IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

ex rel. Amrah Holloman, :

Appellant :

 :

v. : No. 737 C.D. 2018

 : Submitted: April 5, 2019

Kevin Kauffman, Superintendent, :

State Correctional Institution at :

Huntingdon :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: August 9, 2019

Amrah Holloman (Appellant), pro se, appeals an Order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Blair County (common pleas), dated November 2, 2017, that 

dismissed his Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum1(Petition) as 

improvidently filed and without prejudice to seek relief in this Court. Common 

pleas found that “the gravamen of the Petition involves an action of the 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole [(Board)],” over which common pleas 

did not have jurisdiction. 

 

1

“A writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is defined as ‘[a] writ directed to someone 

detaining another person and commanding that the detainee be brought to court.’” Pew v. 

Mechling, 929 A.2d 1214, 1216 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 715 

(7th ed. 1999)).
2

In November 2016, Appellant was charged with various crimes and 

ultimately pleaded guilty to simple assault, to which he was sentenced to time 

served to 231⁄2 months in the Blair County Prison in March 2017.2 At the time of 

his conviction, it appears Appellant was on parole for another criminal conviction

from 2011.

3

 According to Appellant’s Petition, Appellant was serving a three- to 

six-year sentence on the 2011 charges and had a maximum sentence date of June 5, 

2017. (Petition ¶ 7.) He was paroled in 2014 at the completion of his minimum 

sentence and remained on parole without incident until his arrest on the new 

charges in November 2016. (Id. ¶ 8(ii)-(iii).) At that time, he alleges he had 71⁄2 

months remaining on his maximum sentence. (Id. ¶ 8(iii).) Following his 

sentencing on the new charges, Appellant alleges he was transferred from Blair 

County Prison to the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (SCIHuntingdon) on March 22, 2017, and detained on what he called an 

“unconstitutional[] . . . parole violation detainer[.]” (Id. ¶ 8(vi).) In his Petition, he 

avers his maximum sentence “was unconstitutionally changed and increased” by 

the Board from June 5, 2017, to March 6, 2020 by order dated June 13, 2017. (Id.) 

He asserts the Board “had no legal authority to change [his] maximum sentence[,]” 

and by doing so, “the Board illegally altered and extended the judicially imposed 

sentence” from 2011. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.) Appellant also alleges that the Board should 

 

2 Appellant also was sentenced to a period of probation on a charge of resisting arrest. 

All other charges were dismissed. (Sentencing Order, March 6, 2017, Record (R.) Item 7.)

3 The Court’s review of this case is hampered by the fact that the record consists only of 

Appellant’s 2016 criminal case. Because the Petition was filed on the criminal docket, the 

District Attorney’s Office has been defending the Petition. Appellant did not name the Board as 

a party. Therefore, the decisions that form the basis of his Petition are not before us. Although 

copies of some Board documents were appended to the briefs filed by the District Attorney’s 

Office and Appellant, they are not part of the record; thus, we cannot consider them. B.K. v. 

Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 36 A.3d 649, 657 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 
3

have credited him with the 21⁄2 years he spent at liberty on parole (street time), and 

the Board committed an error of law and abused its discretion in not doing so. (Id.

¶¶ 8(vi), 16.) 

To remedy these perceived wrongs, on October 30, 2017, Appellant filed his 

Petition with common pleas,4 asking it to issue a writ directing Kevin Kauffman, 

Superintendent of SCI-Huntingdon, whom Appellant named as the lone respondent 

in his Petition, to release him from prison.5 Common pleas issued its Order 

dismissing the Petition three days later. Appellant now appeals that Order.6

On appeal, Appellant argues common pleas erred in dismissing his Petition 

and that the matter should be remanded for common pleas to address the merits. 

He asserts this Court does not have jurisdiction over his Petition under Section 

761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i).

7

 Specifically, he 

 

4 Prior to filing his Petition, Appellant mailed what he labeled a “complaint” to common 

pleas, wherein he again asserted his belief that he should be released from custody as his original 

maximum sentence date expired. (R. Item 10.) By order dated July 18, 2017, common pleas 

dismissed the “complaint,” finding it lacked jurisdiction over the Board. (R. Item 11.) As it did 

here, common pleas dismissed the “complaint” without prejudice for Appellant to “refile any 

concerns with the . . . Commonwealth Court.” (Id.) 

5 Although Appellant named Superintendent Kauffman as the respondent in his Petition, 

there is no indication that Superintendent Kauffman has been served or participated in any 

manner before common pleas. Nor has he participated before this Court. As stated above, the 

District Attorney’s Office filed a brief with this Court. Therein, it asserts it is not a proper party 

to this action and does not represent the Board or “any other interested party” but “believes these 

parties should have the opportunity to respond to [Appellant]’s Brief.” (District Attorney’s Brief 

at 2 n.1, 5 n.2.) 

6 Appellant originally appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which transferred the 

appeal to this Court.

7 Section 761 of the Judicial Code sets forth this Court’s original jurisdiction. It provides, 

in relevant part:

(a) General rule. –The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of 

all civil actions or proceedings:

(Footnote continued on next page...)
4

argues the Petition filed with common pleas is proper because he is being held 

beyond the expiration of his maximum sentence. In the alternative, Appellant 

argues the Board unlawfully extended his maximum sentence by not granting him 

credit for street time. In his reply brief, Appellant argues the Board also provided 

no explanation for its decision to deny him credit for his street time, which is in 

violation of Pittman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 159 A.3d 466 

(Pa. 2017). 

