Filed 2/25/21 P. v. Jackson CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LADAWN MARIE JACKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D077341

 (Super. Ct. No. SCD284719)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Reversed in part and remanded for resentencing.

Shay Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel 

Rogers, Kristen Chenelia, Michael D. Butera and Christopher P. Beesley,

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Ladawn Marie Jackson pled guilty to one count of assault with a deadly 

weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1))1 and admitted that she personally 

used a dangerous and deadly weapon (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). The trial court 

placed Jackson on formal probation for four years. 

Jackson challenges two of the conditions of probation ordered by the 

trial court: (1) the condition that she report her contacts with law 

enforcement; and (2) the condition requiring that she submit to a search of 

her computers, recordable media and electronic devices. Further, in 

supplemental briefing, Jackson contends that under newly enacted Assembly 

Bill No. 1950 (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2) (amending § 1203.1), she is entitled to 

have the term of her formal probation reduced from four years to two years.

We conclude that Jackson’s first challenge to the probation conditions 

fails, but the second challenge has merit. In addition, we conclude that 

Jackson is entitled to a reduction of her term of probation pursuant to 

Assembly Bill No. 1950. Accordingly, we reverse the sentence and remand 

for resentencing with directions that the trial court (1) strike the condition of 

probation requiring that Jackson submit to a search of her electronic devices, 

and (2) resentence Jackson to a term of probation consistent with Assembly 

Bill No. 1950.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

According to the probation officer’s report, on the morning of December 

26, 2019, Jackson summoned an Uber to pick her up at the Residence Inn 

hotel on Pacific Highway in San Diego, and she requested to be driven to the 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the 

Penal Code.
3

St. Vincent De Paul facility on Imperial Avenue in San Diego.2 As described 

by the probation officer, “While on Park Avenue, [Jackson] directed [the Uber 

driver] to make a left turn. He replied he was unable to because the trolley 

was passing. She placed a knife to his neck and stated, ‘Okay, mother fucker. 

Go wherever I tell you to go.’ The knife was a purple folding-knife, about 

nine inches in length with about a 4-inch blade. [¶] Around the same time, 

[the Uber driver] received a notification on his cellphone. When he touched 

the phone, [Jackson] told him, ‘Don't fucking touch the cellphone or I will hit 

you.’ As he continued driving, she touched the blade to his neck about three 

times and told him he was making a lot of wrong turns. She also forced him 

to make an illegal U-turn and drive through a red light. [The Uber driver]

eventually dropped [Jackson] off at her destination. She was laughing as she 

exited the vehicle.” 

During her arrest, Jackson explained that she thought the Uber driver 

“was trying to take me somewhere so these Asians could hurt me.”

Jackson told the probation officer, “I thought somebody was chasing me and I 

was high as hell. . . . The Uber was driving where they wanted to go and I 

wanted him to take me where I wanted to go. . . . He scared me because he 

was taking me behind the ballpark, so I pulled out the knife and held it

in the mirror.” 

Jackson was charged with four counts: kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)); 

assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); making a criminal threat

(§ 422); and false imprisonment by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit (§§ 236, 

237, subd. (a)). Each count also included weapons allegations. (§§ 12022, 

subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23).) 

2 As Jackson pled guilty before any testimony was given, we base our 

statement of facts on the probation officer’s report. 
4

On January 22, 2020, Jackson pled guilty to one count of assault with a 

deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and admitted that she personally used a 

dangerous and deadly weapon (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). The People dismissed 

the remaining charges. 

The trial court placed Jackson on formal probation for four years. The 

order granting formal probation set forth numerous conditions with which 

Jackson was required to comply. 

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Jackson’s Challenges to the Conditions of Probation

We first consider Jackson’s challenges to two of the conditions of 

probation imposed by the trial court.

1. The Conditions of Probation at Issue

Jackson challenges two of the conditions of probation imposed by the 

trial court: conditions 6.k and 6.n. Both conditions are standard conditions 

that appear on the form used by the San Diego County Superior Court. 

Condition 6.k states that Jackson shall “[p]rovide true name, address, 

and date of birth if contacted by law enforcement. Report contact or arrest in 

writing to the [probation officer] within 7 days. Include the date of 

contact/arrest, charges, if any, and the name of the law enforcement agency” 

(the report-contact condition). 

Condition 6.n states that Jackson shall “[s]ubmit person, vehicle, 

residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media 

including electronic devices to search at any time with or without a warrant, 

and with or without reasonable cause, when required by [probation officer] or 

law enforcement officer.” The trial court modified condition 6.n by stating 

that it was “with the exception of Medical/Financial Records.” With respect 
5

to condition 6.n, Jackson challenges only the portion relating to her electronic 

devices, namely, “computers, and recordable media including electronic 

devices” (the electronics search condition). 

2. Applicable Legal Standards

When imposing probation, “a sentencing court has ‘broad discretion to 

impose conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety.’ ” 

(People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.) “But such discretion is not 

unlimited: ‘[A] condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the 

statute,’ and conditions regulating noncriminal conduct must be ‘ “reasonably 

related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future 

criminality.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

A condition of probation may be challenged on state-law grounds 

pursuant to the standards set forth in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 

486 (Lent). Under Lent, a condition of probation is invalid if it imposes a 

term or condition that “ ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the 

offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, 

and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future 

criminality.’ ” (Ibid.) “This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be 

satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a . . . term. [Citations.] As 

such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of 

which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself 

criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related 

to preventing future criminality.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 

379-380.) A trial court’s application of the Lent test is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. (Id. at p. 379.) 

A condition of probation may also be challenged on constitutional 

grounds, including principles prohibiting vagueness and overbreadth. “A 

probation condition ‘must be sufficiently precise for the probationer to know 
6

what is required of him, and for the court to determine whether the condition 

has been violated,’ if it is to withstand a challenge on the ground of 

vagueness. [Citation.] A probation condition that imposes limitations on a 

person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the 

purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally 

overbroad.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K).) When a 

condition of probation is challenged on constitutional grounds as facially 

invalid, a pure question of law arises, to which we apply a de novo standard 

of review. (Sheena K., at pp. 888-889; People v. Arevalo (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 

652, 656.)

Challenges to conditions of probation ordinarily must be raised in the 

trial court, and if they are not, appellate review of those conditions is 

forfeited. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235.) The one exception 

to this rule involves facial constitutional challenges. (Sheena K., supra, 40 

Cal.4th at pp. 887-889.) The forfeiture rule does not apply in such a case 

because a facial constitutional challenge “ ‘present[s] [a] “pure question[ ] of 

law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record 

developed in the trial court” ’ ” (id. at p. 889) and “does not require scrutiny of 

individual facts and circumstances but instead requires the review of 

abstract and generalized legal concepts—a task that is well suited to the role 

of an appellate court.” (Id. at p. 885.)

3. The Challenge to the Report-Contact Condition Is Not Forfeited, 

But Lacks Merit

We first consider Jackson’s challenge to the report-contact condition. 

Jackson argues that the condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad 

because in describing the type of law enforcement contact that Jackson must 

report, it “does not differentiate between casual contact unrelated to any 
7

criminality, or even suspicion of criminality, and contact which might 

warrant some further investigation by a probation officer.” 

Jackson contends that the report-contact condition is 

unconstitutionally vague because it is not “ ‘sufficiently precise for the 

[defendant] to know what is required of [her], and for the court to determine 

whether the condition has been violated.’ ” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at 

p. 890.) Further, Jackson argues that the condition is unconstitutionally 

overbroad because “not all non-arrest contacts between police officers and 

citizens are related to criminal activity,” and she could be required to report 

contacts “based on benign community interaction.” In that case, the 

condition would infringe the rule that “limitations on a person’s 

constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of 

the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” 

(Sheena K., at p. 890.)

