J-S51005-15

_________________________

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ALTON M. PARKER

Appellant No. 2552 EDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 20, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008355-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2015

Appellant, Alton M. Parker, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his 

bench trial convictions for aggravated assault, simple assault, possessing 

instruments of crime (“PIC”), recklessly endangering another person 

(“REAP”), criminal mischief, aggravated assault by vehicle while driving 

under the influence (“aggravated assault—DUI”), accidents involving death 

or personal injury, and DUI—controlled substances.1 We affirm. 

The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this case as 

follows: 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 2701, 907, 2705, 3304(a)(1); 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

3735.1, 3742, 3802(d)(1). 
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On May 7, 2011, at approximately 4:00 p.m.[,] the 2500 

and 2600 blocks of Myrtlewood Street were blocked off for 

two neighborhood block parties. Moonbounces had been 

set up in the 2600 block, along with tables filled with food 

and cake. The streets were blocked off with a parked car 

and rope, and were packed with adults and at least fifty 

(50) children, many of whom were toddlers. 

Appellant, who was driving a dark-colored car which he did 

not own and did not have permission to use, turned off 

Huntingdon Street and proceeded up Myrtlewood in the 

wrong direction. Although the street was blocked off with 

a vehicle barrier, Appellant drove through the barrier 

blocking the 2500 block, hitting tables and chairs as he 

drove by. Neighbors screamed, “You’re going the wrong 

way, you’re going the wrong way.” 

Appellant, driving at a rate of between twenty (20) and 

forty-five (45) mph, ignored them and threw a can of beer 

out of his car window, as he held a hatchet in his left hand. 

Neighbors attempted to herd the children out of the way, 

but it was too late. Appellant revved his car engine, 

speeding up and slammed into one of the moonbounces 

while two-year-old Carmel White was still inside. The force 

of the impact tore the moonbounce out of its plug, with 

wires flying. 

As Appellant turned the corner, still dragging the 

moonbounce with Carmel White inside behind him, he hit 

the other moonbounce as well as hitting two children: 

Jahlil Clark and Andre Clark. As neighbors desperately 

searched for the children, they could not at first find 

Carmel. They had to cut the moonbounces open to free 

the children tangled within. Appellant was traveling at 

such a rate of speed that a cob of corn had wedged in his 

driver’s side mirror, a plastic fork in the windshield, and 

food splattered all over the headlights, hood, and front 

bumper. He also dragged the tables the length of about 

ten houses as he sped by. 

Although neighbors screamed at him that he had hit a 

child, Appellant did not slow down as he turned onto 

Oakdale Street, however he did slow down around the 

2900 block of Lehigh Street and neighbors, including 
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Jerome Conquest...chased after him and eventually caught 

up with his car. Some of them attempted to pull open the 

driver’s side door. Other people attempted to reach in 

through the window. Appellant, who had been attempting 

to fight the neighbors off, pulled the door shut and locked 

it. He then sped off and hit a blue car parked at the 

corner. 

Valerie Walls called 911 while other neighbors ran to help 

Andre Clark, who lay bleeding in the street, his head 

swelling. He and the other children who had been hit by 

Appellant were taken by ambulance to St. Christopher’s 

Hospital.

Off-duty Police Officer Jonathan Ross was driving on 29th

Street near Huntingdon Street when he heard a crash and 

observed a crowd of people running to Myrtlewood Street. 

Officer Ross drove up a block and saw a dark colored car 

traveling eastbound with the crowd chasing it. [Mr.] 

Conquest ran toward Officer Ross’[] truck and told him, 

“Hey, listen, chase that car. He just ran over some kids.” 

[Mr.] Conquest jumped into the back of Officer Ross’ truck 

and they chased Appellant, now driving down Oakdale 

Street, for five or six blocks. They followed him to 26th

Street and Sergeant Streets, where he stopped behind a 

white BMW vehicle. Officer Ross pulled alongside 

Appellant’s car and tried to get him to stop, but Appellant 

hit the passenger side of Officer Ross’ truck, clipped the 

BMW, and crashed into a wall at a speed of at least 30 

mph. 

[Mr.] Conquest jumped from the back of [Officer] Ross’ 

truck, punched Appellant twice in the face, and tried to 

reach in to take the keys from the ignition, but Appellant 

continued to struggle and try to push [Mr.] Conquest’s 

hands away. When [Mr.] Conquest would not be deterred, 

Appellant swung a hatchet at him, the blade sinking into 

the car door. 

Officer Ross positioned his car behind Appellant’s car, 

trapping him, and called 911. As Appellant attempted to 

put his car in reverse, Officer Ross jumped from the truck 

with his badge and gun drawn, and informed the crowd he 

was a police officer. Appellant, glassy-eyed and startled, 
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began swinging the hatchet through the open car window 

at Officer Ross. Officer Ross backed out of range of the 

weapon. Backup officers arrived and together, they 

attempted to get the attention of Appellant, who was still 

swinging the hatchet. 

One of the responding officers, Michael O’Brien, noted a 

strong odor of PCP—a pungent, harsh, chemical scent as 

he opened Appellant’s car door. Officer O’Brien attempted 

to take Appellant out of the driver’s side door, but 

Appellant reached for the hatchet. After Officer O’Brien 

drew his gun, Appellant was distracted long enough that 

another officer was able to snatch the blade away. Once 

the weapon was secured, officers placed Appellant under 

arrest. Appellant was unable to walk under his own power 

and was completely incoherent. His eyes were bloodshot 

and his appearance generally was disheveled; his boots 

were mismatched. He smelled strongly of PCP. 

Appellant was taken to St. Joseph’s Hospital. At the 

hospital, Police Officer Karen Cotton read Appellant his 

O’Connell[2] warnings, informing him of the consequences 

of refusing a blood test, and observed Appellant’s blood 

draw at 5:25 p.m. At the time, Appellant was aggressive 

and struggling while handcuffed to his bed. Appellant told 

Officer Cotton that he was in the area of Lehigh Street to 

drop off a TV to a customer when he blacked out. 

After the accident Carmel White, a twenty-one (21) month 

old toddler, was admitted to St. Christopher’s Hospital with 

difficulty walking. She had left leg pain, an abrasion to her 

right wrist, and blood in her diaper. Jahlil Clark, nine (9) 

years old, had a possible small fracture to his right patella, 

knee swelling, knee and leg sprain, and was admitted to 

St. Christopher’s Hospital. Alexus Jardine, seventeen (17) 

years old, was admitted to St. Christopher’s with wrist and 

hand sprains, and abrasions. She had been dragged by 

the moonbounce for a distance of four (4) houses. 

____________________________________________

2 Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 

242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989). 
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Andre Clark[,] nine (9) years old at the time of the 

accident, was admitted to the hospital with a right epidural 

hematoma, a liver laceration, a right shoulder fracture, 

broken fingers, fractured pelvis, a spine injury, and 

multiple broken ribs. He was referred for plastic surgery 

on his scalp, face, and knee. He could not bear weight on 

his legs initially and spent ten days in a rehab center. He 

was in St. Christopher’s Hospital for a month before being 

moved to a rehabilitation center and wore a neck brace for 

three months. He underwent an extensive rehabilitation 

period: he could not walk for a month and remained in a 

wheelchair, then required crutches, and finally a walking 

stick. After his release, he limped for six months. Even 

today, [Mr.] Clark cannot run as fast as he used to. 

Toxicology tests on the blood drawn from Appellant at the 

hospital showed that his blood contained forty-two (42) 

nanograms per millimeter of phencyclidine (“PCP”), a 

Schedule II controlled substance. Any amount of PCP in 

the blood causes effects; the minimal reportable levels for 

this drug are between one (1) and five (5) nanograms. 

PCP is a hallucinogen which causes a distortion of person, 

place, and time; judgment is affected and rapid muscle 

movement and belligerent behavior also result. The 

amount of PCP in Appellant’s blood was consistent with 

recent, active use in a dosage consistent with and capable 

of producing adverse psychoactive effects. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed December 3, 2014, at 4-8) (footnotes and internal 

citations to the record omitted). 

Following a bench trial, the court convicted Appellant of two (2) counts 

each of aggravated assault, simple assault, aggravated assault—DUI, and 

PIC; three (3) counts of accidents involving death or personal injury; one (1) 

count each of REAP and DUI—controlled substances; and four (4) counts of 

criminal mischief. On August 20, 2013, the court sentenced Appellant to 

consecutive terms of eleven (11) to twenty-two (22) years’ incarceration for 
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aggravated assault; four (4) to eight (8) years’ incarceration for aggravated 

assault—DUI; three (3) to six (6) years’ incarceration for accidents involving 

death or personal injury; and one (1) to two (2) years’ incarceration for one 

of the simple assault convictions. The court imposed concurrent terms of 

seventy-two (72) hours’ to six (6) months’ incarceration for DUI; thirty-two 

(32) to sixty-four (64) months’ incarceration for PIC; fourteen (14) to 

twenty-eight (28) months’ incarceration for REAP; four (4) to eight (8) 

months’ incarceration for criminal mischief; and one (1) to two (2) years’

incarceration for the remaining simple assault conviction. Thus, the court 

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of nineteen (19) to thirty-eight 

(38) years’ imprisonment.3 

Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on August 27, 2013. 

The trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant 

timely complied. On April 29, 2014, this Court dismissed the appeal for 

failure to file a brief. On May 29, 2014, Appellant filed an application to 

reinstate the appeal. This Court reinstated the appeal on July 9, 2014, and 

substitute counsel was appointed. This Court subsequently granted 

Appellant’s application for remand to file a supplemental Rule 1925(b) 

____________________________________________

3 The court subsequently amended the sentence by merging the convictions 

for DUI and aggravated assault—DUI. Because the court had originally 

imposed the merged DUI sentence concurrently, the amendment made no 

change to Appellant’s aggregate term of imprisonment. 
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statement. After the trial court granted Appellant an extension of time, 

Appellant filed a timely supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement.4 

Appellant raises a single issue for our review:

DID THE SENTENCING COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW, 

ABUSE ITS DISCRETION, AND VIOLATE GENERAL 

SENTENCING PRINCIPLES WHEN IT SENTENCED 

[APPELLANT] TO 19-38 YEARS’ INCARCERATION; WHERE 

THIS SENTENCE WAS MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND 

UNREASONABLE; FAR SURPASSED WHAT WAS REQUIRED 

TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC, THE COMPLAINANTS, AND THE 

COMMUNITY; WENT WELL BEYOND WHAT IS NECESSARY 

TO FOSTER [APPELLANT’S] REHABILITATION; AND WAS 

GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE CRIMES?

(Appellant’s Brief at 1). 

In his sole issue, Appellant argues he is fifty-six years old and in poor 

health. Appellant contends the trial court effectively imposed a “life 

sentence” by making many of Appellant’s sentences run consecutively. 

Appellant concedes the individual sentences fall within the standard range of 

the Sentencing Guidelines. Nevertheless, Appellant asserts his aggregate 

sentence is disproportionate to his crimes, considering that the victims all 

survived and made nearly complete recoveries from their injuries. Appellant 

concludes his sentence is manifestly excessive, and this Court should 

remand for resentencing. Appellant’s challenge is to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-Dejusus, 994 

____________________________________________

4 On July 15, 2015, the Commonwealth filed its brief late, along with an 

unopposed motion to accept the brief as timely filed. We grant the open 

motion and accept the Commonwealth’s brief as timely filed. 
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A.2d 595 (Pa.Super. 2010) (explaining challenge to imposition of 

consecutive sentences implicates discretionary aspects of sentencing); 

Commonwealth v. Lee, 876 A.2d 408 (Pa.Super. 2005) (stating claim that 

sentence is manifestly excessive challenges discretionary aspects of 

sentencing). 

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an 

appellant to an appeal as of right. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 

910 (Pa.Super. 2000). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary 

sentencing issue: 

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) 

whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal 

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 

Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if 

they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or raised in a motion to modify 

the sentence imposed at that hearing. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 

788 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 759, 831 A.2d 599 (2003).

When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant 

must also invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a 
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separate concise statement demonstrating that there is a substantial 

question as to the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing 

Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an appellant separately set forth 

the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal ‘furthers the purpose evident 

in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any challenges to the trial 

court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging on the sentencing 

decision to exceptional cases.’” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 

103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 

174 L.Ed.2d 240 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 562 A.2d 

1385, 1387 (Pa.Super. 1989) (en banc) (emphasis in original)). “The 

determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated 

on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 

1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). A substantial question exists “only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions 

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the 

sentencing process.” Sierra, supra at 912-13 (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Brown, 741 A.2d 726, 735 (Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc), appeal denied, 567 

Pa. 755, 790 A.2d 1013 (2001)). 

“Generally, Pennsylvania law ‘affords the sentencing court discretion to 

impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being 
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imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. Any challenge 

to the exercise of this discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial 

question.’” Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.Super. 2011) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Pass, 914 A.2d 442, 446-47 (Pa.Super. 

2006)). See also Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 

(Pa.Super. 1995) (stating defendant is not entitled to “volume discount” for 

his crimes by having all sentences run concurrently). But see 

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 957 A.2d 1198 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal 

denied, 602 Pa. 662, 980 A.2d 605 (2009) (holding consecutive, standard 

range sentences on thirty-seven counts of petty theft offenses for 

aggregate sentence of 581⁄2 to 124 years’ imprisonment constituted virtual 

life sentence and was so manifestly excessive as to raise substantial 

question). “Thus, in our view, the key to resolving the preliminary 

substantial question inquiry is whether the decision to sentence 

consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face 

to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct at issue in the case.” 

Prisk, supra at 533. But see Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d 798 

(Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 692, 77 A.3d 1258 (holding that 

challenge to imposition of consecutive sentences, which yields extensive 

aggregate sentence, does not necessarily present substantial question as to 

discretionary aspects of sentencing, unless court’s exercise of discretion led 

to sentence grossly incongruent with criminal conduct at issue and patently 
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unreasonable). 

On appeal, this Court will not disturb the judgment of the sentencing 

court absent an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 

843 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

[A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of 

judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused 

its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment 

exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In more expansive 

terms, our Court recently offered: An abuse of discretion 

may not be found merely because an appellate court might 

have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result 

of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly 

erroneous. 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 564, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (2007) 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Where the sentencing 

court imposes a sentence within the guideline range, we must review to 

determine whether the trial court’s sentence is ‘clearly unreasonable.’” 

Dodge, supra at 1200 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2)). 

Instantly, Appellant failed to object to his sentence at imposition or to 

file a post-sentence motion. Therefore, Appellant waived his challenge to 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Mann, supra. Moreover, 

assuming without deciding Appellant’s claim even raises a substantial 

question, the trial court explained its sentencing decision as follows:

The evidence introduced at trial established that Appellant 

drove his car through a crowd of children, injuring several 

of them severely. Despite warning cries from assembled 

neighbors, Appellant drove through a blocked-off street 
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and into the crowd. When stopped by concerned citizens 

and an off-duty police officer, [Appellant] threatened them 

with a hatchet until physically restrained. The evidence 

further showed that Appellant had forty-two (42) 

nanograms of PCP in his bloodstream.... 

At trial, Appellant did not admit responsibility for his 

actions and instead testified that he had suffered ministrokes in 2011 and heart attacks in 2009 and 2010 as a 

result of pulmonary artery narrowing, and that, on the day 

of the incident, he suffered another mini-stroke while 

driving. He testified he did not remember anything from 

the time he began driving until the time he woke up in the 

hospital. He testified that although he had taken PCP 

three (3) days prior to the incident, he had not taken PCP 

on the day of the incident. Appellant testified that 

although he had a drug problem “for years...no one tried to 

help [him].” However, the only evidence of his strokes in 

the medical records provided to the [c]ourt were selfreported by Appellant himself. 

At sentencing, this [c]ourt heard evidence that Appellant 

had had a difficult childhood and suffered from years of 

drug addiction. Appellant had a prior record score of four 

(4) and two convictions for selling drugs, as well as arrests 

for violations of Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) orders and 

for aggravated assault. He was first arrested at age fifteen 

(15) and at the time of trial, was fifty-six (56) years old. 

Appellant suffered from uncontrolled blood pressure, 

coronary and peripheral artery disease, chest pain, heart 

palpitations, hernias and foot ulcers. Appellant argued 

that his actions on that day were an aberration brought on 

by stroke symptoms, despite the fact that he had also 

ingested PCP and admitted to ingesting PCP. 

However, this [c]ourt also heard testimony from Andre 

Clark’s family regarding the effects the accident had on his 

life. He no longer enjoys going out and playing, and is 

mocked because he is slower physically than other children 

and “in other ways.” The family noted that Appellant had 

not shown any remorse throughout the entire court case. 

This [c]ourt also heard Appellant’s allocution, in which he 

stated that he was sorry, but also that he did not 

understand what PCP and pulmonary artery disease had 
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been doing to his body. However, despite his apologies, 

he still insisted that he had not used PCP on the day of the 

incident and that he had suffered a stroke while driving. 

In fashioning Appellant’s sentence, this [c]ourt considered 

all of the testimony and evidence offered, including the 

pre-sentence investigation report and mental health 

evaluation, and took note that neighbors yelled at 

Appellant to slow and stop, and he ignored these 

warnings; the injuries and lasting effects suffered by the 

four (4) child victims who had been hospitalized; Appellant 

swinging a hatchet at a police officer; and that the only 

reason Appellant stopped was because his car was forcibly 

rammed by Officer Ross. This [c]ourt found that 

Appellant’s drug abuse had spiraled out of control to such 

a point that the community was not safe from him; 

Appellant’s lengthy criminal record was concerning; and 

that Appellant[] needed rehabilitation, but such 

rehabilitation could not be effectuated outside of a prison. 

Thus, Appellant’s sentence of nineteen (19) to thirty-eight 

(38) [years’ incarceration] was appropriate considering the 

gravity of his offense, his history of addiction and need for 

rehabilitation, and the need to protect the community, and 

this [c]ourt did not abuse its discretion. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed December 3, 2014, at 11-12). The record shows 

the court appropriately considered the relevant sentencing factors and 

thoroughly detailed its reasons for the sentence imposed, including the 

violent nature of the crimes against multiple victims and Appellant’s history 

of criminal activity and drug abuse. Thus, even if Appellant had properly 

preserved his sentencing challenge and raised a substantial question, we 

would see no grounds to disturb Appellant’s standard range sentences. See 

Walls, supra; Dodge, supra. Accordingly, we affirm. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/9/2015