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Filed 8/18/22 In re A.C. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Butte)

----

In re A.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court 

Law.

C094807

BUTTE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

D.C. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

(Super. Ct. No. 21DP00083)

D.C. is the half-brother of the minor’s mother. He is married to K.C. The juvenile 

court denied the requests of K.C. and D.C. for appointed counsel and de facto parent 

status (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 395),

1 and they appeal. D.C. joins in, and adopts, the 

appellate contentions asserted by K.C. Finding no error, we will affirm the juvenile 

court’s orders.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2

BACKGROUND

K.C. filed three previous and related appeals: one from an order issued by the 

juvenile court in Siskiyou County (In re A.C. (Mar. 22, 2022, C093887) [nonpub. opn.], 

review denied June 15, 2022) and two from orders issued by the juvenile court in Butte 

County (In re A.C. (Mar. 24, 2022, C094217) [nonpub. opn.] & In re A.C. (C094859), 

dismissed Mar. 28, 2022). We take judicial notice of the record in each of K.C.’s related 

appeals, as well as this court’s prior orders and opinions in these cases. (Evid. Code, 

§ 452, subd. (d).)

The minor’s mother (hereafter mother) had an extensive child welfare history and 

reportedly did not feel she could provide for the minor. Because K.C. was willing to care 

for the minor, mother stated she intended for the minor to live with K.C. and D.C. K.C. 

arrived at the hospital shortly after the minor was born and was permitted to take the 

minor pursuant to a safety plan prohibiting D.C. from living in the family home due to his 

substance abuse, mental health concerns, and criminal history. The probate court in 

Siskiyou County subsequently issued an ex parte order appointing K.C. the temporary 

guardian of the minor, but a social worker informed K.C. that the Siskiyou County Health 

and Human Services Agency (Agency) would not support K.C.’s request for 

guardianship and would be seeking to place the minor into protective custody. 

(In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

At a detention hearing, the juvenile court in Siskiyou County appointed counsel 

for K.C. Later, at a continuation of the hearing, K.C. said she considered herself to be the 

minor’s mother. She said she had been told that if the father was unknown and she

treated the minor as her own she could complete a voluntary declaration of parentage 

(VDOP) form. She obtained a VDOP form, had mother’s signature notarized, and mailed 

the signed form to the Department of Child Support Services. K.C. said there was an 

upcoming hearing on her request for guardianship and she hoped to become the minor’s 

permanent guardian. But the juvenile court ordered the minor detained, finding among 
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other things that continuance of the minor in the home of K.C. was contrary to the 

minor’s welfare. (In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

Daniel R. (Daniel) came forward and said he was the biological father of the 

minor. He appeared at the contested jurisdiction hearing and testified that he recently 

signed a VDOP. Over K.C.’s objection, the juvenile court declared Daniel the presumed 

father and appointed counsel for him. Mother and Daniel indicated their willingness to 

participate in reunification services and mother requested that the case be transferred to 

her home county of Butte in order for her to participate in services and that the minor be 

placed in an ICWA-approved home.2 (In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

When the social worker informed K.C. of the intent to transfer the case to Butte 

County, K.C. expressed her concern that the minor would be placed in another county 

and stated, “ ‘I have paperwork of Daniel and [mother] giving me full custody.’ ” K.C. 

continued, “ ‘I am [the minor’s] legal parent and so is [mother] but she and Daniel have 

both given us full custody in the guardianship and in the custody case as well. I have 

been in [the minor’s] life since before she was born. My husband and I are doing all we 

can to bring her back home.’ ” K.C. and D.C. requested that the minor be returned to 

their care. (In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

The social worker spoke with a representative of mother’s tribe, who requested 

that the case be transferred to Butte County and that mother and Daniel be given 

reunification services. The Agency recommended the same and noted that, in the event 

reunification efforts failed, the permanent plan was “adoption or a Tribal Customary 

Adoption with a tribal member.” The proposed case plan included services for mother 

and Daniel but not for K.C. (In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

2 Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).
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At the continuation of the contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court noted 

the temporary guardianship had terminated, so K.C. no longer had the rights of a 

guardian. The juvenile court also determined K.C.’s VDOP was not valid and that the 

law did not support K.C.’s argument that she was a legal parent. The juvenile court 

denied K.C.’s request to vacate its prior finding that Daniel was a presumed father. 

(In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

The juvenile court turned next to jurisdiction and disposition and allowed K.C. and 

her counsel to cross-examine witnesses and provide the testimony of D.C. Counsel for 

K.C. was also permitted to present argument. The juvenile court declared the minor a 

dependent of the court and adopted the Agency’s recommended findings and orders as 

modified on the record. (In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

K.C. filed a request for de facto parent status, and the matter was set for hearing 

on March 22, 2021. In the meantime, the juvenile court ordered the State of California 

Department of Public Health, Vital Records to correct the minor’s birth certificate by 

removing K.C.’s name and reflecting only mother’s name under the “Name of Parent” 

portion of the certificate, and providing the minor’s correct full name, date of birth, and 

place of birth. (In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

On March 22, 2021, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the parties’ request 

to transfer the matter to Butte County and on K.C.’s request for de facto parent status. 

K.C. was present with her counsel. The juvenile court ordered the case transferred, 

including the de facto parent request. (In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

On May 27, 2021, the juvenile court in Butte County conducted a transfer-in 

hearing. Present at the hearing was mother, the Butte County Department of 

Employment and Social Services (Department), the social worker, counsel for the 

Mooretown Rancheria Tribe (Tribe), K.C., and D.C. K.C. informed the juvenile court of 

her understanding that her de facto parent request was still pending, and she requested 

appointment of counsel. The juvenile court said it was not required to appoint counsel 
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for a de facto parent but had the discretion to do so. The juvenile court continued K.C.’s 

requests for appointment of counsel and de facto parent status and accepted transfer-in of 

the case from Siskiyou County. (In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

On June 17, 2021, the juvenile court continued the matter for a contested hearing. 

K.C. again requested appointment of counsel, and the juvenile court denied the request. 

K.C. appealed from the juvenile court’s denial of her request for appointment of counsel. 

This court affirmed the juvenile court’s order and the remittitur issued on March 24, 

2022. (In re A.C., supra, C094217.)

The juvenile court heard K.C. and D.C.’ requests for de facto parent status on 

August 31, 2021. The Department opposed the requests, arguing K.C. and D.C. did not 

satisfy the requirements for de facto parent status, and they contributed to the dependency 

of the minor by failing to abide by the safety plan as instructed. The Tribe and the minor 

agreed.

K.C. testified in support of her request, stating the minor lived with her for two 

months until the minor was removed pursuant to the dependency. K.C. testified she 

“preplanned to be [the minor’s] mother” before the child was born, took the minor home 

from the hospital, treated and held the minor out as her own, chose the name for the 

minor, and did everything she could to be a good mom to the minor. After the minor was 

removed, K.C. appeared at every court hearing, attended visits when allowed, and did 

everything in her power to be a part of the minor’s life. K.C. testified she loved the 

minor and treated the minor as her own child.

K.C. acknowledged the minor was released into her care subject to a safety plan 

which prohibited D.C. from living in her home, and she conceded the minor was removed 

based on the Department’s allegation that she violated that safety plan. K.C. also 

conceded that the reason for the safety plan was past domestic violence involving D.C. 

and D.C.’s criminal history. She denied allowing D.C. to live in her home, but admitted 

she allowed D.C. to have contact with the minor. K.C. testified she had a considerable 
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amount of knowledge about the minor’s family and history but conceded that knowledge

was available to the Department. She acknowledged the minor had been out of her care 

for approximately 10 months, during which time much had happened with respect to the 

minor. K.C. further conceded that the Siskiyou County juvenile court previously 

determined she did not qualify as a presumed parent and denied her request for presumed 

parent status.

D.C. testified he took the minor in and held her out and treated her as his daughter. 

He stated, “From the day that little girl was born, I haven’t seen her as anything other 

than my own child.” He explained that the minor was only in his care for two weeks 

before he entered a treatment program but, while he was in treatment, the minor lived 

with K.C. in the home he owned. D.C. denied he was also living in the home, claiming 

he was living in his truck.

The juvenile court said it had reviewed and considered the case file from Siskiyou 

County and it took judicial notice of those documents. After hearing argument from the 

parties, the juvenile court noted it was mindful of the requirements for de facto parent 

status. The juvenile court reviewed the safety plan, found that it was not followed, and 

noted the noncompliance was one of the reasons the minor was detained. The juvenile 

court denied the requests for de facto parent status.

DISCUSSION

I

K.C. and D.C. contend the ultimate reversal of juvenile court orders in related case 

Nos. C093887 and C094217 will require reversal of all subsequent orders, including the 

orders in this case denying K.C.’s request for appointment of counsel and K.C.’s request 

for de facto parent status. The contention lacks merit because case Nos. C093887 and 

C094217 did not result in the reversal of juvenile court orders, remittiturs issued in those 

appeals, and the judgments are final. (See McClain v. Rush (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 18, 
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26 [issuance of remittitur after appeal renders judgment final and unassailable for all 

purposes, including collateral estoppel and res judicata].)

II

K.C. and D.C. next contend the juvenile court abused its discretion when, at the 

hearing for de facto parent status, it denied their request for appointed counsel.

Section 317 provides that a court may appoint counsel for “a parent or guardian of 

the child” when that parent or guardian is “presently financially unable to afford and 

cannot for that reason employ counsel.” (§ 317, subd. (a)(1).) Neither K.C. nor D.C. 

were parents, de facto parents, or guardians of the minor at the time of the hearing.

K.C. concedes she had not yet achieved de facto parent status at the time of the 

hearing but argues the juvenile court should nevertheless have appointed counsel for her 

for the limited purpose of establishing de facto parent status. However, K.C. does not 

cite authority that supports her assertion, and we are aware of none. Moreover, even for 

indigent defacto parents, the juvenile court maintains discretion to deny the appointment 

of counsel. (In re A.F. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 692, 705.) K.C. has not established error 

or an abuse of discretion.

As further support for the contention regarding appointment of counsel, K.C. 

argues the same circumstances she previously asserted in her prior appeals. We already 

determined those arguments lack merit.

III

In addition, K.C. and D.C. contend the juvenile court erred in denying their 

request for de facto parent status. They claim the juvenile court improperly based its 

denial on the conclusion that they failed to follow the safety plan, but it did not weigh all 

the relevant factors.

“ ‘The concept of de facto parent has been judicially created to recognize limited 

rights in dependency cases for a person who has been found by the juvenile court to have 

assumed, on a day-to-day basis, the role of a parent, fulfilling the child’s physical and 
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psychological needs. [Citations.] The decision to grant de facto parent status depends on 

an assessment of the particular individual and the facts of the case. [Citation.] The 

juvenile court applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in making its factual 

findings and we review those findings for an abuse of discretion.’ ” (In re Justin O.

(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1015.)

Courts have identified several factors relevant to whether a person falls within the 

definition of a de facto parent. Those factors include whether “(1) the child is 

‘psychologically bonded’ to the adult; (2) the adult has assumed the role of a parent on a 

day-to-day basis for a substantial period of time; (3) the adult possesses information 

about the child unique from the other participants in the process; (4) the adult has 

regularly attended juvenile court hearings; and (5) a future proceeding may result in an 

order permanently foreclosing any future contact with the adult. [Citations.] If some or 

all of these factors apply, it is immaterial whether the adult was the ‘child’s current or 

immediately succeeding custodian.’ [Citations.]” (In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 

61, 66-67, fn. omitted; see In re Bryan D. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 127, 141; In re Justin 

O., supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.)

Here, the evidence presented by K.C. and D.C. was insufficient to meet the 

requirements for de facto parent status. As confirmed by K.C.’s and D.C.’s testimony,

the minor was in K.C.’s custody and care for only two months and in D.C.’s care for

several weeks. Once the minor was detained, K.C.’s only contact with the minor was 

during supervised visits. Neither of them demonstrated that, during that brief time, the 

minor became psychologically bonded to K.C. or D.C. Nor did K.C.’s testimony 

demonstrate that she assumed the daily role of the minor’s parent for a substantial period 

of time. K.C. regularly attended court hearings, but the information K.C. and D.C.

possessed about the minor was not unique. Additionally, K.C. conceded the minor was 

removed from her custody based on the Department’s allegation, later sustained by the 

juvenile court, that she violated the safety plan put in place to address past domestic 
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violence involving D.C. and D.C.’s criminal history. While K.C. denied that D.C. was 

living in the home, she admitted she allowed him to have contact with the minor.

There was sufficient evidence that K.C. and D.C.’s behavior contributed to the 

dependency of the minor, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

K.C. and D.C.’s request for de facto parent status.

K.C. and D.C. argue the juvenile court improperly relied on the violation of the 

safety plan and failed to weigh the relevant factors. But the record establishes that the 

relevant factors were discussed and considered. The juvenile court did not improperly 

add a disqualifying factor or misapply the law.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

 /S/

MAURO, J.

We concur:

 /S/

HULL, Acting P. J.

 /S/

KRAUSE, J.