alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
ex101.htm












ADDENDUM TO PROPERTY OPTION AGREEMENT


 


This Addendum to the Property Option Agreement (the “Addendum”) is made and entered this 20th day of December, 2011, by and between 9252-4768 Quebec Inc., a Quebec corporation (the “Optionee”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Solo International, Inc., a Nevada Corporation (the “Company”), and 9228-6202 Quebec Inc., a Quebec corporation (the “Optionor”) and is an addendum to that certain Property Option Agreement entered into by and between the Optionee and Optionor. Each of the parties to this Addendum is individually referred to herein as a “Party” and collectively as the “Parties.”







RECITALS







WHEREAS, on November 15, 2011, the Optionee and Optionor entered into that certain Property Option Agreement (“Option Agreement”) of which this Addendum is attached and is made part of, whereby the Optionee was granted the exclusive option to acquire an undivided 100% right, title and interest in and to certain mineral claims, located in Portland Township, Outaouais, Quebec (the "Property"), which consists of 2 mineral claims (CDC2261871(Philadelphia) and CDC2318741) totaling approximately 120 hectares currently staked and recorded in the name of the Optionor, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Option Agreement.







WHEREAS, at the time the Option Agreement was executed, the Registraire des Enterprises Quebec had not provided the Company with the Optionee’s constituent documents including the name of the corporation, thus the Optionee’s current name was unknown to the Company, and Optionee’s name was omitted from the Option Agreement.







WHEREAS, the purpose of this Addendum is to identify the Optionee as 9252-4768 Quebec, Inc., which shall be of the same force and effect as if Optionee had been correctly identified in the Option Agreement.







AGREEMENT







NOW THEREFORE, upon the above stated Recitals, which are incorporated herein by reference, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which is hereby acknowledged, it is hereby agreed as follows:







1. Optionee Name. Optionee is hereby identified as 9252-4768 Quebec, Inc.







2. No Other Changes. Except as expressly modified or amended in this Addendum, all of the terms, covenants, provisions, agreements, and conditions of the Option Agreement are hereby ratified and confirmed in every respect and shall remain unmodified and unchanged and shall continue in full force and effect.







This Addendum has been duly executed by the Parties hereto as of the day and year above written.







The Optionee:                                                                           9252-4768 QUÉBEC INC.


a Quebec, Canada corporation












By: /s/ Michel Plante     


      Name: Michael Plante


      Title: Chief Executive Officer


 



	
The Optionor:

	
9228-6202 QUÉBEC INC.








	
  

	
a Quebec, Canada corporation

















By: /s/Lam Chan Tho       


      Name: Lam Chan Tho


      Title: Chief Executive Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-1328

LARRY SPATES,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INCORPORATED,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem. Richard C. Erwin,

Senior District Judge. (CA-94-652-6)

Submitted: September 10, 1996 Decided: September 24, 1996

Before HALL, WILKINS, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry Spates, Appellant Pro Se. John James Doyle, Jr., Margaret

Ann Anderson, CONSTANGY, BROOKS & SMITH, Winston-Salem, North

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order granting

summary judgment in favor of the Defendant in his civil rights

action. We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the

reasoning of the district court. Spates v. United Parcel Serv., No.

CA-94-652-6 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 8, 1996). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
1 This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please

2 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 

3 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated

4 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does

5 not include the filing date. 

6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

7 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

8 Plaintiff-Appellee,

9 v. NO. 29,781

10 FRANCISCO M.,

11 Child-Appellant.

12 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY

13 Sandra A. Price, District Judge

14 Gary K. King, Attorney General

15 Andrew S. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General

16 Santa Fe, NM

17 for Appellee

18 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender

19 J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender

20 Santa Fe, NM

21 for Appellant

22 MEMORANDUM OPINION

23 WECHSLER, Judge.
2

1 Child appeals the adjudication of delinquency. We issued two calendar notices

2 in this case. In our second calendar notice, we proposed to reverse and remand for

3 retrial. We proposed to reverse the adjudication of delinquency based on our Supreme

4 Court’s decision in State v. Nick R., 2009-NMSC-050, 147 N.M. 182, 218 P.3d 868.

5 We also proposed to hold that reasonable minds could infer that Child had the intent

6 necessary to support a conviction for carrying a deadly weapon on school grounds,

7 and therefore retrial was not barred. The State responded to our second calendar

8 notice, agreeing that the adjudication of delinquency should be reversed and agreeing

9 that retrial is not barred. Child filed no response to our second calendar notice. We

10 therefore reverse for the reasons discussed in our second calendar notice, and we

11 remand to the district court for retrial. 

12 IT IS SO ORDERED.

13 ______________________________

14 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 

15 WE CONCUR:

16 _______________________________

17 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
3

1 _______________________________

2 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE 3RD
QUARTER FORM 10-Q FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 6/30/98 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY
BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-26-1998
<CASH>                                             657
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   28,838
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,721
<INVENTORY>                                     67,785
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                98,596
<PP&E>                                          53,262
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,709
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 233,353
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           72,052
<BONDS>                                        125,935
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     30,968
<COMMON>                                            12
<OTHER-SE>                                      13,737
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   233,353
<SALES>                                        102,739
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               102,739
<CGS>                                           70,438
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   70,438
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                41,916
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               9,361
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (18,946)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                (2,594)
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (13,961)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (2.26)<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.26)
<FN>
<F1>For Purposes of This Exhibit, Primary means Basic.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0001014488
<NAME> SAXTON INCORPORATED
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                             390
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   43,834<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                                       403
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                         127,737
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,201
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 188,925
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             8
<OTHER-SE>                                      42,502
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   188,925
<SALES>                                         60,955
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                64,446
<CGS>                                           51,744
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   52,267
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 5,054<F2>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               1,057
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  6,068
<INCOME-TAX>                                     1,745
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              4,323
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     4,323
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.56
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.56
<FN>
<F1>RECEIVABLES ARE COMPRISED OF "DUE FROM TAX CREDIT PARTNERSHIPS," "CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACTS RECEIVABLE," "NOTES RECEIVABLE," AND "DUE FROM RELATED PARTIES."
<F2>OTHER EXPENSES ARE COMPRISED OF "GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE," DEPRECIATION AND
AMORTIZATION," AND "JOINT VENTURE LOSSES."
</FN>


</TABLE>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-40742 Summary Calendar

AUDWIN JACOBS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus PORT NECHES POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL., Defendants, CITY OF PORT ARTHUR TEXAS; JEFFERSON COUNTY, TEXAS Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:94-CV-767

- - - - - - - - - - August 17, 1999 Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Audwin Jacobs appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Jefferson County in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution in favor of Jefferson County. Jacobs does not brief any argument in connection with the district court’s judgment in favor of the City of Port Arthur and other defendants and those claims are therefore waived. See Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 224-25No. 98-40742 -2- (5th Cir. 1993)(arguments not briefed on appeal are abandoned); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a). Jacobs has failed to provide competent summary judgment evidence that an official custom or policy or the ratification of an unofficial custom or policy led to his alleged malicious prosecution. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Scott v. Moore , 114 F.3d 51, 54 (5th Cir. 1997). The competent summary-judgment evidence demonstrates that there was no official policy or custom of malicious prosecution during the time in question so this claim fails. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); King v. Dogan , 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994). Jacobs has failed to demonstrate any error in connection with the district court’s judgment. Accordingly, it is AFFIRMED. Jacobs’ motion to dismiss the City of Port Arthur and other defendants is DENIED as moot. See Yohey 985 F.2d at 224-25. AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED AS MOOT.
#### In the Matter of Ella Quinn et al., Appellants, v John A. Johnson, as Commissioner of New York State Office of Children and Family Services, et al., Respondents.

Submitted February 25, 2008;

decided March 18, 2008

Motion for reargument of motion for leave to appeal denied with $100 costs and necessary reproduction disbursements. Motion for a stay denied *[see*9 NY3d 818 (2007)].
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND FOR THE
YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                       2,158,909
<SECURITIES>                                28,438,841
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,572,518
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  1,249,330
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            36,704,247
<PP&E>                                      31,377,616
<DEPRECIATION>                            (14,132,278)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              59,037,999
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,323,730
<BONDS>                                      2,004,927
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       333,926
<OTHER-SE>                                  52,375,416
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                59,037,999
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            15,432,759
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  273,757
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            25,122,039
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             215,815
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (16,651,673)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (16,651,673)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                              (16,651,673)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.50)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.50)



</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 112th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2458 Introduced in House (IH)]

112th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2458

  To amend the Clean Air Act to change the frequency of review of air 
quality criteria under section 108 of such Act and national primary and 
 secondary ambient air quality standards under section 109 of such Act 
  from 5-year intervals to 10-year intervals, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              July 8, 2011

  Mr. Flake introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Clean Air Act to change the frequency of review of air 
quality criteria under section 108 of such Act and national primary and 
 secondary ambient air quality standards under section 109 of such Act 
  from 5-year intervals to 10-year intervals, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Air Quality Review Interval and Dust 
Act of 2011'' or the ``ARID Act of 2011''.

SEC. 2. FREQUENCY OF REVIEW OF AIR QUALITY CRITERIA AND NATIONAL 
              PRIMARY AND SECONDARY AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS.

    Paragraphs (1) and (2)(B) of section 109(d) of the Clean Air Act 
(42 U.S.C. 7409(d)) are amended by striking ``at five-year intervals'' 
and inserting ``at ten-year intervals''.

SEC. 3. TEMPORARY PROHIBITION AGAINST REVISING ANY NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR 
              QUALITY STANDARD APPLICABLE TO COARSE PARTICULATE MATTER.

    Prior to December 18, 2016, the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency may not finalize, implement, or enforce any 
regulation revising the national primary ambient air quality standard 
or the national secondary ambient air quality standard applicable to 
coarse particulate matter (generally referred to as ``PM10'') under 
section 109 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7409).
                                 <all>
```
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK

#### Thornton Hall, Inc. v. Patrick Finnerty, Director of the Department of Medical Assistance Services

June 16, 2003

Case No. (Chancery) 02-591

By Judge Jofin C. Morrison, Jr.

This matter comes before the Court on Appellant Thornton Hall, Inc.’s Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs. The Administrative Procedure Act provides:

> In any civil case brought under Article 5 (§ 2.2-4025 et seq.) of this chapter or §§ 2.2-4002,2.2-4006,2.2-4011, or § 2.2-4018, in which any person contests any agency action, such person shall be entitled to recover from that agency, including the Department of Game and Inland Fisheries, reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees if such person substantially prevails on the merits of the case and the agency’s position is not substantially justified, unless special circumstances would make an award unjust. The award of attorneys’ fees shall not exceed $25,000.

Va. Code Ann. § 2.2-403 0 (2003). Therefore, there are three requirements that a party must meet before they can collect attorney’s fees under this statute. The party must show that (1) the person prevailed substantially on the merits of the case; (2) the agency’s position was not substantially justified; and (3) no *163special circumstances make an award of attorney’s fees unjust. *Commonwealth*v. *May Bros., Inc.,*11 Va. App. 115, 120, 396 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1990). In this case, the agency’s position was substantially justified. Therefore, Appellant’s motion is denied.

Appellant Thornton Hall argues that Appellee Finnerty, the Director of the Department of Medical Assistance Services (“DMAS”), was not substantially justified in its decision because the language of the statute was clear and unambiguous. (Appellant’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Award of Attorney’s Fees & Costs, at 4, relying on Letter Opinion from Court to Counsel, March 20, 2003 [61 Va. Cir. 346].) Appellee DMAS asserts that it was substantially justified in its decision because it relied on a reasonable legal position. (Appellee’s Memo, in Opp’n to Appellant’s Mot. for Award of Attorney’s Fees & Costs, at 5.) DMAS relied on a Court of Appeals case that referenced that “initial determinations” were the dates of Notices of Program Reimbursement, and not the date of the Informal Fact Finding Conference. *Id.; see Smith v. Liberty Nursing Home, Inc.,*21 Va. App. 281, 293, 522 S.E.2d 890 (2000). Federal courts have defined “substantially justified” as having a reasonable basis in both fact and law. *See Pierce*v. *Underwood,*487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); *Crawford*v. *Sullivan,*935 F.2d 655, 656 (4th Cir. 1991). In this case, the Court finds that DMAS relied on a reasonable legal position and was substantially justified in its decision. Therefore, Appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees is denied.
a6614574ex10-16.htm



Exhibit 10.16







SCHEDULE OF INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS FOR DIRECTORS







 


In accordance with the Instructions to Item 601 of Regulation S-K, the Registrant has omitted filing the Indemnification Agreements for Directors by and between Rogers Corporation and the following Directors as exhibits to this Form 10-K because they are identical to the Form of Indemnification Agreement for Directors (the “Form Agreement”) by and between Rogers Corporation and certain Directors, which was filed on Form 8-K on December 14, 2004.


 








	
1.

	
Michael F. Barry


	
2.

	
Peter C. Wallace


	
3.

	
Gregory B. Howey


	
4.

	
Eileen S. Kraus


	
5.

	
William E. Mitchell


	
6.

	
Robert G. Paul


	
7.

	
Charles M. Brennan, III


	
8.

	
Carol R. Jensen


	
9.

	
Dr. J. Carl Hsu
exv10wawv







	 	 	 	 	 



Exhibit
10.a(v)



[For holders of awards under the 1991 Plan]




Masco Letterhead


Date




Name

<Address1>

<Address2>

<Address3>





			
	RE:	 	Enhancements to Awards under the 1991 Long Term Stock Incentive Plan




Dear <Salutation>:



As you may know, the Company recently adopted the 2005 Long Term Stock Incentive Plan (the “2005
Plan”). We are pleased to inform you that the Organization and Compensation Committee of the Board
of Directors approved the following enhancements to outstanding awards of stock options and
restricted stock under the 1991 Long Term Stock Incentive Plan (the “1991 Plan”) in order to
conform them to the 2005 Plan.



If you voluntarily terminate your employment, you will have thirty days to exercise any option that
is then exercisable; the original exercise period under these circumstances was 10 days. If your
employment terminates as a result of your permanent and total disability, all unexercisable
installments of an option will immediately become exercisable and will remain exercisable until the
earlier of the expiration of their original term or one year after death. Previously, in this
situation the Option would continue to vest in accordance with its terms.



For purposes of a “Change in Control” under the 1991 Plan, the definition of “Excluded Director”
(i.e., a director who is deemed not to be an incumbent director) will also include directors whose
initial assumption of office occurs as a result of certain actual or threatened election contests
not by or on behalf of the Board.



Very truly yours,




	 	 	 	 	 

	 
	 

	 	 	 	 
	Richard A. Manoogian

	 	 	 	Alan H. Barry
	Chairman of the Board and

	 	 	 	President and
	Chief Executive Officer

	 	 	 	Chief Operating Officer