Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2791 | August 28, 2019 Page 1 of 14

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Jesse R. Drum

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lincoln Ray Pickett,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

August 28, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2791

Appeal from the Lawrence 

Superior Court

The Honorable William G. Sleva, 

Judge Pro Tempore

Trial Court Cause Nos.

47D01-1602-MR-129

47D01-1601-F6-105

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2791 | August 28, 2019 Page 2 of 14

Statement of the Case

[1] Lincoln Ray Pickett appeals his convictions for murder, a felony, and unlawful 

possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony, and he 

appeals his sentence for those and other convictions1 following a jury trial. 

Pickett presents three issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence 

that law enforcement officers had seized pursuant to a 

search of his residence.

2. Whether some of his convictions constitute an episode of 

criminal conduct and require a sentence revision.

3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offenses and his character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On January 18, 2016, Pickett drove Kamie Ratcliff and her infant daughter to 

Pickett’s home with his wife Jasmine Pickett (“Jasmine”) and their three 

children. Kamie and her daughter stayed with the Picketts for three nights. On 

1

 Pickett was also convicted of obstruction of justice, a Level 6 felony; abuse of a corpse, a Level 6 felony; 

false informing, as a Class A misdemeanor; and failure to report a dead body, a Class A misdemeanor. In his 

prayer for relief in his brief on appeal, Pickett purports to request that we vacate all of his convictions. 

However, in his opening statement at trial, Pickett’s defense counsel explicitly stated that Pickett was “guilty” 

of each of the offenses listed above and only contested the murder charge. Tr. Vol. 5 at 61. Because Pickett 

expressly conceded his guilt at trial, to the extent he appeals those convictions here, any alleged error was 

invited. See Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 975 (Ind. 2014).
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the morning of January 21, Kamie told the Picketts that she wanted to go 

home. Jasmine, Kamie, and Kamie’s daughter got into Pickett’s red Chevrolet 

Blazer, with Pickett in the driver’s seat. As they were driving, Kamie asked 

Pickett to drive her to a friend’s house, but Pickett refused. Pickett told Kamie 

that he would drive her to her boyfriend’s house or to her mother’s house. 

Kamie became angry and threatened that both Pickett and Jasmine would “go 

to jail.” Tr. Vol. 7 at 37. Pickett became angry and yelled at Kamie. Kamie, 

who was sitting in the back seat with her daughter, hit Pickett. And at some 

point, Pickett hit Jasmine so hard that Jasmine lost consciousness. A short time 

later, Jasmine heard a gunshot and regained consciousness. Pickett had shot 

Kamie in the head. Pickett told Jasmine to put her head down, and she 

complied. Jasmine heard “gurgling” sounds coming from the back seat of the 

vehicle. Id. at 44.

[4] Pickett drove to his home. Jasmine got out of the Blazer, Pickett backed the 

Blazer into the garage, and Pickett “handed [Jasmine] the baby.” Id. at 48. 

Jasmine took Kamie’s daughter inside the home. At some point, Pickett left for 

a few hours and came home. The next day, January 22, Pickett drove to his 

sister’s house. Pickett told his sister, Allayna O’Neal, that he needed a “safe 

vehicle to drive.” Tr. Vol. 5 at 81. Pickett also showed O’Neal a small pistol 

and two knives, and he told her that he had “shot a girl in the face.” Id. at 86. 

Pickett explained that “the girl” was in the backseat of his Blazer when she had

threatened to accuse him of “criminal confinement” and had “started punching 

him in the head.” Id. Pickett told O’Neal not to tell anyone. 
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[5] At some point, O’Neal’s boyfriend, Mel Roush, came home, and he agreed to 

let Pickett borrow his Subaru. Accordingly, the three of them drove three 

vehicles, including the Subaru and Pickett’s Blazer, to Pickett’s house. When 

they arrived, O’Neal saw a baby there, and someone told her that Jasmine was 

babysitting the baby. After a short time, Kamie’s mother and stepfather arrived 

to pick up Kamie’s daughter. Jasmine had called Kamie’s mother and said that 

she and Pickett “didn’t know where Kamie was” and had asked her to “come 

pick up the baby.” Tr. Vol. 7 at 52. Kamie’s stepfather returned to the Picketts’ 

home the following day looking for Kamie, but Pickett and Jasmine told him 

that “they had no idea where she was at.” Tr. Vol. 5 at 139. On January 24,

Kamie’s mother filed a missing person report with the Mitchell Police 

Department.

[6] On January 28, Pickett asked Jasmine to help him get Kamie’s body out of the 

Blazer. Jasmine saw Kamie’s body wrapped in a sheet in the backseat, and she 

saw Kamie’s feet. Jasmine told Pickett that she could not help him, and she 

proceeded to the front yard. Pickett then put Kamie’s body into a wood pile 

and started a fire. Pickett found Jasmine on the front porch and gave her a gun, 

and he told her to put the gun away. Jasmine took the gun and put it 

underneath their mattress inside the house.

[7] After a short time, officers with the Mitchell Police Department arrived at 

Pickett’s home. The officers had a search warrant to look for evidence related 

to Kamie. Officers questioned Pickett and Jasmine separately, and they 

observed the fire in the burn pile. At one point, an officer started poking 
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around the fire, and he saw what looked like a human “spinal column and rib 

cage” in the fire. Id. at 197. The officers arrested Pickett and Jasmine. Officers 

thereafter obtained and executed an additional search warrant for Pickett’s 

home and a search warrant for his Blazer.2

[8] The State initially charged Pickett with unlawful possession of a firearm by a 

serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony; obstruction of justice, a Level 6 felony; 

abuse of a corpse, a Level 6 felony; two counts of false informing, as Class A 

misdemeanors; and failure to report a dead body, a Class A misdemeanor. The 

State then charged Pickett with murder under a separate cause number. Pickett 

moved to suppress the evidence and alleged that the search of his home was 

unconstitutional. The trial court denied that motion following a hearing. Prior 

to trial, the State dismissed one count of false informing. A jury found Pickett 

guilty as charged on all counts but unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious 

violent felon. The trial was bifurcated, and the trial court found Pickett guilty 

on that count. The trial court entered judgment of conviction accordingly and 

sentenced Pickett to an aggregate term of eighty-four years executed. This 

appeal ensued.

2

 At some point, Pickett had removed from the Blazer door panels and trim pieces because of blood spatter.
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Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Search Warrant

[9] Pickett first contends that the trial court “abused its discretion in admitting all 

of the evidence at trial obtained from the issuance of the search warrants.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 12. Pickett maintains that the search warrants were not 

supported by probable cause and should not have been issued. We cannot 

agree.

[10] As our Supreme Court has explained,

[t]he existence of probable cause is evaluated pursuant to the 

“totality-of-the-circumstances” test. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 

213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983). 

Probable cause exists “when ‘there is a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 

place.’” U.S. v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 1499, 

164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. 

Ct. 2317). Significantly, “probable cause requires only a 

probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an 

actual showing of such activity.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 245 n.13, 

103 S. Ct. 2317. The trial court’s task is to determine whether 

“there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime 

will be found in a particular place[,]” id. at 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 

while a reviewing court must “ensure that the magistrate had a 

‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]’ that probable cause 

existed.” Id. at 238-39, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (quoting Jones v. US, 362 

U.S.257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)).

Eaton v. State, 889 N.E.2d 297, 299 (Ind. 2008).
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[11] Here, in support of the application for the first search warrant, Mitchell Police 

Department officer Matt England testified at a probable cause hearing that: 

Kamie’s mother had reported Kamie missing on January 24, 2016; “at the time 

[Kamie] was last seen she was residing with” Pickett and Jasmine at Pickett’s 

home; Pickett and Jasmine confirmed that Kamie had stayed with them but 

then “left without them knowing”; Kamie’s mother was concerned that Kamie 

“had not returned for the child”; the father of Kamie’s three older children said 

they had not heard from Kamie for over one week, which was “out of the 

ordinary”; Kamie usually checked on her older children “every couple of days”;

it was reported that Kamie might have been using “illegal substances”; and 

“law enforcement [was] concerned about her welfare” at that time. Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 2 at 196-201.

[12] Pickett asserts that, without any testimony, that “any illegal activity had 

occurred at Pickett’s home” and, given the “numerous plausible, legal reasons 

why [Kamie] could not be located,” there was no probable cause to support the 

initial search warrant of his home. Appellant’s Br. at 13. Pickett adds that “the 

officer failed to make any connection [between] Kamie’s disappearance and the 

items police believed might be found in the home.” Id. Pickett’s argument 

misses the mark.

[13] Here, at the time of the probable cause hearing, Kamie had been reported 

missing for several days. Pickett and Jasmine confirmed that no one had seen 

Kamie since she had last been seen at their home, where she had been living for 

a few days. Inexplicably, Pickett and Jasmine had Kamie’s infant daughter in 
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their care, and Kamie had not contacted her older children for more than one 

week, which was unusual for her. We hold that Officer England’s testimony 

sufficiently established probable cause for the initial search warrant for Pickett’s 

home. Once there, officers found human remains in the burn pit and obtained 

additional warrants. The evidence supports the trial court’s determination that 

sufficient probable cause supported the search warrants. We hold that the trial 

court did not err when it admitted the evidence officers obtained pursuant to 

those search warrants.

Issue Two: Episode of Criminal Conduct

[14] Pickett next contends that some of his offenses constitute an episode of criminal 

conduct and are subject to a sentencing cap. An “episode of criminal conduct” 

means offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, 

place, and circumstance. Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(b) (2018). And Indiana Code 

Section 35-50-1-2(c) provides in relevant part that, except for crimes of violence, 

the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment to which the defendant is 

sentenced for multiple felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal 

conduct “shall not exceed the period described in subsection (d).” Subsection 

(d) provides in relevant part that

the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment to which the 

defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an 

episode of criminal conduct may not exceed the following: (1) If 

the most serious crime for which the defendant is sentenced is a 

Level 6 felony, the total of the consecutive terms of 

imprisonment may not exceed four (4) years. . . .
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Id.

[15] Here, Pickett maintains that “the total of the consecutive terms of 

imprisonment, with the exception of the sentences for murder and for the 

[serious violent felon] conviction, could not exceed 4 years[.]” Appellant’s Br. 

at 15. In other words, Pickett asserts that the offenses underlying his 

convictions other than for murder and unlawful possession of a firearm 

constitute an episode of criminal conduct. However, as the State correctly 

points out, the episode of criminal conduct sentencing cap only applies to felony

convictions. Accordingly, Pickett can only challenge his sentences for 

obstruction of justice and abuse of a corpse. We thus address whether those 

two offenses constitute an episode of criminal conduct.

[16] Our supreme court has explained that, in determining whether multiple offenses 

constitute an episode of criminal conduct, the focus is on the timing of the 

offenses and the simultaneous and contemporaneous nature of the crimes. See 

Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1200 (Ind. 2006). Our courts have also held 

that, where a complete account of a crime can be given without referring to the 

other offense, the offenses are not a single “episode of criminal conduct.” 

Tedlock v. State, 656 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). However, our 

Supreme Court has stated that our courts’ emphasis on the “complete account” 

analysis “is a bit of an overstatement.” Reed, 856 N.E.2d at 1200. The Court

explained:

We are of the view that although the ability to recount each 

charge without referring to the other can provide additional 
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guidance on the question of whether a defendant’s conduct 

constitutes an episode of criminal conduct, it is not a critical 

ingredient in resolving the question. Rather, the statute speaks in 

less absolute terms: “a connected series of offenses that are 

closely connected in time, place, and circumstance.” I.C. § 35-

50-1-2(b). And as we have observed, “Tedlock emphasizes the 

timing of the offenses” and “refers to the ‘simultaneous’ and 

‘contemporaneous’ nature of the crimes which would constitute a 

single episode of criminal conduct.” Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 

290, 294 (Ind. 2002) (citing Tedlock, 656 N.E.2d at 276).

Id.

[17] Here, Pickett committed obstruction of justice when he “altered or damaged or 

removed from [the] crime scene[, the Blazer,] Kamie’s body, 2 door panels, 

multiple pieces of trim,” and the baby’s car seat. Tr. Vol. 8 at 39. And he 

committed abuse of a corpse when he burned Kamie’s body. On appeal, 

Pickett contends as follows:

It is true that the State alleged the offenses did not all occur on 

the same day. Yet it was unclear from the evidence presented 

when Pickett took apart the Blazer and began burning Kamie’s 

body. Nevertheless, offenses in a single episode of criminal 

conduct can occur over a period of time, so long as they are 

closely related in place and circumstance, as they were in this 

case. The offenses, with the exception of the murder, occurred at 

Pickett’s home, and each offense was a circumstance related to 

Kamie’s murder.

Appellant’s Br. at 17.
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[18] In short, Pickett emphasizes the relationship of the crimes to each other rather 

than the timing of the offenses. But we cannot say that “a complete account” of 

each offense cannot be given without referring to the other offense. Tedlock, 656 

N.E.2d at 276. Pickett destroyed evidence of the murder found in the Blazer, 

and he burned Kamie’s dead body. Those acts are related only in that they 

were both efforts to cover up the murder, but they are distinct in that they can 

each be described without reference to the other. Moreover, without evidence 

that the obstruction of justice and abuse of a corpse occurred simultaneously or 

contemporaneously, or even when they occurred, we cannot say that these two 

offenses constitute an episode of criminal conduct. See Reed, 856 N.E.2d at 

1200.

Issue Three: Sentence

[19] Finally, Pickett contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature 

of the offenses and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that 

“[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender.” This Court has often recognized that “[t]he advisory sentence is the 

starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the 

crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 

And the Indiana Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he principal role of 

appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers . . . but not achieve 

a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case. Defendant has the burden to persuade 
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us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate.” Shoun v. State, 

67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (citations omitted; omission in original).

[20] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate 

sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should 

receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 

2008). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day 

turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, 

the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given 

case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more 

appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. 

State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court 

“prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive 

light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and 

lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous 

traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 

111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[21] Here, the trial court imposed the maximum possible sentence of eighty-four 

years executed.

3

 Pickett contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of 

the nature of the offenses. In particular, Pickett “does not dispute that Kamie’s 

3

 The trial court imposed consecutive maximum sentences as follows: sixty-five years for murder; twelve 

years for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony; two and a half years 

each for obstruction of justice and abuse of a corpse, each Level 6 felonies; one year for false informing, as a 

Class A misdemeanor; and one year for failure to report a dead body, a Class A misdemeanor.
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murder occurred in front of her young daughter, which made this murder more 

egregious than others. But there was nothing remarkable about Pickett’s other 

offenses that would call for the maximum sentence on each one.” Appellant’s 

Br. at 18. We are not persuaded. Pickett has not directed us to “compelling 

evidence portraying in a positive light” the nature of the offenses. Stephenson, 

29 N.E.3d at 122. Accordingly, we defer to the trial court and cannot say that 

his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses. Id.

[22] Pickett next contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character. 

Pickett points out that he had “a difficult childhood”; only completed the sixth 

grade in school; was employed but “had stress and anxiety” due to “financial 

instability”; relied on marijuana “to ease his anxiety”; and had a “good 

relationship” with his four children. Appellant’s Br. at 19. Pickett asserts that 

his offenses are not “the worst” and he is not “the most depraved” of offenders. 

Id.

[23] Pickett’s criminal history includes multiple adjudications as a juvenile 

delinquent in 1998 and 1999, including adjudications for burglary, theft, 

receiving stolen property, marijuana possession, and carrying a handgun 

without a license. Pickett’s adult criminal history includes four misdemeanors, 

including battery and resisting law enforcement. In addition, Pickett violated 

the terms of his probation in 2002. Moreover, as the State points out, Jasmine 

testified that Pickett was physically and psychologically abusive to her. Finally, 

Pickett has not directed us to evidence of any “substantial virtuous traits or 

persistent examples of good character” to support a revision of his sentence 
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based on his character. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. We cannot say that 

Pickett’s sentence is inappropriate in light of his character, and we affirm his 

sentence.

[24] Affirmed.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.