### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 25, 200 5

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . RODNEY SOUTH ERS

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 240245 Stephen M. Bevil, Jud ge

No. E2004-01136-CC A-R3- CD - F iled April 7, 2005

The de fenda nt, Rodney

Southers, orig inally

char g ed with ag g ravated robbe ry , was c onvicted of

ro bb e ry . T he tr ia l c ou rt

imp os e d a

Ra ng e I , s ix-y e ar s e nte nc e . In th is ap pe a l, the de fe nd a nt a sse rt s (1) that the trial court e rre d by ref using to suppre ss his pretrial statement a nd (2) that the trial court

e rr e d b y de ny ing his re qu e st f

or a sp e c ia l ju ry

ins truct io n. Th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt is aff irmed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Affirm ed

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J
., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Mik e A. L itt le , Ch a tta no og a , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Rod ne y

Sou the rs

. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; Re nee W. Turne r, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; and Boy d Patterson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

On De c e mbe r 1 3
, 2 0 0 1
, a b l a c k m a l e w a l k e d i n t o t h e P i z z a H u t o n S o u t h B r o a d S tr e e tin Chattanoog a. Ac cording to Ramone Giffor d, the manag er on duty
, the perpe trator, who w as we aring a hooded blue pullover sweatshirt and holding a red knit mask t o h i s fa ce, pla ced a g un on the

c ou nte r. Gi ff

or d s ta te d th a t inre spon se, he took mon e y fr om the re g ist e r, pla c e d it int o a pla sti c Piz za Hut bag
, and laid the bag on the counter . At that point, the gunma n mumbled something that G i f f o r d
, " f r o mp r e v i o u s e x p e r i e n c e , " i n t e rp r e t e d a s a d i r e c t i v e t o t u r n ar o u n d a n d w a l k a w a y. Giffor d walked into the dish room and heard the perpe trator leave a pproxi mately

thirty seconds late r. W h en h e l o o k ed o u tt h e b a c kwi n d o w, h e s aw t h e p erp et ra t o r e n t ert h e p as s en gers i d e o f " a l ar ge white vehicle [t hat] resembled a Merc ury Gra nd Marquis or Crown Victoria." After committing the license ta g number, FDM- 907, to memory , Giffor d returne d to the front of the store and a ctivated the alarm. Wi thin forty -five minutes, police found the ve hicle an d Gi ffor d, acc ompanied by an-2-

inv e sti g a tor , " po int e d o ut the c ar be fo re [the y ] e ve n sto pp e d. " He e xpla ine d, " Th e y did n' t sh ow me
a c ar , I s h o w e d i tt o t h e m

. " G i f f o r d t e s t i f i e d t h a t $ 1 4 7 w a s t ak e n i n t h e r o b b e r y.

Eric Milchak of the Chattanoog a Police De partment wa s patrolling in Alton Park on the nig ht of the robbe ry

when h e h ea rd a call from dispatch to be on the lookout for a w hite For d L TD. Shortlyafte r the c all, he saw a vehic le matching that description with license tag number F DH-907 parke d in the are a. After determining that the hood of t he vehicle was warm, he inf ormed De tective B r yd e n o f h i s d i s c o v e r y.

Detec tive J eff

Bry den of the Chattanoog a Police Depa rtment, who responde d to the robbery call, wa s contac ted by

Off i ce r Mi lchak within fiftee n minutes of his interview with Giffor d at the Piz za H ut. When D etec tive Bry den drove Giffor d to the are a wher e the suspect vehicle w as located, Giffor d immediately

identified the c ar a s the g etawa y vehicle. The vehicle was towe d to the police department, searc hed, and pr ocesse d for f inge rprints. Dete ctive Bry den found a reg istration in the name of L isa Har ris, the g irlfriend of t h e defenda nt's c ousin, J erma ine Southers, and a probation identification ca

rd that bel o n ged to J erma ine Southers. Afte r making the discovery , the detec tive conducte d interv i ews of both Southers a nd Ms. Harris, at which point, "the investigation pointed towards the de fenda nt."

Acc ording to Detec tive Br y den, he r ead a

waiver of rig hts fo rm t o t h e def endant a nd the defe ndant sig ned the f

orm in his presenc e. When questioned a bout t h e ro b b er y , the def endant responde d, "I

did it." The defe ndant provided a n audio taped statement, wher ein he a dmitted that he c omm itt e d th e ro bb e ry

. He state d that he pa rk e d h is c ou sin ' s c ar n e ar the ba c k d oo r, wa lke d in to the Piz za Hut, and pointed a .380 p i s t o l at t he cle rk. The de fenda nt acknowle dg ed that the c lerk place d the money

into a plastic bag and hande d it to him. He stated that he disposed of the bag and g un in a housing projec t on his way to the Boy ' s Club. During c ross-examination, Detec tive Bry den

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t he c ou ld n ot r e c a ll i f he ha d vie we d the su rv e ill a nc e vid e o f ro m th e Pizza

Hu t. He state d, ho we ve r, that it is h is g e ne ra l pr a c tic e to r e vie w s uc h v ide ota pe s.
Vita Tally , g ener al m anag er of the P izz a Hut, testified that she verifie d the amount of money
take n in the ro bb e ry , $ 14 7, a ndre vie we d th e su rv e ill a nc e vid e o f ro m th e pr e vio us e venin g . M s. Tally rec alled that the v ideotape de picted imag es which w ere taken f rom two diffe rent c amer as pointed at diffe rent locations. According to Ms. Tally , the imag es fr om the came ra pointed at the front d o o r wer e distorted by the g lare of lig hts from the g ame r oom and " y ou couldn' t rea lly see
a nythi ng fr om that a ng le ." She e xpla ine d that the se c on d c a me ra , wh ic h wa s po int ed at th e cash reg ister, ca

ptured only

the imag e of " a g un and the end of fing ers." Ms. Tally acknow ledg ed that the vid e ota pe wa s n ot ta

ke n by the po lic e a nd that it h a d b e e n ta pe d o ve r m a ny

tim e s b y the tim e of

tr ia l.

J erma ine Southers, a cousin of the de fenda nt, had testified as a witness for the state during the de fe nd a nt' s f

ir st t ri a l, w hic h e nd e d in a

mis tr ia l. Aft er So uth e rs wa s d e c lare d a n u na va ila ble wi t n es s b y t h e trial court in this t rial, the tra nscript of his testimony was re ad into evidenc e. Southers' testimonywas that a t the time of the robbe ry he owne d a " white L TD Crown B uick." On the eve ning of

the robbe ry , he wa s play ing ba sk et b al l at the B oy ' s Club when it beg an to ra in.-3-

Ac c or din g to S ou the rs , h e g a ve his c ar k e y s to the de fe nd a nt and a sk e d him to rol l up th e wi nd ow s. He r ecalled that he had just sat down to eat dinner when the de fenda nt went outside and that he was finishing his desse rt by

the time the def

endant c ame ba ck. Shortly afte r th e d ef

en d an t 's return,

s o m e o n e i n f

o r m e d S o u t h e r s t h a tt h e p o l i c e w e r e s t a n d i n g n e x t t o h i s c ar

. A p p r o x i m a t e l y t w o d a ys later, Southers le arne d that he wa s want ed fo r questioni ng in connec tion with the robbery of the Piz za Hu t

. He t est ified that he g ave a statement to the police de ny ing any involvement in the robbery . Southers rec alled that the de fenda n t wa s we aring a "a blue like coat . . . and some g ray R e e b o k s " o n t h e n i g h to f

t h e r o b b e r y.

I The de fenda nt first asserts that the trial court erre d by ref using to suppress the statement he provided to De tective B ry den. He claims that the statement wa s the product of coer cion and that he was not fully

advised of his rig hts. In response , the state submits that the require ments of Miranda

wer e met and that the statement wa s voluntarily g iven.

At the su pp re ssi on he ari ng , De te c tiv e B ry de n tes tif ie d tha t he ha d a sk e d a

De te c tiv e Ev a ns , who was a

friend of

t h e d ef endant's family , to escort the de fenda nt to the police station for questioning. Whil e he w as aw are that the def endant wa s only

sevente en y ear s old at that time, Detec tive Bry den explained that he a lso knew that the de fend ant had be en dec lare d an adult in an unrelated robbe ry

case and had e ntere d a plea of g uiltyin the criminal court. Detec tive Bry den testified that he r ead the waiver of rig hts f

o rm t o the def

endant be fore asking him to si g n the document and c onfirmed that he understood his rig hts before the interrog ation.

On cr oss-examination, Detective B ry den, who a ckno w le d g e d th at t h ed e f e n d an t' s mo th e r

w as not pres e n t d u r in g th e in te r v ie w , d e s c r ib e d th e d e f e n d a n t a s in c u s to d y

d u r in g th e in te rr o g a ti on beca use of a n arr est war

rant in an unr elated c ase. H e conc eded that he di d not inquire about the defe ndant' s educational backg round but asserted that the defenda nt was a ble to rea d aloud a portion of the wa iver of rights form. Detec tive Bry den denie d having thr ea t en ed to char g e the de fenda nt with four additional ag g ravated robbe ries unless he c onfesse d.

Th e de fe nd a nt, wh o ha d dr op pe d ou t of sc ho ol in the nin th g ra de , a dmi tte d th a t he wa s a ble
to rea d and write but insist ed that Detec tive Bry den informe d him that if he wer e convic ted of four robberies he c ould r ece ive a sentenc e of forty -eig ht y ear s. Whi le ac knowledg ing that the detec tive made no pr omise in ex chang e for his statement, the def

endant testified that he admitt ed robbing the Piz za Hut only

beca use he did not want to be charg ed with the ot her three r obberie s. Although he

c on c e de d th a t he re a d th e wa ive r o f rig hts fo rm a ndthat D e te c tiv e B ry de n r e a d th e fo rm a lou d to him, he claimed that he did not understand it. Acc ording to the defendant, he believed that if he g ave a stateme nt he " was g oing to c ome to jail and make b o n d an d tell [ his] lawy er w hat happe ned, beca use [he] di dn' t want to g et char g ed [wit h] them four robberies." The de fenda nt contended that he didno t f

ull y un de rs ta ndthat th e state me nt c ou ld b e us e d a g a ins t hi m a t tria l.

During cross-e x amination, the defe ndant acknow ledg ed that he had pre viouslyenter ed plea s of g uilt to char g es of attempted agg ravated robbery and robbery

. The de fenda nt also conce ded that-4-

De t ec t i v e E v an s h ad s p o k en wi t h h i s m o t h er b ef o re t ak i n g h i m t o t h e po l i ce s t at i o n fo r q u es t i o n i n g. T h e d e f e n d a n t s tate d th a t h is mo th e r d id n o t a c c o mp a n y th e m b e c a u s e h e to ld h e r th at he ha d not committed the crime.

De te c tiv e Cha

rl e s We lls , w ho wa s p re se nt during the int e rv ie w, te sti fi e d as a r e bu tta l w itn e ss for the sta te. He rec alled that as the defe ndant rea d the waiver of rig hts form, he a sked the de finition of the wo rd " c oe rc ion ," to w hic h D e te c tiv e Wel ls r e sp on de d, " [W]e w e re n' t a tte mpt ing to t ri c k h im i n t o s i gn i n g i t , we we re n 'tt ry i n g t o get h i m t o s i gn s o m et h i n g t h at h e d i d n 'tu n d er s t an d o r h e w as n 't there to say something, tha t wasn' t understood by him." De tective Wells testified that the def endant

ne ve r d e nie d r ob bin g the Pizza Hu t.

At the c on c lus ion of

the he ari ng , th e tr ia l c ou rt ma de the fo llo wi ng ob se rv a tio ns :

He ma y hav e had

. . . a limi te d f orma l e du c a tio n .

. . a ndon ly fi nis he d th e e ig hth g rade , but, of course , the evidenc e bef ore the court is he had been throug h the sy stem befor e. H e h a s , a s a

m a t t e r o f f a c t , s t o o d b e f

o r e t h i s c o u r t a n d e n t e r e d a p l e a o f g u i l t y. And ce rtainly I

wouldn' t have take n his plea if ther e would have been any indications that he didn' t understand what he was doing

. . . . And there was nothi n g t h ere that would indicate to me that he did not understand it. As a matter of fac t, he said he did. Then the of fice rs aske d him, they

rea d h is r ig h ts to h im
, s a id d o y o u u n d e r s tan d it
, h e s a id h e d id

. O n th e ta pes they said
, "W e've just g one over y our rig hts, do y ou understand the m? " A nd he said, "Y es, I do." Al l th a t, c ou ple d w ith the fa c t that y ou r arg ume nt a nd his te sti mon y are re a lly dif fe re nt. B e c a us e he ' s n ot s a y ing in h is t e sti mon y that he did n' t un de rs ta ndhis rig hts, he' s say ing " I admitted I did that because I didn't want to ge t char g ed with four robberies."

. . . . Ha vin g be e n th ro ug h [th e ] sy stem be fo re a ndha vin g be e n c ha rg e d w ith robbery befor e and ple ading g uiltyto either robbe ry or attempted r obbery , he

c e rt a inl y kn e w wh a t that wa s abo ut. An d I fi nd his te sti mon y so me wh a t in c re dib le that he would go ahead and admit to a robbery afte r he ha d alre ady been thr oug h the sy ste m a nd ple d g uil ty to a ro bb e ry a nd sit the re a nd a dmi t do ing it, be c a us e he wo uld ha ve kn ow n, ha vin g be e n th ro ug h th e sy ste m bef or e , tha t he ha d a rig ht t o a tr ia l if he wa nted one, be cause that' s one of the thing s I g o ov er wi t h a per son when they ple a d g uil ty . A ndI

fi ndhis story so mew hat in c re dib le that " I a dmi tte d I

didthi s beca use I didn't want to ge t char g ed with four r obberie s." There ' s nothing in the tape itself from his mouth that indicates that that was a fa brica tion, that he didn't know what he was doing. So I find it wa s a statement that

wa s k no wi ng ly

a ndvo lun tari ly , u nd e rs ta nd ing ly a nd int e lli g e ntl y

g ive n, de sp ite his limit ed formal education; and, theref ore, le t the motion to s uppress be overr uled.-5-

The standa

rd of r eview a

pplicable to suppression issues is well established. When the trial court make s a finding of fac ts at the conclusion of a suppression hearing, the fac ts a re acc orded the

we i gh t o f a ju ry v er d i ct

. S t at e v. S t ep h en s o n , 8 7 8 S

. W

. 2 d 5 3 0
, 5 4 4 (T en n

. 1 9 9 4 ). T h e t ri al co u rt 's fi nd ing s a re bin din g up on thi s c ou rt un le ss the e vid e nc e in the re c or d p re po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e m. State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996); see also Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d at 544; State v. Goforth, 678 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). Que stions of credibility of witnesses, the weig ht and value of the evidenc e and resolution of conflicts in e vidence are matters entr usted to the
tr ia l ju dg e a s th e tr ie r o f f a c t. T he pa

rt y pr e va ili ng in the tr ial c ou rt is e nti tle d to the str on g e st leg itimate view of the e vidence ad d u ce d at the suppre ssion hearing as we ll as all rea sonable a nd l egi t i m at e i n fe re n ce s t h at m ayb e d ra wn fr o mt h e e v i d en ce

. Od o m , 9 2 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 2 3

. T h i s co u rt 's revie w of a

trial court' s application of law to the fac ts, however , is cond u ct ed u nder a de novo standard of

revie w. See Stat e v. Walton, 41 S.W .3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001) ; State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W .2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999)

.

Th e F if th A me nd me nt to the Un ite d Sta te s Co ns tituti on pr ov ide s th a t " no pe rs on

. . . s ha ll be c omp e lle d in a ny

c ri min a l c a se to be a wi tne ss a g a ins t him se lf ." U. S. Co ns t. ame nd . V ; se e a lso Ma llo y v. Ho g a n, 37 8 U .S. 1, 6 ( 19 64 ) ( ho ldi ng that th e Fift h Am end me nt' s p ro te c tio n a g a ins t compulsory

self-inc rimination is applicable to the states throug h the Fourteenth Amendme nt). Article I , section 9 of the T ennesse e Constituti on provi des that " in all criminal prosec utions, the

acc used . . . shall not be compe lled to g ive evidenc e ag ainst himself." Te nn. Const. art. I , § 9. "T he signific ant diffe renc e betwee n these two provisions is that the test of voluntariness for c onfessions

un de r A rtic le I , § 9 is br oa de r andmor e pr ote c tiv e of ind ivi du a l r ig hts than th e te st of vo lun tari ne ss under the Fifth Ame ndment." State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tenn. 1992).

Gene rally
, one must a ffirma tively invoke these constitutional prote ctions. An ex ce p tion arises, however
, when a g overnme nt ag ent m akes a custodial interrog ation. Statements made during the cour se of a

custodial police interr og ation are inadmissible at trial unless the state e stablishes that the def endant wa s advised of his rig ht to remain silent and his rig ht to counsel and that the de fenda nt then waive d those rig hts. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471- 75 (1966); see also Dicke rson v. United States, 53 0 U.S. 428, 444 (2000); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) . A de fe nd a nt' s r ig hts to c ou ns e l a nda g a ins t se lf -i nc ri min a tio n may

be wa ive d a s lo ng a s th e wa ive r i s
ma de vo lun tari ly , kno wi ng ly , an d inte lli g e ntl y

. Mir a nd a , 384 U. S. at 478 ; Stat e v. Mid dle br oo ks
, 84 0 S. W.2 d 3 17 , 3 26 (T e nn . 1 99 2) . In o rd e r t o e ff e c t a wa ive r, the a c c us e d mu st b e a de quately

app ri se d o f h is rig ht t o r e ma in s ile nt and the c on se qu e nc e of de c idi ng to a

ba nd on the ri g ht. Stephenson, 878 S.W .2d at 54 4 -45. I n determining whe ther a confe ssion was voluntary and knowing
, the totality of the circ umstances must be examined. State v. Bush, 942 S.W .2d 489, 500 (Tenn. 1997). I f the "g reater we ight" of the e vidence supports the court' s ruling, it will be upheld. I d. This court must conduct a de novo revie w of the trial court's a pplication of law to fa ct. State v. Bridge s, 963 S.W .2d 487 (Tenn. 1997) ; State v. Year g an, 958 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1997).

I n Miranda, the United States Supreme Court limited its hol ding to a "c ustodial interrog ation." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478- 79. The Court defined the phrase "c ustodial interrog ation" as " questioning initiated by law enf orce ment office rs after a person has been ta ken into custody

or-6-

oth e rw ise de pr ive d o f hi s freed om o f a c tio n in a ny sig nif ic a nt w a y ." I d. a t 44 4. A p e rs on is " in custody " w ithin the meaning of Miranda if there has bee n "a