Jackson’s challenge to the report-contact condition does not depend on 

the specific facts of Jackson’s case. Instead, the challenge is based on the 

language of the condition itself. Accordingly, Jackson makes a facial 

constitutional challenge that is not forfeited by her failure to raise it in the 

trial court. (See In re I.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 261 (I.V.) [when 

appellant argued that the word “property” in a search condition was 

unconstitutionally vague, the challenge was not subject to forfeiture because 

it could be addressed without examining the record].) 

In People v. Brand (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 861, we recently considered 

and rejected a challenge, based on both vagueness and overbreadth, to a 

report-contact condition in an order for mandatory supervision. The reportcontact condition in Brand was identical to the report-contact condition in 

Jackson’s case. Both conditions stated that the defendant shall “[p]rovide 
8

true name, address, and date of birth if contacted by law enforcement. 

Report contact or arrest in writing to the [probation officer] within 7 days. 

Include the date of contact/arrest, charges, if any, and the name of the law 

enforcement agency.” (Id. at p. 870.) As we explained in Brand, 

“Taking the first and second sentences together, a 

reasonably objective person would conclude that [defendant] is 

required to report only those contacts in which a law enforcement 

officer requests identifying information from [defendant]. This 

meaning arises because the requirement that [defendant] 

‘[r]eport contact or arrest in writing to the [probation officer] 

within 7 days’ directly follows the statement that [defendant] 

must ‘[p]rovide true name, address, and date of birth if contacted 

by law enforcement.’ When read together, these two sentences 

make clear to a reasonable reader that the law enforcement 

contact that [defendant] must report is any contact in which 

[defendant] is required to provide his name, address, and date of 

birth to law enforcement. Further, because the last sentence of 

the report-contact condition provides that [defendant] must 

‘[i]nclude the date of contact/arrest, charges, if any, and the name 

of the law enforcement agency,’ a reasonable person would 

understand that [defendant] does not have to report contact with 

a law enforcement officer that is not meaningful enough for the 

officer to provide [defendant] with information about the relevant 

law enforcement agency.

“In sum, the report-contact condition, when read in its 

entirety, would indicate to a reasonable person that [defendant]

is not required to report casual, random interactions with law 

enforcement officers. Instead, the type of law enforcement 

contacts that must be reported are those in which [defendant] is 

questioned by law enforcement officers and is required to give 

identifying information, such as when he has been a witness to a 

crime or is suspected of possible involvement in a crime. 

Accordingly, we reject [defendant’s] contention that the reportcontact condition is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.” 

(Brand, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 870-871.)
9

We rely on our analysis in Brand to conclude that Jackson’s challenge 

to the report-contact condition lacks merit. 

4. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Imposing the Electronics 

Search Condition

We next consider Jackson’s challenge to the electronics search 

condition.

a. The Trial Court’s Imposition of the Electronics Search 

Condition Over Jackson’s Objection

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it would impose the 

electronics search condition, which provided that Jackson shall “[s]ubmit 

person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and 

recordable media including electronic devices to search at any time with or 

without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by 

[probation officer] or law enforcement officer.” However, the trial court 

expressly modified condition 6.n by stating that it was “with the exception of 

Medical/Financial Records.” 

Defense counsel objected to the imposition of the electronics search 

condition, even with the modification, citing two prongs of the Lent test. 

(Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)3 On the first prong, counsel argued there 

was no nexus between Jackson’s crime and any electronic device, except that 

she used a cell phone to arrange the ride with Uber. Defense counsel pointed 

out, however, that “it wasn’t like she called the Uber with the intent to pull 

this knife out on this man. I wouldn’t go so far as to say she used a cell phone 

3 As we have explained, Lent states that a condition of probation is 

improper if all of the following factors are present: the condition “ ‘(1) has no 

relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to 

conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct 

which is not reasonably related to future criminality.’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 

Cal.3d at p. 486.)
10

to accomplish a crime.” On the third prong, counsel argued that the 

imposition of the electronics search condition would not “help Probation

supervise her in any way as there’s no information that she’s committing any 

crimes that deal with cell phones or electronic devices.” 

