sentence is vested in the discretion of the sentencing court 

and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of 

discretion.”). As stated in Smith, an abuse of discretion is 

more than a mere error of judgment; thus, a sentencing 

court will not have abused its discretion unless “the record 

discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill-will.” Id. In more expansive terms, our Court recently 

offered: “An abuse of discretion may not be found merely 

because an appellate court might have reached a different 

conclusion, but requires a manifest unreasonableness, or 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support 

so as to be clearly erroneous.” Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 

839 A.2d 1038, 1046 (2003).

Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007) (citations and 

footnotes omitted). The Sentencing Code offers general standards with 
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respect to the imposition of sentence which require the sentencing court to 

impose a sentence that “is consistent with the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and 

on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Walls, 

926 A.2d at 962; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Where, as here, a sentence imposed 

is outside the sentencing guidelines, we must remand if the sentence is 

“unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c). “In making this “unreasonableness” 

inquiry, the General Assembly has set forth four factors that an appellate court 

is to consider:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant.

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation.

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

Walls, 926 A.2d at 963; 42 Pa. C.S. § 9781(d).

Before the trial court, the victim testified that since the robbery, she has 

been unable to sleep in her own room, and that it took her months before she 

could sleep alone in her apartment. N.T., 9/5/19 at 7. She stated that she 

can no longer spend nights in the library studying past midnight in what was 

formerly a safe and comfortable routine for her; her daily panic attacks have 

become less frequent through therapy, but she is an amputee living in the 

City, and she is left feeling vulnerable. Id. She stated that she remains at 

work for hours after she clocks out, just to avoid walking home alone, and she 

will never feel as safe again. Id. at 7-8. The Commonwealth apprised the 
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trial court that the victim believed that Appellant was armed when he put his 

hand on a bulge on his left side, and that after he took her belongings, he 

grabbed her arm and attempted to pull her from the area, but she pulled free. 

Id. at 8-9. 

Prior to its imposition of the sentence, the trial court acknowledged that 

Appellant was “self-medicating” with Xanax. Id. at 24. Appellant’s mother 

alluded to Appellant’s presentence investigation report, noting that it reveals 

that Appellant lost one of his friends to an accidental shooting, and that his 

father had died under mysterious circumstances. Id. at 14. The trial court 

acknowledged that Appellant had no violent history 

but noted that his probation had been revoked on both of the DUI’s with which 

he was formerly convicted. Id. at 15. The trial court found that Appellant 

was lurking on the Drexel University campus at 2:00 a.m., and that he preyed 

upon the victim. Id. The trial court indicated that the sentencing guidelines

had been considered, but that the court believed that “this crime is so 

egregious that the guidelines have to be superseded,” and stated that 

Appellant was being sentenced for “punishment, protection of the public, 

rehabilitation.” Id. at 25. In its opinion, the trial court explained that it had 

considered the presentence report and the arguments of counsel, as well as 

Appellant’s mother’s testimony, and that it took into consideration that the 

victim did not suffer any serious physical injury as a result of the robbery. 

Trial Court Opinion at 3-4. The trial court noted its particular concern with the 

aggravating factors in this matter, specifically the fact that Appellant robbed 
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an amputee, in a neighborhood where many students reside who can be found 

by themselves and easily preyed upon. Id. at 4. It was extremely

troublesome to the trial court that Appellant tried to drag Appellant away even 

after he had stolen her belongings, which indicated that Appellant “was in fact 

prepared to follow through on his threats to “get really violent.” Id. The trial 

court voiced its belief that Appellant is in need of drug treatment, and poses 

extreme danger to the public without the treatment and rehabilitative services 

he will receive while incarcerated. Id. Upon review, we cannot find that the 

trial court failed to satisfy the requirements set forth by the General Assembly 

in the Sentencing Code here, where it enunciated substantial reasons for the 

imposition of its sentence. We are prohibited from finding an abuse of 

discretion merely because we might have reached a different conclusion, 

Grady, 829 A.2d at 1046, and our review of the record reveals no “manifest 

unreasonableness.” Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of sentence for 

terroristic threats, and we affirm Appellant’s robbery sentence. 

Judgment of sentence for terroristic threats vacated. Judgment of 

sentence for robbery affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/28/2022