FIRST DIS TRICT SIXTH DIVISION APRIL 29, 2011 No. 1-10- 1152 ) JOSEPH M. FERGUSON, as Inspe ctor General of the ) Ci ty of Ch i cago, ) Appe al fro m the ) Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Pl ai n ti f f -A pp el l an t, ) Co o k C o un t y.

) v. ) No. 09 CH 43287 ) MARA S . G EO RGE S, as Co rp or at ion Co unse l of t he ) Ho no r ab le Ci ty of Ch i cago, ) Nancy J. Arnold, ) Judge Presidin

g. Defe ndan t-Appell ee. )

) JUS TI CE ROB ER T E . G ORD ON d elivered t he judg ment o f the co ur t , w ith o pinion. Jus t ice McB ride co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion. Jus t ice Ca hill

dissent ed, wit h op inion.

OPINI ON Thi s m atter is bef ore us to determi

ne wh ether defen

dant, Mara Georges, in

her off ic ia l
ca paci ty as th e c orp ora

ti on cou n se l of th e C i ty of Ch i ca go ( Cor porati on Cou n se l), is req

ui re d to pr od uce unr eda ct ed c op ies o f do cument s t hat she c laims are s hielded by t he at t or ney-client priv il ege to Jo seph F erguson, in hi s off ic ia l c apaci ty as i nspector general

of the Ci ty of Ch ic ago (I nspe ct or Gene ra l). Aft er t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l serve d t he Co rp or at ion Co unse l with a
su bp oen a f or th e docu

men ts a nd the Corp orati

on C oun se l

ref us ed to prov i dethe m , th e In sp ec tor General retained pri

vate counsel

and b rought suit agai

nst the Corporat ion C ounsel to compel product ion of

the unredacted documen ts pursuant to the subpoena. The Corpor ation Counsel filed a mo t io n t o dis miss pu r su an t t o bo t h se ct io ns 2
- 61 5 a nd 2- 61 9 o f t he Co de o f Civ il Pr oc edu re (Co de) (7 35 I LCS 5/ 2- 615 , 2 -6 19 ( West 200 8) ). The t rial co ur t gr ant ed t heNo. 1-10- 1152

2

Co rp or at ion Co unse l’s mot ion t o d ismiss, finding tha t t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l did no t have t he aut hor ity t o r et ain pr ivate co unse l and t hat t he do cument s we re pr ot ect ed by t he at t or ney-client priv il ege. The Inspecto r General appealed. For the reasons that foll ow, we reverse. BACK GROUND This ca se r evo lves in large par t ar ou nd t he po wer s and dut ies o f the Insp ect or Gene ra l and t he Co rp or at ion Co unse l. The re for e, a br ief discus sion o f the ir re spe ct ive offices is he lpful. T he Off ic e of Inspe ctor General

(IGO) is a m

unici pal off ic e created by

chapter 2-56 of the Chi

cago Muni ci pal Code (Munici

pal Code). Chic ago Munici

pal Code §2-56-010 et seq. (added Oct. 4, 1989). The duties of the IGO incl ude “in vestigat[ing] the performance of governmen tal offi cers, em pl oyee s, f un cti ons an d pr ogra m s,” ei the r i n r es pon se to a c om pl ai nt or on th e In sp ec tor Ge ne r al’ s o wn init iat ive , in o r de rt o “d et ec t an d p r ev en t misc o nd uc t , ine fficie nc y and wa st e w it hin the programs an

d operations of the ci

ty governm

ent.” Chi cago Munici

pal Code §2-56-030 (adde d Oct. 4, 1 989). The po wer s and dut ies o f the Insp ect or Gene ra l exte nd t o t he co nduc t of “all elect ed a nd ap po int ed o ffice r s o f t he cit y go ve rnme nt in t he pe r fo rman ce o f t he ir o fficia l du t ies ” a nd “a ll
em ploye es of

the c i ty g overn men t in the p erf orma nc e of thei r off i cial duti es,” ex cept f or me m bers of the ci ty counci l a nd thei r empl oyees. Ch

ic ago Munici

pal Code §2-56-050 (added Oct. 4, 19 89 )
. T he po we r s a nd du t ies o f t he I nsp ec t o rGe ne r al a lso ex t en d t o t he co nd uc t o f “a ll
con tractors a nd su bc ontr ac tors i n th e p rovi di ng of goods or s erv i ce s to th e c i ty pursuan t to a contract”; “busi

ness entities i n seeki ng contracts or cert if

ic ates of eligi

bi li ty f or city contracts”; and “ persons seeki

ng certif ic ation of el

igi bi li ty f or part ic ipa

tion i n an y c ity program.” Chi

cagoNo. 1-10- 1152

3

Mun i ci pal Code §2 -56-05 0. Ev ery “ of f i cer, em pl oyee , de pa rtm en t, ag en cy , con tractor, sub con

tractor an d l i cens eeof t he cit y” has a d ut y to co op er at e wit h t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l in any i nvest igat ion o r he ar ing undertaken pursuan

t t o t he Mun

ic ipa l C ode. Chic ago Munici

pal Code §2-56-090 (added Oct. 4, 19 89 ). Th e i

n v esti ga tory f i l es an d r ep ortsof

th e I GOare c on f

i den ti al an d c an n ot b e rel ea se d to any per so n or age ncy ot her t han t he Unit ed S t at es At t or ney, t he I lli nois At t or ney Gene ra l or t he S t at e’ s A t t o rne y o f Co o k C o un t y. The powers of the IGO i

ncl ude the power “[t]o is sue sub poenas to compel the a

tt endan ce of wi tne ss esf or pu rpos esof exam i na ti on a nd the prod uc ti on of docum en ts a nd othe r i tem s f or in spection an

d/or dupli cation.” Ch

ic ago Munici

pal Code §2-56-030. Once the Inspector General issues a su bpo ena, t he pe rso n t o w hom t he su bpo ena is d irect ed may file an objec t ion t o t he subpoena. “

For seven days af ter receipt of a tim

el y obj ection to a subpoena, the i nspector general shall ta ke no act ion t o e nfor ce t he su bpo ena o r t o init iate pr os ecu t ion o f the per so n t o w hom t he sub poena i s di

rected .” Ch

i cago M uni ci pal Code §2 -56-04 0 (add

ed Oct. 4, 1989). The off ic e of the Corporat ion C ounsel is created by

section 2-60-020 of the M unici pal Co de
. Ch ica go Mu nic ipa l Co de §2
- 60
- 02 0 ( ad de d S ep t . 5, 20 07 )
. T he Co r po r at io n C o un se l is the “h ead of the departme

nt of law of the ci

ty.” Chi cago Munici

pal Code §2-60-020. T he dutie s of the Cor por ation Counsel i ncl ude “[s]uperintend[ing] and *** conduct[ in g] all the law busi

ness of th e c i ty .”Ch i ca go M un i ci pal Cod e § 2- 60 -0 20 . Th

e C orp ora ti on Cou n se l i s a l so r eq ui re d to “[a]ppear f

or and prot ect the rights an d in terests o f the ci

ty i n al l a ctions, sui ts and proceedin

gs brought by

or agains t it or any ci

ty off ic er, board or department” or brought against anNo. 1-10- 1152

4

ad m i ni stra ti ve l aw of f i cer an d i s res pon si bl e f or de f en di ng “ an y mem be r, of f i cer or em pl oyeeof the board of heal

th, poli ce departmen

t o r fi re department” wh

o is sued pe

rsonally for dam ages ba sed on h i s or h er of

f i cial duti es. Chi

cago M uni ci pal Code §2 -60-02 0. In the ca se at b ar, i n J an ua ry 200 7, th e IGO b eg an

i nv es ti ga ti ng how a f orm er C i ty of Chicago (City) employee was awar ded a so le-sour ce co ntra ct se emi ngly in v iolation of t he City’s ethic s and contractin

g rules . Accordin

g to the Inspector General ’s com pla in t, “ ‘[s]ole-source’
con tra cts are c on tra cts aw arde d w i

th out a com peti ti v e proc es s. Non

-c om peti ti v e procur em

en ts are a l l owed ** *, bu

t onl y und er very l i m i ted ci rcum stan ces f oll owi ng a ri gorous i

ntern al proces s. The IGO’s i

nve stigati on to date suggests that t he Ci ty’s process f

or awarding the contract under in vestigation was m

ani pula ted by Ci ty em ploy ees.” The i

nve stigati on in

volv ed current and f

ormer City emplo yees ac t ing in the ir cap acit y as Cit y employees . D ur ing t he co ur se o f the invest igat ion, t he I GO int er viewed 18 p eo ple, re que st ed a nd r ece ived do cument s fro m 5 City de par t ments , a nd reviewed thousands of documents. On Aug ust 15, 200 8, as p ar t of it s invest igat ion, t he I GO s ent a wr itt en r equ est t o t he Ci ty’s l aw departmen

t for all documen ts relev ant to t he award of the

contract t o t he f

ormer em pl oyee . The l

aw depa rtm en t prov i de d s ome docu

men ts, b ut re da cte d others

on th e b as i s of at t o rne y-c lient pr ivileg e o rt he wo rk p r o du ct do ct r ine
. T he r ed ac t ed do cu men t s inc lud ed “( i)
comm uni cations am

ong Law Departmen

t att orneys ; (i

i) com mun ic ations b etween Law De pa r t men t at t o rne ys a nd o t he rCit y emp lo yee s; ( iii) no t es by t wo La w D ep ar t men t at t o rne ys re gar ding co nver sat ions w ith Cit y employees ; and ( iv) char t s and not es by o ne Law Dep ar t ment at t or ney — all reg ar ding t he mat t er *** unde r invest igat ion. ” T he I GO t old t he law d epa rt mentNo. 1-10- 1152

1 The compl

ai nt was f il ed by Fi rst Deputy Inspector General Mary E. Hodge. At the tim

e, the positi on of Inspecto r General was vac ant, as the current Inspector General had n ot ye t been approv ed by the ci ty cou nc i l , so H odge

wa s th e h ead of the IGO . A f ter th e curren t In sp ec tor Gen eral wasconf i rmed b y the c i ty c ounc i l , he

wassub sti

tuted asplai

ntif f i n D ecem ber 2009
. 5 t ha t it di d n o t be liev e t ha t t he Cit y co ul d p r o pe r ly sh ield t he do cu men t s u sin g e it he rt he at t o rne ycl i en t pri vi l ege or the work pr

oduct doctri

ne . On Oc tobe r 8, 200 9, th

e IGO s erv

ed a sub poena on th e C orporati

on C oun se l

ashe ad of the la w departmen

t for the documents requested. Al ong with the s

ubpoena, the IGO i

ncl uded a le tt er sum ma rizi ng the l egal argumen ts it bel ie ved supported its position, as well as a suggested
mem orand um of u nde rstan di ng c once rni ng th e way i n w hi ch the d ocum en ts sh oul d be ha ndl ed. On October 15, 2009, the Corpo ration Counsel ma de an obj ection to the subpoena. On October 21, 200 9, t he I GO r esp ond ed t o t he Co rp or at ion Co unse l’s objec t ion wit h a let t er st at ing t hat t he IG O d i sa gr ee d w i th th e g rou n dsof th e ob j ecti on . Th

e C orp ora ti on Cou n se l di d n ot co m pl y wi th the subpoena. On Novem

ber 4, 2009, through priva te counsel, the In spector General 1 in hi s off ic ia l capa ci ty f i l ed sui t agai nst the Corpora

tion Coun sel i n h er of f i cial capa ci ty, s eeki ng a decl aratory jud gme nt , a wr it o f mandamus , an d enf orce men t of the su bp oen a to c om pe l the Corp orati

on Co unse l to pr od uce unr eda ct ed c op ies o f the do cument s re que st ed by t he su bpo ena. The Corpor ation Counsel

fi le d a m ot ion to dismi

ss the com

pla in t pursuant to sections

2-619 and 2- 615 of the Code. The Corporat ion C ounsel argued that the compl ai

nt should be di sm

is sed pursuan t to se cti on 2 -61 9 b ec au se

(1) the trial cou rt lac ke d j urisd

i cti on s i nc e the In sp ec torNo. 1-10- 1152

6

General la cked the capaci

ty to sue, (2) t he trial

court should not entert ai n a di spute between two par t ies wit hin the s ame go ver nmenta l entit y, and (3 ) t he do cument s we re pr ot ect ed by t he at t or ney-client pr ivil

ege . T he Co rp or at ion Co unse l also a rg ued t hat t he co mplaint sho uld be di sm i ss ed pursuan t to se cti on 2 -61 5 b ec au se

the com pl ai nt d i d n ot ad eq ua tel y sta te a ca us e of action for declarato ry j udgment or mandam us. A hearin g on the Corpor ation Counsel ’s m ot ion was hel

d on April 21, 2010. Af

ter hear ing t he pa rt ies’ ar gument s, t he t rial co ur t fou nd t hat t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l did no t have t he aut hor ity t o e ngag e its ow n at t or ney and t hat t he at t or ney-client pr ivil ege was available t o t he Cor por ation Co unsel. The t rial court enter ed an o rder dism issi ng the I nspect or General’s
com plai nt wi th pre j udice. Th

e In spe ctor Gen

eral tim el y appe aled. AN AL YSIS On appeal, the Inspector General rai ses two issue s: (1) the trial court erred in

fi ndi ng that the a ttorney -cl i en t pri vi l ege a ppl i ed to sh i eld the sub poenaed d

ocum en ts an d (2) the tri al

court erred i n f i ndi ng th at the In spe ctor General

did not hav e the

authority to retai n a pri va te attorney. T he Co r po r at io n C o un se l als o ar gu es t ha t we lac k ju r isd ict io n o ve r t he inst an t mat t er be ca us e it is an intr ago ver nmenta l disput e and t her efo re nonju st iciable. We a ddr ess t he issue s co ncer ning j uri sd i cti on an d th e In sp ector G en

eral ’s ca paci ty to s ue f i rs t. Intragov ernme ntal Disp ute The Corporat ion C ounsel fi rst argues that we lack j urisdi ction over the i

nstant m atter be ca us e “ t his is effe ct ive ly a s uit by t he Cit y ag ain st t he Cit y.” Whe t he rt he inst an t iss ue is jus ticiabl e presents an

is sue of l aw, which we rev

ie w de novo
. Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich ,No. 1-10- 1152

7

231 Ill . 2d

474 , 48 8 (2 008 ). Th

e C orporati

on C ounse l

ci testo Tanner v. Solomon , 58 Ill . App. 2d 134 (1965 ), i n s upport of the a rgum en t that the i

nstant su i t is non j usticiab l e. However, Tanner involved a ver y diff

er ent situ at ion t han t he o ne at issue he re . I n Tanner , one m em be r of the A ddi son B oard of

Fi re an d Poli ce C omm

i ssi oners broug ht su i t agai nst the two other b oard
mem bers b ase d on a

di spute ov

er ca ndi datesf or the pol i ce de partm en t. Tanner , 58 Ill . App. 2d at 135-3 6. In

f i ndi ng th at the b oard m

em ber was una bl e to bri ng s ui t agai nst the other board members, t he co ur t first not ed t hat t her e wa s ca se law hold ing t hat one age ncy of g ove rnment could br i ng s ui t agai nst anothe

r gove rnm en tal agen cy to resol ve a di spute. Tanner , 58 Ill . App. 2d at 13 7. Ho we ver , t he c o ur t po int ed o ut t hat in t he c as e be fo re it , “ o ne me mber o f a governmental body is

suin g the o ther memb ers of that same body .” (Em phasi s ad ded.) Tanner , 58 Il l . A pp . 2d at 1 37 . Th

e c our t con cl uded th at “i t wou l d n ot b e a sa l uta ry th i n g f or th e c our ts t o s t ep in and re so lve the se d isput es o n t he ap plicat ion o f ever y mi nor ity member w hos e o pinions *** have been

over-ridden

by the ma jori ty.” Tanner , 58 Ill . App. 2d at 138. I n t he ca se at ba r , we do no t ha ve o ne ind ividua l su ing an o t he rind ividua l fro m t he sa me body b ut instead have the h

ead of one m

unici pal off ic e sui ng the head of a diff

erent mun ic ipa l office. While they ar e bo t h dep ar t ments wit hin the s ame municipal co rp or at ion, we ha ve cons i dered

analogous si

tuati ons i n the pas t and are wi l l i ng to do so ag ai

n. Se e, e.g. , Burnette v. Stroger , 3 89 I ll. App. 3d 3 21 ( 200 9) (Co ok Co unt y public defend er bro ught suit aga inst p re sident of Co ok Co unt y board of co mm issioners) ; Read v. Sheahan , 359 Il l . Ap p. 3d 89(2005 ) (m

em bers of Co ok Co unt y board of co rr ect ions bro ught suit a gainst C oo k Co unt y sheriff ); Sampson v. Graves , 304 Ill . App. 3d 961 (1999) (City of Harvey

al dermen brought suit agai

nst Ci ty of Harv

eyNo. 1-10- 1152

8

may or). Ac cordi

ngl y , we f i nd th at the d i spute h ere is j usticiab l e. Capacity to Sue In g ra nt ing t he Co rp or at ion Co unse l’s mot ion t o d ismiss, t he t rial co ur t fou nd t hat t he Inspector General

la cked the capaci

ty to sue the Corpo ration Counsel . The Inspector General
ar gue s t hat t he t rial co ur t er re d in gr ant ing t he mot ion t o d ismiss o n t hat basis. We re view t he trial court ’s grant o f the m ot ion to dismi

ss de novo
. Progres

sive Insurance Co. v. Williams , 379 Ill. App . 3 d 54 1, 544 (2 008 ). As a p re lim inary mat t er , w e no t e t hat t he issue befo re us is t he
n ar row qu esti on of wh eth er th e In sp ector G en

eral wa s e n ti tl ed to hi rea pri v ate attor n ey to s ue to enfo rc e t he su bpo ena s er ved o n t he Co rp or at ion Co unse l. We d o no t pur po rt t o r eso lve any broader questions i

nvol vi ng a ri ght of the Inspecto r General to hi re an attor ney

in any ot her ci rcumstance or the pro cedure to be foll owed in the even t t he Corporation Counsel has a conf

li ct of i n terest. I n t he ca se at ba r , t he t r ial c o ur t ’s de cis io n w as ba se d in pa rt o n t he I llino is S up r eme Co ur t ca se o f Environmen tal Protectio n Agency v. Pollution Control Bo ard , 69 Ill . 2d 394 (1977 ) (EPA ). Tha t cas e co ncer ned a re que st by the I lli nois P ollut ion Co nt ro l Boa rd t o be repre sen ted by coun sel other than

the A ttorney Gen eral i n c ertai n s i tuati ons. EPA , 69 Ill . 2d at 39 7. T he co ur t no t ed t ha t t he At t o rne y Ge ne r al w as t he ch ief le ga l o ffice ro f t he st at e o f I llino is
and ha d the duty of a cti ng as the l egal repre sen tativ e of state ag encies. EPA , 69 Il l . 2d at 39 9. The board poin

ted to a statut ory provi sion providi ng that priv

ate counsel c ould be

appoin ted where the A

tt orney Ge

neral was “i nterested” and argued that the Attor ney General was i nterested i n that cas e. EPA , 69 I ll. 2 d a t 40 0. Ho we ve r , t he co ur t he ld t ha t t he At t o rne y Ge ne r al w as o nlyNo. 1-10- 1152

9

“inter est ed” unde r t he st at ut e in tw o s itu at ions: when t he At t or ney Gene ra l was invo lved wit h t he
cas e as a pri va te i ndi vi dual or whe n the A ttorney Gen eral wasan actual party to the acti

on. EPA , 69 I ll. 2d a t 400 -0 1. The co ur t co nclude d: “It see ms to us t hat if the At t or ney Gene ra l is to have the unqual

if ie d role of ch

ie f l egal off ic er of the State, he or she must be a ble to direct t he l

egal af f ai rsof th e S tate an d i ts a gen ci es . ** * To al

l ow th e n um erous Sta te a gen ci es th e l i b er ty to em pl oy pri va te c oun se l wi thou t the approv al of the A ttorn ey Gene ral woul d b e to i

nv i te c ha os in to the area of legal

representation of the State.” EPA , 69 Ill . 2d at 401-02. In t he ca se a t bar , t he Mu nicipal Co de d oe s no t include a n analo go us p ro vision allow ing fo rap po int men t o f pr iva t e c o un se l if t he Co r po r at io n C o un se l is “in t er es t ed
. ” I f t he r e w as , t his
wo ul d b e a simp le c as e, sin ce t he Co r po r at io n C o un se l is a pa rt y t o t he lit ig at io n. Ac co r di ng ly,
weexam i ne the prov i si ons of the Mu ni ci pal Code to d eterm

i ne i f the re i s a sou rce of au thor i ty f or th e In sp ector G en

eral ’s su i t. The Mun ic ipa l C ode pro vi

des the IGO wi

th the power t o inv

estigate and “ [t]o is sue su bp oen asto com pe l the attend an ceof wi tne ss esf or pu rpos esof exam i na ti on a nd the prod uc ti on of documen

ts and other items f

or inspe ction an

d/or duplication.” Ch

ic ago Munici

pal Code §2-56- 030. The courts should not frustrate the very purpose for which the off ic e of Inspe ctor General
wa s c r ea t ed
. On ce t he I nsp ec t o rGe ne r al is su es a s ub po en a, t he pe r so n t o wh o m t he su bp o en a is di rected m ay f i l e a n ob j ec ti on to th

e sub poena . “For

seve n d ay s af ter rec ei pt of a ti mel y obj ec ti on to a s ub poe n a, th e i n sp ector g en

eral sh al l tak e n o acti on to en f orc e th e s ub poe n a or to i n i ti ate prosecution of the person to whom the sub poena i s di

rected.” Chi cago Munici

pal Code §2-56- 040.No. 1-10- 1152

10

The parties di

sagree as to the mean

in g of secti on 2-56-040. The Inspector General argues that it must have the power to enforce the subpoena because the ordinan

ce provide s that for seven da ys, “t he insp ec t o rge ne r al shall take no action to enforce the subpoena .” (Em phasi s ad ded.) Chi cago Munici

pal Code §2-56-040. It cl ai

ms that t he l anguage of

the ordinan

ce m eans that af

ter se ve n d ays , t he I nsp ec t o rGe ne r al may take acti on to e nf orce the su bp oen a. The Corp orati

on Co un se l, o n t he o t he rha nd , ar gu es t ha t t he lan gu ag e d o es no t mea n t ha t t he “a ct io n t o en fo r ce ” is taken by the Inspector General . Instead, she cl ai ms that t he Corporation Counsel has control over any action to enforce the sub poena. If that would b e the case then the IGO could ne

ver in vestigate the Corpo ration Counsel because that offi ce would b e i

mm une f rom i nve stigati on si

nce they would be the only entity to enf orce the subpoena. The dissent re ads t he plain langu age of t he o rd inance t o r equ ire a d isput e o ver t he
en fo r ce men t o f a s ub po en a t o be ult imat ely d et er mined by t he mayo r . Ho we ve r , t he pla in langua ge o f the or dinance do es no t add re ss t he pr oc edu re t o be follow ed in t he ca se o f such a dis pute. The only

referen ces to a dispute are the i

nstruction that for seve

n day s f oll owing a n objec t ion, “the inspec t or gene ra l shall tak e no act ion t o e nfor ce t he su bpo ena” and t hat dur ing tha t seve n d ay s, th e In sp ec tor Ge

ne ral “ may atte m pt to re sol

ve the obj ec ti on th

roug h n eg oti ati on wit h t he pe rso n t o w hom t he su bpo ena is d irect ed. ” Chica go Municipa l Cod e §2 -5 6- 040 . T he
or dinance do es no t dire ct t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l’s act ions in t he ca se a n at t empt t o r eso lve the di spute f ail s. While ther e is no cas e disc uss ing t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l’s subp oe na po wer , w e find Department of Public Aid v. Kessler, 7 2 I ll. App. 3d 8 02 ( 197 9) , t o be instr uct ive. I n Kessler ,No. 1-10- 1152

11

t he I lli nois D epa rt ment o f Public Aid (I DP A) se rve d a s ubpo ena o n t he de fendant and, when t he def endan t di d not com

pl y , f i l ed an action i n the ci rcui t court to enf

orce i t. Kessler

, 72 Ill . App. 3d at 80 3. T he de fen da nt ar gu ed t ha t t he I DP A d id n o t ha ve t he po we rt o en fo r ce t he su bp o en a in the c i rcui t court bec aus e the

re wa s n o statutory provi sion prov i di ng i t that power. Kessler

, 72 I ll. App. 3d a t 804 . T he co ur t held t hat des pit e t he fact t hat t her e we re no “s t anda rd s and pr oc edu re s” in t he st at ut e gr ant ing t he I DP A the po wer t o c omp el the pr od uct ion o f boo ks a nd pa pe r s by s ub po en a, t he st at ut e d id n o t ba rt he I DP A fr o m at t emp t ing t o en fo r ce t he su bp o en a in
co ur t beca use t he abs ence was not significant “inas much as t he circ uit co ur t s, r at her t han t he agency itsel f, are the en

tities with the a

uthority to do t he en

forci ng.” Kessler

, 72 Ill . App. 3d at 804. The C orp ora

ti on Cou n se l i s c orre ct w

h en sh e n otes th at Kessler

did no t add re ss t he question of

whether the agen

cy or t he A tt orney Ge

neral was the proper party for bri ngi ng such an action, wh

i ch i s an i ssue i n th i s ca se. H owever, Kessler is instr uct ive in that t he co ur t allowe d t he agen cy to bri ng a n acti on to en f

orce the sub poena des pi te the l ack of ex pli ci t statutory a

uthori ty. He r e, t he r e is au t ho r it y fo rt he I nsp ec t o rGe ne r al t o iss ue a s ub po en a, bu t t he r e is no ex plic it aut hor ity for t he I GO t o e nfor ce t hat subp oe na. Ho weve r, if the I nspe ct or Gene ra l has t he authority to iss

ue a subpoena, it certain

ly can b e reasonabl

y i nf erred that t he authority

to is sue in cl udes the authority

to enf orce. Like Kessler

, d esp ite t he lack of p ro ced ur es c onc er ning enfo rc ement of t he su bpo ena, we find t hat t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l may enforc e t he su bpo ena th rough re cou rs e i n th e c i rc ui t cou rt. The dissent st at es t hat sec t ion 2 -4 -0 30 o f the Municipa l Cod e “pr ovid es t hat wher e t heNo. 1-10- 1152

12

le gis la tion does not explic itl

y provi de for enf orcemen t, t he m ay or is the en

forcem ent off ic er.” However, section 2-4-030 m erely giv es the m ay or t he authorit

yto act, o r to designate the off ic er who shall act , in t he ca se w her e t he o rd inance fails t o s pec ify t he o ffi cer who is char ged wit h t he duty of en

forcem ent. It do es not provide that the m ay or is the sole

enf orcem en t off i cer. Addit ionally, in the or dinance her e, t her e is a r efer ence t o t he enfo rc ement of t he su bpo ena in the c lause t hat pr ohibit s t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l from t aking a ny act ion t o e nfor ce t he su bpo ena for seve n day s f oll owing a n obj ection. We

agree wi th the Inspector General

that t he m

ost natural
rea di ng of thi s c l au se i nd i ca testha t af ter s even da y s, th e In sp ec tor Ge

ne ral may take s ome s ort of
en f orc em en t acti on . In

most ca se s, th at c oul

d i n cl ude th e C orp ora ti on Cou n se l ’s i n v ol v em en t; how ever , in t his case , it is the Co rp or at ion Co unse l who is o bject ing t o t he su bpo ena. It wo uld be unreal is tic an d nonproductive f

or t he Ins pector General to request t hat the Corpor ation Counsel t ake act ion t o e nfor ce a subp oe na ag ainst her ow n office. Fur t her , t he o rd inance p ro vides t hat t he “the i nspector general

shal l take n o action to enforce the subpoena or to initiate prosecution of the person to w

hom the subpoena is directed .” (Emphas is

added.) Chicago Munici pal Code §2- 56- 040 . On

ceag ai n, thi s i m pl i estha t the In sp ec tor Ge

ne ral has th e a uthori ty to take som e s ort of act ion co ncer ning t he su bpo ena. Acco rd ingly, we find, at least in the limited situ at ion whe re t he Cor porati on Cou n se l i s s er v ed wi th a s ub poe n a b y th e In sp ector G en

eral an d ob j ects to i ts enfo rc ement , t hat t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l may seek t o e nfor ce t he su bpo ena in t he circ uit co ur t by hir ing it s o wn co un se l. We find sup po rt for ou r c onc lusion in o ur dec ision in Burnette , 389 Il l . Ap p. 3d 32 1. In th at c as e, th e C ook C oun ty pu b l i c def en der brough

t su i t ag ai n st th e pre si den t of th e C ook C oun

tyNo. 1-10- 1152

13

bo ar d o f co mmissio ner s a ft er t he b o ar d a pp ro ved a bu dg et ame ndme nt t hat inclu de d la ying o ff pers onnel i n the pub l i c def

ender’ s of f i ce. Burnette , 389 I ll . App. 3d at 322. One issue i n the case was whethe

r the publ ic defen der was an en

tity ca pabl e of bri ngi ng sui t; the presi dent argued that the publ i c def ender was n

ot, si nc e the re wa s n o statute ex

pli ci tly provi di ng th at authority
. Burnette , 389 Ill . App. 3d at 327-28. After noting that the statuto ry s chem e di d contempl

ate that th e pub l i c def

en der w as an en ti ty ca pa b l e of su i t, w e p oi n ted out th at “i t wou l d m ake n o se n se to create an enti

ty that could not even

defen d its ri ght to exi st” and that “our supreme c ourt has
r ep ea t ed ly pe rmit t ed pu blic d efe nd er s t o su e, in o r de rt o pr o t ec t an d d efin e t he sc o pe o f t he ir statut ory authority .” Burnette , 389 Ill . App. 3d at 328. The dissent t ake s issue wit h ou r r eliance o n Burnette , noti n g th at Burnette

involved t he recognition of the uni

que role of pub li

c defe nders as i ndepen dent agenci

es wi thin the crim in al j ustice sy stem

and stati ng th at no su ch pronoun cem en t has be en made i n the ca se of

Ins pectors General . Whi

le , as the di ssen

t not es, this

is a case of f

irst i mpres sion, we fi

nd Burnette

t o be instruct iv e, as is Kessler

, because of the natur e of the IGO. The Inspecto r General occupies a
un i qu e rol e wi

th i n th e C i ty of Ch i ca go’ s g ov er

n men t. Th e In sp ector G en

eral i s e n tru ste d wi th “i nv esti gat[i ng] the p erf

orma nc e of gove rnm en tal off i cers , em ploye es, f unc tions an d program

s,” ei ther in response to a compla

in t o r on the Inspector General’ s own i ni tiativ e, in order t o “detect
an d p re v en t m i sc on duct, i

n ef f i ci en cy an d w aste wi

th i n th e progra

m s a n d op erati

on s of th e c i ty governm ent.” Chi cago Munici

pal Code §2-56-030. As such, every “off ic er, empl oyee, de pa rtm en t, agen cy , c on tra ctor , sub con

tractor an d l i cen se e of th e c i ty ” h as a d uty to co ope ra te with the Inspector General i n an y i nve stigati on or hearin

g undertaken pursuan

t t o t he Mun

ic ipa lNo. 1-10- 1152

2 Whet her t he r efusa l to co mply with t he su bpo ena w as p ro per is discu ssed below . Fo r t he pu r po se s o f t he dis cu ss io n he r e, it is o nly r ele va nt t ha t t he Co r po r at io n C o un se l re fus ed t o co mply with the s ubpoena. 14 Code. C hi cago M un i ci pal Code § 2-5 6-0 90. In

rec ogn i ti on of thi s u ni que role, th e In sp ec tor General is appoin ted for a fi

xed term an

d can onl y b e remove d from

the off ic e for cause. Ch

ic ago Muni ci pal Code §2-56-020, §2-56- 130. In t he ca se a t bar , t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l’s invest igat ion is being fr ust ra t ed by t he Corpor ation Counsel ’s ref usal to compl y w ith a s ubpoena. 2 W i

thou t the ab i l i ty to br i ng an ac ti on to enf orce the su bp oen a, th e In sp ec tor Ge

ne ral has n o mea ns to chal l en gethe Corp orati

on Co unse l’s re fusal o t her t han as king t he mayor t o r eso lve the dispu t e. The or dinance cr eat ing t he I GO co uld no t ha ve be en de sig ne d t o t ie t he I nsp ec t o rGe ne r al’ s ha nd s in t his w ay be ca us e in do ing so its inves t igat ive pr oc ess w ou ld be meaningles s. T he I GO w as c re at ed “t o d et ect and pr ev en t m i sc on duct, i

n ef f i ci en cy an d w aste wi

th i n th e progra

m s a n d op erati

on s of th e c i ty governm ent.” Chi cago Munici

pal Code §2-56-030. T o achi eve i ts goals, the Inspector General must be allow ed t o br ing an ac t ion in t he circ uit co ur t t o e nfor ce a subp oe na ag ainst t he Corpo ration Cou nsel

to further its in

vestigative duties. Th e tri al cou rt f oun d that the In

sp ec tor Ge

ne ral sh oul d have a ppr oache d the C orporati

on Coun sel, at whi ch

poi nt “ i t woul d be

up to her to determ

i ne that the re wa s a c onf

l i ct.” If there was a conf

li ct, “which there obv

iousl y i s,” the Corpor ation Counsel would ha ve n eeded to either
see k au t hor izat ion fro m the c ity co uncil t o e ngag e sp ecial co unse l or ask t he t rial co ur t t o a ppo int spe cial co unse l. We d o no t agr ee w ith t his pro ced ur e and find it t o fr ust ra t e t he indep ende ntNo. 1-10- 1152

15

in vestigative

duties of the Inspector General . We f urther fi nd that the Inspector General fol lowed pr o pe rpr o ce du r es fo rt he ap po int men t o f sp ec ial c o un se l. As we fou nd ea rlier, t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l has t he au t hor ity t o br ing suit aga inst t he Corporation Coun

sel i n th i s ca se. W

i th su ch a cl ear c onf l i ct of i ntere st, i t woul d be

ex al tin g f orm ove r su bst ance t o r equ ire t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l to ask t he Co rp or at ion Co unse l to det er mine wh ethe r a conf l i ct of i ntere st exi sted. M oreover , the In spe ctor Gen

eral i nf orme d the tria l court t hat it had t he disc re t ion t o a ppo int p rivat e co unse l to re pr ese nt him. It was not nece ssar y for t he request to come f

rom the Corporat ion C ounsel . See Suburban Cook County Regional Office of Educati on v. Cook Cou nty Board , 282 Ill . App. 3d 560, 575 (1996) (fi ndi ng that a proper pr o ce du r e fo rap po int men t o f a s pe cia l St at e’ s At t o rne y in t he ca se o f co nflic t be t we en o fficia ls the S tat e’s Att or ney is obligated t o r eprese nt “wo uld require t he in vocat ion of the co urt ’s di sc r et io n by e it he rt he S t at e’ s A t t o rne y or the officials ” (e m phas i s adde d)) . The C orporati on Counsel notes that t he Ins

pector General m

erely me ntioned the

court ’s authority

in its b rief and at t he hea ring o n t he mot ion t o d ismiss, claiming that t he issue was not pr op er ly raised a nd sho uld be f orfe i ted. Howev

er, we choose to cons i der the i ssue. Flynn v. Ryan , 199 Il l . 2d 430 , 438 n .1 (20 02)(wa

i ve r i s a n a dm oni ti on to th e p arti es , not a l i m i tati on u pon the pow ers of cou rts of
re v i ew). A

cc ordi n gl y , w e f i n d th at th e tr i al cou rt’ s g ra n t of th e C orp ora

ti on Cou n se l ’s moti on to di sm i ss on thi s b asi s m ust b e rev erse d. Attorney-Client Privilege Since w e have det er mined t hat we ha ve jur isdict ion o ver t he inst ant matt er and t he Inspector General

was wi thin its authority

to bri ng sui t against the Corpo ration Counsel, weNo. 1-10- 1152

16

co nsid er t he iss ue o f wh et he rt he t r ial c o ur t er r ed in find ing t ha t t he Co r po r at io n C o un se l co uld assert the atto rney

-cli ent priv il ege to shiel

d documen

ts from the Inspector General. A gai n, our review of the trial

cour t’s dism

issal under section 2-619 is de novo
. Van Meter v. Da rien Park District , 207 Il

l . 2d 359 , 368 (2 003). The pur po se o f the at t or ney-client pr ivil ege is “to enco ur age and p ro mot e full and fra nk
consul tation b etw een a

cl i en t an d leg al ad vi sor by rem ovi ng the f ea r of com pe l l ed di sc l osu re of in form ation.” Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. , 89 Il l . 2d 103 , 117-1 8 (198 2). However, because the

priv il ege poses a bar to the disc overy of relev ant and m aterial facts, i t is an
ex cepti on to the ge

neral duty to dis close an

d i s i nterpreted n

arrowl y . Consolidation Coal , 89 I ll. 2d at 11 8. As a gen eral matter, the a

ttorney -cl i en t pri vi l ege i s av ail ab l e to a m

uni ci pal corporation. In re Information to Discipline Certain Attorneys of the Sanitary District of Chicago , 35 1 I ll. 206 , 26 8 (1 932 ). H oweve r, there has b een l

i ttl e c as e l aw asto the avai l ab i l i ty of the pri vi l eg e or its scope i n the context of an

action b etween two go vernm ent agenci

es. The Inspe ctor General asks us to im

pose a rule that the atto rney -cli ent priv il ege i s not availa

ble to City attor ney

s i n an official IGO invest igat ion int o t he Cit y’s miscond uct . T he Co rp or at ion Co unse l advo cat es fo r t he op po site ru le: t hat t he pr ivil ege app lies to “co mmunicatio ns bet wee n go ver nmenta l entit ies and governm ental counsel .” However, we cann ot accept either party ’s argum ent here. In the ca se a

t bar, the Corporati

on Coun sel ha s n ot shown that the docum en ts at i ssue are co ver ed by t he at t or ney-client pr ivil ege . As t he pa rt y seek ing t o s hield t he do cument s, t he Co rp or at ion Co unse l has t he bur den o f est ablishing tha t “the co mmunicatio n or iginat ed in aNo. 1-10- 1152

17

con f i denc e that i

t woul d n ot be di sc l ose d, w asmade to a n a ttorn ey ac ti ng i n h i s l eg al ca pa ci ty f or the purpose of securi

ng legal advi ce or servi ces, and rem

ai ned conf ide ntial .” Consolidation Coal , 89 I l l . 2d at 1 19. How ever, weca nn ot f i nd an y ev i denc e i n th e re cord tha t the Corp orati

on Co unse l made su ch a s how ing befo re t he t rial co ur t and t her e is insufficient info rmat ion in t he record c once

rni ng th e docum en ts at i ssue f

or us to revi ew the tri al

court’s f i ndi ng of pri vi l ege. Th ere are no d etai l s a s to th

e c rea tors of the docum en ts, th ei r re ci pien ts, or the con ten ts of any of t he do cument s. T her e ar e also no d et ails co ncer ning t he t itles, dut ies, o r a ut hor ity o f any of t he individuals invo lved wit h t he do cument s. T he o nly i nfor matio n in the r eco rd is a st at ement in t he I nsp ec t o rGe ne r al’ s c o mpla int ind ica t ing t ha t t he r ed ac t ed do cu men t s inc lud ed “( i)
comm uni cations am

ong Law Departmen

t att orneys ; (i

i) com mun ic ations b etween Law De pa r t men t at t o rne ys a nd o t he rCit y emp lo yee s; ( iii) no t es by t wo La w D ep ar t men t at t o rne ys re gar ding co nver sat ions w ith Cit y employees ; and ( iv) char t s and not es by o ne Law Dep ar t ment attorn ey — al l reg ard i ng the matter ** * un

der i nv es ti ga ti on” ; th ere wa s a l so a red ac ted cop y of t he pr ivil ege log at t ache d as an exhibit t o t he co mplaint. Mo re ove r, t her e is no indicat ion in t he
recor d that the tr ial

cour t reviewed unredacted copies of the documents in camera t o d et er mine whether th

ey were c ove

red by the attorn ey -cl i en t pri vi l eg e. W i thou t thi s i nf orm ati on, weca nn ot review the propriety of

the trial court ’s f in din g. Accordin

gly , we reman

d the case to the tr ia

l
co ur t for t he limi

t ed p ur po se o f co nduc t ing an in camera i n sp ecti on of th e u n re dacte d docu

men ts
and m aki ng f actual f i ndi ngs cons i sten t wi th the conc ern s outli

ne d ab ove. CONCLUSION We find t hat t he I nspe ct or Gene ra l had t he au t hor ity t o br ing t he inst ant suit aga inst t heNo. 1-10- 1152

18

Co rp or at ion Co unse l. Add itio nally, we find t hat we lac k su ffi cient informat ion t o d et er mine whet her t he su bpo enae d do cument s ar e shielde d by t he at t or ney-client pr ivil ege and r emand t he case to t he trial

court for that li

mi ted purpo se. Reversed and reman

ded with in

struct ions.No. 1-10- 1152

19

JUSTICE CAHILL dissen ting: I sym pathize wi

th the diff icul ty the maj ority faced i

n this cas e: as a matter o f f irst i m pre ss i on, what to do w

i th a n a ttem pt by a c i ty of f i cer to bri ng a dec l ara tory j udg men t ac ti on ag ai n st a f el l ow c i ty of f i cer w h o j ust h appen s to b e th

e a ttorn ey f or th e c i ty . Th e m aj ori ty co nc lud es t ha t t he en ab ling o r din an ce fo rt he I nsp ec t o rGe ne r al o f t he cit y, w hile n o t ex plic it ly gr an t ing him p o we rt o se ek t he aid o f t he co ur t s t o en fo r ce his su bp o en as , mu st o f ne ce ss it y, gr an t h i m th at p owe

r by i m pl i ca ti on . I c an

n ot ag re e a n d m ust diss en t. As I r ea d t he I nsp ec t o rGe ne r al’ s e na bling o r din an ce , his s ub po en a p o we ris ad m i n i strati v e, an d th e s cop e is c i

rc um scri b ed b y th e p l ai n l an gu ag e of th e ordi n an ce : a dispute over e nf orcem en t ul tim atel y l ands on the desk of the m ay or, who m

ust dec i de h

ow to resol

ve i t. T o gr an t t o t he I nsp ec t o rGe ne r al t he po we rt o byp as s t he cit y’s at t o rne y and t he mayo rhimse lf and seek a

decl arator y judgme

nt on the nature and ex

tent of hi s power is to grant to a ci ty off ic er app oint ed by t he mayor po wer s t he cit y cou ncil did no t (a nd pr oba bly could no t ) d elega t e. The municipal co de p ro vides t hat wher e t he legislat ion d oe s no t explicitly pr ovid e fo r e nfor cement , t he
may or is the e nf orcem en t off i cer. Chi cago M uni ci pal Code §2 –4–03 0 (199 0). The cas e ci ted by the m aj ority i n s upport of i ts conc l usi on, Burnette v. Stroger , 38 9 I ll. A pp . 3d 32 1, 9 05 N. E.2 d 9 39 (2 00 9) , i n wh i ch th e C ook C oun

ty pu b li c def en der w as al l owe d to
sue the B oard of

Com m i ssi oners , i s n

ot persua si

ve . Burnette

re lied on s upr eme co ur t op inions that recognized the un

ique role of pub li

c defe nders as i ndepen dent agenci

es wi thin the crim in al just ice syst em. N o s uch p ro nou ncement has be en made in the c ase of I nspe ct or s Ge ner al, w ho
r ema in, at t he cit y, c o un t y and st at e le ve l, o ffice s w it hin u nit s o f go ve rnme nt . Alt ho ug h t he irNo. 1-10- 1152

20

powers are b road wi thi n the un i t of wh i ch they are a part, i nc l udi ng th e power to shar e in vestigation m

aterials wi

th law enf orcemen t agenci es, Inspectors General do not have a l egal
exi sten ce i nde pen den t of the uni t of govern

men t of wh i ch they are a part. I wou

l d a f f i rm the di sm i ss al of thi s acti on on the grou nds th at the In sp ec tor Ge

ne ral of th e C i ty of Ch i ca go is n ot a l eg al en ti ty ca pa b l e of b ri n gi n g sui t.