' formal a rre st or restra int on free dom of movement' of the de g ree associate d with a formal arr est." California v. B ehele r, 463 U.S. 1121, 11 25 (1 98 3) (c itatio n o mit te d). Th e Cou rt ha s r e fu se d to e xten d th e ho ldi ng in M ir a nd a to non-custodial interr o gat ions. See Ore g on v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) ( holding that a n
acc used' s confe ssion was admissible because there was no indication that the questi oning took place in a context where his free dom to depart was re stricted in any way ); see a lso Behe ler, 463 U.S. at 1124-25 (noting that the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a " formal a

rre st or restra int on fre edom of moveme nt" of the deg ree associate d with a forma l arre st). I n deter m i n i n g wh et h er a
re a so na ble pe rs on wo uldc on sid e r himse lf or he rs e lf in c us tod y , o ur

su pr e me c ou rt

c on sid e rs a
v ar i et y o f f ac t o rs , i n cl u d i n g t h e f

o l l o wi n g:

" [T ]h e ti me a n d lo c a ti o n o f th e in te rr o g a ti o n ; th e d u r a ti o n a n d c h ar a c ter of the questioning; the of

fice r' s tone of voice a nd g ener al demeanor; the suspec t's me thod of tr a ns po rt a tio n to the pla c e of qu e sti on ing ; the nu mbe r o f p oli c e of fi c e rs pr e se nt; any limit ation on movement or other form of restra int imposed on the suspect during the interrog ation; any interac tions betwee n the officer a nd the suspect, including the words spoken by

the offic er to the sus p ec t , and the suspec t's ve rbal or nonve rbal response s; the ext ent to which the suspec t is confronted w ith the law enf o rcement office r' s suspicions of g uilt or evidenc e of g uilt; and finally , the extent to which the suspect is made a war e that he or she is fre e to re fra i n fr o m answe ring questions or to end the intervie w at will."

State v. Walton, 41 S .W.3d at 82-83 (quoting State v

. An d erson, 937 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn. 1996)).

He re , th e de fe nd a nt c on c e de s th a t he wa s in fo rm e d of his Mi rand a ri g hts bu t arg ue s th a t, beca use of his y outh, he did not understand them. The state contends that althoug h the def endant was only s e v e n te e n y e ar s o ld a t th e ti me o f th e in te rr o g a ti o n , h e w a s a d e q u a te ly f a mi li ar with the

c ri min a l ju sti c e sy ste m be c a us e he ha d r e c e ntl y e nte re d g uil ty

ple a s a s a n a du lt.

I n State v. Gordon, 642 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982), this court ruled that whe n full Miranda w arning s have be en provi d ed and under stood, the voluntariness and a dmissibi lityof a juvenile' s confe ssion is not depende nt upon the presence of hi s pare nts at t he int err og ation. See also S t at e v

. T u rn m ire, 762 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The appropriate standa rd for determining admissibilityis "whe ther, under t he tot ality of t he circumstance s, the . . . confe ssion was the re sult of a knowing and intellige nt waiver of . . . constitutional rights." State v. Lundy , 808 S.W

. 2 d 4 4 4
, 4 4 6 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 1 )

. O u r s u p r e me c o u r t h a s h e ld th a t th e c o u r t mu s t c o nsider the fo llo wi ng fa c tor s:
(1) . .

. all circ umstances surr ounding the interrog ation including the juvenile' s ag e, experience , education, and intelligenc e;-7-

(2) the juve nile' s capa city

to understand the Miranda w arning s and the c onsequenc es of the wa ive r; (3 ) the juv e nil e ' s f

a mil iari ty wi th M ir a nd a

wa rn ing s o r the abil ity to re a d an d w ri te in the la ng ua g e us e d to g ive the wa rn ing s; (4) a ny intox ication; (5) a ny mental disease , disorder, or reta rdation; and (6 ) the pr e se nc e of

a pa re nt, g ua rd ia n, or int e re ste d a du lt.

Sta te v. Ca llaha n, 97 9 S. W.2 d 5 77 , 5 83 (T e nn . 1 99 7) . O ur hig h c ou rt

a lso de te rm ine d th a t " [w]hi le

c ou rt s sh a ll e xer c ise sp e c ia l c are in s c ru tin izin g pu rp orte d w a ive rs by juv e nil e su sp e c ts, no sin g le fac tor such as me ntal cond i t i o n o r educ ation should by itself rende r a c onfession unconstitutional absent c oerc ive police a ctivity ." I d. (citing Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 (1986)).

The law provides that conf essi ons obtained throug h the use of e ither phy sical or psy cholog ical coe rcion must be suppre ssed. See Roge rs v. Richmond, 365 U .S. 534, 540-41 (1961). A statement will not be rendere d involuntary
, howeve r, when office rs have , without more, promised g ener al assistance . See State v. J ohnson, 765 S.W .2d 780, 782 (Tenn. Crim App. 1988) . The c ritical question is "' whether the behavior of t he st ate' s law enforce ment officia ls was such a s to overbea r [t he def endant' s] wil l to resist and bring about confe ssions not fre ely self-de termined -- a question
t o b e a n s we re d wi t h co m p l et e d i s re gar d o f w h et h er o r n o tt h e p et i t i o n eri n fa ct s p o k e t h e t ru t h

. '" State v. Kelly , 603 S.W .2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980) (quoting Roge rs, 365 U.S. at 544).

I n th is i ns ta nc e , th e sev ent een- y e ar- oldde fe nd a nt, wh o d ro pp e d o ut o f s c ho ol i n th e nin th g rade , ag ree d to acc ompany Detec tive Evans, a family friend, to the police station afte r having been informed that the police soug ht him for questioning. B eca use he ha d rec ently

enter ed g uiltypleas

as an a dult, the defe ndant had some f amiliarity with the crim i n al justice sy stem. The re cord establishes that the de fenda nt could rea d an d write a nd that he fully understood the Mira nda

warnings. The re w as no indication that he w as either intox icated or

suffe red a ny

diminis hed mental capa city . Although the defe ndant' s mother was not pre sent during the interrog ation, there was testimonythat Detec tive Evans spoke w ith her bef ore taking the defe ndant to the police station. The defe ndant acknowledg ed that he ex plained to his mother that her prese nce w as not nec essary . The
tr ia l c ou rt a c c re dit e d th e te sti mon y of fe re d by the state a t the su pp re ssi on he ari ng a ndsp e c if ic a lly reje cted the de fenda nt's claim that he admitt ed to the crime only beca use of the t hreat of prosec ution on other char g es. I n our view, the evidenc e does not pre ponderate ag ainst the trial court's f inding that the def

endant' s statement was know ingly , voluntarily , and intellige ntly made.

II Th e de fe nd a nt a lso a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d b yre fu sin g to c ha rg e his sp e c ia lly reque sted jury

instruction on the state' s duty to preserve evide nce. H e cla ims that the instruction was

nece ssary beca use the surveillance videotape had not be en collecte d and prese rved by the state. The state submits that because the evidenc e wa s not ex culpatory
, the trial court did not err by ref using to provide the instruction.-8-

Under the United States and Te nnessee Constit utions, a defe ndant has a constitutional right to trial by jury . U.S. Const. amend VI ; T enn. Const. art. 1, § 6; see State v. B obo, 814 S.W .2d 353, 356 (Tenn. 1991) ; Wi llard v. State, 174 Tenn. 642, 130 S.W.2d 99 (1939). This rig ht encompasse s the def endant’ s rig ht to a corr ect a nd complete c harg e of the law. State v. Tee l, 793 S.W .2d 236, 249 (Tenn. 1990) . I n conseque nce, the trial court ha s a duty “t o gi v e a compl ete c harg e of the law

app lic able to the fa c ts of a c a se .” Sta te v. Ha rb iso n, 70 4 S.W.2 d 3 14 , 3 19 (T e nn . 1 98 6) ; se e Sta te

v. F or be s, 79 3 S. W.2 d 236 , 2 49 (T e nn . 1 99 0) ; se e a lso Te nn . R. Crim. P. 3 0. Jury ins truc tio ns mus t, howeve r, be revie wed in the context of the overa ll charg e rather than in isolation. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) ; see also State v. Phipps, 883 S.W .2d 138, 142 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). A charg e is prejudicia l err or “if it fails t o fairly submit the l eg al i ssues or if it misleads the jury as to the applica

ble law.” State v. Hodg es, 944 S.W.2d 346, 352 (Tenn. 1997).

Whil e the de fenda nt may

reque st spe cial instructions, jury instructions a re suf ficient whe re they adequately

state t he law. See, e.g., State v. Ty son, 603 S.W .2d 748 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)

. When a trial court 's ch ar ge t o the jury is complete, it need not g ive additional spec ial instructions reque sted by

the def endant. See State v. Story , 608 S.W .2d 599, 603 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)

.

I n Arizona v. Young blood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), the United S tates Supreme Court he ld that

a criminal defenda nt must show bad faith on the part of the state in orde r to establish a denial of due proce ss f or fa ilure to prese rve pote ntially useful evide nce. In State v. Fe rg uson, 2 S.W .3d 912, 917 (Tenn. 1999) , howeve r, whe re the police lost a videotape of the defendant's f ield sobriety

tests, our supreme c ourt reje cted the ba d faith re qui re m ent articulated in Young blood. Our hig h court

c on c lud e d th a t th e du e pr oc e ss p ri nc ip le s o f the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion are br oa de r tha n th os e enunciated in the United States Constitut ion and that funda mental fa irness
, as an ele ment of due proce ss, require s that the state' s failure t o prese rve e vidence which could be favor able to the de fe nd a nt be e va luate d in the c on te xt of the e nti re re c or d. F e rg us on , 2 S.W. 3da t 91 6- 17 . I f the state has a duty

to preser ve the e vidence , the re viewing court must conduct a balanc ing te st based upon the fo llo wi ng thr e e fa c tor s:
(1) the de g ree of neg lige nce involved; (2) the sig nificanc e of the destroy ed evide nce, considere d in light of the pr obative value a nd reliability

of sec ondary

or substitut e evidenc e that re mains available ; and (3 ) the su ff

ic ie nc y of the oth e r e vid e nc e a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nt.

I d. at 917. I f a tria l without the lost or destroy ed evide n ce wo u l d b e unfa ir, the trial court may d i s m i s s t h e c h ar ges , p ro v i d e aj u ryi n s tru ct i o n , o r t ak e o t h ers t ep s n ec es s ar y t o p ro t ec tt h e d ef

en d an t 's rig ht to a fair trial. I d.

Her e, the defe ndant ar g ued that the state had a duty to preser ve the videota

pe take n from the surveillance came ras in the Pizz a Hut bec ause the tape mig ht have be en usef ul to his defense . At trial, Ms. Tally

testified that s h e re v iewed the videotape six or more times and that ther e wa s essentiall y

n o th in g h e lp f

u l t o e ith e r

th e s tate o r

th e d e f e n s e

. Sh e s tate d th a t o n e o f th e c amer as
c aptu re d the i mage of

a pe rs on e nte ri ng the fr on t do or bu t e xpla ine d th a t th e fi g ur e wa s la rg e ly-9-

obscure d by

the g lare of the lig hts from the g am e ro o m

. No n e of the perpe trator' s features we re discerna ble. Acc o rd i ng to Ms. Tally , the sec ond came ra c aug ht only the imag e of a

g un on the
counter with the perpe trator' s fing ers on top. Ms. Tally was thoroug hly

cros s -e x am i n ed as to the

co n t en t s of the videota

pe. I n our view, the defe ndant has failed to establish that the videotape

c on ta ine d e vid e nc e fa vo ra ble to the de fe ns e . Se e id. a t 91 6- 17 . I n co ns e qu e nc e , the tr ia l c ou rt did not err by deny ing the specia lly

reque sted instruction on the duty to preserve evide nce.

Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affirmed.

___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE