alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
State of New York

Supreme Court, Appellate Division

Third Judicial Department

Decided and Entered: September 17, 2015 520684 

________________________________

In the Matter of the Claim of

MARY ANN TANGO, 

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF LABOR, 

Respondent.

________________________________

Calendar Date: August 10, 2015

Before: Lahtinen, J.P., Egan Jr., Rose and Clark, JJ.

__________

Mary Ann Tango, New York City, appellant pro se.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City

(Bessie Bazile of counsel), for respondent.

__________

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal

Board, filed July 10, 2014, which denied claimant's application

for reopening and reconsideration of a prior decision.

Decision affirmed. No opinion.

Lahtinen, J.P., Egan Jr., Rose and Clark, JJ., concur.
-2- 520684 

ORDERED that the decision is affirmed, without costs.

ENTER:

Robert D. Mayberger

Clerk of the Court
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CLIFTON FORGE

#### Bruce W. Greene v. Byron C. Smith, Jr., and Deborah S. Caesar

January 5, 1982

By JUDGE DUNCAN M. BYRD, JR.

The issue presented is whether or not a lien creditor of a remainderman may compel "partition".

It is clear that prior to the enactment of Code of Virginia Section 8.01-94 a remainderman could not compel a partition of land during the continuance of the life estate. *Powell*v. *Tilson,*161 Va. 318 (1933). In 1958, the General Assembly adopted what is now Code Section 8.01-94 which provided a special statutory remedy aside from the remedy of partition in part for "the sale or leasing or exchange of the remainder in such estate by a remainderman, *his guardian or committee"*(emphasis added) under certain circumstances.

Since at least prior to the case of *Peatross v. Gray,*181 Va. 847 (1943), the "Partition Statute" now Section 8.01-81 provided that "a lien creditor . . . may also compel partition for the purposes of subjecting the estate of his debtors on the rents and profits thereof to the satisfaction of his liens."

Code of Virginia Section 8.01-94 has no language comparison to the above language in Code of Virginia Section 8.01-81 with regard to lien creditors. Code of Virginia Section 8.01-94 provides a statutory remedy separate from partition and must be strictly construed. Since Code of Virginia Section 8.01-94 is silent with regard to "lien creditors," I will not infer that the Legislature intended that a lien credi*41tor of a remainderman may maintain an action pursuant to this Section.

The Motion to Dismiss should be sustained.
**Exhibit 31.2****CERTIFICATION**I, Robert T. Ray, certify that:1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of The Houston Exploration Company; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange ActRules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internalcontrol over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to providereasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparationof financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally acceptedaccounting principles;  c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.    Date: May 9, 2006
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE COMBINED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE HOUSTON EXPLORATION COMPANY SET FORTH IN THE
COMPANY'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED 
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<CASH>                                           8,219
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   26,114
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      1,309
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                37,066
<PP&E>                                         560,969
<DEPRECIATION>                                 187,923
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 411,285
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           35,690
<BONDS>                                         77,500
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           233
<OTHER-SE>                                     238,091
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   411,285
<SALES>                                         25,014
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                25,328
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   17,041
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 143
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  8,144
<INCOME-TAX>                                     2,451
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              5,693
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     5,693
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .24
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .24
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                       2,114,960
<SECURITIES>                                 1,750,000
<RECEIVABLES>                                  193,794
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    143,624
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             5,046,893
<PP&E>                                       3,773,123
<DEPRECIATION>                               1,280,364
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               8,586,961
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,299,932
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  5,263,333
<COMMON>                                        95,363
<OTHER-SE>                                     434,192
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 8,586,961
<SALES>                                      1,281,150
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,281,150
<CGS>                                        1,032,009
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,107,562
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                49,726
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             135,588
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,985,789
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,985,789
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,985,789
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.43
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.43
        

</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 179 (Monday, September 18, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Page 43640]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-19837]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 10130]


Certification Related to Foreign Military Financing for Colombia 
Under Section 7045(b)(6) of the Department of State, Foreign 
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017

    Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of State, 
including under section 7045(b)(6) of the Department of State, Foreign 
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2017 (Div. J, Pub. 
L. 115-31) I hereby certify and report that:
    (1) The Peace Tribunal and other judicial bodies within the special 
jurisdiction for peace are independent and have authority to document 
``truth declarations'' from perpetrators of gross violations of human 
rights and to sentence such perpetrators to meaningful sanctions, 
including victims' reparations, guarantee of non-repetition, and 
deprivation of liberty;
    (2) Military personnel responsible for ordering, committing, or 
covering up cases of false positives, including those in command 
authority, are being investigated, prosecuted, and appropriately 
sanctioned, and military officers credibly alleged to have committed 
such crimes are removed from positions of command authority until the 
completion of judicial proceedings; and
    (3) The Government of Colombia is continuing to dismantle illegal 
armed groups, taking effective steps to protect the rights of human 
rights defenders, journalists, trade unionists, and other social 
activists, and protecting the rights and territory of indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian communities.
    This Certification shall be published in the Federal Register and, 
along with the accompanying Report and Memorandum of Justification, 
shall be transmitted to the appropriate committees of Congress.

    Dated: September 11, 2017.
Rex W. Tillerson,
Secretary of State.
[FR Doc. 2017-19837 Filed 9-15-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4710-29-P
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-2355

MARLOW L. BATES, SR.,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.; SONY CORP OF AMERICA; L G 

ELECTRONICS USA, INC.; MITSUBISHI ELECTRIC & ELECTRONICS USA 

INC.; PANASONIC ELECTRIC WORKS CORP. OF AMERICA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (1:10-cv-03158-JFM)

Submitted: April 23, 2012 Decided: April 27, 2012

Before GREGORY, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marlow L. Bates, Sr., Appellant Pro Se. Daniel P. Doty, Julie 

Rebecca Rubin, ASTRACHAN GUNST AND THOMAS PC, Baltimore, 

Maryland; David Ira Ackerman, SNR DENTON US LLP, Washington, 

D.C., for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Marlow L. Bates, Sr., seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order granting Samsung's motion to dismiss his civil 

action. We remand for consideration of whether reopening of the 

appeal period is merited.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of 

the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, 

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends 

the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the 

appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). The timely filing 

of a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(e) extends the start of the appeal period until the entry of 

the district court’s order adjudicating the Rule 59(e) motion. 

“[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a 

jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 

214 (2007). 

The district court’s order was entered on the docket 

on July 20, 2011. The order denying Bates’s Rule 59(e) motion 

was entered on the docket on August 18, 2011. Bates filed a 

motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal on 

October 20, 2011, which the district court has not addressed. 

Bates filed a notice of appeal on December 7, 2011.

Bates’s notice of appeal is clearly untimely. 

However, under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), the district court may 
3

reopen the time to file an appeal if (1) the moving party did 

not receive notice of entry of judgment within twenty-one days 

after entry, (2) the motion is filed within 180 days of entry of 

judgment or within fourteen days of receiving notice from the 

court, whichever is earlier, and (3) no party would be 

prejudiced. In his motion for extension of time, Bates stated 

that he did not receive notice of the district court’s denial of 

his Rule 59(e) motion until October 18, 2011. We accordingly 

remand for the limited purpose of permitting the district court 

to determine whether Bates’s motion for an extension of time 

should be construed as a motion to reopen the appeal period, and 

if so, whether reopening is merited. The record, as 

supplemented, will then be returned to this court for further 

consideration.

REMANDED
Exhibit 23.2

CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

As successor by merger, effective October 1, 2009, of the registered public accounting firm Rotenberg & Co. LLP, we hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on Form S-3 (Nos. 333-155048,
333-163454, 333-117558 and 333-132031) and all documents to be filed under Sections 13(a), 13(c), 14, or 15(d) of the Exchange Act after the date of filing of such registration statement and until all of the common stock to which such registration
statement relates has been sold or the offering is otherwise terminated of our report dated March 27, 2008 for the year ended December 31, 2007 relating to the consolidated financial statements of HQ Sustainable Maritime Industries, Inc.
which has been included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009.



|                      
|----------------------
|                      
|/s/ EFP Rotenberg, LLP
|EFP Rotenberg, LLP    
|                      
|Rochester, New York   
|                      
|March 12, 2010
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2338 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

600 Florida Avenue in Cocoa, Florida, as the ‘‘Harry T. and Harriette 

Moore Post Office’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JUNE 23, 2011 

Mr. POSEY (for himself, Mr. MILLER of Florida, Mr. SOUTHERLAND, Ms. 

BROWN of Florida, Mr. CRENSHAW, Mr. NUGENT, Mr. STEARNS, Mr. 

MICA, Mr. WEBSTER, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Ms. CASTOR of Florida, Mr. ROSS of Florida, Mr. BUCHANAN, Mr. MACK, Mr. 

ROONEY, Ms. WILSON of Florida, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, Mr. DEUTCH, Ms. 

WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mr. WEST, Mr. HASTINGS of 

Florida, Mrs. ADAMS, and Mr. RIVERA) introduced the following bill; 

which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 600 Florida Avenue in Cocoa, Florida, as 

the ‘‘Harry T. and Harriette Moore Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. HARRY T. AND HARRIETTE MOORE POST OF4 FICE. 

5 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

6 Postal Service located at 600 Florida Avenue in Cocoa, 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2338 IH

1 Florida, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Harry T. 

2 and Harriette Moore Post Office’’. 

3 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg4 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

5 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

6 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Harry T. and Har7 riette Moore Post Office’’. 

Æ 


srobinson on DSK4SPTVN1PROD with BILLS
NOTE: This order is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Miscellaneous Docket No. 896

IN RE LAWRENCE V. WILDER, SR.,

Petitioner.

On Writ of Mandamus from the Merit Systems Protection Board in

case nos. PH844E080524-I-1 and PH1221080452-W-1.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Before MAYER, SCHALL, and MOORE Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

ORDER

Lawrence V. Wilder, Sr. petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the Merit

Systems Protection Board to appoint counsel, and "notify of rights to appeal

discrimination claims to the EEOC." Wilder further requests that the court remand to the

Board various Board cases.

A party who seeks a writ of mandamus bears the burden of proving that it has no

other means of attaining the relief desired, Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of

Iowa 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989), and that the right to issuance of the writ is "clear and

indisputable." Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980).

The Board cases which Wilder requests the court remand are not currently

before this court. Therefore, even if a mandamus petition were the correct method for

seeking such relief, which it is not, the court cannot remand.

With respect to Wilder's request for counsel, Wilder cites the Board's decision in

French v. Office of Pers. Mqmt., 37 M.S.P.R. 496 (1988). In French based on this

court's decision in French v. Office of Pers. Mqmt., 810 F.2d 1118 (1987), the Board
determined that in certain cases involving mentally incompetent litigants, it was

appropriate for the Board to request pro bono representation for an appellant. The

Board further noted, however, that it lacked authority to appoint counsel. See French 

37 M.S.P.R. at 498 ("Neither the Board nor OPM has authority to appoint a paid

conservator or counsel for Mr. French").

In the Board decision at issue in this petition, the administrative judge (AJ) cited

French and provided Wilder with a list of attorneys and organizations to consult

concerning the possibility of obtaining legal assistance. The AJ further dismissed

Wilder's appeal without prejudice until such time as Wilder becomes competent or

obtains representation. Wilder has not shown that either this court's decision or the

Board's decision in French requires more than this. Thus, Wilder has not shown that

the AJ clearly and indisputably erred.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.

FOR THE COURT

APR 3 2009 /s/ Jan Horbalv

Date Jan Horbaly

Clerk

ultRaNatattirs"

cc:	Lawrence V. Wilder, Sr.

William P. Rayel, Esq.

s17

APR 03 2009

JAN HORB$LY

CLERK

Misc. 896	 2
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-40356

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

PEDRO PEREZ-MENDOZA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:07-CR-493-4

Before SMITH, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

The attorney appointed to represent Pedro Perez-Mendoza has moved for

leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967). Perez-Mendoza has not filed a response. Our independent

review of the record and counsel’s brief discloses no nonfrivolous issue for appeal.

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 20, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 09-40356 Document: 00511085742 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/20/2010
EXHIBIT 32.2

CALIPER LIFE SCIENCES, INC.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Caliper Life Sciences, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
September 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Thomas T. Higgins, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company certify, pursuant to the requirement set forth in Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act") and 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge that:

(1)   The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act; and

(2)   The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

|                       |  | /s/THOMAS T. HIGGINSThomas T. Higgins
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
(Principal Financial Officer)
|---------------------- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: November 9, 2007 |  |                                                                                                                         

---



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