The trial court overruled the objection, with the following explanation:

“Okay. In this matter, the defendant asked the Uber 

driver, it looks like almost immediately upon getting into the car, 

where she wanted to go, and then pulled out the knife. She used 

her phone to call the Uber driver, and then threatened that if he 

didn’t follow her directions, she threatened him with a knife.

“Separate and apart from the connection with this case, in 

the third factor of Lent, we look at future criminality and the 

Fourth Waiver extension in a way to deter that. The defendant’s 

criminal record started in 1995 as an adult, and she has had 

several convictions that deal with theft and drug use. And 

almost each and every time she’s on probation, she violates 

picking up a new case.

“Given that this case deals with mental health issues that 

are exacerbated by drug and/or alcohol issues, and that she has 

previously tried and struggled and failed with drug treatment, I 

want Probation to have all the tools that it needs to make sure 

that she is not using, obtaining any drugs, so they can generally 

make sure she is where she’s supposed to be, and that she’s had 

no contact with the victim.

“Frankly, if they don’t think she should be using Uber or 

any sort of ride share because of this case, I want them to have 

the ability to monitor that, given that she’s had this serious 

offense.

“Given not only the direct nexus to this case but the third 

factor of Lent, weighing public safety against her private interest, 

I think that the public safety is compromised if that extension 

does not exist, and I will therefore order it.” 
11

After the court delivered its ruling, defense counsel pointed out that, 

despite the trial court’s statement that Jackson pulled out the knife “almost 

immediately” after getting into the car, the record showed that during the 

drive between the Residence Inn and the St. Vincent De Paul facility, “the 

knife did not come out the first half of the trip.”4

b. Application of the Lent Test to the Instant Case

On appeal, Jackson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing the electronics search condition because all three prongs of the Lent

test are satisfied.

i. The First Prong

Jackson contends that the first prong of Lent is satisfied because the 

electronics search condition “ ‘has no relationship to the crime of which [she] 

was convicted.’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) Specifically, Jackson 

argues that the crime of assault with a deadly weapon did not involve the use 

of electronic devices. Although recognizing that she was in the Uber when

the assault occurred because she used a cell phone application to arrange the 

ride, Jackson argues that her “use of her cell phone was merely incidental to 

her crime” and “did not relate to the crime she committed.” In support of this 

argument, Jackson points to the uncontradicted information in the probation 

officer’s report, which shows that “the knife came out halfway through the 

ride due to an independent trigger,” and not “as a part of a pre-planned crime 

to call and then kidnap or assault the Uber driver.” The People make only a 

cursory attempt to argue otherwise. In a footnote, they observe that although 

4 On our own motion, we take judicial notice that the distance from the 

Residence Inn on Pacific Highway to the St. Vincent De Paul facility on 

Imperial Avenue is over two and a half miles, and the distance to Park 

Boulevard, where Jackson pulled the knife, from the Residence Inn is at least 

approximately one and half miles. 
12

the trial court “also noted that Jackson used an electronic device when she 

scheduled the Uber driver and shortly thereafter attacked him,” the point 

was “admittedly a somewhat weak argument in support of the first Lent

factor.” 

We conclude that Jackson’s argument on the first prong of the Lent test 

has merit. Although Jackson used a cell phone application to call for an 

Uber, the assault itself occurred after she had been in the car for a period of 

time, and appears to have taken place because of a mental health trigger 

unrelated to Jackson’s use of the cell phone to arrange for the Uber ride. 

Jackson could have committed the same sort of assault had she arranged a 

ride by walking up to a waiting taxi rather than by using her cell phone. 

Therefore, the use of the cell phone was merely coincidental to Jackson’s 

offense.

ii. The Second Prong

As for the second prong of the Lent test, the issue is whether the 

electronics search condition “ ‘relates to conduct which is not in itself 

criminal.’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) The parties do not dispute that 

the second prong of the Lent test is satisfied, as the use of electronic devices 

is not in itself criminal.

iii. The Third Prong

The inquiry under the third prong is whether the probation condition 

“ ‘requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future 

criminality.’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) 

The leading case on how Lent’s third prong applies to electronic search 

conditions is In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.), in which our 

Supreme Court concluded that, under the facts of the case before it, the 

electronics search condition failed the third prong of the Lent test. (Id. at p. 
13

1116.) Specifically, in Ricardo P., the juvenile probationer, who had 

committed two burglaries (id. at p. 1115), was ordered by the juvenile court to 

“ ‘[s]ubmit . . . electronics including passwords under [his] control to search by 

Probation Officer or peace office[r] with or without a search warrant at any 

time of day or night.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1116-1117.) Even though there was no 

basis for inferring that electronic devices were connected to the juvenile’s 

commission of the burglaries, the juvenile court imposed the electronics 

search condition to enable probation officers to monitor whether the juvenile 

was communicating about drugs or with people associated with drugs. (Id. at 

p. 1119.) To support its reasoning, the juvenile court pointed to evidence that 

the juvenile had previously used marijuana, which the juvenile stated “ ‘did 

not allow him to think clearly.’ ” (Ibid.)

Explaining that “Lent’s requirement that a probation condition must be 

‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ contemplates a degree of 

proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the 

legitimate interests served by the condition” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

p. 1122), our Supreme Court concluded that “[s]uch proportionality is lacking 

here” because, among other things, “nothing in the record suggests that [the 

juvenile] has ever used an electronic device or social media in connection with 

criminal conduct.” (Ibid.) Our Supreme Court explained that because an 

electronics search condition is “burdensome and intrusive,” it “requires

. . . substantial and particularized justification,” which was lacking. 

(Ricardo P., at p. 1126.)

In the course of explaining its holding, Ricardo P. observed that Lent

would be “ ‘render[ed] . . . meaningless by broadening the third prong to allow 

any probation condition that enhances surveillance of the probationer” 

(Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1125), and thus declined to “categorically 
14

permit any probation conditions reasonably related to enhancing the effective 

supervision of a probationer.” (Id. at p. 1127.) Doing so “would effectively 

eliminate the reasonableness requirement in Lent’s third prong, for almost 

any condition can be described as ‘enhancing the effective supervision of a 

probationer.’ ” (Id. at p. 1127.) Ricardo P. favorably cited a case holding that 

“ ‘[t]he fact that a search of [the probationer’s] cellular phone records might 

aid a probation officer in ascertaining . . . compliance with other conditions of 

supervision is, without more, an insufficient rationale to justify the 

impairment of [the probationer’s] constitutionally protected interest in 

privacy.’ ” (Id. at p. 1126, quoting People v. Bryant (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 

396, 404, judg. vacated and cause remanded, sub. opn. People v. Bryant

(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 839, review granted Feb. 19, 2020, S259956.)

In summarizing its holding, Ricardo P. clarified that it did not intend 

to “categorically invalidate electronics search conditions” and “[i]n certain 

cases, the probationer’s offense or personal history may provide the juvenile 

court with a sufficient factual basis from which it can determine that an 

electronics search condition is a proportional means of deterring the 

probationer from future criminality.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 

1128-1129.)5 However, as our Supreme Court explained, “[u]nder the rule we 

set forth today, a juvenile court imposing such a condition must consider 

whether, in light of ‘the facts and circumstances in each case’ . . . , the 

5 Ricardo P. cited examples of the type of case where an electronics 

search condition could be a proportional means to deterring future 

criminality, such as where the “defendant lured [the] victim using ‘ “either 

social media or some kind of computer software,” ’ ” the defendant had a 

“ ‘history of robbing people of their cell phones,’ ” or the defendant “had 

previously used social media sites to promote his gang.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 

Cal.5th at p. 1129.)
15

burdens imposed by the condition are proportional to achieving some 

legitimate end of probation.” (Ricardo P., at p. 1127, citation omitted.)

