Nebraska Advance Sheets

IN RE INTEREST OF CASSANDRA B. & MOIRA B. 619

Cite as 290 Neb. 619

In re Interest of Cassandra B. and Moira B., 

children under 18 years of age.

State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Angel B., appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed April 3, 2015. No. S-14-708.

1. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews juvenile cases 

de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile 

court’s findings. When the evidence is in conflict, however, an appellate court 

may give weight to the fact that the lower court observed the witnesses and 

accepted one version of the facts over the other.

2. Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case, as in any 

other appeal, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.

3. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court to 

acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court 

from which the appeal is taken.

4. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Among the three types of final orders which 

may be reviewed on appeal is an order that affects a substantial right made during 

a special proceeding.

5. Juvenile Courts: Appeal and Error. A proceeding before the juvenile court is a 

special proceeding for appellate purposes.

6. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Parent and Child: Time: Final Orders. 

Whether a substantial right of a parent has been affected by an order in juvenile 

court litigation is dependent upon both the object of the order and the length of 

time over which the parent’s relationship with the juvenile may reasonably be 

expected to be disturbed.

7. Constitutional Law: Parental Rights. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in directing the education of their children.

8. Parental Rights: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Orders which temporarily 

suspend a parent’s custody, visitation, or education rights for a brief period of 

time do not affect a substantial right and are therefore not appealable.

9. Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Constitutional Law: Parent and Child. The 

substantial right of a parent in juvenile proceedings is a parent’s fundamental, 

constitutional right to raise his or her child.

10. Juvenile Courts: Minors. The State has a right, derived from its parens patriae 

interest, to protect the welfare of its resident children.

11. Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights. A juvenile court has the discretionary power 

to prescribe a reasonable program for parental rehabilitation to correct the conditions underlying the adjudication.

Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Lancaster 

County: Linda S. Porter, Judge. Affirmed.
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John C. Ball, of Pollack & Ball, L.L.C., for appellant.

Joe Kelly, Lancaster County Attorney, and Lory A. Pasold 

for appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack, 

Miller-Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.

Stephan, J.

Angel B. is the mother of Cassandra B., born in 1998, and 

Moira B., born in 2008. She appeals from an order of the 

separate juvenile court of Lancaster County prohibiting her 

from homeschooling Moira until further order of the court. We 

conclude that the order was final and appealable. Finding no 

error, we affirm.

FACTS

In May 2012, the State asked the juvenile court to place 

Cassandra and Moira in the temporary custody of Nebraska’s 

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-248 (Cum. Supp. 2012). The 

request was supported by the affidavit of a representative of 

the Lancaster County sheriff’s office describing an incident 

that occurred at a home in rural Lancaster County, Nebraska, 

on May 11, 2012. The juvenile court entered the requested 

order, based upon its finding that Cassandra, who was then 

13 years old, had been forced to sleep outside in a tent when 

the temperature was 55 degrees. When Cassandra attempted to 

reenter the house, she was forced back into the tent and her 

uncle “zip tied” the tent shut. Cassandra escaped, and Angel 

then turned on a water hose, which Cassandra’s uncle used to 

spray Cassandra with water. Angel also gave the uncle a rope, 

which he attempted to tie around Cassandra’s wrists. The court 

found that these facts placed both Cassandra and Moira at risk 

of harm.

Angel subsequently entered a no contest plea to an 

amended petition alleging that both Cassandra and Moira 

were children who came within the meaning of Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2008), and the children were 
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IN RE INTEREST OF CASSANDRA B. & MOIRA B. 621

Cite as 290 Neb. 619

adjudicated on August 1, 2012. The adjudication order 

included a finding that Cassandra had “severe mental and 

behavioral health needs” which required “immediate intervention for the safety and well-being of both minor children.” 

The order further found that “[o]n one or more occasion[s],” 

Angel had “used inappropriate discipline when trying to handle Cassandra[’s] extensive needs. Angel . . . needs assistance 

in addressing the extensive needs of Cassandra . . . and learning appropriate discipline. The above situation places both of 

the minor children at risk of harm.”

The court ordered that temporary legal and physical custody 

of both children should remain with DHHS. Cassandra was 

placed outside the home, but Moira was returned to the physical care of Angel and has remained there since. Cassandra now 

resides with her paternal grandparents in another state. This 

appeal pertains only to Moira.

The original disposition was on October 22, 2012. At that 

time, the court adopted a case plan, which provided in relevant 

part that Angel should not subject Moira to any form of physical discipline or restraint and that Angel would complete a full 

psychological evaluation.

A review hearing was held on December 10, 2013. At that 

hearing, DHHS requested that Angel be ordered to undergo an 

updated psychological evaluation. This request was based on 

concerns regarding Angel’s mental health, expressed by both 

the DHHS family services caseworker assigned to the case 

and Moira’s therapist. Evidence also showed that in September 

and October 2013, Angel had locked Moira in her bedroom 

as a form of discipline. The caseworker testified that in late 

November or early December, Moira had hit and kicked a visitation worker and was so uncontrollable that the police had to 

be called. The caseworker also testified that Angel continued 

to think that forcing Cassandra to stay alone in a tent in the 

middle of the night had been an acceptable form of discipline. 

The caseworker thought Angel was making very little progress 

in therapy. She further reported that Angel was at times volatile in her interactions with her and in November 2013, had 

yelled at the caseworker for an extended period of time during 

a home visit.
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In its order entered after the hearing, the court found, inter 

alia, that Angel was not cooperating with DHHS and that she 

had failed to take responsibility for the improper discipline 

of Cassandra. The court ordered that Moira should remain 

physically placed with Angel, but noted that Angel’s “care of 

Moira, including her emotional well being, should be carefully 

monitored by [DHHS] pending further hearing in this case.” 

The court also ordered both Angel and Moira to participate in 

individual therapy.

Another review hearing was held on June 30, 2014. By that 

time, Cassandra was residing with her grandparents. The same 

caseworker testified that Moira had attended kindergarten at a 

Catholic school during the 2013-14 school year and had done 

well. She testified that Angel expressed no complaints about 

the curriculum at the school. Moira’s behavior had improved, 

and her therapist was recommending less frequent therapy. 

The caseworker also testified that there had been no recent 

concerns regarding parenting or safety during random drop-in 

visits at Angel’s residence.

The caseworker testified in June 2014 that DHHS had 

concerns about Angel’s desire to homeschool Moira. School 

officials informed the caseworker that Moira was behind academically when she started kindergarten but was catching up, 

and the officials were concerned that she might fall behind 

again if homeschooled. The peer interaction at school had also 

helped Moira improve her ability to share and communicate 

with others. DHHS was also concerned about Angel’s ability 

to homeschool Moira, because Angel worked full time, and 

when asked to provide information about a proposed schedule 

and curriculum, she became defensive and did not provide the 

information. Further, DHHS was concerned that Angel wished 

to homeschool Moira in order to limit the adults Moira could 

communicate with or confide in. The caseworker testified 

that when Cassandra was in Angel’s custody, “[s]he would go 

periods of time being homeschooled and then she would be in 

traditional school, and then she’d go back to homeschooling, 

so it was very inconsistent.” The caseworker expressed her 

opinion that academically and socially, it was in Moira’s best 
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Cite as 290 Neb. 619

interests to remain in a traditional school setting, rather than a 

homeschool environment controlled by Angel.

In an order issued on July 9, 2014, the court found that 

Angel was not cooperating with DHHS and had not taken 

responsibility for the improper discipline of Cassandra. It also 

found that Angel had made “minimal progress” to alleviate the 

causes of the adjudication. It ordered both Angel and Moira 

to continue in individual therapy. In addition, it ordered that 

Moira “shall continue to be enrolled in an educational program 

as arranged or approved by [DHHS] and shall not be home 

schooled at this time, pending further order of this Court.” In 

the same order, it set the next review hearing in the case for 

January 26, 2015.

Angel appealed from this order, alleging it improperly 

infringed on her right to educate Moira as she chose. The 

Nebraska Court of Appeals issued an order to show cause as 

to why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It questioned both whether the prohibition against homeschooling was a new order in the case and, if it was, whether 

it was an order affecting a substantial right in a special proceeding that was subject to appeal. After finding that cause 

had been shown, the Court of Appeals ordered the parties to 

address the jurisdictional issue in their briefs. We subsequently 

moved the case to our docket on our own motion pursuant to 

our authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts 

of this state.1

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Angel assigns that the juvenile court erred in (1) prohibiting 

her from homeschooling Moira and (2) ordering that Moira 

continue to be enrolled in an educational program arranged or 

approved by DHHS.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on 

the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the 

juvenile court’s findings. When the evidence is in conflict, 

1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
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however, an appellate court may give weight to the fact that the 

lower court observed the witnesses and accepted one version of 

the facts over the other.2

ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction

[2-5] The order from which this appeal was taken was the 

first time that the juvenile court had specifically prohibited 

Angel from homeschooling Moira. The State contends that 

it nevertheless was not a final order for purposes of appeal. 

In a juvenile case, as in any other appeal, it is the duty of an 

appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the 

matter before it.3 For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction 

of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court 

from which the appeal is taken.4 Among the three types of 

final orders which may be reviewed on appeal is an order that 

affects a substantial right made during a special proceeding.5 A 

proceeding before the juvenile court is a special proceeding for 

appellate purposes.6 Therefore, we must consider whether the 

order of the juvenile court which prohibited Angel from homeschooling Moira affected a substantial right.

[6,7] Whether a substantial right of a parent has been 

affected by an order in juvenile court litigation is dependent 

upon both the object of the order and the length of time over 

which the parent’s relationship with the juvenile may reasonably be expected to be disturbed.7

 The U.S. Supreme Court 

has clearly established that parents have a fundamental liberty 

interest in directing the education of their children.8 Thus, there 

2 In re Interest of Nicole M., 287 Neb. 685, 844 N.W.2d 65 (2014); In re 

Interest of Edward B., 285 Neb. 556, 827 N.W.2d 805 (2013).

3 In re Interest of Danaisha W. et al., 287 Neb. 27, 840 N.W.2d 533 (2013).

4 Id.

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 See, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 

(2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 

(1923).
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IN RE INTEREST OF CASSANDRA B. & MOIRA B. 625

Cite as 290 Neb. 619

can be no doubt that the object of the July 9, 2014, order is of 

sufficient importance to affect a substantial right.

[8] The issue, then, is the length of time over which Angel’s 

ability to homeschool Moira may reasonably be expected to 

be disturbed. Orders which temporarily suspend a parent’s 

custody, visitation, or education rights for a brief period of 

time do not affect a substantial right and are therefore not 

appealable.9 For example, in In re Interest of Danaisha W. et 

al.,

10 we held that an order imposing restrictions on a parent’s 

visitation rights was temporary in nature and therefore did not 

affect a substantial right so as to be appealable when it was in 

effect only until a hearing on a motion to terminate parental 

rights, which was scheduled for approximately 5 weeks later. 

Similarly, in In re Guardianship of Sophia M.,

11 we held an 

order which denied a parent visitation rights pending a guardianship hearing 3 weeks later was not of sufficient duration to 

affect a substantial right.

The Court of Appeals recently relied in part upon this precedent in In re Interest of Nathaniel P.12 In that case, a juvenile 

court entered an order which “‘suspended’” the mother’s right 

to direct the child’s education “‘at least on a temporary basis 

at this time.’”13 Although the next scheduled review hearing 

was almost 6 months later, the Court of Appeals construed the 

order as providing a means for the parent to regain her education rights before the review hearing by participating in rehabilitative services, and it thus concluded that it was not a final 

order, because it was “expected to disturb [the parent’s] education rights for a relatively short period of time.”14 It therefore 

dismissed the appeal, and neither party sought further review 

by this court.

9 See In re Interest of Nathaniel P., 22 Neb. App. 46, 846 N.W.2d 681 

(2014).

10 In re Interest of Danaisha W. et al., supra note 3.

11 In re Guardianship of Sophia M., 271 Neb. 133, 710 N.W.2d 312 (2006).

12 In re Interest of Nathaniel P., supra note 9.

13 Id. at 48, 49, 846 N.W.2d at 683, 684 (emphasis omitted).

14 Id. at 52, 846 N.W.2d at 686.
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There is tension between the reasoning of In re Interest of 

Nathaniel P. and our holding in In re Interest of Karlie D.,

15

in which we determined that the ability of a juvenile court 

to change conditions of an adjudicated juvenile’s custody or 

care “has no bearing on whether the court’s order is final and 

appealable.” And neither the language of the order in this case 

nor the context in which it was entered denotes a temporary 

interruption of Angel’s right to direct Moira’s education. The 

juvenile court’s July 9, 2014, order provided that Moira “shall 

not be home schooled at this time, pending further order of 

this Court.” The order gave no indication that the court would 

revisit this issue prior to the next review hearing scheduled for 

January 26, 2015, approximately 6 months in the future. This 

is a considerably longer duration of time than the 5 weeks 

and 3 weeks we characterized as temporary in In re Interest 

of Danaisha W. et al. and In re Guardianship of Sophia M.

And because juvenile courts are required to review the cases 

of juveniles adjudicated under § 43-247(3) every 6 months,16

virtually no order would have a longer duration than that. 

The order challenged in this appeal encompassed at least the 

first semester of Moira’s school year and, potentially, an even 

longer period. We conclude that it was not a temporary order, 

but, rather, one which affected the parent’s substantial right to 

direct the education of her child. It was therefore a final order, 

which we have jurisdiction to review.

Merits

[9,10] The substantial right of a parent in juvenile proceedings is a parent’s fundamental, constitutional right to raise 

his or her child.17 As we have noted above, this includes the 

parents’ fundamental liberty interest in directing the education 

of their children.18 But the State also has a right, derived from 

its parens patriae interest, to protect the welfare of its resident 

15 In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581, 587, 811 N.W.2d 214, 221 

(2012).

16 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-278 (Cum. Supp. 2014).

17 In re Interest of Karlie D., supra note 15.

18 See, Troxel v. Granville, supra note 8; Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note 8.
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children.19 In a juvenile abuse and neglect case such as this, a 

court must balance these sometimes competing interests so as 

to achieve a result that is in the best interests of the child. In 

other words, a parent’s right to determine the educational needs 

of an adjudicated child is not absolute.

[11] When a court’s order of disposition permits an adjudicated juvenile to remain in the parental home, a court has 

statutory authority to impose certain conditions, which may 

include requiring the parent to “[e]liminate the specified conditions constituting or contributing to the problems which led 

to juvenile court action,” to “[t]ake proper steps to [e]nsure 

the juvenile’s regular school attendance,” and to “[c]ease and 

desist from specified conduct and practices which are injurious 

to the welfare of the juvenile.”20 Such terms and conditions 

“shall relate to the acts or omissions of the juvenile, the parent, or other person responsible for the care of the juvenile 

which constituted or contributed to the problems which led to 

the juvenile court action in such case.”21 Thus, a juvenile court 

has the discretionary power to prescribe a reasonable program 

for parental rehabilitation to correct the conditions underlying 

the adjudication.22

Angel argues that “the adjudicated issue in this matter has 

nothing to do with Moira’s educational needs” and in fact “does 

not involve Moira specifically at all.”23 That is not accurate. In 

adjudicating both children, the juvenile court specifically found 

that Angel’s inappropriate discipline of Cassandra “places both 

of the minor children at risk of harm.” And, as noted, the 

record reflects that even after both children were adjudicated, 

DHHS received a report that Angel had disciplined Moira inappropriately by locking her in her bedroom.

19 See, In re Interest of Karlie D., supra note 15; In re Interest of Anthony 

G., 255 Neb. 442, 586 N.W.2d 427 (1998); In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 

405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991), disapproved on other grounds, O’Connor v. 

Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 582 N.W.2d 350 (1998).

20 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-288(1), (4), and (5) (Reissue 2008).

21 § 43-288.

22 See In re Interest of C.D.C., 235 Neb. 496, 455 N.W.2d 801 (1990).

23 Brief for appellant at 10.
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The juvenile court permitted Angel to retain physical custody of Moira but placed legal custody of the child with 

DHHS. Under the Nebraska Juvenile Code, “[l]egal custody” 

has the same meaning as under the Parenting Act, i.e., “the 

authority and responsibility for making fundamental decisions 

regarding the child’s welfare, including choices regarding education and health.”24 Thus, the juvenile court was entitled to 

give weight to the testimony of the DHHS caseworker that 

homeschooling by Angel was not in Moira’s best interests. 

And this was the only evidence before the court on the issue 

of Moira’s educational needs. Although Angel was present with 

her counsel at the hearings at which the caseworker testified, 

she did not testify or offer any evidence regarding her reasons 

for wanting to homeschool Moira or the specific manner in 

which she planned to do so.

In explaining its reasoning from the bench, the juvenile 

court stated that it was not in Moira’s best interests to be homeschooled because of the adjudicated findings of inappropriate 

discipline by Angel “for which she continues to maintain a 

complete lack of understanding as to how inappropriate that 

was and . . . that that was a problematic way to deal with a 

child.” The court stated its view that

there’s plenty of evidence before the Court that [Angel’s] 

decision making with regard to parenting and discipline 

issues still places Moira at risk and I don’t think it’s in 

the child’s best interest to have no other contacts with 

individuals and to have her mother be in charge of her 

educational setting as well. And I think it’s not a huge 

inference for the Court to make that this is designed, 

in part, to isolate the child from others that she may be 

exposed to and talk to and I’m concerned about that. . . . 

I’m not dictating which . . . educational setting she needs 

to be in, but I am going to preclude her from being homeschooled at this point in time because I don’t find that to 

be in her best interest.

Based upon our de novo review of the record, we reach the 

same conclusion. Cassandra and Moira were adjudicated on 

24 See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-245(13) and 43-2922(13) (Cum. Supp. 2014).
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the basis of a finding that Angel’s inappropriate discipline of 

Cassandra placed both children at risk of harm. There is some 

indication in the record that this discipline was intended as 

punishment for Cassandra’s “back-talking and not doing her 

homework.” Following adjudication, there was a subsequent 

incident of inappropriate discipline directed at Moira which 

prompted the juvenile court to specifically order that Angel 

“shall not lock Moira . . . in her room at any time.” Given 

the court’s finding that Angel had made “minimal progress 

. . . to alleviate the causes of the Court’s adjudication,” to 

which no exception was taken on appeal, and the recommendation of DHHS against homeschooling, the juvenile court 

was entirely justified in concluding that Moira’s best interests 

would not be served by an educational setting which would 

place her under Angel’s exclusive control with no opportunity 

for regular interaction with other adults interested in her welfare. The court’s prohibition of homeschooling was directly 

related to the parental conduct which resulted in adjudication, and the court properly exercised its discretion to prohibit 

homeschooling as a part of a rehabilitation program to address 

such conduct.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 

separate juvenile court.

Affirmed.