IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

N O. 2013-CT-01244-SCT

C ONSOLIDATED WITH

N O. 2012-CT-00196-SCT

JAMES WILSON

v.

PEARLEAN DAV

IS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/01/2013 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. PATRICIA D. W ISE TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: FELECIA PERKINS JESSICA NICOLE AYERS JOHN R. REEVES COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: FELECIA PERKINS JESSICA NICOLE AYERS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JOHN R. REEVES JOHN JUSTIN KING NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - CUSTODY DISPOSITION: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS REVERSED, AND THE CASE IS REMANDED - 01/07/2016 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.

KING, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:¶1. In this custody action between a child’s n atural f ather and her m aternal grandm other,

the c hancery court f

ound that the natural p arent presum ption was rebutted, a nd, f

urther, that

the best interests of the child were served by rem aining in the phy sical cu s t ody of the
grandm other, while allowing the f ather liberal v isitati o n

. B e c ause t he evidence was

insuf f icient to rebut t he natural paren t presum ption, we reverse and rem and the case f or

f urther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS
¶2. Sha’Ny la W ilson ( “Sha”) was born to Concetter D avis and Jam es W ilson on April 20,

2003. Sha has a m aternal half -sister, Ka’Ny l a (“Ka”), who is two y ears older than Sha.

This action began as a paternity and custody dispute between C oncetter and Jam e s W ilson. Jam es was adjudged to be Sha’s natural f ather. C oncetter was awarded custody , and Jam es was awarded visitation. Concetter died in 2011. W hen Concetter’s relatives would not return Sha to Ja me s , he f

i led a petition f

or m odif ication and sought sole legal and phy sical c ustody of Sha. The c h a n c e l l or entered an o rder that awarded the prim a ry phy sical custody of Sha to Pearlean D avis, Sha’s maternal grandm other. The chancellor also awarded Jam es liberal visitation. In the decision, t he chancello r d i d n o t treat the i ssue as an initial custody d ispute b e t w e e n a natural parent and grandparent. Instead, the chancellor considered the m otion as a m o dif ication of child custody based on the prior custody

determ ination between Concetter and Jam es. The judgm ent was appealed and assigned t o [ the C o u r t of Appeals]. [ The Court of Appeals] r eversed the j udgm ent and rem anded the case f or the chancellor to m ake a determ ination of whether the natural-parent presum ption had been rebutted. See Wilson v. Davis , 111 So. 3d 1280, 1283 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

Wilson v. Davis , No. 2013-CA-01244-COA, 2014 W L 6 436839, a t * 1 (Miss. Ct. App. Nov.

18, 2014). Rather than conduct a new hearing r e g a r d i n g t h e rebuttal of the natural parent

2presum

ption on rem and, t he chancellor instead s im ply am end e d h er original order and
opinion to f

ind that the natural parent presum ption was rebutted.

¶3. The chancellor f

irst f ound that Jam e s had abandoned Sha, but the C o urt of Appeals

reversed that decision, determ ining that such a f inding w as not supported by s u bstantial

evidence. Id. at *3. The c hancellor then f ound Jam e s’s conduct to be so im m oral as to be

a d etrim ent to Sha. T he chance l l o r n o t e d that Jam e s had been m arried three tim es, had a
history of dating m uch y ounger wom en, and had a history o f dating m u ltiple wom en at the

sam e tim e, including c om m itting adultery

. S he noted that Jam es w as s eventy -two at the t im e

o f t h e h earing. The chancellor f ound that Jam e s ’s current, m uch-y ounger wif

e, Anne t t e

W i lson, had two sons who had serious anger issues, as evinced by t he f act that they were in
therapy f o r said issues m

ultiple ti me s p e r week. T he chancellor expressed concern that

Jam es h ad a “lack of awareness or lack of concerns of the potential dan g e r ” t o which Sha

“ c o u ld be” exposed. Further, she f ound that Annette and Sha h ad n o r eal bo n d w i t h o n e
another, and that Annette, a hom em aker, would b e prim arily responsible f o r S h a ’ s c a re.
Moreover, the chancellor f ound Annette and C oncetter had gotten into a p hy sical altercation

in f ront of Sha. T he chancellor f urther f ound that, shortly b ef

ore C o ncetter died, Jam es had

f iled p apers to have her com m itted. The court n oted t hat it “is not convinced that it is in his
daughter’s best i nterest f

or Mr. W ilson to have sole custody

. ” It then concluded that Jam es

was
asking this Court t o rem o ve the m inor child f rom the hom e she has known f or the better part of l if

e and f rom her 10 y ear old s ibling, Ka, who she resides with. Sha will a lso be taken away f r om her cousins and a very c lose college age aunt if Mr. W ilson obt ains phy sical c ustody

. I n light of t he em otional

3stress s h e has experienced r esulting f rom the untim e ly death of her m o ther and considering all f

actors outlined above, this Court f inds that this environm ent would be clearly detrim ental to t he m in o r c hild a nd s hows an o therwise unf itness by M r. W ilson to believe this is a good environm ent f or his daughter.

The c hancellor then f

o und that the natural parent p resum ption had been rebutted because the

court was “clearly convinced that M r. W ilson has shown him self to be otherwise u nf it.” The

chancellor then placed Davis, the grandm other, on e qual f ooting with J am es a nd applied an
Albright 1 analy sis. Under that analy sis, the chancellor f o und that the best interests of Sha

were served by D avis retaining prim ary phy s i c a l custody , Davis and Jam es b eing granted
joint legal custody , and Jam es being granted liberal visitation.

¶4. J a me s a p p e a l e d and Davis f ailed to f ile an a p pellate brief

. The Court of

App e a l s

declined to f

ind that Davis’s f

ailure to f ile a brief was tantam ount to a c onf ession of error.

A divided Court of Appeals af f i rm ed the chancellor’s determ ination that Jam es’s conduct

was so i m m oral that he w as unf it to have c u stody , and that the n a t u r a l p arent presum ption

was thus rebutted. It also f o und no error in the chancellor’s Albright analy sis. Judge Roberts

dissented in an opinion joined by Judge Irving. J u dge Roberts a rgued t hat he could not “f ind

that t he c han c e r y c o u rt’s reliance on this evidence [ of Jam es’s dating and m arital
relationships] is cl e a r a n d convincing evidence of im m orality a n d unf i tness such that the
natural-parent presum

ption should be overcom e.” H e f urther a rgued that the o ther f acts of

im m o rality and unf

itness f ound by the chancellor, such as the anger issues of Jam es’s

stepsons, were m ore s uited f or an Albright analy s is, a nd had little bearing on Jam es’s

m orality or f

itness as a p a rent. Judge Roberts last concluded that he could not “reconcile the

1 A lb rig h t v. A lb rig h t , 4 3 7 S o . 2 d 1 0 0 3 (M iss. 1 9 8 3 ).

4chancery court’s f inding that J am es was so im m oral and unf it to parent Sha that the naturalparent presum

ption was o vercom e, while at the sam e tim e awarding him joint legal custody

and liberal visitation.” Judge Rob e r t s b e l i eved the case should be reversed and j udgm ent

r endered granting Jam es c ustody , while rem anding the m atter t o c o nsider g randpa r e n t

visitation.

¶5. Jam es f

iled a m otion f

or rehearing, which the Court of A p p e a l s d e n i e d. He then
petitioned this court f

or certiorari review, which w e granted. In his petition, h e argued that

the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding Davis’s f a ilure t o f ile a brief b eing t antam ount to

a c onf ession of error conf

licted with prior precedent, and that the Court of Appeals’ decision

that the e vidence of u nf

i tness a nd im m orality against him established by c l e ar and convincing

evidence that the natural parent pr e s u mp t i on had been rebutted was error. W e lim it our

review t o the issue of wh e t h e r c l e a r and convincing evidence existed to rebut the natural

parent presum

ption. See Guice v. State , 952 So. 2 d 129, 133 (Miss. 2007) (Suprem e Court
“unquestionably ” has the authority to lim it the issues o n r e v i e w ) ; see also Y elverton v.

Y e lverton , 26 So. 3d 1053, 1056-57 (Miss. 2010) (even if one party f ails to f ile a brief , “in

m atters of child custody and support

. . . t his Court will ‘m ake a special ef f ort to review the

record f or support f

o r af f irm ance.’” (quoting Barber v. Barber , 608 S o. 2d 1338, 1340 (Miss.
1992))).

ANALYSIS
¶6. Thi s C o u r t r e v i e w s t h e c h a n c e l l or’s f indings f or m anif est error. Westbrook v.
Oglesbee , 606 So. 2d 1142, 1146 (Miss. 1992).

5¶7. “ T h e best i nterest of the child is param ount in any child-custody case.” S m i t h v .
Sm ith , 97 S o

. 3 d 4 3 , 46 (Miss. 2012). Indeed, “[ t]his is a principle of law so deeply

e mb e d d ed in our jurisprudence that it s hould not r equire f urther e laboration o r citati o n o f
authority .” In re Dissolution of Marriage o f Leverock a n d Ham by , 23 So. 3d 424, 429
(Miss. 2009). This Court has consistently held that it is presum ed that the best interests of

a child are served by being in the custody o f his or her natural parent, as opposed to a third

part y

. D a v i

s v. V aughn , 1 26 So. 3d 33, 37 (Miss. 2013). “[ H]um an experience has

dem onstrated that as a g eneral rule parental love and solicitude f or the child’s welf

a re are the

best guarantee that it w ill be properly cared f or

. . . . The presum

ption in all cases is that the

c h i l d ’ s parents w ill love it m ost and care f or it better than any o ne else and it is in the b e s t

interest of the child to leave i t in the custody of a parent.” Moody v . Moody , 211 So. 2d 842
(Miss. 1968). This presum ption “m ay be rebutted by clear and convincing e vidence that ‘(1)

the par e n t h a s a b a ndoned the child; (2) t he p arent has deserted the child; ( 3) the parent’s

conduct is so im m oral as to b e detrim ental to the child; or (4) the parent i s unf it, m entally or
otherwise, to have c ustody .’” Davis , 126 So. 2d at 37 (quoting S m i th , 9 7 S o. 3d at 46). If

the natural parent presum

ption is rebutted, “ the court m ay then p roceed to determ ine whether

an award of custody to t he challenging party will serve the child’s best interests.” Davis , 126

So. 3d at 37.

¶8. Requiring clear and convincing evidence to rebut t he natural parent presum ption in

one of the f

our m a nners listed is im

portant to “honor[ ] and protect[ ] t he f undam ental right

of natural parents to rear their children.” Id. However, this Court takes the opportunity to

6n o t e t h a t t he rigid a dherence to proving one of the f our precise f

actors to rebut the natural

parent presum

ption m ay , in very lim ited and e x c e p t i o n a l circum stances, place a child in a

circum stance that is clearly not in his or her b est interests. And, as is clearly established, the

best interests of the c hild is the lodestar in c ustody cases. T his C ourt has recognized this
principle in the p ast, stating that “[ i]n order to overcom e this presum p tion, there m

ust be a

clear showing that the parent is unf it by reason of im m oral conduct, abandonm ent, or other

circumstances which clearly indicate that the best interest of the child will be served in the
custody of anot her

. ” Moody , 211 So. 2d at 844 (em phasis a d ded). W ith this decision, we

m ark a return to that principle. The natural parent presum ption m ay b e rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence t hat a ctual or proba b l e , serious p hy s i cal or psy chological harm or

detrim ent will occur to t he child if c u s t o d y i s placed with the natural parent, such that
granting custody to t he third party is substantially necessary to prevent s uch probable harm

. 2

2 E x am p les o f co u rt s f

i n d in g th at e x c ep tio n al c ircu m s t an ces ex ist o f ten in v o lv e ch ild ren w ith sp e cial m ed ical an d /o r d ev elo p m en tal n eed s. F o r ex am p le, in In re M

a rria g e
o f A l l en , th e c h ild , w h o w as d eaf , liv ed w ith h is m o th er; th en , af ter h is f ath e r o b tain ed

cu sto d y , th e f

ath er lef t th e ch ild w ith h is m a tern al g ran d m o th er. In re M a rria g e o f A llen , 6 2 6 P .2 d 1 6 , 1 8 (Wash

. C t. A p p

. 1 9 8 1 ). Wh en th e f a t h e r r e ma rried , t h e ch ild , t h en th ree y ears o ld , m o v ed i n w ith h is f ath er an d step m o th er. Id

. at 1 8 -1 9

. D u rin g th e f

o u r y ears t h at th e f ath e r an d step m o th er w ere m arried , th e step m o th er w o rk e d w ith th e ch ild to t each h im sig n lan g u ag e , sh e f

o u n d s p ecial train in g f

o r t h e ch i l d ( w h o w as also b eh in d in h is in tellectu al d ev e lo p m en t), sh e h erself to o k sp e cial classes an d p r o v i d ed ad d itio n al train i n g
an d tu to rin g to t h e ch ild , an d sh e w en t in to d eb t t o h elp p ay f o r th e c h i ld ’s ed u catio n an d sp ecial to o ls. Id

. at 1 9

. T h e co u rt n o ted th a t t h e r e s u l t s o f h er e f f o rts w e r e d ram atic. Id

. A t t h e t im e o f th e trial, t h e c h ild ’s i n tellectu al d ev elo p m e n t w as at t h e lev el o f th at o f h earin g ch ild ren h is ag e, w h ich “ v ario u s w itn esses in d icated th is w as rem a rk ab le f o r a d eaf ch ild .” Id

. T h e C o u rt f

o u n d th at “[ t] h e reaso n f

o r th is rem a r k a b l e d e v e lo p m en t w as n o t

o n ly [ th e ch ild ’s] n ativ e in tellig en ce, b u t also h is ed u catio n an d h o m e en v iro n m en t w h ich

w a s c o n d u civ e to co m m

u n icatio n in sig n lan g u ag e. [ T h e s tep m o t h e r] an d h er t h r ee ch ild r en
u se sig n lan g u ag e as f

lu en tly a s o rd in ary sp eech

. A ll h av e th e h ab it o f ‘sig n in g ’ ev ery th i n g th ey say in [ th e ch ild ’s] p resen ce, so t h a t h e p articip ates in th e c o n v ersatio n s.” Id

.
7In other words, if d em onstrable, clear and convincing evidence exists t hat the c hild will

suf f e r probable harm and detrim ent in the custody of the natural parent, the court m ay f ind

that the natural parent presum ption is rebutted, and consequently proceed to a determ ination

C o n v ersely , th e f

a th er w as f

o u n d to k n o w o n ly m i n im al sig n lan g u ag e, an d th e co u rt f o u n d th at h i s a ttitu d e to w ard s h is ch ild ’s f u tu re d ev elo p m e n t w a s “ap ath etic an d f atalistic.” Id

. T h e co u rt f

o u n d t h at th ese w e re v ery u n u s u a l c i rcu m stan ces an d w ere su b j ect to ch an g e,
w h ich m ig h t m ean a m o d if icatio n o f cu s to d y w as a

p p ro p riate at a later t im e, b u t it u ltim ately d eterm in ed th at th e ch ild ’s f u tu r e d ev elo p m en t w o u ld b e d etrim e n t ally af f ected b y h is f

ath er h av in g cu sto d y

. Id

. at 2 2 -2 3

. A n o th er e x a mp l e i n v o lv e d a ch ild w i th c y s tic f i b r o sis an d cereb ral p alsy

. In re G u a rd ia n sh ip o f D .R .G

. , 6 2 P .3 d 1 1 2 7 ( N ev

. 2 0 0 3 ). T h e ch ild liv ed w ith h is m o th er f o r th e f irst t w o y ears o f h is l if

e , t h e n mo v ed t o L as V eg as w ith h is m o th er, h i s au n t, an d h is sister. Id

. at 1 1 2 9

. T h ere, h e liv ed p rim arily w ith h is au n t, b u t sp e n t sig n if ican t tim e w ith h is m o th er. Id

. H i s au n t to o k h im to h is w eek ly p h y s i c a l t h e r a p y , s p e n t t h e n ig h t in th e h o s p i t a l w ith h im , an d h ad p articip ated in h is care sin ce b irth

. I d

. H i s m o th er w as t h e n d iag n o s ed w ith term i n al can cer. Id

. A t a c u sto d y trial b etw een t h e au n t an d t h e f ath er, th e ch ild ’s d o cto r testif

ied th at “[ m ] an ag in g th e ch ild ’s cy stic f ib ro sis an d cereb ral p alsy is o f th e u tm o st im

p o rtan ce to th e ch i ld ’s w ell b e i n g

. . . .[ C ] y stic f ib ro sis is a term in al d isease an d

. . . f ailu re to strictly f

o l lo w treatm en t an d m ed icatio n reg im en s can r e s u l t in serio u s d etrim en tal ef

f ects.” Id

. at 1 1 3 1

. F u rth e r

m o re, h e “em

p h asized th a t

co n t in u i ty

o f care is

an i mp o rtan t f

acto r in d eterm in in g th e su c cess o f treatm en ts” an d th at “ th e c h i ld is in th e
m ild r an g e o f th e d isease at th is t im e, d u e m o stly to th e e x c ellen t c are an d th erap ies th e ch ild h as receiv ed .” Id

. a t 1 1 3 0

- 3 1

. T h e c o u r t also f o u n d th a t th e f

ath er v isited th e ch ild o n ly sp o rad i cally , th a t h e h ad “n ev er g o n e to an y o f th e ch ild ’ s m ed ical ap p o in tm en ts[ ,]

. . . n ev er sp o k en to an y o f th e ch ild ’s m ed ical care p r o v i d ers in L as V eg as[ ,]

. . . n ev er stay ed all n ig h t in th e h o sp ital w ith th e ch ild [ ,]

. . . [ an d ] d o es n o t ev en k n o w h o w m an y tim es th e ch ild h as b een in th e h o sp ital.” Id

. at 1 1 2 9

. A d d itio n ally , th e f ath er h ad “ad m itted ly ref erred to th e ch ild in su ch d ero g ato ry term s as ‘C rip p le’ a n d ‘S au sag e A rm , ’ d u e to th e ch ild ’ s p h y sical

m alad y .” Id

. T h e lo n g est v isit th e c h ild ev er h ad w ith h is f ath er at h is f

ath er’s h o m e w as f o r th ree d a y s , an d th e ch ild retu rn ed h o m e w ith m o re th an h alf o f h is req u i red m ed icin es
u n tak en , an d su c h h ad h ap p en ed o n m o re th an o n e o ccasio n

. Id

. at 1 1 2 9 , 1 1 3 1

. T h e f

ath er d id n o t ev en k n o w th e ch ild ’s b irth d ate. Id

. at 1 1 2 9

. T h e C o u r

t n o ted th a t th e f

ath er h ad

n o t d em o n strated th at h e co u ld ad eq u ately care f o r th e ch i ld , an d th at g ran t in g h i m cu sto d y
co u ld u n d erm in e th e ch ild ’s p h y sical an d em o tio n al w elf are. Id

. a t 1 1 3 1

. T h e co u rt f

o u n d th at, w h ile th e f

a th er w as n o t u n f

it, h e w as n o t q u alif

i ed to h av e cu sto d y o f th e ch ild d u e to

ex trao rd in ary circu m stan ce s

. I d

. at 1 1 3 2

. T h e c o u rt d id n o t e th at if th e f a th er to o k sig n i f ic a n t s t ep s to b e reu n if

ied w ith h is ch ild , it w o u ld rev isit th e cu sto d y d eterm in atio n

. Id

.
8of whether a custody a ward to the c hallenging p arty will be in t he c hild’s best interests. Such

a f inding m ust prevent probable h a rm to the child, and n ot sim ply f i nd that the third party can
provide the child with dif f erent or arguably “better” things. See Moody , 211 So. 2d at 844
(“The f act that som eone else m ay be in a better p osition to f urnish the c hild a l arger and m ore

convenient hom e i n which t o live does not necessarily m ean it would be in the best interest

of the child to take i t f

rom a parent who is otherwise f it to have the custody

of the child.”).

This “ exceptional circum stances” f inding m e ans m ore than t hat a child’s bests interests m ay

be served by third party custody ; it “requires proof of serious phy sical or psy chological harm

or a substantial likelihood of such harm .” Watkins v. Nelson , 748 A.2d 5 58, 5 65 (N.J. 2000).

More than sim

p l y best i nterests i s required, because if that “is the only criterion, then a judge

m ay take children f

r om their parents because the judge p ersonally disproves of the parents’

lim ited m eans.” Id. at 567 (internal quotations and alterations o m itted). B y requiring a m uch
higher threshold than sim ply b est interests, the e

x ceptional c ircum stances f inding “is
designed to reduce or m inim i ze judicial opportunity t o engage in social e n g i n e e r i n g in
custody cases i nvolving third parties.” Id. It is im portant not t o devolve i nto a l ess stringent

standard because such would easily “evolve into a ‘f itness contest’ w h o se outcom e will
depend o n the whim s of the trial court.” Id. at 568. “The standard that we adopt has as its

benchm ark the welf

are of the child while a t

the sam e tim e protecting parental rights.” Id.
¶9. If the court f

inds that custody should be granted to the third party u nder t his standard,

it is required to m a ke very specif ic f indings of f

act on the record. W e again em p hasize that

this is a high threshold. Howeve r , w e b e l i e ve this standard will allow chancery courts to

9reconcile the f undam e ntal rights of natural parents to r aise their o wn children with the
prim ary concern in a c ustody case, the best interests of the child. 3 See Davis , 126 So. 3d at

3 M an y o t h er sta t e s also h av e stan d ard s th at a l lo w f o r slig h tly m o r e f

lex ib ility in d eterm in in g w h e th er a ch ild s h o u ld b e p laced w ith a th ird p a rty in stead o f a n a tu ral p aren t. S ee, e.g

. , W

a tk in s v. N

elso n , 7 4 8 A .2 d 5 5 8 , 5 5 9 , 5 6 4 (N .J. 2 0 0 0 ) (T h e n atu ral p aren t p resu m p tio n “can b e r eb u t ted b y p ro o f o f g ro ss m i sco n d u ct, ab an d o n m en t , u n f itn ess, o r th e
ex isten ce o f ‘ex cep tiona l c i r c u m stan ces[ .] ’” T h e p aren tal p resu m p tio n is r eb u ttab le b ecau se th e rig h t to cu sto d y “ mu st, at tim es, g iv e w ay to t h e S tate’s p a ren s p a tria e o b lig atio n to

en su re th at ch ild ren w ill b e p ro p erly p ro tected f ro m serio u s p h y si c a l or psy ch o lo g ical h arm .” T h u s, “[ t] h e ‘ex cep tio n a l circu m stan ces’ ex cep tio n m a y reb u t th e p resu m p t io n in f av o r o f

a p aren t seek in g cu sto d y ev e n if h e o r sh e is d eem ed to b e a f it p a ren t ” b ecau se o f th e C o u rt’s p o w e r to p ro tect m in o r c h i ld ren f ro m serio u s p h y s ical o r p sy ch o lo g i cal h arm

. “E x c ep tio n al c i r c u m stan ces” m ean m o re th an sim p ly th e ch ild ’s b e st in terests; rath er, it “alw ay s r eq u ires p ro o f o f serio u s p h y sical o r p sy ch o lo g ical h arm o r a su b stan tial lik elih o o d

o f su ch h a r m.”); A d

a m s v. T

essen er , 5 5 0 S

. E .2 d 4 9 9 (N .C

. 2 0 0 1 ) (n atu r al p aren t p resu m p tio n i s reb u tted o n ly u p o n a sh o w in g b y clear a n d c o n v in cin g ev id en c e o f u n f itn ess
o r “w h ere th e p aren t’s co n d u ct i s in co n sisten t w ith h is o r h er co n stitu tio n ally p ro tected statu s”); In re M

a rria g e o f D a fo e , 7 5 4 N .E .2 d 4 1 9 (Ill. A p p

. C t. 2 0 0 1 ) ( “[ I] n o rd er to retain

cu st o d y o f a c h ild o v e r th e su p erio r rig h t o f th e n a t u r al p aren t, a th ird p arty m u st d em o n strate g o o d cau se o r reaso n to o v erco m e th e p resu m p tio n th a t a p a ren t h as a su p erio r rig h t to cu sto d y [ .] ”); C

la rk v . W a d e , 5 4 4 S .E .2 d 9 9 (G a. 2 0 0 1 ) (In o rd e r to reb u t th e n atu ral p aren t p r esu m

p t io n , th e th ird p arty m

u st “sh o w th a t p aren tal cu sto d y w o u ld h arm t h e ch ild .” “B y h arm , w e m ean eith er p h y s ical h arm o r sig n if ican t, lo n g -term e m o tio n al h arm ; w e d o
n o t m e an m erely so cial o r eco n o m ic d i s a d v a n tag es.”); C h a r les v. S teh lik , 7 4 4 A .2 d 1 2 5 5 (P a. 2 0 0 0 ) (n a tu ral p aren t p resu m p tio n is reb u tted o n l y if “co n v in c i n g reaso n s” ap p ear t h at th e ch ild ’ s b est in t erest w ill b e serv ed b y aw a rd in g cu sto d y t o th e t h i r d p arty ); In re G u a r d i a n sh ip o f J

. S .L .F

. , 8 2 6 N .W.2 d 9 1 6 (N

. D . 2 0 1 3 ) (a co u rt m ay p lace a ch ild in th e
cu sto d y o f a t h i r d p a r ty i n stead o f a p aren t w h en ex cep tio n al circu m stan c e s ex ist an d it is i n th e b est in terests o f th e ch ild t o b e p laced w ith th e th ird p arty ); In re G u a rd ia n s h i p o f A s h l eig h R

. , 5 5 P .3 d 9 8 4 (N

. M

. C t. A p p

. 2 0 0 2 ) (A n o t h e rw ise f it p aren t can b e d en ied

cu sto d y u p o n a f

in d in g th at e x trao rd in ary circu m stan ces j u stif y th e d e cisio n

. “A f

in d in g o f

ex trao rd in ary c i r c u m s t a n c es m u st b e b ased o n p ro o f o f a su b stan tial lik elih o o d o f serio u s p h y sical o r p sy ch o lo g ical h arm , . . . o r serio u s d etrim e n t to th e ch ild [ .] ” P sy ch o l o g ical h a rm
m u st n o t b e p r esu m e d b y th e circu m stan ces, b u t th e th ird p arty m u st p r o v e t h a t th e ch ild “w o u ld su f

f er su b stan t ial, lo n g -term p sy ch o lo g ical h arm i f cu sto d y w as t ran sf erred to ” th e
n atu r al p aren t.); In re G u a rd i a n s h i p o f D .R .G

. , 6 2 P .3 d 1 1 2 7 (N ev

. 2 0 0 3 ) (U n f itn ess o r
o th er ex trao rd in ary circu m stan ces, w h ich a r e circu m stan ces th at resu lt in serio u s d etrim en t to th e c h i ld , m a y reb u t th e n atu ral p a ren t p resu m p tio n

. A l i s t o f sev eral f acto rs m ay b e
co n sid ered to d eterm in e w h eth e r ex trao r d in ary circu m stan ces ex i st, am o n g th em th e lik elih o o d o f serio u s p h y sical o r e m o tio n al h arm to th e ch ild an d an y o th er circu m stan ces

1 038 (“Judges of ten are f aced with the dif

f icult task of

rem oving a child f

rom a loving hom e

in def erence to a natural parent’s custodial rights. Even s o, the law does not allow parental
rights to supercede [ sic] the best interests of the child.”).

¶10. Turning to t his case, we f ind that the chancel l o r e r r e d f o r s e v e r al reasons. The
original hear i n g , conducted in the vein of a m o dif ication o f c ustody , was held in January

2012. In April 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court, f inding t hat it had

a p p l i ed the incorrect standard and had n ot determ ined whether the natural paren t p r e s u m p t i o n

was rebutted. In July 2013, a f ter a y ear and a half had passed with a great potential f or
changed circum stances, a nd without holding a hearing in which both parties were on notice

of t he issue of rebutting the n atural parent presum ption, the chancery c o urt sim p ly am ended

its original order. The chancery court shoul d have held a hearing and received and

th at w o u ld s u b stan tially an d ad v ersely im p act th e ch ild ’ s w elf

are.); F lo rio v. C la r k , 6 7 4 S .E .2 d 8 4 5 (V a. 2 0 0 9 ) (T h e n a tu ral p aren t p resu m p tio n m ay b e reb u t ted w ith clear an d

co n v in c i n g ev id en ce o f u n f itn ess, an o r d er o f d iv estitu re, v o lu n tary relin q u ish m en t, ab an d o n m e n t , o r sp ecial f acts an d circu m stan ces c o n stitu tin g an ex trao rd in ary reaso n f o r tak in g ch ild f

ro m its n atu ral p aren t.).

1 1considered e vidence r egarding whether the natural p arent presum ption wa s r e butted. 4 See

Y e lverton , 26 So. 3d at 1055, 1057.

¶11. Furtherm ore, the evidence f ound by the chancellor was clearly insuf f icie n t to rebut

the natural parent presu mp t i o n

. First, the court r elied on evidence that Jam es dates and

m arries wom en m

uch y o u nger than him self , and that these relationships overlap and include

adulter y

. T h i s C o u r t has noted that m arital f ault, including adultery , m ay not be used as a

sanction in c ustody awards. Brekeen v. Brekeen , 8 80 So. 2d 280, 287 ( Miss. 2004). W hile

this is not a divorce action, if adultery m ay not be sanctioned by d e n i a l o f c u s t o d y in a

divorce action, i t certainly f ollows that such behavior will b e dif f icult to justif

y as suf f icient

to rebut the natural parent presum ption. W hile som e of Jam es’s relationship behavior m ay

cause concern, no evidence whatsover was adduced that s uch behavior has had any actual

d e trim ental ef

f ect on Sha, thus the evidence does not show t hat Jam es’s condu c t “ i s s o

im m oral as to b e d

e t rimental t o the child.” See Davis , 126 So. 3d at 37 (em phasis added).
Additionally , Jam es ma rried his c urrent wif e bef o re Concetter passed away and was still

m arried and living with h er at t he tim e of the hearing. Indeed, the l ast extram arital af f air and

4 T h e reco rd d o es raise so m e areas o f co n c ern w i th Jam e s’s p o ten tial cu s t o d y o f S h a, y et th ese issu e s d o n o t a

p p ear t o h av e b een ex am in ed w ith an y th o ro u g h n ess. F o r ex am p le, th e reco rd in d icates th at S h a h as asth ma a n d t h a t p e o p le m ay s m o k e at h er f ath e r’s h o m e. T h e reco rd f

u rth er i n d icates th at s h e h as b eco m e p h y s ically ill f ro m th e sm o k e. T h e reco rd is a lso clear th at C o n cetter, S h a’s m o th er, h ad sev e re asth m a w h ich led to h o sp ital an d IC U stay s an d , ev en tu ally , h er u n t im e ly d eath

. C ertain ly , a f ailu re to cease sm o k in g aro u n d S h a, if su c h is actu ally o ccu r

rin g , co u ld b e o f g rav e co n cern

. T h e reco rd also in d icates th at S h a
m ay h a v e certain u n u su al allerg ies o r sen sitiv ities w h ich m a y n o t b e p r o p erly a d d ressed at h er f ath er’s h o m e. H o w ev er, o n b o th o f th ese issu es, n o m ed ical e v id e n ce w as in tro d u ced , n o su b stan tial testim o n y w as a d d u ced , an d t h e issu es w e re g en erally n o t ex am in ed w ith an y sp ecif icity

. S u ch issu es c o u ld b e p ro p erly ad d ressed a t a h e a rin g in w h i ch f u rth er ev id en ce is receiv ed an d co n sid e red

.
1 2relationship with a y ounger w om an noted by the chancellor were with Jam es’s current wif e,

and began in approxim ately 2009, m ore than two y ears prior to t he hearing. The chancellor

m ade no f indings that Jam es was currently engaged in adulterous or im m o ral relationships,

and m o reover, m ade no f

indings that he was involved in any extram arital relationships that

harm ed or inf

l uenced Sha in any w ay

. See Westbrook v. Oglesbee , 606 So. 2d 1142 (Miss.
1992) (where f

ather a nd his wif

e d r a n k a l c ohol, f

ather used t o take drugs b ut had passed

random drug tests by his em ploy er f o r the past six y ears, a paterna l r e l a t ive sm oked

m arijuana in f

ront of the child once, and f ather only had m inim al contact with child prior to

mo t h er’s death, the Court f ound “a stronger case m

ust be m ade a gainst [ the f a ther] a n d

m atters of

m ore current nature need to be shown to establish that he is unf it as a parent.”).

¶12. T h e c h a ncellor a lso cited anim osity b etween Concetter and Annet t e a n d J a me s , including phy sical a l t ercations, as reason to deny Jam es c ustody

. W hile certainly
noteworthy , as it appears in the best interests of Sha to have her m other’s m e m ory and her
grief f or h er m other honored, Concetter has passed away , and there is thus no present danger

of such anim osity or conf

rontations. These f

acts are n ot suf

f i cient to rebut the natural parent

presum ption, as they do not bear on Jam es’s f itness o r detrim ental im m orality , b ut they m ay
be a consideration in a best interests analy sis.

¶13. The chancellor also cited t he anger issues of Annette’s t wo s ons as a reason to rebut

the natural parent presum ption. Again, such issues are certainly of concern. Yet , the

1 3evidence i ndicated t hat n either Sha 5 nor he r s t e p s i s ter 6 had been injured or harm ed by the

boy s. The evidence also showed that the parents w ere seeking i ntensive therapy to address

the issues. Anger issues in the hom e of a natural parent that pose a p otential danger to a child

are certainly som ething a c hancellor should e xam ine in d etail. However, in this case, the

determ ination of harm was not based o n any proof of actual or pro b a b l e h a r m to Sha, but

rather, based u

pon pure speculation on the part o f the court. Thus, this is not an appropriate

reason to f

ind Jam es unf

it or so im m o ral as to rebut the natural parent presum ption.

¶14. Because none of t h e f a c t s f o u n d by the chancery court are suf f icient to rebut the
natural parent presum

ption, we m

ust reverse the chancery c o urt on this issue.

CONCLUSION
¶15. W h ile t he chancery court exam ined certain f a c ts regarding J am es’s potential custody

of Sha that certainly give c a u s e f or concern, none of these issues rose to the level of

im m orality that is detrim ental to the child or u nf itness; thus the n atural parent presum ption

was not rebutted. W e theref ore reverse the chancery court’s custody de t e r mi n a t i on and

rem and f or f urther proceedings. F urther p roceedings should include a hearing in which the

court receives a nd considers evidence c oncern i n g w h e t h e r t h e natural parent presum

ption has

been rebutted, including whether it is rebutted by exceptional circum stances in which actual

or probable, serious phy sical or psy chological harm o r detrim e nt w ill occur to the child. The

5 S h a h ad reg u lar, o v ern ig h t v isitatio n in th e h o m e w i th th e tw o b o y s p resen t, an d n o h arm , o r th reat th e reo f

, ap p e ars to h av e b ef

allen h er.

6 T h e b o y s d o n o t ap p ear to h av e h arm e d th e i r y o u n g er sister, S h a’s step s ister, w h o liv es in th e h o m e w ith th em

.
1 4last hearing in this case was nearly f our y ears ago. T hus, on rem and, the chancellor should

consider the circum stances at t he tim e of t he rem and hearing. S ee V a ughn v. Davis , 36 So.
3d 1261, 1267 (Miss. 2010).

¶16. THE JUDGMENT O F THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND R EVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT O F T HE CHANCERY COURT OF HINDS COUNTY IS REVERSED, AND THE CASE IS REMANDED.

WALLER, C.J., LAMAR, KITCHENS , P I ERCE AND COLEMAN, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P.J., CONCURS IN PART A ND I N RESULT WITHOUT SEP A R A T E WRITTEN OPINION. DICKINSON, P.J., C ONCURS IN P ART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTE N OPINION. MAX WELL, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

DICKINSON, PRESIDING JUSTICE, CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:
¶17. The m ajority ’s decision to rem and this case f or a hearing is appropriate. B ut the only

reason that, pending t he outcom e of that hearing, the child, Sha’Ny la W i lson, rem ains with

her grandm other is that—with n o legal right to do so—she ref used to turn the child over to

her natural f

ather. The natural-parent pres u mp t i o n has not been overcom e, and this Court

should not a id a t h i r d p arty who, with no legal right to do so, holds a child away f rom her

natural parent. W hile the particular f acts of t his c ase m ay lead som e to the personal view that
Sha’Ny la would be “better of f ” with her grandm other a nd half -sibling while t his case drags
on, the precedent set today is rem arkable and unsettling.

¶18. The law p r esum es that it i s in S ha’Ny la’s best i n t e r e s t t o b e i n t h e custody of her

f ather. 7 And assum ing t his Court intends to m a i ntain som e sem blance o f stability , this long7 S ee B u lla rd v. W

elch , 1 5 8 S o

. 7 9 1 (M iss. D iv

. A

. 1 9 3 5 ) ; S in q u e field v. V a len tin e , 1 3 2 S o

. 8 1 (M iss. D iv

. B 1 9 3 1 ); N ick le v . B u rn ett , 8 4 S o

. 1 3 8 (M i ss. 1 9 2 0 ); R a w lin g s v. R a w lin g s , 8 3 S o . 1 4 6 (M iss. 1 9 1 9 ) ; H ib b ette v. B a in es , 7 8 M iss. 6 9 5 (1 9 0 0 ).

1 5recognized presum ption a pplies no less to this Court than t o the trial c ourts and litigants who

com e bef ore them

. So, had the m ajority began i ts analy s i s (as it should h ave) w i t h t he

presum ption that it w as in S ha’Ny la’s best interest t o be in the custody of h er f ather, why is

the m ajority

leaving her with a third party ?
¶19. W e , too, should respect and f ollow the law. B ut as o f t oday , even though this Court

has determ ined that the natural-parent presum ption h as not been overcom e, the m a jority aids

the grandm other in continuing to h old the c h ild away f r om h er natural f

ather, who has been
deprived of hav ing his child f or f our y ears while this m atter has crept through—and will

c o n t i n u e to creep through—the c ourts. This ad hoc a pproach to deciding cases based o n
personal views of

the f acts rather than an im

partial application of

the law, is wrong.

¶20. I would presum e—as the law requires m e to do—that it is in Sha’Ny la’s best interest
to be in the custody

of her f ather. I would order that she im m ediately be t ransf erred to her

f ather’s c u stody , and that she r em ain in his custody u nless and u n t i l t h e natural-parent

presum ption is overcom e.

1 6