In this case, the probation officer’s report indicates that, as an adult, 

Jackson incurred misdemeanor convictions for petty theft and prostitution, 

and felony convictions for possessing marijuana for sale and possession of a 

controlled substance. The probation officer’s report also indicates that 

Jackson suffers from mental illness and substance abuse. 

Pointing to Jackson’s history of drug use and her drug-related 

convictions, the People argue that the electronics search condition does not 

violate the third prong of the Lent test because it is “an effective way to 

monitor whether she was trying to procure drugs.” Under the People’s 

reasoning, the electronics search condition is permissible because it allows

probation officers to assess whether Jackson is complying with the probation 

condition under which she must not “knowingly use or possess any controlled 

substance without a valid prescription,” including “[n]o marijuana use at all.” 

We reject the argument. As in Ricardo P., “nothing in the record 

suggests that [Jackson] has ever used an electronic device or social media in 

connection with criminal conduct” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122), 

and in particular, there is no indication in the record that Jackson ever used 

an electronic device to procure or sell drugs. The trial court stated that it 

wanted the probation officers “to have all the tools that [they] need[ ] to make 

sure that she is not using, obtaining any drugs, so they can generally make 

sure she is where she’s supposed to be, and that she’s had no contact with the 

victim.” However, Ricardo P. establishes that an electronics search condition 

is not warranted merely to “enhanc[e] the effective supervision of a 
16

probationer” when there is no nexus between a defendant’s use of electronic 

devices and her past or future criminality. (Ricardo P., at p. 1127.)6

Although the trial court narrowed the electronics search condition by 

excluding financial and medical records, the intrusion on Jackson’s privacy is 

still significant, as any item not falling into those two categories remains 

subject to search. As noted in Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, a cell 

phone has an “immense storage capacity” that “collects in one place many 

distinct types of information . . . that reveal much more in combination than 

any isolated record,” and comprises “a digital record of nearly every aspect of 

[the defendants’] lives—from the mundane to the intimate.” (Id. at pp. 393, 

395.) For example, solely from photographs stored on an electronic device, 

“[t]he sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a 

thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions” (id. at 

p. 394), and “[d]ata on a cell phone can also reveal where a person has been,” 

allowing law enforcement to “reconstruct someone’s specific movements down 

to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.” 

(Id. at p. 396.) In a case, such as this, where there is no nexus between the 

use of electronic devices and Jackson’s past or future criminality, even an 

6 Although the People do not advance the argument, the trial court also 

supported its imposition of the electronics search condition, in part, by 

stating that “if [the probation officers] don’t think she should be using Uber 

or any sort of ride share because of this case, I want them to have the ability 

to monitor that.” However, because the trial court did not issue any order 

specifically giving probation officers the authority to prevent Jackson from 

using rideshare applications, this consideration does not provide a rational 

relationship between the electronics search condition and a legitimate end of 

probation. Moreover, allowing probation officers to search all of Jackson’s 

electronic devices is far broader of an intrusion than would be justified by the 

goal of allowing probation officers to check whether Jackson used rideshare 

applications on her cell phone.
17

electronics search condition that excludes financial and medical records is too 

intrusive to make “the burdens imposed by the condition . . . proportional to 

achieving some legitimate end of probation.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

p. 1127.) The electronics search condition is therefore not reasonable 

under Lent’s third prong. 

As all three prongs of the Lent test are satisfied, we conclude that the 

trial court abused its discretion in imposing the electronics search condition. 

The order granting formal probation must therefore be modified by striking

the electronics search condition.

B. Jackson Is Entitled to a Reduction of the Term of Her Probation Due to

Recent Legislation Generally Limiting Felony Probation to a Period of 

No More than Two Years 

The final issue is the impact of the Legislature’s recent enactment of 

Assembly Bill No. 1950 on the term of Jackson’s probation.

At the time the Jackson was sentenced, section 1203.1, subdivision (a) 

provided that a court may impose felony probation “for a period of time not 

exceeding the maximum possible term of the sentence.” It further provided 

that “where the maximum possible term of the sentence is five years or less, 

then the period of suspension of imposition or execution of sentence may, in 

the discretion of the court, continue for not over five years.” (Former 

§ 1203.1, subd. (a).) Accordingly, the trial court ordered a four-year term of 

formal probation for Jackson.

