SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA 

En Banc 

 

In the Matter of the ) Arizona Supreme Court 

Application of ) No. SB-03-0152-PR 

 ) 

LEE KELLER KING, ) 

 ) O P I N I O N 

 Applicant. ) 

__________________________________) 

APPLICATION DENIED 

________________________________________________________________ 

OSBORN MALEDON P.A. Phoenix 

 By Mark I. Harrison 

 Daniel L. Kaplan 

Attorneys for Lee Keller King 

STATE BAR OF ARIZONA Phoenix 

 By Robert B. Van Wyck, Chief Bar Counsel 

 Patricia A. Sallen, Senior Bar Counsel 

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae State Bar of Arizona 

________________________________________________________________ 

T I M M E R, Judge 

¶1 This court recently denied the application to practice 

law submitted by an individual previously convicted of firstdegree murder. In re Hamm, 211 Ariz. 458, 123 P.3d 652 (2005). 

In the wake of Hamm, we review the recommendation of this 

court’s Committee on Character and Fitness to admit Lee Keller 
- 2 -

King, who was previously convicted of attempted murder. Because 

King has failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate his 

character and fitness to practice law in Arizona, we reject the 

Committee’s recommendation and deny King’s application. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 1977, twenty-four-year-old Lee Keller King was a 

certified peace officer, employed as a reserve deputy constable 

in Harris County, Texas. In that capacity, King served civil 

court papers, performed patrol duties with full-time officers, 

and attended numerous hours of basic training. King was 

authorized to carry a handgun while in uniform and, when dressed 

in civilian clothes, was permitted to keep the weapon in the 

glove compartment of his car. 

¶3 On December 30, 1977, King was upset because he had 

been “passed over” for a full-time deputy constable position. 

While off duty1

 and out of uniform, King went to a neighborhood 

bar, became highly intoxicated, and argued with two male 

acquaintances who King knew to be convicted felons. Although 

 

1

 Police reports indicate that King was suspended from his 

duties at the time of the shootings. King contends the 

Constable’s office altered records to misrepresent this fact. 

He cannot recall the reason given for his purported suspension, 

and the record does not enlighten us on this point. 
- 3 -

reports about what occurred next conflict somewhat,2 it is 

undisputed that King left the bar in the early morning hours of 

December 31, and the two men soon followed. King then used his 

semi-automatic service weapon to shoot each man several times at 

 

2

 Barry O’Brien, a security guard who witnessed the 

shootings, told police he drove up to the scene and saw King 

outside the bar. When King saw O’Brien, whom he knew as a 

fellow reserve officer, King pulled a gun from his belt and 

threatened to shoot O’Brien. At that moment, the two victims 

left the bar, said something to King, and King shot them. King 

then got into his car before O’Brien ran over, ordered him out 

at gunpoint, and told King he was under arrest. While still 

seated in the car, King attempted to shoot himself, but the gun 

chamber was empty so it did not fire, and King threw it from the 

car. He next pulled out a knife and inflicted superficial cuts 

on his leg and throat before throwing the knife from the car. 

King then left the car and was handcuffed. 

 A bar employee told police that King was upset about a 

work-related issue. After one victim told King to stop 

bothering him, King left the bar but soon returned and pounded 

on the door, which had been locked after his exit. When one 

victim and another man looked outside, they reported that King 

was at the door with a gun. The victims and possibly another 

man then walked outside to take the gun from King, who shot the 

victims. 

 One victim interviewed at the hospital on the morning of 

the shootings told police that the incident started with namecalling, that neither he nor the other victim was armed, and 

that the shootings were “unprovoked.” 

According to King, he left the bar with the intention of 

going home. When the two men soon followed, King felt 

threatened, pulled his gun from the glove compartment, and shot 

the men in a panic as they approached. Although he does not 

recall attempting to shoot himself, he remembers cutting himself 

with the knife in an act of self-hatred for his deed. King does 

not recall seeing O’Brien before the shootings, does not recall 

events as described by O’Brien or the bar employee, and does not 
- 4 -

close range, emptying his fully loaded weapon and firing some 

bullets through the bar door. Neither King nor any other 

witness reported that King warned the victims to stay back 

before shooting them. One man was shot in the upper thigh and 

back, with an exit wound through the neck, leaving him in a 

critical condition that required surgery. The other man was 

shot in the abdomen and upper leg, splintering the bones and 

causing serious damage. Both victims were unarmed. Despite 

sustaining serious wounds, both victims survived. 

¶4 After the State of Texas indicted King on two counts 

of attempted murder, King entered a guilty plea to one count of 

attempted murder pursuant to a plea agreement. In September 

1978, King was sentenced to a seven-year prison term. After an 

unsuccessful appeal on bases King cannot recall, he began 

serving his sentence in June 1979 before the court suspended his 

sentence and placed him on probation four months later.3 During 

 

recall why he argued with the victims or felt threatened by 

them. 

3

 Under Texas law in 1979, a court could suspend execution of 

sentence after a qualified defendant had served a short portion 

of a prison term. Cross v. Metcalfe, 582 S.W.2d 156, 157 n.1 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (Roberts, J., dissenting). The purpose 

of such “shock probation” programs was to “stun the probationer 

with the harsh realities of imprisonment, then release the 

probationer into society with a strong impression of the 

consequences of crime.” Shaun B. Spencer, Does Crime Pay – Can 

Probation Stop Katherine Ann Power from Selling her Story?, 35 

B.C. L. Rev. 1203, 1214 n.123 (1994) (citing Arthur W. Campbell, 

Law of Sentencing 100, 112 (2d ed. 1991)). 
- 5 -

his term of probation, King underwent mental health counseling 

and group therapy. In February 1985, a court set aside King’s 

conviction. 

