NO. 12-22-00212-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

ROJELIO BARBOZA, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

§

§

§

APPEAL FROM THE 2ND DISTRICT 

COURT

CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rojelio Barboza appeals his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child. In 

two issues, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment 

and he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment with continuous sexual abuse of a young child. 

The indictment later was amended multiple times without objection, including an amendment 

which added predicate acts of abuse against another victim. Appellant pleaded “not guilty,” and 

the matter proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found Appellant “guilty” as charged and, following 

a trial on punishment, assessed his punishment at imprisonment for sixty years. The trial court 

sentenced Appellant accordingly, and this appeal followed.

EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY

In his first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial 

court’s judgment. Specifically, he contends that the respective testimonies of the alleged victims 

are not specific enough to establish that the instances of sexual abuse to which they testified 

occurred within the time period set forth in the indictment.
2

Standard of Review

The Jackson v. Virginia1legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing 

court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a 

criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v. 

State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional 

minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a 

criminal conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315–16, 99 S. Ct. at 2786–87; see also Escobedo 

v. State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d). The standard for reviewing a

legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 

2789; see also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is 

examined in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 

2789; Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186. A jury is free to believe all or any part of a witness’s 

testimony or disbelieve all or any part of that testimony. See Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 

(Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A 

successful legal sufficiency challenge will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing 

court. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41–42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217–18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 

(1982).

Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and 

circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Rodriguez v. State, 521 

S.W.3d 822, 827 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Sorrells v. State, 343 

S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Each fact need not point directly and independently 

to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating 

circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Juries are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as 

each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 15. Juries are not permitted 

to reach conclusions based on mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or 

presumptions. Id. An inference is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing 

a logical consequence from them, while speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the 

possible meaning of facts and evidence presented. Id. at 16.

1 443 U.S. 307, 315–16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786–87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
3

The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a 

hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1997). Such a charge would include one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the 

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict 

the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the 

defendant is tried.” Id.

Discussion

To meet its burden of proof that Appellant committed the charged offense, the State was 

required to prove that he, during a period of thirty or more days in duration, committed two or 

more of the alleged acts of sexual abuse at a time when he was seventeen years of age or older 

and the victim is a child younger than fourteen years of age. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 21.02(b) (West Supp. 2022). The State need not prove the exact dates of the abuse, only that 

“there were two or more acts of sexual abuse that occurred during a period that was thirty or 

more days in duration.” Buxton v. State, 526 S.W.3d 666, 676 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 

2017, pet. ref’d).

The Evidence

In the instant case, A.Z., who was twelve-years-old at the time of trial, testified that in 

2014, when she was four or five-years-old, Appellant, who was her uncle, put his penis in her 

mouth for the first time. She further testified that this occurred two or three more times and that 

more than thirty days passed between the occurrences. She testified that in 2018,

2 when she was 

around seven years old, Appellant took her into a room in his apartment, locked the door, told 

her to take off her pants and sit on top of him, at which point he rubbed her genitals with his 

hand for several minutes. 

Additionally, Appellant’s daughter, A.B., who was fifteen-years-old at the time of trial, 

testified that Appellant touched her genitals in 2014 when she was seven-years-old. She testified 

that Appellant later touched her genitals on five different occasions over a time span of a year or 

two. Moreover, A.B. recounted that, on another occasion when she was eight-years-old, she 

awoke on the floor and discovered that Appellant was using her hand to rub his genitals. A.B. 

stated that she noticed a “white-like goo” on her hand. 

2 A.Z. testified that Appellant touched her genitals when she was around seven-years-old. She testified that 

in 2018, she was approximately seven or eight-years-old.
4

Date Range Stated in the Indictment

Appellant acknowledges that the testimony of a child victim, standing alone and without 

corroboration, is sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child. 

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a), (b) (West 2023); Garner v. State, 523 S.W.3d 

266, 271 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2017, no pet.). Appellant contends, however, that A.Z.’s and A.B.’s 

respective testimonies are insufficient because they do not support that the instances of abuse 

occurred within the date range set forth in the indictment of August 1, 2014, through August 1, 

2017. 

It is a longstanding rule that the state is not required to prove that an offense was 

committed on the date alleged in the indictment, regardless of whether the words “on or about” 

are used, but it may prove that the offense was committed on any date prior to the return of the 

indictment and within the period of limitations.3See Klein v. State, 273 S.W.3d 297, 304 n.5 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Martin v. State, 335 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. App.–Austin 2011, pet. 

ref’d). Nonetheless, several courts, including this one, have discussed the necessity of proving

that the instances of sexual abuse occurred within the date range specified in the indictment, but 

only under certain circumstances. For instance, cases prosecuted soon after Section 21.02’s

enactment often alleged a date range which began on September 1, 2007, the effective date of the 

statute. See, e.g., Martin, 335 S.W.3d at 873. In such cases, because sexual abuse which 

occurred prior to the statute’s effective date could not be used to prove continuous sexual abuse 

of a young child, it was necessary to prove that the underlying instances of abuse occurred after 

that date. See id.; see also Gomez v. State, 459 S.W.3d 651, 660 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2015, pet. 

ref’d); Kuhn v. State, 393 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tex. App.–Austin 2013, pet. ref’d). Moreover, 

because continuous sexual abuse requires proof that the victim is younger than age fourteen and 

the actor is older than age seventeen, where the beginning or end of the date range is related to 

those elements, e.g., where the end date coincides with the date of the victim’s fourteenth 

birthday, specific proof that the alleged instances of sexual abuse occurred within that date range

would be necessary. See, e.g., Martin, 335 S.W.3d at 873. 

Here, the August 1, 2014, through August 1, 2017 date range bears no relation to the 

effective date of the statute or the ages of Appellant, A.Z., or A.B., and Appellant has not 

3 There is no limitations period for continuous sexual abuse of a child. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

12.01(1)(D) (West 2005).
5

directed this court to any other circumstance that would necessitate proof that the underlying 

instances of sexual abuse occurred within that date range. Accordingly, we conclude that 

whether the evidence of underlying abuse occurred within the alleged date range has no bearing 

on the sufficiency of the evidence under the facts of this case. Cf. Klein, 273 S.W.3d at 304 n.5. 

We have reviewed the record in the instant case in the light most favorable to the jury’s

verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. Having done so, we remain mindful 

that a jury is free to believe all or any part of a witness’s testimony or disbelieve all or any part 

of that testimony. See Lee, 176 S.W.3d at 458. Moreover, we reiterate that the testimony of a 

child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child. 

Garner, 523 S.W.3d at 271. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that based on 

A.Z.’s and A.B.’s testimonies, the jury reasonably could have found that Appellant, during a 

period of thirty or more days in duration, committed two or more acts of sexual abuse at a time 

when he was seventeen years of age or older and A.Z. and A.B. each were younger than fourteen 

years of age. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.02(b), (c). Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In his second issue, Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did 

not object to the State’s several requests to amend the indictment.

Standard of Review and Governing Law

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two-step analysis 

articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 674 (1984). 

The first step requires the appellant to demonstrate that trial counsel’s representation fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. To satisfy this step, the appellant must identify the acts or 

omissions of counsel alleged to be ineffective assistance and affirmatively prove that they fell 

below the professional norm of reasonableness. See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The reviewing court will not find ineffectiveness by isolating any 

portion of trial counsel’s representation but will judge the claim based on the totality of the 

representation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

In any case considering the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, we begin with the 

strong presumption that counsel was effective. See Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. 
6

Crim. App. 1994). We must presume counsel’s actions and decisions were reasonably 

professional and were motivated by sound trial strategy. See id. Appellant has the burden of 

rebutting this presumption by presenting evidence illustrating why his trial counsel did what he 

did. See id. Appellant cannot meet this burden if the record does not affirmatively support the 

claim. See Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A record that 

specifically focuses on the conduct of trial counsel is necessary for a proper evaluation of an 

ineffectiveness claim. See Kemp v. State, 892 S.W.2d 112, 115 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 

1994, pet. ref’d). 

Before being condemned as unprofessional and incompetent, defense counsel should be 

given an opportunity to explain his or her actions. See Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2002). Thus, absent a properly developed record, an ineffective assistance claim 

usually must be denied as speculative, and, further, such a claim cannot be built upon 

retrospective speculation. Id. at 835. 

Moreover, after proving error, the appellant affirmatively must prove prejudice from the 

deficient performance of his attorney. See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1999); Burruss v. State, 20 S.W.3d 179, 186 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d). The 

appellant must prove that his attorney’s errors, judged by the totality of the representation and 

not by isolated instances of error, denied him a fair trial. Burruss, 20 S.W.3d at 186. It is not 

enough for the appellant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of 

the proceedings. Id. He must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his 

attorney’s errors, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt about his guilt or that the extent of 

his punishment would have been less. See id.; see also Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 837.

Discussion

Here, Appellant sets forth in his brief that his attorney’s performance at trial fell below 

the professional norm because he did not object to the State’s several requests to amend the 

indictment, one of which added the allegations of predicate acts of abuse against A.B.

4

 Yet, the 

record before us is silent about trial counsel’s strategy or why he chose the course he did. 

Indeed, Appellant acknowledges in his brief, “The record is absent as to any mention about the 

4 As Appellant notes in his brief, he was represented by two different attorneys during the course of 

proceedings, each of which declined to object to the State’s motions to amend the indictment. We refer to “counsel” 

singularly for ease of reference.
7

indictments or a reason why a challenge to the indictment or its amendments [was] not made. 

Counsel cannot discern any trial strategy to failing to object[.]”

Normally, a silent record cannot defeat the strong presumption of effective assistance of 

counsel. See Garza, 213 S.W.3d at 348; Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813–14 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1999); but see Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593 (holding if trial counsel is not given 

opportunity to explain allegedly deficient actions, appellate court should not find deficient 

performance absent challenged conduct “so outrageous that no competent attorney would have 

engaged in it”); Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (reversing a 

conviction “in a rare case” on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel did 

not object to a misstatement of law by the prosecutor during argument).

Thus, due to the silent record before us, we must presume that Appellant’s counsel acted

in accordance with sound trial strategy unless his failure to object could be considered so 

outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it. See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 

593. Here, based on our review of the record, we conclude that the “extremely unusual 

circumstances” present in Andrews are not present in the case at hand. Counsel’s reasons in 

Andrews, if any, were unnecessary to resolve the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See 

Berry v. State, No. 05-04-01161-CR, 2005 WL 1515512, at *3 (Tex. App.–Dallas June 28, 2005, 

no pet.) (op., not designated for publication). But counsel’s failing to object to a misstatement of 

the law that is detrimental to one’s client when the harm is so clearly presented on appeal is quite 

different from determining whether to object to the State’s request to amend an indictment

potentially as a matter of trial strategy. See Scales v. State, 601 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Tex. App.–

Amarillo 2020, no pet.) (counsel’s failure to object to amendment of indictment is matter that 

lies within wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and because there is nothing in 

record to show why counsel chose not to object to amendment of indictment, court cannot say 

with certainty that counsel’s performance was deficient or fell below objective standard of 

reasonableness); cf. Jefferson v. State, 663 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (discussing

possibility of sound trial strategy for not objecting to request to amend indictment). 

Having reviewed the record in the instant case, we conclude that the facts before us are 

distinguishable from the facts in Andrews and that Appellant’s trial counsel’s alleged deficient 

conduct is not “so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” See 

Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 593; see also Scales, 601 S.W.3d at 388; cf. Jefferson, 663 S.W.3d at 
8

764. Therefore, we hold that Appellant has not met the first prong of Strickland because the 

record does not contain evidence concerning Appellant’s trial counsel’s reasons for choosing the 

course he did. As a result, Appellant cannot overcome the strong presumption that his counsel 

performed effectively. 

Appellant also attempts to address the second prong of Strickland, arguing that without 

the State’s ability to use A.B.’s testimony under the amended indictment, the jury “conceivably”

could have found Appellant “not guilty.” However, we are mindful that to satisfy the second 

prong of Strickland, it is not enough for the appellant to show that the alleged errors had some 

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceedings; instead, he must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for his attorney’s supposed errors, the jury would have had a 

reasonable doubt about his guilt. See Burruss, 20 S.W.3d at 186. Even so, we cannot conclude 

that had the State not presented evidence that Appellant sexually abused his daughter, A.B., on 

several occasions over the course of years, the jury would ignore A.Z.’s testimony that Appellant 

put his penis in her mouth on multiple occasions when she was four or five-years-old and that he, 

on another occasion, rubbed her genitals for several minutes when she was around seven-yearsold. Accordingly, we hold that Appellant has not met his burden under the second prong of 

Strickland. See id.

In sum, Appellant cannot overcome the strong presumption that his counsel performed 

effectively and has not met his burden of proving that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for his attorney’s supposed errors, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt about his guilt. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue is overruled.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant’s first and second issues, we affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

GREG NEELEY

Justice

Opinion delivered June 30 2023.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JUNE 30 2023

NO. 12-22-00212-CR

ROJELIO BARBOZA,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 2nd District Court

of Cherokee County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 21254)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this Court that there was no error in 

the judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment 

of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court 

below for observance.

Greg Neeley, Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.