1 

2024 IL App (5th) 240338-U 

NO. 5-24-0338 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In re MARY-AMBER S., a Minor ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of

(The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee; ) St. Clair County.

Andrea L. Rako, Intervenor-Appellant; The Department ) 

of Children and Family Services, Appellee). ) No. 22-JA-188 

 ) 

 ) Honorable 

 ) Elaine L. LeChien,

 ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court. 

Justices Boie and Sholar concurred in the judgment. 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: Where the trial court’s order granting the Illinois Department of Children and

Family Services’ motion to reconsider its dispositional order was correct,

we affirm.

¶ 2 Andrea L. Rako (Rako), the maternal grandmother of Mary-Amber S. (M.-A.S.), 

intervened in this case, and later filed a motion seeking guardianship of the child. At the conclusion 

of the dispositional hearing, the trial court made M.-A.S. a ward of the court, named Rako as the 

child’s custodian, and designated the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as the 

child’s guardian. DCFS filed an emergency motion to reconsider the dispositional order, arguing 

that the court erred in splitting custody and guardianship between Rako and DCFS. The trial court 

stayed its order, and granted DCFS’s motion to reconsider, from which Rako now appeals. 

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 08/05/24. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
2 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 We recite only those facts necessary to our understanding of the case and resolution of this 

appeal. Teagan S. is the mother of a female child, M.-A.S.1 DCFS became involved in this case 

immediately after the child’s birth upon receipt of a hotline call from the hospital where she was 

delivered. After her birth, M.-A.S. tested positive for marijuana, while Teagan tested positive for 

marijuana and fentanyl. M.-A.S. remained hospitalized until October 21, 2022.

¶ 5 The State filed a petition seeking wardship on October 25, 2022. Count I of the petition 

alleged that M.-A.S. was neglected because Teagan received no prenatal care during the pregnancy 

and, upon M.-A.S.’s birth, they both tested positive for controlled substances. 705 ILCS 405/2-

3(1)(c) (West 2022). In count II, the State alleged neglect on the basis that M.-A.S. was in an 

environment injurious to her health and welfare. The State also alleged that Teagan tested positive 

for fentanyl and marijuana on October 16, 2022. 

¶ 6 Additionally, on the date after M.-A.S. was discharged from the hospital, Teagan posted a 

video to a social media platform “appearing to be using illicit drugs.” Cathy Houston (Houston), a 

DCFS caseworker, interviewed Teagan, who openly admitted that during the pregnancy, she had 

used marijuana and any other illicit drug offered to her. Teagan reported that she was unaware that 

she was pregnant, and that was why she received no prenatal care. DCFS offered Teagan intact 

family services. 

¶ 7 Houston testified at the October 25, 2022, shelter care hearing and confirmed that M.-A.S. 

suffered withdrawal symptoms after birth which required a three-week hospital stay. M.-A.S. was 

discharged on October 21, 2022, and went home with Teagan and Rako. The weekend following 

1

Angel R. was named as M.-A.S.’s biological father, although he never submitted to a DNA test to 

confirm and is not a party to this case.
3 

M.-A.S.’s discharge, there were reports of Teagan’s drug usage with videos and/or photos 

uploaded on a social media platform. Houston testified about an incident in mid-October that 

resulted in Teagan’s hospitalization at Barnes Hospital in St. Louis, where she tested positive for

marijuana and fentanyl.

¶ 8 Houston testified that DCFS took protective custody of M.-A.S. on October 24, 2022, at 

10:45 a.m. Houston recommended that the trial court allow Rako to have temporary physical 

custody of M.-A.S. Houston indicated that she had no safety concerns about Rako and that 

Teagan’s visitation with the child should be supervised. Finally, she stated that she believed there

was an immediate and urgent necessity for the removal of M.-A.S. from Teagan’s home to prevent 

risk of harm based upon her continued use of fentanyl, and that it was in the best interest of M.-

A.S. to be placed in the temporary legal custody of DCFS. Following the October 25, 2022, 

hearing, the trial court found that there was an immediate and urgent necessity to remove M.-A.S. 

from Teagan’s home and granted DCFS’s petition for temporary custody. 

¶ 9 On November 18, 2022, a caseworker visited Rako’s home to check on M.-A.S. Teagan 

answered the door while wearing pajamas. The caseworker left the home and returned later with 

police officers to remove M.-A.S. from Rako’s home. M.-A.S. was then placed in a traditional 

foster home. On December 1, 2022, Rako filed a motion for leave to intervene arguing that since

M.-A.S. lived in her home from October 21, 2022, until November 18, 2022, she was a necessary 

party because her presence was required in the case to protect her interests relative to M.-A.S.

¶ 10 On February 13, 2023, the State filed a motion objecting to Rako’s petition to intervene, 

arguing that she was not a necessary party. The State cited to section 1-5(1) of the Juvenile Court 

Act of 1987 (Act), which provides: “the minor who is the subject of the proceeding and the minor’s 

parents, guardian, legal custodian or responsible relative who are parties respondent have the right 
4 

to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine

witnesses, [and] to examine pertinent court files and records” to a proceeding instituted under the 

Act. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2022). The State argued that Rako was not a “guardian,” although 

she had filed a separate petition for guardianship; she was not a “legal custodian”; and she was not 

a “responsible relative” and, thus, could not be a party respondent. The State noted that Rako did 

not assert that she was a legal custodian, and that she did not meet the definition of the term 

“responsible relative” as outlined by our Illinois Supreme Court in In re Jennings, 68 Ill. 2d 125, 

130 (1977) (stating that the term “responsible relative” applies to two categories of individuals:

(1) the individual who was a person having custody and control of the minor or (2) the individual 

who was the nearest known relative and a parent or guardian could not be found). The State 

asserted that at best Rako could be deemed a former responsible relative, and if so, would have the 

right to be heard by the court but could not become a party to the proceeding. 705 ILCS 405/1-

5(2)(a) (West 2022). Finally, the State argued that Rako had no right to intervene because she only 

had temporary custody of M.-A.S. in her placement within the intact family case. Moreover, during 

that brief period, Teagan was often found at the same household with Rako, and thus, she did not 

meet the definition of “responsible relative” set forth in In re Jennings. Id.

¶ 11 On February 14, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Rako’s motion for leave to 

intervene. Rako testified that she was 52 years of age, was Teagan’s biological mother, and a 

licensed clinical social worker. She testified that before M.-A.S. was discharged from the neonatal 

intensive care unit, she had a conversation with Cathy Houston of DCFS, who allowed M.-A.S. to 

be discharged to Teagan and Rako if the child was in Rako’s care. On the date of M.-A.S.’s hospital 

discharge, Rako filed a separate petition for guardianship.2 Between October 18, 2022, and 

2

This case was filed as St. Clair County case No. 22-GR-239, which has been closed. 
5 

November 18, 2022, M.-A.S. lived in Rako’s Belleville home. Rako testified that Teagan moved 

out on or about October 25, 2022, when the trial court entered the temporary custody order. Rako 

stated that Teagan did not have a permanent place to stay, and she moved around a bit. On 

November 18, 2022, Rako had asked Teagan and Teagan’s sister, Quinn, to come over to the house 

to go grocery shopping with her and M.-A.S. Rako stated that while she was getting ready, the 

DCFS representatives arrived at the house. Teagan informed Rako upon their arrival, and Rako 

asked Teagan to explain that she was getting the baby ready but would speak to them soon. 

Approximately four minutes later, she and the baby were ready, but the DCFS workers had left. 

¶ 12 Rako testified that her goal was to obtain guardianship over the child, stating that both 

Teagan and the baby’s father had agreed. Moreover, Teagan was going to sign over her parental 

rights to Rako so she could adopt M.-A.S. She testified that she had developed a bond with M.-AS. in the approximate 30 days that the baby was in her care. On cross-examination, Rako specified 

that she was the first placement for M.-A.S. and confirmed that Teagan was allowed to live with 

her and M.-A.S. until the temporary custody order was entered. Rako confirmed that she worked 

in person at Live Well Counseling Services and online with BetterHelp. Earlier in her career, she 

had worked for two contractors who worked with DCFS and so she was familiar with the 

processes.

¶ 13 Rako’s attorney also called Quinn, Teagan’s sister, who testified that she never saw Teagan 

alone with M.-A.S. She testified that she and Teagan arrived at Rako’s home at about 7:45 a.m. 

on November 18, 2022, and had not spent the night at Rako’s home. 

¶ 14 The State called Brittney Griffin, who testified that she was employed by Hoyleton Youth 

and Family Services as a foster care case manager. She confirmed that Rako was the first 

placement for the baby and was designated as a custodial placement of the minor with DCFS 
6 

approval. As a condition to Rako being M.-A.S.’s custodian, Teagan had to be absent from the 

home. Griffin also testified that there had been three anonymous hotline calls about M.-A.S. and 

Rako but provided no details about these calls. 

¶ 15 On cross-examination by Rako’s attorney, Griffin testified that Hoyleton Youth and Family 

Services made the discretionary decision to remove M.-A.S. from Rako’s care. On November 18, 

2022, when she initially arrived at Rako’s home, she waited approximately 45 minutes before 

departing. The first 20 minutes, they knocked on the front door of Rako’s home with no answer.

When the door was opened, they were brought inside only to wait an additional 15 to 20 minutes. 

Upon returning that same date with law enforcement, she attempted to speak with Rako, but Rako 

“did not want to hear what we were saying.” Without reciting any reasons on the record or in its

written order, the trial court granted Rako’s motion to intervene. 

¶ 16 On April 18, 2023, Rako filed a petition for temporary custody stating that she was a 

“responsible relative” in that she was the biological maternal grandmother; she was capable, 

willing, and able to care for the child, and had demonstrated that ability; and she had developed a 

relationship with the child during the month that the child was in her care. She argued that it was 

in M.-A.S.’s best interest to award her temporary and permanent custody. Alternatively, she asked 

the court to award her grandparent visitation. 

¶ 17 On April 25, 2023, the trial court held the adjudicatory hearing. Teagan stipulated to the 

State’s petition that M.-A.S. was neglected or abused in that she was born with a controlled 

substance in her blood, urine, or meconium, and was in an environment that was injurious to her 

welfare. The court entered its order finding that the allegations in the State’s petition had been 

proven by the preponderance of the evidence.
7 

¶ 18 The dispositional hearing was held on October 24, 2023, at which time the trial court also

heard Rako’s petition for temporary custody. The State called Terra Dennis, a Hoyleton Youth and 

Family Services caseworker, to testify. Teagan and Rako both testified.

¶ 19 Terra Dennis (Dennis) testified to the services that DCFS required Teagan to complete and 

stated that Teagan had not engaged in any of them. Teagan also did not have any visits with M.-

A.S. from March 20, 2023, until September 25, 2023. From September 25, 2023, until the date of 

the hearing, Dennis testified that Teagan participated in two visits and missed two visits. She 

submitted to a drug test on September 25, 2023, which was positive for fentanyl. Teagan failed to 

appear for all other scheduled tests. Teagan recently provided Dennis with a new Missouri address, 

stating that she had moved in with her boyfriend and his mother, which Dennis had not had an 

opportunity to confirm. Her permanency recommendation remained to return M.-A.S. home to 

Teagan in 12 months. 

¶ 20 Teagan testified that on the date when DCFS removed M.-A.S. from her mother’s home, 

she did not physically live there. She testified that she did not answer the door because the 

neighborhood was “weird,” and it was early in the morning. She answered the door after about 10 

minutes and left the DCFS workers in the kitchen for 5 to 7 minutes while she went upstairs to 

notify her mom. She was present at Rako’s house when DCFS returned and removed M.-A.S.

Teagan stated that she had not spent the night at her mother’s home since August 2023.

¶ 21 Rako next testified that she was seeking custody of M.-A.S. When M.-A.S. was released 

from the hospital, she was released into Rako’s care. As DCFS only had an intact family case open 

at that time, Teagan was allowed to live with Rako and M.-A.S. Rako testified that because of a 

couple of social media posts made by Teagan, DCFS initiated the shelter care process. Rako stated 

that she never allowed Teagan to care for M.-A.S. Between the October 25, 2022, shelter care 
8 

hearing and November 18, 2022, when DCFS removed M.-A.S. from Rako’s home, DCFS made 

one visit to her home. Rako testified that on November 18, 2022, Teagan told her that DCFS 

workers were in the kitchen. Rako told Teagan to tell them that she would come downstairs to 

speak with them after she finished changing and dressing M.-A.S. Rako testified that she headed 

downstairs within approximately five to six minutes after Teagan informed her of their presence, 

but by then, they were gone. She texted the caseworker to ask if everything was “okay,” but never 

received a response. 

¶ 22 On October 25, 2023, the State filed its response to Rako’s April 2023 motion seeking

temporary custody of M.-A.S. The State’s response was also intended as its closing argument to 

the dispositional hearing. Noting that DCFS had been granted both guardianship and custody, the 

State asserted that only DCFS had the right to determine where the child is placed. 705 ILCS 

405/1-3(8), (9) (West 2022). The State contended that other sections of the Act prohibited the trial 

court from ordering specific placements, services, or service providers, unless otherwise 

authorized by law. Id. §§ 2-23(3), 2-28(2). 

¶ 23 On November 6, 2023, Rako filed her written closing argument to the dispositional hearing, 

contending that the trial court had the power to determine in whose custody the minor should be 

placed and that the court could select any of the options listed in section 2-27(1) of the Act. She 

specifically argued that the court had the option of placing M.-A.S. in the custody of a person not 

the parent of the minor. Id. § 2-27(1)(a). She asked the court to (1) declare M.-A.S. a ward of the 

court; (2) to find that Teagan is unfit, unwilling, or both; and (3) place M.-A.S. with Rako.

¶ 24 On December 22, 2023, the trial court entered its orders. The court denied Rako’s request 

that she be awarded permanent custody and guardianship of M.-A.S. and stated that Teagan 

“should have the opportunity to work on her Service Plan before a goal of guardianship would be 
9 

considered.” The trial court adjudicated M.-A.S. as neglected, made her a ward of the court, placed 

custody with Rako as a suitable relative, and placed guardianship with DCFS.

¶ 25 On December 27, 2023, DCFS filed an emergency motion to reconsider the December 22, 

2023, dispositional order. DCFS argued that the dispositional order stripped DCFS of legal custody 

of M.-A.S. and improperly restricted DCFS’s statutory authority to make placement decisions. 

Stated alternatively, DCFS argued that the trial court made a specific placement, which it lacked 

the authority to do. After a hearing on January 4, 2024, the trial court took the motion under 

advisement, and on February 16, 2024, the trial court granted the motion to reconsider and placed 

custody of M.-A.S. with DCFS.

¶ 26 Following a motion to clarify filed by Rako, the trial court entered an explanatory order on 

March 4, 2024, stating it agreed with DCFS that the trial court did not have the authority to grant 

guardianship to DCFS and custody to another individual because the trial court would then have 

made a specific placement, which the Act did not authorize. 

¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 28 The narrow issue before us is whether the trial court has the authority to place custody of 

a minor child with a relative while at the same time awarding guardianship of the minor to DCFS. 

On appeal, DCFS contends that custody and guardianship cannot be split in this way. While the 

State agreed with DCFS’s position in the trial court proceeding, the State has now determined that 

its original position was incorrect, and the trial court did have the authority to split guardianship 

and custody.

¶ 29 Our review is de novo. In re M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 15; Horlacher v. Cohen, 2017 IL 

(1st) 162712, ¶ 80. In reviewing statutory language, the primary rule of statutory construction is 

to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. In re M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 16; 
10 

Hawkins v. Voss, 2015 IL App (5th) 140001, ¶ 12. We determine legislative intent by giving the 

language chosen its plain and ordinary meaning. Hawkins, 2015 IL App (5th) 140001, ¶¶ 12-13. 

In reviewing statutory language, we must not consider words and/or phrases in isolation but must 

construe these words and/or phrases in the context of other relevant statutory provisions. In re 

M.M., 2016 IL 119932, ¶ 16. We must read the statute in its entirety and not consider a word, 

clause, or sentence to be irrelevant. Id. Moreover, we should not read into a statute any exceptions, 

limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not specifically state. Elam v. Municipal Officers 

Electoral Board for Village of Riverdale, 2021 IL 12780, ¶ 14. In addition, “[o]ne of the 

fundamental principles of statutory construction is to view all provisions of an enactment as a 

whole.” Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). 

¶ 30 Our Illinois Supreme Court has stated that “a court exercising jurisdiction over a minor 

pursuant to the provisions of the Act is not at liberty to reject or embellish its statutory authority 

even if there is a perceived need or desirability for such action.” People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 

226 Ill. 2d 445, 454 (2007). DCFS argues that the trial court did not have the statutory authority to 

give Rako custody of M.-A.S. after granting DCFS guardianship, because this constituted a

“specific placement,” which is prohibited under section 2-23 of the Act. That section states: 

“Unless otherwise specifically authorized by law, the court is not empowered under this subsection

(3) to order specific placements, specific services, or specific service providers to be included in 

the plan.” 705 ILCS 405/2-23(3) (West 2022). 

¶ 31 Here, following its dispositional order, the trial court had five options for placement of M.-

A.S. pursuant to section 2-27 of the Act: (1) place the minor in the custody of a suitable relative 

or other person as legal custodian or guardian; (2) place the minor in the subsidized guardianship 

or a suitable relative or other person as legal guardian; (3) place the minor under the guardianship 
11 

of a probation officer; (4) commit the minor to an agency that is not DCFS (or under DCFS’s 

authority) for care and placement; or (5) commit the minor to DCFS for care and service (subject 

to specific limitations that are not relevant to this case). Id. § 2-27(1)(a)-(d). When a minor is 

placed pursuant to section 2-27 of the Act, the trial court “may choose only among the dispositional 

alternatives provided in the statute and ‘may not exceed [its] statutory authority no matter how 

desirable or beneficial the attempted innovation might be.’ ” In re P.F., 265 Ill. App. 3d 1092, 

1104 (1994) (quoting In re Peak, 59 Ill. App. 3d 548, 551-52 (1978)). 

¶ 32 We find In re T.L.C., 285 Ill. App. 3d 922, 924 (1996), instructive. There, the trial court 

appointed the guardianship administrator of DCFS as the minor’s “guardian with power to place.” 

The trial court also ordered DCFS to place the minor in a specific residential facility. Id. The 

appellate court recognized that the Act technically would allow the court to split guardianship and 

custody of a minor, except when guardianship is placed with DCFS, because the Act “does not 

permit the court to dictate to DCFS exactly where custody must be placed.” Id. at 926. Upon 

reviewing the entirety of the Act, the court noted that “the legislature intended that the circuit court 

not be empowered to order specific services.” Id. at 929. In reversing the trial court’s dispositional 

order directing DCFS to place the minor in a specific residential facility, the appellate court stated 

that although section 2-27(1)(c) seemingly allows the court to “commit [the minor] to an agency 

for care or placement,” the court may not do so after appointing DCFS as the minor’s guardian

because the duties outlined in the definitions of “guardianship of the person” and “legal custody” 

in section 1-3 of the Act are limited by the guardian’s rights and responsibilities. Id. at 925-26 

(citing 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1)(c), 1-3(8)(c), 1-3(9)). 

¶ 33 In its analysis, the court in In re T.L.C. relied upon an earlier case—In re Chiara C., 279 

Ill. App. 3d 761 (1996). In In re Chiara C., guardianship of the minor had been placed with DCFS. 
12 

Id. at 763. DCFS then placed custody of the minor in a relative placement. Id. At a hearing on 

Chiara’s emergency motion to change placement, the trial court entered an order directing DCFS 

to remove the minor from her relative placement and move her to a licensed residential facility for 

college-bound students. Id. On appeal, the court reversed the trial court’s placement order stating 

that the court’s order directing DCFS to change Chiara’s placement was an order for a specific 

service that was not authorized by the Act. Id. at 767. The court also noted that Chiara was in 

DCFS custody pursuant to section 2-27(1)(d) in that she was committed to DCFS for care and 

service. Id. at 766-67 (quoting 705 ILCS 405/2-27(1)(d) (West 1994)). In support, the appellate 

court cited section 2-28(2) of the Act: “ ‘Unless otherwise specifically authorized by law, the court 

is not empowered *** to order specific services or service providers to be included in the plan.’ ” 

(Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 765-66 (quoting 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 1994)).

¶ 34 Rako argues that while DCFS had guardianship of M.-A.S., DCFS did not explicitly have 

guardianship “with the right to place” as the trial judge had ordered in In re T.L.C. We disagree 

with this argument and find that the trial court implicitly gave DCFS the power to place M.-A.S.

by placing her under DCFS’s guardianship. Moreover, in its own administrative regulations, DCFS 

has the legal authority to place a child when it has obtained custody or guardianship pursuant to 

the Act. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 301.40(a)(1), (3) (2010). 

¶ 35 We conclude that the trial court’s original dispositional order which split custody and 

guardianship was in error. We find that the trial court corrected this error when it granted DCFS’s 

motion to reconsider and entered its subsequent dispositional order, placing both custody and 

guardianship with DCFS. 

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the St. Clair County circuit court. 
13 

¶ 38 Affirmed.