During the pendency of this appeal, the Legislature enacted Assembly 

Bill No. 1950, which amended section 1203.1. (Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 2.)

Subject to exceptions not applicable here, section 1203.1, subdivision (a), as 

amended, provides that a felony probation term cannot exceed two years. 

The provision now provides, “The court, or judge thereof, in the order 

granting probation, may suspend the imposing or the execution of the 
18

sentence and may direct that the suspension may continue for a period of 

time not exceeding two years, and upon those terms and conditions as it shall 

determine.” (§ 1203.1, subd. (a).)

Jackson argues in her supplemental briefing that because her case is 

not yet final, under the principles of retroactivity applicable to ameliorative 

changes to the criminal law as set forth in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

(Estrada), she is entitled under Assembly Bill No. 1950 to have her term of 

probation reduced from four years to two years. In their supplemental 

briefing, the People agree that the statutory amendment implemented by 

Assembly Bill No. 1950 is retroactively applicable to cases, like Jackson’s, 

that are not yet final. 

Based on this court’s recent opinion in People v. Sims (2021) 59 

Cal.App.5th 943, the parties are correct regarding the retroactivity of 

Assembly Bill No. 1950. As we stated in Sims, “the two-year limitation on 

felony probation set forth in Assembly Bill No. 1950 is an ameliorative 

change to the criminal law that is subject to the Estrada presumption of 

retroactivity,” and “[t]herefore . . . the two-year limitation applies 

retroactively to all cases not reduced to final judgment as of the new law’s 

effective date.” (Sims, at p. 964.)

The parties disagree on whether we should issue an order modifying 

Jackson’s term of probation to two years, or whether we should remand with 

directions to the trial court to resentence Jackson based on the change in the 

law. In Sims, instead of modifying the term of probation, we remanded for 

resentencing, stating that “defendant is entitled to seek a reduced probation 

term on remand under Assembly Bill No. 1950.” (Sims, supra, 59 

Cal.App.5th at p. 964.) We will follow the procedure employed in Sims, and 

we will therefore remand to the trial court with directions that Jackson be 
19

resentenced based on the current state of the law, as enacted by Assembly 

Bill No. 1950.7

7 The People argue that a remand is appropriate because (1) the People 

may want to withdraw from the plea agreement based on the change in law 

enacted by Assembly Bill No. 1950; or (2) the trial court may want to impose 

different conditions of probation in light of the shortened probation term. As 

the possibility that the People will seek to withdraw from the plea agreement 

is, at this point, only hypothetical, we need not, and do not, express any view 

as to whether the change in law enacted by Assembly Bill No. 1950 would 

present a valid ground for the People to do so. With respect to the possibility 

that the trial court may choose to impose different conditions of probation,

that course of action is available regardless of whether the matter is 

remanded for resentencing. As we stated in Sims, “We are confident that to 

the extent current probationers face difficulties timely completing their 

probation conditions through no fault of their own, those conditions can be 

modified as needed to account for the two-year felony probation limitation our 

Legislature has imposed. (§ 1203.3, subd. (a); see People v. Killion (2018) 24 

Cal.App.5th 337, 340 [‘Generally, a trial court has the authority and 

discretion to modify a probation term during the probationary period, 

including the power to terminate probation early.’].)” (Sims, supra, 59 

Cal.App.5th at p. 963.) 
20

DISPOSITION

We reverse the judgment in part as to Jackson’s sentence. The matter 

is remanded for resentencing, with directions that the trial court (1) strike

the words “computers, and recordable media including electronic devices” 

from condition 6.n in the order granting formal probation; and (2) resentence 

Jackson consistent with the amendment to Penal Code section 1203.1, 

subdivision (a) effective on January 1, 2021, which generally limits a term of 

felony probation to no more than two years. In all other respects the 

judgment is affirmed.

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

GUERRERO, J.