2021 IL 126432 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 

(Docket No. 126432) 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. ROBERT CHRISTOPHER 

JONES, Appellant. 

Opinion filed December 16, 2021. 

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Garman, Theis, Michael J. Burke, and Overstreet concurred in the 

judgment and opinion. 

Justice Neville dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Anne M. Burke. 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Petitioner Robert Christopher Jones was a juvenile in 2000, when he pled guilty 

to one count of first degree murder and was sentenced to 50 years in prison pursuant 

to a fully negotiated plea agreement. After unsuccessfully petitioning for 

postconviction relief, petitioner sought leave to file a successive postconviction 
 

 

petition alleging his 50-year juvenile sentence violated the eighth amendment 

protections in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The trial court denied his 

motion for leave, and the appellate court affirmed, finding that petitioner’s claims 

did not invoke the protections provided to juveniles in Miller. 2020 IL App (3d) 

140573-UB. After reviewing the parties’ arguments and the United States Supreme 

Court’s most recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, ___,141 S. Ct. 

1307, 1312 (2021), we affirm the appellant court’s judgment. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 In 1999, when petitioner was 16 years old, he was charged in La Salle County 

circuit court with eight counts of first degree murder; two counts of armed robbery, 

a Class X felony; one count of residential burglary, a Class 1 felony; and one count 

of home invasion, a Class X felony. Petitioner confessed to entering the home of 

George and Rebecca Thorpe at 2 a.m. armed with a knife. He knew they were home 

at that time, and he intended to take their money. The Thorpes were an elderly 

couple whom petitioner considered to be his great-aunt and great-uncle. Petitioner 

stated he did not know how many times he stabbed George before he moved to 

Rebecca’s room and began to stab her as she reached for the telephone. He also did 

not know how many times he stabbed Rebecca before he covered her face with a 

pillow to stop her from making “gurgling” sounds. After taking Rebecca’s purse 

and lockbox, petitioner fled the scene. 

¶ 4 After abandoning a potential insanity defense, petitioner agreed to enter a fully 

negotiated guilty plea. According to the plea deal, he would plead guilty to one 

count each of first degree murder and residential burglary and two counts of armed 

robbery in exchange for the State dismissing the remaining charges. Under the 

terms of the agreement, petitioner would be sentenced to concurrent prison terms 

of 50 years for the murder, 30 years for each armed robbery count, and 15 years for 

the residential burglary, with credit being given for the time he already spent in 

custody. He was 17 years old when he agreed to enter into the plea agreement. 

¶ 5 After reviewing the factual predicate for the charges and the terms of the plea 

agreement and giving the appropriate admonishments, the trial judge found the plea 

was knowingly and voluntarily made. Petitioner waived the preparation of a 

presentence investigation report as well as any hearing on mitigating and 

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aggravating factors. In May 2000, the trial court entered judgment in accordance 

with the terms of the parties’ fully negotiated plea agreement. 

¶ 6 Petitioner did not timely seek to withdraw his guilty plea or appeal from that 

judgment. He did, however, later file a pro se postconviction petition seeking relief. 

In that petition, petitioner argued that his defense counsel was ineffective and that 

his sentence constituted an unconstitutional violation of his due process rights. The 

trial court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing, and that dismissal was 

upheld on appeal. People v. Jones, 345 Ill. App. 3d 1159 (2004) (table) 

(unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 7 Petitioner later filed a pro se successive postconviction petition, arguing that 

both the provision automatically transferring certain juvenile cases to adult criminal 

court and the requirement in the Illinois truth-in-sentencing statute that he serve 

every day of his sentence were unconstitutional under the principles the United 

States Supreme Court found applicable to juvenile offenders in Miller, 467 U.S. 

460, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 

(2005). In petitioner’s motion for leave to file his successive postconviction 

petition, filed two weeks after that petition, he noted that his guilty plea and the 

subsequent judgment were entered in 2000, years before Miller was decided. He 

also asserted that the mandatory statutory scheme that applied to him at that time 

was void when applied to juvenile offenders. The trial court denied petitioner’s 

motion for leave to file his successive postconviction petition. 

¶ 8 On appeal, petitioner argued the claims in his pro se successive petition met the 

cause-and-prejudice standard, requiring his case to be remanded to the trial court 

for appointment of counsel and additional postconviction proceedings. The 

appellate court disagreed and affirmed the denial of leave to file the successive 

postconviction petition. It agreed with the trial court that petitioner did not satisfy 

the cause-and-prejudice test and held that his sentence was not mandatory because 

he voluntarily entered into a fully negotiated plea arrangement. The appellate court 

also explained that petitioner was unable to receive relief under Miller because he 

did not receive a life sentence when he could be released from prison at the age of 

66. 2016 IL App (3d) 140537-U. 

¶ 9 In his initial petition for leave to appeal to this court, petitioner argued his plea 

was void because it was premised on a now-unconstitutional mandatory life 

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sentence. We entered a supervisory order directing the appellate court to vacate its 

judgment and reconsider those contentions in light of People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 

122327, where we held that a sentence of more than 40 years constitutes de facto 

life for a juvenile offender. After reexamining those issues, the appellate court 

vacated its prior decision and again affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of 

petitioner’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition, with 

Justice Wright specially concurring. 2020 IL App (3d) 140573-UB. 

¶ 10 The appellate court reasoned that petitioner’s fully negotiated guilty plea 

stipulated to a 50-year sentence that was only later declared to constitute de facto 

life, effectively waiving any eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) 

sentencing challenge based on the principles in Miller. In addition, he could not 

challenge the sentencing scheme at the time as it applied to him because his fully 

negotiated plea agreement precluded it from ever actually being applied to him. 

Because petitioner was therefore unable to establish the “prejudice” prong of the 

cause-and-prejudice test, the appellate court’s judgment affirmed the trial court’s 

denial of his motion for leave to file his successive postconviction petition. 2020 

IL App (3d) 140573-UB, ¶¶ 14, 19. The court later denied petitioner’s motion for 

rehearing. 

¶ 11 Petitioner then filed a petition for leave to appeal from the appellate court’s 

revised judgment pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019), 

and this court allowed that petition. 

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 Before this court, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether the appellate court 

erred by finding that his 1999 guilty plea, entered into while he was a juvenile, bars 

him from filing a successive postconviction petition alleging that his 50-year 

de facto life sentence violated the eighth amendment of the federal constitution 

(U.S. Const., amend. VIII) under the rationale in Miller and its progeny and (2) the 

appropriate remedy under the facts of this case if petitioner raised a valid Miller 

claim. 

¶ 14 We begin our examination by addressing a question of first impression in 

Illinois: whether petitioner’s guilty plea, entered into when he was a juvenile, 

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precludes him from raising a Miller claim. Because that issue presents a pure 

question of law, it is subject to de novo review. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, 

¶ 25. 

¶ 15 Petitioner argues that the sentencing scheme in place at the time of his guilty 

plea violated the eighth amendment protections noted in Miller. He asserts that, if 

he had gone to trial and been convicted of committing two first degree murders as 

a juvenile offender, he would have faced a mandatory life sentence under the thenexisting statutory sentencing scheme. To comport with Miller, however, the trial 

court was required to use its discretion when deciding whether to impose a life 

sentence on a juvenile offender. Because the mandatory life sentence required by 

the statutory scheme precluded the trial court from exercising its discretion in 

imposing the proper sentence, petitioner asserts that the scheme was 

unconstitutional as applied to him as a juvenile offender. 

¶ 16 The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that the federal 

constitution’s eighth amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishment 

for juvenile offenders are premised on the fundamental concept of proportionality. 

The Court has viewed the application of that concept “less through a historical 

prism than according to ‘ “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 

of a maturing society.” ’ ” Miller, 567 U.S. at 469 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 102 (1976), quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality 

opinion)). The additional protections that the Court has recognized for youthful 

offenders, however, are not without bounds. 

¶ 17 As the Court recently reaffirmed in Jones, 593 U.S. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1312, 

although juvenile offenders may not receive mandatory sentences of life-withoutparole, they may still be given discretionary life sentences if the appropriate 

safeguards are in place. See also Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (stating that “Graham, 

Roper, and our individualized sentencing decisions make clear that a judge or jury 

must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing 

the harshest possible penalty for juveniles”). In petitioner’s view, therefore, a 

constitutionally valid sentencing scheme must provide trial courts with discretion 

in setting those types of juvenile sentences. He asserts that here the sentencing 

scheme that would have applied if he had been convicted of the two first degree 

murder charges would have mandated a life sentence, eliminating the trial court’s 

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use of any discretion, and for that reason it was an unconstitutional violation of 

juveniles’ eighth amendment protections under Miller. 

¶ 18 If the statutory sentencing scheme had actually been applied in this case to set 

petitioner’s life sentence, petitioner’s argument would have presented a claim that 

we could have reviewed on its legal merits. The problem with petitioner’s claim is 

apparent from his arguments on this issue: the mandatory scheme that applied in 

Illinois at the time he was sentenced was never applied to him. Instead, his 50-year 

sentence for a single count of first degree murder was imposed as part of the fully 

negotiated guilty plea agreement he entered into with the State. 

¶ 19 Petitioner acknowledges, as he must, that he was never sentenced under the 

statutory scheme he now claims is constitutionally invalid as it applied to him. He 

maintains, however, that when he entered into the plea agreement with the State, 

he did not anticipate that the 50-year prison term stipulated in it would later be 

declared to be a de facto life sentence that required the trial court’s use of discretion 

and consideration of his youthful characteristics and rehabilitative potential. In 

making that argument, petitioner effectively asserts that he did not knowingly and 

voluntarily enter into the plea agreement. It is undisputed, however, that petitioner, 

the State, and the trial court all correctly understood the law that was applicable at 

the time petitioner entered into the plea agreement. The crux of petitioner’s claim 

is that none of them knew that the Supreme Court would later change the criteria 

for reviewing the constitutionality of the applicable law. 

¶ 20 By entering a plea agreement, a defendant “forecloses any claim of error. ‘It is 

well established that a voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional errors or 

irregularities, including constitutional ones.’ ” (Emphasis added.) People v. 

Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 33 (quoting People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 

545 (2004)). Here, petitioner did not raise any claim that the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction. 

¶ 21 Fundamentally, plea agreements are contracts, and principles of waiver apply 

equally to them. People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77, 87 (2011). Entering into a contract 

is generally “a bet on the future.” Dingle v. Stevenson, 840 F.3d 171, 175 (4th Cir. 

2016). “[A] classic guilty plea permits a defendant to gain a present benefit in return 

for the risk that he may have to [forgo] future favorable legal developments.” Id. 

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¶ 22 In Dingle, the defendant was 17 years old when he was charged with numerous 

serious offenses, including murder. After the State filed a notice of its intent to seek 

the death penalty under South Carolina law, Dingle sought to avoid death by 

entering a guilty plea on all counts in exchange for a sentence of life in prison with 

the possibility of parole after 30 years. Because the imposition of consecutive 

sentences proved to bar the possibility of parole, Dingle sought postconviction 

relief. While those proceedings were pending, the Supreme Court issued Roper, 

543 U.S. 551, holding that the eighth amendment barred capital punishment for 

juvenile offenders, eliminating any risk that he could have been sentenced to death 

if convicted of the charged offenses. Dingle then tried to withdraw his guilty plea, 

asserting that his original guilty plea was based on his desire to avoid the death 

penalty, for which he was no longer eligible after Roper. Dingle, 840 F.3d at 172-

73. 

¶ 23 In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals compared the situation to 

that in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), where the defendant also pled 

guilty to avoid the death penalty. When changes in the law resulted in the defendant 

no longer being death-eligible, Brady attempted to withdraw his plea. In rejecting 

that request, the Supreme Court explained that 

“[t]he rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require 

that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess 

every relevant factor entering into his decision. A defendant is not entitled to 

withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been 

accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the 

likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action. More particularly, 

absent misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents 

[citation], a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then 

applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions 

indicate that the plea rested on a faulty premise.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 757. 

See Dingle, 840 F.3d at 175. 

¶ 24 Here, petitioner has not claimed that the State engaged in any misrepresentation 

or committed any misconduct. He attempts to distinguish the rule in Brady by 

pointing out an alleged factual distinction, arguing that Brady was not destined to 

receive a death sentence and that his attempt to withdraw the plea came after the 

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Court struck down the state law that imposed the death penalty. In his brief, 

petitioner asserts that Brady’s “attempt was unsuccessful precisely because he pled 

guilty to avoid a potential, not a certain, sentence.” 

¶ 25 What petitioner’s argument fails to recognize is the similarity of the actual 

circumstances surrounding the pleas entered by both Brady and petitioner. 

Petitioner asserts that he agreed to the plea deal with the State to avoid the 

mandatory sentence of life in prison he would have received if convicted of the host 

of serious charges, including two first degree murder counts, filed against him. Due 

to the procedural posture of this case, the record is sparse regarding any possible 

defenses petitioner may have been able to employ at trial. Although petitioner 

suggests that he had no defense to the charges, no one, including petitioner, can be 

certain of the outcome of the case if he had chosen to proceed to trial instead of 

pleading guilty. The State is constitutionally required to prove its case against a 

defendant at trial beyond a reasonable doubt for good reason. It would be purely 

speculative for this court to conclude that petitioner was doomed to be convicted of 

the most serious charges against him at trial and sentenced to mandatory life 

without parole, and we decline to adopt that approach in this case. 

¶ 26 Contrary to the assertion in petitioner’s brief, his current effort to undo the 

effects of his guilty plea shares much common ground with that of the defendant in 

Brady. Most importantly for our present analysis, both defendants entered a plea 

“to avoid a potential, not a certain, sentence.” Because the principles that were 

considered and applied in Brady and Dingle operate here with equal force, we 

conclude that petitioner’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any 

constitutional challenge based on subsequent changes in the applicable law. See 

Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 33; Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d at 545. 

¶ 27 Furthermore, petitioner’s Miller claims require him to show that the de facto 

life sentence he received was not entered as a result of the trial court’s use of its 

discretion since both this court and the Supreme Court permit the imposition of 

discretionary life sentences on juvenile offenders. Jones, 593 U.S. at ___, 141 S. 

Ct. at 1312; Miller, 567 U.S. at 489; People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 43. As the 

State points out, the trial judge here was not required to accept the parties’ fully 

negotiated plea agreement. If the judge had found the factual predicate for the plea 

insufficient, found the defendant’s entry of his plea to be involuntary or 

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unintelligent, or determined that the stipulated 50-year sentence was excessive 

under the facts and circumstances of the case, he could have declined to accept the 

plea. Because the trial court had the option to accept or reject the plea agreement 

offered by the parties, its decision necessarily constituted an exercise of its 

discretion. The trial court’s decision to accept the plea agreement and enter a 

judgment consistent with it, thereby convicting petitioner, in relevant part, of one 

count of first degree murder and imposing the parties’ agreed-on 50-year prison 

sentence, was not compelled by the statutory sentencing scheme that applied at the 

time or by any other legal authority. We therefore reject petitioner’s Miller 

challenge. 

¶ 28 Miller’s additional protections for juvenile offenders apply only when a trial 

court lacks, or refuses to use, discretion in sentencing a juvenile offender to a life, 

or de facto life, sentence. The trial court in this case did not fail to exercise its 

discretion in deciding to accept the parties’ plea agreement and entering petitioner’s 

convictions and 50-year sentence accordingly. Because petitioner failed to make 

constitutional claims that were cognizable under Miller, it was not error to deny his 

motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. 

¶ 29 Because we find Miller inapplicable, we need not address the petitioner’s 

remaining arguments. We also need not consider the second issue before us, 

namely, the proper remedy for an unconstitutional imposition of a de facto life 

sentence in this case. 

¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court upholding 

the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for leave to file his pro se successive 

postconviction petition. 

¶ 32 Affirmed. 

¶ 33 JUSTICE NEVILLE, dissenting: 

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¶ 34 The issue presented is whether petitioner, who entered a guilty plea in exchange 

for a de facto life sentence, is precluded from challenging that sentence as 

unconstitutional in violation of the new substantive rule of law set forth in Miller 

v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The majority holds that petitioner is not entitled 

to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence because he waived that right by 

entering a negotiated guilty plea. Supra ¶¶ 19-26. I disagree and would hold that 

the Miller protections must be guaranteed to juvenile offenders who plead guilty as 

well as to those who insist that the State prove the charges beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

¶ 35 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 36 Petitioner was charged with several offenses, including two counts of first 

degree murder, that were committed when he was 16 years old. Petitioner 

ultimately entered a negotiated plea of guilty to one count each of first degree 

murder and residential burglary and two counts of armed robbery. In exchange, the 

State agreed to specified terms of imprisonment and dismissed the remaining 

charges against him. The circuit court approved the terms of the plea agreement 

and sentenced petitioner to concurrent prison terms of 50 years for murder, 30 years 

for each armed robbery count, and 15 years for residential burglary. As part of the 

plea process, petitioner waived his right to the preparation of a presentence 

investigation report and to a hearing in mitigation and aggravation. Petitioner was 

17 years old when he entered into the plea agreement. 

¶ 37 After filing an unsuccessful petition for postconviction relief, petitioner later 

moved for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. His proffered 

successive petition asserted that the automatic-transfer provision for juvenile 

offenders, together with the truth-in-sentencing provision in force at the time, 

required him to serve his entire 50-year sentence. According to the petition, that 

sentencing scheme violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution 

and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (U.S. Const., 

amend. VIII; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). 

¶ 38 The circuit court denied petitioner’s motion for leave to file the successive 

petition, and the appellate court affirmed. Thereafter, this court entered a 

supervisory order directing the appellate court to reconsider its decision in light of 

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People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-41, which held that any sentence greater 

than 40 years’ imprisonment constitutes a de facto life sentence. 

¶ 39 On remand, the appellate court again affirmed. 2020 IL App (3d) 140573-UB. 

The appellate court acknowledged that petitioner had shown cause under the causeand-prejudice test applicable to successive postconviction petitions but held that he 

failed to establish prejudice because he had forfeited any constitutional challenge 

to his sentence by entering a fully negotiated plea. Id. ¶ 14. The appellate court 

concluded that, by entering into a negotiated plea agreement, petitioner had waived 

his right to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence. Id. ¶¶ 14-20. 

¶ 40 The majority also affirms, and its reasoning essentially mirrors that of the 

appellate court. According to the majority, petitioner cannot show prejudice 

because he waived any constitutional error in the imposition of his sentence when 

he entered a negotiated guilty plea that included a de facto life sentence, even 

though he was a juvenile and the circuit court did not consider the factors articulated 

in Miller. Supra ¶¶ 19-27. I cannot agree with the majority’s decision because it 

disregards the fundamental principles governing the sentencing of juvenile 

offenders. 

¶ 41 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 42 A. United States Supreme Court 

Juvenile Sentencing Jurisprudence 

¶ 43 In an unbroken line of cases commencing in 2005, the United States Supreme 

Court has recognized that juvenile offenders are constitutionally different from 

adult defendants with regard to sentencing. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 

578-79 (2005), the Court concluded that the eighth amendment prohibits capital 

punishment for murderers who were under 18 at the time of their crimes. Five years 

later, in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010), the Court held that the eighth 

amendment prohibits a mandatory sentence of life without parole for offenders who 

were under 18 and committed nonhomicide offenses. Then in Miller, 567 U.S. at 

489, the Court held that the eighth amendment precluded a mandatory sentence of 

life without parole for a juvenile offender who has committed homicide. The Court 

recognized that such a sentence could be imposed only where the sentence is not 

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mandatory and the sentencer has discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of a 

youthful offender and to impose a lesser punishment. Id. at 476. In Montgomery v. 

Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 206, 212 (2016), the Court held that Miller applied 

retroactively to cases on collateral review. And most recently in Jones v. 

Mississippi, 593 U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1316 (2021), the Court reaffirmed 

that the Miller factors must be considered before a sentencer can impose a 

discretionary life term on a juvenile offender. The Court also recognized that the 

individual states may adopt additional reforms that limit the sentencing of juvenile 

offenders. Id. at ___, 141 S. Ct. at 1323. 

¶ 44 B. Illinois Supreme Court 

Juvenile Sentencing Jurisprudence 

¶ 45 This court has embraced all of those holdings and applied them to juvenile 

offenders in Illinois. Two years before Montgomery was issued, we held that the 

new rule announced in Miller is retroactive and must be applied to cases on 

collateral review. People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 39. In People v. Reyes, 2016 

IL 119271, ¶ 9. we held that Miller applies when a juvenile offender is sentenced 

to a mandatory term of years that is the functional equivalent of life without the 

possibility of parole and that the failure to consider the offender’s youth, 

immaturity, and potential for rehabilitation as mitigating factors constitutes cruel 

and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 

¶ 46 In People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 38, we recognized that the Miller 

Court’s reasoning is not specific to mandatory life sentences alone. Holman 

observed that, under Miller and Montgomery, life sentences imposed on juvenile 

offenders—whether mandatory or discretionary—are disproportionate and violate 

the eighth amendment, unless the sentencer considers youth and its attendant 

characteristics. Id. ¶ 40. Accordingly, we held that Miller applies to discretionary 

sentences of life without parole for juvenile offenders. Id. 

¶ 47 In Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-41, this court held that a prison term imposed 

on a juvenile offender that exceeds 40 years constitutes a de facto life sentence in 

violation of the eighth amendment. We further observed that 

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“to prevail on a claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant sentenced 

for an offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the defendant was 

subject to a life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural or de facto, and 

(2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its attendant characteristics 

in imposing the sentence.” Id. ¶ 27. 

Moreover, the legislature has codified the rule articulated in Miller by adopting a 

set of nine statutory factors that must be considered when a court imposes sentence 

on a juvenile offender. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2020). 

¶ 48 The progression of this precedent has been clear and consistent. Both the United 

States Supreme Court and this court have specifically recognized that juvenile 

offenders are different from adults when it comes to sentencing and that they are 

entitled to additional protections that allow for the capacity to change, an increase 

in maturity, and the potential for rehabilitation. 

¶ 49 C. Application of Established Case Precedent 

¶ 50 I believe this line of authority governs the outcome of this case. As the Supreme 

Court has specifically recognized, juveniles inherently lack maturity, do not have a 

fully formed character or a fully developed sense of responsibility, and are both 

more susceptible to external influences and less able to control their environment 

than are adults. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471, 475-76. In addition, juveniles are more 

capable of change than adults and, consequently, more capable of being reformed. 

Id. at 471. Based on these characteristics, juveniles are less deserving of the most 

severe punishments, and it will be the rare case in which a life sentence will be 

appropriate for a juvenile offender. Id. at 479-80. 

¶ 51 Petitioner was a juvenile when the offenses were committed and when he 

entered his guilty plea, and he agreed to serve a 50-year de facto life term without 

the sentencing judge’s consideration of the characteristics that were attendant to his 

youth. Also, as is common in cases involving a plea agreement, petitioner waived 

his statutory right to a presentence investigation report and a hearing in mitigation 

and aggravation—which would have influenced the sentencing judge’s assessment 

of the plea agreement. A presentence investigation report and hearing in mitigation 

would have provided relevant information as to petitioner’s characteristics such as 

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his personal background and environment, his level of maturity and ability to 

consider risks and consequences of behavior, the presence of cognitive or 

developmental disability, his susceptibility to outside pressure, and his potential for 

rehabilitation. The waiver of those two procedural safeguards prevented the 

sentencing judge from fully considering the Miller factors. 

¶ 52 In my view, the established precedent of the Supreme Court and this court as to 

the sentencing of juveniles should apply here. I would adopt the reasoning applied 

in a line of cases holding that a juvenile offender should receive the benefit of the 

Miller protections even though he or she has entered a guilty plea. See People v. 

Johnson, 2021 IL App (3d) 180357, ¶¶ 18-22 (holding that principles of waiver do 

not apply to bar a juvenile offender from challenging his negotiated sentence under 

Miller); People v. Applewhite, 2020 IL App (1st) 142330-B, ¶¶ 19-21 (same); 

People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶¶ 18-19 (same as to a young-adult 

offender); People v. Parker, 2019 IL App (5th) 150192, ¶¶ 10-18 (reversing the 

denial of leave to file a successive postconviction based on Buffer). 

¶ 53 D. The Majority’s Cases Are Distinguishable 

¶ 54 The majority, however, reaches the opposite conclusion and places significant 

reliance on Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In Brady, the Supreme 

Court addressed whether an adult defendant could argue that his guilty plea was 

involuntary because he pled guilty to avoid a potential sentence of death, which 

was subsequently held to be inapplicable to the charged offense. Id. at 749-50. The 

Court held that the defendant was precluded from challenging the voluntariness of 

his plea on the ground that “he discover[ed] long after the plea has been accepted 

that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s case or the likely 

penalties attached to alternative courses of action.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 757. 

¶ 55 The decision in Brady is distinguishable from this case in two critical respects. 

First, it involved an adult defendant and has nothing whatsoever to do with the 

sentencing of juvenile offenders. Second, the defendant in Brady only faced the 

possibility of a death sentence if convicted. Id. at 743. Here, petitioner faced a 

mandatory life sentence if convicted of both murder charges. The only reason the 

mandatory life sentence provision was not applied to petitioner is because he agreed 

to plead guilty to a single count of murder in exchange for a 50-year term of 

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imprisonment. That sentence constitutes a de facto life term, requiring 

consideration of the Miller factors. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-41. Given that 

Brady was decided more than 40 years ago and applies only to adult defendants, it 

obviously does not consider the special concerns surrounding imposition of a life 

term on a juvenile offender and does not reflect the evolving jurisprudence 

governing how juvenile offenders are to be treated for sentencing purposes. 

¶ 56 In addition, the majority relies on Dingle v. Stevenson, 840 F.3d 171, 172 (4th 

Cir. 2016), which involved a juvenile offender who pled guilty to avoid the 

possibility of a death sentence and was sentenced to a life term with the opportunity 

for parole. The offender sought to set aside his guilty plea on the ground that Roper 

prohibited the death penalty for juvenile offenders. Id. at 173. In rejecting that 

argument, the Dingle court relied on Brady to hold that the offender was precluded 

from seeking vacatur of his guilty plea because the subsequently proscribed 

sentence was not imposed on him. Id. at 174-76. 

¶ 57 Dingle does not control this case any more than Brady does. Like the adult 

defendant in Brady, the juvenile offender in Dingle only faced the possibility of a 

death sentence upon conviction. Here, petitioner faced a mandatory life sentence if 

convicted of both murder charges. Also, the offender in Dingle was not subjected 

to the sentence that Roper invalidated. In this case, however, petitioner was 

sentenced to a discretionary life term, as defined by Buffer, without the protections 

guaranteed under Miller. The Dingle court simply tracked the reasoning adopted in 

Brady and goes no further in explaining why juvenile offenders who plead guilty 

should be deprived of the protections that have been universally adopted and 

embraced following Miller. 

¶ 58 In addition, the majority’s reliance on Brady and Dingle suffers from a basic 

error in logic. The majority has confused the uncertainty of conviction with the 

possibility of a harsh sentence that could be imposed if the offender goes to trial. 

The uncertainty of conviction is present in virtually every case. That is why 

prosecutors are willing to offer plea deals and why defendants are often motivated 

to accept such deals to avoid the possibility of a sentence that is harsher than the 

one offered. The fact that conviction was not certain in petitioner’s case was also 

true in Brady and Dingle. The difference between these cases is the fact that the 

offenders in Brady and Dingle entered guilty pleas to avoid a possible death 

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sentence. Here, petitioner pled guilty to avoid a mandatory life term—an 

unassailable statutory certainty upon conviction of two murder charges. Contrary 

to the majority’s assertion, this case is not akin to Brady and Dingle. 

¶ 59 The majority also relies on this court’s decision in People v. Sophanavong, 2020 

IL 124337, ¶ 33 (citing People v. Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d 543, 545 (2004)), for the 

proposition that a defendant who enters a voluntary guilty plea relinquishes the 

right to challenge nonjurisdictional errors or irregularities, including those based 

on constitutional principles. However, both Sophanavong and Townsell are like 

Brady in that they involved adult defendants and did not consider the special 

sentencing concerns affecting juveniles. In addition, both of those cases are 

distinctly different from this case in that they did not involve novel constitutional 

rights. Id. ¶ 25 (rejecting defendant’s request for a new sentencing hearing based 

on failure to comply with statutory requirement for a presentence investigation 

report); Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d at 547 (rejecting a challenge based on Apprendi v. 

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which addressed well-established constitutional 

rights). Here, petitioner’s claim is premised on the new substantive rule of 

constitutional law articulated in Miller, which must be applied retroactively on 

collateral review. Therefore, neither Sophanavong nor Townsell offers any 

guidance in resolving this appeal, and Brady does nothing to change that. 

¶ 60 E. The Majority’s Reasoning Is Flawed 

¶ 61 1. Youth Diminishes the Ability to 

Agree to a De Facto Life Sentence 

¶ 62 The incontrovertible flaw in the majority’s reasoning is that it treats this case as 

if it were a Brady case. It is not. It is a Miller case. And the United States Supreme 

Court and this court have definitively and consistently held that juvenile offenders 

are constitutionally different from adult defendants when it comes to sentencing. 

¶ 63 Here, as a consequence of the automatic transfer statute and the truth-insentencing law, petitioner is required to serve the full 50-year term of imprisonment 

specified in the plea agreement. Thus, petitioner was subjected to a sentence that 

has been declared unconstitutional—a discretionary de facto life term without the 

possibility of parole and without consideration of the Miller factors. 

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¶ 64 The analysis of the majority severely undermines the protections articulated in 

Miller and Holman. The majority’s reasoning ignores the fact that a juvenile 

offender—like petitioner here—is likely to agree to a plea offer that includes an 

unconstitutionally long prison term as a means of avoiding a mandatory life 

sentence. The very same factors that Roper, Graham, and Miller have held to 

diminish a juvenile offender’s culpability similarly impair a juvenile offender’s 

ability to fully appreciate and knowingly enter into a plea agreement that includes 

a de facto life sentence. When it comes to sentencing, the rules that apply to adult 

defendants do not govern juvenile offenders, and this court should not mechanically 

apply Brady, Sophanavong, and Townsell here. 

¶ 65 2. The Majority Incorrectly Assumes That Miller 

Does Not Apply to Discretionary Sentences 

¶ 66 The majority seeks to justify its decision on the ground that the circuit court 

could have declined to accept the 50-year term of imprisonment as part of the plea 

agreement. Supra ¶ 27. This reasoning is entirely unpersuasive. This court held in 

Holman that the protections recognized and mandated in Miller apply even where 

the life sentence imposed on a juvenile is discretionary. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, 

¶ 40. Also, given the nature of plea agreements generally—and the facts of this 

case—the possibility that the circuit court might have rejected the terms of the plea 

agreement is highly unlikely. But even if that were not the case, nothing in the 

record before us demonstrates that the court considered the mitigating 

characteristics attendant to petitioner’s youth in exercising its discretion to approve 

the de facto life sentence. Those characteristics are equally relevant for offenders 

who plead guilty and those who go to trial—they do not magically disappear simply 

because a juvenile offender has agreed to a plea deal. If a sentencing judge is not 

required to consider the Miller factors when deciding whether to approve a plea 

agreement that includes a de facto life sentence, then juvenile offenders who are 

tried as adults necessarily must insist on a trial in order to benefit from the 

protections that Miller guarantees. 

¶ 67 3. The Majority’s Contract Law Analysis Is Inapplicable 

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¶ 68 As a final point, I find the majority’s reference to contract law as justification 

for its decision to be misguided. Supra ¶ 21. In noting that plea agreements are 

contracts and subject to waiver principles, the majority ignores that waiver of a 

constitutional right requires more. This court has recognized that “[w]aiver of a 

constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was an 

intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right” and that “[s]uch 

waivers must not only be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with 

sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 137 

(2000). 

¶ 69 Obviously, petitioner could not have knowingly waived his right to have the 

Miller factors considered when the court was evaluating the propriety of his plea 

agreement and de facto life term. Miller was not decided until 12 years after his 

plea was accepted, and Buffer was decided 7 years after that. Because the 

constitutional protections recognized in Miller and Buffer did not exist at the time 

of his plea, petitioner agreed to and received a sentence that violates the eighth 

amendment. In any other context, a juvenile such as petitioner would not be bound 

by a contractual obligation. Yet the majority takes the extraordinary step of holding 

that this court must enforce the terms of a contract that is unconstitutional. 

¶ 70 4. The Majority Should Adhere to Supreme Court 

and Illinois Precedent 

¶ 71 This appeal offers the opportunity for this court to confirm that we meant what 

we said in Holman and Reyes—that the constitutional protections recognized in 

Miller apply to juvenile offenders who receive a life sentence, whether mandatory 

or discretionary, natural or de facto. In my view, there is no good reason to depart 

from our prior precedent. I believe that we should hold that all juvenile offenders, 

including those who enter negotiated guilty pleas, are entitled to the protections set 

forth in Miller. 

¶ 72 III. CONCLUSION 

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¶ 73 In sum, I disagree with the majority’s holding that a juvenile offender is 

precluded from challenging the imposition of a de facto term of life in prison, 

without consideration of the characteristics attendant to petitioner’s youth, because 

that sentence was the culmination of a negotiated plea agreement at a time when 

the length of that sentence was not unconstitutional. Stare decisis has been—and 

should remain—our guiding principle. Therefore, I cannot join in the majority 

opinion, which ignores United States and Illinois juvenile sentencing jurisprudence. 

I would reverse the judgment of the lower courts and remand the cause for further 

postconviction proceedings. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

¶ 74 CHIEF JUSTICE ANNE M. BURKE joins in this dissent. 

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