Docket No. 109137.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

BRIAN T. HUBBLE, Appellee, v. BI-STATE DEVELOPMENT

AGENCY OF THE ILLINOIS-MISSOURI METROPOLITAN

DISTRICT, d/b/a Metro and Bi-State, a/k/a Bi-State Development

 Agency, Appellant.

Opinion filed September 23, 2010.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Fitzgerald and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman,

Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

Plaintiff, Brian Hubble, brought a personal injury action in the

circuit court of St. Clair County against defendant, Bi-State

Development Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan District,

doing business as Metro or Bi-State, also known as Bi-State

Development Agency (hereafter Bi-State or Metro). Bi-State moved

to dismiss the action, asserting that plaintiff filed his complaint

outside of the applicable statute of limitations (735 ILCS

5/2–619(a)(5) (West 2006)). The circuit court denied Bi-State’s

motion to dismiss, but certified for interlocutory appeal a question of

law asking whether Bi-State is a “local public entity” as defined by

the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
 

1The complaint contained a separate negligence count against the bus

driver. However, on April 30, 2007, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the bus

driver from the case.

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Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) and thereby subject to its

one-year statute of limitations (745 ILCS 10/1–101 et seq. (West

2006)). A divided panel of the appellate court answered the certified

question in the negative. 393 Ill. App. 3d 1016.

The case is now before this court on a certificate of importance

granted by the appellate court (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(c); 155 Ill.

2d R. 316). We reverse the judgment of the appellate court and the

order of the circuit court, and remand the cause to the circuit court

with directions to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 13, 2005, a Metro bus owned and operated by BiState collided with plaintiff’s automobile at the intersection of Illinois

Highway 159 and F Street in Belleville. On March 1, 2007, plaintiff

filed a complaint against Bi-State alleging that the Metro bus driver

was negligent and that Bi-State was vicariously liable based on the

doctrine of respondeat superior.

1

 Illinois has a two-year general

statute of limitations for personal injury actions (735 ILCS 5/13–202

(West 2006)), and plaintiff filed his complaint within that period.

Bi-State moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to

section 2–619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS

5/2–619(a)(5) (West 2006)). In its supporting memorandum, Bi-State

explained that it is a body corporate and politic created by a

congressionally approved interstate compact between Illinois and

Missouri (hereafter Compact). The Compact also created the Bi-State

Metropolitan District, which consists of the City of St. Louis,

Missouri, and the Missouri counties of St. Louis, St. Charles, and

Jefferson, and the Illinois counties of Madison, St. Clair, and Monroe

(hereafter District). 45 ILCS 100/0.01 et seq. (West 2006); Mo. Ann.

Stat. §70.370 (West 2004); Pub. L. No. 81–743, 64 Stat. 568. The two

states authorized Bi-State, among other activities, to own and operate

buses and passenger transportation facilities. Pursuant to the

Compact, Bi-State provides public masstransportation throughout the
 

2

In addition to its motion for interlocutory appeal, Bi-State filed an

answer to plaintiff’s complaint. The answer raised, as an affirmative

defense, the one-year statute of limitations contained in section 8–101 of

the Tort Immunity Act.

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District. 45 ILCS 110/0.01 et seq. (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat.

§70.373 (West 2004); Pub. L. No. 86–303, §2, 73 Stat. 582. Bi-State

contended that it is a “local public entity” under the Tort Immunity

Act, which provides for a one-year statute of limitations. 745 ILCS

10/8–101(a) (West 2006). Bi-State argued that plaintiff’s complaint

was time-barred under section 8–101 of the Act because plaintiff filed

his complaint over one year after the injury. 

The circuit court rejected Bi-State’s contention and denied BiState’s motion to dismiss. Bi-State filed a motion for interlocutory

appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308).2 The

circuit court denied Bi-State’s motion. On October 26, 2007, this

court entered a supervisory order directing the circuit court to grant

Bi-State’s motion for an interlocutory appeal and to stay the

proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal. Complying with this

court’s order, the circuit court stayed the proceedings and certified the

following question of law for interlocutory appeal: “Whether Bi-State

Development Agency is a local public entity as defined by the Local

Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act,

[citation], and is therefore subject to the one–year statute of

limitations set forth in the Act.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1017.

A divided panel of the appellate court answered the certified

question in the negative, concluding that the legislature did not intend

to include Bi-State within the meaning of the term “local public

entity” as defined in the Tort Immunity Act. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1023.

Justice Spomer disagreed with the court on all material points. 393 Ill.

App. 3d at 1033 (Spomer, J., dissenting).

The appellate court granted Bi-State’s application for a certificate

of importance. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(c). We will refer to

additional pertinent background in the context of our analysis of the

issues.
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II. ANALYSIS

A. Preliminary Matters

At the outset, we note what is actually before this court and our

standard of review. First, the certificate of importance states that the

appellate court “grants a certificate of importance concerning the

following question of law for review by the Illinois Supreme Court,”

and then states the certified question that was presented to the

appellate court. However, under Supreme Court Rule 316 (155 Ill. 2d

R. 316), the whole case comes before the supreme court and not only

a particular issue. O’Casek v. Children’s Home & Aid Society, 229 Ill.

2d 421, 436 (2008), quoting People v. Crawford Distributing Co., 78

Ill. 2d 70, 73 (1979).

Second, Bi-State moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant

to section 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–619

(West 2006)). A section 2–619 motion to dismiss admits the legal

sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim, but asserts affirmative matter that

defeats the claim.King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215

Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2005). Among such affirmative matter is that “the action

was not commenced within the time limited by law.” 735 ILCS

5/2–619(a)(5) (West 2006). When ruling on a section 2–619 motion

to dismiss, the circuit court must interpret all pleadings and

supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. On appeal, review is de novo. Orlak v. Loyola University

Health System, 228 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2007); Borowiec v. Gateway 2000,

Inc., 209 Ill. 2d 376, 383 (2004).

B. “Local Public Entity”

Turning to the merits, a divided panel of the appellate court

concluded that plaintiff’s complaint was not time-barred pursuant to

the Tort Immunity Act. Based on canons of statutory construction, the

appellate court determined that Bi-State was not a local public entity

within the purview of the Act. We disagree. As we will explain, BiState is a “local public entity” within the purview of the Tort

Immunity Act, notwithstanding Bi-State’s status as an interstate

compact entity, and so the one-year statute of limitations provided by

section 8–101(a) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/8–101(a) (West 2006))

applies to civil actions against Bi-State. Plaintiff’s complaint is

therefore time-barred.
 

3To the extent that we construe provisions of the Compact, we recognize

that the interpretation of a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact

presents a question of federal law. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767,

810-11, 140 L. Ed. 2d 993, 1029-30, 118 S. Ct. 1726, 1750 (1998) (and

cases cited therein). That is not to say that state courts lack jurisdiction.

Rather, it means only that if the signatory states dispute their respective

obligations under a compact, then the United States Supreme Court has the

final say. Ballinger v. Delaware River Port Authority, 172 N.J. 586, 593,

800 A.2d 97, 101 (2002). State courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction with

federal courts in construing interstate compacts. Reidelberger v. Bi-State

Development Agency, 8 Ill. 2d 121, 123-24 (1956); accord International

Union of Operating Engineers, Local 68 v. Delaware River & Bay

Authority, 147 N.J. 433, 441-42, 688 A.2d 569, 573 (1997).

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We conduct our analysis within a familiar analytical framework.

The primary goal of construing the meaning of a statute is to ascertain

and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The most reliable

indicator of such intent is the statutory language, which must be given

its plain and ordinary meaning. A statute is viewed as a whole.

Therefore, words and phrases must be interpreted in light of other

relevant provisions of the statute and must not be construed in

isolation. County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 231

Ill. 2d 593, 603-04 (2008); People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill.

2d 264, 279-80 (2003). Accordingly, in determining legislative intent,

a court may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but

also the purpose and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be

remedied and the goals to be achieved, and the consequences that

would result from construing the statute one way or the other. County

of Du Page, 231 Ill. 2d at 604; Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d at 280. Further, the

canons of statutory construction apply to interstate compacts. 1A N.

Singer & J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §32:5, at

723 (7th ed. 2009); F. Zimmerman & M. Wendell, The Law and Use

of Interstate Compacts 1 (1976) (same); see, e.g., S&M Investment

Co. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d 324, 326-27 (9th

Cir. 1990).3

Section 1–206 of the Tort Immunity Act defines a “local public

entity” as follows:

“ ‘Local public entity’ includes a county, township,
 

4We observe that section 2–101 of the Tort Immunity Act states:

“Nothing in this Act affects the liability, if any, of a local public entity ***

based on *** [o]peration as a common carrier ***.” 745 ILCS 10/2–101(b)

(West 2006). In the present case, Bi-State was not operating as a common

carrier with respect to plaintiff at the time of the accident since he was not

a passenger. See, e.g., Katamay v. Chicago Transit Authority, 53 Ill. 2d 27,

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municipality, municipal corporation, school district, school

board, educational service region, regional board of school

trustees, trustees of schools of townships, treasurers of

schools of townships, community college district, community

college board, forest preserve district, park district, fire

protection district, sanitary district, museum district,

emergency telephone system board, and all other local

governmental bodies. ‘Local public entity’ also includes

library systems and any intergovernmental agency or similar

entity formed pursuant to the Constitution of the State of

Illinois or the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act as well as

any not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of

conducting public business. It does not include the State or

any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board,

commission, university or similar agency of the State.”

(Emphases added.) 745 ILCS 10/1–206 (West 2006).

This court has repeatedly observed that the term “local public entity”

is broadly defined. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d

497, 512 (2003); Boyles v. Greater Peoria Mass Transit District, 113

Ill. 2d 545, 553 (1986); see A. Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability:

A Decade of Change, 1966 U. Ill. L.F. 919, 933 (listing, as one of the

“significant characteristics” of the Act, that it applies “to every kind

of local governmental body”); E. Kionka & J. Norton, Tort Liability

of Local Governments and Their Employees in Illinois, 58 Ill. B.J.

620, 628 (1970) (same). Illinois courts have widely recognized

various public entities as coming within the definition of “local public

entity,” although those entities were not expressly identified in

section 1–206 of the Tort Immunity Act. See, e.g., Carver, 203 Ill. 2d

at 512; Roark v. Macoupin Creek Drainage District, 316 Ill. App. 3d

835, 839 (2000); Luciano v. Waubonsee Community College, 245 Ill.

App. 3d 1077, 1083 (1993) (collecting cases).4
31 (1972); Pence v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 398

Ill. App. 3d 13, 19 (2010).

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The appellate court outlined its analysis as follows:

“In order for Bi-State to qualify as a ‘local public entity,’

however, it would have to fit within the general catchall

category of ‘other local governmental bodies.’ To determine

whether the legislature intended to include interstate compact

agencies within this general catchall category, we must look

at the nature and characteristics of interstate compacts

generally and of Bi-State specifically and interpret the Tort

Immunity Act in light of those characteristics.” 393 Ill. App.

3d at 1020-21.

The flaws in the appellate court’s analysis begin with its premise. The

appellate court stated that Bi-State could qualify as a local public

entity only if it fit within the general catchall category of “other local

governmental bodies” referenced in section 1–206 of the Tort

Immunity Act. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1020. 

The appellate court did not consider whether Bi-State fit within

any of the other categories of local public entities listed in section

1–206. Bi-State qualifies as a local public entity because it is a “notfor-profit corporation organized for the purpose of conducting public

business.” 745 ILCS 10/1–206 (West 2006). See McQueen v. Shelby

County, 730 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (construing Act,

stating that “the phrase ‘any not-for-profit corporation organized for

the purpose of conducting public business’ is itself a specifically

enumerated entity which applies to a particular class of

organizations”). Bi-State is a corporation created pursuant to the

United States Constitution; Bi-State has no shareholders and is

composed of commissioners who are chosen by Illinois and Missouri

government officials; Bi-State is funded with public and user fee

revenue; and Bi-State operates, inter alia, a transit system in the

public interest. As such, Bi-State falls within section 1–206 of the

Tort Immunity Act, which expressly includes nonprofit public

corporations within its definition of “local public entity.” 745 ILCS

10/1–206 (West 2006). See Barnes v. Chicago Housing Authority,

326 Ill. App. 3d 710, 724-29 (2001) (recognizing resident
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management corporation as not-for-profit corporation conducting

public business); Smith v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R.

Corp., 210 Ill. App. 3d 223, 227-28 (1991) (same; METRA). 

Further, significant persuasive authority supports our conclusion

that Bi-State is a nonprofit public corporation. The decisions of both

federal and state courts may guide our interpretation of compact

provisions (see Remick v. Lopes, 203 Conn. 494, 498, 525 A.2d 502,

504-05 (1987)), and the courts of signatory states should promote

consistency in interpreting an interstate compact, based on comity

(see State ex rel. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Coniglio, 82 Ohio

App. 3d 52, 55, 610 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 (1993); State v. Hill, 334

N.W.2d 746, 748 (Iowa 1983)), or because those courts are

interpreting the same federal law (see American Sugar Refining Co.

of New York v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor, 55 N.Y.2d

11, 25-26, 432 N.E.2d 578, 584, 447 N.Y.S.2d 685, 691 (1982)).

Federal and Missouri courts have recognized: “ ‘There is no question

that Bi-State operates as a nonprofit corporation in the public

interest.’ ” Redbird Engineering Sales, Inc. v. Bi-State Development

Agency of Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District, 806 S.W.2d 695,

698 (Mo. App. 1991), quoting Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State

Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District,

433 F.2d 131, 134 (8th Cir. 1970); accord Love 1979 Partners v.

Public ServiceComm’n, 715 S.W.2d 482, 489 (Mo. 1986) (describing

Bi-State as a nonprofit public agency). Bi-State is a local public entity

because it is a nonprofit public corporation, which is specifically

referenced in section 1–206 of the Tort Immunity Act.

As noted, the appellate court did not consider whether Bi-State

fell within the section 1–206 categoryof nonprofit public corporation.

Rather, the appellate court concluded that Bi-State was not a local

public entity because it did not fit within the section 1–206 category

of “other local governmental bodies.” 745 ILCS 10/1–206 (West

2006). We disagree with this conclusion for a number of reasons.

Initially, we note that pursuant to the Compact, Bi-State is expressly

“a body corporate and politic.” 45 ILCS 100/1 (West 2006); Mo.

Ann. Stat. §70.370 (West 2004). Further, Bi-State was expressly

created to perform public or governmental functions. Bi-State’s

powers include: (1) planning, constructing, and maintaining bridges,

airports, and terminal facilities; (2) making plans for the coordination
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of streets and highways; (3) charging and collecting fees; (4) issuing

bonds; (5) receiving contributions from local, state, and federal

governments; (6) the power to perform all other necessary and

incidental functions; and (7) the power to exercise such additional

powers as shall be conferred on it by the legislature of either state and

concurred in by the legislature of the other state and approved by Act

of Congress. Lastly, Bi-State is “local” in that it performs its

governmental or public functions within its defined district. See 45

ILCS 100/1 (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. §70.370 (West 2004); Pub.

L. No. 81–743, 64 Stat. 568. Thus, in addition to falling within the

section 1–206 category of nonprofit public corporation, Bi-State also

constitutes a form of “local government body” as referenced in

section 1–206 of the Tort Immunity Act and, therefore, a “local public

entity” under the Act.

Our conclusion finds support in Grady v. Bi-State Development

Agency, 151 Ill. App. 3d 748, 750 (1986). There, the appellate court,

considering Bi-State’s status, relied on the same aforementioned

factors to reach a similar conclusion as to Bi-State’s status as a local

public entity pursuant to section 1–206. Subsequent decisions of the

Fifth District have likewise applied the provisions of the Tort

Immunity Act to Bi-State. See Cooper v. Bi-State Development

Agency, 158 Ill. App. 3d 19 (1987); McClintock v. Bi-State

Development Agency, 228 Ill. App. 3d 382 (1992).

We note, too, that our determination is faithful to the intent of the

legislature. Subsequent to Grady, decided in 1986, the General

Assembly has amended section 1–206 of the Tort Immunity Act six

times to include various entities within the statutory definition of

“local public entity.” 745 ILCS 10/1–206 (West 2006). A court

presumes that the legislature amends a statute with knowledge of

judicial decisions interpreting the statute. Morris v. William L.

Dawson Nursing Center, Inc., 187 Ill. 2d 494, 499 (1999); Bruso v.

Alexian Brothers Hospital, 178 Ill. 2d 445, 458 (1997); In re May

1991 Will County Grand Jury, 152 Ill. 2d 381, 388 (1992). In this

case, therefore, we presume that the legislature knew of Grady’s

holding when it amended section 1–206 six times in the past 24 years.

The legislature’s failure to expressly exclude Bi-State from section

1–206 (see Bruso, 178 Ill. 2d at 458-59), or expressly add Bi-State to

those already listed (see Morris, 187 Ill. 2d at 499; Grand Jury, 152
 

5Bi-State presents the attenuated argument of the appellate court dissent

that Bi-State is a form of “local governmental body,” as referenced in

section 1–206 of the Tort Immunity Act, based on the definition of “units

of local government” in article VII of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.

1970, art. VII, §1) read together with section 2(e) of the Transportation

Cooperation Act of 1971 (5 ILCS 225/2(e) (West 2006)). See 393 Ill. App.

3d at 1036 (Spomer, J., dissenting). Our statutory analysis obviates

discussion of this constitutional argument. See Beahringer v. Page, 204 Ill.

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Ill. 2d at 388), indicates legislative acquiescence in Grady’s holding.

If the legislature intended to exclude Bi-State from the purview of the

Tort Immunity Act, it would have done so expressly, as it did with

“any entity organized under or subject to the ‘Metropolitan Transit

Authority Act.’ ” 745 ILCS 10/2–101(b) (West 2006).

Also, our conclusion is consistent with federal authority. See,

supra, at B. In Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy

Corp., 948 F.2d 1084 (8th Cir. 1991), the United States Court of

Appeals for theEighthCircuit exhaustively analyzed Bi-State’s status

to determine whether the agency was entitled to eleventh amendment

immunity as an “arm” of either state. The court concluded: 

“On balance, we believe Bi-State is more like a local

governmental entity than an arm of Missouri and Illinois.

State law characterizes Bi-State as a local public body. Much

like a county, Bi-State’s object is to plan, develop, and engage

in proprietary functions in a defined region with local

governance, for the common good of the communities within

the region. The compact does not identify Bi-State as an arm

of the states or grant Bi-State sovereign immunity. Although

Missouri and Illinois retain control over Bi-State’s actions,

Missouri and Illinois are not compelled to fund Bi-State.

Significantly, nothing obligates Missouri and Illinois to

satisfyBi-State’s liabilities and obligations.” Barket, 948 F.2d

at 1088.

Clearly, Bi-State is a form of “local government body” as referenced

in section 1–206 of the Tort Immunity Act. See F. Zimmerman & M.

Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 11 (1976) (stating

that interstate compact entities “are public bodies with characteristics

similar to those of other governmental organs”).5
2d 363, 370, 378 (2003) (deciding case on nonconstitutional grounds).

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Notwithstanding the above, plaintiff argues that the appellate

court here correctly determined that Bi-State’s status as an interstate

compact entity prevented it from receiving the protections of the Tort

Immunity Act. We disagree. Although the appellate court discussed

the general nature of interstate compacts and surveyed the provisions

of the Compact (393 Ill. App. 3d at 1021-23), the court overlooked

dispositive aspects of interstate compacts, including the Compact in

the present case, which renders its analysis unpersuasive.

C. Interstate Compact Principles

The United States Constitution provides mechanisms to address

“matters that are clearly beyond the realm of individual state authority

but which, due to their nature, may not be within the immediate

purview of the federal government or easily resolved through a purely

federal response.” C. Broun, M. Buenger, M. McCabe & R. Masters,

The Evolving Use and the Changing Role of Interstate Compacts: A

Practitioner’s Guide 1 n.2 (2006).

“Of all the mechanisms available, none is more formal,

more state-focused, more adaptable to collective state needs,

and perhaps less understood than interstate compacts.

Compacts are fundamentally negotiated agreements among

member states that have the status of both contract and

statutory law. Interstate compacts *** represent the only

mechanism in the Constitution by which the states themselves

can alter the dynamics of their relationships without running

afoul of the authority of the federal government or reordering

the federal structure of government. Thus, compacts are

singularly important because through a compact, the states

can create a state-based solution to regional or national

problems and effectively retain policy control for the future.”

(Emphasis in original.) C. Broun, M. Buenger, M. McCabe &

R. Masters, The Evolving Use and the Changing Role of

Interstate Compacts: A Practitioner’s Guide 2-3 (2006).

Accord F. Zimmerman & M. Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate

Compacts 46 (1976) (stating that “[t]he interstate compact is the most
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effective medium” for establishment by two or more states of joint

entities “to provide and administer joint public works and facilities”);

J. Winters, Interstate Metropolitan Areas 12 (1967) (observing that

“the increasing awareness of the magnitude of [interstate]

metropolitan area problems has been accompanied by the increased

use of the compact to solve such problems”). 

The compact clause of the United States Constitution provides:

“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress *** enter into any

Agreement or Compact with another State ***.” U.S. Const., art. I,

§10, cl. 3. Interstate compact entities occupy a significantly different

position in our federal system than do the states themselves. The

states are separate sovereigns and constituent elements of the Union.

In contrast, interstate compact entities typically are creations of at

least three distinct sovereigns: two or more states and the federal

government. Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S.

30, 40, 130 L. Ed. 2d 245, 255, 115 S. Ct. 394, 400 (1994). Normally,

the “ultimate control of every state-created entity resides with the

State, for the State may destroy or reshape any unit it creates.” Hess,

513 U.S. at 47, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 115 S. Ct. at 404. However: “As

part of the federal plan prescribed by the Constitution, the States

agreed to the power sharing, coordination, and unified action that

typify Compact Clause creations.” Hess, 513 U.S. at 41-42, 130 L.

Ed. 2d at 256, 115 S. Ct. at 401. Thus, “no one State alone can

control the course of a Compact Clause entity.” Hess, 513 U.S. at 47,

130 L. Ed. 2d at 260, 115 S. Ct. at 404. Once given, congressional

consent transforms an interstate compact within this clause into a

federal law. One consequence of this transformation is that, unless the

compact to which Congress has consented is somehow

unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent with its

express terms. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564, 77 L. Ed. 2d

1, 12, 103 S. Ct. 2558, 2565 (1983). 

D. Approbative Legislation

In the present case, plaintiff echos what the appellate court

stressed: that Congress’s approval of the Compact contained a

proviso that prohibits Bi-State from exercising any additional powers

“unless and until such power or powers shall have been conferred

upon the Bi-State Agency by the legislature of one of the States to the
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compact and concurred in by the legislature of the other and shall

have been approved by an Act of Congress.” Pub. L. No. 81–743, 64

Stat. 568, 571. The appellate court reasoned:

“Bi-State’s powers are confined by the terms of the

compact, and its powers cannot be altered or expanded

without the consent of both Illinois and Missouri and

approval from Congress. Each state gave up its sovereign

right to exclusively control its portion of the District so that

Bi-State could operate transportation services within the

entire District for the betterment of both states. As a result,

neither Illinois nor Missouri may act unilaterally with respect

to modifying or expanding Bi-State’s powers, duties, or

obligations. Bi-State is an autonomous entity that is vested

with specific powers and authority to perform specific

functions independent from the control of any one state.” 393

Ill. App. 3d at 1023.

According to the appellate court, “Missouri and Illinois must enact

identical legislation on matters involving Bi-State’s powers,” which

Congress must approve. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1028. We disagree.

Initially, congressional consent is not necessary “in respect of

each and every matter relating to or growing out of a congressionally

approved ‘compact’ or ‘agreement’ between States.” Henderson v.

Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n, 362 Pa. 475, 486, 66

A.2d 843, 849 (1949) (collecting cases). Further, it is true that one

party to an interstate compact may not enact legislation that would

impose burdens upon the compact absent the concurrence of the other

signatory states. However, the converse is widely recognized: “It is

within the competency of a State, which is a party to a compact with

another State, to legislate in respect of matters covered by the

compact so long as such legislative action is in approbation and not

in reprobation of the compact.” Henderson, 362 Pa. at 488, 66 A.2d

at 849-50, citing Olin v. Kitzmiller, 259 U.S. 260, 263, 66 L. Ed. 930,

933, 42 S. Ct. 510, 511 (1922); accord Kansas City Area

Transportation Authority v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir.

1981); Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois

Metropolitan District v. Director of Revenue, 781 S.W.2d 80, 82

(Mo. 1989); Roehl Transport, Inc. v. Division of Hearings & Appeals,

213 Wis. 2d 452, 464, 570 N.W.2d 864, 870 (App. 1997).
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In the present case, the appellate court failed to recognize that the

express purpose of the Tort Immunity Act “is to protect local public

entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation

of government. It grants only immunities and defenses.” 745 ILCS

10/1–101.1(a) (West 2006). Thus, the Act generally protects, rather

than burdens, the Compact.

Specifically, section 8–101(a) of the Act requires that a plaintiff

commence a civil action for any injury against a local public entity or

any of its employees “within one year from the date that the injury

was received or the cause of action accrued.” 745 ILCS 10/8–101(a)

(West 2006). The purpose of the one-year limitation period contained

in section 8–101(a) is to encourage early investigation into a claim

against a local governmental entity when the matter is still fresh,

witnesses are available, and conditions have not materially changed.

Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304, 313 (2001); Saragusa v. City

of Chicago, 63 Ill. 2d 288, 293 (1976). Such an investigation permits

prompt settlement of meritorious claims and allows governmental

entities to plan their budgets in light of potential liabilities. Ferguson,

202 Ill. 2d at 313; Reynolds v. City of Tuscola, 48 Ill. 2d 339, 342

(1971). Because a local governmental entity must anticipate that the

number of claims made against it will far exceed those brought

against a private individual, the provision of an abridged limitations

period is reasonable. Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 313; Saragusa, 63 Ill.

2d at 293. Clearly, the one-year statute of limitations provided by

section 8–101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act furthers or supports BiState and does not burden it.

1. Article IX

However, plaintiff observes, as did the appellate court, that the

Tort Immunity Act must be construed as a whole, reasoning that the

Act cannot apply to Bi-State because article IX of the Act cannot

apply to Bi-State. Article IX concerns the payment of claims and

judgments (745 ILCS 10/9–101 et seq. (West 2006)). The court noted

several provisions. Article IX empowers and directs local public

entities to pay tort judgments or settlements for compensatory

damages and establishes the procedure therefor. 745 ILCS 10/9–102

(West 2006). Article IX requires local public entities that derive

revenue from rates or charges to set such rates, or otherwise provide

funds, in an amount sufficient to pay their tort judgments and
 

6Based on our previous discussion of Grady, we summarily reject

plaintiff’s contention that Grady was erroneously decided.

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settlements in accordance with article IX and their obligations under

the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West

2006)), the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/1 et

seq. (West 2006)), and the Unemployment Insurance Act (820 ILCS

405/100 et seq. (West 2006)). 745 ILCS 10/9–106 (West 2006). Also,

article IX allows local public entities to levy taxes upon all taxable

property within its territory “for funding expenses relating to tort

liability, insurance, and risk management programs.” 745 ILCS

10/9–107 (West 2006).

Based on these provisions,the appellate court reasoned that article

IX would grant Bi-State additional “powers,” or impose upon BiState additional “burdens,” “duties,” or “obligations” that are beyond

Bi-State’s authority. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1023-26. The court posited:

“Missouri has not consented to these additional powers or duties

contained within article IX of the Tort Immunity Act by enacting

identical legislation, nor has Congress granted approval. These

provisions in article IX of the Tort Immunity Act, therefore, cannot

validly apply to Bi-State.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1025. The court

concluded that “the Illinois legislature cannot unilaterally grant

additional powers to or place additional burdens on Bi-State without

an express concurrence from Missouri and congressional approval.”

393 Ill. App. 3d at 1026. The appellate court also concluded that

Grady was erroneous and refused to follow it. 393 Ill. App. 3d at

1029-31.6

The appellate court overlooked the nature of the Tort Immunity

Act and misapprehended the effect of article IX on Bi-State. As

Justice Spomer explained in his dissent: “Contrary to the majority’s

assertions, there is nothing in article IX of the Act that is incongruent

with the interstate compact which created Bi-State, and no section of

article IX modifies Bi-State’s powers or imposes additional

obligations on Bi-State.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1036-37 (Spomer, J.,

dissenting).

Generally, the Tort Immunity Act contains no requirement that a

governmental body must possess the power to tax in order to be
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classified as a “local public entity.” If the legislature intended to

restrict the definition of a “local public entity” to those entities

authorized to levy taxes, it could have defined a “local public entity”

as an entity possessing the authority to tax. However, section 1–206

does not contain such a restriction. Carver, 203 Ill. 2d at 514;

McQueen, 730 F. Supp. at 1454.

Specifically, article IX of the Tort Immunity Act does not confer

upon Bi-State the power to levy taxes. Section 9–101(c) of the Act

expressly recognizes that not all public entities have the power to levy

taxes by defining a “local taxing entity” as “a local public entity that

has the power to levy or have levied on its behalf taxes or

assessments upon property within the territory of the entity.”

(Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/9–101(c) (West 2006). Likewise,

section 9–107 provides that “[a] local public entity may annually levy

or have levied on its behalf” property taxes in an amount sufficient to

cover the costs of insurance and judgments against it. (Emphases

added.) 745 ILCS 10/9–107(b) (West 2006). Indeed, section 9–107

does not require local public entities to levy those taxes, but simply

confers the authority to do so. Further, the Compact itself confers on

Bi-State the powers to have taxes levied on its behalf. Article III,

paragraph 5, of the Compact provides that Bi-State shall have the

power: “To receive for its lawful activities any contributions or

moneys appropriated by municipalities, counties, state or other

political subdivisions or agencies.” 45 ILCS 100/1, art. III (5) (West

2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. §70.370, art. III (5) (West 2004). Accordingly,

these sections of article IX are in no way incongruent with the

Compact.

Moreover, article III, paragraph 3, of the Compact authorizes BiState: “To charge and collect fees for use of the facilities owned and

operated by it.” 45 ILCS 100/1, art. III (3) (West 2006); Mo. Ann.

Stat. §70.370, art. III (3) (West 2004). Consistent with this express

authority, the Tort Immunity Act authorizes local public entities that

derive revenue from rates or charges to set such rates “in an amount

sufficient to pay [their] tort judgments and settlements.” 745 ILCS

10/9–106 (West 2006). The appellate court’s use of article IX as a

means to remove Bi-State from the purview of the Tort Immunity Act

was “simply wrong.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1037 (Spomer, J.,

dissenting). Nothing about article IX affects our recognition that Bi-
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State falls within the definition of “local public entity” as provided in

section 1–206.

E. Danger of Absurdity

Curiously, the appellate court stated:

“We are not asked to determine whether the State of

Illinois can unilaterally enact a valid statute of limitations

applicable to claims against Bi-State or whether such an

enactment requires identical Missouri and Illinois laws along

with Congress’s approval. Contrary to the dissent’s assertion,

we take no position on that issue. Our only task is to answer

the certified question, and in order to answer that question, we

must determine the legislature’s intent. For the reasons noted

above, our only holding in this decision is that the legislature

did not intend to include Bi-State within the Tort Immunity

Act’s definition of a ‘local public entity.’ ” 393 Ill. App. 3d at

1028-29.

This disclaimer is perplexing. Rather than taking “no position on the

issue,” the appellate court repeatedly stated that Illinois and Missouri

must enact identical legislation on matters involving Bi-State’s

powers, which must also receive congressional approval. 393 Ill.

App. 3d at 1023, 1025, 1026, 1028. In determining “the legislature’s

intent,” the appellate court expressly reasoned that the legislature

shared the court’s erroneously narrow view of interstate compacts

and, accordingly, could not have “intended to sweep Bi-State into the

purview of the Tort Immunity Act with the general catchall phrase

‘all other local governmental bodies.’ ” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1028. As

explained above, the appellate court’s alleged “nonposition” plainly

misconstrues the law of interstate compacts and the Compact in this

case.

By overlooking significant aspects of interstate compacts, the

appellate court’s construction of the Compact was so narrow that it

could possibly render an absurd result. “[A] court construing the

language of a statute will assume that the legislature did not intend to

produce an absurd or unjust result” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1992)), and will avoid a

construction leading to an absurd result, if possible (City of East St.

Louis v. Union Electric Co., 37 Ill. 2d 537, 542 (1967)). “In almost
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all instances *** pragmatic accommodations can be made [for an

interstate compact entity] which do not strain the letter or the intent

of existing statutory or constitutional requirements.” F. Zimmerman

& M. Wendell, The Law and Use of Interstate Compacts 11 (1976).

This is why interstate compact analysis acknowledges persuasive

decisions of federal and state courts, and recognizes that courts

should promote consistency in interpreting an interstate compact.

Although “[a] definition has yet to be drawn of its precise nature,”

“the Bi-State Agency is essentially a local government itself.” M.

Ridgeway, Interstate Compacts: A Question of Federalism 133

(1971). Based on our analysis, and consistent with significant

persuasive authority, we hold that Bi-State is a local public entity

within the purview of the Tort Immunity Act. Consequently, the Act’s

one-year statute of limitations applies to civil actions against Bi-State,

and plaintiff’s complaint is time-barred.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court,

and the order of the circuit court of St. Clair County denying BiState’s motion to dismiss, are reversed, and the cause remanded to the

circuit court with directions to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court order reversed;

cause remanded with directions.