Although fashioned as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad 

Subjiciendum, it is apparent from a review of Appellant’s Petition that Appellant is 

challenging the Board’s actions in extending his maximum sentence date following 

his conviction on new charges. Habeas corpus relief “is not available to challenge 

an action of the Board.” Gillespie v. Dep’t of Corr., 527 A.2d 1061, 1064 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1987). Appellant cites to Department of Corrections v. Reese, 774 A.2d 

1255 (Pa. Super. 2001) for the proposition that, because his confinement exceeded 

his maximum release date, his filing of the Petition was appropriate to remedy this 

wrong. The Superior Court in Reese consolidated two cases involving the 

propriety of two petitions for writs of habeas corpus filed by two prisoners. The 

first prisoner, Reese, reached his maximum release date of October 30, 1998, but 

_____________________________

(continued...)

(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, 

acting in his official capacity, except:

(i) actions or proceedings in the nature of applications for a writ of habeas 

corpus or post-conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings within the 

appellate jurisdiction of the court[.]

. . . .

42 Pa. C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i).
5

was not released from incarceration because he was being detained on a Board 

warrant pending disposition of new criminal charges that were filed against him 

while on parole. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus after his maximum 

release date expired but before the Board recalculated a new maximum date. 

Given those facts, the Superior Court held the trial court properly exercised 

jurisdiction over Reese’s petition because Reese was being held beyond the date of 

his maximum sentence at the time he filed his habeas corpus petition. Id. at 

1261. In contrast, the Board recalculated the second prisoner’s (Richart) maximum 

release date on October 27, 1997. Nearly two years later, Richart filed his petition 

for writ of habeas corpus. With regard to Richart, the Superior Court found the 

petition was improper because Richart was attempting to challenge the Board’s 

recalculation of his maximum sentence. At the time his petition was filed, the 

maximum date had not yet expired. Thus, the Superior Court concluded the trial 

court lacked jurisdiction to decide that petition. Id.

Here, Appellant argues his situation is analogous to that of Reese and not of 

Richart. Based upon Appellant’s averments in his Petition, we disagree. In his 

Petition, Appellant alleges the Board issued its order recalculating his maximum 

sentence date on June 13, 2017. Appellant filed his Petition with common pleas on 

October 30, 2017. Therefore, at the time his Petition was filed, Appellant’s 

maximum date had not yet expired.8 In short, he was not being held beyond his 

maximum date at the time he filed his Petition. As a result, common pleas 

correctly determined it did not have jurisdiction. Instead, to challenge the Board’s 

recalculation, Appellant must first seek administrative review through the Board 

 

8 The “complaint” Appellant filed with common pleas on July 11, 2017, also was filed 

after his maximum date had been extended. 
6

and then, if still dissatisfied, he may petition for review of the Board’s decision in 

this Court. Id. at 1259-60. Therefore, we affirm common pleas to the extent it 

found “the gravamen of the Petition involves the action of the . . . Board,” over 

which common pleas lacked jurisdiction. (Common Pleas’ Order, November 2, 

2017.) 

There is no documentation of record that shows whether Appellant did seek 

review before the Board. Rather than dismissing the Petition, common pleas 

should have transferred the matter to this Court pursuant to Section 5103(a) of the 

Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 5103(a). Commonwealth v. Snyder, 829 A.2d 783, 

785 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Section 5103(a) provides:

If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court or 

magisterial district of this Commonwealth[,] which does not have 

jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the court or magisterial 

district judge shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter, but 

shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this 

Commonwealth, where the appeal or other matter shall be treated as if 

originally filed in the transferee tribunal on the date when the appeal 

or other matter was first filed in a court or magisterial district of this 

Commonwealth. A matter which is within the exclusive jurisdiction 

of a court or magisterial district judge of this Commonwealth but 

which is commenced in any other tribunal of this Commonwealth 

shall be transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court or 

magisterial district of this Commonwealth where it shall be treated as 

if originally filed in the transferee court or magisterial district of this 

Commonwealth on the date when first filed in the other tribunal.

42 Pa. C.S. § 5103(a).

Because common pleas did not transfer Appellant’s Petition to this Court, 

we vacate that part of common pleas’ Order that dismissed Appellant’s Petition. 

Instead, we will treat the Petition as being transferred, which will preserve the 

filing date of October 30, 2017. Because the Board is not currently a party to the 

action and we do not have the Board’s record before us to review, we direct 
7

Appellant to file an amended petition for review naming the Board as a party and 

serve the amended petition upon the parties within 30 days pursuant to Rule 1514 

of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 1514. This prevents 

prejudice to Appellant by preserving the filing date of the Petition, which may or 

may not be timely; prevents prejudice to the Board, which is an indispensable party 

to this action, by allowing it to defend its own actions; and permits the Court to 

review the claims with the benefit of the Board’s certified record. 

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania :

ex rel. Amrah Holloman, :

Appellant :

 :

v. : No. 737 C.D. 2018

 : 

Kevin Kauffman, Superintendent, :

State Correctional Institution at :

Huntingdon :

O R D E R

NOW, August 9, 2019, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair 

County (common pleas), dated November 2, 2017, is AFFIRMED, in part, to the 

extent common pleas found it did not have jurisdiction over the matter. The Order 

is VACATED to the extent it dismissed the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Ad Subjiciendum (Petition). Because common pleas should have transferred the 

Petition to this Court, instead of dismissing it, we treat the Petition as a Petition for 

Review of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole’s (Board) decision 

recalculating Amrah Holloman’s (Appellant) maximum sentence date in order to 

preserve Appellant’s filing date. However, as the Board is an indispensable party 

to this action, Appellant is directed to file an amended petition within 30 days 

naming the Board as a party. The amended petition shall be served by Appellant 

upon the parties within 30 days pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1514, or this matter will be 

dismissed as of course. 

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge