United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 13, 2022 Decided April 8, 2022

No. 20-5264

KARIN WENG,

APPELLANT

v.

MARTIN J. WALSH, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:15-cv-00504)

Karin Weng, pro se, argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant.

Stephen M. DeGenaro, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued 

the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were R. Craig 

Lawrence and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, TATEL, Circuit Judge, 

and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

EDWARDS. 
2

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: From 1995 until 2012, 

Karin Weng (“Weng” or “Plaintiff”) was employed as an 

Employee Benefits Law Specialist at the U.S. Department of 

Labor (“Department” or “Defendant”). In December 2010, 

after filing a number of complaints against Department 

officials, Weng filed a lawsuit against the Department in the 

District Court. See Weng v. Solis, No. 1:10-cv-02051 (D.D.C.) 

(“Weng I”). Her complaint alleged race, national origin, and 

sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964, as well as retaliation in violation of Title VII and 

the Rehabilitation Act. The parties settled their dispute in Weng 

I, and the District Court dismissed the action in December 

2013. The settlement agreement “provides for the full and 

complete satisfaction” of “all claims relating to [Weng’s] 

employment with the Department,” “[e]xcept as specifically 

provided” elsewhere in the release. Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 

126 (emphasis added).

While Weng I was still pending, Weng was informed she 

would be terminated. Weng then sent an email to her superiors 

purporting to resign in lieu of removal; and in March 2012, she 

filed a Grievance through her union representative contesting 

her removal. In April 2015, Weng filed the present lawsuit

claiming that her removal was motivated by retaliation, in 

violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, and race, 

national origin, and sex discrimination, in violation of Title 

VII. See Weng v. Perez, No. 1:15-cv-00504 (D.D.C.) (“Weng 

II”). After protracted litigation on ancillary matters, the District 

Court granted the Department’s motion for summary 

judgment, reasoning that Weng had released her removalrelated claimsin the settlement agreement that concluded Weng 

I. Weng v. Scalia, No. 1:15-cv-00504, 2020 WL 3832950, at 

*5-7 (D.D.C. July 8, 2020). Weng now appeals.
3

We reverse the District Court’s judgment. We hold that the 

disputed settlement agreement did not release the Department 

from all Title VII claims. To the contrary, the settlement 

agreement contains an express carveout allowing Weng to 

pursue any claims included in the separate Grievance that she 

had filed against the Department complaining about the 

Department’s failure “to conform to laws and regulations 

governing its treatment of Ms. Weng, including, but not limited 

to, . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” J.A. 115. We remand for

the District Court to consider in the first instance whether that 

Grievance preserved the claims Weng advances in this 

litigation.

I. BACKGROUND

Weng is an Asian woman of Taiwanese national origin. 

From 1995 until March 2012, she worked as an Employee 

Benefits Law Specialist in the Department’s Employee 

Benefits Security Administration Office of Exemption 

Determinations (“Office”). According to Weng, she “never 

received a negative performance evaluation, nor any formal 

counseling or discipline, from 1995 to 2005.” Second Am. 

Compl. ¶ 38, J.A. 169. During the timeframe at issue, Weng’s 

union representative – the American Federation of Government 

Employees, Local No. 12, AFL-CIO (“Local 12”) – had a 

collective-bargaining agreement with the Department.

Weng alleges that, from the time she joined the Office, 

“she, along with other minority employees, was subjected to 

offensive racial, ethnic, and/or sexually charged slurs, 

comments, and jokes by [Office] management officials.” Id.

¶ 34, J.A. 168. Beginning in 2004, two of Weng’s coworkers

filed Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaints 

against Office management. Weng appeared as a witness in her 

coworkers’ cases, and she alleges that the harassment against 
4

her escalated after she testified in support of a colleague. 

Starting in 2006, Weng also filed multiple EEO complaints and 

union grievances about her working conditions. 

In December 2010, Weng, represented by counsel, filed a 

lawsuit against the Department in the District Court. See 

Weng I. Her complaint alleged race, national origin, and sex 

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 

of 1964, as well as retaliation in violation of Title VII and the 

Rehabilitation Act. The District Court dismissed the action in 

December 2013 after the parties reached a settlement. The 

settlement agreement “provides for the full and complete 

satisfaction” of “all claims relating to [Weng’s] employment 

with the Department,” “[e]xcept as specifically provided” 

elsewhere in the release. J.A. 126 (emphasis added). The scope 

of Weng’s release of claims against the Department is the 

central issue before the court in this appeal. See Section II.B, 

infra.

In April 2011, a few months after Weng filed Weng I, she 

was told during a mid-year review that her performance was 

unacceptable. The Department placed her on a performance 

improvement plan in the summer of 2011. In early 2012, Weng 

received a notice of proposed removal, which stated that she 

had failed to improve her performance to an acceptable level. 

On March 7, 2012, Weng received a decision from the Office’s 

Acting Director sustaining the proposed removal and

informing Weng that she would be terminated on March 9, 

2012. On March 9, Weng sent an email to her supervisors

stating that she resigned her position “in lieu of removal.”

Weng v. Perez, Civ. Action No. 15-504, at 4 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 

2015), reprinted in J.A. 150.

Weng challenged the removal decision pursuant to the 

negotiated grievance procedure prescribed in the collective-
5

bargaining agreement between Local 12 and the Department.

The Grievance alleged that the Department “failed to conform 

to laws and regulations governing its treatment of Ms. Weng, 

including . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1964,” inter alia. J.A. 115. 

The dispute proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator 

determined that he lacked jurisdiction over the Grievance 

because Weng failed to establish that her resignation was 

involuntary. 

Weng appealed the arbitrator’s decision to the Merit 

Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), an independent 

adjudicator established pursuant to the Civil Service Reform 

Act (“Act”), 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. See Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 

U.S. 41, 44 (2012) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 1204, 7512, 7701). The

Act provides “a framework for evaluating personnel actions 

taken against federal employees.” Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

137 S. Ct. 1975, 1980 (2017) (citation omitted). For certain 

serious personnel actions – including removal – “the affected 

employee has a right to appeal the agency’s decision to the 

MSPB.” Id. (citation omitted). The MSPB also has jurisdiction 

to hear “mixed” cases, which are those “in which the asserted 

claim (or claims) both arises under a federal employment 

discrimination law (such as Title VII) and also relates to or 

stems from an action [such as removal] that is within the 

[MSPB’s] jurisdiction.” Niskey v. Kelly, 859 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. 

Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). However, “[a]n employee who 

voluntarily resigns . . . has no right to appeal to the MSPB.” 

Shoaf v. Dep’t of Agric., 260 F.3d 1336, 1340-11 (Fed. Cir. 

2001) (citation omitted).

In Weng’s case, the MSPB adopted an administrative 

judge’s recommendation that the appeal be dismissed for lack 

of jurisdiction based on Weng’s supposed failure to establish 

that her termination was involuntary. The MSPB’s order 
6

informed Weng that she had the right to request review from 

the Federal Circuit. 

Proceeding pro se, Weng then filed the instant action, Weng 

II, in the District Court. This lawsuit is based solely on claims 

arising from her removal. Weng’s complaint allegesretaliation, 

in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, and race,

national origin, and sex discrimination, in violation of Title 

VII. In 2015, the Department moved to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. The District Court granted the motion, reasoning 

that petitions for review of the MSPB’s jurisdictional 

dismissals must be filed in the Federal Circuit, rather than in 

the district courts. Weng v. Perez, Civ. Action No. 15-504 

(D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2015), reprinted in J.A. 147-56. Weng 

appealed to this court, which summarily affirmed the District 

Court’s judgment. See Order, Weng v. Perez, No. 15-5299 

(D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2016). The District Court then transferred 

the case to the Federal Circuit. However, an intervening 

Supreme Court decision clarified that the district courts, not the 

Federal Circuit, are the proper fora to hear “mixed” cases

dismissed by the MSPB on jurisdictional grounds. Perry, 137 

S. Ct. at 1988. This court then granted Weng’s petition for 

rehearing and vacated its previous order. See Order, Weng v. 

Acosta, No. 15-5299 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 2017). We remanded 

the matter, and the Federal Circuit transferred the case back to 

the District Court.

Before the District Court in Weng II, the Department filed 

a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, for judgment 

on the pleadings. The Department argued, inter alia, that

Weng’s action involved some of the same claims or causes of 

action resolved in Weng I. The Department thus argued that, 

under the doctrine of res judicata, it was entitled to judgment 

in its favor on any claims for which Weng had already obtained 

relief. 
7

The District Court granted the Department’s motion for 

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure as to the Rehabilitation Act claims 

and denied the motion as to the Title VII claims. Weng v. 

Pizzella, No. 1:15-cv-00504, 2019 WL 6109268, at *7-8 

(D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2019). The court concluded that Weng’s 

Rehabilitation Act claims were barred because the relevant

allegations pertained to claims that had been conclusively 

decided. Id. at *7. As to the Title VII claims, however, the court 

reasoned that “a dispute of fact between the parties as to which 

specific conduct [Weng] has recovered on, and which she has 

not,” rendered judgment on the pleadings inappropriate. Id. 

at *8.

Following discovery, the Department moved for summary 

judgment on the Title VII claims. In its analysis, the District 

Court stated that it “ha[d] already established that [Weng] was 

effectively terminated” before she sent the email purporting to 

resign in lieu of removal. Weng v. Scalia, No. 1:15-cv-00504, 

2020 WL 3832950, at *2 (D.D.C. July 8, 2020) (citation 

omitted), reprinted in J.A. 356. Nonetheless, the District Court

granted summary judgment to the Department, concluding that 

the Weng I settlement agreement “settled any claims within the 

Grievance related to discrimination and retaliation under Title 

VII.” Id. at *7. The trial court also denied Weng’s request to 

amend her complaint. Id. at *4-5. 

Weng now appeals pro se, renewing only her Title VII 

claims.
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II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“We review the [D]istrict [C]ourt’s grant of summary 

judgment de novo.” United States v. Greer, 987 F.3d 1089, 

1091 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

B. The Weng I Settlement Agreement Did Not Release 

Any Removal-Related Title VII Claims Included in 

the Grievance

The District Court granted the Department’s motion for 

summary judgment because it concluded that the Weng I 

settlement agreement released the Department from all Title 

VII claims relating to Weng’s removal. As explained below, 

the unambiguous terms of the settlement agreement foreclose 

the District Court’s reading.

“We interpret a settlement agreement under contract law.”

Keepseagle v. Perdue, 856 F.3d 1039, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 

(citation omitted). If a contract’s terms “are unambiguous on 

their face, interpretation is considered a question of law 

appropriately resolved by this court.” United States ex rel. 

Dep’t of Lab. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 131 F.3d 1037, 1042 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

In relevant part, the Weng I settlement agreement’s release 

provision states:

8. Release. Except as specifically provided in this 

paragraph, this Stipulation provides for the full and 

complete satisfaction of all claims which have been or 

could have been asserted by plaintiff in the abovecaptioned civil action, and all claims relating to her 
9

employment with the Department of Labor, . . . unless 

they are among the subjects specifically described 

below and made part of the listed matters. Plaintiff 

hereby fully and forever releases and discharges the 

[Department] from any and all rights and claims of 

every kind, . . . including without limitation any rights 

or claims under . . . Title VII . . . . [P]laintiff agrees, 

through this Stipulation, to settle and release all such 

rights and claims, provided, however, that, except for 

claims that would cover in whole or part anything 

within the period of her complaint ending April 24, 

2009, nothing in this Stipulation shall affect Plaintiff’s 

ability to pursue any claims that she has currently 

pending that are the subject of any of the following:

. . .

(iii) [Grievance], on appeal to the Merit 

Systems Protection Board . . . .

This reservation i[s] not intended to, and does not, 

increase or decrease Plaintiff’s or Defendant’s rights 

or claims in those matters, and Defendant reserves all 

defenses that the Agency may have in defending against 

those claims.

J.A. 126-28 (emphases added).

In granting the Department’s summary judgment motion, 

the District Court interpreted this release to mean that, “even to 

the extent the Settlement Agreement carved out the Grievance, 

its broad terms settled any claims within the Grievance related 

to discrimination and retaliation under Title VII.” Weng, 2020 

WL 3832950, at *7. It reasoned that the provision stating that 

“Plaintiff hereby fully and forever releases” the Department 

“from any and all rights and claims of every kind,” “including 
10

without limitation any rights or claims under . . . Title VII,” 

indicated that the removal-related Title VII claims raised in the 

instant action were among those claims settled in Weng I. See 

id. (citation omitted). 

We disagree. The contract’s express terms make clear that 

Weng did not release any Title VII claims raised in her 

Grievance. The release’s terms are subject to the proviso 

“[e]xcept as specifically provided in this paragraph,” and the 

paragraph specifically provides that “nothing” in the release 

“shall affect Plaintiff’s ability to pursue any claims that she has 

currently pending that are the subject of” the MSPB appeal

involving the Grievance. J.A. 126-28 (emphasis added). 

Similarly, the provision carves out from the release any claims 

that “are among the subjects specifically described below and 

made part of the listed matters,” and the listed matters include 

Weng’s MSPB appeal of the Grievance. Id. at 126, 128. The 

paragraph also states that the reservation “i[s] not intended to, 

and does not, increase or decrease Plaintiff’s or Defendant’s 

rights or claims in those matters.” Id. at 128. Given these plain 

terms, any claims – including Title VII claims – that “[we]re 

the subject of” the Grievance on appeal to the MSPB are carved 

out from the release. See id. at 127-28.

Indeed, counsel for the Department conceded at oral 

argument that the Department does not believe the Weng I 

settlement agreement resolved any removal-related Title VII 

claims included in Weng’s Grievance. Nor did the Department 

advance this argument in its summary judgment briefing before 

the District Court. See generally Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., 

reprinted in J.A. 277-306; Def’s Reply Supp. Mot. Summ. J., 

reprinted in J.A. 336-51. To the contrary, the Department 

acknowledged that “Plaintiff’s Grievance is identified as one 

of several matters carved out of the parties’ settlement 

agreement,” and that “Plaintiff’s settlement agreement does not 
11

preclude her from litigating claims she raised in her 

Grievance.” Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. 22, J.A. 296 (citations 

omitted). 

Before this court, the Department instead advances a 

distinct argument: that “Weng failed to administratively 

exhaust any Title VII claims” related to her removal because 

she did not “include those claims in the [G]rievance.” Final Br. 

of Appellee 20. According to the Department, the Grievance 

“does not include any allegations that the Department 

terminated Weng because of her race, national origin, or sex, 

or for prior EEO conduct.” Id. Therefore, the Department 

contends that Weng failed to exhaust the removal-related Title 

VII claims she now advances.

Weng disputes this assertion, stressing that the Grievance 

“invok[ed] both 5 U.S.C. § 2302” – which “references Title 

VII” – “and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Appellant’s Reply 

Br. 10. She also argues that the MSPB “acknowledged Weng’s 

Title VII claims, despite not reaching the merits thereof.” Id. 

at 11. 

In its summary judgment ruling, the District Court did not 

address the Department’s argument that the Grievance failed to 

identify Weng’s Title VII claims. We decline to reach the issue

in the first instance and instead remand for the District Court to 

do so, assuming the court determines that the Department 

raised the argument.

For the reasons set forth above, we hold that the Weng I 

settlement agreement does not release any removal-related 

Title VII claims included in Weng’s Grievance. We therefore 

reverse the District Court’s ruling to the contrary.
12

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District Court’s 

judgment and remand the case for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.