J-S52015-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

JAKWAN ARCHIE GREEN, :

:

Appellant : No. 694 MDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 10, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-36-CR-0005217-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 12, 2017

Jakwan Archie Green (“Green”), pro se, appeals from the Order 

dismissing his Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court aptly summarized the relevant factual and procedural 

history in its Opinion, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/10/17, at 1-6.

The PCRA court dismissed Green’s Amended Petition on April 10, 2017. 

Green filed a timely Notice of Appeal.1

On appeal, Green raises the following questions for our review:

I. [Were] trial counsel[] ineffective for failure to investigate and 

interview a potential witness[,] which prejudice[d Green’s right] 

to a fair trial?

 

1 The PCRA court did not order Green to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise 

statement of matters complained of on appeal.
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II. [Were] trial and appella[te] counsel[] deficient in [their] 

representation for failure to suppress the [Commonwealth] 

witness[’s] statement on grounds of inconsistent statements and

hearsay?

III. [Were] trial counsel[] ineffective for failure to obtain an 

expert witness to disqualify the [Commonwealth] witness[’s] 

ability to stand trial as a witness, where it was said that this 

witness suffered from mental disabilities[?]

IV. [Were] trial counsel[] ineffective for failure to raise 

prosecutorial misconduct, during trial and direct appeal, where 

the [Commonwealth] knowing[ly] used a [perjured], fabricated 

statement to gain an arrest and conviction against [Green,] 

which violated [Green’s] “due process rights” and the “due 

process clause”?

V. [Were] trial counsel[] ineffective for failure to raise and 

preserve a claim challenging the insufficiency of the evidence 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(2)[,] (7)[?]

VI. Was the [j]udgment of sentence illegal, due to the extent 

that [Green’s] conduct “did not” violate “shared intent[,]” [a] 

basic element required in which [Green] was convicted[,] to 

sustain a first[-]degree murder and criminal conspiracy 

[conviction] on the basis of co-conspirator liability in violation of 

the 14th [A]mendment [] of the United States Constitution[,] and 

a miscarriage of justice occurred thereto?

VII. Did the [trial court] abuse [its] discretion by rendering a 

verdict against the weight of the evidence?

VIII. Did the government official[]s of Lancaster County abuse 

their discretion, violating [Green’s] 14th Amendment rights, by 

committing a misconduct in office[]?

Brief for Appellant at 5-6 (unnumbered; issues renumbered, some 

capitalization omitted).

Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s [dismissal] of a 

petition for post[-]conviction relief is well-settled: We must 

examine whether the record supports the PCRA court’s 

determination, and whether the PCRA court’s determination is 
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free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be 

disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the 

certified record.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted).

Green’s first five claims challenge the effectiveness of his trial counsel. 

The PCRA permits relief when a conviction is the result of “[i]neffective 

assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so 

undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of 

guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

It is well-settled that counsel is presumed to have provided 

effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and 

proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal claim is of 

arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any 

objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s 

interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s 

error. 

Franklin, 990 A.2d at 797 (citations omitted). “A claim of ineffectiveness 

will be denied if the petitioner’s evidence fails to satisfy any one of these 

prongs.” Commonwealth v. Roane, 142 A.3d 79, 88 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(citation omitted).

In his first claim, Green argues that his trial counsel were ineffective 

for failing to investigate and interview Rebecca Hall (“Hall”), the girlfriend of 

Green’s co-defendant, Christopher Lassitter (“Lassitter”), as a potential 

witness. See Brief for Appellant at 18-22. According to Green, Hall told the 

police about a conversation between Lassiter and co-defendant Oscar 
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Martinez (“Martinez”), during which Martinez stated that he “want[ed] to kill 

everybody in the house[,]” and Lassiter responded, “Do what you got to do.” 

Id. at 19. Green contends that Hall’s testimony would tend to show that 

“the gunm[a]n’s intentions were his own.” Id. at 18.

In its Opinion, the PCRA court set forth the relevant law, addressed 

Green’s claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 

4/10/17, at 17-19. Because we conclude that the PCRA court’s 

determinations are supported by the record and free of legal error, we affirm 

on this basis as to Green’s first claim. See id. 

We will address Green’s next three issues together, as each one 

relates to the testimony of Taria Lowden (“Lowden”). In his second claim, 

Green argues that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to “suppress” 

Lowden’s statement to police “on the grounds of inconsistent statement and 

hearsay.” Brief for Appellant at 22. Green claims that Lowden’s statement, 

which he believes was false, was obtained through intimidation and coercion 

by the police. Id. at 22, 23-24. Green asserts that without Lowden’s 

testimony, the Commonwealth could not prove that he was involved in the 

conspiracy. Id. at 25.

In his third claim, Green avers that his trial counsel were ineffective 

for failing to retain an expert witness to disqualify Lowden from testifying at 

trial, due to her “mental disabilities.” Id. at 25. Green claims that Lowden 

was incompetent to testify because she suffers from bi-polar disorder, and 
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because she was intoxicated on the night of the murder. Id. at 26; see 

also id. (wherein Green argues that an expert could explain that both bipolar disorder and intoxication can affect memory). Green contends that he 

was prejudiced because “[i]f[] an expert would have been obtained, 

[Lowden] ... could have been impeached and eliminated from the record as a 

credi[ble] witness....” Id. at 27.

In his fourth claim, Green asserts that his trial counsel were ineffective 

for failing to raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, based on the use of 

purportedly perjured testimony by Lowden. Id. at 29. Green claims that 

the prosecutor knew that Lowden provided perjured testimony at trial 

because the prosecutor was aware that Hall had made a statement that 

contradicted Lowden’s testimony. Id. at 30-31. Green argues that he was 

prejudiced because the trial court would have declared a mistrial if his trial 

counsel had raised the issue of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 31.

In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed Green’s claims regarding 

Lowden’s testimony, and concluded that they lack merit. See PCRA Court 

Opinion, 4/10/17, at 20-24. Because we conclude that the PCRA court’s 

determinations are supported by the record and free of legal error, we affirm 

on this basis as to Green’s second, third, and fourth claims. See id. As an 

addendum, we note that Green failed to demonstrate that the outcome of 

trial would have been different if not for counsel’s purported errors. See 

Franklin, supra; see also Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 
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1026 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “unsupported speculation” does not 

establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been 

different).

In his fifth claim, Green argues that his trial counsel were ineffective 

for failing to raise and preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. Brief for Appellant at 27. Green claims that he “never harbored a 

weapon, shared intent, malice or a motive to harm or kill anyone in the 

victim[’s] household.” Id. at 28.

In its Opinion, the PCRA court set forth the relevant law, addressed 

Green’s claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 

4/10/17, at 26-32. We adopt the sound reasoning of the PCRA court as to 

Green’s fifth claim. See id.

In his sixth claim, Green argues that his judgment of sentence is illegal 

because the Commonwealth did not establish that he shared an intent to 

commit first-degree murder, and therefore, he cannot be guilty of the 

offense as a co-conspirator. Brief for Appellant at 11-12. Green contends 

that the evidence presented at trial showed that the crime “revolved around” 

Lassitter, and a recent attack on the mother of Lassitter’s child by “a group 

of Latin King females.” Id. at 15. Green asserts that he did not speak with 

Lassitter “concerning a plan to commit an unlawful or prohibited act[,] and 

there is no evidence that can prove or say otherwise.” Id. Green concedes 

that he spoke with the victim’s boyfriend (who had allegedly ordered the 
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attack on the mother of Lassitter’s child), but argues that he “went to the 

home to defuse any further problem.” Id. Green states that he walked to

the victim’s door with Martinez, but claims that he had no reason to believe 

that Martinez intended to commit a criminal act. Id. 

Although Green states that his judgment of sentence is illegal, his 

argument challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction.2 A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not a 

cognizable claim under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2); see also 

Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2005) (rejecting a 

sufficiency claim that was raised on PCRA appeal without an ineffective 

assistance of counsel analysis because it is not cognizable under the PCRA); 

Commonwealth v. Bell, 706 A.2d 855, 861 (Pa. Super. 1998) (holding that 

sufficiency claims are not cognizable under the PCRA). Moreover, even if we 

could consider the merits of Green’s claim, we would conclude that the 

evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction, based 

upon the reasons set forth by the PCRA court. See PCRA Court Opinion, 

4/10/17, at 26-32. Accordingly, Green is not entitled to relief on this claim.

In his seventh claim, Green contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by rendering a verdict against the weight of the evidence. Brief 

 

2 Even if Green had properly challenged the legality of his sentence, we 

would conclude that the trial court did not impose an illegal sentence. In 

fact, Green, who was an adult at the time of the murder, received a 

mandatory sentence for the crime of first-degree murder. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 1102(a)(1).
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for Appellant at 31. Green argues that the trial court overlooked testimony 

that would prove that he did not share an intent to commit an unlawful act. 

Id. at 32-33. Green also challenges the credibility of Lowden’s testimony. 

Id. at 33.

A challenge to the weight of the evidence is not a cognizable claim 

under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). Moreover, Green could 

have raised a challenge to the weight of the evidence on direct review but 

failed to do so, and therefore, his claim is waived. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9544(b) (providing that, under the PCRA, “an issue is waived if the 

petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during 

unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state post[-]conviction proceeding.”);

see also Commonwealth v. Rush, 838 A.2d 651, 660 (Pa. 2003) (stating 

that “[a]t the collateral review stage, allegations of trial court error are 

waived, since they were not raised at the first opportunity for review.”). 

Therefore, Green is not entitled to relief on his seventh claim.3

In his eighth claim, Green asserts that government officials in 

Lancaster County (i.e., the District Attorney and detectives) abused their 

 

3 Even if we could consider Green’s claim, which asks us to re-weigh the 

evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial, we 

would agree with the PCRA court’s conclusion that a challenge to the weight 

of the evidence would be without merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/10/17, 

at 32-33; see also Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. 

Super. 2015) (stating that “[t]he weight of the evidence is exclusively for 

the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” (citation and brackets 

omitted)).
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discretion by pursuing a case against him based on corruption, prejudice and 

racism. Brief for Appellant at 34-35. Additionally, Green continues his 

arguments that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, 

and that Hall should have been called as a witness to contradict Lowden’s 

testimony and establish that Green was not part of the conspiracy. Id. at 

38-39. 

Green’s claim does not fall within one of the categories of errors for 

which the PCRA provides a remedy. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). 

Moreover, Green’s claim is waived because he could have raised this issue 

on direct appeal but failed to do so. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b); see also 

Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa. 2001). Thus, 

Green is not entitled to relief on his final claim.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/12/2017
'Under Rule 907 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, a PCRA court may 

dispose of post conviction collateral relief petitions without a hearing if it is satisfied after 

reviewing the materials submitted that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the 

petitioner is not entitled to post conviction relief. 

the get-away car. All three co-conspirators were arrested and charged with first-degree 

when she answered Green's knock on the door. Lassitter provided the loaded gun and 

the City of Lancaster. Martinez would later admit to shooting the victim multiple times 

Christopher Lassitter participated in the murder of Diana Spencer at her residence in 

follows. On April 16, 2011, at approximately 12:52 a.m., Green, Oscar Martinez, and 

The relevant facts and the procedural history of this case may be summarized as 

I. Procedural Background 

hearing.1 

9541-46. For the reasons set forth below, these petitions will be dismissed without a 

petitions filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

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OPINION 

JAKWAN ARCHIE GREEN 

c: 

v. No. 5217 - 2011 

COMMONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL 

Circulated 09/13/2017 04:03 PM
2 

3The aggravating circumstance the Commonwealth identified at that time was that "in 

the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another 

person in addition to the victim of the offense." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711 (d)(7). The Commonwealth 

had evidence that an adult female, Crystal Zook, was within feet of the victim in this case when 

she was shot and killed. In addition to Ms. Zook, there was evidence that at least two young 

children and two adults were in the house at the time of the shooting. 

4Co-defendant Martinez, No. 2587-2011, entered a plea of guilty to first-degree murder 

in exchange for the Commonwealth withdrawing the death penalty. Co-defendant Lassitter, No. 

2583-2011, entered a plea of guilty in exchange for the Commonwealth reducing the firstdegree murder charge to third-degree murder. 

218 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501 (a) and 18 Pa.C.S.A.§ 903(a)(1 ), respectively. 

2013, to the mandatory sentence of life in prison without parole for the first-degree 

found guilty of both charges on January 10, 2013. He was sentenced on February 28, 

sentencing option, Green waived his right to a jury trial." After a bench trial, Green was 

In exchange for the Commonwealth's withdrawal of the death penalty as a 

sounds other than oral communications. 

video portion of the recording, as well as portions of the audio recording that contained 

between the two individuals seen on the video. I further denied suppression of the 

entered granting the suppression of the audio recording of oral communications 

Control Act, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5701 et seq. After an evidentiary hearing, an order was 

before the shooting violated Pennsylvania's Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance 

the taping of the conversation between him and co-defendant Martinez immediately 

located near the residence where the killing in this case occurred. Green argued that 

suppress video and audio recordings taken from a security camera used by a business 

Green filed an omnibus pre-trial motion on July 13, 2012, seeking, inter alia, to 

gave notice of its intent to seek the death penalty.3 

murder and criminal conspiracy to commit murder.2 Thereafter, the Commonwealth 
3 

5Green furnished a statement of errors complained of on appeal which raised just one 

issue: whether the court erred in failing to suppress the video portion of the surveillance 

recording depicting Green speaking to a co-defendant immediately before the killing. 

6While the petition for allowance of appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, 

Green commenced a civil action by filing, pro se, a "petition for writ of habeas corpus ad 

subjiciendum," challenging this Court's subject matter jurisdiction in the criminal homicide 

matter. Green requested the dismissal of his case and his immediate release from custody. 

Because the PCRA encompasses all common law and statutory remedies for obtaining post 

conviction collateral relief, including habeas corpus, Green's petition was deemed a petition 

filed pursuant to the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6503; Commonwealth 

v. Turner, 622 Pa. 318, 80 A.3d 754, 770 (2013). Given the fact that Green's petition for 

allowance of appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, the PCRA petition was dismissed 

as premature. See Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487, 493, 746 A.2d 585, 588 (2000) 

(holding that when an appeal is pending a post conviction petition cannot be filed until the 

resolution of the pending appeal "by the highest state court in which review is sought."). 

for transcripts for purposes of filing a petition for post conviction relief. Each request 

Between November 21, 2014 and June 4, 2015, Green filed four prose requests 

on appeal by Attorney Lyden. 

785 (Table) (Pa. Oct. 7, 2013); see also No. 197 MAL 2014. Green was represented 

the matter on October 7, 2014.6 See Commonwealth v. Green, 627 Pa. 770, 101 A.3d 

(Pa. Super. 2013). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal in 

Super. 2013); see also Commonwealth v. Green, 2013 WL 11250357 (Memo. Op.) 

unpublished memorandum. See Commonwealth v. Green, 91 A.3d 1286 (Table) (Pa. 

panel of the Superior Court affirmed the conviction and judgment of sentence in an 

February 28, 2013.5 See No. 440 MDA 2013. On November 15, 2013, a three-judge 

A timely notice of appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was filed on 

J. Miller, Esquire, and Christopher P. Lyden, Esquire. 

criminal conspiracy conviction. Green was represented at trial and sentencing by Cory 

murder conviction, and a concurrent sentence of 20 to 40 years' incarceration for the 
4 

9For purposes of the PCRA, "a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct 

review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States ... or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Here, Green's petition for 

allowance of appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on October 7, 2014. As 

Green did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, his 

judgment of sentence became final on January 5, 2015, when the period for filing a petition 

expired. See U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 13, 28 U.S.C.A. (providing "[a] petition for writ of certiorari 

seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary review by the 

state court of last resort is timely when filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order 

denying discretionary review."). Accordingly, pursuant to section 9545(b), Green had one year 

from January 5, 2015, in which to file a timely PCRA petition. Green filed the instant petition on 

September 18, 2015; therefore, the petition is timely. 

8The pleading is deemed filed on the date of mailing, September 18, 2016, rather than 

the date of docketing, September 21, 2016, pursuant to the "prisoner mailbox rule." See 

Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011) ("Under the prisoner 

mailbox rule, we deem a pro se document filed on the date it is placed in the hands of prison 

authorities for mailing."). 

7 A trial court is not required to comply with a defendant's request for transcripts in order 

to pursue relief in a post conviction proceeding where no such action is pending. See 

Commonwealth v. Crider, 735 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. 1999); Commonwealth v. Martin, 705 

A.2d 1337 (Pa. Super. 1998); Commonwealth v. Ballem, 482 A.2d 1322 (Pa. Super. 1984). 

Dennis C. Dougherty, Esquire, was appointed to represent Green on his collateral 

Pursuant to Rule 904(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, 

transcripts. On October 14, 2015, that appeal was dismissed by the Superior Court. 

Pennsylvania from my Order of June 4, 2015, denying Green's prose request for 

counsel. This petition was stayed pending Green's appeal to the Superior Court of 

conviction collateral relief challenging the effectiveness of his trial and appellate 

On September 18, 2015,8 Green filed, prose, a timely9 petition for post 

Appeal from the last order of June 4, 2015, denying Green's request for transcripts. 

to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which was deemed to be a timely Notice of 

he requested.7 On June 15, 2015, Green filed a prose "Petition for Writ of Mandamus" 

was denied, as there was no pending proceeding that would entitle Green to the relief 
5 

10This was filed pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 

(1988), Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa. Super. 390, 550 A.2d 213 (1988), and its progeny. 

complete copy of discovery" consisting of "nearly 5,000 pages" to aid him in his prose 

Green also petitioned for an order "compel[ling) P.C.R.A. counsel to forward a 

amended PCRA petitions was filed by Green on August 29, 2016. 

response after review of the transcripts. A memorandum of law in support of the prior 

August 22, 2016, and gave Green an additional 60 days to supplement his Rule 907 

purposes of further responding to the Rule 907 Notice. I granted that request on 

Green also requested copies of the suppression, trial and sentencing transcripts for 

PCRA petitions on June 16, 2016, July 12, 2016, July 20, 2016, and August 4, 2016. 

to the Rule 907 Notice. After receiving an extension of time, Green filed amended 

24, 2016. Green was given 30 days to file an amended petition or to otherwise respond 

907(1), I filed a notice of my intention to dismiss the petition without a hearing on May 

would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

there were no disputed issues of fact, Green was not entitled to relief, and no purpose 

After reviewing the pro se petition and counsel's "no merit" letter, I found that 

May 23, 2016. 

Accordingly, a "no merit" letter" and petition to withdraw as counsel were submitted on 

did not present any issues of arguable merit and was frivolous as a matter of law. 

locate and interview witnesses in this matter, PCRA counsel concluded that the petition 

of the entire record, and after having engaged the services of a private investigator to 

claims and was granted leave to file an amended petition. After a conscientious review 
6 

11Green already had in his possession scores of pages of discovery as evidenced by the 

attachments to his supplemental PCRA petitions. ( See, for example, June 16, 2016 Response 

to Rule 907 Notice, Exs. A (Rebecca Hall statement) and B (police supplemental report of Taria 

Lowden statement); Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended PCRA Petitions, Exs. A, B, C, 

H, 11, 0.) Green's trial counsel received all of the Commonwealth's discovery. Moreover, PCRA 

counsel reviewed extensive volumes of discovery. (See PCRA Counsel's No-Merit Letter at 1.) 

Green's request failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances to support the production 

of the same thousands of pages of discovery reviewed by his trial and PCRA attorneys. Rather, 

in his petition, Green requested "nearly 5,000 pages" of discovery contained in trial counsel's 

file "to prove a violating [sic] of his constitutional rights to effective representation and a fair 

trial," and to expose "exculpatory evidence that trial counsel(s) failed to produce at trial, which 

negated the petitioner of being aware of any crime, that was formulated before his arrival to the 

area in which the crime occurred." (See Petition to Compel of September 26, 2016, at 1lil 1-2.) 

Green, however, failed to identify specific documents or items to support his claims. Thus, 

Green appeared to wish to embark on an impermissible "fishing expedition" based on bald 

assertions and conclusory allegations. See Commonwealth v. Chhea, 2015 WL 6957265 *4 

(Pa. Super. June 23, 2015). This Court saw no reason to believe that the requested documents 

would show that Green was entitled to relief. Rather, the available documents in the court 

record, along with PCRA counsel's "no merit" letter, amply support the conclusion that Green's 

post conviction collateral claims must be dismissed as meritless. 

Commonwealth witness Taria Lowden; (8) failed to move to "suppress" the testimony of 

investigate, interview, subpoena and call several witnesses; (7) failed to impeach 

motion; (5) failed to negotiate a plea agreement with the Commonwealth; (6) failed to 

recusal because I took a co-defendant's guilty plea and ruled on Green's suppression 

cited by the Commonwealth in support of the death penalty; (4) failed to file a motion for 

case of murder of the first degree; (3) failed to challenge the aggravating circumstance 

habeas corpus to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to establish a prima facie 

attorneys: (1) advised him to waive his preliminary hearing; (2) failed to file a writ of 

Green claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his 

II. Discussion 

response. This petition was denied by Order entered on February 27, 2017.11 
7 

Ms. Lowden due to her incompetency and bias; (9) failed to engage an expert witness 

to disqualify Ms. Lowden from testifying due to her "mental issues/disabilities"; (10) 

failed to raise prosecutorial misconduct for using the perjured testimony of Ms. Lowden; 

(11) failed to introduce exculpatory evidence at trial; (12) failed to raise abuse of 

discretion by the Court for sentencing him to life without parole; (13) failed to challenge 

the life without parole sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and 

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); and (14) failed to challenge the sufficiency and 

the weight of the evidence on appeal. ( See Original 2015 PCRA Petition, June 16, 

2016 Response to Rule 907 Notice, July 12, 2016 Amended PCRA Petition, and July 

20, 2016 Supplemental PCRA Petition.) 

In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made in the 

post conviction context, a defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel is 

effective by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the underlying 

claim has arguable merit; (2) trial counsel had no reasonable basis for proceeding as 

he did; and (3) the defendant suffered prejudice. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii); 

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 616 Pa. 164, 187, 47 A.3d 63, 76 (2012) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158-59, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (1987)). The 

client has the burden of establishing counsel's ineffectiveness because counsel is 

presumptively effective. Id. 

With respect to whether counsel's acts or omission were reasonable, defense 

counsel is accorded broad discretion to determine tactics and strategy. 

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 447 Pa. Super. 534, 670 A.2d 1153 (1996), aff'd 550 Pa. 
8 

152, 703 A.2d 1027 (1997). The applicable test is not whether alternative strategies 

were more reasonable, employing a "hindsight" evaluation of the record, but whether 

counsel's decision had any reasonable basis to advance the interests of the defendant. 

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 361, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (2011). The 

appellate courts will conclude that counsel's chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis 

only if the defendant proves that "an alternative not chosen offered a potential for 

success substantially greater than the course actually pursued." Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 587 Pa. 304, 312, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2006) (citation omitted). Counsel 

cannot be ineffective for failure to pursue and preserve a meritless issue. 

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 631 Pa. 67, 108 A.3d 779, 789 (2014). 

To establish the prejudice prong, the defendant must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different 

but for counsel's ineffectiveness. Chmiel, 612 Pa. at 362-63, 30 A.3d at 1127-28. "We 

stress that boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or 

ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a defendant's burden to prove that counsel was 

ineffective." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Paddy, 609 Pa. 272, 292, 15 A.3d 431, 

443 (2011 )). Where a petitioner has not met the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness 

standard, the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone without a determination of 

whether the arguable merit and client's interest prongs have been met. 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 320-21, 961 A.2d 119, 148-49 (2008); 

Commonwealth v. Zook, 585 Pa. 11, 26, 887 A.2d 1218, 1227 (2005). 
9 

12While there is no federal or state constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, 

Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 433 Pa. Super. 411, 415, 640 A.2d 1326, 1327 (1994), defendants 

have a constitutional right to counsel at a preliminary hearing since it is considered a "critical 

stage" of the criminal proceedings. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). Thus, 

defendants do have a constitutional right to effective counsel at the preliminary hearing stage of 

the proceedings. See Commonwealth ex rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 525 Pa. 413, 417-18, 

581 A.2d 172, 174 (1990). 

The absence of a preliminary hearing, however, did not so impair the 

truth determining process as to require that appellant be discharged. 

Here, the case was tried and the evidence was submitted to the court 

which, as trier of the facts, found not only that the Commonwealth had 

established a prima facie case of guilt but that appellant's guilt had 

been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Any deficiency in the 

preliminary hearing procedure, therefore, was harmless. Because the 

truth determining process was not impaired by counsel's alleged 

ineffectiveness, the P.C.R.A. court did not err when it dismissed 

appellant's petition for post conviction relief. Appellant failed to show 

that he had been prejudiced by counsel's failure to assert post-trial 

the absence of a pre-trial preliminary hearing. 

ineffectiveness of counsel when the defendant is later convicted at trial, stating: 

Our Superior Court has held that waiving a preliminary hearing is not 

have dismissed the charges. 

preliminary hearing and challenged the evidence the magisterial district court would 

Amended PCRA Petitions at 5.) Green suggests that had counsel not waived the 

statements given by a biased witness." (See Memorandum of Law in Support of 

challenged the Commonwealth's case which he contends was based upon "inconsistent 

could present a prima facie case.12 Specifically, Green argues counsel should have 

hearing and for not filing a habeas corpus motion to test whether the Commonwealth 

Green first maintains that counsel was ineffective for waiving his preliminary 

A. Waiver of Preliminary Hearing and Failure to File Habeas Corpus 

Motion 
10 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 390 Pa. Super. 464, 568 A.2d 1266, 1268 (1989) (citations 

omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 881 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Thus, once a defendant is tried and convicted, it is clear that prima facie evidence was 

introduced and, therefore, the defendant cannot establish actual prejudice if no 

preliminary hearing was held. See also Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 623 Pa. 253, 82 

A.3d 943, 984 (2013) (in the direct appeal context, our Supreme Court concluded that 

"once a defendant has gone to trial and has been found guilty of the crime or crimes 

charged, any defect in the preliminary hearing is rendered immaterial."). 

Here, Green was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal conspiracy to 

commit murder following a bench trial. That judgment of sentence was affirmed by the 

Superior Court. Therefore, any ineffectiveness from waiving the preliminary hearing or 

failing to file a habeas corpus motion did not prejudice Green. 

Moreover, Green's complaints regarding his waived preliminary hearing and the 

prima facie case against him rest on assertions that Taria Lowden could have been 

impeached based on prior inconsistent statements and bias. Credibility determinations, 

however, are not made at a preliminary hearing. Commonwealth v. Landis, 48 A.3d 

432, 444 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en bane). See also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 

(1968) (removing credibility as an issue at a preliminary hearing and limiting defense 

actions to negating the existence of a prima facie case conforms to the fact that a 

preliminary hearing is a much less searching exploration into the merits of the case); 

Liciaga v. Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, 523 Pa. 258, 262, 566 A.2d 

246, 248 (1989) (magistrate is precluded from considering the credibility of a witness 
11 

13"1t is well-established that the Commonwealth has no pre-trial burden of proving an 

aggravating factor." Commonwealth v. Buck, 551 Pa. 184, 191, 709 A.2d 892, 896 (1998). 

However, a defendant may file a pretrial motion to challenge the aggravating circumstances in 

case of a prosecutor's purposeful abuse where the aggravating circumstance is not based on 

verifiable facts. Id. In determining the propriety of the defendant's motion, the trial court will 

consider whether "the case is properly designated as capital, not whether each aggravating 

factor alleged is supported by evidence." Id. It is the defendant's burden to make the 

appropriate showing. Id. at 192, 709 A.2d at 896. 

Lassitter's motion to quash the aggravator in an opinion filed on November 5, 2012, and 

circumstance due to a lack of verifiable facts.13 I addressed my reasons for denying 

Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish this particular 

Commonwealth from relying upon Section 9711 (d)(7) on the grounds that the 

20, 2012, co-defendant Lassitter filed a pretrial motion seeking to bar the 

a notice of its intent to consolidate the three capital cases for purposes of trial. On July 

penalty against all three co-defendants pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711, and then filed 

As noted above, the Commonwealth first filed a notice of its intention to seek the death 

aggravating circumstance cited by the Commonwealth in support of the death penalty. 

Next, Green argues counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 

B. Aggravating Circumstance in Support of Death Penalty 

motion. 

be found ineffective for waiving the preliminary hearing or failing to file a habeas corpus 

preliminary hearing and pre-trial habeas corpus motion. Consequently, counsel cannot 

preliminary hearing). Thus, impeachment evidence is immaterial for purposes of a 

402 Pa. Super. 429, 433, 587 A.2d 326, 328 (1991) (credibility is not an issue at a 

who is called upon to testify during the preliminary hearing); Commonwealth v. Tyler, 
12 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 599 Pa. 270, 316, 961 A.2d 119, 146 (2008)). 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 605 Pa. 103, 116, 987 A.2d 699, 707 (2009) (citing 

bystander need not be in the direct line of fire to be in grave risk of death." 

where there is potential for an errant, ricochet, or pass-through bullet; the endangered 

omitted). Our Supreme Court has also held "the grave risk of death aggravator applies 

Id. at 144, 808 A.2d at 909 (emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotations 

the grave risk of death aggravator applies to situations where the 

defendant in the course of killing his particular victim acts in a manner 

which endangers the lives of others close in proximity to the intended 

or actual victim. Sufficient evidence to support the application of the 

aggravating circumstance of creating a grave risk of harm to persons 

other than the murder victim, has been found by this Court in those 

instances where the other persons are in close proximity to the 

decedent at the time of the murder, and due to that proximity are 

in jeopardy of suffering real harm. 

Court held in Drumheller that 

Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 570 Pa. 117, 808 A.2d 893 (2002). Our Supreme 

persons were not in "such proximity as to be in jeopardy of suffering real harm," citing 

in proximity to the victim when she was fired upon five times, he argued that such 

Lassitter conceded that the evidence in this case indicated that there were other people 

person in addition to the victim of the offense." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711 (d)(7). Although 

murder during which "the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another 

circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty includes any first-degree 

Section 9711 (d)(7) of the death penalty statute provides that an aggravating 

equally to Green. 

restate them here for purposes of Green's ineffective assistance claim, as they relate 
13 

14The Commonwealth had evidence there were two children and one adult on the first 

floor within feet of the victim at the time she was murdered, in addition to another child and 

adult on the second floor of the home. ( See Commonwealth Response to Motion to Quash at 

,m 7-8.) 

aggravator. 

ineffective for having failed to file a redundant, baseless motion to quash the 

defendants, Green and Martinez. Accordingly, Green's trial counsel will not be ruled 

motion to quash the aggravator. This ruling applied equally to Lassitter's two coruled no abuse of discretion by the prosecutor was evident, and I dismissed Lassitter's 

aggravating factor(s) exist[ed]." Buck, supra at 192, 709 A.2d at 896. Accordingly, I 

minimum, "evidence exist[ed) to create a factual dispute regarding whether the 

the absence of any evidence supporting the proffered aggravating circumstance. At a 

In light of these facts, I found that Lassitter failed to satisfy his burden of proving 

at least five persons within the zone of danger. 

potential for an errant, ricochet, or pass-through bullet existed in this case, thus, placing 

(citing Commonwealth v. Paolello, 542 Pa. 47, 82, 665 A.2d 439, 457 (1995)). The 

by the defendant's actions in killing the victim." Brown, supra at 116, 987 A.2d at 707 

persons in close proximity to the intended or actual victim to the zone of danger created 

house at the time of the shooting.14 Clearly, there was a "nexus connect[ing] other 

Zook, there was evidence that at least two young children and two adults were in the 

within feet of the victim in this case when she was shot and killed. In addition to Ms. 

The Commonwealth presented evidence that an adult female, Crystal Zook, was 
14 

Id. See also Commonwealth v. Corbin, 447 Pa. 463, 291 A.2d 307 (1972) (it is not 

[W]hile it may be the better practice to have a different judge 

preside over trial than preside over pre-trial proceedings, such a 

practice is not constitutionally required and has not been made 

the basis for setting aside a verdict reached in an otherwise 

proper trial. This principle appears to be based on the prevailing 

view that judicial fact-finders are capable of disregarding 

prejudicial evidence. 

Court in Lott noted: 

Commonwealth v. Lott, 398 Pa. Super. 573, 581 A.2d 612, 615 (1990)). The Superior 

Commonwealth v. Postie, 110 A.3d 1034, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting 

proceedings does not provide a per se basis for requiring recusal of the trial judge." 

Moreover, "the mere participation by the trial judge in an earlier stage of the 

and quotations omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Tedford, 598 Pa. 639, 730-31, 960 A.2d 1, 55-56 (2008) (citations 

Additionally, it is the burden of the party requesting recusal to produce 

evidence establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a 

substantial doubt as to the jurist's ability to preside impartially. 

A trial judge should recuse himself whenever he has any doubt as to 

his ability to preside impartially in a criminal case or whenever he 

believes his impartiality can be reasonably questioned. It is presumed 

that the judge has the ability to determine whether he will be able to 

rule impartially and without prejudice, and his assessment is personal, 

unreviewable, and final. 

governing recusal, as follows: 

over Green's suppression motion. Our Supreme Court has discussed the standards 

motion for my recusal because I accepted a co-defendant's guilty plea and presided 

Green further submits that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to file a 

C. Motion for Recusal 
improper for the suppression judge to preside in a non-jury trial). Therefore, the failure 

of trial counsel to request my recusal as trial judge was not per se, without more, 

ineffective representation. 

Here, Green could not have met his burden of demonstrating partiality, bias, or 

an abuse of discretion had a motion for recusal been filed by trial counsel. Green now 

asserts that as the suppression judge I became "a bias[ed] and prejudice[d] fact finder" 

by reason of having listened to the wiretap evidence, some of which I suppressed. 

(Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended PCRA Petitions at 13.) Such evidence, 

however, was not so prejudicial that I would have been unable to render an impartial 

verdict. Our Superior Court is "of the view that the trial judge has by training and 

experience developed instincts that permit the entry of determinations based solely 

upon relevant, admissible evidence and unaffected by irrelevant, inadmissible or 

prejudicial developments." See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 314 Pa. Super. 298, 307, 

460 A.2d 1149, 1153 (1983) (citing Corbin, supra). 

In the instant case, I was capable of rendering a fair decision regardless of what I 

heard at Green's suppression hearing or at co-defendant Martinez's guilty plea. I did 

not have any bias or prejudice towards Green that prevented me from rendering a fair 

and impartial verdict. Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective by reason of a failure 

to request recusal. 

Additionally, Green's decision to proceed to a bench trial with the suppression 

judge was freely and knowingly made. After the election to proceed without a jury, I 

conducted a very thorough and lengthy colloquy with Green and his attorneys. (Notes 

of Testimony (N.T.), Trial at 4-24.) The record clearly indicates that Green expressly 

15 
16 

connection with the negotiation of a plea, "there is no constitutional right to plea 

agreement to Green. Although a defendant is entitled to effective representation in 

a guilty plea to any offense or to the prosecution being willing to offer any plea 

Furthermore, the record is devoid of any reference to Green being willing to enter 

999, 1013 (1995). 

to negotiate a guilty plea." Commonwealth v. Lassen, 442 Pa. Super. 326, 659 A.2d 

noted "[t]here is no caselaw which requires grant of a new trial due to counsel's failure 

an attempt to negotiate a plea agreement. To the contrary, our Superior Court has 

cites no legal authority to support his proposition that effective representation requires 

(Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended PCRA Petitions at 53 (verbatim).) Green 

Both counsel(s) knew the petitioner was innocent of the crime(s) 

alleged and counsel(s) knew through discovery that existed 

evidence were available to negate shared intent. With this 

knowledge they ignored a plea negotiation to have the charges 

reduced to a more approach charge that constituted the 

petitioner actions. 

a plea agreement with the Commonwealth. Specifically, Green asserts: 

Green submits counsel's performance was deficient for having failed to negotiate 

D. Negotiation of a Plea Agreement 

issue lacks merit. 

objection to same judge's hearing motion and presiding at trial on merits). Thus, this 

expressly agreed that trial judge could hear his motion to suppress evidence, waived 

supra (defendant who in response to judge's inquiries in connection with waiver of jury, 

agreed to waive his right to a jury trial and to have his case heard by me. See Corbin, 
17 

"ln Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984), the United States 

Supreme Court adopted a two-part test for assessing claims of counsel's ineffectiveness: the 

defendant must prove that (1) counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness," and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's errors. 

demonstrate the proposed witnesses' availability and willingness to testify, and that the 

and internal quotations omitted; footnote added). Without providing specific facts to 

Commonwealth v. Sneed, 616 Pa. 1, 22-23, 45 A.3d 1096, 1108-09 (2012) (citations 

When raising a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call a potential 

witness, a petitioner satisfies the performance and prejudice requirements 

of the Strickland[15] test by establishing that: (1) the witness existed; (2) 

the witness was available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, 

or should have known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness 

was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony 

of the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair 

trial. ... To demonstrate Strickland prejudice, a petitioner must show 

how the uncalled witnesses' testimony would have been beneficial under 

the circumstances of the case. . . . Thus, counsel will not be found 

ineffective for failing to call a witness unless the petitioner can show that 

the witness's testimony would have been helpful to the defense. . . . A 

failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel for 

such decision usually involves matters of trial strategy. 

not calling a witness are well settled by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: 

witnesses at trial. The standards governing a challenge to trial counsel's assistance for 

Next, Green claims his attorney was ineffective for failing to call certain 

E. Failure to Investigate, Interview, Subpoena and Call Certain 

Witnesses 

without merit. 

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977)). Accordingly, Green's claim is 

Commonwealth v. Stinnett, 356 Pa. Super. 83, 514 A.2d 154 (1986) (quoting 

bargain, since the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial." 
18 

"tn his statement to the police, Green confirmed that Ms. Hall was "drugged up on 

whatever she was using and just sitting there [in the basement] in her own little world." (N.T., 

Trial at 449.) 

she could not remember, talked about and planned the murder together. (Id.) 

of the events.16 She did state that Christopher Lassitter and another man, whose name 

because she stated she was heavily on drugs at the time and had no clear recollection 

was unable to state whether Green was present at Mill Street prior to the shooting 

was successful in locating Rebecca Hall. (See No Merit Letter at 6.) Ms. Hall, however, 

finding these individuals and in attempting to obtain statements from them. Mr. Jeffries 

Here, PCRA counsel retained a private investigator, Dick Jeffries, to assist in 

the trial. 

he must further prove that the proffered testimony would have changed the outcome of 

Green is able to meet his burden that the witnesses were available and willing to testify, 

defense or that the witness was willing to testify for the defense. Moreover, even if 

through a subpoena, does not prove that the witness was available to testify for the 

claiming that trial counsel could have compelled the appearance of the witnesses 

not meet the required burden of proof set forth by our Supreme Court. Likewise, 

name and stating that Petitioner thinks they would have contributed to his case does 

(4) Elliot Olmeda-Torres, Jr. I begin by noting that merely identifying the witnesses by 

witnesses at his trial: (1) Rebecca Hall; (2) Natasha Sweigart; (3) Oscar Martinez; and 

In his original petition, Green claims trial counsel failed to call the following 

relief. 

testimony would have been helpful to Green's case, Green fails to state a claim for 
In Ms. Hall's statement to the police on April 21, 2011, she puts Green at Mill 

Street. ( See Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended PCRA Petitions, Exhibit "H" 

at 2.) In that statement, Ms. Hall told police that Green was called and told to bring a 

gun over to the Mill Street address "cause the plan was to kill 8-Boy [Diana Spencer's 

boyfriend] and Dianna [sic]." (Id. at 5.) She then states that Green did not bring the 

gun. (Id.; see a/so Id. at 14-15.) When asked by the police as to who she felt was 

responsible for participating in the murder, Ms. Hall identified "ICK" and "Shine." (Id. at 

8.) Ms. Hall identified Green in a photo array as the man she knew as "ICK." (Id. at 9.) 

Given Ms. Hall's statement to the police that she felt Green was responsible for 

the murder of Diana Spencer, it would appear that trial counsel had a strategic reason 

for not calling Ms. Hall at trial. During her interview with Mr. Jeffries, Ms. Hall neither 

recanted her statement nor said anything that was contrary to her April 21, 2011, 

statement to police. Thus, Green is unable to establish that Ms. Hall's testimony would 

have changed the outcome of the trial. 

Natasha Sweigart was the next witness whom Green claims his trial attorney 

failed to investigate and call at trial. Mr. Jeffries was unable to locate this witness. 

PCRA counsel reviewed Ms. Sweigart's statement to the police and determined that 

"[n]othing in her statement appears to hurt or help [Green]." (See No Merit Letter at 7.) 

Thus, it would appear that trial counsel's failure to call her as a defense witness at trial 

did not prejudice Green. 

Green further claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Oscar 

Martinez, his co-defendant, to testify on his behalf. Mr. Martinez was subpoenaed to 

testify at trial. Because Martinez was represented by counsel, Green's attorneys were 

19 
20 

17This individual was identified at trial as Elliott Almeda Torrez, and by his street name, 

"Goblin". (N.T., Trial at 571.) 

and that counsel failed to use Ms. Lowden's prior statements against her at trial and the 

Green initially asserts that Ms. Lowden changed her testimony during the trial, 

F. Testimony of Commonwealth Witness Taria Lowden 

Green a fair trial. Accordingly, this claim must fail. 

the absence of the testimony of the witnesses was so prejudicial as to have denied 

show that the witnesses were available and willing to testify for the defense, and that 

for failing to call the four witnesses identified by Green because Green has failed to 

Under the circumstances of this case, trial counsel will not be found ineffective 

Green's case and may, in fact, have hurt his defense. 

statement by Olmeda-Torres suggests that his testimony would not have helped 

stated: "Good job, you guys make me proud." (See No Merit Letter at 8.) This police 

door and let off the whole clip." Lassitter, known to Olmeda-Torres only as "B", then 

door." To which, Martinez added: "I saw the curtain moving and I just shot through the 

statement to the police, Olmeda-Torres stated that Green said, "I was banging on the 

The final proposed defense witness was Elliot Olmeda-Torres, Jr.17 In his 

Martinez as a defense witness. 

circumstances, it would appear that trial counsel had a strategic reason for not calling 

and did not invoke his 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Under these 

they could not know what Martinez's testimony might be at trial, if, in fact, he testified 

not able to speak to him prior to trial without permission from his attorney. Therefore, 
21 

(a) General Rule. Every person is competent to be a witness except 

as otherwise provided by statute or in these Rules. 

part: 

all persons are competent to be a witness. Specifically, Rule 601 provides, in pertinent 

issues/disabilities." As a general matter, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence presume 

to engage an expert witness to disqualify Ms. Lowden from testifying due to her "mental 

Next, Green submits that counsel's performance was deficient for having failed 

witness from testifying. 

examination, but suppression is not an available remedy to prevent an allegedly biased 

A.2d 775, 779 (1983). A witness's alleged bias may be the subject of cross 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 (A). See also Commonwealth v. Bracey, 501 Pa. 356, 365, 461 

defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See 

Green misperceives the purpose of a suppression motion, which is to vindicate a 

motion seeking to "suppress" Ms. Lowden's testimony based on her bias against Green. 

Green further argues that trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to file a 

Commonwealth witness. 

(Id. at 586.) This evidence establishes that trial counsel did attempt to impeach this 

witness, Elroy Johnson, to testify to Ms. Lowden's reputation in the community for lying. 

and her motive to lie. (Id. at 192-99.) Trial counsel also specifically called a defense 

Lowden about her substance abuse and alcohol use, her prior crimes of dishonesty, 

the police. (N.T., Trial at 200-09.) Additionally, Attorney Lyden cross examined Ms. 

Attorney Lyden did extensively cross examine Ms. Lowden on her prior interviews with 

fact that she was originally charged with a crime. A review of the record reveals that 
22 

unequivocally demonstrates a compelling need for examination. Id. at 110. 

ought not to order an involuntary psychiatric examination of a witness unless the record 

Id. at 109-10 (internal citations, footnote and quotations omitted). A court, therefore, 

Claims that a witness' memory has been corrupted by insanity, mental retardation, hypnosis, or taint go to the competency of that 

witness to testify. The capacity to remember and the ability to testify 

truthfully about the matter remembered are components of 

testimonial competency. The party alleging a witness is incompetent 

to testify must prove that contention by clear and convincing evidence. 

is expressly intended to preserve existing Pennsylvania law. In 

general, the testimony of any person, regardless of [her] mental 

condition, is competent evidence, unless it contributes nothing at all 

because the victim is wholly untrustworthy. Thus, in Pennsylvania, 

[a witness is] presumed competent to testify, and it is incumbent 

upon the party challenging the testimony to establish incompetence. 

Above all, given the general presumption of competency of all 

witnesses, a court ought not to order a competency investigation, 

unless the court has actually observed the witness testify and still 

has doubts about the witness' competency. 

competence to testify. Id. at 104. The Boich Court opined that Rule 601 

compelling need existed for an involuntary psychiatric examination of the victim witness' 

Superior Court reversed the trial court and held the defendant did not show a 

In Commonwealth v. Boich, 982 A.2d 102 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en bane), the 

Pa.RE. 601. 

(b) Disqualification for Specific Defects. A person is incompetent to 

testify if the Court finds that because of a mental condition or 

immaturity the person: 

(1) is, or was, at any relevant time, incapable of perceiving 

accurately; 

(2) is unable to express ... herself so as to be understood either 

directly or through an interpreter; 

(3) has an impaired memory; or 

(4) does not sufficiently understand the duty to tell the truth. 
23 

unless the court has some doubt on the issue from having observed the witness." 

court does not have an obligation to order an investigation of a witness's competency 

Boich, 982 A.2d at 110 (citations and quotation marks omitted). As a result, "a trial 

The privacy implications of a compelled psychiatric examination 

are significant. . . . The presumption of witness competency is 

necessary to effectuate the fundamental policies underlying both 

the constitutional right to privacy and the statutory psychiatristpatient privilege. Thus, a court-ordered, involuntary psychiatric 

or psychological examination should never be the starting point 

for a competency evaluation. 

court-ordered, involuntary psychiatric examination. 

Thus, a diagnosis of bipolar disorder alone does not present a compelling need for a 

ill. Commonwealth v. Counterman, 553 Pa. 370, 393, 719 A.2d 284, 295 (1998). 

Incompetency does not follow from the fact that a witness is insane or mentally 

psychiatric examination. 

and do not unequivocally demonstrate a compelling need for a psychological or 

competency and credibility. Contradictory statements are subject to cross examination 

police. (Id. at 57-58; see also Id. at 39-40.) Green is merging the concepts of 

memory," which was demonstrated by Ms. Lowden's contradictory statements to the 

Police Report).) Green contends a symptom of bipolar disorder is "an impaired 

mother told the police her daughter is bipolar. (Id., Ex. 11 (McClendon Supplemental 

PCRA Petitions, Ex. "A" (Lowden Supplemental Police Report)), and (2) Ms. Lowden's 

she is "disabled" and "takes medication" (Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended 

psychiatrically examined is that (1) this witness told the police during her interview that 

The basis of Green's contention that Ms. Lowden should have been 
Green maintains that trial counsel failed to introduce exculpatory evidence at trial 

which would have "negated" the charges of murder and criminal conspiracy and 

"suggested a lesser offense." (Memorandum of Law in Support of Amended PCRA 

Petitions at 49.) The purported exculpatory evidence identified by Green is the police 

statement of Rebecca Hall. As noted above, in her April 21, 2011 statement to the 

police, Ms. Hall said that Green was called and told to bring a gun over to the Mill Street 

house "cause the plan was to kill B-Boy [Diana Spencer's boyfriend] and Dianna [sic]." 

(Id., Exhibit "H" at 5.) Ms. Hall further named "ICK" (whom she identified in a photo 

array as Green) and "Shine" as the individuals responsible for the murder. (Id. at 8.) 

24 

G. Exculpatory Evidence 

Counterman, supra at 393, 719 A.2d at 295 (citing Commonwealth v. Jennings, 446, 

Pa. 294, 304, 285 A.2d 143, 149 (1971), and Commonwealth v. Smith, 414 Pa. 

Super. 208, 606 A.2d 939, 943 (1992)). Here, based on my observation of the witness, 

I had no doubt as to her competency. Therefore, any request by defense counsel for 

such an involuntary mental health examination of Ms. Lowden would have been denied. 

Finally, Green contends his trial counsel failed to raise prosecutorial misconduct 

for the Commonwealth's use of purportedly perjured testimony by Ms. Lowden. The 

record reveals a point in the trial where the Assistant District Attorney attempted to 

introduce a prior inconsistent statement of Ms. Lowden's for substantive purposes. 

(N.T., Trial at 172.) Both counsel for Green objected and argued against the admission 

of that statement at trial for substantive purposes. Accordingly, this issue is wholly 

without merit, as are the three previous claims regarding Ms. Lowden's testimony. 
25 

18Green argues that his sentence is only mandatory "for an individual with a prior 

homicide conviction." (See June 16, 2016 Response to Rule 907 Notice at 5.) Otherwise, "[t]he 

only way to find a first time defendant guilty of first degree murder with a sentence of life without 

parole [] [i]s if that person is responsible for the death of an unborn child or law enforcement 

officer." (Id.) This argument must be rejected in light of the clear statutory pronouncement on 

sentencing of first degree homicide offenders: 

(a) First degree.- 

( 1) Except as provided under section 1102.1 (relating to sentence of persons 

under the age of 18 for murder, murder of an unborn child and murder of a 

law enforcement officer), a person who has been convicted of a murder of 

the first degree or of murder of a law enforcement officer of the first degree 

shall be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment in accordance 

with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (relating to sentencing procedure for murder of the 

first degree). 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102. 

matter of law. Therefore, this claim is meritless. 

abuse of discretion it would have been rejected by the Superior Court as frivolous as a 

homicide.18 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a). If counsel had challenged this sentence as an 

without parole is a mandatory sentence for an individual who is convicted of first-degree 

discretion by the court for the sentence of life without parole. The sentence of life 

Green contends counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim of abuse of 

H. Sentence of Life Without Parole 

Thus, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacks merit. 

strengthened the Commonwealth's case and further established Green's culpability. 

Spencer's murder. Had this statement been used at trial, I suggest it would have 

exculpatory value in that it does not exclude Green as one of the participants in Ms. 

Super. 546, 550, 411 A.2d 1220, 1222 (1979). The police statement of Ms. Hall had no 

defendant is innocent of the crimes charged. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 270 Pa. 

Exculpatory evidence is evidence that extrinsically tends to establish that a 
26 

Green claims the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his 

convictions for murder and conspiracy to commit murder, and that his trial counsel's 

failure to make that argument on direct appeal was constitutionally defective. The 

standard to apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing all the 

evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact finder to find every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 599 Pa. 617, 627, 962 A.2d 1170, 

1176 (2009); Commonwealth v. Mccurdy, 943 A.2d 299, 301-02 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

"Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

I. Sufficiency and Weight of the Evidence 

In a related claim, Green argues counsel was deficient for not challenging the life 

without parole sentence under Miller, supra, and Graham, supra. In Miller, the United 

States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a mandatory sentence 

of life without parole for those under the age of 18. 567 U.S. at-, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. 

In Graham, the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of life 

without possibility of parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses. 560 U.S. 

at 62. Here, it is undisputed that Green was 21 years old, or three years beyond the 

age of majority, at the time the murder occurred. Therefore, these United States 

Supreme Court cases addressing the constitutional rights of juveniles do not apply, and 

Green was subject to a sentence of life without parole. This issue, therefore, lacks 

merit. 
27 

agreement with another ... to engage in the crime; and (3) the defendant or one or 

to commit or aid in the commission of the criminal act; (2) the defendant entered into an 

To prove conspiracy, "the trier of fact must find that: (1) the defendant intended 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Jordan, 619 Pa. 513, 522, 65 A.3d 318, 323 (2013) (citations and 

There are three elements of first-degree murder: (i) a human being 

was unlawfully killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for the killing; 

and (3) the defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill. 

18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a); Commonwealth v. Houser, 610 Pa. 264, 

18 A.3d 1128, 1133 (2011 ). As set forth in the third element, firstdegree murder is an intentional killing, l.e., a 'willful, deliberate and 

premeditated killing.' 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a) and (d). Premeditation 

and deliberation exist whenever the assailant possesses the 

conscious purpose to bring about death. The law does not require 

a lengthy period of premeditation; indeed, the design to kill can be 

formulated in a fraction of a second. Specific intent to kill as well as 

malice can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon upon a 

vital part of the victim's body. Whether the accused had formed the 

specific intent to kill is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. 

to commit murder. 

In this case, Green was convicted of first-degree murder and criminal conspiracy 

A.2d 252, 254 (Pa. Super. 1997)). 

Riley, 811 A.2d 610, 614 (Pa. Super. 2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 701 

produced, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence." Commonwealth v. 

of fact, who determines credibility of witnesses and the weight to give the evidence 

proving the crime's elements with evidence which is entirely circumstantial and the trier 

661, 663 (Pa. Super. 2003). Moreover, "[t]he Commonwealth may sustain its burden by 

be drawn from the combined circumstances." Commonwealth v. Taylor, 831 A.2d 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may 
28 

more of the other co-conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the agreed 

upon crime." Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 598 Pa. 263, 275-75, 956 A.2d 926, 932 

(2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Murphy, 577 Pa. 275, 844 A.2d 1228, 1238 

(2004)). "Finally, each member of a conspiracy to commit homicide can be convicted of 

first-degree murder regardless of who inflicted the fatal wound." Id. (citing 

Commonwealth v. Wayne, 553 Pa. 614, 623, 720 A.2d 456, 460 (1998)). Application 

of these concepts to the facts presented at trial requires this Court to reject Green's 

ineffective assistance claim based upon counsel's failure to challenge the sufficiency of 

the evidence on appeal as to his convictions for murder and criminal conspiracy. 

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the 

verdict winner, was sufficient to sustain Green's convictions for first-degree murder in 

the killing of Diana Spencer, and for conspiracy to commit such offense. With respect 

to first-degree murder, Green does not dispute that Ms. Spencer's death was a 

homicide, as the evidence plainly established that she died from multiple gun shot 

wounds. Instead, Green only challenges the second and third elements of first-degree 

murder, i.e., whether he was responsible for Ms. Spencer's death, and whether he had 

the specific intent to kill. 

As the evidence clearly established that co-defendant Martinez was the actual 

shooter in this case, Green's liability is as an accomplice. "It is well established that a 

defendant, who was not a principal actor in committing the crime, may nevertheless be 

liable for the crime if he was an accomplice of a principal actor." Commonwealth v. 

Murphy, 577 Pa. 275, 285, 844 A.2d 1228, 1234 (2004) (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306, and 
29 

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 481 Pa. 223, 392 A.2d 688, 690 (1978) (the actor and his 

accomplice share equal responsibility for commission of a criminal act)). A person is 

deemed an accomplice of a principal if he acts with the intent of promoting or facilitating 

the commission of an offense and agrees, aids or attempts to aid such other person in 

either planning or committing that offense. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306; Commonwealth 

v. Spotz, 552 Pa. 499, 512, 716 A.2d 580, 585 (1998). Accordingly, two prongs must 

be satisfied for a defendant to be found guilty as an "accomplice." First, there must be 

evidence that the defendant intended to aid or promote the underlying offense. 

Second, there must be evidence that the defendant actively participated in the crime by 

soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to aid the principal. Murphy, supra at 286, 844 A.2d at 

1234. "Both requirements may be established wholly by circumstantial evidence. Only 

the least degree of concert or collusion in the commission of the offense is sufficient to 

sustain a finding of responsibility as an accomplice. No agreement is required, only 

aid." Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2005). With 

regard to the amount of aid, it need not be substantial so long as it was offered to the 

principal to assist him in committing or attempting to commit the crime. Murphy, supra. 

"[A] shared criminal intent between the principal and his accomplice may be inferred 

from a defendant's words or conduct or from the attendant circumstances." Spotz, 

supra at 511, 716 A.2d at 586. 

Green asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient because it 

failed to prove that he shared the requisite state of mind with his co-conspirator who 

shot and killed Ms. Spencer. At trial, Green challenged the existence of a conspiracy to 
30 

19The residents of 26 Old Dorwart Street were associated with a group known as "the 

Latin Kings" (N.T., Trial at 127-29, 146, 148), and Green and his co-defendants, who gathered 

at 322 Mill Street, were affiliated with a group known as "the Bloods." (Id. at 132-34, 145, 178- 

80.) Lassitter's girlfriend, also a member of "the Bloods", had apparently been assaulted earlier 

in the day by members of the Latin Kings, while she was holding Lassitter's son in her arms. 

(See Id. at 132-33, 158, 176, 513-14.) 

later returned to the car and had red bandanas around their necks that were not there 

near Ruby Street. (Id. at 158, 185.) Ms. Lowden testified that both Green and Martinez 

that Green and Martinez both left the vehicle in which she was a passenger somewhere 

"Shine" (see Id. at 133)), on the night of Ms. Spencer's murder. (Id. at 153.) She stated 

("Insane Grip Killer") (N.T., Trial at 168-69), and Martinez (whom she knew only as 

Taria Lowden testified that she was with Green, whom she identified at trial as "ICK" 

The Commonwealth presented the following evidence to refute Green's defense. 

shoot her at point blank range. (Id.) 

know that when Ms. Spencer answered the door, Martinez would pull out a firearm and 

doing, what Mr. Green understood the plan to be." (Id. at 614.) Green claimed not to 

to do something completely different, completely independent of what Mr. Green was 

Spencer's door in hopes of conversing with her or her boyfriend. But Martinez "decided 

crime of any kind. (Id. at 613.) Rather, Green merely agreed to knock on Ms. 

counsel argued there was no evidence Green agreed to participate in a murder or a 

to settle a dispute between the respective parties.19 (N.T., Trial at 611.) Defense 

to speak to her and her boyfriend, Francisco Camacho, in order to "broker peace" and 

Lassitter, also known as "B" (N.T., Trial at 133), went to the residence of Diana Spencer 

was planned. The defense theory of the case was that Green, on behalf of his friend 

commit murder and the Commonwealth's contention that he understood that a killing 
31 

21Green's insistence that he did not know weapons were involved when this 

confrontation with the Latin Kings was being planned in the basement of the Mill Street house 

(N.T., Trial at 400-01) is inconsistent with his statement to the police, in which he said that when 

Lassitter asked about a gun just hours before the shooting, Green told him he did not have one 

but that he "could probably find a way to get [him] one." (Id. at 287.) Later in the interview, 

Green admitted that he did own a gun and that others knew about it. (Id. at 356.) 

20The color red was worn by the Bloods, while the colors black and yellow were 

associated with the Latin Kings. (N.T., Trial at 128, 132-33, 185-86.) 

been able to do it.21 This boasting statement constitutes an admission of complicity in 

door. Moreover, Green stated that he was prepared to shoot the gun had Martinez not 

established that Green had knowledge that Martinez was going to fire the gun into the 

designed to bring Ms. Spencer and/or Camacho to them. Ms. Lowden's testimony 

driving to Ms. Spencer's home. It was Green whose knock on the door was clearly 

son. The evidence revealed that Green, Martinez and Lassitter cooperated together in 

retaliate against Ms. Spencer and Camacho for the attack on the mother of Lassitter's 

The Commonwealth proved that Lassitter solicited Martinez and Green to 

celebratory after the murder. (Id. at 170, 175.) 

do it. (Id. at 174-75.) Ms. Lowden described Lassitter's attitude in the basement as 

shoot the gun through the door, because Green did not think Martinez would be able to 

Green told the group he thought he might have to do "it," implying he would have to 

[Martinez] was going to do it. I knocked on the door." (Id. at 169.) She stated that 

Street. (N.T., Trial at 166-68.) Ms. Lowden testified that Green said, "I didn't think 

After the shooting, all those in the car went down into the basement at 322 Mill 

later heard Lassitter say "they just shot some bitch on Dorwart." (Id. at 160, 165.) 

and shaky". (Id.) Ms. Lowden observed Martinez handling a gun in the back seat, and 

before." (Id. at 159, 185.) She added that Green was "calm" but Martinez was "sweaty 
32 

22The video recording seized from a nearby business shows Green and Martinez 

conversing immediately before the shooting at Ms. Spencer's residence. (See N.T., Trial at 262- 

63; see also Commonwealth Ex. 18.) This fact also raises a reasonable inference that these 

two men were finalizing the details of some joint criminal activity. 

was deficient for not challenged it on appeal. Green's position is unpersuasive in that it 

of first-degree murder, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and counsel 

Green also contends that even if the evidence was sufficient to support a finding 

merit. 

would have offered Green no relief. Accordingly, this ineffectiveness claim is without 

convictions for murder and conspiracy to commit murder would have been frivolous and 

Raising a claim on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

clearly established that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the crime. 

conspiratorial agreement was ultimately satisfied with the death of Ms. Spencer, it was 

supporting the existence of a conspiratorial agreement. Finally, as the object of the 

the shooting, and both were seen together before and after the crime,22 thereby 

of the murder. Further, as stated above, Green and Martinez were heard discussing 

establish the first element of conspiracy: that Green intended to aid in the commission 

These facts further established that Green acted with the requisite mens rea to 

and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. 

Spencer's murder. This clearly satisfied the statutory elements of first-degree murder, 

was, at a minimum, with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of Ms. 

presented evidence to support a finding that Green's willing and conscious participation 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prosecution 

the murder. 
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appellate rights. 

It is further ORDERED that Petitioner shall have the right, if indigent, to appeal in forma 

the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Failure to appeal within 30 days will result in the loss of 

appeal from this Order. Petitioner shall have 30 days from the date of this final Order to appeal to 

Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4), this Court advises Petitioner that he has the right to 

leave to withdraw as counsel. 

which I agree after my independent review of the record. Accordingly, Mr. Dougherty is granted 

24, 2016, states that the prose petition is lacking in merit as a matter of law, a conclusion with 

C. Dougherty, Esquire, a copy of which was attached to this Court's Rule 907 Notice filed on May 

Further, the May 23, 2016, no-merit letter of Petitioner's court-appointed attorney, Dennis 

that said petitions are DENIED without a hearing. 

original and amended pro se petitions for post conviction collateral relief, it is hereby ORDERED 

AND NOW, this 10th day of April, 2017, upon consideration of Jakwan Archie Green's 

ORDER 

JAKWAN ARCHIE GREEN 

v. No. 5217 - 2011 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL