I N T H E

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 23S-PL-358

Thomas DeCola,

Appellant,

–v–

Norfolk Southern Corporation,

Appellee.

Decided: December 8, 2023

Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court

No. 46C01-2111-PL-2250

The Honorable Thomas Alevizos, Judge

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals

No. 23A-PL-610

Opinion by Justice Slaughter

Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Goff, and Molter concur.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-358 | December 8, 2023 Page 2 of 4

Slaughter, Justice.

Appellate jurisdiction here is premised on the trial court’s entry of a 

final judgment. But the court’s entry—the denial of plaintiff’s summaryjudgment motion—was not final because (among other reasons) it did not 

resolve all claims as to all parties. Thus, there was no final judgment. We 

grant transfer, dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remand.

I

Through a subsidiary, defendant, Norfolk Southern Corporation,

owned property in LaPorte County, Indiana. In 2019, Norfolk fell

delinquent on its property taxes. Plaintiff, Thomas DeCola, bought the 

property at a tax sale two years later. Afterward, the county auditor 

issued DeCola a property-tax deed. 

Deed in hand, DeCola brought this suit against Norfolk to quiet title. 

He sought judgment on the pleadings, which Norfolk opposed, arguing it 

never received proper notice of anything—the county’s decision to tax the 

property, the tax sale, the petition for tax deed, or its right of redemption.

Norfolk attached several exhibits to its opposition. DeCola’s reply, which 

also included exhibits, argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to 

determine whether the tax deed was void for lack of notice. Norfolk’s surreply asked the court to enter judgment for Norfolk on all DeCola’s 

claims. Because the trial court considered evidence outside the pleadings, 

it converted DeCola’s 12(C) motion to one for summary judgment. See 

Ind. Trial Rule 12(C). 

In a detailed order, the trial court rejected DeCola’s jurisdictional 

objection and found the tax deed was void because Norfolk did not 

receive sufficient notice of the tax sale, the right of redemption, or the 

petition for tax deed. The court ordered that DeCola’s “Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings (converted to Summary Judgment) is 

DENIED.” DeCola filed a motion to reconsider. And Norfolk filed its own 

motion for final judgment, asking the court to award it summary 

judgment on all claims. The trial court did not rule on either motion and,

by operation of law, the motion to reconsider was deemed denied. T.R.

53.4(B). 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-358 | December 8, 2023 Page 3 of 4

DeCola appealed the denial of summary judgment. His notice of appeal 

said he was appealing “from a final order as defined by Ind. App. R. 

2(H).” Reaching the merits, the court of appeals affirmed in a nonprecedential decision. DeCola v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 23A-PL-610, at *8

(Ind. Ct. App. July 14, 2023) (mem.). The panel described the trial court’s 

order as one denying DeCola’s motion for summary judgment and 

“concluding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether 

[Norfolk] received the statutorily required notices.” Ibid.

DeCola then sought transfer, which we now grant, thus vacating the 

appellate decision, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

II

An appellate court will typically hear an appeal only after a trial court 

has entered a final judgment. Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 

2023). The final-judgment rule’s rationale is to enhance judicial economy 

by avoiding duplicative appeals. Ibid. The rule has exceptions, but no 

exception applies here. DeCola premised his appeal on entry of a final 

judgment below, and the court of appeals proceeded accordingly. Yet, on 

this record, the trial court’s order satisfies none of the five definitions of a 

“final judgment”—set out in Rule 2(H) of our appellate rules:

• The order did not “dispose[] of all claims as to all parties”. App.

R. 2(H)(1). To the contrary, the order disposed of nothing. 

DeCola’s quiet-title claim remains, as does Norfolk’s lack-ofnotice argument.

• The order made no express determination or direction in writing 

under Trial Rules 54(B) or 56(C) that judgment should be entered 

as to fewer than all issues, claims, or parties. Id. at 2(H)(2).

• The order was not deemed final under Trial Rule 60(C). Id. at 

2(H)(3).

• The order was not a ruling on a motion to correct error under 

Trial Rule 59. Id. at 2(H)(4). 
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• And the order was not otherwise deemed final by law. Id. at 

2(H)(5).

No party raised the issue of appellate jurisdiction below, and neither 

did the court of appeals. But whether an order is immediately appealable 

is a jurisdictional question that cannot be waived and can be raised at any 

time, including by a reviewing court on its own motion. Georgos v. Jackson, 

790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003). We raise the jurisdictional issue here to 

remind ourselves and our judicial colleagues of the importance of 

ensuring that courts exercise judicial power only where our jurisdiction is 

secure. Imposing and enforcing limits on judicial power are important not 

only in their own right, but in sending the vital message that we police 

ourselves just as vigilantly as we do other government actors.

* * *

For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and 

remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our 

opinion.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.

A P P E L L A N T P R O S E

Thomas DeCola

North Judson, Indiana

A T T O R N E Y S F O R A P P E L L E E N O R F O L K S O U T H E R N 

C O R P O R A T I O N

Barry L. Loftus

Scotty N. Teal

Matthew M. Humble

Stuart & Branigin LLP

Lafayette, Indiana