J-S29034-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHICON JORDAN 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 299 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 30, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-45-CR-0000450-2014, 

CP-45-CR-0000844-2014, CP-45-CR-0000846-2014, 

CP-45-CR-0000847-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 23, 2021

Appellant, Shicon Jordan, appeals from the December 30, 2020 order

dismissing his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, as untimely. After careful review, we 

affirm.1

The PCRA court summarized the relevant procedural history of this case 

as follows:

On January 28, 2015, [Appellant] was sentenced in 

the four captioned cases to an aggregate of 144 to 

288 months in a state correctional institution, 

consecutive to a sentence previously imposed in case 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The record reflects that the Commonwealth has not filed a brief in this 

matter.
J-S29034-21

- 2 -

No. 2854 Criminal 2013 — a case not implicated or 

involved in the instant PCRA motion. The sentences in 

case Nos. 450 and 846 followed jury trial convictions;

the sentences in case Nos. 844 and 847 were imposed 

based on closed guilty pleas. The pleas and sentences 

were negotiated between [Appellant] and the 

Commonwealth and approved by the Court.

[Appellant] did not seek reconsideration or, file direct 

appeals. Accordingly, the judgments of sentence 

became final on February 27, 2015.

The negotiated plea and sentencing agreement 

provided that the sentence imposed in Case No. 844 

would run concurrent to all other sentences. The 

judgment of sentence issued on January 28, 2015 

inadvertently omitted case No. 2854 Criminal 2013 as 

one of the cases to which the sentence in Case No. 

844 was to run concurrent. Accordingly, on December 

4, 2015, we issued an amended judgment which 

corrected the error and clarified that the sentence in 

Case No. 844 was concurrent to the sentence imposed 

in Case No. 2854 Criminal 2013 as well as other 

specified sentences.

On August 18, 2016, nearly 18 months after the 

judgments of sentence became final, [Appellant] filed

a PCRA motion[, his first]. Since the Prior PCRA 

Motion was filed almost six months late and did not 

plead any exception to the one-year PCRA filing 

deadline, on August 26, 2016, we issued an order 

providing notice of our intent to dismiss the Prior PCRA 

motion as untimely. We incorporate that Order into 

this Order by reference.

Counsel was appointed and [Appellant] was given 40 

days in which to object to dismissal, file an amended 

motion, or both. [Appellant] did not respond. 

Accordingly, on November 15, 2016, we issued an 

order dismissing the Prior [first] PCRA Motion. Counsel 

did not file an appeal.

On March 18, 2019, [Appellant] mailed a pro se

second PCRA motion from jail. Subsequently, we 
J-S29034-21

- 3 -

issued an order which, among other things, appointed 

counsel, granted time for the filing of an amended 

PCRA motion, and directed the parties to address both

jurisdictional timeliness filing issues and the law 

pertaining to second PCRA petitions.

Subsequently, [Appellant] filed a counseled amended 

PCRA motion [on July 17, 2019]. After continuances 

were requested and granted, several hearings were 

held. Both parties submitted evidence, arguments, 

and briefs.

PCRA court opinion, 2/24/21 at 1-2 (parentheticals omitted).

Following evidentiary hearings, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s 

petition on December 30, 2020. On January 28, 2021, Appellant filed 

separate, timely notices of appeal at each docket number, listing all four trial 

court docket numbers. That same day, the PCRA court directed Appellant to 

file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement on February 17, 2021. 

Thereafter, the PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on February 24, 

2021, adopting its prior December 30, 2020 memorandum.

On May 18, 2021, this Court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal 

should not be quashed in light of Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 

(Pa. 2018). On May 19, 2021, Appellant filed a response to the rule to show 

cause. On June 11, 2021, this Court entered an order discharging the rule to 

show cause and referring this issue to the merits panel. 
J-S29034-21

- 4 -

Prior to our consideration of the merits of this appeal, we must address 

whether Appellant’s notice of appeal complied with the requirements set forth 

in Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(a) and Walker. In Walker, 

our supreme court provided a bright-line mandate requiring that “where a 

single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices 

of appeal must be filed for each case,” or the appeal will be quashed. Id. at 

185 A.3d at 971, 976-977. The Walker court applied its holding prospectively 

to any notices of appeal filed after June 1, 2018. 

In the instant case, Appellant’s notices of appeal were filed on January 

28, 2021, and therefore, the Walker mandate applies. This appeal was of a 

single order resolving issues arising on all four docket numbers. A review of 

the record demonstrates that appellant filed separate notices of appeal at each 

docket number; however, the notices of appeal referenced all four docket 

numbers in their respective captions. 

A recent en banc panel of this Court held that such a practice does not 

invalidate Appellant’s separate notices of appeal. Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc), appeal denied, 242 

A.3d 304 (Pa. 2020). Accordingly, we turn to the merits of Appellant’s appeal.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred as a matter of 

law and abused its discretion in finding 

[Appellant’s] PCRA petition was not timely filed?

2. Whether the [PCRA] court erred as a matter of 

law and abused its discretion in finding 
J-S29034-21

- 5 -

[Appellant’s] prior counsel was not ineffective in 

failing to amend his [PCRA] petition or failing to 

respond to the motion to dismiss his [PCRA]

petition?

3. Whether the [PCRA] court erred as a matter of 

law and abused its discretion in finding 

[Appellant’s] prior counsel was not ineffective in 

failing to notify [Appellant] that he was not 

going to respond to the motion to dismiss or file 

an amended [PCRA] on his behalf?

4. Whether the [PCRA] court erred as a matter of 

law and abused its discretion in finding 

[Appellant] was not induced to enter into a plea 

under duress when he was not guilty of the 

crime?

5. Whether the [PCRA] court erred as a matter of 

law and abused its discretion in finding

[Appellant’s] prior counsel did not fail to 

investigate the case?

6. Whether the [PCRA] court erred as a matter of 

law and abused its discretion in finding 

[Appellant’s] prior counsel was not ineffective 

for failing to file an appeal regarding an 

excessive sentence?

Appellant’s brief at 4-5.

Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition 

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s 

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the 

certified record.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa.Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the 
J-S29034-21

- 6 -

PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record 

could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 

136, 140 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted). 

Preliminarily, we must consider the timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA 

petition because it implicates the jurisdiction of this court and the PCRA court. 

Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883, 887 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). All PCRA petitions, including second and subsequent petitions, must 

be filed within one year of when a defendant’s judgment of sentence becomes 

final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). “[A] judgment becomes final at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

Here, the record reveals that Appellant’s judgment of sentence became 

final on February 27, 2015, when the 30–day time period for filing a direct 

appeal to this Court expired. See id. Accordingly, Appellant had until 

February 27, 2016 to file a timely PCRA petition. Id. at § 9545(b)(1). 

Appellant’s instant PCRA petition was filed March 18, 2019, more than four 

years after his judgment of sentence became final, and is patently untimely. 

Accordingly, appellant was required to plead and prove that one of the three 

statutory exceptions enumerated in Section 9545(b)(1) applies.

The three statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar are as follows:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials 
J-S29034-21

- 7 -

with the presentation of the claim in violation of 

the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated 

were unknown to the petitioner and could not 

have been ascertained by the exercise of due 

diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that 

was recognized by the Supreme Court of the 

United States or the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to 

apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). A petition invoking any of these exceptions 

must “be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been 

presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). 

Instantly, Appellant invokes the “newly-discovered facts” exception to 

the PCRA time-bar and argues that he is entitled to a new trial based upon his 

purported discovery that he was abandoned by his prior PCRA counsel2 during 

the pendency of his first PCRA petition. Appellant’s brief at 14, 18-19, 31. 

We disagree.

To be eligible for relief on a claim of newly-discovered evidence, a PCRA 

petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

evidence:

____________________________________________

2 The record reflects that Appellant was represented during his first PCRA by 

Brian S. Gaglione, Esq.
J-S29034-21

- 8 -

(1) could not have been obtained prior to the 

conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable 

diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or 

cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the 

credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in 

a different verdict if a new trial were granted.

Commonwealth v. Foreman, 55 A.3d 532, 537 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation 

omitted).

Our supreme court has recognized that attorney abandonment 

constituting ineffectiveness per se may constitute a factual basis for the 

”newly discovered facts” exception. In Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 

A.3d 1123 (Pa. 2018), our supreme court stated that:

[T]he principle . . . that PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness 

cannot be advanced as a newly-discovered “fact” for 

purposes of application of the subsection 

9545(b)(1)(ii) exception to the PCRA’s one-year time 

bar, has no application in cases where PCRA counsel’s 

ineffectiveness per se completely forecloses review of 

collateral claims.

Id. at 1030.

Nonetheless, a petitioner invoking the ineffectiveness per se of his prior 

PCRA counsel under subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) is still required to plead and 

prove that: (1) he filed his petition within the applicable time frame provided 

by subsection 9545(b)(2) – in this case, one year – of when he was able to 

first present his claim; and (2) that he could not have presented the claim 

earlier through the exercise of due diligence. See id. at 1130-1031 (finding 

that a petitioner’s second PCRA petition, based on ineffectiveness per se of 

his prior PCRA counsel, was timely when filed within 60 days of when petitioner 
J-S29034-21

- 9 -

received a copy of Court’s order quashing the appeal of his first, untimelyfiled PCRA petition).

Here, our review of the record reveals that Appellant failed to file his 

instant PCRA petition invoking the newly-discovered fact exception within one 

year of the date the claims could have been presented, as required by 

Section 9545(b)(2). Appellant has also failed to prove that could not have 

presented the claim earlier through the exercise of due diligence.

As recognized by the PCRA court, 

the record, including the docket and [Appellant’s] own 

testimony and exhibits, demonstrates that [Appellant]

was served with the Order dismissing the Prior PCRA

Motion. Thus, in late November, 2016, [Appellant]

became aware that his motion had been denied. The 

evidence presented similarly demonstrates that at 

some point shortly thereafter, [Appellant] became 

aware through communications with appointed 

counsel that appointed counsel had not filed anything 

on his behalf. At the latest, [Appellant] absolutely 

became aware that no action had been taken on 

December 7, 2017, when our Clerk of Courts sent

[Appellant], at [Appellant’s] written request, a copy of 

the docket sheet. A docket sheet printed and mailed 

that day would have confirmed that the Prior PCRA 

Motion had been denied and shown that appointed 

counsel had not filed an objection or other response 

to the Notice of Intent Dismiss, submitted an 

amended PCRA motion, filed an appeal, or taken any 

other action of record on behalf of [Appellant]. 

Nonetheless, the instant PCRA motion was not filed

until March 18, 2019, two years and three months 

after the docket sheet brought or in the exercise of 

due diligence should have brought to his attention the 

omissions of appointed counsel. 

. . . .
J-S29034-21

- 10 -

In-between the time [Appellant] received the docket 

sheet and the filing of the instant PCRA motion, 

[Appellant] attempted to file pro se appeals, out-oftime without permission, from the order dismissing 

the Prior PCRA Motion. However, those attempts were 

not made until well after the [one-year] filing period 

expired. In fact, the instant PCRA was not filed until 

more than one year after the Superior Court returned

to our Clerk’s Office a pro se appeal [Appellant]

attempted to untimely file directly in the Superior 

Court. Simply, while [Appellant] caused some docket 

activity, his actions were untimely and not diligent.

PCRA court opinion, 2/24/21 at 8-9.

Under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), “due diligence requires neither perfect 

vigilance nor punctilious care, but rather it requires reasonable efforts by a 

petitioner, based on the particular circumstances, to uncover facts that may 

support a claim for collateral relief.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 

491, 506 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation omitted; emphasis added). Clearly, 

appellant failed to undertake reasonable efforts in this instance. 

Based on the foregoing, we find that Appellant has failed to demonstrate

that his untimely petition satisfies the newly-discovered fact exception to the 

statutory one year time-bar.

Appellant also argues that the untimeliness of the instant PCRA petition 

should be excused due to the ineffectiveness of his prior counsel with respect 
J-S29034-21

- 11 -

to his guilty plea, investigation of the case, and sentencing.

3

 See Appellant’s 

brief at 31-32. We find that such relief is impermissible. 

Courts in this Commonwealth have long recognized that there is no 

statutory exception to the PCRA time-bar applicable to claims alleging the 

ineffectiveness of prior counsel. As our Supreme Court has explained:

It is well settled that allegations of ineffective 

assistance of counsel will not overcome the 

jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 

See Commonwealth v. Pursell, [749 A.2d 911, 

915-916 (Pa. 2000)] (holding a petitioner’s claim in a 

second PCRA petition, that all prior counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance, did not invoke timeliness 

exception, as “government officials” did not include 

defense counsel); see also Commonwealth v. 

Gamboa-Taylor, [753 A.2d 780, 785-786 (Pa. 

2000)] (finding that the “fact” that current counsel 

discovered prior PCRA counsel failed to develop issue 

of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was not afterdiscovered evidence exception to time-bar)[.]

Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (citation 

formatting amended). 

To allow Appellant to raise new claims of prior counsel’s ineffectiveness 

more than four years after his judgment became final directly conflicts with 

the legislative mandate of Section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA. See 

Commonwealth v. Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 767 (Pa. 2013) (stating that the 

PCRA places time limitations on claims, and in doing so, “strikes a reasonable 

____________________________________________

3 The record reflects that Appellant was represented at trial by Chandra V. 

Bliece, Esq.
J-S29034-21

- 12 -

balance between society’s need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted 

person’s need to demonstrate that there has been an error in the proceedings 

that resulted in his conviction”), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1039 (2014). The 

fact that Appellant frames some of his issues as alleging the ineffectiveness

of prior counsel simply does not overcome this Court’s lack of jurisdiction to 

address them.

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we discern no error on the 

part of the PCRA court in dismissing Appellant’s second petition as untimely.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/23/2021