Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DARREN BEDWELL GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

MICHAEL GENE WORDEN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CLAUDE F. HUDSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 84A01-1305-CR-197

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Michael J. Lewis, Judge

Cause No. 84D06-1204-FB-1187

May 7, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Claude Hudson (Hudson), appeals the denial of his credit 

time.

We reverse and remand.1

ISSUE

Hudson raises one issue on appeal which we restate as follows: Whether the trial 

court abused its discretion when it denied Hudson credit time for time spent in a mental 

health facility.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 7, 2012, Joshua Mast (Mast) returned home to find Hudson inside his 

home, standing at the foot of his bed wearing his jacket. Mast asked Hudson why he was 

at his house, and Hudson told Mast that had knocked and nobody answered so he thought 

it was fine to go in. Mast then asked Hudson to leave. Hudson left wearing Mast’s jacket. 

On April 12, 2012, the State filed an Information charging Hudson with Count I, 

burglary, a Class B felony, Ind. Code § 35–43-2-1(b)(i), and Count II, theft, a class D 

felony, I.C. § 35–43-4-2. On May 2, 2012, Hudson requested for an evaluation to 

determine whether he is competent to stand trial. On September 26, 2012, at the 

competency hearing, the trial court ordered Hudson to be committed to the Department of 

 

1 We recognize that the State filed a verified motion for remand, and we accordingly grant their motion in this 

opinion. 
3

Mental Health Family and Social Services Administration. On October 15, 2012, Hudson 

was transported from the Vigo County Jail to the Logansport State Hospital (Hospital). On 

December 20, 2012, Hudson was certified competent and on December 27, 2012, the trial 

court ordered him transported back to jail. On February 25, 2013, a jury was empaneled 

and sworn in. On February 26, 2013, the jury found Hudson guilty as charged on both

Counts. On April 10, 2013, the trial court sentenced Hudson to six years executed in the 

Indiana Department of Correction. The trial court gave Hudson 295 days of credit time on 

Count I and dismissed Count II. The credit time awarded for Count I did not include the 

period from October 15, 2012, to December 27, 2012, when Hudson was confined at the 

Hospital for mental evaluation. (Appellant’s App. p. 164). Hudson now appeals. 

Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Hudson contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give him 

credit time for the time he was confined at the Hospital from October 15, 2012 to December 

27, 2012. 

We begin by noting that the standard for review of a trial court’s sentencing decision 

is an abuse of discretion. Groves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1229, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 

The trial court abuses its discretion if its “decision is clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances.” Id. 

Indiana law provides that a person earns “one (1) day of credit time for each day the 

person is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.” See I.C. § 35–
4

50–6–3(a). “[C]onfinement in this context includes time a criminal defendant spends in a 

mental health facility as a part of the criminal proceedings.” State v. Davis 898 N.E. 2d 

281,289 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (Ind. Ct. App.1997).

The State concurs with Hudson that the trial court erred for not awarding credit to 

Hudson from October 15, 2012 to December 28, 2012 when he was confined at the Hospital

for mental evaluation. The record shows that the trial court awarded a total of 295 days of 

credit time. The breakdown for the credit time as per the abstract of the judgment was as 

follows: 192 days from April, 7, 2012, the day Hudson was arrested, to October 15, 2012,

when he was transported to the Hospital; 90 days from December 28, 2012 to March 27, 

2013, spent at the jail where Hudson was awaiting the trial; and lastly, 13 days from March 

28, 2013 to April 9, 2013, spent at the jail where Hudson was awaiting sentencing. Based 

on this breakdown, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to include 

the period from October 15, 2012 to December 27, 2012, when Hudson was confined at 

the Hospital as credit time. 

CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to award 

Hudson credit time from October 15, 2012 to December 27, 2012 when he was confined 

at the Hospital.

We reverse and remand.

VAIDIK, C. J. and MAY, J. concur