¶5 After King left the criminal justice system, his life 

took an admirable turn. He graduated from college and law 

school and passed the Texas bar examination. The Texas Board of 

Law Examiners concluded that King possessed the requisite good 

moral character to practice law in Texas, and he was admitted to 

practice in 1994. Thereafter, King practiced law in Texas 

without incurring any disciplinary charges, he married, adopted 

his wife’s child, and the couple had two additional children. 

¶6 In 2003, King moved to Arizona to work in his law 

firm’s Phoenix-area office. He passed the Arizona bar 

examination and submitted his Character and Fitness Report to 

the Committee on Character and Fitness4 as required by Arizona 

Supreme Court Rule 34(a), 17A Ariz. Rev. Stat.5

 After conducting 

 

4

 The Committee on Character and Fitness, which consists of 

both lawyers and nonlawyers, screens applicants who have passed 

the Arizona bar examination to determine whether they possess 

the requisite character and fitness to practice law in Arizona. 

Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 33(a), 34, 36. Based on its findings, the 

Committee then recommends to this court whether applicants 

should be admitted, conditionally admitted, or denied admission. 

Id. 36(a)(4). 

5

 Effective December 1, 2005, the court amended Rules 34 

through 37, which delineate the requirements for admission to 
- 6 -

an evidentiary hearing on October 14, 2003, the Committee 

recommended that this court deny King’s application for 

admission, finding that he had failed to prove his good 

character and fitness to practice law in Arizona. The Committee 

concluded that although King had presented strong evidence of 

rehabilitation and positive social contributions since the 

shootings, the Committee was unable to overlook the seriousness 

of his crime. This court declined King’s subsequently filed 

petition for review on April 19, 2004, effectively denying 

King’s application. 

¶7 King re-applied for admission six months later and 

another hearing was held on April 21, 2005. The landscape of 

this hearing differed from that of the prior hearing. 

Specifically, membership in the Committee had changed, King had 

secured legal representation, and King presented more extensive 

evidence concerning his character and fitness to practice law. 

By a vote of eight to three, the Committee recommended King’s 

admission to the bar and notified the court of its decision by 

 

the Arizona bar. Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 461 n.3, ¶ 12, 123 P.3d at 

655 n.3. Because King filed his second application for 

admission before that date, we evaluate that application under 

the version of the Rules in effect before the amendment. Id. 
- 7 -

letter four days later. The Committee offered no explanation 

for its decision.6 

¶8 Pursuant to Rule 33(a), this court, on its own motion, 

continued consideration of King’s application and has since 

considered the record of all Committee proceedings as well as 

the written and oral arguments presented in this court by King 

and the State Bar of Arizona, which appeared as amicus curiae in 

opposition to the application. Although we seriously consider 

the Committee’s recommendation, we independently decide whether 

King possesses the requisite character and fitness to gain 

admission to practice law in Arizona. Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 462, ¶ 

15, 123 P.3d at 656. 

ANALYSIS

I.

¶9 King bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of 

the evidence that he possesses the requisite character and 

fitness qualifying him for admission to the Arizona bar. Rule 

 

6

 The Committee is required to make findings of fact only if 

it recommends against admission or recommends admission with 

conditions. Rule 36(f)(7). If the Committee recommends 

admission, it is merely required to place its decision “in 

writing,” as it did by letter in this case. Id. Because the 

Committee had fully explained its recommendation against 

admission in 2003 through findings of fact, however, an 

explanation of its reversal of position would have been helpful. 

 
- 8 -

36(a)(3), (f)(5).7 To satisfy this burden, King must prove, 

among other things, that he presently possesses good moral 

character. Rule 34(c)(1)(B); Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 462, 463, ¶¶ 

12, 17, 123 P.3d at 656, 657. As we explained in Hamm, although 

an applicant’s conviction for a serious crime does not 

constitute a per se disqualification to practice law,8

 it adds 

weight to the applicant’s burden of proving present good moral 

character. 211 Ariz. at 462, 463-64, ¶¶ 16, 21, 123 P.3d at 

656, 657-58. Specifically, because past serious misconduct may 

indicate flaws in an applicant’s present moral character, the 

applicant must initially demonstrate complete rehabilitation 

before we consider other evidence of present good moral 

character. Id. at 463-64, ¶¶ 17, 21, 123 P.3d at 657-58 

(citations omitted). 

¶10 In summary, when an applicant convicted of a serious 

crime applies to practice law in Arizona, we conduct a 

conditional, two-part inquiry. We first consider whether the 

 

7

 Rule 36(f)(2)(E) currently requires an applicant to prove 

character and fitness by clear and convincing evidence. Order 

Amending Rules 32-40, 46, 62, 64 and 65, Rules of the Supreme 

Court, Ariz. Sup. Ct. No. R-04-0032 (June 9, 2005). 

 

8

 The State Bar argues strenuously for a per se rule of 

disqualification for applicants who previously engaged in 

serious criminal misconduct. As we stated in Hamm, however, the 

court has never imposed such a bright-line rule, and we continue 

to adhere to the principle that each case deserves scrutiny on 

its own merits. 211 Ariz. at 462, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d at 656. 
- 9 -

applicant has satisfied the burden of proving complete 

rehabilitation from the character deficits that led to the 

commission of the crime. If not, our inquiry ends and we will 

deny the application. If the applicant proves complete 

rehabilitation, we then decide whether the applicant has 

otherwise demonstrated present good moral character. With these 

principles in mind, we turn to King’s application. 

II. 

¶11 The weight of the added burden of demonstrating 

complete rehabilitation is determined by the gravity of the past 

criminal conduct. Id. at 464, ¶ 22, 123 P.3d at 658. The more 

serious the unlawful act, the greater the burden. Id. “[I]n 

the case of extremely damning past misconduct,” such as firstdegree murder or, in the circumstances here, attempted murder, 

“a showing of rehabilitation may be virtually impossible to 

make.” Id. (quoting In re Matthews, 462 A.2d 165, 176 (N.J. 

1983)). Undoubtedly, King’s act in shooting two unarmed men at 

close range multiple times without apparent verbal warning 

constitutes the type of “extremely damning” misconduct that 

mandates an extraordinary showing of rehabilitation. Although 

neither victim died, King inflicted serious injuries upon them 
- 10 -

while holding a position of public trust as a peace officer.9 

See Barlow v. Blackburn, 165 Ariz. 351, 357, 798 P.2d 1360, 1366 

(App. 1990) (recognizing society demands much from law 

enforcement officers as state “entrusts them with power to 

enforce the laws upon which society depends”); Seide v. Comm. of 

Bar Exam’rs of the State Bar of Cal., 782 P.2d 602, 604 (Cal. 

1989) (finding applicant’s criminal history “all the more 

reprehensible [because] committed by a former law enforcement 

officer and law school graduate”). 

¶12 The extraordinary showing required of King affects the 

quantum of evidence required to satisfy the preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard rather than the burden itself. Phrased 

differently, King’s misconduct tips the scales against admission 

 

9

 Our dissenting colleague takes issue with our 

characterization of King’s conduct as the type of “extremely 

damning” misconduct that required the applicant in Hamm to make 

an extraordinary showing of rehabilitation. The dissent 

essentially contends that such a rigorous showing should be 

borne exclusively by applicants convicted of first-degree 

murder. See infra ¶¶ 43-44. We decline to rigidly tie the 

weight of an applicant’s burden to the classification of the 

applicant’s crime. Instead, we elect to examine the unique 

circumstances of each case to decide the weight of the burden an 

applicant must overcome. In this case, the fact that King’s 

victims did not die appears the result of good fortune rather 

than King’s design. For this reason, and because King committed 

his crime while occupying a position of public trust, it is 

appropriate to charge him with the same extraordinary burden 

borne by the applicant in Hamm. 

 
- 11 -

at the outset, thereby requiring him to produce an extraordinary 

amount or quality of evidence to meet his burden of proof. 

¶13 To prove complete rehabilitation, King must establish 

that he has both (1) accepted responsibility for his past 

criminal conduct, Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 464, ¶ 23, 123 P.3d at 658, 

and (2) identified and overcome the weakness that led to the 

unlawful conduct, In re Arrota, 208 Ariz. 509, 513, ¶ 17, 96 

P.3d 213, 217 (2004). We “weigh those factors tending to show 

rehabilitation against those tending to show a lack thereof” to 

decide whether King has met his burden. Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 465, 

¶ 25, 123 P.3d at 659. 

A. 

¶14 Evidence in the record both supports and negates 

King’s contention that he has accepted responsibility for the 

1977 shootings.10 King demonstrated his acceptance by informing 

judges, lawyers, law professors, former employers, and a host of 

friends, acquaintances, and colleagues of his crime over an 

extended period of time, impressing upon many of them heartfelt 

 

10 We decline King’s request to view his purported suicide 

attempt and guilty plea as acknowledgments of responsibility for 

the shootings. According to O’Brien, King hurt himself only 

after he had retreated to his car and O’Brien subsequently 

ordered him from it at gunpoint, thereby suggesting that King 

was as remorseful about being caught as for shooting the 

victims. Additionally, although King pled guilty to one charge 

rather than proceed to trial, he admitted to the Committee that 

he did so because he feared convictions on both charges. 
- 12 -

feelings of remorse.11 And in both hearings before the 

Committee, King admitted shooting the victims and expressed 

remorse, calling the shootings “a mistake I made that I will 

carry with me for the rest of my life.” 

¶15 Conversely, in his written applications for admission 

to law school and to the Arizona bar, both created years after 

his conviction had been set aside, King minimized his personal 

responsibility for the shootings. In his application for law 

school submitted in the early 1990s, King described the 

circumstances of the shooting and explained that in light of 

these facts, the lack of any witnesses on his part, his strained 

emotional state, and anti-police sentiment of the day, it was in 

his best interests to plead guilty to one charge and “throw 

[himself] on the mercy of the Court rather than to attempt to 

clear [himself] in a jury trial.” Although King appropriately 

stated that he was “stricken with remorse” immediately after the 

shootings, we are nevertheless left with the impression that 

King intended his readers to infer that he had a defense to the 

 

11 It is difficult to determine from the letters of support 

whether King informed all writers of the shootings or shared 

details of the shootings with others. Some letters do not 

allude to the shootings while others minimize the seriousness of 

the acts by referring to them, for example, as an “unfortunate 

event with the law,” “past transgressions,” and an “infraction 

of the law.” Additionally, King’s employer in 2005 answered 

“no” when the Committee asked in a mailed form whether the 

employer was aware of any unlawful conduct by King. 
- 13 -

shootings but chose to plead guilty to one charge after weighing 

his chances for success. His suggestion that only circumstances 

beyond his control prevented him from mounting a successful 

defense is inconsistent with the notion of acceptance of 

responsibility. 

¶16 In his application to this court, King provided a 

shorter account of the shootings, noting his intoxication and 

fear of the victims, whom he knew to be convicted felons aware 

of his peace-officer status. He explained that he pled guilty 

to one charge “rather than attempt to fight [the charges] at 

trial at a time of major anti-police sentiment in Houston that 

was caused by the then recent death of a prisoner who had been 

mistreated by the Houston Police Department.” King expressed no 

remorse, and we are left with the sense that King wanted the 

Committee and this court to believe he pled guilty only because 

of prevailing anti-police sentiment rather than as an 

acknowledgement of actual guilt. 

¶17 Finally, King’s statements to the Committee suggest he 

has not candidly assessed his actions on the morning of the 

shootings. Specifically, although he related details of the 

crime that support his assertion that he shot the victims in a 

drunken panic when they approached him, he repeatedly cited a 

failed memory when asked about facts that dispute that version 
- 14 -

of events. For example, because King claimed no memory of these 

events, the Committee could not meaningfully question King about 

witness statements that he threatened to shoot O’Brien and acted 

as the aggressor by returning to the bar door with his gun. The 

Committee was also prevented from probing the basis for King’s 

fear of the victims because he could not remember why he argued 

with them or why he felt threatened by them. King’s memory of 

details that only favor his version of the events compels us to 

discount his claim that he does not remember salient facts about 

the shootings. 

¶18 In light of the above-described evidence, King has 

failed to make an extraordinary showing that he has accepted 

responsibility for the shootings. Id. at 464, ¶ 22, 123 P.3d at 

658. Because we weigh all factors tending to show 

rehabilitation, however, we must examine other evidence 

concerning King’s rehabilitation before deciding whether he has 

satisfied his burden of proof. Id. at 465, ¶ 25, 123 P.3d at 

659. 

B.

¶19 To prove complete rehabilitation, King must also 

identify the weakness that caused him to engage in criminal 

misconduct and then demonstrate that he has overcome that 
- 15 -

weakness. Arrota, 208 Ariz. at 513, ¶ 17, 96 P.3d at 217.12 

King has not proven either factor. 

¶20 While before the Committee, King did not explicitly 

identify the weakness that caused his criminal misconduct. 

Although he stated that at the time of the shootings he was 

intoxicated, depressed, and stressed, he never plainly said that 

this combination of factors caused him to engage in such extreme 

criminal misconduct. Indeed, he expressed that he was “not sure 

anything can adequately explain” what occurred the morning of 

the shootings.

¶21 At oral argument before this court, King argued that a 

mix of stress and alcohol abuse caused the misconduct. The 

record before us, however, does not reflect that King identified 

the character flaw that led him to fail to appropriately cope 

with stress and/or to abuse alcohol. 

¶22 King offered no evidence identifying the weakness that 

prevented him from appropriately coping with the stress he was 

experiencing in late 1977. For example, King did not introduce 

 

12 Arrota involved a disbarred lawyer’s application for 

reinstatement, 208 Ariz. at 510, ¶ 1, 96 P.3d at 214, but we do 

not discern any reason a new applicant required to demonstrate 

rehabilitation should be relieved from showing that he or she 

has identified and overcome the weakness leading to the 

misconduct. We did not reach this issue in Hamm because the 

holding in that case rested on the applicant’s failure to 

demonstrate present good moral character, independent of 

rehabilitation. 211 Ariz. at 465, ¶ 26, 123 P.3d at 659. 
- 16 -

any evidence from a mental health professional identifying 

emotional problems King was suffering in 1977 that would explain 

his inability to appropriately respond to stress or his resort 

to alcohol abuse. See Arrota, 208 Ariz. at 514, ¶ 22, 96 P.3d 

at 218 (recognizing that in many instances a counselor can 

assist a person to understand reasons for misconduct). And even 

though King participated in counseling while on probation, he 

cannot recall any diagnoses, although he believes he was 

counseled for depression and “probably” low self-esteem. But 

many people have low self-esteem, experience employment 

disappointments, and suffer financial strain without unleashing 

their emotions in the violent manner chosen by King on the 

morning of the shootings. King provides no clues as to why 

seemingly routine stressors caused him to engage in such extreme 

misconduct. 

¶23 In short, nothing illuminates why King lacked 

appropriate skills to cope with stress or abused alcohol during 

the pertinent period of his life. Without such knowledge, we 

cannot be assured that King has appropriately addressed and 

overcome the weakness leading to his criminal misconduct. See 

id. at 513, ¶ 18, 96 P.3d at 217 (applicant for reinstatement 

failed to show he understood or even identified cause of 

misconduct). 
- 17 -

¶24 King has similarly failed to persuade us that he has 

overcome the weakness that led to his misconduct. We credit the 

fact that King has not engaged in serious misconduct or had an 

alcohol-related incident since the 1977 shootings. This 

circumstance is particularly significant as King has encountered 

many stressors since the shootings, including incarceration, 

probation, schooling, practicing law in Texas,13 taking on family 

responsibilities, and experiencing financial difficulties that 

led to bankruptcy. We disagree with the dissent, however, that 

the manner in which King has led his life since the shootings, 

however admirable, compels a conclusion that he has overcome the 

weakness that led to the shootings. See infra ¶ 52. The mere 

 

13 The dissent contends that we fail to give appropriate 

weight to evidence that in 1994 the Texas Board of Law Examiners 

determined that King possessed present good moral character to 

practice law in that state. See infra ¶¶ 34-35. In fact, we do 

not disregard that fact, but we have no need to address it 

further as it has no bearing on rehabilitation, which is the 

basis for our decision. Assuming Texas’ current admission rule 

was substantially in place in 1994, convicted felons were not 

required to demonstrate rehabilitation, as we mandate in 

Arizona. See Tex. Rules Governing Admission to the Bar, Rule 

IV(f) (West, Westlaw through 2006) (requiring such applicants to 

prove that (1) the best interest of the public, the legal 

profession, and justice would be served by admission, (2) the 

applicant is of present good moral character and fitness, and 

(3) during the immediately preceding five years the applicant 

led an exemplary life). Moreover, King did not provide the 

Committee or this court with any information that the Texas 

board considered rehabilitation as a component of present good 

moral character. Therefore, although the Texas Board’s 

determination might have some bearing on the second prong of our 

conditional inquiry, it has no bearing on the first. 
- 18 -

passage of time without incident is insufficient standing alone 

to evidence King’s triumph over the weakness that caused his 

misconduct. Arrota, 208 Ariz. at 515, ¶ 29, 96 P.3d at 219 

(“Merely showing that [an individual] is now living and doing 

those things he . . . should have done throughout life, although 

necessary to prove rehabilitation, is not sufficient to meet the 

applicant’s burden.”) (citation omitted); Matter of Robbins, 172 

Ariz. 255, 256, 836 P.2d 965, 966 (1992) (to same effect). 

Rather, to ensure King’s complete rehabilitation before 

entrusting him with the responsibility of practicing law in 

Arizona, he must persuade us that he has directly addressed and 

overcome the weakness that led to the shootings. Arrota, 208 

Ariz. at 515, ¶ 29, 96 P.3d at 219. 

¶25 We give weight to King’s testimony that he 

participated in counseling while in the Texas justice system and 

during college and law school. According to King, as part of 

his probation, he underwent weekly individual, and eventually 

group, counseling sessions, which were designed in part to 

address his alcohol abuse. He also attended “some meetings of 

Alcoholics Anonymous,” and worked through a twelve-step program 

designed to overcome addiction.14 While in college, he again 

 

 

14 Alcoholics Anonymous provides “a program of total 

abstinence” from alcohol achieved through attendance at group 
- 19 -

attended individual and group counseling sessions to help him 

cope with the stress of being a student. King also attended 

weekly meetings of Adult Children of Alcoholics during law 

school. Finally, during his last year of law school and for two 

years thereafter, he attended weekly counseling sessions with a 

“master’s social work psychological counselor.” According to 

King, this treatment, along with his religious beliefs, 

increased his sense of self-worth, helped him take 

responsibility for his actions, and taught him coping mechanisms 

to deal with stress that do not involve “going out and getting 

drunk and getting in trouble.” 

¶26 Other factors discount the positive effects of King’s 

treatment. King provided limited detail about the type or focus 

of his counseling while on probation and how it assisted him in 

gaining coping skills or overcoming alcohol abuse. Similarly, 

King stated that he received “counseling or treatment” at 

meetings for Adult Children of Alcoholics, but failed to 

describe that treatment or whether he completed any programs. 

This lack of detail hinders our ability to assess whether King 

 

meetings and by working through twelve suggested steps for 

recovery from alcoholism. A.A. at a Glance, 

http://www.aa.org/en_information_aa.cfm?PageID=10 (last visited 

June 19, 2006). 
- 20 -

has directly addressed and overcome the reasons for his 

misconduct. 

¶27 King also provided contradictory testimony regarding 

his alcohol abuse. Although he reported that he worked through 

Alcoholics Anonymous’ twelve-step program to help with 

“addiction,” which required him to admit he was powerless over 

alcohol,15 he continues to drink alcohol occasionally and denies 

that he is or was an alcoholic. King’s continued, albeit 

moderate, use of alcohol indicates either he has not overcome 

the weakness leading to his alcohol abuse or does not believe 

that alcohol abuse caused the emotional turmoil that led to the 

shootings. And again, King fails to provide any evidence from a 

substance abuse specialist or counselor that would enable us to 

assess whether King has an ongoing addiction so that even social 

drinking might compromise his ability to practice law. See In 

re Beers, 118 P.3d 784, 788, 791 (Or. 2005) (admitting applicant 

with criminal record stemming from drug and alcohol abuse based 

in part on psychologist’s testimony that applicant did not 

suffer addiction). Without this or equivalent evidence, King 

has not shown that he has truly conquered the weakness that led 

to his misconduct. Consequently, although the lengthy passage 

 

15 See A.A.’s Twelve Steps, 

http://www.aa.org/en_information_aa.cfm?PageID=17&SubPage=68

(last visited June 19, 2006).
- 21 -

of time without incident and King’s participation in counseling 

provide some evidence that he has overcome the weakness causing 

his misconduct, the impact of this evidence is compromised by 

other evidence. 

C. 

¶28 In weighing all the factors concerning King’s 

rehabilitation, we conclude that King’s demonstration falls 

short of the “virtually impossible” showing needed to erase the 

stain of his serious criminal misconduct. Although significant 

and commendable evidence shows rehabilitation, contrary evidence 

dilutes its strength. For this reason, we deny King’s 

application for admission to the bar. In light of our decision, 

we need not consider whether King has otherwise proven his 

present good moral character.16 Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 465, ¶ 25, 

123 P.3d at 659. 

¶29 By our decision today, we do not effectively exclude 

all applicants guilty of serious past misconduct from practicing 

law in Arizona, as the dissent suggests. See infra ¶ 32. Nor 

do we lightly view the choice of applicants such as King to live 

 

16 We acknowledge and appreciate the support from King’s 

colleagues, friends, and acquaintances detailing King’s laudable 

activities in his church and the community at large. Because 

this evidence concerns the second prong of our conditional 

inquiry, however, which we do not reach due to King’s failure to 

prove complete rehabilitation, we do not consider this evidence 

in denying King’s application. See supra ¶ 10. 
- 22 -

as good citizens after paying for past misdeeds, as the dissent 

implies. Indeed, it is out of respect for and belief in 

rehabilitation that this court has refrained from mimicking 

other professions by drawing a bright-line rule to disqualify 

convicted felons from practicing law in Arizona. See infra ¶ 

30. Such applicants, however, must overcome the additional 

burden born from their past misdeeds as reflected in our twopart inquiry. King has not done so. 

 _______________________________________ 

 Ann A. Scott Timmer, Judge* 

CONCURRING: 

_______________________________________ 

Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice 

_______________________________________ 

Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice 

_______________________________________ 

Michael D. Ryan, Justice 

*The Honorable W. Scott Bales recused himself; pursuant to 

Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the court 

designated the Honorable Ann A. Scott Timmer, Judge of the 

Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, to sit in this matter. 

H U R W I T Z, Justice, dissenting 

¶30 The State Bar of Arizona has repeatedly urged us to 

disqualify from the practice of law all applicants with records 
- 23 -

of serious past misconduct. Such a bright-line rule would 

hardly be irrational. Felony convictions disqualify applicants 

from participation in a number of other professions, including 

law enforcement, Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-904(F) (2001), 

certified public accounting, A.R.S. § 32-741(A)(1) (2002), 

nursing, A.R.S. § 32-1632(2) (Supp. 2005), private 

investigation, A.R.S. § 32-2422(A)(3) (2002), and security, 

A.R.S. § 32-2612(A)(3) (2002). 

¶31 Our opinions, however, have twice expressly rejected 

the Bar’s suggested per se approach.17 In In re Hamm, we stated 

that “the rules and standards governing admission to the 

practice of law in Arizona include no per se disqualifications” 

and that we therefore “consider each case on its own merits.” 

211 Ariz. 458, 462 ¶ 16, 123 P.3d 652, 656 (2005). I concurred 

in that holding, which is entirely consistent with our 

willingness to consider the readmission of attorneys disbarred 

after felony convictions upon proof of rehabilitation. See In 

re Arrotta, 208 Ariz. 509, 96 P.3d 213 (2004) (involving 

reinstatement application of attorney convicted of mail fraud 

and bribery). I also concurred in the Court’s conclusion that 

 

17 We also rejected a per se approach in 2005 when we amended 

the Rules governing admission. Order Amending Rules 32-40, 46, 

62, 64 & 65, Rules of Supreme Ct., Ariz. Sup. Ct. No. R-04-0032 

(June 9, 2005). 
- 24 -

despite his admirable post-conviction record, Mr. Hamm had not 

discharged his difficult burden of demonstrating current good 

moral character. Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 468 ¶ 40, 123 P.3d at 662. 

¶32 The majority purports again to reject a per se rule 

today, stating that, notwithstanding serious past misconduct, an 

applicant can prove the current good moral character required by 

Arizona Supreme Court Rule 3618 for admission to the Bar. Op. ¶ 

9 & n.8. In practice, however, the Court has adopted the very 

bright-line rule it purports to abjure. If Mr. King has not 

demonstrated rehabilitation and current good moral character, it 

is difficult for me to conclude that any applicant previously 

convicted of a serious felony ever can. 

I. 

¶33 The majority accurately recites the background facts 

of this case, Op. ¶¶ 2-7, and I need not recount them here. But 

several uncontested facts not emphasized in the majority opinion 

deserve particular focus. 

¶34 Mr. King comes to us with an extraordinary item on his 

resume – he is a long-standing member of the Texas Bar. King 

graduated from law school, took and passed the Texas Bar 

 

18 This dissent, like the Court’s opinion, refers to the 

version of the rules in effect at the time King filed his 

application for admission. Rules of the Supreme Court are cited 

as “Rule --.” 
- 25 -

examination in 1994, and was admitted to practice after a formal 

hearing before the Texas Board of Law Examiners. Under Texas 

law, his admission necessarily involved a finding that he was 

then of good moral character. See Tex. Rules Governing 

Admission to the Bar, Rule IV(f)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2006) 

(requiring that an applicant with a felony conviction 

demonstrate current good moral character as a prerequisite to 

admission). 

¶35 While we are of course not bound by another state’s 

determination that an applicant possesses good moral character, 

neither should we simply disregard such a finding.19 More 

importantly, the years since 1994 strongly bear out the wisdom 

of Texas’s conclusion. Mr. King worked for several firms in 

Texas from 1994 to 2003, specializing in personal injury law. 

He is in good standing with the Texas Bar and has never been the 

subject of a disciplinary grievance or sanction. King belongs 

to an Inn of Court, an organization emphasizing professionalism 

 

19 The Court discounts the Texas admission, arguing that it 

“has no bearing on rehabilitation,” but rather only on the issue 

of King’s good moral character. Op. ¶ 24 n.13. Rule 36(a), 

however, makes plain that rehabilitation from past misconduct is 

a necessary component of present good moral character. Hamm is 

to the same effect, noting that “[r]ehabilitation is a necessary 

but not sufficient, ingredient of good moral character.” 211 

Ariz. at 465 ¶ 26, 123 P.3d at 659. Thus, whatever the 

differences between Texas and Arizona law, the Texas finding of 

present good moral character at the very least suggests 

rehabilitation from past misconduct. 
- 26 -

and ethics among lawyers. He has worked as a paralegal since 

coming to Arizona and receives high praise from his employers. 

¶36 Nor is there a single blemish on King’s personal 

record. King has had no serious difficulties with the law since 

1977. Indeed, he appears to have been a model citizen in the 

almost thirty years following his crime. He is a devoted family 

man, happily married and successfully raising three children. 

He is active in his children’s Boy Scout groups and the Chandler 

Christian Church, where he is involved with a number of 

leadership groups and charitable programs. He was similarly 

active in his church in Texas for an extended period of time. 

¶37 King’s application is supported by some fifty letters 

of recommendation, each of which praises King’s good moral 

character and good works. These letters come from peers, 

colleagues, supervisors, friends, clients, professors, clergymen 

judges, and lawyers.20 The letters of recommendation are 

uniformly supportive of King’s application, some in glowing 

terms. No one appeared before the Committee or submitted a 

letter opposing King’s admission. King also presented 

compelling character testimony at the Committee hearings. Peter 

 

20 See Kwasnik v. State Bar, 791 P.2d 319, 323 (Cal. 1990) 

(“Traditionally we have accorded significant weight to 

testimonials submitted by attorneys and judges regarding an 

applicant’s moral fitness, on the assumption that such persons 
- 27 -

William Murphy, a professor at the South Texas College of Law, 

defense counsel for the International Criminal Tribunal, former 

trustee for the American Inns of Court, and former teacher and 

moot court coach to King, testified that King’s rehabilitation 

from his past crime was like nothing he had ever seen. 

Professor Murphy unreservedly recommended King to the practice 

of law, explaining that he believed King to possess the 

requisite good moral character and fitness. 

¶38 Perhaps most telling is that, after considering all of 

this evidence at a formal hearing, our Committee on Character 

and Fitness (“Committee”) recommended King in April 2005 for 

admission to the State Bar. The Committee did so after hearing 

from King personally on two occasions; its recommendation is 

therefore obviously based on a determination that King was 

credible and had established his rehabilitation. “[W]e give 

serious consideration to the facts as found by and the 

recommendations of the Committee.” Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 462 ¶ 15, 

123 P.3d at 656.21

 

possess a keen sense of responsibility for the integrity of the 

legal profession.”). 

21 The Committee had recommended denial of a previous 

application by King in 2003. The Court correctly does not rely 

on this previous denial today. King represented himself before 

the Committee on that prior occasion, and presented far less 

evidence than he did in 2005. Even on that lesser showing, the 

Committee seems to have concluded in 2003 that King had 

discharged his burden of demonstrating rehabilitation, finding 
- 28 -

II. 

¶39 Notwithstanding this compelling and extraordinary 

record, the Court nonetheless concludes that Mr. King is not fit 

to practice law in Arizona. It does so not because it concludes 

that he currently lacks good moral character, but rather because 

it believes that King has not sufficiently demonstrated 

rehabilitation from his 1977 crime. I respectfully disagree. 

A. 

¶40 The majority denies Mr. King admission to the Bar 

because he has fallen “short of the ‘virtually impossible’ 

showing needed to erase the stain of his serious criminal 

conduct.” Op. ¶ 28. By making the required showing of 

rehabilitation “virtually impossible,” the majority pre-ordains 

the result. I do not believe, however, that our rules and case 

law support the application of the “virtually impossible” 

standard in this case. 

¶41 We have long held that an applicant has the burden of 

establishing his qualifications to practice law. See, e.g., In 

re Greenberg, 126 Ariz. 290, 292, 614 P.2d 832, 834 (1980). 

Rule 36(a)(2)(A) provides that prior unlawful misconduct is 

relevant to the issue of the applicant’s current good moral 

 

“strong evidence of the Applicant’s rehabilitation.” Rather, 

the 2003 denial seems to have been based on the “seriousness of 
- 29 -

character. Rule 36(a)(3) provides that in determining that 

character, various factors relating to prior misconduct, 

including its “recency,” “seriousness,” and “evidence of 

rehabilitation,” should be taken into account. Our rule is thus 

properly read as requiring more convincing proof of 

rehabilitation the more serious the prior misconduct: “The 

added burden becomes greater as past unlawful conduct becomes 

more serious.” Hamm, 211 Ariz. at 464 ¶ 22, 123 P.3d at 658. 

But nothing in the language of the rule suggests that such a 

showing is, as the Court holds today, “virtually impossible” for 

all serious prior misconduct. 

¶42 The “virtually impossible” language appears for the 

first time in our case law in Hamm. We correctly noted there 

that an applicant “who is attempting to overcome the negative 

implications of a serious felony on his current moral character 

. . . must overcome a greater burden for more serious crimes.” 

Id. We then agreed with a statement made by the New Jersey 

Supreme Court that “in the case of extremely damning past 

misconduct, a showing of rehabilitation may be virtually 

impossible to make.” Id. (quoting In re Matthews, 462 A.2d 165, 

176 (N.J. 1983)). 

 

the crimes” committed by King, an approach that is at odds with 

this Court’s rejection of a per se exclusionary rule in Hamm. 
- 30 -

¶43 It is important, however, to note that the applicant 

in Hamm had been convicted of the most serious crime recognized 

under Arizona law – first degree murder – the paradigm of 

“extremely damning past misconduct.” Because Hamm’s crime was 

the most serious our law recognizes, his burden of establishing 

good moral character was appropriately very difficult. Mr. 

King, however, was not convicted of first degree murder, but 

rather of attempted murder. Mr. Hamm killed two people; Mr. 

King injured two.22 Our legislature has expressly recognized 

that attempted murder, while a serious offense, is much less 

“damning” misconduct than first degree murder. See A.R.S. § 13-

1105(D) (Supp. 2005) (classifying first degree murder as a class 

one felony punishable by death or life imprisonment); A.R.S. § 

13-1001(C)(1) (2001) (classifying attempted murder as a class 

two felony); A.R.S. § 13-702(A) (Supp. 2005) (punishing a class 

two felony with four to ten years imprisonment). The laws of 

Texas, under which King was convicted, are similar. Conviction 

for the Texas equivalent of first degree murder results in 

either a death sentence or life imprisonment, Tex. Penal Code 

Ann. § 12.31(a) (West, Westlaw though 2005); attempted murder is 

normally punished by at least two years imprisonment, Tex. Penal 

 

22 When questioned by police, one of the victims said he was 

unsure if he wanted to press charges. The victim’s views do not 
- 31 -

Code Ann. § 12.33(a) (West, Westlaw through 2005), but can lead, 

as it did in Mr. King’s case, to probation after a brief period 

of shock incarceration, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 

3(a) (West, Westlaw through 2005). 

¶44 The majority ignores these substantial distinctions 

between Mr. Hamm’s and Mr. King’s past misconduct, simply 

equating first degree murder with attempted murder as “extremely 

damning prior misconduct.” Op. ¶ 11. I do not believe that the 

“virtually impossible” test, which is in practice outcomedeterminative, should be applied to all prior serious 

misconduct. Indeed, were that the case, we would not have 

considered the application for reinstatement in Arrotta from an 

applicant who had committed mail fraud and bribery. See 208 

Ariz. at 512 ¶ 12, 96 P.3d at 216. Rather, I believe, as I 

thought the Court held in Hamm, that the quality of proof of 

rehabilitation should increase as the seriousness of prior 

misconduct increases. In Mr. King’s case, the appropriate 

burden, in light of his serious crimes, is not “virtual 

impossibility” but rather “an extraordinary showing of 

rehabilitation and present good moral character.” Hamm, 211 

Ariz. at 468 ¶ 40, 123 P.3d at 662. 

B. 

