COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank 

LESTER RAY TERRY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 3091-99-3 PER CURIAM 

 JUNE 6, 2000 

ROANOKE CITY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 

Robert P. Doherty, Jr., Judge 

 (Joseph F. Vannoy, on brief), for appellant. 

Appellant submitting on brief. 

 (William M. Hackworth, City Attorney; 

Allen T. Wilson, Assistant City Attorney, on 

brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on 

brief. 

 Lester Ray Terry (Terry) appeals the decision of the circuit 

court terminating his parental rights to five of his biological 

children.1 The circuit court found that the Roanoke City 

Department of Social Services (DSS) proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that Terry, without good cause, had been unwilling or 

unable within a reasonable period of time to remedy substantially 

the conditions which led to the children's placement in foster 

care, despite the reasonable and appropriate efforts made by DSS 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1

 The termination petitions were for Anthony Jermaine Pond, 

Marcus Ray Pond, Kimberly Marie Pond, Montel Jerome Pond, and 

Janice Leslie Pond. 
to reunite the children with Terry. On appeal, Terry contends 

that the trial court erred in finding that DSS presented clear and 

convincing evidence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Code 

§ 16.1-283. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, 

we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

affirm the decision of the trial court. 

 "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the 

termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount 

consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests." 

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 

409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "Code § 16.1-283 embodies 'the 

statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual parental 

rights in this Commonwealth' [which] . . . 'provides detailed 

procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents and their 

child,' balancing their interests while seeking to preserve the 

family." Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540 

(1995) (citations omitted). "'In matters of a child's welfare, 

trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the 

decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's best 

interests.'" Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 

(citation omitted). The trial judge's findings, "'when based on 

evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id. (citation 

omitted). 

- 2 -
 The evidence proved that at the time the four older children 

were placed in foster care in January 1998, Terry was in jail. 

The youngest child was placed in foster care at her birth in July 

1998 when the mother tested positive for cocaine. In June 1998, 

DSS provided a foster care plan to Terry, indicating what steps he 

needed to accomplish before the children could be safely placed in 

his care. Those steps included obtaining and maintaining steady 

employment and housing, avoiding drugs and alcohol, scheduling a 

substance abuse assessment and following any recommendations 

arising therefrom, completing a parenting class, and visiting 

regularly with his children. By the review in October 1998, Terry 

had obtained employment, but had taken no other steps required 

under the foster care plan. DSS conducted another review in 

January 1999, and found that Terry had maintained employment but 

had not performed any of the other actions required under the 

foster care plan. Terry was incarcerated three different times 

between January 1998 and November 1999. 

 The trial court found that DSS presented clear and convincing 

evidence sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Code 

§ 16.1-283(C). That section provides, in pertinent part, that 

the court may terminate the residual parental rights of a parent 

of a child placed in foster care if the court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of the 

child and that: 

- 3 -
2. The parent . . ., without good cause, 

[has] been unwilling or unable within a 

reasonable period of time not to exceed 

twelve months from the date the child was 

placed in foster care to remedy 

substantially the conditions which led to or 

required continuation of the child's foster 

care placement, notwithstanding the 

reasonable and appropriate efforts of 

social, medical, mental health or other 

rehabilitative agencies to such end. Proof 

that the parent . . ., without good cause, 

[has] failed or been unable to make 

substantial progress towards elimination of 

the conditions which led to or required 

continuation of the child's foster care 

placement in accordance with their 

obligations under and within the time limits 

or goals set forth in a foster care plan 

filed with the court or any other plan 

jointly designed and agreed to by the parent 

or parents and a public or private social, 

medical, mental health or other 

rehabilitative agency shall constitute prima 

facie evidence of this condition. 

Code § 16.1-283(C). 

 Terry was incarcerated at the time the children were 

initially placed in foster care from their mother's custody. 

DSS communicated to Terry the steps he was required to take in 

order for his children to be returned to his care. Terry 

obtained and maintained employment for approximately six months 

before he returned to jail. He also visited every other week 

with his children, missing only five visits over a period of 

approximately fourteen months. However, Terry did not complete 

any of the other obligations under the foster care plan. At the 

time of the hearing, Terry did not have stable housing or 

employment, although he testified that he had a meeting 

- 4 -
scheduled with his former employer and anticipated being 

rehired. He never completed substance abuse screening or 

parenting classes. He testified that he did not think he had to 

do anything but get a job, although he admitted that he signed 

the foster care plans setting out the requirements. 

 Evidence also established that the children were special 

needs children. The eldest had a physical handicap of his arm 

and required physical and occupational therapy several times a 

week. All four older children had severe speech deficits and 

displayed some form of developmental delays. The youngest 

child, who was taken into foster care at birth, did not show 

signs of significant developmental delays. 

 Terry indicated at trial that he would refrain from 

criminal activity in the future and that he would complete the 

required steps set out in the foster care plan. However, "'past 

actions and relationships over a meaningful period serve as good 

indicators of what the future may be expected to hold.'" 

Linkous v. Kingery, 10 Va. App. 45, 56, 390 S.E.2d 188, 194 

(1990) (quoting Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530, 536, 359 S.E.2d 

315, 319 (1987)). Although DSS informed Terry of his 

obligations under the foster care plan, Terry failed to complete 

the majority of his obligations, despite DSS's offers to assist 

him and despite the passage of over a year. Under the 

circumstances of this case, the trial court was not required to 

- 5 -
allow Terry additional time within which to commence his 

obligations. 

 It is irrelevant to the trial court's determination under 

Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) that there was no evidence that Terry 

abused the children prior to their placement in foster care. 

The statute focuses on remedying the underlying conditions and 

required evidence that Terry made progress towards correcting 

the conditions that led to the children's foster care placement. 

 The record contains sufficient evidence to support the 

finding of the trial court that DSS presented prima facie 

evidence meeting the requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). DSS 

proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of 

Terry's parental rights was in the best interests of the 

children and that Terry failed, without good cause, to make 

substantial progress towards the elimination of the conditions 

which led to the children's foster care placement in accordance 

with his obligations under and within the time limits set out in 

the foster care plan. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.

- 6 -