IB 

Union Calendar No. 221 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2829 

[Report No. 112–323] 

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United 

Nations system, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

AUGUST 30, 2011 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS, Mr. PENCE, Mr. 

MCCOTTER, Mr. KING of New York, Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. GALLEGLY, Mr. MANZULLO, Mr. 

CHABOT, Mr. BARTLETT, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. BROUN of Georgia, Ms. 

BUERKLE, Mr. BURGESS, Mr. CALVERT, Mr. CHAFFETZ, Mr. COFFMAN

of Colorado, Mr. DOLD, Mrs. ELLMERS, Mr. FLEMING, Mr. FORBES, Mr. 

FRANKS of Arizona, Mr. GARRETT, Mr. GRIFFIN of Arkansas, Mr. 

GRIMM, Mr. HUELSKAMP, Mr. HULTGREN, Mr. HURT, Mr. JOHNSON of 

Ohio, Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. KLINE, Mr. LAMBORN, Mr. 

LANCE, Mr. LATTA, Mr. LONG, Mr. MARINO, Mr. MCCAUL, Mr. 

MCHENRY, Mr. MCKINLEY, Mrs. MILLER of Michigan, Mr. NUNNELEE, 

Mr. OLSON, Mr. PALAZZO, Mr. POMPEO, Mr. POSEY, Mr. RENACCI, Mr. 

RIVERA, Mr. ROGERS of Alabama, Mr. ROSS of Florida, Mrs. SCHMIDT, 

Mr. AUSTIN SCOTT of Georgia, Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. THOMPSON of Pennsylvania, Mr. TURNER, Mr. WALSH of Illinois, Mr. WEST, and Mr. WESTMORELAND) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

DECEMBER 8, 2011 

Additional sponsors: Mr. BUCHANAN, Mr. JOHNSON of Illinois, Mr. POE of 

Texas, Mr. ROE of Tennessee, Mr. SCALISE, Mr. SOUTHERLAND, Mr. 

WALBERG, Mr. WILSON of South Carolina, Mr. WOODALL, Mr. CAMP, 

Mr. CULBERSON, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. GOODLATTE, Mr. KINGSTON, Mr. 

ROSKAM, Mr. SCHWEIKERT, Mr. SMITH of Texas, Mrs. ADAMS, Mr. 

CANSECO, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Ms. FOXX, Mr. GOSAR, Mr. GRAVES of 

Missouri, Mrs. HARTZLER, Mr. KELLY, Mr. LANDRY, Mr. MEEHAN, Mr. 

SMITH of Nebraska, Mr. SHIMKUS, Mr. COBLE, Mr. CONAWAY, Mr. 

CRAWFORD, Mr. DUNCAN of South Carolina, Ms. JENKINS, Mr. MARCHVerDate Mar 15 2010 01:12 Dec 09, 2011 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6652 E:\BILLS\H2829.RH H2829

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ANT, Mr. NUGENT, Mr. TURNER of New York, Mr. WOMACK, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. FINCHER, Mr. LUETKEMEYER, Mr. GERLACH, Mr. ROONEY, 

Mr. KING of Iowa, Mr. KINZINGER of Illinois, Mr. RIBBLE, Mr. GARDNER, Mr. DENT, Mr. FARENTHOLD, Mr. FITZPATRICK, Mr. HALL, Mr. 

GARY G. MILLER of California, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mr. RYAN of 

Wisconsin, Mr. TIPTON, Ms. HAYWORTH, Mr. LABRADOR, Mrs. LUMMIS, 

Mr. MURPHY of Pennsylvania, Mr. PRICE of Georgia, Mr. RUNYAN, Mr. 

THORNBERRY, Mrs. BACHMANN, Mr. LATHAM, Mr. MACK, Mr. ROHRABACHER, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mrs. MYRICK, Mr. CRAVAACK, Mr. 

ROYCE, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. TIBERI, Mr. GOHMERT, Mrs. BLACK, 

Mr. AUSTRIA, Mr. FLORES, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. MCCLINTOCK, Mr. 

RIGELL, Mr. WALDEN, Mr. HUIZENGA of Michigan, Mr. LANKFORD, Mr. 

WOLF, and Mr. BARTON of Texas 

DECEMBER 8, 2011 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Committee of the Whole 

House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed 

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 

[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on August 30, 2011] 

A BILL 

To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within 

the United Nations system, and for other purposes. 


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1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Re6 form Act of 2011’’. 

7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents is as 

8 follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 101. Findings. 

Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a voluntary 

basis. 

Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations. 

Sec. 104. Report on United Nations reform. 

TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED 

STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 201. Findings. 

Sec. 202. Definitions. 

Sec. 203. Oversight of United States contributions to the United Nations System. 

Sec. 204. Transparency for United States contributions. 

Sec. 205. Integrity for United States contributions. 

Sec. 206. Refund of monies owed by the United Nations to the United States. 

Sec. 207. Annual reports on United States contributions to the United Nations. 

TITLE III—UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS 

Sec. 301. Annual publication. 

Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure. 

Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the security council. 

Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits. 

Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity. 

Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations. 

Sec. 307. Report on United Nations personnel. 

Sec. 308. United Nations treaty bodies. 

Sec. 309. Equality at the United Nations. 

Sec. 310. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations. 

Sec. 311. Regional group inclusion of Israel. 

Sec. 312. United States policy on Taiwan’s participation in United Nations entities. 

Sec. 313. United States policy on Tier 3 human rights violators. 


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TITLE IV—STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED 

NATIONS 

Sec. 401. Findings. 

Sec. 402. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 403. Implementation. 

TITLE V—UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 

Sec. 501. Findings. 

Sec. 502. Human rights council membership and funding. 

TITLE VI—GOLDSTONE REPORT 

Sec. 601. Findings. 

Sec. 602. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 603. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer dollars. 

TITLE VII—DURBAN PROCESS 

Sec. 701. Findings. 

Sec. 702. Sense of congress; statement of policy. 

Sec. 703. Non-participation in the Durban process. 

Sec. 704. Withholding of funds; refund of United States taxpayer dollars. 

TITLE VIII—UNRWA 

Sec. 801. Findings. 

Sec. 802. United States contributions to UNRWA. 

Sec. 803. Sense of Congress. 

TITLE IX—INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

Sec. 901. Technical cooperation program. 

Sec. 902. United States policy at the IAEA. 

Sec. 903. Sense of Congress regarding the nuclear security action plan of the 

IAEA. 

TITLE X—PEACEKEEPING 

Sec. 1001. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Sec. 1002. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations. 

Sec. 1003. Certification. 

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) EMPLOYEE.—The term ‘‘employee’’ means an 

4 individual who is employed in the general services, 

5 professional staff, or senior management of the United 

6 Nations, including consultants, contractors, and sub7 contractors. 


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1 (2) GENERAL ASSEMBLY.—The term ‘‘General 

2 Assembly’’ means the General Assembly of the United 

3 Nations. 

4 (3) MEMBER STATE.—The term ‘‘Member State’’ 

5 means a Member State of the United Nations. Such 

6 term is synonymous with the term ‘‘country’’. 

7 (4) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

8 the Secretary of State. 

9 (5) SECRETARY GENERAL.—The term ‘‘Secretary 

10 General’’ means the Secretary General of the United 

11 Nations. 

12 (6) SECURITY COUNCIL.—The term ‘‘Security 

13 Council’’ means the Security Council of the United 

14 Nations. 

15 (7) UN.—The term ‘‘UN’’ means the United Na16 tions. 

17 (8) UNITED NATIONS ENTITY.—The term 

18 ‘‘United Nations Entity’’ means any United Nations 

19 agency, commission, conference, council, court, de20 partment, forum, fund, institute, office, organization, 

21 partnership, program, subsidiary body, tribunal, 

22 trust, university or academic body, related organiza23 tion or subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies 

24 the United Nations flag or is authorized to use the 

25 United Nations logo, including those United Nations 


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1 affiliated agencies and bodies identified as recipients 

2 of United States contributions under section 

3 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense 

4 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 

5 109–364), but not including the International Bank 

6 for Reconstruction and Development, the Inter7 national Centre for Settlement of Investment Dis8 putes, the International Development Association, the 

9 International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral 

10 Investment Guarantee Agency, and the World Trade 

11 Organization. 

12 (9) UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.—The term 

13 ‘‘United Nations System’’ means the aggregation of 

14 all United Nations Entities, as defined in paragraph 

15 (8). 

16 (10) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION.—The term 

17 ‘‘United States Contribution’’ means an assessed or 

18 voluntary contribution, whether financial, in-kind, or 

19 otherwise, from the United States Federal Govern20 ment to a United Nations Entity, including contribu21 tions passed through other entities for ultimate use by 

22 a United Nations Entity. United States Contribu23 tions include those contributions identified pursuant 

24 to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National 


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1 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Pub2 lic Law 109–364). 

3 (11) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT4 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit5 tees’’ means— 

6 (A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ap7 propriations, and Oversight and Government Re8 form of the House of Representatives; and 

9 (B) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 

10 Appropriations, and Homeland Security and 

11 Governmental Affairs of the Senate. 

12 TITLE I—FUNDING OF THE 

13 UNITED NATIONS 

14 SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 

15 Congress makes the following findings: 

16 (1) The United States pays billions of dollars 

17 into the United Nations system every year (almost 

18 $7.7 billion in 2010, according to the White House 

19 Office of Management and Budget), significantly 

20 more than any other nation. 

21 (2) Under current rules and contribution levels, 

22 it is possible to assemble the two-thirds majority need23 ed for important United Nations budget votes with a 

24 group of countries that, taken together, pay less than 

25 1 percent of the total United Nations regular budget. 


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1 (3) The disconnect between contribution levels 

2 and management control creates significant perverse 

3 incentives in terms of United Nations spending, 

4 transparency, and accountability. 

5 (4) The United Nations system suffers from un6 acceptably high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, 

7 which seriously impair its ability to fulfill the lofty 

8 ideals of its founding. 

9 (5) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, 

10 and sexual abuse scandals of the past several years, 

11 American public disapproval of United Nations has 

12 reached all-time highs. A 2011 Gallup poll revealed 

13 that 62 percent of Americans believe that the United 

14 Nations is doing a poor job, a negative assessment 

15 shared by a majority of respondents from both polit16 ical parties. Research polling by another firm in late 

17 2006 found that 71 percent of Americans think that 

18 the United Nations is ‘‘no longer effective’’ and needs 

19 to be significantly reformed, while 75 percent think 

20 that the United Nations ‘‘needs to be held more ac21 countable’’. 

22 (6) Significant improvements in United Nations 

23 transparency and accountability are necessary for 

24 improving public perceptions of and American sup25 port for United Nations operations. 


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1 (7) Because of their need to justify future con2 tributions from donors, voluntarily funded organiza3 tions have more incentive to be responsive and effi4 cient in their operations than organizations funded 

5 by compulsory contributions that are not tied to per6 formance. 

7 (8) Catherine Bertini, the former UN Under-Sec8 retary General for Management and director of the 

9 World Food Program (WFP), has stated that ‘‘Vol10 untary funding creates an entirely different atmos11 phere at WFP than at the UN. At WFP, every staff 

12 member knows that we have to be as efficient, ac13 countable, transparent, and results-oriented as pos14 sible. If we are not, donor governments can take their 

15 funding elsewhere in a very competitive world among 

16 UN agencies, NGOs, and bilateral governments.’’. 

17 (9) Article XVII of the Charter of the United Na18 tions, which states that ‘‘[t]he expenses of the Organi19 zation shall be borne by the Members as apportioned 

20 by the General Assembly’’, leaves to the discretion of 

21 the General Assembly the basis of apportionment, 

22 which could be done on the basis of voluntary pledges 

23 by Member States. 

24 (10) Unlike United States assessed contributions 

25 to the United Nations regular budget, which are 


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1 statutorily capped at 22 percent of the total, there is 

2 no cap on voluntary contributions. 

3 (11) The United States, which contributes gener4 ously to international organizations whose activities 

5 it recognizes as credible, worthwhile, and efficient, 

6 contributes more than 22 percent of the budget of cer7 tain voluntarily funded United Nations Specialized 

8 Agencies. 

9 SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REG10 ULAR BUDGET ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS. 

11 (a) UNITED STATES POLICY.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United 

13 States to seek to shift the funding mechanism for the 

14 regular budget of the United Nations from an assessed 

15 to a voluntary basis. 

16 (2) ACTION AT UNITED NATIONS.—The President 

17 shall direct the United States Permanent Representa18 tive to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 

19 influence of the United States at the United Nations 

20 to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget 

21 of the United Nations to a voluntary basis, and to 

22 make it a priority to build support for such a trans23 formational change among Member States, particu24 larly key United Nations donors. 


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1 (b) CERTIFICATION OF PREDOMINANTLY VOLUNTARY

2 UN REGULAR BUDGET FINDING.—A certification described 

3 in this section is a certification by the Secretary of State 

4 to the Appropriate Congressional Committees that at least 

5 80 percent of the total regular budget (not including extra6 budgetary contributions) of the United Nations is appor7 tioned on a voluntary basis. Each such certification shall 

8 be shall be effective for a period of not more than 1 year, 

9 and shall be promptly revoked by the Secretary, with notice 

10 to the appropriate congressional committees, if the under11 lying circumstances change so as not to warrant such cer12 tification. 

13 (c) WITHHOLDING OF NONVOLUNTARY CONTRIBU14 TIONS.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning 2 years after the 

16 effective date of this Act and notwithstanding any 

17 other provision of law, no funds may be obligated or 

18 expended for a United States assessed contribution to 

19 the regular budget of the United Nations in an 

20 amount greater than 50 percent of the United States 

21 share of assessed contributions for the regular budget 

22 of the United Nations unless there is in effect a cer23 tification by the Secretary, as described in subsection 

24 (b). 


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1 (2) ALLOWANCE.—For a period of 1 year after 

2 appropriation, funds appropriated for use as a 

3 United States contribution to the regular budget of 

4 the United Nations but withheld from obligation and 

5 expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be obli6 gated and expended for that purpose upon the certifi7 cation described in subsection (b). After 1 year, in the 

8 absence of such certification, those funds shall revert 

9 to the United States Treasury. 

10 SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES 

11 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE REGULAR BUDGET 

12 OF THE UNITED NATIONS. 

13 (a) DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The annual congres14 sional budget justification shall include a detailed itemized 

15 request in support of the contribution of the United States 

16 to the regular budget of the United Nations. 

17 (b) CONTENTS OF DETAILED ITEMIZATION.—The de18 tailed itemization required under subsection (a) shall— 

19 (1) contain information relating to the amounts 

20 requested in support of each of the various sections 

21 and titles of the regular budget of the United Nations; 

22 and 

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1 tributed by the United States in previous fiscal years 

2 for the same sections and titles. 

3 (c) ADJUSTMENTS AND NOTIFICATION.—If the United 

4 Nations proposes an adjustment to its regular assessed 

5 budget, the Secretary of State shall, at the time such adjust6 ment is presented to the Advisory Committee on Adminis7 trative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and con8 sult with the appropriate congressional committees. 

9 SEC. 104. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM. 

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

11 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, 

12 the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

13 committees a report on United Nations reform. 

14 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required under subsection 

15 (a) shall describe— 

16 (1) progress toward the goal of shifting the fund17 ing for the United Nations Regular Budget to a vol18 untary basis as identified in section 102, and a de19 tailed description of efforts and activities by United 

20 States diplomats and officials toward that end; 

21 (2) progress toward each of the policy goals iden22 tified in the prior sections of this title, and a detailed, 

23 goal-specific description of efforts and activities by 

24 United States diplomats and officials toward those 

25 ends; 


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1 (3) the status of the implementation of manage2 ment reforms within the United Nations and its spe3 cialized agencies; 

4 (4) the number of outputs, reports, or other man5 dates generated by General Assembly resolutions that 

6 have been eliminated; 

7 (5) the progress of the General Assembly to mod8 ernize and streamline the committee structure and its 

9 specific recommendations on oversight and committee 

10 outputs, consistent with the March 2005 report of the 

11 Secretary General entitled ‘‘In larger freedom: to12 wards development, security and human rights for 

13 all’’; 

14 (6) the status of the review by the General As15 sembly of all mandates older than 5 years and how 

16 resources have been redirected to new challenges, con17 sistent with such March 2005 report of the Secretary 

18 General; 

19 (7) the continued utility and relevance of the 

20 Economic and Financial Committee and the Social, 

21 Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, in light of 

22 the duplicative agendas of those committees and the 

23 Economic and Social Council; and 

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1 cluded on the Lists of Parties Excluded from Federal 

2 Procurement and Nonprocurement Programs. 

3 TITLE II—TRANSPARENCY AND 

4 ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 

5 UNITED STATES CONTRIBU6 TIONS TO THE UNITED NA7 TIONS 

8 SEC. 201. FINDINGS. 

9 Congress makes the following findings: 

10 (1) As underscored by continuing revelations of 

11 waste, fraud, and abuse, oversight and accountability 

12 mechanisms within the United Nations system re13 main significantly deficient, despite decades of reform 

14 attempts, including those initiated by Secretaries 

15 General of the United Nations. 

16 (2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of 

17 any Secretary General of the United Nations to pro18 mote institutional transparency and accountability 

19 within the United Nations System, the Secretary 

20 General lacks the power to impose far reaching man21 agement reforms without the concurrence of the Gen22 eral Assembly. 

23 (3) Groupings of Member States whose voting 

24 power in the General Assembly significantly outpaces 

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1 tions system have repeatedly and successfully defeated, 

2 delayed, and diluted various reform proposals that 

3 would have enabled more detailed oversight and scru4 tiny of United Nations system operations and expend5 itures. 

6 (4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor 

7 states, including the United States, lack access to rea8 sonably detailed, reliable information that would 

9 allow them to determine how their contributions have 

10 been spent by various United Nations system entities, 

11 further contributing to the lack of accountability 

12 within the United Nations system. 

13 SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS. 

14 In this title: 

15 (1) TRANSPARENCY CERTIFICATION.—The term 

16 ‘‘Transparency Certification’’ means an annual, writ17 ten affirmation by the head or authorized designee of 

18 a United Nations Entity, provided to the Department 

19 of State, that the Entity will cooperate with the De20 partment of State and Congress, including by pro21 viding the Department of State and Congress with 

22 full, complete, and unfettered access to Oversight In23 formation as defined in this title. 

24 (2) OVERSIGHT INFORMATION.—The term ‘‘Over25 sight Information’’ includes— 


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1 (A) internally and externally commissioned 

2 audits, investigatory reports, program reviews, 

3 performance reports, and evaluations; 

4 (B) financial statements, records, and bill5 ing systems; 

6 (C) program budgets and program budget 

7 implications, including revised estimates and re8 ports produced by or provided to the Secretary 

9 General and the Secretary General’s agents on 

10 budget related matters; 

11 (D) operational plans, budgets, and budg12 etary analyses for peacekeeping operations; 

13 (E) analyses and reports regarding the scale 

14 of assessments; 

15 (F) databases and other data systems con16 taining financial or programmatic information; 

17 (G) documents or other records alleging or 

18 involving improper use of resources, misconduct, 

19 mismanagement, or other violations of rules and 

20 regulations applicable to the United Nations En21 tity; and 

22 (H) other documentation relevant to the 

23 oversight work of Congress with respect to United 

24 States contributions to the United Nations sys25 tem. 


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1 (3) ACCOUNTABILITY CERTIFICATION.—The term 

2 ‘‘Accountability Certification’’ means an annual, 

3 written affirmation by the head or authorized des4 ignee of a United Nations Entity provided to the Sec5 retary of State that the Entity— 

6 (A) provides the public with full, complete, 

7 and unfettered access to all relevant documenta8 tion relating to operations and activities, includ9 ing budget and procurement activities; 

10 (B) implements and upholds policies and 

11 procedures to protect whistleblowers; 

12 (C) implements and upholds policies and 

13 procedures to require the filing of individual an14 nual financial disclosure forms by each of its 

15 employees at the P–5 level and above and to re16 quire that such forms be made available to the 

17 Office of Internal Oversight Services, to Member 

18 States, and to the public; 

19 (D) has established an effective ethics office; 

20 (E) has established a fully independent, au21 tonomous, and effective internal oversight body; 

22 (F) has adopted and implemented, and is 

23 in full compliance with, International Public 

24 Sector Accounting Standards; and 


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1 (G) has established a cap on its administra2 tive overhead costs. 

3 SEC. 203. OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS 

4 TO THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM. 

5 (a) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to en6 hance oversight of United States contributions to the United 

7 Nations System and the use of those contributions by 

8 United Nations Entities, in an effort to eliminate and deter 

9 waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of those contributions, 

10 and thereby to contribute to the development of greater 

11 transparency, accountability, and internal controls 

12 throughout the United Nations System. 

13 (b) IMPLEMENTATION.— 

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State shall 

15 collect and maintain current records regarding 

16 Transparency Certifications and Accountability Cer17 tifications by all United Nations Entities that receive 

18 United States contributions and submit that informa19 tion for inclusion in the report required under section 

20 207. 

21 (2) NOTIFICATION.—The Department of State 

22 shall keep the appropriate congressional committees 

23 fully and promptly informed of how United Nations 

24 Entities are spending United States contributions. 

25 (3) REFERRALS.— 


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1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 

2 shall promptly report to the Attorney General 

3 and to the appropriate congressional committees 

4 when the Secretary of State has reasonable 

5 grounds to believe a Federal criminal law has 

6 been violated by a United Nations Entity or one 

7 of its employees, contractors, or representatives. 

8 (B) NOTIFICATION.—The Secretary of State 

9 shall promptly report, when appropriate, to the 

10 appropriate congressional committees, and to the 

11 Secretary General or to the head of the appro12 priate United Nations Entity, cases in which the 

13 Secretary of State reasonably believes that mis14 management, misfeasance, or malfeasance is like15 ly to have taken place within a United Nations 

16 Entity and disciplinary proceedings are likely 

17 justified. 

18 (4) CONFIRMATION OF TRANSPARENCY BY

19 UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES.— 

20 (A) PROMPT NOTICE BY DEPARTMENT OF

21 STATE.—Whenever information or assistance re22 quested from a United Nations Entity by the De23 partment of State pursuant to a Transparency 

24 Certification is, in the opinion of the Secretary 

25 of State, unreasonably refused or not provided in 


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1 a timely manner, the Secretary of State shall no2 tify the appropriate congressional committees, 

3 the head of that particular United Nations Enti4 ty, and the Secretary General of the cir5 cumstances in writing, without delay. 

6 (B) NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE.—If and when 

7 the information or assistance being sought by the 

8 Department of State in connection with a notifi9 cation pursuant to subparagraph (A) is provided 

10 to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the 

11 Secretary of State shall so notify in writing to 

12 the appropriate congressional committees and the 

13 head of that particular United Nations Entity. 

14 (C) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the information 

15 or assistance being sought by the Department of 

16 State in connection with a notification pursuant 

17 to subparagraph (A) is not provided within 90 

18 days of that notification, then the United Na19 tions Entity that is the subject of the notification 

20 is deemed to be noncompliant with its Trans21 parency Certification, and 

22 (D) RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.—After 

23 the situation has been resolved to the satisfaction 

24 of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State 

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1 tion of that fact and of the restoration of compli2 ance, along with a description of the basis for the 

3 Secretary of State’s decision, to the appropriate 

4 congressional committees, the head of that United 

5 Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any 

6 office or agency of the Federal Government that 

7 has provided that United Nations Entity with 

8 any United States contribution during the prior 

9 2 years. 

10 (5) CONFIRMATION OF ACCOUNTABILITY BY

11 UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES.— 

12 (A) PROMPT NOTICE BY SECRETARY OF

13 STATE.—Whenever a United Nations Entity that 

14 has provided an Accountability Certification is, 

15 in the opinion of the Secretary of State, not in 

16 full compliance with any or all of the provisions 

17 of that certification, the Secretary of State shall 

18 notify the appropriate congressional committees, 

19 the head of that particular United Nations Enti20 ty, and the Secretary General of the cir21 cumstances in writing, without delay. 

22 (B) NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE.—If and when 

23 the United Nations Entity resumes full compli24 ance with its Accountability Certification fol25 lowing the provision of the notification pursuant 


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1 to subparagraph (A), the Secretary of State shall 

2 so notify in writing the appropriate congres3 sional committees and the head of that United 

4 Nations Entity. 

5 (C) NONCOMPLIANCE.—If the United Na6 tions Entity named in the notification in sub7 paragraph (A) does not resume full compliance 

8 with its Accountability Certification to the satis9 faction of the Secretary of State within 90 days 

10 of that notification, then the United Nations En11 tity that is the subject of the notification is 

12 deemed to be noncompliant with its Account13 ability Certification, and the Secretary of State 

14 shall provide prompt, written notification of that 

15 fact to the appropriate congressional committees, 

16 the head of that United Nations Entity, the Sec17 retary General, and any office or agency of the 

18 Federal Government that has provided that 

19 United Nations Entity with any United States 

20 Contribution during the prior 2 years. 

21 (D) RESTORATION OF COMPLIANCE.—After 

22 the situation has been resolved to the satisfaction 

23 of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State 

24 shall promptly provide prompt, written notifica25 tion of that fact and of the restoration of compliVerDate Mar 15 2010 23:42 Dec 08, 2011 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H2829.RH H2829

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1 ance, along with a description of the basis for the 

2 Secretary of State’s decision, to the appropriate 

3 congressional committees, the head of that United 

4 Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any 

5 office or agency of the Federal Government that 

6 has provided that United Nations Entity with 

7 any United States contribution during the prior 

8 2 years. 

9 (6) REPORTING.— 

10 (A) REPORTING.—In the report submitted 

11 by the Director of the Office of Management and 

12 Budget to Congress pursuant to section 207, the 

13 Secretary of State shall submit for inclusion a 

14 section that, among other things, includes a list 

15 and detailed description of the circumstances 

16 surrounding any notification of compliance 

17 issued pursuant to paragraph (4)(C) or (5)(C) 

18 during the covered timeframe, and whether and 

19 when the Secretary has reversed such finding of 

20 noncompliance. 

21 (B) PROHIBITED DISCLOSURES.—Nothing 

22 in this subsection shall be construed to authorize 

23 the public disclosure of information that is— 

24 (i) specifically prohibited from disclo25 sure by any other provision of law; 


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1 (ii) specifically required by Executive 

2 Order to be protected from disclosure in the 

3 interest of national defense or national secu4 rity or in the conduct of foreign affairs; or 

5 (iii) a part of an ongoing criminal in6 vestigation. 

7 (C) PRIVACY PROTECTIONS.—The Secretary 

8 of State shall exempt from public disclosure in9 formation received from a United Nations Enti10 ty that the Secretary of State believes— 

11 (i) constitutes a trade secret or privi12 leged and confidential personal financial 

13 information; 

14 (ii) constitutes confidential personal 

15 medical information; 

16 (iii) accuses a particular person of a 

17 crime; 

18 (iv) would, if publicly disclosed, con19 stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 

20 personal privacy; and 

21 (v) would compromise an ongoing law 

22 enforcement investigation or judicial trial 

23 in the United States. 


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1 SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBU2 TIONS. 

3 (a) FUNDING PREREQUISITES.—Notwithstanding any 

4 other provision of law, no funds made available for use as 

5 a United States Contribution to any United Nations Entity 

6 may be obligated or expended if— 

7 (1) the intended United Nations Entity recipient 

8 has not provided to the Secretary of State within the 

9 preceding year a Transparency Certification as de10 fined in section 202(1); 

11 (2) the intended United Nations Entity recipient 

12 is noncompliant with its Transparency Certification 

13 as described in section 203(b)(4)(C); 

14 (3) the intended United Nations Entity recipient 

15 has not provided to the Secretary of State within the 

16 preceding year an Accountability Certification as de17 fined in section 202(3); or 

18 (4) the intended United Nations Entity is non19 compliant with its Accountability Certification as de20 scribed in section 203(b)(5)(C). 

21 (b) TREATMENT OF FUNDS WITHHELD FOR NON22 COMPLIANCE.—At the conclusion of each fiscal year, any 

23 funds that had been appropriated for use as a United States 

24 Contribution to a United Nations Entity during that fiscal 

25 year, but could not be obligated or expended because of the 

26 restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United 


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1 States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for 

2 any other use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury 

3 shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United 

4 Nations Entity. 

5 (c) PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.—The President may 

6 waive the limitations of this subsection with respect to a 

7 particular United States Contribution to a particular 

8 United Nations Entity within a single fiscal year if the 

9 President determines that failure to do so would pose an 

10 extraordinary threat to the national security of the United 

11 States and provides notification and explanation of that 

12 determination to the appropriate congressional committees. 

13 SEC. 205. INTEGRITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS. 

14 (a) LIMITATION.—(1) No funds made available for use 

15 under the heading ‘‘Contributions to International Organi16 zations’’ may be used for any purpose other than an as17 sessed United States contribution to a United Nations Enti18 ty or other international organization. 

19 (2) No funds made available for use under the heading 

20 ‘‘International Organizations and Programs’’ may be used 

21 for any purpose other than a voluntary United States con22 tribution to a United Nations Entity or other international 

23 organization. 

24 (3) No funds made available for use under the heading 

25 ‘‘Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities’’ 


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1 may be used for any purpose other than a United States 

2 contribution to United Nations peacekeeping activities, to 

3 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo4 slavia, or to the International Criminal Tribunal for 

5 Rwanda. 

6 (b) TREATMENT OF FUNDS WITHHELD FOR NON7 COMPLIANCE.—At the conclusion of each fiscal year, any 

8 funds that had been appropriated for use as a United States 

9 contribution to a United Nations Entity during that fiscal 

10 year, but could not be obligated or expended because of the 

11 restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United 

12 States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for 

13 any other use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury 

14 shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United 

15 Nations Entity. 

16 SEC. 206. REFUND OF MONIES OWED BY THE UNITED NA17 TIONS TO THE UNITED STATES. 

18 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

19 (1) United States taxpayer funds overpaid to 

20 United Nations Entities and payable back to the 

21 United States sometimes remain in the hands of the 

22 United Nations because the United States has not re23 quested the return of those funds. 

24 (2) Such funds have been paid into, among other 

25 United Nations Entities, the United Nations Tax 


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1 Equalization Fund (TEF), which was established 

2 under the provisions of United Nations General As3 sembly Resolution 973 (1955), and which is used to 

4 reimburse United Nations staff members subject to 

5 United States income taxes for the cost of those taxes. 

6 (3) In recent years, the TEF has taken in con7 siderably more money than it has paid out, with the 

8 United States apparently overpaying into the TEF 

9 by $52.2 million in the 2008–2009 timeframe alone. 

10 (4) According to the United Nations Financial 

11 Report and Audited Financial Statements released on 

12 July 29, 2010, ‘‘As of 31 December 2009, an amount 

13 of $179.0 million was payable to the United States of 

14 America pending instructions as to its disposition.’’. 

15 (5) That balance was allowed to accrue notwith16 standing United Nations Financial Regulation 4.12, 

17 which states that any such surpluses ‘‘shall be cred18 ited against the assessed contributions due from that 

19 Member State the following year.’’. 

20 (6) Allowing the United Nations to regularly 

21 overcharge the United States and to retain those over22 payments, or to spend them on wholly unrelated ac23 tivities, is a disservice to American taxpayers and a 

24 subversion of the Congressional budget process. 


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1 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

2 United States— 

3 (1) to annually instruct the United Nations to 

4 return to the United States any surplus assessed con5 tributions or other overpayments by the United States 

6 to any United Nations Entity; and 

7 (2) to use the voice and vote of the United States 

8 to press the United Nations to reform its TEF assess9 ment procedures to reduce the repeated discrepancies 

10 between TEF income and expenditures. 

11 (c) CERTIFICATION AND WITHHOLDING.—For each 

12 and every fiscal year subsequent to the effective date of this 

13 Act, until the Secretary of State submits to the appropriate 

14 congressional committees a certification that the United Na15 tions has returned to the United States any surplus assessed 

16 contributions or other overpayments by the United States 

17 to any United Nations Entity, the Secretary of State shall 

18 withhold from the regular budget of the United Nations an 

19 amount equal to the amount of the funds that the United 

20 Nations has yet to return to the United States. 

21 SEC. 207. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBU22 TIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS. 

23 (a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after 

24 the date of the enactment of this Act and annually for two 

25 years thereafter, the Director of the Office of Management 


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1 and Budget shall submit to Congress a report listing all 

2 assessed and voluntary contributions of the United States 

3 Government for the preceding fiscal year to the United Na4 tions and United Nations affiliated agencies and related 

5 bodies. 

6 (b) CONTENTS.—Each report required under sub7 section (a) shall set forth, for the fiscal year covered by such 

8 report, the following: 

9 (1) The total amount of all assessed and vol10 untary contributions of the United States Government 

11 to the United Nations and United Nations affiliated 

12 agencies and related bodies. 

13 (2) The approximate percentage of United States 

14 Government contributions to each United Nations af15 filiated agency or body in such fiscal year when com16 pared with all contributions to such agency or body 

17 from any source in such fiscal year. 

18 (3) For each such contribution— 

19 (A) the amount of such contribution; 

20 (B) a description of such contribution (in21 cluding whether assessed or voluntary); 

22 (C) the department or agency of the United 

23 States Government responsible for such contribu24 tion; 

25 (D) the purpose of such contribution; and 


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1 (E) the United Nations or United Nations 

2 affiliated agency or related body receiving such 

3 contribution. 

4 TITLE III—UNITED STATES POL5 ICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS 

6 SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION. 

7 The President shall direct the United States Perma8 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, 

9 vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na10 tions to ensure the United Nations publishes annually, in11 cluding on a publicly searchable internet Web site, a list 

12 of all United Nations subsidiary bodies and their functions, 

13 budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary and as14 sessed, sorted by donor. 

15 SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE. 

16 The President shall direct the United States Perma17 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, 

18 vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na19 tions to implement a system for the required filing of indi20 vidual annual financial disclosure forms by each employee 

21 of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, pro22 grams, and funds at the P–5 level and above, which shall 

23 be made available to the Office of Internal Oversight Serv24 ices, to Member States, and to the public. 


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1 SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE 

2 SECURITY COUNCIL. 

3 It is the policy of the United States to use the voice, 

4 vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na5 tions to oppose any proposals on expansion of the Security 

6 Council if such expansion would— 

7 (1) diminish the influence of the United States 

8 on the Security Council; or 

9 (2) include veto rights for any new members of 

10 the Security Council. 

11 SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS. 

12 The President shall direct the United States Perma13 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, 

14 vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na15 tions to ensure that Member States may, upon request, have 

16 access to all reports and audits completed by the Board of 

17 External Auditors. 

18 SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY. 

19 The President shall direct the United States Perma20 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, 

21 vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na22 tions to ensure that the Secretary General exercises the right 

23 and duty of the Secretary General under section 20 of the 

24 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United 

25 Nations to waive the immunity of any United Nations offi26 cial in any case in which such immunity would impede 


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1 the course of justice. In exercising such waiver, the Sec2 retary General is urged to interpret the interests of the 

3 United Nations as favoring the investigation or prosecution 

4 of a United Nations official who is credibly under investiga5 tion for having committed a serious criminal offense or who 

6 is credibly charged with a serious criminal offense. 

7 SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 

9 United States Permanent Representative to the United Na10 tions to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

11 States at the United Nations to work toward adoption by 

12 the General Assembly of— 

13 (1) a definition of terrorism that— 

14 (A) builds upon the recommendations of the 

15 December 2004 report of the High-Level Panel 

16 on Threats, Challenges, and Change; 

17 (B) includes as an essential component of 

18 such definition any action that is intended to 

19 cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians 

20 with the purpose of intimidating a population or 

21 compelling a government or an international or22 ganization to do, or abstain from doing, any act; 

23 and 

24 (C) does not propose a legal or moral 

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1 paragraph (B) and measures taken by a govern2 ment or international organization in self-de3 fense against an action described in such sub4 paragraph; and 

5 (2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that 

6 includes the definition described in paragraph (1). 

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

8 that— 

9 (1) authoritarian regimes often inaccurately 

10 label peaceful, pro-freedom, pro-democracy movements 

11 as terrorist movements in order to undermine the le12 gitimacy of those movements; and 

13 (2) any United Nations definition of terrorism 

14 should not be used to undermine a peaceful, pro-free15 dom, pro-democracy movement against authoritarian 

16 rule. 

17 SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL. 

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date 

19 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 

20 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re21 port— 

22 (1) concerning the progress of the General Assem23 bly to modernize human resource practices, consistent 

24 with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General 


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1 entitled ‘‘In larger freedom: towards development, se2 curity and human rights for all’’; and 

3 (2) containing the information described in sub4 section (b). 

5 (b) CONTENTS.—The report shall include— 

6 (1) a comprehensive evaluation of human re7 sources reforms at the United Nations, including an 

8 evaluation of— 

9 (A) tenure; 

10 (B) performance reviews; 

11 (C) the promotion system; 

12 (D) a merit-based hiring system and en13 hanced regulations concerning termination of 

14 employment of employees; and 

15 (E) the implementation of a code of conduct 

16 and ethics training; 

17 (2) the implementation of a system of procedures 

18 for filing complaints and protective measures for 

19 work-place harassment, including sexual harassment; 

20 (3) policy recommendations relating to the estab21 lishment of a rotation requirement for nonadminis22 trative positions; 

23 (4) policy recommendations relating to the estab24 lishment of a prohibition preventing personnel and 

25 officials assigned to the mission of a member state to 


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1 the United Nations from transferring to a position 

2 within the United Nations Secretariat that is com3 pensated at the P–5 level and above; 

4 (5) policy recommendations relating to a reduc5 tion in travel allowances and attendant oversight 

6 with respect to accommodations and airline flights; 

7 and 

8 (6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the 

9 Secretary General relating to greater flexibility for 

10 the Secretary General in staffing decisions to accom11 modate changing priorities. 

12 SEC. 308. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES. 

13 The United States shall withhold from United States 

14 contributions to the regular assessed budget of the United 

15 Nations for a biennial period amounts that are propor16 tional to the percentage of such budget that are expended 

17 with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty moni18 toring body or committee that was established by— 

19 (1) a convention (without any protocols) or an 

20 international covenant (without any protocols) to 

21 which the United States is not party; or 

22 (2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if 

23 the United States is a party to neither. 

24 SEC. 309. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS. 

25 (a) DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AND REPORT.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—To avoid duplicative efforts 

2 and funding with respect to Palestinian interests and 

3 to ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Pales4 tinian issues, the Secretary shall, not later than 180 

5 days after the date of the enactment of this Act— 

6 (A) complete an audit of the functions of the 

7 entities listed in paragraph (2); and 

8 (B) submit to the appropriate congressional 

9 committees a report containing audit findings 

10 and conclusions, and recommendations for the 

11 elimination of such duplicative entities and ef12 forts. 

13 (2) ENTITIES.—The entities referred to in para14 graph (1)(A) are the following: 

15 (A) The United Nations Division for Pales16 tinian Rights. 

17 (B) The Committee on the Exercise of the 

18 Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. 

19 (C) The United Nations Special Coordi20 nator for the Middle East Peace Process and 

21 Personal Representative to the Palestine Libera22 tion Organization and the Palestinian Author23 ity. 

24 (D) The NGO Network on the Question of 

25 Palestine. 


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1 (E) The Special Committee to Investigate 

2 Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 

3 the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the 

4 Occupied Territories. 

5 (F) Any other entity the Secretary deter6 mines results in duplicative efforts or funding or 

7 fails to ensure balance in the approach to 

8 Israeli-Palestinian issues. 

9 (b) IMPLEMENTATION BY PERMANENT REPRESENTA10 TIVE.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 

12 United States Permanent Representative to the 

13 United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence 

14 of the United States at the United Nations to seek the 

15 implementation of the recommendations contained in 

16 the report required under subsection (a)(1)(B). 

17 (2) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—Until such rec18 ommendations have been implemented, the United 

19 States shall withhold from United States contribu20 tions to the regular assessed budget of the United Na21 tions for a biennial period amounts that are propor22 tional to the percentage of such budget that are ex23 pended for such entities. 


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1 SEC. 310. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS. 

2 The President shall direct the United States perma3 nent representative to the United Nations to use the voice, 

4 vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na5 tions to make every effort to— 

6 (1) ensure the issuance and implementation of a 

7 directive by the Secretary General or the Secretariat, 

8 as appropriate, that— 

9 (A) requires all employees of the United Na10 tions and its specialized agencies to officially 

11 and publicly condemn anti-Semitic statements 

12 made at any session of the United Nations or its 

13 specialized agencies, or at any other session 

14 sponsored by the United Nations; 

15 (B) requires employees of the United Na16 tions and its specialized agencies, programs, and 

17 funds to be subject to punitive action, including 

18 immediate dismissal, for making anti-Semitic 

19 statements or references; 

20 (C) proposes specific recommendations to 

21 the General Assembly for the establishment of 

22 mechanisms to hold accountable employees and 

23 officials of the United Nations and its specialized 

24 agencies, programs, and funds, or Member 

25 States, that make such anti-Semitic statements 


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1 or references in any forum of the United Nations 

2 or of its specialized agencies; 

3 (D) continues to develop and implements 

4 education awareness programs about the Holo5 caust and anti-Semitism throughout the world, 

6 as part of an effort to combat intolerance and 

7 hatred; and 

8 (E) requires the Office of the United Na9 tions High Commissioner for Human Rights 

10 (OHCHR) to develop programming and other 

11 measures that address anti-Semitism; 

12 (2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the 

13 General Assembly that establishes the mechanisms de14 scribed in paragraph (1)(C); and 

15 (3) continue working toward further reduction of 

16 anti-Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions in 

17 the United Nations and its specialized agencies, pro18 grams, and funds. 

19 SEC. 311. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL. 

20 The President shall direct the United States Perma21 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, 

22 vote, and influence of the United States at the United Na23 tions to expand the Western European and Others Group 

24 (WEOG) in the United Nations in Geneva to include Israel 

25 as a permanent member with full rights and privileges. 


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1 SEC. 312. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TAIWAN’S PARTICIPA2 TION IN UNITED NATIONS ENTITIES. 

3 The Secretary of State shall direct the United States 

4 Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

5 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United 

6 Nations to ensure meaningful participation for Taiwan in 

7 relevant United Nations Entities in which Taiwan has ex8 pressed an interest in participating. 

9 SEC. 313. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TIER 3 HUMAN 

10 RIGHTS VIOLATORS. 

11 The Secretary of State shall direct the United States 

12 Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the 

13 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United 

14 Nations to ensure that no representative of a country des15 ignated pursuant to section 110 of the Trafficking Victims 

16 Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) by the Department 

17 of State as a Tier 3 country shall preside as Chair or Presi18 dent of any United Nations Entity. 

19 TITLE IV—STATUS OF PALES20 TINIAN ENTITIES AT THE 

21 UNITED NATIONS 

22 SEC. 401. FINDINGS. 

23 Congress makes the following findings: 

24 (1) In 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organiza25 tion (PLO) launched an effort to evade direct negotia26 tions for peace with the State of Israel by instead 


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1 pursuing Palestinian membership in international 

2 organizations, which could imply de facto recognition 

3 of a Palestinian state by the United Nations. 

4 (2) The Executive Branch, with significant sup5 port from Members of Congress, successfully stopped 

6 the PLO’s effort by credibly threatening, as noted in 

7 a May 1, 1989 statement by then-Secretary of State 

8 James A. Baker, ‘‘that the United States [would] 

9 make no further contributions, voluntary or assessed, 

10 to any international organization which makes any 

11 change in the P.L.O.’s present status as an observer 

12 organization.’’. 

13 (3) The United States success in this case dem14 onstrates that withholding contributions and placing 

15 conditions on their payment can result in real re16 forms, stop counter-productive developments, and ad17 vance United States interests at the United Nations. 

18 (4) The Palestinian leadership has recently re19 sumed its effort to evade direct negotiations for peace 

20 with the State of Israel by seeking recognition of a 

21 Palestinian state from foreign governments and in 

22 international forums. 

23 (5) Efforts to bypass negotiations and to unilat24 erally declare a Palestinian state, or to appeal to the 

25 United Nations or other international forums or to 


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1 foreign governments for recognition of a Palestinian 

2 state or membership or other upgraded status for the 

3 Palestinian observer mission at those forums, would 

4 violate the underlying principles of the Oslo Accords, 

5 the Road Map, and other relevant Middle East peace 

6 process efforts. 

7 (6) On December 15, 2010, the House of Rep8 resentatives passed House Resolution 1765, in which, 

9 inter alia, the House of Representatives: 

10 (A) ‘‘reaffirms its strong opposition to any 

11 attempt to establish or seek recognition of a Pal12 estinian state outside of an agreement negotiated 

13 between Israel and the Palestinians’’; 

14 (B) ‘‘supports the Administration’s opposi15 tion to a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian 

16 state’’; and 

17 (C) ‘‘calls upon the Administration to . . . 

18 lead a diplomatic effort to persuade other na19 tions to oppose a unilateral declaration of a Pal20 estinian state and to oppose recognition of a Pal21 estinian state by other nations, within the 

22 United Nations, and in other international fo23 rums prior to achievement of a final agreement 

24 between Israel and the Palestinians.’’. 


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1 (7) Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, United 

2 States Deputy Permanent Representative to the 

3 United Nations, stated on July 26, 2011, ‘‘Let there 

4 be no doubt: symbolic actions to isolate Israel at the 

5 United Nations in September will not create an inde6 pendent Palestinian state . . . The United States will 

7 not support unilateral campaigns at the United Na8 tions in September or any other time.’’. 

9 (8) On September 16, 2011, the Deputy National 

10 Security Advisor for Strategic Communications stated 

11 that ‘‘We would veto actions through the Security 

12 Council and oppose action through the Security 

13 Council associated with a unilateral declaration of 

14 [Palestinian] statehood.’’. 

15 SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

16 It is the policy of the United States to oppose the rec17 ognition of a Palestinian state by any United Nations En18 tity, or any upgrade, including but not limited to full mem19 bership or non-member-state observer status, in the status 

20 of the Palestinian observer mission at the United Nations, 

21 the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestinian Au22 thority, or any other Palestinian administrative organiza23 tion or governing entity, at any United Nations Entity, 

24 prior to the achievement of a final peace agreement nego25 tiated between and agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians. 


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1 SEC. 403. IMPLEMENTATION. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 

3 United States Permanent Representative to the United Na4 tions to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

5 States at the United Nations to advance the policy stated 

6 in section 402. 

7 (b) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of State 

8 shall withhold United States contributions from any United 

9 Nations Entity that recognizes a Palestinian state or up10 grades in any way, including full membership or non-mem11 ber-state observer status, the status of the Palestinian ob12 server mission at the United Nations, the Palestine Libera13 tion Organization, the Palestinian Authority, or any other 

14 Palestinian administrative organization or governing enti15 ty, at that United Nations Entity, prior to the achievement 

16 of complete and final peace agreement negotiated between 

17 and agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians. Funds appro18 priated for use as a United States contribution to the 

19 United Nations but withheld from obligation and expendi20 ture pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to 

21 the United States Treasury and shall not be considered ar22 rears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity. 

23 TITLE V—UNITED NATIONS 

24 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 

25 SEC. 501. FINDINGS. 

26 Congress makes the following findings: 


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1 (1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United 

2 Nations Human Rights Council has failed to mean3 ingfully promote the protection of internationally rec4 ognized human rights, and has proven to be even 

5 more problematic than the United Nations Human 

6 Rights Commission that it was created to replace. 

7 (2) The United Nations Human Rights Council 

8 suffers from fundamental and severe structural flaws 

9 present since its establishment by the United Nations 

10 General Assembly, such as the fact that it draws its 

11 members from the General Assembly without any sub12 stantive membership criteria, with the perverse result 

13 that a number of the world’s worst human rights 

14 abusers are members of the council. 

15 (3) For example, the majority of members of the 

16 United Nations Human Rights Council are rated 

17 ‘‘Not Free’’ or only ‘‘Partly Free’’ by Freedom House. 

18 Only a minority of members were rated ‘‘Free’’. 

19 (4) The structure and composition of the United 

20 Nations Human Rights Council have made it subject 

21 to gross political manipulation, with the result that, 

22 during its almost five years of operation, the Council 

23 has passed over 40 resolutions censuring the demo24 cratic, Jewish State of Israel, as compared to only a 

25 handful censuring the dictatorships in Burma, North 


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1 Korea, and Syria, just one addressing the severe, on2 going human rights abuses in Libya, Iran, and 

3 Belarus, and none addressing the severe, ongoing 

4 human rights abuses in China, Cuba, Russia, 

5 Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and elsewhere. 

6 (5) The United Nations Human Rights Council’s 

7 agenda contains a permanent item for criticism of the 

8 democratic, Jewish State of Israel, but no permanent 

9 items criticizing any other state. 

10 (6) The United Nations Human Rights Council 

11 has established, or preserved the existence of, a num12 ber of ‘‘Special Procedures’’ mechanisms to address 

13 country-specific situations or thematic issues. These 

14 mechanisms include a number of ‘‘special 

15 rapporteurs’’ whose expenses and staff support are 

16 paid for by contributions to the United Nations. 

17 (7) The United Nations Human Rights Council 

18 has also established an ‘‘Advisory Committee’’ whose 

19 expenses and staff support are paid for by contribu20 tions to the United Nations. 

21 (8) Some of these special rapporteurs and mem22 bers of the Advisory Committee have displayed con23 sistent bias against the United States, Israel, and the 

24 Jewish people, while providing support to human 

25 rights abusers. 


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1 (9) Richard Falk, the United Nations ‘‘Special 

2 Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Pal3 estinian territories occupied since 1967’’, has com4 pared Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians to the 

5 Holocaust, questioned the veracity of the events of 

6 September 11, 2001, and posted a cartoon on his blog 

7 depicting Americans and Jews as bloodthirsty dogs. 

8 (10) Jean Ziegler, a member of the United Na9 tions Human Rights Council Advisory Committee 

10 and former United Nations ‘‘Special Rapporteur on 

11 the Right to Food’’, has accused former President 

12 George W. Bush and former Israeli Prime Minister 

13 Ariel Sharon of committing ‘‘state terrorism’’, has 

14 called for an investigation of Israel by the Inter15 national Criminal Court for ‘‘war crimes’’ following 

16 Israel’s war against Hezbollah in 2006, has visited 

17 Cuba and praised the Cuban regime’s provision of 

18 food to the Cuban people, and has stated that 

19 Zimbabwean dictator Robert Mugabe ‘‘has history 

20 and morality with him’’. Ziegler was also involved in 

21 the establishment of the ‘‘Al-Gaddafi International 

22 Prize for Human Rights’’, a prize established by, 

23 funded by, and named after Libyan dictator Muam24 mar al-Gaddafi, and awarded in the past to Fidel 

25 Castro, Hugo Chavez, Louis Farrakhan, and Roger 


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1 Garaudy, who has denied the Holocaust, questioned 

2 the veracity of the events of September 11, 2001, and 

3 supported Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 

4 call for Israel to be ‘‘wiped off the map’’. 

5 (11) Miguel D’Escoto Brockmann, a member of 

6 the United Nations Human Rights Council Advisory 

7 Committee who has previously served as President of 

8 the United Nations General Assembly and as foreign 

9 minister for the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, has 

10 implicitly accused the United States of ‘‘terrorism’’, 

11 has called former President Ronald Reagan a ‘‘butch12 er’’, has called for a international boycott of Israel, 

13 has stated that the Palestinians were being ‘‘cru14 cified’’ by Israel, has called Israel’s defensive Oper15 ation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip a ‘‘monstrosity’’ 

16 and ‘‘genocide’’, has urged the United Nations to use 

17 the term ‘‘apartheid’’ in discussing Israeli treatment 

18 of Palestinians, has embraced Iranian leader 

19 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after Ahmadinejad delivered 

20 an anti-American, anti-Israel address to the United 

21 Nations General Assembly, has stated that charges of 

22 genocide against Sudanese dictator Omar Hassan al 

23 Bashir are ‘‘racist’’, and has declared Fidel Castro 

24 ‘‘World Hero of Solidarity’’, stating that Castro 


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1 ‘‘embod[ied] virtues and values worth emulation by 

2 all of us’’. 

3 (12) Halima Warzazi, a member of the United 

4 Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, 

5 has compared Israel to Nazi Germany, and used her 

6 previous membership in a United Nations apparatus 

7 to shield Saddam Hussein from censure for gassing 

8 Iraqi Kurds in Halabja. 

9 (13) The ongoing five-year review of the United 

10 Nations Human Rights Council concluded on June 

11 17, 2011, and failed make any significant reforms to 

12 its fundamental and severe structural flaws, including 

13 its absence of substantive membership criteria, or to 

14 remove the permanent agenda item on Israel. 

15 (14) On June 17, 2011, John F, Sammis, United 

16 States Deputy Representative to the Economic and 

17 Social Council, stated that ‘‘The Geneva process [of 

18 the five-year review] failed to yield even minimally 

19 positive results, forcing us to dissociate from the out20 come . . . the final resolution [for the five-year re21 view] also fails to address the core problems that still 

22 plague the Human Rights Council . . . The United 

23 States has therefore voted ‘no’ on the resolution . . . 

24 the Council’s effectiveness and legitimacy will always 

25 be compromised so long as one country in all the 


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1 world is unfairly and uniquely singled out while oth2 ers, including chronic human rights abusers, escape 

3 scrutiny . . . The resolution before us today does 

4 nothing to address the Council’s failures nor move it 

5 any closer to the founding values of the UN Charter 

6 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’’. 

7 (15) United States membership in the Human 

8 Rights Council has not led to reform of its funda9 mental flaws diminished the Council’s virulently 

10 anti-Israel behavior. The Council has passed fourteen 

11 resolutions criticizing Israel since the United States 

12 joined in 2009. 

13 SEC. 502. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND 

14 FUNDING. 

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—For each and every fiscal year sub16 sequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Secretary 

17 of State submits to Congress a certification that the require18 ments described in subsection (b) have been satisfied— 

19 (1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from a 

20 United States contribution each fiscal year to a reg21 ular budget of the United Nations an amount that is 

22 equal to the percentage of such contribution that the 

23 Secretary determines would be allocated by the United 

24 Nations to support the United Nations Human Rights 

25 Council; 


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1 (2) the Secretary of State shall not make a vol2 untary contribution to the United Nations Human 

3 Rights Council; and 

4 (3) the United States shall not run for a seat on 

5 the United Nations Human Rights Council. 

6 (b) CERTIFICATION.—The annual certification referred 

7 to in subsection (a) is a certification made by the Secretary 

8 to Congress that— 

9 (1) the United Nations Human Rights Council’s 

10 mandate from the United Nations General Assembly 

11 explicitly and effectively prohibits candidacy for 

12 Human Rights Council membership of a United Na13 tions Member State— 

14 (A) subject to sanctions by the Security 

15 Council; and 

16 (B) under a Security Council-mandated in17 vestigation for human rights abuses; 

18 (2) the United Nations Human Rights Council 

19 does not include a United Nations Member State— 

20 (A) subject to sanctions by the Security 

21 Council; 

22 (B) under a Security Council-mandated in23 vestigation for human rights abuses; 

24 (C) which the Secretary of State has deter25 mined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export 


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1 Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in ef2 fect pursuant to the International Emergency 

3 Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms 

4 Export Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign 

5 Assistance Act of 1961, or other provision of law, 

6 is a government that has repeatedly provided 

7 support for acts of international terrorism; or 

8 (D) which the President has designated as 

9 a country of particular concern for religious free10 dom under section 402(b) of the International 

11 Religious Freedom Act of 1998; and 

12 (3) the United Nations Human Rights Council’s 

13 agenda or programme of work does not include a per14 manent item with regard to the State of Israel. 

15 (c) SPECIAL PROCEDURES.—The Secretary of State 

16 shall withhold from a United States contribution each year 

17 to a regular budget of the United Nations an amount that 

18 is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Sec19 retary determines would be allocated by the United Nations 

20 to support the United Nations ‘‘Special Rapporteur on the 

21 situation of human rights in Palestinian territories occu22 pied since 1967’’, and any other United Nations Human 

23 Rights Council ‘‘Special Procedures’’ used to display bias 

24 against the United States or the State of Israel or to provide 


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1 support for the government of any United Nations Member 

2 State— 

3 (1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; 

4 (2) under a Security Council-mandated inves5 tigation for human rights abuses; 

6 (3) which the Secretary of State has determined, 

7 for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administra8 tion Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to 

9 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), 

10 section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 

11 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or other 

12 provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly 

13 provided support for acts of international terrorism; 

14 or 

15 (4) which the President has designated as a 

16 country of particular concern for religious freedom 

17 under section 402(b) of the International Religious 

18 Freedom Act of 1998. 

19 (d) REVERSION OF FUNDS.—Funds appropriated for 

20 use as a United States contribution to the United Nations 

21 but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 

22 this section shall immediately revert to the United States 

23 Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid 

24 to any United Nations Entity. 


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1 TITLE VI—GOLDSTONE REPORT 

2 SEC. 601. FINDINGS. 

3 Congress finds the following: 

4 (1) On January 12, 2009, the United Nations 

5 Human Rights Council passed Resolution A/HRC/S– 

6 9/L.1, which authorized a ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ re7 garding Israel’s conduct of Operation Cast Lead 

8 against violent militants in the Gaza Strip between 

9 December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009. 

10 (2) The resolution pre-judged the outcome of its 

11 investigation by one-sidedly mandating the ‘‘fact12 finding mission’’ to ‘‘investigate all violations of 

13 international human rights law and International 

14 Humanitarian Law by . . . Israel, against the Pales15 tinian people . . . particularly in the occupied Gaza 

16 Strip, due to the current aggression’’. 

17 (3) The mandate of the ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ 

18 makes no mention of the relentless rocket and mortar 

19 attacks, which numbered in the thousands and 

20 spanned a period of eight years, by Hamas and other 

21 violent militant groups in Gaza against civilian tar22 gets in Israel, that necessitated Israel’s defensive 

23 measures. 

24 (4) The ‘‘fact-finding mission’’ included a mem25 ber who, before joining the mission, had already deVerDate Mar 15 2010 23:42 Dec 08, 2011 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H2829.RH H2829

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1 clared Israel guilty of committing atrocities in Oper2 ation Cast Lead by signing a public letter on Janu3 ary 11, 2009, published in the Sunday Times, that 

4 called Israel’s actions ‘‘war crimes’’. 

5 (5) The mission’s flawed and biased mandate 

6 gave serious concern to many United Nations Human 

7 Rights Council Member States which refused to sup8 port it, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cam9 eroon, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 

10 Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slo11 venia, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United King12 dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 

13 (6) The mission’s flawed and biased mandate 

14 was never broadened or revised by any plenary meet15 ing of the United Nations Human Rights Council, 

16 and troubled many distinguished individuals who re17 fused invitations to head the mission. 

18 (7) On September 15, 2009, the ‘‘United Nations 

19 Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’’ released 

20 its report, which is commonly referred to as the 

21 ‘‘Goldstone Report’’. 

22 (8) The Goldstone Report repeatedly made 

23 sweeping and unsubstantiated determinations that the 

24 Israeli military had deliberately attacked civilians 

25 during Operation Cast Lead. 


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1 (9) The authors of the Goldstone Report admit 

2 that we did not deal with the issues . . . ‘‘regarding 

3 the problems of conducting military operations in ci4 vilian areas and second-guessing decisions made by 

5 soldiers and their commanding officers in the fog of 

6 war’’. 

7 (10) In the October 16, 2009 edition of the Jew8 ish Daily Forward, Richard Goldstone, the head of 

9 the ‘‘United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the 

10 Gaza Conflict’’, is quoted as saying, with respect to 

11 the mission’s evidence-collection methods, ‘‘If this was 

12 a court of law, there would have been nothing prov13 en’’. 

14 (11) The Goldstone Report, in effect, denied the 

15 State of Israel the right to self-defense, and never 

16 noted the fact that Israel had the right to defend its 

17 citizens from the repeated violent attacks committed 

18 against civilian targets in southern Israel by Hamas 

19 and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations operating 

20 from Gaza. 

21 (12) The Goldstone Report largely ignored the 

22 culpability of the Government of Iran and the Gov23 ernment of Syria, both of whom sponsor Hamas and 

24 other Foreign Terrorist Organizations. 


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1 (13) The Goldstone Report usually considered 

2 public statements made by Israeli officials not to be 

3 credible, while frequently giving uncritical credence to 

4 statements taken from what it called the ‘‘Gaza au5 thorities’’, i.e., the Gaza leadership of Hamas. 

6 (14) Notwithstanding a great body of evidence 

7 that Hamas and other violent Islamist groups com8 mitted war crimes by using civilians and civilian in9 stitutions, such as mosques, schools, and hospitals, as 

10 shields, the Goldstone Report repeatedly downplayed 

11 or cast doubt upon that claim. 

12 (15) In one notable instance, the Goldstone Re13 port stated that it did not consider the admission of 

14 a Hamas official that Hamas often ‘‘created a human 

15 shield of women, children, the elderly and the 

16 mujahideen, against [the Israeli military]’’ specifi17 cally to ‘‘constitute evidence that Hamas forced Pales18 tinian civilians to shield military objectives against 

19 attack’’. 

20 (16) Hamas was able to significantly shape the 

21 findings of the investigation mission’s Goldstone Re22 port by selecting and prescreening some of the wit23 nesses and intimidating others, as the Goldstone Re24 port acknowledges when it notes that ‘‘those inter25 viewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about the 


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1 presence of or conduct of hostilities by the Palestinian 

2 armed groups . . . from a fear of reprisals’’. 

3 (17) Even though Israel is a vibrant democracy 

4 with a vigorous and free press, the Goldstone Report 

5 erroneously asserts that ‘‘actions of the Israeli govern6 ment . . . have contributed significantly to a political 

7 climate in which dissent with the government and its 

8 actions . . . is not tolerated’’. 

9 (18) The Goldstone Report recommended that the 

10 United Nations Human Rights Council endorse its 

11 recommendations, implement them, review their im12 plementation, and refer the report to the United Na13 tions Security Council, the Prosecutor of the Inter14 national Criminal Court, and the United Nations 

15 General Assembly for further action. 

16 (19) The Goldstone Report recommended that the 

17 United Nations Security Council— 

18 (A) require the Government of Israel to 

19 launch further investigations of its conduct dur20 ing Operation Cast Lead and report back to the 

21 Security Council within six months; 

22 (B) simultaneously appoint an ‘‘inde23 pendent committee of experts’’ to monitor and re24 port on any domestic legal or other proceedings 


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1 undertaken by the Government of Israel within 

2 that 6-month period; and 

3 (C) refer the case to the Prosecutor of the 

4 International Criminal Court after that 6-month 

5 period. 

6 (20) The Goldstone Report recommended that the 

7 United Nations General Assembly consider further ac8 tion on the report and establish an escrow fund, to be 

9 funded entirely by the State of Israel, to ‘‘pay ade10 quate compensation to Palestinians who have suffered 

11 loss and damage’’ during Operation Cast Lead. 

12 (21) The Goldstone Report ignored the issue of 

13 compensation to Israelis who have been killed or 

14 wounded, or suffered other loss and damage, as a re15 sult of years of past and continuing rocket and mor16 tar attacks by Hamas and other violent militant 

17 groups in Gaza against civilian targets in southern 

18 Israel. 

19 (22) The Goldstone Report recommended ‘‘that 

20 States Parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 

21 start criminal investigations [of Operation Cast 

22 Lead] in national courts, using universal jurisdic23 tion’’ and that ‘‘following investigation, alleged per24 petrators should be arrested and prosecuted’’. 


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1 (23) The concept of ‘‘universal jurisdiction’’ has 

2 frequently been used in attempts to detain, charge, 

3 and prosecute Israeli and United States officials and 

4 former officials in connection with unfounded allega5 tions of war crimes and has often unfairly impeded 

6 the travel of those individuals. 

7 (24) On September 20, 2009, United Nations 

8 High Commissioner for Human Rights Navanethem 

9 Pillay wrote, ‘‘I lend my full support to Justice 

10 Goldstone’s report and its recommendations’’. 

11 (25) The State of Israel, like many other free de12 mocracies, has an independent judicial system with a 

13 robust investigatory capacity and has already 

14 launched numerous investigations, many of which re15 main ongoing, of Operation Cast Lead and indi16 vidual incidents therein. 

17 (26) Several nations have indicated that they in18 tend to further pursue consideration of the Goldstone 

19 Report and implementation of its recommendations 

20 by the United Nations Security Council, the United 

21 Nations General Assembly, the United Nations 

22 Human Rights Council, and other multilateral fora. 

23 (27) On September 30, 2009, Secretary of State 

24 Hillary Clinton described the underlying mandate for 

25 the Goldstone Report as ‘‘one-sided’’. 


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1 (28) On September 17, 2009, Ambassador Susan 

2 Rice, United States Permanent Representative to the 

3 United Nations, expressed the United States’ ‘‘very se4 rious concern with the mandate’’ underlying the 

5 Goldstone Report and noted that the United States 

6 views the mandate ‘‘as unbalanced, one-sided and ba7 sically unacceptable’’. 

8 (29) Israeli President Shimon Peres has called 

9 the Goldstone Report a ‘‘blood libel’’. 

10 (30) The Goldstone Report reflects the long11 standing, historic bias at the United Nations against 

12 the democratic, Jewish State of Israel. 

13 (31) The Goldstone Report is being exploited by 

14 Israel’s enemies to excuse the actions of violent mili15 tant groups and their state sponsors, and to justify 

16 isolation of and punitive measures against the demo17 cratic, Jewish State of Israel. 

18 (32) On November 3, 2009, the House of Rep19 resentatives overwhelmingly adopted House Resolu20 tion 867, which stated that the House of Representa21 tives: 

22 (A) ‘‘considers the [Goldstone Report] to be 

23 irredeemably biased and unworthy of further 

24 consideration or legitimacy’’; 


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1 (B) ‘‘supports the Administration’s efforts 

2 to combat anti-Israel bias at the United Nations, 

3 its characterization of the [Goldstone Report] as 

4 ‘unbalanced, one-sided and basically unaccept5 able’, and its opposition to the resolution on the 

6 report’’; 

7 (C) ‘‘calls on the President and the Sec8 retary of State to continue to strongly and un9 equivocally oppose any endorsement of the 

10 [Goldstone Report] in multilateral fora, includ11 ing through leading opposition to any United 

12 Nations General Assembly resolution and 

13 through vetoing, if necessary, any United Na14 tions Security Council resolution that endorses 

15 the contents of this report, seeks to act upon the 

16 recommendations contained in this report, or 

17 calls on any other international body to take fur18 ther action regarding this report’’; 

19 (D) ‘‘calls on the President and the Sec20 retary of State to strongly and unequivocally op21 pose any further consideration of the ‘Report of 

22 the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the 

23 Gaza Conflict’ and any other measures stemming 

24 from this report in multilateral fora’’; and 


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1 (E) ‘‘reaffirms its support for the demo2 cratic, Jewish State of Israel, for Israel’s security 

3 and right to self-defense, and, specifically, for 

4 Israel’s right to defend its citizens from violent 

5 militant groups and their state sponsors’’. 

6 (33) On October 16, 2009, the United Nations 

7 Human Rights Council voted 25–6 (with 11 Member 

8 States abstaining and 5 not voting, and with the 

9 United States voting against) to adopt resolution A– 

10 HRC–S–12–1, which endorsed the Goldstone Report 

11 and condemned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, 

12 other such violent militant groups, or their state 

13 sponsors. The United States voted against the resolu14 tion. 

15 (34) On November 5, 2009, the United Nations 

16 General Assembly voted 114–18 (with 44 Member 

17 States abstaining, and with the United States voting 

18 against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/10, which, 

19 among other things: 

20 (A) endorsed the United Nations Human 

21 Rights Council’s resolution A–HRC–S–12–1, 

22 which endorsed the Goldstone Report and con23 demned Israel, without mentioning Hamas, other 

24 such violent militant groups, or their state spon25 sors; 


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1 (B) requested that the Secretary General of 

2 the United Nations transmit the Goldstone Re3 port to the United Nations Security Council; 

4 (C) expressed its ‘‘appreciation’’ to the 

5 ‘‘United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the 

6 Gaza Conflict’’ for its ‘‘comprehensive report’’; 

7 (D) expressed grave concern regarding ‘‘re8 ports regarding serious human rights violations’’ 

9 during Operation Cast Lead, including the find10 ings in the Goldstone Report; and 

11 (E) recommended ‘‘that the Government of 

12 Switzerland, in its capacity as depositary of the 

13 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 

14 Civilian Persons in Time of War, undertake as 

15 soon as possible the steps necessary to reconvene 

16 a Conference of High Contracting Parties to the 

17 Fourth Geneva Convention on measures to en18 force the Convention’’ in the West Bank, the 

19 Gaza Strip, and ‘‘East Jerusalem’’. 

20 (35) On February 26, 2010, the United Nations 

21 General Assembly voted 98–7 (with 31 Member States 

22 abstaining, and with the United States voting 

23 against) to adopt resolution A/RES/64/254, which 

24 built on the determinations of A/RES/64/10. 


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1 (36) On March 24, 2010, the United Nations 

2 Human Rights Council voted 29–6 (with 11 Member 

3 States abstaining and one not voting, and with the 

4 United States voting against) to adopt resolution A/ 

5 HRC/13/L.30, which, among other things— 

6 (A) called upon ‘‘all concerned parties, in7 cluding United Nations bodies, to ensure their 

8 implementation of the recommendations con9 tained in the [Goldstone Report]’’; 

10 (B) requested that the United Nations High 

11 Commissioner for Human Rights submit a 

12 ‘‘progress report on the implementation of the 

13 present resolution to the [Human Rights] Coun14 cil at its fourteenth session’’ in May and June 

15 2010; and 

16 (C) decided to ‘‘follow up on the implemen17 tation of the present resolution at [the] fifteenth 

18 session’’ of the Human Rights Council in Sep19 tember 2010. 

20 (37) On March 25, 2011, the United Nations 

21 Human Rights Council voted 27–3 (with 16 Member 

22 States abstaining, and with the United States voting 

23 against) to adopt resolution A/HRC/16/L.31, which, 

24 among other things— 


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1 (A) called upon ‘‘all concerned parties, in2 cluding United Nations bodies, to ensure the full 

3 and immediate implementation of the rec4 ommendations contained in the [Goldstone Re5 port]’’; 

6 (B) recommended that the United Nations 

7 General Assembly again consider the Goldstone 

8 Report at its sixty-sixth session, and urged the 

9 General Assembly to submit the report to the 

10 United Nations Security Council ‘‘for its consid11 eration and appropriate action,’’ including refer12 ral to the prosecutor of the International Crimi13 nal Court; 

14 (C) requested that the United Nations High 

15 Commissioner for Human Rights submit a 

16 ‘‘progress report on the implementation of the 

17 present resolution to the Human Rights Council 

18 at its eighteenth session of September 2011’’; and 

19 (D) decided to ‘‘follow up on the implemen20 tation of the present resolution at [the] nine21 teenth session [of the Human Rights Council] of 

22 March 2012’’. 

23 (38) On April 1, 2011, Richard Goldstone, the 

24 head of the ‘‘United Nations Fact Finding Mission on 

25 the Gaza Conflict’’ that authored the Goldstone ReVerDate Mar 15 2010 23:42 Dec 08, 2011 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H2829.RH H2829

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1 port, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post that re2 nounced the Goldstone Report’s claim that the Israeli 

3 military deliberately attacked civilians during Oper4 ation Cast Lead. Goldstone wrote that the Israeli 

5 military’s investigations with respect to incidents in 

6 Operation Cast Lead ‘‘indicate that civilians were not 

7 intentionally targeted as a matter of policy’’. 

8 (39) Efforts to delegitimize the democratic State 

9 of Israel and deny it the right to defend its citizens 

10 and its existence can be used to delegitimize other de11 mocracies and deny them the same right. 

12 SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

13 It is the policy of the United States to— 

14 (1) consider the Goldstone Report irredeemably 

15 biased and unworthy of further consideration or legit16 imacy; 

17 (2) strongly and unequivocally oppose any con18 sideration, legitimization, or endorsement of the 

19 Goldstone Report, or any other measures stemming 

20 from this report, in multilateral fora; 

21 (3) lead a high-level diplomatic campaign in 

22 support of the revocation and repudiation, by the 

23 United Nations General Assembly, of the Goldstone 

24 Report and any United Nations resolutions stemming 

25 from the report, including: 


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1 (A) United Nations General Assembly reso2 lutions A/RES/64/10 and A/RES/64/254; and 

3 (B) United Nations Human Rights Council 

4 resolutions A–HRC–S–12–1, A/HRC/13/L.30, 

5 and A/HRC/16/L.31; and 

6 (4) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encour7 age other responsible countries not to endorse, sup8 port, or legitimize the Goldstone Report or any other 

9 measures stemming from the report. 

10 SEC. 603. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED 

11 STATES TAXPAYER DOLLARS. 

12 (a) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.—The Secretary of State 

13 shall withhold from the United States contribution to the 

14 regular budget of the United Nations an amount that is 

15 equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Sec16 retary determines would be or has been expended by the 

17 United Nations for any part of the Goldstone Report or its 

18 preparatory or follow-on activities. 

19 (b) REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER DOL20 LARS.—Funds appropriated for use as a United States con21 tribution to the regular budget of the United Nations but 

22 withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to sub23 section (a) shall immediately revert to the United States 

24 Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid 

25 to any United Nations Entity. 


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1 TITLE VII—DURBAN PROCESS 

2 SEC. 701. FINDINGS. 

3 Congress makes the following findings: 

4 (1) The United States is opposed to racism, ra5 cial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intoler6 ance, and has long been a party to the Convention on 

7 the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 

8 (2) Expensive and politically skewed inter9 national conferences can disserve and undermine the 

10 worthy goals that they are ostensibly convened to sup11 port. 

12 (3) The goals of the 2001 United Nations World 

13 Conference Against Racism—held in Durban, South 

14 Africa, and commonly referred to as ‘‘Durban I’’— 

15 were undermined by hateful, anti-Jewish rhetoric, 

16 and anti-Israel political agendas, prompting both 

17 Israel and the United States to withdraw their dele18 gations from the Conference. 

19 (4) The official government declaration adopted 

20 by Durban I, the ‘‘Durban Declaration and Program 

21 of Action’’, focused on the ‘‘plight of the Palestinian 

22 people under foreign occupation’’, and thereby singled 

23 out one regional conflict for discussion and implicitly 

24 launched a false accusation against Israel of intoler25 ance towards the Palestinians. 


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1 (5) On September 3, 2001, Secretary of State 

2 Colin Powell explained the withdrawal of the United 

3 States delegation from Durban I by stating that ‘‘you 

4 do not combat racism by conferences that produce dec5 larations containing hateful language, some of which 

6 is a throwback to the ‘days of Zionism’ equals racism; 

7 or supports the idea that we have made too much of 

8 the Holocaust; or suggests that apartheid exists in 

9 Israel; or that singles out only one country in the 

10 world—Israel—for censure and abuse’’. 

11 (6) The late United States Representative Tom 

12 Lantos, who participated as a member of the United 

13 States delegation to the Durban Conference, supported 

14 that delegation’s withdrawal and wrote in 2002 that 

15 the conference ‘‘provided the world with a glimpse 

16 into the abyss of international hate, discrimination 

17 and, indeed, racism’’. 

18 (7) On December 19, 2006, the United Nations 

19 General Assembly approved a resolution initiating 

20 preparations for a Durban Review Conference (com21 monly referred to as ‘‘Durban II’’), which was held 

22 between April 20 and 24, 2009, in Geneva, Switzer23 land. 


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1 (8) The chair of the preparatory committee for 

2 Durban II was Libya, and the co-chairs included 

3 Iran and Cuba. 

4 (9) Throughout the preparatory process for Dur5 ban II, member states of the Organization of the Is6 lamic Conference urged that the conference again 

7 focus criticism on Israel and single out the Israeli8 Palestinian conflict for discussion, and also urged 

9 that the conference advocate global speech codes that 

10 would impose restrictions contrary to fundamental 

11 freedoms recognized in the provisions of the Universal 

12 Declaration of Human Rights. 

13 (10) In testimony before the House of Represent14 atives on April 2, 2008, then-Assistant Secretary of 

15 State for International Organizations Kristen 

16 Silverberg stated that the United States had decided 

17 against participating in preparatory activities for 

18 Durban II because ‘‘[there is] absolutely no case to be 

19 made for participating in something that is going to 

20 be a repeat of Durban I. We don’t have any con21 fidence that this will be any better than Durban I’’. 

22 (11) On September 23, 2008, the House of Rep23 resentatives passed House Resolution 1361, which, 

24 among other things, called on the President to ‘‘urge 

25 other heads of state to condition participation in the 


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1 2009 [Durban II] Conference on concrete action by 

2 the United Nations and United Nations Member 

3 States to ensure that it is not a forum to demonize 

4 any group, or incite anti-Semitism, hatred, or vio5 lence against members of any group or to call into 

6 question the existence of any state’’ and urged all 

7 United Nations Member States ‘‘not to support a 

8 2009 Durban Review Conference process that fails to 

9 adhere to established human rights standards and to 

10 reject an agenda that incites hatred against any 

11 group in the guise of criticism of a particular govern12 ment or that seeks to forge a global blasphemy code’’. 

13 (12) The present United Nations High Commis14 sioner for Human Rights, Dr. Navanethem Pillay, 

15 who served as Secretary General of Durban II, has re16 peatedly sought to downplay the level of hateful, anti17 Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas 

18 present at Durban I, describing it as merely ‘‘the vir19 ulent anti-Semitic behavior of a few non-govern20 mental organizations on the sidelines’’ and praising 

21 the biased 2001 Durban Declaration and Programme 

22 of Action as ‘‘[t]he legacy of this Conference’’, has re23 peatedly sought to downplay the level of hateful, anti24 Jewish rhetoric and anti-Israel political agendas 

25 present at Durban II and its preparatory activities, 


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1 and has repeatedly praised and urged the full imple2 mentation of the Durban Declaration and Programme 

3 of Action. 

4 (13) High Commissioner Pillay has repeatedly 

5 and publicly criticized nations, including the United 

6 States, which announced that they would not partici7 pate in Durban II, but has almost never publicly 

8 criticized governments who succeeded in using the 

9 conference and its preparatory activities to single out 

10 Israel for criticism and to attempt to restrict funda11 mental freedoms. 

12 (14) A United Nations press release on Sep13 tember 8, 2008, regarding an address by High Com14 missioner Pillay, disturbingly dismissed objections 

15 raised by non-governmental organizations to Durban 

16 II as ‘‘ferocious, and often distorted, criticism by cer17 tain lobby groups focused on single issues’’. 

18 (15) During February of 2009, the United States 

19 actively participated in intergovernmental consulta20 tions on Durban II’s ‘‘draft outcome document’’ and 

21 engaged in high-level diplomatic efforts to dramati22 cally reverse the path of Durban II by directing it to23 wards meaningful efforts to combat intolerance and 

24 bigotry and directing it away from efforts to under25 mine the cause of fighting discrimination through 


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1 singling out Israel for implicit criticism and calling 

2 for restrictions on fundamental freedoms. 

3 (16) On February 27, 2009, a State Department 

4 spokesman stated that, despite United States efforts to 

5 redirect the path of Durban II, ‘‘the document being 

6 negotiated has gone from bad to worse, and the cur7 rent text of the draft outcome document is not sal8 vageable . . . A conference based on this text would 

9 be a missed opportunity to speak clearly about the 

10 persistent problem of racism’’ and therefore, the 

11 United States would not participate in further con12 sultations and negotiations regarding the ‘‘draft out13 come document,’’ and would not participate in Dur14 ban II itself unless the ‘‘draft outcome document’’ was 

15 radically shortened and revised to eliminate objection16 able material. 

17 (17) On April 17, 2009, the third and final ses18 sion of the preparatory committee for Durban II pro19 posed a final ‘‘draft outcome document’’ that con20 tained a number of provisions advocating restrictions 

21 on freedom of expression, and that also implicitly sin22 gled out and criticized Israel for racism by reaffirm23 ing, in its very first paragraph, the 2001 Durban 

24 Declaration and Programme of Action. 


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1 (18) On April 18, 2009, a State Department 

2 spokesman announced that ‘‘the United States will 

3 not join the [Durban II] conference’’, noting that 

4 ‘‘The current document . . . still contains language 

5 that reaffirms in toto the Durban Declaration and 

6 Programme of Action (DDPA) from 2001, which the 

7 United States has long said it is unable to support 

8 . . . The United States also has serious concerns with 

9 relatively new additions to the text regarding ‘incite10 ment’, that run counter to the U.S. commitment to 

11 unfettered free speech.’’. 

12 (19) On April 19, 2009, the President stated at 

13 a press conference that ‘‘I would love to be involved 

14 in a useful conference that addressed continuing 

15 issues of racism and discrimination around the globe 

16 . . . we expressed in the run-up to this conference our 

17 concerns that if you incorporated—if you adopted all 

18 the language from 2001, that’s just not something we 

19 could sign up for . . . our participation would have 

20 involved putting our imprimatur on something that 

21 we just don’t believe . . . Hopefully . . . we can part22 ner with other countries on to actually reduce dis23 crimination around the globe. But this wasn’t an op24 portunity to do it.’’. 


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1 (20) Canada, Israel, Italy, Germany, the Nether2 lands, Poland, Australia, and New Zealand also did 

3 not participate in Durban II, and the Czech Republic 

4 walked out of the Conference during its proceedings, 

5 never to return. 

6 (21) Libya was the chair of the Main Committee 

7 of Durban II, and vice presidents of Durban II in8 cluded Libya, Iran, and Cuba. 

9 (22) Speaking at Durban II on April 20, 2009, 

10 Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called the 

11 democratic State of Israel ‘‘totally racist’’ and ‘‘the 

12 most cruel and repressive racist regime’’, and called 

13 for Israel’s destruction, stating that ‘‘Efforts must be 

14 made to put an end to the abuse by Zionists . . . 

15 Governments must be encouraged and supported in 

16 their fights aimed at eradicating this barbaric rac17 ism’’. 

18 (23) In his speech at Durban II, Ahmadinejad 

19 also propagated anti-Semitic conspiracy theories, say20 ing that ‘‘Those who control huge economic resources 

21 and interests in the world . . . mobilize all the re22 sources, including their economic and political influ23 ence and world media, to render support in vain to 

24 the Zionist regime’’. 


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1 (24) Disgusted by Ahmadinejad’s biased and in2 cendiary statements, delegates from about two dozen 

3 nations walked out of the assembly hall in protest, but 

4 most delegations remained, and a large number of 

5 delegations and observers repeatedly applauded 

6 Ahmadinejad’s remarks. 

7 (25) On April 21, 2009, governments partici8 pating in Durban II adopted by consensus an ‘‘out9 come document’’ that contained a number of provi10 sions advocating restrictions on freedom of expression, 

11 and that also implicitly singled out and criticized 

12 Israel for racism by reaffirming, in its very first 

13 paragraph, the 2001 Durban Declaration and Pro14 gram of Action. 

15 (26) Throughout Durban II, many speakers sin16 gled out Israel for criticism or called for restrictions 

17 on fundamental freedoms, including representatives of 

18 Iran, Libya, Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Viet19 nam, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Qatar, Al20 geria, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Egypt, 

21 Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Tunisia, Bangladesh, 

22 Switzerland, the Organization of the Islamic Con23 ference, the Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Or24 ganization, and a number of other organizations and 

25 countries. 


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1 (27) During Durban II, several speakers who 

2 sought to draw attention to genuine instances of rac3 ism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, related intol4 erance, and human rights violations by the govern5 ments of Iran, Libya, and China were repeatedly in6 terrupted by the delegations from those governments 

7 and instructed by the conference’s chair to not refer 

8 specifically to those governments. 

9 (28) On December 18, 2009, the United Nations 

10 General Assembly approved Resolution A/RES/64/ 

11 148, which urged the ‘‘full and effective implementa12 tion of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 

13 Action’’ and called for a ‘‘one-day plenary event to 

14 commemorate the ten-year anniversary [of Durban I] 

15 during the high-level segment of the General Assembly 

16 to be devoted to racism, racial discrimination, xeno17 phobia, and related intolerance during its sixty-fifth 

18 session, in 2011’’. The United States, joined by 12 

19 other nations, voted against this resolution. 

20 (29) On December 24, 2010, the United Nations 

21 General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/65/240, 

22 authorizing the holding of a ‘‘one-day high-level meet23 ing of the General Assembly to commemorate the 

24 tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Dec25 laration and Programme of Action, at the level of 


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1 Heads of State and Government, on the second day 

2 of the general debate of the sixty-sixth session’’ in 

3 September of 2011. The resolution also states that the 

4 meeting (commonly referred to as ‘‘Durban III’’) will 

5 adopt a ‘‘political declaration aimed at mobilizing 

6 political will at the national, regional, and inter7 national levels for the full and effective implementa8 tion of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 

9 Action and its follow-up processes.’’. The resolution 

10 also requests that the United Nations Secretary Gen11 eral ‘‘establish a programme of outreach, with the in12 volvement of Member States and United Nations 

13 funds and programmes as well as civil society, in14 cluding non-governmental organizations, to appro15 priately commemorate the tenth anniversary of the 

16 adoption of the Durban Declaration and Programme 

17 of Action.’’ The resolution also requests that ‘‘the Of18 fice of the United Nations High Commissioner for 

19 Human Rights and the Department of Public Infor20 mation of the Secretariat . . . launch a public infor21 mation campaign for the commemoration of the tenth 

22 anniversary of the adoption of the Durban Declara23 tion and Programme of Action’’. The United States, 

24 joined by 21 other nations, voted against this resolu25 tion. 


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1 (30) The Government of Canada announced that 

2 it would not participate in the Durban III meeting. 

3 Canadian Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and 

4 Multiculturalism Jason Kenney stated that ‘‘Our gov5 ernment has lost faith in the entire tainted Durban 

6 process. Canada will not participate in this charade 

7 any longer. We will not lend our country’s good name 

8 to a commemoration of what has widely been charac9 terized as a hatefest . . . Canada is clearly committed 

10 to the fight against racism, but the Durban process 

11 commemorates an agenda that actually promotes rac12 ism rather than combats it.’’. 

13 (31) The Government of Israel announced that it 

14 would not participate in the Durban III meeting, 

15 stating that ‘‘Israel is part of the international strug16 gle against racism. The Jewish people was itself a 

17 victim of racism throughout history. Israel regrets 

18 that a resolution on an important subject—elimi19 nation of racism—has been diverted and politicized 

20 by the automatic majority at the UN, by linking it 

21 to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action 

22 (2001) that many states would prefer to forget. The 

23 Durban Conference of 2001, with its antisemitic un24 dertones and displays of hatred for Israel and the 

25 Jewish World, left us with scars that will not heal 


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1 quickly . . . Under the present circumstances, as long 

2 as the [Durban III] meeting is defined as part of the 

3 infamous ‘Durban process’, Israel will not participate 

4 . . .’’. 

5 (32) On June 2, 2011, the United States publicly 

6 announced that it would not participate in the Dur7 ban III meeting. The Department of State’s deputy 

8 spokesman stated that the ‘‘Durban process includes 

9 displays of intolerance and anti-Semitism, and we 

10 don’t want to see that commemorated. In our con11 versations about this commemoration, we’ve not seen 

12 the kind of progress that we think is indicative. We 

13 remain unconvinced that the conference is moving in 

14 a new direction.’’. 

15 (33) The Governments of Australia, Austria, 

16 Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, 

17 Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, 

18 and the United Kingdom also did not participate in 

19 the Durban III meeting. 

20 (34) On September 22, 2011, at the Durban III 

21 meeting, the United Nations General Assembly adopt22 ed Resolution A/RES/66/3, a ‘‘political declaration’’ 

23 which ‘‘[r]eaffirm[ed] that the Durban Declaration 

24 and Programme of Action... and the outcome docu25 ment of [Durban II]. . . are a comprehensive United 


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1 Nations framework and solid foundation for com2 bating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, 

3 and related intolerance’’, ‘‘[r]ecall[ed] that the aim of 

4 [Durban III] is to mobilize political will at the na5 tional, regional and international levels and reaffirm 

6 our political commitment to the full and effective im7 plementation of the Durban Declaration and Pro8 gramme of Action and the outcome document of [Dur9 ban II], and their follow-up processes, at all these lev10 els’’, and ‘‘welcome[d] the continued engagement of 

11 the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 

12 Rights to incorporate the implementation of the Dur13 ban Declaration and Programme of Action into the 

14 United Nations system’’. 

15 (35) On September 22, 2011, the White House 

16 Press Secretary stated that ‘‘Since its inception. . . 

17 the Durban process has included ugly displays of in18 tolerance and anti-Semitism. . . Last December, the 

19 United States voted against the resolution establishing 

20 [Durban III] because we did not want to see the hate21 ful and anti-Semitic displays of the 2001 Durban 

22 Conference commemorated. Over the last few months, 

23 we did not participate in negotiations on [Durban 

24 III’s] Political Declaration document and, like many 

25 other countries, we were not present when the DecVerDate Mar 15 2010 23:42 Dec 08, 2011 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H2829.RH H2829

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1 laration was adopted. We are also deeply dis2 appointed that the rules established for credentialing 

3 non-governmental organizations to participate were 

4 used by some delegations to silence voices critical of 

5 the Durban process.’’. 

6 (36) Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and 

7 their preparatory and follow-on activities, have made 

8 little or no demonstrable contribution to combating 

9 racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and re10 lated intolerance. 

11 (37) To date, several million dollars from the 

12 United Nations regular budget has been expended on 

13 Durban I, Durban II, Durban III, and their pre14 paratory and follow-on activities. 

15 (38) The United States is the largest contributor 

16 to the United Nations system, and is assessed for a 

17 full 22 percent of the United Nations regular budget, 

18 which is funded by assessed contributions from Mem19 ber States. 

20 (39) Funding for Durban I, Durban II, Durban 

21 III, and their preparatory and follow-on activities 

22 through the United Nations regular budget has re23 sulted in United States taxpayer dollars being used 

24 for those purposes. 


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1 (40) Congress, through its adoption of the Con2 solidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110– 

3 161) withheld from the United States assessed con4 tribution for fiscal year 2008 to the United Nations 

5 regular budget an amount equivalent to the United 

6 States share of the United Nations Human Rights 

7 Council budget, including its share of the Council-ad8 ministered preparatory process for Durban II. 

9 SEC. 702. SENSE OF CONGRESS; STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

10 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

11 that— 

12 (1) the Durban I, Durban II, and Durban III 

13 conferences, and their preparatory and follow-on ac14 tivities, were subverted by members of the Organiza15 tion of the Islamic Conference and irredeemably dis16 torted into a forum for anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and 

17 anti-freedom activity; 

18 (2) by walking out of the Durban I conference, 

19 and by not participating in the Durban II conference, 

20 and announcing that it would not participate in the 

21 Durban III meeting, the United States Government 

22 upheld and reaffirmed the fundamental commitment 

23 of the United States to combating racism, racial dis24 crimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance; 


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1 (3) the Governments of Canada, Israel, Italy, 

2 Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Australia, New 

3 Zealand, and the Czech Republic should be com4 mended for their decision to not participate or cease 

5 participation in the Durban II conference; 

6 (4) the Governments of Australia, Austria, Bul7 garia, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, 

8 Israel, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Italy, New Zea9 land, Poland, and the United Kingdom should be 

10 commended for their decision to not participate in 

11 Durban III; and 

12 (5) the Administration should expeditiously and 

13 unequivocally announce that it will not participate 

14 in, support, or legitimize any part of the Durban 

15 process. 

16 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of 

17 the United States to— 

18 (1) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encour19 age other responsible countries— 

20 (A) not to participate in, support, legiti21 mize, or fund any part of the Durban process, 

22 and 

23 (B) to withhold from their respective con24 tributions to the regularly assessed biennial 

25 budget of the United Nations an amount that is 


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1 equal to the percentage of such respective con2 tributions that they determine would be or has 

3 been allocated by the United Nations for any 

4 part of the Durban III meeting or its pre5 paratory or follow-on activities, or for any other 

6 part of the Durban process; and 

7 (2) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to explore 

8 credible, alternative forums for combating racism, ra9 cial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intoler10 ance. 

11 SEC. 703. NON-PARTICIPATION IN THE DURBAN PROCESS. 

12 None of the funds made available in any provision of 

13 law may be used for United States participation in any 

14 part of the Durban process. 

15 SEC. 704. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED 

16 STATES TAXPAYER DOLLARS. 

17 (a) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS FOR THE DURBAN PROC18 ESS.—The Secretary of State shall withhold from the 

19 United States contribution to the regular budget of the 

20 United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage 

21 of such contribution that the Secretary determines would 

22 be or has been expended by the United Nations for any part 

23 of the Durban I or Durban II conferences, the Durban III 

24 meeting, their preparatory or follow-on activities, or any 

25 other part of the Durban process, including— 


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1 (1) the ‘‘public information campaign for the 

2 commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the adop3 tion of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 

4 Action’’ requested by United Nations General Assem5 bly Resolution A.RES/65/240; 

6 (2) the Intergovernmental Working Group on the 

7 Effective Implementation of the Durban Declaration 

8 and Programme of Action; 

9 (3) the ‘‘group of independent eminent experts on 

10 the implementation of the Durban Declaration and 

11 Programme of Action’’; and 

12 (4) the Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of 

13 Complementary Standards. 

14 (b) WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS FOR OTHER BIASED AND

15 COMPROMISED ACTIVITIES.—Until the Secretary of State 

16 submits to the appropriate congressional committees a cer17 tification, on a case-by-case basis, that the requirements de18 scribed in subsection (d) have been satisfied, the United 

19 States shall withhold from the United States contribution 

20 to the regular budget of the United Nations an amount that 

21 is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Sec22 retary determines has been allocated by the United Nations 

23 for any conference, meeting, or other multilateral forum, or 

24 the preparatory or follow-on activities of any conference, 

25 meeting, or other multilateral forum, that is organized 


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1 under the aegis or jurisdiction of the United Nations or of 

2 any United Nations Entity. 

3 (c) REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER DOL4 LARS.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Funds appropriated for use 

6 as a United States contribution to the regular budget 

7 of the United Nations but withheld from obligation 

8 and expenditure pursuant to subsection (a) shall im9 mediately revert to the United States Treasury and 

10 shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any 

11 United Nations Entity. 

12 (2) ALLOWANCE.—Funds appropriated for use as 

13 a United States contribution to the regularly assessed 

14 biennial budget of the United Nations but withheld 

15 from obligation and expenditure pursuant to sub16 section (b) may be obligated and expended for that 

17 purpose upon the certification described in subsection 

18 (d). Such funds shall revert to the United States 

19 Treasury if no such certification is made by the date 

20 that is one year after such appropriation, and shall 

21 not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United 

22 Nations Entity. 

23 (d) CERTIFICATION.—The certification referred to in 

24 subsection (b) is a certification made by the Secretary of 


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1 State to the appropriate congressional committees con2 cerning the following: 

3 (1) The specified conference, meeting, or other 

4 multilateral forum did not reaffirm, call for the im5 plementation of, or otherwise support the Durban 

6 Declaration and Programme of Action (2001) or the 

7 outcome document of the Durban II conference (2009) 

8 or the Durban III meeting (2011). 

9 (2) The specified conference or forum was not 

10 used to single out the United States or the State of 

11 Israel for unfair or unbalanced criticism. 

12 (3) The specified conference or forum was not 

13 used to propagate racism, racial discrimination, anti14 Semitism, denial of the Holocaust, incitement to vio15 lence or genocide, xenophobia, or related intolerance. 

16 (4) The specified conference or forum was not 

17 used to advocate for restrictions on the freedoms of 

18 speech, expression, religion, the press, assembly, or pe19 tition, or for restrictions on other fundamental 

20 human rights and freedoms. 

21 (5) The leadership of the specified conference or 

22 forum does not include a Member State, or a rep23 resentative from a Member State— 

24 (A) subject to sanctions by the Security 

25 Council; 


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1 (B) under a Security Council-mandated in2 vestigation for human rights abuses; or 

3 (C) the government of which the Secretary 

4 of State has determined, for purposes of section 

5 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 

6 (as continued in effect pursuant to the Inter7 national Emergency Economic Powers Act), sec8 tion 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 

9 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or 

10 other provision of law, is a government that has 

11 repeatedly provided support for acts of inter12 national terrorism. 

13 TITLE VIII—UNRWA 

14 SEC. 801. FINDINGS. 

15 Congress makes the following findings: 

16 (1) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 

17 302 (1949) created the United Nations Relief and 

18 Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 

19 (UNRWA) with the temporary, strictly humanitarian 

20 mandate to ‘‘carry out . . . direct relief and works 

21 programmes’’ for Palestinian refugees. 

22 (2) UNRWA has acknowledged that it is the 

23 ‘‘only UN agency that reports directly to the UN Gen24 eral Assembly, and whose beneficiary population 

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1 ly for Palestinian refugees, while the United Nations 

2 High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is respon3 sible for other refugees across the world. 

4 (3) UNHCR’s definition of a refugee is, in ac5 cordance with the 1951 Convention Relating to the 

6 Status of Refugees, any person who ‘‘owing to a well7 founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 

8 religion, nationality, membership of a particular so9 cial group, or political opinion, is outside the country 

10 of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such 

11 fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 

12 that country . . .’’. 

13 (4) UNRWA’s much broader definition of a 

14 ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ is any person, and his descend15 ants, whose ‘‘normal place of residence was [the 

16 former British Mandate of] Palestine during the pe17 riod 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both 

18 home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 

19 conflict.’’. 

20 (5) UNRWA’s overly inclusive definition of a 

21 ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ has resulted in an increase in 

22 UNRWA’s reported number of ‘‘Palestine refugees’’ 

23 from under one million in 1950 to over 4.5 million 

24 today, encompassing multiple generations of descend25 ants of the original Palestinian refugees. 


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1 (6) Hundreds of thousands of ‘‘Palestine refu2 gees’’ are citizens of recognized states, including Jor3 dan. 

4 (7) UNRWA, unlike UNHCR, does not offer refu5 gees the option of resettlement and reintegration into 

6 their country of refuge or a third country. Efforts by 

7 UN officials in the 1950s to offer resettlement and re8 integration as an option for Palestinian refugees were 

9 dropped under fierce opposition from Arab govern10 ments, and have not been taken up since. 

11 (8) Through its overly inclusive definition of a 

12 ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ and its refusal to offer refugees the 

13 option of resettlement and reintegration, UNRWA 

14 contributes to the perpetuation of the suffering of Pal15 estinian refugees, who have been exploited by Arab 

16 governments and Palestinian militant groups for over 

17 six decades as a political tool with which to assail 

18 Israel. 

19 (9) Almost all of UNRWA’s almost 30,000 staff 

20 are Palestinian refugees themselves, presenting a clear 

21 conflict of interest. 

22 (10) UNRWA’s total annual budget, including 

23 its core programs, emergency activities and special 

24 projects, exceeds $1 billion. 


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1 (11) The United States has long been the largest 

2 single contributing country to UNRWA. 

3 (12) From 1950 to 2010, the United States has 

4 contributed almost $3.9 billion to UNRWA, including 

5 an average of over $210 million per year between fis6 cal years 2007 and 2010. 

7 (13) Section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act 

8 of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2221(c)) states that ‘‘No contribu9 tions by the United States shall be made to the 

10 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Pal11 estine Refugees in the Near East except on the condi12 tion that the United Nations Relief and Works Agen13 cy take all possible measures to assure that no part 

14 of the United States contribution shall be used to fur15 nish assistance to any refugee who is receiving mili16 tary training as a member of the so-called Palestine 

17 Liberation Army or any other guerrilla type organi18 zation or who has engaged in any act of terrorism.’’. 

19 (14) Then-Deputy Secretary of State Jacob J. 

20 Lew testified before the House Committee on Foreign 

21 Affairs on May 13, 2009, that ‘‘We have the highest 

22 level of scrutiny in terms of UNRWA’’. 

23 (15) However, in contravention of United States 

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1 ents if they are members of Foreign Terrorist Organi2 zations. 

3 (16) Even though the United States remains the 

4 largest single contributing country to UNRWA, until 

5 2010, UNRWA did not make available its list of staff 

6 for screening through United States watch lists, in7 cluding that of the Department of the Treasury’s Of8 fice of Foreign Assets Control, refused a United States 

9 request to do so in 2005, and still does not do so for 

10 its list of aid recipients. 

11 (17) UNRWA claims that it has fulfilled its obli12 gations under section 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance 

13 Act of 1961 by screening personnel through the 

14 United Nations Consolidated List pursuant to United 

15 Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, but the 

16 names on that list are largely members of Al-Qaeda 

17 and the Taliban, not of Palestinian Foreign Terrorist 

18 Organizations such as Hamas, Fatah’s al-Aqsa Mar19 tyrs’ Brigades, or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 

20 (18) Former UNRWA commissioner-general 

21 Peter Hansen, stated in 2004 that ‘‘I am sure that 

22 there are Hamas members on the UNRWA payroll 

23 and I don’t see that as a crime.’’. 


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1 (19) A number of UNRWA personnel have been 

2 discovered to be affiliated with Foreign Terrorist Or3 ganizations, including, inter alia: 

4 (A) Issa Batran (now deceased), a com5 mander of Hamas’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades 

6 and senior rocket-maker who taught at an 

7 UNRWA school in Gaza; 

8 (B) Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi 

9 (now deceased), who reportedly carried out a 

10 homicide bombing that killed seven Americans 

11 and one Jordanian at Forward Operating Base 

12 Chapman in Afghanistan on December 30, 2009, 

13 reportedly worked as a physician at an UNRWA 

14 clinic in Amman, Jordan, and had longstanding 

15 ties to violent Islamist extremism; 

16 (C) Said Siam (now deceased), a longtime 

17 Hamas official who eventually served as 

18 Hamas’s Interior Minister in Gaza, and who 

19 taught at an UNRWA school in Gaza; 

20 (D) Awad al-Qiq (now deceased), a rocket21 builder for Palestinian Islamic Jihad who served 

22 as headmaster of an UNRWA school in Gaza; 

23 (E) Nahd Atallah, an UNRWA staff mem24 ber in Gaza, who was arrested, convicted, and 

25 sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment by an 


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1 Israeli military court of using his UN travel 

2 document to bypass Israeli checkpoints in Gaza 

3 in order to transport armed Palestinian mili4 tants; and 

5 (F) an UNRWA teacher who reportedly 

6 praised homicide bombers and permitted Hamas 

7 leader Ahmed Yassin (now deceased) to speak to 

8 an assembly of students at an UNRWA school. 

9 UNRWA did not terminate the teacher’s employ10 ment, instead only giving him a letter of censure. 

11 (20) UNRWA staff unions, including the teach12 ers’ union, are frequently controlled by members af13 filiated with Hamas. 

14 (21) Former UNRWA general counsel James 

15 Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that— 

16 (A) ‘‘UNRWA . . . obviously does not take 

17 ‘all possible measures’ in practice’’ to assure that 

18 United States contributions do not provide as19 sistance to any refugee with ties to Foreign Ter20 rorist Organizations, in accordance with section 

21 301(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; 

22 (B) ‘‘UNRWA makes no attempt to weed 

23 out individuals who support extremist positions 

24 . . . UNRWA has taken very few steps to detect 

25 and eliminate terrorists from the ranks of its 


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1 staff or its beneficiaries, and no steps at all to 

2 prevent members of terrorist organizations, such 

3 as Hamas, from joining its staff.’’; 

4 (C) ‘‘[I]t is rare for an area staff member 

5 . . . to report or confirm that another staff mem6 ber has violated rules against political speech, let 

7 alone exhibited ties to terrorism. Not surpris8 ingly, external allegations of improper speech or 

9 improper use of UNRWA facilities are difficult 

10 to prove, as virtually no one is willing to be a 

11 witness against gang members.’’; and 

12 (D) ‘‘[T]here are no formal procedures for 

13 deregistering or denying services to a properly 

14 registered refugee, no matter what he or she 

15 does.’’. 

16 (22) The late Representative Tom Lantos, in a 

17 May 13, 2002 letter, expressed his concern that— 

18 (A) ‘‘UNRWA is perpetuating, rather than 

19 ameliorating, the situation of Palestinian refu20 gees’’; 

21 (B) ‘‘UNRWA officials have . . . failed to 

22 prevent their camps from becoming centers of 

23 terrorist activity’’; and 

24 (C) ‘‘for too long, UNRWA has been part of 

25 the problem, rather than the solution, in the 


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1 Middle East . . . UNRWA camps have fostered 

2 a culture of anger and dependency that under3 mines both regional peace and the well-being of 

4 the camps’ inhabitants.’’. 

5 (23) UNRWA has long held accounts at the Arab 

6 Bank and the Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS), fi7 nancial institutions that the United States deems or 

8 believes to be complicit in money laundering and ter9 ror financing. 

10 (24) The Arab Bank is reportedly at the center 

11 of United States investigations into how tens of mil12 lions of dollars have flowed to Palestinian groups that 

13 allegedly used some of those funds to pay off suicide 

14 bombers and their relatives, and is also reportedly 

15 being sued in Federal court by American victims of 

16 attacks in Israel, with attorneys for the victims accus17 ing the bank of facilitating Acts of International Ter18 rorism. 

19 (25) On May 11, 2004, the Department of the 

20 Treasury designated CBS as a financial institution of 

21 ‘‘primary money laundering concern’’ pursuant to 

22 section 311 of the USA Patriot Act, stating that 

23 ‘‘CBS had been used by terrorists and their sympa24 thizers and acted as a conduit for the laundering of 

25 proceeds generated from the illicit sale of Iraqi oil’’ 


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1 and that ‘‘numerous transactions that may be indic2 ative of terrorist financing and money laundering 

3 have been transferred through CBS, including two ac4 counts at CBS that reference a reputed financier for 

5 Usama bin Laden.’’. 

6 (26) On August 10, 2011, the Department of the 

7 Treasury designated CBS, pursuant to Executive 

8 Order 13382, for serving as an ‘‘agent for designated 

9 Syrian and North Korean proliferators’’. 

10 (27) CBS is controlled by the Government of 

11 Syria, a State Sponsor of Terrorism. 

12 (28) The curriculum of UNRWA schools, which 

13 use the textbooks of their respective host governments 

14 or authorities, has long contained materials that are 

15 anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and supportive of violent 

16 extremism. 

17 (29) As far back as over forty years ago, former 

18 UNRWA commissioner-general Laurence Michelmore 

19 admitted that UNRWA schools were supporting a 

20 ‘‘bitterly hostile attitude to Israel.’’. 

21 (30) Former UNRWA general counsel James 

22 Lindsay noted in a January 2009 report that 

23 ‘‘[T]eachers in UNRWA schools were often afraid to 

24 remove posters glorifying ‘martyrs’ (including suicide 


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1 bombers) for fear of retribution from armed sup2 porters of the ‘martyrs.’ ’’. 

3 (31) UNRWA officials have compromised 

4 UNRWA’s strictly humanitarian mandate by engag5 ing in political agitation, propaganda, and advocacy 

6 agitation against Israel and in favor of Hamas, as 

7 reflected by the following, inter alia: 

8 (A) UNRWA officials have repeatedly called 

9 for the United States and other nations to deal 

10 directly with Hamas and have repeatedly called 

11 for political ‘‘reconciliation’’ between Hamas 

12 and Fatah. 

13 (B) UNRWA officials have repeatedly casti14 gated Israel for her actions to defend innocent ci15 vilians from rocket and mortar attacks from vio16 lent extremist groups in Gaza and from other 

17 Acts of International Terrorism, and has repeat18 edly blamed Israel, not Hamas and other violent 

19 extremist groups, for present restrictions on ac20 cess to Gaza. 

21 (C) Former UNRWA general counsel James 

22 Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that: ‘‘Although 

23 it occasionally issued mild, pro forma criticisms 

24 of Palestinian attacks (most of which were clear25 ly war crimes), [UNRWA] put more effort into 


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1 criticizing Israeli counterterrorism efforts (which 

2 were condemned using language associated with 

3 war crimes, though any such crimes were far 

4 from proved) . . . UNRWA never seems to ac5 knowledge that Israel, since its 2005 withdrawal 

6 from Gaza, has launched strikes on the territory 

7 largely in order to halt rocket attacks and other 

8 assaults.’’. 

9 (D) Lindsay also noted that ‘‘UNRWA— 

10 through its leaders and press spokespersons—is 

11 constantly involved in political speech . . . These 

12 one-sided speeches on political matters do not 

13 further the goals of a humanitarian and sup14 posedly nonpolitical agency.’’. 

15 (E) UNRWA Commissioner-General Filippo 

16 Grandi described as a ‘‘massacre’’ Israel’s May 

17 31, 2010 naval operation, and use of self-defense 

18 measures, to seize the Mavi Marmara ship in 

19 order to enforce its naval blockade of the Gaza 

20 Strip. 

21 (F) Former UNRWA commissioner-general 

22 Karen AbuZayd stated in a 2009 meeting with 

23 Congressional staff that ‘‘We [UNRWA] are not 

24 just humanitarian.’’. 


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1 (G) In January of 2009, UNRWA spokes2 man Christopher Gunness called for an inves3 tigation as to whether Israel had committed ‘‘a 

4 war crime.’’. 

5 (H) On December 30, 2008, former 

6 UNRWA commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd 

7 stated that only Israel was responsible for the 

8 start of the most recent conflict in Gaza. 

9 (I) On May 25, 2008, in an interview with 

10 Press TV, which is controlled by the Government 

11 of Iran, former UNRWA commissioner-general 

12 Karen AbuZayd reportedly claimed that Hamas 

13 was free from corruption and ‘‘more popular 

14 than ever’’. 

15 (J) On October 5, 2007, former UNRWA 

16 commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd blamed 

17 Israel for violent extremist groups in Gaza 

18 launching rockets and mortars against Israeli ci19 vilian targets, stating that residents of Gaza 

20 ‘‘have absorbed—and continue to experience— 

21 military incursions in which civilian lives, live22 lihoods, and property have been destroyed, and 

23 to which they have responded with the contin24 uous firing of Qassam rockets into Israel.’’. 


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1 (K) On March 8, 2007, former UNRWA 

2 commissioner-general Karen AbuZayd, com3 paring the 1948 Arab-Israeli War with more re4 cent conflicts between Israel and Palestinian 

5 militant groups, stated that ‘‘[T]here is a strik6 ing historical continuity in the systematic ap7 proach to use overwhelming and disproportionate 

8 force in the name of security; to separate and ex9 clude Palestinians from the mainstream; to eject 

10 them from their land; and to occupy Palestinian 

11 land.’’. 

12 (L) On January 19, 2005, former UNRWA 

13 commissioner-general Peter Hansen stated that 

14 ‘‘My job [is] to represent the refugees.’’. 

15 (M) In 2002, former UNRWA commis16 sioner-general Peter Hansen falsely accused 

17 Israel of carrying out a ‘‘massacre’’ in 

18 UNRWA’s Jenin refugee camp after Israeli forces 

19 entered the camp, a base of operations for Pales20 tinian militant groups, to carry out defensive 

21 operations to halt repeated homicide bombings in 

22 Israel. 

23 (N) In 1964, UNRWA allowed its staff to 

24 attend the conference in Jerusalem where the 


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1 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was 

2 established. 

3 (32) Despite UNRWA’s contravention of U.S. 

4 law and activities that compromise its strictly hu5 manitarian mandate, UNRWA continues to receive 

6 United States contributions, including $237.8 million 

7 in fiscal year 2010. 

8 (33) The bilateral ‘‘Framework for Cooperation’’ 

9 that the United States concluded with UNRWA for 

10 2010 actually ‘‘commends’’ UNRWA and does not 

11 commit UNRWA to vetting its aid recipients through 

12 United States watch lists. 

13 (34) Assistance from the United States and other 

14 responsible nations allows UNRWA to claim that 

15 criticisms of the agency’s behavior are unfounded. 

16 UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness has dis17 missed concerns by stating that ‘‘If these baseless alle18 gations were even halfway true, do you really think 

19 the U.S. and [European Commission] would give us 

20 hundreds of millions of dollars per year?’’. 

21 (35) Former UNRWA general counsel James 

22 Lindsay noted in a 2009 report that: 

23 (A) ‘‘The United States, despite funding 

24 nearly 75 percent of UNRWA’s national budget 

25 and remaining its largest single country donor, 


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1 has mostly failed to make UNRWA reflect U.S. 

2 foreign policy objectives . . . Recent U.S. efforts 

3 to shape UNRWA appear to have been ineffective 

4 . . .’’; 

5 (B) ‘‘[T]he United States is not obligated to 

6 fund agencies that refuse to check its rolls for in7 dividuals their donors do not wish to support.’’; 

8 (C) ‘‘A number of changes in UNRWA could 

9 benefit the refugees, the Middle East, and the 

10 United States, but those changes will not occur 

11 unless the United States, ideally with support 

12 from UNRWA’s other main financial supporter, 

13 the European Union, compels the agency to 

14 enact reforms.’’; and 

15 (D) ‘‘If the [UNRWA commissioner-gen16 eral’s] power is used in ways that are conflict 

17 with the donors’ political objectives, it is up to 

18 the donors to take the necessary actions to ensure 

19 that their interests are respected. When they have 

20 done so, UNRWA—given the tight financial 

21 leash it has been on for most of its existence— 

22 has tended to follow their dictates, even if some23 times slowly.’’. 

24 (36) The Government of Canada has recently 

25 placed restrictions on its contributions to UNRWA, 


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1 demonstrating consequences for UNRWA’s malfea2 sance and setting an example for the United States 

3 and other donor governments. 

4 SEC. 802. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA. 

5 Section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is 

6 amended by striking subsection (c) and inserting the fol7 lowing new subsection: 

8 ‘‘(c)(1) WITHHOLDING.—Contributions by the United 

9 States to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 

10 Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to any suc11 cessor or related entity, or to the regular budget of the 

12 United Nations for the support of UNRWA or a successor 

13 entity (through staff positions provided by the United Na14 tions Secretariat, or otherwise), may be provided only dur15 ing a period for which a certification described in para16 graph (2) is in effect. 

17 ‘‘(2) CERTIFICATION.—A certification described in this 

18 paragraph is a written determination by the Secretary of 

19 State, based on all information available after diligent in20 quiry, and transmitted to the appropriate congressional 

21 committees along with a detailed description of the factual 

22 basis therefor, that— 

23 ‘‘(A) no official, employee, consultant, contractor, 

24 subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of 

25 UNRWA— 


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1 ‘‘(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist Or2 ganization; 

3 ‘‘(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or in4 cited anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic 

5 rhetoric or propaganda; or 

6 ‘‘(iii) has used any UNRWA resources, in7 cluding publications or Web sites, to propagate 

8 or disseminate political materials, including po9 litical rhetoric regarding the Israeli-Palestinian 

10 conflict; 

11 ‘‘(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other 

12 facility, or other infrastructure or resource is being 

13 used by a Foreign Terrorist Organization for oper14 ations, planning, training, recruitment, fundraising, 

15 indoctrination, communications, sanctuary, storage of 

16 weapons or other materials, or any other purposes; 

17 ‘‘(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive finan18 cial audits by an internationally recognized third 

19 party independent auditing firm and has imple20 mented an effective system of vetting and oversight to 

21 prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any UNRWA 

22 resources by any foreign terrorist organization or 

23 members thereof; 

24 ‘‘(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational 

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1 rials that propagate or disseminate anti-American, 

2 anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric, propaganda or 

3 incitement; 

4 ‘‘(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is 

5 a member of a Foreign Terrorist Organization; and 

6 ‘‘(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affili7 ations with financial institutions that the United 

8 States deems or believes to be complicit in money 

9 laundering and terror financing. 

10 ‘‘(3) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

11 ‘‘(A) FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION.—The 

12 term ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’ means an orga13 nization designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organiza14 tion by the Secretary of State in accordance with sec15 tion 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

16 (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)). 

17 ‘‘(B) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT18 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional commit19 tees’ means— 

20 ‘‘(i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ap21 propriations, and Oversight and Government Re22 form of the House of Representatives; and 

23 ‘‘(ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 

24 Appropriations, and Homeland Security and 

25 Governmental Affairs of the Senate. 


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1 ‘‘(4) EFFECTIVE DURATION OF CERTIFICATION.—The 

2 certification described in paragraph (2) shall be effective 

3 for a period of 180 days from the date of transmission to 

4 the appropriate congressional committees, or until the Sec5 retary receives information rendering that certification fac6 tually inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the event that 

7 a certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall 

8 promptly transmit to the appropriate congressional com9 mittees a description of any information that precludes the 

10 renewal or continuation of the certification. 

11 ‘‘(5) LIMITATION.—During a period for which a cer12 tification described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the United 

13 States may not contribute to the United Nations Relief and 

14 Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 

15 (UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual amount— 

16 ‘‘(A) greater than the highest annual contribu17 tion to UNRWA made by a member country of the 

18 League of Arab States; 

19 ‘‘(B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA 

20 budget, exceeds the proportion of the total budget for 

21 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

22 (UNHCR) paid by the United States; or 

23 ‘‘(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget 

24 of UNRWA.’’. 


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1 SEC. 803. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

2 It is the sense of Congress that— 

3 (1) the President and the Secretary of State 

4 should lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage 

5 other responsible nations to withhold contributions to 

6 UNRWA, to any successor or related entity, or to the 

7 regular budget of the United Nations for the support 

8 of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff posi9 tions provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or 

10 otherwise) until UNRWA has met the conditions list11 ed in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 

12 301(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as 

13 added by section 802 of this Act); 

14 (2) citizens of recognized states should be re15 moved from UNRWA’s jurisdiction; 

16 (3) UNRWA’s definition of a ‘‘Palestine refugee’’ 

17 should be changed to that used for a refugee by the 

18 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 

19 Refugees; and 

20 (4) in order to alleviate the suffering of Pales21 tinian refugees, responsibility for those refugees should 

22 be fully transferred to the Office of the United Nations 

23 High Commissioner for Refugees. 


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1 TITLE IX—INTERNATIONAL 

2 ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 

3 SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM. 

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

5 (1) The International Atomic Energy Agency 

6 (IAEA) was established in 1957 with the objectives of 

7 seeking to ‘‘accelerate and enlarge the contribution of 

8 atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity 

9 throughout the world’’ and to ‘‘ensure . . . that assist10 ance provided by it or at its request or under its su11 pervision or control is not used in such a way as to 

12 further any military purpose.’’. 

13 (2) The United States, via assessed contributions, 

14 is the largest financial contributor to the regular 

15 budget of the IAEA. 

16 (3) In 1959, the IAEA established what is now 

17 called the Technical Cooperation Program, financed 

18 primarily through voluntary contributions by member 

19 states to the Technical Cooperation Fund, to provide 

20 nuclear technical cooperation (TC) for peaceful pur21 poses to countries worldwide. 

22 (4) The United States is the largest financial 

23 contributor to the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation 

24 Fund. 


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1 (5) A March 2009 report by the Government Ac2 countability Office (GAO) found that ‘‘neither [the 

3 Department of State] nor IAEA seeks to systemati4 cally limit TC assistance to countries the United 

5 States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism— 

6 Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria—even though under 

7 U.S. law these countries are subject to sanctions.’’. 

8 (6) The GAO report also found that ‘‘Together, 

9 [Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria] received more than 

10 $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 

11 2007.’’. These four countries have received continued 

12 assistance since 2007. 

13 (7) The GAO report also found that ‘‘prolifera14 tion concerns about the [Technical Cooperation Pro15 gram] have persisted because of the assistance it has 

16 provided to certain countries and because nuclear 

17 equipment, technology, and expertise can be dual18 use—capable of serving peaceful purposes . . . but also 

19 useful in contributing to nuclear weapons develop20 ment.’’. 

21 (8) The GAO report also found that ‘‘[The State 

22 Department] reported in 2007 that three TC projects 

23 in [Iran] were directly related to the Iranian nuclear 

24 power plant at Bushehr.’’. 


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1 (9) The GAO report also found that ‘‘The pro2 liferation concerns associated with the [Technical Co3 operation Program] are difficult for the United States 

4 to fully identify, assess, and resolve . . . [because] 

5 there is no formal mechanism for obtaining TC 

6 project information during the proposal development 

7 phase . . . [l]imited [Department of] State docu8 mentation on how proliferation concerns of TC pro9 posals were resolved . . . [and s]hortcomings in U.S. 

10 policies and IAEA procedures [including monitoring 

11 proliferation risks] related to TC program fellow12 ships.’’. 

13 (10) The GAO report noted that ‘‘IAEA officials 

14 told us that the [Technical Cooperation Program] 

15 does not attempt to exclude countries on the basis of 

16 their status as U.S.-designated state sponsors of ter17 rorism or other political considerations’’ and that, ac18 cording to the Deputy Director General for the Tech19 nical Cooperation Program, ‘‘there are no good coun20 tries and there are no bad countries’’ with respect to 

21 provision of technical cooperation by the IAEA. 

22 (11) The GAO report also found that ‘‘given the 

23 limited information available on TC projects and the 

24 dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and ex25 pertise, we do not believe [the State Department] can 


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1 assert with complete confidence that TC assistance 

2 has not advanced [weapons of mass destruction] pro3 grams in U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism’’. 

4 (12) The GAO report also found that ‘‘we do not 

5 share [the State Department’s confidence in IAEA’s 

6 internal safeguards to prevent TC projects from con7 tributing to weapons development . . .]’’. 

8 (13) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

9 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) prohibited any of the funds au10 thorized to be appropriated for ‘‘International Orga11 nizations and Programs’’ from being made available 

12 for the United States proportionate share for pro13 grams for Libya, Iran, Cuba, or the Palestine Libera14 tion Organization, inter alia. 

15 (14) The Foreign Operations, Export Financing, 

16 and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998 

17 (Public Law 105–118) prohibited any of the funds 

18 made available by such Act for the IAEA from being 

19 made available for programs and projects of the 

20 IAEA in Cuba. 

21 (15) The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc22 turing Act of 1998 (Public Law 105–277) required 

23 the United States to withhold a proportionate share 

24 of funding to the IAEA for projects in Cuba regarding 


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1 the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant and the Pedro Pi 

2 Nuclear Research Center. 

3 (16) The GAO report asked Congress ‘‘to consider 

4 directing [the State Department] to withhold a share 

5 of future annual contributions to the [Technical Co6 operation Fund] that is proportionate to the amount 

7 of funding provided from the fund for U.S.-designated 

8 state sponsors of terrorism and other countries of con9 cern, noting that such a withholding is a matter of 

10 fundamental principle and intended to foster a more 

11 consistent U.S. policy toward such nations’’. 

12 (17) The IAEA has repeatedly reported that the 

13 Government of Iran continues its work on heavy 

14 water-related projects and its enrichment of uranium, 

15 in violation of United Nations Security Council Reso16 lutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 

17 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010). 

18 (18) United Nations Security Council Resolution 

19 1737 (2006) decided ‘‘that technical cooperation pro20 vided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices shall 

21 only be for food, agricultural, medical, safety or other 

22 humanitarian purposes [inter alia] . . . but that no 

23 such technical cooperation shall be provided that re24 lates to . . . proliferation sensitive nuclear activities 

25 . . .’’. 


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1 (19) The IAEA Director General reported to the 

2 IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 2011 that 

3 the Government of Iran now has approximately 7,000 

4 centrifuges for enriching uranium, is running almost 

5 5,000 of them, and has increased its stockpile of low6 enriched uranium to over 3,600 kilograms, considered 

7 sufficient for further enrichment into enough high-en8 riched uranium for more than one atomic bomb. The 

9 Government of Iran has also reportedly produced a 

10 stockpile of over 40 kilograms of uranium enriched up 

11 to 20 percent U–235. 

12 (20) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

13 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

14 in his report of February 25, 2011, about the ‘‘out15 standing issues related to possible military dimen16 sions to Iran’s nuclear programme’’. 

17 (21) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

18 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

19 in his report of February 25, 2011, that ‘‘the [IAEA] 

20 remains concerned about the possible existence in 

21 Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related ac22 tivities involving military-related organizations, in23 cluding activities related to the development of a nu24 clear payload for a missile.’’. 


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1 (22) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

2 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

3 in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘Iran has 

4 not implemented the Additional Protocol, which is a 

5 prerequisite for [the IAEA] to provide credible assur6 ance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material 

7 and activities. Nor has [Iran] agreed to [the IAEA’s] 

8 request that Iran provide, as a transparency measure, 

9 access to additional locations related, inter alia, to 

10 the manufacturing of centrifuges, research and devel11 opment on uranium enrichment, and uranium min12 ing and milling, as also required by the Security 

13 Council.’’. 

14 (23) The IAEA Director General has repeatedly 

15 reported to the IAEA Board of Governors, including 

16 in his report of February 19, 2009, that ‘‘as a result 

17 of the continued lack of cooperation by Iran in con18 nection with . . . issues which give rise to concerns 

19 about possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear 

20 programme, [the IAEA] has made no substantive 

21 progress on these issues.’’. 

22 (24) Iran has refused to comply with resolutions 

23 adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on Sep24 tember 12, 2003, November 26, 2003, March 15, 2004, 

25 June 18, 2004, November 29, 2004, August 11, 2005, 


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1 September 24, 2005, February 4, 2006, and July 31, 

2 2006, regarding ‘‘Iran’s many failures and breaches 

3 of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards 

4 Agreement’’ and continues to block IAEA inspections 

5 of its nuclear facilities, in violation of its NPT Safe6 guards Agreement. 

7 (25) According to multiple news reports, Iran re8 cently denied access to its enrichment site at Natanz 

9 to IAEA inspectors, and has also denied a request by 

10 the IAEA to place one or more additional surveillance 

11 cameras at the enrichment site at Natanz. 

12 (26) In April of 2008, United States Government 

13 officials publicly revealed that Syria was building at 

14 the Dair Alzour site, with North Korea’s assistance, 

15 a secret nuclear reactor that was based on a North 

16 Korean model capable of producing plutonium for nu17 clear weapons and that was weeks away from becom18 ing operational before an Israeli air strike reportedly 

19 destroyed the reactor in September 2007. 

20 (27) On April 28, 2008, General Michael Hay21 den, the former Director of the Central Intelligence 

22 Agency, stated that the Syrian reactor at Dair Alzour 

23 could have produced enough plutonium for 1 or 2 

24 bombs within a year of becoming operational. 


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1 (28) The IAEA Director General reported to the 

2 IAEA Board of Governors on November 19, 2008 that 

3 the Syrian facility at Dair Alzour bore features that 

4 resembled those of an undeclared nuclear reactor, add5 ing that ‘‘Syria has not yet provided the requested 

6 documentation in support of its declarations con7 cerning the nature or function of the destroyed build8 ing, nor agreed to a visit to the three other locations 

9 which the IAEA has requested to visit.’’. 

10 (29) The IAEA Director General publicly stated 

11 to the IAEA Board of Governors, on June 15, 2009, 

12 that ‘‘the limited information and access provided by 

13 Syria to date have not enabled the Agency to deter14 mine the nature of the destroyed facility’’ at Dair 

15 Alzour site, that uranium particles have been found 

16 in samples taken from a second site, the Miniature 

17 Neutron Source Reactor facility in Damascus, and 

18 that the particles found at both sites ‘‘are of a type 

19 not included in Syria’s declared inventory of nuclear 

20 material.’’. 

21 (30) Commercial satellite photos published on 

22 February 23, 2011, indicate efforts by the Govern23 ment of Syria to conceal its activities at an addi24 tional site, Marj as Sultan, which may be connected 

25 to the Dair Alzour facility. 


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1 (31) The IAEA Director General reported to the 

2 IAEA Board of Governors on February 25, 2011 that 

3 ‘‘Syria has not cooperated with the [IAEA] since 

4 June 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues 

5 related to the Dair Alzour site and the other three lo6 cations allegedly functionally related to it. As a con7 sequences, the [IAEA] has not been able to make 

8 progress towards resolving the outstanding issues re9 lated to those sites.’’. 

10 (b) PROHIBITION.—No funds from any United States 

11 assessed or voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be used 

12 to support any assistance provided by the IAEA through 

13 its Technical Cooperation program to any country, includ14 ing North Korea that— 

15 (1) is a country the government of which has 

16 been determined by the Secretary of State, for pur17 poses of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 

18 of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act 

19 of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, 

20 or other provision of law, is a government that has 

21 repeatedly provided support for acts of international 

22 terrorism; 

23 (2) is in breach of or noncompliance with its ob24 ligations regarding— 


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1 (A) its safeguards agreement with the 

2 IAEA; 

3 (B) the Additional Protocol; 

4 (C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; 

5 (D) any relevant United Nations Security 

6 Council Resolution; or 

7 (E) the Charter of the United Nations; or 

8 (3) is under investigation for a breach of or non9 compliance with the obligations specified in para10 graph (2). 

11 (c) WITHHOLDING OF VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

12 Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 

13 this Act, the Secretary of State shall withhold from the 

14 United States voluntary contribution to the IAEA an 

15 amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA in the pe16 riod from 2007 to 2008 on assistance through its Technical 

17 Cooperation Program to countries described in subsection 

18 (b). 

19 (d) WITHHOLDING OF ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

20 If, not later than 30 days of the date of the enactment of 

21 this Act, the amount specified in subsection (c) has not been 

22 withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all assistance 

23 provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to the 

24 countries described in subsection (b), an amount equal to 


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1 that specified in subsection (c) shall be withheld from the 

2 United States assessed contribution to the IAEA. 

3 (e) WAIVER.—The provisions in subsections (c) and 

4 (d) may be waived if— 

5 (1) the IAEA has suspended all assistance pro6 vided through its Technical Cooperation Program to 

7 the countries described in subsection (b); or 

8 (2) the President certifies that the countries de9 scribed in subsection (b) no longer pose a threat to the 

10 national security, interests, and allies of the United 

11 States. 

12 (f) UNITED STATES ACTIONS AT IAEA.—The Presi13 dent shall direct the United States Permanent Representa14 tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of 

15 the United States at the IAEA to block the allocation of 

16 funds for any assistance provided by the IAEA through its 

17 Technical Cooperation Program to any country described 

18 in subsection (b). 

19 (g) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the date 

20 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit 

21 to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the 

22 implementation of this section. 

23 SEC. 902. UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE IAEA. 

24 (a) ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE.— 

25 (1) OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE.— 


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1 (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall 

2 direct the United States Permanent Representa3 tive to International Atomic Energy Agency 

4 (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and influence of 

5 the United States at the IAEA to establish an 

6 Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the 

7 IAEA. 

8 (B) OPERATION.—The Office of Compliance 

9 shall— 

10 (i) function as an independent body 

11 composed of technical experts who shall 

12 work in consultation with IAEA inspectors 

13 to assess compliance by IAEA Member 

14 States and provide recommendations to the 

15 IAEA Board of Governors concerning pen16 alties to be imposed on IAEA Member 

17 States that fail to fulfill their obligations 

18 under IAEA Board resolutions; 

19 (ii) base its assessments and rec20 ommendations on IAEA inspection reports; 

21 and 

22 (iii) take into consideration informa23 tion provided by IAEA Board Members that 

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1 tion of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483) 

2 (commonly referred to as the ‘‘Nuclear Non3 proliferation Treaty’’ or the ‘‘NPT’’). 

4 (C) STAFFING.—The Office of Compliance 

5 shall be staffed from existing personnel in the 

6 Department of Safeguards of the IAEA or the 

7 Department of Nuclear Safety and Security of 

8 the IAEA. 

9 (2) COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND

10 VERIFICATION.—The President shall direct the United 

11 States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use 

12 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at 

13 the IAEA to ensure that the Committee on Safeguards 

14 and Verification established in 2005 shall develop and 

15 seek to put into force a workplan of concrete measures 

16 that will— 

17 (A) improve the ability of the IAEA to 

18 monitor and enforce compliance by Member 

19 States of the IAEA with the Nuclear Non20 proliferation Treaty and the Statute of the Inter21 national Atomic Energy Agency; and 

22 (B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, beyond 

23 the verification mechanisms and authorities con24 tained in the Additional Protocol to the Safe25 guards Agreements between the IAEA and MemVerDate Mar 15 2010 23:42 Dec 08, 2011 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00126 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H2829.RH H2829

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1 ber States of the IAEA, to detect with a high de2 gree of confidence undeclared nuclear activities 

3 by a Member State. 

4 (3) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE IAEA.— 

5 (A) IN GENERAL.—The President shall di6 rect the United States Permanent Representative 

7 to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 

8 of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that 

9 a Member State of the IAEA that is under inves10 tigation for a breach of or noncompliance with 

11 its IAEA obligations or the purposes and prin12 ciples of the Charter of the United Nations has 

13 its privileges suspended, including— 

14 (i) limiting its ability to vote on its 

15 case; 

16 (ii) being prevented from receiving any 

17 technical assistance; and 

18 (iii) being prevented from hosting 

19 meetings. 

20 (B) TERMINATION OF PENALTIES.—The 

21 penalties specified under subparagraph (A) shall 

22 be terminated when such investigation is con23 cluded and such Member State is no longer in 

24 such breach or noncompliance. 


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1 (4) PENALTIES WITH RESPECT TO THE NUCLEAR

2 NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.—The President shall di3 rect the United States Permanent Representative to 

4 the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 

5 United States at the IAEA to ensure that a Member 

6 State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, 

7 in noncompliance with, or has withdrawn from the 

8 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty shall return to the 

9 IAEA all nuclear materials and technology received 

10 from the IAEA, any Member State of the IAEA, or 

11 any Member State of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 

12 Treaty. 

13 (b) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.— 

14 (1) VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS.—Voluntary 

15 contributions of the United States to the IAEA should 

16 primarily be used to fund activities relating to Nu17 clear Safety and Security or activities relating to Nu18 clear Verification. 

19 (2) LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.—The Presi20 dent shall direct the United States Permanent Rep21 resentative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and in22 fluence of the United States at the IAEA to— 

23 (A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspec24 tions are prioritized for countries that have 


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1 newly established nuclear programs or are initi2 ating nuclear programs; and 

3 (B) block the allocation of funds for any 

4 other IAEA development, environmental, or nu5 clear science assistance or activity to a coun6 try— 

7 (i) the government of which the Sec8 retary of State has determined, for purposes 

9 of section 6(j) of the Export Administration 

10 Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign As11 sistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms 

12 Export Control Act, or other provision of 

13 law, is a government that has repeatedly 

14 provided support for acts of international 

15 terrorism and the government of which the 

16 Secretary has determined has not disman17 tled and surrendered its weapons of mass 

18 destruction programs under international 

19 verification; 

20 (ii) that is under investigation for a 

21 breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 

22 obligations or the purposes and principles 

23 of the Charter of the United Nations; or 


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1 (iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 

2 obligations or the purposes and principles 

3 of the Charter of the United Nations. 

4 (3) DETAIL OF EXPENDITURES.—The President 

5 shall direct the United States Permanent Representa6 tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 

7 of the United States at the IAEA to secure, as part 

8 of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA to 

9 Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by 

10 country of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards 

11 inspections and nuclear security activities. 

12 (c) MEMBERSHIP.— 

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 

14 United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA 

15 to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

16 States at the IAEA to block the membership on the 

17 Board of Governors of the IAEA for a Member State 

18 of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the Ad19 ditional Protocol and— 

20 (A) is under investigation for a breach of or 

21 noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the 

22 purposes and principles of the Charter of the 

23 United Nations; or 


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1 (B) that is in violation of its IAEA obliga2 tions or the purposes and principles of the Char3 ter of the United Nations. 

4 (2) CRITERIA.—The United States Permanent 

5 Representative to the IAEA shall make every effort to 

6 modify the criteria for Board membership to reflect 

7 the principles described in paragraph (1). 

8 (d) SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.—The President 

9 shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to 

10 the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 

11 States at the IAEA to make every effort to ensure that the 

12 IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small Quantities 

13 Protocol in order to— 

14 (1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities 

15 Protocol; 

16 (2) require that any IAEA Member State that 

17 has previously signed a Small Quantities Protocol to 

18 sign, ratify, and implement the Additional Protocol, 

19 provide immediate access for IAEA inspectors to its 

20 nuclear-related facilities, and agree to the strongest 

21 inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and 

22 (3) require that any IAEA Member State that 

23 does not comply with paragraph (2) to be ineligible 

24 to receive nuclear material, technology, equipment, or 


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1 assistance from any IAEA Member State and subject 

2 to the penalties described in subsection (a)(3). 

3 (e) NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF IRAN AND SYRIA.— 

4 (1) UNITED STATES ACTION.—The President 

5 shall direct the United States Permanent Representa6 tive to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and influence 

7 of the United States at the IAEA to make every effort 

8 to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the IAEA 

9 Board of Governors that, in addition to the restric10 tions already imposed, makes Iran and Syria ineli11 gible to receive any nuclear material, technology, 

12 equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member 

13 State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not re14 lated to safeguards inspections or nuclear security 

15 until the IAEA Board of Governors determines that 

16 Iran or Syria, as the case may be— 

17 (A) is providing full access to IAEA inspec18 tors to its nuclear-related facilities; 

19 (B) has fully implemented and is in com20 pliance with the Additional Protocol; and 

21 (C) has permanently ceased and dismantled 

22 all activities and programs related to nuclear-en23 richment and reprocessing. 

24 (2) PENALTIES.—If an IAEA Member State is 

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1 ance to Iran or Syria described in paragraph (1) be2 fore the IAEA Board of Governors determines that 

3 Iran or Syria, as the case may be, has satisfied the 

4 conditions described in subparagraphs (A) through 

5 (C) of such paragraph, such Member State shall be 

6 subject to the penalties described in subsection (a)(3), 

7 shall be ineligible to receive nuclear material, tech8 nology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA 

9 Member State, and shall be ineligible to receive any 

10 IAEA assistance not related to safeguards inspections 

11 or nuclear security until such time as the IAEA 

12 Board of Governors makes such determination with 

13 respect to Iran or Syria, as the case may be. 

14 (f) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date 

15 of the enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years there16 after, the President shall submit to the appropriate congres17 sional committees a report on the implementation of this 

18 section. 

19 SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR 

20 SECURITY ACTION PLAN OF THE IAEA. 

21 It is the sense of Congress that the national security 

22 interests of the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear 

23 Security Action Plan of the IAEA and the Board of Gov24 ernors should recommend, and the General Conference 


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1 should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear Secu2 rity Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA. 

3 TITLE X—PEACEKEEPING 

4 SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 

5 OPERATIONS. 

6 It is the sense of Congress that— 

7 (1) although United Nations peacekeeping oper8 ations have contributed greatly toward the promotion 

9 of peace and stability for over 6 decades and the ma10 jority of peacekeeping personnel who have served 

11 under the United Nations flag have done so with 

12 honor and courage, the record of United Nations 

13 peacekeeping has been severely tarnished by oper14 ational failures and unconscionable acts of mis15 conduct; 

16 (2) in response to such failures, successive Secre17 taries General of the United Nations have launched 

18 numerous reform efforts, including the high-level 

19 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, led by 

20 former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar Brahimi, 

21 the 2005 report by the Special Advisor on the Preven22 tion of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal 

23 Highness Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jor24 dan, and the 2009 New Partnership Agenda, known 

25 as the ‘‘New Horizon’’ reports; 


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1 (3) despite the fact that the United Nations has 

2 had over a decade to implement many of these re3 forms, nearly four years to implement the reforms in 

4 the Zeid Report, and the fact that Secretary General 

5 Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and the 

6 Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations re7 peatedly have expressed their commitment ‘‘to imple8 menting fundamental, systematic changes as a matter 

9 of urgency,’’ a number of critical reforms continue to 

10 be blocked or delayed by Members States who argu11 ably benefit from maintenance of the status quo; 

12 (4) further, audits of procurement practices in 

13 the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, con14 ducted by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 

15 and the now-defunct United Nations Procurement 

16 Task Force have uncovered ‘‘significant’’ corruption 

17 schemes and criminal acts by United Nations peace18 keeping personnel; and 

19 (5) if the reputation of and confidence in United 

20 Nations peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fun21 damental and far-reaching reforms, particularly in 

22 the areas of planning, management, procurement, 

23 training, conduct, and discipline, must be imple24 mented without further delay. 


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1 SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NA2 TIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. 

3 It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue 

4 reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the 

5 following areas: 

6 (1) PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT.— 

7 (A) GLOBAL AUDIT.—As the size, cost, and 

8 number of United Nations peacekeeping oper9 ations have increased substantially over the past 

10 decade, independent audits of each such oper11 ation should be conducted annually, with a view 

12 toward ‘‘right-sizing’’ operations and ensuring 

13 that all operations are efficient and cost effective. 

14 (B) PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPARENCY.— 

15 The logistics established within the United Na16 tions Department of Field Support should be 

17 streamlined and strengthened to ensure that all 

18 peacekeeping missions are resourced appro19 priately, transparently, and in a timely fashion 

20 while individual accountability for waste, fraud 

21 and abuse within United Nations peacekeeping 

22 missions is uniformly enforced. 

23 (C) REVIEW OF MANDATES AND CLOSING

24 OPERATIONS.—In conjunction with the audit de25 scribed in subparagraph (A), the United Nations 

26 Department of Peacekeeping Operations should 


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1 conduct a comprehensive review of all United 

2 Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with 

3 a view toward identifying objectives that are 

4 practical and achievable, and report its findings 

5 to the Security Council. In particular, the review 

6 should consider the following: 

7 (i) Except in extraordinary cases, in8 cluding genocide, the United Nations De9 partment of Peacekeeping Operations should 

10 not be tasked with activities that are im11 practical or unachievable without the co12 operation of the Member State(s) hosting a 

13 United Nations peacekeeping operation, or 

14 which amount to de-facto Trusteeship out15 side of the procedures established for such 

16 under Chapter XII of the United Nations 

17 Charter, thereby creating unrealistic expec18 tations and obfuscating the primary respon19 sibility of the Member States themselves in 

20 creating and maintaining conditions for 

21 peace. 

22 (ii) Long-standing operations that are 

23 static and cannot fulfill their mandate 

24 should be downsized or closed. 


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1 (iii) Where there is legitimate concern 

2 that the withdrawal from a country of an 

3 otherwise static United Nations peace4 keeping operation would result in the re5 sumption of major conflict, a burden-shar6 ing arrangement that reduces the level of as7 sessed contributions, similar to that cur8 rently supporting the United Nations 

9 Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, should be ex10 plored and instituted. 

11 (D) LEADERSHIP.—As peacekeeping oper12 ations become larger and increasingly complex, 

13 the Secretariat should adopt a minimum stand14 ard of qualifications for senior leaders and man15 agers, with particular emphasis on specific skills 

16 and experience, and current senior leaders and 

17 managers who do not meet those standards 

18 should be removed. 

19 (E) PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING.—Pre-de20 ployment training on interpretation of the man21 date of the operation, specifically in the areas of 

22 use of force, civilian protection and field condi23 tions, the Code of Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and 

24 human rights should be mandatory, and all per25 sonnel, regardless of category or rank, should be 


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1 required to sign an oath that each has received 

2 and understands such training as a condition of 

3 participation in the operation. 

4 (F) GRATIS MILITARY PERSONNEL.—The 

5 General Assembly should seek to strengthen the 

6 capacity the United Nations Department of 

7 Peacekeeping Operations and ease the extraor8 dinary burden currently placed upon the limited 

9 number of headquarters staff by lifting restric10 tions on the utilization of gratis military per11 sonnel by the Department so that the Depart12 ment may accept secondments from Member 

13 States of military personnel with expertise in 

14 mission planning, logistics, and other oper15 ational specialties. 

16 (2) CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE.— 

17 (A) ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM CODE OF CON18 DUCT.—A single, uniform Code of Conduct that 

19 has the status of a binding rule and applies 

20 equally to all personnel serving in United Na21 tions peacekeeping operations, regardless of cat22 egory or rank, including military personnel, 

23 should be adopted and incorporated into legal 

24 documents governing participation in such an 

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1 dums of Understanding, promulgated and effec2 tively enforced. 

3 (B) UNDERSTANDING THE CODE OF CON4 DUCT.—All personnel, regardless of category or 

5 rank, should receive training on the Code of Con6 duct prior to deployment with a peacekeeping 

7 operation, in addition to periodic follow-on 

8 training. In particular— 

9 (i) all personnel, regardless of category 

10 or rank, should be provided with a personal 

11 copy of the Code of Conduct that has been 

12 translated into the national language of 

13 such personnel, regardless of whether such 

14 language is an official language of the 

15 United Nations; 

16 (ii) all personnel, regardless of category 

17 or rank, should sign an oath that each has 

18 received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that 

19 each pledges to abide by the Code of Con20 duct, and that each understands the con21 sequences of violating the Code of Conduct, 

22 including immediate termination of partici23 pation in and permanent exclusion from all 

24 current and future peacekeeping operations, 

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1 ity and victims compensation, where appro2 priate, as a condition of appointment to 

3 any such operation; and 

4 (iii) peacekeeping operations should 

5 continue and enhance educational outreach 

6 programs to reach local communities where 

7 peacekeeping personnel of such operations 

8 are based, including explaining prohibited 

9 acts on the part of United Nations peace10 keeping personnel and identifying the indi11 vidual to whom the local population may 

12 direct complaints or file allegations of ex13 ploitation, abuse, or other acts of mis14 conduct. 

15 (C) MONITORING MECHANISMS.—Dedicated 

16 monitoring mechanisms, such as the Conduct 

17 and Discipline Teams already deployed to sup18 port United Nations peacekeeping operations in 

19 Haiti, Sudan, Kosovo, Liberia, Lebanon, Timor 

20 Leste, Cote d’Ivoire, Western Sahara, and the 

21 Democratic Republic of Congo, should be present 

22 in each operation to monitor compliance with 

23 the Code of Conduct, and should report simulta24 neously to the Head of Mission, the United Na25 tions Department of Field Support, the United 


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1 Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 

2 and the Associate Director of the Office of Inter3 nal Oversight Services for Peacekeeping Oper4 ations (established under section 1114(b)(9)). 

5 (D) INVESTIGATIONS.—A permanent, pro6 fessional, and independent investigative body 

7 should be established and introduced into United 

8 Nations peacekeeping operations. In par9 ticular— 

10 (i) the investigative body should in11 clude professionals with experience in inves12 tigating sex crimes and the illegal exploi13 tation of resources, as appropriate, as well 

14 as experts who can provide guidance on 

15 standards of proof and evidentiary require16 ments necessary for any subsequent legal ac17 tion; 

18 (ii) provisions should be included in 

19 all Memorandums of Understanding, in20 cluding a Model Memorandum of Under21 standing, that obligate Member States that 

22 contribute troops to a peacekeeping oper23 ation to designate a military prosecutor 

24 who will participate in any investigation 

25 into credible allegations of misconduct 


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1 brought against an individual of such Mem2 ber State, so that evidence is collected and 

3 preserved in a manner consistent with the 

4 military law of such Member State; 

5 (iii) the investigative body should be 

6 regionally based to ensure rapid deployment 

7 and should be equipped with modern 

8 forensics equipment for the purpose of posi9 tively identifying perpetrators and, where 

10 necessary, for determining paternity; and 

11 (iv) the investigative body should re12 port directly to the Associate Director of the 

13 Office of Internal Oversight Services for 

14 Peacekeeping Operations, while providing 

15 copies of any reports to the Department of 

16 Field Support, the Department of Peace17 keeping Operations, the Head of Mission, 

18 and the Member State concerned. 

19 (E) FOLLOW-UP.—The Conduct and Dis20 cipline Unit in the headquarters of the United 

21 Nations Department of Field Support should be 

22 appropriately staffed, resourced, and tasked 

23 with— 

24 (i) promulgating measures to prevent 

25 misconduct; 


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1 (ii) receiving reports by field personnel 

2 and coordinating the Department’s response 

3 to allegations of misconduct; 

4 (iii) gathering follow-up information 

5 on completed investigations, particularly by 

6 focusing on disciplinary actions against the 

7 individual concerned taken by the United 

8 Nations or by the Member State that is con9 tributing troops to which such individual 

10 belongs, and sharing such information with 

11 the Security Council, the Department of 

12 Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mis13 sion, and the community hosting the peace14 keeping operation; and 

15 (iv) contributing pertinent data on 

16 conduct and discipline to the database re17 quired pursuant to subparagraph (H). 

18 (F) FINANCIAL LIABILITY AND VICTIMS AS19 SISTANCE.—Although peacekeeping operations 

20 should provide immediate medical assistance to 

21 victims of sexual abuse or exploitation, the re22 sponsibility for providing longer-term treatment, 

23 care, or restitution lies solely with the individual 

24 found guilty of the misconduct. In particular: 


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1 (i) The United Nations should not as2 sume responsibility for providing long-term 

3 treatment or compensation under the Sex4 ual Exploitation and Abuse Victim Assist5 ance Mechanism by utilizing assessed con6 tributions to United Nations peacekeeping 

7 operations, thereby shielding individuals 

8 from personal liability and reinforcing an 

9 atmosphere of impunity. 

10 (ii) If an individual responsible for 

11 misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, 

12 redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide 

13 assistance, responsibility for providing as14 sistance to a victim should be assigned to 

15 the Member State that contributed the con16 tingent to which such individual belonged 

17 or to the manager concerned. 

18 (iii) In the case of misconduct by a 

19 member of a military contingent, appro20 priate funds shall be withheld from the 

21 troop contributing country concerned. 

22 (iv) In the case of misconduct by a ci23 vilian employee or contractor of the United 

24 Nations, appropriate wages shall be gar25 nished from such individual or fines shall 


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1 be imposed against such individual, con2 sistent with existing United Nations Staff 

3 Rules, and retirement funds shall not be 

4 shielded from liability. 

5 (G) MANAGERS AND COMMANDERS.—The 

6 manner in which managers and commanders 

7 handle cases of misconduct by those serving 

8 under them should be included in their indi9 vidual performance evaluations, so that man10 agers and commanders who take decisive action 

11 to deter and address misconduct are rewarded, 

12 while those who create a permissive environment 

13 or impede investigations are penalized or re14 lieved of duty, as appropriate. 

15 (H) DATABASE.—A centralized database, 

16 including personnel photos, fingerprints, and bi17 ometric data, should be created and maintained 

18 within the United Nations Department of Peace19 keeping Operations, the Department of Field 

20 Support, and other relevant United Nations bod21 ies without further delay to track cases of mis22 conduct, including the outcome of investigations 

23 and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that per24 sonnel who have engaged in misconduct or other 

25 criminal activities, regardless of category or 


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1 rank, are permanently barred from participation 

2 in future peacekeeping operations. 

3 (I) COOPERATION OF MEMBER STATES.—If 

4 a Member State routinely refuses to cooperate 

5 with the directives contained herein or acts to 

6 shield its nationals from personal liability, that 

7 Member State should be barred from contributing 

8 troops or personnel to future peacekeeping oper9 ations. 

10 (J) WELFARE.—Peacekeeping operations 

11 should continue to seek to maintain a minimum 

12 standard of welfare for mission personnel to 

13 ameliorate conditions of service, while adjust14 ments are made to the discretionary welfare pay15 ments currently provided to Member States that 

16 contribute troops to offset the cost of operation17 provided recreational facilities, as necessary and 

18 appropriate. 

19 SEC. 1003. CERTIFICATION. 

20 (a) NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

21 CONTINGENT UPON PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION OF

22 PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS REFORMS.— 

23 (1) NO NEW OR EXPANDED PEACEKEEPING OP24 ERATIONS.— 


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1 (A) CERTIFICATION.—Except as provided in 

2 subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State 

3 certifies that the requirements described in para4 graph (2) have been satisfied, the President shall 

5 direct the United States Permanent Representa6 tive to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 

7 and influence of the United States at the United 

8 Nations to oppose the creation of new, or expan9 sion of existing, United Nations peacekeeping op10 erations. 

11 (B) EXCEPTION AND NOTIFICATION.—The 

12 requirements described under paragraph (2) may 

13 be waived with respect to a particular peace14 keeping operation if the President determines 

15 that failure to deploy new or additional peace16 keepers in such situation will significantly con17 tribute to the widespread loss of human life, 

18 genocide, or the endangerment of a vital national 

19 security interest of the United States. If the 

20 President makes such a determination, the Presi21 dent shall, not later than 15 days before the exer22 cise of such waiver, notify the appropriate con23 gressional committees of such determination and 

24 resulting waiver. 


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1 (2) CERTIFICATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPER2 ATIONS REFORMS.—The certification referred to in 

3 paragraph (1) is a certification made by the Sec4 retary to the appropriate congressional committees 

5 that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of re6 forms, related to peacekeeping operations have been 

7 adopted by the United Nations Department of Peace8 keeping Operations or the General Assembly, as ap9 propriate: 

10 (A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that 

11 has the status of a binding rule and applies 

12 equally to all personnel serving in United Na13 tions peacekeeping operations, regardless of cat14 egory or rank, has been adopted by the General 

15 Assembly and duly incorporated into all con16 tracts and a Model Memorandum of Under17 standing, and mechanisms have been established 

18 for training such personnel concerning the re19 quirements of the Code and enforcement of the 

20 Code. 

21 (B) All personnel, regardless of category or 

22 rank, serving in a peacekeeping operation have 

23 been trained concerning the requirements of the 

24 Code of Conduct and each has been given a perVerDate Mar 15 2010 23:42 Dec 08, 2011 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00149 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H2829.RH H2829

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1 sonal copy of the Code, translated into the na2 tional language of such personnel. 

3 (C) All personnel, regardless of category or 

4 rank, are required to sign an oath that each has 

5 received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that each 

6 pledges to abide by the Code, and that each un7 derstands the consequences of violating the Code, 

8 including immediate termination of participa9 tion in and permanent exclusion from all cur10 rent and future peacekeeping operations, as well 

11 as the assumption of personal liability for vic12 tims compensation as a condition of the appoint13 ment to such operation. 

14 (D) All peacekeeping operations have de15 signed and implemented educational outreach 

16 programs to reach local communities where 

17 peacekeeping personnel of such operations are 

18 based to explain prohibited acts on the part of 

19 United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to 

20 identify the individual to whom the local popu21 lation may direct complaints or file allegations 

22 of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of mis23 conduct. 

24 (E) The creation of a centralized database, 

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1 ometric data, has been completed and is being 

2 maintained in the United Nations Department 

3 of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of 

4 misconduct, including the outcomes of investiga5 tions and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that 

6 personnel, regardless of category or rank, who 

7 have engaged in misconduct or other criminal 

8 activities are permanently barred from partici9 pation in future peacekeeping operations. 

10 (F) A Model Memorandum of Under11 standing between the United Nations and each 

12 Member State that contributes troops to a peace13 keeping operation has been adopted by the 

14 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Op15 erations that specifically obligates each such 

16 Member State to— 

17 (i) uphold the uniform Code of Con18 duct which shall apply equally to all per19 sonnel serving in United Nations peace20 keeping operations, regardless of category or 

21 rank; 

22 (ii) designate a competent legal author23 ity, preferably a prosecutor with expertise 

24 in the area of sexual exploitation and abuse 

25 where appropriate, to participate in any 


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1 investigation into an allegation of mis2 conduct brought against an individual of 

3 such Member State; 

4 (iii) refer to its competent national or 

5 military authority for possible prosecution, 

6 if warranted, any investigation of a viola7 tion of the Code of Conduct or other crimi8 nal activity by an individual of such Mem9 ber State; 

10 (iv) report to the Department of Field 

11 Support and the Department of Peace12 keeping Operations on the outcome of any 

13 such investigation; 

14 (v) undertake to conduct on-site court 

15 martial proceedings, where practical and 

16 appropriate, relating to allegations of mis17 conduct alleged against an individual of 

18 such Member State; and 

19 (vi) assume responsibility for the pro20 vision of appropriate assistance to a victim 

21 of misconduct committed by an individual 

22 of such Member State. 

23 (G) A professional and independent inves24 tigative and audit function has been established 

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1 keeping Operations and the Office of Internal 

2 Oversight Services to monitor United Nations 

3 peacekeeping operations. 


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Union Calendar No. 221 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2829 

[Report No. 112–323] 

A BILL 

To promote transparency, accountability, and reother purposes. form within the United Nations system, and for 

DECEMBER 8, 2011 

Reported with an amendment, committed to the Comand ordered to be printed mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, 


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