 

excuse King’s criminal conduct, but do suggest that his offense 
- 32 -

¶45 Although Mr. King faced a difficult burden in 

establishing rehabilitation and good moral character, I conclude 

that he has discharged it. Rehabilitation, like good moral 

character, is not a concept susceptible to easy objective 

measurement. But surely the most compelling evidence of 

rehabilitation is the way that King has led his life since his 

criminal conduct and the first-hand observations of those with 

whom he has interacted during that period. Over the course of 

almost three decades, Mr. King has lived his life in an 

exemplary fashion on both a personal and professional level, and 

this is attested to by scores of those with detailed knowledge 

of his actions. The record contains no evidence to the 

contrary. 

1. 

¶46 In concluding that Mr. King has failed to demonstrate 

rehabilitation, the Court first suggests that he has failed to 

take responsibility for his misconduct. I find no such evidence 

in this record. As the majority acknowledges, in the Committee 

hearings, “King admitted shooting the victims and expressed 

remorse, calling the shootings ‘a mistake I made that I will 

carry with me for the rest of my life.’” Op. ¶ 14. The 

 

was less serious than first degree murder. 
- 33 -

Committee, which had the opportunity to observe and question Mr. 

King, obviously believed the sincerity of that statement. 

¶47 The majority, however, discounts the Committee’s 

conclusion on several grounds, none of which I find persuasive. 

First, the majority suggests that in explaining, in a law school 

application in the early 1990’s1990s, why he pleaded guilty to 

one count of attempted murder, Mr. King somehow attempted to 

minimize his culpability for the crimes. Op. ¶ 15. Read in 

context, however, the statement in the application was simply a 

factual explication of the factors that went into a guilty plea 

– the lack of witnesses, his impaired memory of the event, the 

likely hostility of jurors to his actions, and the fact that the 

plea involved dismissal of one count of attempted murder. The 

application did not call for expressions of remorse, and I would 

not penalize Mr. King for not gratuitously offering them. 

Nothing in his explanation in the application, nor in subsequent 

descriptions Mr. King has given about his actions and the 

subsequent criminal justice proceedings, suggests to me that Mr. 

King is denying responsibility for his actions. He began to do 

so by admitting his guilt to the Texas court,23 and has continued 

 

23 Indeed, the record suggests that Mr. King understood his 

responsibility for what he had done, at least in a fundamental 

manner, well before court proceedings began. After the 

shooting, King retreated to his car and tried to kill himself by 
- 34 -

to do so repeatedly throughout his career since, most recently 

in his appearance before the Committee. Rather than parse a 

section of a law school application filed fifteen years ago for 

evidence of lack of remorse, I would rely on the Committee’s 

first-hand observations of the applicant within the last year. 

¶48 Nor can I conclude that Mr. King’s impaired memory of 

the events of the fateful evening demonstrate either lack of 

candor or failure to accept responsibility. The arrest report 

makes clear that when apprehended, Mr. King was intoxicated to 

the point of incapacitation; he was so incoherent that the 

police officers were unable to read King his Miranda rights. 

Under these circumstances, his failure to recall every detail of 

the events is more a demonstration of honesty than evasion. The 

majority’s suggestion that Mr. King has “selective memory” is 

again in stark contrast to the conclusions of the Committee 

members who had the face-to-face opportunity to consider his 

credibility. 

2. 

¶49 The Court also concludes that Mr. King has failed to 

identify the weaknesses that caused his misconduct or address 

those weaknesses. Again, I am unable to agree. 

 

putting the gun to his chin. After the gun failed to discharge, 

King took out a knife and proceeded to cut himself. 
- 35 -

¶50 Mr. King has consistently recognized that his 

misconduct was caused by a combination of alcohol abuse and jobrelated stress. The majority acknowledges this, but speculates 

that there was also a deeper “character flaw that led [King] to 

fail to appropriately cope with stress and/or to abuse alcohol” 

to which King has failed to admit. Op. ¶ 21. The majority 

condemns King for not submitting evidence from a mental health 

expert diagnosing this supposed character flaw and attesting to 

King’s triumph over it. Op. ¶ 22. 

¶51 The record, however, indicates that King has undergone 

counseling, during both his probation and in the years since his 

absolute discharge, including personal, psychological and 

alcohol-related sessions. He has never been diagnosed as an 

alcoholic or as having a mental health condition requiring 

further treatment. I therefore find no warrant for concluding 

that Mr. King has hidden some character flaw or disease from us 

or the Committee. 

¶52 More importantly, Mr. King’s life since 1977 has 

conclusively demonstrated that he has triumphed over whatever 

demons led him to commit his crime. What better evidence can 

there be to prove an applicant has overcome a weakness than 

twenty-nine years of consistent, incident-free conduct in 

stressful situations? If Mr. King had a continuing problem with 
- 36 -

alcohol, surely there would have been some indication of this in 

the almost thirty years since his crime. If Mr. King had a 

continuing problem dealing with stress, surely there would have 

been some indication of this in his more than ten years of 

practicing personal injury law, a pursuit hardly free from 

stress. 

III. 

¶53 Our goal in ensuring that members of the Bar possess 

good moral character is to protect the public. See Matter of 

Shannon, 179 Ariz. 52, 77, 876 P.2d 548, 573 (1994). In this 

case, King’s spotless record as a practicing attorney, together 

with the glowing recommendations of his clients, colleagues, 

adversaries and judges before whom he has appeared, adequately 

assures us that the citizens of Arizona would be safe with King 

practicing law. 

¶54 I therefore respectfully dissent from today’s opinion. 

I would accept the Committee’s recommendation and admit King to 

the practice of law. Although the Court today suggests that 

some hypothetical future candidate with a record of serious past 

misconduct might someday qualify for admission to the Bar, Op. ¶ 

29, I wonder whether the public and future applicants would be 

better served by adopting the per se approach the majority 
- 37 -

opinion purportedly rejects. If Mr. King’s application cannot 

meet our “non per se” standards, I doubt that any ever will. 

_______________________________________ 

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice