COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

SHAWN ANTONIO COLES, s/k/a 

 SEAN COLES 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0693-95-2 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 MARCH 26, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

James B. Wilkinson, Judge 

 Felipita Athanas for appellant. 

 John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Shawn Antonio Coles (appellant) was convicted in a bench 

trial of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. He 

contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress 

evidence recovered during a warrantless search of his automobile. 

 Finding no error, we affirm. 

 On October 14, 1994, Officers Misiano and Ford of the 

Richmond Police Department conducted a surveillance operation in 

the 2500 block of Bradby Street in Richmond in response to 

complaints of drug dealing. During this surveillance, at 10:00 

p.m., Misiano saw appellant approach a parked car, open the 

trunk, pull out a baggie with white powder, remove some of the 

powder to give to another individual, place the baggie back in 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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the trunk, and close the trunk. Misiano believed that the baggie 

contained cocaine. Misiano recognized appellant and knew that 

there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest on an unrelated 

charge. He did not arrest appellant at the time of the initial 

observation, but chose to complete the surveillance operation. 

 Approximately three and one-half hours later, the officers 

saw appellant walking a block and a half from the parked car 

where they had earlier seen him involved in what they believed to 

be a drug transaction. At that time, they arrested him on the 

outstanding breaking and entering warrant. In a search incident 

to the arrest, the officers found car keys and a beeper. The 

officers returned appellant to the car where they had seen him 

earlier, opened the trunk, and retrieved the baggie of white 

powder. The car, which at that time was found to be inoperable, 

was later towed to the police station. The baggie contained 

20.56 grams of cocaine. 

 At the suppression hearing, Misiano testified that the 

officers acted without obtaining a search warrant because: "[A]t 

that time we didn't know if there were any other keys to that 

vehicle floating around out there. We didn't want the vehicle to 

leave the area. And, we had limited manpower at the time." The 

trial court overruled the suppression motion, stating: "I think 

the exigency of the circumstances of the automobile [justified 

the search;] he could have had a buddy that saw him arrested, a 

girlfriend, anybody could take the car away." 

 Searches conducted without prior 
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judicial approval are per se unreasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment, subject to 

exceptions allowed when exigencies require 

warrantless searches. Under the wellestablished automobile exception to the 

warrant requirement, an automobile may be 

searched without a warrant where there are 

both probable cause to believe the car 

contains evidence of crime and exigent 

circumstances. 

McCary v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 219, 227, 321 S.E.2d 637, 641 

(1984) (citations omitted). "[P]robable cause exists when the 

facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of 

which he has reasonably trustworthy information, alone are 

sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe 

that an offense has been or is being committed." Derr v. 

Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 215, 219-20, 368 S.E.2d 916, 918 (1988) 

(quoting Taylor v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 816, 820, 284 S.E.2d 

833, 836 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 906 (1982)). 

 An automobile's mobility and the 

likelihood that evidence will be lost or 

destroyed if the automobile is permitted to 

continue on its way present exigent 

circumstances justifying an exception to the 

warrant requirement. . . . Where police have 

secured or seized an automobile to be 

searched, . . . risk of removal of the car or 

its contents may still exist and justify an 

immediate warrantless search. 

McCary, 228 Va. at 228, 321 S.E.2d at 641. "The exigency may 

arise at any time and the fact that the police may have obtained 

a warrant earlier does not negate the possibility of a current 

situation's necessitating prompt police action." Patty v. 

Commonwealth, 218 Va. 150, 156, 235 S.E.2d 437, 441 (1977) 
 4 

(quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595-96 (1974)), cert. 

denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978). 

 In the instant case, both probable cause and exigent 

circumstances were present. The officers' observations of 

appellant's earlier behavior at the car provided ample probable 

cause to believe a drug transaction had occurred. The decision 

to continue their surveillance rather than immediately arrest 

appellant does not dissipate this finding. Additionally, exigent 

circumstances existed because the cocaine was in the automobile. 

 The Virginia Supreme Court has held that exigent circumstances 

exist even when the police secure a vehicle on private property 

and the vehicle is inoperative. See Patty, 218 Va. at 156-57, 

235 S.E.2d at 441. This car was parked on a public street in an 

area where drug transactions were being observed. The officers 

had reason to believe that drugs were in the car's trunk and that 

"there were other keys to that vehicle floating out there." 

Thus, both the necessary probable cause and exigent circumstances 

existed to support the search. 

 Lastly, even if the search had been flawed, the doctrine of 

inevitable discovery would apply to this case. "Inevitable 

discovery has long been recognized in Virginia as an exception to 

the exclusionary rule." Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 639, 

655, 347 S.E.2d 175, 184 (1986). For the inevitable discovery 

doctrine to apply, the Commonwealth must show: 

 (1) a reasonable probability that the 

evidence in question would have been 

discovered by lawful means but for the police 
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misconduct, (2) that the leads making the 

discovery inevitable were possessed by the 

police at the time of the misconduct, and (3) 

that the police also prior to the misconduct 

were actively pursuing the alternative line 

of investigation. 

Id. at 656, 347 S.E.2d at 185 (quoting United States v. Cherry, 

759 F.2d 1196, 1204 (5th Cir. 1985)). 

 In the instant case, the requirements of the inevitable 

discovery doctrine are clearly met. The police could have towed 

the vehicle and conducted an inventory search because appellant 

was already under arrest for the unrelated breaking and entering 

charge. Thus, the officers had information that would have led 

to the inevitable discovery of the cocaine, and they actively 

pursued this alternative line of investigation. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.