UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4162

DESHAWN SANDERSON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge.

(CR-00-118)

Submitted: October 31, 2001

Decided: December 6, 2001

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Bruce C. Sams, SAMS & SCOTT, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant. Kenneth E. Melson, United States Attorney, Raymond E.

Patricco, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

DeShawn Sanderson appeals his conviction and sentence entered

after a jury trial for his possession of a firearm in violation of 18

U.S.C.A. § 922(g) (West 2000), and for maintaining a place for distribution and use of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 856(a)(1) (1994). Sanderson, a previously convicted felon, was

arrested and convicted after local authorities obtained and executed a

search warrant for Sanderson’s residence and discovered a shotgun,

a quantity of marijuana, crack cocaine residue, and various paraphernalia. On appeal, Sanderson contends that the search warrant was

invalid and that evidence gathered from its execution and later in the

investigation should have been suppressed. Sanderson also claims that

the district court erred in admitting evidence pertaining to his behavior prior to the offense conduct and suggests that the verdict was not

supported by sufficient evidence. Sanderson also raises several issues

regarding his sentencing. Finding no merit to any of his claims of

error, we affirm Sanderson’s conviction and sentence. 

As a threshold matter, we have no difficulty concluding that the

district court did not err in determining that the warrant was supported

by a proper finding of probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 238 (1983); United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th

Cir. 1998). This conclusion forecloses the possibility that Sanderson’s

post-arrest statements could be considered the "fruit of the poisonous

tree." See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-84 (1963);

see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 107 (1980). In addition,

the court properly admitted Sanderson’s statement regarding the location of the shotgun under the "public safety" exception to the requirement that a putative defendant be warned of his constitutional rights.

See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984). Neither did the

court abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Sanderson’s

actions prior to his arrest for these offenses. See Cook v. American

S.S. Co., 53 F.3d 733, 742 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Mark, 943

F.2d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1991). The evidence of Sanderson’s prior

threatening behavior was relevant, necessary, and reliable. United

States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460, 1464-65 (4th Cir. 1995). 

2 UNITED STATES v. SANDERSON
Sanderson next contends that the Government’s evidence was

insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. A jury’s verdict must be

upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support it. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In determining whether the evidence in the record is substantial, this court

views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and

inquires whether there is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact

could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Burgos,

94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this court does not review the credibility of

witnesses and assumes that the jury resolved all contradictions in the

testimony for the government. See United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d

359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998). Our review of trial transcript reveals that the

evidence presented by the Government was sufficient to convince a

reasonable trier of fact of Sanderson’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt of both possession of the shotgun and maintaining a place for

the distribution and use of controlled substances. 

Sanderson’s claims of error at sentencing are similarly without

merit. The district court calculated the amount of controlled substance

used in determining the Base Offense Level based on trial testimony

and committed no clear error in doing so. United States v. D’Anjou,

16 F.3d 604, 614 (4th Cir. 1994). Further, the district court did not

err in finding that Sanderson’s perjury at trial warranted the application of a two-level enhancement under USSG § 3C1.1. United States

v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 92-98 (1993). Finally, there is no merit to

Sanderson’s cursory claims that the district court erred in failing to

depart downward based on either the drug amount or the disparate

impact of crack as opposed to powder cocaine because there is no evidence that the district court mistakenly believed it lacked the authority

to depart. See United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214, 230 (4th Cir.

1998). In addition, the disparate sentencing argument concerning the

form of cocaine and its racial implications has been uniformly

rejected. United States v. Banks, 130 F.3d 621, 626 (4th Cir. 1997).*

*We have considered and rejected the possibility that Sanderson’s

conviction and sentence are affected by this court’s recent decision in

United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397 (4th Cir. 2001), as suggested in

Sanderson’s pro se Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter. 

UNITED STATES v. SANDERSON 3
Accordingly, Sanderson’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

4 UNITED STATES v. SANDERSON