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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CORNEILUS TAYLOR, 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1399 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order March 28, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0001566-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 13, 2018

Appellant, Cornelius Taylor, appeals pro se from the March 28, 2017 

Order entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his 

first Petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 

9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm. 

The PCRA court set forth the underlying facts and we need not repeat 

them in detail. See PCRA Court Opinion, filed 6/27/17, at 1-3. Briefly, on 

February 2, 2015, Appellant, Lashon Royster (“Victim”), and a group of friends

that lived together drove from Philadelphia to Darby Borough Medical Center 

to accompany Appellant’s fiancé, Mama Shirl, to a medical appointment. 

Appellant’s niece, Tia Taylor, drove the vehicle. Appellant and the Victim got 

in an argument in the waiting room. Upon leaving the medical appointment, 

Appellant told the Victim that he was not allowed to drive back to Philadelphia 

with the group and that he should find a new place to live. Appellant sat in 
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the back of the car and Mama Shirl sat in the front passenger seat. When the 

Victim leaned in the car to help Mama Shirl buckle her seatbelt, Appellant 

instructed Tia to drive away and threatened to kill the Victim. Tia began to 

drive and Appellant reached over the seat and stabbed the Victim in the back 

of the neck. While a struggle ensued between Appellant and the Victim, Tia 

continued to drive and hit several other vehicles. Eventually, the vehicle came 

to a stop. 

Officers Charles Shuler and Randall Kennedy from the Darby Borough 

Police Department arrived at the scene. Officer Shuler followed the Victim to 

the hospital where he took the Victim’s statement. Officer Kennedy remained 

on the scene and spoke to a witness, Alexander Miller, who stated that the 

man who stabbed the Victim, later identified as Appellant, was still in the 

vehicle. Officer Kennedy arrested Appellant, took him into custody, and 

obtained a statement from Appellant. Appellant told Officer Kennedy that he 

stabbed the Victim in the face and neck due to an argument that day and an 

alleged previous mistreatment of Mama Shirl by the Victim. The 

Commonwealth charged Appellant with Attempted Criminal Homicide, 

Aggravated Assault, and related charges. 

A jury trial commenced on September 22, 2015. The Commonwealth 

presented testimony from the Victim, Alexander Miller, Officer Shuler, and 

Officer Kennedy. Appellant presented testimony from Tia Taylor. On 

September 23, 2015, the jury convicted Appellant of Aggravated Assault and 
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Possession of an Instrument of Crime.1 The jury acquitted Appellant of 

Attempted Criminal Homicide. 

On December 17, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of eleven to twenty-two years’ incarceration. Appellant did 

not file a Post-Sentence Motion or a Notice of Appeal. 

On July 8, 2016, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA Petition, his first, 

alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of his 

constitutional rights. The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed a Petition 

to Withdraw and a Turner/Finley “no merit” letter.2 On March 2, 2017, the 

PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of Intent to Dismiss Without a 

Hearing and issued an Order granting PCRA counsel’s Motion to Withdraw. On 

March 29, 2017, after considering Appellant’s pro se Response, the PCRA court 

dismissed the PCRA Petition.

Appellant timely appealed pro se. Both Appellant and the PCRA court 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following four issues on appeal:

1. Whether [] Appellant is entitled to relief on his claim of trial 

counsel’s ineffective assistance for failure to raise a selfdefense claim?

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a), respectively.

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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2. Whether [] Appellant is entitled to relief on his claim of trial 

counsel’s ineffective assistance for failure to call fact and 

character witnesses on Appellant’s behalf at trial?

3. Whether [] Appellant is entitled to relief on his claim of trial 

counsel’s ineffective assistance for failure to request a 

psychological evaluation?

4. Whether Appellant[’s] sentence pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S. § 

9714] is unconstitutional [and] illegal.

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (some capitalization omitted).

We review the denial of a PCRA Petition to determine whether the record 

supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is otherwise free of 

legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014). This 

Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if they are 

supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa. 

Super. 2007). We give no such deference, however, to the court’s legal 

conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 

2012).

To be eligible for relief pursuant to the PCRA, Appellant must establish, 

inter alia, that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the 

enumerated errors or defects found in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2): a 

constitutional violation; ineffective assistance of counsel; an unlawfully 

induced plea; improper obstruction by governmental officials; a case where 

exculpatory evidence has been discovered; an illegal sentence has been 

imposed; or the tribunal conducting the proceeding lacked jurisdiction. See 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i)-(viii). Appellant must also establish that the issues 
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raised in the PCRA petition have not been previously litigated or waived. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). 

There is no right to a PCRA hearing; a hearing is unnecessary where the 

PCRA court can determine from the record that there are no genuine issues of 

material fact. Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 

2008). “With respect to the PCRA court’s decision to deny a request for an 

evidentiary hearing, or to hold a limited evidentiary hearing, such a decision 

is within the discretion of the PCRA court and will not be overturned absent 

an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 

2015).

In his first three issues, Appellant avers that his trial counsel was 

ineffective. The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[T]he 

burden of demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.” Id. To satisfy 

this burden, Appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that: “(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular 

course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis 

designed to effectuate his interests; and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, 

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged 

proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 

567, 572 (Pa. 2003). Failure to satisfy any prong of the test will result in 
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rejection of the appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 811 A.2d 994, 1002 (Pa. 2002).

In his first issue, Appellant avers that his trial counsel was ineffective 

for failing request a self-defense jury instruction. Appellant’s Brief at 6-7. 

Appellant asserts that Tia Taylor testified that the Victim was aggressive and 

that everyone was in danger. Id. at 7. Appellant argues that “[Tia] testified 

to an event that would put any citizen into fear” and that trial counsel failed 

to “present a defense that Appellant was in self-defense of himself, and/or 

other.” Id. Our review of the record belies this claim.

Trial counsel did, in fact, request two separate jury instructions 

regarding a justification defense, including both justification to use 

force/deadly force in self-defense and justification to use deadly force in 

defense of others. The trial court denied these requests.3 N.T. Trial, 9/23/15, 

at 21. Accordingly, Appellant’s assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to present a justification defense lacks arguable merit.

In his second issue, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective 

for failure to call fact and character witnesses on Appellant’s behalf at trial. 

Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant argues that trial counsel failed to investigate 

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3 Appellant has waived any claim that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying trial counsel’s request for self-defense jury instructions, as the 

appropriate time to raise that issue was on direct appeal. See Fulton, supra

at 571 (Pa. 2003) (“An issue is waived for purposes of the PCRA if the 

petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during 

unitary review, [or] on appeal[.]”); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b).
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or interview potential witnesses from the crime scene. See id. at 8. Appellant 

fails to identify who these witnesses are, and, therefore, Appellant’s claim 

lacks arguable merit.

For an appellant to be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffectiveness of 

counsel for failure to call a witness, the appellant must demonstrate that: (1) 

the witness existed, was available, and willing to cooperate; (2) counsel knew 

or should have known of the witness; and (3) the absence of the witness's 

testimony prejudiced the appellant. Commonwealth v. Birdsong, 24 A.3d 

319, 334 (Pa. 2011).

Instantly, Appellant fails to name any of the witnesses to whom he is 

referring. Without disclosing the identity of the witnesses, Appellant cannot 

establish that the witnesses actually existed, were available, and were willing 

to cooperate. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for 

failing to call certain fact and character witnesses lacks arguable merit. 

In his third issue, Appellant avers that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to request a psychological evaluation. Appellant’s Brief at 8. This 

averment is factually inaccurate. The PCRA court explains, and our review of 

the record reveals, that trial counsel did request both a psychological and 

psychiatric evaluation prior to sentencing. See N.T. Trial, 9/23/15, at 75. 

Both evaluations were completed, presented to the court, and considered by 

the court prior to sentencing. See N.T. Sentencing, 12/17/15, at 8. 

Accordingly, this issue is devoid of arguable merit. 
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In his fourth and final issue, Appellant asserts that his sentence is illegal. 

Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant avers that the trial court sentenced him 

pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714, and that there are pending cases in the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court dealing with the “illegality” of Section 9714. 

Therefore, Appellant requests to be re-sentenced pending the outcome of 

those cases. Id. at 9-10.

As an initial matter, we recognize that a legality of sentencing issue is 

reviewable under the PCRA and cannot be waived. Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 932 A.2d 179, 182 (Pa. Super. 2007). As such, even though Appellant 

raises this issue for the first time in his Brief, we will address it, bearing in 

mind our well-settled standard of review. As issues relating to the legality of 

a sentence are questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Kline, 166 A.3d 337, 340–

41 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal denied, 176 A.3d 236 (Pa. 2017).

Appellant correctly asserts that the trial court sentenced him to an

aggregate term of eleven to twenty-two years’ incarceration pursuant to 

Section 9714, which, in relevant part, imposes a mandatory minimum 

sentence of 10 years’ incarceration for any person who has previously been 

convicted of a crime of violence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1). While 

Appellant argues that Section 9714 is unconstitutional, and therefore illegal, 

Appellant’s argument is incorrect. In Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99, 112-13 (2013), 

the Supreme Court of the United States held, inter alia, that the Sixth 
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Amendment requires that any fact – other than a prior conviction – that 

increases a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense must be submitted 

to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable double. Moreover, this Court has 

specifically held that Section 9714, which increases mandatory minimums 

based on prior convictions, is not unconstitutional under Alleyne. 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 785 (Pa. Super. 2015). Accordingly, 

the trial court did not sentence Appellant under an unconstitutional statute 

that renders his sentence illegal. There is nothing in the record to support 

Appellant’s argument that his sentence is illegal and, thus, Appellant is not 

entitled to relief. 

Because Appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing that trial 

counsel was ineffective, or that his sentence is illegal, he is not entitled to 

relief under the PCRA. Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err when it 

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA Petition.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/13/18