Howar d Arne tt died in 1994. 1 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 05 -00 056 -CV

M ar y A r ne tt , A ppe lla nt

v. Angela Marie Arnet t , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF LAMP ASAS COUNTY , 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 14,9 52 , HO NORAB LE JO E CARROLL , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellee Ang ela Ma

rie Ar nett g ave bir

th to a son, A.M.A., in Septe mber 1992, whe n she wa s seventee n y ear s old. A.M.A. has sever e health issues and require s signific ant medica l car e. Six day s after A.M.A. was born, a ppellee sig ned an a ffidavit re linquishi ng her pa renta l rig hts and desig nating her pa

rents, appellant Mary Arne tt a nd Howar d Arne tt, a s manag ing conser vators of the
c hil d. On

Oc tob e r 1 , 1 99 2, a

ppell ant and

Ho wa rd Ar ne tt f ile d a su it a ff e c tin g the pa

re nt- c hil d relationship (SAP CR). That same da y , the trial cour

t signe d a “ p r e a d o p tive temporar

y order ” naming
a pp e lla nt a nd Ho wa rd Ar ne tt as A. M. A. ’s te mpo ra

ry mana g ingc on se rv a tor s. A.M.A. and a ppellee 1 liv e d w itha

pp e lla nt u nti l late 19 99 or

e arl y 20 00 , wh e n a

pp e lle e mov e d o ut, le avin g A. M. A. wi th appellant. In J une 2001, appe llant went forwa rd with the termination and a doption procee ding, a nd in September 2001, the tria l c ourt signe d an orde r terminatingappellee ’s par ental rig hts and namingWe initi ally dismiss ed this appea l for wa nt of jurisdiction, ex plaining that an orde r g ranting 2 a bill of revie w that does not dispose of the me rits of the under lying c ase is int erloc utory in nature, see J ordan v. Jordan , 9 07 S.W. 2d 47 1, 47 2 ( Te x. 19 95 ); Teso ro Pe tr ol eum v . S mi th , 796 S.W .2d 705, 705 (Tex. 1990) , but then withdrew our opinion and abate d the ca use to the trial cour

t for entr y of a f inal order
. Se e Ar

ne tt v . A rn e tt , No. 03-05-00056- CV, 2005 T ex . App. L EXI S 9507, *4 (Tex. App.—Aus t i n No v . 10, 2005, no pet.). On Ma rch 21, 2006, the trial court sig ned a “ final custody order ,” setting aside all temporar y order s, the termination of appellee ’s pare ntal rig hts, and the a do pti on

or de r. I t is fr om t

his fi na l or de r t

ha t th e a pp e a l pr oc e e ds
. 2 appellant a s A.M.A.’s adoptive pare nt. I n November 2002, appellee filed a pe tition for bill of review seeking to ove rturn the termination/adoption order
. In J anuar y 2005, the trial court sig ned an or der g rantingappellee’s bill of review a nd setting a side the termination of he r par ental rig hts and appellant’ s adoption of A.M.A. Ap p el l an t appea ls from the trial cour t’s order s g rantinga bill of 2 revie w and dismissing the 1992 te mporary order and ter mination/a d o p t ion suit. W e re verse and rende r judg ment denying a ppellee’ s petition for bill of review
. Appellant conte nds in her s econd issue that the trial court e rre d in gr anting the petition because appellee di d not present leg ally or fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence to show that her
ex ec u tion of the aff

idavit of relinquishment was due to fraud, dur ess, or c oerc ion. See Te x. F am. Code Ann. § 161.211(c ) (West 2002).

“A bill of re view is an equitable proce eding by a party to a for mer a ction who see ks to set aside a judg ment that is no lo n ger appea lable or subjec t to a motion for new tria l.” Ortega v. First RepublicBank Fort W orth, N.A. , 792 S.W .2d 452, 453 (Tex. 1990) (op. on re h’g ). The pa rty seekinga bill of revie w must show that ( 1) she has a mer itorious claim or defe nse (2) and that she wa s preve nted from a sserting her c laim or defe nse by the opposing party ’s fra

ud, acc ident or wrong ful conduc t, (3) unmix ed with any fault or ne g lige nce of

her own. Id. A p art

y se e kin g to3

overtu rn a t ermination orde r base d on an unre voked af fidavit of re linquishm ent is limi ted in her attack to a

rguing f raud, dur ess, or c oerc ion in the execution of t h e af fi d av i t . Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.211(c ). F raud ma y be committed throug h active misreprese ntation or passive silence and is “an a ct, omission, or conce alment in br eac h of a le g al duty , trust, or confide nce justly imposed, when the br eac h cause s injury to a nother or the taking of an undue and unconscie ntious advantag e.” Vela v. M arywood , 17 S.W .3d 750, 760-61 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2000), pet. denied, 53 S.W .3d 684 (Tex. 2001). Coerc ion occur s if someone is compelled to pe rfor m an ac t “b y fo rc e or thre at.” B la c k’ s L aw D ic tio na

ry 25 2 ( 7th

e d. 19 99 ); see Tex. P enal C o d e Ann. § 1.07(a )(9) (West Supp. 2007). Duress occ urs when, due to some kind of threat, a per son i s “inca pable of exercising [her] free a g ency” and una ble to withhold consent. Dallas County C mt y. Coll. Dist. v. Bolton , 185 S.W .3d 868, 877 (Tex. 2005).

Assuming that ap p el lee’ s petition for bill of review was prope rly

broug ht under section 161.211(a ) (limiting time to attack te rmination order to six months after sig ning of order), the evidenc e in this case does not support the t rial court’s g ranting of a bill of re view. The re is no evidenc e of f

raud, dur ess, or c oerc ion in appellee’ s execution of the af fidavit, without which her attack on the termination/adoption order cannot suc cee d. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.211( c). At the hea ring on her pe tition for bill of review, a ppellee te stified that despite sig ning the af fidavit of re linquishm ent, she a lway s intended to reg ain custody of A.M.A. afte r she g raduated from colleg e and sta

biliz ed her life. She said that she and appe llant planned to re turn to court and have custody “re turned
. . . back to me .” Appellee g raduated from nursing school in 1998 and is now
marr ie d a nd liv ingin C op pe ra s Co ve , a nd te sti fi e d that whe n she mov e d out fr om ap pe lla nt’ s h ou seI n the af fidavit of re linquishm ent, appe llee wa ived the rig ht to “i s s u an ce, service , and 3 return of all proce ss in any

suit to t erminate the par ent-c hild relationship . . . without further notice t o m e . I F U LLY U

N D E R S T A

N D T H A T I W ILL N O T B E IN F O R M E D F U R T H E R A B O U T T H IS SUI T.” 4 in 1999, she wante d to take A.M.A. with he r but w as told she could not take him from a ppellant’s
car e. Appe llee believe d until a b o u t 1 9 9 9 that her pa renta l rig hts had bee n terminated. When she lear ned that her rig hts had not been terminated, she consulted wit h four attorney s but was told there was nothing she could do to re g ain custody at the time. Despite intendingto reg ain custody and eve n afte r see king le g al advice , appellee never attempted to re voke her aff idavit of relinquishment. She testified t ha t s h e d id

n o t r e a li ze h e r

a f f id av it w a s r e v o c a

b le an d th a t s h e d id

n o t b e li e v e a

p p e ll ant would g o to court to terminate a ppellee’ s rig hts and adopt A.M.A. Appellant testified that in a bout 2000, appellee asked he r not to g o forwa rd with the ter mina tio n. Ap pe lla

nt r e pli e d th a t sh e did

no t th ink that ho ldi ngof

f w iththe pr oc e e din g wa s in A.M.A.’s be st interest, and a ppellee told appe llant, “Do what y ou have to do.” Appellant testified that she did not proce ed with t he ter mination/adoption procee ding until 2001 bec ause he r

“ un de rs tand ingwa s th a t th e te rm inatio n was do ne” in 19 92 , w he n th e tr ia l c ourt e nte re d it s temporar y order s. She said, “I

don’t know why

there wa s t h i s wa i t . Ihad no idea how adoptions took p l ac e. Ispoke with my attorney . He sa id it was still an ong oing c ase.” Appellant believe d te rm inatio n a

nd a do pti on wa s in

A. M. A. ’s be st i nte re st b e c a us e it a llo we d h im t o c oll e c t be ne fi ts, including he alth benef

its, through a

ppellant’s dec ease d husband, who wa s a vete ran. I n J une 2001, appe lla nt filed an amended pe tition s eekingto move ahea d with the termination/adoption proce eding . Appellant did not inform appe llee that she was g oing to proce ed or that she ha d proce eded w ith the termination and adoption. In Se p te mb e r 2 0 01, based on 3At oral a rgument, appellee ’s counse l conce ded as muc h, ag ree ing tha t t h er e wa s no 4 evidenc e of f

raud, dur ess, or c oerc ion to be found in the re cord. 5 a pp e lle e ’s a ff

ida vit of re lin qu ishme nt, the tr ia l c ourt sig ne d an or de r te rm inatin g he r p are nta l r ig hts and allowingappellant to adopt A.M.A . Appellee did not learn of the termination/adoption order until April 2002, when she found a copy of it in her mother’s paper work; she f

iled her pe tition for bill of review in Nove mber 2002.

Ap pe lle e did

no t te sti fy

tha t sh e wa s mi sle d o r t

ri c ke d into s ig nin g the a ff

ida vit or int o failing to revoke it in the interveningy ear s, nor did she testify that appellant lied or

dece ived appe llee into believing that appellant would not move forward to adopt A.M.A. Appellee testified that she did not believe appe llant would g o forwa rd with the termination but did not testify that this belief was ba sed on any

wrong ful ac ts by

ap p ell ant. Appellant told appe llee re peate dly that she did not believe th a t s to p p in g th e te r mi n a ti o n/a d o p ti o np r o c e e d in g w a s in A
. M
. A
. ’ s b e s t i n te r e s t. When
a pp e lle e sig ne d th e a ff

ida vit of re lin qu ish me nt, sh e wa ive d a ri g ht t o no tic e of fu

rt he r p ro c e e din g s, and appe llant’s failure to inform appelle e th a t s h e w a s mo v ingforwa

rd with the termination/adoption pr oc e e din g do e s n ot a

mou nt t o f ra ud , d ur e ss, c oe rc ion , o r o the r wro ng fu l c on du c t. 4 Alt h o u gh t h e t ri al cour

t did not file findings of f act a nd conclusions of law , and appellant did not file a notice of pa st-due finding s and conc lusions, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 297, which means that we must im ply all finding s nece ssary to support the judgme nt, see Curtis v. Commission for Law yer D iscipline , 20 S.W. 3d 22 7, 23 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 00 , n o p e t.) , w e sti ll must evaluate those implied finding s for evidentiary sufficie ncy , using the standards w e apply to jury or trial cour

t findings a

nd upholding the tr ial court’s decision if we find evidentiary support for a

ny le g a l th e o r

y o f la w a p p li c a b le to th e case . Se e Cur tis , 20 S.W .3d at 231. B eca use there is noDue to our r esolution of appellant’ s second issue, we need not de cide he r re maining two 5 iss ue s r e late d to the tim e lin e ss o f ap pe lle e ’s pe tit ion and the pr oc e dure s e mpl oy e d b y the tr ia l c ourt
. 6 evidenc e of f

raud, dur ess, coe rcion, or othe r wrong ful ac t in the m ak i n g o f t he af fidavit of relinquishment, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.211( c), the evidenc e is le g ally insufficient to support the trial cour

t’s g rantingof appe llee’s pe tition for bill of review. We sustain appellant’s se cond issue
on a p p e a l. We r e v e r s e th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s o r d e r an d r e n d e r ju d g me n t d e n yin g a p p e ll e e ’ s petition for bill of re view. 5

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Reverse d and Rende red Filed: May

2, 2008