NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.D., R.D., and 

F.D.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0025 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County 

No. B8015JD202004046 

The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Harris & Winger PC, Flagstaff 

By Chad Joshua Winger 

Counsel for Appellant Michelle G. 

The Law Offices of Robert Casey, Phoenix 

By Robert Ian Casey 

 Counsel for Appellant Benjamin D. 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson 

By Autumn Spritzer 

Counsel for Appellee 

Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman 

By Bobbie Shin 

Counsel for Appellee Children 

FILED 09-03-2024
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.D., et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins 

joined. 

H O W E, Judge: 

¶1 Michelle G. (“Mother”) and Benjamin D. (“Father”) appeal 

from the order terminating their parental rights. Because reasonable 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s best-interests finding, we affirm the 

termination order. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Mother and Father are the parents of four children, D.D. (born 

2006), E.D. (born 2009), R.D. (born 2013), and F.D. (born 2015). This appeal 

involves only the three minor children. 

¶3 In August 2020, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) 

received a report alleging that adults in the family’s home were sexually 

abusing the children. When DCS employees arrived at the home, they 

found that the police were already there because of a verbal argument 

between Father and the children’s step-grandfather. After speaking to the 

children about the alleged sexual abuse and observing the home’s filthy 

state, DCS employees took emergency temporary custody of the children. 

DCS subsequently placed the children in foster homes and petitioned for a 

dependency. 

¶4 A month after the children’s removal, the juvenile court 

adjudicated them dependent as to both parents and ordered a 

family-reunification case plan. The court also directed DCS to provide the 

parents with reunification services. As the dependency case moved 

forward, DCS offered the parents individual counseling, parent aide 

services, parenting classes, psychological evaluations, transportation, 

supervised visitation, and referrals to community resources. As part of the 

parents’ case plan, DCS also stressed to them that they needed to find 

appropriate housing for the children. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.D., et al. 

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¶5 The parents engaged in these services and developed a better 

understanding of their children’s needs and how to protect them. The 

parents also consistently attended supervised visits, which usually went 

well. From October 2022 to July 2023, the parents progressed to 

unsupervised visits. In July 2023, however, DCS reinstated supervision 

following Father’s arrest during a visit and Mother’s arrest while traveling 

to a visit. Although the parents had worked on their case plans for three 

years, they still had no safe home for the children. 

¶6 In July 2023, DCS submitted a progress report recommending 

that the court change the case plan to severance and adoption “if a suitable 

residence cannot be verified by the hearing date.” At the next review 

hearing, the parents failed to appear because they were in jail. In light of the 

parents’ circumstances, DCS moved to change the case plan to severance 

and adoption, which the court granted. 

¶7 In January 2024, the juvenile court held a one-day termination 

trial. The DCS case manager testified that the parents stayed in contact with 

DCS and were mostly engaged in DCS services. She further testified that 

although the parents had benefited from some of these services and 

increased their ability to care for their children, they still struggled to put 

the children’s needs before their own. When asked what was preventing 

the parents from reunifying with the children, the case manager answered 

that it was “safe and stable housing.” She went on to state that “[t]he 

parents don’t have a home for them to live in. We don’t know that the 

parents would be able to provide the children’s basic need[s].” 

¶8 The case manager also testified that E.D. has autism and R.D. 

potentially has dyslexia, creating special needs. She testified that the 

children’s foster placements were able to meet the children’s special needs. 

She also testified that the children were adoptable and that their foster 

parents were appropriate adoptive placements. She opined that 

terminating the parent-child relationship was in the children’s best interests 

because it would “open the children up for permanency” and would 

prevent them from lingering in foster care. She acknowledged, however, 

that “[n]one of [the children] want to be adopted” and that the children 

want to return home. 

¶9 Mother next testified that she was on the wait list for an 

apartment and asked for more time to secure an apartment for the children. 

Father then testified that he had applied for an apartment and found a job 

as a cook. He expressed concern about the children’s religious upbringing 

in their foster homes. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.D., et al. 

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¶10 At the end of trial, the court ruled from the bench that DCS 

had proved the statutory grounds for termination as to both parents by 

clear and convincing evidence. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The court found 

that “as of today each parent lacks suitable housing for the children” and 

that this condition “has lasted for well-over 3 years, almost 3 and-a-half 

years.” The court noted that “the concerns go beyond just the housing; but 

again, that seems to be the main concern by the Department given today’s 

testimony.” The court found that DCS offered the parents “numerous 

services” and that the parents engaged in some services but were unable to 

demonstrate behavioral changes that would resolve DCS’s safety concerns. 

The court also found that “each parent continues to struggle with 

understanding the children’s needs and the safety concerns raised by the 

Department.” The court found“a substantial likelihood that the parents will 

not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care and control 

in the near future.” The juvenile court told the parties that it would take the 

issue of best interests under advisement and issue a ruling as soon as 

possible. The juvenile court memorialized the court’s oral findings on 

statutory grounds in an unsigned minute entry. 

¶11 On January 29, 2024, the juvenile court entered a written order 

terminating parental rights. The court referred to its prior rulings that DCS 

proved the time-in-care statutory ground for termination, although it did 

not expressly restate those findings in the written order, which would have 

been the better practice. See A.R.S. § 8-538(A); Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 241 ¶ 25 (App. 2012). Regardless, the court made detailed 

best-interests findings and concluded that “terminating parental rights will 

serve the children’s best interests by allowing them to continue to live in 

safe, stable homes where their needs can be met, and they can thrive.” The 

court also concluded that “while the parents engaged in reunification 

services and made progress in certain areas, there remains a significant risk 

of abuse or neglect to the children if the motion for termination is denied.” 

¶12 The parents timely appealed from the termination order. We 

have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A), 12-2101(A); Ariz. R.P. 

Juv. Ct. 601(a). 

DISCUSSION 

¶13 A parent’s fundamental right to custody and control of his or 

her child is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 

248–49 ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). The juvenile court may terminate the parent-child 

relationship if DCS proves by clear and convincing evidence at least one of 

the statutory grounds set forth in A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Id. at 249 ¶ 12. The court 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.D., et al. 

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must also find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the 

child’s best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 22 (2005). 

Because the juvenile court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, 

observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed 

facts,” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334 ¶ 4 (App. 2004), 

we will accept its factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence and 

inferences and will affirm the order terminating parental rights unless it is 

clearly erroneous, Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478–79 ¶¶ 

30–31 (2023). We do not reweigh the evidence. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004). 

¶14 In this case, because the juvenile court terminated parental 

rights under the time-in-care statutory ground, DCS was required to prove, 

among other requirements, that it “made a diligent effort to provide [the 

parents] appropriate reunification services.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). What 

constitutes a diligent effort will vary, but “at the least” DCS must “identify 

the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services 

that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as 

they arise throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with 

the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where 

compliance proves difficult.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 

23 ¶ 50 (App. 2019). 

I. Father Waived His Argument that DCS Failed To Make a Diligent 

Effort To Provide Appropriate Reunification Services to Father. 

¶15 Father contends DCS failed to fulfill its diligent-effort 

obligation because it did not provide him with housing assistance or direct 

him to services to help him with housing. DCS responds that he waived this 

argument by not raising it in the juvenile court. 

¶16 Because the juvenile court is in the best position to evaluate 

the adequacy of reunification efforts, a parent is precluded from 

challenging these efforts for the first time on appeal. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179 ¶ 16 (App. 2014) (holding that when 

“the court finds that [DCS] has made reasonable efforts to provide such 

services . . . , a parent who does not object in the juvenile court is precluded 

from challenging that finding on appeal”). Thus, if Father believed that DCS 

was not making diligent efforts “at any point, it was incumbent on [him] to 

promptly bring those concerns to the attention of the juvenile court.” Id. at 

179 ¶ 18. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.D., et al. 

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¶17 During this dependency case, the juvenile court held 13 

review hearings. At each of those hearings, DCS submitted a progress 

report to the court describing the services it offered to the parents. The court 

found that DCS had made reasonable efforts to provide the parents

appropriate reunification services. Father never objected to these 

reasonable-efforts findings in the minute entries. 

¶18 Further, during the trial, Father did not argue that DCS’s 

efforts to help him find housing were inadequate. He did not object when 

the case manager testified that the parents never requested additional 

services from DCS. For these reasons, he has waived his challenge to the 

adequacy of the services DCS offered him. See id. at 178 ¶ 16 (“[The 

dependency] process demands that parents voice their concerns about 

services to the juvenile court in a timely manner.”). 

II. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Best-Interests 

Finding. 

¶19 Mother and Father both challenge the juvenile court’s 

best-interests finding, arguing that the court’s finding was an abuse of 

discretion and deficient as a matter of law. We review a best-interests 

finding for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if “no reasonable 

evidence [] support[s] [the finding].” Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47 ¶ 8 

(citations omitted). When considering the child’s best interests, the court 

must consider the totality of the circumstances, which includes the child’s 

stability and security. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150–51 

¶¶ 12–13 (2018). 

¶20 To prove that termination is in the child’s best interests, DCS 

must show either: (1) the child will benefit from the termination; or (2) the 

child will be harmed if the termination is denied. Id. at 150 ¶ 13. The court 

may find a child would benefit from termination if DCS has an adoption 

plan or if the child is adoptable. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3–4 

¶ 12 (2016). The court may also find that a child will benefit from the 

permanency and stability that an adoption would provide. Oscar O., 209 

Ariz. at 337 ¶ 16. When a prospective adoptive placement is meeting the 

child’s needs and the child’s adoption is both legally possible and likely, 

the court may find that termination of the parental rights is in the child’s 

best interests. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4 ¶ 12 (internal citations omitted). 

A. The Juvenile Court’s Benefit Finding 

¶21 Mother argues that, as a matter of law, the juvenile court’s 

best-interests finding fails because the court could not make a requisite 
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Decision of the Court 

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“benefit” finding that “the children will obtain a permanent, stable, and 

secure home through a future adoption.” She asserts the children’s 

“opposition to termination renders adoption problematic and possibly a 

legal impossibility for any of the Children over the age of 12.” See A.R.S. 

§ 8-106(A)(3); see also Titus S. v. Dep’t Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 371, 373 

¶¶ 24, 30 (App. 2018) (reversing the termination order because the children, 

who were over the age of 12, “consistently stated their intent to withhold” 

their consent to any adoption, and the court made no other benefit or 

detriment finding). 

¶22 Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the evidence presented at trial 

supports the juvenile court’s finding that the children will benefit from the 

termination. The case manager testified that the children are adoptable, 

their foster parents are adoptive placements, and the foster parents are 

meeting the children’s special needs. In addition, the record contains 

several progress reports DCS submitted describing the children’s special 

needs and detailing how the foster parents were successfully meeting those 

needs. From this evidence, the court could reasonably infer that the 

proposed adoptions were legally possible and likely to occur if the 

parent-child relationship were terminated. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3 

¶ 9 (“Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence 

and assess witness credibility, we accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact 

if reasonable evidence and inferences support them[.]”). Therefore, the 

juvenile court’s finding that the children will benefit from termination 

because “all three children are adoptable” and in “a potential adoptive 

placement” is supported by evidence from trial and is not legal error. 

B. The Juvenile Court’s Detriment Finding 

¶23 The parents also challenge the juvenile court’s findings that 

the children would be harmed if termination were denied. First, Father 

points to A.R.S. § 8-538(A), which requires that “[e]very order of the court 

terminating the parent-child relationship . . . be in writing and . . . recite the 

findings on which the order is based[.]” He argues the juvenile court’s 

detriment findings are deficient under this statute because the court 

focused on allegations of neglect and abuse from years before DCS removed 

his children and contain no findings about his current circumstances. 

¶24 The purpose of requiring written findings is to enable this 

court to determine exactly which issues the juvenile court decided and 

whether the court correctly applied the law. Ruben M., 230 Ariz. at 240 ¶ 24. 

Thus, the juvenile court need not detail each fact that supports its ruling, 

Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 451–52 ¶ 19 (App. 2007), 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.D., et al. 

Decision of the Court 

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but must include all “ultimate facts” relied upon in reaching its decision, 

Ruben M., 230 Ariz. at 241 ¶ 25. 

¶25 In the termination order, the juvenile court made several 

record-supported findings explaining the court’s best-interests 

determination. The court found, for instance, that (1) “neither parent has 

been able to provide an appropriate, stable, and safe residence for their 

children” for more than ten years; (2) the children have special needs, and 

“the parents have not demonstrated an understanding of those needs or an 

ability to adequately address them going forward”; and (3) despite the case 

lasting three-and-a-half years, “[t]he parents have been unable to 

demonstrate safety or stability.” These findings are sufficient under A.R.S. 

§ 8-538(A) to explain how the court reached its conclusion that the children 

would be harmed if the termination motion were denied. 

¶26 Second, Mother argues that these same detriment findings fail 

to properly consider the children’s wish to retain a parent-child relationship 

with her. In the best-interests stage of the analysis, “[t]he weight of the 

presumption that the child shares the parent’s interest in preserving the 

family relationship is greatly reduced by the potential harm to the child 

from maintaining a relationship with an unfit parent.” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 

285 ¶ 31. In determining best interests, the court’s “foremost concern” is 

“the child’s interest in stability and security.” Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

251 Ariz. 574, 583 ¶ 27 (2021) (cleaned up). 

¶27 The termination order shows that the juvenile court carefully 

considered the totality of the circumstances, including evidence of the 

children’s bond and desire to reunify with their parents. The court 

expressly recognized that “[t]he children love and support their parents 

and want their parents to have more time to reunify.” Although the 

children’s bonded relationship was a factor for the juvenile court to 

consider, it is not dispositive in addressing best interests. See Dominique M. 

v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 99 ¶ 12 (App. 2016). As noted, the record 

supports the court’s finding that continuing the relationship with the 

parents would harm the children. We will not reweigh that evidence. Mary 

Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47 ¶ 8. 

¶28 Third, Mother argues that so long as the children remain 

dependent, DCS and the juvenile court can continue to protect them from 

any risk of parental abuse, neglect, or emotional harm by managing the 

parents’ relationship with the children. But Arizona law recognizes that 

long-term foster care is harmful to children. See Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 476 ¶ 23 (App. 2022) (explaining that “the legislature’s 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.D., et al. 

Decision of the Court 

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intent to avoid having children linger in foster care echoes throughout other 

grounds justifying termination in § 8-533(B),” including (B)(8)). 

Additionally, the “juvenile court may find that continuing the parent-child 

relationship would be detrimental to the child’s well-being because the 

child would linger in care with no prospect of reunifying with the parent.” 

Steven M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 254 Ariz. 426, 431 ¶ 15 (App. 2023). 

¶29 Here, Mother has not challenged the juvenile court’s finding 

of statutory grounds for termination, including its finding that she is 

unlikely to be able to provide the children with a safe and stable home in 

the near future. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c) (requiring that the court find “a 

substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising 

proper and effective parental care and control in the near future”); Crystal 

E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577–78 ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (explaining

that a party’s failure to challenge the time-in-care ground constitutes

waiver and abandonment of the claim). Under these circumstances, the

juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the termination

will protect the children from “a significant risk of abuse or neglect” and

allow “them to continue to live in safe, stable homes where their needs can

be met, and they can thrive.” These findings support the court’s

best-interests determination and are supported by evidence in the record.

CONCLUSION 

¶30 For these reasons, we affirm.