Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1508-CR-1155 | April 4, 2016 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steven Knecht

Vonderheide & Knecht, P.C.

Lafayette, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Richard C. Webster

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Richard Lee Dulin,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 4, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

79A05-1508-CR-1155

Appeal from the Tippecanoe 

Superior Court

The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

79D02-1501-F5-6

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1508-CR-1155 | April 4, 2016 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary and Issue

[1] Richard Lee Dulin pleaded guilty to operating a vehicle while privileges are 

forfeited for life, a Level 5 felony, and resisting law enforcement, a Class A 

misdemeanor. Dulin pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement

and received an aggregate sentence of five years, with two years suspended to 

probation. Dulin appeals, raising the sole issue of whether his sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. 

Concluding Dulin’s sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 28, 2015, officers of the Lafayette Police Department were 

traveling in their police vehicle when they observed a 1991 Ford Escort fail to 

stop at a stop sign. They activated their vehicle’s emergency lights to initiate a 

traffic stop, but the Escort did not immediately stop. Instead, the driver of the 

Escort, later identified as Dulin, continued for roughly fifteen blocks before 

stopping, exiting the vehicle, and fleeing on foot. The officers chased Dulin for 

two more blocks, giving loud verbal commands for him to stop, but Dulin did 

not comply. Eventually, one of the officers caught up with Dulin and forced 

Dulin to the ground. Once Dulin was in custody, the officers checked his 

driving status and determined his driving privileges had been forfeited for life.

[3] The State charged Dulin with Count I, operating a vehicle while privileges are 

forfeited for life, a Level 5 felony; and Count II, resisting law enforcement, a 
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Class A misdemeanor. Dulin pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea 

agreement. The trial court found as aggravating factors: (1) Dulin’s significant 

criminal history; (2) the State’s eleven petitions to revoke his probation (six of 

which had been found true and two of which were still pending); (3) that his 

placement in a Community Corrections program had previously been revoked; 

and (4) that he was written up in the county jail while the present case was 

pending. It considered the following factors mitigating: (1) Dulin’s mental 

illness and history of substance abuse; (2) his history of being employed; (3) that 

he pleaded guilty in the present case; and (4) that he took advantage of 

programs while in jail. Concluding the aggravating factors outweighed the 

mitigating ones, the trial court sentenced Dulin to four years on Count I and 

one year on Count II, to be served consecutively, with two years in the 

Department of Correction, one year of direct placement in Community 

Corrections, and two years suspended to probation. This appeal followed.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[4] A person who pleads guilty is entitled to contest on direct appeal the merits of a 

trial court’s sentencing decision where the trial court has exercised discretion. 

Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004). Dulin pleaded guilty without 

the benefit of a plea agreement and now contends the sentence the trial court 

imposed is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. 
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[5] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, “The Court may revise a sentence 

authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the 

Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender.” The defendant bears the burden of 

persuading this court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. 

State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). Whether we regard a sentence as 

inappropriate turns on “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the 

crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light 

in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Finally, 

we note the principal role of appellate review is to “leaven the outliers,” not 

achieve the perceived “correct” result in each case. Id. at 1225. We therefore 

“focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—

consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any 

individual count.” Id.

II. Inappropriate Sentence

[6] As to the nature of the offenses, the advisory sentence is the starting point the 

legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed. 

Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081. Dulin was convicted of operating a vehicle while 

privileges are forfeited for life, a Level 5 felony, and resisting law enforcement, 

a Class A misdemeanor. A Level 5 felony carries a possible sentence of one to 

six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). A 

person who commits a Class A misdemeanor shall be sentenced to not more 
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than one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-2. There is no advisory sentence for a Class 

A misdemeanor. See id. 

[7] The trial court sentenced Dulin to four years for operating a vehicle while 

privileges are forfeited for life and one year for resisting law enforcement, to be 

served consecutively, with two years suspended to probation. In addition to 

driving when he was prohibited from doing so, Dulin ran a stop sign, thereby 

endangering the public, and did not pull over when the officers activated their 

emergency lights. He continued driving for fifteen blocks and then exited his 

vehicle to flee on foot. We conclude the nature of the offenses supports the 

sentence imposed. 

[8] As to Dulin’s character, he was on parole and probation at the time of the 

offenses, and there were two pending petitions to revoke his probation. His

criminal history includes seven felonies and nine misdemeanor convictions as 

an adult, as well as three true findings as a juvenile. Dulin has never possessed 

a valid driver’s license but forfeited his driving privileges for life in 2013 (at the 

age of twenty-five) following his convictions for operating a vehicle while never 

receiving a license, operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent 

of 0.08 to 0.15 grams, operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled 

substance in his body, and operating a vehicle as an habitual traffic violator. 

He also has prior felony convictions for theft, resisting law enforcement, and 

unlawful possession of a syringe. This case marks his third conviction for 

resisting law enforcement. 
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[9] In short, Dulin continues to reoffend, and he admits he has been “abusing drugs 

and alcohol for years.” Brief of Appellant at 6. Although Dulin has been 

ordered by the court to undergo treatment for substance abuse and mental 

illness in past years, there is nothing in the record to suggest Dulin has ever 

voluntarily taken steps to address the issues he now blames for his behavior. 

While we do not wish to downplay the severity of Dulin’s addiction or the 

difficulty of living with bipolar disorder, we cannot ignore his utter disregard for 

the law and failure to take responsibility. See Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 

501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding the trial court did not err in concluding the 

defendant’s substance abuse was an aggravating factor where the record showed 

he “was aware of his drug and alcohol problem, yet he had not taken any 

positive steps to treat his addiction”), trans. denied. Both the nature of the 

offenses and Dulin’s character support the sentence imposed by the trial court.1 

Conclusion

[10] Dulin’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and 

his character. We therefore affirm his sentence. 

[11] Affirmed.

 

1 To the extent Dulin argues the trial court improperly weighed his mental illness and substance abuse as 

mitigating factors, the relative weight or value assignable to factors properly found by the trial court is not 

subject to appellate review. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 

218.
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Barnes, J., and Altice, J., concur.