alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
TRAVIS TUCKER

,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA

,

Respondent.

___________________________/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D 16

- 5247

Opinion filed December 9, 2016.

Petition Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

-- Original

Jurisdiction

.

Travis Tucker, pro se

, Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee , for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

The petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied on the

merits.

ROBERTS, C.J., ROWE and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

REGINALD BRYANT,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 371 EAL 2021

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

REGINALD BRYANT,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 372 EAL 2021

Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 23rd day of February, 2022, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal

is DENIED.
#### Delamater *against*Smith.

"Where acase, ^llfverdicq is noticed for the opposite party intends to object to the argument coming on at the day, on any ground of irregularity, he must give notice of an application to the Court, for that purpose, as in *non-enumerated motions,*to strike the cause off the calendar, as the objection will not be heard when the cause is called on for argumerit.

*TALCOT,*for the plaintiff, moved to bring on the argtiment of this case, on the usual notice, and affidavit of service.

*3
      *Cady,*contra, objected to the argument being called on, on the ground that a copy of the case had not been served on the defendant’s attorney, and offered to read an affidavit to that purpose.

*Talcot*objected to the reading of the affidavit, as such a practice would lead to surprise, and the Court would be hearing a non-enumerated motion on a day fixed for hearing enumerated motions.

*Per Curiam.*

We shall not let the argument come on, or permit a judgment to be taken by default, in this case. But we think proper to lay down a rule, as to the practice in future, that, wherever a *case, derrturrer,*or *special verdict,*shall be duly noticed for argument, the Court will not hear any suggestion or affidavit, on a day for enumerated motions, to put off the argument, when the cause is called on the calendar. But where, on the cause being noticed for argument, either party intends to object to the cause coming on to argument, he must give notice of an application to the Court for that purpose, as in non-enumerated motions, to strike, the cause off the calendar of enumerated motions,
#### HUNTINGTON v. SAUNDERS.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

October 9, 1896.)

No. 142.

On Motion for Rehearing. For former opinions, see 18 C. C. A. 409, 72 Fed. 10; 16 Sup. Ct. 1120.

Before COLT, Circuit Judge, and WEBB, District Judge.

PER CURIAM.

Since this cause was decided by the court of appeals, one of the judges who took part in the hearing and decision has deceased. The survivors have presented to them this petition for a rehearing, and must act upon it without his counsel and aid. ' The original decision was without any diversity of opin*395ion among the judges, Judge Carpenter delivering the opinion of the court. Neither of the survivors personally desires a rehearing, and although, if they had encountered any hesitation of their deceased associate in the decision of the case, they might now feel disposed to grant a rehearing, they do not feel it to be their duty, contrary to their own views, to allow the petition. Petition for a rehearing is denied; mandate to issue forthwith.
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (a)
    
    the Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended June 30, 2008 filed on the date
hereof with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report) fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (b)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 By:
    /s/ KENNETH D. TUCHMANKenneth D. TuchmanChairman and Chief Executive Officer
**EXHIBIT32.2**

 

**CALIPER LIFE SCIENCES, INC.**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

 

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

 

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

 

**SECTION 906 OF THESARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of Caliper Life Sciences, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Qfor the quarter ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Peter F. McAree,Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company certify,pursuant to the requirement set forth in Rule 13a-14(b) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”) and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tothe best of my knowledge that:

 

(1)                      The Report fully complies with therequirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and

 

(2)                      The information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultof operations of the Company.

 

 
|                       | /s/ PETER F. MCAREE                                |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
|                       |                                               |
|                       | Peter F. McAree                                    |
|                       | Senior Vice President  and Chief Financial Officer |
|                       | (Principal Financial  Officer)                     |
|                       |                                               |
|                       |                                               |
| Date: August 7,  2009 |                                               |

 

1

----
In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02-21-00004-CR

EX PARTE ERIC RANDALL HINKLE §

§

§

§

§

On Appeal from the 372nd District 

Court

of Tarrant County (0708720R)

April 8, 2021

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion

(nfp)

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that the 

appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for want of 

jurisdiction.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

PER CURIAM
| (logo)  WELLS                                                    | Commercial Mortgage Servicing |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| **          **FARGO | D1086-120, 12th Floor         |
|                                                                  | 550 South Tryon Street        |
|                                                                  | Charlotte, NC 28202           |
|                                                                  | 1-800-326-1334                |

 

 

ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

 

Reference is hereby made to that certain Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of August 1, 20 1 3, by and among GS Mortgage Securities Corporation II, as Deposit or, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Master Servicer and Certificate Administrator, LNR Partners, L LC, as Special Servicer, Pentalpha Surveillance L LC, as Operating Advisor and Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas as Trustee, with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through GS MS Certificates Series 2013 -GCJ14 ( the "Agreement"). Capitalized terms used herein not otherwise defined s hall have the meanings assigned in the Agreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 1 0.07 of this Agreement, I, Daniel Bober, Executive Vice President of Commercial Mortgage Services do hereby certify that:

 

1 .        A review of the activities of the Master Servicer during the period from January 1, 2014 through December 31, 20 14 (the “Reporting Period”), and of its performance per the Agreement during such period has been made under my supervision, and

 

2 .        To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Master Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the Reporting Period.

 

 

 

 

 

IN WI T N E SS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate as of the 6 th day of March 201 5.

 

 

 

                                         

/s/ Daniel Bober

Daniel B ober

Executive Vice President

Wells Fargo Bank 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
| Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo) Together we’ll go far |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|
CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY

#### Voelker v. Voelker

January 26, 1983

Case No. (Chancery) 33529

By THOMAS R. MONROE

Under advisement is the Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service of Process. I have carefully considered your arguments and examined the authorities submitted by you.

The question presented is the matter of service of process, Subpoena in Chancery and Bill of Complaint, Chancery No. 33529, on the Defendant in the Courthouse on November 9, 1982, when Defendant appeared in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court for a final hearing involving custody and support of the minor child of the parties.

Defendant contends that he appeared pursuant to the Summons and Court Order, and thus such appearance was voluntary, rendering the service of process in this case before this Court invalid.

Complainant, on the other hand, contends that the service of process is valid.

Defendant has submitted the case of *Wheeler*v. *Flintoff and Yonan,*156 Va. 923 (1931), as his authority bearing upon his exemption from service of process. In the *Wheeler*case the Supreme Court of Virginia held:

> The privilege, or exemption from service of a civil process on a witness, while attending court in a State other than the State of his *79residence, seems to be almost universally recognized. . .

Section 19.2-280 of the *Code of Virginia*provides that:

> If a person comes into this State in obedience to a summons directing him to attend and testify in this State he shall not while in this State pursuant to such summons be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this State under the summons.

Here the non-resident Defendant voluntarily appeared pursuant to the Summons and Notice. I am of the opinion, after considering *Wheeler*v. *Flintoff, supra,*and *Davis*v. Hackney, 196 Va. 651 (1955), and Section 19.2-280, *Code of*Virginia, that a similar exemption applies to an out-of-state person, here Defendant, who is only involved in civil litigation in Virginia. The Motion to Quash Service of Process is granted.
C HIEF J USTICE

C AROLYN W RIGHT

J USTICES

D AVID L. B RIDGES

M OLLY F RANCIS

D OUGLAS S. L ANG

E LIZABETH L ANG

- M IERS

R OBERT M. F ILLMORE

L

ANA M YERS

D AVID E VANS

D AVID L EWIS

A DA B ROWN

C RAIG S TODDART

B ILL W HITEHILL

D AVID J. S CHENCK L ISA M ATZ

C LERK OF THE C OURT

(214) 712

- 3450

theclerk@5th.txcourts.gov

G AYLE H UMPA

B USINESS A DMINISTRATOR

(214) 712

- 3434

gayle.humpa@ 5th.txcourts.gov

F ACSIMILE

(214) 745

- 1083

I NTERNET

WWW

. TXCOURTS

. GOV /5 THCOA

. ASPX 

## Court of Appeals

**Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**

600 C OMMERCE S TREET

, S UITE 200

D ALLAS

, T EXAS 75202

(214) 712

- 3400



### September 22, 2015

Mr. Thomas Clark

Ms. Jill Malouf

Clark, Malouf & White, L.L.P.

12222 Merit Drive, Suite 340

Dallas, Texas 75251

RE: Court of Appeals Number: 05

- 15

- 00916

- CV

Trial Court Case Number: DC

- 15

- 04034

Style: GeoTag, Inc. v. Lawrence P. How orth

Dear Counsel:

The Court has reviewed the clerk’s record and has a question concerning our jurisdiction

over the appeal. Specifically, there does not appear to be a n appealable order . This Court has

jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgmen ts and those interlocutory orders specifically

authorized by statute. See Lehmann v. Har

- Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). A final

judgment is on e that disposes of all parties and all claims. See id

.

Appellant is appealing the trial court’s or der granting a motion to compel arbitration

. A

party may appeal an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. See T EX



### . C IV



### . P RAC



### . & R EM



### . C ODE 

### A NN



### . § 171.098(a)(1) (West 201 1 ). There is no statutory authority for appealing an order

granting a motion t o compel arbitration. See Brooks v. Pep Boys Automotive Supercenters , 104

S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).

So that this Court can determine its jurisdiction over the appeal, appellant is requested to

file, by OCTOBER 2, 2015 , a letter brief of no more than 3 pages explaining how this Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal. Appellee may file a responsive letter brief of no more than 3 pag es

within 10 days of appellant’s brief. No extension of time will be granted. If either party will be

relying on information not in the record before this Court, that party must obtain a supplemental

clerk’s record from the trial court containing that information.

We suspend the current deadline for appellant’s brief on the merits . After i t has

received briefs regarding the jurisdictional issue, the Court will either: (1) dismiss the appeal for

want of jurisdiction; or (2) notify the parties by letter that the Court appears to have jurisdiction

### 2 over the appeal and of the new deadline for a ppellant’s brief . We caution appellant that failure to

file a jurisdictional brief by OCTOBER 2 , 2015 , may result in dismissal of the appeal without

further notice.

Respectfully,

/s/ Lisa Matz, Clerk of the Court

cc: Mr. William Dunn

Du nn Sheehan, LLP

3400 Carlisle St., Suite 200

Dallas, Texas 75204

LM/rz
Exhibit 31.1

ICONIX BRAND GROUP, INC.

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14 OR 15D-14 OF

THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, John Haugh, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Annual
Report on Form 10-K/A for the period ended December 31, 2015 of Iconix Brand Group, Inc.; and

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain
any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.



|                                                
|------------------------------------------------
|Date: April 29, 2016                            
|                                                
|/s/ John Haugh                                  
|John Haugh President and Chief Executive
Officer
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

MARTHA BAÑUELOS CANALES,

Appellant,

v.

BENITO MARTINEZ,

Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-22-00098-CV

Appeal from the

County Court at Law #4

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2022-CCV00232)

O R D E R

The Court has granted Appellant’s correspondence filed on September 2, 2022, which has 

been construed as a motion for rehearing. It is therefore ordered that the opinion and judgment 

dated August 30, 2022 are hereby withdrawn.

Further, the reporter’s record is due thirty (30) days from the date of this order. If there is 

no reporter’s record the Appellant’s brief is due thirty (30) days from the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 20TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2022.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Chief Justice

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
#### Jose Antonio MEZA-CASTILLO, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-72407.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 20, 2007 *.

Filed Dec. 28, 2007.

Eudene B. Eunique, Esq., Ontario, CA, for Petitioner.

Regional Counsel, Western Region Immigration & Naturalization Service, Laguna Niguel, CA, Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Legal Officer, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.

Before GOODWIN, WALLACE, and HAWKINS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Jose Antonio Meza-Castillo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming without opinion an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, *Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales,*468 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir.2006), and we grant the petition for review.

The agency’s decisions preceded our determination in *United States v. Vidal,*504 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc), that a conviction under Cal. Vehicle Code § 10851(a) is not categorically an aggravated felony. *See id.*at 1086. Moreover, as the government recognizes, the record of conviction in this case does not establish the factual predicate for Meza-Castillo’s plea. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review and remand for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. *See Ruiz-Vidal v. Gonzales,*473 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir.2007).

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 13.2  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Luxottica Group S.p.A. (the Company) for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2014 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Adil Mehboob-Khan, Chief Executive Officer for Markets of the Company, certify to my knowledge, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that:  1.             The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2.             The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  By:
/s/   ADIL MEHBOOB-KHANAdil   Mehboob-KhanChief   Executive Officer for Markets   Dated: April 24, 2015  This written statement accompanies the Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6402

ANTOINE LORENZO BOWDEN,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

HAROLD W. CLARKE, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, Chief District Judge. (2:17-cv-00196-RBS-LRL)

Submitted: September 13, 2018 Decided: September 18, 2018

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Antoine Lorenzo Bowden, Appellant Pro Se. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Antoine Lorenzo Bowden seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) 

petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district 

court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the 

dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of 

the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Bowden has not 

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED